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

An Introduction to Political Behavior

POLSBY • DENTLER • SMITH

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

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

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To Linda,

Helen,

and Joyce

PREFACE

For some time, each of us has felt a need for a book in which the developing area of intellectual life that is sometimes styled "political behavior" put its best foot forward to our students. We hope the present book serves to introduce them to the study of political behavior by suggesting some of the variety and vitality of the field, by showing how political behavior studies go about advancing knowledge, and by indicating some of the major findings about political life that have been expressed in these studies.

The major premise, we suppose, which undergirds the entire study of political behavior is simply that political life is but one kind — a most interesting kind — of social life. As men come together and relate to one another in a variety of ways, they develop practices of all kinds. Human societies are thus characterized by reasonably stable practices relating to kinship, the production and exchange of goods, the division of labor and numerous other activities, including activities which can be regarded as political, such as the settlement of conflicts and the collective determination of policy for large numbers of people. The quest for laws describing accurately the political activities of men can, we think, be greatly enriched by continuous attention to laws which are being developed and tested and which describe men in other aspects of their lives.

As in any book of readings, we as editors accepted the task of including some articles and excluding others, perhaps equally good. It may be useful, therefore, to mention some of the criteria which guided us. Every reading in this book has been selected to make a pedagogical point of one kind or another. The particular points involved are mentioned in the essays introducing each chapter. We have worked hard to keep to a minimum articles whose main virtue was that they stated succinctly points of view which we would have been inclined to attack. When we could, we put in hard-to-find articles in preference to readily available ones. In several cases, we were fortunate in attracting previously unpublished works which we thought said some things that needed saying better than anything we had seen in print.

Social science is a collective enterprise, as this book should make clear. This has been a collaborative effort, not only among three editors of widely differing backgrounds, tastes and temperaments, but also between us and each of the authors whose work is reprinted here. We want to thank them, and their publishers, for allowing us to republish their work in this format. We also want to thank

Dayton D. McKean, Richard N. Clark and Stuart Cleveland who, in behalf of our own publisher, gave us encouragement and assistance in the development and completion of this book. Unhappily, Stuart Cleveland, to whom we turned so often for his kindly, perceptive guidance, died suddenly as this book went to press. If the substantial increment of clarity and refinement that he brought to this book contributes a mite to our readers' enlightenment and enjoyment, we feel that his memory will have been saluted in a way that he, as scholar and editor, would have approved.

Other colleagues and friends whose advice we leaned upon include Fred I. Greenstein, Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Dennis H. Wrong, Alfred Diamant, Winifred Armstrong, H. Douglas Price, Aaron B. Wildavsky, Leon D. Epstein, Eugene N. Feingold, Harold A. Fletcher, Howard R. Burkle, Robert Adams, Peter H. Rossi, Phillips Cutright, and Bernard C. Cohen. Invaluable assistance was also rendered by Jeananne Reister and by Diane Hantak, whose services were made possible through a Ford Foundation grant to Wesleyan University. None of these should be held responsible for inclusions, exclusions or errors, however. Each of the editors, furthermore, happily accepts credit for the merits of this work; complaints may properly be directed to the other two.

N. W. P.
R. A. D.
P. A. S.

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1

A Brief Introduction to the Scientific Study of Political Behavior

This is a book about two subjects. It is organized so as to give the reader a fairly systematic view of what the scientific study of politics is like, but it is mainly about politics. Advocates of the scientific study of politics often misrepresent themselves, we think, by being long on promises and short on payoffs. In this book, we are going to try to reverse the emphasis.

What is our purpose in presenting a book on the scientific study of politics? We believe, first, that many people misunderstand how science works, especially in the study of human behavior. Second, the history of intellectual progress shows, beyond any reasonable doubt, that in most areas of inquiry to which it has been applied, science has proved extraordinarily useful in helping men understand the world around them. Living, as we do, in times made dangerous by the operations of politics, we believe it is important to explore every avenue to political knowledge and especially to explore an approach which has improved the state of knowledge so dramatically in other fields of study. Finally, we confess that another reason for putting this book together was to rescue from undeserved obscurity some fine analyses of politics. Not all the articles reprinted here are "fugitive" pieces; in fact, some are justly famous among social scientists.

To the reader unacquainted with the whimsies of historical circumstance, it may seem odd that we do not refer to "the scientific study of politics" as "political science." Curiously, the two are not synonymous. The "science" in political science comes from a previous usage of the term, when to be "scientific" in human affairs meant finding a course of action which would maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Utilitarian philosophers believed that a program could be devised which would maximize pleasure and minimize pain for entire societies, and the search for this "most rational" combination of policies became known as "political science."

This aspiration was an early casualty of the twentieth century, though dim echoes

of utilitarian optimism can be detected in some political scientists today. Nowadays, the term "political science" stands for a mélange of disciplines, all connected somehow with the operations of governments, or of people acting in relation to governments. And political "scientists" in the modern, up-to-date, everyday sense of the word science, are often referred to as political "behaviorists" — despite the ironic fact that non-"behavioral" political scientists study human behavior too, though not so scientifically.

One way to tell a political behaviorist from another kind of political scientist is, as one might expect, by his use of certain scientific paraphernalia, which we will describe later. But obviously, no hard and fast line can be drawn between those who are and those who are not behaviorists on this basis, because people can, and do, use scientific methods part of the time. In fact, there are even a few members of the political science profession who do political behavior studies on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and spend their off-days taking pot shots at "behaviorism."

Such virtuosity could exist only in an extremely permissive and heterogeneous discipline, as present-day political science certainly is. We can think of at least five kinds of political science presently being taught and studied under that name by different people, and it may be well to indicate what some of these alternatives are, in part to "locate" the readings in this book within the field of political science, and in part to suggest the range and vitality of approaches to the study of politics presently camped under the hospitable umbrella of "political science."

We should begin by apologizing that there are only five alternatives in our classification. Few political scientists we know would feel altogether happy with such a meager smörgåsbord to choose from. But, allowing for straddlers, hybrids, part-timers, and mavericks, we are content to identify (1) political theologians, (2) political historians, (3) political engineers, (4) political anecdotalists, and (5) political behaviorists. All differ markedly in their intellectual concerns, in the audiences they write for, in the things they read, and in the goals they have set for themselves.

Political theology is concerned with such questions as "How should men live together?", "What is a good man?", and "What is a good society?" Theologians formulate and defend answers to questions such as these. They tend to enter into dialogue with others concerned with the same questions, such as theologians and philosophers not attached to political science departments. The political theologian does not necessarily seek ways and means of bringing about the good society; he is rather, concerned to justify his values as the "correct" ones.

The political historian seeks factual information. One form of history popular with political scientists is intellectual history, in which the historiographic craft of circumstantial reconstruction is coupled with the delicate art of literary criticism. The speculations of political thinkers of bygone days are recreated, traced to their sources, clarified, criticized, followed from country to country and from incarnation to incarnation. Another equally honorable branch of political historiography concerns the doings and decrees of jurists. Still another branch traces the fortunes of nations through wars, treaties, alliances, and still more wars. A mixed bag of historians, philosophers, *littérateurs*, lawyers, and diplomatists form the professional audience for these political scientists. Their task is to discover and describe the past.

The task of the political engineer is to reform the present. Plans for "efficiency and economy," and legal, constitutional and organizational change spring from this tradition in political science. Some political engineers define political life as a series of "problems" demanding "solutions." Public administrators and civic reformers often solicit the advice of political engineers, and so it is natural that much of the engineer's audience outside of the political science profession is made up of clients or potential clients for his services. Political engineers, unlike theologians, tend to take as given the goals of the organization they are examining and to define their task as seeking the prompt fulfillment of these goals, through the elimination of practices they have in their collective experience come to regard as obstacles.

Many political engineers appear to be intent on remaking the world so that it would conform with an ideology in which "scientific management" ushers in a millenium of "clean" government "in the public interest," but not all engineers share these utopian sentiments. Aside from a tendency to ally themselves with reform movements in local politics, engineers seem to be diverse in their political sympathies, and, on the whole, unfavorably disposed with about equal fervor toward all political parties. Their political orientations seem to run toward a vaguely populistic anti-bossism rather than toward any elaborate version of socialism. This may be a peculiarly American phenomenon, to have a group of professionals deeply concerned with politics who view most major questions of value and preference in civil life as for all practical purposes "settled" by an underlying consensus. Surely, such a view would be totally untenable in any of the more clearly stratified or otherwise divided nations of the world. But it remains the fact that for at least one sizable group of American political scientists, the major professional questions revolve around the technical adjustment of social machinery to arrive at ends of unexamined and unquestioned general goodness.

Under the rubric of anecdotalists we classify those who are, in the main, historians of the present. These political scientists see as their goal the reconstruction of "what happened." This branch of political science bears the closest resemblance to journalism, of an especially comprehensive and responsible kind, and in fact many of the most skilled political anecdotalists find themselves in great demand as reviewers of books, as writers for popular magazines and Sunday supplements, and as authors of speeches and publicity for political leaders. At their best, political anecdotalists serve the function of communicating to "general" publics valuable information concerning political developments much in the public eye.

Other political scientists sometimes take a dim view of the work of anecdotalists on the grounds that the felicity of their phrasemaking often conceals from the untrained eye the extent to which nothing is really known about a particular topic. It is fair to say that anecdotalists sometimes make new slogans from old saws without improving the state of knowledge, but the fact that old saws are often the best information the anecdotalist has to work with in diffusing knowledge to "gentle readers" in the literate population is everybody's calamity. It is the responsibility of all political scientists to make repairs, where they can.

One facet of the anecdotalist's art escapes the above criticism. This is the rather widespread preoccupation among political scientists with describing rather minutely "case studies" of political or governmental events. These studies, addressed alike to students and to professional audiences, are rich in atmospheric detail, and give a

"feel" for politics which is pedagogically useful. Some political scientists feel that the professional value of these studies is somewhat attenuated, however, because of what could almost be described as a storage problem. As more and more case studies are written, readers are overwhelmed by details. Case writers and anecdotalists often resist the codification of their findings in any but the most primitive ways, however. For them, it is those qualities of events which are historically unique that are most salient, and the inevitable distortion of individual cases, no matter how slight, which makes it possible to summarize or generalize from them in some fashion, occasionally brings anecdotalists pain.[1]

Political behaviorists are often the bringers of pain to their anecdotalist colleagues. All too often, it should be admitted, the pain inflicted on collectors of case materials far outweighs the advantages of the particular scheme in the interests of which examples were wrenched out of context. But it is not necessary for us to apologize more than this. Though we believe this book will give them small comfort, those who seek examples of "bad" political behavior research will not have to look far.

Since this entire book is in part an attempt to describe the concerns and activities of political behaviorists, we shall need only to make a brief first approximation here. On the whole, political behaviorists can be distinguished from their fellow political scientists by the close attention they are apt to pay to what is going on in one or more of the other social sciences: social psychology, psychiatry, sociology, economics, and anthropology. Political behaviorists often "borrow" insights used by writers in these disciplines for use in political analysis. Occasionally, social scientists from other fields execute studies of political behavior, and political behaviorists are the most likely of all political scientists to be attentive to these contributions.[2]

A second characteristic of political behaviorists is, as we have said, their attempt to explain political events "scientifically." Let us move, then, to a brief description of what is meant by a "scientific" approach to the study of politics.

"Science" is in one sense a way of organizing information, in another a series of directives about how to proceed in gaining new knowledge, in another a social institution embracing many members who have a special code of behavior. When knowledge about a particular subject matter is organized "scientifically," when new knowledge about the subject is gathered according to "scientific" rules, and when students of the subject obey the "scientific" code of professional behavior, we call the *subject matter* a "science." From this definition, it is clear that there is nothing *inherently* "scientific" about energy and matter, or the sun and the stars, or voting statistics, or traffic jams. These subjects become "scientific" when we study them scientifically.

One underlying principle of the scientific approach is the search for similarities.

[1] Some foundations which sponsor the writing of case studies are beginning to awaken to this problem. They continue to sponsor case studies, however, and have not, so far as we are aware, offered comparable incentives to students who want to summarize or generalize from them. The time may not be far off when this occurs, since it is not uncommon for the performance of scholars to lag a bit behind the ambitions of the agencies that sponsor them.

[2] An analogous situation exists within each of the other branches of the discipline: when historians write political history, political scientists with a historical bent are their most attentive audience. When theologians speak of politics, political theologians are likely to be listening. And so on.

Most scientists will gladly grant that there is something unique and unrepeated in every single event, but, for most purposes, we can conveniently ignore the unique properties and concentrate on similarities. Every snowflake apparently has a unique design, but all snowflakes are formed and fall under similar circumstances. For many excellent reasons, the meteorologist concentrates on the latter problem, without prejudice to the former. We all recognize that there are *some* things which are similar about events that repeat themselves: the seasonal behavior of the physical environment and the life cycle of living creatures are two repetitive phenomena which early impressed themselves upon men, and apparently led to the speculation and experimentation which were the ancestors of modern science.

In science, the search for similarities expresses itself in two ways: in the activities of classification and of deduction. When the scientist classifies, he groups things or events according to some element which he supposes they have in common. When he deduces, he observes that a particular event has elements which include it in some general class of events.

The grounds for making particular classifications or deductions are purely heuristic — matters of convenience depending on what sorts of statements one wants to make about the world.

Which brings us to our second characteristic of science. It refers to the "real world." The meaning of this is that scientists deal with things and events which more than one competent observer can "see" and report on. "Seeing" of course refers to all the physical senses, and to extensions of the physical senses such as telescopes, radar, and photographic plates. It is possible to classify angels, and to engage in debate about their behavior, but the generally agreed-upon difficulty of observing them or verifying the consequences of their behavior has forestalled scientific advance on the subject.

Scientific statements concern the realm of what "is" and "is not." Now there are obviously many statements well worth making which are not statements of this kind. Statements such as "I believe," or "I prefer," or "men should," or something of the sort are not scientific statements, because they refer not to the existence or non-existence of an empirical state of affairs but to someone's desire or preference. Now insofar as desires or preferences exist or do not exist in the sight of competent observers, they can be treated as "empirical" states of affairs. It is easy to see that "Irving Berlin likes Ike" is an empirical statement, but whether men ought to like Ike or not, science cannot say.

Science, then, seeks to identify repeated characteristics in events which may be observed with the senses and their extensions. These features of science are well known, but they only begin to explain why science has been found to be such an efficient and powerful organizer of information. The key to the success of science lies in the special relations between the general and the particular which this method of organizing information allows. This special relation obtains in deductive systems especially, where numerous particular statements are implied by statements of great generality. In other words, a great many statements are interdependent in a reasonably elaborate deductive system. They are made interdependent by the rules of logic, or of grammar or of mathematics, which men have agreed for the sake of convenience to use in communicating with one another.

The usefulness of an interdependent set of statements is manifold. First and

most obviously, it orders many seemingly disparate observations. Second, it makes indirect tests of the validity of a given statement possible. Third, it helps to answer the gnawing question "so what?" which political scientists occasionally ask of their own and one another's work.

Many major propositions in physical and social science are not easily tested directly, and so indirect tests are deduced. We can not observe the earth moving around the sun from a fixed third position, but we can figure out tests which would come out in a certain way if this were true, and would come out some other way if it were false. So also with social behavior. An example of this might well be Aristotle's famous dictum holding that the stability of a regime depends on its acceptance by the middle class. *Direct* measures of the operative terms "stability" and "acceptance" are by no means simple to concoct, nor would they be likely to command confidence. Let us make approximations: "stability" means persistence through time; "regime" means a particular constitutional order (*not* a particular ruling group). We can think of many modern instances where "regimes" have fallen: the Weimar Republic, the Fourth Republic of France, the Spanish Republic, the dictatorships of Hitler, Péron, Mussolini, and Batista, the monarchies of Russia, Prussia, Italy, and Spain, and so on. Most of the changes seem to have come about by the intervention of external armies. But ruling these cases out, let us assume that a loss of confidence in the regime is in some sense registered at the polls, by non-voting or by voting for parties and candidates opposed to the constitutional order. Finally, let us assume that the voting of the various classes can be distinguished by their place of residence, or by some other means. We now have a means for testing a general statement. If the stability of a regime depends upon its acceptance by the middle class, then in the election preceding the dissolution of those regimes not toppled by external armies, the middle class registered an abnormal protest vote (as compared with their previous performance and with the performance of other classes). This is clearly not a direct test of the proposition, but the finding nonetheless bears on the proposition indirectly, and provides data which would lead to its eventual acceptance or rejection.

Now as to the question, "So what?" Malicious comments from some quarters to the contrary notwithstanding, it seems plain that the statement "there are seven hundred and thirty-nine unused manhole covers" is not likely to send a social scientist very far into a fit of ecstasy. But if essentially trivial statements, referring to easily observed things, are linked in logic or experience with many other statements, then counting the trivia may be a quick and inexpensive way of finding out something of importance. Your doctor will be glad to quote you the odds on your contracting lung cancer if you will give him trivial information about how many cigarettes you smoke a day. Insurance companies give and withhold policies after finding out little more than the prospective policy-holder's age, height, and weight. Exactly what a finding "means" depends entirely upon the contents of the interdependent set of statements to which it relates. Consequently, a single finding can "mean" several things, or nothing at all.

Science is, in its second sense, a set of directives for gathering information. Just as science answers the question "So what?" in a special way, it also addresses the question "How do you know?" As we have already said, the scientific answer is "I saw." But scientists are not allowed to make this reply until they are able to

account for many alternative possibilities: that they were hallucinating, that the events they saw had nothing to do with "knowledge" claimed, that they could have misconstrued what they saw, that alternative explanations for the events seen are more plausible or parsimonious, and so on. Scientists have a healthy mistrust of their own experience and of their own common sense, and so, in search of confidence about their own conclusions, they have developed a sideline called (in the social sciences) "methodology."

"Methodology" has functions for social science akin to functions of schedule inspectors and garage mechanics in a bus company. The job of social science is to describe and explain human behavior, and the job of "methodologists" is to devise ways of increasing confidence in these descriptions and explanations.

Political scientists are most familiar with statistical analysis, which helps to increase confidence in conclusions by summarizing compactly many observations of the same thing. "Models," often confused with statistics because both employ mathematics,[3] are used primarily to clarify relations between statements, and increase confidence in conclusions by demonstrating that a given chain of reasoning adheres to formal rules of logic.

But methodology need not be so formidable or formal: the motorist who successfully challenges the accuracy of the policeman's speedometer is engaging in a methodological critique the importance of which few of us would be likely to doubt.

In our discussion so far we have been presuming that it is in fact quite easy to tell the difference between a statement asserting a state of affairs and a statement asserting a preference. But this is by no means always the case. Take the statement "Dictatorships always fail." This *could* be an empirical statement, or it could be another way of saying "I dislike dictatorships," depending upon the context. "Methodology" gives us tools to help us examine the context of a statement such as this one. Moreover, these tools can help us make a confident resolution of this ticklish problem even when — as regrettably is often the case — the author of the statement himself is confused about the extent to which his argument is empirical.

Social scientists make use of what they call a "null hypothesis" in separating empirical from non-empirical elements in ambiguous statements. If it is possible to think of conditions under which the statement "all dictatorships fail" can be negated, then the task of the scientist is greatly clarified: one makes the requisite observations and the statement is upheld or rejected on this basis. If no conditions for rejecting the statement can be specified, then the statement is not empirical.[4]

In enumerating some of the formal characteristics of social science, we have specified numerous tasks which social scientists perform. We do not want to suggest that each social scientist normally engages in the performance of each task. Rather, divisions of labor are quite customary. Some scientists spend their time in the theory-building jobs of classification and deduction. Others make observations of the world, and still others examine problems and suggest solutions to dilemmas of method.

How are these diverse tasks coordinated, if customarily they are not all per-

[3] Statistical tests are also *based* on assumptions which are put together as models.

[4] To repeat: we of course do not mean to suggest that statements of faith or preference are in themselves uninteresting or insignificant — only that they are not subject to tests of "truth" in the sense in which scientific statements are.

formed by the same scientist, in a given problem area? Some of the rules of science as a social institution provide an answer to this problem. The first such rule is a prescription that scientists should regard themselves as standing in a fiduciary relation to the information they possess. They do not own this information: it belongs in the public domain, and hence they are expected to report promptly significant findings which seem likely to aid others working on similar problems. Science is public knowledge, and hence coordination of scientific information is accomplished through the media of scientific publication, scientific meetings, and other exchanges among scholars to which a ticket of admission is interest, (often) professional qualification, and (occasionally) professional competence.

The second prescription of science as a social institution which aids in the coordination of scientific knowledge is that knowledge is perpetually open to criticism and challenge. Obviously a genius so unconventional as to be incapable of communicating his insights in terms persuasive to his colleagues will have little chance of changing the state of knowledge even if he is entirely correct.[5] Furthermore, particular explanations of the real world, "schools of thought" and special orientations find supporters among scientists who are loath to "let go" when something better comes along that threatens to put them out of date or set at naught their investment of time and energy. And so it would be incorrect to say that science is absolutely flexible, and automatically self-corrective. No human institution, thank heaven, is that. However, the norms favoring publicity and criticism work in favor of the progressive incremental improvement of scientific explanations.

Is it possible, then, to have a science of politics? What we have said so far argues strongly in the affirmative, we believe. Our reasoning is this: that "science" refers not to subject matter, but to a way of organizing information, a method of discovering and validating new knowledge, and a way of coordinating these tasks among many heads and hands and machines. We would be less than honest with our readers if we did not warn them that among political scientists this conclusion is controversial. Often the disagreement among political scientists is over the question of whether the scientific study of politics is *desirable* or not — a different but related question to be settled in the end by individuals as their tastes dictate. But whether such a study is *possible* or not — this is an empirical matter.

One obvious way to settle the question is merely to point to the readings in the rest of this book: if scientific studies of politics were not possible, then these readings could not exist. We do not propose this argument, however, because the obvious rejoinder would be "But these are not really scientific studies at all," and the debate would be reduced to the exchange of mutually incompatible definitions.

We want now to present several "objections" voiced by critics of the scientific study of politics. These objections mingle questions of fact with questions of preference since they often rest on an unspoken premise that the undesirability of social science can be demonstrated by exposing as erroneous what appear to be its claims to be scientific. Or, exposure of the undesirable consequences of social science are sometimes held to lead to the conclusion that therefore social science is not possible. Both arguments seem obviously specious to us — especially the latter one — but we do not see other grounds for mingling the two questions.

[5] This is not always the case, however. Sometimes scientists have to invent and teach new languages to express what they have on their minds — e.g., the calculus.

A final observation: Many "objections" similar to those voiced about the scientific study of politics have been raised about all the social sciences at one time or another, and for that matter, about practically every sustained effort to gather and codify knowledge about the world. There are fairly substantial, historically valid excuses for dismissing out of hand as cranky and ignorant most blanket indictments of all political behavior studies. We are choosing to treat several of these objections seriously here, mainly because we are assuming that our readers are largely unacquainted with the scientific study of politics but may be vaguely aware that the whole idea of doing such studies is controversial. Or, it is entirely possible that the reader is better informed of the case against political behavior studies than he is about these studies themselves. We begin by listing a few common objections and discussing them in turn.

1) Human behavior is too complex and too unpredictable to study scientifically. There are too many unknown factors which enter into human behavior for social science to be a true science. Social science can not predict as well as physical sciences, nor conduct experiments, and hence it is not truly science.

No one, least of all the social scientist, will deny the complexity of human beings. But all that the social scientist needs to begin his work is a certain amount of repetition in human behavior. Once people begin to repeat themselves, it becomes possible for us to speak of the conditions under which repeated behavior occurs. If many kinds of repetitions take place in social life, enough raw material is available for the construction of rather elaborate explanations having all the characteristics of scientific explanations, except that the confidence we may properly have in our conclusions is somewhat less than that enjoyed by physicists most of the time.

But do human beings repeat themselves? Of course they do — in thousands of ways. One familiar kind of repetition is with words. Educators know rather precisely which words people know and which words they do not know when their vocabularies contain 500, 1000, or 10,000 words of English. We repeat ways of dressing ourselves, of combing our hair. Many people have the same thing for breakfast every morning; many know exactly how many cigarettes they smoke each day, where they will have lunch, whom they will encounter on the way to work. Is human behavior predictable? If not, why do we blithely drive our automobiles into busy intersections when a green light faces us? We are acting on an unarticulated prediction that the drivers on the cross street will stop for the red light facing them.

The regularities of political life are also striking: people tend to vote for the same party year after year. Husbands and wives tend to vote alike; so do parents and children; so do friends. Lawyers tend to hold more public offices in the United States than elsewhere. People tend to be more attentive to political messages favoring their side than those favoring the opponent. People who are interested in politics tend to affiliate with a political party more than people who are uninterested. And so forth. The number of regularities is formidable.

Can social scientists perform experiments? It is true that we cannot manipulate our materials to the extent to which chemists and physicists are able to do so — but this inability is less of a burden than most people realize. The natural scientists' experimental laboratory is useful in large part as a device for checking the results of mental experiments which scientists construct first with pencil and paper. These

mental experiments are the product of reasoning from general theories about the behavior of molecules or materials to specific materials available in the laboratory. If Theory Z is true, goes the reasoning, *then* it follows logically that the so and so molecule will behave in so and so fashion if we do so and so to it. Whereupon the experiment is performed and the prediction of the mental experiment is confirmed or refuted.

Social scientists are not totally without experimental tools such as these. Let us suggest two experiments most readers can perform themselves. Many people believe that their telephone rings whenever they get into the bathtub. The appropriate test is obvious, and can be repeated until statistically competent bystanders can quote odds with some confidence on the likelihood of the two events coinciding.

Another experiment is almost as easy to perform. Drive a set distance through the downtown section of your community between 3 and 4 A.M. Note the time it took you to do it. Then drive the same course between 5 and 6 P.M., and note down the time. By repeating this experiment often enough, and at different hours of the day, you will be able to predict with some confidence the amount of time it will take you to travel the distance you set yourself, and under a variety of easily described conditions. You will also arrive at an excellent empirical understanding of the concept "rush hour."

"Unknown factors" enter into human behavior in both of these experiments. But we are not interested in these factors for the moment. In our mental experiment, we block out all factors extraneous to the ones we are testing, assuming only that if the unknown factors matter in our results, they will reveal themselves as the experiments are repeated again and again in real life.[6] This, of course, is the identical assumption the chemist or the physicist uses in his work.

But is this true science? It assuredly is, if by true science we mean having the same logic as natural science. The natural sciences are more successful than the social sciences in predicting the outcomes of experiments, owing to their superior theories, more precise measuring equipment, and vast superiority in the numbers of repetitions they can afford to observe. But we know no reasons why these advantages cannot in time be made up for by the diligence and imagination of social scientists.

2) I knew it all the time. Common sense is as good as social science. Anyone with any common sense is as good as a social scientist.

The trouble with common sense is that it is just a shade too common. Sometimes, the careful student of human affairs can distinguish common sense from nonsense in particular situations, but social science is, after all, simply a way of being careful about studying human affairs. Over the years, scientists have developed rules for being careful which have proved generally useful. Once in a while, social science does confirm what was already widely known. This merely proves that because something is widely known it need not be wrong. But surprisingly often, generally accepted notions about human behavior and social life *are* wrong, when they are examined carefully.

Many people have observed that social scientists, who are supposed to be in

[6] See Chapter 7 for an account of several kinds of political experiments

possession of so much arcane and powerful knowledge, are in fact no more socially competent than anyone else. Why? There are many answers to this. First, *some* social scientists, we have no doubt, in fact *are* more socially competent than they would be if they had no professional knowledge of society. Some economists *do* make a million on the stock market; and some political scientists even win bets on elections. But this need not be the case. Our second observation is that very few people question the general efficacy of modern medicine if the doctor gets sick. High ranking army officers are not all crack marksmen, personally. The distinction we are drawing is between the private lives of people engaged in a certain occupation and their professional roles. The psychiatrist's unruly children may make us suspect the success of their upbringing, but they do not jeopardize the validity of psychoanalytic hypotheses.

There is an additional confusion, between the professional roles of members of practicing professions and the professional role of the scientist. Practicing professionals are engaged in applying current knowledge to human situations. The scientist is engaged in improving the state of current knowledge, an activity which may have little to do with the demands people make on this knowledge at any particular time. In other words, if you want to go fishing, take a fishing guide, not a marine biologist.

3) Social science can never study the things that really matter. Social scientists can only be rigorous with unimportant, trivial things, that nobody really thinks are worth bothering about.

Later on in this book there is an entire chapter given over to social science studies on matters which public policy-makers felt were very important. The question of importance is a tricky one. After all, how do we decide what is "important"? Important to whom? In spite of the fact that social scientists often define their problems narrowly, in order to handle them at all, their results often add up to findings which non-social scientists are glad to know about. Perhaps the readings in chapter eight will be persuasive on this point.

4) Social science is badly written. There is too much jargon in it.

Our first impulse is to agree, and let it go at that. None of our lay readers can possibly have suffered through so much intolerable social science writing as we have, and so we would like to suggest that they don't know the half of it. Some of our friends from other disciplines and walks of life have charitably suggested that social scientists are but little worse off than anyone else; we have seen enough bad writing in everyone else's technical literature, in income tax forms, in newspapers, on cereal boxes, even in novels to suspect this is the case. Why, then, are people especially resentful of jargon and bad writing in social science, as we believe they are?

There is a fundamental conflict of interest at the root of the problem, we believe. On the one hand, many members of the general public want to know about social life. They pick up a journal or book of social science, and are repelled by the impenetrable special vocabulary which specialists are using to communicate with one another. They are particularly unhappy at the paradox that common, every-day events should be written about in such a strange, artificial lingo.

Of course social scientists do not tell people what to read. But they appreciate

this paradox. They have good reasons for inventing new expressions in place of old ones. In part, these inventions are designed to prevent lay people from understanding them too easily. To a certain extent, it is useful and necessary that professionals speak exclusively to one another on matters of mutual scientific interest. Amateurs have a way of barging in at the wrong time, of drawing unwarranted or premature conclusions, of attracting destructive publicity. Scientists have a right to protect themselves from being the unwilling source of public misinformation, and jargon has this time-honored function in social science, as well as in the "pure" sciences and the professions.

To be sure, jargon serves to embroider triviality and to confer status on "insiders." But jargon also makes it possible for scientists to talk to one another compactly and dispassionately. Words, especially everyday words referring to social events and behavior, vibrate with overtones. They are filled with connotations and with emotional nuances, with double and triple meanings. Jargon words are used to replace everyday words so that social scientists can communicate less ambiguously with one another. Sometimes it is useful to say precisely what we mean and no more. Invented words have the advantage of newness: they are not encrusted with multiple meanings and redolent with emotions. This is all to the good when the purpose of communicating is scientific rather than polemical.

We hope that our readers will find examples of good writing in this book plentiful enough to lead them to reject the notion that social scientists are forever at war with the English language. It is an uneasy truce, perhaps, but we take comfort from the thought that we are not the only aggressors.

5) Social scientists seek to eliminate values, which cannot, in the nature of things, be eliminated. Social scientists delude themselves by claiming that they have eliminated values from social science, and insofar as they are deluded, they lose control over reality, and hence over their data.

Different critics draw this indictment differently, and perhaps we are doing them an injustice by stating it the way we have above. We believe that many charges similar to this one are based on a confusion among three things: the private policy preferences and philosophical ideas of social scientists, their professional judgments, and their scientific statements. "Values" may enter into the *lives* of social scientists in many ways, and they may be inferred by the alert observer from many of the choices the social scientist makes: from how he treats his wife and children and pets, from how he spends his time, from how he dresses, and so forth. His "values" may also be reflected in how he does his work: in how he defines problems, in how he goes about solving them, in what sorts of problems he chooses to tackle and what sorts he leaves alone, and so forth. Social scientists recognize, on the whole, that "values" enter into their lives as human beings in these and other ways. They seek merely to distinguish, for the purposes of their work, between *statements* asserting a fact and *statements* asserting a value, or preference. "The Supreme Court is composed of nine men" is, under rules of discourse adopted for convenience by virtually all civilized men, generally conceded to be a factual assertion. Men of differing opinions about the goodness or competence or impartiality of the Supreme Court can nevertheless agree with this statement. Factual statements characteristically refer to "things" or events in the real world which can

be observed with the human sensory apparatus, or extensions thereof, and are accessible to more than one competent observer. Social science does not consist wholly of factual statements, nor does it wholly exclude statements of preference, but it does distinguish for convenience rather rigorously between the two. It is in making the distinction, and in remembering the differences between the two sorts of statements, that social science apparently distresses some of its critics, but we are unable to see why this should cause such great concern.

6) Social scientists are amoral. They give us no basis for judging between cannibals and civilized men. They and their science would serve totalitarian or democratic societies with equal efficiency.

Curiously, many critics who assert that values can never be removed from social science also claim, with this final charge, that social scientists have succeeded in doing so — at least in their private lives. But we know of no evidence that this is the case. We do know of distinguished physical scientists who, apparently with equal efficiency, worked for Hitler before and during the Second World War and have been employed by the United States since. No social scientist of any stature has, to our knowledge, made a similar record.

It should be admitted, however, that the findings of social science can be employed by anyone. This is true of all knowledge. It is also true that no finding of social science of which we are aware evaluates the over-all moral superiority of cannibals in relation to "civilized" men. Some social scientists may, as private citizens, have undertaken to ascertain their own preferences on this matter, but they do not pretend to capacities greater than those of their fellow citizens to do likewise.

It occurs to us that many of the misconceptions we have been discussing arise because social science is mistakenly supposed to confer magical powers on insiders that set them apart from their neighbors, to make them immune to the usual problems of getting along with people in the every-day world, and to insulate them from personal feelings about public questions. Some social scientists, we admit, indulge themselves by smugly reporting to their fellow men that their behavior is ill-informed, or self-defeating, or ridiculous. While such conclusions are on rare occasions adequately justified by evidence and argued with scientific rigor, the posture of superiority seems to us in all charity unprofessional at all times. Even if, at intervals, a few unwary social scientists seem to be excluding themselves from the human race, and the rest of us are glad to see them go, they are, after all, merely displaying an old human failing in a new guise.

Finally, a few brief words about how this book is organized. The readings of this chapter cover in a more detailed way much of the material discussed so far. Dahl traces the history of the "behavioral" approach to the study of politics. Goldberg discusses the sense in which political science is scientific. Deutsch and Lazarsfeld give reasons why "scientific" explanations of social behavior are often more useful than the simple application of common sense, and the delightful little story by Robert Coates indicates the extent to which we in our everyday lives depend upon regularities in human behavior of which we are scarcely aware.

Sunday supplements and slick magazines have in this country taken an ignorant and irresponsible stance with regard to social science in general, a position typified

by Russell Kirk's essay in the *New York Times Magazine*. The "equal time" given Robert K. Merton is also reprinted here. Merton is, of course, put in the impossible position of having to describe a great range of disciplines, "defend" their right to exist, and also expose the irrelevancies of the Kirk article. We reprint Kirk in order to show that the manufacture of canards about social science is an on-going industry with a small but avid market. No matter how tiresome, the canards must be dealt with. Merton does as well as any in this dreary task, but it should be noted that medical scientists are not likely to display much of their more recent knowledge if we ask them to refute the existence of the four humors.

Chapter Two discusses "scientific" political theory, how it is built and how it is used. The chapter following that examines ways in which people relate to politics, and attempts to show how the different identities people inherit or adopt change the ways in which they orient themselves to political life. In Chapter Four we take up the description of the process of political decision-making, with special emphasis on the theories of limited rationality, choice under conditions of uncertainty and incrementalism which seem most adequate in explaining decision-making in several American political settings.

The fifth chapter once again focuses primarily upon American materials and attempts to illustrate typical relations between political leaders and non-leaders by describing the organization of the political parties, the relations between candidates and electorates, and the relations between congressmen and their constituents. Chapter Six illustrates ways in which various theories of political behavior can illuminate the politics of other countries. Theories about the prerequisites of a stable democratic political order, and about interest group activity in governmental decision-making are used for this purpose.

In Chapter Seven, we deal with recent issues and innovations in methods of research, including the uses of the interview, simulation and experimentation, and scale analysis in the study of politics. The last chapter discusses four functions which the scientific study of politics can perform for policy makers. Policy scientists anticipate and invent alternatives for policy makers to consider, clarify their factual bases for choice, create special techniques for policy makers to use in collecting information, and identify and redefine new political problems as they appear.

1

THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest

• ROBERT A. DAHL

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the "behavioral approach" in political science is the ambiguity of the term itself, and of its synonym "political behavior." The behavioral approach, in fact, is rather like the Loch Ness monster: one can say with considerable confidence what it is not, but it is difficult to say what it *is*. Judging from newspaper reports that appear from time to time, particularly just before the summer tourist season, I judge that the monster of Loch Ness is not Moby Dick, nor my daughter's goldfish that disappeared down the drain some ten years ago, nor even a misplaced American eight heading for the Henley Regatta. In the same spirit, I judge that the behavioral approach is not that of the speculative philosopher, the historian, the legalist, or the moralist. What, then, is it? Indeed, does it actually exist?

I

Although I do not profess to know of the full history of the behavioral approach, a little investigation reveals that confusing and even contradictory interpretations have marked its appearance from the beginning. The first sightings in the roily waters of political science of the phenomenon variously called political behavioral approach, or behavioral(ist) research, evidently occurred in the 1920s. The term "political behavior," it seems, was used by American political scientists from the First World War onward.[1] The honor of first adopting the term as a book title seems to belong, however, not to a political scientist but to the American journalist Frank Kent, who published a book in 1928 entitled *Political Behavior. The Heretofore Unwritten Laws, Customs, and Principles of Politics as Practised in the United States*.[2] To Kent, the study of political behavior meant the cynical "realism" of the tough-minded newspaperman who reports the way things "really" happen and not the way they're supposed to happen. This meaning, I may say, is often implied even today. However, Herbert Tingsten rescued the term for political science in 1937 by publishing his path-breaking *Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics*. Despite the fact that Tingsten was a Swede, and his work dealt with European elections, the term became increasingly identified with American political science.

The rapid flowering of the behavioral approach in the United States no doubt depended on the existence of some key attitudes and predispositions generated in the American culture — pragmatism, factmindedness, confidence in science, and the like.[3] But there were also at least six specific, interrelated, quite powerful stimuli.

One was Charles E. Merriam. In his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1925, Merriam said:

> Some day we may take another angle of approach *than the formal, as other sciences do*, and begin to look at *political behavior* as one of the essential objects of inquiry.[4]

Reprinted by permission from the *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 55 (December, 1961), 763–772. A paper presented at the Fifth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Paris, September 26, 1961.

[1] David Easton, *The Political System* (1953), p. 203.

[2] Kent's earlier book, *The Great Game of Politics* (1924), made no pretence of being systematic and continued to be widely read by students of American politics, but within a few years *Political Behavior* fell into an obscurity from which it has never recovered.

[3] *Cf.* Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics, Its Origins and Conditions* (London, 1959).

[4] "Progress in Political Research," this *Review*, Vol. 20 (February, 1926), p. 7, quoted in David B. Truman, "The Implications of Political Behavior Research," *Items* (Social Science Research Council, December, 1951), p. 37. Emphasis added.

During the next decade under Merriam's leadership at the University of Chicago, the Department of Political Science was the center of what would later have been called the behavioral approach. A number of the political scientists who subsequently were widely regarded as leaders in introducing that approach into American political science were faculty members or graduate students there: for example, Harold Lasswell as a faculty member and V. O. Key, Jr., David Truman, Herbert Simon, and Gabriel Almond, all graduate students in Merriam's department before the Second World War. Chicago was not the only place where the new mood of scientific empiricism was strong. At Cornell University, for example, G. E. G. Catlin was expounding similar views.[5] But the collective impact of "the Chicago school" as it was sometimes called, was greater than that of a single scholar.

A second force was the arrival in the United States in the 1930s of a considerable number of European scholars, particularly German refugees, who brought with them a sociological approach to politics that strongly reflected the specific influence of Max Weber and the general influence of European sociology. American political science had always been strongly influenced by Europeans. Not only have Americans often interpreted their own political institutions most clearly with the aid of sympathetic foreigners like de Tocqueville, Bryce, and Brogan, but American scholars have owed specific debts to European scholarship. The first American university chair in political science (actually in History and Political Science), established in 1858 at Columbia, was occupied by the liberal German refugee Francis Lieber. In the second half of the nineteenth century, many of the leading academic advocates of a "science of politics" sought to profit from the methods and teachings in some of the leading European universities.[6]

In the 1930s, there was once again an abrupt revival of European influences as the life of American universities was enriched by the great influx of refugee scholars.

A number of these scholars who came to occupy leading positions in departments of sociology and political science insisted on the relevance of sociological and even psychological theories for an understanding of politics. They drew attention to the importance of Marx, Durkheim, Freud, Pareto, Mosca, Weber, Michels and others. Although some of them might later reject the behavioral approach precisely because they felt it was too narrow, men like Franz Neumann, Sigmund Neumann, Paul Lazarsfeld, Hans Speier, Hans Gerth, Reinhard Bendix and many others exerted, both directly and indirectly, a profound influence on political research in the United States. Political sociology began to flourish. Political scientists discovered that their sociological colleagues were moving with speed and skill into areas they had long regarded as their own.

The Second World War also stimulated the development of the behavioral approach in the United States, for a great many American political scientists temporarily vacated their ivory towers and came to grips with day-to-day political and administrative realities in Washington and elsewhere: a whole generation of American political science later drew on these experiences. The confrontation of theory and reality provoked, in most of the men who performed their stint in Washington or elsewhere, a strong sense of the inadequacies of the conventional approaches of political science for describing reality, much less for predicting in any given situation what was likely to happen.

Possibly an even bigger impetus — not unrelated to the effects of the War — was provided by the Social Science Research Council, which has had an unostentatious but cumulatively enormous impact on American social science. A leading spirit in the Council for the past two decades has been a distinguished political scientist, E. Pendleton Herring. His own work before he assumed the presidency of the Council in 1948 reflected a concern for realism, for

[5] See Catlin's *Science and Method of Politics* (1927). Another early example of the behavioral approach was Stuart Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (1928). Rice had received his Ph.D. at Columbia University.

[6] *Cf.* Bernard Crick, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–31. Crick notes that "The Fifth Volume of the Johns Hopkins University *Studies in Historical and Political Science* published a long study, edited by Andrew D. White, 'European Schools of History and Politics' (December, 1887). It reprinted his Johns Hopkins address on 'Education in Political Science' together with reports on 'what we can learn from' each major European country." Fn. 1, p. 27.

breaking the bonds of research confined entirely to the library, and for individual and group influences on politics and administration. In the mid-1940s Herring was instrumental in creating an SSRC committee on political behavior. The Annual Report of the SSRC for 1944–45 indicated that the Council had reached a

> . . . decision to explore the feasibility of developing a new approach to *the study of political behavior*. Focused upon *the behavior of individuals* in political situations, this approach calls for examination of the political relationships of men — as citizens, administrators, and legislators — by disciplines which can throw light on the problems involved, with the object of *formulating and testing hypotheses*, concerning *uniformities of behavior* in different institutional settings. (Emphasis added.)

In 1945 the Council established a Committee on Political Behavior, with Herring as the chairman. The three other members[7] were also well known political scientists with a definite concern about the state of conventional political science. In 1949, the Council, together with the University of Michigan's Department of Political Science and its Institute for Social Research held a week's conference on Research on Political Behavior at Ann Arbor. The topics covered help to provide an implicit definition of the term: papers were presented on regional politics, the possible contributions of related social sciences (*e.g.*, George P. Murdock, the anthropologist, discussed the "Possibility of a General Social Science of Government"), voting behavior, political attitudes, groups, and methodological problems.[8]

Near the end of 1949, a new SSRC Committee on Political Behavior was appointed, with V.O. Key, Jr., as the chairman. In 1950, this committee succinctly defined its task: "The committee is concerned with the *development of theory* and *improvement in methods* which are needed if *social science research* on the *political process* is to be more effective."[9] This committee has been an active stimulant in the growth of the behavioral approach down to the present time; indeed, in recent years (under the chairmanship of David Truman) the committee has also awarded research grants.

The fifth factor was the rapid growth of the "survey" method as a tool available for the study of political choices and attitudes, and specifically of the behavior of voters. Where Tingsten had necessarily relied on aggregate voting statistics, the survey method provided direct access to the characteristics and behavior of individuals: an advantage that anyone who has ever labored with aggregate data is quick to recognize. As survey methods became more and more "scientific," particularly under the auspices of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan and the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia, political scientists found their presumed monopoly of skills in the scholarly interpretation of voting and elections rudely destroyed by sociologists and social psychologists who in a series of path-breaking studies of presidential elections began to convert the analysis of voting from impressionistic — even when it was brilliant — history or insightful journalism to a more pedestrian but occasionally more impressive and convincing empirical science. To political scientists dissatisfied with the conventional methods and manners of the discipline, the new voting studies offered encouragement. For in spite of obvious defects, the voting studies seemed to provide ground for the hope that if political scientists could only master the tools employed in the other social sciences — survey methods and statistical analysis, for example — they might be able to go beyond plausible generalities and proceed to test hypotheses about how people in fact do behave in making political choices.

A sixth factor that needs to be mentioned is the influence of those uniquely American institutions, the great philanthropic foundations — especially Carnegie, Rockefeller, and more recently Ford — which because of their enormous financial contributions to scholarly research, and the inevitable selections among competing proposals that these entail, exert a considerable effect on the scholarly community. The relationship between foundation policy and current trends in academic research is too complex for facile generalities. Perhaps the simplest accurate statement is that the relationship is to a

[7] Herbert Emmerich, Charles S. Hyneman, and V. O. Key, Jr.

[8] Alexander Heard, "Research on Political Behavior: Report of a Conference," *Items* (Social Science Research Council, December, 1949), pp. 41–44.

[9] Social Science Research Council, *Items* (June, 1950), p. 20. (Emphasis added.)

very high degree reciprocal: the staffs of the foundations are highly sensitive to the views of distinguished scholars, on whom they rely heavily for advice, and at the same time because even foundation resources are scarce, the policies of foundation staffs and trustees must inevitably encourage or facilitate some lines of research more than others. If the foundations had been hostile to the behavioral approach, there can be no doubt that it would have had very rough sledding indeed. For characteristically, behavioral research costs a good deal more than is needed by the single scholar in the library — and sometimes, as with the studies of voting in presidential elections, behavioral research is enormously expensive.

In the period after the Second World War, however, the foundations — reflecting important trends within the social sciences themselves, stimulated by the factors I have already mentioned — tended to view interdisciplinary and behavioral studies with sympathy. The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, had helped finance the pioneering panel study by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet of voting in the 1940 presidential election in Erie County, Ohio, and it has also, almost singlehandedly, financed the costly election studies of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. In the newest and richest foundation, Ford, the short-lived Behavioral Sciences Program probably increased the use and acceptability of the notion of behavioral sciences as something both more behavioral and more scientific than the social sciences (I confess the distinction still remains cloudy to me despite the earnest attempts of a number of behavioral scientists to set me straight). The most durable offshoot of the Behavioral Sciences Program at Ford is the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Palo Alto. Although the Center has often construed its domain in most catholic fashion — the "fellows" in any given year may include mathematicians, philosophers, historians, or even a novelist — in its early years the political scientists who were fellows there tended to be discontented with traditional approaches, inclined toward a more rigorously empirical and scientific study of politics, and deeply interested in learning wherever possible from the other social sciences.

All these factors, and doubtless others, came to fruition in the decade of the 1950s. The behavioral approach grew from the deviant and unpopular views of a minor sect into a major influence. Many of the radicals of the 1930s (professionally speaking) had, within two decades, become established leaders in American political science.

Today, many American departments of political science (including my own) offer undergraduate or graduate courses in Political Behavior. Indeed, in at least one institution (the University of Michigan) Political Behavior is not only a course but a field of graduate study parallel with such conventional fields as political theory, public administration, and the like — and recently buttressed, I note enviously, with some fat fellowships.

The presidency of the American Political Science Association furnishes a convenient symbol of the change. From 1927, when Merriam was elected president, until 1950, none of the presidents was prominently identified as an advocate of the behavioral approach. The election of Peter Odegard in 1950 might be regarded as the turning point. Since that time, the presidency has been occupied by one of Merriam's most brilliant and intellectually unconventional students, Harold Lasswell, and by three of the four members of the first SSRC Committee on Political Behavior.

Thus the revolutionary sectarians have found themselves, perhaps more rapidly than they thought possible, becoming members of the Establishment.

II

I have not, however, answered the nagging question I set out to answer, though perhaps I have furnished some materials from which an answer might be derived. What *is* the behavioral approach in political science?

Historically speaking, the behavioral approach was a protest movement within political science. Through usage by partisans, partly as an epithet, terms like political behavior and the behavioral approach came to be associated with a number of political scientists, mainly Americans, who shared a strong sense of dissatisfaction with the achievements of conventional political science, particularly through historical, philosophical, and the descriptive-institutional approaches, and a belief that additional meth-

ods and approaches either existed or could be developed that would help to provide political science with empirical propositions and theories of a systematic sort, tested by closer, more direct and more rigorously controlled observations of political events.

At a minimum, then, those who were sometimes called "Behaviorists" or "Behavioralists" shared a mood: a mood of skepticism about the current intellectual attainments of political science, a mood of sympathy toward "scientific" modes of investigation and analysis, a mood of optimism about the possibilities of improving the study of politics.

Was — or is — the behavioral approach ever anything more than this mood? Are there perhaps definite beliefs, assumptions, methods or topics that can be identified as constituting political behavior or the behavioral approach?

There are, so far as I can tell, three different answers to this question among those who employ the term carefully. The first answer is an unequivocal yes. Political behavior is said to refer to the study of *individuals* rather than larger political units. This emphasis is clear in the 1944–45 SSRC report (which I quoted earlier) that foreshadowed the creation of the Political Behavior Committee. This was also how David Easton defined the term in his searching analysis and criticism of American political science published in 1953.[10] In this sense, Tingsten, Lasswell, and studies of voting behavior are prime examples of the behavioral approach.

The second answer is an unequivocal no. In his recent *Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis* (1960), Vernon Van Dyke remarks: "Though stipulative definitions of *political behavior* are sometimes advanced, as when a course or a book is given this title, none of them has gained general currency."[11] Probably the most eloquent and resounding "No!" was supplied three years ago by an editorial in *PROD*, a journal that some American political scientists — and many of its readers — probably regarded as the authentic spokesman for the newest currents among the *avant garde* of political behavior. As an alumnus both of Merriam's Chicago department and the SSRC Committee on Political Behavior, the editor of PROD, Alfred de Grazia, could be presumed to speak with authority. He denied that the term referred to a subject matter, an interdisciplinary focus, quantification, any specific effort at new methods, behaviorist psychology, "realism" as opposed to "idealism," empiricism in contrast with deductive systems, or voting behavior — or, in fact, to anything more than political science as something that some people might like it to be. He proposed that the term be dropped.[12]

The third view is perhaps no more than an elaboration of the mood I mentioned a moment ago. In this view the behavioral approach is an attempt to improve our understanding of politics by seeking to explain the empirical aspects of political life by means of methods, theories, and criteria of proof that are acceptable according to the canons, conventions, and assumptions of modern empirical science. In this sense, "a behavioral approach," as one writer recently observed, "is distinguished predominantly by the nature of the purpose it is designed to serve. The purpose is scientific. . . ."[13]

If we consider the behavioral approach in political science as simply an attempt to make the empirical component of the discipline more scientific, as that term is generally understood in the empirical sciences, much of the history that I have referred to falls into place. In a wise, judicious, and until very recently neglected essay entitled "The Implications of Po-

[10] "To precisely what kind of research does the concept of political behavior refer? It is clear that this term indicates that the research worker wishes to look at participants in the political system as individuals who have the emotions, prejudices, and predispositions of human beings as we know them in our daily lives. . . . Behavioral research . . . has therefore sought to elevate the actual human being to the center of attention. Its premise is that the traditionalists have been reifying institutions, virtually looking at them as entities apart from their component individuals. . . . Research workers often use the terms . . . to indicate that they are studying the political process by looking at the relation of it to the motivations, personalities, or feelings of the participants as individual human beings." David Easton, *The Political System* (1953), pp. 201–205.

[11] As we shall see, Van Dyke distinguishes the term "behavioral approach" from "political behavior."

[12] "What is Political Behavior?" *PROD*, July, 1958.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

litical Behavior Research," David Truman, writing in 1951, set out the fruits of a seminar on political behavior research held at the University of Chicago in the summer of 1951. I think it is not misleading to say that the views Truman set forth in 1951 have been shared in the years since then by the members of the Committee on Political Behavior.

> Roughly defined, [he wrote] the term political behavior comprehends those actions and interactions of men and groups which are involved in the process of governing. . . . At the maximum this conception brings under the rubric of political behavior any human activities which can be said to be a part of governing.
>
> Properly speaking, political behavior is not a "field" of social science; it is not even a "field" of political science.
>
> . . . Political behavior is not and should not be a specialty, for it represents rather an orientation or a point of view which aims at *stating all the phenomena of government in terms of the observed and observable behavior of men.* To treat it as a "field" coordinate with (and presumably isolated from) public law, state and local government, international relations, and so on, would be to defeat its major aim. That aim includes an eventual reworking and extension of most of the conventional "fields" of political science . . .
>
> The developments underlying the current interest in political behavior imply two basic requirements for adequate research. In the first place, research must be systematic. . . . This means that research must grow out of a precise statement of hypotheses and a rigorous ordering of evidence. . . . In the second place, research in political behavior must place primary emphasis upon empirical methods. . . . Crude empiricism, unguided by adequate theory, is almost certain to be sterile. Equally fruitless is speculation which is not or cannot be put to empirical test.
>
> . . . *The ultimate goal of the student of political behavior is the development of a science of the process* . . . .[14]

Truman called attention to the advantages of drawing on the other social sciences and cautioned against indiscriminate borrowings. He argued that the "political behavior orientation . . . necessarily aims at being quantitative wherever possible. But . . . the student of political behavior . . . deals with the political institution and he is obliged to perform his task in *quantitative terms if he can and in qualitative terms if he must.*" (Emphasis added). He agreed that "inquiry into how men *ought* to act is not a concern of research in political behavior" but insisted on the importance of studying values as "obviously important determinants of men's behavior."

> Moreover, in political behavior research, as in the natural sciences, the values of the investigator are important in the selection of the objects and lines of inquiry. . . . A major reason for any inquiry into political behavior is to discover uniformities, and through discovering them to be better able to indicate the consequences of such patterns and of public policy, existing or proposed, for the maintenance or development of a preferred system of political values.

Truman denied that "the political behavior orientation implies a rejection of historical knowledge . . . Historical knowledge is likely to be an essential supplement to contemporary observation of political behavior." Finally, while suggesting that the conventional graduate training of political scientists needed to be supplemented and modified, Truman emphatically opposed the notion that the behavioral approach required "the elimination of . . . traditional training."

> Any new departure in an established discipline must build upon the accomplishments of the past. Although much of the existing literature of politics may be impressionistic, it is extensive and rich in insights. Without a command of the significant portions of that literature, behavioral research . . . is likely to be naive and unproductive. . . . Many attempts made by persons not familiar with the unsystematized facts [have been] substantively naive even when they may have been methodologically sound.

I have cited Truman's views at length for several reasons: because I wholeheartedly agree with them; because they were expressed a decade ago when the advocates of the behavioral approach were still searching for acceptance and self-definition; because they have been neglected; and because I believe that if the partisans and critics of "political behavior" and "the behavioral approach" had read them, understood them, and accepted them as a proper statement of objectives, much of the irrelevant, fruitless, and ill-informed debate

[14] Social Science Research Council, *Items* (December, 1951), pp. 37–39. (Emphasis added.)

over the behavioral approach over the past decade need never have occurred — or at any rate might have been conducted on a rather higher level of intellectual sophistication.

III

Thus the "behavioral approach" might better be called the "behavioral mood" or perhaps even the "scientific outlook."

Yet to explain the behavioral approach as nothing more or less than an emphasis on the term "science" in the phrase "political science" leaves unanswered whatever questions may be raised as to the present or potential achievements of this mood of protest, skepticism, reform, and optimism. Fortunately, there is an element of self-correction in intellectual life. The attempt to increase the scientific competence of political studies will inevitably be judged by results. And the judges of the next generation will share the skepticism of the past. If closer attention to methodological niceties, to problems of observation and verification, to the task of giving operational meaning to political concepts, to quantification and testing, to eliminating unproductive intervening variables, to sources of data, hypotheses, and theory in the other social sciences; if all of these activities do not yield explanations of some important aspects of politics that are more thoroughly verified, less open to methodological objections, richer in implications for further explanation, and more useful in meeting the perennial problems of political life than the explanations they are intended to replace; if, in short, the results of a scientific outlook do not measure up to the standards that serious students of politics have always attempted to apply, then we may confidently expect that the attempt to build an empirical science of politics will lose all the impetus in the next generation that it gained in the last.

The representatives of the "scientific outlook" are, it seems to me, right in saying that it is a little early to appraise the results. We shall need another generation of work before we can put the products of this new mood and outlook in political science in perspective. Nonetheless, I believe it may be useful to make a tentative if deliberately incomplete assessment.

The oldest and best example of the modern scientific outlook at work is to be found in studies of voting behavior using survey methods. These begin with *The People's Choice*,[15] a study of the 1940 presidential election first published in 1944, and end — for the moment at least — with the magnificent study of the 1956 election entitled *The American Voter*.[16] It is no exaggeration to say that in less than two decades this series of studies has significantly altered and greatly deepened our understanding of what in some ways is the most distinctive action for a citizen of a democracy — deciding how to vote, or indeed whether to vote at all, in a competitive national election. Each study has profited from the last; and as broadly trained political scientists have begun to work on these studies together with sociologists and social psychologists, the contributions of the studies to our understanding of politics — rather than of individual psychology — have greatly increased. On many topics where only a generation ago we had not much beyond impressionistic evidence, today we can speak with some confidence.

Although in a field as ambiguous and rich in contradictory hypotheses as political science, it is nearly always possible to regard a finding as merely confirming the obvious, in fact a number of the findings point in rather unexpected directions: *e.g.*, that "independent" voters tend to be less interested, involved, or informed than partisan voters;[17] that socio-economic "class" whether objectively or subjectively defined is not a factor of constant weight in American presidential elections but a variable subject to great swings; and that only a microscopic pro-

[15] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1944).

[16] Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Donald Stokes, and Warren Miller, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), a study extended and refined by the same authors in "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election," this *Review*, Vol. 55 (1961), pp. 269–280.

[17] A finding, incidentally, that may have to be revised in turn. A recent re-analysis of the data of the voting studies, completed after this paper was prepared, has turned up new evidence for the active, interested independent voter. William Flanigan, *Partisanship and Campaign Participation* (Ph.D. dissertation. Yale University Library, 1961).

portion of American voters can be said to bring any ideological perspectives, even loosely defined, to bear on their decisions. Where once one might have asserted these propositions or their contraries with equal plausibility, the evidence of the voting studies tends to pile up in a single direction. Moreover — and this is perhaps the most important point of all — these studies are cumulative. The early studies were highly incomplete and in many ways unsatisfactory. They were subject to a good deal of criticism, and properly so. Even the latest ones will not escape unharmed. Yet it seems to me there has been a steady and obvious improvement in quality, range, and depth.

The voting studies may have provided an indirect stimulus to the "scientific outlook" because of a psychological effect. It seems to be beyond much doubt that some political scientists, particularly younger ones, compared the yield produced by the methods used in the studies on voting with the normal yield of conventional methods and arrived at the inference — which is probably false — that the application of comparable new methods elsewhere could produce a comparable gain in results.

A closely related topic on which the scientific outlook, has, in my view, produced some useful and reliable results of great importance to an understanding of politics is in the general domain of political participation. A listing of some of the chapter headings in Robert E. Lane's *Political Life* (1959) indicates the sort of question on which our knowledge is very much better off than it was only a few years ago: "Who Takes Part in Elections and What Do They Do?" "Who Tries to Influence Public Officials and How Do They Do It?" "Political Discussion: Who Listens to What? Who Talks to Whom?" "Why Lower-Status People Participate Less than Upper-Status People," "The Way of the Ethnic in Politics," etc.

Since I am not responsible for a complete inventory, I shall limit myself to mentioning one more subject where the behavioral mood has clearly made itself felt. This is in understanding the psychological characteristics of *homo politicus:* attitudes, beliefs, predispositions, personality factors. The range of "behavioral" scholars and research in this area is very great, though the researchers and the research may not always bear the professional label "political science." A few scattered names, titles, and topics will indicate what I have in mind: Lasswell, the great American pioneer in this area; Cantril; Lane, McCloskey; Adorno, *et al., The Authoritarian Personality;* Almond, *The Appeals of Communism.* Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties;* and Lipset, "Working Class Authoritarianism" in *Political Man.* The fact that these scholars bear various professional labels — sociologist, psychologist, political scientist — and that it is not easy to read from the professional or departmental label of the author to the character of the work itself may be regarded by some political scientists as an appalling sign of disintegration in the distinctive properties of political science, but it is also a sign of the extent to which a concern by "behavioral scientists" with similar problems now tends to transcend (though not to eliminate entirely) differences in professional origins.

IV

What of the yield in other matters that have always been of concern to students of political life? There are a number of important aspects of political studies where the behavioral mood has had, is having, or probably soon will have an impact, but where we must reserve judgment for the time being simply because the results are too scanty.

A good example is the analysis of political *systems.* The most distinctive products of the behavioral mood so far have dealt with *individuals* — individuals who vote, participate in politics in other ways, or express certain attitudes or beliefs. But an individual is not a political system, and analysis of individual preferences cannot fully explain collective decisions, for in addition we need to understand the mechanisms by which individual decisions are aggregated and combined into collective decisions. We cannot move from a study of the attitudes of a random sample of American citizens to a reasonably full explanation of, say, presidential nominations or the persistent problems of policy coordination in the United States.

Yet one classic concern of students of politics has been the analysis of *systems* of individuals and groups. Although the impact of the scientific outlook on the study of political systems is still unclear, there are some interesting straws in the wind. In *Union Democracy,* Lipset, Trow and Coleman brought the behavioral

mood and the intellectual resources of three highly trained social scientists to bear on the task of explaining how it is that a legitimate two-party system is maintained, as it is not in other American trade unions, in the International Typographers' Union. Recently a number of political scientists have followed sociologists into the study of local communities as systems of influence or decision-making.[18] Deutsch reflects the behavioral mood in his study of international political systems.[19] A number of other studies are in process that may help us formulate some new, or if not new then more persuasive, answers to some ancient questions.[20] But until more evidence is in, anyone who does not believe he knows *a priori* the outcome of this present expression of the scholar's age-old quest for knowledge will perhaps be pardoned if he reserves judgment and awaits the future with skepticism — mixed, depending on his prejudices, with hope or dread.

V

Where will the behavioral mood, considered as a movement of protest, go from here? I think it will gradually disappear. By this I mean only that it will slowly decay as a distinctive mood and outlook. For it will become, and in fact already is becoming, incorporated into the main body of the discipline. The behavioral mood will not disappear, then, because it has failed. It will disappear rather because it has succeeded. As a separate, somewhat sectarian, slightly factional outlook it will be the first victim of its own triumph.

Lest I be misunderstood in what I am about to say, let me make clear that the present and probable future benefits of the behavioral revolt to political studies seem to me to outweigh by far any disadvantages. In retrospect, the "behavioral" revolt in political science was, if anything, excessively delayed. Moreover, had that revolt not taken place, political science would have become increasingly alienated, I believe, from the other social sciences. One consequence of the behavioral protest has been to restore some unity within the social sciences by bringing political studies into closer affiliation with theories, methods, findings, and outlooks in modern psychology, sociology, anthropology and economics.

But if the behavioral revolt in political science has helped to restore some unities, it has shattered others; and the fragments probably cannot ever again be united exactly along the old lines. There are, so to speak, five fragments in search of a unity. These are: empirical political science, standards of evaluation, history, general theory and speculation.

The empirical political scientist is concerned with what *is*, as he says, not with what *ought* to be. Hence he finds it difficult and uncongenial to assume the historic burden of the political philosopher who attempted to determine, prescribe, elaborate, and employ ethical standards — values, to use the fashionable term — in appraising political acts and political systems. The behaviorally minded student of politics is prepared to *describe* values as empirical data; but, *qua* "scientist" he seeks to avoid prescription or inquiry into the grounds on which judgments of value can properly be made. To whom, then, are we to turn for guidance on intricate questions of political appraisal and evaluation? Today, probably no single professional group is qualified to speak with wisdom on all important political alternatives.

It may be said that this is the task of the political philosopher. But the problem of the political philosopher who wishes to engage in political evaluation in a sophisticated way is rendered ever more formidable by the products of the behavioral mood. An act of political evaluation cannot be performed in a sterile

[18] *Cf.* Janowitz, ed., *Community Political Systems* (1961); Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (1961); and the English study by Birch and his colleagues at the University of Manchester, *Small Town Politics* (1959).

[19] *E.g.*, in his *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1953). See also his recent article with the economist Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890–1959," *World Politics* (January, 1961), pp. 267–299; and his "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this *Review*, Vol. 55 (September, 1961), pp. 493–514.

[20] For an interesting example of an application of the behavioral mood to comparative politics, see Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "Parties, Elections and Political Behavior in the Northern Countries: a Review of Recent Research," *Politische Forschung* (1960). Probably the most ambitious attempt to apply survey methods to comparative politics is represented by a study of political socialization and political values in five nations, conducted by Gabriel A. Almond; this study has not yet been completed.

medium free from contamination by brute facts. Surely no one today, for example, can intelligently consider the relative merits of different political systems, or different arrangements within a particular political system, unless he knows what there is to be known about how these systems or arrangements work, what is required to make them work, and what effects they have on participants. No doubt the specialist who "knows the facts" — whether as physicist, physician, or political scientist — sometimes displays great naïvité on matters of policy. Still, the impatience of the empirical political scientist with the political philosopher who insists upon the importance of "values" arises in part from a feeling that the political philosopher who engages in political evaluation rarely completes all his homework. The topic of "consensus" as a condition for democracy is a case in point; when the political philosopher deals with this question, it seems to me that he typically makes a number of assumptions and assertions of an empirical sort without systematic attention to existing empirical data, or the possibility of gaining better empirical data.[21] Obviously some division of labor will always be necessary in a field as broad as the study of politics, but clearly the field needs more people who do not regard rapid shifts of mood — I mean from the behavioral to the philosophical — as a symptom of severe schizophrenia.

Second, in his concern for analyzing what *is*, the behavioral political scientist has found it difficult to make systematic use of what *has been: i.e.*, with history. In a trivial sense, of course, all knowledge of fact is historical; but I am speaking here of the history of the historian. Despite disclaimers and intentions to the contrary, there seems to me little room for doubt that the actual content of almost all the studies that reflect the behavioral mood is a-historical in character. Yet the scientific shortcomings of an a-historical theory in political science are manifest, and political scientists with "behavioral" predispositions are among the first to admit them. As the authors of *The American Voter* remark:

> In somewhat severe language, theory may be characterized as a generalized statement of the inter-relationships of a set of variables. In these terms, historical description may be said to be a statement of the values assumed by these variables through time . . .
>
> If theory can guide historical descriptions, the historical context of most research on human behavior places clear limitations of the development of theory. In evolving and testing his theoretical hypotheses the social scientists usually must depend on what he is permitted to observe by the progress of history. . . . It is evident that *variables of great importance in human affairs may exhibit little or no change in a given historical period.* As a result, the investigator whose work falls in this period *may not see the significance of these variables* and may fail to incorporate them in his theoretical statements. And even if he does perceive their importance, the *absence of variation will prevent a proper test of hypotheses* that state the relation of these factors to other variables of his theory (pp. 8–10, emphasis added).

There are, I think, a number of nodes around which a unity between behavioral political studies and history may be expected to grow. Because it is unreasonable to suppose that anything like the whole field of history will lend itself successfully to the behavioral approach, both historians and political scientists might profitably look for targets-of-opportunity on which the weapons forged by modern social science can be brought to bear. In this respect the work of the American historian, Lee Benson, seems to me particularly promising. By the application of rather elementary methods, which the historian has not been prone to employ, including very simple statistical analysis, Benson has shown how the explanations of five eminent American historians of four different presidential elections are dubious, if not, in fact, downright absurd.[22] The sociologist, S. M. Lipset, has also contributed a new interpreta-

[21] In 1942, in *The New Belief in the Common Man*, C. J. Friedrich challenged the prevailing generalizations about the need for consensus (ch. 5). However, his challenge seems to have met with little response until 1960, when Prothro and Grigg reported the results of an empirical study of consensus on "democratic" propositions in Ann Arbor, Michigan and Tallahassee, Florida. See their "Fundamental Principles of Democracy," *Journal of Politics* (May, 1960), pp. 276–294.

[22] The historians and the elections were: Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., on the election of 1824, Samuel E. Morison and Henry S. Commager on the election of 1860, Allan Nevins on the election of 1884, and William Diamond on the election of 1896. See his "Research Problems in American Political Historiography," in Komarovsky, ed., *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences* (1957).

tion of the 1860 election, based upon his analysis of Southern voting patterns in the presidential election of that year and in referenda on secession a few months later.[23] Benson has also turned his attention both to Charles A. Beard's famous interpretation — which Beard called an economic interpretation — of the creation and adoption of the American Constitution, and to the latter-day critics of Beard's somewhat loosely stated theory; he demonstrates convincingly, at least to me, some of the gains that can arise from a greater methodological sophistication on matters of causation, correlation, and use of quantitative data than is customary among professional historians.[24]

In addition to these targets-of-opportunity that occur here and there in historical studies, a problem that obviously needs the joint attention of historian and "behavioral" political scientist is the matter of political change. To the extent that the political scientist is interested in gaining a better understanding of political change — as, say, in the developing countries, to cite an example of pressing importance — he will have to work with theories that can only be fully tested against historical data. Unfortunately, the a-theoretical or even anti-theoretical biases of many historians often make their works a storehouse of data so vast as to be almost unmanageable for the theorist. Rather than demand that every theorist should have to become his own historian, it may be more feasible to demand that more historians should become theorists, or at any rate familiar with the most relevant issues, problems, and methods of the modern social sciences.

I have already implied the third unity that needs to be established, namely a unity between empirical political studies and a concern for general theory. The scientific outlook in political science can easily produce a dangerous and dysfunctional humility: the humility of the social scientist who may be quite confident of his findings on small matters and dubious that he can have anything at all to say on larger questions. The danger, of course, is that the quest for empirical data can turn into an absorbing search for mere trivialities unless it is guided by some sense of the difference between an explanation that would not matter much even if it could be shown to be valid by the most advanced methods now available, and one that would matter a great deal if it should turn out to be a little more or a little less plausible than before, even if it still remained in some considerable doubt. So far, I think, the impact of the scientific outlook has been to stimulate caution rather than boldness in searching for broad explanatory theories. The political scientist who mixes skepticism with methodological rigor is all too painfully aware of the inadequacies of any theory that goes much beyond the immediate data at hand. Yet it seems clear that unless the study of politics generates and is guided by broad, bold, even if highly vulnerable general theories, it is headed for the ultimate disaster of triviality.

Finally, I should like to suggest that empirical political science had better find a place for speculation. It is a grave though easy error for students of politics impressed by the achievements of the natural sciences to imitate all their methods save the most critical one: the use of the imagination. Problems of method and a proper concern for what would be regarded as an acceptable test of an empirical hypothesis have quite properly moved out of the wings to a more central position on the great stage of political science. Yet surely it is imagination that has generally marked the intelligence of the great scientist, and speculation — often-times foolish speculation, it turned out later — has generally preceded great advances in scientific theory. It is only fair to add, however, that the speculation of a Galileo, a Kepler, a Newton, or an Einstein, was informed and controlled by a deep understanding of the hard empirical facts as they were known at the time: Kepler's speculations always had to confront the tables of Tycho Brahe.

There is every reason to think that unities can be forged anew. After all, as the names of Socrates, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Tocqueville remind us, from time to time in the past the study of politics has been altered, permanently, by a fresh infusion of the spirit of empirical inquiry — by, that is to say, the scientific outlook.

[23] "The Emergence of the One-Party South — the Election of 1860," in *Political Man* (1960).

[24] Lee Benson, *Turner and Beard, American Historical Writing Re-Considered* (1960).

2

POLITICAL SCIENCE AS SCIENCE

• ARTHUR S. GOLDBERG

THE PROBLEM

Why does one need to go into the realm of science to make intelligible the particular segment of human experience called political? For example, how is science useful in answering the question, "Why do the British have a stable political system and the French an unstable one?" This can be made understandable on the grounds that the British people are phlegmatic while the French are of volatile temperament. Quite as simply, one can explain the higher degree of personal civil liberties in the U.S. vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. by the presence of an effective separation of powers in the former and the lack thereof in the latter. Assuming for the moment the truth of the descriptive aspects of these explanations, they certainly make the phenomena more intelligible by common sense than would a great deal of scientific jargon. They are, however, unsatisfactory in that they fail to account for a broader range of similar experiences. Thus one is aware of what is perhaps a higher level of personal civil liberties in Great Britain than in the United States, with a less clearly defined or functioning separation of powers in the former than in the latter. One is also aware of an alleged volatile temperament among Spaniards along with the ominous stability of Franco Spain. Admittedly, these were "simple" explanations, but it would be well to keep in mind the grounds for their rejection; i.e., their failure to account for a broader range of similar experiences.[1]

More complex non-scientific explanations often suffer from a different defect, i.e., they cannot be rejected. They may be argued in terms of plausibility, or in terms of logical consistency, but they cannot be empirically refuted for lack of prescribed operational tests. Thus, for example, the causes of the American Civil War are a source of continuing debate. Each proposed explanation rests on an implicit theory, yet none of these is so articulated as to enable recognition of an empirical refutation of the theory when one is encountered.[2] One of the definitive characteristics of science, on the other hand, is that it seeks to explain the world in terms of testable ideas. It is thus empirical — but science is not empiricism.

The distinction between science as empirical and science as empiricism is not a trivial one. The failure to make this distinction has, I suggest, been the fundamental source of conflict between the "traditionalists" and the "behaviorists" in the study of political phenomena. The former have looked with grave misgivings upon the "behaviorists'" penchant for experiential data, arguing that such "pure facts" offer no meaningful explanations. The "behaviorists," in turn, have argued that the theoretical abstractions of traditional political theory have failed, after centuries of speculation, to produce reliable explanations of political phenomena. Both points are well taken, as will be shown.

FACTS AS THEORY

Consider the advice of Lord Bryce to the members of the American Political Science Association:

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[1] For a most enlightening treatment of common sense explanation in general see Karl W. Deutsch, "The Limits of Common Sense," *Psychiatry*, XXII, No. 2 (May, 1959), 105–112.

[2] The difficulties entailed in attempting to refute such explanations empirically can perhaps be better appreciated after reading a collection of arguments on the Civil War such as that available in Edwin C. Rozewenc, ed., *Slavery as a Cause of the Civil War* (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1949). One ought in this case to read with a view to making an empirically based decision among the arguments.

I start by offering you one maxim of universal validity. Keep close to the facts. Never lose yourself in abstractions. Never fancy that a general proposition means anything more than the facts which it sums up.[3]

and further with regard to facts:

Every political organism, every political force must be studied in and cannot be understood apart from the environment out of which it has grown and in which it plays. Not all of the facts of that environment are relevant, but till you have examined all of them, you cannot pronounce any irrelevant.[4]

Such advice is, to be sure, well intended. It seeks to ensure objectivity and comprehensiveness — to deal with "reality" on its own terms. On application, however, the advice encounters some difficulty. As David Easton has called to our attention:

There is an infinite level of detail possible about any event. The aspect of the event selected for description as the facts about it is determined by the prior interest of the observer; the selection is made in the light of a frame of reference that fixes the order and relevance of the facts. When raised to the level of consciousness this frame of reference is what we call a theory.[5]

Thus, it is theory which provides the criteria by which the judgment of relevance is made for only certain of the myriad of details entailed in any event. But theory is even more intimately involved with facts. It provides more than criteria of relevance. Easton implies this when he says "A fact is a peculiar ordering of reality in terms of a theoretic interest."[6]

It is theory which provides the bridge between the infinitely complex reality with which we are faced and the means through which we are aware of this reality, i.e., our senses. Take the extreme position for a moment and consider facts as the data of the senses. Facts then consist in patches of color, shapes, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations. A moment's reflection will indicate how far such data are from being objective.[7] How many people's sensory receptors react in exactly the same way to the same external stimulus? What would be the content of human communication if our minds were capable of no more than recording the data of the senses and commanding effectors to respond to these data? What, under these circumstances, would be the chance of developing any phase of man's science as we know it today, or even as it was known at the time of Ptolemy?

It seems unlikely that Lord Bryce meant for us to deal simply with the data of the senses — to examine such characteristic political phenomena as revolutions in terms of quantities and qualities of noise and flow of reddish liquid. But the moment that one moves off this extreme position one deals no longer with pure facts. Rather one deals with concepts. This is exactly the case when one examines a revolution in terms of personalities, power, culture, income distributions, and electoral processes. No criticism is here intended of the data with which we deal. Rather it is the intent to recognize such data for what they are, viz, concepts. As such, they are products of *mental postulation*, complex statements about the way we think the world is, for who has seen a personality, power, or a culture? For that matter, how would one recognize a revolution utilizing only the data of the senses? Without mental postulation these data would simply fail to cohere.

However, while mental postulation is thus essential for the cognition of a fact, this very process imposes a limit on the reliability of the cognition. Norwood R. Hanson comments significantly on this point:

Seeing a bird in the sky involves seeing that it will not suddenly do vertical snap rolls; and this is more than marks the retina. *We could be wrong.* But to see a bird, even momentarily, is to see it in all these connexions.[8]

If one agrees that the data of the senses would fail to cohere without mental postulation, and that the cognition of facts is inextricably dependent upon such postulation, Hanson's comment becomes salient. With regard to the theoretical assumptions and implications of any fact, "We could be wrong." It therefore be-

[3] James Bryce, "Presidential Address to the Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association," *American Political Science Review*, III, No. 3 (1909), 4.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[5] David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 53.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] For a systematic *reductio ad absurdum* of pure empiricism, see F. S. C. Northrop, *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), pp. 39–49.

[8] Norwood Russell Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 21. (Italics supplied.)

hooves us to be aware of the postulational framework within which our cognition of facts takes place.

Consider one of the "hardest" of the few "hard data" with which political scientists deal, i.e., votes. Bryce notwithstanding, votes are taken as data by the political scientist not simply because they occur, but because they are believed to have meaning. Are they measures of approval, habituation, apathy, civic obligation, distributions of philosophic preferences, or personal popularity? What is the significance of the voting process itself? Unless the political scientist either makes assumptions about these meanings of votes, or seeks to test them, he falls prey, deservedly, to the charge of the traditionalist that "one cannot learn anything by counting noses."

The Theoretical Context of Causal Relationships

If the theoretical nature of facts be conceded, one is well on the way to an appreciation of the role of theory in causal relationships. For here, in addition to the theoretical aspects of the facts involved, one is concerned with a relationship between, or among, facts. Consider the example offered in Hanson of a classic causal chain:

> For want of a nail a shoe was lost; for want of a shoe a horse was lost; for want of a horse a rider was lost; for want of a rider a battalion was lost; for want of a battalion a battle was lost; for want of a victory a kingdom was lost — all for want of a nail.[9]

Indeed, the events described in the "chain" succeed one another in time, and (as will be discussed shortly) this is a necessary condition in a causal relationship. However, unless one has some theory about the importance of proper shoeing for effective functioning of horses, and about the importance of military victories for the maintenance of kingdoms, this does not constitute a causal chain but a sequential series of accidents. Scientific method specifies a set of necessary conditions for the establishment of causality. Causation is seen as established only in the case of repetitive events wherein an event, or paradigm of events x, is always followed by an event y, regardless of what events precede x.[10] While these are necessary conditions for the establishment of causality, it is here argued that they are not sufficient. What is needed in addition is a meaningful explanation relating the events (a battalion strength force in military strategy; war and empire, and so forth). Given this additional condition, one is not forced to accept sunrise in New York as the cause of sunrise in California simply because the former is invariably followed by the latter.

In the subject matter of political science the necessary and sufficient conditions for the establishment of a causal relationship are rarely encountered. Certainly this is the case if one seeks unicausal relationships. For example, if one suspected that college education increased political interest, and therefore tested the hypothesis that *all* college educated persons had a higher level of political interest upon completion of a college education than when they entered college, it would be very likely to be falsified by the evidence.[11] However, if one were to posit an invariate direction to the change in the proportion of a group voting as the average level of education in the group was increased, the hypothesis might withstand considerable testing.[12] If the hypothesis withstands testing, one has an event (education of a man or group) followed by another event (increase in probability that an individual will vote or increase in proportion of group members vot-

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 50. Hanson's discussion of the problem is quite lucid, cf. *ibid.*, p. 53.

[10] Cf. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Interpretation of Statistical Relations as a Research Operation," *The Language of Social Research*, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, eds., (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), p. 125.

[11] Cf. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 25, for an indication of this.

[12] *Ibid.* However, one would have to test for spurious relationships, for other variables may be operative, e.g., aging, the student selection process, and SES, Socio-Economic Status, to name a few possibilities.

A word of caution is due on the difficulty of actually meeting all the criteria posited for a causal relationship. Not only are these criteria rarely fulfilled, but even when fulfilled, the tentativeness of theoretical explanation of causality, and the frequent multiplicity of variables operative have led scientists to abjure the term causality in preference for association. Cf. Stephen Toulman, *The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960; Harper Torchbooks/The Science Library), pp. 119–24.

ing) regardless of preceding events; and thus one has fulfilled some of the necessary conditions for the establishment of causality. Ignoring for the moment the problem raised by regarding a change in probability as an event, one still lacks sufficient conditions for the establishment of a causal relationship between college education and change in the probability of having a given level of political interest.[13] In the absence of a meaningful explanation relating these two events, one has only an empirical relationship which, if it withstands a great deal of testing, may, by convention, come to be regarded as an empirical law. However, it is not causal law. Only a meaningful explanation, taken together with the other requisite, can establish a causal law. Thus, for example, if there were a reliable body of theory which held that our values are affected by our learning experiences, and that college education over a given span of time affords individuals learning experiences not equally available outside of that education during that span of time, and that our level of political interest results from our values, the empirical relationship between college education and increased probability of change in party allegiance would be regarded as causal. Here, Hanson's remarks are quite relevant:

> Causes certainly are connected with effects; but this is because our theories connect them, not because the world is held together by cosmic glue. The world *may* be glued together by imponderables, but that is irrelevant for understanding causal explanation.[14]

Before moving to a consideration of the nature of explanation, a word of reassurance is due the reader with respect to regarding a change in probability as an event. This tactic may appear to be designed to evade the issue, i.e., the existence of an invariant relationship. If one insists on regarding the individual as the sole significant unit in political analysis, the introduction of probability certainly does evade the issue; for to know that a given individual's probability of voting Republican is 0.692 is not to know very much. However, if one is willing to regard the behavior of large numbers of people as significant units of political analysis, the knowledge that any given individual's probability of voting Republican is 0.692 is quite useful; for under certain attainable conditions it is to know that about 70 people out of every hundred in the electorate will vote Republican. It seems unlikely that political science will arrive at a position where its laws can govern the actions of individuals taken singly. However, it is perhaps reassuring to note that even the physical sciences have encountered this problem — in fact, it is a problem of that "exact science," physics. As it happens, it is impossible to predict either the direction or the velocity of the movement of any given atomic particle. Rather, one must deal with probability statements about groups of particles. Yet particle physics is regarded as quite scientific and has, in fact, been able to discern "conceptual order among puzzling data," to use Hanson's terms.[15]

The Nature of Scientific Explanations

Explanation, scientific or otherwise, is essentially an attempt to make some event understandable. There exists some disagreement among philosophers of science as to how events are made understandable. One school argues that explanation consists in showing the particular event to be subsumed under more general laws.[16] The other school holds that explanation is accomplished by showing that the unfamiliar comports with familiar experiences.[17] Obviously if the more general laws are a part of our *familiar* experience the problem is resolved. In the training of a scientist in a field with an established body of theory, many general laws are assimilated and, for this scientist, they are a part of his experience. However, the argument of the anti-general-law-explanation school is that the true explanation consists in accounting for the more general laws, and that this is done by analogy, or in the case of mathe-

[13] For a thorough discussion of empirical causal relationships, and of methods of analysis when several variables may be related, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Interpretations of Statistical Relations. . . ," *op. cit.*, pp. 115–25.

[14] Hanson, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[15] Cf. Hanson, *op. cit.*, chaps. V and VI. See also Northrop, *op. cit.*, chap. XI.

[16] Cf. Richard B. Braithwaite, *Scientific Explanation* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960; Harper Torchbooks/The Science Library), pp. 342–43.

[17] Norman Campbell, *What Is Science?* (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), pp. 79–86.

matics by mathematical neatness.[18] Thus, the Dynamical Theory of Gases is based on an analogy with moving particles of solid matter and their impacts on each other and the walls of their container. A little thought will indicate that familiar experience traced back to fundamentals eventually reaches back to inchoate general laws, and the argument seems to be one of the chicken-egg-which-came-first type. The attempt will not be made to solve the conundrum here. However, it is necessary to understand the utility of our experiences for suggesting explanations. Thus, for example, animosities and greed have been offered as explanations for wars because experience has shown that these often lead to individual acts of violence. Whether or not an explanation is accepted depends on a number of factors, not the least of which is its ability to withstand the testing of its implications. Testing requires separate treatment and will be so handled at another point. There are criteria which are applied to scientific explanations prior to testing. The theory, and scientific explanation is here seen as a theory, must permit the phenomena to be accounted for to be deduced from it; it must also either not do damage to existing theory, or if it does damage, be able to account for the phenomena subsumed under the theories which it damages. Thus, for example, one could argue, as does David Truman, that the cohesive potential of an interest group is inversely related to the degree that its membership overlaps those of groups with conflicting interests, on the grounds that the cross-pressures tend to produce apathy.[19] Such an explanation immediately recommends itself for acceptance because of its fit with existing role-theory. This theory holds that the way in which an individual behaves is in large measure determined by the role which he sees himself playing, and a single individual is capable of playing a great variety of roles. However, a role-theory also holds that the requirement of performing incompatible roles (e.g., striking railway worker loyal to his union and patriotic citizen with attendant loyalties during a war) constitutes a personality threat to which withdrawal may be a response.[20]

The Ubiquity of Theory Restated

The attempt has been made above to demonstrate the theoretical natures of fact, causality, and explanation. An awareness of the theoretical, and therefore tentative,[21] nature of the matrix in which all perception takes place is essential to an understanding of science. In the absence of such an awareness, astronomy would still have to think in terms of the earth being at the center of a set of planets orbiting in perfect concentric circles about it. Such awareness has certainly not been lacking among political theorists. Political thinkers as far apart as Edmund Burke and John Stuart Mill were well aware, for example, that votes meant different things to different people. The empiricists' criticism (with Burke as a leading critic) is that no amount of theorizing can ascertain the meaning of votes, the causes of war, or of group disintegration. It is the method of science to so combine theory and verification as to make increasingly intelligible the phenomena of experience. To the elucidation of this method this paper now addresses itself.

The Scientific Method

At the heart of scientific method lies a system of thought. The exact nature of the system is a matter of some controversy,[22] and it is felt that a discussion of these controversies in this paper would prove more confusing than beneficial. Therefore, it is preferred to proceed directly to the heart of scientific method: i.e., retroduction and verification (more properly, falsifiability).

The Development of Theory

The term "retroduction" is used, not in order to move the familiar into the esoteric, but as a form of shorthand. The term derives from

[18] The argument for mathematical explanation founded on mathematical neatness rests on the improbability of a mathematically neat universe. Thus, if one can find a simple set of mathematical equations which account for a given phenomenon, the set of equations will be taken as explanation. Cf. Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 153–57.

[19] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 156–67.

[20] Cf. Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945), pp. 79–82.

[21] See discussion of the reliability of cognition, above.

[22] For argument on the roles of inductive and deductive logic see Northrop, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–18; Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*

Pierce's translation of the Greek for Aristotle's third class of inference[23] (the other two being deduction and induction). The term is here defined as an imaginative leap, a flight of fancy, taken to account for observed phenomena. Pierce makes a neat distinction among the three types of inference:

> Deduction proves that something *must* [logically] be; induction shows that something *actually* is operative [to the extent of observations]; . . .[retroduction] merely suggests that something *may be*.[24]

Thus, one thing the scientist does is observe certain phenomena, e.g., the acceleration of falling bodies, the occurrence of revolutions, the growth of totalitarian systems. He then seeks an explanatory principle beyond his observations to account for them. He seeks these by the use of creative imagination. Induction will not do it, as induction — the reasoning from the specific to the general — is the specific writ large. It is descriptive, describing the universal as a replica of the observable;[25] e.g., in all observed cases, an increase in educational level is associated with an increase in political participation,[26] therefore, by induction, all cases of increased education level are associated with increased political participation. It does not seek to explain why in any or all cases an increased level of education is associated with increased political participation. Nor will deduction provide explanation, except in the case of an imaginatively conceived major premise. Thus, for example, Pareto's explanation of revolutions has deductive aspects, but these are not the source of his major premise. They are (in very simplified form):[27]

1. All societies are divided into ruling elites and ruled.
2. Into each group, people of leadership ability are born.
3. In each group, certain persons with leadership ability have a strong desire to lead.

These premises were arrived at neither inductively (although experience was a guide in their selection) nor deductively. Rather they are *a way of conceiving the world to be organized*, selected in order to permit Pareto to deduce that:

> (a) Unless the elites either kill off non-elite natural leaders, or admit them to the elite ranks, such leaders will provide the leadership for revolution.

Thereby he offered an explanation for revolutions. The effort has been made to distinguish retroduction from both deduction and induction in order to make it clear that explanations are arrived at by no mechanical process, but by a creative one.[28] Such a process is essentially psychological, and the question might be raised as to whether such processes are part of the formal requirements of scientific method. Morris R. Cohen, in a critique of traditional doctrine concerning deduction, has distinguished the formal logic of deduction (wherein the conclusions are contained in the premises and form no temporal series at all) from the psychological process of perceiving the logical conclusions implied by a set of premises.[29] The distinction is a fruitful one in an analysis of deduction, and one could gain some appreciation of the role of deduction in science by concentrating on its formal logic. However, at present, this is not the case with retroduction. There exists as yet no statement of its formal rules of procedure. It can be appreciated only as a psychological process. Yet its role in science is pivotal. For example, Kepler was able to use deductions from Copernican theory and the incompatibility of his own and another's (Tycho Brahe's) observations with those deductions to

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(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959), pp. 27–34; Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellars, eds., *Readings in Philosophical Analysis* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), chap. V.

[23] Hanson, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] Perfect induction — i.e., without inductive risk — is a special case of deduction. Cf. Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934), p. 275.

[26] Cf. Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 351–52. N.B.: Professor Lane does not make the induction used in illustration here.

[27] Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), Vol. III.

[28] This effort may herein have been given a deceptively simple portrayal. The effort involved in retroduction is perhaps best illustrated in Hanson's account of Kepler's study of the orbit of Mars. Hanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 77–89. See also Arthur Koestler, *The Sleepwalkers* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), pp. 324–33.

[29] Morris R. Cohen, *A Preface to Logic* (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1956), pp. 26–27.

refute the concept of planetary orbits as circles concentric to the sun. However, no set of logical rules could have led him to the concept of the ellipticity of planetary orbits. Yet, without that concept the observations could not have been explained. If it is the role of science to explain observations in terms of a set of testable ideas, retroduction is the means by which science expands its explanatory powers. In a letter to Karl Popper, Einstein commented, "I think (like you, by the way) that theory cannot be fabricated out of the results of observation, but that it can only be invented."[30]

Before moving on to the second essential feature of scientific method, i.e., verification, one word of caution is due the reader. To recognize the vital role of imagination is not to ensure that it will readily or satisfactorily provide explanations. (The satisfactory nature of an explanation is its ability to withstand testing, which will be treated in the discussion of verification.) Philosophers of science occasionally leave one with this mistaken impression. Thus, for example, Northrop argues that Galileo, in attempting to account for the motion of a falling object, allowed an analysis of his initial problems to guide his imagination in terms of three relevant variables, i.e., weight, distance, and time; that by testing the explanatory powers of the first two, Galileo eliminated them and was left with the third variable, time, which proved satisfactory.[31] This is deceptively simple, for, as Hanson points out, it took Galileo more than thirty years to recognize the significance of time as a variable.[32]

Verification

The satisfactory nature of a particular scientific explanation consists, as has been mentioned, in its ability to withstand testing. Essentially, this is a matter of failing in the face of suitable tests, to be proved false, as distinguished from being proved true. The class of statements which can be proved to be true are so temporally limited as to be of little use to science. These are what Professor Popper calls *existential* statements.[33] Such statements say that something exists: e.g., "There are white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, upper-class Americans who are extreme liberals." One could prove such a statement by finding two such individuals. Of itself, the statement when proved contributes little to an understanding of political phenomena. It may be objected that such a statement when proved does enlighten, for it invalidates the statement, "All white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, upper-class Americans are conservatives." The objection is valid, and it is the point to be made here. Note that the existential statement takes on significance only from its relation to a different type of statement — one that not only says that something exists, but one which says implicitly that something does not exist, namely, white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, upper-class Americans who are not conservative. Such a statement is called a *universal* statement,[34] for it purports to define the universe by excluding certain things from it. Both types of statement are "empirically decidable," to use Popper's terms, but each in only one direction. The existential can be proved by finding the existence of that which it postulates. However, it cannot be disproved, as failure to find the object in question cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that it does not exist. The universal statement, on the other hand, can be disproved by finding that which it excludes from the universe. However, it cannot be proved, as that which it excludes, while undiscovered, may yet exist and someday be discovered. Since the universal statements are so much more informative (they postulate both what exists and what does not exist, and the latter includes all possible worlds minus one), it is with these, rather than with existential statements, that science is concerned. Thus, science is concerned with statements that can be disproved rather than with those which can be proved. Popper offers as his criterion of demarcation for science, falsifiability rather than verifiability, and it is hoped that in the light of the foregoing explanation this is seen as justifiable.[35]

> I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled

[30] Albert Einstein in Popper, *op. cit.*, p. 458.

[31] Northrop, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–26.

[32] Hanson, *op. cit.*, p. 68. For a recent and timely treatment of the difficulties of scientific discovery see Koestler, *op. cit.*

[33] Popper, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–70.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 40–41.

out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: *it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.*[36]

There exists one crucial problem in Popper's criterion for science. There is the implication that by putting a statement into a particular logical form, i.e., the form called universal, one ensures the possibility of its empirical refutation. One should be aware that this is not necessarily the case. Consider the statement, "All human actions are predetermined." Such a statement is in universal form. One could refute it by finding a human action that was not predetermined. However, the substance of the statement is such that it is not empirically possible to refute it unless additional conditions are specified. Specifically one must be told how to recognize a non-predetermined human action upon encountering it. Thus, while the logically refutable form is a necessary condition for the possibility of empirical refutation, it is not a sufficient one. There must be specified, in addition, criteria of invalidation, i.e., an empirical means of recognizing what would count as negating evidence. Whether, for every universal statement, there can be devised and implemented such criteria, which will discriminate without doing damage to the meaning of the original statement, remains a moot point.[37] However, in the absence of such criteria, evaluation of theory is limited to tests of consistency, argument by analogy, and the use of indirect and sometimes ambiguous evidence.

Problems of Criteria of Empirical Invalidation

One is specifically concerned here with criteria for empirical invalidation of a relationship among postulated concepts. There are at least two problems inherent in the generation of such criteria. There is the epistemological problem of relating the meaning of the data of sensory perception upon which the empirical judgment is to be made to the meaning of the postulated concepts about which judgment is to be made. Then there is the problem of operationalization, i.e., of the design and construction of empirical sensing and recording devices which can be both epistemologically justified and physically accomplished. Their significance rather than their solution is the point of the discussion which follows.

The set of epistemological problems seems comprehended by what F. S. C. Northrop calls epistemic correlation — an intellectual feat which "joins a thing known in the one way to what is in some sense the same thing known in a different way."[38] We are thus concerned with establishing a connection between such postulated concepts as, e.g., power, or ideology, or authoritarian personality, or anomie, on the one hand, and the empirical referents which are taken as indicative of their presence (and in some cases of the degree in which they are present); e.g., the relationship between an individual's voting record in a legislative body and the voting record of the majority of that body has on occasion been taken as a measure of the power of that individual over that legislative body.[39] Similarly, there are indices of ideological thinking,[40] of authoritarian personality,[41] and of anomie.[42] In each case two epistemological questions are salient. First, what is the rationale by which the empirical referent is linked to the postulated concept; second, to what extent are they the "same thing" known in different ways?

Dahl's treatment of the concept of power affords an opportunity for gaining an appreciation of the import of these questions.[43] He sets out his postulated concept of power as follows:

> My intuitive idea of power, then, is something like this: A has power over B to the extent that he

[36] *Ibid.* For objections to Popper's criterion, see Arthur Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 458.

[37] See discussion below.

[38] Northrop, *op. cit.*, p. 119. For a thorough discussion of the concept see *ibid.*, pp. 119–31.

[39] See Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, II (July, 1957), 210–14.

[40] Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), pp. 188–215.

[41] T. W. Adorno *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 224–79.

[42] Leo Srole, "Social Dysfunction, Personality and Social Distance Attitudes," mimeographed paper read before the American Sociological Society, 1951 Annual Meeting, Chicago; quoted in Arthur Kornhauser *et al.*, *When Labor Votes* (New York: University Books, Inc., 1956), pp. 189–90. See also Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), chaps. IV and V.

[43] Dahl, *loc. cit.*, pp. 201–15.

can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.

He then specifies the properties of this concept: (1) the necessity of a time lag between the effort of A to influence B's behavior and B's behavior itself, (2) no "action at a distance," i.e., the establishment of some connection between A and B, (3) a difference between the probability that B will do something (X) if A does not act to influence him and the probability that B will do X if A acts to influence him.[44] In turning to examine the empirical referent used in ranking U. S. Senators in terms of power over legislative voting, i.e., roll-call votes, he notes that these properties do not inhere in the referent. One cannot establish by the roll-call alone either that a given Senator acted to influence the voting behavior of his fellow legislator or the direction of that action if it occurred. Thus this particular referent requires additional support in the form of observers' reports and explicit assumptions to link it with the postulated concept of power. Finally, even if a link is established between the two, Professor Dahl makes it clear that the empirical referent is something subsumed under, but less than, the postulated concept of power. Here concern shifts to the problem of operationalization, but the problem of epistemic correlation is relevant. Professor Dahl perceives in the concept of power at least three dimensions, or variables — specifically, scope, number of respondents, and change in probabilities, i.e., the areas of behavior in which A has influence over B, the number of people over whom A has influence, and the change in their probable behavior which A effects. The question then arises as to whether any scale could be devised to handle simultaneously all of these dimensions and still meet the requirements of epistemic correlation, that is, have the same properties as the concept and be linked to it by a satisfactory rationale. An additional aspect of the operationalization problem should be noted. Various empirical referents are occasionally used for the same concept with non-identical results. Here again, epistemic correlation comes to the fore. A choice among such referents for the purpose of testing theoretic implications of a concept should be made on the basis of the similarity in properties between the concept and each of the referents and the satisfactory nature of the rationale by which they can be linked.[45]

These are of course not the only problems in the generation and application of empirical criteria of invalidation. There are the problems of the constancy of meaning of indicators over time and environment. How satisfactory is any given SES index over a twenty-year period or cross-culturally? How does one intercalibrate two such indices developed at different points in time and within different cultures? There is the host of problems raised by the impact of sensing operations on the environment under examination. Do surveys of voting intentions affect those intentions? Does the presence of observers affect the behavior of the individuals in the groups under observation? If so, to what extent? Then there are policy and ethical problems that arise. Does the known presence of social science researchers operate unequally to the advantage of some groups? What are the ethical implications of hiding their presence or concealing their purpose? These are not trite questions, but they have been ignored in favor of focusing attention on the importance of the relationship between operationalization and epistemic correlation, in order to stress again that while science is empirical it is not empiricism. It is in the failure to make this distinction that "operationism" has been wanting.[46]

Conclusion

Of the two principal intellectual tools of science, retroduction and universal, empirically falsifiable statements, traditional political theory has certainly not been lacking in the former. The complex theoretical structures of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Harrington, Hobbes, Hegel, and Marx attest to no lack of imaginative abili-

[44] Note that these assumptions rule out the alternative of A influencing B solely by way of B's expectations about A. See Herbert Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," *The Journal of Politics*, XV (1953), 500–516.

[45] An example of such a problem is provided in George A. Lundberg and Pearl Freidman, "A Comparison of Three Measures of Socioeconomic Status," *Rural Sociology*, VIII (1943), 227–36. Reprinted in Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–73.

[46] See A. Cornelius Benjamin, *Operationism* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1955), pp. 64–91.

ties. What have been lacking have been the casting of theory into universal, empirically falsifiable form, and the provision of criteria of falsification. Wrestling with the problem of criteria, while perhaps not incumbent on the political philosopher, is certainly incumbent upon the political scientist as scientist. This is not to say that speculative thought is to be denied the political scientist. On the contrary, the discussion of retroduction should have made clear the vital role of such thought in the construction of any scientific theory and in the discovery of any scientific "facts." Nor need the establishment of criteria of falsifiability precede the structuring of theory, i.e., the explication of the logical relationship of its parts. Quite the opposite, the theory may have to be structured, by deduction, a long way to some fairly remote implications of its major premises before criteria (normally operational criteria) can be devised to test the major premises via their implications. However, to the extent that the political scientist seeks to contribute to the reliability of the body of political knowledge, he must concern himself with finding criteria for the rejection of the unreliable.

Political science is identified herein as a science, not on the basis of its achievements, but on the basis of its available aspirations. That these may prove illusory, in whole or in part, cannot be denied[17] — but that is an occupational hazard in the pursuit of knowledge.

[17] For a discussion of the operative limits on theoretical development see Northrop's discussion of economic theory in Northrop, *op. cit.*, chap. III.

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3

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER

An Expository Review

• *PAUL F. LAZARSFELD*

I. An Important Event

During the war, the Army established and maintained under General Frederick Osborn a Research Branch of the War Department's Information and Education Division. In the course of its five-year existence, this agency undertook about 300 studies dealing with various phases of the soldier's life.

In 1945, at the conclusion of the war, the original materials, including over 600,000 interviews and all the declassified reports, were turned over to a research committee appointed by the Social Science Research Council. A grant from the Carnegie Corporation made it possible to devote four additional years to re-analysis of the data. This phase of the work as well as the original research was directed by Samuel A. Stouffer and an able group of collaborators. To the unique scope of the original inquiry was thus added an intensive analysis of the material. The results of both are without parallel in the history of the social sciences.

This body of work has now been published in four volumes. The first two deal with the attitudes of soldiers in training and in combat. A third volume reports the results of experiments in connection with army indoctrination. The fourth is devoted to a discussion of methodological procedures. The following pages will deal only with the first two volumes. Volume IV will be available shortly.

Reprinted by permission from *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall, 1949), 377–404.

Never before have so many aspects of human life been studied so systematically and comprehensively. The findings have major implications for the understanding of civilian as well as military life. It is true, of course, that civilians do not live through the dangers of combat, nor are they subject to rigid military discipline. But soldiers too have their ups and downs in mood and hopes. They must adjust to other people, perform their jobs, strive for success, and adjust to changing situations. Thus in many respects the problems and experiences of the two groups are similar.

In an introductory chapter, Stouffer states that the book is written for three audiences: the historian, the military man, and the social scientist. Actually, there is a fourth audience which in the long run may be more important than the other three. It is the educated layman who has an interest in social science. For the first time a comprehensive demonstration of the techniques and potentialities of attitude research is available to him. It is therefore important that this fourth audience be introduced to the Stouffer volumes, and the main purpose of the present review is to provide a guide for

the non-technical reader who turns to these 1300 pages of fact and interpretation.

First, however, it will be helpful to consider the special role played by attitude surveys in contemporary social science. Although surveys are only one of the many techniques available, at the moment they undoubtedly constitute the most important and promising step forward that has been made in recent years.

THE NATURE OF ATTITUDE SURVEYS

The limitations of survey methods are obvious. They do not use experimental techniques; they rely primarily on what people say, and rarely include objective observations; they deal with aggregates of individuals rather than with integrated communities; they are restricted to contemporary problems — history can be studied only by the use of documents remaining from earlier periods.

In spite of these limitations survey methods provide one of the foundations upon which social science is being built. The finding of regularities is the beginning of any science, and surveys can make an important contribution in this respect. For it is necessary that we know what people usually do under many and different circumstances if we are to develop theories explaining their behavior. Furthermore, before we can devise an experiment we must know what problems are worthwhile; which should be investigated in greater detail. Here again surveys can be of service.

Finding regularities and determining criteria of significance are concerns the social sciences have in common with the natural sciences. But there are crucial differences between the two fields of inquiry. The world of social events is much less "visible" than the realm of nature. That bodies fall to the ground, that things are hot or cold, that iron becomes rusty, are all immediately obvious. It is much more difficult to realize that ideas of right and wrong vary in different cultures; that customs may serve a different function from the one which the people practising them believe they are serving; that the same person may show marked contrasts in his behavior as a member of a family and as a member of an occupational group. The mere description of human behavior, of its variation from group to group and of its changes in different situations, is a vast and difficult undertaking. It is this task of describing, sifting and ferreting out interrelationships which surveys perform for us. And yet this very function often leads to serious misunderstandings. For it is hard to find a form of human behavior that has not already been observed somewhere. Consequently, if a study reports a prevailing regularity, many readers respond to it by thinking "of course that is the way things are." Thus, from time to time, the argument is advanced that surveys only put into complicated form observations which are already obvious to everyone.

Understanding the origin of this point of view is of importance far beyond the limits of the present discussion. The reader may be helped in recognizing this attitude if he looks over a few statements which are typical of many survey findings and carefully observes his own reaction. A short list of these, with brief interpretive comments, will be given here in order to bring into sharper focus probable reactions of many readers.[1]

1. Better educated men showed more psycho-neurotic symptoms than those with less education. (The mental instability of the intellectual as compared to the more impassive psychology of the-man-in-the-street has often been commented on.) B, 439.
2. Men from rural backgrounds were usually in better spirits during their Army life than soldiers from city backgrounds. (After all, they are more accustomed to hardships.) A, 94.
3. Southern soldiers were better able to stand the climate in the hot South Sea Islands than Northern soldiers (of course, Southerners are more accustomed to hot weather). A, 175.
4. White privates were more eager to become non-coms than Negroes. (The lack of ambition among Negroes is almost proverbial.) A, 583.
5. Southern Negroes preferred Southern to Northern white officers. (Isn't it well known that Southern whites have a more fatherly attitude toward their "darkies"?) A, 581.
6. As long as the fighting continued, men were more eager to be returned to the States than they were after the German surrender. (You cannot blame people for not wanting to be killed.) B, 561.

[1] References are handled the following way. The first and the second volume are referred to by A and B respectively. Chapter numbers are given in Roman numerals. Page numbers are given in Arabic numerals. Charts and Tables are specifically marked by Chart and T respectively.

We have in these examples a sample list of the simplest type of interrelationships which provide the "bricks" from which our empirical social science is being built. But why, since they are so obvious, is so much money and energy given to establish such findings? Would it not be wiser to take them for granted and proceed directly to a more sophisticated type of analysis? This might be so except for one interesting point about the list. *Every one of these statements is the direct opposite of what actually was found.* Poorly educated soldiers were more neurotic than those with high education; Southerners showed no greater ability than Northerners to adjust to a tropical climate; Negroes were more eager for promotion than whites; and so on. (The references following the above statements indicate where the evidence for the true findings can be located.)

If we had mentioned the actual results of the investigation first, the reader would have labelled these "obvious" also. Obviously something is wrong with the entire argument of "obviousness." It should really be turned on its head. Since every kind of human reaction is conceivable, it is of great importance to know which reactions actually occur most frequently and under what conditions; only then will a more advanced social science develop.

A PROBLEM OF SOCIAL ACOUSTICS

Such considerations are a necessary starting point for a discussion of *The American Soldier*. The volumes contain a large and reasoned inventory of the prevailing manner in which certain types of people respond to certain situations, surpassing anything that is available thus far in the literature of social science. For the most part, the findings can be applied productively to questions of general interest to the social investigator. Everyone who is concerned with a particular facet of human behavior is sure to find some pertinent material.

The presentation is organized around the main problems which the Army faced and in connection with which it needed the help of the Research Branch. But in all the chapters the reader feels the concern of the authors with basic themes of social relations. To bring out these themes will be the task of all of us whose work will be so greatly helped by *The American Soldier*. In the next section of this review a few of these which seem most pertinent to current discussions among social scientists will be considered. A final section gives an idea of how the book is organized and points to especially interesting results in the various chapters.

It has been said that many years pass before an important book makes its mark on the thinking of a period. But why shouldn't such a process be speeded up? Use of the text in teaching is a major way in which scientific contributions can be disseminated. But there is a difficulty here. Social research techniques are fairly new; a great number of those who will be teaching sociology and political science in 1950 have not had experience in the kind of field work on which *The American Soldier* is based. It is only fair, therefore, that some of us point up the methodological contributions to analysis, organization, and reporting of findings which have been made in the two volumes. An effort in this direction is made by the present reviewer in another place.[2] Furthermore, the teaching of social research has been greatly handicapped thus far by the scarcity of published examples of good research. Many will welcome the abundance now provided by Stouffer and his associates, particularly if some additional commentary is provided.

In other respects more intensive work may be needed in order to provide the volumes with their deserved social acoustics as quickly as possible. The present review is written from the point of view of a social psychologist. But the work has great implications for students and artisans in other fields as well. For the historian it sets new standards of reporting social facts. Historical literature is full of references to the way people felt at various times, and how different groups of the population reacted to various events. But how is this known? Imagine a historian writing now about the armies of the Civil War and compare his sources with those of the historian writing about the American Army in World War II a hundred years hence. Of course, the future historian will also use diaries, letters, newspaper reports, and so on. But what a difference it will make that these volumes will be available to him. Responsible historians should have enough methodological insight into their professional work and enough imagination to spell out what the

[2] *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1949.

proper contribution of *The American Soldier* will be. This should be done not only in regard to the specific topic but with more general awareness of what such data would mean to the historian if they were systematically collected in many areas of behavior and attitude.[3]

Other cooperative evaluations would be equally rewarding. For example, certain parts of the text deal with experiences of soldiers in combat. A number of remarkable novels written about World War II have treated the same topics in a literary context. What are the chief differences between an artistic creation and a cool, analytical dissection of the combat situation into its main elements and their interrelations? It would not be difficult to devise a number of experiments to compare the two forms of presentation in a variety of ways. Which of the two appears to give a truer picture to readers who were not in combat themselves, and which to those who were? Among the latter one might compare "naive" subjects with others who had some training in observation. How should we weigh the vividness of the unique event described by the artist against the generalized picture presented by the social scientists? These are problems which could be handled jointly by an experimental psychologist and a literary critic.

The present expository review, then, is written in the awareness that it can only be a first contribution to the much broader evaluation called for by the publication of *The American Soldier*.

II. Some Basic Themes

The present section is concerned with the contributions of the book to particular social science problems. Material relevant to these problems will be selected from various parts of the two volumes without regard for the particular contexts in which it is found. Thus the reviewer anticipates what is sure to become a favorite topic for Master's theses: "The Contributions of *The American Soldier* to the Problem of. . . ."

It is to be regretted that only brief references to the various findings will be possible. To appreciate the richness of the original material, the reader will have to refer to the indicated sections of the text, which, incidentally, is written in a vivid and fluent style.

The Primary Group

Sociologists have long been concerned with the ways in which people are influenced by their immediate surroundings. Face-to-face contacts have a strong impact on all of us. If we share most of our experiences with other human beings, we are also likely to share their attitudes and opinions. Such primary groups as the family, the fraternity, or the work group can be a source of psychological strength and security to the individual. Anxieties are created when people fall "out of step" with them.

The Stouffer volumes contribute to our understanding of at least three aspects of the role of primary groups:

a) the way in which primary groups shape the thinking of the individual;
b) the way in which they provide emotional support;
c) how the loss of contact with such groups creates emotional disturbances in the individual

a) *Primary groups shape attitudes of the individual.* An unusual research design made it possible for the investigators to gain information on this point. Prior to the invasion of France, there were three types of American troops in England. The "Green" Divisions were whole units which had come directly to England from the United States. The Veteran Divisions were those that had seen battle in the Mediterranean and were then re-assembled in England in preparation for the invasion of France. Finally, there were the *replacements* — individual soldiers who had come straight from the United States but who were assigned to Veteran Divisions to take the places of battle casualties.

The authors realized that the replacements found themselves in a very special situation. If lack of combat experience were alone relevant they should have the same attitudes as the soldiers in the "Green" Divisions. If the replacements held different attitudes, however, this could be attributed to their close contact with experienced soldiers in the Veteran Divisions. Thus the story of these replacements becomes a case study in the impact of primary

[3] It is a fair estimate that the preparation of such a paper would require six months' time, and it would therefore be necessary for some foundation to make provision for freeing that much of a historian's time.

groups, in the importance of "environmental influences." The new men who were placed in Veteran Divisions acquired the excessive pride of the "convert" with regard to their outfits, but they also developed feelings of inferiority about their own abilities. The replacement thus took a middle position between the rather cynical viewpoint of the veteran and the more battle-eager attitude of men who were assigned to the "Green" Divisions — becoming "already half a veteran without ever having been in combat" (B, 246).

This whole chapter (B, V) is remarkable because in it rather refined psychological processes are convincingly documented by statistical data. A child born into a Democratic family, a farm girl moving into the city, a young law student hired by a Wall Street firm — they are all "replacements." Anyone who wants to study how they become fitted into the opinion climate of their new environment will find relevant ideas in *The American Soldier.*

b) *Primary groups provide emotional support.* "Sources of power and security from the group" are traced in B, pages 130 to 148. The context is a discussion of combat motivation. How were men able to stand the terrific strain of battle? Partly because of their peculiar relations with fellow soldiers. They wanted to keep their respect and in turn they did not want to let them down; they had their officers to tell them what to do when they became paralyzed with fear and the medical corpsman to help them if they were wounded. The whole complex of mutual interdependence is difficult to describe; the text makes skillful use of qualitative material and of general observations of social psychologists.[4] Some of the most convincing evidence comes from an argument in reverse: groups which had been in battle showed an especially high degree of loyalty and solidarity (B, 138, Chart VI and B, 258).

c) *Emotional disturbances from loss of contact with the group.* When men had become integrated into a primary group and then had to leave it, they showed marked signs of anxiety. Here again the most cogent material comes from the study of a special group — the returnees, soldiers who had come back to this country after service overseas (B,IX). They exhibited many nervous symptoms (T.2), were dissatisfied with their jobs (T.12), did not feel they really belonged in their present companies (T.24), and so on. Most interesting in the present context is the fact that these returnees preferred to serve if possible with other returnees and under returnee officers (T.3). They tried in this country to reenact the life in the primary groups they had left overseas.

The replacements, just *before* joining their new units and in the *early* stages of their contact with the veterans, also showed signs of great uneasiness, which are carefully traced in B, 275 ff. ("The career of a replacement." See especially the table on page 281). Thus the people marginal to their primary groups (replacements before integration and returnees after leaving) provided the best semi-experimental cases for the study of the groups' emotional impact.[5]

The effects of primary groups, like any other effects, are notoriously difficult to investigate. At least the following four methods are available: the study of people who have been brought into new situations; repeated interviews (panel technique) with the same persons; comparison of present and past attitudes, the latter obtained from retrospection; experimental procedures. Stouffer repeatedly expresses regret that he could not make more use of panel and experimental methods. This is one of the points where service studies have their unavoidable limitations; the "front office" will always prefer the quicker and simpler methods even if the social scientist knows that with more time and effort he could get sounder results. Still the Research Branch was able repeatedly to use quite sophisticated procedures and the volumes are very outspoken indeed in regard to the limitations under which the Research Branch worked.

THE FRAME OF REFERENCE

It is a basic tenet of social science that all things men do are "determined from within and without." The impingement of a primary group on an individual is an example of the force "from without." But to a considerable degree

[4] It is interesting to note the similarity of findings in E. Shils and M. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 12, No. 2 (1948).

[5] Educators will be interested also in some of the material on the relation between primary groups and problems of discipline as discussed in B VIII, Section 3.

it is possible for an individual to select the outside stimuli to which he will react and adjust. The past experiences of different people will cause them to notice, to fear, and to neglect different things. For this reason, no two members of even an intimate primary group will necessarily respond to situations in the same way. The manner in which such inner controls function and develop is summarized by the concept of a "frame of reference." Stouffer and his associates have devoted a great deal of attention to clarifying and documenting the importance of these inner controls.

For the purposes of preliminary orientation we can make the following distinctions, which rank the effects of frame of reference in an order of increasing complexity:

a) selective perception,
b) level of expectation,
c) relative deprivation,
d) role of uncertainty.

We shall now exemplify these concepts with some of Stouffer's data.

a) *Selective perception.* It is well known that people tend to see the world as they want to. Each delegate to the United Nations, for example, feels that his country's contribution to the war effort was greatest. American soldiers were no exception to this general tendency. Their ethnocentrism is shown in B, 627, where it is seen that 78 per cent of a large sample of soldiers said that the United States was doing more than its share in the war. Only 22 per cent conceded this role to Russia and 5 per cent credited England with it. In the same vein, both Negroes and whites claimed that their own race was doing more in the war than the other (A, 511).

Another interesting instance of selective perception arose when soldiers were asked how they felt when they saw Japanese prisoners (B, 160, Chart V). Those who already were strongly anti-Japanese were reinforced in their hatred by the sight of the prisoners. More conciliatory respondents discovered that the Japanese prisoners were "men just like us." The two volumes are filled with such syndromes and halo effects. A systematic collection and interpretation of them would be another highly desirable "cross-cutting" assignment.

b) *Level of expectation.* The next group of findings illustrates the fact that individuals' attitudes are influenced by their expectations. The graphic presentation of one such case is quite impressive (B, 512, Chart V). It reports the answers given by Negro soldiers to the question: "Do you think that most Negroes are being given a fair chance to do as much as they want to help win the war?" The Negro soldiers in the sample (according to the table) were separated into Southerners and Northerners and were also classified according to the amount of formal education they had had. The Southern Negroes consistently gave more affirmative answers than the Northern Negroes. In both groups, the proportion of "yes" replies decreased steadily as the educational level became higher. Northern Negroes and well-educated Negroes are accustomed to better treatment and expect better opportunities. Therefore, they will respond with greater discontent to a situation that a Southern or a poorly educated Negro may readily accept.

An even more direct effect of the level of expectation is found in B, 500, T. 20. Among men returning to the United States some were promised, or believed they had been promised, that they would be stationed at a post near their homes. Others did not share this expectation. The results indicate a sharp difference in attitudes depending on whether or not the soldier had such an expectation. When compared with the men who had no such hopes, almost twice as many in the "expectant" group were dissatisfied with their stations.

The influence of expectations on attitudes leads to a seemingly paradoxical result. Promotions played an important role in the life of a soldier. (See A, 215 ff.) Men who were promoted had higher morale in general.[6] Their own good fortune was reflected in their more favorable opinions of Army practices (A, 88, Chart I). Now, various Army units differed greatly with regard to promotion opportunities. It was much easier, for instance, to get promoted in the Air Force than in the Military Police. It is also true that opportunities varied with amount of education. Well-educated men had considerably higher promotion rates than poorly educated soldiers. The seeming paradox is that the greater the objective opportunities available, the less the subjective satisfaction felt by the soldiers. The proportion of men saying a soldier had a good chance to be pro-

[6] For an interesting exception see A 308.

moted was greater in the Military Police than in the Army Air Force, and the more educated men experienced greater discontent than those with less education. (A VI, Chart IX)

The explanation given for this state of affairs is convincing. If a group of soldiers has a good chance of promotion, a high level of expectation is created in each member of the group. The expectations, however, are far greater than the opportunities that are available. As a result, the greater the average opportunity, the greater the average disappointment.

c) *Relative deprivation.* The notion of relative deprivation implies that people do not suffer in an "absolute" way; they compare their lot with that of other people of their kind. In answer to the question, "At the time you came into the Army, did you think you should have been deferred?", men indicated varied feelings. Such responses as, "No, I shouldn't have been deferred," or, "I volunteered," were taken as an index of personal commitment (A,III, 124,T.3). Unmarried men were more positive than married respondents in their replies. The proportion of positive answers decreased with an increase in age. It was also found that less educated soldiers were more discontented with being in the Army than others. (The table is a typical example of the remarkable consistency found in much of Stouffer's data). The text explains all three findings through the concept of "relative deprivation." Married men have more to lose when drawn away from civilian life. The same is true for older men, who were probably better established in civilian jobs than were younger ones. The role of education is not as immediately evident. The less educated men frequently came from a working class background. They had lived among factory workers — the occupational group most likely to have been deferred during the war. Thus the less educated soldier probably had more direct contacts with persons who had been deferred than did other men in the army. As a result he felt more frustration about having been drafted.

Conversely, the fact that "Negroes in Southern camps made no worse general adjustment than those in Northern camps" is explained by the concept of "relative status" (A, 563 ff.). In the South the Negro soldier's basis of comparison was the still more badly treated Negro civilian. In Northern camps the comparison with the Negro war worker who made good money was more frustrating. The relative deprivation in the North counterbalanced the objectively worse treatment of Negro soldiers in Southern camps. (This is documented in A, X, Sect. 6).

The relations between officers and men also indicate the role of relative deprivation. A question used in many of the surveys was: "How many of the officers in your present outfit are of the kind who are willing to go through anything they make their men go through?" The favorable answers "all of them" or "most of them" were given most frequently by combat troops (A, VIII, Charts I and II). They were least frequently given by overseas troops who were outside of the combat zone. Troops that were stationed in the United States held a middle position. Stouffer offers the following explanation. The American soldier strongly resented the fact that his officers had rights and privileges of which he was deprived. As long as the soldiers were in the United States there were situations outside of camp where the traditional American equality of consumption came into play. Overseas, however, when troops were garrisoned in foreign countries, the opportunities for private enjoyment were scarce. Here the full impact of the privileges Army life granted officers was felt. In the front lines, on the other hand, the opportunities were scarce for everyone, including officers; general austerity prevented resentment.[7]

d) *Role of uncertainty.* The importance of a clear frame of reference is apparent when a situation is examined in which it has been "lost." Then uncertainty, with all its devastating psychological effects, develops. The morale of the Air Force was much higher than that of any other section of the Army (A, V, Sect. 2). One of the major reasons was the fact that Air Force personnel participated in a "tour of combat duty" (B, VIII, Sect. 1). It was the general practice in the Air Force for a flier who had completed a certain number of missions to be allowed to return home for a period of rest and recreation. No matter how dangerous their

[7] The findings bring to mind many wartime studies which indicated the importance of fairness in shaping attitudes toward rationing. This discussion is particularly interesting because of the skillful integration of statistical data and qualitative comments. (A, 377 ff.)

tasks were, fliers knew that at the end of a certain period they would have temporary release from the ordeal. On the other hand, infantry men, particularly in the first years of the war, had no such goal. They felt ensnared in a series of interminable trials. This seems to have been one of the worst psychological handicaps of ground troops (B, 83). Corroborative evidence is provided in the chapter on returnees. These men were primarily interested in learning what the Army was going to do with them (B,478, T. 7). The importance of certainty is also stressed in the works of industrial psychologists.[8] The data in *The American Soldier* will add a great deal to our thinking on this point.

In addition to their substantive value, the great emphasis in the two volumes on the "frame of reference" will be beneficial for future studies. The concepts reviewed here were used mainly for *post hoc* interpretation of findings. In the future we will be better prepared to introduce directly questions on expectations, aspirations, and comparisons, and the basis for evidence will be firmer than before.[8a]

ROLE AND POSITION

We are quite accustomed to the idea that people think differently, depending on their role and position in society. It is taken for granted that rich men will hold different ideas than poor men; that farmers' beliefs will contrast with those of city dwellers. But prior to these studies, no one knew how markedly a person's attitudes would change when he moved into a new situation. After all, class positions are relatively stable, and it may take years or even a lifetime's experience before a change in attitudes and values can be effected. The Army, however, gave rise to rapid changes in position. A man might be a private one day and an officer the next. Obviously his role would change too. How much did this affect his outlook?

The American Soldier reports very large differences in the replies of officers and enlisted men to a vast range of topics. In order to give the full impact of the findings, even in a review, it is necessary that we quote some figures. The following table shows the proportion of *affirmative* answers given to a selection of questions by two groups: the enlisted men and the officers (A, 374 and 419).

The most vivid documentation of the extent to which different positions lead to different pictures of the world is provided by the next table. The soldiers were asked to respond to the statement: "An officer will lose the respect of his men if he pals around with them off duty." The proportion *disagreeing* with it are classified by rank:

Enlisted Men	82%
Second Lieutenants	54
First Lieutenants	39
Captains	27

The text provides convincing evidence that these differences are, at least in part, the result of a change in rank. It may of course be, and is certainly partially true, that men having conformist attitudes were more likely to be promoted. In some cases, however, soldiers were interviewed before and after their promotions. This allowed for the tracing of attitude changes in the same individuals. Furthermore, the use of cross-tabulations cuts down the danger that spurious background factors can account for these marked differences.[9]

Here, then, is important material for a theory of class position. Men were rapidly, and often

[8] See Daniel Katz and Herbert Hyman, "Morale in War Industries," in *Readings in Social Psychology* (eds., Theodore Newcomb and Eugene Hartley), New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947, pp. 437–447.

[8a] The explicit use of expectation as an empirical variable is altogether rare in the literature. One of the few published studies which provides a very good example is George Katona, "Effect of Income Changes on the Rate of Savings," printed in the *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Volume XXXI, No. 2, May 1949. There it is shown that the effect of past income changes on present saving habits varies according to what expectations people have about their future income. At different points in *The American Soldier* Stouffer expresses regrets that the role of such variables was not more stressed during the work of the Research Branch. Here, again, the service nature of the whole enterprise was not hospitable to more abstract considerations. Much material along this line can be expected from a study of social relations in housing projects to be published soon under the direction of Robert K. Merton. In it, also, much will be found on "reciprocal images" between Negroes and whites and the factors which account for them.

[9] The influence of position on opinion can also be traced in a comparison of regular Army men with selectees which was made prior to Pearl Harbor. (A, II, Chart III-V) and in a comparison of staff and line officers (A, VI, Chart XIII).

TABLE 1

Question	*Officers*	*Enlisted Men*
"The Army places too much importance upon military courtesy."	23%	74%
"The harder a man works in the Army, the better chance he has of succeeding."	65	30
"If enlisted men have to observe curfew, officers should, too."	35	84
"Officers deserve extra rights and privileges because they have more responsibility than enlisted men."	67	23

artificially, placed in one group rather than in another. How did this affect the way in which they saw and evaluated the situations in which they lived? A systematic combing of the two volumes for pertinent material would be very worthwhile. One would like to identify the attitudes which are strongly influenced by position, and those on which its effect is minor. In this way, the foundation for a more general theory may be laid. The studies themselves make a valuable contribution in this direction. In A, VIII, "barriers to understanding between officers and enlisted men" are discussed. An especially provocative analysis of officer candidates schools suggests that there a high anxiety situation was created. This situation changed the personality of the candidates to the extent that "many officers, themselves formerly enlisted men, seemed to fail as officers to carry over their enlisted experience and try to see the enlisted men's point of view in handling their men" (389–391).

In the development of this theme, special attention must be given to the role of the non-commissioned officer. His position in the military hierarchy was between the men and the commissioned officers. Correspondingly, his attitudes fell between the two extremes (A, VIII, T. 12 & 13). However, the non-coms had a tendency to side somewhat more with the men than with the officers. This may be partly attributed to the fact that their primary contacts were more with the men. They had also shared the actual experience of the men, whereas they had not personally experienced the role of the officer. The value of this material is further enhanced by data on the expectations of men and officers with regard to non-com behavior (A, VIII, Chart IV). The officers were primarily interested in the non-com's executive abilities. The enlisted men looked at him in terms of human relations. Thus the non-com really was under cross-pressure.

It seems that differences in role and position lead not only to differences in attitudes but to misunderstandings and mistaken judgment of one group by another. We learn, for example, that in every respect officers over-estimated the morale of their soldiers and under-rated their "gripes" (A, VIII, T. 5, 6 & 7). Sometimes self-deception about other people's feelings and the coloring of one's own attitude by self-interests combine to make for a rather complex and contradictory situation. In a survey made with flying personnel, the following question was asked: "How do you feel about the promotion policy for enlisted men (officers) in combat crews?" Only 5 per cent of the officers were "very well satisfied" with their own promotion chances; 13 per cent of the enlisted men were "very well satisfied." (This reflects the fact mentioned before that the group which had objectively the better chances was always less satisfied.) Most interesting, however, is that 24 per cent of the officers felt that the men were very well satisfied. Thus they not only thought that what is not good enough for themselves is good enough for the men; they also were quite mistaken as to how the enlisted men really felt (A, VI, Chart XV).

This misjudgment of one group by another reappears in a variety of other contexts. In B, X, the problem of returnees — soldiers who have been overseas and are reassigned to units in the States — is treated. In a mixed unit, consisting of returnees and non-returnees, both groups were asked whether "men who haven't been overseas appreciate what returnees have done and been through." Seventy-eight per cent of the non-returnees were quite satisfied with the returnees' lot; they believed that all

or most of the men appreciated the returnee. The returnees felt quite differently about the matter. Only 35 per cent gave answers which indicated satisfaction with the amount of appreciation they received (B, X, Chart V). A question on combat incentives of enlisted men was also answered quite differently by officers and the men themselves (B, III, Chart I).

There is, however, a limit to the importance of position. It seems to be reached under the impact of strong emotional experiences which are shared by two groups. A number of tables in B, III (T. 3, 4, & 9), classify respondents' answers in two ways: according to their rank and according to the length of time they had spent in battle. Almost always, the following trend is shown: As long as the men have little or no battle experience the difference between enlisted men and non-commissioned officers is very great. With increased battle experience the differences between them diminish until the two groups feel almost alike. The relative importance and interplay between integrating and dividing experiences is thus clearly shown to be a significant problem.

It should be apparent by now that the material furnished in *The American Soldier* is not of less value because it is directly concerned only with the Army. On the contrary, it is only because there was Army research that we now have a type of information which, heretofore, civilian research could not provide.

OTHER THEMES

Many other topics found in the volumes could have been selected for our discussion here. There is ample material to demonstrate the importance of attitudes as determinants of and mediators between actual experiences and performances. The relation between statistical data and qualitative material could be traced through many chapters.[10] In various parts of the volumes changes of attitudes as a result of combat, of overseas service, or of sheer length of time in the Army are discussed. What do these data contribute to a theory of opinion formation?

Special attention should be given to the very numerous findings on educational differences. The reluctance of the uneducated man to criticize (A, 124, 270, 445, 458), his hesitancy about making use of "channels of redress" (A, 74), his defeatism with regard to promotion (A, 252), his difficulty in appraising situations realistically (A, 153, 185 & B, 146), his fear of not grasping what he is supposed to do (A, 407), and his heightened feelings of uneasiness (A, 124, 129 & B, 420) are shown by data sometimes filled with pathos. These facts provide us with material for a "portrait of the underdog."[11]

The use of the concept of personal adjustment in *The American Soldier* is an illustration of clarity of analysis, elaborately documented. Two important points are made. First, that the viewpoint from which adjustment, or morale, is analyzed must be explicitly specified. For example, the morale of a labor force in a factory would be considered high from the viewpoint of both labor and management if both cooperated enthusiastically to achieve a common goal (A, III, 82–85). A labor force on strike which manifested a spirited defiance of management also would be exhibiting high morale, but only from the viewpoint of labor. A non-union labor force which was highly efficient might be exhibiting high morale from the viewpoint of management, but not in the eyes of the organized labor movement. The Army studies explicitly view personal adjustment from the standpoint of the Army management, at the same time often pointing out situations — goldbricking for example (A, VIII, 420) — where men were adjusting well to anti-management goals. The second point is that adjustment needs to be regarded as a profile of traits, not as a single unitary trait (A, III, 98–102). Although several traits may be positively related to actual success or failure in the Army, some types of soldiers may be consistently high on certain traits and low on others. In documenting differences among different types of men in adjustment profiles, the authors use a method of matched comparisons. One table alone (A, V, Table 9) is based on a study of the differences between 8,554 pairs of percentages, each percentage in turn being based on the responses

[10] These two points will be elaborated in the paper on "techniques of survey analysis" mentioned in footnote 2.

[11] Earlier material on this point is summarized by G. Knupfer, "Portrait of the Underdog," *Public Opinion Quarterly* Vol. II, No. 1 (1947). The new data corroborate many of the earlier findings but they are probably richer than all previously available information combined.

of from forty to several hundred soldiers. Just as intelligence is now usefully thought of as a profile of several factors, so a concept like adjustment becomes useful in sorting out different kinds of men if it is analyzed as a set of components.

III. The Epic of the American Soldier

We shall now turn to a description of the way in which the volumes are organized. Terms which have been discussed and tables which were mentioned before will not be repeated. We shall, however, occasionally point up results not introduced previously and pay some attention to their practical application.

The Beginning of the Journey

The first chapter describes the history of the Research Branch and its mode of operation. In Section 2 (27–53) one finds a revealing discussion of what one might call the "philosophical basis" of its work. The Branch was organized in 1941, and when Pearl Harbor came one major survey had just been finished. Chapter II makes available a description of the prewar Army. The differences between the selectees, who had come in as a result of the first draft, and the regular Army men are interesting, as is a comparison between the armies of the First and Second World Wars.

Chapters III, IV, and V of the first volume deal with adjustment in the Army. It was decided that adjustment would be represented by four major factors: personal *esprit*, commitment to war goals, satisfaction with status and job, and finally, approval or criticism of the Army. Chapter III shows that those four factors are generally related, but their "profile" varies from group to group: educated soldiers, for instance, have better *esprit* and are more highly committed to the war, but are less satisfied with their jobs and more critical of the Army as compared with uneducated soldiers (102). Occasionally the four factors are combined to form one adjustment index, and it is interesting that this index is highly correlated with an over-all self-rating of the soldiers as to how they think they have adjusted to Army life (A, III, Chart II).

Chapter IV traces in greater detail the variation of adjustment according to background characteristics such as age, marital status, and education (T. 1). Skillful use is made of comparisons between special groups, such as soldiers who were in the guardhouse for going on leave without permission (AWOL) as well as those who had to be transferred to psychiatric wards. Section 4 of this chapter considers the possible role of early childhood experiences and their influence on subsequent adjustment in the Army (Chart VI). Section 5 makes use of repeated interviews conducted with the same soldiers. This "panel" study is woven in throughout the text and yields important contributions at several crucial points. In Chapter IV it is used to show that better adjusted soldiers had greater chances of being promoted at some later date.

Chapter V shows variations in adjustment by type of experience in the Army. It turns out that soldiers overseas did not feel worse off than soldiers at home. There were a number of compensating factors overseas which are discussed in Section 1. Section 2 introduces a fact which is used in many discussions all through the volumes: the Air Corps men were most satisfied and the Infantry men least satisfied with their lot. Section 3 shows by a variety of statistical devices that as time went on the personal *esprit* of the soldiers deteriorated, and they became more and more critical of the Army. The content of their criticism is discussed in considerable detail, and much quantitative material is used for purposes of exemplification. This case analysis (212 ff.) is a good example of how Research Branch materials could be used in determining Army policy.

Chapter VI deals with the promotion opportunities which existed in the Army. First, the whole promotion picture, in so far as the chances of becoming an officer are concerned, is described in considerable detail. Then, in Section 2, the enlisted man's desire for promotion is analyzed carefully. As can well be understood, there was a general desire for promotion, but quite a number of soldiers were skeptical about the promotion chances they had. This attitude toward chances for promotion provides one of the most interesting blocks of data. Here information is obtained from a large sector of the population regarding their hopes for and frustrations with respect to "success." Four major findings as to what determines whether soldiers were or were not satisfied are documented (254 ff.). It is easy to see such analyses transferred to industrial situations or even to the sphere of personal experience.

An intelligent generalization of this section should go far toward showing what surveys of the future might look like. A final section in Chapter VI deals with the factors which were related to actual promotion.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

Chapter VII describes job assignments and job satisfactions. While the layman thinks of the Army as a fighting outfit, the fact of the matter is that a majority of the soldiers in World War II had jobs very similar to those of civilian life. Only one-quarter of the men ever came near the battlefields; half had some kind of manual work, and one-quarter clerical work (312). Thus the findings as to how the men felt about their jobs, and how this feeling in turn affected their efficiency, are applicable to many other areas of industry and education. There is, for instance, a chart on page 291 in this chapter which shows how much better men liked their jobs when they chose them themselves. The data and discussion pertaining to this finding will certainly have a prominent place in any future textbook on industrial or educational psychology.

Chapter VIII is entitled, "Attitudes toward Leadership and Social Control." It is among the richest as far as psychological and sociological interpretation go and therefore has been referred to frequently in Section II of this review. It is probably no exaggeration to say that it could be used as an empirical companion-piece to a book like Chester Barnard's *Functions of the Executive*.

Chapter IX discusses the orientation of soldiers toward the war. In the first section an effort is made to describe and discuss the strange ideological background of the Second World War. The Pearl Harbor attack had made the war acceptable to the whole population, although a large number of people were not especially concerned with its background and its aims. Variations in "identification with the war" are reported in Section 2, and the final section summarizes some of the educational efforts which the Army made to raise the soldier's feelings of personal commitment. (Some of these efforts are discussed in the third volume of the series, which is not included in this review.) It seems that for a variety of reasons such efforts were not too successful. The fact that the last war was fought in a detached manner has been repeatedly commented upon in the literature and is corroborated here as far as the soldiers themselves were concerned. The reasons for and implications of this phenomenon are still far from clear and will certainly be mulled over for some time to come.

The final chapter of Volume I assembles all material available on Negro soldiers. It contains more new data on Negro-white relations than is to be found in any single text in the vast literature of this field (with the exception of the review volumes in the Myrdal series). Using a variety of ingenious statistics the chapter first shows the extent of discrimination in the Army. Then the degree to which the Negro soldier interpreted ordinary experiences in racial terms is documented. As a result of these two factors Negro soldiers had a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the war. To them the most popular slogan was that of the double "V," which stood for simultaneous victory on the battle front and on the race front at home. In this connection a rather complicated syndrome is presented and discussed: Negro soldiers who were more optimistic in regard to the future of their race in this country were also more willing to do their share in the war (528 ff.).

In general the Negroes seemed not to have been less well adjusted than the whites (see 535 ff.) although in some respects they had special problems to cope with. (See the discussion of venereal disease, 545 ff.). Section 6 of this chapter makes especially skillful use of camp locations, which provided something like an experimental situation. Southern and Northern Negroes were trained in both Southern and Northern camps. For a Southern Negro, for instance, a Southern camp had the advantage of being near home and the disadvantage of being in an unfavorable environment. The resulting cross-pressures are brilliantly documented and interpreted (555 ff.).

In two other sections attitudes of Negroes and whites toward racial segregation in the Army, and Negro soldiers' opinions regarding Army leadership are brought into the picture. These data include many contributions which are of general importance for race relations but which cannot be discussed in detail here. The final section (9) contains a table which, even before these volumes appeared, had become widely known by word-of-mouth. Toward the end of the war some Negro platoons were inserted into white companies. The white soldiers

who fought in these companies liked the experiment. The farther removed white soldiers were from the actual experiment the more did they persist in their distrust of such an innovation. Chart XVII on page 594 will certainly remain a classic of social research for a long time to come.

FEAR AND MORALE IN COMBAT

While Volume I covers mainly the soldier in training, Volume II deals with combat and its aftermath. Merely as a historical document this volume is obviously unique. Chapter I contains a large amount of material showing that soldiers having better attitudes during training also showed superior performance in actual battle. Section 3 of this chapter presents in great detail all of the indices which were used to prove the case and all the work the Research Branch went through in order to obtain the basic data. This section will be a godsend for teachers who need detailed material on more complicated research procedures. A more detailed discussion will be found elsewhere (see footnote 2).

Chapters II to IV deal with combat situations. The first in this block is especially valuable for some of its conceptual discussions. It is often assumed that the empirical research man just goes out and collects data as one might count pebbles on the seashore. Here it is shown how difficult it is to dissect terms like "combat situation" (77 ff.) or "active theater" (60 ff.) or "victory" (169 ff.) into their component elements so as to make them amenable to empirical study.

Chapter III singles out five major elements which seem to have made the majority of soldiers able to stand the terrific stress of battle: coercive authority, personal leadership, social relations with the primary group, convictions about the war, and finally, certain more individual elements like prayer and personal philosophies. On this last point there is a very interesting discussion (especially Tables 20–23) in regard to the differences between the soldiers who were helped by prayer and the others who were helped by the idea that they could not let the other fellow down. It seems that an objectively greater amount of stress and danger did lead to more reliance on prayer. At the same time, the soldier who relied most on prayer had somewhat fewer personal resources for coping with the stresses which he underwent. Pages 172–185, which attempt to clarify the functioning of prayer and feelings of personal solidarity by a series of cross tabulations with other questions, are an especially good example of research sophistication, and will, it is hoped, be carefully studied by teachers and research practitioners.

The final chapter in this group reports on ways in which the Army tried to control fear in combat. Three major aspects are singled out. The general policy was to have it understood that everyone is afraid and that it is somewhat easier to cope with fear if it is openly admitted. The data show how willing the soldiers were to report their fear symptoms (T. 3) and to accept the fear of their fellow soldiers as something natural (T. 1 & 2). It is especially interesting that veterans did not hesitate to state how much their anxieties were increased by the actual battle experience (Chart I), something quite different from the old stereotype of the *miles gloriosus*. In several sections of the text it is shown that veterans were less willing to go into battle than were the new troops who had not yet experienced it.

A second aspect of the control of fear is discussed in connection with some experiments the Research Branch carried out to screen soldiers who might become psychologically unfit during battle. A carefully designed and observed jump from a mock-up tower introduced in the course of the training of parachutists was used as a screening test, the efficiency of which is discussed in detail. The exhaustive consideration of factors which can be involved in such an experiment makes this report especially valuable (215 ff.). A final question is whether danger situations introduced during the training period make for better performance in battle. The authors tend to the conclusion that they do.

Chapter V deals with combat replacements. These data were referred to extensively in our previous discussion of primary groups. A good summary of the main findings can be found on page 246. The chapter contains an interesting discussion of the role of question wording, especially in connection with Tables 2 and 4. It also employs a very instructive statistical device, in one case using information collected from veteran troops prior to the arrival of replacements (265 ff.), thus giving an example of a "panel study" based on rates instead of individual responses. Finally, Chart III indicates that

after a certain amount of combat the effectiveness of soldiers decreased so markedly that too long deployment in the front lines was of dubious advantage to the Army.

Somewhat more specifically geared to military problems is Chapter VI. It shows that front-line soldiers resented and envied the men who were in the rear echelons, farther away from the danger zone. As a compensation a kind of "pecking order" developed. The nearer a man was to the front-line the more informal privileges he had; he could express his social superiority to the man farther behind in a way which the latter was not entitled to return. It is noteworthy that, as far as the soldiers in the United States and civilians on the home front are concerned, the front-line men did not feel too resentful, although there was an increase in aggression with increased length of time in combat (Charts VII and VIII). This chapter contains a suggestive chart (X) giving combat soldiers' opinions on whether "the people back home are doing all they should to help win the war." The respondents feel much more confident about their own family members and close friends than about people in general. This finding should be a challenging lead for social psychologists especially because it is paralleled by another finding (B, 398). Soldiers were asked whether they thought it would be difficult to obtain jobs after the war. Again they were much more optimistic about their own personal chances than about the outlook for the veterans' labor market in general.

Chapters VII and VIII deal with men in the Air Corps, and in spite of apparent restriction to a specific military unit the findings have great general significance. The starting point of the discussion is a large amount of evidence that Air Corps morale was especially high. In Section 2 possible explanations of the fact that morale was highest in that part of the Army which had the most dangerous job are considered. It is shown that the following factors help to account for this situation: the Air Force picked its men very carefully; it gave them a great amount of status and prestige; the relationship between officers and men was very fortunate, especially because combat officers were not in charge of administrative and disciplinary matters; there were certain psychological satisfactions involved in the flying experience; the training was of obvious usefulness for post-war civilian jobs; and, finally, the Air Corps gave the men a lot of medical attention and was careful about their rest periods. (The great importance of the limited tour of combat duty was mentioned previously.) The whole array of data shows how much can be done to overcome an objectively difficult situation by careful social engineering.

At another point (A, 309 ff.) tactful reference is made to the fact that the Army restricted this kind of effort to the Air Force because it was the newest and supposedly most important weapon. The Infantry was the most neglected part of the Army as far as social engineering went. At a rather late date it seems that the Army command became aware of this difficulty, and made an experiment with an "Infantry Badge" designed to raise the prestige of the Infantry and to impress upon the Infantryman the importance of his job. Data on the success of the whole enterprise are reported and should be carefully studied by educational and industrial sociologists.

Chapter VIII also shows the limitation of all these engineering efforts in the Air Corps. When the stress becomes too great, then nature, so to speak, takes its course. Charts V–XII show that, with an increasing number of missions, the fliers' willingness for combat decreased, and their anxieties and nervous symptoms increased. (See especially Charts X and XI). This chapter also contains one of those riddles which come up occasionally in social research and which show so clearly that survey findings are far from obvious. Flying personnel were distinguished according to the craft they served in: fighter pilots, light bomber pilots, medium bomber pilots, and heavy bomber pilots. The order indicated also furnished a sharp rank order in morale: Charts XVII and XVIII show that on a number of questions the fighter pilots had the highest, and the heavy bomber pilots the lowest morale, with the other two types of craft ranking in morale of personnel as they ranked in size of craft. Considerable efforts are made to explain this parallel, but none of the interpretations is completely conclusive.

Chapter IX is especially interesting as a provocative example of what social surveys may be able to do in the future. It deals with the general distribution of psychoneurotic symptoms in the Army. The first section weighs a variety of possible indices against each other and provides material for a discussion of scal-

ing techniques. The second section then shows that by far the greatest increase of nervous symptoms came about as the result of combat experience. Transfer to over-seas posts and length of service in the Army seem not to have made too much difference. Table 17 provides an example of the way in which retrospective information may be used. Soldiers whose nervous symptoms were very marked after combat were asked how they felt about many things prior to their battle experience. Their answers are very similar to those of a comparable group of soldiers who were interviewed before having seen combat.

THE END OF THE ROAD

The problem of returnees which is dealt with in Chapter X has been mentioned before. The men who had served overseas and come back to an Army which was still training formed an interesting example of an artificial "sub-culture." Some readers will want to give special attention to the great difficulty the Army and the returnees had in solving the problem of job adjustment in this country (486–496). The discussion reads almost like a description of displaced persons in a new country, or a chapter in a textbook on social disorganization. (It is important to realize that it was a question of finding jobs in the Army for the returnees. This turns out to be quite different from the post-war problem of finding jobs for discharged soldiers in civilian life, as shown in B, XIII, Section 3.)

Chapter XI is a brief record of a device which was well known at the time through the press. After V-E Day the Army instituted a point system on the basis of which it was decided in what order soldiers would be discharged. The research behind the development of the point system and its general success when actually used are described. It is especially interesting to read about various efforts to adapt the whole procedure to the changing situation in the closing months of the war. A memorandum from the Research Branch to General Marshall is quoted (534 and 540 ff.) which gives valuable insight into the relation between policy makers and research staffs.

This relationship between policy and research is brought out even more clearly in Chapter XII, which deals with the reaction of soldiers to the end of the war. All material is grouped around a rather unique document. It appears that in the summer of 1944 the Research Branch submitted a memorandum to the Army "forecasting the problems which would arise as an aftermath of hostilities." The predictions were based partly on previous surveys of the Research Branch and partly upon general sociological considerations. It is reproduced in full (551–60) and then compared with the actual course of events as far as they can be established by data collected in 1945. The predictions were right in the majority of cases, wrong at other points; not enough space is available in this review to go into details. There is no doubt, however, that with this procedure an important pattern has been set. Historians and political scientists try to understand and explain events after they have occurred. Undoubtedly analysis will be much keener if a prediction has first been made. For a variety of explanations of the same event will usually sound equally plausible. On the other hand, a prediction is, so to speak, a choice of the most convincing explanation in reverse. The actual course of events then forces an "explanation of the second order." Why were some predictions right and some wrong? The present chapter contains such an analysis, and the interspersed summaries will clearly show the merits of this remarkable innovation.

In the final chapter, the assembled data throw light on the soldiers' reabsorption into civilian life. A first section shows that soldiers were not too worried about their civilian future, although a considerable number felt they had been hurt rather than helped by their Army experience. Their attitudes towards a number of topics important for civilian society are discussed. Their prejudices were not much different from the civilian average. They in no way wanted to "take over the country" (615, 624). They showed very little concern with general social problems, and little desire for a "better society" (621 ff.). Some valuable data are provided on the way in which contact with other countries affected their attitudes toward foreign people. Finally, two studies of discharged soldiers were made, and the results indicated that most of them adjusted well and carried out the job plans which they had formed prior to entering the Army, or while they were in it.

As he approaches the last pages of these two volumes, the reader develops a feeling of frustration. Here was gripping and seemingly in-

exhaustible reading material which suddenly comes to an end, like a novel of which only the first chapters are available. Why was a war necessary to give us the first systematic analysis of life as it really is experienced by a large sector of the population? As Stouffer is about to turn out the lights he remarks, "What happened afterwards is a story which must be told someday from data other than that assembled by the Research Branch."

Where, O Lord, will they be coming from?

4

THE LIMITS OF COMMON SENSE

• *KARL W. DEUTSCH*

Some time ago a distinguished colleague from abroad asked me a rather intriguing question. What need is there, he asked in effect, for anything called the social sciences or the behavioral sciences? Can't we get all that we can know and all that we need to know from common sense? Can't we get it from a knowledge of affairs, a good stock of anecdotes, and the insights into human feelings gained from our own experience and the writings of great novelists? Can't we learn more about war and peace from Tolstoy than from all the work of the social scientists?

My foreign colleague was referring to all of us who are trying to take an intelligent and responsible interest in public affairs. Most immediately, however, his question referred to the behavioral scientists in the United States in their role as members of this broader public. In trying to answer him, we shall have to imagine ourselves as playing two roles. The first is that of a member of the public who has only the resources of common sense at his disposal, and who sees no need for anything more; the second role is that of a person who believes that social science is needed, in addition to common sense, and who is trying to get a clearer picture of what the methods of the sciences consist in and what kinds of usable results can be obtained with their aid.

The discussion which follows will pursue these two lines of questioning: What is meant by common sense and its limits? And what can the methods of behavioral science do to help us to move somewhat beyond these limitations so as to gain at least a small amount of knowledge that could be more specific and more trustworthy?

To begin, there is a wide area of validity for common sense. It is that range or area of events over which many tests would yield the same results — where, indeed, tests are not necessary since they would merely confirm the obvious. It is the area where the prevailing inaccuracies do not matter, since we know accurately enough what we need to know. It is the world of familiar everyday predictions in which neither science nor logic is needed to prove solemnly the trivial. Yet this world does not extend indefinitely.

How did we learn about common sense in the first place? Through contact with other people and through experience. Hence if we could get more contacts and more experience, could we not get more common-sense knowledge of the world? And if we could get, individually or jointly, an infinite amount of contacts and experience, could we not get an infinite amount of common-sense knowledge and call it wisdom? Better still, should we not call wisdom the most economical and efficient use of common-sense knowledge, stretching a little common sense in a short time as far as it possibly can go to cover the extent of our problems?

Or are there limits to this common-sense approach to problems of society and politics, to problems of war and peace? I should like to take a somewhat closer look at common sense, to see just where it might deceive us.

One interpretation of the meaning of common sense is common opinion. Common sense is, then, that on which people can agree at a

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particular time and place. But common sense interpreted as common opinion encounters at least three kinds of difficulties. First of all, it may be untrue. For a long period of time common opinion agreed that the earth was flat. Common opinion also agreed that the nature of light was white. Subsequent investigation showed that both of these views were incorrect. Second, common opinion may be a matter of changing fashions. It was believed before Newton that time was not independent of the events that took place in it, and Newton's conception of absolute time, independent of all events taking place within it, was considered to be against common sense. In the twentieth century, on the other hand, Newton's idea of time had become accepted as common sense, and Einstein's notion of time as not independent from the events in it was said to violate common sense. This process of embodying, in the course of time, changing ideas into common sense has led a philosopher of science, Phillip Frank, to suggest that common sense might be defined as that portion of science which has become obsolete.[1]

In the third place, common-sense knowledge may be self-contradictory. Many common-sense propositions come in pairs. We are told that opposites attract, and also that birds of a feather flock together. We are told that countries are united by common enemies. We are told this by Kenneth Boulding — among others — in his book, *The Organizational Revolution.*[2] We are also told that countries are not united by common enemies but that, on the contrary, they will be divided by them and so ruled; and we are finally told by Ortega y Gasset that countries are united only by common positive undertakings great enough to appeal to the imagination of their peoples.

All these views go back to common-sense propositions. Which one of the contradictory common-sense propositions applies at what time? Often a pair of opposite common-sense propositions circumscribe something which might be called deep truth. As some physicists have said only half-facetiously, truth is a statement the opposite of which is clearly false, deep truth is a statement the opposite of which is also true; and the progress of science consists in transforming deep truth into truth. In this sense, the contradictory notions that opposites attract each other and that birds of a feather flock together both agree that there is a relationship between the structural similarity of two personalities, organizations, or things, and the amount of attraction or repulsion between them. This much is in agreement, and to this extent the pair of common-sense propositions contain between them a relevant polarity — something that might be called a tiny bit of deep truth; but what the precise relationship between inner structure and mutual attraction is, this pair of common-sense propositions does not say, and something else will be needed to get beyond deep truth toward truth.

One alternative to common sense which has sometimes been proposed is intuitive insight — the recognition of how others think and feel, derived from looking introspectively into one's own personality. But whose intuition, insight, or introspection is to be believed, and at what time? Moreover, to what extent is it to be trusted? "I know exactly how those people think and feel" was classed by the anthropologist Alexander Leighton among the "famous last words" of administrators.[3] But if neither common sense nor inspired guessing will suffice, what else remains?

What is the meaning of the largest alternative that remains — the meaning of science as applied to human behavior? Clearly, some agreement is needed on what is meant by behavior. I shall call it that which is interpersonally observable, that on which different persons can agree, so that the bias of each single observer, although not eliminated, can at least be taken into account. To this entire area of observable human behavior, the well-known methods of science can be applied, and I would emphasize that I am using the plural in the word *methods.*

First of all, we try to decide what aspects of

[1] James Bryant Conant, *Science and Common Sense;* New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1951. Phillip Frank, *Modern Science and its Philosophy;* Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1949; see also Frank's *Philosophy of Science: The Link Between Science and Philosophy;* Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1957.

[2] Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Organizational Revolution: A Study in the Ethics of Economic Organization;* New York, Harper, 1953.

[3] Alexander H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men;* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1945; and *Human Relations in a Changing World: Observations on the Use of the Social Sciences;* New York, Dutton, 1949.

behavior interest us, since we never can investigate all of them; that is to say, we first state, implicitly or explicitly, some preliminary criteria of relevance. We may think, for instance, that in the patter of children's feet on their way to school we can hear the march of political demonstrations and the tread of armies ten or twenty years from now, and we may therefore wish to find out what the figures of school attendance are in countries where, ten or twenty years from now, nationalist political movements may assume a mass character.

In arriving at these criteria of relevance, we may first of all use introspection, intuition, or insight — that is, processes which are not verifiable among different observers. Here we are utilizing what some scientists have called hermeneutics,[4] or what Max Weber described as *verstehende Soziologie*, the attempt to understand through introspection.[5] But even though it is true that we can understand introspectively many facts and relations which exist, it is also true that we can understand in our fertile imagination very many relations that do not exist at all. What is more, there are things in the world that we cannot understand readily with our imagination as it is now constituted, even though we may be able to understand them some days or months or years in the future, after we have become accustomed to some of the presuppositions of such understanding.

We can, therefore, do nothing more than accept provisionally these guesses or potential insights about relevance. If we want to take them seriously, we must test them. We can do this by selecting certain behavioral data, verifying them, forming explicit hypotheses as to what we expect to find in observation, or what we expect to encounter as an outcome of experiment. We may then explain the outcome, or state what samples of a larger total we will consider if the total universe of observations is too large for us to handle. And we then finally test these explicit hypotheses by confrontation with the data which we get. In the light of these tests we revise our guesses and hypotheses, we revise our criteria of relevance, we get new and revised data, and we set up new methods of testing.

So far I have given an extremely general description. Let me add a few examples from an area in which I have been interested for some time — the area of nationalism versus internationalism, the sovereignty of many small countries merging into a few large ones.

Common sense does not tell us much about the willingness of different people to accept a common government. Intuitive estimates as to whether a particular political community will be stable vary widely. Very little was known, for instance, about the possibilities of a political community in India. Many British writers stressed the diversity of the two hundred and twelve languages spoken there, including about a dozen major ones, as well as the major cleavage between Moslems and Hindus. Indian leaders, on the contrary, like Gandhi and Nehru, stressed the unity of India and avowed their expectations that both Moslems and Hindus would accept it. In the end, the issue was resolved by experiment. Moslem Pakistan seceded from India, but the language groups within each of the new nations thus far have stayed together. The emergence of those new nations was in many ways a great success in the history of mankind, even though their partition had not been clearly foreseen or prepared for, and a million lives were lost in its turmoil.[6] With better foresight, however, and with better preparation, the same good results might have been attained with less loss of life.

Similar experiments in the living together of different populations are now going on in many parts of the world — in Algiers and Cyprus, in West Africa, in the Union of South Africa, and in the South in the United States. What could behavioral science contribute to make their course more foreseeable and less costly in terms of human suffering?

All these situations have something in com-

[4] Frank, *Modern Science and its Philosophy;* see footnote 1. Herbert Arthur Hodges, *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey;* London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952. William Kluback, *Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of History;* New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1956. Joachim Wach, *Das Verstehen,* 3 vols.; Tubingen, Hohr, 1926–1933; see especially Volume 3, *Das Verstehen in der Historik von Ranke bis zum Positivismus.*

[5] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization;* edited and with an introduction by Talcott Parsons; New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1947; see especially Introduction and Section I, "The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology."

[6] Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan;* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1951. Chandulal N. Vakil, *Economic Consequences of a Divided India: A Study of the Economy of India and Pakistan;* Bombay, Vora, 1950.

mon: a previously submerged group that has had little or no share of political control and of social and cultural status, and whose members desire and demand a larger share of such control, or even outright privilege or predominance. And there is always at least one other group, previously favored or predominant, which feels threatened by the claims of the hitherto disfavored neighbors and is tensely determined to resist them.[7]

In such a situation social science could provide a fair amount of useful information. First of all, how large is each of the conflicting groups, and how large is it likely to become in the future? We can answer this question by determining the rate of demographic growth and projecting it to find out what to expect. Second, how many in each group participate in social communication beyond the local level? How many, therefore, are at least potential participants in politics, democratic or violent? We can find answers to this question by trying to estimate a rate of social mobilization; the particular data we could use are the growth in the audience of mass media of communication, such as the radio, motion pictures, theaters, and newspapers; the growth of mass literacy; the use of the mails; the growth of urban population; the growth of non-agricultural employment; and, generally, the growth of population employed in commerce, transportation, industry, and government. From these growth rates we can forecast roughly what the mobilized population will be like five or ten years hence, and we can investigate what the relation of this rate of social mobilization in the past was to the rate of change in political participation, such as voting, attendance at meetings, or membership in political or quasi-political organizations.[8]

The third kind of information would answer the question, How intense will be the *needs* felt by the newly mobilized members of the population? What are their expectations and aspirations for the future? What changes do they look for in the present insecurity which they feel, the competitive conditions which they face, and the highly visible frustrations which may be customary in the country where they live? Some of these facts can be found out by simple observation; a great deal more could be found out by systematic interviews carried out on samples of the population.[9]

The fourth kind of information deals with the other side of the process. How much relief of these tensions can be expected from the process of assimilation? Assimilation may take place in regard to language, or to culture, or to religion; possibly through an increase in the rate of intermarriage; possibly through the development of cross-group audiences or cross-group organizations. We may therefore try to estimate the past growth of rates of assimilation and the past development of human links between the different groups, and derive from them an estimate of their probable development in the future.

Finally we may ask: What kinds of resistance of the favored groups can be expected against the accommodation of new claimants? And what kinds of causes of resistance can be distinguished? There may be resistance that can be traced to failure of communication — that is to say, to simple lack of knowledge and understanding due to ignorance or the adoption of stereotypes; and we can find out what the chances are of increasing communication between the groups and what the effects of this would most likely be.

But there are other kinds of resistance. The resistance may be primarily against external deprivations. Very frequently, equality for a previously underprivileged group has meant greater insecurity or outright deprivation for hitherto relatively privileged neighbors. There may be actual or expected competition for land, for housing, for educational opportunities, for

[7] Karl W. Deutsch, S. A. Burrell, R. A. Kann, M. Lee, Jr., M. Lichterman, R. E. Lindgren, F. L. Loewenheim, and R. W. Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area;* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1957.

[8] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality;* Cambridge, Technology Press of M.I.T., 1953. UNESCO, *Progress of Literacy in Various Countries: A Study of the Economy of India and Pakistan;* New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1953.

[9] John Dollard, Neal E. Miller, Leonard W. Doob, O. H. Mowrer, and Robert R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression;* New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1939. Harold Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity;* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935; see also Lasswell's *The World Revolution of our Time: A Framework for Basic Policy Research;* Stanford, Calif., Stanford Univ. Press, 1951.

jobs. What is the likelihood that such deprivations will, in fact, occur? What are the prospects for their subsequent increase or decrease, and for more or less resistance to accommodation on this basis? And what is the possibility of overcoming this particular type of resistance partly or altogether by the introduction of joint rewards for the hitherto privileged and unprivileged?

The third kind of resistance might come from conformity to the in-group. People may resist the claims of the previously disfavored group because their neighbors in the privileged group are resisting. Robert Merton once distinguished, in a study of discrimination, between the "all-weather liberals" who are tolerant regardless of whether tolerance is popular with their neighbors, and those liberals who merely conform; and between the all-weather segregationists and the fair-weather segregationists who demand segregation only if it appears to be popular in their community.[10] A study of the morale of the German Wehrmacht in World War II, by Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, made a similar point. They found that if as few as two highly indoctrinated Nazis — all-weather Nazis, so to speak — were present in a group of soldiers numbering about fifteen, the group was unlikely to surrender.[11]

The fourth type of resistance is perhaps the most serious. It is resistance against a perceived or imagined threat to the self-image of the person or to his personality structure.[12] In such cases the attempt to provide greater knowledge, or the offer of joint rewards, would likewise be perceived as threats to the personality.

What assistance can social science provide here? It could help us in trying to estimate the extent of the overlap of the four types of resistance which I have just sketched. How often are they found in the same person? And are they all equally important? To what extent do they overlap in a given country at a given time? And what is the likelihood of their overlap in the future? Second, and perhaps more important, we could find out something about the quantitative distribution of resisters of each type. How many die-hard all-weather resisters are there? How many are likely to change their view in line with a change in the prevailing climate of opinion? How many will resist in the short run — and how many will resist ultimately — for superficial reasons such as ignorance or fear of deprivation? Again data of this kind are ascertainable by interviews, and we could get estimates for their distribution in the population at large by using appropriate samples. From all these data we might often be able to find out the most probable outcome of such a conflict situation. Will it resolve itself through assimilation or acquiescence of the disfavored group; or will it be settled through accommodation of the previously predominant elements of the population to some of the major claims of the political newcomers; or is it moving toward violence with partition of the territory and evacuation of part of the population as the only remaining alternative to perpetual deadlock or large-scale bloodshed? Examples of this latter resolution are the evacuation of the Greek minority from Turkey in 1920, and the evacuation of the Germans from many territories of Eastern Europe after World War II.[13]

Perhaps we may yet develop, while there is time, the beginning of a science of conflict resolution which may facilitate friendly settlements in those cases in which the growth of

[10] Robert Merton, "Discrimination and the American Creed," pp. 99–126; in *Discrimination and National Welfare*, edited by Robert MacIver; New York, Inst. of Religious and Social Studies, 1948.

[11] Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quart.* (1948) 12:280–315.

[12] T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, D. H. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality;* New York, Harper, 1950. Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, editors, *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality";* Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1954. Alex Inkeles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character," Vol. 2, pp. 977–1020; in *Handbook of Social Psychology,* edited by Gardner Lindzey; Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1954. Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray, editors, *Personality in Nature, Society and Culture,* 2nd ed.; New York, Knopf, 1953. Margaret Mead, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Problems of Soviet Character;* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1951. David M. Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character;* Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1954.

[13] Inis L. Claude, Jr., *National Minorities: An International Problem;* Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1955.

numbers and mobilization rates and the mutual tensions seem manageable, and the conflicting values and expectations are peripheral rather than basic.

And perhaps there may develop at least some adequate techniques of disentanglement, of timely territorial partition and mass evacuation, in those cases in which the numbers seem too large, the trend of events too swift, or the imagined threats to traditional personality structures too vivid and widely perceived to permit either accommodation or acquiescence, so that evacuation or partition remains the least terrible alternative.

What has been said about the possible contributions of behavioral science to the early recognition of group conflicts within a single existing political community applies, in principle, also to the prospects for the union of two or more political communities into a single larger one. Here, too, we can try to identify the most relevant facts and processes, get verifiable data about them, and estimate the ease or difficulty with which some proposed policy of political cooperation or outright federation could be carried forward. Broadly speaking, what behavioral science could give us in these and similar cases are some concepts and data for conflict analysis and conflict management — perhaps not an unwelcome aid to our much strained resources of common sense in this atomic age.

Behavioral scientists have already begun to make such contributions. They contributed to information policy and to the management of home-front morale in the United States during World War II; and if we compare the American level of tolerance toward minorities and of effective unity during World War II with that during World War I, we might give the social scientists at least part of the credit for the improvement. Both during and after the war, social scientists, in such works as *The American Soldier,* made at least some contributions to the changes that led to the policy of integration in the United States Army;[14] and techniques of social science, notably public opinion polling, have been used to advantage by the United States authorities in Germany.[15]

It is only fair to cast at least a glance at some of the major shortcomings of the behavioral sciences at their present level of development. Certainly they will need more resources and facilities, more data and better techniques, more and better observations and experiments. But at present their main shortcomings do not seem to lie in this area but somewhere else.

Perhaps most of all, behavioral scientists at this stage need more knowledge of history and more knowledge of the vast variety and subtlety of human behavior patterns recorded in the traditions of the humanities. Some prominent behavioral scientists are well aware of this. Men of considerable professional standing in various behavioral fields, such as Paul Lazarsfeld, Martin Lipset, and A. L. Kroeber, have addressed themselves to historians in recent years with pleas for closer cooperation for the mutual benefit of their crafts.[16] In the behavioral sciences we shall need longer series of data over time, and data of processes that occur on a larger scale, or under more extreme conditions, than can be reproduced in the laboratory or classroom. The succession of several generations, the behavior of millions of people, the effects of wars and revolutions — all these can be explored only with the aid of the historian, and all these are highly relevant for the findings and the entire development of the behavioral sciences.

But we need more from the historians than longer series and a wider range of data. We need them perhaps most of all to help us identify more subtle variables of behavior that might be worth investigating. All behavioral research designs will be about as good as the criteria of relevance from which they start and

[14] Samuel A. Stouffer and others, *The American Soldier,* Vols. 1 and 2 of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II; Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1949. Stouffer and others, *Measurement and Prediction,* Vol. 4 of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II; Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1950.

[15] Rolf Fröhner, *Wie Stark sind die Halbstarken?;* Bielefeld, Maria von Stackelberg, 1956. Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, *Jahrbuch der Öffentlichen Meinung, 1947–1955* (and subsequent years); Allensbach am Bodensee, Verlag für Demoskopie, 1956.

[16] Paul Lazarsfeld, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, December, 1951; S. M. Lipset and A. L. Kroeber, Papers read at the opening session of the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association, Eugene, Oregon, December 27, 1956.

the particular variables which they propose to study. In studying the complexities of a decision situation, in identifying the salient aspects and processes in a situation of social and cultural change, and in many other situations, the behavioral scientist may receive valuable aid from the historian's judgment. We need history not as a handmaid of the social sciences, but as their full-fledged partner, guide, and friend.

Thus far I have avoided an old analogy which yet seems relevant to my conclusion. Soren Kierkegaard spoke of the philosopher as the physician of souls;[17] Nietzsche wrote about the philosopher as a physician of culture;[18] Plato had already described the philosopher as a physician of society. To be sure, the social scientist, in his need for large amounts of data taken from a very wide diversity of observations, and often requiring for their gathering the resources of government, may seem to resemble less the physician than the student of meteorology. Yet, in the motivations that drive him to his work, and in the possible applications of his findings, it is the model of the physician and the physician's combination of concern for objective facts and for the lives and emotions of human beings — it is this existential situation and this intellectual task of the physician that is most nearly a model for his own.

If my discussion thus far has suggested anything, it has suggested for society and politics what is known to be valid for the realm of medicine: that a physician might well add the data of science and the techniques of quantitative measurement to the old ingredients of common sense, a good bedside manner, knowledge of the ancient traditions of leechcraft, and experience with a large number of patients. Even profound diagnostic intuition will not be enough. Science — the method of observation, sampling, hypothesis, experiment, and verification — will remain essential, not to displace the old skills but to supplement them to the point where the vital common task of all approaches can be accomplished.

Two contrasting images may be recalled from literature for this predicament of the physician who must be both scientist and humanist. The first of these images appears in Camus' novel *The Plague*, written out of the experience of the Second World War.[19] In it, Camus confronts his readers with the fate of a doctor who stays in a town stricken by pestilence, at the risk of his life, although he does not know whether anything he can do will be of any help to anyone. His staying with his patients is an existential decision in which he elects what kind of person he wants to be in life and death, even though he does not understand fully the nature of the plague and even though all his medical skill may well prove wholly ineffective. Camus' doctor makes the ethical and, if you will, heroic decision; but despite his commitment as a physician, he does not seem to be greatly concerned over whether anybody else will learn anything about the plague from his experience. The story of this decision by no means exhausts Camus' novel, which treats of many other things; but the concept of effective learning is not prominent among them.

The second image comes from the novel *Arrowsmith*, by Sinclair Lewis.[20] Here, too, is a doctor in the midst of a plague; here, too, it is doubtful whether his serum will be of any help to the stricken victims. But here, in this essentially optimistic American novel, a very great deal of attention is centered on the problem of how much can be learned for the future from this particular struggle against this particular epidemic. Arrowsmith and his patients face death and defeat, as do their counterparts in the novel by Camus; Arrowsmith is even willing to compromise part of the scientific accuracy of his experiment in order to make a gesture of assistance to some of his patients, even though he cannot know whether this gesture will do them any good; but in all his anguish and all his tragedy the possibility of effective learning remains a major theme.

Many years ago, Abraham Flexner was one of the men who helped to introduce a much larger amount of science into American medical training. What he accomplished, backed by the resources of the Rockefeller Foundation, was not merely a small increase in learning, but, in many respects, a major shift of empha-

[17] Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, and *The Sickness Unto Death;* Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday Anchor, 1954.

[18] Friedrich Nietzsche, "Der Philosoph als Arzt der Kultur," Vol. 10, pp. 99–126; in *Werke;* Leipzig, Naumann, 1905.

[19] Albert Camus, *The Plague;* New York, Knopf, 1948.

[20] Sinclair Lewis, *Arrowsmith;* New York, Grosset and Dunlap, 1925.

sis. The possibility of learning through science, and the duty to learn in this manner as thoroughly and as quickly as possible, have remained major elements in the development of American medicine to this day.

Perhaps social scientists in the United States today are engaged in an enterprise similar to Flexner's, even if they may not be quite aware of it. Each of us in the social sciences is nowadays experimenting in his own field and in his own way with a common question. How much and what kinds of scientific method can be used to supplement our ancient craft skills of intuition, experience, and judgment? If this enterprise should be carried on over the years, not only by ourselves but by others after us, then there might be a fair chance, after all, that mankind's none too healthy international society should find at least some pieces of verifiable knowledge to aid its search for survival.

5

THE LAW

• *ROBERT M. COATES*

The first intimation that things were getting out of hand came one early fall evening in the late nineteen-forties. What happened, simply, was that between seven and nine o'clock on that evening the Triborough Bridge had the heaviest concentration of outbound traffic in its entire history.

This was odd, for it was a weekday evening (to be precise, a Wednesday), and though the weather was agreeably mild and clear, with a moon that was close enough to being full to lure a certain number of motorists out of the city, these facts alone were not enough to explain the phenomenon. No other bridge or main highway was affected, and though the two preceding nights had been equally balmy and moonlit, on both of these the bridge traffic had run close to normal.

The bridge personnel, at any rate, was caught entirely unprepared. A main artery of traffic, like the Triborough, operates under fairly predictable conditions. Motor travel, like most other large-scale human activities, obeys the Law of Averages — that great, ancient rule that states that the actions of people in the mass will always follow consistent patterns — and on the basis of past experience it had always been possible to foretell, almost to the last digit, the number of cars that would cross the bridge at any given hour of the day or night. In this case, though, all rules were broken.

The hours from seven till nearly midnight are normally quiet ones on the bridge. But on that night it was as if all the motorists in the city, or at any rate a staggering proportion of them, had conspired together to upset tradition. Beginning almost exactly at seven o'clock, cars poured onto the bridge in such numbers and with such rapidity that the staff at the toll booths was overwhelmed almost from the start. It was soon apparent that this was no momentary congestion, and as it became more and more obvious that the traffic jam promised to be one of truly monumental proportions, added details of police were rushed to the scene to help handle it.

Cars streamed in from all directions — from the Bronx approach and the Manhattan one, from 125th Street and the East River Drive. (At the peak of the crush, about eight-fifteen, observers on the bridge reported that the Drive was a solid line of car headlights as far south as the bend at Eighty-ninth Street, while the congestion crosstown in Manhattan disrupted traffic as far west as Amsterdam Avenue.) And perhaps the most confusing thing about the whole manifestation was that there seemed to be no reason for it.

Now and then, as the harried toll-booth at-

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tendants made change for the seemingly endless stream of cars, they would question the occupants, and it soon became clear that the very participants in the monstrous tieup were as ignorant of its cause as anyone else was. A report made by Sergeant Alfonse O'Toole, who commanded the detail in charge of the Bronx approach, is typical. "I kept askin' them," he said, " 'Is there night football somewhere that we don't know about? Is it the races you're goin' to?' But the funny thing was half the time they'd be askin' *me*. 'What's the crowd for, Mac?' they would say. And I'd just look at them. There was one guy I mind, in a Ford convertible with a girl in the seat beside him, and when he asked me, I said to him, 'Hell, you're *in* the crowd, ain't you?' I said. 'What brings *you* here?' And the dummy just looked at me. 'Me?' he says. 'I just come out for a drive in the moonlight. But if I'd known there'd be a crowd like this . . .' he says. And then he asks me, 'Is there any place I can turn around and get out of this?' " As the *Herald Tribune* summed things up in its story next morning, it "just looked as if everybody in Manhattan who owned a motorcar had decided to drive out on Long Island that evening."

The incident was unusual enough to make all the front pages next morning, and because of this, many similar events, which might otherwise have gone unnoticed, received attention. The proprietor of the Aramis Theatre, on Eighth Avenue, reported that on several nights in the recent past his auditorium had been practically empty, while on others it had been jammed to suffocation. Lunchroom owners noted that increasingly their patrons were developing a habit of making runs on specific items; one day it would be the roast shoulder of veal with pan gravy that was ordered almost exclusively, while the next everyone would be taking the Vienna loaf, and the roast veal went begging. A man who ran a small notions store in Bayside revealed that over a period of four days two hundred and seventy-four successive customers had entered his shop and asked for a spool of pink thread.

These were news items that would ordinarily have gone into the papers as fillers or in the sections reserved for oddities. Now, however, they seemed to have a more serious significance. It was apparent at last that something decidedly strange was happening to people's habits, and it was as unsettling as those occasional moments on excursion boats when the passengers are moved, all at once, to rush to one side or the other of the vessel. It was not till one day in December when, almost incredibly, the Twentieth Century Limited left New York for Chicago with just three passengers aboard that business leaders discovered how disastrous the new trend could be, too.

Until then, the New York Central, for instance, could operate confidently on the assumption that although there might be several thousand men in New York who had business relations in Chicago, on any single day no more — and no less — than some hundreds of them would have occasion to go there. The play producer could be sure that his patronage would sort itself out and that roughly as many persons would want to see the performance on Thursday as there had been on Tuesday or Wednesday. Now they couldn't be sure of anything. The Law of Averages had gone by the board, and if the effect on business promised to be catastrophic, it was also singularly unnerving for the general customer.

The lady starting downtown for a day of shopping, for example, could never be sure whether she would find Macy's department store a seething mob of other shoppers or a wilderness of empty, echoing aisles and unoccupied salesgirls. And the uncertainty produced a strange sort of jitteriness in the individual when faced with any impulse to action. "Shall we do it or shan't we?" people kept asking themselves, knowing that if they did do it, it might turn out that thousands of other individuals had decided similarly; knowing, too, that if they *didn't*, they might miss the one glorious chance of all chances to have Jones Beach, say, practically to themselves. Business languished, and a sort of desperate uncertainty rode everyone.

At this juncture, it was inevitable that Congress should be called on for action. In fact, Congress called on itself, and it must be said that it rose nobly to the occasion. A committee was appointed, drawn from both Houses and headed by Senator J. Wing Slooper (R.), of Indiana, and though after considerable investigation the committee was forced reluctantly to conclude that there was no evidence of Com-

munist instigation, the unconscious subversiveness of the people's present conduct was obvious at a glance. The problem was what to do about it. You can't indict a whole nation, particularly on such vague grounds as these were. But, as Senator Slooper boldly pointed out, "You can control it," and in the end a system of reëducation and reform was decided upon, designed to lead people back to — and we quote Senator Slooper — "the basic regularities, the homely averageness of the American way of life."

In the course of the committee's investigations, it had been discovered, to everyone's dismay, that the Law of Averages had never been incorporated into the body of federal jurisprudence, and though the upholders of States' rights rebelled violently, the oversight was at once corrected, both by Constitutional amendment and by a law — the Hills-Slooper Act — implementing it. According to the Act, people were *required* to be average, and, as the simplest way of assuring it, they were divided alphabetically and their permissible activities catalogued accordingly. Thus, by the plan, a person whose name began with "G," "N," or "U," for example, could attend the theatre only on Tuesdays, and he could go to baseball games only on Thursdays, whereas his visits to a haberdashery were confined to the hours between ten o'clock and noon on Mondays.

The law, of course, had its disadvantages. It had a crippling effect on theatre parties, among other social functions, and the cost of enforcing it was unbelievably heavy. In the end, too, so many amendments had to be added to it — such as the one permitting gentlemen to take their fiancées (if accredited) along with them to various events and functions no matter what letter the said fiancées' names began with — that the courts were frequently at a loss to interpret it when confronted with violations.

In its way, though, the law did serve its purpose, for it did induce — rather mechanically, it is true, but still adequately — a return to that average existence that Senator Slooper desired. All, indeed, would have been well if a year or so later disquieting reports had not begun to seep in from the backwoods. It seemed that there, in what had hitherto been considered to be marginal areas, a strange wave of prosperity was making itself felt. Tennessee mountaineers were buying Cadillac convertibles, and Sears, Roebuck reported that in the Ozarks their sales of luxury items had gone up nine hundred per cent. In the scrub sections of Vermont, men who formerly had barely been able to scratch a living from their rock-strewn acres were now sending their daughters to Europe and ordering expensive cigars from New York. It appeared that the Law of Diminishing Returns was going haywire, too.

6

IS SOCIAL SCIENCE SCIENTIFIC?

• *RUSSELL KIRK*

Sociology has become a power in the land. Since Gunnar Myrdal's "An American Dilemma" was cited as a basis for the Supreme Court's anti-segregation decisions, reforming social scientists have felt themselves approaching, at last, the high estate they have long claimed for themselves.

Certainly their realm has grown mushroomlike in this century. Scarcely any American now eludes its influence: "Social studies" is a required course in nearly every public school. Teacher-training is heavily laden with social-science indoctrination, at the expense of the humanities and the natural sciences. For the past two decades, the big foundations have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the social sciences. And, recently, the Federal Government began to subsidize social-science research.

Still, the social scientists' standing is insecure. They are split into warring camps, the basis of their authority remains in question, and there

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lingers a certain public reluctance to grant them the respect they covet. If a professor declares roundly, "I speak as a social scientist," some other professor may mutter, "That stuff isn't science — it's only scientism."

Among themselves, indeed, the social scientists are divided and vague as to any definition of their discipline. It is "the science of society," of course; and Auguste Comte expected sociology to be the master science, all branches of learning merging upward into it. But in America, the disciplines of economics and politics already were established before sociology made its appearance; and so, often, the sociologist is forced either to deal with marginal activities or to indulge in grand generalizations about society. For the typical college student, sociology consists of "introductory sociology" — mostly talk about in-groups and out-groups — "marriage and the family" and "social problems."

The serious sociologist, nevertheless, aspires much higher. He asserts that his discipline is, or ought to be, as truly scientific as are the natural sciences. He claims that he, like the natural scientist, describes, predicts and controls phenomena; he lays down "laws" of behavior; he is the engineer and the architect of a new, rational social order.

His opinion polls, his analyses of out-groups, his indices of prejudice, his statistical computations of popular choice (and nowadays he is intoxicated with the computing machines), all are intended to convert mankind into a predictable and controllable species.

He may advocate, for instance, with Dr. Stuart C. Dodd, director of the Washington Public Opinion Laboratory, "Project Aimscales" — a plan to ascertain exactly, through a labyrinthine system of preference polls, "America's current inventory of national goals," and to improve those goals.

"Aimscales of the future," Mr. Dodd writes, "will be able to measure with increasing precision the sizes of the itemed target ends, and subtarget means thereto; their costs in terms of man-hours of effort, money, alternatives displaced, or other appropriate terms; their scheduling in regard to any needed regional differentials or adjustments for diverse conditions; and the all-important attitudinal dimensions of the citizens and their leaders . . . ." Such is the language and the objective of the social scientist par excellence.

Philosophically, the representative social scientist is an empiricist of the positivist variety; emotionally, he is often a secular evangelist. Yet despite his increasing influence in many quarters, he is not quite so confident as Comte was that the future belongs to him and his science. Jacques Barzun suggests that the term "behavioral sciences" is supplanting the older term "social sciences" because of the sociologist's "desperate conviction that man does *not* behave and should be made to with the help of science."

About three years ago, a youngish instructor in sociology declared to me, somewhat defiantly, "I really believe that we can teach everybody the scientific approach."

A touch of shrillness in his "really" suggested that even this zealot was experiencing doubts. For today's humanitarian social scientist is discouraged by one hard fact: only in totalitarian states have positivistic doctrines of social reconstruction on "scientific" lines been applied thoroughly. So, he is forced back upon studies in "democratic behavior patterns"; but if "democracy" is his ideal, how can he ever attain the status of priest-scientist that Comte ordained?

Thus, the aims of social science remain in dispute: whether this discipline is meant to give coherence and fresh meaning to older disciplines; whether it is intended to work toward a terrestrial paradise; or whether it ought to rest content with recording group behavior.

Is this branch of study, strictly speaking, a science at all? Pitirim Sorokin, perhaps the best-known of American sociologists, maintains that it is indeed a science — but a science which requires something more than the empirical method for its basis, and which ought to recognize and respect knowledge already possessed by the several intellectual disciplines, including the sociological discipline itself.

Undeniably, much of what has passed for social science has been mere scientism, or pseudo-science. Loosely employed, the word "science" means simply any orderly and reputable study, on systematic principles.

But the social scientists have not been satisfied with so general a claim to the laurels of science: many of them have asserted that their discipline must be, or perhaps already is, as exact and regular a science as physics, or chemistry, or botany, or geology. (Some, indeed, have used the term "social physics.") Envying the natural sciences, they have sought

to emulate the methods of their natural-science colleagues, and to assert parallel claims of certitude in prediction and control.

"The nemesis of such simulacra," Sorokin writes, "is sterility and error — and this nemesis is already walking abroad among the contemporary psychosocial sciences . . . . In spite of our narcissistic self-admiration, of the enormous energy and funds spent in pseudomathematical and statistical research, its achievements have been singularly modest, its sterility unexpectedly notable, and its fallacies surprisingly numerous."

One consequence of this common social-scientist passion for imitating the outward forms of natural science is the development of an amazing jargon, incomprehensible even to nineteen-twentieths of the body of university graduates and, one suspects, often unclear to most sociologists themselves.

This "scientific" vocabulary of the sociologist, to which every professor feels free to add at will (by way of establishing his claim to "originality") resembles the deliberate obscurity of the learned Marxist — an opaqueness intended to convert the vulgar through awe of erudition.

The medical word "synergy," for instance, redefined to convey the meaning of "the sum total of energy which any group can command and expend," obscures rather than enlightens. The word "valence" is borrowed from physics and converted to mean "attraction in society" — which is not at all like its natural-science meaning and is severed from its linguistic root.

Even a popular and comparatively lucid sociological writer like David Riesman twists terms to suit his passing purpose and, perhaps, to impress his general readership — using the word "anomic," for example, to mean being cut off from the tone and temper of a society, which is a borrowing from Durkheim's *anomique*, the masterless man.

In an age which requires the restoration of clarity and of reasonable persuasion, this pedantry in terminology is a sorry tendency. Genuine science does not need to cloak itself in convoluted verbiage.

More serious than this debauching of language is what Sorokin calls "quantophrenia," or infatuation with statistical surveys and nose-counting. Because the natural sciences are non-moral — that is, they have to do only with things and animals less than human — the aspiring "behavioral scientist" endeavors to develop a methodology which will be equally indifferent to moral norms — that is, to standards and models for humanity.

For old normative judgments, the social scientist of this persuasion substitutes opinion surveys and numerical compilations. However, as Carlyle wrote, "Statistics is a science which ought to be honorable, the basis of many most important sciences; but . . . a wise head is requisite for carrying it on. Conclusive facts are inseparable from inconclusive except by a head that already understands and knows."

So there have sprung up the immense behavioral research centers, most notably the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, at Stanford University, almost a Mecca for this persuasion. The University of Michigan has a whole series of such institutions, supported by very large sums from foundations and government — the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, the Research Center for Group Dynamics, the Survey Research Center.

C. Wright Mills, a radical gadfly among sociologists, suggests that very often the research assistants in behavioral institutes are chosen from among the second-rate: "I have seldom seen one of these young men," he writes, "once he is well caught up, in a condition of genuine intellectual puzzlement."

Deficient in imagination, they mistake fact accumulation for wisdom. The ancient Greeks had one word, philodoxer, for the lover of opinion, and another word, philosopher, for the lover of wisdom; and they knew that these two are a world apart. Much modern opinion-and-behavior investigation is only philodoxy.

Such behaviorists often ignore theory and history in favor of the currents of the year or the decade: awareness of the drift is all. One young behavioral professor said to me recently, when the name of a distinguished historian of ideas was mentioned, "How does he think he knows all this? Did he make a survey?" Resentment of unusual imagination and obsession with nose-counting are the behaviorist's form of anti-intellectualism.

Absurdities result. One behavioristic study, cited by Barzun and Graff in their "Modern Researcher," came to the solemn conclusion that "if in a given society an aunt resides with or near the mother, and assists in giving care to the child, the latter will regard her as a mother; less so, or not so, if the aunt lives at a distance."

Thus do some sociologists establish, as brilliant new discoveries, on scientific principles, the tiny secrets of the bassinet.

Another expensive survey, financed by the Federal Office of Education, proposed to analyze "succorance and playmirth" — that is, seeking of comfort and companionship in fun — among small children. The researchers came to the enlightening conclusion, after much statistics-juggling, that little boys like to play with little boys, and little girls with little girls.

And the absurdities can grow into serious errors about men and communities. If a behavioral researcher acting from the assumptions of nineteenth-century positivism investigates religious beliefs, he is likely to discover exactly what he expected to find: that religious convictions are unscientific, irrational, absurd and perhaps dangerous. He is against prejudice — but, unaware of his own prejudices, because he has been deliberately cut off from theological, humane and historical disciplines, he may mistake his petty, private rationality for self-evident truth.

Or if the behavioral scientist assumes that political conservatives are ignorant bigots, he usually finds by his opinion surveys that the conservative folk he interviewed were just that. Ignorant and bigoted folk give ignorant and bigoted answers; ergo, ignorant and bigoted folk are conservatives.

In reality, one can understand the significance of such a term as "conservative" only by painstaking historical and political studies; but too many behavioral researchers confound their unconscious prejudices with complete objectivity.

As Raymond Aron — the most widely read of living French sociologists — remarked recently, the typical American sociologist tends to be "liberal," in part because "many stem from semimarginal groups: first-generation Americans, Jews, and natives of central Europe are more common among American sociologists than Back-Bay Bostonians."

And although the complete behaviorist may deny the existence of "value-judgments" and normative understandings, nevertheless he does not escape, in his researches, the influence of his own value-judgments, "even though they are unwittingly held as vague sentiments or animosities."

In his introduction to "The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences," one well-known behaviorist, Daniel Lerner, declares that the social sciences have shown modern man that "there are no more eternal mysteries . . . there are no more eternal verities"; man is revealed as "plastic, variable, and amenable to reshaping." And the energetic social scientist intends to set to work promptly at that reshaping, free from authority, prescription and value-judgments.

The trouble with this view of social studies and their purpose is that to act without any norms except vague humanitarian sentiments may bring a nation into grave peril. It may injure the institutions which shelter community and freedom at home, and lead to the gravest of mistakes in foreign policy — in the administration of a foreign-aid program in Afghanistan or Laos, for instance.

For the social scientist is not really dealing with things soulless or inanimate or abstract, as does the natural scientist. The sociologist's subject, embarrassing though it may be to the eager reformer, is man, living and erratic man, in complex humanity.

Human beings are the least controllable, verifiable, law-obeying and predictable of subjects. If man were predictable, indeed, he would cease to be truly human. Andrew Hacker, of Cornell University, therefore writes forebodingly about "the spectre of predictable man" — the man of the future whose coming so many behaviorists view complacently, the man of "Brave New World."

Now, of course, there can be ascertained certain general rules concerning human behavior in community; indeed, a large body of literature on the subject has long been available — though often ignored by the novelty-seeking behavioral scientist. But the more important part of this literature is not "scientific" in the strict modern sense. This knowledge is the work of poets, theologians, political theorists, moralists, jurists and men of imagination generally.

One may learn a great deal about the first principles of human nature from Dante or Samuel Johnson; but this is not the sort of knowledge that fits into the calculations of the astronomer or the engineer. Plato and Cicero, Montesquieu and Burke are the sources of much wisdom concerning the civil social order; but they are not "scientists" in the sense of the natural sciences.

Even when one finds a philosopher like David Hume, severely logical and methodical, the zealot for "social science" must be dismayed by

Hume's conclusion that rational accounting for morals and politics is simply impossible.

In fine, I think that the behavioral scientist has been the victim of illusion when he has attempted to solve all the ills to which community is heir by the application of the techniques of physics and chemistry and biology.

"It is this false analogy with mechanics and mathematics," Prof. S. Herbert Frankel of Oxford says, "that accounts for the facile belief that the problem involved in living and working together in a community is similar to the problem of finding, by abstract thought or logical deduction, the 'unknown' factor in an equation. In the realm of organic life there is, and can be, no final solution — other than death itself. . . . Those who arrogantly write solutions upon their political banners . . . offend the very nature of all social evolution, which rests on the slow unfolding of institutions, laws, and habit-patterns of thought and action." Amen to that.

By deliberately cutting himself off from tradition and theory, by ignoring theology and ethics and humane letters, the average social scientist of our generation has deprived himself of the principal instruments for understanding human behavior — or for effecting any enduring improvement of society, let alone the "solution" of human striving which he often seeks.

If a scientist at all, he has become a scientist without reliable means for measuring and weighing. Infatuated with the empirical method, the doctrinaire social scientist omits from his calculations the higher and more enduring elements in human behavior.

As Sorokin argues, modern social science desperately needs reinvigoration of social theory and observation through the employment of reason and the recognition of poets' and philosophers' genius. Only by a return to the true sources of wisdom — which in part are intuitive — can the critic of society find standards by which to measure our present discontents and to propose remedies.

Neither the utopian sociologist of the old positivistic breed nor the survey-taking behaviorist of our time is prepared to confront the Gorgon's head of twentieth-century social disintegration. What social studies need more than anything else, I suspect, is the recovery of norms: a restoration of normative disciplines, a return to the knowledge of standards for human personality and for the just order. Some imaginative sociologists — one may cite as an example Robert A. Nisbet, in his book "The Quest for Community" — already have turned that way.

Imagination, in the long run, rules the world — not scientific research, and still less scientistic sham. It is pointless, and at heart unscientific, to survey the shifting opinions of the hour unless one recognizes standards in opinion — that is, sources of truth. And it is pointless to ape the natural sciences when one has to deal with whimsical and impatient and irrational mankind.

So I venture to suggest that we professors of social disciplines might do well if we talked less about the claims of social science and more about the realities of social art. Modern society, in many ways sick, needs, not the shortsighted manipulations of the research technician, but the artist's touch.

7

THE CANONS OF THE ANTI-SOCIOLOGIST

• *ROBERT K. MERTON*

Once again the season of the anti-sociologists is upon us. The academic year has ended and professors are ready to turn from talking to writing. A self-selected few will dust off and publish yet again the litany that fiercely imprecates sociology and all its works. This year, the avowed conservative professor of political science, Russell Kirk, got in first. His version will serve to exhibit the curious admixture of illogic

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and sentiment that makes up the creed and canons of anti-sociology.

Some sociologists find these assaults tiresome. To me, they have the peculiar charm of testifying to the need for the very kind of sociological inquiry they caricature. For each jaded version reads as though it were written by a sociologist-*manqué*. Each purports to describe the behavior of sociologists, to explain that behavior and, even more ambitiously, to describe and explain the responses to it.

With practiced ease, for example, Mr. Kirk reviews the work of thousands of social scientists and promulgates the first canon that "the representative" specimen is an "empiricist of the positivist variety; emotionally, he is often a secular evangelist." Had Mr. Kirk allowed himself to profit from the introductory course in sociology he so deplores, he might have learned of the danger of creating out of his private impressions a stereotype of the aims and behavior of large numbers of people, all the while pretending to have caught hold of the representative reality. But amateur sociologizing has no place for disciplined inquiry. Rather, it assumes that statements become authoritative simply by being put into the black and white magic of print.

The second canon declares the absurdity and impiety of statistics dealing with the behavior of men in society. For nothing significant about man's behavior can be counted. If it could be counted, it would be immoral to do so. Everyone knows that no good can come of it.

To support this canon, Mr. Kirk cites Carlyle, who knew little about the primitive statistical methods of his own day and nothing, obviously, about the mathematical bases of modern statistics. As further proof, he quotes the attack by the sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin on "quantophrenia" or an uncritical devotion to faulty statistics. Unlike myself, Mr. Kirk has not had the benefit of having been Professor Sorokin's student, and so does not know, apparently, that Sorokin used vast arrays of social statistics in every one of his major works and, in "Social and Cultural Dynamics," states that "quantitative judgments . . . in verbal form" are inevitable in any substantial work of history.

No doubt it is more inviting to assume statistics of human behavior. The amateur sociologists will explain, for example, why it is that we have such high rates of mental illness in what Mr. Kirk feels free to describe as our age of "twentieth-century social disintegration." But while the amateur sociologist explains *why* this is so, the disciplined sociologist proceeds first to find out whether it really *is* so. Only through painstaking analysis of the statistics of mental illness — as in the work of Herbert Goldhamer and Andrew Marshall — do we find that we had best postpone our ready-to-hand explanations, if only because it now seems probable that the rate of confinement for mental illness is no higher today than it was during the past century.

Turning up like death and taxes, the third canon of the anti-sociologists declares the sociologists to be both perpetrators and victims of jargon. Here, the anti-sociologist knows himself to be on altogether safe ground, for just about everyone can be counted on to be "against jargon" in the same penetrating sense that President Coolidge's minister declared himself against sin.

Perhaps it is time to distinguish between jargon and that essential of all disciplined thought, technical language. Technical language is a more precise and condensed form of thought and communication than colloquial language. It is designed to fix definite meanings in which each word has ideally only one denotation and is deliberately deprived of connotations. Jargon, in contrast, is a muddled and wordy imitation of technical language.

The mere unfamiliarity or unesthetic quality of language is no criterion. Jargon and technical language sound alike to someone untrained in the discipline where the language is employed.

All this is only prologue to the pair of canons central to the anti-sociologists' creed. Briefly put, these hold, first, that sociological truths cannot be discovered, for there are no detectable uniformities in human behavior, since man is incorrigibly unpredictable. And second, that sociologists constitute a danger to society, for they provide the knowledge through which men can be molded to fit a new and obnoxious social order. I need not burlesque the logic of the anti-sociologists, for they have preceded me here. I need only review it.

It would seem clear that, if there are no discoverable uniformities about man in society, there can be no sociological knowledge employed to regiment him. Should anti-sociologists admit that there are such uniformities, they can scarcely argue that these uniformities

can be discovered by the defective sociology of today, with its inapplicable statistics, its tattered jargon, and its total misunderstanding of human nature.

Forced to acknowledge that there are discoverable uniformities in social life and that modern sociology, for all its limitations, discovers some of them, would they then propose to exorcise this knowledge for fear that it might be used to violate civilized values? On this last line of retreat, the anti-sociologists would join forces with the anti-intellectuals and totalitarian regimenters of thought they ostensibly combat. They would declare themselves guardians of us all, alone able to distinguish dangerous from undangerous knowledge.

The remaining canons of the anti-sociologists are transparently trivial. Criticism among sociologists, for example, is described by the anti-sociologists in the militant metaphors of "warring camps" and "internecine warfare." Perhaps they should pause before advocating monolithic agreement on intellectual issues. It would be a curious reading of the history of thought to suggest that the absence of disagreement testifies to a developing discipline.

As for the anti-sociologists' canon that gives them alone access to the recorded wisdom of the past — from Plato to Montesquieu and Burke — this need only be stated to refute itself.

Since the anti-sociologists impose their grotesque versions of the methods of sociological inquiry upon a public too busy to look for themselves, a few words should be said about those methods. Social scientists believe it no longer sufficient to describe the behavior, attitudes, values and social relations obtaining in a complex society simply on the basis of a large but scattered array of documents, both public and private, and on educated guesses about what people are thinking and feeling. Studies of the historical past, of course, have no alternative. But in the study of present-day societies, these procedures are giving way to systematic, though far from perfected, methods.

One such method is the "sample survey," which sounds out the practices and attitudes of a group selected as representative of the larger population from which they are drawn. This type of survey is now part of the intellectual landscape. However, the "opinion polls" in the popular press do not begin to reproduce the analytical uses to which such surveys are put by academic sociologists.

Furthermore, it is with this instrument as with the rest: the most devastating criticisms of its misuse have come, not from the anti-sociologists who know about it only through casual inspection, but from the professional sociologists who are prepared to study their sometimes disappointing experience with it. For they, at least the best of them, know that, whatever the worth of one or another tool of inquiry, it is the questions put into the inquiry that determine the significance of the results. If the questions are trivial, then the answers will be trivial.

For sociology as for most other scientific disciplines, the electronic computer has emerged as a new resource. Contrary to the imagery of the anti-sociologists, this machine is not the universal mind of our day. It must be told what to do. But, as with most technical creations, the computer has a capacity for deflecting men from the pursuit of purposes that genuinely matter. It tempts its tenders to cast all manner of raw data into its maw and wait for the thoroughly digested product that will itself be senseless if the thought of its managers is without sense. The potential victims, by their professional training, are best qualified to recognize and to counter this danger.

With or without the computer, today's sociology makes no attempt to substitute science for ethics and esthetics or to displace humanism with scientism. Every responsible sociologist, and there are not a few, knows that his knowledge is no substitute for artistic thought.

The thinking humanist, for his part, recognizes that the social scientist who knows his business seeks only to provide an understanding of certain, not all, aspects of the behavior of men and the organization of human society. The intellectual gulf between humanist and social scientist has begun to be bridged. The late Gilbert Murray, critic and classical scholar, said that sociology is "destined to bear abundant and ever-increasing fruit." The political journalist Richard Rovere, has observed that "those of us who have been educated in the twentieth century habitually think in sociological terms, whether or not we have had any training in sociology."

After all this, it is only natural to ask: what is going on in sociology and what does it all amount to? It would be foolish to answer this question by staking out the boundaries of sociology, as though it were a piece of real estate.

That is not the character of intellectual property. But we can, in this short space, at least hint at the answer.

In the large, sociology is engaged in finding out how man's behavior and fate are affected, if not minutely governed, by his place within particular kinds, and changing kinds, of social structure and of culture. This means that sociology moves across a wide, varied and, to the layman, often bewildering range of topics and problems.

In doing so, one of its principal functions is to subject popular beliefs about man and his works to responsible investigation. As I have implied, the sociologist asks about many of these beliefs, "Is it really so?" The popular assumption, for example, that the rate of social mobility in America has recently declined has been put in question by systematically assembled data.

The alleged breakdown of the American family, with obsequies read regularly over the remains by those who should know better, has been found to be specious; thorough analyses of data on divorce and death find American marriages remaining intact more often now than they once did. Or, to tackle one last widespread assumption, people who reject orthodox religious beliefs are not more apt to engage in crime than people who hold fast to such beliefs.

Some of the findings of sociology take a considerable time to enter the public domain. For more than a generation, sociologists have found that complex organizations of widely different kinds — economic, political, military, educational — exhibit the same tendencies. These tendencies make for the "bureaucratic man," who is shaped by organizationally induced pressures to conform to the rules even when this means that conformity gets in the way of doing the job effectively. How far this is inevitable remains to be seen, and inquiries are now under way to find out how these tendencies can be counteracted.

Basic to sociology is the premise that, in the course of social interaction, men create new conditions that were not part of their intent. Short-run rationality often produces long-run irrationality. Public health measures may go awry; financial incentives may lead to a decline rather than an increase in production; intensified punishment may aggravate rather than curb crime. Growing recognition of this has become one of the sources of an enlarged use of sociological research in such fields as medicine and public health, social work, law education, the ministry, architecture and city planning, business, organized labor and agriculture.

Yet it must be added, that sociologists, perhaps better than the anti-sociologists, know they are just beginning to acquire the knowledge needed to cope with the many social ills man has the inveterate capacity to contract.

We sociologists need to be saved from the anti-sociologists only in respect to the exaggerated claims they make for our prowess and accomplishments. It is they, not we, who say that "sociology is a power in the land." It is they, not we, who make the absurd claim that sociology has the power and the intent to turn men into robots and to construct a new social order. The men and women at work in sociological inquiry have more modest and less sadistic hopes. Like their colleagues in other scholarly and scientific disciplines, they recognize that this "very new science of an ancient subject" has still a long way to go. And undisturbed by the cannonades of the anti-sociologists, they are methodically proceeding on their way.

2

Scientific Theory in Political Behavior Research

The goal of a science of political behavior is to establish general statements explaining the actions of persons and groups as these are observed in political situations. Such principles enable us to assemble information about political events that otherwise might have been regarded as unrelated, and to predict the shape of still other political events. Every theoretical principle in science reflects a point of view or frame of reference, a disposition among a group of scientists to identify some recurrent events as more important or more researchable than others. As Lasswell and Kaplan remark, the behavioral approach conceives of "political science as a branch of the study of human behavior. Central throughout are persons and their acts, not 'governments' and 'states.' Terms like 'state,' 'government,' 'law,' 'power' — all the traditional vocabulary of political science — are words of ambiguous reference until it is clear how they are to be used in describing what people say and do."[1] This is not in itself a theoretical statement, but it is a choice of a frame of reference from which such statements may be developed.

What do we mean by a theoretical statement? Anatol Rapoport's paper in this section tells us what the physicist means when he uses the term. As he indicates, the theories of the political scientist are similar in their logic but less exact and less extensive than in the "exact" sciences. In the exact sciences as in the study of political behavior, a theory includes a generalization; that is, a guiding idea that asserts or predicts a connection between characteristics or properties. It includes a statement that every act of a certain sort either has a certain set of characteristics associated with it or stands in certain relations to other events having certain characteristics.

When a science is highly developed, its generalizations can be summarized into a

[1] Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 3.

terse code; that is, a set of statements so arranged that a few major ideas serve as premises from which all other propositions or hypotheses will follow. In an immature science the principles may do little more than define and classify characteristics, thus setting the stage for the future development of a deductive code. A codified set of propositions and, less comprehensively, concepts, classifications and principles that are presently limited in their applicability, both represent more and less complete elements of a scientific theory. A scientific theory, then, is a deductive network of generalizations from which explanations or predictions of certain types of known events may be derived. It is of course highly *desirable* that the generalizations embodied in the theory should have universal application and that they should provide exhaustive answers to the questions they address, but universality and completeness are only aspirations as far as most scientific theories are concerned.

It is generally conceded by responsible political behaviorists that the quest in political studies for *universal* laws serves mainly "to distract attention and energies from partial inquiries that can illuminate situationally localized problems in empirical ways."[2] In his paper on "The Concept of Power," Robert Dahl shows why "we are not likely to produce — certainly not for some considerable time to come — anything like a single, consistent, coherent 'Theory of Power.' " This view does not divert Dahl from the effort to construct a limited theory of power, one that is "useful in the context of the particular piece of research or theory but different in important respects from the definitions of other studies." The same preference for flexibility characterizes Lasswell's paper on "The Decision Process," which presents principles for classifying theoretically relevant elements in governmental decision-making: "In matters of this kind," says Lasswell, "it is not a question of arriving at a permanent classification. Rather, the requirements of research and policy change as the context of knowledge and controversy changes. . . ."

Limited theories can be erected at present about political behavior. In his paper in this section, Charles Lindblom argues that good theories have already been developed, possibly beyond the awareness of some scholars in the field. A case in point for Lindblom is Anthony Downs' theory of political decision-making. Limited in scope to the behavior of parties and voters in a democracy, Downs' theory nevertheless achieves logical consistency and subsumes many verified hypotheses from decades of previous research. Lindblom concludes that our "task is . . . less to create theory than to make it explicit. We now have a partly excavated political theory."

Lindblom's essay further reveals the general standards by which the quality of a scientific theory is most often assessed. First, the theoretical principles must conform to the rules of logic: their content and their relation to one another must not be contradictory. In a deductive code for example, a good theory provides a few initial propositions from which all the other ideas or principles may be deduced logically. The paper by David Braybrooke, summarizing ideas about party systems entertained by various political writers, is perhaps the best testimony we could offer to illustrate the helpfulness of the deductive approach. In Braybrooke's model of party politics, the confrontation of seemingly contradictory statements forces more

[2] *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.

precise formulations, sharpens areas of agreement and disagreement, promotes closer reasoning, points to propositions which need buttressing and testing, and generally serves to clear the mind.

When Lindblom remarks, "As is generally true of theoretical systems, many of Downs' propositions are not directly testable; but again, their degree of correspondence with those widely accepted as true among political scientists is impressive," he is referring to a second common standard for evaluating theories. A good theory generates empirically verifiable hypotheses; hence, it is *feasible* operationally. No contemporary student of political behavior believes that voting statistics or data on the variations in political attitudes among ethnic groups make up a science unless organized and informed by some general ideas. A body of facts does not give us a science of politics any more than a collection of stamps gives us a postal system. But a general idea that *cannot* be refuted through tests of measurable behavior is equally unhelpful. Thus a good theory is one that directs us to hypotheses that refer to observable, measurable events.

The feasibility of a theory does not always depend upon the *directness* with which empirical verification may be made. In his paper on "Game Theory and the Analysis of Political Behavior," Richard Snyder suggests "that game theory may offer us a new kind of laboratory for experiments with human behavior." The experiments he refers to, however, involve direct observation of groups but not of real policy making groups. Game theory leads us toward the experimental *simulation* of political processes. (Treatment of these possibilities may be found in papers located in Chapter 7 of this book.)

Feasibility is more complicated in the social than in the exact physical sciences. In Newtonian physics, for example, if the theory predicted an observable relation between phenomena, and such a relation did not show itself under proper conditions of observation in a crucial experiment, the theory would be challenged. As Rapoport points out, it may well not be abandoned because it fails to account for the facts, at least not until an effective alternative principle has been advanced. But where phenomena must be approached probabilistically rather than mechanically (when the problem is one, as in political behavior or modern physics, of more or less rather than either-or), the test as to when the data are sufficient to verify a statistical generalization cannot be absolute. "Every single theoretic statement in regard to nature takes the form of universal propositions which can be definitely refuted by a single contradictory instance, and this is not true of statistical statements."[3]

Even with these difficulties, a good political theory is most feasible if it is stated in operational terms for purposes of empirical research. Anatol Rapoport and Frank Pinner supply examples in their papers in this section of the difference between feasible and unfeasible theories. Other examples include Robert Dahl's effort to apply his concept of "power comparability," and Lasswell's way of defining his categories, first by precise denotation and second by extended illustration through examples.

The question of feasibility concerns the cost and precision with which the facts required to test the theory can be obtained. Any theory that directs attention to relations between classes of behavior implies that evidence about these classes can

[3] Morris R. Cohen, *A Preface to Logic* (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), p. 145.

be gathered and assessed. Where precise evidence is too difficult to come by, the utility of the theory will be challenged or its application evaded by practicing scientists. This standard is especially relevant in political research, where the stock of relevant variables is vast and unwieldy and where measurement is often difficult. As Pinner shows at the close of his paper, much of the vigor of the behavioral approach in political studies springs from the technical ingenuity of individuals bent on demonstrating that behavioral principles are not only important and valid but often easier to verify than principles developed in other political research traditions.

Lindblom's essay suggests a third standard for evaluating a political theory: "As for the scope of Downs' model, by no means are all the major empirically based generalizations of political science placed in it." A theory may be logical and feasible yet be rejected for another theory that displays greater *scope*. Scope refers to the range of otherwise unconnected generalizations that a theory ties together. Downs's theory for example pertains mainly to parties and voters, not to judicial and administrative processes. Ultimately, a good political theory would integrate these as well and would place the theory in a frame of reference common to that of economics, social psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology. Downs and Pinner among others in this section give special emphasis to the importance of the interconnectedness between guiding principles in the social sciences. Downs uses the model of classical economic theory in his initial propositions. Pinner, convinced that it is "unwise to gamble on the early emergence of systematic theory in political science," looks toward "other, more highly systematized areas of the social sciences . . . for support." He relies on principles developed in economics and psychology.

Some of the dangers of adapting principles from other disciplines are noted by Richard Snyder. Where the principles may transfer neatly, the ability to measure political as distinct from psychological or economic units may be impossible. The theoretical translation may not be accompanied by appropriate methods of inquiry. More often, the principle being transferred treats important problems in its original domain only to prove inappropriate or trivial in its bearing on important questions about politics. Many political behaviorists, however, convinced as they are that a common frame of reference is of great importance, have run these risks in their determination to enhance the scope of political theory.

Theoretical principles originate in a number of ways. In addition to transfer from neighboring disciplines, mundane hypotheses (that is, common sense ideas that are part of a culture's thoughtways) often supply principles that invite testing and conceptual refinement, as we see in Dahl's discussion of the common-sense elements of the concept of power. Also, most of this exposition of scientific theory has concerned deductive systems, while in fact much of political behavior theory has developed *inductively,* through inferences or generalization from empirical findings. Take survey research into electoral behavior for example. Surveys have been conducted to discover who votes, how choices are made between candidates, and to find relations between choices and voter characteristics. Ample data and simple generalizations about relations between facts, provide grist for the creation of limited theoretical statements. The scientist may move from *post hoc* accounts of why individuals vote as they do toward summary explanations of whole electoral systems.

In practice, inductive and deductive strategies are usually employed together.

The ultimate source of political theory is the tradition of scientific inquiry the researcher has learned which directs him to locate and classify regularities in political behavior in a variety of situations.

Theoretical principles are seldom accepted immediately by the scientific community. Ingredients in any new theory are scrutinized, debated and only after long years accepted or rejected. Even in physics, where a body of theory has been built up over centuries of work, counter-principles are advanced and compete for approval. In political behavior research, where the stock of verified principles is small, competition between alternative explanations is continuous. This in no way reduces the need to proceed to collect and analyze facts that speak to theoretical principles. It only means that, when a theory has been constructed and its hypotheses tested, it must also undergo the political trial of agreement among peers.

Short of the powerful elegance of theory in physics, several types of theory may co-exist readily within a single discipline. Principles may be reductive, so that political behavior is regarded as the net result of compounding effects along a nearly endless string of processes explained ultimately by the biopsychological reactions of individual organisms. Reductive theories need not press this far but may halt at some unit defined as the irreducible minimum, such as psychosexual instinct and parental conditioning in the psychoanalytic theory of national character. Or, principles may be holistic, as in the conception of political acts in their place in the larger sociocultural system.

Theories of political behavior differ also in the manner of handling problems of *causation.* In a deductive code of principles, the question "why" is answered by tracing according to strict rules of inference from initial assumptions. With partial theories, an idea's relation to all its logical premises may be unclear. Here, causal explanation may be limited to classification: behavior is accounted for in terms of its placement in a larger category of characteristics. If a student asks, "Why is the majority vote in Chicago and Detroit usually predominantly Democratic?" the reply, "Because many of the voters in these cities are members of labor unions and also are Roman Catholic," tells him that a Democratic majority is not peculiar to these cities. The particular case is classed as an instance of one or several slightly more inclusive propositions. A third kind of causal principle is represented in Pinner's psychological mechanisms of "productive behavior," "avoidance behavior," and "calculated behavior." Here, political behavior is explained theoretically in terms of *goals* that are imputed to political actors. Goal-directed behavior of individuals assumes human *intentions,* latent or otherwise, influential enough to determine responses.

Thus far, the nature of theory has been discussed; some bases for evaluating competing theories considered; and a few of the strategies of political behavior theorists for developing good theory reviewed. The idea that important research on meaningful political problems depends on the use of good theory has been advanced, but it deserves more complete description. We are convinced that political research has developed as a science only as it has pointed to a reasonably well ordered accumulation of empirically validated knowledge. Unrelated research findings, "facts" that cannot speak for themselves, however interesting, can never become knowledge. Equally unlikely materials for theory are the results of substantive scholarship in constitutional law, international relations, comparative gov-

ernment, or political parties, where the results are not interpreted as tests of general principles that bear on all or some of these domains.

A good theory contributes to the search for knowledge, indeed is indispensable to the search, in several ways. The student of political behavior is apt to become so involved in his research problem that he never really states it clearly. All his energy may go toward developing his answer. Theory helps to check this tendency. By locating and defining the problem within a larger context, a theory helps identify what is meaningful about a particular set of facts. Since a theory conveys the larger principles (the assumptions) on which the meaning of any set of facts depends, theory improves the climate of agreement within which any two students of the problem may reach consensus about the validity of the facts.

In summarizing what is known, moreover, a good theory helps prevent the misuse of energies in the study of problems that can lead only to the rediscovery of what is known. Codified principles thus direct our attention to problems in need of solution. And, by specifying logical but otherwise undetected relations between events, theory points up the outstanding gaps in what is known.

8

VARIOUS MEANINGS OF "THEORY"

• *ANATOL RAPOPORT*

So many discussions go astray because the same words are used in different senses by adherents of different points of view that it seems imperative to start practically every discussion by clarifying the meanings of terms. Yet this problem is easier posed than solved. We in academic life owe understandable allegiance to erudition and to elegance of expression, and all too often we take a definition to be adequate (in the sense of clarifying meaning) if it sounds well. More is required, of course. Clarification of meaning (whether couched in formal definitions or in illustrative examples) takes place only if the terms defined are actually geared to the experience of the people concerned. This is a serious problem, because the experiences of people, although they overlap, can be widely disparate. Particularly among us in academic life the disparity may be quite wide. For our experience is very largely the experience of thinking, and thinking is tempered by language in the broadest sense, that is, by the way ideas are organized. And various ways of organizing ideas are imposed on us by our disciplines. Discipline means constraint. Discipline is essential for any organized activity. And so in academic disciplines, "discipline" means constraint on the mode of thought. It prescribes the repertoire of concepts, the patterns of classification, the rules of evidence, and the etiquette of discourse.

Cross-disciplinary endeavor, therefore, depends on the ability of the participants to think in terms of more than one language — a feat more difficult than the ability to think, say, both in English and French, because the languages of the disciplines vary not only in their vocabularies and grammars (as ordinary languages do) but also in deeper aspects, whose meaning I hope can be conveyed by the phrase, "principles of organizing thought."

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I

Our concern here is the role of theory. I will first try to convey the experiences behind this term characteristic of the exact sciences (which I will define by their predominant

thought patterns). Here I am on sure ground, because this is the field in which I myself have been "disciplined." Afterwards I will try to convey the experiences behind the term "theory" in other than exact sciences, particularly in the social sciences. Here I can only give my impressions. I am neither a political scientist nor a psychologist (to give two examples of "non-exact" sciences), and so I have not been properly disciplined to speak with authority on the way a term like "theory" is used there. My remarks are to be taken only as an account of how the thinking of social scientists and others about theory appears to someone who thinks of theory in terms imposed by the discipline of exact science.

In the exact sciences, a theory is a collection of theorems. This concept of theory is also a partial definition of an exact science. It is the *entire* definition of any self-contained branch of mathematics. Some maintain, however, that mathematics is not a science, because it makes no assertions about the observable world. Whether one demands that a science must necessarily make assertions about the outside world is a matter of taste. I tend to accept this limitation on what is to be called a "science" and thus I agree to exclude mathematics from the sciences. What then is an exact science?

To begin with, it is a collection of theorems (to be presently defined); but the theorems have to be translatable into assertions about the tangible world and these assertions should be verifiable within certain limits of accuracy. The theorems are what makes a science exact; the accuracy of the assertions is what makes it successful.

Next we define a theorem. A theorem is a proposition which is a strict logical consequence of certain definitions and other propositions. The validity of a theorem, then, usually depends on the validity of other theorems. This tracing of antecedents goes on until the rock bottom is reached . . . assertions which are not proved but simply assumed, and terms which are not defined but simply listed. In a mathematical system it is unnecessary (in fact, impossible) either to prove these basic assumptions (the postulates) or to define the basic terms. This is what Bertrand Russell meant when he said that in mathematics we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. In logic, the situation is exactly the same. Indeed logic is often taken to be a branch of mathematics or vice versa.

According to our criterion for science, however, we demand that some of the terms used in a science be related extensionally to referents and at least some of the assertions be empirically verifiable. I say some, not necessarily all, and this is an important point to which I will return.

Practically all the exact sciences we know are mathematical or at least highly mathematicized. This is by no means an indication of some supernatural power inherent in mathematics but rather of the propensity of mathematicians for preempting new territories and of adjusting and extending mathematical methods so as to be able to deal with different content areas. The central fact is that a necessary adjunct of an exact science is a set of completely rigid rules of deduction. It is the rigidity of these rules, not the accuracy of the assertions or precision of measurements, which makes an exact science. Now wherever there are such rules, a symbolism is invented as a purely mnemonic device. Wherever a symbolic notation occurs coupled with rules of deduction, *i.e.*, of manipulating the symbols, the mathematician steps in and assumes jurisdiction over the territory, or else the practitioners of the newly invented system of symbol manipulation are called mathematicians. This is what accounts for the all-pervasiveness of "mathematics" in the exact sciences.

II

I will now describe in greater detail by an illustrative example what is meant by a theory in an exact science. Specifically I will take a problem from mechanics, the earliest and one of the most successful of the exact sciences.

Consider a pendulum, that is, a weight supported by a string. The problems is to "explain" its motion. Immediately the question arises, what one means by "explain"? Obviously any explanation will contain statements introduced by "because" in reply to questions starting with "why." But what kind of questions are these? They are likely to be determined by what is observed about the pendulum. What is observed, in turn, will depend on what is singled out for observation. A question like "Why does the pendulum move around?" is so vague that it frustrates any attempt to answer it. Or, viewed in another way, it is trivially

easy to answer, *because* it is so vague. One might say, for instance, that the pendulum moves around because there are forces acting on it.

The first task of an exact science, therefore, is to make the questions precise. The question "Why does the pendulum move *as it does*?" is more to the point. But the phrase "as it does" now lays the questioner open to a counter-question "What do you mean, 'as it does'?" This is a challenge to describe how in fact the pendulum does move, and this temporarily turns the attention away from an "explanation" toward description. To explain anything we must first circumscribe just what we are going to explain.

The first problem, then, is to *describe* the motion of the pendulum. This immediately introduces a motivation to simplify the situation. If the pendulum is constrained only by the string, its bobbing about will appear at first too chaotic to yield to a systematic description. Let us therefore constrain the pendulum to move in one plane, the way clock pendulums move. Now it moves just "back and forth."

But "back and forth" is still too crude a description. How can we make it more precise? Here is where the fundamental orientation of mechanics (of motion) as an exact science begins to direct one's methods of observation. This orientation prescribes what shall be of prime interest in any investigation of motion. If a moving object can be specified at any given moment by its position, the description of motion consists of associating a sequence of positions with a sequence of moments of time. In the simplest case, the position can be uniquely specified by a single number, and, of course, time can also be so specified. The position of the pendulum bob, for example, can be specified by the angle of deflection (positive or negative) from the plumb line, or else equally well by the horizontal displacement of the center of the bob from the position of rest. A complete description of the motion, then, will be given by a table specifying the deflection at each moment of time. Such a table is called a mathematical function.

It can be demonstrated by experiment that the mathematical function $x = A \sin (mt)$ will very nearly, but not quite, describe the motion of the pendulum. Here x is the horizontal deflection of the bob, A is the maximum deflection, t is time, and m is a certain constant to be presently discussed. The qualification "not quite" is of paramount importance, as we shall see. First, however, let us see what we mean when we say that a mathematical function describes a set of data.

Actually a set of data in which values of two variables are related can be represented by a set of points in the plane, as many points as there have been readings. In particular, suppose one took only three readings of the pendulum position and got three points on a graph whose axes are displacement *vs.* time. A mathematical function will "describe" these data if the curve corresponding to the function can be passed through these points. Now a circle or a parabola can always be passed through any three (non-collinear) points, and so can many other kinds of curves. All of them, then, can be said to "describe" this limited set of data. Of course, if more readings are taken, the additional points may not lie on the same curve. However, given any number of points, a great many curves can be made to fit them, which is to say that a great many equations can describe the data, indeed exactly, not approximately. Why, then, is the particular function $x = A \sin (mt)$ chosen, even though it does *not* describe the data exactly?

This function is chosen because it does more than describe the data. It *explains* the data in the sense of "explanation" as it is used in an exact science. And the discrepancies between it and the data are accounted for by the inadequacies of the fundamental assumptions in terms of which the explanation is made.

The fundamental assumptions concern the general laws which supposedly govern the motion of a body subjected to forces. In the case of the pendulum, we can from the geometry of the situation analyze the forces acting on the bob, hence *derive* the mathematical form of the motion. The equation above gives the derived (idealized) motion of an idealized body in an idealized environment. The discrepancy between the idealized and the actual state of affairs is supposed to account for the discrepancies between the prescribed and the realized motion. Some of these idealizing assumptions are as follows:

1. The supporting string or rod is supposed to have no mass.
2. No friction or air resistance acts on the pendulum.

3. The bob is assumed to have mass but no extension.
4. The (small) horizontal displacement is supposed to be proportional to the angle of displacement.

Etc.

All of these assumptions are false. Yet the physicist continues to make them. Why? In return for sacrificing precision (precision must in any event be sacrificed wherever measurements are involved), he gains simplicity and, what is more important, he gets at the fundamentals (almost in the Platonic sense of the word) of the situation. This allows him to subsume a great many phenomena under a single scheme. For example, the assumed laws of motion and idealized properties of the pendulum allow the physicist to derive *from the same set of postulates* the following additional relations:

1. The period of the pendulum will be independent of the mass of the pendulum.
2. Within limits, it will be independent of the amplitude of oscillation.
3. For large amplitudes, the period will become dependent on the amplitude, and the precise nature of this dependence can be predicted.
4. The period will be directly proportional to the square root of the length of the pendulum.
5. The period will be inversely proportional to the square root of the acceleration of gravity. This relation explains the meaning of the constant m in the equation of the pendulum's motion. The constant involves the square root of the ratio of the acceleration of gravity to the length of the pendulum.
6. The horizontal velocity of the pendulum will be given by the function $v = mA \cos (mt)$.
7. The same scheme can be extended to the spherical pendulum, *i.e.*, one not constrained to a single plane. That is to say, from the same set of assumptions one can get many additional results, for instance, the precession of the plane of rotation of the spherical pendulum, etc. Indeed, all the observed motions of the heavenly bodies are derived from exactly the same three or four assumptions about motion which are supposed to underlie the swinging of a simple pendulum.

The story of the pendulum illustrates the power of the mathematical model. A mathematical model is much more than a description of events in terms of the mathematical relations among the variables. It is rather a set of assumptions often referring to a highly idealized situation, from which assumptions the relations to be observed are *derived* to be compared with observations. Agreement with observations corroborates the model. Most important for corroboration is the prediction of *other* relationships, perhaps not hitherto observed. At any rate, the more are the relationships derived, and the fewer are the relationships assumed, the more powerful is the model. A trivial model does no more than lead to relationships which observations had suggested in the first place. Such a model penetrates no deeper than the observational level and is therefore purely descriptive, not explanatory. It simply restates in other terms what has been observed.

The method just outlined is applicable to many widely disparate exact sciences, though the content, of course, will be different in each case. In mechanics, for example, the fundamental assumptions have to do with the laws of motion. In mathematical genetics, another exact science in the sense defined, but not as successful as mechanics, the fundamental assumptions have to do with something quite different, namely the re-shuffling, segregation, and recombination in sexually reproducing organisms of entities supposed to be carriers of separate inherited traits. In this science, the laws governing these events are assumed to be not laws of mechanics or of electrodynamics or of thermodynamics but "laws of chance." For these too an exact mathematical theory exists. And on the basis of it, given certain combinations of genotypes, certain patterns of mating, certain linkages among the genes upon the chromosomes, certain selection pressures exerted by the environment, etc., the distributions of the genotypes and of the phenotypes in the succeeding generations can be computed. Here too discrepancies between prediction and observation are unavoidable, because of the idealizing assumptions which cannot be avoided. But the principle of investigation is the same as in theoretical mechanics. One derives a collection of theorems about how things should happen under idealized conditions. The discrepancies are attributed to the imperfections in the assumptions, and in the initial observations. The dis-

crepancies provide the leverage for further refinements of the theory.

Economics may be viewed in the same light. The assumptions here have to do (in the classical picture) with the relations between price levels, supply, demand, maximization of profit (or expected profit) by the so called "economic man," etc. The mathematical scheme being given, predictions on the basis of initial observations can be made. In mathematical economics agreement between theory and observation is not often good, and many are led to dismiss mathematical methods in economics on this ground. In the light of what has been said, such an attitude is not justifiable. The predictive power of mathematical meteorology, especially in its early stages, was also quite poor. Yet there was never any question that air currents, temperature gradients, and all the other conditions studied in meteorology are subject to the strict laws of physics. The low success of primitive meteorology is entirely attributable to the complexity of the phenomena compared with the drastically simplified assumptions which it was still possible to handle mathematically. Crude meteorology was merely a stage in the development of more refined and more successful meteorology. The original conceptual scheme was correct. Only the tools had to be sharpened.

Thus the bluntness of the available mathematical tools is not a sufficient ground for rejecting them in principle. It is an entirely different matter if the question is raised whether the tools applied are the right *kind* of tools. As is conceded by all who understand the mathematical method, its power is enormous where it can be applied. The big question is, where can it be applied? Clarification is needed here. For many, mathematics means classical mathematics, that is, the mathematics of eighteenth-century physics, derived from the differential and integral calculus. As pointed out, the range of logical disciplines now called "mathematics" has enormously increased, both in techniques and in the variety of conceptualizations, so that any inadequacy of classical mathematics for dealing with problems of social science can by no means be taken as an indication of the inapplicability of mathematics in principle.

Nevertheless, let us first examine the conditions that must be fulfilled in order that classical mathematical methods may be utilized to advantage in theoretical social science.

III

First, there must be sharply defined, quantitative variables singled out for study. In the mechanics of motion, we have seen that position and time were fundamental. Actually there are three fundamental kinds of quantities in mechanics, from which all others are derived: length, time, and mass. Nor is there any question (in classical mechanics) how these quantities are to be measured. In other branches of physics, there are other quantities, for example heat and temperature in thermodynamics, electric charge current, and strength of electric and magnetic fields in electrodynamics, etc. Where probability theory is used, the fundamental quantities are frequencies of occurrence of events or of "types," and so on. In pursuing the question to what extent a quantitative variable can be sharply defined, a most important problem looms: the problem of recognition.

Note that the problem is trivial in mechanics. To determine the position of an object, we must, of course, recognize the object in all positions, but this is ordinarily so easy as to present no problem. As we pass from physics to chemistry, the problem of recognition becomes more important. For example, before quantities or concentrations of substances can be measured, the substances must be recognized. To be sure, there are unambiguous rules for recognizing substances by their "properties," and to the extent that the "properties" are defined in terms of classical physical measurements, the problem of recognition is solved. But it makes itself known.

As we pass to biology, the problem of recognition becomes even more serious. It now takes special training, sometimes quite prolonged, to tell one type of organism from another, one tissue from another, to interpret what is seen through a microscope, etc.

In the behavioral sciences, the problem of recognition becomes paramount. Since these sciences have only recently arisen from the humanities, their terms are derived largely from common sense and from intuitive notions at best, and from deeply rooted pre-scientific notions and prejudices at worst. Outside of science, no need may be felt to endow terms with operational meanings: one's intuitive meaning seems to suffice on the basis of the universal naive assumption that the other's perceptions are like one's own, or else something is wrong

with the other's perceptions. Where there is no consensus on recognition, there can, of course, be no question of quantification or measurement, and so the first requirement of exact (or mathematical) science seems to be not fulfilled. Some workers in behavioral sciences feel that this difficulty precludes in principle the extension of mathematical methods to behavioral science.

The other condition usually assumed necessary for an exact science is this. Given a set of unambiguously measurable variables, one must be able to choose some assumptions about how they are related which reasonably reflect "reality." It is conceded, of course, that only an idealization of reality can be reflected in any finite set of assumptions, but it is maintained that the idealization should at least come close to reality. In mechanics, this condition is fulfilled. True, there is no such thing as frictionless motion, a perfectly rigid body, extensionless mass, etc., but these idealizations are in many instances well enough "approached" by reality. Once a set of assumptions is chosen, the mathematics required to derive theorems and conclusions from them must be amenable to being handled by the human mind. Again, it is maintained by some that even if unambiguous variables could be singled out (as they are in economics) and even if reasonably accurate assumptions could be made, the resulting mathematical system would be too unwieldy to be useful — there are too many relevant variables, and they are too intricately interwoven to permit treatment by existing mathematical techniques.

When it is proposed to simplify the situation by holding all but a few variables constant, it is pointed out (quite correctly) that, first, in many fields of investigation this is practically impossible: one cannot experiment with national economics or with real political systems; second, even where experimentation is possible, controlled conditions introduce distortions of such magnitude as to make extrapolations from controlled to natural situations, *i.e.*, from *in vitro* to *in situ* (to use the physiologist's terms), worthless.

Now I will develop what I want to say further along two lines. First I want to recognize to a certain extent the justice of the criticism of *premature* uses of mathematics in the social sciences and thereby the inevitability of an entirely different conception of "theory" and of the notion of a model, which have arisen in social science. But then I want to point out the limitations of this conception and its underlying assumption concerning the nature and function of mathematical methods and of mathematics itself.

IV

There are social scientists who understand the nature and the importance of the operational definition. Whether motivated by a hope of an ultimate possibility of mathematization of their disciplines (they are more likely to criticize premature mathematization, not mathematization in principle), or because they have been caught up by the spirit of positivism, which has become dominant in modern systematic thought, they undertook the task of creating a sound and consistent terminology of social science, particularly in sociology.

This task, however, would be trivial, if it were confined to a compilation of a glossary, no matter how "operational" the definitions in it. For definitions are arbitrary — they are no more than agreements on how to use terms. Implicit in the work of Parsons and of Levy (to name two workers who recognize the importance of systematization) are not only attempts to map observable events on terms (which is what is done in operational definitions). Their main efforts are directed toward selecting events and combining them in such a fashion as to make the terms applied to these combinations fruitful in the development of a social theory which eventually is to become a collection of theorems — statements in "if so . . . then so" terms.

They ask, for example, in effect, "What is a social action?" Given a certain philosophic orientation, questions like this can be appallingly misunderstood. Traditional philosophy is cluttered with questions of this type where the implicit assumption is that behind each word in use there must be a reality, and that the business of the philosopher is to discover it, so that making a "proper definition" is tantamount to establishing a truth. It has always been the curse of philosophy (until this curse was lifted by the logical positivists) to assume that entities called politics, society, power, welfare, tyranny, democracy, milieu, progress, etc., actually exist, just as cats, icebergs, coffee pots,

and grains of wheat exist, and that each has an essence discoverable by proper application of reason and observation. I add observation, because I am speaking not only of the Platonists but also of the Aristotelians.

Now I certainly am not trying to say what is often said in vulgarized versions of the logical positivist position, namely that "concrete" objects certainly exist while "abstractions" don't. A "cat" is no less an abstraction than "progress," when you come to think of it. The problem is not one of existence but one of consensus. Not what *is* a cat, but what easily recognizable objects shall be *called* cats, is the first question. Because agreement is comparatively easy to reach on this question, we can pass immediately to the study of the cats themselves, their "nature," if you wish. But where agreement is not easy, that is, where one cannot immediately agree on an easily recognizable class of events which shall be subsumed under the term "democracy" or "status" or "power," it is futile to pass to the study of these supposed entities.

The systematizers understand in varying degrees the nature of this semantic problem, and they try to come to grips with it. They ask in effect, "What sort of thing shall we *call* a social action?" Consensus is not easy to reach, because the various definitions will presumably have different consequences. "Social action" once defined will presumably be a key term in some social science discipline. It will (hopefully) appear in the theorems of future theory. Therefore its particular definition serves to focus attention on the component events from which the definition is compounded. It may or may not be fruitful to focus attention on this or that combination of events. Hence the problem of definition becomes a "theoretical" problem, something which is often difficult for the natural scientist to recognize.

In the same spirit we can interpret the question "What is a political act?" "What is an economic act?" This search for primary, supposedly elemental, acts is itself inspired by the role of the atom concept in chemistry (as Easton points out). It is not so much a question of whether these "elementary particles" exist: just naming them does not confer existence. It is rather a question of whether our observations can be so organized that the *assumption* that they exist gives us a heuristic and predictive advantage. Incidentally, this is the only sense in which the so called "elementary particles" of physics can be said to exist.

We have, then, so far two distinct meanings of theory. For the natural, especially the physical scientist, theory, as we have said, is a collection of derived theorems tested in the process of predicting events from observed conditions. The physical scientist is able to address himself to problems of this sort, because for him the problems of recognition, of definition, and of meaningful classification either do not exist or have been largely solved. For the social scientist, all too often, the latter kinds of problems are central. The social scientist's aim, therefore, must be lower than that of the physicist.

It is often difficult to concede that one's aims are lower. So there are social scientists who will insist instead that their aims are "different." They are likely to say that they aim at "understanding" events, not at predicting them. For the physical scientist, however, "understanding" is synonymous with prediction. For this reason the physical scientist is likely to become impatient with the social scientist's distinction between the two. Moreover, the physical scientist often associates so called "understanding" (divorced from predictive ability) with ancient philosophical "explanations" which were unsurpassed in their vagueness or in tautological triviality. For this reason, too, the physical scientist often looks upon social science down his nose. And also for this reason, some investigators, usually those with physical science backgrounds, in an attempt to be constructive (that is, willing to extend to social science the power and respectability of the physical sciences) try to take the bull by the horns and to construct mathematical models of social behavior or of historical process wherever quantifiable variables can be found, not bothering too much with the question of whether these variables are germane to the sort of thing social science is trying to do.

The success of these attempts is spotty but by no means negligible. But because it is spotty, and because the relevance of the results to the important questions of social science is uncertain and (let's face it) because many social scientists do not read mathematics

and for this reason develop defensive attitudes toward its methods, there is a reaction in the social science camp. This reaction is largely, I think, the source of the disclaimer to the effect that social science is not interested in prediction but only in "understanding." When asked what the proponents of "understanding" mean by it, they are in difficulties. It is as difficult to convey the meaning of "understanding" (in its subjective sense, as it is used here) as it is to convey the meaning of "appreciation" or of "perception." Yet these words are full of "meaning," of sorts. All of us "know" what they mean in the same sense that we "know" what vinegar smells like or how velvet feels. Pressing the issues of "meaning" of understanding is not fair in this situation. But it is fair to raise the question whether it is proper to give the name "science" to an activity which aims only at subjective understanding of this sort.

This is not a rhetorical question. I am not at all sure that the answer is categorically "no," although I suspect that I prefer "no" to "yes." Yet there is no denying that this intuitive organization of perception (akin to appreciation) is an important component in the psychology of science. Without it I doubt whether any but utilitarian motivation would exist for scientific activity, and I doubt whether science could get very far on utilitarian motives alone.

We have, then, a third meaning of "theory" in the attempts of social scientists (these attempts are no longer tolerated in physical science) to achieve and to impart intuitive understanding of social behavior, of the nature of institutions, of political systems, of cultures, and such matters. The language of such theory is largely metaphorical, although a great deal of factual material may be brought "in support." To "support" a theory in this context means at best to marshal factual material (historical and political events, case histories, etc.) in such a way that the reader who views this "evidence" through the metaphors, concepts, and definitions of which the "theory" is constructed will have the experience of "understanding." There is no need to say that even such attempts at concretization are often lacking in the writings of social scientists.

You may gather that as I mention concepts of theory farther and farther from those which enjoy hegemony in the physical science, I am becoming more and more sceptical about the scientific worth of such concepts. To a certain extent this is true, but I do not wish to draw a sharp line anywhere. The "worth" of a theory is not calculable by a set of cut and dried criteria any more than a man's worth as a member of the community is calculable in terms of how much he produces. In particular, metaphor and analogy, although they cannot be accepted as scientific "explanations," are sometimes important aids in the sense that they prepare the mind to make more precise investigations. It is in this sense that the so-called "models" of the non-exact sciences are to be appreciated. They are like the diagrams of geometry, neither necessary nor sufficient for the sort of proof that mathematical rigor demands, but often helpful for the eventual construction of such proofs.

There is also a branch of psychology which partakes in this sort of theorizing, namely, "depth psychology," to which the Freudian system also belongs. This branch of psychology is singularly poor in predictive capacity, either deterministic or statistical. Nor are there many attempts to make its terms operational, similar to the attempts of the systematizers in sociology. The aim is intuitive understanding of what makes up personality (another term which is only intuitively understood). It is strange for me, whose habitat is mathematics, to say this, but I think that depth psychology, particularly the contribution of Freud, is the richest area of behavioral science. I only regret that the disparity between the soft-heads and the hard-heads is so great that it is difficult for them to lay out a common program in which intuitive insights can be translated into strict deductions and verifiable generalizations.

V

There is still a fourth sense in which theory is used, in particular "political theory," namely in the normative, value-laden sense. In this sense, political theory would be concerned, for example, with the question of what is the best form of government. I have been specifically warned to avoid this issue on the ground that too much ink has already been shed over it. To some it seems that concern with what "ought to be" is farthest removed from science, which properly concerns itself with "what is." I will take serious issue with this position.

Whatever I know of the situation in political

science is, of course, largely hearsay. In particular I take advantage of learning about the ideas of men whose books I have not read from the very few books on political science which I have read. Thus whatever I know about the ideas of James Bryce I have read in a book by Easton. Easton tells me that Bryce felt that generalization must be firmly rooted in "fact." He also shows how the idea is carried to extremes in some sections of American political science. This "hyperfactualism," as Easton calls it, is, of course, quite understandable. The passage from undisciplined speculation, left over from the times when all science was rooted in philosophy, to militant empiricism has occurred in so many sciences as to suggest the operation of a law. In physical science hyperfactualism died on the vine. It might have proliferated if Francis Bacon's recommendations were ever carried out. But the greatest scientist who was Bacon's contemporary happened to be Galileo Galilei, and he chose a different path. If he had taken "facts" too seriously and too meticulously, he could never have enunciated the general law of falling bodies, because it would never account for the falling of leaves from trees, nor for the fall of rain drops, which between them account for probably 99 per cent of the falling that ever occurs on this planet. Neither leaves nor rain drops follow Galileo's law even approximately. Therefore his law is factually false. But it is true nevertheless, in a deeper sense. Without such ideally true and factually false laws, mathematical physics would have never left the ground.

Galileo's was, in a way, a normative theory. It described not how bodies fell but how they ought to fall under idealized conditions. In this sense one can well see how a theory can be normative and yet truly scientific. The idea of a truly scientific normative theory of action is not to pontificate about morality but to prescribe a correct course of action on the basis of a given desiderata, and in certain (usually idealized) conditions. Such a theory may not have any "practical value," because the idealized conditions may never obtain, but it may have immense heuristic value. In particular, it may through its underlying analysis of the fundamentals of the situation impart to the social scientist just the part of intuitive understanding of an area of investigation that he is seeking.

An example *par excellence* of this sort is game theory, a mathematical structure, which for the most part deals with situations which seem exceedingly remote from the subject matter of social science. However, centuries of scientific experience should have taught us that remoteness of a theory from a particular content area is no indication of its relevance or irrelevance. The fever which derives its name from "bad air" was not really understood until the events in the life of a certain mosquito became known. The harnessing of natural forces owes a tremendous lot to the ancients' curiosity about the anomalous behavior of amber and to one man's logical analysis of an experiment, which had been designed for no other reason than to determine the earth's motion relative to "absolute space."

The relevance of game theory to social science, particularly to political science (although originally the most direct applications were thought to be to economics) resides in the circumstance that game theory distills the logical essence of the situation which Catlin has termed the political act, namely a desire to fulfill an act of will in a context where conflict with others' desires to fulfill their acts of will is to be expected.

Interpreted in a physical context, the metaphor "conflict of forces" calls for some sort of equilibrium theory. Such a theory can be and has been developed purely metaphorically. The concepts of "force," "pressure," "balance of power," "leverage," "stability," "instability," are mostly terms borrowed from physics. Descriptions of conflict situations in these terms sound like descriptions of physical systems. But of course the analogy is a metaphorical, not a logical one, *i.e.*, the similarity is felt intuitively, not derived as a consequence of an isomorphism between two situations. Therefore metaphorical models of conflict, although they may be valuable for a variety of reasons, cannot be expected to yield logically compelling theorems, let alone theorems translatable into predictions.

There have been attempts to construct real mathematical models of conflict by utilizing the conceptual apparatus of classical mathematics. One such attempt, a very ambitious one, was undertaken by the late Lewis F. Richardson, who cast international rivalries in terms of differential equations and interpreted the stabilities and instabilities of the resulting systems

of equations as the stabilities or instabilities of certain international situations. Since Richardson's theory is mathematical, its conclusions are definitive and compelling. In this they have an advantage over the metaphorical theories of the same sort. Its success as a predictive theory is, as would be expected, extremely limited. One set of data was fitted very well by the assumptions of the model, namely the arms expenditures of the two coalitions during the armament race preceding World War I. But even this extremely good fit is not impressive, since there are too many free parameters in the model and the points to be fitted are too few. One could at this point recall our previous argument that a mathematical theory always begins by treating an idealized situation and this beginning serves as a point of departure for greater refinements.

VI

The merits of game theory, however, are of quite another kind. It too deals with idealized situations; in particular it assumes "perfectly rational players." But it departs radically from earlier attempts to cast behavior into models of the mathematical physics type in one very important respect. The older models assumed the metaphysical basis of mechanics. That is, they described systems whose "states" were determined by a causality operating on the "here and now," the way physical states are determined. The state of any physical system is a consequence of the immediately preceding state in accordance with the laws governing infinitesimal changes of state.

In contrast, game theory is primarily a decision theory. It too casts situations into sequences of states. But each successive state is determined by a decision made by a rational being who foresees all possible outcomes and chooses a course of action, which in some way is likely to yield the best outcome under the circumstances. The phrase "under the circumstances" is crucial, for here game theory goes to the real heart of the matter. Each decision maker controls only a part of the situation. In making his decisions, he is aware that other decision makers whose "interests" may be opposed to his also make "rational decisions," and moreover take into account the decisions which *he* is likely to make. No physical theory treats of such situations.

Whereas the mathematical theories of behavior borrowed from the methods of physics (and often chemistry) depend for their success on the special assumptions concerning the interaction of variables and on the possibility of measuring certain key parameters, game theory is largely independent of special assumptions and measurements.

The independence from measurements is achieved by simply by-passing the problem. The only numerical variables are "utilities," *i.e.*, degrees of preference by the several decision makers for the various possible outcomes, and these are simply regarded as given. Independence from special assumptions obtains because game theory is entirely "normative." It assumes "complete rationality" of the decision makers.

To some workers in game theory, particularly those who are oriented to social science applications, the most interesting results are paradoxically those which show up the inadequacies of game theory, *i.e.*, the indeterminacies of results based on the indeterminacy of the concept of "rationality" in all but the simplest of situations.

To illustrate, let us examine two game-like situations, in the first of which "rationality" can be satisfactorily defined, but not in the second. Suppose two decision makers have two courses of action each. Each of the four pairs of choices leads to an outcome which is denoted by a pair of "pay-offs," that is utilities accruing to each player. The situation can be represented by a 2×2 matrix. The first player chooses one of two rows; the second, one of two columns. The entries in the matrix are the pay-offs to the first and second players respectively, as in Figure 1.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0, 0 & 3, -3 \\ 1, -1 & 2, -2 \end{bmatrix}$$

FIGURE 1

Note that the pay-offs in this case all add up to zero, *i.e.*, what the first player wins, the second loses. These games are called zero-sum.

This game has a "solution" which prescribes a "rational" choice to each player, namely for the first player to choose the second row, and for the second player the first column. This is so, because the first player can obviously guarantee for himself a win of 1, and the second

player can *prevent* him from winning more than one, even if each choice is made without knowledge of the other's choice. Here a true "balance of power" exists, but note that this balance is not analogous to any physical balance of "opposing forces." It is a balance based on the *logic* of the situation, involving rational decisions.

The "solution" is much less definite in our next example, shown in Figure 2. Here the

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1, 1 & -2, 2 \\ 2, -2 & -1, -1 \end{bmatrix}$$

FIGURE 2

pay-offs do not add to zero. Such a game is called non-zero sum. If we follow the first player's "rational" reasoning, we must concede that he should choose the second row because *no matter which* column the second player chooses, he is better off by choosing the second row. By symmetry, the second column is the second player's "best" choice. But this pair of "best" choices results in a loss to both players $(-1, -1)$, whereas their "worst" choices would have given both a win. Obviously "self interest" is not a self-evident concept.

Agreement between the players to choose first row, first column would be considered "rational" in this case. But admitting agreements of this sort leads to questions of coalition formation, an immensely fertile field in game theory and a very difficult one, because of the ambiguities which plague the concepts of "power," "self-interest," "rationality," etc. — terms taken for granted in much discussion of individual and social behavior, but which game theory has undertaken to define with mathematical precision, and was led into formidable conceptual difficulties in consequence.

The central problem in game theory thus appears to be logical analysis, specifically logical analysis of situations in which common sense often fails. Where such logical analysis can be pushed to a definitive conclusion, the theory of games can be considered a normative theory. For example, the equilibrium solution of a two-person zero-sum game is essentially a prescription to two rational players how to choose their strategies.

But sometimes no such conclusion can be reached on the basis of existing concepts. The following extremely instructive example is taken not from game theory proper but from closely allied investigations. I shall cast it in terms likely to be of interest to political scientists.

Suppose three men, A, B, C, rank three courses of action, X, Y, Z, according to their preference 1, 2, 3. Let their rankings be displayed in the matrix shown in Figure 3.

	X	Y	Z
A	1	2	3
B	2	3	1
C	3	1	2

FIGURE 3

What is a fair compromise? Suppose we apply the majority rule to paired comparisons. Noting that X is preferred to Y by A and B (a majority) and Y to Z by A and C (again a majority), we are tempted to assign to X, Y, and Z the ranks 1, 2, 3 respectively. However, this violates the majority rule in the case of X and Z, because Z is preferred to X by B and C (again a majority!).

Kenneth Arrow has shown that such impasses are *certain* to arise wherever more than 2 persons rank more than 2 alternatives; that moreover no decision rules except those which seem undesirable in a democracy, such as dictatorial or entirely arbitrary prescriptions, can be assigned which do not contain inherent contradictions of the sort just noted.

The methods of such analyses, like the methods of game theory, are those of exact science. The situations portrayed certainly remind us of political situations. They involve conflicts of interest, advantages of coalition, social decision rules, in other instances also arbitration schemes, calculation of power indices, etc. Here, then, is an exact science, seemingly applicable to politics (or perhaps, economics). But what does "applicable" mean? If it is taken to mean as involving the possibility of translating the theorems into predictions about human behavior, I am afraid it is stretching the imagination to call game theory "applicable."

The conditions of translatability are not met. Situations are seldom so clear-cut as to be describable in terms of a few "alternatives"; preferences are never so clear as to be measured in utilities; men are seldom rational. In this sense game theory fares no better than the classical mathematical models of behavior borrowed from physics and chemistry.

But in another sense, game theory and similarly oriented investigations are a genuine step forward. For they have burst through the framework of thought imposed by physical science on those who wished to apply mathematical methods to behavioral science. The floodgates have opened and a torrent of entirely new concepts has rushed by. I wish to note in passing that a flourishing terminology is more often a calamity in a rhetorically oriented discipline than an indication of its richness. Vagueness allows undisciplined proliferation and duplication, often providing a mask of erudition for lack of originality and insight. Not so in exact science. There concepts hold their own only if they provide points of anchorage for genuine theorems, not simply for rhetorical speculation.

But what good is it, the empiricist is bound to ask; which is his perfect right. No hidebound answer can be given. Only if one believes that far-reaching and deep-digging logical analysis is essential in any discipline which aspires to the status of science, will one be satisfied with the answer that game theory is an example of such an analysis, that it is of relevance to political science because its fundamental concepts are idealizations of what political science is about, namely decisions made amid partly conflicting and partly coincident interests of rational, calculating beings. Theory of this sort represents one of two poles. The other is meticulous empiricism, of the kind espoused by Bryce, by most historians, and by the positivists of Jerome Frank's persuasion in legal thought. The arguments of the empiricists are well known. They are worthy arguments. The arguments in favor of pure theory are much harder to present because social scientists do not often come into contact with really powerful pure theories, the kind that grow on mathematical soil. One can only say that their worth has been amply demonstrated elsewhere. The physicist might spend thousands of years studying the behavior of ocean waves on a beach in most meticulous detail; in the end he would be no wiser than before with regard to what is essential in wave motion.

The really profound understanding of waves is quite independent of observing any real waves. For that matter, the most important waves in our lives are not even observable directly — I am referring to the waves which underlie our entire telecommunication system and also subatomic events.

It is these kinds of essences which pure theory seeks. It goes without saying that *ultimately* the findings of theory must somehow be translated into real predictions and observations. But to demand this too soon is not wise. It would be like demanding cash payment in every business transaction. Such "hard-headedness," although aimed at security, would actually disrupt the system of credit on which any complex economy must depend to a great degree.

Theory, then, is like a system of credit. One has a right to demand that *somewhere* there are assets to back up the transactions. But, as often as not, these assets may be in the future, and the very act of questioning their existence may set in motion a chain reaction which will preclude their existence.

This is what I meant by the statement that not every conclusion of an exact theory has to be translatable into observation. In the case of the recent constructions of exact theories of presumed relevance to social science, we will do well to extend to them the most liberal credit. After all, in our society the thinker's time comes cheap.

9

IN PRAISE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

• CHARLES E. LINDBLOM

Is anyone's esteem for political science better suppressed than a political scientist's? Ordinary modesty is admirable, but his is professionally destructive. For, not only hiding his light under a bushel, he follows the more nihilistic course of blowing it out. Granted that many political scientists neither deprecate their discipline nor permit a low regard for it to stultify their work, I have been repeatedly assured by members of the profession that no social science is more retarded and none less promising for systematic theory. Thus they hide — even from their own eyes — their discipline's accomplishments. This I shall try to show, offering two books as evidence. There is other evidence, too. When even politically ignorant undergraduates complain that the major in political science is thin, no imaginable poverty of the field explains enough. Such a phenomenon proves concealment, either deliberate or unintended.

To be sure, political scientists seem no less happy in their work than other social scientists. They do not apologize for the books they write, or even concede intellectual superiority to their cousins in the other social sciences. I find their lack of esteem for political science displayed in two other ways: (1) As Rogow will show, they often undervalue the richness of their professional insights, concepts, and empirical generalizations, neglecting to employ them in analytical work to which they are relevant. (2) As Downs will show, they have failed to recognize, applaud, and make explicit the systematic theory that is implicit in their work.

A review of: Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Government Decision-making in a Democracy*, Technical Report No. 32, prepared for the Office of Naval Research, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University, Department of Economics, May 31, 1956, 347 pp. (mimeographed; Armed Services Technical Information Agency, Knott Building, Dayton, Ohio); and Arnold Rogow, *The Labour Government and British Industry, 1945–1951*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1956. Reprinted by permission from *World Politics* (January, 1957), 240–253.

I

Consider the second first. Attitudes toward explicit theory differ in the profession; some do not wish to pursue it, others do. For the latter, the prospects are thought discouraging in all fields — from political parties to budgeting, and not excluding international relations. This in a discipline long ago distinguished by the skillful even if only half-explicit model-building of Hobbes and then Rousseau! Judging by their common practice of applying the term "political theory" to what in other disciplines would be called the history of doctrine, it would appear that to many political scientists political theory has only a past — no present, no future.

The contrast with my own discipline is pertinent. Where economists have made the most of a seriously defective theoretical system, political scientists have permitted a kind of perfectionism to inhibit ambitious, explicit system-building. In talking with political scientists I am often struck by their dissatisfaction with theoretical proposals that do not promise a rough fit to the phenomena to be explained, while economists have happily elaborated, to take one example, a theory of the firm that is still a caricature of the phenomena described. The difference between the two disciplines is noteworthy, despite difference of opinion on whether paralytic tendencies in the one are to be preferred to the elegant errors of the other.

Because economists deal with easily measured quantities — with prices, amounts bought and sold, numbers employed, and flows of funds — systematic theory may on this count be easier for them. On the other hand, much of their theoretical refinement has been paid

for in relevance. Quite aside from the limited relevance of economic theory attributable to its heroic assumptions, it is irrelevant again to large areas of economic life about which it has nothing very important to say. Consumer economics is an example. A multitude of questions about consumer behavior, comparable to questions asked in political science about voting behavior, are beyond the reach of economic theory for the time being. It is quite possible therefore that explicit political theory, less elegant but more relevant, will turn out to be more serviceable than economic theory, as well as intellectually more satisfying. This is not merely a possibility but an eventuality toward which signs are pointing.

The test of whether political scientists fail to appreciate the implicit theoretical accomplishments of their own discipline hinges on the answer to the question: Do they in fact possess an underlying implicit theoretical system? I would argue that a number of works are beginning to show that they do;[1] and I can now point to Downs's splendid book as clinching evidence. The fact that it is not a professional political scientist who has here integrated a large part of political science into an explicit theoretical system doubly bears out my argument that the profession itself has not appreciated its riches.

[1] Pendleton Herring's *Politics of Democracy* (New York, 1940) is an excellent example of a work with substantial theoretical content remaining implicit. Less rich in theory but more explicit in the theory it contains is David Truman's *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951). Somewhat more systematically theoretical and more explicit is E. E. Schattschneider's *Party Government* (New York, 1942). Still more deliberate attempts to make explicit and systematic the underlying theory of political science include, among others, Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior*, New York, 1947; R. A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, Chicago, 1956; David Easton, *The Political System*, New York, 1953; H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society*, New Haven, Conn., 1950; Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1952; R. A. Dahl and C. E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare*, New York, 1953; and A. Ranney and W. Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System*, New York, 1956. I would add the further evidence of underlying theory constituted by A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government*, Chicago, 1908; and W. Edwards, "The Theory of Decision-making," *Psychological Bulletin*, LI, No. 4 (July 1954), pp. 380–417.

Downs's formulation is neither full-blown nor unblemished. But it is bold, imaginative, creative, to say the least, and persuasive beyond any expectation with which I approached it. I believe its impact on political science, as well as on economics, will be deeply registered in the next ten years. It is an impressive theory in the classical sense: from relatively few definitions and assumptions, it derives deductively a large integrated body of generalizations which can be tested against generalizations empirically established.

My reason for believing that Downs has uncovered a previously implicit system is that his definitions, assumptions, and propositions are on the whole familiar to political scientists, even if his formulation carries him on to the unfamiliar as well. His major postulate, that of rational individual behavior, is similar to the rationality assumption of economics. From it and certain supplementary definitions and assumptions, he derives a central critical hypothesis. This hypothesis is a reformulation of a proposition often encountered in political science: a political party is an organization for making nominations and contesting elections in order to win control of the governmental machinery.[2] His reformulation turns it into a maximizing hypothesis. Putting the party into a kind of entrepreneurial role, the hypothesis is that the political party seeks to maximize votes cast for it. On these simple foundations, his remarkable achievement is constructed.

Correspondence between Downs's propositions and the fruits of empirical research he leaves to his readers to appraise. But here are some of his empirically testable propositions, and I think they bear out my thesis with respect to the political scientists — that they "knew it all the time," but, not knowing that they know it, are underplaying the possibilities of explicit and systematic theory.

> Party members have as their chief motivation the desire to obtain the intrinsic rewards of holding office; therefore they formulate policies as means to that end rather than seeking office in order to carry out preconceived policies.
>
> Both parties in a two-party system agree on any issues that a majority of citizens strongly favor.
>
> In a two-party system, party policies are (a) more vague, (b) more similar to those of other

[2] For example, Ranney and Kendall, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

parties, and (c) less directly linked to an ideology than in a multi-party system.

In a multi-party system governed by a coalition, the government takes less effective action to solve basic social problems, and its policies are less integrated and consistent, than in a two-party system.

A large percentage of citizens — including voters — do not become informed to any significant degree on the issues involved in elections, even if they believe the outcomes to be important.

The percentage of low-income citizens who abstain in elections is higher than the percentage of high-income citizens who abstain, *ceteris paribus*.[3]

As is generally true of theoretical systems, many of Downs's propositions are not directly testable; but, again, their degree of correspondence with those widely accepted as true among political scientists is impressive. This can be illustrated by any of his analyses: of the circumstances that determine whether a party appeals to a majority or to a group of minorities, of the impact of costs of obtaining information upon voter behavior, of coalition governments, or of the role of party ideology. On the last named, here is his summary of some of the derived propositions:

Uncertainty restricts each voter's ability to relate every government act to his own view of the good society. Therefore acquaintance with each party's view of the good society — its ideology — helps him make his voting decision without knowing about every policy specifically. Voters thus use ideologies to cut their information costs.

Parties also find ideologies useful in gaining the support of various social groups and in short-cutting decisions about which policy will gain the most votes. A diversity of party ideologies can exist only because uncertainty prevents any one from being proven superior; if a superior one does emerge, other parties imitate it and subtler differentiation takes place.

In our model, it is necessary for each party's ideology to bear a consistent relation to its actions and to develop without repudiating the party's former acts. Any other procedure makes rational voting nearly impossible; hence voters impute value to parties with these traits. To win their votes, all parties are forced by competition to be relatively honest and responsible in regard to both policies and ideologies.

Though ideologies are never internally contradictory, they may be only loosely integrated, since they are designed to attract many social groups. Their stability over time has both logical and institutional roots which prevent policies from being altered smoothly to fit changing conditions. Thus ideologies cause lags and discontinuities that may cost a party votes.

In this way conflicts arise between the maintenance of ideological purity and the winning of elections. The former may occasionally take precedence over the latter, but our hypothesis is upheld as long as parties behave most of the time as though election is their primary objective (pp. 127–28).

To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that I am not calling attention to the correspondence between Downs's deductions and the propositions of empirical political science to prove that Downs is right, for both the deduced and the empirical propositions may be faulty. My point, to repeat, is that he has demonstrated that a large body of definitions, assumptions, and propositions current in the profession constitute with some adjustment a theoretical system. Q.E.D., the discipline has been and is better off than many of its practitioners have allowed.

Productive as the assumption of rationality is in economic theory, I would not have expected, before reading Downs, that a similar assumption would prove as fruitful in political theory. I was inclined to think that people in the market are more rational than people in the political arena. But Downs has defined rationality in such a way that, although he retains its usefulness for deductive theory, it can encompass both the ignorant voter and the apathetic. Hence his model predicts surprisingly well some of the "irrationalities" in voter behavior that have been described in empirical research.[4]

Moreover, rationality turns out to be a powerful postulate for leadership in the form of the vote-maximizing hypothesis. It may actually be a more useful hypothesis than its comparable application in economics, where it postulates entrepreneurial profit-maximizing. The business firm may embark, it is of course true, on profit maximization as an organizational goal; but it may also pursue in combination with profits, or in place of them, such goals as conservation of assets, growth, diversification, minimization of disturbance of mar-

[3] These propositions are taken verbatim from a summary list of twenty-five testable propositions, pp. 336–41.

[4] For example, P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, New York, 1948; and B. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, *Voting*, Chicago, 1954.

ket relationships, or minimization of competitors' profits, assets, growth, or diversification. These various possibilities reduce the fit of a theoretical system postulating profit-maximization even if, as some believe, all these goals can be related eventually to profit-maximization. In contrast, the political party's interest in winning elections is almost single-minded and the vote-maximization assumption more serviceable.[5]

Even aside from entrepreneurial goals such as growth or conservation of assets, the profit-maximization assumption in economics stumbles on alternative time perspectives that entrepreneurs entertain. A firm may plan to maximize profits here and now, gambling that the future will take care of itself; or it may seek to maximize over a decade, over the lifespan of its owner, or for an even longer time, especially in the case of corporations. Consequently it is difficult to deduce anything from the assumption of profit-maximization without a supplementary assumption about time perspective. But any one of many alternative assumptions is as good as any other; and propositions are therefore greatly multiplied at the same time that the possibility of applying the appropriate theory to any given empirical situation is reduced.

In contrast, Downs argues rather convincingly that the political party is ordinarily preoccupied with the next election in any cycle to the exclusion of its interest in any subsequent ones. A vote-maximizing assumption therefore requires no supplementary assumption as its counterpart does in economics, and its application is much simpler and more correctly predictive.

As for the scope of Downs's model, by no means are all the major empirically based generalizations of political science placed in it; and it is almost foolish even to mention such a possibility. The judiciary never appears in it, nor do the administrators. It is largely a theory of parties and their relations with voters. On the other hand, he has not begged off with the plea that differences between the American system and others abroad make a general theory of democracy impossible. His is a general theory, encompassing both two-party and multi-party systems, as well as systems differing in the distribution of voting power among groups in the electorate, and otherwise embracing common aspects of differing democratic systems. What he has not included in the model are still other factors varying from one country to another. In this understandable failing political theory is, again, not necessarily less adequate than economic theory, which, for all the freedom with which it is applied to various economies, remains incapable of explaining, for example, just why or in what specific consequential respects American, French, and British business practices will differ.

How far Downs's model can be extended through further work is best tested by further work. One is tempted to speculate on the potential in political theory compared with that for economic theory, but systematic comparisons of that kind can be made only with clearly specific standards, which are present in neither field and presumably would differ in any case from the one field to the other. But for what it is worth, let me say that I find the model richly suggestive of directions to take for explicit theoretical analysis along several lines.

One is the preconditions or prerequisites for political democracy. By contrast traditional economic theory promises very little on prerequisite conditions for the market system. On another — the justification for, as opposed to preconditions of, political democracy — Downs has himself developed a brief but sharp argument covering a few of the issues. Because it will in a sense claim less for democracy than welfare economics has tried to claim for the market, I would guess that political theory can more quickly establish a satisfactory theoretical justification for democracy than can economic theory for the market.

Still further, on the clarification and appraisal of alternative forms of democracy, the model should be extraordinarily fruitful. Differences in potential development in the two fields of theory may be possible to guess, the comparable field in economic theory being market structure. With considerable precision, economic theory permits explanation and appraisal of alternative forms, but these forms are

[5] For a fine discussion, still largely correct, of the discrepancy between the theory of the firm and the phenomena described by it, see K. W. Rothschild, "Price Theory and Oligopoly," *Economic Journal*, LVII (September 1947), pp. 299–320, reprinted in the American Economic Association's *Readings in Price Theory*, Chicago, 1952.

encompassed in a model whose fit to the real world is poor, as witness the profession's inability to find workable norms for market structures. Rigor is won at the cost of relevance. Here is a specific area in which I would expect, both from Downs's formulations and from empirical generalizations not yet organized into a theoretical system, that political theory with tolerable precision can meet a higher standard of relevance or fit than can economics.

I would not so sanguinely regard the prospects for theoretical advancement along the line that Downs has taken if it were not that the task is, as I have said, less to create theory than to make it explicit. We now have a partly excavated political theory. And what we see are not ruins but the outlines of well-developed structures. Although greater prizes have already been uncovered than had been thought to exist, indefinitely more digging remains to be done. Because circulation of Downs's work in its present format is limited, its commercial publication by Harper & Brothers will be fortunate for social science.

II

For the kind of future we can imagine, the whole of no social science will be neatly bound together by theory, and substitutes for theory will be heavily relied upon. It is the political scientist's attitude toward these substitutes that constitutes my other reason for believing that the profession undervalues its own discipline, Rogow serving as a case in point. I begin again by analogy with economics.

Insofar as economics has substantial accomplishments to its credit, they are due somewhat less to theory than is commonly supposed both in the profession, I should guess, and outside. A great strength of economics is a kind of half-formal codification of generalizations, concepts, and questions, all short of theory.

Put an economist to work on the effects of income taxation on business spending, for example. He really knows very little about it, except for the obvious; and his formal theory is of little help. But he will organize his work in a fairly predictable way, working with standard categories. He will distinguish between effects of taxes on incentives to spend, on one hand, and on resources for spending, on the other. He will separately examine each of several different incentive problems: the incentive to invest, the incentive to save, and others. He will distinguish between marginal and average rates of taxation. He will consider the impact of taxes on the individual's absolute share of income as well as on his rank in the distribution of income. And so on. And having broken down his large problem into its analytical components, into each part he will feed the relevant generalizations from a common stock widely accepted in the profession. He will not be a very good economist if this is all he does, but this procedure is a beginning on which he can then build his own contribution. In short, he values and uses his discipline.

Political science is perhaps quite as well equipped as economics for exploiting partially codified concepts, questions, and propositions. If we take, as one of many possible examples, a group of studies like Herring's *Politics of Democracy;* Schattschneider's *Party Government,* Truman's *Governmental Process,* and Ranney's and Kendall's *Democracy and the American Party System,* we find certain concepts, questions, and generalizations common to all four. Substantial professional assets are apparent.

Rogow's book suggests, however, that if one puts a political scientist to work on a problem, there is little predicting what he will do with it — whether he will use his professional assets or not. I am not competent to decide whether the book is a representative or an extreme case. In any case, it is an example of a scholar's throwing away accumulated organized knowledge and trying to go it alone, presumably because he does not highly enough value the accumulated achievements of his discipline, certainly not because he is unfamiliar with them.

I turn to the book to illustrate a situation in political science, not to judge Rogow individually. The evidence from this book, from his other writings, and from many hours of discussion with him is that he has an able mind; he is intellectually courageous, imaginative, and vigorous — and I choose those three adjectives with care. Anyone interested in recent British history, economic life, and politics will profit from his study of the Labour government. It displays more than the virtues of accuracy, organization, and style, for it is also thoughtful, sensitive, insightful. I especially applaud Rogow's skillful balance between forest and trees. And, considering that he chooses to throw away

the excellent analytical aids of his own discipline, it is a perspicacious piece of analysis.

But he does throw them away. And having thrown them away, he is pushed back onto less satisfactory questions, concepts, and generalizations simply because he cannot do without any at all. From the questions he asks and the answers given, one can work back to his set of implicit norms or expectations for two-party democratic processes. I want to list and discuss some of them to show by contrast what he has wasted. An explicit statement of them is probably sufficient to lead Rogow to deny their validity; yet on them his analysis stands or falls, as I shall try to show.

(1) *A successful political party is an organization for carrying through a predetermined program derived from a highly integrated ideology.*

The significance of this proposition is clear if contrasted with the more common view that a political party is an organization for winning elections and control of government. Now Downs and others show that conflicts sometimes arise between ideological purity and winning elections, and I think it is clear that such a conflict has been serious in the Labour Party. Hence an analysis of the prospects for the Labour Party must come to grips with factors facilitating a loosening in ideology sufficient to permit the Labour Party to continue successfully as a political party. Instead we find Rogow alarmed by the ideological impurity of the party and concluding that "the Labour Party must reformulate its basic principles. Nor is there much time to lose" (p. 187). This he regards as one of his major conclusions: if socialism is to be achieved, the Labour Party needs a theory, a more precisely defined socialism.

Perhaps for the Labour Party Rogow prefers ideological purity to winning elections. But if he believes that ideological purity wins elections, he is flying in the face of accumulated knowledge that ought to be taken account of. Perhaps his point is that ideological purity, though it does not win elections, is logically necessary to the achievement of Socialist goals. But then he must explain how the Labour Party, without winning elections, will achieve socialism.

(2) *A practical ideal for democratic politics is that interest groups be cooperative rather than conflicting.*

Because most analysts of political parties would find it hard to explain party organization without reference to conflict among interest groups, I think it unnecessary to labor the contrast between the more common view in political science and Rogow's near-Utopian view of harmonious democracy. What is more difficult to believe is that such a view is often implicit in Rogow's analysis.

He reveals it in a variety of ways, one of which is curious. A serious constraint on the Labour program, he says, is the possibility that further change cannot be peaceful and democratic. Why? Because the Conservatives will fight it. He quotes Laski's well-known thesis on revolutionary resistance to radical social change. But he then goes on to say that resistance is unlikely to take the form of violence. The offended power interests will, however, increasingly enter the political arena to influence public opinion (p. 180). Thus his fears for peaceful and democratic change rest on his expectation that business groups will become increasingly active in politics. The argument has either accidentally been muddled or is, as I suggest, an implicit contrast of peaceful democratic processes with group conflict that throws away the insight of political scientists who see democracy as a process of reconciling conflict.

Rogow's identification of democracy with harmony is even more sharply illustrated in his critical comment on the thesis that a taxpayer is morally entitled to minimize his tax liabilities, so far as the law permits. This unexceptional position he sees as "anachronistic in a society where the State, financed by taxation, is undertaking a vast responsibility for welfare and services" (p. 125).

Is a reasonable interpretation of Rogow's views on harmony and democracy simply that he identifies some minimum level of agreement as essential to democracy? If so, he would be on familiar ground. Consider his next implicit proposition, which is to the contrary.

(3) *Major interests are bi-modally distributed in a democracy.*

I must admit I have some difficulty reconciling this proposition with Rogow's norm of harmony in democracy, but his attempt to go it alone understandably involves him in frequent inconsistency. The assumption of a bimodal distribution is the other side of the coin of class conflict. His picture of such a distribution of interests is revealed in several ways. To

begin with, he does not see the two British parties as appealing in slightly different ways to an underlying consensus, despite the overwhelming evidence of empirical and theoretical political science that this is the case. Secondly, he has difficulty imagining an individual with multiple group loyalties. For example, "It is almost axiomatic that any identification of interests between the workers and private enterprise operates against an identification of interests between the workers and socialism, and ultimately, between the workers and the State" (p. 115). Thirdly, he has little conception of role-playing as a determinant of behavior; instead, behavior is determined simply by class origin, as illustrated in his belief, ignoring American experience to the contrary, that the attitudes of industrial leadership are largely a product of class origin and not of career and role.

I concede that there are social classes and that there are serious class conflicts. My point is that Rogow has neglected his discipline's wealth of insight into class and *other* group conflict, its relation to social agreement as a prerequisite to democracy, and its bearing on party strategy.

(4) *A political party is a monolithic interest group.*

Again, the contrast between this postulate and the more common one requires no explanation. The most convincing evidence that it is indeed a reasonable inference from Rogow's work is in his analysis of the failure of the Labour Party to achieve all its objectives, especially its failure to carry nationalization further. Some of the leaders in the Labour Party felt themselves caught in an ideological trap in 1945, and feel so increasingly with each passing year. The party's traditional position on nationalization, hardened in a period in which no alternatives to nationalization were attractive, they thought somewhat inappropriate to a post-Keynesian era. Clearly much of the opposition to nationalization came from within the party, and it seems probable that the growing intensity of opposition from outside the party was encouraged, in part deliberately, by the lukewarm nationalizers within the party. This internal struggle Rogow alludes to. But for the most part Rogow's story is one of monolithic opposition outside the party poised against monolithic policy-making inside. Much as he has to say on the motives, character, and tactics of the opposition, his analysis is far from adequate, as will inevitably be the case when internal conflict within a party is largely ignored as a determinant of party policy.

(5) *Power is a homogenous mass fixed in total amount, so that what A gains B loses.*

Power, it would appear from professional writing, is neither homogenous nor fixed in amount. A may gain certain powers over B by putting certain other powers into the hands of C. Analysis requires that who controls whom be specified, as well as the scope of each control. But Rogow's analysis runs in terms of a struggle for possession of a large undefined mass. His is a kind of "lump of power" fallacy. In pursuing the question: "Was there a substantial transfer of power from the middle to the working classes?" (p. 1), he never makes clear whether he means voting power, administrative power, managerial power in industry, or the control of public opinion. His interest shifts from one to another of these categories, which are neither well defined nor carefully related to his overriding question on the transfer of power.

(6) *A party's program, in a time as short as one or two periods of incumbency, may sometimes be expected to achieve a drastic displacement of certain power groups, hence a fundamental alteration of the power structure of the society.*

The proposition is loosely stated because Rogow's concept of power is not well defined. And because there is less crystallization of a common position in the discipline, the contrast between his implicit view and a more common one is not so easily identified as it is for the earlier propositions. However, to indicate his failure to use the analytical aids at his disposal, I return to Rogow's question on the transfer of power: "Was there a substantial transfer of power from the middle to the working classes?"

In the contexts in which the question appears and reappears, Rogow wastes his time and ability investigating the possibility of a transfer of power substantially greater than is consistent either with the implicit models of democracy that are to be found in empirical political science or with the explicit model of Downs. To put it another way, if in a six-year period such a transfer of power as Rogow wishes to investigate actually took place, the transfer would have been marked by disturbances to the democratic process which he neither found nor thought

worth investigating. Hence he has posed an analytical question that makes sense only if the common models are incorrect.

These are only a few of his working assumptions. Considering the six, as well as others that might have been cited, one can concede the outside possibility that they fit the phenomena they describe better than the more commonly accepted hypotheses with which they contrast. For, lacking both careful statistical verification and theoretical validation, many of the commonly accepted beliefs of political scientists are as shaky as those of economics. But I doubt Rogow's assumptions, just as he will doubt them in their explicit form. If it was Rogow's intention — and here I scrape bottom looking for an alternative interpretation of the book — to undermine a large segment of what can be referred to as the half-codified knowledge of political science and to substitute a new set of propositions for the old, he has been overly subtle. Assuming this was not his intention, I return to my thesis: his work, for all its merit, illustrates the failure of an able political scientist to value his professional assets. To perceive the failure is to appreciate the discipline.

III

Why many political scientists have undervalued and underemployed the theoretical richness of their discipline and its accumulated wealth of concepts, questions, and generalizations I do not know. But that political science is a more fully developed area of organized knowledge than is frequently assumed, I am increasingly convinced, even when I see some of its practitioners turning a blind eye to it. Underplaying it presumably has its roots in the history of the profession, just as overplaying the discipline of economics is also rooted in its tradition.

A last few words about my own field: I believe that political scientists would more accurately value their own discipline if they better understood what little reason economists have for self-satisfaction. As I have said — and with great respect for my profession — economics is only in small part theory and consists largely of informally codified procedures and knowledge, much of which is bookkeeping or even simple arithmetic. Political science is today no less favored. If, then, economists are euphoric where political scientists are not, the reason is that a tradition in recruitment has grown up through which those who will be happy within the limitations of economics are admitted to the brotherhood and others are commonly turned away. In the best training centers, with few exceptions no one can become an economist who does not come to value formal economic theory. Moreover, the boundaries of economics have been marked out with careful attention to those tasks to which theory can be applied. Where political scientists represent a wide variety of interests and kinds of skill with ambitions outstripping capacities, economics has come close to defining an economist as one whose professional ambitions are limited to those for which formal economic theory is not seriously frustrating.

Since World War II, however, urgently practical problems of economic development on every continent have rudely thrust economists into tasks far beyond the competence of their theory. The new demands are to be welcomed for their erosive effect on the discipline's boundary lines. But to say something when called upon to speak and to say it in terms not unduly demanding on the policy-maker, economics will now meet a new difficulty. It will be pulled in the direction of very high-grade journalism — toward analysis that, however skillful, is unburdened by the weight of a discipline's terminology, methods, insights, and theory. Looking backward, one wonders if it is not also this — practical problems and a large audience — that has sometimes pulled political scientists away from an appreciation and employment of their profession's assets. To exploit these assets poses obstacles to communication. And even for the analyst himself, theory is first constraining and only afterwards liberating.

10

THE DECISION PROCESS

Seven Categories of Functional Analysis

• HAROLD D. LASSWELL

As every student of American civics will testify, the decision process of government is "legislative, executive, and judicial." Valuable as this tripartite scheme has been for constitution, building purposes in our polity, it is less than adequate for purposes of comparative political science or jurisprudence. With the expansion of modern inquiry, the limitations of such a simple scheme have been modified in many ways, especially by detailed enumeration of the activities carried on by the various structures that are found in different historical circumstances or among the existing bodies politic of the globe. Long enumerations are helpful in connecting large words with smaller processes. Yet when we are dealing with activities that display the infinite variations of institutional practice to be found in government, it is important not to lose sight of the forest by becoming preoccupied with naming the trees. We need schemes that, without becoming unwieldy, are more discriminating than the tripartite division of American tradition.

It is the purpose of this discussion to develop seven categories of functional analysis that have been undergoing rather intensive testing in some of the studies of comparative political science and jurisprudence in which I have had a hand. In matters of this kind it is not a question of arriving at a permanent classification. Rather, the requirements of research and policy change as the context of knowledge and controversy changes in response to the unceasing flow of human experience. Classifications are serviceable when they are tentative and undogmatic, and when they guide scholarly activity in directions that are presently accepted as valuable.

Perhaps the most direct way to introduce the seven categories is to ask seven questions: How is the information that comes to the attention of decision makers gathered and processed? How are recommendations made and promoted? How are general rules prescribed? How are general rules provisionally invoked in reference to conduct? How are general rules applied? How is the working of prescriptions appraised? How are the prescriptions and arrangements entered into within the framework of such rules brought to termination?

The seven questions refer to the seven functions:

Intelligence:	information, prediction, planning
Recommendation:	promotion of policy alternatives
Prescription:	the enactment of general rules
Invocation:	provisional characterizations of conduct according to prescriptions, including demand for application
Application:	the final characterization of conduct according to prescriptions
Appraisal:	the assessment of the success and failure of policy
Termination:	the ending of prescriptions and of arrangements entered into within their framework[1]

[1] The fundamental framework used in this analysis of the decision process is in H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950. The seven functions have been selected for emphasis by my colleague, Professor Myres S. McDougal, and me in order to further comparative studies of law and government. See especially M. S. McDougal, "The Comparative Study of Law: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order," *Yale Law Journal* 61 (1952) 915–46 [also in *American Journal of Comparative Law* 1 (1952) 24–57].

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When we examine the decision process of any body politic — national, international, state (provincial), local — it is usually possible to describe the structures specialized to a function. At the Federal level we think at once of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Census, and the like, when we consider the intelligence function. So far as recommending is concerned we take note of the legislative proposals that are presented and promoted by the President. The prescribing function is the peculiar province of constitutional conventions and other lawmaking organs. Invocation is the task of the officers concerned with law enforcement who, for instance, must provisionally assess whether a given act contravenes the Federal code and initiate a demand for application. Application is the function to which most of the courts, commissions and departments are specialized. They determine how prescriptions are to be acted upon. The appraising function is the province of evaluators of effect and of efficiency of execution. Termination involves, among other agencies, commissions to revise statutes and treaties.

Although it is usually possible to point to agencies that specialize in a given function, all agencies perform all functions to some extent. The Senate and the House, for example, are sources of intelligence for official agencies and the electorate. The campaigns of the individual Senator and Representative, plus debates on the floor and in committees, perform a recommending function. The prescribing function is the most distinctive role of a legislative body. In the course of debate and in committee the Congress continually performs an invoking function, since conduct is often characterized as in harmony with the law or out of line, and sanctioning activity is demanded. The Congress has applying functions, notably the ratification of appointments, the granting of funds. One major function of the Congress is appraisal, the assessment of whether past prescriptions have been lived up to, whether the results have been achieved by economical and congenial methods, and whether the results on the whole are satisfactory in terms of overriding policy goals. Of course the Congress is active in termination, putting an end to statutes.

When we think of the decision process as a whole in a body politic it is usually apparent that a function is performed outside as well as inside the organizations conventionally called governmental. By custom and tradition the intelligence function in American society is largely in the hands of the press. The recommending function is the peculiar province of political parties, pressure groups, other voluntary associations and individuals. The prescribing function is formally a monopoly of government; yet even a cursory examination of the market, for instance, will show that coercive arrangements are often agreed to by employers and unions. The formal prescriptions of the body politic are not only invoked by policemen or prosecutors but by private parties in their negotiations. In a non-governmentalized society like ours the burden of applying community prescription rests, not only upon the official bureaucracies, but upon the leaders and bureaucracies of private organizations (and individuals). Many prescriptions are established and terminated outside the authoritative machinery of the community. Yet they are sufficiently important to the community for us as scientific observers to regard them as part of the effective power set-up (cartel arrangements, for example).

When we describe the decision process of any body politic, then, we expect to find — and we do find — that several official and unofficial participants in the arena of politics are implicated at any given cross-section in time. An inventory of the authoritative language (the formal prescriptions) confirms that this is true, though the facts are not adequately depicted in their words. The written Constitution of the U.S. makes this fully apparent. There are few direct references to intelligence. The President is to report on the State of the Union, and a census is called for. It is obvious that Congress is expected to receive much information from the Executive; and that the statements made by or in the Congress will come weightily to the notice of the other organs of government. The President is authorized to recommend action; and when we look at the amendments we see that precautions are taken to defend the right of petition, assembly, freedom of the press (and so on). That the Congress can recommend without taking final action is so obvious that it needs no confirmation. So far as prescriptions are concerned, the situation is simple enough on the surface. We read of the majority needed to pass ordinary and extraordinary measures through the Congress; and of the veto authority of the President.

Looking beyond the document we know that the concurrence of a third organ is required, namely, the Supreme Court. But we know too that the Court has been sparing of its controversial role of acting as a delayed veto chamber. The document has little to say about invocation, and the structures needed to make official application of Federal prescriptions are barely alluded to in the Constitution. On the whole they are taken for granted. The appraisal function, too, must be read between the lines; but it needs no magnifying glass. Since appropriations are short-term, it is clear that officials must stand evaluation by the Congress. And there is the authorization of impeachment. Looking outside the document again it is certain that the courts were expected to be available in appraising the legality of official action. The function of termination is rather assumed than stated.

When we look beyond the text to the evidence of practice, it is clear that every agency of government is involved in varying degree with every function; and that all the component parts of American society are expected to express themselves at least through the electorate.

True as this is we must concede nevertheless that available knowledge is fragmentary. Indeed, one purpose of this analysis is to direct research attention toward neglected topics whose importance will, I think, be generally granted.

Promising Lines of Inquiry

Curiously enough, perhaps, the intelligence function has received relatively little systematic treatment. In reference to any individual, voluntary association, pressure group, political party, or governmental body the key questions are the same: From what sources is intelligence received? To whom is intelligence communicated? Here are test questions about current knowledge: Do you know of any study that has dealt with the total inflow of information to the Department of State during a given period (or even on any issue) and the outflow to the President, the Congress, other Federal agencies, other governments, state and even local governments, the press, party leaders, pressure leaders, other voluntary association leaders, and individuals? The question refers not only to formal communication but to informal exchanges. Present studies are relevant though partial. But even at best these investigations do not tell us how they sampled the entire stream of inflowing-outgoing communication.[2]

Consider the recommending function. What audiences are reached by the promotional activities of the Department of Agriculture, for instance? What individuals and organizations, official or unofficial, urge policies upon the Department?[3]

Formal acts of prescription are relatively well studied because of the importance of statutes and regulations. What prescriptions does an agency make for itself and others? What

[2] The modern study of communication has provided us with trend knowledge concerning the American electorate. For instance, we keep rather well informed currently of how many people spend how much time reading newspapers, magazines, and books, listening to speeches or radio; viewing TV or films. We know something about the source of the news (how much is obtained by correspondents attached to the local unit of a medium of communication, to a cooperative association, to a private syndicate, to a governmental agency). We are told about the degree to which private individuals, associations and media serve as sources of the intelligence received by the public officials (at various levels). Some studies have described the inflow of officially communicated information from one agency or official to another. Attempts have been made to describe informal flow. The historical trend in these exchanges has been sketchily investigated. A few examples: James E. Pollard, *The Presidents and the Press*, New York, Macmillan, 1947; (Comment) "Local Monopoly in the Daily Newspaper Industry," *Yale Law Journal* 61 (1952) 948–1009; Louis H. Mayo, "The Limited Forum," *George Washington Law Review* 22 (1954) 261–317; "The Free Forum," *ibid.*, 22 (1954) 387–446. Consult the collected articles in the symposia on communication by Daniel Katz (et al.), Wilbur Schramm, and B. Berelson and M. Janowitz.

[3] Beginning with E. Pendleton Herring's study of the constellation of pressure group activities impinging upon the Congress and the Federal administrative agencies investigations of the kind have become distinctive features of American political science. Yet the interaction between agencies and the total official and unofficial environment remains to be systematically sampled. Indispensable first steps include such work as Richard E. Neustadt's description of the growth of the President's recommending function in recent years. "Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Program," *American Political Science Review* XLIX (1955) 980–1021. Case studies are helpful in seeking to disentangle the recommending from the other functions. Ralph K. Huitt suggests that the intelligence role of congressional committees has been exag-

prescriptions made by others are binding on the agency? These questions are easy enough to answer where enactments are printed. But many prescriptions are not to be found in a code book. They are "customary law" and must be ascertained by studying the propositions invoked in the diplomatic and bargaining activities of members of the political community. Furthermore, we distinguish between those who are authorized to prescribe and those who in fact make the decisive determinations. We go beyond the final vote at elections or in legislative bodies to discover the winning coalitions. And we may take the additional step of finding who initiated the winning proposal or whose support was of pivotal importance in obtaining a successful combination.[4]

Research on the invoking function tries to answer two main questions: In reference to whom are prescriptions invoked? By whom are prescriptions invoked in reference to the agency? In diplomatic intercourse among governments the conduct of another Power is called legal or illegal according to a treaty, convention, or principle of international law. Parties characterize their own conduct in such terms. Any government is likely to initiate formal legal action in various jurisdictions in connection with a wide range of controversies.[5]

In recent years the applying function has received more attention than before as a result of the growth of research on public and private administration. As usual two of the most general questions to be answered for a given participant are: Concerning whom are applications made? How is the participant involved in the applying activities of others? We answer these questions by taking note of the number of people in various positions in the total context

gerated. See "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study," *American Political Science Review* XLVIII (1954) 340–365. The constellation of factors that contribute to the early patterning of a role are of great importance since they stereotype the way in which the role is subsequently conceived. See James Hart, *The American Presidency in Action in 1789*, New York, Macmillan, 1948.

[4] Formally speaking the Congress and the President share the prescribing function (with the Court) at the Federal level. How does effective control as distinct from formal authority work out? An important step was taken by L. H. Chamberlain when he examined the legislative history of 90 major statutes and sought to assess the relative weight of the President, the Congress and the pressure groups. The statutes were classified according to some prominent institutional characteristic (e.g., national defense, railroad transportation, and the like). L. H. Chamberlain, *The President, Congress and Legislation*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1946. The prescriptions comprising the legal system of any body politic may be conveniently classified as supervisory, regulative, enterprisory, corrective, executory. The first comprises the prescriptions referring to private agreements when the decision making machinery is invoked by one of the parties. The regulative prescriptions relate to the features of the social system that are to be maintained by community intervention in private affairs. The enterprisory prescriptions include the activities specialized to community wide institutions. The corrective provisions deal with acts destructive of the public order that are rooted in unconscious motivations. Executory arrangements are the special features of the decision process. Before an "authoritative" statement can be accepted as "law" it must be shown to have been applied in the past with at least a certain minimum frequency; or the expectation must prevail that it will be so applied in the future. Consult: George H. Dession and Harold D. Lasswell, "Public Order Under Law: The Role of the Advisor-draftsman in the Formation of Code or Constitution," *Yale Law Journal* 65 (1955) 174–195.

[5] The invoking function is another important activity that has been neglected by political scientists and even by legal scholars. Throughout the context of government the problem continually arises of whom to proceed against in the name of the law and whom to dismiss with a warning and whom to ignore entirely. The patrolman, the police officer, the prosecuting attorney, the grand jury are largely specialized to invoking rather than making final application of the formal prescriptions of the body politic. Even when studies tell us how many people of what characteristics have been arrested, for instance, we usually find that the factual circumstances are left vague. Yet the key question for comparative research is "Under what factual circumstances does A invoke prescription X in reference to B?" The invoking function is not only exercised by public officials: it is prescribed that each private person shall conform his own conduct to the norm. What are the circumstances in which deviation occurs? In what proportion of these situations do public officials invoke the norms? Also, in what situations are norms invoked even when, from the standpoint of the scientific observer, there is no deviation? According to American institutional practice the initiation of criminal prosecutions is an official monopoly and prosecuting attorneys may regard themselves as better off if they withstand public sentiment and refuse to proceed (against strongly entrenched interests). (Comment) *Yale Law Journal* 65 (1955) 209–234, "Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction."

who are reached by departments, commissions, courts and similar entities.[6]

The key questions relating to the appraisal function are: Whose activities are appraised? By whom are one's own activities appraised?[7]

Concerning termination: By whom are prescriptions brought to an end (as when they are suspended or amended)?[8]

Cyclical and Structural Changes

If our picture of the decision process were rather complete for a given body politic we could describe the functional interactions occurring among (and within) the participants. When stabilized, such relations tend to display cyclical fluctuations. That is, we detect the presence of interdependent changes. Common experience tells us something about these patterns. The "reform wave" is an old story in the decision process of U.S. cities. Typically it begins as an appraisal. People stigmatize activities as lawless, immoral and wasteful. Intelligence media bring more information about how other cities freed themselves from corruption. The recommending function expands as civic clubs and other organizations busy themselves with the dissemination of reform demands. The result may be legislative prescriptions designed to tighten up or clarify public policy. Indictments are sought and obtained against corrupt officials (invocation). Efforts are made to improve the administration of the courts and of all agencies involved in the application function. A number of old arrangements may be terminated, including licensing provisions that have fostered "pay-offs" to law enforcement officers and political bosses. After the reform phase of a cycle we often observe the corruption phase. This may be characterized as involving less strict appraisal of conduct, and less conformity to the prescriptions incorporating public policy (reduced application). The other functions modify accordingly.[9]

We are aware of the fact that cycles are rarely if ever "perfect"; they do not re-establish the original state of affairs completely. Political fluctuations are structural as well as cyclical; new patterns of interaction emerge and become relatively stable, and the level of conformity between prescription and conduct may be higher or lower than it was before.[10]

Explaining Changes of Function

How can we explain changes of function? As a means of stimulating hypotheses it is useful to think of the maximization postulate. The postulate is that people do what they do

[6] Although we have trend figures telling us, for example, how many individuals or associations have been brought formally into the arena of a given court, commission, or department, we do not know the most important facts about them, such as how many are members of a culture that differs from the dominant one; or how many belong to upper, middle or lower positions in the class structure; or how many belong to what interest groups and organizations that cut across class lines (or do not contain all the members of a class); or how many had what kind of personality system. Consequently we are in no position to make a global assessment of the immediate (much less the ultimate) impact of the action taken by the court. For instance, the same number of dollars assessed as a fine is trivial to one man or association, and formidable to another. It is not true that all parties who lose cases believe that the court is crooked; yet an unknown number do. It is not even true that all parties who "get away with it" believe that they should. Not only do our studies of courts lack comprehensiveness and relevance: think of the present state of our knowledge of the impact of the tax services, the health services, and the like, on the community context (local, state, national, international).

[7] Appraisals are designed to provide a flow of information about the working of past prescriptions — and to paint a picture of the aggregate situation (in such terms as efficiency in the use of appropriations, enforcibility, and so on). The Congress, like any legislative body operating in a complex age, is dependent to a large extent upon self-appraisals made by public agencies. There are no satisfactory systematic studies of the appraising function. Any political scientist will, of course, appreciate Senator Paul H. Douglas's account of the roadblocks in his path in *Economy in the National Government,* Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1952.

[8] Judicial review operates as a terminating organ when prescriptions have already been followed on the assumption of legality. When judicial review occurs promptly the court is acting more like the chamber of a legislature in the ordinary exercise of the prescribing function.

[9] Improved measurements usually disclose cyclical fluctuations. See the "cyclically competitive States" described in J. A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to the Degree of Inter-Party Competition," *American Political Science Review* XLIX (1955) 1120–1128.

[10] See the structural changes referred to in Schlesinger's article.

in the hope of being better off than if they did otherwise. To be better off is assessed in terms of the values, the preferred events, of the persons concerned. In general the postulate holds that any change in function comes about because the change is expected to maximize the value position of those who make it. The task of research is to explore hypotheses suggested by this postulate.

Let us begin by thinking about the intelligence function. A partial hypothesis is that the function varies directly with (a) the demand to be informed, (b) the base values available for performing the function. The demand to be informed, in turn, varies directly with the expectation that information will disclose threats or opportunities pertinent to the present or potential value position of the demander. (There must be agreement upon the specific patterns that constitute a threat of deprivation or an opportunity for indulgence.) We know that the foreign intelligence function in the Federal Government greatly expanded with the threat and fact of war. Much of the activity initiated in World War II remained after the termination of hostilities as a result of arms rivalry with the Soviet world. The demand for information in foreign affairs has been increasing among the better educated members of the community. Knowledge not only contributes to the expectation that what goes on abroad affects us, but enables the individual to obtain the gratifications that come from retouching his old map of knowledge and adding new detail and understanding. Many of the intelligence services of the Federal Government have come into being in response to the demand of economic groups to receive intelligence with an important bearing on their investment, saving and consumption choices.[11]

The recommending function, we may hypothesize, varies directly with (a) the demand to recommend or receive recommendations, (b) the base values at the disposal of the recommenders. The demand is affected by the expectation that values will be affected by such activities. During the nineteenth century the popular governments of the world were affected by the rise of the mass political party as a structure highly specialized to the function of recommendation. The present century is witnessing the growth of a new institutional network concerned with this activity, namely, the pressure groups. These structures have greatly influenced one another, spreading as the expectation gained currency that without such organizations one's value position is vulnerable or less advantageous than it might be. In membership drives business associations point at trade unions; trade unions point to the corporations as well as the trade associations to stir up support among the workers.

The prescribing function rises and falls with (a) the demand for prescription, and (b) the base values available. The demand depends upon the expectation that legislation will affect values. In modern government one conspicuous trend is the growth of legislation. Groups have turned to legislation in many cases to remove disabilities from which they have suffered by long established legal doctrine and application. The rise of labor, for instance, has been characterized by a series of efforts to obtain legal equality in collective bargaining.

The invoking function likewise depends upon demand and capability; and the demand is affected by the expectations that relate the act of invocation to values. The tactic is well-established of embarrassing rivals by bringing them into court, often with damage to their credit position while litigation drags on.

Big government is characteristic of the modern large-scale body politic even in those countries where big business, big labor, and so on, are outside official employment. The applying function has grown in response to demands and capability; and the demand is nurtured when values are expected to be affected by public administration. Application, of course, is not a function restricted to officials, since private conduct conforms to or deviates from prescribed policy. In this context one interesting question is who turns to the courts to decide controversies and who relies upon private procedures. Commercial arbitration is a large field of private action because of the expectation that regular courts will be slow, unacquainted with market practice, and expensive.

[11] The demand for an effective intelligence function is a demand for enlightenment. But enlightenment is sought as a base for other values more often than as a scope value. Recently we have seen evidence of a demand to curb the pursuit of information by the Congress because other values — such as respect for privacy — are too often sacrificed. See Telford Taylor, *Grand Inquest; The Story of Congressional Investigations*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1955, for a technically reliable popular summary.

Intimately connected with big government and the Great Society is the expanded role of the appraising function. The demand has come largely from the expectation that a complex division of labor multiplies the dangers from corruption, inefficiency and indifferent administration. The international crisis carries with it grave apprehensions of subversive activity. The result has been to expand surveillance personnel.

The terminating function also assumes new significance in a complex social order which depends less upon tradition than upon explicit arrangements to define the reciprocal claims among individuals and organizations. Statutes and regulations require regular review in order to weed out the obsolete and the obsolescing.

Structural Changes

Functions rise and fall; they also change their structure, growing more or less centralized, concentrated, democratized, or legalized. Let us consider these changes from the point of view of maximization analysis. Fundamental hypotheses are parallel to those given above. Each response is favored by effective demands that are sustained by the expectation that values are at stake. If we think of all the structures that share in a given function as comprising a system of interaction — a political arena — it is clear that changes in the units of the system depend upon gaining potential support anywhere in the total context of the community. We have been particularly conscious of the trend to centralize many activities once regarded as exclusively local. Grants-in-aid to education, for instance, have come about as a result of changing expectations of many kinds. Businessmen, labor leaders, and teachers have recognized that the failure of relatively impoverished areas to provide educational opportunity is a drag on economic progress. The national security is at stake to the extent that illiterate or barely literate youth are unable rapidly to acquire the skills of modern warfare. There is resentment against the humiliations based upon the bad luck of being born in a poor district. Many have felt morally outraged at our failure to live up to the ideal of providing every child with a sound minimum education, followed by opportunity to develop latent talent into socially contributory skill. Health is also at stake. So, indeed, is enlightenment and the growth of sentiments of solidarity with the whole nation. (Studies have repeatedly shown the connection between education, civic knowledge, and patriotism.)[12]

It will be noticed that I have made use of eight categories for the classification of the value-institution patterns of society: Wealth (economics), Power (national security, political democracy), Respect (freedom from humiliating discrimination), Rectitude (standards of ethical responsibility), Skill (and taste), Well-being (health), Enlightenment (history, civic knowledge), Affection (loyalty). It is convenient to describe all the preferences of individuals and groups in these terms. The values are sought by each of us for the primary ego ("I", "me") and for the component egos that we include with the primary ego to constitute the self (family, political party, nation, etc.). Our perspectives also include all matter of fact assumptions about the past and future (all of which are called "expectations").[13]

If we study movements toward or away from highly "concentrated" structures for the performance of a function, we shall doubtless confirm the role of expectation in political change. A recurring feature of state government is a long range cycle initially characterized by the multiplication of boards and commissions, followed by reforms that consolidate such organizations. Then a new cycle begins. The coalition that brings about reform usually empha-

[12] The fluctuating perspectives of demand, expectation and identification that foster and in turn are affected by operational activities are indicated in such accounts as Carter Goodrich, "Local Government Planning of Internal Improvements," *Political Science Quarterly* LXVI (1951) 411–445; Rudolf Schlesinger, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1945.

[13] All interactions among human beings can be classified in terms of values and practices, the latter being the patterns employed in shaping or sharing the values. Each individual or group (organized or unorganized) is continually *indulging* itself or others in terms of values; or it is *depriving* itself or others. The indulgence or deprivation always involves specific practices. The act of voting is a practice; and so, of course, are the other features of legislative structure and function. "Centralization" is a term that designates practices. "Democracy" is a term we use to describe shared power and specifies the events that are the value goals of our ideal political order. Detailed specification calls for an enumeration of the practices that are regarded as constituting a shared power relationship.

sizes the taxpayer's stake in efficiency and economy, the decent citizen's concern for honest rather than corrupt government; and the impetus is typically given by ambitious politicians who see an opportunity to build careers by exploiting discontent. Mass media often seize the initiative or join in the clamor as a means of boosting circulation, revenue, and reputation; there is also the journalist's concern with applying his skill to a lively issue. The coalition of factors making for de-concentration is usually less inclusive than the coalition just described. The demand for a new commission may spring in part from distrust of existing leaders and patterns of government to cope with the specific problem that is in the public eye. A new agency may mean more patronage for the party, more prominent and powerful roles for certain individuals, more self-congratulation for achievement on the part of those who have become identified with a campaign. New agencies may enlarge, at least temporarily, the influence of the legislature in relation to the executive and the civil service by providing new joint appointments on a political basis. The result can be to strengthen certain local and functional interests in the legislature, the party and in the government as a whole. Power, wealth, respect, solidarity are all involved in such developments; minute analysis may show that all values are at stake.

Trends away from democracy often take the form of subtle extensions of bribery and coercion throughout the arena concerned with a given function. In many local communities we have seen functions gathered into a few hands. The intelligence facilities — the public media — have been monopolized or made subject to the dictation of a ruling clique. Recommending activities have been channelled into grooves congenial to the clique. No opposition party is permitted to operate; no unwelcome agitation is allowed. The prescribing function (and all the other functions) are similarly controlled. Often the outcome is the result of an overwhelming ownership element. Or it may rest upon physical force (power and control of well-being) rather than wealth, in the shape of gangs that levy tribute for protection. Other values may supply the base for an antidemocratic development (religion, for instance, which we include with rectitude).

Another structural change is toward or away from legality. Power is twofold: it is formal authority; it is effective control. Power is lawful when authoritative and controlling. The anti-democratic processes referred to above are instances of unlawful power in a body politic; but all deviations are not necessarily translatable in such terms. Some governmental structures survive in name and not in fact. They rubber-stamp decisions made by other organs in the same way that the electoral college passively registers the state electorates. What factors account for discrepancies between authority and control? We find instances of this in connection with some of the centralizing, concentrating or de-democratizing changes sketched before.

In general it appears that the relative rise or fall of a given social structure depends upon its contextual linkages. When the demands and expectations of rising social formations and personalities attach relative importance to one structure rather than another, it is safe to predict that the preferred structure will rise. It is commonplace to say that the political strength of the new middle class groupings in modern society has usually worked to the advantage of specific institutions; e.g., the popular press, the political party, the popularly elected chamber of legislative bodies, due process of law, administrative careers open to merit, free speech concerning public officials, concern for private contractual relationships.

If any institutional structure becomes more powerful it is, by definition, indulged in terms of the power value (from our point of view as scientific observers of the decision process). Concurrently the declining institution is deprived in terms of power. We say that structure A is depriving B of power in the decision process. According to the maximization postulate we expect such changes to occur as a result of certain perspectives and capabilities (access to base values). A obtains base values when A is indulged by individuals and organizations in the social context. The base values available at any given time are used or withheld according to the strategical and tactical policies of the institution. The decision process within the institution can be functionally analyzed in the same way that the role of the institution itself can be examined in relation to the total community context.

Intensive Methods: The Supreme Court

The factors explaining the political role of an institutional structure can be examined by intensive methods. A comprehensive investigation of institution X would cover such interactions as these: During a given period what institutions and individuals external to X were indulged or deprived by X (in terms of what values and in reference to what patterns)? What institutions and individuals external to X were sources of indulgence or deprivation for X? What component institutions and individuals within X were indulged or deprived through their participation in X? What base values and strategies were employed by X in affecting others? What values and strategies were employed by outsiders in influencing X? What is the internal decision process of X (functionally described) and which participants had how much impact upon outcomes? What base values were at the disposal of these participants and what strategies were utilized in manipulating them? What were the perspectives (value demands, expectations, identifications) of X in relation to the outside environment? What were the perspectives of the participants in the internal decision process of X?

Let us take the Supreme Court as an instance. In the exercise of the prescribing function the Court may impose a power deprivation upon other structures that participate in this function by setting aside a Federal statute or a state statute, or by refusing to give effect in the United States to a statute enacted by a foreign government or to accept an interpretation advanced in the name of international law. The lower courts are affected when they are overruled. The Court may provide a power indulgence by accepting such prescriptions. The consequences of the Court's action may go very much farther in terms of power (and all other values). It is commonly said that the decision of the Court in the Dred Scott case and in other controversies was an exacerbating factor in the Civil War crisis. It is obvious that more than the immediate parties to a controversy are indulged or deprived, since the repercussions ramify throughout society by influencing expectations, demands, identifications; and also by affecting operations that involve values. The production and distribution of wealth is influenced in a measure by the decisions affecting foreign trade, interstate commerce, social security burdens, and the like. Respect is at stake in all that affects social discrimination. Health (well-being) is directly involved in public health questions and indirectly in many more. Controversies over freedom of the press immediately concern enlightenment; rectitude is involved in "criminal" questions; skills are at stake in whatever affects technical education; and affection is influenced by all that touches upon the family, intimacy and sentiments of solidarity with larger units.[14]

[14] Note that we do not "explain" the factors contributing to the impact of the Court by describing who is indulged or deprived and with what effect. These are the "responses" of the Court; they must be explained by "environmental" and "predispositional" factors. The environmental factors include the arguments of counsel, the testimony, the rules of order and evidence actually used in the official proceedings; and the unofficial exposures of the Court to conversation, the press and other influences outside official proceedings. For purposes of systematic comparison such environmental practices must be re-defined as indulgences or deprivations of the Court. For instance, lawyers may explicitly criticize the Court for its recent holdings (which is a deprivation of the Court). More commonly, the lawyers try to indulge the Court as a whole (or a majority) by declaring that what they want in the present litigation is in harmony with the magistral action of the Court in all truly relevant cases. The predispositional factors that are invoked to explain the response of the Court are of two kinds: the predispositions with which the Court enters the situation ("first order explanation"); the factors accounting for these predispositions ("second order explanation"). Herman Pritchett has accurately described the alignment of the Supreme Court in given cases (which is a description of the response). When he demonstrates that various Justices during a given period are predisposed to take a "liberal" position, he is explaining the response in a given case (or run of cases) by referring to the way in which Justices had been conditioned prior to the case (or cases). *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court*, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1954. If he, or any other scholar, tries to account for these predispositions we have an example of a "second order" explanation. It is generally recognized that the Supreme Court can increase its deprivational weight upon the Congress and the President (as in dealing with New Deal legislation). This may have the effect of provoking counter-attack; in turn this can lead the court to a cycle of concurrence partly from a demand to protect its own power position from being formally curtailed.

The Court performs a positive intelligence function when public attention is focussed upon its deliberations and decisions, and when a contribution is made to understanding the significance of important social trends and future contingencies. The factual technique of the "Brandeis brief" has facilitated this intelligence role. The Court also deprives the public of information, as when the Justices support some privileged communications.[15]

The Court is chary of advocating specific policies. But it provides a forum in which the recommending function is partially exercised. The forum serves the invoking function especially since the parties put forward their claims by alleging that they are in harmony with the authoritative language of statutes, treaties, previous Court decisions, the opinions of commentators and the like.[16]

So far as the applying function is concerned this is the major role of the Court, since it is the tribunal authorized to make final determination of how community prescriptions apply to particular circumstances.[17]

The appraising function is implemented whenever statements are made about the effects of public policy and their causes. When public authorities are party to a controversy they are unescapably subject to appraisal by the Court and by one another, as well as by the attentive public. But the Court goes considerably beyond appraisal since it makes final applications. The appraising function, like the intelligence function, is limited to the making of factual statements; strictly speaking, no applications, prescriptions or recommendations are part of it. It differs from the intelligence function only by subject-matter (the causes and consequences of past public policy), or by the assumption of responsibility for using the normative standards of public policy for characterizing the facts. An inspector, for instance, performs a "pure" func-

[15] How do we explain the rise of the "Brandeis brief," a factor that has augmented the role of the court in the national intelligence process? In recent decades the American school of realistic jurisprudence has influenced the teaching in American law schools. But the point of view was already functioning before it became a labelled body of doctrine. And the expansion of the factual brief preceded the doctrine. (See on American legal realism the selections from Cardozo, Haines, Hutcheson, Llewellyn, Frank and F. S. Cohen in chapter 6 of Cohen and Cohen, *Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1951.) Concerning value conflicts between the demand for enlightenment and the requirements of respect, rectitude and the like, consult (Comment) "An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings," *Yale Law Journal*, 63 (1953), 206–232; Richard Donnelly, "Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agents Provocateurs," *Yale Law Journal*, 60 (1951), 1091–1131.

[16] From the standpoint of interests who seek changes in the Constitution or in basic legislation the arena of the court is perceived as a step in a total campaign. Our procedures of litigation can be used to make the point that "lesser" remedies have been exhausted and that "major" innovations are needed. We need studies that show under what circumstances defeated parties appeal successfully to the legislature, or fail in the attempt to reach a post-court arena. Concerning citation patterns see J. H. Merryman, "The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950," *Stanford Law Review*, 6 (1954), 613–673.

[17] Most of the scholarly work on the Court is concerned with the applying function. The response of the Court is sometimes traced to characteristic features of American culture, although this line of study is in its infancy (Llewellyn, for instance). Class factors may be invoked, especially economic position and perspectives (Charles A. Beard, of course, was the great innovator of this line of analysis). Interest factors — not identical with class — are commonly referred to (notably in the work of John R. Commons). This category also includes the perspectives prevailing among law teachers, judges and practitioners (rather abundantly documented in *The Journal of Legal Education*). See also Leonard H. Goodman and Richard W. Rabinowitz, "Lawyer Opinion on Legal Education: A Sociological Analysis," *Yale Law Journal*, 64 (1955), 537–555. Scholars are keenly aware of the role of individuality in the history of the tribunal. As a rule, however, biographers have had no notable competence in the study of personality systems and have not discriminated the "personality" from the "personal." I have been referring to predispositional factors. Environmental influences also are continually studied, such as the effect of evidentiary rules upon what gets to the focus of attention of the decision maker and activates his predispositions. Scholarship is also directed toward examining the impact upon law (with special reference to prescription and application) of "institutional complexes" such as "capitalism." See *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*, ed. by Max Rheinstein, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954; Karl Renner, *The Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions*, ed. by O. Kahn — Freund, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949.

tion of appraisal when he reports on the apparent legality or economy of administrative conduct without adding a recommendation or invoking another decision maker to apply authoritative prescriptions. Many such reports traditionally lie idle, or are tabulated and further reported, with no known result. The appraisal statements made by the Court or to the Court are typically imbedded with advocacy (invocation) or final judgment (the opinions elaborated by the Court to make the decision more acceptable to the losers).[18]

The terminating function figures continually in court decisions, since controversy often poses such questions as when "war" ends, and when emergency prescriptions are no longer effective.

Every structure engaged in the decision process is subject to indulgences or deprivations originating elsewhere. The Supreme Court has repeatedly been under political attack by other organs of government who share the prescribing function, for instance. It is continually being reported upon in various public, professional and private channels of communication. The slightest idiosyncracies of the nine judges are likely to be known (or imagined) by the Bar throughout the entire country. Lawyers, political scientists and others frequently propose and advocate changes in the place or procedures of the Court in our system. The Bar and the law schools in particular are focussed upon the doings of the tribunal and appraise it constantly. The position of the Court as an organ of government, and of the individual Justices, is perpetually altering — even though slightly — in terms of power, respect and other values. Lawyers try to enhance their own position by contributing to the Court, by practicing before it, by clerking for a Justice, or by contriving to reach the Bench. The Court thus draws upon skill, vigor (well-being), enlightenment, and a reputation for integrity (rectitude). It has typically been an object of sentimentalization (affection) among Americans who are trained to think of judicial review and the Court as distinctive achievements of American society. Although the emoluments are substantial they are not in proportion to power or prestige.[19]

In common with any stable institution the Court has great significance for those who are explicitly connected with its operation. For most of the Justices the Supreme Court is the culminating peak of their lives. They see in it the power role that they want; they revel in prestige; they are challenged by the skills required; they are financially comfortable and able to adjust the tempo of their participation to physical limitations; they find the work of the Court a great source of enlightenment on the dynamic processes of American society; they are aware of their ethical obligations and opportunities; and most of them are fiercely loyal to the institution and often on congenial terms with their colleagues. This, of course, is not the whole story. For some men the Court is a stepping stone to the Presidency and they remain politically frustrated as long as they fail to make it. The prestige and the ethical standing have their costs, which are varying degrees of isolation from mankind and the avoidance of spontaneity. And it is not to be assumed that the Justices are always on good terms with colleagues, or that they are complacent about their degees of skill and enlightenment. Some of them suffer from anxieties that make their lives a continuing tribulation. Even the financial provisions may require downward adjustment of living standards.

At any cross-section in time, then, we may inventory the base values at the disposal of the Court for maintaining (or even advancing) its power position. The authority derived from

[18] From the standpoint of a contextual jurisprudence the Court is frequently confronted by appraisal problems, since the issues before it depend upon assessing the results of official action according to the major policies of the system of public order. However, the appraisal function is characteristically obscured by legal technicalities that transform the candid assessment of factual results into a more complex mould. The parties to a controversy are continually calculating the probable effect of each "fact" statement upon the interpretation to be given by the Court of the formal prescriptions that are pertinent to the issue. The result is to multiply incentives to distort the factual picture.

[19] See Jack W. Peltason, *Federal Courts in the Political Process*, Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science, 1955; Victor G. Rosenblum, *Law As a Political Instrument*, Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science, 1955. The court has presumably benefited from the trend to treat public service with more respect. See Morris Janowitz and Deil Wright, "The Prestige of Public Employment," *Public Administration Review*, 16 (1956), 15–21.

the wording of the Constitution and consecrated by a century and a half of active use is a potent asset. This is power as a base of power. The clear title to authority is sustained by the willingness of the significant elements of American society to supply the obedience, respect, ethical confidence, loyalty, skill, and physical facilities (wealth, well-being) required. At any given time the unqualified commitment of the Justices to the Court is a major asset.

Now it is notorious that base values are shiftable since they are the perspectives and capabilities of people. They are seldom invoked to the full during any period, hence they are chiefly potentialities. And potentialities can only be accurately assessed in reference to future circumstances. At any given time the scholarly observer must imagine future contingencies and estimate the way in which existing predispositions will work out. To some extent these estimations can be grounded on past responses (by and to the Court, for instance).

There are some circumstances in which the Supreme Court might become the focus of the entire process of decision. Imagine a catastrophe in which the Justices survive and are able to establish contact with one another, the remaining fragments of top officialdom, and wider audiences. Under the pressure of shock and urgency the Court might exercise emergency functions of every kind, concentrating all effective control in its hands. The Court might inaugurate a legislative (prescribing) process that resembles the procedure of a court by separating the personnel charged with making the final judgment from the personnel that presents the policy alternatives for judgment. Problem panels could thus be constituted to cope with particular fields requiring action. The Court might use the remnants of the old Senate and House as an electoral college for new Justices, but develop a method of plebiscite (directed to leaders of organizations in various areas) to confirm choices and legitimate emergency management.

I shall not pursue this hypothetical construct further. But it shows some of the possibilities to be explored when one examines the potentiality of existing predispositions to respond to various configurations of indulgence and deprivation in the environment.

It is, I think, apparent that the maximization postulate enables us to formulate many hypotheses to serve as guides to inquiry. At the same time the complexity of the social context is such that the number of conditioning variables in any situation is vast. In this regard our problems deal with factors of the same order of magnitude as the number of molecules in physico-chemical interactions. The operational indexes of our elementary units are undergoing continual change. The indexes by which we describe the same perspectives today do not necessarily remain the same tomorrow.

Continuing Intelligence and Appraisal

One implication is that it is important to perfect our systems of *continuing* intelligence and appraisal. This requires a systematic plan designed to provide a program to guide research. The plan would call for the selection of case studies at strategic points in the whole decision process of the bodies politic of this country and of all accessible peoples. The strategic points are determinable by the seven functions with which we have been concerned, and the pattern of structures relatively specialized to each. The interchange of indulgence and deprivation needs to be followed (for each value) in order to discover the significant trends in the influence position of each agency. As indicated above our expectation is that the relative proportions of indulgence and deprivation provide essential information about current and potential value position.

Case studies at a given focus quickly reach a point of rapidly diminishing returns since they are chiefly useful in disclosing the range of variables to be further investigated.[20] Surveys can be conducted according to a sampling plan; and surveys can make use of methods as "extensive" as opinion polls or as "intensive" as prolonged interviews. Laboratory studies can be conducted as a means of devising new

[20] The pioneer case studies prepared by Harold Stein and colleagues provide invaluable information about the perspectives and operations of individuals and groups working in official roles. It fell outside the scope of the program to use a comprehensive framework of hypotheses to explain the decision process. Case studies can be conducted to exhibit the decision process of a structural unit (the Court, a Bureau), of a structural whole (the Federal Government), or of a functional whole (limited to official structures or including unofficial participants). In the latter case the seven functions, for instance, would provide the orienting frame of reference.

procedures suitable for describing the intensity and the finer structure of predispositions. For instance, small group researches may provide a means of discovering how persons who occupy a given place in the decision process adapt to test situations. The curve of adaptation is a measure of predisposition that may make it possible to improve analysis and prediction since the procedure may show that predispositions that look alike in polling terms may differ greatly in degree of rigidity or plasticity in response to environmental change.[21]

Besides the surveys and laboratory-devised testing instruments the plan would call for pretests; that is for deliberate innovation in selected circumstances of practices that might be installed elsewhere if the results are satisfactory in terms of the goals of democratic decision processes. Among the most manageable pretests are those designed to show how various personnel combinations can be modified to a desired level of performance. At what cost (in terms of all values) can "compulsive" personality types (measured by appropriate methods) be modified by training programs until they perform the required roles in a satisfactory manner?[22]

It will be noted that throughout this discussion the emphasis has been put upon a contextual approach to the study of the decision process. We indicated our goal (the goal of a free society), called attention to relevant trends and conditioning factors, referred to future projections (if no changes are made), and mentioned the invention and evaluation of policy alternatives. The standpoint has been that of the scientific observer who is willing to adopt the goal values of human dignity as working postulates, and who then considers how decision processes are to be made more effective. This is part of the intelligence and appraisal functions of democracy; and it shows the interplay of various patterns of thinking and acting in relation to one another. This is why we speak of a contextual (a configurative) approach.[23]

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[21] The impact of "authoritarian personality" studies has called the point vividly to the attention of political scientists and legal scholars. See R. Christie, and Marie Jahoda, eds., *Studies in The Scope and Method of The Authoritarian Personality*, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1954.

[22] Or how can biassed predispositions be denied effect upon administrative action? See chapter 5 of Peter Blau, *Dynamics of Bureaucracy*, Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1955, presenting evidence that discriminatory practices decline when the emphasis is upon production. Career perspectives affect performance; and the functioning of an agency can presumably be affected by selecting various combinations of outlook, and by introducing indulgences and deprivations that modify the perspectives or render them nugatory. See Dwaine Marvick, *Career Perspectives in a Bureaucratic Society*, Bureau of Government, Inst. of Public Administration, U. of Michigan, 1954. The study of high and low performance units typically will reveal constellations of factors that may be modified by introducing new practices that may thereupon serve as "built in" releasers or inhibitors of the responses sought. See A. L. Comney, J. M. Pfiffner, and H. P. Beem, *Studies in Organizational Effectiveness, I. The U.S. Forest Survey*, Los Angeles, U. of Southern California, 1951.

[23] Of special interest for the systematic analysis of the decision process is the recent work of Herbert Simon, Burton Sapin, R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck. A convenient introduction to the fundamental methods of von Neumann and O. Morgenstern is Martin Shubik, ed., *Readings in Game Theory and Political Behavior*, Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science, 1954. An imaginative application by layman E. Allen is "Games Bargaining: A Proposed Application of The Theory of Games to Collective Bargaining," *Yale Law Journal*, 65 (1956), 660–693. See H. D. Lasswell, "Current Studies of The Decision Process: Automation versus Creativity," *Western Political Quarterly*, 8 (1955), 381–399.

11

THE CONCEPT OF POWER

• *ROBERT A. DAHL*

That some people have more power than others is one of the most palpable facts of human existence. Because of this, the concept of power is as ancient and ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast. If these assertions needed any documentation, one could set up an endless parade of great names from Plato and Aristotle through Machiavelli and Hobbes to Pareto and Weber to demonstrate that a large number of seminal social theorists have devoted a good deal of attention to power and the phenomena associated with it. Doubtless it would be easy to show, too, how the word and its synonyms are everywhere embedded in the language of civilized peoples, often in subtly different ways: power, influence, control, pouvoir, puissance, Macht, Herrschaft, Gewalt, imperium, potestas, auctoritas, potentia, etc.

I shall spare the reader the fruits and myself the labor of such a demonstration. Reflecting on the appeal to authority that might be made does, however, arouse two suspicions: First (following the axiom that where there is smoke there is fire), if so many people at so many different times have felt the need to attach the label power, or something like it, to some Thing they believe they have observed, one is tempted to suppose that the Thing must exist; and not only exist, but exist in a form capable of being studied more or less systematically. The second and more cynical suspicion is that a Thing to which people attach many labels with subtly or grossly different meanings in many different cultures and times is probably not a Thing at all but many Things; there are students of the subject, although I do not recall any who have had the temerity to say so in print, who think that because of this the whole study of "power" is a bottomless swamp.

Paradoxical as it may sound, it is probably too early to know whether these critics are right. For, curiously enough, the systematic study of power is very recent, precisely because it is only lately that serious attempts have been made to formulate the concept rigorously enough for systematic study.[1] If we take as our criterion for the efficiency of a scientific concept its usability in a theoretical system that possesses a high degree of systematic and empirical import, then we simply cannot say whether rigorous definitions of the concept of power are likely to be useful in theoretical systems with a relatively large pay-off in the hard coin of scientific understanding. The evidence is not yet in.

I think it can be shown, however, that to define the concept "power" in a way that seems to catch the central intuitively understood

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[1] By demonstrating the importance of concepts such as power and influence, particularly in political analysis, and by insisting upon rigorous conceptual clarity, Harold Lasswell has had a seminal influence. Cf. especially Reference 3. A similar approach will be found in References 6, 7, 8, 10. For the approach of the present article I owe a particularly heavy debt to March, with whom I had countless profitable discussions during a year we both spent as fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I have drawn freely not only on our joint work but on his own published and unpublished writings on the subject. The comments of Jacob Marschak on this paper have also been most helpful. There are, of course, approaches radically different from the one employed here and in the works mentioned above. John R. P. French, Jr. (2), has developed a model that assumes "a unidimensional continuum of opinion which can be measured with a ratio scale," and he defines "the power of A over B (with respect to a given opinion) [to be] equal to the maximum force which A can induce on B minus the maximum resisting force which B can mobilize in the opposite direction." Game theory provides still another approach. Cf. References 4, 5, 9.

meaning of the word must inevitably result in a formal definition that is not easy to apply in concrete research problems; and therefore, operational equivalents of the formal definition, designed to meet the needs of a particular research problem, are likely to diverge from one another in important ways. Thus we are not likely to produce — certainly not for some considerable time to come — anything like a single, consistent, coherent "Theory of Power." We are much more likely to produce a variety of theories of limited scope, each of which employs some definition of power that is useful in the context of the particular piece of research or theory but different in important respects from the definitions of other studies. Thus we may never get through the swamp. But it looks as if we might someday get around it.

With this in mind, I propose first to essay a formal definition of power that will, I hope, catch something of one's intuitive notions as to what the Thing is. By "formal" I mean that the definition will presuppose the existence of observations of a kind that may not always or even frequently be possible. Second, I should like to indicate how operational definitions have been or might be modelled on the formal one for some specific purposes, and the actual or possible results of these operational definitions.

I should like to be permitted one liberty. There is a long and honorable history attached to such words as power, influence, control, and authority. For a great many purposes, it is highly important that a distinction should be made among them; thus to Max Weber, "*Herrschaft ist. . . ein Sonderfall von Macht.*" Authority is a special case of the first, and Legitimate Authority a subtype of cardinal significance (11). In this essay I am seeking to explicate the primitive notion that seems to lie behind *all* of these concepts. Some of my readers would doubtless prefer the term "influence," while others may insist that I am talking about control. I should like to be permitted to use these terms interchangeably when it is convenient to do so, without denying or seeming to deny that for many other purposes distinctions are necessary and useful. Unfortunately, in the English language power is an awkward word, for unlike "influence" and "control" it has no convenient verb form, nor can the subject and object of the relation be supplied with noun forms without resort to barbaric neologisms.

Power as a Relation Among People

What is the intuitive idea we are trying to capture? Suppose I stand on a street corner and say to myself, "I command all automobile drivers on this street to drive on the right side of the road"; suppose further that all the drivers actually do as I "command" them to do; still, most people will regard me as mentally ill if I insist that I have enough power over automobile drivers to compel them to use the right side of the road. On the other hand, suppose a policeman is standing in the middle of an intersection at which most traffic ordinarily moves ahead; he orders all traffic to turn right or left; the traffic moves as he orders it to do. Then it accords with what I conceive to be the bedrock idea of power to say that the policeman acting in this particular role evidently has the power to make automobile drivers turn right or left rather than go ahead. My intuitive idea of power, then, is something like this: *A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do.

If Hume and his intellectual successors had never existed, the distinction between the two events above might be firmer than it is. But anyone who sees in the two cases the need to distinguish mere "association" from "cause" will realize that the attempt to define power could push us into some messy epistemological problems that do not seem to have any generally accepted solutions at the moment. I shall therefore quite deliberately steer clear of the possible identity of "power" with "cause," and the host of problems this identity might give rise to.

Let us proceed in a different way. First, let us agree that power is a relation, and that it is a relation among people. Although in common speech the term encompasses relations among people and other animate or inanimate objects, we shall have our hands full if we confine the relationship to human beings. All of the social theory I mentioned earlier is interesting only when it deals with this limited kind of relationship. Let us call the objects in the relationship of power, actors. Actors may be individuals, groups, roles, offices, governments, nation-states, or other human aggregates.

To specify the actors in a power relation — A has power over B — is not very interesting, informative, or even accurate. Although the statement that the President has (some) power over Congress is not empty, neither is it very useful. A much more complete statement would include references to (*a*) the source, domain, or *base* of the President's power over Congress; (*b*) the *means* or instruments used by the President to exert power over Congress; (*c*) the *amount* or extent of his power over Congress; and (*d*) the range or *scope* of his power over Congress. The base of an actor's power consists of all the resources — opportunities, acts, objects, etc. — that he can exploit in order to effect the behavior of another. Much of the best writing on power — Bertrand Russell is a good example — consists of an examination of the possible bases of power. A study of the war potential of nations is also a study of the bases of power. Some of the possible bases of a President's power over a Senator are his patronage, his constitutional veto, the possibility of calling White House conferences, his influence with the national electorate, his charisma, his charm, and the like.

In a sense, the base is inert, passive. It must be exploited in some fashion if the behavior of others is to be altered. The *means* or instruments of such exploitation are numerous; often they involve threats or promises to employ the base in some way and they may involve actual use of the base. In the case of the President, the means would include the *promise* of patronage, the *threat* of veto, the *holding* of a conference, the *threat* of appeal to the electorate, the *exercise* of charm and charisma, etc.

Thus the means is a mediating activity by A between A's base and B's response. The *scope* consists of B's responses. The scope of the President's power might therefore include such Congressional actions as passing or killing a bill, failing to override a veto, holding hearings, etc.

The *amount* of an actor's power can be represented by a probability statement: e.g., "the chances are 9 out of 10 that if the President promises a judgeship to five key Senators, the Senate will not override his veto," etc. Clearly the amount can only be specified in conjunction with the means and scope.

Suppose now we should wish to make a relatively complete and concise statement about the power of individual A over individual a (whom I shall call the respondent) with respect to some given scope of responses. In order to introduce the basic ideas involved, let us restrict ourselves to the 2 by 2 case, where the actor A does or does not perform some act and the respondent a does or does not "respond." Let us employ the following symbols:

(A, w) = A does w. For example, the President makes a nationwide television appeal for tax increases.
$(A, \bar{w})$ = A does not do w.
(a, x) = a, the respondent, does x. For example, the Senate votes to increase taxes.
$(a, \bar{x})$ = a does not do x.
$P(u|v)$ = Probability that u happens when v happens.

Then a relatively complete and concise statement would be symbolized:

$$P(a, x|A, w) = p_1$$
$$P(a, x|A, \bar{w}) = p_2$$

Suppose now, that $p_1 = 0.4$ and $p_2 = 0.1$. Then one interpretation might be: "The probability that the Senate will vote to increase taxes if the President makes a nationwide television appeal for a tax increase is 0.4. The probability that the Senate will vote to increase taxes if the President does not make such an appeal is 0.1."

Properties of the Power Relation

Now let us specify some properties of the power relation.

1. A necessary condition for the power relation is that there exists a time lag, however small, from the actions of the actor who is said to exert power to the responses of the respondent. This requirement merely accords with one's intuitive belief that A can hardly be said to have power over a unless A's power attempts precede a's responses. The condition, obvious as it is, is critically important in the actual study of power relations. Who runs the XYZ Corporation? Whenever the president announces a new policy, he immediately secures the compliance of the top officials. But upon investigation it turns out that every new policy he announces has first been put to him by the head of the sales department. Or again, suppose we had a full record of the times at which each one

of the top Soviet leaders revealed his positions on various issues; we could then deduce a great deal about who is running the show and who is not. A good bit of the mystery surrounding the role of White House figures like Sherman Adams and Harry Hopkins would also be clarified by a record of this kind.

