


Alfred de Grazia

Political Behavior



New, Revised Edition of **THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE** Volume I

A FREE PRESS PAPERBACK
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY



ALFRED DE GRAZIA

POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR

Volume One of

**THE ELEMENTS OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE**

NEW, REVISED EDITION
in Two Volumes




THE FREE PRESS, *New York*
COLLIER-MACMILLAN LIMITED, *London*

 Library IAS, Shimla



00018188



320
G796P

Copyright © 1952, 1962 by Alfred de Grazia

Printed in the United States of America

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publisher.

For information, address:

THE FREE PRESS
A DIVISION OF THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
60 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10011

Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., Toronto, Ontario

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 62-19199

FIRST FREE PRESS PAPERBACK EDITION 1965

Introduction

My aim in this book is to introduce the citizen who has had no previous training in political science to its proper elements, in their most useful order, and with appropriate emphasis. The book is designed to be a first glimpse of a field of vast importance and universal interest, a glimpse, it is hoped, that will stimulate a general interest in the ever fresh problems of political science.

The best books of political science are broad in scope, logical, and well grounded in the facts of political life. Like Plato and Aristotle, recent respected political scientists regard the field of politics as covering the most important problems of community living. The study of the form these important problems take is political science, and the study of political science, like the other sciences, rests on facts. Today we have increasingly accurate means of gathering and analyzing facts. Field surveys, sample polling, and intricate systems of punch-card tabulation and analysis are several of the techniques for studying human behavior that annually increase our reliable knowledge and make possible a better political science than had our predecessors. If we accept the good life as defined by great moral philosophers like Aquinas, Spinoza, or Jefferson, we have readier ways than they had of demonstrating how such a good life may be achieved. There are exciting possibilities in the future of political science, and it is hoped that this book will help to reveal them.

The work is divided into two volumes. The first describes some great political scientists and their ideas, tells how scientists study political subjects, what those subjects are, and how the ordinary person can think correctly about politics. It proceeds to introduce the reader to some of the basic elements of political behavior: leadership, political groupings, public opinion, representation, party organization, and the use of economic, psychological, and coercive pressures in politics—all of which occur very generally, on all levels of government, in all political institutions, and in the pursuit of all kinds of goals. Volume I concludes by discussing how men strive to

8 / Introduction

realize their major goals by political action that is calculated to bring specific results. It inquires into the main branches of democratic thought and the moral and scientific obstacles to the realization of democracy. Finally, it investigates the nature of public policy and considers how policy affects private rights, and how it may be made more rational and productive of liberty.

The second volume of the work discusses the common and specialized structures of government within which much of political behavior occurs. These structures are laws, constitutions, legislatures, executives, administrative agencies, and courts. It then takes up the study of the level of political organization—local, national, and international. Enough of the main facts about key political institutions are given to enable the student to comprehend how the basic elements of political behavior operate within, influence, and are influenced by such institutions. The work concludes with a look at recent developments in political science and the larger world that it concerns, and speculates upon the new forms of the profession and the world order.

As the reader progresses, he will appreciate some of the handicaps under which political scientists labor. Although political scientists are no less well trained, clear thinking, or logical than the natural scientists, their subject matter, as I have attempted to show, presents special difficulties from which the natural sciences are exempt. In addition to the indefinite nature of social facts themselves, many of which lack any identity whatsoever save our calling them by a name (for instance, "social class," a "leader"), one encounters in human affairs a profusion of elusive values (for instance, "freedom of opportunity," "effective leadership") that cause no end of theoretical and practical difficulty.

Furthermore, beyond this intrinsic difficulty, which political science shares with the other social sciences, lies another, peculiar to political science: the problem of reducing to logic, order, and principles the greatest movements, motives, and institutions of mankind. Aristotle was the first but certainly not the last of scientists to be struck by the vast scope of political science. Nevertheless, since man has created the state, some science must study it, and the great tradition in political science has never quailed before the seemingly unfathomable mysteries of man's most complex creations. Political scientists

have always undertaken to say what can be said, to draw those principles and findings that can be drawn from the behavior of men with reference to the most important problems of their community.

The complexity of human behavior and especially of politics, however, prohibits any final statement of the elements of political science. Many points must be made in preliminary form, as invitations to further study. And if some of the readers of this book should at some future time develop these preliminary forms into more substantial principles, then a major objective of the book will have been realized.

Contents

| | |
|--|------------|
| Introduction | 7 |
| 1 Political Philosophy | 15 |
| The Basic Ideas of Political Science | |
| Ideas Derived Mainly from the Middle Ages | |
| Early Modern Ideas | |
| The New Science | |
| The Obligations of Political Science | |
| 2 Thinking About Politics | 55 |
| The Science and Art of Politics | |
| What is "Political" | |
| The Political Scientist at Work | |
| Creative Thinking and Acting in Politics | |
| 3 Leaders and Followers | 81 |
| The Leaders: Hero or Pawn? | |
| The Psychology of Leadership | |
| The General Skills of Political Leaders | |
| Social Class and Political Mobility | |
| The Total Analysis of Leadership | |
| 4 The Community and Special Interests | 115 |
| The Political Community and Consensus | |
| Community Problems and Consensus | |
| Separatism and Voting Behavior | |
| Public Opinion | |
| The Majority | |
| 5 Representation and Elections | 158 |
| Representative Government | |
| Universal Suffrage | |
| The Use of Election Forms to Achieve Values | |
| 6 The Political Party | 188 |
| The History and Types of Parties | |
| Parties Founded on Nonbasic Issues | |
| Class and Charismatic Parties | |

12 / Political Behavior

Religious and Elite Parties
Oligarchic Influences and Party Trends

| | | |
|----|---|-----|
| 7 | Pressure Groups | 230 |
| | Individual Influence in Politics | |
| | The Lobby and Pressure Groups | |
| | Legal Representation of Interests | |
| 8 | Civil Conflict and War | 265 |
| | Force and Violence | |
| | The Objectives of Physical Coercion | |
| | The Larger Patterns of Coercion | |
| | The Effects and Limits of Physical Coercion | |
| 9 | Thinking About Democracy | 302 |
| | Basic Questions of Values | |
| | The Social Setting of Democracy | |
| | The Four Moral Positions in Democracy | |
| | Democracy as a Whole | |
| 10 | Liberty and Public Policy | 338 |
| | Rights, Liberty, Restraints, and Plans | |
| | Rational and Irrational Policies | |
| | The Social Organization of Policy | |
| | The Goals of Policy | |
| | Bibliography | 369 |
| | Index | 370 |

Chapter 1

Political Philosophy

TO PHILOSOPHIZE is natural to man. All humans of whom we know something, whether primitive or technically advanced, try to spell out the meaning of their lives, and look within themselves and to the farthest stars for a satisfying Word. The frequent failure of such speculation in the past should not cause us to shun its practice now nor even to dismiss its particular historical forms. Without philosophy man would be a mere vocal beast.

However, philosophy has many parts, not all of which are germane to our interests here. There are schools of ethical philosophy. There are philosophies of scientific method. There are philosophies that argue different views about other philosophies. In every work there is philosophy behind the organizing of materials, the stating of facts, and the evaluating of theories. *Political* philosophy has all of these in its nature, but confines itself mostly to that part of life which is political, or directly connected with politics. It seeks laws of political behavior and government. It presents man with alternative visions of the good life in the good community. It may also advocate its own vision. It also criticizes the methods by which political scientists seek truths, and proposes better methods of thought and study.

Not only the present chapter, but the whole of this book, then, deals with political philosophy. The peculiar trait of this chapter is its concern with the most fundamental notions of politics and where they began. "Where they began" means, in the language of political science, "the history of political ideas." Often the phrase "political philosophy" is used only in an historical sense, which, to our view, is incorrect and regrettable. "Political philosophy" to us is broader and more important than the history of political ideas. The latter helps political science in several ways, but it remains an instrument of political science, not the whole nor nearly the whole of political science.

If we must know the political scientists of the past, we do so with several purposes in mind besides satisfying our curi-

osity and quoting authoritative support of our views. We know them in order to understand how ideas are born and grow, for, as with human development, some significant elements in an idea can only be discerned as they occur in the process of growth. We study older expressions of political science, too, because in some cases they remain the most correct and sharp expressions of political truths, try as we may to excel them.

For these reasons, this study of political science may be initiated by tracing the origins of the basic concepts of political philosophy. Later on, the same ideas will come in for further definition and development.

The Basic Ideas of Political Science

By a basic idea in political science is meant a concept or vision of something important and universal in the political behavior of men. To state it positively, it is a mental tool that allows man to understand and control the social universe of politics. To put it negatively, it is an idea without which our understanding and control of a host of human relations would suffer.

Behind each basic idea is usually discoverable a man or group of men who developed it and contributed it to the body of political philosophy. Naturally, there is no fixed number of such ideas, yet students are in some agreement on which are the more important ones. Scholars usually agree also in identifying the early creative exponents of the ideas.

There need be no further delay in listing the ideas, and discussing them in turn. Twenty-eight in number, they are presented as they appeared forcefully on the stage of history.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Authority (rewards and punishment) | 7. Constitutionalism |
| 2. The World as Mathematical Order (A quantitative approach) | 8. Empirical Method in Political Study |
| 3. Man as the Measure | 9. Pleasure-Pain and Politics |
| 4. The Political Community (including nationalism) | 10. A World Order: Fraternity and Law |
| 5. The Division of Labor and Hierarchy | 11. Existential Political Activism |
| 6. Democracy and the Social Compact | 12. Introspective Method |
| | 13. Theory of World History |
| | 14. Systematic Ethical-Political Theory |

- | | |
|--|---|
| 15. Representative Government (including pluralism) | 22. Economic Determinism |
| 16. Value-Free Political Science | 23. Sociology of Class |
| 17. Power Politics | 24. Models of Society ("culture") |
| 18. Liberty and the Liberal State (including "individualism") | 25. The Elite |
| 19. The New Science | 26. Communications |
| 20. Rationalistic Analysis of Law | 27. Operational Inquiry |
| 21. Applied Social Science | 28. Unconscious Factors in Political Behavior |

AUTHORITY

Man did not create the world; it was created by some higher intelligence. So it has appeared to mankind, and, to reinforce the thought, he has had the personal experience of being created within a family. Therefore his mind has dwelt heavily upon authority. Authority is legitimate power. Authority it is that controls and comforts man. Its attention to him—personified in the gods that are said to create the world for him—seems to deserve his worship. Authority is bifurcated from the beginning—it is the original source of rewards and punishment, the concern equally of the witch doctor, the priest, and the psychologist. Without authority, the world tends to appear disorderly, ruleless, impersonal, and frightening.

Here is a concept man must deal with. He must merge it into his behavior. He must try to understand it. For he cannot in his nature exempt himself from its influence. Such is the testimony of a mountain of anthropological evidence. Such also is indicated by the revelations contained in the stories of the Bible. There men come to grips with the authority of God and strive to make from it a scheme of good and evil, of behaviors that are to be rewarded by God and society and of those that are to be punished.

It is the dawn of mankind, and already present is the immensely important concept of political science—the ordering of the world by a great power possessed of ethical justification. In a manner that is both astonishing and significant, the idea of authority descends in recognizable form into the most modern and complex laboratories of human science, furnishing them with problems eternally old and perennially fresh: What is the psychological nature of authority? How do men come to possess it? How are they deprived of it? How are

their claims to authority made legitimate? How does society organize and distribute authority? What are the consequences of the universal presence of the authority problem in political affairs?

G. B. Vico, writing his *New Science* in eighteenth-century Italy, said that we move from magic, through religion, to science. Actually the path is not nearly so certain, and it is more a current than a path. That is, the witch doctor is not nearly so unscientific and stupid as he is said to be. His advice has been shown by anthropological studies to resemble the scientific counsel of psychiatry in some analogous cases, and his masks and other trappings have a lesser but nonetheless distinct parallel in the scientific trappings of modern healers. If the Bible and the religion that succeeded it to the time of Vico are considered, there too evidences of logical empiricism are abundant. The authors of the Bible knew man in many ways. As scientists of man, they were certainly as far advanced, say, as the chemists were as scientists of nature when Lavoisier began to order the elements in the eighteenth century.

Besides, we need not refer only to the Bible or to prehistory and non-Western history. Plato (427-347 B.C.) and other Greeks were already precisely concerned with the problem of authority. Plato created, for instance, a famous "myth of the caves." In it man was shown to revere images, not reality. Those who could know reality, the philosophers, should have authority over the others and, to substantiate their rule, that is, to legitimize and enhance their power, should let the mass of people understand that society is formed of men of gold, silver, and brass; the men of gold are the philosopher kings. Thus Plato, in a manner absolutely modern, tackled the problem of how to set up, in a functioning, rational society, a respect and regard for the authorities.

Vico was *statistically* correct, but he vastly simplified history. The ancient has more of the new science than is recognized. And ancient animism and religion continue with their own functions and validity in the currents of today.

In connection with authority, it is well to mention one of its descendents, *sovereignty*, this being, according to its chief inventor, Bodin (1530-1596), the unlimited power of the state to make laws. It is "perpetual, indivisible, and complete." It is, he claims, the essential characteristic of the state, plac-

ing it above all other forms of organization, spiritual or temporal. In modern language, we say that sovereignty is the *belief* that the state has the power to make the ultimate decisions in human relations, not necessarily the *fact*, or a *virtue*, of state authority.

THE WORLD AS MATHEMATICAL ORDER

The ancient world was equally modern when it produced a second important concept, the quantitative interpretation of the universe. Modern science, it is recognized, is emphatically mathematical and quantitative in its view of the world. The science of man—psychology, sociology, economics, political science, and truly there are no exceptions—is similarly attempting to describe its world in a series of compact statements that facilitate understanding and control.

Pythagoras, too, at an early stage of Greek philosophy sought to unite speculation and discoveries about the universe, about music, and about man and public affairs into a single whole by means of mathematics. The conception, startling in his day and for 2500 years to come, gave to the Pythagorean movement a semidivine and mysterious character. It was a cult that played games and practical tricks, somewhat like balloon and rocket societies a few years ago, because it could not possibly carry out and develop the enormity of its basic ideas. Today we begin to appreciate that Pythagoras (572-497 B.C.) conceived of a universal set of mathematical formulas which could tell the truth about man, the earth, the stars, and the gods. He might be called the first inventor of quantitative method in political science. We should be much richer if we might have had more than fragments of Pythagorean theories and writings on political subjects. But perhaps they were lost in such disasters as occurred when the early Pythagoreans, who had commanded the politics of Croton, were overthrown and destroyed by a rival faction. Political science, even then, was not an infallible guide to political success.

MAN AS THE MEASURE

The burdens of ancient doctrines of authority sat upon restless shoulders, as the Greek cities became busy and cosmopolitan. The abstractions of Pythagoreans seemed little connected with the details of existence, especially since they were premised on there being *absolute* measures of existence.

A new philosophy of relativism was called forth out of the pain and the inexplicability of older doctrines, and it emerged from its natural soil, the wide-open, individualistic Greek cities. "Man is the measure of all things," declared Protagoras, the Sophist, and many a colleague said amen. Protagoras (481-411 B.C.) was a leading figure in a movement that carried the youth into successful intellectual revolt against the older Greece. Why concede, save for expedience, that we must go beyond the study of customs and behavior for an explanation and control of mankind? The rules man lives by are clearly discernible in his actions. The relativity of his rules are discoverable by a comparison of cities and culture; Athenians behave one way, Spartans another; Greeks one way, Egyptians another.

The Sophists gave political science the greatly useful concepts of "cultural relativism," of mundane rather than transcendental explanation of human behavior, and of the applied science of politics, that is, "manipulative" political science. Specialized in rhetoric and moral philosophy, Protagoras would charge a student over \$1,000 in tuition for a course of study under him.

Of Protagoras and the other Sophists, Professor Giorgio Santillana has this to say:

All that we call progressive, pragmatic, or social-minded education, all that calls itself the constructive attitude, or the positivistic theory of science as economy of thought, or the empirical approach to a growing world, or education for life, or adjustment to a mature outlook, or sociological anthropology or anthropological sociology and such like double-ended catchwords—all are Sophistic.¹

THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY

We are still with the Greeks, even if slightly later, and with Plato and Aristotle particularly, as a third idea is expressed. We refer now to the concept of the political community, whose descendents in social science are numerous—among them the group, the state, patriotism, nationalism, communications, social cohesion, collective psychology, and public opinion.


¹ G. Santillana: *The Origins of Scientific Thought* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 175.

However it may reflect upon the limits of human creativity, the fact remains that for two thousand years political philosophers have gone back to Plato (427-347 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) for inspiration and ideals. The two together managed to cover most human problems, and they did the job well. More important for later times, they did it in different ways. They had, we might say, two different world views. Each saw society and nature differently. In consequence of and in association with their different world views, they used different methods of arriving at truth. Their similarities were great, enough so that John Dewey, for example, discussing their methods and viewpoints in the twentieth century, could say that there was a Greek way of looking at the universe. On the other hand, the emphases brought about by their viewpoints and methods were different enough to divide many other philosophers into Platonists and Aristotelians in their views both of nature and society.

Both differed from their chief Sophist predecessors in regarding virtue as a universally valid standard that could be known by the intellect. Both refused to distinguish politics from ethics; they would claim that a lack of virtue was a political handicap. Man is rational in the sense that he can really know the world through his reason and produce therein the conditions that lead to happiness. They were not pessimistic about the social sciences as the later Epicureans and Stoics were, but rather shared the sentiments of Sophocles, who exclaimed in his *Antigone*: "Against everything that confronts him, man invents some resource—against death alone he has no recourse."

Now the state was really a community so far as its ends were concerned. It was a political order, a natural system linking all citizens together. The good state gave to each his own, in Plato's words. No one was to be a "busybody," but all were to apply their talents where they would do the most good. Men were not self-sufficient without the community, said Aristotle, else they would be either gods or beasts. To both Plato and Aristotle, the state was the means of realizing the individual good of every member. They made relatively little use of our distinction between "private" things and "public" ones.

What the Greeks did with the idea of community was to pull out of the "collective unconscious," and to clarify, those



bonds which knit men together and permitted them to act in concert, as a society. Once exposed to light, these community ties could be examined and their functions analysed. Allowances might thereupon be made for them in any theories of how men behave as they do and of how they might change their behavior. Plato's *Republic* then became a search for "the good community," utopia; in Aristotle's famous words, that mark the beginning of political science, of sociology, and of most general and social theory, "Man is a political animal." He exists in and by society. His individuality is social individuality. His psychology becomes social psychology.

Before moving to the next great idea, it may be well to pause on a politically energetic descendent of the idea of community, *nationalism*. "Nationalism" is one of the commonest words in the vocabulary of political science and politics, but it is of modern origin. Medieval Europeans knew of different peoples, of course. The European universities were sometimes organized according to "nations," that is, schools of different nationalities. The public feeling of nationalism, that strong emotion of patriotism for a large area of land, its culture, and its people, grew slowly, with strong forward movements wherever a king consolidated his rule over the nobility and made a true realm, wherever the unifying force of the Catholic Papacy was weakened, and wherever the populace took an active part in governing. Thus English nationalism surged forward when the king's law was made enforceable throughout England following the Norman conquest of 1066. Central European nationalism became stronger when Martin Luther led a movement out of the Catholic Church, and expressed the doctrine, a people's religion is that of its rulers (*cuius regio, eius religio*). And the French Revolution inspired the general population with allegiance to the nation, not to a ruling monarch or nobility or church.

The resulting phenomenon, nationalism, became an active ingredient in political discussions and writing. It was, of course, a descendent of the notion of the political community of former times, but tied to a particular kind of community, the nation-state.

THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND HIERARCHY

The differences among men are not entirely subdued in the political community. As the American political scientist

James Madison wrote in the *Federalist* papers, 2200 years after Plato:

The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.²

Plato early perceived this complexity upon which the political community was based. His organic theory of the psychological division of labor is exceedingly important for the history of the social sciences. He described it and planned controls for it in his *Republic*. The ideal state would be based clearly on class lines. As the soul has three component parts—the intellectual, the passionate, and the appetitive—so society is to be composed of three major classes, containing in each case the members of society who have a preponderance of one of the three parts of the soul. Society is the individual writ large. The task of the state is to relegate to each person responsibility for those affairs that he can competently undertake. Individual happiness consists of each person performing his own functions well. The officers who delegate responsibilities are chosen by merit, with freedom of opportunity for all.

Individuals are relegated to their lot in life as they evidence capacity for one rather than the other job. This process of elimination results in having philosopher-kings at the top, who, being educated to justice, are incapable of being unjust. The vast majority of individuals in the trades and on the farms would hold property, but the possessions of the guardian class and the ruling class would be held in common to prevent an individual taking his own interest too seriously at the expense of the public good. There is no limit to the regulation of life, customs, and property within the state save the limits of justice itself. Manners, schools, religion, the arts—all must conform to public policy. The ideal state is the veritable incarnation of justice.

² *The Federalist* (New York: Tudor, 1942), p. 64.

The idea of hierarchy is developed in order to unite a people split up by the functional specialization of the division of labor. It is also fabricated to place more important and superior values above less important and inferior ones. It refers in general to the system of authority, responsibility, and accountability in society, the "chain of command." A political science without the notion of hierarchy is inconceivable and practically every scholar ever since has had to concern himself with the problems engendered by the idea. That human groups are stratified according to higher and lesser degrees of influence and possession is both an outstanding fact and also a source of continuous proposals for social reforms.

DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL COMPACT

The Greeks discovered democracy, if they did not invent it. It came to their keen eyes that a certain kind of government had swept away many a tyranny in their cities in Asia, the Greek peninsula, and Italy. The government was a people's government, and occurred frequently and with moderate success, so that it was credited with being a basic form, along with tyranny (rule by the one), and aristocracy (rule by the few).

There was many a struggle in the Roman republic over the degree to which the common people might influence the government and hold office, but almost no theory of politics grew out of the class and factional debates. Nor did the next thousand years produce any democratic theory of consequence.

Finally, in the late Middle Ages, there appeared Marsiglio di Padova (1270-1342), a man who came within a stone's throw of accomplishing a fantastic scheme for the coordination and democratizing of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church. In his *Defensor Pacis* (Defender of the Peace) a radical democratic theory was boldly expressed. The majority idea is stirring in his mind although it does not have the numerical quality of the majority principle today. But he definitely stipulated responsibility of the rulers, both temporal and spiritual, to the people, and consigned active power to the mass of men. He recommended government by means of elected councils in church and state.

In Marsiglio are the beginnings of a great positivist reconstruction of law. For he says that if enforceability is not

present, there is no law. That which people may *wish* were law, and what many called "the natural law," has no validity as law except when enforced. The real law, he declared, comes from "the will of the people," for only such consent permits law to be enforced. (We notice how he exaggerates to make his point, thus falling into his own trap of unrealism.) The people by active consent, especially by elections, concedes powers to the government and may withdraw it. The people is the legislator, the sovereign, the state. Forms of government—whether monarchic or republican or theocratic—are immaterial, if the rule is by the citizenry.

Following these preliminary analyses, the idea of democracy as rule by the many was given little critical development until the seventeenth-century Leveller movement in England. The Levellers, a radical soldier's movement in the Republican army of Cromwell, proposed a number of devices for achieving democracy through representative government. More important than the Levellers, because his investigations were systematic, was John Locke (1632-1704). Locke exalted the Parliament, which he regarded as the repository of the rights of liberty and property that the people had assigned to the state for convenience of management. His arguments were such as the victors of the Glorious "Whig" Revolution of 1688, the American Revolution of 1776, and the French Revolution of 1789 could claim as their own. His words were on the lips of all but the most conservative and radical at the time of the American revolt against England and in the Constitutional Period that followed.

We can recognize them at first glance. Men are reasonable and social creatures. They create society for their own good to avoid certain inconveniences of living in a state of nature. This is the idea of the *social compact*, which Plato alluded to long before, and which came into strong play in the seventeenth century again. People mix their time and sweat to produce property, which becomes almost part of their very personality. They elect representatives by a majority vote to carry out their will. The representatives may not violate the majority will or the social contract that lies beneath the expressed will of the community. If such violations do occur and are beyond reasonable sufferance, the people have the right to appeal to God, revolt, and establish a lawful government, which will observe the constitution.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), following Locke by half a century, went beyond him in several important ways. The disorders of a state of nature require the formation of a community of citizens to which each person gives up his natural rights. He is then stronger and more free in the group than as an isolated individual living in a state of nature. The community is the state. Government is all-powerful but not specialized into certain organs. Rather the "general will" of the whole community acts directly to legislate and regulate. The minority must always succumb to the will of the whole community, which for practical purposes may be reduced to the majority. Life, liberty, and property are at the beck and call of the general will. A kind of primitive democracy, reminiscent of the Leveller ideas, is proposed. He is more explicit than Locke in giving all power to the majority. The result of Rousseau's democracy in later times was mixed: although his views numbered many adherents of the Jeffersonian type, they also enlisted many totalitarians who, by making identical the will of the community and the will of the state, could justify governmental transgressions of individual liberties in the name of the "general will" and the "true freedom" of the person.

CONSTITUTIONALISM

Another important invention of Plato and Aristotle was the idea of constitutionalism, which, in their terms, relates not only to democracy but to all "good" forms of government. This idea, as we shall show later on, is connected closely to the idea of "rule of law," and "government by laws, not men." Here was an abstract idea, buried in a welter of political practices so that it was not at all apparent to the naked eye. Yet Aristotle discovered its elements and fashioned it into a potent instrument of thought and plan. His discovery was that from the mass of human institutions there can be abstracted something of a structure, a pattern of rules and conduct, which amounted to constitutions of the city-states. Men lived by these rules; the rules lent character to the state; and the rules guided and educated the men in turn. Men would know what to expect from the state; justice would be defined for them.

THE EMPIRICAL METHOD IN POLITICAL STUDY

Reliance upon the gathering and analysis of facts in political study is nowhere better exemplified in ancient thought than in Aristotle's use of many different constitutions as evidence for his conclusions in the *Politics*. He cites widely varying customs, laws, and views in arguing his points. He made, for instance, a penetrating analysis of revolutions, classifying them by causes. He went on then to prescribe their preventives—observance of the laws by rulers, mindfulness of the general interest, a balanced government in which the several social classes are represented, and limited tenure of office. He also wrote a work on *Rhetoric* that is still useful in the study of opinion and propaganda. Certainly, in this work, he was influenced by the Sophists, those masters of persuasion, and in general his empiricism is probably derived from the Sophist turn of mind towards "man as the measure." Still, in Aristotle the new powerful weapon of systematic, logical, empirical method in political science is made available for the first time. It is surprising to learn that it is hardly practiced again until the sixteenth century brings the Renaissance writers, and especially Machiavelli, upon the social scientific scene.

PLEASURE-PAIN AND POLITICS

Whereas one side of Greek political philosophy preoccupied itself with the serious business of governing, another disliked what it saw in the political process and preferred to stand apart from it. Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) might be said to have made civic apathy a virtue. His logic was appealing: man is a creature whose life is dictated by the desire to enjoy pleasure and avoid pain. Politics is almost always a troublesome pursuit. Ergo, politics is to be shunned by the wise man. The pleasure-pain principle was not to die with the end of the Epicureans in the Roman Empire. Its descent goes down to Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century, of whom more will be said below, and to modern political psychology where it is variously experimented with in the study of political motivations. Epicurean political attitudes may not please one, but they certainly act as an antidote to the intoxication with politics that some people have and presume everyone else must and should possess.

A WORLD ORDER: FRATERNITY AND LAW

Quite in contrast to Epicureanism stands Stoicism, its contemporary and competitor. The Stoics, led by Zeno of Citium (335-265 B.C.), took a more sober view of man's position in the cosmos, and, shunning the active search for pleasure, urged a universal brotherhood of man. Tolerance, respect for the rights of others, refusal to commit injustices, the endurance of injustices committed in ignorance by others—these were their main attitudes.

The Stoics were especially compatible to the Roman temperament and impressed Roman jurisprudence with their idea of the universal empire and a law of nature applicable to all times and manner of man. The ideas of fulfilling duty and obligation, without joy and even without expectation of success—ideas characterizing existentialism today—often characterized the Stoics. At the same time, their charitable, anti-hedonistic, and humanistic attitudes were remarkably similar to Christian ethics in the period after Christ.

Cicero, a Stoic, and an apostle of republicanism previous to its collapse before Caesarism, declared that there existed a natural law which all men and governments must observe, and that the task of the state was to distribute justice in accordance with the law of nature. The magistrates are under the law and are trustees of the power of the people.

A thousand years went by before something resembling a universal law of nations developed. The first statement of principles of international law was, however, connected with the old Stoic and Christian belief in a law of nature. In Bodin's terms, the law of nature was those rational principles of justice which may be abstracted from the infinite individual laws of men. Such a view could sponsor the belief that states themselves ought to observe certain common principles in their relation with one another. Grotius of Holland and Vittoria of Spain formulated systems of international law founded partly on observed standards of conduct which men everywhere seemed to agree to in principle.

A tendency counter to the natural law school of international law was the "positivist school." It divorced law from ethics and confined its consideration of international law only to the *facts* of international relations. Law is what people *do*, not what they preach. The positivist school originated a

few years before Grotius in the work of Alberico Gentili (1552-1608). Gentili was expelled from his Italian home for Protestantism and spent a long, influential life in England, where his law of war was published in 1588.

EXISTENTIAL POLITICAL ACTIVISM

The major contributions of Stoicism were not exhausted. The principle of engaging in political activity out of a sense of obligation, regardless of the pains and failures suffered, was again a Stoic idea. It calls to mind the existentialist philosophy of Sartre and Camus today.

Seneca the Stoic, writing under the early Roman Empire, believed that before governments existed, man lived in a state of nature where peace and bliss prevailed and men followed just leaders. The problems induced by cupidity brought the necessity for compulsion and the state. These penalties must be endured. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius, another great Stoic, wrote his *Meditations*, in which he endeavored to reconcile the arduous and depressing duties of statecraft with the reasonable humanitarianism of his philosophy.

Meanwhile Jesus Christ had lived and taught and been executed for alleged agitation and sedition. His teachings were remarkably similar to those of the Stoics. Equality, humility, service to God were especially emphasized. Rulers and ruled were to be judged by the same moral canons. The dignity of men and women, regardless of their station in life and even of their personal record, was to be respected. Revolt against the state was not encouraged, for, in a sense, the state with its terrors was a punishment of man for his original fall from grace that the Bible had described. Furthermore, cultivating the virtues of the soul was deemed to be preferable to a preoccupation with worldly success. We note here the emphatic split, under the Roman Empire, between the "private" and "public" spheres of life, so little recognized by the ancient Greeks and republican Romans.

Ideas Derived Mainly from the Middle Ages

Spread everywhere by Paul, Peter, and other apostles and disciples, the Christian gospel became an influential force in the empire. All persecution failed to halt its development until finally the emperor Constantine embraced Christianity. By this time barbarian encroachments and domestic disorgan-

ization had so weakened the empire that the Church became actually better organized than the state. Especially in the Western Empire, the deterioration of the *pax romana* left principally the Church to hold together some semblance of unity in the great society. The proud *imperium*, the vast powers of the Roman emperors, fell to the Church.

INTROSPECTIVE METHOD

In this chaos of crumbling empire, Augustine (354-430 A.D.) wrote his *Confessions*. An early manhood of recklessness and dissipation was followed by conversion to Christianity and high rank as a Bishop of the Church. Augustine carried out fully the injunction of Socrates to "Know thyself." In the first highly revealing autobiography of history, he plumbed the depths to which man can descend and the heights to which he may rise. Deeply influenced by Plato's way of thought, he looked far into his own soul for knowledge and consolation.

His passionate individualism and search for self-insight were emulated by the Protestant reformers of the sixteenth century.

I will now call to mind my past foulness, and the carnal corruptions of my soul; not because I love them, but that I may love Thee, O my God. . . . To whom tell I this? not to Thee, my God; but before Thee to mine own kind, even to that small portion of mankind as may light upon these writings of mine. And to what purpose? that whosoever reads this, may think out of what depths we are to cry unto Thee. . . . For these very sins, as riper years succeed, these very sins are transferred from tutors and masters, from nuts and balls and sparrows, to magistrates and kings, to gold and manors and slaves, just as severer punishments displace the cane.

This may be called the introspective method, especially where it is so effectively and exhaustively employed. More science than we realize depends directly upon the capacity for self-knowledge. This is particularly true where the social sciences must be strongly psychological in character, as in the areas of politics, public opinion, social classes, and international affairs. Self-knowledge aids in self-control, ob-

jectivity, scholarly discipline, and understanding much of other people's minds and action. The autobiography, the case study, the journal and diary, and personal letters are among the most valuable sources of political data.

THEORY OF WORLD HISTORY

Then also Augustine's mind turned to practical affairs in *The City of God*. Here, he examines the City of God and the City of Man. He leaped from introspection onto the alps of history, propounding the first grand view of the rise and fall of civilizations and the significance of historical tides. For similar subsequent panoramas of history, we must wait for *The Divine Comedy* of Dante (1265-1321), the *Universal History* of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the Arab philosopher, G. B. Vico's *New Science* (1725), Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West* (1914), and Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History* (1933 on).

Other doctrines of Augustine were influential in history, if not important in the development of political science. Too often were states without justice and therefore only great robber-bands, he wrote; stability, respect for property rights, and an end to plunder are needed. The state has no command over man's soul, which belongs to God and the Heavenly City. Obedience in secular affairs alone is owed the Earthly City, which stands as a monument to man's fall from grace. This Augustinian division of "spiritual" and "temporal" orders was used for centuries thereafter to justify Church supremacy in matters of religion. Augustine's debt to Plato made medieval Europe Platonist in philosophy, as evidenced in Scotus and Abelard, until Aristotle was rediscovered and St. Thomas Aquinas systematized Catholic philosophy along Aristotelian lines.

SYSTEMATIC ETHICAL-POLITICAL THEORY

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), writing in the most creative century of the Middle Ages of the West, covered the range of social science—psychology, economics, education, ethics, law, and politics. His classifications of political phenomena are exceedingly numerous and his multitude of distinctions brilliant. Although he followed Aristotle closely, he added new doctrines to philosophy as well. In a book addressed to princes, he declared that the object of government

was the good of the people. In another place, he defined law as an ordinance of reason promulgated for the common good. These ideas were then of considerable force and novelty, but they were less important than the intricate and vast structure of ideas, facts, and moral choices of which they formed a part. Today St. Thomas remains the greatest political philosopher for Catholic students and various others.

Aquinas' major contribution to political science, it appears, was his systematic ethical-political theory. What is meant by these words? They mean that Aquinas climaxed, perhaps for all history to the present moment, the striving of any science towards the perfection of statement. His hierarchy of values is clear: he makes known what are the ranking and subordinate goals of man and society. His logic, by Aristotelian standards, is impeccable. His style is clear and calm, without regard to the controversiality of the matter under discussion. With all this, two features assail the modern political scientist adversely. His employment of Aristotelian, as opposed to modern operational and quantitative logic, and his assuredness, which far exceeds the quality and quantity of evidence available to him for building generalizations.

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

The idea of representative government should be placed also in the European Middle Ages. Despite the occurrence of certain representative devices in ancient times and in other cultures, notably, government by consent of the governed and voting by citizens for officials, additional major elements were needed for the more complex development that has come to be the universal form of government in the twentieth century. One of these new elements was territorial and functional constituencies, that is, election of public officials by separate groups of voters who lived in special areas or engaged in certain occupations. Overcoming problems of distances was difficult in the Middle Ages; so instead of calling all members of the group together, first the religious orders of the Church, and then the secular authorities, began to call together delegates from various areas to reflect the views of their groups. Such delegates came from the rural communities, the towns, the nobility, and the clergy. The very numerous guilds of artisans and merchants were powerful local influences but did

not become part of the larger representative governments. The latter were more territorially than functionally representative. However, the idea of the guilds having not only local powers but power in the central government sustained itself as the theory of pluralism down to the present.

Once assembled in parliament, the delegates were beset by the pressures that shaped their function and role. Their constituencies expected obedience from them; yet the king expected them to take his larger views. In the end they took neither position, but became quasi-independent. Furthermore, borrowing from the theory of medieval associations the idea of corporation, they formed a parliament that possessed *corporate* integrity, that is, a single organism whose members might act freely. Thus another important social invention of man, the corporation, came into a new area of government, the legislature, where it remains today.

The several stated conditions of representative government were satisfied in the thirteenth century in Europe and England. After various ups and downs, the triumphant, fully empowered parliament of the nineteenth century emerged. This story will be dealt with later. It is important here to realize that political science had now to deal with the complex social, psychological, and juridical relations met within representative structures. The concepts of representation, delegation, consent, leadership, conformity, cohesion, power, balance, autonomy, voting, majority, and dozens of other important ideas useful in studying government and politics probably were stimulated and refined in connection with the development of representative government.

Representative government apparently grew for centuries without much awareness of its nature or importance. In England where it flourished, myriad struggles took place over small pieces of the whole structure. The rebellious Levellers of the seventeenth century seemed to know that a parliament might alone rule the land. John Locke, a little later, and Edmund Burke, over a century later, and John Stuart Mill, in the middle of the nineteenth century—the works of all three men are benchmarks in the analysis of representative government.

We mentioned in passing a less successful major category of political thoughts on representative government, that of *pluralism*. It still merits attention in the present discussion.

Pluralism is the doctrine that the state is only one of a number of important and equally valuable groups in society, all of which ought to have various self-governing powers.

In its reflection of the numerous interests of the society, the doctrine harks back to the idea of the division of labor. The idea depends also upon the general idea of representative government both in origin (feudalism and territorial representation are kinds of pluralism) and in intent. In the ranks of pluralism we find syndicalists, gild socialists, Fascist corporativists, Catholic social theorists, and regionalists (including federalists). The syndicalists have been mostly from the working-class movements and demanded autonomy of occupations and industries. Instead of the centralized state, there were to be a number of powerful, self-governing, worker-dominated industrial groupings, with a weak state or even none at all. Gild socialism, as exemplified recently in the writings of G. D. H. Cole, was related to syndicalism. It harked back to the medieval guilds of masters and workmen. It would have these economic interests help run the government directly.

*Mussolini, originally somewhat of a syndicalist, abandoned his working-class socialist viewpoint on the road to becoming dictator of Italy, but retained the idea that autonomous associations of industrialists and workers should send their representatives to the national parliament. This he called *corporatism* and installed to a certain extent in Italy after 1937. The Catholic Church had a long historical interest in functional, or occupational, groupings reaching back to the gild system of the Middle Ages. Catholic social policy has urged increasingly that healthy work conditions and good employer-employee relations depended on some form of functional organization of society.*

Finally, federalism or geographic pluralism has had many advocates, especially in Switzerland, Germany, the United States, and Soviet Russia. Regional decentralization—granting large powers to smaller cultural, geographic units of a nation—has excited much approval in recent times, especially in France. But both federalism and regionalism have lacked recently the fires of a vital political movement. All pluralist theory, in fact, has had to buck the tide of nationalism, concentration of industrial controls, war, crisis, and other centralizing forces.

Early Modern Ideas

Within a century after 1400, life and thought in Italy had been radically transformed and the effects of the Renaissance were spreading north and west. New concepts of political science were part of the movement.

VALUE-FREE POLITICAL SCIENCE

Out of the many books that purported to tell princes how to behave, came in 1513 a daring and startling little treatise by a Florentine, Niccolo Machiavelli (1467-1527). What are the kinds of governments, he asked in *The Prince*? How may they be conquered and held? The answers were brutally frank and gained for the author an undeserved reputation for viciousness and immorality. Actually, Machiavelli looked at the world, held his own preferences in check, and declared: the chief and universal value in politics is power; getting and holding power is the object of rulers; therefore the real, not the wished-for, ways of doing this should be *objectively* related. He wrote vividly of the historical errors of politicians. Force and cunning, as found in the lion and the fox, were the principal instruments of power; to use them well usually meant success; to use them not at all meant failure. *Raison d'etat*, the reason of state, demanded many times that virtues be foregone. Man in politics could not exhibit the same goodness as in private life. "A prince . . . cannot observe all those things that are thought good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, charity, humanity, and religion." The appearance of virtue was more valuable in politics than hidden but real virtue. This was all too bad, declared Machiavelli, but it was the way the world functioned.

The Prince was a landmark in the history of political philosophy, comparable in effect to the work of Plato and Aristotle, of Augustine, and of Aquinas. As we have indicated, the scientific method was not foreign to scholarly writing prior to Machiavelli. And every great writer knows how to deal with reality. But Machiavelli, not without qualms and missteps, introduced the dominant idea of all modern science, both natural and social: to know how the world works, one's emotions have to be put aside. Moon-struck lovers cannot produce

good astronomy, and virtue-struck writers cannot describe politics. Nor can the lovers provide instructions for space travel, nor such writers give instructions in applied political science. This intellectual position of Machiavelli may be called value-free political science.

POWER POLITICS

Machiavelli's leading contribution to scientific method did not end there. He is also the formulator of power politics, again both in the pure sense and in the applied sense. *Power politics* in the pure sense is the theory that all politics can be clarified, and laws about political behavior can be stated, if a student assumes power to be the paramount object of politicians. Then everything will fall into place.

Thomas Hobbes (1558-1679) enlarged the Machiavellian approach, both as to value-free science and power politics. "All passions may be reduced to the Desire of Power," he said in *Leviathan*. As Hobbes wrote on and on, much of his work became diffuse and irrelevant, yet he sees the science of man as science more clearly than Machiavelli or anyone else before him.

Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time: Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, we see how to make it produce the like effects.

Science divides into natural philosophy "the Consequences from the Accidents of Bodies Naturall," and "Politiques and Civill Philosophy, the Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies."

Most social scientists today have accepted the value-free theory of social science. A number of political scientists, such as Harold D. Lasswell, have focused their theory upon the power-politics approach. "The study of Politics," wrote Lasswell in *Politics*, "is the study of influence and the influential." No doubt, as the latter observes, the political world lends itself to the model of power-seeking. The science of economics later came to be brilliantly developed in a similar way, but around

the concept of the gaining of wealth. Such models simplify (and, of course, may oversimplify and exclude other important models), but they are vastly useful to scientist and student alike.

On the *applied* side, the power-politics model is again useful because it lights up parts of the political process otherwise rarely viewed and gives instructions that are more effective than those commonly offered would-be politicians. Again the danger is oversimplification and an undesirable morality, over-balanced in the direction of an obsession with power as the only value (the same danger, incidentally, as when business is taught as ruthless passion for profits regardless of other values). Therefore, we say that Machiavelli made these great contributions to the procedures of pure and applied science. But they must be understood and restricted to their proper meanings and uses—not misunderstood and misapplied, as often happens today and happened on occasion even in the mind and life of their inventor.

LIBERTY AND THE LIBERAL STATE

Liberty has so many meanings that a portion of a late chapter will be given over to it. The concept of freedom from restraint, however, marks the end of the old order and the beginning of modern society. That places its general climax about 1776, the year of the American Declaration of Independence, Jeremy Bentham's *Fragment on Government*, Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, and Tom Paine's *Common Sense*. It belongs alongside the idea of individualism, a word which also is associated with the beginnings of modern democracy. If one asks why these two words came about, the answer would be that both of them expressed a feeling that persons did not often have in tighter societies of class and status, a feeling that a good society was one that put no bounds upon a person. In retrospect and objectively, it seems that "liberty" and "individualism" existed in many societies other than the "liberal" and "individualistic" ones of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

However that may be, there came into being a new conception of a "liberal state" and, in a few instances in Western Europe and America, actual attempts to bring into being "liberal" societies. Ideas of individualism began to appear frequently in political writings of mid-seventeenth-century Eng-

land. Equality and reason were considered more and more to be the innate attributes of individuals. The Leveller movement in mid-seventeenth-century England, referred to earlier as a source of democratic ideas, insisted that all men were equal before God. It reduced all functions of government to the level of the body of individuals. It began to talk of the "rights of man." The Levellers failed to win over Cromwell and the Parliament, but their ideas were exported to America and the Continent. And certainly among the seventeenth-century inventors of "liberalism" must be listed John Locke.

Locke was a political consultant and a psychologist, as well as a political theorist. As consultant, it is interesting to note, he drew up a plan for the government of the American Carolinas that provided a feudal system pleasing to his noble clients, if not at all like the true individualistic Locke. But, in his role as psychologist, he asserted that individual experiences fully accounted for individual personality and knowledge, a theory that was forcefully translatable into individualistic politics. Locke the empiricist fathered Locke the exponent of individual liberties. He proposed to protect such individual liberties, furthermore, by a government that represented the express desires of elected delegates of the people.

In 1776 came the famous *Wealth of Nations* of Adam Smith. It presented a systematic case for a severely restricted government operating with a "let-business-alone," or "laissez-faire," policy. Economics was to be divorced from politics and allowed to follow natural laws governing demand and supply, production and consumption. For the best interests of society in general, the functions of government were to be limited to the protection of individuals from violence, to warding off injustice and oppression among individuals and groups, and to building and maintaining a few essential public works.

Smith's examination of economic phenomena and recommendations for economic policy played a large part in the limitation of the functions of the state, which occupied so many political philosophers and economic theorists during the nineteenth century. The utilitarian school of economics in England (Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill, for example), Bastiat in France, Herbert Spencer in England, William Graham Sumner in America, and many others attacked, on principle, state intervention in economic affairs.

Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* and *Age of Reason* were radical works of a different sort than Smith's book. For we see in them, along with the same distrust of government as appears in Smith, a profound faith in human nature. Man is a reasonable being. All men are equal by birth and the laws should keep them equal. Religion is an obstacle to progress. The government must be strictly controlled. All should have the right to vote. So Paine sets the stage for a sort of majoritarian democracy which reminds one strongly of the Levellers and Rousseau. Although presenting himself almost as an anarchist in his hatred of the state, Paine makes drastic recommendations for reform and revolution which, to be carried out, demand a strong state. This was somewhat the predicament of Marx at a later date when in order to carry out the vast proletarian revolution, designed to destroy the state, Marx had to recommend a dictatorship to do so, adding wistfully that the dictatorship of the proletariat would be a temporary affair.

Perhaps in connection with the liberal state a word should be said of anarchism. Anarchists have uniformly believed that the primary condition for the establishment of social harmony and the abolition of social injustices lay in the abolition of the state entirely. There have been in general two types of anarchists, the philosophical or peaceful anarchists and the revolutionary or violent anarchists. Proudhon, Tucker, Tolstoi, and Kropotkin were cases of the first type, Bakunin and Max Stirner of the second. Proudhon argued that private property was ultimately a form of robbery. Tolstoi went back to early Christianity and based his pacifism and communism of possessions on Jesus' Sermon on the Mount. Kropotkin studied Darwinian theories of evolution; he came to believe that cooperation, not conflict, was the chief factor in promoting beneficial change for the species. Bakunin was the apostle of nihilism; he called for total destruction of every form of social organization and advocated terrorism, the destruction of the state by individual acts of violence. Stirner called progress an illusion and declared that only the complete and violent emancipation of the individual could achieve final and complete justice.

We have already mentioned Jeremy Bentham as a liberal and shall meet him again as a father of modern legal analysis.

One of his most ardent disciples, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), amplified the work of the master generously. His interests were similar—economics, logic, social reform, representative government—but his approach was much softer and more understanding of opposing views. Little wonder then that Mill could write a work on liberty with a depth of insight and sympathy impossible for Bentham. He could furthermore allow debate and discussion a more fundamental role in the discovery of truth. He was a defender of absolute individual liberty: “The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.” Yet, he could see in modified free enterprise and even socialism certain virtues denied to the vision (or patience) of Bentham. Even a century later Mill’s studies of liberty and individualism indicate in a superior fashion the generally approved consequences of a liberal regime, such as individual creativity and the development of spontaneous and flexible character, that follow upon free speech, free press, and free enterprise. Mill, like Bentham, also wrote extensively on the methods of social science inquiry.

Again, as with “representative government,” the cluster of key ideas in the liberal state have presented political science with a large budget of theories, practices, data, and propositions. It is a truism, but a very important one, that a science can only expand with the number of problems that it is given to solve. To their everlasting credit, it must be said that the Greeks were as busy developing science and method, as in the proliferation of issues and problems of politics. For almost a thousand years, from Augustine to Aquinas, there was almost no political analysis in Europe and little in the rest of the world. Then for five hundred years, many more problems and doctrines were handed to the field of political science than were dealt with by systematic knowledge and scientific intelligence. The subsequent period, from about 1800 to the present, has turned part way to redressing the balance. This has been the period of the social sciences, and the liberals were their founder.

The New Science

The new science has tended towards a unity of method and substance. On the whole, it has adopted the subjects of an-

cient, medieval, and early modern times as its own. There are few new subjects in the new social sciences. Indeed, in one large sense, there are no new major generalities, and no new major applied forms of social relationships. Subatomic physics and microbiology, and nuclear power and chemical control of plants and animals, are more radical departures of subject-matter from those of old physics and biology than any new social science subject from its ancestors. That is because man is naturally a social scientist of sorts, and artificially a physicist. He has always known more *in general* about men than about non-men, even when he could not control himself or others. Now his main achievements must come in accenting the *science* in social *science*—the method and system, as opposed to the general content of behavior. Political *science* and social *science* have not failed. They have just begun. And their development is obscured by the circumstances of their new vigor. They grow in a time of great restlessness. The great wars, revolutions, and crises of the twentieth century found their roots not in a failure of science, but in the incapacity of modern society to settle down to a common standard of values, beliefs, and political practices and institutions.

RATIONALISTIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

A first great idea of recent times broke into the last sacred precincts of the old society, the courts and the law. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) can be given major credit here. His philosophy, as we know, contained the essence of liberalism and a great deal more as well, for he was a logician, a grand reformer, a moral philosopher, and an economist. He owed something to Locke, but more to Hobbes, to the English "New Radicals" such as Paine, to continental writers such as G. B. Vico, who set out to organize a new science of man in his *Scienza Nuova* (1725), and Beccaria, the Italian social reformer (*Crimes and Punishments*, 1764). He restated Adam Smith's position on behalf of free enterprise. He sought direct democracy so far as possible in government.

Besides all this, Bentham launched an attack against the traditional basis of English law (the common law) and sought to substitute therefor a system of positive legislation aimed at securing "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" (Beccaria's phrase). His *Commentaries* on the "holy book" of English and American law students, Blackstone, is one of

the most scathing critiques in English literature. He published works on logical fallacies and on concepts as they occur in law and politics. Plunging into many fields, wielding his scythe of pleasure-or-pain to distinguish good from bad, Bentham was the archetype of the positive, rationalistic reformer.

APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE

As Bentham wrote, a new kind of political sociology was rising in France. Henri Saint-Simon (1760-1825) urged a reconstruction of society to provide a new leadership class from among the intellectuals and engineers of the industrial revolution. He would abolish the military, feudal, and religious leadership. Society ought to aim directly at the moral and physical betterment of the poor. All social resources are to be pooled in a single fund that is to be drawn upon by producing associations. Women are to receive complete equality with men. Saint-Simon and the cult that grew up around him were at once socialists, radical Christians, technocrats, and social scientists. Saint-Simon's ideas moved in many streams.

The passion of Saint-Simon was for applied social science. Every human relation, the Saint-Simonists believed, might be reorganized according to scientific principles. They went so far as to take up a new positivist position—that in science itself there could be discovered a new ethic and philosophy for society. This high and mighty position proved, however, to be a Tower of Babel, and the movement broke into hostile and mutually distrustful fragments. Yet no one can deny that it imparted an important vision of a society where the scientific approach in human affairs might bring extensive benefits.

ECONOMIC DETERMINISM

The managerial social science of Saint-Simon became the workers' socialism of Marx and Engels. Several basic ideas characterized the thought of Karl Marx (1818-1883), the leading member of the famous pair. Two of them can be regarded as among the great ideas of political science, and indeed of social science in general. One was economic determinism, the other the sociology of class. There had been predecessors of Marx in regard to both; the Greeks, of course, the Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) on economic

determinism, Adolphe de Cassagnac (1806-1880) on social class.

Marx and Engels examined history from primitive man to their own times and concluded that the search for subsistence was the dominant, even exclusive, theme of man's existence. All man's culture and ideas ultimately stemmed from the ways in which he coped with the struggle for property. Religion, politics, government, family institutions, relations between the sexes—all reflected and depended upon property. Strangely this theory, so common, too common, today, was strikingly novel a little over a century ago. Even discounting the extreme fashion in which it was presented and the other ideas of violence and class struggle that went with it, the idea was new and represented an important addition to political theory. No student of political affairs today fails to take account of how ideas and practices are influenced by economic conditions.

SOCIOLOGY OF CLASS

The same novelty was conceded the ideas of social class and the class struggle when Marx and Engels proposed them in *The Communist Manifesto* of 1848. They asserted that history represented the efforts of one class to dominate another, first the feudal class over the middle class, then the middle class over the working class; now the working class would abolish all classes and build a classless society.

The strength of a class depended on its control of the means of production. Therefore the means of production had to be wrested from the hands of the bourgeoisie; this meant destroying the state, which stands as guardian of the vested interests. There would follow a temporary classless state, when the workers would own the means of production in common, under the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the dictatorship, temporarily established for the revolution, would wither away and a stateless society would follow.

The various ideas of social class have been incorporated into the important field of the sociology of class, or social stratification. It must be admitted that the Marxist theories of class-consciousness have made the world and even political scientists, whether adverse or not, conscious of class.

The interpretation of modern society as the unjust rule of

middle class wealth over the mass of people has characterized much of socialist thought as well, but the socialists may be distinguished from the Marxists communists (including such groups as the Trotskyites) in that they generally favored gradual, peaceful, and constitutional means of changing the system of ownership of society; usually they urged transferring machinery and large corporate agglomerations of property from private hands to state ownership. The socialists may trace their origins beyond Marx to writers like Fourier, the "scientific socialist" of the early nineteenth century. The cooperative movement in Scandinavia and other countries has many beliefs in common with the socialists, for it fights the concentration of wealth in a few hands by arranging for joint ownership and management of certain processes, goods, and operations by producers and consumers thereof. The English Fabian Socialists, led by intellectuals such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb, were the most successful of the reform socialists; they influenced the Labour Party, which came, in time, to govern England.

MODELS OF SOCIETY

Marxism plunged the world's intellectuals into a social maelstrom. Society was not only becoming more complex as the industrial revolution proceeded, but interpretations of society were also becoming exceedingly involved. All manner of factors came to be taken into account in social science. Political science in the universities resisted longer than any other discipline the enlargement of its scope and method, but it too finally gave up in the last generation to the new complexity. Like sociology it found it had to consider the economic factor in politics, the religious factor, the pure power factor, the intelligence factor (it did know something of this), the psychological factor, and the ideological factor. Put them all together and one gets the "culture," the sum of related practices and attitudes in the political community.

The new idea of culture was related to the old one of the political community but with the large difference that the culture concept focused attention on the ways and rules by which a community handles its problems. The culture scientist is interested in the interrelations of all the behaviors and beliefs of a society. The anthropologists helped develop the concept because they could see a "culture" more distinctly

and clearly in the small primitive communities they were studying.

It is in this larger context of culture that Max Weber, a German sociologist of the early twentieth century (1864-1921), can be understood and presented. A prodigious student of comparative cultures, he developed a method of social analysis that is sometimes called the ideal-type method, or, as here, the method of models of society. Weber wrote extensively in the fields of economic history and the history of administrative organization, on the *literati* (the influential intellectual officials of old China), the castes of India, the bureaucracy, traditional systems, and economic systems. Generally he tended to draw first a great and complete conception of how the society or institution tended to operate—"all things being equal"—that is, what its "natural" functioning was like. Then as he described the myriad related details of structure, beliefs, and operations of a kind of society, he would cite exceptional or accidental or overlapping features of other kinds. His method generally proved to be a powerful tool of analysis, profound, suggestive, and possible to comprehend.

Since his work was done, both the culture-concept and model-building have been sometimes used in political writing, and more often in other social sciences. Especially for the larger subjects of political science, which treat of whole periods of civilization, whole institutions, complete political systems, and complete publics, this mode of attack has great promise. Its use brings generally a danger of some exaggeration (the exceptions may be left out) but more often a total comprehension impossible to obtain otherwise, and an appreciation of the meshing and interactive influence of a great many factors of all kinds in a single setting—an office, a political party, a society, or a church.

THE ELITE

The Greeks, it was related, initiated the idea of democracy. Going further, they began the whole notion of forms of government, which they considered to be three—governments by the one, by the few, and by the many. The most abundant discussion of the forms of government has, however, occurred in modern times, concurrent with the entrance of people of all classes onto the political scene. Of all the discussions, per-

haps the most illuminating from the standpoint of science has centered around government by the few—variously called aristocracy, oligarchy, or the elite.

As might be expected, elite theorists, as we shall call them, were many in number, ranging from those who urged an *elite of birth or intelligence*, to those who simply found the idea of an elite a useful tool in political analysis. We can begin with a group of aristocratic and conservative writers who were prominent in the nineteenth century. All of them were critical of important aspects of democracy and most of them rather pessimistic about the prospects for democratic survival. They harked back in many ways to Edmund Burke who had defended the English oligarchy against the English Radicals and French Jacobins during the revolutionary period of the eighteenth century. He had defended the class system and the prerogatives of the nobility and wealthy groups, claiming that their leadership and abilities provided peace, progress, and contentment for the nation. Not reason, he claimed, but long tradition and usage made government effective and good, and little could be expected of intemperate reforms. Burke's views characterized a number of the historians of the nineteenth century when they ventured into political writings. Taine, Guizot, and Lecky are examples.

In England also, Thomas Carlyle criticized the claim of the majority to rule and declared history to be the workings of a few great leaders of men and thought. Faguet in France denounced what he called the democratic "Cult of Incompetence." And Gaetano Mosca in Italy declared that forms of government such as democracy or monarchy are meaningless in the face of an invariable "ruling class" which directs the course of events. Ortega y Gasset summarized the aristocratic forebodings about the eventual fate of mass democracies, which one found a century earlier in de Tocqueville, by predicting the rise of dictatorships in his *Revolt of the Masses*. Walter Lippmann in America doubted the very existence of a majority on most questions and sought effective government by a small skilled group of statesmen cognizant of the public interest. James Burnham predicted, in line of descent from Saint-Simon and Mosca, a new ruling class of managers following upon a peaceable or violent *Managerial Revolution*.

Drawing sustenance from Hegel, a number of organic idealists wrote in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Hegel saw the gigantic movements of history as the products of the human will and adulated the Prussian state as the embodiment of the highest form of will, completely dominant over the individuals of the society. For the state led the people just as the brain guides the human organism. United with the doctrines of the value of force and violence, the ethics of the national will may be found in forerunners of Fascism such as Treitschke, or in the philosophers of Fascism such as Gentile or Nazism such as Schmidt.

The defense of violence as a political instrument did not characterize the pre-Fascists alone. Nietzsche praised force and other techniques for the seizure of power that the nineteenth-century democracies had for the most part rejected. Like Carlyle, he regarded important historical events as the accomplishment of great men. He rejected Christianity and democracy as contemptibly mediocre and weak. The philosophical adoration of naked strength with a morality of its own reached its peak of frenzy with Nietzsche.

The scientific notion of the elite as a tool of analysis is to be found particularly in the works of Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). Pareto wrote voluminously and systematically, with a thorough command of engineering, mathematics, economics, history, and sociology. He insisted upon viewing society as a natural scientist would, without fear or favor, as a working out of laws of human behavior that could form the basis for prediction and a limited degree of control. Not since Pythagoras was anyone so completely taken with the idea of a mathematical description of society.

He criticized Marx's economic determinism, showing that what was economic behavior in Marxist eyes could be ideological behavior in a sociologist's eyes. The structure of men's thoughts determine their economic behavior and economic institutions. Politics are run by a few men everywhere. This elite, more often than not, has a military or power-hungry cast of mind, of temperament, and of habit, rather than being business-minded. So the state, far from being the superstructure resting on the dominance of the *bourgeoisie*, as the communists believed, was usually the master of the business classes. At the least, the government was an important independent factor in the determination of public policies, including business policy.

Roberto Michels integrated the work of Pareto and Weber

in a number of minor studies and contributed perhaps the greatest case study of political institutions ever written, *Political Parties* (1915). In this work, which dealt with the ideology, structure, and functioning of the democratic parties of early twentieth-century Europe, he propounded his Iron Law of Oligarchy. There he revealed the apparently irresistible tendencies of groups, organized in democratic ways for democratic aims, to develop into groups run by a few men mostly for their own goals.

COMMUNICATIONS

John Dewey (1859-1962), a prolific writer and long-lived sage of American instrumentalism (pragmatism), was outside the immediate intellectual and moral circles of the Europeans just discussed. Despite his knowledge of the Greek classics, his study of German idealist philosophy, and his sojourn in the Orient, he was imbued with American culture and problems. His original and important theories grew out of American educational philosophy and psychology. Beneath all of Dewey's production was the driving desire to make Jeffersonian and Lincolnian democracy work, from the nursery to the grave.

He developed a new logic that wedded wants and thought. Man thinks because he must solve problems. Logic as a tool of inquiry must be made part of the process of living, individual or mass. Political activity should be regarded as a simple extension of other forms of activity: it is made "political" because it has indirect consequences for a great many people. The great problem of democracy, he declared in *The Public and Its Problems* (1927), is to assure among the vast public the fullest communication of goals, needs, policies, and consequences of actions. Elections, laws, rules, and all other devices and institutions have to be judged good or bad as they contributed to the citizens' mutual understanding. The final values of man emerge from the process of solving life's problems in a socially compatible way.

OPERATIONAL INQUIRY

It is the wise man, said Aristotle, who will be as precise as his material permits. One trouble of older forms of expression was this indefinite quality. This took two forms, multiple meanings and not referring to real events. Take the sentence:

"Behind the defeat of the Persians lay the genius of the Greeks." The sentence is too broad. It says little, although it is stirring to all who are siding with the Greeks and love what they believe to be genius. Actually it indicates only the statement "Something some Greeks had, had something to do with some defeat some Persians had." That is, the story begins, not concludes with the sentence. "Genius" and other words in the sentence mean only vaguely the same thing to all readers. The musician is likely to think of genius as peculiarly aesthetic; a soldier thinks of Greek military formations. But worst of all, the sentence does not refer to any observable connection between the genius and defeat. Moreover one is entitled to suspect that no such operational contact exists.

It would be foolish to say that such "operational" thoughts did not occur to many men who never heard of the term "operationalism." What the term "operational inquiry" denotes is that a statement about observed events can be tested, and besides is phrased in language concrete enough to let everyone talk intelligibly about the events. The philosophy of operational inquiry holds that a great improvement in social science will occur as scientists insist upon the language and events-oriented approach of operationalism. Noticeably, since Machiavelli's value-free mode of inquiry, and through one line of descent from Max Planck, Einstein, and other natural scientists to Bridgman and Eddington, and through a second line of descent from Hobbes, Bentham, Durkheim, Max Weber, Pareto, and other social scientists to Dewey, the line of descent is growing stronger, the descendants more numerous. The language and meaning of words in political and social science are ever more distinct from their classical ancestors.

To summarize, operationalism in political science begins with realism (Machiavelli). It takes a value-free position (Machiavelli). It holds that reality has infinite complexity (a political party can be described by millions of words and from innumerable points of view). It aims at using some portion of this complexity to solve a problem (such as, what happens to the number of members in a party when dues are charged). It uses words to get this reality into a position where we can work with it to suit our needs. (We define terms such as *party*, *member*, *dues*, and *charged* in a tight empirically testable way.) Once it thus comes to grip with its

created reality, it can experiment with and test that reality (as for instance by varying the dues and watching for a decline in numbers). What is really known then is a set of operations that we can confidently say will have certain consequences if they are performed. These, then, are the working parts of one of the greatest instruments ever devised by man to deal with his environment, whether human or natural. As Dewey wrote in his *Quest for Certainty*, "A genuine idealism and one compatible with science will emerge as soon as philosophy accepts the teaching of science that ideas are statements not of what is or has been but of acts to be performed."

UNCONSCIOUS FACTORS IN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

One more idea arrests our attention in this chapter, the concept of an unconscious part of man's personality that works continuously to shape and influence his behavior. Hints of this notion come from all over the world and from antiquity, but Sigmund Freud is unchallenged as discoverer of the phenomenon and developer of its implications. Harold D. Lasswell (1902-) has in turn established the idea in the body of political science. Exploitation of the "unconscious" has rapidly opened up the field of political psychology, including factors that enter into public opinion, leadership, policy decisions, motives, ideologies, and organizational behavior. No subject of political science, and no applications of political science, are untouched by the new knowledge that has flowed from the realization that political man can be only understood and acted upon through his hidden and concealed drives, feelings, and predispositions.

Lasswell's career has been constructed of all modern intellectual forces, in a unique fashion. The European masters of political sociology and the American pragmatists coalesce with the psychoanalytic movement in his intellect. Consequently, in his numerous works, one discovers a language, logic, concepts, principles, and emphases formed out of a profound appreciation of these differing minds, and combined in style and language that can only be called Lasswellian. His *Psychopathology and Politics* and *Power and Society* are of paramount importance to modern political theory. Even though he is a theorist of general social science, he is an inventor and developer of research techniques in the areas of content analysis, political psychology, law, and the soci-

ology of leadership. There is scarcely a field of social science that he has not touched upon and improved.

Like his contemporary peers, Lasswell is first a scientist, which means methodologist and validator of propositions about man-as-he-is, rather than a moralist. Yet as the sum of his writings mount, he approaches the condition of Dewey, whose total creation had a heavy impact on moral thought. Lasswell approaches morality gently, coaxing it out of natural social behavior, so to speak. He concludes with less of a triumphant new statement of ethics than with a clarification of how human dignity and welfare can be served by the logic and empirical methods of the policy sciences.

The Obligations of Political Science

The list of basic ideas has served to give preliminary shape to the study of political science. It has also indicated something of the role that individual political scientists play, and a few more words to this point may be said by way of concluding.

A suspicious reader may perceive in the story of basic ideas presented in these pages a bias toward Western political science. Averroes, the Muslim Aristotelian, is not ranked with Aquinas, the Christian Aristotelian. Ibn Khaldun is not credited with the basic development of the idea of world history over Augustine. Aristotle and Plato, not Kautilya of India, are credited with perceiving political science as a body of instructions. Machiavelli, not Kautilya of India, is called the founder of the idea of power politics. (In Kautilya's *Arthashastra* [about 321-300 B.C.] is found an encyclopedia of rules for administering a government. The science of governing, *Dandaniti*, is the queen of sciences. It applies the triple Vedas (knowledge of righteous and unrighteous acts), and the Varta (knowledge of agriculture and trade), by means of its own sciences of the expedient and inexpedient [Nayanayan] and power and impotency [Balabale]). Nor are the great ideas traced into Sumeria, Egypt, the Sudan, Persia, or China, where undoubtedly some or all of them have occurred to men. The imperial administration of China was independent of the great Roman development. The organization and philosophy of the social division of labor was well developed in India two thousand years ago.

It would be dishonorable and incorrect, by way of self-

justification, to hide behind the historical and philosophical authorities who have not only dominated Western minds but trained the Eastern minds as well. The correct explanations are simple enough. By historical interpenetration, the Near East, the Middle East, and Africa are involved. The American Indian civilizations have given us no political literature to speak of and the line of descent of their ideas is still working below the surface of the Western Hemisphere countries. Chinese and Indian literature has been more exclusively didactic, moralistic, intuitive, and fragmentary than the Western literature. Western man has been more vocal, more socially self-conscious, more possessed of glimmerings of the methods and principles of pure science from the beginning. Even so, in the life of man, these 2500 years and few ideas must appear a small matter. There were 500,000 years before and there are more millenia to come, and many more ideas came before and many more will come after. Hence, although reasonable disputation may be in order, there should be little place for partisan or ethnic quarrels in a tentative history of ideas.

Great ideas—whether moral or scientific—cannot come from one man, either. He represents his teachers. Plato bespoke the Sophists. Aristotle repeated Plato. Bentham reflected the Levellers, English revolutionaries of a century earlier. Pareto reflected Comte, the "Father of Sociology." In turn, those that follow modify; sometimes they improve, sometimes they destroy. The Roman jurists who worked on the Great Code of Justinian systematized some views of Cicero. Referring to his disciples, Marx once said in disgust: "I am not a Marxist." Moreover, political philosophers draw from other fields some of their greatest ideas. Smith was primarily an economist and psychologist. Mill was an economist and logician. Marx was trained in the idealistic philosophy of Hegel.

Also a movement may bring forth great ideas that can hardly be ascribed to a single man. An example is the Bible, that treasure of moral rules and observations about man's soul. There is much of politics there, and many authors. The Sophists were many in number. It is difficult to say who was the most original Stoic, even though we have chosen Zeno. The pragmatists Charles Pierce and William James lent much

to Dewey. Furthermore, ideas that are in the air can be independently invented. Gaetano Mosca developed a theory of rule by the few at about the same time as Pareto. Should Gentili or Hugo Grotius, who wrote a grand treatise a few years after him, be credited as the inventor of international law? The limits of individual responsibility are manifest.

Moreover, it is important to note our emphasis finally upon great philosophers and scientists, instead of great men who are incidentally philosophers, or powerful men whose ideas have influenced the course of history. That is why, for example, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic, who wrote a beautiful little book of *Meditations* in the Stoic vein, is not emphasized; nor Jefferson (who wrote voluminously but unsystematically) or Woodrow Wilson (even though Wilson was a fine political scientist); nor Napoleon or Mussolini, both of whom had original ideas about the structure of the modern state and human motivation.

Then many leaders, such as Akhnaton, Moses, Augustus Caesar, Louis XIV, King George III, Hitler, Stalin, and Franklin Roosevelt, have had important effects upon their age, but their ideas have been incoherent, or unsystematic, or imitative, or undeveloped. Therefore they are excluded here. But how they behave and think is information upon which political science depends greatly for its theories.

A final point needs to be made. A glance at the luxuriant growth of political values and studies in history shows that society is misunderstood when it is oversimplified. The world of ideas is not divided into two—totalitarian and democratic. Reality is much more complicated. It is also more durable. No sweeping doctrine of history—nor even a great war—can wipe the slate of history clean and start humanity along a common path. The ghosts of history haunt banquets that toast the future.

The proliferation of major values imposes burdens upon political science. There is a multiplicity of frames of reference for viewing society. There are many objectives. There exist many methods of seeking truth. There is a grand confusion of findings, because the seemingly most innocent statement of a political fact often turns out to be based on controversial premises about what is good or bad, or about what is the nature of man. The achievement of common

54 / Political Behavior

goals promises to be a lengthy and painful process, the outlines and limits of which cannot be now foreseen. Even the desirability of agreement on ends is in question.

Thus a great waste of time and effort is unavoidable in reaching agreement on matters to be studied, on methods of studying them, and on criteria for establishing the validity of findings. Political science has been called the Queen of Sciences. The name perhaps fits her lofty concerns and goals. But her subjects are unruly and the boundaries of her kingdom unmarked.

Chapter 2

Thinking about Politics

MANY PEOPLE have only a vague idea of what is meant by the term "political science." Often they confuse it with political economy, which is economics; or they conceive it to be the discussion of current events, although there is no more reason for a political scientist to know offhand the present situation in the Near East than for a professor of physical mechanics to be able to describe the pilings of any bridge in North Carolina. They often believe that political science is civic ethics, that is, a system of moral exhortations that tell students what is good and bad about the political conduct of various persons and groups.

Political science is fundamentally none of these things. It is scientific method applied to political events. Like any other science, it is an attempt to reduce, by ever-broader statements, the facts with which it deals to a number of clear, precise, descriptive principles. Of course, in a science called political, these facts and principles are political. A principle of political science might be: "Third parties have a difficult time getting on the ballot in most states"; or "The system of filling committee chairmanships by seniority in the Congress operates on the whole to the advantage of the conservative Southern faction of the Democratic Party when that party is in the majority."

The Science and Art of Politics

POLITICS IS AN ART

However confused some people may be about political science, they seem to have clear-cut and dogmatic ideas about politics. To many voters, politics is a racket, a game, or a disgrace; but to those they elect to office, who are "in politics," it may be a noble profession. Such epithets, however, can only express emotional reactions, not the realities of politics. Practical politics actually resolves itself into the adjustments of human relations. It calls for a practical skill that distinguishes one man from another—an art. Long training,

even if only self-training or experience, elevates one man above another, and when training and aptitude increase a skill, we have conditions that are typical of an art, whether it be bad or good, plain or fancy art. A few men seem to be born to the political art.

Science presents the principles; the corresponding art applies them. So, in theory, should the political scientist provide the principles for the political artist—the politician, the administrator, the active citizen. It would be false, however, to conceal the fact that the co-ordination between the scientist and the politician, in practice, is slight.

This situation is by no means peculiar to political science. Knowing the principles of anatomical mechanics hardly helps one walk better, and he who tries consciously to operate by them may well fall on his face. On the other hand, without a science of anatomy and engineering, artificial limbs could not be employed successfully. Even in those areas where science and art are indispensable to one another, co-ordination cannot be perfect. The engineer learns mechanics in school and even takes courses in the art of bridge building, that is, "applied" courses; but he does not learn how to build *the* bridge of real life. *The* bridge is unique; it is his individual solution of a special bridging problem—a problem of scientific principle, aesthetic principle, climate, public opinion, and perhaps even politics.

POLITICS AND COMMON SENSE

Certainly, to the neutral observer and to the artist of politics the political world seems so confused and complex that most of the descriptions of it over the last two thousand years appear to be monstrous oversimplifications, completely useless as guides for political practice. Everything seems to be done according to homely sayings that people have acquired during their individual life experiences or by reason of some complex "feeling" for the particular situation that cannot be broken down into a statement of scientific principle or taught to others. When one asks a politician whether there are principles of political science that underlie his activities, he snorts in derision or else emits several heavy dogmas that he would never in his right mind pursue implacably: "Never offend anybody;" "Always vote for appropriations and against taxes;" "Be loyal;" or "God is on the side with the most

votes." When one turns to the diaries, lives, memoirs, and accounts in political literature, one must, if one is reasonable, perceive that the precious advice of Boss Plunkitt of Tammany Hall might inspire, but would badly serve, the budding politician in rural Nebraska, that the finesse of the diplomat, Talleyrand, reconciles poorly with the bumptious tactics of Huey Long, one-time boss of Louisiana.

It is true that powerful men have a weakness for citing other great men as their mentors: Napoleon cited Alexander; Mussolini, Caesar; Lenin, Marx; Mao Tse-Tung of Communist China, George Washington; and many American leaders, Jefferson. But the alleged "educators" are often discovered after the fact, when the new leader needs justification. The "model" often is fitted into the ego of the new man—a cloak he wears, a role he plays, a symbol of what he would like to be. The new men are not getting science from the old, but are getting propaganda. For the settled areas of science, and this is true of parts of political science, the founders, such as Newton, may, as men, give inspiration, but as contributors their work is mingled with and lost in the general body of scientific principles in their fields.

