



DISCUSSION BOOKS

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PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
RELIGIOUS QUEST

No. 23

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PSYCHOLOGY AND THE RELIGIOUS QUEST

AN ACCOUNT OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION
AND A DEFENCE OF INDIVIDUALISM


by

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THOMAS NELSON AND SONS LTD
LONDON EDINBURGH PARIS MELBOURNE
TORONTO AND NEW YORK



First published, Autumn 1938

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00012432

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TO
WILLIAM McDOUGALL, F.R.S.

FOREWORD

It is with a sense of attempting the impossible that I have set out to deal with so great a theme as the present one in so small a book and with such incomplete equipment as the knowledge of a clinical and social psychologist provides. As the following pages will, I trust, convince the reader, an adequate study of the religious consciousness and its proper rôle in man's adventure through the universe needs to be undertaken by great research institutions, staffed by the ablest scientists, and with fingers on the pulse of every social, economic, and cultural movement that is capable of being recorded.

This book is neither a handbook of practical religious psychology, nor an analysis of psychological methods of developing religious sentiments in the traditional moulds. It attempts a brief but fundamental analysis of social and personal religious motivations, and discusses their truth and usefulness in adjusting man to his universe. In addition to the reviewing of current psychological notions concerning religion some new conceptions are presented, which I have thought fit to label with new names. Obviously these pages can offer no more than a presumptive outline of the entities requiring delineation by research. At the risk of being called unscientific I have preferred to work with these new ideas for the time being in the rough, postponing definition by rule and line, delimiting by implication. At the end of each chapter a short bibliography is added for those who wish to examine certain points in more detail; but for Chapters XIII. to XVI. a bibliography is not possible without reference to scientific journals. Purely "philosophical" questions have been avoided, for, as I have pointed out more fully elsewhere, those philosophical questions which are not scientific are largely beyond our present powers of reasoning.¹

¹ *Psychology and Social Progress*. London, 1933.

FOREWORD

Because I have pounced somewhat sharply on the errors—grave errors—which I believe to have been made by such rationalists as Freud and Bertrand Russell, it is not to be thought that I lack admiration for their works as a whole, and for the determination and success with which they have dispelled by the light of reason many stubborn religious superstitions. Their errors are more illuminating than many religious truisms.

Although the following chapters proceed as logically as possible, the method of advancing by discovery and discussion results in some of the same issues being encountered in several chapters, from a different angle in each. The index should come to the rescue of readers who wish to follow faithfully a single issue.

In an age when print gets bigger as ideas get smaller, and when, to judge by the more popular magazines, most adults have reverted to the picture books of infancy, I feel inclined to apologize for writing in a manner which, as one graduate reader of the manuscript complained, "requires constant thought." If the style could have been more easy without increasing the length of the book or diminishing its accuracy, I should have liked to have made it so. For this and other defects, in so far as it was possible for me to remedy them in this little book, I plead indulgence on the score that I was compelled to write within a stone's throw of that strenuously noisy little hysteria which is Broadway, when I would fain have written of "God in gardens when the eve is cool." What is even more regrettable is that many of my readers will also have to think on the subject when keyed to the tempo of this world's Broadways.

In conclusion, I want to thank an eminent theologian who discussed certain themes with me and promised, on seeing the early chapters, to write me a foreword from the standpoint of the Church. Although he gallantly persisted in this intention despite the alarming trend of the later chapters, I have thought it best to release him from a promise which obviously meant his accompanying me to perdition.

R. B. CATTELL.

New York, 1938.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE RELIGIOUS QUEST

CHAPTER I

THE CULTURAL DUEL OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

CULTURALLY we live in momentous times. We are the spectators in the closing scenes of a long and devastating war between science and religion. Perhaps that statement fails to convey the whole truth, for cultural conflicts are creative as well as desolating; and there are no pure spectators, not even among the imbeciles. All are in some way affected, and whether we are fighting a bitter rearguard action on behalf of religion, or triumphing with the invading armies of science, exasperated, nevertheless by seemingly senseless obstruction, it is part of our lives and the most important social adventure in the modern world.

A synopsis of the events that have led up to the present state of affairs would most fittingly begin four hundred years ago with the insurrection of Renaissance culture against a strongly systematized theology, enthroned amidst philosophical prestige and vested with political power. In a less vital sense the antagonism is older, and seekers after ultimate roots would need to go back to Greek civilization, or even to the rivalry of magic and animism among primitives.

Most historians of the early phases of the struggle are prone to dwell upon the seemingly unprovoked ferocity

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with which ecclesiastical authority began stamping out the first sparks of intellectual insurrection. But in view of the subsequent events, one marvels rather at the penetrating intuition which enabled the Church to recognize at once, even in its innocent infancy, the serpent fanged with a potent wisdom which would poison all that the religious life found worth while. For the most fantastic fears, the wildest nightmares of that religious autocracy have since been realized. In less than four hundred years a politically and intellectually dominant religion has been tumbled to the ground. In the intellectual world, at least, the position of the contestants has been completely reversed. The lesser scientists are already crowing over the body, as if the life of their formidable antagonist were quite extinct, and they are increasingly joined by a sophisticated public which refers to religion, when it speaks of it at all, as "the opium of the masses" or "a gigantic social hoax."

Our concern in this book is with what psychology—the youngest and in many ways the most revolutionary of the sciences—has to say about the present critical situation. But before we follow the forces of psychology into the rout, let us see to what point the other sciences have carried it, and note in perspective the salient events and personalities of the main conflict.

Doubtless, the first rumblings of battle were audible to a few discerning folk in 1530, when Copernicus published his initial, guarded statement of reasons for believing that the earth, contrary to Holy Scripture, was not the centre of the universe, but only one of several planets circling round the sun. Now, Copernicus was a discreet man, and though he may personally have believed that God was under a misapprehension in imagining He had set the sun to swing through the firmament, he refrained from saying as much. He sent a copy of his results first to the Pope, taking care to minimize their significance and pointing out that other interpretations of his results were possible. The Pope also abstained from drawing any unnecessary conclusions, but there were impolitic people among those who saw the results—simple-minded folk such as live in the kingdom of heaven—who could only suppose that there

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must be a mistake in the Bible. Among these was Giordano Bruno, a starkly sincere man, a "fanatic," who noised abroad the full implications of the discovery.

The Church realized at once that if the Bible were proved wrong on one matter, its authority would be undermined at all points and with regard to matters of more practical importance. Questioning the story of Creation might easily end with questioning the validity of the ten commandments. And in our secure age we must not forget that the Church had, for centuries, been engaged in an uphill struggle to maintain order and morality, and to secure for Europe a little civilization, comfort, and decency. It was a refractory world, all too apt to slip back into illiteracy, confusion, banditry, bestial brutality, and immitigated selfishness.

The polite scientific monologues of Leonardo da Vinci had been listened to without disfavour by a liberal-minded Pope ; the more perilous conclusions of Copernicus received no opposition in their discreet publication ; it was the rude, point-blank challenge of men like Bruno that awoke the enmity of the Church. The Church aroused itself and answered the challenge by sending Bruno, in 1600, to the stake, for the good of his immortal soul and in the interests of a stable European society. In 1610 the aged Galileo was forced, by threat of the same strong medicine, to recant a similar heresy, and he did so in a way which every school-boy knows and appreciates.

An alert inquisition and vigorous persecution had thus effectively silenced the first handful of rebel scientists. But subsequent happenings proved this to be the most empty and transitory of triumphs. For from that time independent minds carried forward the scientific understanding of our physical universe with tremendous zeal, until finally there came Newton to systematize this new knowledge, showing that the laws of dynamics and the powers of scientific prediction, *i.e.* of determinism uninterrupted by any discernible miracles of divine origin, held sway throughout the visible universe. Men realized that, after all, the biblical account of the created universe was the veriest fairy tale told by children in the mists of antiquity.

While the physicists were thus driving back religion

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on a wide front from the intellectual domains in which its authority had been undisputed, and in which it had provided the only framework of reference for thought, the chemists were almost equally successful in dispelling myths about the nature of matter. The vagaries of comets and stars, the mystery of thunder and lightning, the transformations of minerals and elixirs, yielded up their claims to the supernatural, and men rejoiced in a new sense of power and a new serenity of order given them by the physical sciences. But the majority of mankind clung to older beliefs, refusing to be impressed or to open their minds, and as late as the middle of the nineteenth century it was confidently said that the chemist's understanding and control would only extend over mineral, inanimate, inorganic matter. The last defended bridge was lost to physical science, however, as "vitalism" collapsed. This occurred when the chemist Wöhler succeeded in artificially synthesizing an organic compound, even though it happened to be nothing more than urea.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, therefore, the physical sciences—there were no others to speak of—had driven a great salient into the realm of religious dogma, irretrievably wrecking much of the foundation of theology. For the Bible maintained that the earth was flat and geographers had proved it round; it had considered man's home to be the centre of the firmament, around which the greater and lesser lights revolved, and lo, the astronomers had found it to be far from the natural centre of God's attention, a diminutive planet attached to a very minor sun. And whereas Bishop Ussher had calculated from Holy Writ that the date of creation was late in 4004 B.C., probably in November, the geologists, even in the nineteenth century, could bring indubitable evidence that the earth must be some millions of years old. Finally, man's body, regarded as the creation of a master craftsman, skilled to perfection by five days of stupendous creation, was shown by anatomists to contain some regrettable flaws of structure, so that Helmholtz, for example, was moved to say that the normal human eye had every kind of defect possible in an optical instrument.

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The views and practices of society are generally from ten to a hundred years behind the enlightened thought of the time. Consequently, although momentous battles were lost and won in the intellectual world of the mid-nineteenth century, it was a long time before their finality was appreciated in the life of the people. The common man opposed these uncomfortable new ideas almost as strongly as did ecclesiastical authority. His invested psychological interests made him reluctant to abdicate from the traditional glory of being lord of the universe and the especial object of God's daily concern. Moreover, stiff theological counter-attacks, in which men lost their means of subsistence, if not even their lives, were constantly made. As late as 1751, Buffon, France's most eminent naturalist, was publicly called to order by the Faculty of Theology in Paris for the mild statement that geologists considered mountains to be manufactured by natural processes, and to be lacking in that permanence favoured by theologians. He was forced to recant as follows: "I hereby declare that I had no intention to contradict the text of scripture; that I believe most firmly all therein related about the Creation." But most members even of the present generation can recall the disabilities, and often the positive exclusion from administrative and teaching posts, resulting from failure to belong to a Church or to subscribe to Christian doctrines. It is as if the fact of being intellectually in retreat caused the Church to be socially more aggressive.