2. A second necessary condition is, like the first, obvious and nonetheless important in research: there is no "action at a distance." Unless there is some "connection" between A and a, then no power relation can be said to exist. I shall leave the concept of "connection" undefined, for I wish only to call attention to the practical significance of this second condition. In looking for a flow of influence, control, or power from A to a, one must always find out whether there is a connection, or an opportunity for a connection, and if there is not, then one need proceed no further. The condition, obvious as it is, thus has considerable practical importance for it enables one to screen out many possible relations quite early in an inquiry.

3. In examining the intuitive view of the power relation, I suggested that it seemed to involve a successful attempt by A to get a to do something he would not otherwise do. This hints at a way of stating a third necessary condition for the power relation. Suppose the chances are about one out of a hundred that one of my students, Jones, will read *The Great Transformation* during the holidays even if I do not mention the book to him. Suppose that if I mention the book to him and ask him to read it, the chances that he will do so are still only one out of a hundred. Then it accords with my intuitive notions of power to say that evidently I have no power over Jones with respect to his reading *The Great Transformation* during the holidays — at least not if I restrict the basis of my action to mentioning the book and asking him (politely) to read it. Guessing this to be the case, I tell Jones that if he does not read the book over the holidays I shall fail him in my course. Suppose now that the chances he will read the book are about 99 out of 100. Assume further that nothing else in Jones's environment has changed, at least nothing relevant to his reading or not reading the book. Then it fully accords with my intuitive notions of power to say that I have some power over Jones's holiday reading habits. The basis of my power is the right to fail him in his course with me, and the means I employ is to invoke this threat.

Let me now set down symbolically what I have just said. Let

(D, w) = my threat to fail Jones if he does not read *The Great Transformation* during the holidays.

$(D, \bar{w})$ = no action on my part.

(J, x) = Jones reads *The Great Transformation* during the holidays.

Further, let

$p_1 = P(J, x|D, w)$ the probability that Jones will read *The Great Transformation* if I threaten to fail him.

$p_2 = P(J, x|D, \bar{w})$ the probability that Jones will read the book if I do not threaten to fail him.

Now let us define the *amount of power*. To avoid the confusion that might arise from the letter p, let us use the symbol M (from *Macht*) to designate the amount of power. Then, in accordance with the ideas set out in the illustration above, we define A's power over a, with respect to the response x, by means of w, as M, or, more fully:

$$M\left(\frac{A}{a} : w, x\right) = P(a, x|A, w) - P(a, x|A, \bar{w}) = p_1 - p_2$$

Thus in the case of myself and Jones, M, my power over Jones, with respect to reading a book during the holidays, is 0.98.

We can now specify some additional properties of the power relation in terms of M:

a. If $p_1 = p_2$, then $M = 0$ and no power relation exists. The absence of power is thus equivalent to statistical independence.

b. M is at a maximum when $p_1 = 1$ and $p_2 = 0$. This is roughly equivalent to saying that A unfailingly gets B to do something B would never do otherwise.

c. M is at a minimum when $p_1 = 0$ and $p_2 = 1$. If negative values of M are to be included in the power relation at all — and some readers might object to the idea — then we shall have a concept of "negative power." This is not as foolish as it may seem, although one

must admit that negative control of this kind is not ordinarily conceived of as power. If, whenever I ask my son to stay home on Saturday morning to mow the lawn, my request has the inevitable effect of inducing him to go swimming, when he would otherwise have stayed home, I do have a curious kind of negative power over him. The Legion of Decency sometimes seems to have this kind of power over movie-goers. Stalin was often said to wield negative power over the actions on appropriations for foreign aid by the American Congress. A study of the Senate that will be discussed later suggested that at least one Senator had this kind of effect on the Senate on some kinds of issues.

Note that the concept of negative power, and M as a measure, are both independent of the *intent* of A. The measure does, to be sure, require one to assign a positive and negative *direction* to the responses of the respondent; what one chooses as a criterion of direction will depend upon his research purposes and doubtless these will often include some idea as to the intent of the actors in a power relation. To take a specific case, p_1 *could* mean "the probability that Congress will defeat a bill if it is contained in the President's legislative program," and p_2 could mean "the probability that Congress will defeat such a bill if it is not contained in the President's legislative program." By assigning direction in this way, positive values of M would be associated with what ordinarily would be interpreted as meaning a "negative" influence of the President over Congress. The point of the example is to show that while the measure does require that direction be specified, the intent of A is not the only criterion for assigning direction.

Power Comparability

The main problem, however, is not to determine the existence of power but to make comparisons. Doubtless we are all agreed that Stalin was more powerful than Roosevelt in a great many ways, that McCarthy was less powerful after his censure by the Senate than before, etc. But what, precisely, do we mean? Evidently we need to define the concepts "more power than," "less power than," and "equal power."

Suppose we wish to compare the power of two different individuals. We have at least five factors that might be included in a comparison: (1) differences in the basis of their power, (2) differences in means of employing the basis, (3) differences in the scope of their power, i.e., in type of response evoked, (4) differences in the number of comparable respondents, and (5) differences in the change in probabilities, or M.

The first two of these may be conveniently thought of as differences in properties of the actors exercising power, and the last three may be thought of as differences in the responses of the respondents. Now it is clear that the pay-off lies in the last three — the responses. When we examine the first two in order to compare the power of individuals, rulers, or states, we do so on the supposition that differences in bases and means of actors are very likely to produce differences in the responses of those they seek to control.

As I have already indicated, much of the most important and useful research and analysis on the subject of power concerns the first two items, the properties of the actors exercising power, and there is good reason to suppose that studies of this kind will be as indispensable in the future as they have been in the past. But since we are concerned at the moment with a formal explication of the concept of power, and not with an investigation of research problems, (some of these will be taken up later on) it is important to make clear that analysis of the first two items does not, strictly speaking, provide us with a comparison of the power of two or more actors, except insofar as it permits us to make inferences about the last three items. If we could make these inferences more directly, we should not be particularly interested in the first two items — at least not for purposes of making comparisons of power. On the other hand, given information about the responses, we may be interested in comparing the efficiency of different bases or means; in this case, evidently, we can make a comparison only by holding one or both of the first two factors constant, so to speak. In general, the properties of the power wielder that we bring into the problem are determined by the goals of one's specific research. For example, one might be interested in the relative power of different state governors to secure favorable legislative action on their proposals by means of patronage; or alternatively, one might be interested in the

relative effectiveness of the threat of veto employed by different governors.

In whatever fashion one chooses to define the relevant properties of the actors whose power he wishes to compare, strictly speaking one must compare them with respect to the responses they are capable of evoking. Ideally, it would be desirable to have a single measure combining differences in scope, number of comparable respondents controlled, and change in probabilities. But there seems to exist no intuitively satisfying method for doing so. With an average probability approaching one, I can induce each of 10 students to come to class for an examination on a Friday afternoon when they would otherwise prefer to make off for New York or Northampton. With its existing resources and techniques, the New Haven Police Department can prevent about half the students who park along the streets near my office from staying beyond the legal time limit. Which of us has the more power? The question is, I believe, incapable of being answered unless we are ready to treat my relationships with my students as in some sense comparable with the relations of the Police Department to another group of students. Otherwise any answer would be arbitrary, because there is no valid way of combining the three variables — scope, number of respondents, and change in probabilities — into a single scale.

Let us suppose, for a moment, that with respect to two of the three variables the responses associated with the actions of two (or more) actors we wish to compare are identical. Then it is reasonable to define the power of A as greater than the power of B if, with respect to the remaining variable, the responses associated with A's acts are greater than the responses associated with B's acts. It will be readily seen, however, that we may have jumped from the frying pan into the fire, for the term "greater than" is still to be defined. Let us take up our variables one by one.

To begin with, we may suppose that the probability of evoking the response being the same for two actors and the numbers of comparable persons in whom they can evoke the response also being the same, then if the scope of responses evoked by A is greater than that evoked by B, A's power is greater than B's. But how can we decide whether one scope is larger than another? Suppose that I could induce my son to bathe every evening and to brush his teeth before going to bed and that my neighbor could induce his son to serve him breakfast in bed every morning. Are the two responses I can control to be counted as greater than the one response my neighbor can control? Evidently what we are willing to regard as a "greater" or "lesser" scope of responses will be dictated by the particular piece of research at hand; it seems fruitless to attempt to devise any single scale. At one extreme we may wish to say that A's scope is greater than B's only if A's scope contains in it every response in B's and at least one more; this would appear to be the narrowest definition. At the other extreme, we may be prepared to treat a broad category of responses as comparable, and A's scope is then said to be greater than B's if the number of comparable responses in his scope is larger than the number in B's. There are other possible definitions. The important point is that the particular definition one chooses will evidently have to merge from considerations of the substance and objectives of a specific piece of research, and not from general theoretical considerations.

Much the same argument applies to the second variable. It is clear, I think, that we cannot compare A's power with respect to the respondents $a_1, a_2 \ldots a_n$ and B's power with respect to the respondents $b_1, b_2 \ldots b_n$ unless we are prepared to regard the two sets of individuals as comparable. This is a disagreeable requirement, but obviously a sensible one. If I can induce 49 undergraduates to support or oppose federal aid to education, you will scarcely regard this as equivalent to the power I would have if I could induce 49 Senators to support or oppose federal aid. Again, whether or not we wish to treat Senators as comparable to students, rich men as comparable to poor men, soldiers as comparable to civilians, enlisted men as comparable to officers, military officers as comparable to civil servants, etc., is a matter that can be determined only in view of the nature and aims of the research at hand.

The third variable is the only one of the three without this inherent limitation. If scope and numbers are identical, then there can be no doubt, I think, that it fully accords with our intuitive and common-sense notions of the meaning of power to say that the actor with the highest probability of securing the response

is the more powerful. Take the set of Democratic Senators in the United States Senate. Suppose that the chance that at least two-thirds of them will support the President's proposals on federal aid to education is 0.6. It is fair to say that no matter what I may do in behalf of federal aid to education, if there are no other changes in the situation except those brought about by my efforts the probability that two-thirds of them will support federal aid will remain virtually at 0.6. If, on the other hand, Senator Johnson, as majority leader, lends his full support and all his skill of maneuver to the measure the probability may rise, let us say, to 0.8. We may then conclude (what we already virtually know is the case, of course) that Senator Johnson has more power over Democratic Senators with respect to federal aid to education than I have.

Earlier in defining the amount of power by the measure, M, I had already anticipated this conclusion. What I have just said is precisely equivalent to saying that the power of A with respect to some set of respondents and responses is greater than the power of B with respect to an equivalent set if and only if the measure M associated with A is greater than the measure M associated with B. To recapitulate:

$$M\left(\frac{A}{a} : w, x\right) = p_1 - p_2, \text{ where}$$

$$p_1 = P(a, x | A, w)$$

the probability that a will do x, given action w by A

$$p_2 = P(a, x | A, \overline{w})$$

the probability that a will do x, given no action w by A.

$$M\left(\frac{B}{b} : y, z\right) = p_1^* - p_2^*, \text{ where}$$

$$p_1^* = P(b, z/B, y)$$

$$p_2^* = P(b, z/B, \overline{y}).$$

Now if these two situations are *power comparable* (a notion we shall examine in a moment) then A's power is greater than B's if and only if

$$M\left(\frac{A}{a} : w, x\right) > M\left(\frac{B}{b} : y, z\right).$$

In principle, then, whenever there are two actors, A and B, provided only that they are power comparable, they can be ranked according to the amount of power they possess, or M. But if it is possible to rank A and B, it is possible to rank any number of pairs. And it is obvious from the nature of M that this ranking must be transitive, i.e.,

$$\text{if } M\left(\frac{A}{a} : w, x\right) > M\left(\frac{B}{b} : y, z\right), \text{ and}$$

$$M\left(\frac{B}{b} : y, z\right) > M\left(\frac{C}{c} : u, v\right), \text{ then}$$

$$M\left(\frac{A}{a} : w, x\right) > M\left(\frac{C}{c} : u, v\right).$$

In principle, then, where any number of actors are in some relation to any number of equivalent subjects, and these relations are regarded as power comparable, then all the actors can be unambiguously ranked according to their power with respect to these subjects.

There is, as everyone knows, many a slip 'twixt principle and practice. How can one convert the theoretical measure, M, into a measure usable in practical research? Specifically, suppose one wishes to examine the power relations among some group of people — a city council, legislature, community, faculty, trade union. One wants to rank the individuals in the group according to their power. How can one do so?

The first problem to be faced is whether given the aims, substance, and possible theoretical import of his study, one does in fact have *power comparability*. One of the most important existing studies of the power structure of a community has been criticized because of what appears to have been a failure to observe this requirement. A number of leaders in a large Southern city were asked, "If a project were before the community that required *decision* by a group of leaders — leaders that nearly everyone would accept — which *ten* on the list of forty would you choose?" On the basis of the answers, individuals were ranked in such a way that a "pyramidal" power structure was inferred to exist in the city, i.e., one consisting of a small number of top leaders who made the key decisions, which were then executed by a larger middle-group of subordinate leaders. The significance of this conclusion is

considerably weakened, however, if we consider whether the question did in fact discriminate among different kinds of responses. Specifically, suppose the leaders had been asked to distinguish between decisions over local taxes, decisions on schools, and efforts to bring a new industry to the community: would there be significant differences in the rankings according to these three differents kinds of issues? Because the study does not provide an answer to this question, we do not know how to interpret the significance of the "pyramidal" power structure that assertedly exists. Are we to conclude that in "Regional City" there is a small determinate group of leaders whose power significantly exceeds that of all other members of the community on all or nearly all key issues that arise? Or are we to conclude, at the other extreme, that some leaders are relatively powerful on some issues and not on others, and that no leaders are relatively powerful on all issues? We have no way of choosing between these two interpretations or indeed among many others that might be formulated.

Let us define A and B as formally power comparable (in the sense that the relative magnitudes of the measure M are held to order the power of A and B correctly) if and only if the actors, the means, the respondents and the responses or scopes are comparable. That is,

the actor	A	is comparable to	the actor	B;
A's respondent,	a	"	"	" B's respondent,	b;
A's means,	w	"	"	" B's means,	y; and
a's response,	x	"	"	" b's reponse,	z.

But this is not a very helpful definition. For the important question is whether we can specify some properties that will insure comparability among actors, respondents, means, and scopes. The answer, alas, is no. So far as an explication of the term "power" is concerned, power comparability must be taken as an undefined term. That is, power comparability will have to be interpreted in the light of the specific requirements of research and theory, in the same way that the decision as to whether to regard any two objects — animals, plants, atoms, or whatnot — as comparable depends upon general considerations of classification and theoretical import. To this extent, and to this extent only, the decision is "arbitrary"; but it is not more "arbitrary" than other decisions that establish the criteria for a class of objects.

To political scientists it might seem farfetched to compare the power of a British prime minister over tax legislation in the House of Commons with the power of the President of the United States over foreign policy decisions in the Senate. It would seem farfetched because the theoretical advantages of such a comparison are not at all clear. On the other hand, it would not seem quite so farfetched to compare the two institutional positions with respect to the "same" kind of policy — say tax legislation or foreign policy; indeed, political scientists do make comparisons of this kind. Yet the decision to regard tax legislation in the House of Commons as comparable in some sense to tax legislation in the Senate is "arbitrary." Even the decision to treat as comparable two revenue measures passed at different times in the United States Senate is "arbitrary." What saves a comparison from being genuinely arbitrary is, in the end, its scientific utility. Some kinds of comparisons will seem more artificial than others; some will be theoretically more interesting and more productive than others. But these are criteria derived from theoretical and empirical considerations independent of the fundamental meaning of the term power.

On what grounds, then, can one criticize the study mentioned a moment ago? Because the use of undiscriminating questions produced results of very limited theoretical significance. By choosing a relatively weak criterion of power comparability, the author inevitably robbed his inquiry of much of its potential richness. Considerations of comparability are, therefore, critical. But the criteria employed depend upon the problem at hand and the general state of relevant theory. The only way to avoid an arbitrary and useless definition of "power comparability" is to consider carefully the goals and substance of a particular piece of research in view of the theoretical constructs one has in mind. Thus in the case of the Senate, it may be satisfactory for one piece of research to define all Senate roll-call votes on all issues as comparable; for another, only votes on foreign policy issues will be comparable; and for still another, only votes on foreign policy issues involving large appropriations; etc. In a word, the researcher himself must define what he means by comparability and he must do so in view of the purpose of the ranking he is seeking to arrive at, the information available, and the

relevant theoretical constructs governing the research.

Applications of the Concept of Power Comparability

Assuming that one has power comparability, the next problem is to rank every actor whose rank is relevant to the research. Here we run into practical problems of great magnitude.

Suppose we wish to rank a number of Senators with respect to their influence over the Senate on questions of foreign affairs. Specifically, the respondent and response are defined as "all Senate roll-call votes on measures that have been referred to the Foreign Relations Committee." To begin with, let us take two Senators. What we wish to find out is the relative influence on the Senate vote of the activities of the two Senators for or against a measure prior to the roll call. "For" and "against" must be defined by reference to some standard "direction." Passage of the measure is one possible "direction" in the sense that a Senator can be for passing the measure, against it, or without a position for or against passage. This is not, however, a particularly significant or meaningful direction, and one might wish to determine the direction of a measure by reference to the President's position, or by content, or by some other standard. For this discussion, I shall assume that "for" and "against" are defined by reference to the first standard, i.e., passing the measure.

Let us now assume that a Senator does one of three things prior to a roll-call vote. He works for the measure, he works against it, or he does nothing. (The assumption, although a simplification of reality, is by no means an unreasonable simplification). Let us further assume (what is generally true) that the Senate either passes the measure or defeats it. With respect to a particular Senator, we have the following conditional probabilities:

		The Senator		
		Works For	Works Against	Does Nothing
The Senate	Passes	p_1	p_2	p_3
	Defeats	$1-p_1$	$1-p_2$	$1-p_3$

Since the bottom row provides no additional information we shall, in future, ignore it. Following the earlier discussion of the concept M, the measure of power, it is reasonable to define

$$M_1 = p_1 \quad p_3$$
$$M_2 = p_3 \quad p_2$$

M_1 is a measure of the Senator's power when he works for a measure and M_2 a measure of his power when he works against a measure; in both cases a comparison is made with how the Senate will act if the Senator does nothing. There are various ways in which we might combine M_1 and M_2 into a single measure, but the most useful would appear to be simply the sum of M_1 and M_2. To avoid confusion with the earlier and slightly different measure which we are now approximating, let us call the sum of M_1 and M_2, M^*. Like M, it is at a maximum of 1 when the Senate always passes the bills a given Senator works for and always defeats the bills he works against; it is at a minimum of -1 when the Senate always defeats the bills he works for and always passes the bills he works against; and it is at 0 when there is no change in the outcome, no matter what he does.

In addition, there is one clear advantage to M^*. It is easily shown that it reduces to

$$M^* = p_1 \quad p_2.$$

In a moment we shall see how advantageous such a simple measure is.

The theoretical problem, then, is clear-cut and a solution seems reasonably well defined. It is at this point, however, that practical research procedures begin to alter the significance of a solution, for the particular operational means selected to breathe life into the relatively simple formal concepts outlined so far can produce rather different and even conflicting results.

Let me illustrate this point by drawing on a paper by Dahl, March, and Nasatir (1) on influence ranking in the United States Senate. The aim of the authors was to rank thirty-four Senators according to their influence on the Senate with respect to two different areas, foreign policy and tax and economic policy. The 34 Senators were all those who had held office continuously from early 1946 through late 1954, a long enough period, it was thought, to insure a reasonably large number of roll-call votes. The classification of measures to the two areas was taken from the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, as were the votes themselves.

Thus the subject was well defined and the necessary data were available.

No such systematic record is maintained, of course, for the positions or activities of Senators prior to a roll-call vote, and what is more it would be exceptionally difficult to reconstruct the historical record even over one session, not to say over an eight-year period. Faced with this apparently insuperable obstacle, it was necessary to adopt a rather drastic alternative, namely to take the recorded roll-call vote of a Senator as an indication of his position and activities *prior to* the roll-call. While this is not unreasonable, it does pose one major difficulty: a vote is necessarily cast either for or against a measure and hence the roll-call provides no way of determining when a Senator does nothing prior to the roll-call. But the very essence of the formal concept of power outlined earlier hinges on a comparison of the difference between what the Senate will do when a Senator takes a given position and what it does when he takes no position.

It is at this point that the advantages of the measure M^* reveal themselves. For provided only that one is prepared to take the Senator's recorded vote as a fair indication of his prior position and activities, the data permit us to estimate the following probabilities, and hence M^*

		The Senator	
		Works For	Works Against
The Senate	Passes	p_1	p_2

One could, therefore, estimate M^* for each of the 34 Senators and rank all of them.

The validity of this method ranking would appear to be greatest, however, when all Senators are ranked on precisely the same set of bills before the Senate. To the extent that they vote on different (although mostly overlapping) sets of bills, the comparability of M^* from one Senator to another will be reduced, conceivably to the vanishing point.

For a number of reasons, including a slightly different interpretation of the characteristics of an ideal measure, the authors chose a rather different approach. They decided to pair every Senator against every other Senator in the following way. The number in each cell is an estimate of the probability that the Senate will pass a proposal, given the positions of the two Senators as indicated; the number is in fact the proportion of times that the Senate passed a foreign policy (or tax) measure in the period 1946–54, given the recorded votes of the two Senators as indicated.

		S_1	
		Favors the motion	Opposes the motion
S_2	Favors the motion	p_{11}	p_{12}
	Opposes the motion	p_{21}	p_{22}

With 34 Senators, 561 possible pairs of this kind exist; but only 158 pairs were tabulated for foreign policy and 206 for tax and economic policy over the whole period. The measure used to enable comparisons to be made between the two Senators in each pair might be regarded as an alternative to M^*. This measure — let us call it M'' — rests upon the same basic assumption, namely that we can measure a Senator's influence by the difference between the probability that the Senate will pass a measure the Senator opposes and the probability that it will pass a measure he supports. However, there are two important differences. First, the authors decided not to distinguish between "negative" and "positive" power; consequently they used absolute values only. Second, in estimating the probability of a measure passing the Senate, the positions of two Senators were simultaneously compared in the manner shown in the table. Thus the influence of S_1 over the Senate was measured as the difference between the probability that a bill will pass the Senate when S_1 favors it and the probability that it will pass when S_1 opposes it. However, this difference in probabilities was measured twice: (1) when S_2 favors the motions before the Senate; and (2) when S_2 opposes the motions. In the same way, S_2's influence was measured twice. Thus:

$M_1''(S_1) = |p_{11} - p_{12}|$,

that is, the change in probabilities, given S_2 in favor of the bill.

$M_2''(S_1) = |p_{21} - p_{22}|$,

that is, the change in probabilities, given S_2 in opposition to the bill.

Likewise,

$$M_1''(S_2) = |p_{11} - p_{21}|$$
$$M_2''(S_2) = |p_{12} - p_{22}| .$$

The influence of S_1 was said to be greater than the influence of S_2 only if $M_1''(S_1) > M_1''(S_2)$ *and* $M_2''(S_1) > M_2''(S_2)$. That is, if

$$|p_{11} - p_{12}| > |p_{11} - p_{21}| \text{ and}$$
$$|p_{21} - p_{22}| > |p_{12} - p_{22}| .$$

Except for the rare case of what would ordinarily be regarded as "negative" power — which, as I have already said, this particular measure was not intended to distinguish from "positive" power — the absolute values are the same as the algebraic ones. Where the algebraic differences can be taken, and this will normally be the case, both inequalities reduce to

$$p_{21} > p_{12} .$$

In the ordinary case, then, using the measure M'' we can say that the power of Senator George is greater than that of Senator Knowland if the probability that the Senate will pass a measure is greater when Senator George favors a bill and Senator Knowland opposes it than when Senator Knowland favors a bill and Senator George opposes it.

The results, some of which are shown in Tables 1–3, are roughly consistent with expectations based on general knowledge.

Note how the formal concept of power has been subtly altered in the process of research; it has been altered, moreover, not arbitrarily or accidentally but because of the limitations of the data available, limitations that appear to be well-nigh inescapable even in the case of the United States Senate, a body whose operations are relatively visible and well recorded over a long period of time.

The most important and at first glance the most innocent change has been to accept the roll-call position of a Senator as an indication of his position prior to the roll-call vote. This change is for most practical purposes unavoidable, and yet it generates a serious consequence which I propose to call the problem of the chameleon. Suppose a Senator takes no prior position on any bill and always decides how to vote by guessing how the Senate majority will vote; then, if he is a perfect guesser, according to the ranking method used he will be placed in the highest rank. Our common sense tells us, however, that in this case it is the Senate that has power over the Senator, whereas the Senator has no influence on the votes of other Senators.

If the reader will tolerate an unnatural compounding of biological and celestial metaphors, a special case of the chameleon might be called the satellite. Although I have no evidence that this was so, let us suppose that Senator Hoey took no prior positions on issues and always followed the lead of Senator George (Table 3). Let us assume that on foreign policy and tax policy, Senator George was the most powerful man in the Senate — as indeed nearly every

TABLE 1

Thirty-four U.S. Senators Ranked According to "Power" over Senate Decisions on Foreign Policy, 1946–54

HIGH	
Hayden	(tie) Magnuson
	Chavez
	Smith (N. J.)
	George
	Maybank
	Green
	Hill
Aiken	(tie) Wiley
	Hoey
	Kilgore
	Ferguson
	Murray
	Knowland
	Morse
Fulbright**	(tie) Saltonstall
	Johnston
	Cordon
	Hickenlooper**
	Ellender
Millikin	(tie) McClellan
	Eastland
	Russell
	Bridges*
	Johnson (Colo.)
	Byrd
	Butler (Nebr.)
	Langer*
	Young
	Capehart*
	McCarran
LOW	

** member of Foreign Relations Committee five or more years

* member of Foreign Relations Committee one to four years

TABLE 2

Thirty-four U.S. Senators Ranked According to "Power" over Senate Decisions on Tax and Economic Policy, 1946–54

HIGH

George††
Millikin††
Ellender
Byrd††
Saltonstall†
Cordon
McCarran
Young
Hoey††
Maybank
Johnson (Colo.) †† (tie) McClellan
Hickenlooper
Eastland
Russell
Smith (N. J.)
Knowland
Aiken
Capehart
Johnston
Bridges
Hayden (tie) Chavez
Butler (Nebr.)†† (tie) Wiley (tie) Ferguson
Langer (tie) Hill (tie) Murray (tie) Magnuson
(tie) Fulbright (tie) Green
Morse (tie) Kilgore

LOW

†† member of Finance Committee five or more years

† member of Finance Committee one to four years

seasoned observer of the Senate does believe. By following George, Hoey would rank as high as George; yet, according to our hypothetical assumptions, he had no influence at all on George or any other Senator.

The problem of the chameleon (and the satellite) is not simply an artifact created by the method of paired comparisons employed. It is easy to see that ranking according to the measure M^* would be subject to the same difficulties *given the same data*. The formal concept of power, that is to say, presupposes the existence of data that in this case do not seem to be available — certainly not readily available. If one had the kinds of observations that permitted him to identify the behavior of the chameleon or satellite then no serious problem would arise. One could treat chameleon activity as equivalent to "doing nothing" to influence the passage or defeat of a measure. Since, as we have seen, under the measure M^* the column "does nothing" is superfluous, the effect would be to ignore all cases of chameleon or satellite behavior and make estimates only from the instances where a Senator actually works for or works against various bills.

Thus the conceptual problem is easily solved. But the research problem remains. In order to identify chameleon behavior and separate it from actual attempts at influence one cannot rely on roll-calls. One needs observations of the behavior of Senators prior to the roll-calls. But if it is true, as I have been arguing, that observations of this kind are available only with great difficulty, rarely for past sessions, and probably never in large numbers, then in fact the data needed are not likely to exist. But if they do not exist for the Senate, for what institutions are they likely to exist?

CONCLUSIONS: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A "CONCEPTUAL" THEORETICIAN AND AN "OPERATIONALIST"

The conclusions can perhaps best be stated in the form of a dialogue between a "conceptual" theoretician and a strict "operationalist." I shall call them *C* and *O*.

C. The power of an actor, A, would seem to be adequately defined by the measure M which is the difference in the probability of an event, given certain action by A, and the probability of the event given no such action by A. Because the power of any actor may be estimated in this way, at least in principle, then different actors can be ranked according to power, provided only that there exists a set of comparable subjects for the actors who are to be ranked.

O. What you say may be true in principle, but that phrase "in principle" covers up a host of practical difficulties. In fact, of course, the necessary data may not exist.

C. That is, of course, quite possible. When I say "in principle" I mean only that no data are demanded by the definition that we cannot imagine securing with combinations of known techniques of observation and measurement. The observations may be exceedingly difficult but they are not inherently impossible: they don't defy the laws of nature as we understand them.

O. True. But the probability that we can

TABLE 3

Thirty-four U.S. Senators Classified According to "Power" over Senate Decisions on Foreign Policy and Tax Policy, 1946–54

		Foreign Policy		
		High influence	*Medium influence*	*Low influence*
Tax and Economic Policy	High influence	George**††	Ellender	Millikin
		Hoey**	Saltonstall	Byrd
		Maybank	Gordon	McCarran
				Young
				Johnson (Colo.)††
				McClellan
	Medium influence	Smith (N. J.)**	Hickenlooper	Eastland
		Aiken*	Knowland	Russell
		Hayden	Johnston	Capehart
		Chavez		Bridges
	Low influence	Wiley**	Ferguson	
		Hill*	Murray	
		Magnuson	Fulbright	Butler (Nebr.)††
		Green**	Morse	Langer
			Kilgore	

** member of Foreign Relations Committee five or more years
* member of Foreign Relations Committee one to four years
†† member of Finance Committee five or more years
† member of Finance Committee one to four years

actually make these observations on, say, the U.S. Senate is so low as to be negligible, at least if we want relatively large numbers of decisions. It seems to me that from a strict operational point of view, your concept of power is not a single concept, as you have implied; operationally, power would appear to be many different concepts, depending on the kinds of data available. The way in which the researcher must adapt to the almost inevitable limitations of his data means that we shall have to make do with a great many different and not strictly comparable concepts of power.

C. I agree with all you have said. In practice, the concept of power will have to be defined by operational criteria that will undoubtedly modify its pure meaning.

O. In that case, it seems wiser to dispense with the concept entirely. Why pretend that power, in the social sense, is a concept that is conceptually clear-cut and capable of relatively unambiguous operational definitions — like mass, say, in physics? Indeed, why not abandon the concept of power altogether, and admit that all we have or can have is a great variety of operational concepts, no one of which is strictly comparable with another? Perhaps we should label them: Power 1, Power 2, etc.; or better, let's abandon single, simple, misleading words like "power" and "influence", except when these are clearly understood to be a part of a special operational definition explicitly defined in the particular piece of research.

C. I'm afraid that I must disagree with your conclusion. You have not shown that the concept of power as defined by the measure *M* is inherently defective or that it is never capable of being used. It is true, of course, that we cannot always make the observations we need in order to measure power; perhaps we can do so only infrequently. But the concept provides us with a standard against which to compare the operational alternatives we actually employ. In this way it helps us to specify the defects of the operational definitions as measures of power. To be sure, we may have to use defective measures; but at least we shall know that they are defective and in what ways. More than that, to explicate the concept of power and to pin-point the deficiencies of the operational concepts actually employed may often help us to invent alternative concepts and research methods that produce a much closer approximation in practice to the theoretical concept itself.

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AN ILLUSTRATIVE MINIATURE AXIOMATIC SYSTEM

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REASONS FOR SEEKING AXIOMATIC SYSTEMS

The fundamental reasons for trying to construct axiomatic systems regarding the processes of politics seem to me to be identical with those for asking that the study of politics be as scientific as it can be. I might mention two benefits that may be expected from attempting such things. They are benefits that would be realized to an appreciable degree even before the systems were finished; and, indeed, it is to be borne in mind that as much may be learned, for example, in the way of clarifying concepts, from the process of constructing an axiomatic system as from studying the system after it has been perfected.

These benefits are, first, that of providing explicit standards for assessing the value of explanations. One naturally wants the propositions advanced in political science to be true of the phenomena which they purport to explain; but that is not all that is required of explanations. One must ask, are the propositions advanced in explanation connected with one another? Just what is this connection? Is it solid and unambiguous? Is it direct or unnecessarily circuitous? Is it compatible with known truths about other phenomena? Answering these questions is in fact the only way of determining whether an explanation is a good one; for a good explanation is more than a collection of statements, suppose each of them to be as true as anyone likes — it is a connected collection, which entails propositions describing the phenomena to be explained, and displays the entailment as clearly and neatly as the nature of the case allows.

It is difficult, however, to see how anything like conclusive answers can be returned to

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I am indebted to C. E. Lindblom and to Robert A. Dahl for a rich variety of suggestions and criticisms that assisted the projects of which this system was originally a part throughout their development. I asked my colleagues Alan R. Anderson and the late Arthur Pap, as people who know a great deal more about logic than I did or do, to give the Miniature Axiomatic System a casual survey by expert eyes, and I am grateful that they did so, without attributing to them the least responsibility for my affirmation that the system is sufficiently rigorous.

these questions if no recourse is available to at least a rudimentary axiomatic system covering the subjects involved and neighboring topics, for such a system is indispensable to conceiving the structure of a science, and hence to understanding whether a place can be made for the proffered explanation. Experiments with construction should fairly soon provide a rudimentary sketch of the axiomatic system prefigured in a Consensus-List of generally agreed-on propositions, and also some idea of how it compares in simplicity and capacity with alternative sketches. It is only relatively to an axiomatic system or a sketch of one, furthermore, that it makes sense to try to talk precisely about the basic concepts of a science in general, or of the common theory of the Consensus-List in particular. The basic concepts of a science are those that are needed to state the axioms of the best axiomatic system that can be devised.

But, in the second place, the progress of political science requires not only the means of assessing the value of different explanations when these turn up; it requires active efforts to seek them out — to discover new facts and formulate new laws. Yet surely it is very easy to lose sight of the bearing of any set of facts or of any set of proposed laws if one does not already have in hand a systematic theory to which the new discoveries can be referred and their bearing determined as explicitly corrective to this or that element of the system in hand. How effectively can scientists co-operate if they do not have some notion of the relationships between the tasks which they assign themselves? One of the principal benefits of constructing an axiomatic system is that it facilitates this cooperation, and helps ensure that no tasks or results will be disregarded; the system provides a common object to work upon. It would be better to have such a system to co-ordinate the efforts of different investigators, even if it were at the beginning only a caricature, than to accumulate insights without having any instrument of co-ordination at all.

EFFECTS OF SYSTEM-BUILDING ON THE CONCEPTION OF THE CONSENSUS-LIST

Progress from a Consensus-List toward an axiomatic system would change the perspective in which the List appears, and permit a more penetrating view of the starting-place for the project. As the List stands, it is masked by a certain logical ambiguity: the logical status of the propositions contained in the List is not clear. In an axiomatic system, some would become axioms and others would appear as theorems, strictly deduced from the former by the procedures of formal logic, and exhibited in hierarchical connections that would make it plain which propositions were properly subordinate to which others. Some propositions in the present list might perhaps have another destiny; they might be assigned most happily to a methodological (or meta-linguistic) discussion of the purpose and scope of the system arrived at, rather than being incorporated in the system themselves.

In the absence of such a system, there is a specific logical reason why the bearing of observations upon any of the propositions in the List remains indeterminate. For observations would bear very differently upon different propositions, according to the status that had been assigned them, whether that of axioms or that of theorems; and this would be true whether or not the system was interpreted as an empirical account of politics. Theorems that were falsified by observation might be thrown out without further ado, if the empirical interpretation was adopted; but the axioms from which those theorems were deduced might deserve saving. They could be saved by stating further axioms; and in many cases, there would be a choice of which axiom to amend, of those that led to the falsified theorem.

It is possible, moreover, to interpret the system as a whole as something different from an empirical account of politics. One might be able to imagine a model for it, a game sufficiently like real politics and intelligible enough in itself for it to be convenient and enlightening to represent empirical facts about politics as deviations from the activity envisaged in the game. This is the way in which economic theory studies the behavior of firms and consumers in an ideally competitive market. In this case, neither the axioms nor the theorems of the system would have any straightforward claims to truth; and still they would have scientific uses. There are reasons, in fact — not confined to the theory of games as formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern — for thinking that the concept of games may be

the key to useful formal developments in social science.[1]

ELECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE NUMBER OF PARTIES: A MINIATURE AXIOMATIC SYSTEM

The virtues of axiomatization, like other virtues, are more impressive when they are practiced than when they are merely theorized about. Let us therefore proceed to an experiment in axiomatization. For purposes of such an experiment, the propositions of the Consensus-List may be divided roughly into two sets, one of which, by contrast with the other, is relatively easy to axiomatize. Into the hard set fall those propositions that treat the general social and political context in which parties, interest groups, and the organs of government act upon one another. The easy set includes propositions that treat a more specialized subject, the effects on party competition and the number of parties of various electoral arrangements.

Of course, these sets of propositions have implications for one another, and in explanations of ordinary political phenomena, propositions are taken from both sets and their mutual relations discussed. It would be just the task of a unified axiomatic system to make clear what the mutual relations of the two sets were (as well as the internal relations of each). However, because differences in electoral arrangements are manifested in explicit rules — the rules, as it were, of a clearly defined game — the latter, more specialized set of propositions lends itself more readily to immediate formal development. One can seize upon the rules (treating them as contingent laws of politics, if one likes) for half the axioms needed.

The possibilities of developing these particular topics axiomatically are palpable in such works as Duverger's. We may hope to realize some of them by working directly from the Consensus-List. In order to illustrate what unified formal theory based on the Consensus-List might achieve in structure and precision, I choose a few propositions from the easier set, and offer an axiomatic system to connect them. The result is a system of which it would be an understatement to say, it has a very limited scope. However, it is a system susceptible of expansion. Some points of expansion are identified by stating propositions that are within near reach of the system, though strictly speaking outside it as it stands. Since the system could be adapted to take a place in a more comprehensive theory, perhaps it might be regarded as an advance installment of the system prefigured in the Consensus-List as a whole.

The aim of this miniature system is to show how from taking part of the sense of Prop. XLV, regarding the "polarization" of voters between leading candidates and leading parties,

[1] See, for example, the brief discussion of laboratory games and simulation techniques in Olaf Helmer and Nicholas Rescher, *On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences* (RAND Corporation Publication P-1513), 1958; also Thomas C. Schelling's proposals for reorienting game theory (in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. II, No. 3, September 1958; reprinted in the same author's book, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 1960). In *Autotelic Folk-Models* (Yale Interaction Laboratory), 1959, Alan R. Anderson and Omar K. Moore argue that the games found in various cultures may be regarded as means which those societies have hit upon for giving their members practice in solving problems of social behavior; and hence the games may be said to embody pre-scientific theories of social action. Anderson and Moore note that "there are just two theories which have been deeply investigated from a formal point of view, and which also have applications in the behavioral sciences." These are the theory of probability and Von Neumann's theory of games of strategy; and both of these originated in the study of popular games. The connection of this line of thought, which would make games heuristic devices for studying social phenomena, with the position that social science consists at least in large part, perhaps mainly, in explicating systems of rules and rule-following behavior, a position expressed, for example, by E. E. Evans-Pritchard in *Social Anthropology* (1951, see especially pp. 19–20) and (though too sweepingly) by Peter Winch in *The Idea of a Social Science* (1958), deserves thorough exploration. (For further references, see my article, "Authority as a Subject of Social Science and Philosophy," in *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, March 1960.) According to Anderson and Moore, "the clearest and most obvious models" for the formal theories of rules developed to date "are to be found in rules for games." In the miniature axiomatic system presented below, it will be seen that I take advantage of the susceptibility of explicit rules to axiomatic treatment, though I make no pretence of analyzing the notion of a rule or of applying the latest developments in the formal theory of rules.

as axiomatic, a relation of implication can be established between the single-member district system and party dualism (cf. Prop. XLIV). Other theorems state relationships between the number of parties in the legislature and the existence of multi-member districts and proportional representation (cf. Prop. L, on the absence of any tendency toward party dualism under proportional representation). Part of the sense of Prop. XLV, too, will appear among the theorems (specifically, in Theorems 10 through 15). Roughly speaking, there is a division of potentiality and actuality between the axioms and the theorems related to Prop. XLV. Axioms VIII and IX prescribe a readiness for polarization; the theorems show polarization actually happening in certain circumstances, namely, the circumstances of the single-member district system; and failing to happen in other circumstances, namely, multi-member districts, with or without proportional representation. (The latter point is not fully demonstrated in the present system.)

Only a small part of the content of the Consensus-List is drawn upon for the system, but this part is elaborated in considerable detail. With extended axioms, a more comprehensive system could be formulated; and to indicate some of the theorems that might be within reach of axioms only a little more extensive than those presented, I have stated some rough theorems inside brackets. These bracketed theorems are not deducible from the axioms given; they are stand-ins for theorems that might be proved in an extended system.

The other theorems are rigorously deducible from the axioms given. By this I mean that the theorems and axioms can be translated into well-formed formulas of symbolic logic, and the formulas for the theorems derived from the formulas for the axioms by procedures whose validity can be proved in a system of logistic, i.e., a system symbolizing the valid argument-forms of ordinary language, in this case one that either assumes all theorems of arithmetic as axioms or comprehends enough of the theorems of arithmetic to do the present job. Because of the arithmetical content of some of the axioms and theorems, actually constructing these symbolic derivations would be difficult and tedious, and I have not done it in detail. I have written out formulas for all the axioms and theorems and tested the general form of each deduction. Apart from the arithmetical content, which is not in itself complicated, the deductions are all logically quite simple ones, even though the logical form of some of the propositions is quite complex. An example of a step-by-step deduction, which by-passes complexities of logical form internal to the propositions, is given for Theorem 2.

The major steps in the proof of all the theorems are themselves stated as theorems, if they do not already appear among the axioms. Consequently, in most cases it seems sufficient, by way of proof, to indicate just what theorems and axioms would be invoked in the step-by-step deduction of the theorem. Some of the theorems represent truths of arithmetic, and as such can be derived without reference to the axioms; but since they are true, they may in the sense of "material implication" — a minimal logical connection, which is all we need for our present purposes — be regarded as implied by any set of axioms whatever, including our specified set.

Axioms

Axiom I. In an election, all voters cast each one vote of equal weight if and only if it is not the case that all voters cast a multiple-ranking vote, which is scored as under the Hare system of proportional representation.

By "election" we shall sometimes mean an event that occurs in some one given constituency, sometimes a class of simultaneous events occurring in all constituencies. In the latter case, we shall speak of a "general election," which is a procedure by which the membership of the legislature is determined. Run-offs and primaries are excluded from consideration, as is the popular election of officers of state other than members of the legislature. The Hare system is specified simply to fix the alternatives to be considered as definitely as possible.

Axiom II. One of any two candidates for election from the same constituency pursues a differentiating strategy with respect to the other if and only if he does not pursue an associative strategy with respect to him.

See the comment below, on Axiom V.

Axiom III. If one of two candidates can gain votes only concomitantly with an exactly equal loss in the votes obtained by any other given candidate, then the first candidate pursues a

differentiating strategy with respect to the second.

By "gain votes" or "lose votes" we mean something unusual and fairly complicated, though these phrases may serve to suggest it in an intuitive and approximate way. Suppose we regard every candidate as having at the outset the possibility of obtaining the maximum possible score: in the case of proportional representation, getting all the first-place-votes in the constituency; otherwise, simply getting all the votes. Now, in the first case, if a candidate actually gains the first-place-vote of a certain voter, every other candidate loses the chance of having it, but the loss will be unequally felt, for one of the other candidates will be compensated with a second-place-vote from that same voter, a second will get his third-place-vote, and so on. It will still be worth while to strive for the second-place-vote, failing the first; and the best strategy for doing this may be to appeal to the voter on the same grounds that led him to give his first-place-vote to the candidate who received it. If every voter casts only one vote, however, the candidates who do not receive the vote cast by a certain voter all suffer an equal loss, in the sense that the confirmed score for each of them has been reduced from the maximum possible score by the same amount.

Axiom IV. All members of the legislature have been winning candidates at the last general election.

Axiom V. If one candidate of a pair of candidates for election from the same constituency pursues a differentiating strategy with respect to the other, then it is not the case that both of them belong to the same political party.

The notions of "differentiating" and "associative" are left uninterpreted beyond what is said in Axioms II, III, and V. We may suggest that "differentiating" might include adopting a policy stand that differs from that of another candidate, whether because the latter takes no stand at all or because he takes a contradictory one; on the other hand, it might involve merely publicizing certain personality traits. The idea would be that the candidate presents himself as someone whom the voters should choose *instead of* another candidate, not *as well as* the other. So far as degree of differentiation goes, candidates who differentiate need differentiate only to the minimum degree that prevents them from belonging to the same party for the axioms to apply. It is to be noted that the axioms apply only to the strategy of candidates who are competing in the same constituency.

Axiom VI. No winning candidate who belongs to a party changes his party before the next election.

Axiom VII. In any given constituency, either the number of voters is odd or a procedure exists for breaking a tie between two or more candidates who each have enough votes to win office instead of or besides candidates outside the tie, in favor of one or more of the tied candidates, the number depending on the number of offices to be filled.

We must introduce two technical notions before we state the next axiom: first, that of a rank-ordering of the candidates in any given constituency according to the favor or disfavor felt for them by any given voter. Call this ordering, which will vary from voter to voter, the Voter's Candidate-Preference List, or C-List. Second, we introduce the notion of a rank-ordering of the same candidates according to the size of the voting score that each will receive if every voter votes or first-place-votes for the candidate at the top of his C-List. There will be just one such ordering for a given constituency and a given election; call it the Form-List. (By "first-place-votes" we mean, marking "list" after a candidates name on a multiple-ranking ballot, such as is used in proportional representation.)

Axiom VIII. If (a) for any voter in a given constituency there is a candidate A who has a rank-number on the F-List of $(n + 1)$ or smaller and a rank-number on that voter's C-List greater than n and (b) it would follow from the fact that every such voter voted for some other candidate whose rank-number on his C-List was smaller than A's that A, whoever he might be for different voters, would either lose or win with margins of votes over every other candidate diminished from the margins to be discovered in computing the F-List, *then* every such voter will vote or first-place-vote for some such other candidate. (n = the number of candidates to be elected from the constituency.)

This axiom, together with the next one,

represents a precise technical interpretation of the notion of "polarization." It is not claimed that they represent the only possible interpretation; but I think that any other interpretation, if it were equally precise, would look as artificial and arbitrary as these axioms do. The basic idea of this axiom is that voters will switch their votes so as to penalize a disfavored candidate, if there is assurance that switching will actually do this; such assurance exists when if every voter switches, disfavored candidates who meet certain conditions will all be penalized. (Cf. the discussion under Theorem 10 below.)

We introduce two further technical notions before stating the final axiom: first, that of a rank-ordering, which may vary from voter to voter, of political parties according to the voter's favor or disfavor for them. Call this the Voter's Party Preference List, or P-List. Second, we introduce the notion of a rank-ordering of all parties in the country according to the number of members it will have in the forthcoming legislature if every voter in every constituency votes for a candidate belonging to a party which is at the top of his P-List (or first-place-votes for such a candidate). There will be just one such ordering for the whole country for any given general election. Call it the Party-Form List, or P-F-List.

Axiom IX. (i) In the jth election after the last general election in which a new party for the first time won at least one seat in the legislature, every voter's C-List will be determined by his P-List, in this way: any candidate who does not belong to a party will rank after all candidates who do belong, on both lists; and the candidates who belong to parties will be ranked in the same order on any C-List as the parties which they belong to are ranked on the corresponding P-List, candidates belonging to the same party occupying consecutive places on any C-List.

(ii) At the same time, the $(n+1)$ top places on the Form-List of every constituency will be occupied by candidates who belong to the parties which, if there are $(n+1)$ parties or more, occupy the $(n+1)$ top places on the Party-Form-List. (Again, n = the number of candidates to be elected from a given constituency.)

This axiom implies that in time the voters' favor for individual candidates will be determined by their concern with which party will control the legislature. In the theorems following, the phrase "the jth election after the last general election in which a new party for the first time won at least one seat in the legislature" (i.e., from any constituency, this one or some other) will be abbreviated to "the jth election" or "the jth general election." j represents a number which is to be discovered by studying the electoral history of various countries empirically. j must be a relatively small number, if the system is to be useful; if it were given a value of 300, the truth of propositions derived from Axiom IX would be indeterminate, since (one may suppose) in no country has there been that many elections since party competition began.[2] It is to be noted that the *order* of the candidates who occupy the $(n+1)$ top places of the Form List in any constituency is not determined by the order which their parties occupy in the Party-Form-List.

Theorems

Theorem 1. If, in an election in a given constituency, every voter casts only one vote, and the score of every winning candidate consists simply in having a sum of equally weighted votes greater than the sum attracted by any losing candidate, then for any given voter to vote for any given candidate implies a gain in the votes for that candidate exactly equal to the loss in the votes obtained by any other given candidate.

Proof: From arithmetic, using "gain" and "loss" in the sense explained by the comment on Axiom III above.

Theorem 2. If, in an election in a given constituency, every voter casts only one vote, and the score of every winning candidate consists simply in having a sum of equally weighted votes greater than the sum attracted by any losing candidate, then for every pair of candidates, the one candidate pursues a strategy that is differentiating with respect to the other.

Proof: Let G symbolize the proposition, "Either of any two candidates can gain votes only concomitantly with an exactly equal

2 This point about j was suggested to me by Alan R. Anderson.

loss in the votes obtained by any other given candidate"; S, the proposition, "In an election in a given constituency, every voter casts only one vote, and the score of every winning candidate consists simply in having a sum of equally weighted votes greater than the sum attracted by any losing candidate"; and D, the proposition, "Of every pair of candidates, the one candidate pursues a strategy that is differentiating with respect to the other."

(i) G implies D. (Axiom III)
(ii) S implies G. (Theorem 1)
(iii) If P implies *Q* and *Q* implies R, then P implies R. (A truth of logic, holding for any three propositions P, Q, and R)
(iv) If S implies G and G implies D, then S implies D. (Substituting S, G, and D in (iii))
(v) S implies D. ((i), (ii), and (iv) by Modus Ponens) Q.E.D.

(Theorem 3. Candidates will seek to eliminate prospective rivals by offering them reassignment to different constituencies or to future elections in the same constituency.)
(Theorem 4. Prospective candidates, if they accept reassignment at all, will prefer reassignments sanctioned by party organizations to reassignments that are not.)
(Theorem 5. If the number of prospective candidates is greater than one more than the number of offices to be filled in any election in a given constituency, then some of the prospective candidates will accept reassignment, if it is offered them.)
(Theorem 6. Members of the legislature who are candidates or prospective candidates for any of the offices that are at the disposal of the legislature will form parties in the course of seeking those offices.)
(Theorem 7. In an election held in the legislature, members of parties that do not contest the election and members of the legislature who are not also members of the parties will vote for that party or coalition between parties which is strongest of those parties and coalitions competing with that other party which, of those they disfavor has, either by itself or in coalition with some other parties, the prospect of the greatest number of votes up to the time of voting.)
(Theorem 8. Once formed, a party will seek to coopt uncommitted members from constituencies that it does not already have candidates in; and failing a sitting member, it will seek to coopt the strongest of those rival candidates who have a reasonable chance of winning election.)

Theorem 9. If, in an election in a given constituency, the number of candidates to be elected is one, then if all voters vote or first-place-vote for one or the other of the same two candidates, either the one or the other of the two candidates wins, but not both.

Proof: From arithmetic and Axiom VII.

Theorem 10. If, in an election in a given constituency, the number of candidates to be elected is one, then every voter will vote or first-place-vote for one or the other of the two candidates who rank first and second respectively on the Form-List for that constituency.

Proof: From Axiom VIII, Theorem 9, and arithmetic. For every voter, either one or the other of the two candidates who rank first and second on the F-List must rank lower than *n*th place (i.e., have a rank-number greater than *n*) on the voter's C-List, since by hypothesis $n = 1$. Now, *this* candidate must rank lower or higher on any given voter's C-List than the other leading candidate. Either he or the other candidate is for any given voter the candidate A described in Axiom VIII. Voters for whom he is candidate A will vote for the other leading candidate; voters for whom the other leading candidate is candidate A will vote for the present candidate. These are circumstances in which if every voter casts his vote for "some other candidate" (in this case, one of the leading candidates, which one varying from voter to voter as the C-Lists vary), then whichever candidate is candidate A for the given voter will either lose or win with diminished margins. (Cf. Theorem 18 and Comment below.)

Extended Comment on Theorem 10: Perhaps the crucial deduction in the whole system, so far as intuitive plausibility goes, is the deduction of Theorem 10 from Axiom VIII. The presence of both propositions is essential to the system. The deduction is valid; but perhaps it would be useful to say something by way of justifying the presence of the two propositions taken together. Theorem 10 does not happen to be true of all constituencies even in a very long established single-member district system like that of the United States or Great Britain. Indeed, it is to be expected that normally, in any constituency, there will be some voters who vote for third or fourth candidates

(third-party candidates, independents, write-ins), so that the split is seldom neatly bi-polar. But this discrepancy with the facts is not the only remarkable thing about Theorem 10. Neither it, nor Axiom VIII, explains how all the voters happen to *know* which are the two leading candidates on the constituency Form-List. But how can the phenomenon described occur unless the voters know this? It seems that the system is implicitly presupposing that the voters have perfect information.

But this is not the case. Consider the following possibilities: (a) all the voters know the places of all the candidates (in the given constituency on the Form-List; (b) all the voters know the places of the two leading candidates, without knowing the places of any of the other candidates; (c) all the voters know which are the two leading candidates, but none of them know which of the two is first and which is second on the Form-List. It is not necessary that the voters' beliefs, so far as they are correct, derive from exact information about the numbers of votes that would be assigned each candidate if the Form-List were computed; all the voters need to know is the relative positions of candidates (or, in the case of (c), of one pair of candidates taken together). It is not implausible that they should obtain this information from public opinion polls, newspaper analysts, or from the talk of other voters. Now, if either (a) or (b) or (c) is true — and there are other possibilities — the voters have enough information for the effect described by Axiom VIII and Theorem 10, taken together, to take place.

Axiom VIII and Theorem 10, however, say nothing about what information the voters have. Axiom VIII says merely that if the two conditions stated in the antecedent hold, then the effect described in the consequent will follow. The causal mechanism, which in fact would be needed to establish the connection, is disregarded. To explain this mechanism, one would undoubtedly have to talk about the voters' beliefs; it would, however, greatly complicate the present system to incorporate any such explanation, and therefore the attempt has not been made.

The discrepancy with the facts arises from stating Axioms VIII and Theorem 10 in the form of unqualified universal implications. Again, this is done for reasons of simplicity. The point which the present system makes is that Axiom VIII and Theorem 10 stand or fall together (Theorem 9 not being in question); if one is only approximately true, then the other will only be approximately true, too. Modifications in the theorem, intended to bring about a better fit with the actual variations of reality, would have to be accompanied by modifications in the axiom.

Theorem 11. If, in the jth election, there are two candidates who rank first and second on the Form-List for a given constituency, and the number of candidates to be elected is one, then every voter will vote or first-place-vote for one or the other of this pair of candidates.

Proof: From Theorem 10, applying it to the special case of the jth election.

Theorem 12. If, in the jth election held in a given constituency, the number of candidates to be elected is one, then every voter will vote or first-place-vote for a candidate who belongs to one or the other of the two parties that rank first and second on the Party-Form-List.

Proof: From Axiom IX and Theorem 11. The top two places on the Form-List for the constituency will be occupied by candidates who belong to the parties that occupy the top two places on the Party-Form-List; and every voter's C-List is determined by his P-List. Theorem 11 then applies to the relation of the Form-List and the C-Lists so constituted.

Theorem 13. If, in the jth election held in a given constituency, the number of candidates to be elected is one, then the two candidates who rank first and second, respectively, on the Form-List for that constituency will each belong to one or the other of the two parties that rank first and second, respectively, on the Party-Form-List.

Proof: From Theorems 11 and 12.

Theorem 14. If, in the jth election held in a given constituency, the number of candidates to be elected is one, every voter casts only one vote, and the score of the winning candidate consists simply in having a sum of equally weighted votes greater than the sum attracted by any losing candidate, then every voter will vote for a candidate who belongs to one or the other of the two parties that rank first and second on the Party-Form-List, but not to both.

Proof: From Theorem 12, Theorem 2, and Axiom V. (Theorem 12, by itself, leaves open the logical possibility that either of the

two leading candidates might belong to both of the two leading parties. The reason for stating Theorem 12, even so, is that it, together with other theorems that hold both for equal weight voting and for multiple-rank voting, tend to show that the two party system results from the single-member constituency arrangement, regardless of the method of voting.)

Theorem 15. If, in the jth election held in a given constituency, the number of candidates to be elected is one, every voter casts only one vote, and the score of the winning candidate consists simply in having a sum of equally weighted votes greater than the sum attracted by any losing candidate, then the two candidates who rank first and second, respectively, on the Form-List will each belong to one or the other of the two parties that rank first and second, respectively, on the Party-Form-List, but both will not belong to the same party.

Proof: From Theorem 13, Theorem 2, and Axiom V.

Theorem 16. The number of parties in the legislature at any time is at least as great as the number in the set of winning candidates who each have pursued differentiating strategies with respect to all other candidates in the set, in that constituency where the specified set was most numerous at the last general election.

Proof: Suppose that there were fewer parties in the legislature than there were candidates in the most numerous such set. Then either some pair of candidates who pursued differentiating strategies with respect to each other would have belonged to the same party, which contradicts Axiom V; or some candidate would have changed his party since the election, which contradicts Axiom VI.

Theorem 17. If, in every constituency, every voter casts only one vote, the score of every winning candidate consists simply in having a sum of equally weighted votes greater than the sum attracted by any losing candidate, and every winning candidate belongs to a party, then there must be at least as many parties in the legislature as the greatest number of candidates elected for any one constituency.

Proof: From Theorem 16 and Theorem 2.

(Theorem 18. If, in a given constituency more than one member is elected to the legislature, then it does not follow that every voter will vote or first-place-vote for one or the other if the two candidates who rank first and second respectively on the Form-List for that constituency.)

(Comment: It *might* happen that if every voter voted in such circumstances for the "some other such candidate" of Axiom VIII, the various candidates who were candidate A for different voters would all either lose or win with diminished margins. But whether or not it would happen would depend on the existence of some particular relationship between the number of candidates to be elected, the number of voters, and the specific arrangement of the different C-Lists.)

Theorem 19. If more than one candidate is to be elected from any given constituency, then if any of the candidates pursue strategies that are associative with respect to one or more other candidates, it is not the case that it is both true that every voter casts only one vote and every winning candidate has a score that consists simply in having a sum of equally weighted votes greater than the sum attracted by any losing candidate.

Proof: From Theorem 2 and Axiom II.

(Theorem 20. If n members are to be elected to the legislature from any constituency, then as many as n candidates from that constituency, but no more, can belong to any one combination of candidates pursuing mutually associative strategies.)

(Theorem 21. If every constituency fills its seats with a combination of mutually associative candidates, and every winning candidate from whatever constituency belongs to the same party, only one party will be represented in the legislature.)

(Comment: The point of stating such a theorem would be to exhibit the possibility of proportional representation and multi-member districts leading to a one-party legislature. The possibility exists, of course, for the single-member district system, too.)

Theorem 22. If, in the jth general election, every voter in every constituency votes or first-place-votes for a candidate who belongs to one or the other of the two parties that rank first and second on the Party-Form-List, the number of parties in the subsequent legislature will be no greater than two.

Proof: From arithmetic and Axiom IV.

Theorem 23. If, subsequent to the jth general election, there are more parties in the legislature than two, there is at least one constituency from which more than one candidate is elected to the legislature.

Proof: From Theorem 12 and Theorem 22.

Theorem 24. If, in the jth general election,

all the candidates who are elected in the constituency that elects the greatest number of candidates pursue strategies that are differentiating for each candidate with respect to all the other elected candidates, then the number of parties in the subsequent legislature must be at least as great as the number of candidates elected from the specified constituency.

Proof: From Theorem 16.

Theorem 25. If, subsequent to the jth general election, there are more parties than two in the legislature, but fewer than the number of candidates elected from that constituency which elects the greatest number, then it is not the case that it is both true that every voter casts only one vote and every winning candidate has a score that consists simply in having a sum of equally weighted votes greater than the sum attracted by any losing candidate.

Proof: From Theorems 19, 23, and 24, and Axiom II.

RESULTS ACHIEVED BY THE MINIATURE AXIOMATIC SYSTEM

A number of unkind things can justly be said of the axiomatic system just expounded. It applies only the very simplest logical techniques. It treats only a drastically restricted topic. It is unrealistic.

Nevertheless, I think that the system may be credited with establishing some useful points, or, at least, with putting them in reach of being established; and it may be a beginning toward establishing others. Other systems, of the same humble dimensions, could do as much for other topics.

In the works on which the Consensus-List was based, two principal effects on the number of parties are attributed to differences in electoral arrangements. It is said that the single-member district system, with plurality rule and without run-offs, leads to two-party government; and it is intimated that proportional representation leads to there being more than two parties. Both propositions can be found in Schattschneider, though I may be forcing the text a little when I extract the second.[3] The first is also in Duverger. Regarding the second, Duverger is more cautious: his basic position seems to be that proportional representation will preserve at least the number of parties that exist when it is instituted, and tends to encourage the formation of new parties besides.[4]

Various explanations of the causal connection between the single-member district system and party dualism can be found in Schattschneider and Duverger. Duverger speaks of a natural tendency toward dualism, stemming on the one hand from the fact that "political choice usually takes the form of a choice between two alternatives" and on the other hand from a broad bipolar difference of temperament among political agents.[5] Schattschneider asserts that dualism in the legislature is "the limit" of organization and counterorganization;[6] and he pictures the extension of party competition from the legislature to the country at large as one of the great events of party history. One presumes that if the legislative conflict were extended to the country, so would be the legislative dualism. Schattschneider alludes, further, to the predominant influence in American politics of the Presidential election,[7] in which (one supposes) the forces working for dualism in single-member constituencies are reproduced on a grand scale, in the largest single-member constituency of all. Both Schattschneider and Duverger place greatest stress on two other factors, however: first, the fact that under the single-member district system the number of seats won by the leading party tends to be disproportionately larger than the total number of votes attracted by the party, while the other parties are disproportionately penalized, third or fourth parties, etc., suffering most grossly,[8] and second, the fact that voters tend to be "polarized" between the two leading candidates and the two leading parties in their constituency.[9]

Which of these explanations is the best one? None of them are complete. They tend to show, for example, why there are at most two parties; why there are two and not one requires mention of the sectional differences, stressed by

[3] *Party Government,* pp. 69–74. On p. 74, Schattschneider says, "A system of proportional representation or vocational representation, by abolishing the geographical factor, would almost certainly destroy the two-party system altogether."

[4] *Political Parties,* p. 217; p. 248; pp. 252–253.

[5] Ibid., pp. 215–216.

[6] *Op. cit.,* p. 45.

[7] *Op. cit.,* p. 83.

[8] Duverger, p. 226; Schattschneider, pp. 74–75.

[9] Duverger, p. 226; Schattschneider, p. 82.

Schattschneider, that enable one party to hold some constituencies even while it loses the national election.[10] But which of the explanations listed is the best so far as they go?

The miniature axiomatic system supplies an answer. If the axioms of the system, as they stand, are observed to apply to political affairs, then all the proffered explanations except the last one — "polarization" — are logically superfluous.[11] Now, very likely the axioms do not apply as they stand, but they can be modified in various ways without incorporating any feature of the other explanations; and if they then apply, the superfluousness of the others will be established.

The system makes the fact that only one member is elected from each constituency crucial; and if the system were vindicated by observation, it would be established that the difference between single-member and multi-member constituencies was of transcendent importance in this connection, while the difference in methods of voting was negligible.

The system clarifies another point. On the analysis which it represents, single-member districts are a sufficient condition for there being at most two parties, but neither proportional representation nor multi-member districts is a sufficient condition, by any means, for there being *more* than two parties. All that we can say, if the system or anything like it is confirmed by observation, is that single-member constituencies will lead to two parties, if both parties continue to win some constituencies, and thus escape elimination at election-time; and that multi-member constituencies are compatible with there being more than two parties. This seems to be a fair account of the actual facts.[12]

The miniature axiomatic system thus illustrates the benefits that may be expected both from other systems of restricted scope and from a general system which consolidates them. It makes the logical picture of the whole subject — in the present case, the connection of the number of parties with various electoral arrangements — a great deal clearer. Indeed, it gives us a picture. We might ask for a better likeness, but it could hardly be said that there *was* a picture, before.

The principal suggestion for research which may be drawn from the present system is that the phenomenon of polarization should receive

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[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 81. Cf. Prop. XLII.

[11] Superfluous — or, possibly, relegated to a remoter logical connection. It may be relevant to cite the Presidential election as an important factor among the motivations for polarization. Schattschneider invokes it to explain why minor parties cannot retain even sectional support.

[12] In an article published in 1958, "Theories of Electoral Systems" (*Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. II, No. 4, pp. 357–376), to which Fred I. Greenstein has called my attention, John G. Grumm marshals some reasons for doubting theories like Duverger's which connect electoral arrangements with the number of political parties. Grumm's evidence, collected from a number of European countries, tends to show (1) that there is no consistent pattern of overrepresentation for leading parties when proportional representation is not used; (2) that the number of parties winning seats after proportional representation is introduced is generally not greater than the number which won seats previously; (3) that more than two parties may survive indefinitely even if proportional representation is not introduced.

The Miniature Axiomatic System is consistent with all these points. The second and third points have just been explicitly allowed for; and the first tends to confirm the suggestion, expressed in the previous paragraphs, that the phenomenon of overrepresentation, which the system does not mention, may be superfluous as an explanation of there being no more than two parties.

Grumm's evidence may make more trouble for Duverger's own theory, in which some weight is placed on the phenomenon of overrepresentation. However, the fact that in making both the first and third of the points mentioned, Grumm does not refine out geographical complications — larger populations in some constituencies than in others; more than two parties each having a sectional stronghold — suggests that Duverger's contention on this point needs to be stated more carefully (so as to apply only to countries, or models, in which constituencies have at least approximately equal populations) before it can be given a clear test.

In attacking Duverger's position regarding polarization, Grumm fails to observe how cautious Duverger is about passing from its manifestation in single constituencies, to its manifestation on the national scene, taking all constituencies together. That caution has been reproduced in our discussion and in the Miniature Axiomatic System. The distinction between Axioms VIII and IX of the Miniature Axiomatic System may be said to make it plain exactly how essential it is to distinguish in this matter of polarization between events within single constituencies and effects in a given country as a whole.

more exact investigation; other systems would offer further suggestions. Research into the question of polarization would simultaneously enrich the fund of facts at the disposal of political science and enable us to perfect an axiomatic system, to which the present one may be regarded as a first approximation, treating the same topics. A perfected system on these topics would have a place, if only a small one, in a future general system of political behavior. It should be possible to join the present system up quite readily with a system treating the connections between the number of parties and the amount and kind of variation in policies proposed by different parties, a subject which has already been opened up by the authors from which the Consensus-List was derived. The two systems so joined would approximately duplicate the system proposed by Downs in range of topics — they would also, undoubtedly, corroborate some of his theses and profit by his deductions; and the topics consolidated at this stage might provide the proper framework for a larger job — that of representing in a strict formal system the complex relations between parties and interest groups, the very stuff of politics, whose general features at least are adumbrated in the Consensus-List. The axioms of the smaller systems might figure as deduced theorems in the larger one.

13

GAME THEORY AND THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

• *RICHARD C. SNYDER*

The purpose of this essay is two-fold: first, to indicate certain intellectual interests that the game theorist and the political scientist share, and, second, to suggest some possible applications and uses of the theory of games for the analysis of political behavior.[1] It is assumed that both students and practitioners of politics wish to keep track of developments in other fields that may be of considerable help in their own tasks. Developments in at least a few of the nonpolitical science disciplines would seem to be somewhat more inaccessible and less readily understandable. Such is the case with mathematics and mathematical economics.[2] Though the theory of games of strategy has been developed by mathematicians and economists who were particularly concerned with political phenomena, it is the present thesis that what is emerging is one kind of general theory of social behavior whose present and future fruitfulness merits the serious consideration of political scientists.[3]

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[1] The author is greatly indebted to Dr. Martin Shubik, friend and colleague, who is Research Associate in the Economics Research Project at Princeton University directed by Professor Oskar Morgenstern. Both Professor Morgenstern and Dr. Shubik have read this manuscript carefully, correcting errors and making valuable suggestions. The author is, of course, responsible for any interpretations. Gratitude is due to Professor Karl Deutsch of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who was among the first to recognize the importance of game theory and who has helped to stimulate the interest of political scientists. See his "Game Theory and Politics," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XX (February 1954), 76–83.

[2] Game theory is only one form or aspect of the mathematical analysis of social phenomena. Political scientists might read the following with profit, Paul Lazarsfeld (ed.), *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences* (1954), the editor's introduction on pp. 3–16, "Probability in the Social Sciences" by Jacob Marschak, Chap. 4, and "Some Strategic Considerations in the Construction of Social Science Models" by Herbert A. Simon, Chap. 8; Kenneth Arrow, "Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences," in *The Policy Sciences*, edited by Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (1951). See also Irwin D. F. Bross, *Design for Decision* (1953); R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs, and R. L. Davis (eds.), *Decision Processes* (1954).

[3] Foundations of the theory were laid in J. von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, first published in 1944 by the Princeton University Press and now in its third edition.

No attempt will be made to set forth the theory of games in detail or to evaluate it critically. Qualified experts have prepared excellent expositions for the social scientists and laymen who are not trained in mathematics.[4] However, it will be necessary to call attention to certain key elements of the theory in order to establish common concerns and analogies between politics and games of strategy and to provide a basis for exploring possible applications. The basic question is, of course, whether the theory aims to describe and explain some of the same types of social situations and behaviors with with political scientists are confronted and in which they are interested.

Certain difficulties inevitably plague an enterprise of this kind and should be made explicit. Transference of a complex theoretical apparatus from one field to another is a delicate operation. Adaptations must be made with minimum distortion. The journey downward from the high levels of generalized theories to lower levels of concrete example is often a free fall, bringing the passengers up sharply, even painfully. Or, the translation of technical materials from one discipline to another represents a flight of fancy rather than an orderly trip down a clearly marked road. Occasionally, only the vocabulary is transported, and the users may be misled into believing that something has really happened to their analytical operations. However, pitfalls of transfer should not be confused with the possible inappropriateness of any new theory, although the two may be closely related. On the other hand, to misrepresent a theory is virtually to slander the hard-won gains of those who labor in the honest conviction that it is possible to discover laws of behavior. Failures may be due to transfer, not to internal defects of the theory.

Game theory would seem to be a typical case where the temptation is very powerful to seize upon a recognized and well-developed scheme of analysis and turn it into an all-purpose magical device. If this complete embrace accompanied — as it often is — by a sweeping condemnation of the allegedly primitive tools and underdeveloped analytic skills of one's colleagues, an equally extreme response of total rejection may result. The dilemma of either overselling or of refusing to consider anything that does not fit existing patterns of thought ought to be avoidable. Optimism over the possibilities of social science easily turns into extravagant claims. Healthy skepticism easily turns into dogmatic, uncritical rejection. Interwoven with this opposition is the supposed gulf between the man of affairs — who is not nearly so anti-theoretical as he often proclaims — and the ivory-tower man of science — who is not nearly so ignorant of harsh realities as he is made out to be.

A very serious issue that arises in connection with game theory is the premature application of mathematics to social behavior. The specter of prematurity arises from two sources: the theory is admittedly not yet complete *and* political science problems may not be quite ready for so sophisticated a type of analysis. Too many sober-minded yet optimistic social scientists have given this warning to ignore it without grave consequences. As matters now stand, the application of game theory to politics is limited by the absence of needed data. But the avoidance of false starts and disappointments should not be pushed so far that no bold new steps are taken. It is much too early for a game theory of politics, but perhaps it is not too early to discuss possibilities of fresh insights and other benefits from greater collaboration between the study of politics and this one kind of mathematical theory.

Game theory is a general theory — that is, it is designed to deal with a wide range of situations and problems in terms of repetitive patterns of behavior, common aspects of phenomena, and types of actions and factors. The vocabulary may appear at first glance to have no similarity or relevance to everyday life or to a particular academic discipline. To lay a general theory against a real life situation in all its concreteness and uniqueness results in an apparently bad fit. Part of the task of transferring a theory from one field to another requires the translation of a technical vocabulary in terms of everyday language or the language of, say, political science. This is, of course, risky because of the different rules that govern

[4] The best introductions to the subject are Martin Shubik, *Readings in Game Theory and Political Theory* (1954), especially the editor's remarks on pp. 1–11; J. D. Williams, *The Compleat Strategyst* (1954); Jessie Bernard, "The Theory of Games of Strategy as a Modern Sociology of Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology*, LIX (March 1954), 411–24; and Oskar Morgenstern, "The Theory of Games," *Scientific American*, CLXXX (May 1949), 22 ff.

the formation and use of vocabularies. Strategy is a perfectly good word in everyday life, in political science, and in game theory, but it is not necessarily the same in all three. The rejection of general theories on grounds of "bad fit" is natural, but unfortunate. A rather curious paradox sometimes inhibits intellectual progress: in order to demonstrate or evaluate the possible utilities of a new theory, it may be necessary to re-think one's subject, and yet it may not be at all self-evident from the new theory why one should think differently about his subject. Game theory requires thinking about politics in somewhat different ways.

There is one further difficulty. The effort to "apply" a general theory may result in a magnificent demonstration of the "obvious." Why employ a cumbersome theory to demonstrate what everyone knows? A part of our problem is to prevent scuttling the advantages of explicitness and precision in order to escape being banal. Few would deny that trivialities ought to be avoided in social research. However, if the reader will tolerate a small word play, the obviousness of the obvious is often not at all obvious. Many of the things we take for granted have not been explained. Here the danger of concrete examples is that illustrations may be taken at face value as revelations of underlying patterns and may be taken as proof that the theory is useless or superfluous.

Common Interests of the Game Theorist and the Political Scientist

It is essential to make clear what the game theorist and the political scientist have in common. Though often for different reasons, both aim to reduce a series of social actions and a wide variety of human behaviors to some sort of order. Both are confronted by complexity of phenomena. The factors that enter into Soviet behavior and into the formation of policies in response to Soviet behavior, are equally complicated for the teacher-researcher, the official policy-maker, and the game theorist. All must select and interpret data from a large body of seemingly undifferentiated events and conditions concerning which knowledge is rarely complete.

The central bond between the game theorist and the student of politics is their common interest in decisions, decision-making and conflict. All policy-makers must sooner or later try to select a successful course of action from among alternatives. This involves a prediction of consequences based on assessed probabilities. Game theory focuses on the "reasonable" policy-maker who weights values (or utilities) with probabilities and maximizes the weighted sum of the two.[5] Most policy-makers must consider the choice of policies or actions by others at home and abroad who may interfere substantially with desired success. The theory of games is also directed to the question: What would I reasonably do if I were in the other fellow's shoes? Although successful *positive* policies are always desirable, it may well be that the policy-maker must select the *safest* course of action, the one with the least inconvenience and potential damage to the status quo. No policy-maker can escape being at least partially self-conscious about the major ingredients of his own decisions and the decisions of those who can affect his interests and intentions. The game theorist wishes to characterize decision-making behavior in certain situations and to discover, if possible, the conditions under which the aims of the policy-maker can be promoted or protected to the greatest extent.

Few will doubt that *conflict* is an all-pervasive empirical phenomenon in political life. Conflict is a basic, though not the only noteworthy aspect of most political situations and processes. Conflict can, of course, assume several different forms. There may be just two contestants, one of whom must win and the other lose, as in the case of an election. There may be several participants, each of whom can win something but not the same amount, as in the case of omnibus legislation that distributes benefits but not necessarily equally.

Although it is always individuals who choose and act and interact with each other, we normally discuss conflict between groups and between groups joined in formed temporary or permanent alliances. Legislative coalitions in Congress are a familiar fact in American politics. It is important to recall, too, that we commonly view conflict as opposition between *sets of interests*. Finally, conflict can take the form of opposition to the aims of individuals and groups by non-human factors or by unchangeable (but humanly induced) conditions

[5] See Jacob Marschak in Shubik, *op. cit.*, p. 24; also the same author in Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 166–69.

in terms of which action must take place. The conservation official is in conflict with dust storms and floods. The commanding general is in conflict with certain practices of the community in which his post is located. Two general characteristics of conflict situations emerge: first, participants do not completely control the situation, and second, not all interests can be satisfied in the same degree and often some cannot be satisfied at all.

While it is true that game theory has so far been applied to "statistical decisions,"[6] linear programming[7] and competition[8] in economics, and to optimum behavior in the extreme conflict situation of war,[9] it would be a great mistake to assume that the theory is not geared to other decisions and conflict as broadly outlined above. If game theory has nothing substantial to offer students of politics, it is not because its inventors are interested in fundamentally different kinds of problems and phenomena. The political scientist and the game theorist — and indeed other social analysts — wish to describe, explain, and prescribe human behavior manifest in conflict situations where decisions must be made.

Nature of Game Theory

The next step is to discuss briefly the nature of game theory in order to pave the way for a judgment as to possible uses by the political scientist.

The purpose of game theory is two-fold: to formulate mathematically complete principles that will specify what is rational behavior in certain kinds of social situations and, on the basis of such principles, to isolate the general characteristics of such behavior. Thus it is a method of analysis and a method of selecting the best courses of action. The social situations are those that are goal-oriented — action is geared to accomplishment of certain ends. These situations call for rational behavior, *i.e.*, behavior designed to produce decisions and courses of action embodying the least costly way to achieve goals or to keep losses to a minimum given operating conditions. These situations are marked by conflict, competition, and often co-operation. What action is rational when all relevant possibilities are known and the outcome is not determined by any one participant? Game theory attempts to answer this question by developing a mathematical theory for choice-making among alternative courses of action when it is impossible to control *all* the factors that govern outcomes because of the actions of others. It is to be noted that the term rational applies only to action, not goals, and that the theory does not ignore the possible impacts of irrational behavior.

The theory employs as its basic model the game of strategy as distinct from games of chance. This is so because the pattern of rational behavior in a game of strategy is the same as that manifest in social situations that call for rational behavior — the achievement of aims at the minimum cost under certain conditions or the maximization of aims at a fixed cost. The game and the conflict are on all fours insofar as they both require and reflect rational behavior. Not *all* conflict situations can be treated as strategic games. Use of this model simply assumes far-reaching *similarities* between conventionally standardized games and *some* recurrent social situations. The analogy between a bridge game and the nuclear weapons race, if pressed to extremes, would be a macabre joke indeed, but it may be equally tragic to ignore the implications of the analogy completely. However, the assumption of similarity with some parlor games of strategy is intended only to provide a basis for thinking about the more complicated real-life games.

It must be emphasized that the "game" is an analytic device, a model for describing and predicting behavior the properties of which are specified by the model. Game theory is in essence a simplifying analytic scheme that enables us to concentrate on crucial aspects of conflict situations. Under no circumstances does the model pretend to include everything one might observe in a typical concrete situation. The theory deals with simple games such as poker and with simplified versions of more complicated games such as war. Poker and war overlap as games in the analytic sense, but clearly poker does not exhibit all the complexities of war. Furthermore, as is always the

[6] Bross, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[7] Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

[8] von Neumann and Morgenstern, 3rd ed., *op. cit.*

[9] Shubik, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–21, 56–59. See also Col. O. G. Haywood, "Military Decision and the Mathematical Theory of Games," *Air University Quarterly Review*, IV (Summer 1950), 67 ff.

case with general theories, the model will have to be tailored to fit particular problems and conditions.

Game theory envisages several types of games. Perhaps the basic game, the one in which the most theoretical development has taken place, is the two-person, zero-sum game. In this game there are two players only, and the winnings and losses cancel out. A two candidate election race is an example. All votes that one wins, the other loses, and the results can be computed as a loss for one and a gain for the other. If the victory is computed as plus (+ 1) and the defeat is computed as minus (− 1), then the values of the game for each player are canceling. On the other hand, it must be emphasized that the two-person, non-zero-sum game is a basic political type—particularly in bilateral international relationships. The other major type of game is the n-person, non-zero-sum game in which there are more than two persons and in which the winnings and losses do not cancel out. For example, in a three-person election with one office open, the results will be plus one for the winning candidate, and minus one for each of the losers. It will be recognized that n-person, non-zero-sum games are the most complicated and also the most frequent.

MAJOR CONCEPTS OF THE THEORY

There are five concepts of game theory that must be mentioned. First is the concept of *strategy*. Ordinarily the word strategy means a skillful or an adroit plan. As employed by game theory it means a complete plan—so complete it cannot be upset by an opponent or by nature. Strategy refers to a previously decided upon set of moves that complete the game in such a way that at least a certain minimal outcome is guaranteed regardless of what an opponent does. Strategy takes into account the potential behavior of opponents and renders irrelevant the expectations of the latter concerning one's own behavior. The theory assumes that within the limits of particular situations, the range of strategies for any one player is usually not infinite and each player's strategies are known to the others. Rational behavior in a two-person-zero-sum game constitutes the selection of a strategy by each player that will either maximize the minimum he can obtain or will minimize the maximum loss he can sustain.

In these games, the theory yields a single strategy or a pattern of probabilities that indicate the frequency with which several alternative strategies should be used. Rational play is one or the other depending on circumstances. There is always an optimal strategy available for both players. If only a single strategy happens to be optimal for each player, it is called a *pure* strategy. If on successive plays a different strategy is required to minimize loss and maximize gains, the strategy is said to be *mixed*. When each player chooses an optimal strategy, he can guarantee himself an expected value of the game. Minimax is a guaranteed value of the outcome of a game such that one player gains the largest plus-score he could gain in the face of his opponent's best play, and the other player will receive the smallest minus score.[10] In simple games a minimum of two strategies will be available to the players. More complicated games may have a very large number of strategies.

The optimal strategy — whether pure or mixed — is chosen so as to protect the player against *anything* his opponent can do. Game theory assumes an opponent who is as wily as the rules permit and who is bent on pursuing an antithetical goal. If the opponent acts irrationally, naturally it may be possible to score added gains against him.

The *pay-off* refers to the value of the game to each player as pairs of strategies clash, a value that results when each person plays his optimum strategy. In brief, the pay-off is what the game is worth at the end in terms of probabilities fulfilled, in terms of winnings and losses, in terms of positive or negative progress toward avowed goals. For every pair of strategies in a two-person game, the rules of the game determine a value. If the players have five strategies each, then there will be twenty-five possible pairs of strategies and twenty-five different values depending on which pair is chosen. What is referred to as the pay-off matrix is calculated by plotting the strategies and their probabilities in box fashion.[11] To revert to the case of a two-man election, let us assume there are six campaign strategies open to each candidate, A and B. Thus there will be thirty-six numbers repre-

[10] The determination of minimax strategy is of course based on a very complicated mathematical proof.

[11] Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–20.

senting the values or outcomes of possible pairings of pure strategies used by each player. The theory says that for each player there will usually be one strategy — in the above example perhaps strategy number four for candidate A and strategy number two for candidate B — that will maximize minimum gains and minimize maximum losses regardless of what each does.[12] Even for n-person games, pay-offs can be calculated by treating coalitions as single players.

In parlor games, there are well-known "*rules*" that govern play — instructions that clearly specify what is allowed and what is not allowed. In sociological conflict situations, the rules are different. The rules are the laws of nature and human nature — geographical, biological, sociological, and psychological factors. In other words, the rules are the limiting conditions under which the game takes place. The values in the pay-off are determined by the rules as are available strategies. In many communities the ethnic factor requires a slate of candidates commonly referred to as a balanced ticket, which then is a rule of the game. The absence of uranium deposits is a rule of the game. Human endurance is a rule of the game in air duels. Public apathy may be a rule of the game in certain situations. Any game or conflict situation will manifest a distribution of power to enforce choices. Voting procedures, for example, give each member of a committee leverage on the group decision. Much of the capabilities analysis done by C.I.A. with respect to the "control over power factors" of the Soviet Union exemplified an attempt to illuminate one important aspect of the "rules of the game" for conflict situations involving the Soviet Union.

Another significant building-block of game theory is *information*. Presumably, every game will have a "structure" of information. Actually, the information state is included in the rules of the game, but it is worth pulling out for special emphasis. In some political games, spies and information agencies may be required to substitute for, say, the information carried by the informative bid in a bridge game. Signaling and bluff can be illustrated by parlor game analogies. Ordinarily in bridge, the players know the rules of the game but cannot see what cards opponents have — hence they do not have perfect information. If the bridge hand were played with all cards face up, every player would be completely informed about all previous plays and future possibilities. When incomplete information is the rule, signaling may be necessary. In poker it may be good strategy to misinform an opponent by bluff. Depending on the goals, the rules, the existence of coalitions, and so on, it may be part of the optimal strategy to reveal the grand design of moves one has selected, or it may be optimal strategy to let the opponent guess in the hope he will commit himself to a pattern of moves first. The concept of information suggests the great importance of timing of moves.

Coalitions are very important in n-person games. Two or more players may gain more as a unit. The pay-off is shared by the members of a coalition and may or may not be shared equally. Formation of coalitions will result from competitive bargaining. Coalitions may be held together by some formal enforcement device or by the price of double-crossing other members of the coalition. The price of violating a coalition agreement will depend on sanctions available to the members, on whether short term or long term pay-offs are considered, and on whether the game is a one-shot affair. One important aspect of over-all strategy is the discovery that the pay-off function can be measurably increased by forming a coalition and that losses can be minimized by joining forces with other players. Choice of strategy is governed first by a calculation of the pay-off to a coalition relative to the pay-off to a single player, and secondly by a decision that distributes the pay-off among the members of a coalition. At the moment, the first can be easily handled by game theory, but the second, as might be imagined, is troublesome — partly because so little is known about the formation and disruption of coalitions under actual conditions.[13] The point to be stressed here is that games can be played co-operatively or non-co-operatively. Optimal strategy and the process of arriving at optimal strategy will be different in each case.

Now it is clear from the foregoing that game theory embraces both simple and very complex models. Perhaps the simplest is the two-person

[12] Conceivably a game might involve two different strategies yet identical pay-off values for each.

[13] However, it is important to note that the theory claims to be able to specify the strategy for members of a coalition such that the combined gains of each individual member would be greater than each would receive by going it alone.

zero-sum, two-strategy game while the most complex is the n-person, non-zero-sum, co-operative games with many strategies. It is imperative not to assume automatically that politics in real life can only be represented adequately by the most complex games. For example, the purpose of many political coalitions is to maintain the status quo in which case there is no problem of determining how the pay-off is to be divided.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY

As a step toward an outline of possible applications of game theory, certain implications of the nature of the theory must be noted. The theory analyzes conflict basically in terms of strategies and pay-off matrices, with the other concepts related to these two. Strategy, to repeat, does not have its ordinary meaning but a technical one as is true of the other concepts. Nonetheless, it can be agreed that the observed phenomena of politics easily fit these categories. Such phrases as: the "unwritten rules of American politics," "cold war strategy," "campaign pay-off," "the Southern Democrat-Northern Republican coalition," and so on, are familiar. These illustrate the recurrence of game situations, but do not prove that strategies in the technical sense are employed in each case.

Certain assumptions about conflict situations that underlie game theory have already been mentioned, and it has been suggested that the student of politics could accept these assumptions. Two further assumptions must now be added. First, it is assumed that pay-off values (or utilities) and probabilities can be measured. That is, in a decision-making situation, degrees of belief in probable outcomes and degrees of preference for values or utilities can be both ranked and scaled. To the extent that it is possible to construct a measuring scale for human preferences, it is possible, according to the theory, to take account of the role of nonmonetary values in behavior. Second, it is assumed that the problem confronting the decision-maker can be clearly enough defined so that action alternatives can be completely itemized. In other words, for any conflict, the range of available alternative strategies can be prescribed *exhaustively* for each participant.

Many political scientists will not, perhaps, accept these assumptions as easily as those that render games of strategy and sociological conflict situations analogous for analytic purposes. The first assumption rests on a technical argument that should be examined carefully before it is summarily rejected. Current research is being devoted to this problem, and a sketch of the mathematical proof has been offered.[14] The second assumption involves being precise about what is meant by "available" strategies (or action alternatives) and "exhaustive." Certainly the assumption does not require that *all conceivable* strategies be specified, nor does it require the decision-maker to be omniscient. Rather the assumption rests on a clear formulation of the game situation — the objectives, rules, and so on — and on specification of relevant, permissible and, of course, feasible strategies. Problems or game situations that are not clearly defined are not the fault of the theory, which implies only that such clarity is possible. Failure to consider an adequate list of alternative strategies is not a fault of the theory either. In sum, the theory presumes a certain property of games, situations, or problems and a certain minimum capacity for analysis on the part of decision-makers.

It must be emphasized that the game theorist does *not* discover strategies by the employment of mathematics. The formulation of appropriate strategies must remain an art — a combination of the imagination of individuals or groups and the rules of the game. Game theory is indispensable to the *selection* of strategies and, in the case of zero-sum games, it can actually devise the proper mixed strategy. By and large, the *listing* of strategies must be based on the knowledge and experience of the player or the decision-maker together with skilled prodding by the game theorist. Neither does game theory assign pay-off values. The theory requires that pay-off data be supplied; it simply assumes that values can be known both to participants and observers and that they can be expressed in mathematical symbols. Again, the rules of the game heavily condition what values will be attached to various pay-off functions.

APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY

Suggestions of possible applications can be divided into two major types: *analytic* and *problem-solving*. This follows from the statement

[14] See Marschak, "Toward a Preference Scale for Decision-making" in Shubik, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–32. See also note 3, p. 70.

earlier that game theory is both a way of thinking about conflict and decision-making as well as a device for discovering optimum strategies or otherwise illuminating problems of decision.

ANALYTIC CONTRIBUTIONS

Under the general heading of analytic contributions, one might venture to suggest that game theory may provide the political scientist with the raw materials for concise, economical, and powerful models that in some ways may be markedly superior to the ones he now has. Clearly no real theory of decision-making or of conflict is currently available in political science. Neither does there appear to be an adequate system of analysis for describing and explaining decision-making in a conflict situation. Certain key concepts — power, decision, conflict, and co-operation — are badly in need of more precise and operational definition and in need of explicit rules for governing their use as research tools. Subject to much additional exploration and to modifications suitable to sociological games, game theory offers a set of related concepts that constitute a framework for thinking about certain extremely complex phenomena and, if you will, a tool for sharpening other tools.

In effect, game theory poses this question: Is this model of rational decision-making in conflict situations sufficiently realistic to help identify and describe the crucial aspects of one kind of political behavior? Or to put the question another way: Is it fruitful to base political analysis on the assignment of certain basic properties — strategies and pay-offs together with coalitions, rules, and information — to typical, recurrent, empirical situations provided those situations meet the criteria of a "game"? More specifically, what is to be gained by viewing an election as a two-person zero-sum game? Can anything more be said of significance than can be said with existing analytic procedures and conclusions from past experience?

Two positive results may be forthcoming if the tentative answer to these questions is affirmative: first, a more meaningful and more complete interpretation of behavior in game situations may be possible, and, second, if behavior does not square with the model, accounting for the difference may add to knowledge. The isolation of crucial factors through the device of simplified models is, of course, subject to continual corrective measures so that the relevant empirical data do not escape the model. In the case of game theory there are actually several forms of the model, as noted, and the fact, say, that the two-person, zero-sum, two-strategy per player version will not accommodate six months of Anglo-American negotiations over Iranian oil does not necessarily mean that no form of the model will provide insights into the latter. It may well be that more complex political games will require further complication of the model in terms of "games in extensive form" — involving a sequence of separate pay-offs spaced through time. One of the exciting things about the probing of the empirical world with sharp analytic tools is the possible illumination of processes and relationships hitherto deemed beyond observation or commentary and the establishment of a basis on which certain propositions can be stated for *all* situations and behaviors of a given type.

Furthermore, game theory raises — and this is to be welcomed — the fundamental question of the value of mathematics in political analysis.[15] The question is *not* whether human relations are intrinsically characterized by mathematical precision, but whether there are not great advantages in symbolizing alternative choices, strategies, actions, and conditions of action mathematically and in formulating outcomes and relationships in mathematical terms. At this point a relevant digression from games of strategy may be useful. Most political scientists are doubtless unfamiliar with probability theory.[16] This is a strange omission — especially in view of commonly accepted features of decision-making behavior. Do not decision-makers *scale* as well as *rank* their preferences? *i.e.* Do they not prefer A more than B and B more than C and also do they not prefer A over B much more than B over C? Do they not face more than one possible outcome for any course of action contemplated? Do not decision-

[15] Statistics have been a familiar technique in political science for many years — particularly in the analysis of voting behavior. However, possible uses of mathematical analysis in the broader sense have never been fully explored. An exception is Herbert Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," *Journal of Politics*, XV (November 1953), 500 ff.

[16] See Marschak, *op. cit.* and Bross, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–85.

makers "bet" on the basis of the strength of their belief in a certain outcome? Do they not relate their preferences to their predictions of outcome in the sense that they would rather have a gain of + 2 on a 90—10 probability than a gain of + 10 on 30—70 probability?

It is often said that politicians are essentially "do-nothings," that they "play it safe" and are overcautious or cowardly in many choice-making situations that are not analogous to strategic games.[17] The reasons given for this range from an honest prudence and legitimate fear to a dishonest attempt to please everyone and displease no one. But if crucial decisions involving great sums of money, military risks, and long-range commitments are considered, it may be that policy-making behavior is to be explained in large part as the result of pressure to decide interacting with the strength of belief in certain outcomes. Politicians may actually want the same grandiose goals that many feel they should want, but in the position of responsible decision-makers they may be forced to accept what they regard as better odds.

Another phase of decision-making is often regarded as obscure: Why did the decision-makers decide as they did? Among what utilities or values (outcomes) did they choose? How much did they want one utility or value over another? What possible outcomes did they predict? Probability analysis may offer a method for reconstructing the choice-making situation so that answers to some of these questions may be easier to attempt. Such analysis makes possible statements about choice-making processes on the basis of inference from actions provided only that some information is available. If utilities or values are known, the "subjective probabilities" of the decision-maker can be implied from the choice of action finally made and, similarly, if his probability estimates are known, utilities or values can be implied. At the very least, this should pave the way for more adequate description of decision-making that takes place under certain conditions.

Other conceptual aids from game theory and its mathematical tools should be mentioned. Basically, as already stated, one of the primary advantages is the demand for precision and explicitness. There is nothing like a cold shower of mathematical symbolization to sober up the imprecise words and phrases that stagger from one meaning to another. If something meaningful is said, and it is expressed clearly, it will stand the test of mathematical formulation. To take a well-known example, it can be demonstrated that the phrase "the greatest good for the greatest number" is logically meaningless. Many of the artificial dichotomies and debates over linguistic conventions rather than over genuinely empirical conditions that plague political science might be usefully exposed. Furthermore, certain assumptions that appear frequently in political discourse might be periodically re-examined. Are the "best" strategy, the "optimal" strategy and the "rational" strategy, as often assumed, the same thing? Is there only *one* rational strategy or only one way to accomplish the aims of policy? Game theory suggests a *no* to both questions. Is having and exercising initiative *always* good strategy? Is bluff *always* a safe gambit? Must co-operation always be accompanied by trust, good will, and mutual liking? Again, game theory suggests a negative answer. Initiative may be poor strategy, bluff may be a fatal gambit, and co-operation can be "antagonistic." Probably few sophisticated political observers would be trapped by such assumptions, but specifying the conditions under which they might be true or false is another matter.

Another type of conceptual aid that may be derived from game theory consists in bringing to the surface underlying patterns of relationships. Common sense impressions can be very misleading. Ordinarily, when presented with a situation involving a four-man committee where one man has two votes and the other three men have one vote each, most would say that the first man is twice as powerful, assuming any possible coalitions are equi-probable. Actually, as it turns out, the man with two votes is three times as powerful because he is pivotal on one half of the voting occasions, and the other three are each pivotal on only one sixth of the occasions.

This last example suggests another analytic application of game theory. What is actually known about certain situations and how it is known? Is it always known why things happen as they do? Much knowledge is "obvious" or self-evident, *i.e.*, taken for granted. Though it may be a modest dividend, it can be argued that

[17] "Playing safe" in a strategic game does not mean, of course, the same thing as avoidance of risk in a game of chance or in an ordinary probability situation. Minimax, as noted, guarantees safe, *i.e.*, riskless, play.

it is better when possible to know the "why" of what is known. Most would agree that a tie-breaking chairman on a ten-man committee having no a priori coalitions is in a crucial position. And it is clear that his voting privileges are not the same as those of the members. But it is helpful to know that so far as his *voting* power is concerned, it is without a shadow of a doubt exactly equal to the voting power of the ten members even though he does not vote as often.

Clearly the enforcement and interpretation of antitrust laws has been handicapped by the difficulty of determining beyond a reasonable doubt that collusion exists. Outwardly, competition seems to prevail. Companies can prove they do not talk to each other. Yet prices turn out to be remarkably similar not to say identical. Enforcement officials know collusion exists. How to prove it? Game theory *may* be able one day to demonstrate conclusively that stable prices in a competitive market can result from isolated decision-makers choosing strategies of pricing and production that result in equilibrium without collusive, face-to-face discussion among rival company executives. By knowing — or better still assuming — that company B is employing strategy 3, company A can maximize profits by employing strategy 5. Actually, when collusion exists the companies *do not* employ minimax. The pairing of strategies 3 and 5 yields each company a positive and equal gain, say plus 8 each, whereas minimax might yield company A, 0 and Company B, 4, or 2 for A and 8 for B.

As indicated earlier, some things are not so obvious. To the non-mathematical mind, for example, it is not obvious that number of votes and amount of power in a legislative chamber are *not* related on a linear basis. Nor is it obvious in a four-man committee that there are twenty-four possible outcomes in balloting in which the vote of any one is pivotal, *i.e.*, the addition of that vote turns a losing coalition (those grouped on one side of a policy choice) into a winning one.

Perhaps needed research in political science could be prompted and guided by game theory. Very little is known about the "rules" of typically political games — rules in the technical sense. The limits of political action are well-known, apparently, to practical politicians and high-level policy-makers, but we lack systematic collection, codification, and interpretation of such limits on an explicit basis. Political and organizational survival and stability are of great interest to all of us. These matters are yet to be fully explored. It is recognized that the executive and legislative branches of the federal government do not push their veto power to the point where the system is basically altered or destroyed. There appears to be no inherent reason for this, particularly since political systems in other countries have collapsed or become paralyzed on this very point. Organizations seem to survive and pursue rationally certain goals, but this takes place despite the fact that individual members may be ignorant of organizational goals, may disagree about organizational goals, and — most important — may pursue individual goals not necessarily consistent with group goals. Karl Marx alleged that capitalism was an inherently unstable form of economy. He has been proven in error for a number of reasons. However, one wonders if all the right reasons have been given. Some research might be gambled on a look at stability — political, social, organizational — in terms of a co-operative game — a restrained, self-policed game in which individuals and coalitions act in such a way as to obtain a joint optimal solution from which it is too costly for any individual or subgroup of a coalition to deviate.

The achievement of goals might then be viewed as the co-operative intersection of the pay-offs resulting from strategies employed by individual decision-makers or decision-making units. Stability may depend in part on the avoidance of a winner-take-all definition of the value of the game, on explicit enumeration of probable outcomes so that the risks of complete maximization as against optimal behavior can be precisely compared, and on making double cross too costly. Most political games (*i.e.*, sociological as distinct from games of strategy played for fun) are not zero-sum games and minimax is not good strategy. In general, it appears that the more opposed are the interests in a game, the more appropriate is minimax; the less opposed are the interests, the less reliance on minimax. Hence stability may be defined in certain cases as "bribed interdependence" in a game situation where the interests of the participants are divergent but not necessarily diametrically opposed. A shared outcome that represents *not* an identical or common value or utility but that is composed of

parts of various values or utilities achievable in a particular solution may be the optimal strategy. Altogether too often in political science it is assumed automatically that in conflict situations the more one set of interests is satisfied or satisfiable, the less of another set can be satisfied. Many conflict situations may be such that a range of strategies may yield less satisfaction to all interests or perhaps no satisfaction at all.

In connection with new research, it might also be suggested that game theory may offer us a new kind of laboratory for experiments with human behavior. An imaginative political scientist possessing — and it is a big qualification — sufficient data and a game theorist gifted in the construction of useful model games, can perform many fruitful tests for various hypotheses and can isolate political games that are pure bargaining situations. Furthermore, continuation of the work of Bales, Bavelas, and Simon,[18] which applies mathematics to the structure and functioning of social groups, may yield certain kinds of insights not dissimilar from what might be expected from direct observation. Not everyone can sit in the National Security Council or an interdepartmental committee. Most must observe politics from a distance. The game may offer a means of reconstructing aspects of *any* committee or group decision-making in order that the analyst can probe and test the assumptions and statements made about policy-making. Combined with the yields of probability theory for inferential description and explanation, this tool may appreciably strengthen political analysis based on indirect observation.

Finally, among the analytic aids is an extension of a point on conceptualization made earlier. Power is not only a crucial empirical phenomenon in politics but a predominant concept as well. There has been growing dissatisfaction over the fuzzy meanings of power and a growing embarrassment over the lack of fruitful results from application of the concept. Game theory will not automatically give us a theory of power and conflict, and it would be absurd to try to tidy up this problem in a few glib sentences. A suggestion or two is, however, in order. The committee chairman example leads to the problem of committee design. How power relations will operate in any given decision-making body is not necessarily predictable from the a priori distribution of voting privileges.[19] If it has been intended in many cases to weaken the tie-breaking chairman in an even numbered committee vis à vis other members, this is not the result that will occur. Throughout history, the establishment of decisional units and the assignment of voting privileges as well as the adoption of modes of voting generally have been central political problems.

Probably most observers are vaguely aware that the number of members in a decision-making body and the voting procedures adopted do strongly affect the nature of final choices. Everyone is familiar with the oft-repeated existence of a relationship between what is done and how it is done. Rarely is the relationship spelled out. Game theorists and mathematical economists have thrown some light on this problem. Altering the size of the majority (from simple to unanimity) required for a committee decision affects not only the likelihood of a new decision but also the choice of particular motions before the group.[20] Equilibrium in a committee (selection of one motion as the group decision) results from interaction between the scaling of individual preferences and voting procedures.[21] It has been shown that there is a very important relationship between majority rule and the degree to which group preferences are truly reflected in decisions and the degree to which such decisions are rational.[22] Often unintended conse-

[18] Robert F. Bales, *Interaction Process Analysis* (1950); A. Bavelas, "A Mathematical Model for Group Structures," *Applied Anthropology* (1948), pp. 16–30; Herbert Simon, "A Formal Theory of Interaction in Social Groups," *American Sociological Review*, XVII (April 1952), 202–11.

[19] L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," *American Political Science Review*, XLVIII (September 1954), 787–92.

[20] Duncan Black, "The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority" and "The Elasticity of Committee Decisions With an Altering Size of Majority," *Econometrica*, XVI (July 1948), 245–70.

[21] Duncan Black, "The Unity of Political and Economic Science," reprinted in Shubik, *Readings in Game Theory and Political Behavior*, pp. 62–68.

[22] Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (1951) and the criticism by James M. Buchanan, "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets," *The Journal of Political Economy*, LXII (April 1954), 114–23.

quences have followed because of a failure to make explicit the way in which the alteration of rules of the game and the formation of coalitions has undermined a priori assumptions. Underlying power patterns are not always visible to the observer's eye.[23] It is one of the attributes of game theory that it attempts to bring these patterns to the surface. Survival of the fittest has been a political proverb for centuries, but in a three-person, non-co-operative game it may pay to be weak or to act as though one were weak.[24] Mathematical analysis may be able to provide an index of "blocking power" and other measures of relative strength in various situations.

Ordinarily power is conceived of chiefly as means, as control of factors such that decisions can be forced or enforced — that is what might be called resource power. Game theory alerts us to more precise formulations of power elements, which common sense also recognizes. There is positional power, and there is power related to the information state of the conflict situation. That initiative, *i.e.*, moving first, can overcome deficiencies of resource power is well-known, as is the fact that the rules can block the use of resource power under particular conditions. True and false information, complete and incomplete information likewise affect the power equation. Game theory calculates power as a probable outcome given all the power elements, the relationships between them, and the strategies employed in the game. In the absence of anything better, we have tended to settle for an inadequate model of political conflict as a function of a power struggle. Game theory may offer a way of discovering more about the power factor in political games and a way of testing the consequences of assuming power to be at once a single motive and a single goal.

PROBLEM-SOLVING CONTRIBUTIONS

The thesis presented in this paper would, of course, be more convincing if it were possible to cite a number of cases in which game theory had neatly solved some thorny problems of a primarily political nature. The reader who has waited patiently for concrete cases may feel let down, but the alternative is to say that there is nothing to game theory — which the author firmly does not believe — or to provide examples that the reader might accept on their merits without accepting their implications or general relevance.[25] One could cheat a little and concentrate on what the Colonel Blotto example has meant to the Army, what solution of supply problems has meant to the Navy, and the specification of optimal strategy in fighter duels has meant to the Air Force. These are somewhat special cases although, broadly speaking, they are in the political realm.

As in the case of analytic aids, an attempt will be made to suggest a range of applications. It is not necessary to assume that only complete solutions of problems would be useful to the practical policy-maker and politician. And it is more important to open some doors rather than to conclusively "prove" the case.

Viewing an election as a two-person, zero-sum game, political parties might get some help from a game theorist with respect to the expenditure of resources, stress on certain issues, and on secrecy of strategies to be employed. In many two-person zero-sum games, it pays to try to get your opponent to commit his strategy first. The strategy of the Republicans in maneuvering their 1956 national convention to come late in the summer *after* the Democrats have nominated their candidate seems to be a classic example of game theory intuitively applied to a practical problem. Simultaneous presidential nominating conventions might produce entirely different results than successive conventions in which one party must commit itself to a candidate and a campaign platform. Unpredictability (secrecy) may be indicated and the differences in pay-off can be clearly shown.

It was insisted earlier that the pay-off matrix in a two-strategy, two-person game is not necessarily self-evident. An optimal strategy can be specified for each party in an election. A game can be worked out showing the results when different issues are stressed more than others by each of two competing parties. Unless probability estimates are made explicit, common sense may be a poor guide. Thus if a

[23] Shapley and Shubik, *op. cit.*

[24] Argument by Shubik in *Readings in Game Theory and Political Behavior*, p. 43.

[25] However, see the significant example of proven error in a Danish proportional election when certain political parties bargained with each other after one party had gained a minimum number of votes. G. Leunbach, "Indirect Elections and Zero-sum Games," Kobenhavns Universitets Statistiske Seminar, December 1950.

party has only eighty workers to divide between two districts and decides to distribute them equally, this may make sense only if the situation is identical in each, and the opposing party sends forty of its workers into each. If the other party splits its workers sixty-twenty, neither forty-forty nor sixty-twenty is necessarily optimal strategy. In each of these instances, of course, the theorist must have information about available strategies and pay-off values. Conceivably, a political party might be misled into putting thousands of dollars into a television campaign because it did not dare not to — a familiar phenomenon. If parties would spend a few thousand on competent analysis on the basis of the minimax principle, they might save ten times that amount. But even more important than savings is the fact that given the requisite information, game theorists could offer immediate and substantial help to parties in the efficient choice of optimal strategies.

Suppose it is assumed for a moment that it is possible for an administrator heading a sensitive project to consider the security problem as a game situation. Essentially, the game is a conflict between the organization and an enemy country or between the administrator and a spy. Let it also be assumed that the administrator has six different strategies and that he can estimate what he can win or lose on each strategy as well as its cost, and that he knows the spy's strategies and their cost. If the administrator wishes to maximize his gains — catching spies — and minimize his losses — having secrets reach an enemy — game theory can help in choosing the optimum strategy. If an administrator has decided on Q clearance plus searching one in ten employees at the gate of a project, he has calculated on a maximum gain and a minimum loss. Whether he has chosen the optimum strategy depends on the adequacy of his valuations, the devising of strategies, the assessment of probable outcomes, and how good a mathematician he may be.

One of the points in the American political structure where the choice of strategies is extremely significant and where the game situation often prevails is interaction between President and Congress. Assume a two-person, non-zero-sum game. The rules in this case state that there will be a bill passed — ruling out refusal by Congress to vote. The bill is divided into three sections valued differently by the President, but this is not known to Congress. Congress, on the other hand, is opposed to all three sections, but not in the same degree. Congress may propose substitutes for any of the three sections. It is not known to the President which of its sections Congress values most.

Four strategies are open to the President in presenting his bill. He may: (1) inform Congress ahead of time that he is proposing a bill and what is in it; (2) not inform Congress ahead of time; (3) let Congress advise on the bill in advance; and (4) let Congress participate in shaping the bill. Congress thus has 16 strategies, four for each of the President's one: (1) concede the President one section, and propose two of their own; (2) concede the President two sections of his bill and one of its own sections; (3) concede the President's bill in entirety; (4) propose a bill containing three sections wanted by Congress.

This simplified game suggests a possible solution at some time in the future to the problem of optimal strategy for President and Congress. If — and again it is a big if — we knew the outcomes of these strategies, and if we knew the pay-off value attached by the two participants, we could solve mathematically for the minimax. Even if the President simply knew the number of pure or mixed strategies available to Congress and could assign pay-off values to various pairings of strategies, he would be well along in the solution to his problem. The fact that we do not have this kind of interaction data has enormous consequences for our political system. However, further studies might show that the system yields close to a minimax pay-off in zero-sum situations. Yet periodic instability in executive-legislative relations suggests that "stable sets" of co-operative solutions to the game have not been established.[26]

Game theory also may throw some light on the safest course of action with respect to foreign affairs. It is interesting to consider the present problem confronting Secretary of State Dulles over the defense of Formosa. If the United States is considered to be in a two-person, non-zero-sum game with Communist China, the theory suggests that the optimum strategy for the United States is to move first

[26] However, this phenomenon may reflect changing imputations *within* the solutions.

and commit itself to a defense of Formosa by some sort of device that would make it impossible to reverse the decision. This is so because often in a non-zero-sum game both players can lose, especially if one of the pay-offs is war. If the Formosa situation were a zero-sum game, the early commitment of the United States to a strategy might not be desirable. Although in such a game it does not matter whether one is predictable or not, bluff may offer one's opponent an opportunity for error that can be turned into a gain.

On the contrary, bluff in a non-zero sum game may tempt your opponent into the use of a strategy that results in a negative pay-off for both players. From the standpoint of the safest course of action in Formosa, an automatic defense of Formosa — perhaps triggered by some automatic mechanism — would be most desirable because the opponent (in this case Communist China) must know that the strategy cannot be altered.[27] Now it will be argued that Mr. Dulles has in fact followed this course, and his worry over being interpreted as a bluffer is proof of that fact. Of course. It might also be argued that Mr. Dulles did not need game theory — he could employ common sense. Of course. One necessary comment is that the validity of the theory does not depend on Mr. Dulles using it. If the Secretary's diagnosis happens to coincide with the diagnosis of the theory, it is probable that it coincided because his reasoning followed the pattern indicated by the theory. But no game theorist would be discouraged by this. Actually, it is strong justification for the pretensions of the theory to explain how a rational decision-maker would act in certain circumstances. Moreover, not everyone agrees, apparently, than an explicit commitment by the United States is a good thing. A mathematical demonstration based on outcomes of various pairings of strategies might be convincing to some of these people.

Even more important, one can find in the writings on international politics recurrent insistence that bluff is a valuable strategy *more often than not* and that avoidance of a hard and fast commitment in the early stage of a game is a valuable strategy more often than not. Game theory suggests both propositions are in need of serious qualification. In *some situations*, bluff and failure to commit early may be most unfortunate. Policy-makers and intelligence experts must in one way or another make predictions about policies and political developments in other nations. In some cases — notably Soviet Russia and France — an already difficult task is complicated by special obstacles. Often it is necessary to make assumptions that cannot be tested and to make allowances for incomplete information about a given government. There is no device for guaranteeing certitude in these matters. On the other hand, there may be a far cry from pure guesses to educated guesses, and from educated guesses to reasonably tested hypotheses.

If something more is involved than drawing explanations and predictions out of a glass bowl, there must be some structure to thought, some form to our analysis. Every school boy knows there is a conflict situation in the Kremlin and that it has some bearing on Soviet behavior. There are, of course, several different "models" for analyzing this conflict: interplay of personal rivalry; asymmetrical power relations; frustration-aggression, etc. It might be interesting — and possibly fruitful — to view Soviet policy as the outcome of a co-operative game. This would necessitate rearranging the reliable data on the Kremlin in terms of the theory discussed here. Just as it may be possible to "fill-in" what happens in collusion, it may be possible to gain greater insight into this "invisible" struggle in the Kremlin. One can probably assume someone in C.I.A. has considered this possibility. Perhaps someone at the Rand Corporation is doing likewise.

The foregoing examples have illustrated major types of problems for which game theory may have some relevance. In concluding these comments on applications, it is worth asking: What kinds of general help can the average policy-maker get from this theory? For one thing, most administrators face a familiar quandary: How much can he afford to pay for information whose value cannot be ascertained? An analogy here is the "slot-machine problem" when the player knows one of the two machines has a higher pay-off, but he does not know

[27] Similarly, it can be argued that uncertainty over American defense of Quemoy and Matsu islands potentially opened the door for Communist China to select a strategy that, when paired with an American responsive strategy, would result in a negative payoff for both.

which one. The policy-maker often is in a position where he must either make a random guess or forego certain information entirely. In those cases that are essentially statistical decision problems, game theory may provide considerable help.

By this time a question may have arisen in the reader's mind: If a policy-maker had all the ingredients required by the theory, *i.e.*, formulated strategies, probable outcomes, and pay-off values, can he dispense with the game theorist? He cannot. Evaluating all the relevant combinations of strategies is a complicated procedure in any game.[28] Selection of minimax strategy in a two-person, zero-sum game and selection of an optimal strategy for non-zero-sum games may involve enormous calculations requiring technical skills. In addition to providing accurate computations on which an application of the theory can be based, the game theorist can render the policy-maker a real service — even when the particular game situations or a lack of information may prevent complete solutions. Ordinarily, the game theorist will ask five basic questions of the policy-maker with respect to conflict situations: (1) What strategies are available to you? (2) What strategies are available to an opponent or an enemy? (3) What is the outcome of a whole series of pairings of strategies — if you do this and he does that, and so on through the two lists of strategies? (4) What value do you place on various outcomes? (5) What value does your opponent or enemy place on these same outcomes? Obviously, to answer fully such questions compels the policy-maker to be explicit about his valuations and probability estimates. It is then possible to identify and test the necessary calculations. Game theorists who have worked on government contracts for linear programing have testified that often policy-makers have not clearly defined their problems. One contribution the game theorist makes is to find out what is really bothering the policy-maker by the process of formalizing what he says. If, as we noted earlier, mathematical symbols are to replace verbal symbols for greater facility in calculation, the verbal formulations must be precise.

It may also be argued that the policy-maker may not have the data to supply to the game theorist that will enable the latter to calculate all pay-off matrices for a complicated game. This must be acknowledged as a serious difficulty, but it should not necessarily be assumed in advance that such data are not available. Formalizing decision situations sometimes "uncovers" data ignored or taken for granted. However, the point is the game theorist can help the policy-maker calculate *his own* pay-off matrix in a two-person, zero-sum game on the basis of what elements of the game are under control, thus putting a floor under the situation. In other words, incomplete data need not prevent an estimation of the worst that can happen. It may be further objected that the policy-maker may not be able to put a precise value on various payoffs, but in many instances it is only necessary to know that the policy-maker prefers outcome A to outcome B, and outcome B to outcome C and so on. Relative values may be sufficient.

No attempt has been made to anticipate systematically all the objections to the potential usefulness of game theory to the political analyst. But a distinction should be drawn between the logical and empirical inapplicability of the theory to certain political phenomena and other factors that render the application of the theory impractical. The first turns in large part on the adequacy of the game model for the analysis of decision-making in political conflict situations. As for the second, allusions have been made throughout to difficulties and limitations in the application of game theory to political behavior. Not all interesting and significant political situations are game situations. Lack of data may seriously impair the utility of the theory. The theory itself is not yet complete for complicated n-person, non-zero-sum games with several strategies available. There are many crucial questions having to do with strategy formulation and evaluation of consequences that game theory cannot appropriately handle.

Certain issues that would have unduly complicated this essay have been purposely avoided. Among these are questions arising from the concentration of game theory on a single play of the game or on a single shot games, whereas the concept of mixed strategy can be taken to imply repetition of play, and politics seems to consist of a sequence of plays or a set of games played out over time. In the writer's view, it will turn out that these apparent stumbling

[28] Deutsch, "International Politics and Game Theory," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 76–83.

blocks are not deficiencies in the theory but are analytic problems that must be faced if and when a systematic attempt is made to apply the theory as a major tool of political analysis.

The reader should not infer from anything said here that the game theorist can replace the policy-maker, that Univac can replace the cabinet member, or that the policy-maker should replace his psychoanalyst with a game theorist. Hopefully, a convincing case has been made that the potential usefulness of game theory to political science justifies further exploration.

14

NOTES ON METHOD IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESEARCH

• *FRANK A. PINNER*

The term "methodology" currently has a partisan ring among political scientists. A rather heterogeneous congregation of innovators — inappropriately lumped under the single appellation "behaviorism" — has for some time been agitating for more refinement and discrimination in the discipline's intellectual procedures and research technologies. Indeed, this concern with method is perhaps the only interest common to all "behaviorists." Reactions to this insistence on methodological matters have varied from encouragement to heated rejection; not the least common among these responses is a certain wariness lest we exhaust ourselves in sterile disputations and neglect the tasks at hand — whatever these may be.

Yet, the frequent connections between methodological debates and important intellectual advances are unmistakable. All of natural science evolved in the atmosphere of a debate, extending over centuries, between the proponents of empiricism and rationalism; neither team won, but both abstract mathematics and experimental science were led to ever new discoveries and are now so closely intertwined and mutually dependent as to form a single body of knowledge. Similarly, the physics of relativity and of quantum mechanics — to give a recent example — doubtless owe an intellectual debt to the methodological debate over Poincaré's conventionalism and Mach's positive empiricism.

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Traditional psychology was jolted, in the first part of the century, by the double onslaught of behaviorism and psychoanalysis, both being, in their earliest formulations, little more than programs for inquiry; the raging arguments between experimentalists and clinicians have now died down, and we have several still separate but equal branches of psychology and an emerging recognition of their intimate connections with one another (see, for instance, Bruner, et al., 1957; Adams, et al., 1954; Hilgard, et al., 1952; and Brunswik, 1952). Hegel's dialectic, perhaps, has at least one empirical referent in the evolution of scientific thought.

Whether we, in political science, will be rewarded for our logomachic efforts by the rich prize of intellectual discovery is a matter of conjecture. So far, the chief effect of the debate has been a heightened sensitivity to the importance of theory. The new breed of political scientists is fond of accusing the old-liners of insufficient sophistication in "theory," while the old-liners accuse the "behaviorists" of a seemingly similar crime: that of neglecting significant theoretical questions for the sake of empiricism and of neatness in research technology. As a result, "theory" is now to the political scientist what motherhood is to the politician: you cannot go wrong if you are for it.

Such apparent unanimity amidst contentions is not necessarily heartening; it rather makes

one suspect the presence of some confusion. In the first section of this essay, I shall consider two meanings of the term theory which may account for the confusion. The second section will focus on the possibilities of so-called "system" theory in political science and introduce, as illustrations, three sketches of possible theoretical models. In the last section, I will briefly survey some of the more recent research procedures which might help in translating theoretical ideas into practical research.

Theory in Political Science[1]

Political scientists use the term "theory" with a variety of meanings. If we restrict our discussion to descriptive theory — leaving aside the history of doctrine as well as political philosophy — at least two kinds of theory are still left. I will distinguish them by the adjectives "phenomenal" and "systematic." In phenomenal theory, the facts of experience are at the focus of attention: we wish to explain the weather, the reasons for differences in the behavior of individuals, or the emergence of dictatorships. In systematic theory, attention is focused upon a logical system by the aid of which we explain phenomena carefully and purposefully abstracted from the world of experience: for the sake of theoretical neatness and clarity we treat of such abstract entities and processes as mass-points, perfect gases, or choices under certainty. Thus, for the two types of theory, our world is organized according to different principles: for phenomenal theory, we allow the physiology of our senses and the culture-bound categories of our understanding to define the range and context of relevant observations; whereas for systematic theory, we deliberately select and relate to each other those aspects of events which lend themselves best to logically coherent explanations.

The propositions belonging to a given systematic theory form a logic system; most of the propositions, called "theorems," can be deduced from a smaller set, called "axioms." Phenomenal theories lack such internal logical consistency; their propositions often belong to several universes of discourse or are in other ways logically independent. This distinction — I shall argue presently — has far-reaching consequences for research methodology. But first to illustrate: Duverger's *Political Parties* (1954) contains phenomenal theory. It brings together a variety of propositions containing the term "party," irrespective of the universes of discourse from which they are drawn, e.g., those dealing with leadership characteristics, properties of organizations, effects of electoral systems, etc. Being composed of such disparate parts, the theory cannot possibly be tested for internal consistency. Downs' *Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), on the other hand, is a systematic theory. Each concept is explicitly defined and the demonstration that the propositions comprising the system are logically consistent occupies the major part of the book.

I shall now discuss the verifiability of the two types of theories, and I shall argue that the truth of phenomenal theories depends on the truth of related systematic theories. From this it will follow that no discipline can be built upon phenomenal theories alone, and that close attention to systematic theory is, in underdeveloped areas of knowledge, the first order of business.

Verification of theories consists in at least two operations:

1. We test the empirical truth of propositions composing the theory.

2. We test the logical compatibility of such propositions.

The second test is necessary because evidence gained from the first test nearly always leaves us in a state of considerable uncertainty.

Strictly speaking, no proposition is ever verified by any empirical test we may apply. We can say only that it has not been falsified. Suppose we wished to test the proposition that, for all pendulums in motion, the direction of swing remains constant. Experience seems to support this generalization. In order to test it we now must develop hypotheses about the conditions under which the direction of swing might change. We guess that the length and mode of suspension of the pendulum might have something to do with the matter; we keep varying these and observe, under these changing conditions, the direction of the pendulum swing with respect to a line drawn on the ground. So long as the points of our pendulums faithfully follow the line on the ground, we keep ruling

[1] I am indebted to Professor Richard Rudner, of the Philosophy Department at Michigan State University, for advice on this section. All errors are mine.

out various specific hypotheses about the conditions under which the direction of swing might change. Thus we continue to believe the generalization about the constancy in the direction of pendulum swings to be true. Yet we have no direct confirmation.

Suppose now we use, in the course of experimentation, a particularly long pendulum suspended in such a way as to minimize friction; we find now that the swing of the pendulum changes in a clockwise direction. (I should add that this experiment is being conducted in the United States.) The generalization which set out to test is now falsified. But immediately, we are lead to formulate some new proposition about the direction of pendulums, for instance: "Pendulums, if suspended from a low-friction joint, swing in a plane which rotates clockwise with respect to the surface of the earth." We now set out to test various hypotheses which might falsify this proposition, and finding none that can be supported by observation, we gain more and more confidence in the truth of the "clockwise" proposition. This confidence lasts until, one day, we receive a letter from a colleague in Australia who reports that all his pendulums change their direction of swing, too, but in a counter-clockwise direction. Conceivably, we might receive another communication from a colleague in Ecuador who informs us that his pendulums do not change direction at all. We must now look for a new generalization which would accommodate all the known data, one of the possibilities being the rotation of the earth.

This last proposition — that the earth rotates about its axis — is no more subject to *direct* proof than were any of the propositions previously considered. All we can say is that we know of no case in which a hypothesis inconsistent with this proposition failed to be falsified. We thus have great confidence in the proposition asserting that the earth rotates, but we do not entirely discount the possibility of its being false.

This "round about method" of gaining support for generalizations is quite general. It applies whenever the empirical facts to which a generalization purportedly applies are not available for direct and exhaustive inspection, either because the number of instances is too large or because our sensory apparatus is not equipped to make some of the relevant observations. Such generalizations are quite common, and they are held in particularly high esteem because they alone enable us to think rationally about situations which we have not previously observed.

Assume now that we have two generalizations, logically inconsistent with one another, and that we wish to make a choice between them, declaring one acceptable and the other unacceptable. The tests which we have conducted do not yield any criterion for making this decision; they only tell that neither of the generalizations has so far been infirmed. Thus, judged by empirical tests only, both generalizations have equal truth value. Clearly, we now need further criteria for making the decision. One such criterion is that of logical consistency with the rest of accepted knowledge. In practice, all other things being equal, we accept generalizations which fit logically into the existing body of theory, while rejecting those inconsistent with it.

If it were not for this criterion of consistency, human knowledge would be of little use. It would be a collection of unconnected propositions giving no directions for action or for further research. Such a disjointed body of knowledge would scarcely fulfill the purposes for which we intend it: reducing our perplexities and increasing our ability to make rational choices. The application of the criterion of consistency makes for an essentially conservative policy in the management of human knowledge: we entertain new ideas only if forced to do so by empirical facts inconsistent with existing theory or if such new ideas would increase the logical consistency of existing theory.

At the same time, the discovery of logical inconsistencies often serves as a potent stimulus for important intellectual advances. The theory of light is now a classical example of the internal stress within a discipline forced for a time to adopt as true two logically inconsistent theories — in this case the corpuscular and the wave theory. The resulting logical difficulties led to the formulation of the photon theory, which is now regarded as most satisfactory. (For a discussion of this issue, see Frank (1957), pp. 189–206.) Cumulative growth in a field of knowledge, it may well be argued, depends to a large extent on the discovery and resolution of logical contradictions.

The requirement of logical consistency thus

has at least two functions: it serves as a criterion in deciding upon the acceptability of propositions and, by revealing inconsistencies, it stimulates new theoretical formulations. Accordingly, theories, to be testable, must be in such a form that inconsistencies can be discovered. Phenomenal theories, as I have defined them, are not in this form. Each of the propositions contained in a phenomenal theory must be tested separately by establishing its logical consistency with those *systematic* theories from which they can be logically derived. Phenomenal theories thus depend, for their acceptability, upon the verification of systematic theories. *Quod erat demonstrandum.*

Let us now apply the conclusions thus far reached to the area of political and administrative research. Clearly, knowledge in this field has not been, thus far, systematized to the point that internal logical checks are possible. And so long as we have no systematic theories in this field of knowledge, propositions dealing with political phenomena will have to be referred, for tests of their logical consistency, to other, more systematic theories.

The question whether a systematic political theory is within the realm of possibilities is not directly relevant to the present discussion. In the conduct of research, we can be guided only by the state of knowledge as it exists now, not by a state expected to exist at some later, yet quite undetermined, date. Still, this question has some bearing on the allocation of our research efforts. If we believed that systematization is just around the corner, we might be well advised to bend our best efforts toward its early achievement. If, on the other hand, the development of systematic theory appears either distant in time or uncertain of realization, we should prefer to concentrate upon the development of phenomenal theory. I should add that the existence of an academic field of study, administered by a separate department, does not imply the practical feasibility of systematization. Most university departments will perhaps never become managers of logically coherent chunks of human knowledge, and they will forever have to rely on their brethren in other departments for the development of the logical systems needed to verify their propositions. Nothing compels us to think that political science departments and bureaus of government or public administration must some day become proprietors of an independent scientific domain.

At the present time, the prospects for systematic political theory do not appear promising. David Easton, who in recent years has called most forcefully for the study of the "political system," has supplied only a definition of the set of phenomena to be studied (all processes leading to the "authoritative allocation of values" in a society) and has proposed a set of terms which appear to designate properties of an (unknown) set of elements, such as "regime," "demands," "support," and "policies." But there is no attempt to define the elements of the system, to describe a particular state of the system at some time, or to formulate laws showing how the state of the system at one time can be inferred from the state of the system at another time. The absence of all needed specifications reflects the inchoate condition of systematic theory in politics.

In a special area of political science, that of formal organization, James March and Herbert Simon (1959) have recently gathered up as much systematic theorizing as they were able to uncover. In only a small portion of their volume were they able to present theoretical statements dealing with organizations as independent empirical systems. Most of the generalizations and theoretical ideas contained in their work had to be gathered from psychology, economics and sociology; March and Simon, despite their strong bias in favor of theoretical model building, would be among the first to argue that the study of formal organization will, for some time to come, be greatly in need of systematic knowledge gained elsewhere.

Under these circumstances I believe it unwise to gamble on the early emergence of systematic theory in political science and its subdisciplines. In formulating generalizations, political researchers will have to look to other, more highly systematized areas of the social sciences (not necessarily organized disciplines) for support.

The research strategy which I advocate should not be confused with methodological "reductionism." The reductionist position assumes a hierarchy of intellectual disciplines; processes described by the "higher" disciplines can be expressed in terms of the "lower" ones, but the obverse (description of lower in terms of higher processes) is not possible. Thus, von Neurath believed that the languages of all sci-

ences should ultimately be reduced into physical terms. Whether it is useful to postulate such a hierarchy of sciences and whether the proposed reduction is either feasible or desirable need not detain us at this point. My requirement of "consistency" is much less stringent at any rate. It is one thing to call for total homogenization of all scientific language, and it is quite another to require that generalizations in a given field of inquiry be logically compatible with such logical structures as can be brought to bear upon it.

Behavior Systems

I shall now sketch three types of processes which might lend themselves to systematic description. The ideas upon which I rely have been developed chiefly in economics and psychology. But the systematic theories to which I think political processes should be referred have not yet been fully developed. Possibly, students of political and administrative life may have to develop certain sideline specialties to help organize data and concepts in adjoining fields so that their logical bearing upon political and administrative phenomena may be more easily determined.

Theoretical models never emerge full-blown from the heads of their creators. In their nymphal state, they are rather formless images of the logical structures they are to become. Such images bear to future theories the same relation as the painter's first sketch to the final painting: although vague in outline and gingerly drawn, they nevertheless exhibit a basic over-all design showing the chief dimensions and relationships. Inasmuch as such images are imprecise, arguments can easily arise over their potential worth; this in part explains the everlasting disputes of the methodologists.

As labels for the three processes, I have chosen the terms "behavior trimorphism," "segregation and integration processes," and "selection processes." The three types of processes are thought to explain social and political events on different "levels": they are related to one another in the same manner as micro-economics is related to macro-economics, and as the theory of economic fluctuations is related to the theory of economic change. Under the heading of "behavior trimorphism" I discuss three basic mechanisms of individual and social choice which appear to control social events; this suggests a molecular analysis of choice processes underlying large-scale events. In drawing the outlines of a "segregation and integration" model, I deal with certain large-scale social effects of the choice mechanisms under varying conditions: the segregation and integration processes are thought to explain cyclical fluctuations as well as steady directional changes in social and political systems. The "selection processes," finally, are expected to account for "irregular" changes, i.e., changes which cannot be ascribed to any given system of action but are the combined effects of several systems.

Behavior Trimorphism

Approaches to the development of political models have thus far tended to follow the reasoning of utilitarianism and economic theory. In these systems of thought, avoidance of pain and attainment of pleasure are regarded as similar strivings, different only in their directions. In traditional and marginal economic theory, both pleasure and the avoidance of pain have utility; in making economic choices, the individual is believed to maximize utility by equalizing the marginal utilities of all goods and services he acquires. So long as we speak about pains and pleasures which have a market price, this does not seem unreasonable. People do ask themselves the question whether they should buy an additional amount of insurance or rather eat out more often — and they do seem to come to decisions about such matters. In the same fashion, members of city councils seem to be able to balance off increased amounts of police protection against the construction of new playgrounds, i.e., equalize the utilities of both at the margin.

All the cases we have mentioned are controlled by the well-known law of diminishing marginal utility. As the individual keeps acquiring increments of various commodities, their marginal utility decreases; if he is careful in managing his resources, the marginal utilities of all commodities will have declined to the same level at the end of the process, which occurs when the marginal utility of his remaining liquid assets equals that of any commodity increment. The belief that all marginal utilities diminish is based on a notion of satiation. As one stills his hunger, interest in food decreases; as one acquires more and more desk lamps, the desire for desk lamps goes down.

The applicability of this model to political behavior is implicitly assumed in much current thinking. Thus, Harold Lasswell draws up a list of eight "values" (i.e., "preferred events"), which includes both "wealth" and "well-being"; in the absence of any specific distinctions, we are led to believe that the processes of acquiring these values are in both cases quite similar. The "group" theorists, David Truman, Earl Latham, and others also have never attempted to distinguish between processes of group striving for positive goods and for protection from harm. Anthony Downs, in his *Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), explicitly states that voters derive from government a "stream of utilities." However, he departs from the traditional utilitarian model when he ascribes to government a desire to maximize votes rather than utility. Clearly, votes guarantee the government's security in positions of control, and Downs seems to indicate that the law of diminishing marginal utility does not apply to the government's search for its own security.

Going beyond Downs, one might wonder whether the law holds for security measures generally. The observer of administrative behavior is often struck by the elaborate network of formal and informal rules employed to prevent the actual or suspected occurrence of bribery, embezzlement, and nepotism, as well as violations of status and specialty lines. The practices which the vernacular calls "red tape" constitute a complicated network of protective devices used to avoid illegal actions, violations of etiquette, and threats to the integrity of organizations. Is the acquisition of such protective devices subject to the law of diminishing marginal utility? The answer to this question is doubtful. In some administrative organizations there may be no point at which an additional increment in honesty becomes negligible and hence undesirable. Often, the object of security measures is not merely to maintain honest performance at a reasonably high level but to guard against any and all dishonesty which, if discovered, might lead to scandal and to political difficulties. In such circumstances, marginal utility can hardly be thought to decrease as security increases.

The same question might be raised with respect to the national defense effort. It is rather difficult to believe that the marginal utility of implements of war decreases as more such implements are acquired. (For simplicity's sake, implements of war are assumed to be homogeneous.) The reason for doubt is the same as in the previous example. There appears to be no point at which the acquisition of more security is not worthwhile. For the object of the defense effort is not just a "reasonable" security level, but the avoidance of any possibility of defeat. Similarly, the law of diminishing marginal utility apparently did not apply to the Communist hunts of the late Senator McCarthy.

Thus, there may be commodities whose marginal utility does not decrease. Suppose, for instance, that a man was obsessed with the idea of security for himself and his family and that each incremental $1,000 of insurance had to him the same utility as any other $1,000 of insurance. What would be the consequence? In the first place, the range of commodities which this man might consider buying would be narrowed; he would exclude all commodities the smallest usable quantity of which has less utility than the fixed utility increment of $1,000 of insurance. All other commodities would be purchased until their marginal utilities had become equal to that of $1,000 worth of insurance. If, at this point, the marginal utility of the buyer's liquid assets were still larger than that of insurance, he would continue to purchase insurance.

The examples of administrative and national defense policy suggest that such processes are common in political life. More specifically, I think that the marginal utility of items acquired in response to anxiety does not decrease. If this were true any model of political and administrative life would have to take this fact into account. Some insight into this problem can be gained by reviewing certain findings of learning theory.

The question as to whether behavior under reward is controlled by the same laws as behavior under punishment has received the recurring attention of learning theorists. A few, such as Guthrie, have argued that escape from pain or injury is rewarding and that pain *avoiding* behavior (when no noxious stimuli have been applied during training) is in the nature of an anticipatory response which, in some unexplained way, is learned as a correlary of *escape* responses (Hilgard, 1956, pp. 60–62). Other authors, struck by the fact that responses learned under punishment are much slower to

extinguish[2] than rewarded responses, have expressed doubt about the symmetrical nature of the effects of reward and punishment. The earlier learning theorists, being devoted servants of scientific parsimony, attempted to explain *all* learning — of both goal-directed and avoidant behavior — by a single principle. For a while, two principles of learning vied for the allegiance of the scholars: the principles of contiguity and reinforcement. According to the principle of contiguity, a response is thought to become conditioned to any neutral stimulus, CS, within the organism's field of attention at approximately the time this response is elicited by noxious stimulus UnCS. The principle of reinforcement states that a response becomes conditioned to a stimulus CS if, during training, the response is rewarded. But the proponents of either principle were never entirely successful in explaining both goal-directed and avoidant behavior.

More recently, many learning theorists have, under the weight of evidence, resigned themselves to postulating two distinct learning mechanisms. In 1947, O. H. Mowrer (1950) suggested in a pathbreaking article entitled "On the Dual Nature of Learning" that avoidance responses are learned by association conditioning (or contiguity), while "operant" (Skinner, 1938, pp. 20ff.) responses are learned because their effects are reinforcing. In the case of avoidances, a neutral stimulus present at the time of noxious stimulation becomes a danger signal; whenever this stimulus is perceived, the organism will exhibit an avoidant response. In the case of operant responses, no stimulus is needed; any response will become reinforced if it reduces a drive.[3] Mowrer believed that "conditioning," as narrowly conceived by him, accounted for emotional, i.e., visceral and vascular, responses, whereas effect learning accounted for behavioral responses, i.e., for activity of the skeletal musculature (Mowrer, 1950, p. 244).

In support of his position, Mowrer cited an extensive literature describing experiments with animals and humans. From this survey emerged two major differences between the two types of learning. Both are important for our purposes. *First*, noxious stimuli result in much faster acquisition of the conditioned response than does reinforcement in effect learning. *Secondly*, conditioned anxiety responses extinguish much more slowly than do conditioned operant responses.

In a dramatic experiment, Solomon and Wynne (1954) demonstrated that these two generalizations held particularly well in the case of *trauma*, which they generated in dogs by administering "subtetanizing" shocks. The avoidant response was invariably established after a very few — on occasion a single — trials. Furthermore, the response so established showed no sign of extinction after numerous trials and long periods of time. By careful training, it was possible to reduce the frequency and amplitude of the conditioned response, but in no case did the authors succeed in eliminating it completely.

These differences between behavior acquired by conditioning and by effect learning are often ascribed to physiological causes, such as presumed differences in the functioning of the autonomic and the central nervous systems. Whatever the explanation, the two modes of functioning clearly have survival value for the organism. Skeletal activities, which serve the functions of food gathering, mating, etc., tend to disappear unless reinforced at least on occasion; clearly, their persistence without reinforcement would be highly inefficient. On the other hand, danger avoidant responses cannot possibly be reinforced so long as the organism persists in avoiding danger; it is clearly to the advantage of the organism for such responses to be maintained in the absence of actual exposure to danger. Indeed, laboratory experience seems to indicate that exposure to the noxious stimulus *after* the conditioned response has been established is not reinforcing but rather weakening; such exposure seems to "confuse" the organism by "telling" it that its conditioned response is perhaps not entirely appropriate for avoiding pain and injury.

[2] "Extinction" is the technical term used by learning theorists to designate the diminution (in frequency or strength) of the conditioned response when the conditioned stimulus is presented without the unconditioned stimulus (i.e., in the absence of "reinforcement"). Resistance to extinction is considered a measure of habit strength.

[3] Mowrer has subsequently made radical changes in his two-factor theory, particularly with respect to the genesis of anxiety. These revisions need not concern us, since we are less interested in the theory offered to explain the two learning processes than we are in the nature of the processes themselves.

The foregoing descriptions suggest rather obvious parallels in human behavior. We have known people who, after one serious car accident, were forever incapable of driving, and there is the proverbial child which once burned avoids the fire. Compulsive behavior in anxiety neuroses is the same phenomenon in more extreme form. On the other hand, a person who has learned that there is money to be made at the race track or female companionship to be found in San Francisco's International Settlement will abandon his search if it remains for long unrewarded. Note, however, that the race track and the Settlement may, under some conditions, become objects of a neurotic attachment born of anxiety; if so, the behavior is likely to persist.

In suggesting two behavior mechanisms (which reflect two kinds of learning), I have thus far disregarded the high level of symbolic functioning in human beings. But people are capable of rational calculation, at least insofar as motives, stimuli, and responses are conscious; the question whether there is also unconscious calculation must remain unexplored. Calculation involves the ability to make comparisons between "imagined" situations (conditions of drive, environmental configurations, effects of behavior) which are not directly evoked by the stimulus field at any given time but which are summoned up into consciousness by virtue of man's cognitive organization. Insofar as calculation controls behavior, the process appears to consist of assigning two sets of weights to all possible outcomes: probabilities and preferences. This activity is described by the game-theoretic concept of "utility." Under the definition of the game theorists, utility is a realvalued function defined over "lotteries," where each lottery is a set of alternatives to which probabilities are assigned (Luce and Raiffa, 1958, Ch. 2).

I have thus defined three behavior mechanisms, which, for the sake of simplicity, I shall henceforth label "productive behavior," "avoidance behavior," and "calculated behavior." "Production" is taken to be motivated by primary drives and reinforced by its effects; "avoidance" is motivated by the secondary drive of anxiety and is conditioned to anxiety-arousing stimuli; "calculated behavior" results from comparisons of gains and losses to which probabilities are assigned. "Production" obeys the law of diminishing marginal utility, "avoidance" that of response perseverance under anxiety, and "calculation" that of game-theoretic utility maximization.[4]

It may have been noticed that this formulation coincides rather closely with Freud's theory of personality structure (1927; 1932; Munro, 1955, pp. 82–89). The id is regarded as the unconscious organization of primary (organic) drives; it operates according to the "pleasure principle." The superego is the repository of secondary (learned) drives and inhibits the id. The ego is the calculating mechanism whereby the reality principle is applied and id and superego drives are made to conclude a viable "compromise."[5] Both ego and superego are in part conscious.

Various aspects of personality patterns are usually assumed to result from the relative predominance of each of the three "institutions" of personality. A strong ego means rational behavior. A weak ego means either anxiety, inhibition, guilt, and sometimes moralistic rigidity (if the superego is predominant), or audacity, impetuosity, absence of guilt feelings, and sometimes immorality (if the id is in control).

Many phenomena of government and politics may well be understood as manifestations of the three behavior mechanisms. Two broad categories of questions might be asked:

1. If we hold personality type constant, what

[4] It will be noted that marginal and game-theoretic utility are different concepts and do not refer to the same behavior mechanisms. Marginal utility can be interpreted, in terms of learning theory, as either drive reduction or extinction of the orientation reflex (Konorski, 1948, pp. 78–79); it does not necessarily involve symbolic behavior. Game-theoretic utility, on the other hand, calls for a high level of symbolic activity.

[5] Political scientists may find it stimulating to reflect on the similarity between this theory and the separation of powers, particularly in the latter's earlier forms. The legislative body tended to represent the productive, crudely acquisitive layers of the population and make demands for material improvement and freedom of action. The monarch represented the controlling elements whose task it was to maintain order, morality, and decorum; he had the veto power. The courts, of course, occupied themselves at resolving conflicts between these two powers in the light of reality; as Freud's ego, the judicial institution had no power of its own.

effects are likely to result in the political system from the interaction of the three behavior mechanisms?

2. Given a range of personality types, what will be the effects of their interaction?

The first set of questions asks, in effect, what behavior mechanisms will dominate the activities of any group of people, under conditions to be specified. We might hypothesize that, so long as the perceived rewards of cooperation are low, avoidance behavior will be predominant. It will be remembered that avoidance behavior does not extinguish, rather, it is triggered by anxiety. It is possible to raise any person's anxiety level considerably by mere symbolic presentations of conditioned stimuli, such as the words "cancer," "Communist," "fallout," "inflation," and the like. Since such threatening cues are likely to occur frequently among any group of people communicating with one another directly or through the mass media, we hypothesize that *all human groups operate in such a way that anxieties will constantly be regenerated and avoidant behavior generated.* On the other hand, productive behavior extinguishes unless it is reinforced. It seems to us that there is no reason to suppose that social interaction is as such likely to be reinforcing; that is, a given behavior will be reinforced if rewarded irrespective of whether it occurs in a context of social interaction or not. It is only where group productivity — and hence the individual reward — is particularly high that increased reinforcement of productive behavior will counterbalance group-generated anxiety.

Now political groups and — even more so — the apparatus of government are largely nonproductive. Even in the relatively restricted area of productive governmental activity reinforcement of productive behavior is unlikely to occur; since government-produced goods usually are collective, the connection between behavior and reward cannot be easily perceived. This holds particularly for voters: the bearing of their voting choices on utility derived from government action is, at best, a matter of highly educated guesses, not of immediate experience. While the successes of small political groups can at times be reinforcing, government at large usually does not involve many individuals in productive behavior. At the same time, anxieties are constantly being generated and maintained. And since politicians and administrators are only rarely in a position of rewarding behavior directly (bribes are unfortunately forbidden), they are bound to resort to the systematic exploitation of anxieties.

All large scale political processes are therefore likely to be both products and sources of anxiety, as Hobbes saw so clearly some three hundred years ago. The typical forms of political behavior are all avoidances. Besides withdrawal (on the part of the least-involved citizen), there is the constantly reiterated affirmation and testing of political loyalty, partisan as well as national, which is either a "hiding in the herd" reaction or a posture of defense taken in expectation of attack and destruction. There are the protective systems of status and bureaucratic position carefully worked out in communities and administration. There is everlastingly the readiness to oppose change, even if deemed desirable, because of the unknown dangers it might harbor. And there is the reliance on protective authority and, in extreme cases, on authoritarianism.

Under these circumstances, it is hardly possible to conceive of political and administrative life as equilibrium processes, in the sense in which such writers as Truman (1949) and Easton (1953) speak of them. Their models rest on vague analogies between economic and political behavior. Lasswell is guilty of the same mistake of analogizing when he accords identical treatment to such "values" as "wealth" on the one hand and "respect" and "well-being" on the other (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950, pp. 161 ff). His error is all the more astonishing as he is well aware of the genesis and impact of personality patterns in the "political arena."

What, indeed, will be the effect of a predominantly anxious group assuming positions of high visibility in a given society? Or of a particularly unscrupulous group of leaders? Under what conditions will the ones or the others be tolerated, and what conditions make for rational leadership? These are some of the questions suggested by the differences in personality structure — and they do not point very directly to an equilibrium model, at least not to one which conceives of the political process as a balancing of group demands.

To raise such questions and even to make general assertions about the place of avoidance

behavior in social and political life is, of course, not doing a great deal. General propositions of the Hobbesian variety express nothing more than a methodological viewpoint — they are not theories of political or administrative life. We shall have a beginning of theory when we can specify the conditions or events which cause anxiety to increase or decrease among particular individuals or groups of people; or when we know under what specific conditions productive behavior will be reinforced or extinguished in social and political situations; or when we have learned something in detail about the interaction between various types of leaderships and publics. More specifically, we shall make progress toward theory if we are able to explain levels of defense expenditures — for instance — as a function of anxieties generated among various groups of people by threatening cues; or if, in similar terms, we succeed in explaining strength of party affiliations and party ideologies; or if we can specify the conditions under which administrative changes can be made in the face of protective practices; or if we succeed in explaining why state legislators appear to be so much more resistant to change than are congressmen.

Such questions need not be answered in their concrete historical settings. Indeed, the needed information often is not likely to be accessible and, if accessible, to be too confusing for systematic analysis. We may thus be forced to resort to methods which have proved so successful in other disciplines, for instance, those of experimentation.

SEGREGATION AND INTEGRATION PROCESSES

The behavior mechanisms may yield insights into certain aspects of a political or administrative system; they may even enable us to predict its possible alterations. But they are not likely to help us assess the stability of any system or to yield concise descriptions of fluctuations which a political or administrative system is likely to undergo. This is so because the mechanisms are attributes of behaving entities — individuals and relatively small groups; they are not characteristics of the system as a whole.

A general understanding of fluctuations in policies and, above all, in constitutional practices is greatly needed. When we are called upon to submit proposals for administrative reorganization or for community development, we must have some basis for predicting the course of constitutional development which our suggestions might entail. Clearly, we place a high value on such things as opportunity for participation and guarantees of rich and rewarding lives for the citizens. The question often arises whether one should try so to design plans for governmental or community organization as to satisfy the desires of as many people as possible, or whether precedence should be given to some, presumably more ethical, desires. And indeed, what are these desires? The man in the field often finds it difficult to find out what people want — if they want anything specific at all.

Our preoccupation with desires, wants, preferences and the like is another instance of the manner in which economic analogies have colored our thinking. At bottom, we wish to build and maintain systems which will enable people to pursue their interests and seek their satisfactions with some reasonable chance of success. Political and administrative systems are not directly providers of gratifications; they are merely regulatory systems which open and close the avenues toward rewarding experiences. The availability of such avenues depends to a large extent on the strength of boundaries enclosing human groups, such as social classes, castes, religious communities, occupations, geographical political entities, voluntary associations, and primary groups; in part they also depend upon the permeability of groupings, i.e., the amount of overlap in membership, which can facilitate social mobility.

Georg Simmel (1922; translated by Bendix, 1955) recognized the great importance of "web of group-affiliations" for individual self-determination (pp. 140ff). He also realized the close correspondence between the cognitive systems of individuals and the system of social segregation and integration; the constructs which people use to organize their experience resemble rather closely the actual social groupings they observe. In the present section, I will deal with the group structure of society, and in the next section with the relationships between the articulation of a social system and the cognitive systems of participants.

To begin with, I shall proceed somewhat formally. Let an individual be defined as some entity (e.g., person, firm, family) with the following properties: he can be a member of one

or several given groups, or not a member; he can join or leave groups; and he can engage in interaction with other individuals either within a given group or without it. A group is a collection of individuals with the following properties: it has boundaries that keep some individuals inside and others outside the group (called "members" and "nonmembers"); it can be attractive to members and/or nonmembers or it can repel them. Society is the collection of all individuals who are in some sense interdependent (above some minimal level), whether or not they are members of groups.

I now define "cohesion" as the amount of attraction a group has for its members and I define "rejection" as the strength of the boundaries a group maintains with respect to nonmembers; cohesion and rejection are both factors in "segregation." Finally I define "integration" as the frequency and intensity of interactions between individuals both outside and across group boundaries.

Under these conditions, any society can find itself in one of the following four states:

		Integration: High	Integration: Low
Average Segregation	High	Pluralism	Caste or class society
	Low	Mass society	Disintegration

The terms in the cells of our diagram indicate roughly the kinds of society I think will be produced by combinations of the segregation and integration variables. It will be intuitively clear that the states of "class or caste society" and of "mass society" are fairly stable, whereas the other two states are relatively unstable. Since pluralism interests us most, let us briefly consider under what conditions this state is likely to be maintained.

Assume that, for any reason, some important groups in society become more cohesive. If others groups respond to this occurrence by becoming more cohesive themselves, the system is likely to move in the direction of a segregated society with strong distinctions of status and situs. If, on the other hand, a sufficiently large number of individuals leave their groups and if other members of these groups respond by doing the same, the society is likely to be atomized (i.e., become a mass democracy or an authoritarian system). In order to maintain the system in the state of pluralism, it is therefore necessary that there be countervailing forces: in general, swings in the direction of segregation must generate forces for integration, while swings toward integration must trigger segregation movements. Limits must, of course, be assigned. Many groups can lose members and even disappear before the pluralistic character of the society is in serious danger, and, conversely, a certain amount of group consolidation must still be consistent with the maintenance of the pluralistic system.

The conditions contributing to the maintenance of a pluralistic system might well be an object of serious theoretical study. Simmel believed and Leaderer agreed that the system was maintained in virtue of the personality structures which are frequent in a pluralistic society; multiple memberships and "cross-pressures" (Simmel invented the term which has since become so popular among students of voting behavior, see p. 146) cause individuals to resist excesses of segregation and integration; moreover, each individual's involvement with many different kinds of people brings about a kind of social morality which rejects both discrimination and depersonalization.

Whether this is so is a matter of conjecture. Clearly, under the impact of events a pluralistic system will forever be oscillating between segregation and atomization. The amplitude of the swings and, indeed, the reversibility of each swing will depend on the nature of the events and upon the characteristics of the process whereby countervailing forces are generated.

To be sure, it will prove extremely difficult to study such phenomena in the field. It might even be foolhardy to approach this problem experimentally before a theoretical model has been worked out. Such a model might well take the form of a stochastic process (see Bush and Mosteller, 1955; Kemeny *et al.*, 1959).

It might consist in a matrix containing the probabilities for members of all groups to move into other groups; such probabilities might be assigned on the basis of empirical social mobility indices. To move the system to its next state, an operator must be applied to transform the probabilities. What might be the nature of such an operator? Ideally, this operator should be a function of the differences between the

gain-or-loss expectations of groups, i.e., of the differences between probabilities. The reason for this definition of the operator is as follows: groups that are likely to lose or gain members will exhibit certain signs of anxiety or of satisfaction that will make them more or less cohesive or attractive. Thus, social mobility can be seen as a function of anxiety and satisfaction levels. Furthermore, the model might be so constructed so as to take threatening or rewarding events into account; i.e., such events should change the probabilities of single and multiple group memberships in opposite directions.

SELECTION PROCESSES

The kinds of mechanisms so far suggested are expected to illumine the *normal* functioning of a political or administrative system. To be sure, even these processes can conceivably "get out of hand" and thus produce lasting changes. I believe, however, that the system itself is more likely to be altered by changes in the selection processes whereby new social groups and new leaderships are recruited. Changes, then, are the consequences of discrepancies between coordinated systems, e.g., the personality systems of leaders and the role system which is embedded in the social matrix.

I have already mentioned the similarities which Simmel saw between the network of human concepts and the "web" of group affiliations. Such correspondence does not seem startling; after all, people form their concepts through experience in the social world, and the language they learn is likely also to reflect the categories of people into which a given society is customarily divided. Moreover, to the extent that man is the creator of social divisions and institutions, these are likely to be the projections upon the screen of reality of his habitual patterns of thought (see Whorf, 1956, particularly pp. 134–159).

A growing awareness of this correspondence has impelled recent researchers to pay renewed attention to cognitive organization. While Whorf emphasized the effects of grammatical and syntactic forms upon thought and behavior, modern investigators have paid particular attention to man's concept system. A landmark in this effort is Bruner's careful study of concept attainment (1956), i.e., of the strategies used by people in ordering their experience. In the course of his investigation, Bruner developed an eminently useful typology of concepts.

While Bruner feels that detailed studies of the conceptualization process *qua* process should be given first priority (see his critique of Festinger's "dissonance" theory in Bruner, 1957, pp. 151–156), other authors have fastened attention upon both the social and personality correlates of cognitive organization. Such researches have yielded initial evidence for the proposition that cognitive organization might well be taken as an indicator of many other personality characteristics, particularly those which are relevant for social and political analysis.

George A. Kelley (1955) has developed an elaborate theory of personality disorders based entirely upon cognitive organization. Central to his study is the overlap between classificatory concepts and the resulting "permeability" of the construct system; clearly, there is a formal resemblance between the construct system so defined and the "web" of group affiliations. Milton Rokeach (1954, 1956a, 1956b, 1960), taking his departure from the California studies of the authoritarian personality, has conducted a connected series of investigations into dogmatism. Political, religious, and — indeed — scientific-academic dogma are shown to consist in the existence of strong boundaries between belief and disbelief systems, in the maintenance of contradictions within the belief system, and in a drastic narrowing of the cognitive field due to discounting and denial of experience. An experimental study by Easterbrook (1959) makes a similar point by showing that the number of environmental cues which the organism will utilize decreases with rising emotion.

A few researches have shown — as Rokeach (1954) discovered early in his work — that conceptual structures bear relationships to such social variables as class and status and primary-group membership. Schatzman and Strauss (1955) divided participants in a disaster into groups by education and income; they found definite differences in perspectives, imagery, use of classifying and generalizing terms, style, and cognitive organization. Runkel (1956) demonstrated that similarities between two cognitive fields increase the efficacy of communication between them.

In view of these recent advances, it does not seem farfetched to argue that intensive analyses

of the relationships between cognitive and social structures might throw much light upon the manner in which people are selected into social positions or else select social situations in which, given their conceptual apparatus, they are capable of functioning. I argue that there must be substantial congruence between social organization and cognitive structure for any system to persist over time. Thus, an integrationist will feel uncomfortable in a segregated society; either his conceptual system or — if he is one of many or a man in a key position — the social structure will have to yield. Similarly, an "operator" will feel constrained in a tightly organized bureaucracy; either he changes his own conceptions or he subverts the system.

Our questions concern, of course, the conditions under which either of the two change processes is likely to take place. Do status and situs measurably affect the chance that a cognitive system will have effects upon the group structure of an administrative organization, a community, a society? Does formal position? In other words, is the problem of social and political change chiefly a staffing problem? Are there large-scale changes in the cognitive structures of groups, due perhaps to culture contact, which might affect the socio-political table of organization? Or do cognitive structures tend to conform to the system of social articulation in which they must exist. It is clear that none of these questions is likely to deserve a clear "yes" or "no." Let us suggest once more that the permeability of boundaries, whether cognitive or socio-political, is likely to be a function of levels of anxiety and of satisfaction present throughout a given social system or at particular points within it.

Procedures

In making suggestions for theory, we have implicitly assumed the possibility of certain types of data analysis. These will now retain our attention.

Three types of data-processing methods are clearly called for:

1. We need ways for ordering preferences and for comparing preference orderings.
2. We must be able to handle large batches of variables and to constitute types.
3. We must be able to identify configurational patterns and to define indices describing them.

Our greatest needs thus are for methods of *scaling*, of *multivariate analysis*, and of *configurational analysis*.

Scaling

Scaling methods nowadays enter nearly every phase of research activity. Usually it is necessary to know something about the order in which observed phenomena should be arranged before correlational analysis can proceed. If, in some research setting, we need to ascertain levels of anxiety or of satisfaction, some scaling methods would surely have to be applied.

In recent years, scaling methods that borrow their procedures from psycho-physical research and are aimed at the construction of interval scales have generally fallen into disfavor; they were criticized on the ground that they often were not unidimensional. Scales which achieve an ordering of both items and subjects have largely superseded the interval scales. Since Guttman's statement of the basic theory of cumulative scaling (1950), many refinements have been introduced into its theory and practice. A careful survey of all scaling methods will be found in a volume by Torgerson (1958), while specific problems of Guttman scaling are treated in Riley (1954). For an excellent theoretical statement of scaling theory see also Coombs' article in Festinger and Katz (1953).

The greatest difficulty in scaling still remaining is that of evaluating the extent to which the scale order is different from a chance order. The sampling distribution of the statistic which is used to measure unidimensionality, the Coefficient of Reproducibility, is unknown and appears highly unstable. Various other methods for determining departure from chance linearity have recently been explored (e.g., Sagi, 1959; Green, 1956; White, 1957; Goodman, 1959).

Approaches have also been made toward simultaneous scaling along several dimensions (see Guttman in Lazarsfeld, 1954, pp. 258–348; Torgerson, 1958, pp. 247–297; Torgerson, 1952; Messick, 1956). None of these methods has thus far had wide application. Siegel (see Siegel, 1956, and Hurst and Siegel, 1956) has made promising efforts in the direction of obtaining ordered metric scales from paired comparisons (see also Fagot, 1959). It is claimed that such scales have a special application in the

measurement of utilities and that the distances between points on the scales are meaningful.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

If we are to make comparisons between organizations, communities, or individuals, we are likely to be faced with large sets of indices. Usually, we are not so much interested in relating one particular measurement to another as we are in finding similar index patterns. If our data are quantitative, a first approach is that of comparing profiles of measurements. A variety of methods for the computation of profile similarity have been developed (e.g., Webster, 1952).

A frequently used method for processing quantitative data based on multiple measurement is factor analysis. The method reduces a large number of variables to a small number by using the information contained in a correlation matrix relating all variables to one another. The end product of the analysis is a small number of constructed variables, called factors, which correlate with the original variables. For decades, factor analysis has been the exclusive domain of experts; the mathematical sophistication needed and the inordinate amount of labor often required made it prohibitive to the ordinary researcher in social science. Recently these difficulties have been largely removed. We have now good introductory descriptions of the method written for people of moderate statistical means (Fruchter, 1954; Adcock, 1954; Cattell, 1952). Moreover, the presence of high-speed computers on most larger campuses and the existence of "canned" programs has taken most of the work out of factor analysis.

Factor analysis was developed for the handling of data measured by an interval scale. The technique uses the Pearsonian correlation coefficient; it is subject to all of the restrictions applying to the latter. Difficulty arises in deciding whether serious errors are likely to result, in a given case, from applying the method to nonmetric variables and in the absence of normal distributions. A nonmetric factor analysis has, however, been proposed by Coombs and Kao (1955). A large variety of systems of cluster analysis, pattern analysis, and the like has sprung up in recent years (see Fruchter, 1954, for a lengthy bibliography, and Gaier, 1953).

Lazarsfeld's latent structure analysis (1950) is based on a generalized model of which factor analysis and scaling are special cases. This system will handle both quantitative and nonquantitative data. A description of the technique which will make it accessible to the work-a-day social scientist is not yet available.

A very simple method for handling both quantitative and qualitative multiple measurements was recently developed by McQuitty. Two versions of the system exist under the names of linkage analysis (1957) and hierarchical syndrome analysis (1959). Both methods aim at the establishment of types, the difference being that the types constituted by the first method are discrete whereas those constituted by the second method are overlapping and hierarchically arranged (according to strength of association). Analyses of the same sets of data by McQuitty's method and by factor analysis have yielded very similar results. The method recommends itself by its great simplicity, since it calls for nearly no calculations.

An ingenious method for collecting data that will be susceptible to easy factor analysis is Stephenson's Q-technique. This method will work only if the number of individuals to be studied is small, but it yields rich data. While Stephenson has employed the technique chiefly in clinical research, it will lend itself to various other uses. (For further details see Mowrer (1953), Stern (1956), Block (1956), Jackson *et al.*, 1959.)

A great advance in our understanding of cognitive structure was made recently as a result of Osgood's invention of the semantic differential (1958). The technique consists in having individuals rate each concept of interest to the researcher along a fairly large number of scales defined by pairs of adjectives which are polar opposites. The scales are then factored, and the factors constitute a reference system which defines a "semantic space"; each concept can be located in this space. Osgood has adopted a number of scales whose factor loadings (correlations with the reference variables) are known. The three major reference variables found by Osgood are the evaluative, potency, and activity dimensions. The use of different scales with specialized populations might of course yield other factors. Development of additional scales, suitable for political and administrative investigations, would be highly desirable.

CONFIGURATIONAL ANALYSIS

The most venerable of the techniques of configurational analysis is no doubt Moreno's sociometric method (for descriptions see: Moreno, 1951, 1955; Borgatta, 1954; for a classification of sociometric literature, Nehnevajsa, 1955). Its status is so high that it rates a journal all of its own. As originally conceived, the sociogram was a simple graphic device in which people were represented by dots, with arrows drawn to show lines of attraction between them. This exhibited degrees of popularity and isolation of individuals and gave an impression of the over-all group pattern. Since then, numerous indices of group characteristics have been developed, new applications found and refinements introduced (e.g., Criswell, 1955; Proctor and Loomis in Jahoda, 1951; Edwards, 1949; Torrance, 1955; Borgatta, 1954; Nehnevajsa, 1955). The technique is perfectly general and can be used to describe any system in which a set of relations is defined over a set of points. A more general statement of graph theory, applying to various types of networks, will be found in Harary and Norman (1953). Katz and Olkin (1952) developed probability methods for assessing the likelihood of given configurations.

While sociometric measurement describes a group at a particular point in time, interaction process analysis (Bales, 1950) takes account of the flow of information within the group and of the types of interaction which occur. This technique requires that the group studies (e.g., a committee, conference, etc.) be observed in action. The technique would appear to be particularly adaptable to studies of administration. (For a fuller statement of methods of group measurement see Hemphill, 1956. Group variables are discussed by Borgatta and Cottrell, 1955, and by the same authors with Meyer, 1956.)

A configurational method of interest to the community researcher might be that developed by Thrall and Angell (1954), the purpose of which is to assess the spread of group influence in the community. Using voluntary organizations for index construction purposes, the authors develop a detailed mathematical model of community influence.

Since researchers might be interested in relating the structure of communities or organizations to cognitive structures, they might want to use a technique developed by Kelly (1955) to describe individual construct systems. Indeed, it would be highly desirable if techniques could be evolved which would yield comparable descriptions of social and of cognitive patterns.

MODERN STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES

Many of the techniques mentioned in the preceding sections of this paper are rather uncomplicated; yet, they have thus far been rarely applied by political scientists. Among the members of the profession, there persists a tendency to shy away from rigorous methods of data-collection and processing. In the past, there existed at least one good reason for such reluctance: only relatively few methods were available for the processing of nonquantitative data. The political scientist felt that his data, usually, did not come in quantitative form; and where quantification was attempted, it often seemed contrived and led to the suspicion that conclusions drawn from such data might be quite artificial and untrustworthy. Being unaccustomed to the readings of methodological literature, he then did not realize that times had changed and that techniques requiring no more than ordinal measurement or qualitative classification had now become bountiful.

Until very recently, the nonparametric statistical techniques were still hard to come by, their descriptions being scattered in a great variety of journals and obscure monographs. Comprehensive descriptions of these techniques are now available (Siegel, 1956; Fraser, 1957; Mosteller and Bush in Lindzey, 1954; Chapin, 1955). Rapid developments have taken place in the area of rank order correlation which is of particular interest for the comparison of individual preferences (Kendall, 1948; Jardine, 1958; Haberman, 1955; Cureton, 1956.) Thus, the former dearth of statistical techniques applicable to political data has now been remedied.

CONCLUSION: RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BUREAUS

The preceding paragraphs contain an implicit suggestion that the bureaus of governmental and administrative research in American universities should devote themselves to the development of abstract theory and formal research procedures. This may seem a rather radical proposal implying an abrupt change in the orientation of the bureaus. I suggest that it would, indeed, mean a change in current

practices, but perhaps not so radical a departure from the ethic and the objectives which have in the past informed bureau activities.

In former days, the bureaus had four major assets, which accounted for their strength:

1. A central theory.
2. A strong ethical impetus combined with an action orientation.
3. An empirical attitude toward political events.
4. An ability to enlist the interests and cooperation of several disciplines.

Historical erosion has deprived the bureaus of most of these advantages. Let us briefly consider these four points:

THEORY

Historically, the theory of the bureaus was normative in character and puritanical in content. It concerned itself chiefly with the elimination of malfeasance and corruption in government and with the individual's rights to freedom and participation. The theory stated that abuses could be eliminated by the adoption of adequate practices of management and administrative supervision and by guarantees of sufficient popular controls.

While this theory still appeals to the common sense of many, it has lost much of its power of conviction. The reasons are twofold:

1. Shifts in our ways of thinking have led to a changed conception of government; while once government was conceived as separate from and opposed to the "interests," we have now come to regard interest-participation as part of the governmental process.

2. We have lost faith in the effectiveness of purely legal and organizational arrangements as tools for obtaining far-reaching changes.

The weakness of the older theory lay not merely in its unrealistic emphasis upon purely formal-institutional change. The theory also suffered from — and ultimately became discredited because of — over-ambitious claims. The notion that the extremely complex processes of government could be the subjects of rigorous theories was easily deflated whenever the results of reform did not correspond to expectation. This debacle resulted from the erroneous assumption that any set of phenomena, once it was identified as socially important, should and could become an object of independent, *systematic* theory. When such theory failed to materialize — or, if formulated, to be confirmed — discouragement took the place of enthusiasm.

Rigorous theory can deal only with rather special phenomena of an experimental or otherwise contrived nature — not with the fullness of human experience. Once this is recognized and once the small likelihood of systematic theory in our field is admitted, the bureaus will have to turn to existing systematic knowledge in the social sciences and make their work consonant with it. Thus, research work in the political and administrative field involves chiefly the utilization and elaboration of systematic theories developed elsewhere, not the development of *ad hoc* theories. Further, bureaus must learn to *recognize* the real-life situations in which general principles of behavior, gleaned from the social sciences, are likely to apply. This means that research in our area is to a great extent *diagnostic*.

ETHICAL IMPETUS

The reformist convictions of the earlier era put the bureaus in a position of teachers and guides with respect to the public and the officialdom. Bureaus believed that they had — and were believed by many to have — the answers to many social and political problems.

Two reasons help to explain why this ethical drive has disappeared from the governmental research movement:

1. The audiences for political evangelism have shrunk, as have the audiences for other movements of political salvation.

2. As the doctrinal core of the movement has been eroded in practical testing, the inner conviction of the reformers has tended to suffer.

As a consequence, from being teachers the bureaus have become servants of their clients. While client-orientation was once a means for changing — and bettering — the political world, it has now become a source of political constraints. In many instances, bureaus have become prisoners of their clienteles, with attendant loss of status among other groups of the population and in the academic community — not to mention the unavoidable loss of self-respect.

The bureaus will be able to regain their status as guides to moral action to the extent that they succeed in extricating themselves from special publics and clienteles. They must be able to

show that they are concerned with the welfare of *all*, not with that of special client-groups. This implies a humanistic approach to social and political phenomena — an understanding of the human conditions that form the basis of events.

EMPIRICAL ORIENTATION

The older tradition of the bureaus was more empirical than that of political science departments. The bureaus carefully observed political practices and events so as to compare them to the normative models of their theory. This was therefore an empiricism of fact-finding and exposé. But the theory itself remained largely untouched by empirical findings. Ultimately, discrepancies between theory and known fact contributed greatly to the decline of bureau work. Clearly, effectiveness of empirical work depends to a very large extent upon its relevance to theory. While there is always a place for the job of fact-finding, no sustained program of research and no research institution can be for long maintained unless the data can be put into a meaningful relationship to general theory.

Whether such relationships actually exist, and how firm they are, is often difficult to decide. In the daily life of experience, the variables a researcher would like to observe are muddied and obscured by fortuitous conditions. Complex techniques of data-gathering and interpretation are often needed to make the needed data available for inspection. Existing techniques must therefore be inventoried and adapted to needs of research in our area. Currently, knowledge of formal research procedures and the ability to adapt them to special problems are still scarce among political and administrative researchers. The bureaus might well perform an intellectual brokerage function in making the new techniques available to the profession.

INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH

In the past, a common political ethic enabled the bureaus to attract not merely political scientists but also economists and lawyers. This interdisciplinary cooperation, which helped to explore more fully the phenomena of politics and government, has now largely disappeared. Even in the field of political science, the number of professionals willing to work in bureaus has now greatly shrunk. The loss of a central ethic is not the least of the reasons for this isolation of the bureaus in the academic community.

The disciplines attracted to bureau work in the past were largely the "hard" or "tough-minded" (to use William James' term) areas of the social sciences — those which did not deal explicitly with man and his hopes and fears but rather with money, commodities, legal norms, and precedent. A new humanistic ethic of governmental research would seem to call for much closer cooperation with the "soft" or "tenderminded" disciplines, such as psychology and sociology. Besides, these fields have in recent years taken great strides and offer findings of considerable use in the understanding of political events. While some researchers have endeavored to exploit the "tender-minded" social sciences for sheer managerial manipulation, it would seem peculiarly the task of the bureaus to use their findings for a more penetrating understanding of the problems of our time and for the development of those plans of social action which are consistent with a humanistic ethic.

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3

Personal and Social Bases of Political Behavior

What determines how people relate to politics? Why, and under what conditions, will individuals display one style of political behavior or espouse one set of attitudes or join one political group rather than some other? Political activity is, from one point of view, a special form of social behavior. In this section political acts are discussed as social acts determined largely by three somewhat inextricable processes: personality, relations between individuals and groups, and cultural norms.

From birth, each person undergoes experiences which are highly peculiar and personal. At the same time, he is exposed to events common to whole groups and subcultures. Personality forms through this interaction between self and groups. Over years of experiencing such interaction, unique habits, individual needs, and biologically given capacities are conditioned by group expectations. A fairly constant pattern of responses emerges, a "self-system" which the individual and the members of groups around him jointly recognize as the individual's personality.

This much we think we know, yet evidence about the nature and influence of personality is difficult to obtain. In psychology as well as political science, personality is no more than an analytical construct — an abstraction from patterns of behavior of the single individual. The term refers to the characteristic ways in which people organize their habits; and to the tendency for this organization to become enduring and consistent.

Freud was the first to provide a coherent map of personality, emphasizing unconscious, nonrational, and symbolic properties of behavior. Freud's theories were used thirty years ago by Harold Lasswell as a basis for his seminal psychology of politics, including his description of "political personalities." Lasswell described the developmental history of "the political man" somewhat as follows: private motives, such as hatred of authority, are built into the self as a result of family and peer relationships during early childhood. In adulthood, these private motives

are *displaced* from family objects to public objects. "Repressed father-hatred," Lasswell argued, "may be turned against kings or capitalists, which are social objects playing a role before and within the community. Harmonious relations with the father of the family may actually depend upon the successful deflection of hatred from private to public objects."[1] Displacements are rationalized variously in terms of public interests. The process is enacted in such diverse ways that Lasswell devised a typology of political personalities. The political self chooses a characteristic style of displacement, the choice depending on conditions laid down by early social identifications. Among the more fully developed of Lasswell's types are the agitator, the administrator, and the democratic personality.

A leading element in psychoanalytic theory is the dynamic relationship of the infant to his parents. This idea has generated assumptions about how stresses and strains in the parents' social milieu are transmitted to the personality of the child. The child's relations with his parents represent the origin of a cycle wherein the child, becoming an adult, not only will introduce his emotional heritage to his own children, but will also help create a social order conducive to similar personality consequences throughout the community.

Here at least was a presumed connection between personality and the social environment — one which in the 1930's was intellectually exciting and satisfying to apply to Nazi Germany and to America. Lasswell made an analysis which suggested that persons in the German lower-middle class would support Hitler,[2] while Karen Horney, in a widely influential work,[3] stressed the social determinants of personal hostility, anxiety, and fear as intrinsic to America's competitive social order. A more recent but similar treatment of Germany and Britain by Money-Kyrle asserts that democratic cultures and politics produce "normal" (healthy) personalities and vice versa.[4]

Studies like these helped modify psychoanalytic theory by qualifying earlier assumptions made by some Freudians that the individual can be understood apart from his greater social environment. With the parallel and integral development of the concept of culture, propositions relating culture, personality, and national politics began to appear in the 1930's. The logic was crude but appealing: cultural patterns (like toilet training) have a decisive effect on personality; these are shared throughout cultural areas (which tend to coincide with modern nations); therefore particular personality traits may be expected in the populations of particular nations — resulting in national regularities in political behavior.

Though no doubt doing violence to numerous finely wrought and worthy studies, we can draw a few conclusions from this work on psycho-social-cultural-political interaction and its unhappy offspring, the notion of "national character". The first is that the complex depth analysis demanded by psychoanalytic theory is extremely difficult to employ on a large scale. In particular, to deduce that sociocultural factors have common psychological effects on many persons who then perform a certain

[1] *The Political Writings of Harold Lasswell* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), p. 75.
[2] "The Psychology of Hitlerism as a Response of the Lower Class to Continuing Insecurity," in Swanson, *et al.*, *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, 1952), pp. 171–177.
[3] *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: Norton, 1937).
[4] *Psychoanalysis and Politics* (New York: Norton, 1951).

few political acts, is to take a long gamble on shaky evidence. There are too many dubious assumptions involved, and too few ways of testing them.[5]

Second, the personality construct works. It helps make sense out of political behavior by employing, in a rather more systematic way, notions we intuitively suspect are true of political actors. One may take a functional view and define political attitudes and actions as acts that satisfy deep inner needs. Or, personality may be viewed chiefly as mediating, that is, channeling, the influences of biological and social forces upon individual behavior. In either case, the idea of personality gives us a convenient device for getting at determinants of political acts.

Alex Inkeles' summary of theory and research on "National Character and Modern Political Systems," reflects an awareness of these difficulties. It also demonstrates the potentialities of an approach which has provided us with "substantial and rather compelling evidence of a regular and intimate connection between personality and the mode of political participation by individuals and groups within any one political system."

The more people we study at one time, the more we seek out certain ways of clarifying political behavior — ways that lack the depth of personality investigations. In fact, for large populations, the properties of individuals may be treated deliberately as outcomes of relevant categories of group life. For example, the impact of education on voting is often explored without recourse to study of the personalities of hundreds of respondents. Or, large-scale personality studies may rely upon the identification of specific, operationally defined character traits or attitudes through written or verbal questionnaires. Attitude patterns of various kinds and degrees of complexity are then labeled as personality types and correlated both with social characteristics and with political acts.

Personality research has increased our understanding of the individual in politics and the factors composing the political universe. This is particularly true of "depth" analyses. Exclusive of exploratory and qualitative case studies, however, "personality" has yet to prove an efficient tool for predicting concrete political *behavior*, especially when it involves more than a few individuals. For this, more superficial measurements of specific attitudes and opinions, and of social characteristics, carry the day.

The study of Woodrow Wilson by Alexander and Juliette George is a distinguished example of the application of psychoanalytic theory to political biography. The authors draw inferences from the events of Wilson's early childhood, but in the tradition of neo-Freudian psychoanalytic theory their interpretation centers on his development in adolescence and young adulthood.

The very richness of the context presented by the Georges, who drew extensively on memoirs, personal papers, and newspaper accounts, gives convincing plausibility to their cautious analysis of the part various attitudes played in Woodrow Wilson's political behavior. After reading the Georges' account, it is impossible to deny Wilson's driving ambition, his passionate desire for personal affection, his zeal to be "in the right," or his concern with literalness and constitutional forms. Yet Wilson emerges as the Georges intended, not as the sum of these qualities alone, so much

5 This point is well put in Nathan Leites, "Psycho-cultural Hypotheses about Political Acts," *World Politics*, I (1949), pp. 102–119.

as distinguished by these and other characteristics which on occasion served him well, but tragically combined to serve him ill at critical moments in his life.

Social scientists are not engaged in predicting the outcomes of particular historical events. Nonetheless, the personal idiosyncrasies of powerful leaders predispose events significantly toward certain outcomes and away from others. The Georges have grasped a nettle skillfully in portraying the circumstances of Wilson's early life as a powerful predisposing factor in the making of future political news without claiming that the events they discuss were inexorable extrapolations from the character of their subject.

A step along the road of greater generality is taken by M. Brewster Smith in his paper, "Opinions, Personality, and Political Behavior." Smith and his associates studied the opinions (notably about the Soviet Union) of ten different people. They were not so much interested in political behavior as in the functions for the personality of holding various kinds of political opinions.[6]

Demonstrating how opinions tend to interact functionally with "inner needs" and with individual styles of cognition and perception, Smith's findings have general applicability. His cases illustrate how opinions serve as means and shortcuts for testing reality, how they function to improve adaptation to life situations, and how "inner needs" are met through the externalizing (the displacement on external objects) of beliefs. Smith also touches on the relation between political opinions and behavior. He asserts that opinions (the expression of attitudes) are themselves a form of behavior, but he admits that this study does little to extend our knowledge of the exact relation between opinions and action. He warns that "Knowledge of personality does not, in general, permit the prediction of policy stands," because public issues present actors with a "highly limited set of alternative proposals for collective action." Individuals, that is, exhibit a wide range of opinions; parties and interest groups express only a few of these alternatives. Therefore it is difficult to predict a pattern of affiliations for an individual if we know only his opinions. Where our concern is with political influence or with the dynamics of opinion change, Smith concludes, we must "look behind the façade of relatively stereotyped public opinion to the private, individual level." But where the problem is one of predicting electoral behavior, policy stands, or decisions, Smith suggests that psychological measures of personality may be of little value.

Without advancing substantially our understanding of how personality operates to generate specific political *acts*, Herbert McClosky's article on "Conservatism and Personality" illustrates how personality affects political attitudes. What is conservatism? McClosky answers this by extracting a series of statements from assertions of famous conservative theorists and politicians. People are then asked to agree or disagree with the statements comprising this "standard." Responses were obtained by survey interviews with a large sample of adults visited in their ordinary settings rather than by paper tests administered to the familiar captive sophomores.

McClosky draws no conclusions about political behavior from his research on

[6] The reader might also see, Alexander Leighton, *My Name is Legion* (New York: Basic Books, 1959), for a particularly promising and succinct exposition of the total environment of the personality.

personality. But in this case the omission is somewhat mysterious. His finding that those who subscribe to classical conservative doctrines are less educated, less intelligent and less mature emotionally and socially than those who do not, is at first a startling one to people who naturally assume that personal qualities are randomly distributed among political antagonists. Some of the interest evaporates from this finding, when it is noted that nothing is asserted about political *behavior* in McClosky's report, and hence a variety of explanations can be invented which will explain McClosky's finding without incriminating any politically meaningful group in the population. A contemporary sample survey, as distinguished from a biography of a single historical figure, offers a better opportunity to reach general conclusions about political behavior. Information on party affiliation, voting preferences or political activity are easily ascertained by the researcher. In fact, it appears that data on these variables were gathered, but no clear patterns emerged.

If this happened, it illustrates Smith's point that while personalities are almost infinite in their variations, the range of political behaviors and orientations open to most citizens is quite narrow and hence many people will find themselves doing the same politically relevant things from a great variety of motives. Where political behaviors are more manifold and diverse, as in the case of activities open to an American President, the close examination of personality patterns makes a good deal of sense, but for most people, the available alternatives are structured by "forces" external to the personality.

Neither Smith nor McClosky takes us as far as we would like toward an understanding of how personality affects actual political events. Robert Lane's paper on "Political Personality and Electoral Choice," however, attempts to connect voting behavior with at least one dimension of personality. The "authoritarian personality" has become a fashionable term in the discourse of political science. The term was first given empirical substance in the distinguished study by Adorno and his associates.[7] Authoritarianism, to them, was composed of a specified set of attitudes which allegedly could be identified through the person's degree of agreement with a series of rather simple statements. Over the years elaborate studies have linked authoritarianism to other attitudes and opinions related directly to public policy. It seemed certain that this personality "type" implied patterns of actual political behavior.

Utilizing large-scale voting surveys, Lane puts a number of these expectations to the test. Extensive research on the authoritarian personality has revealed that feelings of apathy and political impotence often coincide with authoritarianism, yet Lane finds no differences in level of electoral participation between authoritarians and non-authoritarians. Lane finds that, contrary to what we would expect, persons categorized as authoritarian vote in the same proportion as persons rated as equalitarian. Obviously something is wrong, and Lane speculates that authoritarians and equalitarians differ in *motives*. Hence, while overt voting behavior is the same, authoritarians may possibly vote in response to group pressures to conform or from an impulse toward personal power, while equalitarians may be impelled by an internalized norm of civic duty.

7 T. W. Adorno, *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).

The work of Fred Greenstein, reported in his paper, "Sex-Related Political Differences in Childhood," demonstrates how cultural norms influence the individual's political participation. In this case, a commonplace in American politics, the comparative passivity of women, is shown to be socially inculcated. American girls are not rewarded for displaying dominance; they are reared in conformity to a conception of femininity as apolitical. By adulthood, the pattern becomes circular: political ignorance and apathy are taken as signs of a desirable lack of dominance associated with femininity.

This paper provides us with a coherent sociocultural explanation for the apathy with which a great number of Americans address themselves to politics. Moreover, Greenstein's data reinforce findings in other studies of political socialization. These reveal that individuals develop their political orientations long before voting age by internalizing family, peer group, and community standards. Unless confronted by very divergent experiences, adults tend to maintain their early political "sets" with impressive fidelity.

Early socialization affects one's party identification and responses to issues in politics too. For example, most Americans vote as their fathers did. As the first and most intensive source of all socialization, the family's influence is generally the most enduring. The political patterns learned in the family are usually fortified by the congruity of social and economic positions between parents and children. Class, ethnic, and religious affiliations, even in an "open" society, tend strongly to be maintained across generations. Despite sharp changes in their structure, American families generally create a network of harmonious primary associations and loyalties which help to support the political affiliations and dispositions they teach their young.

The importance of these and other primary group influences is suggested in the selection by Herbert McClosky and Harold Dahlgren, "Primary Group Influence and Party Loyalty." We witness here the degree to which the *parental* family "transmits, indoctrinates, and sustains the political loyalties of its members." Individuals who reject their family's party preferences usually do so because of attachments to other primary groups and end up with unstable party loyalties. When an individual's other primary groups, like his spouse and his peer group associates, are politically congruent with his family, they strengthen his party ties; they buttress the stability and intensity of political loyalties.

McClosky and Dahlgren succeed in relating primary group membership to concrete political behavior. They surpass the previous selections in that they consider what people actually do in politics. Nonetheless, the authors emphasize that the influence of primary groups cannot be understood apart from other political variables. A number of these, including occupation, income, education, and religion, make up what they call the family's "life-style," and are assayed in terms of their effect on family influence.

These elements may be considered as political variables without regard to family politics, as is shown in the study by Oscar Glantz, "Protestant and Catholic Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan Area." Following the survey tradition that has established the "impression among social scientists that American Protestants and Catholics differ a great deal in their voting behavior," Glantz tests a number

of propositions asserted in a notable study of Elmira, New York[8] relating religious affiliation to voting behavior. He asks if these differences hold only for communities with Elmira's size, socio-economic composition, and political culture. To check this he introduces an additional variable: Orientation (and loyalty) to business or labor.

The steps by which one might arrive at the proposition "Catholics tend to vote Democratic" are by no means easy to trace — in part because political issues seem historically never to have separated Catholic and Protestant citizens with any persistence or regularity, at least in national elections. Glantz's paper underscores the relative political impotence of religious differences *per se* — when education and income, two powerful separators of status groups, are controlled. The influence of religion upon the American voter — a perennial puzzle to perplexed politicians — is apparently decisively affected by other group attachments. In the Glantz study of Philadelphia, orientation toward an economic interest group seems more pertinent to electoral behavior than membership in a religious group. In effect, a reference group displaces a membership group in influence on political behavior.[9]

This restores us to the embrace of an old friend in political analysis, the notion that economic position or interest determines one's place in society and one's politics. From Aristotle to Madison to Marx to the present day the phraseology has varied, but the suspicions have remained the same. Sometimes we have talked about "landed interests", sometimes about "economic dominants", or "strata", or simply "income"; but the most favored term has been "class".

The over-all usefulness of notions about class membership for political analysis is indisputable. But aside from nagging problems of definition, a sobering amount of research on social classes has neglected problems relating to the determinants of *strength* of affiliation, the processes by which affiliations are forged and changed, and the extent to which social class memberships carried any particular political "message" for members. Gabriel Almond's study, "The Political Attitudes of Wealth," remedies some of these deficiencies.

Without recourse to jargon, Almond demonstrates that by themselves "the objective economic interests of persons of wealth and economic power are not the *determinants* of political attitudes." He locates intriguing regularities among the attitudes associated with economic wealth, but these patterns are explained through culture, family influences, and personality, not solely by references to economic position and social class.

The selections following Almond's paper discuss determinants of the structure of opportunities awaiting Americans in different political settings. Schlesinger treats a phenomenon which has occasioned much comment by foreign observers: The fact that a particular occupational group, lawyers, supplies America with an

[8] Bernard B. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[9] A reference group is a group other than one to which an individual belongs, but which nonetheless shapes his behavior by helping to guide his aspirations, expectations or preferences. One common example would be "keeping up with the Joneses". The Joneses are perhaps the most famous reference group in America. See Robert K. Merton and Alice S. Rossi, "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," Chapter VIII in Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, Revised Edition, 1957).

inordinate number of its politicians. This suggests that the occupational component of one's identity makes a good deal of difference in one's chances to become a political leader. Lawyers not only develop certain skills: people also develop expectations which impute politically relevant skills to them and in addition, as Schlesinger indicates, lawyers monopolize certain channels to high level political activity which gives them a head start on a political career.

Ralph Huitt's article on "The Outsider in the Senate" shows how political institutions present to newcomers an array of role possibilities and how a particular newcomer became acquainted with the gains and costs associated with one of these possible roles. Huitt's treatment of the Senate breaks fresh ground by describing or adumbrating a variety of acceptable role models which a freshman can legitimately choose to emulate. Heretofore, it had been widely assumed that senators could be divided into Members of the Inner Club and Failures, but the Huitt article expands and greatly improves upon this conception.

Any political institution complex enough to contain members specializing in different sorts of work is likely to encourage a variety of ways of relating to politics, and in this sense one's identity is shaped by institutional, as well as psychological, biological, ethnic, occupational, and other social factors. A final politically relevant component of one's identity may well be one's geographic locale. The custom of voting by geographic area and the historical stability and comparative insulation of many geographic areas has encouraged the formulation of propositions concerning locally-based political attitudes and dispositions. V. O. Key, Jr. has played a significant part in destroying the myth that all Southerners relate to politics in the same way, but this does not rule out accurate generalizations about political behavior within states or parts of states.

Douglas Price investigates the extent to which political behavior remains rooted in the customs of particular localities, and incidentally refines and improves on Key's discussion of an aspect of southern politics. Noting that Negro participation in politics was lowest where Negroes were most heavily concentrated in the population, Key proposed the hypothesis that race tension increased with the number of Negroes in a given Southern county. Price successfully explained the cases in Florida deviating from this pattern by postulating an additional mechanism: persistence of attitudes over time in a locality. Thus, counties in northern Florida where the percentage of Negroes had declined over the years, still regularly deprived Negroes of their vote while counties in southern Florida receiving a heavy influx of Negroes continued to allow their large colored populations a measure of political freedom unavailable to them in north Florida counties having fewer Negroes.

This chapter illustrates some ways that personal and group characteristics shape political behavior. The number and variety of determinants of political behavior turn out to be quite substantial. In cases where the political behavior to be explained is relatively simple and elaborately structured by the environment, such as voting, we must look to those forces in the environment that are doing the structuring, such as the processes that led to the presentation of the particular alternatives given, in order to understand outcomes. This plus relatively easy-to-collect information about group memberships, identifications and preferences of voters is enough to explain a large proportion of the results. On the other hand,

when the political behavior to be explained is subtle, variegated, sustained over long periods of time, and only vaguely or incompletely structured by the environment, we must look more carefully at the habits of the individual and the ways in which they developed.

Among the determinants of political behavior are one's early childhood, one's sex, occupation, religion, income, education, institutional role, geographic location and race, the values of one's primary and reference groups, and the organizations to which one belongs, the strength of one's affiliations with various of these, the congruence and incongruities among their political values. It is surprising, given the number of factors involved, that social scientists have done as well as they have in identifying the effects of each.

15

NATIONAL CHARACTER AND MODERN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

• *ALEX INKELES*

The method of analysis which yields studies in "culture and personality" when applied to "primitive" peoples has its analogue among studies of large-scale societies in a varied assortment of investigations on what is called national character. If, under this heading, we allow impressionistic, introspective, and loosely evaluative works to qualify, then for the United States alone — from De Tocqueville to Brogan and Gorer — the articles and books depicting the American character will be numbered in the hundreds (Commager 1947). Were we to extend our coverage to the major nations of Europe and Asia, the number of relevant studies would be in the thousands. To review even the most important of these would strain the limits of our allotted space even while permitting only the driest catalogue of their contents. Yet if we were to insist on the more rigorous standards of empirical social science, and were to consider only more systematic investigations based on representative samples and utilizing standard psychological tests, then not more than two or three studies in the relevant literature could qualify. There is no third alternative. By selecting a specific problem focus we may simultaneously escape the boundlessness of a general review and the confining restrictions forced on us through the adoption of a rigorous methodological canon. A topic suitable to our purpose, one of interest and importance, is the relation of national character to the political systems found in modern national states, and more specifically, to the establishment and maintenance of democracy. Before we examine this relationship, we must clarify the meaning of our concepts.

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WHAT IS NATIONAL CHARACTER AND HOW CAN IT BE MEASURED?

PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

The confusion about the term *national character* is pervasive and enduring. Yet arguing about what a concept *should* mean can be utterly sterile. What is important is that we designate some empirical phenomenon which has concrete reference, which can be effectively distinguished from other phenomena, and which can conceivably be investigated by standard replicable, reliable, and valid methods. For purposes of this discussion I will adopt the

definition of national character presented in the *Handbook of Social-Psychology* (Inkeles and Levinson 1954) which, I believe, is now widely accepted: "National character refers to relatively enduring personality characteristics and patterns that are modal among the adult members of a society."

The other meanings given to national character, and related terms such as people's character, folk character, national (or "racial" or popular) psychology, are almost as numerous as the roster of political essayists from Plato to Pareto and from Pareto to Potter. Some treat national character as simply "the sum total" of all the values, institutions, cultural traditions, ways of acting, and history of a people. However useful this idea may be for popular discourse, it is sadly lacking for purposes of scientific analysis, since the failure to differentiate the elements of the phenomenon makes an impossible task of measurement, obfuscates issues of cause and effect, and precludes systematic study of the relations between elements. With most other definitions we have no quarrel, so long as those using the different terms are appropriately aware that each has a special and restricted meaning, and that no one of these concepts exhaustively describes the phenomenon under investigation. The following main types of definition may be discerned (*cf.* Herz 1944, and Klineberg 1944):

National Character as Institutional Pattern. In this approach, most common among political scientists, the national character is epitomized by the dominant, or typical and representative, institutions, particularly those concerned with politics and economics. The choice between dominant as against typical or representative institutions as the basis for characterizing a nation is a difficult one, and has led to much confusion in those studies in which the distinction was not precisely made or rigorously adhered to. Outstanding examples of the genre are to be found among numerous studies of the American character, such as those by Andre Siegfried (1927) or D. W. Brogan (1933, 1944).

National Character as Culture Theme. Broadly similar to the preceding approach, this genre gives prime emphasis not to political and economic institutions but to the family, friendship, the local community, and to values, attitudes, philosophy of life, religion and the like. Themes are often selected as cutting across or as infusing these and other social realms. Most common among anthropologists, this approach is also typical for many historians, political scientists, and essayists who speak in terms of spirit or *folkgeist*, world outlook, lifeways, and similar themes. Perhaps the best known of the more or less modern efforts of this type would be de Madariaga's *Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards* (1929), and the most impressive of the recent statements, Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946).

National Character as Action. In this approach stress is placed on behavior and its consequences, with special reference to political and economic *action*. In this view both formal institutional patterns and informal cultural norms, in and of themselves, are not regarded as very reliable guides to a nation's "character." Those adopting this approach stress particularly the history of peoples or societies, and on this basis may characterize them as warlike or peaceful, enterprising or backward, trustworthy or deceptive, pragmatic and industrious, or idealistic and impractical. Germany is a case often discussed in this context. Many have emphasized the contrast between Germany's outstanding institutional creations and cultural achievements on the one hand, and on the other its historic role in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Hearnshaw's *Germany the Aggressor Throughout the Ages* (1940) may serve as an example. This mode of analysis should not be confused with a more sophisticated type in which national character is recognized to be a property of persons, and is treated as an independent variable contributing to an explanation of some form of political action considered as a dependent variable. An outstanding example is Gabriel Almond's (1950) use of materials on the American character to explain certain persistent tendencies in the conduct of foreign policy by the United States.

National Character as Racial Psychology. The identification of national character with the allegedly "inborn" and presumably biological characteristics (generally defined as superior or inferior) of a group is one of the oldest and

most common approaches, and in modern social science the one most severely criticized if not actively abhorred (*cf.* Benedict 1945). A typical illustration, by no means the most extreme, may be found in Jaensch's (1938) study, published under Hitler, in which he asserted that the French were usually erratic and unreliable, the Germans consistent and stable.

The belief in racial psychology is by no means restricted to racist theoreticians. As tolerant and democratic a man as Andre Siegfried (1951), for example, attributes one of the two main qualities he finds in the French mind — its being "extremely practical and matter of fact" — to a Celtic heritage which he says is found wherever "Celtic blood prevails," including places as widely separated as northern Spain and the west of the British Isles. And Brickner's (1943) analysis of the German character as one essentially paranoid struck many students of the problem as verging on racism in psychology, even though it certainly did not suggest that the allegedly typical paranoid behavior was biological in origin. Although the pendulum may have swung too far in the opposite direction, there is today general agreement that the biologically given properties of what are in any event extraordinarily mixed national populations are *not* a significant influence in shaping the institutions, culture, or behavior of those national populations. Yet the altogether proper discrediting of racial psychology has perhaps had the unfortunate unintended effect of discouraging serious scientific research on a basic question of social science.

In most of the better known general essays on national character, such as those by Sforza (1942) on Italy, Siegfried (1930) on France, and Ortega y Gasset (1937) on Spain, more than one of these definitions or approaches will be used simultaneously and generally without any special note being taken of this fact. Typically, no distinction is made between character as something already formed and acting, and those forces such as climate and geography, history, biology, or child rearing which may be designated as the causes or consequences of the observed national character. If progress is to be made in the field, we need to make our investigations more systematic. There is no one line of development which can do full justice to the complexities of the problem. We feel, however, that great advantages inhere in the concentration on *modal adult personality* characteristics as a central problem in national character study. We therefore pose the question: whether produced by common heritage, common upbringing, the sharing of common culture, the exposure to common institutional pressures, or other causes, are there in fact any clearly demonstrated important differences in the psychological characteristics of the populations who make up modern national states? The question is more difficult to answer with confidence than many imagine it to be.

THE PROBLEM OF MEASUREMENT

No matter how we conceive of national character, a scientific approach to it must face the problem of its assessment — or to use a less evasive word, its measurement. This subject generates as much confusion and malaise as does the issue of definition. The different approaches to national character based on institutional structure, and on national action or behavior, involve virtually no common understanding, standard techniques, regular procedures, or canons of reliability and validity. The situation is only slightly less variable in the racial psychology and the culture-pattern approaches. Each study proceeds almost entirely independently of all others, utilizes unique perspectives, draws on distinctive materials, follows idiosyncratic rules of evidence, and observes only its own standards of reliability and validity. The result is, if not intellectual chaos or anarchy, at least a great buzzing, blooming confusion which defies representation. Under the circumstances, a systematic comparative perspective is almost impossible.

It is argued by some, not without cogency, that institutional arrangements are so varied, culture patterns so unique, national psychologies so distinctive, that no common or standard language can hope to encompass this infinite diversity. Under these circumstances, it is said, we cannot do justice to the unique character of any people unless we develop a special battery of concepts and a new glossary of terms to describe them. This claim may be somewhat exaggerated. In any event it suggests that systematic analysis of national character as a field of scientific investigation is blocked. The same basic difficulty does not, at least in equal degree, attend efforts to deal with national character as modal personality patterns. There is good

reason to believe that the range of variation in human personality, however great, can be adequately encompassed by a conceptual scheme, with a sufficiently limited set of terms to make for manageable research designs without sacrifice of essential richness or variety. We also maintain that, despite the many methodological and conceptual problems involved, this scheme and its measuring instruments can be developed so as to permit reliable and valid applications across national lines.

Harold Lasswell once claimed it would be an exaggeration to say that in two thousand years of studying politics we had made no advances whatsoever beyond Plato and Aristotle. Perhaps an exaggeration, but not a great one. At least so it seems when we recognize that the genius of political analysis has gone mainly into the invention of new terms for old ideas which were never made operational, never tested, and therefore never developed. For how else is one to choose between Plato's theory of the desiring, spirited, and reasoning parts, Pareto's "residues of combination" and "residues of persistence of aggregates," Spranger's six types of men, or Thomas and Znaniecki's Philistine, Bohemian, and Creative Man. These approaches must meet the criticism, as Spranger acknowledged, that they "abandon the concrete ground of experience and reduce psychology to mere speculation" (1928:xi).

As Harold Lasswell went on to say, however, our chief contemporary advantage over Plato and Aristotle lies "in the invention and adaptation of procedures by which specific individuals and groups, operating in specific historic and cultural settings, can be understood. . . . In a word, the modern approach is toward the building of scientific knowledge by perfecting the instrumentalities of inquiry" (1951:468–469). For the first time in the history of the study of politics we actually have within our grasp the means for systematic study of such conceptions as those developed by Plato, Pareto, and Spranger. I refer, of course, to the great strides made in this century in our understanding of personality dynamics and in the means for personality testing, measurement, and assessment. However, the concepts of Plato and others must first be clarified. They must be made operational, that is, transformed into possible research procedures of testing and measurement.

In some cases this has already been attempted, and it has been found possible and useful to devise formal measures of these classic typologies. Spranger's types, for example, were an important influence in shaping the widely used Allport-Vernon Scale of Values. In the process the old concepts may be found wanting. For example, Lurie's (1937) factor analysis to ascertain which generalized attitude clusters, if any, conform to Spranger's types, located several fitting Spranger's definition fairly closely — the theoretical, the religious, the social, and the economic-political. Several others, however, could not be empirically distinguished. As we test and perhaps discard some of these "classic" concepts, they will be replaced by others which are proving important in our study of personality and have obvious relevance to politics, such as: the needs for power, affiliation, and achievement; the authoritarian and ethnocentric syndrome; dominance drives; alienation and anomie; dogmatism and rigidity; tough- and tender-mindedness. It is in the nature of science and the inevitable path of its advance that concepts are replaced as empirical research advances. If for sentimental reasons we are unable to abandon the old familiar concepts, we may do ourselves honor as classicists, but we disqualify ourselves as scientists.

Political Systems as Objects of Study

The definition and classification of political systems is a more familiar and less ambiguous task, although it too has its vicissitudes. The sturdy old distinctions among political forms such as democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny which come down from Plato and Aristotle still serve us well today, although some may prefer a more contemporary classification, such as that proposed by Gabriel Almond (1956) who identifies the Anglo-American, the Continental European, the pre- or partially industrial, and the totalitarian political systems. Whatever scheme we might choose, we would probably not have great difficulty in agreeing on the defining characteristics of each type and could probably attain fair agreement in classifying particular societies.

Such classifications are, however, deceptively easy, and for many purposes they may be misleading. We generally accept the Greek city-state as the epitome of the democratic political system, but we should not forget that internally

it rested squarely on a large slave class, and in external affairs was characterized by almost continuous intercity warfare motivated by nothing more noble than the desire for power and gain. Tsarist Russia was perhaps the most absolute autocracy in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, yet the village *mir* was a self-governing community observing some of the purest principles of egalitarian democracy. Germany was an outstanding example of relatively absolute monarchy before World War I, although intellectually and spiritually one of the freest nations in Europe. The Weimar Republic which followed represented the embodiment of the most advanced democratic principles, but it was succeeded by one of the blackest of totalitarian regimes — which again is followed by a West German Republic which seems one of the stablest and most genuine of Europe's democracies. The rule of Ataturk in Turkey was a dictatorship, yet he used his dictatorial powers to foster democratic institutions against the resistance of the traditional religious oligarchy and the peasant masses. Soviet Russia under Stalin had what was nominally the most democratic constitution in the world, while in fact it closely approximated a regime of absolute totalitarian terror.

The obvious point is that we must differentiate the components of political systems just as we must distinguish the diverse elements in, and the different bearers of, national character. As a minimum we must make a distinction between: the relatively enduring and the more fleeting or transitional features of a nation's political system (*cf.* Lipset 1960 on stable and unstable democracies); the formal, exoteric system from the informal, esoteric, operational patterns (*cf.* Leites 1951 on the *Politburo*); the politics of central government from that which characterizes vital institutions such as the local community, the church, trade union, or family (*cf.* Michels 1949 on the iron law of oligarchy); the principles embodied in constitutions and other venerated documents and those commonly held by the populace (*cf.* Stouffer 1955 on civil liberties in the United States); the political orientation of the elite as against that of the rank and file of the population (*cf.* Stouffer 1955 and Mills 1956 on the power elite).

Only if we recognize both politics and national character as highly differentiated systems of variables can we hope to do any justice to the complex phenomena we are studying. Unfortunately many, indeed most, studies which seek to relate character to political systems fail to make these necessary distinctions. They treat political systems as undifferentiated and more or less unchanging units rather than as complex variables.

Review of Systematic Empirical Studies

Despite the efflorescence of the field of culture and personality during the last three decades,[1] and a parallel growth of interest in the empirical study of modern political systems, we can point to very few systematic empirical studies of the relations between personality patterns, or psychological factors in general, and the rise, functioning, and change of political systems. As usual the history of intellectual disciplines reveals much of the story. Modern studies of the relations between personality and sociocultural systems have been developed almost exclusively by cultural anthropologists. Perhaps because most nonliterate (or primitive) people rarely have a formal or specialized political organization, all but a few cultural anthropologists have shown little interest in political structure. In this respect, at least, the students of personality and culture have followed the dominant pattern in their discipline. Benedict's book on Japan (1946) and Hsu's comparison of the Chinese and American culture (1953) each give a chapter or more to politics and government, and Mead (1957) devoted an entire book to Soviet attitudes toward authority, particularly political authority. But these are outstanding exceptions. The early editions of the two standard and massive American collec-

[1] The point at which a new field of exploration begins can as a rule be designated only on an essentially arbitrary basis. Most authorities acknowledge Franz Boas as the father of this movement (see especially Boas 1910), and many date its formal beginning with the publication in 1934 of Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture*. Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead were, of course, students in the seminars on Individual and Society which Boas gave at Columbia in the late twenties. Boas himself gave great credit to Theodore Waitz, of whose *Anthropolgie der Naturvolker* he said "[this] great work is an inquiry into whether there are any fundamental differences between the mental make-up of mankind the world over, racially as well as socially."

tions of articles on culture and personality do not contain a single item which deals directly with the relation of personality patterns to the political system.[2] Similarly, the standard anthropological textbook in the field contains a chapter on psychiatric disorders and one on "personality in class, caste, region, and occupation," but none on politics.[3] Linton's (1945) little classic on *The Cultural Background of Personality* makes no mention of government or politics. The same may be said of the works of Abram Kardiner (1939, 1945) which have done so much to shape the field. Geoffrey Gorer's study of the English character has chapters on "friends and neighbors," on "people and homes," on "religion," and on "marriage," but none on those political institutions and attitudes about parliaments, elections, local government, civil liberties, and personal rights which most people regard as the truly distinctive political features of English society.[4]

These comments are, of course, not meant to ignore the substantial contribution of the British anthropologists to our understanding of primitive political systems, but in this case the hiatus is complementary to that found in the culture and personality studies. In their exceptionally fine work on African political systems Fortes, Evans-Pritchard, and their associates (1940) say virtually nothing about the characterological qualities which may be important to the development and maintenance of stable political orders in these important underdeveloped regions.

Unfortunately the situation is not markedly changed when we consider the work of political scientists, to whom one might appropriately assign greater responsibility for this line of work. Although Plato and Aristotle both stressed the role of character in shaping political forms and processes, the person tends periodically to disappear from political theory. Early in this century Graham Wallas made a plea for a return to the study of human nature in politics. He deplored the books by American university professors as useless, because the writers "dealt with abstract men, formed on assumptions of which they were unaware and which they had never tested either by experience or by study" (1908:10). Very little was done to take up the challenge. More than two decades later Charles E. Merriam (1925) was still pleading the same needs, but in a more focused and hopeful manner with emphasis on personality, measurement, large-scale statistical studies, and correlational analysis of the relations between political conduct and psychological characteristics of the political man. In the same year Henry Moore (1925) published a pioneering study of psychological factors associated with holding radical and conservative political opinions. Moore's analysis, utilizing tests for resistance to majority opinion and of readiness to break old habits, anticipated much of the recent research on personality and politics. Unfortunately it failed to become the start of an active research tradition in psychology.

Merriam's role in fostering the application of psychology to politics is comparable to that played by Franz Boas in the development of culture and personality studies. It was under Merriam's influence that Harold Lasswell wrote what was probably the first modern, systematic, and broad application of psychology to contemporary politics. In *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930) Lasswell broke new ground in going beyond the usual hypothetical classification

[2] Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry Murray (1953); Douglas Haring (1948). The former did contain an article on personality under the Nazis, but rather than having a political focus it was designed only to show that personality remained unchanged despite changes in the individual's political security. The latter had an article on the armaments race, but only as illustrating a type of mechanism in interpersonal relations. Later editions gave somewhat, but not much more, attention to the political process. The later edition of the Kluckhohn, Murray (and Schneider) volume (1956) included a new article by R. Bauer, "Psychology of the Soviet Middle Elite." In addition, the third edition of the Haring volume (1956) included materials on the role of character in postwar Japanese sociopolitical development and one by Gorer which, while not explicitly dealing with political structure, discussed the role of the police in the apparent modification of the English character in modern times.

[3] John Honigmann (1954). The index does call attention, under the heading "political relations," to two pages which discuss the evidence that organizational atomism in a community is related to the degree of ingroup sorcery, and two pages on the relations of family patterns to political structure.

[4] Gorer's (1955) book does contain a chapter on "law and order," but it deals exclusively with two questions: the popular image of the police and the attitude toward "fiddling," a term used to describe minor infractions of the rationing regulations.

of political types to develop the detailed study of life histories. Guided by psychoanalytic theory, he showed quite explicitly and empirically the connection between personality traits and the choice and style of political roles such as the agitator, the propagandist, and the administrator. In the same volume he sketched one of the first systematic schemes for describing personality in politically relevant terms. Although he worked mainly with the individual case study, Lasswell was not unaware of the implications of this mode of analysis for the study of political patterns characteristic of classes and national populations. "What matters to the student of culture," he said, "is not the subjective similarities of the species but the subjective differences among the members of the same and similar cultures" (1930:261). He did not, however, follow through to undertake the systematic research this statement implied.

A decade elapsed before the next really major event in the field occurred with the publication of Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* (1941). Fromm took the step that Lasswell had anticipated but failed to make himself. He held that the typical character types prevalent at any given time were different, that these differences varied systematically with changes in the socioeconomic system, and that character types could serve either as a cement holding the system together or as an explosive tearing it apart, depending on the degree to which a given character type fit the demands of the system and found satisfaction in it. He traced this interaction through the history of medieval Europe and the Reformation, sought to explain the appeal of Hitler by the widespread prevalence of the authoritarian character in Germany, and sketched some of the forces in democratic society — such as the sense of aloneness, the loss of individuality and spontaneity — which he saw as inducing an "escape from freedom."

Fromm's theory has been extraordinarily stimulating to all concerned with the study of personality and politics. We should appreciate his theoretical sophistication, his clinical intuition, and his clear recognition of the most vital problems. His use of historical documents and contemporary sources, such as political speeches and party platforms, represented a commendable improvement over the efforts of those who were content to rely more or less exclusively on their clinical experience with psychoanalytic patients. Nevertheless, many students of the problem would insist that Fromm's analysis did not present more than suggestive hypotheses. It was yet to be demonstrated by objectively verified testing based on adequate samples that the modal personality types in different socioeconomic systems were significantly different from each other, or that within any nation the form and content of political action varied according to the personality traits typical for any group.

Considering that the conflict of political principles played so central a role among the issues in World War II, it is rather striking that the series of books on national character which anthropologists contributed to the war effort gave such incidental, indeed almost casual, treatment to the relations between national character and democratic government. There are important limitations on the justice with which this characterization can be applied in one or another case, yet it fairly well fits the work of Gorer on Japan (1943), Russia (1950), and the United States (1948), Mead on the United States (1942), and Benedict on Japan (1946). Insofar as they did deal with governments, they did not with any rigor specify the personality traits of politically active adults which might conduce them to support democratic or autocratic government. Instead, their method was to highlight the analogy between the political system and other features of the culture, most notably the family. Thus Gorer notes the characteristic division of power in the United States as contrasted with greater centralization in European governments, then points to the typical American nuclear family council, and concludes that "to a certain extent the pattern of authority in the state is reflected in the family" (1948:44–45). Similarly, Benedict notes that the Japanese father is not a martinet, but rather exercises his authority as the representative of the larger family. The attitude thus "learned by the child in his earliest experiences with his father" is then invoked to explain why in Japanese governmental affairs "the officials who head the hierarchy do not typically exercise the actual authority" (1946: 301).

These are undoubtedly important insights. Nevertheless, to conceive of the family as the

mirror of the state, and of the state as a reflection of the pattern of relations in the family, establishes a circle without any suggestion as to how change can and does come about. In the case of the Japanese, Benedict sought to meet this challenge by stressing the Japanese "ethic of alternatives." But what of the Germans and Russians who presumably do not have such an ethic? Are they doomed to perpetual authoritarian government as the cycles of family and state patterns ever renew themselves?

The basic difficulty with this approach, one pervasive in the culture and personality literature, is its failure to take adequate account of the differentiation within large national populations. It emphasizes the central tendency, the existence of which it presumes but does not prove, and neglects the range of variation within and around the average or typical. Once we begin to deal with distributions, with variation and range, we must recognize that a second weakness of this approach is that its descriptive language, the technical terms on which it is based, does not easily permit the precise measurement and quantitative expression necessary to the study of a distributive phenomenon. These deficiencies were largely remedied in another set of the wartime studies, particularly those by Henry Dicks (1950) and David Levy (1951), which represent an important landmark in the development of our understanding of how personality relates to political action.

Dr. Dicks' work was in the main line of culture and personality studies in that it considered personality in psychoanalytic terms and was based on a general model of the German personality drawn from a variety of cultural sources. In his case, however, what is generally the conclusion of many studies was only the starting point. He went beyond previous studies in three important respects: (1) the personality of each subject was explicitly scored on clearly specified and carefully defined variables; (2) the political orientation of each person was also carefully measured in concrete terms; and (3) the personality measures and the indices of political orientation were systematically related to each other by standard statistical procedures. All this was done with clinical sensitivity, with use of general theory, and without loss of contact with the more traditional but impressionistic description of the German national character.

Dicks worked with a sample of 138 German soldiers taken as prisoners of war between 1942 and 1944. On the basis of *politically* focused interviews each man was classified on a five-point scale running from "fanatical, wholehearted Nazi" to "active, convinced anti-Nazi." In addition, on the basis of nominally free but in fact highly focused *psychiatrically* oriented interviews, each man was rated on 15 different psychosociological variables ranging from degree of religiosity to presence or absence of schizoid features. Relationships attaining a high degree of statistical significance (at the .01 level or better) were obtained between Nazism and six of the fifteen psychosocial variables. For example, those high on the scale of Nazism showed a marked taboo against tenderness, were more sadistic or antisocial, and were much more likely to engage in projection.

It is important to recognize that Dicks did not prove these or any other characteristics to be *generally* present in German nationals. He proved only that Nazis and near-Nazis were different from non-Nazi Germans in a number of important respects. This is not to say that Dicks did not attempt a general characterization of the German personality. He could hardly have undertaken his study without some such hypothetical model which, he assumed, the Nazi "embodied in more exaggerated or concentrated form." The typical German he described as having "an ambivalent, compulsive character structure with the emphasis on submissive dominant conformity, a strong countercathexis of the virtues of duty, of 'control' by the self, especially buttressed by re-projected 'external' super-ego symbols." Even though such individuals might be highly susceptible to the propaganda themes and the style of leadership offered by the Nazis, it is also apparent that this character type could freely support any one of a number of different sociopolitical orders. Dr. Dicks' study is of particular value, therefore, in keeping before us the awareness that in any national population there is likely to be substantial variation in modal personality patterns, even though for any given nation this variation may cover only a narrow part of the world-wide range. Dicks' study also suggests that the extreme political positions are those which are most likely to be attractive to the extremes on the personality continuum. If the extremists seize power, the resulting po-

litical forms may or may not be congruent with the dominant personality tendencies in the population at large. It seems likely that this congruence was greater in Hitlerite Germany than in Stalinist Russia.

Inkeles, Hanfmann, and Beier (1958) administered a battery of tests including the Rorschach, TAT, sentence-completion test, and others to a small sample (51 cases) of refugees from Soviet Russia who departed during and just after World War II (*cf.* Dicks 1952). On this basis they constructed a composite national character portrait, differentiating a main modal pattern, a variant on it, and a residual group. The subjects were also divided into four social classes. The authors did not, unfortunately, relate the personality characteristics of each individual directly to his mode of political orientation. For the group as a whole, however, they related its adjustment to the Soviet political system to each element of the modal personality pattern — which included a strong need for affiliation, marked dependency needs, emotional expressiveness and responsiveness, and resistance to being shamed for failures in impersonal performance. The authors found, for example, that the persistent shortages of food, shelter, and clothing which characterized Soviet life under Stalin, aggravated the anxieties about oral deprivation which were frequently manifested in the Russian character. In general, they concluded, "there was a high degree of incongruence between the central personality modes and dispositions of many Russians and . . . the behavior of the regime." This was most marked, however, for those who represented the basic personality mode, and was much less true for those whose personality reflected a substantial departure from the modal pattern common to the mass of peasants and workers.

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

Research in the period after World War II has been characterized by two important developments: (1) improvements in the methods for assessing personality on a large scale and (2) the application of such methods on a cross-national or comparative basis.

If we require that national character studies be based on systematic and objective study of personality, that they represent all the diverse elements of national populations, and that they permit meaningful comparison with results from other studies, we are in effect calling for a transformation of the standard methodology of the field. Such a demand made before 1940 would have been perhaps not visionary, but hardly reasonable as a practical matter. The post-war period, however, has seen the development and application of means for the assessment of personality which enable us to measure it with relative ease, and to do so with large representative samples. There is reason to believe that at least some of these instruments may be effectively used cross-nationally.

The effort to measure with some precision the personality traits of entire national groups has a longer history than many suppose. One of the earliest ventures in the use of a standard psychological test to assess personality trends in a significantly large population was the Bleulers' (1935) application of the Rorschach Ink-Blot test to Moroccans in the thirties. The Bleulers administered the Rorschach to an unspecified number of "simple country folk" (half Arab, half Berber) living in the vast plains of West Morocco. Their characterization, based on the Rorschach records as measured against their experience with the test in Europe, is full of comments of the following order: the Moroccan lacks the typical European "tendency to abstractive generalization;" his extroversion emerges mainly in "a marked enthusiasm under the influence of momentary events . . . but he lacks the systematic, energetic, and persevering striving after outward success."

Of course we will wonder whether we can safely generalize these comments to other Moroccans, and how much these patterns reflect not Moroccan culture but rather the low level of education and the relative isolation of these people. But more important for our purposes is the question of the relevance of such qualities of character for the ability to act as a good citizen in a stable political order of a national state. The Bleulers' description typically makes no mention of images of authority, civic consciousness, or other traits of obvious political relevance, and we do not have the knowledge to judge whether the lack of a tendency to abstractive generalization is conducive to good democratic citizenship or not. That these defects of the typical Rorschach analysis of group personality are relatively persistent may be observed by comparing the Bleulers' study with later ventures, such as the study of the Chinese

by Abel and Hsu (1949). Indeed, the Rorschach has come into serious question as an instrument for systematic research into group traits (Carstairs, Payne, and Whitaker 1960).

Probably the greatest influence on our thinking and practice in the measurement of personality dimensions relevant to politics is exerted by the now classic study of the authoritarian personality by the Frankfurt Institut fur Sozialforschung (Horkheimer 1936). Erich Fromm played a major role in this group's development of the concept of the authoritarian personality, which Adorno (1950) and his associates carried forward in the United States both theoretically and methodologically. The main fruit of the California group's investigation was the isolation, definition, and measurement of a particular personality type, but the conception of that type was initially derived from ideas about the distinctive psychological coloration of authoritarian political creeds and movements. Although the F scale[5] has been severely criticized because it can distinguish right authoritarians but permits left authoritarians to escape notice (Christie 1954), there can be no serious question but that the psychological syndrome thus isolated is highly correlated with extreme right-wing political attitudes.

The semipsychiatric interview which Dicks used requires special talent to conduct, is difficult and expensive to code or score, and must therefore be restricted to very small samples. By contrast the F scale has the special virtue of great simplicity as a test instrument, something unusual in the earlier efforts to measure personality variables of theoretical interest and proved clinical significance. The F scale thus made possible for the first time the simultaneous collection of data on personality and on political orientations from a fully representative national sample. Using a modified version of the F scale, Janowitz and Marvick found that in the United States those whose personality tended more toward authoritarianism were also more markedly isolationist in foreign affairs (*cf.* Levinson 1957). The more authoritarian also revealed a sense of political ineffectiveness, that is, they believed themselves powerless to influence government action. The conclusion reached by Janowitz and Marvick is particularly noteworthy: "Personality tendencies measured by [an] authoritarian scale served to explain political behavior at least as well as those factors [such as age, education, and class] traditionally included in political and voting behavior studies." (1953:201; also see Lane 1955.)

In addition to the F scale, there are other personality measures suitable for administration to large samples and relevant to political orientations, such as Rokeach's (1956) dogmatism scale and Eysenck's (1954) classification of the tender minded and tough minded. In their study of American automobile workers, Arthur Kornhauser (1956) and his associates utilized measures not only of authoritarianism but also of life satisfaction and social alienation or "anomie." Those characterized by anomie showed little interest in politics, and were much less likely to vote. When they did vote, they tended to vote contrary to the prevailing sentiment among their fellow workers. Among numerous important findings in this rich and interesting study was the discovery that authoritarianism is related to political extremism *whether of the right or left.* This assumption gains support from a study of political orientations in Iran. Despite their fundamental differences in political position, the extreme rightists and extreme leftists were more like each other in many social and behavioral characteristics — such as "level of social detachment" and "breadth of social horizons" — than they were like the more moderate groups of the political center (Ringer and Sills 1953).

In summarizing their detailed results, Kornhauser and his associates reach a conclusion which accords well with the requirements of our model of the democratic personality. They say: "The problem of democracy . . . is partly the problem of maintaining an adequate proportion of members who are capable of engaging in the market place of proposals and counter-proposals, immune from the feeling that 'the leader knows best' and from the temptation to condone, or to resort to, desperate measures in

[5] The letter F was used with the scale to designate "susceptibility to Fascism." This sounds more like a specifically political than a psychological measure, although the authors intended it mainly as a measure of personality. This use of the term Fascism for the scale unfortunately clouded the issue by seeming to prejudge the relation between measures of personality and those of political orientation, or worse to suggest they were perhaps one and the same thing.

times of social and political crisis" (1956:249–250).

Perhaps the most systematic effort to relate personality to political inclinations is to be found in the pioneering study by Herbert McClosky (1953) in which he sought to define the personality characteristics of those taking positions along the continuum from conservative to liberal politics. He unfortunately defines conservatism not by party affiliation, but on the basis of agreement with a set of normative propositions drawn from the works of leading, modern, conservative spokesmen. These statements include items such as: you can't change human nature; no matter what people think, a few people will always run things anyway; duties are more important than rights. Using a rich battery of personality scales developed at the University of Minnesota and elsewhere, he finds that the extreme conservatives are sharply differentiated from both the "liberals" and "moderate liberals" in being more submissive, anomic, alienated, pessimistic, guilty, hostile, rigid, paranoid obsessive, intolerant of human frailty, and extremely ego-defensive. It will be immediately apparent that the personality traits of the extreme conservative or "reactionary" bear a very close relation to those of the authoritarian personality, and at every point are polar to the qualities described below in our model of the democratic personality.

It is unfortunately characteristic of McClosky's study, and many others in this field, that they are not comparative. This necessarily leaves us in doubt as to whether in other countries or environments the same traits of personality would also be associated with the same kinds of political orientation. For example, Dr. Dicks' (1950) study raises at once a question as to the uniqueness of the Nazi pattern and the degree to which we can generalize his findings. Since all of Dicks' comparisons were made within the German sample, he is quite justified in saying that in Germany certain individual characteristics are more associated with fascist political leanings than others. But his assumption that the Nazis are only extreme variants of a more general or typical German character cannot be taken as proved. On the basis of his sample he could hardly establish what the average or typical German is like, if he exists at all. In any study restricted to one sample, we may easily be led into assuming that the response which fits our preconception of the group is distinctive to it, when in fact that response is quite common in other populations as well. For example, we would have much more confidence in Schaffner's (1948) finding of extreme authoritarianism in the typical German conception of the family had he given his sentence completion test to at least one other comparable national group.

This defect was remedied in a number of studies conducted after World War II. Indeed the postwar period is outstanding for the development of more systematic comparative research. For example, D. V. McGranahan (1946) put a number of questions on basic issues — such as obedience to authority under duress, and freedom of the press even when not "for the good of the people" — to comparable samples of American and German boys. In the latter case he made a distinction by political orientation between Nazis, neutrals, and anti-Nazis. The German youth distinctly favored obedience to authority more often than the Americans, showed less faith in the common man, and were more admiring of people with political or military power. In general these findings fit our expectation with regard to the greater emphasis on democratic values in American as against German society. But it is crucial to note that *within* the German group, those classified as anti-Nazi were on some questions closer to the Americans than to their Nazi-oriented compatriots.

Of course, no simple conclusions can be drawn from one such study standing alone. For example, when the same questions were given by Stoodley (1957) to a more or less comparable group of youths from the Philippines, he found that on some dimensions they were closer to the Germans, on others, to the Americans, thus yielding a distinctive national profile. Unfortunately, he did not inquire into the relation of these attitudes to political orientation, which would have enabled us to judge whether the same value orientations which made for Nazism in Germany made for comparable antidemocratic leanings in the Philippines.

Gillespie and Allport (1955) studied hopes for the future among college students in several countries. Although they did not inquire directly into political beliefs, several of the topics they dealt with are clearly relevant to an evalua-

tion of the strength of tendencies toward various forms of active "citizenship." They reported the Japanese to be outstanding in their "sense of obligation to the social group in which they live." The Japanese were, for example, first among all countries in saying they would seek to inculcate in their children such qualities as good citizenship, social usefulness, and service to society (*cf.* Stoetzel 1955). On this and similar questions Americans were near the bottom of the list. They "emphasized their rights rather than their duties and in all presented a picture of individuality, separation from the social context of living, and privatization of values and personal plans" (1955:29). The New Zealanders presented a profile quite similar to that of the Americans, but we cannot say whether this results from their common Anglo-Saxon heritage, the common experience of settling a new continent, or some combination of these and similar influences. These findings are well in accord with the conclusions of earlier, more impressionistic studies of American and Japanese character. They are none the less welcome for providing firm confirmation of these hypotheses.

Despite such promising starts there seems to be great hesitation to undertake systematic comparative studies. The hesitation to apply methods of personality testing cross-nationally arises not merely from the magnitude and cost of the task, admittedly substantial, but in large part from resistance, skepticism, and outright rejection of the possibility of reliable and valid cross-national testing of opinions, values, and personality traits. We should not minimize the substantial technical difficulties facing any such effort. But the objections often offered to such attempts seem exaggerated, and in any event the appropriate response is to accept the challenge and attempt the necessary methodological innovation. By way of encouragement we may note that a number of studies have shown that certain tests can be used cross-nationally with a high degree of reliability. In a study for UNESCO (Cantril and Buchanan 1953) conducted in nine countries it was found that most questions had the same meaning in all the countries studied, and that the opinions related to each other in one setting were similarly correlated in the others. For example, in each country those who believed human nature can be changed were also more likely to believe that national characteristics arise from the way in which people are brought up. Indeed the same syndrome, or complex pattern of attitudes, was represented in all countries. One group in each country, who might be called the optimists, believed human nature perfectible, national character pliable, world peace attainable, and world organization desirable. The pessimists, or fatalists, believed there would always be wars, human nature cannot be changed, and that efforts at improving the international situation are bound to fail.

The UNESCO study, of course, dealt more with opinions than with deeper lying attitudes and facets of personality, but we are not limited to that level. In an important study of values which Charles Morris (1956) conducted in the United States, India, and China, he discovered that in each country the ratings of individual questions were made along the same common value dimensions and that "there is thus revealed an underlying value structure (or value space) which is very much the same in the culturally diverse groups of students." In addition, the relation of the value factors to other issues was much the same in each culturally distinct group. For example, those individuals whose values centered on receptivity to and sympathetic concern for others tended, in all three countries, to dislike or reject the operative values of the political world, as measured by the Allport-Vernon scale.

Similar results are reported in the use of a personality test which presumably taps deeper-lying strata of the personality. In a comparative study of teachers in seven European countries it was found that the same items of the F scale designed to test authoritarianism tended to cohere and form a pattern in all of the countries studied.[6] In addition, the research uncovered high consistency in the way in which orientations toward threatening situations in both domestic and international politics were patterned in the several countries. But at the same time the authors offer us some sobering words of caution regarding the difficulties facing such comparative studies. They found "many of the relationships vary in size, direction, and significance in different countries . . .

[6] Personal communication from Drs. D. J. Levinson and Stein Rokkan. The data were collected in the study reported in Aubert, 1954.

modified by specific national and international situational factors — by the historically given structures of political forces, by the dominant policies, by majority-minority relations, by the ongoing communication processes in the mass media and in the larger organizations" (Aubert et al. 1954:38).

Toward the Delineation of the Democratic Character

It is apparent that we have made at least a modest beginning in studying the relation of personality patterns to the development and maintenance of political systems. There is substantial and rather compelling evidence of a regular and intimate connection between personality and the mode of political participation by individuals and groups within any one political system. In many different institutional settings and in many parts of the world, those who adhere to the more extreme political positions have distinctive personality traits separating them from those taking more moderate positions in the same setting. The formal or explicit "content" of one's political orientation — left or right, conservative or radical, pro- or antilabor — may be determined mainly by more "extrinsic" characteristics such as education and social class; but the form or style of political expression — favoring force or persuasion, compromise or arbitrary dictation, being tolerant or narrowly prejudiced, flexible in policy or rigidly dogmatic — is apparently largely determined by personality. At least this seems clear with regard to the political extremes. It is not yet certain whether the same characteristics make for extremism in all national groups and institutional settings, but that also seems highly likely.

Prominent among the traits which make for extremism appear to be the following: exaggerated faith in powerful leaders and insistence on absolute obedience to them; hatred of outsiders and deviates; excessive projection of guilt and hostility; extreme cynicism; a sense of powerlessness and ineffectiveness (alienation and anomie); suspicion and distrust of others; and dogmatism and rigidity. Some of these terms have been or will be shown to be merely alternative designations of the same phenomenon, but some such general syndrome of authoritarianism, dogmatism, and alienation undoubtedly is the psychological root of that political extremism which makes this type actively or potentially disruptive to democratic systems.

If political extremism is indeed an accompaniment — and even more a product — of a certain personality syndrome, and if this syndrome produces the equivalent extremism in all national populations and subgroups, this fact poses a considerable challenge to the student of national character in its relation to political systems. At once we face this question. Are the societies which have a long history of democracy peopled by a majority of individuals who possess a personality conducive to democracy? Alternatively, are societies which have experienced recurrent or prolonged authoritarian, dictatorial, or totalitarian governments inhabited by a proportionately large number of individuals with the personality traits we have seen to be associated with extremism? In other words, can we move from the individual and group level, to generalize about the relations of personality and political system at the societal level?

Almost all the modern students of national character are convinced that the answer to this question is in the affirmative. Systematic empirical evidence for this faith is unfortunately lacking. To prove the point we would be required to show that the qualities of personality presumably supportive or less destructive of democracy are more widely prevalent in stable democracies such as the United States, England, Switzerland, or Sweden than in Germany, Japan, Italy, or Russia. At the present time we cannot offer such proof. We will continue to be unable to settle this question until we undertake nation-wide studies of modal personality patterns —such as we do of literacy or per capita income — and test their relation to the forms of political organization in various countries. Before we undertake such studies we must have some conception of the character types for which we are looking.

The problem of defining anything as broad as "the democratic character" may be much like the problem of locating the Manchester economists' "economic man" who Unamuno somewhere described as "a man neither of here nor there, neither this age nor another, who has neither sex nor country, who is, in brief, merely an idea — that is to say, a 'no-man.' "

The danger of excessive generality in defining the democratic character is not greater than the danger of "misplaced concreteness," that is, defining the characteriological requirements of

any democracy as identical with those of some particular people who have a strong democratic tradition. For example, it has been true of the great majority of commentaries on the people of the United States, going back to its earliest days, that "practicality" and "emphasis on religion" have been consistently cited as American traits (Coleman 1941). Yet it would be difficult to argue that either quality is a sufficient or even a necessary requirement for effective citizenship in a democracy. The same may be said of other traits frequently cited as characterizing the American people, such as valuing success and achievement, which are also strongly emphasized in Japanese culture, or the marked emphasis on activity and work, which is also commonly cited as typifying the German character.

While observing these cautions, we should not avoid postulating certain qualities which are probably indispensable to the long-run maintenance of a democratic political order. In holding this view we do no more than did De Tocqueville. De Tocqueville weighed the role of geography and climate, of religion and political institutions, and finally of what he called "manners," meaning thereby "various notions and opinions current among men . . . the mass of those ideas which constitute their character of mind . . . the whole moral and intellectual condition of a people." Comparing Mexico, South America, and the United States in these terms, he concluded: "The manners [character] of the Americans of the United States are the *real* cause which renders it the only one of the American nations that is able to support a democratic government . . . I should say that the physical circumstances are less efficient than the laws, and the laws very subordinate to the manners [character] of the people" (1947:213).

De Tocqueville's insistence that the maintenance of democracy depends upon the primacy of certain popular values, and what we would today call character traits, has often been reaffirmed since by numerous authorities including men as widely separated in formal philosophical allegiance as Sidney Hook and Jacques Maritain.[7] What specific qualities do we then require in a people as a necessary condition for the maintenance of a democratic political order? Even a casual content analysis of any sampling of opinion on the democratic society reveals an extraordinary degree of agreement about the values, attitudes, opinion and traits of character which are important to its maintenance. The various formulations may be summed up by reference to conceptions about others, about the self, about authority, and about community and society.

Values about the Self. All authorities are agreed that democratic societies require widespread belief in what Maritain calls the "inalienable rights of the person," and Hook "the belief that every individual should be regarded as possessing intrinsic worth or dignity." "Where low estimates of the self are permitted to develop," says Harold Lasswell, "there the democratic character cannot develop."

Orientation toward Others. The basic dignity not only of the self but of all others is an essential ingredient cited by virtually every theory on the democratic character. This particularly manifests itself in the concept of equality, under which Hook includes recognition "that equal opportunities of development should be provided for the realization of individual talents and capacities." To hold this view one must have a basic acceptance of other people. In Lasswell's words: "The democratic attitude toward other human beings is warm rather than frigid, inclusive and expanding rather than exclusive and constricting . . . an underlying personality structure which is capable of 'friendship' as Aristotle put it, and which is unalienated from humanity." Underlying these attitudes is a fundamental conception of the perfectibility of man, which De Tocqueville phrased as the belief "that a man will be led to do what is just and good by following his own interest rightly understood."

Orientation toward Authority. At the core of the democratic personality lies a stress on personal autonomy and a certain distance from.

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[7] Hook has said, for example, "Democracy is an affirmation of certain attitudes and values which are more important than any particular set of institutions" (1950:294). Maritain argues that "the democratic impulse burst forth in history as a temporal manifestation of the gospel" and says directly that the democratic ideal "is the secular name for the ideal of Christianity" (1944:65). It does not seem necessary or desirable to clutter the text in the remainder of this section with source and page citations for each of the numerous quotations. In addition to the cited works of Hook and Maritain the main sources are Lasswell (1951) and De Tocqueville (1947).

if not distrust of, powerful authority, or, to put it negatively, an absence of the need to dominate or submit such as is found in the authoritarian personality. As Sidney Hook phrased it: "a positive requirement of a working democracy is an intelligent distrust of its leadership, a skepticism stubborn but not blind, of all demands for the enlargement of power, and an emphasis upon critical method in every phase of social life . . . Where skepticism is replaced by uncritical enthusiasm . . . a fertile soil for dictatorship has been prepared." Almost identical language is used by Maritain. Maritain described the democratic philosophy as one insisting on the "political rights of the people whose consent is implied by any political regime, and whose rulers rule as vicars of the people . . . it denies to the rulers the right to consider themselves and be considered a superior race and wills nevertheless that their authority be respected on a juridical basis. It does not admit that the state is a transcendent power incorporating within itself all authority and imposed from above upon human life . . ." The same idea is stressed by Lasswell who says: "the democratic character is multi-valued rather than single valued . . . disposed to share rather than to monopolize. In particular, little significance is attached to the exercise of power as a scope value . . . [for] when the demand for respect is the consuming passion, other values are sacrificed for the sake of receiving symbolic acknowledgments of eminence."

Attitudes toward the Community. Although overweaning authority may be controlled, there is always the danger of that tyranny of the majority which De Tocqueville early warned might undo democracy. This realization has repeatedly led those who sought to define the democratic character to stress the importance of openness, ready acceptance of differences, and willingness to compromise and change. De Tocqueville early anticipated this point, as he did so many others. Stressing the belief "that every man is born of the right of self-government, and that no one has the right of constraining his fellow creatures to be happy," he went on to say we must recognize "society as a body in a state of improvement, [and] humanity as a changing scene in which nothing is or ought to be permanent." Hook also speaks of the importance of "a belief in the value of differences, variety, and uniqueness in a democracy [where] differences of interest and achievement must not be merely suffered, they must be encouraged." According to Hook this requires that the ultimate commitment of a democracy must be in some method by which value conflicts are to be resolved, which in turn means that policies must be treated as hypotheses, not dogmas, and customary practices, as generalizations rather than as God-given truths.

It will be apparent from this extremely brief review that there is substantial agreement about the core personal beliefs and values which have been frequently identified as important to the maintenance of a democratic order. The relevant "themes" can, of course, be integrated into the personality at different levels. They may reflect opinions publicly held, but not vitally important to the person. They may represent basic attitudes or central values in the belief system, typical "ideologies" to which the individual has deep allegiance. Or they may be even more "deeply" embedded in the personality at the level of character traits and modes of psychodynamic functioning. Most of the outstanding writers on the democratic character do not trouble to distinguish these "levels." I have not attempted above to sort them out, and merely note here that most of the characterizations given above are statements at the level of ideology. We can, however, translate or transform the classic portrait of the democratic character to present it in the language of clinical psychology, expressed in terms of character traits, defenses, ways of dealing with wishes and feelings, and the like. In those terms, the democratic character emerges at the opposite pole from the authoritarian personality syndrome. The citizen of a democracy should be accepting of others rather than alienated and harshly rejecting; open to new experience, to ideas and impulses rather than excessively timid, fearful, or extremely conventional with regard to new ideas and ways of acting; able to be responsible with constituted authority even though always watchful, rather than blindly submissive to or hostilely rejecting of all authority; tolerant of differences and of ambiguity, rather than rigid and inflexible; able to recognize, control, and channel his emotions, rather than immaturely projecting hostility and other impulses on to others.

This model of the democratic personality represents only a very rough first approximation. Although it is based on a great deal of philosophical wisdom and historical experience, by

the standards of modern social science it rests on an extremely narrow and uncertain base of empirical research. Indeed, it might be argued that at the present moment there is no relevant evidence which meets the standards set by contemporary social science research. It is largely to the future that we must look for refinement of the model, and for testing of its actual relevance for political systems and popular participation in them. No doubt some elements in the model will be discarded, others added. It may even be discovered that some one element is critical, all the others incidental or even irrelevant. In the present stage of our work it is important to avoid premature closure through the exclusive concentration on one conceptual scheme for analyzing personality. It is true that earlier efforts which accepted publicly offered opinions, attitudes, and values as guides to the individual's probable political action were often naive and misleading. Nevertheless, an analysis couched exclusively in terms of psychodynamic depth psychology, of defenses, projective tendencies, and the like may also leave out much which is of great significance in shaping the pattern of political life. We cannot be satisfied with a scheme of personality analysis which is insensitive to themes such as self-centeredness or "privatism" which Gillespie and Allport (1955) found so important in distinguishing the students from different countries in their study. Nor can we be content with an analysis of the "compulsive" German character (Kecskemeti 1947) if it leads us to neglect the feelings of obligation to self and society (McClelland 1958).

Whatever the defects of the available scheme, the use of some explicit model is essential to focus our studies in this area. It is also a necessary condition for the meaningful comparison of different studies, and particularly for our efforts to cumulate the results in ever firmer generalizations or conclusions. We must particularly regret, therefore, that so few of the empirical investigations into the relations of character and political systems have sought systematically to test the model of the democratic character presented above, or, for that matter, any other explicit model.

Some Problems and Prospects

With very few exceptions, the available studies of modal or group personality unfortunately suffer from several defects which make them poor evidence in support of *any* systematic proposition. As a rule they are not designed to test any theory or validate any model. They are usually based on very small and haphazardly selected samples, making it extremely difficult to generalize with any confidence beyond the sample itself or the narrow circle from which it is drawn. In addition, the analysis is usually based on the total sample, without basic differentiation of the characteristics of subgroups, whether deviant or merely variant. More serious for our purposes is the fact that the description of personality is generally cast in clinical or psychodynamic terms which are difficult to relate to social structure. Even in the rare cases when a study has given attention to the more politically relevant realms of personality such as attitude toward authority, tolerance of ambiguity, acceptance of differences, and the need for power, it generally fails to record information on the political attitudes and opinions, the party affiliation, or other political characteristics of the subjects. Most of these studies, therefore, are obviously of limited usefulness to the student of politics. Only in the last few years have we attained the first, limited personality inventory of a representative sample of the national population of the United States — and this applies only to the F scale, as we have already noted, and more recently to the TAT variables of *n* affiliation, achievement, and power.[8] There are apparently no comparable results on these or any other dimensions for any other modern nation, and it will undoubtedly be many years before we have such results for a number of major nations simultaneously.

Even when we attain good data on the distribution of personality traits in a number of national populations, a great many questions will remain. For example, we will need to understand better the relation between personality dispositions in the rank and file of a population, and their orientation to different kinds of leadership. The decisive factor affecting the chances of preserving democracy may not be the prevalence of one or another undemocratic personality type, but rather the relation between

[8] The test was administered in connection with the national survey sponsored by the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health and conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. Reports on this material are in preparation by Gerald Gurin, Joseph Veroff, and John Atkinson.

the typical or average personality and that of the leaders. It is highly unlikely that any character type will be found to be invariably associated with a single form of political system. Nevertheless, certain personality types may indeed be more responsive to one than to another form of government. Their character, then, may be an important determinant of their susceptibility to certain kinds of influence. Thus, Dicks does not argue for the propensity toward authoritarian government *per se* in the German character. The typical German character delineated by Dicks was a type highly susceptible to the style of leadership the Hitler movement offered and extremely vulnerable to the kind of propaganda appeals it utilized. Much the same conclusion is suggested by Erikson's (1950) analysis of the German character and Hitler's appeal to it. Neither analysis should be interpreted as suggesting that the German character, as described, could not under any circumstances adjust to or function in *any* democratic political order. McClelland's analysis (1958) of the distinctive structure of obligations to self and society in Germany and the United States is particularly interesting for the light it throws on this question.

Whatever the distribution of personality types, including leaders, in any population, we will want to know what produces the types. This enormously complex problem is one I have been obliged by limits of space to ignore almost entirely, although it is one of the most fundamental facing the field. The predominant opinion among students of national character is that these types arise mainly out of the socialization process, and that in democratic societies the family structure is one which generates individuals adapted to life in a democracy. The typical argument was forcefully stated by Ralph Linton when he declared: "Nations with authoritarian family structure inevitably seem to develop authoritarian governments, no matter what the official government forms may be. Latin American countries with their excellent democratic constitutions and actual dictatorships would be a case in point" (1951:146).

Linton's opinion is not uniformly held. On the basis of a thorough review of a great deal of relevant empirical research, Herbert Hyman (1959) poses a formidable challenge to this assumption and suggests a number of other factors — particularly experiences in adulthood — which may account for the political orientations we observe in certain groups. Even after we secure data on the distribution of personality characteristics in large populations, there will be much work to be done in discovering what produces the propensity to extremism, how it operates, and what — if anything — changes or modifies it.

Another problem we must face is the relation between personality factors and other forces which affect the political process (*cf.* Levinson 1958). To analyze political participation and political structures through a study of personality and its statistical distribution is, of course, only one of the possible avenues of approach to the problem. Clearly, political institutions and political action cannot be comprehended exclusively or even predominantly by reference to attitudes and values. The history of a people obviously plays a major role in shaping the basic structure of their political institutions. And institutional frameworks, once established, may have an endurance much greater than the formal allegiance to their principles would have indicated. Indeed, once firmly established, institutions have the capacity to develop or generate support among those whose early disposition would hardly have led them to move spontaneously in that direction.

A recent extensive comparative study by S. M. Lipset (1959) of the relation between a complex of factors including industrialization, urbanization, literacy, education, and wealth, reveals that they are highly correlated not only with each other, but also with the existence of stable democratic systems.[9] None of these factors cited by Lipset is at all psychological or attitudinal, but it is interesting to note that in seeking to understand why these factors play such a role, Lipset had to fall back from these more "objective" to more subjective causes, in particular to such concepts as the "effectiveness" and the "legitimacy" of a political system

[9] De Tocqueville made the same point: "Their ancestors gave [the people of the United States] the love of equality and of freedom, but God himself gave them the means of remaining equal and free by placing them on a boundless continent. . . . When the people rules it must be rendered happy or it will overthrow the state, and misery is apt to stimulate it to those excesses to which ambition rouses kings" (1947:185).

in the eyes of its constituents. By effectiveness he means the capacity to satisfy the basic interests of most members of society, or of the most important groups in it, and by legitimacy "the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society" (1960:77). Surely the tolerance of ambiguity, the readiness for compromise, the level of projectivity characteristic of a people or important subgroups, will play a major role in shaping the "effectiveness" of the political system and even its freedom of action *to be* effective. The value placed on autonomy versus control and direction, the strength of needs for power or achievement, the wish for dominance or subordination, the orientation toward authority figures, will all clearly play an important part in determining whether a particular political system is felt by people to be legitimate or not.

Although further refinements are needed, it is not likely that we will make any further unusual leaps along the line of analysis which Lipset has so diligently pursued. By contrast, the role of psychological factors — of attitudes, values, and character traits — in influencing the political process is an almost virgin field which promises a rich harvest. To secure it we must overcome imposing but by no means insuperable obstacles. We need to clarify our concepts, isolating or delineating those personal characteristics which, on theoretical grounds, seem to have the greatest relevance for the development and functioning of the political system. We must also refine our analysis of the political system, so that our descriptive categories are maximally analytical and conducive to comparative study. Our next step must be to assess systematically the distribution of these qualities in different national populations and in important subgroups of those populations. This poses one of the most difficult methodological problems, since the meaning of important terms, the pattern of response to tests, and the interpretation of those responses are highly variable as we move from country to country. On this base we can then proceed to correlational and causal analyses of the relations between opinions, values, and personality on the one hand, and the quality of political participation and the stability of political structures on the other. We may thus develop a comparative social psychology of the political process to support and supplement our traditional study of politics.

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16

WOODROW WILSON AND COLONEL HOUSE

A Personality Study

• *ALEXANDER L. GEORGE and JULIETTE GEORGE*

WILSON'S BOYHOOD

A boy never gets over his boyhood, and never can change those subtle influences which have become a part of him, that were bred in him when he was a child.
Woodrow Wilson

One day when Woodrow Wilson was sixteen years old, his younger cousin, Jessie Bones, came up to him as he sat at his desk practicing shorthand. On the wall where he could see it every time he glanced up hung the portrait of an austere-looking man. Jessie inquired who it was. "That is Gladstone, the greatest statesman that ever lived," the boy answered reverently. "I intend to be a statesman, too."

There is, of course, nothing remarkable in this avowal. Countless adolescents boldly proclaim their intention of becoming statesmen, military heroes, incomparable surgeons or, in this atomic age, explorers of outer space. What is remarkable in this instance is that the young dreamer succeeded in converting his high-flown fantasy into reality. The traits of character which enabled him to do so were forged in his childhood, as such traits usually are. So too were those compulsive tendencies which caused him to be perpetually dissatisfied with himself, his very great accomplishments notwithstand-

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ing, and drove him to ruinously self-defeating behavior when the supreme goal of his life — ratification of the League of Nations Covenant — was at stake. It is to Wilson's early years, then, that we must look for the origins of his superb strength and of his truly classical tragic weakness.

Thomas Woodrow Wilson was born on December 28, 1856, in Staunton, Virginia. His mother, Jessie Woodrow Wilson, came of a learned, religious Scottish family, distinguished through many generations for its scholars and Presbyterian ministers. His father, Joseph Ruggles Wilson, was a Presbyterian minister of Scotch-Irish extraction.

For many generations back Wilson's forebears on both sides were for the most part ministers, elders, professors of theology, or their dutiful wives or children. All, including those who were attracted to other occupations, were deeply religious. Their religion was the very core of their existence. It was a stern Calvinistic doctrine they believed, according to which man is innately depraved, a corrupt sinner who deserves eternal punishment. His only chance for salvation lies in being elected by God to a state of grace and eternal life.

It is not surprising that true subscribers to this dogma are greatly preoccupied with the problem of their state of grace and engage in anxious, sometimes terrified, self-examination for signs that they are or are not among the elect. The tension is heightened by the fact that, strictly speaking, there are no such reliable signs: God, according to His inscrutable will, has preordained each individual's fate and nothing the individual does on this earth can alter the decision as to his eternal destiny. Through the years, however, this severe concept has been mitigated by widespread acceptance of the notion that good works and pure thoughts are signs of election, whereas sinful behavior is a sign of one's doom. It therefore becomes a matter of momentous consequence for the believer to be able to deduce from his examination of his conduct and thoughts that he is among the elect. There is great pressure to do good works and to resist all forms of temptation — indeed, to conquer even the feeling that he is tempted.

It is painful to accept the notion that all men (all infants, even) share a heinous guilt, and to struggle against impulses which are part of the nature of the human animal. Those who succeed in persuading themselves that they may indeed be subjects of God's electing grace are sometimes rewarded with a thrilling sense of freedom from human authority. For such a man is convinced that nothing can separate him from the love of God, that in doing what he conceives to be God's works he is guided and protected by divine strength. Small matter what other men think. No matter, even, if it be necessary to fly in the face of temporal authority. A man's only real responsibility is, through his conscience, to his Lord and Maker.

Such a creed produces men of conviction, who find it possible to cling to their principles no matter what the opposition. Young Tommy heard many tales of the courage of his ancestors. In his youth, he witnessed an example of this variety of tenacity on the part of his uncle, Dr. James Woodrow, a professor of science at the Columbia Theological Seminary. Dr. Woodrow became convinced of the validity of Darwin's theory of evolution, and taught it, at a time when it was anathema to the orthodox. After a long controversy, during which he refused to repudiate his opinion, he was ousted from his position. Wilson's parents admired Dr. Woodrow for his steadfastness. So did Wilson.

The boy Wilson was steeped in a tradition which extolled moral achievement above all else. His family unanimously accepted Calvinistic doctrine and their faith was firmly knitted to the same faith of generations of their forebears. Religion must have appeared to the boy an overwhelming, immutable component of everyday existence. There is ample evidence that this was the case and, further, that it remained so throughout his life. He never permitted himself to question the basic tenets of his church. "So far as religion is concerned," he once remarked, "argument is adjourned." He prayed, on his knees, daily; read the Bible daily; said grace before every meal, attended church regularly. These were the outer expressions of a faith which penetrated to his innermost being.

The Wilsons neither had nor coveted wealth. They did not lack for the necessities, but they were among the genteel poor. In later years, Wilson loved to relate how one day his father met a member of his congregation on the street. The minister's horse and trap were drawn up

to the curb. "Your horse looks very well, Mr. Wilson. Much better than you do," said the parishioner. "Yes," Dr. Wilson retorted. "You see I keep my horse, but I am kept by my congregation!"

Wilson's mother was a rather plain, serious woman, extremely reserved, greatly devoted to her family. There is little in the historical record on the boy's relationship with his mother. He was his parents' third child, their first son. His sister Marion was six years old when he was born; his sister Anne was two. We know from contemporary letters that he was a placid infant — "a fine healthy fellow," "just as fat as he can be," "*beautiful*" and "just as *good* as he can be," according to one description written by Wilson's mother when he was four months old.

". . . I remember how I clung to her (a laughed-at 'mama's boy') till I was a great big fellow," Wilson wrote of his mother many years later in a letter to his wife. "But love of the best womanhood came to me and entered my heart through those apron-strings. If I had not lived with such a mother I could not have won and seemed to deserve — in part, perhaps, deserved, through transmitted virtues — such a wife . . ."

From earliest childhood, his father took an extraordinarily active role in his education. They were closely bound together, the boy and this handsome, impressive, somewhat frightening minister to whom Wilson later habitually referred as "my incomparable father."

Dr. Joseph Ruggles Wilson was an eloquent preacher, a man of learning, wit and great presence — a personage in the community. His physical appearance, too, was distinguished: he was large and well built, with a gaunt face which conveyed something of the intelligence and moral fiber of its owner.

Dr. Wilson spent much time with his family. There were daily prayers, with all the family kneeling together. Evenings, the Doctor often led in the singing of hymns. Or he would read aloud to the assembled household, his rich bass voice full of expression. The novels of Sir Walter Scott and Charles Dickens were especial favorites. Sundays, Tommy attended church services and listened, awestruck, as his father delivered his carefully composed sermons expounding the austere doctrine of his denomination. Sometimes, when certain sad hymns were played, the boy would cry.

Dr. Wilson was noted for his caustic wit. This he directed not only at his contemporaries but at his young son as well. Tommy never retorted and he never rebelled. Instead, he accepted his father's demands for perfection, tried to emulate him, and interpreted his stinging criticisms as humiliating evidence that, try as he might, he was inadequate. He felt eternally inferior to his father, in appearance as well as in accomplishment. He once remarked: "If I had my father's face and figure, it wouldn't make any difference what I said."

Tommy was not enrolled in school until he was ten. He promptly took his place at the foot of his class. There were family conferences between his father, maternal grandfather and uncle James Woodrow about what to do with a child who performed so poorly. We do not know what corrective measures the family attempted, but perhaps something of the boy's feelings at the time can be inferred from a remark Wilson made many years later that he knew how mortifying it is to a boy to fall behind his class in his studies.

One striking aspect of Tommy's slow development was his ignorance of the written alphabet until he was nine and his inability to read readily until he was eleven. It seems hardly likely that Dr. Wilson, who took such pains with his son's education and who revered masterly use of the English language above all other intellectual skills, would have neglected to teach the boy his letters. One wonders whether Tommy's capacity to learn was not reduced by his father's perfectionist demands. Perhaps the Doctor's scorn of fumbling first errors was so painful (or perhaps the mere expectation of such a reaction was so distressing) that the boy renounced the effort altogether. Perhaps, too, failing — *refusing* — to learn was the one way in which the boy dared to express his resentment against his father. In any case, the significant fact is that coming from a home in which reading was an important daily activity, Tommy's reading proficiency was retarded; in a home saturated in a religious atmosphere, he had difficulty learning the catechism; in a family of scholars, he was a conspicuously poor student.

Once literacy was achieved, great new possibilities for rigorous drilling of the boy suggested themselves to Dr. Wilson. Frequently, after he had spoken to his son about one subject or

another, he would ask, "Do you thoroughly understand that?" "Oh, yes," the boy would say. "Very well then, write it out and bring it to me so I can see that you do." Tommy would take great pains to produce a composition that would pass muster. Timorously, he would submit his effort to his father. If the Doctor came upon anything that seemed in the slightest degree ambiguous, he would demand what exactly was meant. Tommy would explain. "Well, you did not say it," Dr. Wilson would snap, "so suppose you try again and see if you can say what you mean this time, and if not we'll have another talk and a third go at it."

Many years later, President Wilson told his wife that time and again he had a fourth and even a fifth "go at it" before his father was satisfied. Another favorite exercise was to examine the classics sentence by sentence and try to rewrite portions of them in better style.

Dr. Wilson had a passion — an obsession — for the most exact use of language. Did the boy, perhaps in the heat of animated conversation, use a word imprecisely? He was interrupted at once and sent to the dictionary to discover his error.

After President Wilson's death, his daughter Margaret summed up her grandfather's pedagogical creed for the benefit of Wilson's official biographer: "His idea was," she said, "that if a lad was of fine tempered steel, the more he was beaten the better he was."

Other relatives, too, had graphic recollections of Dr. Wilson's severity. Helen Bones, Wilson's cousin, reported: ". . . Uncle Joseph was a cruel tease, with a caustic wit and a sharp tongue, and I remember hearing my own family tell indignantly of how Cousin Woodrow suffered under his teasing. He was proud of WW, especially after his son began to show how unusual he was, but only a man as sweet as Cousin Woodrow could have forgotten the severity of the criticism to the value of which he so often paid tribute, in after life."

Another cousin, Jessie Bones, recalled a typical instance of Dr. Wilson's "teasing." The family was assembled at a wedding breakfast. Tommy arrived at the table late. His father apologized on behalf of his son and explained that Tommy had been so greatly excited at the discovery of another hair in his mustache that morning that it had taken him longer to wash and dress. "I remember very distinctly the painful flush that came over the boy's face," Mrs. Brower said.

One can imagine the effect on a boy of such mockery. Indeed, one does not need to resort to imagination. Wilson's own recollections of his youth furnish ample indication of his early fears that he was stupid, ugly, worthless and unlovable. These feelings had rich opportunities for elaboration in his religious convictions concerning the fundamental wickedness of human nature. It is perhaps to this core feeling of inadequacy, of a fundamental worthlessness which must ever be disproved, that the unappeasable quality of his need for affection, power and achievement, and the compulsive quality of his striving for perfection, may be traced.

For one of the ways in which human beings troubled with low estimates of themselves seek to obliterate their inner pain is through high achievement and the acquisition of power. The trouble is that no matter how dazzling, their accomplishments are likely to prove only momentarily satisfying because the deep-seated low estimates persist and in short order begin to clamor anew for assuagement.

Wilson seemed enmeshed in such an unending attempt to prove to his father, to his God — to himself — that he was a capable and worthwhile human being. As a child he determined he would do something magnificent in the world. An old family servant recalls how once Tommy announced solemnly at the dinner table, "Papa, when I get to be a man, I'm going to have a lofty position." Dr. Wilson laughed good-naturedly. But to the boy this was no childish joke. He was in dead earnest. He spent his childhood and youth industriously preparing to be a great man.

It is by now a generally accepted fact among psychologists that in the process of raising their children, parents inevitably arouse a certain amount of resentment against themselves. For to induce a child to conduct himself in a civilized fashion necessarily involves requiring him to abandon many forms of pleasurable behavior. This the child resents and he experiences anger at the parent who thus thwarts him. Specialists in these matters still are not agreed as to what kinds of parental behavior produce what varieties and degrees of resentment. But it is probably not unreasonable to suggest that a boy like Wilson, upon whom very high demands

were made, had to contend with an ample load of anger, which was certainly not mitigated by his father's penchant for ridiculing him.

It is also a truism among modern psychologists that the manner in which a child handles his resentment of his parents is of crucial importance in the development of his personality. Some children feel free to express it openly, and in the fortunate event that the parent in question is able to accept the child's hostile feelings and reassure him, a potential source of future difficulty is averted. Some children, on the other hand, are afraid to express such negative feelings openly, commonly out of fear of what reprisals the parent would take if he knew. Sometimes the child is so terrified that he dares not even recognize the existence of such feelings within himself but, rather, seeks constantly to persuade himself of a surpassing devotion to his parent. This seems to have been Wilson's method of handling the anxiety engendered by his hostile feelings.

There is not a shred of evidence that he ever once openly rebelled against his father's authority. Instead, he submitted and became an extravagantly devoted son. It was a devotion which lasted throughout his life. Tommy was always obedient and respectful. He delighted in doing chores for his father. As a young man, he cheerfully helped his father with the dull task of writing the minutes of the General Assembly of the Church. Even in successful maturity, he retained a feeling of incompetence in his father's presence. He once said the most difficult speech he ever had to make was one during which he suddenly espied his father in the audience, he felt exactly like a boy again, as though he would have to answer to his father afterward for what he said.

When the Doctor grew old and ill, Wilson insisted that he live in Princeton with him, although the care of the increasingly helpless old man was burdensome. A fellow professor recalls that when father and son were together the son was a pupil. When Wilson was President of Princeton and involved in an enervating campus imbroglio, he nevertheless found time to try to lift the old Doctor's spirits by singing some of their favorite hymns to him.

Perhaps nothing more vividly illustrates how Wilson venerated his father than some of the letters that passed between them. Here is one, written when Wilson was thirty-two years old, and a rising young scholar. Its tone is typical.

My precious father,

My thoughts are full of you and dear "Dode"* all the time. Tennessee seems so far away for a chap as hungry as I am for a sight of the two men whom I love. As the Christmas recess approaches I realize, as I have so often before, the pain there is in a season of holiday and rejoicing away from you. As you know, one of the chief things about which I feel most warranted in rejoicing is that I am your son. I realize the benefit of being your son more and more as my talents and experience grow; I recognize the strength growing in me as of the nature of your strength; I become more and more conscious of the hereditary wealth I possess, that capital of principle, of literary force and skill, of capacity for firsthand thought; and I feel daily more and more bent toward creating in my own children that combined respect and tender devotion for their father that you gave your children for you. Oh, how happy I should be, if I could make them think of me as I think of you! You have given me a love that grows, that is stronger in me now that I am a man than it was when I was a boy, and which will be stronger in me when I am an old man than it is now — a love, in brief, that is rooted and grounded in reason, and not in filial instinct merely — a love resting upon abiding foundations of service, recognizing you as in a certain real sense the author of all I have to be grateful for! I bless God for my noble, strong, and saintly mother and for my incomparable father. Ask "Dode" if he does not subscribe? and tell him that I love my brother passionately.

. . . Ellie joins me in unbounded love to you both.

Your devoted son,
Woodrow

Dr. Wilson's death in 1903 did not diminish his hold on his son. Joseph Tumulty, President Wilson's private secretary, has told how one day during World War I, the President interrupted a Cabinet meeting to receive an old friend of his father. While the old man praised him, the President stood like a bashful schoolboy. Then the visitor said, "Well, well, Woodrow, what shall I say to you? . . . I shall say to you what your dear old father would have said were he here: 'Be a good boy, my son, and may God bless you and take care of you!" The President wept.

Nothing in the many descriptions Wilson gave of his relationship with his father suggests that he was aware of any feeling other than exceeding devotion to him. If ever he was aware of his hostility toward his father, he seems to have banished it from consciousness and to

* Wilson's younger brother Joseph.

have lived in fear of the possibility of ever stumbling upon the knowledge. All his life long, he shrank from reflecting about his inner motivations. The very idea of such self-examination made him uneasy. He once wrote in a letter that he had always had an all but unconquerable distaste for discussing the deep things that underlie motives and behavior. He believed the solution to personal difficulties was rigorous self-discipline. Mary Hoyt, a young relative, reported that he tended to be, as she put it, "hard-hearted" toward anyone who seemed to him lacking in self-control. He was critical, for example, of an artist acquaintance who was unable to work because of an attack of melancholia. "Cousin Mary," he said, "it is possible to control your thoughts, you know." He seemed to fear that if he let his thoughts flow freely some nameless danger would overwhelm him. He once remarked that he never dared let himself go because he did not know where he would stop.

Modern psychologists generally agree that unacceptable thoughts and feelings anxiously dispatched from awareness do not obligingly depart once and for all. Rather, they establish themselves elsewhere within the mind and continue to direct behavior, frequently in highly disruptive fashion.

Not only did Wilson grow up with a taste for achievement and power: he must exercise power *alone*. He could brook no interference. *His* will must prevail, if he wished it to. He bristled at the slightest challenge to his authority. Such a characteristic might well have represented a rebellion against the domination of his father, whose authority he had never dared openly to challenge. Throughout his life his relationships with others seemed shaped by an inner command never again to bend his will to another man's. He seems to have experienced men who were determined to make their viewpoints prevail against his own — men like Dean West at Princeton or, later, Senator Lodge — as an unbearable threat. They seem to have stirred in him ancient memories of his capitulation to his father and he resisted with ferocity. *He* must dominate, out of fear of being dominated. It was a need so strong that nothing — except, on occasion, the lure of achieving higher office — could overcome his determination to bring his opponents to heel. Not the pleas of his friends. Not even the recognition, deep within himself, that sometimes it is necessary to compromise with one's adversaries to achieve desirable goals.

The validity of the foregoing interpretation and of others that follow is necessarily a matter of opinion. No incontrovertible proof can be offered. Nor can any one incident be relied upon to sustain this or any other theory of Wilson's motivation. It is only when the man's career is viewed as a whole that a repetition of certain basically similar behavior is discernible. Let the reader consider whether these patterns of behavior become more consistently comprehensible in terms of the explanations herein offered than in terms of other explanations. That will be the best test of their usefulness.

If Dr. Wilson was a martinet, there were other facets to his personality as well. He could be full of fun. There are tales of games of tag between the dignified minister and his young son, the participants progressing noisily from the study to the garden, to the delighted consternation of the female contingent of the family. The two played chess and billiards together. They took long walks and Dr. Wilson spoke to the boy without condescension of his hopes and problems. He was free in his expression of affection. He often greeted his son with a kiss. "My Precious Son," his letters generally began. His ambition for his son was boundless. Long before it seemed likely that Wilson would enter politics, Dr. Wilson regarded him as presidential timber, but confided to an acquaintance that "the interests" would never countenance such a choice. Once, at a dinner in Princeton, when Wilson was a professor there, the old Doctor, bursting with pride, leaned over and asked a friend in a loudly audible whisper, "Are you listening to Woodrow? Isn't he brilliant?" At a moment when he felt gravely ill in Princeton, he summoned his three granddaughters to his bedside and admonished them to remember always that their father was a very great man.

Dr. Wilson communicated to his son a solid sense of belonging, both to a religious tradition and to his family. He truly nurtured his son, perhaps unwisely in some respects, but with an unflinching acceptance of his responsibilities. It is a fact of fundamental significance that Dr. Wilson's strict training of his son was conducted in the context of genuine concern for the boy and pride in him. If it is necessary in order

to understand some of Wilson's later difficulties to postulate a subterranean hostility between Wilson and his father, it is certainly also necessary in order to understand the man as a whole, to underscore the positive influence of the elder Wilson.

The Apprentice Statesman

The profession I chose was politics; the profession I entered was the law. I entered the one because I thought it would lead to the other.

Woodrow Wilson to Ellen Axson, October 30, 1883

When Tommy was a year old, the family moved from Staunton to Augusta, Georgia, where Dr. Wilson became pastor of the First Presbyterian Church. He performed his duties there with distinction, and was rewarded with one of the much-coveted professorships at the Columbia Theological Seminary in Columbia, South Carolina. The family moved there in 1870. Tommy was fourteen.

In Columbia, he was enrolled in a private school where, again, he was a mediocre student. A classmate remembers him as somehow different from the other boys — aloof and extremely dignified. He was much alone. Not for him the usual boyish sports: he could not even catch a ball properly. He developed a passion for ships and spent hour after hour, day after day, drawing beautifully shaded sketches of various types of vessels. He became the imaginary admiral of an imaginary navy and composed daily reports of its activities. Another favorite exercise was daily handwriting practice, to cultivate a flowing script like that of an admired uncle.

It was a time of preoccupation with religion. In addition to attending church regularly and sitting in on some of his father's lectures at the seminary, he took part in religious meetings conducted by a young theological student. In the summer of 1873, when he was going on seventeen, he applied for, and was granted, membership in the First Presbyterian Church of Columbia.

It was a time, too, of preoccupation with his future. He had by now decided he wanted to be a statesman and set about studying the lives of great men.

Although he seemed "different" to his fellows, he was generally well liked. His distinctiveness was not of the sort that gets a boy labeled "queer" and earns him ridicule. Rather he seemed to be mysteriously marked for eminence and was accorded respect.

A few months before his seventeenth birthday, Wilson entered Davidson College, a Presbyterian institution near Charlotte, North Carolina. His chief interest there was in the debating society. His academic preparation was below average and he was accepted with conditions in several subjects. Whether it was the pressure of study, the strain of being away from home, or some other conflict about which there is no information, the fact is that at the end of the academic year he was in such poor general health that it was decided that he should return home and continue his studies there, with a view to eventually entering Princeton.

He remained at home (first in Columbia and then in Wilmington, North Carolina, where in the fall of 1874 Dr. Wilson became pastor of the First Presbyterian Church) for fifteen months. He read, discussed books and great men with the one good friend he made in Wilmington, wandered dreamily about the docks, paid a few desultory calls on local girls. Those are the essentials of what is known of his activities during this period.

In September, 1875, Wilson entered Princeton. At once, he joined the Whig Society, a debating club, and set about cultivating his oratorical skills. He combed the library for the speeches of great orators through the ages. The woods near Princeton (and, during vacations, his father's empty church) resounded to his rendition of Burke's orations and the speeches of Gladstone, Bright, Patrick Henry, Daniel Webster and Demosthenes. "What is the object of oratory?" he asked in an article published in the *Princetonian* at the end of his sophomore year. "Its object is persuasion and conviction — the control of other minds by a strange personal influence and power." Oratory, he argued, is not an end but a means — a means, indeed, which it behooved any young aspirant to statecraft to master.

He was intrigued by an article he discovered in *Gentleman's Magazine*, entitled "The Orator," which analyzed the role of oratory in political life and evaluated British statesmen in terms of their oratorical abilities. It was a

case of an eager mind meeting just the sort of stimulus most capable of stirring its imagination. He began to compare the British and American systems of government, fairly devouring books on political theory, history and politics. To some students, these were dull pursuits. But to Wilson, who read with an eye to giving more specific direction to his own vaulting ambitions, they were excitingly alive. He decided he would like to be a Senator and wrote out a number of cards identifying himself, after his name, as "Senator from Virginia."

There were a number of other young men in Wilson's class earnestly interested in political affairs. With some of them, the would-be Senator formed close friendships. With one of them, Charles Talcott, he made a solemn covenant binding them to school their powers and passions in order to establish the principles in which they believed; to seek knowledge in order to gain power; to drill themselves in all the arts of persuasion. This agreement was no mere effusion of sophomoric idealism. Wilson took it seriously and so did Talcott. Long after their graduation from college they corresponded about ways of implementing it.

Then there was the talk — the endless, earnest talk of college students about everything under the sun. Politics, religion, morality, hopes and ambitions, all were grist for the mill. Many a discussion ended with Wilson saying half jokingly, "When I meet you in the Senate, I'll argue that out with you."

There were lighter moments as well, in the company of good friends. We have glimpses of Wilson speaking about "the ladies," dancing a hornpipe, telling jokes, sometimes in Negro, Scotch or Irish dialect. His humor and gaiety were a delight to his intimates not only at Princeton, but all through his life. He was a master of the cancan. He could make ludicrous faces, which never failed to send any children present into gales of laughter. He could prance about in a feather boa, trailing a velvet curtain, uttering banalities in falsetto voice in imitation of a society lady greeting friends. He had an impersonation of "the drunken man" which became a family favorite along with a delicious rendition of a pompous Englishman. All this impishness somehow did not detract one whit from his dignity and, one suspects, therein lay the special charm of his nonsense. This lighter side of him only his family and close friends knew. To those not close to him, and particularly to his opponents, he seemed austere and humorless. Nor can it be denied that in his relations with them, in fact he generally was.

An inspection of Wilson's grades at Princeton could not lead an impartial observer to the conclusion that he was a brilliant under-graduate. In a real sense, of course, he was. With subjects which did not touch his interest, he had neither patience nor noteworthy success. But when his interest was aroused, he did not need the lure of good grades to motivate him to study, nor was his study in the nature of stolidly committing masses of facts to memory. Through his capacity to relate the contents of books to his own aspirations, all manner of information sprang to exciting life. He could master the rules of order with avidity, for they were to him a highly practical tool. He could absorb histories of political institutions, for he regarded them as the context in which men — men like himself — must function.

The political system which most appealed to him was the British and a major reason for the preference was that in the House of Commons, great leadership was a function of great oratory and debating skill. In the United States, on the other hand, the committee system in Congress tended to reduce the importance of discussion on the floor. He set out to document this hypothesis and the result was an article entitled "Cabinet Government in the United States." It was published in a then prominent journal, *International Review*. (The editor who accepted it, by the way, was a young historian by the name of Henry Cabot Lodge.) Nor were reading and writing about the advantages of the British system enough. He must put his ideas to a practical test. He organized his friends into a "Liberal Debating Club," composed a constitution modeled on the British and was installed forthwith as Prime Minister.

Princeton was a stimulating experience for Wilson. He was able to a large extent to follow his own bent, and made fruitful use of the opportunity. He also gained in self-confidence. He won honors as a debater. He made friends and reveled in the discovery that they accepted him not only as a person but as a leader too. He wrote for the *Princetonian*. His article on "Cabinet Government" was widely praised. Triumphantly he wrote his father of a great discovery: he found that he had a mind!

This happy era ended in 1879 when Wilson was graduated. His great problem was, what next? A young man of twenty-two who wishes to be, simply, a great statesman, is in a poignant dilemma. Society fairly efficiently defines the alternative ways of proceeding toward various occupational goals: a would-be physician must go to medical school; a would-be businessman seeks a job, starts an enterprise himself or, in Wilson's youth, might still strike out west. But what does a young man burning to be a world leader do? Wilson pondered this problem in the months following his graduation and decided to study law. "The profession I chose was politics; the profession I entered was the law. I entered the one because I thought it would lead to the other," he explained in a letter a few years later. In the fall of 1879, he enrolled in the law school of the University of Virginia.

Interested in the broadest problems of government, Wilson found it tedious to memorize endless cases illustrating, to him, abysmally uninteresting points of law. But the conviction that legal training would be useful later on sustained him. He described himself in a letter to his friend Talcott on December 31, 1879, as swallowing vast masses of legal technicalities "with as good a grace and as straight a face as an offended palate will allow." While, of course, he had no idea of abandoning his studies, "one may be permitted an occasional complaint, if for no other purpose than to relieve his feelings. To relieve my feelings, therefore, I wish now to record the confession that I am most terribly bored by the noble study of Law sometimes, though in the main I am thoroughly satisfied with my choice of a profession. . . . This excellent thing, the Law, gets as monotonous as that other immortal article of food, *Hash,* when served with such endless frequency."

Extracurricular activities were more satisfying. He joined one of the two leading debating societies, the Jefferson. He so distinguished himself that some of the debates in which he participated had to be moved to larger halls to accommodate the overflow audience, and some of his remarks were reported in the newspapers. He was elected President of the Jefferson Society. Promptly he revised its constitution, a project he undertook with much contagious enthusiasm and carried to a highly successful conclusion. He contributed articles to the University magazine. He became, in short, a popular and respected student leader.

These successes only intensified his larger ambitions. "Those indistinct plans of which we used to talk grow on me daily," he wrote Charles Talcott on May 20, 1880, "until a sort of calm confidence of great things to be accomplished has come over me which I am puzzled to analyse the nature of. I can't tell whether it is a mere figment of my own inordinate vanity, or a deep-rooted determination which it will be within my power to act up to."

However irksome his formal studies, Wilson was obliged to spend a great deal of time and energy on them. He was also deeply engaged in outside activities, not only debating but daily practice of elocution and composition — and a courtship — as well. This would be a heavy load for almost anyone. It was a crushing one for the tense young Wilson. In December, 1880, he collapsed. The major symptoms, apparently, were gastrointestinal, and so severe that he had to leave the University and return home.

For the next year and a half, he continued his studies alone, doggedly plugging away at his law books and in his spare time training himself for that nebulous great future in which he still had unshakable faith. A casualty of this period was his first name, Thomas. After experimenting with the various ways of signing his name, he decided "Woodrow Wilson" was the most euphonious possibility.

After eighteen months of solitary study, "Woodrow Wilson" resolved to launch his professional career. The thing to do, he decided, was to set up a law office in an expanding community. Atlanta, Georgia, was the city he finally chose.

In June, 1882, the young hopeful arrived in Atlanta, and immediately called on Edward Ireland Renick whom he had known as a fellow student at the University of Virginia. Renick, too, was about to establish a law office. They decided to join forces and the firm of Renick and Wilson was born. Elated, Wilson wrote his parents about the great development. They promptly sent their good wishes, some new shirts and a few pieces of office furniture. In October, Wilson passed his bar examination. In high spirits, Renick and Wilson awaited bids for their services. They waited in vain. Clients did not pour in. They did not even trickle in.

Wilson was burning for a chance to demonstrate his forensic brilliance. None materialized. Day after day the partners sat in their office, their time disconcertingly their own.

There was leisure aplenty to become a frequent spectator of sessions of the Georgia Senate, then still crowded with the post-Civil War mediocrities and worse who had risen to local prominence throughout the South. The oratory Wilson heard did not call to mind that of Demosthenes, Gladstone, Calhoun or Webster. The perspiring legislators, with their crude and ignorant ways, repelled him. This was not the statesmanship he dreamed of. And law was not proving to be a steppingstone to even these vulgar local political opportunities. Law, in fact, was not proving to be a way to earn the cost of his room and board, let alone any of the amenities. So far from distinguishing himself in arguing great legal principles, he was unable to hold his own even in the scrabble for the petty claims cases which might at least have been his financial salvation. He seems not to have attracted a single client — except his mother, who entrusted certain business matters to him.

". . . The potentially great firm of Renick and Wilson," he wrote Heath Dabney January 11, 1883 "[is] doing *very* little, but hoping very *much* . . ." The months dragged by. Wilson spent his time reading, mostly history and political science, interspersed with Milton, Shelley and Keats. He practiced composition every afternoon.

The contrast between the intellectual delight his studies afforded and the niggardly opportunities to engage in stimulating work, even if he were successful at obtaining the sort of cases that seemed most readily available, began to weigh on him. The practice of law seemed more and more a blind alley. Less than a year after venturing so exultantly into the world of practical affairs, he decided to return to university life. ". . . I have about made up my mind to study, at Johns Hopkins University . . ." he wrote Heath Dabney, May 11, 1883.

> In doing this I am, beyond all reasonable doubt, following the natural bent of my mind. I can never be happy unless I am enabled to lead an intellectual life. . . . But hereabouts culture is very little esteemed; not, indeed, at all because it is a drug on the market, but because there is so little of it that its good qualities are not appreciated. . . . I suffer very much in such a community for lack of intellectual companionship.
>
> But the greater matter is that the practice of the law, when conducted for purposes of gain, is antagonistic to the best interests of the intellectual life. . . . The philosophical *study* of the law — which must be a pleasure to any thoughtful man — is a very different matter from its scheming and haggling practice . . .
>
> Now, here it is that the whole secret of my new departure lies. You know my passion for original work, you know my love for composition, my keen desire to become a master of philosophical discourse, to become capable and apt in instructing as great a number of persons as possible. My plain necessity, then, is some profession which will afford me a moderate support, favourable conditions for study, and considerable leisure; what better can I be, therefore, than a professor, a lecturer upon subjects whose study most delights me?

The year in Atlanta took its toll of Wilson's political aspirations. Not that those aspirations ceased to exist. They continued unabated. But exposure to existence without the protection of either home or college atmosphere forced him to the conclusion that he must make an adjustment which would afford him an income and at least some satisfaction, even if not the most deeply desired. As an academician, after all, he could look forward to exerting influence through writing and teaching, even if he could not directly participate in governmental affairs.

The decision to set his sights upon a more attainable occupation than "statesmanship" was facilitated by a momentous event. He fell in love. Before long, he was dreaming of getting married. How could he, though, until he had made some sensible career adjustment?

The young lady was Ellen Louise Axson, who, like Wilson, was a child of the Presbyterian manse. She was, from all accounts, a rare human being. Altogether accepting of her womanly role, she also had literary and artistic interests of her own. Wilson delighted in her capacity to understand his intellectual pursuits and valued her opinions. Above all, she truly understood Wilson's temperament and catered lovingly to his need for a continuous flow of affection and approval. And how he thirsted for her reassurances! "It isn't pleasant or convenient to have strong passions," he once wrote her. ". . . I have the uncomfortable feeling that I am carrying a volcano about with me. My salvation is in being loved. . . . There surely never lived a man with whom love was

a more critical matter than it is with me!" This letter was written during their engagement. Many others, written long afterward, testify to the persistence of these feelings.

Wilson and Ellen Axson became engaged in September, 1883, two days before he arrived in Baltimore to enter Johns Hopkins. "My purpose in coming to the university," he wrote on his application form, "is to qualify myself for teaching the studies I wish to pursue, namely, history and political science, as well as to fit myself for those special studies of constitutional history upon which I have already bestowed some attention."

Wilson applied himself to his studies with furious industry. As always, he regarded the formal course work as little more than a necessary evil, and conserved his best energy for the reading and writing projects he prescribed himself. He undertook the writing of two books. One was a history of American economic thought and was never published. The other was *Congressional Government*, which attempted to evaluate American governmental institutions in terms of the day-to-day operation of our constitutional system.

He labored with a passion for perfection. "I *must* be true to myself," he wrote his fiancée. ". . . No chance of getting my name before the public shall tempt me to do what I should some day regard as beneath my reputation, as weakly done." He berated himself for the deficiencies of his writing style and set himself a standard that few mortals could meet.

In addition to all his other activities, Wilson sought out the debating society and became one of its leading lights. His oratory dazzled its members. Their warm response dazzled Wilson. He enjoyed speaking, he wrote Ellen Axson, because "it sets my mind — all my faculties — aglow." He felt possessed of confidence and self-command when he spoke and was so exhilarated that it was hard to go to sleep afterward. He told her of the "absolute joy in facing and conquering a hostile audience . . . or thawing out a cold one."

Wilson was irresistibly drawn to the debating societies of every university he attended. And he was irresistibly drawn to the task of revising each club's constitution, along the lines of the British parliamentary system. So at Johns Hopkins. At Wilson's instance, its members converted the Hopkins Literary Society into the "Hopkins House of Commons," and adopted a constitution of Wilson's composition. He promptly reported this success and the great pleasure he took in it to his fiancée, and noted: "I have a sense of power in dealing with men collectively which I do not feel always in dealing with them singly. In the former case the pride of reserve does not stand so much in my way as it does in the latter. One feels no sacrifice of pride necessary in courting the favour of an assembly of men such as he would have to make in seeking to please one man." His success stirred his ancient ambitions. He longed, he wrote his fiancée, "to do immortal work."

The course around which the intellectual life of political science graduate students revolved was Dr. Herbert B. Adams' seminar in history. To this group, Wilson read chapters of his *Congressional Government* as he completed them. Dr. Adams and the students were greatly impressed. Wilson toiled away at his manuscript from January to October, 1884. At last it was complete. In some trepidation, he sent it to Houghton, Mifflin and Co. Less than two months later, the young author had stupendous news: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. wanted to publish the book. "They have actually offered me as good terms as if I were already a well-known writer! The success is of such proportions as almost to take my breath away — it has distanced my biggest hopes," Wilson wrote Ellen Axson.

Significantly, the first elation was quickly followed by a siege of depression. He was restless. He could not even for a while rest on his laurels. In a letter to Ellen Axson, he confessed his low spirits and explained that "success does not flush or elate me, except for the moment." The acceptance of the book had pleased him, of course, "but it has sobered me a good deal too. The question is, What next? . . . I must push on: to linger would be fatal."

Congressional Government was published in January, 1885. Gamaliel Bradford, reviewing it in the *Nation*, termed it "one of the most important books, dealing with political subjects, which have ever issued from the American press." The book reviews were alive with praise for the brilliant young Hopkins student. Again, Wilson was elated but in the midst of triumph, Ellen Axson sensed an ineffable sadness and gently inquired about it. Wilson wrote her a remarkably revealing reply, dated February 24, 1885:

Yes . . . there is, and has long been, in my mind a "lurking sense of disappointment and *loss*, as if I had missed from my life something upon which both my gifts and inclinations gave me a claim"; I do feel a very real regret that I have been shut out from my heart's *first* — primary — ambition and purpose, which was, to take an active, if possible a leading, part in public life, and strike out for myself, if I had the ability, a *statesman's* career. That is my heart's, — or, rather, my *mind's* — deepest secret. . . . Had I had independent means of support, even of the most modest proportions, I should doubtless have sought an entrance into politics *anyhow*, and have tried to fight my way to predominant influence even amidst the hurly-burly and helter-skelter of Congress. I have a strong instinct of leadership, an unmistakably oratorical temperament, and the keenest possible delight in affairs; and it has required very constant and stringent schooling to content me with the sober methods of the scholar and the man of letters. I have no patience for the tedious toil of what is known as "research"; I have a passion for interpreting great thoughts to the world; I should be complete if I could inspire a great movement of opinion, if I could read the experiences of the past into the practical life of the men of to-day and so communicate the thought to the minds of the great mass of the people as to impel them to great political achievements. . . . My feeling has been that such literary talents as I have are *secondary* to my equipment for other things: that my power to write was meant to be a handmaiden to my power to speak and to organize action. Of course it is quite possible that I have been all along entirely misled in this view: I am ready to accept the providential ordering of my life as conclusive on that point. Certainly I have taken the course which will, with God's favour, enable me to realize *most* of what I at first proposed to myself, and I do not in the least repine at the necessity which has shut me out from all other courses of life. It is for this reason that I have never made these confessions so fully before: I did not want even to *seem* to be discontented with my lot in life. I shall write with no less diligence of preparation, both moral and mental, and with no less effort to put all that is best of myself into my books because I have had to give up a cherished ambition to be an actor in the affairs about which only my *pen* can now be busy.

However valiant his disavowal of discontent, every sentence of this letter bespeaks the man's longing for the career of his first choice. His acceptance of his lot and determination to do his best with the opportunities open to him only underline the poignancy of his disappointment. In the quarter century following the publication of *Congressional Government*, Wilson achieved a degree of distinction in the academic world seldom equaled before or since. He earned many honors, some of which truly pleased him. But none of his academic triumphs could obliterate that undercurrent of restless dissatisfaction which was the man's fundamental mood. None could be enjoyed without a nostalgic pang for another kind of triumph which he yearned for to the depths of his soul but which, reason told him, was forever beyond his grasp. In short, for a quarter of a century, Wilson felt, in a crucial area of his existence, painfully unfulfilled.

Congressional Government established its author as a promising young scholar. His reputation was by now something more than local. He began to receive offers of teaching posts. The one he accepted was from a college for women which had just been founded — Bryn Mawr. His salary was to be fifteen hundred dollars per year. On such a stipend, a man could support a wife, even if only modestly. On June 24, 1885, Wilson and Ellen Axson were married. "Can you keep a secret?" Ellen had exclaimed to her brother. "He is the greatest man in the world and the best." Her tender admiration lasted until her death twenty-nine years later.

For any period in their marriage, one can dip into their correspondence or the reminiscences of friends and relatives who knew the household well, and emerge with evidence of Wilson's dependence on his wife's love and her unfailingly tender response. Nine years after their wedding, he could write: "It is so *dull* to be away from you. Life is so much more *commonplace* without you. That is one of the depressing and degrading things you have saved me from: a commonplace life. It is so fresh and sweet and interesting where you are." Seventeen years after their wedding, she could write him: "How do you expect me to keep my head, you dear thing, when you send me such letters as you have done recently — when you lavish upon me such delicious praise? Surely there was never such a lover before, and even after all these years it seems almost too good to be true that you are *my* lover. All I can say in return is that I love you as you deserve to be loved, — as much as you can possibly *want* to be loved."

Years after Wilson's death, Mary Hoyt, a young cousin who had lived with the Wilsons for a year and often visited afterward, wrote a memorandum for Ray Stannard Baker: ". . . I cannot express to you the loveliness of life in

that home. It was filled with so much kindness and courtesy, with so much devotion between Ellen and Cousin Woodrow, that the air always seemed to have a kind of sparkle."

The Wilsons moved to Bryn Mawr in September, 1885. Wilson dutifully set about preparing his courses, which were in modern history. But he found teaching women uninspiring, and being supervised by a female dean abhorrent. Just six months after he arrived, we find him visiting Washington to investigate the possibility of getting a place in the State Department. Nothing came of this attempt.

His self-esteem suffered another blow. Through the good offices of his friend, Robert Bridges, he was invited to address a Princeton alumni meeting in New York. In his eagerness to perform well he became nervous, solemn and execrably dull. Not this time the joy of "facing and conquering an audience!" To Wilson's mortification, some of his auditors laughed aloud and others walked out. He returned to Bryn Mawr feeling profoundly humiliated and discouraged. Here he was, trapped teaching women which, so he said, relaxed one's mental muscle; he had failed miserably as an orator — for he so magnified the importance of this incident that he tormented himself for years with this idea; his economic situation was critical, for his wife was about to have a baby and even in those days it was no simple matter for three to exist on fifteen hundred dollars a year. There seemed only one thing he could still fasten his hopes to: his writing.

He conceived a plan for a monumental work, tentatively titled *The Philosophy of Politics*, which would trace, in great detail, the origins and development of democratic government. This was to be his magnum opus, a book which would become a classic. He was prepared to devote years to preliminary research before even beginning to write. As a start, he began to collect data on the systems of government of every nation in the world. There was, he found, no adequate single volume on the subject. He undertook to write one, to be called *The State*, for D. C. Heath & Co.

For three years, in his all-too-scarce spare hours, he labored painstakingly on *The State*. His teaching duties increased, but not his pleasure in them. He tried to augment his income by giving outside lectures and writing articles. The time-consuming activities connected solely with earning a bare living took most of his energy. He grew increasingly oppressed by the feeling that on the slim margin of time left over for the pursuit of his own studies, he would never be able to make much headway. "I don't see how a literary life can be built up on foundations of undergraduate instruction," he wrote his wife on October 4, 1887. "That instruction compels you to live with the commonplaces, the A.B.C. of every subject. . . . You get weary of the plodding and yet you get habituated to it, and find all excursions aside difficult — more and more so. What *is* a fellow to do? How is he to earn bread and at the same time find leisure for thoughts detached from the earning of bread?"

The strain began to tell on his health. He confided to an old friend that he feared he would break down if he remained at Bryn Mawr. It was not merely the amount of work but the aridity of it which fatigued him. He began to cast about for some alternative, and was delighted when he was offered a post at Wesleyan University. The salary was higher than at Bryn Mawr. And the students were men!

In September, 1888, Wilson moved his family to Middletown, Connecticut, and began to teach at Wesleyan. The Wilsons occupied a comfortable old house on High Street, which Charles Dickens once described as "the most most beautiful avenue in America." The gnawing discomforts, endured throughout their stay at Bryn Mawr, of cramped living quarters and insufficient money, were now eased. Even more important, here Wilson found the students and faculty more stimulating than at Bryn Mawr. They could serve as a foil for his efforts. His spirits soared.

Reminiscences of some of his students testify to the man's genius for communicating his intellectual enthusiasm. He demanded the best of himself; he inspired the best efforts of his students. He quickly gravitated to the University's debating society, and it will not surprise the reader to learn that he decided it needed to be reorganized into a "House of Commons." The idea took hold. "Cabinets" were formed and clung tenaciously to life as equally tenacious young politicians sought to persuade "Commons" to unseat them. The "House of Commons" became an exciting outlet for the students' competitive spirit. The supremacy of

football as their favorite sport was threatened!

Wilson even took an interest in football. He was as enthusiastic a rooter as anyone on that football-loving campus. Between games, he would exhort the players to have faith in their ability to defeat even the big-college teams. During games, when the outlook seemed dark, Wilson would rush onto the field and lead cheers. Wesleyan had a hugely successful season. Wilson became one of the most popular professors on campus.

The State was published in the fall of 1889, and enhanced Wilson's growing reputation. His outside lectures were beginning to attract favorable attention. He was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and made president of the Johns Hopkins Alumni Association. At last he was, in small measure, at least, finding a way to apply his talents.

"Have I told you," he wrote his wife on March 9, 1889, "that latterly — since I have been here, a distinct *feeling* of maturity — or rather of maturing — has come over me? The *boyish* feeling that I have so long had and cherished is giving place, consciously, to another feeling — the feeling that I am no longer young (though not old quite!) and that I need no longer hesitate (as I have so long and sensitively done) to assert myself and my opinions in the presence of and against the selves and opinions of old men, 'my elders.' "

Despite these various satisfactions, the man felt larger than the opportunity. "Though this is in truth a delightful place to work, it is not a sufficiently *stimulating* place . . . ," he wrote his friend Robert Bridges. From the time he had first thought of teaching, he dreamed of the political science department of Princeton University as his destination. At this time a reorganization and expansion of the department were under way. Bridges was in a position to advance Wilson's candidacy, and Wilson gratefully accepted his help. A meeting with President Patton of Princeton was arranged. Wilson made a good impression. Eventually, an offer was made. Wilson accepted joyfully. His career at Princeton — it lasted twenty years, twelve as professor and eight as president of the university — began in September, 1890.

In a real sense, when Wilson returned to Princeton, he had "arrived." For he did not consider Prinecton a mere way station to a better university. Whatever capacity he had for achievement in academic life could be realized at Princeton. Here was an institution fully worthy of his mettle. Now was the time to give vent to every talent. He accepted Princeton as the place where he was destined to do his life-work.

A flood of pent-up energy poured forth. Wilson's performance at Princeton, from the very start, was superlative. His class lectures were celebrated. He applied all his carefully cultivated dramatic skill to the facts of American constitutional law, international law, English common law and administration. Thirty years later, some of his students could still recall his picturesque description of this or that historical event, so that it remained forever meaningful to them. Sometimes, at the end of a particularly brilliant performance — and they were *performances* — the students would impulsively burst into applause.

He took an active interest in faculty affairs. His contributions to the discussions were cogent, frequently witty and enormously stimulating. He had a way of making whatever he spoke about seem important. An aura of dignity and virtue surrounded the man, and he had the gift of communicating a sense of elevating rectitude to those who adopted his viewpoint. Many of his colleagues were attracted to him as a leader, and he quite naturally slipped into the role of their spokesman.

He was writing too, prolifically, and his books and articles spread his fame far beyond Princeton. So did his outside speeches, for which he now had many more invitations than he could accept. He broadened the scope of his talks, spoke about current affairs to men of affairs. He was coming to the attention of the nation's leaders.

Such outstanding accomplishments resulted in literally scores of offers from other institutions. Whenever a university presidency was open, it seemed, Wilson was sought to fill the post. In quick succession, he was asked to become president of the Universities of Illinois, Virginia, Alabama, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Washington and Lee. The more other universities pursued him, the more determined the trustees became to persuade him to remain at Princeton. They approved an unusual arrangement which provided that several friends of Princeton would contribute money to increase Wilson's income substantially in return for his promise not to accept a position at any other university for five years, beginning in 1898.

No scholar could dream of a more secure opportunity to pursue his studies and produce his books than that which Wilson had secured for himself. Yet he was dissatisfied. The trouble was that, try as he would, he could not efface his desire to take an active role in politics. He was keenly aware of the tendency of men of affairs to look with scorn upon ivory-tower academicians. "The genuine practical politician," he wrote in an essay, ". . . reserves his acidest contempt for the literary man who assumes to utter judgments touching public affairs and political institutions. . . . The ordinary literary man, even though he be an eminent historian, is ill enough fitted to be a mentor in affairs of government. . . ." But "the practical politician should discriminate. . . . Let him find a man with an imagination which, though it stands aloof, is yet quick to conceive the very things in the thick of which the politician struggles. To that man he should resort for instruction."

This is one of the recurrent themes of his writings. He tried to establish himself as the sort of practical thinker to whom men in positions of power might turn for guidance. But the role of scholarly guide hardly fitted his deepest aspirations. For he did not want his influence filtered into existence through a medium. He wanted the reins in his own hands. "I am so tired of a merely talking profession!" he once exclaimed to his brother-in-law, Stockton Axson. "I want to *do* something!"

Exactly what it was he wanted to *"do"* he seemed not to have decided. What attracted him, apparently, was the prospect of exercising leadership *per se*. He was then and, indeed, throughout his career, a leader in search of a cause. One feels, almost, that the various causes for which he fought so passionately in later years were in themselves almost incidental to him. A man cannot exercise power in a vacuum, after all. Wilson sometimes seemed hard put to fix on a practical goal to which to wed his ambitions for leadership. His clearly was not the variety of will to leadership which is born of an overwhelming desire to accomplish certain specific programs. Rather, he had a nebulous desire to lead, and adopted specific programs as a means of giving propulsive substance to his ambition.

This fact in no way detracts from the merit of the projects he thus utilized. If the motivation of the heroes of history could only be laid bare, one suspects it might be discovered that they drew for their great works upon energy generated by what are generally considered the baser drives of human nature. But we are getting rather far afield and ahead of our story, for in his days as professor at Princeton, Wilson had not yet latched on to any moral crusade. He was still trapped in a vise constructed on one side of his unquenchable yearning for the direct exercise of power and, on the other, his rational conviction that it was a yearning he would never be in a position to satisfy.

Stockton Axson once asked if he would be interested in becoming a Senator. "Indeed I would, but that is impossible. In this country men do not go from the academic world into politics," Wilson replied.

There seemed no alternative to plodding ahead as a professor and man of letters, trying as best he could to govern his ungovernable ambition. This effort involved him in perpetual tension. At home, his devoted tenderness to his family continued unabated. But members of the household were aware of a subterranean irritability, ever on the verge of erupting into the open. ". . . Cousin Woodrow had attacks of, I suppose, threatened nervous breaks," Mary Hoyt later recalled.

Wilson lashed himself to an increasingly taxing schedule of writing and lecturing, as though through sheer intensity of effort he could wrest fulfillment from his work. Twice, in 1895 and 1899, he broke down. His doctors prescribed rest. Both times, he went to Great Britain and, at a leisurely pace, toured the great universities, the towns where some of his ancestors lived and places hallowed through some association with his intellectual heroes. Leaves of grass from the graves of Adam Smith and Bagehot were dispatched to Mrs. Wilson with instructions for their preservation. In Wordsworth's haunts, he read Wordsworth's poems and reveled in their beauty. His was not the glazed eye of the bored tourist: he had the capacity for taking innocent joy in the great sights.

Both times he returned to Princeton in better health and in better spirits and plunged back to work with the happiest consequences to an already formidable reputation. There was the Princeton Sesquicentennial celebration in the fall of 1896, at which he delivered an address which attracted national attention. His thesis was that universities ought to train students not merely for their individual self-realization

but with a view to their serving the nation. There were his outside speeches, which he made to ever more distinguished audiences on ever more important occasions. There were his books and articles, and his popularity with Princeton students and faculty.

All through this difficult period — indeed, all his life long — Wilson sought relief from inner stress through comforting friendships. He had not as a boy felt unconditionally loved. Rather he seems to have felt that he must earn acceptance by molding his attitudes and behavior in accordance with his father's prescription, and to have been perpetually doubtful of his success in this endeavor. Throughout his life, Wilson was greatly concerned with the problem of whether he was lovable and loved, and required an inordinate amount of explicit reassurance on this score. He was aware of his great dependence on the supplies of affection which his friends provided. He wrote literally hundreds of letters thanking this friend or that who had bolstered his spirit.

To an English friend, Fred Yates, after a vacation in England in 1906: "It is always affection that heals me, and the dear friendships I made were my real tonic and restorative."

Or again, in 1914, to Mrs. Edith G. Reid:

> How sweet it is of you to write such notes as that you sent me on the fourth. They cheer me and hearten me and calm me as only the voice of a beloved friend can; and I bless you for them with all my heart. The turmoil and contest and confusing struggle of the life down here drains the sources of joy and confidence in me sadly, and a dear voice like your own, so generous, so full of affectionate reassurance, so sincere and so full of comprehension, is the very tonic I need. It makes the springs run full and fresh again. . . .

To Mary Hulbert, on August 3, 1913, he wrote that he was not made of steel and that, more than any man he ever knew, he was dependent upon his friends' sympathy and belief in him for strength to do his work as President.

Again, to Mrs. Reid, just a few months before his death: "My friends grow more and more indispensable to me. Little as I see them I think more and more about them. . . . I must see my friends or starve."

All of Wilson's close friends — the men, the women, the professors, the politicians, the socialites — shared one characteristic: they were, or at least had to seem to him to be, *uncritical* admirers of the man and of everything he did. Intellectual disagreement or the feeling that a friend disapproved of some project he had in hand aroused intolerable anxieties, the echoes of indelible boyhood impressions. For the boy Wilson had learned that if he did not earn his father's approval by instantly accepting his every opinion and behaving accordingly, he stood in danger of forfeiting his father's love. To the man Wilson, identity of opinion and love were inseparably linked. He never learned that he and a friend could disagree and still retain a mutual affection. To him, if a friend disagreed with him about a matter of importance, it signified that the friend no longer cared for him. He reacted in the way he once had feared his father would react to him in similar circumstances — he broke the relationship.

Wilson had many female friends. He reveled in their flattery and praise and doubtless, too, in the relative freedom such relationships enjoyed from the danger that disrupting differences of opinion might one day arise. There were the Misses Lucy and Mary Smith, Mrs. Nancy Toy, Mrs. Edith Gittings Reid, Mrs. Mary Allen Hulbert Peck (who, after her divorce, resumed using her first husband's name and became, again, Mary Hulbert).

His relationship with Mrs. Hulbert threatened to become a national scandal in the presidential campaigns of 1912 and 1916. For Wilson had written her, as he had written many others, both male and female, letters expressing his affection and appreciation of her friendship in fervent terms which the ignorant or malicious might misconstrue. Wilson had a way of attributing the noblest human qualities to his friends and their real personalities did not always affect the mental image he formed of them. His idealized view of Mrs. Hulbert through eyes blinded by gratitude seems to have been at some considerable variance with that of more impartial observers who considered her a flighty, sycophantic social climber. Mrs. Wilson knew of all of these friendships. Some she shared. In any case, no one who understands the role friendship played in Wilson's life, who knows his devotion to Mrs. Wilson, his religious scruples and the equally intimate tone of his correspondence with male friends, can give credence to the scandalous imputations made in connection with his letters to Mrs. Hulbert.

Wilson's capacity for idealizing friends was apparent to the more discerning among them. Mrs. Reid, for example, has written:

> His appreciation of an affection given him was out of the ordinary as was his need of personal love. A person, to obtain his intimacy, had to say very definitely, "I like you," or "I love you." After that, if you were sincere, your life became his personal and unfailing concern.
>
> To make one's friends appreciate each other is not an easy matter. His letters of introduction for one of his women friends almost always began, "You will feel her charm at a glance." Of a man he would write, "You will at once realize his fine nature, his powers of right thinking." The recipient of one of these notes often saw none of those charms and was very bored; and the idealized often found it trying to live up to unfamiliar virtues. It was especially trying when he introduced in glowing phrases two women and each thought the other too awful for words, but dared not say so . . .
>
> With his intense interest in the personality of a friend, and his entire confidence in a quick characterization, which he never failed to make, it is curious how little he did know about any one who was at all subtle. He had a model for men and women, made out of his own traditions, which at first sight he fitted to any one he felt drawn to.

Wilson's closest friend during his Princeton professorship was John Grier Hibben. The Hibbens and the Wilsons saw each other almost daily, for years. When he learned that Hibben was to sail for Europe for an extended stay, Wilson exclaimed in a letter to his wife, "Doesn't that make you feel a little blank? It does me, very. . . . *What shall we do without them?*"

It is not surprising, given Wilson's passion to lead, either that he took a keen interest in Princeton's administrative problems or that he was quick to find fault with the administrators, chiefly President Patton. Aglow with his observations of the pedagogical methods employed at Oxford and Cambridge, Wilson rhapsodized about the possibility of reorganizing campus life so that the students would learn, not facts, primarily, but, more important, how to think. He expounded the virtues of the tutorial system. He had dreams of a great future for Princeton. Many of the faculty — not only those who disliked Patton for one personal reason or another, but those who felt Wilson could provide a dynamic leadership beyond the capacities of the elderly, conservative Patton — began to look to Wilson for direction. When Patton announced his retirement in June, 1902, the trustees unanimously elected Wilson to succeed to the presidency of Princeton. Seldom had the trustees been so single-minded. Never before had the mantle fallen to a layman.

17

OPINIONS, PERSONALITY, AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

• *M. BREWSTER SMITH*

It is gratifying to be able to present to students of political behavior the approach that my colleagues, Jerome Bruner and Robert White, and I worked out for the study of "Opinions and Personality,"[1] since throughout our explorations political scientists had been what the current jargon would call a "salient reference group" for us. As a psychologist and "outsider," however, I offer these remarks with some trepidation, since the framework that we arrived at in the detailed study of ten men's outlook on Russia was, after all, distinctly psychological; therefore a limited view that embraces but one segment of the processes with which political scientists are properly concerned. Our investigations were long on the

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[1] M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White, *Opinions and Personality* (New York, 1956).

description and analysis of *opinions*, but short on the observation of consequential *behavior*, political or otherwise. And our study did not even focus on *public* opinion, in any sense that attempts a close conceptual distinction between the public and the private.

Yet these very limitations of scope and perspective may be instructive if they are explicitly faced. The domain of political behavior is too large, too complex, to be readily comprehended in terms of any single or simple conceptual scheme, any at least that presents itself to the psychological onlooker as immediately available. It may be more profitable to chart a portion of the larger terrain, taking note of its bearings with respect to maps plotted from other bench marks. If the experience of our mapping expedition can be said to point to a single moral, it is that a useful map of the small region comprising men's opinions in their personal context turns out to be complicated enough — considerably more so than many proposed formulations have been wont to recognize.

I

The need for a map of opinions and personality that takes into account a considerable degree of complexity can be appreciated in any attempt such as ours to make sense of the opinions of a series of persons with whom the investigator has established a close, quasi-clinical acquaintance. But hindsight supports the same conclusion — the need for a comprehensive framework — when one examines the earlier research on opinion determinants. Since it will be my principal point that it is fruitful to study the interrelations of opinions and personality in terms of a more comprehensive set of assumptions than hitherto, a brief critical look at a few of the earlier efforts is in order.

The first major foray by psychologists into the personal determinants of opinion was anything but promising. To the empirically minded American psychologists of the late 'twenties and 'thirties, newly equipped with pencil-and-paper questionnaires for the measurement of personality traits and of attitudes, what could be more natural than to correlate these scales with one another? So there was a spate of correlation studies in this vein, mostly employing the ever-available college sophomore, a good many of them focused on the personal correlates of radicalism and conservatism.[2] The yield was small, and no wonder. Both on the side of attitudes and of personality, conceptualization was meager and inadequate. Personality as caught in the questionnaires of the day was a congeries of traits. More adequate formulation of motivational dynamics and of personality organization had to await the impact of psychoanalysis and of holistic influences from Europe. Attitudes, on the other hand, were measured by crude scales that compressed the many-faceted nature of opinion to the single dimension of pro-con *direction* usually mingled with *intensity*. Correspondences that such a conceptual armory could establish between attitudes and personality can be regarded as almost coincidental.

Now the correlation of trait and attitude variables makes sense when one's concern is with the *expressive* aspects of opinion — opinion as a manifestation of personal style, whether temperamental (for instance, optimism, pessimism, or apathy) or intellectual (for instance, tendency to focus on discrete detail, or on the broad picture). For the study of such correlations to yield returns, however, one must ask the right questions about personality and about opinions; one must discover the aspects of each that are most susceptible to congruent stylistic variation. The approach, in a word, falls into place as a legitimate partial one, when it is guided by more adequate theory. But even in the more sophisticated if not always responsible hands of a modern factor analyst like Eysenck,[3] the correlational approach yields a limited perspective on personality and a very incomplete view of its contribution to opinion.

The next landmark that demands our attention, Harold Lasswell's *Psychopathology and Politics*,[4] suffered from no such dearth of scientific imagination, bringing to bear as it did

[2] For a summary of the literature, see Gardner Murphy, Lois B. Murphy, and Theodore M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, rev. ed. (New York, 1937).

[3] See H. J. Eysenck, *The Psychology of Politics* (London, 1954). This work has been stringently criticized. See Richard Christie, "Eysenck's Treatment of the Personality of Communists," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 53 (November, 1956), pp. 411–430, and the immediately following reply and rejoinder.

[4] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1930).

on political opinion the rich treasure of hypothesis to be mined from classical psychoanalysis, and illustrating the fruitfulness of case studies for the elucidation of political thinking. Displacement and rationalization were for Lasswell the major devices whereby private motives come to be transformed into political opinions. According to his formula for the "political man," private motives are displaced onto a public object and rationalized in terms of the public interest. The formula and the case material introduced by way of illustration served the important positive function of bringing a dynamic view of human motivation into the ken of American political science at a time when most American psychologists eschewed the psychoanalytic jungle with fear or disdain. Negatively, Lasswell's contribution dealt one more blow to the rationalistic view of man as embodied in the political philosophy of the Enlightenment and of the Founding Fathers. Of course, his formula necessarily oversimplified, even in terms of the earlier Freud on whose writings Lasswell drew. From the perspective of modern Freudian psychoanalysis with its emphasis on "ego psychology,"[5] the distortion appears somewhat greater. "Rationalization" in the formula swallows up rational processes without residue while the constructive role of opinion in the functioning of personality goes unregarded. Again we have a partial truth, more provocative and more penetrating, to be sure, than one pursued by the trait-attitude correlators. But the partial insight comes close to error unless it is placed in perspective as comprising only one of a variety of relationships that can be observed between opinions and personality.

No account of opinion research, however selective, can afford to ignore the impact of the opinion polls, even though the sampling survey did not come to a natural focus on the personal setting of opinion. It is not easy to gather useful data on personality in doorstep interviews, though we have recently seen that it is by no means impossible.[6] Rather, the line of least resistance was to relate opinions to the demographic facts of age, sex, education, socioeconomic status — "face-sheet" data that were normally collected as a check on the representativeness of sampling. Under the leadership of Paul Lazarsfeld and others,[7] this opinion demography was given a sociological rationale. The demographic uniformities of opinion turned up by the pollsters were attributed to homogenizing pressures of primary group membership. It remained to identify the "cross-pressures" exerted on a person by divergence among the normals prevailing in the various groups with which he was affiliated, and a manifestly powerful tool was in hand for coping with interindividual variation as well as with uniformity. An Index of Political Predisposition such as Lazarsfeld and his collaborators constructed from the Erie County data[8] left but little for personal idiosyncrasy.

To this sociological account a social-psychological refinement was added, primarily by Herbert Hyman[9] and Robert Merton,[10] in the concept of *reference groups*. The groups to which a person looks for norms and standards, they pointed out, need not be identical with those to which he actually belongs. The implications of this distinction between membership groups and reference groups are still being worked out in research, but the conception is patently a fruitful one.

While an account of political opinion solely in terms of membership groups and their cross-pressures, matters of apparently objective social fact, presents itself as a competitor to psychological interpretation, the complications of reference group theory bring the person's selective orientation to the social world once more into the picture. What enduring personal dis-

[5] A good account of these developments from a sympathetic standpoint may be found in Ruth L. Monroe, *Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought* (New York, 1955).

[6] See Fillmore H. Sanford, "The Use of a Projective Technique in Attitude Surveying," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 14 (Winter, 1950–51), pp. 697–709.

[7] See especially Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1944); Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McFee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954).

[8] Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–27.

[9] Herbert H. Hyman, "The Psychology of Status," *Archives of Psychology*, No. 269 (New York, 1942).

[10] Robert K. Merton with the collaboration of Alice S. Rossi, "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," in Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, rev. ed. (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), pp. 225–280; also pp. 281–386 in the same volume.

positions underlie an individual's choice of reference groups? What characterizes the conformist, Riesman's "other-directed" man[11] who finds his reference group in the salient membership group of the moment or in the just-more-prestigeful "Joneses"? What distinguishes him from the maverick whose attachment to an ideal reference group provides him, in Riesman's metaphor, with a gyroscope that frees his judgments from the influence of his immediate associates and social betters? These are legitimate questions for personality theory.

From this perspective, the account of opinion in terms of "group determinants" can be seen to have thrown into focus still another facet of the relational complex linking opinions and personality. The whole story of group influences cannot, of course, be encompassed by the psychology of personality, for opinions and behavior, as Kurt Lewin[12] was fond of emphasizing, are a function of personality and situation taken jointly. One can come to grips with this field of interaction from the standpoint of social groups and the constraints that these important constituents of human situations impose on behavior. Or, and this is the tack taken here, one can take personality as the point of departure. In the latter case, the person's orientation to his social world must be seen as one more partial source of his opinions. It too needs to be put in perspective by viewing it together with strands of relationship that other approaches have chosen to emphasize.

An additional line of development remains to be noted. Rensis Likert, Angus Campbell, and the group associated with them, now the Michigan Survey Research Center, gave currency in the study of opinion to an emphasis, adapted from clinical interviewing, on how the respondent himself formulates or "structures" the topic being investigated.[13] Their emphasis on the texture of a person's assumptions, beliefs, and opinions in terms of which his particular decisions and actions are to be understood — on "cognitive structure" — provided a much needed corrective, on the one hand to the pollsters' undue reliance on categorical statements of preference about preformulated issues, and on the other, to the oversimplifying tendency of academic attitude research to reduce attitudes to the scalable dimensions of direction and intensity. The task of systematizing the analysis of cognitive structure, to be sure, is formidable, and the "open-ended" questioning of the Michigan group may not have progressed very far on it. But they performed the important task of recapturing for research scrutiny a view of attitudes that opens for exploration a rich array of possible relationships to personality. Just as Lasswell's Freudian view of the motivational dynamics of opinion represents a conceptual enrichment on the side of personality in advance of the earlier trait-psychology, so the approach to attitudes as cognitive structures sensitizes the investigator to relevant aspects of attitude that the tradition of attitude scaling had neglected and still neglects. Some of the old questions concerning attitude-personality relationships could now profitably be reopened.

Perhaps this all-too-casual review has sufficiently established that when Bruner, White and I embarked on our case studies a decade ago, the ingredients were available for attempting to encompass the relations of opinions to personality in a comprehensive framework. The prevalent formulations tended to emphasize single strands of relationship, and thus to be offered as competitive rather than as supplementary lines of explanation. We thought that close attention to the thinking of a few people on a controversial topic, coupled with the study of their personalities along clinical lines, would help us in this task of synthesis. As a venture in the natural history of holding opinions, our study could not prove the correctness of specific hypotheses or the general validity of the framework we arrived at. But the richness of clinical detail that our interviews and tests evoked should, it seemed to us, allow us to scotch simplistic formulations in somewhat more definitive vein.

II

Before turning to what seems to me distinctive in our explorations, I must at least men-

[11] David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, 1950).

[12] See his later writings collected in Dorwin O. Cartwright (ed.), *Field Theory in Social Science* (New York, 1951) and *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York, 1948).

[13] See Charles F. Cannell and Robert L. Kahn, "The Collection of Data by Interviewing," in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (eds.), *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1953), pp. 327–380.

tion the related work of Nevitt Sanford, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, and the other authors of *The Authoritarian Personality*,[14] not because this monumental study was a source we could draw on — our cases were closed and our thinking about them essentially crystallized before its publication — but because its well-deserved renown among social scientists makes it an essential benchmark in regard to which any subsequent attempt to map the relations of opinions to personality has to be located.

The California investigators, it is important to remember, set out on the trail of the psychological sources of *antisemitism*, and the elucidation of this very archetype of social irrationality remained the focus of their inquiry throughout. As we know, they found — and the finding seems to have stood up in the flood of subsequent research though with some qualification[15] — that people who fall at the antisemitic extreme not only are likely to give evidence of a cluster of related attitudes (general rejection of "out-groups," super-patriotism, and the like), but are also distinguished by a set of character traits that cohere in a meaningful pattern from the authors' psychoanalytic perspective. The so-called F (Fascism) Scale developed to measure this authoritarian syndrome of superstition, cynicism, punitive moralism and the like has turned out, for all its technical deficiencies, to do a fairly good job of separating sheep from goats with respect to a wide assortment of socially relevant attitudes and behaviors.

As a monographic study of the sources in personality of a socially important set of attitudes, *The Authoritarian Personality* is unparalleled. And the personality syndrome delineated by the California authors has much interest for political scientists, whether for the light it sheds on endemic McCarthyism or for the dimensions it suggests for the analysis of political leadership and followership. What is does *not* provide (it was not intended to) is a generally useful framework for the analysis of relationships between personality and opinions — or a dependable example of the kind of relationships likely to be found in other politically relevant realms. If you start out with a bit of institutionalized irrationality like antisemitism, you are bound to come out with a psychological formula for irrationality, nothing more. In other words, the kinds of phenomena with which Frenkel-Brunswik, Sanford, and their collaborators were dealing, were the sort that fit the early Lasswellian formula. One must cast a wider net, or fish in different waters, to bring more representative kinds of political thinking and behavior into view.

[14] T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950).

[15] See Richard Christie and Marie Johoda (eds.), *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality"* (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), also H. Edwin Titus and E. P. Hollander, "The California F Scale in Psychological Research: 1950–1955," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 54 (January, 1957), pp. 47–64.

III

I would not argue that our fishing grounds — attitudes toward Russia and Communism during the promulgation of the Truman doctrine — were especially representative. Very likely the topic carried a higher charge of unreasoned emotionality fanned by distorted information than many that we might have chosen. Had we followed the strategy of the California group and singled out the most virulent Russophobes for investigation — or the extreme Communists — we might have come to a formulation more similar to theirs than in fact emerged. But the series of men we studied held positions on Russia covering a wide range of favorableness, involvement, and information, and when we sought to trace in each case sources of opinions in personality that the evidence made clinically plausible, no single syndrome dominated the picture but a variety of linkages came to light. Such variety, we suspect, *is* characteristic of opinions on most political issues.

Central to our inquiry was the question, what kinds of *functions* do opinions serve in the economy of personality? A word is, therefore, in order about the legitimate role of a functional approach, as we see it, in such a psychological investigation. When we ask, of what use to a man are his opinions, what good do they do him, we are posing the functional question in the sense we have in mind — a sense that has a venerable lineage in Darwinian biology and in most post-Darwinian psychology. Clearly the question is *not* one of cause or mechanism; one has not given a causal or genetic explanation to a person's opinions when one discovers their contribution to his personal

economy. To confuse function with cause is the error of teleology, and we do not mean to be teleologists.

We recognize that in a maturing science, systematic causal explanation replaces functional analysis: witness physiology since Bernard, Cannon and Henderson, where concern with the detailed operation of homeostatic mechanisms has supplanted the earlier emphasis on the functions of organ systems. Yet in the earlier stages of a biological or human science — and surely the psychology of personality must be placed here together with most social science — a functional approach provides a very useful, perhaps an indispensable strategy for coming to grips with ongoing processes. Wherever one has to do with an entity that behaves as a self-maintaining system, a going concern, it is safe enough to assume that functions are being taken care of that keep the system going. Personality has profitably been regarded as such a system, and the Parsonians find it helpful to take a similar view of societies.[16] And if, as current theories of learning and of personality development lead us to believe, people tend to learn those ways of thinking and behaving that, broadly speaking, *work* for them, the functional approach is not so remote from causal explanation after all. If we can discern the functions served by an item of opinion or behavior, that is, we may be well on the road toward an understanding of — an ability to predict — the circumstances under which the item will be manifested, and those under which it will be modified. The distinctions drawn by a functional analysis, in other words, are likely to be causally relevant. Knowledge of the functions that a particular opinion or belief are serving a man can be put to use without waiting for a full understanding of the underlying causal mechanisms.

[16] The view of personality as a system is so widely shared as to need no documentation. Representative of a contemporary formal approach to "general systems theory" is James G. Miller, "Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences," *American Psychologist*, Vol. 10 (September, 1955), pp. 513–531. For Parsons, see Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), and T. Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill., 1951). A related view is developed by Marion Levy, *The Structure of Society* (Princeton, 1953).

The opinions about Russia and Communism held or expressed by our subjects appeared to us to be used by them in ways that we could sort into three broad categories, which we called *object appraisal*, *social adjustment*, and *externalization*. A person's opinions on a topic are likely to serve all three functions to some extent; the extent to which one or another of the functions predominates varies from person to person and from one topic to another. What, in brief, are these functions?

It should go without saying — but our look at the earlier literature shows that the saying is necessary — that a person's initial orientation to events is not to be thought of as serving purely autistic needs. *Object appraisal* we understand as the process of testing reality in order to assess its relevance to one's ongoing enterprises. It comprises those activities whereby the events and issues in the person's world are appraised for their relationship to his motives, goals, values, and interests. The "input" of information — from personal experience, from the mass media, from hearsay — has to be scanned for its possible bearing on things that he wants, fears, or otherwise cares about. The process of "opinioning" reflects to a considerable extent such scanning for relevance.

A person's stock of *existing* beliefs and opinions, to carry the argument one step further, simplifies his task of scanning, as Lippmann[17] long ago suggested, by providing him with already evaluated categories to which incoming information can be fitted. To serve this function, his opinions must be closely enough anchored in the reality presented to him to minimize the likelihood of surprise.

People differ greatly from one another in the extent to which a topic like Russia engages their values and interests, in the extent to which their attitudes toward Russia serve the function of object appraisal. Some are sufficiently isolated by social position and habits of attention that the barest minimum of borrowed clichés suffices to satisfy their "placing need" to put in order the modicum of information that filters through. For others, a strong personal commitment to religion, to liberal democracy, or to national interests may organize their view of Russia and the orientation that they take toward

[17] Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922).

it, perhaps leading them even to seek out information that is relevant to their concerns. Even when the interests and values of a person are minimally engaged, however, and his concern with Russia is perfunctory, one can usually see the influence of his central concerns in the aspects of Russia that he singles out for notice.

Under *social adjustment* we consider another major role that opinions play: that of facilitating, disrupting, or simply maintaining an individual's relations with others. Here what matters is not so much the object itself — what Russia is like, but rather the opinions about it that a person thinks are held by other people who are significant to him. In contrast with object appraisal, in which the informational input *about the object* engages with a person's going concerns insofar as he sees the object to be relevant to them, the social adjustment function involves a process in which information about *how other people regard the object* engages with his motives to affiliate or identify himself with them or to distinguish himself from or oppose them. In view of the variety of social motives — needs for autonomy and for recognition, etc., as well as for acceptance and status — the significance of social adjustment for opinions is not just a matter of conformity. The rebel and the autonomous person as well as the conformist give evidence of having come to hold opinions that contribute to attaining or maintaining their distinctive pattern of social relationships.

It is not merely through the *expression* of opinions in the give and take of social intercourse that opinions contribute to an individual's social adjustment. The mere *holding* of an opinion whether or not the person expresses it may symbolize for him his solidarity with some remote reference group; it may be for him a way of saying, "I am like them." Or, for that matter, that "I am *un*like them": so-called "negative reference groups" must also be recognized. During the period of our study, for example, the views of Russia, and of sundry other topics, held by a good many would-be respectable people undoubtedly served the function of confirming in their minds how different they were from the despised Communists. The possibilities of playing upon such a widely shared negative reference group were not, of course, neglected by the masters of political rhetoric.

The third and final class of functions in our list is *externalization*, which involves response to an external event in a way that is colored by a person's unresolved inner problems. Outside events are treated as if they were analogous to inner ones, and the attitude taken toward them corresponds to attitudes taken in the inner struggle. Himself greedy for a share of the world's goods and prestige to a greater degree than he could afford to recognize, one of our subjects, for example, conceived of the Soviet leadership with imagery of "pigs at the trough." In attempting to appraise the object, the person thus unwittingly carries on some of the work that is necessary in dealing with his inner problems. Insofar as he can cope with them more readily as externally symbolized, and thus better contain his conflicts, his burden of anxiety may be somewhat reduced.

Private dilemmas take Protean shapes, so the evidences of externalization that we found in our subjects' opinions about Russia fell into no single pattern. Certainly any expectation of one-to-one correspondence between "standard" conflicts, Freudian or otherwise, and particular opinion content is doomed to disappointment. As if to underline this observation, our single Communist subject, an inveterate externalizer if ever there was one, gave no evidence of the latent father-hatred that some popular versions of the Freudian account would have had us look for; it was his paranoid mother that forced the Sullivan siblings to band together in defensive revolt.[18] But the significant way in which his ideology helped him to cope with almost insupportable dilemmas lay in another highly individual direction.

The relationships we conceptualize as externalization are, of course, essentially those with which Lasswell and the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* were concerned. Those we treat under the heading of social adjustment include points emphasized by the theorists of group influence, as these appear from a perspective focused on personality. In this day of anti-intellectualism in social and psychological theory, however, one must turn to an earlier page of political thought to encounter emphasis on the reality-oriented processes we discuss as object appraisal.

Not that we would reinstate that admirable

[18] *Cf.* Smith, Bruner, and White, *op. cit.*, p. 154–188.

fiction, the Rational Man. Human interests are more diverse and less reducible than the rationalists supposed, and the information on which men have to judge and act is more often faulty and misleading. And I suppose that today anyone who came close to displaying the classical rational calculus in his political opinions would be checked off as a sick man, an obsessional-compulsive. But there is an undeniably rational component in men's opinions, rooted in the reality-testing function, which current thinking is prone to underplay. Only a social psychologist like Solomon Asch,[19] writing in the Gestalt tradition, can be accused of giving it too much weight.

The kind of pluralistic scheme we have proposed has advantages, we think, over simpler views of the functions of opinion. It would still be an academic exercise in classification, however, if the primary functional grounding of opinion in object appraisal, in social adjustment, or in externalization did not have divergent consequences. We think there is such a pay-off. When a person's opinions on a topic function largely for object appraisal, it seems reasonable to suppose that he should be relatively flexible in assimilating new facts and in changing his mind when these facts point to different implications for his interests. Information campaigns, as a political strategy, assume that object appraisal is importantly involved in the opinions of the relevant publics. Sometimes this is the case; sometimes not: it should be possible to devise ways of assessing the extent to which prevalent attitudes are responsive to new information.

Opinions that are founded largely on social adjustment should be more readily influenced by what others think than by information about their object. Political as well as advertising campaigns employ the strategies of "prestige suggestion" on the assumption, often apparently justified, that the dynamics of the opinions they would alter are of this kind. The case is different with externalization, which lends to opinions a defensive rigidity not amenable to rational persuasion or to simple social manipulation. We would not expect opinions primarily in the service of such a function to undergo gradual change under the pressure of changing fact or group opinion; more characteristic would be "conversion," the saltatory change from one equilibrium to its dynamic near-equivalent, as from Communism to another True Church. The politics of scare and innuendo thus appeals to externalizing tendencies in people, and tries to focus and channel these tendencies in line with the propagandist's objectives. The good democrat who wants his politics along more rational lines, on the other hand, can perhaps foster the flexibility of object appraisal by striving to create an atmosphere of reassurance minimizing the anxiety that sets defensive dynamisms to work. His motto might well be, "There is nothing to fear but fear itself." In a world that presents so much to warrant real anxiety and to tap neurotic fears of the monstrous and uncanny, this may not be an easy course to follow.

Our excursion into the natural history of opinion was not designed to put such hypotheses to test. Fortunately, Daniel Katz and Helen Peak have recently been directing at the University of Michigan a series of studies, conceived independently of our work, that are providing more systematic evidence along these lines.[20]

IV

There is a tempting error to which functional theories are prone: to over-interpret, to seek functions where none exist. If a function can be found for every aspect of a person's dispositions and behavior, or for every institutional arrangement of a society, one comes close to

[19] Solomon E. Asch, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1952).

[20] See Irving Sarnoff and Daniel Katz, "The Motivational Bases of Attitude Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 49 (January, 1954), pp. 115–124; Helen Peak, "Attitude and Motivation," in Marshall R. Jones (ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1955* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1955), pp. 149–188; Earl R. Carlson, "Attitude Change Through Modification of Attitude Structure," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 52 (March, 1956), pp. 256–261; Milton J. Rosenberg, "Cognitive Structure and Attitudinal Affect," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 53 (November, 1956), pp. 367–372; Daniel Katz, Irving Sarnoff, and Charles McClintock, "Ego-Defense and Attitude Change," *Human Relations*, Vol. 9 (January, 1956), pp. 27–45; Daniel Katz, Charles McClintock, and Irving Sarnoff, "The Measurement of Ego Defense as Related to Attitude Change," *Journal of Personality*, Vol. 25 (June, 1957), pp. 465–474.

the position of a Pangloss for whom "whatever is, is right." There are *dys*functions, too, as the good functional sociologist Robert Merton reminds us.[21] Not every feature of a person's opinions is currently useful to him, and just as certainly, not all the linkages between opinions and personality are brought to light by inquiry along functional lines. Although much of what was at one point functional for a person gets embedded somehow in his personality structure as it emerges in the transactions that compose his life history, there is no guarantee that the functional basis persists to the present. Yet personality coheres, and students of personality like Gordon Allport have provided us with ample evidence that different samples of a person's behavior bear that person's distinctive stamp.[22]

A man's opinions, too, carry his signature. So a comprehensive account of the relations between personality and opinions must go beyond the functional question to examine the *expressive* aspect of opinions, the ways in which an individual's opinions are shaped by the kind of person who has them. Both a person's intellectual and his temperamental qualities are revealed in the nature of his attitudes, as we found in our case studies. But the correspondences seldom determined his stand on gross issues such as, for example, whether he supported or opposed the Truman Doctrine — the kind of datum likely to be provided by an attitude test or opinion poll. Support or opposition for the publicly formulated alternatives on current issues appeared to us in the guise of "final common paths" (to borrow a metaphor from neurophysiology) that people could arrive at from a diversity of private routes. The impress of intellectual and temperamental traits of personality was to be discerned rather in the style than in the gross outcome of political thinking and action.

Stylistic features rooted in personality traits remain practically important, even though they are not predictive of a person's particular policy stand. Take, for example, the effects of differences between people in the abstractness or concreteness characteristic of their thinking. In spite of the fact that without our intending it the men we studied were well above average in intelligence as a group, we were forcibly impressed by the narrow limits within which most of them could cope with political issues in abstract terms — a general feature of their thinking. This common attribute of Nonacademic Man has, of course, a lot to do with the prevalence of stereotypy in political attitudes and of the *non-sequitur* in popular political thinking. As a formal condition of political thought and behavior, to look at the matter from another perspective, such incapacity for abstraction puts the functioning of opinion in object appraisal under major constraint. It goes far to explain why opinions that primarily serve this essentially rational function can fall so short of the standards of logical rationality.

V

Let me return to features of our approach that I noted at the outset, by way of introducing some comments on its possible relevance for political scientists.