SCIENCE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR EXPERIENCE

In short, it would be false and vainglorious to declare that political science can provide its disciples with scientific tools that will give them a great advantage over uninitiates in practical politics. Political science cannot make a politician out of a scientist any more than physiology can make an athlete out of a physiotherapist. Nor can it make up to any great extent for the wealth of experience and the insights that the "practical" politician, administrator, or citizen brings to bear on individual political problems. Except in rare cases, such as that of Woodrow Wilson, a political scientist does not possess an aptitude for politics, and it is noteworthy that, although some of Wilson's practical success was traceable to his excellent scientific preparation, his major political failures were an outgrowth of a temperament that was more congenial to scientific discovery than to politics.

SCIENCE MAY BE MISLEADING

Furthermore, political science is not always accurate in describing the political process. It is all too easy for one fresh

from the textbooks to scoff at the "irrationalities" of politicians, who seem to be like the fabled bird that flies forward with its head turned backwards. The political novice tends to be cynical, like the playwright, Alexandre Dumas the Younger, who, when urged by an admirer to write about politics, replied: "Comedies about comedies don't go."

Often the supposed "irrationalities" turn out to be elements of the problem at hand that a more perfect political science would have taken account of in its body of principles. For example, when a group of students views the sessions of any of the world's important assemblies, it most frequently sees a scattering of members acting in a leisurely manner. The students often conclude on the basis of a "principle" they have been taught in class ("Laws are made in assemblies after debate on the merits of the bill") that the members are not living up to their responsibilities. The member will tell them privately, however, that if he attended all the meetings of this term of the assembly, he would not be around for the next. He has learned quickly that his job has many "angles," and the purely formal function of attending sessions and launching debates must take its proper place.

We have said that politics is the art, political science the science, and that the art has not had great help from the scientific principles. Still, one should not underestimate political science. There are many useful things that can be said about the ways in which men of different viewpoints and different standards of right and wrong behave in the political process. The chapters that follow will describe some of the materials of political science and their relationships. Their aim is to make general statements about politics that will be meaningful either to those who contemplate the political process or to those who are active in it.

In addition to these principles of political science, there is a science of political inquiry that this book aims to describe. As Karl Pearson has written: "The man who classifies facts of any kind whatsoever, who sees their mutual relation and describes their sequences, is applying the scientific method and is a man of science. The facts may belong to the past history of mankind, to the social statistics of our great cities, to the atmosphere of the most distant stars, to the digestive organs of a worm, or to the life of a scarcely

visible bacillus. It is not the facts themselves which make science, but the method in which they are dealt with.”¹

What is “Political”?

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES ARE MINGLED

Political science, as one of the social sciences that deal with human relations, is a member of a rather quarrelsome family. Psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, history, and human geography are the other members. Each of these, like political science itself, is not very sure of its place in the family or its future as a science. None has a private room, and each has a habit of wearing the others' party dresses.

For example, a psychologist will sometimes interpret international relations of the most complex sort on some theory of “reward and punishment” or “the aggressive instinct.” An anthropologist will show that we can have peace, because he has found some primitive tribes that seem not to have war. An economist can be heard saying now and then that if we were to restore a world-wide free movement of goods and persons, the causes of war would vanish. And sociologists here and there raise their voices to state that war is essentially a struggle between “we” and “they,” the “ingroup” and the “outgroup,” who are jealous of their respective gods and customs, or that war is a struggle for social prestige. Not a few geographers seem all too certain that the control of strategic routes and raw materials is at the root of warfare. Not to be outdone, some historians have been prone to see war as the logical outcome of dynastic disputes, personal ambitions, or some combination of unique factors that are not capable of being fitted into a pattern for purposes of explanation.

The political scientist who studies war draws on his knowledge of one or more of the sister sciences. The best studies of war to this day, in fact, have been skillful combinations of the insights and evidence afforded by all of the social sciences. Each science reveals some facet that the other cannot. One may ask: Must a political scientist who studies war be skilled

¹ *The Grammar of Science* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1900), p. 12. Reprinted with the permission of The Macmillan Company, New York.

in all of the social sciences? The answer is, at the present time, yes. Since political science has chosen to study war as a whole, in its total meaning as human behavior, it cannot escape the obligation to bring to the subject all the contributions of the social sciences and to risk the danger of amateurishness in any one of them.


The same broad demands are made of political science in other problem areas. The political scientist is called on to be expert on matters concerning the state, for example. Again, he must be, as he has often been in the past, a jurist in speaking of the constitution and the laws, a sociologist in speaking of political institutions, a psychologist in describing public opinion and propaganda on public issues, a historian in describing governmental changes, and an economist in talking of fiscal policy, budgetary matters, and social legislation. If he is to study municipal government, he would do well to read that classic on city government, Aristotle's *Politics*, and see there how a great scientist treated the psychological, economic, sociological, and other elements in the operation of the city-state.

MOST POLITICAL SCIENTISTS ARE SUBJECT-AREA SPECIALISTS

Given this necessity for making use of materials of all the social sciences, the field of political science is usually defined by subject-area, in history and today. The prevailing broad divisions in America are shown in Figure 1. Governmental institutions and the major areas of life that government influences are the foci of attention; a re-examination of the table of contents of this book will show that most chapters refer to subject-areas. The reason why most political scientists are specialists in a certain area of government or politics is that continuous, intensive study of one area of human involvement may often produce better results than a one-sided application to a wide range of situations of a "law" or principle" obtained elsewhere from a raw and crude science. For example, today it is probable that a political scientist who is a specialist on *legislatures* can answer more of the questions we ask about the principles of legislation than can a political scientist who is an expert on the *psychology of group behavior*, although, as we shall point out later, both men can give different and yet useful answers, and the two in co-operation can be even of greater use.

At this stage of political science, specialization by subject can work well. Given talent, a man concentrating on one certain area of behavior, such as political parties or public law, can come to understand it well. He can achieve a sympa-

FIGURE 1
THE FOUNDATIONS AND FIELDS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*
(as practiced generally in American Universities)



*Political theory is germane to all aspects of the diagram. All subjects cited relate to all other subjects in many ways.

thetic relationship with the characters and events he studies. He can see the parts in relation to the whole without losing sight of the whole. If he is outstanding, he can bring to bear on his own area of specialization the new techniques and discoveries of the other social sciences.

Considerable doubt exists as to whether any complex situation in politics, such as war, elections, legislation, administration of public affairs, or municipal government, can be understood by one man. Yet the political scientist is the most probable candidate for the task. To take one instance, can anyone find out why an election goes Republican or Democratic in

a particular county? Among the variables or factors that we can imagine to be at work are the following: sex, age, religion, nationality, income, the kind of neighborhood, the county history, the organization of the party, party leadership, the amount and kind of propaganda, the influence of past elections, party platforms, party history, individual histories, the personality of candidates, the beliefs of voters, the actual and presumed issues, press coverage and viewpoints, the number of eligible voters, the extent to which voters who were eligible actually turned out to vote, the number of names on the ballot, the type of election system used, the weather on election day, and many more. Obviously, the political scientist studying this election has to be highly trained in many disciplines if he is to estimate the possible operation of all of these factors. No other social scientist can tell him the absolute or relative importance of sex, age, religion, economic issues, organization, and so on. He must determine them for this election and other elections by himself or with the aid of a few close colleagues.

He can, in fact, by virtue of his intimate knowledge of these influences as they function in this whole situation that he studies, give members of the other social sciences instruction regarding their own fields. The sociologist who studies race differences, for example, can learn something from studies of voting behavior. The political scientist's preoccupation with one problem of behavior may even produce more useful principles than would be produced if other social scientists were separately to apply the principles and methods of their disciplines to his field of interest. If so, we cannot expect to learn from the economist how money influenced the vote, or from the psychologists how age influenced it, or from sociologists how social class affiliations influenced it. The political scientist must be aware of what the economists, psychologists, and sociologists have said about these influences; but perhaps only he can assign to these factors their proper influence, for only he has considered them as they operate together in the election process.

EMPHASIS ON SUBJECT-AREAS CRITICIZED

There has been a great deal of criticism of the customary orientation of political science to subject-areas. Other social

scientists sometimes greet with protests writings by political scientists on war, the state, the political party, or leadership. They claim, for example, that only an economist can talk of the economic causes of war, the sociologist of the cultural causes of war, or the psychologist of the tensions that cause war. However, such criticism, to be justified, must show that the political scientist used, for example, bad psychological techniques, uninformed estimates of psychological findings, and over-generalizations from psychological materials. The individual political scientist must defend his work in these respects.

But his harassment does not end here. For quite the opposite reason, political scientists who have taken a broad view of their subject have sometimes been reproached from within the profession of political science itself. He who discussed how the law was made ran some risk when he talked of the informal elements that enter into legislation. At one time he would have encountered real opposition to including in his description "extraneous" matters such as the influence of lobbies on lawmakers, the rule of legislative bodies by key committees, or the domination of legislatures by party bosses. Sociologists like Ostrogorski, Michels, and Bentley, and social psychologists like Sighele, Le Bon, and Wallas helped political scientists like Wilson, Bryce, Merriam, and Beard to force a treatment of these realistic questions so that many other political scientists could deal with them without incurring the distrust of their colleagues.

A certain amount of cautious sniffing and headshaking still occurs whenever a political scientist takes broadly the subject-area pretensions of political science and tries to describe the whole of the problem on which he is concentrating. As soon as a student moves about in the bibliography of political science in America and western Europe he will detect a strong legalistic air, persisting from the recent past, when political science was public law rather narrowly conceived. As such, public law concerned itself principally with the formal procedures a political system required in such situations as filing and running for office, being a party official, becoming an elector, introducing a bill, drafting a bill, judging its constitutionality, and following it through the continuous court re-definitions of its precise applications to particular cases. On

the whole, however, today's political scientists are the better received the more materials and viewpoints they bring to bear on their subject.

Although a great many political scientists are experts on given subjects, a few have urged upon their colleagues a scope of study other than subject-area specialization. Two alternative points of view deserve mention. Each differs from the substantive area definition. Each attempts to make political science assume a more logical position in relation to other social sciences and a more advantageous position for undertaking the solution of political problems. One is the "policy science" approach. The other is the "factor specialization" approach.

POLICY SCIENCE

Exponents of the "policy science" approach (well known among them are Harold D. Lasswell and James K. Pollock) would share the problems of political science with other social sciences. Since it is difficult for one man to bring all the rapidly multiplying techniques and findings of the social sciences to bear on the solution of a particular political problem, they consider a form of interdisciplinary co-operation necessary. Wherever the community must have informed "policy," the social sciences are to co-operate. Thus, the political scientist would not venture to give sole judgment on a law governing the press, but would be one of a committee of economists, psychologists, sociologists, and ethical scientists who would contribute the findings of their respective disciplines to a complete description of the state of the press and the consequences of the proposed legislation. Under the guidance, preferably of practicing experts on the "possible," that is, representatives of the public or statesmen, these findings would form the basis for social action. The specific contribution of the political scientist would be in the design of the co-operative study and in the knowledge he possesses of how policies are made. Examples of the use of this co-operative technique have been such enterprises as the Committee on Freedom of the Press, the National Resources Planning Board, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, and (to indicate how highly controversial this approach may be) the various four-year, five-year and other plans of collectivist economies abroad.

FACTOR SPECIALIZATION

The approach we term factor specialization would make of political science an analytic science. If we let economics analyze the "price-value" factor in human relations and motivations, sociology the "honor-value" or "prestige" factor, geography the "physical" factor, and psychology the "psycho-physical" origins of the various factors, political science would study the "power" factor. Just as economics often studies the conditions of the maximization of profit, political science would study the conditions of the maximization of power. Power we would define roughly as the control over the disposition of valued things—public offices, material goods, honors, and so on. The man who submerged all other values to the single-minded pursuit of the power to make decisions and to tell other people in a society how to act would be the pure "political man."

Factor specialization would differ from the usual approach to the field of political science in that it would be more limited and would depend greatly on the other social sciences to provide the missing elements needed for a complete analysis of any problem. For example, a political scientist would lean upon the economist, the sociologist, and others in treating of the administration of roads, schools, and other activities of government.

However, many political activities are not "power" activities; some, but never all, have to do with power. Exclusive preoccupation with one factor like "power," in the absence of ability to measure that element exactly, may thus produce a lopsided description of the event studied.

Neither of the two approaches just described can be ignored. If they operate at present on a precarious footing, they may be expected to become stronger as time goes on and the science of politics develops. Meanwhile both views help discourage more conventional political scientists from producing shapeless descriptions of transitory situations. The "policy" scientists point out the important problems, the need for cooperation in the social sciences, and the principles common to the processes by which political decisions are made. The "factor" scientists, by emphasizing the study of the central components of the political process, advance the development of dynamic principles of political behavior.

WHAT EVENTS FORM THE DATA OF POLITICS?

The three views jointly contribute to a proper construction of the field of political science, which at the present time can be said to discuss three classes of phenomena: politics, the politically relevant, and the politically conditioned. "Politics" or "political" includes the events that happen around the decision-making centers of government. Who makes the most important decisions locally, nationally, and internationally? What are the decisions, and what is their effect? What are the procedures, formal and informal, by which they are made?

The "politically relevant" encompasses those general and specific social events that are not directly political, but that have effects of political importance: the political beliefs of certain religious movements like Mohammedanism, the political effects of business cycles, the relative amounts of compulsory and free elements in the training of children in a society, the productivity of labor and machinery in a political jurisdiction, the effects of monopoly upon control of the nation, the rate of social and technological change, or the curricula of universities and the political influences operating on students.

The "politically conditioned" denotes those events that in large part follow from political decisions or are associated with political behavior. Typical are the effects of legislation. However, in so far as the effects of a particular law are the concern of the special field to which it pertains, political scientists lose interest. They are too busy observing those laws that affect behavior that is either political or closely relevant to politics. Thus, they customarily observe closely the effects of laws regulating lobbies, labor unions, and political parties, leaving the effects of child labor legislation, grain and money market regulation, or crop control legislation to sociologists and economists.

There are other kinds of politically conditioned events: the effects of state activities on religion—for instance the antireligious behavior of the Communist parties in eastern Europe after World War II; the effects of government ownership upon work motivation and capitalistic initiative; the use of political power to obtain personal revenge or make a fortune; or the way in which economic, educational, and social insti-

tutions bend to follow the direction of political events. These influences of politics are implied in verbal expressions. For example a stock broker says: "The President must become optimistic about business if economic conditions are not to get worse"; an educator says: "How can we teach students to be good when the politics are so corrupt"; a Negro leader states: "Race relations will never be what they were before the war because so many Negroes fought and died for freedom."

The sphere of what is political, politically relevant, and politically determined is not fixed. It shifts with the times and the interests of men in what may be obtained through the apparatus of the state. In early Virginia, the vestry was a unit of religion and government together. It later lost political character and finally even political relevance. Certain mountain ranges like the Alps or the Pyrenees gain or lose political relevance as the nations around them move in different political directions. The education of the young is sometimes, as in ancient Sparta or Nazi Germany, directly managed by political leaders for their own ends; sometimes, as in the United States, it is politically relevant and politically conditioned.

Various scientific theories and discoveries have added new dimensions to the relevant and the conditioned. Marx's theory that the state was dominated by the class that owned the instruments of economic production, when adopted by some political scientists, made the study of the control of factories "political" and tended to make the study of the machinery of the state "relevant," but not central.

Freud's examination of the "unconscious" factor in human conduct, coupled with his theory that strong feelings of guilt may produce aggressive behavior, led to some important contributions to the study of nonrational behavior in politics. Thus today, when a political scientist studies certain destructive political characters in action, he may look as deeply as possible into their personal history. He may find evidence, for instance, that they were held to impossible standards of conduct as children and blamed for many unaccountable situations, until in desperation they sought relief from their anxieties by casting their feelings of guilt elsewhere and finding political opponents to blame and punish.

The Political Scientist at Work

THE GENERAL METHODS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Political science cannot be said to have a coherent and indisputable body of methods and techniques, partly because of the great depth and scope of its interests, partly because of the little success thus far achieved in measurement as the natural sciences know it. The political scientist ordinarily approaches some portion of the materials of politics that interests him, observes what is going on from as close a vantage point as possible, reads and listens to what others say about it, and forms a theory as to the key influences at work and how they interact with each other. Guided then by his theory or hypothesis, he goes deeper into the evidence, confirming, changing, or disproving his theory, depending upon what he finds.

Political scientists differ temperamentally and intellectually, and the results of their work very often express these differences. Four general approaches can be observed. One political scientist may present careful descriptions; he may provide a detailed and exact mirror of the events he is observing. Another may have a talent for analysis; he may isolate the influences at work in a situation and their essential relation to the events he is studying. A third scholar may prefer to work by comparison; if he is blessed with an acute ability to discriminate the characteristics of two similar events or institutions, he may be able to show as no one else can what distinguishes one event from another, and account for the different behavior of the human beings in each. A fourth student may proceed by the genetic or historical method; his chief interest is then in trends over a period of time. Given an event to explain, such as the defeat of a candidate in a single election, he will immediately proceed to examine the sequence of events of which this is the latest. There are probably profound psychological reasons why different scientists emphasize one method over another in the discovery of truths. But little is known about how individual differences among scientists are transformed into different ways of studying the same events.

A glance at some studies in the field of American politics will illustrate these striking differences in approach. For in-

stance, J. T. Salter's *Boss Rule* is a vivid description of the routine of the local politician. H. F. Gosnell's *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* shows how variables like income, religion, nationality, past party affiliation, and newspaper reading habits can be isolated and employed statistically to explain election results. The erudite work of Herman Finer on *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government* contrasts the cabinet systems and other institutions of the Western countries and relates their different effects to their different organization. In Harold Zink's *City Bosses in the United States* and H. D. Lasswell's *Psychopathology and Politics* two very different techniques of personal history are used to reveal how the lives of politicians influence the course of American politics. And W. E. Binkley's *American Political Parties: Their Natural History*, a broader history, shows how much of the present behavior of the parties in America rises out of past events and political crises.

No method is used alone. Each of the works above, and every other work, is colored by more than one way of explaining political reality. In Plato's *Republic* analysis and comparison (especially by detailed analogies) go hand in hand. Aristotle's *Politics* is much more descriptive, although he develops in a modern form some of the current concepts used in analyzing governments (such as the influence of the wealthier classes on politics). The other great works of political theory have also employed combinations of the four methods in order to ensure the validity and increase the persuasiveness of their findings.

THE TECHNIQUES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The methods just described are general; they represent basic and universal patterns of thought; they underlie what we may call the techniques of political science. By techniques are meant those many neat and precise ways by which the investigation of facts may be carried on in pursuance of the general methodology of the research worker. Although political science needs far more techniques than it presently possesses, their number is still too great to allow mention of more than a few.

The ability to work quickly and skillfully with documentary materials is of course of first importance. Yearbooks, encyclopedias, periodical files, law books, statutes, legislative

records, and personal documents like diaries and letters are commonly used. They contain an abundance of evidence on many points of great interest in all subject-areas of political science. Research workers studying the movements of public opinion preceding World War II found in the newspapers, periodicals, and documents that had preceded World War I certain trends that provided useful comparisons and theories to test. The voting records of a succession of Congresses as contained in the *Congressional Record* and journals afforded some researchers, for example, the chance to trace the extent to which the party leaders maintained or failed to maintain adherence of party members to the party line. Congressional hearings, which are often recorded, are mines of information on numerous subjects.

Direct observation includes all those accounts that men make of events immediately perceived. The events may be recorded in systematic or haphazard fashion, using occasional notes or one's memory. Or they may be recorded by one of the new techniques. Wire recordings of interviews and movies of events have been used to gather materials for subsequent political study. The "participant observer," one who belongs to a group or movement in order to study it, is a favorite role of political scientists. For often they cannot otherwise get close enough to the center of events.

The "questionnaire" is used widely in studies of the political attitudes of a selected group and (to a lesser extent) of the political behavior of larger numbers of persons. Carefully drafted in advance, the same question may be presented to many individuals, and their answers may be tabulated and analyzed according to rigid standards. Where the activities, attitudes and responses of a *large* number of people are to be found, a "sample" is made. If we have some foreknowledge of the characteristics of an entire group (for instance, the distribution of its members according to age, sex, residence or income), a small fraction of the total number is selected in proper proportions to stand for the whole. Where foreknowledge is slight or likely to mislead, a "random" sample may still be obtained. A random sample is taken by giving to all things or persons in the universe of data studied an equal chance of being selected. Sampling has come to be quite an intricate technique, mastered only by specialists who

must be called on by the ordinary political scientist for assistance when he believes the technique might be useful.

The most extensive development of sampling and questionnaire techniques has grown out of the polling of public opinion. Often the polls are designed to prepare data for all four general methods of political science (see Figure 2). For example, a poll based on a sample of the population will give an accurate *description* of how people feel about a particular issue of current interest. The same poll may present data by states so that one area may be *compared* with another. It may break down its findings by income levels, or age groups, or sex and thus allow the behavior of the component parts of the population to be *analyzed* in relation to one another. Finally, the same poll, taken at several points in time, will afford opportunity to discern *historical* trends and perhaps to foresee the future.

Political science makes increasing use of statistics also, especially in the analysis of government finance and in the compilation of voting figures. Public opinion and propaganda studies are next in frequency of employment of statistical techniques, but one may expect to encounter rather simple statistics even in studies of Supreme Court opinions or legislation. As yet, however, no total subject of political science has been quantitatively presented in statistical or other exact language.

PROBLEMS OF LANGUAGE

Ideally, once the results of research by these and other techniques have been formulated in a large number of general statements about politics, these statements should all be phrased in a few exact words or symbols and fitted into an ever-diminishing number of even more general statements. Our knowledge of politics should be systematized, just as are the facts one knows about Lassie, about Collies, about dogs, about mammals, and about all animals.

However, although some political scientists are systematic, political science itself is not. The writers remain individualistic. To each systematizer his own system. They are like the blind men hired by the Chinese Emperor to describe an elephant; one felt a huge foot and described the animal as a tree, another felt the trunk and described the animal as a snake, and so on, with results scarcely helpful to the Emper-

FIGURE 2

RELATION BETWEEN ISOLATIONIST ATTITUDES AND INFORMATION LEVEL*

An example of sample survey materials allowing one to draw descriptive, comparative, analytic, and historical inferences with relative ease.

| <i>Has U. S. gone too far in con- cerning itself with problems in other parts of the world?</i> | <i>Scale of information possessed by respondents on foreign affairs (Oct. 1948)</i> | | | | | <i>Percentage of total population</i> | | |
|---|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | <i>LOW 0</i> | <i>1</i> | <i>2</i> | <i>3</i> | <i>HIGH 4, 5 & 6</i> | <i>Oct. 1948</i> | <i>Apr. 1947</i> | <i>Dec. 1946</i> |
| <i>Agree</i> | 40% | 31% | 31% | 22% | 22% | 32% | 33% | 32% |
| <i>Undecided</i> | 21 | 11 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 12 | 16 | 16 |
| <i>Disagree</i> | 35 | 54 | 60 | 69 | 76 | 53 | 49 | 50 |
| <i>Not ascertained</i> | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |
| <i>Number of cases</i> | 196 | 157 | 121 | 85 | 45 | | | |

* Source: Survey Research Center: *Attitudes toward United States-Russian Relations* (University of Michigan, Dec., 1948), pp. 5, 70.

or. Similarly, books on the state by brilliant scholars fail to talk about the same things in the same language and with the same purposes in mind. What is true of the concept "state" is true of many other concepts describing important political problems, such as "liberty," "authority," "representation," "power," "law," "public opinion," and "social welfare." We hardly need add "democracy," "fascism," and "communism." Political sects, far more than scholars, make a cult of language and tend to confuse further the language of science. In order to understand many of the best writers on these concepts, one must know all about them, their troubles, the age in which they lived, and the meanings they give to these words in relation to all the other words they use; even so, one often cannot be satisfied. A more limited approach, suited especially to the concise, objective summing up of what a large body of symbols tells about their authors, is called "content analysis."

Thus, to find a systematic political science, one must know the various systems thoroughly—there are not many, for all men are not Aristotles or Platos—and select that which provides the shortest course and the most usable body of principles; but this task is long and arduous and brings a student to middle age. One may build a "solipsistic" system of one's own, that is, a system that communicates rules and principles with meaning only to oneself, like a painting that is understood only by its creator. However, since no great science has sprung from the experience of a single man, but rather from the experiments and controlled observations of generations, the chances of such a personal science being of considerable immediate use to the man or his disciples will be small. *Scientific findings must be communicable. The language of science must be as precise, clear, and standardized as possible.*

Creative Thinking and Acting in Politics

A PRESCRIPTION FOR SOLVING POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Let us now suppose that two men, one a political scientist, the other a person active in practical politics, were to pool their intellectual and practical experience in working out a single prescription for creative thinking and action in politics. They wish to describe how a person, both enlightened and energetic, can effectively think about and deal with a real po-

litical problem. Their combined efforts would give the scientific and moral man who is pursuing a goal this prescription:

1. He must not allow his values or desires to obscure the facts.
2. He must compare his values with the values of other individuals and groups.
3. He must examine the institutions of society that affect his desires and the desires of others.
4. He must take into account the unexpected and accidental behavior of others.
5. He must devise a strategy for achieving his goals.
6. He must decide on the extent to which he must revise his goals.

DISSOCIATING FACTS AND DESIRES

Let us try to explain a little more clearly each of these six steps to competent political thinking.

Preventing one's desires from obscuring the facts is more difficult than it seems. Suppose, for example, that the city government is spending a great deal more money than it is taking in through taxation; this deficit is a fact. If the city cannot sell bonds and no one wants to decrease the spending, then it is also a fact that increased taxation is the only remedy. A citizen may not like to pay more taxes, but he can see that what he likes or does not like cannot change the necessity for them. So far so good.

But suppose the question of the tax is turned into a question of tax policy; he is called on to vote for either a sales tax on retail purchases or a progressive income-tax. The sales tax, which is paid on food, hits hardest the lower-income groups, who spend a large part of their income on food. The progressive income-tax hits hardest the upper-income groups, who pay a higher tax rate the higher their income goes. The man in question belongs to a higher-income bracket; his wishes, let us say, thus impel him to prefer the sales tax. He hears a slogan to the effect that the income-tax destroys the initiative of the "more productive elements" of society. Without bothering to weigh the evidence or look further into the matter, he uses this slogan to justify his support of the sales tax. Lacking the ability to examine his motives, he uses his own desires to pro-

duce a "mythical" state of reality. He does not investigate the real state of affairs. He is satisfied to take spurious evidence, asking of it only that it be on "his side." He rejects all facts that conflict with his desires. It is difficult for most of us to do otherwise.

RECOGNIZING DIFFERENCES

The second principle of political thinking is to compare one's own values with those of others. "One man's meat is another man's poison." The values of other people are facts like any others, although it may be difficult to discover and adjust to them. For instance, suppose a man votes Republican, his wife Democratic; each knows the other's position and avoids political argument in the home—an easy and simple adjustment to the conflict. But both believe society is divided into classes: the "upper class," to which they believe they belong, and the "lower class." Within their respective parties, they thus prefer to vote for men of high income, high education, and "good family." Since their favorite candidates are often defeated, they ascribe these defeats to a supposed political "machine" that conspires against "good" candidates. Both fail to realize that large numbers of people make no distinction between an upper and a lower class and prefer other candidates for other reasons. This inability to see that the rest of society has different values leads the couple to venture false, or at least unproven, explanations for the defeat of their men.

Another, rather complex, example was provided by Prime Minister Chamberlain of England in 1938. He valued the continuation of peace more than anything else. He believed that any concession should be made to preserve peace and that it was possible to make peace worthwhile to Hitler as well. This view turned out to be mistaken. Hitler did not desire peace so strongly; he accepted all the concessions that Chamberlain offered and demanded more. If Chamberlain had not believed that even Hitler shared his basic aversion to war, he might have foreseen more clearly the results of his policy of appeasement.

One may properly ask; of course, how much other people's values are worth in relation to one's own. By what standard shall we judge the values of others? This question is extremely controversial, and no answer can be given here, if anywhere. The standard itself is a value. He who regards other

people's needs and desires as deserving as much consideration as his own will adjust his desires to what he knows of those of others. He will decide what he would like to see happen; he will find out what the other people concerned would like to see happen; he will then compromise between his "selfish" and "altruistic" desires and thus develop a new value position.

Take for example a man who dislikes war, who refuses to take part in any military preparation and becomes a conscientious objector. He realizes that the values of nearly all other persons are opposed to his, but he believes that there is no other means of avoiding conflict. He is then like Samson, who was willing to bring the temple crashing down on himself in order to destroy the Philistines. Take another man who dislikes war, who also believes that it will not solve any problems. He believes, however, that it is up to the authorities to make such decisions; that is, he prefers to accept a group solution to any problem. He therefore accepts the duties imposed upon him by law. Each of these men knows his own values and the values of others, but each regards differently the value of compromising with the group. The man who compromises in such matters is, of course, far more common than the man who balks.

Such open conflict among one's values is common in political life. When a union member, for example, is told by his union leaders to strike and by his governmental leaders to stay on the job, he must choose between conflicting loyalties. Of course, most men decide without being aware of any problem, but correct political thinking requires that they be conscious of these conflicts.

KNOWING INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES

Getting one's values straight prepares one for the third step: to become acquainted with the institutions that affect one way or another the events important to one's desires. Let us suppose that a man is extremely interested in making as many political decisions as possible in conjunction with his neighbors. He wants a hand in deciding whether streets in his town should be curved or straight, whether the town should own or purchase electric power, whether the voting age should be eighteen or twenty-one, whether private schools should be supported by public funds or not, what tax rates should be

levied, whether the constable should be elected or appointed by the mayor, and a host of other questions that have increasingly become the concern of more remote levels of government. Such a man must fight a number of institutions that have multiplied in modern times. Federal and state constitutions have long ago laid great barriers to the realization of most of his desires. The incumbents of federal, state, and even county offices are not inclined to sympathize with his desires, and the forces of entrenched interests (a loose term for institutional barriers) are opposed to him. A number of private and public pressure groups—another kind of institution—oppose his demands because they are afraid of what he might do with his powers once he possessed them. Even the United Nations looks forward eagerly to the day when it may enforce a bill of rights for the whole world and prevent this man from discretionary acts that would violate the civil rights of his neighbors. He must take into account all these institutions and attitudes in estimating his chances of putting his “home rule” plan into effect.

Our man may be told his ideal is impracticable but that he can participate instead in choosing and controlling the authorities who govern him from afar. It is argued that in return for the surrender of his immediate controls, he can exercise indirect control. But indirect control is not what he wants. He wants to help make decisions. So long as he continues to value this power despite the march of events, he must become a pessimist. The most he can hope for is to keep the freedom of action he still possesses.

Most men, of course, adapt themselves and accept necessity. Their values change under the impact of institutions and events; their children often do not even notice that there has been a conflict of values with events and that a change has occurred. Their values are the new ones, not those of their parents. History had hardly begun when in ancient Chaldea, a legend was inscribed:

We are fallen upon evil times,
 And the world has waxed very old and wicked,
 Politics are very corrupt,
 The sons of the people are not
 So righteous as their parents were.

THE CALCULATED RISK

One must not only take into account institutional obstacles, one must allow for accidents—the result of imperfect knowledge or uncontrollable events. Imperfect knowledge often hampers the analysis of the institutional obstacles. For instance, the Russians are not very eager to tell Americans about their atomic bombs. Since the Russians' policy depends somewhat on their supply of bombs, any judgment about it becomes risky—a judgment about *probabilities*.

The uncontrollable event is typified by the weather. No political strategy can prevent storms or bring thaw. The wreck of the Spanish Armada on the English coast in 1588 made Englishmen bless the stormy Channel weather for many a year. The first winter offensive of the Germans against Moscow in 1940 literally froze in its tracks in the worst winter in many years. Crop failures have dashed the calculated expectations of many politicians, brought on terrible pogroms against minority groups, and sent tribes on the warpath. Some of the political process, we may conclude, is placed irrevocably in the hands of fortune. The ability of individuals to guide it is limited.

Some social scientists believe, with reason, that over the centuries these accidents are erased by the movements of general social forces, and they may well be right. But the individual political thinker or actor can be sure that his lifetime will see many of them and that they will inevitably alter his calculations.

In providing for these accidents, men must take what we call a calculated risk. Thus Mussolini took a calculated risk when he decided that if he invaded Ethiopia the League of Nations would *probably* not bring completely effective sanctions to bear against him. Hitler thought that England and France would *probably* not aid Poland if he attacked her in 1939. Churchill thought the Germans *probably* would not invade England in late 1940 and therefore sent more troops and arms to the North African theater. Roosevelt thought Hitler would *probably* not declare war if the United States provided England with a number of destroyers. Often, of course, such decisions prove to be mistakes. The North Koreans did not estimate that the United States would use mili-

tary intervention to prevent their conquest of South Korea in 1950.

There are only two ways to cope with the double threat in the calculated risk; reduce the area of ignorance by constant scientific inquiry and prepare a detour for the unforeseen. An example of the prepared detour is the Vice-President of the United States, whose principal function is to replace the President if the President dies. Both ignorance and accident have been provided for in an American foreign policy that builds bigger atomic bombs while working for a stronger world government.

DEVISING POLITICAL STRATEGY

Having done what he can to analyze the present and foresee the future, the political thinker must lay his special strategy for reaching his goal. For this he must be familiar with the techniques of politics. He must be a practical man, not a dreamer. He cannot win with words alone, though he must use propaganda. He cannot win with amiable companions who have no political skills. He must realize that ends are not achieved without proper means. He must also realize that many ends are so utopian and remote that they cannot be reached; one cannot have Heaven on earth. One of the great contributions that a close study of politics brings to its disciples is the realization of the absolute necessity for proper means—proper skills, organization, and hard work.

CONTINUAL REVISIONS OF GOALS

In fact, to come to our last rule for competent political thinking, the very heart of politics seems to lie in this problem of selecting practicable goals and in modifying them as necessary from day to day. For the political artist is only one among a host of others, all with their own goals, and the game becomes one of pushing a bit here, giving a bit there, trading an advance in one direction for a retreat in another direction, often standing stock still and perhaps wondering whether progress will ever be resumed.

One may wonder whether any sensitive person can survive these six steps, whether a cynical mind, a strong back, and an iron stomach are not really the requirements for success. We can only answer that the political man must not only have clear goals, but he must want to reach them. He must prefer

fighting for them to forgetting about them. He must prefer struggle to a detached contemplation of events. He must prefer justice, even if getting it brings indigestion.

Fortunately, also, one man need not perform all the difficult tasks just described. The division of labor operates in politics as elsewhere. There are specialists in thinking, in organizing, in planning, in speaking, in writing, in legislating, and in many other things. They join together in the political process. Success often falls to the movement that forms the best combination of ideas and action. When we have given sufficient attention to the various operations of the political process, we will return, in the last two chapters, to a discussion of the goals of democracy and the various plans for their achievement.

Chapter 3

Leaders and Followers

NO HARD AND FAST DISTINCTIONS separate political behavior, studied in this volume, from governmental organization, studied in the volume to follow. Generally speaking, however, political behavior consists of (1) a particular *area* of political activity and (2) *kinds* of political actions that are *common* to all politics.

Political behavior is an area of political activity—the activity that occurs outside the formal and legal organizations of government. The chapters of this volume discuss a progression of concerns: first comes the political activity of large and vague groupings like the community and public; then comes that of tighter groups—the electorate, election constituencies, political parties, pressure groups, and conflict groups. Political behavior in this sense is the behavior of individuals and groups outside the government who are striving to influence or take possession of the government. The volume ends as we reach the special organized activities of the state, as exemplified by legislative and administrative institutions.

Political behavior is political activity common to all politics. Certain principles of political science apply both to political behavior and governmental organizations. We find, for instance, that lawyers, soldiers, and professors maintain characteristic habits both in the contest for power and later in the offices of government; or that a person's attitudes will remain in many respects the same be he a voter or a congressman; or that leadership in the Department of Agriculture has a number of qualities in common with leadership in a club or political party. Principles such as these, which are common to politics as a whole, are traditionally and conveniently treated as part of the study of political behavior.

Leadership is a fitting topic with which to begin the study of political behavior. It is a relationship that pervades every association among men. Even Robinson Crusoe became a leader when he took into his life his good man Friday. In the most simple associations and in the most complex ones, leaders exert some directing influence, the nature and extent of

which must be known if we are to understand how men get along together. To explain why people choose or follow one kind of behavior rather than another—why they go to war or remain at peace, vote Democratic or Republican, or do a job poorly or well—introduces a search for guiding influences. The study of leadership is therefore most important to political science.

A political leader may be identified as any occupant of an established political position or as any person, in or out of such a position, whose political activity has more influence upon a group's behavior than has the activity of the average member.

How are leaders created? In studying this problem, the political scientist must ask a series of further questions. Are leaders heroes of exceptional powers or pawns of social forces? Have they physical or mental traits in common? Do they develop like abilities through their experience in such typical political activities as organizing, bargaining, or fighting? Does membership in certain social classes increase or decrease a man's chances of becoming a leader? Is it the nature of all great organizations to be led by an active group that tends to monopolize leadership?

In raising these questions we must remember that there are many roles for leaders to play—leaders may be party organizers, legislators, judges, executives, diplomats, or soldiers—and we must ask how leadership is molded by the functional demands of each situation. Finally, in order to explain the inadequacies of our answers to all of the foregoing questions, we advance the theory that leadership cannot be fully understood before we examine the reciprocal relationships between the leader and his followers and the relationships of his group with the other groups that operate in the same environment and context.

The discussion of these successive questions provides the structure of this chapter. Taken together, the various answers, in so far as there are any, help one to understand leadership both as an isolated concept and as an integral part of political behavior and political organizations.

The Leader: Hero or Pawn?

THE "GREAT MAN" THEORY OF HISTORY

Two famous writers have presented us with opposite theories about the influence of leaders. Thomas Carlyle wrote most

passionately: "Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here." Heroes teach us right and wrong, he said; heroes give us great inventions and discoveries. It is the great few who transform society; the multitude follows them. Modern democracy, he believed, has produced millions of fools who vote, other men who go to Parliament and palaver, and, inevitably, the few who act.

TOLSTOI'S INFINITESIMAL ELEMENTS

By contrast, Count Leo Tolstoi asserted that there is no greater fool than he who thinks he makes history and believes others when they assure him he does. Not even a leader like Napoleon Bonaparte, according to Tolstoi, has any part in determining the course of history. Napoleon was the tool of vast social forces beyond his control. "Studying the laws of history," Tolstoi declared, "we must absolutely change the objects of our observation, leaving kings, ministers, and generals out of the account, and select for study the homogenous, infinitesimal elements that regulate the masses."

Both Carlyle and Tolstoi are representative of long rosters of illustrious writers. Those who share Carlyle's view of the role played by men of genius tend also to be aristocratic in political viewpoint. Among the most enthusiastic have been men who believed that they themselves were to be among the great of history and that their indomitable wills could overcome all obstacles—Hitler and Mussolini, for example.

By contrast, those who have agreed with Tolstoi have often been socialists. For socialism, as Marx taught it, was a triumph of the masses over the few, and of irresistible historical tendencies over individual effort—socialism being the irresistible tendency of the modern age. Tolstoi's less specific determinism has also received support from most social and natural scientists, who have hoped that by applying the theory of determinism to all events they may explain history far better than can the biographers of greatness.

LEADERS ARE BOTH UNIQUE AND TYPICAL

Like many other puzzling problems in political science, the conflict between these rival theories dwindles in importance if we ask an appropriate methodological question: Why are we interested in the argument? What do we want to know? First, we want to discover the consequences of the acts of

particular men; second, we want to explain the interaction of social forces—economic wants, nationalism, religious beliefs, and so on. If we are to understand the first problem, the peculiar combination of qualities that particular men undeniably possess become objects of serious attention. Men are the actors of politics; some men are more active than others; and the shape and direction of their activities earn them leadership, great or minor. If we are interested in the second problem, the interaction of social forces, the leaders become nameless carriers of influence, instruments of the environment, helpless products of their times. We then select abstractions such as the idea of freedom, or social movements such as the industrial revolution, or indeed any social force in which we are interested, and assess its contribution to the power of the leader. We see the leader as *caused*, like all things. He becomes an instrument.

Both kinds of information are valuable. Let us take the study of Napoleon as an example. Clearly he was the product of forces outside his own will. He owed his being to his parents, and was conditioned by his family life. He was, we are told, deeply influenced by his inferiority to the upper-class group at his military school. He was certainly deeply affected by the French Revolution. At the same time, *only* he had his *particular* parents, was born at that *certain* time, had that *peculiar* relationship to his fellow students at military school, and had many other *distinct* experiences *all to himself*.

It would seem, then, that Napoleon—a unique character—encountered various deterministic social forces throughout his life. Thus one may study him, like any other event, in his uniqueness, or, also like any other event, as a statistic. But one cannot say that *only his uniqueness* or *only social forces at work upon him* are of importance. We must understand both in order to understand Napoleon.

GREAT AND MINOR LEADERS CAN BE STUDIED TOGETHER

What is true of the “great” leaders is true of the minor. No grand principle distinguishes one from the other in political science. A psychological “halo”—to be treated later—surrounds the “great” leader and seems to distinguish him from others. But there is no more reason for thinking a different principle is at work than for thinking that the sound that bursts an eardrum is different in kind from the sound that

brings pleasing harmonies to the ear or even from the sound that is not heard at all.

The Psychology of Leadership

TRAITS OF LEADERS

A common method of investigating the "principles" that explain leadership has been to seek among leaders of all kinds some uniform traits that distinguish them from their followers. Are leaders taller than the average, heavier, more intelligent, more studious, more loyal, more dependable, or more active? We may present an interesting example of a study that seeks to find traits distinguishing leaders from followers.

In 1950, Dr. John B. McConaughy reported a study of eighteen members of the South Carolina General Assembly. The politicians took standard tests that had been used throughout the country. The results, writes Professor McConaughy, indicate that the political leaders were decidedly less neurotic than the general male population; that they were more self-sufficient; that they were decidedly more extroverted; but that they were only slightly more dominant. Furthermore, "they are, to a large degree, more self-confident than the average person and have fewer feelings of inferiority; and . . . they are less irritable and tense than the average person." Finally, they appeared not to have "fascist ideas" and to be not much more conservative than the average South Carolinian. Many more studies of this character must be made, however, before one is entitled to generalize about politicians as a group. And, since there are many differences in the degree of power possessed among politicians, it is possible that this group typifies the "subelite," rather than the most dominant group within the community, state, or nation.

Less definite conclusions were reached by Dr. Ralph M. Stogdill, who surveyed 124 studies of leadership and found only a small amount of agreement concerning the traits of most leaders. He reports that over fifteen studies provided evidence that leaders were more intelligent than the average of their group, more studious, more dependable, more active and sociable and from a higher social and economic class. Ten or more of the studies indicated that leaders had unusual persistence and initiative, knew how to get things done, were co-operative, and possessed self-confidence, insight, popular-

ity, adaptability, and verbal facility. There seemed to be vague indications in a number of studies that leaders topped their group average in such characteristics as age, height, weight, physique, appearance, and dominance. But the outstanding fact, as Dr. Stogdill discovered, is quite plain: It is at present impossible to say that any single trait distinguishes most leaders from followers in *all* groups taken together. Political situations vary so greatly that they require very different types of leaders at different times and places.

MOTIVATION OF LEADERS

Dissatisfied with the search for isolated *traits* that distinguish leaders, some modern political psychologists have suggested that we must study in greater depth the psychological motivation of leaders in order to explain how they developed. For instance, Napoleon was short; perhaps he compensated by furious energy for what is commonly considered a defect in would-be leaders.

One of the most outstanding of these political psychologists, Harold D. Lasswell, suggests that the most dynamic type of political leader compensates for personal inadequacies. If an individual feels deprived, consciously or not, of characteristics or possessions that he is trained by his environment to regard as valuable—good looks, family affection, money, social respect, a certain upper-class occupation, an education—his feelings of deprivation create a high tension that seeks outlets. There are many outlets, but those men destined to become politically active choose power or prestige as a compensation. Since power has always to be justified in terms of the public good, they repress their private motives and acquire a set of beliefs truly political—a notion of the “public interest.” They may or may not in fact serve the public interest in the light of history, but the spark to their interest in public activity comes from tensions originally private. Of course, the intense motivation of such a man only partly explains his power; he must also acquire political skills—military, organizational or demagogic.

This type of exceptionally forceful leader, however, includes only a fraction of all those who satisfy our definition of a leader. Many political leaders “fall” into office; they may be born to it; they may get office with little effort because of family connections. Others may serve in high political posts simply because of technical skills; such, for instance, are

many army leaders, undersecretaries and bureau chiefs of government departments. These men may have special characteristics typical of those who do their kind of work, but they would not be men of "pure power" such as we have just described. Most political leaders are subject to a variety of motives; they may wish to earn money, acquire leisure, help their careers, defeat personal enemies, and so on. Taking all political leaders into consideration, those who are compensating for intense feelings of deprivation are an important but unknown fraction of the total number.

CHARISMATIC LEADERS

This man of "pure power" is one of the types that sometimes provides us with a special kind of political leader, the charismatic leader, who gains dictatorial powers during periods of widespread social distress. He seeks to incite as large a mass of people as possible. Unstable times, the twentieth century, for instance, provide him an immense audience that, to another age or land, seems unbelievably suggestible and stupid.

Max Weber first defined the nature of charisma. Charisma is the quality that enables one man, without measurable traits far exceeding those of his followers, without coming from any ruling group or holding any office, to exercise surpassing magnetism and to gather a tremendous following. Charisma is "nonrational," nontraditional, and nonbureaucratic.

It is a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader. . . .

Pure charisma is specifically foreign to economic considerations. Whenever it appears, it constitutes a "call" in the most emphatic sense of the word, a "mission" of a "spiritual duty."¹

¹ Quoted, with permission, from Max Weber: *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 358-59, 362.

Charismatic leadership, evidenced in a man originally by some remarkable or "miraculous" accomplishments, can be maintained only by the continuous demonstration of those abilities—prophecy, heroism, striking successes—or by a "routinizing of charisma." Charisma becomes institutionalized or routinized when the initial contempt of a charismatic leader and his followers for organization, positions, money, and laws diminishes in fact, if not in theory, and regularized ways of achieving the sinews of permanence, such as bureaucracies and taxation, are established.

Inasmuch as a charismatic leader challenges the existing political leadership, the offices of the state, and many of the existing laws, he cannot be expected to gain support from the *status quo* for his mission, be he conservative or radical in relation to the ideas of the existing political leaders. He therefore prospers on mass support and only belatedly receives adherents from among the established leaders. Such was the experience of men like the Gracchi of ancient Rome, Cola de Rienzi of medieval Rome, Savonarola of Renaissance Florence, St. Francis, Cromwell of the English Commonwealth, Robespierre of Revolutionary France, Napoleon I, Mussolini of Fascist Italy, Gandhi of India, and Hitler of Nazi Germany.

DANGERS OF OVEREXTENDING THE ANALYSIS OF CHARISMA

Caution is necessary, for charisma may be used to explain too much. Max Weber was careful to state that charisma is often mixed with the traditional kinds of authority, and that charismatic leaders, for all their contempt of rules and regulations, frequently utilized existing channels of ascent. Despite his messianic pretensions, for example, Hitler revered "legality" and sought to cloak many of his most radical acts in the garments of pre-existing law and political order. Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of India after Gandhi, is, by his own words, of uncertain character; though at one moment rational, skeptical, and impatient of the adulation he receives as a "miracle man," he is at another swept into telling himself: "I drew these tides of men into my hands and wrote my will across the sky in stars."

Furthermore, essentially noncharismatic offices may acquire charismatic occupants. For example, thousands of Americans stood in the rain to pay their last respects to the cor-

tege of Abraham Lincoln. Obviously, the meaning of Lincoln to his followers transcended the meaning of his office. He was much more than the President.

Besides, purely charismatic leaders cannot arise anywhere at any time. Charisma, which convinces followers of the leader's miraculous gifts, depends on the followers' receptivity. The mission of the leader must have psychological meaning to the follower. The French Revolution had to precede Napoleon, the Versailles Treaty and the depression, Hitler. Sebastian de Grazia has gathered a variety of evidence on the permanent, lurking, immanent, and transcendent character of charisma in his book on the *Political Community*. Both in tranquility and crisis, he writes, religious and political rulers fulfill a role identical in significant respects with that of the parents and attendants of infancy and childhood. In crisis we find exclamations such as the following about Hitler from the pen of Peter Drucker:

It was not Hitler who made himself a demi-god; it was the masses who pushed him on this pedestal. For only a demon, a superman and magician who can never err and who is always right can resolve the contradiction between the need for a miracle and the impossibility of producing one. Only unquestioning belief in the Führer can give the security of conviction which the masses crave in order to be spared from despair. . . . Hitler must be right because otherwise nothing is.²

According to De Grazia, charisma is more often present in subdued form. The death of a ruler may reveal that he had charisma for many of his subjects. Thus when George V of England died, a psychoanalyst, Dr. W. R. D. Fairbairn, reported that one patient dreamed that he had shot a man resembling his father, another was exceedingly depressed by memories of his father's death, and a third dreamed that her own father was dead. All three showed aggravated nervous symptoms. Even for the week of crisis before the abdication of Edward VIII in 1936, Professor De Grazia reports signs of public turmoil. "An increase in absenteeism and a spectacu-

² Quoted, with permission, from Peter Drucker: "The End of Economic Man," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. CLXXVIII (1939), p. 562.

lar fall in trade were apparent. People seemed to have left off buying, going to the theaters, or attending meetings."

De Grazia has also made a study of how thirty patients under psychoanalysis behaved when Franklin D. Roosevelt died in 1945. The findings are not surprising to those who recall the event, but they are rendered impressive by the objective nature of the materials.

All persons expressed great initial incredulity that the event had actually occurred and some related the unusual measures they had taken to verify the news. Once belief was defined, all persons felt for a time that "the world" had changed. Absence of direction in the environment was a dominant fear. "What will we do?" Another remark was, "What is there to live for now?" Or, "Now we're all alone." The environment was pictured as potentially hostile. "Who will save us now?" Or, "Who's going to save the world? Everything's stopped."

All persons reported abdominally-located sensations and most of them had gastric disturbances. At the news, they said, their stomach knotted or tensed, or their stomach seemed to drop, or they had a sinking feeling. The gastric disturbances were mainly of a diarrhoetic character.³

Indeed, leadership in the larger political community seems to have a simmering charisma about it at all times. Rulers, no matter how they have acquired their positions, are expected to produce results in excess of those expected of normal men. On occasion, grave crises produce leaders whose primary rather than secondary character is charismatic. They stand or fall by their performance unless, before their skill or luck runs out, they are able to routinize or consolidate their positions.

The General Skills of Political Leaders

SKILL IN USING THE INSTRUMENTS OF AUTHORITY

The statement of what we know about the traits of leaders, the psychological development of leaders, and the special case

³ Quoted, with permission, from Sebastian de Grazia: "A Note on the Psychological Position of the Chief Executive," *Psychiatry*, Vol. VIII (1945), p. 268.

of the *charismatic leaders* (a small minority of all leaders), gives us some idea of the general psychology of leadership. We may now inquire whether there are certain persistent political activities that demand certain leadership skills.

We have said that the instruments of authority are education and propaganda, force and violence, and economic measures and economic manipulation, depending upon whether or not acts are considered legitimate. Political leadership (whatever may be true of other kinds of leadership) in part depends upon skill in working with these instruments of authority. Priests, teachers, lawyers, orators, writers, and journalists; policemen and soldiers; the organizers, the managers, the "bosses," and the mechanical and human engineers; these are the people that become political leaders.

OCCUPATIONS OF POLITICIANS

Different cultural and political patterns tend to produce different kinds of leaders. In the United States the military man must "civilianize" himself before he can acquire political power in local or national politics, whereas in Nicaragua or China, for instance, he can move directly from the army into politics. The largest number of American politicians are lawyers. A study of twelve American state senates and thirteen lower chambers from 1925 to 1935 showed that 28 per cent of all members were lawyers. Another count in 1937, this time of all state legislatures, revealed eighteen hundred lawyers in the total of seventy-five hundred legislators. A study of five successive national congresses found the percentage of lawyers in the Senate to vary between 61 and 76 and in the House to vary between 56 and 65. No other occupation, save, in the more rural states, that of farming, competes seriously with the law. The inference we may draw is that American political conditions favor lawyers as politicians, and that the particular political requirements with which lawyers are equipped are the ability to bargain among diverse groups and interests, the freedom to engage in politics while earning money at the law, skill in handling people, and facility in dealing with the legal procedures so prominent in the American apparatus of government.

Yet in early colonial times, in Massachusetts and nearby places, theological status gave political preference. Religious leaders like John Winthrop, John Cotton, and Roger Wil-

liams were politicians. In certain Southern colonies, on the other hand, the owners of large plantations were active in politics. Nor ought we to forget that the American Revolution was led in good part by businessmen and merchants. Even today a background as businessman or military leader may help a particular candidate.

Furthermore, European political leaders are not preponderantly lawyers. Down to 1945, England produced a leadership of birth and wealth. Of 306 cabinet ministers from 1801 to 1924, 213 lived off accumulated wealth and only 93 had to earn their own living; since 1945 a high proportion of British leaders have depended upon financial support and jobs supplied by trades unions. French and Italian legislatures have possessed more teachers and intellectuals than other national legislatures; the Third French Republic was sometimes referred to as the "Government of Professors." The German Reichstag before Hitler had some lawyers and a noticeable number of representatives of special economic interests such as trades unions and landholders, together with a considerable number of professional civil servants. In the Soviet Union, an increasing number of Communist party leaders have come from the managerial group—those who control and operate the state-owned factories, farms, and transportation system. The bona fide factory worker is becoming a scarce person in official circles. In India intellectuals and businessmen, most of them from high castes, rule the masses, whereas in Japan's postwar House of Representatives, business owners and executives are prominent, and bureaucrats, educators, and farmers fall considerably behind. Militarists have abounded in Chinese politics of the last century, but early modern China saw the domination of politics by *literati*, a group of scholarly civil servants. On the whole, only American legislatures may be said to be lawyer-dominated. Other legislatures have had more representatives from a larger number of occupations.

IMPORTANT POLITICAL SKILLS

This information about the background and training of political leaders suggests that certain skills give their possessors perennial or recurrent advantages in the struggle for political power. Ceremonial and rhetorical skills, soldierliness, and organizing ability have always characterized the office

holders and office seekers of societies everywhere. Furthermore, particular environments seem each to favor particular skills. Pareto called Prussia of a half century ago the habitat of the lions, Paris of the foxes. Prussians were prone to gain political advantage by force, the French elite by guile.

Revolutions accelerate changes in the skills demanded of politicians, but they do not transform them. The Nazis weakened the grip of the bureaucrats and *Junkers*, but did not destroy them; indeed, they worked out an uneasy co-operation with them. In America, the New Deal replaced conservative lawyers with liberal ones. Fascism, although claiming to destroy political bargains and "deals," replaced the politicians of democratic Italy with the untitled "fixers" of despotic Italy. The Italian political milieu had not changed overnight because of the Fascist revolution.

Although different cultures tend to favor different skills, no one of the general political skills is ever quite absent. The modern state, especially, is based on a complex division of labor, in government as elsewhere. Military skills, for instance, have always had a place in politics, though the success of military men in making the *most important* decisions may go up and down sharply. Similarly, educators and journalists succeed in maintaining, even in the most anti-intellectual of political environments, a share of political power disproportionate to their numbers in the population as a whole. Whatever the form of society or its temporary condition, someone must educate and justify it, administer it, and fight for it. To the specialists in these tasks goes some return in the way of power.

Social Class and Political Mobility

SOCIAL CLASS AND POLITICAL SKILL

In addition to possessing useful political skills the successful leader often belongs to the proper social class. In all societies of which we have knowledge, at least a slight boost on the ladder to political leadership comes from belonging to that group in the society that is held in highest respect. Very often there is a close connection between the possession of, or the right to learn, political skills and membership in the group of highest respect. Thus in the England of the last century, top administrative posts—that is, the offices that de-

manded skill in handling men and procedures in the systematic execution of legislative policy—were occupied by members of the more fortunate social classes. A study by Harold Laski showed that the British foreign office was staffed in its higher posts almost exclusively by men of high birth and expensive education.

On the other hand—and this example shows why skill may be analyzed separately from class—the administrators of the *ancien régime* in France before the French Revolution were not members of the aristocracy. In fact, their skills, by helping to make the aristocracy useless, contributed to the revolutionary abolition of aristocratic privilege.

SOCIAL CLASS DEFINED

A social class is a group of persons with similar chances in life of gaining recognized goals—education, property, honors, leisure, and political office. An upper class person is one who belongs to a social group highly privileged in its chances. Societies range from rigid caste societies—where all the scarce and desirable values obtainable on earth are rationed at birth to the persons of different classes and cannot be much modified in the struggles of life—to the almost classless society in which men move readily up and down in the class scale according to their abilities and the accidents of life.

CASTE SYSTEMS

The contrast between a caste society and a relatively classless society is very striking and of course produces two contrasting kinds of politics. One caste society about which we know a fair amount is that of India. There, in the census of 1901, twenty-three hundred castes and subcastes were reported, and no Indian was entirely outside the system. Each caste was an exclusive and hereditary group with its own governing organization. Its members generally pursued a common occupation, celebrated their own festivals, and disciplined offending members through the caste council. Members of one caste could not marry into another caste, eat food prepared by a lower caste, or dine with anyone but their caste fellows. The whole caste system was supported by Hinduism, and caste obligations were decided by the Hindu priests—the Brahmin caste. The leaders of the caste system

were hereditary: the princely castes, the Brahmin caste, and the conciliar leaders within each caste. However, the present rulers of India dislike the caste system, and it is crumbling perceptibly.

Twentieth-century American society is, in many respects, the extreme opposite of the Indian caste society. Yet even in America one tenth of the people is divided from the other nine tenths by racial barriers that are, in fact, caste lines, even though lacking the religious and legal sanctions so prominent in the Indian caste system. In practice, the essentials of a caste system—bars against intermarriage and social intercourse—operate to segregate whites and Negroes. Whatever the legal theory, the Negro is effectively restrained from political leadership over whites in most parts of the country, though there are numerous exceptions.

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Nevertheless, with the striking and important exception of the Negro-white caste system, the significance of social class as a factor in political leadership in America is slight. In this respect, America is much like most countries of Europe today, although before the two world wars it could be said that the United States was much closer to a classless society than were the countries of Europe. The present similarity of America and Europe in this respect is due both to a certain increase of class stratification in the United States and to a decline of such stratification in Europe as a result of wars, reforms, and violent economic fluctuations.

What categories of life chances can we find in America today that indicate the existence here of social classes? And if we find such categories, how do they affect an individual's chances of becoming a political leader—ignoring for the moment the effect of individual traits, skills, and other factors upon the chances of attaining political leadership?

Two of the most important attempts to ascertain whether and to what extent social classes exist in America are found in the work of the social anthropologist Lloyd Warner, and in that of the social psychologist Richard Centers. Dr. Warner, after making a number of intensive studies of small Eastern and Midwestern cities, came to the conclusion that six "social classes" could be said to exist in America: the upper-upper, lower-upper, upper-middle, lower-middle, upper-

lower, and lower-lower. By ascertaining the kind of occupation pursued by a person, the source of a person's income, the type of house inhabited by the person, and the kind of neighborhood in which his dwelling was situated, one could assign to the person a composite index that would place him in one of the six classes. The observer could then make certain predictions about the probable behavior of such a person on the basis of the known behavior of persons on the same level or on different class levels.

According to Dr. Warner and his associates, the composite index of status characteristics just described tells in most cases what groups of people a person associates with, what general possibilities such a person has of obtaining wealth, excellent marriage arrangements, and social honors, and—most important for us—the Warner studies confirm the fact that political influence does not always depend upon office. In America, as in western European civilizations, it is often divorced from office. Those who actually hold political office may have economic and social characteristics quite different from the people who have the most political influence. There exists in a certain sense a “behind the scenes” government that is closer to “class” government than a study confined to the characteristics of the elected and appointive office holders would give one to believe. For example, John Gunther in his book *Inside U.S.A.* concluded that the United States is essentially “run by the propertied class.”

Richard Centers, in his study *The Psychology of Social Classes*, pursued the search for classes in American life by means of opinion polls. He found that when a representative sample of the American population were asked to identify themselves as upper, middle, working, or lower class, the results were: 3 per cent, upper; 43 per cent, middle; 51 per cent, working; 1 per cent, lower; and 1 per cent, “don't know”; 1 per cent did not believe in classes. When asked what was most important in determining the class to which a person belongs, these people answered: 47.4 per cent, the person's beliefs and attitudes; 29.4 per cent, the person's education; 20.1 per cent, the person's family; 17.1 per cent, the person's money; 5.6 per cent, other reasons; and 9.1 per cent, “don't know.” Dr. Centers believes that this last tabulation, showing that “beliefs and attitudes” ranked highest in determining why people assigned a person to a particular class, is

significant as showing class *consciousness* to be the most important unifying element of a class.

What do studies of the kind just cited reveal about an individual's chances of becoming a political leader? They show that many Americans have a vague belief that social and economic classes exist. They show that a person of wealth, skilled occupation, good home, and respected family can ordinarily exercise more political influence, if he wishes to, than can persons of lower standing. But more than this can hardly be concluded from the existing studies of class in America. The American population is still very mobile, socially and physically. Men move up and down the social, economic, and political ladder with bewildering and sometimes distressing rapidity. They move in space, from city to city and state to state, more than the men of any other society in history. This rapid turnover in life-chances or class-chances means that "class" in the United States tends to change in each generation, that is, it tends to become what has usually been termed "freedom of opportunity." Up to the present time at least, the road to political leadership has been more dependent upon individual opportunities or chances for political mobility than upon fixed, graded, and handicapped starting positions.

INFLUENCES UPON POLITICAL MOBILITY

One need only compare the powerful influences working for political mobility in the United States with the feeble influences working toward class stability to see why it is that the American political scene as a whole, despite little islands of class dominance, gives a profound impression of classlessness. Intermarriage, for instance, between men and women of different social and economic groups, a frequent event in America, extends the chances for general and political success to a new group of relatives. Successful politicians may marry into wealthy families and acquire new political resources. Historians often emphasize how Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, of fairly humble origins, married off his relatives into the royal families of Europe; but they find nothing remarkable in such behavior in America where it occurs so frequently.

The financial power that brings political influence, and *vice versa*, the business opportunities that open up for those who

have political training or power, also create political and social mobility. Poor but bright lawyers move from government employment into the employ of wealthy corporations. Privately accumulated wealth helps win political influence through campaign contributions, contracts, and the purchase of the private-time services of politicians. Political leaders of immigrant groups move through politics into contracting, thence to real estate, thence to community activities such as the Community Chest drive. Sometimes this change occurs in one generation, sometimes in two or more.

The growth of new functions in government increases political mobility by raising clerks to prominence in political policy-making. Poorly paid bookkeepers in government offices rose to executive positions when the federal government moved into the field of social security insurance. Shifts in economic chances give a lift to many more people. Land on the frontier doubles and trebles in value as the country fills up. Fortunes and political power go to the first landholders, provided that they cling to their possessions—such opportunities present themselves in places as widely separated as Manhattan Island and California. As the financial and banking systems come to be regulated and dominated by the government, administrative officers shift readily from positions of power to positions of wealth and *vice versa*.

The rise of new types of organizations produces new types of political leaders. When John Gunther came to name sixty-four men "who run America," he named labor leaders among them, remarking that their emergence was a recent phenomenon in American politics. Whereas, for example, the automobile workers were scarcely organized twenty years ago, today they are tightly organized, and the President of the United Automobile Workers, Walter Reuther, is a powerful political leader. Another new kind of political leader in twentieth-century America has been created by the voluntary association for lobbying and agitating—for example, the trade associations and the reform groups such as the League of Women Voters. Because the membership is voluntary and usually not very active, the executive secretaries of such associations have come to wield a good deal of influence in politics.

Certain genetic considerations also operate constantly to increase mobility. The families whose indices fall into Dr.

Warner's upper and middle classes have fewer children than those with lower class indices. Thus, especially in periods when the number of political positions is increasing, politics, no matter how strong the class system, must draw a large proportion of its leaders from the lower social and economic levels.

Finally, the easy availability of educational opportunities, which makes parental sacrifice for the young remunerative within one generation, is a great influence. It is not too difficult to help one's sons to obtain a legal education, for example. Of the vast number of lawyers in American legislatures and politics generally, a considerable number are using politics to make connections with clients-to-be, to enhance their prestige—in short, to attain success more quickly than they could in private legal practice. An American farm boy faces a social and political structure offering him chances for a wide variety of adult careers. Social mobility is so great that an individual can rise as far in one generation as a European family traditionally could in several. America's constitutions, laws, education, and ideology tend to speed the individual upward. He has chances for education in state universities, chances to move freely in space, and chances to enter politics. That the vast majority of men do not follow these routes is due to choice and circumstances. A horny-handed farmer or mechanic in his forties, it is true, is an implausible prospect for political leadership in competition with others who have specialized in acquiring political skills; but by his time of life it is unlikely that he would wish to compete. The fact that most men count themselves out of the race does not mean that the race is not open to most. It would be useless to define "class influence" as any and every influence and habit in a man's life that inclines him *not* to seek advancement in money, skill, respect, and political power, or that prevents him from attaining such things.

The conclusion one reaches, after surveying both the influences making for class stratification of chances and the influences making for classlessness, or social and political mobility, is that the groupings of Americans according to occupation, income, education, kind of house, and respectability are mainly "statistical" categories rather than social entities; that is they are categories of *individuals*, who occupy *acquired, tenuous* ratings on scales of occupation, wealth,

housing, education, and respect. When we move into the study of men who are active in politics we find even less indication that the present position or office of a politician could have been predicted on the basis of the life-chances foreseen for him at birth.

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN EUROPE

To a lesser extent this same mobility exists in twentieth-century Europe. There, of course, limited resources, a more inflexible tradition, and remnants of aristocracy slow down social and political circulation, so that a man's political behavior and political prospects can be predicted to a considerable extent once his family history is known. But wars, revolutions, economic changes, and political reforms (such as the extension of the vote to the whole people) have profoundly modified the class character of politics, changing "class" from its ancient meaning of "those who possess special birthrights" to something more like "a convenient statistical category for classifying the population."

A number of writers, including Roberto Michels, T. S. Eliot, and Ortega y Gasset, have challenged the belief that increasingly rapid class mobility improves the quality of leadership. They assert that self-made men are likely to be poor rulers. Michels declares, for example, that the new men of power lack the respect for culture, the humaneness, and the relaxed sense of security that are possessed by men who achieve power without undergoing dehumanizing tensions and conflict. We should bear these criticisms in mind when evaluating the consequences of rapid political mobility as against a slowly changing ruling class.

THE POLITISTS

As we have learned from the foregoing discussion, a man's social class may not be the most important influence upon his chances of attaining political leadership. Nevertheless, with or without a strong system, there is to be found in every community, large or small, and in every organization, large or small (save the most minute), a group of individuals, however selected, who constitute the active political element. This element, constituting always a small fraction of the total community or organization, has been called by some writers the "elite," by others the "oligarchy," by some "the ruling

class," and by others, especially in America, the "active citizenry." We shall call this group the politists, that is, those who differ from the rest of the population in that they are particularly occupied with the political process—with varying success, out of varying motives, and in different ways.⁴

If rank and privilege are strongly entrenched in a society, such influence will, of course, be manifest in the character of the politists. In England, until very recently, the aristocracy and upper middle class of company owners and merchants were the most powerful group among the politists. In Germany, even after the Empire was replaced by a republic following World War I, the Prussian junkers and the high career officers of the bureaucracy were among the most influential policy makers. In America, certain genuine class influences can aid political careers in a few places—certain districts, for example, in New York, Maryland, Virginia, or Massachusetts, where old, wealthy families maintain their political activity. But with or without such class influences, a group composed of politically active persons may be said to exist everywhere.

THE "IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY"

Just as the politists are not to be confused with a ruling social class, so they are not to be confused with an oligarchy, with rule by the few. The politists *may be* a certain social class, or they *may be* an oligarchy, but this is not necessarily so. Perhaps the best description of how the politists can evolve into an oligarchy in most large groups, no matter how classless in theory and origins, is that presented by Roberto Michels in his book *Political Parties*. From the study of a wide variety of European political parties he concludes that in all organizations, no matter how democratically conceived

⁴ The term "politist" has been used but rarely. It means one versed in polity, one who is particularly occupied with the affairs of the political community. This writer introduces the term of necessity, to fill a gap in the terminology of political science. Pareto, for example, would have avoided many difficulties if he had constructed a second term to avoid using "elite" ambiguously as (1) those with the highest index of any given trait, (2) those psychologically and socially fitted to govern a society. Dr. Gabriel Almond and Dr. Paul Lazarsfeld have been experimenting with the utility of the concept "opinion leader," which certainly would be included in the term "politist."

and organized, there arises a trend towards actual domination and rule by a few. He writes: "The appearance of oligarchical phenomena in the very bosom of revolutionary parties (workers, socialists, social democrats, communists) is a conclusive proof of the existence of immanent oligarchical tendencies in every kind of human organization which strives for the attainment of definite ends." Case after case shows how organizational leadership develops out of the complexity of work, how leaders become specialized and managerial, how well-trained leaders, recruited from intellectuals as well as from workers, take over union leadership, party administration, the party news organs, and the party's representation in parliament. Leadership becomes technical and indispensable. It is reinforced by routine, extended experience, acquisition of parliamentary skills, and the renown that accrues to actual leaders.

Sidney and Beatrice Webb pointed out the same tendency toward professional leadership in the history of British trades unions in the nineteenth century, but they furnished a somewhat different interpretation. British trades unions started as direct democracies, using the town-meeting form of government and emphasizing direct participation of all members in all union matters. Tardily and incompletely, the workers adopted representative institutions.

The workman has been slow to recognize the special function of the representative in a democracy. In the early constitutional ideals of trades-unionism the representative finds . . . absolutely no place. The committeemen elected by rotation of office or the delegate deputed to take part in a revision of rules was habitually regarded only as a vehicle by which "the voices" could be mechanically conveyed. His task required, therefore, no special qualifications beyond intelligence to comprehend his instructions and a spirit of obedience in carrying them out.⁵

Power, the Webbs found, leaked into the hands of executive secretaries. Elected leaders become more specialized and powerful in the process of controlling the secretaries. Finally expert and trained leadership was demanded. The disagreement in evidence and findings between Michels and the Webbs

⁵ Sidney and Beatrice Webb: "Representative Institutions in Trade Union Democracy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XI (1896), pp. 655-56.

is negligible. Their interpretations differ in that Michels speaks of the observed trends as "inevitable," whereas, the Webbs speak of them as "rational adjustments" of the workers themselves.

The trend, here observed in trades unions, exists in all large organizations that are not subject to constant check. Most detailed studies of group structure and leadership, from infant play-groups to national legislative bodies, reveal tendencies toward the crystallization of a leading group of individuals from the politists. Traditions, habits, expertness, prestige, and the possession of chances to stay in office combine to convert politists into oligarchs.

POLITISTS NOT A HOMOGENEOUS GROUP

The politics of a large nation, when they are not dominated by a single social class or oligarchy or by a single party (in which the "iron law of oligarchy" holds sway), show a great deal of flux and change. The politists are not a uniform group, a single elite, but are a mixture of leaders from many different organizations and associations. A brief table of the American political occupations will show how heterogeneous are the origins of the people who have something to say about political decisions in this country. There are several large categories of individuals who find themselves in government. They may be listed as follows:

I. OCCUPATIONS OF THE POLITICAL FORUM

- a. National elective offices (President, senators, etc.)
- b. State elective offices (governor, state legislators, etc.)
- c. County and township elective offices (county board member, etc.)
- d. City and town elective offices (mayor, town clerk, etc.)
- e. National party offices, elective or appointed (national chairman of the Republican Party, etc.)
- f. State party offices, elective or appointed (member of the state central committee of the Illinois Republican Party, etc.)
- g. Local party offices, elected or appointed (chairman of the county central committee of the Democratic Party, etc.)
- h. National appointive offices (department heads, ambassadors, various committees, commissions, etc.)

104 / Political Behavior

- i. State appointive offices (liquor control board, state commerce commissions, department heads, etc.)
- j. Local appointive offices (chief of police, commissioner of streets and sewers, civil service commissioners, etc.)
- k. Precinct captains or committeemen, holding minor state and local government jobs and paid from public funds for part-time party work.

II. PUBLIC CAREERS IN POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

- a. National foreign service offices (ministers, consuls, clerks, etc.)
- b. National civil service offices (clerk in Bureau of Mines of Department of the Interior, personnel officer in Department of Justice, national forest ranger, etc.)
- c. The armed forces (general, pilot, infantryman, etc.)
- d. State civil service offices (engineer in highway department, warden of state penitentiary, etc.)
- e. Local civil service offices (principal of high school, sewers engineer, etc.)
- f. International organization offices (translator in Secretariat of the United Nations, statistical clerk in the World Labor Organization, consultant to United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, etc.)

III. THE PRIVATE (I.E. NOT DIRECTLY GOVERNMENTAL) CAREER VOCATIONS IN POLITICS

- a. Executive secretaries and other offices of national, state, and local civic organizations (League of Women Voters, Taxpayers' League, Parent-Teacher Association, etc.)
- b. Executive secretaries, research positions, and other offices in philanthropic and political study foundations (Russell Sage Foundation, Brookings Institution, Ford Foundation, etc.)
- c. Interest group offices (research worker for the American Medical Association, labor economist for the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, director of political action for a union, etc.)
- d. Research, consultant and advisory positions (Public

Administration Service, consultant on political and industrial problems for industrial concerns and other private associations, etc.)

- e. Journalists, lecturers, commentators, and writers on political affairs.
- f. Educational positions, administrative and teaching positions in the political science areas in secondary schools, junior colleges, and universities.
- g. Special interest representatives before policy-making governmental bodies (lobbyists for Farm Bureau Federation, American Manufacturers Association, Congress of Industrial Organizations, etc.)