The great drive of physical science may have transformed man's ideas about the physical world and his own body, but at least it left his soul intact. Consequently the devastation of religious beliefs and philosophies wrought by physical science was but a fraction of that which next ensued from the biological sciences, when these began to connect man's mind with that of the animals. Lyell, Darwin, and Huxley, in the middle of the nineteenth century, pressed forward the marches of scientific determinism into the realm of living things. The crisis that was reached when Darwin's thoroughly marshalled arguments rapidly convinced the educated world that man was evolved from lower animal forms, is too well known to require

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description. For the first time the Church was stung to massive action, and indeed rendered so insecure that members of the Church began to learn the language of science, to use its weapons and to attempt to carry the war into the opposing camp. One of the high lights of this acute phase was Bishop Wilberforce's attendance at the British Association meeting of 1860, where, failing in logical attack, he attempted unwisely to crush Darwin with ridicule. Huxley—"Darwin's Bulldog"—is generally agreed to have chased the bishop from the field in ignominious rout.

From their walled retreats, politically impregnable, intellectually enfiladed, the bishops continued to thunder with Wilberforce that "Natural selection is absolutely incompatible with the Word of God." But thereafter the scientific view of life, with its monumental strength, its beautiful dovetailing of fact to fact, its openly verifiable chains of cause and effect, and its sincere promise of a palpably improved world, became an essential part of the mental equipment of most educated people. The wrestle of religion with truth was at an end. Science became a powerful creative force, organizing a new philosophy of life in place of that which it destroyed. Even in popular thought the systematizations of the newly-conquered field made by such men as Herbert Spencer in England and Ernst Haeckel in Germany provided new frameworks for thought and social action. Science permeated education and gave basic inspiration for poets, even for those so far apart in temperament as Nietzsche and Tennyson.

The extent of the transformation of culture occasioned by the physical sciences and by biology is soundly appreciated by most people to-day, and their present attitude to religion is conditioned by that transformation. But the next stage of the conflict, in which the retreat of religion from the field became a positive rout, and which was occasioned by the advent of intellectual reinforcements from a new science—anthropology—has not yet been so widely understood and deserves the closer scrutiny which we will give it in the next chapter.

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For further related reading see :

BURTT, E. A., *Religion in an Age of Science*. New York, 1929.

DRAPER, J. W., *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science*. London, 1900.

INGE, W. R., *The Idea of Progress*. Oxford, 1920.

Science and Ultimate Truth. London, 1926.

SIMPSON, J. Y., *Landmarks in the Struggle between Science and Religion*. New York, 1926.

WHITE, A. D., *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*. London, 1896.

CHAPTER II

ANTHROPOLOGY AND RELIGION'S ANCESTRY

ANTHROPOLOGY, the study of man, his social customs, his beliefs, his ways of living, had its golden age in the latter part of the nineteenth century, when scientists could gather, with comparative ease and a spice of adventure, data regarding the lives of an interesting variety of primitive peoples still relatively uncontaminated by civilization.

It was not until a generation later that civilized people realized that in achieving a critical and detached attitude to other cultures, they were preparing the way for a similar coldly incisive treatment of their own cherished ideals and dearly beloved prejudices. In particular, the painstaking studies of Tylor and Frazer between 1870 and 1890 concerning the forms of primitive religions, awakened Europeans to the alarming resemblances between the most sacred forms of worship in the Christian churches and the blind and ridiculous superstitions of savages. Our assured belief in the uniqueness of Christianity is shaken somewhat when we find, for instance, that something strikingly like Christmas, in its spirit and ritual, was celebrated long ages before the birth of Christ, and when we discover the story of the vicarious sacrifice, the atonement, and the resurrection far more widely spread in primitive religions than the spread of Christianity itself.

If Christianity has no place for evolution, evolution, on the other hand, is quite prepared to find a place for Christianity. Science opens our eyes to a procession of gods. Though we Europeans put unique value on the religion in which we are nurtured and spurn as the veriest pinchbeck all other superstitions, it is clear that our religion, like man

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himself, is the end product—though not the finished product—of a long line of evolution. What we label specifically as religion is something which gradually develops from an undifferentiated matrix of activities and thoughts among primitive people comprising belief in magic, superstitious animism, ritual, and taboo.

Tylor and Spencer were astonished at the amount of animism in primitive thought ; yet animism was present in refined and concentrated form in the religion of their day. By animism we mean the tendency to explain all sorts of natural happenings as being due to the will of living (but disembodied) beings. Most savages seem to have little patience for the coldly common-sense "cause and effect" reasoning of science. Lévy Bruhl, indeed, defined primitive thought as "pre-logical." That is scarcely true ; the savage knows that he himself changes the external world by his impulses and his will. Consequently it is logic, if only an unsophisticated logic, which tells him that the greater changes which we Europeans ascribe to natural causes must likewise be caused by the impulses and will of some other creatures.

For him, therefore, every remote hill and mysterious forest, every gloomy cave, rushing river or spring is the abode of some spirit. There are demons of the earth, the air, and the water, producing, by their colourful and capricious acts, all the phenomena of Nature. And since the life of the savage is all too closely beset by storm and famine, accident, disease, and sudden death, he is prone to invent more numerous malignant and dangerous devils than beneficent spirits. Like the child, he takes his blessings for granted, and devotes his energies to complaining about his restrictions.

Animism, as a naïve tendency to "project" our own modes of experience on the outer world, is a universal tendency of the untutored mind. It is to be seen in children, in primitives, in unsophisticated agricultural communities—and in poets. The wind shuts the door upon a child, and he turns and kicks it viciously, not merely because it gives relief to his feelings, but because he imputes to it a malevolent tendency, as the Emperor Xerxes did when he beat

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the Bosphorus with chains for daring to wash away his bridge of boats. Similarly the child will explain the opening of a flower in the sun by saying that it likes to feel the warmth upon its face.

Animistic thinking must, in most cases, be labelled as regressive because it is associated with a falling back to pre-logical thought and behaviour. It belongs with what the psychoanalysts have called the "pleasure principle" of the unconscious—the principle of getting at once the greatest ease and pleasure—rather than with the disciplined reality principle which impregnates most of our developed conscious thinking and guides us by the harder way which will alone enable us to attain our goals or master refractory Nature. For that reason, it is difficult to rid our lives of animism, and indeed we are continually tempted to return to it. An essential part of the pleasure we get from poetical similes or the vivid metaphor of prose, or the personification of drama, or the projection of human personality in religion, or the talk of ghosts, arises from the permitted relapse from harsh reality thinking to the warmth and facility of more old-established, primitive, and natural ways of thinking.

In the authoritative source books, such as Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, Frazer's *Golden Bough*, or the more recent contributions in anthropological journals, the reader may gather, through a host of fascinating stories of native life in its superstition and magic, a more adequate idea of the extent and nature of animism. Little more time can be given to it here, for it is only the beginning of primitive religion, not the whole story. Since the term "animism" is sometimes used in a different sense, as by McDougall in his *Body and Mind: a History and Defence of Animism*, we should emphasize that the present use has no implications either way with respect to the existence of mind or conscious purpose as the correlate of highly-organized grey protoplasm which accompanies it; mind is quite as real as "physical reality," more so in fact, for as the philosophers have pointed out, we know consciousness directly but matter only indirectly. If one had no alternative but to follow the half-baked physical scientist who thinks that consciousness is unreal, or the acute Berkeley who con-

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sidered matter unreal, there would be somewhat more justification for following the latter.

Animism as it is found in the savage, however, includes belief in disembodied souls and in the existence of mind behind ordinary occurrences of Nature which can be adequately explained on physical grounds alone. Savages speak of the soul as if it were a shadowy image of the body, or even identifiable with a person's shadow or reflection. At other times their behaviour implies that the soul is in a man's breath or his blood or even his spittle. From the observation that men are unconscious and insensitive when asleep, and from his own experience of dreams about distant places and adventures the savage concludes that his soul goes on a journey when he sleeps. For that reason many savages hesitate to wake any one suddenly, believing that his wandering soul may be surprised in some remote journey, and be unable to get back into the body. By the same logic, a sick person sunken into a trance or coma may be restored to health if some one—preferably a powerful medicine man—can pursue and recover the truant soul. In Sarawak, for example,¹ the medicine man, with closed eyes, will describe to entranced listeners the journey made by his own soul in pursuit of the defaulting psyche.

With such a background of "reasoning," it is not surprising that savages, continuing to dream for a while of once influential parents or dreaded chieftains, should be powerfully governed in their daily lives by a belief in the continued existence of ancestors and chieftains. The young warrior, long impressed by the wisdom, benevolence, and tyrannical power of the old chieftain, would in any case find it difficult to believe that so powerful a personality could really have come to an end. Any infringement of the old man's prohibitions would awaken the fear that he might still be lurking somewhere, and dreams would ensue, in conflicts of guilt or desire, with convincing evidence of his continued existence.

Along with animism must be considered the activities of magic. By magic men have sought to master their world

¹ The majority of examples here are taken from the most recent and reliable observations, as found in Sir James Frazer's *Aftermath*.

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through their own efforts, without beseeching the aid of whatever spirits may be. Yet magic is still far short of reality thinking. The savage desires to be successful in hunting, to kill an enemy, to increase the crops or heal the sick, and with this object he utters incantations, performs strange rituals, invokes primitive alchemy. Animism may partly have disappeared, but hard-headed realism has not taken its place. Instead there is a kind of bastard logic, an inconclusive, symbolic wish-thinking.