Our study, I observed, was long on the description and analysis of opinions, but short on the observation of political *behavior*, a result that followed perhaps from our selection of Russia as a focal topic, perhaps from our method that leaned heavily on interview and discussion. From a political scientist's standpoint as from a psychologist's, this is certainly a deficiency in our case materials. But the theoretical position that we worked out from opinion data may nevertheless have implications that extend beyond "mere" opinions. *Expressed* opinions are, after all, a form of behavior, and opinions *held* are but one type of behavioral disposition. To the extent that we learned about things that our subjects did in the service of their opinions — other than talking to us — this behavior seemed to be intelligible in much the same terms as their attitudes. The Communist who avoided subjecting himself to Party discipline but avidly sought out information to feed his internalized version of the Marxist "line"; the affable real estate agent who rarely discussed Russia but accepted a wide range of favorable or unfavorable information about Russia without being much af-

[21] Robert K. Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[22] Allport's views are best found in his classic textbook, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, 1937), and in a collection of his more recent papers, *The Nature of Personality* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950). Some of the basic evidence for the congruence of a person's expressive behavior was collected by Allport and Philip E. Vernon in their *Studies in Expressive Movement* (New York, 1933).

fected at the core of his beliefs; the cautious accountant who avoided controversy at all costs in spite of a view of Russia as a villainous regime: all of these behaved in ways that were congruent with the functions their opinions about Russia were serving, if not always logically consistent with the letter of their beliefs. Discrepancies between attitudes and behavior pose a logical or moral problem, hardly a psychological one.

That our studies barely touched on *public* opinion in any strict sense is a more serious reservation. There are general implications here, I think, for the political scientist who is interested in psychological approaches. If I understand the uses of the term in political and social theory, "*public* opinion" implies not so much the contrast between public vs. private circumstances of expression, as the existence of *consensually defined issues* in the social group whose opinions are under consideration.[23] Our scheme for describing opinions (which I have not summarized in this paper) did take cognizance of the person's position on public issues, under the rubric of *policy stand*. But the interesting correspondences that we found between opinions and personality primarily involved the richer aspects of attitude content and structure as uniquely patterned by the particular individual. Indeed, we came to see the necessity of arriving at a simple policy stand — "Are you for or against the Truman Doctrine?" — as imposing a kind of Procrustean frame on the much subtler distinctions often drawn in the attitudinal object as privately construed, and in the person's orientation toward it. It is in the nature of public opinion, we came to see, that a wide range of personal opinions are brought into focus on a highly limited set of alternative proposals for collective action.

If knowledge of personality does not, in general, permit the prediction of policy stands, need the political scientist who is interested in public opinion concern himself with personal opinions and with personality? This crucial question is not easy to answer. There is undoubtedly a Sirens' lure to personality studies that political scientists who are tempted would do well to view with sturdy suspicion. How easy it is to be enticed into the pursuit of humanly fascinating facts that, in last analysis, have rather little to do with the broader issues that purportedly motivate one's inquiry! For many purposes, the student of political behavior is clearly justified in ignoring personality; he can take people's policy stands as *data* without close inquiry into the private ingredients of which they are resultants.

Yet the burden of this paper is, obviously, that the personal setting of public opinion does matter, and that political scientists will surely have recurrent needs to come to grips with it. Not, usually, through the intensive study of individual cases, on our model: this procedure is too inefficient for purposes other than the exploratory search for illustrative specimens. More extensive appraisals can be envisaged, however, as for example, of the personal values and interests with which a particular topic engages, in a defined public, or of the degree to which the attitudes prevalent on a topic in a defined population serve one or another of our three functions. Such partial but extensive inquiries into opinion dynamics look particularly promising as avenues to the understanding and perhaps prediction of *shifts* in public opinion in response to events and to different styles of leadership or manipulation.

The final limiting feature of our work that I mentioned at the outset — a matter related to the point just discussed — arises from the fact that our approach maintains a distinctly psychological perspective focused on the individual personality as a functioning system. How is such an approach to be integrated with others that are appropriate to the broad domain of political behavior, particularly that of sociology with its emphasis on roles, groups, and institutions? I shall not attempt an easy solution to this chronic source of difficulty, which presents resistant obstacles to empirical research on social behavior as much as it troubles the theorist who ventures across disciplinary boundaries. Aspects of our discussion may nevertheless have suggested, perhaps, some lines along which a *modus vivendi* may be approached among differently focused conceptual approaches. Group-related concepts, we have seen, enter the psychological account among the variety of considerations relevant to the functional analysis of opinion. Had the paper attempted a genetic formulation of how opinion develops, I would also have had to call upon

[23] See Daniel Katz, Dorwin Cartwright, Samuel Eldersveld, and Alfred McClung Lee (eds.), *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York, 1954), pp. 50–84, for representative approaches to the definition of public opinion.

them in identifying the sources of information from which opinions are constituted. Not everything that a group theorist would have to say about public opinion finds its way into this personality-oriented schema, but no matter. The sociologist, on his part, extends his conceptual linkages from the group to the personality level, without any obligation to include in his formulation everything that the psychologist of personality can contribute to the study of opinion. For the political scientist, it seems to me, the profitable question is not, "Which account is more valid, the psychological or the sociological?" but rather, "For what problems of political behavior is the vantage point of personality theory more useful, and for what problems that of groups and institutions?"

My very tentative suggestion with respect to this question runs along lines already hinted at. So long as concern is focused on whether people accept or reject the various positions on an issue as they are publicly formulated at a particular time, sociological emphasis on group affiliations may well be the more promising. A "cross-pressures" analysis, for example, may account for differences in policy stand where the detailed study of personality does not carry us very far. To look at the matter from a slightly different angle, *public* opinion as a phenomenon of social consensus may best be described in categories of sociological theory. In order to anticipate *changes* in people's policy stands under the impact of attempts to influence them or of events, however, one has to look behind the facade of relatively stereotyped public opinion to the private, individual level. Here a psychological approach may well be the method of choice. The present paper has attempted to illustrate one such psychological approach from the vantage point of personality theory, and to suggest an orderly framework for the study of the complex relations between opinions and personality.

18

CONSERVATISM AND PERSONALITY

• HERBERT McCLOSKY

If justification were needed for taking notice once again of the liberal-conservative distinction, it would be sufficient, I suppose, merely to observe that this division has been injected into the politics of Western nations for at least two centuries and, depending on the nature of one's criteria, perhaps longer.

I. Introduction

The distinction between the two camps has not always been sharply drawn, of course, for both have been compelled, as a condition for survival, to hold important beliefs in common. Moreover, each has reserved itself on certain issues, such as government regulation of the economy, casting off old views in favor of beliefs previously cherished by the other. Competing for popular support in elections, and succeeding one another in office, the two camps have, of necessity, taken on many values in common, tempering their programs and adjusting their courses to the practical requirements of political contest. In a system like ours, where the parties have functioned less as ideological movements than as brokerage organizations hoping to attract majority support from almost every segment of the electorate, the distinction has tended to be dulled even further, until, at the actual scenes of daily political struggle, it has often faded entirely. Even in political systems abroad where doctrinal parties are more frequently in evidence, the differences between liberals and conservatives have become operationally more obscure as the parties have shared office, confronted the reality of common problems, and competed for the support of the waverers at the middle ranges of the ideological spectrum.

We would be mistaken, however, to infer from this that all distinctions between the liberal

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and conservative tendencies are spurious, or that they are mere inventions of office-seekers or publicists. Not only do our Minnesota studies find many of the differences to be genuine, but the two camps bear a remarkable continuity with the patrilineal doctrines from which they have descended. For example, the credo of the "New Conservatives" (as distinguished from the shifting programs of conservative parties) includes few notions not already expressed by Edmund Burke, whose writings, despite seeming inconsistencies, are generally considered the fountainhead of modern conservative thought. The political writings of Russell Kirk, Clinton Rossiter, John Hallowell, or Richard Weaver, of the refurbished Southern Agrarians like Donald Davidson, the poets of nostalgia like T. S. Eliot, or of magazines like *Measure*, the *National Review*, the *American Mercury*, and *Modern Age* — express with varying degrees of intensity and spiritual violence the principles and doctrines which have enjoyed currency among self-styled conservatives for generations. Thus, despite modifications imposed by political exigency and despite even the sharp reversals that have occasionally developed on specific issues, the outlook of conservatism has, like liberalism, remained fairly firm through recent centuries. This suggests that both conservatism and liberalism may be "natural" or polar positions around which individuals of certain habitual outlooks, temperaments, and sensibilities can comfortably come to rest and be united with others of like disposition.

Many people, of course, do not exhibit the patterns of mind and personality that are fully identified with either of the polar positions, but embrace elements of both, in varying proportions. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that a characteristic conservative focus exists, not only because of the historical continuity already noted, but also because liberal and conservative values would not, in the absence of such focus, fall into pattern, but would instead be distributed randomly throughout all sections of the population; *i.e.*, even if one knew some of the beliefs a given individual possessed, one could not predict by better than chance what other beliefs or values he held.

The data I will present show, however, that there is considerable regularity and coherence not only in the body of norms professed but in the relation between certain casts of character and personality on the one side and the degree of conservatism or liberalism expressed on the other.

Before proceeding to the body of the paper bearing on this relation, I should point out that we have had less interest in the conservative-liberal distinction as such than in the example it offers for the further study of political preference, belief, and affiliation — the subjects with which we have been centrally concerned in our research. Hence we have not been occupied with many of the questions about conservatism which have commanded the attention of political scientists and essayists. It has not been our purpose, for example, to explore the historical unfolding of conservative thought; to describe conservative movements of the past; to present the case for embracing or rejecting conservatism as a doctrine; to estimate the truth of its essential propositions or the validity of its claims; to ascertain the excellence or shabbiness of its moral outlook; or to resolve the question of its "real" definition. It has not been our intention either to challenge or support its assumptions, to make policy recommendations, or to exhort anyone for or against its doctrines. Admittedly, we have opinions and biases on these matters, and we are not blind to the possibility that they may influence the interpretation of our findings. Indeed, we assume that they will, no matter how disinterested our original intention. We should be very disappointed, nevertheless, if the controversial nature of the subject matter or the heat that may be generated by the findings were to obscure the scientific validity we have worked so hard to achieve.

A prefatory note concerning our interest in personality may also be helpful. Although certain assumptions about the nature of man were implicit in the thought of many of the classic political writers (Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham come immediately to mind), the relation of personality to politics has, I think, received less attention from contemporary political scientists than it deserves. Spurred, however, by the injunctions of Graham Wallas that we must "deal with politics in its relation to the nature of man," and stimulated by the progress of academic, as well as Freudian, psychology, attention has here and there begun to be focused upon personality as an important dimension for the study of politics. In recent years the work of Lasswell, Fromm, the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality*, Almond, and a few others offer cases in point,

and these have stimulated others. For my own part, I should like to make it clear that while I believe the study of personality to be extremely valuable, it would be naive to suppose that it could possibly serve as a universal device for the study of every problem encountered in political research. It cannot be substituted for certain other types of investigation which have interested political scientists, such as the study of institutional and legal structures, descriptions of political process, or the formal analysis of normative propositions. Rather, the study of personality offers one more category of explanation to accompany those already familiar to us, thereby adding an important new dimension to our understanding of political phenomena, and helping us to clarify or correct certain propositions about politics that have never been put to adequate empirical test.

II. The Conservatism Measure: Definition and Validity

Because it is a key term in the language of political conflict, choked with emotive connotations, "conservatism" has naturally evoked controversy over its meaning. The problem of defining it has, furthermore, been confused in recent decades by the already mentioned switch in the economic attitudes of both conservatives and liberals, and by the rise of movements of the "radical right" of which the fascist parties are the most extreme example but which are also represented in somewhat milder form by such groups as the Conservative Citizens' Committees. Some prefer to reserve the "conservative" label for the advocates of laissez-faire capitalism, for critics of the New Deal, or for Republicans of whatever ideological persuasion; for some it mainly signifies intemperate right-wing values of the McCarthy or *Chicago Tribune* type; while for others, it recalls the somewhat romanticized image of a Boston Brahmin — genteel, cultivated, practical, a gentleman of exquisite sensibilities and manners, a critic of the vulgarities of mass society, saddened by, though resigned to, the heavy price of equalitarian democracy.

Arguments occur as well over most esoteric questions: whether conservatism is a full-blown ideology or only a state of mind; whether it is a social posture found among the defenders of every type of society or a clutch of prejudices appropriate to a specific social class at a given historical stage; whether it is a set of empirically settled propositions about man and society or a body of self-evident truths, intuitively prized by persons of sufficient character to grasp their significance; and so on.

In the face of these diverse opinions, we cannot hope that the definition employed in our research, and the measure or "scale" that we constructed from this definition, will satisfy everyone. We have made an earnest effort, however, to extract from the tradition of self-styled conservative thought, and especially from the writings of Edmund Burke, a set of principles representing that tradition as fairly as possible. We have concentrated upon those attitudes and values that continually recur among acknowledged conservative thinkers and that appear to comprise the invariant elements of the conservative outlook. By the same token, we have tried to avoid attitudes or opinions that seemed to us situationally determined and which, for that reason, appear to be secondary and unstable correlates of liberal or conservative tendencies. Many attitudes that arise mainly from party or class affiliation fall into this category, *e.g.*, attitudes toward free enterprise, toward trade unions, toward expansion of government functions, toward the New Deal and its welfare measures, toward tariffs, farm supports, and a number of similar issues that have featured prominently in political campaigns.

In spite of the differences, there is astonishing agreement among the disciples, and among disinterested scholars as well, that the following are characteristic, if not quintessential elements of the conservative outlook:[1]

(1) Man is a creature of appetite and will, "governed more by emotion than by reason" (Kirk),

[1] The doctrines expressed in these paragraphs have been drawn from the writings of such acknowledged conservative spokesmen as Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France;* F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *Conservatism in England* (London, 1933); R. J. White, ed., *The Conservative Tradition* (London, 1950); Quentin Hogg, *The Case for Conservatism* (Harmondsworth, 1947); Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago, 1953); Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (New York, 1955); Francis G. Wilson, *The Case for Conservatism* (Seattle, 1951); Peter Viereck, *Conservatism: From John Adams to Churchill* (New York, 1955); and others. In addition, books and articles by numerous commentators were consulted, including such recent articles as Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," this Review, Vol. 51 (June 1957), pp. 454–73.

in whom "wickedness, unreason, and the urge to violence lurk always behind the curtain of civilized behavior" (Rossiter). He is a fallen creature, doomed to imperfection, and inclined to license and anarchy.

(2) Society is ruled by "divine intent" (Kirk) and made legitimate by Providence and prescription. Religion "is the foundation of civil society" (Huntington) and is man's ultimate defense against his own evil impulses.

(3) Society is organic, plural, inordinately complex, the product of a long and painful evolution, embodying the accumulated wisdom of previous historical ages. There is a presumption in favor of whatever has survived the ordeal of history, and of any institution that has been tried and found to work.

(4) Man's traditional inheritance is rich, grand, endlessly proliferated and mysterious, deserving of veneration, and not to be cast away lightly in favor of the narrow uniformity preached by "sophisters and calculators" (Burke). Theory is to be distrusted since reason, which gives rise to theory, is a deceptive, shallow, and limited instrument.

(5) Change must therefore be resisted and the injunction heeded that "Unless it is necessary to change it is necessary not to change" (Hearnshaw). Innovation "is a devouring conflagration more often than it is a torch of progress" (Kirk).

(6) Men are naturally unequal, and society requires "orders and classes" for the good of all. All efforts at levelling are futile and lead to despair (Kirk and Rossiter), for they violate the natural hierarchy and frustrate man's "longing for leadership." The superior classes must be allowed to differentiate themselves and to have a hand in the direction of the state, balancing the numerical superiority of the inferior classes.

(7) Order, authority, and community are the primary defense against the impulse to violence and anarchy. The superiority of duties over rights and the need to strengthen the stabilizing institutions of society, especially the church, the family, and, above all, private property.

Some of the points in the conservative creed are, unfortunately, distinguished more for their rhetoric than for the clarity and crispness of their content. Nevertheless, owing to the fact that they comprise an integrated outlook, we were able to construct a scale that makes it possible to measure the strength of conservative belief in individuals and groups, and thus to classify persons according to the degree of conservatism they exhibit.

In constructing this scale, we began with an initial pool of 43 items, the majority of which were fairly straightforward statements of the various conservative beliefs just discussed. Here, for example, are some typical items from the original set of 43:

If something grows up over a long time there is bound to be much wisdom in it.

If you start trying to change things very much, you usually make them worse.

It's not really undemocratic to recognize that the world is divided into superior and inferior people.

All groups can live in harmony in this country without changing the system in any way.

You can usually depend more on a man if he owns property than if he does not.

Our society is so complicated that if you try to reform parts of it you're likely to upset the whole system.

I prefer the practical man anytime to the man of ideas.

A man doesn't really get to have much wisdom until he's well along in years.

I'd want to know that something would really work before I'd be willing to take a chance on it.

No matter how we like to talk about it, political authority comes not from us but from some higher power.

Private ownership of property is necessary if we are to have a strong nation.

It is never wise to introduce changes rapidly, in government or in the economic system.

It's better to stick by what you have than to be trying new things you don't really know about.

Together with the items from a number of other scales we were simultaneously trying to build, the 43 items in the conservatism pool were submitted, through survey methods, to a large general sample of persons in the vicinity of the Twin Cities who were asked to state, in relation to each item, whether they agreed or disagreed. The patterns of their responses were then analyzed, with a threefold purpose in mind: 1) to select from each pool those items which, by reproducibility and other statistical tests, clustered sufficiently to convince us that they belonged to the same universe; 2) to reduce the number of items in each scale to manageable proportions (we began with more than 2300 items, and over 80 pools of scale items); and 3) to ensure that every item selected for a given scale was in fact measuring some degree of the same attitude dimension or, in other words, that all the items in the final scale were consistent with each other.

Altogether, the responses of over 1200 persons were sampled and analyzed in this preliminary scale-construction stage, a procedure that took more than two years to complete. Some 539 items, comprising an inventory of 53 separate scales, survived this stage. The remaining thirty item pools failed to meet our scale standards and were dropped. Conserva-

tism emerged as a twelve-item scale, tighter, more refined, and with greater internal consistency than was found in the original 43-item pool, with which, however, it correlated +.83. Although the twelve-item scale did not encompass as wide a range of values as were contained in the initial item pool, its ranking of people from extreme conservatism on the one end to liberalism on the other was very close to the rank order yielded by the original 43 items, as the high correlation attests. Empirically, then, the shorter scale may be taken as an adequate, if not actually a superior and more refined substitute for the initial set of "conservative" items. (The scale has subsequently been refined further in a succeeding study, and the items reduced in number to nine.)

The validation of a scale, *i.e.*, determining the degree to which it in fact measures the thing it purports to measure, is at best a difficult and frustrating affair. Although we have not yet exhausted all the validation procedures planned for this scale, several considerations bearing on its validity can be offered. For one thing, the scale possesses a certain amount of "face validity," which is to say that the items it includes express on their face the values which most knowledgeable people would designate as conservative. In one validation procedure employed, we submitted subsets of items from the twelve-item conservatism scale to an advanced senior-graduate class in political theory, whose members had no prior knowledge of the study or its purposes. Each student was asked to supply a name or label for the group of statements and to write a paragraph explaining or justifying the label he had chosen. Of 48 students participating, 39 volunteered the word *conservatism* as best describing the sentiments expressed in the statements, five offered names that were virtually synonymous with conservatism (*e.g.*, *traditionalism*), while two supplied other names and two did not answer.

Thus, over 90 per cent of an informed group recognized that the items expressed values characteristic of conservatism, and were able to supply explanations consistent with the labels they chose.

The conservatism also correlated highly, and in the predicted direction, with several related measures that were being tested at the same time. For example, persons who scored as strongly conservative in the preliminary runs also proved, by comparison with the low scorers, to hold extremely conventional social attitudes, to be more responsive to nationalistic symbols, and to place greater emphasis upon duty, conformity, and discipline.

We also checked a number of individual statements that were not included as part of the conservatism scale but which, nevertheless, express sentiments or opinions that would be widely recognized as related to conservatism. In all but a few instances, the persons who score as extreme conservatives agree with these statements far more frequently than do those who score as liberals. The table below gives a few examples:

By reason of such criteria, we believe that the conservatism scale possesses the properties of a

	Per Cent Agree	
	Liberals (N = 258)	Extreme Conservatives (N = 282)
Duties are more important than rights.	32%	63%
The world is too complicated to be understood by anyone but experts.	26%	51%
You can't change human nature.	30%	73%
People are getting soft and weak from so much coddling and babying.	31%	68%
The heart is as good a guide as the head.	22%	58%
We have to teach children that all men are created equal, but almost everyone knows that some are better than others.	35%	73%
No matter what the people think, a few people will always run things anyway.	33%	63%
Few people really know what is in their best interest in the long run.	43%	77%

valid measure, and that it can be used with confidence in group studies or in research involving large samples. Similar procedures were employed in the development of the 52 other scales used in the original study (referred to as the *PAR* study, the initials standing for political participation, awareness, and responsibility); and the process was repeated in the development of 18 additional scales employed in a subsequent study of persons with extreme or "marginal" political beliefs (the *Marginal Believer* study). In constructing and validating some of the personality and social attitude scales, we were able to build on a great deal of previous work by clinical and social psychologists interested in the classification and measurement of personality traits; while in the case of other scales, such as Dominance and Social Responsibility, we were compelled to start afresh and to undertake elaborate empirical procedures to develop measures that fitted these concepts.[2]

The *PAR* study was carried out on a sample of 1211 persons in the Twin City area (not to be confused with the 1200 subjects previously employed in developing and pre-testing the inventory of scales). The *Marginal Believer* study drew upon a cross-section sample of 1082 persons from the entire state of Minnesota,[3] together with two special samples of extreme Right-Wing and Left-Wing believers, numbering almost 300 each. The data from the cross-section sample of the *Marginal Believer* project have confirmed in virtually every detail the findings relative to conservatism yielded by the *PAR* study. Hence the results described below have been borne out by two separate studies, carried out six years apart, on entirely different samples of the adult population. Most of the findings presented in this paper are drawn from the general population data of the *Marginal Believer* study, although we have equivalent results that could as easily be reported from the *PAR* project.

In each study, we broke the entire sample into quartiles of several hundred persons each, assigning subjects to one quartile or another according to their scores on the conservatism scale. Subjects scoring 7–9 on the conservatism scale were thrown into the uppermost or Extreme Conservative quartile; those with scores of 5–6 were labelled Moderate Conservatives; with scores of 3–4, Moderate Liberals; and the lowest quartile, with scores of 0–2, were called Liberals.

With these classifications, we next computed the scores of the four groups on each of the remaining scales used in the two studies, as well as on a large number of personal background characteristics for which we had also collected data in the course of the two surveys. A variety of tabulating and statistical procedures were then employed to check hypotheses, to note differences and similarities between groups, and to ascertain patterned or prototypic responses. In addition, all major tabulations were re-run with controls introduced for such factors as education, occupation, socio-economic status, and possible response set bias,[4] in order to be certain that the findings were not the spurious product of some hidden or disguised factor which, conceivably, we had been failing to take into account. We discovered, however, that even with such factors partialled out or otherwise accounted for, the tendency to affirm or to reject conservative doctrines was significantly related to social and personality characteristics.

III. Results

In turning now to some of the outcomes of the research, I will confine myself in the main to the data that bear most immediately on personality and related attributes, omitting, for reasons of space, the material on political and social attitudes with which both studies have been greatly concerned.

Intelligence. One of the clearest findings in both studies is that, contrary to claim, conserva-

[2] We have described the procedures employed in the development of these scales in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 46 (1951), pp. 360–366; and Vol. 47 (1952), pp. 73–80.

[3] I should like to acknowledge the generous assistance of the *Minnesota Poll* and of its director, Sidney Goldish, for assistance in selecting this sample and administering the questionnaire.

[4] Among the most important and interesting of such response sets is the tendency exhibited by some respondents to agree — or to disagree — with statements regardless of their content. This tendency obviously distorts the response scores of the individuals who possess it. A number of special procedures were introduced to correct for this phenomenon, and to eliminate, as far as possible, the spurious influence of this factor. The procedures and findings bearing upon this "unthinking," "uncritical," or "acquiescent" tendency will be described elsewhere in a forthcoming technical monograph.

tism is not the preferred doctrine of the intellectual elite or of the more intelligent segments of the population, but the reverse. By every measure available to us, conservative beliefs are found most frequently among the uninformed, the poorly educated, and so far as we can determine, the less intelligent. The following table [Table I] sets out a few of these relationships:

The Awareness scale, referred to in the table, is a test not only of actual knowledge but also of the clarity of one's grasp of the social process, past and present. It serves, to some extent, as a crude intelligence test. The same can be said, though less authoritatively, for the Intellectuality scale, which assesses the degree to which intellectual habits have been formed and are perceived as attractive. The findings on these measures make plain that there is a sharp decline in the level of information and intellectual grasp as one moves from the more liberal to the more conservative sections of the population. Similarly, an increase in the level of knowledge is usually accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the incidence of conservatism. Individual items correlated with intelligence bear out the same general tendency. Thus, the item "I was a slow learner in school" is answered yes by 34 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives but by only 14 per cent of the Liberals. These differences on Awareness and Intellectuality remain large and statistically significant even when education and other status factors are controlled.

Of course, not all conservatives are uninformed, not all liberals are knowledgeable, and not all the unlearned are conservative. The data show clearly, nevertheless, that the most articulate and informed classes in our society are preponderantly liberal in their outlook. Procedures carried out with a special sample of civic and political leaders in the *PAR* study bear this out even further, regardless of party preference or of other affiliations that might ordinarily be expected to have an influence upon liberal-conservative tendencies.[5]

Social-Psychological Attributes. Related to status and intelligence are a set of traits that reflect the interrelation of personality and life-

[5] This conclusion receives at least implicit support from the findings of Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York, 1955) in which leadership groups were found to be uniformly more tolerant of diversity and non-conformity than the general population.

TABLE I. *Comparison of Conservatives and Liberals by Education and Knowledge, Minnesota Sample**

	Liberals (N = 190)	*Moderate Liberals* N = 316)	*Moderate Conservatives* (N = 331)	*Extreme Conservatives* (N = 245)
Education				
% with grade school education	9	14	29	49
% with some college education	47	33	21	12
Awareness				
% scoring low	9	25	45	66
% scoring high	54	32	21	9
Intellectuality				
% scoring low	7	20	34	56
% scoring high	62	43	26	11

* In this and the following tables *high* always means a score in the upper third of the scale named; *low* always means a score in the lower third of the scale named. The middle third is omitted from these tables. The table should thus be read across, as follows: Whereas 54 per cent of the Liberals score among the upper (or "high") third of the distribution on the Awareness scale, 32 per cent of the Moderate Liberals, 21 per cent of the Moderate Conservatives and only 9 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives have "high" scores on Awareness. It should also be noted that the differences between the extreme groups in this table, and in all the subsequent data reported, are statistically significant beyond the 1 per cent level of significance, which is to say that the probability is less than one in 100 that differences of these magnitudes could be occurring by chance, given the size of our samples.

style, and especially the degree to which people feel themselves to be the masters or victims of their immediate environment and of themselves. These traits have to do with one's sense of security, with the sense of belonging, isolation, and social support, with feelings of worthlessness, submissiveness, inferiority, timidity, self-assurance, personal strength, and the like. In [Table II] are some of the scales we developed to assess this universe of feelings and attitudes, together with the scores registered by liberals and conservatives for each of these traits.

As these figures make plain, the Conservatives tend to score at the more "undesirable" end of the distributions on every one of the above traits. Uniformly, every increase in the degree of conservatism shows a corresponding increase in submissiveness, anomie, sense of alienation, bewilderment, etc. To some extent, the vast differences appearing in this table are a function of the somewhat higher status and education of the liberals in the sample. But the differences remain almost as large even when we control for these factors. Conservatism, in our society at least, appears to be far more characteristic of social isolates, of people who think poorly of themselves, who suffer personal disgruntlement and frustration, who are submissive, timid, and wanting in confidence, who lack a clear sense of direction and purpose, who are uncertain about their values, and who are generally bewildered by the alarming task of having to thread their way through a society which seems to them too complex to fathom.

Readers of Eric Hoffer will recognize in these findings support for his brilliant, intuitive characterization of the conservative and of the conditions which give rise to him.[6] Far from being the elite or the masters or the prime movers, conservatives tend on the whole to come from the more backward and frightened elements of the population, including the classes that are socially and psychologically depressed. The significance of this, and of other findings reported in this section, will be considered in the evaluation section shortly to follow.

[6] Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York, 1951), Ch. 1, and *passim*.

TABLE II. *Comparison of Conservatives and Liberals by Personality Traits — Social*

	Liberals (N = 190	*Moderate Liberals* (N = 316)	*Moderate Conservatives* (N = 331)	*Extreme Conservatives* (N = 245)
Dominance				
% low	9	19	37	51
% high	72	50	29	14
Anomie				
% low	71	48	32	10
% high	4	16	30	59
Alienation				
% low	57	47	35	18
% high	11	20	27	45
Bewilderment				
% low	61	40	33	10
% high	9	20	34	57
Pessimism				
% low	44	35	31	19
% high	25	35	42	53
Social Responsibility				
% low	12	25	36	62
% high	47	31	23	8
Self-Confidence				
% low	18	23	32	35
% high	46	38	24	20
Guilt				
% low	62	42	36	18
% high	16	18	28	47

TABLE III. *Comparison of Conservatives and Liberals by Personality Traits — Clinical*

	Liberals (N = 190)	*Moderate Liberals* (N = 316)	*Moderate Conservatives* (N = 331)	*Extreme Conservatives* (N = 245)
Hostility				
% low	59	38	26	9
% high	18	37	46	71
Paranoid Tendencies				
% low	56	42	28	13
% high	16	27	37	62
Contempt for Weakness				
% low	61	33	21	5
% high	8	18	29	55
Need Inviolacy (Ego Defense)				
% low	68	58	36	17
% high	11	20	38	60
Rigidity				
% low	58	43	29	14
% high	18	32	41	60
Obsessive Traits				
% low	47	40	29	22
% high	24	31	43	55
Intolerance of Human Frailty				
% low	52	30	17	6
% high	8	16	23	54

Clinical-Personality Variables. Turning now to a set of traits that are more straightforwardly clinical and psychological, conservatives and liberals are found to be sharply distinguished from each other in many of these characteristics as well. The differences, furthermore, are consistent with those cited in the personality-life style group. Scores on the more important of the clinical variables are shown in Table III, above.

The figures demonstrate with overpowering effect that conservatives tend once more to score on the more "undesirable," poorly adapted side of these personality variables. Of the four liberal-conservative classifications, the extreme conservatives are easily the most hostile and suspicious, the most rigid and compulsive, the quickest to condemn others for their imperfections or weaknesses, the most intolerant, the most easily moved to scorn and disappointment in others, the most inflexible and unyielding in their perceptions and judgments. Although aggressively critical of the shortcomings of others, they are unusually defensive and armored in the protection of their own ego needs. Poorly integrated psychologically, anxious, often perceiving themselves as inadequate, and subject to excessive feelings of guilt, they seem inclined to project onto others the traits they most dislike or fear in themselves.

If space permitted, these data could be buttressed by numerous other related findings in our studies, and the relationships so briefly presented here could be elaborated in dozens of ways. We must, however, move on to evaluate the data just offered and to analyze, in particular, their relation to conservatism as a political and social outlook.

IV. ANALYSIS

If we may trust the evidence just presented, there seems little doubt that support for conservative doctrines is highly correlated with certain distinct personality patterns. The quantitative data do not immediately make plain, however, the nature of the connection between the two or the reasons for the particular relationships found. These questions take us into realms that are somewhat more theoretical and speculative.

In the explanations that follow I have proceeded from the view that most of the propositions fundamental to the conservative creed (as well as to the liberal creed) are in reality normative rather than empirical statements. Hence, they can neither be demonstrated nor refuted

by experience or observation of the external world. The universe to which conservative doctrines refer is so ambiguous that it is often possible to assert with equal validity a given proposition or its contrary. For example, which can we demonstrate more firmly, that men are naturally equal or unequal? Anarchic or law-abiding? Essentially wicked or essentially good? Which is it correct to believe, that man is governed more "by emotion than by reason," or the reverse? Which generalization can best be supported by evidence, that change is a "devouring conflagration," destructive of mankind, or a boon that prevents stagnation and the withering of the human spirit? As for statements which claim — or for that matter deny — that society is ruled by "divine intent" and that power is made legitimate by Providence, one would be hard put to decide what manner of data would be needed before one could rationally embrace or reject either view.

If the assertions contained in the conservative creed cannot be referred to the world of experience for proof or refutation, we may conclude that one is led to conservatism not by the facts as such, but only by the way one happens to perceive or "structure" the facts. There are, I think, three main ways in which such structures are developed:

First, one may impose structure on an ambiguous field of phenomena by logical procedures. Conservative doctrines might, for example, be formally derived from some set of postulates or from another system of beliefs or cognitions. Many of us like to think that our beliefs are carefully reasoned out in this way, and that our several outlooks and attitudes are internally consistent, dispassionately arrived at, and valid. The practice of reasoning out and forming attitudes on complex social questions in this purely disinterested way is, however, rare. It may occasionally be found in a few intellectuals of unusual philosophic inclination, but it is not likely to be the essential element in determining most people's convictions. As Graham Wallas observed, even the methods of reasoning about social affairs are fixed by habit and by subjective leanings. Numerous psychological studies have shown, moreover, that judgments thought to have been derived analytically, or sometimes even from observation, become notoriously more unreliable as the ambiguity of the stimulus field increases.

A second possibility is that one's views of man and society are learned through indoctrination and group influence, so that an individual reared in an environment of conservative belief absorbs its attitudes unconsciously and with no particular awareness of alternatives. While such learning is obviously important in the formation of opinions and doubtless accounts for a great number of conservative (and liberal) believers, it cannot by itself adequately explain the personality differences revealed in our research. One should also keep in mind that Americans appear mainly to have been exposed to a liberal rather than a conservative tradition.[7] Then, too, it is difficult for anyone in a society as mobile and as literate as ours to escape all contact with alternative doctrines; hence, individuals reared in an environment of conservative belief are likely to have had *some* contact with liberal sentiments as well. Some measure of choice has probably been exercised, therefore, even by those whose beliefs have been determined chiefly by indoctrination.

This brings us to a third process by which cognitions of the external world may be structured, namely, through projection of the personality of the observer himself. In this way, an individual creates a set of perceptions that express, or that are consonant with, his own needs and impulses. The more ambiguous the thing observed, the greater the likelihood that he will fashion his perceptions of it to accord with his own inner feelings. In other words, conservatives believe what they do not because the world is the way it is but because they, the observers, are the way *they* are. Liberals, observing the same world, arrive at quite different judgments about it. Thus, conservative doctrines may tell us less about the nature of man

[7] For a full scale development of this thesis, *cf.*, for example, Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955). Interestingly enough, a belief in the predominance of a liberal tradition in America has frequently been advanced by new conservative writers, who point to it as an obstacle to a victory for conservatism. For example, Clinton Rossiter, *op. cit.*, p. 68, asserts that: "The American political tradition is basically a liberal tradition, an avowedly optimistic idealistic way of thinking about man and government. It is stamped with the mighty name and spirit of Thomas Jefferson, and its articles of faith, an American Holy Writ, are perfectibility, progress, liberty, equality, democracy, and individualism."

and society than about the persons who believe these doctrines. Although we cannot explain all our findings by reference to these projective processes, they do, I think, provide a key to the explanation of a good many of the results.

Even the data on intellectuality, knowledge, and intelligence bear some relation to these processes. The conservative, as we have seen, is psychologically timid, distrustful of differences, and of whatever he cannot understand. He fears change, dreads disorder, and is intolerant of nonconformity. The tendency of the prototypic conservative to derogate reason and intellectuality, and to eschew theory, seems in some measure to be an outgrowth of these and related elements in his personality. He is inclined to regard pure intellectual activity as dangerous to established arrangements, for in his view of the world such activity often gives way to utopian "schemes" or unrealistic "plans." Intellectuals are likely to be impractical dreamers and potential radicals, unstable people whose theories may weaken the foundations of the social order. The conservative tends, furthermore, to perceive intellectuals as bohemians, as deviants and non-conformists who flaunt the requirements of convention and who lack respect for property or religion. Excessive intellectual activity is thought to lead to skepticism and rationalism and, consequently, to the destruction of faith. Like Cassius, the intellectual thinks too much and is therefore very dangerous.

It will be obvious that this manner of perceiving intellectuals has little to do with the characteristics of the class of people being observed and much to do with the anxieties and torments of the observer.

Related to this is the tendency for conservatives to be attracted to sentiments that would have to be described as mystical, and even obscurantist. One comes upon this not only in the writings of Russell Kirk, Eric Voegelin, or other spokesmen for the "New Conservatism," but also in the responses of conservatives throughout our samples. To cite but one illustration among dozens, over 67 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives score in the upper third of the Mysticism scale compared with only 15 per cent of the liberals. Similarly the conservatives show a far greater tendency to agree or to say yes to items that are sweeping in nature and somewhat obscure in meaning. To judge from their responses, they apparently set far less store upon rigor or precision of thought, and allow less scope to the critical faculties. They also tend to score higher on the more extreme religious items and on the Religiosity scale itself.

To some extent, the findings on intellectuality are the result of the lower average education of conservatives. In the United States, at least, education is likely to lead to liberal rather than conservative tendencies. For one thing, it exposes the student to the American inheritance which, as we have noted, is primarily liberal. For another, education trains people in some measure to demand greater precision in speech and thought, to be more open-minded and tolerant, to be intellectually flexible and receptive to scientific modes of discourse, to reject mystical or non-natural explanations, and so on. These are traits which we find to be negatively correlated with conservatism; or, put another way, we find that individuals who learn to think in the ways just described are, other things being equal, far more likely to become liberals than conservatives.

If we turn next to the connection between conservatism and the variables reflecting hostility and suspicion, the role of personality in the formation of social beliefs becomes even more striking. In many ways hostility is a principal component of the conservative personality, as it is a principal component of conservative doctrine. It does not seem accidental, considering the data on hostility, that conservatives prefer to believe in man's wickedness, that they choose to see man as fallen, untrustworthy, lawless, selfish, and weak. Expressed as political doctrines, these projections of aggressive personality tendencies take on the respectability of an old and honored philosophical position. These tendencies may also lie at the root of the conservative inclination to regulate and control man; to ensure that he will not violate the conditions necessary for order; to train him to value duty, obedience, and conformity; and to surround him with stabilizing influences, like property, church, and the family. The high values placed on authority, leadership, and natural hierarchy, and on an elite to guide and check the rest of mankind, apparently derive from the same set of psychological impulses.

These personality needs can also be discerned in the scores registered on several of our other social attitude measures, as well as on many individual items. It may be noted, for

example, that only 11 per cent of the Liberals scored at the high end of our ethnocentric prejudice measure,[8] compared with 71 per cent of the extreme Conservatives. Similarly, 45 per cent of the Liberals but only 12 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives were high on a measure of Faith in People. A scale dealing with Political Suspiciousness showed conservatives to be far more mistrustful of others in this respect as well (55 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives were high, but only 14 per cent of the Liberals). From whatever direction we approach him, the prototypic conservative seems far more impelled to contain, to reject, and to take precautions against, his fellow creatures.

The data on psychological rigidity offer additional support for these interpretations. It will be recalled that conservatives showed up as relatively inflexible and far more inclined than the rest of the sample to exhibit compulsive-obsessive traits. Not only are they less able to tolerate human foibles or weaknesses, but they are less tolerant of any and all differences between themselves and others. On a Tolerance scale developed for these studies, 55 per cent of the Liberals fell into the highest third of the distribution, compared with only 25 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives. An item asserting that "A man oughtn't to be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he is talking about" was answered affirmatively by 55 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives, but by only 8 per cent of the Liberals. Seventy-seven per cent of the Conservatives say that "It is wrong ever to break a law," while only 38 per cent of the Liberals assert this. As we have seen, 32 per cent of the Liberals but 63 per cent of the Extreme Conservatives think that "Duties are more important than rights." In a measure of the ability to tolerate ambiguity — a scale which expresses a need for certainty and for having all matters neatly pegged and ordered — the Extreme Conservatives appear considerably less able than others to live with uncertainty or ambiguity (67 per cent of the conservatives, but only 12 per cent of the Liberals, score high on this measure).

These are a few of the many supplementary findings which lend support to the hypothesis that the inflexible and exacting features of conservative social doctrine are related to the prototypic personality attributes of conservative believers. The connection does not seem surprising, so soon as one thinks about it. The extreme emphasis on order and duty; the elaborate affection for the tried and familiar; the fear of change and the desire to forestall it; the strong attachments to the symbols and rituals of in-group culture; the hope for a society ordered and hierarchical in which each is aware of his station and its duties; the unusual concern for law, authority, and stability — all these can easily be understood as doctrinal expressions of a personality pattern that has strong need for order and tidiness; that adjusts only with difficulty to changes in the environment; that cannot bear the uncertainty of questions left open, and requires answers; that is made uncomfortable by the give-and-take of free inquiry and the open society; that yearns for consensus, harmony of values, unequivocal definitions of the norms, and conclusive specification of the sources of authority.

It may seem ironic, in light of these traits, that conservatives also tend to exhibit the submissive, indecisive, retiring, and somewhat spiritless demeanor noted in our discussion of the social-psychological variables. I cannot pretend to follow, if indeed anyone can, the complex threads by which these several personality configurations are somehow held together. One can, nevertheless, observe (without explaining it) that persons who feel inadequate and who for one reason or another dislike themselves are often the quickest to aggress against others and to demand perfection of them. Similarly, by a process which psychologists have labelled "reaction formation," the disgruntled often seem to venerate the very society which frustrates them. It is almost as though, disliking themselves, they seek solace and support in an overdefense of society and in the over-institutionalization of life. Conservatives make a fetish of community, although it is apparent that in many ways they are more alienated from the community than most. This conclusion is suggested not only by their scores on such measures as anomie, alienation, and social responsibility, but by their unusually high scores on political cynicism, feelings of political impotence, and status frustration. In the same vein, although the intensity of their patriotism exceeds that of any other group, their faith in democracy (American or otherwise), is lowest of the four

[8] Adapted and revised from the California Ethnocentrism scale, the original version of which is reported in T. W. Adorno *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950), Ch. 4.

groups, while their scores on the totalitarian, elitist, and authoritarian values (which for the most part, the American creed rejects) are the highest of the four.[9]

V. Cautions and Qualifications

Impressive though the conservatism data may be, we must take note of several important qualifications and problems bearing upon their interpretation, to which fuller attention will eventually have to be given. Here, for reasons of space, I can only comment briefly upon a few of these points.

1. The findings refer to aggregates, not to specific individuals. Doubtless, many of us know individual conservatives whose personalities differ in key ways from the prototypic pattern described here. In our research, some conservatives have been turned up who, in personality and other attributes, essentially resemble liberals. These, however, are exceptions, since the probabilities are strong that a conservative selected at random from the general population will resemble the conservative profile that emerges from the preceding data.

2. A question might also be raised about the propriety of classifying highly informed, upper status conservatives in the same category with uneducated conservatives of low status. Conceivably, the "elite" and the "mass" conservatives are motivated by very dissimilar influences and could be scoring high on conservatism for quite different reasons. This possibility cannot be dismissed lightly, especially when one considers that status and education factors account, by themselves, for a significant share of the total variance found in our data. Subsequent analyses will make it possible, we hope, to settle this matter conclusively; but for the present, at least one important consideration can be noted: when education and other status factors are controlled, we find that informed, upper status conservatives differ from informed, upper status liberals in precisely the same ways that conservatives in general differ from liberals in general; or, for that matter, in the same ways that "mass" conservatives differ from "mass" liberals. While the *range* of the scores varies as occupation, education, or knowledge varies the *direction* and *magnitude* of the differences between liberals and conservatives remain very much the same for all status and education levels. In short, personality factors seem to exercise a fairly uniform influence on the formation of conservative or liberal outlooks at all social levels.

3. The association between conservatism and the traits outlined exists in the form of correlations, which only tell us that the two go together. *How* they go together, and which is antecedent to which, is a more difficult and more elusive problem. Conservative doctrines appear, in some measure, to arise from personality needs, but it is conceivable, at least, that both are the product of some third set of factors. Both, for example, may have been learned or acquired simultaneously, through family indoctrination, in which case the connection between the two would be more epiphenomenal than causal. I do not think that this explanation can account for most of our results, but it will need to be checked out further.

4. The terms employed in the description of traits must be seen as relative and as having been mainly defined by the items in the scales themselves. Satisfactory external validation has not always been available. Also, although clinical terms have been employed that might be used in the diagnosis of psychotics, we have used the terms only as terms of tendency within the normal population. None of them is intended to signify the presence of a pathological mental state.

5. One must be careful to avoid the reductivist fallacy of assigning all significance in the problems considered to personality factors. Equally, one must avoid the temptation to "psychologize" problems to such an extent as to strip them of their significance as genuine political or philosophical problems.

6. The term liberalism has been inadequately defined in our study so far. We have tended to call someone liberal if he rejected the values of conservatism. While our findings suggest that most of these people would in fact meet the definition of a liberal, our present classification of liberals is crude and needs to be refined. All persons who reject conservatism may not be liberals, for, as in the case of the "authoritarian-democratic" dimension, liberalism-conservatism may not be variables, paired in such a way

[9] For a fascinating set of data on *conformity* as measured in an experimental group situation that fit, even in detail, with the findings presented here on conservatism, see Richard S. Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," *American Psychologist*, Vol. 10 (1955), pp. 191–198.

that a high score on one necessarily signifies a low score on the other.

7. The connections between classical conservatism (or liberalism) and such factors as party affiliation, attitude on economic issues, and liberal-conservative self-designation have been extensively explored in our research, but could not be reported in the present paper. The correlation between them tends, however, to be fairly low, suggesting that for the present, at least, many Americans divide in their party preferences, their support of candidates, their economic views, their stands on public issues, or their political self-identifications without reference to their beliefs in liberalism or conservatism. The latter have influence, of course, especially among some of the more articulate groups; for the general population, however, political divisions of the sort named appear to be more affected by group membership factors than by personality.

8. Some readers may be inclined to identify our "conservatives" with "rightwing authoritarians," in the belief that we are measuring the latter rather more than the former. This view would be difficult to support, however, for not only have we defined conservatism by reference to its most frequently articulated values (which are by no means identical with right-wing values), but we have also found that while right-wing authoritarians are in some respects a more extreme version of our conservatives, there are also significant differences between the two.

9. Finally, our findings have so far been drawn entirely from Minnesota samples, and the degree to which the conclusions can be generalized to conservatives everywhere and at all times is open to debate. We shall soon have comparable data on a national cross-section sample, which I have reason to think will bear out the present results. In fact, I am inclined to believe that the connections between conservatism and the personality configurations presented in the foregoing would very likely prevail wherever, and whenever, the members of a society are free to choose between conservatism and alternative, liberal systems of belief. But this is a subject for future research.

19

POLITICAL PERSONALITY AND ELECTORAL CHOICE

• *ROBERT E. LANE*

The most widely-held and well-supported theories of electoral choice today relate such choice to group membership, socializing, so to speak, the vote decision. In this process the personality of the individual voter has tended to be overlooked or its influence minimized. In focussing in this discussion upon the relationship of authoritarianism to electoral choice, therefore, we hope not only to contribute to our knowledge of a particular personality pattern in a political context but also, more generally, to restore the individual, as contrasted to the group, to an important place in a theory of the electoral process.

In an electoral situation, as in any other situation, personality factors play a double role: (1) they affect the perceptions of the individual, screening out some stimuli, distorting others, and admitting others intact; and (2) they shape the responses of a person, selecting among the various possible responses those which are most serviceable to basic personality needs. Every personality develops certain attitudes to assist in this process of selecting among the possible responses. For example, interest in the election,[1] sense of duty,[2] sense of political ef-

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[1] See, for example, Elmo Roper's interpretation of "concern" in "New York Elects O'Dwyer," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 10, pp. 53–57 (Spring, 1946). Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell treat this attitude under the head of general apathy in *Non-Voting* (Chicago, 1924); Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet consider the significance of "interest" in *The People's Choice* (New York, 1944), pp. 40–41.

[2] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill., 1954),

ficacy,[3] or sense of social integration with the community[4] might form the nucleus of the attitudes bearing on the decision whether or not to vote. Identification with a political party,[5] position on current political issues,[6] candidate preference,[7] anticipation of economic or political advantage,[8] prestige considerations,[9] or identification with a partisan social group[10] might affect the vote itself.

I. Circumstances Limiting the Influence of Personality

We have said that dimensions of personality can help to explain certain attitudes which in turn help to explain participation decisions and partisanship decisions. But the influence of personality in making these contributions to the ultimate political decisions is not constant, due to variation in the strength of the personality factors which may be present. In addition, the situations themselves provide either a broad or a narrow scope for the influence of personality. Undoubtedly many elements of the situation tend to affect the degree of influence that personality may have on any single electoral decision, but among the important elements of the situation the following four are surely significant.

1. *The degree to which the national or local culture has established an approved norm.* Where the individual perceives a latitude of decision, elements of his personality can guide his decision in a way which is not possible where the culture provides sanctions against all those who deviate from a specified position.

2. *The degree to which the choice is guided by personal experience and illuminated by personal information.* It is a commonplace that a structured situation gives rise to fewer rumors and less projectivity than a vague situation where knowledge is little and guideposts few. But where there is personal information, the projective possibilities are limited and internal referents are displaced by clearer perceptions of the outside world.

3. *The degree to which the choice is guided by perceived economic, social, or political self-interest.* A person who believes that some clear gain to himself or to his group will result from a victory of one or another candidate generally narrows the scope of "expressive" responses. In other words, when dealing with tax and subsidy matters, the expression of aggression, passivity, projectivity, and authoritarian-submission will be inhibited when they entail the prospect of economic loss, although they may be

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pp. 194–99; Harrison Gough *et al.*, "A Personality Scale for Social Responsibility," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 47, pp. 73–80 (Jan., 1952).

[3] See *The Voter Decides*, pp. 187–94.

[4] See Alice Kitt and David B. Gleicher, "Determinants of Voting Behavior," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 14, pp. 393–412 (Fall, 1951); the idea forms an important part of the analysis of Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William M. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), and is further developed in *The Voter Decides*, pp. 199–206.

[5] The idea of traditional loyalty to political parties has been discussed by such writers as MacCauley, Bryce, and Holcombe, and has recently been analyzed by V. O. Key in his *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, 1949). See also *Voting* and *The Voter Decides*, pp. 88–11.

[6] For the relationship of issues to electoral choice see Stuart Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York, 1928); Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency* (Baltimore, 1951); George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 601–23 (Winter, 1951–52); *The Voter Decides*, pp. 112–35; Angus Campbell and Robert L. Kahn, *The People Elect a President* (Ann Arbor, 1952), pp. 54–60.

[7] See Fillmore Sanford, "Public Orientation to Roosevelt," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 189–216 (Summer, 1951); Jerome Bruner and Sheldon Korchin, "The Boss and the Vote," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 10, pp. 1–23 (Spring, 1946); *The Voter Decides*, pp. 136–43; James C. Davies, "Charisma in the 1952 Campaign," this REVIEW, Vol. 48, pp. 1083–1102 (Dec., 1954).

[8] Although the assumption that man behaves economically in political situations has been prevalent in the literature, the nature of this type of motivation has rarely been analyzed. Much of the discussion has dealt with group economic interests, confusing the appeals of group solidarity and economic gain. Other discussion, that of Bean, Lundberg, Holcombe, Lubell, and others, shows the economic basis for the vote, without reference to the psychology of economic self-interest. On this latter point, see the forthcoming work of Stephen Sarasohn.

[9] Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1951), pp. 75–80.

[10] Howard Freeman and Morris Showell, "Differential Political Influence of Voluntary Associations," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 703–14 (Winter, 1952); *The People's Choice*, pp. 137–58; Berelson *et al.*, *Voting;* and Morris Janowitz and Warren Miller, "The Index of Political Predispositions in the 1948 Elections," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 14, pp. 710–25 (Nov., 1950).

pressed into the service of the economic interest in the manner or style of argument employed.

4. *The degree to which a person's group memberships create cross pressures.* When a person belongs to groups whose political attitudes are homogeneous, the scope of personality factors is somewhat limited by his narrowed perception of alternatives. When he belongs to several groups whose political views are different, he must choose among them, compromise, or withdraw from the field.

Even if the above four factors are kept constant and the strength of personality forces in the individual himself is fixed, there is another way in which the influence of personality on electoral choice may be varied. Not all elections evoke the same kinds of personality responses. For example, Paul Lazarsfeld suggested (in a recent talk at the Survey Research Center) that the 1896 campaign between Bryan and McKinley might have brought forth a difference between the inner-directed and the other-directed persons of Riesman's typology in a way never again reproduced, whereas the 1928 campaign in which Prohibition was a campaign issue might have been more discriminating on certain elements of the authoritarian syndrome. Each election, then, varies not only in the degree to which it evokes decisions determined by personality, but also with respect to the nature of the personality syndromes which are relevant.

In spite of these various opportunities for personality-shaped determinations, it must be repeated that under many circumstances the social forces, the group memberships, and the stimuli of the media, which have been at the focus of traditional attention, exercise their influence without regard to personality factors. So to speak, they slip unscathed through the screening influences of the personality. It is for this reason, among others, that analyses of political decisions employing solely demographic data and data of exposure to the media have been able to achieve considerable success. Yet always behind the demographic relationships there lurk the unexplored problems of motivation, both for the portion of the vote that is "explained" in this fashion and even more for that portion which is considered deviant.

II. Method

Although the literature contains many suggestions of personality factors which might provide the basis for fruitful exploration, the authoritarian "syndrome" isolated by the pathbreaking study on *The Authoritarian Personality*[11] has been selected for the following case study. Recent criticism[12] has tended to highlight the methodological weaknesses of this work, but further research with the instruments devised by its authors has amplified our knowledge of the several personality factors involved in the "authoritarian personality" and has corroborated a significant proportion of the original findings.[13] The set of attitudes which make up the authoritarian syndrome may be briefly described as follows: desire to submit to strong leaders; desire to dominate persons and groups seen as weaker than oneself; tendency to seek destructive and aggressive solutions to problems as contrasted to an attitude of tolerance and compromise; tendency to accept superstitious or supernatural explanations and to avoid scientific explanations; tendency to see individuals as members of favorable or unfavorable types rather than as unique human beings; cynicism regarding other people's motives (and regarding the integrity of the political process); tendency to project one's own motivations upon other people — to see them responding in the same way the individual himself responds; tendency to value conventional attitudes and behavior and to reject deviants — tendency to conformity; tendency to avoid introspection and to "externalize" explanations for the events in one's life (anti-intraception); tendency to see situations in terms of power and to see one's own part in such situations as a function of one's own power and toughness; tendency for sex drives to be inadequately integrated with the rest of the personality, and therefore a fear of sexual impulses.[14]

But to move from a promising and indeed demonstrably fruitful concept to a test of the concept in some relevant situation is difficult. The authoritarian personality was originally measured by a battery of thirty items, called the F (for Fascist) Scale. Ten of these thirty items

[11] T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel S. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950).

[12] Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, "The Authoritarian Personality," in *Continuities in Social Research* (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), pp. 50–122.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 123–96.

[14] *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 222–79.

were included in a battery of questions asked of a portion of the national sample, interviewed by the Survey Research Center in their November, 1952, post-election survey, thus opening up an opportunity for significant research on the relation of personality to electoral behavior.

The use of these data, however, posed a number of methodological questions, a few of which must be mentioned. First, there emerged the question of the *representativeness* of the sample. Only a portion (585) of those interviewed in the post-election national survey were asked the authoritarian-equalitarian (AE) questions. Since the 585 were randomly selected from a random stratified sample, there was assurance that they were about as close to a representative national sample as could be secured with this size group. Second, was the question of the *nature of the scale* to be used. It would have been possible to construct a simple Likert-type scale on the basis of all ten of the questions, but this type of scale is open to the criticism of multi-dimensionality; the scale may be measuring more than one dimension of personality. For this reason, after some experimentation a Guttman-type four-item scale (hereafter referred to as "the AE scale") was constructed which met the minimum requirements for this type of scale — a Coefficient of Reproducibility of 90.4.[15] This type of scale has the virtue of more nearly measuring a single dimension. The items in this scale, with their distributions, are as follows:

1. What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents. (agree: 76%; disagree: 23%; NA: 1%)
2. Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power. (agree: 64%; disagree: 35%; NA: 1%)
3. A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk. (agree: 51%; disagree: 48%, NA: 1%)
4. People sometimes say that an insult to your honor should not be forgotten. Do you agree or disagree with that? (agree: 25%; disagree: 73%; NA: 2%)

[15] The coefficients of error for each question were: 1 — 7.6; 2 — 12.7; 3 — 12.0; and 4 — 7.4. On computation and use of the Guttman Scale, see L. Guttman, "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis," in Samuel Stouffer *et al., Measurement and Prediction: Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (Princeton, 1950).

In some ways this four-item scale purports to measure, by a less complex method, an aspect of personality already explored by the authors of the *Authoritarian Personality*. Although there are areas of difference, the series of attitudinal and behavioral relationships obtained with this shorter AE scale do suggest that the scale measures some of the main dimensions of the 30-item F Scale. By and large, the evidence presented below reveals that those who show high authoritarianism on the four-item AE scale are less tolerant of ambiguity, more ethnocentric, more projective (at the lower educational levels), more moralistic, and more tough in their attitude on foreign affairs (at the lower educational levels) than are the equalitarian types.

The demographic characteristics of the authoritarian and equalitarian personalities are of interest, but space permits discussion of only the educational factor. As might be expected, the more education a person has the more likely he is to be equalitarian, but the relationship between education and authoritarianism is not a very close one. Suffice it to say that those with only a grade school education are the most authoritarian group by a moderate margin.

III. Political Participation

Political participation can be conveniently classified in terms of three modes of behavior: (1) non-voting; (2) voting without further political activity; and (3) voting plus such further political activity as going to meetings, ringing doorbells, and contributing funds. How does authoritarianism relate to these levels of participation?

Theoretically, the expectation is unclear. Voting implies faith in a democracy (equalitarian), but it is also a conventional act (authoritarian). Political activity implies social responsibility (equalitarian), but it also suggests power-oriented activity (authoritarian). Other studies have indicated that authoritarians tend to vote less than equalitarians,[16] but since authoritarianism and non-voting are both class-linked and the data are not broken down by classes, one cannot be sure of the validity of this conclusion. Similarly, Fillmore Sanford

[16] Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 17, pp. 185–201 (Summer, 1953).

concludes that "equalitarians are more politically participant"[17] but his data suffer from the same lack of class breakdown, and therefore, the same possible invalidity.

When our data are not broken into two class groups, it also appears that there is a significant personality difference ($p < 5\%$) between authoritarian and equalitarian patterns of participation, but when the class break-down is made, this significance disappears. On the basis of the class-controlled (education) data there appears to be almost no difference in non-voting between the two personality groups and only slight differences ($p < 5\%$) in political activity of the meeting-going, money-giving type.

Yet such evidence in no way proves that the authoritarian syndrome does not play a part in decisions on political participation. It is possible for people to arrive at the same decision for different reasons, to vote for different reasons, and to go to meetings for different reasons. Although with the data at hand we cannot probe deeply into motivation, we can make a rough test of the way two important influences on participation bear on authoritarians and equalitarians in our sample.

The first of these influences is a set of attitudes relating to a person's belief in the effectiveness of voting in a democracy. In a battery of five questions, the Survey Research Center probed people's beliefs on whether public officials "care what people like me think," the effectiveness of the vote in influencing policy, and the sense of bewilderment at the complexity of public problems, summarizing the responses in a score on "sense of political efficacy." Theory would suggest that the authoritarian, with his cynicism and his belief that weak people do not have to be consulted, would score low in such a test. The data for non-high school graduates are given in Table I. There was no significant relationship for the better-educated group.

But if a sense of the importance of his vote helps lead the equalitarian into political participation, why does the authoritarian participate? Is it from a sense of duty? The members of the sample were asked about their concept of a person's duty to vote under various circumstances and were scored on their responses. On

TABLE I. *Authoritarianism and Sense of Political Efficacy for Non-High School Graduates*

Sense of Political Efficacy	Authoritarianism	
	Equalitarian N = 53	Authoritarian N = 147
Low	38%	55%
High	62	45
Total	100%	100%

$\chi^2 = 5.04 \quad p < 5\%$.

the whole, it appears that authoritarians and equalitarians do not perceive the duty to vote in different ways — it is too heavily laden with cultural approval for such personality dimensions to show through.

Why, then, does the authoritarian vote and become active in approximately the same degree as the equalitarian? It is at least possible that he is responding less to inner feelings of responsibility and self-confidence and more to external pressures. The nature of such pressures is such that they tend to increase with the number of social contacts a person in a community, or the number of groups to which he belongs. Therefore, greater number of group memberships of authoritarians revealed in Table II is significant in appraising the context of "civic" influences on the two personality groups.

Yet the data probably have another meaning as well. The very thing which makes the authoritarian a joiner of groups (although, according to Sanford,[18] not a leader) may also make him politically active: that is, it is the perception of some personal or material advantage which makes him both join groups and work for a political party. Sanford has shown that the authoritarian, more than the equalitarian, is reluctant to join the less prestigeful groups but eager to "head up" some community committee work.[19] Similar considerations probably enter into the authoritarian's calculations regarding political activity.

From the evidence, therefore, it appears that although there is little difference in voting and political activity between the two personality groups, there may be differences in the personal meanings of these forms of participation to the

[17] Fillmore H. Sanford, *Authoritarianism and Leadership* (Philadelphia, 1950), p. 159.

[18] *Authoritarianism and Leadership*, p. 181.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 159–69.

TABLE II. *Authoritarianism and Number of Formal Group Memberships*

	Authoritarianism	
	Equalitarian	Authoritarian
Non-High School Graduates	(N = 60)	(N = 172)
0–2 group memberships	72%	62%
3 or more group memberships	28	38
Total	100%	100%
High School or College Graduates	(N = 68)	(N = 97)
0–2 group memberships	68%	51%
3 or more group memberships	32	49
Total	100%	100%

two groups. The equalitarian, in part at least, seems motivated by a feeling that his voice in a democracy is significant; the authoritarian may be responding more to the group (conventional) pressures around him, and to the hope of some increment in prestige and power associated with his political activity.

IV. ORIENTATION

While this portrayal of personality forces operating covertly in a series of political acts helps to illuminate the level of participation, it does nothing to reveal the direction. Other studies have suggested that there is a relationship between ideology and authoritarianism,[20] between Communist party identification and authoritarianism,[21] and between candidate orientation at the rightist margin and authoritarianism.[22] This last study, however, also shows that in the spring of 1952 there were only minimum differences between Eisenhower and Stevenson supporters at the upper-income level, and the Adorno study shows the small difference in authoritarianism between "Willkie Republicans" and "New Deal Democrats" in 1946 and 1947. Theoretically, therefore, there was no clear reason for assuming that the vote in the 1952 election would reflect important differences in authoritarian personality orientation. The data are given in Table III.

[20] *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 151–207.

[21] See Edward A. Shils, "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left'," in *Continuities in Social Research* (cited in note 12), pp. 24–49.

[22] See Ohmer Milton, "Presidential Choice and Performance on a Scale of Authoritarianism," *The American Psychologist*, Vol. 7, pp. 597–98 (Oct., 1952).

The interrelationship of personality, education, and the 1952 vote shows a pattern of some interest. It is clear that at every educational level authoritarianism tends to be associated with the Republican party. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that those at the middle level of education, the high school graduates who did not go to college, are most influenced by the personality dimension. It is at this level, roughly upper working and lower middle class, where social group memberships exert cross pressures, and, as noted above, cross pressures open up the way for personality influences which are blocked out by solidly partisan group identifications.

If it is legitimate to make a rough equivalence between education and socio-economic status, certain of the cell groups are especially significant. The authoritarian grade-school Republicans and equalitarian college Democrats suggest the influence of personality operating not merely to structure an ambivalent situation but in opposition to socio-economic pressures. These may be the groups for whom personality influences are the greatest of all. The equalitarian grade-school Republicans and authoritarian college Democrats represent groups for whom both socio-economic and personality forces are thwarted by some other more significant force, such as regional party loyalty, religious identification, or a particular stand on the issues of the day.

The relation of education to personality (authoritarianism) differences between the parties tells us something about the way in which equalitarians and authoritarians at every educational level behave politically. Their voting history is also informative in this respect. If

TABLE III. *Authoritarianism and the 1952 Vote Preference*

1952 Vote and Vote-preference of Non-voters	Authoritarianism	
	Equalitarian	Authoritarian
Grade School	(N = 30)	(N = 124)
Democratic	60%	49%
Republican	40	51
Total	100%	100%
High School	(N= 70)	(N = 98)
Democratic	51%	34%
Republican	49	66
Total	100%	100%
College	(N = 26)	(N = 41)
Democratic	38%	24%
Republican	62	76
Total	100%	100%

$\chi^2 = 8.60 \quad p < 5\%$.

one were to ask, for example, whether it was something distinctive about the 1952 election that attracted the authoritarians to the Republican standard, a clue would be given by the 1948 vote of each group. Examination of the data in Table IV shows that, on balance, the 1952 election had, in a small degree, opposite effects on the Democratic vote in the two personality groups, and that these effects were largely the result of the effects upon the non-voters. Put differently, 1948 equalitarian non-voters divided between Democrats and Republicans, while 1948 authoritarian non-voters probably went solidly for Eisenhower. In addition, some 1948 authoritarian Democrats switched to Eisenhower.

But, as with the problem of participation, once the fact of difference has been established, the explanatory hypotheses crowd the stage. Why, in 1952, were authoritarians drawn to vote for the Republican candidate, General Eisenhower? The line of attack on this question will use three elements in the vote decision: party identification; position on current and relevant issues; and attitudes towards the candidates.

Party Identification. Party identification, that is, a sense of personal attachment to a political party, is a significant feature of a man's group orientation; it helps him to decide not only which candidate to support but also which issues to endorse and to oppose. It is related to many things which define a man's living space, such as his family and friends, his religion, and his socio-economic status. In view of this significance, how do authoritarians and equali-

TABLE IV. *Authoritarianism and the 1948 and 1952 Vote*

Voting Decision	Equalitarian		Authoritarian	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
	(N = 126)	(N = 127)	(N = 247)	(N = 241)
Democratic	37%	41%	36%	30%
Republican	21	38	28	43
Non-Voters	42	21	36	27
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

$\chi^2 = 20.87 \quad p < 1\%$.

tarians tend to relate themselves to political parties? The data are presented in Table V.

Among other things, it is clear that there are many more Democratic party identifiers than Republican party identifiers or independents. One consequence of this fact is that for both equalitarian and authoritarian groups, there are more Democratic partisans than Republican partisans. The significant feature is the difference in proportion of partisans in each personality group. Among the partisans, the equalitarians are about nine to three Democratic, while the authoritarians are only about five to three Democratic, a relationship due partly to socio-economic factors. It is also clear that the equalitarian is more likely to be independent (tolerant of ambiguity)[23] than the authoritarian. Put another way, one might say that personality (authoritarianism) does not make so much difference in terms of identification with the Democratic party, but does make a lot of difference as to whether one says he is an independent or a Republican. For those who do not identify with the Democratic party (because of demographic considerations, group pressures, or ideological conviction), authoritarian motivations will move them towards Republican partisanship, while equalitarian considerations will move them toward an independent position.

TABLE V. *Authoritarianism and Party Identification*

Party Identification	Authoritarianism	
	Equalitarian	Authoritarian
	(N = 117)	(N = 241)
Democratic	48%	47%
Independent	35	23
Republican	17	30
Total	100%	100%

$\chi^2 = 9.71 \quad p < 1\%$.

Although it would be fruitless to attempt here to catalog the many kinds of attitudes which impel a man to identify with one party rather than another as a regular feature of his orientation, surely one of the elements in this choice lies in his perception of the kind of group with which he is aligning himself. It was clear enough in the Survey Research Center study of the 1952 election, for example, that most members of the electorate perceived the Democratic party as being more closely associated than the Republican party with labor union members, and the Republican party as being more closely linked than the Democratic party with big business. For those people who regard unions as a negative reference group, and who wish to dissociate themselves from unions and possibly the working class in general, identifying with the Republican party offers a means of so doing; and in reverse the same thing is true of "big business." Equally, it is true that for those who wish to vote Democratic for other (family, regional, economic) reasons, a means of escape from this conflict is offered by changing the perception of the disliked labor union group so that one "doesn't know" how union members will vote, or so that they are seen as voting Republican. Projection of this kind offers a kind of index to the social distance a person wishes to place between himself and a specified group.

Specifically, we would hypothesize that authoritarians would tend to disidentify from whatever party they perceived as the party of Negroes, immigrants, and "social inferiors." If this were true, authoritarians would tend to see these groups voting for the other party rather more than did the equalitarians; that is, their effort to identify with the more respectable party would be measured by their projective perceptions of the way the less prestigious groups voted. This hypothesis can be tested with perceptions of the Negro vote in 1952. The data for the better-educated group (high school or college graduates) who stated a perception on this point are given in Table VI.

Why this relationship attains significance only among the better-educated portion of the population is not clear, although the presence of "split" and "don't know" categories left the less well-educated groups means of "escape," which they used relatively more frequently. What the data suggest, however, is that political parties are reference groups with positive and negative images in the minds of the electorate and that further research into the properties of these reference groups might be rewarding.

Political Issues. The part which political issues play in national elections has never been

[23] *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 461 ff.; 480 ff.

TABLE VI. *Authoritarianism and White Perception of the Negro Vote Among High School or College Graduates*

Perception of the Negro Vote	Equalitarian	Authoritarian
Negroes will vote "like me" i.e., Democrats think Negroes will vote Democratic, Republicans think Negroes will vote Republican.	(N = 44) 59%	(N = 74) 41%
Negroes will not vote "like me," i.e., Democrats think Negroes will vote Republican, Republicans think Negroes will vote Democratic.	41	59
Total	100%	100%

$\chi^2 = 3.99 \quad p < 5\%$.

adequately appraised and certainly not measured. The lore of political science is filled with historical judgments: the Democrats lost the 1920 election on the question of the League of Nations and the issue of "normalcy"; the Republicans lost New York in 1884 because of a "rum, Romanism, and rebellion" statement left uncorrected by James G. Blaine; Woodrow Wilson won the 1916 election on the basis of an implied pledge to keep the United States out of war, and so forth. More recently Campbell, Gurin, and Miller have minimized the role of issues in the 1948 election, while Julius Turner elevates them into a much more significant position in that election.[24] The relative importance of issues, candidates, and traditional party loyalties assumes varying proportions in each campaign and there remains much to be done in discovering how each of these factors, and particularly issues, relates to other campaign phenomena.

Whatever their particular influence in each election, issues are significant features of the electoral process and the stand a person takes on the important issues of the day will contribute to his electoral decision.[25] The extent of the awareness of the issues of the day taken all together will, of course, vary greatly in the population, just as the significance of any one issue will be differently appraised by different people. Here, again, personality will affect this determination. An illustration of this is provided by the "coders' " estimates of the main reason why each respondent in the 1952 study who had arrived at a vote decision prior to election day would cast his ballot as he planned. (The coders were neutral staff persons in the Survey Research Center who were required to go through every interview and indicate how the interview was to be coded on the IBM cards.) Although in a number of areas there were no differences, it appeared that equalitarians were more likely to be concerned with domestic issues and authoritarians with foreign policy (projective?) issues. Of more significance, perhaps, is the finding that of the 35 cases of persons whose main reason for voting for Eisenhower was the corruption issue, the distribution was as follows: equalitarians, 17 per cent; medium, 26 per cent; authoritarians, 57 per cent. Although the number is small, the evidence suggests that the authoritarian is, in politics as elsewhere, more concerned with conventional moral values than is the equalitarian: if he is a reformer, he is a moralistic reformer and not a social reformer.

The Survey Research Center study makes the statement that the voters favored Eisenhower "because a central aspect of his appeal was his presumed ability to do something personally about Korea and the cold war."[26] How does personality relate to voters' attitudes on Korea? If it could be shown that personality factors such as authoritarianism were related to popular attitudes on Korea, it would follow that personality probably made some contribution to vote decision in 1952.

Curiously enough, in the attitudes on foreign policy authoritarianism plays a role only among those who have at least some high school

[24] See Julius Turner, "Responsible Parties: A Dissent from the Floor," this *Review* Vol. 45, pp. 143–52 (March, 1951).

[25] See *The Voter Decides*, pp. 112–35.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

TABLE VII. *Authoritarianism and Attitudes on United States Korean Policy Among High School or College Graduates*

Policy	Authoritarianism and the 1952 Vote			
	Democrats		Republicans	
	Equalitarian	Authoritarian	Equalitarian	Authoritarian
	(N = 42)	(N = 39)	(N = 58)	(N = 98)
Pull out of Korea entirely	5%	15%	5%	14%
Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement	67	49	38	29
Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China	26	36	48	52
Other	2	0	9	5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

$\chi^2 = 8.26$ $p < 10\%$.

education. Although this was not expected, in retrospect one might argue that those with less education either answer "don't know" or, if they have views on foreign policy, take their cues from their party alignments in a way not true of the better-educated groups. Earlier we made the inference that lower-class individuals are less influenced than others by personality considerations in their party choice because of the preponderance of group and demographic forces. It now appears that this holds true for issues as well as for party identification.

Specifically, on the Korean question we would hypothesize that the authoritarian would be less likely to tolerate continued peaceful negotiation in Korea at a time when progress there seemed minimal (intolerance of ambiguity) and would prefer a policy either of pulling out or of bombing the Chinese and committing other aggressive acts (authoritarian aggression and destructiveness, orientation toward power and toughness). The data for the better-educated groups controlled for the 1952 vote decision, are given in Table VII.

The evidence tends to support the hypotheses, although the relationship is least strong (where we would expect it to be strongest) in the "bomb China" responses. In certain areas of foreign policy, then, we may say that the personality dimension of authoritarianism tended to contribute to or to reinforce a decision to vote for the Republican party in 1952.

The most salient question among the various domestic policies was the over-all attitude towards what may be referred to as "welfare-statism," the notion that the state should serve the interests of the less privileged through housing, health, and social security measures. It is not normally associated with governmental aids to the business community or subsidies to manufacturers. For the lower-income groups, then, it has a quality of self-interest which obscures and overrides the relationship of personality (authoritarianism) to attitudes toward the welfare state, but there is no such clear self-interest (except indirectly, the tax interest) for the upper income and education groups. For these latter groups, in accordance with our theory of the circumstances which facilitate the influence of personality, some relationship might be expected.

On the question of services to lower-income groups, one would hypothesize that among the better educated, the equalitarians would be more likely to favor welfare services than would the authoritarians. The responses of those who wanted more governmental services and those who wanted less are compared in Table VIII. "About right" responses were ambiguous (conventional or "liberal"?) and hence not included in the analysis.

The hypothesis is confirmed, although the relationship is much more significant among the Republicans and the numbers involved are small. On the whole, it would seem that for the equalitarian Republicans who believed in more governmental services (17 in number), a force had been set in motion which, given the right

TABLE VIII. *Authoritarianism and Attitudes Toward the "Welfare State," Among High School or College Graduates**

	Authoritarianism and the 1952 Vote			
	Democrats		Republicans	
	Equalitarian	Authoritarian	Equalitarian	Authoritarian
	(N = 22)	(N = 18)	(N = 28)	(N = 46)
Not enough	86%	78%	61%	26%
Too much	14	22	39	74
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

$\chi^2 = 9.38$ $p < 5\%$.

* Determined by the question "Some people think the national government should do more in trying to deal with such problems as unemployment, education, housing, and so on. Others think that the government is already doing too much. On the whole, would you say that what the government has been doing is about right, too much, or not enough?

circumstances, would make them more likely than most Republicans to switch to the Democratic party.

It is important, however, to issue a *caveat* at this point, and to raise the possibility that issue-orientation may be the result of a vote decision, as well as a contributing cause. Belknap and Campbell have demonstrated the manner in which certain policy attitudes flow from party identification,[27] and Lazarsfeld and associates have shown how a person resolves his cross pressures in a voting situation by adjusting his attitudes so that they are in conformity with his vote preferences.[28] Using only the partisan attitudes employed in this paper, the sequence of events, then, could take any one of three forms:

1. Party identification → vote decision ↗ candidate preference ↘ position on issues
2. Position on issues → vote decision ↗ candidate preference ↘ party identification
3. Candidate preference → vote decision ↗ position on issues ↘ party identification

Party identification in the second and third forms, of course, would not be likely to develop out of a single election.

Candidate Orientation. The literature of political science has dealt extensively with the problem of candidate appeal to the electorate. Much of this discussion has been in terms of the demographic or experiential characteristics of the candidates, such as the advantage of a humble origin, the advantage or disadvantage of military titles, the handicap of being a non-Protestant and the importance of coming from a pivotal state. To some extent the personality of the candidate has entered into discussion, as in references to Wilson's coldness, Roosevelt's charm, and Dewey's apparent conceit. Furthermore, to an increasing degree the personality of the electorate or constituency has come under examination, as in Sanford's Philadelphia study,[29] James Davies' study of charisma in the 1952 election,[30] Hyman and Sheatsley's analysis

[27] "Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy" (cited in note 6), pp. 621–22.

[28] *The People's Choice*, pp. 56–64.

[29] *Authoritarianism and Leadership* (cited in note 17). See also Dorothea E. Johannsen, "Reactions to the Death of Roosevelt," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 41, pp. 218–22 (April, 1946).

[30] James C. Davies, "Charisma in the 1952 Campaign" (cited in note 7).

of Eisenhower's appeal,[31] and studies of the followers of American demagogues.[32]

On the surface it appears that the 1952 election offers a unique opportunity for studying the part which personality plays in drawing people toward one or another political candidate. It was hypothesized, for example, that the authoritarian, more than the equalitarian, would be drawn toward Eisenhower, partly because he was endowed with the attributes of a victorious general, partly because he was presented as a "strong" leader, a role which he himself attempted to enhance by his selection of the term "crusade" to describe his campaign, and partly because his opponent could well have been seen as a weak and indecisive intellectual. With this hypothesis in mind, an effort was made to test the relation of personality to the perception of the candidates.

A precondition of this test was the elimination of those who supported a candidate because he was their party's candidate or because his position on issues was more congenial to them. The first step, therefore, was to select all of those who responded to open-ended questions on the candidates in personal terms ("I like him," or "He is a marvelous man"). With data available on these responses, several hypotheses seemed plausible and were tested. The first of these was to the effect that authoritarians would respond more to candidates in this way than would equalitarians, a hypothesis in line with the theory expressed in *The Authoritarian Personality* that authoritarians tended to personalize politics.[33] The data showed that there was no such relation, at least as measured by the number of voluntary responses of this character.

A second hypothesis was to the effect that the group limiting its comments to pro-Eisenhower and anti-Stevenson statements would be more authoritarian, an hypothesis not borne out by the data. One of the interesting findings, incidentally, was that one of the most authoritarian patterns of response was given by those who made only favorable references to Stevenson with no other personal references of any kind. Inspection of the data, however, showed that most of the equalitarian patterns included some critical remarks about Eisenhower, whereas most of the authoritarian patterns did not. The data were then arranged as shown in Table IX (page 243).

The similarity of responses of equalitarians and authoritarians suggests that the authoritarian syndrome is unrelated to attitudes towards Stevenson and Eisenhower. Yet since this facet of personality is related to attitudes on political issues, to party identification, and to some elements of participation, it seems likely that it is also related to the selection of the candidate. As in the case of political participation, it seems probable that authoritarians and equalitarians arrived by different routes at similar decisions on the candidates. To some, "Ike" may have appeared as a *warm, friendly, democratic man;* to others he may have been a *strong, military leader* who would shoulder the nation's burden; to still others, he may have been specially trained in international affairs and hence a *competent man* who might solve the problems posed by the Korean war; in short, his special strength may have been the ambiguity of his public personality.

That there is a difference in the basis of support for the two candidates is suggested, although not proved, by the figures in Table IX. Equalitarians tend to support Eisenhower as much as do the authoritarians, but they are also markedly . . . more critical. What is the meaning of this?

One interpretation might be that equalitarians liked Eisenhower as much as did the authoritarians, but voted Democratic either because they liked Stevenson better or because of the greater influence of party identification and issue orientation.

Another possible interpretation is that while the equalitarian is capable of neutral and detached attitudes toward political leaders, the authoritarian tends to see competing leaders in black and white terms, endorsing one and criticizing the other.

A third interpretation, based upon the theory of the origin of authoritarianism, is that each group sees the political leader as a father image modeled after his own father, the authoritarian recalling a father whom it was unsafe to criticize publicly, and the equalitarian remembering

[31] Herbert Hyman and Paul Sheatsley, "The Political Appeal of President Eisenhower," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 17, pp. 443–60 (Winter, 1953–54).

[32] See Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, "Reactions to Fascist Propaganda — A Pilot Study," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 14, pp. 52–60 (Spring, 1950).

[33] *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 664–71.

TABLE IX. *Authoritarianism and Criticism and Support of Eisenhower and Stevenson*

Expression of Criticism and Endorsement	Equalitarian (N = 121)	Authoritarian (N = 251)
Expressed criticism of Eisenhower in personal terms	60%	48%
Did not express criticism of Eisenhower in personal terms	40	52
Total	100%	100%
Expressed endorsement of Eisenhower in personal terms	72%	68%
Did not express endorsement of Eisenhower in personal terms	28	32
Total	100%	100%
Expressed criticism of Stevenson in personal terms	37%	43%
Did not express criticism of Stevenson in personal terms	63	57
Total	100%	100%
Expressed endorsement of Stevenson in personal terms	58%	56%
Did not express endorsement of Stevenson in personal terms	42	44
Total	100%	100%

a less frightening father, a person about whom one could be objective.

Whatever the correct interpretation, it appears that the factors that led the authoritarians to be uncritical of Eisenhower may have been important in their vote decision. On the other hand, the factors that led the equalitarians to be generous in their praise for Eisenhower were apparently less important in theirs. Expressed in another way regardless of personality, criticism may be a better index of candidate preference than is support of a candidate.

SUMMARY

We have suggested a theory for the part which personality features play in electoral choice, showing the manner in which they affect a man's perception of his economic interests, group memberships, and the stimuli of the media, and the manner in which they shape political responses through certain politically relevant attitudes. Taking the authoritarian syndrome for illustrative purposes, we have shown its influence upon political participation (voluntary "persuasive" activities and voting) in terms of a sense of political efficacy and the effect of multiple group memberships. It was suggested that these two influences had differential effects on equalitarians and authoritarians, often balancing out and leading them to participate politically in approximately equal degree.

In terms of political orientation, it appeared that authoritarians were relatively more Republican in 1952 and that this Republican orientation had increased since 1948 in two ways: a defection from authoritarian (1948) Democrats and an increase of Republican voters from the ranks of authoritarian (1948) non-voters. The Republicanism of the authoritarians was due partly to a greater traditional identification with the Republican party, which in turn could be traced partly to disidentification with the underdog groups seen as allied to the Democratic party. The better-educated authoritarians' position on Korea is in accord with what would be expected of people with this personality characteristic and is in accord with the position of the Republican party; and the same is true of their position on the welfare state. With respect to their candidate orientation, authoritarianism seems to inhibit criticism of General Eisenhower but not to be associated with praise of the General in personal terms. The relationships revealed by the data suggest that the ambiguity of the electoral image of Eisenhower may have led both authoritarians and equalitarians to perceive in him traits congenial to their own respective personality structures.

20

SEX-RELATED POLITICAL DIFFERENCES IN CHILDHOOD

• *FRED I. GREENSTEIN*

Although four decades have passed since the Nineteenth Amendment made the political status of women legally identical to that of men, differences persist in the political behavior of the sexes. Men and women vary both in the degree and the direction of their political participation. Sex differences in political behavior are such that, especially in close electoral contests, they are likely to have a significant impact on some political outcomes.[1]

In the present paper political sex differences are examined from the vantage of their antecedents in childhood. Data from the literature on child development and from a 1958 survey of 659 fourth- through eighth-grade New Haven children (ages 9–14)[2] will be presented, showing that from remarkably early ages boys and girls parallel men and women in the ways that their political responses vary. By describing these pre-adult differences and attempting to explain why they develop, it should be possible to add to our understanding of the adult differences.

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[1] For general discussions of female voting and of political sex differences, see Harold F. Gosnell, *Democracy the Threshold of Freedom* (New York, 1948), Chap. 4; Maurice Duverger, *The Political Role of Women* (Paris, 1955); Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 209–216; Louis Harris, *Is There a Republican Majority?* (New York, 1954), pp. 104–117.

[2] Fred I. Greenstein, "Children's Political Perspectives: A Study of the Development of Political Awareness and Preferences among Pre-Adolescents," 1960, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University Library. I am indebted to Robert E. Lane for thoughtful criticism at every stage of this investigation and to Miss Helen Rakieten, New Haven elementary education supervisor, for her kind assistance in obtaining subjects. Many helpful comments were made on an earlier draft of the present paper by Herbert Jacob, Tulane University.

I

A brief account of the kinds of adult political sex differences which have been observed provides a necessary preface to considering the pre-adult differences.

The most conspicuous points at which men and women have been found to differ in the direction of their political involvement are in their issue positions and candidate choices. Women are less willing to support policies they perceive as war-like or "aggressive" — policies ranging from universal military training to capital punishment. Women have been shown to have greater "moralistic orientation" than men; for example, they are more likely than men to support sumptuary legislation. Women also seem to be less tolerant of political and religious nonconformity.[3] Discrepancies between the attitudes of men and women may in part account for the recurrent sample survey findings of sex differences in candidate preference. For example, the American Institute of Public Opinion reported that a larger proportion of women than men supported Eisenhower in both 1952 and 1956.[4] Similar differences were found dur-

[3] For representative instances of sex differences in attitude (in a number of nations), see the various entries reported by sex in Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, *Public Opinion 1935–1946* (Princeton, 1951), *e.g.*, pp. 106, 172, 740, 833, 968, 972, 1052–54; also Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York, 1955), pp. 131–155.

[4] See the AIPO release of February 3, 1960. Harris, *op. cit.*, reports Roper findings indicating that the greater female preference for Eisenhower in 1952 converted a slim margin for the General into a landslide victory. Harris also shows substantial sex differences in response to 1952 campaign issues, with much more female concern with the Korean War and allegations of government corruption.

ing the 1960 pre-nominating campaigns.[5] Sex differences in candidate choice are of particular interest in view of the Survey Research Center finding in 1952 that more women than men were candidate oriented.[6]

As important as contrasts in the direction of political involvement may be, however, they are probably of less political significance than disparities in degree of involvement. It is with the latter topic that this paper is mainly concerned. At the mass level, women are less likely than men to engage in the whole range of activities available to the politically interested citizen. This includes the mere act of voting, although the gap in turnout seems to have been declining in recent years, and it also includes more intense forms of mass participation, such as communicating with elected representatives.[7] Consistent with these participation differences, attitude surveys frequently reveal that women inflate the "no opinion" and "no information" response categories.[8] When women do make political evaluations, they show much less "sophistication" than men, by the yardstick of the Survey Research Center's index of "level of conceptualization."[9] And the gap between the sexes in mass-level participation is, as a glance through the *United States Government Organization Manual* reminds us, multiplied many times over by vast sex differences in the composition of government officialdom.

Sex differences in participation affect political outcomes in at least two ways. Most obviously, they underrepresent any viewpoints and candidate preferences held disproportionately by women. Because of the way they vary by socioeconomic status, sex differences also may have a selective effect on the political success of particular groups. For example, differences in the electoral turnout of men and women in the United States currently are small or nonexistent in the high-education and high-income groups and much larger in the lower groups.[10] In terms of the contemporary relationship of these factors to party preference, a bonus of votes is thereby provided to the Republican party.

In the past, one factor which tended to depress female turnout was the consciously held belief of at least some women that "voting is for the men."[11] This belief — when applied to the act of voting — is doubtless almost completely absent in the population groups where turnout differences have vanished. Angus Campbell and his associates suggest that, as new conceptions of what is appropriate to the female role spread, sex differences in the will-

[5] AIPO releases, February 3, 5 and 7, 1960. The 1960 AIPO post-election analysis, which was based on a pool of several national samples, also showed greater female preference for the Republican candidate, but the sex difference (three per cent) was much less than in the two previous elections. (AIPO release, December 16, 1960). However, differences of between five and ten per cent, with more women favoring Nixon, were reported by a number of the state polls. For example, Minnesota Poll release, November 6, 1960; Wisconsin Agriculturist Farm Poll release, November 5, 1960; Wallaces Farmer Poll, November 19, 1960. For an early report of sex differences in candidate choice see Malcolm M. Willey and Stuart A. Rice, "A Sex Cleavage in the Presidential Election of 1920," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XII (1924), pp. 519–520.

Another point at which the sexes may diverge in direction of political choice is party identification. "Today most surveys show about four per cent more females than males preferring the Republican party," Philip K. Hastings notes. ["Hows and Howevers of the Woman Voter," *The New York Times Magazine*, June 12, 1960, p. 80]. Actually, the Survey Research Center authors argue, this persistent finding probably is an artifact of national sampling, reflecting among other things the greater number of women in older age groups, which tend to be Republican [Angus Campbell, *et al., The American Voter* (Evanston, 1960), p. 493]. Evidence drawn from continental Europe makes it clear that sex cleavage in party preference is possible. French, German and Italian women have long been more likely to support center parties, especially parties with a church affiliation. Duverger, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–73; Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behavior* (London, 1937), pp. 37–76.

[6] Angus Campbell, *et al., The Voter Decides* (Evanston, 1954), p. 155. *Cf.* Campbell, *et al., The American Voter*, p. 492n.

[7] Lane, *op. cit.*; Julian L. Woodward and Elmo Roper, "Political Activity of American Citizens," *American Political Science Review*, XL (1960), p. 877; Campbell, *et al., The American Voter*, pp. 483–493.

[8] Cantril and Strunk, *op. cit., e.g.*, pp. 37, 131, 197, 368, 740, 1072.

[9] Campbell, *et al., The American Voter*, pp. 491–492.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 485–489; Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

[11] Lane, *op. cit.*, pp. 210–211; Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control* (Chicago, 1924), pp. 109–116.

ingness to vote may disappear in the remaining population groups.[12]

When types of participation other than the act of voting are considered, however, there still seem to be substantial differences in conceptions of the sexes' political roles. For example, in the early 1950's, when James March asked members of an eastern, suburban League of Women Voters organization and their husbands to rank the most and least "appropriate" policy areas for that group's agenda, he found striking agreement between the spouses that women might discuss "local government" and "education policy," but that they should not discuss "labor policy" and "tax policy."[13] March's finding of political sex specialization is supported by a recent, unpublished comparative citizenship study. Cross-sections of the populations of five nations were asked how well they felt they understood local political issues and how well they felt they understood national and international issues. In each nation both sexes expressed greater local competence, but in every case there also were sex differences indicating a greater tendency for women to feel competent *only* in the local arena. For example, in the United States 68 per cent of the men and 63 per cent of the women were high in the expression of local understanding. Fifty-six per cent of the men, but only 39 per cent of the women, responded similarly about national issues.[14]

A final indication that women still are not viewed as the political equals of men may be seen in responses to the AIPO's recurrent question: "If your party nominated a generally well-qualified person for President and she happened to be a woman, would you vote for her?" As recently as 1959, 43 per cent of a national sample answered "no." Moreover, only four per cent more women than men were eager to support a female president.[15]

[12] Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, p. 485.

[13] James G. March, "Husband-Wife Interaction over Political Issues," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVII (1953–54), pp. 461–470.

[14] The other countries included in this study are Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. I am indebted to Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba for making these data available to me.

[15] AIPO release, October 26, 1958. For trend data on attitudes toward women in public life see Cantril and Strunk, *op. cit.*, pp. 1052–1054.

II

In spite of the paucity of systematic study intentionally designed to learn how children develop politically, a remarkable amount of relevant data can be found. Children's social development has been studied in luxurious detail for more than half a century by educators, psychologists and other students of child development. One merit of Herbert Hyman's *Political Socialization* is that it assembles many such "forgotten and exotic sources."[16]

The kinds of data which Hyman brings to bear on his discussion of pre-adult "precursively political" sex differences can be placed under three headings: studies of manifestly political variables (*e.g.*, level of political information), studies of politically relevant variables (*e.g.*, news media interests), and studies of politically analogous variables (*e.g.*, general reading interests). For reasons which will become apparent below, I shall deal at this point only with the first two classes of sex differences, drawing also on a number of politically relevant studies discussed in the authoritative summary of literature on childhood psychological sex differences by Terman and Tyler.[17]

Each of the studies described below will be reported in terms of both the date of the field work and the ages of the children among whom sex differences were found. The date of the field work is relevant because sex roles have so clearly been in a process of transition in the twentieth century. In view of the often-remarked convergence of adult sex roles and increasing tendency for adults to treat young girls and boys in the same manner, it cannot be assumed that manifestly political and politically relevant sex differences which existed fifty years ago are still present.[18] It is important also

[16] Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, 1959), p. 26.

[17] Lewis M. Terman and Leona E. Tyler, "Psychological Sex Differences," in Leonard Carmichael (ed.), *Manual of Child Psychology* (2nd ed., New York, 1954), Chap. 17. The classification introduced in this paragraph is no more than a convenient way of organizing the literature for secondary analysis. Whether one describes a response as "manifestly political," "politically relevant," "politically analogous" or "non-political," is clearly a matter of somewhat arbitrary choice.

[18] See, for example, Margaret Mead, *Male and Female* (New York, 1955), pp. 208–209; Talcott

to note the ages of the children studied, because when sex differences emerge early in life it is likely that these differences reflect deep-seated cultural themes. Moreover, given the apparent stability of early learning,[19] such differences also may be important in reinforcing these aspects of the culture.

1. *Studies of manifestly political responses.* The occasional studies which explicitly tap political variables have dealt largely with adolescents. Hyman summarizes a pair of recent surveys, one of American adolescents and the other of German adolescents and youths. In the latter, but not in the former, there is evidence of less female expression of interest in politics.[20] Moreover, the German findings are similar to those of a 1942 *Fortune* survey of American adolescents with respect to political information.[21] In each case it was found that teen-age girls knew less about politics than did boys. Another point at which adolescent political sex differences parallel those found among adults is in the tendency to have political opinions. National surveys of high-school students conducted by H. H. Remmers in the 1950's consistently indicated more "no opinion" responses among females.[22] Data also exist showing that pre-adolescent boys and girls (sixth grade) vary similarly in political information, but none of these reports is more recent than the 1920's.[23]

2. *Studies of politically relevant responses.* Politically relevant information differences have, however, been found somewhat more recently among pre-adolescents. In a media behavior study conducted in the late 1930's, Meine found that seventh-grade (age 12) boys were better informed than girls about the current news. Meine's data suggested generally that the boys were considerably more attuned to politically relevant communications.[24] Ten years earlier, Johnson had found that by the fifth grade boys were more likely than girls to attend to national news.[25] Similarly, a 1936 media study by Brown of children ranging upward from fifth grade showed that more boys than girls reported listening to radio news programs and broadcasts of political speeches.[26]

These media studies and the political information data summarized above indicate that boys exceed girls in two dimensions: interest in and information about matters of relevance to politics. Two unusual studies conducted during World War II of children's familiarity with war suggest the genetic relationship between these dimensions — differences in interest precede differences in information. Preston, who studied the war information level of fourth — through eighth-grade boys and girls, reported higher male scores.[27] Late in the war a pair of investigators reported a similar study of a small sample of considerably younger (first-grade) children. Although only twelve boys and nine girls were studied, the findings were strikingly clear-cut. Neither sex exceeded in the meager factual awareness of war at this age, but when

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Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," *American Sociological Review*, VII (1942), pp. 604–616; Daniel G. Brown, "Sex Role Development in a Changing Culture," *Psychological Bulletin*, LIV (1958), pp. 232–242.

[19] Irvin L. Child, "Socialization," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, 1954), p. 678.

[20] *Op. cit.*, pp. 34–35. The former consists of findings from the Purdue Youth Poll of H. H. Remmers, the latter an EMNID Institute for Opinion Research survey. Both studies were in the early 1950's.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35. *Fortune*, XXVI (November, 1942), p. 84. For the period of 1932–1939, boys exceeded girls nationally in the American Government and Contemporary Affairs Iowa Every Pupil in High School Achievement tests. J. B. Stoud and E. F. Lindquist, "Sex Differences in Achievement in the Elementary and Secondary Schools," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, XXXIII (1942), pp. 656–667.

[22] H. H. Remmers and D. H. Radler, *The American Teen Ager* (Indianapolis, 1957), pp. 210–221, report responses to 40 items dealing with "The Bill of Rights, Communism, and Fascism." In this national sample of high school students, the "no opinion" category of response varies by sex for 22 of the items (ignoring differences of less than 3 per cent). In *each case*, the girls are less likely to have opinions.

[23] William Burton, *Children's Civic Information* (Los Angeles, 1936).

[24] Frederick J. Meine, "Radio and Press among Young People," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Frank N. Stanton (eds.), *Radio Research 1941* (New York, 1941).

[25] Byron L. Johnson, "Children's Reading Interests as Related to Sex and Year in School," *School Review*, XL (1932), pp. 257–272.

[26] Francis J. Brown, *The Sociology of Childhood* (New York, 1939), p. 328.

[27] Ralph C. Preston, *Children's Reactions to a Contemporary War Situation* (New York, 1942).

asked which of a series of pictures they preferred, nine of the boys and *none* of the girls picked war pictures. Eleven of these six-year-old boys and only two of the girls were described by the authors as "enthusiastic or excited" about the war.[28]

Politically relevant sex differences also have been found among young age groups in a class of investigation which was particularly common during the first two decades of this century and which was "rediscovered" by Hyman — studies of children's exemplars, the people with whom they identify. These studies consistently found, for example, that girls were less likely than boys to identify with political leaders of the past and with other historical characters.[29]

III

Thus the child development literature, when carefully combed, reveals many indications that at least in the past adult sex differences in political behavior had roots in rather early preadult differences. But the literature gives no indication of whether this is true of contemporary children, especially the younger age groups.

The 1958 New Haven findings are instructive in this regard. This "sample" consists of the fourth- through eighth-grade populations of three public schools and one private school. Socio-economic status (SES) ranges widely among the four schools. In one of the public schools few of the children come from families in occupational categories higher than the unskilled labor level. The private-school clientele, on the other hand, includes children from the city's highest socio-economic brackets and children of Yale faculty.[30]

Table 1 summarizes many findings from the New Haven study. Here we see that sex differences in political response of the same sort which have been reported since the turn of the century were still present in 1958, in this group of urban, northern children. Not all of the questionnaire responses differentiate between boys and girls; but on those that do, boys are always "more political." This is so both in the case of statistically significant sex differences and of non-significant differences which exceed two or three per cent. In view of our interest in the age at which differences emerge, Table 1 also reports findings for the youngest sub-group of the sample. Similar differences, of roughly the same percentage strength, are present in this sub-sample of nine-year-olds, although probably because of the much smaller number of cases only one of the fourth-grade sex differences is significant.

More specifically, the following observations may be made in connection with Table 1:

1. *Manifestly political responses.* The first entry in Table 1 is a political information score consisting of the number of "reasonably accurate" answers to nine rather elementary information items asking the child to name the incumbent mayor, governor, and president, describe their duties, and describe the duties of the legislative bodies at each level of government.[31] The fourth-grade average score on this index was about three points, two of which in almost every case were earned by naming the president and New Haven's popular mayor. This makes it clear that young children's level of political information is infinitesimal — even the thirteen- and fourteen-year-old eighth graders averaged only about six on this index of rudimentary information. Even so, at both the fourth-grade level and for the total sample, boys were significantly, if not very strongly, better informed than girls. Further evidence along the same line is provided by the second

[28] Leanna Geddie and Gertrude Hildreth, "Children's Ideas about the War," *Journal of Experimental Education*, XIII (1944–45), pp. 92–97.

[29] Representative studies in this body of literature are Estelle M. Darrah, "A Study of Children's Ideals," *Popular Science Monthly*, LIII (1898), pp. 88–98; Will G. Chambers, "The Evolution of Ideals," *The Pedagogical Seminary*, X, (1903); David S. Hill, "Personification of Ideals by Urban Children," *Journal of Social Psychology*, I (1930), pp. 379–392. These studies are discussed in Hyman, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–31, and, in further detail, in Greenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–102 and 262–267.

[30] Further description of the characteristics of the New Haven respondents, along with a full discussion of the methodology of the study from which the data on sex differences are drawn, may be found in Greenstein, *op. cit.*, Chap. 2.

[31] Point biserial coefficients of correlation were computed, testing the relationship between correct responses on each item and the nine-point index composed of these scores. Seven of the items show correlations ranging from .59 to .64, and the remaining two (the President's and Mayor's names) were slightly positively correlated (.26 and .22 respectively).

TABLE 1. *Sex Differences in Political Responses of New Haven Grade School Children*[a]

Questionnaire Items	*Fourth-Grade Sub-sample*		*Total Sample (Grades 4–8)*	
	Boys	*Girls*	*Boys*	*Girls*
Manifestly political variables:				
Political information score	3.30	2.77**	4.69	4.31*
Can name at least one party leader	41%	33%	56%	48%
Proposes "political" change in the world	13%	5%	41%	34%
Will vote when 21	76%	77%	80%	81%
Believes "elections are important"	69%	72%	72%	73%
Politically Relevant variables:				
Names interesting news story	65%	47%	73%	60%*
Story named is political	15%	12%	36%	12%*
Names pleasant news story	39%	28%	54%	41%*
Story named is political	9%	2%	26%	17%*
Names unpleasant news story	37%	35%	53%	43%**
Story named is political	18%	9%	33%	20%*
Prefers Washington to New Haven news	52%	35%	38%	26%*
Names someone from public life as "famous person you want to be like"	39%	23%	24%	15%
Names someone from public life as "famous person you *don't* want to be like"	22%	14%	32%	13%*
Total cases	54	57	337	332

[a] One asterisk indicates that a sex difference is significant at the one per cent level; two asterisks at the five per cent level. The significance of political information score differences was tested with a one-tailed t-test. All of the percentage differences in the remainder of the table were tested by chi square, using two-by-two contingency tables. Yates' correction for continuity was used wherever the expected frequency fell below five. In the case of two items summarized in this table the number of cases falls below the number indicated in the total row due to invalid responses. The "Washington news" item is based on 48 boys and 54 girls in the fourth-grade sub-sample and 325 boys and 312 girls in the total sample. The information score for boys in the total sample column is based on 336 instead of 337 cases.

item in Table 1, showing a tendency for there to be sex differences in ability to name at least one leader of the Republican or Democratic party. An additional "precursive form of politics" which varied by sex was response to the item, "If you could change the world in any way you wanted, what change would you make?" Responses classified as "political," the most common of them being the wish for peace, were more frequent among boys. Girls were more likely not to respond at all or to suggest a distinctly non-political change, such as, "Get rid of all the criminals and bad people."

Table 1 shows, however, that no sex differences were evoked by a pair of items designed to tap juvenile conceptions of citizen duty and political efficacy: "Will you vote when you are 21?" and "Do you think it makes much difference which side wins an election?" This finding is not too surprising. These questions, with their implication of a moral imperative, might if anything have been expected to differentiate between the sexes in the opposite direction, with more favorable replies from girls than from boys.

2. *Politically relevant responses.* Clear-cut, consistently significant differences in media behavior, corroborating findings of the older studies, were found in the New Haven group. Boys were more likely to be able to name a news story in response to an open-ended question which asked the child to describe "a news story which interested you." They also were more likely to answer similar items designed to tap

emotional involvement in the news ("Can you think of a news story which made you feel happy? angry?"). In response to these three items, significantly more boys than girls referred to political news.[32] Furthermore, New Haven children resembled Johnson's 1929 sample in the greater male interest in national news.[33]

Non-significant sex differences in the same direction were produced by an item resembling the earlier studies of children's identifications ("Name a famous person you want to be like"). This item stimulated nine per cent more boys than girls to refer to figures from "public life," a category including past and present political leaders. A companion item, asking the child to "Name a famous person you *don't* want to be like," produced statistically significant sex differences, with girls about 20 per cent less likely to name a "public life" figure.

In view of the way adult sex differences in electoral participation vary by social status, it might be suspected that the political and politically relevant pre-adult sex differences reported here are confined to lower socio-economic status children. This expectation, however, turns out not to be true. When class is controlled,[34] one of the sex differences in Table 1 "washes out"; only the lower-SES children vary in the tendency to wish for political changes in the world. But the other eleven differences reported in this table still persist.

IV

How can we explain the existence of political sex differences among contemporary grade-school children? The discussion of adult sex differences suggests that the first place to look for an explanation is in people's sex role conceptions, their views of the kinds of political acts which are appropriately male or female. Perhaps it is common for the young child to acquire the assumption that "politics is the man's business."

Table 2 suggests that some sort of awareness of politics as an area of male specialization develops during childhood. This table reports the proportions of children who checked "mother" and "father" when asked, "If you could vote, who would be best to ask for voting advice?" Children of both sexes were more likely to choose the father than the mother as an appropriate source of voting advice.[35] This finding jibes with recurrent reports in the voting literature of male political dominance in the family.[36]

The child's awareness of male political specialization is, however, surely not a sole determinant of childhood political sex differences. For this to be the case, we would have to explain the fact that a nine-year-old female is less politically involved than a male of the same age in terms of a conscious deflection of the girl's vision from political events out of the belief that "this is not for girls." Young children are too politically unaware for this to be the case.

The world of adult politics is at the most extremely marginal to the child's existence. New Haven fourth graders were, after all, aware of little more than the names of the Mayor and the President. Except during election campaigns, most children's political preoccupations are no more than an obscure tessera in the large and complex mosaic of experience and activities which engage the bulk of their attention — relationships with adults and peers of the immediate environment and everyday obligations and amusements.[37]

[32] A rather broad class of responses were classified under the heading "political," the most common of them being references to news stories about satellite competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[33] See note 25.

[34] This comparison was made by dichotomizing the sample into high and low socio-economic status groups on the basis of the child's place of residence in the city. Past studies of New Haven residence patterns suggest that this index differentiates roughly between white- and blue-collar occupational backgrounds. About one-third of the sample is thus classified as upper socio-economic status and half of this group consists of the prosperous private school population referred to above in the text. *Cf.* Greenstein, *op. cit.*, Chap. 2.

[35] It is not likely that these choices simply reflect a greater fondness for the father, since investigations of children's preferences for one or the other parent regularly have found that children say they "like" their mothers more. Terman and Tyler, *op. cit.*, p. 1101.

[36] *E.g.*, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *et. al.*, *The People's Choice* (2nd ed., New York, 1948), pp. 140–145. But Hyman, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–84, points out the presently inconclusive state of the literature on intrafamily political influence.

[37] For further discussion of pre-adolescent children's awareness of politics see Greenstein, *op. cit.*, and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader:

TABLE 2. *Percentage of Boys and Girls Choosing Either Parent as a Preferred Source of Voting Advice, by School Year**

	Boys		*Girls*		*Total Cases*	
School Year	*Father*	*Mother*	*Father*	*Mother*	*Boys*	*Girls*
4	54%	15%	35%	44%	54	57
5	44	10	46	24	61	57
6	53	4	43	22	57	58
7	51	11	31	24	73	72
8	42	11	35	16	92	88
Total	48	10	40	25	337	322

* Based on the following check list item: "If you could vote, who would be best to ask for voting advice? (Check one): a friend your own age; brother or sister; father; mother; teacher; someone else (write in whether this person is a neighbor, relative, or what)." For both boys and girls the percentage differences reported in the total row are statistically significant. The male differences also are significant at each age level, but at the individual age levels only the eighth-grade female differences are significant. It should be noted that in spite of the general tendency to recognize the father as the source of voting advice, sex differences exist. Girls choose the mother more often than do boys, and boys exceed girls in references to the father.

We must turn to this mosaic, and to the vast literature which describes it, if we are to understand the political and politically relevant sex differences reported above. For in the realm of childhood non-politics, and of childhood behavior of the sort earlier described as politically analogous, there are extensive psychological differences, some of which are present almost from the cradle and many of which are stronger than the political differences. For a thorough review of this literature the reader is referred to Terman and Tyler.[38] Here we shall consider three of the bodies of research summarized in their excellent account, looking briefly at studies of "aggressiveness" and "sociability," and considering at greater length an interrelated collection of investigations dealing with childhood sex differences in interests and in spheres of competence.

One psychological dimension along which the sexes vary non-politically is in "aggressive and dominant behavior." The far greater prominence of the male in police-blotter and juvenile-court statistics is sufficient to remind us that there are great adult and adolescent sex differences in the willingness to express hostility.[39] But it is less well known that differences in aggressiveness emerge almost as soon as children are able to engage in social activity. At every age boys are more pugnacious and quarrelsome than girls. Even among the two-to four-and-a-half-year-old nursery-school children studied by Hattwick, boys exceeded girls "in all forms of aggressive behavior with the exception of verbal bossing."[40] This class of sex difference seems to have an obvious bearing on

Children's Images of Political Authority," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (1960), pp. 936–37.

[38] See note 17.

[39] Terman and Tyler, *op. cit.*, pp. 1085–1089. Also John P. Scott, *Aggression* (Chicago, 1958), Chap. 4.

[40] Terman and Tyler, *op. cit.*, p. 1086; LaBerta A. Hattwick, "Sex Differences in Behavior of Nursery School Children," *Child Development*, VIII (1937), pp. 343–355. Because sex differences in aggressiveness emerge so early there is some tendency to relate them to the manifold physical sex differences which are present from birth, "for almost every physical variable" (*e.g.*, strength, body size, vital capacity, rate of maturation, and stability of body functions). [Terman and Tyler, *op. cit.*, pp. 1064–1067]. However, Robert Sears and his associates have shown that the greater aggressiveness of even young boys seems to a considerable extent to be learned. In large part this learning may be through the mechanism of identification with the father. [Robert R. Sears, *et al.*, "Effect of Father Separation on Pre-School Children's Doll Play Aggression," *Child Development*, XVII (1946), pp. 219–243.] *Cf.* Margaret Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* (New York, 1939).

the adult tendencies, referred to above, for women to be more pacifist in their issue positions. In a field as controversial as politics, it also seems possible that differential aggressiveness would affect degree of participation.

Another psychological sex difference which has been observed among children of widely diverging ages confirms the "common belief that one of the characteristically feminine traits is an absorbing interest in persons and personal relations."[41] Terman and Tyler document this assertion with a remarkably disparate set of indices: "sociability ratings" of the kinds of games children prefer, children's references to their worries, and even the content of their dreams.[42] When one reads of this class of childhood sex differences, it is difficult not to be reminded that among adults women are more likely than men to be candidate oriented.[43]

"Evidence for differences in interests" between boys and girls, Terman and Tyler comment, "is unequivocal. Furthermore, such differences show up with as much clarity in the primary and pre-school groups as in those approaching adulthood."[44] Of the variety of interest difference research they discuss, two types of studies which may at first seem unconnected are worth juxtaposing. These are studies of the play and game preferences of pre-school children and studies of the reading and school-subject preferences of older children. Together they contribute to an understanding of the developmental processes through which non-political sex differences seem to shape the political.

Children's games are probably much more than indicators of their interests; they also seem to be a part of the process which shapes these interests. It even has been argued that through playing the child learns his own identity, since to a notable degree children play at adult roles or idealizations of adult roles.[45] An ingenious procedure to establish the ages at which children's play begins to reflect adult sex roles, making use of a collection of "male" and "female" toys, was devised by Rabban.[46] Sometime between the age of three and four, Rabban found, children begin concentrating on "sex appropriate" toys as preferred playthings within a year or two there is almost no deviation from choice by girls of toys symbolic of the home and femininity (*e.g.*, a doll, a bathinette and a purse) and by boys of toys reflecting male activities out of the home (*e.g.*, soldiers, a steam roller and a fire engine).

Differences between the sexes in reading interests, Terman and Tyler comment,

> . . . are among the most interesting to be found in any field, because of the clear indication they give of a fundamental difference in masculine and feminine interests. At home, at school, and in the public libraries the books to which children are exposed are largely the same for boys and girls; yet marked sex differences in reading preferences are evident as early as the primary school grades and persist to the adult years.[47]

Like the toy choices of pre-school children, the reading choices of school children vary along the axis of female emphasis on the immediate circle ("milder stories of home and school") and male focus outward into the wider environment ("violent or outdoor adventure, sports, travel, exploration, and war"). Among groups of older school children, the same differences seem to be reflected in the many findings, some of them (as Hyman points out) going back to the late nineteenth century, showing that girls are more likely to read fiction and boys are more likely to read biography and history.[48]

41 Terman and Tyler, *op. cit.*, p. 1095.
42 *Ibid.*, pp. 1095–1096.
43 See note 6.
44 Terman and Tyler, *op. cit.*, p. 1075.
45 *Ibid.*, pp. 1075–1078. *Cf.* George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago, 1934), p. 50ff.
46 Meyer Rabban, "Sex-Role Identification in Young Children in Two Diverse Social Groups," *Genetic Psychology Monograph*, XLII (1950), pp. 81–158.
47 Terman and Tyler, *op. cit.*, p. 1078.
48 *Ibid.*, pp. 1078–1081; Hyman, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–33. It should be added that evidence showing female concentration on the immediate environment and male on the wider environment is not confined to studies of children's play and of children's reading. For example, it was regularly reported in the studies of children's identifications discussed above (note 29) that girls were more likely than boys to identify with "acquaintance ideals" — family, neighbors, friends, *etc.* A number of studies of college students and other groups of older respondents, which show that women are more closely attached to their parents than are men, have been summarized by Mira Komarovsky, "Functional Analysis of Sex Roles," *American Sociological Review*, XV (1950), pp. 508–516.

Complementing the sex differences in reading interests, as one might expect, are differences in school-subject preferences. Girls prefer English and foreign languages; boys prefer the civics-history-social studies complex, and also are much more likely to prefer science. Moreover, these interest differences and the motivational differences which flow from them have an interesting effect on the usual relationship between male and female school achievement. It has been uniformly observed that in grade school and high school girls receive higher marks than boys, but in the areas which interest them, boys reverse this tendency.[49] The sequence from early sex-based differences in interest to later differences in competence has been best brought out in connection with the field of science. During the early school years there are no differences between boys and girls in aptitudes and abilities related to science. But by the high-school level, presumably spurred by the maleness of scientific, engineering and mechanical pursuits in the United States, differences are so great that the following situation described by Terman and Tyler obtains:

> In the Science Talent Search, every year from two to three times as many boys as girls apply, which might lead one to expect that the girls would be more highly selected. Yet, in spite of this fact, the boys have each year obtained higher scores on the test. Differences are unquestionably significant and always in the same direction.[50]

This sequence dovetails closely, of course, with the findings summarized above about how sex differences seem to develop in the politically relevant variable of information about war.

Parallels such as these help to explain why there are early sex differences in the political responses of young children, even though politics is a minute part of children's world views. It is only a short step from the politically analogous differences between the sexes in their interest in social studies and their civics grades to the greater political information of young boys. The step is slightly, but not much, longer from reading stories about the Wild West rather than stories about home life, to interest in Washington news rather than New Haven news. Both of these steps seem to be related to the general non-political division of labor between the sexes in American society and to the early learning of this division as manifested in the five-year-old boy's insistence on playing with a fire engine, and the girl's selection of a doll.

Children's political sex differences do not flow from a rationalistic developmental sequence in which the girl learns "politics is not for girls," hence "I am not interested in politics." Rather there is a much more subtle and complex process in which, through differential opportunities, rewards and punishments which vary by sex, and through mechanisms such as identification with one or the other parent, a sex identity is acquired. Among other things this learning process associates girls with the immediate environment and boys with the wider environment. Political responses, developing as they do relatively late in childhood, fall into the framework of already present non-political orientations.[51]

V

What do these observations on pre-adult sex differences tell us about the adult phenomenon? The differential political behavior of men and

[49] For discussion of sex differences and similarities in general intelligence, academic achievement, and academic interests, see Terman and Tyler, *op. cit.*, pp. 1067–1075 and 1081–1082. Also Beth L. Wellman, "Sex Differences" in Carl Murchison (ed.), *A Handbook of Child Psychology* (2nd ed., rev., Wooster, 1933), Chap. 15. The New Haven findings agree with the general literature on these points: there were no sex differences in general intelligence; girls had significantly higher school grades than boys; boys were significantly more likely to prefer social studies as a school subject than were girls. I have no data on boys social studies *grades*. The fact that, in the face of their generally poorer academic performance, boys are better informed politically is, however, especially clear evidence that politics becomes a male specialization at an early age.

[50] *Op. cit.*, p. 1072.

[51] The belief that politics is not part of the female role may, however, help to reinforce political sex differentiation. This would be especially true later in childhood, as political awareness becomes more fully developed, and it becomes possible for the child consciously to accept or reject communications because they are political.

Reinforcement of political sex differences also may be encouraged by the mechanism of identification with figures in the wider environment, combined with the greater availability of male political exemplars for boys than of female political exemplars for girls. (See note 21 and the findings on identification with political figures reported in Table 1.)

women has been explained at a number of levels. Some explanations suggest that political sex differences are at least in part based on superficial situational factors which may be easily remedied. In the classic non-voting study of Merriam and Gosnell the need to stay at home and care for sick members of the family kept a few women from voting.[52] Similarly, the authors of *The American Voter* explain the fact that young women are somewhat more likely to turn out if they have no children by asserting: "The presence of young children requiring constant attention serves as a barrier to the voting act."[53] A second level of explanation of political sex differences stresses aspects of the present and past experiences of adults. Gosnell, for example, seems to imply that differences in formal education are the major determinant of the political differences.[54] Finally, some explanations dwell on much less malleable psychological causes of political sex differences, such as the "vestigial" yet "deeply ingrained" sex roles discussed by Campbell and associates,[55] and the female "feeling of dependence on man" described in Duverger's charmingly Gallic remarks.[56] Data based on observations of pre-adults do not enable us to come to any final conclusions about the relative weight of explanatory factors at these various levels, but do make it possible for us to reject inadequate theories.

The pre-adult data cast particular doubt on theories which suggest that political sex differences will disappear in the near future, on the assumption that such differences derive mainly from variables related to the individual's adult or adolescent experiences. We have seen, in contradiction to that assumption, that these differences emerge early in life, even in a group of contemporary children, the youngest of whom will not enter the electorate for another decade. Fourth-grade political sex differences are patently a consequence neither of situational impediments, nor of educational differences, nor, for that matter, of any of the other experiential variables which are held constant by studying the populations of coeducational grade schools. An adequate theory, these data indicate, must account for the psychological underpinnings of political sex differences, understood in terms of sex roles in the society, how they develop, and what maintains them.

Further research is needed to learn in detail just what these underpinnings are. In part they may be curiosity, interest, and other related "positive" drives, channeled from a tender age in one direction for girls and in another for boys. Politics, although not of deep interest to children of either sex, is more resonant with the "natural" enthusiasms of boys. Other psychological bases also will be found. For example, the need to conform to cultural definitions of masculinity often is bulwarked by powerful feelings. This need is complemented by the severe penalties which departure from the cultural definitions may bring. Women who find it especially threatening not to be "feminine" and who see politics as a male function, will be drawn into the political arena only at the cost of great psychic discomfort.[57]

Many elements in contemporary society tend to counteract the tendency for early learning to perpetuate political sex differences. Women are thrust into the wider environment by, for example, their careers, their educations and the proselytizing of political parties. Nevertheless, the aspects of children's political and non-political development described here make it clear that, in the words of Almond, "One of the most important factors making for resistance to social and political change is . . . the early family socialization process."[58]

[52] *Op. cit.*, pp. 72–77.

[53] Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, p. 488. This difference could also be explained, however, by other differences between mothers and non-mothers, even within the same educational and socio-economic stratum.

[54] *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

[55] Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, pp. 484–485.

[56] Duverger, *op. cit.*, p. 129. "While women have, legally, ceased to be minors," Duverger comments, "they still have the mentality of minors in many fields and, particularly in politics, they usually accept paternalism on the part of men. The man — husband, fiancé, lover, or myth — is the mediator between them and the political world."

[57] For evidence that strict adherence to "sex appropriate" roles still carried a strong emotional charge in the 1950's, see the interviews with a pair of Boston area mothers who were rated "high" in "sex role differentiation," reported in Robert R. Sears, *et al.*, *Patterns of Child Rearing* (Evanston, 1957), p. 398.

[58] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960), p. 27.

21

PRIMARY GROUP INFLUENCE ON PARTY LOYALTY

• *HERBERT McCLOSKY and HAROLD E. DAHLGREN*

Political science, like other fields of social inquiry, has had an enduring interest in questions of stability and change. This interest — until now principally expressed in studies of the rise and fall of institutions — has lately been focused increasingly upon individual and group behavior, in a search for the influences that hold men to their political beliefs and affiliations or cause them to shift about. Such influences are important not only for the study of voting and party membership, but for *haute politique* as well — for the great and dramatic questions surrounding political loyalty, conformity, deviation, apostasy, and other states of membership or disaffiliation. Although the research reported below concentrates on the former, it is our hope that it may also cast light upon the latter. It is concerned specifically with primary groups — those small, face-to-face, solidary, informal and enduring coteries that we commonly experience as family, friendship and occupational peer groups.

I. The Political Role of Primary Groups

The belief that people who associate together come to think alike is now so thoroughly buttressed by research and daily observation that it has become a commonplace. Studies have also shown that the more intimately we relate to our associates, the greater the correspondence between their views and ours. Since we interact most frequently and familiarly with the members of our own primary groups, it is mainly in these groups that our social and political attitudes are anchored. An impressive body of data supports the claim, earlier advanced by social theorists like C. H. Cooley, that the primary group is an essential bridge between the individual and the "great society," serving to transmit, to mediate, to interpret, and, in the end, to sustain society's norms. Primary groups, it now seems plain, are among the principal "carriers" and repositories of cultural beliefs and values. They are instrumental in launching and supporting class, religious, and ethnic identifications, and are even thought to function as intermediaries between consumers and the mass media.[1]

Almost every major voting study furnishes additional proof that primary groups are essential links in the complex process by which political norms are indoctrinated and party preferences implanted.[2] They find, for example,

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[1] *Cf.* Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization* New York, (1909), especially chs. 3 and 4. For a review of current theories and research on the role of primary groups, see Edward Shils, "The Study of the Primary Group," in Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford, 1951), pp. 44–69; Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1955), chs. 2–5; also Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (Evanston, Illinois, 1953), *passim*. Two valuable works dealing with small group influence on the formation of political attitudes have become available since this manuscript was prepared: Herbert H. Hyman, *Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959); and Sidney Verba, *The Experimental Study of Politics: The Contribution of Small Group Experiments in Leadership to the Understanding of Political Leadership*, unpublished dissertation, (Princeton University, 1959).

[2] *Cf.* Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Wm. N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), pp. 88–9, 92–3, 96–7, 120–2; P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1948) ch. 15; Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Illinois, 1954), pp. 199–206; R. S. Milne and H. C. Mackenzie, *Straight Fight* (London, 1954), pp. 44–5, 123–5; Eleanor Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 18 (Spring, 1954), pp. 23–9; Alice S. Kitt and David B. Gleicher, "Determinants of

that members of the same primary groups characteristically vote alike, think alike on issues, and affiliate with the same party; that voters in doubt about whom to vote for usually resolve their indecision by embracing the political preferences of their friends; that approximately three out of four young people vote as their parents do; and that the more uniform a group's political outlook the firmer the voting intentions of its members. Homogeneity of opinion among primary group members also affects voting turnout and the level of political curiosity. People who disagree with their families or friends about politics are less apt to vote and less likely to develop or to retain an interest in politics.[3] But primary groups may help to reinforce habits of participation and interest as well as to inhibit them. Patterns of participation, as one study concluded, are "contagious" — likely to be active when voters belong to politically aware groups and apathetic when they belong to politically indifferent ones.[4]

II. Theory of Primary Group Influence

The singular influence exerted by primary groups on the behavior of their members arises from a number of attributes that distinguish them from other types of groups.[5] Compared with larger and more impersonal associations whose direct impact is only occasionally or sporadically felt, the members of a primary group enjoy unparalleled opportunities to make their attitudes known, to check, modify, or correct each other's views, and to bring dissenters into line. Their power is further augmented by their extraordinary capacity for rewarding conformity and punishing deviation, and, what is equally important, for doing so immediately, directly, and tangibly. Other associations, in contrast, must rely upon "reinforcements" that are often more distant in time, more dimly perceived, more ambiguous, and likely, therefore, (as numerous experiments in the psychology of learning make plain), to be far less effective. Then, too, primary groups enlarge their influence through being able to dispense (or withhold) rewards that are specially valued to their members: more than any other social institution, they have the faculty to satisfy fundamental needs for affection, acceptance, approval, and self-definition, for the grounding of values, and for the resolution of conflicting standards of conduct.[6] Should the use of rewards fail, a primary group may, and often does, win obedience by rejecting or threatening to ostracize the deviants — measures with a potency that increases in proportion as the latter esteem the group or find no alternative groups to turn to.[7]

Voting Behavior," *ibid.*, Vol. 14 (Fall, 1950), pp. 393–412; Mark Benney and Phyllis Geiss, "Social Class and Politics in Greenwich," *Brit. J. of Sociology*, Vol. 1 (1950), pp. 324–7; Kenneth Helfant, "Parents' Attitudes vs. Adolescent Hostility, in the Determination of Adolescents' Sociopolitical Attitudes," *Psychological Monographs*, Vol. 66 (1952).

[3] Kitt and Gleicher, *op. cit.*, pp. 401–2; Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 120–2; on the effects of "cross-pressures" of various types on the decision to vote, see Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–64. However, in their study of the 1952 election, *op. cit.*, pp. 202–3, Campbell *et al.* found no connection between level of participation and membership in groups of "divided political loyalty."

[4] Lazarsfeld, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 142; Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

[5] For a review of theories concerning the psychology of small group influence, see Henry W. Riecken and George C. Homans, "Psychological Aspects of Social Structure" in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954), Vol. II, pp. 786–832; Daniel Katz, "Social Psychology and Group Processes," *Annual Review of Psychology* (1951), Vol. 2, pp. 137–172; C. I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis and H. H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven, 1953), ch. 5. An important attempt to elaborate and to apply a theory of group structure and influence has been made by Leon Festinger, Stanley Schachter, and Kurt Back, *Social Pressures in Informal Groups* (New York, 1950), ch. 9; also by George C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950). For summaries of small group theory as it applies more immediately to the research problem considered below, see Henry W. Riecken, "Primary Groups and Political Party Choice," in E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), ch. 8; and Katz and Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–115.

[6] See E. A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (1948), pp. 280–315; also T. M. Newcomb's study of the Bennington College community in *Personality and Social Change* (New York, 1943), and W. F. Whyte's *Street Corner Society* (Chicago, 1943).

[7] For experimental data bearing on these tendencies, see Stanley Schachter, "Deviation, Rejection,

Primary groups have also been found to play an important part in defining the "social reality" we experience, which means that they not only "structure" certain of the ways in which we perceive the world — itself a powerful source of influence upon us — but that they also furnish us with many of our standards and with an image of ourselves in relation to these standards.[8] Since their portrait of us is obviously important for our happiness, it is not surprising that we usually try to behave as they would like us to. Yielding to a primary group and to its power to define social reality may also help us gain confidence in many of our beliefs. In fact, one reason we fraternize with like-minded people is to reassure ourselves of the wisdom and probity of our opinions.[9] Through the "feedback" mechanisms of congenial primary alliances we frequently manage to soften the conflict between our opinion preferences on the one side and the empirical realities that crowd in upon us on the other. These alliances also furnish the social support we need to face and to discount the possibility that other people may consider our opinions false, foolish, or even base. The effect of these ministrations is, of course, to increase our dependency upon them and to permit them to impinge even more strongly upon our attitudes.

Some of the pressure for uniformity exerted by primary groups is unintentional, a mere incident of the tendency for people who associate together to arrive at common opinions, especially about subjects that are inherently ambiguous.[10] But much of their influence is deliberate, the result of the group's efforts to realize its goals and to survive. Since the governing of primary groups depends so heavily upon voluntary and informal incentives, they may require a greater measure of agreement than other associations. In a small, face-to-face group, differences of outlook stand out sharply, looming especially large in proportion to the size and intimacy of the group. Disagreements are, furthermore, difficult to confine: the ready accessibility of members to each other heightens the danger that any differences among them may spread to the entire group and divide it severely.

Partly to avoid such catastrophes, the members of small groups quickly set about to resolve disagreements that arise among them. Research has shown, for example, that when disagreements are first discovered, a disproportionate number of comments are addressed to the dissenters in the hope of persuading them to modify their opinions and to restore the group's equilibrium.[11] In general, the intensity of the effort to impose uniformity will depend on the felt relevance of the disputed opinions to the group's activities or goals. The presence of dissension not only interferes with the fulfillment of the group's purposes but also weakens its confidence in its own opinions and hence in its own viability. Finally, primary groups set about to achieve unanimity not merely for the instrumental reasons cited, but for the simple reason that their members have learned to understand things in a certain way and find it puzzling and discomfiting to confront alternative ways of seeing them.[12]

III. Hypotheses and Procedures

We were concerned in the present study not merely to verify anew the connection between group membership and political orientation but to explore the role which primary groups play in strengthening or weakening party loyalty — in the contribution they make to life-long patterns of political support at the one extreme or to political apathy, vacillation, or defection at the other. We began our inquiry with a number of assumptions, *e.g.*, that political prefer-

and Communication," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* (1951), 46, pp. 196–207; Kurt Back, "Influence through Social Communication," *Ibid.*, pp. 9–23; H. H. Kelley and E. H. Volkhart, "The Resistance to Change of Group Anchored Attitudes," *American Sociological Review* (1952), Vol. 17, pp. 453–465; L. Festinger and John Thibaut, "Interpersonal Communication in Small Groups," reprinted in G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley, *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, 1952), pp. 125–134. For evidence that group influence may be exercised even in the absence of cohesiveness, see the landmark experiments by S. E. Asch and M. Sherif, brief descriptions of which are available, *ibid*, pp. 2–11, and 249–262.

[8] Festinger, Schachter, and Back, *op. cit.*, pp. 168–176; Katz and Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–6.

[9] The theoretical statement and summary of research bearing on these processes is set forth most thoroughly by Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, 1957).

[10] See Sherif, *loc. cit.*

[11] Festinger and Thibaut, *loc. cit.*; Schachter, *loc. cit.*

[12] Katz and Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

ence is rooted in primary group memberships, changing as they change; that the parental family ("family of orientation") functions to sustain as well as to initiate the political affiliations of its offspring; and that other primary groups, such as peers and the "family of procreation" (spouse and children), serve mainly as secondary or reinforcing agents to bolster or undermine the political predisposition implanted by the family of orientation.

The ability of the parental family to stabilize the party affiliations of any of its members would depend most critically, we thought, on the following considerations: (1) the strength of the family's initial political indoctrination; (2) the degree of unity with which its remaining members support its original preferences; (3) the extent to which the family continues to offer opportunities for affection and solidarity ("cohesiveness"); (4) the physical availability of the members to each other ("physical distance"); (5) the degree of exposure to certain "life style" influences (occupation, class, education, religion, etc.) that reinforce or counteract the family's initial preferences; and (6) the degree of correspondence between the political views of one's parental family and one's newer primary group alliances (*e.g.*, friendship and occupational groups and family of procreation).

We anticipated that instability or shifts in party preference would most frequently occur (1) when the parental family has little interest in politics; (2) when one belongs to or enters primary groups with conflicting political norms; (3) when the groups that gave life to the original norms themselves change, experience conflict, or cease for whatever reason to reinforce their earlier views; and, (4) closely related to this, when a voter has become estranged or physically cut off from the groups in which his political outlooks have been anchored.

Systematic inquiry into these and related matters was undertaken in 1953–54 through a field project based on directed, two-hour interviews (conducted by professional interviewers) with a sample of 215 adults in the Twin City area of Minnesota. Since only a minority of voters reject their parents' party preferences, special procedures were employed to muster a sample of political "changers" large enough to be statistically useful. Essentially, we proceeded by first drawing a random, cross-section sample of the general population, and by then selecting our final sample from this pool, stratifying it purposely in such a way as to overrepresent the number of voters who favor a different party from their parents.

All respondents were presented with the same interview schedule and, wherever possible, were asked identical questions. The interview inquired in detail into the past and present life of the individual members of the respondent's family, friendship, and occupational groups, their social and intellectual backgrounds, their political habits and preferences, etc. A special effort was made to collect all vital information on the respondent's voting history and political attachments. From the copious data yielded by these questions we then constructed indexes for each of the variables that interested us, assigning index scores to each respondent according to the information elicited. Since we were compelled to rely heavily upon recall data — a risky procedure at best — we preferred to ask as many detailed, factual questions as possible, approaching the same core of information from several directions and combining each individual's answers into appropriate index scores. In this way we hoped to catch inconsistencies and to offset somewhat the failures and distortions of memory that time and prejudice are bound to introduce.[13]

More than a dozen indexes were worked out to assess such key variables as: respondent's party stability, modal political orientation of his parental family, "social distance" between respondent's "life style" and that of his parental family, degree of family cohesion or solidarity, reinforcement by friendship groups and spouse, and so on. The elements from which these measures were fashioned will be set forth as we present the findings concerning them.

IV. Results: The Influence of Family Indoctrination

The observation that three out of four voters adopt the party attitudes of their parents merely begins the analysis of family influence on political preference. Not all voters, for example,

[13] The interview schedule is too lengthy, and the manner of constructing the indexes too complex, to be described in detail in this paper. Information concerning them may be had upon request, however, through the Laboratory for Research in Social Relations, University of Minnesota.

maintain their affiliations with equal firmness. Some cling tenaciously to the same party, supporting its candidates regularly and without regard for their individual merit. A smaller number at the other extreme identify with a party but vote only intermittently for its candidates. Here we have called the former "stable" voters and the latter "unstable" voters. A third class of voters, who are less consistent than the "Stables" but more consistent than the "Unstables," have been labelled "moderately stable" voters (or "Moderates").[14]

Whether a voter shifts or remains firm in his party support may depend on a number of political factors, including changes in social conditions and the impact of individual candidates and issues. The influence of these factors is, however, severely circumscribed by a voter's readiness to receive them. Many voters are so unfaltering in their conviction and so deaf to the opposition's appeals that no practical way can be found to disengage them from their habitual attachments; others are held so loosely to a party that any of a number of influences (a dramatic issue, an unfamiliar candidate, a compelling slogan, an alarming rumor, an unfavorable ethnic background, etc.) may be sufficient at the moment to dislodge them.[15] A voter's susceptibility to defection would, we thought, greatly depend on how firmly his party affiliations have been anchored in his primary groups, especially his family. As Table I shows, voters who share their parents' political orientation are far more likely to be consistent in their party support than voters who have rejected parental preferences. Although the latter have renounced the family's political outlook, they are unable to rid themselves of its influence entirely, and have difficulty embracing a new political loyalty without wavering. Only 29 per cent of them become stable voters, compared with 53 per cent stable among voters who continue to support their parents' party.[16] Similarly, 43 per cent of the voters who disown the family's political loyalties are unstable in their adopted preferences, whereas among those who

[14] The classification of voters as *stable, moderate,* or *unstable* was determined from their responses concerning: present party preference, first vote, first presidential vote, presidential candidates supported in 1944, 1948, 1952, present preferences in congressional and state elections, self-description of voting habits and consistency of party support, etc.

[15] The effect of such factors on stability of preference was explored in an unpublished study by Herbert McClosky and Norris C. Ellerston, carried out through the Laboratory for Research in Social Relations. The degree to which voters responded to these factors was found to be determined largely by the stability of their party attachments.

[16] Unless otherwise indicated, all differences discussed are statistically significant at, or beyond, the .05 level.

TABLE I. *Stability of Preference, when Voters Agree or Disagree with the Party Loyalties of their Parents*

Respondents are →	Republicans		Democrats		Total	
	Parents Were		Parents Were		Voter Supports Same Party as Parents	Voter Supports Different Party from Parents
	Republican	Democratic	Democratic	Republican		
	(%'s Down)		(%'s Down)		(%'s Down)	
Stable Voters	52.8	17.4	54.0	38.5	53.4	28.6
Moderate Voters	30.2	30.4	32.0	26.9	31.1	28.6
Unstable Voters	17.0	52.2	14.0	34.6	15.5	42.8
Sample Size*	53	23	50	26	103	49

* The sample sizes in this and the following tables vary somewhat. Some of the total sample of 215 voters have been excluded from one or another of our indexes or classifications owing to inappropriateness or lack of reliable information required by the particular index (*e.g.*, voting record, family political background, marriage status, etc.).

cling to the family party, few (only 16 per cent) turn out to be unstable.[17] Table I also suggests, for reasons we will later consider, that the Republican children of Democratic parents are, on the whole, slightly less stable than the Democratic children of Republican parents.

The present study proceeded on the hypothesis that the primary family not only launches but also helps to sustain the political loyalties of its offspring. Since many voters remain in communication with their families throughout their lifetimes, and since they are likely to have parallel life styles, the family's influence can be expected to endure far beyond the time of the original indoctrination. This expectation is in some measure borne out by the data presented in Table II. There we have grouped our respondents according to the initial and current affiliations of their families, taking into account the modal preferences of the entire family, siblings as well as parents. Those whose family members were predominantly Democratic when the respondent was "in his teens" and who remain primarily Democratic today were placed in the D-D category. Republicans in the parallel condition were classified under R-R; while voters whose political backgrounds varied over time in any way were placed in the "Conflicted" column.

These percentage distributions show that a voter's party regularity is strongly affected by the consistency of his family's political preferences. Moving from the Stable Republicans at the one extreme to the Stable Democrats at the other, the frequency of respondents with an R-R pattern of family preference sharply declines, falling from 84 per cent to 11 per cent, while that of respondents with a D-D family background gradually increases, rising from 6 to 57 per cent. The more unstable the voter, in short, the greater the probability that his family has either shifted its past support from one party to the other or has consistently favored the opposition party. The data in the "Conflicted" column also suggest once again that stability among Democrats may be less dependent than Republican stability upon appropriate family influences.

Comparable inferences can be drawn from the data on family "reinforcement" — a term which has reference to the *strength* with which the family has, over the years, reinforced its

[17] Apparently these relationships are also somewhat affected by the *strength* of the family's indoctrination, the more strongly indoctrinated favoring the party of their parents more frequently and consistently than the weakly indoctrinated. The differences are not large, however, and are only significant at the .07 level. Possibly our measure of "strength of family influence," resting as it does on retrospective reporting, is too insensitive to give full scope to this variable.

TABLE II. *Stability of Voters, According to the Consistency of Party Loyalties Exhibited by their Parental Families, from the Time Voters were in their "Teens" to the "Present"*

Respondent's Preference and Stability	N	Family Political Preference*		
		R-R	D-D	Conflicted
		(%'s across)		
Stable Republicans	(32)	84.4	6.2	9.4
Moderate Republicans	(23)	60.9	13.0	26.1
Unstable Republicans	(21)	42.9	38.1	19.0
Unstable Democrats	(17)	23.5	35.3	41.2
Moderate Democrats	(26)	11.5	53.8	34.6
Stable Democrats	(37)	10.8	56.8	32.4

* R-R — Family preference has remained consistently Republican over the years.
D-D — Family preference has remained consistently Democratic over the years.
Conflicted — Family preference has varied or shifted over the years.

TABLE III. *Voter Stability and Strength of Family Reinforcement (Democrats and Republicans Combined)*

Respondents' Stability	Family Reinforcement		
	Strong	Moderate (%'s Down)	Weak
6 Stable Voters — Support Family Party	40.7	45.1	20.0
5 Moderate Voters — " " "	27.1	21.6	25.7
4 Unstable Voters — " " "	13.6	13.7	8.6
3 Unstable Voters — Reject Family Party	8.4	9.8	22.9
2 Moderate Voter — " " "	6.8	2.0	14.3
1 Stable Voter — " " "	3.4	7.8	8.6
Sample Size	59	51	35
Mean Stability Score	4.77	4.75	3.89

initial political indoctrination.[18] As can be seen from Table III, party regularity is significantly affected by the strength of reinforcement a voter receives from his family. If his family has been united and steadfast in its support, exhibiting the characteristics of a dependable, homogeneous, and politically aware reference group, he is far more likely to turn out a stable voter than if any of these conditions are absent. On a six-point stability measure in which a high score of 6.0 signifies stable support for the parents' party and a low score of 1.0 represents stable support for the opposition party, the strongly reinforced voters have a mean stability score of 4.77 while the weakly reinforced have a score of 3.89. Examination of the distributions and percentages in Table III will show these relationships in greater detail.

Findings from small group research also lead one to expect that reinforcement (and hence family influence) will be greater when its members like one another and are able to see each other often. A voter who is psychologically or physically cut off from his family should be less influenced than one who is frequently exposed to his family and hopes to win or keep its affection. To test this hypothesis a measure was developed for the purpose of classifying respondents into those who satisfy the conditions of high "solidarity" and low "physical distance" (the "favorable" condition) versus those who fail to meet either or both of these requirements (the "unfavorable" condition).[19] Comparison of the two groups is presented in Table IV and shows that the hypothesis is strongly supported. Frequent exposure to one's primary family and affection for its members thus have a substantial impact on the nature and stability of party loyalties. Voters who become alienated or separated from their families tend either to renounce its initial political affiliations entirely or to retain them more tenuously. Among voters who share the family's political attachments, 58 per cent of those in the favor-

[18] The "index of family reinforcement," which was built to measure this variable, takes into account the initial and current party outlook of each family member, siblings as well as parents. It includes the direction and intensity of the initial indoctrination and of all adult members of the family at present, all of which are scored in relation to the respondent's party preference. The "intensity" scores, in turn, take into account levels of political interest, frequency of political discussion with parents and siblings, strength of party attachment among the several family members, etc.

[19] The measure of "physical distance" took into account place of residence of each family member, the actual geographic distance between them, and the average number of times respondent saw each of them. The cohesiveness measure was comprised of a scale of items testifying to various aspects of family harmony and solidarity, which was principally developed, and generously made available to us, by Luther T. Jansen. See his "Measuring Family Solidarity," *American Sociological Review* (December, 1952), Vol. 17, pp. 727–33. We should have liked, of course, to allow "cohesiveness" to vary while controlling for "physical distance" (and conversely), so that we could measure the effect of each of them separately. The size of the samples did not make this feasible, however, so we paired them in this way.

TABLE IV. *Voter Stability and Family Reinforcement, Under Conditions "Favorable" and "Unfavorable" to Reinforcement (Democrats and Republicans Combined)*

Respondents are ↓	Respondents in the "Favorable Condition Who Support: Same Party as Family	Respondents in the "Favorable Condition Who Support: Different Party from Family	Respondents in the "Unfavorable" Condition Who Support: Same Party as Family	Respondents in the "Unfavorable" Condition Who Support: Different Party from Family
Stable Voters	58.1	23.8	32.3	25.0
Moderate Voters	28.4	19.1	44.1	37.5
Unstable Voters	13.5	57.1	23.6	37.5
Sample Size	74	21	34	16

able condition, but only 32 per cent in the unfavorable condition, are stable party supporters.

Comparison of voters in the favorable and unfavorable conditions who have *discarded* their family preferences yields similar results, but, as our hypothesis would anticipate, in inverted form, *i.e.*, for such voters family propinquity and solidarity serve to weaken rather than to strengthen party regularity. Among voters who have renounced the family preferences, 57 per cent in the favorable condition, but 37.5 per cent in the unfavorable condition, are unstable. Family solidarity and interaction can thus either strengthen or weaken stability, depending on whether one shares or rejects the family preferences. The stronger the attachment to the family, the greater its influence and the more difficult it becomes to hold firmly to views of which it does not approve.

V. Stability, Life-Style, and Social Distance

Since disunity *within* the primary family discourages party regularity among its members, it seemed reasonable to expect disagreements *between* primary groups to beget similar consequences. In order to test this and related hypotheses, detailed information was collected on all individuals named by a respondent as his primary group associates, especially his spouse, friends, and occupational associates. In addition, however, we tried to ascertain, as carefully as possible, the memberships which define his life-style, *i.e.*, his educational, religious, and socio-economic identifications, on the assumption that these categories of social stratification are also indirect measures of primary group affiliations. A voter who belongs to a church or social class, in other words, will doubtless be a member of some of the face-to-face groups which comprise the larger category. These smaller groups, furthermore, are often the vehicles that transmit the social and political norms of the larger aggregation. All such groups, it was assumed, have power to inspire loyalties, to set norms, to grant or withhold rewards for conformity and non-conformity, and thus to weaken or reinforce the family's influence on the respondent's political values. Retaining the family's life-style should lead one to hold its preferences more firmly; placing "social distance" between oneself and one's family, *i.e.*, attaining a higher or lower SES level than one's parents, switching to a different religion, etc., should cause one to become politically more unstable.

In order to assess the strength and direction of political influence arising from life-style associations, each respondent and his family were scored on a politically related "index of life-style," their scores ranging from 1.0 (Strongly Republican) to 5.0 (Strongly Democratic). Like the Lazarsfeld *et al.* "Index of Political Predisposition,"[20] which it resembles in certain

[20] Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, *op. cit.*, ch. 3. The Index of Political Predisposition combines three criteria — occupation, religion, and rural-urban residence — in ascertaining a voter's "natural" party predisposition. Ours was an urban sample, which meant that we could not employ the rural-urban criterion at all. Our index also differs from Lazarsfeld's in that its SES rating took into account income as well as occupation. Furthermore, we did not rely on the Catholic-Protestant distinction alone, but took into account the

respects, our life-style index rested upon several assumptions about the political relevance of SES and religious group factors, along with a further assumption about the relation of education to party preference. To illustrate at the extremes, in the Twin City area a Catholic worker and trade union member who has not gone beyond grade school and whose income is small can safely be assumed to have encountered pressures that are overwhelmingly Democratic; a Congregationalist or Episcopalian businessman who has attended college and earns a high income can be supposed, on the basis of known patterns of voter preference, to have experienced a powerful thrust in the Republican direction.[21] Between these extremes, of course, voters with more heterogeneous life-styles are to be found who are politically more cross-pressured.

The validity of these assumptions may be determined from Figure 1, where it can readily be seen that the index of life-style has a strong bearing on both the direction and stability of political preference. Thus, not only do Democrats and Republicans have life-styles appropriate to their actual party preferences, but the variations in their life-style scores correspond

rate of church attendance and the Republican or Democratic predispositions of the *specific* Protestant denominations. Finally, our index also used education as a criterion. Each of these was weighed and combined into a single life-style score for each respondent. In determining the weights for the index we are indebted to Angus Campbell and the Survey Research Center for making available to us in advance data on the demography of party affiliation from their 1952 election survey.

[21] For voting patterns arising from religious affiliation, see W. and B. Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude: a Study of Eight Major U.S. Religious Groups," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (1948), pp. 377–389.



FIGURE 1. Life-Style and Stability of Voter Preference.

TABLE V. *Relation Between Voter Stability, Family Preferences, and Social Distance*

Family Preference Is Republican				Family Preference Is Democratic			
	Respondent's Social Mobility Is:				Respondent's Social Mobility Is:		
Respondent's Preference Is ↓	Favorable (Rep)	Neutral	Antagonistic (Dem)	Respondent's Preference Is ↓	Favorable (Dem)	Neutral	Antagonistic (Rep)
	(%'s Down)				(%'s Down)		
Republican	84.6	60.8	42.1	Democratic	84.3	62.9	50.0
Democratic	15.4	39.1	57.9	Republican	15.5	37.0	50.0
Sample Size	39	23	19		32	27	12
Mean Stability Score*	4.90	3.91	3.32		5.25	4.04	3.50

* The Mean Stability score is computed on a 6 point scale in which 6.0 represents highest party stability in the same direction as the family preference, and 1.0 represents highest stability in the direction of the party opposed by the family.

closely with the variations in their level of party stability. As their life-style scores approach 1.0, stable Republican preferences become more frequent; as they approach 5.0, Republican preferences give way to loyalties that grow increasingly and more firmly Democratic. Both the Republican and Democratic unstables tend to fall in the middle — or cross-pressured — ranges of the index. Although the data are not shown in the table, voters whose life-style conflict with their preference tend, on the whole, to be unstable, while the reverse is true for voters whose preference and life-style are congruent.

Our primary purpose in calculating life-style scores, however, was to enable us to compute a score of "social distance" (or "mobility") between an individual voter and his family, in order to test the hypothesis that social distance weakens a family's influence by exposing a voter to other, conflicting primary group influences. In measuring "social distance," life style scores were worked out not only for the respondent but for *all* the members of his family as well, taking into account their social characteristics at present and at the time the respondent was "in his teens." By comparing the respondent's score with the modal life-style score of his family, we could assess how far he had moved (in his social characteristics) from the other members of his family. As can be seen in Table V, social distance factors have an important bearing on the stability of a voter's party loyalties. It is plain from these figures that family influence increases or decreases as its members enter other groups with parallel or conflicting party attitudes. More than 84 per cent of the voters who remain in a milieu favorable to the politics of the family retain its preferences, whereas among those who have moved into a politically hostile environment, only 45 per cent remain loyal to the traditional family party.

Stability *within* a party preference is likewise affected by social distance. As the entries in Table V show, stability declines sharply as one moves from the "favorable" to the "neutral" to the "antagonistic" social distance columns, the mean stability scores falling from 5.25 to 4.04 to 3.50 for the offspring of Democratic families, and from 4.90 to 3.91 to 3.32 for respondents from Republican families.

VI. SPOUSE AND FRIENDSHIP GROUP INFLUENCE

Further warranty for some of the foregoing inferences about primary groups can be gained from the data on the spouse and peer groups of our respondents. We find, for example, that a large number (84 per cent) of our married respondents have the same party loyalties as

their mates,[22] and that voters who agree with their partners' preferences are considerably more stable (51 per cent of these are stable and 21 per cent unstable; among voters who disagree with their mates, only 14 per cent are stable and 57 per cent are unstable). The spouse also plays an important part in reinforcing the political orientation earlier instilled by a voter's parents. When both the spouse and parents favor the same party, the chances are overwhelming (93 per cent) that a voter will also favor that party; when, however, their political outlooks are diverse, the probability that a voter will remain loyal to his parents' party falls to only 28 per cent.

Conflict between one's parental and acquired families also has a marked effect on the stability of voting, reducing it severely (Table VI). The stronger the political interest and preference of the spouse, moreover, the greater his or her influence on the respondent's party loyalties. But this influence can work both ways — to increase stability when husband and wife agree in their party attitudes, or to decrease it severely when they disagree. The magnitude of this influence is doubtless a function of the frequency of interactions between husband and wife, and of the solidarity ordinarily achieved by primary groups of this type. As anticipated, there was a tendency for women to switch to their husbands' preferences more often than the reverse. However, our sample of "switchers" was too small to place much confidence in this conclusion.

It should also be noted from Table VI that, when family background is taken into account, no difference is found between the stability of voters who marry Democrats and those who marry Republicans. A respondent from a Democratic family who marries a Republican is badly shaken in his voting habits, but no more so, apparently, than a voter from a Republican family who marries a Democrat.

Data on the friends named by our respondents, including friends at work, at church, in neighborhoods, clubs, and other social activities, furnish additional proof of the crucial role which primary groups play in stabilizing political loyalties. As Table VII demonstrates unmistakably, the higher the proportion of friends who support a voter's party, the more stable his preferences: as one reads downward in the left-hand columns, from the Stable Republicans through the moderate and unstable voters to the Stable Democrats, the frequency of Republican peers steadily declines (from 60.8 per cent to 18.8 per cent) while the proportion of Democratic peers uniformly rises (from 21.2 per cent to 53.8 per cent). Whereas stable voters have the highest proportion of peers who share their preferences, the unstable voters draw their friends almost equally from both parties and are subject, therefore, to greater cross-pressure. But they are also politically less aware, they select their friends with less regard for political belief, and they know least

[22] *Cf.* Campbell *et al.*, *The Voter Decides*, p. 201; Maccoby *et al.*, *op. cit.*; Lazarsfeld *et al.*, *The People's Choice*, pp. 140–5.

TABLE VI. *Influence of Spouse's Party Preference on Voter Stability**

	Family Background Is Republican			Family Background Is Democratic			Family Background — Combined Samples		
	Spouse's Preference Is:			Spouse's Preference Is:			Spouse's Preference Is:		
	Strongly or Moderately Repub.	Neutral or Weak	Strongly or Moderately Dem.	Strongly or Moderately Dem.	Neutral or Weak	Strongly or Moderately Repub.	Same as Family's — Strong or Moderate	Neutral or Weak	Different from Family's — Strong or Moderate
Respondents' Mean Stability Scores:	5.35	4.00	2.60	5.38	4.50	2.50	5.36	4.20	2.60
Sample Size:	28	15	19	21	12	13	49	27	32

* The measure of spouse's strength of party preference is an index comprised of data on the spouse's level of political interest; frequency of voting; frequency of political discussion; intensity of party feeling; and direction of party preference. The Mean Stablity Scores are computed, as before, on the 6 point scale previously described.

TABLE VII. *Relation Between Stability of Voting Preference and Proportion of Democratic and Republican Peers**

Respondents are: ↓	Total Sample		Voters from Republican Family Backgrounds		Voters from Democratic Family Backgrounds	
	Proportion of Peers who are:		Proportion of Peers who are:		Proportion of Peers who are:	
	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Stable Republicans	60.8	21.2	59.2	20.8	75.0	15.0
Moderate Republicans	43.8	21.6	47.6	21.8	50.0	26.6
Unstable Republicans	36.6	26.0	34.0	24.0	44.6	28.2
Unstable Democrats	27.4	29.2	30.0	36.6	21.4	24.2
Moderate Democrats	23.4	50.6	30.0	52.8	24.6	48.6
Stable Democrats	18.8	53.8	22.0	54.0	18.2	51.4
Sample Size	193		81		70	

* The proportions of peers named whose party preferences were unknown to the respondents have been omitted from this table. In every case, however, it would be the percentage remaining after subtracting the proportion of Republican and Democratic peers from 100 per cent: *e.g.*, for the Stable Republicans in the total sample, the party preference of 18.0 per cent of the peers is unknown; for the Unstable Republicans, the proportion is 37.4 per cent.

about the actual affiliations of their friends; they were unable, for example, to identify the party preferences of 38.6 per cent of their friends, while the comparable figure for the Moderates was 30.2 per cent and for the Stables 23.4 per cent. Whether out of anxiety or apathy, the Unstables seem somewhat more inclined to avoid friendships with people who reveal strong political convictions — a practice which tends to prolong their own instability.[23]

Controlling for family background does not alter the nature or direction of these findings in any important way. Stability, as anticipated, is greatest when the loyalties of one's peers predominantly correspond with (and thus reinforce) the political outlook of one's family. However, when the majority of a voter's peers do *not* support the party favored by his family, the conditional probability is high (over 80 per cent) that he will abandon the family's voting tradition and shift his support to the opposition. Approximately one-third of these "shifters" become stable opposition supporters.

The rather impressive power exerted by friends on voting behavior does not mean that they have entirely displaced the family, as a source of influence. In Table VIII, we hold friendship preferences constant and vary family background, and find the family continues under all conditions to register an impact upon the preference and stability of the offspring. As the figures show, Republican voters from Republican families are proportionately more stable than voters from Democratic families, even when the latter have as many Republican friends as the former. The same relationships hold for the Democrats when we control for the number of Democratic friends.

In considering the relative influence of family and friends, furthermore, we should keep in mind that the connection between stability and the party preferences of one's peers is not the simple, unilateral relation it may appear at

[23] The Elmira study found, for example, that voters, and especially uncertain or undecided voters, avoid talking with people who hold different views. See R. H. Baxter, "Interpersonal Contact and Exposure to Mass Media during a Presidential Campaign," unpublished dissertation (Columbia University, 1951).

first to be. Cause and effect in this matter are not always easy to distinguish. Our choice of friends is, in some measure at least, governed by our political views, and these in turn have largely been predetermined by our families. Since our families also help to fix our levels of party loyalty, they are indirectly responsible, in part, for the high correlation between voting stability and the party affiliation of friends. Unfortunately, the magnitude of such indirect family influence cannot be assessed and demonstrated in studies of the type we are now considering. Its importance, nevertheless, can safely be assumed.

tions may be found in Table IX where combined data are presented for four of the more important variables employed in the study: family reinforcement, social distance, spouse's preference, and peer group influence. Each time one of these factors supported a respondent's party preference, he was assigned a plus (+) score for that variable; each time a variable was in conflict with his preference, he was given a minus (−) score.

It should first of all be noted that group affiliations tend to be mutually reinforcing. When the total number of "reinforcements" were tallied for all respondents, 64 per cent

TABLE VIII. *Family Influence upon Voter Stability when Frequency of Republican and Democratic Friends is Controlled*

Proportion of Republican Friends	Percentage of Stable Republican Voters: From Republican Families	From Democratic Families	Proportion of Democratic Friends	Percentage of Stable Democratic Voters: From Democratic Families	From Republican Families
↓	%	%	↓	%	%
Under 20%	25.0	0.00	Under 20%	25.0	0.00
21%– 60%	41.6	0.00	21%– 60%	57.7	46.1
61%–100%	69.6	50.0	61%–100%	66.6	44.1
Total Repub. sample	76		Total Dem. sample	75	

The data on friendship groups, it should be observed, show no significant or systematic differences in the strength of the influence exerted by Democratic or Republican peers. The correlation between voter stability and the proportion of peers with congruent preferences is .40 (sig. > .001) for the Republican respondents and .37 (sig. > .01) for the Democratic respondents.

VII. Primary Group Influences Combined

So far we have seen that each type of primary group registers its own separate impact on our political loyalties. What happens, however, when they are combined? Our theory suggests that their influence ought to be cumulative, becoming stronger (or weaker) as favorable (or antagonistic) units of reinforcement are added. Warranty for these expecta-

were found to be favorable (+), 24 per cent were negative (−), and 12 per cent were neutral. Regular party supporters, however, have experienced a significantly greater proportion of positive reinforcements than unstable supporters, the figures being 82 per cent for the former and 54 per cent for the latter.

Examination of Table IX shows that 74 per cent of the Stables have been exposed to three or more positive reinforcements (out of a possible four), while only 25.9 per cent of the Unstables have been so consistently reinforced. When we compute the percentages vertically, the degree to which stability depends upon the frequency and homogeneity of primary group support becomes, if anything, even more obvious. The probability that a voter will be stable if all his reinforcements are favorable is 70.5 per cent; it declines sharply, however, as the number of his positive scores diminishes —

dropping from 70 to 58 to 35 and finally to 17 per cent. Similarly, if all four group reinforcements are favorable, the probability is small (only 5.9 per cent) that a voter will become unstable, whereas it is quite high (64.7 per cent) if only one of the four reinforcements is favorable. Clearly, party loyalty strongly depends upon the ratio of favorable to unfavorable primary group supports.

Controlling for initial family background modifies these results only in detail, for stability rises as reinforcements increase, no matter what political outlook voters have received from their families. Nevertheless, a voter who does not follow his family's preference is less likely to be stable than a voter who does, even when both have been subjected to the same number of subsequent group pressures. The impact of the family's initial indoctrination persists, in short, even if it does not always result in retention of the parents' party.

Correlations were computed which summarize and elaborate these findings somewhat. The simple correlation between family reinforcement and the level of respondent's stability is, to begin with, .27 (sig. .01). If we add social distance and compute a multiple correlation, the figure rises to .41, with similar correlations for Republican and Democratic respondents. When spouse and peer group variables are added, the multiple correlation rises again, this time to .49.[24] Had we also been able to take account of family solidarity and propinquity (which unfortunately we could not, owing to complications involving the small size of the N), these correlations would doubtless be even higher, since family influence is increased, as we have seen, when physical and psychological "distance" are favorable to reinforcement.

VIII. Summary and Conclusions

The data presented in this paper largely confirm the hypotheses with which the project began and furnish additional support for some of the inferences about primary groups suggested by the Elmira study, the Maccoby study, and

[24] The multiple correlation for stability, family reinforcement, spouse, and peer group preference is .49, even if social distance is omitted. This is consistent with our assumption that social distance variables can, for many purposes, be viewed as indirect measures of primary group membership.

Table IX. *The Combined Effect of Four Primary Group Influences (Family Reinforcement, Social Distance, Spouse, and Peer Groups) on Voter Stability*

Respondents are:	Number of Favorable (+) Reinforcements* (%'s Down) 1+	2+'s	3+'s	4+'s
Stable Voters	17.6	35.7	58.1	70.5
Moderate Voters	17.6	32.1	27.9	23.5
Unstable Voters	64.7	32.1	13.9	5.9
Sample Size	17	28	43	17

Respondents are: ↓	Number of Favorable (+) Reinforcements			Voters Who Support Initial Family Preference — Number of Favorable (+) Reinforcements			Voters Who Have Switched from Initial Family Preference — Number of Favorable (+) Reinforcements		
	1 or 2 +'s	3 or 4 +'s	(N)	1 or 2 +'s	3 or 4 +'s	(N)	1 or 2 +'s	3 or 4 +'s	(N)
	(%'s Across)			(%'s Across)			(%'s Across)		
Stable Voters	26.0	74.0	(50)	18.9	81.0	(37)	46.1	53.8	(13)
Moderate Voters	42.9	57.1	(28)	36.9	63.1	(19)	66.7	33.3	(6)
Unstable Voters	74.1	25.9	(27)	66.7	33.3	(12)	78.6	21.4	(14)

* Favorable or (+) = Association with a primary group whose party loyalties are congruent with those of the respondent.

others. The findings make it plain that the indoctrination, retention, or shift of party loyalties is significantly related to, and often determined by, family and other primary bonds. Of course, our results do not explain stable or shifting patterns of support in *particular* elections, for these, as Key and Munger correctly point out, require explanations that are more immediately *political, i.e.*, that chiefly take account of issues, candidates, or changing political conditions.[25] What the findings do show, however, is that voters differ widely in their susceptibility to political influence, and that their tendencies to shift or remain stable in response to such influence will vitally depend upon the strength and homogeneity of their primary group affiliations.

Specifically, the following inferences seem warranted from our data:

1. The family is a key reference group which transmits, indoctrinates, and sustains the political loyalties of its members. Voters who support the party favored by their families develop firmer and more consistent habits of party allegiance than voters who renounce the family preference.

2. Family influence on the stability of a voter's preference increases when (a) the party outlooks of its members are homogeneous; (b) political interests and loyalty among the other members are high (this affects direction of preference more than stability, however); and (c) the same family preference has been retained over time. Family influence on party allegiance becomes stronger, in addition, when its members like and often see each other; however, these factors undermine the party loyalty of voters who have rejected the family preference. The family thus serves as a continuing agency for defining the party affiliations of its members.

3. A voter's political attachments are strongly affected by both his and his family's "life-style" (occupation, income, education, and religion). Homogeneous life-styles that are consistent with the family's political loyalties reinforce those loyalties; heterogeneous life-styles, and discrepancies between life-style and party preference, weaken them. Social distance, *i.e.*, changes in life-style away from the modal family patterns, diminishes family influence by placing a voter among new and often conflicting primary groups.

4. Unless they embody a party viewpoint or life-style that conflicts with the family's outlook, primary groups other than the parental family, such as spouse and peer group associates, operate to reinforce the party loyalties a voter acquires from his family. The more widespread the agreement among them, and the more intense their outlook, the more stable his own party allegiance. Compared with party regulars, unstable voters are less often able to identify the political affiliations of their friends.

5. Disagreements among the several primary groups to which a voter belongs are among the most important sources of party irregularity and defection. Most voters, however, are anchored in a matrix of politically harmonious primary associations — a result, to some extent, of conscious selection and of the tendency for the social environment to bring together people of like views.

6. Democrats and Republicans were observed to differ somewhat in their response to family and other primary group influences, but the differences were neither large nor systematic enough to warrant firm generalization. If family political background is allowed to vary freely, Republican voters appear to conform more strongly than Democrats to family influence. They also appear to be less affected by changes in life-style or social mobility — a result consistent with the findings reported by the Elmira study, by Maccoby, and others.[26] These inferences, which imply the greater tenacity of Republican loyalties, are misleading, however, for they overlook the consideration that some of our Republicans and Democrats were initially indoctrinated by families of a contrary political persuasion. When we took this into account and controlled for family party preference, the differences between Democratic and Republican voters either disappeared or reversed themselves: Democrats from Democratic families and Republicans from Republican families proved to be equally stable; while Democrats from Republican family backgrounds turned out, on the average, to

[25] V. O. Key and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case of Indiana," in Burdick and Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior*, ch. 15.

[26] Maccoby *et al., op. cit.*; Berelson *et al., op. cit.*

be somewhat more stable than Republicans from Democratic backgrounds. Voters whose origins were Democratic, in short, appear more resistant to conversion than voters from Republican backgrounds. These findings could mean either that Democratic families leave a more enduring imprint on the politics of their members or — a more plausible explanation — that the balance of non-family forces in the Twin City community favored the Democrats. On this explanation, the apparently greater tenacity of Democratic family influence would be largely an artifact of our measurement procedures, and would arise from our inability to assess independently other important influences in the community. In any event, the belief that Republicanism is the more magnetic and enduring preference, owing to the higher status of its more visible supporters and its symbolic identification with the middle and upper classes, is not substantiated in our data. The Republican party does tend, on the whole, to be the party of status, but it is not always the preferred or prestige party. Especially since the New Deal, with its strong impact on political affiliation and perceptions, the advantage of being the prestige party belongs, in many communities, to the Democrats.

7. Reference to the role of the community environment underscores the need to observe that primary group memberships cannot, by themselves, account for all the variance in political belief and affiliation, and that other influences, such as economic interest, status needs, the mass media, the behavior of the parties themselves, etc., will often have to be considered. We should also enter the qualification that, having dealt in this research largely with party affiliations, we cannot be certain that the results can be generalized to all forms of political attachment. We have, nevertheless, proceeded on the assumption that the several forms of political support are sufficiently alike so that knowledge gained from the study of party affiliation will prove useful in the investigation of other forms of political loyalty.

22

PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC VOTING BEHAVIOR IN A METROPOLITAN AREA

• OSCAR GLANTZ

Contemporary surveys provide empirical evidence to substantiate the persistent impression among social scientists that American Protestants and Catholics differ a great deal in their voting behavior, particularly in presidential elections. For example, in the Erie County, Ohio, and Elmira, New York, studies (1940 and 1948 respectively) by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard B. Berelson and associates,[1] the data indicate that a majority of Protestants are oriented in the direction of the Republican Party, a majority of Catholics even more so in the direction of the Democratic Party. Moreover, Lazarsfeld and associates concluded that stratification differences are not as important as religious differences in the determination of party preferences.[2] In Elmira, for example, "on each socio-economic status level about half as many Catholics vote Republican as Protestants. Catholics of high status vote more Democratic

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[1] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard B. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944; and Bernard B. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954.

[2] For Catholics in the Erie County study, the Republican vote was 14 per cent at the lowest socio-economic status level, but only 29 per cent at the top level. For Protestants, the variation in Republican vote was less moderate, from 43 per cent at the lowest SES level to 76 per cent at the top level. Lazarsfeld *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

than do Protestants of low status; thus Catholic affiliation is stronger than socio-economic status in determining vote."[3] "Catholics vote more Democratic than Protestants regardless of . . . class identification"[4] or "the 'liberalism' or 'conservatism' of their attitudes on political issues."[5] And "young Catholics and Protestants [up to 44] are more likely than older voters to resolve the cross-pressures between religion and class in favor of class."[6] This last proposition has historical significance for any future Protestant-Catholic differentiation, suggesting as it does that "the succession of generations seems to be softening the religious differences."[7] In particular, this appears to be the case for younger Catholics in the business and white-collar group and younger Protestants in the labor-union group.

The problem here is whether these conclusions are tenable for a large metropolitan area in the same industrial region. Accordingly, it is the purpose of the current paper to examine the Elmira propositions by utilizing a set of "comparable" data from a post-election study in Philadelphia. These data have been arranged in sections to provide answers to the following questions:

1. Within each occupational stratum, is voting behavior associated with religious affiliation?
2. Regardless of business-labor identifications, is voting behavior associated with religious affiliation?
3. Regardless of business-labor orientations, is voting behavior associated with religious affiliation?
4. For upper- and middle-strata persons who are clearly on the side of business, i.e., they identify with business *and* are oriented toward the N.A.M., is voting behavior associated with religious affiliation?
5. For middle- and lower-strata persons who are clearly on the side of labor, i.e., they identify with labor *and* are oriented toward the CIO, is voting behavior associated with religious affiliation?
6. Within the middle stratum, is there more Republican support among younger Catholics than older Catholics?
7. Within the unionized segment of the lower stratum, is there more Democratic support among younger Protestants than older Protestants?

[3] Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 65. The Elmira data for 1948 are included in Table 1 of this paper.
[4] *Ibid.*, part of conclusion 38, p. 75.
[5] *Ibid.*, conclusion 39, p. 76.
[6] *Ibid.*, conclusion 35(a), p. 75.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

Affirmative answers to these questions would indicate that the Elmira conclusions are tenable for Philadelphia.

Procedure of the Study

In the Philadelphia study, 201 white male Protestants and 199 white male Catholics, selected as informants in a disproportionately stratified sample, were interviewed in their homes shortly after the presidential election of 1952. Within this group, 12 unskilled laborers were excluded from all analyses in the total study and are similarly omitted from the current examination. Of the remaining 388 respondents, there were 43 big businessmen in an upper occupational stratum; almost equal numbers of professionals (63), small businessmen (65), and white-collar workers (61) in a middle stratum; and roughly equal numbers of skilled manuals (74) and semi-skilled and service workers (82) in a lower stratum.[8] In addition to a number of other questions, they were asked to reveal the names of the candidates for whom they had voted in the Truman-Dewey and Eisenhower-Stevenson elections, whether they owed their allegiance to business or to labor, and whether they agreed or disagreed with six partisan statements taken from the literature of two organizations promulgating opposite viewpoints, three from the N.A.M. and three from the CIO. The statements, which concerned such domestic issues as the Taft-Hartley law, industry-wide collective bargaining, the excess-profits tax, rent control, government ownership and operation of the TVA type of power project, and national health insurance, were unidentified in the questionnaire, so that respondents were unaware of the sources.

Agreement with the N.A.M. or disagreement with the CIO was scored as a business-oriented response, while disagreement with the N.A.M. or agreement with the CIO was scored as a

[8] For a description of the sample design, including the method of random selection within fourteen political precincts, see Oscar Glantz, "Class Consciousness and Political Solidarity," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 23, 1958, footnote 10, p. 377. For a close view of the types of occupation included within each stratum, see Oscar Glantz, "Unitary Political Behavior and Differential Political Motivation," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 10, 1957, Table 1, p. 835.

labor-oriented response. In the event of indecision (or "don't know) the response was scored as indeterminate. Of the total of six responses, interviewees who gave at least three more business-oriented than labor-oriented responses were classified as *business-oriented.* Those who gave at least three more labor-oriented than business-oriented responses were listed as *labor-oriented.* Patterns which did not meet these requirements were categorized as inconsistent or *indeterminate.*

It should be noted that the number of inconsistent persons was considerable, particularly in the middle and lower strata. Some of these persons must have been genuinely inconsistent, but others may have reduced the consistency of their total response by rejecting the emotionalism inherent in partisan statements with which they might otherwise have agreed.

However, an unfavorable reaction to the emotionality of a statement is itself a suggestion of incomplete conviction concerning the politico-economic value contained therein. If it is the notion of organized business (N.A.M.) that an excess-profits tax is "always based on . . . political considerations,"[9] or that government ownership of electric power facilities is "the spearhead of our advance into socialism,"[10] it seems plausible to assume that an individual is indeterminate in his orientation if he reacts negatively to both the tone of these statements and the totality of CIO statements. In the same manner, if it is the impression of organized labor (CIO) that the Taft-Hartley law is "a legalized attack on the basic human rights of wage earners,"[11] or that congressmen "voted to take money out of your pocket" if they voted to end rent control,[12] one can suggest that an individual is indeterminate if he responds unfavorably to both the emotionality of these statements and the totality of N.A.M. statements.

Yet it should be emphasized here that responses to strongly worded statements can only measure an informant's receptivity to the values of the sponsoring organizations. For this reason, the attitudinal dimensions are circumscribed as business-labor orientations.[13]

Inasmuch as the Elmira and Philadelphia projects were conceived and conducted disparately, any firm comparison between the two is precluded. The pre- and post-election study of Elmira was based on repeated interviews with males and females selected by area-probability sampling, while the post-election study of Philadelphia was concerned exclusively with males, and these were drawn by disproportionately stratified sampling. An index based on interviewer rating, education, and occupation (of breadwinner) was used to stratify the Elmira respondents by socio-economic status, while occupation alone was utilized to stratify the Philadelphia respondents. Here, the major point of divergence is probably at the top level, between the high status group for Elmira and the upper occupational group for Philadelphia. The high status group probably incorporated some professionals and other middle occupational persons, while the upper occupational group was composed of a big-business élite. It included large-scale investment and commodity brokers, corporation presidents and other top-management officials, board directors, and independent manufacturers and proprietors with large or moderately large operations.

Again, comparability is limited somewhat by (1) differences between structured questions used to measure subjective class identification, and (2) differences between the statements em-

[9] *A Federal Tax Program for the Period of Defense and Partial Mobilization,* National Association of Manufacturers, Economic Policy Division Series, No. 34, 1950, p. 15.

[10] *Cut Non-defense Spending Now,* N.A.M., Economic Policy Division Series, No. 40, February 1951, p. 10. (The third N.A.M. statement was as follows: "Industry-wide [collective] bargaining in the coal industry has fostered one of the strongest [union] monopolies this country has ever experienced." *The Economic Impact of an Industry-wide Strike,* N.A.M., Economic Policy Division Series, No. 27, July 1950, p. 1.)

[11] *The Platforms: Here's How They Stack Up,* Congress of Industrial Organizations, Political Action Committee, 1952 (no pagination).

[12] *How to Cut Your Rent,* CIO, Political Action Committee, 1952, p. 2. (The third CIO statement was as follows: ". . . A national health insurance program to provide preventive and curative medical care for all the people [should be enacted by Congress]."

[13] See Glantz, "Class Consciousness and Political Solidarity," as cited, footnote 19, p. 378, for notes on an item-analysis test which indicated that the six statements belong together as a meaningful set.

ployed to gauge politico-economic attitudes. The identity question for Elmira contained traditional upper-, middle-, lower-class divisions, by contrast to the categories of business-labor allegiance in the current study, and this difference does indeed color the meaning of any comparative test in which these questions are involved.[14] Much less severe is the dissimilarity between sets of items used to measure conservatism-liberalism in Elmira and business-labor orientations in Philadelphia. The Elmira index was constructed from statements on price control and billion-dollar corporations and labor unions, and these pertained to issues closely related to those in the N.A.M.-CIO collection, e.g., rent control, excess-profits tax, and the Taft-Hartley law. Thus, the writer would suggest that both indices were concerned with the same sort of economic dimension.

[14] In an excellent chapter on the political effects of the 1948 campaign, Berelson and associates used an index of class predispositions which enabled them to characterize their informants in terms of business-class or working-class dispositions, with an "ambivalent" group in the center. Unfortunately, this classificatory scheme was not used in the section on religious differentials. *Op. cit.*, pp. 253–273.

Protestant-Catholic Differences

Question 1. When occupational strata are controlled, the Philadelphia data for 1948 exhibit the same kind of pattern as the Elmira data, with one notable exception (Table 1). Within the big-business élite at the top level in Philadelphia, there was as much Republicanism among Catholics as there was among Protestants, suggesting thereby that the upper class is solid in its political inclination.[15] Moreover, it can be noted in Table 1 that the Republican party could accumulate only 41 per cent of the presidential ballots of lower-stratum Protestants, by contrast to Republican majorities among Protestants in the lowest pair of Elmira status levels. Nonetheless, this 41 per cent figure was roughly twice the size of the Republi-

[15] In the Elmira data, differences are significant at the .01 level (except as noted) for H-P, H-C; HM-P, HM-C; M-P, M-C; LM-P, LM-C; and L-P, L-C (.05). In the Philadelphia data, differences are significant at the .01 level for M-P, M-C; and L-P, L-C.

TABLE 1. *Protestant-Catholic Differences in Voting Behavior, by Socio-economic Status, Elmira, N.Y., and by Occupational Stratum, Philadelphia, 1948*

Elmira			*Philadelphia*		
Status	*Per Cent Republican**	*(N)*	*Stratum*	*Per Cent Republican**	*(N)*
High:			Upper:		
Protestant	98	(45)	Protestant	88	(26)
Catholic	50	(10)	Catholic	85	(13)
High middle:					
Protestant	92	(62)			
Catholic	48	(25)			
Middle:			Middle:		
Protestant	83	(132)	Protestant	77	(87)
Catholic	31	(61)	Catholic	39	(78)
Low middle:					
Protestant	68	(154)			
Catholic	32	(74)			
Low:			Lower:		
Protestant	66	(41)	Protestant	41	(58)
Catholic	31	(16)	Catholic	18	(72)

* Of the two-party vote.

Note: See footnote 15 for significant differences.

Source: Elmira data are adapted from Bernard B. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954, Chart 24, p. 65.

TABLE 2. *Relation of Business-Labor Loyalties to Protestant-Catholic Differences in Voting Behavior, by Occupational Stratum, Philadelphia, 1948**

Stratum	Business Loyalty Per Cent Republican‡	(N)	Middle-of-the-Road† Per Cent Republican‡	(N)	Labor Loyalty Per Cent Republican‡	(N)
Upper:						
Protestant	100	(14)	82	(11)		
Catholic	83	(6)	83	(6)		
Middle:						
Protestant	91	(46)	70	(33)	25	(8)
Catholic	57	(23)	45	(34)	10	(20)
Lower:						
Protestant	67	(9)	48	(21)	29	(28)
Catholic	42	(12)	5	(20)	17	(40)

* See footnote 16.
† Includes voters who said "both," "neither," or "don't know."
‡ Of the two-party vote.

can percentage among Catholics in the lower stratum.

Question 2. When occupational strata and religious background are both controlled and voting behavior is tabulated by type of loyalty, the data reveal three Catholic groups with Republican majorities (Table 2). These include middle-stratum Catholics who were loyal to business, in addition to an expected pair of upper-stratum Catholic groups (loyal to business and middle-of-the-road). Conversely, three of the eight groups with Republican minorities were Protestant, including middle-stratum Protestants who were loyal to labor and an expected pair of lower-stratum Protestant groups (middle-of-the-road and loyal to labor.) Middle-of-the-road members of the two religious groups in the middle stratum had different majority preferences (70 per cent of the Protestants were Republican, compared to 45 per cent of the Catholics), as did members of the two religious groups in the lower stratum who identified with the business class (67 per cent of the Protestants were Republican, compared to 42 per cent of the Catholics).[16] Moreover, for Protestants and Catholics in the middle stratum who were loyal to business, the percentage of Protestants in the Republican column was much larger than the percentage of Catholics. Here, then, is partial affirmation of the Elmira conclusion that Catholics vote more Democratic than Protestants, regardless of class identification.[17]

Question 3. Was there more Republicanism among Protestants than among Catholics in the various orientation units? In Elmira, the Republican party received a preponderance of Protestant votes in each of the three attitudinal categories, including those in the "liberal" group, but they also received 69 per cent of the votes registered by Catholics in the "conservative group.[18] The test would have been more definitive if these attitudinal data had been examined within each status level separately, but nonetheless the imprint of religion appears to be relatively strong, particularly among Protestants.

In the Philadelphia data, when occupational strata and religious background are both controlled, the results are somewhat but not completely similar (Table 3). Note, for example, that the Republican party captured the majority vote of business-oriented Catholics in both the upper and middle strata, but failed to gain the majority vote of labor-oriented Protestants in both the middle and lower strata. On the other hand, Protestants in these four categories still returned a larger vote to the

[16] Inasmuch as a number of subcells were utilized in Tables 2 and 3, the exceedingly small number of respondents here and there was unavoidable. Given these small N's, the writer did not employ statistical tests for significant differences between any pair of contrasted groups.

[17] The Elmira data on this point are unclear. See Chart 24 in Berelson *et al., op. cit.*, p. 65.

[18] *Ibid.*, Chart 25, p. 66.

TABLE 3. *Relation of Business-Labor Orientations to Protestant-Catholic Differences in Voting Behavior, by Occupational Stratum, Philadelphia, 1948**

Stratum	Business Orientation Per Cent Republican†	(N)	Indeterminate Per Cent Republican†	(N)	Labor Orientation Per Cent Republican†	(N)
Upper:						
Protestant	100	(17)	75	(8)		
Catholic	100	(9)	50	(4)		
Middle:						
Protestant	94	(36)	74	(43)	13	(8)
Catholic	56	(16)	38	(55)	0	(6)
Lower:						
Protestant	71	(7)	43	(35)	25	(16)
Catholic	50	(4)	22	(37)	10	(31)

* See footnote 16.
† Of the two-party vote.

Republican party than Catholics, regardless of majority preference. In sum, the data suggest that an interplay occurs between religion, occupation, and orientation, but with occupation and orientation by no means subdued. Otherwise the eight Protestant groups would have been at the top of the Republicanism list, and the eight Catholic groups at the bottom. That there were three Protestant groups with lower Republican percentages than four of the Catholic groups, some small subcells aside, indicates that the Elmira conclusion is not strictly applicable to the observed situation in Philadelphia.

Questions 4 and 5. Here, exclusive attention is focused on the respondents who were clearly antithetical in their business-labor references. Accordingly, in Table 4 the relationship between religion and voting behavior is examined by introducing a contrived item of "pure" loyalty-and-orientation. With the data organized along such lines, it can be observed that loyal business-oriented Protestants in a combined upper and middle unit gave the Republican party 97 per cent of their votes in both the 1948 and 1952 elections. Eighty per cent of the Catholics in this category voted Republican in 1948, and this number was raised to 92 per cent in the first Eisenhower-Stevenson election. By contrast, the Republican party received scant support in 1948 from loyal labor-oriented persons in a combined middle and lower unit, regardless of religious background. They gathered some additional support from both religious groups in 1952, but even here the totals were relatively small at 25 and 21 per cent.[19] Protestant-Catholic differences were

[19] It is interesting to note that in response to an open-end question, all the ex-Democrats in the loyal labor-oriented group said that they voted Republican in 1952 because of the Korean War specifically or the international situation generally. None of them mentioned domestic issues. For an analysis of the motivations of Republican voters in the Philadelphia sample, see Glantz, "Unitary Political Behavior and Differential Political Motivation," as cited.

TABLE 4. *Percentage Republican of Two-party Vote for Protestant and Catholic Voters with Business or Labor Loyalty and Orientation, by Combined Occupational Strata, Philadelphia, 1948 and 1952*

Loyalty and Orientation	1948 Per Cent Republican	(N)	1952 Per Cent Republican	(N)
Business:				
Upper- and middle-strata Protestants	97	(38)	97	(38)
Upper- and middle-strata Catholics	80	(10)	92	(12)
Labor:				
Middle- and lower-strata Protestants	13	(15)	25	(12)
Middle- and lower-strata Catholics	4	(23)	21	(24)

negligible compared to the sharp differences between two politically cohesive socio-psychological groupings: the loyal business-oriented persons in the upper half of the table and the loyal labor-oriented persons in the lower half.

Questions 6 and 7. The one remaining test in the current study concerns the role of younger voters within each religious group. It can be noted initially that in the Elmira study, Republicanism within the middle and lower strata (but with religious affiliation uncontrolled) was more demonstrable among older voters (45 and over).[20] However, with religion controlled (but with status uncontrolled) Republicanism among Catholics was last evident in the age group from 55 upward, whereas among Protestants it was most evident in this senior age group,[21] and this raises the question as to why younger voters in the two religious groups were not as clearly differentiated. Formulated more directly in terms which can be accommodated to the available data in both the Elmira and Philadelphia studies, was there less resistance on the part of younger Protestants and Catholics to the influence of class position? Specifically, were younger Catholics in the middle class more likely to vote Republican than older Catholics, and were younger Protestants in the working class (the unionized segment of it) more likely to vote Democratic than older Protestants?

In Table 5 the affirmative Elmira data are compared to the data from the Philadelphia sample. For Catholics in the middle class, the age difference shown by the Elmira data did not materialize for Philadelphia in either 1948 or 1952, i.e., there was less Republicanism in Philadelphia among younger Catholics than older Catholics. To see whether a larger percentage of business orientation in the older group may have accounted for the disparity in Republican preference, the data for 1948 were reorganized in four-fold tables; these revealed that there was no association between business orientation and Republicanism in either group. However, non-business orientation was negatively associated with Republicanism among younger middle-class Catholics (but not among older Catholics), and this appears to be the factor responsible for their lower Republican percentage.

For Protestants in organized labor, the age difference shown by the Elmira data was duplicated in 1948 and reinforced by a wider gap in 1952, i.e., there was more Democratic voting among younger than older Protestants. To see if the greater labor orientation in the younger group may have accounted for the larger Democratic vote in the 1948 data, appropriate four-fold tables were employed. As it happened, not only was there positive association in both the younger and older groups, but it was of the same magnitude, so that the greater Democratic sympathy in the younger group can be viewed as a function of greater labor orientation. This would suggest that there was less resistance to class values on their part, and consequently more resolution to vote along class lines. Here, then, is a glimpse of how the succession of generations may affect future political behavior.

SUMMARY

When a comparative study is not designed as a carbon copy of its predecessor, either deliberately or by chance, the results are bound not only to differ in some respects but to leave the question of validity in abeyance. This is not to imply that replication itself is necessarily a definitive approach to the problem of independent verification, since replication may repeat conceptual and methodological error, but rather to stress that from the outset the current study had a high probability of yielding data dissimilar to those in the Elmira study and therefore less probability of validating the Elmira conclusions. However, despite comparability limitations, it was observed that all the Elmira conclusions were at least partially applicable to Philadelphia. These partial affirmations may be stated as follows: (1) At the middle and lower stratification levels, there was approximately twice as much Republicanism among Protestants as there was among Catholics; (2) these differences were still apparent (but not as large in some cases) when Protestants and Catholics were compared within various class-identity and politico-economic groupings; and (3) among younger and older labor-union Protestants, the younger group returned a large vote to the Democratic party.

Beyond these affirmations there was a pair

[20] Berelson *et al., op. cit.*, Chart 22, p. 60.
[21] *Ibid.*, Chart 28, p. 70.

TABLE 5. *Percentage Republican of Two-party Vote for Protestant and Catholic Voters in Selected Occupational Groups, by Age Category, Elmira, N.Y., 1948, and Philadelphia, 1948 and 1952*

	Elmira		*Philadelphia*			
			1948		*1952*	
	Per Cent Republican	(*N*)	*Per Cent Republican*	(*N*)	*Per Cent Republican*	(*N*)
Business and white collar Catholics:						
Up to 44	48	(48)	38*	(39)	57	(46)
45 and over	32	(31)	46*	(28)	64	(28)
Labor-union Protestants:						
Up to 44	48†	(65)	31‡	(13)	27	(11)
45 and over	70†	(59)	38‡	(24)	55	(22)

* Middle stratum only; does not include white-collar unionists.

† Difference is significant at the .05 level.

‡ Lower stratum only.

Source: Elmira data are adapted from Bernard B. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954, Chart 24, p. 65.

of notable disparities between the two sets of data. Whereas Berelson and associates found only half as much Republicanism among Catholics as among Protestants at the top level in Elmira, there was no difference whatever between the two religious groups at the top level in Philadelphia. Actually, this contradiction may be a reflection of different stratification arrangements, particularly when one considers the possibility of a compositional difference between the high status group in Elmira and the big-business élite in Philadelphia. At any rate, the writer would submit that the current data are evidence of big-business solidarity, with all the strategic political advantages implied by such cohesiveness.

A second disparity occurred in connection with the Elmira finding that the Republican party received more votes from younger than older Catholics in the business and white-collar group; the opposite was observed in the Philadelphia study. Moreover, when Republicanism on the part of younger Catholics in Philadelphia increased in 1952, it increased proportionately for older Catholics as well, so that the age difference remained intact.

Moreover, on the assumption that integrated loyalty and orientation are an intervening variable which leads to political cohesiveness, regardless of religious affiliation, the voting data were reorganized to include only those persons who were in such categories. In these terms, it was observed that the influence of religion was relatively unimportant, as best witnessed by political contrasts within each religious group. In 1948, for example, 97 per cent of the loyal business-oriented Protestants voted Republican, while 87 per cent of their religious fellows in the loyal labor-oriented unit voted Democratic. In similar manner, 80 per cent of the loyal business-oriented Catholics voted Republican, while 96 per cent of their religious fellows in the opposing socio-psychological unit voted Democratic. These data in particular serve to modify the general conclusion of the Elmira study, for here is an intervening variable which fails to distinguish Protestants and Catholics as voters.

23

THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF WEALTH

• GABRIEL A. ALMOND

I

It is often assumed that the typically "conservative" attitudes of wealth in matters of public policy are the simple and direct consequence of calculations of economic interest. This point of view would hold that any group of persons occupying positions of economic advantage would endeavor to employ political means to protect and aggrandize these positions. It is human and rational to do so. In broad terms human experience demonstrates a close relationship between political attitudes and economic interest. But the assertion that there is this direct automatic relationship between economic interest and political attitudes is subject to challenge on a number of grounds.

First, this theory does not account for the many significant deviations from the typically conservative attitudes of wealth. No poll of public opinion has ever resulted in unanimity among the "upper income" sample. Characteristically, there are very sizeable deviational groups sometimes larger than a third of the total. And these deviational groups are by no means homogeneous. They include both "reactionary" and "liberal," as well as other tendencies. The existence of deviational groups of this type and size plays havoc with any simple effort to account for the political attitudes of wealth, or for that matter, of any economic and social group. Second, this simple formulation is challengeable on an even more significant ground. The use of political means and influences to protect economic interest is assumed somehow to be the correct or rational attitude to take. Certainly we need search no further than the record of the past twenty years to find a rich body of evidence which demonstrates the "irrationality" of conservative policies in this era. The content of the Republican platform of 1944 is in itself proof of the irrationality of the platform of 1936. The position of the National Association of Manufacturers on Social Security legislation at the present time is tacit admission of the costly error of its earlier campaign of opposition. We shall have the occasion below to treat in greater detail this problem of the "rationality" of the political attitudes of wealth.

If political attitudes are not the simple reflection of economic interests, upon what bases do they rest? In most general terms it is maintained here that political attitudes are not the defenses of any particular value such as economic interest, but rather are a part of a total system of values and attitudes characteristic of individual persons, living in particular cultures, at specific historic periods. Attitudes and actions on questions of public policy may in part be understood as instruments of defense or aggrandizement of these value systems. But as we shall see below, these value systems vary widely from individual to individual and from culture to culture in the stress or emphasis put upon particular interests or values. They also vary widely in the extent to which persons are "attached" to their interests, or are capable of adjusting and compromising in response to threats and pressures of various kinds. As illustration, it may be pointed out that the attitudes of historic conservative groups toward their interests show considerable differences. The reaction of the British aristocracy toward the rising middle classes may be contrasted with that of the aristocracies in Russia, France, and Germany. The attitude of the British and American "capitalist" classes toward the growing political power of the smaller income groups may be contrasted with that of the similar class in Germany. In some cases the defense of "class interest" has not precluded the possibility of compromise, of flexibility. In

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other cases such defense has been rigid, combative, leaving no alternative save violence. Even within a particular country interpretations of political and economic interest within the same economic grouping vary widely. Abram Hewitt and Andrew Carnegie, four or five decades ago, recognized the value of trade union organization and collective bargaining. Weir and Girdler but a few years ago fought organization. And yet all four of these men were economically powerful, were even in the same kind of business.

Value systems, of which political attitudes are a part, vary from individual to individual within the same economic and social groupings. Social groups and classes differ from one another in their typical value tendencies and related political attitudes. Historic processes and changes modify and introduce new elements in these value and attitudinal systems. These systems of valuing and behaving have certain dimensions in which such changes and differences occur. We shall take a step toward understanding the bases and determinants of political attitudes if we first sketch out briefly some of the dimensions and elements in these value systems.

The ends or values toward which people strive differ in objective content and arrangement. Among some persons political activity is the predominating value; others are concerned primarily with economic activity; others strive after aesthetic, recreational, and scientific values and the like. Typically, individuals are concerned in varying degrees with the whole range of available objective values, so that differences in objective content and arrangement actually take the form of differences in value *priorities*. Among the wealthy in the United States, for example, there are distinguishable groups characterized by such differences. There are those to whom the accumulation of wealth and economic power is the dominant value, while political, philanthropic, religious, recreational, and other activities are subordinated in varying order. There are those to whom political activity and power take priority over economic accumulation and other possible lines of activity. There are wealthy sportsmen whose lives are largely taken up with horse-racing, yachting, fox-hunting, and the like. There are wealthy women to whom participation and leadership in exclusive social functions is the most urgent line of achievement or value. The objective content and systems of priority in values and activities are indefinitely variable, the intricate and subtle character and potentialities of which have been hardly indicated here. And yet in particular areas and historic periods, individuals, groups, and whole cultures show common trends and tendencies, reflecting the common fate in which all partake. Thus it would be generally agreed that, for our culture, economic accumulation and power are the dominant values. In the Middle Ages economic, political, intellectual, and aesthetic values were subordinated to, or at least greatly influenced by religious meanings and values. The Crusades and the Wars of the Reformation are illustrations of situations in which political and military values have been combined with religious interests and values, while the imperialist wars of recent centuries are illustrations of situations in which political and military values have been combined with economic interests and activities.

The declining importance of religion and the development of "rationalism" in the period since the Renaissance have resulted in the differentiation and "specialization" of the various spheres of value. The values of art, science, politics, economics, recreation, and the like have moved away from their earlier religious moorings and are now more or less pursued in terms of their own creative possibilities. Thus modern systems of value priorities no longer take the form of a rigid rooting of all spheres of activity in the *ultimate* value — religious salvation. But the emancipation and independent pursuit of the values of politics, economics, art, science, and recreation do not necessarily mean that the value systems of modern man now have a genuinely "rational" basis. This question leads us to a discussion of the second dimension in value and attitudinal systems — that of the relationship of the individual to his values and activities. Value systems differ not only in the order and hierarchy of objective interests, but in the nature of the attachment of the individual to these interests.

All of us in our experience have observed sharp differences in the manner in which different persons carry on their activities. We speak of some persons as "ambitious," of others as "easy-going"; some persons have "broad interests," others tend to exclude everything save

some particular all-absorbing concern such as money-making, artistic achievement, science, and so on. With considerable internal variation, of course, social groups, nations, and cultures exhibit tendencies of this kind.[1] It is suggested here that the relationship of persons to their values may vary from the pole of *compulsive striving* for particular values or value combinations, to the pole of the *rational ordering* of activity in the direction of objective goals.

This brings us to the problem of what we mean by *rationality*, a term which has become increasingly ambiguous as a consequence of developments in psychology and the social sciences. It is necessary to distinguish between the limited type of rationality characteristic of our culture which we may call "means rationality" and that type of action which Mannheim has termed "substantial rationality."[2] "Means rationality" involves the employment of conscious intelligence in the choice of means to a particular end. The selection of the end of the action results from tradition, or from other types of inner and external pressure. This is the type of rationality more or less characteristic of modern man. A few examples may make this type of behavior clear. A business man may resist price control in wartime in order to increase his profits and those of his stockholders. His rationality takes the form of techniques in opposing the application of price control for his products, or in exercising pressure to raise his prices. His use of intelligence is limited to the organization of means; he is not concerned with the consequences of raising prices for his own or for the general longer range interests. The laborer or farmer exercising pressure for higher wages or farm prices behaves in a similar fashion. The anarchist who employs his rationality quite effectively in the execution of acts of violence similarly arrives at his ends by other than rational means. It is the "irrationality" in this type of limited "rational" behavior which has brought the term itself into disrepute. That is, in an action in which intelligent choice has been limited to the selection of means the end result may be irrational or self-defeating. Thus the business man, laborer, or farmer may succeed in increasing his own prices and wages, but general inflation may soon wipe out the short-run advantages. The anarchist may succeed in blowing up an establishment, but such action, if anything, decreases rather than increases the likelihood of the realization of his anarchist goals.

"Substantial rationality," on the other hand, is a type of action in which conscious intelligent choice is employed not only in the selection and organization of means but in the selection and combination of ends as well. It implies clarity of purpose and recognition of the consequences of striving after one value for other values and of the effects of using particular means upon values.

We might look at this problem from the point of view of private life. Every one of us is continually faced with the problem of allocating our energies among competing interests — occupational success, recreation, knowledge, friendship, the service of social and political purposes, and so forth. Some of us develop into relatively "well-rounded" persons. We make adequate incomes and derive enjoyment from our work. We are capable of creative relaxation and have adequate personal relations. We retain our curiosity and interest in understanding what goes on around us; we have a capacity for appreciating aesthetic creation and performance; we may even pursue scientific or artistic interests with more than a layman's skill. To the extent that we actually develop these various potentialities, balancing them and combining them in such a fashion as to maximize and broaden our satisfaction, we have achieved a "substantially rational" economy of our energies. But how many of us actually achieve this genuine fulfilment of potentiality? Is it not more typical for most of us to strive compulsively for economic accumulation or security, for occupational distinction, for social legitimacy and supremacy at the same time that we permit our potentialities for friendship, our curiosity, our capacity for aesthetic appreciation to become perfunctory, or to atrophy en-

[1] See, among others, Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston, 1934); Ralph Linton and Abram Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society* (New York, 1939); Margaret Mead, Editor, *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples* (New York, 1937).

[2] Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in An Age of Reconstruction* (New York, 1940), pp. 51 ff.; for a general classification of types of action see Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1925), Vol. 1, pp. 12 ff.

tirely? To be sure many of us compete successfully for money and power and for occupational and social distinction; we employ means rationally for these purposes. But how many of us in seriousness and not with irony actually are capable of viewing ourselves and our activities and values with detachment, to say nothing of taking the further step of withdrawing at least in part from the arena of meaningless competitiveness in order to arrive at a set of purposes and activities genuinely growing out of our individual needs and capacities? If it is true that the people of our culture tend to have this compulsive non-intelligent relationship to their general values and activities, it would also follow that their political attitudes typically would have a compulsive non-intelligent base. For example, many wealthy men have excluded everything from their lives save the compulsive striving for wealth and economic power. Throughout their lives they have been driven by this all-absorbing concern. How could the activities of such persons with regard to public issues involving their wealth and economic power have anything but a similarly compulsive basis? If the general relationship of an individual to his interests is compulsive in character, political attitudes and actions, which are but instruments in the larger value system, partake of the same imperative tension.

A number of psychologists and social scientists[3] have endeavored to throw light on the tendencies in our culture which impair the capacity for thoroughgoing rationality. Karen Horney stresses the importance of competition as a factor in producing the typically hostile "power-striving" in our culture:

> The psychic result of this situation (competitiveness) is a diffuse hostile tension between individuals. Everyone is the real or potential competitor of everyone else. This situation is clearly apparent among members of the same occupational group, regardless of strivings to be fair or of attempts to camouflage by polite considerateness. It must be emphasized, however, that competitiveness, and the potential hostility that accompanies it, pervades all human relationships.[4]

[3] For a bibliography of some of the historical, sociological, and psychological literature dealing with these problems, see Mannheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 434 ff.

[4] Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1937), p. 284.

It should be pointed out, however, that it is not competition in general, but rather the particular form which competition takes in our culture, which has the consequences described by Horney. When competition takes the form of a sound emulation between persons in which success is measured according to standards of constructive accomplishment and is governed by generally accepted rules, a general impairment of human relationships need not result. But our type of competition undermines dignity and self-esteem. Those who gain wealth, or distinction, by whatever the means (within more or less "legal" limits) have *succeeded;* those who "fail" suffer "not only economic insecurity, but also loss of prestige and all kinds of emotional frustration."[5] Persons are not dealt with in terms of their peculiar potentialities and capacities, but rather are judged according to the extent to which they have been able to realize these socially imposed goals. The need for "success" in these narrow cultural terms is imperative, compulsive; the fear of failure is a constant threat of rejection, of utter worthlessness.

> All these factors together — competitiveness and its potential hostilities between fellow-beings, fears, diminished self-esteem — result psychologically in the individual feeling that he is isolated. Even when he has many contacts with others, even when he is happily married, he is emotionally isolated. Emotional isolation is hard for anyone to endure: it becomes a calamity, however, if it coincides with apprehensions and uncertainties about one's self.[6]

Erich Fromm[7] similarly stresses individualistic competitiveness and the consequent isolation, hostility, and apprehension as the underlying qualities of character contributing to the "irrationality" of modern man. He describes the rôle played by the Protestant Reformation in dissolving the "organic" social ties of the Middle Ages and placing the individual on his own feet in competition with his fellow-man for religious salvation, for economic and political power, and for other values. But he points out that the individualism of modern urban-industrial society does not by any means provide a genuine positive freedom and individuation. Modern man, Fromm argues,

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 285.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 286.

[7] *Escape From Freedom* (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1941).

. . . has been freed from traditional authorities and has become an "individual," but at the same time he has become isolated, powerless, and an instrument of purposes outside of himself, alienated from himself and others; furthermore, that this state undermines his self, weakens and frightens him, and makes him ready for submission to new kinds of bondage. Positive freedom on the other hand is identical with the full realization of the individual's potentialities, together with his ability to live actively and spontaneously.[8]

Franz Alexander, though placing greater stress on the allegedly "instinctive" character of this competitiveness, nevertheless points out that "in a free and competitive society we are at the same time friends and rivals; we live in an 'antagonistic cooperation' with our fellow man. Our conflicting social standards contribute more than anything else to that emotional insecurity which is found as the most common basis of neurotic disturbance."[9]

II

Before we undertake to illustrate the relationship between cultural influences, character traits,[10] and the conservative political attitude, it will be useful to give the concept of "conservatism" a more precise definition. Conservatism is to be distinguished from the general phenomenon of acquiescence in the "legitimate" social structure. Under "normal" or "equilibrium" circumstances the typical attitude for most persons and groups is one of acceptance of the prevailing distribution of power and opportunities, as long as habitual expectations are fulfilled. This general attitude of acquiescence in the "legitimate" structure of society has been termed "traditionalism."[11] "Conservatism" on the other hand is more than passive acquiescence in the existing social order. It is the use of political means in the active defense of that order primarily by those who enjoy the objectively favored social position. Among the characteristics of the conservative political attitude we have chosen three qualities for comment. These are (1) general unimaginativeness and fear of the unfamiliar, (2) biasing and interest-oriented selection of the data adduced to the support of political judgments, (3) elements of flexibility and expediency.

A classic expression of the conservative's fear of the unfamiliar is to be found in the speech of Elihu Root on the Seventeenth Amendment in the United States Senate:

> Let me first state the reasons why I am opposed to the change in the matter of electing senators. It is not wise that the people of the United States should contract the habit of amending the Constitution. Stability in our government is a matter of vital concern. . . . We enter upon a field of doubt, of new discussions, the end of which no man can foresee, when we begin to tamper with the delicately adjusted machinery to which we have been so long accustomed and which we now understand so well.[12]

Chauncey Depew exhibited a similar dread of change in the same debate and declared that "in this proposition we are called upon to disregard the overwhelming lessons of the past and enter upon an untried experiment, to adopt a theory which opens the door for innumerable possibilities of danger to the sovereignty of the states and wise conservatism in the administration of government."[13]

What we will endeavor to show in the material which follows is that this dread of the unfamiliar, of experimentation and change, grows out of the typically compulsive attachment of individuals to their values and routines. The rational consideration of broad alternatives in public policy comes into conflict with an im-

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 270.

[9] "New Trends in Psychotherapy," *New Republic*, Vol. 112, pp. 53–55 (1945).

[10] The character sketches which follow have been taken from a larger study of the social-psychological factors in the political attitudes of wealth. It should be stressed that while a larger number of biographical studies preceded the formulation of the tentative conclusions advanced in this paper, no claim is made that these generalizations have been conclusively tested. In so new a field as this the data are fragmentary and frequently of doubtful reliability. Nevertheless certain general connections may become apparent even from a small number of case studies. In addition, many hypotheses may be formulated for more precise future testing.

[11] Karl Mannheim, "Das Konservative Denken," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 57, pp. 68–112, 470–495 (1927).

[12] Elihu Root, *Addresses on Government and Citizenship* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1916), p. 261.

[13] Quoted in Joseph B. Gilder, Editor, *Life and Later Speeches of Chauncey Depew* (New York, Cassell Publishing Co., 1894), p. x.

perative need to maintain one's advantaged position in the existing political and social order, one's relatively rigid attachment to the familiar and the "known."

As far as the biasing of data and of argument is concerned, the literature of political debate is rich in illustration. Here we only intend to stress that this selection and "stacking of the cards" cannot be understood in terms of the moral categories of honesty or dishonesty. What appears to happen is that the need to defend the existing order of things is so compulsive that the minds of typical wealthy persons are emotionally closed to data and argument which challenge the political defenses of their interests and consequently the interests themselves. The capacity for objectivity cannot co-exist with a compulsive need to come out with a conservative conclusion.

At the same time modern conservatism, particularly that of the United States and England, exhibits elements of mutability, flexibility, expediency. Chauncey Depew, lobbyist *par excellence* against the regulation of railroads, illustrates this factor of limited rationality in his autobiography:

> Among the most important of the many problems during Mr. Vanderbilt's presidency [of New York Central] was the question of railway commissions, both in National and State governments. In my professional capacity of general counsel, and in common with representatives of other railroads I delivered argumentative addresses against them. The discussions converted me and I became convinced of their necessity.[14]

The mobility in our culture and the demands made upon individual persons, particularly the successful, for the intelligent use of means in constantly changing situations accounts for the fact that the prevailing attitudes among the wealthy, as well as other groups, are capable of modification, even though marked by rigidity. The anxiety and hostility provoked by threats to the interests of the conservative are not of such intensity as to exclude the possibility of adjustment. These feelings affect the character of the adjustment, but do not preclude it. They exclude a constructive, rational adjustment, but do not exclude acceptance of a changed situation insofar as the change does not call for too great an adjustment at too rapid a tempo. The conservative's capacity for orientation is lamed rather than destroyed. It is typical for him to oppose a policy change and yet, after he has been able to reorient himself with regard to the new situation, he may positively accept the change, or merely take it for granted. But the next policy change will typically find him in a similar condition of disorientation. In other words, in the conservative the intensity of unconscious anxiety and compulsion is not so great as to eliminate the possibility of adaptation to changes in his policy position, but his adjustment is unstable, involving serious limits on rationality.

If our hypothesis is correct that conservatism is the expression in the political sphere of a compulsive non-intelligent striving for socially imposed goals, particularly those of economic and occupational success, then we should find the conservative attitude associated with certain general character traits. Broadly speaking these general socially-induced character traits include, among others, (1) compulsive competitiveness, (2) impairment of spontaneity and capacity for affection and friendship, (3) general apprehension or anxiety. The biographical material cited below is fragmentary in character, but we are limited to the materials at hand, and for the purpose of the preliminary testing of hypotheses, such admittedly tentative formulations are justifiable.

The character of the magazine and newspaper publisher Frank Munsey is of special interest to us. The positive quality of Munsey's personality was his relentless, exclusive ambition. The negative qualities were his loneliness, his incapacity for friendship and love. Munsey, more clearly than our other cases of conservatives, fulfilled the logic of our cultural standards and paid the costs. Everything — friendship, family, aesthetic, intellectual, and religious values — were perfunctory or meaningless for him. The only meaningful values were wealth, power, and social esteem. In later life he spoke bitterly of his loneliness to waiters and subordinates whom he had known for a long time. He was pathetically eager for the slightest sign of non-instrumental warmth, but could never trust such responses, not because they were not offered to him, but because he had no personal confidence in his own or anyone's capacity for spontaneous friendship. His withdrawn, com-

[14] *My Memories of Eighty Years* (New York, Scribner, 1924), p. 184.

pulsive character is well described by his biographer: "Always he had been alone by temperament and choice, an outsider looking in, compelled jealously and sometimes plaintively to find different interests."[15]

The spirit of his business activity was single-minded, ruthless rationality of the limited type. In the newspaper world he was an outsider, referred to as a "newspaper butcher." He had little capacity for feeling and loyalty to any enterprise. He himself boasted that newspapers had to be organized like "a chain of grocery stores." The compulsive character of his activity is described by a remark of an acquaintance of his: "He's the kind that you never know what he's going to do tomorrow, but you know damned well he's going to do something."[16]

Munsey is an excellent illustration of the conservative type in another sense. Not only was he primarily moved by a compulsive need for power and prestige, but his striving after this end was guided by rationality of the limited type. If success required some modification of his policy, he was capable of such modification. Policy and values (other than personal success) were secondary, were means, and were consequently modifiable within limits. Even his relation to religious values was governed by this end of personal success. Munsey said of his religious beliefs: "I came to believe that whoever created the world has stepped aside, and I cannot see that life has any meaning at all for me at present. When I gave up my belief in immortality, it took all the starch out of me."[17] Even religion had been meaningful to Munsey only insofar as it had meant the personal assurance of immortality.

The key to the understanding of Munsey's conservative policy position is to be found in the intense and compulsive striving after "success." His capacity for rationality was exhausted in organizing his activities, modifying his use of means in the interest of achieving his imperative compulsive aim. The self-defeating irrationality of his value position grew out of his repression of persistent needs for warmth, affection, and constructive satisfaction which he was forced to exclude because of the destructive, hostile character of his ambition. The product of this conflict was the empty and meaningless character of his life and the cynicism and bitterness of his old age. He viewed the world with suspicion growing out of his own hostility and expectation of retaliation. His newspaper associates spoke of his "circular insanity," meaning his periodic apparently pointless rages. This seems to have been Munsey's way of handling the overpowering anxiety which accumulated from his destructive, hostile way of dealing with people. In his relations with fellow magnates he was sometimes idolizing but never without fear. Morgan was his "god" of whom he said: "But I was always afraid of him. It seemed to me he always had a knife sharpened and ready for me, if I ever made a mistake, to plunge it in my back. I remember how Charles W. Morse — who also came from Maine — was caught over-certifying a check and the bankers put him behind the bars."[18]

Although more flexible and with a broader set of interests, the character of the conservative Republican Elihu Root exhibits trends similar to those of Frank Munsey. Root came of a richer cultural background. His father was a professor of mathematics at Hamilton College. Root had interests outside of his own personal success. It should be pointed out that in the sphere of foreign policy Root was an ardent internationalist. But clearly in his attitudes on the great domestic political and constitutional decisions of his day he was consistently conservative, exhibiting all the limitations and narrowness characteristic of this point of view. Root is described as an ambitious, but shy and rather withdrawn man. In one of his intimate letters to Theodore Roosevelt, Root, then Secretary of State, remarked: "There are some things which men (not being dagoes) can't say to each other easily, especially when they belong to the race with whom 'How do you do, sir' is an expression of affection."[19] Root once remarked: "I used to hate to say what I wanted. I remember my grandmother asking me once if I wanted a piece of pie and

[15] George Britt, *Forty Years Forty Millions* (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1935), p. 167.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 290.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 289.
[19] Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root* (New York, Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938), Vol. 1, p. 32.

I was so shy that I said I didn't care. She answered that if I didn't care I needn't have it; so I missed my piece of pie."[20]

The intensity of Root's ambition is reflected in a letter written to him by his mother at a time when his name was being mentioned in the papers as one of "Boss" Tweed's attorneys:

> We have watched the papers very anxiously since you were here. We have not learned that your friend of the "Ring" has yet needed an advocate. You know, my dear, that I have confidence in your integrity. Do you remember that you once said to me that "every man had his price"? I only hope and pray that your price may be so high that even the arch-fiend himself cannot reach it.[21]

And in a later letter on the same matter, Root's mother wrote:

> He [Root's father] thought that you were on more dangerous ground as a test of your moral power than ever before. He hoped that you were living wisely for the future. . . . You will, my dear, be ever true to your higher nature. You will not let your ambitions make you forget what life is in its noblest, most important aspect. Do not neglect that Book which is the only safe light to your feet and lamp to your path. . . .[22]

Root's conservatism appears to have rested upon an internal and external balance of forces. A policy of unprincipled ruthlessness and disregard of others might have grown out of intense resentment and hostility. But his family life had many positive elements, so that he did not become completely embittered. At the same time both his parents, his mother particularly, were marked by strong and dignified religious feeling and moral standards; and these positive standards held Root's ambition within limits. Somehow his conduct, while giving him power and prestige, had also to include moral elements. Embittered, irreconcilable reaction was therefore not possible. On the other hand, liberalism was similarly impossible for Root. To take a broad view of social and political problems involving spontaneous feeling would have hampered the fulfilment of pressing aspirations for power and prestige. And against such spontaneity his emotional withdrawal was an adequate protection.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

Aside from these subjective obstacles in the way of embittered reaction and liberalism, Root's choice of a career inhibited the development of such policy deviations. He did not become a business man, but a corporation lawyer and statesman, and in both these fields expediential considerations blocked the expression of either reaction or liberalism. As a corporation lawyer, he would, no doubt, have lost his great clients if he had permitted the pressure of his inner moral feelings to lead him into too warm and sympathetic a reaction to the aspirations of the masses of the population. As a politician either reaction or liberalism would have hampered his ambition. A liberal could not have comfortably fitted into the Republican Party of Tom Platt and Boies Penrose. He could not have hoped for a long career of safe and prominent office-holding. At the same time a reactionary would have had a similarly unstable political career in a state with such a large urban population as New York.

Frank Munsey's conservative policy position was a relatively stable, consistent thing. In his external behavior he was unable to permit any doubt to obtrude to the surface. In this respect his compulsive political attitudes were of a piece with his general compulsiveness. Elihu Root's conservatism was more complicated, combining an active internationalism with conservatism on domestic issues. Conservatism may also be associated with instability, may be full of doubt and dissatisfaction. But to the extent that this is true, the capacity for conservative leadership is impaired. Dwight Morrow, the Morgan partner, United States Senator from New Jersey and Ambassador to Mexico, illustrates this type of unstable conservatism.

In practice Dwight Morrow played a predominantly conservative rôle. In private communication to friends he admitted to doubt. Speaking of the campaign of 1912, he wrote:

> If we drift into a conservative and a radical party, my surroundings and historical study will lead me toward the conservative party, especially if we should be fortunate enough to get a conservative party which would put the emphasis upon the performance of duties rather than upon the protection of rights. I am not sure, however, that a conservative who really wanted progress would not be of more service in a radical party trying to hold that party back. . . . Probably a man that was either a radical or a conservative during the

whole of his lifetime would be on the wrong side about half the time.[23]

Whereas for Elihu Root, striving for power tended to be the most important dynamism in his character, for Morrow the main driving forces seem to have been striving for security and affection. Amassing wealth was more important to him than power, though there was always present in him an only partially fulfilled intention for leadership. His biographer states that he often remarked that after his wealth reached seven figures, he would leave the business world and teach history.

> But being a practical man and one who had experienced the cramping anxieties of poverty, he was determined to harvest the crop which, at such risks and with such endurance, he had sown. . . . He was determined to secure for himself, for his own family, as for his brothers and sisters, a tolerable financial independence. Only when this primary objective had been achieved would he indulge in the luxuries of an academic career.[24]

Any sharp, or direct attack, any leading political position would have too seriously threatened Morrow's need for warmth and affectionate response. As it was, every change of occupation on Morrow's part precipitated moods of depression and melancholy. It was this fear of the unfamiliar, of dealing with challenging problems that Morrow's biographer describes as his "sensitivity." "To the end of his life he was subject to moods of nervous diffidence when the sunshine of his self-assertive gaiety would be suddenly blotted out."[25] Morrow, apparently, was continually in need of reassurance. Anne Morrow Lindbergh, his daughter, writes of a practice of his which caused considerable strain in the family. This was his frequent embarrassment of his children by asking them whether they loved their mother better than himself. In his politics Morrow consequently was unable to assert himself. He moved with the drift of his social milieu, always hoping to resolve his conflicts but apparently never able to accomplish this.

Charles Evans Hughes represented a quite different type of political attitude — a peculiar combination of conservatism and liberalism. Hughes pre-eminently was a legalist and constrained within the structure of our institutions. Genuine liberalism as used in this context requires a capacity for warmth and sympathy, and for the advocacy of measures in which there is a direct reaction to injustice. Hughes was capable of acting on the basis of legal principle with complete literalness regardless of the nature of the interests involved. But he had little capacity for insight and imaginativeness. Hughes was an extremely ambitious man, with a reserve that gave him the reputation of being a "human icicle." His biographer writes:

> . . . his severe early training has fundamentally affected his character. Possibly it explains that reserve which many find today in the exterior man; possibly it explains also that toughness of moral fibre, that hatred of compromise, that conciseness and directness of mind, which Mr. Hughes has always shown.[26]

Hughes' character was admirably suited for a legal career in an era of relative stability. But in an era which called for the application of legal principles to new situations he had difficulty in adapting himself. This is illustrated most clearly in his position on the first AAA measure. Justice Stone saw clearly, in his dissent, that it was not the province of the Court to examine into the motives of legislation. If a measure was a tax, and if the tax was for the "general welfare," then it was constitutional. Hughes voted with the conservative majority on the older precedent of the child-labor tax in *Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.*, although he later moved to the other side in the Social Security cases. He was more bound to precedent than the consistently liberal judges, and less capable of a creative judicial approach. At the same time, his compelling need to make correct applications of legal principle, regardless of the character of the contenders and the issues involved, made it impossible for him to fall into the group of conservative justices who were mainly concerned with finding plausible rationalizations to justify the position of the business interests of the country.

These brief, fragmentary sketches only raise the problem of the relationship between general character traits and political attitudes. They do, however, suggest a connection between what we assert here is a typical forcing of char-

[23] Harold Nicolson, *Dwight Morrow* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935), p. 121.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 103.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 137.
[26] Burton J. Hendrick, "Governor Hughes," *McClure's Magazine*, Vol. 30, p. 523 (1908).

acter development into the grooves of compulsive ambition, accompanied by a general impairment of the capacity for creativeness and imagination in all types of relationships on the one hand, and conservative political attitudes on the other. Other cases of wealthy conservatives may be cited in which, with individual variations, similar trends and connections are to be noted. Political attitudes partake of the same spirit as is to be found in the total value systems of individuals and groups. A culture which stresses competitiveness for economic power, for occupational "success," and which correspondingly undermines human relationships and capacities for creativity and rationality in relation to the broad scope of possible values, undermines similarly the capacity for rational, constructive, problem-solving attitudes on political questions. The same trends noted among the wealthy and powerful in our culture are to be found among other groups and elements. The important difference, of course, is that among the wealthy and economically powerful, this type of value rigidity attaches to the maintenance of the existing system of power and opportunities, because the wealthy have been able to achieve objectively favored positions through more intense competitiveness, skill, inclination, and the like.

It has been our contention that the character traits described above were products of cultural influences. These influences have their greatest effect in early childhood when basic character tendencies and qualities are shaped. The general cultural influences of individualistic competitiveness take the form in early family life of an underlying hostility in the various relationships. On the behavioral level this impairment of family relations is manifested in an incapacity on the part of the parents to express a genuine and stable affection toward the children, in sibling and parent-child rivalry, and in the many ways of "covering up" these underlying attitudes, such as parental overprotection. The "ideology" of child-training may have a religious or a secular content, more typically both for the historic period for which we have biographical material. "Stern disciplinarianism," the inhibition of the free expression of feeling and emotion, the inculcation of compulsive ambition and of repressive religious attitudes are all parts of this indoctrination.

Information available describing the early character development of some of the above wealthy conservatives may illustrate these relationships. Elihu Root's father is described as having been a quite restrained and aloof person. An amusing story is told of the elder Root's behavior on the occasion of the return of Root's older brother from a long and dangerous trip out west.

> The college boys, who had made bets as to whether "Cube" [the father's nickname] would show any signs of emotion when he greeted his son were gathered in the near distance as the coach rattled up the village street and "Cube" junior descended. "Cube" walked up to him, put out his hand and inquired evenly, "How do you do, sir?"[27]

The general atmosphere of Root's early family life had in it strong elements of religious repressiveness. There was little possibility for the expression of enthusiasm and of emotion. At the same time there is evidence that the small income and high standards of the family resulted in a continuous humiliating struggle to make both ends meet and keep up "appearances." Root reacted to these experiences by developing a withdrawn, compulsive ambition accompanied by a certain cynicism, but certainly not complete rejection, toward the moral standards advocated by his mother and father. "Every man has his price."

The influence of religion in the life of Chauncey Depew was more specifically Calvinist. He writes of the religious attitude of his mother:

> Several times in my life I have met with heavy misfortunes and what seemed irreparable losses. I have returned home to find my mother with wise advice and suggestions ready to devote herself to the reconstruction of my fortune, and to brace me up. She always said what she thoroughly believed: "My son, this which you think so great a calamity is really divine discipline. The Lord has sent it to you for your own good, because in His infinite wisdom He saw that you needed it. I am absolutely certain that if you submit instead of repining and protesting, if you will ask with faith and proper spirit for guidance and help, they both will come to you and with greater blessings than you ever had before."[28]

Dwight Morrow's father is described as "tenacious, precise and uncompromising," his mother as "practical, sharp, shrewd and acute." Morrow always spoke of the rigidly strict at-

[27] Jessup, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 32.

[28] Chauncey M. Depew, "Leaves from My Autobiography," *Scribner's Magazine*, Vol. 70, p. 518 (1921).

mosphere of his upbringing and of the "tragedy and glory of a teacher's life." His father was a professor of languages with a meagre salary. Morrow's compulsive need for economic and affectional security grew out of this repressive religious and aloof upbringing, combined with humiliating economic insecurity.

Charles Evans Hughes' father, a teacher of classics and later a Baptist minister, is described as "conscientious, devoutly religious, thoroughly orthodox . . . with firmly fixed ideas on the training of children."[29] When Hughes' father found his son reading some fairy tales, he intervened and "presented his son with a complete set of *Chambers' Miscellany*, and over these eight bulky volumes of carefully digested information and selected literature the growing boy constantly browsed."[30] At an early age Hughes composed sermons on the various Baptist dogmas.

> Until his tenth year he always recited his lessons standing, and like most children had at first considerable difficulty in keeping still. . . . One day, with no suggestion from his mother, who was hearing his lessons, he announced that he had found a method of controlling his rebellious members. He selected a seam in the carpet, placed his toes firmly against it, shut his eyes tightly together, and assumed a determined soldier-like pose. From that day Mr. Hughes has had entire command of himself.[31]

E. H. Harriman, a ruthless opponent of trade unionism, was described by one of his associates as a "cold-blooded little cuss . . . with a vein of cynicism that kept friendship away." His biographer describes him as having lacked in "gratitude, sympathy, and sensitiveness. His reputation was diamond-like-hard, cold, cruel and brilliant. . . . His manner was brusque and sharp, because people wasted his time, his invaluable time."[32] Harriman's father was an Episcopalian minister who was frequently without regular employment and had an uncertain income. The elder Harriman is described as having been "cold and austere in manner"; his mother was from an old family, excessively conscious of her "social superiority," and haughty and arrogant in her relations to neighbors and associates.

[29] Hendrick, *loc. cit.*, p. 521.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 522.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 524.
[32] H. J. Eckenrode and P. W. Edmunds, *E. H. Harriman* (New York, Greenberg, 1933), pp. 221 ff.

It is not within the scope of this study to do more than cite the relationship between Protestant and particularly Calvinist asceticism and repression and the typical trends and tendencies and associated character forming influences of modern capitalist society. Max Weber in his classic studies of the relationship between economic ethics and religion was the first social scientist to develop this connection in the vast context of comparative religion.[33]

Erich Fromm deals more deeply with the emotional and characterological aspects of this problem. In the lives of wealthy conservatives we have been able to observe that the inculcation of competitiveness and the associated impairment of the capacity for spontaneity and creativity may result from religious influences or secular influences, more typically from both. The secular influence takes the form of the inculcation of a compulsive need for economic and occupational "success," accompanied by the repression of tendencies toward a broad humane development of the personality. The religious influences also inculcate a need for "success" (although in a "morally" limited form), which is taken as a sign of "Grace," and similarly inhibit other value potentialities. Both influences have in common the tendency to undermine and impair human capacities for genuine friendship and security and to set individuals in a relationship of hostile tension with one another. It should be noted that the declining influence of religion has been associated with a rationalization and intensification of this competitiveness through the elimination of religious moral limitations, and the "other-worldliness" characteristic of the religious spirit.

III

In the material which follows an endeavor will be made to show how these cultural and family influences occurring in different form and with a deviational content combine to produce deviational political attitudes among the wealthy. Although the reality is full of fine and subtle shadings, for our purposes it will be sufficient to treat those deviations commonly referred to as "reaction" and "liberalism." So little information is available on those wealthy persons who have supported and participated in radical movements, that rather than engage in

[33] *Gessammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen, 1920), particularly Vol. 1.

pure speculation we have considered it advisable to leave this phase of the problem to possible future researches.

The character traits of the reactionary appear to differ from those of the conservative mainly in the intensity of anxiety, resentment, and other negative feelings underlying his entire adjustment. The wealthy conservative appears to possess somewhat more than the "normal" amount of hostility and competitiveness, but by no means as much as the reactionary. The wealthy reactionary, on the other hand, stands out as a destructive and ruthless person. He is uncompromising in politics, in business, and in private life. He is quite incapable of discussion and persuasion; arguments are used as weapons, if argument is permitted at all. His efforts unconsciously tend to force issues into a violent outcome. His need to maintain his value position against all opposition is imperative. He is typically a dominant, lonely person, without friends and without warmth. He cannot deal with individuals as equals. To him are denied the values of intimacy, and only the peremptory struggle for power, wealth, and prestige has meaning. His life is largely subordinated to this end.

According to modern psychiatric standards the reactionary is an emotionally sick person. But his illness is not of such a character as to immobilize him. The expression of his destructive ambition is not seriously blocked by religious or moral standards. And although there are underlying feelings of weakness the outgoing behavior is strong, destructive, fanatic. There are persons who possess these character traits in common with reactionaries, but who are not reactionaries. For lack of opportunity, energy, skill, and inclination, many such persons operate within more restricted non-political arenas. Many of the sectaries of the left, lacking in the opportunity, skill, or inclination required for the acquisition of wealth, possess these traits in common with the reactionaries whom they most despise.

Although there are some cases of wealthy reactionaries who have engaged in politics, more typically the wealthy reactionary influences politics indirectly. The reason for this typically indirect relationship of wealthy reactionaries to the political sphere is that conditions of democratic competition are not normally adapted to these extremist tendencies. They are too rigid in their approach to policy questions to be able to find compromises and adjust themselves to shifts in public opinion. They tend to seek out situations in which their need for domination may be more unequivocally expressed. They affect politics rather by precipitating and intensifying conflict situations, or by giving financial support to political reactionaries or to reactionary organizations.

In the fragmentary material available to us it appears that these extremist, uncompromising tendencies result from a greater impairment of family life and family relations than is the case among conservatives. The degree of instability, conflict, and rejection is far more damaging in effect. The evidence which is available shows partially or totally broken family situations, disinterested, exploitative, or embittered parents, and a general atmosphere of humiliation and rejection.

It should be noted that this impairment of family relations has a special meaning in a culture in which the "family" plays so important a rôle in providing emotional support and security. In other cultures the immediate family is merged in a larger kinship group or community. Children are not so dependent upon the immediate father and mother. There are a variety of substitutes available, and the immediate community provides a greater emotional support than that in our culture. For us, if immediate family life is broken, there is generally no alternative save to bear the emotional consequences.

Family life may suffer this degree of impairment through a number of influences. The parents may have been deviationally embittered, ruthless, or exploitative persons. Or special economic and social factors may intensify tendencies of this type. It is important to keep in mind that these are differences in degree and, given the present inadequate data, any formulation is tentative and subject to further consideration and investigation.

Jay Gould's reactionary attitude may be best deduced from his actions as one of the major corrupters of New York politics and as one of the extremist employers responsible for several of the destructive riots over labor disputes in the decades after the Civil War. Throughout the biographical material discussing Gould there is not the slightest evidence showing generosity of character, or anything save impersonal ruthlessness. It is reported that he cheated his first employer in a real estate transaction.

He forced his first partner out of business, an action which is said to have contributed to his partner's suicide. In the Erie Railroad conflict, Gould outdid Vanderbilt in his corruption of the New York State legislature.

The record of Gould's background is not detailed but what evidence there is clearly shows an unstable and embittering childhood. A biographer writes:

> His father was a bitter failure, a fighter of lost causes, a hard man beaten by a harder soil. . . . Jay's father was the last of a fighting line, and the anti-rent wars, then raging in Delaware County, claimed a great deal of his attention. He was the leader in the agitation, to the neglect of the farm and his children's schooling. Jay suffered for lack of actual necessaries. From the beginning life was a continual struggle, a preparation not designed to develop generosity and consideration for others.[34]

Gould's mother died when he was a child and he was in continual conflict with his stepmother.

Developing in this hostile and unstable atmosphere Gould became aloof and ruthlessly ambitious. A schoolmate of his wrote:

> In his early family life he was in a measure different from boys in general in that he did not enter into the sports and games of the ordinary schoolboys. He was quiet and rather aloof. He seldom engaged in the "sports of the school." Said John Burroughs, "because he was proud and exclusive, and would not put himself on an equality with other boys. I frequently went home with him and stayed all night, but he would never go home with me."[35]

Apparently there were few relieving elements in the background of Jay Gould. He could not gain approval from his parents by fulfilling moral and intellectual standards as did Hughes; nor could he gain response by direct pleading for affection as did Dwight Morrow. Root's parents, at least, provided a standard of moral dignity and honor. But the picture we get of Gould's childhood is one of relatively unrelieved rejection and conflict.

The first John D. Rockefeller appears to have been a similarly ruthless, withdrawn person. Unlike Gould, he was not directly involved in labor disputes; nor was he implicated in political corruption. But, although all kinds of pressure were brought to bear upon him, he refused to take any action in the labor controversies culminating in the Ludlow massacre which occurred on Rockefeller-owned property. "Rockefeller's mind had a trick, not an uncommon one, of closing up tight to the logic or appeal in his enemy's argument the moment that enemy rose to assert his own rights by the use of those weapons which Rockefeller himself employed to protect his own. He was for making no concessions whatever to organized labor."[36] At the time of the Homestead strike Rockefeller wrote a letter to Frick "approving his cause and expressing sympathy."[37] In his own labor policy Rockefeller was paternalistic, paying good wages and providing comparatively good working conditions. But he could not tolerate trade union organization and collective bargaining, or any type of public regulation and control of business.

Rockefeller in some ways even more than Munsey was completely preoccupied with "business." Munsey regretted his incapacity for relaxation and the pursuit of other values. In Rockefeller this destruction of other potentialities was viewed as a religious virtue. Aside from his Sunday School teaching and official position in his church, he had no other interest. "He joined no societies. He was a member of no clubs. He played no games. [Golf came much later after his retirement.] He went to no plays. He attended no concerts or lectures."[38] He rarely smiled, and "never laughed." His impassivity was only broken by successful turns of fortune when he would "throw up his hat, kick his heels, and hug his informant." On one occasion, after a successful deal he is reported to have hugged himself and said: "I'm bound to be rich! Bound to be rich; bound to be rich."

Rockefeller had an extremely disturbed childhood. His father was a travelling medical "quack." Early in his marriage he is reported to have been involved in a scandal which required him to leave his home county forever. The family moved to Cleveland to be nearer the father's area of operations as a "cancer specialist" and seller of other nostrums. The father was, apparently, a boastful, cunning fellow with a sense of responsibility toward his

[34] Robert Irving Warshaw, *Jay Gould* (New York, Greenberg, 1928), pp. 18–19.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[36] John T. Flynn, *God's Gold* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1932), p. 459.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 458.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

family which was limited to an uncertain financial support. He remained away from home for long periods of time. The picture one gets of Rockefeller's mother is of a deeply hurt and humiliated woman, at odds with her own family over her husband, and lacking the moral support of her husband for most of her life. There was little affection among the Rockefeller children. John D. was superior and withdrawn and continually in conflict with Frank who is described as "wild and passionate."

Like Munsey, in later life Rockefeller mellowed somewhat, took the advice of public relations counsellors, and engaged in large-scale and useful philanthropies. He changed his tone in his Sunday School lectures, urging: "The kind of man I like is one that lives for his fellows — the one that lives in the open, contented with his lot and trying to bestow all the good he can on humanity."[39]

The record of William Randolph Hearst on questions of public policy is so well and vividly known that there is little need to demonstrate his reactionary tendencies. It is possibly not so well known that Hearst had a "liberal" period in his life. In the Democratic Convention of 1904 he received 263 votes mainly from Western Populist delegates. This "liberal" period occurred at a time when Hearst had hopes of a political career. The insincerity and expediential character of his early liberalism is suggested by the fact that Hearst was "bought off" from attacking a railroad company in his early days in San Francisco. In general this "liberal" phase can be understood as a kind of unstable anti-authoritarianism which Hearst rapidly sloughed off as soon as it became apparent that he had little to hope for from the electorate and the political organizations.

Hearst's father, George Hearst, was a self-made millionaire mine and real estate owner. He was "loud, flamboyant, outwardly genial; inwardly acquisitive and ruthless with a turn for knavish practices. . . ."[40] The father spent much of his time away from home, and had little confidence in, or affection for his son. His mother gave in to his every whim, was extravagantly over-indulgent and overprotective. This background, coupled with Hearst's physical awkwardness and high voice, combined to produce a person lacking in self-confidence, isolated, resentful, and fearful in his relations with others. From childhood on he was accustomed to winning "friends" through his money.

Hearst's destructiveness and sensationalism as a newspaper owner were the counterpart in adult life of his childhood tantrums and destructive mischievousness. Hearst was permitted to get away with outrageous conduct as a boy. When a dancing teacher came to his home at his mother's request, Hearst turned the garden hose on him. He later broke the windows of the dancing school and thereby made sure that the master would not accept him as a pupil. While on a trip to Paris he and a friend deliberately started a fire in a hotel room for the excitement of calling in the Paris fire department. At Harvard, Hearst kept a live alligator in his room. As a young man he sowed "wild oats" on a large scale. Hearst's incendiary journalism was of a piece with this destructive attention-getting behavior.

Hearst's entire career can be understood in terms of his unscrupulous demand for power and reassurance. His mischievousness, his corrupt and sensational journalism, and his politics all were intended to get attention from the world. When he was rejected in politics, he turned to a vicious advocacy of reactionary policies. This apparently was his way of getting response and revenging himself against a people who did not give way to him, as he had been accustomed to expect by his over-indulgent mother, his millionaire father, and the many sycophants whose friendship he was able to buy.

Ambrose Beirce, at one time a Hearst employee, says of him: "the man has not a friend in the world. Nor does he merit one, for either congenitally or by induced perversity, he is inaccessible to the conception of an unselfish attachment, or a disinterested motive. Silent and smiling he moves among men, the loneliest man. Nobody but God loves him, and he knows it."[41]

It is suggested, on the basis of admittedly provisional, partial evidence, that the reaction-

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 414.

[40] Quoted in Ferdinand Lundberg, *Imperial Hearst, A Social Biography* (New York, Equinox Cooperative Press, 1936), p. 39.

[41] George P. West, "Hearst: A Psychological Note," *American Mercury*, Vol. 21, pp. 298–308 (1930).

ary attitude among wealthy persons in our culture results from a particularly serious impairment of the stability and warmth of early family life. These elements of conflict, rejection, and humiliation in the "world" of a small child introduce strong underlying feelings of anxiety, bitterness, resentment, desires for retaliation. One of the ways of coping with these feelings is to gain power and possessions, to dominate others, to force them to bend to one's will, to humiliate them and cause them suffering.[42] As we have seen in the cases of John D. Rockefeller and William Randolph Hearst, these qualities were only tendencies; other more constructive aspirations also were present. But the negative feelings of hurt, humiliation, and rejection were so powerful that these constructive potentialities could not be directly and adequately expressed.

IV

It is as important to understand the factors which produce the liberal spirit among wealthy men as it is to understand the factors which produce reactionaries. For, if the wealthy reactionary is the man who projects a provocative, rigidly hostile, uncompromising spirit into the field of industrial relations and politics, the wealthy liberal moistens the crust of wealthy conservatism, and arouses doubt among his conservative fellow-wealthy as to the rationality and propriety of their traditional point of view.

The liberal spirit is to be found where there has not been a serious impairment of the capacity for spontaneous feeling. The liberal is a man of "ready human sympathies," whose feelings have not been closely channeled into the socially legitimate grooves (or once channeled have not remained there). He has retained the capacity for relatively fresh reaction to persons and situations.

Liberalism is by no means inconsistent with neurotic character trends. On the contrary, liberalism generally develops among more complicated character types where the possibilities of emotional conflict and suffering are greater than average. The resentful and destructive energies of the reactionary are not particularly hampered by conflicting standards of conduct; this is also true of the less destructive but still negative trends of the conservative.

[42] Horney, *op. cit.*, pp. 162 ff.

The liberal has an objective "cause" for which he influences and seeks to influence others. It is not to be confused with the "pet charities" of many wealthy men and women, or the vast philanthropies which have been endowed by wealthy men. It is a restless, dynamic searching for constructive solutions to serious social problems. There must be a genuine emotional investment in the cause, a devotion of time and energy.

Liberalism, therefore, is inconsistent with a narrow satisfaction with "success" in the culturally legitimated sense of that term. The mere possession of wealth and power and the enjoyment of prestige and luxury are not enough. The liberal is moved by other standards, and evaluates his conduct in a broader context of human relations and activities. He has a feeling of personal responsibility and obligation, whether this be derived from religious influences, from personal experience, from a sensitive searching intelligence, or from a combination of them. The imperative demands of these feelings of duty and responsibility toward the larger community may produce personal conflict and suffering of serious dimensions, particularly when the feelings are too exacting, precluding the development of values conducive to relaxation and renewal of energy. It should also be recognized that these feelings of duty and responsibility may be superimposed on underlying negative and destructive tendencies. When this is so, the liberalism is unstable and inconsistent and may turn into reaction, conservatism, or political indifference and negativism. The case of Hearst is illustrative. Munsey, at a time when he had hopes of public office, was extremely active in the Progressive movement of 1912.

Liberalism develops among wealthy persons primarily as a consequence of deviational influences. Among typical wealthy families character-forming influences all tend toward the development of the "conservative character structure"; that is, a relatively narrow conception of interest, a sense of satisfaction with one's status, a capacity for the exclusion or rationalization of data which might challenge this structure — underlying all of this a compulsive relation to values and activity in general. The emancipating influence among wealthy liberals must be of sufficient strength to resist the pressures and blandishments of

class, to provide the steel-like resolution necessary to continue striving in the face of defeat, misunderstanding, and political sectarianism, particularly where there is always present the alternative of a materially secure, even creative, private life.

Abram S. Hewitt — one of the first great American iron-masters — a Democratic party leader, mayor of New York, and five times a member of Congress, combined outstanding business success with broad social vision and political leadership. In a few instances he espoused causes which were conservative in tendency. As a young industrialist in the pre-Civil War period he was actively engaged in efforts to get Congress to raise the tariffs on iron products. During the anthracite strike of 1901–1902, Hewitt opposed the United Mine Workers because the union, according to Hewitt, favored the closed shop. In 1886 Hewitt was the successful mayoral candidate of the conservative elements in New York City in the campaign against Henry George. But despite these problematic actions the sum total of Hewitt's influence was genuinely progressive and liberal in tendency.

The main liberal policies which Hewitt advocated were the right and value of trade union organization, free trade, and the distribution of corporate ownership among the workers. As a member of Congress Hewitt admitted his earlier errors and advocated the progressive lowering of the protective tariff primarily because of its advantages to the consumer and laborer. Hewitt's general economic policy was "cooperative" and collectivistic in a decentralized sense. In 1878 he argued that the

> . . . present distribution of wealth does not conform to the principles of justice . . . that in the nature of things it would seem that corporations must continue to grow and absorb the great bulk of the business of the world, but that these corporations will be organized upon a distribution of ownership among those who are engaged in them, so that in the end the business of the world will be conducted by men in association with each other, each being directly interested in the ownership of the enterprise in which he is engaged. . . .[43]

This distribution of ownership, Hewitt thought, would eliminate the causes of labor disputes and make available resources which would provide unemployment and social insurance funds for workmen. With a naive faith in human progress Hewitt prophesied: "The question, 'By what right?' penetrates the very heart of power, and is no longer answered by the plea of tradition. Thus at length the way is opened for the amelioration of humanity by growth instead of by revolution, and henceforth society will take no steps backward."[44]

Hewitt's father was an immigrant English skilled workman. He is described as a "man of scrupulous integrity, proud of his handiwork and oversanguine of returns. Struggling against a sea of difficulties to obtain hard money for his wares, and repeatedly betrayed by misfortune, other men's delays, and their dishonesty."[45] Before Abram Hewitt's birth, his father failed in business because of his having trusted a dishonest Englishman who failed to pay his loans and forfeited bail furnished by Hewitt after he had been arrested for some dishonest business deals. Hewitt was born on a small farm in Haverstraw to which the family had gone after this disaster. The family regained its economic position some time later, but at a fairly low level of income.

Hewitt's mother is described as a woman of "courage, cheeriness and resourcefulness in caring for a large household under grinding hardship."[46] But despite these hardships occurring during Hewitt's impressionable years, the atmosphere of his early family life appears to have been affectionate and constructive.

He put himself through Columbia College by tutoring. He was an outstanding scholar and after graduation taught mathematics for a short time. He had made friends with the family of Peter Cooper, the New York inventor and industrialist. The influence of the Cooper family on Hewitt (he later married a Cooper daughter) was highly stimulating. Peter Cooper was active in reform politics in New York, and had an inventive liberal-rational mind.

Hewitt's character was quite different from that of the typical business man of his era. He was more concerned with doing the job right than with making money. He once wrote to Peter Cooper:

[43] Abram S. Hewitt, *The Mutual Relations Between Capital and Labor,* Speech delivered at a Church Congress in Cincinnati (New York, 1878).

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] Allan Nevins, *Abram S. Hewitt* (New York, Harper & Bros., 1935), p. 7.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

. . . I am willing to do any amount of labor or feel any amount of anxiety that may be necessary to attain a successful issue in this great enterprise — and not because I desire to avail myself personally of the results. You will bear me witness that I have from the beginning refused to take any more than a bare support for myself and those who are dependent on me.[47]

Hewitt's feelings of obligation and duty were so powerful that they drove him to exceed his strength on many occasions. He was subject to periods of nervous exhaustion and headaches of long duration. He was not the kind of person who could easily relax. From his early family life and experience he had acquired high standards of conduct and achievement. His need to fulfill these demanding standards of objective success, selflessness, and devotion to justice and good causes, had in it strong elements of compulsion. But unlike the conservatives and reactionaries, Hewitt's compulsiveness did not exclude responsiveness and sympathy for the condition of people around him. On the contrary, all of his activity had to be evaluated in terms of its service to his community, or to his country. In the Civil War, when many business men took advantage of their country's need and raised their interest rates, furnished defective materials, and raised their prices to unreasonable heights, Hewitt proposed that the government take over his Trenton plant even though this would mean a loss of profit, because "all private interests should in this crisis yield to the public welfare."[48] He and Edward Cooper offered their services to the government as managers of their plant without pay.

The case of Hewitt offers proof for the thesis that it is not anxiety or insecurity in themselves which produce the emotional soil from which the reactionary and conservative spirits derive their sustenance, but the entire combination of early character-building influences. Where these are primarily negative and repressive, hostility and resentment become the most important dynamism in the character, and condition political attitudes. In the case of Hewitt the hardships of his early life, the failures of his father, and the inculcation of high standards of integrity and obligation were sufficient to produce conflict and anxious character trends. But the family's hardships and the father's failures were in large measure due to the father's generosity and scrupulousness. Both parents exhibited this generosity and integrity in the treatment of their children. Even though Hewitt took resolve as a boy to achieve economic security and thereby correct his father's failures, it was impossible for him to act on the basis of ruthless ambition. If his father was an example of failure, he was also an example of honor and devotion to standards. Hewitt's life goals consequently had to combine objective economic success with scrupulous integrity and service to a larger whole.

Andrew Carnegie, the Scotch immigrant who built up a fortune of hundreds of millions of dollars in iron and steel manufacturing and who dispersed most of this wealth in philanthropies before his death, professed a social philosophy which aroused antagonism among the wealthy business men of the country. He differed from the typical point of view of wealthy men in his attitude toward labor, toward the possession and inheritance of wealth, and in his view of the proper way of life of wealthy persons.

Writing about the problems of the organization of labor, Carnegie observed: "The right of workingmen to combine and to form trade unions is no less sacred than the right of the manufacturer to enter into associations and conferences with his fellows, and it must sooner or later be conceded. . . . My experience has been that trades unions, upon the whole, are beneficial both to labor and capital."[49]

In his book, *The Gospel of Wealth*, Carnegie developed a theory of the disposal of surplus wealth which he himself largely followed. He opposed leaving wealth to descendants on the ground that it was injurious for persons to receive great sums in this fashion. He was opposed to bequeathing wealth for public purposes after death on the ground that conditions change, while bequests once made cannot be changed. He argued that "It is well to remember that it requires the exercise of not less ability than that which acquires it, to use wealth so as to be really beneficial to the community."[50]

He favored the policy which he himself fol-

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 137.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 221.
[49] Andrew Carnegie, *The Gospel of Wealth* (New York, The Century Co., 1900), p. 115.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

lowed — to administer his wealth during his own life. Anything remaining he thought ought to be taken by a practically confiscatory inheritance tax.

> Men who continue hoarding great sums all their lives, the proper use of which for public ends would work good to the community from which it chiefly came, should be made to feel that the community, in the form of the state, cannot thus be deprived of its proper share. By taxing estates heavily at death the state marks its condemnation of the selfish millionaire's unworthy life.[51]

Carnegie was born of a poor Scotch workingman's family. Both his father and uncle were "radicals" active in the early nineteenth-century movements in Scotland for a liberalization of the suffrage and the improvement of the lot of workmen. Both of Carnegie's parents were intensely religious but liberal in their attitudes toward dogma and theology. Carnegie writes:

> I grew up treasuring within me the fact that my father had risen and left the Presbyterian Church one day when the minister preached the doctrine of "infant damnation." Father could not stand it and said: "If that be your religion and that your God, I seek a better religion and a nobler God." He left the Presbyterian Church never to return, but he did not cease to attend various other churches. I saw him enter the closet every morning to pray and that impressed me. He was indeed a saint and always remained devout.[52]

Carnegie's mother was not an attending church member. She was under the Unitarian influence of Channing.

Carnegie's parents raised their children in a relatively free unrepressive atmosphere. Carnegie's spontaneity and emotional flexibility were reflected in his warm attachments to people and in his great enthusiasms in his work and in his philanthropies. His deviation from conservative tendencies was attributable to these character traits and to his strong constructive conscience which developed from parental influence and moral inculcation. While we saw that religious and moral inculcations were important factors in the lives of some of the conservatives, there were significant differences. The parental influence in the cases of Root, Hughes, and Morrow tended to be more repressive, while in the case of Carnegie there appears to have been a policy of developing independence of character in the children, and the religious influence was neither dogmatic nor rigorously inculcated. Constructive conscience — relatively unambivalent feelings of duty and responsibility — appear to thrive best in an atmosphere of patience, affection, and example.

Charles E. Wilson, former executive vice-chairman of the War Production Board, and at the present time President of the General Electric Company, has come into prominence only recently. In November of 1939 he succeeded Swope in General Electric at the same time that Swope and Owen D. Young withdrew from the chairmanship of the board and the presidency respectively. The withdrawal of Young and Swope has been interpreted as a wise step in order to maintain a continuity of vigorous leadership in General Electric. Although Wilson had been practically unknown before this step, the soundness of the decision was soon demonstrated by Wilson's executive ability and industrial statesmanship. A widely reproduced speech, originally given before the mid-winter convention of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers at Philadelphia on January 29, 1941, gave Wilson the reputation of being one of the outstanding of the newer type of progressive industrialists. Pointing out that the war was to be understood as growing out of the failures of the existing economy to provide full employment and security, Wilson urged that business management must prove its capacity to handle these problems, or accept regulation and control.

> . . . the private enterprise system is faced with two alternatives — either private decisions will be made and enforced by public-spirited and fully supported leaders in finance, industry, commerce, labor and agriculture — or public decisions will be made and enforced by the government of the people for the whole people. Therefore it must be seen that if no way can be found to make and enforce the first kind of decisions, there can be little justification for resistance to the second kind.

Wilson's courage and insight were again demonstrated when, as executive vice-chairman of WPB, he warned the annual convention of the National Association of Manufacturers against the dangers of "right wing" irresponsi-

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[52] *Autobiography*, p. 23.

bility and reaction.[53] More recently, following his return from WPB to General Electric, Wilson aroused considerable comment and criticism because of an address delivered at a dinner of utility and industrial executives in Atlanta.[54] Wilson reasserted his statement of the alternatives facing business management, and then, referring to industrial policy in the post-war period, he urged a program of maintaining low prices *without* lowering wages. Citing the magnificent advances in industrial efficiency during the course of the war, he urged that such a price and wage policy was not only desirable but possible.

> In 1920 . . . some 15 billions in income were shut off with the closing of plants and reductions in working hours. There were 100,000 bankruptcies, and a 44 percent drop in industrial payrolls. That must not happen again. It can happen during the post-war period of readjustment unless there is a strong effort on the part of every business to hold down its prices, utilize its productive efficiency, cut its extravagant distribution costs, and maintain its workers' incomes. . . . After the war take-home pay on a 40 hour week basis must eventually represent the higher level of earnings which now prevail.

Wilson was born in the "Hell's Kitchen" section of Manhattan, the son of a poor Irish bookbinder. When he was three years old his father died of injuries received in a panic at the dedication of the new Brooklyn Bridge. His mother supported the family for several years through her sewing. Wilson left school before graduation in order to bear his share of the burden. The first job he found was with an electrical appliance concern which later became a General Electric subsidiary. He earned money on the side playing semi-professional basketball. He married at the age of 21 when he was receiving a salary of $20 a week. His physical presence arouses confidence and certainly played an important rôle in his career. His stamina and energy were important factors in his rapid rise to responsibility and prominence.

Under the influence of his wife, Wilson became a Baptist and took up Sunday School teaching on the side. He started a Bible class for Chinese children and conducted a Baptist young men's forum in Bridgeport, Connecticut. He is a man of genuine religious feeling. Wilson claims that the big influences in his life "have been his mother, his wife, and his first boss." The death of his father did not have embittering consequences for his character development. His first employer took a fatherly interest in Wilson, encouraged him to study engineering and gave him many opportunities to learn the various sides of the electrical appliance business.

The adverse circumstances of his childhood accentuated a strong ambition to succeed, but in Wilson it appears that this ambition was not compensatory for inner feelings of damage and rejection. His early life had been difficult and challenging, but the personal influences seem to have been positive and encouraging, developing inner confidence. His ambition was constructive and developed in him a craftsmanlike satisfaction in dealing with the technical and organizational problems of production. His ambition was motivated by a sense of personal obligation and gratitude which makes it impossible for him to view his job as an industrial manager in narrow terms. As in many other wealthy liberals Wilson has a "mission" above and beyond that of simple business success.

Insofar as the data have created a valid picture of some of the early influences in the lives of our wealthy liberals, two factors seem to have been of special importance. First, the parents of wealthy liberals appear to have been warmer, more affectionate persons. They appear to have accorded more scope to the independence of their children, more encouragement in the development of talents and interests. Contrariwise, in the cases of conservatives and reactionaries the fragmentary data suggest that patterns of conduct were more rigidly inculcated, less spontaneous warmth and encouragement were displayed. In some cases it was evident that positive harm was done by the withholding of interest and affection, by hostile, manipulative treatment, by parental overprotection and exploitation. Second, religious and moral influences appear to have been of considerable importance. The denominational factor seems to have been of less significance than the kind of religious spirit which animated early family life. In the cases of the conservatives and reactionaries the religious influence tended to be largely of a repressive kind.

[53] WPB press release, December 8, 1943.
[54] October 26, 1944.

The religious factor was mediated by a parental selection among the various elements of Christianity, and the choices made by the parents were of a piece with the non-religious early family influences. In other words, parents with strong repressive tendencies selected the repressive elements of the Christian doctrine. Parents with warmer and more affectionate tendencies selected the more positive, humanitarian elements of Christianity.

A few remarks concerning the tentative findings of this study and their implications may be helpful by way of conclusion. It has been suggested here that the objective economic interests of persons of wealth and economic power are not the *determinants* of political attitudes. Even within our own culture it is possible to indicate a wide variety of political attitudes which are associated with similar economic interests. Economic interests are one value in a larger context of values which are interrelated and combined in various ways. How important economic interests are in comparison with other interests is an extremely complicated problem which is beyond the scope of this paper. We would like to stress also that in those situations in which "economic calculations" are the major data in forming a political judgment variations may occur because of differences in the nature of the "attachments," or relationship of individuals to these interests. Where the relationship is rigid and compulsive, attitudes and behavior with regard to political issues affecting these economic interests are similarly rigid, incapable of flexibility and compromise. Conversely, where the relationship between the individual and his interests has in it a larger element of rationality, the capacity for constructive, problem-solving behavior is greater.

In our culture competition for economic means and power is of such intensity that it undermines the capacity of most persons for genuine rationality in their political as well as other spheres of behavior. In varying degree most of the persons in our culture have an irrational, rigid attachment to their "short-run" economic, as well as other, interests. Conservatism among wealthy persons is not only to be understood as that attitude and related behavior intended to defend economic interests, but also must be understood as a rigid, irrational effort to defend these immediate interests with little regard for the consequences of such behavior for the larger society, and in the long run for the interests of the individual himself.

It is also suggested that "reactionary" attitudes among wealthy persons are the products of situations and experiences in which these common cultural factors of competition, individual isolation, and hostility have a particularly severe impact. Contrariwise, "liberal" attitudes among the wealthy appear to result from situations and experiences in which the individual has, by one means or another, been protected from the typical impact of these negative cultural and social influences.

24

THE OUTSIDER IN THE SENATE
An Alternative Role

• *RALPH K. HUITT*

The growing concern of students of politics with the social structure of official bodies and the behavior expected of their members promises to make the Senate of the United States a prime target of research. Two recent books make notable contributions and suggest the trend. One is William S. White's *Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate*,[1] an "insider's" impressions based on years of close observation; and the other is Donald R. Matthews' *U.S. Senators*

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[1] New York, 1956.

and Their World,[2] the work of a political scientist. One (though not the only) concern of both books is the system of norms for behavior of members of the Senate.[3] Although reached through different routes (White's largely inferred from observed behavior, Matthews' principally from interviews) their statements of Senate norms and the way they work have much in common. The norms (or "folkways," as Matthews calls them) are viewed as cultural "oughts" upon which there is a high degree of consensus. The members who conform most closely to the norms are, generally speaking, the most influential and effective members. This general view is almost certainly correct, as it would be for any stable human group; in this the Senate is not unique (as White sometimes seems to suggest it is) but typical.[4]

But what about the senator who does not conform? What is his place in the Senate and what happens to him there? This study will explore these questions through a case study of such a senator. But first it may be useful to try to restate the relevant parts of the analysis of White and Matthews (without holding them in any way responsible for the restatement) in terms of role theory, which will provide the conceptual framework for the analysis of the senator's experience.[5] In this the senators will be seen as actors in a political sub-system called the Senate, vested with an official position (or status) called "senator." The analyst's problem then is to describe the "senator" role — the dynamic, behavioral aspect of the official position. The new senator, with different motivations, faces much the same problem: he must learn or be taught the norms which define the rights and obligations of his position in order to take the actions which will validate, poorly or well, his occupancy of the position. White and Matthews, in effect, describe the senator role by stating the norms which prescribe how persons who occupy the senator position are expected to behave. Needless to say, it is essential to identify *whose* expectations are meant — who, that is, prescribes the appropriate behavior. For White the expectations apparently emanate from a powerful elite he calls the "Inner Club" whose members, appropriately referred to as the "Senate type," most nearly fulfill the requirements of the role, and who wield the internal sanctions. Matthews suggests that the expectations are widely shared by the membership as a whole.

What is the "senator" role (White's "Senate type" or "Senate man," Matthews' effective senator) which emerges from these two books? It is one of a prudent man, who serves a long apprenticeship before trying to assert himself, and talks infrequently even then. He is courteous to a fault in his relations with his colleagues, not allowing political disagreements to affect his personal feelings. He is always ready to help another senator when he can, and he expects to be repaid in kind. More than anything else, he is a Senate man, proud of the institution and ready to defend its traditions and perquisites against all outsiders. He is a legislative workhorse who specializes in one or two policy areas, says Matthews. He has a deep respect for the rights of others, says White, making his institution the last citadel of individualism. In this composite, the senator as an ideal type is a man of accommodation who knows that "you have to go along to get along"; he is a conservative, institutional man, slow to change what he has mastered at the expense of so much time and patience.

But what of the man who does not play by the rules? What sanctions, if any, does the system impose? White suggests small inconveniences: the formal rules, for instance, may be closely applied to him.[6] But the Senate is disinclined to proceed against *any* senator; the "great ones" do about as they please and the others, except for a few who are not acceptable

[2] Chapel Hill, 1960.

[3] See especially White, chs. 5–10, and Matthews, ch. 5.

[4] George Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950), pp. 147, 169–170, 426–28.

[5] "Role" and related concepts are defined in a great variety of ways by social scientists, depending upon the discipline of the definer and the special problems which engage his interest. For an excellent clarification of the definitional problems see Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role* (New York, 1958), ch. 2. Because the purpose of the present study is not to refine role theory but to employ it rather crudely to gain some insights into the behavior of senators, concepts are stated with as little elaboration as possible. For the theoretical formulation principally relied on see Theodore Sarbin, "Role Theory," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), Vol. I, pp. 223–58.

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

at all, can get away with almost anything so long as it is not directed against a member of the Inner Club.[7] The whole thrust of his book nevertheless suggests that the non-Senate type who does not make the Inner Club never amounts to much in the Senate. This is essentially Matthews' point, too, which he arrives at through some ingenious measurements showing on their face, that the senator who violates the folkways is less effective in getting his bills passed.[8] Neither is bothered much by the cases of spectacularly successful senators who do not altogether fit the type — the talkative Humphrey, whom White firmly locates in the Inner Club; the domineering Taft and Johnson, who leapt immediately to leadership. White explains them simply as "authentic geniuses among Senate types,"[9] which indeed is consistent with his emphasis on sentiment and feeling rather than overt behavior. In Matthews' collective profile they cause hardly a wrinkle.

This study is a participant-observer analysis of a single case of presumptively deviant senatorial behavior, that of William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin, in his first year in the Senate. The observer was legislative assistant to Senator Proxmire that year. The observer's assumption was that one way to gain insights into the structure and working rules of a social system is to learn what the neophyte has to learn during his "initiation" period. Senator Proxmire was an ideal subject. He went to the Senate keenly aware of the importance of learning its norms and constructing with care the role he should play there. His interest was theoretical as well as practical; as a person trained in the social sciences he was self-conscious about his learning experiences and determined to rationalize them in order to develop a consistent view of the Senate and his place in it.[10] More than that, he was willing to share his experiences and discuss them regularly with the observer.

Because this is a study of an individual in his relations with an institution, an attempt will be made first to suggest some of the relevant personality factors. Then Proxmire's choice of role will be recounted. After that some inferences will be drawn and hypotheses suggested about the role systems of the Senate.

I

A complex human being like William Proxmire cannot be psychologically categorized by a layman. Nevertheless, analysis begins with simplification; from the whole man must be abstracted some elements which shape him as a political personality, which identify him as a political type. In Proxmire's case, the first would seem to be a driving ambition to succeed, to which almost everything else in his life is subordinated, coupled with a puritan's belief in the sanctity of unremittent work.

Only a man with Proxmire's bottomless ambition and faith in the efficacy of effort would have believed he had any prospects at all in Wisconsin politics. His disabilities were perhaps best summed up in an apocryphal story given wide currency in the state in 1952, when he first ran for governor. It relates a conversation between his opponent, Governor Walter Kohler, and, say, Driscoll of New Jersey, at the governors' conference that year.

"Have you an opponent, Walter?" asks Driscoll.

"Yes," replies Kohler. "He's the son of an Illinois Republican. He graduated from Yale and Harvard, worked for J. P. Morgan and married a Rockefeller, and just moved into Wisconsin three years ago."

"My God, Walter," explodes Driscoll. "Did you pick him yourself?"

The presumed liabilities bear closer inspection.[11] The Illinois Republican father was a physician who worked long hours seven days a week until his death at 79, who taught his son that it is morally wrong as well as inefficient to be awake and not at work. At Yale Proxmire learned the rewards of perseverance: too light for football, he nevertheless made every practice, spring and fall, for four years and finally got his letter by participating in one play in a "letter" game. His experience at the Harvard graduate school confirmed what Proxmire had

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 122, 126.

[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 114–17. More will be said about this later.

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

[10] Proxmire has a B.A. degree from Yale, an M.B.A. from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, and he carried his doctoral program in government at Harvard to the dissertation-writing stage.

[11] See the sketch of Proxmire's life and personality by Godfrey Sperling, Jr., in *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 31, 1957; or the Chicago *Sun-Times*, August 25, 1957.

suspected while working for Morgan, that the financiers no longer made the decisions that mattered; the politicians did. The public life therefore offered the largest opportunities for a man who would make his mark. There also his political values crystallized. ("I didn't raise my son to be a Democrat," said Dr. Proxmire. "Harvard did it to Bill.")[12] To decide to be governor of his newly adopted state did not seem preposterous to Proxmire; experience had taught him that he could reach his goals because he wanted to more than most people and would pay a higher price.

Another lesson of experience, reinforced by temperament, was that he did better alone. The second personality trait — and I think the decisive one — which affected Proxmire's choice of role in the Senate is his compulsive independence. No group can contain him long; he does not trust it to take care of him nor make his decisions, and he cannot abide the restrictions on his actions which would go with truly belonging. Claims upon him which would limit his freedom of action, even those of friends and supporters, are onerous. His position in the Democratic Party of Wisconsin is a case in point.

The value of Proxmire's winning a Senate seat in 1957 to a party which had won only one other statewide race in 25 years can hardly be overstated.[13] Nevertheless, before the election an astute political reporter said in his syndicated column that it was no secret that there were "some pretty substantial Democrats who would not mind Proxmire's defeat in the senatorial election, considering their personal feelings alone and not the welfare of the party to which they owe their allegiance."[14] Some understanding of this estrangement is crucial to an explanation of Proxmire's political personality.

After World War II a group of Wisconsin Democrats, many of them Madison intellectuals, undertook the seemingly impossible task of rejuvenating their moribund and reactionary party. Their success, after a decade of effort, was spectacular; in 1958 the Democrats captured the state Assembly, all statewide offices but one, and half the congressional seats. These organization people naturally would like a dominant voice in party affairs, and at the minimum they expect to be consulted. Proxmire has not done much consulting, the plain fact being that if he had he almost surely would never have gone to the Senate. He had barely qualified to vote in the state when he won his first office — from a Democratic assemblyman who had lived all his 65 years in one Wisconsin county. After that Proxmire ran as he pleased (three times for governor before going to the Senate) without heeding pointed suggestions that he had "had his chance."

His indefatigable campaigning undoubtedly did much to rebuild the party, but as usual he made his own calculations along the way. He discovered very early that time spent hunting up a county chairman is, on the average, enough to shake two hundred hands downtown. Whether the chairman would get him any votes was problematical; not so with the handshaking. With Democratic politicians at that time virtually ignored by communication media in large areas of this Republican state, direct personal contact through continuous campaigning seemed the one sure way to make himself known. This piece of practical wisdom, acted upon, did not endear him to the organization but it made him unbeatable in a primary.

More important, a strong hold on the electorate, which can control him only in the most general sense, enables him to resist any group (including his staunch supporters) which might seek to exercise specific influence. Two incidents will illustrate. The morning after his first election to the Senate Proxmire stood with his wife before daybreak in the rain at a plant gate in Milwaukee, thanking the workers for their help. A couple of weeks later, when a labor leader dared to suggest that he was the union's man, Proxmire chose a state CIO convention as the place to declare his independence of labor. One act was as significant as the other and they were not unrelated.

II

Throughout the spring of 1958, for roughly half his first session in the Senate, Proxmire strove earnestly to be a model freshman senator. He worked hard on his committees and took care of his constituents. He accepted cheerfully a mammoth portion of the burden of freshmen of the majority party, presiding over the

[12] Chicago *Daily News*, August 8, 1957, p. 22.

[13] Proxmire was elected in August, 1957 to the unexpired term of Senator McCarthy, and to his first full term in 1958.

[14] John Wyngaard, August 17, 1957.

Senate. He did much more than his share: an unofficial tabulation midway in the session showed that he had sat in the chair longer than anyone else and about sixteen times as long as Vice President Nixon. The club apparently approved of him. No senator can ask his colleagues how he is doing, but his staff members can and do check with *their* peers. The reports at first were always the same: He's doing fine; he hasn't made a single mistake.

But Proxmire had not satisfactorily answered the question that mattered most to him: How much could he talk on the floor? Ordinary prudence, as well as Senate practice, counsel a neophyte to bide his time before exercising very freely his undoubted right to speak at any time. But to a man like Proxmire the life of the Senate is the debate on the floor. Not to be there and participate is to deny himself equal membership in the Senate. Proxmire said of a freshman colleague who seldom spoke: "He might as well not be a senator!"

Nevertheless he forbore, trying to find socially acceptable ways to take some part. The "morning hour," that period at the beginning of each day when senators introduce bills and insert material in the *Congressional Record*, seemed safe enough so he quickly became a regular contributor to the *Record*. He entered colloquies on the floor only when specifically invited to do so by senior members. He cautiously scheduled his first major speech for the day before the Easter recess when most members would be gone, having been assured that this was an appropriate time for a freshman to talk. Only two members heard him through, the presiding officer and Senator Douglas (who canceled an appointment in order to give Proxmire an audience).[15]

But almost as if he could not help himself, Proxmire became steadily more active in debate until he was one of the busiest men on the floor. Then came the first warnings that he was "talking too much." The warnings were characteristic of the operations of the Senate. None of them was direct. They came in friendly tips: someone heard an unnamed person say it; the report was passed on to a Proxmire staff man for what it was worth. Or a very senior senator in the chair would pointedly overlook Proxmire standing at his desk, to recognize other members ahead of him out of turn.

Proxmire retired, brooding, to his office. He was puzzled and frustrated. He believed that he *had* exercised great restraint. He had kept his speeches short, except when asked by a party floor man to help kill time. So he sat mute. Not even a debate on unemployment compensation, in which he was deeply interested, could make him speak.

Then the dam broke. In the first week of June Proxmire offered six amendments to the Mutual Security Act and pressed them to a vote.[16] Inasmuch as Proxmire was not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and four of his amendments were first introduced on the floor so the committee had no chance to consider them, the performance was hardly a demonstration of modesty and withdrawal. Criticism was sharp and immediate (though indirect, as always), and it spurred Proxmire to a decision: he would "be a senator like Wayne [Morse] and Paul [Douglas]"; he would talk when he pleased on whatever he chose and would not worry about his influence in the Senate. He had found his role.

The Senate soon learned what that meant. In mid-July, for instance, Proxmire served notice that "I intend to rise every day, from now on until social security improvement is adopted, to plead for it,"[17] which he did, on 27 consecutive occasions. But if the club was unused to being lectured by a freshman member, it must have been wholly unprepared for his threat to hold them beyond adjournment by the very antithesis of freshmanlike behavior, a filibuster.

The provocation was a bill to allow the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Chicago to increase the amount of water it may withdraw from Lake Michigan by a thousand cubic feet per second for a three-year test period.[18] Similar bills had been passed by both houses twice before (by the Senate in the closing hours of a session with scant debate) only to be vetoed by the President because of objections raised by Canada. Once more it appeared that the bill

[15] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 104 (April 3, 1958), pp. 6200–14.

[16] *Ibid.* (May 26, 1958), pp. 9424–25; (May 28, p. 9655; (June 4–5), pp. 9868–69, 10157–63, 10260–62, 10266–70.

[17] *Ibid.* (July 18), p. 14187.

[18] H.R. 2, 85th Cong. See S. Rept. 2482, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 104 (August 20, 1958), p. 18606.

would come up in the flood of last-minute legislation, and with committee and leadership support it seemed sure to slide through the tired Senate. Moreover, because the Canadian position was now ambiguous the President might sign the bill.

But the pressure for adjournment which was the greatest factor in favor of the bill's passage could also be its doom — if its opponents had sufficient nerve. Their hope was to stall consideration as long as possible, then make it clear that the cost of passage was extended debate. It was a simple, time-proven strategy, but not one designed to make friends.

Proxmire was by no means the only man fighting the bill — there was a militant bipartisan coalition on each side — but he was probably the most determined and certainly the most conspicuous. It was he who blocked unanimous consent to allow any deviation from the rules in handling the bill. Thus he objected to a meeting of the Public Works committee while the Senate sat, and to the bill's being reported to the Senate after the expiration of the morning hour — tactics which brought sharp rebukes from two senior members but delayed the bill a day.[19] And it was he who held the floor from nine till midnight the last night of the session, until the water-diversion bill was put aside for other business;[20] and he who sat through the early morning hours, armed with a score of amendments and great piles of materials, ready to resume the debate. When the session ended at 4:11 A.M. the unfinished business of the Senate was a Proxmire amendment to the bill. It is not likely that anyone on the floor that night doubted that Proxmire was ready to talk on through Sunday if need be, but probably few present realized how eager he was to do just that.

III

What may be suggested about the "senator" role from this summary statement of the first stage of Proxmire's socialization in the Senate?

First, at a certain point in his first session, Proxmire selected the role he would play. He did not play badly the role associated with the member of the Inner Club; he rejected it. He did not fail in an effort to make himself acceptable to the Inner Club; he decided he did not want to try to be one of them. The role he chose was one suited to his personality and temperament, one he had played before.[21] In his opinion it offered him the best opportunities to attain his goals in the Senate. Conformity with the folkways would not have allowed him, for instance, to associate himself so persistently with expansion of social security nor to make his Horatio-like stand against the water-diversion bill. Moreover, the independent role clearly was congenial to his constituency — Proxmire's seat had been held successively by "Old Bob" LaFollette and his son and by Joe McCarthy — and Proxmire was up for reelection. But it is important that his performance was not simply a bid for votes; it was rather a deliberately adopted legislative style which he has followed consistently since reelection.[22]

Second, he had a model to go by. He mentioned two senators and could have named others. The norms for his behavior were furnished by a small group within the Senate, just as the norms of the "Senate type" are likewise furnished by another, perhaps much larger, group within the Senate. The model, moreover, is rooted in Senate history. There have always been members of the Senate labelled variously as "independents," "mavericks," and the like. They have come from all sections of the coun-

[19] *Ibid.* (August 19), p. 18457.

[20] *Ibid.* (August 23), pp. 19464–66, 19469–78, 19522–39. 19554–55.

[21] In his first press conference after winning the special election in 1957, Proxmire shunned labels such as "liberal" and "Douglas Democrat," but mentioned approvingly that some labor leaders had described him as a "maverick." Chicago *Daily News*, August 29, 1957.

[22] Representative actions are not hard to find. In 1959 Proxmire made three speeches criticizing the Democratic party leadership in the Senate, with support from four other senators. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 105 (February 23), pp. 2814–20, (March 9), pp. 3559–78, (April 15), pp. 5956–59. In 1960 he opposed the judicial nomination of a Wisconsin man who had massive support from within and outside the state, with no one else from Wisconsin in opposition. (Proxmire said: "I have had more visits and phone calls in connection with this nomination than with any other matter I have dealt with since I came to the Senate.") Hearings, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, 86th Cong., 2d sess., *Nomination of James R. Durfee; Congressional Record*, Vol. 106 (January 25), pp. 1027–1033, (April 19), pp. 7577–78, (April 20), p. 7750. In 1961 he was the first to make a fight against a Kennedy nominee. *Ibid.* (daily edition, January 23, 1961), pp. 1086–1100.

try, although the midwest seems to have produced more than its share. It is not necessary to try to establish a roster of such senators; a voluminous popular literature and common knowledge support the contention that the "loner," the man who conspicuously walks his own way, is a familiar figure in the Senate.[23] What is more important is to try to sharpen the description of the role and to distinguish it from its opposite, the "Senate type" which makes up the membership of the Inner Club.

Because the most significant characteristic of the role is its conscious rejection of the behavior associated with belonging to the Inner Club, we might tentatively label it the "Outsider." The term is not meant, however, to apply indiscriminately to all members of what White calls the Outer Club (*i.e.*, all senators not in the Inner Club), who may simply have failed somehow to be taken into the inner communion, but to the man who does not *want* to be in.

If the "Senate type" who belongs to the Inner Club is distinguished by his sensitiveness to Senate moods, his regard for Senate traditions and norms, and his spirit of accommodation, the Outsider is notable for his determination to speak out whenever he pleases on whatever subject he chooses without regard to whether he can get any vote but his own. And if the "Senate type" cares more for the esteem of like-minded colleagues than any other kind of approval, the Outsider typically looks elsewhere — to his constituents and to his ideological allies across the nation, perhaps more than to those other members of the Senate whose norms he shares.

The difference between the Outsider and the Senate type is not so much in ideology or issue orientation (although the Outsider is more likely to be liberal, as his opposite number is apt to be conservative) as in legislative style. The popular literature of forty years has drawn a sharp picture of that style. The Outsider feels impelled to stand for principle absolutely, preferring defeat on those terms to half-a-loaf. He likes to tell people what they should and frequently do not want to hear. He is never so confident of the soundness of his opinions as when he holds them alone. He is as comfortable alone against the crowd as the Senate type is in the bosom of the club; indeed he is probably happiest when he stands by himself against powerful and wrong-headed foes. As a consequence few people, in the body or outside, are lukewarm toward him; they tend to like or dislike him strongly. He is like the "sons of the wild jackasses" who came out of the midwest thirty years ago, of whom it was said that "theirs is not a compromising spirit, and this lack of the give-and-take philosophy may, with their want of a sense of humor, be their greatest weakness but it has often proved to be their strength."[24]

The characterization is not really adequate. For one thing, it is undoubtedly too harsh. Many who helped shape it were deeply unsympathetic with the goals and tactics of the men they described, among whom there were, then and now, attractive as well as powerful personalities. Nevertheless there is more than a suggestion that unpopularity was not unknown to them and they were not dismayed

[23] "Borah and Johnson, Disturbers of the Senatorial Peace," *The Literary Digest* (August 23, 1919), pp. 52, 55; Austin Haines, "Smith W. Brookhart, Dissenter," *Nation* (November 1, 1922), pp. 465–7; Richard Barry, "A Radical in Power: A Study of LaFollette," *Outlook* (November 29, 1922), pp. 564–7; Chester H. Rowell, "LaFollette, Shipstead, and the Embattled Farmers," *World's Work* (August, 1923), pp. 408–20; F. E. Haynes, "LaFollette and LaFollettism," *Atlantic Monthly* (October, 1924), 536–44; Bruce Bliven, "Robert M. LaFollette's Place in Our History," *Current History* (August, 1925), pp. 716–22; Charles Merz, "Androcles and the Lion: The Silent President and the Roaring Borah," *Century* (April, 1926), pp. 698–703; Richard Washburn Child, "He Rides Alone," *Saturday Evening Post* (May 21, 1927), pp. 6–7, 187, 189; Dixon Merritt, "Four Senators," *Outlook* (December 28, 1927), pp. 531, 534; Ray T. Tucker, "Those Sons of Wild Jackasses," *North American Review* (February, 1930), pp. 225–33; Frederick R. Barkley, "The Voice of the Corn Belt: Senator Norris — Square Peg in the G.O.P.," *Outlook* (January 14, 1931), pp. 52–4, 74–5; Louis H. Cook, "Brookhart, Insurgent," *North American Review* (February, 1931), pp. 178–84; Oswald Garrison Villard, "Borah Goes on the War Path," *Nation* (July 25, 1934), p. 91; "Borah: Political History-Maker," *Literary Digest* (February 1, 1936), p. 9; Richard L. Neuberger, "Wayne Morse: Republican Gadfly," *American Mercury* (July, 1947), pp. 16–24; Robert L. Riggs, "Wayne Morse: The Peril of Independence," *The New Republic* (March 2, 1953), pp. 10–12; Robert L. Riggs, "That Maverick Morse," *Nation* (May 5, 1956), pp. 380–2.

[24] Tucker, *op. cit.*, pp. 226–27.

by it. Even if it were wholly fair, the description obviously would not apply in all its details to any individual. What we have sketched here is an "ideal type"; real people are only more or less like it.[25] Its relevance is that it suggests what I shall argue here, that the Outsider is not a deviant at all but a person playing a recognizable and recognized role, a legitimate alternative to some others which he might select.

Deviant behavior has been defined as "behavior which violates institutionalized expectations — that is, expectations which are shared and recognized as legitimate in a social system."[26] My argument is that the Outsider role has been accepted and esteemed by a considerable part, at least, of the general public and by the specialized publics of close students of the Senate and that within the Senate itself it is recognized as legitimate whether it is popular with a majority or not. Most theories of deviant behavior postulate an effort (even if ineffective) by the social system to eliminate or at least control the offending behavior. The Senate has proved that it can and will take telling measures against what it considers deviant behavior, but the kind of behavior associated with the Outsider role is remarkably free of institutional inhibitions.

One piece of evidence supporting the assertion of widespread public acceptance of the role is the long tenure in office usually enjoyed by the established maverick. Approval by the special publics is suggested by the frequency with which close observers rank men noted for their independence at or close to the top of lists of outstanding senators. Thus a group of political scientists who specialized in legislation (presumed to be able to make informed judgments largely free from provincial, partisan or emotional bias) were asked in 1950 to "grade" all members of the Senate; they consistently put Douglas first, and the next three in order were Kefauver, Morse and Lehman.[27] The same year *Time* included Douglas among the "Senate's most valuable ten," calling him, among other things, a "maverick liberal."[28] *Collier's* congressional award for 1946 went to Robert LaFollette, Jr., "as notable an independent as the Senate has known since his fiery father, Wisconsin's famous Old Bob . . ." who always "has been free to do his stuff as he thought it should be done."[29] One of two awards made by the American Political Science Association in 1959 to outstanding members of the Senate went to John J. Williams of Delaware, who is noted for his lone-wolf assaults on wasteful spending, subsidies, and tax privileges.[30]

More than that, the Senate itself has in a sense put its *imprimatur* on the role. In 1955 the Senate set about selecting "five outstanding persons, but not a living person, who have served as members of the Senate" whose portraits would be painted in oval spaces left blank for that purpose when the Reception Room was decorated a century earlier.[31] A committee of five senators chaired by John F. Kennedy considered nominations for two years with ad-

[25] This should be emphasized. No classification of individuals is intended. Where individuals are mentioned it is only to illustrate a characteristic in the construction of a type.

[26] Albert K. Cohen, "The Study of Social Disorganization and Deviant Behavior," in Robert K. Merton et al. (eds.), *Sociology Today* (New York, 1959), pp. 461–84, 462. Robert A. Dentler and Kai T. Erickson argue that deviants are functional to the group, testing and tracing its boundaries, as opposed to the notion of deviance as a dysfunctional aspect of group or society; but they accept Cohen's definition and it is clear that they are talking about behavior which is regarded as illegitimate by the group. "The Function of Deviance in Groups," *Social Problems*, Vol. 7 (Fall, 1960), pp. 98–107.

[27] Byron L. Johnson and W. E. Butt, "Rating the Senators," *New Republic* (March 3, 1952), pp. 10–11.

[28] "Senate's Most Valuable Ten," *Time* (April 3, 1950), p. 20.

[29] James C. Derieux, "For Distinguished Congressional Service," *Collier's* (April 26, 1947), pp. 78–79. The awards, made each year for four years to one member of each house, consisted of a $10,000 cash prize and a gold medal presented by the President of the United States. Other senators chosen were Arthur H. Vandenberg (1945), Alben W. Barkley (1947), and Vandenberg again (1948). Young Bob's style in the Senate was not his father's; indeed, by the time the *Collier's* award was made he probably was a valued member of the Inner Club. But the point is that his independence was stressed in the article announcing the award.

[30] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 105 (September 11, 1959), pp. 19085–86. See also William Benton, "For Distinguished Service in Congress," *New York Times Magazine* (July 24, 1955), pp. 14 ff.

[31] New York *Times*, May 5, 1957, IV, p. 2.

vice from many people.[32] The senators finally selected were Webster, Calhoun, Clay, Taft, and the senior LaFollette. The names fall almost automatically into slots — the nationalist, the sectionalist, the compromiser, the arch Republican, the maverick liberal.[33] Was the committee — perhaps consciously — filling historic roles? The choice of LaFollette is striking. It is doubtful that any man ever aroused more bitter antagonisms in the Senate or was ever more reviled by his colleagues than he.[34] That LaFollette was selected as a prototype seems more likely from the fact that his closest competitor was George W. Norris, a man not like any of the other "outstanding persons" but the most like LaFollette.[35]

What happens inside the Senate to the Outsider? Not much; as White observed, the Senate is not a body disposed to impose sanctions on any behavior but the most outrageous. The point is important. A group may be expected to punish deviant behavior, and the Senate has proved that it can and will do so with dreadful finality.[36] Calculated and continued flouting of the dignity and good order of the Senate, easier to recognize than define, is deviance which compels sanctions. It will be punished finally, as Huey Long and Joe McCarthy learned, by a spiritual banishment more conclusive than formal censure and more galling, in its daily erosion of ego, than physical expulsion. But the Senate is of all official bodies (again, as White remarked) perhaps the most tolerant of individualistic, even eccentric, behavior.

Institutional arrangements, both formal and informal, encourage tolerance. An external system determines who shall be members and confers upon them an equal official status, and the seniority system softens the contest for status and preference internally. The Senate is a relatively large group (though its smallness has always been emphasized); it *does* have a hundred members, and the staff people who share intimately in the work of the body multiply that number several times. Differences in style, temperament and goals therefore may be softened by simple avoidance if not by the sharing of committee tasks, or by the temporary alliances of mutual interest which account for much legislation. And because the Senate agenda is managed largely by unanimous consent a majority judiciously refrains from employing against irksome behavior the small sanctions which serve merely to irritate the offending members. The imposition of censure or ostracism is a rare and traumatic action reserved for really deviant behavior usually borne a long time.

The evidence is strong that the Senate accepts as legitimate a wide range of behavior. Its members advance without hindrance to the perquisites of seniority, and some of the most powerful committees have had rather odd chairmen. Relations among subgroups appear to be easy; an Outsider who fights with only a handful of friends on one issue may, because of personal expertness on the subject, be chosen by the leadership to lead the party on a crucial measure the next week. Proxmire has said that no sanctions have been imposed on him; on the contrary, the leadership gave him substantial help in 1960 in the passage of a dairy price support bill which was helpful to his constituents.[37] Proxmire, like other Out-

[32] The original committee was made up of Lyndon B. Johnson, chairman; Richard B. Russell, Styles Bridges, Mike Mansfield, and Eugene D. Millikin. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 101 (August 2, 1955), p. 12967. Johnson later was replaced by Kennedy and Millikin by John W. Bricker. For a description of the selection process, see John F. Kennedy, "Search for the Five Greatest Senators," *New York Times Magazine* (April 14, 1957), pp. 14–18.

[33] See S. Rept. No. 279, 85th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record*, Vol. 103 (May 1, 1957), pp. 6206–08.

[34] This was frankly acknowledged in the committee report, *ibid.*, p. 6205, which says of LaFollette, in part: "Ceaseless battler for the underprivileged in an age of special privilege, courageous independent in an age of partisan conformity, he fought memorably against tremendous odds and stifling inertia for social and economic reforms which ultimately proved essential to American progress in the 20th century. . . . The bitter antagonisms stirred by his unyielding opposition to international commitments and conflict were ultimately submerged by widespread admiration for his dedicated life-long fight against political corruption and corporate greed." An editorial criticism of the selections characterizes LaFollette as "the champion of lost causes." "What Makes These Senators Great?" *Christian Century* (May 15, 1957), p. 612.

[35] *Congressional Record, ibid.*, pp. 6212–13.

[36] *White, op. cit.*, pp. 121–35.

[37] S. 2917, S. Rept. 1592, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.; P.L. 86–799. See *Congressional Record* (daily edition, August 19, 1960), pp. 15594–600.

siders, readily joins subgroups in support of common interests and frequently votes with the majority. The behavior associated with the Outsider role seems to fall well within the bounds of what most members of the Senate regard as tolerable.

If this analysis is correct, an assumption of role consensus in the Senate is incorrect; there is variability not only in the behavior of occupants of the senator position but in the expectations — the "ideal patterns" — of behavior to which members may conform.[38] The Outsider therefore is not a deviant but an alternative role. It would be a mistake also to assume, without empirical justification, a bimodal distribution of acceptable behaviors — the Inner Club member and the Outsider. What is more probable is the existence of several legitimate "senator" roles. One thinks, for instance, of the persistence of the pure service type, the "Errand Boy," who eschews controversy and distinguishes himself neither in committee nor on the floor, but renders himself unbeatable by causing his beneficence to fall like gentle rain on all his constituents, Democrats and Republicans alike. The identification and conceptualization of alternative roles will in turn provide important clues to strains and conflicts, or to the existence of subsystems, within the body.[39]

It should be emphasized, however, that the successful performance of this task would by no means exhaust the sets of role orientations in the Senate which are worth analysis.[40] What we are dealing with here — the way the senator relates himself generally to his colleagues and the obligations of his office, or better, the *style* of his performance in chamber, committee room and office — is concerned with only one set, albeit an important one. Externally it is the image of himself as senator which he projects to his publics. Within the Senate it is the cluster of attitudes and modes of behavior toward other members which identify him to them and stimulate and shape their attitudes and behavior toward him. The choice of this role among available alternatives is therefore crucial to the successful performance of his other roles and to his self-esteem, and its importance is heightened by the fact that, once adopted, it is not easy to change.

IV

The disability usually supposed to be associated with the Outsider role is that the senator who chooses it is thereby doomed to be less effective in the Senate. White puts it indirectly: the Inner Club runs the Senate;[41] the Outsider would be then, by definition, not of much consequence. Matthews goes further, attempting to test the proposition that the more effective member abides by the folkways. He constructs an index of "Legislative Effectiveness" by calculating the proportion of all public bills and resolutions introduced by each senator in two successive congresses that were passed by the Senate, arguing that "to the extent that the concept as used on Capitol Hill has any distinct meaning, 'effectiveness' seems to mean the ability to get one's bills passed." He then plots the effectiveness index against indexes measuring conformity with two Senate folkways and concludes: "The less a senator talks on the Senate floor, and the narrower a senator's area of legislative interest and activity, the greater is his 'effectiveness.' "[42]

It should be said at once that Matthews is as modest in his claims for his statistical test as he is resourceful in constructing it. Nevertheless the effectiveness index raises questions too important to ignore. To the individual senator, to whom being a senator is part of a professional career, the ability to get reelected might be considered a fair test of effectiveness and any behavior judicious which helps him pass the test. From the point of view of so-

[38] See the discussion of "the postulate of role consensus" in Neal, et al., *op. cit.*, ch. 2.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp.25–26.

[40] The most perceptive and elaborate statement of the interrelated sets of roles within a legislative sub-system is found in the comparative study of four state legislatures by Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, LeRoy C. Ferguson and William Buchanan, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (September, 1959), pp. 742–56; "The Legislator as Specialist," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13 (September, 1960), pp. 636–51; and especially their mimeographed working paper, "The Role Concept in the Comparative Study of State Legislatures," pp. 3–17. See also my "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (June, 1954), pp. 340–365.

[41] *Op. cit.*, pp. 86–87.

[42] *Op. cit.*, pp. 114–17.

ciety, the conception of the Senate as a bill-and-resolution factory where the individual members are paid on a piece-work basis seems both too narrow and contrary to fact. To take the last point first, the passage of a bill is a collective process in which the introducer may have played a very small part, if indeed his bill was not changed beyond recognition.[43] Conversely, bill introduction may be no more than a form of advocacy, or a way to state a personal platform, or simply a bid for publicity. Or again, a senator may persistently sponsor legislation he knows can pass only well in the future, if at all, as George Norris did the TVA.[44] But more important, the enactment of legislation is but one and perhaps not the most important function of either house of Congress, let alone of all members individually. An adequate assessment of the effectiveness of alternative Senate roles or individual role-takers must await an analysis of the political functions performed by the Senate.[45]

Suppose, for instance, that one function of the legislature should prove to be "the institutionalization, crystallization and resolution of conflicts."[46] Might not then the Outsider's outspoken championship of minority, perhaps unpopular, views contribute to the process? The analysis would have to take account of the latent functions — the unintended and unrecognized consequences — as well as the manifest functions.[47] A latent function of the legislature might be to provide catharsis for fringe views which never will prevail.[48] If so, what better agent than the lone fighter against hopeless odds (regardless of his motivations or what he fights for) who, as he afflicts the mighty, may serve as the psychological representative of all the Outsiders in the great society?[49] To turn the questions around, is it likely that certain modes of legislative behavior should persist over long periods of time *without* having relevance for the political functions the legislature is called upon to perform?

It may be that Senate role and Senate function are directly linked and either may be approached through the other. The "ideal pattern" of behavior which we have called "role" may embrace one or more basic functions of the Senate, performed in greater or less degree by all the members, writ large and personified in the "ideal" role-taker. Thus the Errand Boy, if we may assume there is such a role, simply is performing to the virtual exclusion of everything else a function which by all accounts has always consumed a great deal of energy and time of senators and (especially since the Legislative Reorganization Act) their staff. In any event, what is important is that a functional analysis be made, and that it take into account what the legislators actually do and not just putative functions ascribed to them. Not until such an analysis has been satisfactorily performed can anyone say what senatorial role is "effective" and what is not.

Any sophisticated assessment of Senate roles, moreover, must recognize that any role, or even a single item of behavior, may have "diverse consequences, functional and dysfunctional, for individuals, for sub-groups, and for the more inclusive social structure and culture."[50] Thus the behavior of the Senate type

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[43] In determining standards for the selection of the five outstanding senators, Kennedy rejected the notion of choosing those whose names are prominently associated with legislation. He pointed out that the senator whose name a bill bears may not be for the bill and may not even have read it, while a senator whose legislative efforts fail may find that later on someone else will take up his bill and succeed. John F. Kennedy, *op. cit.*

[44] Stephen K. Bailey and Howard D. Samuel, *Congress at Work* (New York, 1952), ch. 8; Henry C. Hart, "Legislative Abdication in Regional Development," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 13 (1951), pp. 393–417.

[45] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), pp. 19–84.

[46] In their forthcoming comparative study of four state legislatures, Eulau, Wahlke, Ferguson and Buchanan use this phrase to define the legislative process.

[47] *Op. cit.*, pp. 60–84. Merton makes "the distinction between manifest functions and latent functions; the first referring to those objective consequences for a specified unit (person, subgroup, social or cultural system) which contribute to its adjustment or adaptation and were so intended; the second referring to unintended and unrecognized consequences of the same order."

[48] David B. Truman suggests this as one of the functions of the public hearing of the congressional committee. *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1953), pp. 372–77.

[49] This is suggested by Proxmire's mail from all over the country when, for instance, he criticized his party's leadership in the Senate.

[50] Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

who is in the Inner Club may be functional for groups which benefit from preserving the status quo, dysfunctional for those seeking change; functional for the preservation of harmony within the body, dysfunctional for conflict resolution in the larger society. The behavior associated with the Outsider may be functional for protest groups seeking a spokesman, dysfunctional for groups needing leverage inside the legislative body. It may even be functional for the leadership, to the degree that it makes more persuasive the middle position usually taken by the leaders. A given role may be functional in some respects for the role-taker, dysfunctional in others. Proxmire, for example, unquestionably has paid a price for choosing the Outsider role (as he would if he had chosen another) which he believes to be justified by the increased freedom of action it gives him. The important thing would seem to be not what role is chosen but what the role-taker uses it for, what goals are served by it. The Inner Club member may get little more than the personal satisfaction of belonging, the Outsider no more than personal publicity. Either may, on the other hand, choose his role self-consciously with the probable consequences clearly in mind, in order to maximize the advantages to be gained toward legislative goals he has set himself.

25

LAWYERS AND AMERICAN POLITICS

A Clarified View

• *JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER*

The observation that there is an affinity between lawyers and politics is a commonplace of the literature of political science.[1] In all the Western democracies the law has been the dominant occupation of politicians and the lawyer's importance has reached its highest point in the United States.[2] Many reasons have been proposed for this phenomenon, but for the most part they have been unrefined and untested inferences based upon the original observation.

It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the relation between lawyers and politics more closely on the basis of empirical data. The data have been gathered from the careers of men who were elected governor of the American states in the period from 1870 to 1950. From an examination of their careers three hypotheses have been advanced. (1) The compatibility of the professions of law and politics operates to the advantage of lawyers primarily when they are career politicians. (2) The lawyer's advantage in politics derives not so much from generalized political skills as from specific legal skills which give him a monopoly of offices related to the administration of law in the court system. (3) There are regional differences in the extent and character of the lawyer's dominance in American politics.

The most widely accepted reason given for

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[1] For example, Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," *Essays in Sociology,* ed. and trans. by H. Gerth and C. Mills (New York, 1946), pp. 94–95; Harold Laski, *Studies in Law and Politics* (New Haven, 1932), p. 197.

[2] Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Garden City, N.Y., 1954), p. 30, has an excellent summary table of various studies of American politicians. Of American congressmen in the period 1949–51, 57 per cent were lawyers. In the British Parliament 23 per cent of the members from 1918–35 were lawyers, and in the French National Assembly elected in 1951 there were 15.4 per cent lawyers. J. F. S. Ross, *Parliamentary Representation* (New Haven, 1944), p. 77; Mattei Dogan, "L'Origine Sociale du Personnel Parlementaire Français," in *Partis Politiques et Classes Sociales en France,* ed. by M. Duverger (Paris, 1955), p. 309.

the distinctive position of lawyers in politics is that in modern capitalist society the law is the profession most compatible with a political career.[3] Politics is both a part time and a hazardous profession. A fortunate politician has some other source of income which is not upset by the discontinuities of a political career. Presumably the lawyer's trade is more flexible than that of the businessman or of other professionals. At the same time, the law itself changes so slowly that a lawyer can return to his private practice without much loss of skill, especially if his political activity has had anything to do with the making and interpretation of laws. It is not surprising that young men with political ambitions tend to study the law, for occupationally it is the best hedge against the ever-present possibility of failure in politics.

Not only, is it asserted, are lawyers less subject to the hazards of politics, but as a group they are more likely to gain positively in their private affairs from political activity. Political campaigning is generally regarded as an effective form of ethical advertising. In addition, political activity provides lawyers with the kinds of experience and contacts which can aid their private trade. Given the professional advantages of a political career to the lawyer, the compatibility explanation asserts that lawyers are more willing and eager to enter politics than other men. It follows, therefore, that more politicians will be lawyers.

The preceding explanation, however, must be qualified by the fact that occupational compatibility does not necessarily have the same influence in every situation. Not all public officeholders are involved in political activity to the same degree. Thus the need of a particular politician for a compatible non-political occupation is dependent on the extent and character of his political involvement. Officeholder A, for example, has spent fifteen years on and off in various offices. He is evidently a political careerist. Officeholder B has never held office before. If, on the basis of the compatibility argument, we ask which one is most likely to be the lawyer, the answer is obviously politician A or the political careerist. In other words, the advantage which lawyers have in politics, as a result of the special relation between the two occupations, accrues to them primarily when public office goes to men with extensive political careers.

This conclusion may be tested empirically by examining the careers of the governors of the states. In the period from 1870 to 1950 there were 995 men elected governor in all of the states combined.[4] Of these 456 were practicing lawyers.[5] The legal profession is, therefore, distinctly predominant amongst the governors. How do these lawyer-governors differ from their colleagues? Are they clearly the political careerists?

Let us examine first the most distinctly amateur of the governors, those who had never spent any time in public office before obtaining the governorship. This does not necessarily mean that they had little experience in political activity. However, as a group, such governors never had to face the hazards of office-holding. If our thesis is correct, occupational compatibility should influence least the sources from which governors with no office experience have been drawn. Consequently, lawyers should have no special predominance among them. Such, indeed, is the case. (See Table 1, first column.) Among these amateur governors we find that businessmen as a group actually outnumber the lawyers by more than two to one. The representatives of the non-legal professions combined, largely journalists and educators, are found in the same proportion as lawyers. Thus, among the governors who are amateur politicians, it is evident that lawyers enjoy no particular advantage, as they should not if their favered position in politics is due largely to occupational compatibility.

[3] Matthews, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–32, gives a brief summary of the usual explanations of lawyers in politics. See also Matthews, "United States Senators and the Class Structure," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVIII (1954), 5–22.

[4] This figure includes only governors elected in their own right, excluding those who succeeded from the lieutenant governorship or some other office. No governor is counted more than once. The sources of the information on their careers are varied and include all of the major biographical collections, notably, the *Dictionary of American Biography*, the *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–1949*, *Current Biography*, and *Who's Who in America*.

[5] Governors admitted to the bar or with law degrees who clearly did not practice the law were not considered lawyers for the purposes of the study.

TABLE 1. *Occupations of American Governors (1870–1950) and Political Careerism*

Non-political occupation	*Number of years spent in public office before being elected governor, in percentages*				
	0	1–4	5–9	10–14	15 and over
Law	20	38	45	58	61
Business	52	40	37	27	23
Farming	8	8	9	7	10
Professions (other than law)	20	14	9	8	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Number (Total, 932)*	86	154	287	225	180

* The discrepancy in the totals between this and the succeeding tables is due to the lack of complete information for all of the categories in the cross-tabulations. The actual total number of governors considered was 995. Of these 456 were lawyers.

Careerism is, after all, a relative concept. The longer time a man has spent in office before becoming governor, the more justified we are in describing him as a political careerist. Such an influence as occupational compatibility should become increasingly effective the longer a man's office career. We can perceive this influence among the governors, for there is a relation between the length of a man's career in politics and the likelihood that he was also a lawyer. (See Table 1.) Among the governors with less than five years in office previously, businessmen continue to outnumber the lawyers. The lawyers only reach an absolute majority of all governors amongst those with ten or more years of experience. The chances, therefore, are only one in five that a governor with no office experience will be a lawyer. For governors with over fifteen years in office the chances rise to three in five. This direct relation between the length of a man's career leading up to the governorship and his occupation lends weight to the proposition that the lawyer in politics is to be equated with the careerist in politics.

The lawyer governors are political careerists in another sense besides that indicated by their length of service. Their commitment to politics begins at an earlier age and its pursuit is more continuous than is the case for non-lawyer governors. Almost half of the lawyers had already attained some public office before reaching the age of thirty. (See Table 2.) This was true of relatively few of the non-lawyers. At the same time, lawyers reached the office of governor at an age earlier than men of other occupations, the majority of them even before the age of fifty. As the governors get older the lawyers' proportion decreases, despite the fact that, as we have seen, lawyers have had more prior office experience.

The difference in the timetable of the lawyer and non-lawyer reflects a much greater intensity in the former's commitment to politics. Reaching the governorship before the age of fifty, the lawyer politician has not necessarily reached the peak of his career. Before him is still the possibility of the United States Senate and perhaps even higher office. The lawyer's career thus contrasts with that of the businessman or journalist who reaches the governorship in his fifties or sixties. For the latter a political career is supplementary, to be pursued after a successful career outside of politics.

In the traditional explanation of the lawyer's predominance in politics the argument of occupational compatibility is generally supplemented by the attribution of special political qualities to the lawyer as such.[6] This additional argument is necessary because the mere willingness of a group to accept political office cannot explain why the electorate should comply in this decision. Thus it is pointed out that lawyers enjoy high social prestige. As professional representatives of diverse interests they are accredited with skill in the arbitration of social conflicts. Finally there is assigned to them

[6] Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers*, pp. 30–31.

special talents in debate and verbal exposition. All of these factors help make the members of the legal profession an elite political class.

The assumption that lawyers have better than average political skill, however, is a form of residual explanation which should be resorted to only when their position can be explained in no other way. Lawyers may or may not be better politicians than other men. Officeholding in itself proves only that lawyers are acceptable to the electorate. Is there, then, any other positive advantage that lawyers enjoy, which, together with occupational compatibility, serves to explain their position in American politics?

One distinct advantage lawyers enjoy in the public office structure of the United States is their monopoly of those offices involved in the administration of law through the courts.[7] The fact that most judges and public attorneys have been lawyers certainly does not indicate superior political skills on the part of lawyers. I may have a high or low opinion of the legal profession, but if I wish to sue my neighbor in a court of law I must hire a lawyer. Nothing in this act indicates how I feel about his skill in personal relations or reflects the prestige he has in my eyes. Similarly, the fact that judges and public attorneys are lawyers reflects only the fact that lawyers are specifically trained for these offices, and that this division of labor is accepted within the social system.

[7] H. D. Lasswell, D. Lerner, and C. E. Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford, 1952), p. 18, mention the lawyer's monopoly as a possible factor explaining his predominance among politicians.

The lawyer's monopoly of law enforcement offices[8] is relevant to our discussion because in American politics there is a great deal of movement from these positions to others of a more general character. It is not unusual for a judge to run for a legislative or executive office. In turn, the law enforcement hierarchy draws its personnel from all of the other branches of government. This easy interchange of personnel, however, leaves the occupational market for politicians in a state of imperfect competition, due to the lawyers' control over a major avenue to public office.

The governorship is a non-law enforcement office for which lawyers, presumably, must compete on equal terms with men of other occupations. The competitive picture, however, is modified by the fact that a high proportion of all of the governors (32 per cent) at some time in their career held a law enforcement office, and many (16 per cent) held one as their last office prior to the governorship. Of all the lawyer governors, approximately a third advanced directly from a law enforcement position. It would appear that for these lawyer governors the law enforcement position rather than their occupation was the significant factor in their advancement to the governorship. The large proportion of lawyer politicians who ad-

[8] The term "law enforcement office" here and in the subsequent discussion refers to all offices related to the administration of the law by the courts. In the experience of governors these positions are mostly those of judge or public attorney. A few governors, however, had been police commissioners or sheriffs.

TABLE 2. *The Timetable of the Political Careers of Lawyer Governors (1870–1950)*

	Ages at Starting Political Career					
	Under 30	30–39	40–49	50–59	60/and over	Total
Number of lawyer governors	223	167	39	9	1	439
Per cent of governors in age group who were lawyers	68	48	35	14	8	
	Ages at Achieving the Governorship					
		Under 40	40–49	50–59	60/and over	
Number of lawyer governors		55	198	138	61	452
Per cent of governors in age group who were lawyers		63	56	38	41	

vanced by means of their office monopoly poses the problem of their importance in a new perspective.

If the lawyer has any extraordinary political aptitude he should be able to maintain his importance without the aid of a law enforcement office. The question, then, is, do the governors who derive from non-law enforcement offices, such as the state legislature or state and local executive positions, show any strong tendency to be lawyers? If the governors are divided according to their last previous office, we find, as we might expect, that most governors coming from law enforcement offices are lawyers. (Table 3.) Among the other groups, however, we find only one in which lawyers are a majority, the former Congressmen.[9] Businessmen rank on a par with lawyers among the former state legislators and minor state officers. And among former administrators and local officers it is the businessman rather than the lawyer who predominates. As we have already observed, among governors with no office experience, lawyers are relegated to a minor position. From this evidence it is clear that a great deal of the lawyer's status in American politics is directly related to his monopoly of the law enforcement offices.[10]

Further analysis reveals, in fact, that lawyers are becoming increasingly dependent on a law enforcement office as a means of political advancement. Over the eighty years covered by this study, the proportion of lawyer governors who have come from law enforcement offices has steadily increased. (Table 4.) Between 1870 and 1950 the actual number of lawyers remained stable, rising somewhat in the first and last decades of the time span.[11] This stability in numbers, however, obscures the fact that both the proportion of governors with some form of law enforcement experience and of those who held such office just prior to the governorship have increased almost steadily in the same period. The proportion of lawyer governors who at one time had held a law enforcement office rose from 56 to 77 per cent, reach-

[9] Why lawyers are so abundant among Congressmen is a problem needing closer study. It is possible that this is due to a greater degree of careerism among congressmen than is the case among state officials.

[10] One might argue that careerism and the control of a law enforcement office are related to each other, i.e., the former is the product of the latter since judicial offices generally are held for longer terms than other offices. Actually the two influences appear to be independent of each other. Both groups of lawyer governors, those who did and those who did not advance from a law enforcement office, exhibit the same characteristics of careerism.

[11] A governor is attributed here only to that decade in which he was first elected governor.

TABLE 3. *The Relation Between the Occupations of the Governors and the Last Public Office Held Before the Governorship, Stated in Percentages*

Non-Political Occupation	*Last Office Type* Held before the Governorship*					
	Law enforcement	*Federal Elective*	*State Legislative*	*Statewide Elective*	*Local Elective*	*Administrative*
Lawyers	95	52	39	38	31	29
Businessmen	4	29	37	39	51	42
Farmers	0	9	14	9	4	10
Professionals (other than lawyers)	1	10	10	12	12	15
Unknown	0	0	0	2	2	4
	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total Number	162	112	200	157	74	136

* The office types are composed as follows: law enforcement: all offices related to the administration of law by the courts, judge, public attorney, etc. at all levels of government; federal elective: U. S. Senators and congressmen; statewide elective: all of the generally elected state officers such as lieutenant governor, secretary of state, excluding judges and attorneys general; local elective: mayors, city councillors, and county officials; administrative: all appointive offices at all levels of government, excluding the legal positions.

TABLE 4. *The Changing Office Careers of Lawyer Governors 1870–1950*

Decade	*Number of lawyers elected governor*	*Per cent of lawyer governors with law enforcement experience*	*Per cent of lawyer governors whose last previous office was law enforcement*
1870–79	68	56	22
1880–89	51	61	16
1890–99	55	64	31
1900–09	54	67	37
1910–19	56	73	43
1920–29	54	78	44
1930–39	53	85	51
1940–50	65	77	42

ing a high of 85 per cent in the 1930's. The proportion of lawyer governors coming directly from a law enforcement office went from a low of 16 per cent in the 1880's to a high of 51 per cent in the 1930's.

These long range trends imply that the lawyer's role in American politics has been changing from that of versatile politician to that of legal technician. The nineteenth century lawyer governor appears to have been the political man in the more general sense, precisely because he was able to advance through legislative and administrative offices for which he had to compare equally with men of other occupations. In contrast, the lawyer governor of the mid-twentieth century seems far more dependent upon his technical legal role. What in effect has happened, the evidence suggests, is that the role of the courts and judicial administration is increasing in importance. Therefore the success of lawyers in becoming governor is more a product of the public attorney's and judge's ability to advance in office than it is of any generalized political skill on the part of the lawyer.

The evidence, it is true, does not rule out the possibility of generalized political skills on the part of lawyers. They continue to form a sizable proportion of the governors who came from all offices, certainly more than their numbers in the population at large would warrant. However, they are far from being the dominant element in American politics, once their monopolistic advantage is removed.

If the lawyer's position has not been the same over time, it is equally important to realize that his role in politics varies considerably among the states. As semi-independent political systems we should expect the states to differ in their office promotion patterns. For this reason the conclusions we have reached with respect to office holding by lawyers in the United States have only more or less validity for each of the forty-eight states. For one thing, the proportion of lawyers among the governors is not uniformly distributed among the states. Secondly, the very bases of the lawyer's position appear to differ from region to region.

If we examine the distribution of lawyers among the governors, we find a sizable number of states in which lawyers enjoyed no particular predominance at all. In twelve states less than 30 per cent of the governors in the period 1870 to 1950 were lawyers. (See Table 5.) In two of these states, Utah and Delaware, no governor was ever a lawyer, an extreme inversion of the general proposition. In general, the proportion of lawyers was distinctly lowest in the Western Mountain states. Of the region's eight states, five, Utah, Wyoming, Nevada, Idaho, and Arizona, were in this category. New England also was an area of low importance for lawyers. There, the only state to have as many lawyer governors as the national average was Massachusetts, with 47 per cent. The remaining states with few lawyer governors form no distinct regional concentration, although it should be pointed out that almost all are from the West and Midwest. It is in the South and border states that lawyers are heavily concentrated. Viewing the states at large we can say that the general proposition that lawyers are especially abundant among political leaders is false for about one-fourth of the states.

Just as the lawyer's importance in politics varies regionally within the United States, so does his use of the law enforcement office monopoly as a means to political advancement. The range in the proportion of lawyer governors who had held a law enforcement office just prior to the governorship goes from a low of 0 per cent in Iowa to a high of 67 per cent in Texas. In Table 5 the states have been arranged to show precisely this variation in the office experience of lawyer governors. The states where lawyers were of any significance among the governors (i.e., over 30 per cent) are placed in three arbitrary categories according to the proportion of governors coming from law enforcement offices. Category I contains those states where the proportion is low, category III those where the proportion is high. Category II contains the intermediate group for whom the evidence is least conclusive either way.

Using the categories of Table 5 a number of distinct regional groupings is discernible. All of the New England states fall either in the group where lawyers are negligible among the governors or in category I, the states whose governors have been least dependent on law enforcement positions. In New England it is clear that the position which the lawyer enjoys in politics is not the product of his monopoly of law enforcement offices. The Southern states cluster in categories I and II, which suggests that in these states as well the lawyer's dominance is the product of something other than

TABLE 5. *The Distribution of Lawyer Governors Among the States, and the Proportion of Such Governors who Came from Law Enforcement Office*

The figure following each state is the percentage of lawyer governors, 1870–1950

	New England	Southern States	Border States	Western Mountain	Other States
States where less than 30 per cent of the governors were lawyers					
	N.H. 19			Utah 0	Del. 0
	Conn. 29			Wyo. 6	Wis. 22
				Nev. 6	Ore. 24
				Ida. 14	Neb. 26
				Ariz. 22	N.D. 26
					Mich. 28
States where 30 per cent or more of the governors were lawyers					
Category I:					
0–25 per cent of lawyer governors came directly from law enforcement office	Vt. 36 R.I. 31 Mass. 47 Me. 30	Va. 73 Miss. 65 Okla. 42 N.C. 85			Iowa 45 Ind. 57 N.Y. 59 Kans. 30
Category II:					
27–42 per cent of lawyer governors came directly from law enforcement office		Ala. 67 Fla. 68 Ga. 73 S.C. 59 La. 68	Md. 72 Ky. 67 W. Va. 80 Tenn. 81		Cal. 39 Ill. 79 N.J. 59 Wash. 45 Penna. 67 Minn. 57
Category III:					
50–67 per cent of lawyer governors came directly from law enforcement office			Mo. 55 Ark. 64 Tex. 55	N.M. 36 Mont. 90 Col. 43	S.D. 42 Ohio 50

a monopoly of law enforcement offices. The fact that in the South a much higher proportion of governors were lawyers than in New England would indicate that the lawyers in the former states are the true political men in a general sense. The border states, in contrast, group in categories II and III, indicating the greatest support for the assumption that lawyers are dependent on law enforcement offices. In the Western Mountain states, also, lawyers appear to be dependent on their office monopoly for advancement. Although lawyers generally play a small part in the politics of these states, those in which they are significant all fall in category III.

The fact that the states do fall into regional groups when classified according to our categories lends additional significance to the findings. When states which resemble one another in the way they recruit their political leaders also have similar political histories and social and economic structures, we can be more confident that leadership recruitment itself is not simply the product of chance elements. Thus we should expect to find that the importance of lawyers and the extent to which they are dependent upon their monopoly of law enforcement office are related to the states' political systems.

In Texas, for example, we have noted that lawyer governors have been exceptionally dependent upon law enforcement offices for political advancement. These offices gain an additional advantage in the state's politics from the close identification of all local government with the county courthouse.[12] On closer examination of the state's history we are able to observe how the character of its political conflicts also focused attention upon the major law enforcement positions. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a rapidly expanding economy created political demands for regulation of railroad, insurance, and oil interests. These demands placed the attorney general in an especially conspicuous and strategic position for the attainment of political power. The first attorney general to utilize his position in this manner was James S. Hogg, who became governor in 1891 on a platform of railroad regulation. He was succeeded by his own attorney general, C. A. Culberson.[13] Since then the attorney general has normally been a major contestant for promotion to the governorship or the U.S. Senate. In 1926 Dan Moody became governor after having made much capital out of the frauds of the Ferguson regime.[14] Moody had originally been able to rise to the attorney generalship because of his successful prosecution of the Ku Klux Klan. Later, in 1934, attorney general James Allred also became governor. The most recent attorney general to gain major office in Texas has been Senator Price Daniel. Thus a political system in which law enforcement offices are a major avenue of advancement inevitably produces a high proportion of lawyers amongst its leaders.

In Montana politics the lawyer has much the same position as in Texas. From the beginning of its statehood up to 1950 Montana had ten elected governors, nine of whom were lawyers. All of these lawyer governors at some time held a law enforcement office, and five held such an office directly before the governorship. The state's politics has to a large extent revolved about the courts. As its predominantly mining economy developed, the primary service demanded of government was frequently litigation of conflicting economic interests, first of competing owner groups, later of management and labor. And always at issue has been the power of government to take in taxes the wealth gained from natural resources by private capital.[15] It is not difficult to understand, then, the special premium which the judge and public attorney, and thus incidentally lawyers, have enjoyed in Montana's politics.

In conclusion, it is evident that the lawyer's relation to politics is not the product of any single factor. It is true that all of the evidence we have examined deals with a single group of officials, the governors of the states, and any

[12] Caleb P. Patterson *et al.*, *State and Local Government in Texas* (New York, 1948), pp. 453–54.

[13] Rupert N. Richardson, *Texas, the Lone Star State* (New York, 1943), p. 359.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 430; Hart Stillwell, "Texas," in *Our Sovereign State*, ed. by R. S. Allen (New York, 1949), p. 326.

[15] Joseph K. Howard, *Montana, High, Wide, and Handsome* (New Haven, 1943) is the best general discussion of Montana's history. For descriptions of the legal battles occurring around the turn of the century see C. P. Connelly, *The Devil Learns to Vote, the Story of Montana* (New York, 1938) and C. B. Glasscock, *War of the Copper Kings* (New York, 1935).

conclusions should be restricted to this group. We have demonstrated, however, that lawyers enjoy two distinct advantages in becoming governor. The first is that of the compatibility of the professions of law and politics. As we have pointed out, this is an advantage which accrues to lawyers primarily when positions of political leadership go to career politicians. The lawyer's second advantage lies in his monopoly of offices related to the administration of law by the courts. When and where these offices lead to the governorship the lawyer also becomes governor. In most of the states one or both of these factors explain the dominant position of the lawyer. However, both the importance of lawyers as such, and the relative impact of their office monopoly are highly variable from state to state. Thus the explanation of the lawyer's position in American politics must always be related to the milieu in which he is able to advance. The fact that these differences are regionally concentrated suggests further that occupational sources of American political leaders are integrally related to the states' political systems.

26

NEGRO REGISTRATION

• *H. DOUGLAS PRICE*

Judicial and Legislative Policy

On March 16, 1944, Florida's Attorney-General J. Tom Watson — no close relative of the Georgia Populist despite certain similarities — replied to a question submitted to him: the question whether members of the colored race should be allowed to register as Democrats. His answer, which ought to have caused the old Tom Watson to rest a little more securely in his grave, was:

> Political parties in Florida do not perform a government function, neither do they, or either of them, constitute a governmental agency. Such parties came into existence, not as the children of statute, but as a result of the exercise of the free will and choice of those citizens who compose them. . . .
>
> The Democratic Party in Florida, speaking through its State Democratic Executive Committee, has provided that only white persons may become members of such Party. See Resolution Number 2, adopted January 17, A.D. 1944. This determination of qualification for party membership is a valid exercise of the inherent power of the Party. . . .[1]

Reprinted by permission from H. D. Price, *The Negro and Southern Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1957), pp. 27–58.

[1] J. Tom Watson, *Biennial Report of the Attorney-General: Florida, 1943–1944* (Tallahassee, 1945), p. 145.

At this time the Supreme Court decision on the Texas white primary was still pending.

Just eighteen days after Mr. Watson delivered his opinion on the private nature of political parties the Supreme Court held, in the case of *Smith v. Allwright*, exactly the opposite. Eight of the nine Justices agreed that when the privilege of membership in a party "is also the essential qualification for voting in a primary to select nominees for a general election, the state makes the action of the party the action of the state." The wording of the decision left little hope for any form of white primary:

> . . . When primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing officials, state and national, as they have here, the same tests to determine the character of discrimination or abridgment should be applied to the primary as are applied to the general election. . . .
>
> The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials without restriction by any State because of race. This grant to the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a State through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization to practice racial discrimination in the election.[2]

[2] Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944). This decision expressly overruled Grovey v. Townsend, Chapter I, note 42 *supra*. Justice Roberts, the sole dissenter, objected to overruling so recent a precedent, on the ground that it reduced the Court's

Although the decision came after the close of registration for Florida's 1944 primaries, it brought an immediate response in the South.

The reception of the Supreme Court's decision against the Democratic white primary varied widely. In South Carolina one legislator was quoted as saying of the prospective Negro voter: "we'll fight him at the precinct meeting, we'll fight him at the county convention, we'll fight him at the enrollment books, and, by God, we'll fight him at the polls if I have to bite the dust as did my ancestors!"[3] In Florida Tom Conely, chairman of the Democratic Executive Committee, announced in less colorful terms: "We'll certainly resist if possible any attempt to have Negroes vote in our primaries."[4] Paradoxically, some of the strongest statements in defense of the white primary in Florida came from liberal Senator Claude Pepper, then engaged in a primary fight in which his alleged sympathy for the Negro had already become a major issue.[5]

On the legal front a variety of schemes for evasion were put forward.[6] Arkansas sought partial evasion by establishing separate primaries for state and for national offices, on the dubious assumption that the decision might not apply to state office and that a system of four primaries (including the runoffs if there were no majority winner) would prove workable. The sovereign state of Georgia, which has been at odds with the Supreme Court off and on since 1795, refused to register Negroes as Democrats until after a Georgia test case had been decided by the federal courts. Alabama adopted a special constitutional amendment, subsequently held unconstitutional, which delegated wide discretionary powers over registration to local boards of registrars. Perhaps the most serious threat to the decision came in South Carolina. The Palmetto state repealed all its laws relating to primary elections, a move roughly analogous to the current plans of some Southern states to abolish public schools and substitute some form of private tuition-subsidy system. This device served to prevent Negroes from voting in the 1946 South Carolina private primaries, but they moved to challenge the system in the federal courts.

In Florida supplementary court action also proved necessary. Suits were brought against the supervisors of registration in several counties.[7] Most such actions ended at the local court level with the Negroes being accepted as eligible for registration as Democrats. The supervisor of registration in Escambia County (Pensacola), however, appealed the local decisions in his two test cases to the Florida Supreme Court. Attorney-General J. Tom Watson entered a brief denying that the *Smith v. Allwright* decision was controlling in the Florida situation, but the court held that it was controlling and that eligible Negroes must be allowed to register in the party of their choice.[8] Watson subsequently advised the Florida secretary of state, in reply to an official inquiry, that this decision superseded his earlier ruling to the contrary.[9]

Except for causing some last-minute embarrassment to Senator Pepper, the white primary issue came too late to have much effect on the 1944 primaries in Florida. By the time the Florida courts had applied the Supreme Court decision to the local scene Pepper had won renomination and Millard Caldwell, a middle-of-the-road candidate, had won the Democratic nomination for the 1945–49 term as governor. In some other Southern states, particularly Georgia and South Carolina, candidates for state-wide office were able to make political hay out of the primary voting issue, but the Florida election calendar and subsequent federal court decisions prevented the issue from ever coming

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decisions to "the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only." 321 U.S. 669.

[3] Quoted by Stetson Kennedy, "The White Primary vs. Democracy," *The Southern Frontier*, VI, No. 11 (November 1945), p. 4.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] See the account by Francis P. Locke in J. T. Salter, *Public Men In and Out of Office* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), pp. 257–76.

[6] For the details and eventual fate of these schemes see Key, *Southern Politics*, Chapters 25–31.

[7] Farris, "The Re-Enfranchisement of Negroes in Florida," pp. 272–73.

[8] Davis, Supervisor of Registration v. State *ex rel.* Cromwell, 156 Fla. 181 (1945), and Davis, Supervisor of Registration v. State *ex rel.* Chavis, 156 Fla. 178 (1945).

[9] J. Tom Watson, *Biennial Report of the Attorney-General: Florida, 1945–46* (Tallahassee, 1947), pp. 189–90.

to a head in a state-wide campaign in Florida. There were, however, vociferous opponents of Negro registration and voting at the local level in some parts of the state.

In the 1945 session of the Florida legislature a number of proposals were made to "preserve the purity of the ballot": that is, keep Negroes from voting in primaries. Representative McMullen of Hillsborough County (Tampa) led off with a House Joint Resolution calling for a constitutional amendment to grant the legislature further power over suffrage and to require a literacy test among the qualifications for registration.[10] One day later Representative Hendley of Pasco County introduced a bill, similar to the "Arkansas Plan," that would require holding primaries for federal offices at a separate date from all others.[11] A more serious proposal was repealing all state laws relating to the primary, as South Carolina ultimately did. This measure was introduced in the House by Representative Pooser of Jackson County and in the Senate by Senators Mathews of Duval County (Jacksonville) and Sanchez (representing Hamilton, Lafayette, and Suwannee counties).[12] As yet there was little public support for any definite action, and the sixty-day session of the legislature expired without an affirmative stand in either house for any of these proposals.

In the May 1946 Democratic primaries state senator John E. Mathews (of Duval County), who had become the leading spokesman of those advocating new steps to prevent Negro voting, was up for re-election. Although over 9,000 Negroes had already registered as Democrats in Duval County, Mathews made his plan for repealing all primary laws in favor of private white primaries the central issue in his campaign.[13] After a bitter fight Mathews emerged from the runoff victorious. In the following months he sought to build up support for his private primaries plan; however, few legislators were willing to declare their support for his cause. The constitutionality of the South Carolina private primary system was as yet undetermined, and the number of Negroes registered as Democrats in most Florida counties in 1946 was not very impressive (or, from the opposite point of view, alarming). Mathews' cause did not seem hopeless, however: the governor was regarded as favorable to the idea, and the state Democratic Executive Committee (composed of two members from each county) passed a resolution requesting that the legislature repeal the primary laws.[14]

Unfortunately for Senator Mathews his proposals brought forth more organized opposition than organized support. The repeal of all laws relating to primaries would obviously open the door to all sorts of abuses and irregularities in the private elections. Secretary of State R. A. Gray, who has served as chief state election official since 1930, toured the state before the meeting of the 1947 legislature, lining up opposition to the scheme. Ministers, newspapers, prominent civic leaders, and many others expressed their opposition. By framing the issue in terms of a defense of the laws requiring "clean" primary elections, rather than on grounds of "Negro rights," it was possible to create a wide coalition of groups and individuals ordinarily not found in the same camp. Thus the vice-president of the State Junior Chamber of Commerce, the Florida State Federation of Labor, and the Southern Conference for Human Welfare all joined in supporting a state-wide meeting to plan strategy for defeating the private primaries proposal.[15]

By the time the legislature convened it appeared that consideration of the private primary plan would be a waste of time. Mathews, however, would not give up. Whether he seriously expected to win, was trying to exploit an issue for possible use in the 1948 gubernatorial primary, or felt that he had burned his bridges behind him (Duval county Negro registration passed the 12,000 mark in April 1947) is not clear. Whatever the reason, by parliamentary maneuver Mathews forced his bill to the senate floor. After a colorful debate — Mathews was in white linen suit with black string tie[16] — the

[10] *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Florida, 1945* (Tallahassee, 1945), p. 42.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 172, and Senate *Journal*, p. 15.

[13] Farris, "The Re-Enfranchisement of Negroes in Florida," p. 275.

[14] *Ibid.*, 276–77.

[15] *Ibid.*, and *Christian Century*, LXIV (1947), p. 506.

[16] Farris gives a detailed account of this historic debate, which took place to the accompaniment of jeers for Mathews from Tallahassee college students who packed the Senate galleries; *ibid.*, 279–82.

private primary bill was defeated 31 to 4, with two absent senators pairing their opposing stands to make the count 32 to 5 (one additional senator uncommitted). The five supporters were Mathews and four senators from small rural counties of North Florida.[17] Significantly, each of the districts of the latter four senators included one of the four rural counties in which no Negroes had yet registered. No senator from peninsular Florida or from a district west of the Apalachicola River supported the bill.

The wisdom of the opponents of the private primary was soon vindicated. On December 30, 1947, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held the South Carolina plan for private white primaries unconstitutional despite the repeal of all state laws relating to primary elections.[18] And in April 1948 the Supreme Court refused even to review the decision.[19] This refusal effectively killed the private primary idea, and apparently it killed any hopes Mathews may have had of taking the issue to the voters in the 1948 gubernatorial primary. Absence of Mathews from the contest in turn improved the chances of Jacksonville's other gubernatorial possibility, Fuller Warren. Had Mathews run he could have been a serious threat to Warren both in his home bailiwick and in the race-conscious rural counties of North and West Florida. Since the contest involved nine candidates even without Mathews, inroads into Warren's local strongholds might have cut his vote enough to keep him out of the second primary runoff between the two high candidates; another segregation extremist accomplished just this in Warren's 1956 come-back attempt. Warren doubtless realized this possibility full well and apparently made appropriate arrangements. At any rate, Mathews did not announce for the governorship, but came out for Warren. And after Mathews' defeat for re-election to the senate in 1950 Governor Warren appointed him to fill a vacancy on the Florida Supreme Court.

The private primary fight of 1947 marked the last serious effort to forestall Negro voting in Florida by legal means. Although Mathews returned to the 1949 legislature with a plan to amend the state constitution so as to require voters to be able to read any paragraph of the constitution, and proposals were made in both houses in 1951 that ability to "read and write" be required, these plans received no serious consideration. And under modern conditions a literacy test, if honestly administered and not used as a mere pretext for refusing the registration of Negroes, would have only a very limited effect in Florida. In the Deep South, however, a literacy test can still have a very appreciable effect in restricting Negro registration, especially if it is drawn up and applied with that end in mind. In Louisiana, where voters who "make their mark" are recorded separately, in 1954 there were 23,367 such whites (3.1 of the total white registration) and 13,005 colored (11.0 per cent of the total nonwhite registration). Illiteracy doubtless runs even higher among those Louisiana adults who were not registered.[20] In Alabama the complicated questionnaire provided for by the 1951 Voter Qualification Amendment to the state constitution has proved rather effective in minimizing Negro registration, although Negro leaders are conducting questionnaire schools designed to prepare potential registrants to go through the rigmarole.[21] What cannot be openly accom-

[17] Voting in favor of the measure, in addition to Mathews (of Duval County), were Senators W. T. Davis (representing Madison and Taylor counties), Charley E. Johns (Bradford and Union), and Luther C. Tucker (Franklin, Liberty, and Wakulla). Paired in favor of the bill was G. Warren Sanchez (Hamilton, Lafayette, and Suwannee). For the geographical area that these men represented see Map 3, p. 49.

[18] Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (1947).

[19] 333 U.S. 875 (1948). The Supreme Court has subsequently extended the rationale of Rice v. Elmore back one further step by holding, in the case involving the "Democratic Jaybird Club" in Texas, that the Fifteenth Amendment applies even to a preprimary election if it is the controlling step in the election process. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).

[20] Actually Louisiana statutes require that applicants for registration personally fill out the required form. Where this requirement is strictly applied it performs the function of a literacy test. In Rapides parish, for example, it resulted in cutting 300 whites and 800 Negroes from the rolls. So long as it is applied impartially the requirement has been upheld by the federal courts; see *Williams v. McCulley*, 128 F. Supp. 397 (1955).

[21] Donald S. Strong, *Registration of Voters in Alabama* (University, Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration, 1956). This is an excellent analy-

plished by law often can be achieved, at least in part, by resort to more devious stratagems.

The Negro Registers — in Most Counties

The collapse of the Democratic white primary as a legal impediment to Negro voting was a major change in the political rules of the game. Whether it would result in a corresponding major change in the composition of the Florida electorate, however, was a different matter. That Negroes *could* legally register as Democrats and participate in primary elections did not necessarily mean that they would do so in practice. Social and economic pressure from whites, apathy, lack of leadership, low economic and educational status, and many other factors appeared likely to work against widespread Negro registration. To some extent they have done so, but the cumulative change in the picture has still been decidedly striking.

In 1944 no Florida Negro was legally able to vote in the Democratic primary elections, and not over 20,000 were registered so as to participate in the general election. By May 1956, however, total major-party Negro registration in Florida had reached 137,535, of whom 128,437 were registered as Democrats and able to vote in the Democratic primaries. The course of this tremendous growth of Negro registration and the rapid crossing of the Jordan from Republican to Democratic affiliation can be traced in the figures of Table 3. This quantitative change has not been accompanied by a qualitative change in the significance of registration. No longer are Negro voters limited to participating in Republican intraparty politics and occasional municipal elections. Negroes are now voting for local, state, and presidential primary candidates, for members of Democratic Executive Committees, and in a growing number of contested general elections.

As the figures of Table 3 indicate, from 1944 to 1950 the increase in Negro registration was decidedly rapid, with the greatest gain for any two-year period occurring between May 1948 and May 1950. Since 1950 Negro Democratic registration has continued to increase, but at a much slower pace. Negro Republican registration has remained almost constant since 1948. The reasons for these changes are fairly obvious. Part of the increase in Negro Democrats from 1944 to 1948 was simply due to the change in party affiliation of a majority of those Negroes who had previously been registered as Republicans or independents. The record increase of 52,130 Negro registrants from 1948 to 1950 resulted largely from two hotly contested elections of direct concern to the Negro. The concentrated drive for Negro votes made on behalf of Senator Pepper in 1950 has re-

sis of the whole registration process for both whites and Negroes, with a wealth of material on the difficulties faced by prospective registrants in Alabama.