IV. AVOCATIONS IN POLITICS

- a. Appointments on special political affairs ("dollar-a-year" men, investigating commissions, national and state jurors, advisory committees, etc.)
- b. Membership of specialized associations with public-private membership (public health associations, associations of social workers, American Political Science Association, American Psychological Association, etc.)
- c. Reformers and other part-time politically active persons and groups, ordinarily activated only by the existence of a special combination of political conditions (Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, independent citizens' committees to defeat the political machine, Audubon League, fourth-ward committee to save the old water tower, etc.)
- d. Officials of labor unions and large corporations, with their public relations staffs; trade associations officers; church leaders; and other socio-economic group officers.
- e. Political lawyers, political real estate and insurance brokers, and others specializing in political-private arrangements.
- f. Contractors, sellers, and buyers for governmental services and goods.

SIZE OF THE POLITIST GROUP

A few of the people concerned with government may well have escaped our classification: no doubt there are a number

of politically trained ditch-diggers and bartenders, as well as industrial tycoons and Hollywood screen writers. For two facts stand out even in a preliminary listing of political occupations in America and in most Western or Westernized nations: governmental activity is widely distributed throughout the population; and in consequence, individuals move readily into and out of the political group and up and down the various levels of the political hierarchy. America was for a long time not typical of the western European nations. But since the beginning of the twentieth century, with the advent of socialist and labor parties and with the succession of internal and foreign crises, the class of politically active individuals has become as large proportionally in many other nations as it is in America.

The number of American politists has never been accurately measured. Both De Tocqueville and Bryce in their famous commentaries on the American system of government remarked at the astonishing number of politically active citizens. Lord Bryce estimated at about 200,000 the "persons whose chief occupation and livelihood lies in politics." This was in 1891, and his definition included roughly the members of our Class I (above) with a considerable number from our Class II who were at that time political appointees. In contrast, Bryce estimated the politically active class in England, then at the height of her prestige and influence in the world, at about 3,500. De Tocqueville, writing some fifty years earlier, had ventured no numerical account, probably because all America seemed to him to be political.

No sooner do you set foot upon American ground than you are stunned by a kind of tumult; a confused clamor is heard on every side, and a thousand simultaneous voices demand the satisfaction of their social wants. Everything is in motion around you; here the people of one quarter of a town are met to decide upon the building of a church; there the election of a representative is going on; a little farther, the delegates of a district are hastening to the town in order to consult upon some local improvements; in another place, the laborers of a village quit their plows to deliberate upon the project of a road or a public school. Meetings are called for the sole purpose of declaring their disapprobation of the conduct of the government; while in

other assemblies citizens salute the authorities of the day as the fathers of their country.⁶

AMERICAN POLITISTS

Fifty years after Bryce, and a hundred after de Tocqueville, the population had increased enormously, the machine age had concentrated half the population in large cities, and the governments of nation, state, and locality had increased their scope and function. In 1949, Merriam and Gosnell estimated the total of party workers over the whole nation at 800,000 in normal times and as many as 1,500,000 in an exciting campaign. Probably no more than 300,000 of these are regularly engaged in politics unless they hold, or hope to hold, office. But to these "grass roots" workers, mostly of our Class I, k (above), must be added the elective office-holders, usually several apiece from the some 155,000 units of government estimated by the Census Bureau to be operating in 1942. Of these, let us say, there are 500,000—a conservative figure. Then, from some 1,529,000 school teachers and school employees must be added perhaps 250,000 who are active in politics, civic activities, and reform groups. Perhaps 250,000 of the 638,000 appointive state administrators are important either by virtue of their office duties or because they are political workers as well as state employees. There are 1,622,000 local government employees of whom perhaps 1,000,000 are politists by virtue of their duties and political interests or because of their civic and political activities beyond the demands of their formal duties. Of the 2,000,000 employees of the federal civil service, no more than 30,000 can be reckoned as "activists." And of the 3,000,000 individuals of the armed forces, perhaps only 5,000 exert political influence beyond their immediate tasks. All the foregoing would be classified by us in Classes I and II. There may be about 15,000 persons in Class III, and perhaps some 75,000 persons in Class IV. Therefore, the total number of people, very roughly calculated, whose occupations concern the governments of the United States lies in the neighborhood of

⁶ Quoted with permission from Alexis de Tocqueville: *Democracy in America*, the Henry Reeves Text, as revised by Francis Bowen, further corrected and edited with introduction, editorial notes, and bibliographies by Phillips Bradley (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1946), Vol. I, pp. 249-50.

9,879,000 persons. The number of these who are unusually active in political affairs is roughly 2,425,000 persons.

These 2,425,000 are the persons, then, who during a good portion of their adult, productive years are preoccupied with politics more than most people. Beyond them lie millions of persons occupied with government and many millions more whose interest in politics is intellectual and passive; they may vote, read the political columns of the newspapers, talk occasionally about their opinions with friends, and have some taste of political activity at long intervals. But the bulk of law sponsorship, political decision-making, and the other tasks of the political process remains with these 2,425,000 out of the 9,879,000; they form only about 1/62 of the total population and the whole 150,000,000 depend to a considerable extent for their fortunes and misfortunes upon the leadership of this group.

A study by Drs. J. L. Woodward and Elmo Roper, published in December, 1950, approaches our problem differently. They polled a representative sample of the adult population of the United States on six types of political activity and scored the responses as shown in Figure 3.

It will be noted that, even though the authors generously classify as "very active" a person who scores as little as six points out of a possible twelve, only *10.3 per cent of the adult population* achieved this classification. This would be about ten out of every one hundred American adults. And if the minimum score for this classification were raised (justifiably, we think) to nine points out of twelve, only two out of every hundred adult Americans would qualify as "very active" politically. Our own politist ratio of one in sixty-two, if applied only to adults instead of the whole population, would come to about the same figure, that is, something like two politists for every one hundred adults. Research is badly needed on this whole question and can readily supply a more valid and reliable estimate of the number of politists in the population. These preliminary estimates, however, are probably not so greatly in error as to be useless for our purposes.

Although this large group of politically inclined persons that we call the politists—a group that we find in every state—has no sharp form or character, it does provide the milieu from which the more prominent and influential leaders arise.

FIGURE 3

THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF AMERICANS *

A. Scoring System for Political Activity Index

| | % OF TOTAL SAMPLE QUALIFYING | SCORE POINTS CREDITED | TOTAL POSSIBLE SCORE FOR CHANNEL |
|--|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| <i>Voting</i> | | | |
| Once or more in last four years | 75 | 1 | } 3 |
| Three times or more | 47 | 1 | |
| Five times or more | 21 | 1 | |
| <i>Discussing Public Issues with Others</i> | | | |
| Discusses frequently and takes an equal share in the conversation | 21 | 1 | } 2 |
| Discusses frequently and usually tries to convince others he is right | 6 | 1 | |
| <i>Belonging to Organizations That Take Stands on Public Issues</i> | | | |
| Belongs to one or more such organizations | 31 | 1 | } 2 |
| Belongs to two or more | 7 | 1 | |
| <i>Written or Talked to Congressman or Other Public Official to Give Own Opinion on a Public Issue</i> | | | |
| One or more times in the past year | 13 | 1 | } 2 |
| Two or more times in the past year | 7 | 1 | |
| <i>Worked for Election of a Political Candidate in Last Four Years</i> | 11 | 2 | 2 |
| <i>Contributed Money to a Party or Candidate in Last Four Years</i> | 7 | 1 | 1 |
| TOTAL POSSIBLE SCORE | | | <u>12</u> |

* Reprinted with permission of the *American Political Science Review* from Julian L. Woodward and Elmo Roper: "Political Activity of American Citizens," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLIV (1950), pp. 872, 874, 876.

The scores made by the sample were as follows:

| <i>B. Distribution of Political Activity Scores</i> | | |
|---|---|------------------------|
| SCORE OF RESPONDENT | % OF TOTAL SAMPLE WHO MAKE THE SCORE | CUMULATIVE PER CENT |
| 12 | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| 11 | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| 10 | 0.7 | 1.1 Very Active |
| 9 | 1.2 | 2.3 (10.3%) |
| 8 | 1.6 | 3.9 |
| 7 | 2.4 | 6.3 |
| 6 | 4.0 | 10.3 |
| 5 | 6.5 | 16.8 Active |
| 4 | 10.3 | 27.1 (16.8%) |
| 3 | 15.6 | 42.7 Inactive |
| 2 | 19.0 | 61.7 (34.6%) |
| 1 | 19.1 | 80.8 Very Inactive |
| 0 | 19.2 | 100.0 (38.3%) |
| | 100.0 | |

Obviously, not all of these 2,500,000 persons in America are equal in influence. They all are leaders in a sense, but few are powerful leaders. Many acquire their "political" roles through skills not very different from the skills a person not employed by the government might possess. Obviously, too, a great number of these millions are political foot soldiers, even if they are party workers. They work, obey, and receive modest emoluments—honor, favors, money, and perhaps the excitement of the "game" of politics. The top ranks of the politists, who set the pace for the rest to follow, may number no more than a few hundred in each state of the Union and perhaps no more than 2,500 at Washington, D. C.

SPECIAL FUNCTIONAL CONDITIONS OF LEADERSHIP

Membership in these top ranks requires, besides the traits, general skills, and the class background sometimes needed, the ability to perform specialized functions—to play the role of elected executive, legislator, member of the Department of Agriculture; to influence legislation, lead reform groups, manage a political campaign, and so forth. Hence, each type of leadership in politics—executive, legislative, judicial, military, and so on—has its peculiar requirements. Success in one sit-

uation does not imply equal ability for success in the others; sometimes, in fact, it may imply quite the opposite. A successful legislator may prove to be an unsuccessful governor. A conscientious reformer may prove to be a bad politician. A good soldier may make a ludicrous President. Even if political science were to prepare ideal "job analyses" for all political offices, the accidents and fortunes of politics are such that those who hold or aspire to political office will, as often as not, lack a good part of the qualities called for. Political scientists, like ordinary mortals, are often struck by great disparities between the assumed demands of a position of political leadership and the character of the leaders who successively occupy it.

The Total Analysis of Leadership

THE PROBLEM OF NUMEROUS CONTRADICTORY LEADER TYPES

How does it happen that such great differences of character are apparent in the men who hold the same office? How does it happen, for example, that a reticent, cautious, conservative man like Calvin Coolidge can hold the same office as an extroverted, daring, tradition-breaking man like Franklin D. Roosevelt? Or—to put the question on a lower level, showing thereby the universal nature of this problem of leadership—how does it happen that a fussy, petty bureau chief may be succeeded by a flamboyant, impatient chief who appears for all the world to be a politician fresh from the campaign stump? Or, on still another level, why are there genial, baby-kissing city bosses, and taciturn, shy bosses, both of whom may come from the same community? Does not this incessant chain of contradictions deny the essential thesis of the study of leadership: that there is a pattern of leadership? Does it not deny the assertion of this chapter *in toto*? We have, it is true, been extremely cautious in asserting that there are universal physical and mental traits of leaders; and we have been careful to show that only most general statements can be made about the extent to which certain political skills bring political leadership. We have declared that certain kinds of class structures promote certain kinds of leaders who have the qualities favored by the class structure, but we were also careful to point out that describing the class conditions of a community could still not adequately explain the rise of individual

leaders, especially when those leaders are "outsiders" as were Edmund Burke, Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler, or Disraeli.

LEADERSHIP PART OF AN INTRAGROUP RELATIONSHIP

We cannot adequately explain leadership through trait, skill, class, or functional analysis—individually or all together—because leadership is a relationship to a particular political group situation that is itself determined by all related group situations. The leader operates somewhat like a communications control-system. He is a set of acts and signals that are prearranged by his personal history and that communicate to his group and related groups. A study of only one part of this communications system *cannot help* but result in the disconcerting number of contradictions and exceptions that have up to now characterized the study of leadership.

Leadership is a function of the group and cannot be understood by merely studying the leader. Leaders who occupy identical positions will seem to possess inexplicably diverse qualities when they are studied in isolation from their followers. Thus, according to our theory, an attempt to find uniformities in the traits of American Presidents would be doomed to failure unless it also studied the "men around the President." A satisfactory comparative study of wartime leadership in America, England, and Germany would have to include not only Roosevelt, Churchill, and Hitler, but also Hull, Hopkins, Marshall, Morgenthau, and Byrnes, as against Attlee, Eden, and Bevin, as against Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, and Schacht, in order to observe how the collective qualities in each group add up.

Moreover, *the supply of qualities of leadership appropriate to a given situation may be a function of more than one group*. A classic example of this theory is found in Polybius' discussion of the separation of powers in his history of the Roman Republic. He wrote that Rome had become great largely because of its balanced constitution, which contained elements of monarchy (the consuls), aristocracy (the Senate), and the people (assemblies of plebs). Governance in accordance with the best interests of the nation was guaranteed by a combination of the strength of the three branches of

government: weak consuls could be buttressed by strong Senates, harsh Senates modified by popular protest. A study of consular leadership alone, ignoring the Senate and plebs, would show a puzzling succession of men of very different traits and backgrounds.

Similarly, in regard to the United States, a study of the Presidents alone, or of the Presidents with their cabinets and kitchen cabinets, will not reveal any intelligible pattern of presidential leadership qualities. To the study of the President's group must be added the study of the other leadership groups of the United States that influence the decisions of the President. Within these groups we should study the top men, their immediate cliques, and their relation to their followers. We should have to add up their leadership qualities, add to them the qualities that come from the President's group, and determine from that sum the leadership equilibrium of such a structure. We should expect this final sum to be the same for equivalent situations. One may constantly expect, however, differences in the leadership qualities of, say, the President's group, or any other subgroup, at different times.

The empirical work required in studying any leadership situation by the method implied in this theory is, of course, very great. Some may say that we are shutting out an elephant in order to admit a whale. To this the reply may be that difficulties are never avoided in science. It is as difficult to make painstaking studies of foolish things as of important things. Another answer is that the best biographical studies do proceed in the manner we have outlined. Sandburg's biography of Abraham Lincoln is an example. Seeming contradictions in the behavior of the leader can be resolved often only by unraveling a difficult knot of circumstances that contains ultimately all the contending influences in a given situation.

Finally, we may argue that we claim no certainty in our studies of leadership. Absolute certainty, so far as the future can be foreseen, is not going to be achieved by social science. Problems concerning leadership will remain indefinitely a puzzle to political science; the conceptions and materials of this chapter can only add some understanding and clarify the important features of the picture presented by politics. Certain "mysterious" phenomena, such as the charismatic

114 / Political Behavior

leader, can be made to seem not so awesome and incredible. It is not impossible that some knowledge of such leadership, even if not total knowledge, will increase the possibility of braking, modifying, or otherwise controlling the circumstances under which leadership operates.

Chapter 4

The Community and Special Interests

POLITICAL LEADERS supply much of the dynamism that operates and changes political institutions. But leaders by no means act in isolation; they are themselves mirrors of the people in many ways, and their actions are modified at every step of the political process by the energy, reactions and demands of the less active and less authoritative citizenry.

If we reconsider the conditions from which leaders emerge, we can see how utterly important it is to know something about people as a whole. Leaders may emerge because they possess unusual psychological and physical traits—often acquired from the culture rather than inherited. Leaders may emerge from certain occupations, certain social classes, certain power-commanding environments (public offices), and from fulfilling certain balancing roles in and among their various groups. As we attempted to explain more and more of the conditions that produced leaders, we came to see that the people themselves must be taken into account, and we are now compelled to seek other concepts that can cope with the people as a whole.

This chapter is devoted to concepts for studying the political behavior of the people as a whole. It seeks to explore the general social foundations of politics and of the politists. Therefore it treats several large and diffuse social groupings: the community and public, less general interests of an economic or other social character, public opinion, and the majority. Later chapters will discuss the more tightly structured political groupings—electoral constituencies, political parties, and pressure groups. Both kinds of groupings are the bases upon which the politists rest and function.

If men were all alike and society were static, how easy our analysis would be! We could define the several major concepts of this chapter as follows and little would be left to explain. We would say that the state (territory, population, officers, independence) is the same as the community. The

people of the community are the *public*; the political beliefs shared by everyone in the community are *consensus*; the opinions they hold are *public opinion*; and *public opinion* is divisible into a *majority* and *minority* opinion.

All of these statements are often true, but more often are not true enough. In order to use the several concepts more exactly and with greater realism, we must define them more carefully and—more important—use them carefully. For the state is not always the community, and the community does not always have consensus, and several communities and publics may be found among the same people, and the several publics do not always have public opinions, and there may be several public opinions in the same public, and, finally, a majority is not always to be discovered.

The redefinition of these concepts is therefore in order.

A community exists to the extent that a people is knit together by mutual intercourse and mutual belief. Hence *a community is defined as a people who have many habitual relations or communications with one another*. To find the community, one observes the relations and communications among a population and judges that they are so many and all-embracing as to give the people a culture or character.

A public exists to the extent to which the people of a community have political relations with one another. Hence *the public is defined as the political part of the community, that is, the people with respect to their political relations and communications*.

A consensus exists when the people almost universally agree upon a basic set of beliefs about right and wrong in politics and about the organization of the state. Hence, *consensus is defined as a basic agreement of the public upon the general method of organizing and conducting the political process*.

Public opinion exists whenever members of the public are divided over the proper solution of an issue that is relevant to the state. Hence, *public opinion is defined as a belief held by a number of people regarding a political issue*.

If more than half of any given group are in agreement upon an issue, they are what we call a majority. Thus initially we see that consensus implies a heavy majority of the community agreeing upon a *number of interrelated basic issues*. We also see that many majorities may exist without there being a consensus. Thus one majority can agree that

Smith is a better politician than Jones, another majority, that high tariffs are better than low.

Thus far, we have only set the frame for understanding these concepts. The concepts will become clearer and more useful as we examine them in detail and with respect to one another.

The Political Community and Consensus

THE STATE AND COMMUNITY CONTRASTED

First of all, a state may not be a single community. Take the case of England, Scotland, and Southern Ireland in the nineteenth century. All three were united in the same state. They constituted a population inclosed within a territory, governed by public officers (the government) not subject to higher authority. Yet to some extent Scotland and certainly Southern Ireland contained peoples apart from the English in many important respects, including dialect, customs, and religion. The differences among the three included many important political differences, less marked in Scotland than in Ireland. Hence three general publics existed. Not the least of the differences that made Ireland and England different communities and publics was the presence of a consensus in England with respect to English political government and politics and the absence of the same consensus in Ireland with respect to English rule over Ireland. Thence came the great dissatisfaction in Ireland, the attempted revolts, and the demands for Irish independence. The legitimacy of English rule was stoutly contested. Yet on particular political issues that came up from time to time, there can be little doubt that segments of Irish and English opinion coalesced and agreed. And there may have been occasions when a majority of Irishmen and Englishmen agreed on some political viewpoint or principle.

OVERLAPPING COMMUNITIES

The community differs from other social groups in that it embraces all the physical and psychological connections among people necessary to give a person an over-all way of life. For example, being born and raised in Shanghai or Peiping usually suffices to make a man or woman Chinese. He is a member of Chinese culture and shares many customs and beliefs with his fellow Chinese. Being a carpenter or farmer influences a great

deal of one's life, customs, and outlook, but not nearly so much as membership in the greater community. The first affiliation is to a community, the second to a social group, perhaps occupational. A man ordinarily can change his occupation without becoming a different kind of person, but hardly his community.

Where do we place individuals whose lives are complicated by universal claims and attachments stemming from more than one source? What happens to a South Carolinian who feels the claims of two community systems, regional and national; to an Italian who has dedicated himself to the priesthood of the Catholic Church? We can only say that such men belong to two communities, each with all-embracing cultures that he must hope will never make conflicting demands upon his loyalties.

THE COMMUNITY A NETWORK OF COMMUNICATIONS

By the community, therefore, we mean a people who maintain a considerable number of habitual relations or communications. The community includes such important relationships among people as their co-operation and competition, their mutual dependence, the interconnections among their special group affiliations, and their shared beliefs and impulses. A community may be visualized as a giant spider web. The outer limit of the community is that area under observation where the number of communications diminishes in extent to a tiny amount and in duration to temporary and sporadic contacts. Thus, the United States and Soviet Russia form different communities. In one sense there is no inner limit to the community; that is, all relations contribute to determining the nature of the community. But where those communications are intensified according to some special criteria—such as religion, occupation, or (especially) locality—we see social groups; and when such a special group (the locality is most frequently met with) affects markedly most aspects of the lives of many people, it too may be called a community.

GREAT AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES FORMED BY PHYSICAL INTERDEPENDENCE

The study of a great community reveals patterns of relationships among the community members. Modern American

society, for example, can be described physically as a community in which over 180,000,000 people depend upon one another through an exceedingly complex division of labor that clothes Californians in New England's textiles and feeds New Englanders with California fruit. People across the continent read the same news, compete with each other in business, fight the same wars together, and travel to each other's resorts and schools. Yet local communities persist in abundance, for a great number of one's social relations are made locally. Two hundred years ago, the separate colonial communities were of even greater importance to their respective members because the American colonists had not nearly so much to do with one another as Americans today.

The political scientist must not overestimate certain types of connections in the network of the community. For example, it was often stated before the last two wars that the existence of certain international agencies, such as the International Postal Union, meant that a community of nations existed. However, the mere fact that nations communicated with each other did not mean that they were in ideological agreement. Ideological ties are among the most meaningful of community ties, but because they are intangible and hard to measure, they are often ignored.

HOW A COMMUNITY ENFORCES CONFORMITY

Out of the myriad human contacts in the community there evolve various modes of thought and moral beliefs. A community teaches its members to do things in certain ways through its mores, customs, folkways, and fashions. Not all of these patterns of behavior are given equal significance by the community, and their strength may best be judged by the penalties for nonconformance. While a man will only receive frowns for not wearing a tie on certain occasions, he will be treated very harshly for betraying his country, killing his children, or walking the streets naked. Sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists have collected much material on the way the community regulates the conduct of its members.

THE COMMUNITY SANCTIONS

The community can command conformity and obedience from most of its members, be they humble or great, without using formal procedures. Most persons follow community

rules without the intervention of laws, courts, police, or discipline. One need only name the community sanctions in order to prove that most men are made acutely aware of their existence at one time or another in their lives. The first sanction is habit. Most men never know much of what is "wrong" because they encounter little but what is "right." Their habits, the repeated performance of certain social obligations in learned ways, tend to exclude the learning of other ways of doing them.

But the fear of isolation and frustration also impels men to conform. To act in uncommon ways usually means that one acts alone and is prevented from gaining valued responses. To most men, especially in political activities, which are social to begin with, such a condition is not pleasant. They would rather conform than lose the companionship of their fellows and the respect and rewards of the community. Jobs, appointments, election, privileges, and other tokens of social esteem can be denied an offender by general community consent. Thus, custom imposes its own sanctions without invoking the formal, legal sanctions of the criminal law—the compulsion of force.

In rare instances, an allegedly flagrant violation of community mores is met by mob violence, vigilantism, political assassination, and other sporadic manifestations of disapproval. Such "crowd" behavior, however, should never be considered by the political analyst even as *prima facie* evidence that a "community spirit" has been thoroughly aroused. Too many "spontaneous" crowds of protest, vengeance, and "righteousness" have been found by historians to be aroused, organized, led, and manipulated by a few directing agitators towards goals having little to do with the members of the crowd themselves. As we shall see in the concluding section of this chapter, the community is too diffuse a grouping to act directly in the political process. It must always be transformed by other groups before it can effect its desires.

THE PUBLIC IS THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY

The public consists of the people's *political* relationships in a community—the politically specialized part of all the communications that exist among community members. Essentially, as we shall see shortly, this specialized part is what we commonly call public affairs, and those people some part

of whose relationships to the community concerns public affairs have opinions the special sum of which constitutes public opinion. When some people are entirely excluded from political affairs by law and tradition, as has happened in many states, they are not to be considered part of the public.

THE VARIETY OF PUBLICS

There are as many publics as there are communities. The number of both is not fixed for all time by an immutable law. As both terms have been defined, the key criteria for distinguishing one community and public from another are the scope, number, duration, and intensity of their human bonds. Certainly the Athenians were a community to themselves, separate from the Spartans and the Corinthians. Their attachments to the great Greek cultural community were not so numerous and strong as their local attachments. The big nation-state of today would not be a meaningful community to most ancient Greeks. Many people predict that the modern nation, as the most important community, is to be replaced by a community of mankind.

Furthermore, some men may acquire stronger over-all loyalties to their unions, localities, or states than to the nation as a whole; they may possess less relations with the great community. For them there exist two communities and two publics, perhaps even more. Political scientists therefore must describe, enumerate, compare, and analyze all the human contacts in each situation that they study in order to determine whether there are one or more communities present.

RELATION OF COMMUNITY BELIEFS TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Enough has been said to demonstrate that a community and its public are closely related. What happens to the basic customs of a community must transform the nature of a public. Changes in characteristic social sanctions mean changes in political sanctions. If a community rejects the use of force, public opinion will evidence this feeling. If community standards place a high value on material things, politics will be generally materialistic.

We must always be aware that politics operates within such a framework of community custom with its penalties for deviation. The preparation, enactment, and administration of laws are only the baldest points of contact between com-

munity beliefs and habits and the political process. Few men are so naive as to insist that the law could command and the community would knuckle down. To the innocent query: "What is the limit of the power of the English Parliament if it is supreme?" Leslie Stephen gave the sensible answer:

It is, of course, omnipotent in the sense that it can make whatever laws it pleases, inasmuch as a law means any rule which has been made by the legislature. But from the scientific point of view, the power of the legislature is, of course, strictly limited. It is limited, so to speak, from within and from without; from within, because the legislature is a product of a certain social condition, and determined by whatever determines the society; and from without, because the power of imposing laws is dependent upon the instinct of subordination, which is itself limited. If the legislature decided that all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies would be illegal, but legislators must go mad before they could pass such a law, and subjects be idiotic before they could submit to it.¹

Even apparently "lawless" politicians, who by-pass or violate established formal procedures for making political decisions, are acting either in accord with the tacit understanding of the community or at least are not flagrantly disregarding the limits of toleration set by the community.

CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS

Different communities and the same community at different times vary in the sort of conduct they expect and demand from politicians. It is apparent in reading about the Roman-Carthaginian wars, the Spanish-American War, the Roman-war of liberation, and the Korean War of 1950 that the parties operated according to widely differing standards of humaneness. Notions of "chivalry" and "humaneness" varied widely in the different conflicts.

Other examples of changing standards that affect both the community as a whole and politics specifically may be cited.

¹ Quoted with permission from *The Science of Ethics* (2nd ed., New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), p. 137.

The English penal law of the seventeenth century would not be tolerated in England today. Chronic corruption was accepted by the people of certain modern American localities like New York City until relatively recently. Today, propaganda is used much more extensively as a political technique than it was in medieval cities; the "re-education" of criminals is a common form of "punishment"; and "laws of war" are generally able to give some protection to belligerents. The power of the English King to appoint his choice for Prime Minister has given way to the power of the victorious party to dictate the choice. Community belief has so changed in this respect that an independent appointment would be received with horror and anger. Similarly, the power of popularly chosen Electors to name the President of the United States has been transmuted into a delegated function of electing the man the electorate voted for. Although violations of this tradition have occurred, the culpable Electors have been subjected to considerable popular resentment.

Community Problems and Consensus

CONFLICTING LOYALTIES HARM CONSENSUS

Since a community is intimately associated with its public, disorders of the community are quickly communicated to public affairs and become political problems that affect the state. A rutted, broken road, for example, may incite discontent, may lead the discontented community to engage in public controversy, and may finally bring a political reaction against the government.

The community problem usually regarded as gravest of all is of a different order. It results from overlapping community identifications. As we have suggested previously, a person may feel himself part of two communities—one local, the other national, or perhaps less frequently, one a social class and the other a local or national community. In modern Western society, the national community is a strong contender for one's total affiliations, but one's social class in a European country, or one's locality or occupation in America, may claim an equal or greater loyalty. If the two loyalties conflict, the individual becomes disloyal to one or the other, or withdraws from the conflict by becoming apathetic towards both. Both disloyalty and apathy produce personal anxiety. What is

more, they produce anxiety in others who are affected by the behavior and attitudes of the individual in question. A kind of rootlessness and rulelessness grows and spreads. Consensus is weakened. Yet there is no neat method by which such individual dilemmas may be solved, the anxieties reduced, and consensus fostered.

HOW COHESIVE IS THE MODERN GREAT COMMUNITY?

Practically all writers on the subject of the community and the public have asserted that the vast technical changes of modern times complicate the individual's role in the great community. Science, technology, rapid physical communications, movements of population, and many other factors have built a physical community in which many men feel ill at ease. Physically, they may be more comfortable than their ancestors; psychologically, they often feel little sympathy with the larger community. Furthermore, they lack any effective control over their environment. Great economic, physical, and political changes take place, vastly important political decisions are made, and they can only applaud or condemn or escape. Their work life is transformed, their cities grow like weeds, they are automatically made members of a "United Nations."

To make their lot even more difficult this loss of active power has come at a time when men everywhere have learned to demand democratic practices. Men are supposed to be active in decision making at a time when the decisions to be made concern matters completely beyond the ken of individuals. Americans, for example, are told from childhood that they should control government policy; but how can they conceivably control the delicate, shifty, secret maneuvers of the so-called cold war? Englishmen are told that a socialist government is a people's government, rather than the government of a few. Yet how can the British worker actively participate in the intricate plans of the socialist government or in the decisions of the government to co-operate or not to co-operate in the Schuman Plan to integrate western European industrial facilities?

To tell the citizens of various countries today that they are responsible for events in their new enlarged communities and that they must participate in molding the direction of those events may be flattering to their beliefs about democracy, but

such directives have also proved terribly embarrassing to many people and to their governments as well. For in trying to exercise the controls to which they are entitled by the beliefs of the times, people make impossible demands of their governments. The governments themselves, in reconciling their decisions with democratic theories, trip and stumble in trying to keep in line with the shifting, jerking moods of the various groupings of the people.

Seeming solutions of the problems of democratic leadership often are suggested. For instance, officials are sometimes tempted to transform the theory of political democracy into a theory of social engineering; that is, many officials feel that the only way to escape from the intolerable fickleness of popular pressures is to control those pressures by propaganda. The people are assured that they are being consulted, that their wishes are being followed, and that popular controls are real controls.

Unless such a policy is carried out with ruthless efficiency, as it appears to be done in Russia today, it tends to make many people more suspicious of the intentions of their rulers. They feel that control is being stripped from them by unscrupulous politicians. They turn to "sincere" men, ones who, they believe, voice truly the needs and aspirations of the masses. They are willing to confide their active interests to such men to rid themselves of the "plague of self-interested politicians" who are supposed to exist.

The danger of another kind of dictatorship appears at this stage of community anxiety. The charismatic leader finds the political environment in which he may prosper. The Mussolinis and the Hitlers appear to many people, not as destroyers of democracy, but as the only true democrats, the restorers or builders of the new great community in which such people can recapture their sense of control or understanding of events.

The despair over controls felt by many citizens of modern democracy has not gone unnoticed among political writers. We can name Walter Bagehot, Émile Durkheim, Gaetano Mosca, Max Weber, Roberto Michels, Ortega y Gasset, T. S. Eliot, Elton Mayo, and John Dewey as writers who have concerned themselves with the tensions of modern great communities and with the political consequences for democracy that such tensions possess. In general their argument parallels

William James's theory that individual self-esteem is the ratio of success to pretensions: when one wants much more than he can possibly get he is miserable. So the people of modern societies, clamoring for the immediate direction of their vast and complex governments, may well lose faith in the institutions of representative democracy and thus contribute to democracy's ruin.

CONSENSUS AS AGREEMENT ON BASIC PRINCIPLES

Such a loss of faith would mean that there was no longer a community consensus, that the vast majority no longer agreed with the body of basic principles that originally held them together. According to Walter Bagehot, consensus is the essential feature of a well-organized community; a country cannot be happily governed unless the people are generally agreed as to what is right and wrong in politics. When governmental or social institutions are not in harmony with consensus, or where there is no consensus, a society is in for a bad time. The people are apathetic or frightened into desperate measures to establish some new order of community relationships.

DEWEY'S "HEALTHY" COMMUNITY AS CONSENSUS

By contrast, according to John Dewey, the healthy community would be one in which the individual is neither boss over others nor bullied by others. The individual would feel that he controlled the destiny of the community in co-operation with the other members, all sharing similar aspirations and responsibilities—an adaptation of Jefferson's idea of local community self-rule. Dewey's ideal community is

a society in which the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying consequences of associated activities shall be known in the full sense of that word, so that an organized, articulate Public comes into being. The highest and most difficult kind of inquiry and a subtle, delicate, vivid and responsive art of communication must take possession of the physical machinery of transmission and circulation and breathe life into it. When the machine age has thus perfected its machinery, it will be a means of life and not its despotic

master. Democracy will come into its own, for democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communion.²

But Dewey's formula is most difficult to apply to the great community. The self-governing and tightly knit localities of Jefferson's day are gone.

REQUIREMENTS OF COMMUNITY INTEGRATION

The modern age can derive inspiration from the past, but it requires a host of new techniques and beliefs if it is to achieve the necessary minimum of integration. Often its subgroups are so unrelated, separate, and mutually hostile that politics operate solely by means of temporary compromises, expedients, and stopgaps, while group conflicts are emphasized and total community sentiment means little. Often there is such widespread apathy in the community, so little attention to public affairs, so little active communication among the members that the government becomes disconnected from the public and works to impede rather than to encourage the development of consensus.

Nothing less than a wholesale transformation of individual viewpoints can make the community recognize and appreciate the bonds that unite them solidly, and bring them into accord on fundamental issues. They would have to agree on matters most important to political behavior—on what constitutes legitimacy, on basic religious matters, on the extent to which individuals should be competitive or co-operative, on the use or nonuse of violence and propaganda, on the main opportunities an individual should be allowed in his lifetime, on the limits of public restraint and private indulgence. These items of agreement would form the consensus of the political community. They would not be seriously challenged, and change would be gradual.

Although rudiments of these common beliefs are present in some great national communities, they are scarcely even visible in relation to the world as a whole. Several national and many local societies have a profound consensus whereas others have an abbreviated consensus. Most leaders of contemporary national or local governments can hardly feel that their power rests upon an unshakeable foundation of unquestioned popular belief.

² Quoted with permission from *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago: Gateway Books, 1946), p. 184.

Separatism and Voting Behavior

SUBCOMMUNITY AFFILIATIONS (SEPARATISM)

The last section affirmed that community ties and sentiments, based on both physical and psychological bonds, exist and influence political behavior. For example, everyone living in a community is usually required to be loyal to it, be it a tribe, city, or nation. When, as often happens, a person belongs to more than one community and public, his deep loyalties must be divided among his plural communities. Usually there is no grave conflict; a man can be quite loyal to his city and the nation at the same time.

A man is more than a citizen of a community, however. He is most often also a member of special separate groupings within the community. He possesses special interests that drive him to act differently in politics from the way he would act if he tried only to consider his all-embracing community obligations. Besides owing great services to his communities, a man is likely to behave "selfishly" on behalf of other groupings into which he may fall, voluntarily or involuntarily. He is likely to possess a special occupation, income, religion, and attachment to locality that mark him off from other members of his community and cause his political behavior and attitudes to be different from theirs.

In addition, he may belong to organized groups that correspond to his special interests—a church, a club, a fraternity, a trade union, a manufacturers' association, or the like. As a member of such a group he becomes active in politics in a manner that is quite different in effect from the manner in which the totally unaffiliated person is active. Perhaps 50 per cent of all Americans belong to one or more such associations, although the extent of such participation abroad is much less.

These three types of belonging—the community, the separatist grouping, and the organized group—complicate a person's political behavior. Figure 4 serves to show how involved a person's connections may be.

We must conclude that a political theory that speaks only of the *community* of interests is inadequate. Political theory must also study the *separatism* of interests in order later to show how the various interests become organized in the

FIGURE 4
A PERSON'S AFFILIATIONS

As an individual, one may have a combination of personal and political motives directed at increasing the power, wealth, respect, health, education, and so on of himself and of those men, few or many, with whom he identifies himself. His identifications are often shown by his affiliations and he accomplishes his goals through them.

| TYPE OF AFFILIATION | A PERSON WITH SIMPLE INVOLVEMENTS | A PERSON WITH COMPLEX INVOLVEMENTS |
|--|---|--|
| I. Family (<i>all-embracing</i>) | Ia Only tied to immediate family | Ib Many relatives tightly bound together |
| II. Community (<i>all-embracing</i>) | IIa National community is exclusive | IIb May be heavily involved in national community, home city, and religion (or trade union) |
| III. Behavioral Grouping (<i>partial</i>) | IIIa Possesses a religion, an occupation, and a neighborhood—each influencing his voting behavior and political attitudes | IIIb Possesses a religion, occupation, neighborhood, nationalistic leanings towards second country, and investments in business other than his own occupation. |
| IV. Association or Group (<i>partial</i>) | IVa Belongs to a church | IVb Belongs to a church, a political party, social club, trade union, civil defense organization, foreign affairs study group (or other similar groups) |

Social separatism emerges from IIb, IIIa, IIIb, IVa and IVb in most cases. Conflict among one's affiliations is not always present, but frequently results from contrary directives of two affiliations. For instance, a worker who tries to be a Catholic and a Communist at the same time undergoes great emotional stress that may be reflected in apathy and apparent withdrawal from political concerns.

political process and obtain a favorable place in the structure of the government.

The several social sciences offer us various routes by which we may investigate the special interests of individuals. Social philosophy, economics, anthropology, psychology, sociology, and special fields such as industrial relations and public ad-

ministration are all deeply concerned with problems that arise from conflicting and co-operative groups and have their own ways of solving such problems. Political science has a traditional way of addressing such problems too; it pursues the study of the community and separatist interests of men through the study of voting behavior in order later to understand the nature of representation, political parties, pressure groups, and the institutions of government. We shall follow the route of political science, emphasizing, because of the introductory nature of this work, only the major concerns of political scientists.

Voting behavior is a common subject of political study. Among the human differences that express themselves in different ways of casting ballots are traditions, localisms, economic motivations, religious beliefs, nationalities, races, and sex. We will discuss them in turn.

TRADITION

One of the most striking facts in the field of voting behavior is the tendency of people to support repeatedly the same parties.³ Changes in conditions, in rival candidates, or in

³ Tradition, economic and religious interest, and other factors that determine voting behavior are studied in various ways. We may describe one technique often used to determine the economic or social significance of a particular candidate, party, or issue and to ascertain whether or not voters sharing certain socio-economic qualities share preferences for such candidates, party, or issue. The logic and procedure are as follows:

1. *Hypothesis:* Candidates of a given religious affiliation are supported disproportionately by members of their affiliation. We would then expect, for example, that a Catholic candidate would receive a greater proportion of votes from the Catholic members of his constituency than he would receive from the Protestant members.
2. *Method:* We compare the behavior of Protestant and Catholic voters, similar in all respects except religious affiliation, with reference to the candidacy of Mr. Smith, a known Catholic running against a Protestant.
3. *Techniques:* Possible ones are many—participant observation, interviews using multiple-choice questionnaires with a large cross-section of the voting population, depth interviews with

party platforms do not seem to change the attachment of many people to their favorite party. This phenomenon has been often seen to perpetuate itself through generations;

a smaller sample of voters, or an analysis of the voting figures after the election. We shall use the last technique in the balance of the illustration.

4. The votes of the two candidates are assembled and tabulated according to the smallest units for which tallies are available. (Let us say wards.) These are converted into percentages.
5. A poll is discovered that gives the religious affiliation of the population of each ward in percentages. (Since people are often reluctant to reveal their religious affiliations, we must make sure that the information is reliable. We must also make sure that the sample was accurately drawn from a cross-section of the population.)
6. A table is prepared showing the percentage of Catholics for each ward and the percentage of votes for Mr. Smith. A mere glance shows that where the ward population is heavily Catholic Mr. Smith's vote was heavy and *vice versa*.
7. If there are many wards and figures that are not absolutely clear, we calculate the simple coefficient of correlation between votes for Mr. Smith and percentage of Catholics. (This is done according to a generally available formula. It allows one to handle two large contrasting sets of data. It brings out any tendency of the two sets of data to be associated with each other, or dissociated from each other.) We find it to be .78, definitely significant.
8. We cannot say that Catholicism *caused* the heavy Smith vote, nor can we say immediately that other factors might not be at work. For example, we may find several exceptional wards that are heavily Catholic but somewhat anti-Smith. Further study reveals that those wards are composed of wealthy people for the most part. So we surmise that economic level *as well as* religious affiliation played a part in determining the sources of Mr. Smith's support. On the whole, however, we are reasonably satisfied that the hypothesis has some element of truth to it.

This is one of the principal techniques of studying voting behavior. New techniques are constantly being sought for and discovered, refined and retested. From the various studies that actually have been made, we can make some statements about the five major forces that operate in the voting process.

many men vote as did their grandfathers. Only about one quarter of the American voting population regard themselves as independent of party affiliation, according to several surveys. Professional men, businessmen, white collar workers, and skilled workers tend to be more "independent" according to the *party* criterion of independence.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TRADITION

"Traditional voting," however, is difficult to define and hence difficult to study. There are, in fact, two useful meanings of the term. First, voting may be called traditional when a study of the motivation of a voter reveals that he identified himself with ancestral behavior in preference to other interests he may have in casting his ballot.

For example, if a certain congressional district is composed mainly of dairy farmers who vote time after time for a party that tries to ban the sale of oleomargarine, they are not *traditional voters* in this sense because economic motives might be assumed to be more important here than any identification with their forebears. If, however, the party switches to support the sale of oleomargarine on equal terms with butter and the congressional district still continues its support at the polls, then we may suspect that certain traditional influences are at work. Traditional voting in this sense implies that all conceivable current reasons for a person to support a party, candidate, or issue are disregarded and that he continues his support of the party because he feels identified with his own past conduct or with the habits of his forebears.

STATISTICAL TRADITION

A second useful meaning of the term can be distinguished from the first. Voting may also be called traditional when a study of the voting habits of an individual or a group over a period of time reveals a persistent support of the same party. Thus, in the example of the dairy farming district cited above, the mere fact that the voting behavior of the district is repetitive allows us to call the behavior "traditional voting" in the second sense of the term.

"Traditional voting" in this sense has no psychological meaning, but it is an analytically useful *index* of trends employed, for example, by Ralph and Mildred Fletcher in their article: "Consistency in Party Voting from 1896 to 1932."

Here they tabulated party votes by counties for the various election years. Assuming that each county had one chance to change party affiliation at the next election, they added up a total of 26,151 "chances to change." If the counties switched 26,151 times, this would be 100 per cent nonconsistency. In fact, nonconsistency was observed in only 29.2 per cent of the cases. It was found that 591 counties voted consistently for one party over the whole period. They thus would have a nonconsistency of 0 per cent or a traditionalism of 100 per cent. Of course, as with all statistical problems of this kind, the behavior of each county might register no change as a whole, even though many nonconsistent individuals may have crossed from one party to the other. Gosnell similarly found consistency very strong in Chicago voting even during the great political changes of the depression years of the thirties and the New Deal.

Now let us take the example of the American South. On the whole, the South votes in election after election for the Democratic candidates for President. Statistically speaking, that is, in the second sense of the term, the South is dominated by traditional voting. But is the South traditional in our first sense of the term, that is, in the sense that Southerners identify themselves with ancestral behavior in preference to other interests in casting their ballots? The answer here too is "yes," but "yes" only in part. Many Southerners are still "fighting the Civil War" or following their grandfathers' advice. Many others, however, who do not care for their ancestors' behavior, have current reasons for voting Democratic. They vote Democratic because they can get what they want *via* the Democratic Party; they do not need nor care to establish another party. Such men as these are traditional in the statistical sense, not in the psychological sense.

Frequently, men speak of traditional voting in the psychological sense as being "irrational." They say, for example, that those Southerners who vote Democratic, even though they agree far more with the national policies of the Republican Party than with those of the Democratic Party, are "irrational." One can define "rational" as he pleases, of course; but objective political science cannot say that identification with one's ancestors is morally inferior to favoring some kind of economic self-betterment. It is not for political science to tell a man that he ought to prefer wealth to honor or a tariff

to his father's habits. Objectively we can only say that a person or a group that wants mutually contradictory values—for example, *both* Republican policies *and* agreement with ancestral behavior—is going to have a conflict of conscience and will act differently than other people in certain ways.

LOCALISM

Localism is as universal as traditionalism in affecting people's political behavior. By localism is meant a strong sentiment favoring one's neighborhood, town, city, or regional interests over the broader geographical community. In many cases localism is so strong a force that the only community a man belongs to is a local one. In most cases, however, localism is a partial bias, a separatist emotion, rather than a total community involvement. In Chapter 6, we shall mention the strong local character of American party politics. When we discuss legislatures in Volume II, we shall again mention the play of local interests in the behavior of representatives. In dealings with local institutions in Volume II, we shall treat at some length the limited horizons that politics has for many people. And in the chapter on federalism, local interests such as states' rights come into play. Thus, localism affects much political behavior and many political institutions. For the moment, to indicate its pervasiveness as a motive is enough. Many studies of election returns or of opinion polls discover that localism is a potent contributor to political behavior and attitudes.

ECONOMIC FORCES

Men often act politically according to their occupation and income level. The most extreme proponent of economic motivation was Karl Marx. He would say the voter acts according to his relation to the means of production. An "exploited worker" votes for revolutionary candidates; an owner of a business votes for a "capitalist." Voting figures, being records of real happenings, show no such pure behavior. Rather, economic motives are tied up with all the others that influence the way a vote is cast, and they are often subordinate to ideological, political, and social forces. What studies of voting behavior do show, and polls of opinion in general corroborate, is that there does exist a measurable tendency for people in like economic circumstances to vote alike on economic issues.

Sometimes we may find a poor man backing candidates who use slogans that appeal to the economic interests of the poor, and a rich man supporting a candidate using opposite slogans. Sometimes there is no apparent economic factor, but the rich men cast their votes differently from the poor men. The first event gives some support to the Marxian hypothesis. The second, however, shows no strong motive of economic class-interest in political affairs at all. We are merely using an economic index to show political differences between social groups. Very often only an economic index may be available, and when we find a positive correlation, we have the illusion that only the *economic* force separating the two groups is being measured.

Here is an example of how the use of an economic index may give an exaggerated impression of the strength of economic motivation: Let us suppose that a certain Englishman is a faithful supporter of the policies of the established Church of England. Let us suppose that he votes for a candidate who also supports this church. It is likely that the economic views of both the voter and the candidate will also for the most part coincide. Therefore, if we use a set of economic views as an index, and apply it to the two men, they will be seen to be alike in their views. However, this does *not* mean that these views are *economically determined* or *economically self-interested*. It only means that the economic *index* is associated with *whatever does determine* their behavior. The economic viewpoint is the only thing that is being measured, and *not* the total personality and its motivations.

IN EUROPE, SOCIAL GROUPINGS MORE MEANINGFUL

In Europe, the tendency for people of one social category to vote differently from those in other categories is more distinct than in America. Giving the vote to the poorer classes brought notable changes in the growth of new political parties and the composition of the political class. For example, after the Act of 1918 had given the vote to all adult English males, the Labour Party advanced to power rapidly; and before that, the Reform Act of 1832 had increased notably the representation of the merchants and manufacturers in the House of Commons. The abolition of the three-class Prussian representation system after World War I brought an immediate change in the party composition of the *Landtag* in favor

of the liberal-socialist parties of the left. All other countries saw an intensification of political groupings of voters according to economic features they shared in common. The workers became strongly organized into leftist parties.

RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES ON VOTING BEHAVIOR

The effect of religion upon voting behavior, like the effect of economic conditions, is often indirect. If one examines the programs of religious parties of Europe, one finds many non-religious appeals, especially conservative economic appeals. Obviously, therefore, religion and economic measures are tied together. In America, we find no religious parties, but we find

FIGURE 5
RELATION OF RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES TO
POLITICAL ATTITUDES*

| RELIGIOUS GROUP | RANK ORDER OF RELIGIOUS GROUPINGS | | |
|-----------------------------|---|---|----------------------------------|
| | <i>In Desiring More Power for Workers</i> | <i>In Giving High Importance to Guaranteed Security for Roosevelt</i> | <i>% in Group That Voted</i> |
| Baptist | 2 | 4 | 4 |
| Catholic | 4 | 1 | 2 |
| Undesignated Protestants | 6 | 6 | 7 |
| Protestant (smaller bodies) | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| No Preference | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Christian | 7 | 11 | 6 |
| Lutheran | 9 | 7 | 9 |
| Methodist | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Jewish | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Episcopal | 11 | 9 | 10 |
| Presbyterian | 10 | 10 | 11 |
| Congregational | 12 | 12 | 12 |

* Central Department of Research and Education: *Information Service*, Vol. 27, no. 20, part 2 (May 15, 1948). National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, New York, New York. See also, Wesley and Beverly Allinsmith: "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (1948), p. 377.

Note that an economic factor is obviously operating here. Most of the named religious groupings hold rankings corresponding to the average income status of their members. Thus, the average Congregationalist is somewhat better off than the average Baptist or Catholic and the "conservatism" of the Congregationalists is partially explainable by that fact. On the other hand, this study and others (such as a forthcoming study of a New York town) show that Jewish and Catholic views and affiliations are not completely explained when the economic factor is taken into account. Cultural and religious influences seem to be operating also.

religion at work in politics, nevertheless. We find Democratic sentiment more common among Catholics and Jews, but again indices of economic conditions, urban residence, national origin, and so on overlap with the religious index.

An analysis of four opinion polls of a sample of the American population in 1945 and 1946 presents the American pattern of religious influence in voting. It agrees substantially with other studies. We give the rank order of the religious denominations on three questions. The questions were:

- (1) "Would you agree that everybody would be happier, more secure and more prosperous if working people were given more power and influence in government, or would you say we would all be better off if the working people had no more power than they have now?"
- (2) "Which of these statements do you most agree with?
 - (a) The most important job for government is to make certain that there are good opportunities for each person to get ahead on his own.
 - (b) The most important job for the government is to guarantee every person a decent and steady job and standard of living."
- (3) Voted for Roosevelt, Dewey, or Didn't Vote in 1944.

Figure 5 presents the results of the survey.

Other studies also find consistently that Catholicism is related positively to Democratic affiliation. The anti-Catholicism of segments of American opinion was manifested during the 1928 election, when Alfred E. Smith, a Catholic, ran for the Presidency on the Democratic ticket and lost the support of several Southern states previously staunchly Democratic. Smith, however, also favored repeal of the prohibition amendment, and the South was strongly against its repeal. Furthermore, Gosnell pointed out that if Smith had run in 1932, he would have been elected on economic grounds despite his religious affiliations. Religious affiliations, like economic ones, become more important in voting behavior whenever religious issues are raised in the campaign (as they were in the elections of 1928 and 1960).

NATIONALITY AND RACE

Just as with religious and economic motivation, the most extreme examples of voting motivated by nationality or racial differences occur when the differences become political issues. European democratic politics have seen many a case of electoral differences over nationality. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Italy, and England have all had experience with electoral movements that arose from the demands of constituent nationalities. Canada faces similar difficulties with its voters of British and French origin.

These experiences make all the more remarkable the ability of the American political system to repress overt divisions along lines of national origins. Differences are known to exist—between "Cajuns" and hill folk in Louisiana, old immigrants and new immigrants in the North, Irish elements against Polish elements in several Northern cities, and so on. But no compact organization of voters on the basis of nationality persists for any length of time. Typically, in country and city, national blocs dwindle with each added year of settlement in America, until finally they cannot be manipulated at all as cohesive and integrated electoral forces.

Persons of groups that have settled recently in America—the Irish, Poles, Italians, Czechs, and other groups—tend to be Democratic more often than do persons of groups that have settled less recently—English, Scotch-Irish, Irish, Scandinavians, and others. The latter tend to be Republicans. There are, however, notable exceptions, and nationality here again is perhaps mostly a reinforcing influence on other economic, social, and historical factors. The Negroes in the United States, originally heavily Republican, have, during the period of the New Deal, become about equally Democratic and Republican outside the South. This change, in fact, has been one of the most significant to emerge in the area of voting behavior in the last fifty years.

SEX

We might imagine that the women, having achieved the vote at a late date, might differ from men in their subsequent use of it. On the whole, this is not so. There exist only small differences between the political affiliations of women and of men, and these differences have little to do with when the

vote was achieved. Rather they seem to relate to more basic differences in the upbringing of men and of women. Studies by Tingsten and others in Europe and America indicate that women tend to vote somewhat more for conservative and religious center parties than do men and are less inclined toward extreme reaction or radicalism. They incline, at least in Britain and America, to support pacifist ideas more than men. And they tend to be more rigid on moral issues, supporting more strongly movements such as that for the prohibition of the sale of alcoholic beverages.

Public Opinion

RELATIONS WITH COMMUNITY AND PUBLIC

We have already declared, in studying communities and personal interests, that people gain opinions from their various affiliations. If two communities and publics overlap one another, engaging the affiliations of some of the same people, or of different people living side by side, we should still have public opinion about issues of concern to one or both publics. In fact, these differences in degree and kind of affiliations are a common source of disputed opinions. For instance, some American states' rightists wish to recapture for their state communities certain powers from the national government and find their opinions opposed by nationalists who have no sympathy for the state as a community. And when we consider also that individuals belonging to the same public may belong to different subgroups—religious, national, professional, neighborhood—we can perceive another important source of contested opinions. For instance, South Carolina states' rightists owning textile mills may oppose the C.I.O., whereas South Carolina states' rightists working in such mills may favor a union.

PUBLIC OPINION NOT CONSENSUS

We may ask now about the nature of public opinion and look into its several dimensions. Public opinion is not to be confused with consensus. Consensus is not present in every community or public; it requires a high cohesiveness that such groupings may not possess. Consensus may not be present in a public wherein public opinion is abundantly displayed.

Conversely, when consensus does exist, those beliefs that

compose it are beyond dispute and hence beyond the scope of public opinion. The English monarchy is favored as part of the English consensus; it is too important and agreeable to most Englishmen to be debated in the forum of public opinion. Hence it is most useful to think of consensus as the unquestioned moral principles about politics and government that may be held by a public. By contrast, public opinion may be perceived as arising over any controversy, whether or not the controversy is framed within an existing consensus or develops in the absence of any consensus at all. Without proving finally here that a great consensus exists in the United States, we can say that one belief that would form part of such a consensus is that the President must be elected. Whether Truman or Taft or Eisenhower or someone else should be elected is a matter of public opinion.

DEFINITION OF PUBLIC OPINION

If these relationships between public opinion and other concepts are clear, there need be little difficulty with the precise definition of public opinion. Public opinion is a *belief* held by a *number of people* regarding a *political issue*. By a belief is meant a delineated, definable feeling about the rightness or wrongness of a projected course of action. By a number of people is meant all those holding to one or more of the projected resolutions of the belief. By a political issue is meant any problem for the solution of which people turn to the government.

SIX DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion has no real existence apart from the people who form it. It is a concept, a way of referring to parts of people's psychological activities, useful for analytic and statistical purposes and for predicting behavior. Once posited, we can give its dimensions and show how to assess or measure it. The important dimensions are as follows:

1. The number of alternative opinions that exist on an issue.
2. The distribution of social groups according to their adherence to one or more of the alternatives.
3. The intensity with which the beliefs are held.


4. The number of people adhering to the various alternative opinions.
5. The degree of organization of and critical political controls held by the opinion groups.
6. The rate of opinion change over time periods.

Once these data are collected on a particular issue, we have a reliable basis for analyzing and predicting the behavior of the public on that issue.

THE NUMBER OF VARIANT BELIEFS

Let us take a hypothetical case to illustrate how it is possible to analyze and speak and think more exactly about public opinion. Given political issue X, we find five major subcategories of beliefs regarding X. Let these be called A, B, C, D, and E. The relationship of the subcategories to X may be diagrammed as a Figure 6.

FIGURE 6
VARIANT BELIEFS ON AN ISSUE



EXAMPLES:

(1) G. C. Thompson, in *Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, 1875-1880* (2 vols., 1886), gives us a splendid account of the relations of English opinion and political leadership on the issue of British policy towards Turkey and Russia over a five-year period, ending in the electoral defeat of the ministry of Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli). Mr. Thompson describes four major variants of belief on the issue: supporters of Turkey and haters of Russia; advocates of isolation and avoidance of war; believers in international order and legalism; and advocates of anti-Turkism and emancipation of Christians from the Turks. These major views dominated opinion over several years.

(2) Morton Grodzins, in *Americans Betrayed* (1949), presents a remarkable full-scale study of the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West coast of the United States in the months following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, with particular reference to the opinions and pressures shaping the policy. The major beliefs regarding the issue were: advocacy of evacuation and stringent control of all persons of Japanese race to prevent treason; advocacy of the same with respect to Japanese aliens; and advocacy of individual treatment of all persons on the basis of specific violations of the law.

COMMENT: Both authors point to much rationalization. Thus some English supported emancipation of Christians in order that English control over Egypt might be obtained. Some Americans supported evacuation to prevent treason because they disliked the Japanese as a race and as economic competitors in California. In short, there are always layers upon layers of subbeliefs. It is incorrect to believe that a poll of two sides to an issue provides a full description of subbeliefs on the issue.


POSITION OF SOCIAL GROUPS ON THE ISSUE

If we examine the persons holding to the subcategories of belief, we find that many of the people holding, for example, to variant A will belong to certain social groups, those holding to D to other social groups. Figure 7 adds these social groupings (indicated by arabic numerals) to the diagram as given in Figure 6.

EXAMPLES:

(1) Thompson's analysis shows that English opinion on the Near East was reflected in associational activity. The character of English government and society at the time resulted in a loose pattern of social groupings with reference to the subbeliefs. The main groups were in Parliament, with the Conservatives under Beaconsfield and the Liberals under Gladstone. In the Foreign Office "the right of Public Opinion to be sovereign was most explicitly challenged." Outside the government, we note the role of the press, petitions of occupational groups, many letters, a variety of meetings of organized and informal groups, the participation of Catholic and Jewish view-

FIGURE 7
SOCIAL GROUPINGS IN RELATION TO VARIANT BELIEFS



points along with those of the Anglican clergy, and even the presence of spokesmen for foreign nations like Russia, Turkey, Germany, and Hungary. The social groupings, we note, are not formal save in a few instances.

(2) Grodzins' analysis of American opinion on the evacuation of Japanese shows greater formal group participation. Here, too, we have government opinion—that of the War Department, the Department of Justice, and Congress—that must be differentiated from outside opinion. However, since this issue is internal and local political influence potent in America, we find the West coast Congressmen as a group veering towards the evacuation and carrying along the whole Congress, and we observe how active are the state and local politicians. Outside the government the American Legion, Lions clubs, vegetable growers, and chambers of commerce are working hard to achieve evacuation. Contrariwise, the Civil Liberties Union, the League for Industrial Democracy, the Japanese American Citizens League, and other groups fought evacuation or at least tried to confine it to "enemy aliens" alone. Writes Grodzins: "Not all organizations, by any means, were calling for evacuation. But opposition groups were far outnumbered and almost unpublicized."


COMMENT: It is impossible to determine the exact extent to which opinion is formed by groups and policy is made by

groups (see Chapter Seven). Issues of the nineteenth century did not seem to be surrounded by group activity as do contemporary issues, especially in America. The precise position of a single group is difficult to ascertain also. Thus the Liberal Party of Gladstone never had a precise position. Nor could the Western Growers Protective Association, which urged evacuation, be pinned down to one subbelief. All that we learned about leadership in Chapter Three and that we shall learn about pressure groups in Chapter Seven should warn us against taking any group as a unanimous mass of opinion.

INTENSITY OF CONVICTION

An issue may mean more to some people than to others, and this fact, so important in the political process, should be somehow considered. To visualize it, we may widen the lines in our diagram to represent strength of pull or intensity; the thicker the line from X to the subbelief, the greater the average intensity of belief held by those holding the subbelief. Assuming that the intensity of conviction of the members of A is on the average three times that of the holders of B and C and twice that of D and E, the new version of the lines of belief would be as in Figure 8.

FIGURE 8
THE AVERAGE INTENSITY OF CONVICTION AMONG HOLDERS OF SUBBELIEFS



EXAMPLES:

(1) Thompson's study reveals much about the intensity of opinion on the Eastern question indirectly. The common usage implying intensity is a statement of consequence, to wit: "If belief A is followed, we will do Y" (Y being vote against you, agitate more strongly, lose faith in England, decline to co-operate, stop reading your newspaper, never pay you honor, or inflict other sanctions within our command). In addition, Thompson speaks variously of "serious misgivings," "extraordinary manifestations of opinion," "the Crusading Spirit," a "certain hostility" or a "universal hostility," "dread," "panic," "the fever" that "had long been rising," and other expressions of greater or lesser emotion.

(2) Grodzins is more conscious of the need to assess intensity closely. He counts the number of favorable and unfavorable editorials, letters to the editors and to public officials, and space given to stories about resident Japanese. He calculates the news space devoted to demands for evacuation and otherwise tries to indicate precisely the lengths to which people will go in supporting their opinions. He also takes care to describe how terrible was the fear among some people for the safety of the Pacific coast. He uses crime records to indicate the extent of vigilantism against Japanese, and reports speeches that make allegations about "hysterical people taking matters into their own hands."

COMMENT: Grodzins' less florid style, his greater awareness of the problem of intensity of opinion, and his use of new techniques of opinion research enable one to judge better the intensity of the opinions he is studying. And, judging well the intensity of opinion is highly important in predicting the reactions that follow a decision favoring one opinion. One heated critic can often hurt a politician more than ten luke-warm friends can help him.

NUMBERS OF ADHERENTS TO A BELIEF

The intensity of conviction may be countered to some extent by the number of adherents to each subbelief category. Let us say that A has twice as many adherents as C, D, and E but only half as many as B. We have shown these relationships in size by rectangles in Figure 8.

EXAMPLES:

- (1) Thompson attempts only briefly to analyze election returns as an indication of the support given Disraeli's policies. He judges or leaves the reader to judge the extent of popular support for any viewpoint by reporting countless news articles, meetings, Parliamentary votes, and individual opinions of participants and observers. He as much as admits that there was needed "some machinery beyond mere guess-work for ascertaining how far Public Opinion responds." He is in the position of an experienced night watchman at the zoo who tries from the outside to judge the sources, sides, and number of participants in a pandemonium coming from the monkey house.
- (2) Even though his techniques for studying the flow of communications are superior to those used by Thompson, Grodzins is up against the same problems. He judges the number of adherents to a belief from meetings, from letters to the press and to officials, and from the guesses of the press, public officials, and journalists. But he can find only one, poorly conducted, "honest" poll, and that disagrees sharply with a high official's declaration that "the American citizens of California, with hardly a dissenting voice say that the Japanese, both alien and American-born, must go."

COMMENT: Constant, careful polling is the best way to judge the extent of support of an opinion among the public. Pressure groups and politicians tend to claim excessive support for their opinions. Often followers back the views of their leaders in official actions but do so with reservations or reluctance.

ORGANIZATION AND CRITICAL CONTROLS

Finally, the social groups (1 to 15), involved in the opinion configuration, do not all have the same degree of efficiency in organization or the same amount of critical political controls (that is, number of offices held, wealth, social prestige, propaganda media). Let us assume that they could be rated as follows on a scale of 1 to 5:

| | EFFICIENCY OF ORGANIZATION | COMMAND OF CRITICAL POLITICAL CONTROLS |
|----|----------------------------|--|
| 1 | 5 | 5 |
| 2 | 3 | 5 |
| 3 | 1 | 4 |
| 4 | 1 | 2 |
| 5 | 2 | 1 |
| 6 | 4 | 1 |
| 7 | 3 | 2 |
| 8 | 3 | 2 |
| 9 | 3 | 1 |
| 10 | 2 | 1 |
| 11 | 2 | 2 |
| 12 | 5 | 5 |
| 13 | 4 | 5 |
| 14 | 4 | 2 |
| 15 | 1 | 4 |

In Figure 8 we have given equal length to each point on the 1 to 5 scale. Thus, for example, group 1 is drawn twice as long as group 3, since it equals 5 + 5, whereas group 3 equals 1 + 4. Our operation here distorts reality, for we cannot measure organizations so neatly. Nevertheless, even such rough evaluations of the potential political energy of the groups involved in a particular issue may aid our insight.

EXAMPLES:

(1) Conclusions about the strength and strategy of the groups involved in the Eastern question depend upon indirect evidence on the character of the participants. Outside the government, one gets the impression of formlessness—committees are formed, and later dissolved; few are continuous and staffed by professionals. These loose groups are judged by the “big shots” in them. Thus the first meeting to support the rebels against Turkish rule was described by the *Times* as “not a crowded one and which certainly could not boast the presence of any distinguished person.” Also “it was said that the Queen was significantly displaying marks of favour towards Lord Beaconsfield.”

(2) Grodzins makes sharp comparisons between the or-

ganizations advocating and those opposing evacuation, showing the preponderance of wealth, staff, and connections of the former. He shows in a number of instances how the leaders of organizations brought pressure to bear upon the press, public officers, and the opposition, and how the leaders of like-minded organizations co-operated to increase their collective force. He emphasizes the secure political and economic positions held in the community by advocates of evacuation.

COMMENT: The subjects of efficiency of organization and command of critical political controls are at the juncture of the study of public opinion and the study of parties and pressure groups, treated elsewhere in this book. We note, however, that organizations are the means by which public opinion gears into public policies. At this point, informal behavior is becoming transformed into formal behavior. Well located and organized groups can direct terrific pressures of opinion—backed by an array of inducements and sanctions—towards a person making a public policy.

PATTERNS OF PUBLIC OPINION ARE UNSTABLE

But our charts are static; real opinion is often in flux. If we suppose the lines leading from X to ABCDE in Figure 6 to be directional lines indicating how much in opposition the alternative beliefs are, we can say that at this one point in time A and B, although powerful and mutually opposing, have more in common than they have with C, D, and E. In fact, C appears as if it might be "on the fence" or torn between both constellations, AB and DE. Shifts and changes by C could spell a crisis for either AB or DE. Since AB and DE are almost diametrically opposed on the issue, can we say that "consensus" is broken? No, we cannot, because the primary indicator of consensus is the intensity dimensions of AB and DE, plus the compromising strength of C—the "crucial center" from one point of view. If X were a proposal to close taverns on Sunday, or a money appropriation bill, without hidden meaning, opposite positions would not be intense enough to threaten consensus. But if X were a proposal to declare illegal all trades unions or to confiscate all industrial establishments employing over 1,000 workers, or a declaration of war, then

“consensus” would be in some danger of being destroyed, and our intensity scale would have to reflect it.

EXAMPLES:

(1) In the works of Thompson and Grodzins, cited above, the instability of opinion becomes quite clear. Other studies by Gabriel Almond, Hadley Cantril, George Gallup, Robert Merton, and Angus Campbell reveal similar fluctuations. Thompson, for example, discovered an Incubation Period, an Atrocity Period, a Period of Reconciliation of people and government, a Conference Period, a Parliamentary Period, a Period of Conditional Neutrality and of Armed Neutrality. He speaks of gatherings, the tone of which in 1876 was “full of self-confidence” and in 1878 was “downcast and distrustful, distrustful of its own backing in the country, and daunted by the forces with which it had to contend.”

(2) Grodzins shows in a chart the progress of front-page newspaper attention to resident Japanese, ranging from 1,000 picas in the period December 8-14, 1941, to almost nothing between January 5-25, 1942, to 9,000 picas in the period January 26—February 1.

COMMENT: It hardly needs saying that one of the most exasperating problems in studying public opinion is the failure of opinion to “stand still long enough to be photographed.” If we think of public opinion as being only a man’s voting record, we fall into grave misconceptions. A man may vote Republican all his life and have many thousands of opinions.

Having considered the main factors in the public opinion surrounding issue X—namely, subbeliefs or alternative solutions of A; the location of social groups related to the subbelief alternatives; the intensity of conviction and the number of adherents to each subbelief alternative; the degree of organization and number of critical controls possessed by the social groups involved in each alternative, and the fluctuations of opinions over a period of time—we can make a fair guess as to who may win out in the battle of opinion.

The astute politician often judges public opinion according to these several dimensions, though he may not be aware of

it. And it is safe to say that any politician—in the United States or in Russia, in elective or in appointive office—who is totally unaware of just one of these dimensions will get into trouble from time to time. One must emphatically dismiss as *childish* and useless the notion that public opinion is like a self-renewing and massive electric charge that strikes all issues, showing eager leaders exactly what is *wanted* and what to do.

The Majority


MAJORITIES AS SIMPLE OPINIONS

The majority, as we previously defined it, is the agreement of more than half of any given group upon an issue. If a majority occurred whenever an issue arose, the analysis of public opinion would be enormously simplified. We should merely have to substitute Figure 9 for our bothersome opinion analysis diagrammed in Figure 8. For then there would be only a majority and a minority opinion and presumably the public would be so simple as not to include the many groups that contribute to the complexity of opinions. Only a most primitive and cohesive society might approach such a condition. In our own society only small discussion or committee groups might possess such a simple division of opinion.

THE MAJORITY AS A WAY OF RESOLVING ISSUES

On the other hand, the majority principle is used frequently to decide questions at issue. This should not be taken to mean that the public opinion on the question exhibits a majority. Not at all. Public opinion may be vastly complex, with nothing like a majority discernible and with many power groups tugging at the issue from all sides. But some way is needed to stop the tug-of-war in order to get on with *some* policy and to attend to other matters. The issue must be resolved. Hence, the majority principle is frequently used to resolve issues. Very often, when one examines the reasons behind a majority agreement, be it a majority vote for the Presidency or a congressional majority vote on a bill, he finds that many different and even conflicting opinions contributed to the majority. The majority was simply the technique for creating a decision when the decision had to be made.

FIGURE 9
PUBLIC OPINION, ASSUMING A SIMPLE MAJORITY



In this manner the majority is used as an expedient. As Prime Minister Gladstone of Great Britain once described it: "Decision by majorities is as much an expedient as lighting by gas. In adopting it as a rule, we are not realizing perfection, but bowing to an imperfection. It has the great merit of avoiding, and that by a test perfectly definite, the last resort to violence; and of making force itself the servant instead of the master of authority." Or, as Professor Charles Heinberg asserted: "The majority principle is simply a convenient rule of law, and contains no inherent ethical validity."

Thus we find that the majority principle frequently is used in organizations and governments that are not committed to any general belief in the rightness or wrongness of the majority. The Spartans, not great believers in majority rule, used the principle; some medieval German kings were elected by majority vote of the important vassals; and most corporate bodies use it as a way of getting things done. We must grant that it is convenient and simple to take the desire of 51 per cent as conclusive and decisive, especially when heated matters are not being decided, and when many petty decisions need to be made by people who are agreed on more basic things.

EMPLOYMENT OF OTHER PRINCIPLES OF RESOLVING ISSUES

Other principles besides that of the majority may also be employed to resolve issues. Courts and executive officers make many decisions. An assembly may require that issues be decided by unanimity, plurality, majority of members in attendance, majority of members constituting the total assembly, or by two-thirds rule. The unanimity rule, often regarded as ludicrous and unworkable, has worked under circumstances where it is conceded that no one need agree with the group, or where the pressures for the voters or members of an assembly to conform to the group are great and a method of counting is not required. The English House of Lords and other medieval assemblies of the nobles and high clergy worked on the principle of unanimity. In some

of the earliest gatherings of the House of Commons, certain members refused to acquiesce in decisions of the body and returned to their constituencies. Medieval kings of Poland were elected by a unanimous vote of the princes of the electoral body. John Calhoun, in the American Senate before the Civil War, argued, with considerable support, that decisions of the federal government affecting the basic nature of the Union could not be made by a mere majority but required a "concurrent majority" of all "parties" (states) to the Union.

Furthermore, in pursuance of more general principles that conflict with the majority principle, such as the principle of checks and balances, a two-thirds or some other high ratio vote may be required of an assembly on certain issues. Treaties prepared by the President of the United States and foreign nations must gain the approval of two thirds of the Senate to be binding and constitutional. The veto is given the executive in practically all American governments; some extraordinary number of votes are required of the assembly if it wishes to override his action. The number is most frequently, as it is in the national government, two thirds.

BEYOND OPINION AND EXPEDIENCY

Thus, a majority may denote (rarely) the condition of opinion and frequently may be used as a principle or technique to foreclose an issue. But beyond its possible status as an opinion or as an expedient, the majority is often a key symbol in a great many political disputes that reaches back a number of centuries. As an agitational symbol, the "majority" is not at all a clear condition or technique. It is a term holding numberless meanings, yearnings, threats, terrors, and promises. It is really in such a complete state of semantic decomposition that the most we can do with it is to extract two general meanings from this third level of usage and describe generally their historical career.

1. On the third or *ethical* level of its meaning, the majority may be a profound belief in the rightness of using the majority principle for deciding issues whenever possible, rather than any other principle. The majority is then not opinion or expediency; it is part of a consensus. Most Americans hold to this meaning of majority as part of their consensus. This may be called *majority rule*.

This belief in majority rule, so widespread in America, values highly majority opinions and the use of the majority principle for resolving issues. It tends to demand both, but where the first cannot be found, it still insists upon the second. Often people who believe in majority rule erroneously believe that majority opinions always exist, and their thinking suffers sadly as a result. They fail to realize that they have two lines of defense and can fall back from one to the other. A brief history of the belief in majority rule will show its complications and variations.

MEDIEVAL THEORY OF THE MAJORITY

Early modern western European political theorists, most of them jurists, inherited the majority principle from the practice followed in corporations under the law of the late Roman Empire. In the early modern period close relations still existed between the Catholic Church and the late feudal states, and when the clergy began to employ the majority principle as a means of resolving disputed questions in certain orders and convocations, men in what we now consider the secular, political sphere surmised that the principle might also be useful to them. However, medieval theorists did not allow the majority clear sailing. Marsiglio of Padua, for example, referred, not to the "larger part," but to the "prevailing part" as the voice of the community. That is to say, power, eminence, and worth were to be valued along with numbers. But at least he *mentioned numbers*. That was his concession to the majority principle, and a radical one it was in those days.

It is noteworthy that most medieval political theorists and their predecessors thought that the values of the community ought to be the objectives of the state. The law was "declared custom." For example, the forerunner of the modern jury was a group of neighbors, a sample of the community, convoked to declare what the common law of the community was in order to inform the King's courts. Both medieval and modern theorists seem to agree that the majority will is at minimum the *passive will* of the people that sets the boundaries within which the laws are to be made. The majority will, in this sense, is what modern theory calls consensus.

IS THE MAJORITY OMNISCIENT?

A more modern variety of the belief in majority rule declares that the majority is omniscient. It is right and can do what it wills. There is a great reluctance to condemn it on any grounds, and the community is supposed to acquiesce gladly in the majority verdict. This is the extreme democratic notion and is found in the more unguarded utterances of Jefferson, the aggressive politics of Jackson, and beneath the devious subtleties of Karl Marx. Jeremy Bentham, in his exuberant desire for a grand rational principle of legislation, was captured by the majority principle and demanded that the greatest number be the judge of what would bring happiness to the greatest number.