Anthropologists have classified the errors of thought behind magic into two kinds. In *imitative* magic the savage acts as if a mere resemblance or symbolic representation constituted an identity. The Moroccan, wishing to harm an enemy, makes an image of him in dough ; after it is dry he breaks off limbs or sticks a nail into the head, believing that similar mishaps will be likely to occur at the same time to the enemy himself. *Contagious* magic, on the other hand, is based on the assumption that mere contact has some special virtue and constitutes an identity in the articles associated. The Malay will take sand, imprinted by the passing foot of the girl he loves and proceed to warm it over a fire, believing that he will thereby cause her heart to warm with passion towards him.

Any keen social observer will have no difficulty in detecting innumerable pieces of debris from the early stages of culture, in which animism and magic held sway, embedded in the fabric of our modern culture. In the first place, there are instances of sheer anachronism in rural areas and racial backwaters cut off from much contact with the stream of progress. Frazer, in his recent publications, comments on imitative magic among the agricultural population of Wales. Thus until recently, yellow objects, *e.g.* a piece of amber, placed in a drinking cup, were prescribed as a cure for jaundice, whilst red blankets and curtains were thought to have special efficacy for treating scarlet fever.

Modern rural superstitions have an eerie resemblance to those of the most primitive people. Thus the unsophisticated natives of the North Andaman Islands believe that the soul of a dying person goes out with the ebb tide, and a similar imitative magic is assumed by the Solomon


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Islanders, who believe that pregnant women are liable to give birth prematurely on a very high tide. Both of these beliefs have been encountered by the present writer in obscure west of England fishing villages, whilst the belief that rains and storms will come in with the flood tide and depart with the ebb, is widespread.

Before disentangling the more subtle and pervasive elements of primitive thought in modern society, we have to consider a third activity among primitive people that has close relations with both animism and magic. This is the phenomenon of taboo. Probably the most impressive taboos are those surrounding kings and chieftains. There are inexorable taboos which prescribe that the chieftain's food shall not be touched except by certain privileged (and tabooed) persons; that his name shall never be uttered by any member of the tribe and that his hair and nail cuttings shall be ceremonially treated. It is not too speculative to see in the first of these a practical precaution against assassination and in the last a means of preventing unscrupulous individuals from gaining power by spells involving contagious magic.

Apart from concern with kings, the principal taboos have to do with menstruous or pregnant women; warriors on dangerous raids; men who have slain a foe in a feud or tribal battle; hunters and fishers on important expeditions; iron and sharp-edged weapons; and a host of verbal utterances, especially certain proper nouns.

The interdependence of the thinking involved in animism and magic with the practice of taboo is an observation not to be overlooked. The natives of Victoria Nyanza carry the "word" taboo common all over the world to the extreme of refusing to tell strangers the names of their children and near relatives. When we remember what sympathetic or imitative magic can do with names, the root of this taboo in fear is apparent, but without magic it is incomprehensible. Elsewhere the motivation becomes more remote and obscure. The natives of Samoa, like the Jews and the English middle classes, have a taboo on mentioning the names of gods. The assumption seems to be that the god will resent the liberty, but in origin the taboo seems more



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related to the fear that individuals may magically control the chieftain through the use of his name. Other taboos have a basis of animistic thinking, and there are yet others which, like the chieftain instance mentioned above, have direct practical utility. Among those having hygienic value, social value, or effectiveness in preserving psychological attitudes, one might mention the taboos on women in menstruation or pregnancy, the ordinance that a man shall never speak to his mother-in-law, the taboos on incest, the imposition of sexual abstinence on men engaged in warfare, and the elaborate taboos surrounding kingship.

To say that some taboos have utility is not to assent that the savage perceives the way in which they work. Some medicine man of genius may have had a flash of insight into their purposefulness, and may even have acted creatively, like Moses bringing down tablets of stone engraved with ten commandments; but on the whole it is more in keeping to suppose a history of blind trial and error, those tribes surviving which chanced to adopt the most socially valuable customs. Certainly there are many taboos, with no conceivable utility, which seem to have sprung from psychological needs, the satisfaction of irrational impulses in the unconscious or aesthetic whims. For instance, anything that excites powerful emotions of attraction or aversion, or anything unexpected, unusual, or violently new, tends to be taboo. Frazer cites the case of a West African native who, in a moment of absent-mindedness, designed a knife of unusual design. Upon seeing this the tribe regarded him with such horror that he escaped with his life only upon condition that the construction should never be repeated; a taboo was imposed. Similarly, natives of the South Sea Islands believe that the discoverer of the method of obtaining palm wine from the palm tree paid for his outrage upon implicit taboo with his life. Frazer could doubtless find many examples of the "conservatism" taboo nearer home.

Historical observation and the consensus of anthropological opinion agree in deriving religion, science, and morality from the cultural matrix of animism, magic, and taboo. Our problem, however, is to trace these features of

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our comparatively adult civilization to their vague beginnings in the embryo, in order that we may better understand the stuff of which they are made.

The lines of descent are not direct, but show many mutual entanglements. Though dabbling with magic is, in its intention to control nature by understanding, clearly the main ancestor of alchemy and eventually of science, there are also features of magic which have been sloughed off into religion. Psychoanalysts speak of magic as manifesting the illusory "omnipotence of thought"—the belief that to think of a thing is to create a thing—displayed also by young children and neurotics. "Omnipotence of thought" in the form of magic-like proceedings, plays a considerable part in the ancillary procedures of religion. It occurs in such common features as the belief in holy water or holy wells, and in the tolling of church bells at a funeral, originally to keep evil spirits from the path of the departing soul. Magic is still common in everyday life also, in the belief in talismans and of the influence of good and bad luck from lucky charms.

Again, though taboo is the precursor of morals, it may also be the ancestor of manners. For, on the one hand, it has much the same relation to the supernatural powers of the animistic menagerie as morality has been considered to have to religion or belief in the Deity. But, on the other hand, it also has the non-religious sanction of the group custom, and enforces itself through fear of ostracism from society, as our customs and manners are enforced. Because the savage is less individualistic than civilized man, more closely bound in emotional solidarity with his fellow tribesmen, the punishment presented by isolation is correspondingly severe; so that the distinction between laws of custom and moral laws is not so marked as with ourselves. It might also be argued that the savage obeys even his supernatural taboos more from fear than love; whereas, at least in the Christian religion and in modern times, the notion of obedience through love has tended to characterize moral obligation.

However, it is as evident that the root of morality lies in taboo as that the core of religion can be traced by peering

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into the dim history of animism. Tylor's considered conclusion tells us that "Animism is the ground-work of the philosophy of religion, from that of savages up to that of civilized man." From the inclinations of the individual unsophisticated mind to react to the problems of its environment with fear, rage, or supplication, addressed to demons and spirits, ancestral or natural, the group builds up a tradition and a ceremony for handling the powers of the unseen world. And in turn the imaginings of the group are grafted upon the suggestive individual, so that there is set up what a rationalist would call a decidedly vicious circle of unrealistic thinking.

For animism, magic, and taboo are, in the main, communal, not individual activities. The hopes and fears of the savage are to a great extent those of the whole tribe, being concerned with the success of the harvest, the friendliness of the weather, the construction of canoes, the warding off of pestilences and evil spirits, and the defeat of tribal enemies. A few magic rites may have personal ends, but the religious sanction of social and public ceremony is accorded mainly to the approved desires of the group. It is to this socialization of animism that we have to look for the real beginnings of religion. Socialization leads to a traditional systematization of ideas concerning the names and natures and numbers of supernatural powers. What is more, it creates a tradition of periodical occasions for rites and ceremonies which heighten by a common experience the religious emotion. It sets up a body of professional men interested in the maintenance of religion and the integration of its purposes. This early pre-occupation of religion with dance and song and communal ceremony rather than with broad philosophical conceptions must not be overlooked. As Marrett says, in the beginning religion was "danced out, not thought out."

From fairly early times it is possible to detect in these ceremonies a common pattern. Thus, among a typically very primitive tribe, the Ibo of Southern Nigeria, any impressive series of natural calamities seems to provoke a mood of guilt and depression, which is eventually dissolved by the device of finding a scapegoat "a young man,

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strong and vigorous and well able to bear the sins of those on whose behalf he is to die." From Stonehenge to Patagonia, men seem to have discovered the same happy solution to the misery of being frowned upon by angry gods. They have learnt to propitiate the supernatural powers, and even to win their warm approval, by sacrifice. Thereafter, it is a small step not only to sacrifice when avoiding displeasure, but to introduce ceremonial immolation whenever some routine favour is desired, such as the success of harvest. Until a few years ago, men and women were still sacrificed to the local fetiches or ju-jus in parts of West Africa, for the sake of the crops.

Meanwhile in some parts of the world, the daring and ingenious step seems to have been taken by which the god himself was made the sacrifice. This illogical arrangement may well have gained ground because of the condensed expression given in a single act to a strong complex of warring psychological impulses, namely, the sense of guilt for transgressions, the desire to project the punishment upon another person, repressed hatred of the god, and the desire to possess his power. Perhaps we see the beginning of this practice among those tribes which kill off their king or priest when rain and crops fail, or when other misfortunes offer signs of declining divinity in their protector. Ceremonial killing of the divine king is widespread in Africa and in Polynesia,¹ where the gods choose to be incarnate in individuals. It was implicit in that strange priesthood of Nemi in ancient Italy :

" The priest that slays the slayer
And shall himself be slain."

and in modified customs in various corners of the world.

A fresh elaboration of this notion occurs when the god is formally resurrected after his death. Anthropologists have concluded that this widespread ceremony of the dying god must be symbolical of the death and resurrection of the year, and have its main purpose as a fertility rite. Many associations favour this interpretation, and we have evidence

¹ *Golden Bough*, Frazer, Part III.

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of it within historical times in the beautiful Greek myth of Persephone. But this explanation in terms of cosmological conceptions does not rule out the explanation that the ceremony is simultaneously satisfying dimly conscious, profound, and irrational psychological drives connected with guilt, frustration, and desire. Moreover, there are to-day several instances known, *e.g.* the Ibibio tribes, where a mock ceremony of death and resurrection is performed on individuals having no special divine status in the tribe and unconnected with fertility significance.