Table 3. *Negro Major-Party Registration in Florida, 1944–56*
(As of May in each year)

Year	*Number of Negro Democrats*	*Number of Negro Republicans*	*Total Major Party Negro Registration*	*Percentage of 1950 Adult Negro Population Registered*
1944	0	20,000*	20,000*	5.5*
1946	32,280	15,877	48,157	13.1
1948	53,368	8,647	64,015	16.9
1950	106,420	9,725	116,145	31.7
1952	112,868	8,045	120,913	33.0
1954	119,975	8,354	128,329	35.0
1956	128,437	9,098	137,535	37.5

Source: For 1946–54, *Biennial Report of the Secretary of State.* The 1956 figures include preliminary unofficial returns from one small county.
* Estimate.

ceived the most publicity, but a breakdown of the November 1948 registration indicates that almost one half the 1948–50 increase in Negro registrants came between May and November 1948. This concentration is hardly surprising in view of the prominence that Truman's civil rights program and the Dixiecrats' opposition to Negro aspirations played in the 1948 presidential campaign in Florida. By 1950, however, the reservoir of eligible unregistered Negroes had apparently been drained of the most politically conscious and of those in areas of least white resistance. Also, since 1950 the conservative drift of both state and national politics has precluded the raising of the economic and social issues that both the Truman and Pepper campaigns involved. Now the controversy over school segregation may lead to a more rapid increase.

The current state average of roughly one out of three adult Negroes registered to vote conceals wide variations in the percentage registered at the county level. In a growing number of counties at least one half the adult Negro population is registered, whereas at the other extreme a dwindling number of small rural counties have continued to report the absence of any Negro registration. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the number of counties by percentage of adult Negro registration for the period 1946–56. As the figures indicate, the acceptance of Negro registration has been a state-wide matter and not something limited to the large cities. The number of counties with less than 10 per cent Negro registration has dropped from 34 in 1946 to 15 in 1950, to 8 in 1956; the number with over 50 per cent has increased from one in 1946 to 9 in 1950, to 25 in 1956.

Sorting out the various influences that have made for high levels of Negro registration or for an absence of any Negro registrants is a complex task. The percentage of Negroes registered gives us a sort of index, but an ambiguous sort. If Negro political interest and efforts toward registration were roughly uniform throughout the state (as they are not), then the percentage registered would be a useful guide to the location and extent of white opposition to Negro registration. Or if white opposition were uniform, then the registration figures would be a useful index of variations in degree of Negro political interest. Since white opposition and Negro interest in registration *both* vary widely, and direct opinion polling data are not available, we must rely on a somewhat more elaborate analysis of secondary data.

TABLE 4. *Percentage of Adult Negroes Registered in Florida by Counties, 1946–56*

Percentage of 1950 Adult Negro Population Registered	*Number of Counties in Each Class, as of May*					
	1946	1948*	1950	1952	1954	1956
None	4	5	5	4	3	2
0.1–9.9	30	14	10	8	5	6†
10–19.9	20	17	10	5	8	2
20–29.9	9	12	16	14	14	9
30–39.9	2	6	9	11	11	11
40–49.9	1	5	8	11	11	12
50–59.9	1	7	6	6	8	13
60 and over	0	1	3	8	7	12
Total	67	67	67	67	67	67

* For 1948 Escambia and Hillsborough counties did not report separately by race. On the basis of their previous and subsequent reports the former is assigned to the 20–29.9 category and the latter to the 10–19.9 group.

† Includes Liberty County, in which all Negro registrants withdrew their names before the election or moved away.

RESISTANCE TO NEGRO REGISTRATION

A logical point at which to begin the analysis of opposition to Negro registration is by comparing areas where Negroes make up a large proportion of the population with areas where there are relatively few Negroes. On a national scale the difference between the racial attitudes of the predominantly white North and of the South is obvious. Within the Southern states V. O. Key and others have noted the remarkably consistent differences in behavior of whites living in Black Belt counties and those living in counties with relatively few Negroes. Whether within the nation as a whole, within individual Southern states, or even within single counties, the general trend has been for opposition toward candidates or proposals regarded as pro-Negro to be concentrated in the areas with the greatest proportion of Negro population. And the fantastic extremes to which the small minority of whites in South Africa have pushed their

apartheid program lends even further credence to this generalization.

In a relatively stable social situation it is easy to see why Southern whites who are locally outnumbered by Negroes are likely to take a dim view of large-scale Negro participation. Over a period of many years such attitudes seem to have been held by Black Belt whites in most of the South. Such attitudes, however, take time to develop and may last for many years after the cause of their origin has disappeared. Thus former residents of the Deep South who move North often maintain their former attitude toward the Negro even when living permanently in an area with few Negroes; and certainly no one believes that the sudden exodus of a large proportion of Mississippi's Negro population would result in an immediate demise of white supremacy sentiment in that state. Conversely, Northerners who have moved to the South tend to retain relatively tolerant views.[22] The relevance of these tendencies to a state like Florida should be obvious. Rapid population growth and considerable shifts in the Negro-white population ratio make the Florida picture somewhat more complicated than that in most states of the Deep South.

At the turn of the century Florida still had a sizable Black Belt region, complete with plantation-system-and-cotton economy. As late as 1880 barely one tenth of the state population lived in peninsular Florida (exclusive of Key West), and the nine North Florida counties where Negroes were in a majority contained one half the total state population The region of greatest concentration of Negro population a half century ago extended from the counties along the west bank of the Apalachicola River (at the Georgia-Alabama border) along the Georgia border as far east as the Suwannee River; then, following a rough sort of V-shaped pattern, it dipped down through Alachua and Marion counties into central Florida before turning north again to include the counties along the St. Johns River. The extreme western portion of the Florida panhandle has always been a region of relatively few Negroes. Since 1900 much of the old Black Belt has been virtually transformed, particularly those counties in central or northeast Florida. The very rapid growth of the white population has not only removed counties such as Alachua, Marion, and Duval from the category of Black Belt counties, but has also been accompanied by widespread economic and social change. By 1950 four of the remaining seven counties with at least 40 per cent colored population were to be found along the Georgia border, between the Apalachicola River and the Suwannee. Except for Leon county — site of the state capitol at Tallahassee — decreases in the nonwhite proportion of the population in this region have been due mainly to the movement of Negroes away to Florida cities or to the North. As a result of the departure of many local Negroes this same area also contains some of the counties with the lowest proportion of Negroes, such as Liberty and Lafayette.

The proportion of nonwhite population in each Florida county as of 1950 is indicated in Map 1. Unfortunately, a map of this sort cannot indicate the sharp changes in percentage of Negro population that have occurred over the past few decades in many Florida counties, much less show whether the changes are due to the growth of white population or to the exodus of local Negroes. And these factors are almost as important for the level of Negro registration as is the current proportion of Negro population. Map 2, which shows the level of Negro registration by county as of 1954, presents an interesting comparison with Map 1. The area of low registration is concentrated, pretty much regardless of current proportion of Negro population, in the counties between the Suwannee River and the Apalachicola River.

Not all the changes in the distribution of the state's Negro population have been in the direction of reducing the proportion of Negroes in a given locality. In South Florida the opening up of new land and the development of new agricultural products, such as sugar cane, brought about new concentrations of Negro population — ranging as high as 40.8 per cent in Glades County — in an area where there had previously been few whites and almost no Negroes. Social patterns in these new areas of relatively high concentration of nonwhites are quite dif-

[22] For example, Havemann and West in their study of college graduates found that those reared in the South but living in the North were more likely to be prejudiced than those reared in the North and living in the South. Both groups tended to maintain the attitudes typical of their early environment. See *They Went to College* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1952), p. 105.



MAP 1. Percentage of Negro Population in Florida by Counties, 1950

ferent from those to be found in the old Black Belt region where the economic and social system can be traced back to antebellum days. Finally, it should be noted that differences in political attitude in general and toward issues of race in particular have been the most marked between whites who are actually in a local minority and those in areas where Negroes are clearly the minority. By 1950 only two of Florida's sixty-seven counties contained over fifty per cent nonwhites. Hence differences in the racial composition of Florida counties are primarily a matter of the degree to which the Negro is in the minority, and not a question of whites being in the majority or the minority. The differences between the attitudes of whites in areas of ten and thirty per cent nonwhite population are likely to be much less than those between whites in areas of thirty and fifty per cent Negro population.

The importance of some of these additional distinctions becomes evident when one tries to account for the absence or very slow growth of Negro registration in some parts of the state.

As late as 1952, after the two big surges of registration in the Truman and Pepper campaigns, there were still 12 Florida counties where less than 10 per cent of the adult Negroes were registered.[23] Four of these counties reported absolutely no Negro registrants of either party. Our initial hypothesis that opposition to Negro registration would be the greatest in counties with the largest proportion of Negro population suggests that these islands of resistance are likely to be Black Belt counties. To some extent this is the fact: these low-registration counties include the only two in the state where Negroes are in the majority and three of the five counties with over 40 per cent nonwhite population. But also included in the group of low-registration counties are four counties with fewer than 20 per cent nonwhites. And the counties with no Negro registrants cover a wide range in percentage of Negro

[23] There were no Negro registrants in Lafayette, Liberty, Madison, and Union counties, and under 10 per cent registered in Calhoun, Collier, Flagler, Gadsden, Gilchrist, Hamilton, Jefferson, and Taylor.



MAP 2. Percentage of Adult Negroes Registered in Florida by Counties, May 1954

population: Lafayette with only 9.4, Liberty with 18.3, Madison with 45.6, and Flagler also with 45.6. All four of these counties with no Negro registrants in 1952 were small, mainly rural counties: Madison was the only one of the four with a total population of over 3500, and in 1954 Negroes registered in Madison. But the number of counties with relatively few Negroes yet low levels of Negro registration suggest the desirability of comparing registration in all heavily populated Negro counties and in those counties with the lowest proportion of Negroes.[24]

Not only are there some predominantly white counties with no Negro registrants: there are also a few Black Belt counties with rather heavy Negro registration. As of May 1952 the situation in these two extreme types of counties was as follows:

Percentage of Negroes Registered in Counties over 40 Per Cent Negro		*Percentage of Negroes Registered in Counties under 10 Per Cent Negro*	
Flagler	0.2	Hardee	69.3
Gadsden	0.1	Holmes	47.8
Hamilton	8.6	Okaloosa	26.0
Jefferson	3.8	Santa Rosa	55.6
Madison	0.0	Gilchrist	0.1
Seminole	47.2	Lafayette	0.0
Glades	44.9		

In each category two counties deviate markedly from the expected pattern. Gilchrist and Lafayette counties, the two with relatively few Negroes but little or no Negro registration, are both located in the Old South region between the Suwannee and Apalachicola Rivers. Both formerly had higher proportions of colored population, and their current position is largely the result of the exodus of local Negroes, not of an addition of new white residents. In the single decade from 1940 to 1950 Gilchrist lost 45.8 per cent of its Negro population and Lafayette showed a drop of 25.1. Both also showed a somewhat smaller decrease in white population. On the other hand, Glades and Seminole, the Black Belt counties with high Negro registration, are both relatively new centers of Negro concentration, and both are located in peninsular Florida. Within the area still dominated by the Old South way of life, opposition to Negro rights apparently continues even after the percentage of Negro population sinks to a very low level, but under the different cultural conditions of peninsular Florida Negroes generally register and vote freely, even where they make up over forty per cent of the local population.

This analysis suggests yet another distinction that should be taken into account. The extent to which racial attitudes of an earlier period are likely to continue in areas where the percentage of colored population has declined sharply is likely to depend on the kind of population change. Where the change is due to the moving away of many Negroes from an area where the white population remains static (or declines at a much slower rate) the change in racial attitudes is likely to be the least. Adult whites in such areas will generally have adopted views of race typical of the local community in the earlier period of their formative years. Without the influx of *new* white residents the old consensus of local white attitudes toward the Negro may perpetuate itself for many years, and more or less regardless of the actual proportion of Negroes present. Thus a decline in proportion of Negro population is unlikely to be an automatic cure-all for problems of racial hostility. Where such a decline is primarily the result of Negroes' moving away there may be little or no change in white attitudes, at least for many years or even generations. On the other hand, where a decline in percentage of Negroes is the result of a rapid (or more rapid) growth of the white population — particularly one due to Northern immigration — there may be a quite rapid lessening of over-all hostility to the Negro. Local old-timers will not have changed their minds, but their influence will be partially offset by the newcomers.

Some concrete examples of the importance of whether changes in the ratio of Negroes and whites are due to Negroes' moving away or to whites' moving into an area are afforded by the pattern of Negro registration in Florida. Leon and Liberty are adjoining counties, both located in the Suwannee-Apalachicola River region; both had over 50 per cent colored population in 1900, and by 1950 the percentage colored in both was less than one half the 1900 amount. By 1952 Leon County, though still

[24] There is a negative correlation between percentage of nonwhite population (1950 census) and percentage of Negroes registered (as of May 1954), but it is rather low ($r = -.35$).

39.5 per cent colored, reported 33.1 per cent of its adult Negro population registered (a figure close to the over-all state average). In the same year Liberty County, by then containing only 18.3 per cent colored population, was one of the four counties where no Negro was registered. There are several differences between the two counties. Leon is the more prosperous, and it includes the city of Tallahassee. But the most striking difference is in population growth. From 1940 to 1950 the white population of Leon more than doubled while the Negro population barely increased one quarter, but in the same decade the white population of Liberty showed a slight decrease while the Negro population dropped 37.2 per cent.

In both Leon and Liberty counties the proportion of Negroes in the population has declined sharply, but the result has been quite different. With every second white person in Leon a newcomer, there has been a shift from the attitudes typical of an old plantation county.[25] In Liberty, however, there are few newcomers, and the fact that over one third of the total Negro population moved away in a single decade has had little perceptible effect on the attitude of the whites who have remained. Before the 1956 primaries twelve Negroes did register in Liberty. According to newspaper reports, crosses were burned near the houses of two of the prospective Negro voters, and the house of one was struck by shotgun fire. On the day before the end of the registration period eleven of the twelve Negroes returned to the office of the registration supervisor and asked that their names be taken off the list. The twelfth Negro had moved to New York. The local sheriff conducted an investigation of sorts but was unable to get any definite information. He stated that Negroes had wanted to register in Liberty before but had never tried until 1956, although "why they didn't, I don't know." Such situations raise some serious doubts whether a decline in proportion of Negro population will result in an immediate lessening of racial tension. In areas where Negroes are actually in the majority such a decline may be a necessary precondition, but the evidence to date certainly indicates that it is not always a sufficient cause for such a change.

Unfortunately, the problem presented by areas such as Liberty County is more typical of most of the Deep South than is the happy situation of rapid growth and prosperity exemplified by Leon County. And business doubts about the effects of the current racial situation seem likely to slow such progress as has occurred. Even in Florida there were eleven counties showing a *decrease* of more than 5 per cent in total population from 1940 to 1950. Of these eleven, nine are located in the area bordering or between the Suwannee and Apalachicola Rivers. In eight of the nine the rate of decrease in Negro population considerably exceeded that for whites. The very low level of Negro registration in most of these counties is striking. All but two of these latter nine are included in the group of twelve counties where fewer than 10 per cent of the adult Negroes were registered even as late as 1952. And three of the four counties with absolutely no Negro registrants in that year had decreases of more than 10 per cent in total population in the 1940–50 decade, a period in which the state population increased over 46 per cent. These rural counties of declining population, low family income, and intense devotion to white supremacy have chronic social and economic problems that a mere decline in the proportion of nonwhite population is unlikely to affect.

For most of peninsular Florida, as well as for the Gulf Coast counties of the panhandle, recent changes in the racial balance of the population reflect the rapid influx of *new* white residents, including many "Yankees," and not a decline in Negro population. Negro registration in such counties has generally reached very sizable proportions, as can be seen from the figures for six counties in which a considerable decrease in percentage of nonwhites has been mainly due to white population growth:

This pattern is in striking contrast to the situation in most of the countries where the decline in nonwhite proportion of the population has been the result of the departure of local Negroes. Racial attitudes, like political party

[25] Even the "plantations" have changed greatly in kind. The rich land running north from Tallahassee to Thomasville, Georgia, has become a favorite spot for wealthy Yankees — such as Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, Mr. and Mrs. John Hay Whitney, and the retired head of Standard Oil of New Jersey — to buy up estates running into the thousands of acres. These are useful for vacations, quail hunting, Presidential meditation, and tax purposes.

County	Percentage of Nonwhites		Population Increase, 1940–50		Percentage of Adult Negroes Registered in 1952
	1900	1950	White	Non White	
Alachua	58.8	29.0	78.9	3.5	26.7
Duval	56.4	26.9	56.9	19.3	40.4
Hernando	49.9	23.0	27.4	−3.6	45.6
Marion	61.7	38.2	34.3	6.8	46.4
Nassau	52.7	31.3	22.5	10.1	43.4
Putnam	48.3	36.5	38.8	9.1	25.0

affiliations, are likely to prove highly stable, even though based on apparently irrational grounds.[26] Even in the rapidly growing counties such as those above, there are many old-line residents whose attitudes toward the Negro do not appear to have softened, though their influence is lessened by the growing number of relative newcomers. Jacksonville (Duval County) is an obvious example. The over-all shift in white attitude toward the Negro in these counties is less the result of individuals' changing their old beliefs than of the basic fact that many of the current residents are different individuals from a different sort of background.[27]

Comparisons involving counties of rapid population growth or decline almost inevitably bring in contrasts between rural and urban areas. All those counties where population has been declining are sparsely populated nonurban areas, and most of the counties where growth has been the most rapid now include fairly sizable cities. Over much of the South Negro political activity has appeared to be pretty much limited to the larger cities; but not in Florida. Although nonmetropolitan counties account for all those instances in which fewer than 10 per cent of the adult Negroes are registered, they also account for all the areas where over 50 per cent are registered. By 1954 there were only eight cases of the former, but fifteen of the latter. Of the fourteen Florida counties with cities of over 25,000 population (in 1950), Negro registration in 1954 was below the state average in six, above the average in only eight. Even by 1954 the counties including such cities as Tampa and West Palm Beach each had less than 20 per cent Negro registration, and the counties in which St. Petersburg, Sarasota, and Orlando are located each had less than 30 per cent. Since two thirds of the state's Negroes lived in the twelve most populous counties, the low levels of registration in several of the cities are quantitatively much more significant in state-wide elections than the lack of many registered Negroes in some of the rural counties.[28]

One of the dangers of a county-level analysis is that it tends to exaggerate the importance of the small rural counties and to under-rate that of the metropolitan centers, particularly in a state like Florida, where many of the rural counties contain fewer people than do some of the larger precincts in Jacksonville and Miami. Counties with small populations are also more likely to deviate from expected socioeconomic patterns because of the presence of a single particularly able Negro leader. Thus Brevard County, home of the late Harry T. Moore,[29]

[26] Recent political research indicates a past tendency rather to overemphasize the extent to which changes in local or regional attitudes in the aggregate are due to individuals' actually changing their minds. Many political upheavals register the cumulative effect of foreign immigration, internal population movements, or even differential birth rates. This effect is the most obvious with the various ethnic and religious groups in the Northeast, but it is also quite clear in nineteenth-century politics of the Midwest. For some examples see V. O. Key, *American State Politics*, Chapter 8.

It appears likely that much the same principle holds true of racial attitudes. Whites in areas where the percentage of Negroes has declined because of growth of the white population have not changed their minds about the Negro, but there are many new residents whose views are quite different from those of local whites of long residence. Paradoxically, the change in over-all community attitude is a result of the lack of change in individual attitudes.

[27] Much the same thing seems to occur at the state level. Those states in which a very high percentage of the population was born within the state, e.g. South Carolina, Mississippi, and Alabama, have the most intransigent racial views. Southern states with many newcomers, such as Texas and Florida, have generally been the least intransigent. It is doubtful whether a decrease in the percentage of Negro population due to Negroes' moving away from the first group of states will result in the same sort of over-all change in white attitudes as the decrease due to whites' moving in has in the second group.

[28] The three counties with no Negro registrants as of 1954 contained less than one half of one per cent of the state's adult Negro population.

[29] Moore and his wife were both killed in the Christmas Eve bombing of their Mims, Florida,

had over 50 per cent of its total adult Negro population registered by 1950. Moore had been the leading NAACP worker in the state. In a fairly small county his efforts to promote Negro registration brought outstanding results, but in a major city the task is so much greater that the chance presence of a single particularly able leader is much less likely to have so marked an effect. The considerations making for high levels of Negro registration will be taken up later in the chapter. It may be appropriate to consider whether the very low levels of registration in some counties may not be largely the result of apathy, low educational status, and lack of political leadership among the Negroes, rather than of white opposition.

By 1954 the *Smith v. Allwright* decision was ten years old, and the continued absence of appreciable numbers of Negro registrants in a county at this time might be regarded with suspicion. Thirty per cent registration would seem to be a reasonable minimum figure; it is less than one half the percentage for whites. The distribution of counties above and below that mark in the Suwannee-Apalachicola region and the rest of the state is as follows:

Area	*Number of Counties with 1954 Adult Negro Registration*	
	0–29 Per Cent	30 Per Cent or Over
Suwannee-Apalachicola Region	14	4
Rest of State	16	33

This, however, is hardly a strict enough test. Prosperous tourist counties such as St. Petersburg, Sarasota, and Palm Beach all show less than 30 per cent Negro registration. These are hardly strongholds of white supremacy. If we adopt the more rigorous test of 15 per cent registration, we find only nine counties below this level. All nine are north of Ocala and east of the Apalachiocola River, with seven of the nine in the Suwannee-Apalachicola area. The two outside this area are tiny Union County, in which a considerable portion of the "local" adult population is actually incarcerated in the state penitentiary at Raiford (and hence at least temporarily removed from politics), and little Flagler County on the East Coast. Flagler was still 45.6 per cent nonwhite in 1950 and had a total adult Negro population in that year of fewer than nine hundred.

By 1954 white opposition was weakening or Negro leadership was finally asserting itself, even in the historic Black Belt region. Up to 1954 all attempts at Negro registration in Madison County had been successfully discouraged by one means or another, but before the 1954 primaries 586 Negroes went *en masse* to the Madison County courthouse and were registered, 558 as Democrats and 28 as Republicans. In Florida this was news, for Madison is one area where the race issue has been explosive; as recently as July 1945 a Madison County Negro accused of rape had been removed from the unguarded jail and shot to death. Madison is still almost 50 per cent Negro, and the sentiments of the white residents can be gauged by the county's past voting record. In 1950 Madison repudiated liberal Senator Pepper by better than two to one,[30] in the May 1952 gubernatorial primary the county gave 9.3 per cent of its vote to the Grand Dragon of the Florida

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home in 1951. There was no evidence to indicate that Moore's registration activities had anything to do with the crime; rather, as Walter A. White of the national NAACP suggested, it seemed likely that it was connected with Moore's intervention in the explosive Groveland rape case. The previous month Moore had sought to obtain an indictment against the Lake County sheriff for shooting two of the Negro defendants in the Groveland case. According to the sheriff they had tried to escape. Although the FBI was called in, a $5,000 award was offered by Governor Warren, and a federal grand jury held extensive hearings, the bombing is still unsolved. The grand jury did ascertain that clipped reports of Moore's activities and a floor plan of the Moore house had been exhibited at Klan meetings. Perjury indictments were returned against several Klan members, including the Exalted Cyclops of the Apopka Klavern, but these were eventually quashed on jurisdictional grounds. See "Harry T. Moore," *The Nation*, CLXXV (1952), 267, *Gainesville Daily Sun*, May 26, 1953, and *Jacksonville Times-Union*, June 4, 1953.

[30] Several South Florida tourist counties did likewise, but Madison stands out as one of the three counties west of the Suwannee River to vote so overwhelmingly for a Miami Beach candidate. Not only was Pepper from nearby Leon County: it had been the custom for one senator to come from North Florida and the other from South Florida, and Smathers' victory over Pepper meant that South Florida could claim both senators.

Ku Klux Klan (who got 1.5 per cent in the state at large), and in the 1952 presidential preference primary Senator Russell received 93.2 per cent of the county vote as compared with 52.9 in the state. (Kefauver received 41.4 per cent in the state and 5.5 in Madison County; the rest of the vote went to two very minor candidates.) In the light of this record one can hardly attribute the long-continued absence of Negro registrants in Madison entirely to Negro apathy. Southern Negroes are instinctively aware of what political scientists refer to as the "rule of anticipated reaction."[31] Racial violence usually seems to occur through occasional failure to anticipate hostile white reactions. So it was with Emmett Till, who apparently did not realize the extent of the difference between Chicago and Mississippi. Violence, however, is the exception; more often white reactions are correctly anticipated or given excessive allowance. The mere threat or possibility of coercion, whether physical or economic, is often enough to forestall any attempts at Negro registration.

The striking political behavior of Madison County in a series of elections in which the race issue played a major part suggests that these contests might provide a good test of where white attitudes are the least favorable toward Negro rights. If these areas are the same as those where Negro registration is lowest, then we may conclude that extremely low levels of Negro registration are related to the degree of white opposition to Negro "pretensions." Fortunately for our analysis — if not for Florida — there have been a number of elections in which the race issue has played a major part, as well as others in which its influence has been less clear but still important. Since contests of the former type are available in sufficient number for our purposes, the presidential elections of 1928 and 1948 and the Pepper-Smathers senatorial primary of 1950, which fall into the second category, will not be considered in this connection.[32]

Three elections and one legislative roll call of the past decade throw considerable light on the location of white supremacy sentiment. The Ku Klux Klan in Florida has not amounted to much as an organization in recent years, but in 1952 Grand Dragon Bill Hendrix decided to resign his exalted office and throw his hat — or hood — into the ring for the gubernatorial primary. He was by no means a serious contender for the office, but he seemed to enjoy the publicity, and he did poll 1.5 per cent of the total state vote. Granted that almost any name on the ballot is likely to receive one per cent of the vote, Hendrix drew a surprising vote in many of the Suwannee-Apalachicola counties: 18.0 per cent in Wakulla County, 15.0 in Liberty, 10.8 in Jefferson, 9.3 in Madison, 7.6 in Suwannee, 6.4 in Lafayette. At the time Liberty, Madison, and Lafayette were three of the only four counties in the state with no Negro registrants. The nine counties where Hendrix received at least four per cent of the vote — all located within the Suwannee-Apalachicola River area — are indicated in Panel 1 of Map 3.[33]

In the same primary election the Russell-Kefauver presidential preference contest presented another choice that was somewhat more ambiguous. Russell enjoyed considerable support on grounds other than his supposedly orthodox Southern racial views, and much of Kefauver's popularity rested on his spectacular crime committee hearings in Tampa and Miami and not on his social or economic beliefs. In North Florida, however, the Russell campaign became something of a crusade to save the South from the horrors of a compulsory FEPC; Georgia politicians, including Governor "Hum-

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[31] C. J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1946), p. 589.

[32] The Pepper-Smathers race is discussed in Chapter III. The 1928 election in Florida was a nasty affair in which religious prejudice against Smith generally outweighed the racial prejudice from which the Democratic party has traditionally benefited in the South. Of the eighteen Suwannee-Apalachicola counties seventeen remained loyal to the Democratic party (though showing no enthusiasm for the Democratic candidate); in the rest of the state Smith carried only nine of the remaining forty-nine counties. For the South as a whole it was the die-hard area of intense white supremacy sentiment that remained loyal to the Democratic party in 1928; where the concern with the Negro was less intense anti-Catholicism could be indulged in. See William G. Carleton, "The Popish Plot of 1928," *Forum*, CXI (1949), pp. 265–70.

[33] Hendrix received over two per cent in sixteen of the eighteen Suwannee-Apalachicola counties, but in only one of the other forty-nine counties.



MAP 3. Centers of White Supremacy Feeling in Florida Are Concentrated in the Northern Part of the State

man" Talmadge, crossed the border to assist in Russell's campaign. It was in these circumstances that Madison County whites (there being no Negroes registered) turned in 3,240 votes for Russell to 191 for Kefauver — a striking example of bloc voting! Of the thirteen counties where Russell received 80 per cent or more of the presidential preference vote eleven were in the Suwannee-Apalachicola River area. The top quartile (17 counties) of Russell counties includes only three counties from outside of this region — see Panel 2 of Map 3. Taking Levy, Marion, and Flagler counties as the southern tier of North Florida counties this top quartile of Russell strength included only one South Florida county (Lake), and it had been the scene of unusual racial tension due to a sensational Negro rape case. Although Russell received better than 65 per cent of the vote in 31 of the 36 North Florida counties, his margin reached this level in only 8 of the 31 South Florida counties.

The districts of those state senators voting or paired in favor of the 1947 white primary bill are indicated in Panel 3 of Map 3. Events surrounding the defeat of this measure have been discussed in the preceding section, but the geographical location of the districts of those senators supporting the bill gives another test of the areas in which there has probably been considerable sentiment against Negro voting. Three of the five districts are situated entirely within the Suwannee-Apalachicola region, a fourth comprises near-by Union and Bradford counties, and the fifth is Duval County. Despite the rapid growth of Jacksonville, Duval is a former Black Belt county that still has many outspoken critics of Negro rights. In 1948 Dixiecrat J. Strom Thurmond received an impressive 24.7 per cent of the Duval County vote, as compared with only 6.6 in Dade (Miami), 13.6 in Hillsborough (Tampa), and 15.9 in the state at large. It was by only a narrow margin that Senator Mathews, the sponsor of the white primary bill, was defeated in Duval in the 1950 primaries. If Mathews did not speak for a majority of the voters in Duval, he at least represented the views of a very sizable minority of local whites, a group which still controls the Duval County Democratic Committee. The reaction of the voters in the other four senatorial districts to the Hendrix and Russell candidacies indicates that the other four senators were not taking any major risk in supporting the white primary bill.

The 1956 Democratic gubernatorial primary provides our final clue to voter attitudes toward the Negro. Retired National Guard General Sumter Lowry announced for governor on the one-plank program of all-out opposition to desegregation. All the other candidates declared their firm support of continued school segregation, but Lowry, long the state's leading patrioteer and a noisy opponent of such "international socialism" as the UN and UNESCO,[34] went after the race issue vigorously. Accusing the other candidates of being soft on the Negro issue, Lowry pounded away at the race issue with sufficient vigor to outrun ex-Governor Warren and former Speaker of the House Farris Bryant. Although incumbent Governor LeRoy Collins won a slim majority of the total first primary vote, the 179,019 votes cast for Lowry furnish a clear guide to Florida extremist sentiment on segregation. This election will be considered in more detail in Chapter IV (see Map 5, page 101). In general, however, it followed the expected pattern. Lowry ran first in twenty-six counties and tied for first in a twenty-seventh; only four of these were in South Florida. He led in thirteen of the eighteen Suwannee-Apalachicola River counties. (Of the remaining five Warren carried the county of his birthplace and three nearby ones; Collins ran high in his home county of Leon.) Lowry, who hailed from Tampa, was the leading candidate in twenty-three of the thirty North Florida counties having no city of over 10,000 population (as of 1950). As in the Russell-Kefauver contest, there were other issues at stake, but to those regarding segregation as the all-important threat Lowry presented a clear choice.

This analysis of several elections in which the rate issue was of crucial importance indicates that sentiment against Negro rights is strong among a large proportion of the whites in North Florida, particularly in the nonurbanized counties of the Suwannee-Apalachicola region. With a few exceptions this is also the area in which Negro registration has been the least and has grown most slowly. As we have seen, by 1954 only four of the eighteen Suwannee-Apalachicola counties had Negro registration

[34] Lowry's state campaign manager was past president of the state American Legion.

levels of over 30 per cent. That Leon County should have a relatively high figure is not surprising, but how about the other three? Jackson County, for example, would seem to have all the characteristics of an area in which Negroes would be very slow to register. During Reconstruction Jackson underwent a virtual reign of terror, with an estimated 175 murders;[35] in 1900 the county was over half Negro; it is still better than one third Negro; and the population has grown very little in recent decades. The situation is much the same with Gulf and Franklin, the other two counties in the area with sizable Negro registration. For Franklin and Jackson counties the difference appears to be the result of a historical quirk: Negroes in these areas, at some time prior to their admission to Democratic primaries, were apparently allowed the harmless gesture of registering as Republicans.[36] The extent of this prior Negro registration can be estimated from the drop in Republican registration from 1944 to 1946. In the former year Jackson County had 600 Republicans, but the segregated returns in the latter year indicated a drop to twelve white Republicans, coincident with the appearance of 689 colored Democrats and 79 colored Republicans. In Franklin the evidence is even clearer, for the Negroes were somewhat slower in changing their party affiliation. The 221 Republicans of 1944 were succeeded in 1946 by 8 white Republicans and 205 colored Republicans plus 245 new colored Democrats. Registration as Republican, constituting a sort of halfway house toward full political participation, apparently eased the way for Negro acceptance in Democratic primaries even in the heart of the Black Belt.

In general the areas with the lowest levels of Negro registration have been those where the dominant white attitude is the least sympathetic to Negro rights. Relatively high registration exists in a few unexpected areas, apparently thanks to the effectiveness of a single Negro leader or to the fact that Negro Republican registration prior to the white primary decision made the transition to participation in Democratic primaries somewhat easier. Although white opposition is often the strongest in those counties where Negroes make up a sizable proportion of the population, it is by no means always so. White opposition shows a strong tendency to continue in those areas where a decline in the percentage of Negroes is due to their moving away and not to the arrival of new white residents. On the other hand, some of the more recently developed areas of peninsular Florida, outside the Old South cultural pattern, have 40 per cent or more Negro population but still do not react violently on the race issue.

The importance of local attitudes independent of the proportion of local Negro population can be seen from an analysis of the registration picture as of the time of the 1952 Kefauver-Russell primary contest. By dividing Florida's 67 counties according to whether the proportion of nonwhites was greater or less than 30 per cent of the total population and according to whether the percentage of adult Negroes registered was greater or less than 30 per cent, one obtains the following fourfold table:

County Percentage of Nonwhite Population	*Number of Counties with 1952 Adult Negro Registration*	
	0–29 Per Cent	30 Per Cent or Over
0–29	19	28
30 and over	12	8

There is some tendency for Negro registration to be lower in the counties with a higher proportion of Negro population, but the relation is not close. When, however, the counties of 30 per cent or more Negro population are broken down according to whether they voted at least 75 per cent for Russell or not, a very striking relation appears. The complete breakdown for all 67 counties is shown in Table 5. Of the twelve counties with relatively large Negro population but low Negro registration, ten voted over 75 per cent for Russell. Of the eight counties with large Negro population and high Negro registration seven voted less than 75 per cent for Russell. Particularly striking is the fact that Negro registration was *high* in seven of the

[35] Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 565–84.

[36] The sharp decrease in Republican registration from 1944 to 1946, so typical of those counties with appreciable Negro registration before the end of the white primary, is clearly noticeable only in these two of the eighteen counties in the area. In Columbia, Leon, and Levy counties there was a slight decline that might or might not indicate small contingents of Negro Republicans.

TABLE 5. *Number of Florida Counties by Percentage of Adult Negro Registration in 1952, by Percentage of Vote for Russell in 1952 Primaries, and by Percentage of Nonwhite Population*

County Percentage of Nonwhite Population (as of 1950)	*Counties Voting under 75 Per Cent for Russell*		*Counties Voting 75 Per Cent or More for Russell*	
	Adult Negro Registration		*Adult Negro Registration*	
	0–29 Per Cent	30 Per Cent or More	0–29 Per Cent	30 Per Cent or More
0–29	11	25	8	3
30 or over	2	7	10	1
Total	13	32	18	4

nine counties of relatively *high* Negro population that were low in Russell support, but registration was *low* in eight of the eleven counties of *low* Negro population but high Russell support. This complete reversal of the original relationship between percentage of Negro population and level of Negro registration in these counties indicates the importance of considering local attitudes as an intervening variable.[37] Regardless of percentage of Negro population the level of Negro registration is over 30 per cent in almost three quarters of the less strong Russell counties; in the strong Russell counties it is under 30 per cent in at least two thirds of even those counties with relatively few Negroes.

ENCOURAGEMENT TO NEGRO REGISTRATION

Although extremely low levels of Negro registration are usually found in areas where white opposition is strongest, the counties with the highest proportions of Negroes registered are not necessarily those where white opposition is least. Once the general attitude that polling places are for whites only has been broken, the percentage of Negroes actually registering seems to depend largely upon the positive incentives for doing so. Repeated studies of voter participation among the general population have indicated that registration and voting levels are higher for males than for females, increase with higher economic status and greater education, are higher for urban than for rural residents, and are higher among union members than among non-members. Although systematic survey results are not available for Florida Negroes, impressionistic evidence indicates that the same general relationships probably hold.[38] The most striking differences, however, are those between Negroes in different counties of rather similar characteristics.

Even among the five main metropolitan counties of Florida there are wide differences in Negro political participation. By 1954, for example, the percentage of adult Negroes registered in Duval County (Jacksonville) was three times as high as for Hillsborough County (Tampa). Yet both these cities have large Negro communities, a growing Negro middle class, and, despite occasional verbal fireworks, no open opposition to Negro registration. Similarly Dade County (Miami) had a percentage well over double that of Pinellas (St. Petersburg). The main reason for such sharp differences appears to lie in the extent to which local

[37] Of course, by 1952 a good many Negroes were registered, and those that voted in the presidential preference primary favored Kefauver over Russell by a ten-to-one margin. Hence our measure is not entirely of *white* local attitudes; nevertheless the relation holds both for counties with few Negroes and for those with many Negroes but few Negro registrants. In 58 of Florida's 67 counties Negro voters still constituted less than 16 per cent of the local electorate in 1952.

[38] For Louisiana, and for a few Florida counties, specific data are available on the sex differential. The most recent breakdown of Louisiana registration giving both color and sex, as of October 1954, indicated that of the adult white population reported in the 1950 census 73.8 per cent of the men and 62.5 per cent of the women were registered. For the adult Negro population the figures were 27.7 for men and 21.8 for women.

white politicians have invested time and money in actively seeking Negro support. The process seems to run in a sort of self-generating cycle. A fairly large group of Negro voters is likely to receive attention from a hard-pressed local candidate. In turn the promises, publicity, organizational work, and — sometimes — eventual performance of the candidate are likely to result in further increases in Negro registration. At the next election the even greater Negro registration will bring even more intensive solicitation, and so on. Now, Jacksonville and Miami had the two largest groups of Negro registrants in the state in 1944, and both have had a number of more or less permanently organized voting leagues that have served as intermediaries between white candidates and the Negro population. By 1947 Negro voters were playing a decisive role in the Jacksonville municipal elections, but in Tampa and St. Petersburg the NAACP was still involved in fighting a municipal white primary system.[39]

Although campaigns such as those of Mr. Truman and Senator Pepper may activate the more politically conscious Negroes, local elections, local candidates, and the activities of local Negro voting leagues have also played a decisive role in increasing Negro registration. Where Negro-endorsed candidates have been elected and where they realize that their political future depends on continued Negro support, there have been tangible benefits to the Negro community. Such matters as Negro policemen and sheriff's deputies or street lights, sidewalks, paved streets, and other civic improvements in the Negro community are all more common in those areas where Negroes register and vote in large numbers. But intensive efforts to register Negro voters without reaching a *modus vivendi* with local white candidates and without producing tangible results are likely to have little permanent effect. The CIO-sponsored Negro registration drive on behalf of Senator Pepper is an excellent example. In Tampa, home of state CIO headquarters, Negro Democratic registration was pushed up to 7,387, but by 1954 it had dropped back to 3,630. Voting for the Senator had been a lost cause, and the large numbers of Negroes who "single shot" (i.e. voted in only one contest on the ballot) the Senate race meant that little Negro influence was exercised in the local contests. The *ad hoc* Negro committee that had supported Pepper broke up, and by the time of the next state-wide election there was no effective Negro group with which a Tampa candidate could deal.[40]

Of the smaller urban counties in the state the wealthy tourist areas appear to have given the least incentive for Negro registration. In several of these counties Republicans have either already taken over the local government or are presenting a real threat to the incumbent Democrats; and neither the Republicans nor the local conservative Democrats show much eagerness to increase the registration of Negroes, who have generally voted "liberal" in primaries and Democratic in general elections. In addition to Orange and Pinellas counties, such prosperous resort centers as Sarasota County, Manatee (Bradenton), and Palm Beach County each had 1954 Negro registration figures of less than 30 per cent. All five of these counties, incidentally, returned a clear majority for Dewey in 1948 and even bigger votes for Eisenhower in 1952. If maximum Negro political participation is not likely to be found in the strongholds of the Old South region, neither is it common in the growing centers of transplanted Republicanism.

As might be expected, the variation in Negro registration levels is the greatest among the relatively less populous counties. As has already been pointed out, a single enthusiastic Negro leader in a small county can push registration among his friends, relatives, and fellow church members and soon have a higher percentage of Negroes registered than in any of the big cities. The task is obviously rather different in counties with fewer than one thousand adult Negroes (there were eighteen such Florida counties in 1950) and in those with forty or fifty thousand adult Negroes (as in Dade and Duval counties, respectively). In the very smallest counties, however, there may be too few Negroes to constitute a community in which at least some members are not economically dependent on

[39] Alexander Heard, *A Two-Party South?* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952), p. 186.

[40] There were, of course, plenty of Negroes willing to open a campaign office in the Negro community and put themselves on the candidate's payroll, but such self-appointed spokesmen lack the organization, time, or ability to conduct systematic registration drives.

local whites — a situation typical of the few counties (e.g. Liberty and Lafayette) in which no Negroes at all have registered and kept their names on the book.

Paradoxically, white efforts to enforce Negro conformity to the *status quo* have so worked as to provide a number of the leaders who have played key roles in increasing Negro registration. The exceptionally high levels of Negro registration in Brevard County and in Marion County can be traced to the diligent efforts of the late Harry T. Moore and Mr. Ed Davis, respectively. Moore and his wife had both lost teaching jobs because of their efforts to push teacher pay equalization suits. Mr. Davis lost posts as school principal because of his persistent stand for Negro rights. He then opened a combination filling station and real estate office.[41] Had such men been kept in their teaching jobs, their opportunities for political activity would have been circumscribed and their personal motivation less intense. Moore served as president of the Florida Conference of the NAACP from 1941 to 1946 and from then until his death was state NAACP co-ordinator. Mr. Davis also has served as state president of the NAACP and was state co-ordinator of the campaign to register Negroes to support Senator Pepper in 1950. Considering the small Negro middle class and the shortage of leadership talent, such displaced intellectuals may play a role of considerable importance.

Outspoken opposition to Negro rights may also serve as a spur to increased Negro registration. Sumter Lowry's all-out segregation campaign for the governorship in 1956 finally brought Negro registration in his home city of Tampa up to a level that the CIO-PAC, the NAACP, and the Negro Progressive Voters League had been unable to attain in a decade of trying. Though Negro leaders sometimes talk about the incentive to registration that an anti-Negro candidate may supply, such instances appear to be the exception. Large-scale registration depends on organization, funds, and precinct workers more than on oratory, and these are obviously not forthcoming from an anti-Negro candidate, however colorful his verbal fireworks.

Despite all the efforts of individual Negro leaders, of various Negro organizations, and of those white candidates who have felt that they would benefit, total Negro registration in Florida has consistently fallen short of announced goals. By November 1948 only 85,180 of the rather optimistic quota of 150,000 were registered,[42] and for the May 1950 primaries only 116,145 of the 200,000 minimum.[43] Since 1950 Negro leaders in many counties have found it difficult to maintain the level of registration reached in that year. Even without making allowance for Negro population growth and the gradual accumulation of deadwood on the registration books, the increase in percentage of adult Negroes registered since 1950 has been slight. For the state as a whole the 1956 figure is only about one half that of the white population, although the difference between the Negro registration level and that for whites of similar economic and educational status is doubtless much less. Even in cities where solicitation of Negroes has been long continued and quite intense, as in Jacksonville, the forty-to-fifty-per-cent level seems to constitute the maximum Negro registration that can be sustained in present circumstances.[44] This fact tends to vindicate the prediction made by one Negro leader in 1947 that the Southern Negro's political potential "will never prove to be so formidable as many hostile whites fear, nor will it be realized as soon or decisively as most progressive Americans desire."[45]

[41] Mr. Davis is the "representative" Southern Negro leader and Florida the "not atypical Southern state" described somewhat dramatically by George Penty and James Crown in "Southern Negro Leader," *The Nation*, CLXXV (1952), 265–67.

[42] Henry Lee Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

[43] The actual county goals set for 1950 by the Florida Committee for Full Registration total 250,000, but Senator Pepper is understood to have regarded 200,000 as a more reasonable goal.

[44] In Duval County, for instance, total Negro registration has been 25,717 in 1950, 21,350 in 1952, 25,774 in 1954, and 23,026 in 1956 (as of the May primaries in each year).

[45] Henry Lee Moon, "Counted Out — And In," *Survey Graphic*, XXXVI (1947), 79.

4

The Process of Decision-Making

One definition of politics is that it is a social process of decision-making when outcomes are in some sense important. The process is social in that more than one person is involved either in the choosing of outcomes or in the distribution of values produced by the outcomes chosen. This chapter will be concerned with one of the central problems of modern political research: the accurate description of the ways in which people (or organizations) actually make decisions.

In analyzing decision-making in the past, it was commonly assumed that the "elements" of the process could be reconstructed by common sense. Men were confronted with alternatives; they gathered information about possible outcomes; they consulted their values to determine which outcomes they preferred; and then they chose on this basis the alternative producing the best outcome for their purposes. The two major theoretical papers in this chapter, by Simon and Lindblom, both vigorously deny that this is actually what takes place. They suggest that men and organizations very seldom know of the range of alternatives "open" to them, that the information they gather is rudimentary, that their preferences are seldom arranged beforehand in such a fashion as to give meaningful direction to choice, and finally that there can therefore be no such thing as a "best" choice at all.

The elegant, persuasive language in which Simon and Lindblom make their case may not alert the reader sufficiently to the drastic reorientation which acceptance of their argument requires. Heretofore most of our thinking about decisions had been based on a notion of men and organizations which imputed to them an underlying predictability based, in one mode of thinking, on "rational self interest," and in another, on "subconscious motivations." On the one hand, men were free to pursue pleasure and profit and did so; on the other, men were gripped by repressed desires which shaped their choice patterns no matter what they overtly wished.

The intellectual problems involved in describing the social consequences of behavior shaped by one or the other of these images of decision-making were not at all simple. But they led to overly simple portraits of decision-making. Many examples can be cited, but one will do here. Norton Long's discussion of decision-making in the local community attempts in some detail to refute a popular image of local politics derived from Marxist-Populist notions of homogeneity of class interests, of false class consciousness and of upper class dominance. All of these notions can be deduced from axioms asserting that men rationally pursue fixed goals by selecting "best" strategies.

But suppose men do not do this, as they apparently do not? Suppose the real goals of an organization (in terms of which people actually behave) are many and in part mutually contradictory? Suppose these goals are differently understood and differently shared by different people in the organization? Suppose men act "rationally" in terms of some goals sometimes and other goals other times? Suppose their unconscious motivations enter into decision-making more at some times than others?

Lindblom and Simon have both set out to describe a world in which these conditions exist. In order to make sense of such a world, they discuss aspects of decision-making quite different from those discussed by more conventional theorists.

For example, they are concerned with the costs of acquiring information. How do people cut these costs so as to operate in a manner *approximating* (but not really resembling) the picture of rationality given by classical theorists? Other questions Simon and Lindblom raise include these: How do people assemble information? How do they protect themselves against the effects of uncertainty? How do they discover and express their "values"? The contrasts between the way Simon and Lindblom deal with these questions and the way they are dealt with in conventional decision-making theory are explicitly drawn in the articles themselves.

Four selections following Simon and Lindblom attempt to show the utility of looking at American politics from perspectives generally consistent with this theory. Each of the four articles, by Dahl on the Supreme Court, by Polsby and Wildavsky on national conventions, by Hilsman on foreign policy, and by Long on local politics, highlights a slightly different application of a theory of incremental adjustment to conditions of bounded rationality.

In much of conventional theorizing, the Supreme Court's decision-making process is described as the systematic application of general principles to particular cases, thus throwing the focus of research attention upon the elaboration and defense of particular principles as the "correct" ones to be applied in a given situation. This resembles the relationship of means to ends suggested by classical theories of decision-making. An alternative view would hold that *all* outcomes confer benefits and levy costs, and so one significant task of the researcher would be to examine how these costs and benefits are distributed in particular cases, regardless of the supposed "rightness" of the outcome. In this view, the "ends" and the "means" are seen as intertwined one with another, and research is more likely to be focused on who wins and who loses and why.

Dahl discusses the Supreme Court from this perspective. He examines instances where the Court and lawmaking coalitions of President and Congress have come into conflict in order to discover how successful the Court has been in frustrating

the will of a lawmaking coalition. The marshalling of evidence by making use of aggregate data, and Dahl's substantive conclusions are both of interest, but even more interesting is the fact that questions such as Dahl has posed have been asked but rarely about the Court.

Wildavsky and Polsby discuss uncertainty in a decision-making setting where uncertainty reaches the heights of picturesqueness, at least in American politics. Candidates for President and delegates to national party conventions participate in the making of critical decisions under conditions where reliable information on relevant subjects is all but nonexistent. Yet they decide, and they invent plausible substitutes for reliable information. This essay explicitly deals with a situation of "bounded rationality" which is more rational than many observers suppose, yet where the costs of increasing one's information sufficiently to act with assurance are extremely high.

Hilsman's research report emphasizes the complexity of the goal mixture which any single decision-making process may have to satisfy. It is not at all uncommon for observers to write about "the goals of United States foreign policy" as though they could be fixed, identified, and pursued with consistency. Many people who are willing to concede that this is not the case with domestic policy cling to the notion still in foreign affairs. Hilman's application of Lindblom's incrementalist approach to the foreign policy sphere is for this reason especially useful.

Long brings to a focus certain organizational correlates of the incrementalist theory. Clearly, the hierarchy is the social organization which is designed to embody the principles of rational maximization of postulated goals. But what social organization is best suited to describe the maximization of goal mixtures set by bargaining in conditions of bounded rationality? One such organization may be the price system, the "hidden hand" of the economy. But at least one assumption underlying the workability of the price system is an extreme decentralization of power where no single decision by itself alters market values. Since many inequalities in power are in fact reported in all four of the empirical studies given in this chapter, the price system is probably an inadequately descriptive metaphor. Long's substitute is the "ecology of games." The particular term may or may not appeal to the reader, but it seems useful to establish some middle ground between totalitarian regimentation and mass democracy as models of the political system.

The final selection in the chapter carries the argument one step further. The Simon and Lindblom picture of decision-making processes gives theoretical grounds for changing one's focus on the empirical world. The four studies which follow discuss in detail some aspect of the world of politics using something approximating this picture as a guide. All of these support the general thrust of the theory and urge our attention toward techniques through which political actors succeed in attaining their ends, given the newly specified real world conditions under which they operate. Schelling's essay is an attempt to codify some of the techniques and tactics which are actually employed in the politics of bargaining. If bargaining is what really goes on when people and organizations make decisions, as the readings indicate, then how do people bargain? Political behavior studies have only begun to find out.

27

THE SCIENCE OF "MUDDLING THROUGH"

• *CHARLES E. LINDBLOM*

Suppose an administrator is given responsibility for formulating policy with respect to inflation. He might start by trying to list all related values in order of importance, e.g., full employment, reasonable business profit, protection of small savings, prevention of a stock market crash. Then all possible policy outcomes could be rated as more or less efficient in attaining a maximum of these values. This would of course require a prodigious inquiry into values held by members of society and an equally prodigious set of calculations on how much of each value is equal to how much of each other value. He could then proceed to outline all possible policy alternatives. In a third step, he would undertake systematic comparison of his multitude of alternatives to determine which attains the greatest amount of values.

In comparing policies, he would take advantage of any theory available that generalized about classes of policies. In considering inflation, for example, he would compare all policies in the light of the theory of prices. Since no alternatives are beyond his investigation, he would consider strict central control and the abolition of all prices and markets on the one hand and elimination of all public controls with reliance completely on the free market on the other, both in the light of whatever theoretical generalizations he could find on such hypothetical economies.

Finally, he would try to make the choice that would in fact maximize his values.

An alternative line of attack would be to set as his principal objective, either explicitly or without conscious thought, the relatively simple goal of keeping prices level. This objective might be compromised or complicated by only a few other goals, such as full employment. He would in fact disregard most other social values as beyond his present interest, and he would for the moment not even attempt to rank the few values that he regarded as immediately relevant. Were he pressed, he would quickly admit that he was ignoring many related values and many possible important consequences of his policies.

As a second step, he would outline those relatively few policy alternatives that occurred to him. He would then compare them. In comparing his limited number of alternatives, most of them familiar from past controversies, he would not ordinarily find a body of theory precise enough to carry him through a comparison of their respective consequences. Instead he would rely heavily on the record of past experience with small policy steps to predict the consequences of similar steps extended into the future.

Moreover, he would find that the policy alternatives combined objectives or values in different ways. For example, one policy might offer price level stability at the cost of some risk of unemployment; another might offer less price stability but also less risk of unemployment. Hence, the next step in his approach — the final selection — would combine into one the choice among values and the choice among instruments for reaching values. It would not, as in the first method of policy-making, approximate a more mechanical process of choosing the means that best satisfied goals that were previously clarified and ranked. Because practitioners of the second approach expect to achieve their goals only partially, they would expect to repeat endlessly the sequence just described, as conditions and aspirations changed and as accuracy of prediction improved.

By Root or by Branch

For complex problems, the first of these two approaches is of course impossible. Although such an approach can be described, it cannot be

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practiced except for relatively simple problems and even then only in a somewhat modified form. It assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as an approach to policy when the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited, as is always the case. Of particular importance to public administrators is the fact that public agencies are in effect usually instructed not to practice the first method. That is to say, their prescribed functions and constraints — the politically or legally possible — restrict their attention to relatively few values and relatively few alternative policies among the countless alternatives that might be imagined. It is the second method that is practiced.

Curiously, however, the literatures of decision-making, policy formulation, planning, and public administration formalize the first approach rather than the second, leaving public administrators who handle complex decisions in the position of practicing what few preach. For emphasis I run some risk of overstatement. True enough, the literature is well aware of limits on man's capacities and of the inevitability that policies will be approached in some such style as the second. But attempts to formalize rational policy formulation — to lay out explicitly the necessary steps in the process — usually describe the first approach and not the second.[1]

The common tendency to describe policy formulation even for complex problems as though it followed the first approach has been strengthened by the attention given to, and successes enjoyed by, operations research, statistical decision theory, and systems analysis. The hallmarks of these procedures, typical of the first approach, are clarity of objective, explicitness of evaluation, a high degree of comprehensiveness of overview, and, wherever possible, quantification of values for mathematical analysis. But these advanced procedures remain largely the appropriate techniques of relatively small-scale problem-solving where the total number of variables to be considered is small and value problems restricted. Charles Hitch, head of the Economics Division of RAND Corporation, one of the leading centers for application of these techniques, has written:

> I would make the empirical generalization from my experience at RAND and elsewhere that operations research is the art of sub-optimizing, i.e., of solving some lower-level problems, and that difficulties increase and our special competence diminishes by an order of magnitude with every level of decision making we attempt to ascend. The sort of simple explicit model which operations researchers are so proficient in using can certainly reflect most of the significant factors influencing traffic control on the George Washington Bridge, but the proportion of the relevant reality which we can represent by any such model or models in studying, say, a major foreign-policy decision, appears to be almost trivial.[2]

Accordingly, I propose in this paper to clarify and formalize the second method, much neglected in the literature. This might be described as the method of *successive limited comparisons*. I will contrast it with the first approach, which might be called the rational-comprehensive method.[3] More impressionistically and briefly — and therefore generally used in this article — they could be characterized as the branch method and root method, the former continually building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees; the latter starting from fundamentals anew each time, building on the past only as experience is embodied in a theory, and always prepared to start completely from the ground up.

Let us put the characteristics of the two methods side by side in simplest terms.

[1] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon similarly characterize the literature. They also take some important steps, as have Simon's recent articles, to describe a less heroic model of policy-making. See *Organizations* (John Wiley and Sons, 1958), p. 137.

[2] "Operations Research and National Planning — A Dissent," 5 *Operations Research* 718 (October, 1957). Hitch's dissent is from particular points made in the article to which his paper is a reply; his claim that operations research is for low-level problems is widely accepted.

For examples of the kind of problems to which operations research is applied, see C. W. Churchman, R. L. Ackoff and E. L. Arnoff, *Introduction to Operations Research* (John Wiley and Sons, 1957); and J. F. McCloskey and J. M. Coppinger (eds.), *Operations Research for Management*, Vol. II, (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956).

[3] I am assuming that administrators often make policy and advise in the making of policy and am treating decision-making and policy-making as synonymous for purposes of this paper.

Rational-Comprehensive (Root)	Successive Limited Comparisons (Branch)
1a. Clarification of values or objectives distinct from and usually prerequisite to empirical analysis of alternative policies.	1b. Selection of value goals and empirical analysis of the needed action are not distinct from one another but are closely intertwined.
2a. Policy-formulation is therefore approached through means-end analysis: First the ends are isolated, then the means to achieve them are sought.	2b. Since means and ends are not distinct, means-end analysis is often inappropriate or limited.
3a. The test of a "good" policy is that it can be shown to be the most appropriate means to desired ends.	3b. The test of a "good" policy is typically that various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without their agreeing that it is the most appropriate means to an agreed objective).
4a. Analysis is comprehensive; every important relevant factor is taken into account.	4b. Analysis is drastically limited: i) Important possible outcomes are neglected. ii) Important alternative potential policies are neglected. iii) Important affected values are neglected.
5a. Theory is often heavily relied upon.	5b. A succession of comparisons greatly reduces or eliminates reliance on theory.

Assuming that the root method is familiar and understandable, we proceed directly to clarification of its alternative by contrast. In explaining the second, we shall be describing how most administrators do in fact approach complex questions, for the root method, the "best" way as a blueprint or model, is in fact not workable for complex policy questions, and administrators are forced to use the method of successive limited comparisons.

Intertwining Evaluation and Empirical Analysis (1b)

The quickest way to understand how values are handled in the method of successive limited comparisons is to see how the root method often breaks down in *its* handling of values or objectives. The idea that values should be clarified, and in advance of the examination of alternative policies, is appealing. But what happens when we attempt it for complex social problems? The first difficulty is that on many critical values or objectives, citizens disagree, congressmen disagree, and public administrators disagree. Even where a fairly specific objective is prescribed for the administrator, there remains considerable room for disagreement on sub-objectives. Consider, for example, the conflict with respect to locating public housing, described in Meyerson and Banfield's study of the Chicago Housing Authority[4] — disagreement which occurred despite the clear objective of providing a certain number of public housing units in the city. Similarly conflicting are objectives in highway location, traffic control, minimum wage administration, development of tourist facilities in national parks, or insect control.

Administrators cannot escape these conflicts by ascertaining the majority's preference, for preferences have not been registered on most issues; indeed, there often *are* no preferences in the absence of public discussion sufficient to bring an issue to the attention of the electorate. Furthermore, there is a question of whether intensity of feeling should be considered as well as the number of persons preferring each alternative. By the impossibility of doing otherwise, administrators often are reduced to deciding policy without clarifying objectives first.

Even when an administrator resolves to follow his own values as a criterion for decisions, he often will not know how to rank them when they conflict with one another, as they usually do. Suppose, for example, that an administrator must relocate tenants living in tenements scheduled for destruction. One objective is to empty the buildings fairly promptly, another is to find suitable accommodation for persons displaced, another is to avoid friction with residents in other areas in which a large influx would be unwelcome, another is to deal with all concerned through persuasion if possible, and so on.

How does one state even to himself the relative importance of these partially conflicting values? A simple ranking of them is not enough; one needs ideally to know how much

[4] Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, *Politics, Planning and the Public Interest* (The Free Press, 1955).

of one value is worth sacrificing for some of another value. The answer is that typically the administrator chooses — and must choose — directly among policies in which these values are combined in different ways. He cannot first clarify his values and then choose among policies.

A more subtle third point underlies both the first two. Social objectives do not always have the same relative values. One objective may be highly prized in one circumstance, another in another circumstance. If, for example, an administrator values highly both the dispatch with which his agency can carry through its projects *and* good public relations, it matters little which of the two possibly conflicting values he favors in some abstract or general sense. Policy questions arise in forms which put to administrators such a question as: Given the degree to which we are or are not already achieving the values of dispatch and the values of good public relations, is it worth sacrificing a little speed for a happier clientele, or is it better to risk offending the clientele so that we can get on with our work? The answer to such a question varies with circumstances.

The value problem is, as the example shows, always a problem of adjustments at a margin. But there is no practicable way to state marginal objectives or values except in terms of particular policies. That one value is preferred to another in one decision situation does not mean that it will be preferred in another decision situation in which it can be had only at great sacrifice of another value. Attempts to rank or order values in general and abstract terms so that they do not shift from decision to decision end up by ignoring the relevant marginal preferences. The significance of this third point thus goes very far. Even if all administrators had at hand an agreed set of values, objectives, and constraints, and an agreed ranking of these values, objectives, and constraints, their marginal values in actual choice situations would be impossible to formulate.

Unable consequently to formulate the relevant values first and then choose among policies to achieve them, administrators must choose directly among alternative policies that offer different marginal combinations of values. Somewhat paradoxically, the only practicable way to disclose one's relevant marginal values even to oneself is to describe the policy one chooses to achieve them. Except roughly and vaguely, I know of no way to describe — or even to understand — what my relative evaluations are for, say, freedom and security, speed and accuracy in governmental decisions, or low taxes and better schools than to describe my preferences among specific policy choices that might be made between the alternatives in each of the pairs.

In summary, two aspects of the process by which values are actually handled can be distinguished. The first is clear: evaluation and empirical analysis are intertwined; that is, one chooses among values and among policies at one and the same time. Put a little more elaborately, one simultaneously chooses a policy to attain certain objectives and chooses the objectives themselves. The second aspect is related but distinct: the administrator focuses his attention on marginal or incremental values. Whether he is aware of it or not, he does not find general formulations of objectives very helpful and in fact makes specific marginal or incremental comparisons. Two policies, X and Y, confront him. Both promise the same degree of attainment of objectives *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, and *e*. But X promises him somewhat more of *f* than does Y, while Y promises him somewhat more of *g* than does X. In choosing between them, he is in fact offered the alternative of a marginal or incremental amount of *f* at the expense of a marginal or incremental amount of *g*. The only values that are relevant to his choice are these increments by which the two policies differ; and, when he finally chooses between the two marginal values, he does so by making a choice between policies.[5]

As to whether the attempt to clarify objectives in advance of policy selection is more or less rational than the close intertwining of marginal evaluation and empirical analysis, the principal difference established is that for complex problems the first is impossible and irrelevant, and the second is both possible and relevant. The second is possible because the administrator need not try to analyze any values except the values by which alternative policies differ and need not be concerned with them except as they differ marginally. His need for information on values or objectives is drastically reduced as compared with the root method; and his capacity for grasping, comprehending,

[5] The line of argument is, of course, an extension of the theory of market choice, especially the theory of consumer choice, to public policy choices.

and relating values to one another is not strained beyond the breaking point.

Relations Between Means and Ends (2b)

Decision-making is ordinarily formalized as a means-ends relationship: means are conceived to be evaluated and chosen in the light of ends finally selected independently of and prior to the choice of means. This is the means-ends relationship of the root method. But it follows from all that has just been said that such a means-ends relationship is possible only to the extent that values are agreed upon, are reconcilable, and are stable at the margin. Typically, therefore, such a means-ends relationship is absent from the branch method, where means and ends are simultaneously chosen.

Yet any departure from the means-ends relationship of the root method will strike some readers as inconceivable. For it will appear to them that only in such a relationship is it possible to determine whether one policy choice is better or worse than another. How can an administrator know whether he has made a wise or foolish decision if he is without prior values or objectives by which to judge his decisions? The answer to this question calls up the third distinctive difference between root and branch methods: how to decide the best policy.

The Test of "Good" Policy (3b)

In the root method, a decision is "correct," "good," or "rational" if it can be shown to attain some specified objective, where the objective can be specified without simply describing the decision itself. Where objectives are defined only through the marginal or incremental approach to values described above, it is still sometimes possible to test whether a policy does in fact attain the desired objectives; but a precise statement of the objectives takes the form of a description of the policy chosen or some alternative to it. To show that a policy is mistaken one cannot offer an abstract argument that important objectives are not achieved; one must instead argue that another policy is more to be preferred.

So far, the departure from customary ways of looking at problem-solving is not troublesome, for many administrators will be quick to agree that the most effective discussion of the correctness of policy does take the form of comparison with other policies that might have been chosen. But what of the situation in which administrators cannot agree on values or objectives, either abstractly or in marginal terms? What then is the test of "good" policy? For the root method, there is no test. Agreement on objectives failing, there is no standard of "correctness." For the method of successive limited comparisons, the test is agreement on policy itself, which remains possible even when agreement on values is not.

It has been suggested that continuing agreement in Congress on the desirability of extending old age insurance stems from liberal desires to strengthen the welfare programs of the federal government and from conservative desires to reduce union demands for private pension plans. If so, this is an excellent demonstration of the ease with which individuals of different ideologies often can agree on concrete policy. Labor mediators report a similar phenomenon: the contestants cannot agree on criteria for settling their disputes but can agree on specific proposals. Similarly, when one administrator's objective turns out to be another's means, they often can agree on policy.

Agreement on policy thus becomes the only practicable test of the policy's correctness. And for one administrator to seek to win the other over to agreement on ends as well would accomplish nothing and create quite unnecessary controversy.

If agreement directly on policy as a test for "best" policy seems a poor substitute for testing the policy against its objectives, it ought to be remembered that objectives themselves have no ultimate validity other than they are agreed upon. Hence agreement is the test of "best" policy in both methods. But where the root method requires agreement on what elements in the decision constitute objectives and on which of these objectives should be sought, the branch method falls back on agreement wherever it can be found.

In an important sense, therefore, it is not irrational for an administrator to defend a policy as good without being able to specify what it is good for.

Non-Comprehensive Analysis (4b)

Ideally, rational-comprehensive analysis leaves out nothing important. But it is impossible to take everything important into consideration unless "important" is so narrowly defined that analysis is in fact quite limited. Limits on

human intellectual capacities and on available information set definite limits to man's capacity to be comprehensive. In actual fact, therefore, no one can practice the rational-comprehensive method for really complex problems, and every administrator faced with a sufficiently complex problem must find ways drastically to simplify.

An administrator assisting in the formulation of agricultural economic policy cannot in the first place be competent on all possible policies. He cannot even comprehend one policy entirely. In planning a soil bank program, he cannot successfully anticipate the impact of higher or lower farm income on, say, urbanization — the possible consequent loosening of family ties, possible consequent eventual need for revisions in social security and further implications for tax problems arising out of new federal responsibilities for social security and municipal responsibilities for urban services. Nor, to follow another line of repercussions, can he work through the soil bank program's effects on prices for agricultural products in foreign markets and consequent implications for foreign relations, including those arising out of economic rivalry between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

In the method of successive limited comparisons, simplification is systematically achieved in two principal ways. First, it is achieved through limitation of policy comparisons to those policies that differ in relatively small degree from policies presently in effect. Such a limitation immediately reduces the number of alternatives to be investigated and also drastically simplifies the character of the investigation of each. For it is not necessary to undertake fundamental inquiry into an alternative and its consequences; it is necessary only to study those respects in which the proposed alternative and its consequences differ from the status quo. The empirical comparison of marginal differences among alternative policies that differ only marginally is, of course, a counterpart to the incremental or marginal comparison of values discussed above.[6]

RELEVANCE AS WELL AS REALISM

It is a matter of common observation that in Western democracies public administrators and policy analysts in general do largely limit their analyses to incremental or marginal differences in policies that are chosen to differ only incrementally. They do not do so, however, solely because they desperately need some way to simplify their problems; they also do so in order to be relevant. Democracies change their policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy does not move in leaps and bounds.

The incremental character of political change in the United States has often been remarked. The two major political parties agree on fundamentals; they offer alternative policies to the voters only on relatively small points of difference. Both parties favor full employment, but they define it somewhat differently; both favor the development of water power resources, but in slightly different ways; and both favor unemployment compensation, but not the same level of benefits. Similarly, shifts of policy within a party take place largely through a series of relatively small changes, as can be seen in their only gradual acceptance of the idea of governmental responsibility for support of the unemployed, a change in party positions beginning in the early 30's and culminating in a sense in the Employment Act of 1946.

Party behavior is in turn rooted in public attitudes, and political theorists cannot conceive of democracy's surviving in the United States in the absence of fundamental agreement on potentially disruptive issues, with consequent limitation of policy debates to relatively small differences in policy.

Since the policies ignored by the administrator are politically impossible and so irrelevant, the simplification of analysis achieved by concentrating on policies that differ only incrementally is not a capricious kind of simplification. In addition, it can be argued that, given the limits on knowledge within which policy-makers are confined, simplifying by limiting the focus to small variations from present policy makes the most of available knowledge. Because policies being considered are like present and past policies, the administrator can obtain information and claim some insight. Non-incremental policy proposals are therefore typically not only politically irrelevant but also unpredictable in their consequences.

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[6] A more precise definition of incremental policies and a discussion of whether a change that appears "small" to one observer might be seen differently by another is to be found in my "Policy Analysis," 48 *American Economic Review* 298 (June, 1958).

The second method of simplification of analysis is the practice of ignoring important possible consequences of possible policies, as well as the values attached to the neglected consequences. If this appears to disclose a shocking shortcoming of successive limited comparisons, it can be replied that, even if the exclusions are random, policies may nevertheless be more intelligently formulated than through futile attempts to achieve a comprehensiveness beyond human capacity. Actually, however, the exclusions, seeming arbitrary or random from one point of view, need be neither.

ACHIEVING A DEGREE OF COMPREHENSIVENESS

Suppose that each value neglected by one policy-making agency were a major concern of at least one other agency. In that case, a helpful division of labor would be achieved, and no agency need find its task beyond its capacities. The shortcomings of such a system would be that one agency might destroy a value either before another agency could be activated to safeguard it or in spite of another agency's efforts. But the possibility that important values may be lost is present in any form of organization, even where agencies attempt to comprehend in planning more than is humanly possible.

The virtue of such a hypothetical division of labor is that every important interest or value has its watchdog. And these watchdogs can protect the interests in their jurisdiction in two quite different ways: first, by redressing damages done by other agencies; and, second, by anticipating and heading off injury before it occurs.

In a society like that of the United States in which individuals are free to combine to pursue almost any possible common interest they might have and in which government agencies are sensitive to the pressures of these groups, the system described is approximated. Almost every interest has its watchdog. Without claiming that every interest has a sufficiently powerful watchdog, it can be argued that our system often can assure a more comprehensive regard for the values of the whole society than any attempt at intellectual comprehensiveness.

In the United States, for example, no part of government attempts a comprehensive overview of policy on income distribution. A policy nevertheless evolves, and one responding to a wide variety of interests. A process of mutual adjustment among farm groups, labor unions, municipalities and school boards, tax authorities, and government agencies with responsibilities in the fields of housing, health, highways, national parks, fire, and police accomplishes a distribution of income in which particular income problems neglected at one point in the decision processes become central at another point.

Mutual adjustment is more pervasive than the explicit forms it takes in negotiation between groups; it persists through the mutual impacts of groups upon each other even where they are not in communication. For all the imperfections and latent dangers in this ubiquitous process of mutual adjustment, it will often accomplish an adaptation of policies to a wider range of interests than could be done by one group centrally.

Note, too, how the incremental pattern of policy-making fits with the multiple pressure pattern. For when decisions are only incremental — closely related to known policies, it is easier for one group to anticipate the kind of moves another might make and easier too for it to make correction for injury already accomplished.[7]

Even partisanship and narrowness, to use pejorative terms, will sometimes be assets to rational decision-making, for they can doubly insure that what one agency neglects, another will not; they specialize personnel to distinct points of view. The claim is valid that effective rational coordination of the federal administration, if possible to achieve at all, would require an agreed set of values[8] — if "rational" is defined as the practice of the root method of decision-making. But a high degree of administrative coordination occurs as each agency adjusts its policies to the concerns of the other agencies in the process of fragmented decision-making I have just described.

For all the apparent shortcomings of the incremental approach to policy alternatives with its arbitrary exclusion coupled with frag-

[7] The link between the practice of the method of successive limited comparisons and mutual adjustment of interests in a highly fragmented decision-making process adds a new facet to pluralist theories of government and administration.

[8] Herbert Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 434.

mentation, when compared to the root method, the branch method often looks far superior. In the root method, the inevitable exclusion of factors is accidental, unsystematic, and not defensible by any argument so far developed, while in the branch method the exclusions are deliberate, systematic, and defensible. Ideally, of course, the root method does not exclude; in practice it must.

Nor does the branch method necessarily neglect long-run considerations and objectives. It is clear that important values must be omitted in considering policy, and sometimes the only way long-run objectives can be given adequate attention is through the neglect of short-run considerations. But the values omitted can be either long-run or short-run.

Succession of Comparisons (5b)

The final distinctive element in the branch method is that the comparisons, together with the policy choice, proceed in a chronological series. Policy is not made once and for all; it is made and re-made endlessly. Policy-making is a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration.

Making policy is at best a very rough process. Neither social scientists, nor politicians, nor public administrators yet know enough about the social world to avoid repeated error in predicting the consequences of policy moves. A wise policy-maker consequently expects that his policies will achieve only part of what he hopes and at the same time will produce unanticipated consequences he would have preferred to avoid. If he proceeds through a *succession* of incremental changes, he avoids serious lasting mistakes in several ways.

In the first place, past sequences of policy steps have given him knowledge about the probable consequences of further similar steps. Second, he need not attempt big jumps toward his goals that would require predictions beyond his or anyone else's knowledge, because he never expects his policy to be a final resolution of a problem. His decision is only one step, one that if successful can quickly be followed by another. Third, he is in effect able to test his previous predictions as he moves on to each further step. Lastly, he often can remedy a past error fairly quickly — more quickly than if policy proceeded through more distinct steps widely spaced in time.

Compare this comparative analysis of incremental changes with the aspiration to employ theory in the root method. Man cannot think without classifying, without subsuming one experience under a more general category of experiences. The attempt to push categorization as far as possible and to find general propositions which can be applied to specific situations is what I refer to with the word "theory." Where root analysis often leans heavily on theory in this sense, the branch method does not.

The assumption of root analysts is that theory is the most systematic and economical way to bring relevant knowledge to bear on a specific problem. Granting the assumption, an unhappy fact is that we do not have adequate theory to apply to problems in any policy area, although theory is more adequate in some areas — monetary policy, for example — than in others. Comparative analysis, as in the branch method, is sometimes a systematic alternative to theory.

Suppose an administrator must choose among a small group of policies that differ only incrementally from each other and from present policy. He might aspire to "understand" each of the alternatives — for example, to know all the consequences of each aspect of each policy. If so, he would indeed require theory. In fact, however, he would usually decide that, *for policy-making purposes*, he need know, as explained above, only the consequences of each of those aspects of the policies in which they differed from one another. For this much more modest aspiration, he requires no theory (although it might be helpful, if available), for he can proceed to isolate probable differences by examining the differences in consequences associated with past differences in policies, a feasible program because he can take his observations from a long sequence of incremental changes.

For example, without a more comprehensive social theory about juvenile delinquency than scholars have yet produced, one cannot possibly understand the ways in which a variety of public policies — say on education, housing, recreation, employment, race relations, and policing — might encourage or discourage delinquency. And one needs such an understanding if he undertakes the comprehensive over-

view of the problem prescribed in the models of the root method. If, however, one merely wants to mobilize knowledge sufficient to assist in a choice among a small group of similar policies — alternative policies on juvenile court procedures, for example — he can do so by comparative analysis of the results of similar past policy moves.

Theorists and Practitioners

This difference explains — in some cases at least — why the administrator often feels that the outside expert or academic problem-solver is sometimes not helpful and why they in turn often urge more theory on him. And it explains why an administrator often feels more confident when "flying by the seat of his pants" than when following the advice of theorists. Theorists often ask the administrator to go the long way round to the solution of his problems, in effect ask him to follow the best canons of the scientific method, when the administrator knows that the best available theory will work less well than more modest incremental comparisons. Theorists do not realize that the administrator is often in fact practicing a systematic method. It would be foolish to push this explanation too far, for sometimes practical decision-makers are pursuing neither a theoretical approach nor successive comparisons, nor any other systematic method.

It may be worth emphasizing that theory is sometimes of extremely limited helpfulness in policy-making for at least two rather different reasons. It is greedy for facts; it can be constructed only through a great collection of observations. And it is typically insufficiently precise for application to a policy process that moves through small changes. In contrast, the comparative method both economizes on the need for facts and directs the analyst's attention to just those facts that are relevant to the fine choices faced by the decision-maker.

With respect to precision of theory, economic theory serves as an example. It predicts that an economy without money or prices would in certain specified ways misallocate resources, but this finding pertains to an alternative far removed from the kind of policies on which administrators need help. On the other hand, it is not precise enough to predict the consequences of policies restricting business mergers, and this is the kind of issue on which the administrators need help. Only in relatively restricted areas does economic theory achieve sufficient precision to go far in resolving policy questions; its helpfulness in policy-making is always so limited that it requires supplementation through comparative analysis.

Successive Comparison as a System

Successive limited comparisons is, then, indeed a method or system; it is not a failure of method for which administrators ought to apologize. None the less, its imperfections, which have not been explored in this paper, are many. For example, the method is without a built-in safeguard for all relevant values, and it also may lead the decision-maker to overlook excellent policies for no other reason than that they are not suggested by the chain of successive policy steps leading up to the present. Hence, it ought to be said that under this method, as well as under some of the most sophisticated variants of the root method — operations research, for example — policies will continue to be as foolish as they are wise.

Why then bother to describe the method in all the above detail? Because it is in fact a common method of policy formulation, and is, for complex problems, the principal reliance of administrators as well as of other policy analysts.[9] And because it will be superior to any other decision-making method available for complex problems in many circumstances, cer-

[9] Elsewhere I have explored this same method of policy formulation as practiced by academic analysts of policy ("Policy Analysis," 48 *American Economic Review* 298 [June, 1958]). Although it has been here presented as a method for public administrators, it is no less necessary to analysts more removed from immediate policy questions, despite their tendencies to describe their own analytical efforts as though they were the rational-comprehensive method with an especially heavy use of theory. Similarly, this same method is inevitably resorted to in personal problem-solving, where means and ends are sometimes impossible to separate, where aspirations or objectives undergo constant development, and where drastic simplification of the complexity of the real world is urgent if problems are to be solved in the time that can be given to them. To an economist accustomed to dealing with the marginal or incremental concept in market processes, the central idea in the method is that both evaluation and empirical analysis are incremental. Accordingly I have referred to the method elsewhere as "the incremental method."

tainly superior to a futile attempt at superhuman comprehensiveness. The reaction of the public administrator to the exposition of method doubtless will be less a discovery of a new method than a better acquaintance with an old. But by becoming more conscious of their practice of this method, administrators might practice it with more skill and know when to extend or constrict its use. (That they sometimes practice it effectively and sometimes not may explain the extremes of opinion on "muddling through," which is both praised as a highly sophisticated form of problem-solving and denounced as no method at all. For I suspect that in so far as there is a system in what is known as "muddling through," this method is it.)

One of the noteworthy incidental consequences of clarification of the method is the light it throws on the suspicion an administrator sometimes entertains that a consultant or adviser is not speaking relevantly and responsibly when in fact by all ordinary objective evidence he is. The trouble lies in the fact that most of us approach policy problems within a framework given by our view of a chain of successive policy choices made up to the present. One's thinking about appropriate policies with respect, say, to urban traffic control is greatly influenced by one's knowledge of the incremental steps taken up to the present. An administrator enjoys an intimate knowledge of his past sequences that "outsiders" do not share, and his thinking and that of the "outsider" will consequently be different in ways that may puzzle both. Both may appear to be talking intelligently, yet each may find the other unsatisfactory. The relevance of the policy chain of succession is even more clear when an American tries to discuss, say, antitrust policy with a Swiss, for the chains of policy in the two countries are strikingly different and the two individuals consequently have organized their knowledge in quite different ways.

If this phenomenon is a barrier to communication, an understanding of it promises an enrichment of intellectual interaction in policy formulation. Once the source of difference is understood, it will sometimes be stimulating for an administrator to seek out a policy analyst whose recent experience is with a policy chain different from his own.

This raises again a question only briefly discussed above on the merits of like-mindedness among government administrators. While much of organization theory argues the virtues of common values and agreed organizational objectives, for complex problems in which the root method is inapplicable, agencies will want among their own personnel two types of diversification: administrators whose thinking is organized by reference to policy chains other than those familiar to most members of the organization and, even more commonly, administrators whose professional or personal values or interests create diversity of view (perhaps coming from different specialties, social classes, geographical areas) so that, even within a single agency, decision-making can be fragmented and parts of the agency can serve as watchdogs for other parts.

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A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE

• *HERBERT A. SIMON*

Traditional economic theory postulates an "economic man," who, in the course of being "economic" is also "rational." This man is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if not absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He is assumed also to have

Reprinted by permission from *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 241–260. The ideas embodied in this paper were initially developed in a series of discussions with Herbert Bohnert, Norman Dalkey, Gerald Thompson, and Robert Wolfson during the summer of 1952. These collabo-

a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and a skill in computation that enables him to calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which of these will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale.

Recent developments in economics, and particularly in the theory of the business firm, have raised great doubts as to whether this schematized model of economic man provides a suitable foundation on which to erect a theory — whether it be a theory of how firms *do* behave, or of how they "should" rationally behave. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss these doubts, or to determine whether they are justified. Rather, I shall assume that the concept of "economic man" (and, I might add, of his brother "administrative man") is in need of fairly drastic revision, and shall put forth some suggestions as to the direction the revision might take.

Broadly stated, the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist. One is tempted to turn to the literature of psychology for the answer. Psychologists have certainly been concerned with rational behavior, particularly in their interest in learning phenomena. But the distance is so great between our present psychological knowledge of the learning and choice processes and the kinds of knowledge needed for economic and administrative theory that a marking stone placed halfway between might help travellers from both directions to keep to their courses.

Lacking the kinds of empirical knowledge of the decisional processes that will be required for a definitive theory, the hard facts of the actual world can, at the present stage, enter the theory only in a relatively unsystematic and unrigorous way. But none of us is completely innocent of acquaintance with the gross characteristics of human choice, or of the broad features of the environment in which this choice takes place. I shall feel free to call on this common experience as a source of the hypotheses needed for the theory about the nature of man and his world.

The problem can be approached initially either by inquiring into the properties of the choosing organism, or by inquiring into the environment of choice. In this paper, I shall take the former approach. I propose, in a sequel, to deal with the characteristics of the environment and the interrelations of environment and organism.

The present paper, then, attempts to include explicitly some of the properties of the choosing organism as elements in defining what is meant by rational behavior in specific situations and in selecting a rational behavior in terms of such a definition. In part, this involves making more explicit what is already implicit in some of the recent work on the problem — that the state of information may as well be regarded as a characteristic of the decision-maker as a characteristic of his environment. In part, it involves some new considerations — in particular taking into account the simplifications the choosing organism may deliberately introduce into its model of the situation in order to bring the model within the range of its computing capacity.

I. Some General Features of Rational Choice

The "flavor" of various models of rational choice stems primarily from the specific kinds of assumptions that are introduced as to the "givens" or constraints within which rational adaptation must take place. Among the common constraints — which are not themselves the objects of rational calculation — are (1) the set of alternatives open to choice, (2) the relationships that determine the pay-offs ("satisfactions," "goal attainment") as a function of the alternative that is chosen, and (3) the preference-orderings among pay-offs. The selection of particular constraints and the rejection of others for incorporation in the model of rational behavior involves implicit assump-

rators deserve a large share of the credit for whatever merit this approach to rational choice may possess. A first draft of this paper was prepared in my capacity as a consultant to the RAND Corporation. It has been developed further (including the Appendix) in work with the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics on "Decision Making Under Uncertainty," under contract with the Office of Naval Research, and has been completed with the aid of a grant from the Ford Foundation.

tions as to what variables the rational organism "controls" — and hence can "optimize" as a means to rational adaptation — and what variables it must take as fixed. It also involves assumptions as to the character of the variables that are fixed. For example, by making different assumptions about the amount of information the organism has with respect to the relations between alternatives and pay-offs, optimization might involve selection of a certain maximum, of an expected value, or a minimax.

Another way of characterizing the givens and the behavior variables is to say that the latter refer to the organism itself, the former to its environment. But if we adopt this viewpoint, we must be prepared to accept the possibility that what we call "the environment" may lie, in part, within the skin of the biological organism. That is, some of the constraints that must be taken as givens in an optimization problem may be physiological and psychological limitations of the organism (biologically defined) itself. For example, the maximum speed at which an organism can move establishes a boundary on the set of its available behavior alternatives. Similarly, limits on computational capacity may be important constraints entering into the definition of rational choice under particular circumstances. We shall explore possible ways of formulating the process of rational choice in situations where we wish to take explicit account of the "internal" as well as the "external" constraints that define the problem of rationality for the organism.

Whether our interests lie in the normative or in the descriptive aspects of rational choice, the construction of models of this kind should prove instructive. Because of the psychological limits of the organism (particularly with respect to computational and predictive ability), actual human rationality-striving can at best be an extremely crude and simplified approximation to the kind of global rationality that is implied, for example, by game-theoretical models. While the approximations that organisms employ may not be the best — even at the levels of computational complexity they are able to handle — it is probable that a great deal can be learned about possible mechanisms from an examination of the schemes of approximation that are actually employed by human and other organisms.

In describing the proposed model, we shall begin with elements it has in common with the more global models, and then proceed to introduce simplifying assumptions and (what is the same thing) approximating procedures.

1.1 PRIMITIVE TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Models of rational behavior — both the global kinds usually constructed, and the more limited kinds to be discussed here — generally require some or all of the following elements:

1. A set of *behavior alternatives* (alternatives of choice or decision). In a mathematical model, these can be represented by a point set, A.

2. The subset of *Behavior alternatives that the organism "considers"* or "perceives." That is, the organism may make its choice within a set of alternatives more limited than the whole range objectively available to it. The "considered" subset can be represented by a point set $\hat{A}$, with $\hat{A}$ included in A ($\hat{A} \subset A$).

3. *The possible future states of affairs,* or outcomes of choice, represented by a point set, S. (For the moment it is not necessary to distinguish between actual and perceived outcomes).

4. A *"pay-off"* function, representing the "value" or "utility" placed by the organism upon each of the possible outcomes of choice. The pay-off may be represented by a real function, $V(s)$ defined for all elements, s, of S. For many purposes there is needed only an ordering relation on pairs of elements of S — i.e., a relation that states that s_1 is preferred to s_2 or vice versa — but to avoid unnecessary complications in the present discussion, we will assume that a cardinal utility, $V(s)$, has been defined.

5. *Information as to which outcomes in S will actually occur* if a particular alternative, a, in A (or in $\hat{A}$) is chosen. This information may be incomplete — that is, there may be more than one possible outcome, s, for each behavior alternative, a. We represent the information, then, by a mapping of each element, a, in A upon a subset, S_a — the set of outcomes that may ensue if a is the chosen behavior alternative.

6. *Information as to the probability that a particular outcome will ensue* if a particular behavior alternative is chosen. This is a more precise kind of information than that postulated in (5), for it associates with each element, s, in the set S_a, a probability, $P_a(s)$ — the prob-

ability that s will occur if a is chosen. The probability $P_a(s)$ is a real, non-negative function with $\sum_{s_a} P_a(s) = 1$.

Attention is directed to the threefold distinction drawn by the definitions among the set of behavior alternatives, A, the set of outcomes or future states of affairs, S, and the pay-off, V. In the ordinary representation of a game, in reduced form, by its pay-off matrix, the set S corresponds to the cells of the matrix, the set A to the strategies of the first player, and the function V to the values in the cells. The set S_a is then the set of cells in the ath row. By keeping in mind this interpretation, the reader may compare the present formulation with "classical" game theory.

1.2 "CLASSICAL" CONCEPTS OF RATIONALITY

With these elements, we can define procedures of rational choice corresponding to the ordinary game-theoretical and probabilistic models.[1]

A. *Max-min Rule.* Assume that whatever alternative is chosen, the worst possible outcome will ensue — the smallest $V(s)$ for s in S_a will be realized. Then select that alternative, a, for which this worst pay-off is as large as possible.

$$(\hat{V}\hat{a}) = \operatorname*{Min}_{s \in S\hat{a}} V(s) = \operatorname*{Max}_{a \in A} \operatorname*{Min}_{s \in Sa} V(s)$$

Instead of the maximum with respect to the set, A, of actual alternatives, we can substitute the maximum with respect to the set, $\hat{A}$, of "considered" alternatives. The probability distribution of outcomes, (6) does not play any role in the max-min rule.

B. *Probabilistic Rule.* Maximize the expected value of $V(s)$ for the (assumed known) probability distribution, $P_a(s)$.

$$\hat{V}(\hat{a}) = \sum_{s \in S\hat{a}} V(s) P_{\hat{a}}(s) = \operatorname*{Max}_{a \in A} \sum_{s \in Sa} V(s) P_a(s)$$

C. *Certainty Rule.* Given the information that each a in A (or in $\hat{A}$) maps upon a specified s_a in S, select the behavior alternative whose outcome has the largest pay-off.

$$\hat{V}(\hat{a}) = V(S_{\hat{a}}) = \operatorname*{Max}_{a \in A} V(S_a)$$

[1] See Kenneth J. Arrow, "Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations," *Econometrica*, XIX, 404–37 (Oct. 1951).

II. THE ESSENTIAL SIMPLIFICATIONS

If we examine closely the "classical" concepts of rationality outlined above, we see immediately what severe demands they make upon the choosing organism. The organism must be able to attach definite pay-offs (or at least a definite range of pay-offs) to each possible outcome. This, of course, involves also the ability to specify the exact nature of the outcomes — there is no room in the scheme for "unanticipated consequences." The pay-offs must be completely ordered — it must always be possible to specify, in a consistent way, that one outcome is better than, as good as, or worse than any other. And, if the certainty or probabilistic rules are employed, either the outcomes of particular alternatives must be known with certainty, or at least it must be possible to attach definite probabilities to outcomes.

My first empirical proposition is that there is a complete lack of evidence that, in actual human choice situations of any complexity, these computations can be, or are in fact, performed. The introspective evidence is certainly clear enough, but we cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that the unconscious is a better decision-maker than the conscious. Nevertheless, in the absence of evidence that the classical concepts do describe the decision-making process, it seems reasonable to examine the possibility that the actual process is quite different from the ones the rules describe.

Our procedure will be to introduce some modifications that appear (on the basis of casual empiricism) to correspond to observed behavior processes in humans, and that lead to substantial computational simplifications in the making of a choice. There is no implication that human beings use all of these modifications and simplifications all the time. Nor is this the place to attempt the formidable empirical task of determining the extent to which, and the circumstances under which humans actually employ these simplifications. The point is rather that these are procedures which appear often to be employed by human beings in complex choice situations to find an approximate model of manageable proportions.

2.1 "SIMPLE" PAY-OFF FUNCTIONS

One route to simplification is to assume that $V(s)$ necessarily assumes one of two values, (1, 0), or of three values, (1, 0, −1), for all

s in S. Depending on the circumstances, we might want to interpret these values, as (a) (satisfactory or unsatisfactory), or (b) (win, draw or lose).

As an example of (b), let S represent the possible positions in a chess game at White's 20th move. Then a $(+1)$ position is one in which White possesses a strategy leading to a win whatever Black does. A (0) position is one in which White can enforce a draw, but not a win. A (-1) position is one in which Black can force a win.

As an example of (a) let S represent possible prices for a house an individual is selling. He may regard \$15,000 as an "acceptable" price, anything over this amount as "satisfactory," anything less as "unsatisfactory." In psychological theory we would fix the boundary at the "aspiration level"; in economic theory we would fix the boundary at the price which evokes indifference between selling and not selling (an opportunity cost concept).

The objection may be raised that, although \$16,000 and \$25,000 are both "very satisfactory" prices for the house, a rational individual would prefer to sell at the higher price, and hence, that the simple pay-off function is an inadequate representation of the choice situation. The objection may be answered in several different ways, each answer corresponding to a class of situations in which the simple function might be appropriate.

First, the individual may not be confronted simultaneously with a number of buyers offering to purchase the house at different prices, but may receive a sequence of offers, and may have to decide to accept or reject each one before he receives the next. (Or, more generally, he may receive a sequence of pairs or triplets or n-tuples of offers, and may have to decide whether to accept the highest of an n-tuple before the next n-tuple is received.) Then, if the elements S correspond to n-tuples of offers, $V(s)$ would be 1 whenever the highest offer in the n-tuple exceeded the "acceptance price" the seller had determined upon at that time. We can then raise the further question of what would be a rational process for determining the acceptance price.[2]

Second, even if there were a more general pay-off function, $W(s)$, capable of assuming more than two different values, the simplified $V(s)$ might be a satisfactory approximation to $W(s)$. Suppose, for example, that there were some way of introducing a cardinal utility function, defined over S, say $U(s)$. Suppose further that $U(W)$ is a monotonic increasing function with a strongly negative second derivative (decreasing marginal utility). Then $V(s) = V\{W(s)\}$ might be the approximation.



FIGURE I

When a simple $V(s)$, assuming only the values $(+1, 0)$ is admissible, under the circumstances just discussed or under other circumstances, then a (fourth) rational decision-process could be defined as follows:

D. (i) Search for a set of possible outcomes (a subset, S' in S) such that the pay-off is satisfactory ($V(s) = 1$) for all these possible outcomes (for all s in S').

(ii) Search for a behavior alternative (an a in A) whose possible outcomes all are in S' (such that a maps upon a set, S_a, that is contained in S').

If a behavior alternative can be found by this procedure, then a satisfactory outcome is assured. The procedure does not, of course, guarantee the existence or uniqueness of an a with the desired properties.

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2 See the Appendix. It might be remarked here that the simple risk function, introduced by Wald to bring problems in statistical decision theory within the bounds of computability, is an example of a simple pay-off function as that term is defined here.

2.2 INFORMATION GATHERING

One element of realism we may wish to introduce is that, while $V(s)$ may be known in advance, the mapping of A on subsets of S may not. In the extreme case, at the outset each element, a, may be mapped on the whole set, S. We may then introduce into the decision-making process information-gathering steps that produce a more precise mapping of the various elements of A on nonidentical subsets of S. If the information-gathering process is not costless, then one element in the decision will be the determination of how far the mapping is to be refined.

Now in the case of the simple pay-off functions, $(+1, 0)$, the information-gathering process can be streamlined in an important respect. First, we suppose that the individual has initially a very coarse mapping of A on S. Second, he looks for an S' in S such that $V(s) = 1$ for s in S'. Third, he gathers information to refine that part of the mapping of A on S in which elements of S' are involved. Fourth, having refined the mapping, he looks for an a that maps on to a subset of S'.

Under favorable circumstances, this procedure may require the individual to gather only a small amount of information — an insignificant part of the whole mapping of elements of A on individual elements of S. If the search for an a having the desirable properties is successful, he is certain that he cannot better his choice by securing additional information.[3]

It appears that the decision process just described is one of the important means employed by chess players to select a move in the middle and end game. Let A be the set of moves available to White on his 20th move. Let S be a set of positions that might be reached, say, by the 30th move. Let S' be some subset of S that consists of clearly "won" positions. From a very rough knowledge of the mapping of A on S, White tentatively selects a move, a, that (if Black plays in a certain way) maps on S'. By then considering alternative replies for Black, White "explores" the whole mapping of a. His exploration may lead to points, s, that are not in S', but which are now recognized also as winning positions. These can be adjoined to S'. On the other hand, a sequence may be discovered that permits Black to bring about a position that is clearly not "won" for White. Then White may reject the original point, a, and try another.

Whether this procedure leads to any essential simplification of the computation depends on certain empirical facts about the game. Clearly all positions can be categorized as "won," "lost," or "drawn" in an objective sense. But from the standpoint of the player, positions may be categorized as "clearly won," "clearly lost," "clearly drawn," "won or drawn," "drawn or lost," and so forth — depending on the adequacy of this mapping. If the "clearly won" positions represent a significant subset of the objectively "won" positions, then the combinatorics involved in seeing whether a position can be transformed into a clearly won position, for all possible replies by Black, may not be unmanageable.[4] The advantage of this procedure over the more common notion (which may, however, be applicable in the opening) of a general valuation function for positions, taking on values from -1 to 1, is that it implies much less complex and subtle evaluation criteria. All that is required is that the evaluation function be reasonably sensitive in detecting when a position in one of the three states — won, lost, or drawn — has been transformed into a position in another state. The player, instead of seeking for a "best" move, needs only to look for a "good" move.

We see that, by the introduction of a simple pay-off function and of a process for gradually improving the mapping of behavior alternatives upon possible outcomes, the process of reaching a rational decision may be drastically simplified from a computational standpoint. In the theory and practice of linear programming, the distinction is commonly drawn between computations to determine the *feasibility* of a

[3] This procedure also dispenses with the necessity of estimating explicitly the cost of obtaining additional information. For further discussion of this point see the comments on dynamics in the last section of this paper.

[4] I have estimated roughly the actual degree of simplification that might be realized in the middle game in chess by experimentation with two middle-game positions. A sequence of sixteen moves, eight by each player, might be expected to yield a total of about 10^{24} (one septilion) legally permissible variations. By following the general kind of program just described, it was possible to reduce the number of lines of play examined in each of these positions to fewer than 100 variations — a rather spectacular simplification of the choice problem.

program, and computations to discover the *optimal* program. Feasibility testing consists in determining whether a program satisfies certain linear inequalities that are given at the outset. For example, a mobilization plan may take as given the maximum work force and the steel-making capacity of the economy. Then a feasible program is one that does not require a work force or steel-making facilities exceeding the given limits.

An optimal program is that one of the feasible programs which maximizes a given pay-off function. If, instead of requiring that the pay-off be maximized, we require only that the pay-off exceed some given amount, then we can find a program that satisfies this requirement by the usual methods of feasibility testing. The pay-off requirement is represented simply by an additional linear inequality that must be satisfied. Once this requirement is met, it is not necessary to determine whether there exists an alternative plan with a still higher pay-off.

For all practical purposes, this procedure may represent a sufficient approach to optimization, provided the minimum required pay-off can be set "reasonably." In later sections of this paper we will discuss how this might be done, and we shall show also how the scheme can be extended to vector pay-off functions with multiple components (Optimization requires, of course, a complete ordering of pay-offs).

2.3 PARTIAL ORDERING OF PAY-OFFS

The classical theory does not tolerate the incomparability of oranges and apples. It requires a scalar pay-off function, that is, a complete ordering of pay-offs. Instead of a scalar pay-off function, $V(s)$, we might have a vector function, $V(s)$; where V has the components $V_1, V_2, \ldots$ A vector pay-off function may be introduced to handle a number of situations:

1. In the case of a decision to be made by a *group of persons,* components may represent the pay-off functions of the individual members of the group. What is preferred by one may not be preferred by the others.

2. In the case of an individual, he may be trying to implement a number of *values that do not have a common denominator* — e.g., he compares two jobs in terms of salary, climate, pleasantness of work, prestige, etc.

3. Where each behavior alternative, a, maps on a set of n *possible consequences,* S_a, we may replace the model by one in which each alternative maps on a single consequence, but each consequence has as its pay-off the n-dimensional vector whose components are the pay-offs of the elements of S_a.

This representation exhibits a striking similarity among these three important cases where the traditional maximizing model breaks down for lack of a complete ordering of the pay-offs. The first case has never been satisfactorily treated — the theory of the n-person game is the most ambitious attempt to deal with it, and the so-called "weak welfare principles" of economic theory are attempts to avoid it. The second case is usually handled by superimposing a complete ordering on the points in the vector space ("indifference curves"). The third case has been handled by introducing probabilities as weights for summing the vector components, or by using principles like minimaxing satisfaction or regret.

An extension of the notion of a simplified pay-off function permits us to treat all three cases in much the same fashion. Suppose we regard a pay-off as *satisfactory* provided that $V_i \geq k_i$ for all i. Then a reasonable decision rule is the following:

E. Search for a subset S' in S such that $V(s)$ is satisfactory for all s in S' (i.e., $V(s) \geq k$).

Then search for an a in A such that S_a lies in S'.

Again existence and uniqueness of solutions are not guaranteed. Rule E is illustrated in Figure II for the case of a 2-component pay-off vector.

In the first of the three cases mentioned above, the satisfactory pay-off corresponds to what I have called a *viable* solution in "A Formal Theory of the Employment Relation" and "A Comparison of Organization Theories."[5] In the second case, the components of V define the *aspiration levels* with respect to several components of pay-off. In the third case (in this case it is most plausible to assume that all the components of k are equal), k_i may be interpreted as the *minimum guaranteed pay-off* — also an aspiration level concept.

[5] *Econometrica,* XIX (July 1951), 293–305 and *Review of Economic Studies,* XX (1952–53, No. 1), 40–49.

III. Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions

Throughout our discussion we have admitted decision procedures that do not guarantee the existence or uniqueness of solutions. This was done in order to construct a model that parallels as nearly as possible the decision procedures that appear to be used by humans in complex decision-making settings. We now proceed to add supplementary rules to fill this gap.



FIGURE II. Partial Ordering of Pay-Offs

3.1 Obtaining a Unique Solution

In most global models of rational choice, all alternatives are evaluated before a choice is made. In actual human decision-making, alternatives are often examined sequentially. We may, or may not, know the mechanism that determines the order of procedure. When alternatives are examined sequentially, we may regard the first satisfactory alternative that is evaluated as such as the one actually selected.

If a chess player finds an alternative that leads to a forced mate for his opponent, he generally adopts this alternative without worrying about whether another alternative also leads to a forced mate. In this case we would find it very hard to predict which alternative would be chosen, for we have no theory that predicts the order in which alternatives will be examined. But in another case discussed above — the sale of a house — the environment presents the seller with alternatives in a definite sequence, and the selection of the *first* satisfactory alternative has precise meaning.

However, there are certain dynamic considerations, having a good psychological foundation, that we should introduce at this point. Let us consider, instead of a single static choice situation, a sequence of such situations. The *aspiration level*, which defines a satisfactory alternative, may change from point to point in this sequence of trials. A vague principle would be that as the individual, in his exploration of alternatives, finds it *easy* to discover satisfactory alternatives, his aspiration level rises; as he finds it *difficult* to discover satisfactory alternatives, his aspiration level falls. Perhaps it would be possible to express the ease or difficulty of exploration in terms of the cost of obtaining better information about the mapping of A on S, or the combinatorial magnitude of the task of refining this mapping. There are a number of ways in which this process could be defined formally.

Such changes in aspiration level would tend to bring about a "near-uniqueness" of the satisfactory solutions and would also tend to guarantee the existence of satisfactory solutions. For the failure to discover a solution would depress the aspiration level and bring satisfactory solutions into existence.

3.2 Existence of Solutions: Further Possibilities

We have already discussed one mechanism by which the existence of solutions, in the long run, is assured. There is another way of representing the processes already described. Up to this point little use has been made of the distinction between A, the set of behavior alternatives, and $\hat{A}$, the set of behavior alternatives that the organism considers. Suppose now that the latter is a proper subset of the former. Then, the failure to find a satisfactory alternative in $\hat{A}$ may lead to a search for additional alternatives in A that can be adjoined to $\hat{A}$.[6]

[6] I might mention that, in the spirit of crude empiricism, I have presented a number of students and friends with a problem involving a multiple pay-off — in which the pay-off depends violently upon a very contingent and uncertain event — and have found them extremely reluctant to restrict themselves to a set of behavior alternatives allowed

This procedure is simply an elaboration of the information-gathering process previously described. (We can regard the elements of A that are not in $\hat{A}$ as elements that are initially mapped on the whole set, S.)

In one organism, dynamic adjustment over a sequence of choices may depend primarily upon adjustments of the aspiration level. In another organism, the adjustments may be primarily in the set $\hat{A}$: if satisfactory alternatives are discovered easily, $\hat{A}$ narrows; if it becomes difficult to find satisfactory alternatives, $\hat{A}$ broadens. The more *persistent* the organism, the greater the role played by the adjustment of $\hat{A}$, relative to the role played by the adjustment of the aspiration level. (It is possible, of course, and even probable, that there is an asymmetry between adjustments upward and downward.)

If the pay-off were measurable in money or utility terms, and *if* the cost of discovering alternatives were similarly measurable, we could replace the partial ordering of alternatives exhibited in Figure II by a complete ordering (an ordering in terms of a weighted sum of the pay-off and the cost of discovering alternatives). Then we could speak of the optimal degree of persistence in behavior — we could say that the more persistent organism was more rational than the other, or vice versa. But the central argument of the present paper is that the behaving organism does *not* in general know these costs, nor does it have a set of weights for comparing the components of a multiple pay-off. It is precisely because of these limitations on its knowledge and capabilities that the less global models of rationality described here are significant and useful. The question of how it is to behave "rationally," given these limitations, is distinct from the question of how its capabilities could be increased to permit action that would be more "rational" judged from the mountain-top of a more complete model.[7]

The two viewpoints are not, of course, completely different, much less antithetical. We have already pointed out that the organism may possess a whole hierarchy of rational mechanisms — that, for example, the aspiration level itself may be subject to an adjustment process that is rational in some dynamic sense. Moreover, in many situations we may be interested in the precise question of whether one decision-making procedure is more rational than another, and to answer this question we will usually have to construct a broader criterion of rationality that encompasses both procedures as approximations. Our whole point is that it is important to make explicit what level we are considering in such a hierarchy of models, and that for many purposes we are interested in models of "limited" rationality rather than models of relatively "global" rationality.

IV. Further Comments on Dynamics

The models thus far discussed are dynamic only in a very special sense: the aspiration level at time t depends upon the previous history of the system (previous aspiration levels and previous levels of attainment). Another kind of dynamic linkage might be very important. The pay-offs in a particular trial might depend not only on the alternative chosen in that trial but also on the alternatives chosen in previous trials.

The most direct representation of this situation is to include, as components of a vector pay-off function, the pay-offs for the whole sequence of trials. But then optimization would require the selection, at the beginning of the sequence, of a strategy for the whole sequence (see the Appendix). Such a procedure would again rapidly complicate the problem beyond the computational capacity of the organism. A possible middle ground is to define for each trial a pay-off function with two components. One would be the "immediate" pay-off (consumption), the other, the "position" in which the organism is left for future trials (saving, liquidity).

Let us consider a chess game in which the players are paid off at the end of each ten moves in proportion to arbitrarily assigned values of their pieces left on the board (say, queen, 1; rook, 10; etc.). Then a player could adopt some kind of planning horizon and include in his estimated pay-off the "goodness"

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by the problem. They were averse to an alternative that promised very large profit or ruin, where the relevant probability could not be computed, and tried to invent new alternatives whose pay-offs were less sensitive to the contingent event. The problem in question is Modigliani's "hotdog stand" problem described in *American Economic Review, Proceedings*, XXXIX (1949), 201–8.

[7] One might add: "or judged in terms of the survival value of its choice mechanism."

of his position at the planning horizon. A comparable notion in economics is that of the depreciated value of an asset at the planning horizon. To compute such a value precisely would require the player actually to carry his strategy beyond the horizon. If there is time-discounting of pay-offs, this has the advantage of reducing the importance of errors in estimating these depreciated values. (Time-discounting may sometimes be essential in order to assure convergence of the summed pay-offs.)

It is easy to conjure up other dynamic complications, which may be of considerable practical importance. Two more may be mentioned — without attempting to incorporate them formally. The consequences that the organism experiences may change the pay-off function — it doesn't know how well it likes cheese until it has eaten cheese. Likewise, one method for refining the mapping of A on S may be to select a particular alternative and experience its consequences. In these cases, one of the elements of the pay-off associated with a particular alternative is the information that is gathered about the mapping or about the pay-off function.

V. Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to construct definitions of "rational choice" that are modeled more closely upon the actual decision processes in the behavior of organisms than definitions heretofore proposed. We have outlined a fairly complete model for the static case, and have described one extension of this model into dynamics. As has been indicated in the last section, a great deal remains to be done before we can handle realistically a more completely dynamic system.

In the introduction, it was suggested that definitions of this kind might have normative as well as descriptive value. In particular, they may suggest approaches to rational choice in areas that appear to be far beyond the capacities of existing or prospective computing equipment. The comparison of the I.Q. of a computer with that of a human being is very difficult. If one were to factor the scores made by each on a comprehensive intelligence test, one would undoubtedly find that in those factors on which the one scored as a genius the other would appear a moron — and conversely. A survey of possible definitions of rationality might suggest directions for the design and use of computing equipment with reasonably good scores on some of the factors of intelligence in which present computers are moronic.

The broader aim, however, in constructing these definitions of "approximate" rationality is to provide some materials for the construction of a theory of the behavior of a human individual or of groups of individuals who are making decisions in an organizational context. The apparent paradox to be faced is that the economic theory of the firm and the theory of administration attempt to deal with human behavior in situations in which that behavior is at least "intendedly" rational; while, at the same time, it can be shown that if we assume the global kinds of rationality of the classical theory the problems of internal structure of the firm or other organization largely disappear.[8] The paradox vanishes, and the outlines of theory begin to emerge when we substitute for "economic man" or "administrative man" a choosing organism of limited knowledge and ability. This organism's simplifications of the real world for purposes of choice introduce discrepancies between the simplified model and the reality; and these discrepancies, in turn, serve to explain many of the phenomena of organizational behavior.

Appendix

Example of Rational Determination of an Acceptable Pay-Off

In the body of this paper, the notion is introduced that rational adjustment may operate at various "levels." That is, the organism may choose rationally within a given set of limits postulated by the model, but it may also undertake to set these limits rationally. The house-selling illustration of Section 2.1 provides an example of this.

We suppose that an individual is selling a house. Each day (or other unit of time) he sets an acceptance price: $d(k)$, say, for the kth day. If he receives one or more offers above this price on the day in question, he accepts the highest offer; if he does not receive an offer above $d(k)$, he retains the house until the next day, and sets a new acceptance price, $d(k+1)$.

[8] See Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (Macmillan, 1947), pp. 39–41, 80–84, 96–102, 240–44.

Now, if he has certain information about the probability distribution of offers on each day, he can set the acceptance price so that it will be optimal in the sense that it will maximize the expected value, $V[d(k)]$, of the sales price.

To show this, we proceed as follows. Let $p_k(y)$ be the probability that y will be the highest price offered on the kth day. Then:

$$P_k(d) = \int_{d(k)}^{\infty} p_k(y)\, dy \tag{A.1}$$

is the probability that the house will be sold on the kth day if it has not been sold earlier.

$$\mathcal{E}_k(d) = \int_{d(k)}^{\infty} y\, p(y,k)\, dy \tag{A.2}$$

will be the expected value received by the seller on the kth day if the house has not been sold earlier. Taking into account the probability that the house will be sold before the kth day,

$$E_k(d) = \mathcal{E}_k(d) \prod_{j=1}^{k-1} (1 - P_j(d)) \tag{A.3}$$

will be the unconditional expected value of the seller's receipts on the kth day; and

$$V\{d(k)\} = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} E_k(d) \tag{A.4}$$

will be the expected value of the sales price.

Now we wish to set $d(k)$, for each k, at the level that will maximize (A.4). The k components of the function $d(k)$ are independent. Differentiating V partially with respect to each component, we get:

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial d(i)} = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \frac{\partial E_k(d)}{\partial d(i)} \qquad (i = 1, \ldots, n). \tag{A.5}$$

But:

$$\frac{\partial E_i(d)}{\partial d(i)} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{E}_i(d)}{\partial d(i)} \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} (1 - P_j(d)), \quad \text{and} \tag{A.6}$$

$$\frac{\partial E_k(d)}{\partial d(i)} = \mathcal{E}_k(d) \prod_{\substack{j \neq i \\ j=1}}^{k-1} (1 - P_j(d)) \left(- \frac{\partial P_i(d)}{\partial d(i)} \right) \tag{A.7}$$

for $i < k$ and

$$\frac{\partial E_k(d)}{\partial d(i)} = 0 \qquad \text{for } i > k. \tag{A.8}$$

Hence for a maximum:

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial d(i)} = -d(i) p_i(d) \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} (1 - P_j(d)) + \sum_{k=i+1}^{\infty} \mathcal{E}_k(d) \prod_{j \neq i}^{k-1} (1 - P_j(d)) p_i(d) = 0. \tag{A.9}$$

Factoring out $p_i(d)$, we obtain, finally:

$$d(i) = \frac{\displaystyle\sum_{k=i+1}^{\infty} \mathcal{E}_k(d) \prod_{j \neq i}^{k-1} (1 - P_j(d))}{\displaystyle\prod_{j=1}^{i-1} (1 - P_j(d))} = \sum_{k=i+1}^{\infty} \mathcal{E}_k(d) \prod_{j=i+1}^{k-1} (1 - P_j(d)). \tag{A.10}$$

For the answer to be meaningful, the infinite sum in (A.10) must converge. If we look at the definition (A.2) for $\epsilon_k(d)$ we see this would come about if the probability distribution of offers shifts downward through time with sufficient rapidity. Such a shift might correspond to (a) expectations of falling prices, or (b) interpretation of y as the *present value* of the future price, discounted at a sufficiently high interest rate.

Alternatively, we can avoid the question of convergence by assuming a reservation price $a(n)$, for the nth day, which is low enough so that $P_n(d)$ is unity. We shall take this last alternative, but before proceeding, we wish to interpret the equation (A.10). Equation (A.10) says that the rational acceptance price on the ith day, $d(i)$, is equal to the expected value of the sales price if the house is not sold on the ith day and acceptance prices are set optimally for subsequent days. This can be seen by observing that the right-hand side of (A.10) is the same as the right-hand side of (A.4) but with the summation extending from $k = (i + 1)$ instead of from $(k = 1)$.[9]

Hence, in the case where the summation is terminated at period n — that is, the house will be sold with certainty in period n if it has not been sold previously — we can compute

[9] Equation (A.10) appears to have been arrived at independently by D. A. Darling and W. M. Kincaid. See their abstract, "An Inventory Problem," in the *Journal of Operations Research Society of America*, I, 80 (Feb. 1953).

the optimal $d(i)$ by working backward from the terminal period, and without the necessity of solving simultaneously the equations (A.10).

It is interesting to observe what additional information the seller needs in order to determine the rational acceptance price, over and above the information he needs once the acceptance price is set. He needs, in fact, virtually complete information as to the probability distribution of offers for all relevant subsequent time periods.

Now the seller who does not have this information, and who will be satisfied with a more bumbling kind of rationality, will make approximations to avoid using the information he doesn't have. First, he will probably limit the planning horizon by assuming a price at which he can certainly sell and will be willing to sell in the nth time period. Second, he will set his initial acceptance price quite high, watch the distribution of offers he receives, and gradually and approximately adjust his acceptance price downward or upward until he receives an offer he accepts — without ever making probability calculations. This, I submit, is the kind of rational adjustment that humans find "good enough" and are capable of exercising in a wide range of practical circumstances.

29

DECISION-MAKING IN A DEMOCRACY

The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker

• *ROBERT A. DAHL*

To consider the Supreme Court of the United States strictly as a legal institution is to underestimate its significance in the American political system. For it is also a political institution, an institution, that is to say, for arriving at decisions on controversial questions of national policy. As a political institution, the Court is highly unusual, not least because Americans are not quite willing to accept the fact that it *is* a political institution and not quite capable of denying it; so that frequently we take both positions at once. This is confusing to foreigners, amusing to logicians, and rewarding to ordinary Americans who thus manage to retain the best of both worlds.

I

A policy decision might be defined as an effective choice among alternatives about which there is, at least initially, some uncertainty. This uncertainty may arise because of inadequate information as to (a) the alternatives that are thought to be "open"; (b) the consequences that will probably ensue from choosing a given alternative; (c) the level of probability that these consequences will actually ensue; and (d) the relative value of the different alternatives, that is, an ordering of the alternatives from most preferable to least preferable, given the expected consequences and the expected probability of the consequences actually occurring. An *effective* choice is a selection of the most preferable alternative accompanied by measures to insure that the alternative selected will be acted upon.

No one, I imagine, will quarrel with the proposition that the Supreme Court, or indeed any court, must make and does make policy decisions in this sense. But such a proposition is not really useful to the question before us. What is critical is the extent to which a court can and does make policy decisions by going outside established "legal" criteria found in precedent, statute, and constitution. Now in this respect the Supreme Court occupies a most peculiar position, for it is an essential characteristic of the institution that from time to time its members decide cases where legal criteria are not in any realistic sense adequate to the task. A distinguished associate justice of the present Court has recently described the business of the Supreme Court in these words:

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It is essentially accurate to say that the Court's preoccupation today is with the application of rather fundamental aspirations and what Judge Learned Hand calls "moods," embodied in provisions like the due process clauses, which were designed not to be precise and positive directions for rules of action. The judicial process in applying them involves a judgment . . . that is, on the views of the direct representatives of the people in meeting the needs of society, on the views of Presidents and Governors, and by their construction of the will of legislatures the Court breathes life, feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the Constitution and the statute books.[1]

Very often, then, the cases before the Court involve alternatives about which there is severe disagreement in the society, as in the case of segregation or economic regulation; that is, the setting of the case is "political." Moreover, they are usually cases where competent students of constitutional law, including the learned justices of the Supreme Court themselves, disagree; where the words of the Constitution are general, vague, ambiguous, or not clearly applicable; where precedent may be found on both sides; and where experts differ in predicting the consequences of the various alternatives or the degree of probability that the possible consequences will actually ensue. Typically, in other words, although there may be considerable agreement as to the alternatives thought to be open [(a)], there is very serious disagreement as to questions of fact bearing on consequences and probabilities [(b) and (c)], and as to questions of value, or the way in which different alternatives are to be ordered according to criteria establishing relative preferability [(d)].

If the Court were assumed to be a "political" institution, no particular problems would arise, for it would be taken for granted that the members of the Court would resolve questions of fact and value by introducing assumptions derived from their own predispositions or those of influential clienteles and constituents. But, since much of the legitimacy of the Court's decisions rests upon the fiction that it is not a political institution but exclusively a legal one, to accept the Court as a political institution would solve one set of problems at the price of creating another. Nonetheless, if it is true that the nature of the cases arriving before the Court is sometimes of the kind I have described, then the Court cannot act strictly as a legal institution. It must, that is to say, choose among controversial alternatives of public policy by appealing to at least some criteria of acceptability on questions of fact and value that cannot be found in or deduced from precedent, statute, and Constitution. It is in this sense that the Court is a national policy-maker, and it is this role that gives rise to the problem of the Court's existence in a political system ordinarily held to be democratic.

Now I take it that except for differences in emphasis and presentation, what I have said so far is today widely accepted by almost all American political scientists and by most lawyers. To anyone who believes that the Court is not, in at least some of its activities, a policy-making institution, the discussion that follows may seem irrelevant. But to anyone who holds that at least one role of the Court is as a policy-making institution in cases where strictly legal criteria are inadequate, then a serious and much debated question arises, to wit: Who gets what and why? Or in less elegant language: What groups are benefited or handicapped by the Court and how does the allocation by the Court of these rewards and penalties fit into our presumably democratic political system?

II

In determining and appraising the role of the Court, two different and conflicting criteria are sometimes employed. These are the majority criterion and the criterion of Right or Justice.

Every policy dispute can be tested, at least in principle, by the majority criterion, because (again: in principle) the dispute can be analyzed according to the numbers of people for and against the various alternatives at issue, and therefore according to the proportions of the citizens or eligible members who are for and against the alternatives. Logically speaking, except for a trivial case, every conflict within a given society must be a dispute between a majority of those eligible to participate and a minority or minorities; or else it must be a dispute between or among minorities only.[2] Within certain limits, both possibilities are independent of the number of policy alternatives at issue,

[1] Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 781, 793 (1957).

[2] Provided that the total membership of the society is an even number, it is technically possible for a dispute to occur that divides the membership into two equal parts, neither of which can be said

and since the argument is not significantly affected by the number of alternatives, it is convenient to assume that each policy dispute represents only two alternatives.[3]

If everyone prefers one of two alternatives, then no significant problem arises. But a case will hardly come before the Supreme Court unless at least one person prefers an alternative that is opposed by another person. Strictly speaking, then, no matter how the Court acts in determining the legality or constitutionality of one alternative or the other, the outcome of the Court's decision must either (1) accord with preferences of a minority of citizens and run counter to the preferences of a majority; (2) accord with the preferences of a majority and run counter to the preferences of a minority; or (3) accord with the preferences of one minority and run counter to the preferences of another minority, the rest being indifferent.

In a democratic system with a more or less representative legislature, it is unnecessary to maintain a special court to secure the second class of outcomes. A case might be made out that the Court protects the rights of national majorities against local interests in federal questions, but so far as I am aware, the role of the Court as a policy-maker is not usually defended in this fashion; in what follows, therefore, I propose to pass over the ticklish question of federalism and deal only with "national" majorities and minorities. The third kind of outcome, although relevant according to other criteria, is hardly relevant to the majority criterion, and may also be passed over for the moment.

One influential view of the Court, however, is that it stands in some special way as a protection of minorities against tyranny by majorities. In the course of its 167 years, in seventy-eight cases, the Court has struck down eighty-six different provisions of federal law as unconstitutional,[4] and by interpretation it has modified a good many more. It might be argued, then, that in all or in a very large number of these cases the Court was, in fact, defending the rights of some minority against a "tyrannical" majority. There are, however, some exceedingly serious difficulties with this interpretation of the Court's activities.

III

One problem, which is essentially ideological in character, is the difficulty of reconciling such an interpretation with the existence of a democratic polity, for it is not at all difficult to show by appeals to authorities as various and imposing as Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, Jefferson,

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to be either a majority or minority of the total membership. But even in the instances where the number of members is even (which should occur on the average only half the time), the probability of an exactly even split, in any group of more than a few thousand people, is so small that it may be ignored.

[3] Suppose the number of citizens, or members eligible to participate in collective decisions, is n. Let each member indicate his "most preferred alternative." Then it is obvious that the maximum number of most preferred alternatives is n. It is equally obvious that if the number of most preferred alternatives is more than or equal to $n/2$, then no majority is possible. But for all practical purposes those formal limitations can be ignored, for we are dealing with a large society where the number of alternatives at issue before the Supreme Court is invariably quite small. If the number of alternatives is greater than two, it is theoretically possible for preferences to be distributed so that no outcome is consistent with the majority criterion, even where all members can rank all the alternatives and where there is perfect information as to their preferences; but this difficulty does not bear on the subsequent discussion, and it is disregarded. For an examination of this problem, consult Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (1951).

[4] Actually, the matter is somewhat ambiguous. There appear to have been seventy-eight cases in which the Court has held provisions of federal law unconstitutional. Sixty-four different acts in the technical sense have been construed, and eighty-six different provisions in law have been in some respects invalidated. I rely here on the figures and the table given in Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Provisions of Federal Law Held Unconstitutional By the Supreme Court of the United States 95, 141–47 (1936), to which I have added United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), and United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). There are some minor discrepancies in totals (not attributable to the differences in publication dates) between this volume and Acts of Congress Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation (Corwin ed., 1953). The difference is a result of classification. The latter document lists seventy-three acts held unconstitutional (to which Toth v. Quarles, supra, should be added) but different sections of the same act are sometimes counted separately.

and Lincoln that the term democracy means, among other things, that the power to rule resides in popular majorities and their representatives. Moreover, from entirely reasonable and traditional definitions of popular sovereignty and political equality, the principle of majority rule can be shown to follow by logical necessity.[5] Thus to affirm that the Court supports minority preferences against majorities is to deny that popular sovereignty and political equality, at least in the traditional sense, exist in the United States; and to affirm that the Court *ought* to act in this way is to deny that popular sovereignty and political equality *ought* to prevail in this country. In a country that glories in its democratic tradition, this is not a happy state of affairs for the Court's defenders; and it is no wonder that a great deal of effort has gone into the enterprise of proving that, even if the Court consistently defends minorities against majorities, nonetheless it is a thoroughly "democratic" institution. But no amount of tampering with democratic theory can conceal the fact that a system in which the policy preferences of minorities prevail over majorities is at odds with the traditional criteria for distinguishing a democracy from other political systems.[6]

Fortunately, however, we do not need to traverse this well-worn ground; for the view of the Court as a protector of the liberties of minorities against the tyranny of majorities is beset with other difficulties that are not so much ideological as matters of fact and logic. If one wishes to be at all rigorous about the question, it is probably impossible to demonstrate that any particular Court decisions have or have not been at odds with the preferences of a "national majority." It is clear that unless one makes *some* assumptions as to the kind of evidence one will require for the existence of a set of minority and majority preferences in the general population, the view under consideration is incapable of being proved at all. In any strict sense, no adequate evidence exists, for scientific opinion polls are of relatively recent origin, and national elections are little more than an indication of the first preferences of a number of citizens — in the United States the number ranges between about forty and sixty per cent of the adult population — for certain candidates for public office. I do not mean to say that there is no relation between preferences among candidates and preferences among alternative public policies, but the connection is a highly tenuous one, and on the basis of an election it is almost never possible to adduce whether a majority does or does not support one of two or more policy alternatives about which members of the political elite are divided. For the greater part of the Court's history, then, there is simply no way of establishing with any high degree of confidence whether a given alternative was or was not supported by a majority or a minority of adults or even of voters.

In the absence of relatively direct information, we are thrown back on indirect tests. The eighty-six provisions of federal law that have been declared unconstitutional were, of course, initially passed by majorities of those voting in the Senate and in the House. They also had the president's formal approval. We could, therefore, speak of a majority of those voting in the House and Senate, together with the president, as a "lawmaking majority." It is not easy to determine whether any such constellation of forces within the political elites actually coincides with the preferences of a majority of American adults or even with the preferences of a majority of that half of the adult population which, on the average, votes in congressional elections. Such evidence as we have from opinion polls suggests that Congress is not markedly out of line with public opinion, or at any rate with such public opinion as there is after one discards the answers of people who fall into the category, often large, labelled "no response" or "don't know." If we may, on these somewhat uncertain grounds, take a "lawmaking majority" as equivalent to a "national majority," then it is possible to test the hypothesis that the Supreme Court is shield and buckler for minorities against national majorities.

Under any reasonable assumptions about the nature of the political process, it would appear to be somewhat naive to assume that the Supreme Court either would or could play the role of Galahad. Over the whole history of the Court, on the average one new justice has been appointed every twenty-two months. Thus a president can expect to appoint about two

[5] Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, c. 2 (1956).

[6] Compare Commager, Majority Rule and Minority Rights (1943).

new justices during one term of office; and if this were not enough to tip the balance on a normally divided Court, he is almost certain to succeed in two terms. Thus, Hoover had three appointments; Roosevelt, nine; Truman, four; and Eisenhower, so far, has had four. Presidents are not famous for appointing justices hostile to their own views on public policy nor could they expect to secure confirmation of a man whose stance on key questions was flagrantly at odds with that of the dominant majority in the Senate. Justices are typically men who, prior to appointment, have engaged in public life and have committed themselves publicly on the great questions of the day. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has recently reminded us, a surprisingly large proportion of the justices who have left their stamp upon the decisions of the Court, have had little or no prior judicial experience.[7] Nor have the justices — certainly not the great justices — been timid men with a passion for anonymity. Indeed, it is not too much to say that if justices were appointed primarily for their "judicial" qualities without regard to their basic attitudes on fundamental questions of public policy, the Court could not play the influential role in the American political system that it does in reality play.

The fact is, then, that the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States. Consequently it would be most unrealistic to suppose that the Court would, for more than a few years at most, stand against any major alternatives sought by a lawmaking majority. The judicial agonies of the New Deal will, of course, quickly come to mind; but Mr. Roosevelt's difficulties with the Court were truly exceptional. Generalizing over the whole history of the Court, the chances are about one out of five that a president will make one appointment to the Court in less than a year, better than one out of two that he will make one within two years, and three out of four that he will make one within three years. Mr. Roosevelt had unusually bad luck: he had to wait four years for his first appointment; the odds against this long an interval are four to one. With average luck, the battle with the Court would never have occurred; even as it was, although the "court-packing" proposal did formally fail, by the end of his second term Mr. Roosevelt had appointed five new justices and by 1941 Mr. Justice Roberts was the only remaining holdover from the Hoover era.

[7] Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 782–84.

TABLE 1. *The Interval Between Appointments to the Supreme Court*

Interval in Years	*Per Cent of Total Appointments*	*Cumulative Per Cent*
Less than 1	21	21
1	34	55
2	18	73
3	9	82
4	8	90
5	7	97
6	2	99
—	—	—
12	1	100
Total	100	100

Note: The table excludes the six appointments made in 1789. Except for the four most recent appointments, it is based on data in the Encyclopedia of American History 461–62 (Morris ed., 1953). It may be slightly inaccurate because the source shows only the year of appointment, not the month. The twelve-year interval was from 1811 to 1823.

It is to be expected, then, that the Court is least likely to be successful in blocking a determined and persistent lawmaking majority on a major policy and most likely to succeed against a "weak" majority; e.g., a dead one, a transient

TABLE 2. *Percentage of Cases Held Unconstitutional Arranged by Time Intervals Between Legislation and Decision*

Number of Years	*New Deal Legislation %*	*Other %*	*All Legislation %*
2 or Less	92	19	30
3– 4	8	19	18
5– 8	0	28	24
9–12	0	13	11
13–16	0	8	6
17–20	0	1	1
21 or More	0	12	10
Total	100	100	100

one, a fragile one, or one weakly united upon a policy of subordinate importance.

IV

An examination of the cases in which the Court has held federal legislation unconstitutional confirms, on the whole, our expectations. Over the whole history of the Court, about half the decisions have been rendered more than four years after the legislation was passed.

Of the twenty-four laws held unconstitutional within two years, eleven were measures enacted in the early years of the New Deal. Indeed, New Deal measures comprise nearly a third of all the legislation that has ever been declared unconstitutional within four years after enactment.

It is illuminating to examine the cases where the Court has acted on legislation within four years after enactment — where the presumption is, that is to say, that the lawmaking majority is not necessarily a dead one. Of the twelve New Deal cases, two were, from a policy point of view, trivial; and two, although perhaps not trivial, were of minor importance to the New Deal program.[8] A fifth[9] involved the NRA, which was to expire within three weeks of the decision. Insofar as the unconstitutional provisions allowed "codes of fair competition" to be established by industrial groups, it is fair to say that President Roosevelt and his advisers were relieved by the Court's decision of a policy they had come to find increasingly embarrassing. In view of the tenacity with which Mr. Roosevelt held to his major program, there can hardly be any doubt that had he wanted to pursue the major policy objective involved in the NRA codes, as he did, for example, with the labor provisions, he would not have been stopped by the Court's special theory of the Constitution. As to the seven other cases,[10] it is entirely correct to say, I think, that whatever some of the eminent justices might have thought during their fleeting moments of glory, they did not succeed in interposing a barrier to the achievement of the objectives of the legislation; and in a few years most of the constitutional interpretation on which the decisions rested had been unceremoniously swept under the rug.

TABLE 3. *Cases Holding Legislation Unconstitutional Within Four Years After Enactment*

Interval in Years	*New Deal* No.	%	*Other* No.	%	*Total* No.	%
2 or Less	11	29	13	34	24	63
3 to 4	1	3	13	34	14	37
Total	12	32	26	68	38	100

The remainder of the thirty-eight cases where the Court has declared legislation unconstitutional within four years of enactment tend to fall into two rather distinct groups: those involving legislation that could reasonably be regarded as important *from the point of view of the lawmaking majority* and those involving minor legislation. Although the one category merges into the other, so that some legislation must be classified rather arbitrarily, probably there will be little disagreement with classifying the specific legislative provisions involved in eleven cases as essentially minor from the point of view of the lawmaking majority (however important they may have been as constitutional interpretations).[11] The specific legislative pro-

[8] Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339 (1934), involved a reduction in the pay of retired judges. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), repealed laws granting to veterans rights to yearly renewable term insurance; there were only twenty-nine policies outstanding in 1932. Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935), granted permission to state building and loan associations to convert to federal ones on a vote of fifty-one per cent or more of votes cast at a legal meeting. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District, 298 U.S. 513 (1936), permitting municipalities to petition federal courts for bankruptcy proceedings.

[9] Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

[10] United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).

[11] United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 41 (1870); Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. (U.S.) 561 (1865); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Choate v.

visions involved in the remaining fifteen cases are by no means of uniform importance, but with one or two possible exceptions it seems reasonable to classify them as major policy issues from the point of view of the lawmaking majority.[12] We would expect that cases involving major legislative policy would be propelled to the Court much more rapidly than cases involving minor policy, and, as the table below shows, this is in fact what happens.

TABLE 4. *Number of Cases Involving Legislative Policy Other than Those Arising Under New Deal Legislation Holding Legislation Unconstitutional Within Four Years After Enactment*

Interval in Years	*Major Policy*	*Minor Policy*	*Total*
2 or Less	11	2	13
3 to 4	4	9	13
Total	15	11	26

Thus a lawmaking majority with major policy objectives in mind usually has an opportunity to seek for ways of overcoming the Court's veto. It is an interesting and highly significant fact that Congress and the President do generally succeed in overcoming a hostile Court on major policy issues.

It is particularly instructive to examine the cases involving major policy. In two cases involving punitive legislation enacted by Radical Republican Congresses against supporters of the Confederacy during the Civil War, the Court faced a rapidly crumbling majority whose death knell as an effective national force was sounded with the election of 1876.[14] Three cases are difficult to classify and I have labelled them "unclear." Of these, two were decisions

TABLE 5. *Type of Congressional Action Following Supreme Court Decisions Holding Legislation Unconstitutional Within Four Years After Enactment (Other than New Deal Legislation)*

Congressional Action	*Major Policy*	*Minor Policy*	*Total*
Reverses Court's Policy	10[a]	2[d]	12
Changes Own Policy	2[b]	0	2
None	0	8[e]	8
Unclear	3[c]	1[f]	4
Total	15	11	26

Note: For the cases in each category, see footnote 13.

Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Note that although the specific legislative provisions held unconstitutional may have been minor, the basic legislation may have been of major policy importance.

[12] Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 333 (1867); United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 128 (1872); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), rehearing granted 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908); Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S. 109 (1921); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U.S. 475 (1926).

[13a] Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908); Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U.S. 475 (1926); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. (1924).

[b] Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 333 (1867); United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. (U.S. 128 (1872).

[c] United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S. 109 (1921); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).

[d] Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. (U.S.) 561 (1865); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).

[e] United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. (U.S. 41 (1870); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).

[f] Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928).

[14] Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 333 (1867); United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 128 (1872).

made in 1921 involving a 1919 amendment to the Lever Act to control prices.[15] The legislation was important, and the provision in question was clearly struck down, but the Lever Act terminated three days after the decision and Congress did not return to the subject of price control until World War II, when it experienced no constitutional difficulties arising from these cases (which were primarily concerned with the lack of an ascertainable standard of guilt). The third case in this category successfully eliminated stock dividends from the scope of the Sixteenth Amendment, although a year later Congress enacted legislation taxing the actual income from such stock.[16]

The remaining ten cases were ultimately followed by a reversal of the actual policy results of the Court's action, although not necessarily of the specific constitutional interpretation. In four cases,[17] the policy consequences of the Court's decision were overcome in less than a year. The other six required a long struggle. Workmen's compensation for longshoremen and harbor workers was invalidated by the Court in 1920;[18] in 1922 Congress passed a new law which was, in its turn, knocked down by the Court in 1924;[19] in 1927 Congress passed a third law, which was finally upheld in 1932.[20] The notorious income tax cases[21] of 1895 were first somewhat narrowed by the Court itself;[22] the Sixteenth Amendment was recommended by President Taft in 1909 and was ratified in 1913, some eighteen years after the Court's decisions. The two child labor cases represent the most effective battle ever waged by the Court against legislative policy-makers. The original legislation outlawing child labor, based on the commerce clause, was passed in 1916 as a part of Wilson's New Freedom. Like Roosevelt later, Wilson was somewhat unlucky in his Supreme Court appointments: he made only three appointments during his eight years, and one of these was wasted, from a policy point of view, on McReynolds. Had McReynolds voted "right," the subsequent struggle over the problem of child labor need not have occurred, for the decision in 1918 was by a Court divided five to four, McReynolds voting with the majority.[23] Congress moved at once to circumvent the decision by means of the tax power, but in 1922 the Court blocked that approach.[24] In 1924 Congress returned to the engagement with a constitutional amendment that was rapidly endorsed by a number of state legislatures before it began to meet so much resistance in the states remaining that the enterprise miscarried. In 1938, under a second reformist president, new legislation was passed, twenty-two years after the first; this a chastened Court accepted in 1941,[25] and thereby brought to an end a battle that had lasted a full quarter-century.

The entire record of the duel between the Court and the lawmaking majority, in cases where the Court has held legislation unconstitutional within four years after enactment, is summarized in Table 6.

TABLE 6. *Type of Congressional Action After Supreme Court Decisions Holding Legislation Unconstitutional Within Four Years After Enactment (Including New Deal Legislation)*

Congressional Action	*Major Policy*	*Minor Policy*	*Total*
Reverses Court's Policy	17	2	19
None	0	12	12
Other	6*	1	7
Total	23	15	38

* In addition to the actions in Table 5 under "Changes Own Policy" and "Unclear," this figure includes the NRA legislation affected by the *Schechter Poultry* case.

[15] United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S. 109 (1921).

[16] Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).

[17] Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908); Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909); Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U.S. 475 (1926); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).

[18] Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).

[19] Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).

[20] Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).

[21] Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).

[22] Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608 (1902); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).

[23] Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).

[24] Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).

[25] United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).

Thus the application of the majority criterion seems to show the following: First, if the Court did in fact uphold minorities against national majorities, as both its supporters and critics often seem to believe, it would be an extremely anomalous institution from a democratic point of view. Second, the elaborate "democratic" rationalizations of the Court's defenders and the hostility of its "democratic" critics are largely irrelevant, for lawmaking majorities generally have had their way. Third, although the Court seems never to have succeeded in holding out indefinitely, in a very small number of important cases it has delayed the application of policy up to as much as twenty-five years.

V

How can we appraise decisions of the third kind just mentioned? Earlier I referred to the criterion of Right or Justice as a norm sometimes invoked to describe the role of the Court. In accordance with this norm, it might be argued that the most important policy function of the Court is to protect rights that are in some sense basic or fundamental. Thus (the argument might run) in a country where basic rights are, on the whole, respected, one should not expect more than a small number of cases where the Court has had to plant itself firmly against a lawmaking majority. But majorities may, on rare occasions, become "tyrannical"; and when they do, the Court intervenes; and although the constitutional issue may, strictly speaking, be technically open, the Constitution assumes an underlying fundamental body of rights and liberties which the Court guarantees by its decisions.

Here again, however, even without examining the actual cases, it would appear, on political grounds, somewhat unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion of Supreme Court justices would long hold to norms of Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite. Moreover, in an earlier day it was perhaps easier to believe that certain rights are so natural and self-evident that their fundamental validity is as much a matter of definite knowledge, at least to all reasonable creatures, as the color of a ripe apple. To say that this view is unlikely to find many articulate defenders today is, of course, not to disprove it; it is rather to suggest that we do not need to elaborate the case against it in this essay.

In any event the best rebuttal to the view of the Court suggested above will be found in the record of the Court's decisions. Surely the six cases referred to a moment ago, where the policy consequences of the Court's decisions were overcome only after long battles, will not appeal to many contemporary minds as evidence for the proposition under examination. A natural right to employ child labor in mills and mines? To be free of income taxes by the federal government? To employ longshoremen and harbor workers without the protection of workmen's compensation? The Court itself did not rely upon such arguments in these cases, and it would be no credit to their opinions to reconstruct them along such lines.

So far, however, our evidence has been drawn from cases in which the Court has held legislation unconstitutional within four years after enactment. What of the other forty cases? Do we have evidence in these that the Court has protected fundamental or natural rights and liberties against the dead hand of some past tyranny by the lawmakers? The evidence is not impressive. In the entire history of the Court there is not one case arising under the First Amendment in which the Court has held federal legislation unconstitutional. If we turn from these fundamental liberties of religion, speech, press and assembly, we do find a handful of cases — something less than ten — arising under Amendments Four to Seven in which the Court has declared acts unconstitutional that might properly be regarded as involving rather basic liberties.[26] An inspection of these cases leaves the impression that, in all of them, the lawmakers and the Court were not very far apart; moreover, it is doubtful that the fundamental conditions of liberty in this country have been altered by more than a hair's breadth as a result of these decisions. However, let us give the Court its due; it is little enough.

Over against these decisions we must put the fifteen or so cases in which the Court used

[26] The candidates for this category would appear to be Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S. 109 (1921); Justices of the Supreme Court v. United States ex rel. Murray, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 274 (1870); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).

the protections of the Fifth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to preserve the rights and liberties of a relatively privileged group at the expense of the rights and liberties of a submerged group: chiefly slaveholders at the expense of slaves,[27] white people at the expense of colored people,[28] and property holders at the expense of wage earners and other groups.[29] These cases, unlike the relatively innocuous ones of the preceding set, all involved liberties of genuinely fundamental importance, where an opposite policy would have meant thoroughly basic shifts in the distribution of rights, liberties, and opportunities in the United States — where, moreover, the policies sustained by the Court's action have since been repudiated in every civilized nation of the Western world, including our own. Yet, if our earlier argument is correct, it is futile — precisely because the basic distribution of privilege *was* at issue — to suppose that the Court could have possibly acted much differently in these areas of policy from the way in which it did in fact act.

VI

Thus the role of the Court as a policy-making institution is not simple; and it is an error to suppose that its functions can be either described or appraised by means of simple concepts drawn from democratic or moral theory. It is possible, nonetheless, to derive a few general conclusions about the Court's role as a policy-making institution.

National politics in the United States, as in other stable democracies, is dominated by relatively cohesive alliances that endure for long periods of time. One recalls the Jeffersonian alliance, the Jacksonian, the extraordinarily long-lived Republican dominance of the post-Civil War years, and the New Deal alliance shaped by Franklin Roosevelt. Each is marked by a break with past policies, a period of intense struggle, followed by consolidation, and finally decay and disintegration of the alliance.

Except for short-lived transitional periods when the old alliance is disintegrating and the new one is struggling to take control of political institutions, the Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the dominant national alliance. As an element in the political leadership of the dominant alliance, the Court of course supports the major policies of the alliance. By itself, the Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national policy. In the absence of substantial agreement within the alliance, an attempt by the Court to make national policy is likely to lead to disaster, as the *Dred Scott* decision and the early New Deal cases demonstrate. Conceivably, the cases of the last three decades involving the freedom of Negroes, culminating in the now famous decision on school integration, are exceptions to this generalization; I shall have more to say about them in a moment.

The Supreme Court is not, however, simply an *agent* of the alliance. It is an essential part of the political leadership and possesses some bases of power of its own, the most important of which is the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the Constitution. This legitimacy the Court jeopardizes if it flagrantly opposes the major policies of the dominant alliance; such a course of action, as we have seen, is one in which the Court will not normally be tempted to engage.

It follows that within the somewhat narrow limits set by the basic policy goals of the dominant alliance, the Court *can* make national policy. Its discretion, then, is not unlike that of a powerful committee chairman in Congress who cannot, generally speaking, nullify the basic policies substantially agreed on by the rest of the dominant leadership, but who can, within these limits, often determine important questions of timing, effectiveness, and subordinate policy. Thus the Court is least effective against a current lawmaking majority — and evidently least inclined to act. It is most effective when it sets the bounds of policy for offi-

[27] Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393 (1857).

[28] United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); United States v. Stanley (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); Butts v. Merchants & Miners Transportation Co., 230 U.S. 126 (1913).

[29] Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).

cials, agencies, state governments or even regions, a task that has come to occupy a very large part of the Court's business.[30]

Few of the Court's policy decisions can be interpreted sensibly in terms of a "majority" versus a "minority." In this respect the Court is no different from the rest of the political leadership. Generally speaking, policy at the national level is the outcome of conflict, bargaining, and agreement among minorities; the process is neither minority rule nor majority rule but what might better be called *minorities* rule, where one aggregation of minorities achieves policies opposed by another aggregation.

The main objective of presidential leadership is to build a stable and dominant aggregation of minorities with a high probability of winning the presidency and one or both houses of Congress. The main task of the Court is to confer legitimacy on the fundamental policies of the successful coalition. There are times when the coalition is unstable with respect to certain key policies; at very great risk to its legitimacy powers, the Court can intervene in such cases and may even succeed in establishing policy. Probably in such cases it can succeed only if its action conforms to and reinforces a widespread set of explicit or implicit norms held by the political leadership; norms which are not strong enough or are not distributed in such a way as to insure the existence of an effective lawmaking majority but are, nonetheless, sufficiently powerful to prevent any successful attack on the legitimacy powers of the Court. This is probably the explanation for the relatively successful work of the Court in enlarging the freedom of Negroes to vote during the past three decades and in its famous school integration decisions.[31]

Yet the Court is more than this. Considered as a political system, democracy is a set of basic procedures for arriving at decisions. The operation of these procedures presupposes the existence of certain rights, obligations, liberties and restraints; in short, certain patterns of behavior. The existence of these patterns of behavior in turn presupposes widespread agreement (particularly among the politically active and influential segments of the population) on the validity and propriety of the behavior. Although its record is by no means lacking in serious blemishes, at its best the Court operates to confer legitimacy, not simply on the particular and parochial policies of the dominant political alliance, but upon the basic patterns of behavior required for the operation of a democracy.

[30] "Constitutional law and cases with constitutional undertones are of course still very important, with almost one-fourth of the cases in which written opinions were filed [in the two most recent terms] involving such questions. Review of administrative action . . . constitutes the largest category of the Court's work, comprising one-third of the total cases decided on the merits. The remaining . . . categories of litigation . . . all involve largely public law questions." Frankfurter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 793.

[31] Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (C.A. 4th, 1947), cert. denied 333 U.S. 875 (1948); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

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UNCERTAINTY AND DECISION-MAKING AT THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS

• NELSON W. POLSBY and AARON B. WILDAVSKY

Our national party conventions are famous for puzzling casual observers, both foreign and domestic. It therefore seems worth while to show that a great many convention practices and events can be related to basic rules and circumstances of American politics, and that this peculiar manifestation of American democracy is to a great extent a logical outgrowth of preconditions of American politics which puzzle no one.

In this article we draw upon nine standard works on American political parties, making an attempt to link a series of propositions culled from these sources logically with one another and with widely accepted assumptions about the operations of American politics.[1] This attempt can not be called a "theoretical model," however, because we have not spelled out explicitly all of the definitions and axioms actually employed here, on the grounds that such an exercise is both tedious and unnecessary. Our comments try to (1) show the connections between propositions about national conventions and more general knowledge about American politics, (2) suggest hypotheses for empirical test, and (3) indicate the kinds of data that might bear on some propositions. We begin with statements which may seem trivially true, but which lay a necessary groundwork for understanding convention behavior.

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[1] In the order in which they were published, these sources are: M. Ostrogorski *Democracy and the Party System in the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1926); C. E. Merriam and H. Gosnell, *The American Party System* (New York: Macmillan, 1930); P. Odegard and E. A. Helms, *American Politics* (New York: Harper, 1938); D. D. McKean, *Party and Pressure Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949); V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* 2nd ed.; (New York: Crowell, 1950); H. R. Penniman, *Sait's Parties and Elections* (5th ed.; New York: Appleton, 1952); P. T. David, M. C. Moos, R. M. Goldman, *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952*, Vols. I–V (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1954); H. A. Bone, *American Politics and the Party System* (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955); A. Ranney and W. Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956). See also P. Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York: Rinehart, 1940), and E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Rinehart, 1942). Uncited statements of fact in this article, which we call "common knowledge," are treated in many of these sources. The purpose of this article is not to establish the veracity of statements so much as it is to present factual assertions about conventions in a fashion which connects them with more general information about American politics.

I. The Convention as a Social System

1. *Delegates to national conventions are expected to behave in a way that will maximize their political power; that is, they are politicians.*

The rational dice player will place his bets in accordance with his chances of winning under the rules of the game he is playing. Similarly, the "rational" delegate will be expected to be reasonably well informed about how his behavior affects his chances of achieving his goals, and will behave in accordance with his information, his position in the game, and the goals he is intent upon achieving.[2]

[2] Sometimes delegates seem to outside observers badly informed about convention events. These

The goal "political power" can for our purposes be specified as the ability to make decisions, or to influence the making of decisions of government. Instrumental to this is the achievement of access to those offices and officials empowered to make governmental decisions, and instrumental to access, in turn, is the ability to staff the government, either by selecting officials to fill appointive offices (patronage) or by significantly influencing the nomination and election of elected officials. Since the latter are usually empowered to make appointments, access to this class of officials is often instrumental to the dispensation of patronage. "Access" we may define as the opportunity to press claims upon decision-makers.[3] This does not imply that those who have more access are more successful in pressing their claims, but it is generally supposed that claims have a better chance of realization when they are presented repeatedly and auspiciously to decision-makers.

It may be well to emphasize that the term "politician" refers to but one of many roles that individuals play, and it is only insofar as these individuals are delegates to national conventions that they need be considered politicians here. If delegates are politicians in other contexts — members of Congress, for example — this fact may be expected to have impact on their behavior in the convention situation, and may predict channels of communication in the convention.[4] This proposition, however, merely defines the frame of values within which delegates will be expected to calculate their gains and costs.

2. *At each level of government, party organization is controlled by the elected chief executive.*

Parties are organizations devoted to maximizing political power. At each level of government, the elected chief executive (mayor, governor, President) generally has the most political power, and as a result the party organizations depend more upon access to chief executives than on any other source for their political power. In addition, parties are accountable for the activities of chief executives elected with their endorsement. Accountability means that when the party endorses a man, it designates him as its agent before the electorate. The fortunes of the party depend on the success of party candidates. Candidates come and go, but parties and electorates remain, and it is assumed that the actions of a party's men in office will in the long run determine the extent and location of the party's appeal within the electorate and its record of success at the polls.

Just as the party is greatly dependent, at any moment, upon its incumbent office-holders for its political power, these office-holders in turn often have great discretion in the distribution of indulgences to the party, and it is expected that they will seek to strengthen themselves within the party organization by the judicious dispensation of favors and patronage. This suggests that the elected chief executive comes closer than any other individual to possessing unilateral controls over the party organization, and that these unilateral controls may be used by the chief executive to impose his own preferences on the party organization.[5]

We may consider it axiomatic that the presidency possesses more political power than any other national office, and that the governorship possesses more political power than any other state office. If we also take account of the fact

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delegates may still be acting rationally if they are members of state delegations bound to some candidate by law or bound to a delegation leader. One or another of these conditions often applies to delegates, for reasons noted in the text, in which case relevant information for them consists of keeping abreast of the preferences of their leaders. For a general discussion of the costs of keeping informed, see Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957).

[3] See the discussion of "access" in David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1953), pp. 264–70, and 506–7.

[4] Note this observation in David, Moos, and Goldman, *op. cit.*, II, 173. "Some of the New York delegation leaders were somewhat astonished and not entirely pleased at the evident organizational bonds between the New York and other Congressmen. The fact that Congress creates a community, with its own system of favors, obligations, and friendships, seems to have come as a shock to them, and they looked upon the behavior of the New York Congressmen as verging on disloyalty to the delegation and to the state party organization."

[5] This is of course, a statement of probabilities, not an absolute dictum. At one point in the recent past it became apparent that Carmine DeSapio had greater control over the Democratic organization of New York than did Governor Harriman.

that the national government as compared with state and local governments dominates American political life in the scope, comprehensiveness, and immediacy of its powers, we may deduce the following additional propositions: (1) the presidency possesses more political power than any other office; (2) access to the presidency is the most efficient means for politicians to realize their goals; and (3) the choice of a presidential candidate is the single decision dominating the national convention.

If the powers of the President vis-à-vis the national party organization are all that previous propositions assert, they should be reflected in his control of a national convention.

3. *An incumbent President runs national conventions of his party hierarchically, if he chooses to do so.*

The presidential power over national conventions has historically extended to (1) the right to renomination, or to designate the party nominee, effectively exercised in seventeen of the nineteen conventions since the Civil War in which the President interested himself in the outcome; (2) the power to dictate the party platform; (3) the power to designate the officers of the convention; (4) the power to select many delegates — especially potent in the case of Republican delegations from the one-party Democratic South, where Republican Presidents, until the passage of the Hatch Act, drew upon a corporal's guard of federal patronage appointees to man this sizeable convention bloc.[6]

[6] See Paul T. David and Ralph M. Goldman, "Presidential Nominating Patterns," *Western Political Quarterly,* VIII (September, 1955), 465–80. Edward F. Cooke, "Drafting the 1952 Platforms," *Western Political Quarterly,* IX (September, 1956), 699–712. The Constitutional amendment limiting Presidents to two terms may change the power of a two-term incumbent radically. However, it may not. The party still must run on the presidential record, and the outgoing President still seems likely to control the management of the convention. Before Franklin Roosevelt broke the two-term tradition, outgoing Presidents controlled conventions even when no one expected them to run again. And President Truman was also very influential in 1952, when he was not a candidate for re-election. See Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 488–503; Alben Barkley, *That Reminds Me* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954), pp. 225–32.

National conventions which are run hierarchically seem to be subject to the same costs of calculation and control as most other hierarchies.[7] Just as hierarchial price-fixing will tend to misrepresent real costs, this type of decision-making in conventions has historically miscalculated the bounds of the framework of consent within which the political party can function. Party accountability and federal patronage are powerful incentives to co-operation with the President, but his power is not unlimited. This was demonstrated when, in 1912 and 1948, several delegations walked out of national conventions and set up splinter parties to protest hierarchical decisions which threatened to inflict severe deprivations on factional and sectional politicians who acquiesced to them. This suggests that party splinters are much more likely to occur when a party is in power than when a party is out of power, as a possible consequence of hierarchical decision-making.

4. *A relatively few party leaders control the decisions of a large proportion of the delegates to conventions.*

Delegates to national conventions are chosen, after all, as representatives of the several state party organizations, apportioned according to a formula laid down by action of previous national conventions. While it is true that official decisions are made by majority vote of delegates, American party organizations are centralized at state and local levels. This means that such hierarchical controls as actually exist on the state and local levels will assert themselves in the national convention. Since the probabilities are fairly good that both major parties at any given time will have succeeded in electing a substantial number of governors and mayors of important cities, the chances are likewise fairly good that a substantial number of delegates will be controlled hierarchically. The tendency toward centralization is formally aided by the so-called unit rule, providing that a majority vote of a state delegation shall determine the way in which the vote of the entire delegation shall be cast.

The decision to adopt the unit rule is a diffi-

[7] See the discussion of the costs of hierarchy in Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper, 1953), pp. 247–61, and especially 254–55.

cult one for state political leaders faced with an intense, dissident minority within their delegations. While adoption of unit voting assures them of a solid bloc of votes with which they can bargain, hard feelings may linger on within the state. When a minority element within a state is strong enough to gain representation on a convention delegation, muzzling it by imposition of the unit rule is seldom wise. The unit rule is used to best advantage by those delegations whose members generally feel more strongly about preserving the bargaining advantages of a bloc vote than they do about any particular candidate. In a delegation firmly committed to a particular aspirant, the unit rule is superfluous. It is sometimes avoided by a leader who wants to reward delegates who stick together on the delegation's first choice. He releases them to vote as they individually please on their second choice, if the first choice is removed from contention. Hence state delegations governed by the unit rule are most often likely to be relatively uncommitted in their presidential preferences, and comparatively homogeneous in their political outlooks and allegiances. The following conclusions may therefore be drawn: (1) state delegations tend to be hierarchically controlled by state political leaders; (2) the chief political leader of state delegations will be the governor, or his agent; (3) if a state delegation puts forward a favorite son candidate, there is a higher probability that he will be the governor of the state than any other person; and (4) presidential nominees are more likely to be governors than any other persons.[8]

These propositions all rest upon assumptions about who is likely to control access to political power. There may be significant deviations from these propositions in real life, however. For example, there are a few instances in recent years where party leaders controlled a majority of a state's delegation in opposition to the governor of the same party. Usually, the governor, if he is not a state's favorite son, is still the leader of the delegation and is likely to be allied with the favorite son as well. An example of this would be Governor Orville Freeman, who had long been a close ally of Minnesota's 1960 favorite son, Senator Humphrey. No doubt some of these coalitions between the leaders of a state are shotgun marriages, as may have been the case among Tennessee's Democrats in 1956, but for the purposes of the convention, these alliances seem to hold together despite centrifugal impulses.

5. *Politicians will have different preferences among those presidential aspirants having a chance of winning election.*

This proposition follows from the fact that politicians desire to maximize access to governmental decision-makers. But the probability is very high that they will differ in their relations with the various aspirants to the presidency. A politician will naturally favor a presidential hopeful from his own state, or an aspirant with whom he has been on close personal or professional terms. Each presidential aspirant begins the convention with a cluster of connections of this sort with delegates and delegation leaders. The predispositions of delegates toward candidates are shaped by their expectations of access to them, which may depend upon historical accidents, ideological affinities, and/or explicit "deals."

6. *In the absence of hierarchical control by an incumbent President, decision-making at conventions is co-ordinated by a process of bargaining among party leaders.*

We may think of bargaining as a method by which activities are co-ordinated in situations where controls between individuals are bilateral or multilateral and approach equality.[9] Bargainers may differ as to their goals. They are presumed to harbor the expectation that participating in the bargaining process (1) will aid them in achieving their goals and (2) will inform them of the goals and tactics of others, which in turn may help them in attaining their

[8] See the discussion of the role of governors in Malcolm C. Moos, "New Light on the Nominating Process" in *Research Frontiers in Government and Politics* (Washington: Brookings, 1955), pp. 148–155. This picture may be changing. Evidence which we do not regard as conclusive pointing toward the rise of the U. S. Senate as a home of favorite sons is presented in Louis Harris, "Why The Odds Are Against a Governor's Becoming President," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 23 (Fall, 1959), pp. 361–370.

[9] Cf. Dahl and Lindblom, *op. cit.*, and their discussions of bargaining and the price system, *passim*. Also see the working paper by Charles E. Lindblom, *Bargaining: the Hidden Hand in Government* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1955).

goals. Prerequisites to bargaining may be summarized as (1) non-hierarchical controls; (2) interdependence of bargainers; (3) disagreement among bargainers; and (4) expectation of gain.

When the President is of the opposite party, or chooses not to control the convention hierarchically, the convention becomes a bargaining system because no other political leader is in a position to control the national convention unilaterally. The interdependence of party leaders may be established by reference to the rule of American politics which provides that the voters may replace the elected officials of one party with those of another at general elections. In order to mobilize enough nationwide support to elect a President, party leaders from a large number of constituencies must be satisfied with the nominee. Without agreement on a nominee, none is likely to enjoy access to the eventual President; hence party leaders are interdependent and expect to gain from the outcome of the bargain. Because of the different access to different aspirants which delegates carry with them into the convention the preferences of delegates are likely initially to disagree.

Politicians seek to maximize their own political power, but in order to do so, must maximize the potential vote for candidates whom they sponsor. The more leaders who agree on a candidate, the more interest groups and state party organizations there are working for the election of the candidate; consequently, the greater are the chances that the candidate will win election and provide those politicians who supported him with access to political power. Therefore, we may postulate the following: (1) Party unity is perceived by politicians as prerequisite to the achievement of their goals. (2) Unless party leaders achieve a consensus among themselves, the chances are diminished that they will be able to elect a President. (3) Parties tend to nominate candidates who are (a) at the least, not obnoxious to, (b) at the most, attractive to, as many interest groups as possible.[10] (4) Party platforms tend to be broad and vague. (5) Sanctions open to a dissident party faction revolve around its ability to destroy party unity.

[10] The characteristics of the ideally "available" that is, suitable, presidential candidate are enumerated by V. O. Key, *op. cit.*, pp. 375–76.

7. *The parties are in direct competition for many of the same votes.*

Voters and interest groups are distributed between and outside the two parties, and parties must of necessity build a nationwide coalition of votes to win the Presidency. Politicians are uncertain as to the exact distribution of presidential preferences among groups in the population, however, and must make nominations and write platforms with the broadest possible constituency in mind. The two parties thus compete for many of the same politically neutral, apathetic, ambivalent and/or uncommitted interest groups and voters. Therefore, (1) party platforms tend to be similar, though not identical,[11] and (2) presidential candidates are likely to come from states having a large electoral vote and which are politically competitive. This last proposition follows partly from what has been said above, with the addition of the electoral college rules which distribute presidential votes by states roughly according to population and give the whole electoral vote of a state to any candidate winning a majority within the state.

8. *Vice presidential nominees are calculated to help the party achieve the presidency.*

Party nominees for President and Vice President always appear on the ballot together and are elected together. A vote for one is always a vote for the other. Yet the Vice President occupies a post in the legislative branch of the government which is formally honorific, and his powers and activities in the executive branch are determined by the President. The electoral interdependence of the two offices gives politicians an opportunity to gather votes for the presidency, and from this we can deduce the criteria for the selection of the Vice President. A vice-presidential nominee must

[11] Broad, vague and similar party platforms, seen here as "rational" outgrowths of the conditions under which they must be written are bitterly criticized in Committee on Political Parties, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York: Rinehart, 1950), pp. 40, 50 ff. One of the grounds on which this committee criticizes the platforms is that they are written too hurriedly. If the argument advanced in this paper is correct, no amount of extra time would result in the production of less vague platforms unless ways were devised of ascertaining distributions of policy preferences among voters — an extraordinarily difficult, if not hopeless task.

have the same qualities as a presidential nominee, with two additions: (a) he should possess those desirable qualities the presidential nominee lacks, and (b) he must be acceptable to the presidential nominee.

As we have seen, the selection of a presidential nominee is the business which dominates the convention. From this follow: (1) The importance of decisions preceding the presidential nomination in the convention is entirely dependent upon the implications of the outcomes for the presidential nomination. (2) Decisions not taken unanimously which precede the presidential nomination in the convention are tests of strength between party factions divided as to the presidential nomination.

II. The Strategies of Participants

The one route to political power open to all delegates in the convention is to contribute to the majority essential for the nomination of the man they believe will be the winner. This explains the so-called "bandwagon" behavior, which can be seen in operation at many conventions.

1. *When delegates believe that one presidential aspirant is certain of nomination, they will attempt to record themselves as voting for that aspirant as quickly as possible. Delegates committed to a favorite son candidate will trade their votes for access to the candidate they think most likely to win nomination.*

Note the differences in the two statements above. In the first, delegates know which candidate will win, and hope to earn his gratitude by voting for him. In the corollary, delegates are less certain of the outcome, hence their commitment to an aspirant is more costly for the aspirant, who often makes explicit promises of access to delegates in return for their support.

2. *The most important consideration for a politician in choosing a presidential nominee is the expectation that he will win the election.*

Clearly, if a candidate is given no chance of winning election, access to him is not instrumental to politicians' goals. Presidential aspirants claim victory and stimulate manifestations of public enthusiasm and support for themselves as a means of convincing delegates that they will win nomination and election. This follows from delegate behavior in the decision-making process outlined above. If delegates, because of their uncertainty about what other delegates will do, often are driven to bandwagon behavior, the rational presidential aspirant will try to capitalize on this fact. The votes of a majority of delegates are indispensable to nomination, and, as we have seen, a prerequisite to getting these votes is the ability to stimulate the expectation of victory, that is, to generate a bandwagon.

3. *Unexpected losses in primary elections usually doom an aspirant's chance of nomination,*[12] *so the rational aspirant enters only those primaries he thinks he can win.*

Primary elections function largely as a means by which politicians inform themselves about the relative popularity of presidential aspirants. The expectations of delegates are of critical importance in determining the nominee, as the propositions above show, and the strategies of aspirants respond to these conditions. Some aspirants play a somewhat different game from the maximizing behavior postulated in the above proposition. An aspirant from a state with relatively few electoral votes and who has only a few votes from outside his state initially pledged to him may find it necessary to enter primaries where his chances are questionable, in order to come into the convention with enough first ballot votes pledged to him so that he is considered seriously for the nomination. Without this minimum number of votes, the aspirant from the small state stands little chance of consideration. He takes a chance on primaries not to maintain a preconvention record of success (since this of little utility to him), but because he has nothing to lose.

4. *An aspirant who leads in votes for the nomination must actually win nomination by a certain point in time, after which his chances of eventually winning decline precipitously, even though he remains in the lead for the time being.*

This follows from the fact that much dele-

[12] There are a great many examples of this phenomenon at work. Harold Stassen in particular seems to have suffered from primaries. For example, in the Minnesota Republican primary of 1952, Stassen won a plurality but an Eisenhower write-in vote of over 100,000 was considered the significant event of the primary, because it gave the party leaders unmistakable indications of popular sentiment. David, Moos, and Goldman *op. cit.*, I, 32.

gate support is given candidates because of the expectation of victory. When this victory falls short of quick materialization, delegates may question their initial judgment. Thus, the longer a candidate remains in the lead without starting a bandwagon, the greater the chance that his supporters will reassess his chances of victory, and vote for someone else. In order to achieve access, delegates must support the eventual winner before he achieves a majority, as a general rule. They are therefore guided by what they expect other delegates to do, and are constantly on the alert to change their expectations to conform to the latest information. This information may be nothing more substantial than a rumor, which quickly takes on the status of a self-fulfilling prophecy, as delegates stampede in response to expectations — quickly realized — about how other delegates will respond. We have previously pointed out the costs of hierarchy in convention decision-making. In the fragmented situation there are also costs, since there is no guarantee that nominations made in this situation will reflect the best judgment of delegates or leaders, or even their second-best judgment as to the most acceptable party nominee. This is the case because delegates may stampede on reliable or unreliable information, with effects that may be highly prejudicial to the party's chances to elect a President.

Aspirants sometimes combine their voting strength in the convention in order to prevent a front-running candidate from gaining a majority. They will then negotiate the nomination among themselves. If the front-runner's victory promises other aspirants insufficient access, they may defeat him by preventing a bandwagon in his favor. The rational aspirant who leads but lacks a majority will promise access to leaders representing the requisite number of votes. This is the rational response to the expectation that no bandwagon will appear, unstimulated. The front-runner may reasonably expect to win without cost (i.e., without making such promises) unless leaders of opposing factions reach agreement on a ticket, and appear likely to combine against him. Early front-runners often win nominations, precisely because they face a divided opposition.

5. *There are conditions under which a rational delegate will vote for a candidate other than the probable winner, according to his calculations.*

If a politician is without hope of obtaining access to a particular candidate for any of a variety of reasons, then there is no reason for voting for him, even if the politician calculates that the candidate is the probable winner. A second condition under which this obtains has already been mentioned. By withholding his vote temporarily from the probable winner, the delegate may obtain firm promises of access. A third condition may be classed as an irrationality, namely the force of primary law in some states which commits delegates to a candidate regardless of the promises of access other candidates make to the delegation. Since delegates may be released by the candidate, significant bargaining power accrues to him. This may provide him with the access to more probable winners usually accorded to politicians within state delegations. Politicians bound by primary law are thus often severely handicapped in the bargaining process.

III. Topics for Study

The first point that should be made about these propositions is that none of them is necessarily true. Circumstances alter cases, and while there have been historical occasions where all of these propositions might have described real-life behavior, not enough is presently known about decision-making in conventions to allow us to specify the conditions under which they all hold true. Much of our knowledge of conventions is a combination of folklore and common sense, which may be wrong or out of date. If political science is to aspire to more than journalism, it would seem worth while for political scientists to observe party conventions with a check-list of propositions in hand something like those submitted above. Some of the research projects suggested by this particular set of propositions include:

1. *Mapping the distribution of votes for various candidates at various stages in the convention, and accounting for changes.*

If our propositions are correct, changes take place for the following reasons: (1) because delegates change their minds about the chances of presidential aspirants; (2) because promises of access to political power have been made; (3) because delegates have been released from their initial commitment. Field research may discover other reasons, or may discover that different reasons cause different rates of change, or that different reasons for change predom-

inate at different stages in the convention. It would be interesting to know, for example, what we could predict if we knew the second choice of every delegate in a convention.

2. *Studying the distribution of power in conventions.*

Two general types of power distribution have been identified: hierarchical situations and bargaining situations. No one armed with our propositions would have expected a walk-out in the Democratic convention of 1960, though one was threatened, because this convention was not hierarchically organized, and history and prior knowledge of hierarchies suggests that walk-outs are more likely to be a cost of these than of bargaining conventions. Further, one might have predicted that no Democratic presidential aspirant who tries to force a walk-out of the South (or of any other faction) is likely to be nominated.

3. *Finding out how bandwagons are created and thwarted.*

Under what conditions does the front-runner cease to be the most likely nominee? When are delegates most likely to stampede? When are they most likely to hold fast to their choices?

4. *Mapping lines of communication in the convention.*

How news travels in the convention may determine the direction and force of stampedes. For political scientists who observe the conventions at first hand, there is an opportunity to find out which delegates are consulted by whom and about what. Are there significant variations among delegations in their methods of decision-making? How are these differences related to the ways in which delegates are chosen, to their degree of attachment to one or another candidate and to patterns of party organization in the home state?

5. *Discovering the ways in which delegates explain their behavior; when and by whom loyalty to party leader, to the people back home, or to previous agreements are involved and when these rationalizations are replaced by others.*

One of the purposes of this inquiry would be to determine the bounds of "rationality" as defined by the propositions above, and the extent to which delegates actually attempt to maximize values other than those imputed to them.

6. *Discovering the nature of delegates' information.*

The factual knowledge of delegations determines the premises of many decisions. What do delegates believe (or know) about how votes are being traded, what deals are being made, and what the consequences of various events will be? This is a complicated matter, but provides important insights into the strategies and counterstrategies of convention behavior. One report on this subject was made by Colonel Jack Arvey in 1952.

> Cook County Chairman Joe Gill and I were having dinner . . . when one of our ward committeemen came running over to tell us an important roll call vote was under way on the seating of Virginia . . . Gill and I hurried back into the hall. Illinois had already been recorded 45–15 against seating Virginia. It suddenly dawned on us what was happening. The strategy of the Kefauver backers and the Northern liberal bloc was to try and make impossible demands on the Southern delegates so that they would walk out of the Convention. If the total Convention vote was thus cut down by the walkout of delegates who would never vote for Kefauver, then the Tennessee Senator would have a better chance of winning the nomination. Our Illinois delegation quickly huddled and then changed our vote to 52–8 in favor of seating Virginia. The eight opposed included Senator Douglas and other backers of Kefauver.[13]

Now whether or not Arvey correctly guessed the strategy of the Kefauver forces, this anecdote provides a vivid picture of the premises on which the action of the Stevenson group was predicated. Ideally, we should be able to determine what Kefauver partisans had in mind, and whether other delegations, thirteen of which changed their votes on the seating of Virginia within the hour following the Illinois switch, had actually "caught" what was going on, or whether they were playing different games.[14]

Immediately below we attempt a somewhat more elaborate examination of another aspect of this topic, namely, the ways in which participants use information to reduce the uncertainty of their calculations. The main object of this discussion is to enumerate in some detail what it is that participants are uncertain about as an

[13] Jack Arvey, as told to John Madigan, "The Reluctant Candidate," *Reporter*, November 24, 1953.

[14] See Norton E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (November, 1958), 251–61, for a theoretical framework which may have fruitful applications in the convention situation.

indication of the scope of the research problem posed. Many of the propositions already introduced are restated and extended in the particular context of the problem of uncertainty. We begin, as before, by postulating the goals of delegates.

IV. Uncertainty

The major goals of most delegates to national conventions may be simply described: to nominate a man who can win the election; to unify the party; to obtain some claim on the nominee; and to strengthen state party organizations. The attainment of each one of these goals requires a great deal of information about the future. What will the electorate do at the polls months after the convention? Who will other delegates to the convention support and for how long? What will be the effect of initial declarations and switches of support on other delegates? What bargains can a particular candidate make? What will be the consequences of the nomination for one's state party?

Answers to these and other questions about pre-convention and convention events are characteristically difficult to obtain and uncertain at best. There are good reasons for this. The answers depend, first, on national and world conditions which we have not learned how to predict — war, depression, inflation. The candidate who appears likely to win in peacetime, may not be able to command the support of the electorate during open warfare. Second, the answers depend on a complex series of actions and reactions involving the intentions of others. To obtain a claim on the winner, a delegate (or delegation) often must contribute to his support at the convention by guessing who will win in time to "get on the bandwagon." But a delegate's estimate of who will win may be determined, in part at least, by the estimate he makes about what other delegates are going to do. And their behavior, in turn, may be influenced by what he does or says he is going to do.[15] This situation may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy where the delegate's estimate of who is most likely to win leads to actions which influence others in the same direction and confirms his original expectation. A third difficulty in acquiring the necessary information results because the delegates are not merely required to predict an isolated set of occurrences (although this would be difficult enough) but to gauge the outcome of a complex chain of consequences. If nominee A receives support from delegation B and wins decisively in primary C, then he will be in a position to bargain with delegation D and to use this leverage to gain support from party leader E, which, in turn, will lead to the possibility of heading off rival nominee F, and so on.

There are some potentially reliable sources of information — primaries, polls, balloting on procedural motions or on the platform, successive nominating ballots, shifts by key delegations — which are avidly observed. But these publicly available indicators of what might happen in the future do not have meaning in themselves; they are given meaning by interested observers. Unless the significance attributed to the indicators is widely shared and clear beyond any doubt, so that one overwhelming favorite emerges, the delegate is still left with the troublesome problem of interpretation.

Many of the standard indicators may be perceived to be ambiguous. Did Senator John F. Kennedy emerge from the 1960 Wisconsin primary with a margin of only 100,000 votes, or did he win by *so great a margin* as 100,000 votes? Perceptions (and hence interpretations) of identical indicators may vary widely depending on the delegate's predispositions, on the amount of reinforcement or counter-interpretation to which he is subjected, or on the internal discomfort produced by cross-pressures between his reading of the signs and other demands.[16] Unless a delegate's interpretation of events coincides with those made by others, however, his predictions, and the actions based on them, may well be invalidated. At best, the delegate swims in a sea of uncertainty, and this

[15] T. C. Schelling gives excellent examples of reciprocal reaction to intentions in his "Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March, 1957), pp. 19–36.

[16] Robert Merton, *Mass Persuasion* (New York, 1956); Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954); Joseph T. Klapper, "What We Know about the Effects of Mass Communication: The Brink of Hope," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Winter, 1957), pp. 453–474. See Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1960* (New York: Atheneum, 1961), p. 94 for a discussion of the ambiguities in the example given.

uncertainty, we suggest, is an important key to convention behavior.

American national parties are loose federations of independent state parties representing somewhat different economic, ethnic, religious, sectional, and other interests. What holds them together, primarily, is the hope of winning the greatest office in the land — the presidency — and sharing in its benefits. It is not all surprising, therefore, that the great search at the convention is for "The Man Who Can Win," for without hope of victory over the years there would be little reason for a heterogenous party to stay together.[17] Even if the parties were far more cohesive than they are today, still they could not disregard the need to get into office now and then by nominating a popular candidate.[18]

Capitalizing on the understandable desire to nominate a winner, candidates seek to demonstrate that they can win and others cannot. Polls are cited and electoral analyses are made to convince delegates on this point.[19] Frequently, there appear to be several strong candidates and disagreements about which one is the most likely winner often take place because the delegates may have private preferences and lack certain information about what the electorate is likely to do.

The members of each party may love it on a sentimental basis: they certainly love the idea of getting into office; but do they love each other? The convention tests party unity by determining whether the disparate elements which make up each party can agree on one man to represent them — a man who cannot possibly be equally attractive to all of them. That party unity may aid in securing victory provides an incentive for keeping all the factions under the same party umbrella. But the differences among them may be so great that no one is quite sure whether they can agree to disagree together. The much-maligned party platform is exceedingly important in this regard not so much for what it makes explicit but for the fact that it is written at all. The platform tests and communicates the ability of the many party factions to agree on something even if on crucial points, the differences have to be papered over.[20]

One of the important estimates which rival party leaders must make is how far they can go in securing their preferences without completely alienating some faction, resulting in its withdrawal from the convention. This information may not be available outside the conflict within the convention when miscalculation is always a possibility.

The delegates not only want to unify the party around a probable winner; they also want to make certain that they have a claim on him so that he will consider their requests favorably. The delegates seek either a candidate who is known to be friendly to them, whose policy views tend to coincide with theirs, or who is beholden to them because they have provided support toward his nomination. Jim Farley's famous list establishing priorities for distributing patronage — FRBC (For Roosevelt Before Chicago) — illustrates the point. It helps to explain the rush to get on the bandwagon by delegates who wish access to the winning candidate. But more than one bandwagon may

[17] The desire to nominate a winner is widespread among delegates but not necessarily equally. It is strongest among delegates from states where there is a high degree of party competition or where the party is weak. Both these groups perceive a need for a popular candidate to increase their vote and bring them some patronage. It is weakest in one-party areas, such as the South, where local fortunes will continue to be good regardless of what happens in the national election. But the one-party areas have long since ceased to control the conventions, and competition is growing.

[18] For supporting comments see Gerhard Loewenberg, "The Transformation of British Labour Party Policy Since 1945," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1959), pp. 234–257; and Charles Lindblom, "In Praise of Political Science," *World Politics*, Vol. 9 (January, 1957), pp. 240–253.

[19] This is what Senator John F. Kennedy's backers tried to do in his 1956 race for the Vice-Presidency when they put out a study called "The Catholic Vote and the Democratic National Ticket." This purported to show that there was a Catholic vote, that this vote was crucial to Democratic chances, that without this vote the party could not win, but that with a Catholic on the ballot as Vice-President these voters would rally to the party and assure victory. See White (*op. cit.*) pp. 239–242, and Aaron B. Wildavsky "The Intelligent Citizen's Guide to the Abuses of Statistics" in Chapter 8.

[20] Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy, op. cit.*, Chapter 16, "The Uses for National Conventions," pp. 225–239. This book is possibly the single most fruitful source of theory about American national politics.

appear in the making, and the delegates may have to search frantically for clues as to the best time to make the jump and gain the greatest bargaining advantages for themselves.

It must never be forgotten that delegates come from state parties with internal lives of their own. The delegates spend over 1400 days every four years in their state parties and only a few at the national convention. To commit acts at the convention — supporting a candidate unpopular in that state, insisting on the unit rule against the intense opposition of a strong minority — which would lead to years of bitter internal rivalry would be unwise. Yet it is not always possible to avoid mistakes. Delegates may prove mistaken in their judgment of which nominee would run well in their state and provide a "coattail effect." David, Goldman, and Bain have shown that nominees often run better in states which opposed them at the convention than those which gave them support.[21] In any event, it is clear that in order to interpret or predict a state's behavior one may have to know a great deal about its internal conditions. One of the first requirements imposed on any presidential aspirant is that he acquire information on internal party affairs which may prove indispensable to planning his strategy and may enable him to take advantage of or to avoid dangerous party splits.[22]

The search for information under conditions of uncertainty characterizes the process of nominating candidates for the presidency. Nevertheless there are conditions under which a rational delegate might not search for information or might find readily at hand the small amount of information he required. If a delegate believes himself legally (through primary law) or morally committed to a candidate no matter what happens, he simply casts his ballot automatically. Any new information could only have curiosity value. When a delegate's ballot is, in effect, controlled by some leader, the former need know at most what the latter wants. After a simple signal system has been arranged, there is nothing more to do. A delegate may find all candidates so ideologically repugnant that he sees no hope of gaining access for anything he wants. Every outcome being equally bad, there is no point in seeking information unless it involves leaving the convention altogether.[23]

Among the leaders (those who control more than their own vote) and the uncommitted and un-bossed delegations the search for information goes on, together with attempts by nominees to supply favorable information and interpretations. Our knowledge of the way in

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[21] Paul David, Ralph Goldman, Richard Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1959), p. 400 ff. This volume presents a great deal of data about conventions. Its appearance provides an incentive for the development of relevant theory to tell us what it all means.

[22] Senator Kennedy's knowledge of Ohio politics enabled him to secure that state's votes at least on the first ballot. The division between Governor DiSalle's wing of the party and the Cuyahoga County section led by Ray Miller proved useful to Kennedy. By threatening to participate in the primary, Kennedy put DiSalle in the position of not only possibly losing the primary but also his state leadership should the slate led by Miller (and pledged to Kennedy) prove victorious. The stakes for DiSalle were too high, and he came out for Kennedy to prevent Miller from using the Senator as a club in factional politics.

A leader in the Miller camp informed one of us (Wildavsky) that DiSalle's unwillingness to let Kennedy dispose of the State's votes if he could not win would weaken the Senator's chances of emerging victorious. He would be unable to make bargains in which he received support on early ballots in return for being able to deliver his votes to another candidate if he did not make it. Thus, inability to guarantee the transfer of votes on later ballots would endanger Kennedy's chances of receiving additional votes on the early ballots.

[23] A different type of situation may arise when a delegate believes that his party has no chance whatsoever to win the coming election. He might simply give up and seek no further information about nominees. But he might also decide that this was a good time to accomplish certain other purposes such as building the party for future victories, mollifying a section of the party, or indulging in the luxury of nominating a candidate who fully represents his preferences. In the latter case he would be seeking information of a different kind than when he was interested in the man who would win.

Becoming informed is costly, and there may be marginal situations where the return from expected information is less than the cost of acquiring it. The present state of our knowledge does not permit us to specify with any precision the situations in which this may be true for some delegates.

It would also be interesting to discover the extent to which delegates seek information, despite the above considerations, out of sheer curiosity or love of the political game.

which citizens and public officials react to information leads us to believe that different people may respond in various ways. In a splendid article on "The Representative and His District," Lewis A. Dexter has written that

> . . . whether he [the Congressman] hears anything on an issue, what he hears, whom he hears from, or how he interprets what he hears all vary depending upon the kind of person he is, the kind of associations he has had . . . the public image of his interest and concerns, and the background information or misinformation which he possesses. . . . *The first difference between some congressmen and others is how (consciously or unconsciously) they define their responsibilities.*[24]

An important subject for research would be to discover how delegates conceive of their role. Do they see themselves as promoters of particular candidates, as representatives of state or district preferences, as preservers of the national party as they define it, as searchers for candidates who can best serve their conception of the national interest, as passive recorders of the desires of others, as makers of events, as men of self-interest out to make the best deal they can? The kind of information received and interpreted by the preserver of the national party might differ from that of the representative of his locality; the information sought by the man of self-interest might differ from that of the searcher for the national interest.

Dexter also suggests that "A Congressman hears most often from those who agree with him."[25] Is this true of delegates? Do they seek out information they deem to be favorable to the candidates they like and interpret anything they hear to support their own views? Is unfavorable information neglected or rejected as too painful to consider? Is there a point, however, beyond which events force attention to reality and thus lead to the possibility of a common appraisal? Answers to such questions are essential if we are to understand why delegates behave as they do.

The ways in which men decide to become or not to become serious candidates for nomination to the presidency have not been extensively studied.[26] This decision may depend in part upon an early estimate of probable support in the convention and the ensuing election. Feelers may be sent out, comments elicited from party leaders, trips made around the country, polls arranged. Knowledge of the manner in which this information is collected and evaluated would help us to understand the emergence of candidates.[27]

Perhaps the first strategic decision facing an avowed candidate is whether to attempt to become a front-runner by entering primaries, barnstorming the country, and publicly seeking support at state conventions. The advantage of this strategy is that a candidate may build up such a commanding lead (or appear to do so), that no one will be able (or will try) to stop him at the convention. The disadvantage is that an open campaign may reveal his inability to acquire support or may lead other candidates to band together in order to stop him. Adoption of this position depends for its success, then, upon the front-runner's ability to predict accurately both how he will fare compared to others in open competition, and what others will be able to do when they discover his

[24] Lewis A. Dexter, "The Representative and His District," *Human Organization*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring, 1957), pp. 2–3.

A questionnaire asking delegates what they hope to accomplish at the convention, checked by observation, might suffice to turn up data of such importance as to compel us to alter generally accepted statements about the goals of the participants. We might discover that personal and policy preferences rank higher than the desire to find a man who can win or to secure a claim on the winner. Perhaps thoughts of what the effect will be on state politics are of paramount importance. Yet the early appearance, and continued reappearance, of such phenomena as the bandwagon effect suggests that the desire to find a winner and to get a claim on him are important to many delegates. This would appear to be especially true of "swing" delegates who are not firmly committed to any candidate and whose choices help decide the final result.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[26] A man need not be a serious contender to enter the race. He may do so to gain bargaining advantage, to further his career in other arenas, to better his chances at some future convention, or to keep his state delegation together. See White, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–77, for a journalist's view of this process in 1960.

[27] Governor Nelson Rockefeller's decision not to contest the 1960 Republican nomination actively would be worthy of special study since he apparently made an intensive effort to discover the extent of his support. See White, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–75.

lead. His failure to anticipate that his activity may stimulate a coalition of opponents who are not otherwise likely to get together may prove fatal. Consequently, attempts may be made to issue communications playing down the extent of his support. If this is over-done, however, the front-runner may fail to gain new supporters who would have been attracted by a display of strength. It may prove necessary to balance the possible evils, to utilize the utmost skill in communications without his ever being certain that he is quite doing the right thing.

The dark horse is an avowed candidate who avoids primaries and much open campaigning. He is content to be everyone's friend and no one's enemy. His strategy is to combine with others to oppose every front-runner. His hope is that when no front-runner is left he will appear as the man who can unify the party by being acceptable to all and obnoxious to none. The danger the dark horse faces is that he will enter the convention with too little support to make a strong bid or that some other dark horse will prove preferable. How much support is enough to make a serious bid but not enough to be shot at in the line of front-runners? How far behind the front-runner can a candidate permit himself to get without becoming entirely lost from sight? Either an intuitive ability to guess or an exceedingly accurate apparatus for collecting information on the current strength of candidates, as well as the likely effect of different levels of strength on other delegates, must be part of the dark horse's equipment.

Primaries are important largely because the results represent an ostensibly objective indication of whether a candidate can win the election. The contestants stand to gain or lose far more than the small number of delegate votes which may be at stake. Thus a man would be a fool to enter a primary unless the information at his disposal led him to believe that he was reasonably certain to win. This stricture applies with special force to the candidate who is well ahead in delegate support. All he can gain is a few additional votes, while he can lose his existing support by a bad showing in the primary, since this would be interpreted as meaning that he could not win in the election. The candidate who is far behind, however, has little or nothing to lose by entering a risky primary. If he wins, he has demonstrated his popularity; if he loses, he is hardly worse off than if he had not entered the primary at all. The man who is ahead needs more certain information about how primaries are likely to turn out because he takes the greater risk.

The man who is behind in securing convention support, or whose ability to win is in doubt, engages in strategies of enticement whereby he issues siren calls inviting the leading contenders into a primary. He suggests that they are cowardly, lacking in public spirit, afraid to face the public. By luring them into a primary, he hopes to deal a severe blow to their chances and thereby boost his own. In order to avoid this trap, it may be necessary to publicize one's disdain for primaries, to specify in advance all the reasons why such a contest would be unnecessary, unfair and a waste of time. The candidate who finds himself in a primary (and wishes to live and fight again another day) does well to have alibis ready to explain away seemingly disadvantageous results.

One primary strategy — the write-in — offers the maximum possibility of gain with the minimum possibility of loss. If a candidate gets virtually no votes, he can easily explain this by saying that he did not campaign and that it is difficult for people to write-in names. If he receives ten per cent of the vote, he can hail this as a tremendous victory under the circumstances. And if he should win, he can build it up to the sky, stressing the extraordinary popularity required to get people to go to all the trouble of writing-in a name. But the man who is behind cannot rest content with being able to explain away a poor showing; he must win to establish himself as a contender. The strategy of the write-in, consequently, is most accessible to the man who is ahead and hopes to solidify his position while minimizing his risks.

The foregoing discussion should enable us better to understand why those who win primaries often do not win the nomination. Part of the reason is that there are not many primaries and not all of those actually commit delegates to vote for a candidate. Of greater significance, however, is the fact that primary activity is often (though by no means always) a sign that a candidate has great obstacles to overcome and must win many primaries in order to be considered for the nomination at all. The image communicated by a few primary victories, unless they are overwhelming, may be less that of the conquering hero than of the drowning man clutching at the last straw.

Merely entering and winning primaries may be of little value unless the signals communicated by these victories are widely interpreted in such a way as to improve a candidate's chances. The contestant who "loses" but does better than expected may reap greater advantage from a primary than the one who wins but falls below expectations. It is, therefore, manifestly to the advantage of a candidate to hold his claims down to minimum proportions. Kennedy tried to follow this advice in Wisconsin, but the press, radio, and TV took note of his extensive organization and of favorable polls, and pinned the winner-by-a-landslide-label on the Senator from Massachusetts. The public media have taken some of the control over "expectations" from the candidates.

Most of the delegates are chosen by state and district conventions. There are relatively few contests over the selection of delegates (although these may be important) and most attempts to influence them are made after they are chosen.[28] The first strategic requirement is an intelligence service, a network of informants who will tell the candidates which delegations are firmly committed, which are wavering, and which may be persuaded to provide second or third choice support. Advance reports on the opportunities offered by internal divisions in the state parties, the type of appeal likely to be effective in each state, and the kinds of bargains to which leaders are most susceptible may also be helpful. The costs of this information may come high in terms of time, money, and effort. But it will be worth it to the serious candidate who needs to know where to move to increase his support and block his opponents. A comparison of the intelligence services of a number of candidates should throw considerable light on how efficacious these services are, the kinds of information developed, and the reliability of what is discovered.

The well-organized candidates contact the delegates personally or through close associates exemplified by the genial Jim Farley. They may show a winning personality, make implied promises of good things to come, discuss or avoid controversial issues of special salience to the locality, as seems best calculated to increase their support. If a favorable public opinion poll is handy, or can be arranged, this will be cited to substantiate the claims of victory which must be made to convey the impression that it would be a good idea to climb on the bandwagon. More than one can play at this game, however, and "pollsmanship" is becoming a common art whose practitioners know how to secure the desired impression and blunt harmful ones. It is possible that the number of polls taken exceeds the number made public, for good reason.

When an incumbent President is up for renomination his influence is normally great, his party can hardly hope to win by repudiating him, and his nomination is virtually assured. Sometimes, the titular leader of the party or some other candidate is so far ahead that there is nothing left for the convention to do but ratify the existing decision. We are concerned with those cases where there is uncertainty about who will be the nominee at the time of the convention.

In an uncertain convention, what the delegates crave above all is information on what is going to happen and when. They want to know who is ahead and who is behind and what the chances are of majority agreement on one of the leading candidates. Rumors are rife because people like to speculate, because it is to the advantage of a nominee to be thought to be winning, because no one has been able to establish a certain claim. In the grip of uncertainty, the delegates grasp for some objective information provided by events at the convention.

Before the balloting on the candidates begins at the convention, there often are votes on contested delegations, on a plank in the platform, on some rule governing convention life such as a loyalty pledge, or on the person who is to be permanent chairman. If some of the candidates become identified with one or the other side on these preliminary votes, the results may be considered a test of who is likely to win the nomination. The wise candidate does not commit the grave strategic error of identifying himself with a losing cause which will prejudice his chances of nomination.[29] Wisdom

[28] Paul David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph Goldman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, *The National Story*, pp. 188–191.

[29] Much the same strategic considerations hold in relation to any conflict that may develop over the permanent chairman. This struggle may be important because the chairman wields procedural powers over the convention. He can speed up adjournment to give a particular candidate time to

here depends on information indicating the probable loss of such a vote. In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt nearly lost his bid for the nomination by coming out against the two-thirds rule then required for nomination. Fortunately for his chances, FDR's supporters at the convention discovered that the opposition to the change in rules was greater than the opposition to him and he beat a hasty retreat from his previous position. The optimal strategy is to take a position which is supported by a larger number of delegates than the candidate himself and thus create the impression of overwhelming support for him. The Eisenhower forces did this in 1952 with a "thou shalt not steal" charge (magnified enormously by a publicity campaign) in relation to contested delegations from the South. After Eisenhower won the vote on seating his delegates from Georgia, the convention was as good as over.

Such apparently trivial matters as the date or place the convention meets may take on special meaning if these decisions are believed to affect a candidate's fortunes. The fact that the 1844 Democratic Convention was delayed while Van Buren's letter opposing the annexation of Texas was having its effect was known at that time to be prejudicial to his chances. Locating the 1928 Democratic Convention in Houston, Texas, was widely interpreted as a move to mollify people in the South and led to the conclusion that this was necessary because party leaders intended to nominate Al Smith.[30]

While candidates are being nominated, and during the balloting, demonstrations — partly spontaneous, largely prearranged — take place on the floor. This raucous display is meant to let everyone know that a candidate has many loyal supporters. Hopefully, a demonstration at a crucial moment might succeed in igniting the spark of enthusiasm among the multitude of uncertain delegates. Despite the fact that every one seems aware of what is going on, the same old tricks are played every convention like a stuck record. Part of the reason is that once this practice has begun unanimous consent is necessary to eliminate it; otherwise, the candidate who received no ovation would be deemed to have no support (and not enough sense to stimulate it artificially). Another part of the rationale behind demonstrations should be clear from the argument of this paper: reliable information may be so scarce that, despite all warnings, delegates may be swayed (as was the Willkie Convention) by the most immediate, tangible evidence before them — the roar of the crowd.

The strategies which a candidate adopts depend not only on the necessity to show that he can win but also on his position in the convention. The front-runner must score an early victory or resign himself to defeat. So long as he keeps gaining support, no matter how small, he is still in contention because it is assumed that he may have more strength in reserve. But the front-runner who begins to manifest any decline in votes on successive ballots can expect to see uncommitted delegates conclude that he has shot his bolt and begin to shift their support to more hopeful prospects.

Considered as a source of information, the balloting may be viewed as a directional signal indicating not merely each candidate's vote but also whether he is moving up toward hope or down to despair. One strategy often used in this connection is to "hide" a few votes on early ballots by giving them to others and reclaiming them little by little so as to show a steady increase. Or a candidate may decide to bide his time and delay making his bid. In that case, a weak initial total of votes is not likely to be commented upon because the front-runner occupies the center of attention. Later, a dark horse may occasion surprise by his rapid climb and hope that most delegates will decide to hitch their wagons to a rising star.

The time may come when the front-runner

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make bargains, or he can harm another's chances by refusing to recognize a state delegation about to go over to that candidate at a crucial moment. Unless victory appears assured, however, it may be unwise for a candidate to challenge a popular chairman. An alternative strategy is to accept an unfavorable chairman but to put forth a stream of publicity stressing his partiality so that he feels under continuous scrutiny and may bend over backward to avoid charges of favoritism.

[30] Virtually any action can take on added significance if it reveals information hitherto unavailable to all. In the 1932 Democratic Convention there was a vote on seating a contested delegation which was taken under conditions which freed many of the delegates from the unit rule. This showed close observers which delegations were closely split (information which imposition of the unit rule helped to hide) and might be approached with some chance of success.

finds that he cannot win with his existing support. Then he bargains. He may offer a Vice Presidential nomination to a leader of an important state; he may hint at Cabinet posts, patronage, or preferred treatment; he may hint at concessions on policy.[31] But this account is too simple. Before he can bargain, the candidate must know with whom to bargain. And among those delegations which might be swayed must be found the ones amenable to what this candidate has to offer. The necessity of maintaining an apparatus for obtaining this information is evident.

The bargaining process itself may be an excellent source of information on what important delegates are likely to do under a variety of circumstances. A series of probing actions may be carried out to discover what these delegates want, what they will take, what they can reasonably expect to get. Out of the negotiations which are being carried on among leaders may emerge the beginnings of a commonly held picture of the shape of events to come.

One by one the leading candidates try their luck. Timing is of the essence. Each candidate seeks the strategic moment to push his candidacy. A miscalculation, a decision, perhaps, to move ahead before sufficient support is available for the final push, may prove fatal to a candidate's chances. In a closely contested convention the prize may go to the candidate who possesses sufficient information about the intentions of others to make the successful move.

Whispering campaigns are begun, saying "Candidate X is certain to win; get on the bandwagon while you still have a chance." Rumors appear that a crucial delegation will swing to a particular candidate. The balloting may remain substantially unchanged and reveal no secrets. It is difficult to know what to believe. No mass meeting of thousands of delegates can hope to find out who is acceptable to most of them. It is up to the leaders to take over.

In the absence of quick agreement at the convention, the demonstrations and adjournments give party leaders time to meet and see if a candidate can be found who can receive a majority of votes. Generally, the most important leaders are Governors who exercise considerable influence in their states and may be able to control the votes of their delegates. National committeemen, state chairmen, elder statesmen, Congressmen, may be among those who attend. This is the "smoke-filled room" of convention lore. Its participants try to work out an agreement which will meet their desires. But they are severely limited in their choice by their estimate of what the people will accept at the polls and what the other delegates will stand for.[32] The leaders are men of independent influence and differing interests, and there may be only a limited range of agreement among them.

Little is known about the determinants of negotiations among party leaders at conventions. But what we do know suggests that the essential trick is to convince others that one's preferred view of what will happen, or must happen, is the correct one. The available information indicates that this is what took place in the 1920 Republican Convention when Harry Dougherty succeeded in convincing party leaders that a deadlock was inevitable and that only Harding could break it. Much the same kind of thing occurred in 1844 when Gideon Pillow and George Bancroft spread the word that Cass, Calhoun, and Van Buren could not

[31] Bargains may be tacit rather than explicit, made through intermediaries rather than through principals. Exactly what was promised may not be entirely clear or may be distorted later on if this is deemed advantageous. The man who wishes to collect what he believes to be his due may have trouble securing effective guarantees. Thomas Dewey never quite manifested the same understanding that Charles Halleck did about an offer of the Vice-Presidency in return for support in the Republican convention of 1948. (Jules Abels, *Out of the Jaws of Victory* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1959), pp. 65–68.

It is possible that much less comes out of the conventions in terms of reward for support than is commonly supposed. An incoming President, for example, may well decide to handle patronage through the dominant party faction in a state rather than suffer the disabilities of supporting a weak dissident who helped him at a convention. Nevertheless, if delegates believe that rewards are likely to follow support, as some apparently do, their actions would conform to this belief.

[32] "There were not many delegations at Chicago in 1952 in which a single leader could make the decisions and vote the delegation without even asking his colleagues' views; it would be difficult to name even one where this was completely the case." (David, Moos, Goldman, *op. cit.*, p. 191.)

possibly win but that Polk would carry the day.

In order to break a deadlock it is necessary to convince some delegates that the candidate they prefer cannot win and that they would be advised to switch to a man who can. The leaders at the 1920 Republican Convention decided to communicate this point convincingly by calling for several additional ballots during which nothing changed. This also helped to assure losing party factions that their candidates had had a fair chance. At the 1924 Democratic Convention, which went to 103 ballots, however, the lengthy voting apparently did not communicate the hopelessness of their cause to the leading candidates. Not only did incompatibility and intransigence block bargaining, but short-lived booms kept arising, an indication that the delegates shared no common view of future events.

If the uncertainty about information is neglected in analyses of conventions, the conclusions reached will tend to be unrealistic and overly deterministic. From the fact that delegates often seek to choose the candidate who will prove most popular with the electorate, William Carleton has concluded that, in fact, nominations are more and more determined by expressions of mass preference as reported in polls and the media of information.[33] Merely defining the candidate who won the nomination as most popular is not sufficient to prove the thesis; it must be shown that most voters agree who was the most popular candidate, that this was communicated to the delegates, and that they then nominated him. It would be hard to say that William Howard Taft, Warren Harding, Alfred Landon, and Thomas Dewey, to name a few, were indisputably the most popular Republican candidates. Dwight Eisenhower might possibly fill this bill, but he represents just one case and is counterbalanced by Theodore Roosevelt's failure to obtain the nomination in 1912. There is no evidence to suggest that, among Democratic candidates, Woodrow Wilson was more popular than Champ Clark in 1912, that James M. Cox and John W. Davis fit the "most popular" category, or that FDR could have been placed there with certainty before his first nomination. If any one was most popular in 1952 it was Estes Kefauver and not the virtually unknown Adlai Stevenson.

The argument that popularity among the electorate determines the outcome of nominating contests stands in direct contradiction to the burden of this paper. For it assumes that the delegates know with certainty who will turn out to be the most popular candidate. This may be true on occasion, but the very fact that nominations continue to be contested suggests that the delegates, who would ordinarily like a winner, may not be certain whom he might be. Serious errors may be avoided and considerable knowledge gained from full realization that convention decisions are often taken under conditions of great uncertainty. This does not mean, of course, that no generalizations are possible; it does mean that uncertainty must be taken into account in the generalizations that are made.

The uncertainty characterizing decision-making at national conventions is but one aspect of the more pervasive uncertainty connected with human affairs. But the kind of phenomenon encountered in connection with national conventions has several special characteristics. This can be seen by contrasting a perceptive statement about the making of decisions with conditions which obtain at conventions.

In an account of the first days of the Economic Cooperation Administration, Herbert Simon arrived at the following conclusions:

> . . . In its formative stages the organization consisted largely of a series of pictures in the minds of different people. The several pictures were far from congruent with each other, and the process of organizing consisted in considerable measure in arriving at a single picture that was held more or less in common . . . What this suggests is an exceedingly close analogy [with] the process an individual goes through in solving a complex problem. The world in all its complexity cannot be grasped in a single picture. Problem-solving involves the invention and testing of a whole series of simplified approximations, each of which provides a partial representation of the total complex problem. The problem is solved when a "picture" of the situation has been evolved which, though still a simplification of the real situation, is sufficiently realistic and sufficiently comprehensive to provide a reasonable approximation.[34]

[33] William Carleton, "The Revolution in the Presidential Nominating Convention," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXXII, No. 2 (June, 1957), pp. 224–240.

[34] Herbert Simon, "Birth of an Organization: The Economic Cooperation Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (Autumn, 1953), pp. 227, 235.

The convention delegation does not have the advantage which personnel of new organizations have in continuously confronting their picture with pragmatic questions like, "Are we getting sufficient support to maintain ourselves?" The delegate can reorganize his picture only for a limited period of pre-convention time and under the impetus of rapidly changing events during the few days of the convention. He may not realize that his picture is unrealistic until he discovers that others do not share it and it has become too late to press a claim on the winner. The short period of time available for decision, and the absence, until the last moment, of a realistic environment for testing one's picture of events, make the prevalent uncertainty at national conventions particularly important.

The central position of uncertainty at conventions suggests at least one major hypothesis: a candidate's chances for nomination in a contested race depend to a considerable extent on his ability to gain acceptance of a specific interpretation of the signs and portents which will be favorable to him. The task of the candidate who aspires to win is to make the picture of reality most favorable to his chances accepted by most of the delegates. The means by which this is accomplished is one of the unexplored aspects of national conventions.

Analyses of past conventions will probably not serve to ascertain fully how a common picture of events was communicated to and accepted by most of the delegates and their leaders because the necessary data was not collected at the time. The memories of delegates are not sufficiently precise or comprehensive to record every shift in their picture of events. And to this difficulty must be added a desire among delegates not to admit how erroneous their views may have been or how often they changed. Observers who will take down a running account of what is believed to be the picture of events day by day and, if necessary, hour by hour, must be stationed with delegates. In this way it is possible to compile a chronicle of the shifting notions about events held by delegates from a number of states. By comparing the beliefs about events in different states at particular times, we may expect to clarify the progression through which the convention moves toward its ultimate choice.

One of us (Wildavsky) undertook to check on the validity of this research strategy by applying it to the Ohio delegation to the 1960 Democratic Convention to which he was attached as an observer, with the permission of the party leadership. Since the results of this work are more fully reported elsewhere,[35] we shall briefly recount some of the observations in order to make a few points concerning uncertainty about relevant information.

The pre-convention situation was that the delegates were pledged through a primary (though not in a legally binding way) to vote for Kennedy on the first ballot. Governor Michael DiSalle and the Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) organization had vied to see which could garner the most votes pledged to Kennedy, and the Governor had emerged with 53 of the 61 votes. Yet there was considerable support for other candidates which might manifest itself if Kennedy failed to win on the first ballot.

The convention brings the delegates into a strange place in which they must participate, or appear to participate, in making an important decision in a terribly short period of time, under hectic conditions, where most of them never find out precisely what is going on and many are full of misinformation.[36] "Kennedy's sure to win," a delegate insisted, "He's got the support of all the big labor leaders like Hoffa. . . ." "Can't find a G . . damn thing in this place," was the typical plaint of another delegate who found it difficult to orient himself quickly. On occasion delegates considered themselves lucky if they could find out where they were supposed to be for formal party functions. "Do you know when we'll caucus?"

True, information is thrown at them from all directions, but they hardly know whom or what to believe. One day in the papers a Kennedy victory is inevitable, and the next it is doubtful, and he is slipping. A Johnson staff man pa-

[35] Aaron B. Wildavsky, "'What Can I Do?': Ohio Delegates View the Democratic Convention," in Paul Tillett (ed.), *Inside Politics: The National Convention, 1960* (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1962), pp. 112–130.

[36] Most of the observations included here were made in the lobby and rooms of the Hotel Figueroa, the home of the Ohio delegation, where some 20 to 30 delegates a day were interviewed for periods of five to twenty-five minutes during the week of the convention. The quotations all come from delegates unless specifically stated otherwise. They were written down immediately following the interview and were transcribed word for word as nearly as memory permitted.

tiently explains why his candidate's victory is certain, only to be succeeded by Kennedy and Symington people with different stories. One acquaintance says this and another says that. "If you know what's going on you're a better man than I am," responded a delegate who would feel chagrined to give such an answer if he were asked about events in his county. "At home I know," said another delegate, "and here. . . ." The comment trailed off with an expressive shrug.

There was one dedicated band of men who manifested unflagging interest in the affairs of the Ohio delegates — the candidates' staff members assigned to the delegation. They haunted the hotel rooms and the lobby, each zealous in the service of his man. Taking no chances, the Kennedy staff was there radiating confidence in all directions. "Let's get it over on the first ballot. Why waste time? Let's begin work on the election. Jack's over the top now." On Wednesday morning, with more talk of defection than usual, a Kennedy staff man arrived breathless announcing, "I'm worried about a couple of defections."

At an Ohio caucus, a wealthy businessman representing Lyndon Johnson proceeded to demonstrate to the delegates surrounding his seat why Johnson would be a certain winner in the election. He would win all the southern and border states, and then he'd need only 61 more electoral votes. Furthermore, Johnson would win the nomination by switches on the third ballot, since Kennedy would fall short on the first, and no one else had enough strength.

A representative from Symington's headquarters was in evidence, but he followed his candidates lead by playing his hand softly. His pitch was: "Let the people vote. We don't want six or seven politicians to decide."

Adlai's man did not show up until early Wednesday morning (the day of the vote), tapped me on the shoulder and inquired, "Do you know who's supporting Stevenson here?" Discovering that I was not a delegate and that the near-by representative of the city police vice-squad (sent to watch for pick-pockets and prostitutes) could not help him either, he found some delegates. An hour later he was full of confidence and figures: 14 for Stevenson on the second plus 23 more to whom his side had to speak.

The Stevenson demonstration on the second day of the convention was of considerable interest to the delegates. The small group actively working for Kennedy were totally unimpressed. "It was all in the galleries as far as I could see." "They don't vote in the galleries." "Who is there to impress? The people demonstrating outside the convention hall were all from California." "I saw a fellow who said he was a Texan for Stevenson, but he never saw Texas." The whole thing was "bought and paid for," or it was "a lot of hullaballoo" presumably signifying nothing. Any candidate would have gotten the same, an activist asserted, and pointed out that the loser always has to make more noise as evidence by the Southern shout on the platform vote. Delegates who looked on the convention largely as spectators, particularly those who had not been to three or four conventions, were visibly impressed. "Remarkable, never saw anything like it." "It was disturbing — something in it — must have been spontaneous." They felt that Kennedy was definitely weaker now but since they were pledged to him the only speculation concerned what might happen on the second ballot.

With possibly one or two defections, it was assumed that Ohio would go for Kennedy on the first ballot. (Actually, Kennedy received all of Ohio's votes.) But after that, there was much less certainty. The range of responses to a question about defection on the second ballot went from none to twenty; few felt able to venture a prediction on a possible third ballot. The hard-core Kennedy supporters would stick with him, most delegates thought, and the Governor would sway party officials and state employees. Beyond that, no comment. Even in the 1960 Democratic convention, where the preponderance of opinion formed by all the public media of information insisted that Kennedy was going to win, the delegates evidenced considerable variations in perception. The range of responses may be graded in order of the degree of certainty. "It was all over after West Virginia. Kennedy had it sewed up before we came." "It's Kennedy before the end of the first ballot." "New Jersey will switch to Kennedy at the end of the first ballot. Meyner isn't strong enough to hold the delegation. Then Jack will win." Most predicted Kennedy would win on the second ballot; a few on the third. A sizeable minority believed that if Kennedy did not make it on the first or second

ballot at the latest, he was through. A few had serious doubts about Kennedy's ability to win the nomination because the other candidates would gang up against him, because of his religion or youth, because the old pro Harry Truman did not want him, or for some other definable reason. But most of the doubters just felt that the convention was so unpredictable (at least for them) that you just could not know. "With 4,000 delegates around anything can happen," was a typical comment. The number of delegates certain that John Kennedy would win increased on Monday after Ted Kennedy informed them that Pennsylvania would give most of its votes to his brother and this was confirmed later that day. The number of doubters increased on Tuesday after the Stevenson demonstration occurred and after stories about how Kennedy was slipping began to circulate. If perceptions were this far apart when so many signs pointed to Kennedy, one can imagine what the case would be when no one candidate had emerged as the overwhelming favorite.[37]

[37] Consider the Vice-Presidency. Speculation was rife. Virtually every one thought Symington was the logical man. His record was good on defense, labor, civil rights, and farm legislation. He came from a border state, was Protestant, and he had offended no one. Moreover, he had Governor DiSalle's support. Johnson was counted out, not because of his attacks on Kennedy which every one accepted as part of the political game, but because the Congressional specialists kept insisting that he would be a fool to give up the powerful job of Senate majority leader. (We mention only in passing the delegate who thought DiSalle would be the Vice-Presidential candidate, but "don't know if he'll accept.") The Johnson nomination surprised all of the 30 delegates interviewed on this matter.

Had the convention gone several more ballots, the ways in which the delegates acquire different perceptions could have been clarified as well as the consequences of their views of reality upon the eventual nomination. Nevertheless, the interviews demonstrated that there is considerable uncertainty that the candidates are busy trying to resolve this uncertainty in their favor, that the perceptions of the delegates do vary, and that they can be recorded by an observer.

National conventions are particularly difficult to study because things happen so quickly, because we usually cannot count on being "on the inside," and because the exercise of influence is difficult to pin down. But the changing views of reality held by delegates are readily subject to study by the outside observer, and these data may be used as an index of other events not readily amenable to investigation. We may not be able to observe the exercise of influence, but if we hypothesize that in order to be influential in *contested* conventions one must affect the notions of events held by delegates, observation of this process should provide clues to the wielding of influence. Even if delegates just below the rung of top leadership do not dictate the moves of the most influential, they are fairly certain to be kept informed of them in order to give their consent, and this information is likely to be reflected in their picture of events. Until the fact of uncertainty is made an integral part of our analysis, however, we cannot expect to develop a satisfactory theory accounting for the behavior observed at national conventions.

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THE FOREIGN-POLICY CONSENSUS

An Interim Research Report

• *ROGER HILSMAN*

From the time they first tried to establish a separate discipline, political scientists have sought to understand how decisions of government are made and by whom.[1] But, in contemplating government and its workings, each new generation has used a different method and approach — a different theoretical model. The first approach was an analysis of the legal powers of formal institutions, the constitutional rights and prerogatives of the President and Congress, and it is useful still. Few of the analytical approaches that followed were so durable, but some stand out as milestones. One, for example, was the discovery of lobbies and interest groups. Not the least of its contributions was that it attracted the attention of political scientists, ironically, to politics.

A more recent approach has been to regard the formulation of governmental policy as a process of decision-making. Many political scientists decry the formalistic turn that work on decision-making has taken and what they regard as its affectation of scientism (1, 16, 20). There may be much truth in the charge, but the critics of decision-making forget the earlier tendency, at least in the study of international relations, to regard the state as a monolithic entity, identical to every other state in aims, motivation, and behavior. Whole theories of international relations were erected without any reference to the people behind states, the different goals they sought, and the different procedures they followed. What the decision-making concept did was to re-emphasize some very simple but important questions: Who are the people behind the state? How do they reach decisions of state, for what motives and by what processes? For the field of international relations, the decision-making concept rehabilitated, in effect, the study of comparative government.

Originally, the concept of decision-making had none of the vestments of either formalism or scientism which have attracted criticism. The idea was simply to call attention to individual statesmen, their behavior, and the influences bearing on their behavior, both rational and irrational (9). It suggested that the field of study should be motives, goals, political pressures, and processes, on the one hand; and, on the other, biases, predispositions, and psychological identifications and compulsions. In its original form decision-making again called attention to the individual human actors in international relations and to a rather different body of data concerning them. The contribution of later work has been the careful definition of categories and variables that, they hoped, would permit generalizations about both the motives of these actors and their behavior (23).

Most of us would probably agree that none of these various approaches has ceased to have utility in the study of government. At the same time we might also agree that no one of them can answer all our questions by itself. One of the nicest things about reality is that it is infinitely complex. It offers an endless array both of new facets and of new depths to be perceived in the familiar ones.

I. The Problem

One facet of reality that probably deserves more attention than any of these approaches can give it is the complex of informal relationships between the different participants in policy-making; the pattern of pressure and coun-

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[1] I am grateful to Charles E. Lindblom, Bernard C. Cohen, Arnold Wolfers, and H. Field Haviland for comments and criticism.

terpressure, debate, persuasion, and coercion that marks their interaction.[2]

Although we know better, we have tended to assume that the decisions of government are discrete actions, with recognizable beginnings and sharp, decisive endings. We think of policy as conscious and deliberate. Indeed, we think of it as rationalized, in the economist's sense of the word. We think of it as a tidy sequence of specialized actions in a logical division of labor — the groundwork laid by staff, approval by high departmental officers, consideration, judgment, and modification by the National Security Council, approval by the President, and appraisal and implementing legislation by the Congress. We tend to think that this procedure is, or at least that it ought to be, a dignified, even majestic progression, with each of the participants having well-defined roles and powers and performing a standardized function in the consideration of each issue that arises. And we tend to think that alternative policies are, or again that they at least ought to be, clearly associated with alternative goals.

The reality, of course, is quite different. Put dramatically, one might make a fairly good case for the proposition that few of the decisions of government have the decisiveness and finality of discrete acts. To say that few acts of government are final or decisive would be an overstatement, but not very much of an overstatement. Very often policy is the sum of a congeries of separate or only vaguely related actions. On other occasions, it is an uneasy, even internally inconsistent, compromise among both competing goals and alternative means. A fairly clear-cut "decision" may be made, only to become the signal for enormous efforts by different groups within the government itself to reverse it. Policies are often formulated never to be implemented or only to be radically changed in the process of implementation. Some issues are endlessly debated without ever being resolved, the issue eventually being submerged by the relentless pyramiding of events. Even when relatively clear-cut decisions are made, it is difficult to see just who made them. One time a decision seems to have been made low in the hierarchy of the executive branch; on another occasion, at the very top. Sometimes the decision seems to have been made by Congress, and occasionally most mysteriously by a subtle change in the climate of opinion — by a change in widely held assumptions about either the values at issue or what can be accomplished with a particular kind of means. Few participants see themselves as having the power to make decisions. It is an enormous victory to have blocked an action or even to have modified it. More often, satisfaction comes from having supplied an input for a decision rather than the outcome. There seem to be few decision-makers in practice, but only inputters, recommenders, vetoers, and approvers. And a person's role on one issue may be quite different from his role on another issue that seems identical in all its essentials.

Alternative policies, finally, are rarely in a simple means-ends relationship to competing goals. More often, policy is developed as a series of slight modifications, the new policy emerging slowly and haltingly by small and usually tentative steps.

If policy-makers had reliable techniques for identifying and weighting values and fully adequate theoretical equipment for predicting how successfully different policies would achieve those values, "rational" policy-making would consist of five steps: (*a*) identify and clarify the values to be sought and weight them as to priority; (*b*) lay out the full range of alternative means for achieving the desired values; (*c*) estimate the probable success of each alternative means in achieving the primary goal; (*d*) systematically calculate the subsidiary results of each alternative — the effects on values other than those that would be fulfilled by achieving the immediate end; and (*e*) rationally consider the different possible ends (26, pp. 115–18; 27, pp. 52–53). The criterion for deciding on a policy would be whether it was the best alternative, in terms of predictable results, to achieve a previously chosen value.

But, as a practical matter, the policy-maker has neither reliable techniques for identifying and weighting the values in a nation of opinion nor adequate theoretical equipment for predicting the success of alternative means for achieving those values. His procedure is, therefore,

[2] This paper is an interim report on a research project focused specifically on this complex of interrelationships. Since the project is still at midpassage, both the conceptual framework and those of the findings that are given must be regarded as only tentative.

not this systematic and comprehensive exploration of the whole range of values and means but one of trial and error in which policy changes by zigs and zags, reverses itself, and then moves forward in a series of incremental steps.[3]

Since the techniques for identifying and weighting values are inadequate, they cannot be considered deliberately or explicitly in a systematic first step but must be considered implicitly in the context of specific alternative policies. Even the individual has a hard time assigning priorities to his values in the abstract. So much depends on the context, on what alternatives are realistically open to him, on the costs of each alternative means in terms of other values, and on the likelihood that this or that alternative will incidentally serve one of his secondary values. The courses of action realistically available usually serve a mix of values, and in practice choice will hinge on the exact nature of the mix. In a large, diverse society, the range of values, often conflicting or mutually exclusive, will be much wider. Public issues, too, will tend to be more complex than private ones, and policy alternatives are likely to impinge on an even larger number of different values. Public policy would rarely serve only one value without having some sort of secondary effects, incidentally enhancing the achievement of certain values and inhibiting the achievement of others. Getting a wide variety of people who hold different values to sit down and decide on how to rank those values would be next to impossible; but getting people to agree on a particular policy that serves a mix of values is done all the time. One group accepts a policy because it serves one value, and another group accepts the policy because it also serves another, quite different value. The Development Loan Fund, for example, was accepted by some groups because it was a step toward substituting loans for grants in the foreign-aid program, while other groups accepted it because it set economic development as a deliberate goal of our foreign economic policy. The test of policy is not that it will most effectively accomplish an agreed-upon value but that a wider number of people decide to endorse it — balancing in their own minds not only the relative weighting to be given to each of the values which the particular policy serves against those it sacrifices but also the reliability of predictions about how successfully it will serve those values and whether there is any hope that agreement could be reached on some other more desirable policy.

Rationality implies bringing available knowledge to bear on the twin tasks of making means consistent with ends and of making ends consistent with one another. Rational decisions are, therefore, not perfectly correct decisions except at infinity, in the limiting case in which one's predictive apparatus is also perfect. So long as the techniques available for identifying and weighting values and for predicting the effects of means are inadequate, a trial-and-error approach may be more rational than the ostensibly more systematic procedure in which values are clarified and alternatives laid out in a tidy sequence. At present there seems to be no better technique available for identifying and weighting values than a debate on specific policies. Similarly, if the predictive apparatus available is limited, it may be more rational to proceed by small, easily reversible steps than by grand — and irrevocable — leaps.

There are, of course, perfectly sound reasons for consciously and deliberately thinking of decisions of government as discrete actions, of decision-making as a tidy sequence of logical steps, and of alternative policies in a simple means-ends relationship with values, even though we know better.[4] It is only through some such simplification that one can get a handhold on complex problems, separate out particular aspects of reality for scrutiny, and distinguish from the rich and bewildering detail of the true world the workings of a particular set of influences or pattern of relationships. Without simplification there can be no theory and no understanding. Indeed, theory and simplification amount to much the same thing. Thus one cannot argue that it is wrong to assume that decisions are discrete actions or that decision-making is a tidy sequence of rational steps but only that there comes a time when it might be useful to make a different set of

[3] For a description and analysis of this incremental method used by public administrators in formulating policy see Lindblom (19), who develops an analytical model of "incremental" policy-making on which the following section draws heavily.

[4] I have myself happily done so, and without regrets (12, chap. 8).

simplifying assumptions, highlighting different facets of reality, and thus permitting insights into other kinds of relationships.

II. The Theoretical Model

What kind of assumptions, that is, what kind of conceptual model, might be a useful supplement to present approaches?[5] As suggested above, anyone who has observed the process by which policy is made in government on major national issues (those requiring sacrifices by the nation or the concentration on one set of objectives at the cost of neglecting others) cannot avoid noticing interagency rivalries; the fierce battles entirely within the walls of particular agencies, the informal arrangements to act in concert made between groups in different agencies, and the struggle not only between Congress and the Executive but also between informal groupings cutting across the boundaries of Congress and the Executive against other informal groupings cutting across those same boundaries. It is this kind of activity and related and corollary activities that we should probably pay more attention to in the study of the policy-making and decision-making activities of government. The making of policy in government, in other words, is essentially a political process, even when it takes place entirely inside the government, screened from the voter's view, or even when it takes place entirely within one agency of the government.

A process that is essentially political would have three characteristics. In the first place, in a political process the issue or problem confronted requires the reconciliation both of a diversity of values and goals and of alternative means and policies. As described above, in practice these alternative means and policies would rarely stand in a simple means-ends relationship with alternative values but would each serve a mixture of goals. Thus the differences between policies would be in the degree to which one or another value is served as compared to other values in the mix and in the degree to which additional values would be served at the margin.

The second characteristic of a political process is that there are competing groups who are identified with these alternatives goals and policies. In the policy-making process these groups might lie within the government as well as outside it, and the groups within the government might often cut across departmental or institutional lines, including the line between the Executive and Congress.

Finally, in a political process the relative power of these participating groups is as relevant to the final decision as the cogency and wisdom of the arguments used in support of the policy adopted. Who advocates a particular policy may be as important as what he advocates.

Thus one element in the relationship among these participating groups would be conflict. The values and policies pursued by one group may often, if adopted as national policy, inhibit the achievement of the values sought by another group. Since the relative power of the different groups has a bearing on which policy is chosen, the participants must be alert to losses of power that would lessen their potency in future decisions and equally alert to opportunities for maximizing power. We may expect the participants to manipulate threats as a means of coercion (though rarely threats of physical violence); occasionally to behave vindictively, with revenge as a motive; to form alliances and coalitions to maximize power; and, perhaps, to shift their alliances rather frequently.

But conflict is only one aspect of the policy-making process. Although the participating groups may be in conflict over some values,

[5] Some further caveats on models seem appropriate. A model should not be construed as a miniature of reality. Like a map, it deliberately abstracts from reality only certain of its aspects. And even these are simplified. Thus a model is not a description of reality but an act of imagination and creativity. The goal is to create something the mind can handle, manipulate, and thus perceive otherwise obscured relationships in the form of hypotheses suitable for testing against the fulness of reality. Thus the primary purpose of a model is the generation of hypotheses. It is a little machine for grinding out hypotheses that can then be tested, refined, and developed. The second purpose of a model is to highlight certain aspects of reality and so to point to the kind of data that is relevant to these aspects of reality. For example, a model of interstate relations points to certain kinds of relationships and related data — the balance-of-power system, coalition formation, etc. A decision-making model, on the other hand, focuses on the people behind states and on an entirely different body of data (i.e., what these people as individuals do).

there are many that they share. Thus we can also expect the process to be one of accommodation, involving negotiation, persuasion, and a variety of related techniques — techniques for identifying areas of real as opposed to only apparent conflict, for separating out areas of mutual interest, for comparing the relative weights that each group assigns to conflicting and shared values, and for arranging mutual concessions so as to maximize values gained by both groups and minimize sacrifice. We can expect the policy-making process, in a word, to exhibit all the characteristics associated with building a consensus.

What we have developed, then, is a model of conflict and consensus-building. We conceive of groups of interested and in one way or another active participants who are identified with alternative goals and alternative means. Because of this identification, these groups are in conflict; but because they share a wide range of values they also accommodate to each other in an attempt to reconcile conflicts and achieve a consensus. Since membership in the groups is voluntary, the wide range of shared interests would also imply that the composition of the primary groups changes as well as the alliances between groups as attention shifts from issue to issue. Since both the individual and the groups have power, the process of reconciliation involves bargaining, negotiation, the formation of alliances, and an interest in maintaining and increasing power. The patterns of relationships among these groups of participants would cut across institutional lines (i.e., the formal boundaries of Executive, Congress, press, etc.), and the participants would perform a variety of roles, though not necessarily the same role on two different issues or even through time on the same issue. The roles would consist of originating ideas; debating and testing ideas; persuading or selling a policy proposal within a departmental structure; persuading or selling more widely in government to other agencies and to the Congress; bargaining within a department or with other agencies, including Congress; developing policy proposals (i.e., staff work developing requirements for the implementation of the proposal); aggregating alternatives; modifying, vetoing, appraising past results; and enlisting public support where necessary.

The utility of this approach is that it focuses attention on the diversity and inconsistency of the goals that national policy must serve, on the complexity of the process by which these and alternative policies are reconciled, and on the place that bargaining and power have in these relations. Such an approach recognizes at the outset the place of both conflict and consensus-building in the policy-making process rather than introducing them later as qualifications. It assigns a central position, in a word, to politics.

Where this concept most needs further development is in the motives for accommodation. The reason for conflict is clear enough, and there is some understanding of the mechanics of conflict, although this, too, could stand further research. But the greatest need is for more understanding of the impetus toward mutual adjustment of goals. Bargaining seems to be the obvious mechanism of accommodation, yet the findings related to bargaining, which are discussed briefly below, so far do not support this assumption nearly so strongly as one would expect.

Viewed as a process of conflict and consensus-building, the policy-making process has some interesting similarities with certain other fields of study — labor-management relations, business competition and mergers, and outlandish though it may seem at first, international relations.

The similarities between international relations and the policy-making process are especially interesting. In international relations there is also a mixture of both conflict and accommodation. Nations are groups of people pursuing values and ends that are different or, if identical, frequently competitive or mutually exclusive. Two or more nations may compete for the same scarce resources — territory, trade, strategic position, or prestige. If one nation achieves the full measure of its goals, others may thereby be denied the achievement of theirs. People think of the conflict between nations mainly as war and thus fundamentally different from the conflict between domestic groups. Yet physical violence is not the normal state of affairs even between nations. International relations is concerned not so much with the application of physical violence, the military art, as with the manipulation of threats of physical violence or, more accurately, with the manipulation of power, since physical vio-

lence is only one of several means by which one nation may coerce or influence another. International relations is thus in one aspect the study of power — the sources of power, the techniques for pooling the power of two or more groups against a third, and the conditions for applying power effectively. It is concerned both with stability and instability in the system as a whole, the balance of power, and with the way states "balance" the power of a rival — that is, with deterrence, the conditions for discouraging a rival from exercising power and, ultimately, physical violence.

It is conflict in international relations that has been the preoccupation of the so-called "realist" school of international politics. But "realist" theory in its pure form cannot economically account for long periods of peace for the stability of certain friendly relationships, and for other such phenomena without adopting qualifications damaging to the elegance of the theory and to its capacity for prediction. It is the multiplicity of values shared by people on both sides of national boundaries that causes the difficulty — peace, security, prosperity, the sanctity and freedom of the individual, self-determination, etc. Thus there are many circumstances in which one nation's gain is not necessarily another's loss. As a consequence, most theorists try to find a place for accommodation and concerted action in their theories. (3, 5, 10, 11, 15, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28).

Nations act in concert not only in pursuit of peace and freedom and the other "people-to-people" goals but for a variety of lesser purposes — mutually beneficial trade, the regulation of trade, concerted action to mitigate economic depression, conservation of natural resources, international postal services, the extradition of criminals, international copyright conventions, etc.

Accommodation among nations also derives, paradoxically, as a corollary of conflict. Two powers threatened by a third may accommodate their defense efforts, their political and diplomatic postures, toward the threatening power and their policies toward fourth and fifth powers, the potential allies or enemies.

There is also accommodation between adversaries. Potentially, at least, rivals have a stake in keeping the contest within bounds that are appropriate to the goals each is pursuing. Neither wants the competition to end in total destruction for both sides. Neither wants the means of competition to cost the sacrifice of values cherished more highly than those to be won. Hence there are circumstances in which both adversaries wish to keep the contest limited as to means, even to the extent of limiting war itself. In certain circumstances there may be mutual accommodation in limiting the level of armaments, in placing particular issues outside the arena of competition, in neutralizing a particular country or region, and in establishing sanctuaries and spheres of exclusive interest.

Thus international relations is also a mixture of both conflict and consensus-building, and the relations between states have similar attributes whether they are between allies or adversaries, differing only in the proportion of conflict and that of accommodation and concerted action. There is conflict in the relation of allies and accommodation in the relations between adversaries.

International relations is therefore concerned not only with the manipulation of power but also with negotiation and bargaining, the techniques of accommodation. It is concerned also with procedures for identifying areas of real, as opposed to only apparent, conflict; with identifying areas of mutual interest; with comparing the relative weights each side assigns to conflicting and shared values; and with exchanging concessions so as to maximize values gained by both sides and minimize values sacrificed. International relations is concerned, too, with the relation of shared interests to conflict, with achieving agreements, while at the same time maintaining a relatively favorable power position for future contingencies. Thus international politics is concerned with analyzing the value systems of different groups of people; with the process of communication between these groups; with the effects of perfect or impaired communications; and with the consequences if group leaders are neurotically compulsive, if one or more acts irrationally rather than coolly calculating the relations of means to ends and the possibilities of each alternative means achieving the end desired.

What we have done so far is to suggest a special way for looking at each of two different sets of group relationships. We have suggested that policy-making on national issues is essentially a political process requiring the reconcilia-

tion of alternative goals and alternative policies pursued by different, frequently rival, groups of people whose relative power influences the nature of the policy chosen. We have also suggested that international relations can be regarded as the interaction of several groups of people, each group having different sets of goals, and such interaction therefore being characterized by both conflict and accommodation. When the policy-making process, on the one hand, and international relations, on the other, are viewed in this light, it no longer seems so outlandish to suggest that the insights developed in one field might be useful in understanding the other.[6] It can be argued that neither the work on international relations nor that on the policy-making process has yet developed a fully satisfactory body of theory. But what does exist in each may still be useful to the other, and an attempt to consider consciously common aspects of the two processes could conceivably contribute to the further development of theory in both.

The differences between international relations and the policy-making process are those implied in our emphasis on consensus-building as opposed to simple accommodation. In international affairs the group is a state. The state exercises sovereignty over territory; it has a legal monopoly of physical violence; an individual's membership in the state is mandatory; the decisions of the state are authoritative (i.e., legally binding on individual members of the group); and the state may therefore commit the energies of its members more effectively than other groups of people.

Regarding the policy-making process as one of conflict and consensus-building and therefore similar to international relations leads to some interesting questions. If bargaining is a characteristic of the process, what is it that is bargained? Similarly, what is the pattern of bargaining? What conditions contribute to mutual concessions and what conditions lead to impasse? And the analogy can be pushed even further. Is it possible that deterrence may be operating in the relations of groups participating in the policy-making process as it does in international affairs? Is there something to be learned about the effectiveness of policies of reprisal, of threats of retaliation, in studying domestic processes?

Such questions seem bizarre, but still they may be profitable. Take, for example, the peculiar powers that Congress exercises in foreign affairs. Many observers of American government have remarked upon how little direct control or initiative Congress has over foreign affairs (4, 6).[7] Congress participates only fitfully in the actual formulation of foreign policy and takes formal action only in approving or rejecting appropriations, treaties, resolutions, and the appointment of ambassadors and high officials. Yet it is equally clear that Congress — subtly and indirectly but, nevertheless, effectively — sets the tone of many policies and limits on many others. United States policy toward Chiang Kai-shek and Communist China is only one of the more striking examples. It seems obvious that Executive proposals are shaped by estimates of how Congress and individual congressmen will react, the mood of Congress, and the probability, circumstances, and possible means they may use in reprisal. Many of the same kinds of calculations are made by states in pursuing policies of deterrence, and there is at least a possibility — an intriguing possibility — that the concept of deterrence not only might clarify the nature of the peculiarly negative, limit-setting power of Congress over foreign policy but might also suggest some of the mechanics of how that power operates.

The concept of deterrence might also clarify other, even more puzzling, aspects of the domestic scene. Recent work on deterrence has shown that irrational behavior can sometimes be sound strategy (22). To be effective as a deterrent, a threat must be appropriate to what is at stake — that is, it must be credible (17). If, for example, the Soviet Union is convinced that the United States would suffer fifty or sixty million casualties in a thermonuclear war, they would find it difficult to believe that the United States would carry out a threat to

[6] Spykman (24) pointed out the parallel between domestic and international politics almost twenty years ago.

[7] For an attempt to explore some of the implications of the peculiar powers of Congress for congressional-executive relations see my "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus" (13).

initiate all-out war unless the stakes were very high, involving, perhaps, the survival of the United States itself. If, however, the United States deliberately failed to provide itself with the forces to fight a limited war, then the credibility of a threat to initiate all-out war in response to a Soviet attack on, say, one of our smaller allies would increase, at least to some extent. The deterrent effect of a threat to respond to a limited attack by all-out war is enhanced if a nation has followed the seemingly irrational policy of providing itself with no other means for meeting limited attacks except by all-out war.[8]

The principle is more vividly illustrated by the example of the madman with a bomb who enforces his demands with a threat to blow up everyone, himself included, or of the neurotic child who makes a scene in a quiet restaurant. Both the madman and the neurotic child hold a strategic bargaining advantage denied to rational, inhibited adults.

It was precisely this tactic that Hitler followed at Munich. Chamberlain was criticized in the immediate post-Munich period principally on the grounds that he had succumbed to a bluff. But the people in the room with Hitler had no doubts that his threat of war was no bluff.

A diplomatic gambit utilizing this principle of deliberate recklessness was easy for a Hitler, but it also has been used by saner men. It was something similar to a policy of deliberate recklessness that some European statesmen followed in the period before 1914 (14). Here the trick was to be the first in a crisis to establish a position that laid out demands with some shred of legitimacy and that was at the same time irrevocable. The statesman who first lost the power to compromise forced the others to choose between conceding to his demands or going to war.[9] Pursuing this strategy, the statesmen of Europe found that they could have their cake and eat it, too — maintain the peace while achieving their demands.

There are, of course, all-too-obvious limits to the strategic soundness of deliberate recklessness. When everyone in Europe began playing the brinkman's game, accidents were inevitable. Sooner or later both sides were bound to establish irrevocable positions on the brink simultaneously.

This same tactic of calculated recklessness has also been used in the domestic arena, particularly on Capitol Hill. In each new generation of congressmen, there are always a few who deliberately foster a reputation for vindictiveness and an utterly ruthless disregard for the restrictions of propriety or the social niceties. They cultivate the impression that they will stop at nothing — from creating a scene to questioning an opponent's loyalty and patriotism, no matter how esteemed his reputation. Fear, especially the cold, hopeless fear of utterly inappropriate and unreasoning reprisal, can be the stuff of power.

This strategy of deliberate recklessness is typical neither of nations nor of congressmen. But there always seem to be a few of both who follow it on occasion, and among congressmen one or two who seem to make it a career. In Allen Drury's recent novel of Washington politics, *Advise and Consent*, the senior senator from South Carolina is exactly the type. Senator Seabright B. Cooley, Drury says, discovered early in his career that some men would make any bargain to get a needed appropriation for their states and that these men were easy to control. Others needed more subtle appeals, but because "Seab" Cooley was bright and because he had a "quick instinct for the jugular," these he also came to dominate. Fear was one of his weapons, and he deliberately tried to create a reputation for knowing no bounds of rationality, reasonableness, or pity. He staged monumental public rages and repaid slights or insults a hundred fold, even when there were no issues at stake, simply to create an effect that might be useful in future issues. People said that he had once drawn a knife on a colleague

[8] Whether the credibility of the threat of all-out war is increased sufficiently to provide an adequate defense is open to question. The point here is only that there is an increase in credibility, however slight.

[9] Some of the advantages of "irrational" behavior can derive from mechanical and procedural imperfections as well as from deliberate policies. Faulty communication between negotiators in the field and the home office can restrict the freedom of the negotiators and set limits to what they can concede. The limitation set on American negotiators by the separation of powers and the well-known difficulties of getting congressional approval has not always operated to our disadvantage.

on the Senate floor. It was an apocryphal story, but "one he never bothered to kill because it suited his purposes." As Drury says, "Seab" Cooley won many a battle because some people were afraid of him politically and even physically. He influenced policy the same way that one state might influence another — by the manipulation of threat; by creating, in a sense, a high credibility for a policy of massive retaliation.

III. The Model in Action

We have stressed that some of the principal techniques to be expected in the policy-making process are those associated with building a consensus among interested participants. This is not meant to suggest, however, that no policy can be adopted without a consensus. The assumption is not so much that a consensus is a necessary condition before a policy can be adopted as that the advocates of a particular policy attempt to build a consensus as a means of getting their policy adopted; that, in attempting to influence policy, they use the techniques of consensus-building — persuading, bargaining, etc.

If an issue arouses no interest, there is no need for a reconciliation of conflicting values and no need for a consensus to get action. It may also be that all efforts to reach a consensus fail. If so, action may be stymied, and the actual policy may be simply one of drift. On the other hand, depending on the circumstances, an impasse may free the Executive or a part of the Executive to follow its own preferences.

If the issue is complex or if there is widespread apathy, the informed participants may also be too few or too ineffectual to make their weight felt in spite of having reached a consensus. In such circumstances — apathy or ignorance on the part of important power groups or the general public — the President may go against a consensus of policy participants with relative impunity. He may also do so when he builds a wider consensus than one involving only informed participants in policy. An example might be President Eisenhower's desire for a balanced budget and fear of overspending as the issue developed in 1959. Many of the policy participants in Washington seemed to feel that a balanced budget is not centrally important compared with other influences operating on the economy. Yet the President, by conducting an energetic public campaign, can build wide support, not only in Washington but in the public at large, and sweep all before him.

More often than not, however, the President would be responsive to any consensus that did develop among informed participants. One reason, of course, is that many of the participants themselves hold political power so that ignoring a consensus might entail direct political costs at the next election or in getting legislation through Congress. But there may be indirect political costs in ignoring a consensus even when the participating groups are not particularly influential. The co-operation and support of a group whose opinion has been completely ignored on one issue will not be readily given on others to which their support may be crucial. In addition, public judgments as expressed in elections are apparently indirect as often as they are direct. Studies of voting behavior indicate that informal opinion leaders play an important role in voting shifts, and the discontent of a rather small group of specialists about particular policies might occasionally transform itself into a general uneasiness or distrust of a whole party and a shift in votes (2, 18). This shift would not necessarily be either consistent or discriminating. It could, for example, manifest itself as a turn away from the party around the President but not from the President himself. Although its effect was probably small in comparison to that of such issues as the economic recession, there is some evidence that discontent about both defense and foreign policy in a relatively small public had some such effect in the elections of 1958.[10] The general population seemed to be uneasy without having informed judgments about particular policies, expressing their uneasiness not against the President but against the Republican party.

Still another reason the President is normally responsive to a consensus of policy participants, if it develops, lies both in the weight of his responsibilities and in their extent. The awesome consequences of wrong decisions on many

[10] From an analysis of materials collected by the Democratic National Committee.

issues insures that a national leadership will listen to a well-qualified group with care even though it has little political power in the popular sense (e.g., nuclear physicists) and that the administration will go against a consensus in such a group only with reluctance.

The wide extent of the President's responsibilities has the same effect. No one person could develop a knowledge and conviction on every item in the whole range of policy problems on which a President must ostensibly decide. Before a new problem or policy proposal can be raised to the level of decision in government, it must jostle out hundreds of others. Except for problems born of crisis, and sometimes even for these, this elbowing-up through the echelons could be expected to require the approval and co-operation of a rather extensive range of people. And what might be called a "jurisdictional" effect of bureaucracy tends to increase the number of problems which must go the whole way up. The essence of bureaucracy is specialization of function and a division of labor and responsibility accordingly. This device is indispensable in managing large-scale enterprises, but it presents peculiar difficulties when the time comes to fix responsibility for problems that cut across jurisdictional lines — which foreign-policy problems tend to do in any age and especially so in a time of external threat, when both military and economic instrumentalities are prominent. More often than not, complex problems can be "recognized" in an official sense only at the top. Yet the very number of issues and policy proposals that must go the full way to the top insures that few will arrive there unless wide support has been enlisted among all the participants who can stand in the way.

In the normal course of considering policy on major issues, however, the President neither responds passively to a consensus nor overrides it but participates more or less fully in the process. If fully exercised in the service of a well-developed proposal, the President's power to set the framework of debate and to shape the result is enormous. Indeed, it is probably not far-fetched to say that the larger policy decisions, those that mobilize a substantial portion of the nation's energies and resources, depend upon a consensus so wide that it cannot be developed without the full exercise of the President's powers. For the rest, his participation is necessarily intermittent, and his own ideas grow and develop with everybody else's. Covering the whole range of national policies, he can only rarely give full attention to any one.

If consensus is reached, and the weight of opinion among participants settles on one or the other of the debated policies or on some adaptation of one of these, there are all the essentials for consistent, "bipartisan" policy over time. It is worth noting that, when a "process" such as this development of a consensus among informed participants does work, it may be rather efficient in the assessment of policy alternatives. Indeed, it could be argued that this process is responsible for whatever truth there is in the observation that, however many mistakes of omission democracies make, they rarely make the great mistakes of commission that totalitarian regimes seem prone to — such as Hitler's mistake of attacking the Soviet Union. If the subject under debate is one on which the different groups of advocates are knowledgeable, if the participants are well informed, and if the top levels of government participate fully in the process or are sensitive to the verdict, then the chances should be good that the resulting policy will be a wise one, at least providing that the circumstances make no demand for speed. An example of an occasion in which these conditions were largely fulfilled is the development of United States policy toward Europe in the years following World War II. Here the top levels participated fully, the participants were generally familiar with Europe and its problems, and all were well supplied with a frame of knowledge against which to test proposed policies. In the problem presented by the disintegration of Nationalist China and its progressive slide into the hands of the Chinese Communists, on the other hand, many of the basic requirements for exploring alternatives and producing consensus on an effective policy were lacking. There was pitifully little specialist knowledge on China in the United States and almost no familiarity, outside the ranks of specialists, of the elements bearing on the problem.

None of this, of course, is meant to suggest that every problem has a solution or that the conflict-consensus process is an automatic machine for grinding out these solutions. If

pressed to the wall on the postwar China problem, for example, the dispassionate observer might well find himself ultimately standing on the proposition that this was one of several problems that were beyond the power of the United States to affect more than marginally, if at all. What is being suggested, on the contrary, is the notion that, as a consequence of the dearth of specialist knowledge about China and the almost total ignorance among participants in the consensus-building process, all the possible policy alternatives may not have been spelled out; that those alternatives that were proposed — for example, those contained in the Wedemeyer report — may not have been adequately debated; and that, finally, the need for drastic measures may not have been understood widely enough to insure that the sacrifices necessary for these measures were politically acceptable.

Rather than suggesting that the policy-making process is always efficient, the conflict-consensus model suggests some of the reasons for those occasions when it is not. It helps somewhat in understanding the intermittency of policy-making in the United States; in understanding our failure to face up to certain kinds of unpleasant issues; the not infrequent internal inconsistency of foreign policy, since it must serve such a variety of goals with which different clusters of power are associated; the massive effort devoted to some issues; and the equally massive apathy on others.

IV. The Research Design

Research on the informal relationships and interaction of participants in so complicated a process as the making of United States foreign policy presents some formidable problems of method and research design.

The conflict-consensus model leads us to ask who the participants are in the policy-making process, what roles they play, what kinds of power they have available to influence policy, and what techniques they use. It seems both obvious and fundamental that research on questions of this kind must be keyed to case studies of specific policies. Unless the research is grounded in case materials, the result is likely to be little more than a restatement of formal powers or of "potentials for power." But the traditional case-study method has a number of disadvantages. For one thing, it emphasizes the particular and unique. In any given decision or sequence of policy-making events, one factor or another — personality, external events, or some such — is bound to have peculiar influence, and the reconstruction of a single decision or even a collection of single decisions tends to highlight these peculiar influences.

What is even more important, the data indicated by the initial assumption that there are necessarily discrete decisions tend to exclude certain kinds of activity that may be highly significant to a better understanding of the process of policy-making. Data collected under this assumption are likely to obscure, for example, the enormous effort that sometimes goes on in an attempt to reverse or modify the "decision." The traditional case-study method may also impose a decisiveness on a policy "decision" that may have been indecisive; it may impose clarity and purpose on what was really only confusion and drift. In reality, policies sometimes come about without there having been a conscious, deliberate decision, more through a subtle change in assumptions than by a deliberate act of reason. At the other extreme, diffuse debate may have given the participants a feeling of decisiveness and accomplishment without anything at all having really been decided.

In this project the solution to the dilemma posed by the need to ground the research in case materials, on the one hand, and the disadvantages of the case-study approach, on the other, was to study what might be called "areas of policy." Rather than examine the decision to create a Developmental Loan Fund, for example, the whole stream of foreign-aid policy over an arbitrary period of time has been examined. Rather than regard policy-making as a series of discrete decisions, it was decided to regard it as several broad streams of thought, debate, activity, compromise, decision, and action. It should be stressed, however, that it is possible to do this only because the study is concerned with only certain aspects of how policy is made. The case studies are intended to develop data relevant to a special set of questions and not to stand as definitive histories.

Because of the usual limitations of time and resources, only three such "areas of policy" were chosen for the study — foreign-aid policy, military policy, and what has been called, for lack of a better name, East-West relations.

These three were chosen mainly because they were likely to involve different sets of participants.

Foreign aid requires formal action by the Congress — annual appropriations and authorizations. It is a subject of intense interest to a number of active lobbies, to liberals on one end of the political spectrum, and to conservatives on the other.

Military policy is defined as strategy and the defense posture to implement that strategy. It would therefore include such policies as the "New Look" and would exclude reorganization of the Defense Department and unification of the services. Military policy, too, requires annual appropriations but under quite different political conditions and assumptions about the proper jurisdiction of Congress by congressmen. The military, the press, and some sections of academia are active in debate about military policy, but the interest of the general public is intermittent.

The term "East-West relations" as it is used in the study refers to a diverse series of problems, issues, and policies that have in common principally the fact that the reaction or motives of the Communist bloc are central. It would include, for example, the NATO, SEATO, and Baghdad pacts, the Lacy-Zaroubin agreements, "disengagement," the Berlin crisis, the question in 1955 and 1959 of whether or not the United States should agree to a meeting at the summit, the Korean War decision, the question of United States intervention in Indochina at the time of Dienbienphu, the Lebanon landings, and so on. More than the other areas of study, policy concerning East-West relations is formulated in an atmosphere of crisis. It brings the Washington corps of foreign diplomats more fully into United States policy-making than any of the other areas of study, and it seems to permit a lesser role for Congress.

As mentioned above, the goal of the study is to find out more about the process of policy-making, about who participates in the making of different kinds of foreign policy, and what roles these participants perform. Ideally, one would want to determine who has influence or, more precisely, who exercised how much influence in each of the policy areas studied. But measuring influence presents even more difficult problems of method than the study of process. Although data on the roles of the different participants give at least a feeling for relative influence, it is no more than a feeling. A suitable test for measuring influence would require a somewhat different approach from that required for a study focused mainly on process, and the additional effort seemed prohibitive.[11]

Although documentary and published materials have provided a great deal of data, the study has had to rest heavily on interviews. Since part of the research is to identify the nature of the policy-making universe, it was not possible to decide on a sample in advance of the interviewing. The technique has been to develop an initial list of names from published and documentary materials, to interview these people with respect to their roles in the particular policy area, and to add to the list of people to be interviewed the names of those with whom each interviewee had dealings, following the pattern of relationships wherever it led. The stopping point has to be arbitrary, and there is no assurance that all the important participants will have been identified. But there is a point at which one can have some feeling of confidence that an adequate sample has been taken — the point at which new interviews begin to turn up fewer and fewer names and more and more names of people who have already been interviewed.

So far about one hundred and fifty interviews, of one or two hours' duration, have been conducted and the cutoff point will probably be somewhere above two hundred but below three hundred. Access to about four hundred other interviews conducted for other research projects was provided through the generosity of friends. Since these interviews were designed for different purposes, they are not completely relevant. But they have contributed some additional information and — most importantly — confirmation of certain kinds of attitudes.

In conducting the interviews, there was no standard interview schedule. A number of questions, general in nature, were asked of most interviewees. In addition, all interviewees were asked the same kinds of questions related to their role in the particular policy area under scrutiny — how they went about pursuing their goal, who they saw and why, what was bargained and for what, and so on. Beyond this, every interview was hand-tailored. Questions

[11] Dahl (7) has proposed such a test.

were developed from the data already accumulated, aimed at bringing out information on how the interviewees responded to approaches by other participants already interviewed, at filling in gaps in the case study material, and so on.

V. Some Partial and Tentative Findings

The findings expected from the study can be broken down into three categories: first, those on who participates in what kind of foreign policies; second, those on roles and functions of these different participants; and, third, those on the pattern of relationships and workings of the system as a whole. At this time, only a few random, essentially illustrative examples can be given.

PARTICIPATION

The data so far available show that members of Congress, the press, the military, men of affairs, etc., participate in all three of the fields studied but that the bulk of these participants in any particular policy area seem to confine themselves to that area almost exclusively. All participants, in other words, tend to specialize.

The nature of involvement, on the other hand, seems to differ as between the different kinds of issues within a particular area. A crude distinction, for example, can be made between crisis policy, program policy, and anticipatory policy. A crisis policy can be described as the reaction to an external event requiring speedy decision. Examples could be our reaction to the Communist invasion of South Korea, the Lebanon landings, the Quemoy-Matsu affair, and the Dienbienphu crisis in Indochina. (There is, incidentally, no intention of suggesting that any of the examples given is a pure type itself but only that it exhibits more of the characteristics of one category than another.) A program policy can be defined as a policy requiring implementation extending over time — foreign aid, the building of such alliance structures as NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, etc. An anticipatory policy, finally, can be defined as a policy requiring statements as to how the United States would react to foreseen future contingencies. "Containment," the Eisenhower doctrine, and "massive retaliation" would fall principally into this category.

Crisis policy seems to be peculiarly the province of the Executive, since both time and secrecy limit the number of participants. In the decision to intervene in Korea, the decision to land in Lebanon, and in the Indochina crisis at the time of Dienbienphu, for example, there was little time for debate or participation by Congress, scholars, the press, and men of affairs. The only congressmen who got into the act were members of the top leadership, and they seem to have played a decisive role only in the Dienbienphu decision.

Appraisal is the one function that Congress, the press, and so on, might be expected to perform in crisis policy, although their incentive even for this appears to be limited. The feeling seems to be that what is done is done. The only exceptions are those few issues that are sufficiently dramatic and clear-cut to provide ammunition in electoral campaigns, as, for example, the loss of China to the free world during the Truman administration.

The most important influence that Congress seems to exercise over crisis policy is in helping to set the general climate of opinion existing before the crisis begins, in which all participants, including academics, seem to have a role. Intervention in Korea, for example, would probably not have been considered as a possible alternative in the 1930's as it was in 1950. Without the discussion of "containment" that had taken place since World War II, President Truman might very well have thought that intervention was politically out of the question. But, even though the existence of this very broad consensus was basic, the mechanics by which it came about and the relation of such broad climates of opinion to the choice of policies to meet particular events like the invasion of Korea are obscure and difficult to chart. It is one of the purposes of the study, hopefully, to try to relate such a broad consensus of public opinion to particular policies and to trace, if possible, some of the lines of interaction between the two.

In policies concerned with continuing programs, the nature of participation is quite different. New ideas, for example, are more frequently originated or introduced from outside the executive. Congress takes credit for introducing many of the basic concepts in foreign aid, and with some justice. Congressman Vorys was probably the principal person responsible for giving the later aid program its military

emphasis, in spite of considerable opposition within Congress itself.

Participation in anticipatory policy is different still. In the constant criticism of "massive retaliation," for example, the press, especially the columnists, have played an important role, as have academics and men of affairs. In military policy the interest of the press in conflict has done much to keep alive the debate over limited war versus the "new look" emphasis on nuclear air power, yet this same interest in conflict has muted other aspects of military policy.

ROLES

A rather large amount of data has so far been accumulated on the roles and functions of the different participants and on the circumstances in which participants perform particular functions. The function of originating and introducing ideas, since it has already been mentioned, might serve as an example. Except that responses to crisis situations are apparently originated mainly within the Executive, ideas seem to come from almost anywhere, inside or outside the government. It is generally assumed that the communications system between the various participants, and especially between insiders in government and the outside world, is imperfect. Many people seem to believe that there are a host of good ideas about foreign policy floating around if only some way could be found of introducing them into the government for consideration. The evidence so far available, however, indicates just the opposite — the government seems to be exceptionally well located in the communications network, and participants in policy-making seem to be peculiarly avid for new ideas. I distinguish, of course, between the communications system by which ideas are introduced to government and the process by which they become policy. The communications system seems to work well in that people in government, in both the Executive and the Congress, are often among the first to learn of new insights and the results of new research. Getting these ideas translated into policy is another matter; the very multiplicity of values to be served by national policy adds a further dimension to the normal human resistance to change.

Neither does the fact that the communications system seems to work well in introducing new ideas imply that the supply of new ideas is adequate. One suspects, indeed, that some of the failures of United States foreign policy might have been avoided by a deliberate attempt to provide opportunities for creative thinking and for systematic research on how to use the various instruments of foreign policy more effectively. It is striking, for example, how little evidence there is of basic thinking about the purposes of our foreign-aid program, the conditions in which aid can be an effective tool of foreign policy, what constitutes a meaningful goal of an aid program, etc. What work there is has been done mainly by economists on problems of economic development, which touches only lightly on the essentially political problems arising when foreign aid is viewed as an instrument of foreign policy. In this same vein it is also noteworthy how few attempts there have been within the government to institutionalize the development of new ideas, to create an organization devoted to innovation, and to provide it with an appropriate environment.

Since the bulk of the participants in one policy area do not take part in any of the other policy areas, an interesting question is how policies in different areas are coordinated and by whom.[12] Apart from people performing secretariat functions, as, for example, the staff of the National Security Council, only a very few people seem to straddle all three areas — the President; a few people on his immediate staff; occasionally the Secretary of State and his principal advisers (such as the head of the Policy Planning Staff); the very top leadership in Congress (though in a peculiar way stemming from their responsibility for the whole legislative calendar); and a scattered few men of affairs and members of the press.

The National Security Council is the official locus of this over-all function, and it seems to work reasonably well. Yet NSC "decisions" in the three fields of study sometimes appear to be exceedingly general statements that are not always useful as policy guidelines. On occasion, the NSC decisions were apparently internally inconsistent. In more than one instance the

[12] I distinguish between co-ordination in implementing policy, which can be accomplished at the working level, and co-ordination in the shaping of policy — co-ordination of goals, purposes, side effects, etc.

policies the United States actually followed seemed to be the opposite of what the NSC had decided. In other instances, the decision, though dealing with matters falling within the NSC terms of reference, seems to have been made outside its framework. In still other instances, discussion in the NSC seems to have substituted for decisions, with the participants satisfied psychologically even though no decision had actually been reached.

The implication here is not that the NSC plays an insignificant role. In practice its major function appears to be that of an advisory body to the President and a channel of information, and as such it is probably indispensable. Hopefully, more will be learned about the role of the NSC in coordinating the goals, side effects, and so on of policies in the different areas of foreign policy as the study proceeds, but it is at least arguable at this point that the mechanics of a process of conflict and consensus-building would frustrate any attempt to make the NSC into a true decision-making body, similar, for example, to the cabinet in the British parliamentary system. In the first place, the President, unlike the British Prime Minister, does not need the direct support of his cabinet secretaries and fellow party members in the legislature to continue in office, and cabinet secretaries in the United States do not represent segments of political power in quite the same way that ministers do in Britain. In the second place, for many policies a wider consent seems to be needed than can be represented in a body like the NSC, and such a body is not completely suitable for making the bilateral arrangements that may be necessary in developing that wider consent, for bargaining, or for the weighing and balancing of power that a political process entails.

WORKING OF THE POLICY-MAKING SYSTEM

The study shows an enormous amount of informal contact and interaction within each of the three fields studied. This informal contact and interaction takes many forms — introducing ideas, communicating information, aggregating alternatives, appraising the effectiveness of existing policies, debating, estimating relative power of competing groups, modifying proposals, vetoing, selling, persuading, and bargaining. Of these, bargaining can serve as an example. Surprisingly, there was more formal bargaining within the Executive than between the Executive and Congress. The total of bargains struck between Congress and the Executive may actually have been higher, but a larger percentage of these appear to have been tacit rather than formal. The bargains between Congress and the Executive more often took the form of modifications by the Executive anticipating congressional opinion — an example, if you will, of fear of reprisal. Even more frequently bargaining was not between Congress and the Executive as entities but between groups cutting across institutional lines. For example, the Developmental Loan Fund was apparently a compromise attempting to reconcile the interest of some people in both Congress and the Executive in emphasizing loans over grants, others' interest in economic development, and still others' interest in cutting the totals of foreign aid. All these groups cut across the lines of Congress and the Executive, although the center of interest in substituting loans for grants seems to have been in Congress.

Hopefully, it will be possible to look more closely at the bargaining process as the study proceeds. At this time, I might say that bargaining appears to be much too simple a concept to describe what is taking place. *Quid pro quos* are given and received, but the exchange is more indirect and convoluted than simple bargaining. One suspects that there are other motives than special interest at work and that these motives are pursued through more refined processes. It is the exploration of these more subtle relationships that promises to contribute most to theory, giving some further clue to the nature of the pressures for accommodation.

VI. Democracy in a Mass Age

There is, of course, no need to justify research by its implications; the possibility of improved understanding is justification enough. But the implications of this complex process of conflict and consensus-building for the continued effort to adapt the forms of democratic thought to the conditions of a mass, technological age seem worth noting. It is almost traditional among American political scientists, beginning with Woodrow Wilson, to suggest modifications in the American system of government designed to give the voter an opportunity to choose between alternative policies

dealing with specific issues and to make the parties and the government responsive to those choices. The model appears to be parliamentary government on the British pattern, and the suggestions include devices for integrating the congressional and national party, for bringing cabinet officials into the deliberations of Congress, for bringing key congressmen into the cabinet, for replacing the seniority system in Congress, etc. Yet the evidence here raises doubts about the efficacy of these proposed reforms.

If the policy-making process has become a complex process of conflict and consensus-building in which groups of participants debate and maneuver, there may well be reasons. One is probably the sheer mass of government business and the difficulty of devising a scheme by which the general electorate can choose between alternative policies dealing with the whole range of that business. Another is the diversity of a mass society extending over a whole continent and marked by a high degree of specialization of function and thus of interest. As we have said, national goals must serve a multiplicity of values, not just one or another stark alternative. The task of reconciling these various goals is complex, and the citizen must express his preferences indirectly through subgroups and specialized organizations.

For those national policies dealing with foreign and military questions at least, another difficulty lies in the technicality of both the issues and the means for meeting them. There is a gap between what we need to know to act intelligently and what we actually know. When knowledge, the ability to predict the consequences of action, is inadequate, intelligent choice will necessarily turn on the weighting to be given the different possible effects of means — means that are highly technical and as yet only partly understood. Even in an ideal society with no barriers at all to full discussion, debates on foreign policy today would probably center more on disagreement among specialists about the suitability of means for accomplishing goals than on competition between mass publics about the goals themselves. Indeed, when goals were the subject of discussion, the question would more frequently be whether the instrumentalities available were sufficient to accomplish a certain goal and, if not, whether we would be wiser to content ourselves with a more modest goal. The likely alternatives would be, on the one hand, a policy that had an uncertain chance of accomplishing a very desirable goal and, on the other, a policy that would more surely accomplish one that is somewhat less desirable. The choice would present itself in terms of the degree of risk to be shouldered and would depend on a rather intimate understanding of the technical problems that define and clarify that risk.

For all these reasons it may no longer be possible to set the goals of democracy as the simple Athenian system in which the voter can choose among alternative policies or even a modified version of it in which the voter chooses leaders identified with whole sets of policies. Even if the parties were perfectly responsible, the electorate might go right on behaving much as it does now, with policy being made in a complex political process of conflict and consensus-building among groups of more or less active participants. If so, the effort at giving the electorate a clear choice and making the elected parties more responsive to majority preferences expressed in that choice might be misguided. This is not to suggest that periodic elections are unimportant. The participants in the policy-making process are quite clearly mindful of the voters' powers and even though the mechanics of the process are mysterious, there does seem to be some basis for our faith that periodic elections play a role in making government responsive to the people's preferences.[13] But there are limits to how far one can go in bringing the general population into the details of policy-making. If so, the essence of democracy may be not so much that the people perform the daily tasks of government by choosing between policies as that the goals of the people are served. Thus in a diverse, mass society, democracy might be better served by efforts at improving the rationality and effectiveness of the process by which values are identified, weighted, and reconciled, including the place of elections in this, and by insuring that the process is an open one, accessible to anyone who is interested or has something to contribute, either intellectually or as a spokesman for the values of one of modern society's multitude of subgroups.

[13] For support for the proposition that the election process is of decisive importance in spite of the impossibility of the electorate providing clear guidance on specific issues see Dahl (8).

Indeed, efforts in this direction might suggest means for measuring the intensity with which values are held as well as merely the numbers of people holding them, a problem that has long plagued theorists of democracy. It is a nice question whether it is democratic that the slight preferences of a bare majority should hold sway over the very intense desires of a bare minority, and no one has yet found a voting formula that will answer it. The possibility is worth considering, at any rate, that any one way of adapting democratic forms to a mass age might be to improve the conflict-consensus process itself.

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32

THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AS AN ECOLOGY OF GAMES

• *NORTON E. LONG*

The local community whether viewed as a polity, an economy, or a society presents itself as an order in which expectations are met and functions performed. In some cases, as in a new, company-planned mining town, the order is the willed product of centralized control, but for the most part the order is the product of a history rather than the imposed effect of any central nervous system of the community. For historic reasons we readily conceive the massive task of feeding New York to be achieved through the unplanned, historically developed cooperation of thousands of actors largely unconscious of their collaboration to this individually unsought end. The efficiency of this system is attested to by the extraordinary difficulties of the War Production Board and Service of Supply in accomplishing similar logistical objectives through an explicit system of orders and directives. Insofar as conscious rationality plays a role, it is a function of the parts rather than the whole. Particular structures working for their own ends within the whole may provide their members with goals, strategies, and roles that support rational action. The results of the interaction of the rational strivings after particular ends are in part collectively functional if unplanned. All this is the well-worn doctrine of Adam Smith, though one need accept no more of the doctrine of beneficence than that an unplanned economy can function.

While such a view is accepted for the economy, it is generally rejected for the polity. Without a sovereign, Leviathan is generally supposed to distintegrate and fall apart. Even if Locke's more hopeful view of the naturalness of the social order is taken, the polity seems more of a contrived artifact than the economy. Furthermore, there is both the hangover of Austinian sovereignty and the Greek view of ethical primacy to make political institutions seem different in kind and ultimately inclusive in purpose and for this reason to give them an over-all social directive end. To see political institutions as the same kind of thing as other institutions in society rather than as different, superior, and inclusive (both in the sense of being sovereign and ethically more significant) is a form of relativistic pluralism that is difficult to entertain. At the local level, however, it is easier to look at the municipal government, its departments, and the agencies of state and national government as so many institutions, resembling banks, newspapers, trade unions, chambers of commerce, churches, etc., occupying a territorial field and interacting with one another. This interaction can be conceptualized as a system without reducing the interacting institutions and individuals to membership in any single comprehensive group. It is psychologically tempting to envision the local territorial system as a group with a governing "they." This is certainly an existential possibility and one to be investigated. However, frequently, it seems likely, systems are confused with groups, and our primitive need to explain thunder with a theology or a demonology results in the hypostatizing of an angelic or demonic hierarchy. The executive committee of the bourgeoisie and the power elite make the world more comfortable for modern social scientists as the Olympians did for the ancients. At least the latter-day hypothesis, being terrestrial, is in principle researchable, though in practice its metaphysical statement may render it equally immune to mundane inquiry.

Observation of certain local communities

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makes it appear that inclusive over-all organization for many general purposes is weak or non-existent. Much of what occurs seems to just happen with accidental trends becoming cumulative over time and producing results intended by nobody. A great deal of the communities' activities consist of undirected cooperation of particular social structures, each seeking particular goals and, in doing so, meshing with others. While much of this might be explained in Adam Smith's terms, much of it could not be explained with a rational, atomistic model of calculating individuals. For certain purposes the individual is a useful way of looking at people; for many others the role-playing member of a particular group is more helpful. Here we deal with the essence of predictability in social affairs. If we know the game being played is baseball and that X is a third baseman, by knowing his position and the game being played we can tell more about X's activities on the field than we could if we examined X as a psychologist or a psychiatrist. If such were not the case, X would belong in the mental ward rather than in a ball park. The behavior of X is not some disembodied rationality but, rather, behavior within an organized group activity that has goals, norms strategies, and roles that give the very field and ground for rationality. Baseball structures the situation.

It is the contention of this paper that the structured group activities that coexist in a particular territorial system can be looked at as games. These games provide the players with a set of goals that give them a sense of success or failure. They provide them determinate roles and calculable strategies and tactics. In addition, they provide the players with an elite and general public that is in varying degrees able to tell the score. There is a good deal of evidence to be found in common parlance that many participants in contemporary group structures regard their occupations as at least analogous to games. And, at least in the American culture, and not only since Eisenhower, the conception of being on a "team" has been fairly widespread.

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the term "game" for the purposes of this paper is vitiated by, first, the general sense that games are trivial occupations and, second, by the pre-emption of the term for the application of a calculus of probability to choice or decision in a determinate game situation. Far from regarding games as trivial, the writer's position would be that man is both a game-playing and a game-creating animal, that his capacity to create and play games and take them deadly seriously is of the essence, and that it is through games or activities analogous to game-playing that he achieves a satisfactory sense of significance and a meaningful role.

While the calculability of the game situation is important, of equal or greater importance is the capacity of the game to provide a sense of purpose and a role. The organizations of society and polity produce satisfactions with both their products and their processes. The two are not unrelated, but, while the production of the product may in the larger sense enable players and onlookers to keep score, the satisfaction in the process is the satisfaction of playing the game and the sense in which any activity can be grasped as a game.

Looked at this way, in the territorial system there is a political game, a banking game, a contracting game, a newspaper game, a civic organization game, an ecclesiastical game, and many others. Within each game there is a well-established set of goals whose achievement indicates success or failure for the participants, a set of socialized roles making participant behavior highly predictable, a set of strategies and tactics handed down through experience and occasionally subject to improvement and change, an elite public whose approbation is appreciated, and, finally, a general public which has some appreciation for the standing of the players. Within the game the players can be rational in the varying degrees that the structure permits. At the very least, they know how to behave, and they know the score.

Individuals may play in a number of games, but, for the most part, their major preoccupation is with one, and their sense of major achievement is through success in one. Transfer from one game to another is, of course, possible, and the simultaneous playing of roles in two or more games is an important manner of linking separate games.

Sharing a common territorial field and collaborating for different and particular ends in the achievement of over-all social functions, the players in one game make use of the players in another and are, in turn, made use of by them. Thus the banker makes use of the news-

paperman, the politician, the contractor, the ecclesiastic, the labor leader, the civic leader — all to further his success in the banking game — but, reciprocally, he is used to further the others' success in the newspaper, political, contracting, ecclesiastical, labor, and civic games. Each is a piece in the chess game of the other, sometimes a willing piece, but, to the extent that the games are different, with a different end in view.

Thus a particular highway grid may be the result of a bureaucratic department of public works game in which are combined, though separate, a professional highway engineer game with its purposes and critical elite onlookers; a departmental bureaucracy; a set of contending politicians seeking to use the highways for political capital, patronage, and the like; a banking game concerned with bonds, taxes, and the effect of the highways on real estate; newspapermen interested in headlines, scoops, and the effect of highways on the papers' circulation; contractors eager to make money by building roads; ecclesiastics concerned with the effect of highways on their parishes and on the fortunes of the contractors who support their churchly ambitions; labor leaders interested in union contracts and their status as community influentials with a right to be consulted; and civic leaders who must justify the contributions of their bureaus of municipal research or chambers of commerce to the social activity. Each game is in play in the complicated pulling and hauling of siting and constructing the highway grid. A wide variety of purposes is subserved by the activity, and no single overall directive authority controls it. However, the interrelation of the groups in constructing a highway has been developed over time, and there are general expectations as to the interaction. There are also generalized expectations as to how politicians, contractors, newspapermen, bankers, and the like will utilize the highway situation in playing their particular games. In fact, the knowledge that a banker will play like a banker and a newspaperman like a newspaperman is an important part of what makes the situation calculable and permits the players to estimate its possibilities for their own action in their particular game.

While it might seem that the engineers of the department of public works were the appropriate protagonists for the highway grid, as a general activity it presents opportunities and threats to a wide range of other players who see in the situation consequences and possibilities undreamed of by the engineers. Some general public expectation of the limits of the conduct of the players and of a desirable outcome does provide bounds to the scramble. This public expectation is, of course, made active through the interested solicitation of newspapers, politicians, civic leaders, and others who see in it material for accomplishing their particular purposes and whose structured roles in fact require the mobilization of broad publics. In a sense the group struggle that Arthur Bentley described in his *Process of Government* is a drama that local publics have been taught to view with a not uncritical taste. The instruction of this taste has been the vocation and business of some of the contending parties. The existence of some kind of over-all public puts general restraints on gamesmanship beyond the norms of the particular games. However, for the players these are to all intents as much a part of the "facts of life" of the game as the sun and the wind.

It is perhaps the existence of some kind of a general public, however rudimentary, that most clearly differentiates the local territorial system from a natural ecology. The five-acre woodlot in which the owls and the field mice, the oaks and the acorns, and other flora and fauna have evolved a balanced system has no public opinion, however rudimentary. The co-operation is an unconscious affair. For much of what goes on in the local territorial system co-operation is equally unconscious and perhaps, but for the occasional social scientist, unnoticed. This unconscious co-operation, however, like that of the five-acre woodlot, produces results. The ecology of games in the local territorial system accomplishes unplanned but largely functional results. The games and their players mesh in their particular pursuits to bring about over-all results; the territorial system is fed and ordered. Its inhabitants are rational within limited areas and, pursuing the ends of these areas, accomplish socially functional ends.

While the historical development of largely unconscious co-operation between the special games in the territorial system gets certain routine, over-all functions performed, the problem of novelty and breakdown must be dealt

with. Here it would seem that, as in the natural ecology, random adjustment and piecemeal innovation are the normal methods of response. The need or cramp in the system presents itself to the players of the games as an opportunity for them to exploit or a menace to be overcome. Thus a transportation crisis in, say, the threatened abandonment of commuter trains by a railroad will bring forth the players of a wide range of games who will see in the situation opportunity for gain or loss in the outcome. While over-all considerations will appear in the discussion, the frame of reference and the interpretation of the event will be largely determined by the game the interested parties are principally involved in. Thus a telephone executive who is president of the local chamber of commerce will be playing a civic association, general business game with concern for the principal dues-payers of the chamber but with a constant awareness of how his handling of this crisis will advance him in his particular league. The politicians, who might be expected to be protagonists of the general interest, may indeed be so, but the sphere of their activity and the glasses through which they see the problem will be determined in great part by the way they see the issue affecting their political game. The generality of this game is to a great extent that of the politician's calculus of votes and interests important to his and his side's success. To be sure, some of what Walter Lippmann has called "the public philosophy" affects both politicians and other game-players. This indicates the existence of roles and norms of a larger, vaguer game with a relevant audience that has some sense of cricket. This potentially mobilizable audience is not utterly without importance, but it provides no sure or adequate basis for support in the particular game that the politician or anyone else is playing. Instead of a set of norms to structure enduring role-playing, this audience provides a cross-pressure for momentary aberrancy from gamesmanship or constitutes just another hazard to be calculated in one's play.

In many cases the territorial system is impressive in the degree of intensity of its particular games, its banks, its newspapers, its downtown stores, its manufacturing companies, its contractors, its churches, its politicians, and its other differentiated, structured, goal-oriented activities. Games go on within the territory, occasionally extending beyond it, though centered in it. But, while the particular games show clarity of goals and intensity, few, if any, treat the territory as their proper object. The protagonists of things in particular are well organized and know what they are about; the protagonists of things in general are few, vague, and weak. Immense staff work will go into the development of a Lincoln Square project, but the twenty-two counties of metropolitan New York have few spokesmen for their over-all common interest and not enough staff work to give these spokesmen more substance than that required for a "dogooding" newspaper editorial. The Port of New York Authority exhibits a disciplined self-interest and a vigorous drive along the lines of its developed historic role. However, the attitude of the Port Authority toward the general problems of the metropolitan area is scarcely different than that of any private corporation. It confines its corporate good citizenship to the contribution of funds for surveys and studies and avoids acceptance of broader responsibility. In fact, spokesmen for the Port vigorously reject the need of any superior level of structured representation of metropolitan interests. The common interest, if such there be, is to be realized through institutional interactions rather than through the self-conscious rationality of a determinate group charged with its formulation and attainment. Apart from the newspaper editorial, the occasional politician, and a few civic leaders the general business of the metropolitan area is scarcely anybody's business, and, except for a few, those who concern themselves with the general problems are pursuing hobbies and causes rather than their own business.

The lack of over-all institutions in the territorial system and the weakness of those that exist insure that co-ordination is largely ecological rather than a matter of conscious rational contriving. In the metropolitan area in most cases there are no over-all economic or social institutions. People are playing particular games, and their play-grounds are less or more than the metropolitan area. But even in a city where the municipal corporation provides an apparent overall government, the appearance is deceptive. The politicians who hold the offices do not regard themselves as governors of the municipal territory but largely as mediators or players in a particular game that makes

use of the other inhabitants. Their roles, as they conceive them, do not approach those of the directors of a TVA developing a territory. The ideology of local government is a highly limited affair in which the officeholders respond to demands and mediate conflicts. They play politics, and politics is vastly different from government if the latter is conceived as the rational, responsible ordering of the community. In part, this is due to the general belief that little government is necessary or that government is a congery of services only different from others because it is paid for by taxes and provided for by civil servants. In part, the separation of economics from politics eviscerates the formal theory of government of most of the substance of social action. Intervention in the really important economic order is by way of piecemeal exception and in deviation from the supposed norm of the separation of politics and economics. This ideal of separation has blocked the development of a theory of significant government action and reduced the politician to the role of registerer of pressure rather than responsible governor of a local political economy. The politics of the community becomes a different affair from its government, and its government is so structured as to provide the effective actors in it neither a sense of general responsibility nor the roles calling for such behavior.

The community vaguely senses that there ought to be a government. This is evidenced in the nomination by newspapers and others of particular individuals as members of a top leadership, a "they" who are periodically called upon to solve community problems and meet community crises. Significantly, the "they" usually are made up of people holding private, not public, office. The pluralism of the society has separated political, ecclesiastical, economic, and social hierarchies from one another so that the ancient union of lords spiritual and temporal is disrupted. In consequence, there is a marked distinction between the status of the holders of political office and the status of the "they" of the newspapers and the power elite of a C. Wright Mills or a Floyd Hunter. The politicians have the formal governmental office that might give them responsible governing roles. However, their lack of status makes it both absurd and presumptuous that they should take themselves so seriously. Who are they to act as lords of creation? Public expectation neither empowers nor demands that they should assume any such confident pose as top community leaders. The latter position is reserved for a rather varying group (in some communities well defined and clear-cut, in others vague and amorphous) of holders for the most part of positions of private power, economic, social, and ecclesiastical. This group, regarded as the top leadership of the community, and analogous to the top management of a corporation, provides both a sense that there are gods in the heavens whose will, if they exercise it, will take care of the community's problems and a set of demons whose misrule accounts for the evil in the world. The "they" fill an office left vacant by the dethronement of absolutism and aristocracy. Unlike the politicians in that "they" are only partially visible and of untested powers, the top leadership provides a convenient rationale for explaining what goes on or does not go on in the community. It is comforting to think that the executive committee of the bourgoisie is exploiting the community or that the beneficent social and economic leaders are wearying themselves and their digestions with civic luncheons in order to bring parking to a congested city.

Usually the question is raised as to whether *de facto* there is a set of informal powerholders running things. A related question is whether community folklore holds that there is, that there should be, and what these informal power-holders should do. Certainly, most newspapermen and other professional "inside dopesters" hold that there is a "they." In fact, these people operate largely as court chroniclers of the doings of the "they." The "they," because they are "they," are newsworthy and fit into a ready-made theory of social causation that is vulgarized widely. However, the same newspaperman who could knowingly open his "bird book" and give you a run-down on the local "Who's Who" would probably with equal and blasphemous candor tell you that "they" were not doing a thing about the city and that "they" were greatly to be blamed for sitting around talking instead of getting things done. Thus, as with most primitive tribes, the idols are both worshiped and beaten, at least verbally. Public and reporters alike are relieved to believe both that there is a "they" to make civic life explicable and also to be held responsible for what

occurs. This belief in part creates the role of top leadership and demands that it somehow be filled. It seems likely that there is a social-psychological table of organization of a community that must be filled in order to remove anxieties. Gordon Childe has remarked that man seems to need as much to adjust to an unseen, socially created spiritual environment as to the matter-of-fact world of the senses.

The community needs to believe that there are spiritual fathers, bad or good, who can deal with the dark: in the Middle Ages the peasants combated a plague of locusts by a high Mass and a procession of the clergy who damned the grasshoppers with bell, book, and candle. The Hopi Indians do a rain dance to overcome a drought. The harassed citizens of the American city mobilize their influentials at a civic luncheon to perform the equivalent and exorcise slums, smog, or unemployment. We smile at the medievals and the Hopi, but our own practices may be equally magical. It is interesting to ask under what circumstances one resorts to DDT and irrigation and why. To some extent it is clear that the ancient and modern practice of civic magic ritual is functional — functional in the same sense as the medicinal placebo. Much of human illness is benign; if the sufferer will bide his time, it will pass. Much of civic ills also cure themselves if only people can be kept from tearing each other apart in the stress of their anxieties. The locusts and the drought will pass. They almost always have.

While ritual activities are tranquilizing anxieties, the process of experimentation and adaptation in the social ecology goes on. The piecemeal responses of the players and the games to the challenges presented by crises provide the social counterpart to the process of evolution and natural selection. However, unlike the random mutation of the animal kingdom, much of the behavior of the players responding within the perspectives of their games is self-conscious and rational, given their ends in view. It is from the over-all perspective of the unintended contribution of their actions to the forming of a new or the restoration of the old ecological balance of the social system that their actions appear almost as random and lacking in purposive plan as the adaptive behavior of the natural ecology.

Within the general area of unplanned, unconscious social process technological areas emerge that are so structured as to promote rational, goal-oriented behavior and meaningful experience rather than mere happenstance. In these areas group activity may result in cumulative knowledge and self-corrective behavior. Thus problem-solving in the field of public health and sanitation may be at a stage far removed from the older dependence on piecemeal adjustment and random functional innovation. In this sense there are areas in which society, as Julian Huxley suggests in his *The Meaning of Evolution*, has gone beyond evolution. However, these are as yet isolated areas in a world still swayed by magic and, for the most part, carried forward by the logic of unplanned, undirected historical process.

It is not surprising that the members of the "top leadership" of the territorial system should seem to be largely confined to ritual and ceremonial roles. "Top leadership" is usually conceived in terms of status position rather than specifiable roles in social action. The role of a top leader is ill defined and to a large degree unstructured. It is in most cases a secondary role derived from a primary role as corporation executive, wealthy man, powerful ecclesiastic, holder of high social position, and the like. The top-leadership role is derivative from the other and is in most cases a result rather than a cause of status. The primary job is bank president, or president of Standard Oil; as such, one is naturally picked, nominated, and recognized as a member of the top leadership. One seldom forgets that one's primary role, obligation, and source of rational conduct is in terms of one's business. In fact, while one is on the whole pleased at the recognition that membership in the top leadership implies — much as one's wife would be pleased to be included among the ten best-dressed women — he is somewhat concerned about just what the role requires in the expenditure of time and funds. Furthermore, one has a suspicion that he may not know how to dance and could make a fool of himself before known elite and unknown, more general publics. All things considered, however, it is probably a good thing for the business, the contacts are important, and the recognition will be helpful back home, in both senses. In any event, if one's committee service or whatever concrete activity "top leadership" implies proves wearing or unsatisfactory, or if

it interferes with business, one can always withdraw.

A fair gauge of the significance of top-leadership roles is the time put into them by the players and the institutionalized support represented by staff. Again and again the interviewer is told that the president of such-and-such an organization is doing a terrific job and literally knocking himself out for such-and-such a program. On investigation a "terrific job" turns out to be a few telephone calls and, possibly, three luncheons a month. The standard of "terrific job" obviously varies widely from what would be required in the business role.

In the matter of staffing, while the corporation, the church, and the government are often equipped in depth, the top-leadership job of port promotion may have little more than a secretary and an agile newspaperman equipped to ghost-write speeches for the boss. While there are cases where people in top-leadership positions make use of staff from their own businesses and from the legal mill with which they do business, this seems largely confined to those top-leadership undertakings that have a direct connection with their business. In general, top-leadership roles seem to involve minor investments of time, staff, and money by territorial elites. The absence of staff and the emphasis on publicity limit the capacity of top leadership for sustained rational action.

Where top leaderships have become well staffed, the process seems as much or more the result of external pressures than of its own volition. Of all the functions of top leadership, that of welfare is best staffed. Much of this is the result of the pressure of the professional social worker to organize a concentration of economic and social power sufficient to permit him to do a job. It is true, of course, that the price of organizing top leadership and making it manageable by the social workers facilitated a reverse control of themselves — a control of whose galling nature Hunter gives evidence. An amusing sidelight on the organization of the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie" is the case of the Cleveland Fifty Club. This club, supposedly, is made up of the fifty most important men in Cleveland. Most middling and even upper executives long for the prestige recognition that membership confers. Reputedly, the Fifty Club was organized by Brooks Emery, while he was director of the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, to facilitate the taxation of business to support that organization. The lead time required to get the august members of the Fifty Club together and their incohesiveness have severely limited its possibilities as a power elite. Members who have tried to turn it to such a purpose report fairly consistent failure.

The example of the Cleveland Fifty Club, while somewhat extreme, points to the need on the part of certain activities in the territorial system for a top leadership under whose auspices they can function. A wide variety of civic undertakings need to organize top prestige support both to finance and to legitimate their activities. The staff man of a bureau of municipal research or the Red Feather Agency cannot proceed on his own; he must have the legitimatizing sponsorship of top influentials. His task may be self-assigned, his perception of the problem and its solution may be his own, but he cannot gain acceptance without mobilizing the influentials. For the success of his game he must assist in creating the game of top leadership. The staff man in the civic field is the typical protagonist of things in general — a kind of entrepreneur of ideas. He fulfils the same role in his area as the stock promoter of the twenties or the Zeckendorfs of urban redevelopment. Lacking both status and a confining organizational basis, he has a socially valuable mobility between the specialized games and hierarchies in the territorial system. His success in the negotiation of a port authority not only provides a plus for his taxpayers federation or his world trade council but may provide a secure and lucrative job for himself.

Civic staff men, ranging from chamber of commerce personnel to college professors and newspapermen, are in varying degrees interchangeable and provide an important network of communication. The staff men in the civic agencies play similar roles to the Cohens and Corcorans in Washington. In each case a set of telephone numbers provides special information and an effective lower-echelon interaction. Consensus among interested professionals at the lower level can result in action programs from below that are bucked up to the prestige level of legitimitization. As the Cohens and Corcorans played perhaps the most general and inclusive game in the Washington bureaucracy,

so their counterparts in the local territorial system are engaged in the most general action game in their area. Just as the Cohens and Corcorans had to mobilize an effective concentration of top brass to move a program into the action stage, so their counterparts have to mobilize concentrations of power sufficient for their purposes on the local scene.

In this connection it is interesting to note that foundation grants are being used to hire displaced New Deal bureaucrats and college professors in an attempt to organize the influentials of metropolitan areas into self-conscious governing groups. Professional chamber of commerce executives, immobilized by their orthodox ideology, are aghast to see their members study under the planners and heretics from the dogmas of free-enterprise fundamentalism. The attempt to transform the metropolitan appearance of disorder into a tidy territory is a built-in predisposition for the self-constituted staff of the embryonic top metropolitan management. The major disorder that has to be overcome before all others is the lack of order and organization among the "power elite." As in the case of the social workers, there is a thrust from below to organize a "power elite" as a necessary instrument to accomplish the purposes of civic staff men. This is in many ways nothing but a part of the general groping after a territorial government capable of dealing with a range of problems that the existing feudal disintegration of power cannot. The nomination of a top leadership by newspapers and public and the attempt to create such a leadership in fact by civic technicians are due to a recognition that there is a need for leadership with the status, capacity, and role to attend to the general problems of the territory and give substance to a public philosophy. This involves major changes in the script of the top-leadership game and the self-image of its participants. In fact, the insecurity and the situational limitations of their positions in corporations or other institutions that provide the primary roles for top leaders make it difficult to give more substance to what has been a secondary role. Many members of present top leaderships are genuinely reluctant, fearful, and even morally shocked at their positions' becoming that of a recognized territorial government. While there is a general supposition that power is almost instinctively craved, there seems considerable evidence that at least in many of our territorial cultures responsibility is not. Machiavellian *virtu* is an even scarcer commodity among the merchant princes of the present than among their Renaissance predecessors. In addition, the educational systems of school and business do not provide top leaders with the inspiration or the know-how to do more than raise funds and man committees. Politics is frequently regarded with the same disgust as military service by the ancient educated Chinese.

It is possible to translate a check pretty directly into effective power in a chamber of commerce or a welfare agency. However, to translate economic power into more general social or political power, there must be an organized purchasable structure. Where such structures exist, they may be controlled or, as in the case of *condottieri*, gangsters, and politicians, their hire may be uncertain, and the hired force retains its independence. Where businessmen are unwilling or unable to organize their own political machines, they must pay those who do. Sometimes the paymaster rules; at other times he bargains with equals or superiors.

A major protagonist of things in general in the territorial system is the newspaper. Along with the welfare worker, museum director, civic technician, etc., the newspaper has an interest in terms of its broad reading public in agitating general issues and projects. As the chronicler of the great, both in its general news columns and in its special features devoted to society and business, it provides an organizing medium for elites in the territory and provides them with most of their information about things in general and not a little of inside tidbits about how individual elite members are doing. In a sense, the newspaper is the prime mover in setting the territorial agenda. It has a great part in determining what most people will be talking about, what most people will think the facts are, and what most people will regard as the way problems are to be dealt with. While the conventions of how a newspaper is to be run, and the compelling force of some events limit the complete freedom of a paper to select what events and what people its public will attend to, it has great leeway. However, the newspaper is a business and a specialized game even when its reporters are idealists and

its publisher rejoices in the title "Mr. Cleveland." The paper does not accept the responsibility of a governing role in its territory. It is a power but only a partially responsible one. The span of attention of its audience and the conventions of what constitute a story give it a crusading role at most for particular projects. Nonetheless, to a large extent it sets the civic agenda.

The story is told of the mayor of a large eastern metropolis who, having visited the three capital cities of his constituents — Rome, Dublin, and Tel Aviv — had proceeded home via Paris and Le Havre. Since his staff had neglected to meet the boat before the press, he was badgered by reporters to say what he had learned on his trip. The unfortunate mayor could not say that he had been on a junket for a good time. Luckily, he remembered that in Paris they had been having an antinoise campaign. Off the hook at last, he told the press that he thought this campaign was a good thing. This gave the newsmen something to write about. The mayor hoped this was the end of it. But a major paper felt in need of a crusade to sponsor and began to harass the mayor about the start of the local antinoise campaign. Other newspapers took up the cry, and the mayor told his staff they were for it — there had to be an antinoise campaign. In short order, businessmen's committees, psychiatrists, and college professors were mobilized to press forward on a broad front the suppression of needless noise. In vindication of administrative rationality it appeared that an antinoise campaign was on a staff list of possibilities for the mayor's agenda but had been discarded by him as politically unfeasible.

The civic technicians and the newspapers have somewhat the same relationship as congressional committee staff and the press. Many members of congressional committee staffs complain bitterly that their professional consciences are seared by the insistent pressure to seek publicity. But they contend that their committee sponsors are only impressed with research that is newsworthy. Congressional committee members point out that committees that do not get publicity are likely to go out of business or funds. The civic agency head all too frequently communicates most effectively with his board through his success in getting newspaper publicity. Many a civic ghost-writer has found his top leader converted to the cause by reading the ghosted speech he delivered at the civic luncheon reported with photographs and editorials in the press. This is even the case where the story appears in the top leader's own paper. The need of the reporters for news and of the civic technicians for publicity brings the participants of these two games together. As in the case of the congressional committee, there is a tendency to equate accomplishment with publicity. For top influentials on civic boards the news clips are an important way of keeping score. This symbiotic relation of newsmen and civic staff helps explain the heavy emphasis on ritual luncheons, committees, and news releases. The nature of the newspapers' concern with a story about people and the working of marvels and miracles puts a heavy pressure for the kind of story that the press likes to carry. It is not surprising that civic staff men should begin to equate accomplishment with their score measured in newspaper victories or that they should succumb to the temptation to impress their sponsors with publicity, salting it to their taste by flattering newspaper tributes to the sponsors themselves. Despite the built-in incapacity of newspapers to exercise a serious governing responsibility in their territories, they are for the most part the only institutions with a long-term general territorial interest. In default of a territorial political party or other institution that accepts responsibility for the formulation of a general civic agenda the newspaper is the one game that by virtue of its public and its conventions partly fills the vacuum.

A final game that does in a significant way integrate all the games in the territorial system is the social game. Success in each of the games can in varying degrees be cashed in for social acceptance. The custodians of the symbols of top social standing provide goals that in a sense give all the individual games some common denominator of achievement. While the holders of top social prestige do not necessarily hold either top political or economic power, they do provide meaningful goals for the rest. One of the most serious criticisms of a Yankee aristocracy made by a Catholic bishop was that, in losing faith in their own social values, they were undermining the faith in the whole system of final clubs. It would be a cruel joke if, just as the hard-working

upwardly mobile had worked their way to entrance, the progeny of the founders lost interest. The decay of the Union League Club in *By Love Possessed* is a tragedy for more than its members. A common game shared even by the excluded spectators gave a purpose that was functional in its time and must be replaced — hopefully, by a better one. A major motivation for seeking membership in and playing the top-leadership game is the value of the status it confers as a counter in the social game.

Neither the civic leadership game nor the social game makes the territorial ecology over into a structured government. They do, however, provide important ways of linking the individual games and make possible cooperative action on projects. Finally, the social game, in Ruth Benedict's sense, in a general way patterns the culture of the territorial ecology and gives all the players a set of vaguely shared aspirations and common goals.

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AN ESSAY ON BARGAINING

• *THOMAS C. SCHELLING*

This paper presents a tactical approach to the analysis of bargaining. The subject includes both explicit bargaining and the tacit kind in which adversaries watch and interpret each other's behavior, each aware that his own actions are being interpreted and anticipated, each acting with a view to the expectations that he creates. In economics the subject covers wage negotiations, tariff negotiations, competition where competitors are few, settlements out of court, and the real estate agent and his customer. Outside economics it ranges from the threat of massive retaliation to taking the right of way from a taxi.

Our concern will *not* be with the part of bargaining that consists of exploring for mutually profitable adjustments, and that might be called the "efficiency" aspect of bargaining. For example, can an insurance firm save money, and make a client happier, by offering a cash settlement rather than repairing the client's car; can an employer save money by granting a voluntary wage increase to employees who agree to take a substantial part of their wages in merchandise? Instead, we shall be concerned with what might be called the "distributional" aspect of bargaining: the situations in which more for one means less for the other. When the business is finally sold to the one interested buyer, what price does it go for? When two dynamite trucks meet on a road wide enough for one, who backs up?

These are situations that ultimately involve an element of pure bargaining — bargaining in which each party is guided mainly by his expectations of what the other will accept. But with each guided by expectations and knowing that the other is too, expectations become compounded. A bargain is struck when somebody makes a final, sufficient concession. Why does he concede? Because he thinks the other will not. "I must concede because he won't. He won't because he thinks I will. He thinks I will because he thinks I think he thinks so. . . ." There is some range of alternative outcomes in which any point is better for both sides than no agreement at all. To insist on any such point is pure bargaining, since one always *would* take less rather than reach no agreement at all, and since one always *can* recede if retreat proves necessary to agreement. Yet if both parties are aware of the limits to this range, *any* outcome is a point from which at least one party would have been willing to retreat and the other knows it! There is no resting place.

There is, however, an outcome; and if we cannot find it in the logic of the situation we may find it in the tactics employed. The purpose of this essay is to call attention to an important class of tactics, of a kind that is

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peculiarly appropriate to the logic of indeterminate situations. The essence of these tactics is some voluntary but irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice. They rest on the paradox that the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself; that, in bargaining, weakness is often strength, freedom may be freedom to capitulate, and to burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent.

I. Bargaining Power: The Power to Bind Oneself

"Bargaining power," "bargaining strength," "bargaining skill" suggest that the advantage goes to the powerful, the strong, or the skillful. It does, of course, if those qualities are defined to mean only that negotiations are won by those who win. But if the terms imply that it is an advantage to be more intelligent or more skilled in debate, or to have more financial resources, more physical strength, more military potency, or more ability to withstand losses, then the term does a disservice. These qualities are by no means universal advantages in bargaining situations; they often have a contrary value.

The sophisticated negotiator may find it difficult to seem as obstinate as a truly obstinate man. If a man knocks at a door and says that he will stab himself on the porch unless given $10, he is more likely to get the $10 if his eyes are bloodshot. The threat of mutual destruction cannot be used to deter an adversary who is too unintelligent to comprehend it or too weak to enforce his will on those he represents. The government that cannot control its balance of payments, or collect taxes, or muster the political unity to defend itself, may enjoy assistance that would be denied it if it could control its own resources. And, to cite an example familiar from economic theory, "price leadership" in oligopoly may be an unprofitable distinction evaded by the small firms and assumed perforce by the large one.

Bargaining power has also been described as the power to fool and bluff, "the ability to set the best price for yourself and fool the other man into thinking this was your maximum offer."[1] Fooling and bluffing are certainly involved; but there are two kinds of fooling. One is deceiving about the facts; a buyer may lie about his income or misrepresent the size of his family. The other is purely tactical. Suppose each knows everything about the other, and each knows what the other knows. What is there to fool about? The buyer may say that, though he'd really pay up to twenty and the seller knows it, he is firmly resolved as a tactical matter not to budge above sixteen. If the seller capitulates, was he fooled? Or was he convinced of the truth? Or did the buyer really not know what he would do next if the tactic failed? If the buyer really "feels" himself firmly resolved, and bases his resolves on the conviction that the seller will capitulate, and the seller does, the buyer may say afterwards that he was "not fooling." Whatever has occurred, it is not adequately conveyed by the notions of bluffing and fooling.

How does one person make another believe something? The answer depends importantly on the factual question, "Is it true?" It is easier to prove the truth of something that is true than of something false. To prove the truth about our health we can call on a reputable doctor; to prove the truth about our costs or income we may let the person look at books that have been audited by a reputable firm or the Bureau of Internal Revenue. But to persuade him of something false we may have no such convincing evidence.

When one wishes to persuade someone that he would not pay more than $16,000 for a house that is really worth $20,000 to him, what can he do to take advantage of the usually superior credibility of the truth over a false assertion? Answer: make it true. How can a buyer make it true? If he likes the house because it is near his business he might move his business, persuading the seller that the house is really now worth only $16,000 to him. This would be unprofitable; he is no better off than if he had paid the higher price.

But suppose the buyer could make an irrevocable and enforceable bet with some third party, duly recorded and certified, according to which he would pay for the house no more than $16,000, or forfeit $5,000. The seller has lost; the buyer need simply present the truth. Unless the seller is enraged and withholds the house in sheer spite, the situation has been rigged against him; the "objective" situa-

[1] J. N. Morgan, "Bilateral Monopoly and the Competitive Output," *Quart. Jour. Econ.*, Aug. 1949, LXIII, 376, n.6.

tion — the buyer's true incentive — has been voluntarily, conspicuously, and irreversibly changed. The seller can take it or leave it. This example demonstrates that if the buyer can accept an irrevocable commitment, in a way that is unambiguously visible to the seller, he can squeeze the range of indeterminacy down to the point most favorable to him. It also suggests, by its artificiality, that the tactic is one that may or may not be available; whether the buyer can find an effective device for committing himself may depend on who he is, who the seller is, where they live, and a number of legal and institutional arrangements (including, in our artificial example, whether bets are legally enforceable).

If both men live in a culture where "cross my heart" is universally accepted as potent, all the buyer has to do is allege that he will pay no more than $16,000, using this invocation of penalty, and he wins — or at least he wins if the seller does not beat him to it by shouting "$19,000, cross my heart." If the buyer is an agent authorized by a board of directors to buy at $16,000 but not a cent more, and the directors cannot constitutionally meet again for several months and the buyer cannot exceed his authority, and if all this can be made known to the seller, then the buyer "wins" — if, again, the seller has not tied himself up with a commitment to $19,000. Or if the buyer can assert that he will pay no more than $16,000 so firmly that he would suffer intolerable loss of personal prestige or bargaining reputation by paying more, and if the fact of his paying more would necessarily be known, and if the seller appreciates all this, then a loud declaration by itself may provide the commitment. The device, of course, is a needless surrender of flexibility unless it can be made fully evident and understandable to the seller.

Incidentally, some of the more contractual kinds of commitments are not as effective as they at first seem. In the example of the self-inflicted penalty through the bet, it remains possible for the seller to seek out the third party and offer a modest sum in consideration of the latter's releasing the buyer from the bet, threatening to sell the house for $16,000 if the release is not forthcoming. The effect of the bet — as of most such contractual commitments — is to shift the locus and personnel of the negotiation, in the hope that the third party will be less available for negotiation or less subject to an incentive to concede. To put it differently, a *contractual* commitment is usually the assumption of a contingent "transfer cost," not a "real cost"; and if all interested parties can be brought into the negotiation the range of indeterminacy remains as it was. But if the third party were available only at substantial transportation cost, to that extent a truly irrevocable commitment would have been assumed. (If bets were made with a number of people, the "real costs" of bringing them into the negotiation might be made prohibitive.)[2]

The most interesting parts of our topic concern whether and how commitments can be taken; but it is worth while to consider briefly a model in which practical problems are absent — a world in which absolute commitments are freely available. Consider a culture in which "cross my heart" is universally recognized as absolutely binding. Any offer accompanied by this invocation is a final offer, and is so recognized. If each party knows the other's true reservation price, the object is to be first with a firm offer. Complete responsi-

[2] Perhaps the "ideal" solution to the bilateral monopoly problem is as follows. One member of the pair shifts his marginal cost curve so that joint profits are now zero at the output at which joint profits originally would have been maximized. He does this through an irrevocable sale-leaseback arrangement; he sells a royalty contract to some third party for a lump sum, the royalties so related to his output that joint costs exceed joint revenue at all other outputs. He cannot now afford to produce at any price or output except that price and output at which the entire original joint profits accrue to him; the other member of the bilateral monopoly sees the contract, appreciates the situation, and accepts his true minimum profits. The "winner" really gains the entire original profit via the lump sum for which he sold royalty rights; this profit does not affect his incentives because it is independent of what he produces. The third party pays the lump sum (minus a small discount for inducement) because he knows that the second party will have to capitulate and that therefore he will in fact get his contingent royalty. The hitch is that the royalty-rights buyer must not be available to the "losing member"; otherwise the latter can force him to renounce his royalty claim by threatening not to reach a bargain, thus restoring the original marginal cost situation. But we may imagine the development of institutions that specialize in royalty purchases, whose ultimate success depends on a reputation for never renegotiating, and whose incentives can thus not be appealed to in any single negotiation.

bility for the outcome then rests with the other, who can take it or leave it as he chooses (and who chooses to take it). Bargaining is all over; the commitment (*i.e.*, the first offer) wins.

Interpose some communication difficulty. They must bargain by letter; the invocation becomes effective when signed but cannot be known to the other until its arrival. Now when one party writes such a letter the other may already have signed his own, or may yet do so before the letter of the first arrives. There is then no sale; both are bound to incompatible positions. Each must now recognize this possibility of stalemate, and take into account the likelihood that the other already has, or will have, signed his own commitment.

An asymmetry in communication may well favor the one who is (and is known to be) unavailable for the receipt of messages, for he is the one who cannot be deterred from his own commitment by receipt of the other's. (On the other hand, if the one who cannot communicate can feign ignorance of his own inability, the other too may be deterred from his own commitment by fear of the first's unwitting commitment.) If the commitments depend not just on words but on special forms or ceremonies, ignorance of the other party's commitment ceremonies may be an advantage if the ignorance is fully appreciated, since it makes the other aware that only his own restraint can avert stalemate.

Suppose only part of the population belongs to the cult in which "cross my heart" is (or is believed to be) absolutely binding. If everyone knows (and is known to know) everyone else's affiliation, those belonging to this particular cult have the advantage. They can commit themselves, the others cannot. If the buyer says "$16,000, cross my heart" his offer is final; if the seller says "$19,000" he is (and is known to be) only "bargaining."

If each does not know the other's true reservation price there is an initial stage in which each tries to discover the other's and misrepresent his own, as in ordinary bargaining. But the process of discovery and revelation becomes quickly merged with the process of creating and discovering commitments; the commitments permanently change, for all practical purposes, the "true" reservation prices. If one party has, and the other has not, the belief in a binding ceremony, the latter pursues the "ordinary" bargaining technique of *asserting* his reservation price, while the former proceeds to *make* his.

The foregoing discussion has tried to suggest both the plausibility and the logic of self-commitment. Some examples may suggest the relevance of the tactic, although an observer can seldom distinguish with confidence the consciously logical, the intuitive, or the inadvertent, use of a visible tactic. First, it has not been uncommon for union officials to stir up excitement and determination on the part of the membership during or prior to a wage negotiation. If the union is going to insist on $2 and expects the management to counter with $1.60, an effort is made to persuade the membership not only that the management could pay $2 but even perhaps that the negotiators themselves are incompetent if they fail to obtain close to $2. The purpose — or, rather, a plausible purpose suggested by our analysis — is to make clear to the management that the negotiators could not accept less than $2 *even if they wished to* because they no longer control the members or because they would lose their own positions if they tried. In other words, the negotiators reduce the scope of their own authority, and confront the management with the threat of a strike that the union itself cannot avert, even though it was the union's own action that eliminated its power to prevent the strike.

Something similar occurs when the United States government negotiates with other governments on, say, the uses to which foreign assistance will be put, or tariff reduction. If the executive branch is free to negotiate the best arrangement it can, it may be unable to make any position stick and may end by conceding controversial points because its partners know, or believe obstinately, that the United States would rather concede than terminate the negotiations. But if the executive branch negotiates under legislative authority, with its position constrained by law, and it is evident that Congress will not be reconvened to change the law within the necessary time period, then the executive branch has a firm position that is visible to its negotiating partners.

When national representatives go to international negotiations knowing that there is a wide range of potential agreement within which the outcome will depend on bargaining, they seem often to create a bargaining position by public statements, statements calculated to

arouse a public opinion that permits no concessions to be made. If a binding public opinion can be cultivated, and made evident to the other side, the initial position can thereby be made visibly "final."

These examples have certain characteristics in common. First, they clearly depend not only on incurring a commitment but on communicating it persuasively to the other party. Second, it is by no means easy to establish the commitment, nor is it entirely clear to either of the parties concerned just how strong the commitment is. Third, similar activity may be available to the parties on both sides. Fourth, the possibility of commitment, though perhaps available to both sides, is by no means equally available; the ability of a democratic government to get itself tied by public opinion may be different from the ability of a totalitarian government to incur such a commitment. Fifth, they all run the risk of establishing an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the other to concede, and thereby provoke the likelihood of stalemate or breakdown.

II. Institutional and Structural Characteristics of the Negotiation

Some institutional and structural characteristics of bargaining situations may make the commitment tactic easy or difficult to use, or make it more available to one party than the other, or affect the likelihood of simultaneous commitment or stalemate.

Use of a Bargaining Agent. The use of a bargaining agent affects the power of commitment in at least two ways. First, the agent may be given instructions that are difficult or impossible to change, such instructions (and their inflexibility) being visible to the opposite party. The principle applies in distinguishing the legislative from the executive branch, or the management from the board of directors, as well as to a messenger-carried offer when the bargaining process has a time limit and the principal has interposed sufficient distance between himself and his messenger to make further communication evidently impossible before the time runs out.

Second, an "agent" may be brought in as a principal in his own right, with an incentive structure of his own that differs from his principal's. This device is involved in automobile insurance; the private citizen, in settling out of court, cannot threaten suit as effectively as the insurance company since the latter is more conspicuously obliged to carry out such threats to maintain its own reputation for subsequent accidents.[3]

Secrecy vs. Publicity. A potent means of commitment, and sometimes the only means, is the pledge of one's reputation. If national representatives can arrange to be charged with appeasement for every small concession, they place concession visibly beyond their own reach. If a union with other plants to deal with can arrange to make any retreat dramatically visible, it places its bargaining reputation in jeopardy and thereby becomes visibly incapable of serious compromise. (The same convenient jeopardy is the basis for the universally exploited defense, "If I did it for you I'd have to do it for everyone else.") But to commit in this fashion publicity is required. Both the initial offer and the final outcome would have to be known; and if secrecy surrounds either point, or if the outcome is inherently not observable, the device is unavailable. If one party has a "public" and the other has not, the latter may try to neutralize his disadvantage by excluding the relevant public; or if both parties fear the potentialities for stalemate in the simultaneous use of this tactic, they may try to enforce an agreement on secrecy.

Intersecting Negotiations. If a union is simultaneously engaged, or will shortly be engaged, in many negotiations while the management has no other plants and deals with no other unions, the management cannot convincingly stake its bargaining reputation while the union can. The advantage goes to the party that can persuasively point to an array of other

[3] The formal solution to the right-of-way problem in automobile traffic may be that the winner is the one who first becomes fully and visibly insured against all contingencies; since he then has no incentive to avoid accident, the other must yield and knows it. (The latter cannot counter in kind; no company will insure him now that the first is insured.) More seriously, the pooling of strike funds among unions reduces the visible incentive on each individual union to avoid a strike. As in the bilateral monopoly solution suggested earlier, there is a transfer of interest to a third party with a resulting visible shift in one's own incentive structure.

negotiations in which its own position would be prejudiced if it made a concession in this one. (The "reputation value" of the bargain may be less related to the outcome than to the firmness with which some initial bargaining position is adhered to.) Defense against this tactic may involve, among other things, both misinterpretation of the other party's position and an effort to make the eventual outcome incommensurable with the initial positions. If the subjects under negotiation can be enlarged in the process of negotiation, or the wage figure replaced by fringe benefits that cannot be reduced to a wage equivalent, an "out" is provided to the party that has committed itself; and the availability of this "out" weakens the commitment itself, to the disadvantage of the committed party.

Continuous Negotiations. A special case of interrelated negotiations occurs when the same two parties are to negotiate other topics, simultaneously or in the future. The logic of this case is more subtle; to persuade the other that one cannot afford to recede, one says in effect, "If I conceded to you here, you would revise your estimate of me in our other negotiations; to protect my reputation with you I must stand firm." The second party is simultaneously the "third party" to whom one's bargaining reputation can be pledged. This situation occurs in the threat of local resistance to local aggression. The party threatening achieves its commitment, and hence the credibility of its threat, not by referring to what it would gain from carrying out the threat in this particular instance but by pointing to the long-run value of a fulfilled threat in enhancing the credibility of future threats.

The Restrictive Agenda. When there are two objects to negotiate, the decision to negotiate them simultaneously or in separate forums or at separate times is by no means neutral to the outcome, particularly when there is a latent extortionate threat that can be exploited only if it can be attached to some more ordinary, legitimate, bargaining situation. The protection against extortion depends on refusal, unavailability, or inability, to negotiate. But if the object of the extortionate threat can be brought onto the agenda with the other topic, the latent threat becomes effective.

Tariff bargaining is an example. If reciprocal tariffs on cheese and automobiles are to be negotiated, one party may alter the outcome by threatening a purely punitive change in some other tariff. But if the bargaining representatives of the threatened party are confined to the cheese-automobile agenda, and have no instructions that permit them even to take cognizance of other commodities, or if there are ground rules that forbid mention of other tariffs while cheese and automobiles remain unsettled, this extortionate weapon must await another opportunity. If the threat that would be brought to the conference table is one that cannot stand publicity, publicity itself may prevent its effective communication.

The Possibility of Compensation. As Fellner has pointed out, agreement may be dependent on some means of redistributing costs or gains.[4] If duopolists, for example, divide markets in a way that maximizes their combined profits, some initial accrual of profits is thereby determined; any other division of the profits requires that one firm be able to compensate the other. If the fact of compensation would be evidence of illegal collusion, or if the motive for compensation would be misunderstood by the stockholders, or if the two do not sufficiently trust each other, some less optimum level of *joint* profits may be required in order that the initial accrual of profits to the two firms be in closer accordance with an agreed division of gains between them.

When agreement must be reached on something that is inherently a one-man act, any division of the cost depends on compensation. The "agenda" assumes particular importance in these cases, since a principal means of compensation is a concession on some other object. If two simultaneous negotiations can be brought into a contingent relationship with each other, a means of compensation is available. If they are kept separate, each remains an indivisible object.

It may be to the advantage of one party to keep a bargain isolated, and to the other to join it to some second bargain. If there are two projects, each with a cost of three, and each with a value of two to A and a value of four to B, and each is inherently a "one-man" project in its execution, and if compensation is

[4] W. Fellner, *Competition Among the Few* (New York, 1949), pp. 34–35, 191–97, 231–32, 234.

institutionally impossible, B will be forced to pay the entire cost of each as long as the two projects are kept separate. He cannot usefully threaten nonperformance, since A has no incentive to carry out either project by himself. But if B can link the projects together, offering to carry out one while A carries out the other, and can effectively threaten to abandon both unless A carries out one of them, A is left an option with a gain of four and a cost of three, which he takes, and B cuts his cost in half.

An important limitation of economic problems, as prototypes of bargaining situations, is that they tend disproportionately to involve divisible objects and compensable activities. If a drainage ditch in the back of one house will protect both houses; and if it costs $1,000 and is worth $800 to each home-owner; neither would undertake it separately, but we nevertheless usually assume that they will get together and see that this project worth $1,600 to the two of them gets carried out. But if it costs 10 hours a week to be scoutmaster, and each considers it worth 8 hours of his time to have a scout troop but one man must do the whole job, it is far from certain that the neighbors will reach a deal according to which one puts 10 hours on the job and the other pays him cash or does 5 hours' gardening for him. When two cars meet on a narrow road, the ensuing deadlock is aggravated by the absence of a custom of bidding to pay for the right of way. Parliamentary deadlocks occur when logrolling is impracticable. Measures that require unanimous agreement can often be initiated only if several are bundled together.[5]

The Mechanics of Negotiation. A number of other characteristics deserve mention, although we shall not work out their implications. Is there a penalty on the conveyance of false information? Is there a penalty on called bluffs, *i.e.*, can one put forth an offer and withdraw it after it has been accepted? Is there a penalty on hiring an agent who pretends to be an interested party and makes insincere offers, simply to test the position of the other party? Can all interested parties be recognized? Is there a time limit on the bargaining? Does the bargaining take the particular structure of an auction, a Dutch auction, a sealed bid system, or some other formal arrangement? Is there a *status quo*, so that unavailability for negotiation can win the *status quo* for the party that prefers it? Is renegotiation possible in case of stalemate? What are the costs of stalemate? Can compliance with the agreement be observed? What, in general, are the means of communication, and are any of them susceptible of being put out of order by one party or the other? If there are several items to negotiate, are they negotiated in one comprehensive negotiation, separately in a particular order so that each piece is finished before the next is taken up, or simultaneously through different agents or under different rules.

The importance of many of these structural questions becomes evident when one reflects on parliamentary technique. Rules that permit a president to veto an appropriation bill only in its entirety, or that require each amendment to be voted before the original act is voted on, or a priority system accorded to different kinds of motions, substantially alter the incentives that are brought to bear on each action. One who might be pressured into choosing second best is relieved of his vulnerability if he can vote earlier to eliminate that possibility, thereby leaving only first and third choices about which his preference is known to be so strong that no threat will be made.

Principles and Precedents. To be convincing, commitments usually have to be qualitative rather than quantitative, and to rest on some rationale. It may be difficult to conceive of a really firm commitment to $2.07½; why not $2.02¼? The numerical scale is too continuous to provide good resting places, except at nice round numbers like $2.00. But a commitment to the *principle* of "profit sharing," "cost-of-living increases," or any other basis for a numerical calculation that comes out at $2.07½, may provide a foothold for a commitment. Furthermore, one may create something of a commitment by putting the principles and precedents themselves in jeopardy. If in the past one has successfully maintained the principle of, say, nonrecognition of governments imposed by force, and elects to nail his demands to that principle in the present negotiation, he not only adduces precedent behind

[5] Inclusion of a provision on the Saar in the "Paris Agreements" that ended the occupation of Western Germany may have reflected either this principle or the one in the preceding paragraph.

his claim but risks the principle itself. Having pledged it, he may persuade his adversary that he would accept stalemate rather than capitulate and discredit the principle.

Casuistry. If one reaches the point where concession is advisable, he has to recognize two effects: it puts him closer to his opponent's position, and it affects his opponent's estimate of his firmness. Concession not only may be construed as capitulation, it may mark a prior commitment as a fraud, and make the adversary skeptical of any new pretense at commitment. One, therefore, needs an "excuse" for accommodating his opponent, preferably a rationalized reinterpretation of the original commitment, one that is persuasive to the adversary himself.

More interesting is the use of casuistry to release an opponent from a commitment. If one can demonstrate to an opponent that the latter is not committed, or that he has miscalculated his commitment, one may in fact undo or revise the opponent's commitment. Or if one can confuse the opponent's commitment, so that his constituents or principals or audience cannot exactly identify compliance with the commitment — show that "productivity" is ambiguous, or that "proportionate contributions" has several meanings — one may undo it or lower its value. In these cases it is to the opponent's disadvantage that this commitment be successfully refuted by argument. But when the opponent has resolved to make a moderate concession one may help him by proving that he *can* make a moderate concession consistent with his former position, and that if he does there are no grounds for believing it to reflect on his original principles. One must seek, in other words, a rationalization by which to deny himself too great a reward from his opponent's concession, otherwise the concession will not be made.[6]

III. The Threat

When one threatens to fight if attacked or to cut his price if his competitor does, the threat is no more than a communication of one's own incentives, designed to impress on the other the automatic consequences of his act. And, incidentally, if it succeeds in deterring, it benefits both parties.

But more than communication is involved when one threatens an act that he would have no incentive to perform but that is designed to deter through its promise of mutual harm. To threaten massive retaliation against small encroachments is of this nature, as is the threat to bump a car that does not yield the right of way or to call a costly strike if the wage rate is not raised a few cents. The distinctive feature of this threat is that the threatener has no incentive to carry it out either before the event or after. He does have an incentive to bind himself to fulfill the threat, if he thinks the threat may be successful, because the threat and not its fulfillment gains the end; and fulfillment is not required if the threat succeeds. The more certain the contingent fulfillment is, the less likely is actual fulfillment. But the threat's efficacy depends on the credulity of the other party, and the threat is ineffectual unless the threatener can rearrange or display his own incentives so as to demonstrate that he would, *ex post*, have an incentive to carry it out.[7]

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monly limits on the range of acceptable outcomes, and the least favorable outcome that one is free to accept may be substantially superior to stalemate. In these cases one's overriding purpose may be to forestall any misguided commitment by the other party. If the truth is more demonstrable than a false position, a conservative initial position is indicated, as it is if any withdrawal from an initial "advanced" position would discredit any subsequent attempt to convey the truth. Actually, though a person does not commonly invite penalties on his own behavior, the existence of an enforceable penalty on falsehood would be of assistance: if one can demonstrate, for example, his cost or income position by showing his income tax return, the penalties on fraud may enhance the value of this evidence.

Even the "pure" bilateral monopoly case becomes somewhat of this nature if the bargaining is conducted by agents or employees whose rewards are more dependent on *whether* agreement is reached than on how favorable the terms of the agreement are.

[6] In many textbook problems, such as bilateral monopoly between firms, the ends of the bargaining range are points of zero profits for one or the other party; and to settle for one's minimum position is no better than no settlement at all. But apart from certain buying and selling situations there are com-

[7] Incidentally, the deterrent threat has some interesting quantitative characteristics, reflecting the general asymmetry between rewards and punish-

We are back again at the commitment. How can one commit himself in advance to an act that he would in fact prefer not to carry out in the event, in order that his commitment may deter the other party? One can of course bluff, to persuade the other falsely that the costs or damages to the threatener would be minor or negative. More interesting, the one making the threat may pretend that he himself erroneously believes his own costs to be small, and therefore would mistakenly go ahead and fulfill the threat. Or perhaps he can pretend a revenge motivation so strong as to overcome the prospect of self-damage; but this option is probably most readily available to the truly revengeful. Otherwise he must find a way to commit himself.

One may try to stake his reputation on *fulfillment, in a manner that impresses the threatened person. One may even stake his reputation with the threatened person himself,* on grounds that it would be worth the costs and pains to give a lesson to the latter if he fails to heed the threat. Or one may try to arrange a *legal commitment,* perhaps through contracting with a third party.[8] Or if one can turn the whole business over to an agent whose salary (or business reputation) depends on carrying out the threat but who is *unalterably relieved* of any responsibility for the further costs, one may shift the *incentive.*

The commitment problem is nicely illustrated by the legal doctrine of the "last clear chance" which recognizes that, in the events that led up to an accident, there was some point at which the accident became inevitable as a result of prior actions, and that the abilities of the two parties to prevent it may not have expired at the same time. In bargaining, the commitment is a device to leave the last clear chance to decide the outcome with the other party, in a manner that he fully appreciates; it is to relinquish further initiative, having rigged the incentives so that the other party must choose in one's favor. If one driver speeds up so that he cannot stop, and the other realizes it, the latter has to yield. A legislative rider at the end of a session leaves the President the last clear chance to pass the bill. This doctrine helps to understand some of those cases *in which bargaining "strength" inheres* in what is weakness *by other standards.* When a person — or a country — has lost the power to help himself, or the power to avert mutual damage, the other interested party has no choice but to assume the cost or responsibility. "*Coercive deficiency*" is the term Arthur Smithies uses to describe the tactic of deliberately exhausting one's annual budgetary allowance so early in the year that the need for more funds is irresistibly urgent.[9]

A related tactic is maneuvering *into a status quo from which one can be* dislodged only by an overt act, an act that precipitates mutual damage because the maneuvering party has relinquished the power to retreat. If one carries explosives visibly on his person, in a manner that makes destruction obviously inevitable for himself and for any assailant, he may deter assault much more than if he retained any control over the explosives. If one commits a token force of troops that would be unable to escape, the commitment to full resistance is increased. Walter Lippmann has used the analogy of the plate glass window that helps to protect a jewelry store: anyone can break it easily enough, but not without creating an uproar.

Similar techniques may be available to the

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ments. It is not necessary, for example, that the threat promise more damage to the party threatened than to the party carrying it out. The threat to smash an old car with a new one may succeed if believed, or to sue expensively for small damages, or to start a price war. Also, as far as the power to deter is concerned, there is no such thing as "too large" a threat; if it is large enough to succeed, it *is not carried* out anyway. A threat is only "too large" if its very size interferes with its credibility. Atomic destruction for small misdemeanors, like expensive incarceration for overtime parking, would be superfluous but not exorbitant unless the threatened person considered it too awful to be real and ignored it.

[8] Mutual defense treaties among strong and weak nations might best be viewed in this light, *i.e.,* not as undertaken to reassure the small nations nor in exchange for a *quid pro quo,* but rather as a device for surrendering an embarrassing freedom of choice.

[9] A. Smithies, *The Budgetary Process in the United States* (New York, 1955), pp. 40, 56. One solution is the short tether of an apportionment process. See also T. C. Schelling, "American Foreign Assistance," *World Politics,* July 1955, VII, 609–25, regarding the same principle in foreign aid allocations.

one threatened. His best defense, of course, is to carry out the act before the threat is made; in that case there is neither incentive nor commitment for retaliation. If he cannot hasten the act itself, he may commit himself to it; if the person to be threatened is already committed, the one who would threaten cannot deter with his threat, he can only make certain the mutually disastrous consequences that he threatens.[10] If the person to be threatened can arrange before the threat is made to share the risk with others (as suggested by the insurance solution to the right-of-way problem mentioned earlier) he may become so visibly unsusceptible to the threat as to dissuade the threatener. Or if by any other means he can either change or misrepresent his own incentives, to make it appear that he would gain in spite of threat fulfillment (or perhaps only that he thinks he would), the threatener may have to give up the threat as costly and fruitless; or if one can misrepresent himself as either unable to comprehend a threat, or too obstinate to heed it, he may deter the threat itself. Best of all may be genuine ignorance, obstinacy, or simple disbelief, since it may be more convincing to the prospective threatener; but of course if it fails to persuade him and he commits himself to the threat, both sides lose. Finally, both the threat and the commitment have to be communicated; if the threatened person can be unavailable for messages, or can destroy the communication channels, even though he does so in an obvious effort to avert threat, he may deter the threat itself.[11] But the time to show disbelief or obstinacy is before the threat is made, *i.e.*, before the commitment is taken, not just before the threat is fulfilled; it does no good to be incredulous, or out of town, when the messenger arrives with the committed threat.

In threat situations, as in ordinary bargaining, commitments are not altogether clear; each party cannot exactly estimate the costs and values to the other side of the two related actions involved in the threat; the process of commitment may be a progressive one, the commitments acquiring their firmness by a sequence of actions. Communication is often neither entirely impossible nor entirely reliable; while certain evidence of one's commitment can be communicated directly, other evidence must travel by newspaper or hearsay, or be demonstrated by actions. In these cases the unhappy possibility of both acts occurring, as a result of simultaneous commitment, is increased. Furthermore, the recognition of this possibility of simultaneous commitment becomes itself a deterrent to the taking of commitments.[12]

In case a threat is made and fails to deter, there is a second stage prior to fulfillment in which both parties have an interest in undoing the commitment. The purpose of the threat is gone, its deterrence value is zero, and only the commitment exists to motivate fulfillment. This feature has, of course, an analogy with stalemate in ordinary bargaining, stalemate resulting from both parties getting committed to incompatible positions, or one party mistak-

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[10] The system of supplying the police with traffic tickets that are numbered and incapable of erasures makes it possible for the officer, by writing in the license number of the car before speaking to the driver, to preclude the latter's threat. Some trucks carry signs that say, "Alarm and lock system not subject to the driver's control." The time lock on bank vaults serves much the same purpose, as does the mandatory secret ballot in elections. So does starting an invasion with a small advance force that, though too small and premature to win the objective, attaches too much "face" to the enterprise to permit withdrawal: the larger force can then be readied without fear of inviting a purely deterrent threat. At Yale the faculty is protected by a rule that denies instructors the power to change a course grade once it has been recorded.

[11] The racketeer cannot sell protection if he cannot find his customer at home; nor can the kidnapper expect any ransom if he cannot communicate with friends or relatives. Thus, as a perhaps impractical suggestion, a law that required the immediate confinement of all interested friends and relatives when a kidnapping occurred might make the prospects for ransom unprofitably dim. The rotation of watchmen and policemen, or their assignment in random pairs, not only limits their exploitation of bribes but protects them from threats.

[12] It is a remarkable institutional fact that there is no simple, universal way for persons or nations to assume commitments of the kind we have been discussing. There are numerous ways they can try, but most of them are quite ambiguous, unsure, or only occasionally available. In the "cross-my-heart" society adverted to earlier, bargaining theory would reduce itself to game strategy and the mechanics of communication; but in most of the contemporary world the topic is mainly an empirical and institutional one of who can commit, how, and with what assurance of appreciation by the other side.

enly committing himself to a position that the other truly would not accept. If there appears a possibility of undoing the commitment, *both* parties have an interest in doing so. How to undo it is a matter on which their interests diverge, since different ways of undoing it lead to different outcomes. Furthermore, "undoing" does not mean neglecting the commitment regardless of reputation; "undoing," if the commitment of reputation was real, means disconnecting the threat from one's reputation, perhaps one's own reputation with the threatened person himself. It is therefore a subtle and tenuous situation in which, though both have an interest in undoing the commitment, they may be quite unable to collaborate in undoing it.

Special care may be needed in defining the threat, both the act that is threatened against and the counter act that is threatened. The difficulty arises from the fact, just noted, that once the former has been done the incentive to perform the latter has disappeared. The credibility of the threat before the act depends on how visible to the threatened party is the ability of the threatening party to rationalize his way out of his commitment once it has failed its purpose. Any loopholes the threatening party leaves himself, if they are visible to the threatened party, weaken the visible commitment and hence reduce the credibility of the threat.

It is essential, therefore, for maximum credibility to leave as little room as possible for judgment or discretion in carrying out the threat. If one is committed to punish a certain type of behavior when it reaches certain limits, but the limits are not carefully and objectively defined, the party threatened will realize that when the time comes to decide whether the threat must be enforced or not, his interest and that of the threatening party will coincide in an attempt to avoid the mutually unpleasant consequences.

In order to make a threat precise, so that its terms are visible both to the threatened party and to any third parties whose reaction to the whole affair is of value to the adversaries, it may be necessary to introduce some arbitrary elements. The threat must involve overt acts rather than intentions; it must be attached to the visible deeds, not invisible ones; it may have to attach itself to certain ancillary actions that are of no consequence in themselves to the threatening party. It may, for example, have to put a penalty on the carrying of weapons rather than their use; on suspicious behavior rather than observed misdemeanors; on proximity to a crime rather than the crime itself. And, finally, the act of punishment must be one whose effect or influence is clearly discernible.[13]

In order that one be able to pledge his reputation behind a threat, there must be continuity between the present and subsequent issues that will arise. This need for continuity suggests a means of making the original threat more effective; if it can be decomposed into a series of consecutive smaller threats, there is an opportunity to demonstrate on the first few transgressions that the threat will be carried out on the rest. Even the first few become more plausible, since there is a more obvious incentive to fulfill them as a "lesson."

This principle is perhaps most relevant to acts that are inherently a matter of degree. In foreign aid programs the overt act of terminating assistance may be obviously painful to both sides as not to be taken seriously by the recipient, but if each small misuse of funds is to be accompanied by a small reduction in assistance, never so large as to leave the recipient helpless nor to provoke a diplomatic breach, the willingness to carry it out will receive more credulity; or, if it does not at first, a few lessons may be persuasive without too much damage.[14]

The threatening party may not, of course, be able to divide the act into steps. (Both the act to be deterred and the punishment must be divisible.) But the principle at least suggests the unwisdom of defining aggression, or transgression, in terms of some critical degree or

[13] During 1950, the Economic Cooperation Administration declared its intention to reward Marshall Plan countries that followed especially sound policies, and to penalize those that did not, through the device of larger or smaller aid allotments. But since the base figures had not been determined, and since their determination would ultimately involve judgment rather than formulas, there would be no way afterwards to see whether in fact the additions and subtractions were made, and the plan suffered from implausibility.

[14] Perhaps the common requirement for amortization of loans at frequent intervals, rather than in a lump sum at the end of the loan period, reflects an analogous principle, as does the custom of giving frequent examinations in a college course to avoid letting a student's failure hinge exclusively on a single grading decision after the course is finished.

amount that will be deemed intolerable. When the act to be deterred is inherently a sequence of steps whose cumulative effect is what matters, a threat geared to the increments may be more credible than one that must be carried either all at once or not at all when some particular point has been reached. It may even be impossible to define a "critical point" with sufficient clarity to be persuasive.

To make the threatened acts divisible, the acts themselves may have to be modified. Parts of an act that cannot be decomposed may have to be left out; ancillary acts that go with the event, though of no interest in themselves, may be objects to which a threat can effectively be attached. For example, actions that are only preparatory to the main act, and by themselves do no damage, may be susceptible of chronological division and thus be effective objects of the threat. The man who would kick a dog should be threatened with modest punishment for each step toward the dog, even though his proximity is of no interest in itself.

Similar to decomposing a threat into a series is starting a threat with a punitive act that grows in severity with the passage of time. Where a threat of death by violence might not be credited, cutting off the food supply might bring submission. For moral or public relations purposes, this device may in fact leave the "last clear chance" to the other, whose demise is then blamed on his stubbornness if the threat fails. But in any case the threatener gets his overt act out of the way while it is still preliminary and minor, rather than letting it stand as a final, dreadful, and visible obstacle to his resolution. And if the suffering party is the only one in a position to know, from moment to moment, how near to catastrophe they have progressed, his is the last clear chance in a real sense. Furthermore, the threatener may be embarrassed by his adversary's collapse but not by his discomfort; and the device may therefore transform a dangerous once-for-all threat into a less costly continuous one. Tenants are less easily removed by threat of forcible eviction than by simply shutting off the utilities.[15]

A piecemeal approach may also be used by the threatened person. If he cannot obviate the threat by hastening the entire act, he may hasten some initial stage that clearly commits him to eventual completion. Or, if his act is divisible while the threatener's retaliation comes only in the large economy size, performing it as a series of increments may deny the threatener the dramatic overt act that would trigger his response.

IV. The Promise

Among the legal privileges of corporations, two that are mentioned in textbooks are the right to sue and the "right" to be sued. Who wants to be sued! But the right to be sued is the power to make a promise: to borrow money, to enter a contract, to do business with someone who might be damaged. If suit does arise the "right" seems a liability in retrospect; beforehand it was a prerequisite to doing business.