MAJORITY AS COURT OF LAST RESORT

Variations of this idea of the omnipotence of the majority shade off into the idea that the majority ought to be the court of last resort on basic matters affecting a society, and the idea that the majority ought to have some voice in the selection of officers. John Locke, in the second part of his work *Of Civil Government*, declared that the rights of liberty, property, and revolution must not be taken from the total community. Otherwise, he felt that the legislative body might operate according to its majority will. Modern writers, Lindsay, for example, justify the majority idea with the slogan "only the wearer knows when the shoe pinches." This is a watered-down version of the Locke theory and gives the majority a sort of veto on the actions of government. On the other hand, Edmund Burke would not concede that basic rights were reserved to the people. He would permit the electorate only a modest voice in the selection of representatives.

All these beliefs may be grouped into the first of our two basic attitudes towards the majority, that the majority must be understood and followed. Inherent in these ideas is the attitude that the majority has a sense, a reason, a voice or a capacity for specific activity. The Leveller movement in seventeenth-century England, many leaders of the American and French revolutions, and the greater number of political leaders of the nineteenth century took this attitude.

2. Also on the third or ethical level of its meaning, the majority may be considered to be bad and harmful if allowed to rule. This is *anti-majoritarianism*. It holds that the majority must either be ignored or coerced. Its history too may be sketched.

The belief that the majority should have nothing to say is an absolutistic, monarchical notion and is also an aristocratic notion that persists to the present time. Examples of this fear of the majority and the hope that it can be politically ignored are found in the writings of Europeans like Émile Faguet, in his book *The Cult of Incompetence*, and Ortega y Gasset, in his book *Revolt of the Masses*. John Adams, James Fenimore Cooper, and Henry Adams were early American exponents of this belief. Among those who argued that the majority cannot rule are writers such as Roberto Michels, Max Weber, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto—they say the majority is nonrational, cannot act of its own accord, and is generally manipulated through propaganda and violence.

A related view, which does not dislike the idea of majority rule necessarily, asserts however that a majority never exists. Of course, they mean by this that opinion analysis rarely reveals a majority.

Perhaps one of the most complete attempts to banish the majority principle is the complete guild, syndicalist, or corporate-state idea. This idea would have the state governed by organized occupational groups; men would be represented according to occupation rather than according to geographical districts (see Chapters Five and Seven). Each occupation would be autonomous, not governed by central rule or majority rule from above. Gabriele d'Annunzio, fiery poet, passionate novelist, and the dictator of Fiume after World War I, drew up in 1919 a blueprint for the perfect corporate state that influenced the Fascist idea. He modeled his guilds after the nine muses of the ancient Greeks. Nine great corporations were to be named for them—a corporation of salaried workers, technical and administrative employees, commercial employees, all employers, civil servants, professions (2), consumers' co-operatives, and seafarers. The tenth muse of the Greeks was nameless. And so d'Annunzio declared that there would be a tenth nameless corporation that would gather

up the loose ends that evaded the other corporations. It was, he said, to direct the mysterious forces inherent in a people in labor and ascendancy. The meaning of the nameless muse and of d'Annunzio's exotic language is startling—that is that the life of the total community could not be neatly divided. There was a sentiment somewhere, an interest that could not be categorized. That interest, we infer, would be the community interest that could never be syllogized out of existence. Perhaps such is the elusive “majority” of Marsiglio, Jefferson, and the others.

At its least, the majority idea adds flexibility to one's view of the structure of society. William James once said that *no relationship between two objects or between a person and the outside world ever includes everything or dominates over everything*. There is always the word “and” trailing off after every descriptive sentence. So it is with the tenth muse, that gathers no specialized craft, but rather the echoes of the total concept of society.

THE MAJORITY IS MORE THAN OPINION OR MERE EXPEDIENT

It is apparent that the adherents of the theories just described see some problem connected with the idea of the majority that goes beyond the mere examination of opinions or the use of the majority principle for getting things done. There is some ethical quality in the idea that appears to some as a great good, to others as a menace. No amount of technical definition can diminish the force that the majority idea has generated. Revolutions have been fought and rivers of blood shed over the principle. Public opinion polls and intensive studies of the dynamics of small groups and of the attitudes of students and of voters have all indicated the strength of the belief, in America at least, that majority agreement is and ought to be the test of truth on matters of opinion, and that the denial of the right of “majority” rule is blasphemy.

We see, therefore, in the great struggles of centuries between majority rule and antimajoritarianism a struggle to elevate or depress the degree to which the community is allowed to become a public and to which the public is allowed to make laws. The political community, say the advocates of majority rule, has its customary sanctions, but it needs a new will and way. The community has the only instruments that it can and should justly employ, respond the antimajor-

The Community and Special Interests / 157

itarians. The contest shows no signs of ending. The belief that a community of men, a public, may somehow generate devices for forming and executing decisions persists strongly. And the obstacles before it—mechanical and human—seem insurmountable. The story of representation and elections, and of parties and pressure groups—now to be treated in order—accents our conclusion that the great social groupings are like the ocean surfs: they may gradually wear away the beaches, but in the immediate reckoning they exhaust their force on the many rocks of organized interest that surround public policy.

Chapter 5

Representation and Elections

IN SEVERAL ways the preceding chapter on the public and personal interests forms an essential part of the study of representation and elections. The presence of numerous overlapping and often conflicting connections among men sets the stage for the struggle for representation. These interests will cause men to seek governmental forms benefiting their interests—be the interest so large as the safety of the community itself or so small as a tariff to keep out foreign-made shoelaces. Those community influences we have discussed—such as technological interdependence and national loyalties—and those separatist traditional, local, economic, religious, and other leanings we have described combine into dynamic movements to determine the forms of government. The more enduring and basic the interest, the more likely it is that men who share it will organize and wage political battle on its behalf. It is a grave error to think of representative government—or any other form of government—as a static organization, designed to give all conceivable desires equal weight in the determination of laws. In reality, representative government originated in a conflict of interests and is perpetually maintained and changed by the conflict of interests. This chapter will reveal such facts as they are discoverable in history and today. It will show how the numerous facets of men's political characters, described in the last chapter, cause men as individuals and in groups to promote representative and elective devices that help them achieve their ends.

Representative Government

Preparatory to sketching the career of representative government, let us define it and its companion term "representation." Representation is a relation between an official and citizen that exists whenever an action of the official accords with the desires of the citizen. Representative government is a government that makes great use of devices to ensure representation, such as the election of officials. The representation principle is built into the state; it is regularized,

provided for as a normal procedure, and given certain important powers to work with.

ANCIENT REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

The origins of representative government are still somewhat unclear. Early Greek democracies were governed directly by the citizens, not by elected representatives who were authorized to pass laws. When these democracies formed leagues for religious or warlike purposes, their delegates operated under strict instructions. The Roman Republic passed into the Roman Empire without employing the principle of representation, and, so say a number of scholars, one of the reasons for the failure of the Republic lay in its inability to "invent" the principle. The Republic of Rome, built on the city-state, town-meeting pattern, had no mechanical way of representing the people of their far-flung possessions. Tenny Frank, however, in studying the semi-independent Macedonian republics set up by the Romans, has concluded with reservations that "the Macedonian state had a republican form of government that was not very different from that of more advanced republics today."

IMPORTANCE OF MIDDLE AGES TO REPRESENTATION

We do not know whether the Macedonian and other ancient experiments in representation were handed down into the Middle Ages. There is more evidence to show that a second Roman device persisted and had some influence on the development of representative government. This device was the corporation, a legal fiction whereby an organization could be created with an existence apart from that of its members and with powers to perform tasks in their name. Ecclesiastical bodies, such as the Dominican Order, were organized along corporate lines and in several important cases held assemblies attended by delegates of their scattered component groups.

By the beginning of the thirteenth century, this idea of the corporation was adapted to a growing secular, political pattern in western Europe. Kings were reaching out for power. They were trying to consolidate realms more extensive than the average principality. Towns were growing up and had much to gain from some form of monarchical stability, for trade prospered with wider markets and longer periods of

peace. At the same time, the wealth and populations of towns could help the Kings subdue feudal competitors. Feudal ways of financing the King gradually disappeared because they were not as flexible or as generous as periodic consultations and contracts between the towns and the Kings.

In the English countryside, we find the King extending his influence through his itinerant judges, who would call up inquest juries to describe what the local law was. "Twelve men, therefore," wrote an early English historian, "were chosen to make known the provisions of their laws and customs, so far as they were able, omitting nothing and changing nothing by deception." Commenting on these events, Maude Clarke, in *Medieval Representation and Consent*, writes: "Thus between 1066 and 1226 the principle of representation was, by means of the inquest and jury, elaborated to such a point that the knights of the shire were brought to the frontiers of political responsibility."

Both the *untitled proprietors of the land* and the *town leaders*, therefore, came to have a certain role in relation to the King. Both were useful administratively. Both provided political support to kingly aspirations. Both were affected by the idea of consent in this new, nonfeudal situation; they felt that new practices that were not covered by the law ought to be settled by bargaining. The King was given what he wanted most of the time, but not without some bickering, protests, and refusals.

CONVOKING THE COMMONS

The high nobility and clergy of the late Middle Ages were already entrenched behind their privileges. In England the Magna Carta legalized their position. They were frequently consulted and already constituted an assembly. In the thirteenth century, however, the Kings called in the commons, that is, the representatives of the untitled landed interests and the commercial interests of the towns. Early in the century, parliaments of the three estates—nobles, clergy, and commons—were called in Spain, Sicily, and France. In 1265, Simon de Montfort called to the English Parliament for the first time the three estates of England. The exact method of selection in the beginning is in doubt. In 1295, the writ calling the Parliament prescribed elections. Members of these parliaments were strictly controlled by their home con-

stituencies. The suffrage was limited, and the elections were conducted by a number of different methods in the various countries and localities. Within the parliaments, the landed interests far outnumbered and dominated the town representatives, but town membership grew gradually in numbers and power.

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT BY AN OLIGARCHY

There is some evidence that the idea of representative government was close to realization in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, even though representation was based on the estates, and not on the nation as a whole. Within this estates system the assemblies had considerable power and prestige. But everywhere the estates type of representative government declined as the Kings overpowered the nobles and reduced church influence. Only in England did the representative form of government survive, though weakened and pallid under the Tudors (1485-1603). Its tenacity and durability there prepared the way for important changes in the locus of power because the government at least provided a tolerant atmosphere for the growing influence of commerce and of the towns. Elsewhere those promoting the causes of the middle classes and of the "rights of man" could find no ladder of power up which they might climb. In England they could move, slowly, it is true, and not without great effort, into positions from which they could protect their interests. Finally in 1689 a combination of landed, commercial, and religious interests in England, represented in the House of Commons, determined that the ultimate legislative authority should be the Parliament, not the Crown.

However, this form of government, although it used representation, was an oligarchy, not a representative government as we define this term—direct control of the assembly by a large electorate. The controlling forces in the Commons of eighteenth-century England were the agents of a tiny group of wealthy and often titled men.

ADVENT OF MODERN REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

Modern representative government arose out of bitter disputes over the relation of the representative to his constituency. One group proclaimed that the representative is a free agent, attached only by the bonds of good will and remote

influence to his constituents. The opposing group demanded that the representative should be elected, restrained, and tutored by his constituency. Since the first view conformed to the existing representative situation in England, its advocates might be expected also to be defenders of the *status quo*.

This is what in fact occurred. Edmund Burke, the foremost spokesman of the established system, declared in 1774 that "*mandates* issued, which the member [of Parliament] is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and conscience; these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land, and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenour of our constitution."

But Burke's order had not long to live. In the last part of the eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth century, growing opposition to "irresponsible" representatives induced Parliament finally, in 1832, to reorganize the whole electoral system of England, giving many more persons the vote and evening out the number of people who stood behind each member of Parliament. Exact obedience to instructions or mandates was not demanded by law, but the representatives became much more sensitive to sentiments of their constituents than their predecessors had been.

Meanwhile the English development was surpassed in America and France. In early nineteenth-century America, the vote was given to all white males, elections of most government officials were held at brief intervals, and, in some states, the constitutions even authorized the constituents to instruct their representatives (though in practice, this was almost impossible). The Jeffersonian ideal, the belief in "the people acting directly on all things concerning them," came to be held by millions. The egalitarianism that Burke thought dangerous became a cardinal belief of the peoples of America, England, and France. Declared Jefferson, "Equal representation is so fundamental a principle in a true republic that no prejudices can justify its violation."

MAJOR PROBLEMS OF REPRESENTATION AND ELECTIONS TODAY

The twentieth century, prolonging and developing the trend of the nineteenth century, brought representative government to most parts of the world. This triumph, however,

has not simplified by much our problem of analyzing governmental institutions. Not only are there still many significant differences in the structures of the governments of the world, as seen in their constitutions and laws, but there are wide differences in practices to be found among governments whose structures superficially are quite similar. In this chapter, we shall have a good deal to say about certain of these differences. We shall answer the questions: Who has the right to vote? How many people exercise their right to cast ballots? How much power does the vote give to the electorate? How are the voters grouped, that is, apportioned, for the purposes of electing officers? How is the balloting for officials conducted and how are the ballots counted?

A discussion of these questions will take us a good distance toward understanding the different forms of government and political practices. But we shall have to devote a chapter apiece to political parties and pressure groups before we can adequately understand the forces working on systems of representation and elections.

Universal Suffrage

As has been shown above, much of the struggle for representation in government takes place through the fight for the vote in which different social groupings in society try to exercise disproportionate influence. Many think that every man, by virtue of being *homo sapiens*, ought to be allowed the vote, while others think the vote should go only to those who own land or some other form of personal wealth. Other claims have been advanced for and against women, minorities, the young, the noncitizens, the nonresident, and so on. Each new restriction and each abandonment of an old restriction shifts some amount of influence from some interests or values to others. *Generally speaking, all adults of all politically organized communities who are not affected by certain limiting disabilities have the right to vote in equal measure.* Some interesting exceptions to this generalization occur with respect to (1) property and taxes, (2) sex, (3) race, (4) education, (5) citizenship, (6) residence, and (7) age. Selected examples will show the things men wish to accomplish by suffrage restrictions. We will also need to discuss plural voting and compulsory voting.

PROPERTY AND TAX QUALIFICATIONS

In some countries the electorate is universal except for a few scattered property and tax restrictions. The poll tax in several of the Southern states of the United States is an example. Although the poll tax is usually only one or two dollars per year, many potential voters find other ways of spending their money more gratifying or forget to pay it before registration and election time. It then accumulates and twice as big a sum must be paid the next year. In many American localities, only property holders are allowed to vote on certain kinds of bond-issue proposals and other financial propositions.

SEX

All major countries now grant the vote to women. Generally, throughout the nineteenth century, liberals and radicals fought for women's suffrage on grounds of natural rights, equality, individualism, and socialist theory. But the parties of the left in the twentieth century have been cold towards women voting, believing (with some reason as we have seen) that the newly enfranchised women would vote more conservatively than the men as a whole.

NATIONALITY AND RACE

Before the wars and revolutions of the twentieth century, nations composed of more than one nationality, but dominated by only one, limited the vote mainly to the dominant nationality. This was true, for example, of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The United States and the Union of South Africa, both composed of more than one national strain, discriminate against Negroes. In the United States, the legal theory forbids such restriction, but the tradition of slavery and civil strife has made the law a dead letter in a number of Southern localities.

Repeated opinions of the Supreme Court directed against overt or semiovert discrimination have failed to give the Negro impartial treatment at the polls. Intimidation, apathy, strict enforcement of literacy requirements for the suffrage against Negroes (but not against whites), refusal of the Democratic party to tolerate Negro members, and other non-legal but nevertheless strong social pressures have effectively

blocked a large percentage of the population of certain Southern states from voting. Yet in the Northern and Western states, Negroes vote freely, and even in the South they are voting in ever-increasing numbers.

In South Africa, the whites have prevented the more numerous Negro population from voting at all. In the Soviet Union, many races vote without hindrance. In Brazil, the Negroes and Indians, who are very numerous, have the vote, and so it is with a number of other Latin American and Caribbean countries.

EDUCATION

Most countries have abolished educational requirements and even literacy tests for voting, although a few American states, Northern as well as Southern, have literacy requirements. To require more than literacy, that is, the ability merely to read and write on a low level, would introduce new political issues, for everywhere, people of means are more educated than the poor. The former can afford an education, and education itself promotes economic and social success. To require even a high school education in most countries would disfranchise large segments of the poorer classes and weaken the political parties of the poor. Therefore, no radical or liberal party can consent to an educational test, even if it seemed abstractly desirable. Furthermore, it would be extremely difficult to demonstrate any connection between education and "political intelligence"—in political disputes one side usually regards the other as politically unintelligent.

CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship has almost always been a prerequisite to the right of suffrage, from the Greek city-states to modern times. Frontier or revolutionary nations provide a few exceptions. Foreigners voted and held office during the French Revolutionary Period and in the early days of the Soviet regime. Among frontier states, the United States (at one time), Argentina, Chile, and Australia have afforded examples of alien suffrage.

RESIDENCE

Many believe that, in order for a person to use the vote intelligently, he must have dwelt in the same locality for a cer-

tain length of time. Citizenship, of course, satisfies the basic need for some residence requirement. Conservatives have frequently expressed the opinion that longer residence requirements promote stability and responsibility in local and national government.

Ideological considerations aside, however, residence requirements of some minimal sort are necessary to allow time for registration lists to be prepared and checked. Otherwise "floaters" might wander from polling place to polling place on election day, voting at will. Each American state sets its own minimum residence; the period ranges from six months to two years. In addition, somewhat shorter periods of residence in the polling district itself are also required. In England only a three-month residence period is required.

ABSENTEE VOTING

A number of countries and states allow voters who are to be absent from their locality on election day to vote ahead of time or to vote by mail or proxy. When large standing armies or navies exist, how to arrange for their vote becomes a difficult problem. France before World War II denied the armed forces a vote for fear of military participation in politics. English and Soviet military forces have special arrangements to facilitate their voting. American soldiers, sailors, and airmen depend entirely on the laws of their home states.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CAPITAL CITIES

A final and exceptional residence disqualification occurs in the District of Columbia. Residents of the American capital city are deprived of any right to vote except in so far as they retain residence in another state. The reason given is that being at the heart of the government the residents could exercise political influence beyond their numbers. The result is that, even though their number exceeds that of nine states, they cannot influence the vote at all (except those who continue to maintain residence outside the District). It is true, however, that the voting residents of Paris and London are reputed by some to rule the rest of their nations in their own interests. Still, in denying the voting right under any circumstances, the whole gamut of democratic theory must be opposed or answered. Positive evidence on both sides is available, but it is insufficient and vague.

AGE

In most countries, the age of acquiring the vote and the age of acquiring legal majority is the same—twenty-one years. A few nations require voters to be twenty-three to thirty years old. Others establish eighteen and twenty years as the voting age. The United States holds to twenty-one years with the exception of Georgia and Kentucky (and Guam) where eighteen years is the voting age, and Alaska where nineteen years brings enfranchisement. France, Britain, and Italy maintain the twenty-one-year line. The Soviet Union and several of the new governments formed since 1945 have set eighteen as the voting age, and considerable opinion in the United States and elsewhere advocates the same age. The chief argument is that military and job responsibilities begin more often at the age of eighteen than at twenty-one.

Age requirements, like most other requirements, have indirect political consequences. Younger people vote less conservatively than do older ones, according to studies of Swedish, Swiss, German, Danish, Dutch, and American elections. Opinion polls in America indicate the same trend; the youngest age groups tend more to favor the Democratic Party, whereas the oldest age groups tend to favor the Republicans.

PLURAL VOTING

Plural voting is the legal right to cast more than one vote in an election. A plural vote may be granted for a double residence, as formerly in England. Belgium had before World War II a law conferring an extra vote on the heads of families who possessed some wealth, education, or paid some taxes. In Prussia from 1849 to 1918, the total body of men over twenty-five were divided into three classes of voters, each class drawn to contain one third of the total taxes paid to the state. Each class could then elect one third of the members of the *Landtag* or parliament. As a result, about 6 per cent of the people, who paid one third of the taxes, elected one third of the representatives. In recent years there has been an attempt in France and Italy to give the head of a family more political power than single persons.

MISCELLANEOUS RESTRICTIONS

Scattered through the history of suffrage one finds other qualifications of the right to vote. Catholics were excluded in

a number of Protestant countries until recent times. Jews received similar treatment in various countries: in England for a time, until 1923 in Rumania, in Germany before 1848 and during the Nazi period 1933-45, and so on. The Greek clergy were forbidden to vote before World War II. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 prevented the clergy from voting. The clergy in the Soviet Union were likewise disfranchised. English peers, possessed of their own personal "representation" in the House of Lords, cannot vote. Persons unfavorable to the existing regime are denied the vote in the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc of nations generally, and in other countries where elections are used to give "applause" to a powerful ruling group. For a time, men who actively supported the Confederate States of America were disfranchised by the victorious Union Congress. Persons judged morally incompetent or criminal, and insane persons, are generally prevented from voting.

SUFFRAGE NEARLY UNIVERSAL

In general, we may conclude that the world's representative governments today give the vote to everyone. The remaining restrictions described above are not of great practical importance to the total picture. But we must not believe that the vote in itself guarantees that total power, even of an indirect sort, rests with the public. The vote is only one of the many devices used by representative governments. Universal suffrage means only that men can participate alike in the casting of ballots.

VOTING AND NONVOTING

Despite centuries of controversy over the right to vote, a large number of individuals will not vote unless driven to do so. The United States lags about a dozen points behind the countries of western Europe in the percentage of eligibles voting. In Soviet Union elections, where great official pressure is exerted to get out the vote, participation is close to 100 per cent. Something of a modern high in electoral participation in a free election occurred in republican Germany in 1933, when 88.7 per cent of the electorate voted. (This was also the German Republic's last free election before the Nazi repression.) One of the lowest records in a general election since World War I was the American presidential election of

1920, when somewhat less than half of the electorate participated. In American state and local elections, low participation is the general condition, especially in primaries.

Studies of nonvoters have given us a number of generalizations about why certain countries and certain groups within countries participate more heavily in elections. Under most circumstances, new voters vote less than those who have exercised the franchise for some time. This has been true of the working classes, the women, Negroes, and naturalized citizens of the United States. The factors at work are mainly timidity, remnants of social disapproval of the recent change, ignorance of the new procedures, and lack of interest in the new instrument of power. Larger proportions of educated individuals vote than of noneducated people, presumably because the schools of a nation stimulate interest in public affairs. More people of higher income vote regularly than do the people of lower income. Some element in this difference may arise from the feeling among higher-income earners that they have more at stake in government policy. A smaller proportion of young eligibles vote than do older eligibles except for the over-sixty age group, wherein participation declines somewhat. This may be due to a preoccupation of the young with getting a start in life and a feeling of incompetence at facing a new task.

All of these propositions must be used cautiously. For example, education, American birth, whiteness of skin, and higher income commonly are found together in the same groups in America. It is then a difficult statistical-analytic problem to assign the proper weight to each factor.

SITUATIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING PARTICIPATION

Various political and social conditions also seem to affect the amount of over-all participation in elections. Foreign or domestic crisis increases the percentage of participation. Individual excitement is expressed in the collective act of joining other citizens at the polls. The more important the elections seem to be to the voters, the greater the participation; that is, a presidential election or a British general parliamentary election will turn out more voters than local elections. Usually, elections of the top officers of the state draw out more voters than elections of lower-level officers.

The proportion of eligibles who vote in an election increases as the voters believe the race for office will be a close

one. Participation is usually greater in elections the results of which definitely select the winner than in preliminary elections or primaries. Multiple-party systems draw greater participation than one- or two-party systems, perhaps because the range of choice is larger in the former systems, at least in the eyes of many voters who might not otherwise see any point in voting. Systems of proportional representation (see p. 180) increase participation.

Participation varies directly with the simplicity, intelligibility, and easy availability of the electoral machinery. "Get-out-the-vote" campaigns have a positive effect on participation if the campaign is adroit. A vigorous labor movement increases participation. The unions get out the working-class vote.

A tradition or habit of participation, formally or informally learned, tends to maintain a high level of participation. Finally, the general social evaluation of the vote as (a) precious, (b) useful in coping with the perceived political problems, and (c) authoritative affects the rate of participation. If voters are confident that an election will solve important problems, they will vote in larger numbers.

COMPULSORY VOTING

The experience of the few countries that have forced their citizens, by some mild but well-administered sanction, to vote shows that a greatly increased turnout results. A mere declaration of policy is not enough. In Australia, the adoption of a compulsory voting law in 1924 imposing a \$10 fine on non-voting brought an increase in participation from 59.4 per cent in 1922 to 91.4 per cent in 1925, 93.6 per cent in 1928, and 94.9 per cent in 1929. Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Spain, and the Argentine Republic also experimented with compulsory voting.

American opinion seems to shy away from the idea, although drives to "get out the vote" are part of every American election campaign. Professor Munro once declared the "slacker" vote was not worth getting. But that assumes a connection between intelligent voting and the act of voting that is hard to prove. In fact, in American elections, a light participation usually means a heavy proportion of machine-organized to "independent" votes. Several American colonies at one time required electoral participation. The voters of

Massachusetts and the legislatures and conventions of several states have rejected compulsory voting laws in recent times.

In America, nonvoters are more common, though the difference is not striking, among the poorer, less-educated groupings. This means perhaps that compulsory voting would favor slightly the Democratic Party. In Europe, by contrast, the Conservative parties, not blessed with the natural organizations afforded left-wing parties based on trade unionism, have seen in compulsory voting a way of getting their supporters to the polls. Gosnell believes that compulsory voting would tend to lessen the power of political machines in American local elections. Primaries and many crucial general elections find only a small proportion of the potential voters coming out to choose mayors, aldermen, judges, sheriffs, and even state-wide officers. Only the presidential elections in America bring out two thirds or more of the voters regularly.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE MEANING AND POWER OF THE VOTE

How much the vote means depends in part upon how much legal authority is given the voters. Some of the devices that limit the powers of the voters are: (1) the existence of many nonelective offices, (2) constitutional limits to the events the electorate may influence, (3) bicameralism and other checks and balances on the free play of the electoral will, and (4) the principle of separation of powers to keep a popularly elected organ of government (for example, the House of Representatives) from dominating an appointed organ of government (the Supreme Court). Creating a "short ballot" for example, in the interest of "administrative efficiency," may give the electorate controls over a very few top officers but change and perhaps diminish their controls over a number of minor offices, previously elective. A constitution like that of the United States, which is hard to amend, prescribes freedom of the press, assembly, contract, religion, and other rights; the electorate is limited in the effects it may have on those rights. When one house of a bicameral assembly must pass on another's bill, the possibility of a check to the electorate is enhanced, especially when the terms of the offices of the members of one house are longer than those in the other or staggered in such a way that the appearance of a new, popularly chosen majority in one house often encounters an in-

cumbent opposing majority in the other. The American, British, French, Italian, and other bicameral systems employ these checking devices or have used them in the past.

HISTORICALLY, THE SUFFRAGE BROUGHT CHANGES

Despite these checks upon the electorate, the meaning of the vote over a historical period is clear. The extension of the suffrage to new groups has been associated with changes in the composition and behavior of officials of the state. We may cite Negro advances within Northern cities of the United States, the great impetus given the Labour Party in England by the suffrage reform of 1918, and the passionate opposition to the extension of the franchise to new groups by the privileged classes wherever the issue arose. However, mere multiplication of votes does not accomplish changes; new social strata must be involved. The extension of the franchise to women was followed by no recorded visible results in the United States, but it seems to have given some strength to centrist and religious parties in certain European countries. (However, even though it brought no startling changes in the legislative sphere, we should not ignore the profoundly democratic meaning of the franchise for women who were working out adjustments to their changed situation in modern life.)

ELECTIONS CALL THE PUBLIC AND OFFICERS TO ATTENTION

Suffrage has a massive, general influence, rather than being an intelligible source of specific decision, and it deserves respect as such. The simple large fact that the vote can cause extensive movements of political personnel has been sufficient to give it a high value in the minds of that personnel and consequently in the minds of the voters. The behavior of officials is conditioned by a deep respect for it, and a large body of myth surrounds its use. An election is like the morning roll-call in the army; it brings all public officers to attention, and, though it must discipline the "good" ones, it also forces the "bad" ones into line.

THE BALLOT

The kind of ballot used in an election is also of some importance to the representative system. Although a century ago most elections were conducted *viva voce*, that is, by a verbal expression of preference for a candidate before the polling officials, the secret ballot is almost universal today. Even in

absolute regimes that exercise complete controls over the elective process to make certain the election of the regime's candidates, some kind of "secret" ballot may be used. Then outside pressures are counted on to force the election according to the regime's wishes. The secret ballot, when printed by the government, is known as the Australian ballot from its country of origin. Its use is practically universal today, although it was not long ago that each party printed its own list of candidates for the various offices or the voter wrote up his own choices.

The state today also regulates the way in which the names appear on the ballot and the way in which a voter has to mark his ballot. The so-called Indiana ballot and the European list system ballot have a major point in common. In both it is possible for a voter to make only one mark that automatically casts his vote for every candidate of the party for which the mark is made. This encourages "party regularity," that is, adherence to the party all the way down the line. In practice, the effects of the Indiana ballot are probably quite small because a voter who is determined to be independent may easily check candidates in more than one party. The "straight-ticket" voting fostered by the Indiana ballot is not encouraged by the Massachusetts ballot, which lists the candidates in office groups in the same column, according to whether they are running for President, Vice-President, congressman, mayor, or alderman, regardless of party affiliations. Then the voter must pick and choose; if he is a party regular, he must take the trouble to search out with his pencil the candidate for each office who represents his party.

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

The administration of elections in most jurisdictions of the world is a technical operation, publicly operated and directed with no relationship to the parties. In the United States, however, the administration of elections is partly in public hands and partly in party hands. Three criteria are commonly used to determine the "efficiency" of systems of election administration. The "efficient" system allows the voters to participate with a minimum of personal inconvenience by providing them with convenient polling places, easy registration and identification procedures, and in some cases a legal holiday from work to cast their votes.

"Efficient" systems prevent frauds. The American system

operates on the principle that by using officials of the major parties to conduct the polling, each will watch the other and fraud will be prevented. The European, including the English, systems have nonpartisan state employees doing the work.

Systems are also "efficient" if they get the job of balloting done in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of money. Here possible contradictions arise, however, between the different objectives. The convenience of the voter often means greater expense. Using untrained personnel as in many American jurisdictions also means greater expense. Furthermore, in order to avoid the intervention of "foreign" officers and jurisdictions, the American elective machinery is extremely decentralized.

Practically all other elective systems are extremely centralized, as in the cases of France, Italy, the U.S.S.R., and, to a lesser extent, England. In these countries the local polling places are manned and managed by persons responsible to *distant authorities*. Historical evidence shows that many local frauds have occurred in the American system of decentralized administration. On the other hand, in the German Republic a system that was efficient in terms of cost was converted rapidly into a perfect instrument of central control by a dominant party. However, only careful study and expert judgment can decide in any certain case whether the disadvantages of the one system are graver than those of the other.

AMERICAN AND SOVIET SYSTEMS COMPARED

A comparison of the American and the Soviet systems of election administration shows remarkable differences. The American is almost completely federal, while the Soviet system is directed in a stringent fashion from one Central Electoral Commission of the Soviet Union, which is appointed and instructed by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union. The American states generally delegate practically the whole of the election operation to the counties, sometimes not even bothering to keep adequate records of all local elections, much to the despair of political scientists. The Central Electoral Commission of the Soviet Union, however, directs the activities of central electoral committees in each constituent republic, which in turn supervise the work of local electoral commissions in the villages and in the farm and factory soviets. The Communist Party is active at all stages of the Rus-

sian electoral process, although in most instances the elections are held without coercion and in secrecy at the polls. In America, the parties are active everywhere and have a legal responsibility in the conduct of elections that the Communist Party in Russia does not have. The Communist Party, standing allegedly outside the administration of elections, limits in advance all significant free choice of the voters at the polls.

The Use of Election Forms to Achieve Values

Although the suffrage is a highly important device to produce representation for the different social groupings of a community, other devices require attention as well. Such devices are subsumed under the general subjects of electoral constituencies and balloting methods.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUENCIES

A wide range of possibilities for intertwining and adjusting values and interests opens up in the field of constituency construction and in the balloting process. A constituency is the group legally charged with the election of an officer. Given the qualified voters and the officers to be elected, how are the voters to be apportioned and how are the ballots to be drawn? Both processes can be carried out in many ways. We shall discuss apportionment first.

Apportionment is the division of qualified electors into constituencies. Voters may be apportioned by governmental boundaries, territorial surveys, official bodies, functional divisions of the population, or by personal or "free" population alignments. A combination of two or more is often encountered.

APPORTIONMENT BY GOVERNMENTAL BOUNDARIES

Governmental boundaries always form the ultimate basis of the constituency. Thus the United States as a whole is the constituency for the election of the President and Vice-President, speaking realistically. Speaking legally, the constituency of the President and Vice-President is an official body known as the Electoral College composed of men elected by the people of each state. The American governors are all legally and in fact the representatives of governmental constituencies composed of the whole state. Some of the American state senates are elected from counties, which are governmental

areas of some independent powers. The American Senate, formerly elected by the state legislatures, each of which chose two Senators, is now elected by the entire electorate of the individual states, and thus is based on governmental boundaries.

APPORTIONMENT BY TERRITORIAL SURVEY

Territorial surveys are the favorite method of constructing constituencies in modern times. "Artificial" areas are cut out of the map, and their populations serve as constituencies. The survey method is popular because it is the easiest way to conform to the demand that all men be treated alike, that each vote weigh as much as every other vote, and that no subgroup of the population (race or class, for example) should be differentiated from the others for the purposes of voting. This was a specific demand of the Levellers, direct democrats of 1647, who in their first "Agreement of the People" declared: "That the people of England being at this day very unequally distributed by Counties, Cities, and Burroughs, for the election of their Deputies in Parliament, ought to be more indifferently proportioned, according to the number of the inhabitants."

"Indifferently proportioned, according to the number of the inhabitants" has become the standard principle in most representative governments today. Most election districts tend to be drawn to enclose equal numbers of inhabitants (certain exceptions will be noted in this section).

OFFICIAL BODIES

Official bodies as the apportioned unit are of two general kinds, *ad hoc* and permanent. In a number of representative systems we find special bodies called together for the primary or sole purpose of electing another body. This is the object and function of the American Electoral College. Modeled on the American idea, which Condorcet so admired, was the French system of indirect elections of the Senate (now the Council of the Republic) by an electoral college composed of various officials and persons designated by town councils. Permanent official constituencies take many forms. The Speaker of the House of Representatives is elected by the members of the House, who thus constitute an official constituency. The French President is elected by the two cham-

bers of the French Parliament. The English Prime Minister is elected by the House of Commons, though nominally appointed by the King. The German city councils elect their burgermeisters, some American city councils elect the city managers, and so on.

FUNCTIONAL DIVISIONS

Relatively few regions construct their constituencies by functional divisions of the population. Under the Fascist regime in Italy there existed a weak legislative body known as the Chamber of Corporations, which was based on constituencies of major occupations. The American National Industrial Recovery Administration from 1933 to 1935 gave certain powers to groups composed of the representatives of the various firms in particular industries. Russian factories until 1936 returned members to the local soviets or councils, which in turn sent members to the higher councils. English university men used to have special representation in the House of Commons. The Irish and Portuguese legislatures are based partially on functional representation.

FREE APPORTIONMENT BY VOLUNTARY CONSTITUENCIES

A final way of dividing the population into constituencies is by allowing the *population to create its own constituencies* during the voting process; that is, the voters are told that they may vote for whomsoever they please among the candidates up for election, regardless of their place of residence, functional occupations, or other spatial or social characteristics. Of course, there is practically always some spatial limit to the electorate itself, such as national boundaries; a pure personal constituency does not exist. But within the larger boundaries, free choice is allowed. The mechanisms by which this is accomplished will be dealt with below. We need indicate here only the two basic requirements for free constituencies: more than one representative must be chosen, and a limited quota of votes must be enough to elect a candidate.

"ROTTEN BOROUGHS"

Two irregular but widespread phenomena occur and create a pattern of constituency population different from the results of the apportionments already mentioned. These are "rotten boroughs" and "gerrymandering." Rotten boroughs are his-

torical accidents that give disproportionate weight to the votes of a thinly populated district in relation to a thickly populated one. Strictly speaking, a rotten borough is such only when the prevailing principle or belief about constituency construction is that it should be on the principle of equal populations. Thus the famous English rotten boroughs, which lasted for centuries, were originally boroughs of considerable population that declined to practically nothing while other towns of considerable size grew up as a result of the Industrial Revolution and other reasons. The declining centers kept the same representation, and the growing centers gained no new representation. To those who believed even remotely in some connection between representation and population, this situation appeared most unjust. The Reform Act of 1832 established the English representative system on the equal population principle of territorial constituencies. All subsequent legislation reinforced the idea.

Some American writers have quipped that the American Senate is the "worst rotten borough in the world." This statement is not accurate, because the Senate was never designed to be based on the principle of equal population; all states, large and small, were supposed to have equal representation in it. However, the United States has its full share of rotten boroughs in practically every state that has a considerable urban population. All states based their construction of constituencies in large part on the notion that the population of each should be the same. But the plan depends, for practical effect, on periodic reapportionments in order to adjust to population changes. As a consequence, rural regions must give up memberships in the legislatures if new memberships are to be given to the growing urban regions. This the rural representatives have been loath to do, and as a result, in states with large urban populations, such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota, many more people are to be found in the districts of urban representatives than are to be found in those of rural representatives. In Illinois, reapportionment, supposedly mandatory each ten years according to the state constitution, was thirty years overdue in 1951. The largest district, according to a 1940 calculation, held 191.4 per cent more people than the average district, while the smallest held 54.7 per cent less than the average. In New York the situation is roughly the same; in Michigan it is a little less disparate.

GERRYMANDERING

Rotten boroughs are caused by a failure to reapportion according to the population principle, but *gerrymandering* is a positive act of malapportionment. The first violates the principle that equal populations should have equal weight, but gerrymandering violates the territorial principle that the boundaries of districts be "indifferently proportioned," that is, geometrically drawn without reference to the characteristics of the population. For gerrymandering is a process by which the dominant party in a legislature draws the boundaries of electoral districts so as to augment its strength in the assembly. By observing past electoral behavior and thus ascertaining where the consistent majorities of its opponents' voters and its own voters live, the dominant party draws the district boundaries in such a fashion as to concentrate its opponents' votes in as few districts as possible and to spread dependable majorities of its own voters over as many districts as possible. Sometimes this results in obvious distortions on the map such as the famous one committed by the party of Governor Gerry of Massachusetts when it formed a constituency that looked like a salamander. A cartoonist perceived the resemblance and called the malapportionment a "gerrymander."

BALLOTING PROCESS: MAJORITY AND PLURALITY

The balloting process fulfills the process of the construction of constituencies that begins with apportionment. It is most convenient to group the types of balloting under systems of majority and plurality voting and systems of minority representation. Majority systems may be either expected as a matter of course or deliberately provided for. In countries having regularly only two parties running candidates for office, a majority is expected to elect its candidates and usually does. Where the presence of several parties or no parties at all means that there will be several candidates in the field contending for a single office, agitation arises for some system that will insure to the candidate elected a majority of votes. Where a third party or candidate musters a very small percentage of the total vote, say 5 per cent, and the victorious candidate wins by a plurality of 49 per cent to 46 per cent for his other competitor, the problem is not considered ordinarily to be serious. But where in similar cases the vote is regularly some-

thing like 36 per cent, 34 per cent, 30 per cent, then it is felt that steps should be taken to get the constituency's "real will," that is, to force a majority.

FORCING A MAJORITY EXPRESSION

There are many ways to force a majority from the constituency. Three general types of forced majorities may be described. The first is the *run-off election*. In a preliminary election, several candidates contend against one another. The two with the most votes run against each other in a final election. This is found in the American South and in some localities where candidates are not allowed to list their party affiliations on the ballot. The French *ballottage* system allowed all candidates to run again if they pleased, but generally only the two highest pleased to do so.

A second general type of forced majority is the *alternative vote*. The voter is authorized to rank his choices among the candidates, giving the number 1 to his first choice on the list, the number 2 to his second choice, and so on. In the first count all the first choices of each candidate are totaled. If one candidate has a majority of all the ballots cast, he is declared elected. If he has no majority, and no one else has, the candidate with the least number of first choices is eliminated and the second choices on his ballots are distributed among the candidates who have received them. This may well result in one of the top candidates completing his majority. If so, he is declared elected. If not, the same process is repeated with the choices of the second to the bottom candidate.

MINORITY REPRESENTATION THROUGH BALLOTING ARRANGEMENTS

Among the many systems of voting that give minorities representation, four may be presented briefly here. The simplest is the *limited vote*. Assuming that it is bad that a majority party should have all the voice of a district in the legislature inasmuch as it may have only won 51 per cent of the vote, a multimember district is created from which three or five representatives are to be elected instead of merely one. Then, where three representatives are to be elected, each voter is told that he may vote only for two candidates; or where five representatives are to be elected, he is told that he may only vote for three candidates. Thus a majority of the voters will under no

circumstances be able to elect all three or all five members.

Notice that the essential feature of minority representation in this and the other systems to follow is the "voluntary constituency." And, as we stated above (p. 177), voluntary constituencies require more than one representative to be elected from the district and allow each candidate to be elected with a quota rather than a majority of votes.

Simply providing for more than one candidate to be elected from a district is not enough. For example, the *block system of election at large*, under which every voter votes to elect several men from a single constituency, invariably becomes a majority or plurality election. For under such a system, the voters, instead of making up personal constituencies by scattering their votes, quickly gather or are gathered by managers behind a slate of candidates for all three, four, or however many offices are to be filled. Then the group with the largest number of voters wins all of the offices. The only regular methods of creating constituencies that are personal and free in the sense of our limited requirements here are the systems of minority representation that require only a limited quota of votes for a candidate to be declared elected.

MINORITY REPRESENTATION: THE CUMULATIVE VOTE

A second type of minority representation is the *cumulative vote*. Three representatives are to be elected from each district. A voter is allowed to give three votes to one candidate, one and one-half votes to two, or one vote to all three, depending on whether he marks an "x" in the square of one, two, or three of the candidates in the race. Then the total points of each candidate are tallied, and the three highest are declared elected. Under this arrangement, a minority may instruct its adherents to mark only one "x" and that for their candidate. The majority party meanwhile is compelled to concentrate its strength on two candidates and, even if very strong, could hardly hope to give three times as many votes to each of three candidates as the nearest minority competitor could muster through his triple-strength supporters.

MINORITY REPRESENTATION: P.R. BY THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE

A third type of minority representation is provided by the so-called Hare or Andrae system of proportional representa-

tion (*PR*) by the single transferable vote. Like all other systems of minority representation here described, a multimember district is required. The desired object of this system of proportional representation is to give each group in society a number of members in the legislature proportional to its numbers in the population.

For example, let us say that five representatives are to be elected. Let us suppose for the moment that each major social group has a political party representing it. Let us also suppose that the parties rank as follows: Party A has about 20,000 voters; Party B has 10,000; Party C has 10,000; Party D has 7,000; Party E has 5,000; and Party F has 3,000. Accepting the premise that it is good to have all major groupings in the population represented in the legislature in proportion to their voting strength in the population, we would probably agree then that Party A should have two members, Party B and Party C one member each, and Party D one member, although we wouldn't feel too unhappy if Party E, instead of Party D, were represented with one member. How would we go about forcing this result?

First of all, we decide that no vote should count for more than one candidate. Otherwise we would have the block system, which is a multimember district in which the voters vote for as many candidates as have to be elected: invariably the party with the majority or plurality of the votes sweeps all the offices. We accomplish this by having each voter designate his rank order of choices, one for his first choice, two for his second, three for his third, and so on.

We then would allow the voters to establish their personal constituencies. We would say that any candidate receiving over one fifth of the total vote cast ought to be elected, since there are five men to be elected from the district. We therefore set up a quota. The most common formula for arriving at a quota is the Droop quota used in the Hare system of proportional representation. The total vote cast is divided by one more than the number of representatives to be elected, and one is added to the quotient. The result is the number of votes required to elect a candidate. In our example we find that the total number of votes cast in the election is 55,000. The number of men to be elected is 5 (plus 1 is 6). And 55,000 divided by 6 is 9,166+. Add 1 to this figure and the final quota is 9,167. Therefore, any candidate that gets 9,167 votes is bound

to be elected. For no matter how the vote is cast, *providing we insist that no voter's choice is to be counted for more than one candidate*, no more than five candidates can possibly get 9,167 votes.

Now we will show how the counting is done. We take a count of first choices and find the result is as follows:

| | | | |
|--------------------|---|----|--------|
| Party A candidates | | A1 | 8,000 |
| | | A2 | 8,000 |
| | | A3 | 4,000 |
| Party B | " | B1 | 10,000 |
| Party C | " | C1 | 9,167 |
| Party D | " | D1 | 6,000 |
| | | D2 | 1,000 |
| Party E | " | E1 | 5,000 |
| Party F | " | F1 | 3,000 |

In this remarkable election, two candidates, B1 and C1, have already made their quotas, C1 on the head, B1 a little over. Next we take the surplus from B1, reaching into his barrel of 10,000 votes and extracting at random the difference between that number and 9,167. We examine the second choices on these 833 ballots and find they go to F1. We give them to F1, making his total 3,833. Lacking any more surpluses and still having to elect three more representatives, we eliminate the low man. This turns out to be D2. But, as we might expect, the second choices on the D2 ballots all go to D1, giving him 7,000, but electing nobody for the moment. We go to the new low man who happens to be F1 with 3,833 votes. We take the next available choice on all of these ballots and find that 3,000 go to D1, 833 to E1. D1, with 10,000, is declared elected, while E1 has now 5,833 votes. We distribute D1's surplus of 833 votes and find that they now go to E1, giving E1 6,666 votes. But it is too late to help him, for the next low man whose vote is to be dissolved is A3, and his 4,000 second choices go roughly 2,000 each to A1 and A2. Before they are even fully distributed, both these gentlemen are up to their quota and are declared elected. Their poll watchers have had some uncomfortable moments during the proceedings and probably have been regretting the lack of party intelligence and organization that put A3 in the field, but the results have finally come out as they should according

to the party's strength. Party A elects two, B one, C one, and D one.

MINORITY REPRESENTATION: LIST SYSTEM OF P.R.

The fourth type of minority representation is the *list system*. It is a little less nerve-racking to the party managers than the single transferable vote system, for each party submits a list of its candidates and the voter, instead of wandering all over the ballot, simply designates the party of his choice. Then the quota needed to elect having been established roughly as in the Hare system, previously described, as many of the top names on the party list are declared elected as there are multiples of the quota in the total number of votes cast for the party list. In the example above, using the same quota, Party A with its 20,000 votes would again get two seats, Parties B and C would again get a seat each, but the results for Party D with 7,000 votes would be in doubt. To assign the fifth seat, following the Swiss system of list voting, we would give it to the party that would have the highest average vote per seat as a result of having it. Thus: A has 2 for 20,000; with 3 it would have an average of 6,666+. B has 1 for 10,000; with 2 it would have an average 5,000. C has 1 for 9,167; with 2 it would have an average of 4,583+. D with 0 for 7,000 would have 7,000 votes for its one seat, higher than any of the other averages, and would therefore receive the seat.

Generally, the majority or plurality types of balloting just discussed are found in North and South America and in England and its Dominions and are used in part in a number of European systems. The Hare system and other types of single transferable vote systems are found in scattered localities in the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Scandinavian countries. The list system is popular in Europe but varies in details from country to country.

EFFECTS OF MAJORITY AND MINORITY SYSTEMS

If we ask what kinds of values the various elective systems introduce into representative government, we can make certain partially substantiated statements. The majority election provides a working majority of members of a parliament, sharing many common views on issues. If it does not do so, the lack of a majority reflects aimlessness rather than any bitter conflict of party blocs. The systems of proportional representation

or minority representation, on the other hand, when they do not produce majorities, tend to produce crystallized party blocs in the legislatures. Ordinarily a representative under a majority system has to appease a great number of his constituents, whereas a representative sent to the legislature by a certain quota of constituents can rest easy so long as he appeases that quota and may be little concerned with sparing the feelings of the rest of the community. The list system of proportional representation, on the other hand, can certainly be said to encourage strong party discipline, especially where a party determines whether a man goes on its list and assigns him his priority of election position on the list.

Before the coming of the Labour Party to power in England, it was often said that the majority election kept issues of a burning sort out of politics. That, of course, can no longer be said. But one may say that only heated issues that concern almost half or more than half the population will emerge readily in a majority system, while in a system of proportional representation any quota of the population can send its torch-bearer to the legislature. A one-ring circus then becomes a several-ring circus. The exhibition that follows may be somewhat more disquieting.

RECONVERSION OF ELECTIONS TO "TOWN MEETINGS"

It is scarcely necessary to say that no system of electing officers produces universal satisfaction. Often a great many members of the public feel that no representative can ever be relied on to represent them adequately. At certain times in the past, this feeling has been reflected in proposals for special procedures to "return the government to the people." Among the devices favored to accomplish this task are the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. The *initiative* is an arrangement of government whereby a given number of people may demand that a particular proposal be acted upon by the legislature or be referred to the electorate as a whole for a referendum. The *referendum* is an arrangement whereby an initiated proposal or a bill of the legislature may be submitted for approval and enactment into law by the total electorate. Sometimes the legislature may itself call a referendum on a bill. At other times, any bill of a certain kind must be referred to the electorate. The *recall* is a procedure for allowing a prescribed number of voters to demand a special election to be

held for the purpose of retaining or dismissing an elected officer whose conduct is at issue.

Hints of all three devices are to be found in American colonial history but were submerged after the American Revolution. The device of the New England town meeting, coupled with Swiss devices of the late nineteenth century, attracted many Americans who were anxious over losing control of their officers. It is difficult to generalize about the results of the three devices in a number of American governments that adopted them before 1920. However, we can say that it has not been proven that the "people" as a whole find them useful to get things done in accordance with the majority will. V. O. Key and W. W. Crouch, for example, concluded from a painstaking study of the California experience that "the initiators of propositions have usually been pressure organizations representing interests—commercial, industrial, financial, religious, political—that have been unable to persuade the legislature to follow a particular line of action." Also, Gosnell and Schmidt concluded from a general survey of "Popular Law-making in the United States" that participation or voting interest on issues brought up through initiative or referendum devices was generally somewhat below the interest expressed in the elections of candidates. There was also some variation according to the type of legislation proposed. More voters turned out to vote on legislation concerning morals and education, less on issues of revenue and public welfare, least on technical matters concerning governmental organization. The Swiss history of popular legislation has proved similar. A comparison of "popular" legislation with laws made by the legislature shows no striking differences in scope, novelty, moral quality, or radical majoritarianism.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR REGULATION

Besides using many kinds of elections to gain representation, elements of the public have endeavored constantly to control the actions of political parties. If a single group of men dominated the major parties and the parties dominated the whole representative process, the universal suffrage and the many different representative devices would have small effect. Consequently, governments often force parties to admit members freely, to avoid corruption and bribery, and to allow representation to their rank and file. However, the sub-

Chapter 6

The Political Party

FACTIONS, cliques, gangs, lobbies, and caucuses always accompany political events. However, the condition called "party government" is a recent occurrence, with so many points of difference from and developments beyond the above-mentioned organizations that it deserves a distinctive place in the annals of politics. It would be abusing the term "political party" if we applied it to every opinion group among the politists of a society or if we regarded the major social groups—such as labor, capital, farmers, and churches—as if they were the same as political parties. Party government and its chief feature, the political party, have a rather distinct habitat, a peculiar mode of operation, and special characteristics of structure and function. A glance through history may give us some idea of how the modern political party has come about. Afterward we will define at length the qualities of the party, its aims and organization, its variations from place to place, and its relationship to the government.

The History and Types of Parties

ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL FACTIONALISM

In the Greek city-states, a kind of party politics that is usually termed "factionalism" was common. Men formed themselves into groups that stood for or against something. For example, they favored aristocratic or democratic values, they were followers of strong personalities such as Pericles or Philip of Macedon, or they were for or against some such issue as war against the Persians or alliance against Sparta. Romans, too, both under the Republic and under the Empire, split into opposing groups of plebeians or equestrians, landed and landless, into the advocates of leniency for or annihilation of the Carthaginians, into the followers of Sulla or of Marius, of Caesar or Pompey.

The Middle Ages were similar. The medieval Italian cities resounded with the clamor of factional struggle in the piazzas

and in the narrow streets. The medieval Romans were no less susceptible to appeals to democracy and equality from the lips of Cola di Rienzi than were the Americans of nineteenth-century South America to the republican slogans of Bolívar. Guelf and Ghibelline fought bitterly in Dante's time, and the medieval citizen of Florence would probably have had as difficult a time distinguishing issues from personalities, church from state, sincerity from hypocrisy as the American citizen who sits in judgment on the Democratic and Republican Parties on election day.

The triumph of monarchy in most of Europe from the thirteenth through the nineteenth centuries brought the factions off the streets into the salons and courts of the Kings. The matters of sovereignty, legality, succession, and legitimacy were settled in some places for long periods of time, but the ancient pattern of conflict and compromise continued among the interpreters of these concepts.

CHANGING TECHNIQUES OF FACTIONS

This history of partisanship and factionalism gives us the impression that there is a lack of continuity and regularity about the factional process, a lack of organization of the struggle, a lack of agreement on the weapons to be used in the fights, all of which distinguish them in general from the modern phenomenon of the political parties. Perhaps the agreement on the weapons to be used came first. The long tenure of monarchs was partly responsible for this development, since the contending factions had to use the tactics of court diplomacy. Rioting, assassinations, wholesale massacres, and direct appeals to the populace went out of style for the most part. Flattery, discussion, and maneuvering for place in the royal court, the armed forces, and administration became the accepted techniques of factional conflict.

BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH PARTIES

In England, where party government began, the presence of a legislative body of some consequence, the House of Commons, allowed further scope for tactical "party" maneuvers. There was an electorate to contend with. Men could even appeal from the Crown to the people or from the people to the Crown. The developing interests—among them the Puritans, the manufacturers, and the commercial companies—

found a political structure in the courts, Commons, and Crown administration that was loose enough to give room for party maneuver. There was greater place for the bargaining, manipulating, and conspiratorial activities so important to party strategy. A half century of revolution had burned out the forces of fundamental conflict and left a rather dulled group of factional protagonists when the seventeenth century drew to a close.

One could barely distinguish between men who were known as Whigs and others who were known as Tories; yet everyone seemed to agree that these two parties existed, much like people in America who are hard put to tell specifically the distinction between Democrats and Republicans but who are positive that some difference exists. As Lecky described the difference, the Tory group was somewhat overcast with sentiments favorable to the Crown, the Anglican Church, and the landed interests, while the Whigs were just as slightly tinged with bias towards the House of Commons, religious independence, and the commercial interests.

Whatever the real state of affairs, it hardly corresponded to Edmund Burke's famous definition of a political party that he enunciated in the last quarter of the eighteenth century: "Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they all agreed." Parliamentary politics in most of the parliamentary sessions in which Burke served could have better fitted his definition of a "cabal," a clique striving for positions and favors, united temporarily for those particular purposes on the principle of subservience to the King.

Yet the psychology of party was fixing itself on the minds of the English ruling class to such an extent that long before Burke, when William of Orange became King of England and wanted to appoint a Cabinet, he found considerable opposition to the idea of selecting men of both parties. He could not comprehend the difficulty at first. He felt that the best men should serve the "national interest" regardless of party and saw no incongruity in their serving it at the same time. His concession to the spirit of party was a lasting one, and coalition cabinets became an exceptional occurrence. The Whigs grew imperceptibly into the Liberals, the Tories into the Conservative Party. Their identity and continuity were assured, even though their membership and leadership occasionally shifted,

not to mention their policies. The ruling class of England was still small, and a few managers arranged the electioneering. Hardly any semblance of formal structure existed to mark the location and operation and identity of the parties. Yet English politists were agreed that the party that controlled a majority of the seats in the House of Commons ought to name the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

MODERN PARTIES BEGIN IN AMERICA

It was in the United States that the *modern* political party came to fruition. There the factors of agreement on the weapons and continuity and regularity of party procedures and functions were joined with the factor of durable organization. This did not occur all at once. There was a great deal of preliminary skirmishing on the English model, and the Federalist Party, which held the most influential posts in politics, was of the English variety.

Colonial and Revolutionary Americans often disapproved of factionalism. Government was to be by gentlemen, who were presumably well-equipped to govern the nongentlemen. The caucus was the prevailing method of organizing political strength. George Washington believed strongly that faction and parties were unnecessary evils. He even warned his youthful nephew against the dangers of participating in a current affairs discussion group. His attitude was shared not only by the most influential Federalists but also by many of the American intellectuals and well-to-do of the nineteenth century. New England, for example, which had furnished a most active political class from among its wealthiest and best educated citizens, lost the services of most of these men when the American party developed into its later mass-organized form. Alexander Hamilton was one of the few Federalist leaders who saw the future clearly and wished to engage the party in an organizing campaign at the grass roots, but his ideas found little support.

THE MASS PARTY OF JEFFERSON

Thomas Jefferson built the first great mass-democratic party of modern times. He gave the modern party its essential mode of operation—winning the active consent of the mass of voters. His Democratic-Republicans, using the techniques of the majority principle, grass-roots control over elected poli-

ticians, universal suffrage—in short, all the devices that the radical democratic idea contained—maintained a substantial monopoly of American politics until the Civil War. In the haste to credit Jefferson with the philosophy of the pure democrat, subsequent generations have failed to respect him as the master organizer. It was he who created the modern party by adding the factor of organization. Jobs, favors, a constant stream of letters, advice and exhortation, the encouragement of organization in the state and county and village, the consistent reiteration of slogans of self-government and egalitarianism—all came forth to convert a party of anti-Federalism into a continuing and durable structure. The Democratic-Republicans became the prototype of the political parties of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

SIGNIFICANCE OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

The key change associated with the rapid development of the Jeffersonian type of political party was the gradual extension of the suffrage to all adults. As a great many people obtained the right to vote, the advantages of efficient party organization on a grand scale were maximized and inefficient organization heavily penalized. And only among an extensive electorate could the typical appeals of rationalism, individualism, egalitarianism and democracy that characterized party life in later times find their most appreciative audience.

Wherever universal suffrage was delayed, the political party in its most advanced democratic form was late in appearing. Europe and England were two generations behind the United States in gaining universal suffrage. Aristocratic residues in social and political life and limitations on the suffrage retarded the emerging pattern. During the nineteenth century, English parties were traditional and liberal. They contended over specific economic issues and benevolent reforms. They did not "trust the masses," as the Jeffersonians would put it, but rather trusted to enlightened leadership. The European parties tended to be still the mouthpieces of declining aristocracies, romantic exponents of heroic ideals, or revolutionary movements, uncertain whether to use party, cabalistic, or violent techniques to make their weight felt. Personal parties were common, dominated by striking individuals of oratorical and idealistic pre-eminence. When the working classes received the vote, the parties reflected the change and modeled themselves after the Jeffersonian pattern.

•

Party, the Russian Communist Party, the German Nazi Party, the Spanish Falangist Party, and several other groups. This kind of party, which develops into the only party of a one-party state, has a peculiar status of its own and scarcely can be called a party in the same sense as we apply that term to the parties of a multiparty state.

MAX WEBER ON PARTIES

Let us look more closely at the idea of the political party as it stood after World War I. As Max Weber described it, the political party was *a voluntary society of propaganda and agitation, seeking to acquire power in order to procure chances for its active militant adherents to realize objective aims, or personal advantages, or both.*

In other words, the party is composed of joiners; one is not born into it. It is a social group with the same pressures on its members to conform to the group that are found in all social groups of any considerable degree of organization. It is organized to conduct propaganda and agitation; thus it has a certain militancy and a goodly number of leaders who possess skills in orating, writing, bargaining, and organizing. It seeks to acquire power and therefore always is plagued by the problems of means and ends, for power can often be attained only by the "temporary" sacrifice of other values held by the party leaders and members. Often the values sacrificed are the very ones that are used to justify the existence of the party in the first place. For example, Michels, in his famous study *Political Parties*, quotes several socialist leaders, otherwise advocates of direct, egalitarian democracy, who denounced submitting issues to the action of the total membership of the party by referendum. They felt such action would cripple the party leadership, lead to vacillating party policies, and cause internal dissension.

Nevertheless, once attained, power can conceivably provide the party with increased chances to do things. Once it gains office, the authority of the state is behind its acts. It controls the state's resources—financial, mechanical, and human—although only to the extent that these resources have been entrusted to the part of the government that is generally agreed to be subject to capture by the party. In the United States, a victorious party in the national elections is limited initially in the fullness of its triumph by the federal system, the separation of powers, the system of checks and balances, and a

written constitution. The American party, because of the consensus developed within the last generation, cannot transform the administrative offices of the nation to its purposes. It cannot eliminate the influence of the Supreme Court, though it may conceivably cripple it by adding party adherents to its membership.

The active militant adherents of the party get most of the new chances brought by victory. The rank and file of the party have to be content with less. The mass of party members are completely passive and generally have to wait for the next election to register their opinions again. The party leaders distribute the chances: the offices, the favors, and the positions of authority and power. This may be done efficiently by a few men or, in such a party system as the American, in a haphazard, informal manner with much pushing and shoving and many mutual accusations of inadequate militancy among the aspirants.

The chances, now won and distributed, should enable the chance holders to realize their political objectives. But as everyone knows there is no assurance of this by the time that victory occurs. Considering the travail, the disasters, the means, and the obligations that have littered the career of the party marching towards power, it is too much to expect that at the end of it all, the conquerors will dispense only the pure milk and honey of altruism. We need not, however, change our definition of the party so as to say that the personal advantages necessarily outweigh objective aims in the minds of its adherents. That remains to be studied in the case of any particular party.

THE GUIDING THEMES OF PARTY LIFE

Within broad limits, political parties are established around some guiding theme. Members of a party, when called upon to explain their actions, will give reasons. They will say they are working for a leader, or for a cause, or for a class. The facts may disprove their stated motives, of course. It may turn out that a man who claims he is working for a cause is really working because he expects to get a good job in the government if his party wins. Still, perhaps the most useful classification of parties, as suggested by Bluntschli and Michels, may be one that is based on the preponderant motivation of the active members of a party.

Using such a criterion for classifying parties, we would

arrive at six significant themes: *nationalism, political and moral issues, socio-economic class, charismatic or personal leadership, religion, and elitism*. Although it tends to condition much of the party's behavior, the guiding theme of a party does not exclude the presence of other themes—one may find individuals in every party whose guiding motives correspond to any one of the six themes. Thus, in the American Democratic Party, one finds enthusiasts for Puerto Rican independence, economic reforms, the working class, the charms of an F. D. R. or a Huey Long, the beliefs of the Catholic Church, and the permanent elimination of the Republican opposition. On the whole, however, one influence predominates and gives a certain character to a party.

NATIONALISTIC PARTIES

The principle on which nationalistic parties are based is the desire for independent statehood. A minority within a larger realm conducts a campaign for self-government. The former Irish Nationalist Party agitated against the British for a free and united Ireland, often openly and at other times in the shadow of police repression. The German Sudeten Party, in close co-operation with the German state, played a part in the sabotage of the Czechoslovak state; first demanding merely autonomy, it finally insisted upon and won separation from Czechoslovakia and incorporation in the Greater Reich by the Munich Pact of 1938. The Far East, after World War I, saw the birth of several nationalistic parties in the Philippines, Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, India, and elsewhere.

The end of World War II found nationalistic parties in Southeast Asia ready to take control of independent governments. Partly by peaceable means and partly by violence, the transformation of former colonies into nation-states was accomplished. Perhaps the most notable of the nationalistic parties of Asia is the Congress Party of India. It developed under British rule, partly in defiance of the authorities, and when the British withdrew from India it constituted the only effective governing group. The Congress Party included all shades of opinion before the attainment of independence and, even afterwards, maintained a one-party domination of the government under the leadership of Gandhi and, after Gandhi's assassination, Jawaharlal Nehru. From a nationalistic party, it has evolved into a kind of giant holding company for

D

States. One party operates as the government, and the other party acts as the critical opposition. We may do well to discuss at some length the American party system, with particular reference to four of its principal features: the two-party pattern, its decentralization, its political machines, and its heterogeneity.

THE AMERICAN TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

One notes throughout American history a tendency towards a two-party system. Over the last century, the Democratic and Republican Parties have dominated the national political arena, except for minor and transient trespasses by Populists and Progressives. For a few years before the Civil War, several parties contested for national pre-eminence, but before that time, we find that two parties also prevailed.

The strength of the two major parties is distributed rather evenly over the population of the *nation as a whole*. In relation to the total popular vote, the parties are well matched. The gaining of a million or two million votes out of forty-eight millions may well spell the difference between victory and defeat in a national election.

This close national competition is the more remarkable when we see how unbalanced the parties are in the several states. The Republican Party hardly exists in most of the South. The Democrats usually carry the border states of Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, Oklahoma, and Maryland by comfortable majorities. The Western states shift their alignment frequently. The Midwest, New England, and the East are solidly Republican in the rural areas and Democratic in the cities.

It is by no means clear what caused this bipartisanship; but there is no necessary connection between bipartisanship and democracy. Other countries that may be termed as democratic as America have had several parties—Switzerland and Norway, for example; and the two-party system has often occurred in nondemocratic forms of government. Eighteenth-century England, with its Whigs and Tories, could better be called an oligarchy than a democracy. And several South American republics that have shown an equal affinity for bullets and ballots have had only two parties.

We may also exclude the degree of complexity of a society as a factor explaining the development of a two-party system.

Both rural America of the early nineteenth century and diversified America of the twentieth century seem to have favored the two-party system. Industrialized Germany has had several parties, whereas industrialized England has fostered two parties. Furthermore, industrialized Germany received warmly a one-party system under the Nazis, Soviet Russia a one-party system under the Communists, and agricultural India a liberal one-party system under the Congress Party.

Perhaps we are incorrect in seeking the origins of bipartisanship in such basic social factors as a democratic way of life or economic organization. We may do better if we seek the explanation of the two-party system in more limited structural and psychological conditions.

STRUCTURAL SUPPORTS OF TWO PARTIES

The structural or legal conditions are fairly clear. The prize office of American party politics is the Presidency. In order to capture the Presidency a party must capture a majority of the electoral votes or else face the difficult task, if no one gets a majority, of controlling a majority of the state delegations in the House of Representatives. This feat requires that the parties expand their ranks at any cost in order to solicit successfully the electoral vote of as many states as are necessary to obtain the majority.

Now this pressure to expand, in other party systems of the world, would be balked by the intensity of convictions of some groups of politicians. They would refuse to share the same roof with men of contrary principles. But in America, politics are so decentralized, the state parties are so independent and isolated, that uniting to elect the President does not throw politicians of contrary principles together forever and irrevocably. They can remain aloof from their brethren both in victory and in defeat. Thus the lure of the Presidency combines with the comfortable autonomy of the state party to establish a condition in which a majority and minority party are the most compatible arrangement of national politics.

In addition to this major legal condition there are other legal supports of the two-party system. The general employment of single-member districts in elections discourages any small party that has no hope of quickly achieving a majority or plurality of all the votes cast in the district. (Proportional representation would assure the small party of at least some

representation in a legislature.) Furthermore, the two major parties have for generations piled one legal difficulty upon another to prevent minor parties from arising. In some states it is almost impossible for third parties to get a place on the ballot, and the participation of the two major parties by law in the administration of elections gives the parties ample opportunity to discourage dissident voters and opposition candidates. This second kind of legal hold possessed by the major parties can be broken in only one way—a faction of a major party must desert the main body and gain control of particular localities, as occurred in certain Southern states in 1948 when the States' Rights Democrats revolted against the Truman Democrats.

TWO-PARTY PSYCHOLOGY

Certain psychological influences, historically imparted, add their weight to the maintenance of the two-party system. The American colonists were familiar with the "ins" and "outs" system of old England. To change it in the new republic would have required breaking a habit. Moreover, a host of colonial governmental structures, too numerous and detailed to list, depended implicitly on the politics of the government party and the opposition. For example, old parliamentary rule-books could be adapted easily to colonial needs, whereas many new rules of procedure would have had to be devised for a multiparty system. Today, a hundred and fifty years of perpetuated customs have done their work—Americans are not likely to be persuaded by proposals for a multiparty system.

Another psychological force, present in America from its beginning, also bolsters these customs. This is the popular belief in the majority. Call it the will of the people, or the mandate of the voters, or the general will, or something else; in essence, it is the satisfaction felt when most people seem to be behind a government and the sense of insecurity, even of shame, felt when a government has to operate without most people at least *seeming* to be behind it. Consequently, the programs of both the Democratic and Republican parties veer more towards each other than they veer apart. There are far more cases on record of Democrats and Republicans, or Democrats and Whigs, edging closer to one another on the same vaguely defined platform than there are cases of the

disagreeing with them are to be found on the same ticket. To proclaim one set of precise principles as the correct party platform will arouse the anger of other members of their own party and perhaps cause a split within the party and result in defeat. Furthermore, if they raise specific issues, they may antagonize some group of the electorate whose 3 or 4 per cent of the total vote would spell the difference between victory and defeat.

Therefore, the politician—who may be vigorously concerned over political and moral issues—finds it best, under most conditions, to bide his time for the presentation of the issues. The party is not constructed to be a vehicle for any issues save the most universal and generally agreed upon sentiments. When such sentiments are perceived to exist, usually the managers of both parties are able to recognize that the issue may now safely be proclaimed.

If we conclude, then, that the party cannot afford to espouse specific principles “prematurely” without threatening its own internal disintegration and the dissolution of its popular following, we must ask how the party *does* go about keeping itself together. First of all, bowing to the inevitable, the party allows its individual members to espouse issues in their own districts. Thus we have the typical phenomenon of a politician apologizing to his constituents because his party did not support a particular bill that he had been arguing for, and promising them to continue his efforts. Fortunately for him, his opponent is likely to be getting no greater support from his party on similar problems. A Chicago Democrat will be elected on issues that a Mississippi Democrat shuns, and a Chicago Republican running for the State Senate will believe in different principles than a Republican State Senator from “downstate.”

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

But the program of the party in the American system is not as important for maintaining the party as is its organization, which is motivated mainly by friendship, favors, and patronage. The party must trust to a vague program of “glittering generalities” to attract some part of the electorate, and get down to the endless day-to-day task of building a huge number of individual connections.

The national organization of both parties is relatively prim-

itive. The party that controls the Presidency has certain advantages. The President can surround himself with a certain number of loyal supporters in top positions of the government, and the various perquisites of his job allow him to do many more individual favors for important and influential people in the national community than the opposition party can do. But beyond his patronage of a few hundred appointments and a chance to help some thousands of individuals directly, the President runs into the feudal structure of American politics and is prevented from consolidating his position as the leader of an integrated and centralized party.

Apart from the Presidency, the "in" and the "out" parties are in much the same loose condition of organization. Each has a national committee composed of party representatives from each of the states; its task is to tie together the forty-eight autonomous party domains in national campaigns and on national issues. In recent years, the committees have maintained a small permanent staff of organizers, publicity men, fund gatherers, and research clerks to keep the party's case before the people continuously. The committees perform also a liaison function between the President and the party in Washington and the state parties, or between the presidential nominee and the state parties.

CONGRESS HAS STRONG LOCAL INTERESTS

It is not easy to place the congressmen as a group in the party system. Senators and representatives are elected from different states and districts, and in that sense are *local* representatives. But the great majority of congressmen are local representatives in another sense also. They are the "delegates" of state party organizations. They will co-operate sometimes with their national party leader, but will not go against their states' interests. Some congressmen are really administration supporters; they will go down the line for the President's program. Most of the latter come from districts that are closely contested in each election, such as a number of the metropolitan districts. In these areas, which are more closely tied to national interests than to local interests and where the independent vote is eagerly solicited by both parties, joining forces with the President is often more effective politics than following the views of the local politicians.

In general, however, the national Congress has a local

character. Whereas in England, for example, one sometimes gets the impression that the members of Parliament are Londoners who deign to visit the provincials who elect them, in America one senses that the congressmen are provincials who deign to visit Washington. A congressman in Washington will have a retinue of people from "back home," and hundreds of constituents from his state or district will come to him from time to time with requests for information about and help in connection with the great agencies of the government. There is no strong national *party* spirit among these legislators. Just as, legally speaking, the national leaders cannot control the state parties, sociologically speaking, the national leaders for the most part cannot comprehend a truly *national party*. Whatever goods are parceled out by the national party are divided forty-eight ways or among the several states according to population. There is little thought, except when the President brings up the matter or when some money is to be given out by the national party, that the total resources of manpower, locally gathered money, and most appointments should be under central direction or devoted to victory in the crucial districts that determine which party shall gain control of Congress and the Presidency or reserved to insure the election of key leaders of the party.

INTEGRATED STATE ORGANIZATIONS POSSIBLE

Integrated national parties have never existed in America. Perhaps Mark Hanna came closest to organizing a truly national party for the Republicans in the nineties. But integrated state parties have existed under the leadership of certain men—for examples, we need think only of names like Huey Long in Louisiana, Vare in Pennsylvania, Horner in Illinois, or Dewey in New York. The state is the legal unit for purposes of general party-organization. State statutes govern the pattern of organization, and, once a powerful group can find a means of mutual co-operation among its members, it can operate on a state-wide basis.

Two general kinds of state party-organizations in America are worth notice. One is the bureaucratic organization or the state party machine. The other is the personal faction. At one extreme, in states like Pennsylvania and Illinois, the parties are organized, integrated, and continuing bodies. At the other extreme, in states like Nevada and Louisiana, the parties are

shifting, transient, and personally led combinations. The organized state party ordinarily has a semiprofessional governing group within the party itself. These people have a definite personal stake in the success of the party. The bulk of the members of the organization are officeholders, although as one moves to the top of the national and state parties, he finds that the leaders tend to have other occupations as well as political ones—they may be lawyers, businessmen, or manufacturers. Down at the grass roots, on the other hand, most of the faithful and persistent workers hold public jobs.