Of the variations on the theme of the god sacrifice, that which has evoked special interest among anthropologists and psychologists is the form associated with totemism and clan organization. Here the animal which represents the father of the tribe is killed and ceremonially eaten. The peculiarity of this arrangement lies in the fact that the totem animal is normally regarded with great reverence and awe, is considered to have all sorts of supernatural powers, and is protected by a most solemn taboo which forbids any member of the clan to harm or to hurt animals of this kind. Only on one day of the year, at a great annual festival, is the animal solemnly killed and feasted upon.

Now, it is conceivable that the eating of the totem is done with no other purpose than that which urges certain natives to eat lions' flesh, under the simple animistic or magical belief that they will thereby acquire the virtues of lions. That is an unlikely explanation, for many totems are devoid of any qualities with which a reasonable or even an unreasonable savage would wish to identify himself. An alternative possibility is that totemism has some overlap with the widely-prevalent idea among primitive people which credits animals with the souls of departed human beings. Belief in the transmigration of souls is found in Malaya, India, South Africa, and the Pacific Islands. It undoubtedly produces fear of certain animals and a desire to propitiate and be kind to them ; but the associations and the geographical distribution of the idea do not seem to be the same as totemism. Plainly, we are faced with the need for a deeper psychological explanation in terms of human needs and conflicts. Such an explanation has been

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offered by the psychoanalysts, but since it requires thinking in a different plane from that of anthropology, we will defer studying it until the next chapter.

The anthropological approach has done great service in enabling us to see religions in an evolutionary perspective. How the ritual of sacrifice has developed we have just seen. It is interesting to note also the systematization that an anthropological survey makes possible, with regard to beliefs in the soul and in immortality.

Most primitives harbour a host of inconsistent, fragmentary but vivid ideas about the human soul, derived in the main from dreaming, from hallucination, and a little loose logic. But comparative religion shows that primitives may be divided into two large groups according to whether they have or have not a belief in some systematically lived after-life. The larger group believing in human immortality can be again subdivided into those who hold that the after-life is simply a continuation of the mode of life known on earth, and those who have faith in some heaven in which a new life begins on a higher plane. Existing systems of belief can also be classified according to whether or not they involve compensation for the injustices, the sacrifices, the good and evil deeds of the individual's life on earth.

In the Hades or Limbo of the Greeks, or the ancient Sheol of the Jews we meet those half-evolved ideas of an after-life, which is dim and temporary and poorly defined. In later Greek thought, the belief in an immortality of a more full-blooded kind, and not confined to Lethe wharf, is apparent, but it is thought to be the fortune of the few. Typical uncompensated and unmodified immortality is illustrated in the Happy Hunting Ground of the American Indian or the Valhalla of the Norsemen, in which the souls of men may continue the hunting, fighting, and feasting which comprised happiness for them here. Compensated immortality appears in a somewhat anomalous form in Buddhism, and in more fully realized perfection in Mohammedanism and Christianity.

Throughout these gropings, an evolution is apparent towards a definite belief in immortality, a refined immortality in which only the spiritual life is continued. Morality in life

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is rewarded by everlasting bliss and wickedness by banishment or torment. At the latest stage the nature of the life to be led in paradise becomes too spiritual to be defined in earthly terms—it is just “dwelling in God”—whilst heaven ceases to be above the stars and is “within you.”

Simultaneously, there goes on an evolution of the idea of God. The primitive mind revels in a host of agile spirits or cowers before a legion of variegated devils. The earliest historical religions maintain a pantheon of gods, furnished with deities of war, guardians of agriculture, and less respectable specialists in intoxication and vengery. To some extent, the character and occupations of an ancient people can be deduced from the faces of their gods; Zeus, Mars, and Janus, Vishnu and Siva, Pallas Athene, reflect the ideals and temperaments of the people they serve. It was the especial feat of the people who founded the first civilizations in and around Persia and the Euphrates, to simplify religious mythology, condensing all the evil demons into one evil spirit and all the nobler and well-disposed spirits into one benevolent Providence. Thus the Mithraic cult envisaged life in the lively and dramatic terms of a duel between a God of Light and a Prince of Darkness. Mohammedanism and Christianity emphasized God, and tended more and more to regard evil only as His absence. For the spade work in this last great simplification towards monotheism we have to thank the philosophical genius of the Jews, or, as some think, the stern and sterile monotony of the desert landscape. If animism is a delusion, they created the greatest of illusions; if it is an aspect of truth, they brought home to us the greatest of facts.

Whatever may be our initial prejudices, it is a most salutary experience, and one indispensable in grasping the meaning of religion, to observe through the telescope of comparative anthropology this winding road which joins our revered religions—Christian, Buddhist, Mohammedan, or whatever we profess—with the child-like terrors and ecstatic fantasies of ignorant savages. And perhaps the experience will be more profitable in proportion to the superiority with which we have laughed, in thoughtless moments, at the absurdity of those primitive whims.

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For we cannot escape the conclusion that our religions are far from being an absolute truth in contrast to which all that went before was relative or spurious. There is scarcely a Christian rite or moral injunction that is not found in the ceremonials, myths, or taboos of primitive people. Christmas and Easter are ancient festivals of sun worship ; the Eucharist is another version of the widespread sacramental feasting upon the dead totem god and is paralleled in the ancient world by the rites of Attis and Adonis ; the great central theme of the resurrection and the atonement repeats the story of a thousand tribal religions. Even the unique mystery of the Trinity is not really unique : the representation of God by a holy family of father, mother, and son, meeting the deep human need for a sense of security within the family, is seen in the ancient religions of Egypt and India. The replacement of the mother by the Holy Ghost was a process which took place, as Forsyth tells us, for reasons " which happened to have cogency when the Christian doctrine was formulated in the fourth century." At least one branch of the Christian religion has virtually reinstated the Holy Mother, in response to the ancient emotional needs.

It is not surprising that scientifically-minded people, viewing this perspective, conclude that religion is a continuation of the frailties and eccentricities of unenlightened savages. For them it is a mere museum exhibit, to be examined for its archæological interest and no more. They see religion as a way of thought entirely defeated and discredited. Early physical science drove animism from the field, and destroyed the significance of the religious myths. The grotesque authority of the biblical account of creation and all the childish paraphernalia of miracles was replaced by a superb vision of an ordered drama. The setting is a lonely star in the vast interstellar night, and the theme an amazing story of protoplasmic life struggling into being, to take place in a triumphant march of evolution.

Biological science may be said to have continued the battle of science and religion to the decisive climax constituted by the issue of evolution. Thereafter religion was definitely in retreat. The closing years of the last century

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converted that retreat into a rout, by flinging into the field the fresh forces of anthropology, eager for pursuit. For anthropology enabled us to see ourselves with the detached, merciless, and patronizing understanding which we had hitherto accorded to the foibles of savages.

Yet the worst ignominy for the religious viewpoint was still to come with the development of psychology in the twentieth century. The older sciences having shown religious beliefs to be illusory, this new science would demonstrate finally the particular mechanisms by which such a quaint illusion could have arisen from certain weaknesses in the human mind. Psychology would perform what is known as a "mopping up" action upon the remnants of religious forces, hiding in the ruins of its once powerful system of philosophy.

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CHAPTER III

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE RELIGIOUS ILLUSION

PSYCHOLOGY has lost no time in performing its duty of investigating the causes of the religious illusion ; indeed it might be accused of presuming on action somewhat before it was properly equipped for the task.

That the illusion is a widespread one rightly does not impress the psychologist.¹ "Twenty million Frenchmen can't be wrong" is a discredited slogan. Nor does he lay stock on the degree of conviction with which it is held. But he seeks in religion for the typical symptoms and stigmata which characterize the process of delusional thinking in the lunatic or the genesis of illusions in normal individuals. Primarily he looks for the presence of some strong impulse which is debarred from finding satisfaction in the real world ; for such is characteristic of the insane. The despised tramp in his delusion becomes a king or a prophet or a millionaire, finding realization at last for his long suppressed self-assertion. The ugly spinster protests to the mental hospital authorities that she is pestered by the attentions of handsome young doctors. If the psychologist can detect in those societies which "go religious" some sufficiently widespread emotional need to believe in the existence of God and heaven, then one piece of evidence pointing to the probability of illusion formation will have been established.

Thus science reverses the old ontological argument for the existence of God. By that argument theologians and

¹ Beverley Nichols (in *The Fool hath Said*) rejects criticisms of religion because of their "implying that for nearly two thousand years the world has been in the thrall of a Jewish lunatic."

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philosophers have said God must exist because somehow or other we have got an idea of Him, and they demonstrated that the idea rises very persistently in the human mind. The scientist, using the natural persistence of the idea as evidence of its unreality, hoists the theologian with the petard of his own demonstration.

A little reflection should convince both the eager scientist and the resistive pietist that proof of the existence of an illusion mechanism is no proof that God is an illusion. The thirsty desert traveller may see by the illusion of a mirage a far distant oasis as if it were only a mile away. To discover that the optical conditions are such as to create a mirage does not deny the possibility of a real oasis being hidden a mile away behind the false image. There have been instances of paranoiacs, under the delusion of being poisoned, who have actually been poisoned. And when the child who dreams that there is a chocolate cake beside his bed opens his eyes and finds one there, it is no reason for doubting that he has merely been dreaming.

Now to understand the argument for illusion, we must digress slightly into general psychology. When psychologists sought methods of curing the neurotic, the perverted, and the delinquent, they quickly came to realize the critical importance of the early years of childhood, both for normal and abnormal development. It is almost equally a commonplace now that they discovered the roots of human motivation in powerful primitive instincts, or propensities towards certain kinds of satisfaction which we share with the higher mammals. That is to say, they had passed on from Darwin's proof of the physical continuity of man with the animal world to the corollary of an equally definite mental continuity.