In brief, the right to be sued is the power to accept a commitment. In the commitments discussed up to this point, it was essential that one's adversary (or "partner," however we wish to describe him) not have the power to release one from the commitment; the commitment was, in effect, to some third party, real or fictitious. The promise is a commitment to the second party in the bargain, and is required whenever the final action of one or of each is outside the other's control. It is required whenever an agreement leaves any incentive to cheat.[16]

This need for promises is more than incidental; it has an institutional importance of its own. It is not always easy to make a convincing, self-binding, promise. Both the kidnapper who would like to release his prisoner, and the prisoner, may search desperately for a way to commit the latter against informing on his

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[15] This seems to be the tactic that avoided an explosion and induced de Gaulle's forces to vacate a province they had occupied in Northern Italy in June 1945, after they had announced that any effort of their allies to dislodge them would be treated as a hostile act. See Harry S. Truman, *Year of Decisions* (New York, 1955), pp. 239–42; and Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, Vol. VI of *The Second World War* (Boston, 1953), pp. 566–68.

[16] The threat may seem to be a promise if the pledge behind it is only one's reputation with his adversary; but it is not a promise from which the second party can unilaterally release the threatener, since he cannot convincingly dissociate his own future estimate of the threatener from the latter's performance.

captor, without finding one. If the victim has committed an act whose disclosure could lead to blackmail, he may confess it; if not, he might commit one in the presence of his captor, to create the bond that will ensure his silence. But these extreme possibilities illustrate how difficult, as well as important, it may be to assume a promise. If the law will not enforce price agreements; or if the union is unable to obligate itself to a no-strike pledge; or if a contractor has no assets to pay damages if he loses a suit, and the law will not imprison debtors; or if there is no "audience" to which one can pledge his reputation; it may not be possible to strike a bargain, or at least the same bargain that would otherwise be struck.

Bargaining may have to concern itself with an "incentive" system as well as the division of gains. Oligopolists may lobby for a "fair-trade" law; or exchange shares or stocks. An agreement to stay out of each other's market may require an agreement to redesign the products to be unsuitable in each other's area. Two countries that wish to agree not to make military use of an island may have to destroy the usefulness of the island itself. (In effect, a "third-party commitment" has to be assumed when an effective "second-party commitment" cannot be devised.)[17]

Fulfillment is not always observable. If one sells his vote in a secret election, or a government agrees to recommend an act to its parliament, or an employee agrees not to steal from inventory, or a teacher agrees to keep his political opinions out of class, or a country agrees to stimulate exports "as much as possible," there is no reliable way to observe or measure compliance. The observable outcome is subject to a number of influences, only one of which is covered by the agreement. The bargain may therefore have to be expressed in terms of something observable, even though what is observable is not the intended object of the bargain. One may have to pay the bribed voter if the election is won, not on how he voted; to pay a salesman a commission on sales, rather than on skill and effort; to reward policemen according to statistics on crime rather than on attention to duty; or to punish all employees for the transgressions of one. And where performance is a matter of degree, the bargain may have to define arbitrary limits distinguishing performance from nonperformance; a specified loss of inventory treated as evidence of theft; a specified increase in exports considered an "adequate" effort; specified samples of performance taken as representative of total performance.[18]

The tactic of decomposition applies to promises as well as to threats. What makes many agreements enforceable is only the recognition of future opportunities for agreement that will be eliminated if mutual trust is not created and maintained, and whose value outweighs the momentary gain from cheating in the present instance. Each party must be confident that the other will not jeopardize future opportunities by destroying trust at the outset. This confidence does not always exist; and one of the purposes of piecemeal bargains is to cultivate the necessary mutual expectations. Neither may be willing to trust the other's prudence (or the other's confidence in the first's prudence, etc.) on a large issue. But if a number of preparatory bargains can be struck on a small scale, each may be willing to risk a small investment to create a tradition of trust. The purpose is to let each party demonstrate that he appreciates the need for trust and that he knows the other does too. So if a major issue has to be negotiated, it may be necessary to seek out and negotiate some minor items for "practice," to establish the necessary confidence in each other's awareness of the long-term value of good faith.

Even if the future will bring no recurrence, it may be possible to create the equivalence of continuity by dividing the bargaining issue into consecutive parts. If each party agrees to send a million dollars to the Red Cross on condition the other does, each may be tempted to cheat if the other contributes first, and each one's anticipation of the other's cheating will inhibit agreement. But if the contribution is divided into consecutive small contributions, each can try the other's good faith for a small price. Furthermore, since each can keep the other on short tether to the finish, no one ever need risk

[17] In an earlier age, hostages were exchanged.

[18] Inability to assume an enforceable promise, like inability to perform the activity demanded, may protect one from an extortionate threat. The mandatory secret ballot is a nuisance to the voter who would like to sell his vote, but protection to the one who would fear coercion.

more than one small contribution at a time. Finally, this change in the incentive structure itself takes most of the risk out of the initial contribution; the value of established trust is made obviously visible to both.

Preparatory bargains serve another purpose. Bargaining can only occur when at least one party takes initiative in proposing a bargain. A deterrent to initiative is the information it yields, or may seem to yield, about one's eagerness. But if each has visible reason to expect the other to meet him half way, because of a history of successful bargaining, that very history provides protection against the inference of overeagerness.[19]

V. An Illustrative Game

Various bargaining situations involving commitments, threats, promises, and communication problems, can be illustrated by variants of a game in which each of two persons has a pair of alternatives from which to choose. North chooses either A *or* α; East chooses either B or β. Each person's gain depends on the choices of both. Each of the four possible combined choices, AB, $A\beta$, αB, or $\alpha\beta$, yields a particular gain or loss for North and a particular gain or loss for East. No compensation is payable between North and East. In general, each person's preference may depend on the choice the other makes.

Each such game can be quantitatively represented in a two dimensional graph, with North's gain measured vertically and East's horizontally, and the values of the four combined choices denoted by points labeled AB, $A\beta$, $\alpha\beta$, and αB. In spite of the simplicity of the game there is actually a large number of qualitatively different variants, depending not only on the relative positions of the four points in the plane but also on the "rules" about order of moves, possibility of communication, availability of means of commitment, enforceability of promises, and whether two or more games between two persons can be joined together. The variations can be multiplied almost without limit by selecting different hypotheses about what each player knows or guesses about the "values" of the four outcomes for the other player, and what he guesses the other party guesses about himself. For convenience we assume here that the eight "values" are obvious in an obvious way to both persons. And, just as we have ruled out compensation, we rule out also threats of actions that lie outside the game. A very small sample of such games is presented.

Figure 1 represents an "ordinary" bargaining situation if we adopt the rule that North and East must reach explicit agreement before they choose. $A\beta$ and αB can be thought of as alternative agreements that they may reach, while AB and $\alpha\beta$, with zero values for both persons, can be interpreted as the bargaining equivalent of "no sale." Whoever can first commit himself wins. If North can commit himself to A he will secure $A\beta$, since he leaves East a choice between $A\beta$ and AB and the former is obviously East's choice under the circumstances. If East could have committed himself first to B, however, North would have been restricted to a choice of αB or no agreement (*i.e.*, of αB or AB) and would have agreed to αB. As a matter of fact, first commitment is a kind of "first move"; and in a game with the same numbers but with moves in turn, first move would be an advantage. If, by mistake, both parties get committed, North to A and East to B, they lock themselves in stalemates at AB.

Figure 2 illustrates a deterrent threat if we interpret AB as the *status quo,* with North planning a shift to α (leading to αB) and East threatening a shift to β (resulting in $\alpha\beta$) if he does. If North moves first, East can only lose by moving to β, and similarly if North can commit himself to α before East can make his threat; but if East can effectively threaten the mutually undesirable $\alpha\beta$, he leaves North only a choice of $\alpha\beta$ or AB and North chooses the latter. Note that it is not sufficient for East to commit his *choice* in advance, as it was in Figure 1; he must commit himself to a *conditional* choice, B or β depending on whether North

[19] Perhaps two adversaries who look forward to some large negotiated settlement would do well to keep avenues open for negotiation of minor issues. If, for example, the number of loose ends in dispute between East and West should narrow down so much that nothing remains to be negotiated but the "ultimate issue" (some final, permanent disposition of all territories and armaments) the possibility of even opening negotiations on the latter might be jeopardized. Or if the minor issues are not disposed of, but become so attached to the "big" issue that willingness to negotiate on them would be construed as overeagerness on the whole settlement, the possibility of preparatory bargains might disappear.



FIGURE 1



FIGURE 2

chooses A or α. If East committed his choice he would obtain only the advantage of "first move"; and in the present game, if moves were in turn, North would win at αB regardless of who moved first. (East would choose B rather than β, to leave North a choice of αB or AB rather than of $\alpha\beta$ or $A\beta$; and North would take $\alpha\beta$. North, with first move, would choose α rather than A, leaving East $\alpha\beta$ or αB rather than $A\beta$ or AB; East would take αB.)

Figure 3 illustrates the promise. Whoever goes first, or even if moves are simultaneous, αB is a "minimax"; either can achieve it by himself, and neither can threaten the other with anything worse. Both would, however, prefer $A\beta$ to αB; but to reach $A\beta$ they must trust each other or be able to make enforceable promises. Whoever goes first, the other has an incentive to cheat; if North chooses A, East can take AB, and if East chooses β first, North can choose $\alpha\beta$. If moves are simultaneous each has an incentive to cheat, and each may expect the other to cheat; and either deliberate cheating, or self-protection against the other's incentive to cheat, indicates choices of α and B. At least one party must be able to commit himself to abstention; then the other can move first. If both must move simultaneously, both must be able to make enforceable promises.

Figure 4 is the same as Figure 3 except that αB has been moved leftward. Here, in the absence of communication, North wins at $\alpha\beta$ regardless of whether he or East moves first or moves are simultaneous. If, however, East can communicate a conditional commitment, he can force North to choose A and an outcome



FIGURE 3



FIGURE 4

of $A\beta$. But this commitment is something more than either a promise or a threat; it is both a promise and a threat. He must threaten αB if North chooses α; and he must promise "not AB" if North chooses A. The threat alone will not induce North to avoid α; αB is better than AB for North, and AB is what he gets with A if East is free to choose B. East must commit himself to do, for either α or A, the opposite of what he would do if he were not committed: abstention from AB or immolation at αB.

Finally, Figures 5 and 6 show two games that separately contain nothing of interest but together make possible an extortionate threat. Figure 5 has a minimax solution at αB; either can achieve αB, neither can enforce anything better, no collaboration is possible, no threat can be made. Figure 6, though contrasting with Figure 5 in the identity of interest between the two parties, is similarly devoid of any need for collaboration or communication or any possible threat to exploit. With or without communication, with or without an order of moves, the outcome is at AB.

But suppose the two games are simultaneously up for decision, and the same two parties are involved in both. If either party can commit himself to a threat he may improve his position. East, for example, could threaten to choose β rather than B in game 6, unless North chose A rather than α in games 5; alternatively, North could threaten α in game 6 unless East chose β in game 5. Assuming the intervals large enough in game 6, and the threat persuasively committed and communicated, the threatener gains in game 5 at no cost in game 6. Because his threat succeeds he does not carry it out; so he gets AB in 6 as well as his preferred choice in game 5. To express this result differently, game 6 supplies what was ruled out earlier, namely the threat of an act "outside the game." From the point of view of game 5, game 6 is an extraneous act, and East might as well threaten to burn North's house down if he does not choose A in 5. But such purely extortionate threats are not always easy to make; they often require an occasion, an object, and a means of communication, and additionally often suffer from illegality, immorality, or resistance out of sheer stubbornness. The joining of two negotiations on the same agenda may thus succeed where a purely gratuitous threat would be impracticable.

If North cannot commit himself to a threat, and consequently desires only to prevent a threat by East, it is in his interest that communication be impossible; or, if communication occurs, it is in his interest that the two games not be placed on the same agenda; or, if he cannot prevent their being discussed together by East, it is in his interest to turn each game over to a different agent whose compensation depends only on the outcome of his own game. If North can force game 6 to be played first, and is unable to commit himself in response to a threat, the threat is obviated. If he can commit his choice in game 5 before the threat is made, he is safe. But if he can commit himself in game 5, and game 6 is to be played first,



FIGURE 5



FIGURE 6

East could threaten to choose β in game 6 unless North assumed a prior commitment to A in game 5; in this case North's ability to commit himself is a disadvantage, since it permits him to be forced into "playing" game 5 ahead of 6.

Incidentally, dropping AB vertically in Figure 2 to below the level $\alpha\beta$ would illustrate an important principle, namely, that moving one point in a manner "unfavorable" to North may actually improve the outcome for him. The threat that kept him from winning in Figure 2 depends on the comparative attractiveness of AB over $\alpha\beta$ for North: if AB is made worse for him than $\alpha\beta$ he becomes immune to the threat, which then is not made, and he wins at $\alpha\beta$. This is an abstract analogy of the principle that, in bargaining, weakness may be strength.

5

Leaders and Followers in American Politics

Are American politics, broadly speaking, "democratic"? That is, are leaders in some sense controlled by nonleaders? Clearly nonleaders issue few direct instructions to leaders. Issues get all jumbled up in political campaigns. It is hard, if not impossible, to identify the mandate of any particular elected official. This is especially true in a country where Presidents and Congressmen whose policies are diametrically opposed are often elected by the same constituency. Is it true, moreover, that Americans do not *care* very much about politics? Voting turnouts run somewhat lower than in other modern societies. Few people report themselves as active participants in politics. Surprisingly few profess interest in political issues. How is it possible for a democratic political system to run under these circumstances?

One explanation may be that there is a broad substratum of agreement among most members of society, so that issues threatening in some basic way to major groups simply do not get raised and fought out in the political arena. This substratum of agreement may, indeed, be nothing more than a tacit agreement not to act. Prothro and Grigg, in their pilot study, show that Americans agree in the abstract about democratic values, but not when these values are formulated specifically. Even more important, however, is the fact that so few people get up the energy to act on their anti-democratic impulses. Behaviorally, failure to overturn the results of a generally democratic system has much the same effect as "agreement" on (or lip-service to) democratic values. In Chapter Four, it was suggested that issues in our system are raised in piecemeal fashion. Hence, leaders and followers alike rarely confront situations in which all-or-nothing choices must be made, where some ambiguity or room for maneuver is not present. Slogans posing alternatives such as "Red or Dead" may be useful for rallying the emotions, but they do not refer to alternatives that Americans face in the real world. Voters choose not between Red and Dead but between Kennedy and Nixon. Of the thousands of bills facing

Congress in each session, none provides for one or the other. In such a system, observers may on occasion feel frustrated that issues seem rarely to be "settled" one way or another; winners seldom take all, and losers generally survive to fight another day. This fact, frustrating though it may be to the tidy-minded, has its constructive side. It builds loyalty to the preservation of the political system, on the part of winners and losers alike.

Parties and elections play key roles in maintaining this system, and in giving it democratic characteristics. One of the major necessities of a democratic society is, after all, that leaders be replaceable by the action of nonleaders. It is thus of some significance that in American national politics, turnover of leaders is legitimate. Furthermore, it is not only in theory legitimate but in fact possible for one ruling group to be replaced by another. The method by which this turnover is accomplished is peaceable, well accepted, and can be participated in by a large share of those governed. Elections are "real" as opposed to "fake" in that not only does a majority of the eligible population vote, but there also exists a lively chance for one ruling group to be supplanted by another.

Secondly, election outcomes, while they have "real" consequences, do not disturb the underlying consensus. The consequences of elections are real for the contestants, but are of only minor significance for everyone else. This seems to us to be the mechanism through which turnover is legitimized: noncombatants view turnover as more or less as satisfactory as the status quo. Contestants who win are of course content. The team that loses one office always has a chance at winning others, and the fact that changes in the system are brought about only slowly and incrementally, because of the constitutional necessity of gaining the consent of so many actors within the system, means that losers of elections can often gain their policy preferences on a variety of issues. Hence, those who are mobilized and politically active have the most to gain from maintenance of the system.

Parties fit into this system by providing useful machinery for both leaders and nonleaders. For leaders, the party is the organization which supplies a method for the recruitment and advancement of contestants for public office. For nonleaders, the party is the great economizing device. Knowing what party you support makes it unnecessary to know more about individual candidates or technical issues. Information costs are cut to the point where politics is assigned its "proper" place in the scheme of things (a place of extremely low saliency for most people) and this makes noninvolvement in politics feasible while norms of civic duty are complied with.

The readings of these chapters elaborate these themes. Frank Sorauf's article offers the challenging hypothesis that if parties are meaningful to nonleaders only in a "sentimental" sense (i.e., if people vote for candidates because of emotional attachment, family tradition or habitual reflex favoring a particular party), then the more tangible rewards for party support, such as patronage, have much less importance in the maintenance of party organizations than was heretofore thought. If anything, patronage seems to build up gratitude to *persons* rather than parties, and to local dispensers rather than central originators. If Sorauf is right, then a dominating function of political parties no longer is to dispense patronage. The usefulness of this device in generating even a modest amount of party loyalty at the polls is chimerical

in today's politics. But if sentiments of loyalty are all that bind people to parties nowadays, then these can be interrupted and outweighed by other, stronger sentiments, such as adulation for a national hero. This seems to be a plausible explanation for General Eisenhower's amazing popularity among Democrats and Republicans alike, as Hyman and Sheatsley indicate.

Key suggests that certain "critical elections" in history can be identified as having fixed the sentiments of great masses in the population in one or another direction, and he develops evidence arguing the plausibility of this notion. Unfortunately, it is not possible using Key's theory to develop any reliable way of telling, except after the fact, whether a shift of voters in any given year is to be lasting or transitory. Samuel Lubell and other commentators have suggested, for example, that the astounding Eisenhower victories of 1952 and 1956 presaged a critical shift in the party affiliations of certain elements in the population, a prediction which the off-year Congressional elections and the subsequent election of President Kennedy seem to have rendered dubious. Even so, Key takes the first step in suggesting indices which will identify major historical shifts in sentiment. The task of specifying the social processes by which these shifts take place remains for the future.

It is no mean task to do this, as Warren Miller's article makes clear. We really know very little about how the various sentiments which go into the choice of a candidate by millions of voters combine with other loyalties to produce the end product we view, the party vote. Miller's analysis effectively cuts the ground from under one major indicator used by political leaders and observers to judge the strength of a candidate's contribution to his ticket, the so-called coattail effect.

Measuring "coattails" means comparing the votes for one candidate on a party ticket with the votes for another. The man with more votes is presumed to have provided help to the candidate with fewer votes by a proportion roughly equivalent to the difference between their totals. As Miller points out, the actual figures used to validate this hunch may in reality attest to the opposite. That is, they indicate the extent to which people who voted for the ticket leader *failed* to vote for the other man. The questionable assumption behind the coattail effect has to do with what motivates people to vote straight or split tickets. The reasoning of coattail watchers goes like this: the people who vote straight tickets are in the directions of their political orientation much like people who split their tickets. Many people vote a straight ticket because it is easy to do, and they do so because they see a popular name on the ticket. Popular names on the ticket are assumed to appeal equally well to both these straight ticket voters, and to people who split their tickets. Hence, the number of tickets split in favor of a candidate gives a rough estimate of his popularity with straight ticket voters too. This reasoning has a certain persuasiveness, but, as Miller says, very little has been done to test its validity. We do know that there are a good many differences between ticket-splitters and straight ticket voters, and perhaps these differences are relevant to the study of coattails.

In the American political system, not only is there a peculiar disjunction between the sentiments of voters and the policies of elected leaders, but, on most substantive issues which arise in the course of governmental activity, political leaders and followers are on the whole out of touch with one another. This is the major thesis of the two selections by Lewis Dexter. There is no reason to suppose that the Congress-

man is less well informed than other leaders on the national level about what "the people" or any significant portion thereof, want. In some ways, no doubt, their communication channels to the grass roots are better than those of others in Washington. But even so-called "pressure groups" leave Congressmen pretty much alone, or contact them irregularly.

Freedom from grass roots pressure, except of the most trivial sort, does not necessarily free leaders to pursue policies whimsically since there are always the "grass tops" to contend with. In the first place, the political opposition back home is always watching. Furthermore, there are sometimes a few alert and meaningful interest groups, and indeed, often these groups are mobilized by other Congressmen in order to bring pressure to bear on their colleagues. Despite the centripetal influences enumerated by David Truman (e.g., the President's access to national publicity, the alleged growing similarity of problems from locale to locale, the growing impact of federal expenditures and standards on local outcomes) the Congressman is still sent to Washington by the people back home. And, as Truman says, "The relationships which the legislator has established and maintained within the constituency are primary and crucial; others are secondary and incidental."

Many Congressmen are quite free to create their own relationships with their own peculiar clientele of interest groups and voters back home. Many, of course, are closely tied to political organizations in their home states. Nonetheless, in the American political system we have something far more complex and subtle than state organizations that get together every four years to elect a President, or Bryce's "empty-bottles-variously-labeled." Parties are becoming more cohesive under the impact of a magnified presidency and "interests and issues [such as foreign policy] which will tend to cut through rather than to unify constituencies . . . and which demand standardized national solutions." There is a definite tendency for electioneering functions of the "presidential party" to become centralized. With compelling national issues, and media capable of making them persuasive throughout the land, candidates find it increasingly difficult to cut themselves off from the head of the ticket. Their desire to reduce risks by establishing bases of support independent of the actions and fortunes of the national leadership is less and less compatible with the issues of concern to their constituents (and themselves). But both groups are still fairly immune to party discipline in the sense of overarching doctrine or centralized hierarchical demands, supervised by the President. This may change as the country grows and Congressmen come to represent more and more people who are more and more socially heterogeneous and cosmopolitan and, worst of all, from the standpoint of independence from the President, more and more estranged from him.

The costs of getting acquainted may well throw Congressional candidates into the loving grasp of the mass media, which cost big money. This in turn must come from somewhere, and perhaps the ultimate sources will be wealthy party angels who distribute their largesse through national agencies in exchange for a sympathetic hearing for their policy preferences — which could range from oil depletion allowances to civil rights action. The mass media also encourage the use of brand names for the products to be sold. But the day of party government is not upon us yet. For, among other things, it must await a much more issue-conscious electorate.

The system cannot be characterized as a simple one, where nonleaders speak with one voice. The "mandate" or "general will" does not exist in any meaningful

sense. Nor do leaders respond with a set of well-articulated, logically coherent policies. In fact, fewer really pertinent demands — that is, on questions where public officials actually can do something about it — are made than is commonly supposed. Apparently even the act of making demands of government takes skill and effort far beyond what most citizens are disposed or able to marshall. At least, as Woodward and Roper show, very few citizens engage in this kind of activity.

How, then, do nonleaders guide leaders in our system? Neither through directives on specific issues by their votes, nor by their lobbying activities; nor, indeed, by adhering to partisan doctrines. Rather, nonleaders set a "zone of indifference," an underlying apathy that constrains the scope of political conflict. Secondly, they vote in contested elections. Politicians are uncertain enough of the outcomes of these to remain open to a variety of policy suggestions, particularly those advanced through skilled and dedicated lobbying activities. These characteristics result in a system which is stable, permeable, and democratic.

34

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY

Bases of Agreement and Disagreement

• *JAMES W. PROTHRO and CHARLES M. GRIGG*

The idea that consensus on fundamental principles is essential to democracy is a recurrent proposition in political theory. Perhaps, because of its general acceptance, the proposition has never been formulated in very precise terms. When authoritative sources state, for example, that "a successful democracy requires the existence of a large measure of consensus in society," exactly what is meant? We assume that the term "successful democracy," although far from precise, carries a widely shared meaning among political scientists. But we are not told in this typical assertion on what *issues* or *problems* consensus must exist. Presumably they are the basic issues about how political power should be won. Nor are we told what degree of agreement democracy requires. Since the word "consensus" is used to refer to "general agreement or concord," however, a "large measure of consensus" presumably falls somewhere close to 100 per cent.[1] For the purpose of examining the proposition as it is generally formulated, then, we interpret it as asserting: a necessary condition for the existence of a democratic government is widespread agreement (approaching 100 per cent) among the adult

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[1] The consensus of Quaker meetings seems to mean unanimity; although no formal vote is recorded, discussion continues until a position emerges on which no dissent is expressed. Similarly, the literature on the family refers to "family consensus" in a way that suggests unanimity; in a family of three or four people, even one dissenter would make it impossible to speak of consensus. At a different extreme, some students of collective behavior employ a functional definition of consensus, taking it to mean that amount of agreement in a group which is necessary for the group to act. Political scientists clearly do not have such limited agreement in mind when they speak of consensus as necessary to democracy. Majorities as large as three-fourths are required by the Constitution (in ratifying amendments), but such a large majority is no more thought of as consensus than a majority of 50 per cent plus one. Our purpose here is not to develop a general definition of consensus. We interpret the vague usage of the term to suggest agreement approaching unanimity. And, since our study actually found agreement as great as 98 per cent on some questions, we regard any degree of agreement that falls significantly below this figure to be less than consensus.

members of society on at least the basic questions about how political power is won. Specifically, we propose to submit this proposition to empirical examination in an effort to give it more precise meaning and to discover bases of agreement and/or disagreement on fundamental principles.

A recent symposium by three leading political theorists illustrates both the widespread assumption that consensus is necessary and the lack of precision with which the concept of consensus is discussed. In considering the cultural prerequisites of democracy, they all assume the necessity of agreement on basic values, differing only as to the underlying sources of "the attitudes we regard as cultural prerequisites."[2] Ernest S. Griffith supplies an initial list of "the necessary attitudes to sustain democratic institutions," but he is not clear on whether an actual consensus is necessary: ". . . I believe that they must be sufficiently widespread to be accepted as *norms* of desirable conduct, so that deviations therefrom are subject to questioning and usually social disapproval."[3]

John Plamenatz emphasizes individualism as "the sentiment which must be widespread and strong if democracy is to endure," and adds that individualism "has a less general, a less abstract side to it" than the vague "right of every man to order his life as he pleases provided he admits the same right in others." Here the requisite attitudes must be *strong* as well as *widespread*, but when Plamenatz shifts to the specific side he refers to "the faith of the *true* democrat," a somewhat less inclusive reference.[4]

J. Roland Pennock says, "We are in agreement that certain attitudes are essential to democracy," and his initial quantitative requirements are similar to the "widespread" and "strong" criteria: "Unless *the bulk of the society* is committed to a high valuation of these ideals [liberty and equality] it can hardly be expected that institutions predicated upon them will work successfully or long endure."[5] But when he turns to the idea of consensus as such, he withdraws all precision from the phrase "the bulk of the society": "Of course democracy, like other forms of government but to a greater extent, must rest upon a measure of consensus . . . . But can we say with any precision what must be the nature or extent of this consensus, what matters are so fundamental that they must be the subject of general agreement? I doubt it."[6] Here consensus appears necessary as a matter "of course," but we cannot say on what matters it must exist (Pennock cites two opposing views — the necessity of agreement on the substance of policy versus the necessity of agreement on procedures for determining policy); nor need consensus have a great "extent," which presumably means that it can vary from the "great bulk" to even greater portions of society.[7]

Other theorists take similar positions. William Ebenstein, for example, submits that "the *common agreement on fundamentals* is a . . . condition indispensable to . . . political democracy."[8] Bernard R. Berelson asserts, "For political democracy to survive . . . a basic consensus must bind together the contending parties."[9] The same assumption is implicit in Harry V. Jaffa's more specific formulation of the content of consensus: "To be dedicated to this proposition [that 'all men are created equal'], whether by the preservation of equal rights already achieved, or by the preservation of the hope of an equality yet to be achieved, was the 'value' which was the *absolutely necessary condition* of the democratic process."[10]

All of these theorists thus assume the necessity of consensus on some principles but with-

2 Ernest S. Griffith, John Plamenatz and J. Roland Pennock, "Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium," *The American Political Science Review*, L (March, 1956), 101.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 103–104. Italics are his.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 118. Italics are added.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 129–131. Italics are added.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 132.

7 If the term consensus has any meaning, it is in a great extent of agreement; Pennock's reference to the varying "extent" of consensus must accordingly mean variations from large to even larger majorities.

8 *Today's Isms* (Englewood Cliffs, 1954), p. 99. Italics are his.

9 Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Election* (Chicago, 1954), p. 313. Although not a political theorist, Berelson was speaking here on the "theoretical" aspects of "Democratic Practice and Democratic Theory."

10 " 'Value Consensus' in Democracy: The Issue in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates," *The American Political Science Review*, LII (September, 1958), 753. Italics are added. Among the other theorists who have offered similar conclusions is Norman L.

out giving the term any precise meaning.[11] In specifying the principles on which agreement must exist, some differences appear. Although, as Pennock notes, some have gone so far as to argue the need for agreement on the substance of policy, the general position is that consensus is required only on the procedures for winning political power. At the broadest level Ebenstein says that "the most important agreement . . . is the common desire to operate a democratic system,"[12] and Pennock begins his list with "a widespread desire to be self-governing."[13] In addition to this highly general commitment, most theorists speak of consensus on the general values of liberty, equality, individualism, compromise, and acceptance of procedures necessary to majority rule and minority rights. For most of these general principles, the existence (and therefore perhaps the necessity) of consensus is supported by "common sense" observation, by logic, and by opinion survey results. Consensus certainly seems to exist among the American people on the desirability of operating "a democratic system" and on such abstract principles as the idea that "all men are created equal."[14]

But for some of the principles on which agreement is said (without empirical support) to be necessary, the certainty of consensus cannot so easily be taken for granted. Ernest S. Griffith, in maintaining that the essential attitudes of democracy stem from the Christian and Hebrew religions, submits: "Moreover, it would appear that it is these faiths, and especially the Christian faith, that perhaps alone can *cloak such attitudes with the character of 'absolutes'* — a character which is not only *desirable*, but perhaps even *necessary* to democratic survival."[15] Rather than taking absolutist attitudes as desirable or necessary for democracy, Ebenstein asserts that an opposite consensus is necessary: "The dogmatic, totalitarian viewpoint holds that there is only one Truth. The democratic viewpoint holds that different men perceive different aspects of truth . . . and that there will be at least two sides to any major question."[16] At least one of these positions must be incorrect. Does democracy in fact require rejection or acceptance of the "one Truth" idea? In the survey reported in this paper, neither position appears correct: both Midwestern and Southern Americans were found to be closer to a complete absence of consensus than to common agreement in either accepting or rejecting the "one Truth" idea.[17]

Not only do political theorists speak of consensus on abstract principles where none exists, but they also suggest the need for consensus on more specific principles without empirical support. Griffith, for example, insists that the individualistic "view of the nature of individual personality leads straight to true equality of opportunity and treatment as well as to lib-

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Stamps: "Democracy is a delicate form of government which rests upon conditions which are rather precarious . . . . It is impossible to overestimate the extent to which the success of parliamentary government is dependent upon a considerable measure of agreement on fundamentals." *Why Democracies Fail: A Critical Evaluation of the Causes of Modern Dictatorship* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1957), pp. 41–42. Walter Lippmann, in explaining "the decline of the West," cites "the disappearance of the public philosophy — and of a consensus on the first and last things. . . ." *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (Boston, 1955), p. 100. Joseph A. Schumpeter submits: ". . . democratic government will work to full advantage only if all the interests that matter are practically unanimous not only in their allegiance to the country but also in their allegiance to the structural principles of the existing society." *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (3rd ed., New York, 1950), p. 296.

[11] In Pennock's case, the lack of precision is deliberate, reflecting a well-defined position that the necessary amount of consensus on fundamentals varies according to the strength of two other prerequisites of democracy — "willingness to compromise" and "respect for rules and set procedures." *Op. cit.*, p. 132.

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 99.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 129.

[14] For findings of overwhelming endorsement of the general idea of democracy, see Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Current Status of American Public Opinion," in Daniel Katz *et al.* (eds.), *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York, 1954), pp. 33–48, reprinted from the *National Council for Social Studies Yearbook*, 1950, Vol. XXI, pp. 11–34.

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 103. Italics are added.

[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

[17] This item is not included in the results below because we report only on those propositions that relate directly to the question of how political power is gained. The recognition of "different aspects of truth" logically underlies the ideas of majority rule and minority rights, but it is not as directly connected with them as the propositions on which we report.

erty."[18] And this "true equality" must include dedication not only to the old inalienable rights such as freedom of speech, but also to "the right of each one to be treated with dignity as befits a free person — without regard to sex or creed or race or class."[19] As we shall see, the findings below do not support the assumption of general agreement on "true equality" even in such spheres as freedom of speech. And the same is true of the specific proposition that Pennock uses to illustrate the values on which "the bulk of the society" must be agreed — "The proposition that each vote should count for one and none for more than one is doubtless sufficiently implied by the word 'equality'."[20] "True believers" in democracy may be able to make an unimpeachable case for this proposition, but it is not accepted by the bulk of the society.

The discovery that consensus on democratic principles is restricted to a few general and vague formulations might come as a surprise to a person whose only acquaintance with democracy was through the literature of political theory; it will hardly surprise those who have lived in a democracy. Every village cynic knows that the local church-goer who sings the creed with greatest fervor often abandons the same ideas when they are put in less lyrical form. Political scientists are certainly not so naive as to expect much greater consistency in the secular sphere. The theorists who argue the necessity of consensus on such matters as the existence or absence of multi-faceted truth, true equality in the right of free speech, and dedication to an equal vote for every citizen are no doubt as aware of these human frailties as the village cynic.[21] But we tend to regard that which seems a *logically necessary* belief in the light of democratic processes as being *empirically necessary* to the existence of those processes. We assume, in a two-step translation, that what people *should* (logically) believe is what they *must* believe (this being a democracy), and that what they *must* believe is what they *do* believe.

In undertaking to discover what kind of consensus actually exists, we assumed that we would find the anticipated agreement on the basic principles of democracy when they were put in a highly abstract form, but that consensus would not be found on more concrete questions involving the application of these principles. We further assumed that regional and class-related variations would be found on the specific formulation of democratic principles. In pinning down these assumptions, we are no doubt demonstrating the obvious — but such a demonstration appears necessary if the obvious is to be incorporated into the logic of political theory. With empirical support for these two assumptions, we can put the proposition about consensus in more precise form and test the following hypothesis: *consensus in a meaningful sense (at both the abstract and specific levels) exists among some segment(s) of the population (which can be called the "carriers of the creed")*. Should our findings support this hypothesis, we could reformulate the proposition about democratic consensus with reference to a smaller group than the total population, whereupon it could be tested more fully, both in the United States and in other democracies, for further refinement.

Procedure

Our research design was based upon the major assumption that the United States is a democracy. Taking this point for granted, we prepared an interviewing schedule around the presumably basic principles of democracy and interviewed samples of voters in two American cities to elicit their attitudes toward these principles.

While the general research design was thus quite simple, the preparation of a questionnaire including the basic points on which agreement is thought to be necessary was a difficult and critical step. From the literature on consensus cited above and from general literature on democracy, however, we conclude that the principles regarded as most essential to democracy are majority rule and minority rights (or freedom to dissent). At the abstract level, then, our interviewers asked for expressions of agreement or disagreement on the following statements:

Principle of Democracy Itself
Democracy is the best form of government.
Principle of Majority Rule
Public officials should be chosen by majority vote.

[18] *Op. cit.*, p. 105.
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *Op. cit.*, 131.
[21] That the awareness is so consistently forgotten attests to the need of uniting research in political theory with research in public opinion.

Every citizen should have an equal chance to influence government policy.

Principle of Minority Rights

The minority should be free to criticize majority decisions.

People in the minority should be free to try to win majority support for their opinions.

From these general statements, specific embodiments of the principles of democracy were derived.

Principle of Majority Rule in Specific Terms

1. In a city referendum, only people who are well informed about the problem being voted on should be allowed to vote.
2. In a city referendum deciding on tax-supported undertakings, only tax-payers should be allowed to vote.
3. If a Negro were legally elected mayor of this city, the white people should not allow him to take office.
4. If a Communist were legally elected mayor of this city, the people should not allow him to take office.
5. A professional organization like the AMA (the American Medical Association) has a right to try to increase the influence of doctors by getting them to vote as a bloc in elections.

Principle of Minority Rights in Specific Terms

6. If a person wanted to make a speech in this city against churches and religion, he should be allowed to speak.
7. If a person wanted to make a speech in this city favoring government ownership of all the railroads and big industries, he should be allowed to speak.
8. If an admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in this city favoring Communism, he should be allowed to speak.
9. A Negro should not be allowed to run for mayor of this city.
10. A Communist should not be allowed to run for mayor of this city.

These specific propositions are designed to embody the principles of majority rule and minority rights in such a clear fashion that a "correct" or "democratic" response can be deduced from endorsement of the general principles. The democratic responses to statements 1 and 2 are negative, for example, since a restriction of the franchise to the well-informed or to tax-payers would violate the principle that "Every citizen should have an equal chance to influence government policy."[22] The same general principle requires an affirmative answer to the fifth statement, which applies the right of people to "influence government policy" to the election efforts of a specific professional group. The correct responses to statements 3 and 4 are negative because denial of an office to any person "legally elected" would violate the principle that "public officials should be chosen by majority vote."

Of the five statements derived from the broad principle of minority rights, 6, 7, and 8 put the right of "the minority . . . to criticize majority decisions" and "to try to win majority support for their opinions" in terms of specific minority spokesmen; agreement is therefore the correct or democratic answer. Disagreement is the correct response to statements 9 and 10, since denial of the right to seek office to members of minority ethnic or ideological groups directly violates their right "to try to win majority support for their opinions."

Since the proposition being tested asserts the existence of consensus, the interviewing sample could logically have been drawn from any group of Americans. Because we assume regional and class differences, however, we could not rely on the most available respondents, our own college students. The registered voters of two academic communities, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Tallahassee, Florida, were selected as the sampling population, primarily because they fitted the needs of the hypothesis, and partly because of their accessibility. Although a nation-wide survey was ruled out simply on the ground of costs, these atypical communities offer certain advantages for our problem. First, they do permit at least a limited regional comparison of attitudes on democratic fundamentals. Second, they skew the sample by over-representing the more highly educated, thus permitting detailed comparison of the highly educated with the poorly educated, a comparison that could hardly be made with samples from more typical communities.

The over-representation of the highly educated also served to "stack the cards" in favor of the proposition on consensus. Since our hypothesis holds that consensus is limited, we further stacked the cards against the hypothesis

[22] We are not arguing, of course, that these propositions are incorrect in any absolute sense. Good arguments can no doubt be advanced in support of each of the positions we label as "incorrect." Our point is simply that they are incorrect *in the sense* of being undemocratic, *i.e.*, inconsistent with general principles of democracy.

by choosing the sample from registered voters rather than from all residents of the two communities. Although the necessity of consensus is stated in terms of the society as a whole, a line of regression is available in the argument that it need exist only among those who take part in politics. Hence our restriction of the sample to a population of registered voters.

In each city the sample was drawn by the system of random numbers from the official lists of registered voters. The sample represents one per cent of the registered voters from the current registration list in each of the two communities. In a few cases the addresses given were incorrect, but if the person selected could be located in the community, he was included in the sample. A few questions on a limited number of individuals were not recorded in usable form, which accounts for a slight variation in the totals in the tables presented in the paper.

Findings: The Consensus Problem

In the two communities from which our samples were drawn, consensus can be said to exist among the voters on the basic principles of democracy when they are put in abstract terms. The degree of agreement on these principles ranges from 94.7 to 98.0 per cent, which appears to represent consensus in a truly meaningful sense and to support the first of our preliminary assumptions. On the generalized principles, then, we need not look for "bases of disagreement"—the agreement transcends community, educational, economic, age, sex, party, and other common bases of differences in opinion.[23] We may stop with the conclusion that opinions on these abstract principles have a cultural base.

When these broad principles are translated into more specific propositions, however, consensus breaks down completely. As Table 1 indicates, agreement does not reach 90 per cent on any of the ten propositions, either from the two samples combined or from the communities considered separately. Indeed, respondents in both communities are closer to perfect discord than to perfect consensus on over half the statements. If we keep in mind that a 50–50 division represents a total absence of consensus, then degrees of agreement ranging from 25 to 75 per cent can be understood as closer to the total absence of consensus (50 per cent agreement) than to its perfect realization (100 per

[23] See Angus Campbell and Homer C. Cooper, *Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes* (Ann Arbor, 1956).

TABLE 1. *Percentage of "Democratic" Responses to Basic Principles of Democracy Among Selected Population Groups*

	Total N = 244	*Education*† *High* N = 137	*Low* N = 106	*Ann Arbor* N = 144	*Talla-hassee* N = 100	*Income*‡ *High* N = 136	*Low* N = 99
Majority Rule							
1. Only informed vote*	49.0	61.7	34.7	56.3	38.4	56.6	40.8
2. Only tax-payers vote*	21.0	22.7	18.6	20.8	21.2	20.7	21.0
3. Bar Negro from office*	80.6	89.7	68.6	88.5	66.7	83.2	77.8
4. Bar Communist from office*	46.3	56.1	34.0	46.9	45.5	48.9	43.0
5. AMA right to bloc voting**	45.0	49.6	39.2	44.8	45.5	45.5	44.4
Minority Rights							
6. Allow anti-religious speech**	63.0	77.4	46.5	67.4	56.6	72.8	52.1
7. Allow socialist speech**	79.4	90.2	65.7	81.3	76.8	83.8	73.7
8. Allow Communist speech**	44.0	62.9	23.5	51.4	33.3	52.2	36.7
9. Bar Negro from candidacy*	75.5	86.5	60.2	85.6	58.0	78.6	71.1
10. Bar Communist from candidacy*	41.7	48.1	30.3	44.1	38.2	44.8	34.4

* For these statements, disagreement is recorded as the "democratic" response.
** For these statements, agreement is recorded as the "democratic" response.
† "High education" means more than 12 years of schooling; "low education," 12 years or less.
‡ "High income" means an annual family income of $6,000 or more; "low income," less than $6,000.

cent agreement). Responses from voters in both communities fall in this "discord" range on six of the statements (1, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10); voters in the Southern community approach maximum discord on two additional statements (3 and 9), both of which put democratic principles in terms of Negro participation in public office. These findings strongly support the second of our preliminary assumptions, that consensus does not exist on more concrete questions involving the application of democratic principles.

Three of the statements that evoke more discord than consensus deal with the extension of democratic principles to Communists, a highly unpopular group in the United States. But it should be noted that these statements are put in terms of generally approved behaviors (speaking and seeking public office), not conspiratorial or other reprehensible activities. And the other statements on which discord exceeds consensus refer to groups (as well as activities) that are not in opposition to the American form of government: the right of all citizens to vote, the right of a professional group to maximize its voting strength, and the right to criticize churches and religion.

The extent to which consensus breaks down on the specific formulation of democratic principles is even greater than suggested by our discussion of the range of discord. To this point we have ignored the content of the opinions on these principles, which would permit an overwhelming *rejection* of a democratic principle to be accepted as consensus. Specifically, responses to statement 2 were not counted as falling in the "discord" category, but the approach to consensus in this case lies in rejection of the democratic principle of the "majority vote" with an "equal chance" for "every citizen." But the proposition about consensus holds, of course, that the consensus is in favor of democratic principles. On four statements (2, 4, 5, and 10) a majority of the voters in Ann Arbor express "undemocratic" opinions; and on six statements (1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 10) a majority of the voters in Tallahassee express "undemocratic" opinions.

However the reactions to our specific statements are approached, they run counter to the idea of extended consensus. On none of them is there the real consensus that we found on the abstract form of the principles; responses to over half of the statements are closer to perfect discord than perfect consensus; and the responses to about half of the statements express the "wrong" answers. Unlike the general statements, then, the specific propositions call for an appraisal of bases of agreement and disagreement.

Findings: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement

The report of findings on the consensus problem has already suggested that regional subcultures are one basis of differences in opinions on democratic principles. Table 1 also shows differences along educational and income lines. Not included are other possible bases of disagreement that were found to have only a negligible effect, *e.g.*, age, sex and party.

Community, education and income all have an effect on opinions about democratic principles. More "correct" responses came from the Midwestern than from the Southern community, from those with high education than from those with less education, and from those with high income than from those with low income. The systematic nature of these differences supports the assumption that regional and class-related factors affect attitudes toward democratic principles when they are put in specific terms.

Which of these variables has the greatest effect on attitudes toward basic principles of democracy? Table 1 suggests that education is most important on two counts: (1) for every statement, the greatest difference in opinions is found in the high education-low education dichotomy; (2) for every statement, the grouping with the most "correct" or "democratic" responses is the high education category. Before education can be accepted as the independent variable in relation to democratic attitudes, however, the relationship must be examined for true independence. Since more Ann Arbor than Tallahassee respondents fall in the high education category, and since more high income than low income respondents have high education, the education variable might prove to be spurious — with the concealed community and income factors accounting for its apparent effect. Tables 2 and 3 show that when we control for community and income, differences between the high and low education respondents remain. When we control for education, on the other hand, the smaller differences reported in Table 1

TABLE 2. *Percentage of "Democratic" Responses to Basic Principles of Democracy by Education, With Income Controlled*

STATEMENT	HIGH — LOW EDUCATION DIFFERENCES N = 134 N = 101	LOW INCOME			HIGH INCOME		
		High Education N = 42	Low Education N = 58	Difference	High Education N = 92	Low Education N = 43	Difference
1	27.0	67.5	22.4	45.1	59.1	51.2	7.9
2	4.1	20.0	22.0	−2.0	23.9	14.0	9.9
3	21.1	94.4	64.4	30.0	87.8	73.2	14.6
4	22.1	55.0	35.0	20.0	56.5	32.6	23.9
5	10.4	52.5	39.0	13.5	48.4	39.5	8.9
6	30.9	67.5	41.1	26.4	81.7	53.5	28.2
7	24.5	87.5	64.4	23.1	91.4	67.4	24.0
8	39.4	59.0	22.0	37.0	64.5	25.6	38.9
9	26.3	86.1	59.6	26.5	86.7	61.0	25.7
10	17.8	41.0	39.8	1.2	51.1	31.0	20.1

by community and income tend to disappear.[24]

Since educational differences hold up consistently when other factors are "partialled out," education may be accepted as the most consequential basis of opinions on basic democratic principles.[25] Regardless of their other group identifications, people with high education accept democratic principles more than any other grouping. While the highly educated thus come closest to qualifying as the carriers of the democratic creed, the data do not support our hypothesis; consensus in a meaningful sense (on both the abstract and the specific principles) is not found even among those with high education. On only three of the ten specific statements (3, 7, and 9) does agreement among those with high education reach 90 per cent in Ann Arbor, and in Tallahassee it fails to reach 90 per cent on any of the statements. On the proposition that the vote should be restricted to taxpayers in referenda deciding on tax-supported undertakings, 75.8 per cent of the highly educated in Ann Arbor and 81.5 per cent in Tallahassee reject the democratic principle of an equal vote for every citizen. And on five statements (1, 4, 5, 8, and 10) the highly educated in both communities are closer to perfect discord than to perfect harmony. Even when the necessity of consensus is reformulated in terms of the group most in accord with democratic principles, then, consensus cannot be said to exist.

[24] Those statements with particular salience for one of the regional subcultures (Southern anti-Negro sentiment) constitute an exception.

[25] For a discussion of this approach to controlling qualitative data, see Herbert Hyman, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe, 1955), Ch. 7.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The attitudes of voters in selected Midwestern and Southern communities offer no support for the hypothesis that democracy requires a large measure of consensus among the carriers of the creed, *i.e.*, those most consistently in accord with democratic principles. As expected, general consensus was found on the idea of democracy itself and on the broad principles of majority rule and minority rights, but it disappeared when these principles were put in more specific form. Indeed, the voters in both communities were closer to complete discord than to complete consensus; they did not reach consensus on any of the ten specific statements incorporating the principles of majority rule and minority rights; and majorities

expressed the "undemocratic" attitude on about half of the statements.

In trying to identify the carriers of the creed, the expected regional and class-related variations were found in attitudes toward democratic principles in specific form, with education having the most marked effect. While attitudes on democratic fundamentals were not found to vary appreciably according to age, sex or party affiliation, they did vary according to education, community, and income. The greatest difference on every statement was between the high-education group and the low-education group, and the high-education group gave the most democratic response to every question, whether compared with other educational, community or income groupings. Education, but not community or income, held up consistently as a basis of disagreement when other factors were controlled. We accordingly conclude that endorsement of democratic principles is not a function of class as such (of which income is also a criterion), but of greater acquaintance with the logical implications of the broad democratic principles. Note, for example, that the highly educated renounce in much greater degree than any other group the restriction of the vote to the well-informed, a restriction that would presumably affect them least of all.

Although high education was the primary basis of agreement on democratic principles, actual consensus was not found even among this segment of the voting population. The approach to consensus is closer among the highly educated in Ann Arbor, where greater agreement exists on the extension of democratic rights to Negroes, but in both communities the highly educated are closer to discord than consensus on half of the statements. On the basis of these findings, our hypothesis appears to be invalid.

Our failure to find a more extended consensus may, of course, be attributed to the possibility that the statements we formulated do not incorporate the particular "fundamentals" that are actually necessary to democracy.[26] When the approach to consensus is in the "undemocratic" direction — as in the question about restricting the vote to taxpayers — two possible objections to our interviewing schedule are suggested. First, perhaps the question is not a logical derivation from the basic principles with which we began. Second, perhaps the respondents are

[26] The lack of extended consensus cannot, however, be attributed to the possibility that the responses classified as "correct" are actually "incorrect," for we found consensus neither in acceptance nor in rejection of the statements.

TABLE 3. *Percentage of "Democratic" Responses to Basic Principles of Democracy by Education, with Community Controlled*

Statement	*High — Low Education Differences* N = 137 N = 106	*Ann Arbor*			*Tallahassee*		
		High Education N = 92	*Low Education* N = 52	*Difference*	*High Education* N = 45	*Low Education* N = 54	*Difference*
1	27.0	63.7	42.3	21.4	57.1	26.5	30.6
2	4.1	24.2	15.4	8.8	19.5	22.0	−2.5
3	21.1	94.4	77.6	16.8	78.4	56.8	21.6
4	22.1	56.7	28.8	27.9	54.8	39.2	15.6
5	10.4	48.4	38.5	9.9	53.3	38.9	14.4
6	30.9	80.2	47.1	33.1	71.4	45.8	25.6
7	24.5	92.3	61.5	30.8	85.7	70.0	15.7
8	39.4	67.0	23.1	43.9	53.7	24.5	29.2
9	26.3	96.6	65.3	31.3	62.2	53.8	8.4
10	17.8	48.9	34.6	14.3	46.4	25.5	20.9

not interpreting the questions in any uniform way.

On the first point, the logical connection of the specific proposition with the general proposition is virtually self-evident. In syllogistic terms, we have: major premise — every citizen should have an equal chance to influence government policy; minor premise — non-taxpayers are citizens; conclusion — non-taxpayers should be allowed to vote in a city referendum deciding on tax-supported undertakings. Since decisions on tax-supported undertakings are clearly matters of government policy, rejection of the conclusion is inconsistent with acceptance of the major premise. As a matter of policy, perhaps the vote should be restricted — as it often is — under the circumstances indicated. We simply note that such a position is inconsistent with the unqualified major premise.

As to the second apparent difficulty, varying interpretations of the questions undoubtedly influenced the results. As our pre-test of the questionnaire indicated, the wordings finally chosen conveyed common meanings but tapped different attitudes embedded in different frames of reference. In surveys, as in real political situations, citizens are confronted with the need for making decisions about questions to which they attribute varying implications. We can infer, for example, that the respondents who repudiate free speech for Communists are responding in terms of anti-Communist rather than anti-free speech sentiments, especially since they endorse the idea of free speech in general. Conversely, those who endorse free speech for Communists are presumably reflecting a more consistent dedication to free speech rather than pro-Communist sentiments. But our concern in this study is with the opinions themselves rather than with the varying functions that a given opinion may perform for different individuals.[27] The significant fact is that the opinions (and presumably the frames of reference that produce them) vary systematically from group to group, not randomly or on a meaninglessly idiosyncratic basis.

Assuming that the United States is a democracy, we cannot say without qualification that consensus on fundamental principles is a necessary condition for the existence of democracy. Nor does it appear valid to say that, although consensus need not pervade the entire voting population, it must exist at least among the highly educated, who are the carriers of the creed. Our data are not inconsistent, of course, with the qualified proposition that consensus on fundamental principles in a highly abstract form is a necessary condition for the existence of democracy. But the implication of political theory that consensus includes more specific principles is empirically invalid. Our findings accordingly suggest that the intuitive insights and logical inferences of political theorists need to be subjected more consistently to empirical validation.

Discussions of consensus tend to overlook the functional nature of apathy for the democratic system. No one is surprised to hear that what people *say* they *believe* and what they *actually do* are not necessarily the same. We usually assume that verbal positions represent a higher level — a more "democratic" stance — than non-verbal behavior. But something close to the opposite may also be true: many people express undemocratic principles in response to questioning but are too apathetic to act on their undemocratic opinions in concrete situations. And in most cases, fortunately for the democratic system, those with the most undemocratic principles are also those who are least likely to act. A sizeable number (42.0 per cent) of our Southern respondents said, for example, that "a Negro should not be allowed to run for mayor of this city," but a few months before the survey a Negro actually did conduct an active campaign for that office without any efforts being made by the "white" people to obstruct his candidacy.

In this case, the behavior was more democratic than the verbal expressions. If the leadership elements — the carriers of the creed — had encouraged undemocratic action, it might have materialized (as it did in Little Rock in the school desegregation crisis). But, in fact, people with basically undemocratic opinions either abstained from acting or acted in a perfectly democratic fashion. "The successful working of the system is not deliberately aimed at by those who work it," John Plamenatz says, "but is the result of their behaving as they do."[28]

[27] The latter approach is, of course, a fruitful type of investigation, but it is not called for by our problem. For a functional analysis of opinions, see M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner and Robert W. White, *Opinions and Personality* (New York, 1956).

[28] *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

As J. Roland Pennock puts it, democracy can tolerate less conscious agreement on principles if people are willing to compromise and to follow set rules and procedures.[29] Loose talk of consensus as a self-evident requirement of democracy should have no place beside such insightful observations as these. Carl J. Friedrich appears to have been correct in asserting, eighteen years ago, that democracy depends on habitual patterns of behavior rather than on conscious agreement on democratic "principles."[30] His argument has been largely ignored because, like the position from which he dissented, it was advanced without the support of directly relevant research findings. Our results are offered as a step toward settling the question on empirical grounds.

[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 132.

[30] *The New Belief in the Common Man* (Boston, 1942).

35

PATRONAGE AND PARTY

• *FRANK J. SORAUF*

It was not long ago that political scientists reacted instinctively against political patronage much as they reacted against slavery, aggressive war, and divine right monarchy. Reminders of that older, more moral day linger even today — in, for instance, the activities of civic and better-government organizations, and in the Library of Congress's subject classification of "spoils system" under "corruption (in politics)." But I suspect that the issue of patronage, even among those scholars not yet willing to endorse or condone it, is no longer the highly-charged moral issue it once was.

Undoubtedly the rise in prestige and status that political parties have enjoyed has done a great deal to elevate the institution of patronage to semi-respectability, at least among academics. In this era of strong, positive government, scholars have seized upon the party as an instrument through which discipline and responsibility may be achieved within the Leviathan. Party joins with government to generate the political power for achieving broad social ends. The stock of patronage rises concurrently with party's prestige on the general assumption that patronage is essential to a strong and vital party organization. In brief, we have succumbed to the lean but forceful logic of George Washington Plunkitt:

> First, this great and glorious country was built up by the political parties; second, parties can't hold together if their workers don't get the offices when they win; third, if the parties go to pieces, the government they built up must go to pieces, too; fourth, then there'll be h - - l to pay.[1]

There doubtless remain other reasons for the decline in the crusading enthusiasm against patronage. The whole thrust of the political science of this generation has been toward a realistic acceptance of the political facts of life, a willingness to study and participate in grass-roots politics. The interest of political scientists in programs such as that of the Citizenship Clearing House is indicative. Furthermore, patronage no longer dominates public personnel policy as once it did, and consequently it does not present a problem of the magnitude it did.

Where patronage remains today, two chief justifications or rationales generally support it. In the first place, its friends argue that patronage remains an essential aid to party responsibility and control of public policy. Republicans after 1952 bemoaned their inability to appoint a full "Republican team" to top administrative posts in Washington; the removal of

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[1] William Riordan, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1948), p. 18. Note also the similar statement by Edward J. Flynn, *You're the Boss* (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 25: ". . . we cannot have government without elections, elections without organizations, or organizations without a 'spoils system' to keep them going."

some 130,000 jobs from Civil Service protection was said to be a move to restore unity to policy-making at the national level.[2] Secondly, it is widely held that patronage contributes to, and may even be vital to, an energetic party system by providing a system of rewards and incentives for party service. It is this second justification that furnishes the focus of this paper.

The brief observations that follow grow out of research and thought about the uses of patronage and are concerned mainly with at least raising some questions about the assumed values and utilities of patronage to the party. Patronage has for long remained a tail tied to the kite of party; once its importance to party was conceded, its fortunes rose with those of party. To attack patronage was to challenge party and to appear to be burning the barn to kill the mice. It seems to me likely, however, that the basic political usefulness of patronage as either reward or incentive may be overestimated or misunderstood. At any rate the traditional justification of the benefits of patronage to party demands a reevaluation in the light of new knowledge about the political process and recent developments in parties and politics in America. The main body of this paper contains brief examinations of the more important assumptions underlying (and, in fact, creating) the more explicit rationalization of patronage as a bastion of party. They are set down in the conviction that it ill behooves political science to accept any untested assumptions, much less public policy based on them.

The Assumptions

(1) The ability of parties to administer patronage

In the first place, one may seriously question the implicit assumption that the parties are able to use the patronage at their disposal. "The fiction prevails," writes V. O. Key, "that while party leaders may not always manage the public service well they are wizards in the conduct of party business."[3] Too often we fail to realize that the effective administration of a patronage system demands administrative skills that very few county chairmen or precinct leaders can command. The unyielding application of political criteria, the systematic extraction of partisan service, and the ruthless firing that follows election victories require a high degree of administrative will and finesse. Especially in the small, closely-knit rural and small-town areas across the country the use of patronage becomes even more difficult and unlikely. Ties of friendship, blood, and community militate against the political discipline essential to the administration of patronage. The resulting lax and ineffective use of political jobs, the failure to appoint jobholders and supervise their activities with only the welfare of the party in mind, points to the possibility that one may very well need more of the arts of public administration to run a patronage than a civil service system.[4]

Furthermore, patronage systems offer just one more example of an old social fact — just as it takes money to make money, it takes political power to achieve greater power. The party long out of office and desperately in need of new reservoirs of strength is precisely the party that, should it suddenly find itself in office, would be least able to use patronage for rebuilding. Weak parties lack the discipline, the trained leadership, and the surplus of potential jobholders to use the system to their maximum advantage. It is, in other words, the dominant party that can muster the discipline and strength necessary to administer the apparatus of patronage. So capably do the strong build on strength that one is tempted to say that patronage does not build parties quite so much as parties build patronage systems.

(2) The necessity of patronage for effective parties

Students of politics and parties have too often accepted without empirical evidence the assumption that a certain amount of patronage is vital to the parties as a motivator of political

[2] James M. Burns, "Policy and Politics of Patronage," *New York Times*, July 5, 1953, sec. 6, p. 8, and also the *New York Times*, March 15, 1953, sec. 4, p. 10. One may, of course, wonder what policy-making responsibilities the average small-town postmaster has.

[3] V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (4th ed., New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1958), p. 403.

[4] See my article, "State Patronage in a Rural County," *American Political Science Review*, L (1956), 1046–1056. In this study of patronage in highway jobs the data indicate that many other considerations than political worthiness dictated appointment to the jobs; in fact, over one-third of the incumbent Republican appointees were not replaced within a year of the Democratic gubernatorial victory of 1954.

activity. But the fact remains that in states such as Wisconsin political parties have survived and achieved a certain measure of strength and discipline without the inducement of political appointments. Patronage is not, in brief, a universal concomitant of the political process; it is rooted deeply in a particular set of social conditions and traditions.

The implication that party loyalties and activity rest on so slender a reed as the promise of political spoils is at least open to question. Recent studies have indicated that ties to the major parties rest heavily on the conserving force of tradition and on the present appeal of candidates and issues.[5] At least some of this traditional and programmatic loyalty has been converted into work for the party. A generation or two ago patronage flourished among the uprooted, illiterate, and unassimilated groups in the urban centers of America. Without political tradition and involvement in the issues of the day, and constantly beset by economic insecurity, they could be wooed and their political allegiance shaped by offers of political reward. Patronage was under these circumstances a valuable aid in the pragmatic majority-building of American politics.

Rather than universalize the importance of patronage to party, however, one might suggest that its role is declining and that it survives in many places as a mere shadow of its former self. The politics of Messrs. Plunkitt and Dooley have curtailed by the political education and assimilation of migrant and foreign-born populations. Furthermore, with the help of the mass communications media the parties have created loyalties to candidates by retailing their personalities to all corners of the political cosmos. And by centralizing political issues and appeals, the parties have diminished the importance of the local political activity that patronage once bought. Since the 1930's American parties have also become involved in social and economic politics to an extent quite new in our politics and have attracted new attention to the relevance of policy alternatives. Finally, one should mention that well-organized interest groups, such as labor unions, have begun to provide the parties with an alternate source of political workers. The result has been an inevitable decline in the necessity of patronage to the political party.[6]

At the same time that party dependence on patronage has, as I have indicated above, declined steadily, the incidence of patronage has itself declined. Government, for instance, has stolen much of patronage's social and charitable function with its social welfare programs. Steadier economic prosperity, and the expansion of educational opportunities, have reduced the importance of patronage as job security. The need for greater specialization and skills within the public service has in its way contributed to the waning of patronage. But whatever the reason, the most casual glance will indicate the recession of patronage in our time, and that decline in itself — accompanied by no perceptible weakening of the parties — may be taken as evidence that the classic rationale for patronage no longer has the same validity it might once have had.[7]

(3) THE VITALITY OF PATRONAGE AS REWARD OR INCENTIVE

Implicit in the whole argument on behalf of the patronage system is the assumption, related to the previous one, that the political job offers inducement enough to spur men to give money or service to the party. Unless the job carries high value and desirability as a reward, it can hardly serve as either "payment" for past work or incentive for new labors. Many more empirical studies must be made to determine the value of patronage as a political reward. Is it the main or only motive behind political activity? Does the patronage holder perform political service for the party? Does he even vote the party ticket, and does he lead his family, friends, and neighbors to the polls as well? Is patronage, in other words, a really effective means for securing organization and campaign activity for the party? The answer is at least uncertain.[8]

[5] See, for instance, Angus Campbell *et al., The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1954), especially chapter 7.

[6] Bernard Berelson *et al.* in *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 161, indicate, for instance, that "underdog groups" furnish a source of party workers for the patronageless Democrats in Elmira, New York.

[7] A perceptive description of the decline of patronage and the changing nature of urban politics can be found in Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), chapter 9.

[8] The results of the Centre County study, cited in footnote 4, indicate that 60 percent of the pa-

In the first place, the poor pay and generally dismal future prospects that attend most patronage jobs discourage many potential jobholders. Especially in a period of full employment, qualified men and women can find more attractive career possibilities than those which patronage systems offer. More especially, the upper social, economic, and educational levels on which the parties increasingly rely for leadership will find little to tempt them in patronage as it exists in most states today. As a result most patronage jobs fall to the lower skill groups who also lack the political skills the parties need. Political jobs in many areas, because of low pay and the considerable insecurity involved, have been consequently debased as a political currency. They simply cannot attract first-rate political leadership nor extract party service from what jobholders they attract.[9] Where pay is low, the worker may well feel that he "owes" nothing for his salary other than a good day's work. Very possibly, too, he may not be fully aware of the rationale and obligations of the system. As unlikely as it might seem to the sophisticated, he may recognize the party as the appointing agency without understanding his informal debt to it in return for the job.

Undesirable as these jobs may be in times of full employment, they might conceivably become attractive in a period of recession or in a pocket of high unemployment. But, paradoxically, in those very areas of economic hardship where the political job achieves its greatest desirability, the job insecurity also works to the party's disadvantage. A man removed from his position for partisan reasons may find it difficult or impossible to obtain re-employment, particularly if he is beyond his 40's, and he may turn against party and patronage in a rage of disenchantment that more than destroys any gratitude he may have had for the initial appointment. Employment and economic security no longer are accepted as the subjects of political charity that patronage would have them, and dismissal for political reasons strikes the average employee today as unfair, if not immoral. Thus, the very conditions that give a political job its greatest value on appointment probably create the greatest hostility at dismissal, a hostility directed not only at the "other party," but at politics and patronage in general as well.[10]

(4) THE SINGLE USE OR PURPOSE OF PATRONAGE

We tend to assume (and, indeed, this paper has thus far assumed) that patronage serves only the function of reward for the recipient's past or future service to the party. Even at that, parties often must choose between patronage as either reward or as incentive. Were the Republicans after 1952, for instance, to reward the defecting Democrats for Eisenhower in the South or were they to use available patronage to build a Republican party in the South? But the greatest dilemmas facing a party in the administration of a patronage system may arise from the presence of nonpolitical uses or purposes of patronage.

For instance, patronage may become an inverted reward system, rewarding the rewarder rather than the recipient. The mere opportunity to dispense patronage favors may soothe and flatter the ego of the party official to an extent great enough to reward him for his work on behalf of the party. But when the disposal of political jobs becomes the private suzerainty of the local politico, and when he gives the jobs to friends, relatives, and neighbors rather than to the politically worthy, he destroys the value of patronage as a device for enlisting party work-

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tronage workers never campaigned for the party, 89 percent never held party office, and 73 percent did not discuss politics at all. Other data in the study run in the same vein.

[9] Flynn notes in *You're the Boss*, p. 22, that "Most of our captains earn more in private industry than any but a few top political jobs pay . . . Whatever the reason, the fact remains that most Captains receive nothing more than the glory that goes with the title." H. O. Waldby makes an interesting observation on the same point in his *The Patronage System in Oklahoma* (Norman, Okla.: Transcript Co., 1950), p. 57: "When the patronage system is in effect there is a tendency to keep the salaries of employees at a low level so as many persons as possible can be employed. This is certainly true in Oklahoma, which has more state employees per one thousand population than any of the surrounding states and pays them the lowest wages."

[10] In interviewing patronage workers, I have been repeatedly impressed by their hostility and resentment toward the system. They have often spoken of the need for extending a merit system and tenure to the jobs they hold or held. Perhaps no one sees the inadequacies of the patronage system as vividly and immediately as those who pay its price in their own personal insecurity.

ers. In this respect I recall often being told by party officers that they cared not who really made the patronage appointments so long as the appearances of their dispensation were maintained, and so long as they could carry the word to the lucky recipient and claim his gratitude.

The patronage system may also, surprisingly, serve a combination recruitment and "civil service" function. While at heart patronage and merit may be incompatible personnel selection systems, political parties may have to make their peace with efficiency and capability in administration. The party whose appointees, for instance, maintain a rural road network has a genuine political interest in maintaining public approval of the road system. It may have to compromise the use of patronage as reward by appointing and retaining skilled employees, regardless of their political qualifications, for the road crews. Even where this sort of *ad hoc* merit system does not flourish, the party at least functions as a decentralized, local recruitment and job placement agency.[11]

Under usual conditions, therefore, patronage fills many roles. Within any system some balance and compromise among conflicting goals and claims must be struck. What emerges within any patronage system is in reality many systems: some of the more attractive positions may actually serve as rewards, or possibly for policy coordination; some of the most specialized may be subsumed into a quasi-merit system; and some of local concern may be set aside for the self-satisfaction of the local party hierarchy.

(5) THE NATURE OF THE PARTY USING PATRONAGE

No scholar of any perception would indulge himself in the illusion that American political parties are great unified, monolithic structures. Yet, we assume all too often that "the party" benefits from the use of patronage, that "the party" curries favor with its appointments. What we overlook is that only one organ of the party is apt to gain from any one specific political appointment. And it is a matter of vital concern in understanding the effects of patronage to know just which party organ or leader, on what level of the party structure, reaps the reward. Patronage, therefore, by bolstering local centers of power and entrenching the political lords in their local fiefs, by preventing unity on candidates and policy, may be used as a weapon in intra-party squabbles just as easily as it may be used to create intra-party cohesion or vitality.[12]

To state the assumption another way, we assume, contrary to the preponderance of evidence, that political parties have just one internal interest. They indeed have many interests, and patronage may serve one to the detriment of others. The very existence of the institution of "senatorial courtesy" illustrates the war between national party and state party over the use of federal patronage. And just five years ago Leonard Hall was chosen national chairman of the Republican party only after he had assured the national committee of the party a greater voice in the distribution of the GOP patronage. In any event, patronage, like any other form of partisan power, may be used in destructive, internal wars as well as in the great interparty battles.[13]

In Conclusion

These remarks on the assumptions undergirding a patronage system indicate how we build a somewhat unreal image of patronage. The result is a view of patronage that dwells on its political uses, while ignoring its inadequacies and disadvantages. It has been largely on the basis of this simplified and overly charitable appraisal of the political values of patronage that the system has been weighed against merit sys-

[11] The development of these *ad hoc* merit systems probably reflects, at least in part, an excess of patronage. That is to say, the political needs of the party could be satisfied by less than the number of available jobs, and everything over the usable maximum is merely a source of trouble and weakness to the party. Leonard White and T. V. Smith make this point several times in their *Politics and Public Service* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939).

[12] E. E. Schattschneider in *Party Government* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942), pp. 137 ff., has argued persuasively that patronage is used most frequently to bolster the local "bosses" against party centralization.

[13] V. O. Key, Jr., furnishes a fine example of the use of patronage contrary to one of the outstanding interests of a party, the winning of elections. In their desire to keep the number of potential patronage claimants to a minimum, many Southern Republicans have purposely kept the party organization weak and its electoral base narrow. *Southern Politics* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 292–294.

tems. One could even suggest that in addition to overestimating the political constructiveness of patronage, we underestimate its power to destroy both itself and partisan strength.

The self-destructive tendencies of patronage are most virulent when patronage is laxly administered. Where only some workers are replaced following a change of parties, the group replaced will in most instances be the group that has been politically the most active. In other words, the workers who have been least identified with the appointing party become most acceptable to a new administration; accordingly, the apolitical and the "bi-political" survive. Such lessons are not lost on workers who realize they can cheaply purchase job security with political inactivity. A denaturing of patronage results.

Similarly, the retention of workers for personal reasons or for reasons of skill and experience works the same havoc on the patronage system. When personal rather than party considerations dictate political job-giving, as they so often do in closely-knit communities, the political nature of the job is obscured, as is the political obligation and discipline that it demands. Eventually, the very political essence of the positions becomes unclear and impotent. Community expectations about patronage are reshaped and altered, and woe then to him who tries to reestablish a tight political rein over the patronage positions. In fact, anything less than the greatest virtuosity in the management of spoils will invite these self-destructive tendencies. That fact represents the truth in the oft-quoted plaint of the party functionary that with each political appointment he makes nine enemies and one ingrate.[14]

This willingness to accept the conventional assumptions about patronage may reflect some sort of "intellectual lag." The assumptions were no doubt truer 20 or 30 years ago and in the heyday of spoils than they are today. Much of the writing on patronage stems from that period and reflects not only the times but the particular urban conditions under which patronage flourished most vigorously.[15] Political scientists and students of public administration have failed in this respect to heed the advice of the historian to reformulate their generalizations for their own generation. Their failure to do so may be due in part to the decline of patronage and to the triumph of merit civil service systems. But it may also be the result of the delicacy and touchiness of the subject; they may fear to tread where ordinarily voluble politicians become silent and evasive. So, the land in which "fat cats" eat "pie" and in which public servants are "maced" remains largely *terra incognita* for academic political science.

One final problem remains. If the rewards of patronage are so meager and the problems so great, why do parties fight to maintain the patronage system? Political leaders deprecate the value of patronage both publicly and privately, yet do little to divest themselves of it.[16] Their reasons are no doubt complex, and one can only tentatively suggest a few. The parties need the strength of patronage, however minor and irregular it might be, and they realize, as does any great nation, that in matters of empire one does not willingly surrender even the most barren desert. Above all, patronage has generally been the political way of life and the political ally of the local centers of political power in their losing battle for political superiority in America. It survives to a great extent in their protest against the growth of national politics and centralized parties in the United States.

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[14] E. Pendleton Herring in *The Politics of Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1940), p. 350, similarly quotes Lord Melbourne's exasperation with ecclesiastical patronage: "Damn it, another bishop dead!"

[15] There have been very few studies of patronage *per se*, David Kurtzman's *Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: no publisher, 1935) being about the only full-length study to explore the politics of patronage. Patronage also features prominently in broader studies of parties such as Frank R. Kent, *The Great Game of Politics* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1923). I should also mention here a recent instance of a reasoned call for a reexamination of patronage: James R. Watson, "Is Patronage Obsolete?," *Personnel Administration*, XVIII (1955), 3–9.

[16] See James A. Farley, *Behind the Ballots* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938), p. 237: "I am convinced that with the help of a few simple ingredients, like time, patience, and hard work, I could construct a major political party in the United States without the aid of a single job to hand out to deserving partisans. In fact, untold thousands of loyal soldiers in the Democratic army have been toiling for years without receiving tangible reward for their services and without asking for any such reward."

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THE POLITICAL APPEAL OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

• *HERBERT H. HYMAN and PAUL B. SHEATSLEY*

The sweeping Republican victory in the 1952 Presidential election, and the fact that the President ran well ahead of his party ticket in most states, provided striking proof of the personal vote-getting power of Dwight D. Eisenhower. The defeated candidate himself named the personal popularity of his opponent as one of the main factors in his defeat, and political commentators generally interpreted the vote as a demonstration of national confidence in Eisenhower's leadership and in his ability to end the war in Korea, to deal firmly with Russia and to "clean up the mess in Washington."

In this paper we propose to discuss certain survey findings which establish the fact that the extraordinary political appeal of Eisenhower did not *emerge* during the second Truman administration, in consequence of the war in Korea or of revelations of corruption in Washington; but that on the contrary the ability of Eisenhower to pull votes across all normal partisan lines was fully evident five years earlier, in advance of the 1948 election. The main survey data we cite are from two studies conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, during the period in question: the first a national cross-section survey carried out in the fall of 1947, and the second a study of a randomly selected cross-section of voters in three states — New York, Illinois and California — just before the political conventions, in May 1948.

No research report is required, perhaps, to demonstrate the popularity of Eisenhower in 1947–48. It is widely recalled that his name was prominently mentioned as a possible candidate of both major parties in 1948 and his wartime leadership of the Allied armies was still fresh in the public memory. But the data we present are, we believe, pertinent for a number of reasons.

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First, they shed indirect light on the meaning of the 1952 results. Through their documentation of the Eisenhower strength in 1947–48, *before* the Korean war and *before* any widespread criticism of government corruption, they imply that such concrete issues as these may have been less important in the President's election than has popularly been supposed. Indeed, one could plausibly argue, on the basis of our data, that Eisenhower could have been elected even in the absence of such strong issues; or, to go still further, that he could have been elected even had he espoused the position of the Democratic Party on these issues.

Second, analysis of these older poll findings helps us to understand something of the *nature* of President Eisenhower's political appeal, an appeal which is fairly unique in American politics in that it freely crosses party lines and group interests. While the data we have on hand do not provide a complete explanation of the phenomenon, they do supply us with certain clues, and they effectively disprove some of the hypotheses which have occasionally been suggested.

Finally, an analysis of Eisenhower's political strength in 1947–48 permits us to examine some of the important theories which have been advanced to explain voting behavior. Eisenhower's lack of party ties at that time provides a unique opportunity to study the old problem of "the man vs. the party": to what extent and under what conditions do voters adhere to their over-all party preference, and to what extent and under what conditions do they ignore party distinctions and "vote for the man"? Our data also bear on the "group interest" theory of voting behavior, according to which people are seen as voting in fairly strict accordance with their group memberships and economic interests.

This analysis, incidentally, points up the value of *historical* poll findings. The use of trend data in survey research has long been

recognized, but its potentialities have been barely touched. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and his associates have effectively used the panel technique to study public opinion over *short* time periods, and many agencies keep a close watch on the fluctuations which appear in the replies to identical questions asked of comparable samples at periodic intervals of time. Seldom, however, is any effort made to analyze historical polling data for the purpose of illuminating current opinion processes, and we submit that such can be one of the most valuable uses of public opinion surveys. Precise, reliable, and thorough understanding of the long-term dynamics of public opinion can be achieved only through the analysis of large-scale cross-section studies carried out progressively over time.

The analysis reported here is not based on original data on the 1952 election. The purpose in preparing this paper is not at all to show that Eisenhower's election should have been flatly predicted by the pollsters, or to apply 20-20 hindsight to the 1952 results. The purpose is, instead, to show that historical data can contribute something to our understanding of American political behavior.

Characteristics of Eisenhower Supporters in 1947–48

The data in Table 1 are based mainly on a survey of eligible voters in the key states of New York, Illinois and California, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center in May 1948, two months before the major political party conventions of that year. In the previous September Eisenhower said, "I am neither a Republican nor a Democrat," and in January categorically declared that he "could not accept" a Presidential nomination "even under the remote circumstance that it were tendered me."[1] Yet prominent men in both political parties continued to advance his candidacy, and public opinion polls offered impressive evidence of his popularity among voters of widely differing ideologies and partisanships.

A Gallup "trial heat" in September 1947 found Eisenhower, "running for President on the Republican ticket," leading Truman by nine percentage points. In December another Gallup Poll reported that Eisenhower was the first choice among independent voters, ahead of both Truman and Dewey.[2] The question on which the data in Table 1 are based was an open one which asked, "Regardless of whether he's running or not, what *one* person now in public life do you think has the *best* qualities for President?" It is interesting that in spite of Eisenhower's disclaimers of any political ambition, he was most frequently mentioned by the voters of New York State; he tied for the top place with Stassen in California, and, along with Truman, tied for a close third behind Stassen and MacArthur in Illinois.

Inspection of Table 1 reveals rather vividly the disparate sources from which the Eisenhower strength derived. The Republican candidates have usually drawn their chief support from the wealthier classes, the better educated, the native white Protestants, business people, and the Midwest. The Democratic candidates, on the other hand, have appealed chiefly to the lower economic levels, to labor, to Catholics, minority groups, and the South. This general pattern was strengthened during the Roosevelt years and it still held in 1948, as a glance at the distributions reported in the "Regular Republicans" and the "Truman" columns will show. The Wallace candidacy in 1948, which was frankly a liberal left-wing revolt against the Truman Democrats, drew the greatest share of its strength from labor, minority and "intellectual" groups in the large cities, and was extremely weak elsewhere.

The striking aspect of Eisenhower's appeal in 1948 was his strength among *all* of these contrasting and in many cases opposing groups. Reading across on almost each line of Table 1, it may be seen that Eisenhower attracted more of the traditionally Democratic groups than did the regular Republican candidates, and that he attracted more of the traditionally Republican groups than did Truman or Wallace. His supporters are not found in disproportionate numbers among the rich or the poor or in any particular minority group, nor does he seem to be especially disliked by any of the types of people listed. If he does not draw as many wealthy supporters as Dewey, Taft, MacArthur or Stassen, he is much more popular with that

[1] *New York Times*, September 2, 1947, and January 24, 1948.

[2] Gallup releases, September 28 and December 21, 1947.

TABLE 1. *Sources of Political Support, 1947–48, in Terms of Demographic Factors**

Of Those Naming Each Candidate, Percent Who Are	*Regular Republicans***	*Eisenhower*	*Truman*	*Wallace*
College educated	25%	21%	10%	30%
High school only	47	57	46	38
Grade school or less	28	22	44	32
Upper economic level	20%	12%	6%	14%
Middle economic level	67	73	68	62
Lower economic level	13	15	26	24
Union members	29%	33%	40%	40%
Non-union members	71	67	60	60
Catholic	24%	35%	44%	15%
Jewish	4	14	3	28
Protestant	68	47	47	40
Other, None	4	4	6	17
Foreign born	12%	17%	22%	23%
Father foreign born	24	28	23	32
Father born in U.S.	64	55	55	45
Negro	2%	3%	13%	28%
White	98	97	87	72
East	35%	29%	25%	42%
Midwest	37	34	29	28
South	15	26	33	20
Far West	13	11	13	10
Urban	75%	68%	66%	90%
Rural	25	32	34	10

* Data based on probability sample of 3,065 eligible voters in the states of New York, Illinois and California, May 1948, except for geographical region and urban-rural. These last two categories based on quota sample of 1,290 interviews with cross-section of the U. S. adult population in November, 1947.

** Dewey, Taft, MacArthur, Stassen and Vandenberg accounted for the overwhelming majority of these mentions.

group than is Truman. If less of his support than of Truman's comes from the South, or from union members or the foreign born, Eisenhower is nevertheless considerably more popular among those groups than are the traditional Republicans.

Table 2 demonstrates parallel findings, when we consider questions of ideology. The Republicans in 1948 criticized the Truman record and were generally regarded as the more "conservative" of the two major parties. In general, they favored a firmer policy toward Russia, a stricter attitude toward organized labor, a laissez faire policy on price controls, and lower taxes. The Democrats, though often critical of Truman, were more inclined to defend his record; they were more "liberal," and they either opposed the Republicans on the above issues or held the same views somewhat less strongly. The Wallace Progressive Party based its appeal chiefly on amity toward Russia and an end to the cold war, and on a pro-labor domestic economic policy; they were generally regarded as the most "liberal" or even as a radical group.

Supporters of the regular Republicans, of Truman, and of Wallace, generally reflected the viewpoint held by their respective parties on the major issues. Those who voiced a Republican preference for President were more inclined than the Truman supporters to call for a stronger policy toward Russia, while the Wal-

TABLE 2. *Sources of Political Support, 1947–48, in Terms of Ideological Factors*

Of Those Naming Each Candidate, Percent Who Say	*Regular Republicans*	*Eisenhower*	*Truman*	*Wallace*
U. S. should be more willing to compromise in dealings with Russia	7%	9%	11%	57%
Present policy about right	15	12	20	13
We should be even firmer than we are today	73	72	61	19
Don't know	5	7	8	11
Present taxes are too high	54%	49%	48%	52%
They're about right	42	46	48	38
They're not high enough	1	2	1	2
Don't know	3	3	3	8
Labor is mostly to blame for troubles between labor and management	40%	29%	22%	9%
Management mostly to blame	28	41	45	60
Government mostly to blame	5	2	3	6
Don't know	27	28	31	25
*Favor government price controls on most things	49%	56%	61%	82%
Against price controls	48	38	31	15
Don't know	3	6	8	3
Truman doing excellent job as President	4%	3%	22%	2%
Truman doing good job	31	37	54	15
Truman doing fair job	47	46	22	36
Truman doing poor job	18	13	1	45
Don't know	—	1	1	2
When it comes to politics, call self a liberal	19%	25%	26%	61%
Call self middle-of-the-road	45	43	34	22
Call self conservative	24	18	16	3
Don't know	12	14	24	14

* These data based on the national quota sample November 1947. All other figures based on the 3-state survey May 1948.

lace-ites were strongly in favor of compromise with the Soviet. Truman supporters, less than the Republicans, considered present taxes too high. Republicans tended to pin the blame for labor-management troubles on labor, Truman supporters tended to blame management, and Wallace voters overwhelmingly supported the labor view. While a plurality of all groups except the Wallace supporters considered themselves "middle of the road" in their political thinking, the Republicans tended to call themselves conservative and Truman supporters to claim a liberal viewpoint. The Republicans were evenly split on the issue of price control, but those who favored Truman's candidacy were heavily in favor of it, and the Wallace supporters overwhelmingly so.

The voters who favored Eisenhower's candidacy at the time reflected majority sentiment on every issue. They were somewhat more conservative than the Democrats, more liberal than the Republicans. They favored price control, but less so than the Democrats; they condemned Truman's record, but less strongly than the Republicans; they tended to put most of the blame on management for labor disputes, but they were not as pro-labor as the Truman supporters. The "middle position" on ideology, characteristic of the Eisenhower group, is consistent with the broader base of his support as demonstrated in Table 1. More than any of the other candidates, he appealed to the large middle economic and educational groups, and he yet achieved some measure of support from

all minority groups, at both ends of the scale. This broad base of support was reflected in the avoidance, among the Eisenhower group, of extreme positions on any issue and in their adherence to a "middle-of-the-road" point of view.

Table 3 shows the distribution of each of the four groups, according to their past political behavior and their 1948 voting intentions. The appeal of Eisenhower to independent voters and to dissident Democrats is very evident here. More than half of the voters who named him as their choice for President normally considered themselves Democrats, and about half of them expressed a Democratic voting intention in 1948. Yet one-third of his supporters said they would probably vote Republican in 1948. Finally, Eisenhower drew a greater measure of "independent" support than did Wallace, Truman or any of the Republican candidates, and a larger proportion of his followers were at that time undecided on their 1948 vote. It is interesting, too, that Eisenhower, more than any of the other candidates, appealed to the youngest age group — those who had not been eligible to vote in 1944.

The data in Table 3 are based on large-scale sampling surveys and reflect the following of the various candidates in 1948 among the rank and file of voters. But the widespread appeal of the Eisenhower name was not confined to the general population. National leaders, of almost every political hue and often with the most divergent interests, praised Eisenhower's qualities and urged the General to run for office. Some of these leaders argued quite frankly that only a non-political figure of Eisenhower's stature could salvage their party (either Republican or Democratic) and insure victory in the 1948 election; others appeared to believe quite sincerely that Eisenhower shared their own particular political ideology (either liberal or conservative). Still others saw him as a "unity candidate", around whom a divided nation could rally, and there were many appeals that he be nominated on both major party tickets. The following brief sampling of the *New York Times* file during the period is sufficient to show that the disparate sources from which Eisenhower's *popular* strength derived were at least equaled by the divergent backgrounds and ideologies of the *leaders* who called for his nomination.

July 9, 1947: "Talk of General Eisenhower as a possibility (for the Republican nomination) appears to stem from former Governor Alf M. Landon of Kansas." (On December 14 Landon said, "The spontaneous and growing sentiment for the nomination of General Eisenhower is the most amazing phenomenon in the political history of the United States.") March 20, 1948: Conservative Southern Democratic

TABLE 3. *Sources of Political Support, 1947–48, in Terms of Political Partisanship**

Of Those Naming Each Candidate, Percent Who	*Regular Republicans*	*Eisenhower*	*Truman*	*Wallace*
Consider self Republican	51%	19%	10%	7%
Consider self Democrat	29	55	71	40
Consider self other party	*	1	—	34
Consider self independent	18	21	13	17
Don't know	2	4	6	2
Voted for Dewey in 1944	37%	11%	5%	2%
Voted for Roosevelt in 1944	34	54	59	67
Too young to vote in 1944	5	8	5	5
Failed to vote in 1944	20	23	29	23
Don't remember, refused	4	4	2	3
Will definitely vote Republican in 1948	37%	9%	3%	3%
Probably vote Republican	35	23	6	1
Definitely vote Democratic	4	9	45	3
Probably vote Democratic	13	39	37	11
Definitely or probably vote Wallace in 1948	1	3	—	70
Don't know vote in 1948	10	17	9	12

* All figures based on 3-state survey, May 1948.

Senators Sparkman of Alabama and Russell of Georgia urged Truman to step down as a candidate and suggested Eisenhower as the Democratic nominee. March 25: Right-wing labor leaders "revolted against the candidacy of President Truman. . . Most labor leaders would be pleased if the draft movement for Eisenhower became strong enough to alter his intention not to run." March 27: F. D. Roosevelt Jr. urged the people to draft Eisenhower as the Democratic nominee and rejected Truman's candidacy. Elliott Roosevelt also announced he favored Eisenhower's nomination. "The movement to draft General Eisenhower for the Democratic nomination for President has gained the support of leaders of the Liberal Party, including State Chairman Adolf A. Berle Jr., David Dubinsky and Alex Rose." "Leon Henderson, chairman of Americans for Democratic Action, appeared to be anticipating direct activity in the ADA in behalf of the Eisenhower candidacy. The Philadelphia chapter of ADA, the New York State ADA and the executive committee of the Students for Democratic Action are expected to endorse Eisenhower." March 28: In Washington, Democratic Sen. John C. Stennis of Mississippi announced his support of Eisenhower. March 30: The policy committee of the Liberal Party formally abandoned Truman and urged the nomination of Eisenhower on the Democratic ticket: "We have come to the conclusion that Dwight Eisenhower as a candidate of the democratic and liberal forces could unite the greatest number of Americans at this time." April 13: James B. Carey, CIO Secretary-Treasurer, spoke before the ADA in Pittsburgh in support of General Eisenhower for President. April 28: Emil Rieve, general president of the Textile Workers Union, CIO, urged Truman to withdraw from the running and said that someone like Eisenhower could win his vote and those of other members of his union. "Lots of people think Eisenhower would be a good candidate and with that I agree. *But I must say I really don't know what he stands for. But I would take a chance . . .*"[3] July 3: Democratic state conventions in Georgia and Virginia endorsed the Eisenhower candidacy and called on Truman to withdraw. July 5: Frank Hague, vice chairman of the Democratic National Committee, withdrew his recent endorsement of President Truman and urged the drafting of General Eisenhower . . . Jacob M. Arvey, Democratic leader of Chicago, said Illinois might put Eisenhower's name in nomination at the convention and predicted a stampede for the General. He said the nominating speech might be made by Adlai E. Stevenson or by Paul Douglas. July 7: Senator Claude Pepper of Florida called on the Democratic party to draft General Eisenhower as a national and non-partisan Presidential candidate.

That politics makes strange bedfellows is never surprising, but it is indeed a unique tribute to Eisenhower's political appeal that during this period he received the acclamation of not only Alf Landon but also Franklin Roosevelt Jr., not only Senator Pepper but also Senator Stennis, not only northern liberal and labor groups but also Southern state conventions, not only Frank Hague and Jake Arvey but also Adolf Berle and Chester Bowles.

It is unnecessary to discuss further our first basic point. We believe the survey data obtained from rank and file voters at the time, plus sampling of leadership sentiments we have cited, amply demonstrate the tremendous political strength of Dwight Eisenhower at a time when such major issues of the 1952 campaign as the Korean war and charges of corruption and pro-Communism in the Truman Administration simply did not exist.

The Sources of Eisenhower's Political Appeal

The question arises: What was there about Eisenhower in 1947–48 which brought him support from all these disparate sources? Why did the following of the other candidates fall into the expected pattern of group interests and traditional party preference, whereas Eisenhower's support freely crossed group and party lines? Our 1947–48 survey data permit no definitive reply to these questions, but they do tend to confirm some hypotheses and to deny others. And more generally, the data reveal some pertinent findings about basic American political attitudes.

Personal Popularity. One obvious factor in favor of Eisenhower as a vote-getter in 1947–48 was his great personal popularity at that

[3] Italics ours, to illustrate a point to which we return later.

time. His name was familiar to almost every American, and his defeat of the Nazi armies in Europe had made him a national hero. Obscure before the war, his fame was based entirely on his success in forging the coalition of allied armies which finally defeated Hitler in the West, and on his military victories. Both in 1946 and in 1947, when the Gallup Poll asked a national cross-section, "What person living today in any part of the world do you admire most?", Eisenhower ranked second, well ahead of such figures as Churchill, Truman, Marshall and Mrs. Roosevelt.[4]

It is obvious that personal fame and popularity are tremendous assets to anyone running for public office. Such a political aspirant can rely heavily on the popular good will toward him, and the burden of proof is largely transferred to the opposition who must show the voters why he would *not* make a desirable office-holder. And yet personal fame and popularity themselves are no sure keys to political success. History records many examples of the defeat of national heroes in political elections. The national figure who is adored by the apolitical masses may be hated by the minority of those with political power, and thus defeated in his bid for office. The popular hero may be admired for reasons quite irrelevant to his competence as the holder of public office. And finally, the admired figure does not usually run for office alone, on a platform of attractive personal characteristics; he is the nominee of a political party, thus inheriting traditional opposition, and he must take a stand on public issues, thereby alienating many voters who oppose his views. Some of these considerations may be deduced from the ranking of the ten most admired individuals in 1947, for leaving aside foreign personalities such as Churchill, the Pope and Sister Kenny, we find the following names in order: MacArthur, Eisenhower, Truman, Marshall, Mrs. Roosevelt, James Byrnes, Dewey, Baruch, Wallace, Vandenberg.[5]

While there is obviously a correlation here between personal popularity and political appeal, it scarcely approaches unity. One has no way of evaluating the vote-getting strength of such figures as Eleanor Roosevelt and Bernard Baruch, who have never stood for public office. When the NORC cross-sections of voters were asked to name "the one person in public life who you think has the best qualtities for President," their names turned up not at all. Partly, of course, this may have been because people disregarded the permissive wording of the question and named only those persons who they had some reason to believe would actually be candidates. But it is equally tenable to assume that while Mrs. Roosevelt and Baruch are widely admired for particular qualities or achievements, they would nevertheless *not* be elected to public office, even if their political opponents were far less popular. In the 1947 Gallup Poll, for example, Walter Winchell is more admired than Senator Taft, but one would probably not bet on Winchell in an election. In the NORC 3-state survey, both Eisenhower and Truman received more "votes for President" than did MacArthur, who outranked them in popularity, and Stassen (who was not among the ten most popular figures) out-polled Truman, Dewey, Wallace and Vandenberg, all of whom ranked ahead of him. Gallup "trial heats" about the same time showed Dewey, Stassen and Vandenberg, all running on the Republican ticket, out-polling the more "popular" Truman, "if the election were being held today."[6] While Eisenhower's personal popularity was a great political help, therefore, it cannot have accounted for his unusual political strength among all segments of the population, as described in the earlier tables. The more popular MacArthur was far weaker politically.

Military Background. The fact that the two most admired figures in 1947 were both military men suggests that Eisenhower's brilliant army record and wartime leadership may have accounted for his political strength. One could argue that a successful military record almost automatically makes for vote-getting appeal, and that the political non-partisanship of the soldier would tend to encourage the widespread support from many different and opposing segments of the population, which we found was so characteristic of Eisenhower.

Evidence that this is not necessarily the case, however, is provided by the fact that in the NORC surveys such non-military political figures as Truman and Stassen were mentioned

[4] Gallup release, March 9, 1947.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Gallup release, April 11, 1948.

more frequently than MacArthur as people's spontaneous choice for President, and that in Gallup "trial heats" at the time, Dewey, Stassen and Vandenberg all "defeated" Truman by a wider margin than did MacArthur.[7] General Marshall, a well known military figure, ranked high in terms of personal popularity, but such other military leaders as Bradley, Halsey, Clark and Nimitz were not mentioned nearly as often as Herbert Hoover.[8] Military success per se does not appear to guarantee either widespread admiration or great political strength.

More elaborate evidence on this factor is provided by the NORC 3-state survey. The figures in Table 4 cast considerable doubt on the hypothesis that it was Eisenhower's overriding appeal as a national military figure unidentified with any particular political party, which accounted for his ability to draw support from such a wide range of groups. Were this so, we would expect General MacArthur to have a similarly wide appeal. But the MacArthur following in 1948 was much closer to that of Dewey and the other Republicans than it was to that of Eisenhower. MacArthur supporters tended to blame labor, Eisenhower supporters to blame management, for labor-management disputes. MacArthur followers tended to call themselves conservative in politics, Eisenhower followers to describe themselves as liberal. Most of Eisenhower's strength came from Democrats; MacArthur drew more heavily from Republicans. Both Eisenhower *and* Dewey had a greater share of the "independent" vote than MacArthur.

It is clear, therefore, that the military man Eisenhower was able to attract the Democratic, independent and liberal support which the military man MacArthur could not do, and that whereas MacArthur's following was not much different from that of the other Republican candidates, Eisenhower's had a much broader popular base. It is no doubt true that MacArthur was even then, far more than Eisenhower, regarded as a Republican, but it is questionable how widespread this knowledge was among the public. MacArthur was then administering the Japanese occupation, had spoken out very little on American political issues, and had not yet clashed directly with the Truman administration. It must be noted further that Eisenhower, on the other hand, had done or said very little to encourage the belief that he would be a "liberal" candidate for President.

Public Naiveté. One might speculate that Eisenhower's appeal was due to the enthusiasm of large numbers of uninformed voters for his candidacy. Such a theory would explain why Eisehower's name was mentioned prominently by Republican voters when asked whom they would prefer as their party nominee, and also by Democratic voters when asked the same

[7] Ibid.

[8] Gallup release, March 9, 1947.

TABLE 4. *Characteristics of Eisenhower, MacArthur and Dewey Supporters, May 1948*

	Eisenhower	*MacArthur*	*Dewey*
Blame labor for labor-management troubles	29%	35%	41%
Blame management	41	34	27
Blame government	2	4	6
Don't know	28	27	26
Call self liberal in politics	25%	18%	20%
Call self middle-of-the-road	43	42	45
Call self conservative	18	23	25
Don't know	14	17	10
Consider self Republican	19%	42%	54%
Consider self Democratic	55	39	26
Consider self independent	22	15	19
Don't know	4	4	1
Attended college	21%	14%	28%
High school only	57	51	46
Grade school or less	22	35	26

question. It would explain why Eisenhower attracted both liberals and conservatives, while the strength of the other candidates was confined much more strictly to traditional party and group adherents. According to this theory, the masses of uneducated and politically innocent voters could be apathetic to the appeals of both Truman and of the traditional Republican candidates; and could turn to the popular hero Eisenhower in full confidence that whatever his specific political views might be, he would "make the best President." One would speculate, too, that the uninformed segments of the population would be less firm in their party preference, less intense in their opinions on political issues, and thus more ready to overlook their own group interests and partisanship in endorsing Eisenhower.

Such a theory is apparently belied, however, by the educational distributions reported in Tables 1 and 4. While Eisenhower's strength was not quite so large among the college educated group (which is traditionally the best informed on politics) as was Dewey's or that of most other Republican candidates, it was far greater than that of Truman or of MacArthur. Furthermore, proportionately *less* of Eisenhower's support came from the least educated group (traditionally the least informed and most apathetic on political issues) than any other candidate. Dewey and the other Republican candidates drew a larger measure of support from the least educated than did Eisenhower; Wallace drew considerably more; MacArthur had more of his following in this group than even Wallace, and Truman drew most heavily from the least educated.

The theory is further put into question by the strong endorsements of the Eisenhower candidacy which came from well informed and politically sophisticated leaders at that time, some of which we quoted earlier in this paper. Republican and Democratic politicians, big city machine leaders, labor union officials, veterans' leaders — such individuals are not politically naive or uninterested. Yet large numbers of them rallied to Eisenhower, each apparently seeing in him support for his own special political interests.

The Role of Ideology. It is quite evident, therefore, that Eisenhower was not simply a popular military hero, to whom the masses blindly turned, neither knowing nor caring what his stand was on important national issues. And yet his views on many important questions *were* unknown, and logically one would expect an alert, informed citizenry to refuse their political support to a reluctant candidate who was not clearly on the record in favor of their group interests. How explain the enthusiasm for Eisenhower, then, among top political leaders of widely varying interests and among rank and file voters in the better educated groups?

Perhaps the only answer is that a candidate's personal ideology is less important than has often been believed. The major American political parties are loose coalitions of diverse groups, and there is room in both parties for many viewpoints on particular issues. We are even accustomed to seeing isolationist Congressmen supporting Presidential candidates who forthrightly reject isolationism; to seeing New Deal-hating Southern Democrats wildly cheering Franklin Roosevelt. How much easier for political leaders of all persuasions to embrace the popular Eisenhower, who was not on the record as *opposing* their views. The job of the party leaders is to produce a winner. If the winner accepts the party's nomination, he is in large measure forced to accept its platform, traditions and basic viewpoint. Thus, it is not an evidence of naiveté or of cynicism that both northern liberals and southern conservatives sought Eisenhower's nomination on the Democratic ticket in 1948. They were both looking for a winner, which Truman certainly did not appear to be at that time.

There is ample evidence, too, that the public — and even the most educated segment of it — is not "ideologically sensitive." Table 5 provides illustrative data taken from the same survey of voters in New York, Illinois and California in May 1948. It will be noted that when people are asked what they particularly like about the man they spontaneously mentioned as their favorite candidate for President (Eisenhower, or whoever) relatively few of the reasons are in terms of the man's ideology or stand on the issues. The reasons they do give are overwhelmingly in terms of the man's character or experience — seemingly without any reference to his ideology. The wording of our question, which asked for the man's "qualities," may have encouraged responses in these terms, but it is nonetheless surprising that so few of the

TABLE 5. *Lack of Ideological Sensitivity Among American Voters*

*"What are the qualities that you think would make him the best man (for President)?"***	*Percent of 3-state Sample**
His experience, knowledge, administrative ability; he's practical, efficient, level-headed	51%
His honesty, good character, fairness, sincerity; he's above graft, not swayed by politics	23
His energy, leadership; he's aggressive, young, forceful, decisive, firm	22
His military knowledge, military background	10
Miscellaneous other personal qualities: diplomacy, etc.	10
Total mentions of non-ideological factors	116%
He's for the poor man, the working class, opposed to big business, for higher wages, better housing, etc.	5%
He's a middle-of-the-roader, sees both sides, not too liberal and not too reactionary	2
He's for less government control, would keep labor in line, favors business, free enterprise	1
He's against discrimination, favors equal rights for all	1
He's against war, would work for peace	1
Other ideological and policy reasons, direction not indicated: his policy toward Russia, stand on taxes, foreign policy, etc.	16
Total mentions of ideological factors	26%

"What do you like best about the (Republican) (Democratic) Party?" Asked of everyone who considered himself a Republican or Democrat.	*Percent of 3-state Sample** *Republicans*	*Democrats*
Non-ideological factors: Ability, experience, leadership, good intentions, honesty, names of particular party leaders, everything, etc.	31%	23%
Don't know, can't name anything, just have always been one, they're the best, etc.	37	32
Ideological factors: Handling of business-labor, liberal-conservative philosophy, prosperity-depression, foreign policy, civil rights, etc.	43	53
Total of all types of mentions	111%	108%

* Percentages add to more than 100% since some people named more than one thing.
** Asked of everyone who gave a spontaneous choice for President in May 1948.

replies fall into the "ideological" category. Similarly, when people are asked why they support a particular political party, the majority of the responses are not in terms of the ideology, the political philosophy, of the party. Instead, they are either helpless "Don't know" answers ("I've just always voted Republican.") or else the replies come in vague non-ideological terms: "The other party is a bunch of grafters," "Our party has the best man," "They get things done," "They live up to their promises," etc.

This is not to say that American voters make their electoral choices with no regard to the issues, or that their preferences are determined simply by some intuitive feeling that one of the parties or candidates is "better" than the other. On the contrary, there is much evidence to show that in general Americans *do* vote according to their group interests. We need only look again at the "Regular Republicans" and "Truman" columns of Tables 1 and 2 to see that the sources of support for the two major parties are consistent with the political philosophy of those parties. But the evidence in Table 5 indicates that most voters are not ideologically *sensitive*. These data were collected in May, of course, and perhaps the voters would be much more ideologically aware at election time, when the issues are sharpened and the views of each party put on the record. Yet surveys have shown that even during the heat of an election campaign, only a small minority of voters ex-

press any familiarity with the party platforms, know where the candidates stand on more than one or two major issues, or listen critically to the promises of both sides.[9]

The effects of this lack of ideological sensitivity or saliency would be compounded when (a) the candidate is tremendously popular personally, and (b) his stand on the issues is unknown or ambiguous. Such was the case with Eisenhower in 1947–48, and far from losing him supporters, his lack of commitment to either major party or to any particular point of view more likely gained him support, since his admirers could, without any evidence to the contrary, attribute to him all the views which they themselves held. Table 6 demonstrates this point clearly. Both groups named Eisenhower as their spontaneous choice for President, but the Democrats who named him were overwhelmingly pro-labor in their views and the Republicans who named him were equally strong pro-management. Either the candidates' stand on this issue was deemed irrelevant by the voters — a hypothesis which is denied by other evidence[10] — or else both groups saw their own ideology mirrored in Eisenhower.

Table 7 demonstrates that the voters to whom ideology *was* important tended to stick with the labeled candidates, the sure spokesmen for their point of view. They knew where Wallace, Truman, Dewey and Taft stood; but Eisenhower had not declared himself on the issues, and consequently but a very small proportion of his support came from this ideologically sensitive minority. It is interesting and consistent that the Wallace supporters were by far the most "ideologically sensitive" of all. A clear majority of this group named ideological factors as the reason for their preference. Eisenhower, on the other hand, seems to have drawn his support, more than any of the other candidates, from the large numbers of voters who were concerned less with specific attitudes toward Russia, labor, taxes, etc., than with obtaining a President who was "efficient, honest, sincere, fair and experienced."

Further evidence of the role of ideology in his support is apparent from an inspection of Table 8, where it is clear that Eisenhower in 1948 appealed more strongly to the less extreme elements in *each* major party. The Democrats who named Eisenhower still tended to regard themselves as liberal in politics, but they were a little more conservative than the Truman supporters. The Republicans who named Eisenhower still tended to regard themselves as conservative, but they were somewhat less so than those Republicans who endorsed Dewey, Stassen, MacArthur and the other Republican candidates. We have already seen that Eisenhower was the most popular candidate among those voters who considered themselves independent of any party affiliation. Table 8 now demonstrates that Eisenhower was also able to carry with him the marginal Democrats and Republicans.

Summary

Our data show clearly the strength of Eisenhower's political support in 1947–48, and they also show the nature of that support in terms of the characteristics of the voters who endorsed his candidacy at that time.

About the strength of his support there can be little doubt. In the NORC three-state poll in May 1948 his name was mentioned more often than any other as the voters' spontaneous choice

[9] Cf. various Gallup releases on ignorance (July 31, August 25, 1948, etc.); Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet, "The People's Choice," New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, Chapters V, VIII, IX on selective exposure to campaign materials.

[10] Dinerman, Helen, "1948 Votes in the Making — A Preview," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12, p. 595.

TABLE 6. *Labor-Management Attitudes by Democratic and Republican Supporters of Eisenhower, May 1948*

	Democrats for Eisenhower	*Republicans for Eisenhower*
Blame labor in labor-management disputes	18%	53%
Blame management	52	21
Blame both, other, don't know	30	26
	100%	100%

TABLE 7

	Percent of Voters Giving Non-Ideological Reasons for Support of Candidate
Wallace supporters	44%
Truman supporters	72
"Traditional Republican" supporters	76
Eisenhower supporters	88

for the Presidency. In a September 1947 Gallup Poll he outran Truman in a Presidential "trial heat."[11] He was consistently the first choice of independent voters who disclaimed any party affiliation. His candidacy was strongly endorsed by influential leaders of both political parties. And all this in spite of the fact that (a) it was not known which party claimed his sympathies, (b) he had made no major pronouncements on the outstanding issues of the time, and (c) he had strongly emphasized his unavailability for the nomination.

The nature of his support differed rather strikingly from the following of Truman, Wallace and the regular Republican candidates. Consistently throughout our analysis he was shown to have drawn more strength than Truman from the conservative groups and more strength than the Republican candidates from the liberal groups. His greatest appeal was to the less partisan "middle group": the independent voters, the more conservative Democrats, the more liberal Republicans, those who placed less emphasis on ideology and more emphasis on personal qualities in their choice of a candidate. And yet it was not his sheer personal popularity or his military glamor alone which won these supporters (the equally popular and glamorous MacArthur could not do it), nor was it a case of large masses of ignorant disillusioned voters turning away from the old candidates toward a new national savior. Actually, Eisenhower drew proportionately less of his strength from the uneducated group than did any other candidate.

What did cause this strong and widespread endorsement of Eisenhower in 1947–48 can only be inferred from the data we have presented. His popularity and military record, while not crucial, certainly helped him. The fact that 1948 was a year of particular party strain also helped him. In more normal years, when the parties are fairly united, there is little call for an outsider like Eisenhower was then. But in 1948 there were influential groups of Democrats who vigorously opposed Truman's renomination, and influential groups of Republicans who saw no future in any of the traditional Republican candidates who had been involved in the long series of party defeats. The fact that his political ideology was not known, far from hurting him, actually increased his appeal. By and large, Americans are not especially sensitive to ideology, unless the battle lines are tightly drawn and the issues clear-cut. Eisenhower's lack of commitments at this time simply encouraged his supporters to see him either as a nonpartisan national leader, or as an unspoken sympathizer with their own views.

On the evidence, we consider it highly probable that Eisenhower could have been elected President on either major party ticket, in either 1948 or 1952. Obviously, many Democrats who endorsed his candidacy in the NORC polls in 1948 did so on the assumption that he would run on the Democratic ticket, and one cannot

[11] *Op. cit.*

TABLE 8. *Ideology of Eisenhower Supporters, by Political Preference, May 1948*

	Democrats for Truman	*Democrats for Eisenhower*	*Republicans for Eisenhower*	*Republicans for Other GOP Candidates*
Call self liberal	32%	28%	18%	18%
Middle-of-the-road	34	41	49	45
Call self conservative	16	18	23	27
Don't know	18	13	10	10

assume that they would all vote for him if he ran as a Republican. Once Eisenhower committed himself to either major party and started to espouse that party's stand on the issues, he was bound to lose some support from adherents of the opposite party. In exchange, however, and in a much better than even exchange, he would gather to himself virtually all of the basic traditional voting strength of the party he chose. Just as, running as a Republican in 1952, Eisenhower gathered the basic Republican vote in addition to millions of other votes from independents and disgruntled Democrats, we would assume that, running as a Democrat, he would have held the basic Democratic vote and would still have amassed millions of other votes from the same independents and from disgruntled Republicans. None of the other candidates espoused in 1948 had anywhere near this faculty of attracting supporters from both parties.

If this analysis is correct, it is implied that the issues of Communism, corruption and Korea, over which the 1952 campaign was fought, were of decidedly less importance than was the simple candidacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower.

37

A THEORY OF CRITICAL ELECTIONS

• *V. O. KEY, JR.*

Perhaps the basic differentiating characteristic of democratic orders consists in the expression of effective choice by the mass of the people in elections.[1] The electorate occupies, at least in the mystique of such orders, the position of the principal organ of governance; it acts through elections. An election itself is a formal act of collective decision that occurs in a stream of connected antecedent and subsequent behavior. Among democratic orders elections, so broadly defined, differ enormously in their nature, their meaning, and their consequences. Even within a single nation the reality of election differs greatly from time to time. A systematic comparative approach, with a focus on variations in the nature of elections would doubtless be fruitful in advancing understanding of the democratic governing process. In behavior antecedent to voting, elections differ in the proportions of the electorate psychologically involved, in the intensity of attitudes associated with campaign cleavages, in the nature of expectations about the consequences of the voting, in the impact of objective events relevant to individual political choice, in individual sense of effective connection with community decision, and in other ways. These and other antecedent variations affect the act of voting itself as well as subsequent behavior. An understanding of elections and, in turn, of the democratic process as a whole must rest partially on broad differentiations of the complexes of behavior that we call elections.[2]

While this is not the occasion to develop a comprehensive typology of elections, the foregoing remarks provide an orientation for an attempt to formulate a concept of one type of election — based on American experience — which might be built into a more general theory of elections. Even the most fleeting inspection of American elections suggests the existence of a category of elections in which voters are, at least from impressionistic evidence, unusually deeply concerned, in which the extent of electoral involvement is relatively quite high, and in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage

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[1] For most of the detailed compilations of data underlying this discussion I am indebted to Stanley D. Hopper. Contributory analyses were also made by H. Douglas Price.

[2] Elections need not be equated to revolutions to appreciate the suggestive value in speculation about the nature of elections of the categorization of revolutions. See Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America* (Boston: Ginn and Company, rev. ed., 1950), pp. 145–155.

within the electorate. Moreover, and perhaps this is the truly differentiating characteristic of this sort of election, the realignment made manifest in the voting in such elections seems to persist for several succeeding elections. All these characteristics cumulate to the conception of an election type in which the depth and intensity of electoral involvement are high, in which more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community, and in which new and durable electoral groupings are formed.[3] These comments suppose, of course, the existence of other types of complexes of behavior centering about formal elections, the systematic isolation and identification of which, fortunately, are not essential for the present discussion.

I

The presidential election of 1928 in the New England states provides a specific case of the type of critical election that has been described in general terms. In that year Alfred E. Smith, the Democratic Presidential candidate, made gains in all the New England states. The rise in Democratic strength was especially notable in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. When one probes below the surface of the gross election figures it becomes apparent that a sharp and durable realignment also occurred within the electorate, a fact reflective of the activation by the Democratic candidate of low-income, Catholic, urban voters of recent immigrant stock.[4] In New England, at least, the Roosevelt revolution of 1932 was in large measure an Al Smith revolution of 1928, a characterization less applicable to the remainder of the country.

The intensity and extent of electoral concern before the voting of 1928 can only be surmised, but the durability of the realignment formed at the election can be determined by simple analyses of election statistics. An illustration of the new division thrust through the electorate by the campaign of 1928 is provided by the graphs in Figure A, which show the Democratic percentages of the presidential vote from 1916 through 1952 for the city of Somerville and the town of Ashfield in Massachusetts. Somerville, adjacent to Boston, had a population in 1930 of 104,000 of which 28 per cent was foreign born and 41 per cent was of foreign-born or mixed parentage. Roman Catholics constituted a large proportion of its relatively low-income population. Ashfield, a farming community in western Massachusetts with a 1930 population of 860, was predominately native born (8.6 per cent foreign born), chiefly rural-farm (66 per cent), and principally Protestant.

The impressiveness of the differential impact of the election of 1928 on Somerville and Ashfield may be read from the graphs in Figure A. From 1920 the Democratic percentage in Somerville ascended steeply while the Democrats in Ashfield, few in 1920, became even less numerous in 1928. Inspection of the graphs also suggests that the great reshuffling of voters that occurred in 1928 was perhaps the final and decisive stage in a process that had been under way for some time. That antecedent process involved a relatively heavy support in 1924 for La Follette in those towns in which Smith was subsequently to find special favor. Hence, in Figure A, as in all the other charts, the 1924 figure is the percentage of the total accounted for by the votes of both the Democratic and Progressive candidates rather than the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote. This usage conveys a minimum impression of the size of the 1924–1928 Democratic gain but probably depicts the nature of the 1920–1928 trend.

For present purposes, the voting behavior of the two communities shown in Figure A after 1928 is of central relevance. The differences established between them in 1928 persisted even through 1952, although the two series fluctuated slightly in response to the particular influences of individual campaigns. The nature of the process of maintenance of the cleavage is, of course, not manifest from these data. Conceivably the impress of the events of 1928 on individual attitudes and loyalties formed partisan attachments of lasting nature. Yet it is doubtful that the new crystallization of 1928

[3] These notions have been put forward in fragmentary form elsewhere: V. O. Key, Jr., "The Future of the Democratic Party," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, 28 (Spring, 1952), 161–175, where the argument is stated unencumbered by supporting data; Key, *A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), pp. 53–55, an analysis of an illustrative case.

[4] The campaign and its effects are described by Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), pp. 34–41.



FIGURE A. Democratic Percentages of Major-Party Presidential Vote, Somerville and Ashfield, Massachusetts, 1916–1952

projected itself through a quarter of a century solely from the momentum given it by such factors. More probably subsequent events operated to re-enforce and to maintain the 1928 cleavage. Whatever the mechanism of its maintenance, the durability of the realignment is impressive.

Somerville and Ashfield may be regarded more or less as samples of major population groups within the electorate of Massachusetts. Since no sample survey data are available for 1928, about the only analysis feasible is inspection of election returns for geographic units contrasting in their population composition. Lest it be supposed, however, that the good citizens of Somerville and Ashfield were aberrants simply unlike the remainder of the people of the Commonwealth, examination of a large number of towns and cities is in order. In the interest of both compression and comprehensibility, a mass of data is telescoped into Figure B. The graphs in that figure compare over the period 1916–1952 the voting behavior of the 29 Massachusetts towns and cities having the sharpest Democratic increases, 1920–1928, with that of the 30 towns and cities having the most marked Democratic loss, 1920–1928.[5] In other words, the figure averages out a great many Ashfields and Somervilles. The data of Figure B confirm the expectation that the pattern exhibited by the pair of voting units in Figure A represented only a single case of a much more general phenomenon. Yet by virtue of the coverage of the data in the figure, one gains a stronger impression of the difference in the character of the election of 1928 and the other elections recorded there. The cleavage confirmed by the 1928 returns persisted. At subsequent elections the voters shifted to and fro within the outlines of the broad division fixed in 1928.

Examination of the characteristics of the two groups of cities and towns of Figure B — those with the most marked Democratic gains, 1920–1928, and those with the widest movement in the opposite direction — reveals the expected sorts of differences. Urban, industrial,

[5] The measure of Democratic gain was the difference between the Democratic percentages of the town vote in 1920 and 1928. Something might be said for the use of the percentage increase from one election to another as a measure of change. Thus, a town 10 per cent Democratic in 1920 and 15 per cent Democratic in 1928 would have had, with a constant total vote, a Democratic percentage increase of 50. This sort of measure obviously has its peculiarities and conceivably its uses. It was rejected on the ground that the method of percentage differences gave a roughly comparable figure from town to town in that it represented the net proportion of the voting population affected by the trend under observation.



FIGURE B. Persistence of Electoral Cleavage of 1928 in Massachusetts: Mean Democratic Percentage of Presidential Vote in Towns with Sharpest Democratic Gains, 1920–1928, and in Towns of Widest Democratic Losses, 1920–1928

foreign-born, Catholic areas made up the bulk of the first group of towns, although an occasional rural Catholic community increased its Democratic vote markedly. The towns with a contrary movement tended to be rural, Protestant, native-born. The new Democratic vote correlated quite closely with a 1930 vote on state enforcement of the national prohibition law.

Melancholy experience with the eccentricities of data be they quantitative or otherwise, suggests the prudence of a check on the interpretation of 1928. Would the same method applied to any other election yield a similar result, *i.e.*, the appearance of a more or less durable realignment? Perhaps there can be no doubt that the impact of the events of any election on many individuals forms lasting party loyalties; yet not often is the number so affected so great as to create a sharp realignment. On the other hand, some elections are characterized by a large-scale transfer of party affection that is quite short-term, a different sort of phenomenon from that which occurs in elections marked by broad and durable shifts in party strength. The difference is illustrated by the data on the election of 1932 in New Hampshire in Figure C. The voting records of the twenty-five towns with the widest Democratic gains from 1928 to 1932 are there traced from 1916 to 1952. Observe that Democratic strength in these towns shot up in 1932 but fairly quickly resumed about the same position in relation to other towns that it had occupied in 1928.[6] It is also evident from the graph that this group of towns had on the whole been especially strongly repelled by the Democratic appeal of 1928. Probably the depression drove an appreciable number of hardened Republicans of these towns to vote for a change in 1932, but they gradually found their way back to the party of their fathers.[7] In any case, the figure reflects a type of behavior differing markedly from that of 1928. To the extent that 1932 resembled 1928 in the recrystal-

[6] An analysis of the 1928–32 shifts in Massachusetts by the same techniques shows a similar pattern of behavior.

[7] This remark and others throughout ought to be read with the caution invariably applicable to inferences about individual behavior from aggregate statistics. To interpret properly the behavior underlying the graph of Figure C one would need a voting history of individual voters over a period of several elections, a body of data not readily available. The inferences from Figure C, however, parallel findings from a 1952 survey which identified a class of Republicans who indicated that they had deserted their party in 1932 or 1936 and later returned to the fold. See Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, and Company, 1954), pp. 100–103.

lization of party lines, the proportions of new Democrats did not differ significantly among the groups of towns examined. In fact, what happened to a considerable extent in New England was that the 1928 election broke the electorate into two new groups that would have been formed in 1932 had there been no realignment in 1928.

The Massachusetts material has served both to explain the method of analysis and to present the case of a single state. Examinations of the election of 1928 in other New England states indicates that in each a pattern prevailed similar to that of Massachusetts.[8] The total effect of the realignment differed, of course, from state to state. In Massachusetts and Rhode Island the number of people affected by the upheaval of 1928 was sufficient to form a new majority coalition. In Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont the same sort of reshuffling of electors occurred, but the proportions affected were not sufficient to overturn the Republican combination, although the basis was laid in Maine and New Hampshire for later limited Democratic successes. To underpin these remarks the materials on Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island are presented in Figure D. The data on Vermont, excluded for lack of space, form a pattern similar to that emerging from the analysis of the other states.

In the interpretation of all these 1928 analyses certain limitations of the technique need to be kept in mind. The data and the technique most clearly reveal a shift when voters of different areas move in opposite directions. From 1928 to 1936 apparently a good deal of Democratic growth occurred in virtually all geographic units, a shift not shown up sharply by the technique. Hence, the discussion may fail adequately to indicate the place of 1928 as the crucial stage in a process of electoral change that began before and concluded after that year.

[8] Not only was the pattern in terms of the behavior of towns with greatest Democratic gains and widest Democratic losses similar: it is evident, too, that the same sorts of population groups were affected. In Connecticut the towns with the broadest Democratic gains 1920–1928 had a mean foreign-born population percentage of 23.8 and a mean rural-farm percentage of 14.9. In contrast, the towns showing the sharpest Democratic losses had a mean foreign-born population percentage of 15.0 and a mean rural-farm population percentage of 45.5.

II

One of the difficulties with an ideal type is that no single actual case fits exactly its specifications. Moreover, in any system of categorization the greater the number of differentiating criteria for classes, the more nearly one tends



FIGURE C. Impact of Election of 1932 in New Hampshire: Mean Democratic Percentage of Presidential Vote of Towns with Sharpest Democratic Gain, 1928–1932, Compared with Mean Vote of Towns at Opposite Extreme of 1928–1932 Change



FIGURE D. Realignment of 1928 in Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island

to create a separate class for each instance. If taxonomic systems are to be of analytical utility, they must almost inevitably group together instances that are unlike at least in peripheral characteristics irrelevant to the purpose of the system. All of which serves to warn that an election is about to be classified as critical even though in some respects the behavior involved differed from that of the 1928 polling.

Central to our concept of critical elections is a realignment within the electorate both sharp and durable. With respect to these basic criteria the election of 1896 falls within the same category as that of 1928, although it differed in other respects. The persistence of the new division of 1896 was perhaps not so notable as that of 1928; yet the Democratic defeat was so demoralizing and so thorough that the party could make little headway in regrouping its forces until 1916.[9] Perhaps the significant feature of the 1896 contest was that, at least in New England, it did not form a new division in which partisan lines became more nearly congruent with lines separating classes, religions, or other such social groups. Instead, the Republicans succeeded in drawing new support, in about the same degree, from all sorts of economic and social classes. The result was an electoral coalition formidable in its mass but which required both good fortune and skill in political management for its maintenance, given its latent internal contradictions.

If the 1896 election is described in our terms as a complex of behavior preceding and following the formal voting, an account of the action must include the panic of 1893. Bank failures, railroad receiverships, unemployment, strikes, Democratic championship of deflation and of the gold standard, and related matters created the setting for a Democratic setback in 1894. Only one of the eight New England Democratic Representatives survived the elections of 1894. The two 1892 Democratic governors fell by the wayside and in all the states the Democratic share of the gubernatorial vote fell sharply in 1894. The luckless William Jennings Bryan and the free-silver heresy perhaps did not contribute as much as is generally supposed to the 1892–1896 decline in New England Democratic strength; New England Democrats moved in large numbers over to the Republican ranks in 1894.

The character of the 1892–1896 electoral shift is suggested by the data of Figure E, which presents an analysis of Connecticut and New Hampshire made by the technique used earlier in examining the election of 1928. The graphs make plain that in these states (and the other New England states show the same pattern) the rout of 1896 produced a basic realignment that persisted at least until 1916.[10] The graphs in Figure E also make equally plain that the 1892–1896 realignment differed radically from that of 1928 in certain respects. In 1896 the net movement in all sorts of geographic units was toward the Republicans; towns differed not in the direction of their movement but only in the extent. Moreover, the persistence of the realignment of 1896 was about the same in those towns with the least Democratic loss from 1892 to 1896 as it was in those with the most marked decline in Democratic strength. Hence, the graphs differ from those on 1928 which took the form of opening scissors. Instead, the 1896 realignment appears as a parallel movement of both groups to a lower plateau of Democratic strength.

If the election of 1896 had had a notable differential impact on geographically segregated social groups, the graphs in Figure E of towns at the extremes of the greatest and least 1892–96 change would have taken the form of opening scissors as they did in 1928. While the election of 1896 is often pictured as a last-ditch fight between the haves and the have-nots, that understanding of the contest was, at least in New England, evidently restricted to planes of leadership and oratory. It did not extend to the voting actions of the electorate. These observations merit some buttressing, although the inference emerges clearly enough from Figure E.

Unfortunately the census authorities have ignored the opportunity to advance demographic inquiry by publishing data of consequence about New England towns. Not much information is

[9] The data generate the impression that the 1896 alignment persisted in its basic form until 1928, with the Democratic gains of 1916 being principally a short-term desertion of the Republican Party by classes of British origin and orientation.

[10] In the graphs in Figure E the 1912 figure is the Democratic percentage of the three-party vote which is used to provide a measure of the Democratic proportions of the electorate roughly comparable with that used for the other years in the series.



FIGURE E. Realignment of 1896 in Connecticut and New Hampshire

available on the characteristics of the populations of these small geographic areas. Nevertheless, size of total population alone is a fair separator of towns according to politically significant characteristics. Classification of towns according to that criterion groups them roughly according to industrialization and probably generally also according to religion and national origin. Hence, with size of population of towns and cities as a basis, Table 1 contrasts the elections of 1896 and 1928 for different types of towns. Observe from the table that the mean shift between 1892 and 1896 was about the same for varying size groups of towns. Contrast this lack of association between size and political movement with the radically different 1920–28 pattern which also appears in the table.

Table 1 makes clear that in 1896 the industrial cities, in their aggregate vote at least, moved toward the Republicans in about the same degree as did the rural farming communities. Some of the misinterpretations of the election of 1896 flow from a focus on that election in isolation rather than in comparison with the preceding election. In 1896, even in New England cities, the Democrats tended to be strongest in the poor, working-class, immigrant sections. Yet the same relation had existed, in a sharper form, in 1892. In 1896 the Republicans gained in the working-class wards, just as they did in the silk-stocking wards, over their 1892 vote. They were able to place the blame for unemployment upon the Democrats and to propagate successfully the doctrine that the Republican Party was the party of prosperity and the "full dinner pail." On the whole, the effect apparently was to reduce the degree of coincidence of class affiliation and partisan inclination.[11] Nor was the election of 1896, in

[11] While the Boston ward votes of 1892 and 1896 cannot be compared directly because of boundary changes, an indirect check on the comments in the

New England at least, a matter of heightened tension between city and country. Both city and country voters shifted in the same direction.[12] Neither urban employers nor industrial workers could generate much enthusiasm for inflation and free trade; rather they joined in common cause. Instead of a sharpening of class cleavages within New England the voting apparently reflected more a sectional antagonism and anxiety, shared by all classes, expressed in opposition to the dangers supposed to be threatening from the West.[13]

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text is feasible. In 1892 the coefficient of correlation between the percentage of males 21 and over foreign-born in each ward and the Democratic percentage of the ward vote was +0.88, with $Y_c = 16.28 + .931X$. In 1896 the coefficient of correlation between the ward percentages of registered voters foreign-born (*Boston City Documents*, 1897, v. I, Doc. 9) and the Democratic percentage of the ward vote was +0.82 with $Y_c = -9.0 + 1.428X$. In 1892 the mean Democratic percentage of the wards was 58.2; in 1896, 38.1. In both years Democratic strength varied from ward to ward directly with foreign-born population proportions (which may be regarded also as an index of economic status) but in all sorts of areas, rich and poor, the Republicans apparently had a net gain of approximately 20 percentage points in 1896 over 1892.

[12] William Diamond has discussed urban-rural tension in his "Urban and Rural Voting in 1896," *The American Historical Review*, XLVI (January, 1941), 281–305. His measures of tension rest on a comparison of the Bryan percentages of the vote in cities of over 45,000 and in the remainder of each state. In his analysis New England emerges as an area of relatively high urban-rural tension. To the extent that urban-rural tension played a part in Massachusetts in 1896 it was evidently no more salient than it had been in 1892; Democratic candidates did relatively better in the cities than in the country at both elections. Between 1892 and 1896 Democratic strength declined in both rural and urban populations and to about the same extent. Rice's index of likeness between groups (which is the complement of the differences between divisions in percentages) computed for Diamond's urban and rural groups in the 1892 presidential voting in Massachusetts is 91.6; for 1896, 88.6. In other words, the point of party division of urban and rural populations did not differ greatly between the two groups in either election. Apart from these quantitative resemblances there may well have been qualitative differences in urban rural antagonisms in the two elections.

[13] An analysis of states such as that used in dealing with towns in the preparation of Figure B and

TABLE 1. *Contrasts Between Elections of 1896 and 1928 in Massachusetts: Shifts in Democratic Strength, 1892–1896 and 1920–1928, in Relation to Population Size of Towns*

Population Size Group[a]	*Mean Democratic Percentage*		*Mean Change* 1892–96	*Mean Democratic Percentage*		*Mean Change* 1920–28
	1892	1896		1920	1928	
1–999	34.0	14.7	−19.3	16.5	18.6	+2.1[b]
2000–2999	38.8	18.3	−20.5	21.0	33.1	+12.1
10000–14999	46.7	26.9	−19.8	25.8	43.7	+17.9
50000+	47.7	30.1	−17.6	29.5	55.7	+26.2

[a] The 1892–1896 towns are grouped according to 1900 population; the 1920–28 towns, according to the 1930 census. The composition of the size groups is, therefore, not the same for the two periods. It is of some interest that the identical towns included in the 1892–96 groupings had about the same group means in Democratic percentage in 1920 as in 1896. The 1920 means for the 1892–96 groups, as composed in 1900, were, in the order given in the table, 15.9; 20.2; 31.2; 31.3. The similarity of these means to those for 1896 would give comfort to supporters of the position that the 1896 cleavage persisted until 1928.

[b] It might be expected from Figure B that this figure would be negative. Although towns tend to be separated into groups with different political characteristics when classified according to size, the category of quite small towns is by no means homogeneous. A suggestion of the variety included among the 78 towns underlying this figure is provided by their division into those over and those less than 40 per cent wet in a 1930 referendum on a measure to repeal the act for state enforcement of the Volstead Act. The towns under 40 per cent wet had a mean change of −1.2 points in Democratic strength from 1920 to 1928. Those over 40 per cent wet had a mean change of +6.2.

Other contrasts between the patterns of electoral behavior of 1896 and 1928 could be cited[14] but in terms of sharpness and durability of realignment both elections were of roughly the same type, at least in New England. In these respects they seem to differ from most other elections over a period of a half century, although it may well be that each round at the ballot boxes involves realignment within the electorate similar in kind but radically different in extent.

III

The discussion points toward the analytical utility of a system for the differentiation of elections. A concept of critical elections has been developed to cover a type of election in which there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties, although the techniques employed do not yield any information of consequences about the mechanisms for the maintenance of a new alignment, once it is formed. Obviously any sort of system for the gross characterization of elections presents difficulties in application. The actual election rarely presents in pure form a case fitting completely any particular concept. Especially in a large and diverse electorate a single polling may encompass radically varying types of behavior among different categories of voters;[15] yet a dominant characteristic often makes itself apparent. Despite such difficulties, the attempt to move toward a better understanding of elections in the terms here employed could provide a means for better integrating the study of electoral behavior with the analysis of political systems. In truth, a considerable proportion of the study of electoral behavior has only a tenuous relation to politics.

The sorts of questions here raised, when applied sufficiently broadly on a comparative basis and carried far enough, could lead to a consideration of basic problems of the nature of democratic orders. A question occurs, for example, about the character of the consequences for the political system of the temporal frequency of critical elections.[16] What are the consequences for public administration, for the legislative process, for the operation of the economy of frequent serious upheavals within the electorate? What are the correlates of that pattern of behavior? And, for those disposed to

similar charts shows something of the sectional coloration of the 1896 voting. Outside the South, eight states moved more than 12 percentage points (in differences in Republican proportions of the total vote) toward the Republicans from 1892 to 1896. These states with the most marked Republican gains included the New England states, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. States with the widest Republican losses were Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada. The mean percentages of these two groups, when graphed, have a suggestion of the opening scissors form. The mean percentages for the two groups were:

	1892	1896	1900	1904	1908
Gaining Republican	52	67	61	63	61
Declining Republican	38	18	42	58	45

[14] The 1896 voting evidently involved a great deal of crossing of party lines by Democrats while it seems probable that in 1928 the Democratic gain came in considerable measure from the attraction of new voters into the active electorate. In 1896 electoral participation nationally was at a high level, in the neighborhood of 80 per cent of the total potential vote. From 1892 to 1896 in New England the total presidential vote increased only 3 per cent, while the Republican vote grew by 35.8 per cent and the Democratic vote declined by 37.7 per cent. Such figures point toward a large scale conversion of Democrats to the Republican cause. From 1896 to 1924 the proportions of the potential national electorate voting in Presidential elections underwent a secular decline to around 49 per cent, a movement by no means attributable entirely to the expansion of the suffrage but probably more fundamentally reflective of a contraction of national attention on matters political. In any case, by 1928 the population included large numbers of persons eligible for political activation. In 1928, the total New England presidential vote grew by 34.6 per cent over 1924, an unusually high rate of growth between elections, while the Republican vote was increasing by only 13 per cent and the Democratic by 135 per cent, a disparity accounted for in part by Democratic defections to La Follette in 1924. The absolute Democratic gain was of the general order of magnitude of the gain in the total vote. A substantial proportion of the new Democratic vote probably came from accretions to the active electorate. A reexamination of elections with an eye to the bearing on the results of sharp increases in the electorate, either sectionally or within other subdivisions, might produce significant reinterpretations of episodes in the American party battle.

[15] For example, the 1928 election in the South, in contrast with New England, involved large but short-lived accretions to the Republican ranks.

[16] See the related discussion by Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), Vol. 1, pp. 205–206.

raise such questions, what underlying changes might alter the situation? Or, when viewed from the contrary position, what consequences flow from an electorate which is disposed, in effect, to remain largely quiescent over considerable periods? Does a state of moving equilibrium reflect a pervasive satisfaction with the course of public policy? An indifference about matters political? In any case, what are the consequences for the public order? Further, what are the consequences when an electorate builds up habits and attachments, or faces situations, that make it impossible for it to render a decisive and clear-cut popular verdict that promises not to be upset by caprice at the next round of polling? What are the consequences of a situation that creates recurring, evenly balanced conflict over long periods? On the other hand, what characteristics of an electorate or what conditions permit sharp and decisive changes in the power structure from time to time? Such directions of speculation are suggested by a single criterion for the differentiation of elections. Further development of an electoral typology would probably point to useful speculation in a variety of directions.

38

PRESIDENTIAL COATTAILS

A Study in Political Myth and Methodology

• *WARREN E. MILLER*

The medieval query concerning the number of angels who can gambol on the point of a pin has at least one modern counterpart: How many congressmen can ride on the coattails of a President? In the case of the older query the compelling need to find an answer seems to be no longer with us. Not so for the second. At least once every two years political scientists, politicians, and interested citizens throughout the land exhibit a more than passing interest in the impact of the President, or presidential candidates, on elections for congress.

In the absence of adequate empirical study, a body of folklore has evolved to explain, or explain away, all manner of conclusions concerning the phenomenon called coattail influence.

Traditional Analyses of Coattail Influence

In the main, traditional analyses of the influence of presidential coattails rest on two propositions. If, in a given election, the presidential candidate of Party A receives more votes than do all of his congressional running mates combined, it is assumed that he has proved himself an asset to his party. Specifically, it is assumed that the margin by which he leads his congressional ticket is a reflection of his "pulling power" and, therefore, a measure of the extent to which he aided his fellow candidates. The second proposition is assumed to follow as the logical converse of the first. If a presidential aspirant trails his congressional ticket, it is assumed that he was a weak candidate, contributing little to the success of his fellow candidates, or, indeed, that his candidacy actually proved an obstacle to the election of other members of his party's ticket. Following from this proposition, the margin by which a presidential candidate trails his congressional cohorts is accepted as a measure of his weakness as a party leader.[1]

These propositions have gained ready acceptance, it may be presumed, because of the general plausibility which surrounds particular applications of them. It is probable that Republicans and Democrats alike carry the perception of Alf Landon as a very weak presidential candidate. In the present context his

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[1] Moos, Malcolm, *Politics, Presidents and Coattails*, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1952.

resounding defeat at the hands of Franklin D. Roosevelt is supplemented by the fact that he trailed behind the Republican congressional ticket of 1936. On the other hand, Theodore Roosevelt was a strong candidate. He not only captured the presidency in 1904 but, in the same year, led his party's congressional candidates by a large margin. In the more contemporary setting of 1952, General Eisenhower established a new record. As the first Republican President elected since 1928, he swept into office with over 20 per cent more votes than were received by his fellow party members who were competing with Democratic candidates for seats in Congress. Adlai Stevenson at the same time suffered the first Democratic defeat in 20 years and trailed his congressional ticket by a margin exceeded only once before in modern times (and that in 1924 when John W. Davis was given only 76.5 per cent of his party's congressional vote, as against Stevenson's 95.5 per cent). The official returns which tell the story of the 1952 election are presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1. *Votes Cast for President and Congress, 1952*

	Votes for President	*Votes for Congress*
Democratic	27.3 million	28.6 million
Republican	33.9 million	28.3 million

Employing the aforementioned propositions, an inspection of the election data on national voting for President and Congress in 1952 would lead immediately to two conclusions. We would conclude that Eisenhower apparently was a very strong candidate in that he both won the presidency and at the same time garnered votes for Republican congressmen. Stevenson's candidacy would, on the basis of the same propositions, appear to have been doubly weak in that he not only lost the major prize but succeeded only in hindering the efforts of his congressional running mates.

Before accepting these conclusions about the election of 1952, or about Landon, Roosevelt, or any other presidential candidate, it is essential that we examine carefully, if briefly, the propositions which underlie this interpretation of the data. The crucial point to be noted about the existence of coattail influence is that it means that congressional candidates of Party A, for example, receive votes which they would not have received if it had not been for the candidacy of their presidential nominee. The receipt of such votes depends, of course, on voters casting straight tickets at least for President and Congressman. It then follows that the successful exertion of influence by the presidential candidate must be reflected in a high degree of straight ticket voting, voting both for him and for his fellow candidates.

The maximum demonstration of coattail influence would find all of the voters who supported a presidential candidate also supporting his congressional cohorts, and all of the voters who supported his congressional cohorts also supporting him. Given this situation it would mean that the presidential candidate had "delivered" to his congressional running mates all of the votes which he possibly could, namely, all of the votes which he himself received. This would also mean, however, that having successfully exercised his influence, the presidential candidate would not be leading his ticket at all and thus would not have the traditionally required margin which is held to demonstrate the existence of his influence.

Thus, when the role of straight ticket voting in coattail-influenced behavior is placed beside the two propositions which are traditionally used to interpret coattail influence, it becomes obvious that only one of the propositions can be sustained. It is, for example, probably reasonable to assume that Adlai Stevenson was not responsible for the support which people who voted for Eisenhower gave to Democratic candidates for Congress. It appears in Table 1 that there were at least 1.3 million votes cast for Democratic congressmen that Stevenson's candidacy could not have impelled, and that, therefore, indicated a weakness in his candidacy. It would seem to follow that if the margin had been 13 million there would have been even better grounds for assuming that Stevenson did not contribute greatly to his party's fortunes in that election. In both cases the margin reflects the number of people who voted for a congressional candidate in spite of, and certainly not because of, their lack of preference for the presidential candidate at the head of his ticket. Consequently, the proposition that the margin by which a candidate trails his party is a measure of the weakness of his candidacy, and his lack of coattail influence, seems quite defensible.

Although a candidate who trails his ticket

may be weak, it does not logically follow, as the other proposition would lead us to believe, that a candidate who runs ahead of his ticket is, therefore, a strong party leader. For the candidate who leads as well as for the one who trails, the margin between his total vote and that of his congressional colleagues is a measure of the *absence* of the straight ticket voting which his candidacy is supposed to produce. The extent to which a candidate "leads" his ticket is, by and large, at the same time the extent to which his personal followers split away from him and his party in voting for lesser offices. Such defections clearly cannot be taken as evidence of a presidential aspirant's ability to attract votes for other candidates on his ticket. They may, and probably do, reflect the extent to which his personal popularity exceeds the collective popularity of his running mates or the popularity of his party, but such defections cannot reflect the extent to which his popularity resulted in gains for other candidates on his ticket.

The availability of data depicting, for a national sample of adult citizens, the congressional and presidential votes for each individual voter makes it possible for us to illustrate the basic fallacy of the assumptions behind such "traditional" conclusions as those drawn above about the influence of Eisenhower and Stevenson on congressional races in 1952. Data collected by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, are presented in Table 2 and provide a graphic illustration of the argument against the proposition in question.[2]

The actual distribution of congressional votes cast by Eisenhower voters suggests precisely the opposite interpretation from that usually made from such an overall presidential-congressional vote relationship as that which existed in 1952 between Republican presidential and congressional voting. It is apparent that Eisenhower led the Republican congressional ticket primarily because he failed to carry with him many voters who supported him but who would not vote for his party's congressional candidates. From these data it can be seen that the *usual* measure of the strength of a presidential candidate's coattail influence is paradoxically dependent on his failure to exert that influence over a sizable number of his supporters. Indeed, if more Eisenhower supporters had voted for Democratic candidates for Congress, the usual measure of Eisenhower's influence (his margin over that of the total Republican congressional vote) would have been larger even though his demonstrable influence would have been smaller.

TABLE 2. *Vote for President in Relation to the Vote for Congressman*

Vote for Congressman	*Vote for President*	
	Republican	*Democratic*
Republican	70%	5%
Democratic	14*	76
Other	**	1
Voted, don't know for whom	8	8
Did not vote	5	7
Not ascertained	3	3
Total	100%	100%
Number of cases	687	494

* A portion of this group may well be composed of residents of the Deep South who had no opportunity to vote for a Republican congressman because of the absence of a Republican candidate from the ballot.

** Less than one-half of one per cent.

Stevenson, at the same time, was apparently supported to a somewhat larger extent by voters who also supported Democratic congressional aspirants. Thus, although Stevenson lost the election and trailed his congressional ticket, more of his followers than of Eisenhower's followers voted the straight ticket for President and Congressman. This apparent incongruity could be accommodated in the traditional analysis of coattail influence by introducing the above mentioned proposition about the meaning of vote margins and then, as is sometimes done, broadening the definition of coattail effect and allowing presidential candidates to ride the congressional coattails. Such a re-definition would not, however, eliminate the paradox that would again find the *fewer* the supporters of Democratic congressional candidates who also voted for Stevenson the larger the margin between total Democratic congressional and presidential

[2] The data used in the balance of this discussion were gathered by the Survey Research Center in its study of the 1952 election. The study was financed by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation which was made available to the Social Science Research Council for the support of the project. The major report of the study has been published under the title *The Voter Decides*, A. Campbell, G. Gurin, and W. E. Miller, Row, Peterson and Co., Evanston, 1954.

votes and, therefore, the *greater* the assumed coattail influence of the Democratic candidates for Congress on voting for the President.

Coattail influence can exist only where straight ticket voting prevails; its incidence cannot reasonably be equated with deviations from that behavior. However, it is also clear that not all straight ticket voting can be attributed to the influence of presidential coattails. It is not hard to imagine that there are a great many factors in addition to the influence of a presidential candidate which could lead to straight ticket voting. We are thus confronted with the task of isolating from all behavior consonant with the coattail influence (all straight ticket voting) that behavior which is uniquely related to such coattail influence rather than to the influence of party loyalty, a crucial campaign issue, habit, or any of the other potentially confounding factors.

A Suggested Analysis Model

Our attention must turn, therefore, to the question of what portion of all straight ticket voting for President and Congress is attributable to coattail effect. The logic of the subsequent discussion may be outlined in terms of two theoretical conditions which are relevant if presidential coattails are to influence voting for congressmen.

1. Casting a vote for President may be the product of a great many different motivations. One of the many reasons for presidential voting can be designated as the reaction to the personal appeal of the candidate. Coattail influence depends upon the existence of this factor. Other factors which do not depend for their existence on the candidacy of a particular individual are, by definition, excluded from coattail influence in voting.

2. Casting a vote for a congressional candidate may be impelled by a sensitivity to factors uniquely associated with the particular congressional contest. Where such factors are at all important to the voter he will be less readily influenced by the existence of presidential coattails. His decisions for President and Congressman will be arrived at independently of each other. For other people (including coattail voters), casting a vote for a congressional candidate may be an act made in response to precisely the same forces or factors which impel their voting for President. If these voters vote for any candidate other than for President, their non-presidential decisions will not be independent decisions but will follow as a consequence of the motivations which lead to their presidential vote. If the congressional vote decision, as well as the presidential decision, is motivated by the appeal of the presidential candidate, the result is a coattail-influenced vote for Congress.

At any given point during a campaign, the existence or non-existence of specific motivations would tell us a good deal about the possibility of coattail voting in the ensuing election. Nevertheless, the sheer incidence of motivational patterns would not tell us enough. It would leave unanswered the fundamental question of the influence which one motivation may have on the development of others. In this instance it would leave unanswered the question of the extent to which the response to a presidential candidate results directly or indirectly in the creation of reactions to the congressional candidate. It is a matter of common knowledge that the total popular vote for congressional candidates is higher in a presidential election year than in an off year. Shifting from established knowledge to conjecture, it is quite probable that many of the voters responsible for the presidential election increment in the congressional vote would, if subjected to examination, be found to exhibit motivations which are apparently "uniquely associated with particular congressional contests." In addition to measuring motivations relevant to the presidential and congressional elections, a third problem thus arises from the necessity to determine whether any of the motivations found to be focused on the congressional elections were in fact stimulated, activated, or, if you will, produced by the presidential campaign. People exhibiting congressionally oriented motivations of this type, motivations which owe their existence to the presidential candidate, are just as clearly coattail voters as are their cohorts who give no evidence of motivations uniquely related to voting for congressional candidates.

Given full and complete data, the three components of this model could be used to isolate as possible coattail voters (a) those straight ticket voters whose presidential voting motivations (b) included an attraction for the presidential candidate, and whose congressional motivations either (c) did not include a pre-

ponderance of factors uniquely related to the congressional race *or* (d) did include only factors impelled by the existence of the presidential candidate and his campaign. Thus, the consideration of the interaction of motivations demands that the proposed analysis model not only take into account the existence and nonexistence of relevant motivations, but also explore the genetic development of those motivations found to exist prior to the act of voting.

Ultimately, our understanding of the motivation of human behavior in general and of political behavior in particular must be advanced to the point where such gross problems as this can be treated adequately on a theoretical level. In the interim, it is possible to approximate that part of such knowledge as is needed for our immediate problem by drawing inferences from the behavioral manifestations of motivations. To do this we may specify that to identify people who have responded to the presidential coattail influence we must look not only at straight ticket voters, but we must find those straight ticket voters whose decisions on the vote for President preceded their congressional vote decisions. Having identified such people, the inference will be introduced that the motivations leading to the presidential decision played a significant role in the creation of a decision for the congressional vote. We will assume, conversely, that arriving at a decision for Congress prior to a decision for President implies that congressionally relevant motivations were not influenced by, but may influence, the eventual decision for President.

The third logically possible situation, simultaneous decisions for President and Congress, constitutes a major defect in this substitute for direct knowledge about the development of political motivations. Voters exhibiting such behavior will be consigned to the limbo created by indeterminate data. While the discovery that some voters must be treated in this unsatisfactory manner may detract from the neatness of the application of the analysis model, it is hoped that their presence as well as the presence of the rather crucial inferences on which the entire "sequence of decision" phase of the model rests will prompt further research into the nature of motivations rather than the hasty discard of the overall model.

Before attempting to apply this model in an illustrative study of coattail influence, two crucial limitations of the Survey Research Center data should be noted.[3] In the first place, because of the inadequacies of the available data, it is not possible for us to identify *all* of the people whose decision for President preceded their decision for Congressman. To isolate all such people would require some type of a day-to-day record of the times at which each person in the sample arrived at his or her decision for president and congressman. The data which we shall examine shortly resulted from only two sets of interviews, one conducted prior to the election and the second conducted shortly after the election.

The second limitation results from the complete absence of data pertaining to motivations uniquely involved in voting for congressional candidates. In the basic study from which all of the data in this discussion have been taken, the motivational variables were all designed to refer specifically to the presidential contest and not to elections involving lesser offices. They are conceived to be representations of motivational factors which theoretically relate to the vote for President but do not necessarily relate directly to the vote for congressional or other candidates. This means that we cannot use these variables to distinguish between motivations leading to a vote for President and those leading to a vote for congressman. Consequently, we cannot discriminate between voters who were sensitive to factors unique to a congressional election and those who were not, and we are thus prevented from investigating the second of the three conditions employed in the model.

Accepting these limitations, there is still much to be gained by using the data which are available to illustrate the application of the basic model. It should be emphasized at this point, however, that the ensuing analysis is to be interpreted not as a definitive study of coattail influence in 1952, but as an example of the use of the suggested model. Substantive conclusions will be drawn at intervals throughout the analysis insofar as the available data permit. Such conclusions should, however, be evaluated primarily in the context of the question, "Is this

[3] Many of the inadequacies of the data which are referred to result solely from the fact that the data of the SRC study were not gathered with an analysis of coattail influence as even a minor objective of the study.

a useful kind of objective to pursue?" Correspondingly, less emphasis will be placed on the question of whether or not more complete data would have altered the particular content of any substantive conclusion.

The Sequence of Vote Decisions

The first objective of the investigation is to use the behavioral criteria (straight ticket voting and the proper time sequence of vote decisions) in attempting to define the maximum amount of coattail influence possible in a given situation. A successful treatment of this problem would separate people into two categories. It would enable us to distinguish people who could not, on a behavioral basis, be classified as coattail-influenced voters from those who might be so classified. (In the particular application of the analysis plan which follows, a third category, people for whom the data are inconclusive, will also appear.) People who cannot be classified as potential coattail voters will include people who did not vote a straight ticket for both officers or whose congressional decisions preceded their presidential decisions. People who can be classified as potential coattail voters will include straight ticket voters whose decisions for President were arrived at prior to their decisions for Congress. The inconclusive third group in this application of the model will be comprised of people who voted a straight ticket but for whom the sequence of decision data are indeterminate.

The problem may be approached by examining the chronological development of presidential-congressional voting relationships. During the latter stages of the 1952 campaign, between September 15 and November 1, 1952, the people interviewed in the SRC study were asked about their voting intentions in the presidential, congressional, and, where applicable, the senatorial and gubernatorial races. In a reinterview after the election, these same people reported their voting behavior with regard to these contests. Although the data produced by these interviews do not describe the genesis of the interrelationships among vote decisions made prior to the pre-election interview, they do provide some clues about the way in which most of the remaining interrelationships developed after that interview. Table 3 presents a summary of these data.

Because the data do not give us any information about possible coattail influence exerted before our pre-election interviews, the data in Table 3 cannot be used to estimate an upper limit on the *total* amount of coattail influence exerted in the election. They can, however, provide the basis for an inference about the relative coattail influence which could have been exerted by each of the two major candidates.

1. It should first be noted that some 28 per cent of the Stevenson supporters decided to vote for a Democratic congressional candidate after they had decided to vote for Stevenson. Some 26 per cent of the Eisenhower voters altered or at least crystallized their congressional choices so that they conformed, party-wise, to their prior decision to vote for Eisenhower. These people (labeled "A" in Table 3) constitute the only cases which fulfilled the minimum behavioral qualifications for coattail voting for congress (again keeping in mind the limitation created by the short time span in which the pre-election data were gathered) by voting a straight ticket and by coming to a decision on their congressional vote after having reached a decision for president.

2. Two very small groups, 2 per cent of the Stevenson voters and 1 per cent of the Eisenhower voters (labeled "B" in Table 3), decided on their presidential votes *after* deciding on their congressional votes. They cannot have been influenced by presidential coattails in their voting for Congress, but they are leading candidates for examples of congressional-coattail voters for President.

3. A third category of groups contains people who were not straight ticket voters and therefore (in addition to groups labeled "B") cannot be considered as possible coattail voters. Six of these groups (groups labeled "C", "D" and "E" in Table 3) do, however, provide indirect evidence of the possible influence of the presidential race on the congressional race.[4] The members of these six groups have in common their "availability" as supporters for the congressional running mates of their presidential favorites and their eventual failure to manifest that support.[5]

   a. In the first place, both Eisenhower and Stevenson lost 3 per cent of their supporters (groups labeled "C") to minor party congressional candidates or to the ranks of the congressional non-voters, although these same supporters

[4] The remaining groups in Table 3 did not vote a straight ticket for president and congress and did not change from their original congressional intentions when they voted. Their congressional voting apparently was not affected by the presidential race.

[5] These groups are considered available because some change took place between their vote intention and their actual vote. They were apparently still open to influence while the other four groups described in footnote 4, above, were not.

had at one time intended to vote for congressional candidates representing the same parties as their presidential choices.

b. Within the second pair of groups, an additional 6 per cent of the Eisenhower voters (labeled "D" in Table 3) changed from a congressional vote intention which was something other than either Republican or Democratic (i.e., Don't know, Minor party or Won't vote for congressman) to a vote for the Democratic candidate for congress. At the same time, little more than 1 per cent of Stevenson's supporters (also labeled "D") made a similar change from an intention that was neither Democratic nor Republican to a vote for a Republican candidate for congress.

c. In the last two groups, 2 per cent of the Eisenhower voters moved to a Democratic congressional choice during the same time interval in which they moved to Eisenhower's support (group labeled "E") and 1 per cent of the Stevenson voters behaved in a similar fashion. The failure of the presidential coattails to capture these votes reflects a certain weakness in the candidates' abilities to aid their respective party tickets. Here was potential support for congressional candidates which was not mobilized by the presidential coattails.

Four other relatively large groups of voters also may have been subjected to coattail influence, but they fall into the inconclusive category because the data are not capable of demonstrating either that they did or that they did not satisfy one of the basic behavioral requirements. These include the two large groups of voters (labeled "F" in Table 3) who had already reached a decision to vote a straight ticket on the congressional and presidential levels at the time of the first interview, and the two smaller groups (labeled "G") who had decided on neither congressional nor presidential votes at the time of the first interview but who subsequently decided on both and voted a straight ticket for those offices in November. We cannot establish the time sequence of presidential and congressional vote decisions for any of the people in these groups. This inadequacy of the data constitutes one of the two major barriers to any definitive statement we might wish to make about the total role of coattail influence in the 1952 elections.

It should be remembered that the objective at this point is not to produce a definitive analysis of coattail influence in 1952. It is, rather, to suggest a method of analysis which, *with an appropriate collection of data,* would give promise of providing more adequate answers to the problems posed by the theory of coattail influence. The use of a panel design, with relatively frequent and numerous reinterviews, would serve to reduce greatly the proportion of people falling into the inconclusive or indeterminate categories pertaining to sequence of decisions. Thus, even without a more satisfactory understanding of the genesis of political motivations, a different method of data collection, rather than a different theoretical model, would suffice to overcome at least this particular deficiency in the analysis we are now following.

At this point it is useful to consider the type of conclusion which this portion of our model encourages. It is useful because it will serve as the basis for subsequent demonstration that *behavioral data taken alone do not necessarily lend themeslves to unequivocal interpretation even though they are tied to individuals rather than aggregates of people.* A summary statement in terms of the first phase of this analysis — describing the necessary movement of congressional choices toward conformity with prior presidential choices — might be arrived at by combining the "defectors" with the people who met the behavioral criteria for coattail influence. Such a conditional summary based on our data apparently would give Stevenson a slight edge over Eisenhower at this point in the interpretation of the political balance sheet. Stevenson, in the language of coattail influence, may have pulled as many as 28 per cent of his votes for his congressional running mates while losing only 5 per cent, for a net gain of 23 per cent of the potential strength which he held and which could go to his fellow candidates. Eisenhower, on the other hand, may have pulled 26 per cent but he apparently lost 11 per cent, and thus added only 15 per cent of his potential to the votes of his congressional running mates.

A summary such as this, given even the most adequate of data, could only serve to specify the first set of limits within which coattail influence can be found. The identification of all the people who broke away, or at least in their congressional vote did not respond to the party leadership of their presidential favorite, does provide one measure of the weakness of each presidential candidate which can be accepted without further inquiry into its meaning. However, the sheer identification of all the people who voted a straight ticket and made their con-

TABLE 3. *Intention and Vote for President in Relation to Intention and Vote for Congress*

Group	Stevenson Votes: Congress Intention	Congress Vote	President Intention	President Vote	Proportion of all Stevenson Votes
A	O or R	D	D	D	28%
B	D	D	O or R	D	2
C	D	O	D	D	3
D	O or D	R	D	D	1
E	O or D	R	O or R	D	1
F	D	D	D	D	35
G	O or R	D	O or R	D	11
No Change; all other combinations					11
All other combinations*					8
Number of cases					100% 494

Group	Eisenhower Votes: Congress Intention	Congress Vote	President Intention	President Vote	Proportion of all Eisenhower Votes
A	O or D	R	R	R	26%
B	R	R	O or D	R	1
C	R	O	R	R	3
D	O or R	D	R	R	6
E	O or R	D	O or D	R	2
F	R	R	R	R	35
G	O or D	R	O or D	R	8
No Change; all other combinations					10
All other combinations*					9
Number of cases					100% 687

D: Democratic; R: Republican; O: Minor Party, Won't Vote, Don't Know.
* Includes people for whom some information on congressional intention or vote was not ascertained, as well as all other combinations of change not specified elsewhere in the table.

gressional decision after arriving at their presidential choice does not serve as a comparably unqualified measure of each candidate's strength. These people not only comprise all coattail-influenced voters, they also may include in their number a great many people whose motivations do not conform to the additional criteria of the model. This summary would indeed be most misleading as a conclusion in that its implications are not borne out in the subsequent analysis of motivational factors.

THE MOTIVATION OF PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

The next phase of the investigation should proceed to a more direct consideration of the two major motivational criteria which define coattail influence. We are limited in our current investigation, however, to a study of the single criterion on which we have data, the motivational patterns related to presidential voting. In any event, the analysis must next focus on the two groups of voters who do not meet the minimal behavioral requirements for coattail-influenced voting (the groups labeled "A" in Table 3). In the SRC study it was determined that a major portion of the presidential voting behavior of the American electorate could be explained by the use of the three concepts of party identification, candidate orientation, and issue orientation. Although the conceptual and operational definitions of these variables are somewhat complex, it will suffice here to indicate that they each represent con-

cern or involvement with one of the three major phenomena relevant in an election, i.e., parties issues, and candidates. The measures which were developed make it possible to specify roughly how much an individual, or group of individuals, was concerned with each of the phenomena (and, inferentially, how strong a force toward political participation was exerted by each of the variables) and what the partisan direction (pro-Republican or pro-Democratic) of that concern was.[6]

To return then to our two groups of possible coattail-influenced voters, let us look at some of the evidence concerning the relative appeal of the two major presidential candidates. In the face of the overwhelming emphasis which presidential election campaigns place on the presidential candidates themselves, it is somewhat surprising to discover in Table 4 that only half of our "experimental" population evidenced a candidate preference (as measured under the name of candidate partisanship) consistent with their votes. It is clear, however, that this occurred in 1952 to some extent because of Eisenhower's appeal to Democratic voters and Stevenson's lack of appeal to the same voters. Nevertheless, these data indicate that coattail influence quite definitely cannot be responsible for more than half of the presidential-congressional vote relationship which we are examining and thus may generally play a lesser role than behavioral data alone would indicate.

Moreover, even the people included in the 49 per cent whose candidate partisanship was consistent with their vote cannot necessarily be categorized as coattail voters. One obstacle to such a categorization has already been described as the inability to discriminate between voters whose decisions concerning the congressional elections were arrived at independently of their presidential decisions and those whose congressional decisions were not. A second shortcoming derives from the fact that the three factors relevant to the presidential voting are undoubtedly interrelated in a genetic sense. Although they are conceptually mutually exclusive and were carefully measured independently of each other, it is clear that the presence of any one of the three factors may well have promoted the development of the other two, just as the existence of any of them might promote the development of congressional voting motivations. This becomes important to us in the following manner: We shall proceed to look at the motivational patterns underlying the voting behavior of our two selected groups of voters. Where there is (1) no evidence of attachment to the candidate of one's party's choice (see the last two rows of Table 4), we have no problem and may conclude directly that, in these cases, straight ticket voting for president and congress, with the congressional vote decision following the presidential decision, cannot be held to have resulted from coattail influence. We also have no problem when (2) we find (within the top row of Table 4) individuals whose only apparent attraction to their party was that of the presidential candidate; we may conclude that these are the people who are the most likely of all voters to have been coattail voters. In the *third* instance, however, we will find people whose presidential vote was supported by an attraction to the presidential candidate and either a positive response to the party, to the party's issue position, or both. In these instances we will not

[6] A detailed discussion of the three concepts and their measurement is presented in Chapters VII, VIII and IX of *The Voter Decides*, A. Campbell, G. Gurin and W. E. Miller, Row Peterson and Co., Evanston, 1954.

TABLE 4. *The Incidence of Candidate Partisanship Among Possible Coattail Votes for Congress*

Candidate Partisanship	*Presidential Vote*				*Total*	
	Stevenson		*Eisenhower*			
Coattail influence possible; candidate partisanship consistent with vote	38	27%	116	66%	154	49%
No basis for assuming existence of coattail influence; no preference for either candidate	74	54	52	29	126	40
No coattail influence possible; candidate partisanship in conflict with vote	26	19	9	5	35	11
Totals	138	100%	177	100%	315	100%

be able to accept or reject the coattail hypothesis. We will be confronted with the dual possibility that the candidate's appeal was in part a product of his party affiliation or of his stand on important issues, or at the same time, that the attachment to party or support of important issues were at least partially the result of the candidate's personal appeal and perhaps a tribute to his campaigning abilities. In the latter case, of course, the primacy of the candidate would be unmistakable and voting behavior resulting from such a situation would fall into the category of "voting most likely produced by coattail influence." Our inability to distinguish the latter case from the former, however, prevents us from drawing any definite conclusions about the coattail influence in this third category.[7]

As anticipated, a serious obstacle is posed to a definitive statement about coattail influence, even among our selected segments of the electorate, by virtue of our inability to isolate the effects of candidate partisanship from those of other compatible motivational factors. Table 5 shows that only 10 per cent of the people in our two groups meet the extreme test by reflecting their voting behavior in their candidate partisanship and in no other way. Since, as we noted in Table 4, 51 per cent of the experimental population could not be responding to presidential attraction, this leaves 39 per cent of the people in a "possibly but not definitely" category. They are people whose voting behavior is consistent with their candidate partisanship and at least one other major motivating factor.

At a somewhat earlier point in this discussion we suggested that a higher relationship may have existed between presidential and congressional voting among Stevenson supporters than among Eisenhower supporters. We next observed that a larger proportion of Stevenson voters than of Eisenhower voters exhibited behavior consonant with the influence of presidential coattails, i.e., more Stevenson voters voted a straight ticket and made their congressional vote decision after their presidential decision and fewer Stevenson voters defected to the opposition or became non-voters for congress. *It is now quite evident that Stevenson's personal appeal probably was not responsible for any major part of these findings. This is important because it extends our understanding of the limitations which inhere in studies of voting behavior which do not rest on information pertaining to the motivations of voters. It is now apparent that although data on the voting intentions and behavior of individuals may enable us to avoid some of the pitfalls resulting from the use of aggregate data, they have their own limitations and they may, if used without due caution, lead us into other errors which are no less grievous.*

Tables 4 and 5 both illustrate something of the extent to which Eisenhower's appeal exceeded that of Stevenson. It can be seen in Table 4 that almost one out of every five of the Stevenson voters in our two selected groups preferred Eisenhower over Stevenson, while only one out of twenty Eisenhower voters gave evidence of preferring Stevenson. Moreover, where only 27 per cent of the Stevenson voters demonstrated a preference for Stevenson over Eisenhower, two-thirds of the Eisenhower voters were committed to the General in their candidate partisanship.

The data of the first three categories in Table 5 provide even more striking evidence of another aspect of the disparity in the relative appeal of the two candidates. A pro-Stevenson motivation usually existed in conjunction with both issue and party motivations (16 per cent of the Stevenson voters in our two groups exhibited all three, and only 11 per cent exhibited candidate partisanship alone or in conjunction

[7] One of the important implications of this problem was probably quite relevant to voting in 1952. With two rather unusual candidates contending for the presidency, it would not be surprising to discover that each of them activated citizens who had not voted in recent elections. Insofar as such newly activated voters were, prior to 1952, already party identifiers or at least nominally committed to their candidates' issue positions, they would not appear in this analysis as pure coattail voters. This aspect of the problem of the inter-relationship of motivational factors might conceivably be attacked with the use of historical data. Although such an exploration is beyond the scope of this paper, it may be suggested that such a group of probable coattail voters could be distinguished by the relative infrequence of their past appearance at the polls. The role of the presidential candidate need not be restricted to providing or reinforcing motivational patterns; it may also include the function of the catalyst which activates voters and produces votes even though the discoverable motivation behind those votes is multidimensional.

TABLE 5. *The Distribution of Motivational Factors Among Possible Coattail Voters for Congress*

Distribution of Motivational Factors	*Presidential Vote* Stevenson		Eisenhower		*Total*	
Coattail influence most probable: candidate partisanship *only* factor consistent with vote	4	3%	27	15%	31	10%
Coattail influence possible: candidate partisanship *and* one other factor consistent with vote	12	8	54	31	66	21
Coattail influence possible: *all* motivational factors consistent with vote	22	16	35	20	57	18
No coattail influence: candidate partisanship either non-existent or in conflict with vote	100	73	61	34	161	51
Totals	138	100%	177	100%	315	100%

with only one of the two other factors). Eisenhower partisanship, on the other hand, occurred frequently without support from either of the other factors, or, most frequently, in conjunction with just one of the others. It is true that this may be interpreted to mean that Stevenson's candidacy inspired reinforcing motivations of Democratic party loyalty and pro-Democratic issue orientations where Eisenhower, in effect, "sold" himself but not his party nor his party's policies. In view of the marked lack of enthusiasm for Stevenson even among Democrats, it is probable that Stevenson's candidacy was relatively much less effective among this group of Democrats, than Eisenhower's candidacy was in the comparable Republican group.

This finding is of particular significance for the study of coattail influence because it is a specific demonstration that very different motivational factors can produce very similar voting behavior in an election. A more detailed study of the data summarized in Table 5 discloses, for example, that both issue partisanship and party identification were slightly less prominent among our selected group of Eisenhower voters than was candidate partisanship. Among the Stevenson voters whom we isolated as possible coattail-influenced voters, party identification played an even larger part than did candidate partisanship among the Republicans, while pro-Stevenson candidate partisanship was a subordinate factor.

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WHAT DO CONGRESSMEN HEAR?

• *LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER*

This article derives from a book on *Congressmen and the People They Listen To* by the writer.[1] The report was done at the Center for International Studies, M.I.T., in connection with a transactional study of business communication about foreign economic policy. The

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[1] Lewis Anthony Dexter, *Congressmen and the People They Listen To* (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dittoed, 1956). The copyright of this article belongs to M.I.T., and permission for reproduction should be obtained through the author (536 Pleasant St., Belmont 78, Massachusetts).

Copies of the duplicated report, now out of print, are available in part at the Library of Congress and some university libraries; and it may also be obtained through University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan (Ph.D. Dissertation in Sociology, Columbia, 1960).

reception on Capitol Hill of the communications from business was studied partly by interviews (more than 50 with congressmen and a similar number with congressional staff members, and about 500 with businessmen, lobbyists, and leading constituents) and partly by reading the incoming mail of a few members of each house. Except where otherwise indicated, the names of all congressmen in this report have been disguised; the words and illustrations are, however, reported exactly, except that where some interviewee used a phrase which would serve to identify him, this has been changed also.[2]

I. The Mail's the Thing (Superficially, at Least)

Every congressman and senatorial assistant, when asked, "What do you hear . . . ?," or words to that effect, starts telling you about the mail. Most of the businessmen with whom we talked when asked, "What have you done about such-and-such an issue?" tell you (if he has done *anything*) that he's *written* to his congressman or senator (or possibly telegraphed).

In the importance attached to it both by congressmen and by business constituents, mail outweighs every other form of communication. Strangely, many congressmen do not raise any explicit question as to whether the mail *represents* the views of the district. Some congressmen do, of course, question this. A senator, for instance, who received 100 letters from a particular city urging that he support legislation for a higher minimum wage, checked on the senders and found out that at least 75 of them were eligible to vote but only 33 of these actually were registered.

Senator Service's assistant says, "If you put faith in that sort of thing [stimulated mail] you're lost. We can tell the day and hour when somebody or other starts those calls or doorbells ringing [to get people to write]; so what?" Another senatorial assistant says it is easy to identify stimulated letters by the fact that someone nearly always encloses a copy of the letter to the letter-writer asking him to write his congressman. This assistant estimates that in any batch of 1,000 letters, at least fifty will enclose the original request.

But these are the exceptions so far as formal statement goes. It is true that many congressmen and senators run counter to the mail in obedience to the dictates of conscience, party or committee. But they frequently appear to think they are controverting something very significant. This may be merely a habitual genuflection toward the right of petition and the sovereignty of the citizen; in some cases it probably is. For whatever reason, older congressmen were much less inclined to quote the volume of mail as an authority than younger ones. This may simply mean that older ones had become sufficiently familiar with the point of view expressed by the mail (since it is similar on this issue over the years) that they do not pay as much attention to the current inflow on this subject. It may also be due in part to the fact that older congressmen are busier. It is also possible that older congressmen, by the very fact of being older, come from districts which seem safer and may therefore be less anxious to ascertain the views of the electorate. But even they on the whole appear to think that the mail is important and civically significant. There are several reasons that lead them to this attitude.

In the first place, members or their staffs spend an enormous amount of time on mail. And having invested that time on it, they like to feel that it means something.

Second, a great deal of the time congressmen operate in a pretty complete vacuum so far as the voters of their district go. Most people seem to prefer to know what they are supposed to do (if even in some cases merely so that they can protest or revolt). The mail gives a sense

[2] Since 1955, a good deal of my experience has been in political activities and I have also been engaged in a study bearing on the way congressmen are approached by businessmen on defense *contracts*. I want to emphasize that this is a report of what I saw as to mail and contacts on reciprocal trade. Contacts in the State House in Massachusetts are very, very different; some contacts on defense contracts are probably different in Washington; and, in quite another way, mail and contacts on defense *policy* are different — there being practically no mail on issues of defense policy. (See my paper, "Congress and Military Policy," read AAAS, 1958, dittoed, to be published, and excerpted elsewhere in this volume). The picture derived from our report of a soft, nonpressure relationship does not apply to patronage in the Governor's office on Beacon Hill, although my experience and observations suggest that even there the "pressure" on the Furcolo office was much tougher than on the Volpe office, because of sociological and social-psychological differences between the two administrations.

that one is doing something that excites large numbers of people.

Third, as Paul Appleby and others have pointed out, many congressmen are irritated and annoyed because they come to Washington expecting to do and be something important; and because of the complexity of government and the seniority system they find they are hampered and shut off from effective action at every turn. Granted this rather general exasperation, handling mail is almost the only thing on which a congressman finds himself quite free; he can write any sort of letters he likes without let or hindrance from anybody. Thus letter writing becomes a disproportionately significant aspect of his job, for it represents the freedom and importance that he thought he would find when he got to Washington (but rarely does).

Fourth, most congressmen genuinely treasure the right of petition and the opportunity of the individual citizen to complain about mistreatment. This right has great importance on many issues where bureaucrats mistreat or overlook individual rights.

Fifth, whether realistically or not, some congressmen actually believe and many others like to feel that on any issue of national significance, rational communication between them and any constituent is possible. For this reason they spend a quite irrational amount of time on correspondence that is essentially academic in the sense that it is fairly clear that no political or legislative purpose is really served by the time they give it.

For these, and perhaps other, reasons congressmen come to believe that the mailbag is the secret of success. Senator Kefauver (D., Tenn.) reports that when first elected to Congress he asked Speaker Bankhead (D., Ala.) how to get re-elected, and that Mr. Bankhead replied:

> Members get re-elected term after term without substantial opposition (because they) give close and prompt attention to mail. Votes and speeches may make you well known and give you a reputation, but it's the way you handle your mail that determines your re-election.[3]

[3] Estes Kefauver and Jack Levin, *A Twentieth Century Congress* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1947), p. 171. It may be an interesting comment on public preconceptions and expectations that a columnist in a popular magazine, who frequently summarizes academic articles, summarized the present piece from the *Public Opinion Quarterly* by giving the Bankhead quote *as though it were the point of my article* and stated, when I protested, that that was what I had in fact said.

Nearly all the businessmen we talked with also regarded *writing* congressmen as the basic political-legislative act. In view of the supposed popularity of public relations in a wider sense, this was a little surprising. But nearly all of them said, "I wrote," "I telegraphed," or "No, I haven't written," when asked if they had done something about the issue.

In this article we shall review some of the characteristics of the mail that seem extraordinary in so highly valued a source of information.

LITTLE OR NO MAIL ON MANY VITAL ISSUES

A substantial number of congressmen and probably all senators received a noticeable amount of mail about reciprocal trade legislation. This in itself differentiates reciprocal trade from many crucial issues. For example, a senator from a major industrial state heard *nothing* in the 1955 session of Congress on any of the following issues, all of which were considered by the Senate during that session, and several of which were decided so closely that he could have exercised a crucial vote: the Capehart Amendment on Policy Responsibility of dollar-a-year men (WOC's), the Hickenlooper Amendment on permitting construction of an atomic-powered merchant ship, Home Rule for the District of Columbia, the Statute of Forces Agreement (Jenner Amendment), Marine Corps increase, Mutual Aid Programs for Europe and Asia, the stockpiling of minerals, confirmation of SEC and ICC Commissioners (both controversial in the extreme), a Serviceman's Voting Proposal, the Congressional Amendment (actually passed by the Senate) permitting governors to appoint congressmen in event of emergency, the sale of rubber plants, the Housing Act of 1955, and the restriction of wheat and cotton acreage. Several of these are very important *in fact* to his state; some of them are considered by his committees. His experience is typical.

MOST OF THE MAIL COMES FROM FEW SOURCES

In 1955, probably a majority of congressmen received a good deal of mail on the tariff.

However, many rated it as tenth or fifteenth, relatively low in volume compared to mail received in connection with other issues. A few in 1954 heard nothing. Such figures mean relatively little, however, because a very large proportion of the mail on the tariff issue was organized and sent by a few sources. Westinghouse, Dow, Monsanto, and Pittsburgh Plate Glass may by themselves easily have stimulated 40 per cent or more of all mail received by all congressmen in 1954 on reciprocal trade. In addition to them, on the protectionist side, there were the coal, independent oil, and textile interests. One congressman is reported to have received well over 5,000 letters on the topic from textile workers in early 1955.

On the reciprocal trade side, there is only one big producer of mail — the League of Women Voters. Very probably three-fourths of the mail received by all congressmen in favor of reciprocal trade was directly or indirectly stimulated by the League. Even in tobacco or automobile districts, League members produced a majority of the pro-reciprocal trade mail; and in districts where there was no strong protectionist group, the congressmen may have heard mostly from League members. In general, protectionist mail outweighed pro-reciprocal trade mail at least 10 to 1.

INSPIRED MAIL TENDS TO SEEM UNDULY UNIFORM

Congressman Simpson (R., Penna.) received a number of letters and postcards in 1953 urging him to vote against the Simpson Bill for the imposition of a fuel oil quota. To one of his colleagues this simply represented the ineptness and political uninformedness of the much-abused "women's groups."

By and large, most protectionist mail quantitatively speaking takes the line, "Save my job." Printed cards are distributed and often collected and mailed by firms in the woolen textile industry. A manufacturer in one big port city explained why his organization had gone to the trouble of collecting and mailing the cards.

> Oh, we found most of these people just didn't know who their congressman was, or they sent it to their state senator or something, so we asked them just to fill in their address and we did everything else.

One congressman from that city consequently got about 6 per cent of the cards with an address but no name signed. A senatorial assistant comments, "That's doing better than par for the course."

Mail from almost any given industry tends to have its own special characteristics. The cherry industry, for example, seems to promote letters which are particularly "reasonable" sounding: "We know foreign trade is necessary but ours is a special case." It is almost impossible to organize a letter writing campaign so skillfully that an experienced mail clerk does not spot it at once as stimulated and even identify its source.

THE MAIL IS DIRECT

We found that most of the mail to congressmen is quite direct; Mr. X writes to his congressman, and that's that. In the letter, Mr. X may identify himself but more often is simply satisfied to say he is a constituent. Mr. X does not go through channels to write his congressman. For example, I never saw a single letter from a county chairman or other *party* official on trade and tariff matters with one exception — an official Republican group in Midland, Michigan, had petitioned their senators against reciprocal trade. This is interesting because it differs from the prevailing political pattern on patronage where endorsements are often sought unless one is personally known to the congressman (and frequently when one is). It is unrealistic because in fact the attention a congressman pays to mail is *in part* a matter of how important the writer is; frequently the content or title make this obvious, but frequently they do not.

With letters to senators in the larger states, such endorsement or identification would seem still more appropriate since mail clerks for senators often know little about the state. I know one fairly skilled lobbyist who thinks that when he really wants something from a senator's office it is a good idea to write the senator a letter beginning "Dear so-and-so (first name)." Then the mail clerk, not to take a chance, will give the letter to one of the assistants instead of handling it himself. Ordinarily the assistant handles the subject, and the senator will never see the letter — so it will create no embarrassment.

Since we found that many senators and congressmen simply disregard out-of-state mail altogether, it is particularly odd that people who write them from out of state do not take some

steps to identify themselves. Altogether, many thousands of dollars of postage must be spent in out-of-state mail which is unread except for the address or first sentence.[4]

CHAFF IN THE MAIL

I have hardly ever seen a letter which indicated any technical mastery of reciprocal trade legislation. I have never noted a letter which contained a new or unfamiliar thought about the issue; nor have I happened ever to read one (out of several thousands I have looked at) where one could say clearly as one sometimes can with letters: "Here is someone who writes with real conviction." (Letters I have seen on McCarthyism or on defense issues such as civil defense and stockpiling occasionally create such an impression). Put another way, a detailed study of the phrases and sentences in letters on reciprocal trade and the tariff would almost certainly show an enormously high proportion of clichés and stereotyped phrases. I do not recall seeing a coherent presentation of protectionist *theory;* the Careys and the other mercantile political economists and nationalist theorists might as well never have lived as far as the mail goes.

HANDLING AND EFFECT OF SENATE VERSUS HOUSE MAIL

In several cases, I read mail to a senator and also mail to one or more congressmen from the same state. I noted little difference as far as the congressmen's district was concerned.

A good many and perhaps most representatives read all their own mail, except that which is clearly routine. If they do not dictate answers themselves, they indicate who should be queried about the letter, etc. How they handle it — whether they pay attention to out-of-district mail, how much use they make of reference facilities in the Library of Congress or the Executive Departments, how far they try to use the letter as a basis for thinking of something *else* that will interest the constituent — depends enormously upon the representative, the subject, and how busy he or his staff are at a given time.

In the Senate, the situation is quite different. Senators from the larger states with whom we talked have mail clerks who handle the mail, attend to much of it themselves, and if in doubt consult one of the senator's assistants. But most senators rarely see their mail; some of them try to keep control by signing answers.

The inability to see mail results in odd situations. Senator Philip's legislative assistant assured me that no one in the state was concerned about reciprocal trade — the Senator got practically no mail on it, for instance. However, the chief mail clerk told me that it was either first or second among the issues that the Senator got mail about. One of the mail clerk's favorite ways of treating such mail was to reply, "I am turning your letter over to the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee which is now considering H.R.1. and I am sure he will be interested in your comments." I looked at him quizzically. "No, I don't do it," he said, "but I don't think I'm being dishonest in saying that. I would if it said anything new." And this was probably true; every once in a while a letter that poses what is (at least to the senatorial or congressional office) a new question is sent to the staff of Ways and Means or Finance for comment or with the request that an answer be written for the appropriate signature.

NO GREAT DIFFERENCE IN MAIL TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Mail to members of House Ways and Means or Senate Finance, the committees that consider reciprocal trade, did not seem to differ much in volume from mail to congressmen and senators not on these committees. This is surprising, since sometimes lobbying organizations list the members of the pertinent committees.

The Senate version of the Reciprocal Trade Extension Act of 1955 was quite different from the House version; so necessarily a conference committee (of 5 Representatives and 5 Senators) was appointed to decide on the final version. The measure was in conference for a number of weeks.

The conferees could have decided for a more "liberal" or a more "restrictive" measure. One would have thought, therefore, that they would have been bombarded with communications and attempts to influence them. There was a real question how far Messrs. Cooper and Mills, two Democratic conferees from the House,

[4] In other words, where the mail seems routine, repetitious, or uninspired, or where the mail clerk of the congressional office is busy, much such out-of-state mail gets little attention. But a serious, original letter from a person who obviously knows what he is talking about or has some known claim to attention may and often does receive careful consideration.

would go in opposing the Senate version; conceivably Senator George (D., Ga.), who had traditionally been a strong advocate of the old Hull position, and Senator Kerr (D., Okla.), who was then a potential Democratic candidate for President, might be open to some compromise on the numerous restrictive amendments written in by the Senate. Most observers felt Senator George sympathized with the House Bill rather than the Senate version. So from the reciprocal trade standpoint, one might have expected a campaign directed at these four men at least. None took place.

On the other side, Senator Morse (D., Ore.), one of the most vociferous advocates of local interests in the Senate on economic matters, had succeeded in getting into the Senate Bill an amendment that was desired by Northwest fruit and nut producers and that would presumably have especially benefited them. The cherry producers in February and March had put on a fairly intensive campaign of letter writing; but as far as I heard, neither they nor the other Northwest, Michigan, and Georgia fruit-nut producers put on a campaign in May anywhere near resembling the March campaign. Yet, the fact was that in May they were in a special position where a campaign would have been more helpful. In any event the only loss "the" protectionists suffered in conference was the deletion of the Morse Amendment.

GENERALLY CONSTITUENTS WITH IDEAS SUGGEST SOMETHING THAT IS PROCEDURALLY IMPOSSIBLE

For our present purposes, it is sufficient to point out that because of the elaborate and technical nature of congressional procedure most letters to congressmen suggesting that they should do something, recommend things that they cannot, practically speaking, do. Procedural decisions or legislative custom may have allocated the responsibility to somebody else or have set the question up in such a way that what the constituent wants cannot be achieved. For instance, a large number of letters were sent to Senator Hennings (D., Mo.) asking that he support the Curtis Amendment.[5] But the Curtis Amendment never came to the floor of the Senate; it was not to the best of my knowledge seriously considered by the Senate Finance Committee; Senator Hennings belongs to more than a dozen subcommittees of his two major committees (Judiciary and Civil Service) and in addition serves on Rules;[6] and this is quite enough to keep the Senator and his staff busy; it would be difficult for them to take on new responsibilities of the magnitude involved in an effort for the Curtis Amendment even if he should be convinced by the letters that this was important.

Of course, occasionally some senator or congressman is looking around for an issue or is impressed by particular ideas; so there is always an outside chance that letters of this sort may have direct influence. They may certainly have a long-run "educational" effect, so that if the matter does some day come to the floor it may be received with more friendliness.

"YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY MEAN"

Several congressmen pointed out — and a number of others implied — that much of the time "When they write you, you don't know what they mean." For instance, a very large portion of the mail calls for protection for some one particular industry. Sometimes it says, "but we realize the necessity of foreign trade in general." What can the average House member do with this mail? For example, under the closed rule procedure under which tariff bills are usually considered, the House as a whole is very unlikely to have an opportunity to vote to protect the domestic cherry processors and producers. The members will have to vote for or against the Reciprocal Trade Extension Act as reported out of committee. They can of course urge the members of the Ways and Means Committee to do something to help the cherry growers and producers, but precisely what? Either there has to be somebody on Ways and Means who works out the method — or somebody in the cherry growers' association — or somebody in the cherry processors' association — or the congressman himself must do it.

On the cherry industry, three legislators at least have tried to make an effort to work out a tailor-made solution — Senator Morse (D., Ore.), Senator McNamara (D., Mich.) and

[5] No doubt this occurred because both he and Mr. Curtis are from St. Louis and Mr. Curtis had stimulated local attention on the matter.

[6] A minor committee in the Senate, although a very major one in the House.

Congressman Holmes (R., Wash.). But most of the time on most of the mail they get, most congressmen and senators make no such effort. They simply receive the mail, and read and file it.

Or suppose a congressmen gets — as some have — letters saying, "Vote for free trade." There was no free trade measure on the calendar; there is not likely to be one. Probably in January this means support the Reciprocal Trade Extension Act, as reported from committee. The measure was so riddled by amendments in the Senate that some people felt it was no longer a free trade measure; a New Deal congressman who voted for the Cooper Bill voted against acceptance of the Conference Report for the reason that the revised bill was so restrictive and protectionist.

In January, 1955, a letter from a League of Women Voters or a Chamber of Commerce in favor of "more liberal" trade presumably meant "Support the Cooper Bill"; a petition from a cotton textile local to "protect our jobs" in January meant "Oppose H.R.1"; but after the Senate had adopted the committee amendments, what then? How many of those who wrote letters on either side had any idea of the significance of the changes made by the Senate? Actually, the newspapers and newsmagazines and newsletters had given only a very general and frequently a misleading picture of the drift of these amendments.

"YOU ALWAYS HEAR FROM BUSINESS TOO LATE"

Congressman Amiable says, commenting on his wide experience in a state legislature and in Congress, "You always hear from business too late." And this is true *in general* because businessmen and their representatives respond to the news; they write in to protest a bill that has been reported out of committee, for instance, because that is when they hear about it or when it really comes to seem a threat. But by the time it is reported out of committee, it is difficult to amend it; legislators have to say either "Yes" or "No." And by the time it is reported out of committee, the battle lines have formed, commitments and promises have been made, and it is harder for congressmen to change. For example, take Mr. L., a member of Ways and Means; he joins the committee in reporting out such-and-such a piece of tariff legislation. Then he hears that the manufacturers of some product in his district would very much like a particular change in the bill; however, several members of the committee majority are opposed to this change. If Mr. L. had advocated it before the measure was reported out, he might be free to continue his advocacy or look for supporters of the position. But he is under the obligation that most decent men feel — not to throw over an implied agreement without very strong reasons.

And this obligation is backed by a very real sanction or threat. If Mr. L. wants to keep on friendly terms with his colleagues, to preserve their respect, he cannot break many such agreements; if he does he will lose his influence with them. And if he wants to serve his district *not only at the moment but over the years, he must preserve his colleagues' respect.*

II. Sources Other than the Mail

It is apparent that the mail is but one of a number of important sources of information for congressmen. Hattery and Hofheimer, in a study of legislators' sources of expert information, listed ten.[7] These were ranked by the congressmen as follows: (1) Committee hearings. (2) Personal reading and consultation. (3) Office staff. (4) Committee staffs. (5) Arguments on the floor. (6) Legislative Reference Service. (7) Executive departments. (8) Interest groups. (9) Political party. (10) Legislative Counsel.

No congressman mentioned to me his office staff, committee staff, the Legislative Reference Service, or Legislative Counsel as sources of communications which had shaped his thinking about the tariff issue. All four of the sources, of course, are not supposed to try to influence members but merely to aid them as requested, so the omission is perfectly natural. It will be helpful to comment more specifically on the role of a number of the others with respect to the tariff issue itself and to mention still other sources of influence that are absent from this list.

1. *Committee Hearings:* I asked a distinguished member of the Ways and Means Committee early in 1954 whether there would be

[7] Lowell H. Hattery and Susan Hofheimer, "The Legislators' Source of Expert Information," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 18 (Fall, 1954), pp. 300–303.

hearings on the Reciprocal Trade Extension Act in that year. "O my God," he said, "I hope not. I get so bored with those repetitious hearings. We've been listening to the same witnesses saying the same things the same way for ten years."

Statements by witnesses from different industries are extremely repetitious not only from year to year but from witness to witness. Almost all of the statements were criminally dull. I spent portions of several days listening to the Senate hearings, and I wish I may never go through the same boredom again. Even some major government witnesses, such as Assistant Secretary Butz (Agriculture), who led off for H.R.1 before the Senate Committee, sounded as though they were reading statements which they only half understood and found thoroughly boring themselves.

After the first few days of House and Senate hearings, a good many of the members found it necessary to be absent. Since they walk in and out a good deal, no figures are available on how many hearings the "average member" attended.

Some of the questioning, particularly by Mills (D., Ark.) and Eberharter (D., Penna.) in the House, and by Millikin (R., Colo.) in the Senate, was adroitly contrived to embarrass witnesses opposed to the questioner's position. Very few witnesses seemed prepared for fairly obvious questions; yet a reading of hearings several years back or consultation with informed sources would have shown that Millikin, for example, has certain "traps" he has successfully baited his opponents with. Secretary Butz, the government lead-off witness, fell into several of these — apparently he had not been briefed on what to expect.

There was practically no evidence of any effort *systematically* to check facts or to follow through a line of argument except by Senator Malone (R., Nev.), an extreme protectionist who asked probably more than half the questions in Senate Finance. His questions were designed to get all witnesses to admit the unconstitutionality of the reciprocal trade program.

The reciprocal trade issue is, of course, an old one — and many of the members have heard it all before. But the factual basis of the subject has to some extent altered since the matter was last considered by Congress, and many of the members had probably had no occasion to consider the economics of the matter or the political theory, systematically, for years.

No member outside the committee in talking with me referred to the hearings in any way.[8] Probably with them, as with the public, it is the indirect effect of the hearings that counts rather than the direct ones. Newspapermen take the press releases of witnesses and write stories on them, and these stories are often published. So members of Congress read the stories. Since newspapermen are far more apt to get the releases than they are to sit through a session and listen to the questions, even quite inane testimony has a better chance of receiving publicity than quite pertinent questions have. Limitations of time affect the press as well as members of Congress.

2. *The Floor Debates and the Record.* Some debate takes place in the House and often a good deal in the Senate on issues such as reciprocal trade. Some Senate speeches cover a subject widely — for example Senator Gore's four-hour speech on reciprocal trade in 1954, and speeches by Senators Douglas, Langer, and Malone in 1955 on that topic.

It is unusual for many Senators or House members actually to listen to a speech; during most of Senator Gore's speech six other members on the average were in attendance, and those who paid closest attention were close sympathizers and supporters on the reciprocal trade issue.

On this basis, it might seem that the fairly common impression that the floor debate makes no difference and is chiefly for the benefit of the galleries is correct. However, there seems to be general agreement among those in a position to know that Senator Gore's speech in favor of the Randall program in 1954 was four hours long for this reason: The Senator and his associates, in offering the amendment which would have provided for a three-year extension (instead of the one-year extension voted by the House), feared that he would not be taken seriously; they felt the general attitude of his colleagues would be (1) "Gore's trying to put the Republicans in a spot," or (2) "Gore's just trying to show that he fills Hull's shoes."

But his associates felt that if the Senator

[8] There can be little doubt that committee executive meetings, where the text of the bills is discussed and amendments considered, often involve a lot of give-and-take and also result in members on both sides changing their minds.

made a four-hour speech developing the issue in terms of the relationship of reciprocal trade to the discouragement of East-West trade then it would make clear the fact that he really was serious in pushing his amendment.

Hattery and Hofheimer, commenting on the importance of floor debate, assert:

> [Our] findings present a challenge to some assumptions which may have been too readily accepted. . . One of these relates to floor debate. . . Although it is true that members of the committee which studies the bill obtain little additional information through floor debate, the majority of legislators have not had the benefit of the committee deliberations. . . Floor debate in cases of controversy often represents the results of careful research and marshalling of facts and consideration.
>
> Several congressmen cited floor debate as the best source of information on minor matters. . . [and] on amendments (to the bill) it may be the only source of information available to the member before a vote is called for.

Unfortunately, neither their report nor this study enable us to distinguish between the importance of floor debate *as such* and floor debate and speeches as preserved in the *Record,* which members may study at leisure. I suspect it is the latter which is important.

However, no member referred directly to the debate as influencing him; although several members stated that when they went on to the floor February 17, 1955, before the key votes on the closed rule, they did not yet know how they were going to vote.

3. *How Much do Congressmen Hear From Congressmen?* It is likely that congressmen hear more from other congressmen about most legislation than from anybody else. Our study unfortunately was not conducted in such a way as to make it possible to be as certain on this point as we might wish.

Relatively few congressmen in answering our questions referred to other congressmen as sources of information or ideas.

Evidently, the communication of ideas and information between congressmen takes place in such a matter-of-fact way that the congressmen who had heard something from a colleague did not often think of it as "hearing" something from an external source, but as an exchange of views within a work or friendship situation. Nevertheless, party leaders in the Congress, as well as individual congressmen with a specific interest in given issues, are clearly in a strategic position to influence congressional thought, and we have some evidence that they do so.

4. *"Pressure" From Other Congressmen: The Leadership.* A number of references were made to the "pressure" exerted by the Democratic leadership on the 1955 vote. This pressure is indicated by Speaker Rayburn's often-quoted remark at the breakfast of the freshman congressmen just before the vote: "If you want to get along, go along." Those who had read or heard the 1954 debate might also remember that the Speaker (then Minority Leader) had made an impressive speech stating his view that the Reciprocal Trade Act ought to be extended for 25 years. Similarly, one of the Boston newspapers reported that Majority Leader McCormack (D., Mass.) made a remark to representative Macdonald (D., Mass.) which indirectly and euphemistically, but quite clearly, implied that Macdonald, by voting against the leadership, had let his district down — in front of a newspaper reporter! Since Macdonald was serving his first term, and since Medford, the key city in the district, was the scene of unusually public factional struggles, and since the district is traditionally very close, McCormack's remark, under the circumstances, was, in design or not, a threat.

Far more important than such hints are direct efforts to get members to change. On some measures, this is effective. One bill which was extremely vital to the leadership in 1955, actually appeared to squeeze through by five votes or so, but the leadership had in its pocket about twenty-five sure changes if the bill were in danger.

"Changes" take place in this fashion. A member answers to his name and votes "Yea" or "Nay" as the case may be, but while the vote is being checked changes it. A member may also announce an intention to vote "Yea" or "Nay" but fail to answer at the appropriate point in the roll-call and switch if the vote is close. On the closed rule votes on February 17, the leadership in fact won by one vote according to the Record. But at one time, members report, it had lost by seven votes.

5. *"Pressure" From Other Congressmen: Cleveland Bailey.* The only other member reported as exercising "pressure" was Representative Cleveland Bailey (D., W. Va.). Representative Bailey is unusual among members — probably unique — in that protection is the most important issue to him and that he creates

the sense of having a deep-felt conviction on the subject. In 1953–54 he went around and pleaded individually with a number of members to vote against reciprocal trade and for the West Virginia miners. As one member put it, "He was rough, real rough. . . . I had to be rough with him." Another said, "In the 1954 vote, Cleve Bailey was worth fifteen votes to his side easily." In 1955, Mr. Bailey was generally admitted to be the leader of the protectionist fight.

Members who propose something *new* are likely to send statements about it to their colleagues. For example, Congressman Thomas Curtis (R., Mo.), who introduced the Curtis Amendment which would materially change the basis on which reciprocal trade is administered, made an effort to publicize it and even testified before the Senate Finance Committee on its behalf. Similarly, Congressman Bolling (D., Mo.) circulated amongst his colleagues explanations of his measure for facilitating industrial dispersion.

6. *Informal Contacts with Other Congressmen.* As has been noted, the influence of other congressmen is very important, but frequently this is exerted in a casual, unplanned way, so it is not recognized or remembered except in the clear-cut cases. The study of legislative bodies as work groups is one of the crying needs of political science at present.

A couple of cases where friendship seems to have been the dominant factor in the vote in 1955 may be cited. A newspaper correspondent told me:

> Oh, yes, you know those two boys [congressmen]. . . . Well you know why Jack voted against the leadership? Just to oblige Joe to whom he's very close. Joe was afraid he'd be the only fellow from the state to vote against the leadership and he'd get into trouble with the leadership and party organization so Jack went along with him to prevent his sticking his neck out all alone. Then of course on the final vote Jack switched back, so he's OK if anybody in his district asks him.

Similarly, the whip for the area told me:

> Oh, Don went along against the leadership on this, but I don't think he cares at all or heard much about it from his district. It was just that Dave to whom he's very close is pretty strong against foreign imports and Don was more concerned to help him out than to help the leadership. And Tom rather wanted to go along with the leadership, but he found Dave and Don and four other guys from surrounding districts were against the leadership, and he decided he better go along with them, because after all he's hearing a lot from his district against it, and how could he explain his being for it and Dave and Don and the rest being against it?

7. *Personal Contacts.* No congressman in any way indicated that his wife or secretaries influenced his views, but I suspect that this was the fault of our method of interviewing plus the fact that in many cases congressmen are quite unaware of views picked up through daily contacts.

8. *Visitors.* Visitors do come in and see congressmen. Congressmen also talk with people back home about issues. On some matters, congressmen get as much and hear as much from visitors as they do from the mail, but it seems to be quite generally agreed that the tariff and reciprocal trade are mail issues, not visitor issues. To my knowledge, no congressman except a representative from Detroit received a visitor *from his district* simply to talk in favor of reciprocal trade. Most of the protectionist people from a district come in to talk about the sad state of their sales. Now, in regard to any given commodity, there are a number of ways government can help, of which tariff legislation is only one.

Mr. Serious Consideration, for example, and Mr. Fourth, who were certainly open to persuasion, had according to their statements, no visitors come to see them particularly in behalf of protection.

The few cases I know of where someone came to see a congressman *specifically* against reciprocal trade extension and nothing else fall into two types:

(1) People who, it sounded, were glad of a trip to Washington; and if the congressman helped them on gallery tickets, hotel accommodations, etc., that more than offset any disappointment on his views as to trade.

(2) People who buttonholed congressmen in the lobbies the day of the vote, February 17–18; I'm not sure how many (if any) of these were actually from congressmen's districts, but some of them may have been. However, the opportunity for influencing congressmen by a hurried word just before they went on the floor was not great.

One reason why delegations and informal conversations back home count for little in what a congressman does on reciprocal trade is that many congressmen are much more expert in diverting visitors than visitors are in influencing congressmen.

9. *Reading.* Few of the congressmen interviewed quoted specific published sources as the basis of their opinions. With one probable exception (Mills, D., Ark.), there was little indication of familiarity with the economic literature on international trade, convertibility, and so forth. This may depress economists, but it should be remembered that many congressmen feel that economists are generally biased in favor of free trade. This history of economic thought tends to support this feeling. Thus, those congressmen who are much worried about unemployment or threatened unemployment among their constituents will find little credible in the published material on international trade. Journalists and newspapermen, on the other hand, may be encouraged by the fact that several congressmen evidently had obtained ideas from columns. Perhaps a dozen referred to some item in the press (e.g., an article by George Sokolsky, the most active protectionist columnist). The local and business press was not referred to by any of the interviewees.

In addition, few congressmen referred to the various reports recently issued by government agencies or distributed by interest groups; in most cases they had probably skimmed rather than read them.

On these points, congressmen appear to differ in degree at least from the executive department officials with whom I talked. Very likely, however, some executive department officials make a greater effort to impress a scholar than congressmen do. On the other hand it must be remembered that there was little or nothing available in 1956 which was of any real use to congressmen on the topic of foreign economic policy. For essentially what they need is material which *reconciles* the claims and desires of their individual constituents with the overall general economic problems. What they find for the most part is (a) theoretical (e.g., abstract, high-level) discussion of the virtues of international trade, and (b) occasionally a theoretical response to that argument.

Congressmen — and everybody else in this area — also badly need *simple* or at least *simpler* explanations of what the whole apparatus of quotas and tariffs achieves and how they hang together legislatively. But there was nothing clear, usable and readable on the topic, thus blocking this significant material as a source of information for legislators.

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THE REPRESENTATIVE AND HIS DISTRICT

• *LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER*

I

INTRODUCTION

We talk frequently of a representative or senator "representing" or "failing to represent" his constituents. This is shorthand. The fact is the congressman represents his image of the district or of his constituents (or fails to represent his, or our, image of them). How does he get this image? Where does it come from?[1]

Reprinted by permission of the author. Part of this article appeared originally in *Human Organization*, 16 (1947), pp. 2–13. Part also appeared as "Congress and the Formation of Military Policy," (Read at the American Association for the Advancement of Science meetings, Washington, D.C., December 31, 1958). Both articles copyright by Lewis Anthony Dexter.

[1] The present analysis is based upon 650 interviews, from 1953 to 1957 (420 of them by the author) with politicians, businessmen, trade union leaders, and departmental officials, about the influences impinging upon the formulation of policy.

On numerous important policy matters, he hears nothing from his constituency.[2] But whether he hears anything on an issue, what he hears, whom he hears from, or how he interprets what he hears all *vary* depending upon the kind of person he is, the kind of associations he has had and has in the constituency and in Washington, the public image of his interests and concerns, and the background information or misinformation which he possesses. An editorial summary of an earlier draft of this paper said, "Congressmen *make* choices about which people communicate with them. . . ." In large part this is also a manner of speaking.[3] It would be more precise to say that the people in electing a congressman have chosen one sort of recording instrument or another, and that while one instrument may be adjusted to catch and hear one sort of communication, another will hear a different sort, and so on. Although congressmen do, to a small degree, consciously choose what they will hear, it is probably more significant that in large measure their personalities, careers, and public images make them choose what they hear and how they interpret it.

A good many congressmen believe that their districts feel very strongly on this, that, or the other issue, and that they are constrained, therefore, to vote a certain way. The more sophisticated realize, of course, that legislative procedures and processes are so complex that it is more often than not possible to go through the motions of conforming to such views without helping to enact them when they believe the public preference to be wrong.[4] On most issues, out of a desire to serve the district or from indifference, many congressmen do go along with any view which they believe "the district" holds strongly. When the chips are down, and they have to declare themselves, some will vote against their convictions and for their constituents' (presumed) preferences.

This situation has led to a series of classical utterances on the moral problem of the representative: *Should he sacrifice his judgment to his constituents' inclinations as he conceives them or not?* It would be more accurate to emphasize the ways in which representatives' beliefs about constituent preference are functions of the channels of communication and the special processes of transaction between constituents and representatives rather than of anything else.

If this is so, more students of representation and representatives would concur with the late Congressman Eberharter's interpretation of the representative-constituent picture. The latter for years was at the center of the legislative issues which provoke the most comment by critics of "pressure," and he told me early in my study of reciprocal trade:

> You know I am sure you will find out a congressman can do pretty much what he decides to do and he doesn't have to bother too much about criticism. I've seen plenty of cases since I've been up here where a guy will hold one economic or political position and get along all right; and then he'll die or resign and a guy comes in who holds quite a different economic or political position and he gets along all right too. That's the fact of the matter.

II

The first difference between some congressmen and others is how (consciously or unconsciously) they define their responsibilities.

Many of the congressmen interviewed about both tariff and defense matters referred to a personal conception of what they owe their job, of what in some circles would be called "professional obligation." A few made explicit and many apparently hold implicit theories of repre-

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More than 100 interviews were conducted with members of Congress and 40 with executive assistants on Capitol Hill. Four-hundred of the interviews utilized dealt with formation of policy or communication of preference on the Reciprocal Trade Extension Acts of 1953, 1954, and 1955, and it is around these that the analysis is chiefly organized. Considerable use has been made of the writer's own participation in politics, in, for example, the State Government of Massachusetts, September, 1956–August, 1957, the Stevenson primary campaign of 1956, and an effort to arouse public interest in a civil defense bill.

[2] See L. A. Dexter, "Candidates Make the Issues and Give Them Meaning," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 19 (1955–56), pp. 408–414, for supporting data; and "What Do Congressmen Hear: The Mail," *op. cit.*, 20 (1956–57), pp. 16–27.

[3] Either by consciously providing distracting stimuli or by consciously exposing themselves to countervailing viewpoints.

[4] See L. A. Dexter, *Congressmen and the People They Listen To* (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dittoed, 1956), Ch. III, *passim*.

sentation. These theories of representation were not, except for a few instances, so far as I could tell directly derived from philosophical or academic sources. They resulted from the experiences of men facing the actual moral complexities of a job.

Some members expressed themselves in terms of their obligation to select the right course, regardless of the views of their constituents. For instance, Congressman Stubborn[5] has for a good many years represented a district which (according to interviews with business interests in the district and from an economic analysis of its industrial situation) is inclined to favor the reciprocal trade program. Nevertheless, he says:

> Oh, knowing my stubborn characteristics, no one ever thinks he can change me, you know . . . some of my people say, "You may not agree with this man, 'Stubborn,' but you know where he stands."

Mr. Stubborn agreed that if fate were to select as his successor a Clarence Randall-type "free trader," such a man would be able to vote for a reciprocal trade program without much difficulty, but Stubborn interrupted an effort to probe this point further by declaring:

> That's because they [my constituents] do not really understand the matter. During the twenty-one years reciprocal trade has been in effect, it has had . . . [and he named various alleged or actual consequences which he regards as evil]. . . . There isn't any use trying to change *me!*

Congressman Emphatic on the other hand voted the same way as Mr. Stubborn on the Reciprocal Trade Extension Act of 1955 because of a quite different definition of his responsibility. He said:

> My first duty is to get re-elected. I'm here to represent my district. . . . This is part of my actual belief as to the function of a congressman. . . . What is good for the majority of districts is good for the country. What snarls up the system is these so-called statesmen — congressmen who vote for what they think is the country's interest . . . let the Senators do that. . . . They're paid to be statesmen; we [members of the House] aren't.

(This was said sarcastically, but without humorous intent.)

[5] Except for deceased interviewees and (by special permission) Congressman Warburton (R., Del.), the names of all those interviewed and quoted are disguised.

Mr. Leader, as strong a supporter of reciprocal trade as Mr. Stubborn is an opponent of it, comes fairly close to Mr. Stubborn in his attitude towards constituent opinion. Said Leader:

> You're not identifying me on this, of course? It's strictly confidential? Always bear in mind there are those in Congress who lead their districts and those who are led by them. . . . It makes a lot of difference. . . . The "ruanga" growers of my district never opposed *me* on reciprocal trade. . . . The answer is government stockpiling for them. . . . I think I have convinced these men that a program of high tariffs would not assist them and I think my viewpoint has gained general acceptance from them.

(The reciprocal trade issue is so well known, the origin of Mr. Leader's views so deeply based, and his technical knowledge of the field so considerable that he is probably right in his contemptuous dismissal of the possibility that any lobbying or "pressure" could change his position. However, regarding the other legislation, it is entirely probable that a skillful public relations campaign did manipulate *the facts* which came to his attention and to the attention of some of his colleagues, much as we shall see Mr. Fourth was influenced on the reciprocal trade issue.)

Mr. Fourth represents a district in which there is vociferous anti-reciprocal trade sentiment. This district also has strong economic reasons for supporting reciprocal trade and a particularly influential number of intellectuals predisposed toward reciprocal trade. Mr. Fourth showed how a portion of the district can influence a man when he said:

> My impulses when I came down here were in favor of trade not aid, until I started to hear all sorts of things from my district. . . . So, actually, when you stack all these things together, well you're in favor of trade not aid, but, goodness, there comes a time . . . if trade means wholesale layoffs in your district. . . . I've got any number of letters against it . . . carpets, imported rugs . . . there've been around 300 layoffs in a local bicycle plant . . . textiles . . . chemicals . . . electrical equipment . . . glass salesmen. It's difficult to get figures. I assume the Randall Commission report has them. . . . I haven't had time to read it. I don't know. . . . I assume that the people I hear from exaggerate the seriousness of the situation but still that it is serious.

Mr. Fourth ultimately voted against reciprocal trade on the key votes; the decisive factor

appears to have been his unwillingness to separate himself from several members from his state, also of junior status, who were definite in their opposition to reciprocal trade. Mr. Fourth, according to his colleagues was wavering as late as two hours before the vote. Had the chairman of his state delegation (who strongly supported reciprocal trade) personally requested his support, he might well have voted the other way. But he was obviously uncertain, *on the reciprocal trade issue*, whether to adopt the role of servant of his district (as he conceived its desires) or to think in terms of the ideology, implied by the phrase "trade not aid." How he would vote was therefore completely unpredictable.

Congressman Fourth's vote was unpredictable because on this particular issue he does not have a clear conception of what his obligations are. On some issues — flood control or taxes affecting the major agricultural product of the district — one can predict that he would see his responsibility as being almost exclusively to the district. On others — particularly those under consideration by the very important subcommittee of which he is a member — he would be strongly inclined to emphasize national interest in some form as against district concern.

III

Congressmen tend to see their obligations as being either to the nation or to their constituency — other equally possible obligations are seemingly not considered.

Obligation seemed to be conceived as national interest versus district interest (district interest was often, as in the case of Mr. Emphatic, related to re-election and therefore to self-interest). No congressman interviewed indicated any feeling of moral obligation to our allies or to any other country, although our allies are regarded instrumentally as means. This is contrary to a theory sometimes expressed that Americans tend to adopt some favorite foreign country as "theirs." Also, reference to representing a region (the South, the West, New England) was very slight.

The congressman's definition of national interest and responsibility on a particular issue depends in large measure upon his understanding of the facts of a particular issue.

Both Congressman Leader and Congressman Stubborn are quite clear on what they believe are the facts of the reciprocal trade question, and they have no doubt about the effects of the legislation (although their facts are to a great extent contradictory, and their conclusions are opposite). Congressman Fourth, on the other hand, was susceptible to influence from either side because he lacked any clear idea of what reciprocal trade legislation means or entails. His sympathy for the phrase "trade not aid" came from a diffuse and generalized acceptance of a *slogan* rather than from an understanding of facts or consequences. He was really uncertain what, if any, difference his vote on reciprocal trade makes to the national welfare. Thus, he much more easily than Mr. Leader or Mr. Stubborn can see the matter as one of simply performing a service for discontented people in his district. It is far less likely that he will — in the absence of external stimuli — feel any strong need to learn the facts. On *service* matters — and much of a congressman's job is service[6] — most congressmen are willing to go along with those constituents who seem to know what service they want performed, and how it is to be performed (provided, of course, nothing irregular is requested). But if, for instance, Mr. Fourth were a New Deal "intellectual" — and his district is one which might easily elect such a person — he would have interpreted the same situation quite differently. And, if he were a politically astute New Deal "intellectual," he would have shown that the major agricultural crop of the district is exported, that several large industries in the area depend on foreign trade, and so forth.

A congressman's conception of his district confirms itself, to a considerable extent, and may constitute a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Early in my study of reciprocal trade, Congressman Eberharter told me:

> You know I am sure you will find out a congressman can do pretty much what he decides to do, and he doesn't have to bother too much about criticism.

Within the limits of the morally and sociologically conceivable (no congressman from Alabama in 1942 could have advocated racial integration, for instance!), a congressman has a very

[6] Cf. J. F. Kennedy, *Profiles in Courage* (New York: Harper's, 1955), esp. pp. 12–21.

wide range of choices on any given issue, *so far as his constituency is concerned*. His relationships in the House or Senate and with party leadership, of course, limit these choices severely. It is a fact, however, that there is no district viewpoint *as such* to be represented on the overwhelming majority of issues. A few will care one way and a few the other, but the issue will be insignificant or unknown to the great majority. Indeed, in many districts, only a fraction of the voters know the name of their congressman, let alone how he voted on a particular issue.

Mr. Emphatic, who insisted that he was representing his district's desires, was led nevertheless, by my questions, to admit that more than likely none of the workers presumably represented by him actually knew how he had voted. "Not a single one of them," he complained, "wrote in to thank me, though hundreds had written asking me to vote their way." He attributed this in large measure to the allegation that the largest newspaper in the district is "anti-Emphatic." However, since newspapers published outside the district, which gave front page publicity to his stand, have far greater circulation in the district than does the anti-Emphatic "News," this seems an unsound explanation. It would have been perfectly possible for Mr. Emphatic to take the reverse position favoring reciprocal trade and still regard himself as representing his district — particularly since the area also has a strong port interest.

A congressman has great difficulty in deciding what the viewpoint of the district is even on such an issue as reciprocal trade. Most persons with an interest or belief in the tariff will have interests or beliefs in other issues as well. Thus, the most effective representation of their over-all interests may necessitate concessions on some matters, in order to get along with party leadership, colleagues, or prominent committee members in the Congress. "Joe Martin and Charlie Halleck in their heart of hearts," said a prominent Republican, "certainly go along with us, not with the White House on this; and they can swing twenty-five votes, at least, anytime they want; we lost by less than twenty-five votes, so they beat us." Until 1958 Martin was the Republican leader; Halleck became his successor in the 86th Congress. Is a congressman doing a better job of representing his district when he keeps in the good graces of such powerful men (and thereby helps to get a bridge or a new post office or a dam for his district) or when he opposes them on an issue, the details of which few will remember six months later? The Republican who told me about Martin and Halleck is one of the most persistent enemies of reciprocal trade in the party, and he is probably the most effective in a quiet way. He is opposed to reciprocal trade in part because of its "harmful" effect on his district. However, he cheerfully admitted, "It wouldn't make any difference what my congressman does on this matter," insofar as his reelection is concerned. Afterwards he qualified this by saying that perhaps the incumbent ought not stick his neck out strongly *for* reciprocal trade, but there is no call for activity of any kind.

IV

A congressman hears most often from those who agree with him.

A congressman's relationships with his district tend to be maintained through a small group whom he knew before he was elected or through a group who have since then worked closely with him. Generally speaking, the views of those whom he knew prior to his election tend to be more like his than do the views of the "average" voter. It is a well-known fact that we tend to be like the people with whom we associate and vice-versa. Also, most of the people who have worked closely with the congressman since his election — because he is a congressman — have a particular ax to grind. They will naturally tend to stress agreement with him on issues about which they are not concerned — just as salesmen typically do not agree with their customers on politics. For several years, I wondered about the unfavorable references congressmen frequently made to the League of Women Voters and several times to delegations from labor unions. Ultimately, it occurred to me that these two groups are probably the only ones which seriously, on a face-to-face basis, year after year, go over with a congressman the issues on which they disagree with him. Because their efforts cannot be entirely discounted as "politics," they make congressmen uncomfortable.

Congressmen may also have a few close supporters upon whom they rely who tend to be-

come "their" men, and who shift as they shift. This is not always just a matter of holding on to a job, but may represent confidence in a man, prestige gained by association with him, or an unwillingness to sacrifice an investment in goodwill which may be utilized for better public or personal purposes in the future. Such supporters are likely to couch any criticism in tactical terms, and ultimately, to follow the leader.[7]

Some men automatically interpret what they hear to support their own viewpoints.

Mr. First of New Hungary does not think he hears much about foreign imports. Mr. Second, coming from the same sort of district in the same city, says:

> It's either the first or second most important issue with me. Unemployment is the other. And, of course, they're really the same thing.

The last sentence is the clue to why Mr. Second hears so much more than Mr. First about foreign imports. When Mr. First hears about unemployment, he hears just about unemployment, or just about the declining industries of the area, or just about the invidious differential effect which accelerated amortization and certain other tax provisions have had on industry in the area. In fact, when I talked to him about tariff, he advised me that I really ought to study accelerated amortization. Mr. Second, however, interprets almost any statement about unemployment as a plea for relief from foreign imports. Sometimes it is, but sometimes it isn't. So, seeing the same men and hearing the same things said, Mr. Second will "hear" about tariff matters, Mr. First will not. (Mr. Third, their colleague from an adjoining district, is vitally interested in wilderness preservation, hunting, and fishing. He sees many of the same men, but they are likely to talk to him about his interests, and if they do talk to him about unemployment, he is less likely to draw any special conclusions from the talk.)

In more general terms, what congressmen hear and how they interpret what they hear depends on who they are.

Conventional discussion of the relationship between congressmen and constituents assumes that the kind of man the congressman is does not influence what he hears from the district and that the question is whether he follows or contravenes district sentiment. The notion of the congressman representing "the" district at least needs restatement *in terms of a particular congressman who represents what he hears from the district as he interprets it.* And his interpretation results from his being the particular kind of person he is and is reputed to be.

Of course, congressmen will hear many of the same things. The similarity is very great since there are common factors in the careers of American politicians, and since Congress is a continuing social group where habits and attitudes are likely to persist. The old hands (staff, lobbyists, and active constituents as well as members) teach the younger ones. Furthermore, and not surprisingly, within any given district the balance of forces may continue so that several successive congressmen will belong to the same politico-social group (sometimes even when they are members of different parties). The real test of how successfully the district exerts an inescapable "pressure" upon the congressman comes when, without any sharp shift in population characteristics in the district, the congressman comes from a different social grouping.[8]

Students of comparative politics have, however, much more manageable ways of exploring this problem than by studying the activities of congressmen from the same district at different times. For instance, even in terms of our foci upon substantive issues, if I had realized the significance of knowing how a congressman's interpretation of what he hears is affected by his perception of the job, the constituency, and the facts, I could have tried to find out how senators of the same party and from the same state (but representing different factions and obviously looking at the world differently) understood the reciprocal trade question. It is almost incredible that Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin, and McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, could have heard the same messages on domestic security and international relations.

For those whose focus is on the communi-

[7] Dexter, *Congressmen and the People They Listen To*, Chs. II–III.

[8] The likelihood of a break between supporter and leader on some primary matter of personal fairness and the like is considerably greater in general.

cation between a representative and his district, and who are not necessarily confined to a particular issue, there are still better cases for study. For instance, several districts in Maryland elect seven members to its Lower House, and Massachusetts has a number of three- and two-member districts (as have other states and cities). Considering the wide factional and personality differences of incumbents at the same time, an analysis of the messages they "hear" from their districts would be of considerable value.

V

How a congressman was "influenced" by his district: A transactional relationship.

Mr. Serious-Consideration provides a very good case study of how a particular constellation of factors in the district may lead to a particular vote. The vote cannot be understood unless we recognize that both a congressman — as a personality and at a particular time — and the "district," as understood by him, are variables.

During the spring of 1954, my old friend Mr. Straightforward did considerable canvassing in the district with a view to running for Congress in the primary against Mr. Serious-Consideration. Mr. Straightforward, incidentally, has held public office in the area several times before. He told me, in effect:

> There's practically no interest in trade or tariff matters in the district; if you are thinking as we were of interviewing businessmen and labor leaders about it, don't bother. None of them knows anything about it; it just doesn't bulk large in their sight.

Mr. Serious-Consideration, however, in the same year reported that in his view it was one of the most significant issues to his constituents.

Why the difference? It can be explained, I think, partly by the fact that Mr. Serious-Consideration is, consciously, or unconsciously, looking for ways in which he can appeal to local labor without offending local business. Protection against "low-wage foreign imports" is, as trade association executives have pointed out to us, an excellent issue for *uniting* labor and management in depressed or dying industries (of which there are several in the district). Mr. Straightforward, on the other hand, has a program for economic redevelopment and reform of labor legislation which deflects the attention of those whom he meets, whether they agree with him or not, from such issues as the tariff. He, therefore, rarely hears about the tariff as an issue. Then, too, in manner and bearing, Mr. Straightforward is clearly an intellectual, and one of the popular conceptions of the intellectual is his belief in free trade.[9] Mr. Serious-Consideration is not at all of this type. Finally, Mr. Straightforward's worst fault as a politician is a rather curt dismissal of anything he regards as nonsense. Mr. Serious-Consideration, on the other hand, might justly be criticized for not being able to distinguish between more or less unmotivated grumbling and serious pleas for effective action.

Mr. Serious-Consideration is a worrier. He seems genuinely to believe that we must shore-up NATO by strengthening trade relations. Therefore, he called a meeting of everyone in his district who might be interested and wanted to come to discuss the problem. After this meeting, his office, which had already received a good deal of mail on the subject, was simply overwhelmed by protectionist mail. This came about because people who had attended the meeting told their friends and business acquaintances about his indecision. Mr. Serious-Consideration had called upon persons whom he thought might be interested. Naturally most of those who turned up were from protection-minded industries. It is much easier for the businessman who is, or thinks he is, in considerable economic danger from foreign imports to take a day off to attend a meeting on trade and tariffs called by the congressman (he can charge this as a business expense) than it is for the businessman who *might* benefit economically if international trade were increased in total. It is more difficult, of course, for non-businessmen to take such time off and it is usually quite impossible for them to charge the cost off as business expense.

So this meeting was "stacked" in this particular district. If, on the other hand, Congressman Lankford of the Fifth Maryland had called such a meeting it might well have been stacked the other way. His district is a big tobacco-growing area which is well aware of its de-

[9] See Dexter, *Congressmen and the People They Listen To*, Ch. XIX; and "Where the Elephant Fears to Dance Among the Chickens: Business in Politics? The Case of DuPont," *Human Organization*, 19 (1960–61), pp. 188–194.

pendence on sales to Switzerland, and there have been Swiss threats to cut off purchases unless the U.S. withdrew its trade barriers to Swiss watches. Congressman Serious-Consideration or Congressman Lankford, however, by some planning could have gotten a more balanced attendance. A different picture would have developed if leaders of those unions in the district whose headquarters favor reciprocal trade had been consulted; and if the several college professors of economics in the district and representatives of the Grange and the Farm Bureau had been invited. Or several organizations could have been asked to do what the League of Women Voters has done in some areas — study the dependence of the local industries on foreign trade.

Mr. Serious-Consideration would have had to be a different kind of man to provide wider representation at his meeting. However, three or four imaginative supporters of reciprocal trade could have produced the same result. And if the agricultural commodity in which Mr. Serious-Consideration himself has had an interest were on an export basis (as it was prior to World War II), his picture of the situation might well have been altered. He would then have been hearing from his own associates in his own trade association.

Mr. Serious-Consideration finally decided to vote against the party leadership on the key votes on reciprocal trade. He justified himself by objecting to various procedural aspects of the legislation — for instance the so-called "gag rule" under which the bill was brought to the floor. But he had not objected to this gag rule, which is standard parliamentary practice, in other cases where it was invoked. He continues to regard himself as a strong advocate of reciprocal trade.

When a congressman was not much influenced by his district.

Representative Warburton (R., Del., 1953–5) provided a particularly clear example of the way in which a congressman may select the kind of communications he hears. In answer to a question from me, he said to his secretary, "Am I right? We haven't received mail from more than five people on this tariff business." I looked somewhat astounded and she replied, "Yes, except of course for the pressure groups." The congressman had instructed her to segregate all recognized pressure-group mail. And he added, quite offhandedly, that he would discount, "because of his self-interest," one out of the five people who had written him about the tariff. His attitude may, in part at least, explain why the chemical companies and other industries in the state had never given him "any particular specifications" on the tariff. It certainly clarifies his assertion that his approach to the problem of communications had "choked off" pressure-group mail.

Such an approach is relatively easy in Delaware,[10] where DuPont, because of its tremendous size and consciousness of its own vulnerability, has developed a practice and to some extent a doctrine of self-restraint. In a sense, Congressman Warburton's procedure[11] was made much easier because of the effect upon DuPont of the munitions investigations of twenty years ago and its subsequent earnest effort never, never, never to get into that sort of trouble again. Thus it could happen when a prominent Delaware Democrat was asked why DuPont had not put on a campaign in regard to tariff matters (if, as it was reported, DuPont was hostile to the Reciprocal Trade Extension Act) that he said in a genuinely shocked voice, "Oh, the company would never allow that, two or three letters at the most."

A congressman's reputation among those who might want to influence him, determines in large measure what actually is said to him.

Most lobbyists appear to follow the principle of going to see only those who already agree with them. "Work with your friends, but don't stir up your enemies" is a principle fairly widely believed by Capitol Hill lobbyists. There is a reason for this prudence. Most investigations of lobbying and of particular lobbyists seem to have been started by congressmen who were annoyed at being continually approached by lobbyists with whom they disagreed. There is also another possible reason — it makes the job easy for the lobbyist. Representatives of the League of Women Voters and of labor union councils, who do not follow this principle, make themselves unpopular in some quarters. In

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Congressman Warburton followed the same procedure on other matters. He was, it is true, rather badly beaten in his try for the Senate in 1954 by the incumbent Democrat, Frear, but there is no reason to suppose that his handling of communications had anything to do with the outcome. Far more significant political factors, such as the opposition to integration, probably explain that.

other words, survival and comfort for the lobbyist may depend upon not lobbying very much — and it is safer to stay away from somebody who may be an enemy and react negatively than to take a risk.

The tendency to abstain from trying to influence those whom you believe to be against you affects the districts back home as well as professional Capitol Hill lobbyists. The Farm Bureaus in Congressman Stubborn's district, like most Farm Bureaus, were definitely committed to the reciprocal trade program. Nevertheless, when a delegation went to see him, they made no effort to talk in favor of reciprocal trade. Our correspondent in Mr. Stubborn's district inquired of Farm Bureau representatives why they made no such effort and he summarized their attitude as follows:

> The farmers deliberately avoided mention of tariffs; when I asked one of them why he didn't beard old "Stubborn" in his high-tariff den, he replied, "Nothing in the world will change his thinking on tariffs, so why bother? He knows how we feel and can't help but feel a little nervous about the situation. So we can take that nervousness and get him to go along with us on things he isn't so dead-set against."

The probability is that they didn't *change* him on anything, but that they may have influenced him to take a more aggressive and effective part on an issue of importance to them — an issue on which he did not disagree, but which he considered less important than they did.

In another instance, the congressmen from a certain area are inclined to be rather blunt and not to rely on any indirection. Before the 1955 vote on reciprocal trade, the Farm Bureau sent representatives in to talk with these congressmen. One of them, Congressman Ridge, told me that the farmers said, "National asked us to pass the word along that we're in favor of reciprocal trade — but we shan't be mad if you vote against it." Then, according to Mr. Ridge, one of the congressmen asked the Farm Bureau men if any one of them really favored reciprocal trade. Anyone who knows the congressmen present can be sure that at least two of them would look ready to slay on the spot any farmer bold enough to say "Yes." Apparently no one did say "Yes," and the reason may have been similar to that advanced by the Farm Bureau member from Mr. Stubborn's district. So Mr. Ridge, who is not as strongly opposed to reciprocal trade as some of his colleagues, was pushed to this conclusion: "Everybody in my state is against reciprocal trade. . . . The only ones for it would be the ultra-internationalists." Of course, if Mr. Ridge were a devoted supporter of reciprocal trade, or if he were a really sophisticated analyst of interpersonal relations, he might well have felt that the conclusion is not that easy. But he is neither of these and so he allied himself entirely with his colleagues' opposition to the reciprocal trade program.

Several congressmen told me, in effect, that they tell their constituents: "I want a letter of such and such a kind, or I won't pay any attention to it."

We need more studies of what the image of a person to whom a communication is sent is in the minds of the sender.[12] By and large, I strongly suspect that the bulk of political communications in the United States today tends to be addressed to those believed most likely to be sympathetic. Exceptions may occur when an issue becomes one of great involvement (as reciprocal trade did *not*, in 1953–1955), or of interest to persons politically very unsophisticated who have no image of specific political figures. (Occasionally, too, a writer may regard his request as one for a personal service but in the recipient's view, it may involve an issue. A sympathetic response is expected, of course, to a request for a personal service.)

Some communications tend to be unclear in their meaning.

A good deal of so-called "lobbying" by constituents tends to be nothing more than a social visit and a general discussion. One senator's assistant said:

> You know, many of these guys who come in here from back home never talk about issues at all. I've seen lots of them supposedly lobbying. Now, "Roughie," [the senator] takes me to lunch with them and we go out to lunch, but they don't necessarily talk about anything. "Roughie" just knows a good guy may be going out of business because he doesn't get more trade or so. It's the spirit that influences him.

Interestingly enough, some weeks later I found that this particular assistant was completely

[12] The work of Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (Garden City: Doubleday-Anchor, 1960), seems to me to be methodologically of extreme value for this purpose, as is also that of Everett C. Hughes, *Men and Their Work* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).

ignorant of the quite strong feelings (verbalized in other quarters) on tariff matters of an important industry in the state. This is an industry whose representatives had visited him and the senator, and in whose behalf he personally had spent many hours performing other chores in administrative agencies.

Mr. Busy represents a district very much like those of Messrs. First, Second, and Third discussed above, and he is home every weekend. He was professedly strongly opposed to reciprocal trade, but when I questioned him, he said he really did not know whether people talk about the tariff with him or not. At first, it seemed as though this might be because of his schedule which is so heavy that most men could not stand it, and he must be, as a result, always fatigued. But the real point appears to be that Mr. Busy's focus and attention in oral conversations back home are given to requests for personal services. He is the archtype of the errand-boy congressman and the only things he seems attuned to hear are requests for personal services. He shunts comments on issues to one side or regards them as preliminaries to requests for favors. When Mr. Second hears someone talk about unemployment caused by foreign imports, he regards this as a request to fight reciprocal trade. Mr. First regards it as nonsense, although possibly nonsense of which he should be cognizant. But Mr. Busy pays only vague attention to it except insofar as it leads or may lead to a request for him to perform a service. In this he may well be correct, for very few constituents talk about an issue with a congressman just to talk about the issue. I spent about twenty man-days in the winter of 1956 acting as co-manager of a candidate in a congressional primary campaign and about half of this time I was actually with the candidate. During the entire twenty days only four people raised any national or international issues whatsoever with him or me. (Others who worked for him at the same time and in the same area had similar reports to make.)

It's partly accident if anybody's listening.

There is a highly unpredictable element in the kind of response a particular communication will get. As a senatorial assistant said:

> I've seen it a dozen times. One time some letter or call will come in from "Minerville" and nobody will pay any attention to it. They might say, for instance, the miners are all worried about this foreign fuel oil. Another time a call will come in in the same words almost and everybody will get worried as hell about it; it might be that the State Chairman was in the day before and says, "We're not doing so well in 'Coal County' " so we all jump to the conclusion that it's fuel oil that is hurting us there. Or it may be just accident; one time the Senator is preoccupied, another in a relaxed mood, but the third time he listens eagerly. You know how it is.

VI

Important instances when congressmen were changed by their districts.

The two statistically notable shifts on reciprocal trade in 1955 as compared with previous years were: (1) Southern congressmen, mostly representing textile manufacturing districts, who for the first time voted against the Hull reciprocal trade program, in spite of a traditional veneration for free trade in the South; and (2) Farm Belt congressmen, from districts where "isolationist" sentiment had been fairly strong, who for the first time supported reciprocal trade on the key votes. The latter were presumably influenced by the organized efforts of national Farm Bureau leaders to get their local leaders to understand the (actual or alleged) dependence of farm prosperity upon international trade and the (actual or alleged) values of a trade not aid program. But those who were influenced were, not so far as is known, men to whom the issue mattered much one way or another.

In the case of the Southern congressmen the matter is clearer. Here "pressure education" — agitation in the district — worked. They broke with the leadership of Speaker Rayburn, generally said to be the most powerful Speaker since Speaker Cannon. They broke with the Southern tradition and the tradition of Cordell Hull, the father of reciprocal trade. They challenged and to some degree pressured that highly respected Southern Senator, Walter George, on his long-standing pro-reciprocal trade position. And they gave, in this case, a weapon to Herman Talmadge, George's potential opponent in the senatorial primary in 1956, in spite of the fact that practically none of them would have preferred Talmadge to George. This breaking with precedent was chiefly the result of the communications they received from their districts, largely from textile interests. Some Southern congressmen received more mail on the recip-

rocal trade question in a few weeks than they normally do in months on all issues combined. That the mail was more or less synthetic and stimulated is shown by the fact that some congressmen, whose positions are known to be unchangeable, received not a single letter! For these Southern congressmen, such a flood of mail was apparently like the first engagement in a war for inexperienced troops. They had never seen anything of the sort before. The results: most of the Georgia delegation opposed reciprocal trade on the key votes. Hugh Alexander, successor to "Muley" Doughton who as leader of Ways and Means had year after year pushed reciprocal trade through committee and the House much as Cordell Hull wanted it, voted against the program of Hull and Doughton.

This does not controvert what has been said before. Most of these men, although traditionally "free-traders," care very little about the issue one way or the other. If industry and the workers in their district are convinced that reciprocal trade will hurt them, they are willing enough to go along — just as most of them would go along with their farmers if the latter wanted new soil conservation legislation. In either case, they would regard themselves simply as serving their constituents.

Mr. Lanham's shift.

The leader of the Southeastern Congressman was the late Henderson Lanham of Georgia. He played a part, perhaps a large part, in making it respectable for ten to fifteen men from his section to reject the leadership of Sam Rayburn, Jere Cooper, and Wilbur Mills, and support the textile industry's protectionist claims. How did he happen to bolt?

In January, 1955, he received a large quantity of mail from workers in the textile industry saying that they wanted protection against foreign goods. Shrewd enough to realize that they must have been "put up to it" by manufacturers, Mr. Lanham said:

> I did not appreciate it. I wrote to a friend of mine who is in business, saying, in effect, "call your fellows off." I asked my friend, "Don't peril point and escape clause protect you?" He replied, "No, they don't." That shocked me. I started making inquiries. I found out I'd been pretty naive. Peril point and escape clause did not protect our people.

(Peril point and escape clause refer to provisions of earlier Reciprocal Trade Acts, professedly designed to protect U.S. industry against "ruination" through goods introduced under the Reciprocal Trade Act.)

It is significant that the congressman made his inquiries in his home state almost (if not quite) entirely among people in the textile industry. Despite the fact that at least half of the economy of his district is agricultural, producing cotton among other commodities, he made no inquiry among his farmers. A superficial analysis, however, would suggest that most of his farmers profit from foreign trade, directly or indirectly, and that many of them are affiliated with farm organizations which have endorsed reciprocal trade. Mr. Lanham actually represented the town more than the countryside. The town is where his roots are, where his friends are, and he thinks in its terms. Populationwise, it would be perfectly conceivable that his district and several other districts over whose congressmen he had influence, might be represented by men to whom the farmer is more important than the manufacturer. Although I cannot prove it to be so, and I did not realize its significance until 1959, I suspect that the Talmadge-George senatorial rivalry was a very significant matter to Mr. Lanham and his Georgia colleagues. Walter George had won national renown as a "world-minded" statesman; Herman Talmadge intended to challenge him for the Senate. The most vulnerable — in terms of local interests and concerns — aspect of George's internationalist position was his support of reciprocal trade. In whatever manner he responded to the organized pressure from back home on protection for textiles he would be weaker. (George himself, as late as 1954 was, as my interview with him suggested, probably quite ignorant of the potential strength of the drive for textile protection). Consequently, Talmadge in the nature of the case espoused the interests of the textile industry as that industry interpreted them; and, naturally, Congressmen from the state would have been inclined to feel that if they continued to support reciprocal trade they might be out on a limb which Talmadge (a younger, politically stronger, and probably more organization-minded man than George) could saw off.

VII

Reverse English.

When Mr. Lanham became convinced that there was merit to the contention of the textile

and allied industries, he then went to the state organization representing textiles. According to his account, he politely pointed out to them that they really hadn't been on the ball — he should have heard more about the matter and so should his colleagues. Presumably, this did increase the communications on the subject, by mail and personal visits, to his colleagues.

Reverse lobbying — from congressmen to interest groups — is by no means unusual. I asked another prominent congressman how much he heard from the organizations on his side of the issue.

> Hell no, it's just the other way. It's me calling them up and trying to shaft them to get off their fat asses and get out and do something.

More common, probably, is the senator or representative who asks the lobbyists on his side to do something which they then generalize. A senatorial assistant needed some figures in preparing a speech and tried to get them from the lobbying group: "I absolutely had to beat them over the head to get those things." But not long after, the same figures were cited by the organization as "proving" their point.

VIII

Pressure is how you see it.

"Pressure" and "pressure politics" are regarded by most "sophisticated" people today as "explaining" a great deal that happens. But it was frequently impossible to find any admission of or apparently any awareness of "pressure." That was not because shrewd and worldly politicians were concealing what really goes on from this naive and innocent interviewer and his naive and innocent colleagues.[13]

[13] On Beacon Hill in Massachusetts, when with Governor Furcolo (D.), and to a lesser extent with Governor Volpe (R.), the writer noted pressure (possibly from Representative Cleveland Bailey on his colleagues). The journalistic, traditional notion of pressure certainly seemed to apply to highway contracts and some patronage matters in the Furcolo administration. In all probability, the pressure (not so much on congressmen but on the relevant officials in the Defense Department) on defense contracts might be much "rougher" than anything congressmen generally experience on reciprocal trade. But it will be noted that contracts and patronage are matters of direct, demonstrable interest to determinate people. Reciprocal trade is *general* legislation.

The reason is explained by Senator Service's assistant:

> There are very few people actually pressuring us, even if you count all we hear about all issues. Seriously, the sense of being pressured is a matter of reaction. Other people who get no more mail than we do in this office would say, "See how much pressure is on me." We don't feel it. . . . Sure, you get mail. It's just that so-and-so makes more 'phone calls than somebody else. The result is purely physical. It isn't a representation of what or how or when people are going to vote in elections. . . . My personal opinion is that members of most organizations make up their minds on what they read in the papers without reference to organizations.

With this theory of voting behavior, Senator Service's assistant naturally will not be too much worried by a good deal of effort to get him or his boss to change policies — he simply will not regard it as pressure.

Congressman Widesight amusingly illustrated the point made by Service's assistant. Mr. Widesight has moods when he reaches way out into left field looking for things to worry about, things which might possibly defeat him. One day, discussing reciprocal trade, he said that things were very bad indeed. His reason was that he was getting "so much" mail against it, "I, whom they never used to bother at all." When I checked with his secretary later, I found he couldn't possibly have received more than fifty letters opposing reciprocal trade. This was only a fraction of the mail Senator Service received on the same matter. It was also a fraction of what Congressman Widesight himself has several times heard on other matters such as postal pay increases. However, Widesight is accustomed to communications on that issue and he wasn't accustomed to them on the reciprocal trade issue.

As a matter of fact, on the reciprocal trade issue, most of the congressmen interviewed reported that no one had come to see them. Several of them expressed the wish that someone would make the issue clear. (This does not mean, of course, that they were not approached; but simply that they had forgotten the approach or had not realized its purpose.) Some of them tried to question me about the matter in what I think was a serious effort to get some guidance.

Our interviews confirmed the observation of the late Sam Jacobs, then newly appointed to the staff of Senator McNamara (D., Mich.),

who said, speaking generally and not talking just about reciprocal trade:

> I was very much surprised how few representatives of organizations come around to make themselves known. The Senator is, as you know, on the subcommittee dealing with "ruanga" and "minorca" manufacturing; yet nobody came around to see us either from the Ruanga Makers, AFL, or the Minorca Setters, CIO. I raised hell with them about that because I know some of their top guys through AVC; but some, who should have been here, haven't been. . . . Of course, there might have been some reason they hesitated, although, hell, they ought to know the Senator is pro-labor if anybody is; and if they were in any doubt as to how they might be received, there are a dozen ways of throwing your hat in to see if it gets tossed back.

Later he continued:

> You know we are very much interested in educational legislation. I had some representatives of . . . organizations here to talk with us. I sent for them, they didn't try to see us. We thought about some changes in the educational bill which looked desirable in terms of their program and worked them out. We did get their O.K. They went along with us.

The question here is: How much lobbying or pressure was there?

Even where there is a considerable amount of what the outsider would consider pressure, the point made by Senator Service's assistant is entirely valid. What you call pressure, or what you feel to be pressure, depends on how thick your skin is.

The most strongly felt kind of "pressure" on the reciprocal trade issue came, apparently, from Speaker Rayburn and the Democratic leadership against the potentially recalcitrant Democrats. Speaker Rayburn attended a breakfast for freshmen congressmen shortly before the vote and said, in effect, that he's discovered that those who go along, get along. One new member regarded this as pressure — a threat. Another new member (actually probably more vulnerable in terms of his factional position and his position within the delegation) did not. Both of them failed to "go along." Aside from this speech, most of the "pressure" on the doubtful members seems to have come through the grapevine or from their own apprehensions as to what might happen if they bolted the party leadership. One reason why fairly few members seem to have felt pressure on this matter is to be explained in terms of their background and associations in local politics. In many states, "pressure" on matters like highway contracts or patronage, or even for or against gubernatorial programs, must be relatively heavy — that is, threats are far more common at the state level than they are in Washington. Many congressmen come from such a background and a good many are still involved in local conflicts about patronage, contracts, etc. As a result, Washington to them seems mild.

It should never be forgotten that most congressmen respect — although in an inarticulate or almost subconscious way — the right of petition. They have a general feeling that everyone should have a right to talk or write to them about any public issue — that's what they're there for. But they aren't as worried about each communication as college professors might expect. They generally feel they have an equal right to disregard the petitioner's point, once it has been courteously received and acknowledged. Until a congressman definitely makes up his mind, it isn't pressure — it's communication or instruction. Much of what Mr. Fourth, for instance, believes about reciprocal trade he learned from his mail.

IX

Opportunism is also where you see it.

Outsiders, nonpoliticians, tend to attribute many political decisions to opportunism. Also, opponents in politics sometimes attribute the decisions of the other party or faction to "opportunism." However, in the interviews which I conducted, few congressmen attributed their friends' decisions or their own to opportunism. When friends differ on a particular issue it may be explained in terms of "the heat being on." Whether any significant number of politicians anywhere would have a self-image of themselves as opportunist, I do not know. It is certainly true that in these interviews many men were amazingly — and often embarrassingly — frank about events, relationships, and personal opinions. But insofar as the overt picture which they have of themselves is concerned, opportunism does not play a prominent role. Even Congressman District, who related his obligation to his district directly to his chances for reelection, spoke of his "duty" to get reelected. No one used a systematically opportunistic vocabulary of motives to explain himself or his action. Perhaps a different type of interview,

some sort of "depth-interviewing," would bring out a hidden set of self-images at variance with this surface picture. However, I have no evidence to that effect and am inclined to doubt it.

X

We have concentrated on how congressmen get, interpret, and use information, and conceive of their own rule, concerning the issue of reciprocal trade. Obviously, it would also be useful to have studies of other issues before Congress and of issues coming before committees. My later study of the ways in which Armed Services, Defense Appropriations, and Military Operations Committees "hear" about the issues of military policy led me to modify and question some generalizations which I had formulated on the basis of the reciprocal trade study. The military study also made me much more vividly aware of the degree of freedom which congressmen have on the big issues where there is no aspect of personal service involved and of the fact that effective "pressure" on those responsible for presenting an issue to Congress may forestall the need for "pressuring" congressmen themselves. For example, I suspect that the weapons makers find it easier and more satisfactory to work with (or on) the Defense Department than on Congress on such issues as the great missile controversy.

The military study made me aware also of the difference between issues such as reciprocal trade, where there is a quantity of accessible information, and an issue concerning the relationship of weapons construction to national policy. In the latter, access to "facts" is practically impossible for those who provide congressmen with much of their "information," and it is often difficult for congressmen themselves to find out the facts. Congress is, therefore, compelled by "the tyranny of information" to accept the recommendations of specialists who are often more concerned with expanding their own missions or increasing technical competence than with national policy.

It thus appears that Congress does not in any significant degree exercise its constitutional role of checking and balancing the Military or the Executive in regard to larger issues of military policy. Roughly, by military policy I mean what such military critics as Jomini would have designated as "grand strategy," the "politics of warfare" which underlies, guides, and limits strategic, tactical, and material decisions. Military policy is concerned with such questions as: What kind of war are we going to fight? What kind of military doctrine(s) are we going to stress? What kind of weapons do we want to produce, and how will the threat or use of these weapons be related to our overall long-range political purposes, whatever these may be?

In considering the problem, two issues stand out: (1) How in a complex society do politicians legislate on technological issues where some element of crisis is involved? (And as a corollary, what if anything does representation mean on such a matter as military policy?) (2) Can the suspicion of the expert, the bureaucrat, the specialist, the vested interest — which is crystallized in such aphorisms as "war is too important a matter to be left to the generals" and "the expert should be on tap and not on top" — be utilized in any sensible way to guide policy decisions? That is to say, can the principle of check and balance be applied in the military sphere today?

The four points which seem to me to emerge from the interviews with the congressmen with whom I talked are these:

1. Most congressmen (and it is worth noting that most of these men were on relevant committees)[14] assert that Congress has very little to say about military policy and allege that the military matters it is concerned with are such peripheral matters as production, waste, and living conditions. No one with whom I talked ever maintained that Congress had a significant role in the formulation of military policy;[15] since men in many institutions tend to maximize the part of their own institution in whatever they are talking about, this is itself interesting and probably important.[16]

[14] I should add, however, that although I talked with members of their staffs, I did not interview Senators Russell or Saltonstall, ranking members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, or Congressmen Vinson and Short, ranking members of the House Armed Services Committee.

[15] My interview technique was often oriented towards trying to produce such a claim. See my "Role Relationships and Conceptions of Neutrality in Interviewing," *American Journal of Sociology*, 62 (1956–57), pp. 153–157; and my "Interviewing Business Leaders," *Political Research: Organization and Design*, 2 (1959), pp. 25–29, which may suggest that I was not entrapped by some of the more obvious pitfalls of interviewing.

[16] Congress is not, I think, generally exempt from this tendency; but it is possible that the congressmen I talked with, conscious that they have much

2. Most congressmen are suspicious and distrustful of the military and its representations and claims, but they have no technique by which they can "get at them" except by leaks and differences of opinion arising from conflicts between the services, which they therefore tend to welcome. Their attitude to the military is in many cases something like the old saying about men and women; "you can't get along with them, and you can't get along without them." In my judgment, congressmen are far too humble, possibly even timid — especially members of the relevant committees — about questioning the judgment of the military and the policy implications of a military program as presented from the Executive Branch.

3. No congressmen interviewed claimed that he heard about overall problems of military policy or about purposes of military organization, from constituents or persons of prominence — in the way in which congressmen do hear overall economic views as well as arguments for or against specific economic proposals.

4. A number of members interviewed would like to have some resource — but they don't quite know what — in the field of military policy which would provide them with the stimulous and ammunition about over-all purposes. This point is much more dependent upon the correctness or incorrectness of my interpretations of phrases and gestures than the preceding three, and cannot readily be documented. As compared with my earlier study of the relationship of government and business, I had the impression that there were proportionately more interviewees who for the moment felt this was something really crucial, really vital, and also proportionally more interviewees who wondered why on earth I was wasting their time by asking them questions of such an intangible nature.

The legal background and experience[17] of members of Congress play a larger role in how testimony is sought, received, and evaluated than is always recognized. Again and again, members of committees refer to their "quasi-judicial" function. For instance, a member of an Appropriations Committee panel said,

> We're like a grand jury: the plaintiff may ask $50,000, the defendant offer nothing, and we say it should be $22,350.08. Like a grand jury that goes out and investigates. . . . spot-checks. . . . gets complaints; we're like a grand jury that can walk into the homes of litigants and have our staff look them over and haul people in, high and low.[18]

A grand jury does investigate complaints; but there has to be some complaint offered. A judge even more clearly decides between litigants. But who are the litigants? Except in cases of waste, graft, local complaint, or personal injustice,[19] there are on matters of mili-

less influence than would be expected, minimize or ignore the degree of influence they do have, as a consequence of the feeling of frustration which contemplation of this situation creates.

[17] And conceivably it is relevant that most lawyers active enough in politics to be elected to Congress either have been judges, have thought of being judges, look forward to federal judgeships, or recognize that if defeated for re-election a judgeship or appointment to one of the quasi-judicial regulatory agencies will be the best consolation prize. In other words, the role of a judge comes natural to them.

[18] Representative Scrivner of Kansas City, Kansas, a senior Republican on the Armed Services panel of Appropriations, who was defeated for re-election in 1958, states that he took his judicial position so seriously that he would not accept invitations to social events, etc., where officers or Defense Department officials were likely to be present. There is certainly reason to suppose that, in the nature of events, whether or not due to conscious planning, such social contacts may have some influence on congressmen in making up their minds. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that such acquaintanceship may often provide sidelights which cannot be as readily obtained through limited formal relationships, the procedure is not necessarily ideal. Perhaps, some members should adopt such a self-denying judicial stance and others, ideally, adopt the attitude of the social science student of a community who tries to achieve relative immunity from pressure and the identifications of personal friendships by exposing himself to many different stimuli.

[19] The contribution of Congress to the personal liberties of individuals and in protecting the country from bureaucratic arbitrariness and indifference is great because of what it does about individual or local complaints and injustices; perhaps the magnitude of its contribution can never be visualized because in very large measure it is the awareness that some congressmen will look into the matter which acts as a check on the tendency of the bureaucracy to disregard the local and the individual. An example of the kind of issue which congressmen and committees may be concerned with, where there are clear parties at interest, in effect litigants, is the problem of noise made by planes around an installation. The desire, for instance, of a local symphonic group that the installation be moved, the argument of the Defense Department that it would be costly to move it and that the

tary policy only one set of litigants — the services struggling for more prestigeful missions and a higher proportion of defense appropriations. This differs from political conflicts coming before congressional committees over protection and reciprocal trade, over national fiscal policy, over taxes, over agricultural programs, and over the conservation of natural resources; in all these instances general arguments of national policy, national interest, and political philosophy will be presented on both, or on several, sides. It is quite possible that analysis of testimony on military matters during the 1930's would show far more concern with fundamental issues of military policy, because, in those days, isolationists and pacifists were heard, and challenged the military.

But, as it is now, when the services are in agreement, Congress, by and large, has no accepted technique of getting at the big military problems.[20] Consequently, conflict between the services is welcomed, even when it is deprecated, because it provides the one role-relationship within which questions may most satisfactorily be asked by congressmen.[21] There is in fact a real market for — and a real need for — the development of a theory of intellectual free enterprise and open criticism in regard to military matters.

But in the United States the critic of prevailing military doctrines is not only engaged in a relatively innocuous intellectual disputation; he is threatening the status, the security, and in many cases, the sense of dedication of a number of his colleagues and comrades. Weapons systems, service missions, et cetera, are all dependent upon those military doctrines, and weapons systems and service missions encyst the status, security, and aspirations of a good many men.

Also, it would be worth exploring the part which the defense contractors play in determining military orthodoxy. If, as has been quoted in testimony before Congressional Committees, 70 per cent of the weapons ideas, etc., come from them, it is likely that the ideas put forward will be selected according to a process which does not encourage radical revolutions in conception, because such radical changes are likely (a) to prove expensive to a contractor with a given staff and way of doing things; and (b) to prove dangerous in the sense they may destroy the contractor's good relationships with the services, if they are not accepted.

So, the Congress, practically speaking, finds itself forced to rely upon those whom it distrusts — distrusts because it knows or believes it knows they are speaking for vested interests. One member epitomized the situation by saying

location is for one reason or another superior, the inclination of neighborhood realtors and merchants to keep the installation — this is the stuff of which government, particularly local government, is made; but it is only peripherally or fortuitously likely to raise problems of military policy.

[20] Two instances where members did get at such problems may be cited: Representative Deane of North Carolina, formerly a member of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Armed Services, who was defeated because of his refusal to sign the Southern Manifesto, expressed more interest in and concern with my study than any other member whom I had not previously known personally. He endeavored to ask questions of the Secretary of Defense about American troops abroad, designed to determine whether the Defense Department had thought about a program for using troops abroad to encourage goodwill towards the United States, and to discourage ill-will towards the United States, but was answered in purely technical terms. Because of the isolated, junior, and not very strong nature of his position, these questions probably had no effect; but if taken up by senior members they might have.

A second instance is the investigation of the Bolling Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report into the "defense essentiality" provisions which affect foreign imports, and its consequent consideration of the whole idea of the mobilization base. Because of my personal relationship to Congressman Bolling (although in fact I never discussed this inquiry with him until after it was completed), if I were to point out that this was an exception to the general failure of committees to consider matters of military policy I might be suspected of personal partisanship. In any case, the Joint Committee is not a legislative committee, so I have not discussed it in the text.

[21] I am under the greatest obligation to Professor Edward L. Katzenbach of Brandeis University, formerly Director of the Harvard Center for Defense Studies, for some sixty hours of discussion on problems of the Pentagon and the Hill, and for the opportunity to read the manuscript of his forthcoming book on that topic. He has pointed out that one important factor in directing congressional questioning is that congressmen, like other people, often shy away from asking questions which will, when answered, pose unpleasant problems.

perhaps a dozen times in the course of an hour interview, "Who am I to say 'No' to the military. They say a certain thing should be done; who am I to say 'No' to them?" He implied pretty strongly that he doubted many of their recommendations; but he did not feel he had any basis upon which to reject them. The situation he exemplified is similar to that facing a judge where all competent parties at interest are prepared to agree to modification of some legal instrument; he feels that there is something "fishy," something undesirable about it, but he does not have any basis for disapproval. Another member stated the same viewpoint more vehemently, objecting to the whole system by which defense matters are considered. "What," I asked him, "can be done about it?" "Nothing," he replied, "except for me to get off the damn committee and get on some committee where I can do something."

We are faced here with a fairly common problem in the relationship of the "expert" or alleged expert and the amateur or generalist. To be sure, there are half a dozen Defense Studies Centers at leading universities; yet only two interviewees made reference to them, each to Harvard, and each derogating a viewpoint it is said to have put forward on organization and administration. And in fact it is uncertain how much attention these Defense Centers, plus of course the various Staff Colleges, devote to grand strategy and military policy — probably in sum a good deal, but the congressmen would have to dig it out themselves and disentangle it from considerations such as administration, and budgeting, which probably get more attention from Defense Centers and Staff Colleges.

Congress — and so far as I can judge the Defense Department itself and such related agencies as the National Security Council — and a considerable proportion of the scholars who deal with defense problems — suffer from a failure to distinguish between what is properly technical and what is not. When asked about military policy or related topics, the attitude of a number of members was first: "What's that to do with us? That's a technical problem." Some members do not wish to know about war plans because of the security aspects; others because they regard the judgment of the Chiefs of Staff as far superior to their own; still others simply have concluded that the briefings they get from the Chiefs of Staff, etc., are no better than what the newspapers supply, but that there is no way of curing the situation. When they do concern themselves with Defense Department problems, it is most frequently on questions directly affecting personnel — I was surprised to have a Senate Armed Services Committee staff member advise me that probably the majority of their business dealt with personnel matters, such as desire for promotion — land takings, and matters of production and business; those respects, in other words, in which the military bureaucracy is similar to any other business or department of government (except of course that it is much bigger).

The real legislative problem of the Congress, and the best way in which it can make the contribution which an independent legislative body can presumably make to the analysis of military problems, is to raise the policy questions suggested earlier: What kinds of war would best fit into the political purposes which we have in mind? What kinds of deterrence would best fit into such purposes? Are the weapons we are building or developing, or the research we are undertaking, or the military support we are supplying likely to fit into such wars or systems of deterrence? Such an approach would differ from a good deal of current military doctrine which takes the present weapons system and the present pattern of alliances as *given* and proceeds from there; over the very short range this may well be effective, but alliances will alter, and weapons can change over a longer period.

Of course, Congress is not the only body which could and should undertake such an exploration of national military policy. The point here suggested is that so long as it must necessarily resign all the important decisions of national defense to someone else, this someone will tend to be the admirals and generals, or the contractors.

I would guess that consistent, significant concern by any influential institution in the society — whether the Congress or some other — which makes military policy a subject of serious intellectual concern to civilians would very shortly lead to a questioning of policy premises; for instance, the psychological underpinning of the whole theory of deterrence is extremely shaky. Why doesn't deterrence as we talk about it frighten and thus provoke rather than deter? Psychologists, sociologists, and professional

men of common sense might be able to throw some light on that almost unexplored question. If such questions were raised, we would be less likely to find one of the best-informed and most well-situated members of Congress saying: "I can't find anybody around here who can tell me what we are preparing for." Nor would we be so likely to hear two other experienced members telling us that they know nothing about military policy, wish they did, and feel it the most difficult topic to get any light on.[22]

XI

Conclusion

Attention has been focused in the present study on the ways congressmen view representation and on the ways in which their pictures of the world determine what they hear, how they interpret it, whom they represent, how they influence representation by others, and how they view other representatives. It omits many equally significant facets of the representative process — for example, the formal and informal structure of the congressional system. Elsewhere[23] I have discussed the formal structure. It is obvious that there is an informal structure and that it is highly significant. That it is an exceptionally complex structure to study, because congressmen are members of several different groups simultaneously, is also apparent. I have made only random observations concerning it.

Obviously, it would be enlightening and helpful to have comparative studies of state legislatures to follow up the brilliant work of Garceau and Silverman.[24] It would also be useful to have additional studies of other issues coming before Congress.

The study here reported was defective in that it lacked the precision of, for example, many sociological reports on industrial plants. One reason for this is the problem of anonymity. To describe the factional conflicts in a particular congressional district, or even more personal interrelationships within a congressional committee, could hardly be done with fairness to the subjects of the study. Such details are safe enough when the study concerns a factory. But aside from this problem, the "group memberships," reference groups, and so on, of politicians, are substantially more complex than those reported in many professional journals. Our reciprocal trade study devoted an unusual degree of attention to the districts from which some of the congressmen we interviewed came. However, we devised no technique for observing the relationship between a congressman and his constituency in detail over a period of time. Probably, considering the workload of congressmen, this can only be done by those who become helpers and thereby preclude themselves from reporting. Studies of state and city legislatures and of the representative process therein offer more hope for the development of a sociology of representation. It should be remembered that representation exists in many cultural frameworks. How, for instance, does all that is said here apply to other systems? In this connection, it is noted that the representative process exists in the church, in trade unions, in trade associations, and in fraternal organizations. So far, the process has been studied only occasionally in such contexts.

[22] One of these men did add that he thinks the Armed Services do far more than all the corporations in the world to exercise improper pressure on Congress. He feels, for example, that the real impropriety of the airplane rides given himself and his colleagues is not that they receive special privileges but that they are placed in situations where they have so many obligations to the military that it is hard to scrutinize them objectively. The other declared that if he were a little younger he would attack the whole system by which military decisions are made, that he would therefore expect to be beaten for reelection, *but* believes that, with good luck, in ten years this effort would make a great deal of difference.

[23] Dexter, *Congressmen and the People They Listen To.*

[24] Oliver Garceau and Corinne Silverman, "A Pressure Group and the Pressured," *American Political Science Review,* 48 (1954), pp. 672–691.

41

FEDERALISM AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

• DAVID B. TRUMAN

In the representative governments characteristic of the Western World the interdependence of constitutional forms and types of political party is a fact, obvious enough in its simple statement, but complex and baffling when the observer undertakes to explain these interrelations as they bear upon past changes in the political life of a people or to anticipate the form and direction of developments in the future. The need to organize and to lead a mass electorate has given rise, even in political systems paying the merest lip-service to the values of democracy, to party forms basically different from the cliques and cabals which bore the name in an age when the political drama was played before a smaller and more select audience. Constitutional practices, whether formal and written or informal and customary, have presented the engineers of power with both advantages and handicaps in terrain and material to which their structures have been adapted, especially in systems where an attachment to constitutionalism has imposed limitations upon the techniques and tactics of the politician.

Yet even the most superficial glance at these interdependent elements will indicate that the cast has altered the mold, whether subtly and implicitly, as in the case of the American Electoral College, or directly and openly through formal amendments and legislative enactments. A search for origins and for trends is thus bedeviled by the tendency to treat in linear, cause-and-effect terms a relationship which is curcular and elusive. At whatever point the circle is entered appear the dangers of assumptions too hastily made and generalizations too easily arrived at. These dangers are augmented when the constitutional structure to be examined is federal, where diversity of practice and complexity of organization are endemic.

The questions that make this interdependence significant lie close to the core of the underlying paradox of federalism.[1] In the formative phase of a federal system the question of survival — of maintaining a minimal degree of union and of giving some measure of reality to formal powers of central direction — challenges the adaptive and adjusting potentialities of party, even in the context of a restricted electorate. Maturity, on the other hand, focuses upon the party system, as the representative device most responsive to the underlying values of personality, such questions as whether the perpetuation of decentralizing forms must eventuate in restricting a centralized power to govern which a developing popular concensus would otherwise support; whether federalism, as structural fact rather than as doctrine, must spawn an extra-constitutional system of party power which places limits upon the adaptability of the scheme as a whole and forces a choice between an inhibiting political veto and a drastic alteration of the whole pattern, perhaps through violent means.

I

To speak loosely of "the party system," especially when dealing with federalism in the United States, is to run the risk of begging the central question in this inquiry, for the nature of the party enterprise rests on the extent to which the elements collectively designated by the term actually constitute a system. Differentiating factors of structure and function bisect the "system" from various directions and

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[1] See the opening chapter in this symposium by Arthur W. Macmahon, "The Problems of Federalism: A Survey" in Macmahon (ed.) *Federalism: Mature and Emergent* Garden City, Doubleday, 1955.

in bewildering fashion, creating patterns of autonomy and subordination, some stable and some fluid, which seriously embarrass generalization.

The structural elements of party can be classified in the conventional fashion — following the formal, frequently statutory provisions for the diversity of committees, conventions, and individual functionaries — by national, state, and local levels. Such classification, while formally appropriate, is likely to take insufficient account of the extent to which the persistent and effective relationships among men and groups of men active in party affairs are clustered around one or a number of individual offices located on one or two or all three levels of the formal hierarchy.

It is a commonplace to point out that the party on the national level in the United States is, and throughout the country's history has been, focused on the presidency. Such national or interstate machinery as exists is primarily, though not exclusively, concerned with the nomination and election, perhaps especially the renomination and reelection, of a President So much is this the case that, despite the practice by both parties since 1928 of maintaining at least a nuclear national headquarters in continuous operation and despite the normal efforts of the defeated presidential candidate to give substance to his titular leadership, the party which has failed to win the White House presents a somewhat truncated, if not fractionated, appearance, which it is likely to retain until after the next nominating convention. Moreover, when the presidency is not at stake both parties show strong symptoms of "midterm atomization."[2]

The essential supportive structures for members of the Congress typically are not national or interstate. The chairmen and staffs of the national committees provide some services and assistance for duly nominated candidates for the Congress. The organizationally separate and often jealously independent campaign committees maintained by the "parliamentary" parties in the Senate and the House of Representatives seem to perform much the same sort of function, although their activities have never been closely studied.

[2] The phrase is V. O. Key's. See *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 3d edition, New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952, p. 515.

The party in the Senate and the House of Representatives is not without significance as a means of allocating positions of power and influence in the legislative branch or even as a vehicle for the formulation of public policy,[3] and the "record" of the congressional parties is not irrelevant to the fortunes of aspirants for election or reelection to the Congress. But the risks and sanctions to which most members of Congress are particularly sensitive have their focus within the states and localities. The relationships which the legislator has established and maintained within the constituency are primary and crucial; others are secondary and incidental. This seems to be the case despite the evidence that, especially in the case of the House of Representatives, the bulk of the voters in general elections cast their ballots on the basis of party preference rather than attachment to the personal qualities of individual candidates for the national legislature; that is, party percentages in most districts tend to shift in the same direction. This is the case in presidential years, when the party is in a sense symbolized in the person of the chief candidate, but is equally apparent in the midterm elections.[4] This paradox seems to point to the underlying significance of the nominating as against the electoral function of party structure, of which more will be said below.

At the state and local levels the structural patterns are varied and complicated, but not essentially different in kind. The significant organizations in the states may be centered upon the governorship, with control reaching down effectively into the counties and municipalities, or upon the United States Senators or upon both in some form of combination. Specialization in the localities may be built individually or in combination around the positions of mayors, sheriffs, or other prime sources of patronage and power such as the office of surrogate in the counties of New York State.

[3] Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951.

[4] See the data presented in Key, *op. cit.*, chap. 17, and his paper, "The Veterans and the House of Representatives: A Study of a Pressure Group and Electoral Mortality," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 5 (1943), pp. 27–40. This pattern is not to the same degree discernible in the case of Senators, since they are likely to enjoy a greater degree of personal prominence.

Such specialized structures may include a variety of other elective offices, such as seats in the state legislature, in the United States House of Representatives, and even in the Senate. As often as not, however, congressional candidates will operate through more or less independent organizations of their own creation, even in the general election campaign. In the case of Representatives, this is often a reflection of the relative indifference of the more inclusive state and local organizations toward the congressional ticket, as compared with more lucrative sources of patronage. Senators may function independently for quite different reasons. Not only are they more conspicuous in the political affairs of their constituencies and secure in their positions for a longer period of time, but also they are likely to command other means of political power in greater abundance, including federal patronage.

The structural scheme of parties in the American federalism thus displays a confusing complexity, both in its formal aspects and in its informal operation. The system, to the extent that it can be given the name, is composed of a tremendous variety of elements imperfectly and rather unpredictably articulated, capable of showing a remarkable degree of separatism and autonomy. Moreover, the degree of articulation which exists to make the system is of a peculiar sort. The relationships between the more obscure and the more prominent elements in the system show a defensive, unilateral quality. In areas where general elections mean anything, it is a rare local or state party unit which, personal and factional feuds aside, is indifferent to the vote-pulling power of those occupying the principal positions on the ticket. But the concern is in a sense parasitic, to derive support from the leading figure on the ticket rather than to supply it. Given the tendency of voters, even when the form of the ballot does not help, to simplify their tasks by voting a "straight ticket," state and local elements are understandably interested in a nominee at the top of the list who may carry the whole slate into office with him. But these segments of the system are able, in marked degree, to cut themselves off from the head of the ticket when the latter is regarded as a handicap and succeed with remarkable frequency in checking the effects upon them of a swing of voting sentiment adverse to the occupant of the top place.[5] Similarly, there are significant relationships between the presidential party and the "constituency parties," illustrated by the common appeal by a member of the Congress for executive adoption of a particular policy or for a favorable presidential announcement in order to improve the prospects of hard-pressed candidates in special areas, but these carry no guarantee of reciprocal support either on the floor of the Congress or in subsequent election campaigns.

II

Although the system — made up of the presidential parties, the "parliamentary" parties, the constituency parties, and the various other state and local aggregations — is structurally unstable and disjointed, the distribution of power within it is not even or merely haphazard. Here again, however, the danger of hasty generalization is great. It is customary to refer to the distribution of power within the American party system as decentralized. This is the generally accepted view, yet its implications in the context of federalism and for possible future trends are not clear unless some account is taken of the relative significance of the various functions of the party and of the degree of decentralization of power in connection with the most important of them. Parties, in any representative system, perform a composite of functions, including nominating candidates for public office, mobilizing an electorate for their support, distributing patronage and other perquisites of public position, developing and protecting those formulas for social adjustment and accommodation which we collectively refer to as public policies, and a host of less obvious and self-conscious services. In different places and at different times one or another of these may be more conspicuous than the rest, which vastly complicates the tasks of historians and comparative analysts of the political process. Except perhaps in those political situations where a basic consensus is lacking or is being challenged, however, the nominating function seems to be the most fundamental or at least

[5] This point is tentatively demonstrated in V. O. Key, Jr., "Partisanship and County Office: The Case of Ohio," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 47 (1953), pp. 525–32. Cf. Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1937.

the most persistently focal. This has been strikingly the case in the United States since at least as far back as the caucuses and juntos of the later colonial years and, especially on the national level, conspicuously so since the great changes in the period associated with the name of Andrew Jackson, when the presidential party assumed most of the characteristics it displays today. It is around the nominating function that the states in recent decades have constructed the most elaborate and complicated systems of statutory regulation, and the intensity of feeling associated with the spread of the direct primary in the first decade of the present century reflected in part a recognition of the fundamental importance of the nomination process. James Bryce made no more acute observation concerning the American scene than he did when he noted that the nomination of candidates for public office was not only the most important but the most distinctively American function of party organization.[6]

It is in connection with the nominating of candidates that the decentralization of power in the American party system is most apparent. Looking at the presidency it is clear that the changes in practice which developed in the eighteen-twenties — changes largely of degree, perhaps, but of such measure that their significance can scarcely be exaggerated — involved an increase in the importance of localism in the selecting process. The congressional caucus had been the instrument of a limited and comparatively homogeneous national elite, disposing of an office which had little of the quality of popular symbolism that it possesses today. Its members were not, of course, lacking in attachment to states and sections, but theirs was a national and central power reflecting the effects of close association in the institutional frame of the national legislature. The shift of initiative to the state legislatures and later to the national delegate conventions was a response to demands from more heterogeneous elements in the population and eventuated in a shifting of the power of decision, if not of initiative, from the national to the state or local level.

In Jackson's day, and for decades thereafter, the utility of the national convention lay not only in the announcement of a defensible nomination, but also in the sharpening of an effective electoral mechanism. In fact, the first national convention of the Democratic party was apparently more a rally to spur Jackson's state and local cohorts into vigorous activity than a device for selecting the candidate, as, in fact, conventions in which incumbent Presidents have sought renomination have usually been ever since. In later years the leaders of state and factional delegations had not only convention votes to market among the managers of aspiring candidates but also a canvassing and electoral organization as well. Both were needed, even though the former were of more immediate importance.

Perhaps the most significant, if largely undocumented, change in recent years, a change which may account for some of the recent criticism of the national convention, is that the electioneering functions of the presidential party have become increasingly centralized while the power over nominations remains decentralized. Although those voters who alter their choices late in the campaign may be strongly influenced, as the survey studies indicate, by personal solicitation,[7] the presence of the presidential candidates in every living room, by way of radio and television, reduces the need for an army of canvassers in presidential campaigns as the development of the metropolitan press alone never did. In recent presidential elections both the behavior and the informal testimony of many urban functionaries support this interpretation; the circulars and posters are still distributed to the local clubs and headquarters, but the effort necessary to put them in the hands of individual voters is recognized as being of little or no value. State and local leaders are not powerless or completely unnecessary in the electioneering efforts of the presidential party, but both central direction and central execution of a presidential campaign have become in recent years not only a possibility but in large measure an actuality.

Yet the nomination function, excepting the renomination of an incumbent President, remains essentially decentralized. Despite such

[6] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, 2d edition, New York, Macmillan and Company, 1891, Vol. II, p. 73.

[7] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, 2d edition, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. 150–158.

devices as the presidential primary and the centrally directed pre-convention efforts of the leading aspirants, local and frequently extraneous considerations not only enter into but even dominate the selection of delegates and the horse-trading decisions behind the scenes at the convention. In fact, the evidence clearly suggests that in areas where one-party dominance, as in the South, operates to avoid disturbance to distinctive local practices, the only significant function of a state party may be to select reliable delegates to interstate party councils. The leaders of the presidential party may no longer need to rely heavily upon a decentralized machinery for conducting an election campaign, but they are still dependent on forging a cohesive coalition of state and local leaders for the opportunity to conduct one.

Decentralization of the nominating function is more striking and more significant as it affects Senators and Representatives. Regardless of the method of selection, by one or another form of the predominant direct primary or by convention, the influences which are chiefly responsible for the selection of candidates are local rather than national. The importance of this fact is merely underscored by the evidence that, under normal conditions, in about half the congressional constituencies, success in the primary in tantamount to election.[8] This is typically due to the "one-party" complexion of many such areas, but it may result as well from the individual candidate's effectiveness in creating or associating himself with an organization within the constituency which can assure his selection or redesignation. The implications for the party system are much the same in either case.

Even a casual glance at the career lines of Senators and Representatives, as well as of state and local officials from whose ranks they are normally recruited, will indicate that most of them have had long and intimate association with the areas which they represent, more than is required by the symptomatically significant custom demanding residence in the district from which the legislator is chosen. No precise data on this point exist in the literature, but the impression is that a member of Congress is more likely than the average of the population to have been born, raised, educated, and trained in the area from which he is chosen. A constituency, perhaps especially an urban one, may take up a comparative newcomer who has achieved sudden prominence, but his survival is likely to depend ultimately upon his knowing his constituency, not in abstract, intellectual terms, but through supportive associations with individuals and groups. He must have satisfactory "connections," either with the leadership of a dominant party organization or with influential individuals primarily concerned with assuring his continuance in office or a combination of the two.

These connections may not be able to assure his election; the fortunes of the national party may be ebbing so rapidly that nothing can assure his individual survival or the nominee of the opposing party may more successfully exploit local dissatisfactions. But the aspirant will have no chance even to face these risks, except as he chooses to attempt a normally unsuccessful "independent" candidacy, unless he has the support necessary for nomination.

The structure responsible for nominating the legislative candidate need not be parochial or anti-national in its attitudes. This is not its principal significance but rather the fact that it is the locus of discretion in the nominating process. In its operations it need display no dependence upon, no functional association or identification with, the leadership of the presidential or the "parliamentary" party. Bryce made the point effectively in a brief comparison of local party organizations in Britain and the United States:[9]

> An organization which exists, like the political associations of England, solely or mainly for the sake of canvassing, conducting registration, diffusing literature, getting up courses of lectures, holding meetings and passing resolutions, has little or no power. . . . But when an organization which the party is in the habit of obeying, chooses a party candidate, it exerts power, power often of the highest import. . . .

Decentralization of the functions of nominating and promoting the election of members of the Congress is reflected in a lack of cohesion on important policy matters within the "parlia-

[8] Cortez A. M. Ewing, "Primaries as Elections," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 29 (1948–49), pp. 293–98; Malcolm Moos, *Politics, Presidents, and Coattails*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952.

[9] Bryce, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 76.

mentary" parties — within the party in either House and between the party in one chamber and "the same" party in the other — and in fairly frequent rejection of the legislative leadership of "the party's" President when it "controls" the White House. It is too easy to underestimate the influence of party affiliation upon legislative voting and to ignore the evidence that it is more reliably predictive of such behavior than any other factor so far identified.[10] But on controverted issues of prime significance the leaders of the "parliamentary" parties not infrequently find themselves in the minority among their nominal following or split into two opposing wings, and the Administration may have to count on appreciable support from a segment of the "opposition" in Congress for the enactment of a basic portion of its legislative program, often despite extraordinary efforts by a popular President through public appeals and pronouncements, efforts which depend for effectiveness upon their infrequent use.

This state of affairs leads to criticism of the party system and demands for party "responsibility" by those who desire a central place among the functions of party for the formation of a more coherent and enforceable program. Of such criticisms the recent report of the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties may be taken as representative.[11] A common shortcoming of such appeals, illustrated in the committee's proposals, is that in their enthusiasm for programmatic elegance they tend to underestimate the significance of the decentralized nominating function. It seems unlikely that any amount of policy talk in local meetings or of platform writing by interstate bodies will increase discipline within the congressional parties or cohesion within the Administration as a whole, unless they are preceded by a centralization of the risks and sanctions associated with the selection of candidates for seats in the legislature. It may be doubted, in fact, whether in any party system dominated by two major aggregations, even in a country less extensive and socially less complex than the United States, cohesion is provided primarily by the programmatic element rather than by a central leadership whose policy tendencies are but vaguely known and whose displeasure with a parliamentary follower is enforceable at the nominating stage. If the legislator's risks are localized, he will look in that direction when making difficult choices on matters of public policy.

III

The American party system thus tends to be characterized by decentralization of power with respect to its most crucial function, by structural confederation, and by a lack of coherence in matters of major policy. What have the facts of federalism to do with this? To what extent is this an inescapable consequence of the federal system itself? Federalism, by the constitutional protection of constituent governments, creates at least the possibility, as Herbert Wechsler has argued,[12] that the states will control the composition and influence materially the legislative process of the national entity. If, as Arthur Holcombe suggests, the national political party is the principal agent for restricting these tendencies,[13] its effectiveness in the United States has been something less than complete. Is the molding force of the federal system itself such that a party system operating within it must inevitably show the characteristics of political organizations in the United States?

This is a question of considerable importance for an understanding of the American experience and for an estimate of its potentialities in the future. It is a question which the Committee on Political Parties tends to avoid by treating party organization as a matter dissociated from that of governmental structure. Thus it asserts that: "In the case of the American party system, the real issue is not over the federal form of organization but over the right balance of forces within this type of organization."[14]

The basic political fact of federalism is that it creates separate, self-sustaining centers of

[10] Consult the evidence in Turner, *Party and Constituency*. Turner's data are confined to the House of Representatives.

[11] *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, A Report of the Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, Supplement, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 44, No. 3, Part 2 (September, 1950). Also published as a separate volume (New York, Rinehart and Company, 1950).

[12] Herbert Wechsler, "The Political Safeguards of Federalism," in Macmahon, *op. cit.*

[13] See Arthur N. Holcombe, "The Coercion of States in a Federal System," in *ibid.*

[14] *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, p. 26.

power, privilege, and profit which may be sought and defended as desirable in themselves, as means of leverage upon elements in the political structure above and below, and as bases from which individuals may move to places of greater influence and prestige in and out of government. This does not mean simply that a socio-economic interest group, dominant within a state or, more typically perhaps, a group of contiguous states, will utilize state powers to protect itself from assault both from within the area and from the national center. This is true enough; it merely restates the facts underlying the original choice of a federal rather than a unitary structure for the second American constitution, and it points to the familiar fact of sectional politics present through most of our history and recurrent with each wave of state creation.

The separate political existence of the states in the days of the nation's industrial and political maturity, on the other hand, provides effective access to the whole governmental structure for interest groups whose tactics may be local or sectional but whose scope is national. Separatism, whether within the federal system or in the form of a specious demand for making a governmental activity "independent of politics" at whatever level of the structure, has frequently been a refuge for interests bent on defensive or evasive action, and the "states' rights" argument has often had about it an air more of expediency than of principle. This is not new. But it is the fact of federalism which permits an interest group or other enterprise of national scope, in alliance with lesser interests which may be primarily local or sectional, to prevent or negate action on the national level and to insure inaction or indulgence in the states. It was not merely Yankee stubbornness and dedication to local self-government which in the thirties prevented federal action to foster integrated development of the Connecticut River Valley. Such sentiments may have been more than mere expedient romanticism, and they might alone have affected the outcome of the proposal and the fortunes of elected state officials and members of Congress, but they received significant support and direction from private utility interests whose reach was nationwide.[15] Nor were the interests exclusively local or sectional, though such were allied at least peripherally, which induced the Congress to alter in favor of state action a Supreme Court decision asserting or permitting national control of insurance. These illustrations are not cited by way of indictment but merely of illustration. In the maturity of the federal system the existence of the states as self-contained centers of power permits the use of them and associated party units by interests which are state or local only in a tactical sense. This is not equivalent to the separatism of a geographically defined interest, though it appears in the same garb and owes its significance as a technique to the continued existence of the states as power centers. Its effects on the party system are conducive to neither centralization nor cohesion at the national level.

In viewing the states as channels of access for interest groups, however, it is easy to forget that elective positions within the states, especially the governorships, are prizes in themselves and that the political "game" may be merely a means from the viewpoint of the interest group leader but is likely to be an end in itself for many of the more active partisans. It is perhaps a commentary on the instrumental, almost a-political attitudes of many academic observers of politics that they lay such stress upon the American parties as alliances of socio-economic interest groups. They are, of course, alliances of groups, but parties are not distinguishable exclusively or even primarily in terms of their socio-economic policy content. In varying but important measure they are purely political, focused upon securing and holding power for their leading elements as an end in itself. The grand patterns of sectional and perhaps class alliances which have successively dominated our presidential politics for periods lasting up to several decades can in the large view perhaps be explained most meaningfully in terms of socio-economic interest. But at shorter range the detailed patterns take on a more exclusively political appearance.[16] There is here no intended implication of petty place-seeking but rather a suggestion that to aspire to be among those who govern and to associate for that objective as an end in itself

[15] William E. Leuchtenberg, *Flood Control Politics: The Connecticut River Valley Problem, 1927–1950,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953.

[16] I am here dissenting in part from the view expressed by John Fischer in "Prerequisites of Balance," Macmahon, *op. cit.*). Cf. my comments in *The Governmental Process,* New York, Knopf, 1951, pp. 279–81, 509–10, and *passim.*

is both normal and honorable. The evidence which indicates that enduring attachment to a party is for many voters a loyalty independent of, though not dissociated from, socio-economic interest[17] supports the assumption that similar attachments to party, clique, and faction exist among the more active elements in political organizations.

The significance of this point in the present context is that, given the multitude of elective positions in the system (only partially a consequence of federalism) and given the absence of a clearly defined and recognized path from one position to another in the loose hierarchy of political careers (a consequence more of a decentralized party system than directly of federalism itself), conflicting but interdependent clusters of loyalty and aspiration build up around various positions in the governmental structure. Thus, within a given "party," the career aspirations and prospects of a state governor, a United States Senator, and a member of the House of Representatives are likely to be ambiguous to one another or to others in the political structure with whom they must deal. Each may want one of the other offices; the governor and Senator may both have presidential ambitions which are mutually exclusive; the Senator or the Representative, though occupying a "national" office, may hope to move to the governorship and is likely to be far more closely dependent upon the state governor, from considerations either of preference or of expediency, than upon the leaders of the "parliamentary" party or upon a President bearing the same party designation. This is a simplified and hypothetical example,[18] but it illustrates the role played by the offices established in the federal structure, and especially the state governor, in fractionating and decentralizing the party system, in encouraging the development of largely independent, hostile, and internally cohesive factional groupings.

The connection between these tendencies and the existence of federalism should not, of course, be overstated. The basic phenomenon of clique and personal rivalry is familiar enough in all organizations, including political parties. The point of significance here is the extent to which the federal structure tends to give these free rein. It is symptomatic of the function in the party system of state political positions, especially the governship, that of the forty-three major candidates in the twenty presidential elections from 1876 through 1952 (counting three candidates in the elections of 1912, 1924, and 1948), only seven, excluding the thirteen incumbent Presidents, came to the nomination directly from a national political position, such as a seat in the Congress or a cabinet post; five were nominated from non-political positions of national or regional importance, and the remaining eighteen were drawn from state political roles, mostly governorships. Such nominations are, of course, available under normal conditions only to governors of the large doubtful states, but the disruptive potentialities of the governorships are not confined to presidential races. The governor who merely seeks to retain his office through an effective organization covering major sections of the state is in a position to influence the fortunes and the choices of members of Congress, and a Senator or Representative who is aiming at the governorship is likely to be peculiarly solicitous of interests located in his home state.[19]

These three factors derived from the existence of the states as separate and largely self-sustaining power centers — channeling the claims of local socio-economic interest groups, inviting their use as leverage against federal action by interests which are only tactically local, and providing for competing and frequently incompatible nuclei of decentralized intra-party conflict — are, of course, interrelated. In various combinations they go a long way toward indicating that there is something inherent in federalism which induces decen-

[17] There are interesting data on this point in the recent study of the 1952 presidential election by Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller: *The Voter Decides*, Evanston, Illinois, Row, Peterson and Company, 1954.

[18] In some states, of course, party organizations have been disciplined enough to establish a relatively clear and enforceable *cursus honorum*, as recently in Virginia. See V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, New York, Knopf, 1949, chap. 2.

[19] The basic incompatibility of elements in the party structure is underestimated in the report of the Committee on Political Parties when it looks to local party meetings to give local party organizations "a stronger sense of loyalty to the entire party" and when it proposes a Party Council "representative" of various elements, including the party's state governors. See *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, pp. 39 ff., 47.

tralization and lack of coherence in a party system.

But it is not sufficient merely to show that federalism has had some effect upon the nature of the party system. The important question of how much effect it has remains unanswered and to a precise degree unanswerable. It can easily be pointed out that decentralization and lack of cohesion frequently are apparent within the state parties, where factors other than federalism are influential. Could the like of these account in considerable measure for the peculiarities of the system as a whole? Would the American party system have developed essentially its present characteristics if the Founding Fathers had established a unitary constitution? The question is hypothetical but not irrelevant.

IV

Before turning to an examination of some of the influences other than federalism that have molded the American parties, it may be instructive, or at least suggestive, to examine briefly two other federal systems, Canada and Australia, for evidence of similar effects of federal organization. The comparison cannot be conclusive, since, as in all such efforts, it is impossible to differentiate the effects of other influences and state in precise terms the consequences of basic constitutional structure. But contrasts may be revealing even when comparisons cannot be made with exactness.

In both Canada and Australia the major parties are obliged, especially in the former, to take account of the geographically defined differences which underlie the federal structure. Viable national political structures, as would be expected, must reckon with sectional issues, attitudes, and interests. Yet despite this obvious fact both have seen the development of national parties more centralized and considerably more cohesive than those in the United States.[20]

In Canada there is considerable variation in the formal structures of the major parties, and within the parties the patterns differ from one province to another and between rural and urban constituencies, as in the United States. In Quebec, whose politics are not unlike those of the American South, parties are more loosely organized, and purely personal and factional influences have considerable significance. At the national level the only party organization of importance is the parliamentary party. Below that is the somewhat more complex provincial party organization and the constituency (riding) organization.

The fact of federalism introduces potential cleavages into the party system, yet normally the leader of the parliamentary party, especially if he is also Prime Minister, can count on the disciplined support of those elected with him, and a majority Government usually can survive throughout its permissible statutory life of five years. In Dominion elections, to be sure, it is not unusual for the outcome nationally to be affected by the existence of local or provincial hostilities clustered around other points in the federal structure and largely irrelevant to national questions.

Such centrifugal influences as exist within the Canadian parties seem to be associated, as in the United States, with decentralization of the nominating function and with the use of provincial governmental positions as points of resistance. Nominations for the Dominion parliament are made by the constituency organizations through various procedures generally lacking the complexity of their American equivalents, a point perhaps not without significance. These constituency organizations, perhaps especially in Quebec, are a good deal more independent in their decisions than are those in Britain, and the provincial and national parties have no formal or acknowledged power to withhold designations or to control the local decisions. A member of parliament who is not in the best of standing with the Government may be renominated if he nevertheless retains the confidence of the constituency committee, but this is less likely to occur if he is known to be in disfavor, and the national party leader may, especially if he is Prime Minister, be able to punish, by indirect means, the recalcitrant by seeing that he is deprived of his nomination.

The national party's organized contact with the individual voter is through the mechanism of the provincial party association, which di-

[20] In this section I have relied heavily upon Alexander Brady, *Democracy in the Dominions*, 2d edition, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1952; Robert M. Dawson, *The Government of Canada*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1947; H. McD. Clokie, *Canadian Government and Politics*, 2d edition, London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1945; and Louise Overacker, *The Australian Party System*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1952.

rects the electioneering efforts in the constituency. The provincial organization has dual loyalties, to the national party and the provincial leader. These may become divided, as happened in the not entirely unprecedented break in 1940 between Prime Minister Mackenzie King and Mr. Mitchell Hepburn, the leader of the Liberal Party in Ontario and the provincial prime minister. In a fashion not unrecognizable to Americans, the latter made use of his position in the provincial government to embarrass the national leadership. Clokie's comment on the incident was that it illustrated "one of the penalties paid for federalized politics when there is no appropriate political organization to coordinate the entire national party."[21] This was an extreme case; the more common threat is merely that the provincial party will be more interested in winning power in the province than in promoting the interests of the national party leadership.

The Canadian party system thus shows the influences of the federal structure, but it is in rather sharp contrast to the United States in degree. This is not the place to attempt an exhaustive analysis of the reasons for the contrast, but one or two prominent factors should be cautiously mentioned. These seem to be associated with the parliament-cabinet system, operating under conditions at least analogous to those in Britain. In this connection it is tempting to seize upon the absence of a separation of powers as the crucial element, but as a simple constitutional fact it is not convincing. However, the consequence that it involves no separate popular election of the head of the government is significant, in that it implies narrowing and rather sharply defining the alternative lines of succession to the positions of principal influence. The subtle differences in the role of prime ministers, at the national level and in the provinces, flowing from retention of representatives of the Crown in the chief ceremonial positions, are not unimportant. But the chief fact seems to be that the positions of provincial prime ministers, to say nothing of a variety of other governmental and nongovernmental positions, are not points from which direct succession to the most important political post can take place. As a point of leverage the provincial prime ministership, or leadership of the minority party in a province, may be useful, but it is not readily convertible into peak national leadership. In fact, it appears that sectional hostilities are more likely to focus upon a provincial leader than upon a Dominion statesman. The advantages of political ambiguity, which adhere to the governor of an important state or to a presidential aspirant whose prominence rests on a nonpolitical career in the United States, lie with the experienced politician at the national level. This seems to produce a somewhat cooptative pattern of succession which, buttressed by a skillful and thoroughly un-British use of patronage when the party is in power, increases dependence upon the party leader. In the hands of a gifted politician such as a Laurier or a Mackenzie King — historically not unimportant political facts in themselves — the system can produce long and durable national leadership and reduce the disruptive influences of federalism to a minimum.

Associated with and in some instances flowing from these basic factors are a number of supportive influences of apparently less fundamental importance, such as the power of dissolution, simpler and less frequent elections, resulting in a more informal and less sustained party activity at the local level, and the striking dominance of the national party leader. The last of these involves an assumption within the constituency that a member of parliament will support his party in the legislature or resign, which considerably reduces the significance of decentralized nominations.

The main features of the Australian situation are succinctly expressed by Louise Overacker in the closing sentences of her informative study:[22]

> In spite of its federal structure and a strong sense of particularism among the member states, unified, disciplined parties with Commonwealth-wide organizations developed. Even the Senate, created to safeguard state interests, has become a body in which divisions are along strict party lines.
>
> This state of affairs is traceable to the existence of the remarkable Australian Labor Party, not only in the sense that it applies most completely to that party but also because the A.L.P., far more than the Liberal Party in Canada, has developed a structural pattern to be imitated by other political groupings as well as a substantive position for them to react to.

[21] Clokie, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

[22] Overacker, *op. cit.*, pp. 327–8.

Superficially the structure of the A.L.P. resembles the general pattern in Canada. However, the primary emphasis given to the movement has not only attached extraordinary importance at both the state and Commonwealth levels to the parliamentary caucus, which the elected member is pledged to support, but has also produced a federal structure of state and interstate conventions whose relations with the parliamentary parties in the matter of policy-making are not always clear or harmonious.

While discipline within parliamentary parties is high, it is not always so striking in the structure as a whole, and decentralization is even more conspicuous. State party leaders have successfully repudiated the positions taken by federal leaders in referendum campaigns, and the leader of the party in New South Wales was able for five years, from 1932 to 1937, to dominate the party within the state even though his group had been formally expelled by the federal party. These occurrences are not necessarily typical or increasing in frequency, but they point to the fact of federal structure as a source of decentralizing leverage. Ambiguity in lines of succession is not as marked as in the United States, but its equivalent seems to be supplied by control by the state leadership over nominations, both state and federal, and over the financing of campaigns. The influence which they can thus exercise over the composition and conduct of the parliamentary parties appears to warrant Overacker's characterization of them as "masters in their respective bailiwicks" and "lords of their own domain."[23]

Parliamentary discipline is less marked and decentralization is considerably more evident in the new Liberal Party, as in its predecessors, but its tendencies seem to be in the direction of a development similar to that of the A.L.P. The Country Party, clearly more a product of underlying social differences than of the structure of federalism itself, has never achieved a strong central organization.

At least in the case of the A.L.P. the contrasts with the American situation seem, as in Canada, to be more marked than the similarities. For this the parliament-cabinet system, with its partial reflection of British practices, is undoubtedly in part responsible. The importance of the individual national party leader is not as great as it has been in Canada, but, in the hands of a John Curtin, it is apparently possible so to use the machinery of party conference, caucus discipline, and the solidarity pledge as to offset state control of nominations.

But the chief significance of the Australian system for Americans is that matters of constitutional form are far less important than in Canada. The degree of discipline and of centralization which marks the A.L.P., and its rivals by partial adaptation, is fundamentally a reflection of underlying social conditions. Early land policies and patterns of settlement, imposed upon the peculiarities of Australian geography, and a course of economic development which restricted the emergence of a significant middle class and the dominance of middle-class values, resulted in the early appearance of a highly class-conscious labor movement unlike anything in the United States or Canada. Australian politics have been proportionally bitter and marked by lines of conflict drawn in class terms. Their significance is that these lines cut across geographic jurisdictions and minimize, even if they do not eliminate, the centrifugal effects of constitutional structure. These lines, moreover, are old, older than Australian federalism itself. As Overacker puts it, "Not only does the Australian Labor Party antedate federalism but in a sense it became a national party even before Australia was a nation."[24]

The Canadian and Australian experiences thus seem to indicate that, although the structural fact of federalism produces tendencies toward decentralization and lack of cohesion in the party system, a variety of other political or social influences may minimize the effect of such tendencies sufficiently to permit the development of a centralized power to govern consistent with the degree of underlying popular consensus. In the American case, apparently, these additional political and social facts have accentuated or at least perpetuated the centrifugal tendencies.

V

It seems clear that the structural fact of federalism is not alone sufficient to account for the peculiar characteristics of the American

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 319.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 30. For a comment on similar phenomena in interest-group organization, cf. Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

party system, though it may be fundamental. Additional influences must be identified and accounted for. Yet any effort to identify the additional forces in the American experience and to assess their relative importance is, in a sense, likely to be artificial. It sets the analyst to the unenviable task of cutting apart what is a seamless web of multivariant and interdependent factors with the prospect that he will end up with a set of separate elements whose chief significance lies in their interaction.

The foregoing discussion of Canada and Australia suggests the relevance of the separation of powers, the constitutional arrangement which seems to attract the attention of critics most easily. If the present analysis is sound, however, it is not the partial constitutional isolation of executive from legislative functions or the accompanying system of checks and balances that is of chief interest. Attempts to encourage or to develop means for improving communication and collaboration between the White House and the Congress are, in this context, essentially palliatives, though commendably constructive ones of considerable potential significance. It is the separate election of chief executives at both levels, and perhaps all three, which seems relevant here. Governors have often succeeded in imposing their leadership upon state legislators, and Presidents have with varying degrees of success bridged the long mile from Capitol Hill to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Nevertheless the separate election of chief executives has multiplied and thereby rendered ambiguous the lines of succession within the governmental structure, and ambiguity of this sort seems almost certain to encourage independence and parallelism in party structures rather than coherence and centralization. As long as Presidents may be recruited from Congress, from the governorship, or from the cabinet (as well as from outside of political life), and as long as men in any of these positions may reasonably aspire to any of the others, decentralization and lack of coherence are likely to appear in many subtle but significant ways. The hypothesis is rhetorical, but if gubernatorial aspirants could be recruited only from within the state legislature or only from among the principal executive positions and if presidents were drawn exclusively from the Senate, or, in Jeffersonian fashion, from the hierarchy of the cabinet, the reasons for independent and poorly articulated party structures would be reduced.

But if the separation of powers is relevant, it is not sufficient. Such elements of structure would not alone be controlling, particularly in face of the kinds of factors which originally produced a federal scheme and which give it vitality today. Looking broadly at such factors over the sweep of the years, one gets the impression that, with one great exception, our politics has been carried on at relatively low temperatures. Except for the conflicts leading up to the Civil War, the issues generally have been of moderate intensity or, when heated or persistent, have been considerably tempered by a timely improvement in prices or in the level of industrial and commercial activity. Operating in the context of a large domestic market and a rapidly expanding economy, unrestricted by the kinds of factors which stroked the fires of conflict in Australia, our politics has been occupied with parceling slices of a pie that has had a way of expanding when awkward choices were imminent, not only over the relative sizes of the portions, but over who might partake and who must go without. Until very recently, moreover, our controversies have been for the most part domestic.

Our domestic, low-temperature quarrels have taken full cognizance of the geographically defined diversities which are still a reality within the country. In fact, the system has frequently exaggerated them; in a viable polity, and the survival value of the American scheme need not be argued, cleavages along local or sectional lines are not likely to dominate the scene in the presence of intersecting issues of great significance, especially if the latter have their origin on the international plane. In the absence of such issues, and occasionally in default of a recognition of their import, Americans have been able to engage in locally or regionally based disputes which have not infrequently had the appearance of political luxury. The argument is not that all these geographically defined issues have been without substance, although some of them clearly have, but rather that their prominence is in part owing to the absence of more intense, intersecting issues and that collectively their impact on the party system has been decentralizing and disintegrative. These conditions, if this estimate is valid, may help account for tenden-

cies toward a decentralized politics within many of the states as well as in the nation as a whole.

In no respect is the quality of American politics, in contrast with Australian, more clearly indicated than in the labor movement. No substantial proportion of American wage earners has ever developed strong class attitudes. Given our characteristically uninhabited methods of settling and exploiting a rich and virgin continent, the steadily expanding economy, and the resulting high social mobility, the dominant values of the society have been "middle-class" and individualistic. So thoroughly have these values been accepted by the wage-earning population that the labor movement throughout its history has been haunted by the problem of cohesion. For this problem was dealt with in the organized sector of labor more by a reliance on differences within the working-class population than on cleavages between class groupings. From the "plain people" movements of the eighteen-sixties to the industrial unionism of the nineteen-thirties and nineteen-forties, American workers have been more likely to divide along sectional, commodity, even ethnic and religious lines — all essentially decentralized — than to consolidate along the shadowy boundary of social class. For good or ill, the American political system has not been faced with the intersecting issues churned up by a class-conscious labor movement.

A further consequence of the low-temperature, domestic quality of American politics is the high visibility of the organized interest groups which have developed around the lines of cleavage and specialization in a complex, industrialized society. Many of these are local or sectional only in a tactical sense, as noted earlier, but all of them are on occasion highly significant, in the absence of other sorts of controversies, as elements in the calculations surrounding the nomination function, even though they may not be overtly active in this respect. Moreover, even when, in partial consequences of their own characteristically federal structures, they have been rent by divisive controversy, their local or state components are no less likely to be influential in the facilitation or disruption of political careers and in the determination of legislative action at state and national levels.[25]

[25] See Truman, *op. cit.*, chaps. 2, 6, 10, and *passim*.

In this connection it is worth while to point out that a considerable element of localism has inevitably been injected into American politics, regardless of constitutional structure, by such factors as the patterns of immigration from Europe. Immigration itself has rarely provided a controversy of national scope, and nativist movements have been conspicuous on occasion but of no lasting significance. Ethnic issues as such, perhaps excluding the Negro question, have not had the impact on national politics that they have had, for example, in Canada. But with the tendency for individual nationality groupings to concentrate in particular areas, especially in the cities, and to find in their common rootlessness and frequently in the experience of discrimination and exploitation a basis in addition to national origin for cohesion and interdependence, they have constituted a means to power and influence for locally oriented political organizations outside and inside their own ranks.

It is these geographically defined factors, accentuated by a low-temperature, domestic politics, which give major force and relevance to the possibility of state control over the composition of the national governing bodies, through the electoral college and related means. . . . Structural elements in the system — some, it is argued here, inherent in federalism — alone encourage an irreducible minimum of decentralization and disruption in the party system. But it is as these reflect the underlying pace of the political process and as they are harnessed to regionally differentiated issues and clusters of organization that they find their most impelling dynamic.

As in other national systems, moreover, there are additional governmental arrangements which support and in some instances reflect the decentralizing tendencies apparent in the process as a whole. Not the least important of these is the practice of frequent elections specified by the calendar and the related constitutional provision for unequal terms of office. Decentralizing in intent, they have operated to accentuate localized concerns, especially in the midterm primaries and elections at the national level. But in a system in which any election may be relevant to all others in an area, whether they are held simultaneously or not, the very frequency of elections and campaigns can accentuate and exploit local and

transitory animosities and consolidate localized patterns of control. This point has never been more dramatically illustrated than it was in the tragic years leading up to the Civil War. During the decade of the eighteen-fifties "the baneful influence of elections almost continuously in progress, of campaigns never over,"[26] accentuated local and sectional hostilities. Aided by the fact that at that time elections to the Congress were not held at a uniform date throughout the nation, the upthrust of localism further crippled already imperfect efforts to forestall a fatal break. In Nichols' words, "The incessant procession of artificially ordered election conflicts frequently meant nothing more than the routine return of pleasurable electioneering excitement; but in the 1850's it had become dangerous." "It was," he points out, "harder for the statesman at the capital city to calm the emotions stirred in these countless local contests when their representatives brought them to Washington."[27]

The difference between this fateful decade and the more normal course of our politics is one of degree, the more so as a multiplicity of local elections may support a professionalized corps of politicians whose organized relationships within the area can be utilized to resist an effort at centralization.

A representative and significant response to such an effort is provided by the Hatch Act of 1939. Stimulated by Franklin Roosevelt's awkward and ill-fated attempt at a "purge" of rebellious Representatives and Senators in the Democratic primaries of 1938, a bipartisan combination in the Congress took steps to forestall the possibility that a centralized party leadership could be built upon presidential patronage, through the device of a statutory prohibition against political campaign activity by federal employees below the policy-forming level, whether they are in the classified civil service or not. This was an effort at insurance against an extremely remote contingency, since the requirement of senatorial confirmation and the practice of senatorial courtesy have made patronage a comparatively feeble instrument of centralized leadership except in the opening months of an Administration or for purposes of securing renomination for an incumbent President. It is impossible to estimate precisely the effects of this restriction or of the comparable provision in the 1940 legislation restricting the annual expenditures of national committees, but at minimum their enactment testifies to the strength of the decentralizing tendencies.

VI

In a federal system decentralization and lack of cohesion in the party system are based on the structural fact of federalism, but, it has been argued here, the degree to which these become the dominant characteristics of the distribution of power within the political parties is a function of a variety of other governmental and social factors which are independent of the federal structure or are merely supportive of its tendencies. Within the American structure there clearly are limits beyond which centralization and coherence in the parties may not go. Nevertheless, accepting the argument that the national political party is the most responsive instrument of restraint upon federalism's centrifugal tendencies, it may be appropriate briefly to inquire into the circumstances which might produce a gradual shift in the locus of power within the American parties.

It seems clear that the prospects for such a shift must rest fundamentally upon the emergence or intensification of a dominant and persistent set of interests and issues which will tend to cut through rather than to unify constituencies, especially the states, and which demand standardized national solutions. These would imply a more intense and urgent, perhaps a more explosive, politics; that would seem to be the price of change. Here is not the place to attempt a detailed examination of any such issues, but it seems entirely possible that their most likely source would lie in the problems of an increasingly urbanized and industrialized society, as Arthur Holcombe suggested more than twenty years ago in his anticipation of the replacement of sectional by class politics.[28] Another complex of such issues may emerge or may be in process of emerging out of the problems besetting the new American leadership on the international scene.

Neither of these complexes of issues appears

[26] Roy F. Nichols, *The Disruption of American Democracy*, New York, Macmillan, 1948, p. 515.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 7.

[28] Arthur N. Holcombe, *The New Party Politics*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1933.

to hold much promise of startling immediate developments within the party realm. In the unlikely event of an increasingly even industrialization of all the states, it is by no means certain that an expanding economy will not so check the importance of intersecting issues of full employment, social security, and the like, that the demands of commodity and of section will still be dominant. Nor in such circumstances is it at all sure that leadership forces will not prefer the occasional inconveniences of a decentralized politics to the less manageable potentialities of an opposite trend. And in the realm of foreign policy it is by no means clear that an emerging consensus on direction and general posture will not leave the center of the stage free for geographically defined issues of pace and of precise application.

These obstacles aside, the dominance of issues capable of dividing major constituencies internally presupposes their emergence or evocation in sections now monopolized by a single party and the development of a vigorous and genuine bipartisan pattern. This result is not likely to be the work of a single day and not only because of the stubborn disinclination of voters to alter partisan attachments once they have been formed, though this is a factor of no inconsiderable importance. Rather, as V. O. Key has amply demonstrated in his study of the South, a single-party monopoly based on the assertion or defense of a dominant sectional interest tends to inhibit the identification and expression of intersecting national issues. It induces a fluid factionalism along personal and clique lines incapable of the organization necessary to sustained expression of such issues from within and to effective response to their assertion from without.[29] Moreover, the purely political advantages of a one-party monopoly are considerable and not to be surrendered without resistance. Only the most intense conflict over persistent issues is likely to prevail over efforts by an invigorated majority party to capture the leadership of an emerging opposition and to hamstring its efforts with all the statutory and polemic resources at the command of an entrenched group.

The federal structure itself imposes no insuperable obstacles to a shift in the locus of power within the party system, but it seems improbable that the country will soon dispense with the talents of the politician skilled in the manipulation and reconciliation of decentralized and recalcitrant power blocs.

[29] Key, *Southern Politics*, chap. 14 and *passim*.

42

POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

• *JULIAN L. WOODWARD and ELMO ROPER*

The aim of this paper is to make a modest contribution toward improved understanding of how the political process actually operates in America. It reports the results of some research on individual citizen participation in political activity and describes a tool that may be used for classifying individuals in terms of the amount of political activity in which they engage. Finally it outlines some differences that are observed when attitudes with respect to some public personalities and issues held by the politically active portion of the citizenry are compared with attitudes of the politically inert.

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I. Measures of Political Activity

What was sought in the study was a method for segregating the people who are relatively active in relation to national political issues from those who are relatively inactive. Such a quest immediately involves a definition of what constitutes "political activity," or at least a procedure for arriving at a definition. The procedure followed was to write a large number of

questions, the answers to which would presumably throw light on an individual's political behavior, and then to try these questions out in personal interviews with a test national sample of American adults. Some of the questions were found not to work well in doorstep interviews, and were discarded. Others were found to yield results so closely intercorrelated that one question could in effect stand for several others. The list was finally boiled down to the questions shown in Table I. These questions may be said to measure the political activity of the respondent in five different channels of possible influence on legislators and government officials. These "channels" can be described as (1) voting at the polls, (2) supporting possible pressure groups by being a member of them, (3) personally communicating directly with legislators, (4) participating in political party activity and thus acquiring a claim on legislators and (5) engaging in habitual dissemination of political opinions through word-of-mouth communications to other citizens. Taken together, these five ways of behaving constitute an operational definition of the term "political activity."

No doubt most political scientists would make some additions to or subtractions from the list. Just as there are many different tests for intelligence made up of different component sub-tests, so there may be different tests for political activity. The only claims made for

TABLE I. *Questions Used in Setting Up the Political Activity Index*

*Question Number**	
1	Do you happen to belong to any organizations that sometimes take a stand on housing, better government, school problems, or other public issues? (If "yes") What organizations?
	* * *
2a	When you get together with your friends would you say that you discuss public issues like government regulation of business, labor unions, taxes, and farm programs frequently, occasionally, or never?
	and
2b	(If "frequently" or "occasionally") Which of the statements on this card best describes the part you yourself take in these discussions with your friends? (1) Even though I have my own opinions, I usually just listen. (2) Mostly I listen, but once in a while I express my opinions. (3) I take an equal share in the conversation. (4) I do more than just hold up my end in the conversation; I usually try to convince others that I am right.
	* * *
3	Have you ever written or talked to your Congressman or Senator or other public officials to let them know what you would like them to do on a public issue you were interested in?
	and
4	In the last four years have you worked for the election of any political candidate by doing things like distributing circulars or leaflets, making speeches, or calling on voters?
	* * *
5	Have you attended any meetings in the last four years at which political speeches were made?
	* * *
6	In the last four years have you contributed money to a political party or to a candidate for a political office?
	* * *
7	Probably you can't remember exactly, but about how many times do you think you have gone to the polls and voted during the last four years?

* The questions did not actually appear in this order in the interview questionnaire. They were intermixed with questions on personalities and issues.

this particular list of questions are (1) that it seems to have a good deal of "face validity" as a measure of citizen political activity, and (2) that it works well in a public opinion interview in the sense that the questions are comprehended and answered with apparently little exaggeration by people of all educational levels and political persuasions. With the political activity questions limited to six, room is left in the questionnaire for other topics. More complete coverage of different forms of political behavior would have been at the expense of possible questioning on issues, since the length of a doorstep interview is limited.

The political activity questions were first tested in a pilot study with a national sample of 500 respondents; then, after revision, the list was included in a questionnaire that was administered to a national cross-section sample of 8,000 respondents designed to be representative of the adult population of the United States. The first column in Table II indicates how the population reacted to the questions asked. It will be noted that only 13% of the sample claimed at least once in the past year to have written or talked to a Congressman or to other public officials to let them know what the respondent wanted done about a public issue, and only 11% reported that they had worked for the election of a political candidate during the past four years. Forty-seven per cent declared that they had voted at the polls at least three times in the last four years; 21% said they had voted five times or more in the same period. As we know from other studies, these figures inflate actual voting somewhat; and indeed all the percentages in the table are probably affected somewhat by the natural tendency of people to exaggerate their own activity a bit when they are queried by an interviewer. But even without allowing for inflation, the figures on political participation are so low as to give support to the conclusion that in America the few act politically for the many.

TABLE II. *Scoring System for Political Activity Index*

	% of total sample qualifying	*Score points credited*	*Total possible score for channel*
Voting			
Once or more in last four years	75	1	3
Three times or more	47	1	
Five times or more	21	1	
Discussing Public Issues with Others			
Discusses frequently and takes an equal share in the conversation	21	1	2
Discusses frequently and usually tries to convince others he is right	6	1	
Belonging to Organizations That Take Stands on Public Issues			
Belongs to one or more such organizations	31	1	2
Belongs to two or more	7	1	
Written or Talked to Congressman or Other Public Official to Give Own Opinion on a Public Issue			
One or more times in the past year	13	1	2
Two or more times in the past year	7	1	
Worked for Election of a Political Candidate in Last Four Years	11	2	2
Contributed Money to a Party or Candidate in Last Four Years	7	1	1
Total Possible Score			12

II. The Political Activity Index

While the individual questions stand by themselves as measures of different types of important political behavior, there is some advantage in combining them into a single index in order to give each respondent a single, overall political activity rating. As a preliminary to setting up such an index, each of the questions was cross-tabulated against every other, and the intercorrelation between each pair of questions was computed. It became clear from an inspection of the correlation pattern that all the questions were positively correlated with each other, indicating that some common factor (or factors) was measured to some degree by all of them. It was apparent also that none of the inter-correlations was so high as to lead to the conclusion that any two questions were measuring the same thing. With these conditions of partial but not perfect inter-correlation obtaining between all the different questions, a combination of the measures into a single "Index" seemed justified. The Political Activity Index, once constructed, would give a broader and yet better coordinated and more meaningful definition to the concept of political activity than would any of the individual measures taken separately.

Any combining of independent measures into a single "test" involves some sort of weighting among the elements that are combined. Table II shows the weights that were adopted in this study. These weights express a judgment as to the relative importance of the different "channels" through which political influence may be exercised, but they also take into account the relative frequencies with which people give the various possible answers on each question. The result is an index scoring system with a maximum possible score of twelve points for any single person. When all the respondents in the sample were assigned their proper scores in terms of the answers they gave to the six questions, a distribution of scores was obtained for the sample as a whole that is shown in Table III.

A glance at Table III shows a heavy skewing toward the lower end of the score-point distribution. Only 10% of the total adult population attain a score of six or better, and 73% cannot even make a score of four. The political inertness of the larger part of those eligible to vote is apparent. Twenty per cent have done none of the things that would give them a single credit on the Index; and one needs to have voted only once in the last four years, or to have been a member of one organization "that sometimes takes a stand on . . . public issues," in order to gain such a single credit.

TABLE III. *Distribution of Political Activity Scores*

Score of respondent	*% of total sample who make the score*	*Cumulative per cent*	
12	0.1%	0.1%	Very Active (10.3%)
11	0.3	0.4	
10	0.7	1.1	
9	1.2	2.3	
8	1.6	3.9	
7	2.4	6.3	
6	4.0	10.3	
5	6.5	16.8	Active (16.8%)
4	10.3	27.1	
3	15.6	42.7	Inactive (34.6%)
2	19.0	61.7	
1	19.1	80.8	Very Inactive (38.3%)
0	19.2	100.0	
	100.0		

The decision as to where to draw the line in marking off the so-called politically active group from the politically inert mass of the population is an entirely arbitrary one. What was done was to segregate the ten per cent of the population with the highest scores in a group described as "very active politically" while the 17% with the next highest scores were placed in a group termed "fairly active." When the two groups are combined for some tabulations, there results a grouping which comprises a little more than a quarter (27%) of the adult population and which is described simply as "politically active."

The rest of the distribution — the 73% of the sample with scores of less than four — is referred to in subsequent discussion as the group of "politically inactive." In some tabulations it is further sub-divided into the "fairly inactive" (the 35% of the total with scores of two or three) and the "very inactive" (the 38% with scores of zero or one).

TABLE IV. *Amount of Political Activity Exhibited by Various Sub-Groups in the Population*

	% within each sub-group who are politically			
	Very active	*Fairly active*	*Fairly inactive*	*Very inactive*
Sub-groups				
"A" economic level	36%	33%	23%	8%
Executives	34	29	28	9
Professional people	31	32	25	12
Stockholders	28	30	30	12
College educated	24	28	30	18
"B" economic level	24	26	34	16
Republicans	15	21	39	25
Men	13	19	36	32
People 50 years of age and over	12	17	34	37
People 35–49 years	11	19	39	31
"C" economic level	11	19	38	32
White people	11	17	36	36
Farmers	11	14	35	40
Independents in politics	10	21	37	32
Total adult population	10	17	35	38
People with only high school education	9	17	40	34
Democrats	9	15	37	39
Non-stockholders	8	15	37	40
Women	8	14	33	45
People 21–34 years of age	8	14	32	46
Laboring people	6	14	37	43
Housewives	6	14	34	46
People with only grade school education	5	11	33	51
Negroes	5	10	25	60
"D" economic level	3	9	31	57

III. WHO ARE THE POLITICALLY ACTIVE?

In what parts of the population will the highest incidence of politically active people be found? Table IV gives some answers to this question.

It will be noted, first, that the better educated and the more well-to-do are much more likely to be active than those less well-off or less educated. While this is no startling discovery the disparity is large enough to be worthy of some attention. Only 12% of the persons of "D" economic level are "politically active," as against 69% of the "A's"[1] A person with a college education is five times as likely to be "very active" as one with a grade school education only. These facts have important implications for the democratic process.

It must, of course, be remembered that while a much smaller percentage of "D's" than "A's" are politically active, the more numerous "D's" still contribute a considerable share of the total body of politically active people. The "very active" group is actually made up 13% of "A's," 23% of "B's," 54% of "C's," and 10% of "D's." It has an unusually high percentage of college people in it — but still less than half have had a college education.

The political composition of the "very active" group is also interesting. It contains a larger proportion of avowed Republicans than does the group of politically inactive (Table V). In fact, there are a few more Republicans in the "very active" group than there are avowed Democrats, in spite of the ratio of three Democrats to two Republicans found in the total national sample. It should be noted, however, that if the "very active" Independents are added to the "very active" Democrats, the two together constitute a clear majority over the "very active" Republicans.

[1] In the total sample 4% are "A" economic level, 10% are "B's," 52% are "C's," and 34% are "D's."

TABLE V. *Political Orientation of People with Different Political Activity Scores*

	Total sample	Political Activity			
		Very active	*Fairly active*	*Fairly inactive*	*Very inactive*
% Republicans	29	43	37	32	19
% Democrats	44	38	40	46	44
% Independent	16	16	20	18	14
% Other, Don't Know and No Answer	11	3	3	4	23

These facts about political distribution may explain how the Democrats manage to win elections (with the aid of the Independents and of the normally politically inactive but pro-Democratic masses who get aroused at election time), while the Republicans (by greater political activity between elections) keep the Democrats in office from carrying out many of their platform promises.

IV. Attitudes of the Politically Active Toward "National Figures" and Institutions

As a way of illustrating the uses to which the Political Activity Index may be put, we will report attitudes toward U.S. Senators, President Truman and the C.I.O., all cross-tabulated by political activity.

People were asked to name the U. S. Senator whose actions they usually *approve* of most and the ones whose actions they *disapprove* of most, and then were always asked the follow-up question "Why?" The results of this inquiry are shown in detail in Tables VI, VII, VIII, and IX, and may be summarized as follows:

(1) There is apparently a good deal of what might be called political illiteracy even among the politically "very active" group. About a third of the group were not prepared to name *any* U.S. Senator whose actions they usually

TABLE VI. *Senators Whose Actions People Say They Approve of Most*

	Politically very active people	*Politically very inactive people*	*All Republicans*	*All Democrats*	*All Independents*
Total respondents	830	3063	2329	3479	1308
	%	%	%	%	%
Didn't name any Senator	33	84	61	72	66
Named someone not a U.S. Senator	10	2	5	5	5
Most frequently mentioned Senators:					
Byrd (D)	7	1	4	1	3
Eastland (D)	1	*	*	1	*
Fulbright (D)	2	*	*	1	*
Humphrey (D)	3	*	1	1	2
Ives (R)	2	*	1	*	1
Johnson (D)	1	*	1	1	1
Lucas (D)	2	*	*	1	2
McClellan (D)	1	*	0	1	*
Morse (R)	3	*	2	1	1
Pepper (D)	2	*	*	1	1
Saltonstall (R)	1	*	1	*	1
Taft (R)	19	2	17	3	8
Vandenberg (R)	9	1	7	2	6

* Less than 0.5%.

TABLE VII. *Senators Whose Actions People Say They Disapprove of Most*

	Total sample	*Politically very active people*	*Politically very inactive people*	*All Republicans*	*All Democrats*	*All Independents*
Total respondents	8006	830	3063	2329	3479	1308
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Didn't name any Senator whose actions they usually disapprove of	81	51	90	79	81	75
Named someone not a U.S. Senator	4	10	2	4	4	5
Most frequently named Senators:						
Taft (R)	5	10	3	3	7	7
Pepper (D)	3	8	1	5	1	3
Hickenlooper (R)	1	1	*	1	1	1
Humphrey (D)	1	2	*	2	*	1
Taylor (D)	1	2	*	1	*	1

* Less than 0.5%.

approved, and about half could not or would not name a single Senator of whom they disapproved. Ten per cent of the very active who *did* name a Senator, either with approval or disapproval, named a person who was not at the time a U.S. Senator at all!

(2) There is little concentration on any single Senator or group of Senators as most approved or disapproved. Senator Taft emerges as the most controversial figure (19% approval, 10% disapproval among the "very active"). The only other Senators who get mentions from more than one per cent of the "very active" sample are, on the approval side, Senators Vandenberg, Byrd, Humphrey, Lucas and Morse; and on the disapproval side, Senators Pepper, Taylor and

TABLE VIII. *Why People Approve of the Senators They Do*

	Politically very active people	*Politically very inactive people*	*All Republicans*	*All Democrats*	*All Independents*
Number of respondents naming some U. S. Senator as one whose actions they usually approve of	506	335	822	847	378
	%	%	%	%	%
Reasons for approving:					
Like his personal characteristics	41	25	41	28	32
He's conservative	31	16	39	16	24
(For controlling labor, unions)	(15)	(9)	(24)	(6)	(11)
(For less government spending)	(10)	(6)	(11)	(7)	(9)
Like his stand on specific issues but no indication of stand	30	13	23	21	24
He's liberal	16	16	10	21	19
He works for local interests	8	14	6	14	6
Just like his policies	5	6	7	5	6
He's interested in welfare of farmers	6	5	3	8	3
He's a "middle of the road man"	2	1	1	1	1
Don't know	2	11	4	7	3

TABLE IX. *Why People Disapprove of the Senators They Do*

	Politically very active people	*Politically very inactive people*	*All Republicans*	*All Democrats*	*All Independents*
Number of respondents naming some U. S. Senator as one whose actions they usually disapprove of	344	187	401	561	265
	%	%	%	%	%
Reasons for disapproving:					
He's too conservative	25	37	17	38	37
(Anti-labor, anti-union)	(11)	(17)	(5)	(20)	(14)
(All against the little fellow and for big business)	(5)	(8)	(4)	(9)	(8)
(Against civil rights, anti-Negro)	(8)	(8)	(6)	(6)	(8)
He's too liberal	25	13	32	12	14
(Socialistic, radical)	(15)	(11)	(18)	(8)	(8)
(Backs too many social reforms)	(5)	(2)	(9)	(2)	(3)
(For too much government spending)	(4)	*	(7)	(1)	(2)
(Too partial to labor)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(1)
Don't like his personal characteristics	34	28	41	24	31
Don't like his policies (non-specific)	13	14	8	21	14

* Less than 0.5%.

Humphrey. Judged by the number of mentions, the Republicans seem to have more "national figures" among their corps of Senators than do the Democrats, if the term "national figure" is used to describe someone whom a lot of people either look up to or frown upon.

(3) The major reasons given, even by the "very active," for approving or disapproving of Senators tend to have more to do with the Senators' presumed personal characteristics than with their stands on public issues. It is obvious from reading the replies that many people were hard put to it to give any reason at all for their feeling about Senator X, except that they "liked him" or "disliked him." Among the "very active" people who *did* list some concrete policy of the Senator that they approved or disapproved, there was some tendency to approve more often for what might be called "conservative" policies than for "liberal" ones. (This conclusion results from assigning all the classifiable answers to one or the other category.) On the disapproval side the conservative-liberal debate showed no clear leaning in either direction. All of these tendencies are consistent with the picture of the "very active" group that was outlined earlier.

(4) The avowed Independents in politics seem to lean more toward Democratic "liberalism" than toward Republican "conservatism" when they record their critical reactions to Senators, and the same is true to a somewhat lesser extent when they record their reasons for approving senatorial behavior.

A device known as an "adjective test" was used for measuring attitudes toward President Truman and toward the C.I.O. The respondent was presented with a card on which a list of words and short phrases was printed and was then asked to "pick out the three or four" which "best describe the way you feel about President Truman." Subsequently he was asked to pick out words that described the way he felt about the C.I.O. Results of this questioning are shown in Tables X and XI. It should be noted that, while in the tables the words are classified as "favorable" or "unfavorable," there were no such labels on the card handed the respondent. The list he saw had the "favorable" and "unfavorable" words well scrambled. In accord-

ance with the standard procedure, one-half the sample were presented with a card listing the words in one order, while for the other half of the sample the word order was reversed.

The reactions of the politically "very active" to President Truman are somewhat mixed. Those who like him seem to "respect" him more often than they "admire" him, and "admire" him more often than they "have confidence in" him. Those who are negative toward the President seem to "*lack* confidence in" him more often than they "disapprove of" him; and he is apparently a man who rarely inspires "fear," "dislike," or "distrust."

Democrats and Republicans naturally use pro and con words in quite different ratio to describe their reactions to the President, but the particular words they choose tend to fall into the pattern outlined above. Harry Truman is a man whom people can "respect" (perhaps because of his office or his courage) more easily than they can "admire" or "have confidence in" him; he is a man who inspires lack of confidence in many, but he is not one whom many distrust or dislike. One regrets that we do not have a similar word profile for Franklin D. Roosevelt as a sort of standard against which to measure Truman.

The C.I.O. arouses an entirely different response pattern, and one that is, in the main, strongly negative. Not even the Democrats have any great enthusiasm for it, and to "admit need for" it is as far as many of them will go. The Independents are more willing to admit the need for an organization such as the C.I.O., but otherwise are as negative as the Democrats. Americans seldom use the word "fear" in relation to an institution, and it is consequently surprising that almost a quarter of the most politically active people use this word in describing their reactions to the C.I.O.

V. Political Activity and Political Influence

So far the Index has been presented only as a measure for segregating a "top tenth" of the population that probably is on the average more

TABLE X. *Words Picked from a List to Describe How Respondent Feels about President Truman*

	Politically very active people	*Politically very inactive people*	*All Republicans*	*All Democrats*	*All Independents*
	%	%	%	%	%
Favorable Words:					
Admire	25	29	16	41	25
Respect	36	44	31	56	44
Have confidence in	22	34	16	46	27
Approve	21	34	16	44	27
Admit need for	7	6	6	8	8
Neutral (indifferent to)	1	3	2	1	3
Unfavorable Words:					
Disapprove	36	11	35	11	19
Lack confidence in	52	17	53	19	35
Dislike	18	5	17	5	9
Distrust	23	4	17	6	9
Fear	11	2	9	3	5
Only Favorable Words	35	55	29	69	47
Only Unfavorable Words	48	16	50	14	29
Both Favorable and Unfavorable Words	13	7	13	9	13
Indifferent to	1	3	2	2	3

TABLE XI. *Words Picked from a List to Describe How Respondent Feels about the C.I.O.*

	Politically very active people	*Politically very inactive people*	*All Republicans*	*All Democrats*	*All Independents*
	%	%	%	%	%
Favorable Words:					
Admire	6	4	3	7	4
Respect	9	7	6	10	9
Have confidence in	9	8	5	11	11
Approve	13	14	9	18	17
Admit need for	27	14	19	21	28
Neutral (indifferent to)	4	5	5	6	4
Unfavorable Words:					
Disapprove of	34	17	34	23	25
Lack confidence in	27	12	22	16	19
Dislike	31	14	29	19	19
Distrust	34	12	28	18	19
Fear	23	7	20	10	13
Only Favorable Words	23	20	16	26	27
Only Unfavorable Words	48	25	49	32	34
Both Favorable and Unfavorable Words	16	5	12	9	13
Indifferent to	4	5	5	6	4

active politically than the other nine tenths. It has not been maintained that the "top tenth" are actually the most influential group of people in determining the course of political events.

Whether "more active" also means "more influential" is a difficult question to answer, since the political scientist's model picturing how influence is exerted in the American democracy seems to be far from complete. Certainly there is a close relation between political activity (as defined above) and political influence, but it is difficult to ascertain just how close the relation is. It may well be that only the top fiftieth, instead of the top tenth, in the population (i.e., the two million people with the highest activity scores) can be properly described as "influentials" in any realistic sense. And it is of course also possible that the kinds of activity covered in the Index are not good measures of political *influence* at all and that some other approach, placing greater stress on the offices held or the roles played in relation to organized pressure groups, might be more fruitful. No final answer can be given here until there is available a much clearer picture of the mental processes of the legislator or government administrator when he decides how to vote or act on a measure that is before him. What weighting does the average legislator assign to the different influences that play upon him in a given situation, and what is the average impact to any particular influence over a series of situations? In the long run, is it the legislator's daily mail from politically active citizens, the calls he gets from lobbyists, the advice from the party organization, the fear of what citizens may do next election day, or his own philosophy that gets heaviest weight in his average decision? Until political scientists can put the daily thought processes of a sample of legislators under the microscope, there will be no complete or final answers to these questions. . . .

6

Comparative Politics

When the political scientist uses the term *comparative politics* he usually is referring to studies of nations other than the United States. Similarities and differences between political practices here and abroad, or between two or more foreign countries, are the major concern of comparative research. In principle, equally interesting comparisons can be made among political institutions within a single country. Foreign travel and exotic information are not necessary. The method of comparison — the search for regularities through the matching and contrasting of observations — is much more universal than that.

But students of politics have for many years out of curiosity applied the comparative method primarily to the study of foreign countries. Curiosity has been reinforced by the fact that policy-makers have needed information about the political and social structure of other nations in order to make intelligent decisions. Equally important is the insight one gains into one's own political system by understanding how a foreign one works.

The dimensions along which comparative studies have been made are too numerous for comprehensive coverage here. We have chosen, therefore, to present readings about two themes that have excited special interest since 1950: the social and political prerequisites of democracy and interest group behavior. These themes are linked intimately since one of the significant formal properties of a democratic political system is decision-making that is in some sense open and responsive to the wishes of the various interest groups that make up the society. An understanding of the range and variety of groups that contend for political recognition, their strategies, and the processes by which the preferences of these groups are incorporated into governmental policy cannot be built upon knowledge of patterns in one's own country alone. And so we look abroad to the characteristic patterns of other nations.

What determines differences in the kinds of political groupings, their strategies and impacts across a number of national societies? One determinant may be the extent to which political skills are diffused or concentrated within the population. The greater the diffusion, we suggest, the more likely it is that the regime will be democratic.

Seymour Martin Lipset and Phillips Cutright both address this question by examining social and economic data that have been collected for a series of modern nation-states. Each finds that the democratic nation invariably seems to be one in which economic development is advanced, and formal education widespread. The relative availability of economic goods and services, high levels of communication, transportation and formal education are obviously necessary prerequisites for the diffusion of political skills. As Cutright shows, level of political development usually varies with the level of national social and economic development.

More is involved in the evolution of democratic politics than is explained by social and economic conditions, however. By looking at level of political development in relation to these conditions, Cutright is able to identify those countries that deviate most extremely from the level one would expect them to be at, given their social and economic situation. The comparative approach thus offers a model from which predictions of change, political or social and economic or both, may be made. Our attention may also focus on these "deviant cases" in order to develop cultural and historical explanations of their relatively unique political situation.

The economic and social correlates of democracy are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the existence of democratic politics. Lipset reminds us that there is no guarantee that national resources will automatically be used for purposes of democratic political development. In his remarks about the political history of modern Germany, Lipset emphasizes that for a society to be democratic, it is also necessary for there to be a relatively great diffusion of political legitimacy. Widely accepted procedures through which nonleaders can exert control over leaders must exist and endure. The importance of these mechanisms is reflected in Cutright's Index of Political Development, which gives points for the existence of a parliament composed of representatives of more than one party and takes away points where parliaments are dissolved and not recomposed later. In other words, there are formal ingredients in national political structures that embody the idea of legitimacy, and which suggest possibilities for measuring the extent to which legitimacy is diffused in the political system. Other such mechanisms might entail procedures for petitioning the government for redress of grievances, widespread distribution of the vote, and internal governmental checks and balances.

Our readings show that an impressive variety of controls over leaders by nonleaders facilitate democratic politics and that these controls need not be limited to the mechanisms that evolved in the British and American systems. It is apparently not necessary for a stable, viable democratic regime to emulate these models. Moreover, these models are contradictory. England, for example, violates the Madisonian axiom that the accumulation of all powers — legislative, executive, and judicial — in the same hands, will lead to tyranny.

The systems of other nations challenge the common assumption that a competitive two-party system, with frequent alternation in office, is necessary for democratic politics. Surprisingly effective multi-party systems in the Scandinavian countries and in Canada suggest that it would be foolish to assume that the difficulties of the French Fourth Republic arose solely as the result of a multi-party system. Herbert Tingsten explores this point in his paper on Swedish politics. Effective single-party systems may, under certain circumstances, operate so that democratic controls over

leaders by nonleaders are preserved. Amitai Etzioni is persuasive in arguing that this is the case in Israel, and similar patterns may be developed in India and Mexico. Etzioni notes that the Mapai party has not been out of power since the establishment of modern Israel. Indeed, the Mapai has become an "institutionalized" party, according to Etzioni, which, by forming appropriate coalitions — and thus a regime that follows the election returns — insures a stable democracy without replacement of the Mapai majority.

What, then, are the functions of political parties in preserving or promoting democracy? The American experience leads us to attend to the feature of electoral competition: the party that is out of office provides a realistic and legitimate alternative in the event that the party in office proves unresponsive to the demands of a majority of citizens. The perennial existence of this alternative, and the uncertainties that smoulder in the breast of any politician about the possible consequences of any political act, serve to keep the party in power more responsive than they otherwise might be to demands of interest groups representing at least a substantial number of minorities in the electorate. This view of party functions seems particularly suited to a society where party membership is less a formal commitment to an organization and more a matter of psychological identification during election campaigns.