THE PARTY MACHINES

As often as not, however, the state party and its central executive committee do not control the cities. In a good number of the cities, one finds the political machine par excellence, the machine that foreign observers and many Americans exaggeratedly regard as typical of all American politics. The political machine of the city is a bureaucratic organization; it has a full complement of permanent and professional workers, a hierarchy much like that of a government bureau or an army division, and an elaborate system of rewards (including promotions), punishments, and activities. It is composed of managers and runners for office; the top leader may or may not be an elected official. Thus the chief or boss may be the mayor, as were Mayor Hague of Jersey City or Mayor Thompson of Chicago; or he may be a metropolitan county chairman of the party, as was County Chairman Arvey of Cook County in Illinois. The subchiefs may hold positions such as county sheriffs, party district leaders, ward committeemen, aldermen, or city attorneys.

THE PRECINCT CAPTAINS

The rank and file of the well-organized city machine is composed of the precinct captains or precinct committeemen, as they are sometimes called. A party will have hundreds of precinct captains to staff the many polling districts of the city. Without the precinct captains, an organization cannot move, and the man who controls the precinct captains controls the whole party system. A large number of precinct captains hold public office in return for their services. Others have no personal interest but are fascinated by the great game of politics. Still others have received some privilege or favor

from their political leaders or have special business interests that they can protect by actively engaging in politics. Thus one finds tavern owners, rooming-house keepers, real-estate men, and lawyers holding posts as precinct captains to facilitate agreeable relationships with the various agencies of the local government.

Various surveys made in recent years show that precinct captains are the prime instrument for administering the party's *mediation function*. The precinct captains of a city like New York or San Francisco will perform thousands of individual favors, most of them quite legal, within a single year. A large proportion of these favors are interventions by the party on behalf of a person who is having some difficulty with one of the various governments. The party depends upon the captains strongly for maintaining a wide network of favorable connections among people of all kinds.

The nature of much of the party's work as a mediator between individuals and a sometimes adamant and threatening government is apparent when we look at some of the social developments that have occurred since the heyday of the city machines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A new profession of social service has grown up and numbers many thousands of workers. Extensive social security measures have been enacted providing institutionalized services of many kinds—to the old and the young, to the unemployed, to widows, to the poor, and to the sick. The precinct captain, who used to be a general practitioner on problems of human relations, has been replaced or at least supplemented by specialists of all kinds, working under distant auspices and regularized laws. The city machine, it turns out, has fallen victim to the bureaucratization of social services and full employment.

HETEROGENEITY OF AMERICAN PARTIES

Both in the country as a whole and in most localities, each party contains all types of leaders and followers. At the core of the political party is a central group of active leaders, an inner circle that directs the whole group. Next, outside of this nucleus, comes a much larger outer circle of those who take a lively and practical interest in politics and are, one might say, the rank and file of party workers. Then comes a wider circle of those who are strongly partisan and can hardly

be shaken from their party affiliations by any sort of issue or economic condition. After this group would come another circle composed of those who habitually follow a particular party, but who on occasion will stop short and vote for another party. These circles shade off into groups of voters who are largely independent of party affiliation and who move freely from one party to another, depending on their feelings at the particular time an election is held.

Many of the individuals in all of these circles are organized into a variety of groups—nationality groups, unions, trade associations, women's clubs, reform organizations, and the like. While some people operate in politics as individuals, many others—probably just as many—operate through the group or by representing the group to which they belong. The party is a mixed mass of persons who have traditions, tendencies, habits, or principles that make them Republicans, or Democrats, or sometimes insurgent members of third parties.

The party leader, or politician, in America, if he is more than local in influence listens to the electorate as the expert musician to a chord struck by a great symphony. He can hear it as one meaningful voice with a given tendency; but he also can hear the many individual voices. Sometimes, like the ordinary symphonic listener, he can hear only the whole chord and must guess at the parts. At other times, he can hear only the flutes or the timpani and has no perception of the total chord.

PARTY DIFFERENCES AS SEEN BY POLITICIANS

Whereas the unsophisticated observer of the two American parties sees no differences save in name, the expert politician perceives a number of rather fine distinctions among those on whose votes the Democrats and Republicans may depend strongly. He knows, for example, and political scientists have verified his experienced guesses, that north of the Mason-Dixon Line Republicanism tends to be more widespread among Protestants, the well-educated and the well-to-do. He knows that recent immigrants tend to vote for Democratic rather than Republican candidates. He knows that the press represents for the most part a Republican bias. He knows that organized labor is more strongly Democratic than unorganized labor. He knows that business interests, especially

finance and manufacturing, are strongly Republican, but that liquor and entertainment interests are more inclined to be Democratic. Real estate groups, commonly divided among the parties locally, tend to support the Republican Party nationally. Yet so fine are most of these distinctions that a campaign can scarcely be based on them. The heterogeneity of the party following, like the heterogeneity of the party leadership, throws the individual politicians back on the reliable techniques of friendship, favors, and patronage.

Class and Charismatic Parties

CLASS PARTIES

Parties having class as a guiding theme include various socialist, labor, and agrarian parties that believe in a fundamental class conflict that can be resolved only by the victory of some major class-interest. The socialist parties everywhere fall into this category. A notably successful class party is the English Labour Party. It deserves our close attention. Three of its characteristics are especially important: its stout presentation of significant issues, its tight integration, and its strong leadership.

THE ENGLISH LABOUR PARTY

The English party system, like the American, contains two major parties. They are the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. The Liberal Party, one of the two great English parties of the nineteenth century, no longer holds a firm grasp on a huge party following. It began to decline in the late nineteenth century, and is now only a minor influence in the party struggle for power. The Labour Party won its first decisive parliamentary majority and consequent mastery of the government in 1945, shortly after the end of the war in Europe.

STRIKING ISSUES RAISED

The Labour Party, unlike either of the two major American parties, is based on economic and social-class issues. Aside from the monarchy, which remains unchallenged in political campaigns, the whole structure of British economy and society is subject to controversy in politics. The Labour Party traces its origins to the growth of the labor unions and

to the socialist theories of British intellectuals and labor leaders in the late nineteenth century. The party has always advocated socialization of the means of production and an equalization of individual opportunity for education, medical care, old-age security, legal justice, and private and public employment. Once its power over the Commons was achieved, it set to work immediately on its program and with little difficulty nationalized large and important elements of British industry such as the mines, transportation, gas, and electricity; it also established national health-services for all, charging part of the costs to the government.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF LABOUR PARTY

The main influence on the Labour Party is the trade-union idea. It is, one might say, the premise from which only minor deviations in party activity are possible. This leads to conservative, reformist socialism, with the biases and habits of trade unionists predominant. It leads also to a strong pressure for immediately beneficial changes in the conditions of organized labor, especially in working conditions, hours of work, and rates of pay. Deviant pressures come from the intellectuals of the universities, professions, and the press, who are inclined to view socialism more broadly and internationally. The "marginal voter" assumes some importance too, for the success of the Labour Party in national elections depends to a vital extent on voters who have no immediate desire or pressure operating on them to follow the Labour Party. Fifty per cent of the total electorate, after all, may not be a permanent percentage; many "independents" are among them. They are responsible for the wide appeals put out to the British public in Labour Party propaganda and perform a function not unlike that performed by the independent voters in America, though the former are weaker and less effective.

PARTY INTEGRATION AND CENTRALIZATION ARE STRONG

The Labour Party is integrated and centralized. Members of the House of Commons and candidates for office are much more responsible to the leaders of the party for their party behavior than are most American legislators. The force of the party program is so great and the leadership of the party so securely in control that the individual member in the constituency is carried along, prodded, and disciplined. The per-

sonal ambitions of the individual party-member are rather well channeled along party lines. He may hope for advancement, but that depends on his maneuvering within the party framework. He may want more income, but that is not acquired easily and through outside connections, as it is in America. He looks to the party for immediate honors and must depend upon it to get ultimate recognition by the state as a whole. Therefore, in his politics the English politician gives the impression of being more earnest, hard-working, single minded, public-welfare-conscious and informed on state affairs than the American legislator, who, so to speak, "scatters his shots" over a wide range of interests, occupations, groups, and private affairs.

What keeps the Labour Party candidates and members of Parliament in line? What explains the integration and centralization? To say that England is a small country and thus tends to allow easy centralization may be partly true, but still England has been until recent decades one of the most decentralized nations, politically and administratively, in the world. The centralization of the Labour Party can be traced back to the organization of the working class as a whole. Trades unions came and then came the trades unions' party. The already bureaucratically constructed unions influenced the party structure. Other parties in England and elsewhere, both from external and internal causes, have shared these characteristics of centralization and integration, but not nearly to the same extent as the Labour Party.

THE LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE

A great part of the voters who vote for Labour candidates also belong to labor, socialist, or co-operative organizations that themselves are forceful groups in politics through their resources, skilled leadership, and permanent dedication to public activity. The trades unions (ranging from the more to the less member-controlled) joined hands in England with groups of intellectuals and nonlaboring orators, writers and organizers; they also joined hands with certain co-operative societies (also more or less democratically organized) and with purely local political organizations (their members impelled by a wide variety of motivations) to produce a general organization that today constitutes the Labour Party Conference. It meets annually to prepare a program which is

CHARISMATIC PARTIES

Charismatic parties are founded on the personal qualities of some great leader who may be himself the exponent of some class or nationality. But the party members do not bother with much of a program; they rely primarily on the leader to produce good through his personality. He has a mission in which they believe firmly. Thus between 1863 and 1875 in Germany the socialists under Lassalle were distinct from the other Marxists and followed wherever he led. In France before World War II the Blanquists, the Guesdists and the Juarezists subscribed to the deviation of their leaders from the central tendency of socialism.

In Italy, the party of Mussolini was a personal party. The Duce's charisma convinced the *Fascisti* that he could not fail, that his will ought to be followed blindly, and that no precision in program ought to bind him. He was free to do what he wished as the leader of the party. He was identified with Italy, with the party, and with the party membership. The whole arrangement rested on his personality, not on his program. So it was with Hitler and the National Socialists of Germany.

DE GAULLE AND FRANCE

A prominent charismatic party of the post-World War II period sprang up as the *Rassemblement du peuple Français* (or R.P.F.). This party was formed by General Charles de Gaulle in early 1947. It was called by James Burnham (the prophet of the "managerial revolution") the "first genuinely new political reality since Hitler." However, to the other parties in France it seemed to be the old phenomenon of the "man on horseback." The Communist Party of France referred to it as neo-Fascism, and to de Gaulle as the "mouth-piece of reaction," and a large number of the leaders of the "Third Force," the coalition of the older parties, regarded it as destructive of parliamentarism or even of democracy itself.

The new party or movement, for it was really a combination of both, came on the French political scene after General de Gaulle had emerged from a self-imposed retirement from the Presidency of the Republic. During his retirement he had planned and organized his new movement. Six months after the R.P.F. was organized, it took 33.1 per cent of the votes for municipal officers; this percentage would be greater if

coalition votes joining an R.P.F. candidate *with other party* labels were counted. In the elections of June, 1951, the R.P.F. obtained the biggest single bloc of seats in the National Assembly.

The R.P.F. derived a great part of its *raison d'être* from a belief in the personal qualities and mission of General de Gaulle. The belief of his followers was reinforced by the remarkable success he had had in leading a small group of resistance fighters against the Germans when the legitimate authorities of France had surrendered in 1940, thereby becoming recognized in the eyes of the non-French and French worlds as the symbol of France. The General's abstemious, religious, and mystic personality impressed many. He was intensely patriotic, held factionalism in horror, and believed in the future of France as spiritual and political leader of Europe.

WHEN A PARTY IS NO PARTY

One indication that the R.P.F. was charismatic lay in the denial by its leaders that it was a party. "We are not just one more party," exclaimed de Gaulle. The R.P.F. disdained to present an economic program to the nation. One of de Gaulle's closest advisers, the novelist André Malraux, declared: "What de Gaullism stands for, first of all, is the restoration of a structure and vigor to France. . . . We have declared that the party system in France, as it functions at the present time, is in no condition to take measures for the public welfare." Malraux further said: "We maintained from the beginning: 'We have no faith in programs, but only in objectives. Let us define our objectives one after another, reach them as fast as possible, and then go on to what follows. To put it another way, let's begin by doing what we say.' You can imagine how annoying this is to the program mongers."

A DECISIVE GOVERNMENT DEMANDED

De Gaulle himself advocated a thorough revision of the structure of the Fourth Republic to allow for greater permanency of leadership, the strengthening of the executive branch, and the exclusion of the Communist Party from any part in the government. In announcing the aims of the new movement, de Gaulle declared, "To move towards its right goals, the nation must be guided by a government that is coherent, orderly, capable of choosing and applying directly

those measures imperatively required for the public safety. The present system, by which rigid and conflicting parties divide all powers, must be replaced by another wherein the executive power follows the country rather than the parties and where all insoluble conflict may be resolved by the people itself." Although careful at first to avoid an outright demand to outlaw the Communist Party, the idea of outlawry was undoubtedly implicit in his thinking.

R.P.F.'S DECLINE AND DE GAULLE'S RISE

The appeal of this personal party, which utilized symbols of patriotism, unity, religion, family integrity, and camaraderie, was strong. Suffused with enthusiasm and ostensibly possessed of direction, it posed a threat to the other parties of the state that did not go unrecognized. The reaction of the older liberal parties and the Communist Party was intense and continuous. A personal or charismatic party is one type of non-Communist party that has been able to compete with the appeal of Marxian dogma and discipline. For under a "leader," as under a Duce or Fuhrer, individuals regarded by traditional "issue" or "class" politicians as wholly antagonistic or at least dissimilar seem to be able to group together in a powerful political combination. Thus, among the de Gaullists, one found radical intellectuals, Catholic clerics, conservative businessmen, middle-class government workers and clerks, professional soldiers and ex-soldiers, opportunistic politicians, and generally some of the most active of the non-Communist youth. A heavy R.P.F. vote came from the rural areas and towns, from the Catholic and conservative portions of France, and from the middle-class urban residential areas. In the decade between 1950-1960, the R.P.F. declined greatly in activity and popular support, while de Gaulle went into political retirement. Then suddenly, in 1960, a *coup d'etat* by civilian and military leaders brought dictatorial powers to de Gaulle. He needed no party when the political crisis of France (over the Algerian war) reached a peak.

Religious and Elite Parties

RELIGIOUS PARTIES

Examples of parties whose main theme is religion would be the early Belgian Catholic Party and the German Center

THE ITALIAN CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRATS

To illustrate our points about the religious parties, let us take the Christian-Democratic Party of Italy. This party began as one of a number of parties contending for power in the first postwar elections in Italy. An acceleration of the influence of the factors listed in the above paragraph, together with skillful leadership and improved organization, gave it victory in the highly important elections of April, 1948. The Christian-Democrats, under Premier Alcide De Gasperi, won 53.3 per cent of the seats in the Chamber and 43 per cent of those in the Senate. The Communists and part of the Socialists united in a "Popular Democratic Front" and won 31.8 per cent of the Chamber and 31.7 per cent of the Senate. De Gasperi's strength was not great enough to govern comfortably, and he formed a coalition cabinet with progressive and conservative elements in it. Although his party lost some ground in elections held subsequently, he continued as Premier of a coalition government. His successors adopted the same policies.

IMPELLING PARTY MOTIVATION

The Christian-Democratic Party is not based on issues—although it expounds issues and professes a program of reform; it is not a "class" party nor a charismatic party. It has neither dogma nor prophets. It is held together basically by a conviction that, since other absolute solutions to social problems—Fascist or Communist—are intolerable, there remains only a course of exploiting the "civilized virtues" of European liberal conservatism together with piecemeal reform. Giuseppe Glisenti, a Christian-Democrat, described in 1948 "the different psychological structure of the two political forces."

On the one hand, the CD (*Christian-Democratic Party*), whose members, even though active and though they are propagandists, have a vision of the world that inclines them to seek the composing of human differences rather than a struggle for the undisputed victory of their own ideas; men who, the surer they are in their doctrine and the more apostolic in their life, the more they seek that pacification, that balance and that wisdom which excludes extremes in any action, even in the necessary struggle. On the other

hand the PCI (*Partito Comunista Italiano*), whose members, especially party workers—all the more so when they are “sincere”—are permeated with the conviction that they must overturn a mistaken world. They can accept no half-way stage, no truce and no intermediate position between the actual world and the world in which they believe. While for us there is a better world and a less good world, and in any case an improvable world, for them there is always an unacceptable world until the day of the perfect world.

The Catholic Church, while eschewing overt and official favoritism for the C.D., has openly vowed its hostility to the Communist Party and its collaborators and has urged *united* support of anticommunism. In a multiparty country where the only unity might come from the strongest progressive party, that is, the C.D., this was tantamount to throwing the Church’s weight on the side of the C.D. Consequently, the C.D. derived some strength from Catholic “Civic Assemblies” organized locally, and benefited from a wide network of local organizations of the *Azione Cattolica* (Catholic Action).

Because of the pulling and tugging of regional interests, always strong in Italy, the party cannot maintain a doctrinaire position. To retain its quasi-majority, it must organize locally and produce “machines,” and we find this urge to organization strongly voiced in party circles as the condition for survival. Of the alternative bases for establishing machines—fanatic dogma (as with the Communist Party), patronage and favors, a long period of rule with honors and habit adding their forces, or auxiliary organizations—at present only the fourth is possible for the C.D. And, although the party is increasing its influence in labor unions, its real dependence here is on the hierarchy and membership of the Catholic Church. Meanwhile the Communist Party, with its class appeals, picks up readily a solid mass of support from the industrial workers and tenant farmers. It need only defend its position among these voters and perhaps extend it a little.

Temporarily, something much like a two-party system, with the Christian-Democrats dominating, came to a multiparty country. The permanence of this situation depended on the C.D.’s maintaining co-operative rather than dependent relations with the Church (for many of its supporters are

suspicious of clerical politics), on the continued material and moral support of the United States, and on the wooing of secular organizations such as labor unions from the revolutionary or socialist fold.

PARTIES OF THE ELITE


Roberto Michels classified as elite parties the Fascist Party and the Soviet Communist Party. Elite parties, he wrote, defy the majority principle. They refuse to consider that they may remain forever a part of the nation rather than become the nation itself. They regard the idea of elections as abominable, but are fond of plebiscites. Yet, existing in an age when the idea prevails that the whole body of the people should be active in government, they oscillate between trying to represent the whole people and insisting on the special capacity and right of a few to rule.

THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY

Like the former Italian Fascist Party, the former German National Socialist Party, and like the present Spanish Falange, the Communist Party in the Soviet Union established itself as the only party in a one-party state. It monopolized the controlling positions in government despite the fact that on paper at least the structure of the Soviet Union was democratic and representative. It extended its monopoly not only to the central organs of the Soviet Union but also to the federal states of the Union, which again on paper were supposed to have considerable areas of independent and autonomous activities.

What do we mean by "monopoly"? Most baldly stated, we mean that no Russian can expect to be a member of the ruling elite unless he belongs to the Communist Party. We mean also that the top leadership of the party interlocks with and generally constitutes the top positions of the government (see Figure 10). For example, from 1941 to 1953, Josef Stalin was both Prime Minister (that is, Chairman of the Council of Ministers) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and General Secretary of the Communist Party. Since 1958, Mr. N. S. Khrushchev has followed precedent by also presiding as First Secretary of the Party Central Committee (the title of General Secretary was dropped in 1952) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers. And if

FIGURE 10
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY*



* Reproduced with permission from "The Government of the Soviet Union," Harper and Thompson, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1949, with minor changes to carry through 1961.

there is any question as to which of the titles is more important, it is well to remember that the office of First Secretary has been for both Stalin and Khrushchev the launching pad from which they ascended to leadership of party and nation and that neither man, even after attaining Premiership, relinquished control of the Secretariat while in power.

By monopoly we also mean that although *in theory* control over the decision-making process resides at the bottom of the governmental hierarchy with the electorate as represented by the Supreme Soviet, in fact, leaders of the Communist Party—the members of the Presidium—at the top of the governmental machinery dictate policy for both the party and the state. There were in 1960 some 8,700,000 members of the Communist Party out of a population of some 212,000,000 persons. These men constitute the elite of their country and, because of their superior qualities and understanding of party history, doctrine, and dogma, have been deemed qualified to participate in the management of the nation. These trusted members of the party are placed strategically in positions of power (and power in the Soviet Union is an all-inclusive term embracing government, economics, industry, agriculture, and the arts) so that no considerable source of opposition to party decrees could be expected to develop at any point of the vast and complicated apparatus of governmental administrative and counseling bodies.

The Communist Party never abandoned the exhortations of Lenin that to be strong and effective the party must be fanatic, disciplined, and small. Revolution, according to him and his disciples, could never be achieved and carried to fulfillment without the active direction of a small and determined minority. But, since the elites of the twentieth century must operate in the name of the people, they profess that all that they do is on behalf of the great majority; they even claim to be democratic.

COMMUNIST PARTY MONOPOLIZES POLITICAL CHANCES

The functions of the Communist Party are, in line with the foregoing, to carry on the Bolshevik Revolution, to inspire and train the masses along Bolshevik principles and action, and to govern the land. Unlike the American and other parties, the Communist Party (in the Soviet Union and in its

satellite countries) never has to act as the opposition; it denies that there is any need for an opposition party. Changes in policies occur as a result of the changed attitudes of the party leaders. The leaders may change the "line" or may allow a subject matter to be discussed in party circles. In the latter procedure, which the Russians like to call "democratic centralism," problems or issues are discussed freely within the party, although possible reactions from above are watched for. At a point designated by the leadership, discussion is closed, and a decision is arrived at by whatever means the leadership deems desirable: by vote, party-group consensus, or leadership consensus. Once decreed, the decision cannot be challenged by the party membership or organs. It persists until the leadership decides to reopen the matter again.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION

The original ideal of the Communist Party was that it should be the instrument of the workers, and working class members were sought diligently. However, since the qualifications for party leadership (short of the stable top group) demand the same qualities of vigor, ruthlessness, dedication to duty, and organizational ability that are demanded of the people who manage industry and government, middle-party leadership and managerial leadership very often coincide. It is idle to conceive that the thousands of managers, directors, and officials who operate the government and industry are ruled by soviets composed of the factory workers who during most of the time work under them. And it is also idle to assume that the party members and leaders, who are directing the energies of the country, sit back in manual jobs, allowing or assigning nonparty members to the important and well-paying jobs in the management of industry, economy, and government.

This conclusion is inescapable from a deductive evaluation of the power structure of party and government, and from the inductive evaluation of the evidence on party membership, interlocking office-holding in party and government, and the social origins of party officials. The ruling class in both party and government is the same. The class of managers, directors, and officials runs the Soviet Union. Intellectuals are given honors and party positions, but they furnish adornment to the party, rather than leadership. Agricultural workers,

even if they dwell on the collective or state farms, furnish relatively few members to the party. The armed forces contribute a much higher percentage of the total membership, and the ruling members of the party constantly strive to maintain party activity within the armed forces at a high level. Here, too, however, there has been an increasingly close identification of army leadership and party leadership. The time has passed when army officers might be checked by party political commissars; the ruling elements in the army have coalesced.

In sum, the Communist Party permeates the state and the economy. It is still a part of the whole; but it directs the whole, and it holds the formal titles, the legal positions, that are given to the chiefs of administration, industry, and the armed forces.

Oligarchic Influences and Party Trends

OLIGARCHICAL INFLUENCES IN PARTIES

Political parties, whatever may be their *raison d'être*, are susceptible to certain conservative and oligarchic influences. Of course, in an age of universal suffrage, they must employ many democratic symbols and try the best they can to sound sincere. Each party invariably claims that it is the most democratic and has the welfare of the whole nation at heart.

At election time, the *aristoi* candidates deign to descend from their mansions and to bestir themselves among the yokels in order to obtain the majority in their districts [writes Michels]. The majority parties also take care, in political elections, to address themselves not alone to their associates. In democracy everyone appeals to the people, to every one of the people, without discrimination. . . . A socialist who before the elections, and afterwards, has only a very narrow conception of what is meant by the working-class, loves, during the campaign, to stretch the theoretical extent of this class to the point of including capitalists, providing, of course, that they are not too refractory to accord to their employees, in such a case, some small wage increment.¹

¹ Quoted with the permission of the *American Political Science Review* from Roberto Michels: "Some Reflections on the Sociological Character of Political Parties," *American Political Science Review*, Vol XXI (1927), pp. 762-63.

As Alexis de Tocqueville stated the point in his *Democracy in America* (1835): "Democratic republics extend the practice of currying favor with the many and introduce it into all classes."

Michels also describes how a party is transformed through success. Once its flush of youth has gone and its first appeals—backed by fiery intent—have echoed away into the distances, it begins to acquire a bureaucratic mien.

From a means, organization becomes an end. To the institutions and qualities which at the outset were destined simply to ensure the good working of the party machine (subordination, the harmonious cooperation of individual members, hierarchical relationships, discretion, propriety of conduct), a greater importance comes ultimately to be attached than to the productivity of the machine. Henceforward the sole preoccupation is to avoid anything which may clog the machinery. Should the party be attacked, it will abandon valuable positions previously conquered, and will renounce ancient rights rather than reply to the enemy's offensive by methods which might "compromise" its position. . . . We have now a finely conservative party which (since the effect survives the cause) continues to employ revolutionary terminology, but which in actual practice fulfills no other function than that of a constitutional opposition.²

But parties not only tend to grow bureaucratic and conservative as they grow older, they also become oligarchic. More and more of the important decisions are made by the leaders with ever more feeble, formal and informal communication with the party membership, and even less communication with the party's general following in the electorate. At the conclusion of his sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy, Michels summarizes his findings:

Now, if we leave out of consideration the tendency of the leaders to organize themselves and to consolidate their interests, and if we leave also out of consideration the grati-

² Quoted with the permission of The Free Press from *Political Parties*, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, 1915, reprinted 1949 (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 373-74.

tude of the led towards their leaders, and the general immobility and passivity of the masses, we are led to conclude that the principal cause of oligarchy in the democratic parties is to be found in the technical indispensability of leadership.

The process which has begun in consequence of the differentiation of functions in the party is completed by a complex of qualities which the leaders acquire through their detachment from the mass. At the outset, leaders arise *spontaneously*; their functions are *accessory* and *gratuitous*. Soon, however, they become *professional* leaders, and in this second stage of development they are *stable* and *irremovable*.

It follows that the explanation of the oligarchical phenomenon which thus results is partly *psychological*; oligarchy derives, that is to say, from the physical transformations which the leading personalities in the parties undergo in the course of their lives. But also, and still more, oligarchy depends upon what we may term the *psychology of organization itself*, that is to say, upon the consolidation of every disciplined political aggregate. Reduced to its most concise expression, the fundamental sociological law of political parties (the term "political" being here used in its most comprehensive significance) may be formulated in the following terms: "It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy."³

If only we had figures on the duration of the oligarchic process that could be used to compare one kind of party with another, we might make greater use of Michel's concept. However, as matters stand, many differences distinguish one party from another, and we can only suggest a wary attitude towards sweeping statements about all parties. One party's rank and file may be more forceful than another's. We can assume that communications among leaders and followers—the Iron Law of Oligarchy notwithstanding—are stronger and more meaningful in one party than another. The conservative

³ R. Michels, *op. cit.*, pp. 400–401.

and oligarchical tendencies will always suffuse party organizations with their qualities and effects. But the strength and character of a party's guiding theme must pose varying resistance to these tendencies, and—much to the harm of our neat "laws"—the times, the events, the public, and the men will conspire intermittently to interrupt and destroy any smooth progression that the abstract law of oligarchy may picture.

TRENDS IN THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

We have now come to a point where we may make several observations about the trend of political parties generally in the contemporary world. Today parties and governments are on the whole much different from those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The main trends have been fourfold: The executive branch of the government has become more influential in directing, controlling, and organizing the party. The party machine-organization has grown stronger in relation to the party membership, rather than weaker. The relation of political parties to government has grown closer. And those parties that could count on the tangible support of auxiliary organizations such as labor unions have forged ahead of parties that rely simply on the support of the "independent" electorate. All of these trends are of increasing importance in contemporary politics.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH OBTAINING STRONGER CONTROL OF PARTIES

The development of the executive branch of government and the development of strong parties go together. We have seen that the Italian and German charismatic (and later elite) parties of Mussolini and Hitler were integrated and centralized, and that their advent to power meant the abrupt decline of the legislatures. Also we have seen that the Communist Party is controlled by its executive committees and that the Soviet government itself is mastered by the top executives who simultaneously occupy party and state positions. In France, we saw that de Gaulle directs his party without challenge and that his primary demand for the reform of French government is that the executive be strengthened. In England, the executive leadership of the party and the Prime Minister and Cabinet of the state have grown stronger in parallel lines, so that it is difficult to say which came first, the

strong state executive or the strong party executive. In either case, the fact is apparent that the party membership and the Commons have suffered equally in force and influence.

In Italy as in America, the situation is less clear. However, so far as Italy is concerned, politics based on colorful personalities is being overshadowed by party politics. People vote the party label increasingly. The executive is stronger under the new constitution than under the pre-World War I constitution. Although De Gasperi was not the strong *personal* figure that Crespi and Orlando were before World War I, still his position came to be as secure and dominating as were theirs. This might indicate that the executive leadership of the government is *per se*, that is, without regard to the personality of the incumbent, stronger today than it used to be.

UNITED STATES SYSTEM STILL RESISTS TREND

Now let us look at the picture in the United States. The American party system historically joined with the governmental structure in promoting legislative leadership. Federalism and the separation of powers have contributed to making the local party strong and the national party weak. Yet, as Leslie Lipson and Leonard D. White have shown in their studies of the governors and national administration respectively, the executive power has been generally expanding in both state and nation. It is true that the party has lagged behind; it is not as much subject to the executive as is the administrative machinery of government. Nevertheless, the governor is a stronger political party figure today in most states than he was fifty years ago, and even a strongly criticized President such as President Truman was able to command party support in achieving his renomination as candidate for President in 1948. Separate state elections and independent state officers, however, seem to provide a barrier to the national executive's assuming thorough control over the party. Even President Franklin Roosevelt could not impose his choice of candidates on the local parties and electorates, nor could he compel the co-operation of Democratic Party members in Congress. And the very fact that the state governors have become stronger as party leaders means that they have less motive for following in the wake of the national executive.

PARTY DIRECTOR'S INCREASING CONTROL OVER MACHINERY

Of the parties we have described above, only the American parties would seem to be reluctant to participate in the tendency observed by Roberto Michels in his study of political parties before World War I. As we have seen, he found that in every party he studied, the party organizations were increasing their controls at the expense of the membership, a process that he regarded as inevitable. However, in the American case one must distinguish between centralization and integration. Resistance against centralization often occurs when the lower levels themselves are undergoing a process of integration. Thus, as the governor gains party power within the state, he is likely to resist strongly the turning of such power over to the national party. Similarly, the American scene has a multitude of tightly integrated county machines that resist incorporation into the state machine. Let us say, then, that there exists, if at all, only a slight tendency for American parties to become centralized, if only because the American machines, local and state, are already integrated. The American machine actually became oligarchic before the parties of which Michels spoke became oligarchic; the advocates of "better organization" in Europe have referred wistfully to American party organization since the nineteenth century.

PARTIES GROWING CLOSER TO THE GOVERNMENT

We also stated that the political parties seem to be drawing into a closer relationship to the government. In the Soviet Union, of course, the Communist Party runs through the government and economic system like a core of steel. But even elsewhere the victory of a party means more and more change in the activities and personnel of government. Party leaders are more and more often the same people as the government leaders. The parties are increasingly controlled by statutes in their activities and membership. Nevertheless, the idea that opposition parties should be completely out of office is changing in two different but related ways: First, in America and England, on issues regarded as vital, a two-party or bipartisan policy is sometimes adopted. This occurred in England during World War II, and of course the opposition party in England has had at all times a stipulated duty and

office. The same policy of bipartisanship occurred in America during and after World War II when, on matters concerning foreign affairs, Republican leaders joined the Democratic Administration. Thus the problem of a basic split in consensus, which many critics claimed would destroy representative government based on the party system, was attacked by stopgap, "emergency" measures. Second, as in France and Italy, a combination of coalition and fundamental rejection of the opposition is employed. The French and Italian governments have pursued the policy of inviting in all parties but the extreme left and right. The rejection of the Communists is to be considered a final and fundamental rejection—that is, a forced split in competing elites with the object of ultimately eliminating the extreme left. The R.P.F. combined the coalition and rejection ideas in a remarkable way. It insisted that it was not a party and recruited its members from all parties, but rejected utterly the Communist Party not only because the C.P. was in opposition but because it was composed of "non-Frenchmen."

PARTIES MUST SEEK INCREASINGLY SOLID GROUP SUPPORT

The modern party cannot live on the votes of isolated individuals and affiliated volunteers. It needs a richer diet of support from outside organizations. The Communist Party of Russia, of course, feeds right from the state. It has no problem of sustenance. The English Labour Party relies on the mass strength of organized labor. The Italian Christian Democratic Party depends, with many doubts and self-interrogations, on the support of Catholic Church organizations. The Rally of the French People provides its members with the excitement of a cause, a movement, a crusade, and the ultimate promise of victory. In the event of victory, a different solution to the organizational problem would have to be found.

The American political party still depends ultimately on favors and jobs for the local machine-workers and supporters and on "idealistic" politists. A slight challenge to this condition comes from the political strength of organized labor, which inclines towards the Democratic Party. The unions can give state-wide officers and national candidates a kind of support in which union favors are exchanged for machine favors. A more serious challenge to the traditional condition

of American parties is the spread of the merit system in the civil service, which gives jobs to the qualified for as long as they remain qualified. Deprived of this source of work and favors, the local party is somewhat in flux; it is more vulnerable to attack by insurgents, more friendly to the influence of volunteers, and more tempted to rely on the support of organized groups like labor.

Also, we should remember that pressure groups representing special interests, which we are to consider in the next chapter, have been developing concurrently with these several trends in party politics. One may almost perceive a race occurring between the assimilation of highly organized social and economic groups into the party system and the independent establishment of special interests as agencies of the state. Perhaps we may better judge the potential victor in this race and the consequences of its triumph when we have observed more closely the tendency of contemporary pressure politics.

Pressure Groups

CHAPTER FIVE presented the view that no arrangement of representation, no system of election, can be neutral. By any arrangement, some broad value or values, of a majority, of a local region, of an economic or of some other type of group will be pushed a little deeper into the character of the government. Political parties are of especial relevance, since they have the stated goals of representing certain values and interests in the government that differ from the preferences of their opponents. This characteristic bent of political parties is manifested clearly in countries that have several parties. Parties in France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and other lands are often small and vociferous on behalf of minority interests. In America, where the major parties differ on principles so broad and vague as to be sometimes impossible to discover, party statements often cloak the struggle of values and interests that continually agitate the internal life of a party.

PRESSURE GROUPS PART OF THE STRUGGLE OVER VALUES

The pressure group is on another level of the conflict of values with which politics is concerned. The pressure group in America commonly is called the lobby, and the imagination flatters one. They visualize several well-paid, suave gentlemen who, knowing all there is to know about the workings of legislatures, use fair means or foul to induce legislators to raid the public treasury. In essence, how the pressure group is simply any organized social group seeking to influence the behavior of political officers without seeking formal control of the government. The lobby is a type of pressure group whose agents apply whatever influence they may command directly upon the legislators.

PRESSURE GROUPS IN DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS

In modern society, pressure groups can be found among the numerous voluntary associations, such as labor unions

trades associations, and reform groups, that have some interest at stake in politics. However, essentially the same phenomenon as the modern pressure-group existed in other times when society was not so mobile and associations not so voluntary.

"Almost every interest in medieval society," writes Helen Cam, "almost every element in its make-up, has left its trace on the legislation of council and parliament."¹ She listed the principal sources of legislative activity as: "The directive or planning urge in the ruler, the need for clarifying and defining experience by the judicature, and the demand from the ruled for redress of grievances." This last source, "public" demand, meant, especially by the end of the fifteenth century, about what it means today, although the interests have changed somewhat. The medieval pressure-groups were the legal profession, the clergy, the nobility, the landowners, the sheriffs and bailiffs, the merchants, and the leaders of localities. Also, developing continuously as an influence on law-making through the late medieval and early modern periods was the notion of the commonweal, often a mere pretense or rationalization and yet often truly advanced.

Modern pressure-groups have grown in close relation to the various party systems. When there are many parties, a number of such interest groups can be absorbed into the party system. Then the problem of pressure groups becomes almost inextricable from the general study of the political parties. In England, where one kind of two-party system exists, pressure groups play a role different from the role they play in America, where another kind of two-party system exists. In England, until recently, a small group drawn from the same social class had been able to represent dominant landed, religious and commercial interests. Many members of Parliament incarnated the values that might have otherwise prompted strong and numerous pressure groups.

But in America, society has been for a long time relatively classless. The politician has been an individualist, footloose by comparison with his British counterpart, free to bargain and willing to deal with a variety of opposing groups. Further-

¹ "The Legislators of Medieval England," the Raleigh Lecture on History, read June 13, 1945, and published in the *Proceedings of The British Academy* (1945), 137-50.

more, the American economy is tremendously diversified, the population exceedingly heterogeneous, and the political structure greatly decentralized and unintegrated. The formal structure of the government cannot reflect faithfully any large part of the interests, which must seek informal ways of influencing the government.

An analysis of seventy parliamentary enactments of 1936-37 by Professor W. Ivor Jennings shows that private interests do inspire legislation but also reveals how orderly is the process by which the interests affect the British law. If we abstract, not without some loss of realism, the data furnished by Professor Jennings on the informal sources of law, we find that, of the 70 enactments, the sources of 9 lay in Cabinet policy, of 27 in the departments of the government, of 7 in a combination of departmental and pressure-group interests, of 5 in a combination of departmental and local authorities, of 3 in combinations of individual members and pressure groups, of 3 in pressure groups, of 2 in local authorities, of 2 in combinations of departments, pressure groups, and local authorities, and of 1 each in 10 different elements or combinations of elements.

Thus, if one may take 1936 as a usual year, one may conclude that local authorities and pressure groups are active in the British legislative process. Scrutiny of the many sources reveals, however, that English pressure groups and authorities operate more publicly and with more formality than do pressure groups in American legislatures. Furthermore, British interests appear to be tamed by Cabinet and departmental interests to an extent undreamed of in American legislatures. The organized fashion. The looseness, informality, and mystery of American lobbying is mainly absent.

THREE LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION OF PRESSURES

This chapter will distinguish degrees of organization in the pressure groups. Beginning with the sporadic attempts of individuals to influence the government, we shall move on to discuss the pressure group as it has developed in the United States, and we shall conclude by describing the cases in which pressure groups have been integrated into the government and made responsible for public duties. On each level of organization, we shall be concerned with appraising the social groups

producing the pressure, the amount and the impact of such pressure, and the techniques of the groups.

Individual Influence in Politics

SELF-INTEREST IN POLITICS

Analysis of voting behavior shows that economic and social interests condition the way many people vote. Although we certainly *cannot* make the statement that most people are obviously motivated by their own immediate interests when they cast their vote, there does seem to be some relation between the way people vote and their economic and social levels. Many people vote the way they think will benefit most immediately their pockets or their particular religious, nationality, local, or racial groups. Furthermore, many voters are active in politics and seek their personal interests through the political party.

ANY INTERESTED INDIVIDUAL CAN EXERT MUCH INFLUENCE

We are concerned here with those politists who, without belonging to continuously organized groups, still exert pressure on the government over and above their party or voting activities. Among them would be individuals who seek favors of some sort from the government, ranging from an exception to a municipal zoning ordinance to the granting of a contract for a huge dam that the state or national government intends to construct. Among them also would be the individual advocates of "causes," ranging from the construction of a municipal swimming pool to the establishment of a national bird sanctuary.

The number of such persons, contrary to popular belief, is not infinite. The active public, we have pointed out, is not large. A single citizen, inspired by an intense selfish or altruistic purpose, can exert an influence greatly disproportionate to his numerical influence as one of 180,000,000 people. Most politicians who have had any considerable experience in public life can name specific individuals in their constituencies who are intensely interested in some aspect of politics and who persist in making their influence felt. For example, almost every politician who has had a hand in any legislation concerning the conservation or destruction of wild life will have heard from one active woman who has devoted much of

her adult life to influencing public attitudes towards wild-life conservation.

Whatever the country, so few people pay attention to the workings of government that anyone who will spend a few hours a month on some subject of government over a long period of time can become a leader of opinion and action. This is true not only of party politics but also of activity in any one of the hundreds of areas in which the government is doing something—the control of floods in the Dakotas (or in China, for that matter), the habits of the Navaho Indians, the tax rate on personal property, the problems of sewage disposal in Chicago, or the construction of a superhighway.

“The wheel that squeaks, gets the grease.” A mere handful of individuals, raising a clamor that cannot be stilled by constitutional means, can embarrass, badger, and even control a politician, a party, or an agency of government. Citizens who discover this fact for the first time are as astonished as the small boy who enters a great cavern and hears the resounding echo of his shouts. A few people are permanently unbalanced by the shock. They become experts on everything, and appear at every stage of the legislative process, as drunk with power as ever a government official might be. Their entrance on the scene of a meeting, hearing, or conference brings shudders to those acquainted with them.

PRESSURES CAN BE GOOD OR BAD

Unfortunately, no formula can say which of these various individual pressures that have been described are good and which bad. Pressure in itself, obviously, is neither good nor bad. One can influence the government to his own financial profit; but one can also influence the government to relieve famine in India. This is as true of individuals we are now discussing as of the social groups we shall discuss below. The student must determine in his own mind the extent to which the pressure of an individual or group is for an unjustified personal benefit or for a justified larger cause.

If one has no settled standards for making such evaluations, he ought to turn to some of the moral philosophers for help. Aristotle's *Ethics*, Plato's *Republic*, Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations*, Augustine's *Confessions*, Dante's *Divine Comedy*, and Spinoza's *Ethics* are only a few of the older works that can help one to formulate his ethical position on general

questions of politics. The problem is not an easy one, and we shall touch on it again in the next to last chapter.

Nowhere is it more apparent than in the debate over pressure politics that most people consider their own ideas legitimate and true and those of their opponents illegitimate and false. The mere fact that a person advocates reforms on behalf of others does not argue in itself for his goodness. Napoleon almost ruined France by policies that sought glory for that country.

POLITICAL HISTORY IS COLORED BY
UNENDING PERSONAL INTRIGUE

Perhaps we can say, however, that the nature of politics over most of history has been such that the individuals one finds on the political scene seem to be motivated most of the time by a desire to benefit themselves. They are in the business of influencing politics for "what they can get out of it." Applying only the simple index of honesty about money, one rarely finds a society whose politicians are not widely suspected of greed, and one also rarely finds a society in which a person could not purchase disproportionate political influence.

USE OF MONEY TO INFLUENCE OFFICIALS AND PUBLIC

Money has been used often by officials or private individuals to influence other officials. King George III spent so much money buying seats in the House of Commons that his broker warned him of approaching private bankruptcy. Benedict Arnold tried to sell out West Point to the British for £10,000 during the Revolutionary War. Before the Reform Act of 1832, some members of the British House of Commons would sell their vote for the going price of one guinea and a free meal each day of the parliamentary session. Certain American financiers made deal after deal with a notorious boss of Tammany Hall under a kind of syndicate arrangement for their mutual profit. The boss died in disgrace, but his partners lived respectable lives.

Money also has been used by individuals to influence the public. A well-known mayor of a large American city, who is recorded historically as a reform mayor, had accumulated a fortune in public utilities promotion by manipulations of questionable legality. Later he used his wealth to achieve

efficient and honest government, having spent his money freely to become elected and to stay in office. The transformation of John D. Rockefeller is similar. A part of his fortune was accumulated by collusions to raise the prices people had to pay for oil; much of it was spent later in philanthropic enterprises benefiting the public. The prominence of the public relations expert today goes back to the success of Rockefeller's public relations adviser, who influenced the industrialist and financier to clear his name with the public by means of large-scale philanthropy.

Many different kinds of people—campaign managers, government executives, diplomats, corporate businessmen, and speculative businessmen—have used money to accomplish their purposes. A Senate committee investigation during Taft's administration discovered that supporters of the candidate who won election to the United States Senate from Illinois had contributed \$235,000 to a "jack pot" for the Illinois legislators. The "jack pot" was a pool of "contributions," one sum for a favorable vote on utilities, another sum for a "correct" vote on a tax bill, and so on for other purposes. At the end of the session, the representatives that had voted "right" were given a share of the loot.

THE USE OF OFFICE FOR PECUNIARY GAIN

No period of American history evidences quite the picture of purity the idealistic citizen dreams of. Certain periods of political history seem particularly venal and corrupt. Yet often the same periods show a lofty and religious dedication to public tasks on the part of some elements of the population. The Civil War and Reconstruction had this double character. Americans sacrificed careers, fortunes, and even their lives in the War and in the reform movements afterwards. Yet scandals were frequent during and after the War. Individuals speculated in stocks, bonds, and commodities on the basis of inside information they possessed as government officials. Others were partners to grafting and bribery. State and local as well as national government experienced investigations and disclosures that shocked the idealistic and seemingly confused the cynics. It was, said Henry Adams, an age of damaged reputations.

The prohibition period in America produced similar behavior. A large number of prohibition agents were fired or

convicted of crimes during the "great experiment." Indeed, new cases of official profiteering are revealed each month in the country's newspapers. Often the transactions reported are shady rather than illegal. For example, the Chicago Downs Association, which runs harness racing in Cicero, Illinois, was shown in 1951 to have sold stock at \$.10 a share to a number of politicians on whose good will the Association depended. The \$.10 stock paid dividends of \$1.75 a share in two years.

Some diplomats of all nations have promoted business enterprise for their own financial gain in the areas of the world to which they have gone. We are not speaking here of "dollar diplomacy," which is a legitimate, though disputed, policy of a government to help its nationals expand and protect their business enterprise abroad. We are speaking rather of the numerous ways in which diplomats and other public representatives have increased their private holdings with the help of their public office. A Roman provincial governor or general expected to return to Rome as a very wealthy man. Only rarely, as in the case of Verres, who was prosecuted successfully by Cicero for stripping Sicily of its wealth, did the law interfere with private gains.

Venetian and British naval officers and privateers were for centuries commissioned to take what they could find and to keep a part of it for themselves. No army of invasion or occupation, even today, moves into foreign territory without its complement of uniformed (or official civilian) speculators, promoters, and businessmen. Private trading and transportation companies often maintain little "diplomatic services" of their own. The British East India Company was notorious for its ability to influence politics wherever its stations were established. The families of Christian missionaries to Hawaii became active leaders of island politics and built great fortunes in business there. Certain airlines have policy-influencing organizations not only in their country of origin but wherever their planes alight.

SALE OF OFFICES

The great profits to be obtained from holding public office often have fostered the practice of selling offices to the highest bidder or at a fixed price. The sale of offices was nearly a universal practice in the seventeenth century in Europe and

has been found throughout the world at various times. In the seventeenth century one might buy a governorship of Syria for 60,000 ducats from the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, any city office in Milan, a judgeship from Frederick III of Brandenburg, a clerkship of assize from an English sheriff, the office of sheriff in Mexico for 122,740 pesos, and a judgeship in the High Court of Paris for 18,000 livres. Profits from office salaries, fees, and graft made the investments good ones; but in many countries, notably France and Spain, the prices of offices soared also because of the social prestige accruing to the holder of official position. The practice harms the efficiency of an administrative machine and prevents control over it. It is prevalent under aristocratic governments that have a large bureaucracy, but the American spoils system is somewhat like the sale of office. Thus a wealthy man who gives liberally to the national party that wins an election may hope for an ambassador's post and the prestige that goes with it. Instances of more direct payments are not lacking. Congressional hearings in 1951 disclosed that federal offices in Mississippi were being sold, and a Rhode Island grand jury in the same year indicted several Woonsocket officials for selling city jobs.

SOLICITATION OF MONEY FOR POLITICAL USE

Individual corporate businessmen become factors in politics, willing or not. On the even of Nazi triumph in Germany, twenty German industrialists were called to an "important" conference. There they were introduced by Hjalmar Schacht to Adolf Hitler. They listened to a passionate harangue against communism and were dunned for 3,000,000 reichsmark. Not a few American businessmen have been on the "sucker list" of Gerald K. Smith and other extremists, just as not a few professional men and humanitarians have been on the lists of leftist agitators. Some of them are induced to pay the piper even if they are unwilling to dance the tune.

USE OF MONEY

What do they all want—these millions of people who since the beginning of recorded history have used money to get something extra out of politics? Their motives and values are as complex and numerous as are those of the leaders, the mass of voters, and the party members that we have dis-

cussed in the four preceding chapters. Some seek power for its own sake, as did Julius Caesar when he distributed his wealth among the Roman citizens. Others seek wealth by converting a smaller amount of wealth into power and then cashing in on the conversion, as did Cameron. Others seek social respect as did Rockefeller in his old age and Boss Croker of Tammany, who spent his graft in easy retirement as a country squire and breeder of race horses in Ireland. Many seek protection from imminent peril; among this kind would be those who bribed or bought their way out of the ranks of the Revolutionary and Civil War armies, and the shopkeepers and tavern owners who have paid sums of money to officials to remain in business in eighteenth-century France, pre-Revolutionary America, twentieth-century United States, and elsewhere.

Some pay directly to obtain "efficiency" in government, because if they rely on the law and administration alone, they cannot get their due. They must pay for a pension that is theirs by right, a license that they are qualified to receive, a paper that they are entitled to possess, a damage settlement they deserve, a prompt administrative action that never should have been delayed. Some find sport in the game of influencing politics; they like to be on the "inside" or "in the know." But, of course, a great many of these people who attempt to influence government have identified themselves with the cause of others. For example, they may feel uncomfortable when they perceive suffering around them or even across the world, or they may worry about the discomfort of the next generation should it be saddled with a huge public debt.

DIFFICULTY OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRESSURES

It is sometimes difficult to determine whether a particular attempt to influence politics is the act of an individual *qua* individual or *qua* public official or group member. One would find it hard to decide, for example, whether a good part of Thomas Jefferson's huge correspondence was private or public; his private letters often discuss and take a position on public matters. Public office even seems to deprive a man of his right to a private character. Edward VIII of England found that he could not be both King of England and husband of Mrs. Simpson. Secretary of State Acheson met with

hostility when he attempted to draw a line between his "private" friendship for Alger Hiss and his official conduct towards a convicted perjurer.

Such problems arise because in the process of influencing politics, individuals move in and out of pressure groups. They act as individuals; they act also as group representatives. A common question asked by legislators of witnesses in hearings before a committee is: "Do you come in a private capacity or do you claim to represent some group?" Sometimes a person leads several lives. The German millionaire, Stinnes, was a member of the *Reichstag*, a contributor to parties, an owner of influential newspapers, and the controller of large traction interests in the Ruhr Valley with political influence. He was thus a representative being pressured by himself as the agent of himself.

Sometimes even the advocates of a similar point of view are divided. They are not sufficiently organized to know whether they are representing only themselves or others. Is there a single "business lobby," or are there many business lobbies, or are there many individual businessmen who are expressing their views? Only a careful analysis of the facts of a single case can tell whether the opinion being expressed and the pressure being exerted is that of one individual, of several individuals, or of a continuously organized group. Obviously, the attitude that the official, the press, the public, and all other interested parties will take towards the expression or activity will be influenced by the result of such an analysis. Laws regulating lobbies have sometimes stumbled over this distinction between individual and group pressures, finding it hard to draw in legal language. Lone individuals attempt to masquerade as representatives of large groups; representatives of large groups attempt to evade regulation and acquire an air of neutrality by parading as individuals. (However, suspicion can be carried too far; writers who are prone to scent garbage in a rose garden will find in every individual's attempt to influence government a tightly organized and corrupt conspiracy.)

ORIGINS OF PRESSURE GROUPS

Usually pressure groups originate in the felt needs and shared sympathies of individuals concerned with some subject of politics. Wild-flower lovers form leagues to protect

wild flowers; haters of drunkenness gather to form temperance unions or antisaloon leagues. The telltale mark of the true lobby is the lobbyist, the professional hireling of the interested group. He is working year in and year out to influence legislation. His presence is continuously felt. No difficulty in distinguishing special cases can conceal the important special effects of this kind of pressure.

The Lobby and Pressure Groups

The heavy impact of the lobby was felt for the first time in America before the Civil War. In 1857, a noted economist, Henry C. Carey, wrote to President Buchanan that the legislation of the country had fallen into the hands of the shipping and railroad interests. Ten years before, he wrote, one would have been thought a false prophet if he had predicted "that there would have arisen a 'third house of Congress'—composed of lobby members and embracing men who had filled almost the highest legislative and executive offices—abundantly supplied, to use the words of Colonel Benton, 'with the means required for conciliating members and combining interests,' and thus securing the passage of almost any bill, the applicants were willing, sufficiently liberally, to pay."

PRIMITIVE LOBBYING TECHNIQUES

The techniques first used by American lobbyists were, as Carey indicates, quite crude. The primary ones were bribery, sharing the profits of new ventures, personal supplication, and lavish entertainment. The results were startling. Never had so many been bought for so little. Huge tracts of land, vast natural resources, precious public rights were dispensed to special interests. The popular clamor against lobbies became frightening at times, but it was of doubtful effect. Actually political scientists scarcely understand what caused the gradual transition from the crude methods and wholesale plunder of two generations ago to the more genteel techniques and more acceptable objectives of the pressure groups today. It may have been popular anger that played the major role in tempering the old type of lobbying, or it may have been the very multiplication of lobbies that produced better-behaved pressure groups.

During the last decades of the nineteenth century, in any event, and concurrently with the popular movements against

political corruption, there came on the scene the opposition lobbies. Where there had been only lumbermen's lobbies, there were now conservation lobbies. Where there had been only railroad lobbies, there were now farmers' lobbies. Where there had been only public utility lobbies, there were now public ownership lobbies. School lobbies, there were now economy lobbies. Labor lobbies entered the arena against industrial lobbies. Elected representatives who had lost their equilibrium as the result of one force moved about now in a more stable balance of forces.

TRANSFORMATION OF LOBBIES

Furthermore, the techniques and objectives of the lobbies had to change. The lobby—that is, the group directly influencing lawmakers—grew into the pressure group, a broader social organization that made direct lobbying only a part of its total operations. Less money was spent on buying votes and more on persuading representatives. Crude demands had to be fashioned (and changed somewhat in the process) into the “legitimate” requests of interests whose “well-being was important to the country as a whole.”

Public relations became an object of much concern to the leaders of pressure groups. The public was informed by all means possible of the “reasonableness” of a group's needs, and attempts were made to convince the representatives that the cause of a particular lobby was just by the weight of logic, information, and press comment. Furthermore, the pressure groups had to acquire constituencies. Their voice was more effective when it was known that they spoke on behalf of thousands of organized citizens. Representatives listened and attended more carefully to particular interests if they knew such interests carried large numbers of votes on election day.

By such means and in such ways did the lobbies transform themselves into the pressure groups that are to be found on election day. They are highly organized; they claim large membership lists; they have agents who are skilled in persuasion and public relations; they insist that their purposes are consonant with the public welfare.

Business, labor, farm, and “reform” pressure groups are found in all modern nations where social groups are free to combine, to govern themselves, and to exert pressure on political affairs. Where several religious groups exist, we find

religious pressures. Where several nationalities are present, we find nationality pressures. Where there are notable social and economic differences between one part of a country and another, we find local pressure groups. An estimate of the United States Office of Domestic Commerce in 1950 found 150 national labor groups and 40,000 to 50,000 local labor organizations; 150 national agricultural organizations and 14,000 to 15,000 local ones; and over 3,000 national business groups and some 20,000 local ones.

NUMBER OF LOBBIES LARGE TODAY

The total number of lobbying pressure groups in the United States, where the pressure group phenomenon is most strikingly demonstrated, is unknown. One reason for this ignorance, alluded to earlier, is that a lobby or a pressure group is difficult to define. Is a university that, in trying to get large appropriations for educational purposes, sends its skilled administrative and faculty personnel before legislative committees to be considered a lobby? Most state universities have such "lobbies," but they are rarely, if ever, registered under state or federal lobbying acts. Other state and federal agencies also have lobbies, and they, too, are not registered. Are newspaper publishers who attempt to influence legislators to be called lobbyists? Apparently they, too, escape most registration laws. Another reason for our ignorance is that lobbies are not required to register in almost half the states and in most cities and counties; yet there are local as well as national lobbies. Furthermore, a lobby in one state is not defined as a lobby in another, so that one has no reliable standard of comparison. And if one took lobbying in its broader pressure-group sense, *every organized group with political interests* would come under the term.

No one, however, would dispute the statement that the number of pressure groups maintaining lobbyists amounts to several thousands, including about eighteen-hundred organizations actively engaged in influencing legislative and administrative opinion in Washington, a hundred or so in the more populous states, and an unknown number in the fifty largest cities. The amount of money spent for lobbying in Washington alone each year is at a minimum six million dollars and at a maximum, depending on whether one counts all public relations expenditures as lobbying, well over ten

million dollars. This amount, if multiplied by four, exceeds easily the total spent by the national political parties on national campaigns over each four year period. In the states, though our information is even less accurate, the lobbies perhaps spend annually more than the state and local political parties do. The total expenditures in the country for all influencing of opinion with an eye to legislative policy would be even more staggering.

THE CHIEF NATIONAL LOBBIES AND GROUPINGS

What are the top lobbies in the government? A list of the chief lobbies active in Washington would, without doubt, include the Committee for Constitutional Government, National Association of Manufacturers, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, National Association of Electric Companies, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), railway brotherhoods (several unions), American Farm Bureau Federation, National Grange, National Farmers Union, American Medical Association, American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, American Veterans Committee, National Council of Churches of Christ in America, General Federation of Women's Clubs, and League of Women Voters.

It may be observed that the list of lobbies breaks rather easily into the categories of business, labor, farmer, church, and reform, with the exception of the veterans' lobbies. The Townsend National Recovery Plan lobby is typical of a large group of lobbies, not listed here, the objectives of which are reforms of many kinds—humanitarian, financial, prohibitive, or educational. The predominance of business, labor, and farm interests is significant. Beyond doubt it is these three parts of modern society that have found the traditional representative system unresponsive to their needs. To find business and labor pressure-groups is not surprising; businessmen and workers are urban phenomena, and farm minorities even in the cities.

To find farm pressure-groups is more surprising, for, as we pointed out in our discussion of representation, farmers are overrepresented in almost all American legislatures (if we take the position that equal populations should send equal numbers of representatives to the legislatures). However, the farmers nationally are a minority group, and they find pres-

sure politics as useful in gaining their own ends, as do other minority groups. There are other reasons for the farmers having a national lobby. They are isolated; under ordinary conditions they do not find it easy to organize for political activity. Their incomes are middle or lower class; they cannot bring immediate financial pressure to bear on opposing politicians. Only by belonging to a large organization, permanently administered, and supplied by small dues from thousands of farmers, can they acquire effective spokesmen for their *immediate* interests.

BUSINESS INTERESTS ARE NOT UNIFIED INTERNALLY

None of the groups mentioned, however—business, labor, farmers, or any other large segment of the population—is organized as a unit. For example, we cannot speak of “business” as a pressure group; there are many pressure groups based on business interests. There exist organizations of industrialists, exporters, shippers, railroads, fruit growers, fashion designers; national, New England, Western, and Southern manufacturing interests; small businessmen, stock brokers, and a number of other business groups. It is true that several threads of common interest unite most of them. They incline towards conservatism; they do not favor high taxes on corporations or personal income; they tend to dislike government regulations of any large part of the economy; they oppose active support of labor unions by the government. But they differ and even conflict in many ways. Manufacturers’ lobbies may oppose the shippers’ and railroads’ demand for higher freight rates. The manufacturers of fashionable textiles may join with certain industrial interests to favor high tariffs and find opposition from exporters and maritime interests. New England manufacturers may support legislation to increase wages throughout the nation in order to fight off the threat posed to New England industry by low wages in the South. The coal industry will sit by while the oil industry tries to fight off government controls; and the oil industry hardly protests when the government forces the coal industry to pay higher wages to the coal miners.

CERTAIN CENTRALIZED TENDENCIES EXIST

Yet certain tendencies towards the centralization of business policies have been apparent for a half-century, beginning

with the founding of the National Association of Manufacturers and the growth of the United States Chamber of Commerce. Whatever agreement may be present among most of the interests of American business seems to find its way into the policies of these national pressure-groups. No one, however, should make the mistake of believing that the policies of these agencies reflect the deliberations of many thousands of their members. As in most trade associations and pressure organizations, a small group of members lead and speak on behalf of the whole membership, and even on behalf of the whole area of the economy or of the whole country. But one would be foolish to believe, and no Congressman or official does believe, that the National Home and Property Owners' Foundation, for example, is fully supported by and acts in accord with the desires of the millions of American home and property owners throughout the country. Nevertheless, a genuine point of view is being expressed by the Foundation; it represents a solid bloc of opinion and power. The legislator may take it, or leave it, or, even better, evaluate it along with other interests of his constituents.

EUROPEAN BUSINESS PRESSURE

In Europe, business pressures evolved in somewhat the same way as they did in America. As we shall see in the third section of this chapter, European industry has in certain crucial cases moved out of pressure politics into the government itself. But, as in America, the business interests of Europe have fought amongst themselves. There has not been one line of policy; there have been many. As Roberto Michels wrote during the twenties:

Homogeneity is wanting in the businessman type, even when for defensive or offensive reasons of foreign or internal politics the various types sometimes become allies to the point of forming an apparently compact elite. Such occasional apparent compactness does not prevent there being in the bosoms of the elites traces (visible to the naked eye of anybody whose glance is not dimmed by arch-socialist or arch-middle class prejudices) of strongly different types of economic elites, such as the great professional and patrimonial rentiers, the great industrial and landed interests,

the great bankers and the great speculators, the great exporters and the great importers.²

CLEAVAGES AMONG UNIONS

Nor is the American working force united as a pressure group. There are wide cleavages in personalities and policies among its leaders. Their spokesmen, when they testify before congressional committees and speak privately to legislators, claim to represent fifteen million workers. They favor government intervention on matters of wages and hours in the poorest sections of the economy. They seek legislation that makes it easier for them to increase their membership and fight opposition from business management. But they disagree on other important issues. Some favor governmental ownership of basic industries and resources. Some oppose this. Some leaders take positions on issues concerning foreign affairs and fiscal policy that others regard as beyond the appropriate sphere of labor pressure-group influence.

In some localities, the unions may be joined with the Republican Party, although in most the unions pledge their support to Democrats. Moreover, in many places, each individual local union may endorse individual political candidates and need not adhere to any general unified program of political action. Some unions are politically energetic; some are apathetic; some are almost parts of the local political organization of a major party; others endorse men from both parties. Both individual unions and state organizations of unions may be active at the same time in the halls of the same state legislature, one proposing policies different from those of the other.

Finally we should mention that there are some sixty-six million employed persons in the United States. The overwhelming majority of workers in factories, farms, and offices are not organized by occupation in any fashion. They are affected by, but do not participate in, the pressure-group process, not even in the remote sense that a cinder-snapper participates in the decisions made by the president of the AFL-CIO.

² Quoted with the permission of the University of Minnesota Press from Roberto Michels: *First Lecture in Political Sociology*, translated with an introduction by Alfred de Grazia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 120.

AMERICAN LABOR LESS ACTIVE IN POLITICS THAN EUROPEAN

On the whole, American labor unions are less active politically than the European unions. Collective bargaining is the chief justification of American unionism, which tends to stay within the bounds of the traditional economic definition of unions as monopolistic sellers of labor engaged in maximizing the wage bill of an industry. In France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and Britain, the labor unions strive for the greater glories of politics, often, like the British Labour Party, affiliating directly with political parties.

Most European unions strongly advocate the nationalization of basic industries by the government, while American unions often are neutral or split over government ownership of basic industries. The American unions place much more reliance on pressure-group politics than do the European union. This is partly because European labor is more politically bent, partly because the multiparty system allows labor unions to dominate certain parties, and partly because European labor has often faced a class-dominated political elite that was implacably opposed to the interests of workers.

MAJOR FARM ORGANIZATIONS

Farmers, unlike union workers, may belong to several organizations at the same time. An Ohio farmer, for example, may belong to a dairy association, a live stock association, and one or more general associations. Most of the organized farmers of America fall into three large general associations. The offices of these organizations conduct vigorous lobbies in the national capital, in almost all state capitals, and in many local communities. The three major farm organizations are the Farm Bureau Federation, the National Grange, and the Farmers Union. The Farm Bureau Federation is the largest and most influential of the three. Its policies favor government assistance to farmers by means of loans, crop controls to prevent "overproduction," and a variety of technical assistance. The Grange was once a great force for government regulation of the industries and interests that served and often "enslaved" the farmers, but it has evolved into the most conservative of the three groups. The Farmers Union is the most radical of the three and proposes more than the Farm Bureau Federation in the way of government protection for farmers,

public ownership of utilities, transport, and storage facilities, and co-operation with consumer and labor groups against the policies of business interests.

In Europe and England, the policies of the farmers' associations tend to resemble those of the Farmers Union. They are staunch advocates of agricultural and other co-operatives as a means by which producers and buyers may control the mark-up of prices on the things they need. They are friendly to the socialist labor movement, and they are active on behalf of government aid to rural development of electric power, housing, transportation, and education. Often they urge the requisitioning of large estates and their fragmentation into small farms for the benefit of landless tenant farmers.

VETERANS ORGANIZATIONS

The business, labor, and farmer pressure-groups mentioned are the major elements in the total pressure-group picture. But other groups are important. Veterans groups, for example, are very powerful. The American Legion is known to influence legislation not only on matters directly affecting veterans—problems concerning pensions, health, and bonuses for war service—but also on matters of social and economic policy. Its leadership agrees on the whole with the philosophy of government expressed by the National Association of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce.

REFORM LOBBIES

It is much less easy to describe the myriad "reform" groups that inhabit the legislative corridors. Some of them, like the League of Women Voters, are old, trusted, and skilled representatives of opinion on problems affecting governmental structure and efficiency of government, as well as on matters affecting the legal and political status of women. Others, although adhering to a noble general purpose, propose schemes the principal effect of which is to frighten legislators into voting for measures more likely to achieve the noble purpose without disaster to the economy.

TECHNIQUES OF MODERN LOBBIES

Here and there during the discussion, we have mentioned several of the methods by which pressure groups have operated. In describing the ways in which individuals have

made themselves effective in politics, we mentioned that merely "being around" the places where political events are occurring produces influence over a period of time. Calling, writing, and "buttonholing" representatives and administrators is effective when done by individuals simply because, even in a democratic society, few people do such things. To these techniques we added the materialistic weapons of the individual and of the primitive lobby—the speculative collusion, the bribe, lavish gifts and entertainment, and solicitation in an atmosphere of intimidation.

We then mentioned the techniques of the modern lobbies proper. Information is provided legislators to aid them in voting "right" on an issue. The pressure group hires skilled and professional lobbyists. It reformulates its special needs into a program of legislation that allegedly will benefit a large part of society and the best interests of the nation. It conducts vigorous recruiting campaigns to get as many members as possible; this is done to impress legislators or administrators with the wide popular demand for the lobbyist's program. It tries to activate this largely passive membership as much as possible, exhorting them at the proper time to exert individual pressures on their representatives. Several pressure groups have gone into the "publishing business" as a way of avoiding both the stigma of the word "lobby" and the regulations imposed upon lobbies as legally defined. For example, the Committee for Constitutional Government, a strong opponent of governmental intervention in economic life, announced in 1944 that in seven years it had sent out 82,000,000 pieces of literature, 10,000 transcriptions for radio programs, 350,000 telegrams, and many thousands of news releases, all, of course, favoring its point of view. Some 700,000 copies of one book alone were distributed nationally by the Committee in 1949 and 1950.

SPECIAL BUSINESS TECHNIQUES

In addition, each major type of lobby employs techniques of persuasion and influence appropriate to its particular kind of strength. Business groups, as has been indicated, do not typically operate in close-knit organizations. The peak cartels and the top trade associations may on critical occasions band together for a time, but they have always been a minority influence, even when popular myth regards them as ruling the

government. Sporadic clusters of businessmen pay to influence politics. Thus, about twenty wealthy men gave a few thousand dollars apiece to Truman's campaign in 1948 and helped him to raise about a million dollars besides. In the localities, businessmen are much more likely to spend money for direct political returns. Notable among such persons are real-estate men and businessmen who are dependent to some extent on government contracts or good will—contractors, lawyers, automobile dealers, insurance agents, and utilities executives.

Although there is some evidence that in Germany, France, and Italy, the leaders of large industrial aggregates have organized their personnel and equipment directly for political warfare, for the most part, the huge material and manpower resources under the command of the industrial managers have been employed, if at all, only for passive resistance. The Boston merchants in 1769 used nonimportation agreements against English goods to force the revocation of import duties. They punished their unco-operative fellow-merchants by boycotting them, by proclaiming them enemies of their country in town meetings, by stoning and smearing their houses, and even by beatings. When modern American industrialists, bankers, and realtors have on exceptional occasions resisted government intervention, they have done so by instituting interminable legal controversies and by slowing up co-operation, rather than by covert conspiracy.

Finally, we ought to add, in speaking of the techniques of business pressure groups, that businessmen and their allies from the press, the legal profession, and finance have commonly made their influence felt on government by doubling their jobs; that is, possessed of more personal resources and freedom of movement than other occupational interests, they have been able to accept appointive positions in many offices of the government.

FAVORITE LABOR PRESSURE TACTICS

Labor pressure-groups operate through their organizations more than do businessmen. They can, of course, call on the rock bottom methods of exerting economic, social, and political pressures—the strike and the boycott of products the manufacturers of which are considered hostile to labor, and there have been a number of industry-wide strikes, partly

political in purpose; but there has never been a general strike of all union labor throughout the nation, for American labor has never been sufficiently organized or politically motivated to carry out a general strike.

A general strike has never yet been purely economic in nature. It has always been a means of exerting direct political pressure to destroy an opposing political alignment or defeat a threat to the interests of labor. Belgium, England, France, Italy, and other lands have had general strikes during this century. The Belgian strike of 1893, which had to do with a demand for the extension of suffrage to all workers, was notably successful. In most other cases, internal difficulties in the strike movement and vociferous public reaction to the complete cessation of productive and service activities strengthened the hand of the opposition power.

For two generations in Europe and England and for the last generation in America, labor unions have used their organization and manpower for direct intervention in politics. Since personal persuasion is one of the most effective of campaign techniques, the group that can activate its membership during political campaigns and between campaigns will add considerably to its strength in politics. The rise of the English Labour Party to its present position is due in great measure to the ability of the labor leaders to call on their rank and file for the interminable but vital chores of bell-ringing, pamphlet distribution, and getting out the favorable vote.

Where the same techniques have been applied in America, the political influence of unions has been enlarged. For example, the unionized janitors of Chicago supply a valuable service to their favored candidates by seeing that campaign literature is placed at the doorstep of each occupant of apartments and hotels and by disposing of the material of the opposition as trash. On a much larger scale, the "independent" organization known as COPE (Committee on Political Education) has been able to organize some of the manpower of AFL-CIO unions throughout the country for political campaigning of all types and for exerting pressure on representatives.

FARM INFLUENCE ABETTED BY CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS TO GOVERNMENT

Farm pressure-groups use the techniques common to all pressure groups, but they especially benefit from the or-

ganized efforts of co-operatives and dual office-holding. Agricultural producers' co-operatives parallel the efforts of the large farm pressure-groups in organizing support among their membership for favored candidates and measures. Consumers' co-operatives are able to draw in many nonfarm citizens in a program of legislation and activity common to farmers and farm sympathizers alike. The national Department of Agriculture and many state agricultural agencies abound with officials who have been or are also active members and officers of the Farm Bureau Federation and other agricultural pressure and welfare organizations. Hundreds of county agents, for example, are in constant touch with the farmers of their counties. The agents are paid from federal, state, and county funds. A considerable proportion of them are also active in one or more of the farmers' organizations that are, of course, private in character. The combination of affiliations tends to make the government agencies more responsive to farm group-pressures.

Since the American government has generally intervened to force farm prices up rather than down, American farm politics have not experienced the turmoil of farmer-government strife that Europe and Asia have known. Direct action by American farmers occurred sporadically during several of the American economic depressions; it usually took the form of resistance to foreclosures on farms and of damage to railroad property and grain storage facilities. Abroad, farm strikes are more common. In the Soviet Union, for instance, when the government in January, 1930, announced the aim of complete collectivization of farms within three years and the "liquidation" of the kulaks (the rich peasants), the peasants killed their animals. The situation was so serious in its consequences—it reduced milk and meat products and fertilizer as well as leather goods and other secondary products—that Stalin's famous speech "Dizzy with Success" called a halt to the government's policy on March 30, 1930. Faced with a scarcity of flour and meats, governments have often fixed maximum prices, and farmers have refused to send their products to market. Thus, in Italy in 1943, while bread sold in the black markets of Palermo for 70 lire a kilo, in Enna, some miles in the interior, it could be had for 5 lire a kilo; strenuous efforts were necessary to get enough flour into the capital city to meet a barely adequate bread ration for the population.

ORGANIZED PRESSURES INEVITABLE TODAY

Several conclusions should be emphasized as we close this section on the lobby. The United States has had a century of experience with lobbies; during this period it has become apparent that the lobbies cannot be destroyed, that they are very difficult to regulate, and that very likely the peculiar conditions of American politics make the vast number and intense activity of lobbies an invariable factor in American government, at least in the predictable future. The techniques of lobbies have changed over the last century. The role of organization has increased relative to the role of cash spending in the technique of lobbying. As Pendleton Herring wrote some twenty years ago: "The minority groups arose to obtain from the government legislative action that they could not get through the political parties." He termed the lobby "part of the American system of representation."

POPULAR FALLACIES REGARDING LOBBIES

Whether we speak of European politics or of American politics, we should point out that the lobbies are not as tightly organized as many people believe. Firstly, hardly ever does one lobby, stemming from one pressure group, gather together all the people who are eligible to be its constituents; all major groups of the population are represented by several pressure groups and lobbies that often fight among themselves. Secondly, pressure groups are often so constructed internally, being the rather disconnected offshoots of more integrated occupational groups, that they do not command the obedience, activity, or even passive agreement of any considerable number of their members. Finally, the influence of pressure groups and lobbies tends to be underestimated in some quarters and overestimated in others.

On the one hand, for example, a study by Lawrence H. Chamberlain of the *major* federal legislation of the last sixty years indicates that congressional lobbyists could conceivably claim sole credit for no more than 10 per cent of the laws. His study, however, neglects *minor* legislation (in which pressure groups are especially interested). Furthermore, state legislatures are more vulnerable to lobbying than is Congress. Also his figures do not cover dead bills; and the highest achievement of a lobby, often, is to kill an unfavorable bill or

even to delay its passage. Admittedly, it is hard to measure the influence of pressure groups; this would be true even if one could observe every one of their actions. Still, given the fact that lobbies exist on both sides of almost every issue, it is a rare event indeed that a bill, backed by a single lobby and introduced surreptitiously by some friend of the lobbyists, ends as an enactment of Congress, except in drastically amended form.