Our instincts, though discharging most readily in response to certain specific situations, are very plastic in early life. But the particular investments of interest made in infancy, and the general type of dynamic balance or integration achieved, are likely to persist obstinately in adult life, shaping the course of all later development of personality. Defects and arrests of development, and the kinks produced by shock or mishandling, are likely to persist as "com-

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plexes " which defeat the adult's attempt to deal in a rational and realistic way with his environment.

Naturally the most powerful emotions of childhood are lived out in relation to the parents, for they occupy most of the infant's world. The psychoanalysts have given abundant evidence of the central importance of the boy's early love relationship to the mother, which is known as the Oedipus fixation. At the same period the boy's father is loved as a parent, but hated as a rival in the mother's affections. In late infancy the normally developing child is prepared to give up his excessive attachment to the mother in order to earn his father's approval and love and to absolve himself from the fear which father rivalry engenders. Technically he is said to give up the primitive, sensual satisfactions of the Oedipus complex in establishing, by introjection of the father, a "super ego," or conscience. The change is willingly made because the child has a desire for adult power, and feels a boundless awe and admiration for all that the father represents. His father seems, to infant eyes, omnipotent, capable of giving everything or taking everything away, and withal a loving father to whom one may run in doubt or distress.

When the child gains adult status, he is all too quickly disillusioned in regard to his childhood conceptions of the unlimited power, freedom, and privilege of adults. If he has normal intelligence and imagination, he realizes that his control over Nature and his ability to shield himself from the perils of a vast and indifferent universe are virtually no better than before. Consciously and rationally he faces this cold, bare, and hostile reality, accepting the fact that immunity from suffering and death is an impossible aspiration ; but the deeper, unconscious levels of his being long constantly for the security and the assured status in the affections of an all-powerful father, which he enjoyed in childhood. And sooner or later his conscious systems of ideas begin to bend before the insistent thrust of these primitive inner needs. He invents for himself, or accepts from a similarly tainted society, the consoling illusion of a God in heaven having the characteristics, magnified and hallowed, of his earthly father. It is scarcely necessary

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to point out that the gods of all peoples have possessed the qualities of their fathers and their cultures. All have been omnipotent, kind, wise, and all-seeing, stern in maintenance of their moral laws, angry and punitive when disobeyed, and protective when humbly supplicated.

Because religion was developed by men, often in secret societies excluding women, God tends to have a male nature. Here and there, in matriarchates, women deities also play a part. The powerful rôle of the Virgin Mary in the Catholic religion is a tribute to the effectiveness of Mediterranean motherhood. It is a further and interesting item of evidence that youths who have successfully revolted against their fathers commonly adopt an atheistic or anti-religious attitude in later life. The abundant and redundant use of father similes and metaphors throughout religious parlance may also be accepted as evidence of a general kind pointing in the same direction.

The frustrated drive which is seeking expression in this illusion is therefore the desire for security and companionship. It arises from the harsh realization, in men's conflict with Nature, of the menace of an indifferent material world. It is a cry for consolation, for order and comfort, for the intensity and intimacy of human response; a cry which continues to echo in the hollow void of a frigid chaos, until in desperation men invent an idol to reply to them. Thus, from an emotional need and through an old animistic or anthropomorphic way of thinking, God emerges.

That, in a few paragraphs, is the scientific position as put forward by eminent psychologists of to-day. It will be found in more convincing detail in Freud's *Future of an Illusion* or Forsyth's *Psychology and Religion*. The earlier psychological studies of Coe, Starbuck, Pratt, and James were not so revolutionary in viewpoint.

A further contribution to understanding the psychology of religion was made by Freud when he noticed the resemblance between the behaviour of obsessional neurotics and some of the major activities in religious ritual. The unfortunate obsessional neurotic is impelled to repeat a series of relatively meaningless actions or words, although his rational mind deplores the whole procedure. Analysis shows

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that this behaviour arises from an unconscious sense of guilt, in connection with some repressed wish or experience, and that the apparently meaningless ritual has an expiatory purpose, tending to reduce this inner torment.

Freud has called the obsessional neurosis "a private religion," and religion, "the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity." Two sidelights on religious psychology follow from this identification. First, since obsessional neuroses are among the most difficult to cure, the religious mode of thought will not be readily given up, even if reason disapproves of its objects. Secondly, if the group neurosis were to be forcibly dispelled, we should expect an increased eruption of individual neuroses.

Psychology also throws new light on the mental adjustments involved in the action of conscience, prayer, belief in immortality, religious conversion, and the experience of the mystics; but space ordains that the accounts in this chapter be brief.

Conscience is largely what is spoken of among psychoanalysts as the super ego. Religious writers have raised conscience on a pedestal as a divine—even if not altogether welcome—gift to man. Even such a gay reprobate as Byron indited, "Whatever creed be taught or land be trod, man's conscience is the oracle of God." The most cursory glance at various cultures will show, however, that the conscience of a man reared in two or more cultures would direct him to the most mutually incongruous actions. Christians are conscience-stricken over homicide, but Borneo hunters collect their neighbours' heads in the religious belief that their own ancestors will then be able to sleep in peace. Among Romans and Japanese suicide has been viewed as a duty; in medieval Europe it was a detestable sin. Some tribes have a social conscience which prescribes polygamy or incest, others shrink in profound horror from the same courses. The pattern of conscience is thus a reflection of the old established pattern of culture, particularly as that comes to be understood by the parents or guardians who influence the child, and are loved by it during the first six or seven years of its life. It is built by a willing "introjection"—a mental swallowing—of the

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beloved parent's personality and taboos. Thus it is no more and no less divine than the other instinctive energies with which the child is born or the cultures which he may imitate. Before three or four years of age, few children show any sense of guilt—except when they are actually discovered in naughtiness by a parent. But by seven, most have acquired by imitation, through fear of loss of parental affection, a sense of guilt and the correlated notion of sin.¹ These reactions soon become buried too deep for conscious manipulation in later life, so that a convinced rationalist may be as much in awe of the Church as an “emancipated” woman can be uncontrollably reluctant to appear at a nudist colony.

The connection of the great religious consolations of prayer and immortality with animistic and magical levels of thinking is too direct to require demonstration. We have spoken earlier and incidentally of the pre-realistic “omnipotence of thought” stage in the mental awakening of the normal infant child. The seductive yet vicious modes of reasoning found in that pre-realistic phase are indurated by the necessary experiences in early infancy in which his essential bodily needs and freedom from distress magically follow from his desires and their expression in calls and cries. The baby, in a big buzzing, booming confusion of sights and sounds which constitute his incomprehensible world, can scarcely be aware of any intermediate machinery between the expression of his desires and their satisfaction. Belief in the potency of special prayers and in the efficacy of magic incantations is greatly aided by a relapse into those early, uncorrected ways of regarding the real world which the psychoanalysts refer to as the “omnipotence of thought” mentality.

It is noteworthy that in the more elevated forms of religion, and particularly in the later developments of Christianity, prayer becomes more refined and tenuous, whilst its field of use is increasingly restricted. Custom no longer sanctions prayer for the death of a personal enemy,

¹ I have dealt with these features of personality more fully in a form suitable for the lay reader in *Your Mind and Mine: an Introduction to Psychology*. London, 1934.

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and it is religiously a suspect procedure to entreat success in business. As a formality there may be ceremonial supplications for good harvests, sun, or rain; but the advances of agricultural science and meteorology narrow the scope for special intervention on the part of the Deity.

The orisons of the devout, therefore, become relatively meaningless to-day, except with respect to the subjective life of the individual or the people. Increasingly prayer retreats to the position of concerning itself with the improvement of personality and the maintenance of personal or group morale. In this function, psychology cannot deny its efficacy, as a form of auto-suggestion, but it may nevertheless ascribe to it the harmful tendency of suggestive practices to increase the individual's general suggestibility.

From the previous references to immortality, we may sum up its psychological roots as (1) a return to illusory "pleasure principle" thinking, (2) a consequence of primitive man's experience with dreams and hallucinations, (3) a necessity in the maintenance of morals, by punishing and rewarding in the hereafter the deeds which obviously escape human justice.

Most of the early studies of the psychology of religion were perhaps unduly concerned with the spectacular phenomenon of sudden religious conversion. We now know that such experiences are comparatively rare, associated with some degree of temperamental abnormality, confined almost entirely to the age of adolescence, and prone to occur only in certain types of religious culture. Generally its explanation seems to be that the upsurging of sexual emotion at adolescence is met by the powerful inhibitions of a culture which attaches a strong sense of guilt to sexual expression. Increasing conflict between actual sexual expression or unconscious wishes on the one hand and the forces of repression on the other, causes an intolerable strain of anxiety and guilt, from which pressure the individual may unexpectedly escape by the solution of renouncing the goal of sexual pleasure or the right to individual self-assertion. At the cost of sublimation—converting sexuality into love of his fellows, and self-assertion into vicarious self-assertion

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through God—he thereby obtains peace of mind. To explain the process in terms of psychological forces is not to belittle its importance to society, for whether the process be sudden or gradual, it constitutes in moderation a desirable adjustment in civilization. It would be better still if brought about without recourse to illusory ideas.

In looking for the main drives which sustain religious activities, the psychologists have as yet seen no need to posit a special "religious instinct." The natural instincts or propensities which work with the emotions of fear, sexuality, gregariousness, self-assertion, appeal, and self-submission, account adequately for all the specific forms of behaviour observed. With such a range of instincts to draw upon, it is evident that the religious sentiments are capable of dominating the whole personality by the predominance of their dynamic resources.

The unexpectedly great rôle of sexual drives in religion was clearly brought out in some of the earliest investigations, which, curiously enough, regarded the finding as a detraction from the spirituality of religion rather than as a proof of its sublimating power. Leuba¹ pointed out, with a wealth of illustration, the startling resemblance between the descriptions of mystical union left by some of the most eminent of the great mystics, such as St. Theresa, and the characteristics of normal sexual consummation. Again, many writers have noted the insistent tendency in religion for the terms of spiritualized sexual love to creep into use in hymns, prayers, and religious ritual, so that even nuns become "the brides of Christ."