In societies where mass parties customarily enroll members in a more formal way, the possibility presents itself that parties can also act as institutions which educate their memberships politically, and which build loyalty not only to the party but to the political system within which the party is embedded — thus contributing to the stability of the political system. Mass parties may also promote democracy by encouraging and guiding political participation and civic education, as Leon D. Epstein's study of Great Britain and Ruth Schachter's report on West Africa demonstrate. Mass membership parties also often facilitate communication between leaders and nonleaders who are dependent on one another and hence eager to bargain. Schachter finds that under conditions of general illiteracy, severe poverty, and profound ethnic cleavages, mass party systems appear to be the best hope for democracy — a conclusion that contradicts the common impression of nationalist mass parties as primarily agencies for revolution. Where national governmental institutions are not yet established, single mass parties, if they have considerable popular support, may precede and for a time substitute for them.

A significant function for parties, then, is to act as a vehicle for interest group activity. In the early stages of statehood, parties are often the indispensable carriers of national symbols, interest, political mobilization and activity. As a political community develops, parties help generate other interest groups and supply a means for existing ones to relate to governmental policy making. This is very much like their primary function in economically advanced democracies.

Comparative research reveals, however, that this functional pattern is *not* confined to emerging regimes and established democracies. John A. Armstrong's analysis of domestic politics in the Soviet Union indicates that even in a regime with totalitarian as opposed to democratic characteristics, factional struggle through the single legitimate party is common.

The differences between interest groups in democratic and undemocratic settings

are not primarily to be found in variations in the ubiquity or intensity of interest group activity, but in the style of these activities and in the legitimacy which the regime gives to them. Because many types of interest group activity are illegitimate in the Soviet Union, Russian interest groups often adopt quite different strategies. They are driven underground, so to speak, where they operate at increased risk, but also at considerable cost to the regime. Joseph Berliner's discussion of "storming" in the Russian factory illustrates this pattern.

To provide a brief contrast to interest group activity as described for the Soviet Union by Armstrong and Berliner, Joseph LaPalombara's observations on the activities of the Confindustria of Italy conclude the chapter. Italy is described as an extremely fragmented society, in contrast to the politically unified Soviet Union. Where in Russia interest group activity is covert and illegitimate, in Italy it is overt and even formally incorporated into governmental advisory routines. But, in spite of a myth to the contrary, the Confindustria failed in achieving its policy objectives, according to LaPalombara.

We may infer that political legitimacy does not guarantee success in influencing policy outcomes. Legitimacy only guarantees an interest group access to the policy-making process. From one point of view this may be seen as a source of stability for the political system. In democratic regimes, for example, governmental officials are better able to assess the risks they are taking by not incorporating interest group preferences into policy *if* they are aware of the nature of these preferences. Thus the fact that interest groups are active in pressing their claims on the government, and are regarded as engaged in appropriate efforts, need not prevent a regime from adopting policies that reject decisively the policies proposed by interest groups. Governments that do not learn to gauge interest group concerns, however, may have difficulty avoiding the inadvertent incorporation of special interest preferences into policy. Such regimes may also pay unexpected costs for failing to include special interest policies.

Comparative studies thus provide especially rich knowledge about the social and economic conditions under which different types of political systems are most likely to develop. They may supply a way to predict changes, both revolutionary and incremental, that should occur within particular nations in the future. Equally important, comparative research broadens our conceptions of the multiple ways in which very similar outcomes of political behavior result from diverse structures and culturally varied forms of activity.

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SOME SOCIAL REQUISITES OF DEMOCRACY

Economic Development and Political Legitimacy[1]

• SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

The conditions associated with the existence and stability of democratic society have been a leading concern of political philosophy. In this paper the problem is attacked from a sociological and behavioral standpoint, by presenting a number of hypotheses concerning some social requisites for democracy, and by discussing some of the data available to test these hypotheses. In its concern with conditions — values, social institutions, historical events — external to the political system itself which sustain different general types of political systems, the paper moves outside the generally recognized province of political sociology. This growing field has dealt largely with the internal analysis of organizations with political goals, or with the determinants of action *within* various political institutions, such as parties, government agencies, or the electoral process.[2] It has in the main left to the political philosopher the larger concern with the relations of the total political system to society as a whole.

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[2] See my "Political Sociology, 1945–55," in Hans L. Zetterberg, ed., *Sociology in the USA* (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), pp. 45–55, for a summary of the various areas covered by political sociology. For a discussion of intellectual trends in political sociology and the rationale underlying a focus on the problem of democracy, see my "Political Sociology," in R. K. Merton, *et al.*, eds., *Sociology Today* (New York: Basic Books, 1959), ch. 3.

I. Introduction

A sociological analysis of any pattern of behavior, whether referring to a small or a large social system, must result in specific hypotheses, empirically testable statements. Thus, in dealing with democracy, one must be able to point to a set of conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries, and say: democracy has emerged out of these conditions, and has become stabilized because of certain supporting institutions and values, as well as because of its own internal self-maintaining processes. The conditions listed must be ones which differentiate most democratic states from most others.

A recent discussion by a group of political theorists on the "cultural prerequisites to a successfully functioning democracy" points up the difference between the approach of the political sociologist and the political philosopher to a comparable problem.[3] A considerable portion of this symposium is devoted to a debate concerning the contribution of religion, particularly Christian ethics, toward democratic attitudes. The principal author, Ernest Griffith, sees a necessary connection between the Judeo-Christian heritage and attitudes which sustain democratic institutions; the other participants stress the political and economic conditions which may provide the basis for a consensus on basic values which does not depend on religion; and they point to the depression, poverty, and social disorganization which resulted in fascism in Italy and Germany, in spite of strongly religious populations and traditions. What is most

[3] Ernest S. Griffith, John Plamenatz, and J. Roland Pennock, "Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium," this *Review*, Vol. 50 (1956), pp. 101–137.

striking about this discussion is its lack of a perspective which assumes that theoretical propositions must be subject to test by a systematic comparison of *all* available cases, and which treats a deviant case properly as one case out of many. In this symposium, on the contrary, deviant cases which do not fit a given proposition are cited to demonstrate that there are *no* social conditions which are regularly associated with a given complex political system. So the conflicts among political philosophers about the necessary conditions underlying given political systems often lead to a triumphant demonstration that a given situation clearly violates the thesis of one's opponent, much as if the existence of some wealthy socialists, or poor conservatives, demonstrated that economic factors were not an important determinant of political preference.

The advantage of an attempt such as is presented here, which seeks to dissect the conditions of democracy into several interrelated variables, is that deviant cases fall into proper perspective. The statistical preponderance of evidence supporting the relationship of a variable such as education to democracy indicates that the existence of deviant cases (such as Germany, which succumbed to dictatorship in spite of an advanced educational system) cannot be the sole basis for rejecting the hypothesis. A deviant case, considered within a context which marshals the evidence on all relevant cases, often may actually strengthen the basic hypothesis if an intensive study of it reveals the special conditions which prevented the usual relationship from appearing.[4] Thus, electoral research indicates that a large proportion of the more economically well-to-do leftists are underprivileged along other dimensions of social status, such as ethnic or religious position.

Controversy in this area stems not only from variations in methodology, but also from use of different definitions. Clearly in order to discuss democracy, or any other phenomenon, it is first necessary to define it. For the purposes of this paper, democracy (in a complex society) is defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest to choose among alternative contenders for political office. In large measure abstracted from the work of Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber,[5] this definition implies a number of specific conditions: (a) "political formula," a system of beliefs, legitimizing the democratic system and specifying the institutions — parties, a free press, and so forth — which are legitimized, i.e., accepted as proper by all; (b) one set of political leaders in office; and (c) one or more sets of leaders, out of office, who act as a legitimate opposition attempting to gain office.

The need for these conditions is clear. *First*, if a political system is not characterized by a value system allowing the peaceful "play" of power — the adherence by the "outs" to decisions made by "ins" and the recognition by "ins" of the rights of the "outs" — there can be no stable democracy. This has been the problem faced by many Latin American states. *Second*, if the outcome of the political game is not the periodic awarding of effective authority to one group, a party or stable coalition, then unstable and irresponsible government rather than democracy will result. This state of affairs existed in pre-Fascist Italy, and for much, though not all of the history of the Third and Fourth French Republics, which were characterized by weak coalition governments, often formed among parties which had major interest

[4] A detailed example of how a deviant case and analysis advances theory may be found in S. M. Lipset, M. Trow, and J. Coleman, *Union Democracy*, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956). This book is a study of the political process inside the International Typographical Union, which has a long-term two-party system with free elections and frequent turnover in office, and is thus the clearest exception to Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy." The research, however, was not intended as a report on this union, but rather as the best means available to test and amplify Michels' "law." The study could only have been made through a systematic effort to establish a basic theory and derive hypotheses. The best way to add to knowledge about the internal government of voluntary associations seemed to be to study the most deviant case. In the process of examining the particular historical and structural conditions sustaining the two-party system in the ITU, the general theory was clarified.

[5] Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), pp. 232–302, esp. 269; Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 226.

and value conflicts with each other. *Third*, if the conditions facilitating the perpetuation of an effective opposition do not exist, then the authority of officials will be maximized, and popular influence on policy will be at a minimum. This is the situation in all one-party states; and by general agreement, at least in the West, these are dictatorships.

Two principal complex characteristics of social systems will be considered here as they bear on the problem of stable democracy: economic development and legitimacy. These will be presented as structural characteristics of a society which sustain a democratic political system. After a discussion of the economic development complex (comprising industrialization, wealth, urbanization, and education) and its consequences for democracy, we shall move to two aspects of the problem of legitimacy, or the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves, and considered right and proper. The relations between legitimacy and the effectiveness of the system (the latter primarily a function of economic development) will be followed by a discussion of the sources of cleavage in a society and the ways in which various resolutions of historically crucial issues result either in disruptive forms of cleavage or in cross-cutting affiliations which reduce conflict to a manageable level. Finally, the bearing of these various factors upon the future of democracy will be assessed.

No detailed examination of the political history of individual countries will be undertaken in accordance with the generic definition, since the relative degree or social content of democracy in different countries is not the real problem of this paper. Certain problems of method in the handling of relationships between complex characteristics of total societies do merit brief discussion, however.

An extremely high correlation between aspects of social structure, such as income, education, religion, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other, is not to be anticipated even on the theoretical grounds, because to the extent that the political sub-system of the society operates autonomously, a particular political form may persist under conditions normally adverse to the *emergence* of that form. Or, a political form may develop because of a syndrome of fairly unique historical factors, even though major social characteristics favor another form. Germany is an example of a nation in which the structural changes — growing industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education — all favored the establishment of a democratic system, but in which a series of adverse historical events prevented democracy from securing legitimacy in the eyes of many important segments of society, and thus weakened German democracy's ability to withstand crisis.

The high correlations which appear in the data to be presented between democracy and other institutional characteristics of societies must not be overly stressed, since unique events may account for *either* the persistence *or* the failure of democracy in any particular society. Max Weber argued strongly that differences in national patterns often reflect key historical events which set one process in motion in one country, and a second process in another. To illustrate his point, he used the analogy of a dice game in which each time the dice came up with a certain number they were increasingly loaded in the direction of coming up with that number again.[6] To Weber, an event predisposing a country toward democracy sets a process in motion which increases the likelihood that at the next critical point in the country's history democracy will win out again. This process can only have meaning if we assume that once established, a democratic political system gathers some momentum and creates some social supports (institutions) to ensure its continued existence. Thus a "premature" democracy which survives will do so by (among other things) facilitating the growth of other conditions conducive to democracy, such as universal literacy, or autonomous private associations. This paper is primarily concerned with explicating the social conditions which serve to *support* a democratic political system, such as education or legitimacy; it will not deal in detail with the kinds of internal mechanisms which serve to *maintain* democratic systems such as the specific rules of the political game.[7]

[6] Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 182–185; see also S. M. Lipset, "A Sociologist Looks at History," *Pacific Sociological Review*, Vol. 1 (Spring 1958), pp. 13–17.

[7] See Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, *Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent*, Michigan Governmental Studies, no. 32 (Bureau of Gov-

Comparative generalizations dealing with complex social systems must necessarily deal rather summarily with particular historical features of any one society within the scope of the investigation. In order to test these generalizations bearing on the differences between countries which rank high or low in possession of the attributes associated with democracy, it is necessary to establish some empirical measures of the type of political system. Individual deviations from a particular aspect of democracy are not too important, as long as the definitions unambiguously cover the great majority of nations which are located as democratic or undemocratic. The precise dividing line between "more democratic" and "less democratic" is also not a basic problem, since presumably democracy is *not* a quality of a social system which either does or does not exist, but is rather a complex of characteristics which may be ranked in many different ways. For this reason it was decided to divide the countries under consideration into two groups, rather than to attempt to rank them from highest to lowest. Ranking *individual* countries from the most to the least democratic is much more difficult than splitting the countries into two classes, "more" or "less" democratic, although even here borderline cases such as Mexico pose problems.

Efforts to classify all countries raise a number of problems. Most countries which lack an enduring tradition of political democracy lie in the traditionally underdeveloped sections of the world. It is possible that Max Weber was right when he suggested that modern democracy in its clearest forms can only occur under the unique conditions of capitalist industrialization.[8] Some of the complications introduced by the sharp variations in political practices in different parts of the earth can be reduced by dealing with differences among countries within political culture areas. The two best areas for such internal comparison are Latin America as one, and Europe and the English-speaking countries as the other. More limited comparisons may be made among the Asian states and among the Arab countries.

The main criteria used in this paper to locate European democracies are the uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since World War I, *and* the absence over the past 25 years of a major political movement opposed to the democratic "rules of the game."[9] The somewhat less stringent criterion employed for Latin America is whether a given country has had a history of more or less free elections for most of the post-World War I period. Where in Europe we look for stable democracies, in South America we look for countries which have not had fairly constant dictatorial rule (See Table I). No detailed analysis of the political history of either Europe or Latin America has been made with an eye toward more specific criteria of differentiation; at this point in the examination of the requisites of democracy, election results are sufficient to locate the European countries, and the judgments of experts and impressionistic assessments based on fairly well-known facts of political history will suffice for Latin America.[10]

II. Economic Development and Democracy

Perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. Concretely,

ernment, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1956), and Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), esp. pp. 90–123, for recent systematic efforts to specify some of the internal mechanisms of democracy. See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, Vol. 9 (1957), pp. 383–400, for discussion of problems of internal analysis of political systems.

[8] See Max Weber, "Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Russland," *Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 22 (1906), pp. 346 ff.

[9] The latter requirement means that no totalitarian movement, either Fascist or Communist, received 20 per cent of the vote during this time. Actually all the European nations falling on the democratic side of the continuum had totalitarian movements which secured less than seven per cent of the vote.

[10] The historian Arthur P. Whitaker, for example, has summarized the judgments of experts on Latin America to be that "the countries which have approximated most closely to the democratic ideal have been . . . Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay." See "The Pathology of Democracy in Latin America: A Historian's Point of View," this *Review*, Vol. 44 (1950), pp. 101–118. To this group I have added Mexico. Mexico

TABLE I. *Classification of European, English-speaking and Latin American Nations by Degree of Stable Democracy*

European and English-speaking Nations		*Latin American Nations*	
Stable Democracies	Unstable Democracies and Dictatorships	Democracies and Unstable Dictatorships	Stable Dictatorships
Australia	Austria	Argentina	Bolivia
Belgium	Bulgaria	Brazil	Cuba
Canada	Czechoslovakia	Chile	Dominican Republic
Denmark	Finland	Colombia	Ecuador
Ireland	France	Costa Rica	El Salvador
Luxemburg	Germany (West)	Mexico	Guatemala
Netherlands	Greece	Uruguay	Haiti
New Zealand	Hungary		Honduras
Norway	Iceland		Nicaragua
Sweden	Italy		Panama
Switzerland	Poland		Paraguay
United Kingdom	Portugal		Peru
United States	Rumania		Venezuela
	Spain		
	Yugoslavia		

this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy. From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues. A society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or in tyranny (popularly based dictatorship). And these two political forms can be given modern labels: tyranny's modern face is Communism or Peronism; oligarchy appears today in the form of traditionalist dictatorships such as we find in parts of Latin America, Thailand, Spain, or Portugal.

As a means of concretely testing this hypothesis, various indices of economic development — wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education — have been defined and averages (means) have been computed for the countries which have been classified as more or less democratic in the Anglo-Saxon world and Europe and Latin America.

In each case, the average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries, as the data presented in Table II indicate. If we had combined Latin America and Europe in one table, the differences would have been greater.[11]

has allowed freedom of the press, of assembly and of organization, to opposition parties, although there is good evidence that it does not allow them the opportunity to win election, since ballots are counted by the incumbents. The existence of opposition groups, contested elections, and adjustments among the various factions of the governing *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* does introduce a considerable element of popular influence in the system.

The interesting effort of Russell Fitzgibbon to secure a "statistical evaluation of Latin American democracy" based on the opinion of various experts is not useful for the purposes of this paper. The judges were asked not only to rank countries as democratic on the basis of purely political criteria, but also to consider the "standard of living" and "educational level." These latter factors may be conditions for democracy, but they are not an aspect of democracy as such, See Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "A Statistical Evaluation of Latin American Democracy," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 9 (1956), pp. 607–619.

[11] Lyle W. Shannon has correlated indices of economic development with whether a country is self-governing or not, and his conclusions are substantially the same. Since Shannon does not give details on the countries categorized as self-governing and non-self-governing, there is no di-

The main indices of *wealth* used here are per capita income, number of persons per motor vehicle and per physician, and the number of radios, telephones, and newspapers per thousand persons. The differences are striking on every score, as Table II indicates in detail. In the more democratic European countries, there are 17 persons per motor vehicle compared to 143 for the less democratic countries. In the less dictatorial Latin American countries there are 99 persons per motor vehicle, as against 274 for the more dictatorial ones.[12] Income differences for the groups are also sharp, dropping from an average per capita income of $695 for the more democratic countries of Europe to $308 for the less democratic ones; the corresponding difference for Latin America is from $171 to $119. The ranges are equally consistent, with the lowest per capita income in each group falling in the "less democratic" category, and the highest in the "more democratic" one.

Industrialization — indices of wealth are clearly related to this, of course — is measured by the percentage of employed males in agriculture, and the per capita commercially produced "energy" being used in the country, measured in terms of tons of coal per person per year. Both of these indices show equally consistent results. The average percentage of employed males working in agriculture and related occupations was 21 in the "more democratic" European countries, and 41 in the "less democratic," 52 in the "less dictatorial" Latin American countries, and 67 in the "more dictatorial." The differences in per capita energy employed in the country are equally large.

The degree of urbanization is also related to the existence of democracy.[13] Three different indices of urbanization are available from data compiled by International Urban Research (Berkeley, California), the percentage of the population in places of 20,000 and over, the percentage in communities of 100,000 and over, and also the percentage residing in standard metropolitan areas. On all three of these indices of urbanization, the more democratic countries score higher than the less democratic, for both of the political culture areas under investigation.

Many have suggested that the better edu-

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rect measure of the relation between "democratic" and "self-governing" countries. All the countries examined in this paper, however, were chosen on the assumption that a characterization as "democratic" is meaningless for a non-self governing country, and therefore, presumably, all of them, whether democratic or dictatorial, would fall within Shannon's "self-governing" category. Shannon shows that underdevelopment is related to lack of self-government; my data indicate that once self-government is attained, development is still related to the character of the political system. See Shannon, ed., *Underdeveloped Areas* (New York: Harper, 1957), and also his article, "Is Level of Government Related to Capacity for Self-Government?" *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 17 (1958), pp. 367–382. In the latter paper, Shannon constructs a composite index of development, using some of the same United Nations sources, as appear in the tables to follow. Shannon's work did not come to my attention until after this paper was prepared, so that the two papers can be considered as separate tests of comparable hypotheses.

[12] It must be remembered that these figures are means, compiled from census figures for the various countries. The data vary widely in accuracy, and there is no way of measuring the validity of compound calculated figures such as those presented here. The consistent direction of all these differences, and their large magnitude, is the main indication of validity.

[13] Urbanization has often been linked to democracy by political theorists. Harold J. Laski asserted that "organized democracy is the product of urban life," and that it was natural therefore that it should have "made its first effective appearance" in the Greek city states, limited as was their definition of "citizen." See his article "Democracy" in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1937), Vol. V, pp. 76–85. Max Weber held that the city, as a certain type of political community, is a peculiarly Western phenomenon, and traced the emergence of the notion of "citizenship" from social developments closely related to urbanization. For a partial statement of his point of view, see the chapter on "Citizenship," in *General Economic History* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 315–338. It is significant to note that before 1933 the Nazi electoral strength was greatest in small communities and rural areas. Berlin, the only German city of over two million, never gave the Nazis over 25 per cent of the vote in a free election. The modal Nazi, like the modal French Poujadist or Italian neo-Fascist today, was a self-employed resident of a small town or rural district. Though the communists, as a workers' party, are the strongest in the working-class neighborhoods of large cities within countries, they have great electoral strength only in the less urbanized European nations, e.g., Greece, Finland, France, Italy.

TABLE II. *A Comparison of European, English-speaking and Latin American Countries, Divided into Two Groups, "More democratic" and "Less democratic," by Indices Of Wealth, Industrialization, Education, and Urbanization*[1]

A. Indices of Wealth

Means	*Per Capita Income*[2] *in $*	*Thousands of Persons Per Doctor*[3]	*Persons Per Motor Vehicle*[4]	*Telephones Per 1,000 Persons*[5]	*Radios Per 1,000 Persons*[6]	*Newspaper Copies Per 1,000 Persons*[7]
European and English-speaking Stable Democracies	695	.86	17	205	350	341
European and English-speaking Unstable Democracies and Dictatorships	308	1.4	143	58	160	167
Latin American Democracies and Unstable Dictatorships	171	2.1	99	25	85	102
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	119	4.4	274	10	43	43
Ranges						
European Stable Democracies	420–1,453	.7– 1.2	3– 62	43–400	160–995	242–570
European Dictatorships	128– 482	.6– 4	10–538	7–196	42–307	46–390
Latin American Democracies	112– 346	.8– 3.3	31–174	12– 58	38–148	51–233
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	40– 331	1.0–10.8	38–428	1– 24	4–154	4–111

B. Indices of Industrialization

Means	*Percentage of Males in Agriculture*[8]	*Per Capita Energy Consumed*[9]
European Stable Democracies	21	3.6
European Dictatorships	41	1.4
Latin American Democracies	52	.6
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	67	.25
Ranges		
European Stable Democracies	6–46	1.4 –7.8
European Dictatorships	16–60	.27–3.2
Latin American Democracies	30–63	.30–0.9
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	46–87	.02–1.27

[1] A large part of this table has been compiled from data furnished by International Urban Research, University of California, Berkeley, California.

[2] United Nations, Statistical Office, *National and Per Capita Income in Seventy Countries,* 1949, Statistical Papers, Series E, No. 1, New York, 1950, pp. 14–16.

[3] United Nations, *A Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation, 1952,* Table 11, pp. 46–8.

[4] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1956,* Table 139, pp. 333–338.

[5] *Ibid.,* Table 149, p. 387.

[6] *Ibid.,* Table 189, p. 641. The population bases for these figures are for different years than those used in reporting the numbers of telephones and radios, but for purposes of group comparisons, the differences are not important.

[7] United Nations, *A Preliminary Report . . . , op. cit.,* Appendix B, pp. 86–89.

[8] United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1956,* Table 12, pp. 350–370.

[9] United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1956, op. cit.,* Table 127, pp. 308–310. Figures refer to commercially produced energy, in equivalent numbers of metric tons of coal.

cated the population of a country, the better the chances for democracy, and the comparative data available support this proposition. The "more democratic" countries of Europe are almost entirely literate: the lowest has a rate of 96 per cent, while the "less democratic" nations have an average literacy rate of 85 per cent. In Latin America, the difference is between an average rate of 74 per cent for the "less dictatorial" countries and 46 per cent for the "more

TABLE II (*Continued*)

C. Indices of Education

Means	*Percentage Literate*[10]	*Primary Education Enrollment Per 1,000 Persons*[11]	*Post-Primary Enrollment Per 1,000 Persons*[12]	*Higher Education Enrollment Per 1,000 Persons*[13]
European Stable Democracies	96	134	44	4.2
European Dictatorships	85	121	22	3.5
Latin American Democracies	74	101	13	2.0
Latin American Dictatorships	46	72	8	1.3
Ranges				
European Stable Democracies	95–100	96–179	19–83	1.7–17.83
European Dictatorships	55–98	61–165	8–37	1.6– 6.1
Latin American Democracies	48–87	75–137	7–27	.7– 4.6
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	11–76	11–149	3–24	.2– 3.1

D. Indices of Urbanization

Means	*Per Cent in Cities over 20,000*[14]	*Per Cent in Cities over 100,000*[15]	*Per Cent in Metropolitan Areas*[16]
European Stable Democracies	43	28	38
European Dictatorships	24	16	15
Latin American Democracies	28	22	26
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	17	12	15
Ranges			
European Stable Democracies	28–54	17–51	22–56
European Dictatorships	12–44	6–33	7–49
Latin American Democracies	11–48	13–37	17–44
Latin American Stable Dictatorships	5–36	4–22	7–26

[10] United Nations, *A Preliminary Report . . . , op. cit.*, Appendix A, pp. 79–86. A number of countries are listed as more than 95 per cent literate.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 86–100. Figures refer to persons enrolled at the earlier year of the primary range, per 1,000 total population, for years ranging from 1946 to 1950. The first primary year varies from five to eight in various countries. The less developed countries have more persons in that age range per 1,000 population than the more developed countries, but this biases the figures presented in the direction of increasing the percentage of the total population in school for the less developed countries, although fewer of the children in that age group attend school. The bias from this source thus reinforces the positive relationship between education and democracy.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 86–100.

[13] UNESCO, *World Survey of Education*, Paris, 1955. Figures are the enrollment in higher education per 1,000 population. The years to which the figures apply vary between 1949 and 1952, and the definition of higher education varies for different countries.

[14] Obtained from International Urban Research, University of California, Berkeley, California.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] *Ibid.*

dictatorial."[14] The educational enrollment per thousand total population at three different levels, primary, post-primary, and higher educational, is equally consistently related to the degree of democracy. The tremendous disparity is shown by the extreme cases of Haiti and the United States. Haiti has fewer children (11 per thousand) attending school in the primary grades than the United States has attending colleges (almost 18 per thousand).

The relationship between education and democracy is worth more extensive treatment since an entire philosophy of democratic government has seen in increased education the spread of the basic requirement of democracy.[15] As Bryce wrote with special reference to Latin America, "education, if it does not make men good citizens, makes it at least easier for them to become so."[16] Education presumably broadens men's outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices.

The evidence bearing on the contribution of education to democracy is even more direct and strong in connection with individual behavior *within* countries, than it is in cross-national correlations. Data gathered by public opinion research agencies which have questioned people in different countries with regard to their belief in various democratic norms of tolerance for opposition, to their attitudes toward ethnic or racial minorities, and with regard to their belief in multi-party as against one-party systems have found that *the most important single factor differentiating those giving democratic responses from others has been education.* The higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support democratic practices.[17] All the relevant studies indicate that education is far more significant than income or occupation.

These findings should lead us to anticipate a far higher correlation between national levels of education and political practice than in fact we do find. Germany and France have been among the best educated nations of Europe, but this by itself clearly did not stabilize their democracies. It may be, however, that education has served to inhibit other anti-democratic forces. Post-Nazi data from Germany indicate clearly that higher education is linked to rejection of strong-man and one-party government.[18]

If we cannot say that a "high" level of education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary condition in the modern world. Thus if we turn to Latin America, where widespread illiteracy still exists in many countries, we find that of all the nations in which more than half the population is

[14] The pattern indicated by a comparison of the averages for each group of countries is sustained by the ranges (the high and low extremes) for each index. Most of the ranges overlap, that is, some countries which are in the low category with regard to politics are higher on any given index than some which are high on the scale of democracy. It is noteworthy that in both Europe and Latin America, the nations which are lowest on any of the indices presented in the table are also in the "less democratic" category. Conversely, almost all countries which rank at the top of any of the indices are in the "more democratic" class.

[15] See John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, 1916).

[16] Quoted in Arthur P. Whitaker, *op. cit.*, p. 112; see also Karl Mannheim, *Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning* (New York, 1950).

[17] See C. H. Smith, "Liberalism and Level of Information," *Journal of Educational Psychology,* Vol. 39 (1948), pp. 65–82; Martin A. Trow, *Right Wing Radicalism and Political Intolerance,* Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University, 1957, p. 17; Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York, 1955), pp. 138–9; K. Kido and M. Suyi, "Report of Social Stratification and Mobility in Tokyo, . . . Mobility in Tokyo, III: The Structure of Social Consciousness," *Japanese Sociological Review* (January 1954), pp. 74–100.

[18] Dewey has suggested that the character of the educational system will influence its effect on democracy, and this may shed some light on the sources of instability in Germany. The purpose of German education, according to Dewey, writing in 1916, was "disciplinary training rather than . . . 'personal development." The main aim was to produce "absorption of the aims and meanings of existing institutions," and "thoroughgoing subordination" to them. This point raises issues which cannot be entered into here, but indicates the complex character of the relationship between democracy and closely related factors, such as education. See Dewey, *Democracy and Education, op. cit.*, pp. 108–110. It suggests caution, too, in drawing optimistic inferences about the prospects of democratic developments in Russia, based on the great expansion of education now taking place there.

illiterate, only one, Brazil, can be included in the "more democratic" group.

There is some evidence from other economically impoverished culture areas that literacy is related to democracy. The one member of the Arab League which has maintained democratic institutions since World War II, Lebanon, is by far the best educated (over 80 per cent literacy) of the Arab countries. In the rest of Asia east of the Arab world, only two states, the Philippines and Japan, have maintained democratic regimes without the presence of large anti-democratic parties since 1945. And these two countries, although lower than any European state in per capita income, are among the world's leaders in educational attainment. The Philippines actually ranks second to the United States in its proportion of people attending high school and university, while Japan has a higher level of educational attainment than any European state.[19]

Although the various indices have been presented separately, it seems clear that the factors of industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education, are so closely interrelated as to form one common factor.[20] And the factors subsumed under economic development carry with it the political correlate of democracy.[21]

Before moving to a discussion of the inner connections between the development complex and democracy, mention may be made of a study of the Middle East, which, in its essential conclusions, substantiates these empirical relationships for another culture area. A survey of six Middle Eastern countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iran), conducted by the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research in 1950–51, found high associations between urbanization, literacy, voting rates, media consumption and production, and education.[22] Simple and multiple correlations between the four basic variables were computed for all countries for which United Nations statistics were available, in this case 54. The multiple correlations, regarding each as the dependent variable in turn, are as follows.[23]

Dependent Variable	*Multiple correlation Coefficient*
Urbanization	.61
Literacy	.91
Media Participation	.84
Political Participation	.82

In the Middle East, Turkey and Lebanon score higher on most of these indices than do the other four countries analyzed, and Lerner points out that the "great post-war events in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iran have been the violent struggles for the control of power — struggles notably absent in Turkey and Lebanon, where the control of power has been decided by elections."[24]

[19] Ceylon, which shares with the Philippines and Japan the distinction of being the only democratic countries in South and Far Asia in which the Communists are unimportant electorally, also shares with them the distinction on being the only countries in this area in which a *majority* of the population is literate. It should be noted, however, that Ceylon does have a fairly large Trotskyist party, now the official opposition; and while its educational level is high for Asia, it is much lower than either Japan or the Philippines.

[20] A factor analysis carried out by Leo Schnore, based on data from 75 countries, demonstrates this. (To be published).

[21] This statement is a "statistical" statement, which necessarily means that there will be many exceptions to the correlation. Thus we know that poorer people are more likely to vote for the Democratic or Labor parties in the U.S. and England. The fact that a large minority of the lower strata vote for the more conservative party in these countries does not challenge the proposition that stratification position is the main determinant of party choice, given the multivariate causal process involved in the behavior of people or nations. Clearly social science will never be able to account for (predict) all behavior.

[22] The study is reported in Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958). These correlations are derived from census data; the main sections of the survey dealt with reactions to and opinions about the mass media, with inferences as to the personality types appropriate to modern and to traditional society.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 63. The index of political participation was the per cent voting in the last five elections. These results cannot be considered as independent verification of the relationships presented in this paper, since the data and variables are basically the same (as they are also in the work by Lyle Shannon, *op. cit.*), but the identical results using three entirely different methods, the phi coefficient, multiple correlations, and means and ranges, show decisively that the relationships cannot be attributed to artifacts of the computations. It should also be noted that the three analyses were made without knowledge of each other.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 84–85.

One of Lerner's contributions is to point to the consequences, for overall stability, of disproportionate development in one direction or another, and the need for coordinated changes in all of these variables. Thus, he compares urbanization and literacy in Egypt and Turkey, and concludes that although Egypt is far more urbanized than Turkey, it is not really "modernized," and does not even have an adequate base for modernization, because literacy has not kept abreast. In Turkey, all of the several indices of modernization have kept pace with each other, with rising voting participation (36 per cent in 1950), rising literacy, urbanization, etc. In Egypt, by contrast, the cities are full of "homeless illiterates," who provide a ready audience for political mobilization in support of extremist ideologies. On Lerner's scale, following the assumption of the functional interdependence of "modernization" factors, Egypt should be twice as literate as Turkey, since it is twice as urbanized. The fact that it is only half as literate explains, for Lerner, the "imbalances" which "tend to become circular and to accelerate social disorganization," political as well as economic.[25]

Lerner introduces one important theoretical addition, the suggestion that these key variables in the modernization process may be viewed as historical phases, with democracy a part of later developments, the "crowning institution of the participant society," one of his terms for a modern industrial society. His view on the relations between these variables, seen as stages, is worth quoting at some length:

> The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterize the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases — literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy. But, literacy performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third phase, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This in turn accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g., voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies.[26]

Lerner's thesis concerning the functional interdependence of these elements of modernization is by no means established by his data, but the material presented in this paper offers an opportunity for research along these lines. Deviant cases, such as Egypt, where "lagging" literacy is associated with serious strains and

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 87–89. Other theories of underdeveloped areas have also stressed the circular character of the forces sustaining a given level of economic and social development; and in a sense this paper may be regarded as an effort to extend the analysis of the complex of institutions constituting a "modernized" society to the political sphere. Leo Schnore's unpublished monograph, *Economic Development and Urbanization, An Ecological Approach,* relates technological, demographic and organizational (including literacy and per capita income) variables as an interdependent complex. Harvey Leibenstein's recent volume, *Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth* (New York, 1957), views "underdevelopment" within the framework of a "quasi-equilibrium" economic theory, as a complex of associated and mutually supportive aspects of a society, and includes cultural and political characteristics — illiteracy, the lack of a middle class, a crude communications system — as part of the complex. (See pp. 39–41).

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 60. Lerner also focuses upon certain personality requirements of a "modern" society which may also be related to the personality requirements of democracy. According to him, the physical and social mobility of modern society requires a mobile personality, capable of adaptation to rapid change. Development of a "mobile sensibility so adaptive to change that rearrangement of the self-system is its distinctive mode" has been the work of the 20th century. Its main feature is *empathy,* denoting the "general capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation, whether favorably or unfavorably." (pp. 49 ff.) Whether this psychological characteristic results in a predisposition toward democracy (implying a willingness to accept the viewpoint of others) or is rather associated with the anti-democratic tendencies of a "mass society" type of personality (implying the lack of any solid personal values rooted in rewarding participation) is an open question. Possibly empathy, a more or less "cosmopolitan" outlook, is a general personality characteristic of modern societies, with other special conditions determining whether or not it has the social consequence of tolerance and democratic attitudes, or rootlessness and anomie.

potential upheaval, may also be found in Europe and in Latin America, and their analysis, a task not attempted here, will clarify further the basic dynamics of modernization, and the problem of social stability in the midst of institutional change.

A number of processes underlie these correlations, observed in many areas of the world, in addition to the effect, already discussed, of a high level of education and literacy in creating or sustaining belief in democratic norms. Perhaps most important is the relationship between modernization and the form of the "class struggle." For the lower strata, economic development, which means increased income, greater economic security, and higher education, permit those in this status to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of politics. A belief in secular reformist gradualism can only be the ideology of a relatively well-to-do lower class.[27] Increased wealth and education also serve democracy by increasing the extent to which the lower strata are exposed to cross pressures which will reduce the intensity of their commitment to given ideologies and make them less receptive to supporting extremist ones. The operation of this process will be discussed in more detail in the second part of the paper, but essentially it functions through enlarging their involvement in an integrated national culture as distinct from an isolated lower class one, and hence increasing their exposure to middle-class values. Marx argued that the proletariat were a revolutionary force because they have nothing to lose but their chains and can win the whole world. But Tocqueville in analyzing the reasons why the lower strata in America supported the system paraphrased and transposed Marx before Marx ever made this analysis, by pointing out that "only those who have nothing to lose ever revolt."[28]

Increased wealth is not only related casually to the development of democracy by changing the social conditions of the workers, but it also affects the political role of the middle class through changing the shape of the stratification structure so that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a large lower-class base, to a diamond with a growing middle class. A large middle class plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalize extremist groups.

National income is also related to the political values and style of the upper class. The poorer a country, and the lower the absolute standard of living of the lower classes, the greater the pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower classes as beyond the pale of human society, as vulgar, as innately inferior, as a lower caste. The sharp difference in the style of living between those at the top and those at the bottom makes this psychologically necessary. Consequently, the upper strata also tend to regard political rights for the lower strata, particularly the right to share in power, as essentially absurd and immoral. The upper strata not only resist democracy themselves, but their often arrogant political behavior serves to intensify extremist reactions on the part of the lower classes.

The general income level of a nation will also affect its receptivity to democratic political tolerance norms. The values which imply that it does not matter greatly which side rules, that error can be tolerated even in the governing party can best develop where (a) the government has little power to affect the crucial life chances of most powerful groups, or (b) there is enough wealth in the country so that it actually does not make too much difference if some redistribution does take place. If loss of office is seen as meaning serious loss for major power groups, then they will be readier to resort to more drastic measures in seeking to retain or secure office. The wealth level will also affect the extent to which given countries can develop "universalistic" norms among its civil servants and politicians (selection based on competence; performance without favoritism). The poorer the country, the greater the emphasis which is placed on nepotism, i.e., support of kin and friends. The weakness of the universalistic norms reduces the opportunity to develop efficient bureaucracy, a condition for a modern democratic state.[29]

[27] See S. M. Lipset, "Socialism — East and West — Left and Right," *Confluence*, Vol. 7 (Summer 1958), pp. 173–192.

[28] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Vol. I (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Vintage edition, 1945), p. 258.

[29] For discussion of this problem in a new state, see David Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*

Less directly linked but seemingly still associated with greater wealth is the presence of intermediary organizations and institutions which can act as sources of countervailing power, and recruiters of participants in the political process in the manner discussed by Tocqueville and other exponents of what has come to be known as the theory of the "mass society."[30] They have argued that a society without a multitude of organizations relatively independent of the central state power has a high dictatorial as well as a revolutionary potential. Such organizations serve a number of functions necessary to democracy: they are a source of countervailing power, inhibiting the state or any single major source of private power from dominating all political resources; they are a source of new opinions; they can be the means of communicating ideas, particularly opposition ideas, to a large section of the citizenry; they serve to train men in the skills of politics; and they help increase the level of interest and participation in politics. Although there are no reliable data which bear on the relationship between national patterns of voluntary organizations and national political systems, evidence from studies of individual behavior within a number of different countries demonstrates that, independently of other factors, men who belong to associations are more likely to hold democratic opinions on questions concerning tolerance and party systems, and are more likely to participate in the political process — to be active or to vote. Since we also know that, within countries, the more well-to-do and the better educated one is, the more likely he is to belong to voluntary organizations, it seems likely that the propensity to form such groups is a function of level of income and opportunities for leisure within given nations.[31]

It is obvious that democracy and the conditions related to stable democracy discussed here are essentially located in the countries of northwest Europe and their English-speaking offspring in America and Australasia. It has been argued by Max Weber among others that the factors making for democracy in this area are a historically unique concatenation of elements, part of the complex which also produced capitalism in this area. The basic argument runs that capitalistic economic development (facilitated and most developed in Protestant areas)

(Princeton University Press, 1955), esp. chapters 9 and 13. Apter shows the importance of efficient bureaucracy, and the acceptance of bureaucratic values and behavior patterns, for the existence of a democratic political order.

[30] See Emil Lederer, *The State of the Masses* (New York, 1940); Hannah Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1950); Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York, 1947); Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York, 1940; Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon* (New York, 1952); José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York, 1932).

[31] See Edward Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), for an excellent description of the way in which abysmal poverty serves to reduce community organization in southern Italy. The data which do exist from polling surveys conducted in the United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Sweden show that somewhere between 40 and 50 per cent of the adults in these countries belong to voluntary associations, without lower rates of membership for the less stable democracies, France and Germany, than among the more stable ones, the United States, Great Britain, and Sweden. These results seemingly challenge the general proposition, although no definite conclusion can be made, since most of the studies employed noncomparable categories. This point bears further research in many countries. For the data on these countries see the following studies: for France, Arnold Rose, *Theory and Method in the Social Sciences* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), p. 74; and O. R. Gallagher, "Voluntary Associations in France," *Social Forces*, Vol. 36 (Dec. 1957), pp. 154–156; for Germany, Erich Reigrotski, *Soziale Verflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1956), p. 164; for the U. S., Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman, "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 23 (June 1958), p. 287, and J. C. Scott, Jr., "Membership and Participation in Voluntary Associations," *id.*, Vol. 22 (1957), pp. 315–326; Herbert Maccoby, "The Differential Political Activity of Participants in a Voluntary Association," *id.*, Vol. 23 (1958), pp. 524–533; for Great Britain see Mass Observation, *Puzzled People* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1947), p. 119; and Thomas Bottomore, "Social Stratification in Voluntary Organizations," in David Glass, ed., *Social Mobility in Britain* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954), p. 354; for Sweden see Gunnar Heckscher, "Pluralist Democracy: The Swedish Experience," *Social Research*, Vol. 15 (December 1948), pp. 417–461.

created the burgher class whose existence was both a catalyst and a necessary condition for democracy. The emphasis within Protestantism on individual responsibility furthered the emergence of democratic values. The greater initial strength of the middle classes in these countries resulted in an alignment between burghers and throne, an alignment which preserved the monarchy, and thus facilitated the legitimation of democracy among the conservative strata. Thus we have an interrelated cluster of economic development, Protestantism, monarchy, gradual political change, legitimacy, and democracy.[32] Men may argue as to whether any aspect of this cluster is primary, but the cluster of factors and forces hangs together.

III. Legitimacy and Democracy

In this section I turn to an examination of some of the requisites of democracy which are derived from specifically historical elements in this complex, particularly those which relate to the need of a democratic political system for legitimacy, and for mechanisms which reduce the intensity of political cleavage. These requisites are correlated with economic development, but are also distinct from it since they are elements in the political system itself.

Legitimacy and Effectiveness. In the modern world, as the previous section has attempted to document, economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy; it is a mark of the efficiency of the total system.

But the stability of a given democratic system depends not only on the system's efficiency in modernization, but also upon the *effectiveness* and *legitimacy* of the political system. By effectiveness is meant the actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed forces. The effectiveness of a democratic political system, marked by an efficient bureaucracy and decision-making system, which is able to resolve political problems, can be distinguished from the efficiency of the total system, although breakdown in the functioning of the society as a whole will, of course, affect the political sub-system. Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society. The extent to which contemporary democratic political systems are legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved. It is the task of these sections of the paper to show *first,* how the degree of legitimacy of a democratic system may affect its capacity to survive the crises of effectiveness, such as depressions or lost wars and *second,* to indicate the ways in which the different resolutions of basic historical cleavages — which determine the legitimacy of various systems — also strengthen or weaken democracy through their effect on contemporary party struggles.

While effectiveness is primarily an instrumental dimension, legitimacy is more affective and evaluative. Groups will regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in with their primary values. Important segments of the German army, civil service, and aristocratic classes rejected the Weimar Republic not because it was ineffective, but because its symbolism and basic values negated their own. Legitimacy, in and of itself, may be associated with many forms of political organization, including oppressive ones. Feudal societies, before the advent of industrialism, undoubtedly enjoyed the basic loyalty of most of their mem-

[32] In introducing historical events as part of the analysis of factors *external* to the political system, which are part of the causal nexus in which democracy is involved, I am following in good sociological and even functionalist tradition. As Radcliffe-Brown has well put it, ". . . one 'explanation' of a social system will be its history, where we know it — the detailed account of how it came to be, what it is and where it is. Another 'explanation' of the same system is obtained by showing . . . that it is a special exemplification of laws of social psychology or social functioning. The two kinds of explanation do not conflict but supplement one another." A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, "On the Concept of Function in Social Science," *American Anthropologist,* New Series, Vol. 37 (1935), p. 401; see also Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 164–188, for a detailed discussion of the role of historical analysis in sociological research.

bers. Crises of legitimacy are primarily a recent historical phenomenon, following the rise of sharp cleavages among groups which have been able, because of mass communication resources, to organize around different values than those previously considered to be the only legitimate ones for the total society.

A crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of change, and therefore its roots, as a factor affecting the stability of democratic systems, must be sought in the character of change in modern society. It may be hypothesized that crises of legitimacy occur during a transition to a new social structure, if (a) all major groups do not secure access to the political system early in the transitional period, or at least as soon as they develop political demands; or, if (b) the *status* of major conservative institutions is threatened during the period of structural change. After a new social structure is established, if the new system is unable to sustain the expectations of major groups (on the grounds of "effectiveness") for a long enough period to develop legitimacy upon the new basis, a new crisis may develop.

Tocqueville gave a graphic description of the first general type of loss of legitimacy, referring mainly to countries which had moved from aristocratic monarchies to democratic republics:" . . . epochs sometimes occur in the life of a nation when the old customs of a people are changed, public morality is destroyed, religious belief shaken, and the spell of tradition broken. . . . The citizens then have "neither the instinctive patriotism of a monarchy nor the reflecting patriotism of a republic; . . . they have stopped between the two in the midst of confusion and distress."[33]

If, however, the status of major conservative groups and symbols is not threatened during this transitional period even though they lose most of their power, democracy seems to be much more secure. Striking evidence of the link between the preserved legitimacy of conservative institutions and democracy is the relationship between monarchy and democracy. Given the role of the American and French republican revolutions as the initiators of modern democratic political movements, the fact that ten out of 12 of the stable European and English-speaking democracies are monarchies seems a rather ludicrous correlation. Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand are kingdoms; while the only republics which meet the twin conditions — of stable democratic procedures since democracy was instituted, and the absence of a major totalitarian movement in the past 25 years — are the United States, Switzerland, and Uruguay. Nations which have moved from absolutism and oligarchy (linked to a state church) to a democratic welfare state, while retaining the forms of monarchy, more frequently seem able to make changes while sustaining a continuous thread of legitimacy for their political institutions.[34]

The preservation of the monarchy has apparently retained for the system the loyalty of the aristocratic, traditionalist, and clerical sectors of the population which resented increased democratization and equalitarianism. And, by more graciously accepting the lower strata, by not resisting to the point that revolution might be necessary, the conservative orders won or retained the loyalty of the new "citizens." Where monarchy was overthrown by revolution, and orderly sucession was broken, those forces aligned with monarchy have sometimes continued to refuse legitimacy to republican successors down to the fifth generation or more.

The one constitutional monarchy which became a Fascist dictatorship, Italy, was, like the French Republic, relatively new and still illegitimate for major groups in the society. The House of Savoy alienated the Catholics by destroying the temporal power of the Popes, and was also not a legitimate successor in the old Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Catholics, in fact, were forbidden by the church to participate in Italian politics until close to World War I, and the church rescinded its original ban only because of its fear of the Socialists. A similar attitude was taken by French Catholics to the Third Republic during the same

[33] *Op. cit.*, pp. 251–252.

[34] Walter Lippmann, referring to the seemingly greater capacity of the constitutional monarchies than the republics of Europe to "preserve order with freedom," suggests that this may be because "in a republic the governing power, being wholly secularized, loses much of its prestige; it is stripped, if one prefers, of all the illusions of intrinsic majesty." See his *The Public Philosophy* (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), p. 50.

period. Both Italian and French democracy have had to operate for much of their histories without loyal support from important groups in their society, both on the left and on the right. Thus, one main source of legitimacy lies in the continuity of primary conservative and integrative institutions during a transitional period in which new social institutions are emerging.

The second general type of loss of legitimacy is, as indicated above, related to the way in which societies handle the "entry into politics" problem. The determination of when new social groups shall obtain access to the political process affects the legitimacy of the political system, either for conservative or for emerging groups. In the 19th century these new groups were primarily industrial workers; the "entry into politics" crisis of the 20th century typically involves colonial elites, and peasant peoples. Whenever new groups become politically active (e.g., when the workers first seek access to economic and political power through economic organization and the suffrage, when the bourgeoisie demanded access to and participation in government, when colonial elites demand control over their own system), comparatively easy access to the *legitimate* political institutions tends to win the loyalty of the new groups to the system, and they in turn can permit the old dominating strata to maintain their own status integrity. In nations such as Germany, where access was denied for prolonged periods, first to the bourgeoisie and later to the workers, and where force was used to restrict access, the lower strata were alienated from the system, and were led to adopt extremist ideologies which, in turn, alienated the more established groups from an acceptance of the workers' political movement as a legitimate alternative.

Political systems which denied new strata access to power except through revolutionary means also inhibited the growth of legitimacy by introducing millenial hopes into the political arena. Groups which feel obliged to push their way into the body politic through forceful means tend to overexaggerate the possibilities which political participation afford. Their hopes are for far more than the inherent limitations of political stability permit. Consequently, democratic regimes born under such stress will not only face the difficulty of being regarded as illegitimate by those groups loyal to the *ancien régime*, but may be also rejected by those whose millenial hopes were not fulfilled by the change. France seems to offer an example of such a phenomenon. Right-wing clericalists have viewed the Republic as illegitimate, while sections of the lower strata still impatiently await millenial fulfillment. Many of the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa face the problem of winning the loyalties of the masses to democratic states which can do little to fulfill the utopian objectives set by nationalist movements during the period of colonialism, and the transitional struggle to independence.

We have discussed several conditions bearing upon the maintenance, or the initial securing of legitimacy by a political system. Assuming reasonable effectiveness, if the status of major conservative groups is threatened, or if access to the political system is denied at crucial periods, the legitimacy of the system will remain in question. Even in legitimate systems, a breakdown of effectiveness, repeatedly or for a long period, will endanger its stability.

A major test of legitimacy is the extent to which given nations have developed a common "secular political culture," national rituals and holidays which serve to maintain the legitimacy of various democratic practices.[35] The United States has developed a common homogeneous secular political culture as reflected in the veneration and consensus surrounding the Founding Fathers, Jefferson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt and their principles. These common elements to which all American politicians appeal are not present in all democratic societies. In some European countries, the Left and the Right have a different set of symbols, and different historical political heroes. France offers the clearest example of a nation which has not developed such a common heritage. Thus many of the battles involving use of different symbols between the left and the right from 1789 down through much of the 19th century are "still in progress, and the issue is still open; every one of these dates (of major political controversy) still divides left and right,

[35] See Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 391–409.

clerical and anti-clerical, progressive and reactionary, in all their historically determined constellations."[36]

As we have seen, nations may vary in the extent to which their political institutions are viewed as legitimate by different strata. And knowledge concerning the relative degree of legitimacy of a nations political institutions is of key importance in any effort to analyze the stability of these institutions when faced with a crisis of effectiveness. The relationship between different degrees of legitimacy and effectiveness in specific political systems may be more graphically presented in the form of a four-fold table, with examples of countries characterized by the various possible combinations.

Legitimacy	+ Effectiveness	
+	A	B
−	C	D

Societies which fall in box A, those which are high on the scales of both legitimacy and effectiveness, will clearly have stable political systems. Nations like the United States, Sweden, and Britain satisfy the basic political needs of their citizens, have efficient bureaucracies and political decision-making systems, possess traditional legitimacy through long-term continuity of the key symbols of sovereignty, the monarchy or constitution, and do not contain any important minorities whose basic values run counter to those of the system.[37] Ineffective and illegitimate regimes, those which would be found in box D, must, of course, by definition be unstable and break down, unless they are dictatorships maintaining themselves by force such as the governments of Hungary and eastern Germany today. The political experiences of different countries in the early 1930's illustrate the effect of varying combinations of legitimacy and effectiveness. In the late 1920's, neither the German nor the Austrian republics were held legitimate by large and powerful segments of their populations, but nevertheless remained reasonably effective.[38] In the four-fold table, they fell in box C.

When the effectiveness of the governments of the various countries broke down in the 1930's, those societies which were high on the scale of legitimacy remained democratic, while countries which were low, such as Germany, Austria, and Spain, lost their freedom, and France narrowly escaped a similiar fate. Or to put the changes in terms of location in the four-fold table, countries which shifted from A to B remained democratic, while the political systems of those which shifted from C to D broke down. It remained for the military defeat in 1940 to prove conclusively the low position of French democracy on the scale of legitimacy. It was the sole defeated democracy which furnished large-scale support for a Quisling regime.[39]

Situations such as those discussed above in which either legitimacy or effectiveness is high while the other is low to demonstrate the utility of this type of analysis. From a short range

[36] Herbert Luethy, *The State of France* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1955), p. 29.

[37] The race problem in the American South does constitute one basic challenge to the legitimacy of the system, and at one time did cause a breakdown of the national order. The conflict reduces the commitment of many white Southerners to the democratic rules down to the present. Great Britain had a comparable problem as long as Catholic Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom. Effective government could not satisfy Ireland. Political practices by both sides in Northern Ireland, Ulster, also illustrate the problem of a regime which is not legitimate to a large segment of its population.

[38] For an excellent analysis of the permanent crisis of the Austrian republic which flowed from the fact that it was viewed as an illegitimate regime by the Catholics and conservatives, see Charles Gulick, *Austria From Hapsburg to Hitler* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948).

[39] The French legitimacy problem is well described by Katherine Munro: "The Right wing parties never quite forgot the possibility of a counter revolution while the Left wing parties revived the Revolution militant in their Marxism or Communism; each side suspected the other of using the Republic to achieve its own ends and of being loyal only so far as it suited it. This suspicion threatened time and time again to make the Republic unworkable, since it led to obstruction in both the political and the economic sphere, and difficulties of government in turn undermined confidence in the regime and its rulers." Quoted in Charles A. Micaud, "French Political Parties: Ideological Myths and Social Realities," in Sigmund Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 108.

point of view, a highly effective but illegitimate system, such as a well governed colony, is more unstable than regimes which are relatively low in effectiveness and high in legitimacy. The social stability of a nation such as Thailand — even with its occasional *coup d'états* — stands out in sharp contrast to the situation in the neighboring former colonial nations of Southeast Asia. The link between the analysis of legitimacy and the earlier discussion of the contribution of economic development to democracy is evident in the processes through which regimes low in legitimacy may gain it, and conversely in those which are related to the collapse of a legitimate system. Prolonged effectiveness which lasts over a number of generations may give legitimacy to a political system; in the modern world, such effectiveness mainly means constant economic development. Thus those nations which adapted most successfully to the requirements of an industrial system had the fewest internal political strains, and either preserved their traditional legitimacy, the monarchy, or developed new strong symbols of legitimacy.

The social and economic structure which Latin America inherited from the Iberian peninsula prevented it from following the lead of the former English colonies, and its republics never developed the symbols and aura of legitimacy. In a large measure, the survival of the new political democracies of Asia and Africa is related to their ability to sustain a prolonged period of effectiveness, of being able to meet the defined instrumental needs of their populations.

Legitimacy and Cleavage. Prolonged effectiveness of the system as a whole may, as in the cases of the United States and Switzerland, eventually legitimate the democratic political system. Inherent, however, in all democratic systems is the constant threat that the conflicts among different groups which are the life-blood of the system may crystallize to the point where societal disintegration is threatened. Hence, conditions which serve to moderate the intensity of partisan battle, in addition to effectiveness, are among the key requisites for a democratic political system.

Since the existence of a moderate state of conflict is an inherent aspect of a legitimate democratic system, and is in fact another way of defining it, we should not be surprised that the principal factors determining such an optimum state are closely linked to those which produce legitimacy viewed in terms of continuities of symbols and status. Essentially the character and content of the major cleavages affecting the political stability of a society are largely determined by historical factors which have affected the way in which major issues dividing society have been solved or left unresolved over time.

In modern times, three major issues have emerged in western states. The first was the religious issue: the place of the church and/or various religions within the nation. The second has been the problem of the admission of the lower strata, particularly the workers, to "citizenship," and the establishment of access to power through universal suffrage, and the legitimate right to bargin collectively in the economic sphere. The third has been the continual struggle over the distribution of the national income.

The significant general question here is this: were these major issues dealt with one by one, and each one more or less solved before the next one arose, or did the problems accumulate, so that historical issues and sources of cleavage mixed with newer ones? Resolving tensions one at a time contributes toward a stable political system; carrying over issues from one historical period to another makes for a political atmosphere characterized by bitterness and frustration rather than by tolerance and compromise. Men and parties come to differ with each other, not simply on ways of settling current problems, but rather by fundamental and opposed *Weltanschauungen*. They come to see the political victory of their opponents as a major moral threat; and the total system, as a result, lacks effective value-integration.

The religious issue, the place of the church in the society, was fought through and solved in most of the Protestant nations in the 18th and 19th centuries, and ceased to be a matter of serious political controversy. In some states, such as the United States, the church was disestablished, and it accepted this result. In others, such as Britain, Scandinavia, and Switzerland, religion remains state-supported, but the state churches, like constitutional monarchs, have only nominal sway and have ceased to be major sources of controversy. It remains for

the Catholic countries of Europe to provide us with examples of situations in which the historic controversy between clerical and anti-clerical forces, sparked by the French Revolution, has continued to divide men politically down to the present day. Thus in countries such as France, Italy, Spain, and Austria, being Catholic has meant being allied with rightist or conservative groups in politics; while being anti-clerical (or a member of a minority religion) has most often meant alliance with the left. In a number of these countries, newer issues, when they emerged, became superimposed on the religious question; and for the conservative Catholics, the fight against Socialists was not simply an economic struggle, or a controversy over social institutions, but a deep-rooted conflict, between God and Satan, between good and evil.[40] For many secular intellectuals in contemporary Italy, opposition to the church legitimates alliance with the Communists. As long as religious ties reinforce secular political alignments, the chances for democratic give-and-take, and compromise, are weak.

The "citizenship" or "political equality" issue has also been resolved in various ways. Thus the United States and Britain gave citizenship to the workers in the early or mid-nineteenth century. Sweden and a number of European nations resisted through the beginning of the 20th century, and the struggle for citizenship became combined in these countries with socialism as a *political* movement, thereby producing a revolutionary socialism. Or to put this in other terms, where the workers were denied economic and political citizenship rights, their struggle for redistribution of income and status was superimposed on a revolutionary ideology. Where the economic and status struggle developed outside this context, the ideology with which it was linked tended to be that of gradualist reformism. In Hohenzollern Germany, for example, the workers were denied a free and equal suffrage in Prussia until the revolution of 1918. This denial of "citizenship" facilitated the retention of revolutionary Marxism in those parts of Germany where equal suffrage did not exist. In Southern Germany, where full citizenship rights were granted in the late 19th century, reformist, democratic, and non-revolutionary socialism was dominant. The perpetuation of revolutionary dogmas in much of the Social Democratic Party served to give ultra-leftists a voice in party leadership, enabled the Communists to win strength after the military defeat, and perhaps even more important historically, served to frighten large sections of the German middle classes. The latter feared that a socialist victory would really mean an end to all their privileges and status.

In France, the workers won the suffrage but were refused basic economic rights until after World War II. Major groups of French employers denied legitimacy to the French trade-unions, and sought to weaken or destroy them following every trade-union victory. The instability of the French unions, their constant need to preserve worker militancy to survive, gave access to the workers to the more revolutionary and extremist political groups. Communist domination of the French labor movement can in large part be traced to the tactics of the French business classes.

The examples presented above do not explain why different countries varied in the way they handled basic national cleavages. They should suffice, however, to illustrate the worth of a hypothesis relating the conditions for stable democratic government to the basis of diversity.

[40] The linkage between democratic instability and Catholicism may also be accounted for by elements inherent in Catholicism as a religious system. Democracy requires a universalistic political belief system in the sense that it legitimates different ideologies. And it might be assumed that religious value systems which are more universalistic in the sense of placing less stress on being the only true church will be more compatible with democracy than those which assume that they have the only truth. The latter belief, held much more strongly by the Catholic than by most other Christian churches, makes it difficult for the religious value system to help legitimate a political system which requires, as part of its basic value system, the belief that "good" is served best through conflict among opposing beliefs.

Kingsley Davis has argued that a Catholic state church tends to be irreconcilable with democracy since "Catholicism attempts to control so many aspects of life, to encourage so much fixity of status and submission to authority, and to remain so independent of secular authority that it invariably clashes with the liberalism, individualism, freedom, mobility and sovereignty of the democratic nation." See his "Political Ambivalence in Latin America," *Journal of Legal and Political Sociology*, Vol. 1 (1943), reprinted in Christensen, *The Evolution of Latin American Government* (New York, 1951), p. 240.

Where a number of historic cleavages intermix and create the basis for *Weltanschauung* politics, the democracy will be unstable and weak, for by definition such political views do not include the concept of tolerance.

Weltanschauung politics have also weakened the possibilities for a stable democracy, since parties characterized by such total ideologies have often attempted to create what Sigmund Neumann has called an "integrated" environment, one in which as much as possible of the lives of their members is encapsulated within ideologically linked activities. These actions are based on the assumption that it is important to isolate their followers from contact with "falsehood" expressed by non-believers. Neumann has suggested the need for a basic analytic distinction between parties of representation, which strengthen democracy, and parties of integration which weaken it.[41] The former are typified by most parties in the English-speaking democracies and in Scandinavia, and by most centrist and conservative parties other than the religious ones. They view the party function as primarily one of securing votes around election time. The parties of integration, on the other hand, are concerned with making the world conform to their basic philosophy or *Weltanschauung*. They do not see themselves as contestants in a give-and-take game of pressure politics, in which all parties accept the rules of the game. Rather they view the political or religious struggle as a contest between divine or historic truth on one side and fundamental error on the other. Given this conception of the world, it becomes necessary to prevent their followers from being exposed to the cross-pressures flowing from contact with falsehood, which will reduce their faith.

The two major non-totalitarian groupings which have followed such procedures have been the Catholics and the Socialists. In general, in much of Europe before 1939, the Catholics and Socialists attempted to increase intra-religious or intra-class communications by creating a network of church- and party-linked social and economic organizations within which their followers could live their entire lives. Austria offers perhaps the best example of a situation in which two groups, the Social Catholics and the Social Democrats, divided over all three historic issues and separated the country into two hostile camps, which carried out much of their social activities in party or church-linked organizations.[42]

The totalitarian organizations, Fascist and Communist, expanded the integrationist character of political life to the furthest limit possible. They outdo all other groups in defining the world in struggle terms, and in seeing the corrupting influences either of Judaism or capitalism as requiring the insulation of the true believers.

Efforts by democratic parties of integration to isolate their social base from cross-pressures are clearly disruptive of the requirements for a stable democracy in which there is shifting from one election to another, and in which issues between parties are allowed to be resolved over time. Isolation may intensify loyalty to the party or church, but it may also serve to prevent a party from reaching new strata. The Austrian situation also illustrates the frustration of the electoral process which results when most of the electorate is encapsulated within parties of integration. The necessary rules of democratic politics assume that conversion both ways, into and out of a party, is possible and accepted as proper. Parties which hope to gain a majority by democratic methods must ultimately give up their integrationist tendencies. The only justification for isolation from the rest of the culture is a strong commitment to the idea that the party possesses the only truth, that there are certain basic issues which must be resolved by the triumph of historic truth. As the working-class has gained complete citizenship in the political and economic spheres in different countries, the Socialist parties of Eu-

[41] See Sigmund Neumann, *Die Deutschen Parteien: Wesen und Wandel nach dem Kriege* (2nd ed., Berlin, 1932), for exposition of the distinction between parties of integration and parties of representation. Neumann has further distinguished between parties of "democratic integration" (the Catholic, and Social Democratic parties) and those of "total integration" (Fascists and Communist parties) in his more recent chapter, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in the volume which he edited: *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 403–405.

[42] See Charles Gulick, *op. cit.* For their post-World War II formula for compromising this antagonism, see Herbert P. Secher, "Coalition Government: The Case of the Second Austrian Republic," this *Review*, Vol. 52 (Sept. 1958), p. 791.

rope have dropped their integrationist emphasis. The only non-totalitarian parties which can and do maintain such policies are religious parties such as the Catholic parties, or the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary party of Holland. Clearly, the Catholic and Dutch Calvinist churches are not "democratic" in the sphere of religion. They insist there is but one truth, as the Communists and Fascists do in politics. Catholics may accept the assumptions of political democracy, but never those of religious tolerance. And where the conflict between religion and irreligion is viewed as salient by Catholics or other believers in a one true church, then a real dilemma exists for the democratic process. Many political issues which in other countries may be easily compromised become aggravated by the religious issue, and cannot be settled.

The intense forms of cleavage developed by that cumulation of unresolved issues which creates *Weltanschauung* politics is sustained by the systematic segregation of different strata of the population in organized political or religious enclaves. Conversely, however, it should be noted that wherever the social structure operates so as naturally to "isolate" individuals or groups with the same political disposition characteristics from contact with differing views, those so isolated tend to back political extremists.

It has been repeatedly remarked, for example, that workers in so-called "isolated" industries, miners, sailors, fishermen, lumbermen, sheep-tenders, and longshoremen, tend to give overwhelming support to the more left-wing tendencies. Such districts tend to vote Communist or Socialist by large majorities, sometimes to the point of having what is essentially a "one-party" system in the areas concerned. Isolation is created by the fact that the requirements of the job make workers in these industries live in communities which are predominately inhabited by others in the same occupation. And this very isolation seems to reduce the pressures on such workers to be tolerant of other points of view, to contain among themselves diverse strains of thought; and makes them receptive to extremist versions of the doctrine generally held by other less isolated members of their class. One should expect that the least "cosmopolitan" (the most isolated) of every political predisposition, or stratum, will be the ones most likely to accept extremism. The political intolerance of farm-based groups in times of crisis may be another illustration of this pattern, since farmers, like workers in isolated industries, tend to have a more homogeneous political environment than do those employed in most urban occupations.[43]

These conclusions are further confirmed by studies of individual voting behavior which indicate that individuals under cross pressures — those who belong to groups predisposing in different directions, who have friends supporting different parties, who are regularly exposed to the propaganda of different tendencies — are less likely to be strongly committed politically.[44]

Multiple and politically inconsistent affiliations and loyalties are stimuli that serve to reduce the emotion and aggressiveness involved in political choice. For example, in contemporary Germany, a working-class Catholic, pulled in two directions, will most probably vote Christian-Democratic, but is much more

[43] This tendency obviously varies with relation to urban communities, type of rural stratification, and so forth. For a discussion of the role of vocational homogeneity and political communication among farmers, see S. M. Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), chapter 10, "Social Structure and Political Activity." For evidence on the undemocratic propensities of rural populations see Samuel A. Stouffer, *op. cit.*, pp. 138–9. National Public Opinion Institute of Japan, Report No. 26, *A Survey Concerning the Protection of Civil Liberties* (Tokyo, 1951) reports that the farmers were by far the occupational group least concerned with civil liberties. Carl Friedrich in accounting for the strength of nationalism and Nazism among German farmers suggests similar factors: that "the rural population is more homogeneous, that it contains a smaller number of outsiders and foreigners, that it has much less contact with foreign countries and peoples, and finally that its mobility is much more limited." "The Agricultural Basis of Emotional Nationalism," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 1 (1937), pp. 50–51.

[44] Perhaps the first general statement of the consequences of "cross-pressures" on individual and group behavior may be found in Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 126–195. It is an interesting example of discontinuity in social research that the concept of cross-pressures was used by Simmel, but had to be independently rediscovered in voting research. For a detailed application of the effect of multiple-group affiliations on the political process in general, see David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951).

tolerant of the Social Democrats than the average middle-class Catholic.[45] Where a man belongs to a variety of groups such that all predispose toward the same political choice, he is in the situation of the isolated worker, and is much less likely to exhibit tolerance of opposition opinions, or view the possibility of their coming to power with equanimity.

The evidence available suggests that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that social strata, groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting politically relevant affiliations. To the degree that a significant proportion of the population is pulled among conflicting forces, such groups and individuals have an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflict.[46] As Robert Dahl and Talcott Parsons have pointed out, such groups and individuals also have an interest in protecting the rights of political minorities.[47]

A stable democracy requires relatively moderate tension among the contending political forces. And political moderation is facilitated by the capacity of a system to resolve key dividing issues before new ones arise. To the extent that the cleavages of religion, citizenship, and "collective bargaining" have been allowed to cumulate and reinforce each other as stimulants of partisan hostility, the system is weakened. The more reinforced and correlated the sources of cleavage, the less the likelihood for political tolerance. Similarly, on the level of group and individual behavior, the greater the isolation from heterogeneous political stimuli, the more that background factors "pile up" in one direction, the greater the chances that the group or individual will have an extremist perspective. These two relationships, one on the level of partisan issues, the other on the nature of party support, are linked together by the fact that parties reflecting accumulated unresolved issues will seek to isolate their followers from conflicting stimuli, to prevent exposure to "error," while isolated individuals and groups will strengthen the intolerant tendencies in the political party system. The conditions maximizing political cosmopolitanism among the electorate are the growth of urbanization, education, communications media, and increased wealth. Most of the obvious isolated occupations, mining, lumbering, agriculture, belong to the category of "primary" occupations, occupations whose relative share of the labor force declines sharply with economic development.[48]

Thus, we see again how the factors involved in modernization or economic development are linked closely to those involved in the historic institutionalization of the values of legitimacy and tolerance. But it should always be noted that correlations are only statements concerning relative degrees of congruence, and that another condition for political action is that the correlation never be so clear-cut that men cannot feel that they can change the direction of affairs by their actions. And this fact of low correlation means also that it is important for analytic purposes to keep variables distinct even if they intercorrelate. For example, the analysis of cleavage presented here suggests specific propositions concerning the ways in which different electoral and constitutional arrangements

[45] See Juan Linz, *The Social Basis of German Politics*, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1958.

[46] See B. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), for an exposition of the usefulness of cross-pressure as an explanatory concept. Also, see S. M. Lipset, J. Linz, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and A. Barton, "Psychology of Voting," in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954), for an attempt to specify the consequences of different group memberships for voting behavior, and a review of the literature.

[47] As Dahl puts it, "if most individuals in the society identify with more than one group, then there is some positive probability that any majority contains individuals who identify for certain purposes with the threatened minority. Members of the threatened minority who strongly prefer their alternative will make their feelings known to those members of the tentative majority who also, at some psychological level, identify with the minority. Some of these sympathizers will shift their support away from the majority alternative and the majority will crumble." See Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 104–5. Parsons suggests that "pushing the implications of political difference too far activates the solidarities between adherents of the two parties which exist on other, nonpolitical bases so that majorities come to defend minorities of their own kind who differ from them politically." See Parsons' essay "Voting and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in the volume edited by E. Burdick and A. Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe: The Free Press, forthcoming).

[48] Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (New York, 1940).

may affect the chances for democracy. These generalizations are presented in the following section.

IV. Systems of Government and Democracy

From the hypothesis that cross-cutting bases of cleavage are better for the vitality of democracy, it follows that two-party systems are better than multi-party systems, that electoral systems involving the election of officials on a territorial basis are preferable to systems of proportional representation, and that federalism is superior to a unitary state. In evaluating these propositions, it is important to note again that they are made with the assumption of all other factors being held constant. Clearly, stable democracies are compatible with multi-party systems, with proportional representation, and with a unitary state. And in fact, I would argue that such variations in systems of government, while significant, are much less important than those derived from basic differences in social structure of the sort discussed in the previous sections.

The argument for the two-party system rests on the assumptions that in a complex society, such parties must necessarily be broad coalitions; that they cannot seek to serve only the interests of one major group; that they cannot be parties of integration; and that in building electoral coalitions, they necessarily antagonize support among those most committed to them, and conversely must seek to win support among groups which are preponderantly allied to the opposition party. Thus, the British Conservative or American Republican parties must not so act as to antagonize basically the manual workers, since a large part of the vote must come from them. The Democratic and Labor parties are faced with a similar problem vis-à-vis the middle strata. Parties which are never oriented toward gaining a majority seek to maximize their electoral support from a limited base. Thus a peasant-oriented party will accentuate peasant group interest consciousness, and a party appealing primarily to small businessmen will do the same for its group. Elections, instead of being occasions on which parties seek to find the broadest possible base of support, and so to bring divergent groups to see their common interests, become events in which parties stress the cleavages separating their principal supporters from other groupings.

The proposition that proportional representation weakens rather than strengthens democracy rests on the analysis of the differences between multi-party and majority party situations. If it is true, as is suggested above, that "multi-partyness" serves to sharpen differences and reduce consensus, then any electoral system which increases the chance for more rather than fewer parties serves democracy badly.

Further, as Georg Simmel pointed out, the system of electing members of parliament to represent territorial constituencies, as contrasted with systems which encourage direct group representation (such as proportional representation), is preferable, since territorial representation helps to stabilize the political systems by forcing interest groups to secure their ends only within an electoral framework that involves some concern with many interests and the need for compromise.[49]

Federalism serves to strengthen democracy by increasing the opportunity for multiple sources of cleavage. It adds regional interests and values to the others such as class, religion and ethnicity which cross-cut the social structure.

A major exception to this generalization occurs when federalism divides the country according to lines of basic cleavage, e.g., between the different ethnic, religious, or linguistic areas. In such cases, as in India or in Canada, federalism may then serve to accentuate and reinforce cleavages. Cleavage is desirable within linguistic or religious groups, not between them. But where such divisions do not exist, then federalism seems to serve democracy well. Besides creating a further source of cross-cutting cleavage, it also serves various functions which Tocqueville noted it shared with strong voluntary associations. Among these, it is the source of resistance to centralization of power and a source of training of new political leaders; and it gives the "out"

[49] Georg Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 191–194. Talcott Parsons has recently made a similar point, indicating that one of the mechanisms for preventing a "progressively deepening rift in the electorate" is the "involvement of voting with the ramified solidarity structure of the society in such a way, that, though there is a correlation, there is no *exact* correspondence between political polarization and other bases of differentiation. Parsons, *op. cit.*

party a stake in the system as a whole, since national "out" parties usually continue to control some units of the system.

Let me repeat that I do not suggest that these aspects of the political structure as such are key conditions for democratic systems. If the underlying social conditions are such as to facilitate democracy, as seems true for Sweden, then the combination of multi-partyness, proportional representation, and a unitary state, do not seriously weaken it. At the most they serve to permit irresponsible minorities to gain a foothold in parliament. On the other hand, where a low level of effectiveness and of legitimacy has operated to weaken the foundations of democracy as occurred in Weimar Germany, or in France, then constitutional factors encouraging multi-partyness serve to reduce the chances that the system will survive.

V. Problems of Contemporary Democracy

The characteristic pattern of the stable western democracies in the mid-20th century is that of a "post-politics" phase — there is relatively little difference between the democratic left and right, the socialists are moderates, and the conservatives accept the welfare state. In large measure this reflects the fact that in these countries the workers have won their fight for citizenship and for political access, i.e., the right to take part in all decisions of the body politic on an equal level with others.[50]

The struggle for citizenship had two aspects, political (access to power through the suffrage) and economic (institutionalization of trade unions rights to share in the decisions affecting work rewards and conditions). The representatives of the lower strata are now part of the governing classes, members of the club. Political controversy has declined in the wealthier stable democracies because the basic political issue of the industrial revolution, the incorporation of the workers into the legitimate body politic, has been settled. The only key domestic issue today is collective bargaining over differences in the division of the total product within the framework of a Keynesian welfare state; and such issues do not require or precipitate extremism on either side.

In most of the Latin and Eastern European countries, the struggle for working-class integration into the body politic was not settled before the Communists appeared on the scene to take over leadership of the workers. This fact drastically changed the political game, since inherently the Communists could not be absorbed within the system in the way that the Socialists have been. Communist workers, their parties and trade unions, cannot possibly be accorded the right of access by a democratic society. The Communists' self-image and more particularly their ties to the Soviet Union lead them to accept a self-confirming hypothesis. Their self-definition prevents them from being allowed access and this in turn reinforces the sense of alienation from the system (of not being accepted by the other strata) which workers in nations with large Communist parties have. And the more conservative strata are reinforced in their belief that giving increased rights to the workers or their representatives threatens all that is good in life. Thus, the presence of Communists precludes an easy prediction that economic development will stabilize democracy in these European countries.

In the newly independent nations of Asia, the situation is somewhat different. In Europe at the beginning of modern politics, the workers were faced with the problem of winning citizenship, the right to take part in the political game, from the dominant aristocratic and business strata who controlled politics. In Asia the long-term presence of colonial rulers has identified conservatism as an ideology and the more well-to-do classes with subservience to colonialism; while leftist ideologies, usually of a Marxist variety, have been dominant, being identified with nationalism. The trade unions and the worker's parties of Asia have been part of the political process from the beginning of the democratic system. Conceivably such a situation could mean a stable democracy, except for

[50] T. H. Marshall has analyzed the gradual process of incorporation of the working class into the body politic in the 19th century, and has seen that process as the achievement of a "basic human equality, associated with full community membership, which is not inconsistent with a superstructure of economic inequality." See his brief but brilliant book, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 77. Even though universal citizenship opens the way for the challenging of remaining social inequalities, it also provides a basis for believing that the process of social change toward equality will remain within the boundaries of allowable conflict in a democratic system.

the fact that these lower-strata rights pre-date the development of a stable economy with a large middle class and an industrial society.

The whole system stands on its head. The left in the European stable democracies grew gradually in a fight for more democracy, and gave expression to the discontent involved in early industrialization, while the right retained the support of traditionalist elements in the society, until eventually the system came into an easy balance between a modified left and right. In Asia, the left is in power during the period of population explosion and early industrialization, and must accept responsibility for all the consequent miseries. As in the poorer areas of Europe, the Communists exist to capitalize on all these discontents in completely irresponsible fashion, and currently are a major party, usually the second largest in most Asian states.

Given the existence of poverty-stricken masses, low levels of education, an elongated pyramid class structure, and the "premature" triumph of the democratic left, the prognosis for the perpetuation of political democracy in Asia and Africa is bleak. The nations which have the best prospects, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, the Philippines and Turkey, tend to resemble Europe in one or more major factors, high educational level (all except Turkey), substantial and growing middle class, and the retention of political legitimacy by non-leftist groups. The other emerging national states in Asia and Africa are committed more deeply to a certain tempo and pattern of economic development and to national independence, under whatever political form, than they are to the pattern of party politics and free elections which exemplify our model of democracy. It seems likely that in countries which avoid Communist or military dictatorship political developments will follow the pattern developing in countries such as Ghana, Tunisia or Mexico, where an educated minority uses a mass movement expressing leftist slogans to exercise effective control, and holds elections as a gesture toward ultimate democratic objectives, and as a means of estimating public opinion, not as effective instruments for legitimate turnover in office of governing parties.[51] Given the pressure for rapid industrialization and for the immediate solution of chronic problems of poverty and famine through political agencies, it is unlikely that many of the new governments of Asia and Africa will be characterized by an open party system representing basically different class positions and values.[52]

Latin America, underdeveloped economically like Asia, is, however, politically more like Europe in the early 19th century than like Asia today. Most Latin American countries became independent states before the rise of industrialism and Marxist ideologies, and contain strongholds of traditional conservatism. The countryside is often apolitical or traditional, and the leftist movements secure support primarily from the industrial proletariat. Latin American communists, for example, have chosen the European Marxist path of organizing urban workers, rather than the "Yenan way" of Mao, seeking a peasant base.[53] If Latin America is allowed to develop on its own, and is able to increase its productivity and middle classes, there is a good chance that many Latin American countries will follow in

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[51] See David Apter, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of the evolving political patterns of Ghana. For an interesting brief analysis of the Mexican "one-party" system see L. V. Padgett, "Mexico's One-Party System, a Re-evaluation," this *Review* Vol. 51 (1957), pp. 995–1008.

[52] As this paper was being edited for publication, political crises in several poor and illiterate countries occurred, which underline again the instability of democratic government in underdeveloped areas. The government of Pakistan was overthrown peacefully on October 7, 1958, and the new self-appointed president announced that "Western-type democracy cannot function here under present conditions. We have only 16 per cent literacy. In America you have 98 per cent." (*Associated Press* release, October 9, 1958). The new government proceeded to abolish parliament and all political parties. Similar crises have occurred, almost simultaneously, in Tunisia, Ghana, and even in Burma, which since World War II has been considered one of the more stable governments in Southeast Asia, under Premier U Nu. Guinea has begun life as an independent state with a one-party system.

It is possible that the open emergence of semi-dictatorships without much democratic "front" may reflect the weakening of democratic symbols in these areas under the impact of Soviet ideology, which equates "democracy" with rapid, efficient accomplishment of the "will of the people" by an educated elite, not with particular political forms and methods.

[53] Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957).

the European direction. Recent developments, including the overthrow of a number of dictatorships, in large measure reflect the effects of an increased middle class, growth in wealth, and increased education. There is, however, also the possibility that these countries may yet follow to the French and Italian direction rather than that of northern Europe, that the Communists will seize the leadership of the workers, and that the middle class will be alienated for democracy.

The analysis of the social requisites for democracy contained in this paper has sought to identify some, though obviously far from all, of the structural conditions which are linked to this political system. It has been possible in a very limited fashion to attempt some tests of the hypothesis suggested. These preliminary efforts to apply the method of science to comparative political systems can still be considered only as illustrative since we can say so little about actual variations in national social structures. Considerably more research must be done specifying the boundaries of various societies along many dimensions before reliable comparative analysis of the sort attempted here can be carried out. Although the task obviously presents tremendous difficulties, it is only through such method that we can move beyond the conventional semi-literary methods of giving illustrative examples to support plausible interpretations.

The data available are, however, of a sufficiently consistent character to support strongly the conclusion that a more systematic and up-to-date version of Aristotle's hypothesis concerning the relationship of political forms to social structure is valid. Unfortunately, as has been indicated above, this conclusion does not justify the optimistic liberal's hope that an increase in wealth, in the size of the middle class, in education, and other related factors will necessarily mean the spread of democracy or the stabilization of democracy. As Max Weber, in discussing the chances for democracy in Russia in the early 20th century pointed out: "The spread of Western cultural and capitalistic economy did not, *ipso facto*, guarantee that Russia would also acquire the liberties which had accompanied their emergence in European history. . . . European liberty had been born in unique, perhaps unrepeatable, circumstances at a time when the intellectual and material conditions for it were exceptionally propitious."[54]

These suggestions that the peculiar concatenation of factors which gave rise to western democracy in the nineteenth century may be unique are not meant to be unduly pessimistic. Political democracy exists and has existed in a variety of circumstances, even if it is most commonly sustained by a limited cluster of conditions. To understand more fully the various conditions under which it has existed may make possible the development of democracy elsewhere. Democracy is not achieved by acts of will alone; but men's wills, through action, can shape institutions and events in directions that reduce or increase the chance for the development and survival of democracy. To aid men's actions in furthering democracy was in some measure Tocqueville's purpose in studying the operation of American democracy, and it remains perhaps the most important substantive intellectual task which students of politics can still set before themselves.

Methodological Appendix

The approach to this paper (as has already been indicated) is implicitly different from others which have attempted to handle social phenomena on a total societal level, and it may be useful to make explicit some of the methodological postulates underlying this presentation.

Complex characteristics of a social system, such as democracy, the degree of bureaucratization, the type of stratification system, have usually been handled either by a reductionist approach or by an "ideal-type" approach. The former approach dismisses the possibility of considering those characteristics as system-attributes as such, and maintains that qualities of individual actions are the sum and substance of sociological categories. For this school of thought, the extent of democratic attitudes, or of bureaucratic behavior, or the numbers and types of prestige or power rankings, constitute the essence of the meaning of the attributes of democracy, bureaucracy, or class.

The "ideal-type" approach starts from a similar assumption, but reaches an opposite con-

[54] Richard Pipes, "Max Weber and Russia," *World Politics*, Vol. 7 (1955), p. 383.

clusion. The similar assumption is that societies are a complex order of phenomena, exhibiting such a degree of internal contradiction, that generalizations about them as a whole must necessarily constitute a constructed representation of selected elements, stemming from the particular concerns and perspectives of the scientist. The opposite conclusion is that abstractions of the order of "democracy" or "bureaucracy" have no necessary connection with states or qualities of complex social systems which actually exist, but comprise collections of attributes which are logically interrelated, but characteristic in their entirety of no existing society.[55] An example of this type of abstraction is Weber's concept of "bureaucracy," comprising a set of offices, which are not "owned" by the officeholder, continuously maintained files of records, functionally specified duties, etc. Another is the common definition of democracy in political science, which postulates individual political decisions based on rational knowledge of one's own ends and of the factual political situation.

Criticism of categories, or ideal-types such as this, solely on the basis that they do not correspond to reality is irrelevant, because they are not intended to describe reality, but to provide a basis for comparing different aspects of reality with their deviations from the consistently logical case. Often this approach is quite fruitful, and there is no intention here of substituting another methodological approach in its place, but merely of presenting another possible way of conceptualizing complex characteristics of social systems, stemming from the multivariate analysis pioneered by Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues on a quite different level of analysis.[56]

The point at which this approach differs is on the issue of whether generalized theoretical categories can be considered to have a valid relationship to characteristics of total social systems. The implication of the statistical data presented in this paper concerning democracy, and the relations between democracy, economic development, and political legitimacy, is that there are aspects of total social systems which exist, can be stated in theoretical terms, can be compared with similar aspects of other systems, and, at the same time, are derivable from empirical data which can be checked (or questioned) by other researchers. This does not mean at all that situations contradicting the general relationship may not exist, or that at lower levels of social organization, quite different characteristics may not be evident. For example, a country like the United States may be characterized as "democratic" on the national level, even though most secondary organizations within the country may not be democratic. On another level, a church may be characterized as a "non-bureaucratic" organization, when compared with a corporation, even though important segments of the church organization may be as bureaucratized as the most bureaucratic parts of the corporation. On yet another level, it may be quite legitimate, for purposes of psychological evaluation of the total personality, to consider a certain individual as "schizophrenic," even though under certain conditions, he may not act schizophrenically. The point is that when comparisons are being made on a certain level of generalization, referring to the functioning of a total system (Whether on a personality, group, organization, or society level), generalizations applicable to a total society have the same kind and degree of validity that those applicable to other systems have, and are subject to the same empirical tests. The lack of any systematic and comparative studies of several societies has obscured this point.

This approach also stresses the view that complex characteristics of a total system have multivariate causation, and also multivariate

[55] Max Weber's essay on " 'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," in his *Methodology of the Social Sciences, op. cit.*, pp. 72–93.

[56] The methodology presuppositions of this approach on the level of the multi-variate correlations and interactions of individual behavior with various social characteristics have been presented in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Interpretation of Statistical Relations as a Research Operation," in P. F. Lazarsfeld and M. Rosenberg, eds., *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 115–125; and in H. Hyman, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), chapters 6 and 7. See also the methodological appendices to Lipset, *et al.*, *Union Democracy, op. cit.*, pp. 419–432; and S. M. Lipset, "The Political Process in Trade Unions: A Theoretical Statement," in M. Berger, *et al.*, eds., *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1954), pp. 122–124.

consequences, insofar as the characteristic has some degree of autonomy within the system. Bureaucracy and urbanization, as well as democracy, have many causes and consequences, in this sense.[57]

On this view, it would be difficult to identify any *one* factor crucially associated with, or "causing" any complex social characteristic. Rather, all such characteristics (and this is a methodological assumption to guide research, and not a substantive point) are considered to have multivariate causation, and multivariate consequences. The point may be clarified by a diagram of some of the possible connections between democracy, the initial conditions associated with its emergence, and the consequences of an existent democratic system.

The appearance of a factor on both sides of "democracy" implies that it is both an initial condition of democracy, and that democracy, once established, sustains that characteristic of the society, an open class system, for example. On the other hand, some of the initial consequences of democracy, such as bureaucracy, may have the effect of *undermining* democracy, in turn, as the reversing arrows indicate. Appearance of a factor to the right of democracy does not mean that democracy "causes" its appearance, but merely that democracy is an initial condition which favors its development. Similarly, the hypothesis that bureaucracy is one of the consequences of democracy does not imply that democracy is the sole cause, but rather that a democratic system has the effect of encouraging the development of a certain type of bureaucracy, under other additional conditions, which have to be stated if bureaucracy is the focus of the research problem. This diagram is not intended as a complete model of the general social conditions associated with the emergence of democracy, but as a way of clarifying the methodological point concerning the multivariate character of relationships in a total social system.

Thus, in a multivariate system, the focus may be upon any element, and its conditions and consequences may be stated without the implication that we have arrived at a complete theory of the necessary and sufficient conditions of its emergence. This paper does not attempt a *new* theory of democracy, but only the formalizing, and the empirical testing, of certain sets of relationships implied by traditional theories, on the level of total social systems.

[57] This approach differs from Weber's attempt to trace the origins of modern capitalism. Weber was concerned to establish that *one* antecedent factor, a certain religious ethic, was crucially significant in the syndrome of economic, political, and cultural conditions leading up to the development of Western capitalism. My concern is not to establish the causal necessity of any one factor, but rather the syndrome of conditions which most frequently distinguish nations which may be empirically categorized as "more democratic" or "less democratic," without implying any absolute qualities to the definition.



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NATIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Its Measurement and Social Correlates

• *PHILLIPS CUTRIGHT*

Large-scale comparative studies of national political systems offer the social scientist a method of great power if only proper use can be made of the material at hand. It is the purpose of this article to examine in some detail a single sociological effort to apply the comparative method to national political systems and, following this discussion, to offer a number of solutions to the problems which seem to block further progress. Perhaps the best known and most articulate effort by a sociologist to deal empirically with a large number of contemporary national political systems is that of Seymour M. Lipset.[1]

Lipset identifies two groupings of national political systems, stable democracies on one hand and, on the other, unstable democracies, popular dictatorships, and elite-based dictatorships. He then poses the question: What differences in national economic development might explain why a nation would be in one group and not in the other?[2] To answer this question he offers a number of indicators of wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization. (He does not combine indicators to form a scale of wealth, industrialization, or

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[1] See Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," reprinted in this chapter, for a perceptive treatment of the value-loaded concept of political development. See also Lyle W. Shannon, "Is Level of Development Related to Capacity for Self-Government?" *American Journal of Economics and Sociology,* 17 (July, 1958), pp. 367–82, and a follow-up study also by Shannon, "Socio-economic Development and Demographic Variables as Predictors of Political Change," *Sociological Quarterly,* 1962. Leo F. Schnore's "The Statistical Measurement of Urbanization and Economic Development," *Land Economics,* Vol. XXXVII, August, 1961, pp. 229–245, contains an assessment of the relationship among a number of different indicators of national development we will use in this paper.

[2] Ratings by a single expert — or by panels of experts whose opinions on such matters as the condition of the press, political freedom, and so on, are averaged together — are of less value than a more objective indicator of political development. Careful examination of Russell H. Fitzgibbons, "A Statistical Evaluation of Latin American Democracy," *Western Political Quarterly,* Vol. 9, (1956), pp. 607–19, as well as Lipset's attempt to place nations in "democratic" or what amounts to "undemocratic" clusters, reveals the problems of this method of subjective evaluation. The shift in the rank order in which experts place the Latin American nations at different times allows the person using an index based on their ratings to take his pick of the democratic and undemocratic nations. Furthermore, raters disagree on the rank order in which groups of nations should be placed, and, when the number of nations is large, subjective evaluations have to be abandoned in favor of objective indicators — what expert can be in intimate contact with the political histories of all the nations of the world and also be willing or able to order them on simple scales, let alone multiple dimensions? We can devise statistical and objective methods of measuring political development, just as the economist does when he asks about energy consumption per capita, and not have to rely on what an expert believes the whole economy of a nation has been doing over the past year. This implies that we can also remove ourselves from the world of ethnocentric judgments about the goodness or evil of political systems and turn to other aspects of political systems in order to understand them.

economic development, although development forms one half of the central theme of the paper. The other half, "democracy," is not scaled either). Lipset presents statistical averages for the nations in each of the two political groups (stable democratic as opposed to all other forms of government) in two areas of the world, an English-speaking and European area, and the Latin American area. A sample of his analysis of these averages is instructive. Among the English-speaking and European stable democracies the mean number of telephones per 1000 persons (a "wealth" indicator) is 205 compared to only 58 per 1000 in "European and English-speaking unstable democracies and dictatorships."[3] Similar differences favoring democratic nations are revealed by all the indicators of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education among the English-speaking and European groups and, also, among Latin American nations.

Lipset seeks to show the effect of economic development on national political systems. The statistics are offered as proof that a strong relationship exists. However, a comparison of mean averages may show that differences exist between two groups without telling us the strength of the association between the independent variables that are presumably responsible for these observed differences. Thus, when Lipset notes that stable democracies have 205 telephones per 1000 persons compared to only 58 per 1000 in non-democratic nations, he implies that there is a "strong" relationship or association between this indicator of national wealth and the type of political system observed.

To give a little depth to his claims, Lipset presents the ranges for each indicator. Here some curious findings appear. The first and most obvious is that, even though the mean averages for the two types of national governments differ, the spread in the values on almost every indicator is so extreme that it would be very difficult to place a single nation in either the democratic or non-democratic category knowing, for example, only its score on the number of telephones. In the European and English-speaking stable democracies a nation may have from 43 to 400 telephones per 1000 population while a European dictatorship may have as few as 7 or as many as 196 per thousand. One wonders about the stable European democracies that have only 43, 60, 90, 130, 150 or even 195 telephones. How do they manage, while "dictatorial" European nations can at the same time have as many as 196 telephones per 1000? More striking is the case of Latin American *democracies*, in which the average number of telephones is 25 and the range is from 12 to 58. The number of telephones in Latin American democracies seems paltry when compared to the number of telephones in European dictatorships. European dictatorships, on the average, score twice as high on the number of telephones (and "wealth" and "economic development") as Latin American democracies.

Such a peculiarity can exist for a number of reasons. The first may be a failure to develop a scale of "democracy" that has as many gradations as the scale on which all the independent variables are defined. A nation is either democratic or it is not according to the Lipset scoring system. It makes little difference that in discussing national political systems one talks about shades of democracy if, in the statistical assessment, one cannot distinguish among nations. However, one cannot differentiate national political systems without a scoring system that assigns values to different nations according to some stated criteria. Although Lipset states his criteria, he does not discriminate between France and Albania, Brazil or Chile. We would be better able to assess his descriptive statistics if the dependent variable — the national political system — had been indexed or scaled.

A second reason for the peculiar findings reported above is a lack of a theoretical focus specifying what variables matter in determining whether a political system is democratic or not. A theoretical focus means one has a hypothesis to test, using a set of predicting variables that are "given" by the theoretical scheme. Lipset seeks to test the hypothesis that democracy will flourish in nations where wealth is distributed rather equally and in which large masses of starving or near-starving farmers and workers are not dominated by an elite of wealth and aristocracy. Do populations with a relatively high standard of living possess the "self-restraint" necessary to sustain "demo-

[3] Since there were no English-speaking dictatorships, this seems to be an oversight in tabular presentation.

cratic institutions"? Lipset makes no distinction between the varieties of "democratic" or non-democratic political systems. His working hypothesis asks only whether or not a significant difference on each economic indicator exists between nations with two types of political characteristics. When the hypothesis is confirmed he explains the finding through discussion of what people want or what the effects of education might be on self-restraint.

The concept of social change does not appear in Lipset's analysis of his data but he refers to studies by Schnore and Lerner in which the statistical interdependence of many of the same indicators he uses is demonstrated; and, in the case of Lerner, some links between education, communication, urbanization, economic development, and individual political participation are tentatively established.[4] Lerner's analysis is, however, restricted to the Middle East.

Research Objectives and Hypotheses

Let us move, then, to an attempt to build on the beginning furnished by Lipset, by developing an index of political development. The degree of political development of a nation can be defined by the degree of complexity and specialization of its national political institutions. Each nation can be placed on a continuum of political development which will allow it to be compared with any other nation in the world. We will bank heavily on the role played by political parties in national political life in measuring political development.

The principal hypothesis tested is that political institutions are interdependent with educational systems, economic institutions, communications systems, degree of urbanization, and the distribution of the labor force. A nation's economic system can develop only if its educational system keeps pace, if people concentrate in urban areas, if communications and transportation systems emerge, and if changes occur in family and social life that induce people to fit into the occupational demands of the unfolding system. Leo Schnore has measured the interdependence among certain of these factors.[5] But to test the hypothesis that political institutions are not set apart from the rest of a society's institutions we must construct an index of political development and then test the hypothesis by assessing the association between political development and other measures of national systems.

Constructing an Index of Political Development

The following items were selected and given the weights indicated. The time period covered by the data is 1940 through 1961.[6] The score each nation received for the first year was added to the score it received the following year to get a cumulative total score.

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[4] See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958.

[5] For a matrix of rank-order correlations of a number of indicators of these variables, see Schnore, *op. cit.*, p. 236. Schnore's correlations tend to be slightly higher than product-moment correlations using the *T*-scoring method, but slight differences in the number of nations included may account for such differences.

See also Alex Inkeles, "National Character and Modern Political Systems," in *Psychological Anthropology* (ed.) Francis L. K. Hsu, Homewood, Illinois, The Dorsey Press, 1961, pp. 172–208. (Reprinted in Chapter 3 of this book.) He reviews various approaches to this topic and cites studies which suggest connections between national character and modern political systems. However, no conclusions can be drawn from this body of work in part because it lacks a standard measure of political systems with which different national characters might be associated. For a definite point of view on the subject of the importance of personality to social change generally and economic and political change in particular, see Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change*, Homewood, Illinois, The Dorsey Press, 1962. Hagen's theory has the virtue of being testable, but he presents little supporting evidence himself — again, in part, because the evidence simply does not exist. In rejecting economic theories of social change, Hagen swings to psychological explanations, and in the process by-passes sociological perspectives.

[6] The primary source for the materials used in this study was the *Political Handbook of the World: Parliaments, Parties and Press*, published annually for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York: Harper and Brothers from 1940 through 1961. Needed supplementary checks were secured by reference to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* and other reference works. Nations included for study are listed in Table 2. All independent nations are included on all continents except Africa. These were excluded because inclusion would have inflated correlation coefficients artificially — their political development scores lump together in one corner of the scattergram. A more refined index of political development might distinguish variation in development. A total of 76 independent nations are included.

FIGURE 1. Relationship of Political Development to Communications Development: 71 Nations




Switzerland & Australia
Canada
Chile
Ireland
Sweden
U.S.A.
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Panama
Costa Rica
Denmark
France
Iceland
Norway
Belgium
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Cuba
Finland
Brazil
Italy
Japan
Israel
Argentina
Rep. of Germany
Greece
Austria
Venezuela
Hungary
U.S.S.R.
Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
Romania
Poland
Portugal
Spain
$r_{yx} = .80$
$b_{yx} = .2046$
$s_{byx} = .0176$
80
66
65
64
63
62
61
60
59
58
57
56
55
54
53
52
Y
50
49
48
47
46
45
44
43
42
41
40
39
38
37
36
35
20
Political Development Index
X 210
220
230
240
250
260
270
280
290
Communications Development Index

This scheme for scoring the nations, in which high scores mean high development, should penalize each nation for political instability which represents "backsliding" and reward it for achieving or retaining more complex political forms of organization. Points for any one year were awarded in the following manner.

1. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

Two points for each year in which a parliament existed in which the lower or the only chamber contained representatives of two or more political parties and the minority party or parties had at least 30 per cent of all seats.

One point for each year in which a parliament existed whose members were the representatives of one or more political parties, but where the "30 per cent rule" was violated.

No points for each year no parliament existed or for years when either of the above types of parliaments was abolished or discarded by executive power. Parliaments whose members are not members of political parties are given a zero. Parliaments that are not self-governing bodies (e.g., the mock parliaments of colonial governments that have no powers to override an executive veto or to force a government out of office by voting no confidence) are given a zero.

2. EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

One point for each year the nation was ruled by a chief executive who was in office by virtue of direct vote in an open election where he faced competition or was selected by a political party in a two or more-party system as defined by the conditions necesssary to get 2 points on the legislative branch indicator above. If the parliament ceased being a multi-party parliament, the chief executive stopped getting points.

No points for each year the nation was ruled by a chief executive selected by criteria other than those necessary to attain 1 point as given above. Colonial governments received a zero.

It is possible for a nation to acquire zero, one, two or three points per year. Over the 22-year period of our study it would be possible for a nation to accumulate a total of 66 points. This scoring system converts attributes into one continuous variable, just as the attribute "male" or "female" can be converted into a continuous variable by measuring the proportion of males in a group.

RELATIONSHIP OF POLITICAL TO OTHER MEASURES OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This study began with the aim of measuring the degree of association between political development and other types of social-economic development. The objective was a statistical assessment of the degree of association between educational development, urbanization, communication development, economic growth and labor force characteristics and the measure of political development.[7] A statistical statement of the proportion of the variation around the mean of the political development index that could be accounted for by covariation with selected independent variables was also sought. Finally, if the association was reasonably close, one might build a prediction equation which would describe for each nation whether its level of political development was commensurate with the values it received on the independent variables in the prediction equation.

Of the several independent variables considered, the communications development index[8] had a Pearson zero-order association with political development of .80.[9] The communi-

[7] Social-economic statistics used in this report were drawn from the last reporting year from the following United Nations sourcebooks: *Demographic Yearbook, 1960, Statistical Yearbook, 1960,* and *Report on the World Social Situation, 1957.* The *Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1960,* was the source for labor force statistics. Statistical assessment followed T scoring of the data. A simple technique for computing the T score is given in Allen E. Edwards, *Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences,* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1954. For a single item, T scoring of the raw data will yield a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. If we add items together to form an index, a four-part item with a sum of 200 represents a subject (or nation) with an average index score. All single item indicators and combined indices in this paper have been T scored.

[8] The communications development index is formed by summing the T scores a given nation received on newspaper consumption, newsprint consumption, telephones, and the number of pieces of domestic mail per capita. If one or two indicators were missing we took the average of the two or three available indicators and added their scores to estimate the total index score. Five of the 76 nations had less than two communications indicators and their scores were estimated and used in the prediction equation developed later in the paper. They are omitted from Figure 1.

[9] Variables considered but not included in the matrix because of high intercorrelations with vari-

cations development index is tightly related to an index of economic development (.95) but is a better predictor of political development than is economic development.[10] The communications index reflects the ability and the needs of national systems to maintain differing types of communication systems depending on the varying degrees of literacy of their population and varying levels of integration of the economic and social order.

The relationship between national communications development and political development may be seen in graphic form in Figure 1. This scattergram makes the correlation coefficient more meaningful. The communications development scores on the horizontal axis increase from left to right; the political development scores on the vertical axis increase from bottom to top.

The most striking thing about the Figure 1 is the steady increase in the level of political development as the level of communication development increases. The main diagonal is the *regression line*. If every nation's scores were such as to put it exactly on that line, the correlation coefficient would be 1.00. We see, however, that some nations are above the line and some are below. What is the difference? A nation below the line is politically underdeveloped in relation to its given level of communications development.[11] To find the political development score that any nation below the line "should" have, draw a line vertically up until it meets the regression line. Then draw a right angle or horizontal line until it intercepts the political development axis. (Then compare this "expected" development score with the actual development score.) Nations below the line may be defined as politically "backward" relative to their level of communications. Just the opposite is true for the nations above the line. They are politically over-developed. The difference between the communication index scores that the politically overdeveloped nations (above the line) really have and what they should have if they were on the regression line represents the extent of possible imbalance in the social system of the nation.

If the sociological conception of an interdependent social system in equilibrium is valid, we can apply that theory to this statistical model, taking the regression line as that set of points toward which the nations "should" be moving if they are not already on it. Nations above the line (politically overdeveloped) can reach the line by increasing their communication development (and maintaining their political development) or by "backsliding" on political development while maintaining the same score on communications.

Nations below the line face similar alternative routes to the equilibrium point. They can increase their level of political development and rise vertically to the line or they can decrease their communications and move to the left until they meet the line — maintaining or perhaps decreasing their level of political development. Such movements as this may seem unlikely to people living in a society in which communication systems are believed to increase steadily in complexity, but alternative (even "impossible") movements can occur during revolutions, civil wars, and territorial occupation by a foreign power, or through economic disasters. Internal social change may be violent or not, but in any case should result in movement in the predicted direction.

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ables already in the matrix were the economic development index and industrial labor force index. Economic development was measured by combining the *T* scores for a given nation of per capita measures of energy consumption, steel consumption, income in U.S. dollars, and the number of motor vehicles. These items are all highly intercorrelated. (See Schnore, *op. cit.*, p. 236.)

[10] The product-moment correlation of communications development with political development was .80 compared to .68 for economic development with political development.

[11] Our use of the terms politically over- or underdeveloped should not be understood as a moral or ethical judgment of where the nation ought to be. A politically underdeveloped nation lacks sufficient points which it could obtain only if it met the criteria set by our political development index. In severe cases it may lack any political party or even a parliament. Our statements of whether or not a nation is under- or overdeveloped are not made with sole reference to its score on the political development index — a nation is either high or low or in between on the index. The judgment is being made only with reference to the political development score the nation should have *relative* to its level of communications development. Thus, a nation with a one-party system may actually be overdeveloped politically in relation to its communications system or its level of urbanization and other measures of national growth.

Mathematical models have been considered[12] which might be applied to data like these to test the notion that there will be movement toward the line. Empirical testing would be the only way to state whether nations do in fact increase or decrease either variable in order to come into equilibrium. However, if measurements are made each year for a period of years, the movement of nations can be precisely plotted. If empirical tests do not show nations moving toward their equilibrium point, then it is also possible that the same test will reveal different equilibrium points for nations in different social and economic circumstances. We have conveniently assumed a common set of equilibrium points rather than several (one could have several equilibrium points simply if different clusters of nations had different regression lines, a possibility to be explored in later research).

In Figure 1 we have drawn broken lines on either side of the regression line we actually observed for the 71 nations on which we had communication index scores. For these data the sample estimate of the standard error of the regression coefficient can be applied to describe what is a "small" and what is a "large" departure from the regression line. The broken lines represent alternative regression lines that would be likely to occur if we were drawing a sample of 71 from a larger population. Although these conditions are not met in this case, the use of a high and a low estimate of alternative regression coefficients establishes hypothetical confidence bands which may help us sort out errors of measurement and other types of error that may result in moving a nation several points away from the line when actually it should be closer to it. Measurement errors may also place a nation on the line when it ought not to be there, but this is less likely than the former movement which decreases correlations. The inability of either one of our indices actually to distinguish for every nation the refinements of political development; missing data and substitution of estimates for communication scores; the mis-reporting of political information — all of these types of error exist and should be considered before refined explanations of minor deviations from the line are attempted. For the benefit of students who may wish to consider these possibilities, the nations that lie between the two bands of broken lines may be considered as being off the regression line because of measurement and other errors; hence attention may be devoted to nations that are outside the bands for deviant-case analysis or comparison of extreme cases on either side of the line.

[12] See James S. Coleman, "The Mathematical Study of Small Groups," in Herbert Solomon (ed.) *Mathematical Thinking in the Measurement of Behavior*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1960, pp. 26–30.

Accounting for National Political Development

Inspection of the matrix of correlations in Table 1 reveals a high degree of association between each predicting variable and political development. But the variable most closely associated is the communications development index. If taken alone it accounts for 64 per cent of the variation of the political development scores around the mean. It is appropriate to ask whether or not the additional variables add to an over-all explanation of the variation and, if so, how much?

Computation of a multiple correlation coefficient using all four independent variables simultaneously yields a multiple R of .85. Thus, a total of 72 per cent (R^2) of the observed variation around the mean of the dependent variable is associated with covariation in the independent variables. This compares with the 64 per cent of variation that could be accounted for by using communications as a single predictor. By way of further comparison, only 38 per cent — $(.62)^2$ — of the variation around the mean could have been accounted for by variation in the scores on the education index had we used that as a single predictor.

The intercorrelations suggest that we should not be too hasty in abandoning the use of multiple criteria. The fact that the communication index is highly correlated with the education index and its .95 correlation with economic development reveal the highly interdependent nature of national social organization. The statistical meaning of the zero-order correlation coefficient of education and communication is the same as that of the multiple correlation coefficient, which happened also to be .85. Both mean that 72 per cent of variation around the mean of a "dependent" variable was "explained" by covariation with the other variable(s). Thus, the score a nation receives on

TABLE 1. *Matrix of Correlations of National Measures of Political Development, and Levels of Education, Communication, Urbanization and Employment in Agriculture*

	1	2	3	4	5	*Means*	*S.D.*
1) Communication		71	85	−79	80	207.6	35.8
2) Urbanization	[69]		75	−72	64	49.7	8.8
3) Education	[69]	[70]		−72	62	107.1	16.4
4) Agriculture	[57]	[56]	[58]		−56	50.5	10.5
5) Political Development	[71]	[74]	[72]	[58]		50.0	9.5

$$\hat{Y} = (-21.46) + (.300X_1) + (.376X_2) + (-.221X_3) + (.282X_4)$$
$$R_{y.1234} = .85$$

Numbers above the diagonal are product-moment correlations. Numbers below the diagonal give the number of cases on which the appropriate correlation was based.

The communications index summed the T scores of newspaper readers per capita, newsprint consumption per capita, the volume of domestic mail per capita, and the number of telephones per capita.

The urbanization index is the T score of the proportion of the population of the nation living in cities over 100,000. The proportion of the economically active labor force employed in agriculture was T scored. The education index was formed by combining T scores of literacy with T scores of the number of students per 100,000 enrolled in institutions of higher education.

Political development scores are computed by T scoring the 76 nations' raw political development scores.

Means and standard deviations of independent variables are based on the largest reported N in row 5. N for the political development mean and standard deviation was 74.

communications development is itself highly dependent on the national level of educational development, urbanization, movement of the labor force out of agricultural employment, and economic development. That communications and not economic development, urbanization, or education best accounts for the political development of a nation is significant. It should not obscure, however, the essential interdependence of this matrix of characteristics, which collectively give a distinctive profile to any given nation and collectively interact to yield political outcomes which in turn yield further changes in the independent variables themselves.[13]

USING THE PREDICTION EQUATION TO FULL ADVANTAGE

Political development scores can be used in several ways. We can make a simple statement about the relative position of any nation regarding its political development by comparing the index score of one country with scores of other nations. We can extend the power of such comparison considerably, however, if we use the prediction equation (a by-product of our computation of R) and, on the basis of the existing interrelationships among the variables in the matrix in Table 1, predict what the score of any nation on political development "should be" on the basis of its "complete" profile of national development. Knowing its scores on communications development, urbanization,

[13] It is of interest to note that when intercorrelations are high it becomes impossible to give any meaning to the size or sign of the beta weights in the prediction equation. This is a favorite pastime of some sociologists, but inspection of the correlations and beta weights in Table 1 should make them hesitate to partial out variation to any specific independent variable in a multiple regression analysis. Since I have indulged in this statistical fantasy myself, I feel well qualified to bring it to the attention of my colleagues. The use of partial correlations to produce meaningful correlations when intercorrelations are high is also of doubtful usefulness. Removing the effect of "communication" and then seeing what the partial is between education and political development would reveal a coefficient of near zero, but this certainly would not mean that education was not a vital factor. Partial correlation is a way of finding out what added gain one may expect by including certain variables in a multiple regression equation, but it tends to oversimplify our conception of the world under some conditions. It is what might be called an "anti-systems" statistic, albeit an occasionally useful one.

educational attainment, and agricultural labor force, we can calculate an estimated or predicted political development score.

When this is done the predicted value of political development can be compared to the actual value of any nation. If we subtract the predicted value from the actual value we get a positive or a negative number that represents error of prediction. If the error is positive, the nation has a higher than expected political development score. If the error (or the "residual") is negative, the nation has a lower than predicted score for its political development.

For example, the actual political development score for Canada was 66 and its predicted value, 61.3. The difference is + 4.7. Canada has a larger than predicted political development score. On the other hand, Venezuela had an actual political development value of 50, but a predicted value of 56.1, with a negative residual of −6.1. Venezuela's actual political development was less than expected on the basis of its social characteristics.

These errors may tell us much about some of the factors that influence political development. One such factor is revealed in Table 2, which groups nations according to their geographic location. The size of the average net residual error for the 12 nations in North America was a positive 4.3. The table also shows that of the 12 nations in North America, ten had positive residuals. The situation is similar for South America. There, average net residuals reveal greater than predicted political

TABLE 2. *Residual Error of Prediction of Political Development: By Continent and Nation*

North America		*South America*		*Asia*		*Europe*	
Canada	4.7	Argentina	−2.3	Afghanistan	−0.3	Albania	0.8
Costa Rica	7.5	Bolivia	5.9	Burma	10.1	Austria	−2.6
Cuba	3.2	Brazil	−0.9	Cambodia	−6.2	Belgium	2.3
Dom. Republic	−5.7	Chile	12.5	Ceylon	1.6	Bulgaria	−7.1
El Salvador	9.1	Colombia	3.3	China	−3.1	Czechoslovakia	−3.0
Guatemala	7.2	Ecuador	2.0	Fed. of Malaya	−6.7	Denmark	−0.5
Haiti	2.7	Paraguay	3.8	India	11.1	Finland	−2.9
Honduras	10.4	Peru	4.9	Indonesia	7.3	France	4.4
Mexico	1.3	Uruguay	8.3	Iran	−3.5	W. Germany	−2.8
Nicaragua	7.1	Venezuela	−6.1	Iraq	−1.7	Greece	1.1
Panama	6.5			Israel	−1.3	Hungary	1.3
United States	−2.6			Japan	−3.8	Iceland	0.5
				Jordan	−6.3	Ireland	9.7
				Rep. of Korea	−0.4	Italy	−1.0
				Laos	−4.5	Luxembourg	−4.1
				Lebanon	−1.8	Netherlands	1.3
				Mongolia	−6.0	Norway	−1.7
				Muscat	−3.6	Poland	−6.4
				Nepal	−3.5	Portugal	−17.2
				Pakistan	−5.3	Romania	−9.9
				Philippines	10.7	Spain	−20.3
				Thailand	−2.0	Sweden	0.9
				S. Arabia	−7.3	Switzerland	4.3
				Turkey	−1.6	United Kingdom	1.3
				Viet Nam	0.3	Yugoslavia	−2.1
				Yemen	−3.6	U.S.S.R.	−0.7
				Australia	−0.1		
				N. Zealand	2.3		
Mean of Net Residual Errors of Prediction	+4.3		+3.5		−1.4		−2.1
$N =$	[12]		[10]		[28]		[26]

Standard Deviation of residuals:* $s_{y \cdot x} = \pm 5.05$

* Adapted from Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

development — an average error of more than three *T*-score values. Looking over the table as a whole, it is clear that nations located in the Western Hemisphere enjoy a considerable advantage in their political development over nations located in Asia or Europe.[14]

We might speculate that the absence of international conflict over the long history of North and South America has resulted in far greater benefits for their political development than we anticipated. Our common stereotype of Latin American political instability is subject to some re-evaluation when seen from the world perspective. Far from being unstable, the prediction equation suggests that they are not only relatively stable but relatively more developed than comparable nations around the world. The absence of international conflict may well be one of the crucial variables to consider as a background to understanding the political development of nations. Of course, without an international conflict within the Western Hemisphere it is impossible to differentiate nations within the hemisphere. Little can be said about the relation of war to political development in the Western Hemisphere because such conflicts do not exist. In these circumstances, what does not exist in the Western Hemisphere but does exist in other areas of the world can be invoked as an "explanation" of the direction of the residual values!

We are, however, in the fortunate position of being able to compare societies that have not experienced international conflict with societies that have, to see if the pattern of differences observed sustains our suggested explanation for the pattern of positive residuals in North and South America. When we combine Europe with the Western Hemisphere (Table 3) we have a total of 48 nations. Of these, 19 were penetrated by land armies in World War II, and 29 were not.[15] Of the 19 nations so directly affected by the War only 31 per cent show positive political development residuals while 76 per cent of the 29 nations not affected reveal political development gains.[16]

While the implication of disruption of a complex social system by such phenomena as war may seem obvious to some readers, war should not be viewed as the sole source of disruption or even as a disruptive force in some areas. What of the pattern of political underdevelopment in Asia? Does it not refute the data in Table 3?

If one relies solely on a few statistics, without some other types of distinctions among different types of nations, his analysis may falter. We omitted Asia from Table 3 because it obscures the relationship, but we learn something by so doing. We learn that war is disruptive to complex social systems and that this fact is revealed by Table 3, which is composed of nations that are, for the most part, in a stage of advanced political and economic-social development. Asian nations, with a few exceptions, are not yet at the stage where the effects of war will be reflected on the political development index. In fact, a number of Asian nations received their independence largely through the indirect effects of World War II and were thus able to join the ranks of independent nations. The Asian nations that have more complex political organization than predicted are

[14] The U.S.S.R. is considered to be in Europe and New Zealand and Australia in Asia for the convenience of presentation.

[15] We use World War II alone because it occurred during the period covered by our study. Had we gone back to the era of the First World War, roughly the same nations would have again been involved. The effect observed in Table 3 may not be attributable to World War II but to longer-run effects of war on the political development of nations.

[16] The reader may argue that I have "stacked the deck" in favor of this outcome by starting my time series in the year 1940, a time at which Europe was engaged in a war which resulted in the loss of national autonomy for a number of nations — hence an inability to collect political development points. This criticism applies to very few nations. Only a few European nations had multi-party political systems before 1940 and about half of these avoided conquest by staying neutral or by physical location. In fact, France and Belgium, both of which were occupied and both of which had multi-party systems in the prewar period, reveal positive residual values while across the Pyrenees, Spain and Portugal both show gross political underdevelopment. Neither Spain nor Portugal had complex political institutions before, during, or after the war. The over-all effect is best summarized in Table 3.

Greater depth of analysis of the variation among nations with continents can be achieved by subtracting out the "bias" effect that being located on a particular continent gives to a nation, and each nation can then start out on equal terms for further analysis. For example, we could subtract 4.26 from each *actual* score of the North American nations and 3.47 from each South American nation. In similar vein, we could add 1.38 to each Asian nation and 2.14 to each European nation.

TABLE 3. *Territorial Involvement in World War II and National Development: Western Hemisphere versus Europe*

	Territory invaded during the war	Territory not reached by war
Per cent of nations revealing political development gains	31%	76%
100% =	19	29

$\chi^2 = 7.46$; $df = 1$; $p < .01$

India, Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines. These achieved independence *after* the war was over. But most of those Asian nations which have been independent for a long period have *lower* than predicted political development. There are, in short, no single factor explanations of political under- or overdevelopment. The presence or absence of international conflict on the territory of a nation, and other violent conflict may, if protracted, influence the development of nations; and complex social systems are especially vulnerable to such changes. Changes that disrupt socio-economic life may be expected to disrupt other aspects of the national system. We might hypothesize that the amount of disruption would be related to the degree of complexity of organization and interdependency within a given nation.

THE USE OF ERRORS OF PREDICTION IN TESTING THEORIES OF POLITICAL CHANGE

Under the assumption that the institutions of a society form an interdependent system in equilibrium nations should tend to move to the regression line so that their communications development equilibrates with their political development. This should hold for politically overdeveloped nations and for politically backward nations. To reach the line, a nation must change its score on political development or communications development or on both.

In multiple regression analysis, the predicted values may be treated as the regression line. They represent the set of points toward which any one nation should move regarding political development and the scores the nation has on the four predictor variables. When we compare the predicted with the actual score and find that a nation has departed from its predicted values, we can view it as being out of equilibrium. Hypothetically, it should be under some pressure to move toward the predicted score on political development. The student interested in mass movements, political change, or revolution may have seen in the preceding discussions a means of locating nations that should be experiencing deep strains in their socio-political system.

For example, theories of political change which view mass movements as the carriers of political change usually portray such action as taking place when the political institutions are not "adequate" in form or function and are sufficiently out of phase with other areas of national development to set up the conditions that allow traditional bonds of allegiance of the masses to the elites and to existing political institutions to be broken in a mass upheaval. The meaning of the deviation from the "multiple" regression line formed by a set of predicted political scores may be translated in terms of its possible measurement of pressures on certain social classes, or economic or power elites. Kornhauser regards the historic development of national social systems in terms of their *rate* of development (i.e., rate of urbanization, industrialization, transformation of the educational institutions, and the complexity of the economy and communications systems) in relation to political behavior of certain segments of the population that are affected by rapid change.[17] Other theorists focus on the importance of changes in national character before the economic transformations which led to political disequilibrium can occur.[18]

The method presented in this paper makes a *prediction* about which nations should experience political movements of a specific type (either toward increasing complexity or decreasing complexity). Theories of change can

[17] William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1959. See also the discussion by Joseph R. Gusfield, "Mass Society and Extremist Politics," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, February 1962, pp. 19–30.

[18] Hagen, *op. cit.*, and Inkeles, *op. cit.*

then be tested against what actually happens. This frees us from the primary and very legitimate criticism leveled against most theorists of political change: that they are always talking about something that is past and done with.

Taking Asia as an example, we have already noted the politically overdeveloped character of India (11.1), the Philippines (10.7), Burma (10.1), and Indonesia (7.3). These are the only Asian nations whose positive errors of prediction are larger than one standard deviation ($s_{y.x} = \pm 5.05$) of the residuals. Changes have been occurring in these nations, and the more dramatic of these changes are political. Burma and Indonesia have turned away from complex political organization and have abandoned multi-party politics. They will move toward the regression line not only by increasing their socio-economic development scores (a problematic event) but by decreasing their level of political development to the point where equilibrium is reached. When they reach the line, the strain to reestablish more complex political forms ought to resume, providing socio-economic development continues.

The pressures in India and the Philippines toward similar political "backsliding" may also be strong and whether they will follow the path taken by the Burma and Indonesia is problematic. If rapid economic and social development can occur they may achieve equilibrium.[19]

For the student of social change who is oriented to case studies, this technique supplies a basis on which to pick cases on more than "expert" testimony. Here is a tool for locating deviant cases if one wishes to compare different types of nations in detail to see the institutional mechanisms or other national characteristics that allow a nation to wander far from the regression line and stay out of equilibrium for many years. He might wish to contrast, for example, Ireland (9.7) with Spain (−20.3), or Uruguay (8.3) with Venezuela (−6.1).

In tracing out the social correlates of the political development of nations, one need not wait for the future. The design used here could be taken back to 1930. One might calculate the residual values at five-year intervals and recalculate the deviations, observing the differences among different types of nations. Continued up to 1960, the sample of points and deviations would look approximately like our own.[20] Such an analysis might reveal cut-off points in social-economic development beyond which change in the political system is apparently unavoidable. It could reveal a cut-off point further down the scale where complex political institutions cannot stand for long. Such a longitudinal study could get at the interaction between political and other institutions in the society. It could measure some of the non-economic aspects of economic growth that so trouble students of underdeveloped nations. Does the existence of complex (given their level of socio-economic development) political organization in Latin American States give them an advantage over their politically backward counterparts in Europe and Asia? What are the effects of sustained political overdevelopment on other systems within the nation that will allow it to "take off" to new heights of social growth or plunge it into revolution and political traditionalism? What differences in national character sustain political change, economic change or traditionalism, and how is national character affected by increasing levels of organizational complexity in nations?[21]

[19] Philippine deviation may be partially explained by this observation. "While Washington officials and Ambassador Spruance took great pains to maintain neutrality between the candidates, they made it clear to the Philippine government that the conduct of the election was of vital concern to the United States. Had the Liberal Administration been returned to power by means of fraud and violence, it would have been in no position to bargain successfully for badly needed economic assistance and for the much desired revision of the Bell Act!" *Internal pressures* for an honest election, however, are also cited. Willard H. Elsbree, the 1953 Philippine Presidential Elections," *Pacific Affairs,* Vol. XXVII, March, 1954, p. 13. It is interesting to note that representation in the Philippine lower House conformed to our definition of multi-party representation only during the first decade of independence, and has violated the "30 per cent rule" of minority party representation since 1957. In India, the Congress party's majorities also override the 30 per cent rule.

[20] Space restrictions prohibit more than mention of the statistical problems of treating change over time: for example, one would need measures of both political and non-political values. It is possible to study development without reference to a nation's relative position in the world. This is the approach usually followed by the case-study worker. Both approaches have limitations and advantages.

[21] For one example of changes induced by the onslaught of industrialization see Alex Inkeles and Peter H. Rossi, "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology,*

SUMMARY

This report developed some of the possible applications of an index of political development for 76 independent nations in all continents except Africa. (Africa was omitted for statistical reasons, in order not to inflate the persuasiveness of our results.) Knowledge of the level of the development of the communications system of a nation accounts for 64 per cent of the variation in scores around the mean of the political development index. A multiple regression equation which added educational development, agriculture labor force, and degree of urbanization to the communication index as predictors of political development raised the level of explained variation to 72 per cent.

The matrix of intercorrelations among a variety of indicators of the specialization and level of development of different aspects of national social, economic, and political life supported the idea that social systems are indeed systems — that is their parts are interdependent. The concept of interdependence and the statistical method of this study led us to consider the existence of hypothetical equilibrium points toward which each nation is moving. It is possible for a nation to be politically overdeveloped or underdeveloped, and we suggest that either political or non-political changes will occur to put the nation into equilibrium.

The extent to which a nation diverges from its predicted level of political development was considered and possible ways to utilize these errors of prediction were discussed. Finally, the ability of social scientists to test theories concerning revolution, mass movements and political change was discussed.

Vol. LXI, January, 1956, pp. 329–339, for a study of ranking of occupations by inhabitants of six nations. Rankings are highly correlated. The authors interpret this as an outcome of the industrial occupational system and the centralized national state.

45

STABILITY AND VITALITY IN SWEDISH DEMOCRACY

• *HERBERT TINGSTEN*

During the last decades the trend and colour of the debate on democracy have been determined by the rise of the modern dictatorships, by the danger and fear of dictatorship. The success of a democracy therefore has been measured primarily from the point of view of stability and security; a successful democracy has been a régime possessing a community of values sufficiently strong not to be shaken by too great differences, not threatened by nazism, fascism or communism. The attitude and the debate have been marked by the defensive position, by the uncertainty whether the rule by the people could be maintained. For obvious reasons the problems, difficulties and dangers threatening the stable, levelling, universally accepted democracy have received little attention. . . . Briefly stated the problem [is]: is what is generally regarded as a successful democracy a kind of consumption of the democratic idea, the beginning of a decline; and if so, what can be done to halt this development, to combine stability with vitality?

Among the motives which have been fundamental in the process of democratization, I shall discuss only two, which can be described as basic. Democracy, which I define simply as rule through a general franchise under conditions of political liberty, would make it possible for various interest groups and categories of the society to assert their demands within the framework of the state and would in this manner lead to social harmony. Particularly in the older debate, as represented for instance by James and John Stuart Mill, democracy was

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often thought of as the rule by the middle class, who, by virtue of their intermediate position, would act as a conciliatory and levelling agent; democracy has since been regarded to an increasing degree as a means of improving the lot of the poor and neglected social groups. It is obvious that on the whole successful democracy has fulfilled these hopes. The value of the reforms made can be discussed and also which reforms remain to be carried through, but it can hardly be denied that an enormous transformation, accepted by practically everybody, has taken place through the agency of democracy with a minimum of conflict and lasting ill will. The great changes, particularly the economic-social ones, were made possible by the material interests being brought into the foreground; and, as a result, the party political dividing lines have been fundamentally determined by such interests. By this of course it should not be understood that the interests have always been clearly realized or that the dividing lines have always been rational in this respect. If we take a benevolent view of this welfare democracy we can regard it with Sir Ernest Barker as a forum of debate; if we look at it more critically it can be described as a market of interests.

However, in this debate which has now continued for nearly 200 years, there appears just as clearly another motive for democracy. It is, if we like, a romantic, idealistic motive; I need only mention the names of Rousseau and Jefferson. Participation in the ruling of the state should stimulate and educate. The attention of the citizens should be directed to large and fundamental problems; the life of the individual and his personality should be richer and happier in the spiritual sense, through the divorce from that which is private, mean and selfish. "Republics exist only on the tenure of being constantly agitated," is a typical statement by Wendell Phillips. "The republic which sinks to sleep, trusting to constitution and machinery, to politicians and statesmen, for the safety of its liberties never will have any." This idea is often marked by naïve optimism, democracy is regarded as a gigantic people's college, producing eager, skilled and enthusiastic debaters, giving the citizens education, entertainment and passion, and the inevitable fettering to economic-social interests is to some extent neglected or obscured. But this idealistic motivation, often culminating in pure metaphysics, has been a central part of the process of democratization, it has inspired the pioneers of popular government with fervour and strength.

A tendency towards a conflict between these two motives is clearly discernible. The idea of a struggle between economic-social interests requires the citizen to act as a judicious egotist and not from ideal motives disengaged from the individual's private situation. The harmony which is sought must lead to limitation of the conflicts and thereby also of the passion and the debate, to a quietness which is far removed from the high-minded disputes which have been propounded as the glory of democracy.

On this basis, I shall attempt to analyse some features of Swedish democracy, without doubt one of the most successful in the world. But first some elementary facts. For the last 150 years, Swedish constitutional policy has been characterized by peaceful progress towards wider political freedom and a larger popular share in the government. However, complete political democracy is fairly new in Sweden; its beginnings can be traced approximately to 1920. Since that time the Riksdag, divided into two chambers, has been based on full and equal franchise, the royal prerogatives have been transferred in fact to the government appointed in accordance with parliamentary principles. It should be added that the proportional representation principle has been adopted throughout, from the election of state and communal representatives to the election of bodies and committees within these organs.

Five parties have been incomparably the most important throughout this entire period. Their principles are indicated by their names: the Conservatives, the Agrarians, the Liberals (People's Party), the Social Democrats, and the Communists. The strength of the parties at various periods in what we term the Second Chamber (the chamber most closely corresponding to the House of Commons in Britain) is shown in the table below. It should be pointed out that the anti-socialist and the socialist parties have polled practically an equal number of votes in recent years and that consequently the situation in this respect is very unstable. However, the significance of this fact should not be exaggerated: the antagonism between Social Democrats and the Commu-

Representatives elected to the Second Chamber of the Swedish Riksdag in 1925, 1933, 1941, 1949, *and* 1955

	1925	1933	1941	1949	1955
Conservatives	65	58	42	23	31
Liberals or People's Party	33	24	23	57	58
Agrarians	23	36	28	30	26
Social Democrats	104	104	134	112	110
Communists	5	8	3	8	5
	230	230	230	230	230

nists is pronounced; since 1951 the country has been governed by a Social Democrat and Agrarian coalition.

The levelling of party differences which has taken place during this stage can best be clarified by a short account of the changes in the situation concerning the fundamental concrete questions:

1. *The Nation and the Defense.* The Conservative Party has traditionally been the most "national" and the most ardent supporter of defence. Earlier, even up to the second world war, there was a strong, at times dominating, faction among the Social Democrats striving for isolated Swedish disarmament. In Swedish politics, there was a dispute not only about various defence appropriations but about the value or righteousness of a defence force; indeed the very feeling of national community was under debate. Today agreement between the democratic parties on these questions is practically unanimous. A defence budget which is far greater than ever before in peace time is passed annually without dispute and the Social Democrats vie with the Conservatives in emphasizing their patriotic ardour.

2. *Democracy itself.* Forty years ago the Conservatives opposed democracy and parliamentarianism; among the Social Democrats there were many who, under marxist influence, supported the thought that democracy was without intrinsic value and merely the means of realizing socialism. Now the democratic attitude is as natural as the patriot. At no time have we had a fascist or nazi party of any significance; the Communists who spur on the other parties to vie in devotion to democracy have won the votes of 5–7 per cent of the electorate at the recent elections. The rallying around democracy has also led to unity in respect of a number of secondary questions regarding the shaping of the polity. The Monarchy appears as a decoration, criticized on a few occasions for the snobbery with which it is surrounded, but in practice accepted by all. It is characteristic that the Social Democratic programme still includes the demand for a republic, but that the party leaders repudiate the thought of realizing it.

3. *Nationalization.* A number of enterprises which were nationalized in Britain only after the second world war have been state or communal property in Sweden for a very long time, partly because private capital was lacking; for instance, the railways, gas, water, and electricity services. The older, marxist coloured Swedish Social Democratic Party, however, demanded far more extensive nationalization, particularly of banking and the more important industries. For short periods after the two world wars attempts were made to bring up these nationalization programmes, but before long these efforts came to a standstill and the actions carried through were very limited. Certain investigations indicate that interest in nationalization within the working classes is small. As in so many other countries, instead of nationalization, a system has been introduced of government planning and control which certainly has invited criticism in specific instances, but hardly any fundamental and unified opposition.

4. *Social Welfare Policy and Taxes.* These and other questions which more immediately and concretely concern the economic interests of the various social groups, were earlier discussed as fundamental questions, with such general arguments that one is justified in speaking of an ideological battle. Did the state have the right to determine the working conditions of

adult people, to achieve social levelling through taxation, to master unemployment through active economic policies — all these problems which some decades ago divided the nation, appear practically meaningless today. The debate concerns decisions on particular matters and as a rule solutions are found which are accepted by the majority; in respect of the social welfare questions unity is achieved not only in principle, but also usually on individual questions.

5. *Church and Religion* were previously on the agenda, defended and attacked with argumentation in the grand style. Whilst the Conservatives were staunch defenders of the established church, the Social Democrats and a strong faction of the Liberal Party — as in England, largely recruited among the non-conformists — favoured the abolition of the established church. The church has lost a great portion of its power, particularly its tutelage over education, and the whole question of the church has lost its importance. The Swedes are members of the Lutheran Church from birth. They have the right to leave it: only a small minority avail themselves of this right, but no more than 4–5 per cent of the population attend divine services — this is characteristic of the situation.

I shall only call attention to a further few questions. Prohibition was an important and burning question 30 years ago and an advisory referendum was held in 1922; to-day the entire discussion on the alcohol problem is concerned merely with practical details and general ideas have been almost banished from the debate. In foreign policy there is a conflict between the supporters of the present policy of neutrality and those who demand accession to the Atlantic Pact, but the policy now pursued is supported by a clear majority within all parties and the foreign political debates in the Riksdag consist mainly of declarations of concord and unity between the party executives.

The great controversies have thus been liquidated in all instances. As a result the symbolic words and the stereotypes have changed or disappeared. All parties emphasize their patriotism, their feeling for democracy, their progressiveness and their striving for social reform. Liberalism in the old sense is dead, both among the Conservatives and in the Liberal Party; Social Democrat thinking has lost nearly all its traits of doctrinaire marxism, and the label of socialism on a specific proposal or a specific reform has hardly any other meaning than the fact that the proposal or reform in question is regarded as attractive. The actual words "socialism" or "liberalism" are tending to become mere honorifics, useful in connexion with elections and political festivities. Words such as "the proletariat" and "class struggle" are virtually used by the Communists alone — except possibly at the Mayday demonstrations.

These developments, which mean that Swedish democracy has been exceedingly successful, can be explained in various ways. Some extremes and follies have been discredited through experience and common sense — both the communist and nazi examples have been useful because of their deterrent nature. Speculative and metaphysical ideas have lost their grandeur and power and have been reduced to a means of expression for cranks and extremists. Institutions which once were irritating have become harmless; this is true both of the Monarchy and the church. Above all, democracy has brought about compromises in various fields which, without inspiring anybody to enthusiasm, have been accepted by everyone. An ideological and actual economic-social levelling has taken place, the result of which approaches a community of values on the most important points. Latitude for conflicts and great conceptions has been reduced all along the line.

The fact that these natural consequences of democratic success appear so distinctly in Sweden is manifestly connected with the practically total national and religious homogeneity of the country. We have no minority problems. In America the colour question, among many others, is not only a dark spot in a bright picture, but also a source of ideologies, passions and idealism. In Belgium, Holland and Switzerland, there are linguistic and/or religious dividing lines; through its language question Norway has in miniature an element of this kind; national minorities do not exist, the religious groups are small and peaceable, and active faith is regarded in our exceptionally secularized community as being nearly as strange as active atheism.

The tendencies in successful democracy are towards a levelling — both ideologically and in fact — which entails the growth of the fund of

common purpose and the shrinkage of the margin for conflicts, particularly fundamental conflicts. In the economic-social sphere, within which the political conflicts have been concentrated, a series of fairly well-defined principles for action have been universally accepted, even though they may be interpreted in various ways and although their consequences must diverge at some point. In Sweden, as in many other democracies, there is a fair measure of agreement on the following propositions: higher production, not redistribution, is the most important means of bringing prosperity to all groups of society. Full equality is not possible, nor even desirable, but further levelling — to what degree? — is desirable. The lot of certain groups who have lagged behind should be improved, but at the same time it is thought that the several other groups should have the right to retain approximately their present shares in the total production. A high and stable level of employment must be maintained whilst any serious inflation should be prevented. Everyone should have educational opportunities of a similar kind. Children, the aged, and the sick should be assured of a decent standard of living, irrespective of their family environment. The state should assume responsibility for the attainment of these ends.

We shall not discuss here how this universally accepted programme has evolved, nor the economic problems encountered in its realization. It should be stressed, however, that the programme represents a kind of unconscious compromise between formerly conflicting ideas; it incorporates Conservative, Liberal and Social Democrat elements, but it is just as much separated from early twentieth-century liberalism as from the strongly marxist-hued socialism. The essential point is that through the acceptance of the programme the importance of general ideas has been so greatly reduced, that — without falling prey to illusions about a clear difference between means and ends — one can speak of a movement from politics to administration, from principles to technique.

This is best illustrated by the Swedish debate in recent years. There is a fairly complete agreement on what is wanted, and differences in opinion mostly concern variations in the forecasts of economic trends and the consequences of actions decided upon. In the 1948 general elections the non-socialist parties made forecasts which were soon largely confounded by events; in 1951 the Social Democrat declarations about a non-recurring inflation met a similar fate. Will the United States be hit by a depression? How will international woodpulp prices change? Will an increase in agricultural prices lead to an unreasonable improvement in the standard of living of farmers, or merely to a reasonable compensation? By how much should wages be raised to compensate for inflationary losses, how much inflation can be permitted in the interest of full employment? These are only a few of the examples which could have been selected, and they are by no means among the most specialized. Under these conditions, the state becomes not only an arbitrator in details, between various economic interests. As the general standard of values is so commonly accepted, the functions of the state become so technical as to make politics appear as a kind of applied statistics. The men in the street, and often the experts find it difficult, or impossible, to determine the interrelations between various measures and various groups of interests; it is assumed that the party executive possess the knowledge necessary to act as competent representatives for their clients. The margin for discussion on principles is exceedingly narrow, and the debates become as dry as wage negotiations.

The party system has not changed in the sense that new parties have appeared or that older organizations have been wound up — on the contrary, the continued existence and strength of the organizations is a part of the stabilization. But it is obvious that the parties are gradually changing their character. In place of conflicting ideas we are faced with competing bureaucracies. The function of the party leader to catch the public's ear has given way to the task of holding together the traditional clientele; the banner carrier aloft has been replaced by the attorney. The ideal leader is not a man with new ideas, but the mean proportional between the voters already won and those whose support can still be gained. It is a question of wooing a normally limited group of marginal voters on the boundary lines between the various parties; the hunt for those who abstain from voting is practically hopeless owing to the enormous participation in elections. The debates within the parties, which are a sign of vitality, are dying out; the debate

between the parties is dominated by the attempt to combine tactical aims, determined by the current situation of the day, with references to venerable and fading principles.

But the high voting figures? Surely these are proofs of political vitality. No, despite the conventional assertions to the contrary, the figures can tell us little in this matter. Recently, there has been an increasing participation in elections everywhere, in successful democracies, in democracies threatened by internal dissension, in dictatorships. To a large extent this is certainly due to improved communications and state measures to facilitate vote casting. To some extent it is probably also due to the improvements in political awareness, by which is understood the fact that people know when the elections are to take place and are acquainted with the general election procedure and also to the enormously developed, omnipresent political propaganda. But for this very reason, voting in our day is much less than in earlier times a proof of political interest; elections should rather be considered as a general census, and political colour is declared with the same kind of dull willingness as one states one's age, profession and civil status.

It is obvious that the vitality nurtured on impassioned battles of ideas cannot be maintained in the successful democracy's atmosphere of levelling and compromise. We cannot have it both ways. And we cannot wish for vitality at the expense of stability. We do not envy the fragile democracies of France and Italy, where a strong Catholic Church and a strong Communist Party lend lustre and heat to the debate; we are glad to be without the racial problems which in the United States inspire conservative prejudice and militant idealism. The problem is whether or not more eagerness, a more universal and lively interest, discussions on principles and the personal efforts of the citizen can be kindled whilst maintaining security and a sufficient community of values.

It has been said at times that certain reforms in the constitution itself would be of importance in this connexion; I shall recall the various lines of thought without attempting to evaluate them. It has been said that a permanent coalition rule by all the democratic parties is the consequence of the unity already attained; hereby the opportunity would be provided for all the parties to air their wishes at the policy-deciding level. But a coalition rule of this kind has also been said to be of value in respect of the point of view with which I am dealing in this article. It could be expected to restrict the zealous, but tactically poisoned and party-dependent debate and to stimulate a willingness to discuss fundamental questions which actually exists in various quarters.

The importance of the referendum in this connexion is regarded as more manifest. The electorate would be induced to take a standpoint in respect of specific questions, and not only to vote on a party with an obscure programme. Political enlightenment would be enhanced and the feeling of being personally engaged would increase. It can be assumed that a referendum on an important issue would lead to a more intensive debate between the citizens themselves and not only in the press and at the election meetings than any political election since the attainment of democracy. At present, however, there exists only the possibility of holding an advisory referendum on certain issues; referenda which would decide an issue are not possible under the Swedish constitution.

Finally, the system of proportional representation has been discussed. It has been said that the division into parties is vague and the dividing lines between the parties uncertain, the need for voting for personalities has become more important; at present the voter rarely recognizes more than one or at any rate not more than two names on the list of ten for which he is voting. By supplementing proportionalism with the opportunity to vote for personalities (possibly also in connexion with primary elections) a wider scope would be opened for groups outside the party machines and for persons who wish to make a political contribution without adapting themselves to, or serving their time in, the organizations in power. Democracy could thus also be activated through a reform of this kind; it is possible to halt the process of mechanization which is universally regretted, but which those already engaged in the process are unwilling to reform.

As a result of the concentration on economic-social issues the political parties are prone to regard other problems as encroachers, which should be turned away or be summarily dealt with in order to prevent interference with the

tactical game developed for other purposes. The relaxation of class tension should permit the activities of the state and the public debate to be focused on such problems, without affecting the traditional party formations. This applies to questions of interest to individual people of all factions, even if the questions do not directly affect their economic situation and thus do not concern the social groups or the large organizations.

Some examples — in addition to those already given regarding reforms in the government itself — will now be mentioned. The tendency towards centralization of the administration and the gradual liquidation of local self-government has attracted attention and criticism, but in practice hardly anything has been done to counteract this universally regretted development. Democracy has furthered public education, mainly through measures aimed at quantitative improvements, and the provision of equal opportunity for everyone. But these immense advances were not accompanied by a corresponding examination and discussion of the fundamental questions of the aims of education, of the relative importance of different subjects, educational systems and methods. Despite all analysis, forecasts and reforms of detail, the population problem has not yet resulted in the fixing of the general rules governing the actions to be taken, nor in any really important measures.

In principle religious and moral problems are the concern of the individual, but the attitude taken towards them leaves its imprints on the actions of the state. Here, too, there is a clear tendency to avoid and evade the issue; appearing not only in an unwillingness to take up in earnest the question of the established church and all that is connected with it, but also in the meagre and timid debates which arise when matters of this kind are brought up. Here the press should be in the vanguard to break the kind of general taboo which in spite of everything remains, although so many specific taboos have lost their power.

Let me also mention foreign policy, considered in professional politics as the most unpleasant of all subjects of debate. This does not primarily refer to the topical questions of the Atlantic Pact and the European community, but everything affecting the tension between nationalist feelings and internationalism. Efforts should at any rate be made to combat the general tendency to national isolation and self-complacency.

The stability, the levelling, the relaxation of tension discussed here involve a lessening in the engagement of the individual in political questions. Even though the engagement is a necessary condition for the real continuance of democracy, it should finally be emphasized that the ultimate end of democracy is to widen the freedom of the individual, to increase his independence and his capacity for what may be termed meaningful private activity. This is the great problem which transcends all others.

46

ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO DEMOCRACY

The Example of Israel

• *AMITAI ETZIONI*

Each generation seems to work out its own definition of democracy. Since the totalitarian states have imitated many of the more external signs of democracy such as elections and party systems, an effort has been made to establish a definition which will clearly distinguish totalitarian from democratic regimes. There is a strong tendency to call a state democratic if the governmental power can be transferred

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from one party to another in a regularized way; that is, peacefully and in accordance with the rules of the constitution.[1] The party in office must not use its power to block the return of the other party or parties. Any attempt to do so is a violation of the rules of the game and is in itself an argument for a change of administration. In short, it is to the system and not to a leader or a party that the supreme loyalty of the voters is directed.

The frequent alternation of parties, it is further argued, keeps the government in harmony with the shifting distribution of power in society. Social changes quickly have their influence on the political situation and on the policies that are pursued. The equilibrium of the political system is maintained.[2]

It is obvious that this understanding of democracy draws heavily on Anglo-Saxon experience with a two-party system and the rule of law. But is the Anglo-Saxon form the only possible form of democracy? A priori this would hardly seem likely. It is the purpose of this article to describe what may be regarded as an alternative form, and to try to explain some of the political, economic and social conditions in which it appears and is maintained.

We shall use the government of Israel as our example of a political system which is democratic and yet different from the Anglo-Saxon model. Among the basic features of the Israeli government are a multiple party system and coalition ministries in which one center party (Mapai) is always present and always stronger than the other parties. To leave this party out of the ministry is simply not a part of the accepted procedures of the system. The party is one of the political institutions of the country and is identified with the state in the minds of many voters. In fact, too, because of its long term of office it has permeated the governmental, administrative, economic, and other institutions of Israel. Yet that country is democratic, for shifts in public opinion and in the distribution of social power lead to changes in governmental policy and the vital harmony between state and society is maintained.

Having analyzed the Israeli system in the main body of our paper, we shall devote some concluding paragraphs to a comparative note. Its purpose is to stimulate analysis of some other political systems that are also democratic but different from the Anglo-Saxon model of democracy.

I. Mapai: A Case of an Institutionalized Party

A. Mapai — a dominant center party

An analysis of Mapai (Labor party) is the key to an understanding of the Israeli political system. Mapai gained more votes in all three elections to the *Knesset* (parliament) than any other party. Actually it obtained more seats than the next three parties combined. (See Table 1.)

Mapai has been the major party in all eight Israeli governments during the ten-year period following the establishment of the state of Israel. Usually it has held nine out of sixteen portfolios in the various coalitions, always including the key ones of prime minister, defense, foreign affairs, police, treasury, and education, leaving to other parties the post office, welfare, justice, agriculture, interior[3] and other secondary ministries. Thus Mapai has been the dominating political force in the Israeli government.[4]

Mapai's control over the political life of the country goes far beyond a strong control of the government. Israel differs from other societies by having three major national political organizations, each with a "government" of its own. In addition to the regular government

[1] For some relevant discussions, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York, 1950); S. M. Lipset, M. A. Trow and J. S. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, 1956); Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, 1950); H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, 1946), pp. 225–26, 242; S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *Political Sociology* (Tel Aviv, 1955), pp. 28–30 (in Hebrew).

[2] See Talcott Parsons, "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck, eds., *Continuities of Social Research*, Vol. III: *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959).

[3] The Interior Ministry has limited political significance in Israel because it has no control over the police force (which is under the control of a separate ministry), because its budget — like the budget of all ministries — is under scrutiny of the Treasury, and because the local municipalities have a strong tradition of political independence.

[4] B. Akzin, "The Role of Parties in Israeli Democracy," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. XVII, 1955.

TABLE 1. *Seats Gained by Parties at the Three Knesset Elections*

	1949	*%*	*1951*	*%*	*1955*	*%*
Mapai	46	38.3	45	37.5	40	33.3
Herut	14	11.7	8	6.7	15	12.5
General Zionists	7	5.8	20	16.7	13	10.8
Ahdut HaZvoda					10	8.3
Mapam	19	15.8	15	12.4	9	7.5
Hapoel Hamizrahi			8	6.7		
Mizrahi			2	1.7	11	9.2
Agudat Israel	16	13.3	3	2.5		
Poalcy Agudat Israel			2	1.7	6	5.0
Communists	4	3.3	5	4.2	6	5.0
Mapai Arab parties	2	1.7	5	4.2	5	4.2
Progressives	5	4.2	4	3.3	5	4.2
Sephardim	4	3.3	2	1.7		
Yemenites	1	0.8	1	0.8		
Minor Parties	2	1.7				
	120	99.9	120	100.1	120	100.0

the Jewish Agency and the General Federation of Labor (*Histadrut*) have important political functions. The former is the major agency which recruits financial aid for Israel from Jews in the Diaspora and organizes migration to, and settlement in, Israel. The scope of its activities is well illustrated by the size of its budget, which was 211.5 million Israeli *lirot* (about 122 million dollars) for 1958–59, compared with the budget of the Israeli government, which amounted to 969 million Israeli *lirot* in 1957–58.

The political significance of the Jewish Agency will be clarified by examinations of the political significance of immigration. According to Israeli law new immigrants become citizens upon arrival in the country and immediately obtain the right to vote. Since the Israeli political parties have cognate parties in the Jewish communities abroad, regulation of immigration has direct political consequences.

The Jewish Agency is governed by a coalition of all the major Israeli parties except the Communists. As in the government of the state of Israel, Mapai has more representatives on the Executive Board of the Jewish Agency than any other party.[5] More than that, its members hold important positions, as for instance chairman of the board in Jerusalem, heads of the departments of settlement, of absorption of new immigrants, of education and youth.

The third national political organization of extraordinary importance is the General Federation of Labor. Its special position in Israeli society has often been discussed.[6] The *Histadrut* is governed by an Executive Board elected by a national convention. The elections are organized according to the proportional system and representation is by political parties. The Board is a coalition government in which all the major *Histadrut* parties except the Communist participate. Mapai has an absolute majority in the *Histadrut* (see Table 2). In 1957, eight out of thirteen members of the Executive Board of this organization belonged to Mapai. Thus Mapai is not just the major partner in the government of the state; it is

[5] The Zionist Congress elects two branches of the executive board, one seated in Jerusalem and one in New York. The Jerusalem branch is believed to have more political significance. Mapai had five out of eleven members, including the chairman, on the board elected by the 23rd Zionist Congress in August 1951. In New York, Mapai had two members out of eight.

[6] See Margaret L. Plunkett, "The *Histadrut:* The General Federation of Jewish Labor in Israel," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review,* Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 155–182.

also the strongest political force in the Jewish Agency and the ruling party in the *Histadrut*.

Mapai domination in the political realm antedates the establishment of the Israeli state. The Jewish community in Palestine had a semi-autonomous political status under the British mandate. A political organization was established in 1920 and later was formally recognized by the British government. While the organization officially had only education and welfare functions, attempts were made by the Jewish community, in its struggle for full political independence, to increase the functions and the significance of this organization. Its semiofficial parliament was called Assembly of the Elected[7] and the "government" elected by it was named The National Committee.[8] (See Table 3.)

Mapai originated in 1930 from a merger of two smaller parties. Since then it has become a major political party in the *Histadrut* (see Table 2) and an important political factor in the Zionist Congress. Mapai showed its power for the first time in the 1931 elections to the Assembly in which it obtained 43.7 per cent of the vote and gained control of the National Committee. From this election till the day a premiership was created in the first Israeli government, a Mapai member was the head of the National Committee. Thus it can be said that Mapai has been in office twenty-eight years and has never been replaced.

B. MAPAI — AN INSTITUTIONALIZED PARTY

Does this mean that Mapai cannot be replaced? There are countries in which one party remained in office for similar periods (Democrats in the United States for twenty years; Liberals in Canada for twenty-two years, in one province — Manitoba — for forty-three years) and was ousted by legitimate procedures. Can Mapai be ousted in a similar way? While there is no unqualified answer to this question, a number of factors make such a change quite unlikely in the near future, short of a major economic crisis or an international rupture.

The multi-party system and the coalition structure of the government are important factors. We suggest *that if parties elicit strong ideological commitments and the center party is relatively large, no stable government can be formed without the center party*. Mapai is such a center party, with a "hard core" of more than 30 per cent of the votes. Thus Israel had a "right" coalition — Mapai with General Zion-

[7] Asefhat HaNivharim
[8] HaVaad HaLeumi

TABLE 2. *Political Composition of Histadrut Conventions, V–VIII, 1942–1955*

	V *April* *1942*	*VI* *Jan.* *1945*		*VII* *May* *1949*	*VIII* *Feb.* *1955*
	%	%		%	%
Mapai	69.3	53.7	Mapai	57.06	57.54
Hashomer hatzair	19.2		Ahdut HaAvoda	34.40	14.61
Left Poale Zion	5.8	20.7	Mapram		12.54
Unity of Labor Party		17.7	Progressives	3.8	5.25
Haoved Hatzioni		3.0			
Aliya Hadasha		3.0			
Revisionists		0.2			
Religious Workers		1.0	Religious Workers	2.0	1.96
Yemenites		0.5			
Unattached		0.2			
General Zionists Worker	3.5		General Zionists		3.01
Proletarian Group	2.2		Communists*	2.6	4.09
Total	100.0	100.0		99.86	99.80
Valid Votes	81,198	106,420		130,670	410,435

* Varying composition between 1949–55.

TABLE 3. *Constitution of the Four Assemblies of the Elected*

	I 4-19-1920		*II* 12-6-1925	
	Seats	*%*	*Seats*	*%*
Ahdut HaAvoda	70	22.3	54	24.4
Hapoel Hatzair	41	13.1	30	13.6
Communists	..	....	6	2.7
Yemenites	12	3.8	20	9.0
Other Oriental Lists	60[a]	19.1	20	9.0
Religious Parties	64	20.4	19	8.6
Revisionists	..	..	15	6.8
Var. Middle-Class Lists	67[b]	21.3	44[b]	19.9
League for Women Rights	.		13	5.9
	314	100.0	221	99.9
Registered Voters	28,755		64,714	
Valid Votes	22,257		36,737	
Valid Votes, per cent of Reg.	77.0		56.7	

	III 1-15-1931		*IV* 8-1-1944[d]	
	Seats	*%*	*Seats*	*%*
Mapai	31	43.7	63	52.9
Poalei Zion	1	1.4	..	....
Communists	2	2.8	21	17.6
Yemenites	3	4.2		
Other Oriental Lists	c	...	.	....
Religious Parties	5	7.0	17[e]	14.3
Revisionists	15	21.1		
Var. Middle-Class Lists	14	19.7		
League for Women Rights	..		.	....
Aliah	..	....	18	15.1
Hadasha	..	....	..	....
	71	99.9	119	99.9
Registered Voters	89,656		303,000	
Valid Votes	50,436		202,448	
Valid Votes, per cent of Reg.	56.2		67.0	

[a] Includes: Sephardim, 54; Bucharim, 5; Gurgim, 1
[b] 10 Lists in 1920, 13 in 1925, 3 in 1931
[c] Sephardim votes included 6 Middle-Class, 5 Revisionists, 4 Mapai
[d] Sephardim, General Zionists and Revisionists boycotted the elections.
[e] Only Hapoel Hamizrahi participated

ists and other parties (December 23, 1952–January 26, 1954) — a "Left" coalition — Mapai with Ahdut HaAvoda, Mapam and other parties (November 3, 1955) — and a center coalition — Mapai with the Progressive party and some religious parties (March 10, 1949–November 1, 1950), but never a government without Mapai. *There seems to be no basis for a coalition without Mapai.* The only way to create a government without Mapai which would have the confidence of the absolute majority of the *Knesset* is by a coalition which would include parties of the Left or of the Right. In a country like Israel where ideological commitments to parties play an important role, such a coalition is not a realistic alternative.

The fact that parties other than Mapai have no realistic chance to become coalition leaders and must choose between permanent opposition and more or less minor coalition partnerships creates in them "irresponsible" tendencies. The

term "irresponsible political behavior" is usually applied to extreme parties which have little or no chance of coming into office and therefore make promises to the voters and claims upon the government that they would not be able to fulfill, were they to obtain office. The Communists and Herut (extreme Right) come close to this type of total opposition party. But there is another type of irresponsibility which develops when one party seems to be a constant and dominant partner of coalitions. Other parties tend then to become irresponsible in the sense that they are ready to bargain about many issues of public interest in order to be included in the coalition and as a price for staying in it. As they have to choose between being an insignificant opposition or a minor member of the coalition, they often choose the latter. The religious parties in Israel have often followed such a pattern.[9] Irresponsible politics in turn causes some voters to shift to the major party which "does the job" and manifests responsible leadership. This validates the claim of the Mapai spokesman that there is no alternative to the party in office. Thus a vicious circle is created: one party remains in office for a long time; this creates irresponsibility in other parties; and this in turn strengthens the position of the party in office.

What are the social conditions on which this political structure is based? How permanent are those conditions? Would it be conceivable that in the next elections to the *Knesset* (in 1959) about 10 per cent of those who voted for Mapai in previous elections would vote for another party, thus undermining the basis of the present coalition system? Most well-informed political observers would agree that such a change can hardly be expected. The major reason rests on the assumption that, like many parties in office for a long period, Mapai has become so strongly institutionalized that it has a strong grip on a "hard core" of voters needed to maintain its superior position.

On the one hand, a party which remains in office for a long time often loses some public support because the necessity of taking certain action inevitably alienates some groups. For example, a responsible government frequently has to introduce measures which alienate large contingents of the voters without creating any special support from any group, as for instance, new taxes. Even if a party tries to avoid taking action on controversial issues, as Mapai does with the Israeli constitution and some religious issues, it alienates those groups which expect the party to take action. Thus, on one hand, being in office leads to the accumulation of enemies. On the other hand, holding office may have a positive influence on future elections. The leadership of the state and that of the major party are often fused; people who identify with the state tend also to favor the leading party. The party tends to receive credit for any progress which is achieved during its regime. The opposition is labeled as a group of people who "only talk."

Party patronage is another factor. The amount of patronage available depends to some degree on the moral atmosphere and on the institutionalization of a civil service. But even more important is the amount of control which the political organizations have over economic activities. In Israel, as well as in many other newly developed countries, conditions encourage a widespread political influence on the allocation of manpower, capital, land, and power positions. The sources of foreign currency are of major significance in a small, expanding economy. The scope of government control over these sources is well reflected in the following figures. Compared to 28.4 per cent of income from exports and 4.3 per cent of income from private investment, which are only regulated by the government, about 65 per cent of the foreign currency income is virtually state income and is allocated and controlled by the government or by the Jewish Agency.[10] It is almost inevitable that partisan considerations have some influence when political organizations control the economy, and when this control is extensive, these considerations are very important. In such state allocations and controls, parties in power have an advantage over those in opposition.

The most important economic control which the Israeli parties exert on their members concerns place of employment. In an economy

[9] Amitai Etzioni, "Kulturkampf ou Coalition: Le Cas d'Israel," *La Revue Française de Science Politique*, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (June 1958), pp. 311–331 — republished in English in *Sociologia Religiosa*, Vol. I, No. 4 (1958), pp. 3–27.

[10] These figures represent the period of 1949–1956.

where the closed shop is the rule, parties control labor exchanges and trade unions. Parties also organize services for their members including health plans, housing projects, vacations, and recreation.[11] Thus all parties, especially the stronger ones, can expect to hold the allegiance of a large proportion of their members.

But in a regime where ideology plays an important political role, economic control is not sufficient. The parties attempt to secure ideological control by maintaining their own media of communication and by curbing the access of their supporters to communication media of other parties. All Israeli parties publish their own newspapers and exert pressure on their members to subscribe to these newspapers. The larger parties have publishing houses. Until recently, parties were quite influential in the school system. The separate party housing projects, vacation centers and social clubs serve also to increase intra-party communication and to decrease inter-party communication. The members' *Weltanschauung* is constantly reinforced so that they will be ready to resist any "hostile" communication.[12]

In this sphere also the parties in office seem to have some limited advantages over other parties. Israel has no television; the single radio station is controlled by the government. The government has an elaborate information service headed by a Mapai member. This service usually does not communicate political ideology but it functions to increase the loyalty of new and old citizens to the state by emphasizing its achievements and its bright future. This inevitably has some political repercussions.

While the Israeli parties in general and Mapai in particular have considerable economic and ideological control over a good many of their members and supporters, this hold is far from being strong enough to make shifts of voters' loyalties impossible. Less than a third of the voters are party members, and in every election thus far at least 15 per cent of the voters have changed their party allegiances.[13] On the other hand, this very control gives each party a stable core and gives Mapai a hard core of 30 per cent of the electorate, which is sufficient to maintain its dominant role in the coalition system unless some serious crisis should occur.

About half of the voters who will participate in the next parliamentary elections have emigrated to Israel during the last ten years. Could this group cause a considerable change in the outcome of the election? Judging by past elections the answer is clearly in the negative. All attempts to establish new immigrant parties have failed. New immigrants are known to distribute their votes roughly in the same way as the old citizens.

The recent political changes in France illustrate the problem of a third form of institutionalization, namely the investment of the parties in office in the armed forces, police and other security agencies. These "instruments of violence" can be neutral in the political game and thus serve equally all parties which may come into power. If this is the case, they support the institutionalization of the democratic system. If they support parties in office, they increase the institutionalization of these parties and undermine the system. If the support moderate or, more likely, extreme opposition parties, they endanger the parties in office and the democratic system at the same time.

Mapai's position from this point of view has undergone a considerable change. In the pre-state period its control over the various underground forces was relatively weak, compared to its control over other national political organizations.

This difference between the power distribution in the civic political bodies and that in the underground forces sometimes caused "lack of subordination" of these armed forces to the civil authorities. When the state of Israel was established action was taken to change this situation. Units which had political loyalties have been disbanded. Soldiers and officers are not allowed to be politically active. There has not been a case of "lack of subordination" since

[11] See Gerda Luft, "The Party That Shapes Policy," *The Jerusalem Post*, July 11, 1955, quoted by M. H. Bernstein, *The Politics of Israel* (Princeton, 1957), p. 71.

[12] The manipulation of communication channels as a means of maintaining members' loyalties has been analyzed by Philip Selsnick, in his *Organizational Weapon* (New York, 1952).

[13] But note that most changes are among parties with similar ideologies. Thus while more than 15 per cent shift, only about 6 per cent or less shift from parties left of Mapai to parties right of Mapai or vice versa. Thus Mapai's superior and center position is maintained. See Table 1.

the establishment of the Israeli defense forces. Recently this came to a significant test when these forces were ordered to withdraw from Sinai amid strong public protest.

De-politicizing of the defense forces has been considered an insufficient safeguard for the regime in a country where such forces are so powerful. This may explain why today many of the top positions in the defense forces are in the hands of Mapai members or neutrals. Out of the five chiefs of staff of the Israeli defense forces during 1948–58, two have been active Mapai members before and after their service, two are known to be supporters of Mapai in their private lives, and the fifth has never shown any special political inclinations. The names of generals and colonels are usually not published in Israel, but the government year book gives a list of twelve of the top commanders of the defense forces.[14] Most of them are known as members or close adherents of Mapai. The Israeli police commander-in-chief and his deputy are Mapai members; so are many of the higher officers. There is little information on other security agencies, but they seem to be staffed similarly. It is of interest to note that when, in January 1952, a political demonstration by Herut (extreme right) members broke through the police lines in front of the *Knesset*, an army unit was called to help.[15] This shows that the government, and first of all Mapai, can rely on the loyalty of the army.

II. Democracy and an Institutionalized Center Party

The party in office has never been replaced in Israel and it is unlikely to be replaced in the near future. Still the changing power distribution in society corresponds to the changing policy of the government. What are the mechanisms which enable a democracy to function without replacing the party in power?

A. Changes in the Composition of the Coalition Government

Mapai, like other parties in democratic countries, is quite sensitive to public opinion. Although its control over some of its supporters is quite extensive, Mapai can never be secure in its control over its followers. While it never lost its core support, its leaders feel that this was achieved only by the party steering a cautious course, based on a combination of responsible leadership with enough "flexibility" (opponents say "opportunism") not to lose the support of the voters.

Mapai has some difficulty in determining what the public wants. There are no by-elections to the Israeli parliament. If a member dies or resigns, his party appoints a new representative. Since local elections usually take place on the same day as parliamentary elections, they cannot indicate public attitudes between elections. Experience has shown that other elections, for instance to the *Histadrut* conventions, do not reflect clearly the outcome of forthcoming national elections and therefore they are not considered as reliable political indicators.[16] There is no Israeli Gallup Institute or any close equivalent which could serve as a means for assessing the public. Therefore, the main test for the policies of each government coalition comes with the general elections to the *Knesset*. If the electorate then shows dissatisfaction with the government line, Mapai tends to change its policy and its partners in the coalition. Thus, while Mapai stays in office, the government policy may change considerably and in relation to changes in public opinion and pressures.

The first regular Israeli government (March 10, 1949–November 1, 1950) consisted of a coalition of Mapai, Religious United Front, the Progressive Party and Sephardim. The government was under criticism from three major opposition parties: from Mapam (left-wing party) in regard to the Israeli stand between East and West; from Herut (extreme right) with respect to the defense policy; and from the General Zionists (right wing) in the matter of economic policy.

As this was a time of mass immigration and rapid economic expansion, a strong inflation developed.[17] The government introduced a far-

[14] *The Government Year Book* (Jerusalem, 1958–59), p. 84.

[15] *Ha'aretz*, Hebrew daily, Tel Aviv, Jan. 8, 1952.

[16] For instance, Mapam lost 7.25 per cent of its seats in the *Histadrut* convention between 1949 and 1955 (in 1955 both splinters are counted together) but in elections to the *Knesset* in the same years it received the same per cent of the seats — 15.8 per cent.

[17] The amount of money in circulation tripled in three years (end of 1948 to end of 1951). Credit

reaching system of controls which included licensing of imports and exports, complete control over foreign currency, and government allocation of raw materials and of consumer goods. Nearly a thousand different products were rationed. Luxury items were highly taxed. Credit allocation was controlled by the government.

The General Zionists, a party of big business, exporters, importers, citrus plantation owners, and to some degree supported by small business men and artisans, objected to this. The party advocated a liberalization of economic policy, that is, the curtailment or abolishment of governmental regulations and of various allocations. The ration system, which many loathed, was made the symbolic target in the political campaign.

In the elections to the second *Knesset* which followed, the public shifted its support to the General Zionists. While the General Zionists were a small party with 5.8 per cent of the seats in the first *Knesset* (1949), they obtained almost three times as many seats in 1951 (16.7 per cent) to become the second largest party. The other two opposition parties lost considerably (Herut fell from 11.7 per cent to 6.7 per cent and Mapam from 15.8 per cent to 12.4 per cent). Mapai lost only 0.8 per cent of its seats, but the lesson was obvious. Large groups of the public were not satisfied with Mapai's economic policy, and it adjusted to this situation in several ways. First, the party abolished some of the more disagreeable measures of control. Then, in December 1952, the General Zionists were included in the government. Finally, a "New Economic Policy" was introduced which was a compromise between Mapai's policy and the General Zionists' ideas. Mapai economists pointed out that the changes in economic policy were possible now because the economic situation had changed. The change was brought about mainly by the reparation agreement with Germany. But it is clear that the election played its role. Although the General Zionists left the government at a later time and the economic situation changed again, Mapai never tried to return to the 1949–51 system of rationing.

A similar change took place after the elections to the third *Knesset*. The primary cause of conflict and adjustment was defense policy this time. During the days of the second *Knesset* (1951–55) the pressure from the Arabic countries increased by means of economic boycott, border incidents, and infiltration activities inside Israel. Israel reacted by retaliatory operations which were focused on the centers from which the Arabic activities were launched. The frequency and scope of these activities varied in relation to the pressure exerted by other nations on the Arabs and on Israel. Public opinion in Israel was split on these retaliatory activities. Herut and Ahdut HaAvoda (left wing) demanded a more aggressive line and questioned the military and political expediency of limited retaliatory activities. All the other parties were for continuation of the moderate line.

The election to the third *Knesset* showed that the public now was more concerned with the defense issue than with economic problems and that it protested against the continuous insecurity. The public supported the extremists (or activities as they are called in Israel): Herut almost doubled its seats (from 6.7 per cent to 12.5 per cent) and became the second largest party in the *Knesset*. The other party which supported the activists' line also improved its position. Mapai lost a considerable number of seats (4.2 per cent) and so did other parties.

Mapai's reaction was as quick and as determined as in the earlier case. Ben Gurion reassumed the Prime Ministership and the Defense Ministry; Sharet — who supported the moderate line — resigned from the government. Since a coalition with Herut is inconceivable for Mapai,[18] a Left-wing coalition was formed on November 3, 1955 which included the Left-wing activists. When Nasser arranged his weapons deal with Russia and nationalized the Suez Canal only one year later, the Israeli government switched from limited retaliatory activity to broader military activity. In October 1956 the government ordered the Israeli Armed Forces into the Sinai peninsula. Thus again the government acted in accord with a new public trend. A new policy was introduced and a new coalition was formed.

expanded in the same period from 80 million to about 150 million Israeli *lirot*. The consumer's price index jumped from 100 (September 1951) to 178 (December 1952).

[18] Because of the strong ideological differences between the parties.

Of course a change in public opinion was not the only cause of the change in government policy, but the election results had considerable influence. The objective situation was interpreted differently by moderates and activists. If moderate parties had gained in the elections and the activists had lost, Sharet might have remained in the Cabinet as Prime Minister and/or Foreign Minister and the policy as well as the composition of the Cabinet might have been quite different. It is not accidental that public support turned to the activists; the objective situation produced this support. Thus one can see the elections as one mechanism through which the policy of the government is adjusted to the situation and to the electorate wishes without a change of the party in office.

B. CHANGES IN THE INNER BALANCE OF MAPAI

The study of factions and pressure groups within a party is of special interest from several points of view. First, these groups determine to a considerable degree the party's policy and the composition of party representation in the various political institutions. Second, the larger the party and the more interests and groups there are represented in it, the more some functions of the parliament, such as policy-making and consensus formation, are taken over by party organs. The party's higher bodies have to reach a working consensus among the various groups before party policy can be determined.[19] Mapai itself comes close to being a federation of groups.[20] The major groups are: an organization of collective settlements (*Kibbutzim*) which supports Mapai (about 97 per cent of the eligible population votes Mapai), an organization of cooperative villages (*Moshavej Ovdim*) (about the same ratio of support), the *Histadrut* group, professionals and intelligentsia, Mapai members in government administration and representatives of new immigrants. All these groups are represented in the Mapai Center (196 members) and many of them in the Mapai secretariat (15 members, in March 1958).

How does the federative structure influence the democratic process? Through it, those who support Mapai have a voice in the decision-making process in non-election years and without changing the party alliance. Thus, before Mapai changed its defense policy, the fight between moderates and activists was taken up in the Mapai Center, with Ben Gurion heading the activists section and Sharet the moderate one. Only after it was decided here by a majority vote that Ben Gurion's policies should be promoted did Sharet resign and Mapai offer the new policy to the whole government.

The functions, prestige, and voting power of collective settlements are declining, while those of the cooperative villages are increasing. For reasons discussed elsewhere, collective settlements still have considerable privileges and power.[21] But in the last years the cooperative villages have struggled for increased representation of their group. To some degree their demands have been met but the collective settlements are still somewhat over-represented. This is likely to diminish in the near future. Thus, changes in the social significance of groups are reflected in changes in their political power through change in their representation in Mapai's policy-making bodies.

Another group struggle which has aroused much public interest in recent years is that between *Histadrut* (trade union) leaders and Mapai economic experts concentrated in the Treasury. The economists press for enlarged investments in order to achieve an increasing degree of economic independence and strength. The trade-union leaders insist that this should be done without a considerable decrease in the standard of living of the workers. Till now the trade-union leaders have had the upper hand. One of the reasons why they are so influential is that they represent a much larger and better-organized group of voters than the economists.

Is group representation really democratic? First of all one should note that it is part of

[19] In cases where there is only one party, as in totalitarian states, the factional struggle is an uninstitutionalized substitute for rivalry among parties. In some states in the United States where there is only one active party, the factional struggle is the most important form of political expression. Unlike the totalitarian countries, it is here institutionalized in democratic party conventions and primaries. See V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949).

[20] Factions have not been tolerated since 1944 when a faction split Mapai and created its own party.

[21] See Amitai Etzioni, "Agrarianism in Israel's Party System," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3 (August 1957), pp. 363–375.

the democratic process in all democratic countries, especially in those where there is a two-party system, because fewer interests are directly represented on the party level, and more are represented on the faction level. It is more important to examine the way in which faction representation is determined. Even where there are officially controlled and supervised primaries, nomination is still open to much abuse. Oligarchic procedures in units which participate in the democratic mechanisms seem to be almost an "iron law." While there are no primaries in Israel, two thirds of the members of Mapai Center are elected by Mapai locals and one third suggested by the Mapai Secretariat and approved by the convention. The latter are in groups or organizations. New immigrants, intelligentsia, and youth group representation in Mapai is quite democratic in a sense. It is an important mechanism through which powerful groups and Mapai's policy are maintained in balance.

C. STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS OF MAPAI

Mapai's political power, which has been stressed above, is an important factor of the whole process of institutionalization. But the picture would be balanced by showing a major weakness of Mapai which is important because it makes Mapai sensitive to group pressures and public opinion. Mapai is often seen as an omnipotent party, as a strong monolithic political body with branches in all the major power centers. This description is misleading in one important respect. It does not take into account the federative nature of Mapai, in which the main power rests in each group and little in Mapai as a party. There is a powerful group of Mapai members in the trade unions, in the cooperative movement, in the three major cities, in the Treasury, and so on. But their relations to other Mapai groups vary all the way from close cooperation to open hostility. In most cases the relationships are highly voluntary because each group is very independent. The weakest group is the party bureaucracy which supposedly ties them all together. The party personnel is small in number, low paid, has little prestige and consists mainly of party representatives who failed to maintain a position in other organizations. Many Mapai branch secretaries are just clerks for party activities and mediators among the various local centers of power. The Mapai Center, itself, is a place where the various groups determine their relative power and work out common policies, not a center of a powerful party machine which has strong control over its representatives in various political organizations. This is an important reason why Mapai, with all its weight and power, when it comes to coordinated action on the national scene in opposition to other groups, is internally weak and highly sensitive to pressures of various groups.

III. A COMPARATIVE NOTE

Is Israel an exception to the "normal" democratic model or are there other countries which come close to her form of democracy?

The Swedish government in the last twenty-six years (since 1932) has seen a coalition government in which the Social Democratic party is the basic political partner. Since 1949, Germany has been run by a coalition government in which one party, the Christian Democrats, plays the role of the decisive partner. The situation formally resembles a two-party system because two parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, obtain the majority of the votes, but many commentators agree that this is misleading since the class and religious structure of Germany does not give the Social Democrats a real chance to obtain much more than 35 per cent of the vote, which means that there is no alternative party to the CDU at the moment. The special importance of Adenauer for the maintenance of the system can be compared to the position which Ben Gurion holds in the Israeli system. While Ben Gurion has the charismatic role of the state founder, Adenauer plays a similar role as the one who restored the new German Republic to a respectable place among the nations. The coalition partners of the CDU are weaker than the partners of Mapai especially since the CDU gained an absolute majority of the seats in the Bonn parliament (1957). On the other hand, nine years in office have been enough for the CDU to become considerably institutionalized. Group struggles within the CDU are an important mechanism of German democracy as well (Catholic labor, big business, Catholic and Protestant clergy, liberals and others).

Another illustration is the French Fourth Republic which in some respects functioned similarly to the Israeli system. The MRP, like

Mapai, participated in a large number and great variety of coalitions. The decisive difference between Israel and France is that the MRP was by far weaker than Mapai and therefore the coalition system never achieved the stability which the Israeli system has. No central party became institutionalized and the extreme parties on left and right were considerably stronger. The final blow to the system was given by power organizations which had political orientations differing from those of the elected government of France.

Thus if coalition governments are formed on a continuum according to the strength of the center party, the Israeli and Swedish governments would be in the middle, Germany on one side and the Fourth Republic on the other. There are of course other types of coalition governments without one center party, but a discussion of those would take us far beyond the scope of this paper.

Mapai is often compared to the British Labour party and the Social Democrats in the Weimar Republic. These comparisons have certain merits when one attempts to point out the ideological position of Mapai in an *abstract* continuum of political ideologies. Mapai subscribes to a Left-wing noncommunists ideology. But beyond that, the comparison is of little help. The British Labour party is one in a two-party system; it entered and left office several times in the last three decades, while Mapai became a highly institutionalized party.

The comparison to the Weimar Social Democrats is even less meaningful. The Social Democrats were not able to continue in office because, among other reasons, rightist forces were highly entrenched in the army, the bureaucracies and the judicial system. This is almost opposite to the situation in Israel. The center of the Israeli political spectrum is not liberal, as in so many Western societies, but social-democratic with an approximately even distribution of the more leftish forces on one side and conservative and liberal groups on the other side. More than that, for historical reasons which cannot be discussed here, the left-of-the-center ideologies and groups have stronger political, economic and prestige positions than the right and liberal forces. While socialist parties in Western societies are often parties of reform and change, Mapai is more representative of the Israeli values and social structure than any other party. To be a Social Democrat in Israel — and the same holds for many of the newly developed countries — means to be in conformity with the majority of the politically conscious members of society.[22] It is like being a moderate liberal in the present Congress of the United States. Thus in conducting a comparative analysis we have to take into account not only the substance of political values but also the place of such values in the political spectrum of the society. What is quite revolutionary in one society may be rather on the conformist side in another society. The different place in the political spectrum is of great significance in view of the different political conditions with which revolutionary and reform parties are confronted as compared to those in which conforming and status quo parties are placed, disregarding the actual content of their ideologies.

Mapai can be fruitfully compared to other state founding parties which have become highly institutionalized in young nations, as, for instance, the Congress party in India, the Neo-Destour in Tunisia, the Convention People's party in Ghana, and the A.F.P.F.L. in Burma. Of course, there are considerable differences among these countries and between them and Israel, but they all seem to have in common a leader and a party with the charismatic role of gaining independence and establishing the state; left-of-center ideologies; state-regulated economies; a high degree of economic dependence on external sources (perhaps with the exception of Ghana); and control over the labor organizations, excluding the Communists.[23]

A comparative study of democratic societies cannot be carried out here. The main purpose of this paper has been to describe a democracy that functions through mechanisms other than the frequent alternation of parties in office. The concluding paragraphs are meant to suggest that such mechanisms can be found also in countries other than Israel and that a comparative study of these countries might throw light on the nature and organs of modern democracy.

[22] That unorganized voters or weaker groups lose out in this process is obvious, but this is a problem of democracy in general.

[23] See S. M. Lipset, "Socialism — Left and Right — East and West," *Confluence*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 1958), pp. 173–192.

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BRITISH MASS PARTIES IN COMPARISON WITH AMERICAN PARTIES

• LEON D. EPSTEIN

Students of comparative politics usually view mass-membership parties as distinctively modern and progressive phenomena. On this point, many students of American politics join those of the European field in regarding American parties as backward in comparison with European, and particularly British, parties. To take a prime example, the reformers of the "greater party responsibility" school have shown a decided preference for larger and more active memberships along with their basic desire for centralization of party authority.[1] This has not always meant that the American reformers wanted a party leadership to be primarily responsible to a party membership, instead of all party voters or the electorate at large. In fact, the "party responsibility" school is not clear on this crucial matter.[2] But it is definite enough in its belief that American parties would be making an advance by recruiting mass memberships.

The assumption that American parties do not now have mass memberships, in the European sense, may be accepted with only slight qualification. Party membership, as such, has hardly any settled meaning in the United States.[3] Sometimes to be a member means simply to cast one's vote regularly for a given party at general elections. At other times membership is taken to include a party's primary election voters, who may (in closed primaries) or may not (in open primaries) have officially registered their affiliation as a condition for choosing party candidates. Obviously neither of these broad categories constitutes an organized membership. Yet under many state statutes a party's primary voters select the precinct committeemen who compose whatever organization exists.[4] At another extreme, membership may be narrowly defined so as to mean only regularly active campaign workers. In this definition, one cannot very well count those election-year activists who work for a candidate but who do not in any definitive way associate themselves with a party. Their numbers may be so great and their efforts so strenuous that an American campaign, especially a presidential campaign, is often marked by at least as much active popular participation as a European election. Neverthe-

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[1] Committee on Political Parties, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," Supplement to *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLIV (September 1950). Also E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942) and *The Struggle for Party Government* (College Park, 1948). The relationship of this view to legislative responsibility in Britain is discussed by the writer in "Cohesion of the British Parliamentary Parties," to be published in the *American Political Science Review*.

[2] In *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government: Its Origins and Present State* (Urbana, 1954), Austin Ranney, at pp. 17–19 interprets Schattschneider (the leading recent spokesman of the "party responsibility" school) as intending to have party leaders responsible to party *workers* despite the fact that Schattschneider signed the APSA Committee Report which seemed committed to the view that the leadership should be responsible to party *voters* (perhaps to primary election voters). Schattschneider himself seems unconcerned about internal party control so long as it is centralized. "The essence of democracy," he has written, "is to be found *between* the parties, not *within* the parties." *The Struggle for Party Government*, p. 39.

[3] Varying definitions are indicated in Clarence Berdahl, "Party Membership in the United States," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 16–50, 241–62 (February and April 1942).

[4] V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York, 1952), pp. 365–71.

less, this American activism is different in kind from that continuously provided by a party's mass membership.

Only here and there in the United States are attempts made to fix a large-scale membership on a regular dues-paying basis, and thus to correspond to the European example. Significantly, these attempts have been made outside the official parties which are recognized and regulated by state laws. The new extralegal and voluntary organizations (that is, in California and Wisconsin) have settled notions of membership, mainly on a dues-paying basis, and they have achieved something of the ideological purposiveness associated with European parties.[5] It may be argued that these new parties, despite their relatively small size, indicate the beginning of a trend in the United States, but it is still safe to say that generally the major American parties, national and state, are not based on mass memberships.

Although the facts concerning this state of American party affairs are not disputed, the perspective in which these facts are often presented by the student of comparative politics is more difficult to accept. That mass-membership parties are more modern and advanced than what the United States has, is hardly a self-evident proposition. However, it has wide currency and appreciable status. One of its more important recent exponents is Maurice Duverger, whose attempt to provide a frame of reference for the study of parties is now well known. For Duverger the conception of large-scale membership is itself "modern," originating principally in European socialist recruitment at about the start of the twentieth century. Although conceding that some conservative and moderate groups (like the French Radicals) have never had many members, Duverger describes other nonsocialist parties as responding to the challenge of universal suffrage by obtaining mass memberships in order to meet Left-wing electoral competition. At any rate, Duverger finds the *mass* party characteristic of the present age; and he is convinced that what he calls the *cadre* party, with its small and informal membership, properly belongs to an earlier period when the franchise was based on a property qualification. This distinction between cadre and mass parties rests on structure as well as size. Duverger believes that the mass party, typically of the Left, is unlike the cadre party not only on account of its numbers, but also because it is established for a participating membership.[6] While the cadre party has a caucus-type organization (weak, decentralized, and dominated by influential "notabilities"), the mass party is organized on the basis of the *branch*, designed to allow strong articulation of opinions by the membership.[7] Altogether it is plain that Duverger regards the mass party as the political form suited to the democratic franchise, and, as such, the nearly inevitable as well as the rightful product of our times:

> All the speeches upon the benefits of craftsmanship and the evils of industrialization do not alter the fact that the artisan's day is done and that we live in an age of mass-production; regrets for the individualist and decentralized cadre parties of the nineteenth century and imprecations against the vast centralized and disciplined parties of today do not alter the fact that the latter alone suit the structure of contemporary society.[8]

For those who accept Duverger's perspective, in which the American party's cadre membership and caucus organization are deemed old-

[5] Voluntary parties are discussed by Currin Shields, "A Note on Party Organization: The Democrats in California," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. VII, pp. 673–84 (December 1954); Hugh Bone, "New Party Associations in the West," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLV, pp. 1115–25 (December 1951); and Frank Sorauf, "Extra-Legal Political Parties in Wisconsin," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLVIII, pp. 692–704 (September 1954). My own investigation of Wisconsin parties indicates that the Democrats have about 7,000 dues-paying members (in the off-year of 1955), and that the Republicans have dues-paying units in a few urban counties and a large and active membership in a more loosely defined sense.

[6] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, tr. by Barbara and Robert North (London, 1954), pp. 63–67.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 17–27, 44–47. The cell and the militia are also "modern" in Duverger's classification, but they are not regarded as entirely compatible with a democratic political system (pp. 27–40).

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 427. It should be noted that Sigmund Neumann has employed different terms from Duverger's "cadre" and "mass," but to much the same purpose in contrasting the old-fashioned and the modern. In a mimeographed paper, "Political Parties: Concepts, Structure and Strategy," read at

fashioned, it is understandable that British parties should most frequently be cited as models. Not only are the British mass organizations readily accessible to American scholarship, but their very size and regularity seem in sharpest contrast to the state of American parties. Certainly both the Conservative and Labor parties have mass memberships in the sense that Republicans and Democrats do not. But the significance of this difference between British and American parties is not necessarily what the Duverger perspective implies. A close look at Britain's party organizations, in comparison with the American, may cast doubt on the view that mass membership parties are *the* modern response to a democratic age. Thus American parties might be different but no less modern or democratic.

The point of the present analysis is to demonstrate, and indicate the significance of, the decidedly secondary rôle of the mass parties in the structure of British political power. What is to be stressed is a consequence of the theory and practice of the British constitution: that members of parliament are independent of outside control, and that governments are responsible to the House of Commons (or to a majority of that body). The multitudes of dues-paying partisans are not assigned the authority to impose policies on parliamentary representatives. The locus of power, as recent British scholarship has emphasized[9] and as Duverger concedes,[10] remains in the parliamentary parties as opposed to the external mass parties. In this exposition of the secondary rôle of the mass organizations, each of the two major parties is to be discussed separately, and certain generalizations drawn at the end of the study.

Conservative Structure in Great Britain

The mass organization now called the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations was deliberately created in 1867 in order to propagate the Conservative message and to recruit supporters for the already existing parliamentary leadership.[11] Plainly the Union was the response of politicians concerned to win the votes of a mass electorate, just then enfranchised, but since there was no Labor party (and would not be for over thirty years) the Conservative organization was hardly designed to meet socialist competition. Rather it was the organization of the Liberal party which the Conservative leaders originally sought to counteract, and with much the same basic purpose that has animated the subsequent rivalry with Labor. However, it might be contended that it has been the stimulus of recent socialist competition which caused the development of an extremely large dues-paying membership — 2,805,032 as of March 1953.

This membership is on an entirely individual basis, through the local constituency association. By joining a constituency association one simply becomes a Conservative party member. An individual may also belong to one of several auxiliary organizations, of which the Young Conservatives are the most important, but there is no way of being counted a Con-

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the 1954 convention of the American Political Science Association, Neumann contrasted the "party of *individual representation*" with the *"party of integration,"* which he held to be characteristic of mass democracy (p. 9).

[9] The fullest account of the complexities of internal party relationships is that by R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (London, 1955). A brief and succinct statement of the secondary status of the mass organizations has been made by another British political scientist, David Butler, "American Myths About British Parties," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Vol. 31, pp. 46–56 (Winter 1955). McKenzie's book is drawn upon more frequently than other sources in order to support my observations, but this does not mean that he would necessarily share my general point of view. Also it should be emphasized that McKenzie affords a richness of detailed illustrations that cannot be adequately summarized. His will no doubt be the standard guide to British party organization for many years.

[10] Duverger (*op. cit.*, pp. 188–90) believes that the domination exercised by the British parliamentary parties is unusual among modern parties. Probably the French Socialist party has the measure of extraparliamentary control over legislative representatives in order to meet Duverger's requirement for the "usual." On the French Socialists, see Philip Williams, *Politics in Post-War France* (London, 1954), pp. 65–68. Australian Labor is, to some extent, in this same pattern. See Louise Overacker, *The Australian Party System* (New Haven, 1952), pp. 2–3; and J. D. B. Miller, *Australian Government and Politics* (London, 1954), pp. 70–71.

[11] McKenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

servative by virtue of membership in anything but an official party association. Thus the Conservative party conforms clearly and completely to the branch type of organization. The constituency associations are the basis for the National Union.

Each Conservative constituency association is organized, as is its Labor counterpart, with an eye toward its main purpose of campaigning, especially for members of parliament. The constituency units, or parts of them, are also concerned with local council elections, but the entry of Conservative associations into this area of political activity took place some time after their organization around the national parliamentary election constituency. Local purposes were not responsible for the original organization, and consequently the National Union has not been built, in the manner of American parties, as a combination of locally interested political parties. It should be noted that the Labor party, despite earlier local activity, is not substantially different on this score from the Conservatives.

A Conservative association is not meant to have frequent meetings of what may be thousands of members. Instead, meetings are more regularly held in the association's subunits (wards in boroughs and polling districts in rural county areas). Here representatives are elected to serve as directors, along with certain other local representatives, on the Executive Council of the constituency association. For most purposes, this Council of about 60 to 100 members manages the association's affairs.[12] It employs the professional organizer known as the party agent. Also the rôle of the Council is crucial in exercising the outstanding power within the ambit of the local party: selecting the party's parliamentary candidate. When a sitting M. P. again desires to be a candidate, the procedure is ordinarily perfunctory. But when a new candidate is to be chosen, the Executive Council appoints a small selection committee which collects names of aspirants, interviews about a dozen, and then returns a list of about three for the Executive Council's consideration. The Council then hears speeches from the three or so remaining aspirants, and decides to recommend one to the constituency association as a whole. In order to act on this recommendation, the association does have a general meeting but its approval is taken for granted.[13]

Although a great deal more might be known concerning the Conservative selection process, there is little reason to believe that the choice of constituency associations, or of their executive councils, is seriously limited by national headquarters. Names of prospective candidates may be suggested by the national office, but they are not imposed upon a reluctant association. And although the candidate finally selected must be approved formally by a central authority if he is to carry the official banner of the Conservative leadership, this approval is confidently expected save in the most special circumstance. Plainly, then, in the Conservative party (even more definitely than in that of Labor) the parliamentary candidate is the choice of the local party membership, or at least of its representatives. There is no direct primary election by which the rank-and-file party voters can interfere with the choice of the active dues-paying members. The candidate adopted by the association is entitled to all of its (and the national organization's) support.

Yet the Conservative constituency association does not expect a successful candidate to tailor his votes to the wishes of the local organization any more than to local constituents in general. The readoption procedure is not employed as a club by which an association threatens its M. P. To be sure, there are local pressures, but in more moderate form and more thoroughly in keeping with the British tradition of the M. P.'s independence from voter control. The point is that this tradition has not been modified by the existence of a local Conservative mass membership, despite its formal power to select candidates.

However, in the effectively nationalized politics of the British environment, virtually no one ever suggests that it is directly through a constituency association that party members influence parliamentary behavior. Rather it is through the national organizations, if anywhere, that the membership is supposed to affect policy-making; and on this score less is usually made of the influence of the Conserva-

[12] Ivor Bulmer-Thomas, *The Party System in Great Britain* (London, 1953), p. 135.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 204–6.

tive organization than of Labor's. Nevertheless the Conservative case is worth examining.

At the national level, the Conservative mass organization has three agencies of articulation: conference, central council, and executive committee. The annual conference (convention, in American parlance) is the most directly representative of the mass membership. However, the Conservative conference is composed in so odd a way as to show that it is hardly intended as a means by which the membership could control policy. No effort is made to represent constituency associations in proportion to their respective memberships. Each association is allowed the same number of delegates regardless of its size. And each is allowed so many delegates that (together with other miscellaneous delegates) the total potential conference attendance is about 5,600 and the actual postwar attendance has averaged more than 3,000. Clearly this is not the kind of conference that is expected to make policy. As R. T. McKenzie remarks, "The conference in recent years has served primarily as a demonstration of party solidarity and as a source of stimulation to the constituency representatives who attend."[14] These, to be sure, are important purposes, but they indicate subordination and not domination.

To give the full picture, however, it must also be noted that the Conservative conference represents opinion which it would be foolish for the party leadership to ignore. If the conference cannot make policy, nevertheless its consent, tacit or otherwise, to the leadership's policy is highly desirable. Ordinarily this consent has been obtained, but an occasional difficulty does arise. There is even a rare instance when the conference seems to present a policy.[15] But no observer suggests that the mass organization, in annual meeting, could compel the Conservative members of parliament to adopt and carry out a policy which was definitely opposed by the parliamentary leadership.

The Central Council and the Executive Committee of the National Union are no more potent as policy-makers. The Council, too, is a relatively large representative body which usually meets once a year. Among other organizational matters, the Council elects the officers of the Union.[16] The Executive Committee has just over 150 members and meets several times a year (seven in 1953).[17] As is the case with the Council, there is every reason to believe that the Committee's functions are largely concerned with organizational activity rather than with policy matters.

Veto policy resolutions do emerge from the mass organization. Principally these are the product of the annual conference. Debates take place and votes are taken. However, the conference's arrangements for voting in the case of a substantial division of opinion are so primitive as to suggest that such a division is not contemplated as a regular part of the proceedings.[18] Resolutions seldom present divisive issues, and the debates on resolutions consist mainly of routine party exhortations. Conservative delegates only rarely think of themselves as instructors, and certainly not as the controllers, of the party leaders. It was entirely in character for one annual report to a party conference to state: "The resolutions passed at the 1952 Party Conference were presented by the Chairman of the National Union to the Leader of the Party, who showed a lively interest in all that had been done at the Conference."[19]

The Leader, toward whom this gratitude is shown and whose title Conservatives prefer to capitalize, occupies his position as the result of election, principally by his fellow M. P.'s, to head the parliamentary party. The deference accorded him by the mass party is overt partly because non-equalitarianism remains good form among Conservatives. The Leader, unlike Labor's, participates in the annual party conference only at the end of the proceedings when he appears to make a formal address. More important, the Conservatives insist in their constitution that it is the Leader who establishes the party's campaign policy, subject merely to the advice of his followers. How-

[14] McKenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 193; see also p. 189.

[15] An account of the 1950 conference's resolution on housing is given in my "Politics of British Conservatism," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLVIII, p. 35 (March 1954).

[16] Bulmer-Thomas, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–56.

[17] *73rd Annual Report of the Conservative Conference* (1953), pp. 9–11.

[18] See Conference Standing Orders, *ibid.*, pp. 12–13.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

ever, this is now thought to be much less autocratic than it sounds.[20]

A more definite indication of the membership's impotence may be observed in those cases where the conference does actually adopt a policy resolution that is at odds with the decisions of the parliamentary leadership. For example, Conservative conferences have frequently urged, as McKenzie has noted, that the House of Lords should be reformed, but no Conservative government has seen fit to sponsor the requisite legislation.[21] On this particular subject, there is no substantial disagreement on policy between the mass organization and the parliamentary leadership, but only a difference concerning timing and tactics. Almost any Conservative government, it may be assumed, would like to change the composition of the House of Lords so as, eventually, to make it more powerful, but Conservative leaders have so far found it politically expedient to avoid a head-on crash with Labor on anything that looks like a Lords-versus-people issue. The significant point is that the Conservative conference has not been able to force the hand of the party leadership.

Even in a small matter, a Conservative government may display its independence of the conference's judgment. The point is illustrated by the response to the resolutions of the 1953 conference. Of the thirteen resolutions approved by that conference, only one was sharply controversial. That one urged the Conservative government to liberalize the distribution of "post-war credits" so that these credits (a kind of forced savings accumulated during World War II) would be returned to taxpayers at a lower age level than that provided by existing legislation. Despite a government spokesman's speech in opposition, this resolution received conference approval on a close vote.[22] However, when the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer presented his budget to the House of Commons in April 1954, he made it clear that he was not bound by the conference resolution of the preceding autumn. While slightly modifying the distribution of post-war credits, the Chancellor quite deliberately rejected alterations of the type suggested by the Conservative party resolution.[23] This is not to say that the Chancellor and the government failed altogether to take the mass party's wishes into account as influence or pressure, but, acting as the Conservative leadership, they most certainly exercised the power to make the decision themselves.

More surprising than the fact that the National Union, through its conference, does not control Conservative parliamentary policy, is that the Union itself lacks control over some of the most crucial party activities outside of parliament. The Chairman of the Party Organization, who heads what is popularly known as the Conservative central office, and the Vice-Chairman, to whom the important Advisory Committee on Parliamentary Candidates must report, are both direct personal appointees of the Leader of the parliamentary party.[24] The Party Organization and the National Union are, in fact, closely knit, and the Organization performs services for the latter and for the constituency associations. Although the Conservative party does not publish its financial accounts, it is evident that the central headquarters receives large contributions entirely apart from the associations which compose the National Union. No one has ever suggested that the elaborate and effective activity of the Conservative Central Office, during and between campaigns, is supported by membership dues. And it is only recently that the constituency associations have been urged to raise funds, on a large scale, for central rather than local purposes. In sum, the headquarters staff is not an agency of the mass party but rather of the leadership of the parliamentary party.

The secondary status of the National Union is in no way concealed. Conservative principle stresses this point so heavily, consistent with the party's traditional devotion to leadership, that there is even some danger of incorrectly discounting altogether the influence of the mass

[20] McKenzie (*op. cit.*, p. 384) concludes that the Conservative Leader, despite his formal supremacy, rules with the consent of his fellow Conservative politicians, and thus has a position not much different from that of the Labor leader (who is stronger than his formal powers would indicate).

[21] McKenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

[22] *73rd Annual Report of the Conservative Conference* (1953), pp. 22–24, 103, 105–6.

[23] 526 *H. C. Deb.* 218–20 (April 6, 1954).

[24] McKenzie, *op. cit.*, pp. 272–73, 291.

organization. Organized followers, in the millions, are never completely taken for granted. Their willing and preferably enthusiastic consent is worth seeking for those who wish to exercise effective party leadership.

Labor Structure in Great Britain

If there has been a tendency to underestimate the influence of the Conservative mass organization, the opposite has been true of commentary on the Labor party. Often credence has been given to Labor's own claim that its mass organization is the policy-maker. The great merit of recent studies is to demonstrate the similarity, in practice if not in profession, of the rôles assigned by Conservatives and by Labor to their external parties. In fact, Labor's mass organization is only slightly less clearly subordinate than is that of the Conservatives.

Labor's structure is complicated by indirect as well as direct individual memberships. In addition to simple recruitment through branches (constituency Labor parties), members are also obtained by the affiliation of organizations, mainly trade unions, to the party as a whole. A trade unionist becomes an "indirect" member of the Labor party if his union is affiliated and if he registers no dissent from his union's payment to the party of a portion of his dues.[25] The great majority of Labor memberships are indirect. Over five million trade unionists are now affiliated, and the numbers are being increased by the largest unions which before 1955 had affiliated, for reasons of economy, only on the basis of a portion of their total memberships.[26]

On the other hand, Labor's direct membership totals little more than one million — just above one third of the direct Conservative membership. This is large by American standards, but the mass character of the Labor party is impressive in Britain only when the affiliated trade-union membership is counted as part of the total. For most purposes it is reasonable to do so. Certainly the unions, by dues and by other contributions, provide the bulk of the party's financial support.[27] However, the five million or more indirectly affiliated trade unionists, excepting those who are also direct party members, may not fairly be assumed to have made any positive commitment to active participation in party affairs. Union leaders often have such commitments, but that is another matter. This is not to say that unionists are unwillingly affiliated to the party. The bulk of the five million may be Labor voters and many may be supporters, glad enough to contribute six pence a year of their union dues to the party, but even on this assumption the unionist cannot be counted as a participant in the sense that a directly affiliated member is likely to be.

It is the directly affiliated member who attends constituency association meetings. He may also — in fact, he usually does — hold a union card as well, but it is not by virtue of this fact that he participates in constituency affairs. However, organization of the Labor constituency association is complicated by the affiliation of local unions who often maintain such a constituency connection in addition to the national Labor party affiliation which their own national union maintains. In some constituencies, unions dominate the General Management Committee on which they, along with the various geographical subunits of the constituency, have representatives. Like the Conservative association's Executive Council, this General Management Committee conducts the affairs of the constituency association. If anything, Labor's General Management Committee is more important than its Conservative counterpart, since the Labor constituency association, as such, does not meet at all. General membership meetings are held at the ward or polling district level.[28]

As among the Conservatives, the representative body, at the constituency level, is the major factor in candidate selection. The General Management Committee, which may have more than 100 members, has a smaller executive committee that receives names, interviews aspirants, and then furnishes a short list of about six potential parliamentary candidates.

[25] The contrast between direct and indirect members is that of Duverger, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–10.

[26] *53rd Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1954), pp. 10, 36. The recent tendency of unions to increase their affiliations is reported in *The Times* (London), March 5, 1955, p. 6.

[27] *53rd Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1954), pp. 34–35, 41–47.

[28] Bulmer-Thomas, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–39.

From this list the General Management Committee makes its selection.[29] Generally it has been thought that Labor's selection process, compared with the Conservatives', is subject to somewhat closer national supervision. This assumption may be derived from the provisions of the Labor party constitution, which do spell out the need for national approval of the local selection,[30] or from publicized attempts of the Labor leadership to prevent constituencies from adopting suspected Communists or fellow travelers. However, in the absence of a systematic study, it is difficult to find any basis for believing that the Labor constituency associations are much more limited in their candidate-selection process than are the Conservative associations. For example, at the time of the 1955 general election one Labor association chose as its candidate a former M. P. who had been ousted from the party once since World War II and who remained decidedly unorthodox and out of favor with the national leadership. To adopt this maverick, the association rejected a much-respected Labor front-bench spokesman and former minister for whom the national headquarters wanted a new constituency because redistricting had cost the member his old one.[31]

Despite their substantial local authority in candidate selection, Labor associations do not seem much more prone than Conservative associations to employ the adoption procedure as a means of making an M. P. "responsible" to the local mass membership.[32] True enough, a Labor no less than a Conservative association makes some effort, when there is no sitting member, to choose a candidate congenial to the local membership since, at the very least, that membership's loyalty is an important electoral consideration. Sometimes this may even mean a preference for a candidate with local roots although, as is well known, neither British law nor custom requires that a representative live in his constituency. The policy views, as well as the personality, of a prospective candidate may be taken into account. Thus it has recently been observed that those local Labor parties dominated by Bevanites prefer Left-wing candidates, while those more heavily influenced by trade unionists prefer Right-wing candidates. But for sitting members this kind of preference operates only rarely if at all. Thus Attlee-ite M. P.'s continue to be readopted by Bevanite constituency associations, and Bevanites by Attlee-ite associations. Occasionally a Labor association may want an explanation of its M. P.'s position, and perhaps be more open in its displeasure than a Conservative association. But it hardly treats its parliamentary representative as a delegate.

Since, as in the Conservative case, no one contends that the local Labor mass membership makes parliamentary policy through its M. P., it is best to turn to the national organization as such. Here the point must be made at the outset that the direct Labor membership is really a permanent and decided minority. Rank-and-file activists are simply in no position to determine policy. Voting arrangements at Labor's annual conference are illustrative. On the basis of numbers of members, the unions have nearly five times as many votes as the representatives of the local Labor parties.[33] Although it ought to be noted that the unions as such do not necessarily stand against the local parties as such, there is little doubt where the power is located in the event of a showdown. This power is made all the more effective because of each union's practice of voting its membership as a bloc. The largest single union, for example, now has a bloc of one million votes to commit one way or another on any given issue. All that is ordinarily necessary is that the union's delegates to the party conference reach agreement on which way they want their bloc to be voted. On some issues delegates may be instructed in advance by

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 204–7.

[30] Clause IX, Constitution and Standing Orders of the Labour Party, *53rd Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1954), pp. 203–10.

[31] The candidate selected was K. Zilliacus, who had been readmitted to the Labor party as recently as 1952. The rejected ex-minister was Sir Frank Soskice. *The Times* (London), May 2, 1955, p. 8. At the general election, Zilliacus won the seat (which had been redistricted) by a reduced majority.

[32] British Labor's oligarchical selection is different from that of the Australian Labor party, which employs a selection ballot distributed to all party members. Overacker, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[33] *53rd Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1954), p. 64.

their own union conference, in which the union's leadership plays a principal part.

The British trade-union structure is such that three or four large unions, if agreed among themselves, have very nearly a working majority in the party conference. And, in fact, they are generally in sufficient agreement to ensure control. There is little dispute that the practical effect has been to concentrate conference decision-making in the hands of the leaders of a few large, hierarchically ordered trade unions, who ordinarily work closely with the leadership of the parliamentary party. Consequently, even if it is argued that the Labor conference makes party policy, it would be entirely unrealistic to impute power to the rank-and-file activists.

Moreover it is doubtful that the conference is a policy-maker except in an extremely loose sense of that term. Policy is surely discussed at Labor conferences, and with much greater controversy and fervor than at Conservative conferences. But this is not to say that parliamentary policy is made by party conferences, despite the apparent belief of delegates in the efficacy of their many resolutions. Delegates may be encouraged by the fact that Labor's technical arrangements for handling resolutions, unlike Conservative conference arrangements, are at least compatible in appearance with the practice of intraparty democracy. Voting is in accordance with the membership of each unit represented, and the system under which each unit (local party, union, and so on) casts a ballot containing its total membership is a simple and efficient way of establishing results on controversial issues. Also Labor authorizes a somewhat less unmanageable number of delegates to attend its conference. Still the number comes to about 1,300,[34] which, while but one fourth of the Conservative potential, is obviously too large for deliberation during the three or four days of meetings.

The belief in the Labor conference as a policy-maker is ordinarily derived from the ostensible power of the conference to determine the content of the party's election manifesto. Such a power, if real, would be significant since British parties are ordinarily expected to take their election commitments seriously. However, the power is hedged in a number of ways. A two-thirds conference vote is required in favor of any proposal before it is included in the party's official program. More important is the fact that the party leaders are specifically given the authority to decide which items from this program are to be included in the election manifesto and also to define the party's official attitude on other issues not covered by the manifesto.[35] Then, finally, there is the fact that the parliamentary Labor party retains the all-important decision as to "timing." Labor's parliamentary leadership, especially when it constitutes the cabinet, can always decide that the occasion is unpropitious for measures previously included in the election manifesto. Such a course, if frequently followed, would provide the Labor rank and file with some sense of grievance. But the course is seldom necessary. So long as the alliance between the parliamentary leadership and the dominant trade unions remains firm, there are not likely to be many occasions for the conference to adopt resolutions without the leadership's endorsement. Ignoring Labor conference decisions, as one observer has remarked, is done "in the last resort."[36]

The exceptional occasion, however, may be illuminating with respect to the subordinate rôle of the conference. A much-cited example is the tied-cottage issue. Although the issue has not been of great moment, it commanded the Labor conference's attention on more than one occasion. There has been a genuine rank-and-file desire to secure governmental action against the landowner's practice of renting his cottages to farm laborers only so long as they remain in the landowner's employment. Eviction on termination of employment seemed especially offensive in light of Britain's general policy of protecting tenants against landlords during the post-war housing shortage. On two occasions during the Labor government's tenure, the party conference approved resolutions urging legislation which would abolish the tied-cottage system. Both times the resolutions were carried over the objections of the party leadership. No less a spokesman than the Minister of Health, then Aneurin Bevan (ordinarily the favorite of

[34] McKenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 488.

[35] Clause V, Constitution and Standing Orders of the Labour Party, *53rd Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1954), pp. 203–10.

[36] Bulmer-Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

the rank and file), attempted to dissuade the conference from trying to commit the government to legislation. Without defending the tied cottage, Bevan argued that it was "impossible for the Conference not knowing the Parliamentary situation to determine the Parliamentary time table. All the Conference can do is to record its views on principles, and ask that they be implemented at the earliest possible moment."[37]

That statement was made in 1947, but at the 1948 conference ("the earliest possible moment" not yet having arrived) Bevan had again to oppose unsuccessfully a tied-cottage resolution. This time his words provide an unusually revealing statement of the conference's subordination to the parliamentary party:

> What we are concerned about this morning is not whether tied cottages should exist or not, but when it is appropriate for us to deal with them. Last year the Conference was told that it ought not try to decide the Parliamentary time table. It is quite impossible for a conference of 1,100 people, even if it were constitutionally proper, to determine the order in which the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Government introduces legislation into the House of Commons. It is for the Conference to lay down the policies of the Parliamentary Party, and for the Parliamentary Party to interpret those policies in the light of the Parliamentary system. Any other procedure would merely confuse the whole situation.[38]

Although Labor remained in power three more years after the second conference resolution, the parliamentary leadership never did find the time "appropriate" for abolishing the tied cottage. Nor did the leadership allow itself to be committed to conference policy in Labor's 1951 election manifesto. Only a pledge to stop the creation of new tied cottages was included in the manifesto.[39] It was not surprising, then, that the 1952 conference adopted another resolution urging the next Labor government to a more radical reform.[40] And, judging by the record, it would be no more surprising if another Labor government failed to find the proper time for such legislation.

This procedure has its embarrassments, particularly for the leader who must explain the government's inaction to successive conferences. It is safe to say that on issues of broader appeal, in order to avoid similar but larger embarrassments, the party leadership would make the effort necessary to produce a conference majority for its point of view. On the big issues, like foreign policy and rearmament, this has been the pattern in the pre-war and post-war periods.[41]

While the secondary rôle of the Labor conference seems clear, it is sometimes urged that the party's National Executive Committee effectively represents the mass organization's authority over the parliamentary party. If the conference itself cannot make policy, it is suggested that the National Executive can do so in behalf of the conference. The point deserves close examination. The National Executive contains twenty-eight members elected by the conference in such a way that the largest trade unions can and do obtain a majority for themselves and their friends. The leader and deputy leader of the parliamentary party are, ex officio, among the twenty-eight members.[42] There is no doubt whatsoever that the National Executive is granted real powers over finances, campaigns, and policy statements. The headquarters' functions, which the Conservative party places under the personal direction of the parliamentary leader, are definitely located by Labor under its National Executive, the arm of the external organization.

However, this does not mean that the National Executive really makes the policy of the parliamentary party. Rather the National Executive tends to reflect the policies of the parliamentary party. This is accomplished, in part, by the fact that the National Executive regularly contains important Labor M. P.'s in addition to the leader and deputy leader. Their crucial rôle in the National Executive's policy-making has been amply demonstrated.[43] Of course, the parliamentary leadership does need trade-union support in order to win adoption of

[37] *46th Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1947), p. 127.

[38] *47th Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1948), p. 214.

[39] Labour Party, *Election Manifesto,* 1951.

[40] *51st Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1952), pp. 178–79.

[41] See my account of the foreign policy and rearmament debates in chapters vii and xi of *Britain — Uneasy Ally* (Chicago, 1954).

[42] *53rd Annual Report of the Labour Conference* (1954), pp. 203–10. Various activities of the Executive are described on pp. 5–12.

[43] McKenzie, *op. cit.,* pp. 418–22.

its policies by the National Executive. That is the prime requisite, in any event, for Labor party leadership. But this necessity does not negate the point that policy comes from the parliamentary party to the National Executive, which in turn presents the policy to the party conference. This is clearest when the matter is of greatest importance: during the tenure of a Labor government.

Until 1945 there was some excuse, stemming from Labor's official vagueness, for misunderstanding the power of the National Executive. However, the Attlee-Laski episode during the 1945 election campaign did much to clarify the Executive's relationship to the parliamentary leadership. At that time, Harold Laski, as chairman of the Executive, issued a statement which sought to limit the rôle of Clement Attlee during his attendance, with Prime Minister Churchill, at the Potsdam conference. Atlee was then the leader of the parliamentary Labor party and, as such, the prospective prime minister if Labor won the election then taking place. Attlee repudiated the rôle of observer in which Laski wanted to cast him, but nevertheless Laski's statement became an election issue. Churchill and the Conservatives chose to make it so, apparently on the ground that any suspicion of external dictation to parliamentary leadership would hurt the Labor party's chances among British voters. Churchill's charges caused Attlee to put the relationship in definitive form. He explicitly denied that the parliamentary Labor party was answerable to, or under the direction of, the National Executive Committee. While Attlee pointed out that the parliamentary leadership consulted with the Executive, he asserted that no instructions emerged, or could emerge, from these consultations.[44] Since 1945, even among critics of the Labor party, the charge of external dictation has not been seriously raised.

The National Executive, though in a stronger position than the party conference, cannot be viewed as an agency of articulation through which the mass membership determines party policy. Originally both the Executive and the conference were probably intended for some such purpose. What was wanted, in Labor's early days, was a means of ensuring that parliamentary representatives would be loyal to the mass movement. Historically the founders of the Labor party were not, like the Conservatives, trying to create a service agency for the parliamentary leadership. Rather the early Labor leaders were following the formula of socialist and working-class movements elsewhere. In other words, they meant to establish a mass organization which, on the basis of intra-party democracy, would make decisions for parliamentary representatives to carry out. The Labor party thus began in the manner which Duverger regards as normal for modern socialist parties. The fact that Labor's practice now resembles that of the Conservatives appears to be the result of the strength of the British parliamentary tradition and particularly of Labor's experience as a responsible governing party — an experience mainly denied to continental socialist parties.

General Import

Although the main object has been to demonstrate the secondary status of the mass parties, enough has been said to indicate that neither the Conservative nor the Labor organization is an entirely negligible factor in British politics. If the Labor membership is less potent than it is sometimes thought to be, the Conservative membership (even if less important than Labor's) may be underrated. But in both cases, the mass membership is no more than one of several influences, and probably not the dominant one, in making legislative policy.

It is easy to understand why the parliamentary leaders prefer this situation to one in which they would be directly responsible to their respective party members. For the leaders to allow their policies to be settled by party members, or by any organ representative of party members, would be to risk a loss of votes in the nation at large. Rank-and-file activists are assumed to favor more extreme measures (to the right among Conservatives and to the left among Laborites) than do nonaffiliated voters, especially the all-important marginal or swing voters. The very attitudes which produce the sacrifice and devotion of volunteer workers indicate an intensity of conviction which the bulk of the population does not share. Furthermore

[44] One of the best accounts of the Attlee-Laski affair is that of Herbert Morrison, *Government and Parliament* (London, 1954), pp. 140–44. See also Clement Attlee, *As It Happened* (London, 1954), pp. 138, 145; and Kingsley Martin, *Harold Laski* (New York, 1953), pp. 159–63.

the fervor of the rank-and-file activist is unmodified by the same practical vote-getting considerations which affect those who seek public office under the party label. Over and over the mass memberships of both parties may be observed to favor resolutions of dubious popularity in the nation at large and thus unacceptable to the parliamentary leaders. The ideological zeal of the activists is countered by those whose antennae are tuned to middle-of-the-road voters.

Much the same observation has been made of parties elsewhere. Writing particularly of the French socialists, Duverger put the point succinctly: "The militants are more revolutionary than the electors, who are scarcely revolutionary at all. And the deputies are naturally more prone to follow the electors than the militants."[45] Similarly Philip Williams, in his excellent work on French parties, has written of the inevitable difference of outlook between the member of parliament and the militant in the country at large.[46] The French term "militant" seems especially appropriate because it is the militancy of the rank-and-file activist which sets his type apart from the less thoroughly committed voter. It would be a mistake to believe that the militant is peculiar to parties of the Left. Observation of British Conservatives, assembled in conference, discloses essentially the same type as the socialist militant. The Conservative militant, instead of pressing for nationalization and welfare measures, urges that his party lower taxes and reduce public expenditures, often below the point of political feasibility.

What needs to be emphasized is that Conservative and Labor practices differ mainly in their methods of avoiding responsibility to the mass memberships. The Conservative leadership can depend largely on its followers appreciating their own limited rôle in accord with the party's élitist tradition. Labor leaders can count on no such thing but must contend with the antithetical tradition of intra-party democracy on which their party was founded. However, the principle of loyalty to established leadership is cherished within the labor movement, and the party shares with the rest of the community an appreciation of the British system of responsibility to parliament. Thus the leadership is not without strong arguments in seeking to maintain its policy against rank-and-file pressure. Post-war party history testifies to the strength of the leadership's position. Yet much of this strength rests upon the fact that the external organization's approval can, in fact, be secured without the support of the directly affiliated membership. Unlike the Conservative situation, a majority may be secured in the Labor conference without the support of rank-and-file activists. The militants may be outvoted by the big battalions of the trade unions.

Except by the militants themselves, the effective British party restraints on militancy are ordinarily viewed as socially desirable on the ground that moderate rather than extreme alternatives are thus presented to the voters.[47] By leaving policy-making to politicians seeking office at the national level, it is believed that British parties reduce the ideological gulf which would, if the zealots took the lead, so substantially divide the country as to make it hard for the defeated party to accept the government of the victor. This point bears directly on the American advocacy of greater party responsibility. There is no doubt that this advocacy is derived from the larger aim of having American parties adopt more clear-cut and distinguishable policy alternatives. Responsibility to some kind of party membership is thus often viewed as a means to an end. Probably the means is well calculated to achieve the ideological division the reformers desire. But the British experience cannot very well be invoked as precedent. For what both the Conservative and the Labor party leaders do is to avoid the means — that is, avoid "responsibility" to their memberships — because they prefer to appeal to middle-of-the-road voters rather than to achieve the goal of clear-cut ideological alternatives between their parties.

In other words, the existence of mass parties cannot account for the "responsibility" which British parliamentary leaders are commonly supposed to display in the enactment of campaign promises. These promises are really designed for the electorate (though, of course, they may also represent the wishes of the mem-

[45] Duverger, *op. cit.*, p. 192.
[46] Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 367–68.
[47] Butler, "American Myths About British Parties," *loc. cit.*, p. 56.

bership), and it is primarily to the electorate that the leadership remains responsible. Thus it is difficult to appreciate just why and how British mass parties represent an advanced form of democratic expression. Even if they did exercise more power, so that they dominated parliamentary leaders, the "democracy" of the situation would be dubious. It is by no means plain that the will of the people would be better served by having a few million party zealots, readily given to extreme ideological positions, determining national policies. And it might be guessed that American mass parties, if they existed, would be more difficult to "keep in their place" in the manner of their British counterparts. The United States, as is often observed, does not have the aristocratic tradition which makes for the relatively ready deference to leadership characterizing British mass parties.[48]

Although British mass memberships do sometimes constitute embarrassingly strong pressures on the party leaders, nevertheless the organizations are very much worth the trouble their pressures may cause. This is not so much because the members do so much of the work necessary to get out the vote. The latter is no mean chore in British politics. From the electoral registers, each constituency party canvasses its own likely or potential voters, and it does this canvassing by personal interview (often more than once during a given campaign). In a marginal seat, where every vote counts, the canvassing is likely to include intensive follow-up activity to make sure that all of a party's voters get to the polls.[49] This kind of thoroughness, even if directed by a paid professional, requires many volunteers from among party members.

Perhaps it might be contended that this rank-and-file activism is a symptom of the "modernness" of British mass parties. If so, American parties would appear, by comparison, not merely backward but retrograde. Intensive organization efforts to get out a party's vote were more prevalent in American cities a few decades ago than they are today. However, British canvassing does not seem a necessarily modern political feature. In a way, volunteer electioneering in Great Britain is filling a gap created by the law and custom which effectively prevent large-scale expenditures during a campaign. Unlike American practice, British legal limitations for each parliamentary constituency are rigidly enforced. And, in addition to the law, British expenditure is undoubtedly restrained by general environmental inhibitions. To the British there might be something unseemly about political advertising on the lavish American scale. It is doubtful whether the British economy has the surplus wealth to support so easily the level of American campaign expenditure. What is available, more cheaply than in the United States, is manpower, and that is abundantly used in getting out the vote. Otherwise a British campaign is a subdued affair. Radio and television, for example, are used only sparingly and without charge. In the 1955 general election campaign, each major party was granted time for four appearances on the radio and three on television.

What this suggests, in comparison to the increasingly expensive public-relations style of American campaigning, is that the activism of British mass parties represents an adjustment to different, but no more modern, circumstances than those of the United States. It could even be argued that the American style is really more up-to-date. However, there is no sign that British parties, despite an increasing need for funds,[50] are reducing the rôle played by their activists, in favor of other means of reaching the voters. Rather, mass memberships have been increasing and performing more political services, despite the growth of mass media of communication.

This phenomenon of thriving British party memberships relative to American parties remains something of a puzzle. Surely the fact that American parties do not have quite the same need for activists does not seem to offer

[48] Samuel H. Beer touched on a similar point when, in reviewing Duverger's work, he asked: "Can American parties be understood apart from the pervasive 'liberal' values of our society and its lack of a feudal tradition?" "Les Partis Politiques," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. VI, p. 517 (September 1953).

[49] A full account of all the work that went into saving the marginal Labor seat of Reading has been written by the constituency's M. P., Ian Mikardo, *Tribune*, June 3, 1955, p. 5.

[50] Constituency Labor parties have lately been trying to raise money by conducting lotteries on a large scale. Mark Arnold-Forster, "The Future of Labour," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, February 3, 1955, p. 7.

a complete explanation. Americans, after all, are supposed to be a nation of joiners, and it seems odd that so few should join political parties of their choice. Still it may be membership in so many other American organizations which saps the time and energy that might otherwise go into party activity. In particular, Americans may find a convenient and effective outlet for political desires and interests through membership in some kind of nonparty pressure group. Activity in the American Legion, the League of Women Voters, the Farm Bureau, the Chamber of Commerce, or a union unquestionably serves many Americans, materially and psychologically, as party membership does for many Englishmen. Now it is often suggested that this is one of the things wrong with politics in the United States, and that Americans should channelize more of their political activity through party membership. But it is not really an easy matter to convince Americans that they could express their political desires more effectively in a mass-membership party. Surely there is nothing in the British experience that would be very convincing on this score. On the contrary, on the basis of that experience, one can believe it possible that the individual British party member's interest is less likely to command attention than is that of the American who remains outside a party and waits to see what each party offers his interest-group.

At any rate, it would be entirely arbitrary to say that one form of political participation is modern and the other is not. In fact, the burden of this study is that there is really no reasonable sense in which the British mass party, compared to the American "cadre" party, can be considered a modern prototype. Yet, Duverger, and probably the other political scientists who accept his perspective, do have an elaborate argument in support of the view that mass membership is a distinctively modern phenomenon. The argument is related to Duverger's statement, noted earlier, that mass membership resulted from the growth of socialist movements. The supposed backwardness of American party organization is conceived as part and parcel of the general backwardness of America in not having a large socialist party. As Duverger states: "The archaic organization of American parties thus seems the consequence of the essential conservatism of American politics, in the European sense of the term."[51] What he means, of course, is the absence of a European class consciousness.

It is here that one reaches a basic assumption of those students of comparative politics who take European parties and particularly British parties as the norm for American parties. What they are really saying is that it is normal for a class-conscious socialist party to develop, to acquire a large dues-paying membership, and then to influence the method of organization employed by nonsocialist parties. It is reasonable to doubt the assumption that this process is normal in the sense that it may be applied as a standard by which to measure American parties. The growth of mass parties in Europe may possibly be explained as the consequence of a socialist response to class consciousness — although British mass organizations preceded socialist efforts. But even if it be conceded that European experience supports Duverger's interpretation, the very absence of that experience in the United States casts prima-facie doubt on the general validity of the thesis. American society cannot very well be assumed to be backward simply because it has not produced the requisite class consciousness for the creation of a mass-membership socialist party. In no demonstrable economic sense is the United States less highly developed industrially than were European countries when their socialist movements began. The very suggestion is ludicrous.

It seems entirely unreasonable to contend that the American economy has failed to produce political class consciousness because that economy is somehow behind European developments. It would be easier, in fact, to argue the other way around and to say that there is less class consciousness in the United States because the American economy is more advanced than that of Europe. But it is enough, for present purposes, to say that the American situation is simply different. Neither European nor American circumstances have to be posited as a norm.

Much the same point may be scored if the mass-membership factor is considered to be the result of some kind of political maturity. Whatever may be said on the subject of greater European, and especially British, political ex-

[51] Duverger, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

perience, none of the historical evidence really relates to mass participation. Americans did secure the universal franchise well ahead of Europeans, and specifically a half-century or so ahead of the British working classes. Rather than being less-advanced participants in democratic politics, rank-and-file Americans must be viewed as more highly experienced in their employment of electoral processes. The form of American parties can hardly be attributed to any objectively determined political immaturity on the part of the American masses.

The various strained attempts to explain American parties in terms of some kind of social backwardness or immaturity can be avoided altogether if one rejects the assumption that our parties are "underdeveloped" in relation to those of Europe in general and Britain in particular. Among other things, this would involve giving up the idea that British mass parties are models which Americans should follow in order to be modern.

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SINGLE-PARTY SYSTEMS IN WEST AFRICA

• *RUTH SCHACHTER*

In this paper I propose to examine the tendency towards single-party systems in West Africa, particularly in relation to the social structure and the historical circumstances in which the parties emerged.[1] I shall therefore point up the distinction between "mass" and "patron" parties, and then consider the new single-party governments, most of them based on mass parties, in relation to the prospects of democracy in West Africa. My argument is that mass parties are created by African leaders out of the very liberating and egalitarian forces we in this country generally associate with democracy. Some of the mass parties encourage the growth of forces and institutions which may ultimately make possible the machinery of democratic systems familiar to us: as, for instance, competition for every citizen's vote by more than one organized team of candidates. At this stage of West African party history, it seems to me, the number of parties is far too simple a criterion upon which to decide whether or not a system is democratic.

General statements about parties in the new West African states can be made only tentatively. Significant rights to vote and organize parties came to West Africa only after the Second World War. Since then formal institutional change has taken place at a rapid pace. The constitutional framework in which the parties grew changed continuously. The franchise expanded until it became universal, the powers of African elected representatives grew by stages from consultative to legislative and eventually to executive, and the locus of political power shifted from London or Paris to Africa. Even so basic a feature of a political system as its territorial and international frontiers occasionally altered. For example, Upper Volta was reconstituted as a separate territory in 1947; and some eleven years later the federation of French West Africa was dissolved and Ghana had absorbed British Togoland. The Mali Federation, born in 1959, dissolved before it was two years old. The general points evident from an examination of party history over less than twenty years may turn out to be of minor importance in a later perspective.

All these are reasons for caution. Nevertheless, the parties are among the oldest national political institutions in West Africa, wholly Africanized long before the governments or the

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[1] Evidence for this paper was gathered during field trips to West Africa, and is to be published in my *Parties of French-Speaking West Africa*. I am most grateful to Jeffrey Butler, Thomas Hodgkin, Richard Sklar and Immanuel Wallerstein for their valuable comments, and to Newell Stultz for his assistance.

civil services (which still are not). Hence parties give better guidelines to African politics than those formal institutions of government which were set up by French and British colonizers at least in part as a condition for their recent political withdrawal, and are being changed by Africans after independence.

The majority of the new West African sovereign nations are based on single parties, likely to dominate for some time whether or not opposition parties are allowed to exist alongside. Most of their governments are founded on mass parties: Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali (formerly Soudan), Senegal, Togo and — with qualifications — the Eastern and Western Regions in the Federation of Nigeria. Without the pressure these mass parties exerted on the French or British colonial authorities, it is doubtful whether the colonial era in West Africa would have ended quite so soon. Perhaps, indeed, the nationalist drive of these particullar mass movements, linked with the rapid decline of European power, carried along towards independence in 1960 even those states in which mass parties have not yet emerged: the Northern Region of Nigeria, the Islamic Republic of Mauretania, and (with qualifications) Niger and Upper Volta, which are also single party systems, but based on parties of the "patron," "cadre," or "personality" types.[2] In Dahomey, however, government rests on an unstable alliance of parties, both of the mass and patron types, still regional and not territorial in scale.

Successive post-war electoral results in West Africa make obvious another clear trend: the only sharp changes in party majorities took place prior to independence, and were from patron to mass party majority; never the reverse. An apparent exception was Ivory Coast, where the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) rode to power in 1946, immediately after Africans were able to organize parties legally. Between 1949 and 1952 it lost a series of elections and by-elections, but only because the French administration had tampered with the ballot. Officially, then, some candidates of the allied patron parties of Ivory Coast won, but the PDCI resumed its monopoly of offices as soon as the voters could register their choice freely once more.

[2] "Patron" parties and "parties of personalities" are terms employed by Thomas Hodgkin, author of *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (London, Muller, 1956). "Cadre" party is used by Maurice Duverger in his *Political Parties* (London, Methuen, 1954).

1. Mass and Patron Parties

The main distinction between mass and patron parties lies not in the social origins of aspiring national leaders, and not in the scale of party organizations. It lies rather in the reply to the questions: How are the national leaders related to the rest of the population, and on what groups and with what ideas and structures did they build their parties? The distinction is perhaps best seen first at the local branch level.

Mass parties generally sought the adherence of every single individual. They wanted to enroll each man, woman, and even child, and so they had to establish local branches with headquarters, regular meetings and elections for branch leaders. Examples are the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire or the Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (PDG) of Guinea. The patron parties usually terminated their structure simply with the adherence of influential notables or patrons; these were mostly the officially recognized "chiefs" or their direct representatives. Examples are the *Union Nigérienne des Indépendants et Sympathisants* (UNIS)*[3] of Niger, the *Parti Progressiste Soudanais** (PSP *sic*), the *Bloc Africain de Guinée** (BAG) or with qualifications, the *Northern People's Congress* (NPC) of Nigeria. Most patron parties did little to reach every individual in the community, and relied upon the "patrons" for their local influence. A defection from the local branch of a mass party rarely led to the disintegration of the branch. But the defection of a local notable from the patron party seriously weakened it in the locality.

Mass parties, such as the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* of Guinea, the *Union Soudanaise* (US) of Mali, the *Convention People's Party* (CPP) of Ghana, the *Action Group of Nigeria*, the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise* (UPS) of Senegal, *the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons* (NCNC), the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* of Ivory Coast, and the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* (CUT) of Togo counted their numbers in the hundreds of thousands. First organized around an anti-

[3] Parties indicated with an * have gone out of existence.

colonial platform, they claimed to "represent 'all the people'; to embody the national will . . ."[4]

Several structural concepts elaborated by Duverger and applied to Moroccan parties by Rézette[5] can be usefully employed in connection with the tropical African parties. At least for a time, most mass parties were strongly articulated, relatively disciplined and called forth considerable direct participation from members, in varying degrees roughly indicated, in descending order, by the sequence of their listing above. The leaders of these parties emphasized organization partly because they opposed the established authorities and could not use established institutions. They usually created parallel women's and youth organizations. They published newspapers, set up central and regional headquarters, hired permanent staff, distributed membership cards, charged dues, and especially before independence, sychronized activities and shared personnel with African trade unions. The more effective their organization, the more mass party leaders were in a position to implement their decisions. *Union Soudanaise* and *Parti Démocratique de Guinée leaders*, for example, regarded their mass parties as "weapons"[6] designed to achieve independence and economic development with the greatest speed possible.

In contrast, most patron parties — *Parti Progressiste Soudanais**, for instance, and *Union Nigérienne des Indépendants et Sympathisants** — were weakly articulated, comparatively undisciplined, with little if any direct membership participation. This difference in structure between mass and patron parties is one of several reasons why, though mass parties took the place of patron parties with a regularity suggesting a definite pattern, so far no mass party has ever been replaced by a rival in free election.

Closely related to structure was the pattern of authority within the party. Not all but some of the mass parties had both institutionalized and collective leadership, such as the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise*, the *Action Group of Nigeria*, the *Union Soudanaise* and the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée*. Elections were fairly regular; officers gave some account of their stewardship to the members; discipline was given serious attention; a predetermined procedure was followed when important decisions were to be made. Patron parties, and a mass party such as the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* after 1950, had essentially personal leadership; leaders, either as individuals or as a group, made decisions and reconciled conflicts in ways unfettered by pre-arranged rules. The parties with institutionalized leadership could deal far more smoothly with the problems posed by renewal and succession.

For an understanding of the authority pattern within the parties a modified notion of charisma is sometimes useful,[7] provided it is not understood simply as "the polar opposite of formal and traditional bonds,"[8] or taken to mean the total "absence of any defined hierarchy."[9] Thus some, but not all, mass party top-level leaders — Sékou Touré of the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and Mamadou Konaté (d. 1956) of the *Union Soudanaise* — enjoyed a type of charisma which was limited both by the constitutional procedure they themselves insisted upon within their mass parties, and by the power exercized to a greater or lesser extent by other groups and individuals within the party. Other leaders, particularly of patron parties — such as Fily Dabo Sissoko of the *Parti Progressiste Soudanais** and Sourou Migan Apithy of the *Parti Républicain du Dahomey** (PRD) — used their charisma comparatively unchecked by procedure, though limited by the power and influence of the "patrons." This was also true for some mass party leaders, such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*. Still other leaders, like Lamine Kaba of the Kankan region of Guinea, enjoyed charisma

[4] Hodgkin, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

[5] R. Rézette, *Les Partis politiques marocains* (Paris, Colin, 1955).

[6] David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg, "Nationalism and Models of Political Change in Africa," *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, Symposia Studies Series #1, The National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, George Washington University, 1959, p. 8.

[7] David Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955).

[8] Max Weber, "The Sociology of Charismatic Authority," *From Max Weber*, H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds. (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), p. 250.

[9] Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound* (London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1957), p. 271.

only within a locality considerably smaller than a territory. Their gift, usually recognized by only one ethnic group, came to be regarded as a threat to national party discipline. The notion of charisma, denoting extraordinary qualities ascribed to an individual, is a useful starting point for further investigation. But it is only a starting point; perhaps sharper than the idea Carlyle expressed with "Find in a country the Ablest Man . . . raise him to the supreme place . . . what he tells us to do must be precisely the wisest, fittest . . ."[10]

The distinction between mass and patron parties has implications beyond those already discussed — local branch organization, size of membership, patterns of authority, and structure. It illuminates also variations in social composition, methods and function. Before turning to these, however, we must look somewhat more closely at the total society in which West African parties sought support.

II. Modern and Traditional Elements

The West African societies in which ten new sovereign states emerged between 1957 and 1960 were at an earlier stage of economic and social history than the retiring colonial powers. The specific figures are less reliable than the generalizations they are designed to illustrate. As a result of the reforms extended after the Second World War, the vote became universal in a society where — on very rough average — fifteen per cent could read or write, perhaps three per cent were regular wage earners, and another three per cent were employed away from their villages. Considerably more than half the people's efforts still went into subsistence activity outside the exchange economy.[11] In Europe, by contrast, the vote became general only after almost everyone was deeply involved in the market economy. Indeed, not even the middle classes could vote until after the emergence of the "commercial civilization from the feudal, the society based on contract from the society based on status."[12] Not so in West Africa. Although there is an educated elite — mainly clerks, teachers, nurses, doctors, lawyers, and low-level technicians — only Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and southern Nigeria have a growing minority of literate Africans self-employed in trade, transport, and farming for export.

Several hundred different ethnic groups make up the approximately sixty million inhabitants of the new West African nations. The educated minority is almost alone in seeing a clear interest in maintaining the present territorial frontiers, or in enlarging them, and in preventing tribal separatism from fragmenting the new nations. With a few exceptions, the existence of this elite, its size and even its distribution according to ethnic and geographic origins, were due to the forces of economic and social change accompanying the arrival of the Europeans in West Africa. Much more economic activity took place in the coastal and forest belt of West Africa, and the proportion of people educated from that region is far greater than from the savannah and *sahel* belts. This caused trouble both for parties and for nations. Northern Nigerians, Ghanaians, and Ivory Coasters, for example, resent having too many party organizers, too many civil servants, and too many government leaders come from the southern regions of their countries. Some seeds of the 1958 riots against Dahomeans in the Ivory Coast were planted before the war, when the French West African educational system trained an unusually high proportion of them.

The political facts of colonial rule, and then the democratic reforms extending over some two decades, sped up the process whereby the modern layer of African society acquired the lead politically, even though it was still so small a minority. The European powers enlarged the scale of West African political units from the many tribal to the present territorial ones. Together with their new technology they introduced or reinforced secular values such as equality and merit, weakened traditional religious sanctions, and overthrew kinship as the main determinant of rank. Although the British believed in indirect rule and the French in direct rule, in varying degrees they both undermined the secular authority of the pre-European authorities.

There were few areas in which the presence of the Europeans did not add yet another di-

[10] Thomas Carlyle, "The Hero as King," *On Heroes and Hero Worship* (London, Ward & Lock, 1900), p. 262.

[11] See Elliot Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," this *Review*, Vol. 54 (June 1960), esp. Table I on p. 393.

[12] Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London, Macmillan, 1951), p. 567.

mension to the already thorny issue of succession. Pre-war "native authorities," or members of the *commandement indigène* — the official "chiefs" — did not necessarily also have a traditional claim to high rank. These categories seem to have overlapped most in the savannah region of the western Sudan, where such historic pre-European empires as Mali and Ghana existed, and where in the nineteenth century the Europeans could not install their administrations until they had defeated the warrior-kings, Samory Touré and the sons of Hajj Umar Tall. The official "chiefs" were no regular mobile civil servants recruited by standards of merit; few were literate; they were for the most part stationed among their kinsmen. In time, these official "chiefs" constituted a new stratum of the population in the countryside, with a sense of corporate identity transcending the limits of their different ethnic groups. They were aware that the postwar reforms affected the "prestige of the chiefs, precedence, deportment, decoration, housing, salaries."[13]

This awareness developed farthest in northern Nigeria, in Mali, Niger, and the plateau and savannah regions of Guinea. It became the basis for the more successful "patron" parties, including those now behind the single-party governments of Northern Nigeria, Niger, and Mauretania. In Mali and Guinea also, the patron parties which won in the postwar elections until defeated, in 1956, by the *Union Soudanaise* and the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* mass parties respectively, were based on these "chiefs." It was therefore in these territories particularly that the struggle against the colonial power barely masked another struggle, most acute in the countryside, between traditionalists and modernizers. In Mali and Guinea the mass party leaders, as soon as they were in a position to do so, consolidated their electoral victory by doing away altogether with the official "chiefs" and replacing them with regular civil servants, assisted by elected village councils. In Niger and Northern Nigeria, however, the challenge to the "chiefs," though already offered by the respective opposition parties — *Sawaba* and the *Northern Elements Progressive Union* (NEPU) — has not yet been successful.

[13] From the electoral manifesto of September 5, 1945, issued by the *Parti Progressiste Soudanais* leader, Fily Dabo Sissoko.

Even before the war educated Africans rather than traditional or official "chiefs" were increasingly sought out by their kinsmen to help them settle controversies with the Europeans and their laws. After the war, by the order in which they came as well as by their content, the reforms in West Africa helped the educated elite to assume the political initiative. (The recent history of the Congo illustrates, by contrast, the importance of this by-product of a reform phase preceding total independence.) In West Africa, most people took it for granted that Africans elected to postwar representative posts would know how to read and write in English or French — if only to talk to the Europeans who had promulgated the reforms. Moreover, in most territories the franchise was initially weighted in favor of those who were able to identify themselves in the records kept by the colonial power — which meant the literate and those earning money, mainly the people in the regular civil service, and only to a lesser degree those recognized as candidates for official "chief." The reforms gave the educated Africans legal channels for organizing the expulsion of the colonial power. They had reason to want to. Most of them lived in towns, saw Europeans often and were directly affected by the discrimination — racial, cultural, social and professional — which characterized the prewar colonial system.

The postwar reforms strengthened the position of the educated elite further by synchronizing political developments in areas of unequal political pressure, and by forcing even those traditional leaders who could still count upon the following of their ethnic groups, as in Mauretania or Northern Nigeria, to select educated "front men" for the new elective offices. Moreover, because the reforms extended over approximately two decades before full independence came, aspiring leaders had time to build records as nationalists, to champion opposition causes in the countryside, to build parties, and so anchor their authority to some degree. Nationalism gave the educated elite a powerful theme: to make all Africans once again masters in their own land. With a few exceptions this educated elite, rather than the traditional aristocrats or official "chiefs," got the credit for expelling the European colonizers.

Major or minor parties, mass or patron, these educated men staffed them. They provided the candidates for the new government

offices after the war, they took the seats in legislative assemblies, in cabinets, and public corporations; they filled the senior civil service posts. A majority of them were of the first generation in their families to read or write a language other than Arabic. They had been trained in schools designed to produce only subordinates for Europeans in that phase of colonial history when all senior posts were reserved for Europeans. Many were only primary school graduates; a minority — significantly larger in southern Ghana and Nigeria, which were richer, than in French-speaking Africa — went to secondary school. Only a tiny number graduated from universities.

Since most university places only opened up to West Africans after the war, few graduates were available to take the first offices. Nearly all of these had to content themselves with second-level posts, usually in the civil service. Some, indeed, were in the peculiar position of working under African ministers who were contemporaries, but who had failed the secondary school or college entrance examinations — which had left them free to take part in the crucial first years of postwar political activity, and so to become "founding fathers." The mass franchise, in effect, added yet another reason why, for the modern elite, the standards of success in the schools of the Europeans were often the reverse of the standards of success in African elections. Under the prewar conditions of total European control, the most educated generally acquired the highest of the subordinate offices open to Africans. But after the war, when the villagers acquired the vote and so became arbiters in the competition for power among members of the elite, those with only a primary school education often spoke the language of the people and exhibited talents which appealed to the villagers.

While the state schools helped weaken ethnic and historic antagonisms, they also created new cleavages among the educated elite, which in some territories acquired some political significance. For example, in postwar Guinea most of those who had been prewar students in the dominant French West African secondary school, the École Normale William-Ponty, wanted to keep the only paying jobs open to them. These were invariably in the civil service and so they had little alternative, prior to 1956, but to go into "administrative" parties. Most of them joined one of the officially preferred regional patron parties. The mass party in Guinea, the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée,* was led by products of the lower state schools, who accused Ponty graduates of "betraying the masses," and called them "valets of the administration." In Gold Coast (now Ghana) also, political and educational cleavages were to some degree superimposed when the "Standard VII boys" joined a radical breakaway from the more highly educated leaders of the *United Gold Coast Convention** (UGCC) and built the *Convention People's Party*. In Ivory Coast, by contrast, Ponty graduates took the lead both in the regional "patron" parties, and in the mass party — the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*. There Ponty graduates found alternatives to administrative employment in cocoa and coffee farming. Consequently in Ivory Coast political cleavages did not relate closely to differences in the diplomas achieved by members of the elite.

Apart from levels of education, differences of generation also made for cleavages among the elite, such as those which divided the Senegalese leaders of the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais** (BDS)[14] from the leaders of the Senegalese federation of the *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière** (SFIO);[15] or the young organizers of the *Convention People's Party* from the older leaders of the *United Gold Coast Convention.** There are differences in ideology too: Marxist-inspired for the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and the *Union Soudanaise;* a blend of Catholic and socialist political doctrine for many leaders of the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise*. These differences are sharpest in the minor parties organized by university trained graduates: dissident-marxist for some leaders of the *Parti du Régroupement Africain* (PRA) — *Sénégal;* close to orthodox Communism for the leaders of the Senegalese *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance* (PAI); an Africanized version of Emmanuel Mounier's French Catholic social doctrine for those participating in the *Mouvement Africain de Libération Nationale* (MLN). There were also differences in status, distinguishing in Senegal, for example, the prewar privileged "citizens" in the SFIO* from the "subjects" in the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais;** the former had ear-

[14] Forerunner of the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise.*

[15] In 1958 both groups merged into the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise.*

lier access to education, more wealth often from the peanut trade, and higher jobs in the civil service.[16]

These differences within the modern elite were balanced, however, by a certain common outlook. They conceived of themselves as Africans rather than Malinke, for example. Their common experiences in schools, jobs, and in the money economy, in prewar town associations, and with colonial administration gave them a homogeneity. But no such common outlook linked all the elite to the mass of the population. Instead, a separation gradually developed, most marked among people several generations or several decades removed from the village, *e.g.*, the "citizens" of Senegal or many of the French- or British-trained university graduates. Africans building parties to bridge this gulf after the war had to work with peoples mostly ignorant of French or English. Yet these were the languages expressing the modern constitutional decisions, including the decisions to introduce the universal franchise. Few had ever been to a large town and most had never lived in one; almost all handled money rarely and lived far from roads or railroads. The African organizer who came into a village to solicit votes was at the same time a transmitter of news of a modern world. This world was symbolized by the airport located perhaps fifty miles from the village, if the distance is reckoned in physical mileage; but several hundred years away if the distance is plotted against the timetable of European economic and social history.

Grass roots politics are different from national politics in most parts of the world, and particularly great in Africa. The educated elite are few in number and disproportionately distributed over even the most important of the many ethnic groups and regions of various types. The gap is large between the traditions which inspired the formal governments of the new nations and the pre-European institutions. To some extent most people continue to relate themselves to political parties through a "screen of kinship," a fact which made it necessary for all successful parties — mass or patron — to develop skill in "ethnic arithmetic" when selecting leaders and candidates. This skill is at the core of the new African parties' methods of approaching the important work of social integration.

III. The Integrating Function

In illuminating the functions of the parties, the mass-patron distinction again has meaning. Patron parties fulfilled only the minimum tasks assigned to parties by the formal institutions; they integrated only the patrons. With the possible exception of the *Northern People's Congress*, these parties were interested in an individual only insofar as he happened to be included in the franchise; they provided candidates for election and the minimum machinery for bringing the voter to the polls. They paid little attention to the function of political education, and barely explained the context of the postwar reforms to the population.

By contrast, the functions of mass parties were far more complex and varied. On occasion, before they acquired government responsibilities, mass parties disregarded — indeed replaced — the existing legal institutions. To the extent that for a time they substituted, or proposed to substitute, their structure for that of the state — that they developed their own ways of administering justice or of keeping order — these parties filled a revolutionary function. (Though in West Africa, unlike Cameroun or Algeria, none waged guerrilla war.) For some time the population considered them, far more than the legal institutions conceived in London or in Paris, to be legitimate. By agreeing to work at least partly within the postwar representative institutions, therefore, these parties legitimized the formal structure, rather than *vice versa*. Coincidentally, these parties acted as national "melting pots," educating people as Africans. Insofar as they provided a new social framework for people no longer firmly rooted in a stable ethnic tradition, they can be termed "parties of social integration."[17] They and their cultural affiliates were interested in everything from the cradle to the grave — in birth, initiation, religion, marriage, divorce, dancing, song, plays, feuds, debts, land, migration, death, public order — and not only in electoral success.

[16] For further details, see Kenneth E. Robinson's excellent chapter "Senegal" in *Five Elections in Africa*, edited by him and W. J. M. Mackenzie (Oxford, 1960).

[17] Sigmund Neumann, *Modern Political Parties* (University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 404.

An analysis of the modern and traditional status and ethnic origins of national and local leaders shows how the mass parties performed this integrating function. This analysis is particularly important, since the achievement of independence in West Africa allowed shifts in the distribution of power not only between Europeans and Africans, but also within African society — between the modern and traditional elites, within each of these groups, and in the links connecting them with the mass of the population.

Perhaps the best approach is the relatively simple question — what group or sub-group predominated in the major parties? Trade unionists predominated within the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and were of great significance in the *Union Soudanaise* and the (outlawed) *Sawaba* mass party of Niger. African planters formed the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire*, and people associated with the cocoa export trade were influential in the *Action Group of Nigeria*. The educated former "subjects" constructed the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais** to challenge, in effect, the "citizen"-led socialists. All these dominant groups were in the modern categories of the population, a feature all mass parties had in common and shared with only those few "patron" parties that were based on a prewar town elite.

Who predominated in those patron parties resting on important village personalities? The distinction between mass and patron parties, in relation to local party structure, was less neat in fact than in definition. When first organizing, aspiring mass party leaders did not disdain to accept the backing of an important local personage — an official chief, a traditional aristocrat, a Muslim *marabout* or an animist sage. But partly because most mass parties were born after the war either as or out of anti-colonial "congresses,"[18] locally important persons in West Africa connected with the colonial establishment usually held aloof until the mass party was itself becoming the establishment. Then many "shifted their rifles from one shoulder to the other."[19] Most important local personages without modern education who became identified with the mass parties during the height of the independence struggle — *la lutte anti-impérialiste* — had special reasons for lining up against the colonial administration, usually connected with a local quarrel over chieftaincy, prestige or property. Many rivals to the official "chiefs," at the village or regional level, joined the mass parties at an early stage. However, when such a personality became included locally within the mass party, the methods of the mass party worked to control his local influence, to make of him but one among many. There were, of course, variations in degree, related to mass party structure and to the type of tribal political organization.

Where there was an educated urban middle class, also identified both for cultural and economic reasons with the colonial power, its members hesitated too before becoming associated with the radical, anti-colonial mass parties, usually initiated by younger, less educated men, less acceptable to the Europeans. The clearest examples of this were in Senegal and in Gold Coast (Ghana). The prewar "subjects," shortly after they acquired the vote in 1945, broke from the "citizen"-dominated SFIO* of Senegal to organize their *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais**. Similarly in Gold Coast the younger, more radical men broke from the *United Gold Coast Convention** to organize the *Convention People's Party*.

Thus in some areas, in spite of their many differences, a prewar town elite holding the highest positions permitted to Africans in the colonial system, and the official "chiefs" already conscious that the presence of the Europeans stabilized their position, made common cause in patron parties against mass party leaders. The lineup of "haves" against their "have not" challengers was evident in the epithets exchanged at election time. Urban patron party leaders called mass party leaders "vagrants" (Guinea), "veranda boys" (Ghana); in the countryside patrons underlined that their rivals were "slaves" or "strangers." Mass party leaders, for their part, hurled labels like "union of featherbedders" at the patron party leaders.

In varying degrees, the nationalist struggle helped stir up "loyalty" issues, national and local, frequently with the result of providing yet another cause for disintegration in an already fragile society. For where they could, those lower on the traditional or modern social scale used the issue of nationalism to strengthen their own position through the mass parties.

[18] Hodgkin, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

[19] Madeira Keïta, "Le Parti unique en Afrique," *Présence Africaine*, février-mars, 1960, pp. 19–20.

And those with privileges to lose, as in Niger or Nigeria, showed signs of preferring rule by the Europeans to rule by the *talakawa* (commoners in Hausa). Especially in the countryside, showing loyalty to the mass party when it was under pressure from colonial power, was one way to compensate for a weak claim to belonging to the local ethnic group — for the immigrant *dioula* ("strangers") in Ivory Coast to show they were as loyal, for example, as the *originaires* who first came to the area.

With so few in the educated elite, and a subtle network of kinship connecting leaders and followers, it was logical that leaders of both mass and patron parties organized on a territorial scale should have gone through the first and simplest stage of "ethnic arithmetic": they kept a rough correspondence between the ethnic origins of leaders and followers. This correspondence is at least as important in Africa as in Boston or New York City politics. Defeating a patron party which has not been through this first stage was relatively easy for mass party leaders — as when, the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais** used "favorite sons" in the Casamance region of Senegal, to defeat the SFIO* which was locally (as well as territorially) dominated by Wolof and Lébou from Dakar or Saint-Louis. Leaders who tried to build national parties failed when they did not have among their ranks representatives of the most important ethnic groups. The Socialist party of Guinea was in this category. It grew from the Fulani Club at the École Normale William-Ponty and never really succeeded in broadening its ethnic base, even though it underwent several important changes, from an ethnic to a nationalist ideology. Too many of one ethnic group, too few of another, caused jealousies and difficulties for any party. The *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* had relatively little trouble with ethnic separatism from the Baule, while the *Convention People's Party* had considerable difficulty with the Ashanti. These two ethnic groups, traditionally related, occupy similar historic and geographic positions in their respective states, produce most of the coffee and cocoa and so have the most wealth. The PDCI from the beginning had Baule associated with them through the person of their leader, Félix Houphouët-Boigny; while in Ghana the CPP started, and except in the revolutionary years 1949–1950 remained, without similar support among the Ashanti. They are conscious of losing power to southerners, and "young men" "on occasion lament with their more conservative elders the present absolute reversal of Ashanti fortunes."[20]

While patron parties' leaders, once through this first simple phase of "ethnic arithmetic," generally stopped their calculations there, the leaders of mass parties had taken that as a point of departure. They tried to use their party organizations in order to awaken a wider, national sense of community. They appealed to particular categories existing within or cutting across ethnic groups — a technique suitable to recruiting in a mobile, changing society. Youth and women were of course two such categories which mass parties emphasized heavily. As already noted, in many villages mass party organizers went to rivals of official "chiefs": from these they discovered local grievances. They often appealed to rural underprivileged groups. For example, the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* first gained a following in the Fouta Djallon plateau not among the Fulani majority, but rather among the "captives" living in the ancillary villages (*roundé*). They appealed to rural scribes, whose modern skills set them apart, and to those who had travelled, often "strangers" who were among the most recent immigrants to a flourishing agricultural area. In some areas they went to veterans — in Ghana, for example, and in Senegal. They sought out religious dissidents — Harrists in the Ivory Coast, Hamallists in Mali. In some areas they found Muslim proselytizers opposed by the "chief" — either because he was animist, or because though Muslim he nevertheless felt his secular position under attack. They found camel drivers, chauffeurs, transporters, and peddlers — such as the *dioula* traders of Western Upper Volta, Mali, Guinea, and Ivory Coast, or some "Hausa" traders of Ghana and Nigeria. (Many of these in fact came from families with a tradition as middlemen in the trans-Saharan trade before it declined under trans-Atlantic competition.) Finally, they appealed to those who earned money income for growing coffee, cocoa, peanuts or bananas, and had become restless with tradi-

[20] Dennis Austin and William Tordoff, "Voting in an African Town," *Political Studies* (Oxford), June 1960, p. 131.

tion; to young men who no longer listened to the old; and to women who made money trading in the marketplace. People responded to the mass party organizers' appeals against established authorities.

People in these non-ethnic social categories were still in a minority, to be sure; most of them had some roots in a tribal community and they too wanted party leaders of roughly similar origins to their own. Mass party leaders were well aware they needed associates who were kinsmen of those they sought as followers, even while many rejected the principle that ethnic considerations should enter into the selection of party office holders. Indeed, conflicts among ethnic groups were often sharper in mass than in patron parties, since mass parties made a continuous attempt to propagate modern values and diminish the weight of ethnic exclusiveness. For example, after their 1956 victories, both *Union Soudanaise* and *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* leaders developed the habit of deliberately scrambling the ethnic origins of party propagandists and their audiences. Men from the Guinea coast campaigned in the forest and Fouta Djallon; men from Upper Guinea in the forest. All these tactics had the purpose of encouraging people to relate themselves directly to the party.

Conflicts between modern and traditional leaders were also often sharper in mass than patron parties since most mass parties were egalitarian by policy. The traditional upper-class standing of Sékou Touré or Modibo Keïta, for example, was important because of the high popular esteem given to them. The *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* began to make headway among the Fulani after Diallo Sayfoulaye, the son of an important Fulani chief, "like La Fayette . . . left his privileges to join the democratic cause."[21] Félix Houphouët-Boigny, in the militant years of the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* before 1952, used his prestige as official chief, and not only as a doctor and wealthy planter, in order to entrench the PDCI in the countryside. On the whole, they used their nobility to preach equality.

The majority of the national and regional leadership in patron parties is of traditional upper-class status, while the majority of the mass party national and regional leadership is of commoner origin. But mass parties have a surprisingly large number of people with high traditional status as the top national party leaders. And patron parties have an exceptionally large number of prime ministers, or officials holding the first post in the modern institutions, with low traditional status. (Is this a method of chiefly control, reminiscent of their habit, at the turn of the century, of sending not their own but sons of slaves to the schools of the Europeans?) Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Northern Nigerian designated by the *Northern People's Congress* to become Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria, is of low traditional status. So is Joseph Conombo, who until 1956 was deputy to the French National Assembly from Upper Volta, elected through a patron party based on the Mossi chiefs. So was Yacine Diallo (d. 1954), Guinea deputy to the French National Assembly representing the then dominant patron party alliance, and more specifically the Fulani chiefs. So is Hubert Maga, Prime Minister of Dahomey, who represented a regional patron party strong in Northern Dahomey. It is as if "princes" fear least the competition of "captives"; while villagers, first hearing equality preached, learn fastest from "princes."

Thus within mass parties, not only ethnic origins but also ethnic status continue to count, often causing more conflict precisely because mass party ideology usually ignores or challenges these differences. Yet men with high modern but low traditional qualifications — Ponty graduates of *griot*[22] descent, for example, lawyers descended of "captives" — were rarely put forward by local mass party branch members as candidates for elective office. In varying degrees, mass party national leaders usually maintained a continuous pressure in favor of such nominations, as of West Indians and other "strangers," to prove they believed in equality. (Precisely so as to be able to maintain this pressure, mass party leaders often preferred multi-member to single-member constituencies in legislative assembly elections. Where ten seats were to be filled, local branch members were more inclined to accept some candidates

[21] *La Liberté*, PDG newspaper, December 22, 1955.

[22] Traditional caste resembling medieval troubadours.

that national headquarters designated, than where only one seat was involved.) Though they tried much harder than patron party leaders, mass party leaders did not always succeed in avoiding institutionalizing ethnic differences. So in the long run, friction among ethnic groups in Ivory Coast may have been intensified by the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire's* decision to organize local branches on an ethnic, rather than a neighborhood principle. This distinguished the PDCI local structure from that of most other mass parties. The *Union Soudanaise*, the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée*, and the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise*, for example, made strenuous efforts to mix ethnic groups at the local level — and did so at least to the extent that neighborhoods did. The PDCI decision was a recognition of the way people actually communicated in Ivory Coast, a concession to reality, unwillingly made by many educated leaders because they knew they might need to assemble their followers rapidly. It was challenged by a PDCI Congress resolution in 1959, as yet not implemented.[23]

The various methods used by mass and patron parties further illustrate the differences between them. Patron parties adopted methods respectful of established authority. They rarely called mass meetings and until 1957 generally avoided the techniques of protest, offered few if any personal services to supporters, and were little concerned with party symbols. The mass parties, prior to achieving government majorities, employed techniques related to their revolutionary, legitimizing, educational and social integration functions. Demonstrations, strikes, boycotts and occasional violence were revolutionary techniques. The parties paid considerable attention to the creation of new national symbols: insignias, colors, slogans, party cloth for women to wear. The *Action Group of Nigeria* even hired American public relations advisers. Mass party choices of symbols and slogans were based on sound insight into popular responses, and repetition is at the heart of African oratory, as of drumming and dance.[24] "Vote the elephant; he is wise and never forgets." The *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* painted the elephant on walls and roofs and streets and cars. In the savannah, however, the *Union Soudanaise* never made much of the fact that the elephant was its symbol also; for there *Union Soudanaise* opponents said with effect, "the elephant eats your crops and leaves you destitute." The *Action Group of Nigeria* adopted the palm tree as its symbol of the "life more abundant." Elaborating on the meaning of the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais** party colors, Léopold Senghor of Senegal wrote "Green is for the Muslim majority, the color of the Prophet's flag; green is for the Christian minority, the color of hope; green is for the animists, the symbol of youth and the irrepressible force of Black Africa."[25] And using the elimination of forced labor to their ends, aspiring mass party *Union Démocratique Nigérienne*[26] leaders of Niger whose ballot carried the picture of a camel, warned people not to vote for the patron *Union Nigérienne des Indépendants et Sympathisants** party which had a yellow ballot bearing the picture of a stick and a basket. "Vote for the camel, and you will be as free as he," they said, well acquainted with that ornery beast. And they added, "The yellow ballot is a stick and a basket; if you vote for it forced labor will come back." The *Northern People's Congress* made *salama* — "peace" — its slogan. Prayers were often connected with party ceremonies, and so a libation was poured in connection with *Convention People's Party* and *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* meetings, or the Fatiha (opening *sura* of the Koran) was intoned prior to some *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* meetings.

Personal oratory was one of the most effective educational techniques. Campaigning against the Guinea regional patron parties during 1954–6, Sékou Touré explained, "I am Diallo the shepherd from the Fouta, I am Mamba the planter from Nzerekore, Keïta the rice grower from Siguiri, Soumah the fisherman from the coast, I am African, I am every man." Both because they believed it, and because the "important people" in the countryside opposed them, most mass party organizers preached equality. "Vincent Auriol and Lamine both die if they go hungry." Or, "three

[23] *Abidjan-Matin*, June 18, 1959. See A. R. Zolberg, "Effets de la structure d'un parti politique sur l'intégration nationale," *Cahiers d'études africaines*, October 3, 1960, p. 140 f.

[24] Unless otherwise indicated, I recorded the citations in Africa.

[25] *Condition Humaine, Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais** newspaper, November 30, 1948.

[26] The forerunner of *Sawaba*.

men want to go to Bamako. The governor goes by plane, Mamba by bicycle, Yacine on foot. Who arrives first?" "The governor," shouts the crowd. "Next?" "Mamba." "Then?" "Yacine." In such dialogues leaders communicated the idea that the environment accounts for most human differences.

The identification of the mass party with the community before independence was emphasized not only by party sponsorship of dances, festivals, songs, receptions, by party organization of weddings or funerals, but also by the existence of an informal party social security system which resulted in support for indigent partisans, legal advice for imprisoned militants, payment of medical bills for the sick, food and housing for families of party widows or grass widows, as well as automatic hospitality for party-sponsored travellers. On occasion the mass party could count on free labor even for the construction of bridges, roads and schools — on popular good will that the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and *Union Soudanaise* leaders termed human investment — *investissement humain* — and included in their inventory of economic resources.

IV. Democracy and the Single Party System

The nationalist struggle strengthens the position of the educated elite in largely traditional societies and encourages the elite to knit into mass parties the forces for change and dissent, both traditional and modern. There is not yet evidence to show that the trend from patron to mass party majority continues after independence. The distinctions between and among mass and patron parties turn on differences in degree, and some parties fall between the two categories. Is the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire,* for example, losing its mass party characteristics and becoming a patron type? The efficiency of its organization has declined, as has its interest in social equality; there have been many signs of rising discontent; it has been increasingly unable to cope with ethnic separatist pressures. The *Northern People's Congress,* on the other hand, because of its growing emphasis on mass recruitment, may be moving towards the mass party type. Despite these traditional cases the distinction between types is useful.

It is useful in considering the now popular question: how far are the West African single-party systems democratic? I use "democratic" to mean, roughly, that decisions are made with general consent, according to established procedures, in harmony with such values as social equality, and under conditions in which opposition can be expressed. It is difficult to argue that West African single-party systems resting on patron parties are or are becoming democratic, notwithstanding variations in degree. Northern Nigeria has been mentioned. Least in Mauretania, somewhat more in Niger and Upper Volta, can significant evidence be found of general consent, of social equality as a value, or of opportunity to express opposition in the dominant party. The main opposition groups are outlawed. Of the single patron-party states it is easier to argue they are moving towards military dictatorship.

In the present phase of West African party history, there is more evidence that the single-party systems based on mass parties are moving towards democracy. There is, first, the element of widespread consent. During at least a brief period the territorial and party communities were indistinguishable; the mass party reflected the "general will." This was usually just prior to taking over responsibility for governing, but after using to advantage the fact of being in opposition. Discontent was the common denominator. Typical of the instructions national mass party leaders gave to local leaders were, "Go and talk to the peasants in the field." "Tell Abdoulaye his daughter cannot be forced to marry the old chief." "Tell the peasants not to sell their crops at that ruinous price." "Defend Pango's palm trees against destruction by the administrator." "Speak up for Binta's right to cultivate the land the chief claims." While not all the questions were settled, villagers found a national platform in the mass party which they had never known. Mass party organizers sought out grievances, expressed them in the marketplace, coordinated them. They blamed European rule for forced labor, taxes, abuses of official "chiefs," racial discrimination, poverty. Out of these grievances they welded their massive demonstrations against colonial rule. Most patron party leaders were too linked with the established authorities to play this muckraking role.

Muckraking paid. Mass party membership was open to all, and practically all sought to acquire it. This characteristic of recruitment distinguished West African states based on mass

parties from states based on single parties confining their membership — as most fascist or Communist parties do — to a selected group. The widespread influence and number of followers of the mass parties at their peak, their national character long before the institutions of government were controlled by Africans, their success in acquiring the credit for the national revolution — all these bore out the mass party claim to represent the entire population. This helps explain why many West African mass party leaders saw little contradiction between claiming to be democratic and insisting on the existence of only a single, mass-based party. It is the African version of that "sole and central power which governs the whole community, by its direct influence,"[27] which de Tocqueville observed in the nineteenth-century American idea of the state.

The prospect of democracy in West African mass party states is enhanced, second, by party organization and procedure. Mass parties, at their best, have developed the organization which can publicize and encourage the mass discussion of important issues. Local branches involve the many rather than honor the few, and mass party leaders try to use traditional organizations in order to reach individuals. They are often more effective than the civil service. Leaders are chosen by voting. In the thoroughly organized mass parties, institutionalized leadership was also collective. Set procedures were followed for the making of decisions and leaders were expected to report back. Thus the mass parties reenforced the African version of responsibility.

Mass parties strengthened democratic forces, in the third place, to the extent that they encouraged social equality. The modern elite, themselves in favor of such values as merit rather than birth as the determinant of rank, were in a stronger position in the mass party states. Moreover, most mass party leaders rose from lower positions both in the modern and the traditional social scale, and used their new power in favor of social equality. Though they had to employ both ethnic and status "arithmetic" to bridge the gap between the educated and the mass of the population, mass party leaders, unlike patron party leaders, did so in a manner to blur ethnic differences and weaken status differences.

The fourth contribution of mass parties to the prospects of democracy is setting conditions in which opposition is possible. Among the elite, there is enough consensus about the rules of the political game to make it possible for them to disagree without coming, too often, to blows. After all, in prewar Senegal, as in nineteenth-century Britain or present Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, the vote, and controversies among the several parties, remained confined to a few who spoke the same language and fought for similar interests. In the long run in Africa, restricting the franchise to a privileged few is a greater threat to democracy than the existence of but a single party. At the present stage of African social history, the mass party organization makes it possible for people to disagree within it, without necessarily triggering incidents endangering the rule of the elite and the stability of the state. Confining disagreements to the issues at hand is difficult in a society where only the members of an educated elite born of different ethnic groups are able to speak directly to each other in French or English. Even where the organization of a mass party is a "spider's web"[28] villagers often have different ideas than national leaders. Sékou Touré spoke of this to the Fifth Congress of the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* in September 1959:

> . . . democracy, within our Party, is not a democracy of clan or family, but a basic democracy to which the entire population contributes directly and freely . . . the old forms of social democracy anchored in the villages often influence the party militants, who believe themselves authorized to violate the new individual forms prescribed within the PDG. Therefore at each new election for officers, dissensions arise within the Movement. This occurs because we have not yet accomplished our work.[29]

As long as kinship is an important link between the educated and their rural constituents, divisions among the elite on such constitutional matters as federalism, independence, or the position of "chiefs," is often taken by their kinsmen as a signal for settling entirely unrelated traditional issues over land, women

[27] *Democracy in America* (London, 1952), pp. 550–51.

[28] The term is frequently used by the *Union Soudanaise* secretary general, Modibo Keïta.

[29] *Official Report* (Conakry, 1959), pp. 43–4.

or water. This was one of the dynamic factors behind the Kumasi riots which accompanied the *Convention People's Party-National Liberation Movement** (NLM)[30] controversy about constitutional matters after 1956. A similar dynamic helped to explain the Ivory Coast incidents of 1949–51. In the relatively integrated societies of North America or Western Europe, pluralism is quite rightly counted among the democratic virtues. In Africa today, it is rather a vice.

These four points back up the argument that West African states based on dominant mass parties are moving towards democracy. West Africans justify their insistence on a single party on yet other grounds — that a national emergency exists. The struggle for independence is "not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are virtually involved in the contest. . . ."[31] These words of Tom Paine's reflect the African sense of history.[32] Africans argue the plural "party system under imperialist domination is synonymous with a sterile division that profits only those who want to see to it that their privileges continue."[33] This is the logic of a community at war, considering an *administratif* to be like a "quisling." Most Africans carry their sense of urgency into the post-independence era, and consider unity necessary in order rapidly to "install the apparatus of the State, at the service of economic development, of social and cultural development."[34]

While there is good evidence for the argument that West African states based on dominant mass parties are moving towards democracy, there is also evidence of forces moving against. How does a mass party continue to reflect the "general will" after independence? The full responsibilities of government have already brought out centrifugal forces — opposition within the mass parties from its youth, labor and traditionalist affiliates. Some officials have used their public office for personal gain. There have been signs of ethnic separatism, particularly on international frontiers. Rural friction intensified between "strangers" or *dioula* and the original owners of tribal lands. It appears, as Thomas Hodgkin claims, that the logical consequence of self-determination is anarchy. Yet perhaps even a greater threat to democracy is the fear of anarchy, making new African governments as quick to pass Preventive Detention Acts as the United States was to adopt the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798.

What opportunity is there in the mass party states to express disagreement? This varies. *Within* the mass parties the greatest opportunity appears to exist in the best organized ones. So far discussion is widespread and frank — within the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* and the *Union Soudanaise*, for example — and leaders have on many occasions been outvoted on important issues. Not only individual disagreement is possible under the party umbrella, but also organized disagreements by *tendances* — such as trade union, youth, student and cultural organizations, even the civil service. In the less highly organized mass party states, such as Ivory Coast, the Eastern Region of Nigeria, Senegal and Togo, these modern associations tend to be foci of opposition outside of the mass party, though not necessarily calling themselves parties.

The opportunity to express opposition through rival political parties also varies. In no West African mass party state is *all* organized opposition to the dominant party directly excluded by law, though specified parties or types of parties are outlawed in most states. It is excluded in effect, however, where it is a matter of doctrine to insist on the single party, the *parti unique*, and on its identity with both the popular will and with the state. It is less excluded where leaders justify the single party for empirical reasons as a *parti unifié*, making common cause in the present national emergency. Where single-party states are based on patron parties, opposition groups exist which are already or potentially mass parties; at least in Niger, Northern Nigeria, and to less extent Upper Volta these have considerable momentum behind them. But in mass party states, from among what groups has organized opposi-

[30] After 1957 the United Party.

[31] "Common Sense" in *The Political Writings*, Vol. 1, Investigator Office (Boston, 1856), p. 33.

[32] For a most interesting discussion of the new history of West Africa, see Immanuel Wallerstein's paper delivered to the 1960 meeting of the American Sociological Association, "The Search for National Identity," mimeographed.

[33] Alexander Adandé, "In the Phase of National Reconstruction the Fusion of Parties Becomes a Categorical Imperative," address at the Congress for Cultural Freedom Conference, Ibadan, March 1959, mimeographed, F/413, p. 3.

[34] Madeira Keïta, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

tion come? There are "one-man shows" such as the *Union Démocratique et Sociale Africaine** of Guinea or the *Front de Libération Noire** of Ivory Coast; rump groups left over from mergers or reorganizations, like the postwar *Parti Socialiste Sénégalais** and the "expatriate" groups such as the *Parti de la Libération de la Côte d'Ivoire* in Guinea; these have simply curiosity value and generally exist only for a short time. Limited staying power also characterizes parties like the *Parti de Solidarité Sénégalaise*, built by disaffected "clan leaders" and other rural personalities. Numerous ethnic minor parties exist in the countryside, such as the *Union Dogon** of Mali, or the Socialists among the Bété of Ivory Coast. When ethnic parties are based on urban areas, their supporters usually belonged to the tribes which originally owned the land — the *Rassemblement Démocratique Sénégalais* among the Lébou of Dakar, for example.

Standing alone these ethnic parties have little potential on the national scene. But they might have in inter-state politics if, for example, Guinea leaders used as an instrument of pressure the loyalty to the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* of ethnic groups living on the frontiers of Liberia or Sierra Leone. Or there might be a future in federal politics if well organized teams of educated leaders synchronized the discontent among minority groups — as the *Action Group of Nigeria* has done in the North and the *National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons* has done in the West of the Federation. The political history both of Nigeria and the former French West African federation suggests that federalism adds to the prospects for organized opposition groups. Partly this is because the desire to control the federation offers mass party leaders dominant in one region incentives to seek support in another. Furthermore, the desire to work together in a federation is a reason why leaders of the dominant party in one region may at least hesitate before repressing opponents having political support in another region.

Most significant are opposition groups among "young Turks," mainly town-dwellers differently educated or younger than the men leading the dominant parties: JUVENTO in Togo, *An Nahda al Watenia al Mauritania* (Party of the National Renaissance of Mauretania), *Parti du Regroupement Africain-Sénégal*, and the *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance* of Senegal. With the possible exception of the PAI, these avant-garde groups had no conscious elitist theory governing recruitment, but in practice their audience is still confined to the modern elite, to youth and student and trade union groups. Particularly when the party in power is of a mass type, most of these groups alternate between opposing it, and joining it in order to constitute a "party within a party." These "young Turks" are nationalists and modernizers. They have little appetite for ethnic, separatist opposition of the type loosely allied in the *United Party* of Ghana.

The "young Turks" constitute the actual or potential national, not ethnic, opposition. They might be joined, eventually, by breakaway groups from among the "founding fathers."[35] As long as the elite is small, the civil service is likely to absorb the most newly educated strata of the elite — and dominant parties will brook no partisan opposition from within the civil services. On economic development depends the growth of the modern strata of African society in large enough numbers, and spread evenly enough across ethnic groups, to permit opposition party leaders to calculate in ethnic and status "arithmetic." The chance of opposition groups eventually displacing in elections the dominant mass parties in the single-party states, may increase as the "national emergency" ends. Independence is mostly acquired. Now in West Africa, unity for economic development is the order of the day.

There are, in the mass party states of West Africa, obstacles to the growth of democracy, as in most other parts of the world. But on balance, to a much greater extent than the colonial governments which they succeeded, the mass party states rest on popular consent, strengthen procedures and institutions on a scale essential for accomplishing the tasks of the modern democratic state, reflect egalitarian values and leave room for the expression of opposition. So far, the mass party states have used to good effect the emphasis on

union, a word like friendship, goodness, an abstract thing having no face, raising no concrete image in the mind. It goes into all sauces; it accommodates itself to irreconcilables.[36]

[35] Julius Nyerere suggested this in "Africa's Place in the World," *Symposium on Africa* (Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., 1960), pp. 162–3.

[36] *La Liberté*, November 23, 1954.

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TOWARD PERSONAL DICTATORSHIP OR OLIGARCHY?

Soviet Domestic Politics since the Twentieth Congress

• JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

The most dramatic feature of Soviet domestic politics since the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February, 1956, has been Nikita Khrushchev's elimination of his rivals. The sensational nature of this development should not, however, obscure the less readily apparent social, institutional, and ideological currents which have made it possible. In view of the fragmentary nature of the available evidence, any analysis of these currents must be suggestive, rather than conclusive. Even at this stage of our knowledge, however, it seems worthwhile to suggest an interpretation of the Soviet power struggle which may serve to integrate bits of evidence from diverse aspects of the Soviet scene.

I. The Triumph of the Party

While the predominance of the Party was never openly denied during Stalin's lifetime, its real power was greatly restricted. Stalin, in his capacity as General Secretary, was, of course, the leader of the Party, but foreign observers had long been aware that he often relied upon the secret police rather than the Party apparatus as the ultimate sanction of his rule. Since 1956 the present Soviet leaders have admitted their earlier subordination to the "state security agencies under the personal control of Stalin."[1]

Basically, however, the submission of the police to the Party was obtained in June, 1953, with the arrest of Lavrentii P. Beriia. His execution later in the year and the purge of his closest associates during 1953–54 was apparently achieved with the assistance of a portion of the police machine itself, centering around Ivan A. Serov, who became chairman of the Committee on State Security. Serov has apparently relied especially upon officers drawn from the frontier guard component of the police forces, as contrasted to the secret police.[2] His association with Khrushchev in the Ukraine, when the latter was consolidating his position there in the period just before World War II, has apparently stood the police apparatus in good stead, for it has gained in prominence in recent months.[3] There appears little prospect, however, that the police machine will again become master, rather than servant, of the Party.

While Beriia evidently did try to use the police machine as the basis for an attempt to seize power, the frequent rumors of a similar effort on the part of the military leaders seem to have been less well founded. It is undoubtedly true that Marshal Georgii K. Zhukov has enjoyed considerable personal popularity, and he may at times during 1956–57 have felt himself strong enough to take issue with Khrushchev and his associates in the Party. Like the police apparatus, however, the military machine

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[1] Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, *Pravda*, July 2, 1956 (*Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, VIII, #24). For brief citations from standard Soviet press items, I have used the comprehensive and reliable coverage of the *Current Digest* (CDSP). For longer and more complex accounts, I have used the original Russian versions (indicating this by citing the Russian titles of the articles with indication of a *Current Digest* version where available), except for a few articles from the less common periodicals which were not readily available to me.

[2] Note the special praise reserved for the frontier troops in his speech, "40 Years on Guard over Soviet State Security," *Pravda*, December 21, 1957 (CDSP, IX, #51).

[3] Especially in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the formation of the Cheka, as exemplified by Serov's speech, cited in the preceding footnote.

has been divided by power alignments which have linked certain of its elements to the Party leadership. Consequently, Zhukov could not count on the support of the military leaders as a group, and in the denouement in October, 1957, many important officers, including Marshals Konev, Malinovskii, and Sokolovskii, joined with evident enthusiasm in Khrushchev's attack on their colleague.[4]

In dismissing Zhukov from the post of Minister of Defense and from the Central Committee, the Party leadership seems to have been influenced primarily by his efforts to free the military forces from rigid Party control. As will appear later, it is significant that the criticisms directed at the Marshal stressed his efforts to detach military units from supervision by the territorial Party apparatus. "Instead of relying on local Party organizations" he "reduced the Party organizations to the status of purely educational agencies" and violated the tradition of close ties between the local Party and Komsomol organizations and the military units in their areas.[5]

A major, though secondary, charge brought against Zhukov was his alleged failure to prevent the surprise of the troops in the frontier districts at the outbreak of World War II, in spite of his having possessed information concerning the impending German attack.[6] This accusation was accompanied by a general tendency to reduce Stalin's share in the initial failures of the Soviet defense in 1941. The cleavage between the Party interpretation of Stalin's misdeeds and the emphasis preferred by military spokesmen, apparently including those most closely associated with Zhukov, had indeed developed very quickly after the Twentieth Congress in January, 1956. The Party group was primarily interested in the traumatic events of 1937–38 and 1948–49 when Stalin had torn apart the Party apparatus in his effort to destroy all potential rivals. The military group, on the other hand, seems to have been mainly concerned with revealing Stalin's misconduct of affairs during World War II and on its eve.

It would appear that the army leaders had a net advantage, for the memory of the horrible losses inflicted on the Soviet people during the early part of the war runs deep. This memory was evoked most vividly, perhaps with consciousness of its political effect, by the novelist Dudintsev in defending his *Not By Bread Alone* against attack by conformist literary critics in March, 1957:

> "I remember the early days of the Great Patriotic War," he [Dudintsev] said. "I lay in a trench. A dogfight was going on overhead. Messerschmitts were shooting down our planes, although we were superior in numbers. Something snapped in me, because I had always heard that our planes were the fastest and the best.
>
> "It is said that I express 'blackening' tendencies. That is not so. I simply do not want to see a repetition of what I saw then. I have a right to such a wish!"[7]

The absurd portrayal, at Stalin's command, of this catastrophic period as a "planned retreat" seems to have been especially humiliating to the Soviet historians. It is true that articles in their chief periodical, *Voprosy Istorii*,[8] as well as historical discussions in the Party journal *Kommunist*,[9] emphasized the importance of Party and government leaders — especially at the local level — in conducting the war correctly despite Stalin. At the same time, however, these articles did present a picture of the appalling situation at the beginning of the war, noting, for example, "failures of entire army formations" and the advantage in planes and tank strength gained by the Germans in their initial blows against the unprepared Soviet troops.

[4] *The New York Times*, November 12, 1957 (dispatch by William J. Jorden, based on "diplomats" and other "informed sources" in Moscow).

[5] Speech by Marshal Konev, *Pravda*, November 3, 1957 (CDSP, IX, #43).

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, March 19, 1957 (CDSP, IX, #13).

[8] "XX S"ezd KPSS i zadachi issledovaniia istorii partii" [The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and tasks of research in the history of the Party], *Voprosy Istorii* #3, March, 1956, pp. 3–12 (a condensed version appears in CDSP, VIII, #19); "Ser'eznye nedostatki 'Ocherkov Istorii Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny'" [Serious deficiencies of "Essays on the History of the Great Patriotic War"], *Voprosy Istorii* #5, May, 1956, pp. 146–152.

[9] "Massy, partii, i rukovoditeli v bor'be za kommunizm" [The masses, the Party, and the directors in the struggle for Communism], *Kommunist* #5, April, 1956, pp. 14–28 (excerpts in CDSP, VIII, #25).

The organ of the military command, *Voennyi Vestnik*, gave much greater emphasis to the role of the army in reversing the disastrous situation arising from Stalin's mistakes; specifically, the "top leadership" of Stalin was charged with the entire responsibility for failing to alert the armed forces to the danger of German attack.[10] Muted friction between the Party and an element in the army command became evident when *Krasnaia Zvezda*, the daily newspaper for the troops, under control of the Party-dominated Chief Political Administration, attacked *Voennyi Vestnik* for minimizing the role of the Party Central Committee in achieving victory, and maintained that the Party and the government had in fact fostered the preparedness for war.[11] Significantly, *Voprosy Istorii* supported *Voennyi Vestnik* by sharply criticizing the *Krasnaia Zvezda* article.[12]

The Central Committee plenum of July, 1956, hard on the heels of the disturbing Poznan riots, seemed to present a compromise on the interpretation of the war, with military and Party leaders both accorded major roles in overcoming the weaknesses due to the "cult of the individual":

> It is known that precisely during the war period members of the Central Committee, and also outstanding Soviet military leaders, took over certain sectors of activity on the home front and at the fighting front, made independent decisions, and through their organizational, political, economic and military work with local Party and Soviet organizations ensured the Soviet peoples' victory in the war. After the victory the negative consequences of the cult of the individual again made themselves felt.[13]

There the matter rested for fifteen months, but it is easy to see how Khrushchev and his associates may have felt that Zhukov, with his ability to kindle popular indignation at the failures of the Party, as well as those of Stalin personally, represented a threat which had eventually to be eliminated.

[10] Condensed version of "A Glorious Anniversary," *Voennyi Vestnik* #4, April, 1956, pp. 2–9, in CDSP, VIII, #16.

[11] May 9, 1956 (CDSP, VIII, #18).

[12] Ser'eznye nedostatki 'Ocherkov Istorii Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny,'" *op. cit.*, p. 148.

[13] *Pravda*, July 2, 1956 (CDSP, VIII, #24).

II. The Role of the Territorial Party Organization

The reference to the local Party organizations in the passage quoted in the preceding paragraph was probably not accidental. A persistent theme in the 1956 campaign against Stalin's "cult of the individual" was the extent to which he had reduced the central Party mechanism to an instrument for personal rule. In contrast, the local, or territorial, Party organizations were declared to have continued to preserve their pristine "Leninist" purity even under Stalin:

> At the same time, it must be stressed that in local Party organizations the violations of the Leninist norms of Party life were not the same as in those units of Party life which Stalin influenced directly. It is known that meetings in the primary Party organizations were convened systematically. Before and after the war conferences of province and region Party organizations, Congresses of Communist Parties of the Union Republics and plenums of Party committees were held more or less regularly. The Congresses, conferences, and plenums, collectively discussed and solved most important problems of economic and cultural work, and sharp criticism was directed at leading Party workers.[14]

On the whole, this distinction between the territorial and the central Party operation during Stalin's dictatorship was accurate; the territorial committees, particularly in the Ukraine under Khrushchev, did hold meetings roughly at the times provided by the rules; accounts of the questions discussed, and the names of the discussants were published. To be sure, this "regularity" signified neither "Party democracy" nor local autonomy. Participation in the territorial committees was practically limited to an oligarchy composed of the secretaries of the Party apparatus, while the rank-and-file members had no more voice in making decisions in the local organizations than they had in the central Party bodies. Moreover, the frequent transfers of the secretaries prevented their attachment to local interests, while their vested interest in maintaining stringent cen-

[14] "Za tvorcheskuiu razrabotku istorii KPSS" [For the creative reworking of the history of the CPSU], *Kommunist* #10, July, 1956, p. 23 (condensed version in CDSP, VIII, #37).

tralized control made them as insistent upon maintaining totalitarian uniformity throughout the USSR as was Stalin himself. Nevertheless, as a group, the territorial apparatus officials feared and hated the group of favorites whom Stalin had placed in the central Party mechanism to execute his decisions.

The resentment which the territorial Party chiefs felt for leaders of the central apparatus who had been especially closely associated with Stalin seems to have played a major part in the struggle within the Party Presidium in June, 1957. The nucleus of the opposition to Khrushchev, the leaders whom he attacked most savagely, consisted of Georgii M. Malenkov, Lazar M. Kaganovich, Viacheslav M. Molotov, and Dmitrii T. Shepilov. Aside from Shepilov, who had deserted Khrushchev at the last moment, these men, during Stalin's lifetime, had been far more prominent in *Party* affairs than Khrushchev. Unlike Khrushchev, however, they had spent most of their careers in the central, rather than the territorial, apparatus. Molotov's position was compromised by his association with the extreme aspects of Stalin's foreign policy, especially the attack on Tito, which made it awkward for him to remain in a prominent position while the Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation was taking place. Malenkov was still more vulnerable. As a one-time member of Stalin's personal secretariat, and later as director of the central Party personnel administration which worked closely with the MVD in conducting purges, he was probably more hated by the provincial Party officials than any other henchman of Stalin, except Aleksandr N. Poskrebyshev.[15] Significantly, Malenkov, when he was forced to resign as premier in January, 1955, was obliged to confess his lack of experience in administrative work outside Moscow. A year later, at the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev further undermined Malenkov's position by dropping several hints concerning his special role in carrying out Stalin's commands.

[15] Poskrebyshev, apparently Stalin's "chief executioner" during the dictator's last years, disappeared quietly immediately after Stalin's death; as far as the present writer has discovered, Poskrebyshev has been denounced only once in print, and then obscurely. "Ukreplenie sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti i iuridicheskogo nauka" [Strengthening of socialist legality and juridical science], *Kommunist* #11, July (pub. August 7), 1956, p. 17.

Though the basic weakness in the Molotov-Malenkov-Kaganovich triumvirate's position seems to have been their close association with the Stalinist central apparatus, the dispute immediately preceding their downfall involved economic administration. Unlike Khrushchev, Kaganovich and Malenkov, in addition to their years as Party officials, had spent considerable portions of their careers in state posts involving economic direction. Kaganovich had been associated with industrial development for a generation. In his work in the central Party apparatus, Malenkov had probably developed close ties with the industrial ministers whose work was also centered in Moscow; his high educational level may well have facilitated his contact with a group which possessed an exceptionally high degree of technical training. After his resignation as Party secretary in the spring of 1953, Malenkov as premier devoted increased attention to economic matters. During 1954 his moderate shift of emphasis from production facilities to consumer goods, and his accompanying emphasis on managerial decisions as contrasted to political control, apparently secured him support among the central planners and industrial directors. After Malenkov's resignation as premier, on the other hand, the central Secretariat, as indicated below, came more and more under the domination of Khrushchev's group.

Under these circumstances, it is understandable that Malenkov and Kaganovich may have regarded the agencies for central economic management as a part of the bureaucratic system which they could influence. Here, too, however, reorganization was increasing the power of the territorial apparatus. In 1955 and 1956 various means were taken to devolve a measure of control over economic operations to the Union Republics. There is no reason to think that such measures were particularly objectionable to the mass of factory managers and production engineers. Apparently there was genuine dissatisfaction with the many inefficiencies and bureaucratic excesses associated with over-centralization. The changes did, however, lessen the power of the staffs for planning and industrial direction in Moscow.

Apparently Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov sought to reverse the trend in late 1956, when Khrushchev's prestige appeared diminished by the turmoil in Poland and Hun-

gary. By early 1957, however, Khrushchev was able to proceed with the policy of reducing the power of the central industrial direction. The key innovation was the creation of *sovnarkhozy* (councils of national economy) "organized as a rule in accordance with the existing administrative division."[16] During the following months, *sovnarkhozy* were in fact established in all but one province of the RSFSR. In the Ukraine, where Khrushchev's control was nearly complete, less correspondence of economic and Party units was necessary, and one *sovnarkhoz* sufficed for each of the lesser republics. As the new units of industrial control corresponded to the Party territorial organization throughout, the territorial secretaries were in a position to supervise economic operations. Moreover, in some areas at least, the key personnel in the *sovnarkhozy* themselves were drawn from the territorial Party and government apparatus.[17] At the same time, the principal industrial ministries in Moscow were dissolved. From the standpoint of efficiency, this "reorganization" could scarcely have been an improvement. One non-Soviet estimate sets the number of administrators required to staff the new councils at 210,000, a figure which will mean still greater inflation of the swollen bureaucracy.[18] The new system did, however, mean that the old leadership of the central apparatus had lost its last element of influence. When Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich reacted by opposing Khrushchev in the Presidium, he and his supporters in the Central Committee — predominantly drawn from the territorial apparatus — routed the triumvirate and its adherents among the economic planners and ministers. Malenkov, most closely identified with the old central apparatus, was attacked most severely. Ominously, he was accused of having been under the "complete influence" of the executed police director, Beriia. Moreover, Malenkov was saddled with much of the onus for Stalin's misdeeds; Khrushchev attacked him for using and exacerbating Stalin's "weaknesses," and specifically accused him of purging the Leningrad Party organization in 1948–49.[19] Kaganovich was similarly accused, though less violently, of having brought about Stalin's condemnation as a "bourgeois nationalist" of the Ukrainian poet Maksym Ryls'kyi, whom Khrushchev claimed to have "saved" with great difficulty.[20]

III. A Monolithic Party?

The elimination of the chief figures of the old apparatus has certainly not lessened the basic centralization of control in the Soviet system. As suggested above, the ostensible decentralization of industry was designed to place economic operations under the more direct supervision of elements associated with Khrushchev, rather than to admit any real measure of provincial autonomy. Moreover, the central Party apparatus, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU, has been constantly strengthened since the removal of the triumvirate. The CPSU secretaries, now almost identical with the Presidium membership, are mostly former chiefs of the territorial apparatus who were earlier closely associated with Khrushchev. Moreover, the organizational framework of the central apparatus has been strengthened. Probably the most important administrative decision of the Twentieth Congress was the creation of a Party bureau for the Russian Republic (RSFSR), with its vital Party Organs section (in charge of personnel assignments) under Viktor M. Churaev, who had served as a provincial secretary and later as personnel director under Khrushchev in the Ukraine.

Under these circumstances, it is not easy to draw a distinction between the personal position of Khrushchev and the power of his allies from the territorial apparatus. Khrushchev's association with the territorial apparatus has enabled him to gain the support of this important section of the Party, and to use it to remake the central Secretariat and to extend

[16] *Pravda*, March 30, 1957 (CDSP, IX, #13).

[17] This was true for several major industrial provinces in the Ukraine, and also for Estonia. See Hellmuth Weiss, "Estland: Durchfuehrung der Chruschtschowschen Wirtschaftsreform," *Osteuropa*, VII (1957), 740.

[18] J. Kholmogorov, "The Dilemma of Economic Planning," Bulletin of the Institute for Study of the USSR, IV (1957), 40.

[19] *Kommunist* #12, August, 1957, pp. 11–29 (CDSP, IX, #35).

[20] *Ibid.*

his control over all other aspects of the Soviet bureaucratic system. On the other hand, the territorial Party secretaries have probably preferred Khrushchev as leader not only because by background he is one of them, but because of his record of permitting the Party committees which they dominated to participate in decision-making. The frequent reminders of such "collective discussion" cited above were doubtless meant as promises that Khrushchev would permit the lesser figures in the Central Committee of the CPSU to share in power. Probably these men are also reassured by Khrushchev's relatively advanced age — sixty-four. Unlike Malenkov, for example, Khrushchev scarcely has the time required to follow Stalin's example of establishing absolute dictatorship on the corpses of those who helped him to power.

In addition to the factors immediately affecting Khrushchev's personal position, there are circumstances which may tend over a period of years to disrupt unity in the Party itself. One is the growing influence of the indoctrination machine under Mikhail A. Suslov.[21] This branch of the apparatus was most prominent during the ascendancy of Andrei A. Zhdanov. It seems significant that the "Leningrad affair," the 1948–49 purge of his supporters, has figured so prominently among the misdeeds ascribed to Stalin, Beriia, and Malenkov. Moreover, Zhdanov's extreme measures to secure ideological conformity have been given renewed prominence since mid-1957. One of the principal charges brought against Shepilov was that he had undermined these decrees by fostering unsound tendencies among the "art intelligentsia" and by professing a "liberal spirit" to enhance his personal popularity.[22] Suslov's own speeches contain a dogmatic and intransigent tone remarkably reminiscent of Zhdanov's.

[21] The nominal chief of the indoctrination branch of the apparatus is Party secretary Petr N. Pospelov. Suslov apparently is the second secretary — just below Khrushchev. Second secretaries have traditionally been in charge of all intra-Party matters, including indoctrination.

[22] "Za leninskuiu printsipial' nost' v voprosakh literatury i iskusstva" [For Leninist adherence to principle in questions of literature and the arts], *Kommunist*, #10, July, 1957, p. 16 (condensed version in CDSP, IX, #33).

Within the group of territorial Party leaders themselves there are striking differences in background. One type is represented by Aleksei I. Kirichenko, until recently head of the Ukrainian Party, and now a member of the central Secretariat. Like Khrushchev himself, Kirichenko went to work as a child and has little formal education beyond that obtained in vocational schools and Party training centers. Kirichenko's career parallels Khrushchev's in two other respects: the relatively late age (thirty) at which he attained an important post in the Party apparatus; and in his familiarity with agricultural, as compared to industrial, management.[23]

Another large, but quite different, group of Party chiefs is represented by Leonid I. Brezhnev, another of Khrushchev's protegés from the Ukrainian Party who has risen to the central Secretariat. Unlike Kirichenko and Khrushchev, Brezhnev had an advanced technical education, having graduated from the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute before entering the apparatus.

It would, of course, be most unwise to assume that differences in educational background or career patterns alone would lead to friction within the apparatus. Thus far Party officials of such divergent backgrounds as Kirichenko, Suslov, and Brezhnev have worked with seeming harmony in Khrushchev's "team." Probably the latter can maintain unity as long as he is vigorous enough to exercise effective leadership. In the long run, however, Khrushchev may find it necessary to give a considerable share of power to the indoctrination specialists, with their special training in ideological matters, and the engineers, with their ability to deal with the increasingly complex technological aspects of the Soviet system. Meanwhile, it seems likely that he will continue to find it expedient to make large concessions to at least the forms of "collective leadership," and will seek to rule as the first among the Party secretaries rather than as absolute master.

[23] Kirichenko was trained as a tractor mechanic. See *Pravda*, December 22, 1957. For a very able analysis of Khrushchev's continued preoccupation with farming, see Thomas P. Whitney, "The Tireless Voice of the Kremlin," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 10, 1957, pp. 21 ff.

50

A PROBLEM IN SOVIET BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

• JOSEPH S. BERLINER

Soviet industrial organization has long been plagued by a number of nagging little problems.[1] They have not prevented the state from achieving a considerable success in its prime objective of getting its salaried managers, the men who run the nation's businesses, to turn out impressive quantities of goods and services. But there remain certain things which the state, with all its power, has not been able to get its managers to do. The intractable is always intriguing, and one wonders why these persistent thorns have not been eliminated.

Holders of power can rarely expect to achieve a perfect compliance with their wishes, and it is to be expected that Soviet industrial organization would have its share of defects. What is interesting, however, is the particular form they assume. Like the pathology of an organism, an examination of a characteristic defect of a system of organization may be expected to provide an insight into the nature of that system. It is with this end in view that we turn to an inquiry into one such defect in the case of the Soviet industrial enterprise.[2]

Conveniently for us, the leaders of the Soviet state deliver from time to time very candid reports on the state of the nation's industry to the governing bodies of the Communist party. These reports constitute a set of fairly comparable documents which lend themselves to an analysis of the persistent and the changing features of industrial organization over a period of time.[3] In February 1941, G. M. Malenkov delivered to the Eighteenth Party Conference a report which, as it turned out, proved to be a summing up of the state of industry at the end of the prewar period. Among the many matters which he considered important enough to call to the attention of the assembled party leaders was the following:

> Now, Comrades, matters stand thus: in most of our enterprises the output of finished production is carried out unevenly, in spurts, and is concentrated as a rule at the end of the month. Enterprises lack a firm, previously worked-out schedule of production.
>
> Here are some typical examples.
>
> The Kolomensk Machinery Works in Moscow County worked this way in 1940: in the first ten days of every month it produced 5 to 7 per cent of its output, in the second ten days, 10 to 15 per cent, and in the third ten days, 75 to 80 per cent.
>
> The Karl Marx-Leningrad Plant, in December 1940, produced 2 per cent of its monthly output in the first ten days, 8 per cent in the second ten days, and 90 per cent in the third ten days.
>
> In the Moscow Pump and Compressor Plant, in December 1940, 3.4 per cent of the month's output was produced in the first ten days, 27.5 per cent in the second ten days, and 69.1 per cent in the third ten days.
>
> We must put an end to this lack of planning, to this uneven rate of production, to this storming in the work of enterprises. We must achieve a day-by-day fulfillment of the production program according to a previously worked-out schedule, by every factory, mill, mine, and railroad.

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[1] The author wishes to thank Dr. Richard Axt of the National Science Foundation and Hans Heymann of the RAND Corporation for their valuable comments.

[2] The Soviet industrial enterprise may be thought of roughly as mill or factory under the management of a director and his administrative staff. The director is primarily responsible to a minister or one of his assistants. The minister is part of the executive arm of the state. The broad decisions as to what is to be produced are made by the state and transmitted to the enterprises through the ministries.

[3] The three reports referred to may be found in *Izvestiia*, Feb. 16, 1941, pp. 1–3 (the Malenkov 1941 report); Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies* (New York, 1953), pp. 106–116 (the Malenkov 1952 report); *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 7 (Aug. 24, 1955), 3–20 (the Bulganin 1955 report).

In October 1952, at what proved to be the last party congress of the Stalin era, Malenkov was again accorded the honor of delivering the official report. Eleven years of war and reconstruction had elapsed, during which time the preceding generation of industrial managers must have been largely replaced by a new generation. But again, surveying the broad canvas of Soviet industrial achievements and problems, he lashed out against the same old problem. "The Party has more than once drawn our industrial executives' attention to this defect," he said. "Nevertheless many enterprises continue to work in spurts, producing almost half the month's program during the final ten days of the month."

A few months later Stalin died, an uncomfortable collegial form of government emerged, industrial ministries were suddenly combined into a very small number and subsequently decentralized once more, Malenkov fell from the peak of power, and on the next occasion that a major report on the economy was made, it was delivered by Premier N. A. Bulganin. In preparing this first great pronouncement of the new regime on the subject of industrial organization, before a plenary session of the Central Committee of the party in July 1955, Bulganin chose to call attention to the same matter:

> A very serious shortcoming in the work of our industry is the lack of rhythm in production, and the resulting uneven output of industrial production.
>
> Here are three factories. . . . The average fulfillment of the monthly plan at these factories by ten-day periods during the first quarter of 1955 is as follows: first ten days — Russian Diesel, 5 per cent; Spirit of the Revolution, 3 per cent; Kolomna plant, 6 per cent. Second ten days — Russian Diesel, 23 per cent; Spirit of the Revolution, 26.6 per cent; Kolomna plant, 23.3 per cent. Third ten days — Russian Diesel, 72 per cent; Spirit of the Revolution, 70.4 per cent; Kolomna plant, 70.7 per cent. How can one talk of rhythm in the work of these plants when nearly three quarters of the month's work is being carried out in the third ten days? . . .
>
> Much has already been written and said about the lack of rhythm in work, and decisions have been made. However, it must be admitted that we have been unable to achieve any substantial improvement in this matter.

This practice of "storming" leads to a number of uneconomic consequences. States of emergency constantly arise; men and equipment are subject to periods of unnecessary idleness; during the days of storming the rate of spoilage increases, overtime pay mounts up, the machines suffer from speed-up, and customers' production schedules are interrupted. It is certainly a practice which the state would wish to eliminate if it could. Yet storming does not occupy a top position on the list of problems facing the state. If it did, perhaps the leaders would have been willing to take the measures necessary to eliminate it. It has not been the object of a major "campaign," the technique whereby the state attacks a bothersome problem by mobilizing all its propaganda and police resources and focusing them upon that problem. For this very reason, the practice of storming serves our purpose best by providing a case study of a normal problem in the administration of economic activity.

In examining the reports cited above, one is struck by the absence of an explanation of the causes of storming. Only Bulganin offered a feeble sort of explanation. "The principal cause," he said, "is lack of order in the supplying of materials and equipment to industry. . . . Customers usually are sent the major part of their requirements during the second half of the month, and especially during the last ten days." Now this indeed does explain why the customer has to speed up his rate of production at the end of the month, but it does not explain why the supplier failed in the first place to deliver the required materials in the early part of the month, that is, why the supplier engaged in storming. In effect, storming in one enterprise is caused by storming in another enterprise. This does explain how storming is propagated through the system once it is caused somewhere, but it obviously does not explain why it is caused.

The explanation must be cast in terms of the objectives of enterprise managers and the conditions of the economic milieu within which these objectives must be achieved. The prime obligation of managers is the fulfillment of the monthly output plan. The plan is the document in which the state translates its broad economic objectives into specific production instructions for each of the many thousands of enterprises which make up the industrial system. At the highest level, the National Economic Plan is a listing of the annual production targets for the whole economy, with supple-

mentary targets of investment, increases in labor productivity, reduction of production costs, and so on. On the basis of the National Economic Plan, each of the industrial ministries receives its set of annual targets, subdivided into quarters of the year. The ministries' quarterly targets are then translated into monthly targets for each of their enterprises, which carry out the actual production work.

If the economic objectives of the state are to be achieved, enterprises must meet their production targets in the proper quantities and at the proper times. For this reason, the whole system of incentives which the state has fashioned for the purpose of recruiting high-quality people into managerial positions and motivating them to do their jobs well is geared to fulfillment of the monthly plan, particularly the production target of the plan. First and most immediate is the ample money bonus. Depending upon the importance of the industry and the size of his enterprise, the manager earns a bonus of 30 to 100 per cent of his base salary every month in which he just fulfills his plan.[4] For each percentage overfulfillment of his plan he earns an additional bonus of 2 to 10 per cent of his base salary. The opportunities of adding to an already substantial base salary are thus quite appealing. The director of a coal mine, for example, whose base salary may be about 10,000 rubles a month, would earn a total of 25,000 rubles in any month in which he overfulfilled his plan by 5 per cent.

One need not be a *homo economicus* to be profoundly motivated by such income possibilities. Moreover, the state has seen to it that this money incentive is not in conflict with, but is rather reinforced by, other incentives which may motivate a Soviet manager. Personal advancement, public recognition, and all the prestige which the state can officially confer or channel are available to the manager who regularly fulfills his plans. Demotion is the usual lot of a manager who proves incapable of meeting production targets.

The point is that the state has quite successfully met the problem of eliciting a high level of managerial effort. Soviet managers work hard, not only in terms of their hours of work but in the energy and worry they devote to their jobs. And the focus of their efforts is the fulfillment of the monthly plan.

But fulfilling the monthly plan is no easy matter, and this is the second point to be made. The state has succeeded in organizing a system of establishing plan targets which is calculated to maintain the targets at a high level. Among the various devices developed to achieve this aim is one based on the "ratchet" principle. According to this principle, when an enterprise overfulfills a plan target, the plan target for the following period must be raised. That is, if an enterprise overfulfills its plan of a million rubles' worth of output in one period, the plan for the following period must be greater than a million.[5] In combination with a powerful motivation for managers to overfulfill their plans, the ratchet principle provides an ever-rising floor beneath which output plans cannot fall. The abundant bonuses induce managers to overfulfill their plans, the ratchet snaps the catch, as it were, beneath the new level of output achieved, and the manager must then exert even greater effort to overfulfill the raised target. This would seem to be a very efficient mechanism for securing the state's objective of an ever-increasing rate of output.

What we have just described is, to be sure, an abstract model of a real process. In fact, managers have been forced to adopt certain methods of defense against the working of this mechanism. Awareness of the action of the ratchet principle causes the prudent manager to beware of overfulfilling his plan by too large an amount, a practice which is contrary to the intentions of the state. Similarly, managers take pains to preserve a "safety factor" in their production targets, so that they can overfulfill their plans and yet not exhaust their real pro-

[4] A. Vikent'ev, *Ocherki razvitiia sovetskoi ekonomiki v chetvertoi piatiletke* ("Essays on Soviet Economic Development in the Fourth Five Year Plan") (Gosplanizdat, 1952), p. 175.

[5] The ratchet principle is not an explicit principle of planning but a generally understood rule among managers and planners. In the published sources one catches glimpses of it in the criticism of planners who apply it overzealously (*Stroitel'naia gazeta*, July 27, 1955, p. 2), and in criticisms such as that by Malenkov in his 1941 report, directed against "commissariats which not only did not fulfill their 1940 plans but actually reduced their output below 1939." Usually the ratchet principle operates over yearly periods, occasionally over quarterly periods.

duction potential.[6] But, in general, the effect of the mechanism is to maintain plan targets at a level high enough that the margin of fulfillment is perilously close for most enterprises. This pressure of high targets is perhaps the most salient fact of life for the Soviet manager. Bulganin presented some dramatic evidence of this in his criticism of the high rate of underfulfillment of plans. In 1951, 31 per cent of all enterprises failed to fulfill their annual production plans; in 1952, 39 per cent; in 1953, 40 per cent; and in 1954, 36 per cent. Thus a third of all managers can regularly be expected to underfulfill their plans.

One consequence of this close margin of operation is suggested by another observation made by Bulganin. "The executives of many enterprises change much too often. In the coal industry, for example, about 40 per cent of the heads and chief engineers of the mines and some 50 per cent of the sector managers change every year." When a Soviet manager leaves his job, it is not of his own volition.

The picture which emerges is that of a system in which managers work in a rather precarious position. The difference between the successful and the lagging enterprise is not primarily that the former has an easier time of it, but that its managers are more resourceful in overcoming difficulties. Take the Chelia-binsk Tractor Plant, a great and modern establishment which fulfills its plan month after month. Here at least, one might guess, is a smoothly functioning operation. Yet when the Soviet press gives us a glimpse of its day-to-day life, we find another picture. Although the plant fulfilled its plan for the first half of 1955, it had to engage regularly in storming in order to do so. Workers are pressured by management into working on their days off and those who refuse are declared to be "absentees." One woman worker was dismissed for refusing to work on Sundays and was reinstated only after the intervention of the trade union. In September, we read, things began to look bad once more toward the end of the month; the director therefore switched the day off from Sunday, September 25, to Saturday, October 1. "It was possible," declares the reporter of the incident, "with the help of this extra day, to make do, and to make do quite well."[7] The monthly plan was fulfilled once more and the plant is still numbered among the successful.

With this slim margin of safety, any untoward accident can plunge the enterprise into underfulfillment. The breakdown of a crucial piece of equipment, the rejection of a large lot of production, can throw the enterprise off its production schedule. Even if the manager could meet his target as far as his own efforts are concerned, there is the additional source of trouble referred to by Bulganin, namely that the supplier may fall behind his schedule and thus fail to deliver urgently needed materials on time. Indeed, the unreliability of the system of interenterprise supply is perhaps the second most important fact of life in Soviet industry. The economic milieu is therefore such that the manager must often expect to fall behind his production schedule in the course of some month or other.

Given the likelihood of a lag behind the production schedule in some months, what causes the recourse to storming? One might imagine that the lost output would be considered just so much water under the dam: the manager might resume his production schedule when the machine was repaired or the materials arrived, and the month's bonus would be written off as lost. That this does not happen is due to the very special role of the accounting period, the end of the month. Ordinarily, an accounting period is a rather arbitrary date selected for the convenience of planning or for taking stock of performance. Ideally, it should be quite neutral with respect to decision-making; that is, managers should make the same decisions when the accounting date is known as they would make if they did not know on what date the books would be closed. Least of all should the accounting date itself be treated as a datum in the decision-making process. But this is precisely what happens in the Soviet enterprise, and it is this which explains the practice of storming.

This tendency for an arbitrary accounting date to become a factor in decision-making is not unique for Soviet business administration; the effect of tax law on the financial policies of

[6] Joseph S. Berliner, Informal Organization of the Soviet Firm, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 66 (Aug. 1952), 353–355.

[7] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 7 (Nov. 9, 1955), 9.

American business leaps to mind. Because of the crucial role of time periods in planning, it is perhaps more serious in the Soviet economy. A vivid illustration of its unfortunate consequences was provided a few years ago by N. S. Khrushchev, in a report on agriculture.[8] For many years it had been the practice to take the livestock census on January 1. It would seem that January 1 is a rather harmless date; presumably it was selected by an innocent planner with the primary objective of facilitating planning schedules. However, the collective farms have targets of livestock holdings which they are required to meet, as well as targets of meat deliveries to the state. Ordinarily the peasants would bring their stock for slaughter in the early fall when they are fattest from the summer grazing. But in order to meet their livestock targets on January 1, they kept their stock through the cold early winter months so that they could be counted in the census. The consequence was a disastrous loss of weight; and when they finally brought their stock for slaughter after the census date, they had to slaughter many more head of stock than planned in order to fulfill the quota of meat deliveries in kilograms of beef on the hoof. This had been going on for a number of years before it came to the attention of Khrushchev. The census date has since been moved back to October 1, and the simple shift of dates has probably solved this curious problem.

Thus an arbitrary accounting date had become a factor in the decision-making process, with the most uneconomic consequences. This is precisely what happens in the case of storming. Because of the crucial importance of the end of the month for the fortunes of the manager, any lag in the production schedule is followed by an acceleration in the rate of production in order that the planned output be attained on that vital date. The greater the lag in the early part of the month, the greater the speed-up toward the end of the month. Given this special role of the accounting period, storming is to be expected as long as lags in production are a normal occurrence.

If storming were confined to the months in which lags occurred, its prevalence would be much more limited than it is. It would be much less troublesome to the Soviets and much less interesting to us. For the remarkable thing is that at the end of the month of storming the manager is not presented with a *tabula rasa*, so that in the following month, if no lag occurred, he might hope to avoid storming. The very act of storming creates conditions which make a lag in the following month inevitable. Of the many reasons why this occurs, we can present only the most important.

A proper schedule of prophylactic maintenance and repair of equipment requires that a certain number of machines be out of operation at all times. But a machine taken down for repair is a machine which is not producing, and thus there is a constant pressure on the maintenance personnel to postpone their work until the pressure is off. "In the third ten-day period of January," we read in the newspaper of the machinery industry, "machine 'TM-132' was supposed to have been overhauled, but in the shop they decided to wait: 'the production program has to be fulfilled,' they said. Soon, however, the machine broke down completely."[9] And a correspondent of the newspaper of the iron and steel industry observes that "storming leads to the fact that at the end of the month the equipment is not stopped for maintenance. All stoppages for maintenance are postponed until the beginning of the next month."[10] The consequence is that the first part of the month following a period of storming is devoted to catching up on the most vital delayed maintenance work and to repairing the damage caused by overwork. Hence the enterprise falls once more behind its current production schedule.

In the discussion of bonuses it was pointed out that the difference between 99 per cent of the plan fulfillment and 100 per cent may be worth as much as double his salary for the plant manager. This sharp discontinuity in earning power is not exactly calculated to bring out the noblest of qualities in a man. When so much hangs upon that one per cent, it is quite understandable that the manager will stretch a point in order to achieve it. The commonest practice is the "borrowing" of output from the next month and reporting it as having been produced in the current month. The Molotov Weaving and Finishing Mill, for example, was

[8] *Pravda*, Sept. 15, 1953, p. 2.

[9] *Mashinostroenie*, Feb. 9, 1939, p. 2.

[10] *Chernaia Metallurgiia*, March 4, 1941, p. 3.

considerably short of its monthly target on August 31. "What was most important," states the reporter of the incident, "there was no chance for a bonus." The manager called in his accountants, "giving them strict orders to include the output of the first two days of September in the August plan, and, of course, to draw up appropriate 'records' for this purpose."[11] Since the borrowed output must be "repaid," the early period of the following month is devoted to producing output which had been reported as completed in the preceding month. Hence the enterprise falls behind its current schedule once more. "It is like a tight shirt which comes out in front when you pull it down in back," remarked a former Soviet managerial official interviewed by the writer.

The available descriptions of the storming process indicate that a great deal of energy is expended, while the men work long overtime hours and the managerial officials work "round the clock." It is to be expected that when the deadline is over, there will be a letdown — if not in hours, at least in energy expended.[12]

Factors such as these impart a dynamic movement to the output of the Soviet firm, a movement which has all the formal properties of a "business cycle." Consider an enterprise which has managed to achieve an even rate of output. Any disturbance to its schedule will now generate a periodic movement in its rate of output, not only in the month in which the disturbance occurs but in a number of successive months. The oscillations will dampen down if the enterprise has succeeded in tucking away a "safety factor"; that is, if in any month the output plan is small enough that it can be fulfilled with enough time and resources left over to make up for the output deficit of the preceding month. The oscillations will become wider if the initial disturbance is reinforced in succeeding months so that the enterprise falls further and further behind its schedule. This usually ends, as the Russians say, in a great *skandal*. The manager is fired and a new hopeful takes over.

Here, then, is a nice problem for the administrator. Three integral elements of the system of industrial organization are involved; a powerful incentive to produce, a successful technique of maintaining high targets, and a system of planning and accounting. Each in its way is a useful device for what it is designed to accomplish. Yet in combination they give rise to this unfortunate and unintended practice of storming. It is interesting to speculate on changes that might succeed in eliminating the practice. Let us at the outset limit the admissible changes to simple measures which would not require far-reaching alterations in the basic features of the system of industrial organization, such as the planning and incentive systems.

In the three party reports quoted earlier, the only real administrative measure recommended was one put forth by Malenkov in the 1941 report. Certain commissariats,[13] he indicated, had introduced a system requiring every director to report daily to the commissar on the quantity of output produced the preceding day. "These reports oblige the commissar to find the causes of the failure to fulfill the daily targets immediately, and to take immediate measures for correcting the indicated deficiencies." Where the system had been introduced, stated Malenkov, there had been a significant evening-out of the rate of production.

Whatever hopes Malenkov may have had that this measure would provide the panacea must have been short-lived, for little was heard of it thereafter. At least one reason for the failure began to emerge shortly afterward. As a measure of self-defense, managers began to resort to the practice of "prolonging the work day." In an iron and steel plant, we read, "by order of Comrade Matevosian, the chief engineer, it was decided to prolong the acceptance of finished products from the rolling mill on March 15 until 1:30 a.m. of March 16. On March 11 Comrade Matevosian authorized the

[11] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 4 (Jan. 3, 1953), 16.

[12] To this may perhaps be added the survivals of peasant resistance to the harsh and demanding discipline of industrial factory life. There is a very suggestive passage in Marx's *Capital* describing the early capitalists' troubles in disciplining their recently urbanized labor force to the factory regime: "Work toward the end of the week being generally much increased in duration in consequence of the habit of the men of idling on Monday and occasionally during a part or whole of Tuesday also. . . . They lose two or three days, and then work all night to make it up" (Karl Marx, *Capital* [Modern Library], p. 523 n.).

[13] In the prewar period, ministers were known as "peoples' commissars."

inclusion in the output of the current day, of the output of the quality steel shops which had actually been completed by 6:00 a.m. of the following day."[14] In other words, the period of the storming cycle was reduced from the month to the day, but the same elements of periodicity continued to prevail. Any measure to eliminate storming must reckon with the boundless ingenuity of Soviet managers.

There were undoubtedly other reasons for the failure of Malenkov's measure. A system of daily reporting must have greatly increased the work load on the normally overlarge number of bookkeepers and clerks in the plant administration. The system also required a more formalized set of daily plan targets, a further burden on the planning apparatus in the commissariat and in its hundreds of enterprises. And finally, when the lag in production was due to causes outside the enterprise's own control, such as the failure of materials shipments to arrive on time, the commissariat officials could not be expected to straighten matters out in a single day.

Would it help to lengthen the accounting period, perhaps to a three-month or six-month period instead of a one-month period?[15] This measure comes very close to violating the restriction we have set upon the range of admissible solutions, for it may well require far-reaching changes in the methods of plant administration. The system of bonus payments would have to be shifted to a longer time period. If the bonus for fulfillment of the six-month plan is to be equal to six times the bonus previously available for the monthly plan, the stakes on that last few per cent of plan fulfillment would be so high as to constitute an intolerable strain on the honesty of mortal men. Moreover, the whole system of planning and reporting is geared to a monthly basis, and if the bonus system were not similarly geared there would undoubtedly be an increase in the incidence of underfulfillment of monthly plans. For however harshly storming is indicted, the state is really rather ambivalent about it. Because of the planned interdependence of customers and suppliers, underfulfillment by one enterprise often sends a wave of underfulfillment pulsing through a number of other plants. It is therefore vitally important that each manager exert the greatest effort to fulfill his monthly plan. One suspects that the state would rather have storming-plus-fulfillment than underfulfillment-without-storming. It is true that this problem of the close interdependence of enterprises could be met by an increase in inventories and pipeline stocks, but here too is a measure which would alter the basic principles upon which Soviet industry has functioned in the past.

It is doubtful that an admissible solution could be found by the manipulation of the accounting period. It is true that this approach worked in the case of the livestock census date, but there it was merely a matter of tying the accounting period to a certain natural phenomenon which was not one of the variables of the problem but a datum.

Could a solution be found by focusing on another facet of the problem, the incentive system rather than the accounting period? When really serious problems have arisen, the Soviets have often appealed to what they clearly recognize as a major motivating factor, the bonus. Thus in recent years the award of bonuses has been made contingent upon fulfillment of a cost-reduction target and upon the production of the proper quantities of individual items of production (the assortment plan). Judging from the continued complaints about the neglect of costs and product-assortment, this method has not proved outstandingly successful, probably because the state's prime interest in production remains overriding. If the award of bonuses were made to depend on the fulfillment of too many unrealistic side conditions, fewer bonuses would actually be earned, and there is a danger that this potent incentive would be vitiated. If the state introduced and enforced a requirement that no bonus be paid if the plan were fulfilled by storming, most managers would have to write off the bonus as a paper promise.

An alternative solution along these lines would be to offer to the manager who eliminates storming a supplementary bonus which would be independent of the bonus for plan fulfillment. This too is an approach which has been used in the past to motivate managers to put more effort into increasing the production of spare parts and the production of a side line of consumer goods out of scraps and waste

[14] *Chernaia Metallurgiia*, March 22, 1941, p. 2.

[15] The author is indebted to Professor Raymond T. Bye of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, for this suggestion.

The trouble is that too many supplementary bonuses tend to deflect managerial attention in the direction of the largest bonus. The commissariat of the Iron and Steel Industry, for example, once introduced a system in which managers could earn a bonus of 50 per cent of the value of fuel saved and 15 per cent of the value of materials saved.[16] The system may well have turned a good deal of effort away from materials to fuel. And when there are possibilities of substitution (perhaps by producing more consumer goods at the expense of spare parts), quite unintended decisions may be made. Thus a supplementary bonus for elimination of storming, which would be large enough to make a difference, might raise new problems in other spheres of managerial activity. In any case, the bonus must not be larger than the bonus for production plan fulfillment, and therefore it would not be likely to eliminate the causes of storming.

We cannot continue here to explore the full range of possible solutions. But enough has been said to demonstrate that storming is so deeply ingrained in the structure of the system that no simple measures can eliminate it. The argument may be concluded by considering that there is no lack of solutions if we are willing to admit fundamental changes in the system of industrial administration. Suppose, for example, that production plans were reduced well below their present high level, perhaps by eliminating the "ratchet" principle of planning. If there were enough slack in production plans, ordinary lags in production schedules could be easily made up without recourse to storming. Plans would be more often fulfilled, and there would be no need for the postponement of maintenance and the "borrowing" of output. If plans were more often fulfilled, enterprises would less often be thrown off schedule by the delayed delivery of materials from suppliers. A general reduction of plan targets would thus eliminate two of the three components of the storming mechanism: the high probability of lags behind schedule and the dynamic transmission of storming from one period to the next.

It is doubtful that the Soviets will accept this gratuitous suggestion and, it must be admitted, possibly with good reason. The combination of high targets and high rewards is a most effective mechanism for eliciting a high level of effort from their managers. Lower targets might very well lead to a relaxation of effort and output, which is contrary to the objectives of the state. Storming is a price which the state probably considers well worth paying for the benefits of the present system. For the administrator, it remains an embarrassing defect which his art is powerless to eliminate. "What we need if we are to solve this," said Bulganin, "is not exorcisms but elimination of the causes which breed lack of rhythm." But it is doubtful that we shall hear anything but exorcisms unless broader changes in the administrative system are admitted.

[16] *Industriia,* Jan. 22, 1940, p. 3.

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THE UTILITY AND LIMITATIONS OF INTEREST GROUP THEORY IN NON-AMERICAN FIELD SITUATIONS

• *JOSEPH LaPALOMBARA*

"Among some American scholars . . . there exists the tendency to consider that schemes used in the United States for the analysis of political reality are perfectly adequate, except for some slight modification, for the study of political questions in the countries of Western Europe . . . . But it is enough to make a few concrete observations to understand the vanity and the dangers of such a position. Nothing

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will free European specialists in political science from the obligation to engage in an original methodological effort. In our discipline, analytical and, more logically, explicative schemes must be strictly adapted to the realities studied. Once this effort will have been made in each country, then one will be able to proceed to real and exact comparative studies. Without doubt, much time will pass before really satisfactory results are obtained, but which is the sector of human understanding the construction of which has not demanded the efforts of several generations?"[1]

Thus concludes Jean Meynaud in an article on French interest groups written for Italian consumption. It is not the first time that he has questioned whether the conceptual apparatus that has evolved in connection with American studies of interest groups is validly or usefully transferable to French or other European settings. Indeed, while he is quick to recognize that European political scientists might well follow some of their Anglo-Saxon colleagues in the exploration of the role of interest groups in Continental political systems, he is nevertheless skeptical about some of the claims made for the interest-group focus as the key to the systematic understanding of political systems anywhere.

Meynaud's caveats appear at a time when European scholars in increasing numbers are "discovering" interest groups in places where, according to the folklore of an older political science, they were supposed to be either nonexistent or minor phenomena when contrasted to their role in the American political process. Many of these "discoveries" have obviously been encouraged by American scholars who use European countries as research sites.[2] In recent years, however, they have been joined by Jean Meynaud, and by such other thoughtful scholars as Samuel Finer, Phillip Williams, Mattei Dogan, Giovanni Sartori, Stanley Hoffman, and a host of others. In other words, interest group studies, like American jazz and wash-and-wear suits, are now fashionable abroad. And Meynaud's concern,[3] if I interpret it correctly, is that European scholars may accept *uncritically* not only the utility of the group focus in research but also the theoretical notions and methodological habits that have evolved in the United States in connection with it.

I shall argue in this paper that (1) except at a level of abstraction that renders it both useless and dangerous for empirical research, a general interest group theory does not exist, and (2) it is necessary to examine comparatively some middle-range propositions about interest groups in order to ascertain if the interest-group focus has any utility at all for the construction of a general theory of politics.

Regarding my first point, I would note that the literature in the United States is replete with more or less operational propositions, more or less normative statements about groups and their implications for a viable democratic political system, more or less useful concepts regarding groups, and more or less impressive empirical data regarding various aspects of group organization and behavior.

It might be objected by some that the work of Arthur F. Bentley adds up to a general theory, or that it becomes one when viewed alongside the work of Truman, Gross and others who claim Bentley as an intellectual fountainhead. My own view is that Bentley never moved beyond his quite legitimate philosophical and epistemological concerns, and that many of his disciples have either over-simplified his "theory" or, what is worse, have created a fair amount of confusion in their efforts to elaborate and to operationalize what Bentley had in mind.[4] Efforts of the latter variety have

[1] Jean Meynaud, "I gruppi d'interesse in Francia," *Studi politici*, IV (Florence, July-September, 1957), 433–434.

[2] This is not the place to inventory the American studies I have in mind. However, it is worth recalling that Samuel Beer, Henry Ehrmann, Val Lorwin, Gabriel Almond and Leon Epstein, to name but a few who come to mind, have been instrumental in turning both American and foreign scholarly attention to the importance of interest group organization and behavior in British and Continental politics.

[3] A concern more profoundly shared by Professor Giovanni Sartori, of the University of Florence, and provocatively articulated in his recent "Gruppi di pressione o gruppi di interesse? Una discussione sul neopluralismo," *Il mulino* LXXXVII Bologna, January, 1959), 7–42. *Cf.* Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," *American Political Science Review*, XLVI (June, 1952), 380 ff.

[4] One of my colleagues, Joseph Schlesinger, observes that the vague and mystical group notions of Bentley have often been borrowed to lend an

unquestionable utility when they caution us about the ubiquitous tendency to reify the groups that we observe, to endow them with personalities, to give them life and a soul. Or we are helped by similar efforts that compel the researcher to view the group not as a collection of individuals with identifiable boundaries, but simply (simply?) as a way of conceptualizing the behavior of many individuals interacting.[5]

Much more damaging to political science — and, as I shall point out, much more dangerous for European scholars — is the oversimplification of Bentley's or any other conceptual scheme for which the interest-group is central. What Oliver Garceau has rightly dubbed simplistic group theory involves a view of public policy as the resultant of a parallelogram of organized pressure group forces. This is the theory that holds that all political behavior is group behavior, that the individual *qua* individual cannot participate in the political process, that political institutions are essentially the arena of group conflict or struggle, that this struggle itself is the raw material of the political process, that the struggle takes place in terms of basic and often material interests that are glossed over by the ideological or other verbiage of the group representatives, and so on.[6]

As Garceau aptly points out, the trouble with this "theory" is that the data from the field do not confirm it. And often it will not help to introduce the concepts of "potential," "latent" or "reference" groups to account for that portion of a legislator's, an administrator's or an adjudicator's behavior that cannot be explained by the model. The policy process, as I have researched it in Italy, does not respond to the kind of explication of phenomena toward which most of group "theory" is directed. Nor will it suffice to observe that I may not have penetrated deeply enough to the really basic interests and interest groups that were involved in the evolution of a particular policy. Efforts to do this lead to a fantastic unstructuring of the situation under observation, in which the hapless researcher pursues an infinite regression of "less-than-basic" interests. Aside from the fact that some European researchers may experience the disillusionment with the ideal of rationalistic democracy that occurred among American scholars when the "fourth (or fifth, or sixth) branch of government" was discovered here, there exists the danger that the simplistic interest group theory is in a sense tailor-made for some of the gross, superficial characteristics of European societies. Some of the inarticulated ideological premises in American social science theory (and certainly in much of the interest group approach) are clearly of a Marxist character.[7] In societies in which class consciousness is strong, in which the idea of class conflict is widely accepted, in which political decisions are often viewed as the articulation of the interests of minority groups in the societies, simple group theory will have a strong appeal. The fact, for example, that pluralism has not had strong support in societies on the Continent is partially an explanation for the belated discovery of the interest group; but the lack of a strong pluralistic tradition will not prevent scholars and others in these same societies from seeing in interest group "theory" a vindication of some of the generalizations of Karl Marx.[8]

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aura of respectability to research on interest groups conducted essentially in the tradition of the journalistic muckrakers or the "inside dopesters." That the mantle of Bentley's or anyone else's "general group theory" does not really fit is unimportant; it does make the interest group scholar *feel* less naked.

[5] This is the burden of Charles B. Hagan, "The Group in a Political Science," in *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (Evanston, 1958), pp. 38–51.

[6] Garceau's essay on this point is required reading: "Interest Group Theory in Political Research," *Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, CCCXIX (September, 1958), 104–112. Charles Hagan points out that interests other than the material ones (*e.g.*, family, friendship, patriotism) are also included as important by the interest group adherents. This may be true, but I also recall that Bentley had some harsh words about interests that masquerade behind Fourth-of-July orations.

[7] The contribution of pluralism to the growth of group analysis is recognized. Not as recognized — or articulated — is the contribution of Marxist thought to modern sociology and, indeed, to the assumption of the neo-pluralists.