On the other hand, many politicians and agency chiefs are perhaps more impressed by the strength of lobbies than they need be. They often take seriously lobbies that could not muster popular opposition to the representatives. It is just as hard for the representative to analyze correctly the strength of lobbies as it is for the political scientist, and the ordinary legislature does not provide him with the scientific help that is necessary to measure lobbying strength.

Finally, preparatory to taking up the matter at length in the next section, it may be stated here that the pressure groups in modern society have, in a number of crucial cases, moved into close working co-operation with the government. They have taken on public responsibilities and have been entrusted with official duties.

Legal Representation of Interests

INTEREST GROUPS' QUASI-OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS

There are some indications that pressure politics, as we know them today, may be undergoing changes of a basic kind. The interest group in a number of different areas of American government is being vested with functions of a quasi-official nature. To understand the fragments of evidence that lead us to this conclusion, we must venture abroad to countries where interest groups have had different roles to play.

ROLE OF ESTATES IN MEDIEVAL TIMES

In the Middle Ages, society in the countries from which America has drawn much of its culture—England, France, Holland, Italy, Spain, and Germany—was divided into several classes based on modes of living. The nobility, the clergy, the yeomen, the merchants, and the artisans—although they all formed part of society—were assumed each to play a separate special role in society and to have certain duties and privileges

in connection with their status and occupation. Each grouping had some elements of self-government; there was no single body of law covering all individuals for all purposes.

THE GILDS

Merchants and artisans were organized into guilds that were formed in each type of occupation. The guilds often had power to determine for all members the conditions of work, the wages, the obligations of membership, the quality of production, and the price of articles sold. Elections were held to determine the leadership of the guilds, although in many guilds, only the richest and oldest members held real power. In some cases, the guilds held political power over and beyond their economic power. For example, the English guilds sometimes controlled the choice of their local representatives to the early House of Commons.

REVOLUTIONS DESTROYED ESTATES AND GILD SYSTEMS

The economic and technological revolution in commerce, agriculture, and industry destroyed the basis for the guild organization in the cities, but the guilds often were able to hold out for generations, adhering to their ancient regulations and to restrictive practices that had once held real meaning. Adam Smith's great book *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) is to be understood as a reformer's attempt to break the antiquated barriers that the guilds, with the help of the government, maintained against the more productive techniques of the Industrial and Commercial revolutions. The radical movement in late eighteenth-century England, the American Revolution, and the French Revolution were struggles that had as one of their purposes the relief of the new middle classes—technically equipped to produce and exchange more goods than the old middle classes—from the restriction of the old society.

In the French Revolution this fact was more clearly realized than elsewhere, and a specific law was promulgated in 1790 declaring that all combinations of merchants or workers of any kind were prohibited. An English act of 1799 was similar. The age of individualism in economic affairs therefore dates from the beginning of the nineteenth century. The economy was to be separate from politics, and all economic arrangements were to be based on individual contracts, drawn without reference to any political or guild interference.

RESULTS OF PURE INDIVIDUALISM

From this period of theoretically pure individualism (no form of behavior is ever absolute and pure in politics, law or no law) several important modern social movements grew, nourished by the problems of *laissez-faire* individualism. Despite legal hostility and popular distrust, a number of monopolies were able to emerge. In the same unfriendly atmosphere, combinations of laboring men formed to attack some of the more brutal consequences of the new factory system in the industrialized portions of western Europe, England, and America. In 1848, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published the *Communist Manifesto*, which exhorted the laboring classes of the world to revolt against those who were alleged to control the means of production and the state. In order to do this, of course, individualism had to be destroyed and the workers had to unite in one great class movement.

COMMUNISM AND SYNDICALISM

In several countries, the new socialists interpreted Marxism to require the organization of a political party that might in time destroy the other political parties and conquer the state. In other countries, however, especially in Italy, France, and Spain, the new socialists were syndicalists. They believed that the workers might take over the industry in which they worked and run it themselves, guided in a mild sort of way by some central planning committee of workers. This idea was not entirely dissimilar from the medieval gild idea, with the important exception that the tools and buildings were now to be owned by the workers' union rather than by individual masters.

In England, syndicalism was called gild socialism. Both theories proposed worker control and ownership of their factories; both had strong decentralizing tendencies. It is significant that even many Marxist communist parties have urged that economic and political control be decentralized by industry and by factory. However, soon after achieving power, they abandoned this ideal, for they found it threatened their ability to control the economy and state from the center.

MODERN UNIONS AND GILDS COMPARED

In one way, then, socialism has been favorable to the autonomy of local production. But we have also mentioned that

certain combinations of working men were formed that were not socialist. Such was the traditional trade union movement, *much as we know it in America today*. Here it is represented to the highest degree by some of the craft unions of the American Federation of Labor. The policies of such unions have resembled the policies of the medieval guilds. Steam fitters, for example, are skilled workers; this means that employers are not able at a moment's notice to find substitutes for striking steam fitters. By controlling the admission of new union-members, by obtaining contracts with employers that provide for the employment of union members only, such a union can gain considerable power over the area of life where steam fitting is essential. The union can then raise the qualifications of members, provide insurance and other fraternal benefits to its members, and give its members a kind of occupational "home," an *esprit de corps* that means much to human beings, especially in the modern world where most of men's attachments are transient and impersonal.

That is one side of the union's behavior. But there is the fact that in localities where steam fitters are abundant, young men who would rather pursue that trade than anything else had better look for something else. Furthermore, if someone devises new techniques that would cause the unemployment of steam fitters but would also save the consumer's money, he would undoubtedly encounter severe opposition. Much of the power amassed by such a union will be turned against the innovations of the Industrial Revolution (which, it is sometimes necessary to state, is still going on). Furthermore, the steam fitters are likely to possess a high evaluation of their own skill and importance and thus are likely to demand and receive as much for their services as they can get.

Since World War I, numerous trades in America—barbers, plumbers, bricklayers, carpenters, machinists, and many others—have in many parts of the country achieved a position something like that of the steam fitters. The politicians of today are in much the same position as the medieval kings with respect to such trades; the unions are not assaulted because they are compact and can convert readily to political warfare; usually, politicians co-operate with them and accept their accomplishments as beyond change, emphasizing publicly the positive features of such unionism.

PROFESSIONAL INTEREST REPRESENTATION

Certain professions, in particular medicine and the law, have moved faster than the crafts unions in acquiring the power to regulate and discipline their own members. Medical associations and bar associations in most American states set the training for students, the moral qualifications required of them, the ethics of their practice, and the conditions under which they may be suspended from practice. The governments have tended to give some power to the professions over their own affairs. By implication, power over their "own affairs" has tended sometimes to be power to determine what constitutes the "public interest" concerning medicine and law.

THE NEW PATTERN OF INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTIONS

A third reaction to the age of individualism, mentioned above, has been monopoly capitalism. Or, to put it more accurately, there have been several important deviations in practice from the pure theory of competition. Only one of these deviations is monopoly as the popular mind visualizes it—that is, a situation in which the total production of an essential commodity is controlled as to its amount and as to its price by a single owner or corporation. Another deviation that has come to be more typical of modern Western economies is oligopoly, a situation in which several huge firms control the bulk of the productive resources of an industry and set a pattern of leadership in working conditions, output, styles, and pricing that is followed by the small independent producers. A third deviation has been the trade association, an organization of the owners and managers of business enterprise in a particular field dedicated to the attainment of labor, market, production, and price policies on which the leading firms or a majority of members can agree. A final deviation from the theory of individualism of the early nineteenth century has been the separation of ownership of corporate wealth from management. As the stock issues of large corporations have been distributed among hundreds of people, as the financial affairs of large corporations have become more complex, as the privileges of the owners of stock have been reduced to hardly more than the right to receive dividends, the managers or top executives of the large corpora-

tions in many cases have become the real rulers of corporate property.

These industrial deviations have been of great importance to economic theory and practice. Their significance to politics is more relevant here and is worth describing. The managers have come to have a more personal stake in the careers of their enterprises than have the owners. To many owners, income alone is at issue in all the doings of their corporations; to the managers, not only income (for the top managers usually draw large salaries and also own stock) is at stake but also power and prestige. To them, the battle for control of all major decisions affecting their enterprises involves their opinion as to what is right for production and efficiency, and their internal and external prestige as the directors of the destiny of enterprises legally entrusted to them, and also their influence in determining external political policies affecting their concerns. As the government has turned more and more to the regulation of economic activities that had once been "industry-governed" or anarchic, the top managerial posts have required new skills—political skills that go beyond the technical abilities required in the management of large-scale enterprise. Public relations, institutional advertising, labor negotiations, community activities, and political pressure have come to consume a larger proportion of the time of top management. Scarcely a large corporation exists today that does not need constant and expert counseling on relations with governmental agencies, administrative and political.

In Germany, Italy, France, Japan, and England the growth of partial monopolies over many basic industries and the development of influential trade associations have gone hand in hand. Cartels have often been formed by oligopolies to ration out products under agreed-upon prices to maximize profits. There are many evidences that, in addition to economic agreements participated in by the leaders of the cartels and the trade associations, political pressure has been exercised on behalf of the policies of big business.

CORPORATISM

The Italian Fascist government was the first modern government to attempt a synthesis of these modern industrial tendencies with elements of the practices and theories of socialism and trade unionism. "Corporatism" was the name

given the new structure of government. The major productive areas of the Italian economy, such as the maritime industry, agriculture, textile industries, and others, were organized into "corporations" with power, at least on paper, to determine the working conditions, pay rates, production quotas, and other matters concerning the area. The various corporations were members of a Chamber of Corporations that planned and directed the major part of the economy. The system was practiced too little to draw conclusions about its results. But one notes with interest that it originated from very different sources: (1) the gild and craft-union idea that supports pluralism and all the advantages to be gained when workers in an industry have a good deal to say about how it is run (this idea, incidentally, received important backing by the Catholic Church); (2) the syndicalist and gild socialist variety of socialism that received mass backing in several European countries; (3) the obvious tendency of big businesses in modern life to act in concert in political and economic affairs.

FUNCTIONAL REPRESENTATION

Other countries also experimented with functional representation. Democratic Germany experimented with an Economic Council, composed of the representatives of management and labor. The council advised the government on economic and fiscal policy and on the regulation of industry. Functional representation was also debated in France, England, and Japan, and in several smaller countries. But none of these experiments or projects was seriously tried, because deep class antagonisms existed in politics and because the traditional governmental structure and government leaders resisted the development of new and competing political institutions. Leaders of industry and commerce feared to trust their interests to politicians; a good part of the public was deeply suspicious of big business; and the politicians, themselves, had too great an investment in the *status quo* of politics to risk their personal fortunes in novel schemes.

Nevertheless, European governments are still fumbling for a political formula that will allow for a closer integration of economics and politics without offending irredeemably the spokesmen of labor or management. The Schuman Plan of 1950, proposing the integration of western European heavy industrial production under a combined public-private inter-

national agency that would have considerable economic and political power, demonstrated that integrated pluralism along functional lines was far from dead as a goal of political theory. In the subsequent decade the Plan materialized into the effective European Coal and Steel Community.

U. S. A. INHOSPITABLE TO FUNCTIONAL REPRESENTATION

In the United States, formal interest-representation developed in scattered areas of national life, often unnoticed. It has not developed from conscious theory, but from grasping at particular solutions for particular problems. We mentioned that a number of craft unions and professions have powers over their members and over the contribution of their occupation to the great society. This is more than pressure-group politics. Such groups are little governments; by virtue of occupational competence, the group leaders are given special responsibilities with reference to public affairs. Thus, the state medical associations determine what are the legitimate tasks of doctors and the Missouri Bar Association nominates state supreme court justices. Associations of security dealers are required by the federal government to place certain requirements on their members and also to punish offending members. The farmers who raise certain regulated crops conduct elections to determine whether they wish to control the production of such crops. If two thirds of them so vote, a plan for the specified crop controls is put into effect in each county under the supervision of the Department of Agriculture, and all farmers are required to conform to the policy.

The famous National Industrial Recovery Administration (N.I.R.A.) (1933-35) allowed each industry to prepare a code of regulations governing the working conditions, ethics, and production policies of all the firms within the industry. The codes, upon being approved by the President, were executed by the officers of the N.I.R.A. The N.I.R.A. marked the high water mark of functional representation and integrated pluralism in America. Leading opinion at the end of the experiment believed that the nation was moving into the "corporate state" too rapidly. But since then, many state governments have been authorized by law to form boards composed of representatives of the industries regulated by the agencies, to consult with such boards on administrative policy, and to

use such boards to assist in the execution of government policy. During World War II there were created over 750 Industry Advisory committees in the war establishments alone. Each committee gave representation to small, medium, and large companies, to the geographical sections of the industry, to the product specialty components of the industry, and to the members and non-members of the industry's trade associations.

SIGNIFICANCE OF DEPRESSION AND WAR EXPERIMENTS

These arrangements differed significantly from pressure politics of the older, traditional, lobby type. They introduced definite, structural relationships between special interests and the government. Although the N.I.R.A. was abandoned in the thirties and practically all of the Industry Advisory committees were dissolved at the end of the war, a large number of interests remain represented in the various subdivisions of normal, peacetime agencies. Pressure groups have moved far from their origins in the buttonholing of legislators in the lobbies of the legislative chambers. The state of the future, it can be predicted, will have more, not less, techniques for gaining technical assistance, administrative help, and legislative inspiration from the multitude of special economic, social, and religious groups that exist in modern society.

The involved and complicated processes of political influence in the modern state cannot be much simplified or easily controlled. Men have built, mostly without conscious thought, an incredibly complex institutional structure. A highly productive society and an intricate pattern of influence are closely related. If one collapses, the other also falls. It is impossible to destroy the pattern of influence without causing a great decrease in productivity. To destroy productivity in order to rid society of the influence that producers wield would seem idiotic to almost everyone. We conclude, then, that the adjustment of influence is a problem that requires serious scientific attention, and that the alternatives to such an adjustment are primitivism or open conflict. As Charner Perry has written:

In the later stages of social development more and more understanding of the functioning of institutions is needed. As individuals, groups, and the factors of existence become

more and more interdependent and delicately organized, there is increasing danger that the malfunctioning of some part, or the operation of some factor not considered, or a lack of proper adjustment among institutions will produce a serious or even disastrous breakdown.³

Such breakdowns, however calamitous, have not been infrequent in human communities. Now that we possess some understanding of the political dynamics that establish peaceful equilibrium, we will examine the origins of such breakdowns and two of their consequences: civil conflict and war.

³ Quoted with the permission of the American Political Science Review from Charner Perry: "The Semantics of Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLIV (1950), p. 394.

Chapter 8

Civil Conflict and War

WHILE ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MEANS CAN resolve many political disagreements, the use of physical coercion for the same purposes has never been remote from human experience. An adequate introduction to the political process must admit this fact and relate the uses of force and violence to the struggle for values. First, we will determine the difference between force and violence when they are used as instruments of the government. Next, we will examine the motives for using physical means of coercion, rather than economic or psychological ones. We will then analyze the ways in which physical coercion is organized and employed—revolutions and wars, for example. Finally, we will ask whether coercion ever produces the results expected of it in governing human beings.

Force and Violence

WHEN IS COERCION LEGITIMATE?

An intelligent appraisal of civil conflict and war requires some knowledge of force and violence in politics. Force is the legitimate use of physical coercion, and violence is the illegitimate use of physical coercion. If a government is held to be legitimate by its people, its use of force is approved, with whatever reservations the people may have about the usefulness or lack of usefulness and the adequacy or inadequacy of force. Thus, although the people of a state may agree that the government is entitled to use force against a riot of strikers, they may well prefer that the government prevent such outbreaks by establishing a more sound economic policy or by persuading the clashing parties to accept some peaceful settlement. Furthermore, a people rarely holds to a single principle of legitimacy. Thus many Americans applauded the personal leadership of Colonel "Teddy" Roosevelt in the Spanish-American War; whatever "Teddy" did was all right. However, many other Americans deplored the nation's "descent" from legality into "violence." These Americans

would have preferred to arbitrate the Spanish-American dispute.

VIOLENT CONFLICTS AMONG ORGANS OF STATE

We must also consider this fact: Even when its legitimacy is unquestioned by the people, the government—composed as it is of a number of different organs—may develop internal conflicts. The people then may have to side with one element of the government claiming legality, reason, and legitimacy. The people are united in expecting a government that acts according to legal rules; but when one branch of the government is in open conflict with another branch, either or both may resort to violence in order to prove its own *legality*.

America has had some close escapes from violent conflict among governing organs and some unfortunate explosions. President Jackson arbitrarily removed the deposits of the United States Treasury from the United States Bank, even though the Supreme Court had declared that the bank was constitutional and might be the financial agency of the federal government. Jackson disputed the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution and used the executive forces of the government to carry out his theory of the Constitution. Again, during his term of office, Jackson disagreed with the State of South Carolina on the question whether a state might refuse to obey a law of Congress. Partly in response to his threat of force, South Carolina accepted an "honorable compromise."

The most disastrous experience of the United States with conflicting interpretations of legal legitimacy came with the Civil War. Calhoun's interpretation of the federal union held that the states reserved the legal right to disagree with the decisions of the majority in Congress and of the President. Both Southerners and Northerners professed their attachment to legality, constitutionalism, and the lawful union. Both sides resorted to coercion to uphold the "correct and legitimate legal order."

We must therefore warn the unwary student that the theory of legitimacy is only simple at first glance. We must remember that in the same society, more than one principle of legitimacy may be held by the people or by a single person; force is one of the instruments of legitimate authority, and other

struments, like education and economic policy, may be preferred by the people or by the rulers; and finally, different branches of the same government may use physical coercion as well as other instruments of power to foist their policies on each other. Such are the main relationships between legitimate authority and force and violence.

PHYSICAL COERCION DEFINED

Force and violence both involve physical coercion. Physical coercion is the direction of human activities (a) by commands that are accompanied by sanctions of a bodily kind or by the threat of bodily sanctions, and (b) by the unexplained but deliberate infliction of damage to persons—in every case associated with a minimum of symbolic, verbal, and economic tactics.

Why do we require such an involved definition of physical coercion? There is a reason for each element of the definition.

We want to include physical arrest, detention of the person, the physical restraint of children, physical self-defense, the dispersing of a riot, and other cases of manhandling human beings. We also want to include not only such things as the Communist invasion of Southern Korea but also the American actions in resisting the invasion by force.

The threat of bodily sanctions is usually enough to accomplish obedience to commands. The presence of a police force, of an army, of a fleet, and of a court system inhibits disobedience. Most enactments state what conduct is legal and what is forbidden; they also state the consequences of violations of the law.

Sometimes physical coercion occurs as the unexplained but deliberate infliction of damage to persons. By "unexplained" we mean that it is superfluous, or not justified, or not rationalized, or not preceded by command. The application of coercion may be beyond the intention of the law. Further than that, it may be inflicted for its own sake, without reference to any command. The former is more common; there is no more reason to believe that men can always mete out the exactly justifiable amount of punishment in a situation where force is deemed necessary than to believe that men can always levy the exact amount of taxes needed or distribute the exact number of food coupons required. It is as true of coercive means as of any other means of influencing human behavior

that the unforeseen consequences of purposive action sometimes far exceed the predicted consequences. "It was a mistake to arm the rabble," thought many an unhorsed knight in the late Middle Ages. Admiral Perry did not awaken sleepy Japan so that it might arm, in the style of the West, to attack the United States a century later.

POLITICS COMPOUNDED OF COERCION AND OTHER MEANS

Physical coercion exists in its clearest form when it is no accompanied by a great deal of ceremonial justification. We stress this "pure" form of coercion only in order to emphasize the fact that coercion is rarely seen in this form in the world of political events. "Pure" coercion is naked force or naked violence. It is a command that is stripped down to the mere indication of direction desired, accompanied by the flourishes of the weapons of force and violence. Almost every political event is a compound of physical coercion with psychological and economic weapons. Thus, on the same day in 1950 that the United States ordered its planes into action against North Korean Communist armies, it issued a statement of its moral principles, recounted its attempts to keep peace, asked the Soviet government to put pressure on the North Koreans to withdraw from the South, and announced that the United Nations would supply arms and material support to the French Indo-China.

A remarkable proof of the intimate relation of physical coercion to propaganda is afforded by a study of German civilians who had suffered bombing attacks. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey found that one out of five civilian Germans indicated that his morale was more affected by bombing than by any other single factor including the successive defeats at the front. That the morale factor is attributable from the physical coercion factor is implicit in a statement by the Survey: "The maximum morale effect has been attained by lighter raids as widely distributed as possible rather than by concentrated heavy bombing in limited areas. In other words, psychological effects might well be the primary motive for the use of coercion under certain conditions."

CHILDHOOD TRAINING IN COERCION

How we interpret physical coercion depends largely on how it was used and interpreted in our childhood training. How a person's father used physical coercion in the family gives most men some ideas on how force should be and should not be used in politics. How the child's playmates, with their varying family backgrounds, used coercion and interpreted coercion will help provide the framework within which the adult will employ and interpret coercion. This is an age-old discovery of political science. It is startling how many people today profess not to believe it.

The Spartans knew the principle and applied it in the training of their young; the Romans knew it and also applied it rigorously to get the kind of attitudes and practices with respect to force and violence in later life that they wanted. The Fascists, Nazis, and Communists reoriented their educational systems, once they achieved power, so as to insert a new respect for force in the minds of their children. The psychiatrists of today know how a child may be trained to use and accept varying systems of physical coercion. (Several of them have commented on the large number of battle neuroses among American troops that might be traced back to childhood training. Many American children, especially in the middle income and higher educational groups, have been taught to abhor physical compulsion of any kind. They were not taught to abhor education, propaganda, economic measures, or economic manipulation. But, of course, expertness in these instruments does not suffice to win battles.)

The Objectives of Physical Coercion

THE AIMS OF FORCE AND VIOLENCE

Force and violence may be chosen as the effective means of achieving economic objectives—markets, control of factories, the “wealth of the Orient,” and so on. They may be used to establish the honor and respect “due” to a group in order to wipe off a “disgraceful” defeat of the past, for example. They may often be the means of self-defense, of insuring the safety of one's position, of protecting one's “rights.” They are often used to gain power, that is, the right to make important decisions that govern a community. They sometimes

have as their end the satisfaction of an urge to destructiveness, vandalism, sadism, the relief of deep and undefined hate that have no evident rational connection with the object of the coercion.

MOTIVES OF COERCION USUALLY PLURAL

In many, perhaps nearly all, cases of coercion, the aggressor has more than one objective. Thus the Italian campaign in Ethiopia in 1936 was prompted by several motives, among them the desire to exploit the mineral and agricultural resources of the country, the desire to avenge a massacre of Italian troops some fifty years earlier, and the desire to increase the power position of Italy relative to England in Africa. One of Mussolini's sons, an aviator, lived to regret his rash description of the beauty and pleasure of seeing his troops dropping on hapless tribesmen—a way of expressing desire for five urges common in the literature of war. It is safe to say that wherever more than a handful of men engage in violence, one will find a plethora of motives, varying in kind and intensity.

COERCION FOR ECONOMIC ENDS

The use of coercion for economic ends is ancient, as mentioned earlier, some of the most illustrious instances being in conquest of the state of the most illustrious investors and land. It was said of the Romans that they never lost the true meaning of trade; they conquered, carried off, and treated their imperial provinces like beehives, extracting honey upon occasion but rarely contributing to the making process. Also, the booty extracted by medieval warriors—in spite of the fact that they fought for honor and prestige as no men have fought since—makes the economic reparations that modern nations demand of the vanquished (perhaps the Soviet Union should be excepted) seem comparatively small.

In the domestic life of several nations, the Jews have been massacred or violently evicted at various intervals to bankrupt governing groups and pirateering political parties with accumulated wealth. A number of Nazis emerged as millionaires from the violent persecution of the Jews.

ownership of the loot was "legalized" by selling it for a pittance to preferred buyers. Similar scenes were enacted in the early modern period, when the Jews were expelled from Spain, and during the Middle Ages in various countries. Not to be outdone, the French monarchy destroyed the Protestant Huguenot movement in France, in part out of religious fanaticism, but also in part out of covetousness. Else why were the Huguenots not allowed to carry their property with them, and why were so many royal henchmen suddenly enriched? The destruction of the Catholic Church in England was also accompanied by large-scale looting and confiscation of property. This kind of event is so common in history as to require no elaboration here. We may mention finally that among the most vociferous spokesmen for the imprisonment and exile of the Japanese-Americans of California were individuals who stood to gain by the elimination of Japanese competition in agriculture and by the forced sale of Japanese-owned property.

One need not subscribe to Lenin's theory (that monopoly capitalism, having exhausted its domestic markets, turns to imperialism for profits) to perceive that there was a strong economic motive operating in every century of European imperialism. Drake, Raleigh, and the court of Elizabeth had never heard of Communist theory, but they perceived opportunities for wealth on the Seven Seas that little England could never have afforded them; centuries later, workmen in the drab factories of the Industrial Revolution who *had* heard of the Communist ideology acted to seize factories by violence (for example, France, 1871), and their pulses beat quicker when they thought that now there would be more to divide amongst themselves. When the Americans and British liberated Southern Italy in 1943, the landlords were flabbergasted to hear from many of their tenants that the age of rents had gone: what better purpose could be assumed for the invasionary violence than to make farm owners of farm tenants? When the Communist North Koreans captured Seoul, stocks of goods were thrown to the people and a radical redistribution of land occurred.

PRESTIGE, HONOR, AND "FACE"

Acts of coercion made with the intention of restoring prestige or honor, gaining respect, or maintaining "face," are numerous. Indeed, one can marvel at the common idea that

the age of chivalry is gone. True, in ancient and medieval times, men did not feel the need to conceal the fact that they were fighting on the grounds of honor. It was taken for granted as a legitimate motive for war or personal combat. Leonidas and his Spartans fought at Thermopylae for the honor of their city while their Greek allies retreated. Long before that time, Greeks had fought amongst themselves at Troy—over the fate of a woman named Helen, according to Homer.

We shall never know to what degree clannish pride entered into the cause of the fabled Trojan War. Nor shall we ever know the exact extent to which the Germans of Hitler's Germany condoned the resort to international violence in order to avenge their humiliating defeat in World War I. Nor shall we know, for that matter, how many of the hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen who went to death at Verdun went the more willingly because they remembered the crushing defeat of their armies in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Memoirs, eye-witness accounts, and historical researches tell us that honor and "face" were involved. Personal experience tells us that Americans had the same motives when the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and when the North Koreans invaded South Korea. The Japanese, Chinese, and other Orientals are reputed by Westerners to value "face" above every other value; but Westerners, though prone to justify coercion on economic, "rational," or other grounds, including self-defense, undoubtedly value honor to a considerable extent.

In most modern countries, recourse to coercion for the sake of honor is severely discouraged. Dueling has gone out of style, although American and European politicians once knew and practiced the custom. In eighteenth-century England, the London mob was a distinct influence on politics, a kind of measure of the temper of the people. It was, however, a most crude measure, not at all like the Gallup poll; the mob was destructive, not always active when it had good reason to be, but prone to activity when issues were personal and even trivial. It would not gather to declaim against the repressive penal law, or to demand support for popular revolutions in France; but it would rage through the streets in support of a demagogic mountebank like Wilkes, seeing in the opposition

to seating him in the Commons the snubbing of a commoner gentleman's just ambitions.

CLASS WARFARE AND SOCIAL STATUS

The class war of modern European nations shows how complicated the problem of social prestige may be. Ranked against one another are the working classes who appeal to the universal principle of equality, and the middle classes who feel their social rank slipping. While many industrial workers are organizing, gaining higher pay and better working conditions, and claiming that the future belongs to them, many members of the middle class are finding clerical skills less rare and less valued than in the past. They are losing their financial advantage over manual workers and are finding promotion to positions of ownership or high income more difficult to achieve. The upper ranks of society also are directly threatened; the deference, the honor, the bows, the respectful address given their status for centuries hang at issue in the class struggle. The upper and middle ranks have joined frequently against the workers; the aristocracy and the upper middle classes could never have held out in all of Europe from Napoleon to Hitler if they had not gained support from the middle classes, who wanted to go up, but never wanted to go down, even if to go down meant to join in the "inevitable" triumph of the proletariat. The use of violence by one class against another, then, is more easily understood when one appreciates the threat than an aggressive working class poses to the classes above it.

COERCION FOR SAFETY AND PROTECTION

The use of coercion for self-defense and protection is authorized by all major legal systems of the world. In cases of international violence, the plea of "self-defense" frequently is used to justify all kinds of aggression, but it need not be dismissed as a real motive for that reason. The poor showing of Spain in the Spanish-American War and the weak defense of Poland against Germany in 1939 are pathetic instances of self-defense, mixed, no doubt, with motives of honor and prestige. The Germans in 1945 had exhausted practically all motives other than safety; many of them, weighing the relative severities of Anglo-American and Russian occupation,

hoped to forestall the Russians in the East until the Allies in the West might move in.

POWER AS AN AIM OF COERCION

Power is another general objective for which coercion is employed. Obviously, the attainment of economic ends by force or violence will often increase the power of the victorious party; so also will the attainment of greater prestige through the use of force or violence. But control of the apparatus of the government can be in itself a goal of coercion. A violent strike for a closed shop (economic value) is not as clearly a striving for power as is a violent general strike to bring on the collapse of the existing government. Hannibal, Caesar, Alexander, and Napoleon seemed to want nothing more than the utter defeat of their enemies. Lasswell quotes Genghis Khan, the Mongol conqueror, as declaring "a man's highest job in life is to break his enemies, to drive them before him, to take from them all the things that have been theirs." Other values enter the attitude of violence, but the power drive may be foremost in intensity.

The clearest employment of coercion on behalf of the maintenance or the attainment of power is one where, with the consent of both the users and the subjects of coercion, force is used to maintain order, punish crimes, and discourage subversion of the government. Coercion is employed because it is the rational instrument to use in a given case; it is quicker, readier, more adapted to the situation, and more lasting in its consequences than education or economic policy. This is the principle for the use of coercion with which most people would agree.

Other uses of coercion to attain power abound, however, and many of them would not be agreeable to most of the people most of the time. Political assassinations preparatory to seizing power, palace revolutions, "kidnapping" ballot boxes to prevent free elections, dispersal of all assemblages believed to be in the political opposition, intimidation of political opponents—these, too, are violent acts that aim at the achievement or retention of power.

DESTRUCTIVENESS AS A ROOT OF COERCION

Finally, destructiveness must be mentioned as a general objective of coercion. Destructiveness is used here to mean

all motives that have no instrumental connection with the persons who are the recipients of violence. The man who is nagged by his wife and thereupon beats his dog would fall into this category. His motive in beating the dog is to relieve the tensions and anxieties caused by his wife's hostile actions. This "irrational" character of destructiveness should not lead one to think destructiveness is insignificant in politics. Men who have seen atrocities inflicted on helpless enemies in war by exhausted and maddened soldiers or who have seen race riots flare up among men who had never seen each other before that moment, can testify to the strength of destructive impulses in human beings. Even children perceive that certain other children and adults "have a chip on their shoulder."

PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF DESTRUCTIVENESS

Perhaps the most prominent theory used in modern psychology to explain destructiveness is that derived from the psychology of Sigmund Freud. The theory is built on the interaction of six concepts: guilt, frustration, displacement, projection, rationalization, and aggression.

A large number of people in our society are trained as children to feel personally responsible and very uncomfortable whenever they violate any moral principle they have been taught. Whenever anything goes wrong, they believe that they themselves are to blame. The burden of this guilt makes them miserable whenever the environment does not provide them with a minimum of the things they need—affection, security, material things.

In addition, modern Western civilization abounds in frustrations. A frustration is simply the foiled attempt of a person to get something he wants. Continual frustration seems to mark modern Western society more than many others. An American of 150 years ago could exercise greater control over his environment than can the American of today. Still, today or 150 years ago, civilization demands many restraints, and considerable frustration is an unavoidable accompaniment of civilization.

The human being cannot dissipate frustrations automatically. He can, however, shove them off onto something else, in his mind or in the outside world. This is displacement. When a man is fired, he is prevented by long training and by law from beating his employer. The man will be tense and

anxious about the event, and if he is encumbered by many more major and minor restraints and frustrations, he may seize upon outlets for his tensions. He is, fortunately for them, also to some extent prevented from "taking it out" on members of his family. He may possibly get away with kicking the dog.

Among the objects of the world onto which tensions are pushed or affects are displaced are both primary and secondary objects. Thus when a father punishes his boy, the child often represses the hostility he feels at the "unjust" punishment. If he displaces his hostility onto his teacher, that is a primary object; if onto authority in general, that is a secondary object.

Projection is a well-nigh universal occurrence. One imputes to others motives he himself possesses. People who know or believe themselves to be cheaters tend to regard other people as cheaters. Projection stands ready to help displacement. When it is inexpedient to release hostility against frustrating objects, the hostility is repressed and often seeks displacements on secondary objects. Projection affords a motive for the particular displacement. First the subject feels hostile; he imagines then that the other fellow feels hostile. The subject then justifies his feeling of hostility towards the other fellow on the ground of self-defense. Projected hostilities arising out of displacement constitute destructiveness.

Rationalization gives a socially accepted veneer to the destructiveness; usually some slight, insubstantial act of the target-person or group is magnified out of proportion, and, since proof is a very difficult thing in social affairs, most people do not realize that rationalization is occurring—often because they, too, are undergoing the same process. Finally, aggression occurs as a result of these destructive motives along with any other motives present in the situation. The aggression may be expressed verbally, or by depriving someone of something that person holds dear, or by injuring physically another person—the last being perhaps the most satisfying type of release to the aggressor.

Guilt is one of the frequent companions of displacement and projection: the subject acts "wrongly" by being destructive; he feels guilty; he cannot bear more guilt than he already possesses without extreme discomfort. He therefore projects the guilt onto the objects of his destructiveness. The

object is now not only hostile but also wrong, that is, guilty. It is all very convenient to some sick souls who have been brought up badly and to not a few normal adults whose personal situations happen to be very difficult and tense.

OTHER THEORIES OF DESTRUCTIVENESS

There are theories of destructiveness other than the Freudian theory sketched roughly above. Ian Suttie, for example, traces destructiveness to the original shock of the infant being born, modern psychology assuming quite rightly that the mother is not the only person involved in the pains of childbirth. The initial birth-trauma, that of being separated from the mother, sets up an anxiety of a general and massive character that can only be allayed by affection and security. Frustrated love, then, causes destructiveness, whether it is directed against parents, friends, or nations. Sebastian de Grazia has expanded Suttie's analysis into a general theory of social co-operation, in which the tensions that abet wars rise from the fear of the destruction of one's revered symbols and in which the satisfaction of closer fraternity with one's own kind is often sought at the expense of outsiders. It will be some time before any single theory will win the minds of scientists. At present, each theory suggests the deep and hidden nature of human motives that somehow work their way through infancy, childhood and adulthood into the behavior of people in politics. It is perhaps unnecessary to warn against the quick acceptance of any one theory—especially since these psychological problems are formidable enough to baffle even expert psychiatrists.

The Larger Patterns of Coercion

COERCION ASSUMES TYPICAL FORMS

We have found that the motives that drive men to force and violence are various and assume different combinations. We will now look for typical events exhibiting the main patterns of coercion.

Certain typical forms of coercion are already known to us. We know, for example, that every government employs force according to the custom and the law of the land. We are all familiar with the use of police force, the use of troops to disperse riots, and the use of courts to hand down judg-

ments regarding the amount of coercion to be used against individuals. We should also be aware of the fact that countries of western European culture have tended increasingly to frown on personal violence, that is, taking justice into one's own hands. This has not always been true. Old Anglo-Saxon law, for example, left the punishment of crimes of violence to the families whose members were assaulted. Custom set a limit on the amount of punishment that could be inflicted. Brigandage and gangsterism have declined and have been suppressed in most places; the exceptions are some remote and isolated rural communities and a few isolated groups in large cities (the "underworld").

WARFARE AND REVOLUTIONS NOT DYING OUT

But besides the police, the armies, and the courts, modern societies have known three other ways in which force has been organized. These are the *coup d'état*, the revolution by violence, and war. We will now use the term "violence" in describing these processes, because, in most of the cases, the question of legitimacy is in doubt. Even a cursory examination of history compels one to admit that mankind is addicted to foreign and domestic warfare. Pitirim Sorokin's extensive investigations and painstaking enumeration of wars and revolutions reveal this fact clearly. Of 375 years of ancient Greek history (500-126 B.C.), only 34 per cent were free from war and internal disturbances. Of 877 years of ancient Roman history (400 B.C.-A.D. 476), only 46 per cent were free from wars and disturbances. England in the period from 656 to 1933 suffered 162 violent disturbances; in 875 years (1051-1925), England had, according to Sorokin's estimates, 493 years (56 per cent) of war.

These and many other figures caused Sorokin to conclude that wars and revolutions have neither increased or decreased through history. There are merely unexplained fluctuations in violence from time to time. Furthermore, regarding the character of revolutions, every country has had mad and bloody revolutions; the "terror" was not unique to the French Revolution of 1789. There seem to be about three times as many civil wars (that is, severe internal disturbances) as international wars, according to Quincy Wright's figures on 278 conflicts from 1480-1941. Since 1941, every year has seen more war. From 1941-45, the whole world, with isolated

exceptions (Sweden, Switzerland and very few others), was at war. The years 1946-50 saw civil war in China and Korea, revolution in Indonesia, and guerrilla warfare in scattered parts of the Orient including Burma, Malaya, Indochina, and the Philippines. India suffered mass murders among Hindus and Moslems in 1947 and 1948. Successful *coups d'état* occurred in Venezuela and Brazil in 1945, Haiti and Bolivia in 1946, Nicaragua and Ecuador in 1947, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela and El Salvador in 1948 and Paraguay in 1949. In fact, 43 successful *coups d'état* or revolutions marked the period from 1930-49 in South America. The Near East and eastern Europe have had even more hectic careers during the last several years.

THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF PRINCIPLES OF VIOLENCE

There have been many attempts to discover what general scientific laws govern the processes of *coup d'état*, revolutions, and war, but regrettably few principles have emerged. For instance, Dr. Quincy Wright studied warfare in all times and all places about which information is available, and yet, after ten years, could not feel free to state the exact conditions under which wars occur, the exact components in the strength of a nation, the exact conditions under which the laws of war will be observed, nor could he answer several other vital questions concerning this universal form of violence. The same criticisms may be voiced about Curzio Malaparte's study of *coups d'état* and of Aristotle's or Mosca's or Pettee's studies of revolutions.

Yet much progress has been made in the study of these events during the last generation. Groups and individuals from the sciences of politics, psychology, and sociology have made many intensive partial studies that enable us to feel much more sure of our ground when discussing the violent behavior of groups than we ever were before. While there is no agreement about many of the factors entering into intranational and international violence, science can answer certain kinds of questions and make the whole area one of partial light rather than complete shadow.

These problems are similar in many respects to problems that social science has already solved in studying public opinion. An extensive and intensive examination of attitudes and behavior allows a highly probable prediction to be made

about who will win a particular election. Predicting such events as attempts at the violent seizure of power, revolutionary attempts, or wars rests on many of the same observations, methods, and techniques. The main difference is *not* that the number of factors at work in the case of an election campaign are less numerous or less complex than those at work in the dynamic and violent events we are considering here; the main difference lies in the fact that the factors at work in the coming of a war, a revolution, or a seizure of power are dangerous to work with. *Indirect* indices must be devised that have a high correlation with the factors to be predicted. Premier Stalin could not be asked by a casual interviewer: "Do you plan to go to war in ninety days?" "What will you do if the United States and her Allies mass troops in Germany?" Rather one must make elaborate studies of all Stalin's habits, speeches, gestures, journeys, conferences, communications, and so on in order to arrive at a predictive index; that is, there must be a careful interpretation, based on the various social sciences, of all deviations from regularities of behavior on the part of the subject to determine whether an unusual act is in the offing, what kind of an unusual act it is, and whether the act seems about to take place this month, in two months, or six months from now. One also would have to analyze thoroughly all evidence bearing on the Premier's character. From this analysis a theory of his cognitive structure must be built up. That is, how does he view events? What does he continually see as important features of events?

The objection may be raised that leaders are not prone to give away their hands by their behavior, especially as a crucial situation approaches, because they know they are being observed closely by potential enemies. In reply, it may be said that leaders are human and can conceal only part of their behavior if they are to conduct themselves as leaders. They still must communicate with their publics, their subordinates; they still must give orders whose effects are often visible.

Furthermore, any increase in cover-up measures may be significant. Psychoanalysts often get their first clue that a patient is approaching the revelation of important experiences in his life and even a clue to the nature of the experience by the patient's anxious diversionary and secretive behavior. An

apocryphal story of the exaggerated action of a hospitalized mental patient illustrates this point. Realizing that one of the reasons he was hospitalized was his insistence that the earth was flat, he decided to behave normally upon escape. He ventured forth, accosting everyone he met with the words: "The world is round." Soon thereafter, he found himself back in the hospital.

The close scrutiny of a leader, of course, is only one of the numerous facets of the situation that must be studied, but enough has been said to indicate that there are resemblances between this twin problem of predicting elections and predicting international violence and the twin problem of building uranium atomic bombs and building hydrogen atomic bombs. Success in solving one problem leads one to conceive of the way in which the other might be solved, even though no absolute assurance is forthcoming and even though many new special techniques would have to be devised.

Another fact is worth noting in the kind of prediction that we are discussing here. Predictions of this order may well be possible even if the underlying causes of wars and revolutions are not known. Pollsters do not have to know why people vote the way they do in order to predict how they vote, any more than astronomers have to know how the heavens were created in measuring the speed of the stars.

The present book is not a laboratory manual; it is not a study in the application of specific techniques to the solution of particular problems. We must therefore rest content here with a general summary of the most important factors operating in *coups d'état*, revolutions, and wars, with some comment on the way the factors affect each other.

PATTERNS OF THE COUP D'ÉTAT

The *coup d'état* (stroke of state) designates the acts of violence accomplished in a short period of time in a direct attempt to seize a government. The *coup d'état* is *part of all revolutions* and *exists also in a form sufficient in itself* to take over the government. It is the violent seizure of the apparatus of the state by revolutionaries who overturn the existing governing group and substitute their own personnel. Certain elements characterize a *coup d'état* that is sufficient in itself to overthrow the existing government. The government to be overthrown must be weak domestically, like the Czarist

government of Russia in 1917 or the Kerensky government of Russia two years later. Perhaps the chief component of the weakness of authority is the loss of support from the population. Riddled with incompetence, with personal quarrels, and bereft of the capacity for quick decision and vigorous action, the ruling group cannot turn to the population for supporters, and must succumb to the rising group.

Machiavelli was one of the earliest writers to observe that republics are hard to overthrow. The ranks of the rulers in a republic extend downward in considerable depth; a simple changing of places or the annihilation of a small top group has only a momentary effect. The great republics of history die hard, and rarely by simple *coups*. *Coups d'état* abound wherever politics are managed by a tiny proportion of the people—for example, in absolute monarchies or in states with meaningless republican forms. They were everyday occurrences in early medieval times in Europe, in different periods of the Near East ancient empires, in China for centuries past, and in the South American republics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Where the government is not palsied, or where it might gain some popular support, the *coup d'état* requires for success the connivance of members of the government especially in the armed forces—or a source of strength in the population at large sufficient to counter-balance the armed forces that are expected to defend the existing regime. Most commentators believe that Mussolini's "March on Rome" in 1922 would have been thwarted if the King simply had brandished the legitimate authority of the Crown in behalf of the democratic state. His failure to do so was taken as tacit consent for the change. But, of course, "ifs" do not make history. The fact is that Italy was ripe for the *coup* because, among other things, it had a weak monarchy that had never been educated to the democratic regime. The Fascists had the advantage not only of this passivity of the existing regime but also of the active support of elements of the army, the police, and industry.

In contrast, the Nazis in Germany were able to seize power in 1932 in a democracy that had considerable strength. Aside from considerable street-fighting between Nazi gangs and various Socialist and Communist opponents, the transition of the Nazis to power was cloaked in legal form.

Hitler's party obtained a large vote, and Hindenburg was finally influenced (some compare his behavior to that of the Italian King) to appoint Hitler Chancellor. A series of extraordinary decrees placed Nazis in key positions in the government; the violence that had been confined mainly to the street invaded the government itself. Opposition politicians were killed, deposed, or intimidated. Mock elections were held in which the Nazis gained a large majority of votes. Hitler pursued the new popular "mandate" to its extremes, purging the government of opposition, both actual and potential. No sufficient force was left to oppose the ruthless progress of the Nazi Revolution. But again, Hitler's *coup* found passivity at the top (that is, low morale), sympathetic minds in the bureaucracy, and help from extremists in the army.

CHARACTER OF REVOLUTIONARIES

Let us examine the composition of the revolutionary group. The *coup d'état* is carried out by a small number of active revolutionaries, who, while they may have some respect for legal forms, are determined to carry their ends by any means. Invariably some violence is involved. The leadership must possess the skills needed in the critical hours; the most important are the skills of agitation, violence, and administration. In proportion as the *coup* is carried out in a society that is complex and democratic in sentiment, the top leaders must be political and agitational. Oratory, flamboyancy, acute judgment of the timing of the stroke, and decisiveness are much in demand. The conditions of modern society demand that oratorical skills be supplemented by their kindred propagandistic skills. The press must be won over by force, fraud, or persuasion in the early days of the revolt.

The revolting group, wittingly or not, often seizes the sacred symbols of the existing regime. The French rebels of 1789 took possession of the person of the King, a lucky stroke that brought over crowds of Frenchmen despite their knowledge that the King was a virtual prisoner. The President of a republic serves the same purpose in some South American revolutions. When other rebels in history have seized the Capitol, the official seals, the high tribunal of justice, or the temples of the gods, they have gained the same symbolic advantage over the threatened regime.

The group leadership must have an aptitude both violence and administration. Usually this means army traits: ex-army officers, or workers trained in the use of arms. The police force, the key military garrisons, and the key government buildings must be taken over quickly and any opposition found there must be crushed. The administrative skills are needed to manage the treasury, the crucial offices of government, and the vital physical communications that connect the center of the revolt with the rest of the country: railroads, trucks, radio stations, telephone systems, and utilities. The influx of adherents to the new regime must be quickly mobilized and committed to favorable action to lay a firm foundation to the government.

REVOLUTION IS A MORE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE

A *coup d'état* is often only the inauguration of a revolution. A revolution is more fundamental in meaning than the basic structure of power and the distribution of benefits in a society. It is a forcible and rapid transformation that affects the basic structure of power and the distribution of benefits in a society.

There is no doubt that behind every revolution lies a motive for the redistribution of some value, material or ideal (like prestige). But before such a redistribution of values is actively desired by a considerable part of the population, profound changes must take place. A period of gradual change must occur, sometimes, as with the great French Revolution of 1789, lasting for a century before erupting into a change. Allegiances must weaken, and the existing principle of legitimacy must deteriorate (from traditional to rational in the case of the French Revolution; from rational to chaotic in the case of the Nazi Revolution).

AN ORGANIZED FORCE LIES BEHIND REVOLUTIONS

The new forces of revolution cannot succeed without a force, organized, and permanent interests. For instance, the Great Revolution in England in the mid-seventeenth century was essentially a revolt by the parliamentary party, paraded by the religious dissenters and by the new capitalist and middle classes, against the powerful monarch and his coterie of nobles. The parliamentary forces won a definite victory that lasted for a long time, despite a powerful reaction towards the end of the century. The

torious movement possessed tangible strength and cohesion; it combined strong religious and economic interests.

A second revolutionary movement, it is not often enough realized, existed within the parliamentary party. This was the Leveller movement, composed principally of soldiers and company grade officers of the parliamentary army. The Levellers wished to extend the revolution by sweeping economic and social reforms. They hoped for complete equality of rights and privileges. But the Levellers were citizen-soldiers: once the main revolution was consummated they might be demobilized at any time; meanwhile they were under martial law and were not associated with any strong economic or social groups outside the army. Since they were hostile to landlords and merchants, they were opposed by the parliamentary party; since they were republican, the royalists hated them; since there were no masses of factory workers, they could not get organized strength from that quarter; and since the gentry held the small farmers and farm tenants in economic thrall, no support could come from the country. The Leveller movement therefore failed almost completely in its program, although its ideas lived on to inspire the American and French Revolutions over a century later.

GROUP MOTIVES NECESSARY FOR REVOLUTIONS

These interesting facts lead one to conclude that individual motives are not enough; if revolutions are to be successful, there must be some basic interest that ties men together and makes them ready to stand shoulder to shoulder over a considerable period of time and through great sacrifices. This basic interest or interests must be shared, not just by a handful of men, but by a much larger group; and, since a frustrated interest among a large body of men is a formidable thing, it is no wonder that a revolution may shake society to its foundations.

CLASS REVOLUTIONS

One of the interests that seem to inspire at various times in history a prolonged and intensive loyalty of many men is *class* interest. Class interest, as we defined it in Chapter 3, refers to the interest of a social group that shares semifixed chances of obtaining certain important benefits and that is conscious of the differences in life chances. If we now add to

these elements a widespread feeling of injustice about the present distribution of chances, we have marked off one of the basic group of factors leading to revolution. Aristotle surveyed a large amount of data that he collected from the many ancient city-states and concluded that most revolutions are fought to gain equality or to create inequalities where equality existed. He subscribed to a kind of class theory; a state that does not satisfactorily adjust the relations between classes faces the danger of revolution. The poor are repelled by inequality of the rich and seek to destroy them, or the few are repelled by the equality of a democracy and seek to destroy it. There seems much truth in Aristotle's conclusions.

Examples of revolutions in which one socio-economic class was pitted against another would be the great French Revolution, the American Revolution, and the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). One must be careful, of course, to specify exactly what part of a revolution can be attributed to class conflict. Many planters of the American South were revolutionaries despite the fact that their commercial interests were not so sharply in conflict with those of England as were the New Englanders' interests. The French Revolution went through several phases and was colored throughout by the directing influence of the urban middle class. Yet many radical egalitarians assisted the Revolution, and even a few aristocrats collaborated. Furthermore, in both America and France, a good part of the urban middle class clung to traditional loyalties to the king.

In Spain in 1936, a Popular Front composed of Republicans, Socialists, Syndicalists, and Communists won a general election and instituted sweeping social changes, including the redistribution of land, the reduction of the influence and property of the Catholic Church, and other socialist measures. A group of monarchists and conservatives revolted in Morocco, incited army insurrections in Spain, and established headquarters in Spain. For three years a bloody war raged until Franco's rebels triumphed. Italy and Germany sent men and supplies to help the rebels, while Russia sent 750,000 lives were lost. Spain suffered enormous damage and a complete change in the elected government. About the power of workers' movements in Spain was indefinitely crippled.

NATIONALITIES AND CIVIL STRIFE

Nationality is another interest that has often produced violent domestic struggle. Wars of independence pit one group in the population that is distinctive by language, culture, or attitudes against the dominant, governing group. An example would be, again, the American Revolution where, over a period of a century and a half, thirteen British colonies had developed their own peculiar customs, beliefs, and economic problems. Following specific injuries, such as the attempts to enforce the Stamp Act and various navigation laws, important sections of the population revolted and, after several years of warfare, won formal independence.

The American pattern of revolt is paralleled in ancient Latium (unsuccessful revolt of various Latin cities against Roman hegemony, 340-338 B.C.); in Spanish America (an unsuccessful phase, 1809-16, and a successful phase, 1816-25, that freed the continent of South America and southern North America); and in the Dutch East Indies (1946-50, leading to the founding of the Republic of Indonesia). One might mention many more—for instance, the numerous Irish rebellions against England, or the numerous risings of the nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

REGIONAL AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS

In addition to assuming the character of class wars and wars of independence, revolutions may take on a regional or religious guise. By regional revolutions is meant the many rural or urban insurrections that have dotted the pages of history. Notable among them are the forays of tribesmen into the glittering "Babylons" of ancient and medieval times and even twentieth-century China. A sense of general unity exists among the parties, and no class interests are espoused by the rebels, but fighting can be a habit, and when life becomes dull in the hills, an invasion of the cities on the plain can furnish exciting diversion and afford much booty. As Mosca remarks: "In France, Spain, and Italy, there are a few cities in which it is relatively easy to lead masses to the barricades. That is one of the many effects of habit and tradition. Once a population has exchanged shots with a constituted government and overthrown it, it will feel, for a generation at least,

that it can make a new try any time with favorable results. Revolutions sometimes have religious aims, but it is oft hard to distinguish the religious factor from the other factors at work in the struggle. The English Glorious Revolution of the seventeenth century is perhaps one of the clearest cases on record of division between an established church and dissenters in a revolution. Yet we have already mentioned an example of class warfare. The confusion of influences thus apparent. The religious doctrines of Luther were prominent in the rebellion of German principalities from the Holy Roman Empire at the beginning of modern times. Often international and internecine struggles occur together and religious differences may underlie the whole conflict. The Albigensian Crusade (1208-1312) was proclaimed by Innocent III against heretics of southern France, but it also occasioned a power struggle among the French barons.

WHAT FORCES CAUSE REVOLUTION TODAY?

One may only guess what the future holds for religious, regional, and independence movements in the world. Independence is demanded ever more forcefully by the colored peoples of Asia and Africa. Recent history would indicate that religious and regional interests will not assume a leading role in the present century, although they may have some influence on foreign policy. In domestic affairs, although nations may act as political forces of a pressure type, they have their will and capacity for organizing revolutions. Movements have so developed their internal ruling apparatus—armies, police, and bureaucracy—that class warfare and institutional elite struggles are the remaining sources of serious internal conflict. By institutional elite struggles we mean such occurrences as the futile revolt against Hitler in 1933 which was backed by some military and political leaders.

The reason why class struggle may still threaten a more government is that the very division of labor and communication organization from which the government derives its extended controls over a country are built on a potential opposition.

¹ Quoted with the permission of McGraw Hill Book Co. by Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, translated by Hannah D. Hall and edited by Arthur Livingston (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1939), p. 220.

force—the industrial and communication workers. As the workers are organized in the Western world, their influence can be diminished in three ways: by destruction, in which event the whole nation is weakened terribly; by a complete reorganization of their loyalties and affiliations within a short time, in which event we have counterrevolution that brings the same consequences as other revolutions (like the Fascist revolutions in Italy, in Germany, and in Spain); or by a progressive adjustment of loyalties and affiliations over a long period of time.

RELATIONS BETWEEN REVOLUTION AND WAR

From *coups* and revolutions, we may turn our attention now to international violence. International warfare is prompted by the same underlying motives for violence that stand behind revolutions. Also, several of the patterns of revolution are repeated in international warfare. Thus, class conflict and religious conflict sometimes repeat themselves in international affairs. The spreading of the middle-class, liberal movement from France to other parts of Europe in the nineteenth century shows the transformation of a domestic problem of revolution into an international one. Napoleon's invasions were the final international culmination of warfare that originated in the civil war of the French Revolution, when a revolutionary army was organized to fight the monarchical supporters. Ultimately the class warfare of France became the international warfare of the Napoleonic period. The Christian Crusades against the Mohammedans were meant to destroy the kingdoms of the unbelievers and introduce the rule of the true God. American intervention abroad has been motivated partly by the desire to extend the benefits of American practices and ideals to other lands. One should not underestimate the eagerness of people to fight for the "good" of other people. In both world wars, millions of Americans pursued a war policy for ideological reasons.

THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONALISM

The most common form of international warfare in modern times, however, has been based on nationalism, and we should examine this idea in order to understand the pattern of modern international violence. Nationalism combines love of country and suspiciousness of foreigners. Love of country

comes from shared values, and suspiciousness of foreigners comes from the belief that foreigners do not share values in the same strength. The first shared value is that of familiar places—the neighborhood, the land, the hills, the valleys, and the mountains, all of the surroundings one loves because they have been “part of oneself” in infancy. To the love of place is commonly added the pride of or the feeling of shared racial ancestry. This feeling is hardly ever one of purity of race, but is most often a feeling of “difference from” the race of somebody else. Ever since the time that has been inflamed by a claim to superior race has been a racial mixture. Its logic has taken a peculiar form, something like this: Whatever my kind of mongrelism may be, it must be better than yours. It is not even remotely possible at the present time for biology or socio-biology (evolutionary psychology) to establish more than bone, color, and physiological differences among the average persons of various racial subraces. What these differences tell us about “superiority” is six of one and a half-dozen of the other.

To understand the “racial” basis of nationalism, one need only think how people who speak alike, dress alike, and act alike also “look” alike. This fact has been noticed of course by those who have been married a long time. By taking each other’s peculiarities, they get to look like brother and sister to one another. National haircuts, costumes, mustache styles, and other externals make different nationalities seem more distinct than they are.

Very often identity of language is a third shared value among national groups. People who understand each other best by a direct communication of thought and culture by the same language. Yet the Swiss speak three different languages—German, French, and Italian. Many other nations have geographical regions that speak different dialects—France and Russia, to name three. And England and America have almost the same language but have distinct feelings of nationality, as do Spain and Spanish America.

Religion sometimes plays a part in the establishment of national identity. Witness the turmoil the people of India underwent to separate themselves from the Hindus of the continent in 1947 and 1948. The Thirty Years War of the seventeenth century was motivated in some part by the

hostility of Catholic and Protestant countries. Furthermore, a sense of historical continuity and shared destiny can often be a uniting factor. Every national group has its William Tells, its George Washingtons, and its sense of a future in which it will be widely respected because of its accomplishments in war or peace. Most people feel that, just as they judge other individuals by the group from which they come, they themselves will be subject to "guilt by association." Thus they link their fate with the fate of their nationality.

The elements in nationalism just mentioned—place, race, language, religion, and myth—may be joined to a host of historical, shared experiences to produce a common culture. A shared culture, in the last analysis, is what patriots possess; they are ready to stand together and against outsiders because they have lived through and bear the cuts of countless discrete happenings, each one of which marks the possessors as kindred souls. They are partially isolated from the outsiders by their upbringing and by the triumphs and disasters that were contained within the boundaries of their lands. Americans stick together not only because they share a high standard of living, have the same government, and like movies and chewing gum but also because they know the same gangsters, have the same racial problems, and have lived through the great depression of the thirties.

THE DYNAMIC CHARACTER OF NATIONALISM

That the factors referred to are a powerful combination is beyond doubt. They have successfully resisted international developments of all kinds, cultural, economic and political. The wonders of Hellenic civilization never broke down the barriers among the Greek city-states, nor have the great writers, musicians, and scientists of the Western world softened by much the animosities of nations. The dependence of nations on foreign trade for part of their standard of living, the foreign entanglements of international finance and business, and the international postal, telegraph and other arrangements have been feeble barriers to international conflict. And the cries of socialism and communism for a union of all the workers of the world were stifled in the throats of the workers themselves as soon as a crisis involving their individual nation arose. Nor has religion had a greater effect. The ancient Persians had Greek allies of different religion

who fought Athens and Sparta in the Greel
Catholic Italians united with Lutheran, Cath
religious Germans in the beginning of World
Catholic France. Catholic France fought C
Hungary in World War I on the side of C
Russia, which held in bondage Catholic Poland

Considerable mutual communication, then,
the people of a nation and to separate them
national groups. Geographical, racial, lingu
mythical, and cultural identity make up a g
compound that seals people together. An in
communication would have to be prolonged,
intensive in order to decrease the feelings of s
among nations. This would be a most diffic
it were deemed desirable.

The relative hopelessness of this objective
writers to suggest that only certain crucial
the present condition of nationalities can pre
have suggested, for example, that some pow
the individual nations should prevent them fr
It also has been suggested that permanent pe
be assured, but that correct national policie
the number and diminish the violence of v
gestions, in so far as they find their way
policy of nations and into the international
states, are treated in a later chapter.

THE CAUSES OF WAR SUMMARIZED

A war, then, is a condition that exists w
one state commit organized acts of violence
another state with the approval of their
causes of war go back to the *motives behi*
lence—economic gain, prestige, security, 1
destructiveness. They may *assume the char*
tions take—for example, of international c
warfare, of religion, and especially of nat
differences, with the suspiciousness engend
a primary condition of conflict.

CLOSE RELATION OF WAR POLICY TO PEACE 1

To some extent, certainly, the nation th
is the one that maintains a successful foreig

Strong and dependable alliances with friendly nations are as much a preparation for war as is the accumulation of munitions and the training of soldiers. What these arrangements mean in peace and what they mean in war are twin problems for the men who draft treaties. The Marshall Plan to restore western European economies after World War II was a combination of altruism, economic policy, and defense against possible Russian aggression. Billions of dollars were gambled on the calculation that Europe could fend off Soviet imperialism by being economically strong. The alternative gamble, that American military power alone could accomplish the same thing, was rejected. In critical times such as the twentieth century, the distinction between peace policy and war policy becomes difficult to maintain. It is hard to believe that before World War II, the State Department and the military establishment saw very little of each other, so closely are they associated today.

THE PRECIPITATION OF WARS

The timing of warfare is another important factor in military success. The events that *begin* wars are not usually the *causes* of war. The assassination of the Austrian Archduke by Serbian nationalists did not cause World War I. It was only a tiny factor among many large factors; it precipitated the war crisis that fed on an accumulation of international rivalries and tensions—militarism, extreme nationalism, German-French rivalry in Europe and Africa, Austro-Russian rivalry in eastern Europe, Anglo-German competition, Italo-Austrian boundary difficulties, clashing imperialisms in Africa, and so on.

Many of the greatest wars were not started by nations "bent upon war." In World War I, it appears that the leaders of the principal nations, propelled by their own characters and by the forces operating on them domestically, blundered their way into the war. They involved themselves so deeply that they could not pull out. There is even evidence to indicate that Hitler, as confident as he was of Germany's strength, thought to the very last moment that England and France would not go to war over his proposed attack on Poland in 1939. Whether he would have changed his mind if he had known the truth is another question.

Control over the precipitating cause of a war is impossible

in one sense. No one guided the hand of the Serbian assassins, and many wars have started after such spontaneous incidents. The only control that can be exercised over precipitating incident is to create the incident. One advance in the technique of modern warfare has been just this. I deliberately provoking border clashes, hostile riots, and deeds of individual violence. aggressive nations have been able to point to incidents justifying their intervention on a large scale. In order to pacify domestic qualms of conscience and to appease or at least confuse world opinion, no nation too attacks another without crying that it has been attacked first.

Despotic governments have the advantage in this condition of contemporary international politics. They can measure their actions more carefully, time them more accurately, conceal both the incident and their own preparations for follow-up more easily than can republican governments. There seems no reason yet to doubt the common belief that the advantage of the first strike in war goes to the dictatorial governments. This meant less in former times than it in these days of mechanized warfare and the blitzkrieg. battles of the Lowlands, France, Russia, the Philippines, Singapore in World War II, and of Korea in 1950, demonstrate the proposition. Only new defensive weapons of a new order of effectiveness can whittle down this advantage of initial attack.

FACTORS IN THE ABILITY TO WIN WARS

A nation's alliances and the events precipitating therefore, are two elements of importance in determining ability to win wars. The other important elements are geography, natural resources, population, morale, industrial capacity, and military preparedness. Geography is basic to men's control. England can congratulate itself on having the English Channel between itself and the continent of Europe. Similarly, Italy's importance is enhanced by its strategic position in the Mediterranean Sea so long as naval warfare for wars in which land armies are of paramount importance. For world warfare, with planes, rockets, and long-range strikes, the Soviet Union is ideally situated. It can march in all directions over a huge area stretching from J.

western Europe. An opponent wishing to amass powerful striking forces against it must select a very few points on the U.S.S.R.'s perimeter and must supply them from great distances. Meanwhile the initiative must go to the Soviet armies, which are capable at the same time of launching attacks into unprepared areas and breaking up incipient enemy concentrations.

Natural resources undeniably separate those nations that can be important military powers today from those that cannot. The world's resources of iron, coal, oil, rubber, tin, and other vital metals and ores are unqualifiedly available to the United States if they lie in the Western hemisphere or Africa, to the Soviet Union if they lie in the Asiatic belt surrounding the Soviet Union, and at stake in war if they lie in the southern fringe of Asia, the Near East, or in western Europe. Each of the two large areas controlled by the two great powers is rich enough in raw materials to support a prolonged war for control of Europe, Africa, and Asia. The outcome of a world war between the two great powers, therefore, will depend on some factor other than an imbalance of natural resources like that partially responsible for the outcome of the last two world wars.

Under certain conditions, the size of population will be a crucial factor. Rarely have wars been lost because of insufficient manpower. The men may be untrained, or unmobilized, or unwilling, but there are usually enough of them. The number of soldiers available is only important when the strategy of the war is one of attrition of manpower—that is to say, the side that is willing to sacrifice large numbers of men in return for roughly commensurate losses by the enemy will have an advantage, provided that it can maintain the willingness to sacrifice so many men and that the enemy's willingness to make such sacrifices decreases. Human life does not have the same value for all people. The Russians and Chinese can take heavy losses of life without questioning the reasons for the losses as intensely as do the peoples of western European civilization. The ancient tradition of warfare is to use machines to support men; the American psychology attempts to use men to support machines. America therefore seeks to avoid to the last moment a war of manpower attrition.

How far America can go in using machines rather than

Modern war depends not only on undisturbed industrial production and a minimum loss of equipment but also on geographical conditions under which the war is fought. Loss of life relative to the enemy's loss of life will be smaller if the war can be kept mobile and huge armies do not become crowded in close quarters for a long period of time, for the greatest tactical value of atomic bombs may well be that they may throw open the field to quick maneuvers, manuevers, highly skilled staff work and intricate physical communications. That the United States (if it keeps its Army especially well suited to this kind of warfare is beyond question) exceeds that of any nation or alliance and can only be roughly equaled by the junction of western European industry with the Soviet bloc. Since the eighteenth century factors in military importance. The weapons of war have become increasingly expensive. Artillery pieces are larger, and a host of new weapons have been devised dependent upon fine automatic calculators and sensitive electronic devices. Modern warfare makes constant and monolithic demands on every erg of machine energy in the nation.

THE BROAD MEANING OF PREPAREDNESS

We may take military preparedness broadly to cover the factors mentioned above. Some time ago Colonel M. J. Healy of the French army wrote a book on military leadership in which he stressed that the initial conditions for effective discipline were a "friendly press," a military spirit in education of the young, and a co-operative government, economy of working population. It is of little use to say that this must be part of military preparedness, or Russian present, it must be compensated for in other respects or quickly indoctrinated into a people. Bertrand de Jouvenel wrote in his book *Power* that international conflict is

ous competitive struggle in which no nation can avoid taking the antihumanitarian measures adopted by its opponents. If one nation musters its population in a totalitarian fashion, its competitor is compelled to follow suit. For example, universal conscription, once introduced in France, spread quickly through Europe. Full industrial mobilization, once its effectiveness for war was demonstrated by Germany, was decreed in England, partially carried out in America, and will probably occur in every country of the world today, the moment war breaks out. Italian and German bombing of civilian centers in the Spanish Civil War was the prelude for the German devastation of Rotterdam and London, and for the havoc wreaked on the German cities by British and American air forces.

Military preparedness in the stricter sense couples traditional exercises with new ideas. The old patterns of preparation must be gone through: Men must be taught to take care of themselves under the unusual conditions of battle and bivouac; supplies must be inventoried and distributed with efficiency; marksmanship, intelligence, leadership, and other military subjects must be taught; and so on. In addition, each war introduces its surprises. It is never quite like the last war. New formations, procedures, and tactics are forever being devised or dredged up from the long history of warfare. Like all human innovations—television, for example—the inventive period has to be succeeded by the adaptive period. When to decide on a new kind of jet-propelled plane, when to substitute a bazooka for the small arms of a rifleman, when to decrease the size of aircraft carriers, and many similar questions are of continual concern to military and civilian experts in this age of rapid technological change. Military preparedness under these conditions also requires wisdom in making “changeover decisions.”

The Effects and Limits of Physical Coercion

THE OUTRIGHT REJECTION OF COERCION

The application of force and violence undeniably changes the behavior of people. The simple statement becomes a complex problem, however, when one tries to relate the *effects* of the application of force or violence to the *motives* of those who use them and to the *welfare* of those on whom

they are applied. One school of thought throughout history, especially throughout the history of Christianity, contends that violence never succeeds. "Love thy neighbor" and "turn the other cheek" express sentiments older than Christianity itself and presuppose that under all conditions pacifism is the true path to the highest values of this world and the Hereafter.

NONVIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Complete pacifism characterized Gandhi's movement to unseat British authority in India. Making strength out of weakness, the followers of Gandhi, while refusing to cooperate with the British, carefully abstained from violence. In turn, the British, hampered in their efforts to administer the country and watched suspiciously by the humanitarianism of the world, had not the will to repress ruthlessly the Hindu freedom movement. After World War II, the English left India with mixed regrets and relief.

The rarity of such nonviolent, non-co-operative movements is evidence of the great difficulty encountered in organizing them and of the success of organized force as an instrument of the state. Nevertheless, non-co-operation is found to some extent in every society. Farmers who refuse to produce, merchants who avoid taxes, workers who slow down their productivity, and soldiers who avoid battle are practicing Gandhi-ism on a small scale or on a less conscious level. Such non-co-operation relates to concepts previously discussed in this book—the strength of the beliefs in legitimacy, the condition of consensus, and the skills of leadership.

With few exceptions, notably among the Quakers, Christians, and Gandhi towards physical coercion. They have been willing to tolerate and even to encourage the use of force and violence as means to an end, provided that the end is an estimable one. Other people, like Aldous Huxley in his essay on *Ends and Means*, maintain that, even assuming that violence is justifiable in theory as a means, violence in practice never succeeds in attaining its ends. Violence is by nature, Huxley declares, incompetent to attain good ends.

As political scientists we cannot pass judgment on whether of man's ends are good ones and which are less good. However, we can say which ones are more practicable, provided

they are described accurately and precisely enough to discuss them intelligently. And we can say which goals (again, if they are precisely described) are inconsistent with each other. We can also determine by studies what are the values that men hold. On the pros and cons of pacifism we can say that the evidence of the existence of rewards in an afterlife for nonresistance in this life is not the kind that science can deal with. While we can assure religious pacifists that they will be dealt with roughly on earth (something they know very well anyway), we cannot tell them what will happen to them after death. Similarly, we cannot say to the nonpacifist religions that God smiles or frowns upon the methods they use in carrying out their holy objectives.

COERCION, LIKE OTHER POLITICAL WEAPONS, IS LIMITED

We can say something more, however, about Huxley's proposition that force or violence never succeeds. Men in various times and places have been able to achieve their goals and values to as great an extent by force and violence as by education, propaganda, economic policy, and economic manipulation. There is nothing inherent in coercion as a method that is not inherent in any other method of achieving ends, beyond the forms and patterns its application takes. Though force has been used when education might have sufficed, education has been used where only force could suffice; and contrariwise, though economic policy has sought to do what only force could do, force has often been a poor substitute for economic planning. To quote examples on which most people will agree, while it is true that force corrupted religious inquisitioners, it is likewise true that economic policy destroyed the souls of factory workers and that education (in our special sense of legitimate indoctrination) impeded enlightenment.

When we turn to the nonlegitimate instruments of authority, instances on which most people will agree are even more abundant. The brutal father is equaled by the miserly or the superstitious father in his effects upon the character of his children. The savagery of the police state is equaled by the calloused, inhuman bleeding of its inhabitants by a profiteering government and the spiritual deception and manipulation of its people by the thought-control state.

COERCION SOMETIMES SUCCEEDS

To maintain that force and violence never succeed is either a completely unhistorical view of history or a standard never possessed by more than a few men. Americans who believe that the American Revolution had a good end must either accept the goodness of the violence employed or else maintain that independence could have been achieved otherwise than by violence. If they take up the latter position, they would have to maintain it for a great number of the events in history in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. They would have to explain how Carthage could have been subjected to Greek civilization by economic policy (the Carthaginians were eminent traders) or by force (the Carthaginians were hostile to Greek ideas). Mexico could have released Texas by its own free will; the Bolsheviks could have been invited to collectivize Russia at the invitation of the existing liberal, capitalist regime; and how Hitler could have been bought off or prevented out of his designs on the democratic, peaceful world.

FORCE AND VIOLENCE OFTEN IN DISREPUTE

The criteria for the use of violence, like the criteria for economic or psychological policy, must be adapted to a special case. If one is in favor of a particular end, he must decide on the means. If he is against the objective, no means will be good. In deciding on the means at hand, he must take account of the relative merits of the means. For violence has several limitations, like other means. It is not at present in favor as means in certain parts of the world and among certain groups in the population. The philosopher Aldous Huxley, refusing to regard them as means at all, says that subsequently, force and violence are most often supposed to be used "as a last resort," that is, after economic and psychological techniques have been employed without success. It may be called a *mores* or cultural limitation on the use of physical coercion. We also should point out that where people do not want it, do not understand it, and do not know how to use physical coercion is a dangerous and poor instrument of government.

COERCION OFTEN WASTEFUL AND CRUDE

Force and violence are often wasteful. This is a consideration of *expediency*. If the Ostrogoths can be bribed not to invade the Roman Empire, costly campaigns are saved and the tottering old Empire preserved for the time being. If the Russians can be freed from the "encirclement complex" by being allowed to share Germany and control eastern Europe, then a terrible war might be averted. If, of course, these economic and psychological policies do not work, physical coercion may be the next policy employed.

Force and violence are also inexpedient very often because they do not necessarily teach or influence the subjects to act exactly as those who inflict the coercion wish. Force cannot teach children mathematics, nor can it even be used to teach soldiers how to use force. Nor can force accomplish the delicate effects of a highly complicated income-tax schedule in bringing about a redistribution of wealth, activities, and incentives. The income-tax laws of modern capitalist countries are literal marvels of instrumental policy. With only sighs and quivers from the population, effects are achieved that would have bloodied every street in medieval England. The history of lands and times when physical coercion diminished relative to education and economics is the story of politics that has learned more ingenious and sophisticated ways to accomplish its purposes.

Chapter 9

Thinking about Democracy

A STRIKING FEATURE of life in a democracy is that so many people in it suspect their fellow citizens of undermining democracy. *Every imaginable value is proposed* and attacked every group has its own platform of values. It seems obvious that no one's claim to know democracy can be considered valid. All the more reason, therefore, that one should be astonished at another feature of life in a democracy—the suspicions, unperturbed by the implication of it, with which everyone in the society agrees or ought to agree, believe democracy to be *a single set of values*.