Perhaps the most convincing observation regarding the extent to which the sublimated energy of the sex instinct maintains religious activity concerns the readiness with which the sexually unsatisfied flock to religion. Further we should notice that religion either incorporated sheer sensuality in its organized expression, as in the early religions which bought their way with their lewd fertility rites and ceremonials; or, when in power, offered a fierce opposition to all forms of unnecessary and unsublimated sexual activity, often imposing celibacy upon the priest-

¹ *The Psychology of Religion.*

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hood. Religion has opposed inflexibly the squandering of sex energy because it intuitively realizes that religious emotion blossoms from an elevated sexuality.

The fact that the early psychological studies of religion tended to concentrate upon the surprisingly pervasive rôle of the sex instinct must not be allowed to blind us to the important principle that religion has managed to harness to its interests, and provide a preferred outlet for, any thwarted instinct. Wherever the physical or social environment occasions frustration, there will religion be found utilizing the deflected energies in the interests of the great, systematized philosophy of life and living which it represents.

For that reason religion has appealed especially to the inferior, the sick, the maladjusted, the fearful, the poor, and those scorned and rejected by love, power, life, and society. Drawing upon those sources has doubtless caused it in turn to mould some of its expressions in accordance with the desires of its patrons. In some ages and conditions it has become more a consolation for the unsuccessful or exploited than a guiding star for the brilliant and enterprising.

A similar process of moulding to psychological needs rather than social goals seems to have taken place with regard to the attitude of consolation itself. Beginning as a means of adjusting men happily to those inexorable limitations of life, and those galling restrictions of sex expression which are necessitated by the physical world or required for the good of society, religion has tended to extend the virtue of renunciation until the false position is reached in which men are taught to tolerate also remediable shortcomings and abuses. It is this elevation of asceticism for its own sake which has caused religion to be cynically advocated in turn by the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, and which has called forth the blind fury of the Communist against what he stigmatizes as nothing more than "the opiate of the masses."

Later (Chapter XVI.) we shall approach from special angles the general question of the free energy made available in society by various uses and misuses of the accumulated

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instinct energy of individuals, and we can discuss the alternative uses which society can make of this energy by appropriate stimulation and canalization of responses. Here we must continue to consider the mechanisms in the individual mind, without comprehension of which the dynamics of mass effects are often misunderstood.

A serious psychology of religion would now proceed to find out how the above explanatory principles account for the most detailed religious practices, myths, and rituals. Forsyth has made an interesting analysis of the motives which led to the later accretion of saints and other intermediaries in some Churches. The child, he says, is frequently too awed by his father to approach him directly with petitions. He goes instead to a mother or brother with whom more intimate emotional relation exists and says, "You ask him for me." So, in later life, the Virgin Mary and the saints act as psychological intermediaries between himself and God.

But any array of detailed analyses is beyond our scope. We have to look squarely at the main conclusion of the analytical psychologist; that religious expression can be regarded as a pitiful accumulation of escapes and self-deceptions centring upon one major illusion. That major illusion is a reflection of childish attitudes, and persists through the continued emotional immaturity of most adult minds. On this view it may be at best condoned by those who can see it more clearly as a pathetic concession to the need for illusion arising from a kind of constitutional softening of the brain which few can escape. But the story of God and the psychologists does not end with this dogma.

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CHAPTER IV

DISASTERS IN THE RETREAT OF THE CHURCH

LOOKING back at the course of this great cultural struggle, perceiving how religion has rolled in endless retreat before the forces of science, to be finally annihilated by anthropology and psychology, we may sigh like old Kaspar in the well-known poem, commenting contentedly: "It was a famous victory." But like little Peterkin, who was most impressed by the bones of the dead, practical people will insist on asking "What good came of it all?"

For the pure-bred scientist the conduct of the resolute invaders requires no justification or apology. He sees a false ideology laid waste and a race of crabbed and timid intellects replaced by an enlightened people of nobler mental stature. A single-minded devotion to truth, no matter into what emotional difficulties it leads its followers, is, in his opinion, the most important value in life.

Men of affairs, on the other hand, who are concerned with how the world behaves rather than with any abstract pursuit of truth by the few, are aware that a bitter devastation has been wrought, and that a heavy price in human happiness remains to be paid. This fact is beginning to dawn even upon the victors. It is only a little while since rationalists deplored the persisting influence of the Church, referring to it as an intellectual anachronism—an inconvenient and even dangerous ruin not very expeditiously removed from the path of public progress. They shared the justifiable irritation of the young man in the music-hall song with the rich relative who "is dead but he won't lie down." Advanced thinkers found it necessary to remind the young, in view of the continued pomp of the religious parade, of H. G. Wells's observation that "the bishops,

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socially so much in evidence, are intellectually in hiding." But that attitude of surprised indignation has given way in the last decade, and at least among those social scientists who have a finger on the pulse of social change, to a more complex attitude into which genuine alarm enters.

Psychologist and social scientist lose their militant attitude to religion when they realize that all their forces may well be needed to re-establish some order in the city they have so successfully besieged. The intellectual world is full of "post-war" problems from this enormous cultural conflict, but perhaps the everyday world is even more distressingly aware of imminent emotional famines and pestilences arising from the intellectual readjustment.

For though the acute mental conflict may first have raged only in the minds of intelligent and educated people, the consequences are going to affect all lives. Changes from religious belief mean changes in social and economic organization. Individuals who will not suffer conflicts in their own minds will sooner or later find themselves in bloody physical conflicts between opposing groups irrationally bound to incompatible ideas. Boredom and misuse of energy, vacillating loyalties, false goals, fruitless conflicts and despair are the demons fated to torture a generation which has not clearly and consciously thought out the process of readjustment occasioned by this conflict. Not the least of the present social dangers is a disintegration of the system of order and morality, formerly sustained directly or indirectly by religious belief.

A review in the present chapter of the consequences, psychological and social, following the cultural conflict, is rendered difficult because no adequate survey has yet been made of the actual rate and direction of change of religious belief. Nor do we know in any scientific sense just how the various social changes now in progress are caused by the decline of belief.

A general idea of the trend in Britain may be obtained from Joad's figures for church attendance in a typical London sample area. He found a congregation of 295 in 1887, 184 in 1903, and 63 in 1927. Taking the Sunday School attendance for Great Britain as a whole, he finds

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that between two consecutive years, which we have no reason to suppose are abnormal in any respect, the total attendance dropped by more than 100,000.

In 1926 the *Nation* and the *Daily News*¹ conducted independent questionnaire inquiries into the religious views of their readers. The results showed that only 30 to 35 per cent. believed in the key doctrines of the Christian religion. By comparing these results with the questionnaire findings of Ames² in 1910, when he found only one-fourth of his population non-religious or doubtful, one can get some idea of the magnitude of the drift during this generation. At about the same period Duncan³ found that approximately one half of the population of the U.S.A. belonged to no church. This figure has since increased. The trend in Great Britain and America is, therefore, roughly similar, though until recently the movement in Britain was somewhat more advanced. Whereas a generation ago about a half of the population belonged, actively or inactively, to some church, and more than a half agreed with the key tenets of Christianity, to-day these proportions are at least halved.

A fairly recent survey which gives us an idea of religion as it functions in the social setting is to be found in the Lynds' classical study of American life in Middletown.⁴ They write "The dominant impression the research staff gained in a year and a half of attendance at Middletown's religious services, and in talking with individuals in 1924-25, was that of an unalert acceptance, punctuated periodically in the less socially sophisticated churches by bursts of religious energy during a revival." They found that only 39 per cent. of the boys between 8-16 years belonged to any church, and we know that parents frequently send their children to church when they do not themselves believe. Of the adult congregations two-thirds were women and nearly all were over thirty. In the Lynds' second survey, during the years of the economic depression, no

¹ See Joad, C. E. M., *The Present and Future of Religion*. London, 1930.

² Ames, P., *The Psychology of Religious Experience*. 1910.

³ See Cattell, R. B., *Psychology and Social Progress*.

⁴ *Middletown*, R. & S. Lynd. New York.

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increase in attendance was noted, and the congregation was greater in average age. The same change has been observed in the Russian churches, catering only for a passing generation.

In spite of the fact that tribulation favours recourse to religious consolation, the economic depression failed, according to the above observers, to provoke a return to the Church, though there is evidence that it momentarily arrested the decline in attendance and the decay of interest. What surprises the sociologist in this as in other investigations is not so much the magnitude of the decline as its extreme slowness and deliberateness, having regard to the completeness and rapidity of the destruction which has overtaken the intellectual foundations of religious belief.

Compared with the rapidity of change and development in other social and economic attitudes and habits, the rate of change in religion was found by the Lynds to be the most slow of all the life activities of the people. Social scientists have evidently to look for special causes of this slowness, which may perhaps lie in the big differences in education and native intelligence between various groups, and in the established connections of religion with all the conservative processes of a community.

A sign-post to understanding the situation stands out in the finding consistently recurring in all investigations, that the more educated, or people possessed of better native mental capacity, are the most advanced in their abandonment of religious tenets. This was noticed in the early inquiry in England, for whereas the *Daily News* readers certainly represented a good average sample of English population with regard to intelligence and liberality of outlook, the readers of the *Nation* were highly selected for education and cultural intelligence. And it was the latter group which showed a significantly smaller percentage of belief in a personal God, in the divinity of Christ, in individual immortality and in the Apostles' Creed. Only in regard to belief in a purposive, creative Life Force does the more able and educated group show a higher percentage of affirmative answers.

American psychologists have pursued the issue with

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better techniques which enable us to analyse more closely the associations of religious belief. Thus Carlson¹ took a group of relatively unselected students and measured their attitudes to religion by graded attitude tests. By mental tests he also graded their intelligence. The correlation coefficient² between religious belief and intelligence was -0.19 , showing a slight tendency for the unintelligent to hold most strongly to religious beliefs. Applying an attitude test of progressive, radical views on most social and topical questions, and comparing its measurements with a measure of the extent of belief in God, he found a correlation of -0.42 . Thus more precise research substantiates common-sense observation and opinion among thinking people to the effect that orthodox religious belief tends to be associated with general conservatism of outlook, and to some extent with lower intelligence and deficient education.