[8] It should be noted that the latent Marxian analogy involves two dangers for the interest-group researcher. The first is that he may conceptualize about the "group struggle" in terms of a more or less rigid economic determinism. The second (and prior!) danger is that he may take as a given exactly what should be the central *question* of his

One reaction to Meynaud's caveat, then, is that there exists no genuine general theory of interest groups that need concern him. But because there does exist simplistic group theory — the kind that involves either an over-simplified projection of Marxist notions or a fancy elaboration of the dictum that man is a social animal — Meynaud is correct in doubting its applicability to European societies. For the facts show that such "theories" are not valid for the United States either.[9]

My second point is that Meynaud's concern should not lead us completely to eschew the kinds of comparative research out of which an integrated group theory might sometime emerge. This is not to say that one must lead from the assumption that a complete theory of the group will materialize or that, if it does, it will become in fact a general theory of politics or of political systems. As Gabriel Almond points out:

> . . . we turn to the comparative study of interest groups not with the hope that these rather than parties or governmental institutions will yield *the principles* of discrimination between types of political systems, but rather with the expectation that the systematic examination of interest groups in their complex interrelations with public opinion, political parties and formal governmental institutions will enable us to differentiate more accurately between political systems as *wholes*. In other words the growing concern among scholars with interest groups and public opinion is the consequence of a search for a more complete and systematic conception of the political process as a whole, rather than a search for an approach which is an *alternative* to the present emphasis on *formal governmental* institutions."[10]

I would argue, therefore, that if some low-level (or middle-range) group theory does exist in the United States, if there are some concepts that have been used successfully here, if we can present a roll call of propositions that can be tested empirically, there is every reason why at least some European scholars should proceed to trace in other societies the research excursions that have occurred across the Atlantic. This is exactly what those of us who have participated in the SSRC-sponsored studies on pressure groups in Western and non-Western systems have attempted to do, and with some fruitful results. Unless I am greatly mistaken, Jean Meynaud agrees on this score; certainly several of his articles, as well as his recent book, suggest that his conceptual debt to American pressure-group "theorists" and researchers is very great, indeed.[11]

When I suggest that it is legitimate, even essential, that American conceptual baggage be carted to Europe (and to other parts of the world as well[12]), I do not mean that it will necessarily provide the key to our understanding political systems comparatively or, indeed, that the kinds of concepts and propositions that have "worked" in the United States will be equally useful abroad. As a matter of fact, I am increasingly skeptical not merely about the applicability of the interest group approach in non-American settings but also about whether the group framework of analysis, when taken alone, is the most valid approach to political behavior in any society,[13] including the United States.

It is precisely because we do not know very much about the validity of the interest group approach, because we do not yet have a gen-

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inquiry — that the political process is epitomized by group-oriented behavior, that groups conflict and compete in an effort to influence policy, and that policy and political change is the outcome of essentially this kind of behavioral input.

[9] Garceau, *op. cit., passim.*

[10] Gabriel Almond, *A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process.* Mimeographed by the Social Science Research Council (New York, April, 1957), p. 5.

[11] See his "Essai d'analyse de l'influence des groupes d'intérêt," *Revue économique* (Paris, No. 2, 1957), 3–46; and *Les groupes de pression en France* (Paris, 1958).

[12] One very interesting excursion of the type I have in mind is Myron Weiner's "Interest Groups in India," a paper delivered at the 1958 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, September 4–6, 1958.

[13] For example, in many instances the focus on interest groups seems not to differ in substance from previous emphasis placed on more formal institutions of government such as the legislature or the executive. Macrocosmic group analysis, as well as theoretical endeavors in the interest group area, seem to create much impressionistic folklore about the nature of groups and their relationship to the political process. Much is written, but little research is conducted, on the obvious problem of *demonstrating* how certain variables regarding interest groups, the political culture, or the character of political institutions and policy makers affect the political process.

eral group theory or know if one is viable empirically, that we should insist that some of our notions be tested in political systems other than that of the United States. If we discover, not *a priori* but as the result of empirical, tightly organized research, that propositions about interest groups in politics do not in fact apply to other political systems, we have won a major skirmish in the campaign to sharpen our capacities as political and social scientists. Such an approach does not mean that European scholars should shrink from the original effort demanded by Meynaud; in their own work these men can be of great assistance in the business of challenging some of our assumptions and therefore of clarifying the very question that is central to any science, and that is, to what degree are theoretical statements and the empirical research findings growing out of them universally applicable.

II

Perhaps I can best illustrate the utility of the position I have assumed by reporting some of the findings of my recent field research experience in Italy. Along with several other scholars supported by the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics, I ventured abroad to look extensively and, in a more limited way, intensively at the interest group phenomenon in a foreign culture. The concepts, propositions and limited theory that governed my research were gleaned from writings that are familiar to all of us.[11] My intention was to accumulate empirical data that would suggest whether this particular approach would give meaningful results in Italy; whether, that is, the interest group approach would lead me to a more accurate understanding of Italian political institutions and behavior than would, say, a study of the Italian legislature, executive or constitutional decisions.

Because we are still analyzing the data accumulated, I cannot yet answer this question with a high degree of confidence. However, my impression is this: that while the interest group approach, if carefully used, permits the orderly classification of data regarding the behavior of many central actors in the political process, it falls short of providing a satisfactory *explanation* for the patterns of action and the policy outcomes that one encounters in the Italian political system. I should say more — and I have implied it earlier in this paper. The interest group approach at its highest level of generality, tends to lead the researcher to offer explanations of behavior that are stretched beyond the point of minimal credibility, or it may create in him cynicism regarding, say, the behavior of public officials who seem not to be acting according to the requisites of the interest

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[14] A first statement of my research prospectus is reported in "On the French and Italian Bureaucracies" (with J. T. Dorsey), *PROD*, I (September, 1957), 35–40. I might add that the literature is overrun with "middle-range" propositions regarding interest groups and the political process. Here are a few:

A. A group's influence *vis-à-vis* its competitors will vary with the proportion of the total membership in its specialized area that it is able to organize.

B. Although formal organization is not essential to an interest group, all other things being equal, organization is in itself an independent variable affecting the degree of success a group can have in influencing decisions or policies.

C. A group's ability to intervene efficaciously in governmental decisions affecting it varies directly with the nature of the group's access to decisional information.

D. Bureaucratic agencies differ in the degree to which they are penetrable by organized groups. Responsiveness to group demands will be maximized in those agencies that are newer and more functionally specialized.

E. All other things being equal, decision makers will favor those group representatives or negotiators who evidence life experiences (social origin, social class, education, *etc.*) similar to those of the decision makers.

F. Interest groups will be ineffective in the degree to which the concept of the "public interest" is a strongly held myth by the governmental decision makers.

G. Interest groups will be more active in public administrative areas in those countries displaying the highest degree of delegated legislation.

H. The administrative role, as such, limits the influence of interest groups because, like all roles, it involves required, permitted and forbidden behavior.

I. The power of any sample of politically active groups (on any given series of issues) will vary with a) the political "styles" of the groups, b) the reference groups of the bureaucrats, and c) the structure and processes of the bureaucracy.

group model. Or, as Garceau says, "the search for . . . a complete theory of the group basis of politics may be stretching too far for theoretical elegance at the sacrifice of immediate convenience as an analytical tool."[15]

I would caution, therefore, that any attempt to explicate political behavior within the general framework of interest group "theory" is likely to be misleading and fruitless. If, instead, we conceive of the interest group approach as an analytical tool or as a system of describing certain (but not all!)[16] aspects of the political process, the approach has utility, both in the sense of supporting some American empirical findings and of raising questions about the cross-cultural applicability of classification schemes, propositions and concepts that have grown up around interest group research.

Before illustrating some of the problems and results of my field research, it may be appropriate to say something more about the setting within which the research was conducted and the methods utilized for the collection of data. I owe much to Gabriel Almond's article on political cultures as a convenient way of conceptualizing about and describing in broad detail the setting in which Italian interest groups are compelled to act.[17] In Almond's terms, Italy manifests an uneven development of her several political cultures. The society is notoriously fragmented; several political sub-cultures exist of which the major ones are those identified with Catholicism, a secular middle class, and a modernizing and innovating class. Each of these sub-cultures is atomized still further along ideological lines; each tends to have a total and highly articulated design for society as a whole and therefore for the political institutions within it. Although there are some peripheral points at which the views of the sub-cultures tend to merge, these are clearly exceptional; these major groupings are not compatible with each other. The sociologists would say about the society that it is not well integrated; the political scientists might speak of a low degree of consensus when measured, say, against the standard of the United States or Great Britain.

It is of vital importance to understand that formal interest groups in Italy frequently organize *within* these sub-cultures; very few of them cut across subcultural lines, even when the logic of a common economic interest would appear to compel such unification. For their own purposes, Communist-inspired or dominated groups often call for such unity of action and organization, but they are almost always repelled. Even within each of the sub-cultures, the groups are further fragmented. It is not uncommon, for example, to find Communist, Catholic, Socialist, Liberal, Republican, and Neo-Fascist rough equivalents of the American League of Women Voters. Or, within the Catholic sub-culture, one can discern functional groups that separate the wealthy from the poor, radical workers from conservative workers, agricultural day laborers from tenant farmers, from small property-holding farmers, and so on. In a context such as this, it is difficult to isolate what may be the "basic" or "fundamental" interests around which the groups are organized.

All of which results in an enormous proliferation of groups — of countless interest groups in a society where they have gone almost completely unnoticed by political scientists. In Rome alone we were able to identify some 3,000 formal national groups from which we drew both our mailed-questionnaire and interview samples. Of course, as our questionnaire responses show, most of the formal groups are only sporadically involved in the political process. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that not more than a handful of the groups responding to our questionnaire indicated patterns of action that categorically excluded political intervention. For the rest, intervention ranged all the way from an occasional memorandum to a parliamentary committee or administrative agency to frequent and regularized contacts with political party and public officials in every branch of government.

This fragmented nature of Italian society is responsible, I believe, for the relatively important role that violence, and the threat of it, play in the general tactics utilized by interest

[15] Garceau, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

[16] On this point, note Samuel Beer's comment that the exclusive use of group theory would constitute an unsatisfactory conceptual framework for the analysis of British politics. "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain," *American Political Science Review*, L (March, 1956), 2.

[17] "Comparative Political Systems," in H. Eulau, S. J. Eldersveld and M. Janowitz, *Political Behavior* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1956), pp. 34–42.

groups in support of their demands. The group leaders who were queried on this phenomenon tended to see their activities as part of a basic struggle among the sub-cultures to impose hegemony over each other. For these leaders, domination by the opposition was generally taken to mean not merely difficult access to the key centers of policy making, but outright denial of any access at all to the group members of the sub-cultures not in power. As it turns out, this judgment is definitely not exaggerated; for the group leaders themselves freely indicate that, wherever and whenever possible, they seek utterly to exclude their opponents from the policy making areas. In a setting such as this, the threat or use of violence may be the only logical recourse open to a frustrated interest group.

Given this kind of general setting, it would be foolhardy to try to speak with authority about the characteristic patterns of interest group action in all sectors of Italian politics. My field effort focused primarily on the interaction between interest groups and the Italian bureaucracy, and the research was limited to a small number of groups and just a few administrative agencies. Special attention was given to *Confindustria* (Italy's equivalent of the N.A.M.), the trade unions and Catholic Action in its various organizational manifestations. Their relationships to the Ministries of Industry and Commerce and of Labor and Social Security were intensively explored. Information was obtained through the following devices:

(1) Content analyses of the major publications of the three groups over periods ranging from 10 to 50 years.
(2) Mailed-questionnaires to 129 formal groups. The questionnaires elicited information about internal organization, membership, leadership and intervention in the political process. Sixty-eight groups responded.
(3) Analyses of newspapers and other periodical literature dealing with the three groups, the issues in which they were openly involved, and the bureaucratic agencies and personalities with whom they interacted.
(4) Informal discussions with approximately 100 informants or "knowledgeables" from the fields of government, business, organized labor and the professions.
(5) Three-hour focused interviews conducted with 125 group leaders, bureaucrats, party officials and selected members of the legislature.

Perhaps the most frustrating general finding of this study is that, except on the basis of highly unreliable impressions, it is impossible to measure the *relative influence* that groups exert over administrative decisions. The methods employed yielded essentially unsatisfactory results. For example, when respondents (group leaders and public administrators) are asked to differentiate among groups in terms of the power exercised in various administrative agencies, not very impressive results are obtained. For one thing the concept "power" (or "influence") is not easy to define, and, even after the interviewer suggests a definition, he cannot be certain that the respondents adhere to a specific denotation in their evaluations. The most that one can get from analyzing interview materials is a rough classification of responses. Thus, when the agency in question was a subdivision of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, we obtained this pattern of response:

(1) Bureaucrats in administrative agencies other than the ministry identify the unions as weak, Catholic Action as relatively strong, and the power of *Confindustria* as overwhelming.
(2) Communist and Socialist trade union leaders describe themselves as weak (but see below!), the Catholic unions as just a little stronger, *Confindustria* as strong and the power of Catholic Action as overwhelming.
(3) Catholic trade unionists view themselves as stronger than the Communists and Catholic Action, but weaker than *Confindustria*.
(4) Other group leaders and political officials generally identify the unions as weak, Catholic Action as strong, and *Confindustria* as overwhelmingly powerful.
(5) Bureaucrats in the ministry involved identify only Catholic Action and the Catholic unions as in a position "to interfere" with orderly bureaucratic processes.

(6) *Confindustria* leaders describe themselves as weak, identify the Communist unions as similarly situated and ascribe overwhelming power to the Catholic unions and to Catholic Action.

Interestingly, group leaders tend to argue with the interviewer that their organizations are weak, but only to a certain point. That is, the articulation of weakness to the outsider tends to cease whenever the respondent is probed on the reactions of group members to such a situation. Thus Communist trade unionists insist that, even in the Ministry of Industry, things are not completely black for them. The only exception to this pattern worth mentioning is a leader of the Christian Democratic Association of Direct Cultivators, who describes his organization as a pressure group, claims that it wields enormous power and boasts that 62 Christian Democratic deputies owe their election to it.

Similar patterns of subjective evaluation are obtained regarding a long series of questions pertaining to the relative power of groups in administrative agencies. Only to a very limited extent do the replies of the various categories of respondents tend to vary as the focus of attention shifts from one bureaucratic agency to another. Out of the total responses emerges, first, widespread recognition that organized groups do seek to intervene in the administrative process, and second, the tendency of many respondents (both group leaders and bureaucrats) to ascribe dominant influence to Catholic Action and to *Confindustria*.

The difficulty with such ascription is that it is not at all corroborated by other measures. For example, we attempted to identify over a time the positions of the various groups regarding a series of issues that came before the administrative agencies, and to gauge whether the final decision (where we could identify one) corresponded to one position or another. This analysis shows that on almost every major issue in which it expressed itself over several years *Confindustria* was defeated by the groups with which it competes.

The same analysis conducted for Catholic Action, however, raises enormous difficulties. The organization is so vast, so sub-divided into many smaller units, some of which compete among themselves, that it is difficult to know when one has isolated a consistent Catholic Action position. But even here, the current and historical data can be marshalled in support of the proposition that, as far as administrative decisions go, Catholic Action does suffer defeats and, in any case, probably enjoys much less influence than Italians generally ascribe to it.

One might conclude at this point that the subjective evaluations were simply in error and that the second type of measure is more reliable. We think not, and for several reasons. First, it is apparent that group representatives often overstate their demands. This is invariably the case with their public demands, if interview responses mean anything. Thus, it is difficult to know exactly what the interest group really wanted, or expected to get. Second, it is also evident that how these groups fare in any of the administrative agencies will tend to vary with the nature of the issue involved, and, alas, with a host of other intervening variables such as the temper of the Minister of the Treasury, the political deals that may be evolving in the legislature, the struggles within the dominant party, the unlikely alliances between Communist and Christian political leaders, to name only a few about which we have any information at all. Third, a focus on issues that engenders controversy and open opposition tends to lead one away from the many matters that are regularly handled quietly and on a routine basis. The way in which such less controversial issues are disposed of may reflect differing degrees of influence of the very groups about which we are attempting to make a total judgment. And last, this kind of analysis cannot shed any significant light unless a very careful accounting is given of the role of the bureaucrats themselves in these controversies.

Frankly, then, I come away from this experience with the feeling that we can describe relative group influence only in gross and therefore possibly misleading terms. For example, it is my impression that one of the very weakest interest groups in Italy today is *Confindustria*, about whose alleged enormous prowess millions of words have been printed in Italy. I believe that a complete analysis of our data will eventually bear out my assertion, and

I recognize that, in making it, I am open to the criticism that I speak of relative group strength on the basis of pure impression. We know enough, in any event, to caution that it is not sufficient to support a claim of group influence in administration to show that an interest group maintains certain relations with the bureaucracy. It is the existence of these relationships between group leader and bureaucrats that has led some theorists to comment on the power of groups over bureaucratic decisions. Let us examine some of these relationships as they apply to Italy.

For example, it is sometimes suggested that the growth of the welfare state — or of economic planning — has intensified the contacts between group representatives and public administrators, especially in those administrative sectors that deal with economic regulation and welfare services. As Samuel Beer articulates it:

> . . . the structure of the welfare state and the controlled economy associates pressure groups more closely with the administration and makes pressure groups more concerned with the decisions made at the administrative level.[18]

Perhaps such a shift in the locus of interest group activity has occurred at the time and for the reason suggested. However, it is also possible that the welfare state has brought many new groups into existence and that the intensity of group activity in general has increased in all branches and at all levels of government. The kind of shift in emphasis probably began historically when delegated legislation became a major phenomenon, and as groups discovered that administrators have discretion in the implementation of legislative policies, notwithstanding what the juridical scholars may say.

Nor is it to be assumed that the nature of a group's interest will determine where it will concentrate its efforts to intervene in the political or governmental process. In Italy it is not clear that groups with strong economic interests gravitate toward the bureaucracy and groups with strong ideological content toward the legislature, as some writers expect. To be sure, Communist and Socialist groups are generally more visible in the legislature. Their leaders tell us, however, that this is not so much a matter of choice as it is the result of their not finding adequate access in administrative agencies where both management groups sporadically and Catholic groups always and with great determination seek to freeze them out.

With the industrialist and employer associations, on the other hand, there is an apparent preference for the administrative arena. Again, however, our findings show that the unwillingness of these group leaders to appear "in public" is largely a result of the trauma they suffered when the Fascist regime they so openly supported disintegrated. Italy's industrialists, for example, have carried this political shyness to the point where *Confindustria* has only three members in the national legislature who openly speak on behalf of the confederation. *Confindustria* leaders complain bitterly about their disadvantage alongside other organized groups with strong direct legislative representation. However, *Confindustria's* incredibly amateurish and abortive attempt to reenter the legislature in the elections of 1958 will cause both group leaders and the industrialists they represent to retreat once more into the more reassuring, even if not exclusively preferred labyrinth of Italian bureaucracy.

Because they are the easiest to identify, large-scale interest groups appear to dominate the Italian bureaucratic scene. Yet, we find that, with most of the administrators we interviewed, the peak associations are of less importance than the more specialized groups that the associations confederate. Thus, members of the Ministry of Industry are more concerned, they say, with, for example, the National Association of Automotive Industries or the National Association of Transport, than they are with *Confindustria* in which both organizations have membership. Similarly, Ministry of Labor bureaucrats show greater concern about the needs and demands of, say, the National Federation of Portworkers or the National Federation of Metalmechanical Workers, than they do for the confederation in which these units have membership. This is true notwithstanding that the constitutions of almost all confederating associations stipulate that they and not the member units will carry on negotiations with governmental agencies or with other groups.

It is this identification between the governmental and the interest group specialists that leads Meynaud to suggest that the more recent

[18] Beer, *op. cit.*, 15. Similarly, Meynaud, "Essai d'analyse de l'influence des groupes d'intérêt," *op. cit.*, 24.

and specialized ministries (labor, industry, commerce, *etc.*) are likely to be more susceptible to group pressures than older ministries such as war, the interior, and foreign affairs. There is no questioning the existence of this identification in the Italian ministries of industry and labor; respondents on both the interest group and bureaucratic sides articulated at great length about the advantages of dealing with persons who speak one's same professional language, who "really understand" the nature of the problems to which both sides address themselves. Supportive evidence for this point is also suggested by the fact that the most proletarian of trade unions will go to great lengths to insure that their representatives to bureaucratic agencies be university graduates whose status (and, perhaps, socio-economic background) is equal to that of the public administrators with whom the groups must deal.

I will defer until later the inferences that we might draw from patterns such as this. Here I wish particularly to add that we conducted a few interviews in the ministries of the interior and of foreign affairs specifically for the purpose of probing the relative susceptibility of the administrators there to group pressures. We also raised this issue with many of our "knowledgeables." Needless to say, we found that these ministries, too, have their clienteles, even highly specialized ones such as the National Association of Municipal Authorities that interact regularly with Ministry of the Interior officials, and all sorts of interest groups (European federation, protection of emigrants, *etc.*) that are in regular contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These group representatives, too, tend to speak specialized languages that relate to the activities of the public administrators with whom they are in contact. On the basis of our limited findings, I would suggest that hasty conclusions about the newer and more specialized ministries be avoided.[19] It may well be that the proposition is valid for Italy. But it is also possible that not enough attention has been paid the older agencies where, superficially, it may appear that the major functional interest groups are inactive.

We also discovered in Italy a vast network of quasi-corporative relationships between certain interest groups and the administrative agencies. Similar arrangements exist in France and Great Britain,[20] and the practice has been described as providing the privileged groups with built-in access to critical points in the administrative decision-making process. In many of Italy's ministries, group representation is accorded on advisory committees that are expected to aid the minister and other top-level administrators in the formulation of general policy. Additionally, some groups have representation on specialized committees that set prices for consumers goods and scarce natural resources, for gas and electricity, and so on. Other similar agencies consult on matters of foreign commerce, including import-export priorities and regulations. There is no doubt of the intrinsic importance of the activities engaged in by these special committees. *Confindustria*, for example, maintains a card file on all of its leaders and members who hold positions on such committees, both nationally and locally. *Confindustria* leaders are quick to explain that such representation provides an excellent way for the agencies involved to hear the opinions of the parties affected by policy, as well as a way of assuring that the administrators will not succumb to the demands of a single interest group.

In general, representation on these ministerial committees is accorded to the industrial, agricultural and labor associations in the country, with the exception that Communist and Socialist groups in any of the areas have been barred for some years notwithstanding that in several sectors they have the largest organizations. Needless to say, the leaders of these groups complain about this. Interestingly, so did about half of the bureaucrats who were queried on this point. They generally offer as an explanation of their position the view that the representation is meaningless, and possibly harmful to the bureaucracy when it involves representatives of groups that recruit a small minority of the total organized persons in a particular area. This is especially the case where administrative regulation of the groups is the central function of the agency. Not hav-

[19] Jean Meynaud's remarks on the differing susceptibility of administrative agencies to group demands are contained in his "Les groupes d'intérêt et l'administraton en France," *Revue française de science politique*, VII (Paris, July–September, 1957), 573–593.

[20] See *ibid.*, 584 ff. and Beer, *op. cit.*, 6.

ing the regulated individuals represented when, in theory, they are supposed to be, results in considerable difficulty for the bureaucrats.

What is one to say about this kind of group representation? In one or two areas, notably the Interministerial Committee on Prices, administrative bias in favor of the industrial representatives and their organizations has been so blatant as to result in the refusal of trade union and other group representatives to attend meetings. However, we have found this to be a glaring exception. For most of the other committees, we found each group represented articulating the view that the other groups were unduly advantaged, that the administrators were playing favorites, that it was really a hopeless task to try to deal rationally with the Italian bureaucracy.

This suggests that, perhaps, no group is dominant. It also indicates that corporative representation cuts two ways for the interest groups. On the one hand, they have ready access to the agencies and they can make their demands heard. They also have inside information that permits them to handle more readily and expertly than unrepresented groups administrative matters that concern or affect them. On the other hand, the fact that they accept representation means that they share part of the responsibility for the policies that evolve. According to most respondents, such representation generally results in making of more moderate demands than might otherwise be the case. In several instances we find that the group representatives to some of these committees are under great cross pressure and that, often, they tend to side with the administrative agency against their own groups!

This leads me to emphasize what may, perhaps, be well known to all who have looked in on pressure group behavior in administrative settings, and that is that administrative officials are anything but passive actors in the so-called group process. Instead, we often find them competing with group representatives in order to press a point of view that is unsupported by any of the formal groups that interact with the agency.

At times these bureaucrats reveal an amazing capacity for manipulation. For example, one of the officials in the Ministry of Industry has close personal relationships with several of *Confindustria's* leaders. During his interview, he indicated that not a day goes by without his talking with his contacts in *Confindustria* and with officials of the trade or industrial associations that relate to the activities of his division. He added that he never makes a major decision without consulting with representatives of these organizations. Yet, when probed about these contacts, it became apparent that the administrator was engaged in this activity as a means of getting commitments to his policies or, as he put it, as a means of preventing the groups from causing trouble later. When we interviewed the group of representatives about their relations with the agency, they described the public official as a "very difficult" person to deal with but also as someone who knew what he was doing and who generally "got things done."

This story could be repeated for most of the administrators who were interviewed in our study. The fact that the bureaucrats speak the same language as do the group representatives, that they may have the same kinds of university degrees and come from the same social stratum of the society seems not to justify the conclusion that the administrators are prey to the demands of special interests.

I am not trying to force the judgment here that Italian administrative agencies are invulnerable to the pressures of special interests. Our study will spotlight, for example, many of the structural weaknesses of Italian bureaucracy which tend to make the administrators overly dependent on some of their clientele groups. The almost complete lack of research facilities and activities in the ministries is one of these structural shortcomings. Administrators frequently complain that they must rely for statistical and other information on which policy must be based on the research activities of the unions, *Confindustria* or Catholic Action. Even when the memoranda containing research "findings" are suspect, the administrators often have no way of demonstrating this. At best, and this is a very limited practice in the ministries we observed, the bureaucrat might go out of his way to solicit other memoranda from groups that clearly compete with the organizations from which their statistical and other technical data usually come. The thing that struck me was that administrators complained, almost to a man, about this dependence.

III

Much of what we have found fits not so much the interest group "theory" of politics as it does the kind of propositions about organizational behavior that have been expounded by Simon, Selznick and others. To be sure, there are points at which elements of interest group "theory" writ large enter the writings of Simon. However, much value would seem to lie with a research focus that is institutionally circumscribed and which seeks to delineate, or at least to outline, the major behavioral contours that are likely to be associated with the institution or organization itself. Thus, when examining bureaucracy and bureaucratic behavior there is no need for following the proclivities, say, of the neo-Bentlians who would make the bureaucracy an arena for group conflict and the bureaucrat a mere pawn in the "process of government." One can conceptualize about characteristics regarding *all* large-scale organizations insofar as they must reach decisions and implement them, without regard to whether the actors in them are the objects of interest group strategies.

Our data clearly point up the fact that a person who enters a bureaucratic agency is to some degree socialized by it; that is, he takes on some of the values of the administrative agency itself. This identification with his agency, as well as the ideal requirements of the role he occupies, will in some measure curb what might otherwise be a tendency to become an instrument of interest group desires and manipulations.

The bureaucrat also tends to develop certain skills that permit him in turn to manipulate the interest groups, and to play them off against each other for his own purposes. It is for this reason that administrators often welcome group clienteles and, where such do not exist, will seek to create them.[21]

Understanding this, the general interest group "theorists" will observe that, in these instances, the administrative agencies are not merely arenas but an integral part of the battle; the administrators, not merely mediators but participants (in interest group terms) in the struggle to have one's own values or views predominate. But we need not posit the bureaucracy, or any single unit or individual within it, as a competing interest group in order to recognize and explicate the bureaucrat's role in the governmental process. Certainly we could do more research than we have in the direction of exploring the possibility of the highly individualized art of administrative decision-making.[22] Such research is doomed to foredrawn conclusions, however, if our conceptual apparatus makes even the suspicion of such behavior unthinkable and the holder of such a view appear to be hopelessly naive.

In our field interviews, I was impressed by the frequency with which the bureaucrats interviewed sought to explain their policy positions or behavior in terms of a "national interest" or a "general welfare." To be sure, such responses were never accepted at face value, but in many instances (too many to ascribe merely to a chance factor) probing failed to turn up the reference or other group interests that the administrators were serving in the name of a mythical interest. This failure raises for us, as as it has for others who have studied the administrative process, perplexing questions not simply about administrative behavior but about the concept of the "public interest," its meaning, its role and its susceptibility to empirical analysis.[23]

[21] See H. Simon, D. Smithburg and V. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York, 1950), pp. 461–465, and H. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York, 1947), Ch. 10.

[22] Alfred DeGrazia attacks the "individual behavior" notions of political science, sociology and social-psychology in his "Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups," *Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, CCCIXX (September, 1958), 113–122, especially pp. 113–117. Although DeGrazia rejects simplistic group theory, his comments about groups are essentially Bentlian. The second part of this article contains some extremely provocative comments on democracy, old and new.

Another important source worth consulting on this point is Norton E. Long, "Public Policy and Administration: The Goals of Rationality and Responsibility," *Public Administration Review*, XIV (Winter, 1954), 22–31, especially pp. 25–30.

[23] On the problem of "the public interest" in administrative decision-making, the reader should consult the article by my colleague, Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., " 'The Public Interest' in Administrative Decision-Making: Theorem, Theosophy or Theory?" *American Political Science Review*, LI (June, 1957), 346–368. Schubert reviews both

One way out of difficulties such as this is to speak of the administrator as using the "community," the consumer, his fellow administrators, or all those living or dead with whom he feels allied as a reference group. I am increasingly suspicious of such convenient escape hatches. Procedures such as this loom not so much as scientific insights but as self-fulfilling prophesies — or as the kind of cynicism that I touched on earlier. They also point up once more the possibility that simplistic interest group "theory," in seeking to account for all political behavior may not be useful in providing satisfactory explanations for any political behavior in particular. It is to the latter that the field researcher's attention must be directed, and, for the time being at least, only limited propositions about groups appear to have any utility at all.

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critically and caustically various abortive attempts to define the concept operationally. He also notes "the bland optimism" with which some writers "contemplate the impact of the group struggle upon public policy." Although he, too, seems committed to the idea that decision-making is epitomized by governmental accommodation of conflicting interests, his model of "administrative due process" would seek to account for administrative behavior that cannot be explicated by simplistic group "theory."

7

Research Methods in the Study of Political Behavior

The search for a probable theory is the fundamental activity of the research scientist, who identifies a theory as probable if the hypotheses it suggests are consistent with one another and not contradicted by evidence. To test a hypothesis the researcher verifies it by evaluating the likelihood that recorded facts or observations are accounted for or predicted by it.

Verification poses intricate problems, however, as this essay and the selections in this chapter will suggest. To cope with these, to avoid error and prevent spending time and energy in work that may prove meaningless, the procedures used in collecting and evaluating evidence should be considered systematically at every step along the path toward a probable theory.

Highly rational and elegant methods and techniques, unfortunately, may prove sterile; they may yield trivial results. Sophisticated methods do not guarantee the achievement of a probable theory. An irrelevant or insignificant hypothesis, moreover, remains of little value whether it is well or badly tested. The requirements of scientific research call for good hypotheses, that is, propositions that are pertinent to theory and that may be verified, as well as for effective methods and techniques of verification.

Methods are more than procedures used to verify hypotheses. The nature of evidence and the problem of knowledge are themselves issues that bear on theory and, as such, the study of methods embraces more than prescriptions about how to test hypotheses. Methods and techniques also influence the choice of propositions to be studied, for some ideas are more amenable to verification than others. The methodological maturity of a science affects the character of its theories and its choice of problems.

The political behaviorist maintains that, if he learns how to ask the right questions about political events, he can formulate principles which explain how events

occur. Properly interpreted, the right questions constitute testable hypotheses. So great are the difficulties of verification, however, that answers to such questions are seldom sought directly. Just as strategies (such as systems of logic) exist for evaluating the consistency of elements within a theory, so strategies have been devised for transforming theoretical propositions into testable or working hypotheses.

Suppose for example that we want to verify this hypothesis: Elections in a two-party system are likely to be decided by the votes of a set of people who are less consistently partisan for either party than the majority of voters. Before designing a study to verify this proposition, we may translate the concepts into operational definitions; that is, into terms that refer to measurements or enumerations. The key concept of "less consistently partisan voters," for instance, might be defined operationally as voters who report in a panel survey during an election campaign that they are independent, or who report a change in party loyalty prior to voting.

There are immediate difficulties in this illustration, as there are in most operational definitions. We need to know, among other things, whether the new definition is valid; whether we use it in practice so that it corresponds exactly to the concept of "less consistently partisan voters." We also need to know whether the definition will direct us toward reliable, that is, unambiguous data. In this example, the operational definition neglects intensity of party loyalty among nonindependent voters, a matter of importance in locating the less consistently partisan voters. And, reliability here depends on the exactness with which survey interviewers can elicit party affiliations. In any case, if this operational definition were used, the working hypothesis might read: Elections in a two-party system are likely to be decided by the votes of independents and party switchers rather than by party regulars.

In preparing to verify a working hypothesis, the researcher chooses among a variety of means by which to make his test. These means depend for quality upon standards — commonly agreed-upon canons of evidence — against which the researcher accepts or rejects his hypothesis. The means used to verify hypotheses are the most important part of the *design* of the investigation. Perhaps because of the influence of the physical sciences and psychology, "design" is often mistaken for the performance of laboratory experiments. In fact, design refers to any aspect of the organization of research that provides a basis for making inferences about the probability of the hypothesis being correct.

One strategy used in designing research is to formulate a testable *null hypothesis* that may be rejected with a high degree of confidence. Null means of no effect, consequence or significance. By casting his hypothesis in null form, the researcher tests whether his working hypothesis is *not* supported by his evidence. This strategy is extremely useful, for, strictly speaking, a working hypothesis cannot be proved. Even powerful evidence that the hypothesis predicts events correctly may be contradicted by equally powerful evidence obtained later. Or, a different hypothesis — an alternative explanation — may predict the same events equally well. The null hypothesis, however, is a proposition that may be disproved with high certainty, in which case, if the research is well designed, the working hypothesis may be accepted as a likely alternative.

The null hypothesis in the case of the hypothesis about the effect of less con-

sistently partisan voters, for example, might read: The votes of independents and party switchers, when compared with the votes of party regulars, have no effect on elections in a two-party system. Unless special provisions were made in the research design, evidence that disproved this null hypothesis would not verify the working hypothesis. But disproof of the null would at least let one assert that the working hypothesis is not known to be false. We spoke above of rejecting the null with a high degree of confidence. In statistical analysis, this means a test that specifies the probability that the null hypothesis is in fact true (or might be observed to hold true) if repeated tests were made.

A second strategy used in designing empirical research involves eliminating or controlling alternative explanations. Experimental designs, for example, rule out alternatives in advance by direct manipulation of the causal or independent factor; that is, by "producing" the hypothesized cause and by randomizing other factors. As illustration, take the experiment in voting turnout and attitude change conducted in three Ann Arbor, Michigan, wards in 1953.[1]

The hypothesis was that personal contact was more influential than mail propaganda in stimulating attitude change and voter turnout on a particular local issue of municipal reform. Three groups of voters, whose previous attitudes on the issue were known from an earlier survey, were chosen. One group was exposed to mail propaganda, another to personal interview, and a third to no communication. Individuals in each group were voters whose previous attitudes on the reform issue were known from an earlier survey. They were assigned at random to the three groups. After the vote, the groups were again surveyed to determine how they had voted.

Here, stimuli were introduced in two groups and withheld in a third. This design and random placement of voters into the groups, introduced control over the comparative influence of mail and personal interview. The investigators gained confidence that the groups were similar in all respects except one — exposure to the stimulus they introduced. They could thus be fairly confident that any difference between the control group (no communication) and the experimental groups was due to the experimental stimuli. More complicated experimental designs insure even tighter control and make possible the testing of several hypotheses in the same experiment. (Incidentally, personal interviews "proved" to be far more influential).

The possibilities for employment of experimental designs in political research are sharply limited. For one thing, it is hard to select people at random outside the laboratory or the testing situation. This is particularly true if the influence being produced is a powerful one, as strong moral sentiments are inevitably involved. Theodore Newcomb remarks about such sentiments: "To assume that these are freely exploitable is . . . as unreasonable as for a surgeon to accost a healthy man with the request, 'Pardon me, sir, may I rip open your abdomen in the interests of science?' "[2]

[1] Samuel J. Eldersveld and Richard W. Dodge, "Personal Contact or Mail Propaganda?" pp. 532–543 in Daniel Katz, *et al.*, eds., *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York: Dryden, 1954).

[2] "The Interdependence of Social-Psychological Theory and Methods," in Leon Festinger, *et al.*, eds., *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: Dryden, 1953), p. 4.

Thomas Schelling's paper in this chapter suggests, however, some of the ways real political processes may be *simulated* experimentally. In another paper, Schelling has commented:

> The writer is not suggesting that limited war can be simulated in the laboratory or that experimental results regarding the limiting process can be directly transferred to the outside world. Experiments of this kind would come under the heading of 'basic research.' . . . The probability that the results . . . would find ready application, however, is enhanced by the observation that much current theorizing . . . seems itself to be based on what might be described as implicit experimental games played introspectively.[3]

The papers by Rufus Browning, Harold Guetzkow, and Bernard Cohen have been included in this section because they amplify Schelling's comment about the potentialities of simulation. One advantage of simulation is that, as the term suggests, events and processes that resemble reality may be played with in the classroom, the social psychological laboratory, and via the high speed computer. If imaginary data are used, the methodological advantage is twofold: economy, in that costly or hard-to-secure evidence is replaced by hypothetical information; and efficiency, in that the relations between hypotheses and between assumptions within a theory may be assessed. Browning's paper describes computer programs such as Coleman's and Waldorf's that enable the researcher to evaluate the fit between real data and predictions from theoretical models. The instructional possibilities of simulation discussed by Guetzkow are qualified by Cohen's sympathetic critique.

Experimental designs, simulated or real, are but one way of eliminating alternative explanations. Many statistical procedures are available for this purpose, too. In survey research, a hypothesis about association between party loyalty and social class can be tested by successive refinement. If measures of party loyalty and class are found to be associated, a series of third factors such as sex, age, region of residence, and so on may be introduced to determine whether the association tends to hold regardless of secondary or alternative influences.

A good example of refinement is provided in Douglas Price's paper in this section. Using scales based on Senate voting patterns, Price shows that party affiliation predicts patterns of voting on selected issues. To assess the strength of this association, Price introduces the third factor of geographic region. He finds that on some issues but not others, differences in party affiliation continue to predict patterns of voting when region (north versus south) is taken into account.

Two strategies characteristic of good research design — use of the null hypothesis with an established level of confidence for its rejection, and devices for eliminating or controlling alternative hypotheses — have been discussed. A third, more general stratagem consists of evaluating the fit between empirical evidence and the findings predicted by a working hypothesis. The null hypothesis may have been rejected, and alternatives controlled; yet the pattern of findings may not correspond closely to the pattern predicted by the hypothesis. Here, the challenge to research is to estimate whether the empirical test has supplied *positive* support for the theory.

The quality of a study designed to test a hypothesis depends in part on the

[3] *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1960), pp. 166–7.

precision of the measures that are used. Measurements are symbols, such as numbers or categories, to which objects or events are assigned. As we suggested in discussing operational definitions, to translate a proposition into a working hypothesis is to define terms in such a way that the events or attributes they signify may be measured. Where exact measurement is possible, the prospect of making a superior test of a hypothesis is increased.

Measures range in exactness. Some merely make symbolic distinctions between more and less or black and white; others designate the relative magnitude of events and attributes. Symbolic distinctions are called nominal scales in the argot of measurement. In political research, nominal scales or categories are extremely common, whether the problem at hand concerns party membership, attributes of political leaders, or the social requisites of different types of political systems. Ordinal or rank scales that designate relative positions of "greater than" are less common but more valuable because they are more precise. Examples include measures of social and economic status based on level of education and occupation, and measures of intensity of individual political concern or participation. More exact measures, or ones that define the distance between points or positions, are termed interval scales. These are sometimes developed for studies of political attitudes. Ratio scales, or measures that define the distance between points and provide an absolute baseline or zero point as well, are extremely rare in political research. The capacity of any measure depends as much upon its content, however, as upon form. Technically impressive scales may be built from empirical observations, yet lack relevance to theory and validity in relation to the working hypothesis.

In his review of studies of community power, Raymond Wolfinger attacks a technique frequently used to measure power — the reputational or power-attribution procedure, through which power is assumed to be in the hands of individuals because they were named as powerful by others in a given community. He considers the criteria for making nominations ambiguous and unstable. The probability that leadership is specialized around influence over different domains of decision is neglected in this procedure. Wolfinger identifies sources of inaccuracy and questions the relevance of the technique for investigating "the interesting questions about politics," which he sees as "the dynamics of policy making." Findings based on reputation for power, he warns, often lead to "static, reified rankings of individuals whose demographic classification is a poor substitute for analysis of goals, strategies . . . and similar questions." Thus, Wolfinger applies critically some of the criteria discussed here which can be used to evaluate a method of data collection.

Wolfinger's critique should not, however, be taken to invalidate the interview as a perfectly sensible method in political research. Alexander Heard's report, "Interviewing Southern Politicians," summarizes the many data collection procedures, including interviews, employed in preparing a classic report on southern politics. The design of the research is implied in Heard's statement, "The interviews supplemented the customary research materials." Other types of data — election returns, poll tax figures, constitutions and the like — constituted the primary evidence for the testing of hypotheses. Interviews were used to gather "an accurate narrative of major political events," to gain insight into political tactics, and the attitudes of individual politicians, to verify how operational codes were applied in practice as

well as the actual extent of their application, and to obtain clues which led to the formulation of hypotheses.

The interview does not constitute a research method. When it is substituted for the design of a study, hypotheses may be generated but conclusions will remain equivocal. Sometimes the interview occupies a more central place as a project's primary instrument of data collection. Had this been the case in Heard's research, the problems of standardizing the interviews and of assessing their reliability and validity would have taken on greater importance. As devices for gathering supplementary information, the procedures described by Heard are outstanding examples of field research.

Daniel Lerner's report on his perceptive approach to interviewing Frenchmen is included in this section as representative of the standardized interview as opposed to the nonstandardized approach represented by Heard. The differences between the two are, perhaps, obvious. On one hand, the researcher is looking for information about events external to the respondent. He asks people whatever questions he thinks they can answer, and different questions of different people. In the standardized interview, the researcher is looking for information about the respondents themselves; their attitudes, values, activities, and so on, not about events which they may by chance have witnessed. In such interviews, it is necessary to take certain precautions. We must know in some detail how the respondents came to be selected, how well they represent the population they are supposed to represent, whether the questions put to them are arranged in a way that will bias the results of the inquiry, and so forth. Lerner was in this case especially ingenious in creating a situation where rapport between the interviewer and respondent was high. He suggests that with this particular population, alternative approaches using the standardized interview might well have failed. It is possible to infer from this the comparative difficulty of the two approaches. On the whole, nonstandardized interviewing is much less difficult, especially with relatively well informed respondents. But, for reliable results it also demands well-trained interviewers. Obviously, for many purposes, only the standardized interview will do.

What is collected as evidence must be amenable to analysis. Data that cannot be translated into measures may have value for generating hypotheses. They seldom allow testing of propositions. Karl Deutsch's paper, "Shifts in the Balance of Communication Flows," addresses the dual problems of collection and measurement. He asks, "What kinds of communications can we measure in international relations, and what can we measure about them?"

This article is compressed so that hypotheses are only pointed at in passing, but Deutsch shows how indices may be developed from descriptive statistics already gathered by official agencies. Such indicators may be used to test differences "between certain levels of communication among communities or states that are more or less integrated" politically. They may serve as data to test "the extent to which some particular human activity, such as science, is 'international' or 'national,' and in what direction, if any, it may be changing." Other possibilities for application are suggested.

Douglas Price's paper, "Are Southern Democrats Different?" extends our understanding of techniques of measurement in political research and their pertinence

for improving the quality of analysis. Where Deutsch is interested in exploiting existing enumerative statistics, Price concerns himself with transforming qualitative information — how senators voted on selected issues — into ordinal (rank) measures.

Guttman scale analysis helps determine whether the characteristic being studied (defined by Guttman as a universe of attributes) actually involves only a single dimension. In Price's application, one universe of content is the votes of senators for or against rent control. Votes on eleven issues, he discovered, provided a nearly perfect cumulative scale of degree of pro-control sentiment reflected by ninety-five senators.

Once differences in degree of "control" of sentiment among senators are measured, Price is able to use his measure to compare patterns of voting among Southern and non-Southern Democratic senators. He finds the differences on the rent issue between these factions "even more striking than that between members of the major parties." Price developed fifty-six "acceptable" Guttman scales of Senate voting patterns in his research. Once developed, such measures are capable of testing not only differences in regional factions but, as Price demonstrates, much more detailed questions about coalitions among senators. The scales enable the researcher to answer quite precisely questions related to the problem of who votes with whom.

Sidney Ulmer's paper, "The Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme Court," also emphasizes the analytical precision that is gained when hypotheses are tested by rigorous techniques. Much political and social research at present is limited evidence collected at only one point in time. With "one-shot" or cross-sectional data, the researcher cannot be very confident that his findings reflect repeated behavior, nor can he isolate determinants of political behavior. Research involving repeated measurement is essential if confidence in our predictions is to be achieved. In his analysis of the repeated behavior of justices, Ulmer combines repetitive with cross-sectional materials, and employs statistical controls to eliminate alternative hypotheses.

For example, Ulmer's simplified form of factor analysis for identifying "blocs" of justices rests on his choice of a homogeneous sample of cases; here, the civil liberty cases for 1958. As another illustration, his Guttman scale analysis enables him to measure the internal consistency of judicial responses toward alleged violations of civil liberties. Ulmer first uses the scale to assess the validity and reliability of his definition of "patterned judicial decisions." Then he is able to locate particular justices at points along the scale.

The technical sophistication of Ulmer's analysis is paralleled in this section by Phillips Cutright's and Peter Rossi's study analyzing the first evidence ever obtained in a systematic manner on the effects of local party organization on voting behavior. The main hypothesis verified by Cutright and Rossi had been asserted earlier on the basis of educated guesses about the condition of local party structures and from casually looking over election returns. Cutright and Rossi employ election returns as a measure of the relative strength of party organizations and achieve a scale amenable to manipulation by a complex statistical technique known as multiple regression analysis.

This chapter reflects the tradition of autonomy and eclecticism which characterizes modern political research. We have tried to emphasize common standards of excellence in such matters as how hypotheses are formed, how studies are designed, what constitutes evidence, and how to interpret facts. The author of each paper, however, has shaped his method and his analysis to fit his unique concern. The standards of methodological excellence which these papers share do not lead to standardization of procedures. Yet the papers in this chapter, diverse and independent though they are, reach beyond simple description. They suggest that the natural history of politics may after all be a prologue to a science of politics.

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BARGAINING, COMMUNICATION, AND LIMITED WAR

• *THOMAS C. SCHELLING*

Limited war requires limits; so do strategic maneuvers if they are to be stabilized short of war. But limits require agreement or at least some kind of mutual recognition and acquiescence. And agreement on limits is difficult to reach, not only because of the uncertainties and the acute divergence of interests but because negotiation is severely inhibited both during war and before it begins and because communication becomes difficult between adversaries in time of war. Furthermore, it may seem to the advantage of one side to avoid agreement on limits, in order to enhance the other's fear of war; or one side or both may fear that even a show of willingness to negotiate will be interpreted as excessive eagerness.

The study of tacit bargaining — bargaining in which communication is incomplete or impossible — assumes importance, therefore, in connection with limited war, or, for that matter, with limited competition, jurisdictional maneuvers, jockeying in a traffic jam, or getting along with a neighbor that one does not speak to. The problem is to develop a modus vivendi when one or both parties either cannot or will not negotiate explicitly or when neither would trust the other with respect to any agreement explicitly reached. The present paper will examine some of the concepts and principles that seem to underlie tacit bargaining and will attempt to draw a few illustrative conclusions about the problem of limited war or analogous situations. It will also suggest that these same principles may often provide a powerful clue to understanding even the logically dissimilar case of explicit bargaining with full communication and enforcement.

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The most interesting situations and the most important are those in which there is a conflict of interest between the parties involved. But it is instructive to begin with the special simplified case in which two or more parties have identical interests and face the problem not of reconciling interests but only of co-ordinating their actions for their mutual benefit, when communication is impossible. This special case brings out clearly the principle that will then serve to solve the problem of tacit "bargaining" over conflicting preferences.

TACIT CO-ORDINATION (COMMON INTERESTS)

When a man loses his wife in a department store without any prior understanding on where to meet if they get separated, the chances are good that they will find each other. It is likely that each will think of some obvious place to meet, so obvious that each will be sure that the other is sure that it is "obvious" to both of them. One does not simply predict where the other will go, since the other will go where he

predicts the first to go, which is wherever the first predicts the second to predict the first to go, and so ad infinitum. Not "What would I do if I were she?" but "What would I do if I were she wondering what she would do if she were I wondering what I would do if I were she . . . ?" What is necessary is to co-ordinate predictions, to read the same message in the common situation, to identify the one course of action that their expectations of each other can converge on. They must "mutually recognize" some unique signal that co-ordinates their expectations of each other. We cannot be sure they will meet, nor would all couples read the same signal; but the chances are certainly a great deal better than if they pursued a random course of search.



FIGURE 1

The reader may try the problem himself with the adjoining map (Fig. 1). Two people parachute unexpectedly into the area shown, each with a map and knowing the other has one, but neither knowing where the other has dropped or able to communicate directly. They must get together quickly to be rescued. Can they study their maps and "co-ordinate" their behavior? Does the map suggest some particular meeting place so unambiguously that each will be confident that the other reads the same suggestion with confidence?

The writer has tried this and other analogous problems on an unscientific sample of respondents; and the conclusion is that people often can co-ordinate. The following abstract puzzles are typical of those that can be "solved" by a substantial proportion of those who try. The solutions are, of course, arbitrary to this extent: any solution is "correct" if enough people think so. The reader may wish to confirm his ability to concert in the following problems with those whose scores are given in a footnote.[1]

1. Name "heads" or "tails." If you and your partner name the same, you both win a prize.

2. Circle one of the numbers listed in the line below. You win if you all succeed in circling the same number.

7 100 13 261 99 555

3. Put a check mark in one of the sixteen squares. You win if you all succeed in checking the same square.



4. You are to meet somebody in New York City. You have not been instructed where to meet; you have no prior understanding with the

[1] In the writer's sample, 36 persons concerted on "heads" in problem 1, and only 6 chose "tails." In problem 2, the first three numbers were given 37 votes out of a total of 41; the number 7 led 100 by a slight margin, with 13 in third place. The upper left corner in problem 3 received 24 votes out of a total of 41, and all but 3 of the remainder were distributed in the same diagonal line. Problem 4, which may reflect the location of the sample in New Haven, Connecticut, showed an absolute majority managing to get together at Grand Central Station (information booth), and virtually all of them succeeded in meeting at 12 noon. Problem 6 showed a variety of answers, but two-fifths of all persons succeeded in concerting on the number 1; and in problem 7, out of 41 people, 12 got together on $1,000,000 and only 3 entries consisted of numbers that were not a power of 10; of those 3, 2 were $64 and, in the more up-to-date version, $64,000! Problem 8 caused no difficulty to 36 out of 41, who split the total fifty-fifty. Problem 9 secured a majority of 20 out of 22 for Robinson. An alternative formulation of it, in which Jones and Robinson were tied on the first ballot at 28 votes each, was intended by the author to demonstrate the difficulty of concerting in case of tie; but the respondents surmounted the difficulty and gave

person on where to meet; and you cannot communicate with each other. You are simply told that you will have to guess where to meet and that he is being told the same thing and that you will just have to try to make your guesses coincide.

5. You were told the date but not the hour of the meeting in No. 4; the two of you must guess the exact minute of the day for meeting. At what time will you appear at the meeting place that you elected in No. 4?

6. Write some positive number. If you all write the same number, you win.

7. Name an amount of money. If you all name the same amount, you can have as much as you named.

8. You are to divide $100 into two piles, labeled A and B. Your partner is to divide another $100 into two piles labeled A and B. If you allot the same amounts to A and B, respectively, that your partner does, each of you gets $100; if your amounts differ from his, neither of you gets anything.

9. On the first ballot, candidates polled as follows:

Smith	19	Robinson	29
Jones	28	White	9
Brown	15		

The second ballot is about to be taken. You have no interest in the outcome, except that you will be rewarded if someone gets a majority on the second ballot and you vote for the one who does. Similarly, all voters are interested only in voting with the majority, and everybody knows that this is everybody's interest. For whom do you vote on the second ballot?

These problems are artificial, but they illustrate the point. People *can* often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows that the other is trying to do the same. Most situations — perhaps every situation for people who are practiced at this kind of game — provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point for each person's expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do. Finding the key, or rather finding *a* key — any key that is mutually recognized as the key becomes *the* key — may depend on imagination more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric configuration, casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and what they know about each other. Whimsy may send the man and his wife to the "lost and found"; or logic may lead each to reflect and to expect the other to reflect on where they would have agreed to meet if they had had a prior agreement to cover the contingency. It is not being asserted that they will always find an obvious answer to the question; but the chances of their doing so are ever so much greater than the bare logic of abstract random probabilities would ever suggest.

A prime characteristic of most of these "solutions" to the problems, i.e., of the clues or co-ordinators or focal points, is some kind of prominence or conspicuousness. But it is a prominence that depends on time and place and who the people are. Ordinary folk lost on a plane circular area may naturally go to the center to meet each other; but only one versed in mathematics would "naturally" expect to meet his partner at the center of gravity of an irregularly shaped area. Equally essentially is some kind of uniqueness; the man and his wife cannot meet at the "lost and found" if the store has several. The writer's experiments with alternative maps indicated clearly that a map with many houses and a single crossroads sends people to the crossroads, while one with many crossroads and a single house sends most of them to the house. Partly this may reflect only that uniqueness conveys prominence; but it may be more important that uniqueness avoids ambiguousness. Houses may be intrinsically more prominent than anything else on the map; but if there are three of them, none more prominent than the others, there is but one chance in three of meeting at a house, and the recognition of this fact may lead to the rejection of houses as the "clue."[2]

Jones 16 out of 18 votes (apparently on the basis of Jones's earlier position on the list), proving the main point but overwhelming the subsidiary point in the process. In the map most nearly like the one reproduced here (Fig. 1), 7 out of 8 respondents managed to meet at the bridge. These and other results of the experiment and the results of subsequent tests will be analyzed more fully in this *Journal* in a later article.

[2] That this would be "correct" reasoning, incidentally, is suggested by one of the author's map experiments. On a map with a single house and many crossroads, the eleven people who chose the

But in the final analysis we are dealing with imagination as much as with logic; and the logic itself is of a fairly casuistic kind. Poets may do better than logicians at this game, which is perhaps more like "puns and anagrams" than like chess. Logic helps — the large plurality accorded to the number 1 in problem 6 seems to rest on logic — but usually not until imagination has selected some clue to work on from among the concrete details of the situation.

Tacit Bargaining (Divergent Interests)

A conflict of interest enters our problem if the parachutists dislike walking. With communication, which is not allowed in our problem, they would have argued or bargained over where to meet, each favoring a spot close to himself or a resting place particularly to his liking. In the absence of communication, their overriding interest is to concert ideas; and if a particular spot commands attention as the "obvious" place to meet, the winner of the bargain is simply the one who happens to be closer to it. Even if the one who is farthest from the focal point knows that he is, he cannot withhold his acquiescence and argue for a fairer division of the walking; the "proposal" for the bargain that is provided by the map itself — if, in fact, it provides one — is the only extant offer; and, without communication, there is no counterproposal that can be made. The conflict gets reconciled — or perhaps we should say ignored — as a by-product of the dominant need for co-ordination.

"Win" and "lose" may not be quite accurate, since both may lose by comparison with what they could have agreed on through communication. If the two are actually close together and far from the lone house on the map, they might have eliminated the long walk to the house if they could have identified their locations and concerted explicitly on a place to meet between them. Or it may be that one "wins" while the other loses more than the first wins: if both are on the same side of the house and walk to it, they walk together a greater distance than they needed to, but the closer one may still have come off better than if he had had to argue it out with the other.

This last case illustrates that it may be to the advantage of one to be unable to communicate. There is room here for a motive to destroy communication or to refuse to collaborate in advance on a method of meeting if one is aware of his advantage and confident of the "solution" he foresees. In one variant of the writer's test, A knew where B was, but B had no idea where A was (and each knew how much the other knew). Most of the recipients of the B-type questionnaire smugly sat tight, enjoying their ignorance, while virtually all the A-questionnaire respondents grimly acknowledged the inevitable and walked all the way to B. Better still may be to have the power to send but not to receive messages: if one can announce his position and state that his transmitter works but not his receiver, saying that he will wait where he is until the other arrives, the latter has no choice. He can make no effective counteroffer, since no counteroffer could be heard.[3]

The writer has tried a sample of conflicting-interest games on a number of people, including games that are biased in favor of one party or the other; and, on the whole, the outcome suggests the same conclusion that was reached in the purely co-operative games. All these games require co-ordination; they also, however, provide several alternative choices over which the two parties' interests differ. Yet, among all the available options, some particular one usually seems to be the focal point for co-ordinated choice, and the party to whom it is a relatively unfavorable choice quite often takes it simply because he knows that the other will expect him to. The choices that cannot co-ordinate expectations are not really "available" without communication. The odd characteristic of all these games is that neither rival can gain by outsmarting the other. Each loses unless he does exactly what the other expects him to do. Each party is the prisoner or the beneficiary of their mutual expectations; no one can disavow his own expectation of what the other will expect him to expect to be ex-

house all met, while the four who chose crossroads all chose different crossroads and did not even meet one another.

[3] This is an instance of the general paradox that what is impotence by ordinary standards may, in bargaining, be a source of "strength." The general principle is illustrated at length in a previous article (3).

pected to do. The need for agreement overrules the potential disagreement, and each must concert with the other or lose altogether. Some of these games are arrived at by slightly changing the problems given earlier, as we did for the map problem by supposing that walking is onerous.

1. A and B are to choose "heads" or "tails" without communicating. If both choose "heads," A gets $3 and B gets $2; if both choose "tails," A gets $2 and B gets $3. If they choose differently, neither gets anything. You are A (or B); which do you choose? (Note that if both choose at random, there is only a 50-50 chance of successful coincidence and an expected value of $1.25 apiece — less than either $3 or $2.)

2. You and your two partners (or rivals) each have one of the letters A, B, and C. Each of you is to write these three letters, A, B, and C, in any order. If the order is the same on all three of your lists, you get prizes totaling $6, of which $3 goes to the one whose letter is first on all three lists, $2 to the one whose letter is second, and $1 to the person whose letter is third. If the letters are not in identical order on all three lists, none of you gets anything. Your letter is A (or B, or C); write here the three letters in the order you choose:

_____, _____, _____.

3. You and your partner (rival) are each given a piece of paper, one blank and the other with an "X" written on it. The one who gets the "X" has the choice of leaving it alone or erasing it; the one who gets the blank sheet has the choice of leaving it blank or writing an "X" on it. If, when you have made your choices without communicating, there is an "X" on only one of the sheets, the holder of the "X" gets $3 and the holder of the blank sheet gets $2. If both sheets have "X's" or both sheets are blank, neither gets anything. Your sheet of paper has the original "X" on it; do you leave it alone or erase it? (*Alternate:* your sheet of paper is the blank one; do you leave it blank or write an "X"?)

4. You and your partner (rival) are to be given $100 if you can agree on how to divide it without communicating. Each of you is to write the amount of his claim on a sheet of paper; and if the two claims add to no more than $100, each gets exactly what he claimed. If the two claims exceed $100, neither of you gets anything. How much do you claim? $_____.

5. You and your partner are each to pick one of the five letters, K, G, W, L, or R. If you pick the same letter, you get prizes; if you pick different letters, you get nothing. The prizes you get depend on the letter you both pick; but the prizes are not the same for each of you, and the letter that would yield you the highest prize may or may not be his most profitable letter. For you the prizes would be as follows:

K	$4	L	$2
G	$3	R	$5
W	$1		

You have no idea what his schedule of prizes looks like. You begin by proposing to him the letter R, that being your best letter. Before he can reply, the master-of-ceremonies intervenes to say that you were not supposed to communicate and that any further communication will disqualify you both. You must simply write down one of the letters, hoping that the other chooses the same letter. Which letter do you choose? (Alternate formulation shows schedule of K—$3, G—$1, W—$4, L—$5, R—$2, and has the "other" party make an initial proposal of the letter R before communication is cut off.)

6. Two opposing forces are at the points marked *X* and *Y* in a map similar to the one in Figure 1. The commander of each force wishes to occupy as much of the area as he can and knows the other does too. But each commander wishes to avoid an armed clash and knows the other does too. Each must send forth his troops with orders to take up a designated line and to fight if opposed. Once the troops are dispatched, the outcome depends only on the lines that the two commanders have ordered their troops to occupy. If the lines overlap, the troops will be assumed to meet and fight, to the disadvantage of both sides. If the troops take up positions that leave any appreciable space unoccupied between them, the situation will be assumed "unstable" and a clash inevitable. Only if the troops are ordered to occupy identical lines or lines that leave virtually no unoccupied space between

them will a clash be avoided. In that case, each side obtains successfully the area it occupies, the advantage going to the side that has the most valuable area in terms of land and facilities. You command the forces located at the point marked *X* (*Y*). Draw on the map the line that you send your troops to occupy.

7. A and B have incomes of $100 and $150 per year, respectively. They are notified of each other's income and told that they must begin paying taxes totaling $25 per year. If they can reach agreement on shares of this total, they may share the annual tax bill in whatever manner they agree on. But they must reach agreement without communication; each is to write down the share he proposes to pay, and if the shares total $25 or more, each will pay exactly what he proposed. If the proposed shares fail to add up to $25, however, each will individually be required to pay the full $25, and the tax collectors will keep the surplus. You are A (B); how much do you propose to pay? $_____.

8. A loses some money, and B finds it. Under the house rules, A cannot have his money back until he agrees with the finder on a suitable reward, and B cannot keep any except what A agrees to. If no agreement is reached, the money goes to the house. The amount is $16, and A offers $2 as a reward. B refuses, demanding half the money for himself. An argument ensues, and the house intervenes, insisting that each write his claim, once and for all, without further communication. If the claims are consistent with the $16 total, each will receive exactly what he claims; but if together they claim more than $16, the funds will be confiscated by the house. As they sit pondering what claims to write, a well-known and respected mediator enters and offers to help. He cannot, he says, participate in any bargaining, but he can make a "fair" proposal. He approaches A and says, "I think a reasonable division under the circumstances would be a 2-1 split, the original owner getting two-thirds and the finder one-third, perhaps rounded off to $11 and $5, respectively. I shall make the same suggestion to him." Without waiting for any response, he approaches the finder, makes the same suggestion, and says that he made the same suggestion to the original owner. Again without waiting for any response, he departs. You are A (B); what claim do you write?

The outcomes in the writer's informal sample are given in the footnote.[4] In those problems where there is some asymmetry between "you" and "him," i.e., between A and B, the A formulations were matched with the B formulations in deriving the "outcome." The general conclusion, as given in more detail in the footnote, is that the participants can "solve" their problem in a substantial proportion of the cases; they certainly do conspicuously better than any chance methods would have permitted, and even the disadvantaged party in the biased games permits himself to be disciplined by the message that the game provides for their co-ordination.

The "clues" in these games are diverse. Heads apparently beat tails, though not very regularly on the first test, through some kind of conventional priority, similar to the convention that dictates A, B, C, though not nearly

[4] In the first problem, 16 out of 22 A's and 15 out of 22 B's chose heads. Given what the A's did, heads was the best answer for B; given what the B's did, heads was the best answer for A. Together they did substantially better than at random; and, of course, if each had tried to win $3, they would all have scored a perfect zero. Problem 2, however, which is logically similar to 1 but with a more compelling structure, showed 9 out of 12 A's, 10 out of 12 B's, and 14 out of 16 C's, successfully co-ordinating on ABC. (Of the remaining 7, incidentally, 5 discriminated against themselves in departing from alphabetical order, all to no avail.) Problem 3, which is structurally analogous to 1, showed 18 out of 22 A's concerting successfully with 14 out of 19 B's, giving A the $3 prize. In problem 4, 36 out of 40 chose $50. (Two of the remainder were $49 and $49.99.) In problem 5 the letter R won 5 out of 8 votes from those who had proposed it, and 8 out of 9 votes from those who were on the other side. In problem 6, 14 of 22 X's and 14 of 23 Y's drew their boundaries exactly along the river. The "correctness" of this solution is emphatically shown by the fact that the other 15, who eschewed the river, produced 14 different lines. Of 8 × 7 possible pairs among them, there were 55 failures and 1 success. Problem 7 showed 5 out of 6 of those with incomes of $150 and 7 out of 10 of those with incomes of $100 concerting on a 15–10 division of the tax. In problem 8 both those who lost money and those who found it, 8 and 7 persons, respectively, unanimously concerted on the mediator's suggestion of an even $5 reward.

so strong. The original X beats the blank sheet, apparently because the "status quo" is more obvious than change. The letter R wins because there is nothing to contradict the first offer. Roads might seem, in principle, as plausible as rivers, especially since their variety permits a less arbitrary choice. But, precisely because of their variety, the map cannot say *which* road; so roads must be discarded in favor of the unique and unambiguous river. (Perhaps in a symmetrical map of uniform terrain, the outcome would be more akin to the 50-50 split in the $100 example — a diagonal division in half, perhaps — but the irregularity of the map rather precludes a geometrical solution.)

The tax problem illustrates a strong power of suggestion in the income figures. The abstract logic of this problem is identical with that of the $100 division; in fact, it could be reworded as follows: each party pays $25 in taxes, and a refund of $25 is available to be divided among the two parties if they can agree on how to divide it. This formulation is logically equivalent to the one in problem 7, and, as such, it differs from problem 4 only in the amount of $25 instead of $100. Yet the inclusion of income figures, just by suggesting their relevance and making them prominent in the problem, shifts the focal point substantially to a 10-15 split rather than 12.5-12.5. And why, if incomes are relevant, is a perfectly *proportional* tax so obvious, when perhaps there are grounds for graduated rates? The answer must be that no *particular* graduation of rates is so obvious as to go without saying; and, if speech is impossible, by default the uniquely simple and recognizable principle of proportionality has to be adopted. First, the income figures take the initial plausibility away from a 50-50 split; then the simplicity of proportionality makes 10-15 the only one that could possibly be considered capable of tacit recognition. The same principle is displayed by an experiment in which question 7 was deliberately cluttered up with *additional* data — on family size, spending habits, and so on. Here the unique attraction of the income proportionate split apparently became so diluted that the preponderant reply from both the high-income and the low-income respondents was a simple 50-50 division of the tax. The refined signal for the income proportionate split was drowned out by "noise," and the cruder signal was all that came through.

Finally, problem 8 is again logically the same as problem 4, the amount being $16 available for two people if they can write claims that do not exhaust the amount. But the institutional arrangement is discriminatory; finder and loser do not have a compelling equality in any moralistic or legalistic sense, so the 50-50 split seems not quite obvious. The suggestion of the mediator provides the only other signal that is visible; its potency as a co-ordinator is seen even in the rounding to $11 and $5, which was universally accepted.

In each of these situations the outcome is determined by something that is fairly arbitrary. It is not a particularly "fair" outcome, from either an observer's point of view or the points of view of the participants. Even the 50-50 split is arbitrary in its reliance on a kind of recognizable mathematical purity; and if it is "fair," it is so only because we have no concrete data by which to judge its unfairness, such as the source of the funds, the relative need of the rival claimants, or any potential basis for moral or legal claims. Splitting the difference in an argument over kidnap ransom is not particularly "fair," but it has the mathematical qualities of problem 4.

If we ask what determines the outcome in these cases, the answer again is in the co-ordination problem. Each of these problems requires co-ordination for a common gain, even though there is rivalry among alternative lines of common action. But, among the various choices, there is usually one or only a few that can serve as co-ordinator. Take the case of the first offer in problem 5. The strongest argument in favor of R is the rhetorical question, "If not R, what then?" There is no answer so obvious as to give more than a random chance of concerting, even if both parties wanted to eschew the letter R after the first offer was made. To illustrate the force of this point, suppose that the master-of-ceremonies in that problem considered the first offer already to have spoiled the game and thought he might confuse the players by announcing the reversal of their prize schedules. A will get whatever prize B would have gotten, and B will get the prizes shown in A's schedule in problem 5. Does the original offerer of R have any reason to change

his choice? Or suppose that the master-of-ceremonies announced that the prizes would be the same, no matter what letter were chosen, so long as they both picked the same letter. They will still rally to R as the only indicated means of co-ordinating choices. If we revert to the beginning of this game and suppose that the original proposal of R never got made, we might imagine a sign on the wall saying, "In case of doubt always choose R; this sign is visible to all players and constitutes a means of co-ordinating choices." Here we are back at the man and his wife in the department store, whose problems are over when they see a conspicuous sign that says, "The management suggests that all persons who become separated meet each other at the information booth in the center of the ground floor." Beggars cannot be choosers about the source of their signal or about its attractiveness compared with others that they can only wish were as conspicuous.

The irony would be complete if, in game 5, your rival knew your prize schedule and you did not know his (as was the case in a variant of question 5 used in some questionnaires). Since you have no basis for guessing his preference and could not even do him a favor or make a "fair" compromise if you wished to, the only basis for concerting is to see what message you can both read in your schedule. Your own preferred letter seems the indicated choice; it is hard to see why to pick any other or which other to pick, since you have no basis for knowing what other letter is better for him than R itself. His knowledge of your preference, combined with your ignorance of his and the lack of any alternative basis for co-ordination, puts on him the responsibility of simply choosing in your favor. (This, in fact, was the preponderant result among the small sample tested.) It is the same situation as when only one parachutist knew where the other was.[5]

Explicit Bargaining

The concept of "co-ordination" that was developed previously for tacit bargaining does not seem directly applicable to explicit bargaining. There is no apparent need for intuitive rapport when speech can be used; and the adventitious clues that co-ordinated thoughts and influenced the outcome in the tacit case revert to the status of incidental details.

Yet there is abundant evidence that some such influence is powerfully present even in explicit bargaining. In bargains that involve numerical magnitudes, for example, there seems to be a strong magnetism in mathematical simplicity. A trivial illustration is the tendency for the outcomes to be expressed in "round numbers"; the salesman who works out the arithmetic for his "rock-bottom" price on the automobile at $2,507.63 is fairly pleading to be relieved of $7.63. The frequency with which final agreement is precipitated by an offer to "split the difference" illustrates the same point, and the difference that is split is by no means always trivial. More impressive, perhaps, is the remarkable frequency with which long negotiations over complicated quantitative formulas or *ad hoc* shares in some costs or benefits converge ultimately on something as crudely simple as equal shares, shares proportionate to some common magnitude (gross national product, population, foreign-exchange deficit, etc.), or the shares agreed on in the previous negotiation.[6]

Precedent seems to exercise an influence that greatly exceeds its logical importance or legal force. A strike settlement or an international debt settlement often sets a "pattern" that is followed almost by default in subsequent negotiations. Sometimes, to be sure, there is a reason for a measure of uniformity, and sometimes there is enough similarity in the circumstances to explain similar outcomes; but more often it seems that there is simply no heart left in the bargaining when it takes place under the shadow of some dramatic and conspicuous precedent.[7] In similar fashion, mediators often display a power to precipitate agreement and

[5] And it is another example of the power that resides in "weakness," which was commented on in an earlier footnote.

[6] From a great variety of formulas proposed for the contributions to UNRRA, the winner that emerged was a straight 1 per cent of gross national product — the simplest conceivable formula and the roundest conceivable number. This formula was, to be sure, the preferred position of the United States during the discussion; but that fact perhaps adds as much to the example as it detracts from it.

[7] This and the preceding paragraph are illustrated by the speed with which a number of Middle Eastern oil-royalty arrangements converged on the 50-50 formula a few years after World War II.

a power to determine the terms of agreement; their proposals often seem to be accepted less by reason of their inherent fairness or reasonableness than by a kind of resignation of both participants. "Fact-finding" reports may also tend to draw expectations to a focus, by providing a suggestion to fill the vacuum of indeterminacy that otherwise exists: it is not the facts themselves, but the creation of a specific suggestion, that seems to exercise the influence.

There is, in a similar vein, a strong attraction to the *status quo ante* as well as to natural boundaries. Even parallels of latitude have recently exhibited their longevity as focal points for agreement. Certainly, there are reasons of convenience in using rivers as the agreed stopping place for troops or using old boundaries, whatever their current relevance; but often these features of the landscape seem less important for their practical convenience than for their power to crystallize agreement.

These observations would be trivial if they meant only that bargaining results were *expressed* in simple and qualitative terms or that minor accommodations were made to round off the last few cents or miles or people. But it often looks as though the ultimate focus for agreement did not just reflect the balance of bargaining powers but provided bargaining power to one side or the other. It often seems that a cynic could have predicted the outcome on the basis of some "obvious" focus for agreement, some strong suggestion contained in the situation itself, without much regard to the merits of the case, the arguments to be made, or the pressures to be applied during the bargaining. The "obvious" place to compromise frequently seems to win by some kind of default, as though there is simply no rationale for settling anywhere else. Or if the "natural" outcome is taken to reflect the relative skills of the parties to the bargain, it may be important to identify that skill as the ability to set the stage in such a way as to give prominence to some particular outcome that would be favorable. The outcome may not be so much conspicuously fair or conspicuously in balance with estimated bargaining powers as just plain "conspicuous."

This conclusion may seem to reduce the scope for bargaining skill, if the outcome is already determined by the configuration of the problem itself and where the focal point lies. But perhaps what it does is shift the locus where skill is effective. The "obvious" outcome depends greatly on how the problem is formulated, on what analogies or precedents the definition of the bargaining issue calls to mind, on the kinds of data that may be available to bear on the question in dispute. When the committee begins to argue over how to divide the costs, it is already constrained by whether the terms of reference refer to the "dues" to be shared or the "taxes" to be paid, on whether a servicing committee is preparing national-income figures or balance-of-payments figures for their use, on whether the personnel of the committee brings certain precedents into prominence by having participated personally in earlier negotiations, on whether the inclusion of two separate issues on the same agenda will give special prominence and relevance to those particular features that they have in common. Much of the skill has already been applied when the formal negotiations begin.[8]

If all this is correct, as it seems frequently to the author to be, our analysis of tacit bargaining may help to provide an understanding of the influence at work; and perhaps the logic of tacit bargaining even provides a basis for believing it to be correct. The fundamental problem in tacit bargaining is that of *co-ordination;* we should inquire, then, what has to be co-ordinated in explicit bargaining. The answer may be that explicit bargaining requires, for an ultimate agreement, some co-ordination of the participants' expectations. The proposition might be as follows:

Most bargaining situations ultimately involve some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at all. In such a situation any potential outcome is one from which at least one of the parties, and probably both, would have been willing to retreat for the sake of agreement, and very often the other

[8] Perhaps another role for skill is contained in this general approach. If one is unsuccessful in getting the problem so formulated that the "obvious" outcome is near his own preferred position, he can proceed to confuse the issue. Find multiple definitions for all the terms and add "noise" to drown out the strong signal contained in the original formulation. The technique may not succeed; but in one of our income tax problems it certainly did.

party knows it. Any potential outcome is therefore one that either party could have improved by insisting; yet he may have no basis for insisting, since the other knows or suspects that he would rather concede than do without agreement. Each party's strategy is guided mainly by what he expects the other to accept or insist on; yet each knows that the other is guided by reciprocal thoughts. The final outcome must be a point from which neither expects the other to retreat; yet the main ingredient of this expectation is what one thinks the other expects the first to expect, and so on. Somehow, out of this fluid and indeterminate situation that seemingly provides no logical reason for anybody to expect anything except what he expects to be expected to expect, a decision is reached. These infinitely reflexive expectations must somehow converge on a single point, at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat.

If we then ask what it is that can bring their expectations into convergence and bring the negotiation to a close, we might propose that it is the intrinstic magnetism of particular outcomes, especially those that enjoy prominence, uniqueness, simplicity, precedent, or some rationale that makes them qualitatively differentiable from the continuum of possible alternatives. We could argue that expectations tend not to converge on outcomes that differ only by degree from alternative outcomes but that people have to dig in their heels at a groove in order to make any show of determination. One has to have a reason for standing firmly on a position; and along the continuum of qualitatively undifferentiable positions one finds no rationale. The rationale may not be strong at the arbitrary "focal point," but at least it can defend itself with the argument "If not here, where?"

There is perhaps a little more to this need for a mutually identifiable resting place. If one is about to make a concession, he needs to control his adversary's expectations; he needs a recognizable limit to his own retreat. If one is to make a finite concession that is not to be interpreted as capitulation, he needs an obvious place to stop. A mediator's suggestion may provide it; or any other element that qualitatively distinguishes the new position from surrounding positions. If one has been demanding 60 per cent and recedes to 50 per cent, he can get his heels in; if he recedes to 49 per cent, the other will assume that he has hit the skids and will keep sliding.

If some troops have retreated to the river in our map, they will expect to be expected to make a stand. This is the one spot to which they can retreat without necessarily being expected to retreat further, while, if they yield any further, there is no place left where they can be expected to make a determined stand. Similarly, the advancing party can expect to force the other to retreat to the river without having his advance interpreted as an insatiable demand for unlimited retreat. There is stability at the river — and perhaps nowhere else.

This proposition may seem intuitively plausible; it does to the writer, and in any event some kind of explanation is needed for the tendency to settle at focal points. But the proposition would remain vague and somewhat mystical if it were not for the somewhat more tangible logic of tacit bargaining. The latter provides not only an analogy but the demonstration that the necessary psychic phenomenon — tacit co-ordination of expectations — is a real possibility and even, in some contexts, a reliable one. The "co-ordination" of expectations is analogous to the "co-ordination" of behavior when communication is cut off; and, in fact, they both involve nothing more nor less than intuitively perceived mutual expectations. Thus the empirically verifiable results of some of the tacit-bargaining games, as well as the more logical role of co-ordinated expectations in that case, prove that expectations can be co-ordinated and that some of the objective details of the situation can exercise a controlling influence when the co-ordination of expectations is essential. *Something* is perceived by both parties when communication is absent; it must still be perceptible, though undoubtedly of lesser force, when communication is possible. The possibility of communication does not make 50-50 less symmetrical or the river less unique or A B C a less natural order for those letters.

If all we had to reason from were the logic of tacit bargaining, it would be only a guess and perhaps a wild one that the same kind of psychic attraction worked in explicit bargaining; and if all we had to generalize from were the observation of peculiarly "plausible" outcomes in actual bargains, we might be un-

willing to admit the force of adventitious details. But the two lines of evidence so strongly reinforce each other that the analogy between tacit and explicit bargaining seems a potent one.

To illustrate with the problem of agreeing explicitly on how to divide $100: 50-50 seems a plausible division, but it may seem so for too many reasons. It may seem "fair": it may seem to balance bargaining powers: or it may, as suggested in this paper, simply have the power to communicate its own inevitability to the two parties in such fashion that each appreciates that they both appreciate it. What our analysis of tacit bargaining provides is evidence for the latter view. The evidence is simply that *if* they had to divide the $100 without communicating, they could concert on 50-50. Instead of relying on intuition, then, we can point to the fact that in a slightly different context — the tacit-bargaining context — our argument has an objectively demonstrable interpretation.

To illustrate again: the ability of the two commanders in one of our problems to recognize the stabilizing power of the river — or, rather, their inability not to recognize it — is substantiated by the evidence that if their survival depended on some agreement about where to stabilize their lines *and communication were not allowed,* they probably could perceive and appreciate the qualities of the river as a focus for their tacit agreement. So the tacit analogy at least demonstrates that the idea of "co-ordinating expectations" is meaningful rather than mystical.

Perhaps we could push the argument further still. Even in those cases in which the only distinguishing characteristic of a bargaining result is its evident "fairness," by standards that the participants are known to appreciate, we might argue that the moral force of fairness is greatly reinforced by the power of a "fair" result to focus attention, if it fills the vacuum of indeterminacy that would otherwise exist. Similarly, when the pressure of public opinion seems to force the participants to the obviously "fair" or "reasonable" solution, we may exaggerate the "pressure" or at least misunderstand the way it works on the participants unless we give credit to its power to co-ordinate the participants' expectations. It may, to put it differently, be the power of *suggestion,* working through the mechanism described in this paper, that makes public opinion or precedent or ethical standards so effective. Again, as evidence for this view, we need only to suppose that the participants had to reach ultimate agreement without communicating and visualize public opinion or some prominent ethical standard as providing a strong suggestion analogous to the suggestions contained in our earlier examples. The mediator in problem 7 is a close analogy. Finally, even if it is truly the force of moral responsibility or sensitivity to public opinion that constrains the participants, and not the "signal" they get, we must still look to the source of the public's own opinion; and there, the writer suggests, the need for a simple, qualitative rationale often reflects the mechanism discussed in this paper.

But, if this general line of reasoning is valid, any analysis of explicit bargaining must pay attention to what we might call the "communication" that is inherent in the bargaining situations, the signals that the participants read in the inanimate details of the case. And it means that tacit and explicit bargaining are not thoroughly separate concepts but that the various gradations from tacit bargaining up through types of incompleteness or faulty or limited communication to full communication all show some dependence on the need to co-ordinate expectations. Hence all show some degree of dependence of the participants themselves on their common inability to keep their eyes off certain outcomes.

This is not an argument for expecting explicit outcomes as a rule to lean toward those that would have merged if communication had been impossible; the focal points are certainly different when speech is allowed, except in some of the artificial cases we have used in our illustrations. But what may be the *main* principle in tacit bargaining apparently may be at least *one* of the important principles in the analysis of explicit bargaining. And, since even much so-called "explicit" bargaining includes maneuver, indirect communication, jockeying for position, or speaking to be overheard, or is confused by a multitude of participants and divergent interests, the need for convergent expectations and the role of signals that have the power to co-ordinate expectations may be powerful.

Perhaps many kinds of social stability and the formation of interest groups reflect the same

dependence on such co-ordinators as the terrain and the circumstances can provide: the band wagon at political conventions, that often converts the slightest sign of plurality into an overwhelming majority; the power of constitutional legitimacy to command popular support in times of anarchy or political vacuum; the legendary power of an old gang leader to bring order into the underworld, simply because obedience depends on the expectation that others will be obedient in punishing disobedience. The often expressed idea of a "rallying point" in social action seems to reflect the same concept. In economics the phenomena of price leadership, various kinds of non-price competition, and perhaps even price stability itself appear amenable to an analysis that stresses the importance of tacit communication and its dependence on qualitatively identifiable and fairly unambiguous signals that can be read in the situation itself. "Spontaneous" revolt may reflect similar principles: when leaders can easily be destroyed, people require some signal for their co-ordination, a signal so unmistakably comprehensible and so potent in its suggestion for action that everyone can be sure that everyone else reads the same signal with enough confidence to act on it, thus providing one another with the immunity that goes with action in large numbers. (There is even the possibility that such a signal might be provided from outside, even by an agent whose only claim to leadership was its capacity to signal the instructions required for concerted action.)

Tacit Negotiation and Limited War

What useful insight does this line of analysis provide into the practical problem of tacit bargaining that usually confront us, particularly the problems of strategic maneuver and limited war? It certainly suggests that it is *possible* to find limits to war — real war, jurisdictional war, or whatever — without overt negotiation. But it gives us no new strong sense of *probability*. War was limited in Korea, and gas was not used in World War II; on the possibility of limited war these two facets are more persuasive than all the suggestions contained in the foregoing discussion. If the analysis provides anything, then, it is not a judgment of the probability of successfully reaching tacit agreement but a better understanding of where to look for the terms of agreement.

If there are important conclusions to be drawn, they are probably these: (1) tacit agreements or agreements arrived at through partial or haphazard negotiation require terms that are qualitatively distinguishable from the alternatives and cannot simply be a matter of degree; (2) when agreement must be reached with incomplete communication, the participants must be ready to allow the situation itself to exercise substantial constraint over the outcome; specifically, a solution that discriminates against one party or the other or even involves "unnecessary" nuisance to both of them may be the only one on which their expectations can be co-ordinated.

Gas was not used in World War II. The agreement, though not without antecedents, was largely a tacit one. It is interesting to speculate on whether any alternative agreement concerning poison gas could have been arrived at without formal communication (or even, for that matter, with communication). "Some gas" raises complicated questions of how much, where, under what circumstances: "no gas" is simple and unambiguous. Gas only on military personnel; gas used only by defending forces; gas only when carried by vehicle or projectile; no gas without warning — a variety of limits is conceivable; some may make sense, and many might have been more impartial to the outcome of the war. But there is a simplicity to "no gas" that makes it almost uniquely a focus for agreement when each side can only conjecture at what rules the other side would propose and when failure at co-ordination on the first try may spoil the chances for acquiescence in any limits at all.

The physical configuration of Korea must have helped in defining the limits to war and in making geographical limits possible. The area was surrounded by water, and the principal northern political boundary was marked dramatically and unmistakably by a river. The thirty-eighth parallel seems to have been a powerful focus for a stalemate; and the main alternative, the "waist," was a strong candidate not just because it provided a shorter defense line but because it would have been clear to both sides that an advance to the waist did not necessarily signal a determination to advance farther and that a retreat to the waist did not telegraph any intention to retreat farther.

The Formosan Straits made it possible to

stabilize a line between the Communist and National government forces of China, not solely because water favored the defender and inhibited attack, but because an island is an integral unit and water is a conspicuous boundary. The sacrifice of any part of the island would have made the resulting line unstable; the retention of any part of the mainland would have been similarly unstable. Except at the water's edge, all movement is a matter of degree; an attack across water is a declaration that the "agreement" has been terminated.

In Korea, weapons were limited by the qualitative distinction between atomic and all other; it would surely have been much more difficult to stabilize a tacit acceptance of any limit on size of atomic weapons or selection of targets. No definition of size or target is so obvious and natural that it goes without saying, except for "no size, on any target." American assistance to the French forces in Indochina was persuasively limited to material, not people; and it was appreciated that an enlargement to include, say, air participation could be recognized as limited to air, while it would not be possible to establish a limited *amount* of air or ground participation. One's intentions to abstain from ground intervention can be conveyed by the complete withholding of ground forces; one cannot nearly so easily commit *some* forces and communicate a persuasive limit to the *amount* that one intends to commit.

The strategy of retaliation is affected by the need to communicate or co-ordinate on limits. Local aggression defines a place; with luck and natural boundaries, there may be tacit acceptance of geographical limits or types of targets. One side or both may be willing to accept limited defeat rather than take the initiative in breaching the rules and to act in a manner that reassures the other of such willingness. The "rules" may be respected because, if they are once broken, there is no assurance that any new ones can be found and jointly recognized in time to check the widening of the conflict. But if retaliation is left to the method and place of the retaliator's own choosing, it may be much more difficult to convey to the victim what the proposed limits are, so that he has a chance to accept them in his counter-retaliation. In fact, the initial departure of retaliation from the locality that provokes it may be a kind of declaration of independence that is not conducive to the creation of stable mutual expectations. Thus the problem of finding mutually recognized limits on war is doubly difficult if the definition implicit in the aggressor's own act is not tolerable.

In sum, the problem of limiting warfare involves not a continuous range of possibilities from most favorable to least favorable for either side; it is a lumpy, discrete world that is better able to recognize qualitative than quantitative differences, that is embarrassed by the multiplicity of choices, and that forces both sides to accept some dictation from the elements themselves. The writer suggests that the same is true of restrained competition in every field in which it occurs.

Prior Arrangements

While the main burden of this paper has been that tacit bargaining is possible and is susceptible of systematic analysis, there is no assurance that it will succeed in any particular case or that, when it succeeds, it will yield to either party a particularly favorable outcome compared with alternatives that might have been available if full communication had been allowed. There is no assurance that the next war, if it comes, will find mutually observed limits in time and of a sort to afford protection, unless explicit negotiation can take place. There is reason, therefore, to consider what steps can be taken before the time for tacit bargaining occurs, to enhance the likelihood of a successful outcome.

Keeping communication channels open seems to be one obvious point. (At a minimum, this might mean assuring that a surrender offer could be heard and responded to by either side). The technical side of this principle would be identification of who would send and receive messages, upon what authority, over what facilities, using what intermediaries if intermediaries were used, and who stood in line to do the job in what fashion if the indicated parties and facilities were destroyed. In the event of an effort to fight a restrained nuclear war, there may be only a brief and busy instant in which each side must decide whether limited war is in full swing or full war has just begun; and twelve hours' confusion over how to make contact might spoil some of the chances for stabilizing the action within limits.

Thought should be given to the possible usefulness of mediators or referees. To settle on influential mediators usually requires some prior understanding, or at least a precedent or a tradition or a sign of welcome. Even if we rule out overt arrangements for the contingency, evidences by each side of an appreciation of the role of referees and mediators, even a little practice in their use, might help to prepare an instrument of the most extreme value in an awful contingency.

But all such efforts may suffer from the unwillingness of an adversary to engage in any preparatory steps. Not only may an adversary balk at giving signs of eagerness to come to agreement; it is even possible that one side in a potential war may have a tactical interest in keeping that war unrestrained and aggravating the likelihood of mutual destruction in case it comes. Why? Because of the strategy of threats, bluffs, and deterrents. The willingness to start a war or take steps that may lead to war, whether aggression or retaliation to aggression, may depend on the confidence with which a nation's leaders think a war could be kept within limits. To be specific, the willingness of America to retaliate against local aggression with atomic attack depends — and the Russians know that it depends — on how likely we consider it that such retaliation could itself remain limited. That is, it depends on how likely it is in our judgment that we and the Russians, when we both desperately need to recognize limits within which either of us is willing to lose the war without enlarging those limits, will find such limits and come to mutually recognized acquiescence in them. If, then, Russian refusal to engage in any activity that might lead to the possibility of limited war deters our own resolution to act, they might risk forgoing such limits for the sake of reducing the threat of American action. One parachutist in our example may know that the other will be careless with the plane if he is sure they can meet and save themselves; so if the first abstains from discussing the contingency, the other will have to ride quietly for fear of precipitating a fatal separation in the terrain below.

Whether this consideration or just the usual inhibitions on serious negotiation make prior discussion impossible, there is still a useful idea that emerges from one of our earlier games. It is that negotiation or communication for the purpose of co-ordinating expectations need not be reciprocal: unilateral negotiation may provide the co-ordination that will save both parties. Furthermore, even an unwilling member cannot necessarily make himself unavailable for the receipt of messages. Recall the man who proposed the letter R in one of the bargaining games: as long as the partner heard — and it is obvious that he heard — the letter R is the only extant proposal, and, being unchallenged, it may co-ordinate in default of any counter-proposal nearly as well as if it had been explicitly accepted. (Even *denial* of it by the other party might not manage to dislodge its claim to prominence but rather simply prove his awareness of it, as long as no rival claim was made that created ambiguousness.) If one of our parachutists, just before the plane failed and while neither of them dreamed of having to jump, idly said, "If I ever had to meet somebody down there, I'd just head for the highest hill in sight," the other would probably recall and know that the first would be sure he recalled and would go there, even though it had been on the tip of his tongue to say, "How stupid," or "Not me, climbing hurts my legs," when the plane failed. When some signal is desperately needed by *both* parties and both parties know it, even a poor signal and a discriminatory one may command recognition, in default of any other. Once the contingency is upon them, their interests, which originally diverged in the play of threats and deterrents, substantially coincide in the desperate need for a focus of agreement.

Two years ago the *Manchester Guardian* suggested that the Western powers consider declaring unilaterally that, in the event of major atomic war, they would not use nuclear weapons against large cities unless the enemy did so first (1, 2). It proposed making a distinction between the massive bombing of cities and the more restricted use of atomic weapons on a battlefield or on strictly military targets such as airfields. The notion was not that the Soviets would agree overtly or even bother to disagree but that, if war came, both we and they would be so eager to find some limits to the bombing of civilian cities that we both might possibly manage to observe limits — even quite crude limits or discriminatory ones — if there were a proposal in existence as a focus for agreement. Each might at least honor the proposal

tentatively, to see whether the other would too; and the result might be a stable mutual acquiescence. This proposal illustrates negotiation with incomplete communication or, to put it differently, tacit negotiation with the help of a prior suggestion. A number of difficulties come to mind: What is a civiilan city? What is a military target? What kinds of weapons are ruled out on the former? What margin for error is to be allowed? etc. Could the Western powers possibly find definitions and criteria acceptable enough to the Russians to permit such tacit agreement?

Our analysis of tacit bargaining contains two suggestions on this problem. One is to adopt criteria that are as qualitative and discrete as possible, avoiding reliance on matters of degree or judgment. The other is simply that unilateral suggestions, even if not tested for "acceptability" to the Russians in any sense analogous to explicit agreement, may serve the desperate purpose when there is no alternative but mutual destruction. In fact, the analogous feature of explicit negotiation suggests that negotiated agreement might be more quickly achieved if there were some prior suggestion around which mutual expectations could crystallize when quick agreement was required.

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COMPUTER PROGRAMS AS THEORIES OF POLITICAL PROCESSES

• *RUFUS P. BROWNING*

Political scientists share with members of many other disciplines a concern wtih the way in which human beings make decisions. In the study of politics, one result of the increasingly sharp focus on decision-making processes has been a considerable stream of case studies; but as others have pointed out, the contribution of many of these studies to the effort to accumulate an organized body of general knowledge about decision-making has been small.[1] It has been difficult to compare different decision processes, with different kinds of decision-makers, in different policy areas. Until relatively recently, there was a lack of basic concepts which would enable researchers to identify the common elements in any decision, and to discuss within the same framework phenomena ordinarily considered disparate.

Related to this seeming uniqueness of decision processes is the problem of how to deal with their overwhelming complexity. Again, the lack of an adequate conceptual framework has hindered the organization of knowledge about even one decision. Few guidelines were at hand to determine what information was relevant and what was not, or to show how various pieces of evidence could be fitted together other than chronologically.

Finally, despite recent progress at the conceptual level combined with a rapid increase in the amount of theoretically useful information about decision-making,[2] the problem of how to

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[1] For example, Herbert Kaufman, "The Next Step in Case Studies," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Winter, 1958), pp. 52–59.

[2] See James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958).

construct models of these processes at varying levels of specificity has become crucial. One aspect of the problem is simply the difficulty of describing intelligibly systems which are very complex and large in scale. Secondly, once such a system has been described, how can the production of specific predictions from it be made a manageable task? A third aspect of the problem is the absence of mathematical methods appropriate for the description and solution of dynamic systems of this sort.[3]

It may be that solutions to some of these difficulties are at hand. Converging techniques and concepts from several disciplines are setting the stage for breakthroughs in the development of theories of social and psychological behavior, particularly decision-making. These developments include: (1) the specification of ways of handling information which are common to human beings and electronic computers; (2) the representation in sequential form of detailed theories of information-processing and decision-making functions of individuals, organizations, and masses; and (3) the use of computers to simulate the operation of such functions.

The following notes are about computer simulation, mainly of decision processes, and about potentially fruitful applications of concepts and methods of simulation to the study of politics.[4] Several computer models of decision processes are discussed, and their features are compared to commonly observed characteristics of political decision-making. Two computer models of voting behavior are also described.

G. P. E. Clarkson and H. A. Simon characterize simulation briefly and well:

> The process of simulation involves constructing a theory, or model, of a system that prescribes the system's processes. . . . By carrying out the processes postulated in the theory, a hypothetical stream of behavior is generated that can be compared with the stream of behavior of the original system.[5]

In contrast with the familiar use of computers to analyze data statistically, simulation entails, as an initial step, the construction of logically unambiguous theories, and includes the production of data about the processes defined by the theory rather than only the analysis of given data. The computer, after all, can interpret only instructions which are logically rigorous, which of course by no means implies that they are or must be substantively complete or valid. Given the present level of knowledge, and especially the present level of organization of knowledge (*i.e.*, theory), it is clear that the requirement of logical rigor will force researchers to make many quite arbitrary and frequently unrealistic assumptions. But this is not obviously bad — arbitrary and unrealistic assumptions have important, potentially fruitful uses (and more or less characterize all theories anyhow).

Simulation in this sense differs also from the use of computers in operations research to find optimal solutions to mathematical models of (*e.g.*) scheduling or waiting line problems. The applications of simulation discussed here have been developed mainly from observation of decision-making systems rather than through the use of existing mathematical models; indeed, computer simulation models may (but need not) be entirely non-numeric.

The use of computers to simulate human decision-making behavior is based on the unexceptionable premises that patterns of electrical states in the computer may represent not only digits, but any sort of symbol; and that the processes by which symbols are manipulated by the computer may be considered analogous in function to the processes of human decision-making systems. Specifically, the following basic information-processing operations are common to humans and computers:

1. People remember or forget symbols; computers store or erase.

2. Both entities can associate or link symbols together; memories can be organized. For ex-

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[3] R. M. Cyert, E. A. Feigenbaum, and J. G. March, "Models in a Behavioral Theory of the Firm," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April, 1959), p. 84.

[4] This is not a comprehensive survey of computer simulation, even of decision processes. For other references, see articles in the "Symposium on Simulation," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 50 (Dec., 1960), pp. 892–932; M. Shubik, "Bibliography on Simulation, Gaming, Artificial Intelligence and Allied Topics," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Vol. 55 (Dec., 1960), pp. 736–751; and M. Minsky, "A Selected Descriptor-Indexed Bibliography to the Literature on Artificial Intelligence," Inst. of Radio Engineers, *Trans. on Human Factors in Electronics*, Vol. HFE-2 (March, 1961), pp. 39–55.

[5] "Simulation of Individual and Group Behavior," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 50 (Dec., 1960), p. 920.

ample, attributes may be associated with objects, or means with ends. Criteria of evaluation or procedures for problem-solving may be ordered in the sequences in which they are applied.

3. Both people and computers can communicate, internally and externally, by reading, writing, and copying symbols. People are capable of a broader range of perceptual and expressive processes, but if these can be characterized precisely by any symbols at all, they can be characterized by symbols which the computer can read and write.

4. Both people and computers can compare symbols and perceive relationships between them.

5. Both are able to act differentially depending on the outcome of such a comparison.

In sum, *both humans and computers can perceive and compare alternatives and make choices which depend on the characteristics of the alternatives in relation to the features* (*a*) *of the external choice situation and* (*b*) *of goals or other internal determining factors in memory*.

Note that the above analogies are not only a justification for the use of computers for simulation. They are also basic building blocks for the construction of theories of any human decision system. Every statement in the theories of decision-making discussed here is a statement about the way in which a particular decision-maker processes particular kinds of information — how and what he remembers and forgets, how he links pieces of information together (information both about his own goals and about the environment), how and what he communicates, what he compares, how he chooses between compared alternatives, and in what sequences these operations take place.

In various stages of completion and development are a number of computer simulation programs which are made up of these basic elements and assume the human-computer analogy. They include theories of behavior in a range of experimental, formal, and real-life settings:

deciding in a random binary choice situation[6]
learning nonsense syllables[7]
solving problems[8]
playing chess[9]
writing a fugue[10]
balancing an assembly line[11]
selecting common stocks for trusts[12]
deciding how to vote[13]
setting price and output levels in firms.[14]

It is impossible to evaluate definitively the method which these efforts all apply, because

[6] J. Feldman, "An Analysis of Predictive Behavior in a Two Choice Situation," (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1959).

[7] Edward A. Feigenbaum, "An Information Processing Theory of Verbal Learning," (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1959; also RAND Corporation P-1817, 1959).

[8] Many articles by A. Newell, J. C. Shaw, and H. A. Simon, but especially "Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 65 (1958), pp. 151–166; and "Report on a General Problem-Solving Program," *Proc. of the International Conference on Information Processing* (Paris, 1960), also RAND Corporation P-1584 (1959), and reprinted as "A General Problem-Solving Program for a Computer," *Computers and Automation*, Vol. 8 (July, 1960).

[9] See Newell, Shaw, and Simon, "Chess-Playing Programs and the Problem of Complexity," *IBM Journal of Research and Development*, Vol. 2 (Oct., 1958).

[10] Walter R. Reitman, "Programming Intelligent Problem Solvers," Inst. of Radio Engineers, *Trans. on Human Factors in Electronics*, Vol. HFE-2 (March, 1961), pp. 26–33.

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[13] W. N. McPhee, "Note on a Campaign Simulator," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (Summer, 1961), pp. 184–193; McPhee and R. B. Smith, "A Model for Analyzing Voting Systems" (mimeo., Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia Univ.); J. S. Coleman and F. Waldorf, "Study of a Voting System with Computer Techniques" (dittoed, Dept. of Social Relations, Johns Hopkins Univ.).

[14] R. M. Cyert, E. A. Feigenbaum, and J. G. March, "Models in a Behavioral Theory of the Firm," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4 (April, 1959), pp. 81–95; Cyert and March, "A Behavioral Theory of Organizational Objectives," *Modern Organization Theory*, ed. Mason Haire (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. 76–90; and Cyert and March, *The Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Prentice-Hall, forthcoming).

there simply has not been enough experience with it. Nevertheless, what experience there has been is highly suggestive in terms of closeness of fit between the behavior of the models and the behavior of the simulated systems. Comparing price decisions generated by an early simulation model of firms in a duopoly to actual data from the can industry (in which conditions were roughly similar to those of the model), Cyert, Feigenbaum, and March write that "the fit of the behavioral model to the data is rather surprisingly good," although they point out that it is impossible to demonstrate conclusively the validity of the model because of the number of free parameters and the present lack of a general methodology for testing computer models.[15]

Clarkson's model of trust investment behavior "was tested by comparing both its output and its behavior to that of the trust officer. The evidence indicated that the model predicted . . . the actual portfolios as well as the processes by which they were selected with a considerable degree of accuracy."[16] In some cases, the trace of the model's behavior could not be distinguished from the verbal protocol of the investor's behavior.

The efforts at computer simulation listed above have generally reported encouraging results of this sort.

Some Common Features of Political Processes and Existing Computer Models

The intent now is to examine, at varying levels of detail, three models of decision-making — of trust investment, problem-solving, and decision-making in firms — with a view to showing some aspects of the information and analysis applied in each case, features of the processes, and analogous features commonly associated with important political processes.

In analyzing any decision-making process, it is necessary to specify (1) the elements of the choice or problem situation which are perceived by the decision-maker; (2) his goals and subgoals (which may in various contexts be referred to as criteria, attitudes, aspiration levels, etc.); (3) relationships among goals and between goals and situations which specify how certain goals are to be applied in different situations; and (4) in the case of problem-solving rather than purely evaluative programs, methods of manipulating the elements of the problem to reach solutions.

Consider Clarkson's trust investor. On the basis of information about a client, he sets up a trust with one of four combinations of income and growth goals. Different criteria for evaluating industries and companies are associated with these different goals. Applying the criteria, the investment officer comes up with lists of industries appropriate for each goal. (In this model, these lists are taken as given.) Then, applying one of two networks of criteria (one to pick growth, the other for income stocks) to data about some particular features of individual companies in the appropriate industries, he selects (in the model as well as in the real world) a list of stocks for the particular trust, with the number of stocks on the list and the number of shares of each to be purchased dependent on certain rules for diversification as well as on the total capital available. Not all criteria are applied to all companies; the criteria do not constitute a simple checklist. Rather, the criteria are arranged in complex ordered nets[17] such that if a company meets all of the most important criteria, it may be chosen without regard to other characteristics; but if it does not meet one or more of these criteria, it is subjected to other tests which it must pass or be rejected. The tests are performed sequentially, with the outcome of each test determining whether the company is to be accepted, rejected, or subjected to another test.

In this trust investment process, goals, and criteria are set once at the beginning and applied over and over again to many sets of information. Once the available capital is invested, there are heavy constraints on change in the trust portfolio. There is no question of having to select a new sequence of goals and subgoals at each step in the process. The selection process is long and complex, but it, too, undergoes no change. There is no mechanism in the model for developing new selection criteria.

An assumption of such models or of similar

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 94.

[16] Clarkson, *op. cit.* note 13, p. 141.

[17] For examples see *ibid.*, pp. 158–162; and Cyert and March, *The Behavioral Theory of the Firm.*

real-life processes is that there will always be alternatives which meet the selection criteria; hence the application of the criteria will always produce some acceptable alternatives; hence there is no reason to search for new criteria or other modifications of the process. The emphasis is on processing large amounts of data rather than on adapting to new situations or on analyzing a problem for which a satisfactory solution is not guaranteed. Many decision-making processes are undoubtedly similar to the trust investment model in this respect; they are ordinarily termed routine (which is not meant to imply that they are necessarily simple).

Consider now a process in which insight and flexibility are highly prized, a solution is never guaranteed, and each step toward a solution changes the problem — proving theorems in logic. Instead of establishing goals and criteria at the outset and processing data according to them, the Newell-Shaw-Simon General Problem Solver (GPS) sets up at each step in a proof a new subgoal and method and chooses an appropriate change to make in the statement at hand. Every step produces a new statement which must be evaluated and modified in some fashion, according to rules which define permissible operations, until the solution is attained.

GPS presently uses two powerful heuristics — means-ends analysis and planning — which have obvious analogues in familiar though certainly less well-defined conceptions of political decision-making. Both methods are based on the principle of substituting for the achievement of a goal the achievement of a set of easier subgoals. In GPS as applied to solving problems in logic and trigonometry, the means-ends method detects differences between the statement A at hand and the statement B to which A is to be reduced. This is simply a specific case of the general problem situation in which there are an existing state of affairs and a desired state of affairs which differ in certain respects.

GPS then tries to eliminate the differences, starting with the most difficult ones. Operators which are characterized by the changes they produce are applied to the differences, "even at the cost of introducing new differences of lesser difficulty. This process can be repeated as long as progress is being made toward eliminating the more difficult differences." In general terms, means are classified in terms of the functions they perform, and the analysis oscillates among ends, the specification of the functions required, and the application of means appropriate to the functions.[18] What is desired? What needs to be done? How do we do it?

The planning method in GPS proceeds by omitting certain details of the original problem, thereby constructing a simplified version of it. Using means-ends analysis, it then tries to solve this simpler problem. If it succeeds, it uses the solution as a plan for solving the original problem.

Planning — solving problems in general terms first, then taking up the details within the framework of the proposed general solution — and means-ends analysis — proceeding incrementally by setting up and achieving intermediary, partial goals — are practically universal features of political decision processes. In both the political and the logical problem contexts, complexity and uncertainty require the use of such powerful heuristics. Also, in a pluralistic political system in which widespread agreement among diverse groups is frequently a prerequisite for policy change, there is an additional pressure toward incrementalism[19] because nonincremental proposals arouse too much opposition. In effect, there are two problems in policy-making to the one in logic, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that there are two processes in policy-making with identical form but frequently different goals: (1) formulating and modifying policy to achieve policy objectives; (2) carrying out the same processes to obtain agreement from a

[18] Newell, Shaw, and Simon, "Report on a General Problem-Solving Program," RAND Corporation P-1584 (1959), p. 9.

[19] On incrementalism in governmental decision-making, see C. E. Lindblom (with R. A. Dahl): *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York: Harper, 1953), pp. 82–85, 294 ff.; "Policy Analysis," *Amer. Econ. Rev.*, Vol. 48 (June, 1958), pp. 298–312; "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," *Pub. Admin. Rev.*, Vol. 19 (Spring, 1959), pp. 79–88; and "Decision-Making in Taxation and Expenditures," in *Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization*, A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), esp. pp. 306–311.

group of participants sufficient to effect a decision.

This difference between the logical and the political contexts, plus the difference in preciseness of goals, objects, and operators, implies also a difference in the way problem-solvers in logic and in politics know whether they are making progress and when they have reached a solution. In working out a logical proof, one knows beforehand what a correct solution should look like; goals and success or failure in reaching them are unambiguously defined. The politician, in contrast, has a choice between degrees and varieties of success in achieving his policy goals. There are frequently strong pressures both to obtain agreement on an entire program and to obtain quick agreement on at least part of it. In place of a set standard of performance, the political decision-maker has *aspirations* and *expectations*, both of which may shift in response to changes in the problem context.

Aspiration levels are an important part of the models of decision-making in business firms developed by Cyert, March, and associates. In these models, firms are considered as pluralistic organizations with significantly political characteristics. Various "departments" or decision functions in a firm — represented in the model by relatively independent programs for generating decisions about output, price, and sales policy — have potentially conflicting goals pertaining to inventory levels and production smoothing, profit, and sales. These goals, in the form of aspiration levels, are gradually revised upward in periods when they are exceeded, and downward in periods of failure to reach them.

Influencing processes are not defined in the model, but influence relations among the departments are subsumed in the decision rules, as in patterns of response by the pricing and profits department to requests from the sales department for price reduction, or in the focal point within the firm of pressure to take measures to reduce costs or otherwise increase profits. That the influence relations of parts of an organization can be defined by decision routines in a computer model which successfully predicts the stream of organizational decisions is a possibility that deserves exploration and application to political decision-making.

Feedback mechanisms are prominent in the models of decision processes in firms (as well as in GPS). Decisions, studies indicated, tended to be dominated by short-run feedback information rather than by any but very gross long-run expectations and plans. In the models, changes in goals and the initiation of procedures for applying or for relaxing methods of increasing profit depend on frequent answers to the question, "How are we doing?" — in relation to goals, to past performance, to other firms.

Politicians, of course, rely very heavily on feedback and exert much effort to obtain it. Uncertainty about how a stand on some issues will affect the politician's popularity with his electorate is presumably a strong influence toward incremental policy-making and dependence on feedback.

Corollary to the extensive use of feedback, and a feature both of firms and of policy-making processes (and perhaps of human behavior in general), is a tendency to search for solutions to problems only as the problems appear. The firm attempts to reduce costs only when profits fall below aspiration level; politicians develop new policies and coalitions only when it is clear that the old ones no longer serve satisfactorily the purposes for which they were created.

A final point of likeness between the firm and other political systems lies in modes of dealing with conflict. A customary method of handling conflict, in both business and politics, is to avoid it. One of the mechanisms by which conflict is avoided in the firm is sequential attention to potentially conflicting goals, satisfying first one objective, then another. This is, of course, a notorious practice of legislatures — the classic example of attending sequentially to goals of reducing expenditures and of obtaining "pork" for constituencies is too well known to require further explication.

The point of all these comparisons is that initial attempts to simulate behavior have shown that this is a potentially fruitful way of constructing theories of processes which have a good deal in common with political processes, and that these first efforts have laid out not only a technique but also hypotheses of general significance which can guide data gathering and help organize knowledge in other applications. The usefulness of the initial research in this field has been much enhanced by the fact that

intensive work in two limited areas — problem-solving in logic and decision-making in specific firms — has been quickly followed by the development of general models in which the behavioral processes are largely abstracted and factored out of the particular contexts in which they were first studied. As a consequence, guidelines for work in other fields such as political science are much more clearly marked than they would otherwise be.

Computer Models of Voting Behavior

Among other things, GPS and the models of firm decision-making represent good strategic choices of behaviors to simulate. By concentrating on problem-solving in the formally unambiguous context of logic, Newell, Shaw, and Simon avoided the empirical difficulties involved in ascertaining just what the goals and alternatives are in less well structured contexts. Cyert and March were able to take advantage of similar aspects of decision-making in firms: as complex policy organizations go, the firm is relatively well structured and analytically separable from other systems, except the market; and the goals and decisions which were studied — such as price, output, profit, sales — were already expressed in quantitative terms.

Many interesting political processes have none of these handy qualities. Nevertheless, there are a number of areas in which enough information is available to allow us to fill in many of the details and perceive general outlines of models of political processes. This is particularly true of voting behavior. In this area, explorations are already under way with at least two models, developed by W. N. McPhee and by J. S. Coleman.[20] The intent in this section is not to examine these models in great detail, but rather to show by example how extensive knowledge about a political process can be organized into a sequential computer model.

Both models predict the preferences of individuals in a sample of voters, with the characteristics of the particular sample to be determined by the investigator. In both models, a number of important processes of campaigns are represented quite literally. Preferences for candidates are represented by numerical weights.

[20] See note 14.

The structure of McPhee's model is rather closely related to available knowledge from surveys: the model uses data obtainable with familiar survey techniques. Each voter in the model's sample is characterized by dispositions toward each of two or three parties, actually weighted frequencies of voting for the parties in the past. The voter is also represented by membership in up to eight social or economic strata, by sociometric ties to other voters in the sample, and by a history of his past voting.

As during a campaign, political stimuli are emitted by the parties at varying strengths (represented by numbers on a scale) for the different strata, thus (with random elements) for individuals belonging to the strata. Vote preference is determined by combinations of stimuli from and dispositions for a party — individuals with weak dispositions for a party will vote for it if it emits strong stimuli directed toward their particular social or economic groupings; conversely, voters who are already strongly disposed toward a party will vote for it even if they receive only weak stimuli.

Sociometric ties to other voters may also have an effect on preference. If the dispositions of two paired voters conflict, they are re-exposed to the stimuli and may develop new preferences; if they agree, *i.e.*, if their existing preferences are socially re-enforced, these preferences are simply retained, and the voters are not re-exposed to campaign stimuli.

Since party dispositions are a function of past voting in the model, with vote in most recent elections affecting dispositions most strongly, changes in preference which occur during a campaign are carried over as partial changes in disposition to the next election.

The output of the model may include information about the effect of the processes of the model on the individual voters, as well as data on the outcome of the election. Results of several studies with this model, both parameter studies and simulations of particular elections, are in publication.[21]

Coleman's model, unlike McPhee's, was designed from the start to simulate a single campaign. Political, psychological, social, and mass

[21] See "Note on a Campaign Simulator," *op. cit.* note 14, and references therein; this article also contains a description of mathematical elements of this model.

media phenomena are specified in greater detail. The model is closely tied in with new applications in election survey technique such as sociometric surveys and simultaneous systematic surveys of the mass media.

One kind of attribute of a campaign which is specified in detail is the set of issues involved. In the campaign's first surveys, which provide the initial data for the model, voters' attitudes toward the issues likely to be important in the campaign and toward the candidates are determined, along with their perceptions of parties' and candidates' positions on the issues. Voters' attitudes are regarded as constant during the campaign, while perception of candidates' positions may change. Preferences for candidates are affected by stimuli from the mass media. The media focus the voters' attention on particular issues or characteristics of the candidates. Then if, for example, a voter's attitude on an issue brought to his attention agrees with his perception of a candidate's stand on the same issue, a counter is activated which increases the voter's preference for the candidate. If his attitude and his perception of a candidate's position conflict, a negative counter is triggered.

Three types of stimuli from the mass media are provided for, focussing attention on issues, candidates, or candidates' positions on issues. In the model, each of these stimuli may appear on television and radio, in newspapers, or in magazines; thus the extent to which a voter's perception of the issues and candidates is affected directly by the mass media depends on whether he is attending to the particular source of stimuli when various attributes are being presented (though he may subsequently be exposed to mass-media stimuli through his contacts with other voters during the campaign).

Each voter in the model is subject to political discussion with three kinds of associates: a neighbor, a fellow worker, and a member of the same religion. His preferences for the candidates are affected by the associate's attitude toward the issues, the characteristics of the candidates, and other attributes of the campaign, in the same way that the voter's own attitudes affect his preferences when applied to his perception of candidates and their stands on issues. The likelihood that a particular attribute will be discussed in a meeting between two individuals is a function of the saliency which the attribute has for each individual.

At an early stage of development, this model predicted well some rather large shifts in aggregate vote intention of a sample of voters during the 1960 campaign. It did much less well at predicting individual vote intention. In any case, of course, it is more reasonable to expect improvement than immediate excellent results.

However, the development of such models does serve a general function even before acceptable validation is achieved — a function which points up the close relation between theory construction and fruitful empirical research. Building a theory about a process involves relating statements about parts of the process to each other. Only by actually carrying out this task in a comprehensive manner, as in the construction of a computer model, can one ascertain where there are gaps in information about the process. Only then can one specify with certainty what data, out of the large set which could be obtained, are needed to complete the theory. It is, of course, possible simply to read a book on voting behavior and with a little imagination chart out a number of areas in which further investigation is needed; but the development of a computer model does the same thing in a precise, exhaustive, and integrated fashion, because, to work at all, the computer program must have these qualities.

With a rapid increase in information about many political processes, the question of how this knowledge is to be arranged and generalized is more important than ever. For instance, recent studies have made it possible to specify some of the ingredients of models of legislative processes which might usefully be simulated. Simply as a suggestive example, not as an adequate plan for a theory, consider a model of the behavior of individual senators deciding what degree of support or opposition to give to a bill.

Like voters, senators frequently have their minds made up in advance. On many issues, they have committed themselves publicly over long periods of time to a position which they are very unlikely to change. Thus we might posit an initial test which the senator applies to a proposal: What is my public stand on this issue? If he has already committed himself to a public position, we might suppose that he is

likely to apply very few additional tests and that the effect of these additional tests will not include a switch to the other side of opinion on the issue, but may include a switch to inaction or indifference.

If no previous public stand is represented in memory, the senator goes on to apply other tests to determine what stand he should take. The order in which additional tests might be applied is not clear. Probably, however, there is a small subset of tests which may completely determine any senator's position. For instance, assuming he has no public position or strong preference, if a proposal is supported by his party leadership, by senators from similar states, and by constituents, it would be reasonable to predict that he will support it, too. Different senators may have different discrimination nets for selecting degrees of support or opposition when stands taken by the several referents of the tests conflict, and different issues may also evoke different sequences of tests in the same individual. Matthews describes some aspects of the position-establishing procedures of the senator who is not a specialist on an issue:

> His personal interests lie elsewhere and, often, so do those of his constituents. He makes up his mind later in the legislative process and is less likely to have a fixed position on such matters. He is more susceptible to "pressure" from party leaders, lobbyists, and constituents. Lacking other clear-cut cues, he will very often fall back on the advice of one or more of his specialist colleagues.[22]

A network of such tests obviously has yet to be described in detail, even for one legislator, but the literature is full of general statements about them. Bailey and Samuel write of Rep. Ayres that on "particularly controversial issues . . . he shared the dislike of most Congressmen of directly antagonizing a large section of his constituency."[23] Rep. Smith was not inclined to compile a voting record contrasting too sharply with that of the rest of the Mississippi delegation. In addition, on most issues, Smith either knew the opinion of friends and supporters in his district and followed them, or he knew the district was not interested.[24]

Young notes, "On some issues it is *de rigueur* for all partisans to be united and agreed."[25] Matthews describes circumstances in which senators are likely to ignore constituent opinion expressed by mail;[26] he also points out the next-to-the-last test in the discrimination net for senators whose previous evaluations have not impelled or enabled them to decide one way or the other:

> On almost every bill, there are a few members who are unable to make up their minds until the last minute, and when floor amendments raise new and unanticipated questions, a sizeable number of senators may be susceptible to a skillful speechmaker who provides them with a simple, appealing, and defensible justification for voting his way.[27]

And the last test: "An uncommitted senator is more likely to vote what he conceives to be the expedient way" when it is obvious what the outcome of a vote is going to be, than when he expects a close vote in which his own decision might affect the outcome.[28]

All of this information about the ways in which senators make up their minds is interesting indeed, but at a level of generality which is not suitable for the construction of a model which could be tested by predicting outcomes in specific cases. Short of a model in which these general processes are precisely defined for an individual legislator or group of legislators over a set of issues, with predictions such as votes on a bill derived with some acceptable degree of accuracy from the postulates of the model, it is difficult to know the meaning of such general propositions much beyond the recognition that the processes to which they refer do exist.

In many cases, of course, it is neither necessary nor desirable to confine oneself to a literal representation of the individuals who participate in a policy-making process, or even of a sample of such participants, as in the computer models of electorates discussed above. It may be preferable to simulate decision functions of organizations without including in the model the details of the goals and strategies of individuals, especially with respect to relatively stable organizations making the same kinds of

[22] D. R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 251.
[23] S. K. Bailey and H. D. Samuel, *Congress at Work* (New York: Holt, 1953), p. 116.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 131–2.
[25] R. Young, *The American Congress* (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 66.
[26] *Op. cit.*, pp. 223–4.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 249.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

decisions over and over again. This is the approach taken in Cyert and March's models of the firm.

Consider, for example, a model of a governmental bugetary process. The evaluating and choosing routines in such a model, to have any sort of general meaning, would have to be defined independently of any particular organizational structure. Instead of describing the decision functions of some particular agencies, budget department, chief executive, and legislature, the model might contain routines to simulate functions which are very likely to be found in any complex governmental budgetary process in the United States. For instance, one might wish to have routines for evaluating at least roughly the likelihood that any one of a set of considered alternative requests would be granted by other decision-makers. Presumably it would be necessary to have a routine which set one year's total request as a function of the previous year's appropriation plus an increment set by a level of aspiration for agency growth. A routine setting level of aspiration would take into account both the intensity of demands within the agency for growth, and agency expectations of success in obtaining desired appropriations. Carrying this analysis still further, expectations of success, it could be hypothesized, are in part a function of past success and of changes in the decision process or in the decision rules of other participants which are perceived to affect degree of success.

These functions are not as they stand descriptive of any specific budgeting process, but they do outline commonly observed behavior of administrative agencies estimating budgetary needs. Both "historical" behavior in estimating needs (simply making small changes in the previous year's budget) and the watchfulness of agencies for new opportunities to press their demands are represented.

The argument is not that we should have had models of legislative or budgetary decision-making by now, for they were scarcely conceivable. But computer models of apparently equally complex behavior are presently being developed, often from no more promising beginnings with respect to already available information and theory.

There is no denying, to be sure, that obtaining exhaustive data on the decision rules of Congressmen presents some difficulties which are avoided in the study of chess players or other individual problem-solvers performing in well-defined contexts. Part of this is, unfortunately, a burden which must be borne, and part stems from conceptual stumbling blocks, some solutions to which we have been discussing. Granting these difficulties, what data-gathering methods are likely to be particularly useful for the development of computer models?

Data for Computer Models

Both of the models of voting behavior are being developed and applied in conjunction with panel surveys. For simulation runs designed to predict the behavior of a real population, the surveys are, of course, necessary to provide information both on the initial values of the variables in the model and on an actual stream of behavior which can be compared with the output of the model. In addition, the survey can be used to provide data on mechanisms which are simply assumed in the models because no evidence about them exists.[29]

What procedures are likely to be useful for gathering detailed information about mental processes and decision-making by individuals and by large, complex organizations? For individual problem-solving and creative processes, the principal source of information, other than introspection, has been protocols of subjects' verbalized thought processes. While performing the particular activity, subjects are asked to think aloud, and what they say is recorded and transcribed. For well defined tasks, this method may be limited only by the subject's ability to be explicit about what he is thinking. For some less well defined decision processes, it is difficult to identify either the objectives or the operations used to achieve them. In a recent article, for example, Reitman discusses procedures for uncovering the thought processes of a composer writing a fugue, with the protocols used as a basis for progressively intensive and detailed questioning.[30]

[29] Other simulation efforts combined with surveys are a computer-simulated mathematical model of voting, reported by I. de Sola Pool and R. Abelson, "The Simulmatics Project," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (Summer, 1961), pp. 167–183; and a probability model of the behavior of individual decision-making units of the economy, for which work to date is reported by G. H. Orcutt *et al., Microanalysis of Socio-Economic Systems: A Simulation Study* (New York: Harper, 1961).

[30] *Op. cit.*, note 11.

In his study of trust investment, Clarkson gives an instructive account of methods used to uncover the sequences of operations which lead to a decision to purchase particular securities. Interviews with bank trust department officers and observation of committee meetings held to review past and future decisions were useful but failed to separate relevant from irrelevant criteria. Clarkson then examined the history of several accounts administered by one investment officer and constructed simple models of processes which seemed to be common to all of the accounts. Finally, the investment officer was asked to think out loud while making decisions about securities. The first problem given him was an artificial one to accustom him to this procedure, but subsequent recordings were made of his verbalized thought processes for accounts which came up in the course of his work.

Even this method failed to uncover all of the processes used to select particular stocks, because the formation of expectations and much of the evaluation of industries, companies and stocks occurred well before the investment officer sat down to select securities for a specific account. To get at these prior decision rules, he was asked to read and comment on the facts and opinion in financial reports to which he subscribed. It was possible by this means to obtain information about decision rules which had not previously been made explicit.[31]

The trust investment model is a case study of one individual. However, more general models, such as the General Problem Solver and Cyert and March's model of large firms in an imperfect market, have also been developed from case studies. Work on the general model of the firm proceeded from case studies of particular (though complex) decisions to studies of decision rules used in repetitive decision-making in a single organization — for example, the process of setting prices on many items in a single department of a large retail store. What distinguishes such a use of case studies to develop general theories is not that the studies are all of one kind of decision, or of decision-making in one organization. Rather, the distinctive feature of this research is constant attention to what is both important in the individual case and general at some level to many cases, a search for relationships and classifications which will permit the interpretation of specific events according to common features.

In all of this work, empirical research and the construction of the model and computer program are tightly interwoven. The researcher moves back and forth between his subjects and his developing conception of what they are doing. The depth to which the researcher must probe and consequently the methods he uses to gather data are determined by the extent to which he is able to formulate a program which both reproduces the stream of behavior of the programmed human system, and does it for the right reason. This is perhaps the only (and certainly the most important) general rule about gathering data for computer models.

As the researcher continues to gather data and develop the model, the capabilities of the computer can assist him in several ways. It generates a series of predictions which can be checked against the real world: theorems proved, stocks selected, prices set, votes cast, and so forth. In addition, the computer can provide complete information on each step it takes. Computer printout can be compared with protocols or case studies of humans performing in the same situation. Thus the processes postulated in the model, as well as its predictive ability, can be confirmed. Incremental improvements can be made in the model and new simulation runs executed; this is especially convenient if the computer program has been written in a fashion which permits easy factorization and therefore changes in parts without rewriting the entire program.[32]

SUMMARY

Interesting decision processes have a way of turning out to be not only complex but highly repetitive. The firm assesses its profit and sales

[31] Clarkson, "The Meno Anew . . ." (note 13), pp. 34–36.

[32] See B. F. Green, Jr., "Computer Languages for Symbol Manipulation," Inst. of Radio Engineers, *Trans. on Human Factors in Electronics*, Vol. HFE-2 (March, 1961), pp. 3–8. For detailed information on IPL-V, the computer language in which most of the programs cited in this paper are written, see A. Newell *et al.*, "Information Processing Language V Manual: Section I, The Elements of IPL Programming; Section II, Programmers' Reference Manual," RAND Corporation P-1897 and P-1918, respectively (1960).

position from day to day and week to week; millions of voters decide how to vote; many agencies prepare and submit budget proposals year after year. The computer is particularly well suited both to keep track of complex relationships and to carry out with great speed the repetitive operations involved in many decision processes. For building and testing theories about processes which are characterized by great complexity, large amounts of information, or much repetition (whether over time or over many individuals or groups), computers are likely to be at least useful and often essential.

The importance of the method, however, means more than the use of a convenient and powerful tool in an existing theoretical context. For the computer places heavy demands on the researcher. It constrains him to be absolutely unambiguous, to specify his terms and statements precisely, exhaustively. Vagueness, deliberate or not, is impossible: it is perfectly clear what each instruction in the computer program does.

Most significantly, the use of computers to simulate behavior permits the construction of different kinds of theories and the investigation of familiar events in different ways than heretofore. Deterministic descriptions of behavior can be represented in a scientific theory as meaningfully as probabilistic statements about transitions from one state of affairs to another. Dynamic processes can be represented in dynamic terms, rather than as relationships among static variables.

In short, we have at our disposal a tool and a method which afford us new ways of organizing and extending knowledge about politics.

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A USE OF SIMULATION IN THE STUDY OF INTER-NATION RELATIONS

• *HAROLD GUETZKOW*

Events, as recorded in all their variety in historical and contemporary documents, are the usual basis for the development of theory about relations among nations. These international events our theory must explain, and these events we eventually hope to predict. Such theory building — consisting of the development of adequate concepts and the relations of these concepts to each other in propositions — must encompass the welter of facts from life situations. Our theories of international relations — be they implicit or explicit — are the stuff from which we compose our policies, and write our newspapers and textbooks. This essay describes an initial effort to utilize simulation techniques as complementary means both for the development of theory and for instructional purposes.[1]

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Simulation is an operating representation of central figures of reality. Simulations may take the form of war games, of pilot chemical plants, of ship-and-harbor scale models, of computer-inventory systems. There are a multitude of such representations (Malcolm, 1958). Will a social simulation of inter-nation relations prove to be of value as a heuristic device for theory

[1] Early plans for the simulation were thought through during my stay at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. The three exploratory runs reported in this paper were supported in 1957–58 by funds from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. My colleagues and students at Northwestern made many suggestions during the seminars devoted to the formulation of these runs. Professors Richard C. Snyder, George I. Blanksten, and R. Barry Farrell personally participated in the early trial run. Mr. Denis A. Sullivan shared some of the preliminary results from his inventory of propositions in international relations, which further helped guide my selection of key variables. But above all, full credit must go to Mr. Robert C. Noel for developing the mechanics of the simulation in a most creative way, never allowing theoretical objectives to be swamped by practical necessities.

development in international relations research? May inter-nation simulation be arranged to allow live participants to play component units for training purposes? Three exploratory runs of an inter-nation simulation in the laboratory of the Program of Graduate Training and Research in International Relations at Northwestern University in 1957–58 suggest that simulation technique may be useful for purposes of both research and training.

Background for Simulation

The efforts in simulation at Northwestern were stimulated by two streams of intellectual endeavor, one represented in the war game and the other deriving from the social psychological group experiment.

The war game has been in existence for many centuries. During the 19th century it flowered in the "rigid" game, in which complicated problems were played by military decision-makers with outcomes determined by elaborate rule books. During the latter part of the 19th century, the "free" game was reinstated, in which the game "director," a battle-experienced military officer, determined the outcomes of plays on the basis of his judgment. Participants in World War I and II employed the war game as a training device and in World War II, the device was used extensively as a quasi-research tool, for prediction of the outcome of military efforts, such as the Battle of Midway and the invasion of the Ukraine. After World War II the development of the war game continued, returning to more rigid forms with the cumberswift programmed computer. From the point of view of the student of international relations, the flowering of a RAND Corporation effort — the military-political game, COLD WAR, as developed by its Division of Mathematics and the POLITICAL EXERCISE, as initiated by Goldhamer and developed in its Division of Social Science (Goldsen, 1956) — is most useful.[2]

The immediate impetus for explorations in simulation came from the author's work in the social psychology of groups. Since the 1930s, experimental psychologists and sociologists have developed face-to-face groups in laboratories to test theories of group interaction (Cartwright and Zander, 1953; Hare, Borgatta, & Bales, 1955). This work with contrived face-to-face groups has been elaborated in the laboratory study of organizations with component parts at both the Graduate School of Industrial Administration at Carnegie Institute of Technology (Guetzkow and Bowes, 1957) and at Case Institute of Technology. An inter-nation simulation may be thought of as another step in the construction of social systems, the contriving of an inter-organizational system.

But the deeper source for this work is found in the developments in decision-making, as exemplified in the work of Simon and Snyder. Simon and his colleagues developed their interests in decision-making from the perspective of public and, later, private administration (Simon, Smithburg, & Thompson, 1950; March, & Simon, with Guetzkow, 1958). Snyder and his colleagues developed their ideas from the perspective of decision-making in foreign politics (Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1954; Snyder, 1958).

Description of the Inter-Nation Simulation

Contrived face-to-face groups, even when they are created in the experimenter's laboratory, are more replications of reality than they are simulations. The component units — that is, the persons participating in the experiment — necessarily respond to their social environment as human beings even though the environment may be artificially simplified. In the war game, however, there is more role-playing, in which the actors need to imagine many features of the military situation and respond to each other's moves in terms of these self-imposed role conceptions. Usually there is time compression, so that, for example, a month's warfare may be enacted within a day. The mechanical and civil engineer often builds his simulation by reducing his phenomena in scale. The operations research analyst represents the

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2 We are most grateful to RAND personnel for the many courtesies extended during our visits to Santa Monica and Washington. Drs. John Kennedy, Robert Chapman, Olaf Helmer, Lloyd Shapley, and Milton Weiner shared their experience in developing the COLD WAR game; Drs. Hans Speier and Joseph Goldsen allowed us many hours for discussion of their POLITICAL EXERCISE.

flow of traffic in symbolic form, so that he may use digits in a computer as simulation of a distribution of vehicles. In making such an analogue, there often is simplification, as when traffic is allowed only to turn left or right, even though vehicles in reality can make U-turns. All these devices have been used in developing the inter-nation simulation. We have attempted to represent social units — nations, in this case — in their inter-relations with each other. We have simplified and reduced the number of variables involved. We have used both analogies and replication in contriving the parts. *Our simulation is an operating representation in reduced and/or simplified form of relations among social units by means of symbolic and/or replicate component parts.*

When one builds literary and mathematical models, one makes choices as to which features of a system are to be represented (Guetzkow, 1958a). When building social simulations, such choices also must be made. One is forced to specify units and interrelations which often may be left abstract and general in verbal models. The concreteness to be embodied in this description of the inter-nation simulation must not be taken seriously. As the work proceeds, revisions necessarily will make the representation more adequate. Eventually, variations will be introduced in order to check effects of different forms of the simulation. The choice of variables and the representation of their interlocking is highly tentative.

FIVE NATIONS AND THEIR TWO DECISION-MAKERS

In the three initial, exploratory runs described in this paper, five "nations" were operated simultaneously. During the first run, the nations were manned by one, or two, or three decision-makers. Those three units operated by one participant tended to be outward oriented, with less attention given to internal considerations. The nation which was operated by three decision-makers became quite bogged down in its internal processes, so that it had little time left for inter-state interactions. The unit manned by two decision-makers seemed balanced in its orientations. In the second and third runs, each nation was manned by two participants, senior and graduate students concentrating in political science.

In each unit, then, an "internal decision-maker" (IDM) made the nation's final decisions with regard to overall policies of the nation as they related to both external and internal considerations. Another participant served as "external decision-maker" (EDM), conducting the relations of his unit with other nations. The EDM reported to the IDM and might have been replaced by the latter. Yet, some IDMs used their EDMs as collaborators in their decisions. The two positions attempt to represent decision-making as it encompasses the nation as a whole, especially as the government relates to its resources and society, and as the nation relates to an external environment, consisting of other nations.

OFFICE-HOLDING

Considerable effort was made to embed the external decisions in the internal environment. The decision makers were under pressure to maintain themselves in office. Office holding depended upon the extent to which the expectations of the nation's validators (e.g., citizens, elites, juntas, and other forces which maintain decision-makers in office) were met. The probability of being maintained in office depended upon calculations made by the researchers as to how well both external and internal goals were being achieved by the nation in question. At the end of three periods of decision-making, the retention or loss of office was ascertained in each nation on the basis of random determinations (with the probability set as the average of the probabilities obtained for each period). By averaging probabilities, the decision-makers were able to take long-range points of view in making decisions which might decrease their momentary chances for office holding. Such a situation typically occurs in electoral processes in which there is delayed response to official actions. When the probability of office holding, however, decreased to specified critical levels, an immediate determination was calculated, even though the routine determinations was still some periods off. Such consequences simulated revolutions and coup d'etats.

NATION-GOALS

In the experiment each nation attempted to accomplish its goals, which then served as a basis for its decisions. In two of the runs, the goals were formulated by the decision-makers

themselves; in the third simulation, goals were assigned to the IDMs by the researchers. Goals included objectives such as security, domination, cooperation, and internal growth.

RESOURCE DECISIONS

Each nation periodically received basic resources which it could allocate to its internal functioning or utilize in external affairs, either as aid or as strategic strength. Its internal use of these resources could be distributed to its validators for immediate gratification or for building up of basic resources during the coming periods. These decisions were recorded on a decision-form by the IDMs, so that they might serve as one of the bases for computation of the probability of office-holding.

INTERACTION AMONG NATIONS

Once each nation had its preliminary goals and had learned how to make its decisions with regard to its resources, the simulation was put into operation. Besides bi-lateral interaction, the EDMs arranged for conferences of some or all of the nations, with and without their IDMs. The EDMs made treaties, giving aid with or without restrictions. The strategic strength of the nation was used for various purposes, including intimidation of other nations. It was possible for one nation to declare war upon another, alone or within alliances. Some nations endeavoured to build permanent forms of international cooperation. As the interaction developed, the nations were allowed to reformulate their goals.

In the first exploratory run, there were direct communications among the EDMs in bilateral contacts and at conferences. However, to insure perspective on the total scene by the decision-makers, it was useful to create a communication system beyond the one established by the EDMs. During the second and third runs, an external communications system was devised by the researchers in which events were reported to all nations, so that there was more understanding by the decision-makers of what was happening within the interaction system. In this "world newspaper" reports were made by the researchers on the office losses as they occurred, how aid was extended, how treaties and alliances were developed. In addition, the EDMs were permitted to publish communiques and announcements for propaganda purposes.

LABORATORY MECHANICS

The group laboratory of Northwestern's Departments of Psychology and Sociology was used for the experiment, as pictured in Figure 1. Although all the participants were physically proximate, only written communications were permitted, to allow the researchers to obtain a complete record of the transactions. Within a nation, the IDM and EDM passed messages back and forth by sliding them through the barrier separating the two halves of the table at which they were seated. Nonparticipating messengers carried the internation messages from one EDM to another. Carbons of all messages were given to the researcher-reporter, so that reports for the newspaper could be prepared from those not marked "RESTRICTED." The nations were shielded from each other by screens. . . .

The conferences were conducted at round tables, with various methods of recording. In small conferences, the decision-makers simply passed a sheet of paper back and forth, with all reading the last reply before the next response was begun. In larger conferences, a blackboard in view of all was used for the interchanges. A record was made of the messages immediately, so that each EDM might have a copy of the conference transcript.

An hour was allowed for each period of the simulation. Half-way through the period, the IDMs completed the decision-forms, so that the researchers might use them in calculating the probabilities of office holding. The consequences of their decisions were returned to the decision-makers at the beginning of the following period.

In calculating the outcomes, the researchers used a combination of rigid rules and subjective judgments. For example, the strength of states was mechanically determined from their strategic strength allocations, as combined through their alliances. On the other hand, subjective judgments were made by the simulation director as to how well the nation was achieving its evolving goals. These various measures were then combined into a single validator satisfaction measure, in terms of which office holding was determined mathematically.

No attempt is made in this description to give all the details of the simulation in its full concreteness. Only when the design of the



FIGURE 1. Group Laboratory, Northwestern University

simulation settles into more permanent form will it be useful to report with such elaboration. It is hoped that the above description enables the reader to picture the operations. Once we begin using the simulation for particular training or research purposes, it will be necessary, of course, to specify the details. The three runs, each lasting from three to four hours, indicate there is some hope of simulating inter-nation relations in the laboratory.

Simulation as Model Building

It is believed that inter-nation simulation will be of heuristic value in clarifying our theories of international relations. Although it is but one of alternative ways of building models about the operation of social systems, its operating character demands a greater clarity in formulation than is often necessitated in literary and mathematical formulations.

To construct an operable representation, one must specify variables with some precision and then interlock the variables with some exactitude. So that the participants and researchers can operate the model at a scale reduced from that of the original being simulated, a limited number of key variables must be selected. One attempts to represent a whole class of variables, such as the economic, by a more limited set of prototypic ones. To provide feedback from the decisions to the decision-makers, one simply must specify the interlocking which exists among the variables — otherwise there will be no inter-relation.

As in models which present verbal structures isomorphic to the phenomena being studied, one often has characteristics hidden within the interstices of the model. Because we are using human beings as decision-makers, they bring both their personal characteristics into the model and their own implicit theories of the way in which nations should behave. Eventually it will be necessary to appraise these personal styles of decision-making and organizational presuppositions, so that their influence on the evolving inter-nation interaction may be studied. In one of our exploratory runs, the presence of a decision-maker with a particularly strong interest in dominating other nations was as determinate as the presence, in another run, of a decision-maker who wanted to implement morality standards through development of an international organization.

Perhaps the heuristic values of simulation

may be increased by underspecifying parts of the model. To date our strategy has been to build a well structured base for the decisions made within each nation, but to leave the structuring of inter-nation relations ambiguous. Then the interaction generated in the simulation may evolve characteristics of an inter-nation system which are quite independent of the conscious expectations of both the participants and the researchers. It was interesting to note in one run how the demands of the simulated operation forced the development of a clearer division of labor between IDM and EDM than either wanted. Will the development of the inter-nation system force supra-state organization, above and beyond the nations themselves, when we allow the simulation to continue for ten to fifteen hours instead of cutting it short at three or four?

It would be feasible to put the calculation of the decision consequences on computers, as is done in the business game of the American Management Association (Ricciardi and Craft, 1957). Should the translation of the decisions into office holding probabilities be made more complicated, it may be necessary to do this. Oliver Benson has developed an all-computer simulation called "A Simple Diplomatic Game" (1958). Using an IBM 650 Stored Program Computer, Benson is developing a generalized game involving four preparatory sets of input data, "national power," "interest in other states," the propensity of each of nine powers to act, and geographic location. Nine action decisions may then be fed into the machine, which is programmed to compute a set of consequences, as well as "counter-actions." Our simulation differs from both the AMA Business Game and Benson's Diplomatic Game in that our development allows the participants to create consequences as they derive from their inter-group interaction, quite free of programs in the computer.

One of the puzzles encountered in using simulation involving human decision-makers is the extent to which the representation shades into the phenomenon itself. In experimental work with small groups, the social psychologist actually produces face-to-face relations. One would expect in such laboratory replication of the phenomena a surer prediction to the world of nature than when one depends upon the formal isomorphism employed in a simulation. Yet, by using human components — by contriving nations as units which actually interact — to what extent has this simulation become an exemplification of the phenomena themselves? But no matter, for when models developed in simulation predict important features of real inter-nation systems, the distinction becomes of little consequence.

Perhaps most exciting is the potential which simulation models hold for exploration of contemporary verbal theories about inter-national relations. It is feasible to simulate such characteristics as variation in size of nation, representing small and great powers in the same interaction system. It is possible to so structure the simulation as to have nations with rapid growth and slow growth in interaction with each other. We have an impressive literature which can provide hypotheses for examination within the inter-nation simulation.

For instance, we might study the proposition by Haas and Whiting that although "the majority of alliances are concluded for purposes of self-preservation, the dynamics of international relations often transform them into pacts of self-extension for at least one of the parties" (1956, p. 162). By examining the messages of the EDM's we may understand the arguments used in persuading other nations to join alliances. Then, once established, we can check the extent to which the alliance now is used for self-extension. Consider Kennan's hypothesis, that international "conflicts are to be effectively isolated and composed" the more accurate the perception of the given power relationships surrounding the conflict (1954, p. 36). By asking our decision-makers to record their perceptions of power among the units, we can check whether accuracy in such perceptions does lead to more adequate conflict management in the simulation. Because of the costly nature of simulation, it will be wise to explore a number of related hypotheses simultaneously. For example, while one is working Kennan's hypotheses, it would be feasible, by varying the number of nations, to check Kaplan's notion that "mistakes or failure in information can be tolerated more easily if the number of actors is greater" (1957, p. 34).

Gradually tighter bodies of verbal theory are being developed. One might use simulation for exploring these verbal constructions. For example, the theory of political integration created

by Van Wagenen and Deutsch and their colleagues at the Center for Research on World Political Institutions might be mirrored in simulation. Would their prediction of a pluralistic security-community among the nations be realized when conditions of mutual responsiveness to each other's need are simulated? (Deutsch, et al., 1957, p. 66). Or explore Guetzkow's hypothesis that "the more adequately the members of a group envision the techniques of intergroup collaboration as means to their ends, the greater the tendency to move toward collaboration." (1957, p. 54). It would seem feasible to explore Kaplan's constructs of state systems, such as the hierarchical system, even though no exemplification of this phase exists at present in nature. Benson has utilized Quincy Wright's "propensity-to-act" notions in his all-computer simulation.

Once we settle upon a particular design for the inter-nation simulation, it will be feasible to represent the assembly of existent nations. First, one would need to characterize each of these nations on the present variables which are incorporated into the simulation. Using these characterizations as initial conditions, the simulation might be operated, generating consequences — that is, predictions of the evolution of the present international system.

It would seem, however, undesirable — in the present stage of underdevelopment of simulation — to attempt to have our participants role-play particular countries, such as Spain and Indonesia. Would not such encouragement toward role-playing tend to secure reactions in terms of the presuppositions each participant has as to the nature of a particular country's reactions in a foreign policy situation? Then, as was done in the RAND exercise, we would be embodying our participant's theories of how nations are supposed to react rather than exploring reactions produced by the interaction itself.

Use of Simulation for Training

An inter-nation simulation may prove useful for training purposes in a number of situations (Guetzkow's, 1958b). It may be used as exercise material in the training of policy-makers, and it may complement texts and lectures in the teaching of international relations to undergraduate and graduate students.

As the war game has been judged of practical value in providing decision-maker experience to military executives, so the manning of an inter-nation simulation may be helpful in the training of foreign policy makers. The business decision-game, developed by the American Management Association, is found useful for certain levels of management training, especially as it allows specialized executives to gain over-all perspectives.[3] It was just in this respect that the RAND political exercise was thought to have been most fruitful. Goldsen reports, "The game puts a premium on the mobilization and reordering of preexisting knowledge in relation to a special focus, a focus on political action, policy thinking . . . and the analytic assessments of the consequences of alternative courses of action. Seeing new inter-connections of earlier insights . . . seems to have been considerably fostered by the game . . ." (1956, p. 36). The inter-nation simulation, used in conjunction with substantive training in foreign policy, could provide quasi-practical experiences in the exercise of policy judgment. By making explicit that which is often implicit, the simulation would encourage the use of more sophisticated decision-making procedures. Because the simulation could be arranged to provide a constant bombardment of decision-events, practice in decision-making under continuous pressure might be obtained from its use by policy officers preparing for heavy interaction situations. Perhaps the inter-nation simulation can be developed as an adjunct to the case materials being used in the career development programs for foreign service officers in our Foreign Service Institute.

Undergraduate senior students were involved along with graduate students in the three initial exploratory runs reported herein. Seniors with an international relations course background seemed to profit from the experience more than those without. They felt they were actually making use of their knowledge, as they came face-to-face with the quasi-realities of foreign policy decisions. This opportunity to behave as responsible decision-makers increased their enthusiasms for further understanding of the nature of international politics. They felt

[3] We are grateful for the many courtesies of Mr. Virgil Kraft in allowing us full access to their simulation without cost.

they were plumbing the depth and extent of their knowledge. One of the students reported, "The simulation really brought me down to earth. I finally faced the complexities of international relations. All nations wanted their own ways and it's hard to accomplish what you want." The simulation might be integrated as a series of laboratory exercises in international relations. As Alger suggests for an international organization course, the simulation might be designed to demonstrate progressive stages of international structure, going from bi-lateral relations to international conferences, to intermittent councils, to continuous session international bodies without and with secretariates (Alger).

The graduate students found their experiences in the simulation rewarding in many of the same ways as the undergraduates. But in addition, they were most intrigued with its potential as a research tool for building explicit theory.

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55

POLITICAL GAMING IN THE CLASSROOM

• BERNARD C. COHEN

Political science is witnessing a burgeoning interest in techniques of political simulation, or political gaming, for the purpose of bringing problems of the political world closer to the experience of individual students, scholars, or practitioners; and for the purpose of overcoming the limitations that historical reality — especially in the international field — imposes on the scientific method. The forms of the simulations that are being employed are varied: e.g., there are attempts to replicate particular situations by having teams of students play the parts of decision-makers in fictitious nations;[1] there are attempts to simulate international reality by the device of computer techniques;[2] there are "reality" games in which players take the parts of real-life decision-makers in particular countries, working their way through realistic problems as they are introduced.[3] This paper will focus on the last-mentioned category — the reality games, especially as they have developed in the classroom — and will attempt to re-evaluate some of the claims that have been made in their behalf.

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[1] An early report on these efforts which are still being made at Northwestern University was made by Harold Guetzkow, "A Use of Simulation in the Study of Inter-Nation Relations," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4, No. 3, July 1959.

[2] Cf. Oliver Benson, "A Computer Simulation of International Politics," paper prepared for the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Columbia, Mo., May 12, 1961; parts of this paper are to appear in Harold Borko, ed., *Computer Applications in the Behavioral Sciences*, to be published by Prentice-Hall.

[3] Cf. Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Norman J. Padelford, "Three Experiments in Political Gaming," *American Political Science Review*, December 1959; Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Political Gaming," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1960; Herbert Goldhamer and Hans Speier, "Some Observations on Political Gaming," *World Politics*, Vol. XII, No. 1, October 1959.

I

The attempt to simulate political reality in the classroom or on the campus is by no means a new phenomenon. But until the RAND Corporation began its exercises in what it called political gaming six years ago,[4] we were likely to call what we did on the campus "role-playing," or even to ignore the problem of a label and concentrate on the forms: for example, model United Nations or League of Nations sessions; mock political conventions; or perhaps just the simple attempted resolution in the classroom of a contemporary foreign policy problem involving a few countries. Within the last few years, political gaming, especially in the foreign policy field, influenced and enriched by the RAND experience, has tended to become stylized: the games typically involve a small number of real-world countries, represented by small teams of policy-makers who are given some imaginary but "realistic" problems to cope with, and who may be instructed either to work out their own policies to attain the best possible outcomes — or what has been called an "optimal" strategy — or else to act as they believe the country they represent would act in the real world — or what has been called a "predicted" strategy.[5] Moves in these political reality games take place at specified intervals covering several weeks, and are supervised by referees who rule on the acceptability of moves; the referees may perform other functions also, such as representing all countries not formally taking part in the game, or acting

[4] The RAND experiences have been summarized and their internal papers cited in Goldhamer and Speier, *op. cit.*

[5] See Goldhamer and Speier, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of these strategies.

as everyone's intelligence service, or acting the part of Nature. Games of this kind are called "reality games" to distinguish them from the more abstract kinds of simulation, even though the problem-situations being played out may be quite improbable.

These games, which have been played at a number of different universities, have been described in sufficient detail by Bloomfield and Padelford, and Goldhamer and Speier, to provide some familiarity with the genre. The author also directed a game of this kind at the University of Wisconsin in the Spring of 1960. Since that experience is relevant to the comments that appear below, it may be worthwhile to describe that game in more detail.

II

The foreign policy game at Wisconsin was played over a two-week period, near the end of the second semester. Game assignments had been made several weeks earlier, and students prepared for the game by writing papers appropriate to the problems confronting their real-life counter-parts, without having been told the nature of the game-world problems. The players were given a relatively free hand in choosing policies — i.e., optimal strategies — on the ground that they were not well enough versed in the real situations to do a good job with predicted strategies. But they were admonished to be as realistic as they knew how, with the added incentive that the referee would rule on the acceptability of their moves.

On the Friday preceding the game, the players were given a "scenario" — a description of the game world. The scenario was set "in the present," on the assumption that one set in the future dissolved some of the constraints that define "realism." The players were told that they could accept events in the real world up to the day they were given the scenario, but that for the next two weeks they were to keep the two worlds separate, as much as possible. The major problem in the game involved an attempt by Iraq to force Syria out of the United Arab Republic; a minor theme was a renewed warning by the Soviet Union that a peace treaty with East Germany was imminent. The referee stood ready to introduce additional problems into the game, to keep the policy fires stoked, but his intervention was not needed. The players resolved the conflict over Syria very quickly — in order to be free to follow their own designs: the rest of the game was concerned largely with the consequences of an effort by the United Arab Republic to incorporate Jordan. The Soviet challenge in Germany did not materialize until the last play of the game, by which time the tension in the Near East had abated, without war and, be it said, without the incorporation of Jordan into the UAR.

There were 90 students in the game, drawn from two undergraduate classes, one in the substantive problems of American foreign policy, and one in the conduct of American foreign affairs. There were eight "foreign" countries, with five or six players each — generally a President or Premier, a foreign minister, and several foreign office specialists in the problems of some of the countries represented in the game. The United States team had 45 players — and in this respect the game differed from the "stylized" reality game described above. All the major foreign policy-making offices and institutions in the United States government were represented in the game, including an eleven-man Congress, and a nine-man CIA.

There were six formal moves scheduled in the game, to be made — i.e., submitted to the referee for processing and distribution — after regular meetings on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday mornings. Each formal move, however, could consist of as many individual actions as a team cared to make. There were four evening sessions, on Tuesday and Thursday of each week, in order to facilitate negotiations and policy-making; copies of the game newspaper, which recorded the unclassified moves of the teams together with whatever other leading or misleading information the teams put into the paper, were also distributed at these evening sessions. There was a diplomatic correspondent in the game, who wrote a column for each issue of this paper.

An interesting side-light on this game was that it was played during the U-2 incident and its aftermath in the aborative summit meeting in Paris. A few of the reflective players were struck by the "unreality" of the real world as they were struggling to be "realistic" in the game world.

III

The temptation to evaluate this particular experience in gaming will be subordinated here to the more relevant problem of evaluating the

whole procedure. What are the advantages and disadvantages of these classroom reality games for the education of undergraduates in both the form and substance of policy-making, and also for the enterprise of theory-building in international relations? The advocates of gaming in general have tended to couch its advantages chiefly in terms of these two sets of pay-offs, although it is recognized that no one type of game can do equally well on both of these counts, and that it is necessary to relate the design of the game to the major intellectual purpose for which it is being played.[6] Part of the skepticism about the merits of classroom gaming that is reflected in these pages stems from the apparent incompatibility of these two objectives: a technique that is designed to educate undergraduates by role-playing is likely to be far too blunt to serve significant theoretical purposes, for reasons that will be explored below. But there are more important reasons for being skeptical: it is not at all clear that classroom gaming serves *either* of these two objectives very well.

The advantage which is most commonly claimed for political gaming is the sitmulation of intense student interest, by exposing students to the experience of trying to make decisions in a political environment.[7] The level of interest that results is generally regarded as a gain that is not to be found in the ordinary course of reading and lectures and/or discussion. This advantage has in fact become an article of faith among gaming practitioners — and it is easy to see why this might be the case. A game will invariably elicit among some participants attentiveness, enthusiasm and a degree of hard work and vicarious identification and participation that have no parallel in the ordinary classroom routine. This can be seen, in the Wisconsin game, for example, in the delegation that plotted in the Rathskeller until midnight, or in the delegation that had its own stationery and seal prepared; or, as in a game at West Point, in the delegation that showed up complete in native costume, and so on. Yet there is point in asking whether this constitutes sufficient evidence to prove the point: no one has ever systematically investigated the possibility, for example, that those whose interest and enthusiasm are visibly enlisted by games are those who are most interested and enthusiastic about the subject in the regular class, and hence that there is little net increase in interest in the subject. This, of course, refers to student-games, where the participants represent a captive audience; when trained specialists volunteer to play a game, one can assume interest to start with. It might even turn out to be the case that the professors who direct the games are more interested than the students — and thus they tend to see chiefly the evidence that confirms their wisdom in conducting the exercise. On two separate occasions during the Wisconsin game, headcounts were taken during the evening sessions, when the intense activity, which is the visible manifestation of interest and enthusiasm, was at its height — and it was discovered that twenty to twenty-five students were enjoying an unexplained absence. Perhaps the correct proposition is that political gaming stimulates both interest and boredom, in undetermined proportions. It should be noted that Bloomfield and Padelford, in their quite favorable report on "Three Experiments in Political Gaming," mention similar evidence of boredom, although they do not pay much attention to it when they formulate their conclusions.[8]

Furthermore, there is the question, interest in what? What kind of interest is it that gets stimulated? The implication, of course, is interest in the total subject, but this no doubt overstates the case. Judging from the response to a questionnaire that some of the Wisconsin players filled out at the end of their game, it would appear that interest attaches more to "negotiations," i.e., to the talking parts of the game, than to any other aspects of the foreign policy process. A number of students were, by their own admission, least interested in the game newspaper which distributed some rather essential information about the preceding move; they resented the time necessary to read it — on one occasion it was nearly 12 single-spaced pages long — and wanted only to get back "into the ring," so to speak. This suggests, then, that the simple and generally accepted propostition that games stimulate the

[6] See Bloomfield's discussion of this point, *op. cit.*, pp. 57–59.

[7] Bloomfield, e.g., writes that "many who have been involved agree that the most unequivocal successes have been in the educational uses of the political game." *Op. cit.*, p. 59. See also Goldhamer and Speier, *op. cit.*, pp. 79, 81.

[8] Bloomfield and Padelford, *op. cit.*, p. 1111.

interest of students in exceptional ways deserves to be examined with greater rigor than has so far been the case. Some effort should be made to compare the effects of ordinary courses in foreign policy with the impact that a game makes, upon similar kinds of students.

Other educational advantages which are claimed for games of this kind concern the supposedly unequalled insight which students get into the complexities of decision-making in the real world. One set of thoughts on this proposition is similar to those just discussed: Where is the evidence to sustain it? Who are the students who get the insight? And what does the insight consist of? (The student in the Wisconsin game who seemed to learn the most about the constraints induced by a confrontation with superior power, fell afoul of the campus authorities, and subsequently of the Ft. Lauderdale authorities, in the months following the game!) But a second line of reasoning argues the *unreality* of classroom reality games, and hence the very limited applicability of whatever insights may be induced by their simulation.[9] Let us, then, consider more directly the disadvantages or the limitations of such games for both theoretical and educational purposes.

One of the most important of these disadvantages in simulation is the very great difficulty of introducing realistic political weights into a political encounter, and the even greater difficulty of maintaining those weights in a situation that changes very rapidly as a consequence of moves made by the players themselves. It is one thing to have a Soviet delegation, say, and an Israeli delegation involved in the same game, but it is quite another to sustain a pattern of interaction in which the Soviet representatives and the Israeli representatives accurately reflect internal or external constraints on themselves. In the Wisconsin game, the impact of the great powers was slight, although for reasons that differed for each country. The Soviets were unable to generate an impression of great and expanding power; they lacked the means and the manner that would exert an influence on the behavior of their fellow students, some of whom had their own ideas about what they wanted to do in the game and were not inclined to be deterred by their friends! The American team was leaderless and divided, and it was unable to produce much policy, or have much effect on the game, despite its great size. The West German team was headed by an alert German student, who tried to increase the value of the Chancellor's forays into diplomacy by rationing the frequency of his contacts with the other heads of government. This bit of realism, as well as other diplomatic niceties embedded in his state papers, were totally lost on his less sensitive and less informed fellow players, who chose to ignore him. As a result, the smaller powers in this game had an influence that far exceeded in type and scope the influence that these powers possess in the real world. The major problems in the game remained Near Eastern problems, and the major creators of events were the Near Eastern countries, especially Egypt and Iraq.

This instability and fundamental unreality of the game world's power structure are common features of the so-called "reality" games in the classroom; this emerges in almost every discussion of such games. The same problem characterized the internal political structure of the large American government team in the Wisconsin game — a point which bears on the feasibility of decision-making games in domestic arenas. One can constitute such a team according to prevalent descriptions and hypotheses concerning the grosser features of the foreign policy-making process, but one cannot guarantee that the players will act even remotely as real-world politicians do in making their institutions and their political machinery work. For one thing, the players owe their power and position to the director or the referee, and not to the President, or the White House, or the electorate, or some other political institution or Constitutional stipulation. And in the Wisconsin game, the players were so weighted down by the lack of effective political organization in the American government team that they were incapable of producing meaningful political policy.

This is not to argue that it is inherently impossible to introduce and maintain realistic political factors in such a game — although in a practical sense the policing problem involved

[9] Bloomfield and Padelford are disturbed by the inherent distortion of reality in games only when they consider the possible predictive uses of games; they are not explicitly troubled by this problem in other circumstances. E.g., *op. cit.*, pp. 1113–14.

in the maintenance of any set of political factors might eliminate the "free play" of these games and transform them into more abstract types of simulation, or, by clamping down and disallowing "unrealistic" moves, might spoil the fun of the game for the players. The point, rather, is that these factors have not in fact been maintained in classroom reality games in the past, and further, that very little attention has been paid to this as a problem. The chief difficulty, perhaps, is the substantial irrelevance, to the student-players, of the kinds of constraints that operate effectively in the politics of the real world. How does one translate the risks of war, or the expectation of violence, or the expectation of political defeat, or, simply, the uncertainty about where a winning coalition will come from on some unknown issue three months hence — how does one translate these things into the calculations that an average student takes seriously? If a game war breaks out, is he to be punished? and if so, how? What kinds of punishments constitute realistic sanctions against war? What kinds of value-losses can be imposed? Being sent "to the showers," so to speak, may constitute no punishment, especially on a beautiful spring day! On the other hand, the possibility of earning a D may constrain the politics of the game in a wholly unrealistic manner. It might be concluded, then, that despite one's best efforts to the contrary, a freely moving political game with students playing remains fundamentally a game, and not a representation of reality. And if this is the case, there are some serious reservations that may be entertained about the usefulness of the technique for developing or testing substantive hypotheses about international relations.

A second limitation is implicit in this first one: most students — graduate as well as undergraduate — are too uninformed, and too inexperienced, perhaps too "culture-bound," to play the part of national foreign policy leaders with any effectiveness. Their knowledge of objective situations, as well as of the political pressures that define particular policy-making environments, is rudimentary, even as far as their own country is concerned. Within the American team in the Wisconsin game, for instance, students who had spent the whole semester studying the conduct of foreign affairs and the processes of foreign policy-making, were unable to put themselves into the shoes of their real-life counterparts. There were no relations at all between the White House and the Congress; the Congress itself acted as an executive rather than a legislative body; the CIA members acted as if their sole function were espionage; and so forth. With a poverty of this rather essential knowledge, it is futile to expect students to be able to pursue "predicted" strategies; they simply do not know enough about the roles they are supposed to be playing, to play them any other way than impressionistically, and without finesse. This is likely to be a problem at any large university, where almost all courses are open to students with little specialized background, and very few courses are restricted to political science majors. Given the ordinary difficulty in defining what would be a "predicted" strategy — since governments habitually do unpredicted things — the added difficulty of getting students to pursue it constitutes a virtually insuperable obstacle to the use of "reality" gaming as a means of testing particular propositions.

Furthermore, undergraduates do not do any better when they are instructed to design an "optimal" strategy. Superficially, one might conclude that the general use of optimal strategies gives the greatest intellectual freedom to students who lack the precise knowledge required to follow through with a predicted strategy. On closer examination, though, one might see that an optimal strategy, if it is to have any discipline, demands even more from the student than does a predicted strategy: without the guidelines that are offered by the known political strategies of known political leaders of known countries, the students are expected to think through some alternative and contingent moves in order to try to achieve a set of objectives in a political milieu that they can scarcely identify. This calls for a level of experience or sophistication that is rare — and not only on the campus. Given these instructions, the student will perform, because he has to; he may even do it with some enthusiasm: but no matter how he does it, the result is not likely to be a representation of "reality." It is also unlikely that this kind of a process will provide a testing ground for theories about political behavior in the international field. Working with seasoned practitioners as players — with men who know what it means to act

"as if" they were policy-makers — it is possible to use optimal strategies as ways of exploring new possibilities of political response; but working with students does not offer the disciplined exploration of alternative possibilities or the systematic and disciplined testing of specific hypotheses, that would make political gaming useful in the terms of its advocates.

A third difficulty with classroom games of the reality type, and a difficulty which was richly demonstrated in the Wisconsin game, concerns a personnel problem: there are very few "success" criteria that can be applied to match individual players to the requirements of particular roles. In the real world, most policy-makers arrive at their positions as a consequence of some kind of aptitude or ambition or training or experience, even if it is limited to the political arts. The person who organizes a political game in the classroom will not be so well endowed; his enrollment will determine his players, and even the processes of self-selection into a course known to contain a game are not going to produce many players with the requisite skills or personalities. Furthermore, unless one has worked carefully with the students over a long period of time, one is unlikely to know very much about how even the brightest ones will behave under certain simulated conditions. In the Wisconsin game, a number of students who seemed eminently qualified "on paper" for particularly important slots in the game turned out to lack the energy, the sensitivity, the responsiveness — or even the interest — that make for success in these jobs. This, then, is a hazard to be added to the other hazards involved in the pursuit of predicted strategies: even *if* a player knows all about the role he is playing, about the objective foreign-policy situation, and about the political environment of policy-making — which are all unlikely contingencies — the probability that he will *behave* in a manner that is indicated by that role is rather low. An optimal strategy imposes equally great demands on players in the way of political activism, political skill, and intellectual nimbleness. In the widespread absence of these qualities, one is not likely to get very far with the testing of theoretical propositions no matter what mixture of predicted and optimal strategies one may employ.

No doubt there are lessons learned by at least some players when important jobs are held by persons whose skills are not appropriate to those jobs; in the Wisconsin game, as in a game at Columbia University several years ago conducted by Warner R. Schilling, a number of players on the American delegation learned some of the things that might happen if a President plays an extremely passive role. But this is not a major pay-off for a major game; there are much more economical ways of teaching that lesson.

The systematic exploring or testing of theoretical propositions by means of classroom simulation calls for repetitive experimentation. Surely no one would regard a proposition as valid just because of the results of a single political game! A fourth limitation, then, on the use of classroom reality games to explore aspects of international relations theory lies in the very great difficulty of replication. All of the other problems that have been discussed above, which hamper the contribution that classroom gaming can make either to theory or to instruction, are also relevant to the difficulty of replication. If there is grave question whether the testing of theoretical problems in any game is significant, it is hard to claim significant results for the testing that would take place in a lot of games.

But there is still another difficulty in the replication of reality games. There are very many variables involved in the outcome of such a game, and at the present time at least, no one is prepared to say which variables affect the outcome in what ways. Yet conditions vary from university, and from semester to semester within any one university, so that it is virtually impossible to duplicate games so that all or nearly all the variables are constant. Size of classes vary; different people are attracted to the classes because of the existence of the game — and because of the ways students evaluate prior games; different class hours are assigned to the game; different schedules and different time periods are assigned; different physical layouts exist, which affect the interaction among teams and players; different resources are available so that the services performed for the players may differ; the quality of students may differ in different institutions; their backgrounds and preparations may differ; games played in different semesters may be differently affected by the weather; and so on. The importance of some of these factors may be illustrated by the Wisconsin game.

The size of the classes that made up the game

had much to do with the "shape" of the game world, particularly the number of countries in the game. And in particular, the size of the class in the Conduct of American Foreign Affairs virtually dictated the size and strongly affected the composition of the American Government team; a smaller and more cohesive team might have been much more energetic in the policy sense, with different effects on the game. The class hours that were set aside for the two classes participating in the game determined their day-time meeting hours. It also made it impossible to combine students from the two classes into particular country teams, since the classes met at different hours. The physical lay-out was important. The day-time meetings were held in eight rooms in three different buildings; this made negotiations easier among those countries in the same building, and harder among those in different buildings. Furthermore, when the same room assignments were occupied an hour later by various branches and agencies of the American government team, it introduced an additional complicating factor in the internal administration of that team. These tendencies, which were strongly felt in the month of May, would have been magnified greatly if the game had been played at the end of the first semester, when the outdoor temperature was perhaps 50 degrees lower. Finally, the referee had a large administrative burden in connection with the game, although he was assisted from time to time by two graduate students. With larger resources at his disposal, he might have been free to perform more and better services for the teams, which would have had some impact on the conduct of the game itself.

Considering all of these variables, perhaps the best that can be done in the way of replication is to start with the same scenarios, or sets of problems, in different games, and then compare the moves and outcomes; but it would be stretching the evidence then to draw theoretical conclusions about causes and consequences in the policy sense. The extreme difficulty in holding conditions constant for purposes of replication also means that one would run into serious problems in trying to vary only certain particular conditions for purposes of experimentation. These are all part of the instabilities of the classroom milieu, and they militate strongly against the use of classroom reality games for systematic theoretical purposes. While no detailed evaluations have so far been made, the attempts at M.I.T., Columbia, and West Point to replicate certain games several years ago apparently had no theoretical signficance. An SSRC document summarizing the proceedings of a Conference at West Point on the integration of national security policy into the social sciences summarizes the concluding remarks of Warner R. Schilling of Columbia University as follows: "The idea of playing the same game at three institutions offered interesting comparisons for the students, although it did not seem to add much to the game itself."[10]

Finally, there are some other limitations that are less central than those already mentioned, but they are worth noting. In most universities, where resources to conduct games are limited, the course instructor has to referee the game in addition to handling all the other administrative arrangements, such as the supervision of secretarial services, the distribution of official game information, the securing of rooms, and so forth. All this, of course, comes on top of whatever other university obligations he has to meet during this period. Apart from what this means for the referee's ability to perform services for the players, the larger the game the more difficulty the referee is likely to have in monitoring or controlling the flow of information and communication among the players. Theoretically he should know everything that is going on; but practically it is most difficult for him to do so. The loss in game control — and hence in programmed purposes of the game — should be apparent.

Furthermore, there is an important distortion of real-life situations in the fact that the "openendedness" of reality is replaced in political games by a fixed number of moves and a predetermined ending to the game. One can tamper with this circumstance, but never really do away with its fundamental limitation. The experience is less like a segment of political reality, and more like a conference, with its three clearly defined stages: the getting acquainted stage, the productive period in the middle, and the final stage when the conferees are thinking about the problems they will confront when they get home. In the Wiscon-

[10] Social Science Research Council. "Summary of Proceedings, Conference on the Social Sciences and National Security Policy, held at United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, June 17–19, 1959," mimeo., p. 23.

sin game, at least, there was no growth of irresponsibility as the exercise drew to its close, which one might have expected from players who had just "one last chance" to attain some of their objectives; rather, there was a rapid loss of interest, involvement and commitment, which has few parallels in the work-a-day political world.

One might reasonably expect that as knowledge of the techniques of political gaming spreads, more and more use will be made of them, not only in foreign policy courses but more generally in the political science curriculum.[11] In these circumstances, there may be resonance in an argument which states that an enterprise which requires such a heavy investment of time, effort, and resources as this does, ought to have a predictably high return. It would be hard to claim that such a point has been reached at the present time, although one can go a step further and argue that it never will reach such a point unless there is further "experimentation" with, or, more properly, development of, the technique. There is no question but that political reality games can be a great deal of fun — for some people, at least. They can be a welcome change from the lecture routine, both for the professor and the students. But it takes a sizeable fraction of a semester to organize and conduct a game, a point which should be kept in mind by anyone who contemplates a game for the first time. The Wisconsin game took two weeks to play out; but it was preceded by about a week of explanation, all told, during the course of the semester, and was followed by nearly a week of evaluation. In addition, each student spent more time writing a paper on some aspect of the role he was to play, which the director of the game had to read. This added up to something like twenty-five percent of the available time in the semester; and any instructor can find many competing claims for such a large block of time. One could undoubtedly improve the conduct of the game itself by spending even more time in preparing the students for it, but that would aggravate the problem of time even more!

One can think of a number of ways to make these games more fun for more people; for instance, as Warner Schilling has suggested, one can invite journalism students to take over the task of producing the game newspaper This would take a large burden off the shoulders of the director, as well as increase the verisimilitude of the information-environment in which policy is made. Similarly, one can invite psychology and sociology majors to study different patterns of decision-making in small-group country-teams. This last possibility has additional merit of another kind: it might even be helpful in measuring the pay-offs of political reality games, which is still the greatest need of all. For until there is more acceptable evidence of what games actually contribute to the learning process, and to theory development, the future of gaming will be justifiably uncertain.

[11] W. Phillips Davison has recently reported on his use of "A Public Opinion Game," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. XXV, No. 2, Summer 1961.

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REPUTATION AND REALITY IN THE STUDY OF "COMMUNITY POWER"

• RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER

Few books in recent years have had more influence on the study of local politics than Floyd Hunter's *Community Power Structure*.[1] Based on a new research technique which promised to make the study of political influence easier and more systematic, this volume reported that power in "Regional City" (Atlanta) was concentrated in a small, cohesive elite of businessmen. Following the publication of *Community Power Structure* a number of researchers used Hunter's method in other cities and, for the most part, produced similar findings of business dominance.[2] The basic assumption underlying this method is that reputations for influence are an index of the distribution of influence. The researcher asks respondents either to rank names on a list or to name individuals who would be most influential in securing the adoption of a project, or both.[3] He assigns power to the leader-nominees according to the number of times they are

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[1] Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953.

[2] Robert E. Agger, "Power Attributions in the Local Community," *Social Forces*, 34 (May, 1956), pp. 322–331; Robert E. Agger and Vincent Ostrom, "The Political Structure of a Small Community," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 20 (Spring, 1956), pp. 81–89; Robert E. Agger and Vincent Ostrom, "Political Participation in a Small Community," in Heinz Eulau *et al.*, editors, *Political Behavior*, Chicago: Free Press, 1957, pp. 138–148; Robert E. Agger and Daniel Goldrich, "Community Power Structures and Partisanship," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (August, 1958), pp. 383–392; Ernest Barth and Baha Abu-Laban, "Power Structure and the Negro Sub-Community," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (February, 1959), pp. 69–76; Orrin E. Klapp and L. Vincent Padgett, "Power Structure and Decision-making in a Mexican Border City," *American Journal of Sociology*, 65 (January, 1960), pp. 400–406; Delbert C. Miller, "Industry and Community Power Structures: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (February, 1958), pp. 9–15; Delbert C. Miller, "Decision-making Cliques in Community Power Structures: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (November, 1958), pp. 299–310; Robert O. Schulze and Leonard U. Blumberg, "The Determination of Local Power Elites," *American Journal of Sociology*, 63 (November, 1957), pp. 290–296. Hunter himself did similar research in Salem, Massachusetts; see Floyd Hunter, Ruth Connor Schaffer and Cecil G. Sheps, *Community Organization: Action and Inaction*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956. George Belknap and Ralph Smuckler, in using the reputational method, do not assert that their top leaders dominate decision making or comprise a unified group, and do not regard their findings as descriptive of a political system; see their "Political Power Relations in a Mid-West City," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 20 (Spring, 1956), pp. 73–81.

[3] Hunter asked several authoritative sources, e.g., the Chamber of Commerce and the League of Women Voters, for lists of leaders in their respective fields and then asked a panel of judges to rank the ten most powerful persons on each of the four lists of leaders. The top ten names on each list comprised the 40 persons whom Hunter termed the top leadership in Regional City. He interviewed most of these 40 and from these and other sources presented a description of the "community power structure," the pattern that explained policy making in Regional City. Succeeding studies did not always use this two-step nomination and ranking procedure; and in some cases the reputational researchers elaborated their description of the "power structure" by interviewing leader-nominees and other informants.

named by respondents; the highest-ranking nominees are described as the community's "power structure." This technique for describing a local political system is referred to below as the *reputational* or *power-attribution* method.

Several scholars have criticized Hunter's work on various grounds,[1] but there has been no detailed evaluation of the reputational method. Judging by the flow of research making use of this technique,[5] it continues to be highly regarded.[6] The purpose of this paper is to explore the utility of the reputational method for the study of local political systems. This inquiry involves two questions: (1) Are reputations for power an adequate index of the distribution of power? (2) Even if the respondents' perceptions of power relations are accurate, is it useful to describe a political system by presenting rankings of the leading participants according to their power?

It can be argued that the reputational method should be regarded as merely a systematic first step in studying a city's political system rather than a comprehensive technique for discovering the distribution of power. Under this modest construction the researcher would not rely on the method to identify and rank all decision makers but would use it as a guide to knowledgeable persons who would in turn give him leads to other informants until he had a complete picture of the political system under study. Viewed in this unambitious light, the reputational technique is little more than a methodologically elaborate variant of the older procedure of asking insiders — city hall reporters, politicians, and so on — for a quick rundown on the local big shots in order to identify potentially useful interviewees.

The reputational researchers do not make such modest claims for their method,[7] nor do their critics take such a limited view. While I am not aware of any explicit published statement to this effect, the reputational studies give the impression that the technique is regarded as considerably more than a ritualized political introduction. The putative validation of find-

[4] Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, 2 (July, 1957), pp. 201–215; Dahl, "Hierarchy, Democracy, and Bargaining in Politics and Economics," in Stephen Bailey *et al.*, *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government*, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1955, pp. 45–69; Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (June, 1958), pp. 463–469; Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," *Public Administration Review*, 14 (Summer, 1954), pp. 205–212; Nelson W. Polsby, "The Sociology of Community Power: A Reassessment," *Social Forces*, 37 (March, 1959), pp. 232–236; Polsby, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (December, 1959), pp. 796–803; Peter H. Rossi, "Community Decision-Making," in Roland Young, editor, *Approaches to the Study of Politics*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958, pp. 363–382.

[5] One of the most ambitious of these projects is Edwin H. Rhyne's attempt to test the commonly-accepted proposition that political systems with two-party competition are most conducive to popular participation in political decision making. He reports the opposite conclusion but emphasizes the tentative nature of his findings. See his "Political Parties and Decision Making in Three Southern Counties," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (December, 1958), pp. 1091–1107. See also William H. Form and William V. D'Antonio, "Integration and Cleavage among Community Influentials in Two Border Cities," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (December, 1959), pp. 804–814.

[6] With the major exception of the review article by Kaufman and Jones, *op. cit.*, reviews of *Community Power Structure* were favorable and in some cases enthusiastic. See the following reviews: Jack London, *American Journal of Sociology*, 60 (March, 1955), pp. 522–523; C. Wright Mills, *Social Forces*, 32 (October, 1953), pp. 92–93; Louis Smith, *Journal of Politics*, 16 (February, 1954), pp. 146–150; Donald S. Strong, *American Political Science Review*, 48 (March, 1954), pp. 235–237. London disagreed with Hunter's attribution of power to individuals rather than groups, but did not contest his findings that the business element in Regional City dominated policy making. For other endorsements of the reputational method see Gordon W. Blackwell, "Community Analysis," in Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 305–317; William J. Gore and Fred S. Silander, "A Bibliographical Essay on Decision Making," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 4 (June, 1959), p. 106; Arthur Kornhauser, "Power Relationships and the Role of the Social Scientist," in Kornhauser, editor, *Problems of Power in American Democracy*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957, p. 196.

[7] Blackwell, Gore and Silander, Rhyne, and Schulze and Blumberg are among those who see it as a more ambitious technique. Blackwell hails Hunter as a pioneer who has made a significant methodological contribution to the study of politics, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

ings yielded by this method,[8] the assumption that a "power structure" consists of those persons most often given high rankings by panels of judges,[9] and a tendency to limit descriptions of decision making to the activities of the top-ranked leaders[10] all point to a belief that this method is a sufficient tool to study the distribution of political power in a community.

The Problem of Ambiguity

Assuming for the moment that it is worthwhile to rank political actors with respect to their power, is the reputational method adequate for this purpose? There are two major causes of ambiguity inherent in asking respondents to name in rank order the most powerful members of their community: the variability of power from one type of issue to another; and the difficulty of making sure that researcher and respondent share the same definition of power. Each of these problems is examined in turn below, using the familiar concept of power: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."[11] The term *scope* is used to refer to those actions by B which are affected by A's exercise of power; for example, the major scope of a school superintendent's power is public education.[12]

In order to compare the power of two individuals one must either assume that power is distributed evenly for all scopes or present a different set of rankings for each scope.[13] Otherwise, if A is judged to be the most powerful man in town on school affairs and B is named the most powerful on urban renewal there is no way to compare their power except by asserting that power in one scope is more "important" than in another. Most of the reputational researchers, by their failure to specify scopes in soliciting reputations for influence, assume that the power of their leader-nominees is equal for all issues; some researchers specifically state that they are concerned with "a general category of community leadership."[14] This is an exceedingly dubious assumption. It is improbable, for instance, that the same people who decide which houses of prostitution are to be protected in return for graft payments also plan the public school curriculum. Moreover, recent research reveals specialized leadership, for example, in studies of Bennington, Vermont,[15] and New Haven.[16]

An individual's political power varies with different issues. Therefore "general power" rankings are misleading. Furthermore, the researcher cannot be sure that his respondent is not tacitly basing his rankings of community leaders on an implicit scope, with the result that an individual may be given a high general power rating because he is perceived to be very influential on a particular issue which is either currently important to the community or salient to the respondent.[17] Data presented in a paper by Robert Agger — the only case, I believe, in which respondents' rankings are pre-

[8] Blackwell, *op. cit.*, 317; Miller, "Industry and Community . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 10 n.

[9] Miller, "Industry and Community . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 10, and "Decision-making Cliques . . ." *op. cit.*, pp. 300–301.

[10] Hunter, *op. cit., passim*. See Kaufman and Jones for a criticism of this limitation, *op. cit.*, pp. 209–211.

[11] Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *op. cit.*, pp. 202–203. This is similar to Herbert Simon's definition of influence in *Models of Man*, New York: Wiley, 1957, pp. 65–66; and to Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan's definition of power as participation in the making of decisions in *Power and Society*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, p. 75.

[12] For similar uses of this term see Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *op. cit.*, pp. 203, 205–206; and Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, pp. 73, 77.

[13] See Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *op. cit.*, pp. 463–464, and "The Concept of Power," *op. cit.*, p. 206.

[14] Schulze and Blumberg, *op. cit.*, p. 292 n. Miller and Hunter also express interest in a "general power structure." See Hunter, Schaffer and Sheps, *op. cit.*, pp. xi–xii; and Miller, "Industry and Community . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 10, and "Decision-making Cliques . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 300.

[15] Harry M. Scoble, "Yankeetown: Leadership in Three Decision-Making Processes," presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., 1956.

[16] See Robert A. Dahl, "Organization for Decisions in New Haven," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, 1958; and Polsby, "Three Problems . . ." *op. cit.* References to New Haven are based on research on decision making in that city by Dahl, Polsby, and the writer, including a year of direct observation of the activities of the mayor and his chief officials.

[17] Polsby has suggested several possible referents for response made when issues are unspecified; see his "The Sociology . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 232 n.

sented both for specific issues and general power — suggest that this is more than an academic possibility.[18] Agger reports the number of nominations received by each of eight leader-nominees. Three of these reputed leaders received the bulk of the nominations for "most influential," but the distribution of nominations in the three specialized areas is quite different: "H," who was not named as generally influential by a single respondent, received 47 per cent of all nominations for most influential on "community welfare"; "G" received four per cent of the nominations for general influence and 29 per cent for influence on school affairs; the corresponding figures for "F" were five and 35 per cent. What scopes these respondents had in mind when they made their nominations of general leaders is anybody's guess.

The validity of the reputational method is weakened by the difficulty of determining whether the interviewer and his respondents have the same idea of what the former seeks. The problem of defining political power has vexed generations of social scientists, many of whom have suggested definitions which display considerable conceptual and logical ingenuity. A researcher asking questions based on this complicated concept can either inflict his definition of power on each respondent or use a simplified analogous question. It would require a "man in the street" to be cooperative to the point of masochism to stand still while an interviewer labored through the definitions and qualifications that are found in the literature on power. But the alternative embraced by many researchers has equally great disadvantages because of the ambiguity of their questions. Several researchers have used some variant of the following question: "If a project were before the community that required *decision* by a group of leaders — leaders that nearly everyone would accept — which *ten* on the list of forty would you choose?[19] This question could ask for popularity, malleability, or willingness to serve on committees.[20] Hunter's "Who is the 'biggest' man in town?" is also susceptible of numerous interpretations.[21]

The ambiguity of such questions is illustrated by a study in which the researchers asked 107 steel union members and officials to identify the "big shots" in town.[22] The respondents named the banker, the Chamber of Commerce, the mayor, other city officials, the gambling syndicate, and the steel company, which dominated the town economically. No respondent mentioned the union or its officers. Hunter and others might take this as evidence of the union's political impotence. But the union obviously was an influential force in local politics. All but three of the respondents said that the police were friendly and partial to them in collective bargaining, the most important issue for most union members; the three exceptions termed the police neutral. In fact, the union leaders had made a deal with the mayor, trading union political support for police favoritism. The po-

[18] Agger, "Power Attributions . . ." *op. cit.* A study soliciting nominations in several specialized areas produced quite different rankings of individuals in each of three scopes, with the exception of one nominee, the local newspaper editor. See A. Alexander Fanelli, "A Typology of Community Leadership Based on Influence within the Leader Sub-System," *Social Forces*, 34 (May, 1956), pp. 332–338.

[19] This question was first used by Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 62. The same question or a variant was used by Miller, "Industry and Community . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 12, and "Decision-making Cliques . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 301; Barth and Abu-Laban, *op. cit.*, p. 72; and Schulze and Blumberg, *op. cit.*, p. 292 n.

[20] Hunter tacitly acknowledges this drawback in mentioning that one very powerful man in Regional City ranked comparatively low on responses to this question because of his reputation for refusing to serve on committees. *op. cit.*, p. 64. This question assumes that the nature of the "project" under consideration would make no difference in one's nominations.

[21] Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 62. Polsby has pointed out the ambiguity of such questions; see "The Sociology . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 232. The influence of the wording of questions on respondents' answers has long been a serious problem for public opinion researchers and others. Some of the reputational researchers seem not to have been too careful about the phrasing of their questions. It would be interesting to use split-pair techniques to learn how responses vary with changes in the wording of the basic "Who has the power?" question. See, e.g., Hadley Cantril, *Gauging Public Opinion*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947, Chapters 1 and 2.

[22] Joel Seidman, Jack London and Bernard Karsh, "Political Consciousness in Local Unions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15 (Winter, 1952), pp. 692–702.

lice were so friendly that they cooperated in periodic drives in which all non-members were forcibly prevented from entering the steel plant. Most union members did not, however, view police favoritism as a *political* phenomenon. One might also explain their listing of "big shots" as attribution of status rather than power (with the exception, perhaps of the gambling syndicate).

The reputational method appears to be particularly susceptible to ambiguity resulting from respondents' confusion of status and power. This difficulty is amplified by the low esteem in which labor leaders, local politicians, and municipal officials are often held, as well as by their usually lower socio-economic status compared to businessmen and leaders of charitable organizations. In many cities control of political parties and municipal offices has passed from "Anglo-Saxon" businessmen to people of recent immigrant stock and generally lower social status.[23] For example, scarcely any New Haven economic or social leaders participate in party politics, an activity in which the city's populous Irish, Jewish, and Italian groups predominate.[24] In another New England city where the outnumbered high-status Yankees have shifted their attention and aspirations to activities in which money, leisure, and social status count more heavily, "the functions of status allocation and recognition, which were once performed by public office-holding, have been shifted in this period to . . . the community service organization.[25]

These differences pose a problem for reputational researchers, who often rely on voluntary organizations for initial nominations of leaders. The nominees are then ranked by panels which usually are composed largely of business and professional people. One might expect that as the wealthy become less influential in politics they value political office less highly.[26] In these circumstances, questions which do not distinguish between status and power, and between public and private scopes, are likely to lead researchers to leader-nominees whose power may be exercised chiefly on a country club's admissions committee. Businessmen, when asked questions about "projects," are apt to base their answers on those types of private activity in which they are most active and influential, and which are most salient to them. This may be one reason why the reputational method tends to turn up ruling elites consisting largely of businessmen.

Ambiguity can be minimized by asking questions about specific scopes and eschewing the "Who's the local big shot?" approach. This would eliminate situations in which the interviewer assumes that he is getting reports on political power when respondents in fact are ascribing status or merely revealing who pulls the strings in the Rotary Club's program committee. Limiting the question to specific political issues still will not impose on respondents the same criteria that might lead a social scientist to define a certain event as reflecting a power relationship, but it is probably the best that can be done with this method.

Specifying scopes minimizes ambiguity and provides a more accurate description of politics by permitting comparisons of influence in different areas. This procedure also gives the respondent a cue to reality and weakens the force of local myths about politics. A man willing to assert that Yankee bankers run "everything" might make a more cautious reply when asked specifically about the municipal welfare department.

[23] James B. McKee has described this process in Lorain, Ohio in "Status and Power in the Industrial Community: A Comment on Drucker's Thesis," *American Journal of Sociology*, 58 (January, 1953), pp. 364–370. McKee reports that union leaders do not participate very much in decision making in private civic welfare activities and that politically powerful members of minority ethnic groups still tend to have rather low social status. See also Peter H. Rossi and Alice S. Rossi, "An Historical Perspective on the Functions of Local Politics," revision of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, Detroit, 1956.

[24] See Dahl, "Organization . . ." *op. cit.;* and Polsby, "Three Problems . . ." *op. cit.*

[25] Rossi and Rossi, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[26] "Far too frequently they [businessmen] also have a strong distaste for politics and politicians — a distaste that can be particularly strong when the politicians happen to be Democrats" (The Editors of Fortune, *The Exploding Metropolis*, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Edition, 1958, p. xvii). Scoble reports that his respondents tended to nominate as leaders those individuals who agreed with them (*op. cit.*, p. 41), as do Agger and Goldrich (*op. cit.*, p. 391).

The Prevalence of Misperception

Assuming now that interviewer and respondent have in mind the same phenomenon, how accurate are the respondent's perceptions? There is some evidence that these are inaccurate, and to date none of the power attribution studies has been validated on this point by other means.[27]

One of the most striking examples of inaccurate perception appears in a footnote to a paper by Pellegrin and Coates on the influence of absentee-owned corporations in a southern city:

> The typical interviewee [a businessman] in this study described local government officials as relatively powerless figures who do not have the backing of influential groups but secured their positions through the support of working-class voters. Indeed, these officials were more often than not targets of ridicule for those who evaluated their positions in the power structure. . . . The relative lack of integration of Bigtown's interest groups makes it possible for governmental officials to sponsor civic projects which are sometimes successful, in spite of opposition from one or another of the "crowds" [of big business]. Interest groups find it difficult to express publicly opposition to projects which attract widespread support. To do so would be "bad public relations," perhaps unprofitable in the long run.[28]

In the text of this paper the authors emphasize the power of the absentee-owned corporations and report that they can veto any project which they oppose and secure the adoption of any measure they support.[29] Perhaps Pellegrin and Coates were unaware of the implications of the quoted passage, both for their thesis about the distribution of power in "Bigtown" and for the more general assumption that reputations are an adequate index of the actual distribution of power. Whether the passage reveals inaccurate perceptions or an eccentric definition of power, however, it is clear that these respondents' rankings of the community's most powerful men are open to serious question. So many alternate interpretations of such responses are possible that relying on them to define a "power structure" is unwarranted.

If private citizens are unreliable sources of information, people who are active in public life are not much better informants, either on general or specific questions. Key observes that "Such general conclusions [about the political efficacy of various groups] by politicians and other 'informed' citizens are wrong so much of the time that one becomes skeptical of all such remarks."[30] Rossi reports a striking example of misperception in "Bay City," where Republican politicians explained that their lack of success with various ethnic groups was due to the energetic activities of the local Catholic priests on behalf of the Democratic party. Actually most of the priests were Republicans.[31]

In New Haven a number of prominent citizens active in public affairs could not identify other decision makers in the same policy field. This was most notably revealed in interviews with members of the executive committee of the Citizens Action Commission, a group of about 20 men who direct the Commission's activities in various aspects of civic betterment. This group has been described as the "biggest

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[27] Blackwell maintains that studies which Hunter has conducted in other communities have verified the findings of his inquiry in Regional City (*op. cit.*, p. 317). But Hunter's description of the political system in City A is not evidence for the accuracy of his description of City B; and since he has not studied Regional City by means of an alternative procedure, his method has not been validated. Miller reports correlations between choice as a "key influential" and *some* forms of participation in civic groups, but none of these activities has been shown to be an index of political power. See his "Industry and Community . . ." *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 13. He also asserts that "A valuable test of this technique" of power attribution was conducted by John M. Foskett and Raymond Hohle (*ibid.*, p. 10 n). See the latter's "The Measurement of Influence in Community Affairs," *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, 25 (June, 1957), pp. 148–154. But Foskett and Hohle merely compared the lists of leaders chosen by a number of variants of the reputational method and found a high association between them, which did not test the method by comparing its results with findings produced by another method.

[28] Roland J. Pellegrin and Charles S. Coates, "Absentee-Owned Corporations and Community Power Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (March, 1956), p. 414 n.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 414.

[30] V. O. Key, *Southern Politics*, New York: Knopf, 1950, p. 139 n.

[31] Peter H. Rossi, "The Study of Decision Making in the Local Community," University of Chicago, 1957 (mimeo.), p. 20.

muscles in town" and includes among others the President of Yale University and the Dean of the Yale Law School, the presidents of the local power and telephone companies, the President of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, leading bankers and attorneys, the heads of several nationally known industrial firms, the President and Secretary of the Connecticut Labor Council, AFL-CIO, and the Democratic National Committeeman from Connecticut. Although these men meet formally once a month and often get together at other CAC functions, many of them could not identify other committee members. For example, a regular and articulate participant spoke glowingly about the pleasures of his association with the other men on the committee and of his fond image of them all sitting together around the conference table, but, except for friends he had known before the CAC was founded, he was unable to identify a single member. Another active participant, describing his fellow committee members, thought that the president of the Labor Council was a realtor employed by the New Haven Redevelopment Agency. Clearly, these respondents' replies to questions about the relative political influence of various New Haven leaders were not very informative.

New Haven politicians were not much better reporters of the distribution of power. Several of them, interviewed on a particular issue, told researchers that a local figure was the "real power" behind the scenes and always had his way; and then, discussing the same measure, added that another politician, opposed to the first, had "rammed it through the board — no one could stand up to him." An enduring item in the political folklore of New Haven is that one political figure or another is nothing but an errand boy for Yale University. As one would expect, this accusation is most credible to those individuals who are hostile either to Yale or to whichever politician is currently so attacked. Some experienced political figures so devoutly believe this charge that they are impervious to contrary evidence. If people who are professionally involved in community decision making cannot perceive accurately the distribution of political power, how can the rankings of less well-informed respondents be accepted as anything more than a report of public opinion on politics?

The Inutility of Influence Rankings

The reputational method, then, does not do what it is supposed to do: the ranking of leaders is not a valid representation of the distribution of political power in a given community. But assuming that reputations for power do in fact constitute an adequate index of power, nevertheless the resulting list of powerful individuals would not be useful without additional research which would make the method largely redundant, and even this utility would be very limited.

In compiling a list of leaders ranked according to the degree of power attributed to each of them, the researcher must have some means of limiting its size. Hunter, in selecting the arbitrary number of 40 for his leadership group, assumed what he set out to prove: that no more than 40 people were the rulers of Atlanta, possessed more power than the rest of the population, and comprised its "power structure."[32] He assumed that political power was concentrated in a very small group and concerned himself with identifying its members. Hunter's key question might be paraphrased as follows: "What are the names and occupations of the tiny group of people who run this city?"

Any *a priori* definition of the size of a leadership group carries such an implicit assumption about the distribution of political power. The vital point is the establishment of a cut-off point, a criterion which determines the size of the group. If the criterion is placed too high, it may exclude so many significant actors that only a small part of the total amount of influence exercised in the community is included — the top 40 leaders may be outweighed by the next 200 powerwielders.[33] If too low,

[32] Kaufman and Jones mention this limitation (*op. cit.*, p. 207).

[33] *Cf.* Robert K. Merton, "Patterns of Influence: A Study of Interpersonal Influence and of Communications Behavior in a Local Community," in P. F. Lazarsfeld and F. N. Stanton, editors, *Communications Research, 1948–49*, New York: Harper, 1949, pp. 180–219. Miller defines "power structure" so that it is composed of the most frequently nominated individuals, without knowing whether the "pyramid" of power is shaped so that his *a priori* criterion of nomination will coincide with an actual cut-off point in the distribution of power. Thus he reports that there are 12 "key in-

it may result in diluting the leadership group with many non-leaders. Clearly the important consideration here is the shape of the influence "pyramid": the more steeply its sides slope, the fewer people in the elite group and the higher the researcher's cut-off point can be. Yet if he knows enough about the community to envision such a pyramid, he already knows much of what the power-attribution method is supposed to tell him, and a great deal more.

There appears to be no way out of this dilemma without making an assumption crucial to the problem. If the researcher's questions do not specify the number of leaders the respondent can nominate and only a few actors are mentioned, he is in effect passing this problem along to his respondents. For while each of the respondents may believe that the person (or persons) he names is the most powerful single individual, nominations of the most influential man in town do not include information about how much power he has compared to other actors. If the researcher decides to establish the cut-off point by a "break" in number of nominations, or by including the nominees who account for a majority of nominations, he is passing the buck to a statistical artifact, for he still has no way of knowing that his criterion corresponds to political reality.

The identification of leaders which the reputational method is supposed to achieve has very limited utility for another reason. A demographic classification of such leaders is not a description of a city's political system because it does not indicate whether they are allies or enemies. To establish the existence of a ruling elite, one must show not only that influence is distributed unequally but also that those who have the most influence are united so as to act in concert rather than in opposition.[34] One cannot conclude that the highest-ranked individuals comprise a ruling group rather than merely an aggregate of leaders without establishing their cohesiveness as well as their power.

Most of the reputational researchers consider this point, but then go on to draw conclusions about the probable decisions of their putative elites by assuming that political preferences can be inferred from socio-economic status. This inference is questionable on a number of grounds.[35] It assumes that the members of the body politic can be divided into two groups on the basis of a dichotomizing principle (such as relationship to the means of production) which determines all their policy preferences. Thus there will be a "class position" on every issue, with the same people on the same side on all issues. This in turn assumes that economic status is the only variable that determines political preferences. But associations between socioeconomic status and positions on various issues represent correlations, not categoric divisions; there are always sizeable numbers of people on the minority side. Furthermore, persons of different economic status may have similar attitudes on the basis of shared vocational or sectional interests: both the United Mine Workers and coal mine owners worry about competition from other fuels; New England workers and merchants alike are concerned about departing industries. For people in official positions the "norms of the office" represent role demands which often predict behavior more consistently than status. Finally, politicians want to win, to the point at times where they are ideologically indifferent. Even "issue-oriented" politicians accept the need to compromise.

While most political leaders in Bennington were business or professional men, they were split into several durable and bitterly opposed factions on the issues which Scoble studied.[36] In New Haven the six most prominent politicians have the following occupations (or occupational background, in the case of the mayor, a full-time official): attorney (two),

fluentials" and 44 "top influentials" in a city of half a million people, but presents no evidence of their ability to dominate Seattle's political system. See Miller, "Industry and Community . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 10, and "Decision-making Cliques . . ." *op. cit.*, pp. 302–303. Other reputational researchers are less explicit about this assumption. In his later article, Miller expresses some doubt about the extent of business dominance in Seattle. These uncertainties are based on interviews with a few participants, however, not on the reputational method; the latter technique turned up a business ruling elite.

[34] *Cf.* Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *op. cit.*, p. 465.

[35] Several writers have noted this fallacy. See, e.g., Rossi, "Community Decision-Making," *op. cit.*, pp. 366–369; Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, "Political Sociology," *Current Sociology*, 6 (1957), pp. 84–85; and Lipset, "Political Sociology," in R. K. Merton *et al.*, editors, *Sociology Today*, New York: Basic Books, 1959, pp. 106–107.

[36] Scoble, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

undertaker, bond and insurance broker, realtor, and public relations director. The first three are Republicans, the others, Democrats. The two parties are quite differentiated; a change in regime seven years ago brought marked changes in municipal policies. The policies followed by these six men cannot be predicted by reference to their occupations. It should be noted that few of the power-attribution researchers even mention the party identifications of their leader-nominees.[37]

Another weakness of the reputational method is that it assumes and reports a static distribution of power.[38] The three New Haven Democrats mentioned in the preceding paragraph are currently much more powerful than the three Republicans, in large measure because the Democrats are in office. The outcome of elections may be relevant to the distribution of power, a consideration which apparently has escaped the power-attribution researchers and for which their method is ill-suited. Changes in the nature and distribution of the sources of power are assumed to occur very slowly, so that the only strategy for a group engaged in political action is to persuade the real elite to go along with it.[39] The model of the political process resulting from the reputational method assumes an equation of potential for power with the realization of that potential. (It may be a misnomer to refer to this as a "process;" actually the reputational researchers appear to assume a kind of equilibrium.) This in turn assumes that all resources will be used to an equal extent and thus that political skill is unimportant. Either elections are of no consequence or one side will win all of them.

It would be interesting to replicate some of the power attribution studies at five-year intervals to learn how persistently the same individuals are nominated as leaders. A study by Donald Olmsted suggests that quite different lists might result.[40] His panel of "knowledgeable citizens" named 30 community leaders in 1943 and again in 1949; the names of only nine people were on both lists. One would expect some attrition by death, moving, and so on, but the locale of Olmsted's study did not have an unusually unstable population.

Shifting distribution of power, whether the result of elections or of other factors, presents a problem in political analysis which appears to be unsolvable by the power-attribution method. While some individuals might maintain some or all of their power after a change in regime, others would not, and some relatively powerless persons would be placed high in the "power structure." The inclusion of all political actors within a supposed power elite would be neither surprising nor discriminating. The interesting questions about politics are concerned with the dynamics of policy making and are badly warped in static, reified rankings of individuals whose demographic classification is a poor substitute for analysis of goals, strategies, power bases, outcomes, recruitment patterns, and similar questions. When energetic political organization can affect elections and issue outcomes and thus "make new power,"[41] description of a dynamic process by a static concept appears to be a mismatch of method and subject matter. The gifts and energies of social scientists can be better used than in this pursuit.

[37] The major exception is the work of Agger and his associates; see note 2 above.

[38] This has been pointed out by Polsby, "The Sociology . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 232; and by Rossi, "Community Decision-Making," *op. cit.*, pp. 366–369.

[39] Blackwell makes this assertion explicitly, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

[40] "Organizational Leadership and Social Structure in a Small City," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (May, 1954), pp. 273–281.

[41] See, e.g., Francis Carney, *The Rise of the Democratic Clubs in California*, New York: Holt, 1959.

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INTERVIEWING SOUTHERN POLITICIANS

• ALEXANDER HEARD

This is a report on the interviews used in preparing *Southern Politics in State and Nation*.[1] The book, by V. O. Key, Jr., resulted from a study carried on over a three-year period at the Bureau of Public Administration of the University of Alabama. Roscoe C. Martin, then director of the Bureau, originated the project, obtained support for it from the Rockefeller Foundation and gave it general supervision.

Mr. Key was assisted by several persons, including this writer. He directed a large share of the project's resources to the task of interviewing participants in southern politics. Forty per cent of the budget was allocated for the salaries and expenses of the two interviewers[2] and for transcribing their reports. Thirty per cent of the time of the senior staff members and twenty per cent of the total time of the whole staff was spent in the field. The decision to devote this large amount of time and money to interviewing rested on the conviction that much significant political information could be obtained from only politicians themselves or from their close associates. It rested also on the belief that accurate observation would eliminate the need for conjecture about many political phenomena.

The interviews supplemented the customary research materials. Several hundred bibliographical items were assembled after systematic searching of periodical guides and library catalogues. Considerable effort was devoted to collecting election returns, registration and poll tax figures, constitutions, codes, sesssion laws and party rules[3] in addition to the secondary works. A daily paper from each southern state and several other periodicals were clipped regularly. Extensive statistical computations were made, with much literature outside the field of political science called upon to aid in their interpretation. The information from the interviews was used by the author in close conjunction with the data from these other sources.

The interviewers sought information which falls roughly into six categories. First, they needed an accurate narrative of major political events. Newspaper reports and state government documents often fail to tell an adequate story of even recent political happenings. Half a dozen interviews, for instance, were necessary to learn the facts surrounding the repeal of the Florida poll tax in 1937. Second, they tried to learn something of the methods of politicians and the organizations with which they work — for example, how political funds are raised and how primary campaigns are organized. They sought, thirdly, to discern the objectives of practicing politicians, e.g., what the state senator thinks he is after. In the fourth place, they devoted much time to learning how legal and party rules are applied in practice; to answer, for example, such questions as whether *all* persons actually have to show their poll tax receipts. Next, when reflective persons were found, it was possible to test some of the working hypotheses of the study against their judgment. Finally, the interviewers wanted to uncover local attitudes toward political and social problems.

All in all, the interviewers set out to get the

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[1] (New York, 1949.) Eleven states were studied: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

[2] Donald S. Strong and this writer. The conclusions set forth here grew from the writer's experience in the nine states in which he worked.

[3] Most of the political statistics collected for the study, supplemented by additional material, have been published by Alexander Heard and Donald S. Strong in *Southern Primaries and Elections* (University, Alabama, 1950).

important facts about southern politics that could not be obtained from more objective sources. The detailed subjects most fully treated in the interviews are listed later in this article.

I. Selection of Informants

Five hundred and thirty-eight persons were interviewed in the eleven states. They included politicians and political observers of all classes.[4] How were they chosen?

An interviewer spent about five weeks in each state. To help him become familiar with the state's politics, to decide whom to interview and what questions to ask, he went through an orientation program before commencing his task. He read the most adequate one volume history of the state. He read the newspaper clippings accumulated by the study. He became familiar with the major political races since 1920 and with the county-by-county returns of important recent races. He studied a standard set of correlations and maps showing the nature of the candidates' strength in these races. He learned the party rules and the legal provisions affecting the electoral process.[5] He rummaged through secondary works and government reports that threw light on the economic, social, topographical and political conditions of the state.

The interviewer emerged from this period of study with a set of questions that he thought ought to be answered about the state's politics. At the outset of the sudy, Mr. Key had drafted a 32-page outline of the subject matter with which the study would be concerned, and the interviewer's questions were drawn with an eye to the topics enumerated in this outline. He also prepared a preliminary list of persons to see. Then, as further orientation, on first entering a state the interviewer consulted personal friends and acquaintances to get an informal picture of affairs. These friends were sometimes able to advise him about persons worth interviewing and to warn him against those who would probably not be helpful. As the traveller made his way around the state he picked up additional prospects, and his decisions on whom to see were progressively influenced by the results of the preceding talks. He planned his itinerary in order to see people in all major sections, especially when sectional antagonisms were evident in the politics. Three-fifths of all interviews took place outside state capitals.

The interviewer went first to persons likely to to cooperate. The executive officers of pressure groups were generally willing to talk, though not always ready to tell all they knew. Newspaper people and educators had no difficulty in understanding the purpose of the study, and most of them were in sympathy with it. The interviewer soon learned that among partisans he was most assured of a welcome in that band loosely called "liberals." Labor leaders, Negro leaders, spark plugs of reform movements — all generally extended themselves to be of assistance. In a different category, retired politicians were of particular aid. The interviewer found them almost invariably eager to talk, and to talk frankly.

The interviewer went to these "easy" people first; at the same time he set up a stiff guard against overvaluing their data merely because they stood ready to give it. Where it was possible to do so, harder cases were put off until later in the schedule. After visiting around the state somewhat the interviewer felt better prepared to tackle the wary campaign manager, the remote financial angel, the tight-lipped county boss, the wealthy former governor busy

[4] Among those interviewed were 11 former governors, 5 United States Senators and former Senators, 16 United States Representatives and former Representatives, 27 managers of statewide political campaigns, 8 state party chairmen, 12 county party chairmen, 9 county and district judges, 56 present and former state legislators, 6 mayors, 8 secretaries of state, 9 prosecuting attorneys, 25 labor leaders (14 CIO, 7 AFL, 4 railroad brotherhoods), 14 farm organization leaders, 14 business organization leaders, 50 "reform" leaders, 21 officials charged with the administration of the poll tax, registration, primaries or elections, 9 publishers, 48 editors, 29 correspondents and columnists, 48 educators, 40 Negro leaders, and 26 Republican leaders. There was a visit to the office of all secretaries of state and to other offices to obtain statistical and legal data, as well as attendance at miscellaneous gathings such as party rallies, "speakings," a KKK meeting, an ADA meeting, and a Negro political rally.

[5] Research assistants prepared abstracts of legal regulations and party rules as well as statistical calculations. The correlations were designed to show any social or economic bases of a candidate's strength, any similarities in the distribution of his strength from one race to another, any similarities to the strength of other politicians, and so forth.

with his law practice and the crusty plantation manager of hundreds of tenants.

The task of choosing whom to interview and what to ask placed a heavy responsibility upon the interviewer, while the independence with which he worked put a high premium on close understanding with the members of the staff who would use his findings. Since by his selection of interviewees he influenced greatly the quality of the information obtained, he had to evaluate it constantly, together with the sources providing it. It was his task to see that a balanced, sound body of data finally came from the interviews; that the required topics were covered; and that conflicting viewpoints were fully represented.[6]

II. Rapport Between Interviewer and Informant

The success of an interview rests in part on the relationship between the interviewer and his informant. Many factors influence this relationship. The kind of introduction the visitor takes to his informant is one. The way in which the meeting is arranged is another. The persons, organizations and viewpoints with which the interviewer is identified in the mind of the person interviewed make up a third. Finally, the explanation that the interviewer gives of his purposes and the way he frames his questions further influence his informant.

Introducing the interviewer. For the southern politics study, 503 interview meetings were held. The interviewer was presented to his informants in the following ways:

39	The interviewer had no introduction.
29	The informant was suggested by a third party whose name could be used, but no formal introduction was arranged.
15	The interviewer was a personal friend of the informant and needed no introduction.
6	An introduction was made in person or through a letter by a personal friend of the interviewer.
6	An introduction was made by a person not previously known to the interviewer, usually a person who had himself been interviewed.
4	An introduction based on previous contacts was made by the Bureau of Public Administration.
1	Casual encounters led to interviews.
100	

Although it is difficult to generalize on the best ways to get to an informant, a general tendency was noted; it seemed that, on the whole, no introduction at all brought the best results.

When a third person makes the introduction, he thereby usually guarantees the interviewer a courteous reception. In circles skeptical toward outsiders, or among busy people, a proper connection is particularly helpful. Yet, by and large, the ability of the interviewer to create respect for his mission and confidence in his intentions seemed to be more important than the introduction that he brought. In one black-belt town, for instance, the interviewer had impeccable connections. Nevertheless, he had to assure more than one person that he was not a "communist" and had not come as an agent of meddling Yankees. The principle was demonstrated in various settings. The interviewer called on a state A. F. of L. president and took with him adequate references. Unhappily, a CIO friend turned up in the A. F. of L. office at the same time; his cordial greeting to the interviewer produced an unmistakable reticence on the part of the A. F. of L. chief.

An introduction by a local partisan sometimes made it hard for the interviewer to convince his informant of his impartiality, for the interviewer seemed to acquire some of the color of his sponsor. When the sponsor and the informant were on the same side of the political fence, this factor might not be a handicap; but often it inhibited the conversation. The presence of third parties obstructed free conversa-

[6] Studies by public opinion research organizations indicate that the validity of interview results is affected by the personal views of the interviewers and by discrepancies in race or class between interviewers and respondents. Sources of distortion are at least two: in the selection of persons for interview and in the differences in rapport established between the interviewer and his informants. The type of interviewing being discussed here differs from public opinion sampling, but the opportunities for bias are obvious. This is especially true when all interviews are conducted by one or two individuals rather than by a battery of persons whose biases may in some ways offset each other. See Hadley Cantril, *Gauging Public Opinion* (Princeton, 1944), Ch. 8, and Frederick Williams and Hadley Cantril, "The Use of Interviewer Rapport as a Method of Detecting Differences Between 'Public" and 'Private' Opinion," *The Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 22, pp. 171–75 (1945).

tion in somewhat the same way. Informants were invariably restrained in the presence of others, even old cronies. Talk about local affairs cannot be entirely frank if it will get back to one's fellow citizens.

Arranging appointments. The meetings were arranged in the following ways:

%	
45	The interviewer called in person, unannounced, and the interview was held forthwith.
30	The interviewer telephoned in advance for an appointment.
9	The interviewer called in person, unannounced, and a subsequent appointment was arranged.
9	A third party arranged the appointment.
4	The interviewer arranged the appointment in a chance personal conversation.
3	The interviewer arranged the appointment by letter.
100	

In over half the instances the interviewer asked in person for an appointment without preliminary contact. His chief purpose was to save time. With some 45 full-dress interviews to be held during his five weeks in a state, the interviewer had to bestir himself. He travelled by car and arranged his itinerary so that several prospects lay along the route; if one were not available he could go on to another. In important cases, however, or where a lengthy special trip was necessary, he made an appointment in advance. In cities with several prospects, he shuttled from one to another. As a result, the interviewer frequently had to wait to see his informant; but the time lost in waiting was less than would have been required to set up a series of appointments. Furthermore, the interviewer could maintain a flexible schedule if not bound by advance appointments. As noted later, this flexibility made it infinitely easier to write up the results of the interviews.

Some persons with interviewing experience have felt that they obtained best results when their conversation was dignified by an appointment, but for this study the interviewer preferred to arrive unannounced at the office of his prospect. In seeking an audience, he suggested that if the present time were not convenient, he hoped a later appointment could be granted. He found that this personal approach frequently forced, or at least encouraged, a favorable reception. There was less chance to "stall" than an advance inquiry by telephone or by letter might have provided. When the interviewer was in town just for an hour or so, his request assumed special urgency. Similarly, when he had gone out of his way to visit the town, his request was seldom turned down. Not unimportant was the opportunity for personal contact that was afforded. The prospective interviewee could see the kind of person with whom he was dealing, and the interviewer had a chance to use his powers of persuasion. The interviewer concluded that this element of personal contact is particularly important when a stranger wants to talk about "politics."

The initial steps in the interview process, though important, proved less significant than the rapport which the interviewer was able to create once the conversation began.

A friendly attitude. The interviewer immediately tried to place himself in a frame of reference thaat would arouse the sympathy of his prospective informant. He emphasized the indigenous nature of the study: southerners themselves, for a change, were studying southern politics. He expressed familiarity with individuals, organizations and situations that might appeal to his listener. He used or ignored references from third parties as the situation indicated, and tried to make himself attractive to his informant. One of the interviewers was a graduate of the University of North Carolina; some "liberal" circles seemed to find this fact reassuring. The other had spent a long period teaching at the University of Texas; the connection aided him greatly in that state. Some of the persons interviewed were previously acquainted with the Bureau of Public Administration or its personnel. In short, any common bond that could be located was exploited. The interviewer tried to adapt himself to colloquialisms, and even to local habits of dress.

He announced himself as a faculty member of the University of Alabama seeking to understand a much misunderstood subject, southern politics. He described the study in varying degrees of detail, conforming to the interests of his listener. In all cases he emphasized the impartial character of the study. He took care to display neither sympathy nor hostility towards partisan viewpoints. He assiduously avoided the term "investigation" and disclaimed it if it were used by another. His strength lay in an open and direct appeal for help. Many

a gnarled campaigner or smooth inside-operator responded to the simple plea that students of politics had no way to get at the realities of politics except by going to politicians themselves. The direct appeal may have conveyed the sincerity of the inquirer, or may merely have been flattering, but it was patently more successful than an indirect approach might have been.

In eighteen months only three persons refused to grant interviews. One was a local boss in Georgia known for his aversion to the press. He was approached through a third party. If the interviewer had confronted him directly, he might have acceded. Another was a small town editor in South Carolina. He apparently took exception to an opening remark of the interviewer, and invented objections to all times proposed for an appointment. The third was a Virginia state legislator who said that he had plans for using the information requested and would prefer not to rob his own project.

A number of persons were skeptical of more study about the South. A Mississippi editor argued impatiently that southerners ought to study northern politics; they should dig up so much dirt that the Yankees would lose their taste for meddling in the affairs of others. A South Carolina labor leader was bitter. He could not imagine that any southern university would permit a fair statement about labor in politics to be published. But even these persons talked. They and others talked with a generosity and interest which suggested that political scientists should tap more and more this great source of information about politics, the politicians themselves.

The campaign manager of perhaps the South's most notorious demagogue told of his campaign strategy and showed his campaign books with so much pleasure that he invited his visitor back for a second session. In two states, the most influential politician was viewed by the public as unapproachable and slightly "unclean." When questioned with candor, these men gave two of the most penetrating interviews of the whole series. In another state, observers whispered that a leading banker played an important role as collector and distributor of campaign funds but was too deeply involved to talk about it. When interviewed, the banker answered frankly all questions put to him.

"Off-the-record" assurances. The freedom with which informants talked depended in part on their confidence that the interviewer would not embarrass them. The interviewer announced at the outset that he was not interested in statements for quotation. He explained that he was interested in getting data to help him and his colleagues understand their subject, and that he would respect all confidences. A few persons seemed to distrust the disclaimer and were reticent. Others brushed the assurances aside and invited quotation. Generally, however, the informants accepted the assurances for what they were worth and spoke freely.

To keep the spirit and letter of the security commitments created problems. The interviewer had to guard against repeating confidences that became part of his working information. The memoranda reporting the interviews had to be handled by as few people as possible, with some awkwardness in intra-office procedure resulting. And since interview sources were cited only in the first draft of the manuscript, the author had to accept a special burden of responsibility in his use of the material.

Putting the questions. In many interviewing assignments a questionnaire guides the interviewer, but in this work a different technique was used. The interviewer tried to avoid the formal atmosphere of an interview and instead to create the informal atmosphere of a conversation. By showing his familiarity with local conditions, he tried to convince his informant that he was worthy of a man-to-man talk. He speculated on political conditions and raised questions designed to stir his informant's interest. He adapted his pitch to the individual. The visitor might best reach a precinct registrar by sitting at his feet to catch the pearls thrown out in reply to direct questions, while he might more readily interest a United States Senator with a talk in which both parties exchanged views.

The interviewer could not adhere strictly to a written list of questions. He went into each interview, however, knowing specifically what information he was after and how he would direct the conversation to get it. Sometimes the conversation went according to plan — the questions being answered satisfactorily and the conversation moving easily from one to an-

other. At other times, the informant proved unable or unwilling to discuss the questions at first raised. Then other subjects had to be explored. The interviewer kept alert to follow up lines of conversation adventitiously opened as the interview progressed. If a story-swapping atmosphere were established, the potentialities were almost limitless; but the interviewer felt it necessary to prepare himself for a lag in the talk by holding in reserve a battery of observations that would lead naturally to additional questions.

At the risk of impropriety, the questioner dragged out each interview as long as information was forthcoming. The interviews averaged 70 minutes in length, ranging from fifteen minute quickies to half-day visits. The schedule averaged roughly two 70-minute interviews per day.

III. Reporting the Interviews

The interviewer spent more time in writing up his interviews than in holding them. He took no notes during the interviews; to do so would have defeated the effort to create a conversational atmosphere. Consequently, he needed to get something on paper as soon as possible after the talking stopped. One reason that he tried to avoid advance appointments was to make sure of having all the time he needed to take notes immediately after leaving the interview. When, occasionally, the interviewer went directly from one informant to another, the value of both sessions was qualified thereby. The interviewer was preoccupied with the first during the second, and had to take care in unscrambling the two sets of statements. Whenever possible, he not only made notes immediately after the interview but dictated a memorandum within a day or two. (A stream of Ediphone cylinders was kept moving to and from the University by mail.) He reported as many direct quotations as possible in order to preserve the spirit of the interview. In fact, he generally tried to report everything said by the informant, no matter how valueless it might appear at the time.

As already mentioned, an outline of the subjects to be covered was drawn up at the outset of the project. Code numbers were given to the 240 topics of the outline. A file folder was set up for each code number, and materials from all sources were filed in these folders, with a separate folder set up for each state to receive duplicate material. The interview reports were divided into separate "items" — each item dealing with one of the coded topics in the outline. Each item was transcribed on a separate sheet and given the identification of the interview (name, place, date, etc.) and the code number of the topic to which it pertained. When an item pertained to more than one topic, an additional copy was made for each classification. Because of the extreme detail of the breakdown, the interviewer had some difficulty in keeping the classifications consistent.

The first item in each interview was preceded by an introduction giving the circumstances of the interview, such as why the interviewee was selected, how the session was arranged, how long it lasted and what the physical surroundings were. It also gave an appraisal of the interviewee and his information. The details were perhaps tedious, but they were necessary in evaluating the reliability of the data. The memoranda averaged a little over seven items each. Some had only one item; one had 26. In all, the memoranda ran to about 5,000 pages, while each item averaged something over a page in length.

IV. Subjects Covered

Earlier, the *types of data* sought in the interviews were described — namely, pictures of how certain major political developments occurred, of the methods and aims of politicians, of how laws and party rules were applied in practice, of social and political attitudes, together with informed comments on tentative findings. We now turn to the *subjects* that were most frequently reported on by the interviewers.

Information was obtained on 199 of the 240 coded topics of the outline. Altogether, 4,904 items of interview material were reported, each classified under one of the 199 topics. Twenty-nine of the code numbers, however, accounted for three-fourths of all the items. For convenience, the closely related topics among the 29 have been grouped together. The resulting 12 general subjects are listed below with the percentage of the total items devoted to each of them. These subjects — the ones on which the interviewers turned up most information — have particular importance for the one-party politics of the South.

13.2 The nature and political activities of special interest groups, such as labor unions, Farm Bureaus and government employees.
12.9 Factional alignments among politicians and officeholders.
12.0 Campaign finance.
7.7 Campaign tactics and the nature of campaign propaganda.
6.9 The conduct and administration of elections and primaries.
5.6 Factional alignments among voters, in contrast to politicians and officeholders, especially the nature of Negro groupings and Negro political organizations.
4.8 Republican party.
4.5 The organization and management of political campaigns.
4.2 Social and racial attitudes.
3.9 Registration of voters.
3.6 Fraud and irregularity in the conduct of elections and primaries (already included in the larger subject above, conduct and administration of elections and primaries).
3.1 Estimates of the number of Negro voters.

V. What of the Results?

We have mentioned already the types of people who were easiest to approach and we have pointed out that most persons were cooperative. What was the most valuable information obtained? What type of informant was most helpful? How reliable were the data?

With few exceptions, the most valuable interviews were held with practitioners who related their personal experiences. The candidates, campaign managers, public officials and leaders of special groups who simply told what they did in politics and how they did it provided the most convincing and useful data. Their contribution was particularly significant because it was unavailable from other sources.

On the other hand, efforts to obtain "interpretation" of political phenomena were disappointing. Few of the practitioners had an appreciation of the social significance of their activities. The interviewer found that, even among professional observers, the time he could profitably spend discussing intangibles was limited. One of the ambitions of the study was to estimate the consequences for the South of its one-party politics. In the early stages, the interviewer asked many questions on this subject. Virtually no meaningful responses were forthcoming. A former governor of Arkansas delivered himself of a brilliant statement, but his type was rare. Even on more restricted problems of analysis, the results were much the same. There are in the South, for instance, sharp variations in the rates of participation in elections, the variations occurring from one county to another and also in elections held at different times in the same county. Few local informants had any idea of the factors that might provide an explanation. It should be noted, however, that much of the seemingly useless interview material took on meaning when put with data from other sources. And even a wholly disappointing interview provided the portrait of a politically significant individual.

In questioning practitioners about their activities, the interviewer found an interesting pattern. The more self-sufficient the individual, the freer he was to talk. Politicos are often inhibited by a sense of loyalty to their associates or by fear of their superiors. Thus the minions of a political machine refused to talk about matters that their boss discussed with freedom, and politicians operating in close alliance with others declined to answer questions that independent operators answered frankly. Politicians on the make proved less inclined to get down to the essentials than weathered veterans who had won and lost races for twenty years. In fact, the older and more experienced the politician, the more likely he was to speak freely. In several instances, persons retired from active affairs gave superb interviews. (The hazards of senility, alas, cannot always be avoided.) They were particularly informative on practices that skirt the law.

With party and public officials, the interviewer was sometimes able to ask for information as a matter of right. Even in those instances, however, he felt it undesirable to put his informant on edge. If he pressed for answers his informant did not want to give, the interviewer ran the risk of shutting him up altogether. The interviewer believed that he could break down the reticence by other tactics, and such usually proved the case. Sometimes he was able to approach the subject successfully from a different angle, or by a combination of tangential questions.

The staff was constantly aware of the problem of reliability in using the interview data. The limitations inherent in the interview process had been recognized at the outset. But the need to rely on material subject to incomplete-

ness, and even error, only pointed up one of the recurring requirements of social research: imaginative yet disciplined thinking able to work in spite of imperfect data.

The interviewer felt that few informants tried to mislead. More often, they evaded embarassing questions. The informant's manner frequently gave a hint of insincerity, if any were present, while the reputation of the informant served to put the interviewer on guard several times. As much interview information as possible was verified as an index to the dependability of the informant. It seemed clear that intentional deception was much less frequent than unintentional error. Few people can speak accurately on such a matter as campaign costs; fewer still will refrain from making guesses. On all matters, they will generalize on the basis of incomplete, though perhaps accurate, information. Even responsible citizens succumb to the temptation to repeat political gossip as though it were gospel. In every state the interviewer encountered questionable gossip that permeated the whole political community and was accepted by experienced observers as reliable. He made a point of tracing some of this gossip to its source. Numbers of items were found to have originated in nothing more substantial than speculation in high quarters, or simply in a misquotation of an informed individual.

Moreover, on many questions of technical fact the interviews proved useful only as a source of leads. Erroneous statements about the content of laws and party rules and about the outcome of elections revealed the amazing amount of misinformation carried around by many "practical" politicians.

Some persons with whom the staff took counsel were disappointed that no direct effort was made to learn "what the man in the street thinks" about controversial issues. They suggested that interviews confined largely to "big shots" would give a false view of lesser public opinion. The best informed observers that could be found were consulted about public attitudes. The results were sometimes disturbing, however, when apparently reliable informants reported diametrically opposed views as prevailing in a community. The interviewers engaged in no systematic opinion sampling of their own, but the results of opinion surveys were obtained wherever available. These experiences support further the conclusion stated above, that the interviewees were most helpful when they described their own personal activities, things they knew about at first hand.

Every effort was made to test the validity of information obtained in interviews against data collected from other sources. Its accuracy and its plausibility were evaluated by the interviewer when he reported it and by the other staff members when they used it. They were satisfied with the dependability of the data that was used. Interview material went into nearly all the chapters of the book and accounted for a great part of the contents of a majority of them.

One test of general dependability was made. One section of *Southern Politics* contains chapters describing the factionalism in each state. Much of the material for these chapters came from interviews. As a corrective measure, the staff submitted each of the chapters to three or four informed persons in the state to which it pertained. These readers occasionally had differences of opinion about broad interpretations. It was reassuring, however, that rarely did they point out an error of fact. The test may merely indicate the universality of ignorance, but it heartened the staff to know that at least it had company.

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THE "HARD-HEADED" FRENCHMAN

On se defend, toujours

• DANIEL LERNER

When a Frenchman answers the telephone, he says: *"Je vous écoute."* In this way he takes up a position of defence against the unknown interlocutor at the other end of the line. To the greeting on the street, *Comment va?*, one is likely to receive the ironic reply, *On se défend*. In this slightly mocking fashion, with their special gift for self-conscious clarity, the French take note of a profound trait of their national character.

Defensive remarks greeted me when I arrived in September 1954 to start interviewing Frenchmen of the "élite classes," as part of a larger sociological study. What could one learn from such interviews? Besides, how could it be done? There was universal doubt about the value and the feasibility of the enterprise. The French, I was told, would never talk to a stranger with no other claim to their confidence than that of being an interviewer. Now, two years later, we have in fact managed to complete over fifteen hundred long interviews with Frenchmen of very high standing. To these questions have responded, in round figures, five hundred top businessmen, three hundred political leaders (including all but two of the post-war prime ministers and foreign ministers), a hundred high civil servants representing *les grand corps de l'État*, a hundred senior military men, a hundred clerical and lay spokesmen of the church, and a hundred officials of labour, farmers', and other pressure groups.

The trick was to get them started; but, once started, how they talked! The average length of the fifteen hundred interviews was over two hours, and a substantial number of them ran toward eight hours. (The same interview schedule, in England, averaged a bit over one hour and was fully answered.) Rather often the interviewer was requested to return, after a single session lasting two or three hours, by respondents eager to have their full say in an interview that took rather the form of an interior dialogue uttered aloud. The essential is that, once engaged, the Frenchman talked volubly. But, to engage him, one had to scale the defensive wall — as the French put it, *franchir le mur*.

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"Les Formules de Politesse"

Our first approaches to interviewing were modest, tentative, apologetic. Trial-and-error, hit-and-miss (what the French love to call *"l'empirisme anglo-saxon"*) finally produced a workable formula. To each prospective respondent, the interviewer explained that his Institute had undertaken a study of attitudes among the élite. As Frenchmen do not respond readily to questionnaires, he continued, we were seeking the counsel of specially qualified persons: "Would you be so kind as to review with us the questionnaire we propose to use and give us the benefit of your criticisms? In responding yourself, you could explain which questions a Frenchman would be likely to resist and why; which questions would draw ambiguous or evasive responses that could not be properly interpreted; and which questions could be altered in such a way as to require reflective rather than merely stereotyped answers."

By casting the interviewee in the rôle of expert consultant, we gave him the opportunity to indulge in a favourite indoor sport — generalising about Frenchmen. This exercise suggested procedures that were, in fact, used in subsequent interviewing. More important, it provided us with a comprehensive set of French images of the French. How Frenchmen see each other — this became the starting-point

of our inquiry on how they see the world around them.

Their comments clarified, for example, the psycho-cultural rôle of French conventions of courtesy. The highly elaborated set of *formules de politesse* is an elegant way of maintaining proper distance between individuals. By comparison with the American desire for quick intimacy, for promptly reaching a first-name basis, there is a general appreciation in France of the reserved person. This is the mark of a person *bien élevé*, raised with a proper sense of right conduct. A rule that governs personal relations in France is: *"Il faut garder ses distances."* It is generally believed that a person is likely to suffer if, *par manque de réserve*, he exposes himself to the will and way of others. French distance-maintaining mechanisms make it easier to ritualise all sorts of relationships that elsewhere are met by improvisations.

There *is* an established code of behaviour in most matters of daily routine. French gastronomy is a case. *La cuisine française* is widely recognised as a high order of artistic achievement, but its ritual characteristics are less widely noted. Frenchmen tend to be rigid in all matters associated with feeding. There is practically no variation in *les heures de repas* of any region. There is little deviation as to which type of wine goes with which food, and few venture from established rules in order to "try something different." Even the conception of a well-composed meal (*repas bien composé*) is a distinctly Gallic idea with certain fixed features. A young French writer, returning from a summer vacation in the U.S.A., where he was outraged by many native practices, gives priority to the utter *bouleversement* he suffered from American habits of non-scheduled snacks — *"les repas pris à n'importe quelle heure et n'importe comment. . . ."* The case is more dramatic with respect to Chinese cuisine, which many non-French gastronomes regard as the only serious rival to the French, if not its superior. But the notion of eating according to another logic than the linear progression from the spicy (*pour ouvrir l'appétit*) to fish, flesh, salad, cheese, fruit, sweet, coffee, seems to Frenchmen curious and *invraisemblable*. The Chinese logic, if anything more complex and refined, of arranging taste sensations in cyclical fashion appears to them as being merely comic: *"Figurez-vous, ils vous servent un entremet, tout d'un coup, après quelques poissons variés et puis ils terminent le repas avec la soupe! C'est drôle, hein?"*

"Le Refus de s'engager"

The French desire for an environment arranged in a stable fashion, with familiar routines defined by recognisable limits, manifests itself also on questions of public consequence. Typical expressions of distaste for innovation are *"Pas de surprise!"* and *"pas d'aventure!"* This systematic French distrust of whatever is new and strange underlies a variety of otherwise inexplicable phenomena.

Take the notorious case of French politics. During the past several years, the government has suffered from a sustained incapacity to act decisively. Characteristically, the French themselves quickly found *le mot juste* to describe this situation: *l'immobilisme*. Political immobility became pervasive when France was confronted by a new and strange set of demands. The major test was the European Defence Community, which asked nothing less than that Frenchmen henceforth conceive their political identity in terms of being Europeans. There were better reasons for hesitation than many foreigners recognise. But to prolong the issue over four years before they finally rejected an idea they had themselves created was peculiarly characteristic of French politics. Perhaps its sublime expression was the declaration of M. Antoine Pinay, former prime minister and minister of foreign affairs: *"Je suis autant que personne partisan du mouvement, mais j'entends qu'il ne débouche pas sur l'aventure."*

France has become a land in which "surprise" and "adventure" are pejorative words. Every approach from "the outside" must be regarded with suspicion by a person in his right mind. The prudent posture, when confronted by any new and strange proposition, is defence: *"On veut m'avoir."* The safest way to defend one's self, naturally, is a refusal to participate at all (*"Je ne marche pas"*), thereby avoiding the risk of *l'aventure*.

Underlying this view of political action is a more general ontological perspective that has been worked into the French sensibility. Frenchmen commonly perceive the environment as more detached and remote from themselves than do, say, Anglo-Americans. The external world possesses for them rather definite

characteristics, including a capacity for action which is independent of the will of particular human beings. Ordinary French conversation produces an array of phrases which expresses this idea. One speaks often, for example, of *"la force des choses,"* a notion rarely heard in America, where it is regarded as defeatist rather than realist, and hardly more often in Britain. Another way of referring to the external world as possessing a reality independent of human effort is the phrase *"les choses sont ce qu'elles sont."*

This perspective tends to disengage the individual from great public issues. Politics becomes a random series of events about which one can do little. The Anglo-American idea that policy is a sequence of decisions by which one seeks to alter events before they become the *données* of the next public crisis — this idea seems to very many Frenchmen pretentious and rather tiresome. The young express this sentiment by making *je m'en-foutisme* into an ideology; their elders are content with the celebrated Gallic shrug whereby passive inway, this attenuates political life by a widedifference connotes superior intelligence. Either spread *refus de s'engager*, which limits personal involvement with *la chose publique*.

A consequence of the *refus de s'engager* is the relative scarcity of voluntary organisations in France as compared with the massive American proliferation of channels whereby individuals engage themselves in public enterprise. The absence of active civic participation is evident in all social classes in France. There are very few "clubs" of the sort developed by the upper social groups in Britain. Among the middle class there are few parallels of Rotary, Kiwanis, and Lions. Certainly such institutions as the Parent-Teachers' Association, the League of Women Voters, and the Association of University Women have no opposite numbers among a people whose women remain firmly rooted in their primordial sexual rôle. Among the working class only the labour union has made any headway, but even it hardly touches the French worker in his daily life — offering him neither educational opportunities, recreational facilities, consumers' cooperatives, nor social diversions. All classes of Britons are likely to be shocked by the absence of an effective Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. The participant life languishes because the Frenchman is repelled by "groupism"; he guards his inner privacy, the mastery of his individuality (*maîtrise de soi*), by a resolute *méfiance* toward others.

This is part of the fixed self-image of Frenchmen as *réalistes*, which finds varied expression in the phrases used to praise one's compatriots. The French are "hard-headed" (*réfractaires*). They do not "kid themselves" (*pas d'illusions*). Or, as one of our "consultants" phrased it, *"Les Français n'aiment pas se raconter des histoires."* Realism is associated intimately with another self-ascribed trait: scepticism. A person who holds optimistic views on practically any subject is sure to lose his illusions (*prendre un coup dur*). In popular parlance the man who buys the Brooklyn Bridge is a "soft fruit" (*une poire*), who gets universal derision with little of the underlying sympathy Americans retain for the "sucker." For the Frenchman, *une vache à lait* ("softie") is strictly *un pauvre type*, and *"tant pis pour lui!"* ("too bad for him!"). After all, *"il faut savoir se défendre!"*

And so *la chose publique* yields pride of place to the austere demands of privatisation. By rejecting involvements in the public arena, *le soi* guards its privileged status as a *territoire sacré*. The flow of public discourse in France profoundly respects the sanctity of the ego. Even in technical psychology, the vocabulary used for describing the "self-system" and its manifold operations is underdeveloped.

"In the Soup"

Once these conventions of privacy have been breached, the interviewer must still deal with the special French conventions of cognition. The metaphysics which endows the external world with active attributes of its own also creates new problems of question-formulation for a foreigner accustomed to more empirical habits of thought. In our earliest interviews I was baffled by the recurrent request from respondents to state "precisely" various questions that seemed to me already precise. It required much conversation and reflection before I realised that, for the French, precision has a quite different and special meaning, a literally Cartesian meaning. What makes questions "precise" for Frenchmen is their capacity to frame the object of reference in a specific context (*"bien délimité, dans un cadre qui lui est propre"*). The object of reference, to be clear,

must be perceived as *discrète* — with external boundaries sharply defined (*"circonscrire l'objet"* in the conventional vocabulary of French philosophy).

French insistence upon a discrete, disengaged object of reference underscores their revulsion against relationships without clearly perceived boundaries. The language abounds in pejorative expressions to express this horror of inadequate distantiation — *"dans le jus," "dans le sirop," "dans la soupe."* These images convey vividly the sense that fluidity (*des idées floues*) is the enemy of clarity. Other expressions of distaste for "fuzziness" are *"dans le cirage," "dans le coton,"* and *"dans la vaseline,"* where the soft and shapeless mass without defined margins provides the antonym of clarity and precision.

The limits which such a posture impose upon the interview is illustrated by a respondent who served us as "consultant." Director of an important national research organisation, with long experience in survey work, this man seemed perfect for our purpose. Indeed, he gave us many practical suggestions for question-wording, which helped us to avoid the vague and achieve the "precise." At five different questions scattered through our interview schedule, however, this man threw up his hands in utter contempt and despair. "You will never get any Frenchman to answer questions like these," he declared, without explaining why. These were the questions:

1. If you were *président du conseil* (prime minister), what would be the main lines of your policy?
2. If you had to live in another country, which one would you choose?
3. If you had your life to live over again, what sort of life would you want?
4. Who are the most enviable people in the world? Why?
5. What functions do you think you could fill in a Communist France?

What these questions have in common is that they ask the interviewee to imagine himself in a situation other than his real one (i.e., they are "rôle-playing" questions). Such an idea is regarded as frivolous, not worth the attention of Frenchmen, who are, after all, *"des gens sérieux."* These questions were bound to provoke resistance among people who consider as their strongest traits realism, scepticism, and mistrust. And indeed they did, many interviewees regarding them as merely silly: *"De la blague!" "De la fantaisie pure!"*

An instructive study could be made of the diverse ways in which people of different nations respond to rôle-playing questions of this sort. Our British interviewees, for instance, responded to precisely these questions with only minor incident. In general, such questions are handled with greater facility by people habituated to ready ego-involvement with the new and strange, among people who, having a less rigid conception of themselves and their proper conduct in the world, show a more supple capacity for rearranging their self-image upon short notice. A clear difference in the capacity to empathise, to "play rôles," emerged from interviews conducted in the Middle East five years ago. There it was possible to identify the Traditionalists by their total incapacity to answer such questions as "What would you do if you were president of Syria?" By contrast, the Moderns seemed to experience no difficulty whatsoever when asked what they would do as editor of a newspaper, or as leader of their country, or if they had to live in another country.

There is a vast psychic difference between the illiterate and untutored traditionalism of the Middle Eastern peasant and the traditionalism which prevails among the contemporary élite of France. The Frenchman has acquired his traditionalism as an intellectual discipline and as part of an explicit psychic code. He is taught from childhood an articulate conception of *le bonheur* and a system of appropriate behaviour designed to maximise his satisfactions. Whereas the Arab peasant usually has no sense of possible alternatives to his traditional ways but simply "does what comes naturally," the Frenchman has a very sophisticated rationale for his conduct. He not only is quite aware of other ways of behaving but can (and usually does) tell you with the greatest clarity why his way is better than any other.

The personality associated with traditionalism takes a quite different turn, then, among the French. It explains why Frenchmen often accuse Americans, who think of themselves as the world's greatest individualists, of a *"manque d'individualisme."* For contemporary Americans, individualism implies non-conformity; expressing one's self means doing something

just a little differently from the other fellow. For Frenchmen, individualism lives quite comfortably with a massive conformism. Their underlying principle is not to do some things a little differently, but rather not to do very many things at all. In the eyes of Frenchmen the American loses individuality by identifying himself too readily with other persons, by associating himself too intensely with public causes, and by joining too many organisations. The Frenchman guards his by maintaining *le soi* inviolate from the impingements of the public arena.

Politics and Police

We gained *entrée*, in due course, to spokesmen of those social groups which constitute the political Centre and Right — businessmen, high civil servants, military leaders, even chiefs of the non-Communist trade unions. But we made little headway on the Left, a sector of the political continuum which is inadequately interpreted even in France and which reaches far beyond the Communist Party and fellow-travellers.

There exists in France a pervasive political sentiment called *gauchisme*. It is a sentiment because it entails no specific judgments on specific issues but expresses rather a diffuse general hostility to the powers-that-be and things-as-they-are. One approximation of a psychological definition of this sentiment was sketched by Albert Camus in *L'Homme révolté*, with reference to "the alienated intellectual." But the special importance of *gauchisme* in France is rather its sociological diffusion; types of Frenchmen have been affected by chronic oppositionism who, in other countries, are conservative or have no clearly defined political sentiment at all (e.g., army officers, civil servants, rich businessmen). A systematic sociology of the diffusion of gauchisme in France would do much to explain the French incapacity to act decisively on critical public issues during the last two decades.

It was among these *gauchisants* that our inquiry encountered the most widespread suspicion and resistance. We had decided, early in the game, that complete candour on the sponsorship of our study was essential. Our interviewers had been instructed to respond, when questioned, that the inquiry was jointly approved by French and American universities and that an American professor was a member of the scientific committee during the study. The impact of this disclosure upon French *gauchisants* was strong enough to draw caustic remarks, to limit responsiveness, and, in some cases, to elicit a complete refusal. Some *gauchisants* who responded framed their remarks primarily to cause anguish to the American professor — a performance more frequent among those who took their *gauchisme* rather lightly. More committed Leftists not only refused to answer at all but in some cases went further. We were reported to the weekly journal *L'Express*, a leading mouthpiece of *gauchisme*, and for most of a week were haunted by a young reporter determined to denounce and expose our enterprise. Several hours of explaining carefully our interview schedule, our sampling procedure, and our modes of analysis failed to persuade her that it would be impossible for us to derive information useful to the police, French or American. It was perfectly clear to the reporter that there must be some hidden trick; once I was an American, the enterprise was necessarily a manœuvre of the Right and, *ipso facto*, despicable.

The extreme *gauchisant* went even further. In two regions we were denounced to the departmental *préfet*. Our interviewers there reported that, unless we could clear matters with the *préfet*, their usefulness would be at an end. In Paris we were subjected to two visits by agents of the DST (Défense de la Sécurité du Territoire, the French FBI). These persons scrutinised very carefully our intentions, procedures, and, most particularly, our affiliations in France. We were able to surmount those inquiries, as those of the regional *préfets*, only because our *comité de patronage* was composed of Frenchmen of impeccable standing.

Les Anglais: A Projective Test

We learned from these interviews, among other things, that how the French see other nations is now a function of how they see themselves. This sector of French sentiment has a special piquancy for British readers. With no other people do the French lead as complex and many-layered a psychic life as with their neighbours across the Channel. For penetration of the French fantasy world, *les Anglais* make a splendid projective test.

We can deal better with current French judg-

ments of others when we recall André Siegfried's theorem that French culture had been "completed" by the 18th century. Indeed, one can usefully classify Frenchmen today in terms of their reckoning with the marvellous XVIII*ème*. There are those who are still for it (and sometimes in it); those who flaunt the XIX*ème's* reaction against it — the *bons esprits* who, in the phrase of Marcel Aymé, "still assign a high revolutionary coefficient to masturbation"; those who have reacted against XIX*ème's* reaction against it (the, so to speak, anti-anti-XVIII*èmes*). Here and there, one encounters someone who is in and of the XX*ème*. In some ways he seems hardly French any more!

These historic levels reverberated, like geologic layers in a tremor, when our interviewers asked Frenchmen how they felt about *les Anglais*. The ancient orders — military and clerical — emitted the sonorous peals of classic Anglophobia. No happenings *circa* A.D. 1956 dim, for the true Gallic Anglophobe, the vivacious souvenirs of Jeanne d'Arc and Waterloo. Compiègne still symbolises *perfide Albion* and not a few among our respondents still used, as a summary expression, some variant of the ancient formula *"l'argent anglais et les poitrines françaises."*

Events of 1956 not only fail to alter this undertow of Anglophobia, but are themselves transformed by its force. Thus, one 70-year-old retired cavalry colonel attributes current French ills mainly to British design—the interbellum failures of French policy; the defeat of 1940 "caused" by Dunkerque; the undermining of European Union with the defeat of EDC; even the tragedy at Dien Bien Phu (where British desire to safeguard Burma, he alleges, prevented U.S. use of the napalm bombs that would have gained the French victory). Doubtless he is today explaining why the sad outcome at Suez was due to the British. Enveloped in his antique reverie, this Old Soldier — who interlards trenchant critiques of others with such dicta as *"L'État doit être fondé sur la fidelité, la discipline et l'honneur!"* — still considers the principal obstacle to French glory to be *les Anglais*.

The classic Anglophobia, while still vibrant in the subsoil of French emotion, no longer is a prescriptive item in the national doctrine to which every Frenchman good and true must subscribe. The evidence of our interviews suggests, indeed, that Anglophobia of all types has declined in frequency and intensity. A perfectly upright Frenchman can now ignore the old chestnut of British perfidy and say: *"Les Anglais ont une grande loyauté dans l'exécution des contrats particuliers."* This revision of diehard dogma occurs mainly among people who have scaled down ancient French pretensions to an appropriate 1956 level of national aspiration. The relationship, in a word, is this: as appraisals of French power decline, so evaluations of British virtue rise.

Frenchmen are certainly not enamoured of their other principal allies — Americans and Germans. By contrast, *les Anglais* come to seem utterly admirable to many Frenchmen. Interesting variations on the Anglo-French relationship are registered when one collates French sentiments toward these others. It is rare, for example, that one should look with equal favour upon both Germans and Englishmen. (To look with equal disfavour upon both is less rare and forms the basic syndrome of French xenophobia, since these are still the two most salient national entities in the conventional French image of the world.) To the Germanophile — and he constitutes a species of Frenchman more numerous than is ordinarily supposed — the English usually figure as rivalrous and even diabolical, the principal component of disarray in a world that might otherwise be moulded into an orderly image of heart's desire. Such a person is much more likely than most of his compatriots to reveal a highly authoritarian set of preferences, including, if he is a relentless ideologue, the peculiarly French variety of matter-of-fact racism. He is likely, on current issues, to despise the Arabs (for whom his main adjectives are *sale, bête,* and *brutal*) and to blame French decline in North Africa upon British lack of imperial backbone in dealing with the colonial peoples.

Conversely, the Germanophobe — when he is not comprehensively xenophobic — is more likely to tend toward Anglophilia. For him *les Anglais* have, at least, the virtue of sharing his antipathy for the Germans (by contrast with the Americans, say, whose idolatry of productivity and efficiency supposedly blind them to more fundamental traits of human character). Depending upon the intensity of his Germanophobia, such a Frenchman's Anglophilia may

carry him to extreme postures of filiopietism towards *les Anglais*. If there is intense anxiety in his feeling against Germany, and paranoid symptoms are not infrequent among such respondents, then his attitude toward the English is likely to exhibit the ambivalent adoration usually reserved for Big Brother.

These extremist syndromes of Germanophilia-cum-Anglophobia and Germanophobia-cum-Anglophilia are most clearly defined, of course, at the limits of the French spectrum of attitudes. While they surely resonate in the breasts of many ordinary Frenchmen, they are most revealing as expressions of political psychopathology in a nation whose historic self-imagery makes a poor fit to the current reality of forced choices presented, largely, by its partners.

"Private Faces in Public Places"

More subtle, in this context, are the discriminations which Frenchmen make between their major pair of partners — the English and the Americans. For a majority of Frenchmen the direction of sentiment is unilateral: they "like" both or "dislike" both with approximately equal vigour. But two substantial clusters of deviant cases appear among our respondents. One group dislikes the English and likes the Americans. These appear to be largely the same authoritarian types who like the Germans. They are also relatively more discontented with "*l'état actuel des choses*" in France. They find in common among the Germans and Americans the admirable traits of diligence, organisation, mechanism which satisfy a compulsive craving for orderliness — traits whose absence they deplore in France and whose failure to triumph in the world they attribute to the wily and unpredictable *Britanniques* (the epithet which usually replaces *les Anglais* in this context).

The other deviant group dislikes the Americans and likes the English. The underlying sentiment here appears to stem from a sense of shared greatness gone, a wistful affection for the lifeways evolved during the centuries when Frenchmen and Englishmen disputed between themselves for supremacy in the familiar arena of Europe (and the game overseas was merely an extension of the continental play). These older lifeways are felt to be a more suitable *règle de jeu* than the stark code, known as the Cold War, which defines right conduct for the powerful primitives (U.S./U.S.S.R.) now disputing mastery of the great globe itself. This preoccupation with the æsthetic surface of life starts from a net affirmation that "private faces in public places are nicer and wiser than public faces in private places." It expresses itself in the frequent selection, for special admiration, of personal deportment among the English as compared with the Americans or the Russians — since the two giants are usually perceived by such respondents as more alike than different. This preference for a private style of life is frequently transposed to interpret public behaviour, often with the sense that the English have somehow managed to adapt their style better to the demands of the world today.

In these tensions generated by the current need to reconstrue one's Self in terms of Others, the French pay a heavy psychic cost. It may be, as some have averred, only the *rentier's* horrified but belated discovery that his vested values have declined and he has been living off capital. But perceiving current French *malaise* as the outcome of a XVIII*ème* psyche that was "too finished," may aid diagnosis without advancing therapy. Granted that France no longer is what it was, its future will be shaped by the modes that prevail among Frenchmen of perceiving what it is.

For the classic self-image no longer works. Gone are the days when Frenchmen could see their civilisation as *un tout*, and rank all other peoples by the direction and degree of their deviation from this perfected model. Nowadays, Frenchmen are obliged to judge themselves afresh when they judge others.

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SHIFTS IN THE BALANCE OF COMMUNICATION FLOWS

A Problem of Measurement in International Relations

• KARL W. DEUTSCH

Studies of communication deal only with one limited aspect of politics. Many kinds of politically significant transactions cannot be reduced to communication: population growth, gross national product, natural and industrial resources, standards of nutrition, geographic location, transport and trade, manpower and firepower. Yet the limited aspect of politics which is constituted by communication processes is a strategic one. It includes the areas of attention, of perception and orientation, of values and evaluation, of goal-seeking and of decision-making.

Since the days of Plato and Machiavelli, classic political theory has aimed at presenting simplified verbal images of politics, of the state, and of the behavior of states toward each other. These classic conceptions contained assumptions about communication, but communication was not treated explicitly as a major aspect of these analytic schemes. More recent treatments of political decision-making, on the other hand, have increasingly focussed on communication and information, and on the related aspects of values and symbols.[1] Part of the same development has been an increasing interest in representing social and political processes by means of abstract models that pay explicit attention to communication problems.[2]

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[1] Cf. Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, in *A Study of Power*, Glencoe, Ill. Free Press, 1950; Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*, in Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 3, Princeton University, June 1954.

[2] Cf. Herbert Simon, "Some Strategic Considerations in the Construction of Social Science Models," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, ed., *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences*, Glencoe, Ill. Free Press, 1954, pp. 388–415; K. W. Deutsch, "On Communication Models in Social Science," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Fall 1952, pp. 356–380.

The more ambitious of such models attempt to represent quantitative aspects of the political process. Indeed, there is beginning in political science, as there has been in the field of economics, a gradual shift from the sole reliance on qualitative or literary representation, with its potential richness and sensitivity, to its supplementation by quantitative models with their relatively greater poverty and rigidity, but also their possibilities of greater precision and penetrating power. Where such quantitative models are attempted, however, they raise the question of operational definitions and techniques of measurement for the variables they employ.

What is Meant by Measurement

What kinds of communications can we measure in international relations, and what can we measure about them? Moreover, what do we mean by measurement in this context, and what kinds of quantities can we try to measure?[3]

All measurement depends on repetition. We can measure repetitive events, such as communication flows, that is, streams of messages that resemble each other in some important way, such as in their sources or their topics; or we can try to measure the impact of relatively unique events by noting the changes in the repetitive processes of communication with which their occurrence may have been associ-

[3] For an excellent general discussion of the problem of measurement, see S. S. Stevens, ed., *Handbook of Experimental Psychology*, Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1949, ch. 1; and the summary in Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch and Stuart W. Cook, *Research Methods in Social Relations with Especial Reference to Prejudice*, New York, Dryden Press, 1951, Part I, pp. 92–127.

ated. In either case, it is not the individual message but its statistical context that will most concern us at the outset. At any one time, each message derives its meaning only from the statistical universe of possible alternative messages and silences that could have been transmitted in its stead. Over any longer period of time, again, the significance of each message can be appraised only in terms of the context of the changing flow of other messages between the units relevant for this particular communication process. Statistics of communication flows thus constitute essential background data for almost any effective analysis of international communication.

In looking for measurements to construct and interpret such statistics, it is important not to take too narrow a view of the concept of measurement itself. Measurement in its broadest form consists in assigning in a consistent manner some symbol of quantity to each of a number of events, such as assigning numbers to football players. A slightly less primitive kind of measurement involves the assignment of symbols of rank, such as the words "big" versus "small," or "bigger than," or "faster than," etc. However, even though we know that A is bigger than B, and B bigger than C (and perhaps also that our scale of measurement is transitive, so that C must be smaller than A), we do not know from these statements by how much. Only a more thoroughgoing kind of measurement in terms of some ratio scale can answer the latter kind of question. Many of the measurements most immediately useful, and most readily obtainable, are likely to be in the intermediate category, where exact ratios cannot be relied on, but where some statements in terms of "bigger than," "smaller than," "high in x," "low in x," "faster than," "slower than," "increasing" and "declining" can be made with fair confidence. Has there been growth or decline, or no clear-cut change? Has the ratio between two processes or trends roughly been preserved, or has it become drastically altered? It is with such rough proportions and balances among trends that the rest of our discussion of international communication flows here will be concerned.

Rough quantitative measurements of relative proportions among different communication flows can be made in several dimensions. The most obvious dimension is that of volume, taken either as volume per unit of time, or as a proportion of some total volume of messages, or as a proportion of the time or facilities engaged in dealing with them. There are, of course, other dimensions than volume: the speed with which messages are transmitted; the fidelity with which their proportions and details are preserved throughout the process of transmission. There is the effectiveness of communication in terms of the measurable quantities of some response which it may trigger off at the receiving end; and there is the distribution of initiatives among the participating parties in communication.[4] Nevertheless, volume — that is to say, frequency — of communication is the first dimension of international and domestic communication flows that is likely to be measured with any degree of success.

The Intake-Output Ratio

Perhaps the simplest ratio is that between output and intake of communications of some person or organization, such as a political leader, a party or elite, a government, or a country. How much time is spent in talking and broadcasting, in telling others, and how much is spent in observing, or in listening to what they have to say?

In the case of a relatively simple goal-seeking device, such as an automatic gun director, it has been surmised that the intake-output ratio in terms of bits of information necessary for effective operation, may be somewhere near the general order of one-to-one, so that roughly an equal number of units ("bits") of information per second must be taken in for any level of complexity of effective output information required of the system.[5] It seems clear that this ratio is often widely departed from in politics. In the course of a series of extended interviews of Indonesian political leaders, undertaken as part of the Communications Program of the Center for International Studies at M.I.T., John Rodrigues found that Indonesian political leaders told him repeatedly: "The Indonesian people should do this," but he rarely, if ever,

[4] For a more extended discussion of these dimensions, see my *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement*, New York, Doubleday-Random House, 1954, pp. 59–62.

[5] Wiener, Norbert, oral communication, M.I.T., Spring 1955.

encountered a phrase like: "I hear from my constituents," or "some people think," or "people tell me that."[6] A broad program of interviews among members of the United States Congress on the topic of the reciprocal trade program, showed the opposite pattern. The investigator, Dr. Lewis Dexter, found Congressmen telling him frequently: "I hear," "people tell me," "some people in my district feel," or "other members of Congress seem to think," but that they said much more rarely: "I think we should," or "I think people ought to."[7]

The concept of the intake-output ratio could be used to supplement interview materials and other kinds of evidence in verifying at least in part David Riesman's concepts of "inner-directed" versus "other-directed" personality, and of the changing style of American politics which may be related to the changing proportions among those personality types in our population.[8] It could be applied, in more strictly quantitative terms, to the amounts of manpower and money devoted by certain organizations, such as the State Department or the Associated Press, to the gathering of information from abroad, as against the comparable amounts of money and manpower devoted to sending the "American story" to foreign recipients.

There seem to be no good statistical data readily available, but there are scattered indications that some of these ratios are far from one-to-one, and that rather drastic changes have occurred in some of them in the course of the last decades. Thus according to Russell F. Anderson, the number of U.S. foreign correspondents fell from 2,700 in 1946 to less than 300 in 1951 (excluding those newsmen who were then covering the war in Korea).[9] The causes of the decline, in Anderson's view, were mainly economic: rising costs of paper and printing, together with lack of reader demand for foreign news, led editors to cut down expenses for foreign reporting to an extent often concealed from the readers and advertisers of their papers.

This trend was by no means limited to the United States. A *Unesco* survey of seventeen major daily newspapers from as many countries in 1951 arrived at similar conclusions.[10] All foreign newspapers and news agencies together maintained in 1954 only about two hundred regular full-time correspondents in the United States.[11] A significant part of the two-way flow of news in the free market thus seemed to be on the way of being replaced by the heavy output of government-backed information agencies, such as the "Voice of America" and the comparable agencies of other countries.

The Receiving-Sending Ratio of Foreign Mail

Another example of intake-output ratios can be found in the flows of first class mail between countries. Among forty-eight countries for which data were examined, more than three-quarters received regularly more letters from abroad than they sent.

During the decade before the Second World War, the only countries that sent significantly more letters than they received — for whom, therefore, the ratios of foreign mail received to foreign mail sent (R/S) were well below one — were seven industrial and commercial nations with widely diversified economies and long-established traditions of using mail communications on a large scale. These countries were, in ascending order of the R/S ratios (averaged for 1928 and 1938, or nearest years thereto): France (0.52), Austria (0.62), Germany (0.65), the United Kingdom (0.70), the United States (0.81), Belgium (0.82), and Japan (0.83). Three other countries had R/S

[6] Rodrigues, John, Report in the Seminar on Communication, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., Fall 1955.

[7] Lewis Dexter, report in the same seminar, Fall 1955; and Lewis A. Dexter, *Congressmen and the People They Listen To,* Cambridge, M.I.T., Center of International Studies, October 1955 (C/55-26), multigraphed.

[8] Cf. David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950; *Faces in the Crowd,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

[9] Anderson, Russell F., "News from Nowhere: Our Disappearing Foreign Correspondents," *The Saturday Review of Literature,* November 17, 1951.

[10] Kayser, Jacques, *One Week's News: Comparative Study of 17 Major Dailies for a Seven-Day Period,* Paris, Unesco, 1953, p. 93. *Cf.* also Robert Redfield "Does America Need a Hearing Aid?" *Saturday Review of Literature,* September 23, 1953.

[11] The membership of the Foreign Press Association, according to its *1954 Directory of Members,* was 149; this figure was believed to represent about 75% of the regular full-time correspondents in the United States. Data from Center for International Studies, M.I.T.

ratios very close to one: the Netherlands (0.98), Spain (0.98), and Switzerland (1.01).

At the other end of the rank order scale were about eighteen countries that received substantially more mail than they sent; these countries tended to specialize by and large in the export of primary products from agriculture, forestry and mining, and to import a wide variety of goods and services from countries with more diversified economies. In order of declining R/S ratios, these countries were: Finland (3.18), Mexico (3.12), Argentina (2.93), Brazil (2.78), New Zealand (2.64), Indonesia (2.33), Belgian Congo (2.21), Southern Rhodesia (2.20), Iran (2.19), Iceland (2.10), Gold Coast (1.97), Nigeria (1.89), Union of South Africa (1.87), Bulgaria (1.86), Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (1.73), Portugal (1.72), Indochina (1.71), and Turkey (1.63).

The middle range on the R/S scale was taken up by twenty remaining countries, mostly from Northern and Eastern Europe or from Asia: Poland (1.57), Luxembourg (1.53), Sweden (1.48), Roumania (1.42), Ireland (1.41), Norway (1.40), Egypt (1.31), India (1.26), Iraq (1.25), Yugoslavia (1.25), Hungary (1.21), French Morocco (1.19), Greece (1.18), Czechoslovakia (1.17), Australia (1.15), Lebanon and Syria (1.12), Denmark (1.12), China (1.06), Madagascar (1.04), and the USSR (1.02).

By 1951, the main lines of this picture still persisted, but there had been some interesting changes. Unfortunately, there were no postwar figures available for France, the United States, and Japan, nor for the USSR, Iraq, Roumania, and New Zealand. Among the remaining forty-one countries, nine had R/S ratios below one (figures are for 1951, unless otherwise indicated): Germany 0.66 (1950), the United Kingdom 0.74, Hungary 0.79 (1947), Netherlands 0.80, Yugoslavia, 0.86, Switzerland 0.86, Austria 0.92, Ireland 0.94, and Madagascar 0.98. A tenth, Turkey, had an R/S ratio of exactly 1.00 (1949). At the other end of the scale, there were now only twelve countries with R/S ratios above 1.60, while there had been eighteen such countries in the average of 1928 and 1938; and for many countries the imbalance between mail received and sent was somewhat less. A sharp upturn in mail received in 1951 put Greece at the head of the list with an R/S ratio of 5.07. She was followed by Argentina 3.64, Indonesia 3.64 (1949), Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika 2.59 (1950), Finland 2.11, Iran 2.08 (1949), Gold Coast 1.97, Luxembourg 1.92, Australia 1.91, Nigeria 1.81 (1950), Belgian Congo 1.76, and Bulgaria 1.65 (1947). The middle group with R/S ratios between 1.60 and 1.01 included the remaining nineteen countries: Iceland 1.57 (1950), China 1.50 (1947), Egypt 1.47, Brazil 1.43 (1948), India 1.42, Sweden 1.34, Lebanon and Syria 1.31 (1950), Portugal 1.30, Czechoslovakia 1.30 (1946), Spain 1.28, French Morrocco 1.26, Poland 1.24 (1948), Union of South Africa 1.21 (1949), Southern Rhodesia 1.20, Mexico 1.11, Norway 1.06, Indochina 1.04 (1950), Denmark 1.04 (1949), and Belgium 1.04.[12]

What do these figures mean? Since we know as yet so little about international communication flows, all interpretations must be quite provisional. Even so, some tentative inferences seem suggested.

1. The flows of outgoing and incoming foreign mail, and the imbalances between them, are remarkably stable from year to year in most countries, with the obvious exception of times of war or civil war. Changes tend to be greater in underdeveloped countries. Over longer periods of time, however, such as one or two decades, the cumulative changes are often considerable.

2. An appreciable imbalance between the amounts of foreign mail sent and received appears to be the rule. In the average of the 1928 and 1938 figures, such imbalances exceeded ten per cent in forty-two of the forty-eight states examined; and for twenty-eight of these states, the imbalances were larger than thirty per cent. About 1951, thirty-two of the forty-one countries for which we found data had imbalances greater than ten per cent, and twenty-two had imbalances larger than thirty per cent.

3. The number of countries receiving appreciably (i.e., by a difference of more than ten per cent) more mail than they are sending is much larger than the number of countries in the opposite condition.

4. It is conceivable that there might be some correlation between the excess of mail which a country habitually receives from abroad, and

[12] Sources of data: statistics of the Universal Postal Union, Bern, for the relevant years.

its position as an "importer" (rather than as an "exporter") of other kinds of communications. Whether this is true to any significant extent could only be established by further research.

From this brief look at some national intake-output ratios we may move on to consider another relationship between communication flows: the ratio between the flow of messages within a system — such as a country, or an organization — and the flow of messages across its boundaries.

The Ratio of Internal to External Flows

The ratio of intra-boundary processes within any organization to cross-boundary processes originating or terminating in the same organization offers one basic operational measure for the cohesion of any such organization, as well as of the extent of its integration with others outside it.

Local to Non-Local Mail. In this manner, the ratio of local letters — that is, those originating and delivered in the same city (postal district) — to non-local letters (that is, letters originating in the city but delivered outside it) can tell us something about the normal level of integration between some of the large cities of the United States and the rest of the country.

The figures in Table 1 show that the ratio between local and non-local first class mail in New York City was 0.50 in 1952, and 0.54 in 1949. New Yorkers thus sent two letters to the rest of the United States for every letter they sent to someone in their own city. For twenty major cities in the United States, these L/N ratios — local versus non-local first class mail — ranged in 1952 from 0.49 for Atlanta to 1.38 for Milwaukee; and in 1949 from 0.49 for Cincinnati to 1.44 for Milwaukee. The median ratio was about 0.96 in 1949 and dropped slightly to about 0.89 in 1952, suggesting for the latter year a ratio of about nine local to ten non-local letters as somewhere near "normal" for a "normal" large city in the United States. The aggregate predominance of non-local mail was somewhat stronger, for the ratio between the aggregate local mail of those twenty cities and their aggregate non-local mail was 0.85 in 1949, and dropped to 0.73 in 1952, i.e., four non-local letters for every three local letters in the twenty cities taken together.[13]

Table 1. *Ratios of Local to Non-Local Mail in 20 Major U.S. Cities*

L/N Rank in 1952	*City*	*L/N Ratio in 1952*	*1949*
1	Atlanta	0.49	0.54
2	New York	0.50	0.54
3	Cincinnati	0.53	0.49
4	Kansas City	0.56	0.68
5	Minneapolis	0.58	0.53
6	Los Angeles	0.59	1.17
7	Brooklyn	0.63	0.71
8	Washington, D. C.	0.66	1.03
9	Chicago	0.73	1.10
10	San Francisco	0.78	0.89
11	Cleveland	0.87	1.16
12	Dallas	0.92	1.27
13	Pittsburgh	0.98	0.51
14	Philadelphia	0.98	1.03
15	Seattle	1.04	0.87
16	Boston	1.08	0.89
17	St. Louis	1.10	1.30
18	Detroit	1.12	1.19
19	Baltimore	1.29	1.18
20	Milwaukee	1.38	1.44

For the United States as a whole, the ratio of local to non-local mail has remained remarkably stable over almost a quarter century. It was 0.46 in 1928 and 0.45 in 1952, with only minor fluctuations in the non-war years between.[14]

Non-Local to Foreign Mail. For each city, non-local mail sent to the rest of the United States exceeded greatly, of course, the amounts of mail sent to foreign countries, but there were some striking differences. The ratio of non-local to foreign mail — let us call it the N/F ratio — ranged in 1952 from 9.07 for Washington, D. C. to 121.13 for Atlanta, Georgia. More detailed data for twenty major cities in 1949 and 1952 are given in Table 2. They offer some interesting statistical sidelights to our usual intuitive judgments of the degree of

[13] Sources of data: U. S. Post Office Department, *Cost Ascertainment Report for the Fiscal Year 1949*, p. 28, table 2, cols. 3 and 5; *Cost Ascertainment Report for the Fiscal Year 1952*, p. 30, table 2, cols. 2 and 4.

[14] From data in the U. S. Post Office *Cost Ascertainment Reports* for 1928–1940, and 1949–52.

"world involvement" — as against more local or national preoccupations — of the populations of each of these centers.[15]

The series of N/F ratios for the twenty cities showed a slight increase in the N/F ratio from 1949 to 1952 for most individual cities, as well as slight increases in the average — from 31.8 to 32.2 — and in the median — from 20.5 to 20.6 — for the entire group. For the United States as a whole, however, and over a longer period of time, the ratio of non-local to foreign mail has increased considerably. Between the years 1928 and 1952, it grew from 35.77 to 46.79.[16]

Domestic versus Foreign Mail. An outstanding example of a ratio of internal to outside message flows is, of course, the ratio of domestic to foreign mail for a country as a whole. For the United States this ratio — let us call it the D/F ratio — rose for first class mail from 58.09 in 1928 to a peacetime high of 86.39 in 1938, and again after the war from 76.31 in 1949 to 79.42 in 1952.[17]

By 1952, the United States had the highest D/F ratio of all the countries for which contemporary data were available. Earlier, in 1880, the United States with a D/F ratio of 25.6 had ranked third, after Japan and Hungary; and in 1913, when its D/F ratio had declined to an estimated level of about 21.7, it still ranked a close second after Japan.[18] The significance of the high D/F ratio of the United States in recent years, however, can only be appreciated against a background of comparisons with many other countries in the same terms.

Chart 1 shows the average D/F ratios for

[15] Sources of data: U. S. Post Office Department, *Cost Ascertainment Report, 1949,* and *1952,* as cited in preceding note; and for data on foreign mail, *C.A.R. 1949,* Table 2, pp. 32–33, cols. 54, 62; and *C.A.R. 1952,* Table 2, pp. 35–36, cols. 64, 66.

[16] From U. S. Post Office Department *Cost Ascertainment Reports* for the relevant years.

[17] From figures in U. S. Post Office Department *Cost Ascertainment Reports* for the years 1928–40, and 1948–52. D consisted of total first class domestic mail plus domestic air mail. F comprised total foreign surface and air mail minus publishers' second class mail.

[18] From data in Universal Postal Union, *Statistique générale du service postal,* 1875–79, and later years.

TABLE 2. *Ratios of Non-Local to Foreign Mail for 20 Major U. S. Cities, 1952 and 1949*

Group	*N/F Rank in 1952*	*City*	*N/F Ratio in 1952*	*1949*
I. N/F Below 15:	1	Washington, D. C.	9.07	8.19
	2	New York	10.04	8.03
	3	Boston	10.38	12.15
	4	Brooklyn	11.81	11.73
	5	Chicago	13.37	11.39
II. N/F 15–25:	6	Detroit	15.08	15.23
	7	Cleveland	17.09	20.80
	8	Seattle	17.51	22.30
	9	Philadelphia	19.32	20.22
	10	Milwaukee	20.03	18.00
	11	San Francisco	21.25	19.97
	12	Los Angeles	23.45	15.02
III. N/F Above 25:	13	Baltimore	29.25	33.08
	14	St. Louis	30.69	21.37
	15	Minneapolis	40.04	38.15
	16	Cincinnati	47.13	42.25
	17	Pittsburgh	55.35	48.52
	18	Kansas City	57.28	44.95
	19	Dallas	95.33	76.86
	20	Atlanta	121.13	148.40



CHART 1

forty-six countries for the years 1946–51, plotted against an index that takes into account the geographic area A, population P, total letters L, and letters-per-capita L/P for each country. It seemed plausible that domestic should predominate more strongly over foreign mail, and hence the D/F ratio should be higher, the greater the geographic area of a country, the larger its population, and the higher its level of economic, social and cultural activity, as expressed, among other things, by a higher number of letters written per head of the population each year. The graph confirmed the surmise: the D/F ratios of the forty-six countries, when plotted on a logarithmic chart against a base AL^2/P, fell into a pattern that permitted the drawing of a regression line with the relatively high coefficient of correlation of 0.78.[19]

This means two things. First, if we know the geographic area, population, and average number of letters per capita of a country, we can predict — albeit only very roughly — its approximate D/F ratio. In the second place, we can use even the extent to which our prediction will prove wrong for some particular country. For the distance of any country on this chart from the regression line, common to the group of all countries, indicates some particular condition in respect to which this country differs so significantly from the rest that its D/F ratio is much larger, or much smaller, than would ordinarily correspond to its size, population, and level of letter writing. Thus the countries furthest below the regression line on Chart 1 are either colonies, such as Mozambique, or recent ex-colonial territories such as Southern Rhodesia or Indonesia; or they are small countries with some special relationship to large numbers of compatriots or coreligionists abroad, such as Lebanon, Israel, and Ireland. On the other hand, countries with D/F ratios far above "normal," as represented by the regression line, often turn out to be Communist dictatorships, such as Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, or at least fairly large and still partly underdeveloped countries with strongly nationalistic trends in government and policies, as well as in economic and cultural life, such as Turkey, Iran, and Brazil. These correlations are not airtight, to be sure, but neither do they seem entirely fortuitous.

No D/F data for Roumania, India, the USSR, Italy, and Japan were available for the 1946–51 period, but their D/F ratios for 1936–39, as shown on Chart 2, would place the first three of these countries well above the regression line of the forty-six countries of 1946–51. The D/F ratio of Italy, by the same token, would appear close to "normal," and that of Japan would appear somewhat below the line. The extreme position of the USSR deserves a special comment. Its 1936 D/F ratio of 96

[19] Data from the publications of the Universal Postal Union; from United Nations Statistical Yearbooks and Demographic Yearbooks; and other standard sources.



CHART 2

seems to represent the world's record to date in postal isolationism.

But may it not have been just an accident that the D/F ratios of forty-six countries in 1946–51 appeared to group themselves along a common regression line with such relative regularity? Chart 3 shows the corresponding data for forty-seven countries for the period 1928–34. Their average D/F ratios, as shown on the same logarithmic chart, again formed a relatively regular pattern against the same area-population-letter-writing index (AL^2/P), with a coefficient of correlation of 0.80. The greatest downward deviations were again found in the cases of dependent territories, such as Mozambique, French Morocco, Southern Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo, but Japan in that period appeared well above the line.

The same charting method was applied to the twenty-nine countries for which we found data for the year 1913. Their D/F ratios for that year are shown on Chart 4; their coefficient of correlation is 0.83. Finally, we charted on Chart 5 the D/F ratios for 1880 for the twenty-five countries for which we had data. For that period, the correlation was much weaker, with a coefficient of only 0.46, but still perhaps not insignificant.

The regression line itself — the "normal" standard for the D/F ratio of each country in comparison to other countries — has been shifting, albeit only slightly, from each period to the next. What has been the direction of these shifts, and what meaning, if any, can we infer from them?

Chart 6 shows the four regression lines for the situations 1880, 1913, 1928–34, and 1946–51. Each of these lines represents, more or less approximately, the distribution of the D/F ratios of somewhere between two and four dozen countries. The chart shows that the regression line dropped considerably from 1880 to 1913, but became more steeply tilted. It then shifted again upwards from 1913 to 1928–34, while retaining its new tilt; and it shifted further upward, still keeping its tilt, from 1928–34 to 1946–51. Correspondingly, the "normal" level of the D/F ratio for a country of given size, and given activity in regard to mail communication, seems to have declined from 1880

to 1913, and to have risen again from 1913 to 1951.

At the same time, the average size and activity of these countries themselves changed, shifting almost all of them to the right from each period to the next. The combined effects of increasing size and activity, and of changing levels of national self-preoccupation in regard to mails have been summarized on Chart 6 by indicating on each regression line the geometric mean of the D/F and AL^2/P values for all countries from which this particular regression line was derived. The vectors linking the four geometric means for 1880, 1913, 1928–34 and 1946–51 thus represent an extremely simplified summary of the way the world has been going, in terms of relative time and attention available to foreign mail communications, as compared to domestic ones, during the last seventy years.

Some Problems of Interpretation

Are there other processes of communication, or other kinds of transactions between regions or countries for which I/O rates between the relative frequencies of internal and outside events can be found? If so, how do these I/O rates compare to the ratios of inside to outside mail, such as the L/N ratios of local to non-local mail, or the D/F ratios of domestic mail to foreign? And what inferences, if any, could such comparisons suggest?

Detailed answers to these questions would go far beyond the framework of this article. All that can be attempted here are a few brief indications of some I/O ratios found in diverse kinds of communication or transaction flows, and some tentative inferences they might suggest for possible testing.

Travel is a process both of transport and communication, since every traveler carries in his person a considerable range of messages and memories, many of which he eventually communicates to other persons en route or after his arrival. Data for a number of states or regions in the United States concerning the ratio of passengers carried in 1933 by all public carriers within a particular state, as against the number of such passengers carried between the same state and the rest of the United States, are shown in Table 3.

It appears that ten of the twelve states for which data were computed had I/O ratios between 1 and 4; only two states on the West Coast — Washington and California — had higher rates, the latter considerably so.[20]

Another way in which experiences are communicated between countries or regions is the movement of students who cross their bound-

[20] Data for Table 3 were calculated by the author and Mr. Julian Engel at the Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton University, from statistics in Federal Coordination of Transportation, Section of Transportation Service, *Passenger Traffic Report, 1933*, Washington, D. C., 1934. See also Edward L. Ullman, "The Railroad Pattern of the United States," *The Geographical Review*, Vol. 39, No. 2, April 1949, pp. 242–256.



CHART 3

aries in search of higher education. In the United States in 1949–50, the overall I/O ratio for college students — that is, the ratio of the number of students attending college in their home state to the number of students going out of their home state in order to study elsewhere in the United States, plus the number of students from elsewhere in the United States but attending institutions in the same state — ranged from 0.67 for New Jersey and 0.82 for Rhode Island to 5.7 for Texas and 6.1 for California. Table 4 presents I/O student ratios for the same twelve states, for which I/O ratios for passenger traffic were given in Table 3. Six states have similar ranks on both tables: California, Washington, Ohio, Georgia, Tennessee and Missouri, but others for obvious reasons show striking differences, such as Massachusetts, Virginia, Louisiana and New York. For an ideal "average state", the I/O ratio of students in 1949–50 should have been 2.0, for about eighty per cent of all American students in that year attended institutions in their home states.[21]

"The proportion of *graduate* students who

[21] I/O ratios in the text and in Table 4 were computed from data in Robert C. Story, *Residence and Migration of College Students, 1949–50*, Washington, D. C., Federal Security Agency, Office of Education, 1951, p. 5.



CHART 4



CHART 5



CHART 6. Variation of World Regression Lines with Time

migrate tends to be larger than that of the college population as a whole. About seventy-one per cent of all graduate students remained within their own states to pursue advanced programs."[22] This would correspond to an I/O graduate student ratio of about 1.2 for the "average state"; the I/O undergraduate student ratio for the "average" state is about 2.1. "The unchanging percentages of students who migrate (as shown in this and the two previous studies [of 1930–31 and 1938–39, respectively]) indicate that stability is being reached with respect to the percentage of students who seek their higher education in out-of-state institutions. While the factor of facility of transportation tends to increase migration, this factor is evidently offset by the expansion of higher educational facilities into local areas."[23]

As regards other kinds of migration, not just that of college students, United States Censuses for the last hundred years have shown that somewhere near thirty per cent of Americans have been living in states other than those in which they were born, so that the theoretical "average state" has had an I/O ratio of intra-U. S. migration of about 1.2. This would contrast with corresponding I/O ratios for the sovereign states of Western Europe, which as a rule would be certain to lie well above 10, if we took the trouble to compute them. So would, presumably, the international I/O ratios for students in most countries. For the United States in 1949/50 it was well above 45, since foreign students then comprised 1.1 per cent of the total student population,[24] and the number of American students studying abroad in that year was certainly not larger.

The two orders of magnitude of such I/O ratios — below, say, 6 and above, say, 10 — thus illustrate perhaps some aspects of the difference between certain levels of communica-

[22] Story, *op. cit.*, p. 13. Italics supplied.

[23] *Ibid.* Cf. also Fred J. Kelly and Ruth E. Eckert, *Residence and Migration of College Students,* Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1945 (Federal Security Agency, U. S. Office of Education, Pamphlet No. 98), p. 5; F. J. Kelly and Betty A. Patterson, *Residence and Migration of College Students,* Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1934 (Department of the Interior, Office of Education, Pamphlet No. 48); George F. Zook, *Residence and Migration of University and College Students,* Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1926 (Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin 1926, No. 11.).

[24] Story, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

TABLE 3. *Ratios of Intra-State to Interstate Passenger Traffic for 12 States in the United States in 1933*
Traffic Ratios: State/U.S. Minus State

All Carriers			*Railroads Only*		
Rank	*State*	*St/U Ratio*	*Rank*	*State*	*St/U Ratio*
1	Illinois	1.23	1	Ohio	0.85
2	Missouri	1.27	2	Missouri	0.93
3	New York	1.66	3	Illinois	1.00
4	Tennessee	1.70	4	New York	1.64
5	Louisiana	1.78	5	Louisiana	1.80
6	Georgia	2.20	6	Washington	1.84
7	Virginia	2.36	7	Tennessee	1.93
8	Ohio	2.48	8	Pennsylvania	2.00
9	Pennslyvania	2.96	9	Virginia	2.31
10	Massachusetts	3.57	10	Georgia	2.95
11	Washington	5.24	11	Massachusetts	3.71
12	California	18.57	12	California	18.97

tion among communities or states that are more or less integrated in a common country or federal union, and among those that are not. Thus the I/O rate of migration for Scotland in 1951 seems to have been somewhat below 4.9.[25] Similarly, the I/O rate of Swiss citizens in the theoretical "average canton" in Switzerland was 4.8 in 1860, and it fell to 2.3 by 1930.[26]

Inside-outside ratios of communication or transaction flows can also suggest something about the extent to which some particular human activity, such as science, is "international" or "national," and in what direction, if any, it may be changing. Thus a survey of samples of leading American scientific journals in seven fields showed that on the average they contained in the 1890's about two citations of foreign scientific work for every citation from an American author. By 1954, the proportions had become more than reversed: there were almost three references to work published in the United States for every reference to scientific work in the rest of the world. A survey of the I/O ratio of scientific contributions — that is, of American versus foreign contributions summarized in *Chemical Abstracts*, and of American versus foreign Nobel prize winners — showed a closely parallel increase during the same sixty years. The American I/O ratio of scientific citations in the 1890's was roughly four times the I/O ratio of contributions of that time; and the same habit of seeing national contributions loom four times as large in the area of citations than they did in the area of actual contributions seemed to persist without significant change in 1954. Even in the latter year, however, the average I/O ratio of American versus foreign citations in the American scientific journals surveyed remained below three, indicating perhaps the somewhat diminished but still continuing international traditions of scientific work.[27]

Most of the work on the measurement of

[25] In rounded figures the population of Scotland in 1951 was 5,096,000, of which 406,000 were born outside Scotland; at the same time, according to D. J. Robertson, "there were 560,000 Scots living in England." The ratio of the 4,690,000 Scottish-born residents of Scotland to the sum of non-Scottish-born Scots and of Scottish-born residents of England was about 4.9, and this does not take into account the numbers of born Scotsmen who had migrated to other countries than England. Cf. D. J. Robertson, "Population Growth and Movement," in A. K. Cairncross, *The Scottish Economy: A Statistical Account of Scottish Life by Members of the Staff of Glasgow University*, Cambridge (Eng.) University Press, 1954, pp. 12, 16–17.

[26] In 1860, 86.4 per cent of the Swiss lived in their Cantons of origin, while nine per cent lived in other Cantons, and 4.6 were foreigners; in 1930, only sixty-four per cent of the Swiss lived in their native Cantons, while 27.3 per cent lived in others, and there were 8.7 per cent foreigners. This last group, of course, does not enter into this particular calculation. Cf. the data in George Sauser-Hall, *The Political Institutions of Switzerland*, Zurich and New York, Swiss National Tourist Office Publishing Department, 1946, p. 15.

[27] Deutsch, K. W., George Klein, J. J. Baker, and associates, *Is American Attention to Foreign Research Results Declining?*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1954, multigraphed.

international communication flows is yet to be done. Taken together, however, even the few scattered data now available could begin to give us a somewhat better understanding of some aspects of the integration or consolidation of communities, countries, or other kinds of organizations. Generally, if a community, country, or organization is small relative to the larger organization or group of organizations with which it is in communication, then we might tentatively call it "highly integrated" if the I/O ratio of the small unit was below 1.5. We might tentatively consider the extent of integration "fair to high," if the I/O ratio was between 1 and 3; "fair," if it was between 3 and 6; "low to fair," if it was between 6 and 10; "low," if it was between 10 and 15; and "extremely low," if it was above 15. Conversely, reading this extremely tentative scale from the opposite end, we might use it to aid us in forming and checking some judgments of the degree of "autonomy," or "relative self-sufficiency," or "self-preoccupation" which we might be trying to study in some particular organization or social group.

To be sure, this scale will have to be changed, if the relative size of an organization or region increases vis-à-vis its relevant environment. For a very large region, even an I/O ratio between 10 and 15 may be quite compatible with a high degree of integration with its environment. Furthermore, the meaning of any such scale of I/O ratios is likely to differ significantly for different kinds of communications or transactions. All this, however, still leaves us with the surmise that there may be some verifiable and useful scales of social or organizational integration in terms of relative communication flow, and that it may be up to us to find them.

TABLE 4. *Ratio of Students Attending Colleges and Universities in Their Own States of Residence vs. Students Attending Colleges and Universities in Other States of the U. S. for 16 States in 1949/50.*

Rank	*State*	*H/M Ratio*
1	New Jersey	0.7
2	Rhode Island	0.8
3	Delaware	0.96
4	Virginia	0.98
5	Massachusetts	1.3
6	Missouri	1.6
7	Tennessee	1.7
8	Illinois	1.93
9	Pennsylvania	1.94
10	Georgia	2.2
11	New York	2.4
12	Ohio	2.8
13	Louisiana	3.0
14	Washington	3.3
15	Texas	5.7
16	California	6.1

(H/M Ratio = Ratio of Home State Students to Migrating Students, i.e. Ratio of Number of Students Attending Home State Institutions vs. Number of Home State Students Studying at Out-of-State Institutions plus Number of Out-of-State Students Attending Institutions Within State.)

60

ARE SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS DIFFERENT?

An Application of Scale Analysis to Senate Voting Patterns

• *H. DOUGLAS PRICE*

INTRODUCTION

In any given period a discipline possesses certain resources of knowledge, experience, and imagination. These resources are sufficient to deal with some problems, but not with others. An eminent mathematician puts the matter this way:

> Imagine farmers living in a country where no other tool was available except the wooden plough. Of necessity, the farms would have to be in those places where the earth was soft enough to be cultivated with a wooden implement. If the population grew sufficiently to occupy every suitable spot, the farms would become a map of the soft earth regions. If anyone ventured beyond this region, he would perish and leave no trace. It is much the same with mathematical research. . . .[1]

And, one might add, with the social sciences. The map of our reliable knowledge — as distinguished from speculations or hunches — does come to resemble the map of those problems which can be handled by our existing tools and techniques. Other problems may be raised, and be of great importance, but without appropriate research tools they cannot be answered in an adequate manner.

Among the more fascinating problems for the student of internal party processes is the question of "who votes with whom, and on what" in the Congress. Unfortunately, few tools for readily tackling this problem have been available, hence it has remained pretty much off the map of our reliable knowledge. In fact, over the past 25 years — since the pioneering studies of Stuart Rice and Herman Beyle — there has been a surprising lack of innovation in quantitative techniques for the study of the legislative process. This paper seeks to explore the research implications of a relatively new technique, Louis Guttman's scale analysis, which the author has applied in a more general study of Senate voting patterns over the period 1949–1956.[2] In this paper particular emphasis is placed upon problems of intra-party adjustment, using Southern and non-Southern Senate Democrats as an example.

This paper is divided into three parts. In Part I three major alternative approaches to the systematic analysis of roll call votes are contrasted, and some limitations on the usefulness of each are indicated. In Part II the methodology of scaling is very briefly explained, and its relation to Professor Beyle's attribute-cluster-bloc analysis explained. In Part III, finally, some substantive results of the application of scaling to Senate voting are presented.

PART I

No statistical analysis can rise to greater significance than the data on which it is based. Now there are certain obvious limitations on the value of roll call votes as basic data. Cer-

[1] W. W. Sawyer, *Prelude to Mathematics* (Penguin Books), p. 64.

[2] H. D. Price, "Scale Analysis of Senate Voting Patterns, 1949–1956" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1958). The author is indebted to the SSRC for a pre-doctoral training fellowship in support of the research, and to Professor V. O. Key, Jr. for his suggestions and encouragement. Other applications of scaling to analysis of legislative voting include: George M. Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, II (1958), 377–402; Charles D. Farris, "A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress," *Journal of Politics*, XX (1958), 308–38; and Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958).

tainly a simple "yea" or "nay" vote cannot express differing degrees of intensity of feeling, doubts about different parts of a complex measure, and may conceal the fact that the same response may come from two legislators for contradictory reasons (as in the not too frequent situation where two extremes join to defeat a compromise proposal). Further, there is considerable evidence that a legislator's own personal opinion or the position he takes within committee may well differ from the stand he takes on a record vote. One even hears rumors that on occasion votes are more or less traded, as when some Western Democrats vote with the Southerners on civil rights in return for needed Southern support for a high federal dam in Hell's Canyon. Despite these limitations roll call votes are of great importance in the legislative struggle and, properly used, are a very valuable source of data.

In addition to the worth of the basic data the value of any quantitative study is also limited by the validity of the techniques by which the data is handled. This second sort of problem, involving the logical analysis of the quantification process, has not been the subject of much attention among political scientists.[3] Most quantitative roll call studies can be said to follow one or another of three general approaches which correspond rather closely to the three classic positions on the age-old philosophical question of the existence of universals (Plato's "ideas," the abstract entities of the Middle Ages, and abstract classes in general). The differing assumptions of these three positions, which are summarized in Table 1 below, are of direct relevance for this study and will be briefly contrasted.

1. *Research Nominalism.* Taking the last-named approach of Table 1 first, the research nominalist steers clear of numerical indexes of such abstract entities as "liberalism" or "isolationism." Refusing to deal with such abstractions the nominalist will usually regard each roll call vote as a unique irreducible event. He may count the number of different instances in which a given proportion of Southern Democrats vote with the Republican majority, but he will never, never — or at least hardly ever — try to combine these votes into some high-level composite variable. This cautious approach, embodying the minimum ontological commitments and giving the maximum regard to the integrity of the basic data, characterizes much of the work of such outstanding students as V. O. Key and Julius Turner. Needless to say, this approach has much to commend it though it may require an unusual talent for generalizing to be able to draw any simple conclusions from its mass of data.

2. *Research Neoplatonism.* This position is at the opposite extreme. And as Molière's M. Jourdain went through life speaking "prose" without ever realizing it, so some researchers are perhaps equally unwitting users of the Neoplatonic doctrine that universals or abstractions (such as "liberalism" and "isolationism") do exist in nature. Most researchers do not trouble themselves with this implicit assumption, but set right out to measure these abstract variables, and to measure them by *cardinal* numbers.[4] Given some multi-syllable "ism," the research

[3] Honorable exceptions here are the careful work done by Herbert A. Simon on the measurement of "power," by James G. March on the Measurement of "influence," and by Robert A. Dahl on democratic theory.

[4] The distinction between *cardinal* numbers (one, two, three, etc., which assert numerical values) and *ordinal* numbers (first, second, third, etc., which indicate only relative position) is of vital importance. It is not, as sometimes suggested by lan-

TABLE 1. *Characteristics of Alternative Approaches to Statistical Roll Call Analysis*

Type of Approach	*Level of Analysis*	*Ontological Commitment*	*Type of Measurement Used*
Research Neoplatonism	Ideologies or other broad "isms"	Universals exist in Nature	In cardinal numbers (e.g., "60% liberal")
Research Conceptualism	Middle-range policy attitudes	Universals are mind-made categories	In ordinal rankings
Research Nominalism	Individual roll calls of specific issues	Minimizes use of Universals	Usually none, though classification may be used

Neoplatonist will collect a batch of roll call votes which might conceivably be said to have some relation to the broad topic and compute each individual senator's arithmetic percentage of support. The resulting index scores are then analyzed in terms of supposed cardinal values measured from a supposed zero point along the supposed dimension. This, needless to say, involves a lot of supposition!

Now the research nominalist *may* be open to some criticism for sticking too closely to the data and not exploiting those further regularities which might be found, but the research Neoplatonist *must* be criticized for allowing imagination to run beserk. Both the identification of a single variable and the development of a quantitative metric are complex tasks. The ordinary numerical index number of legislative attitudes, however, is usually put together in such a manner that it violates some of the most basic rules of logic and mathematics (though perhaps not necessarily those of common sense, since the results may be of some rough value in pointing up gross differences).

The basic objection to the research Neoplatonist's type of "measurement" is that it puts the cart (of quantification in cardinal values) before determining if there is a horse (a cumulative rank order along which a measurement might be made). Now a quantitative measurement of a variable implies the prior existence of a specific cumulative rank order.[5] Our number system by its very definition is cumulative and implies the existence of a rank order. Hence any variable to which numbers are meaningfully applied must also be cumulative. And if cardinal numbers are applied then that variable must have a given zero point and a basic unit of measure in which all differences of degree can be expressed.

The fallacy of most shortcuts to the cardinal measurement of legislators' attitudes lies in the failure to test whether the various individual votes in an index can be shown to relate to a *single* possible variable and to a cumulative rank order. Contrast the concepts of "height" and "liberalism" for example. Every senator who is at least as tall as the 6′ mark in height is also at least as tall as the 5′ 11″ mark, the 5′ 10″ mark, and every other lesser mark. But if he is "80 per cent liberal" on the basis of a ten-vote index can we guarantee that he voted for at least every included bill for which a "60 per cent liberal" voted? Generally we cannot. In fact, we may even find that "50 per cent liberal" Jones voted liberal on issues 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 while "50 per cent liberal" Smith voted liberal on issues 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10.

But this is surely incredible. Two individuals with supposedly identical degrees of the attribute under study might be opposed on all of the issues included in the index. Now one never finds two five-inch long pencils such that each reaches five of the inch-markers on a ten-inch ruler, but one reaches only the odd-numbered markers while the other reaches only the even ones! It is not enough to merely reach *any* five markers — if we are to genuinely measure a single variable then they must be the first five markers in an ordered series, and they must include all those markers reached by any object of lesser length and be included in those reached by any object of greater length. And so it is — or should be — with votes used in an index. If they are to genuinely measure a single variable then they must constitute a cumulative series of more and more stringent tests of the variable, thus dividing the population under study into cumulative groups.[6]

3. *Research Conceptualism.* Fortunately there is a middle position which sympathizes with the nominalists' respect for the integrity of the data, but which also shares the Neo-

guage students, something invented to make the mastery of French or German more difficult.

[5] For excellent discussion of this topic see Carl G. Hempel, *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science*, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. II, #7, especially pages 50–69; Gustav Bergmann and Kenneth W. Spence, "The Logic of Psychophysical Measurement," *Psychological Review* (1944), reprinted in Feigl and Brodbeck, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, 103–19; and S. S. Stevens, "Mathematics, Measurement, and Psychophysics," in S. S. Stevens (Ed.), *Handbook of Experimental Psychology*, 1–49.

[6] For some purposes and under specified conditions it may be useful to develop a composite index number which deliberately involves several different dimensions. Thus the composite "cost-of-living index" may remain constant while farm prices fall and industrial goods increase in price. Such a composite is of some use because each item can be weighted in terms of a common denominator — namely, the dollar — and the prices of an identical "market-basket of goods" can be compared for different periods. Unfortunately, an index of "liberalism" is not so useful since there is no generally accepted common denominator for

platonists' urge for more general categories of analysis. Conceptualism differs from the Neoplatonists' position in that it denies that there are universals or abstract entities in nature waiting to be discovered, holding rather that such concepts are more or less useful man-made "inventions." At a more down to earth level the conceptualism should be a popular as well as a respectable position since, as Harvard's W. V. Quine points out, "the tired nominalist can lapse into conceptualism and still allay his puritanic conscience that he has not quite taken to eating lotus with the platonists."[7]

In roll call analysis the research conceptualist seeks to combine individual votes in such a manner that the existence of various more general underlying variables (or dimensions) can be suggested as a logical possibility (though not a certainty) and so that individual legislators can be compared in an ordinal (that is, rank order) manner in regard to such hypothetical variables. Thus the conceptualist seeks to go beyond the rather strict limits of research nominalism, but without being forced to embrace the illogic of research Neoplatonism. One technique for doing this is by use of Louis Guttman's scale analysis. In the course of the past decade a sizeable literature has developed on the subject of scaling[8], but the basic concept and its particular importance for roll call analysis are briefly summarized in the following section.

Part II

There is really nothing mysterious or even very complicated about the Guttman scale. It is simply a test of whether a series of criteria can be so arranged as to result in cumulative divisions of the population under study.[9] Thus if a man from Mars wanted to compare New York City buildings in regard to their height but lacked any quantitative concepts (such as the earthman's meter or inch) he could still pick a series of buildings and use them to define a rank order of qualitative classes. He could, for example, classify all buildings on Manhattan as to whether they were at least as tall as the following named examples:

	As high as:			*Not* as high as:		
Building Classes	*Empire State Building*	*Chrysler Building*	*Guggenheim Museum*	*Empire State Building*	*Chrysler Building*	*Guggenheim Museum*
Type I	X	X	X			
Type II		X	X	X		
Type III			X	X	X	
Type IV				X	X	X

Now if our Martian visitor remained on Manhattan long enough he would discover that *all* of the thousands of buildings in the area fall exactly into one of the above four cumulative categories, and that nowhere — on earth or on Mars — is there a building which is not as high as the Guggenheim Museum, not as high as the Chrysler Building, but which is as high as the Empire State Building. Hence we have here a perfect cumulative Guttman-type scale based on a series of qualitative distinctions. The result is a ranking of buildings which are either "more" or "less" high than certain others, but without any connotations of cardinal measurement. Thus the differences in height between the Empire State and Chrysler Build-

weighting the importance of, say civil rights in comparison to farm legislation, nor does each year bring up a fixed number of votes in the different areas. One year there will be many votes on civil rights and perhaps none on farm policy; the next year the situation may be the reverse. An index based on a collection of goods which changed drastically in composition from year to year (all TV sets and no citrus one year, but lots of citrus and no TV sets the next), and which consisted at any given time of items which are themselves incomparable would be laughed out of court by most economists.

[7] Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, p. 129.

[8] For some leading references see Appendix I, below, and Louis Guttman, "An Outline of Some New Methodology of Social Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1954–55), 395–404.

[9] Probably the most lucid introduction to scaling is Edward Suchman, "The Logic of Scale Construction," *Educational and Psychological Measurement* (1950), 79–93. For a more detailed explanation see Samuel A. Stouffer *et al., Measurement and Prediction,* especially Chapters 1, 2, 3, & 6.

ing are not the same as that between the Chrysler Building and the Guggenheim Museum.

Simple as this approach may seem, it was not until the decade of the 1940's that a procedure was worked out for systematically applying it to social science data (so much of which is not "quantitative" in the sense of being suitable for cardinal measurement). This was finally done by Louis Guttman, a social psychologist working in the War Department's attitude measurement project during World War II. Opinion researchers had long been aware that the specific wording of a question often has a very considerable effect on the proportion of positive responses. To obtain greater reliability a number of related questions might be asked to try and evoke varying degrees of agreement about what appeared to be a single broad topic. But this introduced the danger — as yet little recognized by users of legislative index numbers — that some of the questions might relate to some dimension or variable other than the one supposedly being studied.

Guttman's solution to this problem of determining the uni-dimensionality of a series of questions was simply to define a preliminary universe of questions which seemed to be directly related to the basic attitude, then submit a series of questions from this collection to a group of respondents. If the questions do constitute cumulative criteria relating to a single attitude dimension among the various respondents then the answers to the questions will divide the respondents into a series of strictly cumulative groups.[10] Now the problem of whether the questions do in some purely objective sense relate to a single dimension is not at stake, nor does even a perfectly cumulative pattern of responses prove that the questions are even in a subjective sense related to a single dimension. The cumulative pattern among respondents is a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing that the questions themselves are cumulative criteria along a single dimension.

The attitude dimension, be it noted, is purely a hypothetical construct, something that cannot be directly observed but only inferred as the basis for observed consistencies in overt behavior.[11] In those cases where the Senate takes a series of votes on differing percentage cuts in a given program, or on differing dollar amounts of appropriations for a given function, or on requiring a different number of senators to invoke cloture the result is generally a series of perfectly cumulative divisions. Of course, if this were the only value of scaling it would indeed be open to the oft-heard criticism of "proving the obvious." Fortunately, it turns out that many of the major areas of policy difference, such as labor-management relations, rent control, public housing, economic controls, foreign aid, reciprocal trade, and so forth often involve similar cumulative divisions of attitude along what appears to be a series of dimensions.

A very simple geometric metaphor will indicate the difference between a scaleable series of votes and the hodgepodge of measures often lumped together into numerical indexes. The oft-cited but little understood Arthur F. Bentley is the source of this suggestion — he wrote:

> If we take all the men of our society, say all the citizens of the United States, and look upon them as a spherical mass, we can pass an unlimited number of planes through the center of the sphere, each plane representing some principle of classification. . . . Assuming perhaps hundreds, perhaps thousands, of planes passed through the sphere, we get a great confusion of the groups. No one set of groups, that is no set distinguished on the basis of any one plane, will be an adequate grouping of the whole mass.[12]

It is this "great confusion of the groups" which intrigues those who study pressure groups. But it is the great merit of scale analysis that it orders this apparent confusion into sets of cumulative groups which can be distinguished along various dimensions. In doing so scaling provides the *sine qua non* for measurement.

Now if we let Bentley's sphere represent the total membership of the Senate and the planes

[10] There is a basic difference between direct measurements carried out on a physical dimension and the necessarily indirect measurements of psychophysics. In the latter the researcher never operates directly in terms of observations of the dimension itself, but must depend upon the respondents' various judgments which are assumed to be indicative of the dimension. This distinction is rightly stressed by Bergmann and Spence in their excellent article on "The Logic of Psychophysical Measurement," note 5, *supra*.

[11] For a suggestive diagram of the relation between over-all ideology, less general attitudes, and specific opinions see H. J. Eysenck, *The Psychology of Politics*, p. 112.

[12] Bentley, *The Process of Government*, p. 207.

represent the division on each roll call vote we find one of two types of situations. In Figure 1-A below the planes do not intersect, that is, there is no criss-crossing and hence the votes can be said to be criteria potentially relating to a single dimension (and thus defining a single variable). If, however, the result is a confusion of criss-crossing, overlapping classifications — as in Figure 1-B below — then by no stretch of the imagination can they be said to relate to any single dimension.



FIGURE 1-A. Cumulative Scale of Groupings Along a Single Dimension



FIGURE 1-B. A Confusion of Groups Based on Criteria From Several Different Dimensions

At this point it may be well to turn from general discussion to examination of how a scale of legislative attitude may be constructed in actual practice. The 1949 Senate struggle over extension of rent control (involving HR 1731) is an example of a situation where scaling can be applied. Table 2 groups 94 of the then 96 senators (two of whom missed all or almost all of the votes) into 12 ordinal rankings which range from those most favorable to a "strong" rent control act to those most opposed. The rankings are based on the senators' stands on eleven roll call votes taken on passage of the bill or adoption of various proposed amendments. The following lists, in order of increasing strength for the pro-control position, the eleven issues, the sponsors of the amendments, the response scored as pro-control, and the margin of the roll call vote:

1. Senator Magnuson: Extend existing law for two years (Yea vote is scored as pro-control); defeated, 10–75.
2. Senator McClellan: Drop criminal penalties for willful violations (Nay is pro-control); adopted 52–30.
3. Senator Bricker: Retain present system for eviction (Nay is pro-control); defeated, 42–44.
4. Senator Bricker: Allow a "reasonable return" on "reasonable value" of housing (Nay is pro-control); defeated, 34–47.
5. Senator Bricker: Motion to recommit conference report (Nay is pro-control); defeated, 33–53.
6. Senator Bricker: Decontrol hotels, motels, trailers, and premises unrented from 1945–48 (Nay is pro-control); defeated, 29–53.
7. Senator Bricker: Limit extension of controls to September 30, 1949 (Nay is pro-control); defeated, 22–64.
8. Senator Cordon: Require federal government to pay to landlords the difference between "reasonable rental value" and rent ceiling (Nay is pro-control); defeated, 20–59.
9. Senator Capehart: Provide for progressive decontrol, beginning with high cost rental units of September 30, 1949, extending on to include low cost units by June 30, 1950 (Nay is pro-control); defeated, 18–62.
10. Vote on passage of Senate version of bill providing for temporary extension but subject to local option in each state at discretion of state governor (Yea is pro-control); passed, 68–10.
11. Vote on adoption of conference committee version (Yea is pro-control); passed, 78–11.

TABLE 2. *Scale Analysis of Eleven Votes on Rent Control in Senate in 1949*

Senators	*Party*	*Pro-Control* 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	*Anti-Control* 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Pepper	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Taylor	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Humphrey	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Murray	D	X	X	X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Chavez	D	X	O	X	/	X	X	X	/	X	/	/		O									
Myers	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Magnuson	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Kilgore	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Neely	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Hunt	D	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											
Hill	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Sparkman	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Hayden	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
McMahon	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Frear	D		X	X	X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Miller	D	O	O	X	O	X	X	O	O	O	/	X	O	O		O			O	O	O		
Douglas	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Lucas	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Lodge	R		X	X	X		X	X	X		X	/	X				/					X	
Anderson	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Ives	R		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Wagner	D	O	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	O										
Langer	R		X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				O						
Kerr	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Morse	R		X		/	X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X			X							
Green	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
McGrath	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Maybank	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Kefauver	D		O	X	X	X	O	X	X	O	X	X	X	O				O				O	
Johnson (Tex)	D		X	O	X	X	O	X	X	X	X	X	X		O			O					
Thomas (Utah)	D		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Aiken	R		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X										
Flanders	R		X		X	/	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X								
Thomas (Okla)	D	O	O	/	/	X	/	/	/	/	/	X	O	O									
Fulbright	D				X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X						X		
Downey	D				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								
Gillette	D				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								
Chapman	D				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								
Withers	D				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								
Ellender	D				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								
Long	D				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								
Stennis	D				X	X	X	O	X	/	O	/	X	X	X				O			O	
Johnston	D				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								
McKellar	D				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								
Connally	D				X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X						
Robertson	D				X	X	X	X	X	X	O	X	X	X	X							O	
O'Mahoney	D				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								
McCarran	D				X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X						

TABLE 2. (*Continued*)

Senators	*Party*	*Pro-Control* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	*Anti-Control* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
McFarland	D	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X
Johnson (Colo)	D	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X
Holland	D	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X
Smith (Me)	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X
Tobey	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X
Smith (N.J.)	R	/ / / / / / / / / X	/ / / / /
Hoey	D	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X
George	D	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X
O'Conor	D	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X
Tydings	D	X X X O X / X X X X X	X X X / O
Russell	D	O X X X O X X X X X X	X O X X / O
Thye	R	/ / X / / / / / / X	/ / X
Knowland	R	X O X / X X X X X X X	X X X X X X O X
Baldwin	R	O X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X O
Brewster	R	X O O / X X X X X X X	X X X X X X O O
Saltonstall	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X
Vandenberg	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X
Hendrickson	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X
McCarthy	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X
McClellan	D	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X
Donnell	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X
Martin	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X
Watkins	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X
Byrd	D	X X O X / X X X X X X	X X X X X O
Wiley	R	O X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X O
Millikin	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X
Hickenlooper	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X
Reed	R	O O O O O X X X X X X	O O X X X O O X O
Schoeppel	R	O O O O X X X X X X X	O O X X X X O X O
Ferguson	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X
Malone	R	O X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X O X X X
Bridges	R	/ X X X / / X X X X X	X / / / X X X / X
Taft	R	/ X X X / / X X X X X	X X X / X X X / X
Williams	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X
Kem	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X X
Capehart	R	O O X X X X X X X X X	X X X X O X X X X / O
Jenner	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X / X / X
Ecton	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X X X
Wherry	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X X X
Butler	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X / X X X X X /
Cordon	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X O / X X X X X X X
Mundt	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X / X X X X X
Cain	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	/ / / / X X / / / X
Gurney	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X X X
Bricker	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X X
Young	R	X X X X X X X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X X

Senators omitted — because of number of unrecorded stands: Eastland D; Graham D.

In Table 2 pro-control responses are checked in the appropriate columns on the left-hand side of the center dividing line and anti-control responses in columns on the right-hand side. The most pro-control senators are thus in the group at the top of the scale, and those progressively less pro-control are listed in subsequent groups ranging to the most anti-control group at the bottom of the scale. The senators' individual stands on the eleven votes are taken from the 1949 *Congressional Quarterly*. Record votes are indicated by an "X" in the appropriately numbered column on the pro or anti side; pairs or announced stands are indicated by a diagonal: "/". Where a senator neither votes nor indicated his stand a zero is entered in *both* the pro-control and anti-control columns for that issue.

Of the 1,034 senatorial responses indicated in the scale in Table 2 all but 29 fall within the perfect scale patterns (41 responses are unknown, and are scored neither for nor against the consistency of the scale pattern). Thus if we were to try to reproduce each senator's complete voting record on these eleven issues knowing only his rank position on this scale (and his missed votes) we would be correct 97.1 per cent of the time (that is, on all but 29 of the 1,034 responses). Guttman has christened this percentage the "coefficient of reproducibility" and uses it as a basic test of the extent to which a series of items may be said to relate to a single dimension. For a perfect cumulative pattern the figure is 100.0 per cent. At the opposite extreme, even random guesses as to dichotomous responses should result in about 50 per cent reproducibility. Although several alternative scoring formulas have been suggested, a discussion of their respective merits would lead us too far afield. Provided that the responses to most items are not too lop-sided (e.g., votes of 90 to 3) and that the non-scale responses are not too heavily concentrated on a single issue, a coefficient of reproducibility of at least 90 or preferably 95 per cent may be regarded as the minimum for an acceptable scale.

Now with 11 votes there are 2,048 possible combinations of positive or negative responses (equal to 2^n where n = number of votes involved). But there are only 12 (that is, $n + 1$, where n is number of votes) perfect scale patterns. In Table 2 no less than 72 of the 94 senators fall into one of these 12 perfect scale patterns. Thus over 70 per cent of the individuals classified fall within the predicted response patterns although these patterns are less than one per cent of the total possible patterns.

The remaining non-scale response types (the 22 senators *not* fitting one of the 12 perfect scale patterns) must be assigned to one of the perfect patterns if they are to be included in the ranking. This has been done by assigning each to that scale pattern which he most closely approximates. Thus Senator Fulbright, for example, is assigned to rank III, from which he differs in his response on issue 8. If he were assigned to any other pattern, however, he would differ on more than one response (thus if he were assigned to rank XII, the bottom one, he would differ on eight of the eleven issues).

Further details of scaling methodology could be pursued at some length, but for the purposes of this paper we want also to examine what sorts of questions can be explored by use of the scaling technique. What, for example, does the scale in Table 2 indicate about differences between the parties, or about differences between Southern and non-Southern Democrats? For greater convenience in handling this type question the 12 scale ranks — some of which are quite small — have been telescoped into four composite categories. The particular cut-off points are such that we cannot include exactly one-fourth of the senators in each composite grouping, but I have sought to approximate this figure so that the composites represent rough "quartiles." In terms of party the breakdown of the composite scale rankings is as follows:

	Scale Categories					
	I–II	*III–IV*	*V–IX*	*X–XII*	*Total*	
# Reps	6	3	11	22	42	
# Dems	28	18	6	0	52	(2 omitted)

Within the Democratic Party the Southern and non-Southern senators compare on the *same* basis as follows:

# S Dems	6	10	4	0	20	(2 omitted)
# non-S Dems	22	8	2	0	32	

In this particular scale ranking the difference between Southern and non-Southern Democratic senators is not as striking as that between members of the major parties. Now at this point we can turn from the problem of ranking attitudes along a hypothetical dimension to the

closely related question of "who votes with whom."

In approaching this problem Stuart Rice, and later Hermann Beyle, suggested that the number of times each possible pair of legislators voted together on the prevailing side on a series of issues be counted. These dyadic relations should then be entered in a square table large enough to list every legislator across the top of the page and down the side. Beyle suggests the names then be arranged, as nearly as possible, in such an order that those agreeing most often are in the upper-left corner. In the perfect case the number of agreements, on the prevailing side of each issue, between this bloc and the other legislators shades off gradually down to those at the bottom-right corner of the page, who voted opposite the majority bloc on every issue.[13]

This technique, generally known as attribute-cluster-bloc analysis, is obviously closely related to scale analysis. The difficulty with it, other than that it requires almost double the amount of clerical work necessary if one defines a dimension, is that on the prevailing side it is absolutely limited to cases where one block includes at least one-half of the total membership (a fairly rare occurrence). This is obvious since in a perfect bloc arrangement the prevailing block can "prevail" only if it includes at least one-half of the membership. In practice smaller blocs may seem to exist, but only due to the affects of absences or of irregularities in the pattern. In the cases of other than perfectly cumulative blocs the assignment of individuals who do not exactly "fit" the bloc pattern is exactly analogous to the assigning of non-scale types within a scale pattern. In cases of missed votes, however, bloc analysis automatically lowers the absent legislators total number of agreements, and hence his classification whereas scaling provides a rationale for assigning him in accord with the way we would expect him to have voted had he followed the scale pattern.

The attribute-cluster-bloc approach thus compares the records of each possible pairing of legislators, whereas scaling compares each legislator's record against the perfect scale pattern. Now as a matter of logic — a subject which I feel has been unduly neglected by political scientists — if the records of two individuals are related to a given standard in a known manner it should be possible to deduce from this how they are related to each other. If this can be done then scaling has not just one but *two* possible interpretations: not only as a technique for ordinal measurement of legislative attitudes, but as a means for showing the existence of legislative blocs.

Now in a perfect scale we know, without performing any sort of cluster analysis, that each individual in each given scale type voted with all other individuals in the same type on *every* issue considered. We know, further, that all the individuals in a given scale type voted identically as all the individuals in an adjoining scale type (above or below them) *except on one* issue, and we know which issue this is (something not evident from a cluster bloc analysis). In fact, the scale pattern tells us how many times individuals in *any* given scale type voted together with the individuals in *any other* type, and on which issues they agreed and on which they differed. The two extreme scale types, for example, vote opposite on *all* of the issues in the scale.

Every perfect scale pattern thus constitutes, by definition, a perfect attribute-cluster-bloc analysis, and vice-versa. The only difference is that to properly bring out the cluster-blocs it is necessary to arrange the legislators so that the maximum numbers (of agreements between pairs of legislators) are concentrated, as in matrix algebra, along the main diagonal rather than in a corner. The lesser values then shade off symmetrically to both sides of the diagonal, reaching zero in the upper-right and lower-left corners (thus indicating the total disagreement existing between the extreme scale types). Had Professor Beyle only arranged his data in this form he should have arrived at the basic concept of a cumulative scale a full 25 years ahead of the sociologists!

Although a cluster-bloc analysis of voting on the Rent Control Act would not add to what is already evident in Table 2, it does suggest the possibility of using scaling to carry out a *two-dimensional* cluster-bloc analysis. That is, prepare a cross-tabulation with as many horizontal rows as there are different scale rankings on one scale and as many vertical columns as there are rankings on a second scale. Then each legislator can be entered in the unique cell which identifies his voting pattern on both

[13] See Hermann C. Beyle, *Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster-Blocs.* This was published in 1931.

dimensions. Assuming that both scales are perfect then all senators in a given row will have voted identically on all issues included in Scale 1, all senators in a given column will have voted identically on all issues in Scale 2, and thus all senators in a given cell of the table will have voted identically on all issues in both scales. In such a cross-tabulation the extent of voting agreement or disagreement between any individual legislators or groups of legislators in regard to two different dimensions is evident at a glance.

Such a two-dimensional analysis of Senate voting is summarized in Table 3, below. Rankings on the labor-management relations scale are indicated along the horizontal axis (with Rank I on the left as the most pro-labor) and rankings on the previously presented rent control scale are indicated along the vertical axis (with Rank I at the top as the pro-control position). Space limitations preclude listing the individual senators in each cell of the tabulation, but it is interesting to note that all 10 senators in the upper right-hand corner of the table (indicated by an asterisk) are Southern Democrats. These are the senators taking a relatively favorable stand on rent control, but maintaining a disapproving attitude toward organized labor. Conversely, in the lower left-hand corner (thus representing the reverse combination of views) is Senator Malone of Nevada. Although Malone generally represented a point of view somewhat to the right of Senator Goldwater, Nevada is a small state where the mining unions are of considerable political importance. Thus in 1947 Malone voted against passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and to uphold President Truman's veto of it.

Although support for the "liberal" position of labor relations and rent control is obviously correlated, Table 3 indicates the advantages for analysis in treating these as separate policy dimensions. If all the votes on both scales were included in a single numerical index, for example, the result would be a very poor guide to the actual distribution of attitudes. Thus Senator Malone, the senators holding a middle view on both issues, and the Southern Democrats in the upper-right of the table would be likely to have quite similar scores on the combined index.

Where the same policy dimension comes up for debate and is voted on in different sessions of Congress the same simple cross-tabulation procedure can be used to trace shifts in attitude over time. These permit analysis of the impact of change of party control of the Presidency. Where the same subject comes up for a number of years, as with foreign aid, the analysis can be carried out in terms of a panel study. But rather than explore these problems here it may be wise to conclude with a more detailed application of the basic scaling technique to some selected problems of party and sectional divergences in the Senate in the period from 1949–1956.

TABLE 3. *Comparison of Senators' Rankings on Labor Relations and Rent Control Dimensions, 1949*

Position in Rent Control Ranks	*Number of Senators*									
	Position in Labor Relations Ranks									
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	Unk.	Total
I	8	1	1							10
II	5	8	4	3	1	1		2*		24
III		3	5			2		4*		14
IV		2	1		1	1		2*		7
V–VI				1	2			2*		5
VII						3	4			7
VIII–IX							3	2		5
X				1**		1	4	3		9
XI–XII						1	3	8	1	13
Unknown		1						1		2
Total	13	15	11	5	4	9	14	24	1	96

* Category composed *solely* of Southern Democrats.
** Senator Malone of Nevada.

PART III

After this rather long excursion into problems of method we turn more directly to the theme of internal party differences in the Senate. For the period 1949 through 1956 a total of 56 acceptable scales of Senate voting patterns were constructed. These scales cover most, though by no means all, of the major controversial issues of the period on which there were a number of roll call votes. For each scale a breakdown by major party was prepared, and then intra-party breakdowns were run to compare Southern and non-Southern Democrats (taking the eleven ex-Confederate states as "the South"), as well as Northeastern Republicans (from states north of the Potomac and east of Ohio) and other Republicans. Rather than treat each scale separately, as a research nominalist might, or try to cover all 56 by a single description, as a Neoplatonist might, I have sought to group the scales into a few conceptual categories based on differences in relative extent of party cohesion.

The first of my four categories is one designed to indicate scale areas of relatively "high" cohesion, and hence relatively sharp party difference. This pattern, which approaches the ideal of the "responsible parties" proponents, may be the result of a situation where constituency interests largely parallel party divisions, or of a strictly partisan party issue, or of extraordinarily successful maneuvering by the party leadership. The defining characteristic for this category is that there be a cut-off point in the scale ranking such that at least 80 per cent of the Democrats will be on one side and at least 80 per cent of the Republicans on the other. This pattern can perhaps be made somewhat clearer by a simple figure in which the successive scale rankings on the subject are indicated on the horizontal axis — for greater simplicity I have combined the rankings into four of as nearly equal size as possible, with the more "liberal-internationalist" position on the left. The *number* of senators in each ranking is indicated, separately by party, on the vertical axis. Figure 2 presents the party profile in a typical Type I case: the Reciprocal Trade Act Extension scale for 1949.

Now in scale dimensions in which the parties as a whole differ as sharply as this, intra-party sectional differences are obviously at a minimum. Where almost all Democrats oppose almost all Republicans there can be no basic distinction between Southern and non-Southern Democrats. But how often is the difference between the parties this sharp? Of the 56 scales used in this study 15 fall within the category of relatively sharp party disagreement (as defined above). These 15 scale areas and the year in which they occurred are as follows:

Reciprocal Trade Act Extension, 1949
Confirmation of "Liberal" Appointees, 1949
Cut Funds for Army Engineers, 1949
Economic Controls (Defense Production Act), 1950
Universal Military Training, 1951
Increase Postal Rates, 1951
Extend Rent Control, 1952
Cut Funds for Army Engineers, 1952
Cut Funds for Federal Road Aid, 1952
Economic Controls (Defense Production Act), 1953
Rubber Plant Disposal, 1953
Amend Atomic Energy Act, 1954
Amend Revenue Code, 1954
Control of Subversion, 1954
Postal Pay Increase, 1955

In 21 of the remaining scale areas there is a cut-off point such that at least two-thirds of the Democrats are on one side and at least two-thirds of the Republicans on the other, but in which one or both parties fail to meet the more strict requirement set for category I. These 21 dimensions have been designated as policy areas of "moderate" party difference. Figure 3, showing the distribution by party on the 1951 foreign aid scale, illustrates the increased overlap of attitudes found in these scales. Although the differences between the parties is still quite noticeable, sectional intra-party breakdowns also begin to reveal some interesting differences. On this particular scale, for example, the distribution of Southern and non-Southern Democratic senators is as follows:

	(Lib) Rank I	II	III	(Cons) IV	Unknown	Total
# S Dems	6	6	7	3	0	22
# non-S Dems	18	4	3	0	3	28

The two more "liberal" categories of this scale ranking thus include 22 of the 25 classified non-Southern Democrats but only 12 of the 22 Southerners.

Although it might be of some interest to analyze the extent of sectional differences in all the Category II scales, it seems preferable to concentrate our analysis on the remaining 20 scale areas of "low" party cohesion. In these cases, where one or both parties are so badly split as to be unable to muster even a two to one majority on either half of the scale, some variable other than party is obviously exerting powerful influence. The graphic patterns for the scale areas of low cohesion are extremely varied, in fact, so much so that I have subdivided them into two general categories. The first and by far most frequent is what I have termed the ordinary pattern of low cohesion. This includes those cases where the parties are still at least somewhat skewed in opposite directions or are almost identically distributed. There is, however, a very striking pattern which occasionally develops in which one party will predominate at the two polar extremes (thus presenting a bi-modal distribution) while the other party is concentrated in the middle two categories of the scale (thus resembling a normal curve). Because of its explosive implications for internal party adjustment I have regarded this rather rare situation as worthy of a separate classification of its own.

The difference between the "ordinary" pattern of low cohesion and the "bi-modal" pattern can be seen by comparing the foreign aid scales of 1953 and 1954. In the former year, shown in Figure 4, the two parties were rather similarly spread through all four classifications (those in Rank I were the strongest supporters, those in Rank IV the strongest opponents). This was a temporary phenomenon resulting from somewhat decreased Democratic support for the aid program under a Republican administration and an even more noticeable increase in Republican senatorial support for the program. By 1954, an election year in which Eisenhower stressed his concern for the foreign aid program, the situation had changed to that indicated in Figure 5. The Republicans by 1954 were by and large to be found either among the most enthusiastic supporters or among the most bitter opponents of the aid program. The Democrats, however, were concentrated largely in the middle categories. Comparison of Figures 3, 4, and 5 dramatically illustrates the changing party line-up on the question of foreign aid.

The bi-modal pattern occurs for the Republicans on the foreign aid scales of 1954 and 1956. For the Democrats the 1949 cloture rule fight presents the clearest bi-modal pattern, although the Displaced Persons Act of 1950 also meets the minimum requirements for inclusion. Senate Democrats also closely approached the bi-modal pattern in the 1949 labor relations scale (see Table 3) and 1950 Revenue Act scale. In all six of these scales, including the last two marginal cases, the bi-modal pattern occurs in the ranks of the party in control of the White House. In each instance sectional cleavages within the bi-modally divided party are quite pronounced. One might conclude that the political necessities involved in winning the Presidency (as in the case of civil rights and the Democrats) or of carrying out absolutely necessary national policy (as in the case of foreign aid under the Republicans) require the party in power to push programs which threaten to split the party along sectional lines in the Senate.

Of the 20 scales of relatively slight party difference there are 11 in which both parties are sharply divided. In four additional scales only the Democrats are so split, and in five additional ones only the Republicans are so split. Table 4, below presents the customary four-rank breakdown between Southern and non-Southern Democrats on the 15 scales in which the Democrats as a whole were sharply divided. The scales are arranged in a rough order to indicate the decreasing importance of the sectional division as a possible explanation for the party disarray. Thus the first-listed scale, involving the 1949 attempt to modify the Senate's cloture rule and thus facilitate passage of FEPC legislation, presents an extremely sharp division. On the other hand, the last listed scale, on continuing aid to Tito in 1956, indicates almost identical divisions within the Southern and non-Southern Democratic ranks. On most of the scales, however, there is a fairly clear difference between what might be termed the center of gravity among the Southern Democrats as compared to that of the non-Southern Democrats.

From this extremely brief summary of some aspects of one possible application of scale analysis one can draw additional evidence for



FIGURE 2. Party Profile in Area of "Relatively Sharp" Party Difference



FIGURE 3. Party Profile in Area of "Moderate" Party Difference



FIGURE 4. Party Profile in Area of "Slight" Party Difference, with "Ordinary" Distribution



FIGURE 5. Party Profile in Area of "Slight" Party Difference, with "Bi-modal" Distribution of Republicans

TABLE 4. *Comparison of Southern and Non-Southern Democrats' Rankings in Fifteen Scale Areas of Low Party Cohesion in Senate Voting, 1949–1956*

Scale Subject and Year	*Type Democrat*	*Number of Senators in Each "Quartile" Rank* I	II	III	IV	*Total Classified*
Change Cloture Rule (FEPC), 1949	S	1	1	0	19	21
	non-S	17	4	6	5	32
Electoral College "Reform," 1956	S	1	1	1	18	21
	non-S	14	4	3	6	27
Economic Controls (DPA), 1951	S	3	3	13	0	19
	non-S	15	8	1	1	25
Displaced Persons Act, 1950	S	6	1	6	7	20
	non-S	24	3	0	2	29
Reorganize Regulatory Commissions, 1950	S	3	4	10	3	20
	non-S	17	4	3	2	26
Foreign Aid, 1954	S	3	3	11	3	20
	non-S	7	11	3	3	24
Excise Tax Cuts, 1954	S	4	6	7	4	21
	non-S	17	4	4	1	26
Foreign Aid, 1955	S	7	4	6	4	21
	non-S	18	6	3	0	27
Use of Treaty Power, 1953	S	7	3	4	4	18
	non-S	16	3	3	2	24
Foreign Aid, 1953	S	9	3	4	6	22
	non-S	15	4	3	2	24
Revenue Act, 1951	S	4	7	1	10	22
	non-S	16	5	3	3	27
Revenue Act, 1950	S	6	4	4	6	20
	non-S	14	4	0	7	25
Natural Gas Act, 1956	S	4	5	0	13	22
	non-S	15	2	2	8	27
Foreign Aid, 1956	S	5	5	7	5	22
	non-S	14	4	5	4	27
Continue Aid to Tito, 1956	S	8	2	5	7	22
	non-S	10	3	3	10	26

a number of familiar generalizations. A detailed examination of all 56 scales leaves one with the impression that in most of these attitude areas the centers of gravity of the two major parties differed significantly. In almost one-third of the areas the division between the parties was quite sharp, although in another one-third the differences between them must be regarded as rather slight. Very low cohesion within one party was generally accompanied by low cohesion within the other, although in a few crucial areas one party would be bi-modally split while the other party was massed in a moderate position between the opposing wings of the former party.

To speak of "the" Southern Democrats as a monolithic bloc voting the same way on most issues during this period would be to make a very serious error of analysis. On only two of the 56 scales (1949 cloture fight and 1956 electoral college reform) did the Southern Democrats even approach unanimity (and even here Pepper and Kefauver deviated on the former and Long, Gore, and Ellender deviated — with Kefauver absent campaigning — on the latter).[14]

[14] Scale analysis thus generally confirms for the 1949–1956 period most of the conclusions reached by Professor Key in his analysis of individual roll

On a considerable number of scales, however, the center of gravity of the Southern Democrats is obviously more to the conservative and — in recent years — isolationist end of the policy spectrum. That is, both Southern and non-Southern Democrats are split within their own ranks, but two out of three Southerners support the "conservative-isolationist" view on labor-management policy, displaced persons, taxation and revenue policy, use of the treaty power, public housing, rent control, and some other economic issues, while two out of three non-Southern Democrats will support the "liberal-internationalist" viewpoint. And there still remain a good many areas in which the two sectional wings of the Democratic Party are more or less united in opposition to the Republicans or in which both wings are about equally split.

Thus we reach the melancholy conclusion that the difference in Senate voting patterns between Southern and non-Southern Democrats is a complex matter of many varying shades of gray, plus occasional spots of black and white. It would be misleading to describe the general situation in terms of some selected instance of black and white contrast, or of total lack of difference between the two. On the other hand, it seems to me of very slight value to attempt to reduce the situation to some hypothetical "average" situation (which may not correspond to a single real instance) without paying any attention to the very considerable dispersion around this central tendency. If we are to be very accurate I think such a complex situation requires at least a relatively complex description.

For many purposes scale analysis does afford an important new technique for providing more accurate descriptions of many aspects of legislative *voting* behavior. This, of course, may not throw much light upon the broad range of questions involved in a detailed legislative case study. Scaling points up the need for more careful definitions of the variables we seek to measure, as well as the necessity for a more cautious approach to the problems of cardinal measurement.[15] Scaling affords visible proof of the serious methodological weakness of most current indexes of legislative attitudes. It also suggests the importance of developing relational statistics, such as our ordinal rankings, which indicate structure without attempting to establish a strict quantitative metric.[16] Scaling also constitutes an important improvement on existing techniques, such as attribute-cluster-bloc analysis, for the study of who votes with whom.

Scaling, in common with other formal disciplines such as mathematics and symbolic logic, seeks to make more obvious the relationships holding between a large number of factors. As with these other disciplines absolutely nothing is added to the significance of the original data. But to admit that nothing is added to what was already implicit in the data is not to say that we — the harrassed and imperfect observers — do not see relationships that we could not have grasped from merely observing the original data. What is there and what we know about what is there are quite different matters at the methodological level as much as they are at the epistemological level.

Like mathematics and logic, scaling can tell the omniscient mind absolutely nothing new. The results of such tautological processes are already present, in somewhat less obvious form, in the raw data. If God exists and is omniscient, then He knows all possible deductions, correlations, scale patterns, and all other possible relationships without having to perform any calculations. Hence, as has often been remarked, those who feel on a par with the Deity have no need for logic or mathematics. Those of us with lesser endowments continue to find a considerable advantage in the use of such formal techniques.

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call votes of the 1933–45 period in Chapter 16 of *Southern Politics*. Scaling, however, may make it easier to distinguish instances of a differing center of gravity even in those situations where there is no sharp dividing line between the sections.

[15] As Herbert A. Simon has aptly observed, "most of the arguments against 'quantitizing' or 'measuring' the 'qualitative' variables encountered in the social sciences *stem from ignorance* of how flexible the concept 'quantity' is, and how indefinite the lines between quantity and quality." Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," *Journal of Politics* (1953), pp. 506–16, at 513 (italics mine).

[16] The core of mathematics is *not* number, as has sometimes been said, but a concern for order of structure. James R. Newman's excellent four-volume study of *The World of Mathematics* makes this, and many other important points quite clear in terms which even a non-mathematician can appreciate. It may be that political scientists should concern themselves a bit less with the gadgetry of applied statistics, and a bit more with the elements of symbolic logic and pure mathematics.

Despite its many advantages scaling is by no means a research panacea. It requires a volume of data which is often unattainable. And even given the data, scale analysis can only be useful for handling certain types of questions and not others. Thus perhaps the most important question of legislative voting analysis — *why* so-and-so votes a given way — is almost completely beyond its range. The advent of the steel plow has not entirely replaced the earlier wooden version, nor has it yet made the desert or the arctic bloom. Political scientists who, like Voltaire, seek to cultivate their gardens, may find the simpler research techniques satisfactory for some purposes. For many other purposes I think scaling offers very important advantages. And for many yet different purposes I fear we must continue the search for still other new and more powerful research tools.