This remarkable contradiction in attitudes gives us an opportunity on how to proceed with the discussion of democracy. We shall elaborate upon the inconsistencies of political theorists, showing that great philosophers have differed on what is good for man and about what human nature is. We shall show furthermore how a horde of propagandists continually obscures the proper study of democracy. In the first section of this chapter, we shall establish how the wish almost always hovers in the twilight between what men *believe* are the important *facts* of life and what they believe are the important *moral* principles.

The second section of the chapter will describe the social and economic conditions that prevail generally in democratic societies. No attempt will be made to find a consistent set of moral principles that explain the conduct of the people in such societies. Rather the actual social setting of democratic societies will be described.

In the third section of the chapter we shall ask whether there is a consistent ethical system of democracy. We shall find that instead of there being one absolute democracy, there are four major moral positions of democracy that, on their basis for thought and action in democratic societies, they are in some ways mutually antagonistic, do present different. Finally, an eclectic theory that considers democratic

equilibrium of the four moral positions will be presented. When all these tasks are completed, we shall be able to understand the problem of democracy better, and, as a token of this understanding, we should be able to explain the riddle of why men dwelling in a democratic state hold the democracy of their fellows in distrust and yet claim democracy to be a single belief system.

Basic Questions of Values

GREAT MORALISTS DIFFER OVER THE "GOOD"

Whose values *ought* to prevail? Whose liberties and whose policies are the best? Whose liberties and policies shall be frustrated? Political theory, in so far as it discusses what is good or bad about human conduct, gives many answers. One may follow the advice of Aristotle, Plato, Aquinas, Spinoza, Locke, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, or some other philosopher, or even the exhortations of a Hitler or Stalin. These men, and many others, do not agree on what is good for man. Plato, for example, believed the community ought to assign each person his life work and train him for it. Contrariwise, Adam Smith thought that the individual is best assigned to his life work through satisfying whatever happens to be the market demand for his skill at a point in time. Smith would forbid the community from ruling the division of labor by legislation.

Though writers differ on what is good for men, there are schools or species of morality, the members of which agree more with each other than with those outside their group. Thus Plato and T. H. Green subscribe to a different moral order than that of Machiavelli and Hobbes or that of Aristotle and Locke. One of the major tasks of political scientists specializing in the history of ideas and theory is to discover these major species and explain their similarities and differences. This task forms a great branch of political theory.

GREAT SCIENTISTS DIFFER OVER HUMAN NATURE

Another great branch of political theory is devoted to a description of *what men are like, what they want, what is possible*. These theorists do not ask moral questions. They ask what are the facts of political life? Whose liberties *can* prevail? To whom might liberty possibly be consigned, and

whose interests could possibly be defeated? We do not know now, nor will we know for some time to come, the answer to these factual questions.

Nor have political scientists of the past been in agreement on the answer to these questions. John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, for example, wrote their masterpieces about the same time, the middle and later seventeenth century. In the realm of morality, the two men differed greatly. Locke declared himself in favor of private, individual freedom, individual freedom, individual freedom, individual freedom, individual freedom. In favor of authoritative control over many individual freedoms. The two men also put forward antagonistic theories to explain human nature. Locke thought men were naturally cooperative, social, and reasonable. Hobbes thought men were naturally in a state of conflict that made their life "nasty, brutish, and short" until the coming of government. On the basis of his theory, Locke believed that rights could be maintained without the intervention of government; such rights were life, liberty, and property. On the other hand, Hobbes was convinced that, so far as liberty is possible, it was only possible in a regime with enough authority and power to keep order.

There was not enough evidence then, and there seems to be enough today, to declare that either position is correct or incorrect. We are entitled to be suspicious, under such circumstances, of both men, for, where the facts are deep desires (frequently hidden from ourselves) are emphasized to bolster our own moral beliefs.

To put the case in other terms, so long as Chinese, Americans, Russians, Europeans, and Americans do not agree on the same "facts" exist, we must view through narrowed any theory purportedly based on "human nature." There is no agreement either on what is good for man or on what man is like. So human discourse on either level is likely to be treacherous.

MORAL PROPAGANDISTS OFTEN MASQUERADE AS POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

Unfortunately for the student of democratic theory, writers on democracy muffle the opportunity to set forth facts about political behavior and political values which theory and other social sciences have handed down to us.

writers, it seems, join unrestrainedly the ranks of propagandists as soon as they begin to discuss political values. The vast literature on democracy, consequently, is filled with slapdash logic and incredible contradictions.

If we read for logic and evidence, rather than for fervid agreement, we observe that an extraordinary process occurs repeatedly. For example, a writer is moved to broadcast his democratic sentiments and writes a book or article to commemorate the urge. He declares in the text that individual rights are sacred, persuading his readers that his "principle" is correct by citing some individual "right" with which the readers agree enthusiastically. Thus, he might write: "A man has the right to the privacy of his home against pilfering officials and snooping police."

Soon afterwards, he declaims on the rights of minorities, holding that "men must be allowed to speak openly and freely against the government." Again the reading audience applauds. Then in another place, the writer will soar high in praise of the virtues of the common man and of the majority of men. He will cite the London cockney in the air raids, and the popular majorities of Fiorello La Guardia, the scourge of Tammany Hall. At this, his readers give rousing cheers.

Democracy, for them, is now complete: it gives complete freedom to the individual to work out his life plans; it allows the minority to have its liberties; and it permits the majority of common men to govern.

But what we have in this type of argumentation is not a proof that principles of democracy may be discovered, or that these principles are consistent, or that such principles are practical. The argument relies mostly on simple emotional agreement on particular sentiments, masquerading as principles.

To show this fact, let us suppose that our writer is slightly mad and out of touch with his audience. Each time he states a "principle," he gives a different example. When he lauds individual rights, he says, by way of illustration, that "every man has a right to enslave his family and conceal stolen property in the privacy of his home." This would make his audience fidget, of course. Ignoring their reactions, however, he goes on to state the next "principle," the rights of minorities. He proclaims that unions have the right to choose the people with whom they must work; they ought to be able

to discriminate against unskilled persons, persons of different race, sex, or nationality, and people who do not support the union leadership's policies. His audience nodded in ominous calm.

Then he states his third principle, having to do with the great virtue of the common man and with the majority. He cites the American Colonial Revolution, the riotous opposition to the American Colonies, and Napoleon among the mass of Frenchmen, and the enlightened Swiss voters who chose to reject the referendum many years ago, on persons practicing the principle. Practically his whole audience deserts him at this point regarding his sentiments, if not his principles, as he speaks.

These examples are by way of saying that the writings and other expressions on the subject (and anti-democracy) are propaganda, and might be attacked for being good or bad propaganda. The goals of the writer or speaker. There is little to be gained from them. By using examples that please the audience, certain principles, the writers are able to acquire for profound thought, logical method, and so forth, particular likes, although one like may contract different likes in practice, are collected and called. All particular dislikes, whether they belong to the audience or not, are heaped up and called by a horrid word.

In all humility, and realizing that it is impossible to be a sinner, we must recognize the presence of logic and words about the subject. If nonscientific thoughts and words are to be used, a vast silence would settle over the universe. Hardly a pen would be put to hand, hardly a word would be written. The social ideas and political practices of the past 2,500 years of logic and science cannot say what democracy "ought to be."

This indictment that history reads to political scientists is understood to mean that logic and scientific method really ought to be used. No sense of logic and scientific method mean that also present. Men may be dominated, coerced, and manipulated by the use of scientific authority of many kinds.

of science will only clarify the values that men hold, reduce the confusions of thought that emerge in politics, and decrease the waste in energies and resources as men move from their present position to the liberties they visualize.

YET THEORIES OF ETHICS AND SCIENCE ARE BASICALLY RELATED

Far below the everyday use of science as the slave of man's will, lies the problem of the relation between what knowledge man is capable of and what he wants. Some problems of science are so much a part of man's basic thought processes that they have the effect of turning men's desires in certain directions. Conversely, men's basic desires condition these root problems of science. The study of this relationship is one of the most profound problems of philosophy.

Our glimpse of past thinking has shown two general ways in which scientific and ethical problems are related. In one way, men most often assert as fact what they want to believe wherever the evidence on the point at issue is inconclusive. The wish is father to the "fact." In another way, the facts that are universally agreed to will be used by men to support their own temperament and values. An optimist will find that the incomplete facts in a situation bear out his theory about mankind's eternal progress. A pessimist will fit the same facts into a theory of man's approaching doom.

Consequently, we may expect arguments about what is good to be closely associated with arguments about what is true in fact. Indeed, no two political writers ever pursued the same method, agreed on the same facts, and then disagreed radically on what was the good life.

The Social Setting of Democracy

THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

The preceding discussion permits us, for the time being, to put aside the search for a systematic set of moral principles that may be called the democratic belief-system, and to turn our attention to another approach to the study of democracy. Democracy may be studied as a distinctive social setting. Under certain conditions, there have come into being governments that have been called democratic either because the societies termed themselves democracies or because their

actions conformed to a given definition of democracy. Several of the candidates for these honors would be ancient Athens, late republican Rome, medieval Florence, Switzerland over several centuries, France and England over most of the last century and a half, and the United States.

It is not easy to discover what is common to these societies. Not only do several of them differ in many of their institutions, but the members within any one of them also differ in many ways. Certainly Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Pericles, and Aristides held strikingly different moral principles in democratic Athens. And so did Sulla, Cicero, Cati-line, Pompey, and Julius Caesar in Rome. Nor need we more than mention the differences among Franklin D. Roosevelt, Herbert Hoover, John L. Lewis, James Farley, and Huey Long. Probably all of these men, though controversial figures, have either regarded themselves as democrats or have been regarded by thousands of fellow citizens as democrats. Yet there probably exists no single, debatable issue in relation to which all of them would hold to the same position.

On the other hand, the societies in which these men lived or live would qualify for the title of democracy, because certain social and economic conditions prevailed in them that do not prevail in undemocratic societies. We will now enumerate and will subsequently define seven of the most significant conditions for democracy. These are (1) general freedom of action and speech; (2) strong attempts to uplift the common people; (3) constitutionalism and dispersal of political controls; (4) relatively high social and political mobility; (5) relatively high level of personal discontent; (6) undervaluation of the qualities of political leaders; (7) emphasis on education and economic measures, instead of force, as instruments of authority. There are perhaps other indices that signify the presence of democracy, but these seven indices seem most significant and most closely connected with the political process. Any state that possesses these conditions will be called democratic, according to our method of analysis. We will now discuss each of these conditions individually.

GENERAL FREEDOM OF ACTION AND SPEECH

Widespread freedom of action and speech is a primary criterion of democracy. Democracies often have punished

men for their opinions and have prevented a full freedom of political action. But, on the whole, there seems to be little reason to doubt that democratic societies are more hospitable to, and give a wider scope to, criticism of the government, organization for political purposes, and the exercise of individual and group pressures on the state. Since we are dealing with a *general* freedom and believe this general criterion to be the important one, we are not impressed with particular deviations in individual cases. That is, democracies often restrict the freedoms of a few individuals to speak and act the way they desire; and one may not gainsay such persons for feeling bitter against the democratic societies in which they find themselves. But these occasional violations of the general conditions do not make democracy the same as despotism. The police, the ministers, the mob, and the politicians of nineteenth-century France often encroached upon freedom of speech and action, but, nevertheless, freedom then was a much more general condition than it was before the Revolution of 1789.

UPLIFTING THE COMMON PEOPLE

The second condition found in democracies is a strong concern for the mass of people. Democracy without the "people" is inconceivable. Both the political critics of democratic societies and the leading members of democratic societies are preoccupied with the role of the common man. The debate over bettering his standard of living and his intellectual and moral attainments consumes a large volume of political energy. We need not consider whether the common people of democratic societies are better fed or more cultured than those of other societies to agree with the fact that the common man is zealously spoken for and his support eagerly solicited in democratic societies. No one dare question that government ought to be *for* the people. A great deal of economic, moral, and social effort is directed at increasing equalities of all kinds and inhibiting any inequalities that many people see fit to be concerned about.

We are speaking of a general condition. Numerous men disagree with this "populism" and act overtly or surreptitiously against it. But they are at least slightly out of tune with their society. No democratic society can be confused with a nondemocratic society when the relative strength of the

“uplifting” force in each society is known as a mass movement of the Nazi type, or in several problems of the pre-existing society turned more and more away from the betterment of the masses and towards the selfish interests for the nation and the leaders. In the uplift theory has been in cold storage because of the “peasement” of the common man has gone against the demands of industrializing the country.

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DISPERSAL OF POWER

The third general condition of democracy is the way in which their institutions are related to the amount of power possessed by an individual, limited by a separation of powers, a system of checks and balances, a theory, and the level of juridical defense. As described in Chapter 2 of Volume II, it is difficult to get things done in a democracy because of the opposition of democracy's foes and the friends of democracy. The legislatures impede the executive; the executive intervenes in the economy; the courts impede the legislature; the civilians prevent the free operation of the government; the parties fight one another over principle; and local interests and jurisdictions passively resist the central authority. If a separation of powers does not exist, the result is that democracies are famous for their troubles. The Italian politics were incomprehensible to the American people; the Russian politics similarly baffle the Russians. The system called by the communists “democratic centralism” is an inconsiderable separation of powers and a lack of juridical defense.

HIGH SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOBILITY

The fourth condition of democracy is high social and political mobility. The people who are mobile are the people who establish small islands on the society and in certain professions and even in certain social classes are a backwash to the greater flood of the society and women who occupy their social position with good behavior,” so to speak. Class is

be a statistical and acquired status, much as we described the condition of the social classes in America in Chapter Three. Men move up and down the social ladder within a single generation; if they achieve high status before death, they consider themselves fortunate if their sons and daughters maintain that status; if they remain lowly or descend from previous heights of prestige, income, and opportunities, they console themselves with the thought that they have not bequeathed a severe handicap to their children.

In the sphere of politics proper, the politists in a democracy do not come from a single class or group. They are not a homogeneous body. They are subject to the same ups and downs as members of the social classes in general. *Political* status, even more than social status, is statistical and acquired. Certain types succeed more in politics than others, for example, lawyers in America and orators in France, but the characteristics of these types are not *class* characteristics. They are functional and psychological characteristics.

So, on the whole, a relatively high degree of freedom of opportunity may be said to be a condition of democratic societies. One must make an exception to this generalization in the case of revolutionary societies that are rarely democratic but usually have high social and political mobility, as in the Soviet Union. If communism continues in Russia for another generation, we may expect social mobility to decline there at a rapid rate because of other conditions there that are undemocratic.

HIGH LEVEL OF PERSONAL DISCONTENT

Intense social competition has its effects on the personality and is related to our fifth criterion of democracy, the high level of personal discontent. A kind of rootlessness is common in democratic societies. Making one's own way in society, rather than depending upon the position one has inherited, is likely to cause tension and anxiety. One often seems to be passing through life on a steep and narrow path between the pinnacle of social success and the abyss of social failure. There is a constant and direct pressure on the individual in a democratic society to "improve" himself, to "educate" himself, to acquire new wants.

In addition to these direct effects of the relatively classless society on the individual, a general sense of insecurity, com-

ing from the whole political organization of the society, is likely to affect many individuals. Practically no institution or belief in the society is beyond attack; the comfortable sense of knowing exactly what to believe and how to act, which exists in a totalitarian society or a purely conservative society, is absent for the most part in a democracy. Sometimes the condition of rootlessness may be transformed into a moral principle, as in America, where a great many teachers believe their mission is to "shock" their students by adopting a belief-shattering position; this is called "stirring them up" or "making them think" and is based on the somewhat unreliable theory that anxiety is the parent of intelligence. The theory is not too reliable, because over-anxiety is the sire of irrationality.

Still, it is true that a certain complexity of mind and character is necessary if a person is to dwell in sympathy with democracy. Greater understanding, passive if not active, is required of a democratic citizen than of the citizen or subject of a nondemocratic state. At the same time, democratic politics with its multiple and contradictory beliefs and its changing institutions and officers demands a sturdiness of mind not required in other societies. The problem thus emerges of obtaining at the same time a higher intellectual average and a lower anxiety threshold among democratic citizens. Educating with this problem; nevertheless there is a widespread appreciation of its significance. expressed directly or indirectly in hundreds of books and lectures by commentators such as Dewey, Harold D. Lasswell, T. S. Eliot, Elton Mayo, Sebastian de Grazia, and Nevitt Sanford. Needless to say, the problem is part of the everyday work and writings of hundreds of educational psychologists in America.

UNDERVALUATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS

An undervaluation of leadership is our sixth condition of democracies. Leaders of democracies have always complained that they are not listened to, they are not followed, they are not credited with intelligence, and they are not trusted. They might quote with some bitterness the witticism that "a statesman is a dead politician." A large part of the public, on the other hand, assails the alleged double-dealing, hypocrisy,

demagoguery, and incompetence of their leaders. Because of this condition, as well as others, democracy presents a spectacle that is often held in contempt by foreign societies and even by many of its own people. The derision with which the politics of a democracy are received abroad is only exceeded by the laughter constantly accorded them at home. Yet it is probable that this condition is an inescapable one; a democracy in which the political leadership is regarded with profound respect, is harkened to, and is obeyed with great confidence is unthinkable.

Whether this condition is a grave weakness or indirectly a source of some greater strength depends on the circumstances in a particular case; in some ways it causes errors and defeats; in others it prevents blunders and disasters. Such a discussion is not the task of this section, but we may indicate that here too, as with personal discontent, there often arises a competition for influence between two subfactors in a general criterion of democracy. Is the decline in morale, occasioned by mutual recriminations, of greater effect and importance than the exaggerations in thought and action committed by leaders that are insensitive to public opinion?

EMPHASIS ON EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC MEASURES

Our seventh condition of the democratic way of life is the emphasis on education and economic measures as instruments of authority and the diminished belief in, or use of, force. The tendency of a democratic government is to exhaust psychological and economic pressures before resorting to force to carry out its policies. Punishment by "re-education" and economic deprivations is favored over corporal punishment.

This reluctance to use force where force may be used legitimately is another occasion for the critics of democracy, inside and outside the country, to cry that democracy is weak. To such men it appears that force ought to be invoked whenever the government is obviously "right" and wherever force is likely to be "efficient." But these words "right" and "efficient" are deceptive. The government may have such a "right" in one sense, since it is empowered to use force. But a large part of the population may be against force and may dislike its use even where it would bring prompt and "efficient" results. Breaking an illegal strike by force may be "efficient," then, only in the sense that the strike will be broken; to the strikers

and to a good part of the population, strikebreaking is not "efficient" because no act is efficient that violates their expectations of what the government ought to do in such circumstances. This part of the people put force down as a technique of last resort and are badly disappointed when the government reverses the order of expectations by skipping persuasion and economic measures and moving directly into the use of force. The illegal strike of railroad yard workers in the United States in the weeks before Christmas, 1950, illustrates perfectly these points. The government could legally have employed force. Instead, speeding up the usual process, because war shipments to Korea and Christmas shipments were being held up, the government pushed its intervention for an economic settlement and privately and publicly exhorted the workers "to do their patriotic duty." The strikers returned to work, as could have been expected, just before force was due to be employed.

Other consequences of a more fundamental sort follow the affinity of democracies for education and propaganda. The naked use of force and economic pressures leave little room for scientific thought to develop. A society that seeks peaceful psychological adjustments of human relations may invite the most absurd waste of time and energy in propaganda; but it does keep the door to factual investigation open. It allows man to introduce some rational demonstration into political conflict; and if rational demonstration may stifle or settle conflict to everyone's satisfaction, this condition of a democracy seems important. Democratic societies, through their emphasis on discussion, can maximize whatever abilities men may have to find and achieve common aims. Even though most citizens of democracy may be incapable of using, or unwilling to use, the delicate instruments of communications for anything but the mastery or destruction of their fellows, yet, once engrossed in the democratic process, they must be subjected to at least some element of scientific or rational communication.

IS DEMOCRACY ULTIMATELY DEPENDENT ON WELL-BEING?

The seven criteria of the social setting of democracy have been described and several absentees may be noted. The first absentee is a systematic set of beliefs adhered to by all; we have already explained why we do not consider it among the most important criteria and we shall have more to say about

it later on in the chapter. Also absent are the many criteria of any social order—as we have described them throughout this book—the community, the public, politists, leaders, “good” men, “bad” men, government functions, legislatures, political parties, courts, and so on. These criteria are not unique to democracies. Therefore they will not help us discriminate between democratic and undemocratic societies.

But one criterion, often employed by writers, deserves special attention; that is the criterion of economic well-being. It is asserted frequently that unless a country is well-to-do, it cannot afford to be democratic. That is, it cannot be poor and at the same time support our seven conditions of democracy. This theory depends on the theory of economic determinism, which in its most strict and proper sense says that the struggle for bare subsistence will influence politics.

To take an example of this theory at work, we may inquire what happens when a country has a great excess of population to the extent that some of its people are starving at all times. Overpopulation in proportion to available resources causes great insecurity, physical and psychological, among the people of a country. These conditions may affect adversely several of the conditions for democracy in the following ways. The intended beneficial results of free speech and free action are deprived of meaning. Hopelessness about uplifting the mass of people occurs. The complex institutions of democratic government appear a useless luxury to people who are obsessed with their basic needs. Social mobility is reduced as the masses go hungry and a privileged few live in social isolation. The level of personal anxiety is increased far beyond the normal level. The dislike of politicians reaches hysterical proportions. And, finally, accumulated anxieties and hatreds are vented on domestic and foreign enemies with force and violence. In other words, economic distress of wide scope and deep impact tends to disable the conditions of democracy all along the line. Undemocratic conditions begin to be substituted for democratic ones. Ultimately the whole structure of democracy may collapse. That these events occur cannot be denied.

Does this lengthy illustration of how national poverty affects democracy mean that the seven conditions of democracy are ultimately determined by the *subsistence* level of economic well-being? In a broad and indirect sense, yes.

For our purposes here, however, in telling how to identify

a democracy, poverty and wealth will not discriminate ordinarily between despotisms and democracies. The poor Scots of the sixteenth century were as democratic as the wealthier English. The poor American frontiersmen were more democratic than the wealthier Americans of the Eastern seaboard. The French under the democratic Third Republic were poorer than the Germans under the Kaiser. *It would therefore be imprudent to assert that anything but the most extreme poverty prohibits a democratic society.* A dish of hot oatmeal is enough to start a democrat on his way. Thereafter, increases in material wants are combinations of economic, political, and social motives that occur under any form of government.

Economic determinism is most clearly and convincingly at work when severe and widespread economic distress afflicts a community. So-called "economic determinants," as the Marxists habitually use the phrase, most often include not only economic motives, but also motives of social status, if they are ends, and of the struggle for power, if they are means. In these respects, the theory of economic determinism might be better understood as "the theory of invidious comparisons." Thus, the fight for gold or the ambitious drive to own status or more power in the community relative to the other members of the community. It is a mistake to accept the verbal rationalization that one strives for status or power only in order to have champagne and breast of guinea hen under glass on the table. It would seem that we have here a "social determinant (status)" and a "political determinant proper (power)" that are at least as influential as the pure economic determinant in molding the form of any society. And, in fact, if one re-examines the seven conditions of democracy described above, one will find these motives more actively displayed than the economic. In any event, all these motives are found in all societies. Only in impoverished and wretched societies, does economic need determine that democracy cannot exist.

We conclude, then, that for the purpose of identifying the democratic condition of life we need not go beyond the second-level symptoms incorporated in the seven stated conditions. If we go too far into the levels of causality, we should have a massive job of tracing the infinite roots of

society. They would ramify intricately through human motives of all kinds. That task is certainly an important one, and our chapters on political behavior have been dedicated in part to it.

The Four Moral Positions in Democracy

THE FOUR MORAL POSITIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION

Thus far, this chapter has made two chief points. The first was that no clear agreement on what is good or what is true can be found among writers or men at large. The second point was that several criteria can nevertheless be employed to distinguish societies that are democratic from societies that are not. We will now see whether we can abstract from the mass of thoughts and actions relevant to the subject of democracy one or more consistent viewpoints.

It seems that we can demonstrate that four such viewpoints exist. In exploring each of them we shall learn why there is no general agreement on a pure democratic belief-system, and why, nevertheless, each one of these moral positions is essential to the democratic condition of life. These four viewpoints or moral positions of democracy occur together, plague one another, support one another. How this mysterious equilibrium of the four moral positions is attained is described in the last section of the chapter, where it is shown that democracy is an eclectic whole rather than a unified and consistent whole. *And it is this confused and contradictory combination that provides us with the theoretical interpretation of the condition of democracy described in the section just completed.*

THE TECHNIQUE OF STUDYING MORAL POSITIONS

As we venture into the theoretical task of isolating the moral positions that are expressed in thought and action, we ought to repeat a warning advanced elsewhere in this work, notably in the discussion of legitimacy, political parties, and electoral behavior. That is, that although the concepts we are about to extract are unreal they are nevertheless useful. For instance, when we talk about the "conservative" moral position of a man, we do not mean that the man is purely conservative or always conservative, and when we talk about the conservative moral position in democracy we do not mean

that there is exactly one quarter of democratic societies that is composed of purely conservative people. We have in mind rather a great number of ideas and actions that seem to have the same motivation and character (that is, *conservative*), that such ideas and actions are often concentrated in some men (*conservatives*) to the partial exclusion of opposing ideas and actions, and that the cumulative effect of these things makes the total society different (*more conservative*) from other societies.

The technique used here is somewhat akin to the theoretical technique used by a detective in hunting an unknown culprit. The detective may have a hard job ahead with few clues and an inadequate description. However he is more fortunate than we, because he is hunting a reality—an actual criminal. Our approach more closely resembles that of the bacteriologist who is studying invisible viruses. He manipulates in many ways the area in which he has reason to believe they exist and watches what happens to the things he introduces into the area. Then he constructs an "unreal" description of the viruses, which he sends off to fellow scientists elsewhere. By comparing their notes on virus areas with his he will arrive at a theory of viruses. However, his theory may conflict with that of the other scientists because the findings of all scientists do not agree and because there may be disagreements among them as to how to frame the theory. One scientist, for example, may declare that the theory of viruses should be framed in chemical terms, another may prefer biological terms. In the end, however, the findings accumulate and help enrich the theories, and the theories compete for the prize of greatest utility—utility being defined as the extent to which the theory helps out simple, and the extent to which the theory can be used to manufacture a medicine against certain kinds of viruses. Any theory of this type is "unreal," in the natural as well as in the social sciences. To a scientist the value of a theory lies in its utility. One must ask himself, therefore, in the pages to follow, whether we have a useful theory of democracy.

THESE MORAL POSITIONS UNIVERSAL, NOT ONLY DEMOCRATIC
 The four moral systems, which we are about to describe as they operate in democracies, operate in all societies. For

considerations of space and importance, however, we shall discuss the four positions principally as they function in the democratic environment. The four moral positions are the *egalitarian*, the *conservative*, the *elite*, and the *relativist*. As they function democratically, they are called: *egalitarian democracy*; *conservative democracy*; *elitist democracy*; and *relativist democracy*.

EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY

Egalitarian democracy seeks to know what people want and to give it to them. It is called egalitarian because it does not pretend to judge the goodness or badness of individual wants; *whatever* people want is good, and all men's wants are to be equally valued. The big problems of politics, according to this theory, are to find out what people want and how to get those wants expressed quickly in political policy. If this theory were carried to the extreme, egalitarian democracy would have as its goal the discovery of the wishes of some 2,000,000,000 people and of the means of realizing them all on equal terms. Furthermore, we must remember that each one of these individuals has many desires, and the desires vary in intensity and change constantly.

SCIENTIFIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE EGALITARIAN POSITION

Now obviously, posing the problem of satisfying wants in this extreme form is unjust to reality, for no man is such a fool as to try to solve such a problem, granted the desirability of the egalitarian principle. If human nature were different from what it is, something like egalitarian principles could be carried out by science. That is, if all men were alike in their nature and their wants, we could at least understand the scope of the problem and have some success in saying to what extent it might be solved. Or even if all men were by nature divided into two groups, each having one end in life and no other, then we still might conceivably define the possibilities inherent in the situation, preparatory to applying the egalitarian solution of satisfying each group equally. If one group were composed of men who wanted only to extend Soviet rule over the whole world, and the other were composed of men who wanted only to see the Kremlin razed to the ground, and absolutely no other end made a particle of difference to either group, then our problem of analysis would be much simplified. We could analyze the potentialities

in the situation as neatly as Dr. Neumann has depicted mathematically the complete possibilities of success for each player in a two-handed game of poker. How to explain the necessary distribution of results and satisfy the people involved would be a grave difficulty, however, for the egalitarian umpires.

About the closest that political science has come to finding a situation in which wants are simplified and hence can be interpreted with some completeness is when nationalism has run rampant, as in Nazi Germany. "Everything," Hitler scribbled once in a jail cell, "from the baby's first storybook to the last newspaper, theatre, cinema . . . will be put to this end . . . until the brain of the tiniest child is penetrated by the glowing prayer: Almighty God, bless our weapons again . . . bless our battle." And Hitler did have some success in instilling in the German people a desire for the power of the German state at home and abroad that largely superseded any other motive, although other motives were not and cannot be completely obliterated. Still, such a strong motive does permit us to analyze Nazi behavior more easily than the political behavior of a democratic society.

Another example of a simple motivation being successfully pursued is found in Machiavelli's *The Prince*. It is no coincidence that this book has long stood as a classic work in political science. For Machiavelli did something much like the process of reducing the problem we are discussing here; he assumed only one motive, the pursuit of power, and traced the way to its achievement, disregarding other conflicting motives, like the leader's desire for virtue or wealth. From his work we gain two clear conclusions: firstly, science can teach brigands as well as parsons; secondly, the simpler the value desired, the easier it is to build a science for achieving it.

But, in fact, nature is not so generous as to provide egalitarian-directed political scientists with such simple problems. The differences in the values held by human beings, and in the intensity with which they are held, are for all practical purposes infinite. Infinite difficulties face a political science that first must discover everyone's values and then calculate how they can be realized. Only by making general and imperfect categories out of a multitude of observations of human motives and behavior can we cope with the myriad human desires. The egalitarian democrats, then, must concede the minimum

necessity of working only with desires that people *generally* rather than individually have. One of the grave defects of philosophers like Paine and Rousseau was that they spoke of the generality of mankind as if individuals who composed the generality were all alike.

If they admit men are different, the egalitarians must depend on social science to an undreamed of extent. Conceivably a representative sample of the whole population of the world must be studied to obtain the world's values, and then these values must be reduced to the number of individual differences that can be legislated upon. Science must resort to modes and averages in this matter as in so many others. Modal values and average wishes must be the currency of political discourse. Legislation (and this means state intervention) is imperatively demanded because the only way the whole process of realizing egalitarian desires can be achieved is by a general statement proclaiming what must be the stipulated mode of behavior for realizing the modal value.

Yet, though the law and the science be ultra-scientific, they can never cope with the full complexity of the problem legislated upon. Every mode and average hides individual differences. And since the theory of egalitarian democracy never obtained permission to dismiss individual differences in desires, it must admit that the mode or average is a concession to practicability and will not achieve the perfect egalitarianism. And, since their individual wants will differ to a lesser or greater extent from the summary indices, most people will have to look for other ways of satisfying their desires.

MORAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE EGALITARIAN POSITION

The fact that the egalitarian position is impossible to fulfill except by using averages that most fit the population whose desires are to be followed is only one of the moral compromises egalitarians must make. In addition, the egalitarian not only must compel his supporters to accept less or more benefits than what they actually desire, but he must compel the people to accept even the solution that fits their needs exactly. This compulsion invariably introduces all the problems of political *means* to what was originally conceived of as a clear goal. That is, to compel people means domination, psychological manipulation, economic manipulation, and physical coercion in varying amounts. The choice and extent

of use of each weapon can make the policy of securing equal respect for all as disturbing morally as the pursuit of any other value. The moral position behind this policy is no easier than that involved in the pursuit of any other political value. The "voice of the people" is not only difficult to hear and interpret, but its judgments also are almost always so complex as to keep those who wish to satisfy the people in a constant moral quandary.

The "voice of the people" is likely to be a clamor for two, three, or a hundred desires that *conflict*, rather than to exist as shadings of the same desire. The politician must then decide what part of the people he wishes to follow. The "majority" has been the most popular answer to this problem. So the majority principle has come to be venerated among egalitarian spokesmen as the best index of the proper course of conduct. The majority strikes off the best mode or average; the minority must be impelled by the various political instruments to submit. Without the majority principle, or something much like it—a public opinion poll, for example—egalitarianism is lost. Yet some people will lose by the application of the majority principle, so egalitarianism is still removed from its perfect theoretical extreme, that of achieving the total collectivity of individual desires.

THE POLITICAL DEMANDS OF EGALITARIANISM

In history, the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Jefferson, and innumerable less admired and less important figures exemplify the egalitarian position in democratic thought and action. Some of its common beliefs may be enumerated. All men are declared to be born free and equal. All the rights of government come from the mass of people and may be taken back upon demand. Government should be so far as possible that of the people themselves. It should be as close to the town-meeting form of government as possible. The people are the best judge of what concerns them.

Universal suffrage is demanded by egalitarians as a means of expressing powerfully the desires of the collectivity. Frequent elections are favored. The majority principle is adhered to almost to the exclusion of other structural principles of government. All individuals should have the same power, offices should be open to all, representatives should be im-

mediately responsible to the majority.

Thomas Jefferson's definition of the term "republic" gives us a general picture of this form of thought:

Were I to assign to this term a precise and definite idea, I would say, purely and simply, it means a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority; and that every other government is more or less republican, in proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action of the citizens. Such a government is evidently restrained to very narrow limits of space and population. I doubt if it would be practicable beyond the extent of a New England township.

The first shade from this pure element, which, like that of pure vital air, cannot sustain life of itself, would be where the powers of the government, being divided, should be exercised each by representatives chosen either *pro hac vice*, or for such short terms as should render secure the duty of expressing the will of their constituents. This I should consider as the nearest approach to a pure republic, which is practicable on a large scale of county or population. And we have examples of it in some of our state constitutions, which, if not poisoned by priest-craft, would prove its excellence over all mixtures with other elements; and, with only equal doses of poison, would still be the best.

Other shades of republicanism may be found in other forms of government, where the executive, judiciary and legislative functions, and the different branches of the latter, are chosen by the people more or less directly, for longer terms of years, or for life, or made hereditary; or where there are mixtures of authorities, some dependent on, and others independent of the people. The further the departure from direct and constant control by the citizens, the less has the government of the ingredient of republicanism. . . .¹

This very important side of Thomas Jefferson, illustrated in the preceding passage, made his name renowned among

¹ Quoted, with permission, from Saul K. Padover (ed.): *Thomas Jefferson on Democracy*, pp. 39-40, Mentor Books Edition. Copyright, 1939, by D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc.

the advocates of the equality of all men. He had, however, many ideas inconsistent with these principles and often acted, as all men do, contrary to them, but, in general, he earned his fame by his persistent search for the beliefs of the masses and his endeavors to devise a scheme of government that would embody those beliefs.

CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRACY

The second moral position found in a democracy may be termed "conservative democracy." Its origins were hinted at in the previous discussion. There it was stated that science had little possibility of discovering or fulfilling mankind's many desires. While the egalitarian democrats remain optimistic in the face of this condition, the conservative democrats assume a pessimistic role. They are inclined to preserve what is desirable about their present lot and not to risk their present situation for a future one. To them it seems that there exist always far more varied and excessive wants than can possibly be satisfied. The task of government is to reduce wants, rather than to uncover and exalt them. If the people want bathtubs and books and cannot have both, they must be convinced that either baths or books are harmful.

SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF CONSERVATISM

The utility of social science, then, to the conservative, is to provide ways of repressing the exuberant growth of new desires and of eliminating demands already present among the population. Again social policy, this time conservative policy, has problems in common with social science. In many kinds of problems studied by social scientists, the solution can only be obtained if the number of demands in the situation being studied are kept to a minimum or if the number of demands are reduced. Thus the social scientist will try to limit his subject of study at any one time to one of manageable proportions—a small group rather than a large, a simple group rather than a complex one, a static situation rather than a changing situation, and so forth—all in the interests of science. But his motives are the same as those of the conservative who, in the realm of social policy, feels incompetent to handle the needs of a human group in which everyone wants a variety of things at the same time but in which social policy is too haphazard a skill to satisfy all the demands.

Both social scientists and conservatives, however, find the problem of reducing wants to manageable proportions a difficult one. It is quite a trick to stem a flood of wants or to reduce existing wants. Many features of society, completely beyond our control at the present time, contribute to an increase in wants. In consequence, they contribute also to the complexity of the total problem of satisfying wants. Social change has some of the qualities of a self-agitator: change creates demands or needs for even more change. Anyone who wishes to turn back the clock of technology encounters great resistance. Thus the Amishmen of Ohio, a conservative and tightly-knit religious sect, are strongly opposed to automobiles and similar "gadgets," but they could not force a member to use a horse and buggy when he required a car periodically to drive his ailing child to a doctor situated some distance away from his farm. In George Orwell's novel, *1984*, the conservative one-party state had to rewrite history constantly, at extravagant expense, to reconcile its people to a retrograde material standard of living.

Still, severe repression, especially when conducted in the name of some nationalistic frenzy, can reduce and stop the accumulation of wants of a people, as the experience of some European countries in this century evidences. Whole nations have to a large extent forgotten, and hardly miss, the advantages and goods of an earlier period. Nazi Germany threw all the machinery of the totalitarian state into such a campaign to reduce and concentrate the values of its people and achieved considerable success. The Germans were forced in a hundred ways to forget the abundant days before World War I and even the relative abundance of the republican period from 1919 to 1932.

CONSERVATIVE IDEA ESSENTIAL TO SCIENCE AND MORALITY

These examples have been presented to show how fundamental and universal is the conservative position. It is safe to say that anybody who has ever had experience in politics or human relations in general has had to employ the conservative idea at some point in his activities. Like the egalitarian idea, which is always present, both as a method in the study of human relations and as an ethical demand, but which is especially and predominantly present among certain men, the conservative idea must be present everywhere, but yet can

be strong and even predominant among certain men and societies.

As it enters the field of practical political issues, the conservative idea often takes the form of a demand for preserving tradition, seeking to prevent the present from divorcing itself from the past. It affirms that some of the most pressing problems of a democracy emerge from the difficulty of adjusting a society to continuous change. The conservatives look beyond the immediate satisfaction of a want and ask wearily whether this satisfaction will not produce in turn a number of new wants, few of which can be satisfied by the machinery of government.

Among the illustrious advocates of such a position are Edmund Burke, the great conservative politician and orator of eighteenth-century England, and Henry Adams of the United States. Others are Brooks Adams, Ortega y Gasset, and Roberto Michels. A number of recent psychologists, especially those inclined toward psychoanalysis, dwell on this "reactionary" method of handling the problems of democracy. Thus, William James (not at all a psychoanalytic psychologist) defines contentment as the ratio of aspirations to achievement; when aspirations got out of hand no achievement could satisfy the individual. And Erich Fromm, psychoanalytically trained, wrote a book called *Escape From Freedom*, the theme of which has to do with man's liberties outstripping his psychological capacity for using his liberties.

BURKE'S CONSERVATISM

The works of Edmund Burke paint an authentic portrait of conservatism. In one place, Burke sets up a doctrine of the "prescriptive" constitution, the government of law that is so good because it has *grown*, rather than been rashly *created*; it is the work of many generations, each one of which added something to it. He is always wary of social reform, fearing that it will aggravate the conditions that it is supposed to correct. He is suspicious of the effects of reason in overturning custom and precedent, holding true "reason" to be the proven good effects of past generations. He warns that a concession to reformers often paves the way for increasing and incessant demands for more reform, and holds that the end result of reform is naked egalitarianism ("plain French democracy," he calls it), subject to the most extreme palpitations at the slightest fever of the popular imagination.

More precisely, Burke objects to the demand that representatives be closely controlled by their constituents, maintaining that true representation is a sympathetic independence; it is often better without actual election, for "it possesses most of its advantages, and is free from many of its inconveniences; it corrects the irregularities in the literal representation, when the shifting current of human affairs, or the acting of public interests in different ways, carry it obliquely from its first line of direction." Only so much popular control and expression is desired, he declares, as will prevent the government becoming a *complete* oligarchy or a ruthless despotism.

Caution should be the watchword of policy, he believes; political plans rarely produce the effects intended. Furthermore, the analysis of political evils is often unscientific, for people demand more elections to prevent evils caused by elections; they demand equality to remedy problems caused by the demand for equality; they demand controls over representatives when they cannot show that the evils they attack are caused by the lack of controlled representatives. Thus Burke assumes a position congenial to conservative democratic thought and action—reducing, on the scientific side, the hopelessly complex welter of demands to manageable proportions, and, on the ethical side, affirming the great good of what has been attained, the great good of the *status quo*, the great good of the objectives that can be *certainly attained*.

ELITIST DEMOCRACY

In order to understand the third moral position of democracy let us suppose that, instead of concerning ourselves exclusively with what people wanted, we decided that certain things were best for them. The "best values" would be the criteria for setting up a society, and the function of social science would be to provide the means for introducing a maximum of these best values to the people for whom they are intended. Legislation would be then, as Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and others declared it ought to be, for the "common good" and the "best interests" of people, as the common good and best interests appeared to the leaders of the community. The common good might be also what people wanted, but it might be *not* so, either; the criterion is what they "ought to have."

This moral position rests on the aristocratic or elite princi-

ple, for only the smaller part of the population can be conceivably in a position to bear such beneficent principles; otherwise if everyone shared them, we would have simple egalitarianism, with all men seeing their version of the good, seeking it, and finding it.

ELITISM INESCAPABLE IN SCIENCE

Elitism, to a certain degree, like egalitarianism and conservatism, is an inescapable attitude in science. At the same time, it is a paramount desire among many men, a guiding motive in their lives. Let us see how these two things come about.

First, one may turn to the inescapable presence of elitism in science. Science must have problems for study. Problems for study are infinite in number, save as men select only certain problems as worthy of study. In this selection both the natural scientist and the social scientist are conditioned by all the influences that make up a culture. The scientist's problems are *set for him by his culture*. The solutions that emerge from his work will project and emphasize some trend of the culture already present to greater or less degree. He will be a contributor to a current. His answers will be partial (both literally a "portion" and broadly "biased") to the culture. In that sense he is expounding limited values, not purely "objective" reality. In an egalitarian society, science will tend to study problems of universal wants (but it will be forced to select modal wants); in a conservative society science will tend to study problems of minimum needs and social controls; and in an elitist or aristocratic society science will tend to study how to foster ideas and practices conforming to the predominant beliefs as to what is good *for* the society.

A PRIMITIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE FAVORS ELITISM

Other concomitants of the scientific process increase the elitism of science. A hypothesis may be both an ethical one and a factual one: that is, the scientist, in setting up his problem may study how a certain situation is developing or he may study how to bring about a future desired situation. He may be seeking, for example, what will be the distribution of wealth ten years hence, or he may be seeking how to bring about a particular desired distribution of wealth ten years hence. It is a reputable, though not completely established,

axiom of scientific method that the man who knows what he wants to learn will have a better chance of finding it out than the man who is just puttering with his data in the hope of turning something up. Similarly the man who posits specific goals is likely to come up with a formula for achieving those goals while a man who has no idea of a future desirable situation will fail to depict with any reliability any future situations at all.

HOW ELITISTS ARE FAVORED

This thought process also favors the man of few and simple objectives in politics—it is a blessing to the elitist (he who is clear about what is good for other people) and is something of a handicap to the man who would like to take into consideration not only what he himself thinks is good for others but also what other people think is good for themselves.

It has often been remarked that aristocracies have filled the pages of history. Individuals and groups of men, knowing what they wanted, have been able to achieve their goals. Men who have tried to know what everyone wanted and have endeavored to accomplish those things, tripped over their own inadequacies. So rule on behalf of the few has prospered historically because it has been more possible than rule on behalf of the many.

BUT ELITES HAVE NEVER BEEN SECURE

Of course, most of the values exalted in governments by the few have been nothing that most men would boast about; the lions and the foxes, Pareto tells us in hundreds of pages, succeeded in filling history with the triumphs of selfish violence and selfish cunning. The humanitarians and moral philosophers have been ineffectual, bogged down by their pre-occupations with the needs of others and the absence of any plausible, scientific schemes for fulfilling those needs. Furthermore, the elites of history, while pursuing their own principle, have also employed the conservative principle, consigning to the masses a minimum of food, shelter, and peace; by stupefaction from abuse and by deliberate policies, the masses learned to expect little and demand less.

But even the implacable pursuit of the elite principle guarantees nothing. Human engineering, even aimed at the

simple domination of a few, has never been fully a science. Certainly one elite can be more skillful than another. The inefficiency of the despotic Austro-Hungarian Empire pales besides the competence of the Hungarian Communists of today. The Nazis showed the Kaiser some undreamed of ways of employing social science to regiment the population. The most fanatic religious inquisitors of the reformation period might marvel at how the Russians use psychology in extracting confessions from opponents of their regime. Nevertheless, social science is still a babe in arms, no matter who is suckling it. History, as Pareto also said, is a "graveyard of aristocracies." What can be done by one group of leaders can also be done by a group of rebels. Changing conditions produce internal revolution. One ruling group is carried away and another replaces it. If the masses are apathetic at the bottom, they do not care who is at the top. So, at the top, the "law" of the jungle prevails. Attention to one's own demands or to those of a small group diverts attention from maintaining the support of other parts of the population. This causes the regime to become vulnerable and hastens its downfall.

DEMOCRATIC ELITISTS

Oligarchies, aristocracies, and elites—vast in number—have not always produced the same consequences. Many men, of elitist bent, have been concerned primarily with the well-being of the masses. They may have been convinced of the uselessness of finding out what the masses desire, because they regard the values of the chosen few as most worthwhile; they would rather know what "are" the highest ends of man and seek to create a state that might embrace them; but it is unlikely that they would be complete oligarchs or tyrants so long as their definition of the good of the whole people was something more than a rationalization of their personal wants. If Plato had been Thrasymachus, who believed "might was right," he would have written his *Republic* as Machiavelli wrote *The Prince*. But he refused to accept Thrasymachus' declarations about right being whatever the powerful said it was, and went to great pains to distribute justice in his ideal society according to what was fitting and best for each individual, from the most humble worker to the philosopher kings.

Other elitists are Aristotle, Aquinas, Calvin, the American Puritans, T. H. Green of the English idealist philosophers, and John Stuart Mill, an apostate from the egalitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. Of these thinkers, John Stuart Mill is especially interesting because, although his writings differ both in method and detail from those of Plato, he too is essentially concerned with getting the right kind of leadership, the kind that knows how to use intelligence and science to distribute the results of just legislation throughout the population. Mill's great contributions to political science developed by way of his inquiry into how governmental institutions could be based on reasoned and impartial judgment of the national interest. He was intensely concerned with the mechanics of governing according to the knowledge and ideals of an enlightened few. But the values he sought to inculcate by his methods were not the same as those springing from the egoistic assumptions about politics that fostered the ideas of Thrasymachus and Machiavelli.

RELATIVIST DEMOCRACY

The fourth moral position, commonly found in democracy, produces democrats whom we may call relativists. The relativists say that it is quite impossible to determine now or in the foreseeable future either what men want or what is good for men. Furthermore, by negative implication, they foresee no possibility of controlling the increase of demands in a culture. They are sceptics about human effort and the knowledge on which such effort is allegedly based. They are somewhat in the position of the Greek cynic, Gorgias, who claimed that nothing existed, if it did exist we could not know it, and if we knew it we could not communicate it to others. The result of true cynicism, as we observe it among the Greek Sophists or in the Venetian gentleman of Voltaire's *Candide* or among one's cynical friends, is a *disinterested tolerance in questions of values*.

RELATIVISM CONNECTED WITH A MONEY SOCIETY

A bit of history can shed light on the connection between cynical tolerance and democratic relativism. Mercantile and trading societies that depend on money have been especially productive of both cynical tolerance and democratic relativism. Money, we readily observe in our own times, "can buy

anything." It is a neutral intermediary among individuals: it serves any master; it reflects no history and promises nothing specific for the future. People of all beliefs, occupations, and statuses thrive in a society dominated by a money economy. The culture of a money society is suffused with variegated purposes and private affairs. None of these culture traits can be true to a significant extent of a society dominated by the egalitarian, conservative, or elitist principle. It is no accident that the most extreme proponents of the use of the money nexus as the only regulator of human relations were practically anarchists in their political views. Such were Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, and William Graham Sumner.

MADISON'S VIEW OF SOCIETY

The most prominent advocates of the relativist position have historically been identified with the interests of the commercial classes. Witness the view of society held by James Madison (one of the most brilliant exponents of the theory of relativist democracy):

A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government.

The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, and thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests and parties, that in the first place a majority will not be likely at the same moment to have a common interest, separate from that of the whole or of the minority; and in the second place, that in case they should have such an interest, they may not be able to unite in the pursuit of it.

Thus, the Madisonians saw the political process as a vacillating, bargaining arrangement, now giving a little here and there, but never succumbing conclusively to one faction or majority. As Madison would have it, no part of society, minor or major, can claim to know the good of the whole—democracy is an end result of conflict. In fact, Madison

comes closer than any other democratic theorist to that eclectic theory which we shall use later on to describe democracy as a whole. He falls short in two respects: first, he tends towards elitism and sometimes tries to declare what is absolutely good for the country—something his theory of factionalism would contradict; second, he does not realize the *essential* role of conservative, elitist, and egalitarian beliefs in making up the total democratic equilibrium, because he believes democracy could exist without “fanaticism,” without people who are sure of their convictions.

Holding that society is composed of diverse and conflicting elements and that men seek their own interests (the political version of Adam Smith’s economic theory), the relativist position then maintains that the task of the politician is to adjust one interest or party to the others. He is a compromiser, a broker whose commission is the preservation of the peace and the public applause proceeding therefrom.

The theory seeks to cripple the majority, to render it incapable of drastic action. It approves the separation of powers. It does not consider men rational in political matters. In the words of its foremost protagonist in contemporary writing, T. V. Smith: “Legislatures are the readiest exemplars of the process of compromise. This is a humble but honorable view of the democratic process. Nothing is to be gained by not being realistic. . . . Legislation is, as William James suggested of democracy as such, a business in which you do something, then wait to see who hollers, and then relieve the hollering as best you can to see who else hollers.” Obviously, following the instructions of the constituency becomes impossible: in the first place, majorities seldom occur; in the second place, carrying out the will of the majority would destroy representative government by goading minorities to open conflict.

THE “OPEN SOCIETY” VERSUS PLANNING

In addition, to the relativists political planning on a large scale seems too risky, because political behavior is unpredictable, and because such planning implies a stability at the basis of government that is presumptuous. The facts, according to the relativists, show that politics is a flux of competition and change. Since the interests and wishes of any large number of people are imponderable, and since no elite can

judge the good of others, egalitarianism and elitism alike are impossible. That impossibility alone would make them unjust to the relativists. But they are also temperamentally averse to subjecting themselves or others to fixed beliefs.

Democracy as a Whole

VARIETIES OF DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT ARE INTERDEPENDENT

These four strains of democratic thought, when they operate in a democratic way, are in no way self-sufficient. Each leans on the others for intellectual and political sustenance. For example, thoughts very much like those of Burke have been presented by anti-democrats, pure oligarchs. But Burke himself said that his ideas must be rooted in an appreciation of the need for representing all of the people and for thinking of the future of the national interest in legislating. Jefferson's egalitarian thinking was conditioned by a delicate respect for minority rights which inclined his egalitarianism towards what we shall call the democratic complex. On the other hand, Marx wrote in isolation from the democratic complex, except that he derived from the Rousseau tradition some of the egalitarian democratic ideas. Lacking connections with democratic supports, his ideas were loosed onto the revolutionary currents of nineteenth-century Europe. The ideas of Madison and T. V. Smith, hollow vessels of tolerance by themselves, rely very strongly on filling that is provided by other democratic sources. It is notable how Italian fascist theory cited American pragmatism in its support, albeit anti-democracy when it was isolated from the plural democratic equilibrium.

And the elitist democrats speak often of responsibility—responsible power, responsible administration, and responsible leadership. They are obsessed, one might gather, with the necessity for tying the acts of the elite with the needs of the masses. It is remarkable that English Fabian Socialism, which on paper seems perhaps less egalitarian than Russian communism, appears more generally democratic than communism as it operates through the Labour Party government of England. One may surmise that the Fabians, whose egalitarian ideals were suffused by the reformist idealism of Mill and other nineteenth-century elite thinkers, grew accordingly

different from the revolutionary brand of Marxism. Egalitarian democracy, never a pure form of thought or action anywhere, was embraced in Russia by doctrines of despotism and other descendants of Czarist institutions.

DEMOCRACY AN EQUILIBRIUM COMPOSED OF CONTRADICTIONS

The delineation of these four moral positions that operate in a democracy tells us other facts, not ordinarily associated with the philosophical position of democracy. We have an inkling now of why democracy is so often thought to be a confused philosophy, even by its supporters. Democracy is, indeed, confused. It is indeterminate. It leads to all sorts of compromises, hypocrisies, and double talk, essentially because the democratic complex as a whole is based on contradictory premises and interests. It is a balance of forces, any one of which alone would tear it apart if the others were greatly weakened. It is like the atom, an equilibrium of great forces that display none of their potential destructiveness so long as they are held together. Other forms of society, based on a clearer principle, say of pure oligarchy, or of pure equality, can be more clearly understood and can produce more startling and clear results. But no one who is our kind of eclectic democrat could call such societies democracies.

APPLIED DEMOCRACY MOST DIFFICULT OF ALL SCIENCES

From this apparent confusion, which we prefer to call an equilibrium of contradictory forces, come other interesting results. Applied democracy is the most difficult of all sciences. Since no factor in the problem of value analysis, as related above, is excluded from consideration, democratic theory must consider the consequences of any particular social action to each and every value. Again we recall Machiavelli in illustrating this point. It is significant that his book, *The Prince*, is far better known than his *Discourses*. *The Prince* was political science treating primarily of the dependencies of the egocentric variable—the desire of one man for mastery of the state, for power. The *Discourses* were political science dealing with the dependencies of the several major satisfactions sought in a republic. When the number of independent but interdependent variables is increased in a complex problem, the problem is much more difficult to solve. So *The Prince* was an astonishing success at subjecting hu-

man behavior to the one independent variable of the prince's power drive, while the *Discourses* did not achieve the same success with the varied needs of the people.

DEMOCRACY AND SCIENCE INTERDEPENDENT

This vast difficulty in building a science of and for a democracy has a paradoxical effect: it stimulates science, especially social science. America today leads the world in public opinion research, attitude testing, mental measurement, and human engineering in general. More empirical work in social science has been done in America than in all the rest of the world before the twentieth century—even though the logic, purpose, meaning, and success of a good part of it may be seriously challenged. But apart from this country, we see in Athens, in the Renaissance Italian cities, in western Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries much the same flowering of social science. We may conjecture that the complex equilibrium of democracy, especially as it is preoccupied with the individual needs of masses of people, fosters the development of the scientific method in human relations. This thesis remains to be explored and developed by the historians of science, who have concerned themselves more with the origins of natural science and not enough with the origins of social science.

DEMOCRACY NOT A UNITARY WHOLE

We can conclude, if we accept the foregoing as the most likely interpretation of democracy and its effects, that in a sense democracy is a whole. It is not a unitary whole. *It is an eclectic whole composed of a complex of ideas and practices that attempt to say what people want and to give it to them, to say what is good for people and to give that to them, to restrain the tendency of unforeseen wants and effects from unbalancing the equilibrium, and to allow the various ideas free play.*

The varieties of democracy are the true foundation of a separation of powers. Polybius long ago thought that the reason for the success of the Roman Republic was its balance. This balance, he theorized, emerged from certain institutions of the Romans—Senate, consuls, and plebeian assemblies. Subsequent political scientists identified the “separation of powers” with certain institutions—bicameralism, an independent judi-

Thinking about Democracy / 337

ciary, town meetings, a separate executive branch, and so on. By our theory, the separation of powers rests on ideological conditions that are deeper than the aforesaid formal institutions. The separation of powers is an expression of the existence of an equilibrium of psychological forces, represented in the ideologies and actions of men, each force depending on the position and existence of the other forces. None would produce the same society at all, if it operated by itself.

Chapter 10

Liberty and Public Policy

DEMOCRACY, according to the theory just stated, is a social condition in which contrasting values are maintained in an equilibrium. It is an eclectic whole that does not take a definite position on any group of issues, although the component strains of democracy may take such a position. It is a *condition*, but not a *position*. This theory puts one in an awkward predicament when he is asked "What is the program of democracy?" The eclectic democrat must reply that there is *no program* of democracy. To advocate a conservative program would eliminate, for example, the influence of democrats like the relativist jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wanted to let people go to the devil in their own way. To advocate an elitist program would do an injustice to someone like Dr. George Gallup who would prefer to have his polls of what people want used as guides to what government ought to do. And so on.

Therefore, democratic society has no end save that of being an eternal equilibrium under which all four strains of democracy may continue to exist and to prosper. *There is no single view on any issue that so well suits democracy that every democrat must in principle agree with it.* (This statement is one of fact, not of ethics. Indeed this very statement itself must be bitterly opposed *as a moral principle* by strong groups in the community, if the democratic condition is to survive. For this statement must be distinguished from the *moral belief* of the relativist democrats, who would desire a society in which *everyone* believes that it takes all sorts of people to make a democracy. If everyone believed this or too many people believed this, the sense of community, the beliefs that men need to carry on a vigorous life, would wither away. If this scientific fact becomes the moral belief of the community as a whole, it will destroy the basis for the democratic operation of the community. Again we must warn ourselves not to look for our values in scientific theory.)

If democracy is a social condition, how can it act? Democ-

racy does not act. The government acts. Public officials act to carry out policies that are agreed upon, for various reasons, by a good part of those who hold to any one or a mixture of the democratic strains we have described. In this case, a variety of motives is being satisfied. The government acts also to carry out functions that one of the general democratic strains, through its sponsors, has succeeded in foisting upon the community as a whole. In this second case, there is only temporary ascendancy. These two kinds of matters form the settled objectives of the government. In addition a continuing dispute over the execution of policy occurs in the political arena. Thus, legislation to control floods in the Missouri Valley may be passed for a variety of motives and, later on, questions may arise about the efficiency of the authorized public officials in controlling floods.

All the disputed problems of democracy do not have to be solved before the government can act. Moreover the government can act in many ways without proving any component strain of democracy right or wrong. The government can carry the mails, wage a war, build dams, provide pensions, and perform a hundred other functions, choosing any one of many methods, without taking a philosophical stand on the egalitarian, elitist, conservative, or relativist position. We must be clear, however, on the point that the government is not carrying out *the* policies of democracy as an eclectic whole.

Since this book, with its eclectic theory of democracy, is not intended to provide practical advice to people of any special viewpoint to the exclusion of others, we cannot favor our elitist friends, nor our egalitarian friends, nor the others, with special formulae. They will have to work out their own methods of political action. We do, however, propose to help them all together during the balance of this book, by showing them how to think and speak clearly about liberty, rights, and public policies. Then they can examine their own personal condition and human conditions generally with respect to the character of their liberties and can recognize and evaluate the effects of political policies.

Therefore, this chapter seeks to give the practical philosopher an understanding of the nature of individual liberty and rights and of rational public policy. The climax of the political struggle occurs here. All that one knows about

political science in general, and all that one thinks the government ought to be, come together in the controversies over freedom and controls, and over the problem of making politics a rational form of human behavior.

In achieving this general objective, we will, in this chapter, undertake the following specific tasks. In the first section, we will define and describe individual liberty and rights. We will show how liberties often are changed and restrained. We will discuss collective or public policy, showing how political policies develop and relate to individual liberties, and also how the process of restraint works in and out of the process of achieving individual liberties and public policies.

Then we will analyze policy, asking: What is a "rational" policy? What private and public groups make policy? How can one determine the goals of public policy? What parts of the governmental apparatus specialize in policy making? And finally, we ask: How can the rational planning of public policy be increased?

Rights, Liberty, Restraints, and Plans

A RIGHT IS PROTECTED BY LAW

A person's right is his ability to pursue a course of behavior under the protection of the law. The law is often based on community customs. It is formally defined by legislatures, courts, and other official bodies. It is enforced by courts, executive officials, and administrative officers. Therefore the protection afforded by law to a right may spring from activities of the courts or the officials of the government. Different times and places may display different institutions that assist one's rights.

SOMETIMES COMMUNITY CUSTOMS MODIFY A RIGHT

The customs of a community may provide a liberty that is otherwise unrecognized. For example, men wanted for political crimes have often found refuge among the common people. The practice has been encountered so frequently in historical annals to warrant its mention as a guarantor of liberty alongside the courts and legislatures. Tocqueville wrote of early nineteenth-century Europe that neither monarchy nor the majority of people ruled absolutely. The executive and the community each protected certain liberties from abuse by the other.

In any constitutional state in Europe, every sort of religious and political theory may be freely preached and disseminated; for there is no country in Europe so subdued by any single authority as not to protect the man who raises his voice in the cause of truth from the consequences of his hardihood. If he is unfortunate enough to live under an absolute government, the people are often on his side; if he inhabits a free country, he can, if necessary, find a shelter behind the throne.¹

This opposition of political forces, we believe, is an important protection of liberty, despite the absence of official organs of government obligated to protect it. Still, it is best not to call an activity protected by the force of community sentiment a right, but to preserve the use of the word right only for the actual ability of a person to pursue a course of behavior under the protection of law, that is, under the protection of ethical directives enforced by public officers.

THE COURTS MORE FREQUENTLY ACT AS GUARANTORS

We know already that courts work continuously to protect the rights of individuals. We need say little more about how the courts perform this task. The subject of civil and political rights is often taught in America by means of the decisions of the Supreme Court. These decisions, protecting individuals in their opinions on heated questions, or in their unpopular agitation, or in their free worship, grant rights on the basis of constitutional law, statutory law, and judge-made law.

An overwhelming number of the world's constitutions declare the existence of a variety of rights respecting conscience, equality, free religion, a free press, free labor unions, social security, education, property, and other matters. Many of the rights contained in the written constitutions, of course, have no reference to reality; the stipulated protection is simply not to be had by any means—popular, legislative, or judicial.

Whether rights exist can be known by examining the past behavior of the public, the executive and legislative officials,

¹ Quoted, with permission, from Alexis de Tocqueville: *Democracy in America*, the Henry Reeves text as revised by Francis Bowen, further corrected and edited with introduction, editorial notes, and bibliographies by Phillips Bradley (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1945), Vol. I, p. 263.

and the courts. It would be naive to take the few words of a constitutional phrase as more than a moral affirmation of unknown strength and meaning. One has to do legal and social research, for example, before he can predict that the banning of a street meeting will be prohibited by the Supreme Court as a violation of the first amendment to the Constitution. Also, the legal doctrine of the legal omnipotence of the British Parliament does not mean that the Parliament has the right to do anything, in our usage of the word "right." Parliament is bound to act in consideration of the threat of resistances from the public and the courts, and in accord with the ingrained habits and viewpoints of its elected members.

A LIBERTY OR FREEDOM IS BROADER THAN A RIGHT


Disregarding the presence or absence of protection in law, we can also talk about the ability of people to do as they wish. This ability is defined as a liberty or freedom. Possessed of a liberty or freedom, a man will (1) visualize a desirable future situation (value) and resolve to achieve it (value-goal); (2) take means to achieve it; and, (3) be as able as any man in similar circumstances to achieve it. These are the three essential elements of liberty (see Figure 11a). A liberty that is protected by law is a right (see Figure 11b); a liberty that is pursued in defiance of law is a wrong. Liberties that are in the process of being achieved for the first time by pioneering individuals usually hover in the shadows between a right and a wrong. If they are important in effect—like free speech is—their first appearance is likely to be associated with political turmoil and even revolution.

VICTORIOUS LIBERTIES BECOME RIGHTS

Since important liberties are contested violently as they are born, they are often transformed as quickly as possible into rights, so that they may be protected and nurtured. Constitutions that spring from revolutionary periods are careful to name as rights the various liberties for which the revolutions are fought. Several important objectives of the American Revolution, among them free speech, the right to petition, and the right to assemble in public meeting, were guaranteed afterwards in the constitutions of the states and the federal government. In France, political equality, so firmly denied

under the *ancien régime*, was strongly emphasized in the Declaration of the Rights of Man. In the Soviet Constitution,

FIGURE 11
FROM LIBERTY TO PUBLIC POLICY



economic security, one of the rights for which the Russian Revolution was fought, is declared a right of the masses.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESTRAINTS

As many liberties exist as there are human wishes that may successfully be fulfilled, whether the wish is to express emotions or to establish a town library. Liberties truly begin in the cradle and end with the grave. But, as endless as the process of liberty may be, the process of restraint is as long. Restraint is the canceling or training of liberties (see Figure 11c and 11d). The canceling or training comes by way of the sanctions of the law and social intercourse, through frustration and through conscience. One may be restrained in his liberty by a deity, a leader, a partner, a brother or father, a teacher, a book, or an editorial. The law, too, systematically compels behavior and remains, therefore, a restraint upon liberty so long as there remains any consciousness among people that they are being restrained. When all feeling of restraint vanishes, there is no longer any point in calling attention to the restraint or to the law itself (in the doubtful event that such a law still exists). The new, unwitting behavior no longer presents a problem of significance to the study of liberty. The slave who does not know he is a slave is not concerned with liberty, although an outsider may, from a different point of view, demand a change in the condition of slaves.

Examining in this light the course of a man's existence, one can picture it as an endless series of liberties and restraints. In political terms, the "life" of a society is this endless series multiplied by all the members of the community.



A POLICY IS A COLLECTIVE LIBERTY

Our distinction between individual liberty and policy will perhaps be clearer if we think of a policy as a collective liberty (see Figure 12a). Any group that has a goal and can succeed in various ways in achieving it has a collective liberty or a policy. When the government has such a policy, it may be called a public or a political policy, and, since the government has the authority to carry out its policies, it does so with the legal protections of a right (see Figure 12c). Of course, a policy, which provides a goal, a course of action, and an achievement for many people, is usually carried out by a few people. As we shall see shortly, the analysis of a policy is by no means as easy as the analysis of the liberty of a single person.

RELATIONS OF PLANNING TO POLICY

The crucial aspect of a liberty or policy is the process of actualizing the goal. It is easy to visualize future heavens, but

FIGURE 12
PUBLIC POLICY AND PLANNING



the method for arriving there presents grave difficulties. Such a dream had better be called a utopia than a liberty or policy. So one should always pay the closest attention to the *means*.

A policy of "peace and plenty" sounds well to the ears but is only the beginning of a most arduous road.

The advent of science on the historical scene has given men greater visions of practical methods for solving problems than they ever had before. A man who believes firmly in "science" usually believes strongly in the possibility of "progress."

Now every policy has a method. The method may be execrable. It may be hopeless. But it is present. When it fails, of course, the liberty or the policy is not actualized. In recent times, more than ever before, men have resorted to *planning*—the attempt to employ scientific method in the execution of policy (see Figures 12b and 12c).

Political policies may plan for varying periods—a month, five years, or indefinitely. They differ widely regarding the variety of activities they may affect and how much they affect them. Plans may have a limited effect or a total effect, in the latter case bringing about a so-called "planned society"—socialist, fascist, communist, or something else yet to be invented. And plans vary greatly in the extent to which their creation reflects a maximum of rational and scientific method.

THE GENERAL RELATIONS OF LIBERTY, RESTRAINTS, POLICIES, AND PLANS

To summarize the foregoing remarks may be helpful, for their implications are important. Everyone has liberties and restraints. Every liberty involves a method, conscious or unconscious. Political policies are collective liberties. Most policies inflict restraints on some people. Only careful studies of past policies and projected policies will disclose who will probably be affected by the expected operations of the policy. Only factual studies of each policy in operation will reveal who is affected and how much he is affected. When the method of a policy is carried out with conscious attempts at a scientific method, that method may be called a plan.

It follows, furthermore, that the desire for liberty and the plan emerging from that desire may *not* produce the desired liberty—the plan may be scientific in intent but unscientific in fact. (Of course, the desired liberty may itself be impossible to obtain, but to pass such a judgment also requires scientific evidence.) Also, more than one plan may be desirable and it need not necessarily be an extensive plan.

An example, in tabular form, may aid in the comprehension of the relationships among liberty, rights, restraints, policies, and plans:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A goal is possessed 2. A liberty is predicted | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A pioneer desires to build a cabin. 2. He assumes or believes that no obstacle need intervene to prevent his building a home for his family. |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Past restraints are present liberties | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. While at one time, he saw no need for a home, now, in order to be a respected member of the community, he must provide a permanent abode for his family. He has, however, become so conditioned and convinced of the value of settling down and building a home, that what were once restraints are now regarded by him as positive liberties. |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Unconscious method | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. He builds a cabin like his father and neighbors built, employing techniques the origin of which and the meanings of which are mostly unknown to him. |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Scientific observation | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. A visiting scientist observes that certain structural principles of physics and human principles of use-value are being used well, others badly, in implementing the conscious or latent desires of the pioneer and his family. |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Conscious planning | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. A later home builder profits from newly available plans for building homes and adapts his plans to these specifications. |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Scientific observation | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Again the scientist observes that certain structural and human principles, consciously employed, are being used well, but that others are not well used in implementing the conscious or latent desires of the pioneer and his family. |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Restraints | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. The builder is restrained by the availability of certain materials only, by his personal resources, by family pressures, and by the specifications of the particular plan he chose to follow. |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. Alternative plan | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. The builder might choose a different style of construction. |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 10. New protected liberties or rights are acquired | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 10. Builder acquires a legal residence, a status as home owner, sometimes the right to vote or run for office (if a |

11. The officials organize some liberties into rights
12. A private threat to his rights
13. Protection by right is sought for the original liberty
14. One liberty prevails over another
15. An individual liberty is transformed into a collective liberty or right
16. Political or public policy results
17. The policy is only partly scientific
18. The partly scientific character of the policy takes organized protection as a right from certain desires, and allows free play to the liberties of others
19. The original liberty and right conflict with new restraints
20. New liberty evolves from old restraints
11. property qualification is demanded). He and others elect governing officials.
11. While no one may have disputed his original liberty to build, he now has additional court and legislative protection for his property holdings.
12. A tannery wishes to build a factory next to his house, reducing its value.
13. The home owner seeks to establish his liberty and right to be free of a nuisance by appealing to the courts for an injunction against the tannery.
14. The court holds the tannery is not prohibited by the common law or statutes. No right to be free of such a nuisance exists.
15. The home owner unites with others to demand zoning legislation prohibiting manufacturing industry in the community.
16. The village council reserves the area in question for residential purposes only.
17. While taking into account the desires of most members of the community for relief from industrial nuisances, the council fails to zone against another common disintegrator of property values and optimum family living, the use of residential dwellings as rooming houses.
18. Rooming-house keepers buy homes in the area for business purposes.
19. The home owner, confounded now by his involvement in the property and the property's depreciation, must either evolve a new liberty or cut down his expectations from his old one.
20. He is taken with the idea of turning his home into a rooming house and using the payments received therefrom to help build a new home in a better area.

- 21. Broader political planning is demanded
- 21. This time he examines carefully the restrictions present in his new neighborhood to see whether he will avoid all harmful possibilities.

Thus is life an endless series of liberties and restraints; it is interspersed with rights and fraught with individual and political plans that distribute and redistribute, efficiently and inefficiently, a multitude of liberties and restraints. When restraints are imposed overwhelmingly on one group, the process may be called persecution (see Figure 13). Political policies weave in and out of the fabric of existence, now clearly designed and then again confused in purpose and effect. It is useless to assign the words "democratic" or "undemocratic," or the words "bad" or "good" to the meaning of liberty, restraint, plans, or policies. Such superfluous meanings only encumber clear analysis. Water is not inherently good, inasmuch as people may sometimes drown in it or fields be flooded with it; nor is water bad, for people must have it or die of thirst. Such usages may be emotionally impressive, just as we are impressed with the imprecations addressed by a character of Eugene O'Neill to the "she-devil" sea, but they bode only danger for sanity and order in the

FIGURE 13
CHANGES IN RESTRAINTS AND FREEDOMS DURING A SOCIAL REVOLUTION

What 92 anti-Nazis, in their own life stories, report to have occurred to them under the Nazis. The table gives percentage of subjects reporting restriction and expansion of freedom in various spheres of activity.*

| SPHERE OF LIFE | % OF CASES REPORTING CONSTRICTION OF FREEDOM | % OF CASES REPORTING EXPANSION OF FREEDOM |
|-------------------|--|---|
| <i>Family</i> | 42 | 4 |
| <i>Friends</i> | 55 | 4 |
| <i>Occupation</i> | 84 | 2 |
| <i>Recreation</i> | 44 | 1 |
| <i>Religion</i> | 22 | 6 |
| <i>Politics</i> | 24 | 3 |

* Source: With permission, from G. W. Allport, J. S. Bruner, and E. M. Jandorf, "Personality under Social Catastrophe," p. 357 in Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray, *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).

world of fact. Depending on the values held by the one who makes the statement, our key words may be sometimes called "good" and sometimes called "bad."

Rational and Irrational Policies

DIFFERENCE HINGES ON FOREKNOWLEDGE OF CONSEQUENCES

An important problem of individual liberty and public policy is whether enough is known about the behavior affected by the liberty or policy to make them *rational*, that is, *productive of the intended effects*. Liberty and policy, therefore, are defined as rational in so far as they take into account all foreseeable things that lie between their goal and its achievement. Liberty and policy are irrational whenever their results are in any considerable part in excess of, in addition to, or insufficient to their goals, and these occurrences might have been foreseen. Where conscious scientific method is being used, a rational liberty or policy has a perfect plan and an irrational liberty or policy has an imperfect plan (see Figures 12d and e).

A liberty or policy is rational, we have said, in so far as it maximizes its foresight of consequences, irrational in so far as it is ignorant of consequences, irrational in consequences themselves may be good or bad, desirable or undesirable. Thus, if one plans a vacation to the seashore for a rest and swim, he is rational in believing that the seashore can provide both things, rational in bringing oil and umbrellas to protect himself from the burning sun that he foresees to be there, rational in knowing that a crowded beach will disturb him some of the time. He is irrational if he does not look into weather reports that predict two weeks of cold and stormy weather.

One may be irrational about both desirable and undesirable consequences. He may further be irrational about things that he might know and predict but does not know and predict, and also about things he cannot possibly know and predict—that is, it is to a degree irrational to lack complete foreknowledge of all contingencies.

Similarly, a legislature may declare that within three years there will be a power shortage in a community and order the construction of dams and new powerhouses. The legislature is rational in so far as it uses the best that science can offer

in predicting the power shortage correctly. It is rational also if it realized that the power system will drain the treasury of resources—an undesirable, but a foreseen, consequence of its policy. The legislature, however, is neither rational nor irrational if it develops that, against scientific expectations, the cost of the power system does not drain the treasury. It is just lucky.