Though the most ignorant and unintelligent may still be steeped in completely superstitious religion, and though the vast middle section of averagely intelligent and decent people is at the moment in a state of confused mental conflict, there has been—at least since the middle of the nineteenth century—a cultured group of scientists, artists, writers, and men of affairs which has attained complete poise and an established philosophy of life after rejecting religion and the Church. As representative of this mellowed revolt, we may take such a scientist as Julian Huxley, who merely remarks with regard to revealed religion, “I can get, on the whole, more satisfactory mediation from three or four feet of properly filled bookshelf than from a dozen

¹ Carlson, H. B., “Attitudes of Undergraduate Students.” *Journal of Social Psychology*, 5. 1934.

² The correlation coefficient is a mathematical device for measuring and expressing the amount of association between two sets of measurements. If the two sets are perfectly parallel and proportional the coefficient works out at $+1.0$. Thus the correlation between the number of words read and the amount of time spent in reading would be practically $+1.0$. If there is no association, e.g. as between the stature of adults and their age, the coefficient would be zero. If the relation is inverse, as between the size of the piece of cake given to each, and the number of boys who have to share, the coefficient would, with a perfect relation, be -1.0 . An idea of the meaning of coefficients may be gathered from a couple of instances, as e.g. that the correlative coefficient of intelligence with school achievement is about $+0.8$, of intelligence of fathers with sons, about $+0.5$.

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priests," or Sir John Collier, who, in his *Religion of an Artist*, takes it for granted that a good and moral life is quite compatible with atheism. He observes, "Some of the best people that I have ever known have no religion at all."

Of course, there have been sceptics with regard to religion among the leisured and philosophical of every age. They are found writing calmly in Roman villas or living adventurously in medieval courts. But their scepticism was of a different vintage, being based on temperamental deficiencies or special social conditions and traditions, whilst they lacked the knowledge both of the scientific world and of the history of man which gives us perspective to-day. They constituted a perennially irreligious minority of socially detached and peculiar people, whereas the irreligious to-day are beings normally capable of religious feeling, but now involved in a vast exodus from religion which is unique in history and a special product of the discoveries of our times.

For most of the intelligent men who are leaving organized religion to-day are by no means abandoning the essential values of religion. From William James to Bernard Shaw, or from Haeckel to Einstein, across the length and breadth of culture, they have substituted for revealed religion some profounder notion of universal purpose. The validity of the most common of these assumptions we will examine in the appropriate part of the next chapter.

All too frequently one senses in these proud constructions of philosophical rationality a blind nostalgia for emotional anchorage which leads to errors quite as pathetic as the childish imaginings of orthodox religion. Even so hard-headed a thinker as Shaw seems to hunt desperately now here, now there, for some will-o'-the-wisp light in the mute darkness of rationality. At one time he turns with enthusiasm to the Communist society, saying, "The Third International is a church, so naturally it will not allow any other religion to be taught to the children. . . . It is inspired by a great spiritual impulse." At another time he falls back upon the Life Force. One is compelled to agree with his biographer¹ who remarks: "All his life he has suffered under a handicap, which is that he is shy of using

¹ Shanks.

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... the name of God, yet cannot find any proper substitute." A paradox, sometimes amusing but invariably sterile, seems to be the final philosophical destination of most modern trains of would-be-religious thought.

If this is the fate of enterprising and powerful intellects, we must not be surprised to find that thoughtful people of more moderate gifts conclude themselves to be born into a sickly period of cultural change, "When but to think is to be full of sorrow and leaden-eyed despairs." One of the most comprehensive and penetrating seers of our time has indeed confessed his belief that "The world, always full of pain, is particularly so in our own age."¹ When the anguish of mind which attacks the intelligent in contemplating the cultural chaos following this collapse of the moral dominion of religion reaches such open and emphatic expression, we can be sure that even more ruthless tensions wrench the lives of the less articulate masses barely conscious of the directions in which they are being swept along.

One may glance at the ramifications of the conflict in a variety of situations ; it appears in the economic strains of the working man, exploited by a system from which moral curbs have fallen away ; it may be seen in the acute family discords through the differing religious attitudes of parents and children ; it recurs in the perplexity of the unread mother, vaguely conscious that the religious habits she insincerely teaches her children spell conflict and cynicism in later life ; it determines the disillusionment of the simple, devout man who sees his church deserted by most of the people whose guiding intelligence and personality he had learnt to respect ; it stultifies the teacher or social worker who would use religious guidance with morally lost and delinquent children, lacking any stable home background ; it paralyses those whose task it is to give consolation to the defeated and the dying. Thus in a myriad ways the dislocation of cultural lines of reference becomes translated into obscure emotional tensions, physical deprivations or consummated tragedies in the lives of those who may be themselves incapable of explicitly formulating the nature of the conflict in which they are embroiled.

¹ Bertrand Russell, *The Conquest of Happiness*.

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Naturally, it is likely that we exaggerate the neurotic intensity of the conflict now going on in the modern world, just as every age has believed its incubuses to be more malign than those of other ages. No "Golden Age" has ever been found outside mythology: economic depressions and stresses; stupid governments and leaders plunging nations into calamity; cultural riddles that torture the consciences of a century or lay waste fair countrysides in ugly civil war, have existed at all times. Nevertheless, discounting the magnification due to our nearness, it remains true that there have been few periods of history in which so many deep-seated habits of thinking and feeling have had to be changed in so short a time.

Circumstances have forced upon an increasing number of people the pace and complication of a city life in place of the country living to which countless generations of living had accustomed them. Economic experiments and reorganization on an unprecedented scale menace men's sense of independence and confuse their incentives. The old threat of war reappears, hideously magnified. Well-knit national cultures are increasingly impinged upon by alien and discordant attitudes flung across the world by newspaper and radio, regardless of the effects upon immature minds. In this mad delirium of material change and emotional confusion, just when men are most in need of some firm philosophy to build upon amidst the universal chaos, they are forced to face gaping fissures in the rock of religion itself. No wonder that, in spite of undreamt riches and comfort, men to-day are rarely fundamentally happy in the life of their society.

For further related reading see :

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CHAPTER V

AN ADVANCED SOCIETY, WITHOUT A SOUL

THE lack of well organized sociological research necessary to give the body politic a proper awareness of its own bodily health is, as we have seen, the cause of our inability to get any exact estimate of the decline of interest in formal religion. The same deficiency of facts and figures is an even greater obstacle to our present purpose of presenting a sufficiently comprehensive, graphic, and accurate survey of those varied consequences of the decline which we have already listed.

There are direct and obvious consequences, such as the decline in church attendance and church power, but these are probably less important than the indirect, obscure, and insidious undermining of habits and community loyalties which cause collapse in seemingly remote social structures.

Pervading all, and liable to be overlooked on account of its very pervasiveness, is the slow religious and moral disillusionment of the average citizen. The sense of purpose, of being a responsible member of a religious community, has gone from him. He loses confidence in the active and directing rôle of righteousness in human affairs. From this three main consequences are likely to follow: first, the Church as an agent of moral elevation and advance in society finds its attempts at leadership abortive; second, there is a general increase of delinquent and unsocial behaviour wherever the policeman is absent; third, there is a shift of emphasis from spiritual to economic values. The increasing attention given to-day to economic needs and material justice is in itself desirable and a proper application of moral principles, providing people do not think only of the particular application and forget the general principles. Nevertheless, one cannot doubt that the

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attention to material details is partly a consequence of decay of spiritual intensity and that the interest in economic values as such will persist after the injustices have been remedied.

Lynd's American study clearly indicates the loss of leadership suffered by religion : its functions have been cut down to stabilizing old habits of social organic life and consoling the unfortunate. A leading minister summed up for the research workers by saying, " In the old days people went to preachers for consolation, information and inspiration. They still come to us for consolation, but go to the newspapers for inspiration and information." A community the citizens of which are reduced to going to newspapers for " inspiration and information " must be in a bad way.

Characteristic of such decay of a great institution is the rapid and sporadic growth of a variety of new institutions inflated by the freshly released super-personal loyalties of countless individuals. Most of those institutions have no more value than have the fungoid growths on a dying tree, though some may come to have significance as permanent recrystallizations of loyalties and interests.

The Middletown Survey set down as one of its conclusions that religion to-day has no hold if once it cuts across serious issues of politics or patriotism. That is a sign-post to the principal readjustment now proceeding. The individual of religious disposition now gets beyond the limitations of his own meagre ego, and finds release in some super-individual purpose, by blind loyalty to the group to which he belongs. That consequence of religious decay reaches its logical conclusion, with all the intrinsic advantages and dangers of the idea, in Fascism and Communism. This direction of recrystallization is not new : it began, along with other sequels of the scientific invasion, at the Renaissance, but it is only with the spread of religious disillusionment into the general population in recent years that these alternative super-personal loyalties have assumed apparently monstrous and malignant forms.

The constant flourish of trumpets which accompanies the jousting of these new militant groups, admitting no law beyond themselves, must not be allowed to obscure the

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rise of beneficent and quieter purposes of a world-wide nature from the ashes of a formal religion. Education, for instance, has drawn heavily upon the personnel and the energies formerly devoted to religion. Social welfare work has done the same. Artists and scientists remain, as before, religiously devoted to beauty and truth. Their ranks have been strengthened by many who find in the impersonal service of science, and its concern with the great unchanging truths of the universe, something which offers all that religion meant to them—and more.

But these new realms of activity appeal to the few, the intelligent few. There is a majority which, in spite of all education can do, seems to prefer a blind and simple loyalty to partisan groups and gangs. Patriotism and politics readily seize upon their free energies. It may be true that patriotism and politics are not the ruthless banditry they might have been had not a universal religion for a time held sway, but who can say how long those Christian habits will last? Already there is a search for philosophical justification by the national groups which have run amok. And they can turn readily to Hegelianism, in which there is little comfort for those who value a "universal" religious viewpoint.