Appendix I

A Selective Bibliography of Scale Analysis

1. Basic Explanation of Guttman Scale Technique:
   Louis Guttman, "A Basis for Scaling Qualitative Data," *American Sociological Review* (April 1944), 139–50.
   Samuel A. Stouffer, Louis Guttman, and others, *Measurement and Prediction*, especially pages 3–19 and 60–90.
   Edward A. Suchman, "The Logic of Scale Construction," *Educational and Psychological Measurement* (Spring 1950), 79–93.
2. Further Developments in Scaling Technique:
   S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, "A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scale," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer 1952), 273–91, reprinted as Ch. 17 in M. W. Riley *et al.*, *Sociological Studies in Scale Analysis* (1954).
   Louis Guttman, "The Israel Alpha Technique for Scale Analysis," in M. W. Riley *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 410–15.
   Louis Guttman, "An Outline of Some New Methodology for Social Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1954–55), 395–404.
   Paul F. Lazarsfeld (ed.), *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences* (1954), especially Ch. 5 (by Guttman) and Ch. 7 (by Lazarsfeld).
3. Logical Importance of Cumulative Scales:
   Carl G. Hempel, *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science*, International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. II, #7 (1952), especially pages 39–69.
   Gustav Bergmann and Kenneth W. Spence, "The Logic of Psychophysical Measurement," *Psychological Review* (1944), reprinted in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (1953), pages 103–19 (especially 106–108).
4. Some Selected Applications of Scaling (including non-attitude data):
   S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier*, Vols I and II (data is processed by methods explained in *Measurement and Prediction*).
   S. A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (see Appendix) pages 262–69, for use of "H-technique" or "contrived" composite items.
   Margaret J. Hagood and Daniel O. Price, *Statistics for Sociologists* (1952 Revised Ed.), pp. 145–52 and 152–54.
   Normal E. Green, "Scale Analysis of Urban Structures," *American Sociological Review* (February 1946), pages 8–13.
   Herman M. Case, "Guttman Scaling Applied to Centers' Conservatism-Radicalism Battery," *American Journal of Sociology* (May 1953).

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THE ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR PATTERNS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

• *S. SIDNEY ULMER*

In an era of speed and mass production it is anachronistic to find the justices of the Supreme Court assembling each Decision-Monday for a public reading of their printed opinions. The desirability of continuing this tradition is sometimes questioned in view of the fact that it is occasionally responsible for calling public attention to interpersonal conflict among the justices. A recent example of this occurred on December 14, 1959, in an exchange between Whittaker and Douglas in which the latter charged his colleague with writing a "smart-alecky" opinion.[1]

While exchanges of this type may not enhance the confidence of the public in the olympian qualities of the judicial process, they are neither uncommon nor unexpected. Supreme Court justices are neither anointed priests, removed from knowledge of the stress of life, nor impersonal vehicles of revealed truth. They are men with vigorous minds and diversified backgrounds who interpret the Constitution in terms of their experience, their judgment about practical matters and their ideal pictures of the social order.[2] The differences which men inevitably have about these matters is an important factor in the development of the law. But the classical theory of American jurisprudence does not recognize the legitimacy of such considerations in judicial decision-making.

The antagonism between the mechanistic view of the judicial process and human limitations is one of the factors contributing to tension among judges faced with the continuous responsibility of reconciling fact and theory. Since verbal presentation of opinions (and the side remarks which accompany them) serves as a tension-releasing device, the continuation of the practice may have a functional justification.

It is both pertinent and instructive to study the interpersonal relationships and behavior patterns of the members of a collegial court. By doing so, we recognize what legal analysis ignores, namely, that the law, the courts and the judges are something more than mere abstractions. The nature of the endowments, outlooks and attitudes which judges bring to the discharge of their duties may be revealed in the identification of individual behavior patterns.

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[1] Reported in the *New York Times,* December 15, 1959.

[2] See generally, Benjamin Cardozo, *The Nature of the Judicial Process* (New Haven, 1921); Fred V. Cahill, *Judicial Legislation* (New York, 1952); Robert H. Jackson, *The Supreme Court in the American System of Government* (Cambridge, 1957); Alpheus T. Mason, *The Supreme Court: Vehicle of Revealed Truth or Power Group, 1930–1937* (Boston, 1953); John P. Frank, *Marble Palace* (New York, 1958). For a recent analysis of lawmaking on the Court, see S. Sidney Ulmer, "An Empirical Analysis of Selected Aspects of Law-making on the United States Supreme Court," *Journal of Public Law,* VIII (Fall, 1959), 414–436. *Cf.* Felix Frankfurter, "Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes' Constitutional Opinions," *Harvard Law Review,* XXXVI (June, 1923), 909, 916, 918. For quantitative applications in this area see, especially, Glendon A. Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960) and "The Study of Judicial Decision-Making as an Aspect of Political Behavior," *The American Political Science Review,* LII (1958), 1007–1025; also see Eloise Snyder, "The Supreme Court as a Small Group," *Social Forces,* XXXVIII (1958), 232–238, and "Uncertainty and the Supreme Court's Decisions," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXV (1959), 241–245. A recent study of interest on the background of judges is John R. Schmidhauser, "The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* III (1959), 1–57.

The discrepancies among these patterns, in turn, reflect the differences among the actors.

This paper attempts to illustrate some of the methods by which the behavior patterns of Supreme Court justices may be identified and analyzed. It is in one sense, therefore, methodological in character. But it is not designed solely as an essay on methodology since substantive relationships of importance are revealed through the application of new methods as well as through the use of previously developed techniques. The cases used are those raising questions of civil liberty in the 1958 term, a choice of subject matter which reflects the view that the attitude of the judge is of above average significance in such cases.[3]

The article is divided into five parts. Part I is a general statistical summary of civil liberty cases for the 1958 term, and includes a brief comparison to several previous Court terms. The remainder of the paper is devoted to an analysis of interpersonal relations and behavior patterns in three selected areas. Part II is an investigation of cohesion tendencies among the justices. A modified method of factor analysis is introduced and its usefulness illustrated. The number of blocs on the Supreme Court is determined and the composition and nature of each is discussed. Attention is given to interpersonal support rates among the justices as measured by a Solidarity Index and to leadership or power within blocs and within the Court as measured by the Shapely-Shubik Power Index. An analysis of a neglected area of study, opinion behavior, is undertaken in Part III. The authority to assign the writing of opinions is conceptualized as an aspect of power. It is shown that the assigning judges discriminate among their colleagues and that the choices are related to interpersonal factors. The nexus between cohesion tendencies and opinion behavior is observed. It is suggested that the discriminatory decisions have significant consequences for the development of the law. Part IV is concerned with the role of attitude and attitude consistency in Court treatment of civil liberty cases. A scalogram analysis of all such non-unanimous cases in the 1958 term is presented. The results are compared to those derived from analyses in two previous terms, and they reveal a high degree of consistency among the justices. The stability of cohesion tendencies in civil liberty cases is noted. Finally, in Part V we attempt to reach some tentative conclusions about the relationships studied in this paper.

[3] A civil liberty case is defined for the purposes of this paper as any case which raises a question concerning the type of non-economic personal right covered by the first eight and the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution. On this definition it makes no difference whether the case concerns a statutory or constitutional provision since the focus is on the substance rather than the form of the right claimed.

I

In its 1956 term the protection given civil liberties was adroitly expanded by the Supreme Court through restrictive statutory interpretation and deft manipulation of key constitutional provisions. One measure of the expansion was the rejection of only 26 per cent of all civil liberty claims during the term. The rejection rate increased to 41 per cent in the following term and, in the 1958 session, to 48.8 per cent.

The court decided 43 civil liberty cases in the 1958 term as compared to 46 in the previous session.[4] Federal participation as a litigant increased from 43 to 46.5 per cent while state participation moved from 50 to 51.2 per cent. Only one case involved private parties. Of those cases in which the civil liberty claim was upheld, approximately half were decided against the federal government and half against state governments. This suggests a slight discrimination against the federal government which carried over from the 1957 term. Overall, the Court seems to have been more permissive toward governmental activity in the civil liberty field in the 1958 term than in the two terms preceding.

Classification of the substantive rights in contention in the 1958 terms is complicated by the presence of several unusual questions before the Court during the term. An attempt at classification is made in Table 1.[5] One of the novel problems getting increasing attention from the Court is that of multiple punishment for single offenses. This area of contention is related in general to that of former jeopardy, but it also

[4] S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," *The Western Political Quarterly*, XIII (June, 1960), 288–311.

[5] Compilation of similar data for the 1957 term may be found in *ibid.*

TABLE 1. *Substantive Rights in Contention in Civil Liberty Cases, 1958 Term*

Subject Matter	*Number of Cases*
Racial Discrimination	6
Right to Withhold Information*	6
Free Speech	4
Multiple Punishment for Single Offense	4
Former Jeopardy	3
Jury Trial	2
Right to Counsel	2
Search and Seizure	2
Other "Fair Trial" Rights**	9
Miscellaneous***	5
Total	43

* Includes claims under both the First and Fifth Amendments.

** Consisting of: right to indictment (1); improper exposure of jury to news articles during trial (1); coerced confession (1); perjury of prosecution witness with knowledge of prosecutor (1); habeas corpus (1); rights of indigent defendants (1); rights of criminal defendants under the Jenck's rule (3).

*** Consisting of: right to travel (1); right against arbitrary dismissal from federal service (2); right against defamation of character by governmental action (2).

has certain unique aspects. Table 1 lists four multiple-punishment cases during the term, three of which were decided for the defendant. While two of these were decided unanimously, the third found the Court split 8-1 for the defendant, with Clark in dissent. One of the four cases went against the defendant, with Douglas and Black in dissent.

A second sub-area of civil liberties which got inordinate attention in the 1958 term was that of the right to withhold information. The claim made by defendants in these cases covered legislative as well as judicial institutions, with four of the six decisions going against the defendant. On balance, the Court moved to curb the scope of the rights claimed in this general area. Other rights in contention were more traditional, involving such things as race relations, free speech and the right to counsel. Cases in which Negroes were involved were more prevalent in the 1958 term than has generally been the case in the post-1954 period. One outstanding difference between the rights in contention in 1957 and in 1958 is that, in the former period, five different cases revolved around claimed rights of citizenship while the Court decided no cases on this point in the latter period.

II

Those who write about the United States Supreme Court often find it convenient to speak of "blocs" on the Court and, since Herman Pritchett's work on the Roosevelt and Vinson Courts, the existence of such blocs has been common knowledge.[6] Yet we cannot assume that the number, size, composition and cohesion tendencies of blocs of justices are constant. We can identify and speak more meaningfully about change in such characteristics if we first devise adequate methods of measurement. Moreover, the term "bloc" in its general sense is one of those words which has many shades of meaning. A prime requisite to the maturing of any social science is the development of precision in definition and communication.

Appropriate to these goals is the modified form of factor analysis developed by McQuitty.[7] The method seeks to identify a "typal structure" which is a structure in which "every member of a type is more like some other member of that type (with respect to the data analyzed) than he is like any member of any other type." When the members of a type have been

[6] C. Herman Pritchett, *The Roosevelt Court* (New York, 1948); *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court* (Chicago, 1954).

[7] McQuitty has developed a number of techniques for dealing with social science data. Among the more useful ones are Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis, Pattern Analysis, and Agreement Analysis. The method used in this paper is known as Linkage Analysis. For a reference, see Louis L. McQuitty, "Elementary Linkage Analysis For Isolating Orthogonal and Oblique Types and Typal Relevances," *Educational and Psychological Measurement,* XVII (1957), 207–229. Also see, for general reference, Raymond Cattell, "A Note on Correlation Clusters and Cluster Search Methods," *Psychometrika,* IX (September, 1944), 169. A simplified treatment of factor analysis is B. A. Fruchter, *Introduction to Factor Analysis* (New York, 1954). There is some question among statisticians as to the required size of the expected frequencies when using Phi. For evidence of the disparity of views, see Allen L. Edwards, *Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1954), p. 384; Sidney Siegal, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1956), p. 46; and *cf.* Morris Zelditch, *A Basic Course in Sociological Statistics* (New York, 1959), pp. 169–171. The assumptions necessary for the

isolated, a prototype may be defined. The prototype is a composite of the characteristics possessed by members of the type and represents the characteristics which the members possess in common. It is, in short, the centroid of the characteristics common to the typal members. The relevancy which each member of the type has to the centroid or prototype may be computed by the method used to extract first factor loadings in factor analysis. The loadings are extracted, however, from submatrices rather than from the entire matrix.

The first step is to construct a matrix of correlation coefficients expressing the relations of the variables being analyzed. Table 2 is such a matrix. The coefficients reflect the tendency of pairs of justices to agree or disagree in responding to civil liberty cases. A linkage analysis of this matrix establishes the existence of types or sub-matrices. The analysis consists of the following steps. First, the highest coefficient in each column of the primary matrix is underlined. The highest coefficient for the entire matrix is then determined and the two variables involved constitute the core of the first type. The underlined coefficients in the row of each of the two variables are then used to link additional variables to the type. These are called "first cousin" variables. The same procedure is repeated for the rows of the "first cousin" variables and if additional linkage results the additions to the type are called "second cousin" variables. This procedure is continued until all the variables of one type have been determined. When one type has been established the procedure is applied to the remaining variables and so on until all variables have been classified. In the present case two types are identified. The first is composed of Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, Stewart and Clark. The second consists of Warren, Douglas, Brennan and Black. The relationships within the typal structures are portrayed in Figure 1.

Figure 1 shows that each member of a bloc correlated at a higher rate with each member of his own bloc than with any justice not a member of the bloc. It also indicates that the highest correlation within the two blocs was respectively between Harlan and Frankfurter and between Warren and Brennan. Speculation concerning leadership within the blocs is promoted by the fact that each member of a type correlated at a higher rate with either Frankfurter or Warren, as the case may be, than with any other member of his respective type. This facet of the typal relationships may be measured by the extraction of typal relevancies using the method previously mentioned. The results reported in Table 3 indicate that Warren and

use of Phi with judicial voting statistics have been made by L. L. Thurstone and J. W. Degan, *A Factorial Study of the Supreme Court* (Chicago, 1951); a related study using tetrachoric coefficients with judicial data is Fred Kort, "Quantitative Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions" (mimeographed, 1959).

TABLE 2. *Correlations* Between the Responses of Nine Supreme Court Justices in Forty-Two Civil Liberty Cases,** 1958 Term*

	DO	BL	WA	BR	WH	FR	HA	ST	CL
DO		708	843	706	−232	−296	−313	−172	−313
BL	708		713	593	−155	−259	−223	−223	−223
WA	843	713		882	−203	−183	−183	−151	−238
BR	706	593	882		−116	−180	−183	−064	−183
WH	−232	−155	−203	−116		795	670	180	263
FR	−296	−259	−183	−179	795		1000	448	480
HA	−313	−223	−183	−183	670	1000		414	392
ST	−172	−223	−151	−064	180	448	414		053
CL	−313	−223	−238	−183	263	480	392	053	

DO — Douglas WA — Warren WH — Whittaker HA — Harlan
BL — Black BR — Brennan FR — Frankfurter ST — Stewart CL — Clark

* Using the Phi coefficient with a range of −1 to +1. For a methodological note on the use of Phi, see Fn. 7. Decimals have been omitted.

** One case is omitted due to a (4–4) split.



FIGURE 1. The Types*

Code:

⇌ means a reciprocal pair of variables.

→ means that the variable at the tail of the arrow is highest with the one at the head, but the one at the head is not highest with the one at the tail.

* (Key to abbreviations may be found in Table 2)

Frankfurter have more of the characteristics common to the members of the type than other justices in the respective blocs. These two justices closely approximate the prototype. If a positive relationship between possession of characteristics common to a group and influence within the group may be assumed, Warren and Frankfurter may be suspected of being "leaders" of their respective blocs. This inference would not violate prevailing conceptions, for the Court is generally considered to have Warren and Frankfurter wings.

TABLE 3. *Typal Relevancies**

	Type I	*Type II*
DO	.887	
BL	.780	
WA	.950	
BR	.876	
WH		.749
FR		1.000
HA		9.56
ST		.424
CL		.464

(Key to abbreviations used in left-hand column may be found in Table 2.)

* Possible numerical range for the matrix in Table 3 is 0 to 1.

In the Warren group, Black, Douglas and Brennan all have a high loading on the prototype. In the Frankfurter group, however, we note that Stewart and Clark have relatively low loadings on the prototype. The inference is that if a third bloc were to form on the Court, its most likely nucleus would be Stewart and Clark. We should not imply necessarily from these data that Frankfurter and Warren dominated their two reciprocating justices, Harlan and Brennan. The influence or status relationship between any pair of justices must be analyzed in a different manner because a correlation of the behavior of two justices may show that they tend to act together, but it does not indicate who is leading and who is following. We shall return to this problem shortly.

At this point we are concerned with leadership within a bloc. The suggestion is that where a justice more closely approximates the prototype than any other member of his own group, leadership ability on his part may be suspected. This may very well be, however, what is known as second-order leadership. For example, Frankfurter and Harlan have the highest reciprocating correlation in civil liberty cases in the 1958 term. Whittaker, Clark and Stewart correlate highest with Frankfurter, suggesting that he has influence within the

TABLE 4. *Inter-individual Solidarity Index*: Civil Liberty Cases 1958 Term*

Justices as Targets	*Justices as Initiators* DO	BL	WA	BR	CL	ST	WH	FR	HA
Douglas		.73	.53	.53	.20	.20	.20	.14	.13
Black	.58		.58	.42	.25	.08	.08	.09	.08
Warren	.88	.67		.56	.33	.25	.44	.33	.22
Brennan	.64	.88	1.00		.11	.15	.22	.22	.22
Clark	.00	.00	.00	.11		.44	.44	.44	.56
Stewart	.22	.11	.22	.33	.22		.44	.33	.44
Whittaker	.25	.75	.67	.75	.75	.75		.67	.75
Frankfurter	.00	.00	.09	.09	.67	.67	.67		.78
Harlan	.11	.22	.11	.11	.78	.44	.78	.78	

(Key to abbreviations used in column headings may be found in Table 2.)

* $ISI = \frac{aij}{aij + dij} \times 100$ where aij = the number of supportive acts originated by the ith individual and directed toward the jth individual; dij = the number of non-supportive or negative acts originated by the ith individual and directed toward the jth individual. Supportive and non-supportive acts in this case are represented by agreement or disagreement by the ith individual with an opinion written by the jth individual.

group. If Frankfurter, however, tends to be influenced by Harlan, then a tendency on the part of Whittaker, Clark and Stewart to follow Frankfurter would, in effect, result in leadership for Harlan. In other words, it is important to establish, if possible, the status relationship between the two highest reciprocating justices in each bloc. This obviously is not simple to achieve in view of the inability to secure general agreement on the meaning of such concepts as "leadership" or "status." Yet, some insight may be gained by examining the interpersonal relationships and, at the same time, varying the angles of observation.

One approach is through Solidarity Analysis. This furnishes us with an index based upon the ratio of supportive and non-supportive behavior directed by each justice to each other member of the Court. Support or non-support is conceptualized respectively as the agreement or disagreement of one judge with the written opinions of another. In a given case a justice has a number of choices about such things. He may, of course, be asked to write the opinion for the Court. If he does not write for the Court his area of choice is much larger. Possible behavior would include the following.

(1) He may concur in the result.
(2) He may write a concurring opinion.
(3) He may dissent.
(4) He may write a dissenting opinion.
(5) He may concur with a concurring opinion, with a dissenting opinion or with the opinion of the Court.

It is surmised that the way in which he makes this choice furnishes one *crude* indication of his relationship to his colleagues. This, of course, becomes even more significant if consistent patterns of behavior can be observed through time.

Table 4 contains data which bear upon the relationships between the two justices in each group who correlate at the highest level. The Solidarity Index[8] shows that Brennan received almost twice the ratio of supportive acts from Warren that Warren received from Brennan. We infer that Brennan exerted strong influence upon the Chief Justice in the 1958 civil liberty cases. We note further that Brennan had the highest mean excess of support in his bloc. In comparing Frankfurter and Harlan we encounter a tie. It is notable, however, that Frankfurter's mean excess of support is more than double that of Harlan.

A third way of looking at the relationships of the Court is in terms of the relative exercise

[8] For a general reference, see Robert F. Bales, *Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups* (Cambridge, 1951).

of power in civil liberty cases. For this purpose we may utilize the Shapely-Shubik Index,[9] which defines power as the probability of being pivotal in a majority decision. The index is a function, therefore, of both the frequency of participation in the majority and the size of the majority. Table 5 gives the relative rankings for forty-three civil liberty cases (unanimous and non-unanimous) as well as for 121 cases accompanied by written opinions. If only the civil liberty cases are used, Brennan turns up as the most powerful member of his bloc while Warren ranks third within the bloc. Frankfurter ranks a poor fifth in his own bloc. The failure of Frankfurter and Warren to reflect in this index the roles indicated by the correlation analysis reveals the fact that much of the support they received came in cases decided by large rather than small majorities. The Shapely-Shubik Power Index places a premium on participation in marginal majorities.

In comparing the rank order of all cases with that of civil liberty cases only, we find a correlation that is statistically significant at the .02 level.[10] But the coefficient (.64) does not obscure the fact that, as far as the full Court is concerned, Whittaker's role is more crucial and Brennan's less crucial in civil liberty decisions than in decision-making in general. In sum, it would seem that firm conclusions about leadership on the Court must await more conclusive evidence, although Warren, Brennan, Frankfurter and Harlan seem more likely candidates for this mantle than do other members of the Court.

III

A related area of choice for the justices of the Supreme Court is that of opinion writing. With the exception of opinions for the Court, the judge may determine for himself the type, nature and number of opinions which he writes in a given term. Table 6 records the appropriate data for the 1958 term.[11]

The table shows that Douglas, Brennan and Black wrote the largest number of opinions in civil liberty cases. The overall totals, however, are not particularly significant since judges vary in total opinion production. Douglas, for example, wrote thirty-six opinions in the 1958 term as compared to seventeen for Whittaker and fourteen for Warren. The statistics from Table 6 may be used, however, to examine for civil liberty opinions the quantity and directions of deviation from the expected frequency. In the 1958 term, opinions in civil liberty cases constituted 40.4 per cent of the total opinions. If substantive civil liberty issues concerned all justices equally, each would be expected to devote approximately 40 per cent of his total

[9] The method is explained in detail in L. S. Shapely and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," *The American Political Science Review*, XLVIII (September, 1954), 787–792.

[10] The Kendall Rank Coefficient is used here. A general reference is Sidney Siegal, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1956), pp. 213–223.

[11] Compilation of similar data for the 1957 term may be found in Ulmer, "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," *op. cit.*

TABLE 5. *Relative Ranking of Supreme Court Justices on Shapely-Shubik Power Index, 1958 Term*

*Justice**	*All Cases*** *Mean Coefficient*	*Rank*	*Civil Liberty Cases Only* *Mean Coefficient*	*Rank*
Douglas	.0908	9	.0803	9
Black	.1012	8	.1004	7
Warren	.1084	7	.0898	8
Brennan	.1218	2	.1014	6
Clark	.1249	1	.1273	2
Stewart	.1122	6	.1227	4
Whittaker	.1135	5	.1316	1
Frankfurter	.1153	3	.1200	5
Harlan	.1148	4	.1246	3

* Burton is omitted because he participated in too few cases.
** 121 opinion cases only.

opinion production to such cases. The extent that the production of a justice falls on either side of this ratio is a *crude* measure of the concern or intensity of feeling with which the judge views civil liberty questions. This is borne out by the fact, derived from the data of Table 6, that those who expressed themselves in an "excessive" number of civil liberty cases the four "libertarians" and Clark. Douglas, Black, Warren and Brennan have been identified as "soft" on civil liberty questions since the 1956 term. Clark on the other hand usually takes an extreme position in a contrary direction. The other four justices showed less involvement, with Whittaker and Harlan, in particular, appearing relatively disinterested in such matters. The most striking performance was that of Warren, who wrote 64 per cent of his opinions in civil liberty cases. This simply substantiates what is known to be Warren's consuming preoccupation with civil liberty problems.

A second area of choice in respect to Court opinions is more limited than that just discussed. The choice here is restricted to the judge who assigns the opinion to be written for the Court in each case decided. The assigning judge is the Chief Justice if he is in the majority; otherwise the privilege goes to the senior justice in the majority. It has been suggested that the assignment of opinions represents a meaningful exercise of power.[12] That it is viewed as such by those on the receiving end is evident in a letter from Justice Harlan to Chief Justice Fuller in 1898 which contained the following complaint: "Two Saturdays in succession you have not assigned to me any case but have assigned cases and important ones to Justice Gray. I was in the majority in each case assigned to him."[13] The assignment of opinion writing is clearly the most important duty of the Chief Justice in relation to his associates. In discharging this duty he must, of course, attempt to spread the work load to maximize the chances of clearing the docket by

[12] *Cf.* Frank, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–79.

[13] Willard L. King, *Melville Weston Fuller* (New York, 1950), p. 245. For comments from an assigning judge, see Bruce R. Trimble, *Chief Justice Waite* (Princeton, 1938), pp. 259 ff.

TABLE 6. *Written Opinions of Individual Justices in Civil Liberty Cases, 1958 Term*

Justice	*OC*	*C*	*D*	*T*	*CL Op. as % of Total Opinions*	*Deviation* From Expected*	*Previous** Deviation*
Douglas	4	2	9	15	41.6	+ .2	+3.2
Black	3	4	5	12	48	+ 7.6	+ .8
Warren	5	0	4	9	64.2	+23.8	+9
Brennan	5	2	7	14	42.4	+ 2	+9
Whittaker	3	1	0	4	23.5	−16.9	−7.5
Frankfurter	5	1	5	11	39.2	− 1.2	+3.3
Harlan	6	2	2	10	31.2	− 9.2	−8.8
Stewart	3	4	2	9	39.1	− 1.3	***
Clark	3	2	4	9	40.8	+ .4	+19

* Expected frequency is 40.4% (the ratio of civil liberty opinions to total opinions).

** Deviation from the expected frequency in the 1957 term.

*** Not sitting in the 1957 term.

Code: OC–Opinion for the Court
C–Concurring opinion
D–Dissenting opinion (includes opinions dissenting and concurring in part).
T–Total opinions written in CL cases in the 1958 term.

Note: The presentation of the statistics in this table does not imply statistical significance. The size of the opinion frequencies suggest caution in generalizations for which accumulated data from subsequent terms will furnish more meaningful tests.

TABLE 7. *Warren Opinion Assignments in Civil Liberty Cases, 1958 Term*

Justices	*Times Available*	*Opinions Assigned to*	*Marginal (5–4)**	*Unanimous*	*Assignments as % of Times Available*
Douglas	21	3	0	2	14.2
Black	22	3	1	1	13.6
Warren	24	5	0	2	20.8
Brennan	24	4	3	0	16.2
Whittaker	18	3	0	2	16.6
Frankfurter	16	2	0	1	12.4
Harlan	16	1	1	0	6.2
Stewart	18	2	0	2	12.4
Clark	16	1	0	0	6.2
Totals	175	24	5	10	

* Includes one case decided (4–4).

term's end. But an assigning judge may have other ends in view. Among the purposes which have been identified[14] are (1) public relations (as when a liberal opinion is assigned to a conservative judge to promote an image of objectivity for the Court) and (2) reward (as when "choice" opinions are assigned to particular justices and "chore" opinions to newcomers or those in whom the assigning judge has little confidence). Other possibilities are suggested in the discussion which follows.

Table 7 shows that Chief Justice Warren assigned twenty-four civil liberty opinions during the 1958 term, personally assuming the responsibility for writing five of these. Brennan was next in line with four assignments; Harlan and Clark were given one opinion each, thereby making them the least popular of all the justices for this particular function. The more significant statistics, however, are those expressing the opinion assignments as a ratio of the times available for assignment. The availability of the justices for assignment from Warren varied from sixteen to twenty-four times, the variance depending on the extent to which each justice agreed with the Chief Justice in the majority. The percentage figures suggest discrimination against Harlan and Clark while Whittaker, who is not normally associated with the Warren wing of the Court, fared slightly better than other members of the Warren bloc.

[14] Frank, *op. cit.*

In exercising the power of assignment the judge may be expected to discriminate in his choices depending upon the factors operative in a given situation. For example, opinion assignment in a marginal case (5–4) is a different matter from assignment in a unanimous case (9–0). The marginal opinion must be written in such a way as to hold every member of the 5-vote group.[15] Otherwise, the majority may become the minority, a possibility not to be risked unnecessarily. Table 7 shows that Warren assigned opinions in five marginal cases and in ten cases decided unanimously. Since Brennan was given three of the five marginal assignments, it is not unreasonable to surmise that there were factors associated with the Brennan assignments which tended to maximize the coherence of the majority bloc. There are a number of reasons why a particular justice may be favored for opinion assignments in marginal cases. Some of the general considera-

[15] This obviously does not apply with the same force to situations in which the thinking of a justice is so divergent from that of his colleagues as to warrant a separate concurrance. Such instances are clearly exceptions to the general rule, having occurred only twice in the 1958 term. Even in such cases the actual vote of the pivotal justice may have been influenced by the cogency and logic of the opinion for the Court. The concurring opinion, therefore, often serves merely to clarify, embellish or modify one or more points of the Court's opinion.

TABLE 8. *Frankfurter Opinion Assignments in Civil Liberty Cases, 1958 Term*

Justices	*Times Available*	*Opinions Assigned to*	*Marginal (5–4)*	*Unanimous*	*Assignments as % of Times Available*
Douglas	0	0	0	0	0
Black	0	0	0	0	0
Warren	0	0	0	0	0
Brennan	2	2	0	0	100
Whittaker	11	0	0	0	0
Frankfurter	11	3	3	0	27.2
Harlan	11	3	2	0	27.2
Stewart	11	1	1	0	9
Clark	11	2	2	0	18.1
Totals	57	11	8	0	

tions have been mentioned; the following are additional possibilities:

(1) The justice is pivotal in the case, and the assignment is a "pay off" or reward designed to hold him in the majority.
(2) The justice is closest in view to that of the assigning judge.
(3) The justice has some unusual attraction for one or more members of the opposition group.
(4) The justice represents what is common to the bloc to which he belongs rather than some extreme position.

Close analysis at this point produces interesting results. One of the three Brennan assignments was in *Raley* v. *Ohio*,[16] decided by a 4–4 split. A possible explanation for this assignment is the close relationship between Brennan and Warren. Of the four justices voting together in *Raley* (Douglas, Black, Warren and Brennan), the overall agreement rate in civil liberty cases was highest between Warren and Brennan, as expressed by a correlation coefficient of .882.[17] The other two assignments may be explained on the same grounds but additional factors of interest are present. In both of these cases we find that the "four horsemen" (Douglas, Black, Warren and Brennan) picked up a fifth vote from that side of the Court not normally associated with the group. The fifth vote in both cases was that of Stewart. This leads us to suspect some unique relationship between Brennan and Stewart. Investigation shows that in terms of agreement in civil liberty cases Brennan and Stewart correlated at −.064. This means that the tendency was to disagree. But all members of the Warren bloc tended to disagree with the remaining members of the Court since all four correlated negatively with the other five justices. The tendency toward disagreement was lower between Brennan and Stewart than between any other pair of inter-typal justices. Thus an assigning judge wishing to maximize the probability of holding a five-man majority together would, where Stewart is pivotal, assign the opinion to Brennan. The assignments in *Irvin* v. *Dowd*[18] and *In re Sawyer*[19] therefore, may be explained by reasons (2) and (3) stated above.

In *Vitarelli* v. *Seaton*[20] we find the Warren bloc picking up Harlan. Since Harlan was obviously pivotal, the opinion assignment may be viewed as a "pay off" per (1) above. Finally, in *Farmer's Cooperative Union* v. *WDAY*[21] Black was given the opinion and Clark was pivotal. In this case it seems that Brennan would have been the better choice, but Black had the second highest rate of agreement with Clark. Moreover, the fact that Stewart wrote concurring opinions in *Irvin* and *Sawyer* sug-

[16] *Raley* v. *Ohio*, 79 S. Ct. 1257 (1959).
[17] The Phi coefficient is used unless otherwise specified.
[18] 79 S. Ct. 825 (1959).
[19] 79 S. Ct. 1376 (1959).
[20] 79 S. Ct. 968 (1959).
[21] 79 S. Ct. 1302 (1959).

gests that his alignment with the Warren bloc in these cases was more tenuous than that of Clark in *Farmer's Cooperative Union*.

The remaining opinion assignments were made by Black and Frankfurter. The former justice made one assignment to Whittaker and two assignments to Harlan, one of which was a 5–4 decision. In this case, *Barr* v. *Matteo*,[22] Black shifted to the Frankfurter side of the Court while Stewart sided with Warren, Douglas and Brennan. In assigning the opinion Black chose a member of the Frankfurter bloc But while this led to an opinion to which the other bloc members subscribed it did not satisfy Black himself. Thus we observe the assigning justice writing a concurring opinion expressing his own views because as Black writes: "they are not altogether the same as those stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan."[23] The opinion assignment, possibly, was designed to accomplish other purposes.

Table 8 records the data on the remaining assignments during the term, all of which were made by Frankfurter. Several aspects of the table invite comment. Black and Warren were never available for opinion assignment from Frankfurter by virtue of the mechanics of the system, but this did not apply to Douglas. Yet Table 8 indicates that Douglas was never in the majority with Frankfurter unless joined by either Warren or Black or both. In only two instances was Brennan pulled into a majority from which Warren and Black were absent and in both cases (decided by identical 6–3 votes) he won the opinion assignment. One might speculate that this was reward for deviation from the Warren bloc. Whittaker, though available in every possible instance, received no Frankfurter assignments during the term. This could mean that Whittaker's reliability as a member of the Frankfurter bloc is unshakable. It does not appear explainable on the "share the work" theory since Brennan was assigned more opinions by Warren than Whittaker was, yet Brennan received two additional assignments from Frankfurter.

Frankfurter made assignments in eight marginal cases as compared to five by Warren. Contrary to Warren's practice, Frankfurter wrote all three of his opinions in marginal cases reflecting, perhaps, confidence in his ability to hold his majority. Warren, of course, was generally faced with the problem of attracting and holding a member of the Frankfurter bloc in order to make a majority. In contrast, in *all eight* of the marginal cases in which Frankfurter made the assignment the five members of the majority were all members of the Frankfurter bloc, therefore, merely had to hold its own members in the marginal splits. Finally, it should be noted that all eleven of the Frankfurter assignments were made in cases deciding against the civil liberty claim, while six of Warren's twenty-four assignments were in cases deciding against the claim. All six were assigned to Whittaker, Frankfurter or Clark.

IV

At this point a major question remains unanswered. We have suggested that decision-making in civil liberty cases is impinged upon by such factors as judicial philosophy, endowments and attitudes. These attributes are not easily changed and all experience shows that they are the sturdiest of human reliances. If such factors actually governed decision-making in civil liberty cases, we should expect a consistency of behavior which is not significantly affected by such things as the legal classification of the case, or the law or constitutional provision which seems called into play by the facts. Here we adopt a hypothesis that has already been affirmed in both the 1956 and 1957 terms of Court, to wit: the responses of the justices in civil liberty cases are functions of one dominant variable.[24] Guttman Scalogram analysis can tell us whether the response pattern of the judges in those cases can be satisfactorily accounted for by one variable.[25]

[22] 79 S. Ct. 1335 (1959).

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 1342. This is not the only remarkable behavior in opinion writing during the term. Equally notable was the fact that in *Abbate* v. *United States*, 79 S. Ct. 666 (1959), Brennan wrote the opinion for the Court as well as a concurring opinion.

[24] See Ulmer, "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," *op. cit.* For the application of scalogram analysis to a different area of judicial behavior, see Ulmer, "Judicial Review as Political Behavior: A Temporary Check on Congress," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, IV (1960), 426–445.

[25] See S. A. Stouffer (ed.), *Measurement and Prediction* (Princeton, 1950).

The nature of that variable must be separately derived.[26]

Scale analysis is now common enough in political science to justify omission of the details of the operation. In general, a one-variable solution is established if a scale exists. A perfect scale is said to exist if the questions and responses to a series of questions can be arranged in such a way that "persons who answer a given question favorably all have higher ranks than persons who answer the same question unfavorably."[27] Since perfect scales are not expected, Guttman has developed a measure of the difference between a perfect scale and a given scale pattern. This measure is known as the Coefficient of Reproducibility. Any pattern with a CR of less than .90 is classified as a non-scale type. The nature of the variable involved must be inferred. The confidence with which one can draw the inference that variable i has the nature j depends upon the extent to which the questions posed are true attributes of a universe j. The cases selected for the instant study were those involving, in varying degrees, the deprivation of a claimed civil liberty. If the responses to these cases scale, we may infer the existence of one dominant variable, to wit: the attitudes of the respondents toward civil liberty deprivations.

Table 9 presents the scalogram of the twenty-nine non-unanimous civil liberty cases decided in the 1958 term. This scale is well within the requirements of scale theory. The judges are ranked along an attitude continuum with Douglas at the pole most favorable to civil liberty claims and Clark occupying the least favorable position. The scale thus enables us to infer something about the attitudes of the two blocs we have observed operating in civil liberty cases. Moreover, it identifies the relative position of each individual in his bloc as well as on the Court as a whole. Since consistency of responses is measured by a CR of .953,[28] we may say that 95.3% of the overall response can be accounted for by one operating variable: attitude toward claimed civil liberty deprivations. Our hypothesis is therefore affirmed.

We may assume that where individuals are concerned basic attitudes change slowly, if at all. Furthermore, attitude changes may affect decision-making groups in such a way that the relative positions of group members remain unchanged. Thus we find that scale patterns can be used successfully as the basis for certain types of predictions. For example, relative constancy has been observed in the rank orders which occur from year to year. It is reasonably safe to assume that as long as the same justices sit and the same types of questions are presented the rank order derived from the response patterns will remain constant or near constant. The rank order of the justices in terms of favorableness toward civil liberty claims was identical in the 1956 and 1957 terms. A tentative prediction could be made from these data that the 1958 ranking (given the necessary assumptions) would not differ from that of the preceding terms. A qualifying factor was the appointment of Stewart in October, 1958. No prediction could be made about Stewart, and accurate predicting concerning the remaining justices was subject to the impact which Stewart would have on his colleagues. Scale analysis of the 1958 term indicates that the relative rank order remained the same for all but one of the eight justices who sat through the three terms. The exception was Whittaker, who was constant in 1956 and 1957, but in the 1958 term moved from seventh to fifth. It may be surmised that the change in the composition of the Court had something to do with this shift, but firm conclusions must wait for the data of subsequent terms.

Douglas, Warren, Brennan, Whittaker and Frankfurter had perfectly consistent voting patterns in civil liberty cases during the 1958 term, a finding which suggests well-structured attitude continua for those justices. Warren and

[26] For a treatment of some of the problems associated with determination of the nature of the dominant variable, see Ernest Q. Campbell and Alan C. Kerckhoff, "A Critique of the Concept 'Universe of Attributes'," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXI (Summer, 1957), 295. *Cf.* Warren S. Torgerson, *Theory and Methods of Scaling* (New York, 1958), pp. 307 ff.

[27] Stouffer, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[28] The 1958 CR may be compared with those of the two previous terms:

1956 CR = .950
1957 CR = .953
1958 CR = .953

Douglas were also perfectly consistent in the 1957 term. Douglas, clearly, exercises virtually no discrimination in deciding civil liberty cases. In the 1956 term he voted against the claim one time out of a possible thirty-nine, in 1957 once in forty-one non-unanimous cases, and in the 1958 term he is for the civil liberty claim in every one of twenty-nine non-unanimous cases. This performance is so striking that one could predict, with a high probability of success, the Douglas vote in any *single case* raising a civil liberty question. With a slightly

TABLE 9. *Scalogram Analysis: Civil Liberty Cases, U.S. Supreme Court, 1958 Term*

*Scale Score***	29	27	25	23	6	4	3	3	1	
*Cases**	*Douglas*	*Black*	*Warren*	*Brennan*	*Whittaker*	*Frankfurter*	*Harlan*	*Stewart*	*Clark*	*Votes*
Marshall v. United States, 1171	+	−	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	8–1
Greene v. McElroy, 1400	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−	8–1
Ladner v. United States, 209	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	−	8–1
Smith v. United States, 991	+	+	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	6–3
Lee v. Madigan, 276	+	+	+	+	+	−	−	+	−	6–3
Burns v. Ohio, 1164	+	+	+	+	+	−	−	NP	+	6–2
In re Sawyer, 1376	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	+	−	5–4
Farmer's Union v. WDAY, 1302	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	+	5–4
Barr v. Matteo, 1335	+	−	+	+	−	−	−	+	−	4–5
Howard v. Lyons, 1331	+	−	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	3–6
Brown v. United States, 539	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	4–5
Bartkus v. Illinois, 676	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	4–5
Frank v. Maryland, 804	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	4–5
Irvin v. Dowd, 825	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	+	−	5–4
Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 948	+	+	+	+	−	NP	−	−	+	5–3
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 968	+	+	+	+	−	−	+	−	−	5–4
Uphaus v. Wyman, 1040	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	4–5
Barenblatt v. United States, 1081	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	4–5
Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 1025	+	−	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	3–6
Raley v. Ohio, 1257	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	NP	−	4–4
Pittsburgh Glass v. U.S., 1237	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	4–5
Rosenberg v. United States, 1231	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	4–5
Anon. 6 & 7 v. Baker, 1157	+	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	4–5
Mills v. Louisiana, 980	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	−	3–6
Abbate v. United States, 666	+	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	−	3–6
New York v. O'Neill, 564	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	2–7
Harris v. United States, 560	+	+	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	2–7
Draper v. United States, 329	+	−	NP	−	−	NP	−	−	−	1–6
Williams v. Oklahoma, 421	+	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	1–8
Total Participations:	29	29	28	29	29	27	29	27	29	256
Inconsistent votes:	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	4	3	12

Legend: + – For the civil liberty claim
− – Against the claim
NP – Non-participation

Coefficient of Reproducibility: .953***

* The figures following case titles represent the beginning page of the case in the Supreme Court Reporter, volume 79.

** But for his non-participations Stewart could have been ranked 5th instead of 7th. This fact emphasizes the need for caution in interpreting the significance of the rank order within blocs when the S.S. differences are as narrow as in the 1958 term.

*** Tests for chance occurrence indicate this scale pattern is highly significant.

lower probability of success one could do the same for Black, Warren and Brennan, as well as for the members of the Frankfurter bloc.

The basic difference in attitude toward civil liberty claims, is revealed by the break which occurs between Brennan and Whittaker. This is a breakpoint line between the two blocs and is represented by the difference in the scale scores of Brennan and Whittaker respectively. While we expect differences concerning the interpretation of statute and constitutional provisions, we also expect the degree of disparity to have some reasonable limitations. The magnitude of the discrepancy in the behavior of the two blocs in the 1958 civil liberty cases suggests that something more basic than mere problems of interpretation were involved.

The degree to which the two blocs have moved apart can be observed in a comparison of the scale scores of the fourth and fifth ranks on the scale in 1957 and 1958. In the 1957 term the respective scores were 31 and 16. In 1958 the difference becomes 23 and 6 respectively. In 1957 the justice in the fifth position compiled a scale score equal to 40 per cent of that compiled by the justice most favorable to civil liberty claims. In 1958 the ratio becomes 21 per cent. Here we have in part a possible explanation for the Whittaker shift. Whittaker's scale score in 1957 was 27.5 per cent that of Douglas, the justice at the most favorable pole. In 1958 Whittaker's ratio was 21 per cent. Since Douglas was equally extreme in both terms it is clear that Whittaker was slightly less favorable toward civil liberty claims in 1958 than in 1957. The mean shift for the remaining justices in the Frankfurter bloc, however, is from 24 to 9.5 per cent. Thus while Whittaker moved in the same direction as his bloc, his movement was of considerably less magnitude. This explains in part his shift from seventh to fifth position on the attitude continuum. Within the Warren bloc the mean shift of the bloc members relative to the Douglas polar position was almost nil (amounting to a positive mean shift of 1 per cent).[29]

The inconsistent votes reflected by the scale were cast by Stewart (4), Black (4), Clark (3), and Harlan (1). Only one case received more than one inconsistent vote. It is informative to examine this case (*Barr* v. *Matteo*) in which Black and Stewart were inconsistent. Barr was an Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization who, intending to release Matteo and others from governmental employ, issued a press release specifying the reasons for the planned dismissal. Matteo brought suit for libel but the Supreme Court, per Harlan, held that Barr had absolute privilege. Warren and Douglas thought the majority gave not even "the slightest consideration to the interest of the individual who is defamed."[30] They saw the decision as a "complete annihilation" of the individual's rights. Stewart, dissenting separately, agreed with Harlan's principle that governmental officers must be enabled to act within the "line of duty" without unnecessary harrassment. But he made his decision on what he took to be a "personally motivated effort on the petitioner's part to dissassociate himself from the alleged chicanery with which the agency had been charged."[31] Stewart's inconsistency may be explained by his judgment of the motivation behind an act outside the "line of duty." Black, on the other hand, reached a conclusion contrary to that of Warren and Douglas with whom he is usually associated, but he apparently did so out of the same concern for personal liberty which motivated the Warren-Douglas dissent. Recognizing the "freedom people have to applaud or to criticize the way public employees do their job,"[32] Black evinced concern for the freedom of speech which governmental officers must have in order to keep the public properly informed. This freedom may be restrained, he noted, only by the Congress, and any such restraint would have to run the gauntlet of the First Amendment. This case is, therefore, an excellent example of the fact that the Court is someimes asked to choose between promoting the civil liberty of one party and that of the other.

V

This study has suggested that the heterogeneous outlooks, attitudes, philosophies and general backgrounds which justices of the Supreme

[29] The performance of the Warren bloc in civil liberty cases has caused considerable consternation in some quarters, particularly in respect to decisions involving communism. See Ulmer, "The Supreme Court, the Bar and Free Speech," *The American Bar Association Journal* (forthcoming).

[30] *Barr* v. *Matteo*, 79 S. Ct. 1335, 1343.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 1347.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 1342.

Court bring to their work manifest themselves in diverse patterns of reaction to the stimuli presented by the judicial process. On the premise that these pattern variables have important consequences for judicial decision-making, some appropriate methods for their study have been presented.

On balance, the Court seems to have been less favorable toward civil liberty claims in the 1958 term than in the preceding term, continuing a trend evident in 1957. The attitude shift occurring in 1958 was brought about primarily by members of the Frankfurter wing of the Court. Two cohesive blocs of justices operated on the Court in civil liberty cases during the 1958 term. The membership of these blocs has been determined. The leaders of the blocs have been *tentatively* identified as Warren and Frankfurter, with Brennan pinpointed as exerting strong influence on the Chief Justice. The Warren bloc has been shown in general to be highly favorable to civil liberty claims. The Frankfurter bloc has been, on the whole, negative toward such claims. Bloc membership seems to have been of some consequence in the assignment of opinions. There are cogent indications that such assignments are not made arbitrarily.

The responses of the justices in civil liberty cases have been used to affirm the hypothesis that the civil liberty decisions may be explained by one dominant operating variable: attitude toward claimed civil liberty deprivations. The possibilities of successful prediction of Court behavior on the basis of socio-psychological considerations have been discussed. The outlook here is encouraging, particularly in respect to subject matter areas in which attitude plays an important role. We have suggested that the field of civil liberties is one such area. Finally, it should be said that no attempt has been made to suggest or imply that judicial behavior can be understood or explained solely by consideration of the types of factors we have examined or by the methods we have used. The focus of this paper has been motivated by the belief that while all facets of social phenomena which promote better understanding should be studied, somewhat greater emphasis upon empirical analysis of the judicial process seems justified by the promising results.

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GRASS ROOTS POLITICIANS AND THE VOTE

• *PHILLIPS CUTRIGHT and PETER H. ROSSI*

INTRODUCTION

The outcome of an election may be viewed as the result of the interplay between a number of factors: the characteristics of candidates, the activities of the competing party organizations, the processes of communications and influence involving the mass media and informal groups, and, finally, the social and psychological characteristics of individual voters. The roles played by the social and psychological characteristics of individual voters have received the largest amount of attention in systematic research on voting behavior. Such researches have also paid some attention to the role of the mass media and personal influence.

Although voting behavior research has done much to increase our understanding on the social psychological level, the effects of party organizations on the vote has been only poorly studied. To be sure, there are several excellent descriptive studies of local party organizations, particularly of those in large cities. A recent study of Elmira, New York, has provided a description of how the parties functioned in that city during the 1948 presidential campaign,[1] although the authors were unable to

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[1] B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld, and W. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

relate these activities to the outcome of the election.[2]

In part, the failure of research on political behavior to study the roles played by organized political parties may be allocated to the present somewhat lopsided stage of development of research techniques. Our most well developed techniques — such as the survey method or those used in the study of small groups — are best suited to the study of social psychological or micro-sociological problems. The systematic study of large-scale organizations has yet to develop as good a body of research tools.

In part, the neglect of party organizations in research on voting behavior stems from an inability to solve the problem of how to separate out the effects of party activity from those effects produced by the other factors at work in a particular election. It is important to see this methodological problem clearly. To say, for example, that the Democratic Party was effective in obtaining a given vote for its candidate in a particular precinct involves assessing somehow what the Democratic candidate would have received in that district *without* the activity of his party. Because of the way voters divide along ethnic and class lines in most general elections, either one of the parties has a rather large pool of "natural" Democrats or "natural" Republicans whose party vote is assured regardless of the activities of the party in the campaign period. Thus the base line for measuring how much impact a party organization has upon a district is the way in which that district's vote for the party exceeds what is to be expected on the basis of the longstanding predispositions of the voters.

The research reported here is intended as a contribution to a hopefully growing body of methods to be employed in the study of large-scale organizations. This study combines the survey approach with an "ecological" analysis, employing questionnaires to measure the campaign activities of party workers and relating these activities to the votes obtained by the parties' candidates on the precinct level.

In addition, we present a method for separating out the effects of party activities from the total set of determinants of the voting levels of precincts. This solution is illustrated by an analysis of the outcome of the 1956 presidential election in a medium-sized midwestern industrial city.[3] This community is large enough — 160,000 population — to provide us with well-developed party organizations. It is heavily Democratic in political tone, having consistently turned out Democratic majorities in presidential elections over the past two decades.

The analysis attempted consists of a combination of the ecological and survey approaches. The voting records of 74 precincts inhabited primarily by whites are analyzed in terms of the social characteristics of the precincts. A multiple regression equation links together the voting records and the precinct social characteristics, providing an estimate of how each precinct would vote if its social characteristics were the only factors at work. Precinct committeemen of both parties were given questionnaires which attempt to assess their political activities. These questionnaires provide measures of how active each party was in each of the precincts. These measures of activity are then related to how individual precincts either exceed or fall below the expected vote levels indicated by their social characteristics.

Precinct Characteristics and Precinct Voting Records

Since precincts are rather arbitrary subdivisions, it is difficult to obtain from published Census volumes indices which can be used to characterize the social composition of a precinct. In order to do this, it was necessary to use the block statistics published in the 1950 Census of Housing to obtain estimates of the economic statuses of each of the 74 precincts. Two such indices were computed for each precinct: the estimated average rental[4] and the proportion of owner-occupied dwellings.

Since ethnicity is such an important deter-

[2] See Peter H. Rossi, "Four Landmarks in the History of Research on Voting," in E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).

[3] Because of the confidential nature of materials to be presented in forthcoming articles, the city is not identified.

[4] The estimated average rental was taken from a regression equation linking the valuations of owner-occupied dwelling units to the average rentals in the 74 precincts. This additional step was neces-

minant of voting behavior in Northern urban areas, we undertook a special study to estimate the ethnic composition of each precinct. A 10 per cent sample was taken of the names of registered voters in each precinct. These names were then identified according to their ethnic origins by the staff of a local service agency which deals with immigration problems.[5] Two major ethnic groupings were distinguished within each precinct: the "Old Immigrants," defined as those persons with English, Scottish, German, or Scandinavian names; and the "New Immigrants," consisting of all other whites. The proportion of Old Immigrants in each precinct was taken as an index of its ethnic composition.[6]

By correlating each of these three variables of social composition with each other and with the proportion of the vote received by Stevenson in the 1956 presidential election, a regression equation was computed which then was used to obtain an estimate for each precinct of the Democratic vote to be expected on the grounds of its social composition alone. The correlations among these variables and the resulting regression equation are shown in Table 1.[7]

In Table 1 it is important to note that the precinct characteristics are poorly correlated with each other, but each is fairly strongly correlated with the vote for Stevenson. This situation led to a very high multiple correlation with the vote — —.908, indicating that about 80 per cent of the variation in vote among precincts could be accounted for by the differences among precincts in these three social characteristics.

The regression equation shown in the bottom line of Table 1 indicates the weights that should be applied to each of the precinct characteristics to obtain a "best" estimate of the vote of each precinct. This regression equation was used to obtain an estimated Democratic vote for each of the 74 white precincts. The estimated vote for a precinct represents a "best"

sary, since several precincts had a very small proportion of rental units, while other precincts had very few home owners. Neither the average rental nor the average home valuation would, by itself, provide an adequate estimate of the economic characteristics for *all* precincts in the city.

[5] We are grateful to the members of the staff of this agency who agreed to undertake what was indeed a considerable task. The validity of this method has been tested in research undertaken by Peter H. Rossi, where it was shown that estimates of the ethnic composition of areas by the name-rating method came close to the actual compositions as obtained in interviews with residents in those areas. See P. H. Rossi, *et al., Politics and Education in the Local Community* (forthcoming).

[6] The terms "Old Immigrants" and "New Immigrants" coincide largely with religious groups as well, the "Old Immigrants" being largely Protestant and the "New Immigrants" largely Catholic. Had it been possible to employ measures of the religious composition of precincts in the computation of the regression equation, perhaps more of the total variance would have been accounted for. However, since the correlation of ethnicity with the vote is so high, it is not likely that a religious composition index would have done much better.

[7] No variables beyond the ones shown in Table 1 were considered, primarily because these were the only ones available and because the resulting multiple correlation coefficient was so high.

TABLE 1. *Intercorrelations Among Precinct Characteristics and Precinct Voting Records: White Precincts*

		(1) Proportion "Old Immigrant"	(2) Estimated Rental	(3) Proportion Owner-Occupied Dwellings	(4) Proportion Democratic 1956 Presidential
Proportion "old immigrant"	(1)		+.33	+.10	−.76
Estimated rental	(2)			+.15	−.67
Proportion home owners	(3)				−.35

$R_{4.123} = -.908$.

Regression equation of precinct characteristics on the Democratic vote:

$\hat{Y} = -.442\,X_1 - .724\,X_2 - .112\,X_3 + 108.23$.

estimate of what the vote should be in that precinct if only these three social characteristics were involved in the vote of a precinct. The residuals — differences between the actual vote and that estimated for a precinct — then represents random fluctuations and the effects of factors not yet taken into account. These residual differences are the focus of our analysis in the remainder of the paper. We try to account for the way in which a precinct departs from its estimated vote by considering the degree of party activity within that precinct.

The "Ward" and "Breakage" Effects

Although we are concerned primarily with ferreting out the effects of party organizations on the precinct level, we must also consider whether these residuals may not have been generated by other kinds of differences among precincts. Two such possible factors are taken up in this section: one pertains to party organizations on the ward level, the other to the political atmospheres generated in each precinct by the extent of partisanship in the election.

A political party, like other formal groups, is marked by levels of authority. Precincts are usually grouped together into wards or districts under the leadership of a ward captain or district leader, who may often be as in Chicago, an important underlord in a rather feudal hierarchy. Hence party organization may vary in effectiveness from ward to ward rather than from precinct to precinct, expressing the importance of the leadership given by ward captains. If this were the case in the city where our study was undertaken, the residuals would vary considerably from ward to ward, overshadowing the differences between precincts.

Actually, however, this does not appear to be the case in this community. In Table 2, we see that the wards vary only slightly in departing from the expected vote in the various wards — only 6 precincts in one ward depart as much as one per cent from expectation. Since the other 14 precincts in this ward were all "Negro precincts" and were for this reason excluded from our tabulations, this single deviation should not be taken too seriously. Whatever the effect of party organizations on the vote, it must occur on the precinct rather than the ward level.

Several recent studies[8] have indicated that a political party gains an added advantage whenever it is able to obtain a very large majority in an area. A large majority of voters supporting a particular party produces a "political atmosphere" which results in a larger than expected vote for that party. This has been called the "bandwagon" effect, or, more recently the "breakage" effect.

Table 3 shows that the "breakage" effect may be present in the precincts we have studied. If we divide precincts into those with heavy, medium, or light Democratic votes, we see that, on the average, in heavily Democratic precincts the party receives 2.6 per cent more votes than expected, and in light Democratic precincts about 2.5 per cent less than expected. This is a spread of five percentage points, representing a considerable increment to the party in some area of the city.[9] In all but one of the tables which follow, the residuals have been adjusted to remove the "breakage" effect by subtracting the percentages in Table 3 from each precinct's residual according to whether it is a "light," "medium," or "heavy" Democratic area.

If we are correct in this interpretation, Table 3 illustrates the aggregative effects of the interaction among voters taking place within the urban neighborhood.

[8] B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld, and W. McPhee, *op. cit.*

[9] Statistically, the "breakage" effect indicates that the relationship between the vote and the social characteristics of a precinct is slightly curvilinear.

Table 2. *Average Residuals for White Wards: 1956 Presidential*

	Ward Number				
	One	*Two*	*Three*	*Four*	*Five*
Percentage gain or loss for Democratic candidate	−0.01	+0.70	−0.27	−1.13	+0.55
Number of precincts	[18]	[13]	[17]	[6]	[20]

TABLE 3. *Average Residuals in Precincts of Different Democratic Partisanship*

	Light Democratic Vote (44% or less)	Medium Democratic Vote (45–55%)	Heavy Democratic Vote (55% and over)
Percentage gain or loss for Democratic candidate	−2.46	+0.19	+2.63
Number of precincts	[26]	[22]	[26]

THE MEASUREMENT OF PARTY ORGANIZATION AT THE PRECINCT LEVEL

Our approach to the measurement of the activities of the two political parties at the precinct level was to question precinct committeemen about the ways in which they individually went about their precinct duties. Admittedly, there are other types of party activity going on during a campaign which do not involve the precinct committeemen — the speeches, advertisements, and so on which appear in the mass media. Presumably these mass media efforts are not segmented by precincts, but are common to all precincts. The organizational efforts which we studied are primarily those involving face-to-face contacts with voters on the neighborhood level.

Both the Republican and Democratic committeemen were given questionnaires covering several topics — the number of hours spent on their party duties, their commitment to party goals, the number of persons known personally to them in their precincts, and so on. The questionnaires were filled out by the precinct committeemen and returned by mail. Unfortunately, not all committeemen returned their questionnaires: 77 per cent of the Democratic precinct committeemen and 64 per cent of their Republican counterparts returned questionnaires, representing 58 and 47 precincts respectively. For 37 precincts we have returns from both the Republican and Democratic precinct committeemen.

As to the validity of these replies, we may only state that the answers are consistent with the popular reputations of the two party organizations in the city. The Democrats are reputed to have the better organization, and Table 4, comparing the replies of the two parties to a sample of questions, tends to confirm this belief. On the average, Democratic precinct committeemen contact more persons within their precincts, work longer hours, during election campaigns, and know more of the voters in their precincts.

Despite the better showing of the Democrats as a group, there is still much variation among them, as well as considerable variation among the Republican workers. This variation in performance is the subject of the remainder of our analysis. In plainer terms, the question may be put as follows: How many percentage points advantage does a party obtain by having a good precinct committeeman on the job? Conversely, what does the party lose by having a worker who does not perform well?

Starting with Table 5, we take up the analysis of the differences to characteristics of committeemen. Section A refers to the amount of daily contact the Democratic committeeman has with persons within his precinct between elections. The 23 precincts in which the committeeman talked with only 0–10 persons daily show an average loss of 1.2 per cent, while the 15 precincts in which the committeeman talked with 21 or more persons daily gained, on the average, about 1.8 per cent for the Democratic candidate.

Much the same relationship holds for Republican committeemen, with the 29 precincts

TABLE 4. *Republican and Democratic Precinct Committeemen Compared*

	Precinct Committeemen	
	Democratic	Republican
Median number of persons contacted daily in precinct	15	9
Proportion working 21 or more hours weekly during primary election campaign	63%	30%
Proportion knowing by name more than half the voters in their precincts	85%	64%
Number of precinct committeemen	[58]	[47]

TABLE 5. *Precinct Activity and Percentage Gains in Party Vote: 1956 Presidential Election*

A. Democratic Committeemen

	Number of Persons Talked With on an Average Day		
	0–10	11–20	21 and over
Average percentage gained by Democratic candidate	−1.21 [23]	−0.24 [14]	+1.78 [15]
	Proportion of Voters Knowing Committeeman by His Name		
	1–4 in ten	5–6 in ten	7 or more in ten
Average percentage gained by Democratic candidate	−2.58 [12]	+0.85 [22]	+0.74 [21]
	"Difference" to Committeemen if Opposition Wins		
	Little or Some	A Great Deal	
Average percentage gained by Democratic candidate	−0.64 [17]	+0.09 [40]	

B. Republican Committeemen

	Number of Persons Talked With on an Average Day		
	0–10	11–20	21 and over
Average percentage gained by Republican candidate	−0.56 [29]	+1.91 [10]	+6.92 [1]
	Proportion of Voters Knowing Committeeman by His Name		
	1–4 in ten	5–6 in ten	7 or more in ten
Average percentage gained by Republican candidate	−0.01 [20]	−0.19 [14]	+0.04 [12]
	"Difference" to Committeemen if Opposition Wins		
	Little or Some	A Great Deal	
Average percentage gained by Republican candidate	−0.59 [14]	+0.22 [32]	

in which the Republican committeemen were low in daily interaction showing a loss of about 0.5 per cent, while the 11 precincts in which the Republicans were high in daily interaction show a gain for the Republican candidate of about 2.5 per cent.

Committeemen were asked to estimate what proportion of the voters in their precincts could call them by name. Among the Democrats, a marked difference in the expected direction appears between the highs and lows on this characteristic, but there is no such difference among the Republicans.

How committed the precinct captain is to his party is also related to the vote obtained for both Democrats and Republicans. When a committeeman does not care a "great deal" whether the other party wins, his own candidate suffers a loss of a little more than 0.5 per cent, while the candidate gains slightly in a precinct in which the committeeman says that he cares a great deal if the opposition wins.

In Table 6 we return briefly to a breakdown of precincts into areas which give light, medium, or heavy support to either party. The gain for the party in precincts with more ener-

getic committeemen is especially large in those precincts with uneasy majorities for either party — the difference for both Republicans and Democrats being about 6 per cent. Thus we see that the efforts of the party organizations are particularly important where the election outcome can be easily affected. Perhaps this effect may also be discerned on the level of larger geographic districts, wards, congressional districts, and the like.

Questions designed to get at the "qualities" of committeemen rather than their activities were generally found to be unrelated to the gain or loss of votes. Such characteristics as length of service as a committeeman, length of time lived in the precinct, education, age, occupation, contentment with role in the party, and ideology or opinions on the "most effective way of getting out the vote" were not related in any meaningful way to the residuals. Table 7 does show, however, that in this heavily Roman Catholic community Catholic committeemen in each party were able to gain a slight advantage for their party over their Protestant opposites. Among both Democrats and Republicans, those committeemen who profess no religious faith or who were members of small minority religious groups lost, on the average, one per cent to the opposition party.

The popular idea that patronage is extremely important in getting out the vote for a party is tested in Table 8. Since there are no Republicans employed by the local government, this table is limited to Democratic committeemen. While we cannot tell from these results alone whether the better precinct workers are rewarded by patronage jobs or whether those precinct workers with city jobs are more committed to their precinct work, it is clear that the party does gain additional support from those precincts led by patronage committeemen, and also that it loses votes in those precincts where the committeemen are not employed by local government.

Up to this point we have shown how a number of different variables singly contributed to

TABLE 6.* *Percentage Gain in Party Vote in Precincts With Different Pluralities*

A. Democratic Committeemen	Percentage Gained by Democratic Candidate in Precincts in which the *Democrats* Obtained of the Total Vote:		
	Less than 45%	Between 45% and 55%	56% or more
Number of persons talked with on average day			
10 or fewer	−2.98 [8]	−2.99 [8]	+2.49 [7]
11 or more	−2.66 [8]	+3.55 [11]	+2.47 [10]
B. Republican Committeemen†	**Percentage Gained by Republican Candidate in Precincts in which the *Republicans* Obtained of the Total Vote:**		
	Less than 45%	Between 45% and 55%	56% or more
Number of persons talked with on average day			
5 or fewer	−5.30 [4]	−3.85 [5]	+2.29 [4]
6 or more	−0.66 [7]	+1.57 [10]	+3.75 [10]

* Residuals in this table were not adjusted to remove the "breakage effect." All other tables use adjusted residuals.

† If Republicans are divided at the 10 or less, 11 or more line (as were the Democrats), the same relationships hold as are seen in this table; however, the distribution of cases is pathetically small for some cells.

TABLE 7. *Religion of Precinct Committeemen and Gain in Party Vote*

	Democratic Precinct Committeemen		
	Catholics	Protestants	Others
Percentage gained by Democratic candidate	+0.25 [31]	−0.70 [17]	−1.01 [9]
	Republican Precinct Committeemen		
	Catholics	Protestants	Others
Percentage gained by Republican candidate	+0.39 [12]	+0.02 [31]	−1.02 [4]

the way in which a precinct exceeded or fell short of its estimated vote. If we add some of the more effective precinct committeemen characteristics together to form an overall index of the "goodness" of precinct workers, we may see how much a "good" party worker is worth to his party. In Table 9 we see that for both the Democrats and the Republicans the difference between "good" and "poor" committeemen is about four per cent.

These findings provide important clues concerning the ways in which party organizations, through their grass roots representatives, may affect the popular vote. The effective party worker is one who is imbedded in the social life of the area he serves. He knows personally many of the residents, is similar to them in group memberships, and actively seeks to reinforce the bonds of acquaintance and friendship in the interim between elections and especially at election times. From our qualitative interviews with precinct committeemen and observation of these individuals in action, we have learned that the *content* of the contacts with voters need not necessarily be primarily political. Run-of-the-mill contacts, built up into a relationship of trust, provide channels for the influence of party headquarters to be felt on the precinct level.

THE JOINT PERFORMANCE OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEEMEN

Since the two parties are working at cross-purposes, we consider the effect of a committeeman's activities under two different conditions: when his counterpart in the competing party is active, and when he is relatively inactive. Table 10 shows how a precinct committeeman's effectiveness is influenced by the activities of his opposite number in the precinct.

Questionnaires are available from both Democratic and Republican committeemen for only 37 of the 74 precincts. When we subdivide these precincts further according to the patterns of activity of both party workers in each precinct, the number of cases in each cell becomes distressingly small, and hence the cell entries in Table 10 cannot be considered very reliable.

TABLE 8.* *Government Employment and Gain in the Democratic Vote*

	Employed by Local Government	Not Employed by Local Government
Percentage gained by Democratic candidate	+1.45 [18]	−1.02 [39]

* Democratic committeemen only.

Nevertheless, some patterns emerge. The Democratic candidate gains most when his party worker is active and his opponent's is inactive. When both are active, the Republican candidate seems to gain a slight edge, such precincts showing, on the average, about one per cent greater Republican vote than estimated.

Surprisingly, those precincts where the Republican candidate gains the most votes (above what was estimated for the precinct) are not those where the Republican committeeman is

active and his Democratic counterpart inactive, but where *both* party workers are inactive. Although a number of additional factors have been added to Table 10 in an effort to locate the source of this anomalous finding, the small number of precincts involved effectively frustrated further cross-tabulation. Whatever the ultimate explanation, this finding points up the complex way in which party activity interacts with the characteristics of a precinct.[10]

Conclusions

On the substantive side, the research reported here documents the extent to which the grass roots activities of political parties affects the votes received by its candidates. We have seen that the increment to a party from the best, as compared with the worst, precinct workers amounted to about 5 per cent in the 1956 presidential election in the midwestern industrial city studied. The result further documents the "folk" knowledge of the political practitioner and what has also emerged from the studies of individual voters — namely, the efficacy of face-to-face interpersonal contacts as influences on voting behavior. Precinct captains who were well integrated into the social milieus of their precincts were the most effective workers for their parties.

It should be borne in mind that the analysis presented here refers only to a presidential election where the roles played by the mass media on the supra-local levels can be expected to be at a maximum. Analyses presently under way on state and local primaries and elections indicate that the importance of the party organization is much stronger in such contests. These results will be given in future reports.

On the methodological side, the study presents a technique for relating measures of party activity to the popular vote by an analysis which makes use of both ecological and survey data. The technique further makes it possible to study the effects of party activity relatively uncontaminated by the effects of the sociological characteristics of precincts. The systematic study of political parties and how they function is brought closer to realization.

Although the present application of the technique is to the study of political behavior, the technique is not limited to this subject. Any phenomenon which has an areal distribution and is the province of some organized action may be studied in the same way. For example,

[10] It may also be noted from the cell frequencies in Table 10 that there is an overall positive relationship between the activities of the two parties. Both parties tend to be active or inactive in the same precincts.

Table 9. *Performance Ratings of Precinct Committeemen and Gain in Party Vote*

A. Democratic Committeemen

	Performance Scores*			
	+4 or better	+3 or +2	+1, 0, or −1	−2 or worse
Percentage gained by Democratic candidate	+2.34 [8]	−0.20 [14]	−0.52 [28]	−1.61 [8]

B. Republican Committeemen

	Performance Scores*			
	+4 or better	+3 or +2	+1, 0, or −1	−2 or worse
Percentage gained by Republican candidate	+1.44 [3]	+0.99 [12]	+0.05 [26]	−2.67 [6]

* Scores were constructed by giving a precinct committeeman a +1 for each of five items if his answer was in the direction of a "good" performance, a zero if no answer, and a −1 if the answer was in the direction of a "poor" response. For Democrats, the five items were daily contact within the precinct, party partisanship, time spent as committeeman between elections, evaluation of "party support" in the last election, and whether or not he was employed by local government. For Republicans, the last item was necessarily replaced by an attitude question on the role of the committeeman.

the efficacy of police methods, primary schools, social work agencies, and the like may be studied by employing research designs similar to the one employed here. It is in this last extended sense that this research report is presented as a general contribution to the growing body of techniques for the study of large-scale organizations.

TABLE 10. *Joint Performance of Democratic and Republican Committeemen and Gain in Party Vote*

	Precinct Committeemen Activity			
	High Demo. Low Rep.	High Demo. High Rep.	Low Demo. Low Rep.	Low Demo. High Rep.
Percentage gained by Democratic candidate	+3.88 [7]	- 0.91 [16]	−2.63 [6]	−1.58 [8]

* Democratic and Republican committeemen scoring +1 or better on the performance ratings (see Table 9) were assigned to the "high" group; committeemen with a score of 0 or less were put in the "low" group.

8

Policy Formation and Political Research

Critics are fond of casting behavioral science upon the horns of a dilemma. Social scientists must choose, they say, between precise examinations of the trivial and vague speculations about the important questions of the day. The values of the scientific commitment are such, critics argue, as to lead naturally to the counting of manhole covers while the world crashes about our ears.

This criticism puts social scientists in the position of the man who was asked by the Angel of Death whether he wanted to go to heaven or hell. "Neither one," he replied. "I want to stay right here." Like many either-or propositions, the choice between relevance and elegance is a false one. In social science we have bad research about unimportant matters — not just about matters of significance, as some critics seem to be claiming. They would probably be even more surprised to learn that once in a while good research is done on topics of immediate policy significance, as we hope the readings of this chapter will indicate.

It is possible to speculate on reasons why some people believe that good social science research is likely to have few policy payoffs. On the whole, social and political problems loom very large to the average intelligent citizen. What to do about world peace? Juvenile delinquency? Slums? The social scientist has not yet come forward with unequivocal answers. He is in the habit of redefining problems down to manageable size, and in so doing he is likely to lose the attention and the admiration of his lay audiences. People are also suspicious of arcane language when applied to everyday phenomena that they read about in the newspapers. And, finally, as in all disciplines where free discourse is permitted, experts may disagree in their recommendations. When this happens, non-experts are less likely to try to follow the reasoning of each side than to throw up their hands and put a pox on everybody in the vicinity.

In some ways the general public asks a good deal more of its social scientists

than it does of its doctors and physicists: and it is dismayed when social scientists — who have in the short lives of their sciences accumulated much less theory and have many fewer dollars to test theories and attract talented recruits — fail to deliver the goods.

In asking the general public to be patient we are not asking to be ignored. There is, after all, also an underlying reason why good social science should have human significance. The tests of good science are its theoretical articulation and its capacity to predict real-world behavior. Social science, dealing as it does with patterns and regularities of human behavior as its primary subject matter, can not help but to have something of recognizable human meaning to say from time to time.

At this stage of its development, what can we reasonably expect social science to tell us about our political problems? The readings in this chapter give a fairly wide-ranging sample of some of the ways in which social science can aid policy formation.

Harold Lasswell has for many years been the major advocate among social scientists of the proposition that social sciences can help policy-makers. We reprint his eloquent presidential address to the American Political Science Association in which he discusses the possible social consequences of scientific progress in the years ahead.

Lasswell suggests that social scientists, equipped with appropriate "developmental constructs" — or theories projecting present trends into the future — can help to fix the attention of policy-makers on a wider range of alternatives than they are accustomed to considering. Often in the nature of events the necessity for choice overtakes policy-makers with an unexpected suddenness which saps creativity in decision-making; hence the duality of the role of the policy scientist as anticipator of decisions and as creator of feasible alternatives which might otherwise not be considered by policy-makers.

Lasswell's widely misunderstood allusion to the decision to drop the atom bomb on Hiroshima should be placed in the context of the argument. Clearly, he is not blaming the overburdened decision-maker for failing to consider the alternative of dropping the bomb on an uninhabited atoll when he says "we left the minds of one decision-maker flagrantly unprepared to meet the crisis precipitated by the bomb." Rather, Lasswell is suggesting that the invention and communication of such an alternative might have been within the competence of social scientists had they been invited to join the statesmen, military strategists, and physicists who actually were consulted on this occasion and perhaps on many others. The "experts" were in fact not expert in the fields of knowledge most relevant to the choice that had to be made.

Lasswell's essay can also be read as an answer to a dilemma much in the minds of those who act as brokers of knowledge to policy-makers.[1] In particular, the British novelist and public servant, C. P. Snow, has called attention to the tremendous increase in the importance of science to governmental decisions. Yet governmental

[1] See Max F. Millikan, "Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action," *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences*, ed. by Daniel Lerner, (New York: Meridan Books), 1959, pp. 158–180; C. P. Snow, *Science and Government* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961); C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures & the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959).

decision-makers are for the most part ignorant of science, owing to the increasing specialization of intellectual life, and what could be termed the "inadequate" educational backgrounds of public servants. The result is that political leaders, whose responsibilities now include making choices about which scientific programs their governments will support, must depend on advice whose worth they are not well qualified to assess.

Lasswell takes the position that the creation and assessment of political alternatives is itself an activity for experts. No one argues that ignorance of science is better than knowledge, other things being equal, but other things are not equal. The time and effort politicians would have to spend learning elementary physics could also be spent learning how to get what politicians need to know from the physicists about governmental decisions that will have to be made. This latter field is the specialty of the policy scientist. It is a truism that *how* to build bombs is physics and engineering, *whether* to build them is politics. It may be that the argument in favor of politicians learning more physics rests on a confusion between the "how" and the "whether" questions.

In fact, one of the most intriguing problems the policy-maker faces is the problem of choosing which mixture of scientific programs to back when all alternatives appear to be about equally feasible. The real value of competent scientific advice seems to us to consist in screening out hare-brained schemes. Snow points to at least one instance where this sifting process did not take place. One supposes lapses of this kind could occur no matter what administrative machinery one employed. In selecting among feasible projects one can hardly make choices on purely technical grounds; rather "political" considerations relating to the kinds of outcomes one prefers enter in. "Expert" advice in this setting consists of clarifying alternatives for policy makers in terms of their political impacts.

Harvey Wheeler adds another dimension to the relations between policy experts and politicians. He points out that politicians sometimes use experts as political weapons. The experts in turn are often expected to come up with the "right" conclusions — i.e., the conclusions the politician has already reached. The purpose of the policy scientist in this setting is window dressing. He lends a spurious aura of "scientific" rectitude to the choice that has already been made.

There is no sense denying that experts often get used in this way. But it may be that Wheeler has told his story in such a way as to minimize his own effectiveness. For it appears that in many instances, experts can change the minds of the people who hired them. Expert presidential advisors on science and economics, for example, are normally expected to provide "scientific" rationalizations for presidential policies.[2] Yet these advisors also are in strategic positions to change governmental policy by casting up new alternatives to the President and by modulating the degree of enthusiasm with which they defend presidential policies in public and before Congress. This in turn can be exploited by alert publics.

It is not uncommon for experts to "capture" politicians, in a reversal of what

[2] See Bertram M. Gross and John P. Lewis, "The President's Economic Staff During the Truman Administration," *American Political Science Review*, 48 (March, 1954), pp. 114–130, and Warren Cikens, "The Council of Economic Advisors: Political Economy at the Crossroads," *Public Policy* IV (1953), pp. 94–115, and items cited therein.

happened to Wheeler. Snow claims that Cherwell ensnared Churchill, for example, and it can be argued that the science policies of the Eisenhower administration were significantly affected by the thinking of men like Edward Teller to the exclusion of men like Robert Oppenheimer. A case can be made for the proposition that those experts who "fronted" for the scientific policies of the Eisenhower administration created these policies themselves.

A rather amusing instance of captivity by "experts" was the argument a number of years ago by Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois that the electoral college should be abolished. It later became clear to Senator Douglas (himself an expert at economics) that the abolition of the electoral college would work a severe hardship on the voters in populous two-party states such as Illinois. During the Senator's abolitionist period he had been sold a bill of goods by "experts" advocating "good government."

It seems sensible, then, to question the generality of Wheeler's indictment. Often politicians seem genuinely interested in having "experts" define their problems for them, and suggest solutions. There is on the other hand a danger that "improvements" of dubious value will be suggested by political "experts." The political naiveté of such proposals is often recognized by politicians, who mistakenly suppose that there is some occult "scientific" rationale for their appearance in advisory reports.

The Lasswell and Wheeler articles together discuss one of the major concerns of policy scientists. Policy scientists want to make their knowledge and expertise available to political decision makers in part for extremely high-minded reasons. Many policy scientists feel that they can contribute to intelligent policy-making in democratic society, and that the health of democratic society depends at least in part upon the intelligent choices of its leaders. Thus many American policy scientists seek to enlist their scientific knowledge in behalf of human dignity and the open society. Lasswell and Wheeler are exploring the conditions under which they feel policy scientists can be helpful, and are suggesting the range of problems and possibilities to be found in the relations of policy-makers and policy scientists, given the different norms, constraints, demands and expectations typifying the positions of each.

Just as policy science can help in the production of alternatives, it can also help in the reduction thereof. Three examples are given in the readings. Edward C. Banfield addresses himself to a policy alternative widely recommended as a solution to various problems of urban life: the creation of consolidated metropolitan governments. The arguments for such a scheme have normally stressed the virtues of administrative tidiness: economies of scale in purchasing of supplies and in the use of capital equipment; no "confusion" of jurisdictions making for an inattentive, disillusioned electorate; no area is inadvertently excluded from coverage by municipal services.

Banfield indicates some other probable consequences of the metropolitan government proposal. His analysis is "scientific" in the sense that both those who favor and those who oppose metropolitan government would have to grant the factual grounds for the conclusion. They might disagree with his forecast that most communities would turn down metropolitan government if it were offered to them, but

both sides would probably agree that it is quite common for racial and partisan concentrations to coincide with political divisions. Where these lines do coincide, opposition to consolidated government from the people most likely to be outnumbered would be intense. This casts the policy proposal in a new, somewhat less euphoric light.

Polsby's article is addressed retrospectively to Washington policy-makers. He attempts to clarify the factual premises for their almost unanimous decision to give ground before the extravagant demands of Senator Joseph McCarthy for power over certain policies of the Executive Branch of the government. The discovery that McCarthy was largely a paper tiger is an important one, because of the continued persistence of the notion that he was in fact very powerful at the grass roots. It may be too late to change anybody's mind about McCarthy, but it is perhaps not too late to consider the consequences of a finding like this one for the alleged "right wing revival" in this country. Are the supporters of the right wing as strong as the newspapers and magazines are saying, or as weak as this analysis suggests? Perhaps an answer is possible once the question is raised, even though the analysis is done on old news.

Where Wheeler seems unduly pessimistic about changing politician's minds, Polsby seems overly optimistic. He stops short of asserting that McCarthy *would* have been curbed had information such as he presents been widely available. Nonetheless, Polsby underplays the demoralizing effects of uncertainty on Washington politicians. No one *knew* for sure how McCarthy was affecting the people back home. Even if they had interpreted the Benton defeat correctly, it seems unlikely that many politicians would have cared to tangle with McCarthy.

Wildavsky examines the relation between having a Catholic on the ticket and the ensuing "Catholic vote." He finds on the basis of election statistics updated to 1960 that the size and maneuverability of the Catholic "bloc" vote has been greatly exaggerated. One of the central propositions in the folk wisdom of the practical politician has never been adequately tested in a presidential election, according to Wildavsky's analysis.

These three essays display in common a second major concern of policy scientists. They are engaged in clarifying the factual premises of choices which political leaders and sometimes voters must make in the real world. Much of the time, politicians must make choices based on extremely rough estimates of gains and costs. Often, as these articles attest, policy science can reduce the amount of guesswork they employ.

A third major contribution of policy science is indicated by the George and Javits articles. In these essays, specific techniques developed by social scientists as aids in answering the questions they ask of the world are used by political leaders for the purpose of helping them act with greater effectiveness. In both instances, social scientists provided political leaders with complex sensory apparatus. In the case of the then Representative Javits, one of the first privately commissioned public opinion polls was used to discover how well and in what ways he was "getting through" to his constituents. Nowadays, of course, the use of such polls by political leaders is commonplace.

Alexander George describes a much more ambitious project, in which the activi-

ties and intentions of the German government during World War II were inferred with great success solely from Nazi propaganda broadcasts. The usefulness of hypotheses about German behavior developed from this source would have been much improved, of course, if repeated tests of reliability could have been applied promptly. As it was, policy makers did not place great confidence in the results of the propaganda survey, though George's analysis indicates that such confidence was merited.

The final selection by Morton Grodzins represents a fourth major concern of policy scientists. The previous readings in this section worked within a framework provided by current or prospective problems as defined by political actors. There is also a sense in which policy scientists can draw the attention of political actors to social problems which the scientist defines as important. In this case, the policy goals to be pursued are set by the scientist as a citizen. Here the policy scientist uses value-free techniques in aid of his own rather than someone else's norms.

By illustrating four aspects of policy science, we do not mean to imply that other possibilities could not be named. The aspects we have illustrated are in fact neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive categories, but for present purposes we would call attention to: (1) policy science as the anticipation of upcoming decisions and invention of alternatives for decision makers, (2) policy science as the clarification of the logical and factual bases for choice, (3) policy science as the creation and manipulation of special techniques for data collection, and (4) policy science as the identification of new political problems and redefinition of old ones.

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THE POLITICAL SCIENCE OF SCIENCE

An Inquiry into the Possible Reconciliation of Mastery and Freedom

• HAROLD D. LASSWELL

My intention is to consider political science as a discipline and as a profession in relation to the impact of the physical and biological sciences and of engineering upon the life of man. I propose to inquire into the possible reconciliation of man's mastery over Nature with freedom, the overriding goal of policy in our body politic.

I. Political Science and Armament

It is trite to acknowledge that for years we have lived in the afterglow of a mushroom cloud and in the midst of an arms race of unprecedented gravity. Here I shall support a proposition that may at first evoke some incredulous exclamations. The proposition is that our intellectual tools have been sufficiently sharp to enable political scientists to make a largely correct appraisal of the consequences of unconventional weapons for world politics.

We have correctly understood the strength of the factors that perpetuate a feeble international order even in the face of recent technoscientific developments. The traditional tools at our disposal for the analysis of politics prepare us to regard a voluntary relinquishment of power as much less likely than efforts to

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perpetuate power. In a divided world it is not surprising to find that more elites expect to be in a better position by continuing the current system than by taking the risks involved in consenting to a new structure of power. But we have not dismissed as altogether hopeless the prospects of a more perfect union, achieved by measures short of general war. On the occasions when power is relinquished those who make the seeming sacrifice actually expect to be better off eventually in terms of power (and other values) than if they fail to pay the price.

For at times voluntary confederation, federation or integration does take place. Steps toward unity occur when elites perceive an external threat or obstacle to the preservation or fuller realization of commonly interpreted values. It occurs when elites perceive a common internal threat or obstacle. When atomic weapons appeared on the scene it required no great acumen to see that they were introduced under circumstances in which factors of division were heavily loaded against factors favoring a new structure of unity. Nuclear weapons were introduced unilaterally by one member of a wartime coalition. It is noteworthy that the innovating member did not feel sufficiently bound to allied and associated powers to share the new weapons with the coalition. When the enemy was defeated incentives to share were reduced. They were further reduced by the estrangement that promptly set in to separate the partners in a coalition that had been unable to achieve a high level of trust and cooperation even under the provocation of war.

It was easy to recognize that the active political elite of the largest potential rival of the United States had more inducements to procrastinate than to make the immediate sacrifices that would have been necessary for a global system of security. Moscow leaders were not faced by an ultimatum, but by an inspection proposal that in the beginning would undoubtedly have laid bare the full depth of Soviet weakness and disunity. The immediate burden of sacrifice would have fallen upon one side; what was missing was a means of equalizing the cost throughout the whole course of the proposed arrangement. Moscow had no grounds for believing that the decision makers of the outside world viewed them or their ideology or their technique with such benevolence that any visible vulnerability would remain unexploited. Certainly the annihilation of mankind seemed remote and hypothetical when compared with the deprivations likely to follow at once the formation of a new international structure.

It was no necessary part of the analysis to assume that leading Soviet figures loved war (after the manner of Ghenghis Khan and other nomadic "shepherds of men"). We understood that it would be political suicide for individual leaders on either side to propose full unilateral disarmament by their own government, or even to champion a ceiling or a method of arms reduction that would be regarded by colleagues or constituencies as unfavorable to continuing independence.

Nor was it part of the analysis to assume that individuals are fully conscious of the values that influence their judgment and that the thrust of unconscious factors is toward voluntary union. So far at least as the upper levels of an active elite are concerned it is implausible to suggest that continuing uncertainty will generate unconscious factors making for trust in the benevolence and good faith of alien leaders. The evidence seems to support that contrary view that protracted insecurity renders it easy to perceive the "Other" as malevolent and devious. Hence the tendency is toward the perpetuation of seeming autonomy rather than in the direction of constructing a more inclusive system of public order.

We knew that the decision process of a body politic is to be understood as a complex and relatively stable network of communication and collaboration. A system acts to sustain rather than to revolutionize its own structure. This harmonizes with the fact that more acts must be repetitive than innovative if a system is stable. More specifically, structural stability is favored by the entrapment of each individual in a limited segment of the whole. The official or unofficial role of a participant determines what is available to his focus of attention, and with whom he may communicate or collaborate. The perspectives of a participant are the result of previous experience in the position, and in the sequence of positions through which he has passed. The playing of any role modifies predispositions by rewarding an act with value indulgences or by imposing value deprivations. As a strategy of maintaining and improving their net value position, individuals

continually make and unmake coalitions of an explicit or tacit character. Enough information has long been available to show a qualified observer that the private coalitions upon which members of the Soviet or U. S. elite depend for personal advancement are coalitions whose effect is to sustain rather than to supersede a divided world. Obviously the coalitions entered into by top officers in the Red Army, Navy and Air Forces are not made with Americans; and *vice versa*. Nor do the corresponding coalitions of top diplomats, civil officials, or party officials cut across the intervening zone.

There are, political scientists know, typical situations in which active elite elements have expected to benefit by means of a more perfect union. Ruling families have intermarried. Today this institutional presupposition is missing; the top men of the USSR or the USA are not dynastic heads. It is a frail reed indeed to rely upon the hope that a Moscow-Hollywood fusion of infatuated youngsters or calculating oldsters will banish the perils of nuclear fission or fusion. Some historic unifications have been the outcome of duels between appointed champions in the manner of David and Goliath. This institutional predisposition is also missing. No one seriously expects to stake the issue of unity upon two doughty pilots armed with jets, or two teams of missile men lobbing away at one another in the South Seas. We also take note of the fact that thus far we have been unable to rely upon the appearance of an external group capable of being perceived as a common threat. The U.F.O., the unidentified flying objects, have not as yet been shown to be intelligence eyes of another planet against whom we may conceivably combine.

I have been indicating how the tools of the profession provided us with categories, propositions and cases adequate to the task of assessing the probable result of the appearance of unconventional weapons. These tools were, in fact, so used. I do not assert that all members of the profession refrained from adding to the lamentations that arose as this or that circle of humanity awoke to the poignancy of the fact that the planet is moving toward apparent doom. Limited catharsis has often been obtained by railing at the stupidity or malevolence of world elites for failing to bring the current nightmare to a peaceful end. Some among us found a measure of private satisfaction in the discovery of fresh evidence of the depravity of man and turned for consolation to the transempirical doctrines provided by one or another of the theological and metaphysical traditions of mankind. We need not deprecate these personal solutions so long as it is clear that they are not the distinctive roles for which our profession has sought to equip its members.

To assert that political scientists had tools that enabled us to assess a major development correctly is not to say that we are complacent about our part in the story of nuclear weapons. There is always a gap between fundamental theory and the data required to see how theoretical models explain or fail to explain specific configurations. As private scholars political scientists did not always have access to official information; and even when playing an official role a political scientist was not always shown every significant report in the possession of the government. Such limitations go beyond our responsibility as a profession. We must however assume responsibility for any limitation of theory or procedure that prevented us from making full use of every opportunity open to us.

I have been implying that it is possible to interpret our traditional body of theory as giving full recognition to the contextual character of politics. The classical literature made plain that specialized institutions of community-wide action are part of, and interact with, all institutions of the community, all personalities, all institutional and personal patterns in the surrounding world, and with the physical and biological environment. Modern logical technique has made it more apparent than it was formerly that the intellectual task before us is not the discovery of a small number of new fundamental categories with which to designate the context of interaction. Rather, it is apparent that all comprehensive systems are formally equivalent (hence interchangeable) at corresponding levels of abstraction (and regardless of possible differences in the number of key terms employed at each level). The inference is that within a rich intellectual tradition the most significant task is to construct a continuing institutional activity by which central theory is related continuously to events as they unfold. The fundamental categories are retained as constant features of a frame of reference elaborated and employed to delineate the contours

of observational fields. The relevant context is the world political process as a whole.

The limited degree of success achieved by the profession in perfecting or in encouraging the body politic to perfect such an institutional process had adverse consequences for our role in regard to nuclear weapons. Long before atomic weapons were introduced we were well aware of the importance of scientific knowledge for the technology of fighting. But we did not correctly anticipate the approximate timing of the impact of nuclear physics upon military technology. Although we were equipped to assess the political consequences of sudden and stupendous increases of fighting effectiveness we did not foresee that such an emergent was imminent. Since technical developments were not explicitly anticipated we did not clarify in advance the main policy alternatives open to decision makers in this country or elsewhere. We did not create a literature or a body of oral analysis that seriously anticipated these issues. As political scientists we should have anticipated fully both the bomb and the significant problems of policy that came with it.

I do not want to create the impression that all would have been well if we had been better political scientists, and that we must bear upon our puny shoulders the burden of culpability for the situation of the world today. We are not so grandiose as to magnify our role or our responsibility beyond all proportion. Yet I cannot refrain from acknowledging, as I look back, that we left the minds of our decision makers flagrantly unprepared to meet the crisis precipitated by the bomb. I have no desire to hold a kangaroo court on President Truman's momentous decision or upon his principal advisers; or to give credence to the insinuation that "results" had become necessary in the face of Congressional restiveness about the cost of research and development. In the light of hindsight (that should have been foresight) I want to underline the probability that the new weapon was introduced in a manner that contributed unnecessarily to world insecurity. Perhaps the critics are right who say that the bomb should have been demonstrated on an uninhabited island before the live drops were made on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. More important is the question of how formal and effective control might have been extended beyond the decision makers of a single power. At least some members of the winning coalition might wisely have been brought into a system that operated through a common agency of inspection and direction.

Plainly there were not enough political scientists trained in physics, or sufficiently aware of the implication of impending scientific developments, to do much forward thinking and planning. This points to a failure of professional recruitment and training, and calls in question the then-prevailing conception of the political scientist's role. As a profession we are concerned with aggregate processes. It is not our job to supply the working politician with what he knows already, namely a bag of electoral and other manipulative tricks. Our distinctive perspective is not that of a trickster although we must be familiar with the trickster's outlook and his repertory if we are to assess the causes and consequences of his way of doing business for the decision process as a whole in any context. Nor is our role limited to reiterating and celebrating the ideal aspirations of the body politic, and exhibiting how value goals can be derived from fundamental postulates and principles. It is not exhausted by reporting historical sequences to be found in the rise, diffusion and restriction of myth and technique; or even by the formalization and verification of descriptive models of a scientific character. Part of our role, as the venerable metaphor has it, is scanning the horizon of the unfolding future with a view to defining in advance the probable import of what is foreseeable for the navigators of the Ship of State. It is our responsibility to flagellate our minds toward creativity, toward bringing into the stream of emerging events conceptions of future strategy that, if adopted, will increase the probability that ideal aspirations will be more approximately realized.

An implication for our future relation to science and armament is that we need to develop more political scientists who have the competence to infer the weapon implications of science and technology. It then becomes possible to anticipate the implications for collective policy.

Even a moderate degree of cross-disciplinary training or continuing contact should have enabled us to prepare for the advent of nuclear fission (and fusion). The *Review of Modern*

Physics carried an article by Louis Turner of Princeton University in January, 1940, in which 133 papers were appraised. They began with Fermi's original report of 1934 and came down to the Hahn-Strassman-Meitner researches which made explicit the import of Fermi's original experiment. In passing it may be noted that the contributions of a dozen nations were catalogued in Turner's review. Not more than half a dozen of the 133 papers were by American authors. Perhaps American political scientists may be partially absolved for lack of foresight under these circumstances. But the overall record of the profession is not thereby improved, since I do not find that colleagues in other countries were any more in touch than we were. Incidentally, it is worth recording that a standard college textbook in physics included a chapter in which the implications of current research were clearly spelled out. Ernest Pollard of Yale University referred in 1940 to the possibility of nuclear reactors that might generate electrical power or detonate as immensely destructive bombs; or that might produce radioactive substances for research and industrial processes or for a new and frightful kind of chemical warfare. I note further that at the time of the Fermi-Dunning experiment at the Columbia University cyclotron in early 1939 some science writers (especially of the New York *Times*) were quite definite about what was at stake.

Today in assessing the years ahead we need solid bases of inference about the degree to which the cost of producing unconventional weapons can be cut. Is it probable that the elites of intermediate powers will soon have at their disposal instruments capable of doing enough damage to outside powers to exert a strong deterrent effect? If so, the destiny of intermediate powers will be less grim than it has appeared to be in the recent past. If the drift toward bipolarity is reduced, there will be less hypocrisy or desperation among the elites of intermediate powers in clanging the cymbals of national loyalty in public while they readjust private family, business and political affairs in the light of the contingency that one or the other pole will dominate the globe.

It is important to estimate the likelihood that the instruments of defense can regain ground they have lost in recent times. In what period of time (if at all) is it probable that manned or unmanned flying objects can be harmlessly destroyed before they are on target? Is there any prospect that new knowledge may be used in a few years to seal off great areas of the globe behind impenetrable "energy" shells? This would open the not altogether uninviting possibility that disagreeable sectors of the globe may be sealed over and left to their own devices much as small boys put dishpans over snake pits or gopher holes.

In many ways the most disturbing result of the laggard position of political scientists in comprehending science and technology is that we have displayed no intellectual initiative in furnishing guidance to those who are in command of modern knowledge and its instrumentalities. Alert businessmen have long been on the lookout for promising applications in the marketplace. The professional military man is now accustomed to take the initiative. The question for us as political scientists is whether we have given enough serious attention to the task of reducing the human cost of whatever violence we cannot dispense with.

As an exercise in this line of thought I invite you to use your imagination to ask what an instrument of coercion would look like that incapacitates without killing, mutilating or in any way imposing permanent incapacity. You and I will probably come up with the same answer: a gas or a drug or a beam that when applied will induce sleep or a similar state of suspension. We spent several billion dollars on A and H bombs; and it is commonly said, with some plausibility, that scientists and engineers give you what you pay for. Our suggestion (and I repeat an old proposal) is that we go down the alphabet to the P bomb, the "paralysis bomb." The technical difficulties in the way of paralyzing a city or a region are very great, given current means of delivering a concentrated gas. Possibly the instrument can be a "P beam," a paralyzing beam of sound or of some other kind capable of accomplishing the purpose.

Without being in the least committed to the specific devices referred to, I nevertheless assert that in the future we need not remain as passive as we have been in approaching the problem of harmonizing considerations of humanity with the use of whatever coercion cannot be avoided.

So far as ultra-weapons are concerned it is apparent that the polar powers have reached an impasse. If they keep on they will have the

capability of destroying one another several times over. Once would seem to be enough. (Diverting resources to blasting a grave assumes that it is not a common one.) The polar powers have a common affirmative interest in preventing the rise of an outlying gangster or maniac who might take advantage of the declining cost of nuclear weapons to hold up or gravely damage them both. It may be that workable policy proposals will emerge from concentrated study. For instance, in return for universal inspection of new installations the polar powers might be willing to contribute facilities and scientists to UN laboratories situated at intermediate points and devoted to research and development of new and fundamental scientific ideas. By providing for the possible exploitation of the results under collective auspices it may be possible to expedite the development of the UN into a genuine "third factor" that concurrently expresses an inclusive interest. (Senator Anderson of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has already declared in favor of any policy that holds promise of joint activities that "obsolesce" old weapons around which vested and sentimental interests are crystallized.)

Since we are aware of the unforeseeable timing of the many factors that may affect a resort to arms it is evident that rational policies on behalf of peaceful cooperation do not rely upon a single avenue of approach. Wise strategy appeals to as many potential pockets of motivation as possible by making continual use of tactical ingenuity in applying every instrument of policy (diplomatic, military, economic, ideological).

It is generally believed that peaceful cooperation can be most readily encouraged in the field of economic growth. And there are grounds for predicting that developments that impend in the technology of production will rival the leaps that have recently occurred in weapon technology. This brings me to the consideration of our relationship as political scientists to these potentialities. Although the devices that contribute to production may also be employed for destructive purposes, my present concern is with the affirmative uses of science.

II. Political Science and Production

Impending is control of weather and climate. As our knowledge of the upper atmosphere increases it will be obvious that the seeding of local cloud formations is a relatively trivial precursor of hemispheric global control. Impending is the solution of the problem of obtaining pure water at low cost from the sea for irrigation purposes. Taken in conjunction with newly available energy sources it is not too early to anticipate the reclamation of the wastelands of the earth — the deserts, the polar ice caps, the tropical rain forests, the mountains (levelled to productive plateaus). As J. G. Harrar has told us, the total solar energy that reaches the earth every 48 hours is approximately equal to all the known relatives of coal, petroleum and wood. Clearly the conversion of relatively minute amounts to usable form would meet the energy needs of future generations. Already enough progress has been made to indicate that in the immediate future many local power needs can be supplied more economically by solar energy than by nuclear installations.

As political scientists we are conscious of the implications if great resource changes are introduced into a divided world. Imagine that the arid areas inside the Soviet zone are populated with the density of the fertile districts. Suppose further that the non-Soviet world does away with the arid lands of the United States, Mexico and South America, the Sahara, and the Middle East. If these regions become as populous as the more habitable parts of the countries where they are located the population of the non-Soviet world will be increased relatively more than the Soviet area.

Think next of the tropical forests. If the tropical rain forests of Central and Northern South America, of Mid-Africa, of India and of Southeastern Asia are made fit for human life to the same degree as the more temperate regions near them the relative population of the non-Soviet world will appreciably increase.

If mountainous areas are transformed into plateaus, and the plateaus are populated to the density of neighboring areas, the population of the non-Soviet world will also sustain a relative rise.

We know that the political consequences of changes in population and energy production depend upon the impact of these developments upon the "threat value" or the "asset value" of the members of the world community to one another. We expect that the flow of capital and knowhow required to modernize production tends to conform the facts of economic

growth to the configurations that predominate in the arena of world politics. One alternative of policy is to mitigate or modify this tendency to pour the concrete of capital investment into the mould of a current power alignment. To what extent can this result be achieved by instituting multilateral control of great programs of reclamation in selected districts? Can the Sahara, for instance, be jointly developed? Since the ruling circles of a split world pursue different objectives in terms of social structure and ideology it is only feasible to think of even restricted programs of multilateral cooperation within the frame of an agreement in which are prescribed the permissible proportions between governmentalized and non-governmentalized operation to be preserved at successive stages of the project. Further, it will be essential to determine whether the program is intended to consolidate an existing national unity or to lay the foundation for a new nation (one drawn, for example, from widely varying ethnic sources; or from a single principal source of people and culture).

The factor of geographical dispersion has an important bearing upon our expectations. The sources of solar and atomic energy are more capable of being widely distributed than the sources exploited by a technology of fossil fuels like petroleum and coal. It is axiomatic that a decentralized pattern of access to energy provides a favorable resource base for a decentralized outlook, and that the perspectives comprising such an outlook sustain a decentralized network of policy formation and execution. If a reversal is to occur in the trend toward bipolarizing the world, and a pattern resembling the Great Power System of the last century is to revive, two conditions at least must be fulfilled: a network of strong, coordinate centers of energy production; and cheaper costs of producing the newer weapons.

I have been talking of the resources found in the wastelands or neglected opportunities on the surface of the continental blocs. We must take the fact into account that new resources are in prospect whether we look beneath or above the land surface of the earth. To begin with the seas: we shall learn to mine the waters for minerals and to farm the oceans for foodstuffs on a scale hitherto unthinkable. In regard to resources above the surface: we are close to the first experimental expeditions to the moon; and, presently the planets. In this setting the traditional questions that center around the control of air space take on new significance.

As specialists in public law it is not difficult for us to anticipate the form in which conflicting claims to these new resources are likely to be phrased. In connection with the seas those who push particular claims to the exclusive exploitation of a given region will talk in terms of "the territorial sea," "contiguous zones," "jurisdiction," and the "continental shelf." Nation states whose officials push particular claims to share in exploiting the resources of an area will invoke the "freedom of the seas" and other internationalizing concepts. The probing of the upper atmosphere, satellite launching, space platforms and the like will pose the problem of how to adjust claims to exclusive control of "air space" against claims to share control. As expeditions to the moon or the planets become more imminent the question of "who owns what" or "who controls what" will bring into the debate the authoritative language traditionally employed in connection with the acquisition of territory ("exploration," "occupation," "conquest" and other concepts emphasizing priority in time and effectiveness of control).

As clarifiers of the goals and alternatives implicit in a decision process and as advisers of the participants we have an opportunity to reduce the amount of unnecessary friction by establishing a frame of reference in advance of the facts. When factual details appear they will of course exhibit some novel elements; common goals and principles will not. The members of the world community have a long history of accommodating "exclusive" claims and "sharing" claims with one another (as new resources provide new base values for the participants in the world arena).

It is, of course, essential that in taking advantage of this opportunity we deal with the entire context of value goals and principles as they relate to potential facts. I have referred to sets of doctrines that in all probability will be invoked when claims are made. The chief function of these formulations is to guide the attention of decision makers to the context in which pertinent activities occur. Formulas assist in recognizing and evaluating the consequences for international public order of ac-

cepting the exclusive or the sharing claim in particular cases or categories of cases.

When we examine past trends in world history it is not difficult to recognize that shifts have occurred in the relative emphasis laid upon exclusive or sharing claims. Grotius was speaking for the Netherlands and for other challengers of the claims of Spain, Portugal and England to monopolize great stretches of the seas. Sweeping readjustments were made in doctrine and in its applications relating to the seas. At first they were mainly in the direction of consolidating an international order in which sharing claims were widely accepted ("freedom of the seas"). In recent decades the trend has been the other way. As my colleague Myres S. McDougal has shown in some detail, claims to the exclusive enjoyment of resources have been accepted as "reasonable" in the light of facts that have appeared in the course of applying science and technology. A recent tabulation shows that no more than thirteen states accept the ancient three-mile rule for the territorial sea. Forty-five states repudiate it in varying degree, claiming wider limits. Contiguous zones of many kinds have been accepted for the administration of customs, the security of neutral states against belligerent activities, fishing conservation, appropriation of the resources of the sea-bed and of the continental shelf.

When we think configuratively about the problems raised in reference to the new resources it is clear that instead of relying on blanket principles (like "freedom of the seas" or "freedom of the air") the most fruitful policy alternatives are likely to emerge when we anticipate the appearance of characteristic factual contexts, and consider how the values chiefly at stake in them can be maximized. Hence we would not expect to apply the same prescription (1) to the sharing of air space for weather observation (where equipment is used that is expressly designed for the purpose and perhaps registered, and when the information obtained is made public) and (2) to the sharing of air space for projects of weather or climate control that may be deleterious to local values.

The contextual (or, synonymously, the configurative) approach is a challenge to imagine the full range of possible means of anticipating and resolving difficulties. On the most uncertain matters it is appropriate to call attention to the need of exploring the possibilities of agreement in advance of conflict. The inference is that no time should be lost, for instance, in putting into the hands of the UN the facilities for research, development and operation of satellites, "space platforms" and travel beyond the limits of the earth's atmospheric and gravitational fields. Doubtless the USA and the USSR will continue to compete with independent programs. Since the polar powers have a stake in moderating the conflict in which they are engaged in the hope of eventual harmony through agreement, not catastrophe, a practical method would appear to be to strengthen the "third factor," especially when both powers are also included within it.

The rapid introduction of new resources under present conditions calls for some degree of community and regional planning; and planning poses thorny questions about the structure and ideology of society. To an increasing extent questions of this kind need to be answered directly rather than by default. It must be conceded that American political scientists are not especially well equipped to participate in the planning function on the scale required. Although we are accustomed to corroborate the classical authorities and the Founding Fathers in praise of the middle classes as contributory to popular institutions of government, we have not as a rule dealt with these traditional doctrines in significant ways. For instance, we have not explored the principles of proportion that are most likely to consolidate or to sustain at various stages of industrial growth the perspectives and operational technique of popular government. Shall we, for example, rely upon a 30–40–50 rule to guide public policy in regard to the permissible degree of market control permitted to private interests? (For example: When one interest has 30% control of output, shall it be subject to special regulations designed to nullify the side-effects of power that go along with economic control? When one interest rises to 40% shall we put governmentally appointed trustees on the Board of Directors? At 50% shall government trustees predominate?)

Whatever the workable rules of proportion may be in representative contexts it is evident that we need to guide our studies of trend correlation and of comparative cases in order to improve the available bases of inference in such matters.

The same approach — the search for rules of proportion — applies to every institutional and personality pattern in a body politic. What are the optimum proportions of community resources to devote to elementary, intermediate, advanced and ultra-advanced education? To research and development in science and technology? To positive and negative sanctions for correctional and other purposes?

One way to jar "cakes of custom" out of the mind is to draft specifications for the first Mayflower expedition to establish continuing occupation outside the earth. (Possibly it could be "Noah's Jet"?) What proportion of men, women and children of which culture or combination of earth cultures shall we select? What ideological traditions, secular and sacred? What class backgrounds (elite, mid-elite, mass)? What individual and group interests? What personality structures?

By asking questions of this kind we are in a position to assess our present stock of knowledge concerning the interdependence of institutions specialized to power, and all other institutions in the social process of any community, together with the forms of personality involved. These, of course, are the recurring issues of political science and historical interpretation as well as policy.

III. Political Science and Evolution

I have been referring to a few implications of science and technology for weapons and production, and sketching some political ramifications. As political scientists we are perhaps even less well prepared to anticipate developments in genetics, experimental embryology, and related disciplines. Taken together these fields signify that, as Julian Huxley has often put it, man is on the threshold of taking evolution into his own hands. By influencing the genes that constitute the key units in man's biological inheritance we affect the entire potential of future generations.

Important as recent innovations are in radioactivity I do not want to give more than passing notice to the dangers that they embody. The only feasible means of coping with these factors is by policies that avert war and preparation for war, and install proper precautions in the handling of high-energy radiation for other purposes.

Quite recently the dangers that arise from radioactivity have been authoritatively brought to public notice: all high energy radiation that reaches the gonads stimulates gene mutations; more than 99 per cent of all mutations are dangerous; genes can only be eliminated by the death of the gene carrier or by his incapacity to reproduce. Nearly two years ago H. J. Müller told us that the bomb tests since the war had already exposed the inhabitants of the earth to radioactivity comparable with that of the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the original explosions. He estimated that about 80,000 harmful mutations are involved and that "it will mean, in the end, several times this number of hampered lives."

It has been pointed out that perhaps the most satisfactory index of genetic damage is the sum of tangible defects existing among living individuals. We are speaking of such stigmata as "mental defects, epilepsy, congenital malformations, neuromuscular defects, hematological and endocrine defects, defects in vision or hearing, cutaneous and skeletal defects, or defects in the gastrointestinal or genitourinary tracts." We are informed that about 2 per cent of the live births in the United States have defects that are of "simple genetic origin and appear prior to sexual maturity." If mankind were subjected to a "double dosing" of radiation the present level of genetic defects would rise, and would eventually be doubled.

Regulatory measures are obviously needed against wars and weapon tests; and they are essential to the disposition of nuclear waste from industrial plants. (It has been remarked that a nuclear power plant is to be viewed as a large scale production of both highly poisonous gas and explosives under a single roof.)

The principal questions to which I desire to call attention pose issues of a relatively new and different order. Some of these questions have already come up in controversies over artificial insemination. They have embarrassed the champions of the orthodox prescriptions that prevail in several fields (theology, ethics, jurisprudence). Shall we call a child legitimate whose biological father is not identical with the sociological father? Even with the consent of the latter? With spermatozoa from a known or unknown source? (A possible international question is whether a nation state like the United States can claim the child as a citizen if the

spermatozoa employed originated with an American mail order house and was sent by air mail for use abroad.)

Poignant as these issues are in specific cases they do not confront us with the consequences for public order that are to be anticipated if the progress of biology separates insemination and child bearing from genital contact. The assumption is often made that the continuation of sexual rectitude and even civic order depends upon charging every genital contact with the blessings and perils of procreation. The impending improvement of oral contraceptives, joined with other recent advances, are factors that already suggest the wisdom of other norms and sanctions of public order.

Other developments are threatening current ratios of the influence and power of the sexes. Given the millions and millions of spermatozoa produced by one male and the technique of canning by refrigeration, any very large number of males becomes relatively redundant for purposes of procreation. Must the male rest his future upon other values such as the strictly aesthetic appeal of the male contour? Before the female of the species becomes too complacent in this context it may be worth recalling the significance of some current experiments for the removal of the primordial female function from the body and into other receptacles. (Women, too, may have to rely upon their charm, a role for which their experience has provided extensive preparation.)

Apparently we are closer than most of us like to think to the production of species that occupy an intermediate position between man and the lower animals (or even plants). It is sometimes said, even in august quarters, that "one has not yet succeeded in making a species from another species." Theodosius Dobzhansky notes, however, that "the feat of obtaining a new species was accomplished more than a quarter of a century ago." In recent decades a fair number of new species have been brought into being. It is also true that some species that exist in nature have been recreated experimentally. A garrison police regime fully cognizant of science and technology can, in all probability, eventually aspire to biologize the class and caste system by selective breeding and training. Such beings can, in effect, be sown and harvested for specialized garrison police services or for other chosen operations.

Great strides have been taken in brain design. Experimental models of robots have been built who solve problems of a rather complex order in a given environment. Some of these machines look after themselves to a degree, obtaining and using the raw materials required for energy and repairs. Already it is claimed that the function of reproducing its kind, and of interacting with others, can be in-built.

The question then rises: Given our concern for human dignity when do we wisely extend all or part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to these forms? When do we accept the humanoids — the species intermediate between lower species and man, and which may resemble us in physique as well as in the possession of an approximately equivalent central nervous and cortical system — as at least partial participants in the body politic? And at what point do we accept the incorporation of relatively self-perpetuating and mutually influencing "super-machines" or "ex-robots" as beings entitled to the policies expressed in the Universal Declaration?

It is obvious that we are not too well equipped by cultural tradition to cope with these problems. A trait of our civilization is the intense sentimentalization of superficial differences in the visible format of the groupings to be found even within the human species. Recall the theologians, ethicists and jurists who have devoted themselves to the elaboration of symbols to show that the white race alone is genuinely human and hence solely entitled to the dignity of freedom. Recall, too, the counter-assertions, nourished in the soil of humiliation, that have arisen among ethnic groups that seek to overcome their contempt for themselves by dragging down the pretensions of the white imperialist.

Let us recognize that the traditions of certain non-Western civilizations are in some ways better adapted to the problem than the Graeco-Roman and Judeo-Christian perspectives. They possess a relatively broad basis for identifying the primary ego of the individual with a self that includes more than strictly human species in the congregation of living forms. A world view that includes the possibility of reincarnation in lower animal shapes, for example, may prepare its devotees to empathize more readily with other than strictly human species and varieties. Even they, however, may have their

troubles with a mobile power plant in nearly human form.

The most disturbing question, perhaps, arises when we reflect upon the possibility that supergifted men, or even new species possessing superior talent, will emerge as a result of research and development by geneticists, embryologists or machine makers. In principle, it is not too difficult to imagine a superior form. For instance, our sensory equipment does not enable us to take note of dangerous radiation levels in the environment. We have no inborn chattering of a Geiger counter.

I spoke before of taking the intellectual initiative for the use of science and technology for the fuller realization of our value goals. It is plain that if we bring certain kinds of living forms into the world we may be introducing a biological elite capable of treating us in the manner in which imperial powers have so often treated the weak. A question is whether the cultivation of superior qualities ought to be limited to intellectual capability. The answer, I feel confident you will agree, is in the negative. We need to be sufficiently vigilant to prevent the turning loose on the world of a hyperintelligent species driven by an instinctual system especially inclined toward predation. The blood-stained story of our own species is only too familiar (the stories about succulent missionaries whose bodies were more readily incorporated than their messages are not wholly without foundation). Can we improve the prospects of developing a form of intelligent life copied not after our own image, but after the image of our nobler aspirations?

It is not to be overlooked that the problem of human capability can become acute if in the years ahead we escape from our present habitat on the earth, or are visited by other forms of intelligent life. There are, after all, untold millions of environments resembling our solar system, and it would be more remarkable to find that but one planet is inhabited by a complex living form than to encounter parallel developments. It would of course be embarrassing, at least, to discover that we are the savages or that we are put together on a markedly inferior biological plan.

IV. Our Future Program

The fact is that many of the problems to which I have been referring will be upon us long before we can make great changes in the ideological outlook or the socio-political patterns of life in this country or elsewhere. The same point applies to ourselves in our role as individuals and as members of the political science profession. Considering our present predispositions how can we improve the likelihood of contributing to the decision process at every level, from the neighborhood to the world as a whole?

It is abundantly clear that the impact of science and technology does not occur in a social vacuum, but in a context of human identifications, demands and expectations. I make the modest proposal that it is appropriate for political scientists, in company with other scientists and scholars dealing with human affairs, to improve our procedures of continuous deliberation upon the potential impacts of science and technology upon human affairs. No doubt the American Political Science Association and other professional societies constitute an appropriate network for the purpose. We can sustain continuing conferences devoted to the examination of emerging developments. As fellow professionals we have special responsibility for giving thought to the aggregate effects of any specific innovation.

Our first professional contribution, it appears, is to project a comprehensive image of the future for the purpose of indicating how our overriding goal values are likely to be affected if current policies continue.

A closely related contribution consists in clarifying the fundamental goal values of the body politic. We are accustomed to confront political ideologies with new factual contingencies and to suggest appropriate specific interpretations. We also confront political doctrines with rival doctrines, and with comprehensive theological and metaphysical systems. I have called attention to the point that the basic value systems of European civilization, in particular, are likely to be exposed to sweeping challenge as biology and engineering narrow the obvious differences between man and neighboring species, and between man and centrally operating machines. The crisis will be peculiarly sharp if we create or discover forms of life superior to man in intellect or instinctual predispositions. Our traditions have not been life-centered, but man-centered. We possess various paranoid-like traditions of being "chosen." Clearly a difficult task of modifying these egocentric perspectives lies ahead.

The third task is historical and scientific. It is historical in the sense that by mobilizing knowledge about the past we are enabled to recognize the appearance of new patterns and the diffusion or restriction of the old. It is scientific in the sense that we summarize the past in order to confirm (or disconfirm) propositions about the interplay of predisposition and environment. If we are to serve the aims of historic recognition and of scientific analysis, one of our professional responsibilities is to expedite the development of more perfect institutions specialized to continual self-observation on a global scale. Self-observation requires guidance by a system of theoretical models of the political process in which a continuing gradation is maintained between the most inclusive model and submodels adjusted to more limited contexts in time and space. Continual self-observation renders it necessary at each step through time to reevaluate the appropriateness of the operational indices for the variables and concepts employed at the most recent step. In this way all the concepts that figure in systematic, descriptive political science can be kept chronically pertinent to the ordering of political events as the future unfolds.

The fourth task is inventive and evaluative. It consists in originating policy alternatives by means of which goal values can be maximized. In estimating the likely occurrence of an event (or event category), it is essential to take into account the historical trends and the scientifically ascertained predispositions in the world arena or any pertinent part thereof.

The relationship of American political science to these tasks is in many ways unique. The typical department is a microcosm of the macrocosm of university faculties of the social sciences and humanities, and the school of law. It is no secret that a syndicate of philosophers, historians, behavioral scientists and public lawyers is capable of producing some degree of tension among themselves, especially when budgets are at stake. This has led to the suggestion that every component skill should be sent back where it came from — to the departments of philosophy, history, sociology and psychology, for example, and to the law school. In this way political science could be given back to the Indians. The catch is that we are not agreed who the Indians may be.

The present situation does make it possible for political scientists to take the lead in integrating rather than dividing our intellectual community. Compared with an entire university, which has become a non-communicating aggregate of experts, each department of political science can be a true center of integration where normative and descriptive frames of reference are simultaneously and continuously applied to the consideration of the policy issues confronting the body politic as a whole over the near, middle and distant ranges of time.

The profession is advantageously situated therefore to take the lead in a configurative approach to the decision process in society. Where it plays this part, political science is the policy science, *par excellence*. If the implications of science and technology are to be correctly appraised, it will be essential to recruit some trained personnel from such fields into political science, to improve the science-content of professional education, and to provide for continuing cooperation among the professions involved.

It is quite unnecessary for any one individual to emulate the universal ambitions of renaissance man. But if we are to take the lead in performing the configurative or matrix function it is quite essential for the profession as a whole to achieve the division of labor, the understanding and the insight capable of realizing as fully as possible the dream of relevant universality. Each of us can at least widen the boundaries of the self and open the way to identify with living forms that differ from traditional images. We can step toward the possible reconciliation of a growing mastery over Nature with the dignity of freedom for all that lives. In the congregation of living forms human life may come to play a yet more distinguished role in generations to come, a role that transcends even the vision of the commonwealth of man championed by the distinguished political scientist and statesman, the centennial of whose birth we take pride in according special commemoration this year.

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THE SHORT AND HAPPY LIFE OF A RESEARCH CONSULTANTSHIP

• HARVEY WHEELER

> All the expert has to do is to furnish whatever special knowledge the leader lacks and needs before he decides. The character and the amount of knowledge that is demanded of him is relative to what the leader himself is socially supposed to know and believes he knows; but in any case the leader alone determines what use he will make of the expert's knowledge to supplement his own.[1]

Even had I pondered deeply the meaning of this little passage by Znaniecki[1] and the section on "Technological Experts" which it introduces, I doubt if the sequence of events which marked my first brief experience as a research consultant would have been seriously altered. It may, however, provide amusement and perhaps even instruction for some of my equally virginal colleagues if I fill in the salient details of my own case history. It is a case which has the further function of documenting the situation Znaniecki was writing about.

I had received my initiation into the mysteries of political science in the accepted fashion and emerged certified as a journeyman. I, of course, did not see myself as an "expert," and especially not in the affairs of state government. However, I had studied diligently under two men whom I believe to be among that field's most illustrious adornments.

This was the period immediately after World War II. This meant that I had participated in the reaction against "chartism," scientific management, the short-ballot school, and a coterie of allied notions which suffered in the doldrums between the decline of "scientific administration" and the rise of mathematical approaches to Organization Theory. "Organization Man" had not yet arisen, nor had his theoretical rationale.

We postwar Ph.D. candidates confidently dismissed all of the old scientific administration doctrines as shibboliths. We cracked clever jokes about these woefully unsophisticated "legalisms" and "formalisms." The newer social science disciplines, we agreed, led to more realistic (or, as we put it, "fruitful") results than did the empiricism of the "man-hole cover counters." Politics, we agreed, was more revealing about the process of administration than was the "structural" literature of traditional Public Administration. Inevitably, Leonard White emerged as our scapegoat; the symbol of error. We were embarrassed for him. But magnanimously we agreed that he had served a useful function for a less perceptive age. All that was happily behind us.

Nor was all this mere second-hand erudition pirated from the creative younger faculty members. Most of us in that postwar graduate training period had previously been "administrators" of one sort or another. Or at least, we had tussled mightily with pathological military chartism — an especially virulent form of the disease. We had fought the good fight against chartism on the bureaucratic barricades before learning the new and exciting jargon of informal organization, group dynamics, and applied anthropology.

In our eyes it was the scientific management boys who were the academicians. We were the true realists, they were the "scholastics." We knew, we assured ourselves, whereof we spoke.

It was with this orientation that I became engaged a few years back in the preparation of a preliminary report on the office of governor. My report was to serve as orientation and in-

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[1] Florian Znaniecki, *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge*, New York: Columbia University Lectures, 1940, p. 47.

doctrination for a state reorganization commission.

A preliminary informal meeting was held at which the Commission looked me over. It was with at least partly open eyes that they decided to hire me for the job. The chairman of the Commission, an extremely able man who has since come to enjoy an illustrious national career, had the vague notion that there was something wrong with the average run of state reorganization studies. I beamed on him admiringly. He didn't know just why he was dissatisfied. He didn't know for certain what he wanted from his own Commission. But he did seem certain about not wanting a "slick Griffenhagen type of job." "I have no desire," he proclaimed in all candor, "to produce a pretty but ineffectual monument." I have since learned to interpret the non-Euclidian dimensions of such communications.

Other members of the Commission, it seemed to me, were clearer about what they wanted. The most frequent opinion that I could detect was the understandable desire that this was to be a "little Hoover Commission." With regard especially to the governor, the findings of the big Hoover Commission about the Presidency were assumed to be directly applicable.

Though I bridled instinctively at this suggestion, I was not in the beginning on top of the subject and could not at that first meeting marshal evidence one way or another about this notion, which was very popular with state reorganization commissions in the postwar period. However, I did express my initial scepticism about the comparability of the governorship and the presidency. Indeed, I expressed the general scepticism of the freshly minted scholar. Despite these few unremarked portents I was hired.

I set to work, after the manner of my training, to master the literature. For the governorship, this is no small undertaking, particularly as my scepticism had led to me to interpret the subject broadly, in an attempt to pin down the impression of inadequacy everyone seemed to have gathered from the work of the "reorganizers." This inadequacy was much more apparent ten years ago than it is now.

I began by inspecting the comparative biographic and career details of American governors. This led naturally into state politics and party systems. It was from this approach that I backed in to the subject of gubernatorial administration. At about the end of this latter project I hit on two excellent studies, then available only as Ph.D. dissertations. They were Coleman Ransone's *Office of Governor in the South* and Robert Wood's *The Metropolitan Governor*. The fact that they had not been published, of course, almost guaranteed their crucial significance, in the strange world of the research consultant.

These two studies were quite unusual for their time. Their authors had taken careful case studies of the occupational ailments of the American governor before attempting to prescribe for him. This, it seemed to me, was the sort of foundation on which reorganization proposals should be built. However, no sooner had this thought occurred than it also became apparent that my employers on the Commission might not agree.

Meanwhile, out of its own discussions the Commission itself began to achieve a clearer notion of its reorganizational purpose. Its purpose came to be the one of finding out "how to help the Governor do a better job of administering the business of the State." My Commission (and especially my subcommittee on the Office of Governor), in common with most other state commissions, was implicitly making the assumption that the governor would automatically be the kind of fellow who would want to do a better administrative job. "What the Governor needs," the statement ran that I was to hear more and more often, "is the proper executive and staff aids." I take it that this is still the cardinal tenet of the reorganization ideology.

All my evidence heaped doubt on this conclusion. The governors I had studied had seldom been "selected" for their administrative capacities. After selection they had seldom attempted to inaugurate "efficient administration." Those that tried had failed politically. In general, the governors I came to know showed little more than a Commencement Day concern about rigorously efficient state administration.

It is one thing to accomplish an end by furnishing tools to a man who is able and anxious to use them and awaits only your putting them into his hands before setting about the task. It is quite another thing to provide tools for a man who is unimpressed by the job to be done, unpersuaded of its legitimacy, untrained for its

accomplishment, and largely unfree to concern himself with it. Such a man will gladly accept the proffered tools. But the perverse use he makes of them should occasion little surprise when reorganizational post-audits officially bemoan the unfortunate degree to which administrative aids initially designed to promote efficiency, economy, and administrative oversight become applied, in the event, to promotional, public relations, or "political" purposes.

To my sceptisim about staff-aids there came to be added a second doubt. The more I investigated the more I questioned the validity of the assumption that the governor is the same as the Hoover Commission President, only smaller. I began to conclude that the governor is different from most other public officers in that with the decline of the old-fashioned urban bosses the governor inevitably had come to have a direct organizational relationship to grass-roots politics and a direct public relations contact with disorganized voting masses. Both of these relationships had been quite inconceivable in an earlier political era. Those who have remarked upon the trend toward gubernatorial assumption of the specially revised functions of the old-line political bosses seem correct. These direct party and mass mobilization functions placed upon the governor changed responsibilities and burdens. They were new situational coercions.

Furthermore, the governor's administrative position is much different from that of the Hoover Commission President. The governor is legally charged with the execution of vast highly technical services over which he has little or no policy-forming authority. Establishment of major policy outlines has been largely expropriated by Washington as an underwriter's fee for insuring the services in question. The degree to which the President actually "determines" federal policy is of course unimportant here. The point is that in the case of the governor, his policy-forming authority has been explicitly removed from many large areas of the state's most important business.

These two considerations — the governor's overriding concern with mass politics in the new party structure and his secondary relation to many of his administrative departments — led me to agree with those who doubt the validity of applying the Hoover Commission approach to the Office of Governor. He simply is not just a smaller Hoover Commission President. (Again, this is all aside from the independently important question of how accurate a picture the Hoover Commission portrayal of the President may be.) John Gaus once had written that "the States are in the middle" and the governor, it seemed to me, was essentially a middleman.

But to return to my Commission: it was assuming the opposite. Its members viewed the governor as a potentially scientific manager in an office similar to the Hoover Commission Presidency. Apart from the governor they made the further assumption that the principles of scientific management were directly applicable to state government.

So there I was, riding off in two directions at once, each of which was opposed to the course being charted by my Commission. I then began to take thought for the morrow. I had, I told myself, two problems. One was the problem of telling the truth as I saw it. I had applied the mysteries of my licensed art to the investigation of a problem and discovered "truth." Galileo had not been more conscience-torn than I. But I had the advantage. I knew about Galileo *and* politics. I understood the "political" problem that faced me in educating my Commission in order to get a receptive hearing for what were, in my eyes, demonstrable findings.

With this political aim in view I held several talks with Commission members to try to prepare the ground for some of the things I would be saying in the report. They seemed to go off reasonably well. With one crucial member I even left a copy of Ransone's study (by that time in print) in the hope that it might help clear the way for my own.

That hope proved false. Following the submission of my report comments that drifted back showed that I had failed politically, if not academically. The subcommittee chairman to whom I reported directly seemed the most favorable. His letter acknowledging receipt read in part:

> In a sphere of this nature, which often contains highly controversial political material, it may well be expected that there should be considerable disagreement with a great many of the conclusions reached. From a personal viewpoint, I dissent from many of the thoughts given, but there is no doubt that the report encompasses an immense amount of research, gives much valuable background material, serves as a fine basis for discussion, is interesting, and often brilliant. The sub-committee should profit greatly from this report.

Had I not tried explicitly to deal with the communications problem this would have been the most I could have expected. What I was being told, however, even in this kindly way, was that for all my painfully assembled evidence, most of my work was in the realm of "controversial politics" and personal "thoughts" and such things would obviously have to be discounted. The essence of my work would be ignored and all my attempts to ground proposals for reorganizing the governor's office in truly operational theory would have to be disregarded, and they were. I had accomplished nothing and from the viewpoint of the Commission my work was worthless. The Commission chairman who had originally cautioned me against what he had called a sterile Griffenhagen type report turned out in the end to be the most traditionally minded. Why? Why did I incur such an utter political failure with my Commission?

For one thing, accurate political analysis touches too close to real political power. And political power always resists its own reformation. I had insisted on talking about reorganization proposals in an operating political situation instead of in terms of the imaginary world of the reorganization ideology. This was a besetting sin, for my report clearly implied that if one really wanted to improve state government — if one really felt indignant about some of the excesses of "politicians" — it would be necessary to go deeper into political realities than tinkering with administrative machinery. But obviously this was what no reorganization commission could advocate.

I now think that most reorganization commissions realize this quite early in the game. They see that the basic evils of state government cannot even be mentioned. As something must be done, as "evils" must be identified and then eliminated, reorganization commissions inevitably focus their attention upon the most rigidly mechanical and administrative problems. They know that this is "sterile" in a fundamental way. Usually, I believe, they do not really take seriously the reorganization ideology which they appear publicly to support. Usually, I believe, they come to have contempt for the reorganization ideology. This contempt takes the form of jokes about the political naïveté of political scientists. For the whole point is that a reorganization study is an intensely "political" document. The more "sterile" it is, the better it serves its deeper political purpose. For it uncovers nothing scandalous in the state. What it does uncover is proof that everyone in the state administration is overworked and needs larger staffs and authority to do more things, and budgets to fit.

Out of this innocent foundation many marvelous things will spring. The prominent commissioners in effect certify that the state government has been well administered, except for a few agencies which need expansion or reorganization. The governor is presented with a number of harmless "reform" issues, certified from highest social and professional authority. These are good issues on which to wage a re-election campaign. And after they are instituted they make a proud reform achievement to stand on.

This makes the foundation for a happy little unverbalized understanding between commission and political scientist. "Politics" must have no part in the study, for that would be unscientific and might lay the commission open to the charge of being politically partisan. The report will be certified true and scientific by the political scientist who for his part participates in allowing his scientific managerialism to serve a potent political function by the suppression of politics.

I failed as an expert because I took the Commission at its word rather than at its meaning. This led to a confusing paradox. I was an academician conferring with effective practical politicians. I presumably inhabited the "world of the ivory tower" and they presumably inhabited the "world of harsh realities." Yet I was the only one who kept insisting on talking the language of the harsh world, and they kept insisting on talking the language of the ivory-tower world. Worse, we were both calling each other "utopians." I, because what they proposed seemed to me to have no operational validity within the framework they insisted on using; they, because what I proposed could not become a political reality within the framework I insisted upon using. Finally, long afterward, I saw that in employing me they had really wanted the "ivory tower" they deprecated in conversation, not the "forum." In accepting, I tried to give them a scientific basis for the reformation they said they wanted, not the rationalization certified with scienticity that they really wanted.

Znaniecki's admonition to the expert applies

to the political scientist as a research consultant, but with one further qualification. For the political scientist has one problem in addition to that of the scientist-engineer. His field of expertise is precisely the political system whose leaders employ him. The conditions of his employment relationship veto the development of his science when that science touches (as it always must) the mainsprings of power. This means that it is almost impossible in the nature of things for the political scientist truly to ply his art for hire. Political science has a built-in science inhibitor which prevents it from approaching the object of its study the more vigorously, in direct relation to the degree of refinement of the science. What the political scientist may ply is formalism and legalism: professional pharisaism. For this commodity there is an exciting market with many long and happy research consultantships.

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THE POLITICS OF METROPOLITAN AREA ORGANIZATION

• EDWARD C. BANFIELD

I

That there is a critical need to integrate local government organization in the metropolitan areas has become an article of faith with practically all who are concerned with urban affairs. In the last thirty years eighty-eight major surveys have been made of metropolitan organization, and at the present time in almost every metropolitan area at least one official or unofficial body is endeavoring to bring about a "rationalization" of government structure by annexation, consolidation, federation, functional transfers, creation of special districts, or some combination of these.[1]

Despite all the study and talk, not much has been accomplished. If school districts are left out of account, the number of local governments is increasing, and no metropolitan area is yet possessed of a government able to deal with a number of functions on an area-wide basis. Of the eighty-eight major surveys, only three were followed by the adoption of major recommendations.

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[1] For an account of these endeavors see the Council of State Governments, *The States and the Metropolitan Problem* (Chicago, 1956), especially pp. 130–32. See also the annual articles in the *Municipal Yearbook* and the elaborate forthcoming bibliography compiled by the Government Affairs Foundation.

Probably one reason for this is that the metropolitan area "problem" is to some extent spurious. That there are (for example) 1,071 independent local governments in the New York area may not be as bad as it is made to sound. Perhaps there should be even more. There are some real and important problems of metropolitan organization, of course, but the "one local government for one local area" idea reflects a taste for symmetry, simplicity, and, in a special sense, logic.[2]

To the extent that the movement for metropolitan area organization arises out of these naive biases its political failure is accounted for. But the problem is by no means wholly illusory and so some additional explanation for the failure of reform is needed. This article is intended to supply it.

II

If we look at the facts of political arithmetic (as demography was once called), we see that profound changes are underway. The electorate, already predominantly urban, is rapidly becoming overwhelmingly so. About 60 per

[2] The principle of "one local government for one local area" was recommended in the Council of State Governments, *State-Local Relations* (Chicago, 1946). In the report on housing policy referred to above, Morton Grodzins and the writer have shown that although "fragmentation" of government structure in metropolitan areas impedes improvement of the housing situation in some important respects, the effect is on the whole a good deal less serious than is commonly supposed.

cent of the population live in 171 standard metropolitan areas and about 30 per cent live in the 14 largest of these areas.[3] As Table 1 shows, the metropolitan areas are expected to grow fast both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the whole population. Central cities are expected to grow relatively little. The big increases will come in the fringe areas.

These population movements are changing the character of both the central cities and the suburbs. "The central cities," Woodbury has written, "will become increasingly the place of residence of new arrivals in the metropolitan areas, of nonwhites, lower income workers, younger couples, and the elderly."[4] The rate at which the Negro populations of the larger central cities are increasing is one of the most striking features of the situation. A pioneering study by Bogue suggests that in ten years the nonwhite population of Chicago may be more than 900,000 (23.4 per cent of the whole) while that of the suburbs will be less than 200,000 (6.4 per cent of the whole).[5] As Figure 1 shows, Negroes have accounted for much of the population increase in large central cities but for little of it in the suburbs.

It is not easy to generalize about the suburbs. "Dormitory" suburbs within commuting distance of the big cities are predominantly middle and upper income.[6] But many once fashionable suburbs are fast becoming slums or near-slums.[7] There are also, of course, many

[3] As defined by the Census, a standard metropolitan area is a county or group of contiguous counties which contain at least one city of 50,000 inhabitants or more. In addition to the county or counties containing such a city, or cities, contiguous counties are included in a standard metropolitan area if according to certain criteria they are essentially metropolitan and are socially and economically integrated with the central city.

[4] Coleman Woodbury, "Suburbanization and Suburbia," *American Journal of Public Health*, XLV (January 1955), 9.

[5] Donald J. Bogue, *An Estimate of Metropolitan Chicago's Future Population: 1955 to 1956*, published jointly by the Chicago Community Inventory, University of Chicago, and the Scripps Foundation, Miami University (Ohio), Feb. 2, 1955.

[6] For a comprehensive statistical account of these differences see O. D. Duncan and A. J. Reiss, Jr., *Social Characteristics of Urban and Rural Communities, 1950* (New York, 1956).

[7] See the table on substandard dwelling units in

TABLE 1. *Estimates of Population Growth: Metropolitan Areas* (in thousands)

	Population 1955 (civilian)		Increase 1950–55 (estimated)[a]			Increase 1955–75 (projected)[b]		Population 1975 (projected)[c]		
	Number	Per Cent of Total	Per Cent for Area	Number	Per Cent of Total	Number	Per Cent for Area	Number	Per Cent of Total	Change in Per Cent from 1955
U. S. A.	161,461	100	7.9	11,827	100	56,000	34.8	218,000	100	
Standard Metropolitan Areas	95,304	59.0	13.7	11,508	97.4	54,544	56.8	150,000	69	+10
Central Cities in SMA's	51,023	31.6	3.8	1,888	16.0	8,960	17.5	60,000	28	− 4
Urban Fringe	28,236	17.5	19.1	4,526	38.3	21,448	76.1	50,000	23	+ 5
Rural Fringe	16,045	9.9	46.5	5,094	43.1	24,136	150.0	40,000	18	+ 9
Outside Metropolitan Areas	66,157	41.0	0.5	319	2.6	1,456	2.2	68,000	31	−10
Urban	24,217	14.9	5.0	1,150	9.6	5,376	22.2	30,000	14	− 1
Rural	41,940	26.0	− 1.9	− 831	− 7.0	− 3,920	− 9.4	38,000	17	− 9

[a] U. S. Census, Series P-20, No. 63.

[b] "Population Trends in the U. S. Through 1975," Stanford Research Institute, August, 1955. Distribution assumed to be in the same proportion, by type of area, as for the 1950–1955 increase.

[c] These figures include the same deduction for non-civilians made in Census estimates of the 1955 distribution. The actual Stanford projection for 1975 is 220,794,000.

Source: *Architectural Forum*, 105, No. 3 (September 1956), 112–113. Copyright 1956 by Time Inc. Quoted by permission.

industrial suburbs, particularly in the northeast. The movement to the suburbs is in many places a levelling one: the high concentration of upper-income, upper-educated, upper-class people in the suburbs is being diluted by migration from the central cities and from rural places. By and large, the dilution is with respect to the suburban "ring" as a whole: each individual suburb may retain a fairly homogeneous character while the character of the ring as a whole changes. "To some extent," Lubell has remarked, "the suburban exodus appears to have revived the old patterns of segregation. Around New York City there are suburban districts which have become as heavily Jewish, or Italian, or Irish in family ancestry as were the ghettos or 'Little Italy's' or 'New Erins' of the lower East Side of twenty-five years ago. The old-law tenements of the East Side have given way to ranch houses with sylvan settings and neatly cultivated lawns. Yet the walls of discrimination and intolerance still stand."[8]

In general the large cities are heavily Democratic and the suburban rings heavily Republican. (See Table 2.)

It seems likely that the central cities will become more and more Democratic.[9] Those who are leaving them for the suburbs include a disproportionate number of Republicans and of

suburban areas in Victor Jones, "Local Government Organization in Metropolitan Areas," *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment*, ed., Coleman Woodbury (Chicago, 1953), p. 511.

[8] Samuel Lubell, *The Revolt of the Moderates* (New York, 1956), p. 246.

[9] The Democrats lost many of the central cities in 1956. Stevenson got 48.7 per cent of the vote in Chicago (and only 27.7 per cent in the rest of Cook County!). But in Philadelphia he got 56.9 per cent.

That President Eisenhower carried the central cities signifies nothing for the future since he cannot run again and no other Republican will have his popularity. Besides, in this context the important elections are the local ones. In these the Democratic vote is more reliable.



FIGURE 1

the upward mobile people who are likely to become Republicans. Their places are taken almost entirely by poor whites from the South, Negroes, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans. At least four-fifths of these are normally Democratic.

There is, of course, a possibility that in the struggle over school integration the Negro will lose his allegiance to the Democratic party. In the 1956 election the Negro Democratic vote fell off dramatically in some places, particularly in the South. In certain places in the North, the Republicans made impressive percentage gains. These gains do not necessarily reflect shifts in party allegiance, however. For example, in Congressman William Dawson's district in Chicago the Republican share of the vote increased from 26.5 per cent in 1952 to 35.5 per cent in 1956. But this percentage increase does not reflect an important absolute gain to the Republicans: while Dawson's vote dropped from 95,899 to 66,704, that for his opponent climbed only from 34,571 to 36,847. Thousands of Negro voters, impelled by slum clearance or other circumstances, had moved into other districts where — presumably — they were still voting heavily Democratic.[10]

The Republicanism of the suburban rings is being diluted by the movement into them from the central cities and rural area "Hillbillies" and Negroes are moving into suburbs which not long ago were solidly middle-class and solidly Republican. Industrial suburbs are growing like big Disneyland mushrooms. Even in the middle and upper class "dormitory" suburbs a good many of the newcomers are Democrats. However, the dilution of the Republican suburban vote does not seem to be as great as, judging from the size of the population movement, one would expect. It may be that many of the central city Democrats who move to the suburbs become Republicans as soon as they learn what is expected of them in their new surroundings.[11] At any rate, as Table 3 suggests

TABLE 2. *Democratic Vote as a Percentage of Major Party Vote, Central City and Suburbs, 1954*

New York City	65.9
Suburban Counties	
Rockland	40.7
Westchester	35.3
Nassau	36.1
Suffolk	30.9
Chicago	64.2
Cook County except Chicago	40.5
Philadelphia	57.7
Montgomery County	38.1
Detroit	66.9
Wayne County except Detroit	57.1
Pittsburgh	56.8
Allegheny County except Pittsburgh	54.3
St. Louis City	62.0
St. Louis County	45.0
San Francisco	49.3
Suburban Counties	
Marin	35.2
San Mateo	40.8
Cleveland	70.0
Cuyahoga County except Cleveland	51.4
Minneapolis	58.8
Hennepin County except Minneapolis	47.2
Buffalo	52.8
Erie County except Buffalo	36.9
Milwaukee	59.8
Milwaukee County except Milwaukee City	45.5
Cincinnati	43.8
Hamilton County except Cincinnati	39.2

Source: Based on data from R. M. Scammon, *America Votes*, Government Affairs Institute, 1956. Except for St. Louis City and St. Louis County, which were for President in 1952, the votes were for governor or senator.

[10] In four Black Belt wards of Chicago registrations dropped 15 per cent from 1952 to 1956. In 1952, 75 per cent of those registered voted; in 1956 only 71 per cent voted. If in three of these wards (2, 3 and 20) the smaller number of voters had divided between the parties in the same proportion as in 1952, the Democratic candidate for governor would have got 11.5 per cent more votes than he actually did get. In the fourth of these wards (4) there was no net change in registration and the Democratic candidate for governor got 29 per cent fewer votes than in 1952. In these wards Eisenhower ran 9 per cent ahead of the Republican candidate for governor; in Chicago as a whole he ran 25 per cent ahead.

In the three most heavily Negro wards of Philadelphia (30, 32 and 47) Stevenson got 79.3 per cent of the vote in 1952 and 75.5 per cent in 1956. The total vote in these wards was 10 per cent less in 1956 than in 1952. In the Negro wards Eisenhower ran 1 per cent ahead of the Republican candidate for senator; in the city as a whole he ran 2.7 per cent ahead.

[11] A *New York Times* story of May 31, 1956 summarized the views of suburban politicians in the New York metropolitan area on the reasons for this change of political allegiance: "One reason is a sense of property rights and a concern for tax rates that comes with the key to a suburban home and

the Republican suburban vote has in general suffered little from the increase in population.[12]

III

These facts suggest that for many years to come it will be difficult or impossible to integrate local governments where the two-party system operates. Even if the proportion of Republicans declines sharply in the suburbs, metropolitan area government north of the Mason-Dixon line would almost everywhere be Republican government. In effect, advocates of consolidation schemes are asking the Democrats to give up their control of the central cities or, at least, to place it in jeopardy.

It may be that in time Democratic politicians will become so persuaded of the necessity of metropolitan government by the propaganda of the good government movement that they will support it against their own interest and that of their party. (Certainly many politicians are convinced of the merits of the merit system, although it has gone far toward undermining the party system.) Or it may be that the Democrats will be forced to accept metropolitan government by a public opinion which will have come to share the general bias of the experts in favor of symmetry and simplicity. These eventualities are not unlikely, but it will probably be a good many years before they are realized.

Three-quarters of the metropolitan areas lie entirely within a single county. From the standpoint of administration there is much to be said for city-county consolidation: it would make sense to endow county governments with the powers of cities and to organize them to exercise those powers efficiently. Schemes like this are being worked out in Miami, Atlanta, and Nashville, but it is highly unlikely that they will be tried where there is a two-party system. If Buffalo, for example, were to be consolidated with Erie County, control over it would pass from the Democratic party to the Republican. If Chicago were consolidated with Cook County, the Democrats would have a fighting chance of capturing it. But as matters now stand control of Chicago is a sure thing for the Democrats. Why should they change?

City-county separation will be unacceptable for the same reason. If Chicago — to take a typical case — were made a county by itself, apart from the rest of Cook County, the Democrats, although their control of the city would not be jeopardized, would no longer have a chance in Cook County. That would be safely Republican.

For the same reason that they will refuse to turn all of their powers over to a Republican county government, the Democrats of the central cities will refuse to turn over some of them to special function districts. Recently Sheriff Joseph Lohman of Cook County, a good government and planning-minded Democrat (he was formerly chairman of the Washington, D.C. Planning Commission), observed that law enforcement in the Chicago metropolitan area

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the mortgage. Another is a desire for social status and a feeling that it can be achieved by belonging to the 'right' social groups and parties. A third is a feeling that local conditions require a Republican enrollment if there is any hope of a consequent political career or political favors."

There is some reason to believe that in new suburbs many converts to Republicanism become disenchanted when schools go on three shifts, taxes rise, houses require repairs, and transit systems become overloaded.

[12] 1956 returns for most places are not at hand as this is written. However, it is clear that in the Philadelphia and Chicago regions, at least, the Republicanism of the suburban rings is somewhat diluted.

In Philadelphia suburbs the Republican percentages of the vote for senator were as follows:

	1952	*1956*
Montgomery County	65.6	62.5
Bucks "	61.4	52.6
Delaware "	60.8	58.9

U.S. News & World Report (Dec. 1, 1956) concluded that the movement to the suburbs of Chicago has not diluted their Republicanism. As evidence, it reported Eisenhower's percentage of the majority party vote as follows:

	1952	*1956*
Calumet City	42.9	54.5
Chicago Heights	52.5	65.0
Elmwood Park	62.8	71.8
Evanston	75.4	76.5
Harvey	56.8	65.7
Oak Park	76.9	79.1
River Forest	84.5	85.6
Wilmette	82.6	83.7
Winnetka	79.0	80.9

The data does not bear out the conclusion, however. For one thing, in half the suburbs cited the shift was only one or two percentage points, surprisingly little in view of Eisenhower's great popularity. For another, many of those who voted for Eisenhower are still Democrats and may be expected to vote Democratic as a general rule in the future.

TABLE 3. *Republican Vote as a Percentage of Major Party Vote, Suburbs, 1948 and 1954*

Suburban Area	1948	1954	Per cent Increase or Decrease 1954 over 1948
New York Suburbs			
Rockland County	61.2	59.3	− 1.9
Westchester	64.8	64.7	− .1
Nassau	72.2	63.9	− 8.3
Suffolk	72.1	69.1	− 3.0
Cook County except Chicago	64.6	59.4	− 2.8
Montgomery County (Pennsylvania)	67.5	61.9	− 5.6
Wayne County except Detroit	44.3	42.4	− 1.9
Allegheny County except Pittsburgh	46.7	45.4	− 1.3
St. Louis County	52.6	55.0	+ 2.4
San Francisco Suburbs			
Marin County	57.2	64.8	+ 7.6
San Mateo County	56.8	59.2	+ 2.4
Cuyahoga County except Cleveland	60.6	48.6	− 12.0
Hennepin County except Minneapolis	52.0	51.5	− .5
Erie County except Buffalo	55.7	62.8	+ 7.1
Milwaukee County except Milwaukee City	51.9	54.3	+ 2.4
Hamilton County except Cincinnati	58.8	60.7	+ 1.9

Source: 1948 figures computed from data in *The Political Almanac*, New York: B. C. Forbes and Sons, 1952. 1954 figures computed from *America Votes*. The 1948 figures are for a Presidential vote; the others are votes for governor or senator. These are not altogether satisfactory for comparison.

is "hamstrung" by limited jurisdictions and resources. He proposed putting the 11,000 policemen who now serve more than two hundred governmental units within the county under nine elected commissioners and suggested that a police commissioner be elected from each of nine wedge-shaped districts extending from the center of Chicago to the county line. The plan attracted no support from either Lohman's fellow-Democrats or from the Republicans. Obviously the Democrats are not going to give the Republicans the chance — the very good chance — of controlling the police of the central city. Nor are the Republicans going to run the risk of letting control of their suburban police fall into the hands of the central city Democrats.

There will probably be some instances — Detroit and Wayne County appear to be one and Pittsburgh and Allegheny County another — where the number of suburban Republicans is too small to make much difference. Consolidation may be possible in these cases. They will be few, however.

The Republicans outside of the central cities will of course want to remain apart: they are as well satisfied with a one-party system as are the Democrats of the central cities.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the conflict lies altogether or even mainly between the two party organizations or among the professional politicians who have a stake in them. The party differences are important in themselves, but they reflect deeper and still more important differences. Metropolitan government would mean the transfer of power over the central cities from the largely lower-class Negro and Catholic elements who live in them to the largely middle-class white and Protestant elements who live in the suburbs.

It should be remembered that between the central city resident and the suburbanite there are also differences of interest which have no necessary connection with race or class. If overnight all of the people of the central cities were transformed into middle-class white Protestants, there would still be the basis for conflict between them and the suburbanites. It would still have to be decided, for example, whether thousands of central city residents should be relocated to build expressways to give suburbanites quicker access to the city as

well as how taxes to pay for such improvements should be levied. In St. Louis a metropolitan transit scheme failed of adoption recently apparently because of fears that improved service for suburbanites would be paid for by the fares of central city residents. Such instances abound.[13]

The situation will not be altogether different where the city is non-partisan. The major parties are alive and watching for their chances even in non-partisan cities. But even if they were not alive, the fundamental differences of interest and of status which separate the central city and the suburban populations would nevertheless be expressed at the polls and elsewhere. In nonpartisan Milwaukee Mayor Frank P. Zeidler recently complained that influential suburbanites — leaders of industry, of business and real estate, and of the press; presidents of utilities; attorneys; and trained technical persons — "working through their suburban governments and especially through the county government and state legislature . . . can exercise an almost compulsory power on the city." Through the process of functional consolidation, Mayor Zeidler said, "the city is being stripped of more and more of its desirable functions, but it is being left with its problems — especially the social problems."[14]

The few Republicans of the central cities and, in general, the good government forces — in short, all those who want to weaken the Democratic machines — will favor adding the suburban vote to the central city vote wherever the suburbs are predominantly middle or upper class. It is not surprising that in Kansas City, Mo., City Manager Cookingham annexed some fringe areas over their violent opposition. He knew that, bitter as they might be at forced annexation, in the long run they would have to side with him against the remains of the Pendergast machine.[15]

As the Negro tide rises in the central cities, many white Democrats will begin to think of annexation and consolidation as ways to maintain a white (but, alas, Republican!) majority.[16] Unless there is consolidation, some cities will probably have Negro mayors within the next twenty years. Negroes can be expected to oppose annexation and consolidation under these circumstances, of course, and if the issue were to be decided on the metropolitan scene they could probably prevent gerrymandering along racial lines. Rural — and therefore white — dominated legislatures will have the decisive say in these matters, however, and they will be almost immune from Negro influence.

There are fast-growing lower class, and even Negro, suburbs close to some central cities. Democratic politicians will not ordinarily have much incentive to annex these because the Democratic majorities in the central cities will be large enough without them. But where lower class suburbs are large enough to insure Democratic county government, one stumbling block in the way of city-county consolidation will not exist. There will be another in such cases, however: Republican legislatures will be reluctant to pass enabling legislation.

IV

Professor Charles E. Merriam was certainly right in declaring years ago that "the adequate organization of modern metropolitan areas is one of the great unsolved problems of modern politics."[17] The problem is not, however, as many seem to think, merely one of creating organization for effective planning and administration. It is also — and perhaps primarily — one of creating, or of maintaining, organization for the effective management of conflict, especially of conflict arising from the growing cleavages of race and class.

These needs may be incompatible to some extent: the organization which would be best for the management of conflict may not be

[13] See, for example, Daniel R. Grant, "Urban and Suburban Nashville: A Case Study in Metropolitanism," *Journal of Politics,* XVII (Feb. 1955), 93–95.

[14] Frank P. Zeidler, "A Course of Action for the City of Milwaukee for 1956 and the Following Years," multilith, undated, pp. 27–28.

[15] See the account of this in the manuscript by A. Theodore Brown, "The Politics of Reform; Kansas City's Municipal Government, 1925–1950." It is interesting that the districts where Pendergast had been strong were almost decisively against annexation. Chapter X, p. 8.

[16] In Nashville, Tenn., six months after the removal of the poll tax in 1951, Councilman Glenn Ragsdale argued — successfully — that an annexation was necessary to offset the growing Negro vote in his district. — Creed C. Black, "The Politics of Metropolitanism; Opposition to Annexation in Nashville, Tennessee," unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, August, 1952, p. 40.

[17] In his preface to Victor Jones, *Metropolitan Government* (Chicago, 1942), p. ix.

best for area-wide planning and administration. Indeed, it may be that area-wide planning and administration would of necessity heighten conflicts by raising questions which can only be settled by bitter struggle.

Conflict is not something to be avoided at all costs. It may be well, nevertheless, to consider if there are not decisive advantages in the organizational arrangements which now exist — arrangements which, while handicapping or entirely frustrating some important undertakings, also serve to insulate opposed interests and to protect them from each other. In view of their differences, it may be well, despite the obvious disadvantages, that the peoples of the central cities and of the suburbs live largely in separate political communities.

This is not to conclude that area-wide planning and administration should not be attempted. They should be attempted through the political structures which already exist. Rather than enter upon the probably futile and possibly dangerous course of creating new bodies by consolidation or federation it would be better in those places where fundamental cleavages exist to look to the political leaders of existing jurisdictions to negotiate among themselves settlements on the basis of which action may proceed. In effect this means that the political leaders of the central cities must be expected to come to terms with the political leaders of the states. For this to occur it is not necessary that both sets of leaders be of the same party, but it is necessary that both have power. In short, the metropolitan area problem will have to be solved — insofar as it is solved at all — by strong mayors and strong governors engaged in political give and take. Where special function districts are required, their managers should be accountable to the voters, but not directly so, for this would entail the transfer of power from one electorate (and thus one party organization) to another, something which is usually not feasible even if desirable. Instead, the people who run such districts should be accountable to a committee of mayors, county supervisors, governors who have a stake in the matter or to a committee of their appropriate subordinates. In this way accountability can be secured without the necessity of changing radically the distribution of political power. On this basis it should be possible to bring together administratively areas which are growing apart politically.

66

TOWARD AN EXPLANATION OF McCARTHYISM[1]

• *NELSON W. POLSBY*

The recent appearance of an apparently definitive journalistic post-mortem on Senator Joseph McCarthy underscores the rather striking professional inattention of political scientists to one of the most spectacular political phenomena of our time.[2] For those of us who view political science as a potentially powerful weapon in the cause of rational political decision-making, this lost opportunity seems especially poignant.[3] If it is too late to assist politicians in determining the extent to which they should have allowed themselves to be imprisoned by the demands and the rhetoric of

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[1] I have received an extraordinary amount of help and encouragement while pursuing the research reported here. I want to thank Eugene N. Feingold, F. P. Kilpatrick, Robert A. Dentler, Aaron B. Wildavsky, Duane Lockard, Malcolm C. Moos and Francis E. Rourke.

[2] Richard Rovere, *Senator Joe McCarthy* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959).

[3] No political scientist can properly elaborate upon the subject of policy science without acknowledging a debt to Harold D. Lasswell. A recent contribution of Lasswell's is his Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association, appearing in the *American Political Science Review* (vol. 50, Dec. 1956) as "The Political Science of Science," pp. 961–79. See also Lasswell, "Strategies of Inquiry: The Rational Use of Ob-

McCarthy and his followers, it is not too late to ask more academic questions about who McCarthy's followers really were, and about the sources and extent of his power.[4]

I. Three Hypotheses

This paper is by no means the first attempt to discuss the social sources and political pretensions of McCarthyism. In fact, numerous ingenious explanations of the McCarthy phenomenon have been proffered.[5] Furthermore, sophisticated students have seldom relied upon any single explanation. In reducing previous explanations to three hypotheses, then, I have no doubt greatly simplified the viewpoints of the writers who first suggested them.

One hypothesis which attempts to account for McCarthy's rise to prominence lays heavy stress on "atmospheric" conditions surrounding the position of the United States after the Second World War. Instead of being allowed to relax into their customary inter-war posture of "normalcy," Americans were faced with the necessity of continuing their foreign entanglements, owing to the hostility of the Russians and the debilitation of our overseas allies. This hypothesis suggests that many Americans were unhappy at this turn of events, and that many of them interpreted these events as the inexorable result of involvement in "foreign" wars. These citizens opposed large-scale spending for foreign economic aid, were progressively angered by the fall of China and the discovery of atomic spies both here and abroad, had always been skeptical of alliances with Great Britain, and became bitterly frustrated at the seemingly endless maneuvers of the Cold War and the Korean conflict. Senator McCarthy's approach to politics, so runs the argument, gave support to the nostalgia of isolationists, many of whom had ancestral ties with Germany, and was congenial to those who harbored populistic and anglophobic sentiments.[6]

From this hypothesis we should deduce that McCarthy would find support among people of German extraction, among isolationists, and among those who preferred dramatic activity to patience in the conduct of foreign affairs. Evidence on these points is not conclusive, but certainly suggests the plausibility of this hypothetical description of McCarthy supporters. For example, Samuel Lubell has reported two chief sources of strength for Senator McCarthy:

> One was the frustrations that arose out of the Korean War, which often took the form of voters demanding "Why don't we clean up these Commies at home with our boys dying in Korea?" . . . . The second main source of McCarthy strength came in areas which opposed our entry into the last war.[7]

Lubell also indicates that McCarthy ran better in those Wisconsin townships with high German populations than he did in the rest of the state.[8]

Hodges, Graham, and Anderson, in a study of Pierce County, Wisconsin, discovered that McCarthy supporters could be found disproportionately among those of German extraction, and among those who are "skeptical about foreign involvements on the part of the United States . . . [favoring] discontinuing both economic and military aid to Asiatic and European nations, and [feeling] that the Korean conflict was a mistake."[9]

Information from various Gallup surveys is also relevant. A study of New London County,

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servation," in Daniel Lerner, ed., *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences* (New York: Meridian, 1959), pp. 89–113, and Lasswell, "The Intelligence Function: Built-in Errors," *PROD* 3 (Sept. 1959), pp. 3–7.

[4] The extent to which academic men, as well as men of power, failed to ask these questions when they were politically relevant is documented in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958).

[5] See an excellent review which extracts explanatory propositions from mostly hortatory literature on McCarthyism: Dennis H. Wrong, "Theories of McCarthyism," *Dissent*, I (Autumn 1954), pp. 385–92.

[6] See, for expositions of this hypothesis, Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (2nd ed., Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p. 164; Samuel Lubell, "The Question is Why," review of *The New American Right* in the New York *Times Book Review*, 11 Dec. 1955; Peter Viereck, "The Revolt Against The Elite," in Daniel Bell, ed., *The New American Right* (New York: Criterion, 1955), pp. 91–116; Talcott Parsons, "Social Strains in America," in *ibid.*, pp. 117–40.

[7] Samuel Lubell, *Revolt of the Moderates* (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 268.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 269.

[9] Harold M. Hodges, Jr., Charles Graham, and Philip Anderson, "A Sociological Analysis of McCarthy Supporters," a paper delivered at the Fifty-second Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, Washington, D.C., Aug. 1957.

Connecticut, indicated that one of the major reasons people gave for supporting McCarthy was that "They admire greatly his 'courage' and 'sincerity,' feeling that he is not afraid to 'get tough.' "[10] Gallup also reported a similar response among citizens of East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, where many citizens favored McCarthy because of his "fearlessness," and because he "gets a lot done the way he goes about things."[11]

It seems likely that the political atmosphere contributed in some general sense to McCarthy's rise, and supplied his followers with rationalizations for supporting him. But presumably this atmosphere existed for everyone, and, save in the case of the relatively small German-American group, the hypothesis does not explain, for the purpose of assessing his political possibilities at any time, where in the population most of McCarthy's supporters could have been located.

Many people have been persuaded that McCarthy's potential was considerable, since for a great length of time Gallup surveys recorded that a substantial proportion of the population "approved of" McCarthy in some sense.[12] The atmospheric hypothesis differentiates only crudely between those favorable to McCarthy and those unfavorable, on the basis of generalized attitudes toward historical events, and identifies more exactly only a small portion of McCarthy's alleged followers.

A second hypothesis derives from the researches of Adorno and his associates[13] and identifies McCarthy as an authoritarian leader. Authoritarianism implies a host of rather misanthropic social attitudes including "toughness," superconformity, intolerance, generalized hostility, and an unusual concern with sexual "goings on." Many observers, pointing out that Senator McCarthy exhibited more than his share of these hostile attitudes, deduced that throughout the population those individuals who were most authoritarian would be most likely to be McCarthyites.[14]

This hypothesis has gained some confirmation, but contrary evidence suggests the need for more precise specification of the personality characteristics which are supposed to have caused pro-McCarthy sentiments.

Hodges, Graham, and Anderson report that McCarthyites were "more conformistic, agreeing that there are too many 'odd-balls' around, that the 'good' American doesn't stand out among his fellow Americans, and that children should not develop hobbies which are . . . unusual", and more misanthropic, "concurring with statements that 'people are out to cheat you,' and that 'there is wickedness, cheating and corruption all about us.' "[15]

However, some students have noticed that there were relatively intolerant groups in the population whose members nevertheless seemed markedly impervious to McCarthy's charismatic charm.[16] And, conversely, it has been established that members of other groups which were not notably intolerant have supported him

[10] John M. Fenton, " 'Barometer' Area Divided on McCarthy," American Institute of Public Opinion news release, 22 Jan. 1954.

[11] George Gallup, "Two Pennsylvania 'Test-Tube' Towns Split Sharply in Views on McCarthy," American Institute of Public Opinion news release, 26 June 1954.

[12] A trend line on Senator McCarthy's popularity was released on 12 Nov. 1954 by the American Institute of Public Opinion, showing the following results:

Date	*Favorable* %	*Unfavorable* %	*No opinion* %
June 1953	35	30	35
Aug.	34	42	24
Jan. 1954	50	29	21
Mar.	46	36	18
Apr.	38	46	16
May	35	49	16
June	34	45	21
Aug.	36	51	13
Nov.	35	46	19

McCarthy also ran fourth in the Gallup nationwide survey of "most admired men in the world," in 1954. George Gallup, "Ike Tops Ten Most Admired Men," American Institute of Public Opinion news release, 26 Dec. 1954.

[13] T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).

[14] The "authoritarianism" hypothesis is advanced by Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," in Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–35, and David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "The Intellectuals and the Discontented Classes," in *ibid.*, pp. 56–90. See also Immanuel Wallerstein, "McCarthyism and the Conservative," unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1954; James A. Wechsler, "Where Proof of Innocence Becomes Damning Evidence of Guilt," *Washington Post,* 3 May 1953; Richard Rovere, *op. cit., passim;* and Michael Straight, *Trial By Television* (Boston: Beacon, 1954), *passim.*

[15] Hodges, Graham, and Anderson, *op. cit.*

[16] This criticism is in effect a special application

to a disproportionate degree.[17] A third hypothesis attempts to account for these findings by making reference to the needs and aspirations of certain groups within the population which were satisfied, it is suggested, through McCarthyite activity.

The authors of *The New American Right* have advanced this hypothesis in its most full-blown and persuasive form. This volume is a collection of essays by a distinguished group of social scientists, all attempting to explain the social sources and consequences of McCarthyism. The nature of American politics has changed, they say, so as to render the McCarthy movement unintelligible to conventional forms of political analysis. They call for a "new" type of analysis, one that recognizes the significance of the emergence of status groups as entities making important demands upon the rest of American society, through the political system.[18] In times of economic distress demands are made along class lines; economic "interests" divide the nation's wealth and income by putting pressures of various kinds upon one another and on the government, which acts as a mediating and legitimizing agent for society and as a forum for the expression of dissatisfactions and the promulgation of panaceas. In periods of prosperity the continuing adjustments of interests to each other and to the resources of the economy yield the center of political attention to the demands of status groups, which use the arena to insist on the improvement or maintenance of their status position in society. In times of economic well-being the "dynamic of dissent" resides in those status groups who wish to change the *status quo* — and of course consider themselves at a disadvantage in the status hierarchy. The McCarthy movement, the authors agree, expresses a non-economic form of protest which can only mean that those in society who supported McCarthy did so because of status dissatisfactions.[19]

The authors could have predicted from this hypothesis those groups which should be pro-McCarthy and those which should be anti-McCarthy. Secondly, they could have checked these predictions against the available evidence. In fact, they took only one of these steps, deducing who McCarthy's followers might be. It can easily be seen from an inspection of Table I that the "status politics" hypothesis is much too inclusive to have very much explanatory power. Although it may accurately estimate why specific members of each of the groups named may have found McCarthy an attractive political figure (i.e., because of their status anxieties) it neither differentiates successfully among groups, nor provides criteria by which some groups can be excluded from its purview.

A second step would have been to check deductions against facts. Only Lipset, among *The New American Right* essayists, attempted to do so, and he presents only his conclusions from findings, rather than the findings themselves. At the time of publication of *The New American Right* there were several sources available which might have confirmed at least partially some of the predictions made in these essays. I present the relevant conclusions of these sources in Table II.

As Table II indicates, the "status anxieties" hypothesis yields rather indifferent results, since

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of more general strictures against the Authoritarian Personality study. See Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, eds., *Studies in the Scope and Method of the Authoritarian Personality* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954). For indications that non-followers of McCarthy may be at least as authoritarian as his followers see Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 129; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Democracy and Working Class Authoritarianism," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (Aug. 1959), p. 484. Hodges, Graham, and Anderson, *op. cit.*, found that McCarthyites in Pierce County tended to be more anti-Semitic than non-McCarthyites, but were not more anti-Negro. This too suggests that a general "authoritarian" personality syndrome is not an adequate category for the analysis of McCarthyism.

[17] See Stouffer, *op. cit.*, p. 129; Martin Trow, "Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and Support for McCarthy," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (Nov. 1958), pp. 270–81.

[18] Daniel Bell, "Interpretations of American Politics," in Bell, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 4 ff.

[19] *Ibid.* Hofstadter, pp. 33, 34, 43 f.; Lipset, "The Sources of the 'Radical Right,'" pp. 167 ff. This hypothesis suggests a new application for the concept of "relative deprivation," which urges that disprivilege be considered not as an objective social position, but rather as a state of mind which occurs when the aspirations of a group exceed its current resources. See Alice S. Rossi and Robert K. Merton, "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," in Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957, revised ed.), pp. 225–80.

TABLE I. *Groups Comprising the New American Right (i.e. McCarthyites)*

I. *Named in six out of seven essays:* New rich.
II. *Named in five essays:* Texans, Irish, Germans.
III. *Named in four essays:* Middle class, Catholics, Midwesterners.
IV. *Named in three essays:* Lower middle class, up-mobile, less educated.
V. *Named in two essays:* "Cankered intellectuals," old family Protestant "shabby genteel," recent immigrants, down-mobile, minority ethnics, Old Guard G.O.P., ex-Communists, Midwest isolationists.
VI. *Named in one essay:* Lower class, small town lawyers, auto dealers, oil wildcatters, real estate manipulators, small business men, manual workers, elderly and retired, rentier class, youth, Southern Californians, South Bostonians, fringe urbanites in middle-sized cities, transplants to city, Polish Catholics, hick Protestants, patriotic and historical group members (e.g. DAR), Scandinavians, Southern Protestant fundamentalists, soured patricians, small town residents, neo-fascists.

Source: *The New American Right.*

it apparently fails to account for two groups in the populace found to have been disproportionately pro-McCarthy, yet on the other hand evidence indicates that some groups named as McCarthyite in fact were not. Although there is no reason to be enthusiastic about the quality of the sources on which these conclusions are based, they are very much better than mere surmises about McCarthy's grass roots followers.[20] Given the speculative nature of most writing on McCarthy, attention should be paid to these empirical findings, despite their limitations.

Other criticisms can be made of *The New American Right.* The assertion that "status groups" are at the heart of the McCarthy movement is essentially trivial. The task was to determine *which* status groups were peculiarly situated so as to be especially favorable to McCarthy. And the identification of some of the groups named as McCarthyite is simply

[20] A tremendous number of Gallup quota control surveys in which questions about Senator McCarthy were included have been taken. These surveys followed two patterns: first, interviewers would enter a given locale and ask why respondents did or did not support McCarthy (e.g. the New London county survey reported 22 Jan. 1954, or the Pennsylvania "test-tube" towns reported 26 June 1954). The reports of these surveys do not include demographic breakdowns of respondents, and did not contribute to Table II. The second kind of survey was the nationwide poll, in which respondents were asked questions such as those appearing in Tables III–XI. In these surveys respondents were broken into various demographic categories: e.g. occupational, religious, and geographical. The percentages for and against McCarthy in each category were reported. Reports of surveys such as this appeared, among other dates, on 15 and 16 Jan., 14 Mar., and 23 May 1954. The 15 Jan. survey, for example, yielded the following results in the geographical category:

	Reponse		
	Pro-McCarthy	*Anti-McCarthy*	*No opinion*
Location	%	%	%
East	55	27	18
Midwest	48	27	25
South	47	30	23
West	46	36	18

Now these categories are obviously not precise enough to furnish intelligible data on the location of McCarthy supporters within the population. Nevertheless, the relationships among various segments of the population with respect to their sentiments towards McCarthy remained stable over a great many polls, and give us a basis on which we can rank these groups for McCarthyite sympathies. It is in this sense that Gallup data is used in Table II. When Gallup data show consistently that a high proportion of Easterners (let us say) favor McCarthy, over those who oppose him, as compared with a similar ratio among people from other parts of the country, I felt justified in giving a "Yes" in the appropriate box in Table II. I gave a "No" when any group registered consistently anti-McCarthy, or ranked behind half of those groups in a similar category (e.g. geographical) in support of McCarthy.

Louis Bean's monograph *Influences in the 1954 Mid-Term Elections* (Washington: Public Affairs Institute, 1954) provides the second source of data. Bean analysed election returns in races where McCarthy ran for office, in 1946 and 1952. He also discusses the impact of the issue of Communists in government by making inferences from 1950 and 1952 election returns in selected states and counties throughout the country. Bean's major findings are (1) that McCarthy seems to have enjoyed greater support in rural than in urban areas in his home state, (2) that pro-McCarthy results seem to have

TABLE II. *Groups Comprising the New American Right, According to Empirical Evidence*

The vertical axis ranks groups according to the number of essays out of seven in which they are explicitly mentioned in *The New American Right*. The horizontal axis lists sources of empirical data in support of (Yes) or against (No) the listing of groups as nuclei of New American Right sentiment. See footnote 20 for an evaluation of these sources.

	Group	*Gallup*	*Bean*	*Harris*
5				
	(1) Germans	—	No	—
	(2) Irish	—	—	No
4				
	(3) Catholics	Yes	Yes	—
3				
	(4) Less educated	Yes	Yes	
2				
	(5) Minority ethnics	Yes & No	Yes & No	Yes & No
	(6) Republicans	Yes	—	—
	(7) Recent immigrants	Yes & No	Yes & No	—
1				
	(8) Lower class	Yes	Yes	—
	(9) Manual workers	Yes	—	—
	(10) Polish Catholics	—	Yes	—
	(11) Elderly	Yes	—	—
	(12) Youth	No	—	No
	(13) Scandinavians	—	No	—
Groups not named in *The New American Right*				
	(1) Farmers	Yes	Yes	—
	(2) New Englanders	Yes	—	—

Sources: American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll), *Influences in the Mid-Term Election*, 1954 (Bean), *Is There A Republican Majority?* (Harris).

implausible. This should weigh heavily in the case of the book under discussion, where the basic argument depends on plausibility rather than more "scientific" demonstrations of truth. For example, it is unclear why members of the DAR should release status anxieties by joining in an attack on the very social groups whose history their organization celebrates. That status anxieties can drive people to attack others — especially the weak — is a reasonable enough argument, but if it is in principle possible to negate *The New American Right* thesis in any way, surely the cases of white Protestant "shabby genteel" McCarthyites succeed in doing so. Finally, it should be noted that the introduction of ethnic and status considerations into political analysis can hardly be said to have originated with the authors of *The New Amer-*

occurred in those areas where the "Catholic index" was relatively high. This Catholic index is apparently the 1936 census of religious bodies, brought up to 1954 on the assumption that changes in the intervening years were proportional in all areas. This assumption weakens Bean's case considerably, but alternative sources of data about the geographical distribution of religious groups within states were not available. Bean also presents data in an appendix relating 1950 census data on the ethnic compositions of Wisconsin counties to their support of McCarthy.

Louis Harris presents an analysis of the 1952 Roper election surveys in *Is There a Republican Majority?* (New York: Harper, 1954). He says that people of Irish descent were split about evenly on McCarthy (p. 90), and that young people broke with Eisenhower in 1952 because of his appeasement of McCarthy and the right wing of the Republican Party generally (p. 168). Harris does not concern himself directly with McCarthy, except briefly, and he presents little in the way of hard data on the subject; hence his book is of limited value.

ican Right, as they themselves, aware of the practices of "ticket balancing," the folklore of political "availability," and long-standing academic interest in the group conflict theory of politics, no doubt realize.

Since the publication of *The New American Right*, Martin Trow has come forward with new data bearing on the "status anxieties" hypothesis.[21] He concludes from his study of Bennington, Vermont, that: (1) Supporters of McCarthy were not more politically intolerant than non-supporters of McCarthy when formal education was held constant. McCarthy received a disproportionate share of his support from the less educated members of the community, who are always less tolerant.[22] (2) McCarthy received much greater support from those members of the middle class who were *economically* at a disadvantage (e.g. small business men) and who expressed hostility towards modern forms of political and economic organization.

These findings support all three hypotheses in so far as they identify McCarthyites as members of a movement of generalized protest. But they also indicate that economic and political factors may have been as important as status anxieties in explaining the social sources of of McCarthyism.

I want to turn now to a fourth hypothesis, one which attempts to explain McCarthyism as a political phenomenon. It is a surprising fact that analysts have discounted so heavily the purely political aspect of his success. Therefore I want to review now the rather heavy evidence supporting the hypothesis that McCarthy succeeded at the grass roots primarily among Republicans.

For example, I present immediately below in Table III the results of a re-analysis of a Gallup survey.[23] In this re-analysis I have attempted to differentiate between those who were for and those against McCarthy. Pro- and anti-McCarthy populations were selected by tabulating responses to the following question: "In general, would you say you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Senator Joseph McCarthy?"

The data at hand were limited; none the less they provided an opportunity to test in some approximate way the predictions of each of the hypotheses thus far offered to account for McCarthy's grass roots support.

The nationwide questionnaire tapped possible pro-German sentiments among respondents, with the results shown in Table IV. The results, while not extreme, are in the direction indicated by the "atmospheric" hypothesis.

Authoritarians, it is said, tend to be politically confused and badly informed.[24] The na-

TABLE III. *Popularity of Senator Joseph McCarthy*

	N	%
Favorable	456	31
Unfavorable	693	46
No opinion	287	19
Don't know him	41	3
	1,477	99

Source: Gallup Survey 529 K, 6 April 1954.

[21] Martin Trow, *op. cit.*

[22] See Stouffer, *op. cit.*, and Lipset, "Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism," *loc. cit.* Herbert McClosky has some findings which indicate that greater degrees of intolerance, hostility, and misanthropy also characterize those persons subscribing to "conservative" ideology. Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (Mar. 1958), pp. 27–45. This presents an interesting puzzle for the student of McCarthyism. It is generally well recognized that the content of McCarthy's political "program" — such as it was — was destructive and profoundly anti-conservative, as well as politically intolerant, hostile, and misanthropic. It is entirely possible that McCarthy's followers were either conservatives responding favorably to the tone of his approach, or radicals responding to its manifest content — or both. Regrettably, McClosky's data do not relate personality characteristics and ideological predispositions to current political sympathies or activities, hence this puzzle must go unsolved.

[23] This work was computed for me by The Roper Public Opinion Research Center at Williams College, on a grant made available by the Political Science Department of Yale University. I am grateful to Philip K. Hastings and Robert A. Dahl, of Williams and Yale, respectively, for supporting this part of my research. The Gallup Survey whose results appear here was number 529 K, 6 Apr. 1954.

[24] See Adorno *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 658 ff.; Fillmore H. Stanford, *Authoritarianism and Leadership* (Philadelphia: Institute for Research in Human Relations, 1950), p. 159. Low levels of political information have been found to correlate with low personal involvement in politics, and these in

tionwide survey asked a series of questions designed to elicit political information of various kinds. McCarthyites and non-McCarthyites were able to identify Far Eastern political leaders correctly to about the same degree, but, once again, the slight differences recorded were all in the expected direction. This is also true of the questions asking about participation in the last election, and in elections generally (see Tables V, VI).

The same thing happens when crude tests of the "status" hypothesis are applied, the assumption being that a higher proportion of McCarthyites come from the Catholic, lower class, and less educated parts of the population. The tables (VII, VIII, and IX) show, once again, tendencies in the direction of confirmation.

But this relatively meagre empirical confirmation is unimpressive when set against comparable figures describing the two populations by their political affiliations (see Table X).

These findings speak for themselves, but do not stand alone. The distributions of McCarthy's vote in Wisconsin, where, it should be admitted, "The impact [of McCarthyism] on the political and cultural life of the state was not particularly great,"[25] indicate strongly that McCarthy ran best in the most heavily Republican areas, and conversely. James G. March has demonstrated this point conclusively with respect to the 1952 primary election.[26] Samuel Lubell has observed that Senator McCarthy in 1952 ran well ahead of his state average in townships populated heavily by people of German extraction, but this also was true of other Republicans, including Senator Taft in the 1952 primary, and Republican Presidential candidates in 1944, 1948, and 1952.[27] Inspection of election returns bears out the thesis that McCarthy ran best where the Republican Party was strongest. McCarthy's strongest showing in 1952, for example, generally took place in those counties giving Walter Kohler, Republican candidate for Governor, their heaviest support. Out of the 71 counties in Wisconsin, 30 gave McCarthy a margin of 2–1 or better, and of these 30, 24 were counties in which Governor Kohler beat his opponent by 3–1 or more. In the 29 counties where he made his strongest race, capturing 75 per cent or more of the two-party vote. Kohler received only 28 per cent of his state-wide vote. But in the 30 counties where McCarthy received 65 per cent of the vote or more, fully 35 per cent of McCarthy's state-wide vote was concentrated.[28]

TABLE IV. *Sentiment about Germany of Those Favorable and Unfavorable to Senator J. McCarthy*

Would you, yourself, like to see Germany again become one of the three or four most powerful countries?

	F (%)	U (%)
Yes	29	25
No	56	59
No opinion	7	8
Qualified	8	8
	100	100
	(N = 454)	(N = 690)

Source: Gallup Survey 529 K, April 1954.

turn would lead us to assume that authoritarians participate less in politics than non-authoritarians. See Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 17 (Summer 1953), pp. 185–201; Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The Peoples' Choice* (New York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce, 1944); and Morris Rosenberg, "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 18 (Winter 1954), pp. 349–66. The relationship is regrettably not so simple, as Robert E. Lane has demonstrated: "Political Personality and Electoral Choice," *American Political Science Review*, 49 (Mar. 1955), pp. 173–90. Apparently, when class is controlled, authoritarians have been found to participate in elections about as much as non-authoritarians, but possibly for different reasons. I include figures on participation here, first because they were available, and second because they reinforce both my own conclusion — that McCarthyites differentiate themselves slightly by their lower rates of participation — and Lane's conclusion — that the differences between presumably authoritarian and non-authoritarian populations with respect to their political participation is negligible.

[25] Leon D. Epstein, *Politics in Wisconsin* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), p. 4.

[26] James G. March, "McCarthy Can Still Be Beaten," *Reporter*, 7 (28 Oct. 1952), pp. 17–19.

[27] Lubell, *Revolt, op. cit.*, p. 269.

[28] It should be remembered that we are not talking about Wisconsin's more populous counties in this analysis, which no doubt explains why a majority of the state-wide Republican vote is not located in those counties giving Republicans their heaviest majorities. See also Bean, *op. cit.*

TABLE V. *Political Information of Those Favorable and Unfavorable to Senator J. McCarthy*

Will you please tell me which of these men you have heard of? And will you tell me what country he is from?

	Favorable			*Unfavorable*		
	Chiang (%)	*Mao* (%)	*Nehru* (%)	*Chiang* (%)	*Mao* (%)	*Nehru* (%)
Yes, correct country	89	34	60	88	42	67
Yes, incorrect or don't know country	6	19	12	8	20	9
Not heard of, no answer	5	47	28	4	38	24
	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(N = 458)	(N = 455)	(N = 454)	(N = 700*)	(N = 689)	(N = 690)

Source: Gallup Survey 529 K, April 1954.

* The fact that the Ns here exceed the total unfavorable population of 693 is perhaps on account of double responses in a small number of cases.

These figures demonstrate that the McCarthy vote was concentrated in areas of Republican strength, and was neither scattered, nor distributed in some pattern unique to McCarthy, nor particularly strong.

Deciding where McCarthyites at the grass roots were located is of course not sufficient to explain his success in official Washington. Many cogent reasons for McCarthy's success have been given, and since they are mutually complementary it is unnecessary to choose among them. McCarthy was, at first, the weapon of a desperate Republican Party. Senator Taft's famous advice, "If one case doesn't work, then bring up another,"[29] is a measure of the lengths to which Republicans were willing to go in those days to embarrass a long-entrenched Democratic administration. Secondly, there was McCarthy's protected position as a member of the Senate.[30] While he was

[29] William S. White, *The Taft Story* (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 85; Jack Anderson and Ronald W. May, *McCarthy: The Man, The Senator, The 'Ism'* (Boston: Beacon, 1952), p. 353.

[30] One analysis which covers these points especially well is Aaron B. Wildavsky's "Exploring the

TABLE VI. *Political Participation of Those Favorable and Unfavorable to Senator J. McCarthy*

Question I. Have you ever voted in any election, or don't you pay any attention to politics?

Question II. In the election in November 1952, did things come up which kept you from voting, or did you happen to vote?

	Favorable		*Unfavorable*	
	I (%)	II (%)	I (%)	II (%)
Yes	86	77	89	81
No	3	20	2	14
Never	11	—	9	—
No, too young	—	3	—	5
	100	100	100	100
	(N = 456)	(N = 455)	(N = 692)	(N = 687)

Source: Gallup Survey 529 K, April 1954.

TABLE VII. *Religious Preference of Those Favorable and Unfavorable to Senator J. McCarthy*

Question: What is your religious preference: Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish?

	F (%)	*U* (%)
Protestant	68	71
Catholic	28	20
Jewish	1	5
Other	2	3
	99	99
	(N = 452)	(N = 685)

Source: Gallup Survey 529 K, April 1954.

never even remotely a significant member of the Club, attacks on him might have been construed by powerful Senators as attacks on Senatorial prerogatives and practices. McCarthy's place in the Senate also gave him the protection of immunity from libel suits, the services of the staff of a Committee, and the powers to hold hearings and issue subpoenas.

Third, one can scarcely discount his personal effectiveness as an imaginative political entrepreneur who exploited the mass media by accommodating his "exposés" to the exigencies of deadlines, and who employed the bulging briefcase, the nonexistent "document," garbled figures, and so on, with stunning effect.[31] A fourth reason for McCarthy's success was no doubt the vulnerability (real or imagined) of the Truman administration on the issue of Communists in government, and a fifth reason would certainly be the emasculation of administrative resistance to McCarthy's activities, by order of President Eisenhower.[32]

All of these are "factors" which contribute to an explanation of McCarthy's phenomenal success in demoralizing federal employees, in blackening the name of the United States abroad, and in dominating the headlines for more than four years. But they do not explain the remarkable fear of McCarthy that seems to have afflicted those somewhat outside his line of fire — newspaper people, professional folk, most academicians, and his colleagues in Congress. This fear can be accounted for, I think, by adding one more factor, a critical assumption made by almost all those for whom McCarthyism was of daily concern. This assumption was that McCarthy was in fact uniquely powerful at the grass roots; that he had a vast following which cross-cut party lines and loyalties, which he could call upon to defeat his enemies. Richard Rovere reports: "After the 1952 elections, it was believed in the Senate that McCarthy was responsible for the presence there of eight men — which meant that he was responsible for the absence of eight others."[33]

III. A TEST FOR A CRITICAL ASSUMPTION

Surely a useful task for policy science would have been to test such beliefs of policy-makers against the available evidence. It is disquiet-

TABLE VIII. *Social-economic Rating of Those Favorable and Unfavorable to Senator J. McCarthy (Rating by interviewer)*

	F (%)	*U* (%)
Upper	3	3
Above average	32	34
Average	2	1
Below average	47	45
Lower	11	14
	95*	97*
	(N = 433)	(N = 675)

Source: Gallup Survey 529 K, April 1954.

* Totals are less than 100 per cent apparently because interviewers failed to rate some respondents.

Content of McCarthyism," *Australian Outlook*, 9 (June 1955), pp. 88–104. See also John B. Oakes, "Inquiry Into McCarthy's Status," *New York Times Magazine*, 12 Apr. 1953.

[31] See Rovere, *op. cit.*, and Cecil Holland, "Short Course on McCarthy Techniques," *Washington Star*, 11 Apr. 1954.

[32] See Martin Merson, *The Private Diary of a Public Servant* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 72–81.

[33] Rovere, *op. cit.*, p. 37. Rovere has named only five of the eight casualties in his book, and as I write has not responded to a letter asking him to name the other three. He includes Raymond Baldwin and William Benton of Connecticut, Millard Tydings of Maryland, Ernest McFarland of Arizona, and Scott Lucas of Illinois.

TABLE IX. *Educational Levels Attained by Those Favorable and Unfavorable to Senator J. McCarthy*

	F (%)	*U* (%)
No school	1	1
Up to 8 years school	26	21
9–12 years	53	51
Over 12 years	17	24
	97	97
	(N = 441)	(N = 682)

Source: Gallup Survey 529 K, April 1954.

ing to wonder how history might have been changed if the evidence had shown a more modest number of scalps on McCarthy's belt — or none at all. After all, the only thoroughly documented victory of this kind for McCarthy was the replacement of Republican Senator Raymond Baldwin by Democratic Senator William Benton of Connecticut — hardly a net gain for the right wing of the Senate. Baldwin has made no secret of the fact that abuse at the hand of McCarthy during the investigation of the Malmedy massacre was the determining factor in his decision to leave Washington.[34]

It does not seem entirely pointlesss to undertake an analysis of at least one of the other seven cases. There are those who still believe that McCarthy was a powerful influence with voters all over the nation and that these voters rose up and smote some of his most distinguished adversaries. It seems important to make at least a token effort to verify this belief. If it is correct, the usual supposition by political scientists that political support is in general not transferable from one figure to another must go by the board. We would have to conclude that American politics is a more dangerous and unstable game than we had suspected, if a demagogue can criss-cross the country and impose his will upon the electorates of states far from his own.

Political observers seem most willing to grant that McCarthy was important in the defeat of Senator Tydings in 1950, and of Senator Benton in 1952. Rovere says: "McCarthy, a nobody in 1949, threw his weight against Tydings in 1950, and, lo, Tydings lost";[35] and, ". . . he had, in fact, attended to Senator Benton's expulsion by the voters of Connecticut."[36] McCarthy's reputation for grass roots political effectiveness outside his home state rests most

[34] McFarland is generally supposed to have been the victim of the uncommonly vigorous campaigning of his opponent, Barry Goldwater, and Scott Lucas was thought by many observers to have fallen prey to the aftermath of the Kefauver crime investigations. Rovere may be claiming more for McCarthy here than most people ever gave him credit for.

[35] Rovere, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

TABLE X. *Party Sympathies and Voting Records of Those Favorable and Unfavorable to Senator J. McCarthy*

Questions

I Did you vote for Eisenhower (Republican) or Stevenson (Democratic)?

II If the elections for Congress were being held today, which party would you like to see win in this state — the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?

III (If undecided)
As of today, do you lean more to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

IV In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, or Independent?

	Favorable (%)				*Unfavorable* (%)			
Question	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Republican	76	53	37	46	49	29	28	24
Democratic	21	29	23	30	49	57	38	58
Undecided	—	17	27	—	—	13	26	—
Other	3	1	13	24	2	1	8	24
	100 (N = 350)	100 (N = 456)	100 (N = 77)	100 (N = 456)	100 (N = 560)	100 (N = 693)	100 (N = 88)	100 (N = 693)

Source: Gallup Survey 529 K, April 1954.

heavily on these two cases. The easy availability of appropriate statistical materials prompts me to select the Benton case for further examination here.[37]

William Benton was appointed Senator from Connecticut in 1949 by Governor Chester Bowles, his erstwhile partner in the advertising business, to succeed Raymond Baldwin, who retired to the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors. There was some question at the time of Benton's appointment as to whether he was a *bona fide* resident of the state of Connecticut, but he was duly qualified, and took his seat. Benton's occupational record was unusually distinguished. He had been an advertising executive, Vice President of the University of Chicago, President of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and an Assistant Secretary of State. In 1950 he stood for election to the seat he had held by appointment, and won with 50.06 per cent of the state-wide two-party vote.

Returning to the Senate, Benton went out of his way to tangle repeatedly with Senator McCarthy, urging an investigation of McCarthy's finances, among other harassments. McCarthy struck back with characteristic resourcefulness, and managed to have Benton investigated too. When Benton stood again for election for his full term, in the fall of 1952, McCarthy campaigned briefly in Connecticut against him. Benton lost, polling 45.80 per cent of the vote.

Rovere, and presumably others, concluded that McCarthy "got" Benton. But no reasonable construction of the evidence at hand seems likely to sustain this conclusion. A few elementary facts about Connecticut politics should be noted. First, Connecticut had no primary system, a situation which has since been changed; hence at the time there was little incentive for most voters to reveal their party affiliations to registrars of voters, and only a minority did so. However, Connecticut voters generally vote straight tickets, for all the reasons for which straight tickets are popular in other parts of the country, and also because the voting machines in use in Connecticut make a split ballot difficult. In order to split a ticket, it is necessary first to pull a party lever and then cut individual candidates off the ballot, replacing them with other candidates.[38]

It should surprise no one to learn, then, that just as Benton's vote went down in 1952 as compared with 1950, so Democratic fortunes generally declined in the same period. For each of these years, the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote for the "top" of the ticket (excluding the race in which Benton figured) was calculated, giving Democratic "norms" for each year.[39] For both years Benton's percentage corresponds exactly with the Democratic norm, as Table XI demonstrates.

Now, how are we to account for this general depression in the Democratic vote? It would be too much, I think, to attribute these results to McCarthy's efforts, since a more parsimonious explanation is readily at hand.

TABLE XI. *Democratic Percentage of Two-party Vote in 1950 and 1952, Connecticut*

	1950 (%)	1952 (%)
Benton	50.06	45.80
Democratic norm	50.19	45.87

[37] Those interested in the Tydings case might consult the long, but for our purposes inconclusive, Hearings and Report of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, *The Maryland Senatorial Election of 1950*. Hearings, 20 Feb.–11 Apr. 1951. Senate Report 647 (82 Cong., 1st sess.), or Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Professional Public Relations and Political Power* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), pp. 107–43.

[38] But even without this mechanical aid to straight ticket voting, Connecticut voters seem generally to favor the straight ticket. In 1956, in Wallingford, Connecticut, (pop. 11,994), where an overwhelming majority of voters was registered as independent, I conducted a pre-election survey of between 3 and 4 per cent of the population, using paper and pencil ballots, and over 80 per cent of all ballots were straight tickets. The results and methods of this survey are reported in the Wallingford (Conn.) *Post*, 1 Nov. 1956.

[39] In 1950 I averaged the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote for the offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Senator (Long Term), and At Large Representative. In 1952 I averaged the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote for President, Senator (Short Term), and At Large Representative. In 1950 Benton ran for the Short Term, and in 1952 for the Long Term Senatorial Seat. His percentage of the two-party vote is in both cases excluded from the Democratic norm.

For their painstaking help in collecting and tabulating these statistics, I want to thank Daniel D. Polsby and Linda O. Polsby.

Clearly Connecticut Democrats in 1952 were caught in the landslide that elected Dwight D. Eisenhower President.[10]

It still might be argued that Senator McCarthy affected the outcome of the Benton race by robbing Benton of support he had in 1950 and which he could not replace elsewhere. This argument would be based on the premise that Benton would have improved his position as compared with the rest of the Democratic ticket if McCarthy had not campaigned against him.

How to test this assertion? Each of Connecticut's 169 towns reports election returns separately, and so it is possible to detect changes in the location of a candidate's political strength within the state. Fig. 1 shows that Benton deviated by more than 3 per cent in 1952 from his 1950 relationship to the norm in only two towns in the entire state. Benton gained on the norm in 71 towns, stayed the same in 51, and fell behind in 47. Nine of ten towns where Benton fell behind by 3 per cent or more are located in the home county of the 1952 Democratic ticket leader, Abraham Ribicoff, who ran for Senator (short term) in that year, and lost by a narrow margin. Thus Benton's comparatively poor showing in these towns can be attributed to Ribicoff's unusual popularity, and not to some disability of his own.

We have in effect judged McCarthy's impact against two base-lines, by comparing Benton's performance in 1952 with his performance in 1950, when McCarthy did not campaign against him, and, secondly, by comparing Benton's performance with that of the rest of the "top" of the state-wide Democratic ticket in 1952, against whom McCarthy did not campaign. This evidence shows that Benton's record deviates hardly at all from the record of his party in state-wide elections for both years. In general, it appears that Benton maintained or improved upon his 1950 record in 1952, a fact obscured by the effects of the Eisenhower landslide. In the light of these findings, the granting of credit to McCarthy for Benton's defeat is no doubt unjustified, if not entirely erroneous.



FIGURE 1. Net Change, 1952–1950, in Senator Benton's Percentage of the Two-Party Vote Compared with the Democratic Norm, by Towns in Connecticut

IV. Policy Science and McCarthyism

It cannot be overemphasized that most of the facts on which this analysis has been based were available while McCarthy was still very much alive, and in the headlines. I think this analysis shows McCarthy to have been more dependent on his party, and personally much less effective at the grass roots, than has been commonly supposed. The erroneous supposition that McCarthy was a powerful figure with some politically meaningful segment of "the

[10] Two plausible alternative explanations might be mentioned. The first is that 1950 Democratic voters changed over to the Republican Party in 1952 not because they were attracted by Eisenhower but because they were repelled by Benton. This explanation is not testable, given the data available. The second is that McCarthy and McCarthy-generated issues supplied a substantial part of General Eisenhower's personal appeal in 1952. This seems highly unlikely on the basis of much evidence: (1) McCarthy was much less well known than Eisenhower; (2) Eisenhower had a tremendous personal appeal to voters, apart from *any* issues; (3) Eisenhower ran better in 1956, after McCarthy became passé, than in 1952. Consult Stouffer, *op. cit.*; Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row Peterson, 1954); and, especially, Herbert H. Hyman and Paul Sheatsley, "The Political Appeal of President Eisenhower," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 17 (Winter 1953–4), pp. 443–60.

people" no doubt served to make him so in the peculiarly isolated subculture that is official Washington. The consequences of this error are well known to all those who were "tuned in" to news media anywhere in the world over the last decade.

As men of knowledge, policy scientists could profitably turn their attention to making sure that information is readily available which bears on policy questions in order to reduce the incidence of errors of this kind in the future. In the case of McCarthy, commercial polling organizations expended huge sums of money taking the public pulse. Yet time and again opportunities to test important hypotheses about the sources and nature of McCarthy supporters were lost. One example of this was a Gallup Poll which turned up two small neighboring Pennsylvania communities — one of them 2–1 in favor of McCarthy and the other 5–3 against him. Nothing in the report accompanying this finding disclosed any other basis for differentiating these communities — nor did subsequent inquiry to the Gallup organization.[41] Instead of using successive waves of data collection to refine hypotheses about the locations within the population of McCarthy supporters, to over-sample strategic portions of the population, or otherwise to take advantage of the research opportunity before them, the Gallup survey wastefully repeated the same battery of questions with the same type of sample. Hopefully, policy scientists interested in McCarthy's political potential could have brought their working hypotheses to the attention of pollsters who planned in any event to exploit public interest by conducting polls on the McCarthy question.

The political potential of McCarthy was, of course, a major point of interest throughout his brief period of notoriety. Prompt attention to such data as were available could quickly have scotched widely prevalent notions that McCarthy was a fascist leader, or that he was a serious Presidential contender. The essential aimlessness of McCarthy's appeal could be deduced, for example, from the fact that McCarthy support seems to have been highly diffused and multidimensional, rather than effectively mobilized and focused on concrete political goals.

Consider the following evidence. Pro-McCarthy sentiment has been measured from time to time on different issues. We would assume that McCarthyites according to one measure would be the same people as McCarthyites on another; otherwise, McCarthy's potential political effectiveness must be seen as greatly reduced. Table XII shows the results of such a comparison. Those who express themselves as favorable to McCarthy on particular points tend with some (but by no means unanimous) regularity to be 'generally' favorable to McCarthy. Otherwise, populations in common are irregular, and not conspicuously high. Table XIII, on the other hand, indicates a tendency for anti-McCarthy sentiment to be somewhat more cohesive and self-consistent on a variety of issues.[42]

[41] Gallup, "Two Pennsylvania Test-tube Towns . . . . ," *loc. cit.*, and letter to author from Emery H. Ruby, editor, American Institute of Public Opinion, 22 July 1954.

[42] Perfect consistency of responses would be scored in these tables as 100 per cent, which would mean that all of those answering in a pro-McCarthy way on one question also answered in a pro-McCarthy way on another. While 100 per cent is a "perfect score," an unknown percentage is undoubtedly lost through failure to respond to questions, misunderstandings, incorrect recordings of answers, and so on. If we assume that such failures in communication and in the mechanics of polling occur with equal probability in both anti-McCarthy and pro-McCarthy questionnaires, it becomes possible to compare Table XII, which shows consistency scores for a pro-McCarthy population, and Table XIII, which shows similar scores for an anti-McCarthy population. Comparing each of the cells of the tables in turn, we find: 15 cases where the anti-McCarthy population is 20 or more per cent above the pro-McCarthy population in self-consistency; 3 cases where the anti-McCarthy population is 5–19 per cent above the pro-McCarthy population; 6 cases in which the pro- and anti-McCarthy populations are within 4 per cent of one another; 1 case in which the pro-McCarthy population exceeds the anti-McCarthy population in self-consistency by 5–19 per cent; 4 cases in which the pro-McCarthy population is 20 or more per cent above the anti-McCarthy population in self-consistency.

These last four cases all fall in the third question. A moment's reflection will no doubt suggest the obvious proposition that the anti-McCarthy population could reasonably be expected to embrace both people who are willing to defend Army Sec-

TABLE XII. *Populations in Common Among Various Pro-McCarthy Attitudes*

N	I (%)	II (%)	III (%)	IV (%)	V (%)	VI (%)	*Total population* (%)
I = 309		38	57	84	64	39	22
II = 198	60		64	71	58	32	14
III = 430	41	41		60	42	25	30
IV = 458	57	31	56		57	33	32
V = 306	65	38	59	86		40	22
VI = 178	69	36	60	85	69		13

Source: Gallup Survey 530 K, April 1954.

Responses compared

I. Extreme liking (+ 3 to 5) for McCarthy on 11 point scale.
II. No to "Do you think that McCarthy and Cohn used improper means in trying to get a commission for Schine?"
III. YES to "Do you think that Stevens and Adams tried to stop McCarthy from investigating the Army at Fort Monmouth?"
IV. Favorable general opinion of Senator McCarthy.
V. "Approve" to "In general, do you approve or disapprove of the methods used by McCarthy?"
VI. McCarthy's support would make respondent more likely to vote for a congressional candidate.

I do not mean to argue that evidence such as this would have been influential in the calculations of political decision-makers, had it become known among policy scientists. Politicians have been known to ignore expert advice, even when they were paying for it themselves. On the other hand, the fact that information of this kind was neither known nor sought by policy scientists entirely precluded its diffusion to politicians.

Let me summarize, in conclusion, what policy scientists could have established about McCarthyism during the period when it was still a live issue. First, they could have confronted myths about McCarthy with facts. It would have been especially useful if they had mobilized information about the actual consequences of crossing McCarthy and diffused it to those in a position to withhold from him the freedom he enjoyed for so long to create the political atmosphere in which he thrived. Second, they could have indicated the extent to which pro-McCarthy sentiments were ineffectively mobilized politically, revealing that McCarthy was unusually dependent upon regular Republican support both in the Senate and in his home state. McCarthy was more deeply a political phenomenon, perhaps more vulnerable to a change in the definition of his position by Washington politicians, than these politicians themselves realized. Third, policy scientists could have assembled information about current states and locations of pro-McCarthy sentiment. By tracing the ebbs and flows of McCarthy's popularity, inferences could have been made about the kinds of events triggering gains and losses in his popularity, hence about the size and locations of the margins of McCarthy's political appeal.

A latent function of making concerted demands for these kinds of data would no doubt have been a general improvement in the sources of supply for such data — notably the commercial polls. Issues that capture extraordinary public attention are precisely those in which polling organizations are willing to make their greatest investment; hence it is uniquely possible in these cases for policy scientists to help decision-makers to make rational choices, to

retary Stevens and people who disapproved of him. But the pro-McCarthy population could scarcely be expected to find virtue in McCarthy's enemy of the moment. I do not want, however, to overinterpret these tables. They are meant only to provide a simple thumbnail example of the kind of thing one might have done with the data available.

TABLE XIII. *Populations in Common Among Various Anti-McCarthy Attitudes*

N	I (%)	II (%)	III (%)	IV (%)	V (%)	VI (%)	*Total population* (%)
I = 527		61	36	86	84	64	37
II = 541	60		38	68	80	55	38
III = 295	65	69		80	81	63	21
IV = 611	74	60	39		88	63	43
V = 721	61	60	33	75		56	51
VI = 466	73	64	40	83	87		33

Source: Gallup Survey 530 K, April 1954.

Responses compared

I. Extreme dislike (− 3 to 5) for McCarthy on 11 point scale.
II. YES to "Do you think that McCarthy and Cohn used improper means in trying to get a commission for Schine?"
III. No to "Do you think that Stevens and Adams tried to stop McCarthy from investigating the Army at Fort Monmouth?"
IV. Unfavorable general opinion of Senator McCarthy.
V. Disapproval of McCarthy's methods.
VI. Less likely to vote for a congressional candidate supported by McCarthy.

help data-collection agencies to improve on the relevance of their inquiries, and, finally, to help themselves by cultivating increasingly meaningful and useful sources of information. The brief demonstration I have made in the case of McCarthy is meant to suggest that such developments as these are not only desirable but feasible.

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THE INTELLIGENT CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE ABUSES OF STATISTICS

The Kennedy Document and the Catholic Vote

• *AARON B. WILDAVSKY*

Politicians and lobbyists have long sought to make advantageous use of the supposed preferences of some population group. The Negro vote, the farm vote, the Catholic vote, the labor vote, and many others are bandied about as political commodities designed to enhance the claims of a candidate for office or an interest group for preferment. So long as the use of election statistics and opinion polls was in its infancy, these claims (to guarantee support or threaten to withdraw it) could be accepted or rejected on intuitive grounds where no man could claim much greater competence than another. The appearance of presumably scientific studies of voting as well as the development of the arts of statistical manipulation have created new opportunities for the purveyors of bloc votes and new difficulties for the interested but necessarily amateur citizen and public official. How are they to evaluate these important political claims backed up by impressive and complicated displays of data?

Political scientists and sociologists have an interest in thwarting the suspect use of their work to gain political advantage. They have an obligation to provide defensive measures which the interested citizen may use to appraise demands resting upon the alleged behavior of various population groups. In this paper an actual attempt to parlay the predicted voting behavior of Catholics into a nomination for high political office in the United States is analyzed in such a way that the intelligent citizen is provided with criteria by which to judge similar attempts regardless of the group involved.

I would like to thank Allan P. Sindler for bringing the Kennedy Document to my attention, Michael Margolis for helping me compile Table A, and Nelson W. Polsby, H. Douglas Price, and Raymond E. Wolfinger for useful criticisms.

Probably the most important consideration in choosing presidential nominees is the expectation that they can win. For this reason presidential candidates claim victory, create public manifestations of support, and seek to demonstrate to the delegates that they can win while other likely aspirants can not. The use of public opinion polls to pin the "can't win" and "can win" label on candidates is by now a routine tactic in the convention wars. But the preparation of reports utilizing voting studies and electoral statistics, backed up by tables and charts, written in the language of the political scientist and the sociologist, and designed to aid a particular candidate is a relatively new phenomenon.

During the closing weeks of the 1956 preconvention campaign, a remarkable document was widely circulated among Democratic leaders. Its purpose was to mobilize support for Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts as the Democratic candidate for Vice-President of the United States. The argument it advanced was a practical one: that the Democrats could win the 1956 election by running a Catholic for the vice-presidency; whereas they would be likely to lose if they did not do so. This conclusion was buttressed by a series of propositions relating the voting behavior of Catholics to the requirements of the Democratic party in national elections.[1]

If claims are to be made from the findings

[1] According to the well-informed James M. Burns, this survey was put together by Kennedy's assistant, Ted Sorensen, and "quietly let out to reporters as an analysis drawn up by 'backers' of Kennedy." (John Kennedy, *A Political Profile*, New York, p. 181.) It was used again in 1960 and, after the election, accepted as a correct prophecy by researchers for the Republican National Committee. (*The Washington Post*, April 9, 1961.)

and raw material of political science, then consideration of what may and may not be accepted as proof is essential. In order to accomplish this purpose, the Kennedy document is summarized and subjected to critical scrutiny. It then becomes possible to establish a minimum list of critical standards which interested persons may use to decide whether such documents are to be taken seriously. The original document — *Catholic Voters and the Democratic National Ticket* — is reprinted in the Appendix and the reader may wish to consult it before proceeding further.

I. Internal Criticism

Catholic Voters and the Democratic National Ticket (hereafter referred to as the Document) puts forward four basic propositions which may be summarized as follows:

1) there is a Catholic vote
2) this vote is critical for Democratic success at national elections
3) the Democratic Party has lost and is still losing the Catholic vote
4) this lost vote may be recaptured by running a Catholic on the national ticket as Vice-President.

Although it is not possible to demonstrate that all these propositions are false, it can be shown that none of them is demonstrably true.

The first proposition holds "that there is, or can be, such a thing as a 'Catholic vote,' whereby a high proportion of Catholics of all ages, residences, occupations and economic status vote for a well-known Catholic candidate or a ticket with special Catholic appeal."[2] It is obvious that not all Catholics are part of this Catholic bloc, and easily demonstrable that some Catholics on some occasions vote against a Catholic candidate. Who, then, are the voters who make up this Catholic bloc? They can not be those who vote for a Catholic candidate because the latter belongs to the party they favor, or for any reason other than his Catholicism. We may say, then, that the Catholic voter is he who votes (or would vote) against his other tendencies (if he has any), or turns out when he otherwise would not, at a particular election for the sole and specific reason that a candidate identified as Catholic is found on the ballot.[3] In order to determine whether this condition is present we would need to know what the individual voter's intention was before the election and ascertain his reasons, if any, for changing it. We would also have to be able to identify those voters who switched before we could ask them any questions. Neither of these essential conditions has been met. Instead, the Document introduces the dubious concept of the "shifters" which we shall consider later on.

It is important to note that the explanation, the causal factor, for the existence of the Catholic vote is the presence of a well-known Catholic candidate or a ticket with a special Catholic appeal. For this reason we may define the conditions under which the phenomenon known as the Catholic vote *will not appear*. They are: (1) when two known Catholics are opposing each other, and (2) when two non-Catholics (neither of whom or both of whom make a special Catholic appeal) are opposing each other. A third condition, in which a Catholic and a non-Catholic, or a candidate who makes a Catholic appeal versus one who does not, are opposed in a district where there are some Catholic voters, must be satisfied before the Catholic vote has even a theoretical opportunity for manifesting itself. And whatever relationship or pattern is offered as proof of the operation of the Catholic vote in case three situations must be shown not to occur in cases one and two. Yet this control is not utilized in the Document.

Although no proof or even probability of the existence of a Catholic vote is presented, surface indications (though certainly not proof) to the contrary are found within the Document. It is quite possible that considerations of nationality play a larger role in determining the votes of Catholics than does their religion. Information from the various polls cited indicates that there were significant variations in the way the Italian, Irish, and Polish ethnic groups voted, although they may have voted on the same side. There is, furthermore, no

[2] By a "ticket with special Catholic appeal" the Document apparently refers to the presence of a Catholic on the ballot as a Vice-Presidential candidate. No other standard for appealing to voters who are Catholics is mentioned. All quotations in this section are taken from the Document.

[3] The strategy of the argument demands that the "Catholic vote" be narrowed to those Catholics who voted Republican or who would not have voted at all. There would be no sales value in getting a Catholic candidate merely to keep people who were going to turn out and to vote Democratic anyway.

demonstrable relationship between the size of a state's Catholic population and its Presidential vote. If anything, though this is dubious, the figures presented in the Document indicate that Eisenhower (said to be the beneficiary of a shift in the Catholic vote)[4] did proportionately less well in states with a large Catholic population (Rhode Island, Massachusetts) than in those with a much lesser percentage of Catholic voters (Montana, California). And on the surface there would appear to be less reason to suspect the operation of a Catholic vote in 1952 when Catholic voters split 51 to 49 per cent among the two major parties than in 1948 when the split was 66 to 44.

These figures do suggest that Catholics who vote (not the Catholic voter as defined above) supported the Democratic Party in considerable number but are tending to vote Republican nationally. There is a world of difference between stating what may be regarded as an empirical truth — that in 1948 and in other years voting Catholics favored certain candidates and parties in large number — and proceeding from this to conclude that the causal factor at work was the presence of a Catholic on the ballot. Indeed, this can not be so, for there were no Catholics on FDR's winning combinations, and the suggestion that Al Smith's candidacy carried over for many years in influencing Catholic votes is given no substantiation. The Document commits the cardinal error of proceeding from gross statistical parallelisms (though even these are inaccurate) to causal relationships by loose inference rather than logical or empirical argument. Any attempt to predict the future must be based upon knowledge of the motive forces behind the parallelisms observed. Otherwise it becomes merely a matter of faith to separate out one particular factor of the many that might conceivably be responsible for the phenomenon.

The second proposition may be stated as follows: Since the Catholic vote is concentrated in "14 pivotal Catholic states" and *"whether these states go Democratic usually determines whether the Democrats win the [national] election,"* a Democratic victory in a national election depends upon its capturing this Catholic vote. In order to substantiate this proposition the Document employs a means of argument strikingly similar to the old story which goes, "For want of a nail the horse was lost, for want of a horse . . ." and so on until the nail decides the course of the war. However far-fetched this story may appear, it has the virtue of not claiming to identify the particular nail, as differentiated from all other similar nails, without which not only past but future wars were doomed to be lost. All that the Document actually demonstrates is that once upon a time the Democrats won national elections (and therefore needed no additional votes), and that now they are losing national elections and need more votes from somewhere — upstate, downstate, or middlestate; Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish; rich man, poor man, or any man — lest they continue to fall upon evil days.

Turning to Table 1, column three, we discover that the percentage of Catholic voters in each state is distorted by "applying Campbell's national average figures . . . to the official turnout figures for 1952. . . ." The national average is made up of highly disparate percentages for each state. A statistical procrustean bed may discomfort all of its occupants. Furthermore, figures on Protestant turnout are artificially deflated by the South, which is largely Protestant, and where even whites do not vote in great numbers. And the three states with over 50 per cent Catholic population gave Eisenhower a relatively low advantage, compared to those with only 20 per cent of voting Catholics.[5] These are, however, minor matters compared to the more serious errors which follow.

It is, first of all, incorrect to speak of any combination of states totaling more than a

[4] This raises the question of how Eisenhower, a Protestant with a Protestant running-mate, could benefit from the Catholic vote under the terms of the definition. This point will be considered later on.

[5] A glance at Table 2 reveals that there is no connection between the number of Catholic voters in a city and the decline in Democratic vote from 1948 to 1952. Outside of Philadelphia where the Democratic vote increased, it is possible to construct the following table which is just as misleading as Table 2:

City	*% of Catholics*		*Democratic Decline*	
Detroit	39%	Decrease	1.4%	Increase
New York	38%		3.6%	
San Francisco	33%		4.2%	
Los Angeles	22%		5.2%	

It is always possible to claim that even if a Catholic candidate did not do too well in Catholic areas, a non-Catholic might have done worse. One way to check on this would be to compare the results

majority of the electoral vote as in any sense more critical, valuable, or pivotal than any other such combination. In a fairly close election one may choose any number of combinations of states whose defection to the other side would have reversed the course of events. And if one can properly speak of certain states being critical in a past election when the returns are in, there is no logical or empirical reason to believe that this will necessarily hold true for any succeeding election held at a four-year interval. For this reason there is no necessary connection between the margin by which Eisenhower won in 1952 and the number of votes needed to defeat him in 1956 when conditions may have utterly changed the extent and basis of his support.

Perhaps the basic fallacy underlying this section of the Document is the entirely unwarranted assumption that ". . . *The Catholic voters in each of these* [pivotal] *cities can usually determine the size of the Democratic margin in those cities. . . .*" No evidence is offered to indicate how it is possible to say that any group provided the winning or losing "margin." Since Catholics are in a minority in these cities and not all of them vote Republican it would be equally or more logical to suppose that some majority or combination of minorities was more important. We are not dealing with homogeneous economic units where the last one in a series can be considered marginal. The concept of the Catholic margin demands that the votes of all other groups be kept as a constant — an unrealistic condition. It also demands that the authors of the Document be able to separate out what they define as the Catholic vote from Catholics who vote in their roles as wage earners, city dwellers, members of ethnic groups, or any of the myriad combinations thereof.

The third proposition is deceptively obvious. It holds that studies of the 1948 and 1952 presidential elections reveal that the Democratic Party has lost "the Catholic Democratic vote," to a critical degree. There is no denying that these works have recorded a decline in the percentage of Catholic voters supporting the Democratic Party. But this hypothetical Catholic vote can only be made up of those who would turn out to vote or who would vote against their other tendencies because a Catholic candidate or a ticket with special Catholic appeal appeared on the ballot. Now, there may be many reasons why voters who are Catholic did not vote for a Democratic candidate, but the appearance of a Catholic on the ballot cannot possibly be one of them, since both presidential tickets were made up exclusively of Protestants.

Perhaps, it may be alleged, the Catholic vote has been latent in the national arena, but we can observe it at work in congressional and senatorial elections. If it exists in these cases, then it is possible, although not certain, that it might be transferred to a presidential election. As "proof" of this contention we are presented with a selected list of Democratic Catholic legislators, from areas in which there are many voters who are Catholics, who ran ahead of the party's presidential candidate in their electorates. This represents the sum total of the data. Yet the study proceeds to the baseless conclusion that the sole and exclusive reason for the success of these Catholic candidates was their religion. Moreover, we are not told whether any of these Catholic candidates ran against other Catholic candidates, thus completely cancelling any alleged religious influence. (In electorates with a heavy Catholic population we would expect two Catholics to oppose each other quite frequently.) And where are those Catholics who lost? And, still worse, where are the non-Catholics who ran ahead of their tickets?

Before turning to the "shifters," one piece of arithmetical manipulation must be discussed. Table 4 lists the "Number of Percentage Points of Two-Party Vote by Which National Ticket Ran Behind Candidates Listed." In every case where the Document permits us to check these figures they have been grossly exaggerated. Thus we discover that "Dodd won in Hartford by 8 per cent while Stevenson was losing by 1 per cent." Further on, we find that these figures have been added to reach the astounding conclusion that Stevenson trailed Dodd by 9 per cent. Let us assume that a local candidate re-

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from one election to another and see if the presence of a Catholic candidate has reduced the "spread" between the parties. Thus if a Republican Catholic lost it still might be true that his margin of defeat was less than that of his party in previous years. If this proved to be true for many districts, then one might suspect the presence of a Catholic voting bloc. But the Document presents no evidence of this kind. The burden of proof must rest with the proponents.

ceived 80 per cent of the votes cast and his opponent 20 per cent, thus giving him a 60 per cent advantage. At the same time his party's presidential candidate lost that district by 80 per cent to 20 per cent giving him a losing margin of 60 per cent. Since the local candidate received 80 per cent and the presidential candidate 20 per cent, we would normally subtract the two figures and end up with a 60 per cent difference between them. The method employed by the Document, however, would add the two differences together and come up with an impossible grand total of 120 per cent.

Given the practical objective of the Document, it was essential that it isolate a group of voters known as the Catholic bloc, and indicate that they would be ready to vote for a Democratic national ticket under the appropriate circumstances. Using the Michigan nation-wide voting survey, they find that Eisenhower received around 49 per cent of the votes of Catholics in 1952 while the Republican candidate in 1948 received only 34 per cent. It is apparently on this basis (by subtracting the two numbers and dividing by 49) that they arrived at the following conclusion: "Approximately 30 per cent of these Catholics for Eisenhower were 'shifters' — that is, even on the basis of 1948 when the Catholic vote was already slipping away from the Democrats . . . they would have been expected to vote Democratic in 1952. These shifters . . . we shall call 'normally Democratic Catholics' . . ."[6] Without any justification, the Document assumes that all voting Catholics who voted for a Democratic President in 1948 are in some way regular adherents of the party. Those who supported Eisenhower in 1952 are further assumed to come from this number, rather than having been new voters or former Republican voters, although there is no reason why this is necessarily so. If these presumed shifters are equated with the Catholic vote, then one would have to account for their desertion of the Democratic party by the presence of a Catholic on the Republican ticket. Otherwise, they would not have been voting against their "normal" preference and could not be considered part of the Catholic voting bloc. The Document has failed to establish the identity of the shifters or to indicate in any way why some Catholics may have voted Democratic in 1948 and Republican in 1952.

The fourth proposition holds that the Democratic Party may recapture its lost Catholic vote, thus guaranteeing a national electoral victory, by running a Catholic for Vice-President. Even if we permit ourselves to believe that the first three propositions express actual relationships, there is no compelling reason for accepting the fourth. The assumption is that a Catholic vice-presidential candidate would cause the shifters to vote for a Democratic President. But since these shifters did not vote Republican for ascertainable religious reasons, one cannot make any inference regarding their future voting behavior without some knowledge of the underlying factors responsible for this past decision. If, to take one possibility, it is the social position of these voters which has changed their voting habits, it would be anyone's guess as to the effect of a Catholic candidate upon them. Their "natural" inclination would then be to vote Republican, and the task of the Document would be to show how this might be broken; a task it has not performed because it is as much in the dark about the causal factors as we are.

The great claim the Document makes is that

> If Stevenson could have held in 1952 *only* those Catholics who had voted for Truman in 1948 but for Ike in 1952 — or if he could recapture them in 1956 — this would, as shown in Table 3, *add 132 electoral votes to the Democratic column, enough when combined with the Solid South to provide a majority of electoral votes!*

Turning to Table 3, we find it is based on questionable assumptions whose absence vitiates the intended conclusion. Column three contains the "Proportion of Eisenhower Vote Constituting Margin by Which He Carried State" and column 4 the "Estimated Per Cent of Eisenhower Vote in 1952, Made Up of 'Normally Democratic' Catholic Voters Who Shifted." We are then supposed to compare the tables and see that a virtually complete shift of these voters to the Democratic nominee would give the party 132 electoral votes. But in order to reach this conclusion we must first assume that there are marginal voters, that they are Catholic, and that they are the same people known as Catholic shifters. And even so, the difference between the two columns is so slight that all other factors must be assumed to remain pre-

[6] The existence of "normally Democratic Catholics" who could be "expected" to vote Democratic is purely hypothetical. This is another instance where the Document begins by taking for granted the very thing it has to prove.

cisely the same or to cancel each other out in order not to affect the results. Eisenhower must draw the same percentage of voters from all other groups and a Catholic Vice-President must not alienate other Democratic voters.[7]

By making more modest (though less politically useful) claims, the authors of the Document could have done much better. Instead of adopting their terribly demanding definition of the Catholic vote, they might have conceived of it as referring to situations in which Catholicism is an independent variable of fluctuating salience with respect to the voting choice. Whatever the causes of Catholic defection from the Democratic Party, the Document could have tried to demonstrate that the presence of a Catholic candidate on the ballot would increase the saliency of religion to Catholics and thus lead more of them to vote for the Party. Then they might have claimed not that a Catholic candidate would guarantee victory but that he would gain more support from his religion than he would lose or, at least, that he would not necessarily lose support. But, as it stands, the Document does not even provide essential evidence for this lesser claim. The whole possibility of anti-Catholic voting is dismissed in the most cavalier and speculative way. In considering Al Smith's vote, for example, the Document uses one set of figures when discussing his losses and another set ("selected counties" at that) when talking about his gains. The comparison with the Democratic vote in 1924 is particularly unfortunate because it does not take into account the effects of LaFollette's independent candidacy. Turning to another example, we note that the measure of Catholic defection from the Democratic Party is the percentage of Catholic votes for Truman and for Stevenson. Yet there would have had to be a drop in this figure for most sizeable groups, since Truman won and Stevenson lost. Hence to establish that the defection of Catholics was any more significant than that of any other sizeable groups, one would have to show that it was disproportionately large. The Document does not do this.

In seeking to refute the "Al Smith myth" the authors of the Document have fashioned one of their own. They are not content to rest with Lubell and Harris on the proposition that the Al Smith campaign marked the beginning of an era in which the Democratic Party "created a new political base in the large Northern metropolitan areas." They read into this the assumption that this new political base was predominantly Catholic in nature, whereas it could just as well have been a combination of economic and social status, minority status, and many other factors. From this unwarranted assumption they proceed to another: ". . . A Catholic vice-presidential nominee could refashion this base as Al Smith did, and begin a new era of Democratic victories. . . ." Assuming that a Vice-President is equal in appeal (or lack of it) to a President, one would have to go further and assume that all or most of the conditions existing in 1928 and succeeding years would be present in 1956 before agreeing with the Document. And in that case we might repeat a situation where, according to the Document, "1928 [1956?] was a Republican year, regardless of who was on either ticket."

II. External Criticism

Thus far we have limited our criticism solely to internal evidence in the Document. It should not come as a surprise, however, to discover that when electoral statistics not contained in the Document are consulted, they contradict all of its significant findings. Ralph M. Goldman and John H. Romani demonstrate that "a comparison of the percentage points by which Catholic candidates led the [national] ticket in 1952 with the performance of non-Catholic candidates indicates that there is no significant difference. . . ." Moreover, the 1952 vote shows:

(a) that most Congressmen, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, run ahead of the national ticket;
(b) that Catholic candidates do not run better in Catholic areas than they do in non-Catholic areas;
(c) that non-Catholics run as well as Catholics in Catholic areas.

Finally, Goldman and Romani point to John F. Kennedy's experience in Massachusetts in 1952 when he ran for the Senate while Adlai Stevenson was running for President. At that time Massachusetts' Catholic population was approximately 50.5 per cent although its distribution throughout the state was highly uneven, varying from 27.2 per cent in Barnstable

[7] Part of the pattern of assumptions made in the Document is that the personality of the President will have no effect in persuading or dissuading Catholic voters from voting for or against him.

County to 56.1 per cent in Bristol County. Yet Senator Kennedy, who is a Catholic, secured his highest margin over Stevenson (13.1 per cent) in the county with the lowest percentage of Catholics. "In the other counties he ran from 0.4 percentage point to 9.9 percentage points ahead of the ticket without any recognizable correlation with the percentage of Catholics in the counties." So far as one can tell from the bare election statistics in 1952 a candidate's religion was not a significant factor in his success or failure at the polls.[8]

Before analyzing the 1960 election returns, it seems advisable to ask what kind of election results would have been most favorable (on the surface) for the theses proposed in the Kennedy Document. These are the major possibilities:

Case 1. An overwhelming victory of landslide proportions would not have served to lend credence to the Document. Although there might have been a Catholic vote, there would undoubtedly have been many other substantial bloc votes in Kennedy's favor, no one of which was crucial. For if his margin of victory was sufficiently great it would undoubtedly have been possible to subtract the increase over the previous election in any one kind of vote, Catholic included, without changing the final result.

Case 2. A defeat for Kennedy would, of course, have constituted a direct refutation of the proposition that the appearance of a Catholic on the ballot would guarantee victory.[9] There could still have been a Catholic vote and this vote might have been recaptured by the presence of a Catholic candidate, but it obviously could not have been critical for Democratic success.

Case 3. An exceedingly small margin of victory would not have been promising for substantiation of the Document. Virtually any group could then claim that a shift of a few thousand votes in a few critical states made the difference between victory and defeat. While a Catholic vote might be important it would be unlikely to become all-important. Viewed in a practical light, there would not be much political leverage in claiming that one's party must have a candidate who appeals to Catholics *and* a dozen other groups.

Case 4. The returns which put the Kennedy document in the most favorable position would have been a substantial but not overwhelming victory. In this case there would have been a chance that the votes of some one group had changed sufficiently since the previous election to provide the margin of victory, and perhaps Catholics might meet that test. In any event, the possibility could not be ruled out without further examination of the evidence.

As we all know, Kennedy received 49.7 per cent to Nixon's 49.6 per cent out of a total vote of 68,832,670, a hair-breadth margin if there ever was one.[10] Validation of the Kennedy document, therefore, runs up against the difficulties outlined in case three above.

Two hard facts stand out from the welter of imponderables in the 1960 presidential election: (1) If we relax the criteria somewhat, there was probably a Catholic vote of some magnitude; (2) the increase in the votes of Catholics as compared to 1956 was not sufficient in and of itself to ensure Kennedy's victory. He also needed increases in the votes of Negroes, Jews, and other groups.

Both poll and electoral data strongly suggest that there was a Catholic vote in the 1960 election. According to the Gallup Poll, the percentage of Catholics supporting the Democratic candidate rose from 51 per cent in 1956 to 78 per cent in 1960. Moreover, 62 per cent of the Catholics who voted for Eisenhower in 1956 actually voted for Kennedy in 1960, while only 3 per cent of the Catholics who voted for Stevenson in 1960 switched to Nixon.[11] Although we do not know how many of the Catholics who voted for Eisenhower and Kennedy would also have voted for a Protestant Democrat in 1960, it seems safe to assume that by no means all would have done so. The

[8] "More About 'Catholic Vote' in U. S. Elections," *U. S. News and World Report*, Vol. 41, August 17, 1956, pp. 42–46, 132–135. See also the comments by Louis H. Bean on pages 41–42. The authors present the tables from which their conclusions are drawn.

[9] Although the Document specifies a Catholic on the ballot as Vice-President, there is no point in quarreling with the appearance of a presidential candidate to take on the burden of argument.

[10] The final election returns on a national and state basis are reported in an Associated Press dispatch of December 15, 1960. They are available in the *World Almanac* for 1961.

[11] Public Opinion News Service, December 4, 1960. This poll was based on 3,312 interviews with Catholics taken before and after the election.

presumption of a Catholic vote is further strengthened by the 1960 election returns which show that there is a high and positive correlation between the percentage of Catholics in a state and the percentage gain for the Democratic party over 1960.[12] While part of these results may be accounted for by other demographic variables such as ethnicity, it appears unlikely that the conclusion about the Catholic vote will be shaken.

These figures, it must be said, do not necessarily validate the claim that Catholics had been moving from the Democratic Party and that the presence of a Catholic candidate brought them back into the fold. Another Gallup Poll shows that 75 per cent of the Catholics who voted in the 1958 congressional election supported Democratic candidates,[13] a total just three percentage points less than Kennedy received in 1960. It is possible, therefore, that the relatively low vote of Catholics for Adlai Stevenson represents disapproval of him rather than of the party itself.

Unfortunately, we are not in a position to say whether or not Kennedy lost a considerable number of votes from Protestants.[14] Gallup tells us that Kennedy received 38 per cent of the votes by Protestants while Stevenson received only 37 per cent in 1956.[15] But we know from other surveys that Stevenson was extremely unpopular in 1956 and faced the handicap of running against the extraordinarily popular General Eisenhower.[16] Any Democratic candidate in 1960 was expected to do better than Stevenson. Since we are not permitted the luxury of running a laboratory test in which a Protestant Democrat runs against Nixon, there appears to be no way of determining how many voters who are Protestant would have gone Democratic if Kennedy had not been on the ballot.[17]

What we can do is to make a reasonably accurate determination of whether (other things being equal) the increased percentage of Democratic votes by Catholics was sufficient in itself to secure victory for Kennedy. First, we

[12] *U. S. News and World Report*, December 12, 1960. See the table by John H. Fenton substantiating this point. Thomas Flinn has done a county-by-county analysis of the vote in Ohio and reports a high and positive correlation between the percentage of Catholics in a county and the Democratic gain over 1956. Yet Nixon took Ohio by a substantial margin.

[13] Public Opinion News Service, September 16, 1960.

[14] The passage of time is not likely to make it any easier to solve this problem. Let us suppose that in future presidential elections a Protestant Democrat is shown to have retained the high proportion of Catholic voters who supported Kennedy. One explanation might be that Kennedy's candidacy had firmly attached them to the Democratic Party. An alternative explanation would be that Kennedy's Catholicism had been overestimated as a force attracting Catholic voters and that they would have voted Democratic anyhow when Eisenhower was no longer a candidate. Nevertheless, given considerable time and financial resources, some useful light could be shed on the 1960 election through a close examination of local returns in small, homogeneous, heavily Protestant constituencies where there is a clear baseline of support for the major parties. See the suggestion by V. O. Key in his "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 17 (February, 1955), pp. 3–18.

[15] Public Opinion News Service, December 7, 1960.

[16] See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), especially pp. 56–58, 525–530.

[17] In an article on the 1960 presidential election the authors of *The American Voter* properly note "that the simple choice of a baseline will go a long way toward determining . . . the question of net religious effect. If we choose the 1958 vote as a baseline, it is hard to argue that Kennedy could have made any gains from his religion; if we choose the 1956 presidential vote, it is equally hard to argue that he lost ground on balance." They deal with this problem by arguing that it is absurd to choose the 1956 election which is the most disproportionately Republican in the series going back to 1928. Instead, they posit a "normal" presidential election and decide that a Democratic candidate could expect to get 53–54 per cent of the two-party vote. They also posit expected votes of Catholics and Protestants for Democratic presidential candidates. Using this method, they conclude that Kennedy lost 2.2 per cent of the two-party vote, a large proportion of it in the South. (Philip E. Converse, Angus Campbell, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election," *American Political Science Review*, LV (June, 1961), pp. 269–280.

The above line of reasoning in this otherwise excellent article has disturbing ad-hoc qualities to it as the authors argue after the fact that 1960 represented a return to a normal or expected state of affairs.

In this paper I have chosen the 1956 election as a baseline precisely because it gives the greatest

need an approximation of what the Democrats would have received in 1960 in each state if nothing had changed since 1956. This may be obtained by taking the percentage of the total vote which the party received in each state in 1956 and multiplying that figure by the number who voted in 1960. Second, we need the number of additional votes in each state gained by the increase in the votes of Catholics from 1956 to 1960. This may be secured by taking the increase in the percentage of Catholics who voted Democratic from 1956 to 1960 and multiplying that figure by the estimated turnout of Catholics.[18] Third, we need to take cognizance of third-party votes so that all ballots cast will be accounted for. The formula used here may now be stated as follows: the increase in the Catholic vote in each state may have been sufficient by itself to secure Kennedy's victory if the projection of the 1956 percentage upon the 1960 turnout in addition to the increase in the Catholic vote during that period is greater than 50 per cent of the total vote less the number of third-party ballots.[19] Correspondingly, if the 1956 projection plus the increase in the Catholic vote was less than one half the total vote minus the third-party vote, we may conclude that Kennedy could not have won simply on the basis of additional Catholic votes.[20]

Kennedy received 306 electoral votes, 37 above the required majority of 269. Thus the loss of any state or combination of states totaling more than 37 electoral votes would have been sufficient to defeat him or to throw the election into the House of Representatives in case no candidate received a majority.[21]

In order to simplify matters, we can restrict our attention to those states which Kennedy won and which were not in the Democratic fold in 1956.[22] Turning to Table A we see that (assuming a 10 per cent rise in turnout of Catholics) the increase in the votes of Catholics was sufficient to secure Kennedy's election in only seven states with a combined total of 87 electoral votes, while it was not sufficient in nine states having 148 electoral votes. If we assume no increase in Catholic turnout, Kennedy loses an additional three electoral votes

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advantage to those who claim that the Catholic vote was decisive and thus hopefully makes the refutation all the more convincing. No claim is made here, however, concerning whether Kennedy did or did not lose votes. What is claimed is that any votes he may have gained from Catholics were not sufficient to secure his victory.

[18] While methodological difficulties arise which make the results less than wholly accurate, they are accurate enough for the use to which they are put. One difficulty is that we do not have state-by-state breakdowns on the Catholic vote for 1956 and are forced to use the national average of 51 per cent. Gallup does give the 1960 figures by section (East 77%, South 75%, Midwest 81%, Far West 74%) so that the amount of distortion for any one state should be quite small. Since the argument can turn on any one of a number of combinations of states, as we shall see, it seems unlikely that the distortions would affect them all in the same direction. Another difficulty is that we lack figures for the 1960 turnout of Catholics. This can be overcome by using different assumptions and showing that they all validate the conclusion though in different degree. We begin by assuming that the turnout was simply equal to the percentage of Catholics in the total population. Then we increase the Catholic turnout by 10 per cent (which may be fairly reasonable) and again by 20 per cent (which is too high but serves to prove the point).

[19] Caution is necessary here because it is possible that Kennedy might have lost support from some groups and made it up by increasing his vote from others and that these events would cancel each other in the totals.

[20] It may be helpful to diagram these formulas. Let S stand for "the Catholic vote is sufficient," P for the Democratic percentage in 1956, T for the total vote in 1960, CV for the percentage increase in votes of Catholics from 1956 to 1960, Y for the turnout of Catholics in 1960, Z for the third party vote, $>$ for greater than, $<$ for less than, and a period (.) for multiplication. Thus:

$$S \text{ if } (P \cdot T) + (CV \cdot Y) > (\tfrac{1}{2} \cdot T) - Z$$
$$\text{Not } S \text{ if } (P \cdot T) + (CV \cdot Y) < (\tfrac{1}{2} \cdot T) - Z$$

[21] Fourteen electors in Mississippi and Alabama ran unpledged and later supported Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia. It is possible, therefore, that neither Nixon nor Kennedy would have received a majority.

[22] Obviously, the Catholic vote did not help Kennedy win states which he lost. Also, if a state went Democratic in 1956 anything other than a decrease in votes would keep it there. The following states (electoral votes are indicated in brackets) supported Stevenson in 1956 and Kennedy in 1960: Alabama (11), Arkansas (8), Georgia (12), Missouri (13), North Carolina (14). In Louisiana (10) the third party vote was so high, 21% and the Republican vote so low, 28.6%, that the percentage the Democratic Party gained while losing in 1956 would have been sufficient to win in 1960.

TABLE A. *Was the Increase in the Catholic Vote Sufficient for a Kennedy Victory?*

State and Electoral Vote		Per cent Democratic in 1956	Number Voting in 1960	Per cent Democratic in 1956 projected on 1960 turnout	Per cent* Catholic Population	Increase in Catholic vote 1956–1960 assuming 10% greater turnout than per cent in Population	50% of Total vote minus 3rd party vote	1956 Projection plus Increase in Catholic vote	Was Change in Catholic Vote Sufficient?
Connecticut	8	36.3	1,222,883	443,907	46.35	162,881	611,427	606,788	No[x]
Delaware	3	44.6	196,683	87,720	18.65	10,493	97,622	98,213	Yes[a]
Illinois	27	40.3	4,757,394	1,917,220	27.51	431,734	2,368,137	2,348,954	No[x]
Maryland	9	39.9	1,055,349	412,084	18.00	54,329	527,672	475,413	No
Massachusetts	16	40.4	2,469,480	997,670	50.49	356,667	1,229,184	1,354,337	Yes
Michigan	20	44.1	3,318,097	1,463,281	23.47	256,953	1,648,644	1,720,234	Yes
Minnesota	11	46.8	1,541,887	721,603	24.40	124,176	766,905	845,779	Yes
Nevada	3	42.0	107,267	45,052	18.63	5,050	53,634	50,102	No
New Jersey	16	34.2	2,773,111	948,404	37.51	297,416	1,362,284	1,245,820	No
New Mexico	4	41.8	311,118	130,047	36.23	28,508	154,201	158,555	Yes
New York	45	38.7	7,291,079	2,821,648	32.18	671,289	3,630,965	3,492,937	No
Pennsylvania	32	43.3	5,006,541	2,167,832	29.98	429,011	2,492,968	2,596,843	Yes
Rhode Island	4	41.7	405,534	169,108	57.97	67,225	202,767	236,333	Yes
South Carolina	8	45.4	386,687	175,556	1.28	1,318	193,344	176,874	No
Texas	24	44.0	2,311,670	1,017,135	18.71	114,173	1,133,796	1,131,308	No[x]
West Virginia	8	45.9	837,781	384,541	5.65	13,546	418,891	398,087	No

* Figures for the number of Catholics in each state were taken from the *1960 Catholic Almanac*, St. Anthony's Guild (New York, 1960). The percentage of Catholics in each state was figured by dividing the total number by the total population for that state listed in the *1960 Statistical Abstract*.

[a] This symbol indicates that Delaware would not have been included in the sufficient column if we had made no allowance for increased Catholic turnout.

[x] This symbol indicates those states where the increase in Catholic votes would have been sufficient if we had assumed a 20% increase in turnout.

from Delaware. And even if we make the unwarranted assumption of a 20 per cent increase in turnout, he still loses 89 electoral votes in six states. Allowing a large margin for error, it seems clear that Kennedy needed more than the increase in the votes of Catholics to win.[23]

Two brief examples may be cited to support this conclusion. Illinois and Texas together account for 51 electoral votes. Out of the approximately 4.7 million votes cast in Illinois, Kennedy's margin of victory was 8,858. Where a shift of 4,500 votes by any group would have been enough to spell the difference, it would not be difficult to find any number of groups which could be considered necessary for the victory. Gallup reports that on a national basis the votes of Jews increased from 75 per cent to 81 per cent Democratic over 1956 and the votes of Negroes from 61 per cent to 68 per cent.[24] Even if we reduce this increase by two thirds, it is evident that Kennedy needed additional votes from Jews and Negroes to win in Illinois. In Texas, Kennedy's margin was 46,233 out of 2.3 million votes cast and it is apparent that there was a shift by at least 25,000 Negro voters.[25]

What, then, do the 1960 election returns have to teach us about the requirements for future Democratic presidential candidates? If a candidate wants to get elected President on the Democratic ticket he had better get many more votes from Catholics, Jews, Negroes and other groups traditionally providing support for his party than was the case in 1956. If the best he can do is to get 38 per cent of Protestant voters, he had better look for exceedingly strong support from other groups. And common sense suggests that if a candidate can increase his support among Protestants he need not be so dependent upon other groups. As a postscript to Kennedy's victory we might add that it is also advisable to be personally attractive, energetic, photogenic, wealthy, skillful, determined, and run against Richard Nixon rather than Dwight Eisenhower.

[23] To be sure, the increase in the votes of Catholics was necessary for a Kennedy victory; he could not have won without it. But neither could he have won without a larger vote from other groups. It is difficult to answer the argument that Kennedy may have made himself overly dependent on Catholic votes by failing to draw more from Protestants.

[24] Public Opinion News Service, December 7, 1960 and December 9, 1960.

[25] See *The New York Times*, November 27, 1960, p. 51.

III

Despite the advantage of being able to interpret election statistics and voting studies (a skill which many outside the academic community do not possess) there is no need for any interested and intelligent citizen to feel at the mercy of partisan arguments merely because they are accompanied by an imposing array of statistical devices. It should now be evident that a great deal can be learned from an examination of the internal evidence contained in a study which seeks to use this kind of data to make claims favorable to one or another candidate. A determination of validity or invalidity may be obtained by observing whether the necessary evidence has been presented, whether an appropriate methodology has been used, and whether logically permissible deductions from the data have been made.

Since candidates primarily seek to establish that they can win while other men cannot, any attempt to use election statistics and voting studies as a tactical weapon must follow roughly the same pattern as the Kennedy Document. The existence of a certain kind of voter must be established together with a candidate who appeals to that group. The candidate may be a member of that group or may be a person with whom they identify. It must then be shown that this candidate will attract votes otherwise unobtainable, that these votes are crucial to the party's success, and that they will in fact make the margin between defeat and victory. To claim less might be more modest but would defeat the essential purpose of demonstrating that the candidate is crucial to the party's chances. We can, therefore, restate the criteria used to evaluate the Kennedy document in terms of general tests which may be used to ascertain the validity of claims made along these lines. (Eligible citizens having common ethnic, religious, racial or other characteristics which motivate them to vote along identical lines are called "X voters." Candidates sharing these characteristics are said to have "X appeal.")

1. The voting pattern offered as proof of the X vote must not occur when two candidates possessing X appeal run against each other or when two

non-X's run, otherwise we would suspect more general factors at work.

2. There being little advantage in claiming the votes of those who would support the party anyway, X voters must be those who would vote against any other tendencies they may have or who would turn out in appreciably greater numbers because of the presence on the ballot of a candidate with X appeal. Identifying these voters on the basis of raw election returns which do not tell us why a voter is motivated to vote the way he does is exceedingly difficult. An attempt may be made to surmount this difficulty by treating as X voters those who used to vote for the candidates' party but no longer do so. Unless it is demonstrated that these voters left the party because another party had a candidate with X appeal, however, there would be no reason to believe that they would return because of it. A voter may leave a party for one reason and return to it for another, but the factors responsible for the return must be found and validated.

3. The percentage of X voters supporting a candidate with X appeal in an election must actually rise in rough proportion to the number of such voters in a given area. Since X voters are likely to be distributed unevenly over a state, large constituencies must be broken down to see if the county or district returns support the intended conclusion.

4. Rather than relying solely on tables showing how well successful candidates with X appeal did in areas where there are many X voters, the losers as well as the winners must be cited. If there are some X appealers who won but also some who lost this does not prove very much. If candidates with an X appeal ran ahead of their national tickets but so did non-X candidates, the evidence must be deemed unsatisfactory.

5. Tests must be made to see if at least some other major demographic characteristics of the electorate are better predictors of the vote than the presence of a candidate with X appeal. It may turn out that a candidate with X appeal also appealed to city dwellers, low-income people, or others and that these characteristics are more important than his X appeal.

6. A body of voters cannot be shown to provide the margin for victory unless it can also be demonstrated that all other significant groups (whose number may be much larger) will not also change their distribution of votes. Since many things may happen in four years, this is a difficult task.

IV. A Debate Between a Purist and an Operator

The Purist. These tests are admittedly severe. Yet one cannot have confidence in any study which fails to satisfy them. It may well be, consequently, that few or even no candidates will be able to demonstrate the kinds of claims discussed here. Yet there may be some small solace to be had. If it is extremely difficult to demonstrate that a candidate's race, religion, ethnicity or other such characteristic will bring victory to his party, it is equally difficult to demonstrate that some similar characteristic will lead his party to defeat. There is no need to blink at the appropriate conclusion: politicians may simply be forced to take their chances at the polls without using voting statistics as a suspect propellant.

The Operator. This is naive. You talk as if people like Sorensen were supposed to have these studies made for an academic research organization instead of improving their candidates chances for nomination or election.

The Purist. This is just what I am complaining about. If we cannot stop politicians from manipulating voting behavior materials for their own advantage, at least we can expose their devious practices.

The Operator. You claim that politicians distort the facts, but you are equally guilty of oversimplification. You have shown that the Kennedy document does not meet your overly rigorous standards of proof, but you have not shown that it is undeniably false. You should know that politicians work in a world of probabilities and not certainties. Didn't someone say that politicians theorize with a pistol to their heads, under great pressure of time and circumstance.

The Purist. That is their problem: one can sympathize with the difficulties they face without excusing them from meeting essential standards of proof. Are we to permit politicians to make misleading use of social science just because things are tough for them?

The Operator. I see that you have not understood me at all. Surely, you admit that national elections do appear to depend on what happens in the closely competitive states with large electoral votes which happen to have substantial Catholic populations. The Document claims that these key states can be won by Catholic votes without offsetting losses and (implicitly) that other major groups could not be won over in sufficient numbers to insure victory for the Democratic Party. Before you cry out that these claims have not been substantiated, I would grant that there are truly many logical combinations for a favorable result. But in the real world (which we are supposed to be talking about) politicians deal only with the most likely, realistic possibilities. The

fact is that Democratic support from Jews and Negroes seemed to be at a near saturation point, and up-state Protestant farmers and suburban businessmen did not appear too promising. Under the circumstances, how can you suggest that it would be better to say nothing than to rely on weak evidence. You ought to give Kennedy and company a medal for making use of social science material instead of just guessing.

The Purist. What makes you think that the Document is better than "just guessing"? Its "other-things-being-equal" argument is highly fallacious. And Harry Truman showed us in 1948 how it was possible to win by welding together a combination of states which omitted the ones with the most electoral votes like New York and California. The virtue of guesswork is that it does not pretend to be anything else. This unjustified pretension to scientific validity is what I am against, and I hope that most social scientists will react the same way.

The Operator. You speak rather more hotly than objectivity would seem to require. But I will skip over that and attack you on a more familiar ground: you are leaving out the normal operation of our competitive political life. If other politicians did not like the Kennedy Document, they were perfectly free to criticize it or to come out with a rival analysis. The citizen does not have to be a social scientist to evaluate such claims; he can ordinarily choose among competing analyses, each biased, and choose the conclusions he prefers or the source he trusts. Isn't this the market-place-of-ideas which you fellows talk so much about?

The Purist. Perhaps social scientists should provide some of this criticism to restrain both sides from converting the market place into nothing more than a patent medicine show with rival hucksters. The use of electoral data for political purposes is on the increase and raises problems deserving consideration by the interested parties, including those who work professionally in the field.

The Operator. O.K. You do your work and I'll do mine.

The Purist. Agreed.

V. Conclusion

There can be little doubt that under *some* conditions during *some* elections *some* social characteristics of voters and candidates may have *some* relevance to the polling results. The question of the conditions under which specified social characteristics become relevant is most difficult and cannot be disposed of by slogans advertising the alleged potence of this or that group at the polls. We know that in a competitive political system various participants (parties, interest groups, leaders) put forward candidates and issues designed to capture the allegiance of various groups of people. Rarely is it possible to appeal to one group and one group alone not only because there are so many groups but also because each individual may have many social characteristics which are potentially relevant to his voting decision. A sense of history is helpful here because changes in the tides of affairs — war, depression, inflation — help determine which social characteristics are likely to be most salient at a particular time. It is quite possible, for example, that in the previously cited 1958 senatorial election in Massachusetts religion was largely irrelevant because the most relevant social characteristic, one shared by virtually all citizens, was local pride in giving a native son a boost towards the Presidency. As one observes the usual unthinking alternation between decrying social science as a black art of manipulation and ridiculing it as absurd, it is good to take a hard look at some of its more devious practices but also to observe with a sense of excitement the fascinating explanatory tasks ahead.

APPENDIX
Catholic Voters and the Democratic National Ticket

1. *The significance and location of the Catholic vote.* The voter surveys of Lasarsfeld ("The People's Choice"), Lubell ("The Future of American Politics"), Bean ("How to Predict Elections") and others — as well as the statistics contained within on the 1928 election and the 1952 vote for Catholic candidates — all indicate that there is, or can be, such a thing as a "Catholic vote," whereby a high proportion of Catholics of all ages, residences, occupations and economic status vote for a well-

known Catholic candidate or a ticket with special Catholic appeal.

As Lubell has pointed out: "Catholic voting strength is currently at its peak, in view of the maturing of the offspring of the Italians, Poles, Czechs, and other former immigrant elements."

But the Catholic vote is far more important than its numbers — about one out of every four voters who turn out — because of its concentration in the key states and cities of the North. These are the pivotal states with large electoral votes, which vary as to their party support and several of which are inevitably necessary for a victory in the Electoral College. And the strength of the Catholic vote within these states is considerably increased by the findings of Gallup, Campbell of the University of Michigan ("The Voter Decides") and others that Catholics consistently turn out to vote in greater proportion than non-Catholics.

The proportion of Catholics in the adult population and 1952 two-party vote in these key states, with a total electoral vote of 261 (266 is a majority) is shown in Table 1, compared with the margin by which Eisenhower carried these states.

These are the key Democratic states where elections are won or lost. Of these 14 pivotal Catholic states with their 261 electoral votes:

— in 1940, 13 of these states with 240 electoral votes went Democratic, *without which the Democrats would have lost the election.*

— in 1944, 12 of these states with 221 electoral votes went Democratic, *without which the Democrats would have lost the election.*

— in 1948, 8 of these states with 125 electoral votes went Democratic, *without which the Democrats would have lost the election.*

— in 1952, none of these states went Democratic, all 261 of their electoral votes went to Eisenhower, thus making possible the first Republican victory in 24 years.

Equally important are the major urban areas in these states and the concentration of Catholic voters in those areas. As shown by Table 2, *the Catholic voters in each of these cities can usually determine the size of the Democratic margin in those cities; the size of the Democratic margin in those cities usually determines whether these states go Democratic; and whether these states go Democratic usually determines whether the Democrats win the election.* For example, taking the past four elections:

— In 1940, without net margins in New York, Chicago, Hudson County (Jersey City), Philadelphia-Pittsburgh, Providence and Milwaukee, the Democrats would have lost New York (47), Illinois (29), New Jersey (16), Pennsylvania (36), Rhode Island (4), and Wisconsin (12), or a total loss of 144 electoral votes.

— In 1944, without their net margins in New York, Hartford and New Haven, Chicago, Baltimore, Detroit, Hudson County (Jersey City), Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Philadelphia, Democrats would have lost New York (47), Connecticut (18), Illinois (28), Maryland (8), Michigan (19), New Jersey (16), Minnesota (11), and Pennsylvania (35), or a total loss of 172 electoral votes — *and the Republicans would have won the election.*

— In 1948, without their net margins in Chicago, Los Angeles, Cleveland and Providence, the Democrats would have lost Illinois (28 electoral votes), California (25), Ohio (25), and Rhode Island (4), or a total loss of 82 electoral votes — *and the Republicans would have won the election.*

— In 1952, as shown on Table 2, the Democratic vote in all of the major cities except Philadelphia fell sharply, and these cities for the first time in 24 years did not contribute a single electoral vote to the Democrats, thus making possible the first Republican victory in 24 years.

2. *Are the Democrats losing the Catholics?* Every analyst agrees they are, in terms of the national ticket. The Catholic Democratic vote was noticeably off in 1948 — and showed a critical decline in 1952. Gallup, Roper, the University of Michigan Survey and others all reported this trend. Gallup said only 34% of all Catholics considered themselves Republicans in 1950, but at least 44% voted for Eisenhower in 1952. Harris of the Roper organization ("Is There a Republican Majority") said that Roper polls showed the following shifts to have been decisive in Eisenhower's election: Catholics in general, normally over 65% Democratic, went 47% for Ike. German Catholics, previously 82% Democratic, went 55% for Ike. Poles, normally over 70% Democratic, went 50% for Ike. Irish, normally 65% Democratic, went 53% for Ike.

The Democratic era and political base begun by Al Smith, said Harris, ended in 1952. The "immigrant base," which had begun cracking in 1940, split wide open, probably permanently, he said. He predicted that the important Irish and German votes in particular would become largely an independent group, sharply affecting Democratic majorities in the Northern cities.

The University of Michigan nation-wide survey showed that of those voting for one of the two major candidates, over 66% of the Catholics voted Democratic in 1948 but fewer than 51% did in 1952. (There is striking similarity between these figures and those of Gallup and Roper.)

Thus Catholics in 1952, roughly 25% of the voting population, went approximately one out of two for the Republican candidate, whereas in 1948 they had gone two out of three for the Democratic nominee; and, though they had constituted approximately ⅓ of the Democratic vote in 1948, they were only 28% of Stevenson's vote and constituted 21% of Eisenhower's tremendous vote.

Approximately 30% of these Catholics for Eisenhower were "shifters" — that is, even on the basis of 1948 when the Catholic vote was already slipping away from the Democrats (the Republicans carried New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Con-

necticut, Michigan and Maryland), they would have been expected to vote Democratic in 1952.

These shifters — whom we shall call "normally Democratic Catholics" — constituted approximately 7% of Eisenhower's total nation-wide vote. If Stevenson could have held in 1952 *only* those Catholics who had voted for Truman in 1948 but for Ike in 1952 — or if he could recapture them in 1956 — this would, as shown in Table 3, *add 132 electoral votes to the Democratic column, enough when combined with the Solid South to provide a majority of electoral votes!*

3. *Catholic candidates.* What may be the clue as to the means of recapturing those votes — as well as further evidence of the national ticket's loss of Catholic votes in 1952 — is provided by Table 4, showing how Democratic Catholic candidates for congressmen, senator and governor ran consistently ahead of their national ticket, in a striking example of ticket-splitting on the part of Catholic voters.

Outside the South, according to Gallup and Roper, the Democratic presidential vote and the Democratic congressional vote ran approximately even, the same over-all percentage behind the Republican presidential and congressional candidates. Specifically, voters on the average cast Democratic ballots for President at a rate only 1/10 of 1% (Gallup) or 1.6% (Roper) behind their votes for Democratic congressional candidates. But Table 4 shows how selected Catholic Democratic candidates ran much further ahead of the national ticket in their areas.

Some of the examples shown are particularly instructive. Had Stevenson run as well as Pastore (and Roberts), Lausche, Kennedy and Mansfield, he would, of course, have won an additional 49 electoral votes. His lags behind O'Brien in Albany and Delaney in New York City were greater than his lag behind Eisenhower for the state of New York as a whole; and the same is true of his lags behind Rodino in Newark, Zablocki in Milwaukee, Eugene McCarthy in St. Paul, and Price in East St. Louis.

Especially revealing of the picture of Catholic voters leaving the Democratic Party, except where a Catholic is on the ticket, are the following normally Democratic districts where Catholic voters are a major element:

— Zablocki won in Milwaukee by 29% while Stevenson was losing by 4%.
— O'Brien won in Albany by 7% while Stevenson was losing by 9%.
— Delaney won in New York City by 2% while Stevenson was losing by 13%.
— Addonizio and Rodino won in Newark by 4% and 14% respectively while Stevenson was losing by 4% and 7%.
— Rabaut won in Detroit by 6% while Stevenson was losing by 2%.
— Dodd won in Hartford by 8% while Stevenson was losing by 1%.

4. *How much would a Catholic vice-presidential nominee hurt the ticket?* On June 24, 1956, the Gallup Poll Feature was headlined "Qualified Catholic Could Be President." Nearly 3 out of 4 respondents said they would vote for a well-qualified Catholic nominated by their party for the Presidency itself. Of those who thought they would be opposed, a large share lived in the South — and if one of three Democrats stayed home (or even voted Republican) in the South due to a nominee's religious affiliation, few if any Southern electoral votes would be lost, even though Democratic margins in several states might be diminished.

A large share of the remainder appeared to be Republicans who would not support the Democratic ticket under any circumstances, and northern "liberal intellectuals" who will certainly vote Democratic without regard to the Vice-President's religion.

In short, even a Catholic nominee for President would be judged by most people on his qualifications for the office — and it is apparent that a Democratic Catholic vice-presidential nominee, though admittedly prejudice would be stirred, would lose no electoral votes for the ticket simply because a handful of Southerns or Republicans would not support him. Particularly in the key states and cities where he might be expected to concentrate his campaigning, his religion would be irrelevant to most.

5. *How about Al Smith?* This is the cry raised by professional pessimists opposed to a Catholic on the ticket. But, as Bean and others have shown, the "Al Smith myth" is one of the falsest myths in politics.

(a) 1928 was a Republican year, regardless of who was on either ticket. It was a year for "Drys" like Hoover, not "Wets" like Smith. Professor William F. Ogburn, after a statistical study of 173 Northern counties, concluded that "prohibition sentiment was three times more decisive an influence in the election than the religious issue." Moreover, studies showed Midwestern and Southern voters opposing Al Smith as a Tammany product from the streets of New York, a portly cigar-smoking stereotype of the immigrant-base political boss. If Al Smith had been the Republican nominee and a Dry, he would have won the election regardless of his religion.

(b) Of the states his two predecessors as Democratic nominees had both carried, Smith lost only 4 (Florida, North Carolina, Texas and Virginia, all of which the Democrats also lost in 1952 except for North Carolina), despite the usual assumption that Smith's Catholicism caused the Solid South and numerous other states to go Republican.

(c) The nation has changed since 1928. There are more Catholics — their political role as seen above, is more crucial — their leadership in the Democratic Party and in statewide offices from California to Maine is both frequent and accepted — and the nation is considerably more tolerant on

religious matters. Gallup's 1956 poll found an increasing acceptance of a Catholic President in just the last 15 years. The support for Frank Lausche for President among prominent Southern Democrats is most indicative. An Ambassador to the Vatican is not likely to be a maior campaign issue, regardless of the candidates: and the question of Federal aid to parochial as well as public schools has been largely avoided by concentration on the problem of public school construction instead of operation.

(d) Most important of all, and least known, is the fact that Al Smith helped the Democratic Party far more than he hurt it:

— Of the states his two predecessors as Democratic nominees had both carried, Smith lost only 4 (Florida, North Carolina, Texas and Virginia, all of which the Democrats also lost in 1952 except for North Carolina), despite the usual assumption that Smith's Catholicism caused the Solid South and numerous other states to go Republican.

— Smith carried Massachusetts and Rhode Island which had never previously returned a Democratic majority in the 20th century.

— Smith carried a majority of the counties in every section of the country but one (East North Central); and increased the number of counties in the Democratic column in the North Eastern, Middle Atlantic, West North Central, Mountain and Pacific states. 122 Northern counties (77 of them predominantly Catholic) were captured from the Republicans.

— Smith increased the Democratic vote by fantastic proportions in most states and particularly urban counties. For example:

	Democratic Vote, in thousands	
	1924	*1928*
Massachusetts	281	792
Suffolk County	79	205
Connecticut	110	252
Rhode Island	76	118
New York	951	2,090
Bronx County	73	233
Pennsylvania	409	1,060
Philadelphia	54	276
Ohio	478	864
Cuyahoga County	24	166
Hamilton County	35	110
New Jersey	298	616
Hudson County	91	153
Minnesota	56	396
Hennepin	11	81
Michigan	152	397
Wayne County	23	157
Maryland	198	224
Illinois	577	1,300
Cook County	226	716

Thus Lubell has written: "The Republican hold on the cities was broken not by Roosevelt but by Al Smith." And Louis Harris concluded: "Al Smith marked the beginning of the Democratic era which ended in 1952. . . (He) created a new political base in the large Northern metropolitan areas."

Conclusion — Has the Democratic era ended? Has the party permanently lost its political base among the Catholics and immigrants of the large Northern cities that made a Democratic victory possible in 1940, 1944 and 1948? The above indicates that a Catholic vice-presidential nominee could refashion this base as Al Smith did, and begin a new era of Democratic victories, without costing even the few electoral votes Smith did.

His campaign would be largely concentrated in the key states and cities listed above, including also on his itinerary such cities with high Catholic populations as St. Louis, Gary, Omaha, Denver, Dubuque and Reno. No further state-by-state analysis should be needed — but it should be reemphasized as a major example that, by reducing Republican upstate majorities in New York by virtue of his vote in Rochester, Albany and Buffalo, and by increasing the declining Democratic vote in New York City, such a candidate could assure return of New York's 45 electoral votes to the Democratic column in 1956 for the first itme in 12 years.

If he brought into the Democratic fold only those normally Democratic Catholics who voted for Ike, he would probably swing New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Illinois — for 132 electoral votes. If he also wins the votes of Catholics who shifted to the Republicans in 1948 or earlier, he could also swing New Jersey, Minnesota, Michigan, California, Wisconsin, Ohio, Maryland, Montana, and maybe even New Hampshire — for a total of 265 electoral votes (needed to win: 266). Thus Ike could and would be defeated.

SPECIAL APPENDIX

Which would add the most strength to the Democratic ticket — an appeal to the Catholic vote, the Southern vote or the farm vote?

I. *Comparative Electoral Strength.* States with important Catholic votes which were lost by Stevenson in 1952 and might be recaptured in 1956 with a Catholic vice-presidential nominee (all analyzed in memorandum): New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Montana, California — Total Electoral Votes — 261.

Southern and Border States which were lost by Stevenson in 1952 and might be recaptured in 1956 with a Southern vice-presidential nominee: Texas, Florida, Virginia, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee (although this is almost certainly Democratic after Dixon-Yates) and Kentucky (which Stevenson carried) — Total Electoral Votes — 88.

States with important farm votes, including those listed above, and stretched to include Western mining states, industrial states and livestock states

which oppose high grain supports, which were lost by Stevenson in 1952 and might in 1956 be influenced to some degree, however slight, by a Farm Belt Vice-Presidential nominee: Idaho, Iowa, Wyoming, Nevada, Wisconsin, Oregon, Colorado, Montana, Utah, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, Illinois, Washington, Oklahoma, Texas and Missouri — Total Electoral Votes — 202.

II. *How important is the farm vote in the farm belt itself?* In the "farm revolt" of 1948, only three states of the Midwest can be said to have been swept into the Democratic column by virtue of votes cast by farmers — Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin — for a total of only 23 electoral votes. Truman lost Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota. The margin given him by the major urban areas of Illinois and Ohio overcame his deficit in the farm areas of those states; and practically all of his margin in Wisconsin consisted of his margin in Milwaukee, and practically all of his margin in Minnesota consisted of his margin in St. Paul-Minneapolis. Contrast this with the findings of the above memo that the key Catholic city vote was responsible for the Democratic victories of 1940, 1944 and 1948. Even in most farm states, there are more Catholic voters than farm voters, according to official census figures.

TABLE 1

State	*Proportion of Catholics in Adult Population*	*Estimated Proportion of 1952 Two-Party Vote Made up of Catholic Voters*	*Eisenhower's Margin Over 50% of the 1952 Two-Party Vote*	*Electoral Vote*
New York	32%	40%	6.0%	45
Pennsylvania	29	39	3.0	32
Illinois	30	34	5.0	27
New Jersey	39	47	7.5	16
Massachusetts	50	57	4.4	16
Connecticut	49	55	5.9	8
Rhode Island	60	65	0.9	4
California	22	27	6.9	32
Michigan	24	30	5.8	20
Minnesota	24	27	5.6	11
Ohio	20	25	6.8	25
Wisconsin	32	38	11.2	12
Maryland	21	31	5.8	0
Montana	22	26	9.7	4
				261
				(Needed to Win: 266)

Notes:

Column 1 — Selected States: Not included are seven other States where the Catholics are an important part of the adult population: New Hampshire (37%), Louisiana (34%), New Mexico (46%), Arizona (30%), North Dakota (22%), Maine (26%), and Vermont (29%). If these seven States were included, the total number of electoral votes would be 295. They are excluded from this analysis, however, either because they are not considered to be among the key swing States or because it would be speculative to translate the proportion of Catholics in their adult population into important voting strength for a Democratic Catholic candidate.

Column 2 — Proportion of Catholics in Population: These figures are taken from "The Official Catholic Directory" (1955, P. J. Kenedy & Sons). They pertain only to actual members of the church — and surveys have indicated that the actual number of those classified as Catholics would be approximately 10% higher in each state. Survey analysts have found that the proportion of Catholics in the total population approximates the proportion of Catholics in the adult eligible-voter population.

Column 3 — Proportion of Catholics in 1952 Two-Party Vote: This column is calculated by applying Campbell's national average figures for the turnout of Catholics and non-Catholics to the official turnout figures for 1952 for each of the 14 States.

Column 4 — Eisenhower's Margin over 50%in 1952: This figure represents the number of votes which must be shifted to the Democratic column for a Democratic victory in 1956.

TABLE 2

City	*Estimated Proportion of 1952 Two-Party Vote Made Up of Catholic Voters*	*Decline in Democratic Proportion of Two-Party Vote 1948 to '52*
New York	38%	3.6%
Buffalo	62	8.6
Rochester	38	9.8
Albany	38	Not Available
Philadelphia	42	(gain) 8.0
Pittsburgh	46	5.0
Scranton	49	Not Available
Chicago	49	4.2
Newark-Jersey	53	5.4
Trenton	46	Not Available
Boston	55	11.8
Hartford	59	Not Available
Baltimore	31	3.1
San Francisco	33	4.2
Los Angeles	22	5.2
Detroit	39	1.4
Minneapolis-St. Paul	30	9.0
Milwaukee	41	9.4
Cleveland	36	4.6
Cincinnati	25	5.5
Toledo	25	4.0

Note:

Column 2 — Catholic Voters in Cities: These figures are derived by applying the appropriate State turnout figures for these dioceses in "The Official Catholic Directory" (1955, P. J. Kenedy & Sons).

TABLE 3

State	*Estimated Per Cent of Eisenhower Vote in 1952, Made up of Catholic Voters*	*Proportion of Eisenhower Vote Constituting Margin by Which He Carried State*	*Estimated Per Cent of Eisenhower Vote in 1952, Made up of "Normally Democratic" Catholic Voters Who Shifted*	*Electoral Votes*
New York	35%	11%	11.0%	45
Pennsylvania	36	6	11.0	32
Illinois	31	9	9.3	27
Massachusetts	51	8	15.3	16
Connecticut	48	11	14.4	8
Rhode Island	63	15	18.9	4
New Jersey	40	13		16
California	23	12		32
Michigan	27	10		20
Minnesota	23	10		11
Ohio	21	12		25
Wisconsin	30	18		12
Maryland	27	10		9
Montana	21	16		4
				261
			(Needed to win)	266

Notes:

Column 2 — Proportion of Eisenhower Vote Consisting of Catholics: This column is calculated by applying to Table I the findings of the University of Michigan nation-wide survey (Campbell, "The Voter Decides") that roughly 49% of voting Catholics voted for Eisenhower and roughly 51% for Stevenson.

Column 3 — Eisenhower's Margin: The percentage listed is not to be confused with the percentage by which Eisenhower carried the State (which can be determined from Table 1, Column 4); but is the percentage of his own total vote represented by that margin, in order to make it comparable with figures portraying the percentage of his total vote made up of Catholics and previously Democratic Catholics.

Column 4 — Catholics Shifting to Eisenhower: This column is calculated by applying to Table 3, Column 2, and Table 1, Columns 3 and 4, the findings of the Michigan survey that over 66% of the Catholic two-party voters in 1948 supported the Democratic ticket, as compared with fewer than 51% in 1952. Figures are provided only for those States where a shift of the State to the Democratic column by means of a return of these Catholic voters is indicated.

TABLE 4

State or District	*Candidate*	*Number of Percentage Points of Two-Party Vote by Which National Ticket Ran Behind Candidates Listed* (Norm: 0.1% to 1.6%)
New York		
30th (Albany)	O'Brien	16.0%
7th (New York City)	Delaney	15.0
10th (Brooklyn)	Kelly	5.0
9th (Brooklyn)	Keogh	3.0
14th (Brooklyn)	Rooney	11.0
New Jersey		
11th (Newark)	Addonizio	8.0
10th (Newark)	Rodino	21.0
14th (Jersey City)	Hart	4.0
Massachusetts		
	Kennedy	12.0
	Dever	8.4
Rhode Island		
	Pastore	12.0
	Roberts	7.0
Ohio		
	Lausche	26.0
	DiSalle	5.0
19th (Youngstown)	Kirwan	21.0
20th (Cleveland)	Feighan	25.0
Wyoming		
	O'Mahoney	19.0
Wisconsin		
4th (Milwaukee)	Zablocki	33.0
Pennsylvania		
2nd (Philadelphia)	Granahan	2.0
3rd (Philadelphia)	Byrne	2.0
5th (Philadelphia)	Green	1.0
28th (Pittsburgh)	Eberharter	11.0
Minnesota		
4th (St. Paul)	E. McCarthy	12.0
Michigan		
1st (Detroit)	Mackrowicz	6.0
13th (Detroit)	O'Brien	4.0
14th (Detroit)	Rabaut	8.0
15th (Detroit)	Dingell	7.0
16th (Detroit)	Lesinski	8.0
Connecticut		
1st (Hartford)	Dodd	9.0
Illinois		
2nd (Chicago)	O'Hara	1.0
5th (Chicago)	Kluczynski	6.0
6th (Chicago)	O'Brien	4.0
8th (Chicago)	Gordon	7.0
24th (East St. Louis)	Price	11.0
Montana		
	Mansfield	21.0

Note:

Columns 1 and 2 — Catholic Candidates, States and districts: These columns list only those members of Congress or Governors elected in 1952 who are known to be Catholics and elected by areas with large Catholic populations. There are, of course, many others where these facts could not be as easily determined.

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HOW I USED A POLL IN CAMPAIGNING FOR CONGRESS

• *J. K. JAVITS*

Last fall I campaigned for election to public office for the first time, and was elected to represent the people of the 21st District of New York in the House of Representatives of the United States during the 80th Congress. My district takes in the upper west side of Manhattan Island in New York City, starting, roughly, at the southernmost boundary of Columbia University and continuing north along the Hudson River until it branches out to take in all of Manhattan Island and even a little chunk of the Bronx called Marble Hill just over the Harlem Ship Canal; it has a population of approximately 308,000, almost evenly divided among Catholics, Protestants and Jews, with an admixture of Americans of Greek ancestry as well as of new citizens who within the last fifteen years escaped from the Nazi and Fascist terror of Europe and who take a profound interest in government.

Purpose of the Poll

As early as July 1946, I had asked Elmo Roper to conduct an opinion poll of the voters in my district in order to find out how far my views and theirs on national issues were parallel and in this way to appraise my qualifications as a candidate for Congress (my views on major national and international issues had been set forth in a series of articles in the New York *Herald Tribune* which began in February 1946); and also to help me determine which issues the people in the district considered most important so that I could discuss my position on them fully and openly during my campaign. The period of active campaigning is short, usually confined to the last five or six weeks before elections, and therefore I felt that it would be best to concentrate on the problems that were most important to the people in my district.

By using this public opinion poll and other direct approaches to the voters I left the beaten path of traditional politics and entered upon a new avenue to winning the approval and support of the people who cast the votes on election day. I was initiating a novel twist in political campaigning by focusing on issues instead of on personalities and by airing my views instead of concealing them under a thick blanket of pious generalities.

The Elmo Roper organization and I worked together on the formulation of the questions to be used in the survey. Normally, political surveys are made to determine public opinion for the purpose of arriving at policy. In this case, however, the opposite was true. My position and ideas had already been publicly announced and I was endeavoring to measure the similarities and differences between the community and myself. I was acting on my conviction that the people would appreciate honesty and sincerity more than 100 per cent agreement — so long as there was substantial agreement on the major issues.

Interviewing took place during mid-summer. Since this was to be a study of voters' attitudes, all persons under 21 years of age and all individuals residing outside the boundary of the 21st District were excluded from the sample. Students at Columbia University and the College of the City of New York were also excluded unless they were year-round residents of the district.

Results

The survey having set out first to ascertain which issues the voters of the 21st District were most actively interested in, a check list of subjects, suggested as the most likely to

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come up in the 80th Congress, was presented and respondents were asked to select the three they considered most important. These issues included prices, control of atomic energy, housing, unemployment, etc.

Other questions asked fell into three categories:

1. *Questions which had already been answered on the basis of a nation-wide sample, so that my district's results could be compared with national averages.* For example: "On the whole, how would you rate the job Congress has been doing since the war ended —as excellent, good, only fair, or poor?"

2. *Questions dealing with major issues such as wages and price control, housing, labor, atomic energy, veterans' affairs, and relations with Russia, which aimed at comparing the views of the district with my views as the candidate.* For example: early in June, when the President had asked for a bill to draft labor and Congress had passed the punitive Case Bill, I came out against labor legislation enacted in anger and urged instead a national economic policy giving labor, together with business and government, direct responsibility for developing major economic policies in a form of National Economic Organization developed along the lines of the International Labor Organization. I said that if labor legislation is to work it must be assured of the support of the constituency to which it will be applied; that laws of compulsion or oppression do not themselves move trains or mine coal. Labor legislation as well as management-labor-government practices must be founded on a philosophy which attacks causes, prescribes the rules of the game and minimizes recourse to administrative bodies or government machinery. I also said, however, that labor unions should consider whether their present size and power require a degree of public information and financial accountability equivalent to that required of large corporations. This point of view as compared with the opinion of the district may be noted in Table 1.

On foreign affairs, my thinking and that of the district were extraordinarily parallel. In one of the articles I had written for the New York *Herald Tribune*, I had asked for full reliance on the organization of the United Nations, for raising living standards throughout the world, and for insistence on individual human rights of freedom and self determination for all countries. These positions the district fully supported as shown by the answers to a poll question.

3. *This category included questions which would come before Congress but which were not directly related to the problems of a metropolitan area such as the 21st District.* For example, one question dealt with farm prices and subsidies.

In addition to several other questions on issues, similar to those above, voters were asked whom they had voted for in 1944, their sex, age, income level, race, education, religion, veterans' status and labor union status. Answers to these questions about respondents indicated that the 21st District was a particularly good area in which to conduct a sample poll because it is diversified and yet well rounded.

TABLE 1

Do you think there should or should not be a law which:	*Should*	*Should not*	*Don't know and no answer*
a. Requires every union to record with the Department of Labor a financial statement every year	78.8%	7.4%	13.8%
b. Requires corporations to "open their books" to the labor unions so that a union can tell how much a company can afford to pay its employees	59.8	24.9	15.3
c. Makes labor unions liable for damages if they break a contract	76.1	7.5	16.4
d. Requires a "cooling off period" before any strike is permitted	75.6	10.2	14.2
e. Provides for the government taking over any plant where a strike has lasted longer than a month	55.4	24.4	20.2

How the Results Were Used

I released the results of the survey publicly as the opening gun of my campaign, instead of keeping them for my own private use because that course represented the fulfillment of one of the primary purposes for which the poll was initiated — to enable the citizens of the district to judge my qualifications and to vote more intelligently. In addition, I felt that such action would be a public service in that it would point up the issues in the campaign, thus making it possible for my opponents and myself to debate on those topics which were of most concern to the community.

The survey did have a tendency to make the issues upon which the ensuing campaign was fought. I used the survey as the very vertebrae of my presentation to the voters at street corner meetings, at public forums, in open meetings called by social, fraternal and political organizations in the district, and in a radio series during the final weeks of the campaign.

Summary and Evaluation

The future use of opinion polls in Congressional campaigns is not without its limitations (especially on narrow issues where a district sample may be too small or distorted to have meaning), but judging from my recent experience, I think they can be extremely useful in crystallizing the views of the voters at any one time and in getting a general idea of what the community is interested in.

More and more Congressmen are beginning to realize (and, indeed, it is high time that they did) that their influence in Congress is greatly strengthened when they have the articulate support of their district. Moreover, a Representative's action takes on added purpose and direction when he knows that he is speaking with the approval of the people who elected him to office.

The opinion poll has proved invaluable as a gauge of popular sentiment on a wide number of important issues. It forms a substantial and accurate starting point for fixing attention on and creating interest in particular issues that relate to the district as well as for measuring existing opinion.

As the New York *Herald Tribune* said so appropriately in its editorial of October 11, 1946, discussing the opinion poll in my district, "This represents a considerable advance over the old torch-light processions, the street corner tub-thumping and rabble-rousing which used to constitute the major weapons in a political campaign." The opinion poll used in this way may be a new and constructive technique in political campaigning.

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PREDICTION OF POLITICAL ACTION BY MEANS OF PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS

• *ALEXANDER L. GEORGE*

During World War II, a group of analysts in a now defunct unit of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) attempted to make inferences about Nazi propaganda strategy and underlying policy calculations from a close inspection of German radio and press communications. After the war, the work of the FCC analysts was studied intensively by the writer in order to test the inferences and to reconstruct and codify methods of inferences that had been sucessfully applied.[1]

Among the problems of the wartime content analysis was that of predicting the initiatives of an opponent through analysis of his propaganda. This is, however, only the most dra-

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[1] This article is based on a study prepared by the author for the RAND Corporation. A full report is in preparation.

matic type of problem that was investigated. It is selected for discussion here for two reasons. First, the methodological approach to this problem went through an interesting development in the course of the war. Secondly, in addition to the obvious practical interest of this problem at the time, it has a certain theoretical interest as well, since it bears upon the general question of the relationship of communication and action in the relations between nations.

Early Approaches to the Problem

In early considerations of the problem, the possibility of predicting an opponent's initiatives was generally regarded as requiring discovery of a regular pattern, or relationship, in the opponent's past behavior, which would serve as a rule of inference in new instances.[2] Regular relationships were sought between the opponent's intention to initiate a certain line of action and (1) some type of *content characteristic* in his propaganda; or (2) some type of *propaganda strategy* pursued by him prior to the initiative.

Neither of these two early approaches proved fruitful. Inspection of Nazi communications behavior prior to earlier German initiatives failed to disclose regularly recurring relationships of either type.[3] Attempts to infer Nazi initiatives continued to be made throughout the war. But, perhaps because of disillusionment over the failure of the two earlier approaches, no further efforts were made to formulate systematic methods of inference for this purpose. Postwar appraisals of the value of content analysis for predicting the initiatives of an opponent were generally sober.[4]

[2] No adequate account of these early approaches has been published. The logic of these approaches is briefly indicated in H. D. Lasswell's unpublished memorandum, "Specimen Hypotheses about the Focus of Attention in World Politics," February, 1942. The Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communications, Library of Congress, p. 4.

[3] For an authoritative description by a leading German propagandist of how some of the Nazi aggressions were prepared propagandistically, see Hans Fritzsche's affidavit submitted to the Nuremberg Tribunal: document number 3469-PS in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Vol. VI, pp. 184–190 (translation); this is summarized in Vol. II, pp. 1041–1046.

[4] See Bernard Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952, pp. 84, 85–86. Somewhat less sober in their assessment were Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, *German Radio Propaganda*, Oxford University Press, 1944, pp. 289–291, 292–325. There is implicit recognition in the latter work that some modification would be necessary in the early assumption that the ability to predict Nazi initiatives rested upon the discovery of a single, regularly recurring relationship of intended action with propaganda strategy.

The Indirect Method

These two early approaches were replaced in the course of the war by a different method of inference developed in the FCC by content analysts of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. The new approach was, at best, only implicit in this analysis. It has been articulated by the present writer in the course of a detailed study of the procedures and reasoning employed in FCC analyses. The new approach is referred to here as the "indirect" method, because it comprises a series of interconnected causal imputations, or inferences.[5]

The new method is adapted to the highly instrumental character of propaganda. It recognizes, as the earlier approach did not, that propaganda can be used to further a forthcoming initiative in a variety of ways. Therefore, it does not expect to find a regularly recurring relationship between a type of elite intention and a type of propaganda strategy accompanying it. Rather, the new method operates on the expectation that propaganda strategy may be varied from one instance of an elite initiative to another; accordingly, it attempts to identify *whatever* propaganda strategy the opponent may have adopted in order to further his forthcoming initiative.

As will be seen, the indirect method is applicable only to those intended actions of an opponent that involve some measure of deliberation and policy-planning on his part. It is a prerequisite of the method that the opponent use *preparatory* propaganda as a means of enhancing or exploiting in some way his forthcoming action. Excluded from the possibility of inference by this method, therefore, are "spontaneous" and highly "reactive" elite actions, which are likely to be undertaken without

[5] A brief account of the indirect method appears in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, (Winter, 1951–52), pp. 782–784; and in B. Berelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 193–195.

the usual coordination of policy and action with propaganda.

Nonetheless, the range of elite actions to which the indirect method of inference can be applied is a broad one, not limited to prediction of military initiatives but encompassing political, diplomatic, and economic actions as well. Modern elites often find it to their advantage to "prepare" in advance some of those who will be affected by their major actions. Preparatory communications may be directed toward domestic audiences, groups in an opponent's camp, or groups in neutral states. The content analyst takes into account the possibility that preparatory communications may be directed to more than one audience, that the objectives or intent of the preparation may be different for each of the specific audiences addressed, and that the objective may be implemented with considerable subtlety and indirection.

The possibility of predicting an elite's action from its preparatory effort depends, obviously, upon the elite's use of a communications channel that is open to the content analyst's scrutiny. It is usually safe to assume that mass-media channels will be used when preparatory propaganda is directed toward relatively large audiences. Selected, specialized public media may be used in attempting to prepare smaller groups. However, there is no assurance that public channels will be used when preparatory preparation may take place through confidential orders, private messages, word of mouth, and other channels of communication not readily accessible to the content analyst.

Another limitation on the use of this method for predicting actions is the possibility that the elite may decide to forego any preparation and employ propaganda to facilitate its action *only at the time the action is taken or shortly thereafter*. In such cases, the best that the indirect method can do is to aid in assessing the nature and objectives of the major action once it is taken, and to say something about the opponent's estimate of the prospects of his action. The value of such inferences to the policy-maker should not be underrated; in many cases they overshadow in importance the usefulness of having predicted the action before it occurred.

Types of Inferences of Policy Interest

Several aspects of an opponent's forthcoming actions or initiatives may be of interest to the policy-maker. There is, first, the question whether a certain action is actually being planned by the opponent. But equally interesting in many cases, and sometimes of greater value, are questions concerning the *timing* of the action, its precise *nature and magnitude*, its exact *location*, the *objectives* assigned to the action, the elite's *expectations* concerning its success, and the extent and nature of the opposition to that particular initiative within the elite group. Which of these questions has primary interest will vary from case to case.

Mode of Reasoning

In attempting to apply the method of inference here described, the content analyst makes use of existing generalizations about the types of situations and circumstances in which the elite under scrutiny tends to employ preparatory propaganda. Such generalizations should cover the following interrelated questions:

(a) For what *types of actions* does the elite generally regard preparatory propaganda as desirable?
(b) What *types of audiences* does the elite consider it useful to prepare (for each type of action)?
(c) What *types of goals* does the elite consider it useful and feasible to pursue in preparatory propaganda (for different types of audiences in the case of different types of actions)?
(d) What *communications channels*, or types of communication, does the elite usually employ, or is it likely to employ, when attempting to achieve a certain type of goal in preparatory propaganda (for different types of audiences in the case of different types of actions)?

In attempting to solve any particular inferential problem, the content analyst employs generalizations of this order, in conjunction with a *logic of the situation* assessment.[6] He keeps in mind that the elite is guided not merely by its own past practice or by a rigid operational doctrine. Rather, the elite is presumed to make an assessment of the factors upon which the success of a contemplated action is likely to depend, and from this assessment it derives some estimate of the requirements, if any, for preparatory propaganda support. Finally, it is assumed the choice of a preparatory

[6] The term "logic of the situation" is taken over from Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 2nd edition, revised. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., Vol. 2, pp. 96–97, 265.

propaganda strategy is also influenced by considerations of the feasibility and probable effectiveness of available strategies and techniques.

For example, in one case total surprise may be deemed essential by the elite if the success of its intended action is to be assured or maximized. Consequently, the propaganda preparation in this case may consist exclusively in attempts to mask the forthcoming action. In another instance, however, the elite may consider it expedient to precede action by a propaganda of bluffs and threats; and in such cases, not the masking goal but a war-of-nerves strategy will be adopted.

Since several deductive patterns enter into the strand of reasoning characteristic of the indirect method, it is difficult to characterize the analyst's reasoning processes in general terms. Any effort to do so risks giving a picture that is oversimplified or unduly standardized. There is, nonetheless, some value in suggesting the pattern of reasoning by formulating some of the questions an analyst must cope with. In skeletal form, the analyst's reasoning is as follows: "The opposing propagandist would not adopt such propaganda goals for implementation through these media channels at this time and in this situation unless an action of the type being inferred were indeed planned or intended." Thus, the analyst's inference that a major action is or is not planned, and his inferences about its character and scope or about elite expectations concerning it, are the last steps in a sequence of inference. The analysts reasoning may be likened to an effort to reconstruct the missing pieces in an action sequence. Certain parts of the mosaic of action are given or readily assumed. Other pieces are missing. In effect, therefore, the analyst rehearses in his mind the different possible versions of a missing piece, trying to decide which version is more plausible, given the values of the pieces already known to him.[7]

[7] Thus, the mode of reasoning employed in the indirect method is a special application of the procedure of causal imputation in certain types of historical explanation. As in the latter, the propaganda analyst attempts to approximate the logic of experiment by means of a mental rehearsal of hypothetical outcomes. Changes in the value of one or more variables are postulated by the analyst in order to appraise the consequences, if any, for other variables. By means of such imaginative rehearsals, a hypothetical construction or inference of nonobservable causal determinants takes place. On this procedure in historical explanation, see Talcott Parsons' commentary on Max Weber. *The Structure of Social Action*, 2nd edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949, pp. 610 ff.

Possible Goals of Preparatory Propaganda

An effort has been made in this study to develop a list of the possible propaganda goals that an elite might pursue in preparing one or another audience for a forthcoming action. The goals are phrased in general and abstract terms so as to be applicable to as many types of actions, audiences, and channels as possible. It is important to keep in mind, however, that some of these preparatory goals, stated quite explicitly and plainly here, would be implemented in a subtle fashion by the propagandist.

The list of goals presented is probably not exhaustive. It reflects the preoccupation of the present study with the Nazi elite and with wartime propaganda. On the other hand, it would be surprising if this list of general goals were to be totally inapplicable to analyses of preparatory propaganda efforts by other elites.

The list of goals is subdivided according to whether domestic audiences or groups in the opponent's camp are the target of the preparatory propaganda. It is also subdivided according to whether the forthcoming action is expected (by the elite) to have a *deprivational* or *indulgent* effect upon the audience in question.

POSSIBLE GOALS OF PROPAGANDA PREPARATORY TO MAJOR ACTIONS

I. Goals of propaganda directed at domestic or friendly neutral audiences:

A. In the case of major actions expected to have a *deprivational* effect on *domestic* audiences.[8]

Goals:

(1) Reduce the possibility of shock effect (as by hinting at the nature of the forth-

[8] For example, a declaration of war that shocks one's own people; use against the enemy of an unconventional weapon that violates the moral values of the domestic audiences; arrest and trial of one's own elite members for treason; announcement of severe measures against a segment of one's own population, etc.

coming action in gradually more explicit terms, combined with appropriate assurances).
(2) Manipulate "blame-responsibility" for the deprivation.
(3) Identify and reinforce the reaction pattern which the elite would like its own people to adopt when the prepared action takes place.
(4) Strengthen the public's predisposition to accept demands to be made upon it in connection with the intended action.
(5) Lay the basis for moral justification of the forthcoming action.
(6) Prepare for a better understanding of the necessity for the forthcoming action by prior disclosure of estimates and expectations upon which it is based — either the real ones or ones chosen for their propagandistic value.

B. In the case of major actions expected to have an *indulging* effect on the *domestic* audience.[9]

Goals:
(1) Control the degree and manner of expression of the public's expected rejoicing in order to prevent excesses that lower efficiency. (E.g., prevent wild outbursts of rejoicing, disruptions of work schedules and of labor discipline, etc.)
(2) Control public expectations aroused by the good news so as to prevent unrealistic hopes that might be disillusioned later on.
(3) Moderate the public's expectations as to the indulging character of the forthcoming action, in order to produce relatively greater satisfaction with the results of the action when it occurs.
(4) Increase the authority and prestige of the ruling elite by making appropriate claims of strength and foresight on its behalf which will be validated by the coming action.
(5) Alleviate current low morale by forecasting the expected indulgence.
(6) Manipulate in politically desirable directions the gratitude and satisfaction that will be engendered by the forthcoming indulgence.
(7) Exploit the public's gratitude to create greater support for the regime's policies.
(8) Prepare the public for the possibility that the elite's forthcoming action will be followed by a strong and successful counteraction by the opposing elite.

C. In the case of major actions, the expected success of which is indeterminate or difficult to foresee.[10]

Goals:
(1) Ensure that the domestic public's conception of the aims of the action remains within modest bounds. (This may entail countering enemy propagandists' efforts to commit you to more far-reaching aims than you can attain.)

II. Goals of propaganda directed at groups in the opponent's camp:

A. Regarding major actions expected to have an important *deprivational* effect upon groups in the opponent's camp. (Cf. examples under I, B above).

Goals:
(1) When "surprise" is important to the magnitude of the deprivational effect: mask the forthcoming action or veil its time, place, character, and scope.
(2) When advance demoralization of groups in the opponent's camp will facilitate success of the forthcoming action and reduce its costs: publicize the forthcoming action confidently and in detail in terms that emphasize the powerlessness of the opponent and the futility of resistance.
(3) Reduce the audience's confidence in the efficacy of possible countermeasures.
(4) Strengthen predispositions that will increase the demoralizing impact of the action when it takes place.
(5) Anticipating the likelihood that the

[9] For example, the announcement of one's military or diplomatic offensive, the use of a new powerful weapon that does not violate the moral values of the domestic audience, a victorious battle, enemy diplomatic concessions, increase in food rations, etc.

[10] For example, when the elite has relatively low confidence in the successful outcome of its action, as in the case of a military offensive against the enemy or a program for improved welfare at home.

forthcoming deprivation may set into motion efforts within the opponent's camp to fix "blame" and "responsibility," plan the forthcoming action in such a way (a) to maximize disruptive effects of the action on relations among members of an opposing elite, on relations between elite and masses, and among members of an opposing coalition; (b) to minimize the possibility that the action might unify the opponent's camp.

(6) Give prior moral justification for the forthcoming action to prevent strengthening of hatred against yourself on the part of the opponent and neutrals.

B. Regarding major actions expected to have an important *indulging* effect upon groups in the opponent's camp. (Cf. examples under I, A above.)

Goals:

(1) Encourage groups in the opponent's camp to form unrealistic assessments of the advantages accruing to them from your action. (Unrealistic either in seriously under- or overestimating the potentialities of the new situation created by the action; incorrect in diverting the opponent's attention to unfeasible avenues of exploiting the new situation militarily, politically, or psychologically.)

(2) Encourage an initially overoptimistic reaction to the event which is bound to result in subsequent disillusionment.

From the standpoint of a theory of the relationship of propaganda to action, the above framework makes but a modest contribution. No attempt is made to specify the conditions under which one or another preparatory goal will be undertaken. But propositional formulations of this type should serve to sensitize to the variety of ways in which elite actions can be instrumented by preparatory propaganda.

Case Studies

Several case studies drawn from wartime propaganda analyses will now be briefly summarized, in order to illustrate the way in which the indirect method was used for inferring something about an opponent's initiative.[11]

1. In one of the outstanding cases of propaganda analysis on record, British content analysts were able to infer that Nazi propaganda talk about the forthcoming use of a secret, unconventional air-bombardment weapon was no bluff. This inference was made in November 1943, eight months before the inception of the V-1 "buzz-bomb" attacks.

Promises that Germany would have a new reprisal weapon, which began to appear in German propaganda as early as June 1943, were obviously intended to bolster domestic morale, which had been badly shaken by increasingly heavy Allied raids to which Germany seemed to have no answer. If the propaganda objective of such promises was obvious enough, the question remained whether such talk was mere propaganda or whether a new reprisal weapon was actually being prepared for use on a militarily important scale in the near future. The British analyst answered this question affirmatively with considerable confidence. His inference rested upon the fundamental assumption, confirmed on many past occasions, that *German propaganda never deliberately misled the German people in matters involving an increase of German power.*

The British propaganda analyst also inferred that the prolonged delay in the appearance of the new reprisal weapon — after it had been repeatedly and authoritatively promised to the German people — must have been due to delays in its timetable not anticipated when the propaganda commitment was made. This inference was supported by the observation that it was Goebbels' practice not to make an important propaganda commitment of this character too far ahead of the date when he expected it to be realized. Thereby, he avoided aggravating domestic morale, which would be quickly affected by resentment over false propaganda promises. The propaganda analyst even estimated the maximum period of time — about three months — that Goebbels would allow himself for propaganda anticipation of the event. Hence, when the promised reprisal weapon was delayed appreciably beyond this time period, the analyst concluded — correctly

[11] Cases were selected for which some verification of the inferences was possible on the basis of historical materials.

— that the scheduled employment of the new weapon must have been unexpectedly delayed. He even identified the approximate dates on which something had happened to cause the delays.

The British analyst noted that references to air reprisal by means of new weapons suddenly dropped out of German propaganda for ten days beginning August 19, and later for seven days beginning September 11. He was then told of the British air raid of August 17 on the secret-weapon station at Peenemunde and the Allied air raids of September 7–8 on installations in the Boulogne-Calais area which were suspected of being launching platforms for a new type of German weapon. The analyst's problem, therefore, was to consider alternative explanations for the "gaps" noted in German reprisal propaganda. In so doing, he considered (a) the *suddenness* with which the gap began; (b) any *change in quality* of propaganda on retaliation and on new weapons after it was resumed following each "gap"; (c) the possible *coincidence* of the "gap" *with other events* or with changes in the war situation which might be expected to cut off the flow of reprisal propaganda; (d) the possible *coincidence* of the beginning of the "gaps" *with events* that may have been *connected with retaliation* and/or a new weapon.

He found that the "gaps" did not coincide with "other events" and, significantly, that the propaganda commitment on reprisal and new weapons was watered down when such propaganda was resumed after each "gap." The necessary explanation, then, was that something had happened just before each of the "gaps" that was connected with the preparation and scheduling of the new reprisal weapons. (An implicit assumption was that shifts toward *increased ambiguity* in propaganda time commitments regarding date of reprisal — a shift that had in fact occurred after each "gap" — reflected an official Nazi estimate of a further delay in D-day for the new weapon.) Since the analyst knew of the Allied raids of August 17 and September 7–8, his inferences provided additional confirmation of the *significance* of the targets (not fully certain at the time)[12] and of the effectiveness of the raids in disrupting Nazi reprisal preparations.[13]

2. On April 21, 1943, Washington disclosed that the Japanese Government had executed some of the American airmen downed during the raid on Tokyo of April 18, 1942. This news came at a time when mounting Allied air raids on Germany posed a serious problem for German defenses. German propaganda gave considerable play to the news of the execution of American airmen in Japan. Most of it was along the lines of familiar German propaganda themes. But interspersed in it were innuendoes that could be interpreted as threats of similar German action against Allied fliers.

How seriously were these veiled threats to be taken? The FCC analyst predicted that the Germans were *not* planning to emulate the Japanese in this respect. The inference was based on knowledge of German propaganda practices. If the Nazis intended such an extreme action of dubious legality, reasoned the analyst, one would expect them to prepare it carefully by a propaganda campaign designed to achieve prior moral justification. However, the few hints of such action in German propaganda did not evince such a purpose and could not be considered as constituting such a propaganda campaign. The analyst was reasonably confident, therefore, in concluding that no such

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[12] The British Air Ministry estimate was that the installations in Northern France were launching sites for a new type of weapon. "But the missiles were so long in coming," writes Walter Bedell Smith, "that some of our officers — highly placed, too — advanced the theory that the platforms were a gigantic hoax, constructed by the Nazis with great cunning to divert our bombers from vital targets." ("Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions — I. The Invasion Gamble," *Saturday Evening Post*, June 18, 1946, Vol. 218, No. 49, p. 106; cf. also Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1948, pp. 229–230, 259–260; H. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946, pp. 468, 492, 513; and R. V. Jones, "Scientific Intelligence: Some Aspects of Its Development from 1939–1945," *Journal of Royal United Services Institution*.)

[13] The details of the analysis are too complex for fuller presentation here. Partial verification for the inference appears in Goebbels' account of information given to him personally by Hitler to the effect that English air raids on Peenemunde and on V-1 launching sites (August 17 and September 7–8, 1943) had thrown back preparations four to eight weeks. (L. Lochner, ed., *The Goebbels Diary*, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1948, entry for September 10, 1943, pp. 435–436.)

German action was being planned for the time being.[14]

3. In 1941 and 1942 the German Army had launched powerful summer offensives against Soviet forces on the eastern front. After the disaster of Stalingrad in January 1943, however, it was uncertain whether the German command would have the capability for another large-scale offensive on the eastern front in 1943 or would want, in any event, to engage its forces in such an enterprise. During the months following Stalingrad, the FCC analysts carefully watched German propaganda on this subject for indications of German military intentions.

Promises of another German offensive against the Russians were made in Nazi propaganda in the weeks following Stalingrad. Such promises appeared in the context of the highly publicized "total mobilization" measures, launched concurrently with the announcement of the Stalingrad defeat, which had as their avowed aim the restoration of "the fighting efficiency" of German manpower and arms. At the beginning of March 1943, however, references to a forthcoming German offensive in the East were dropped altogether. The FCC analyst noted this abrupt change but felt that a clear-cut interpretation of it was not possible. The sudden propaganda silence on a forthcoming offensive might mean either (a) that no offensive was contemplated, or (b) that an offensive, though contemplated, was not talked about for other reasons — e.g., in order to camouflage the intention to attack again in the East, or in order not to interfere with the possibility of arranging a truce or a separate peace with the Russians.

In order to choose between these alternative explanations, the analyst had to bring additional considerations into his reasoning. It was only several months later, at the beginning of June, that he was able to say with a degree of confidence that a German offensive was not likely. This inference was possible because the analyst interpreted propaganda behavior on the subject of a possible German offensive *in the context of German domestic morale considerations.* His reasoning may be summarized as follows:

(a) In the past, Nazi propaganda had characteristically extolled the virtues of the initiative and had claimed that Germany held and would continue to hold the initiative.

(b) Because of the state of depressed morale in Germany, the traditional assertion of German initiative was almost obligatory upon German propagandists as a morale measure.

(c) *General, vague* predictions of a forthcoming German offensive in the East would hardly tip off the Russians, since in any event the only elements of a modern land offensive of this type that could be camouflaged were its exact time and place.

(d) Instead, however, German propaganda had recently begun to extol the merits of the "defensive."

(e) If the lack of predictions of a German offensive was the result of security considerations or a desire to mask the intention to attack again, then it was most unlikely that German propaganda would be simultaneously preparing the domestic public to accept the unpopular idea that Germany would henceforth play a *defensive* role in the war. Such a propaganda line, implying German weakness and a turning point in the war, aggravated the serious domestic morale problem.

(f) Therefore, German propaganda behavior could be explained most plausibly on the assumption that no major German offensive was being planned. For, if such an offensive were intended, propaganda would not have further depressed domestic morale by attempting to popularize the virtues of the defensive.

This prediction, based on propaganda analysis, was reasonably accurate. Documentary evidence subsequently available indicates that Hitler, while refusing advice to go over to a purely defensive strategy in the East, planned only in terms of a limited, "spoiling" attack.[15]

4. In June 1942, the question arose whether the German Government might change its of-

[14] Some verification of the inference can be found in Goebbels' diary entry for May 10, 1943: "The Führer has no intention of following the Japanese procedure of court-martialing aviators shot down over German soil and having them executed. . . . I must see to it that, while we let our press mention the strong language employed by the Japanese and also more recently by the Italians, we do not suggest to the German public that we should indulge in similar practices." (*Op. cit.*, p. 367.)

[15] Operations Order No. 5, issued by Hitler on March 13, 1943, to German Armies in Russia, spoke only in terms of taking the initiative at certain sectors of the front, if possible before the Russians did, in order to dictate their actions at least at one sector. See also B. H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk*, New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc., 1948, p. 212; J. F. C. Fuller, *The Second World War*, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1949, pp. 276–277. In his diary entry for May 7, 1943, Goebbels stated: "In the East the

ficial diplomatic policy toward Brazil. Relations between the two countries had for some time been critical, amounting in mid-1942 to a virtual state of undeclared hostilities. However, Berlin broadcasts to Brazil had maintained the tone of "injured friend." During the last week of June the tone of these broadcasts became more belligerent. Sharp accusations and emphatic threats were made in the matter of treatment of German nationals within Brazil.

Was this threat a mere bluff, or was the German Government prepared to take some forceful action? The FCC analyst reasoned that such threats and accusations, if no more than bluff, were extremely unsound propaganda. "Behind-the-scenes pressure and muscle flexing may privately impress certain key officials in Latin American countries. But publicly calling a nation to account and threatening it is something to which no Latin American nation could or would permit itself to bow, short of the blackest necessity." Therefore, because he assumed that Latin American psychology was not lost upon the Germans, the analyst suggested that these open threats were not a matter of unskillful propaganda but indicated, rather, that Berlin was ready to drop its earlier role of "injured friend."[16]

Führer will soon start a *limited offensive* in the direction of Kursk. He may, however, delay it to see whether the Bolsheviks want to beat us to it. That might offer us an even more favorable chance than if we took the initiative. . . ." (*Op. cit.*, p. 352; see also pp. 391–392.) Hitler apparently tired of waiting for the Russians to start matters, for he launched the limited offensive on the Kursk salient on July 5. There was in 1943, however, no major German offensive in the East comparable to that of the preceding two summers. That this was not an easy matter for Allied intelligence to establish is suggested by Harry Butcher (*My Three Years with Eisenhower*, New York, 1946, p. 314), who reports that in late May 1943, Walter Bedell Smith returned to Eisenhower's Headquarters, after attending joint British-American conferences in Washington, with the following "Washington" appraisal: The Germans were prepared to attack shortly on the Russian front on a "monstrous" scale in an effort to knock Russia out of the war or to paralyze the Red Army.

[16] The precise relation between the change in German broadcasts to Brazil, noted above, and German plans for action against Brazil has not been directly verified. However, there is some indirect evidence that the change in propaganda tone and content may have been coordinated with military plans. Thus, in a Führer conference on May 14, 1942, a memorandum entitled "The Opening of Hostilities Against Brazil" and naval plans for a "powerful blow" were discussed, and Hitler authorized a strong U-boat attack in Brazilian waters for the beginning of August. The "powerful blow" planned in May was struck on August 15, 1942, when five Brazilian ships, including a troopship, were torpedoed off the Brazilian coast. Another Brazilian ship was sunk on August 19. Thereupon, on August 22, Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy. (For additional details on implementation of the decision to take action against Brazil, see Admiral Raeder's testimony at Nuremberg in International Military Tribunal, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, Vol. 14, pp. 122–125.)

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THE NEW SHAME OF THE CITIES

• MORTON GRODZINS

A little more than fifty years ago Lincoln Steffens published *The Shame of the Cities*, a book celebrated for its exposure of political corruption and for the train of municipal reform that it and other "muckraking" works inspired. Steffens in fact was less interested in reform than in understanding. His work was not even an indictment of the crooks in and out of office who dominated American urban politics (indeed he admired the integrity of crooks within their own moral code). He saw that the reign of the venal minority was made possible by the apathy and tolerance of the larger group of upstanding citizens. Members of the larger group were too busy with other things to be bothered with political corruption; or they left municipal politics to the corrupt

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because this made readily available the political merchandise — welfare services for the poor, special business favors for the rich — which the citizens, as consumers, wanted.

Crookedness, especially in the form of "honest graft," has not disappeared from American urban politics. But the shame of American cities is no longer political corruption. It is a problem which, even more than the one described by Steffens, involves the whole population. Like Steffens' problem, its solution, if there is a solution, hinges upon fundamental changes in the habits of thought and action of the entire citizen group. The new situation that is changing the face and fate of the great cities of the United States can be simply stated: *many central cities of the great metropolitan areas of the United States are fast becoming lower class, largely Negro, slums.*

A continuation of present population trends will produce central cities largely inhabited by low income groups, most of whom will be non-white. The prospect is for an urban-suburban schism along race and class lines: lower classes generally, and Negroes particularly, dominant in central cities, middle- and upper-class whites in the suburbs. The urban-suburban conflict will become largely a Negro-white conflict. The "racial problem" in the United States, still festering in the rural South, will become equally, perhaps most acutely, a problem of the urban North.

I

Some 95 million people, most of the population of the United States, now live in what the Bureau of the Census defines as a standard metropolitan area: a central city of at least 50,000 population with its ring of satellite communities "essentially metropolitan in character and socially and economically integrated with the central city." Fewer than one-third of the nation's population lived within these areas in 1900; considerably more than half (55.9 per cent) resided there in 1950; and it is estimated that seventy per cent of the nation's total population will be metropolitan area dwellers by 1975.

The fourteen largest metropolitan areas, those with populations of over 1,000,000, contain more than half the total metropolitan population and almost one-third of the nation's. These areas attract the largest number of Negro in-migrants from the South, and in them, generally, Negroes constitute a larger proportion of the total population than they do in other metropolitan areas.[1] The consequences of the urban-surburban racial and class bifurcation are therefore seen in their most acute form in these largest metropolitan areas, but what is taking place in them is also taking place (though generally at a slower pace) in many of the smaller metropolitan areas.

For several decades the Negro population of the great cities has been increasing more rapidly than the white population. The great changes come in time of full employment, and the explosive growth, as measured by the decennial censuses, came between 1940 and 1950. In that decade, while the total population of the fourteen largest metropolitan areas increased by 19 per cent, the total Negro percentage gain (65.1 per cent) was more than four times greater than the white increase (15.6 per cent). Negroes increased proportionately more rapidly in both central cities and suburbs, but the significant growth differential was inside the great cities: whites increased by 3.7 per cent, Negroes by 67.8 per cent. Four central cities at least doubled their Negro population while whites in five cities decreased in number.

Despite these increases, non-whites even in 1950 constituted only a minor fraction of the total population in most of the central cities of the fourteen largest metropolitan areas. Washington, D. C., with non-whites totalling 35.4 per cent of total population, and Baltimore (23.8 per cent) had the largest group of non-whites in proportion to total population. In addition to these, only three other cities had Negro populations in excess of 15 per cent, and three had fewer than 10 per cent.

As for the suburbs, some of the areas experienced non-white percentage gains between 1940 and 1950, and even the fourteen-area totals show Negro increases greater than white ones (56 per cent as compared with 33 per cent). But the actual number of Negroes is small. A suburban non-white gain of 130 per cent in Minneapolis-St. Paul, for example, represented an increase of exactly 337 persons.

[1] Otis D. Duncan and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *Social Characteristics of Urban and Rural Communities, 1950* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1956), p. 60.

Moreover, even the non-white "suburban" increases noted are rarely to the suburbs themselves. Rather they largely represent Negro inmigration to the smaller industrial towns within the metropolitan rings of the central cities. Where non-white movements are to the true suburbs, they are almost always to segregated non-white communities.

As of 1950, non-whites constituted more than ten per cent of the suburban population in only one area (Baltimore). In eight of the fourteen suburban areas, non-whites constituted five per cent or less of the respective suburban populations. Non-whites made up a larger proportion of central city population than of suburban population without exception; in most cases, the non-whites were proportionally two or three times more numerous in central cities than suburbs. Whereas Negro central city population increased from 8.6 to 13.2 per cent between 1940 and 1950, the total Negro suburban growth was from 4.0 to 4.7 per cent.

Moreover, without exception, the fourteen cities conform to the pattern of a widening racial schism between central cities and suburbs. Where Negroes in 1940 were proportionally most numerous in both central cities and suburbs (as in Baltimore and Washington, D.C.), the subsequent decade saw them decrease markedly as a percentage of suburban populations and increase markedly as a percentage of central city populations. This record very likely traces the future for other cities whose urban-suburban population distribution by race in 1950 approximated the 1940 distribution of Baltimore and Washington.

Barring unexpected developments, such as an extreme depression, there is every likelihood that the central cities will continue to lose, or remain relatively stable, in white population while continuing to gain in non-white. A careful estimate of Chicago's population in 1956 by Otis and Beverly Duncan revealed that Negroes had reached 19 per cent of the total population compared with 8 per cent in 1940 and 14 per cent in 1950.[2] There seems little doubt that by 1970 Negroes will constitute at least one-third of the city's total population. Estimates for Washington, D.C., indicate that Negro population there is now close to or actually exceeds 50 per cent of the total (from 35.4 per cent in 1950). An official New York agency has forecast that Negroes and Puerto Ricans together will constitute 21 per cent of the city's population in 1960 and 28 per cent in 1970. Their estimate for the core of the core city, the borough of Manhattan, looks forward to 28 per cent non-whites and Puerto Ricans in 1960 and 45 per cent in 1970.

Future population estimates must take into account the larger number of older people in the total population, the lesser attractiveness of the suburbs to those whose children have left home and some consequent reurbanization of white suburbanites. Even making allowance for shifts of this sort, all evidence makes it highly probable that within thirty years Negroes will constitute from 25 to 50 per cent of the total population in at least ten of the fourteen largest central cities. Negroes will probably not muster majorities in more than two or three of the largest cities, but in virtually all of these cities they will certainly be the largest single identifiable (and self-identified) group. On the other hand, it is highly improbable that they will anywhere constitute a sizeable proportion of suburban populations.

The general picture of the future is clear enough: large Negro concentrates (in a few cases, majorities) in the principal central cities; large white majorities, with segregated Negro enclaves, in the areas outside.

II

The growth of Negro population within the central cities follows established and well-understood patterns. It is based upon inmigration from the South and it is accelerated by a larger rate of natural increase of the

[2] The Duncans' figure for 1956 supersedes an estimate made in 1955 by Donald Bogue and illustrates the difficulties of making projections. Bogue estimated that Chicago's Negro population would reach between 19 and 24 per cent of the total by 1965 (*An Estimate of Metropolitan Chicago's Future Population: 1955 to 1965*, a report published jointly by the Chicago Community Inventory, University of Chicago, and Scripps Foundation, Miami University); the Duncans' closer look revealed that the 19 per cent figure had been reached by 1956 (*Chicago's Negro Population*, a report by the Chicago Community Inventory, University of Chicago, 1956). I am indebted to Otis and Beverly Duncan for answering many questions concerning the problems of this article and for their criticism of an early draft.

non-white in-migrants in comparison with the older white residents. Migration has been the source of the largest increase in most non-Southern cities, and continued industrial expansion may actually increase this movement in the years immediately ahead. The "push" from the South may grow stronger as the consequence of growing white antagonisms following attempts to enforce the Supreme Court's non-segregation decisions. And the "pull" of the northern cities may become more forceful as the Negro communities there become larger and more firmly established and as information concerning job and other opportunities flows back to relatives and friends.

The spatial expansion of Negro population in the largest cities follows roughly similar patterns. One universal rule is that residential concentrations are segregated. In Chicago 79 per cent of all Negroes in 1950 lived in census tracts in which at least 75 per cent of the residents were Negroes. At the opposite extreme, 84 per cent of the non-Negroes resided in census tracts in which fewer than one per cent of the residents were Negro,[3] and the disparity would be even greater if Negro servants "living in" were not counted. Chicago's segregation pattern is somewhat extreme, but all cities follow this pattern. Negroes live preponderantly or exclusively with Negroes, whites with whites.

A second rule is equally general: once an urban area begins to swing from predominant white to predominant Negro occupancy, the process is rarely reversed. Between 1920 and 1950 in Chicago, for example, there are no cases in which areas of predominantly Negro residents reverted to areas of white occupancy. More than this, a neighborhood with a substantial proportion of Negroes (say 25 per cent) rarely retains its mixed character for a considerable period of time. The Duncans, in their intensive study of neighborhood changes in Chicago, found not a single instance between 1940 and 1950 of a census tract "with mixed population (25–75 per cent non-white) in which succession from white to Negro occupancy was arrested."[4] Post-war programs of public housing and urban renewal have somewhat altered this rule, in some cases establishing new Negro concentrates where they had not previously existed and in others demonstrating to "tens of thousands of white and non-white low-income families . . . that inter-racial patterns of living are practical."[5] But new housing programs in predominantly Negro areas have for the most part meant the simple exchange of one Negro population group for another; and urban renewal programs, by displacing Negro families in one area, have frequently had the effect of hastening the succession of adjacent areas to all-Negro occupancy.

A third generalization is that the pattern of Negro residential expansion is from the core of the city outward. The original concentration is almost everywhere near the center of the city. It subsequently expands radially or in concentric circles.

A fourth generalization is also possible. The Negro population moves generally into areas already characterized by high residential mobility, and there is a rough comparability between the social characteristics of the in-migrant Negro population and the out-migrant white population (with respect to such items as educational attainment, rate of unemployment, room crowding, home ownership and white collar employment).[6] Lower-class Negroes, in other words, tend to move into lower-class neighborhoods; middle-class Negroes into middle-class neighborhoods. The "piling up" process — the gross overcrowding of dwellings and areas — occurs only after the transition from white to Negro dominance has taken place.

III

The process by which whites of the central cities leave areas of Negro in-migration is called by the social-psychologists "tipping a neighborhood." The variations are numerous, but the theme is universal. Some white residents will not accept Negroes as neighbors under any conditions. But others will not move if a relatively small number of Negroes move into the same neighborhood, the same block

[3] Otis D. Duncan and Beverly Duncan, *The Negro Population of Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 96.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

[5] Robert C. Weaver, "Integration in Public and Private Housing," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March, 1956, p. 87.

[6] Otis D. Duncan and Beverly Duncan, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–16, chaps. vii, viii.

or the same apartment building. Once the proportion of non-whites exceeds the limits of the neighborhood's tolerance for inter-racial living (this is the "tip point"), the white groups move out. The proportion of Negroes who will be accepted before the tip point is reached varies from city to city and from neighborhood to neighborhood. But for the vast majority of the white Americans, a tip point exists. Once it is exceeded, they will no longer stay among Negro neighbors.

The process is not the simple one of "flight" that is a part of the real estate mythology of changing neighborhoods. It may take a number of years before the "invaded" neighborhood becomes an all-Negro one. Nor is the phenomenon uniformly one in which Negroes "push" whites out. As we have seen, areas of heavy Negro in-migration are most often areas already characterized by high mobility; and the process of Negroes taking up vacancies as they occur cannot be conceived as one in which the old residents have been "pushed."

Many people in many ways for many purposes have explored how the tip point operates. Real estate operators, seeking the higher revenues that come with Negro overcrowding, talk freely among themselves about "tipping a building" or "tipping a neighborhood." Quakers in the Philadelphia suburbs of Concord Park and Greenbelt Knoll have utilized the tip point for the opposite purpose: to build interracial communities. They have concluded that this goal can be achieved only if the proportion of Negroes is rigidly controlled and does not exceed the point at which whites (even egalitarian Quakers) will refuse to participate. An official of these developments has written: "Early in our sales program we found that white buyers would not buy without assurance that Negroes would be in a minority."

Public housing officials have faced the tip-point phenomenon from another angle. In some Eastern cities, it is possible to maintain low cost housing projects on an inter-racial basis as long as non-whites do not exceed roughly twenty per cent of the total residents. Once this point is reached, whites will not remain in, or move into, the project. One method used to combat the process of tipping public housing has been to raise rents. This has the effect of decreasing the number of Negroes who can afford to live in the projects. So the tip point leads to a shifting of public housing goals, subordinating the first principle of low rentals to that of maintaining interracial occupancy.

In a few areas around the country Negroes and whites live side by side without fuss or fanfare. This is true even in Chicago, where segregation patterns are extreme, and examples of "open occupancy" can be found from New York to San Francisco.[7] Furthermore, in recent years, there has been a tendency for a single Negro family — usually of considerable income and in the professions — to find a dwelling in an all-white neighborhood. In every such case of "interracial living," however, some factor — economic or other — limits the ingress of Negro residents.

Education and community organization can extend tolerance and thus increase the proportion of Negroes in a given area before the tip point is reached. But the limits have not proved to be infinitely elastic. Even where good will, community effort and financing have been maximized, the psychology of tipping has operated. The only interracial communities in the United States, with the exception of some abject slums, are those where limits exist upon the influx of non-whites.

IV

The sheer cost of suburban housing excludes Negroes from many suburban areas. Furthermore, the social satisfactions of slum or near-slum existence for a homogeneous population have been insufficiently studied, and it may very well be true that many Negro urban dwellers would not easily exchange current big-city life even for reasonably priced suburban homes. The crucial fact, however, is that Negroes presently do not have any free choice

[7] See, for example, Davis McEntire, "A Study of Racial Attitudes in Neighborhoods Infiltrated by Non-Whites" (mimeographed), (Berkeley: University of California, 1955); Arnold M. Rose, Frank J. Atelsek and Lawrence R. McDonald, "Neighborhood Reactions to Isolated Negro Residents: An Alternative to Invasion and Succession," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1953, pp. 497–507; Robert C. Weaver, "Integration in Public and Private Housing," *loc. cit.*,; also the mimeographed reports of the Committee on Civil Rights in Manhattan, "Open Occupancy Living in the Bronx" (May, 1957); "Summary of Survey on Country-Wide Instances of Open Occupancy Housing" (May, 1957).

in the matter. They are excluded from suburbia by a wide variety of devices.

Social antagonisms of suburban communities are themselves effective. Where it is plainly understood that Negroes are not wanted, Negro suburbanization is for all practical purposes impossible. In addition, suburban communities use their control of zoning, subdivision and building regulations to achieve exclusion. Minimum lot sizes are increased to two or more acres. Requirements for expensive street improvements are made — and then waived only in favor of "desirable" developments. Large-scale building operations are defined as "business" for zoning purposes, thus excluding the possibility of low or moderate income suburban building. The suburb itself purchases all vacant land parcels large enough for subdivision, and it then resells only to favored purchasers. Builders are required to obtain certificates from the school board that educational accommodation will be adequate for the new residences; ordinances regulating "look alike" features or requiring certain building materials make home building expensive.

Where legal barriers of this sort are not sufficient to maintain a "white only" policy, land use controls are used informally — and of course illegally — to exclude Negroes. A Philadelphia builder recently told an interviewer that he would very much like to sell suburban houses to Negroes, but that it was impossible because it would ruin him economically. "If I sold just one suburban home to a Negro, the local building inspectors would have me moving pipes three-eighths of an inch every afternoon in every one of the places I was building; and moving a pipe three-eighths of an inch is mighty expensive, if you have to do it in concrete."[8] This sort of collusion is combined with direct social pressures upon white owners of older homes and prospective Negro purchasers of those homes, as well as upon real estate brokers. And where all else fails, suburban residents have turned to violence to prevent Negro occupancy. The total suburban façade is relatively impenetrable.

Suburban restrictions are everywhere aimed at Negroes as a racial group and not simply against people of low or moderate income. When such restrictions are applied uniformly, they of course also affect whites. But even this has an indirect effect upon the Negro concentrations within the cities. If middle- and lower-class whites who live next door to the slums were able to move to the suburbs, their places would quickly be taken by the slum-dwellers, especially those Negroes whose presence in the slums is due less to income than to the prejudice which excludes them from more desirable places. By raising the price of housing in the suburbs, land use regulations reduce the movement of the white middle and lower classes out of the city. And this in turn holds the slum-dweller in the slums and, accordingly, the Negro in the ghetto.

V

Some of the social consequences of the urban-suburban racial and class schism are already apparent and others can be reasonably predicted.

Within the cities, the first result is a spreading of slums. There is no free market for Negro housing. The Negro population always increases faster than the living space available to it. New areas that open up to Negro residence become grossly overcrowded by conversion of one-family houses to multiple dwellings and squeezing of two or more Negro families into apartments previously occupied by a single white one. Though complete statistical evidence is lacking, it is likely that Negroes pay substantially more rent for such accommodations than whites, and the higher rent itself makes for higher density.

Income factors alone would account in large part for the condition of life of the Negro community. In this respect they are not unlike some earlier immigrants to the city; the Irish and the Poles, for example, also settled mainly in the slums.

Like previous newcomers to the city tasting the freedom of urban life for the first time, a significant portion of the Negro group does not possess the stable patterns of thought and action that characterize the "better" older inhabitants. And, as with all immigrant groups, old community patterns of control do not operate well in the new environment. Family disorganization among urban Negroes is high as

[8] Quoted from *Government and Housing in Metropolitan Areas* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1958), by Edward C. Banfield and Morton Grodzins.

measured by such indices as broken marriages, families headed by females, and unrelated individuals living in the same household. The development of social stabilization pivoted on family and community ties take place against great odds. How does a mother keep her teenage son off the streets if an entire family must eat, sleep and live in a single room? What utility can be found in sobriety among a society of drinkers and a block of taverns? What opportunity for quiet amidst the din of a tightly packed, restless neighborhood?

The conditions of urban life, rather than socializing new Negro residents to "desirable" life patterns, frequently have the opposite effect. They encourage rowdiness, casual and competitive sexuality and a readiness for combat. The result is that neighborhoods completely inhabited by Negro residents eventually spiral downward. Disease and crime rates are high. Family stability is further prejudiced. The slum spreads outward.

The Negro "black belts" of the great American cities are by no means homogeneous, however. The very concentration of population within them, plus the visible badge of color, give them a spurious air of likeness. They contain, in fact, wide ranges of every social attribute: from illiteracy to high learning, from filth to hospital-like hygienic standards, from poverty to riches, from political backwardness to sophistication. Though the casual observer of the "black belt" neighborhoods sees only slums, the fact is that in every such area there are sub-areas, frequently on the periphery of the high-density mass, that are anything but slums. These are usually areas of newest acquisition, inhabited by the well-to-do of the Negro community. Density is low, lawns and gardens are well-tended, church attendance is high, neatness and cleanliness are apparent, parental standards of propriety for children higher than for comparable white groups.

Negro neighborhoods in the shadows of white luxury apartments are not unknown; but the more usual pattern is for low income non-Negroes to occupy a buffer zone between all-Negro and the better white neighborhoods. Some of these are themselves new migrants to the city: Southerners and Japanese-Americans in Chicago, Puerto Ricans in New York, for example. Others are old residents on the lower end of the income scale; people who, like the Negroes themselves, do not find success in life, or life itself, easy.

With the exodus of middle and upper classes to the suburbs, the white population of the central cities is made up in larger part of low-income groups who generally exhibit a greater degree of intolerance and racial prejudice than do other white groups. And the increasing juxtaposing of the Negro and the low-income non-Negro populations produces increased inter-racial tensions. Shirley Star of the National Opinion Research Center has shown that the greatest white animosity toward Negroes is found on the edge of the expanding Negro residential areas where whites fear their block or neighborhood will soon be "invaded."[9] In these lower and lower-middle class transitional areas, violence is incipient.

The total situation produces Negro communities in which people live their whole lives without, or with minimum, contact with the other race. The social isolation of the northern urban Negro is, for very large numbers, more complete than it ever was for the Negro rural resident in the South.

Even in education, the urban residential segregation of the non-Southern cities has produced consequences that in fact are not dissimilar to what the South is trying to maintain by the use of violence and unconstitutional laws. If segregation is defined not in legal terms but in the numbers of students who attend all-Negro schools, then it is undoubtedly true that more Negro students are segregated in the schools of New York and Chicago than in any other city.

The general picture of segregation needs some qualification. A small number of church groups have succeeded in building interracial congregations. Qualified Negro workers are finding employment in places previously barred to them, not only in manufacturing, but also in the professions and in retail establishments. On a few blocks in urban America Negroes and whites have demonstrated that they can live together as neighbors. Labor unions, though traditionally anti-Negro, have come to

[9] See Shirley A. Star, "Interracial Tension in Two Areas of Chicago: An Exploratory Approach to the Measurement of Interracial Tension," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, December 1950.

accept Negroes as full partners in leadership as well as membership.

These are evidences of advances toward social integration. Other advances have been made within the Negro community itself. As this community in a given city grows larger, satisfactory career lines, economic security and the home and community life that accompany such developments become possible. Here, however, Negroes and whites meet each other from separate societies rather than within a single group. Though the Negro has his share of the better things of life, he has them in isolation with other Negroes. The disadvantaged segregated community even produces advantages for some individuals within it, providing protected markets for Negro professionals and businessmen and protected constituencies for political and church leaders. But those who profit from segregation also suffer from it. They feel the pinpricks as well as the sledges of discrimination, and they must suppress their dissatisfaction in accordance with standards of conduct expected of all "better" people, whatever their race.

VI

Population shifts bring with them important economic consequences. Of first importance is the further decline of a large segment of business activity, and associated property values, in the central cities. For reasons only remotely related — or unrelated — to the Negro-white population distribution, the economic feasibility of decentralized retail shopping has already been demonstrated. Suburban shopping centers have captured a large segment of the market in clothing, furniture and other consumption goods; almost everywhere the "downtown" shops of the central cities have lost ground, absolutely and proportionally, to the peripheral developments. Retail sales in the central business district of Chicago decreased by 5 per cent between 1948 and 1954 while sales in the metropolitan area outside the city increased by 53 per cent. The sales loss of downtown areas has been even greater in other central cities.

Further developments can be foreseen. The downtown stores, with non-white and low-income customers more and more predominant in their clientele, will tend to concentrate on cheaper merchandise. The decline of the central-city department store will be accompanied by a general deterioration of the downtown area. There are some striking exceptions, most notably in mid-town Manhattan. But in most cities — Chicago, Boston, Los Angeles are good examples — the main streets are becoming infested with all-night jewelry auctions, bargain linens and cheap neckties, hamburger stands and jazz dives. The slums, in other words, are spreading to the central business districts.

A further and more problematic development is that the offices of the large corporations will join the flight from the city, taking along with their servicing businesses: banks, law offices, advertising agencies and others. The rapid development of closed circuit television, facsimile reproduction and other technical aids relieves these businesses of the necessity of clustering at a central point. Their exodus from the city is already underway. New highways will make it easier in many cases to get from one suburb to another than from suburb to downtown; and the losses of giving up central headquarters can be amortized over a number of years, frequently at considerable tax savings. Even the downtown hotel is likely to give way to the suburban motel except for convention purposes, an incidental further boost to the honky-tonk development within the downtown business areas.

The rule seems to be a simple one: retail trade, the white collar shops and the service industries will follow population. Once their exodus is well underway, they also lead population. The same general rule at least partially applies for manufacturing: the greatest suburbanization of manufacturing has taken place in those metropolitan areas where there has also been the most marked suburbanization of population, and some evidence indicates that manufacturing precedes population, rather than vice versa.

Though the central cities have lost some manufacturing to both suburban and non-metropolitan areas, they have nevertheless maintained the preponderant share of the nation's total manufacturing enterprise. As Kitakawa and Bogue have shown, "the over-all spatial distribution [of manufacturing] in the United States has changed comparatively little in the past 50 years."[10] The relative immobil-

[10] Evelyn M. Kitagawa and Donald J. Bogue, *Suburbanization of Manufacturing Activity within*

ity of heavy industry has the result of fixing the laboring and semi-skilled groups, including large numbers of Negroes, within the central cities.

The total economic prospect is one of exodus of a large segment of retail and other non-manufacturing businesses from downtown centers. Abandonment of these centers will lead to a host of municipal problems, not least of which is the loss of a substantial tax base. The economic developments are at once a step toward, and a consequence of, the city-suburban bifurcation of races that promises to transform many central cities into lower class ethnic islands. Successful attempts by central cities to encourage the establishment of new manufacturing plants as a means of rebuilding their tax base will of course hasten this process.

VII

The central cities of the metropolitan areas dominate the nation not only in population but also in retail and wholesale sales, manufacturing and the provision of services to individuals and businesses. They set the tone and pattern for the entire complex of community interdependence in politics, economics and cultural life. If the analysis presented here is accurate, present population trends in the metropolitan areas confront the whole nation with a wide range of deleterious consequences.

For no problem are solutions more easily stated. If racial segregation and separation in the metropolitan areas of the nation lead to evil consequences, the cure is obvious: the separation should be ended. White populations should be brought back into the central cities. Negroes should be allowed to move freely into all areas of the cities and suburbs now barred to them. By rebuilding large areas of central cities, white populations can be induced to return to those cities. By combatting restrictions against Negro occupancy of suburbs, a flow of non-whites can be started in that direction. By establishing a non-discriminatory housing market in both cities and suburbs, income and social attributes, not race, can be maximized as the criteria for residential location; the consequent diffusion of Negro residences will minimize the dangerous consequences of the "tip point" psychology. By attracting Negroes to jobs in the smaller cities outside the South, where they are now underrepresented, some of the present and potential city-suburban population imbalance may be corrected. Community resources and government funds must be invested on a far larger scale than any program has yet seen if genuine results are to be achieved.

No solutions are more difficult to achieve. Lincoln Steffens, after laying bare the earlier shame of the cities, remarked that Americans "can stand the truth; that there is pride in the character of American citizenship; and that this pride may be a power in the land." Pride cuts two ways and, among whites and Negroes alike, can aggravate tension as well as alleviate it. Yet pride — in human dignity, in the urban culture — may indeed be a first requisite for specific action, and economic, social and political values reinforce the need for such action.

Here, as elsewhere, nothing succeeds like success; and a demonstration that results can be achieved in one metropolitan area of the nation will be important for all areas. The only way to avoid the consequences of racial schism is to bridge it.[11]

Standard Metropolitan Areas (Oxford, Ohio: Scripps Foundation, Miami University, and Population Research and Training Center, University of Chicago, 1955), p. 15.

[11] A more detailed consideration of "solutions" will be contained in a paper, "The Metropolitan Area as a Racial Problem," to be published as a part of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. I am indebted to the Special Studies Project for permission to utilize in the present article materials originally submitted to it. Still another version of some of these materials was published as "Metropolitan Segregation," *Scientific American*, October, 1957, pp. 33–41.

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