RATIONALITY IS WITH REFERENCE TO THE DESIRES OF THE ACTOR

But now let us be clear about rationality and values. If the legislature foresees correctly that the treasury will be drained, and goes ahead anyway, because it prefers public power to financial security, it is rational. It is so, *even if a majority of people disagree*. If a commander were to sacrifice a thousand troops to win a medal, his plan would be rational if he got the medal, even though the results might be most undesirable to practically everyone. We are not entitled to call some value that we do not share irrational, except for purposes of propaganda. We can only call irrational those decisions that do not take known consequences into account.

OMNISCIENT PLANS DO NOT EXIST

It must be admitted that our use of the word “rational” makes it difficult to tell in advance whether many policies are rational. But we cannot expect lawmakers to be omniscient, that is, aware of consequences not even the greatest minds can foresee. To call a policy rational because it foresees everything that men know can happen but overlooks a great deal that is known later or is not to be known at all requires that we prove that knowledge *was* or *was not* available before calling any policy rational. We must warn ourselves *not to demand omniscience from either individual liberty or political policy in practical affairs*. Else few purposive actions would survive the gauntlet. In a world of profound mysteries, we are entitled to applaud heartily the men who are relatively rational.

The Social Organization of Policy

MANY JURISDICTIONS MAKE POLICIES

There is no single rational way of organizing human behavior to make or execute policy. Under different circumstances, men organize in different ways to create liberty and

policy. Human activities may take the form of individual liberties, the policies of business corporations, or the policies of political reformers. At other times, human activities may result in planning boards, pension plans, political movements and, finally, the formal activities of government agencies on a high level of authority.

INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY ON POLITICALLY RELEVANT MATTERS

At the height of the popularity of classical economics during the last century, it was believed widely that the most efficacious method of achieving social goals was by individual liberty. To Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, and Charles Sumner it seemed that a maximum of well-being in the population could be achieved if individuals were allowed to plan their own activities as they wished and could, without any positive direction. By the laws of unorganized human behavior, these writers thought, each man had automatically to work towards the good of the whole population. A kind of "invisible hand," wrote Adam Smith, operated to transform each man's self-interest into the general good. The effects, for example, of a man's desire for profit, would be the manufacture of a better product to outstrip his competitors. This would be a material gain for the rest of society.

True, such influences by a single individual would be imperceptible from an over-all view but just as one vote out of forty millions helps to elect a president, one slight influence helps to maintain a condition whereby the whole of society increases its material well-being. Individual abilities and the tastes of the massed individual consumers provide the conditions for a "greater," "natural" plan to work. No group policy is necessary; the state's only policy must be to protect this normal social condition.

This explanation of society has come to be called a defense of planlessness. Strictly speaking, however, it declares that, for certain material values which everyone presumably shares, individual planning is most effective. The theory argues that the conditions of political planning introduce some necessary accompaniments that may be rational (that is, foreseen) but undesirable, as well as some accompaniments that are irrational and mostly undesirable, that together far outweigh the possible rational advantages of political planning.

PRIVATE GROUP POLICY

A second mode of organization of policy holds that *private* groupings may by co-operation produce policies that possess rational advantages unknown to *public* policy. The theory is derived partly from the Smithian view, and partly from a belief in the value of voluntary social organization. A group of firms, for example, may "govern" a segment of the economy within limits. They may set wages and hours for the industry, adjust prices to their own views, and enforce fair trades practices. Or, in the noneconomic sphere, religious groups may pursue common goals co-operatively rather than under the direction of public authority. Or recreational, fraternal, and educational groups may establish the conditions for their own operations independently of a general directive from the state.

Policies of this kind have a limited influence on the behavior of the people concerned: adherence to the group policy is voluntary; the behavior that can be controlled is limited in scope; the instruments available for maintaining the organized movement are economic and social, rather than political. Thus an organization of religious groups to govern the preaching of the gospel cannot force all groups to agree; it can possibly affect the preaching but not the practice. It can only accomplish its goals by persuasion and propaganda and by successfully competing with outsiders in organizing the total number of souls available.

POLICY BY PUBLIC JURISDICTIONS

Another type of policy authority is the local jurisdiction. Towns, cities, states and mixed authorities of private and public interests furnish a variety of schemes for focusing group values on specific functional tasks. Cities and towns operate a number of industries—sewage disposal, water supply protective services, housing developments, parks, and many others. Just about everything that the federal government in America is doing was done initially by some state government. And, in many cases, state governments now perform functions once done by cities and towns. Certain electric power systems, water supply systems, port facilities, and other enterprises are controlled and operated by *mixed authorities*, in which political jurisdictions and private enterprise join. Both may furnish capital, ideas, and direction to the task at hand.

Many of these local authorities are quite intimately connected with the affected populations. Sewage disposal and water supply for example, are particular enterprises in which the goals are fairly clear, the need very general, and the means not very debatable. In certain types of activities, the interests directly concerned, although a minority of the total population of the jurisdiction, do not run into heavy opposition and public activities on their behalf are generally countenanced. The Port of New York Authority, for example, has many problems of detailed planning of facilities in the New York area, but its over-all purpose is clear. The interests involved—shippers, local officials, workers—are agreed in principle and the operations are tangible and observable.

On other matters, however, opposing values clash and the policy operates in a completely political milieu, that is, subject to struggle from beginning to end. Public housing developments in most American communities typify this kind of public policy activity.

There is little difference, indeed, between the nature of the political battle over controversial policy in such localities and in the national and international spheres of interest. Thus, the American states, after some controversy, regulated private grain elevators and erected public ones as a matter of course. Later efforts to bring the national government into the field also was the cue for a renewal of controversy over the legitimacy of such regulation by national agencies.

One reason why national rather than local governments have engaged in large-scale projects is that the *instruments* of national policy are more varied and strong than those of any other authority. The national government has access to the total resources of a community; adequate financing and information may be obtained; and the enforcement of policy is likely to be relatively unhindered by problems of competing jurisdictions and limited police power.

WHAT JURISDICTION SHALL MAKE POLICY?

It is no more than fair to say that all attempts at setting up some principle whereby policy making can be organized most efficiently in one or another type of jurisdiction have failed. This failure has occurred not only because *special interests* tend to advocate that kind of policy organization that will give them the most favorable treatment. Many neutral ob-

servers have striven for such a principle. Thus in the field of state-federal relations, certain business interests in richer states prefer leaving expensive social legislation to the states, feeling that their tax rates will be raised if the federal government assumes such functions. But more neutral bodies, such as the Council of State Governments, have been unable to extract a principle for assigning one function to the federal government and another to the states.

Perhaps the major reason for this failure to establish a principle by which policy making will be organized under one jurisdiction rather than another is the weakness of political science to foretell sufficiently the consequences, direct and indirect, of any *species* of policy organization. This same inherent complexity produces disagreement about the relative merits of assigning decisions mostly to individuals (the Adam Smith idea) or to private groups. It may well be that there is no such thing as a "general principle" for assigning policy making to various levels. Perhaps the individual merits of assigning a task like policy to a local level or a national level may vary from time to time. Similarly, with road building, at one time the localities may be assigned the task because the national government may have "too many" things to do, although at another time the national government may build roads because the localities where roads are needed for national travel are too poor to build them.

The nearest approach to such a principle is the "scope of interdependence" idea. According to this theory, the policy of maximum effectiveness can be obtained in an organization whose scope includes all persons or events directly connected with the plan. Thus a railroad that operates only within one state or a sewage system that serves only one city should be controlled respectively by that state and that city. Similarly, a transcontinental railroad ought to be governed, if it cannot be left entirely to a private group, only by the national government.

The scope of interdependence is not, however, always a clear idea. Before it can be considered appropriate to a particular situation, one must have rejected the possibilities inherent in "natural" adjustments through the medium of supply and demand. The stated idea, that is, assumes that some political plan is necessary. Some matters, like the distribution of magazines and books, occur through many individual and

mixture of motives and values to appraising the goals of a policy. He can, if he is unscrupulous or ignorant, assert that any policy is impractical by defining the terms of the goal to suit himself. For example, if one says that the negotiations in 1944 and 1945 that gave the occupation of Eastern Germany to Russia were intended to provide the United States with a predominant military position in Europe, then the means taken can easily be proved ineffective. But that would be falsifying the goals of the American representatives. In fact, military strength was only one motive; others included the desire to be friendly with the Soviet Union and the desire to end hostilities quickly and demobilize the American economy and armies. The rationality of the policy makers cannot be properly judged by ignoring their motives or imputing motives that are not present.

Another common example of this inversion of goal and plan is the kind of propaganda that says a goal is achieved no matter how far the plan has progressed. There is some reason to believe that the goals of the various four-year and five-year plans of totalitarian states have been redefined in view of what has been accomplished so as to cover the fact that the original goals were not met.

COMPLEXITY OF MOTIVES

Returning to the methods of studying goals, we should be most happy to be able to say that the face of a law gives its goals without doubt. Unfortunately this cannot be said. In the *Discourse on the Understanding of Statutes*, written during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, Egerton assures us how elusive is the intent of a statute: "So manie hedes as there were, so manie wittes; so manie statute makers, so manie minds." And we may quote two renowned latter-day legislators to show the doubts among the legislators themselves. Declared T. V. Smith: "The predicament of the legislator is that every vote is a dozen votes upon as many issues wrapped up together, tied in a verbal package, and given a single number of this bill or that. To decide what issue of the many hidden in each bill one wants to vote upon is delicate, but to make certain that the vote will be actually on that rather than upon another issue is indelicate presumption."

Paul H. Douglas, Senator from Illinois, expressed almost the same sentiments when he wrote of the roll calls of a

session of the Senate: "As the clerk called our names, those of us on the Senate floor had to answer either 'aye' or 'no.' Many times we wished an issue had never arisen. Many times the issue itself is not clear. Many times we felt that the truest answer was neither 'aye' nor 'no' but 'maybe.'"

"LEGISLATIVE WILL" A USEFUL FICTION

In most cases, the interpretation of legislative will is not complete nor accurate in details. It must remain a general interpretation. As Paul Douglas stated: "In each vote on a particular measure the Senators also vote on a general principle. Indeed, it is the operation of the general principle on their thoughts which gives a discernible unity to most of their decisions." In the case of each legislator, so to speak, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

And so also are the goals of the corporate legislature more than the sum of goals of the individual legislators. The idea that there is a "legislative will" that can be found in a law is a fiction. Also it is a *necessary* fiction. The signed bill is like a bulkhead slammed against complexity and confusion. A new start is made; *the* goal is now set.


The bulkhead, however, is defective. Almost all public bills use general terms to describe general situations and to describe general methods and general ends. In order to summarize its prescription, the bill must distort the summed-up goals. Since a summary often lacks precision and requires interpretation, this distortion may occasion controversy later on, requiring the reopening of inquiry into the original motives.

From this inescapable condition of the legislative process, we are led to conclude that *any directive put forth by many minds and any general directive put forth by a single mind will lack complete clarity, and that greater clarity can only come from the minds through which the directive filters—the administrators, judges, and the affected or interested population. We may thence conclude that the goals of policy are conditioned by all influential elements in the political process (see Figure 14). What exists as the central core of the goals of policy is a ponderable motive, a generalized and often high-powered surge in a given direction.*

PROPAGANDA STRUGGLES REGARDING GOALS

One can foresee how, under such conditions, an undiminished, though more limited, struggle will accompany the policy process. There is little possibility that goals will be so precisely drawn as to make their execution purely a question of administrative efficiency. All the forces that originally lock

FIGURE 14. THE FATE OF THE GOALS OF PUBLIC POLICY



The policy method is conditioned by the shape of the goals; its effects are conditioned by the reactions of the target population, which (1) resist and/or modify the policy method and (2) send signals to the forces that shape the goals.

in struggle over the first statement of a goal return to the struggle to interpret the goal. For example, the original and subsequent federal legislation regulating the operation of radio stations left to the Radio Commission and, later on, the Federal Communications Commission, the task of seeing that radio broadcasting was conducted according to the "public interest." The struggle among many groups to define the "public interest" has raged undiminished for twenty-five years. In general, this process of interpreting the goal continues over a long period of time—one might say until the policy is functioning smoothly—but it is really longer than that—until the policy becomes habitual behavior on the part of the affected population. In this struggle, every participant

—the legislators, the executives, the judges, the lobbyists or some other interest—proclaims his interpretation of the goal as the true one and tries to establish an atmosphere of policy administration that is congenial to his own values.

We may also observe the important fact that the clarification of the goals of policy is itself a great power. He who utters general commands but leaves their definition to others may be revered after the manner of prophets or soothsayers, but he concedes much of his power in fact to those who interpret his words and carry them out in action. The organization of policy method is a crucial phase in the achievement of policy and has an important effect on the ultimate form of the policy.

ORGANIZING THE POLICY FUNCTION WITHIN JURISDICTIONS

The policy function, be it corporative, city, or national, is not likely to be found evenly assigned to officers throughout the executive hierarchy. The goals and the methods of the policy are most likely to be set in the offices where the most important decisions are made. This would be in the legislature and in the offices of the top executives. Thus the most important policy makers in the American federal government are to be found in the congressional committees and their staffs, in the offices of the President and his cabinet members, and in the offices of several major quasi-independent regulatory agencies like the Federal Communications Commission. One finds the same situation prevailing in other countries.

LEGISLATURES INDIFFERENT TO PLANNING

Legislatures have maintained an increasingly anachronous position with respect to the "knowing" and "planning" functions of government. Blessed with the collegiate spirit, they have neglected to ask themselves whether a group of amateurs might know everything about everything until the last great day. By contrast with the executive arm of the government, they have failed conspicuously in reinforcing their judgments and prescriptions with scientific planning aids. Old remedies for a lack of omniscience are available and are used. These are the committee sessions, the committee hearings, the committee reports—all ways of adjusting goals to realities and predicting the consequences of legislative policies.

But most observers are impressed rather by the febrility of the scientific legislation movement than by its slow growth in the twentieth century. Legislative drafting aids, reference services such as those the Library of Congress provides to Congressmen, the information granted freely by pressure groups, the help afforded by administrative agencies—all of these are embryos of planning agencies present in slowly developing form as adjuncts to legislatures. Legislators, on the whole, however, are slow to appreciate the instrumentalities of social science. They tend to regard streamlined legislative techniques that employ experts on social consequences (which, after all, is another name for social scientists) like people regarded the first automobiles—with suspicion, with awe colored by fear, and with uncertainty regarding the role that the new gadgets might play in their lives.

EXECUTIVE POLICY METHODS MORE PLANNED

In the executive branch of government, the situation has been different. We find important planning agencies in every department of the federal government and in the President's office. The agencies are quite confident of their ability to draw up the blueprints of political policy. One may mention, in the United States, the defunct National Resources Planning Board that, given the assignment to evaluate national human and material resources and the means to their full realization and utilization, strove mightily to furnish a grand scheme for the total organization of the American economy. Its career, ended by Congressional opposition, left an example that was not forgotten. Many of the interests, techniques, and even personnel of that older organization may be discovered in continuing staff agencies of the executive branch. Among them are the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, and the National Security Council. On a slightly lower level in the Security Establishment alone, one finds the Research and Development Board, the Munitions Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

As we can see from their titles, most staff planning agencies are preoccupied with national defense. In matters of war, few dispute the efficacy of planning. On social and economic matters in peacetime, Congress lacks faith in over-all planning. The plans are made, nevertheless, but almost in private

chambers, one might say. The departments contain many offices devoted to long-term projects and defining future needs. The Bureau of the Budget, with a central function not to be dismissed lightly—for fiscal planning is generally agreed to have good effects—has taken under its wing the planning of the total operations of the executive branch of government. Similarly, abroad, the British Treasury has played a staff planning role of great importance, owing in part to the preferred position its historical bookkeeping function gave it.

RELATION OF STAFF PLANS TO OPERATIONS

A major problem faced by every authority in its internal planning is how to mesh plans into operations. There is likely to be great conflict between "thinking" and "acting" divisions of a department. Separating the planning into "thinking" and "acting" activities means in effect that you give to one office the right to say what must be done and how it must be done, and to another the task of doing the job. When the separation is great, the plans are developed in too general a form and operations remain anarchic. Thus the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), mentioned above, tended towards ever broader reaches of ideas and projects. The actual power-drive of the executive branch was out of touch with the NRPB plans and went ahead little concerned with them. On the other hand, when policy method is left to the operating officers it often depends on mere lunch-hour hunches, or it is molded in the heat of solving immediate operational problems.

Perhaps both these extreme situations allow one to understand better why bookkeeping agencies tend to become effective planning agencies. Their work is intimately geared to operations. By handling the detailed transactions of all the offices, agencies like the British Treasury or the American Bureau of the Budget become acquainted with the total picture of agency operations. Yet the primary focus of attention of budget and financial officers on spending and saving inclines them towards a material evaluation of all problems. "Feasible" plans then become plans whereby the least is spent, everything can be accounted for in dollars and cents, and a maximum of standardized practice and central authority is maintained.

Planning within the organized authority, therefore, is sys-

tematic and effective in proportion to both its close sympathy with operations and its everyday aloofness from operations. It is also conditioned according to the motives that form the guiding influences within the planning agency—broad if the agency is top level, broad if the agency is not preoccupied with simple accounting.

WHEN A POLICY METHOD BECOMES A PLAN

In these last few pages, we have used the word "planning" with greater frequency. It seems to have been used as a synonym for "policy method." In fact, we have used "planning" to refer to one kind of policy method. As we have talked more and more about the large-scale agencies of governments and the huge and enduring projects in which they are engaged, we have gradually slipped into the use of the word *plan*, meaning by it *the conscious application of scientific method to assist in achieving the goals of policy*.

There is no need to define the term "political planning" too tightly. The line between the method a skillful executive uses to achieve his policy and the method a special staff of administrators and engineers uses to control the development of an atomic energy center is set by degrees according to four criteria: complexity of the goal, complexity of the method, size of the task, and duration of the task. When these four factors are considerable in a policy situation, what we call a *plan* is likely to emerge—that is, a complicated end result, the requirement of different special skills, an undertaking affecting millions of people, and an enduring operation combine to give an advantage to that organization of policy method called planning.

Reviewing again these factors that precipitate planning, we find that they are present in *all modern governments*. All governments today undertake numerous and complicated functions affecting the whole population over long periods of time. We should be very much surprised, therefore, if we heard nothing about planning in political discussion. The contrary, of course, is true; political planning is a most popular topic of political argumentation. It seems, however, if we listen carefully to the debate, that there is little disagreement over the question whether policy method should incorporate planning. Almost offhand, it is granted that if government is to undertake functions of great complexity and duration,

political planning, as we use the term, should be substituted for haphazard and unscientific policy method.

The popular debate, however, has little to do with political planning versus hunch methods of carrying through policies. The real argument is whether or not the government *should or should not* undertake large-scale functions like regulating factories, operating mines and mills, or providing medical care to the whole population. We are tempted to ignore here this debate, having treated it briefly in Chapter Two and elsewhere, if it were not for one consideration. We must continue to insist that planning according to scientific methods is inevitable and necessary to maximize the rationality of public policy. This must be done as much for the benefit of those who are in favor of many government functions as for those who favor few public functions. Political planning is only partially understood when it is viewed as a way of streamlining the policy methods of government. Political planning is fully understood when it is viewed as a completely objective means of exposing the full consequences of policy. Many architects of planning today—be they executives or legislators—are like the magicians of early times, primitive scientists possessed of a few techniques and a dreadful role, unable themselves to see where their science ends and their quackery begins. This is said with malice towards no one but in an effort to emphasize the limitations of rationality in public policy today.

COMMON NEGLECT OF CONSEQUENCES IN POLICY AND PLANNING

It is rare indeed that a political policy or plan carries with it a full recognition of its political implications. A noteworthy historical exception that most countries have encountered is the attempt to keep military affairs under the control of civilians. An army is felt necessary but its potential political power is feared. Thus, although it made an exception in the case of General George C. Marshall, American law forbids a military man being chosen Secretary of Defense. But very often foresight is not part of the plan. For example, we have affirmation by the pens of writers like Robert Brady and Bruce Catton that many business leaders, faced with the inevitability of political planning, venture into the government to reconcile their own and the public interest to their own tastes,

both in peace and war. It can be said that this phenomenon was scarcely predicted in the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 but was better foreseen in the creation of the War Production Board in World War II. One also wonders, on this question of politization, how many civil service reformers realized that when they were taking appointive officeholders out of party politics, they were introducing a new kind of "administrative" politics among career officials. Or, when a new governmental function is established, how many realize that the prestige of politics tends to be enhanced and that of private business diminished?

Nor is it always foreseen how a new pattern of political planning will introduce a bureaucratic form of organization. So much is attention concentrated on the job to be done and whether it ought to be done that the inevitable machinery that follows is forgotten. No one has the remotest idea of the total impact of a given number of departments, bureaus, divisions, and positions on the economy. Rather, those who are "against bureaucracy" struggle against those who are "for bureaucracy" as if each new issue were the one that would make or destroy the social structure.

Sometimes the method used for the enforcement of public policy is deliberately inadequate. The American national minimum wages and hours legislation and civil rights legislation are only two examples of programs that were handicapped by insufficient staff and appropriations. More commonly, the goal of a policy is accompanied by a naive policy method. Wrote Thurman Arnold of the various attempts to restrain monopolies in America: "The actual result of the antitrust laws was to promote the growth of great industrial organizations by deflecting the attack on them into purely moral and ceremonial channels."

When political policy turns to the values of the people to be affected, it rarely considers the question of the varying particular demands, for the applied science of administration in its present state is secure only when it limits demands. It abhors complex or increasingly varied demands. We may illustrate how political policy in fulfilling one demand sometimes ignores equally meritorious demands. When the American federal government decided to grant money to the states for old-age assistance, aid to the blind, and aid to dependent children, most members of the government did not mean to

"deprive" poor people of ordinary relief or foresee that such would occur. Yet, because the states had to match federal funds with their own money, the states tended to allocate their resources to the programs for which they would get equivalent federal money rather than to programs that they would support entirely by themselves. This and other cases showed that federal matching grants tended to "starve" nongrant programs of the states.

Controversy over the increased productivity that may or may not be induced by political planning is often confused—which means that it is often prey to decisions by political force and propaganda, rather than by true planning in a scientific spirit. If each new policy were assessed as to the necessary frustration it inflicts on some individual liberties, the indirect effects it has on the total redistribution of social resources, the necessary sacrifice of long-run technological improvements to the policy of supplying all needs, and the negative and positive effects on the workers involved, it might be better judged as a contribution or a handicap to a society.

IMPROVED SCIENCE OF PLANNING A VITAL NEED

The conclusion one comes to, after surveying contemporary experience, is that political policy and planning tend to be most rational when their effects are most immediately perceived and most isolated from other social events. This experience indicates therefore that *political policy and planning can be rational at least to the extent of taking in to known and operating factors*. But political activity of this sort has been very rare in human history. Most existing legislation examined in the light of what might have been known and foreseen but was not so known and foreseen because of various reasons, would be judged irrational. And if society had not collapsed under this burden of irrationality, it is because mankind is very durable and tough and because irrational policies and plans, like a defective slot machine, hand lucky advantages as well as unlucky disadvantages.

As we know it today, the "planned society," in the analysis, is itself unplanned. Special parts of it are rational and faith in public planning, moves on, an inexorable kismet. The only remedy for its planlessness—in local, national, and international affairs—is, strangely enough, faith in the i

of rational planning. If a science is so good as to explain beyond cavil some of what lies in store for mankind, it can command attention to desirable alternatives. Not only restraints and regimentation, but also valuable liberties can be planned. This, to our mind, is the major justification of political science.

Bibliography

Bibliographic materials have been arranged according to chapter. However, because of considerations of space, only a few books can be mentioned. For the same reason, works which may be applicable to several chapters have been cited only once. The principles used in selecting the works cited are: importance, usefulness, readability, and availability in the library or book store. Wherever possible, paperbound books have been cited.

In addition to the bibliographic materials cited under the chapter headings the student should know that several general works contain expanded comments on many of the words and ideas of the present book. These are:

The *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*; *Encyclopaedia Britannica*; and *The Statesman's Yearbook*. On current affairs, *The New York Times*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and *U.S. News and World Report* are good sources. The annual *Index to The New York Times* enables the reader to find readily reports on any current subject in which he is interested. In searching for articles on a subject, he can go to the *International Index to Periodical Literature*. On all professional subjects of political science, one may look into Laverne Burchfield's *Guide to Materials in Political Science* (1935). Many titles appearing after the publication of Miss Burchfield's book have been listed in *The American Political Science Review* and *The American Behavioral Scientist* (after 1958) in their special sections on bibliography. *The New Dictionary of American Politics* (Barnes & Noble), by Edward C. Smith and Arnold J. Zurcher, and *The Vocabulary of Politics*, by Thomas D. Weldon (Penguin) will aid the student in understanding the terminology of political science.

CHAPTER 1

- Walter R. Agard, *What Democracy Meant to the Greeks* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1960).
Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York, Hafner Library of World Classics # 15, 1953).
Aristotle, *Aristotle's Politics and Poetics* (New York, Viking Press, Compass Books, 1957).
Aristotle, *Ethics* (tr. by J. A. K. Thomson, Baltimore, Penguin).
Ernest Barker, *Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors* (New York, Barnes & Noble, 1951).
Howard Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes, *Social Thought From Lore to Science*, 3 vols. (New York, Dover Publications).

- John Locke, *Of Civil Government*, (Chicago, Regnery).
 Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses* (New York, Random House, Modern Library College Editions).
 C. Northcote Parkinson, *Evolution of Political Thought* (New York, Viking Press, Compass Books, 1958).
 Plato, *Republic* (Jowett trans., New York, Scribner).
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Social Contract* (New York, Hafner Library of World Classics #1, 1954).
 Max Weber, *Basic Concepts in Sociology*, (New York, Citadel Press, 1961).

CHAPTER 2

- Stuart Chase, *The Proper Study of Mankind* (New York, Harper, 1956).
 John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York, Holt, 1938).
 Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950).
 Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1939).
 Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, Harvost Books).
 John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).

CHAPTER 3

- Wendell Bell, Richard Hill and Charles Wright, *Public Leadership* (San Francisco, Chandler Publications, 1961).
 Julien Benda, *Betrayal of the Intellectuals* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1955).
 Floyd Hunter, *Top Leadership, U.S.A.* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1959).
 Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (New York, Viking Press, Compass Books, 1960).
 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Communist Manifesto* (in several paperback editions).
 Kurt B. Mayer, *Class and Society* (New York, Random House, 1955).
 C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books, 1956).
 Gaetano Mosca, *Ruling Class* (New York, McGraw-Hill Paperback Series, 1939).
 Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 2 vols. (New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1960).
 W. Lloyd Warner, *Social Class in America: The Evaluation of Status* (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1960).
 William H. Whyte, Jr., *Organization Man* (New York, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957).

CHAPTER 4

- William Albig, *Modern Public Opinion* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1956).
- Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961).
- Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City* (Gloucester, Mass., P. Smith, 1959).
- John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Denver, Swallow, 1957).
- Erich Fromm, *Escape From Freedom* (New York, Rinehart, 1941).
- Paul and Percival Goodman, *Communitas* (New York, Random House, Vintage Books).
- Oscar Handlin, *Race and Nationality in American Life* (New York, Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1957).
- Floyd F. Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
- Clyde Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man* (New York, Fawcett Publications, Premier Books).
- Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, Macmillan, 1960).
- Robert MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York, Macmillan, 1948).
- Arthur E. Morgan, *Community of the Future* (New York, Community Service).
- Michael Olmstead, *Small Group* (New York, Random House, 1959).

CHAPTER 5

- Alfred de Grazia, *Public and Republic* (New York, Knopf, 1951).
- J. A. O. Larsen, *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1955).
- John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, Liberal Arts, 1958).

CHAPTER 6

- Sydney D. Bailey, *British Parliamentary Democracy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin).
- W. E. Binkley, *American Political Parties: Their Natural History* (New York, Knopf, 1958).
- Robert T. McKensie, *British Political Parties* (New York, St. Martin's, 1955).
- Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (Gloucester, Mass., P. Smith, 1960).
- Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950).
- Sigmund Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1955).

Philip Selznick, *The Organization Weapon* (New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1959).

CHAPTER 7

Oliver Garceau, *The Public Library in the Political Process* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949).

Charles M. Hardin, *The Politics of Agriculture* (New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1952).

V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1958).

Arthur Maass, *Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951).

Frank Tannenbaum, *A Philosophy of Labor* (New York, Knopf, 1951).

David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, Knopf, 1951).

CHAPTER 8

Raymond Aron, *On War* (New York, Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1959).

A. H. Buss, *The Psychology of Aggression* (New York, John Wiley, 1961).

Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (New York, Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1958).

Mahatma, K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha: Non-Violent Resistance* (New York, Schocken Books).

Frederick Gentz and Stephen Possony, *Three Revolutions* (Chicago, Regnery, Gateway Books).

Hans Kohn, *Idea of Nationalism* (New York, Macmillan, 1961).

Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How* (Gloucester, Mass., P. Smith).

Paul Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1954).

Margaret Mead, *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1961).

Paul Radin, *World of Primitive Man* (New York, Grove Press, Evergreen Books, 1960).

G. Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (New York, Collier Books, 1961).

Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942).

CHAPTER 9

Benedetto Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty* (New York, Humanities Press, 1941).

Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York, Scribners, 1944).

- J. Ortega y Gasset, *Revolt of the Masses* (New York, Norton, 1932).
- Vernon Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1930).
- Rockefeller Brothers Funds, Inc., *Power of the Democratic Idea* (New York, Doubleday, 1960).
- Adam Smith, *Selections from the Wealth of Nations* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1961).
- R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (New York, Putnam, Capricorn Books, 1961).
- Robins M. Williams, Jr., *American Society* (New York, Knopf, 1951).
- Charles R. Wright, *Mass Communication* (New York, Random House, 1959).
- Michael Young, *Rise of the Meritocracy* (Baltimore, Penguin, 1961).

CHAPTER 10

- Kenneth E. Boulding, *Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1956).
- Oliver Franks, *Central Planning and Control in War and Peace* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1947).
- F. A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1955).
- George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954).
- Milton R. Konvitz, *Fundamental Liberties of a Free People: Religion, Speech, Press, Assembly* (Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1958).
- Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1953).

Index

- Abelard, Peter, 31
Acheson, Dean, and public office, 239-40
Adams, Brooks, as conservative, 326
Adams, Henry: as conservative, 326; on corruption, 236; fears majority, 155
Adams, John: fears majority, 155
Aggression: and destructiveness, 277; unconscious motives of, 67
Agriculture: dual office-holding and, 253; in Europe, 249; and Farmers Union, 248; and functional representation, 262; major organizations of, 248-49; policies of Farm Bureau Federation, 248; as pressure group, 244-45; in U.S.S.R., 253
Air force, *see* Armed forces
Albigensian Crusade, opposes religious revolt, 288
Alexander the Great; Napoleon cites, 57; uses coercion for power, 274
Allport, Gordon W., on social revolution, 349
Almond, Gabriel: public opinion, 149
Alternative votes, 180; *see also* Elections, Majority
American Farm Bureau Federation, as lobby, 244-45
American Federation of Labor: as lobby, 244; and union cleavages, 247; craft unions of, 258
American Legion, as lobby, 244; policy of, 249
American Medical Association, as lobby, 244
American Revolution, 25; leadership of, 92; as class revolution, 286; nationality as factor in, 287; ideals of, 343
American Veterans Committee: as lobby, 244; policy of, 249
Anarchism, 39
Andrae system, *see* Proportional representation
Anglo-Saxon law: and punishment, 278; *see also* English law
d'Annunzio, Gabriele: on corporate state, 155
Antimajoritarianism, defined, 155
Apportionment, defined, 175; effect of "rotten boroughs" on, 177-78; by voluntary constituencies, 177; by functional divisions, 177; by governmental boundaries, 175-76; levellers on, 176; by official bodies, 176-77; rural areas in, 178; by territorial survey, 176
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 31; as moral philosopher, Introduction; as elitist, 331
Argentina: alien suffrage in, 165
Aristocracy, 46; and class warfare in Europe, 273; *see also* Elitism
Aristotle, 21, 26, 27, 48; as political scientist, Introduction; *Politics* as a treatise on city government, 60; descriptive method of, 69; cyclical theory of, 26; political ethics, 234; study of revolutions, 279, 286; as elitist, 331
Armed forces: and voting rights, 166; *see also* Constitutionalism, Military preparedness, Revolution, War
Arnold, Benedict, and money as influence, 235
Arnold, Thurman W.: on antitrust laws, 365
Athens: as community, 121
Augustine, St., 30; and political ethics, 234
Aurelius, Marcus, 29; and political ethics, 234
Australia: alien suffrage in, 165; compulsive voting in, 170
Australian ballot, 173
Austro-Hungarian Empire, nationality and suffrage in, 164
Authority, 17-19; relation to violence, 282; *see also* Legitimacy
Averroes, 51
Bacon, Francis, on need of training, Introduction
Bagehot, Walter: on modern tension, 125; on consensus, 126
Bakunin, Mikhail, 39
Balance of power: defined, 262; as distinguished from imperial system, 262-63; as distinguished from imperialistic system, 263-

- 64; four methods in achievement of, 264-65; historical examples of, 264-65; major aims of, 264; Morgenthau on, 265; in Munich crisis, 264; premises of politics of, 266-67; as rigid in contemporary world, 267; relation to world order, 272-73; strategy of, 265-66; theory of, 264
- Ballot: as in Massachusetts, 173; as secret, 172-73; "short," 171; as "straight ticket," 173
- Ballottage*, 180
- Balloting process: forced majorities in, 180; majority and plurality in, 179; minority representation in, 181-84
- Bar associations, as interest representation, 259, 262
- Bastiat, Claude F., 38
- Beard, Charles: as realist political scientist, 63
- Beccaria, Cesare Bonesana, *Marquis di*, 41
- Belgium: plural voting in, 167; parties in, 230; labor unions in, 248; general strikes in, 252
- Bentham, Jeremy, 27, 38, 39, 41; and majority rule, 154; as egalitarian, 322
- Bentley, A. F.: sociologist, 63
- Benton, Thomas H., on lobbies, 241
- Bible, 18
- Bicameralism: as restriction on the power of the vote, 171
- Binkley, Wilfred E.: historical treatment of American parties, 69
- Bipartisanship: after World War II, 227-28; in two-party system, 198-99
- Block voting system, 181; *see also* Majority
- Bluntschli, J. K., classifies parties, 195
- Bodin, Jean, 18, 28
- Brady, Robert: on business in government, 364
- British East India Company, and financial influence on politics, 237
- Bryce, Lord James: on American politics, 106; as realistic political scientist, 63
- Bureau of the Budget: as planning agency, 362
- Bureaucratic organization: effect on political machine of, 206; and party oligarchy, 222-24
- Burke, Edmund, 33, 46; as conservative, 326-27; defines party, 190; as leader, 112; on representation, 154, 162
- Burnham, James, 46: on de Gaulism, 212
- Business interests: central trend of, 245-46; characteristics of, 245; in Europe, 246; pressure group techniques of, 250-51
- Caesar, Julius: Mussolini cites, 57; uses coercion for power, 274; uses money for power, 239
- Calculated risk, 78
- Calhoun, John C.: on concurrent majority, 152; idea of federal union of, 266
- Calvin, John, as elitist, 331
- Cam, Helen: on medieval interest groups, 231
- Campbell, Angus, on public opinion, 149
- Cantril, Hadley: on public opinion, 149
- Carey, Henry C., on lobbies, 241
- Carlyle, Thomas, 46; "great man" theory, 82-83
- Cartel, *see* Monopoly
- Cassagnac, Adolphe de, 43
- Catholic Church, 30, 34; and corporatism, 261; as opposing Communist Party, 217; relation to Italian Democratic Party, 216-17
- Catholicism: and Democratic affiliation, 137; and majority rule, 153
- Catholics, suffrage restrictions on, 167-68
- Catton, Bruce, on business in government, 364
- Centers, Richard: studies social class, 95-96
- Chamber of Commerce of the United States: and business centralization, 246; as lobby, 245
- Chamberlain, Lawrence H.: on lobbies, 254
- Chamberlain, Neville, and appeasement, 75
- Charisma: as guiding theme of political parties, 212-14; institutionalizing of, 87-89; in political leadership, 87-88; psychological reactions resulting from, 88-90; relation to mass support, 88-89; relation to traditional authority, 88-89; as response to community anxiety, 125
- Chile, alien suffrage in, 165

- China, 91; leadership in, 91-92;
 and overlapping communities,
 177-181; status of, 275-76
- China, Jews, 27, 29
- Christian attitudes, as ideological
 movement, 259
- Christian Democratic Party of
 Italy, Giannini, 217-18; moti-
 vation in, 217-18; relation to
 Catholic Church, 217; strength
 of, 216
- Christian missionaries, political in-
 fluence of, 237
- Christianity, and pacifism, 298
- Churchill, Winston: strategy of, 78
- Citro, as a Store, 28; prosecutes
 Verres, 237
- Citizenship, and suffrage qualifi-
 cations, 168
- City states, factionalism in, 188-
 89; in Greek community, 121
- Civil conflict, and class warfare in
 Europe, 273; and nationality,
 287; social class and, 286; in
 U.S. over legitimacy, 266
- Civil disobedience: Gandhi and,
 298; as reaction to use of vio-
 lence, 298-99
- Clarke, Maude: on medieval
 representation, 160
- Class-consciousness, 43
- Code of Justinian, 52; *see also*
 Roman Empire, administrative
 system of
- Coercion: in ancient Rome, 270-
 71; battle neurosis and, 268;
 childhood training in, 269; cul-
 tural limits on use of, 300; de-
 ductive limits on use of, 300; de-
 fined, 267; destructiveness as
 aim of, 274-75; for economic
 ends, 270-71; education in, 269;
 effects and limits of, 297-301;
 Huxley on, 298; in maintenance
 of order, 274; and mob, 272; as
 naked force, 268; as occasional
 success, 300; plural motives in,
 270; power as goal of, 274; psy-
 chological effect as motive in,
 268; Quakers and, 298; relation
 to ends, 298-99; relation to non-
 violence, 298-99; relation to
 propaganda, 268; for safety and
 protection, 273-74; typical forms
 of, 277-78; as unexplained, 267;
 as used for prestige, 271-72; as
 wasteful, 301
- Cole, G. D. H., 34
- Commercial class: as advocates of
 representative government, 201;
see also Social class
- Commission on Organization
 of the Executive Branch of
 the Government: as "policy
 science," 64
- Committee for Constitutional
 Government: as lobby, 244, pub-
 lishing techniques of, 250
- Committee on Freedom of the
 Press, as "policy science," 64
- Communications, 48; as com-
 munity bond, 119
- Communist Party: "democratic
 centralism" in, 220-21; in elec-
 toral process, 174-75; in France,
 214; function of, 220-21; Lenin
 on role of, 220; membership
 and strategic location of, 218-
 20; as monopoly party, 218-20;
 as party of elite, 218-20; rela-
 tion of top governmental posts
 in U.S.S.R. and leadership posts
 in, 218-20; social composition
 of, 221-22
- Community: as communication
 network, 118; as contrasted with
 state, 117; defined, 116, 120-21
 factors affecting the cohesiveness
 of, 124-26; overlapping of, 117
 18; physical interdependence in
 117-19; public and, 120-21; rela-
 tions of consensus to, 123-24
 relation of laws to beliefs of
 121-22; relation of separatist
 to, 128-30; rights as modified by
 customs of, 340-41; sanction
 of, 119-20
- Compulsory voting: effect on
 parties, 171; experience in Au-
 stralia with, 170
- Comte, Auguste, 52
- Congress of Industrial Organiz-
 tion: as lobby, 244; Political
 Action Committee of, 252; an
 union cleavages, 247
- Congressional Record, votir
 records in, 70
- Consensus, defined, 116; Dewey
 on, 127; relation to majority
 153; relation to public opinion
 140, 148-49
- Conservatism: Burke on, 326;
 essential to science and mora-
 lity, 325; as moral position
- Democracy, 324-25
- Constituency: balloting process:
 179; defined, 175; government
 boundaries as basis of, 175;
 multi-member district, 180-84;
 proportional representation, 177
- Constitution: as protection for
 individual rights, 341

- Constitutionalism, 26; and dispersal of control, 310
- Coolidge, Calvin: leadership, 111
- Cooper, James Fenimore: fears majority, 155
- Co-operatives, in farm policy of U.S. and Europe, 249
- Corporate state, *see* Corporatism
- Corporations: in Middle Ages, 159; owners and managers in, 259-60; political skills of managers of, 260
- Corporatism: d'Annunzio on, 155-56; Fascism and, 155; in Italy, 260-61; *see also* Interest representation
- Correlation, as technique, 131 n.
- Corruption, in public office, 236-37
- Cotton, John, as theocratic leader, 91
- Council of State Governments: and federal-state relations, 355
- Coup d'etat*: compared with revolution, 278; defined, 281-82; in Italy, 282; leadership skills in, 283-84; types of, 281-82
- Craft unions, *see* Trade Unions
- Crocker, Richard, use of money, 239
- Cromwell, Oliver, 25
- Crouch, W. W., on initiative, 186
- Crowds, relation to community sentiment, 120
- Culture: as limit on the use of violence, 300; relation to community, 116-18; relation to elitist science, 328; relation to nationalism, 290-91
- Cumulative vote, 181; *see also* Minority representation
- Custom: as contributing to two-party system in U.S., 199-200; effect on political instruments of change in, 122-23; individual rights as modified by, 340-41; as limit to power of English Parliament, 122; *see also* Community, Consensus
- Dante Alighieri, 31; political ethics, 234
- Decentralization, 34; in American political parties, 201-07; *see also* Centralization
- Decision making: "concurrent" majority in, 152; two-thirds approval in, 152; unanimity in, 152; use of majority in, 151-52; veto in, 152-53; *see also* Public Policy
- Defense planning, in executive branch, 361-62
- De Gasperi, Alcide, as executive leader, 226
- de Gaulle, Charles, forms *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*, 212-14
- de Grazia, Sebastian: studies charisma, 89-90; theory of co-operation, 277
- Delegation of power: in England, 80-81; and growth of executive discretion, 108; *see also* Administration, Administrative powers, Public administration
- Democracy, 45; absence of definite program in, 338; and class theory of Aristotle, 286; concern for common people, 309; as conservative, 324; contradiction in attitudes toward, 302; as dependent on economic well-being, 314-17; as eclectic whole, 336-37; and economic motivation, 316; and education, 312; as egalitarian, 319; as elitist, 327-31; as equilibrium of contradictions, 335-37; four moral positions in, 317-34; freedom as condition of, 308-09; interdependence of science and, 336; and moral propaganda, 304-06; as more than a single set of beliefs, 302-07; as most difficult science when applied, 335-36; necessity of moral belief in, 338; and personal discontent, 311-12; and protection of rights, 340-42; relation to majority, 150-57; as relativist, 331-34; reliance on economic measures in, 313-14; and the social compact, 24-26; social and political mobility in, 310-11; social setting of, 307-17
- Democratic centralism: defined, 310
- Democratic Party, differences as seen by politicians between Republican Party and, 207-08
- de Montfort, Simon, medieval representation, 160
- Denmark: age of suffrage in, 167
- Destructiveness: aggression in, 277; birth trauma theory of, 277; displacement in, 275; frustrations in, 275; and personal guilt, 67, 275; psychoanalytic theory of, 275-77; and rationalization, 276-77; social co-operation theory of, 277
- Dewey, John, 48, 50; on healthy

- Dewey, John, *continued*
 community, 126; on modern tensions, 125
- Dewey, Thomas E., leads integrated state party, 204
- Displacements, defined, 275
- Disraeli, Benjamin, and leadership, 112
- Dominican Order, and corporation idea, 159
- Douglas, Paul H., on legislative motives, 357-58
- Droop quota, 182; *see also* Proportional representation
- Drucker, Peter, on Hitler's appeal, 89
- Dumas, Alexander the younger, quoted, 58
- Duns Scotus, 31
- Durkheim, Émile: on modern tensions, 125
- Dutch East Indies, pattern of revolt in, 287
- Economic Co-operation Administration, as war and peace policy, 293
- Economic depressions: and democracy, 314-17
- Economic determinism: as casual factor in democratic societies, 314-17; limitations on theory of, 315-17; in voting behavior, 134-35
- Economic measures: stress in democratic societies on, 313-14; *see also* Pressure groups
- Economics, 38
- Education: democratic emphasis on, 313-14; and non-voting, 168-69; as problem of democratic societies, 312; relation to use of coercion, 269; and suffrage, 165
- Edward VIII: effects of abdication of, 89; and public office, 239
- Egalitarianism: dependence on social science of, 320-22; differing values in, 319-22; Jeffersonian, 321-22; and majority principle, 321-22; moral difficulties in, 325-26; political demands of, 319; scientific difficulties in, 319-21; *see also* Majority
- Egerton, Thomas, on statutory intent, 357
- Elections: administration of, 173-74; contemporary problems of, 162-63; and cumulative vote, 181; distribution of American party strength in, 201-02; effect of social environment on, 169-70; extent of American participation in, 168-69; forced majorities in, 180; initiative, recall and referendum in, 185-86; at large, and block system, 180-81; list system, 184; majority and minority compared, 184-85; minority representation in, 180-84; in multimember district, 180-84; plural voting in, 167; proportional representation in, 181-84; role of Communist Party in, 174-75; as run-off, 180; types of ballots in, 172-73; by voluntary constituencies, 177, 181; *see also* Electorate, Suffrage, Voting behavior
- Electoral College, *see* United States of America
- Electorate: voting and nonvoting by, 168-69; *see also* Elections, Suffrage, Voting behavior
- Eliot, T. S., on class mobility, 100; on modern tensions, 125
- Elite (leadership), 45-48; elite parties, as Communist Party in U.S.S.R., 218-21; Michels on purges in, 220; principles of, 218
- Elitism: as guiding theme of political parties, 218-21; as inescapable in science, 328; insecurity of, 329-30; as moral position in democracy, 327-31; as reflected in occupations, 91-92; and theory of leadership, 83; *see also* Elite parties, Elitist democracy
- Engels, Friedrich, 42
- England: age of suffrage, 167; balloting, 184; bicameralism, 172; bi-partisan suffrage, 166; capital city and suffrage, 166; Catholic Church, 271; consensus, 140; election administration, 174; electoral system, 162; financial use of office, 237; functional representation, 177; general strikes, 252; guilds, 256; glorious Revolution, 288; indirect elections, 176-77; individual's role, 57; labor pressure tactics, 256-57; labor unions, 248; Labour Party, 208-12; leadership, 92, 112; Liberal Party, 197; majority election, 189; medieval representation, 159-60; Parliament, 122; Parliament and suffrage, opinion, 342; party and suffrage, 192; plural voting, 167; politists, 101; pressure groups, 232; pub-

- lic attitudes, 123; representation, 135; representation reform, 176; rotten boroughs, 178; sale of offices, 238; social class, 93-94; start of parties, 189-91; state and community, 117; suffrage reform, 172; suffrage restrictions, 168; trade associations, 260; trade unions, 102-03; Treasury as planning agency, 362; two-party system, 198-99; unanimity principle, 151-52; wars and revolutions, 278
- Epicurus, 27
- Equality, 38; and class warfare, 273; Levellers and, 285; *see also* Egalitarianism, Majority
- Ethics: and pressure groups, 234-35; relation to science, 307; *see also* Politics
- Europe: balloting, 184; business pressures, 246-47; class war, 273; compulsory voting, 171; conflicting loyalties, 124; election administration, 173-74; female voting, 138-39; imperialism, 271; labor unions, 248; majority rule, 152; parties and suffrage, 192; political science, 63; religious parties, 136, 214-16; sale of offices, 237-38; voting behavior, 135-36
- Executives: barriers in U.S. to party control by, 226; extent of planning by, 361-62; increasing control in party system of, 225-26
- Fabian Socialists, 44; and Labour Party, 334
- Factionalism: changing techniques of, 189; as distinguished from political parties, 189; as party-politics in ancient city-states and Middle Ages, 188-89
- Faguet, Émile, fears majority, 155
- Fairbairn, W. R. D., studies charisma, 89
- Far East: nationalistic parties in, 196
- Farm Bureau Federation: as major farm organization, 248-49
- Federalism, 34
- Finer, Herman: method of, 69
- Fletcher, Ralph and Mildred: on traditional voting, 133-34
- Force: aims of, 269-70; as instrument of authority in democratic societies, 313-14; *see also* Coercion
- Foreign policy: and Marshall Plan, 293; U.S. public opinion and, 72; *see also* Balance of power, International organization, Peace, War
- Fourier, François Marie Charles, 44
- France: administration, 94; age of suffrage in, 167; *ballottage* system, 180; bicameralism, 171-72; capital city and suffrage, 166; charismatic parties, 212; citizenship and suffrage, 165; coalition, 227-28; diverse dialects, 290; egalitarianism, 162; election administration, 174; general strikes, 252; guilds prohibited, 256; graft, 239; honor, 272; Huguenots persecuted, 271; indirect elections, 176-77; king as revolutionary symbol, 283; labor unions, 248; leadership, 92; medieval representation, 160; parties, 230; political skills, 93-94; political status, 311; political techniques of business, 251; Radical Socialist Party, 197; sale of offices, 238; syndicalism, 257; third force, 197; trade associations, 260
- Frank, Tenny, on ancient representation, 159
- Freedom of opportunity, as condition of democratic societies, 311
- Freedom of speech, as condition of democratic societies, 309
- French Huguenots, persecution of, 271
- French Revolution of 1789, 25; as class revolution, 286; ideals of, 343
- Freud, Sigmund, 50; and political behavior, 67; on destructiveness, 275-76
- Fromm Erich: on liberty, 326
- Frustration: defined, 276; and destructiveness, 276
- Functional representation: in N.I.R.A., 262; results in Europe, 261-62; Schuman Plan and, 261; in U.S., 262; in World War II, 262; *see also* Interest representation
- Gallup, George: public opinion, 149; favors popular policy, 338
- Gandhi, Mahatma: charisma of, 88; and pacifism, 298
- General Federation of Women's Clubs, as lobby, 244
- General strike, as pressure techniques, 251-52

- Gentile, Alberto, 29
 Geography: as factor in war, 59, 296; *see also* Regionalism
 George III, and use of money in politics, 235
 George V, charisma of, 89
 Germany: age of voting in, 167; charismatic parties, 212; childhood training, 269; class government, 101; class party, 194; coercion in, 273; election administration, 174; functional representation, 261; honor, 272; indirect elections, 177; Jewish persecution, 270; labor unions, 248; leadership, 112; medieval majority rule, 151; Nazi *coup d'état*, 283-84; Nazi education, 67, 93; Nazi revolution, 349; nonvoting, 168; parties, 230; political techniques of business, 251; Reichstag, 92; sale of offices, 238; strategic position, 294; suffrage restrictions, 168; trade associations, 260
 Gerrymandering: defined, 179; as majority instrument, 179
 Guild: compared with modern trade unions, 257-58; effect of commercial revolution on, 256; *see also* Trade Unions
 Guild socialism: and corporatism, 260-61; *see also* Functional representation
 Gladstone, W. E., and majority rule, 151-52
 Gligenti, Giuseppe, on Italian politics, 216-17
 Gorgias, as cynic, 331
 Gosnell, H. F., on compulsory voting, 171; on 1928 election, 137; method of, 69; on politists, 107; on popular lawmaking, 186; on traditional voting, 133
 Government: problem of popular control of, 124-27; *see also* Public policy
 Government regulation: reaction of managerial group to, 260; *see also* Government, Public policy
 Gracchi, charisma of, 88
 Grants, *see* Conditional grants, Block grants, Grants-in-aid
 Greece: citizenship and suffrage, 165; direct democracy, 159; factionalism, 188; particularism, 291-92; suffrage restrictions, 278
 war and revolutions, 278
 Green, T. H.: as elitist, 331
 Grodzins, Morton: on public opinion, 142-50
 Grotius, Hugo, 28
 Gunther, John: on political leaders, 96, 98
 Habit, as community sanction, 120
 Hamilton, Alexander: urges party organization, 191
 Hanna, Mark, organizes national party, 204
 Hannibal, uses coercion for power, 274
 Hare system, *see* Proportional representation
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 46
 Heinberg, Charles: on majority rule, 151
 Herring, Pendleton: on pressure groups, 254
 Hindu religion, and caste system, 94-95
 Hitler, Adolf: and Chamberlain, 75; charisma of, 88; educational philosophy of, 320; and "great man" theory, 83; and leadership, 112; strategy of, 78, 293
 Hobbes, Thomas, 36; urges authoritative control, 304
 Holmes, Justice Oliver Wendell: as relativist jurist, 338
 Homer, Henry leads integrated state party, 204
 House of Commons: in development of political parties, 189-91; *see also* England
 Huxley, Aldous: on violence, 299
 Ibn Khaldun, 31, 42
 Ideal-type method, 45
 Ideology: and American foreign intervention, 289; as basis for separation of powers, 336-37; conditioned by anxiety, 124-27; of four moral positions in democracy, 317-34
 Illinois, rotten boroughs in, 178
 Imperialism: economic motive in, 270-71
 India: leadership, 92; caste system, 94-95; local government, 92; Congress Party, 196-97
 Indiana ballot, as "straight-ticket" voting, 173
 Individual freedom, *see* Liberty
 Individualism, 37, 40; deviations from theory of, 257; in economic affairs, 257; Marx and, 259-60; and monopoly capitalism, 257; results of, 257
 Indonesia, nationality and suffrage, 165

- Industrial capacity, as factor in winning of war, 295-96
- Industrial Revolution: effects of, 178; union opposition to, 258
- Influence, political: business techniques in, 251; dual office holding and, 251; and interested individuals, 233-35; money and, 235-36; multiple motives in, 239-40; problems of adjustment in, 263-64; *see also* Leadership, Lobbies, Power, Pressure groups
- Initiative: defined, 185
- Interest representation: in corporation management, 259; and corporatism, 260-61; as functional, 261-62; as estates in Middle Ages, 255-56; and guilds, 256; medicine and law in, 259; in U.S., 262; *see also* Pressure groups
- International Postal Union, and ideology, 119
- Ireland: functional representation, 177; Nationalist Party, 196
- Iron law of oligarchy: organization as contributing to, 101-02; in political parties, 222-25; *see also* Michels, Roberto
- Inational policy, defined, 350-51
- Inationality: as failure to see consequences, 350-51; in public policy, 350-51
- Israel, multiparty system, 197
- Italy: age of voting in, 167; bicameralism, 172; charismatic parties, 212; childhood training, 269; Christian-Democrats, 216-18; class party, 194-95; corporatism, 260-61; diverse dialects, 290; election administration, 174; farm strikes, 253; Fascism, 93; functional representation, 177; general strikes, 251-52; labor unions, 248; leadership, 92; Mussolini *coup d'état*, 282; parties, 230; political techniques of business, 251; strategic position, 294; syndicalism, 257; trade associations, 259-60
- Jackson, Andrew: defies Supreme Court, 266; and majority omnipotence, 154
- James, William, 52; on complexity of reality, 156; on legislative compromise, 333; on self-esteem, 126, 326
- Japan: trade associations, 260
- Jefferson, Thomas: American leaders cite, 58; defines "republic," 323-24; as egalitarian, 322; and equal representation, 162; as moral philosopher, Introduction; as party organizer, 191-94; and public office, 239; respects minority, 334
- Jews: persecuted, 270-71; early suffrage restrictions, 168
- Job classification: inflexibility of, 129; in legislative control of administration, 129; purpose of, 129; and reclassification, 129-30
- Jouvenel, Bertrand de: on international conflict, 296
- Juridical defense: as condition of democratic societies, 310
- Kautilya, 51
- Key, V. O., Jr., on initiative, 186
- Khan, Genghis, quoted, 274
- Kropotkin, Peter, 39
- Labor, *see* Trade unions
- Labour Party Conference, composition of, 210-11; functions of, 210-11
- Laissez-faire*, *see* Individualism
- Laski, Harold: studies social class, 94
- Lasswell, Harold D., 36, 50; "policy science" approach of, 64; on power, 274; and psychobiographic technique, 69
- Law, 24-25, 28, 41
- Leadership, political: in American party system, 206-07; charisma in, 87-90, 212-14; and *coup d'état*, 281-83; and community anxiety, 125; defined, 82; effect of class mobility on, 100; in English Labour Party, 211; in France, 84, 212-14; functional conditions of, 110; general skills of, 90-93; "great man" theory of, 82-83; influence of followers on, 112-14, 115; and intragroup relations, 112-14; and legal profession, 91-92; motivation in, 86-87; and politists, 100-08; in prediction of violence, 279-81; psychology of, 85-90; "pure power" in, 86-87; relation to events, 83-90; relation to extension of suffrage, 172; relation to instruments of authority, 90-91; and religion, 92; in revolutionary groups, 283-84; and social class, 93-101; social forces theory of, and tendency to oligarchy, 223-24; and trade unions, 258; trait studies of, 85-

- Leadership, *continued*
 86; as undervalued in democratic societies, 312-13; in U.S.S.R., 218-22; *see also* Executives, Influence, Politists, Skills
- Leadership in great ideas, 52
- League of Women Voters: leadership of, 98; as lobby, 244; as reform lobby, 249
- Le Bon, Gustave: social psychologist, 63
- Lecky, W. E. P., on party differences, 190
- Legislation: initiative and referendum in, 183-86
- Legislatures: and "legislative will," 358-59; methods in voting in, 151-52; planning aids in, 360-61; rise of executive and decline of, 225-26
- Legitimacy: Calhoun's views on, 266; Jackson's views on, 266; relation to community beliefs, 122; relation to force and violence, 265-66; and revolution, 284
- Lenin, V. I., cites Marx, 57; on imperialism, 271
- Leveller movement, 25; on apportionment, 176
- Liberty, 37-40; as broader than right, 342-43; essential element of, 342; relation between restraints, policies, plans, and, 345-49; as subject for planning, 366; transformed into right, 342-43
- Limited vote: *see* Proportional representation
- Lincoln, Abraham: and leadership, 113
- Lindsay, A. D., on majority rule, 154
- Lippmann, Walter, 46
- Lipson, Leslie: on expanding executive power, 226
- List system: and party discipline, 185; quota for, 184; in Switzerland, 184; *see also* Proportional representation
- Lobbies: definition of, 243; determining strength of, 254; early techniques of, 241-42; effect of war and depression on, 263-64; expenditures in U.S., 244; of farm groups, 248-49; first appearance in U.S. of, 241; modern techniques of, 249-53; popular fallacies of, 254-55; and pressure groups, 241-55; principal groups in U.S., 243-45; problems of, 254; as reform groups, 249; relation to political mobility, 99; and role of lobbyist, 239-40; stereotype of, 230 in U.S., 241-46; *see also* Pressure groups
- Localism: and centralization, 76
 77; as community, 120-21; a separatism, 128-30, 134; in U.S. Congress, 203-04
- Locke, John, 25, 33; on majority as court of last resort, 154
 stresses individualism, 304
- Long, Huey, leads integrated state party, 204
- Luther, Martin, 22; and rebellion 288
- Mc Conaughty, J. B.: on leadership, 85
- Macedonia, *see* Frank, Tenny
- Machiavelli, Niccolo, 27, 35, 49
 on power, 320, 335-6
- Madison, James, 23; on relative democracy, 332-3
- Majority: alternate vote and, 180
 antimajoritarianism, 155-6; *ballotage*, 180; and block system of election, 181; Burke on, 154; and consensus, 117, 153, 154; court of last resort, 154; egalitarianism and, 321-2; as ethical imperative, 152; Leveller new order, 153; Madison on, 332-3; Medeval theory of, 153; persistence of concept, 156-7; relation to public opinion, 151; and relativist democracy, 332-3; result of principle of, 184-5; run-off elections and, 180; as technique of decision-making, 150-1; U.S. two-party system, 200-
 will of, 154
- Malaparte, Curzio: studies; *compendium*, 279
- Malapportionment, *see* Apportionment
- Malraux, André: on de Gaulle 213
- Mao Tse-tung: cites George Washington, 57
- Marsiglio di Padova, 23-4
- Marx, Karl, 42, 52; affects political science, 67; cited by Lenin 134; on economic motivation, 334-5; lacks democratic compulsion, 154; and majority omni-urges revolt, 257; and voting behavior, 134

- Marsiglio di Padova, and "prevailing part" principle, 153
- Mayer, Emile, on military leadership, 296
- Mayo, Elton, modern tensions, 125
- Medieval Europe, 31
- Method, *see* Political Science, method
- Merriam, Charles E., on politists, 107; as realistic political scientist, 63
- Mexico, suffrage restrictions, 168
- Michels, Roberto, 47-8; on business pressure, 246-7; on class mobility, 100; classifies parties, 195; as conservative, 326; on elite parties, 218, 220; on majority incompetence, 155; on means and ends, 194; on modern tensions, 125; on oligarchic influences in parties, 222-5; on oligarchy, 101-2
- Middle Ages: factionalism in, 188-9; majority theory in, 153; origin of representation in, 159-60
- Middle class, *see* Social class
- Military forces, *see* Armed forces
- Military preparedness: administration and training in, 296-7; as competitive struggle, 296-7; as factor in winning war, 296-7; and industrial mobilization, 297; universal conscription in, 297; *see also* Armed forces
- Mill, James, 38
- Mill, John Stuart, 33, 38, 40
- Mobility, political: as condition of democratic societies, 310-11; effect of educational opportunities on, 99; and extension of governmental activity, 98; influence of family on, 98-9; and marriage, 97-8; and rise of voluntary associations, 98; and wealth, 97-8; *see also* Social class, Leadership, political
- Monopoly: and cartel, 260; defined, 259; in Europe, 260; and policy-planning, 354; in U.S. capitalism, 259-60
- Morale: in Germany in World War II, 268; and physical coercion, 268, 297; *see also* Efficiency
- Morality; *see* Political morality
- Mosca, Gaetano, 46; on majority incompetence, 155; on modern tensions, 125; on regional revolutions, 287
- Motives, *see* Values, Goals, Political morality
- Munro, W. B.: on nonvoting, 170
- Mussolini, Benito, 34; charisma of, 88, 125; "great man" theory of, 83; takes risk, 78
- Myths: of "legislative will," 358; of nationalism, 290-1
- Napoleon: character of 84, 96; charisma of, 88; and French Revolution, 289; reforms of, 235; and royal marriages, 97; Tolstoi analyzes, 83; uses coercion for power, 274
- National Association of Manufacturers: as lobby, 245; and business centralization, 246
- National Industrial Recovery Administration: as functional representation, 262-3
- National interest: as public interest in policy, 359
- National Resources Planning Board: as "policy science," 64; as planning agency, 361, 362
- Nationalism, defined, 22; origins of, 22; and civil conflict, 287; and community, 119-20; components of, 289-91; and international co-operation, 291-2; myths of, 291; racial basis of, 289-91; and religion, 290-1; as theme of political parties, 196-7
- Nationalistic parties: in India, 196; in Israel, 197
- Nazi Party, *see* Germany
- Negroes: nonvoting among, 168-9; relation to class system, 95-6; restrictions on suffrage of, 164-5; voting behavior of, 138
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, and charisma, 88
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 47
- Oligarchy and bureaucracy, 222-3; Michels on 223-4; and organization psychology, 223-4; in political parties, 223-5
- Oligopoly: defined, 259; and cartels, 260
- Ortegay Gasset, José, 46; on class mobility, 100; as conservative, 326; fears majority, 155; on modern tensions, 125
- Orwell, George: on conservatism, 325
- Ostrogorski, M. L., sociologist, 63
- Pacifism: nonviolence and civil disobedience, 298-9; science and, 76, 298-9

- Purge, political: as characteristic of elite parties, 220
- Puritans: as elitists, 331
- Pythagoras, 19
- Race: and nationalism, 289-91; and suffrage, 164-5
- Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (R.P.F.): 212-4
- Rationality: in public policy, 350-1; relation to values, 351
- Rationalization: and destructiveness, 276
- Recall, defined, 185-6
- Reciprocal legislation, *see* Interstate relations
- Referendum: defined, 185
- Relativism: as contribution to anti-democratic thought, 334; as moral position in democracy, 331-4
- Religion: as guiding theme of political parties, 214-7; as influence on voting behavior, 136-7; and nationalism, 290-1; and suffrage, 167-8; and war, 287-8
- Representation: Burke on, 326-7; contemporary problem of, 162-3; defined, 158; early concept of consent in, 160; in England, 160-2; as functional, 261; in Middle Ages, 159-60; and multi-member district, 181-4; proportional, 180-4; "rotten boroughs" in, 177-8; in Senate of U.S., 178; *see also* Interest representation, Leadership, Lobbies, Pressure groups, Representative government
- Representative government, 32-5; 40; in ancient world, 159; Burke on, 162; defined, 158; devices for public control of, 185-6; in early modern world, 161-2; effects of 1932 reform bill in England, 162; Madison on, 332-3; in relativist democracy, 332-3; suffrage in early period of, 160-2; *see also* Representation
- Republic, defined by Jefferson, 323
- Republican Party: contrasted with Democratic Party, 207-08; *see also* United States of America, Political parties
- Revolution: Aristotle on, 286; class interests and, 286; and *coup d'état*, 278-86; effect of bureaucratic organization on, 288-9; group motive in, 285; historical frequency of war and, 278-9; of institutional elite, 288; leadership in, 283-4; Levellers and, 285; modern causes of, 288-9; and modern class struggle, 288-9; and nationality, 287; as organized force, 284-5; as regional conflict, 289-90; relation of stable social forces to, 284-5; and religious conflicts, 287-8; symbols used in, 284; *see also* Coercion, Violence
- Rights: courts as guarantors of, 341-2; defined, 340; as protected in constitutions, 341-2; as protected by law, 340; relation to community custom, 340-1
- Rockefeller, John D., and use of money, 236; seeks respect, 239
- Rome: childhood training, 269; factionalism, 188; lacked representation, 159; majority, 153; money and politics, 237; separation of powers, 112-3; wars and revolutions, 278, 287
- Roosevelt, Franklin D.: charisma of, 90; leadership, 111; strategy of, 78
- Roosevelt, Theodore: as leader, 265
- Roper, Elmo: polls political activity, 108
- Rotten boroughs: in England, 177-8; *see also* Apportionment
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 26; as egalitarian, 322
- Russia, *see* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Sample surveys: uses, 70, 71
- Sanctions: of community, 119-20; 122; force and violence as, 267-8
- Schuman Plan: as integrated pluralism, 261-2; as planning, 124
- Scientific method: as fostered in democracy, 336; in policy planning, 345-9; relation to values, 307; *see also* Political Science
- Separation of powers: as condition of democratic societies, 310; as equilibrium of social forces, 336-7; leadership and, 112-3; in U.S. House of Representatives, 171
- Sicily, medieval representation in, 160
- Skills, political: in China, 92; politists, 103-5; in England, 92; in France, 92; in Germany, 92; in India, 92; in Japan, 92; and role of specialists, 93-4; relation to revolution, 88, 93; *see also* Leadership, political

- Smith, Adam: attacks guilds, 256; democratic relativist, 332; urges individualism, 303
- Smith, T. V.: on complexity of legislative motives, 357; on legislative compromise, 333
- Social class, 23, 43; class consciousness in, 97; and class warfare in Europe, 273; defined, 94; as factor in European voting behavior, 135-6; and non-voting, 168-9; as statistical rather than social entity, 99-100; status characteristics of, 95-6; in U.S., 95-100
- Social compact, 25
- Social mobility, *see* Nobility, political
- Socialism: effect on political parties, 193; and local autonomy of production, 257-8; theory of leadership, 83; and women suffrage, 164
- Socialists, 44
- Sorokin, Pitirim: studies wars and revolutions, 278
- Sophists, 20, 27
- South America: balloting, 184; revolutions, 283; two-party system, 198
- Soviet Union, *see* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Spain: Civil War in, 286; Falangist Party as class Party, 194; Jews expelled, 271; medieval representation, 160; sale of offices, 238; syndicalism, 257; use of coercion for safety, 273
- Sparta: education, 67, 269; honor in, 272; majority rule known in, 151
- Spencer, Herbert, 38; as democratic relativist, 332
- Spengler, Oswald, 31
- Spinoza, Baruch (Benedict): as moral philosopher, Introduction; and political ethics, 235
- Stalin, Josef, and farm strikes, 253
- Standing armies, *see* Armed forces
- State: contrasted with community, 117; popular control of, 124-7
- Statistics: as social science tool, 71
- Stephen, Leslie: and community beliefs, 122
- Stinnes, Hugo: and pressure politics, 240
- Stodgill, Ralph M.: on leadership, 85-6
- Stoics, 28
- Stirner, Max, 39
- Suffrage: capital city and, 166; citizenship and, 165; after English reforms of 1832, 162; restrictions on, 164-8
- Sumner, William Graham, 38; as democratic relativist, 332
- Suttie, Ian, on destructiveness, 277
- Sweden: age and suffrage in, 167
- Switzerland: age and suffrage, 167; language diversity, 290; list votings, 184; multiparty system, 198; popular legislation, 186
- Syndicalism: defined, 257; *see also* Guild socialism, Interest representation
- Taxation: progressive type of, 74; and suffrage, 164; as alternative to violence, 301
- Third parties: obstacles in U.S. to, 199-200; *see also* Political parties
- Thirty Years' War: religious hostility in, 290-1
- Thompson, G. C., on public opinion, 141-50
- Tocqueville, Alexis de: on American politists, 106; on European society, 340-1; on oligarchic influences, 223
- Tolstoi, Count Leo, 39; and social forces, 83
- Totalitarian society: personal discontent in democratic and, 311-2; *see also* Government, U.S.S.R.
- Toynbee, Arnold, 31
- Trade Associations: defined, 259; *see also* Pressure groups
- Trade unions: cleavages among U.S., 247; and early guilds, 256; compared to medieval guilds, 257-260; as focus of morale, 258; policies of C.I.O. and A.F. of L. compared, 247; in political campaigns, 252; prohibition of, in early 19th century, 256; pressure tactics of, 251-2; reaction to *laissez-faire* of, 257; restrictive practices of, 258; and the general strike, 251-2; in U.S. and Europe compared, 248
- Tucker, Benjamin, 39
- Two-party system, 199-203
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: childhood training, 269; citizenship and suffrage, 165; class party, 194; communications, 118; Communist Party, 92, 218-22, 228; *coup d'état*, 279; diverse dialect, 290; election administra-

- U.S.S.R., *continued*
 tion, 174; farm strikes, 253;
 functional representation, 177;
 propaganda, 125; right of eco-
 nomic security, 343; social mo-
 bility, 311; strategic position,
 294; strategy, 295; suffrage, 165-
 8
- United Nations: and bill of rights,
 77
- United States of America: agricul-
 tural groups, 248-9; bicameral-
 ism 172; business interests, 245-
 6, 250-1, 254; class structure,
 95-100, 231; communications in,
 118; Congress, 203-04; consen-
 sus, 139; constitution, 171; edu-
 cation in, 67; election adminis-
 tration, 173-4; Electoral College,
 175; functional representation,
 177, 255, 262-3; indirect elec-
 tions, 176; leadership, 91, 103-
 08; lobbies, 241-255; money in
 politics, 235-239; national char-
 acter, 272, 313; New Deal, 93;
 nonvoting, 168-9; political party
 system, 191-2, 198-208, 226-9;
 political science in, 60, 63; poli-
 ticians' occupations, 106-08;
 politics, 69; politist, 106-08, 233-
 40; poll tax, 164; public policy,
 268; racial discrimination, 164-
 5; Senate, 178; Supreme Court,
 164, 171; traditionalism, 132-4;
 treaties, 151-2; Vice-Presidency,
 79; *see also* Executives, Federal-
 ism, Legislatures, Lobbies, Po-
 litical Parties, President, Pressure
 Groups, Representation, States,
 Suffrage, Voting behavior
- Values, 53-4; and action, 79; and
 coercion, 299; basic question of,
 in democracy, 303-307; and eco-
 nomic determinism, 316; in elec-
 tive systems, 184; and facts, 74-
 7; and pecuniary gain, 184; and
 pressure groups, 230, 234; and
 rationality, 351; and scientific
 method, 307; and social class,
 94; and social motivation in
 egalitarian position, 319-322; *see*
also Political morality, Political
 science, Public policy
- Vedas, 51
- Venice: navy and financial use of
 office, 237
- Veterans organizations, as pressure
 groups, 249
- Veto power: and legislatures, 151-
 2; of President, 152
- Vico, G. B., 18
- Violence: in *coups d'état*, 278-86;
 as expedient, 300-01; and mili-
 tary preparedness, 296-7; and
 nationality, 287; *see also* *Coup*
d'état, Coercion, Force, War
- Vittoria, Francisco de, 28
- Voting behavior: bicameralism
 and, 171; effect of economic
 forces on, 134-5; in Europe,
 135-6; localism and, 134; Marx-
 ian interpretation of, 134-5; na-
 tionality, race, and, 138; in non-
 voting, 168-71; of Negro, 138;
 participation factors affecting,
 170; in popular legislation, 185-
 6; religion and, 136-7; self-inter-
 est, 233; example of technique
 in study of, 130-2; and tradi-
 tion, 130-4; of women, 138-9
- Wallas, Graham: social psycholo-
 gist, 63
- War: causes of, 59, 292; advan-
 tages of despotic governments
 in, 294; and relation of domestic
 and international events, 289;
 and economic motives, 270-1;
 historical frequency of revolu-
 tion and, 278-9; as instrument
 of policy, 292-3, 300; as inter-
 national conflict, 289; interna-
 tional co-operation and, 291-2;
 factors in precipitation of, 293;
 and prestige, 272; as regional
 conflict, 287; and religion, 287-
 8; and revolution, 289; of social
 classes, 273
- Warner, Lloyd: on social class,
 95, 98-9
- Washington, George: opposes par-
 ties: 191
- Webb, Sydney and Beatrice, 44;
 on oligarchy, 103-04
- Weber, Max, 45; on charisma, 87;
 describes party, 194; on major-
 ity incompetence, 155; on mod-
 ern tensions, 125
- Whig Revolution of 1688, 25
- White, Leonard D.: on expanding
 executive power, 226
- Wilson, Woodrow: as practicing
 political scientist, 57; as realist,
 63
- Woodward, J. L., polls political
 activity, 108
- World Order: fraternity and law,
 28-9
- Wright, Quincy: studies wars and
 revolutions, 278
- Zeno of Citium, 28

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDY

Acc. No. 18188

Author:

Ganga, Alfred de

Title:

Political behaviour

| Borrower | Issued | Return |
|-----------------|---------|--------|
| Dr. E. M. S. Q. | 14-4-67 | 9 |
| Sh. Padam Singh | 6-11-74 | |