According to our background of ideas we may approve or deplore the rise of these new loyalties, but that they are an inevitable consequence of the dispersion of emotional interest previously centred in religion seems certain. For the most active and religiously disposed personalities will have group purpose in life somehow, and if they cannot express their longing and sense of duty in what has seemed to them intuitively the best form—because now that expression is sicklied over by the pale caste of scepticism—they will turn to the next best. Otherwise they must fall victims to a critical intellectualism, incapable of creative thought, and allow the sense of purposefulness, of common adventure in great issues, to die out of life altogether.

Such a spectacle—that of modern man, with all his powers and opportunities, reduced to a pleasant vegetable existence and a merely family-centred philosophy, is more

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degrading if less dangerous than that of his escape into crude nationalism. Joad has drawn an accurate and telling picture of this spreading cancer of unorganized cells within the body of society, a cancer which is the alternative to some form of active vitality in society as a whole. He refers to an all too common type of English suburb, remarking, "These architectural monstrosities are inhabited almost entirely by young married people, complete with cars, but without children. The men go to town daily by the 8.50, and return by the 6.30, while the women follow their example whenever they can spare the money for a matinée, which is about twice a week. They acknowledge no duty towards God, in whom they do not believe, and no duty towards their neighbours, whom they do not know." Viewing the thing from the outside, as a social excrescence, perhaps we do not emphasize sufficiently the most painful feature of all, which is the nagging individual sense of frustration, of isolation, and of deprivation of spiritual values. For who can doubt that these individuals have the normal hunger to play a real part in some community life, to subscribe to some traditions, to enter upon some collective adventure which gives meaning to life and awakens the vitality of the soul?

When one reflects what a living pillar of spiritual life religion has been to men of all kinds in the past, when one recalls, for example, that to thousands of very ordinary people it seemed an eminently natural and worth while thing to sacrifice their lives at the stake, or in battle, or in the cells of monasteries for the sake of this religious essence, one realizes something of the enormous emotional debt that remains to be met in a society suddenly deprived of religion.

It is not surprising, then, to find in our society, among the other symptoms of maladjustment, an almost maniacal hunt for pleasure. It was usual to say that the vogue of hectic enjoyments, speed, cocktails, and jazz was a consequence of the war; but this sensual preoccupation of a large section of the population, extending beyond anything known in happier ages in so large a fraction of the people, is obviously chronic. The social scientist is compelled

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to look for more permanent and massive influences, just as the geologist was forced to look for systematic slow-working forces where he had previously favoured the simple explanation of sudden catastrophes. A similar diabetes of distraction-hunger broke out in the Roman Empire when it became emotionally sickly. That was during the religious decline preceding the present example, when men were beginning to look askance at their old pagan gods. As Chesterton pithily remarks, "All round the circle of the Mediterranean cities the people mourned for the loss of gods and were consoled with gladiators."

Watching such symptoms we are again acutely aware of the dearth of adequate clinical data concerning the course of the disease. It is of interest to observe, however, that it takes different courses in different countries according to their degree of intellectualization and the nature of their past traditions. Germany, for instance, has always had an appreciable percentage of its population interested in, and sensitive to, world philosophical movements. Responding to ideas and cultural stereotypes, the German is a fairly rapid indicator of any increase in cultural *Weltschmerz*. And it is in Germany that the suicide rate has shown the most alarming rise in this generation. It is the same ideationally allergic group which showed the first resort to perverse sensuous dissipation and later turned back even into the bitterly discredited habit of nationalism in order to escape, at whatever cost, from this maladjusted emotional state.

Evidence of a statistical kind is to be found fairly readily, however, in all nations and groups which have undergone this looting by science of their emotional heritage. The United States is typical of most countries in manifesting a rise of neurotic conditions and mental disorders coincident with the decline of religious patterns. Link ¹ tells us that "the net annual *increase* in mental patients in hospitals in the U.S. has risen to 4½ per cent., and the rate is still rising."

A problem which has concerned sociologists and govern-

¹ *The Return to Religion*. New York, 1937.

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ments in the last two decades, but which no one seems to have connected with cultural conflicts, is the decline of the birthrate below the level necessary to save populations from the primrose path to extermination. Already it is evident from the findings of sociologists¹ that the causes are not, as is commonly and confidently supposed, economic. For economic manipulations and government interference with material conditions produce no more than a temporary fillip in the birthrate curves. Elsewhere I have attempted a fuller analysis of the various phenomenon here concerned, which I have called "social melancholia."² One of its main roots seems to be the need for acquiring costly and functionless distractions to compensate for a lack of deeper satisfactions in some fundamental purposive frame of living. And it is the decay of the religious explanation of life which has poisoned that quiet assurance of purpose.

True, one can point to hearty individuals who go about their natural business and pleasures without any awareness of a cultural malaise. They are exceeded in their independent unconcern only by animals—protected, domesticated animals. Apart from the danger which any blind creature constitutes to itself and others, they show the deleterious influence of the moribund state of religion only in their passive idleness. It is this group which Dean Inge has called "the largest and most irresponsible leisure class the world has ever seen." Having regard for the opportunities for human adventure and the conquest of Nature, made increasingly possible by a fuller education and our endowment of titanic energy from science, this impotence—this slow death from spiritual inanition overtaking the purposive body of society—is one of the most painful sequelæ of religious decomposition that a sociologist can be called upon to witness.

The tale of these spreading consequences would be a long one, but no sensitive individual can follow it far without being brought to the horrified conclusion that the game may not be worth the candle. Even ardent scientists, viewing the widespread destruction of happiness entailed,

¹ D. V. Glass, *The Struggle for Population*. London, 1936.

² R. B. Cattell, *The Fight for Our National Intelligence*. London, 1937.

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have ruefully admitted that truth can be entertained sometimes only at a prohibitive cost. Whilst those who thought that science would open a new paradise are already tired of their strange Messiah.

When people are sufficiently hurt and perplexed they have little patience with academic truth, and are prepared to grasp at any straw of emotional comfort. Since one must live before one can think, it is not hard to sympathize with those who value a way of life above a way of thinking. William James, for example, is typical of many men not merely great intellectually who have manifested, when faced with the dilemma of grasping either truth or religion, a determination to make sure of religion. James would persuade us that because religion "works" it must in some way be true.

This "pragmatic proof" of the truth of religion, resting upon analogy with the argument that an hypothesis which explains a set of facts is contingently true, is perhaps the best of a series of rather pitiful contentions by which religion has sought at the last moment to regain, through devious routes, the ground completely abandoned to the direct assaults of science and objective truth.

In view of the grave consequences of the annihilation of religion we should at least pause to give ear to these appeals. It is contended that the social functions of a religion, whether it be true or not, are indispensable. In the first place the religious man is more moral, and does not necessitate the expense of a police force.¹ He is better fortified to endure philosophically, and to adjust himself to, the irremediable frustrations of life. His belief in immortality helps him to acquire the perspective of the race rather than the individual, a perspective motivating those sacrifices

¹ I say this, being aware that there is ample evidence in psychological researches of a higher delinquency among several church denominations in America than in the unattached population. But the positive and indefinable moral benefits are not accessible by such means. Some aspects of the positive action of religion may be revealed by Link in his careful application of a great variety of objective tests to 10,000 school children, from which he states, "one of the findings was that individuals who believed in religion (or attended a church) had significantly better personalities than those who did not," *The Return to Religion*, p. 13.

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without which a great and progressive type of society cannot persist. He gains, it is said, a sense of purpose and faith in belonging intimately to a society that cares for him.

Further, there are abundant arguments showing that the wiser individual, or the same individual in a presumably wiser state, adopts religion. It is pointed out that older people, even when they have been rabid atheists in their youth, are prone, as their experience grows, to acquire a religious viewpoint. It is said that though people may dispense with religion in the careless blindness of health and security, they achieve religious insight when faced with the realities of disaster and death. Again, other things being equal, it is frequently the more intelligent,¹ thoughtful, and sensitive young people who first seem to see the need for a religious belief which convinces of the worth-whileness of life and gives significance to the human struggle against the cruelty and indifference of the inanimate world.

The value of religion to society as a whole seems to stand out as an undeniable lesson of history. Religion has apparently welded societies in a resistance to internal or external disruptive forces which exceeds in tenacity any attained by irreligious societies. Further, the argument is not unreasonable that religion has been a necessary midwife at the birth of culture, restraining the brute forces of cruelty, selfishness, crime, and chaos until the infant powers of intellectuality, beauty, and goodness had a firm grip on life.

But the convinced disciple of religion will scorn dependence on minute historical analyses or the appeal to tables of delinquency statistics. He will bid us look at the matter with broad vision. He will observe that the apes and brute beasts and men who are no better than brute beasts—the moral imbeciles and the feeble-minded—manifest no par-

¹ This is not always true with regard to intelligence alone. Indeed, the youth of high intelligence and low sympathy is often longest able to avoid the perception of God, as he is able to miss emotional education generally, because his intelligence permits him to experience fewer difficulties, and because he acquires a habit of handling his world with the kid gloves of the intellect.

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ticular awareness of the need for God. It is among men of refined intelligence and emotional sensibility whose lives have been enriched by the profoundest experiences that the search for God becomes of dominant importance. He will point out that the dull, the circumspect, and the un-aspiring may go their little ways without accepting God, but that individuals and communities living fully and unselfishly, to the limits of their talents, and shouldering responsibilities and creative tasks apparently beyond their natural powers, have often done so with happy confidence and a success which is miraculous, through that peace of mind given them by belief in God.

Faced by these positive achievements which the religious attitude has bestowed on men, appalled by the desolation which is following on the sickness of religion, we may well come to have some sympathy with those practical people of good works who are stubbornly preserving their loyalty to religious principles in spite of the fact that reason makes this position untenable. Incredible as it may seem to the scientist, they are prepared to throw overboard intellect and logic rather than allow the ship of faith to founder.

I imagine that many clergymen and priests to-day would be found in that position. They are extroverts, more interested in people than in ideas, and greatly concerned to help human beings in the difficult emotional crises of their lives by some faith of proven efficacy. In this they are so engrossed that they do not notice what is happening to the dogma of theology. Probably, in their heart of hearts, and not in the chapter house, they would be prepared to let go all but their belief in the value of the personality of Christ, scarcely realizing that this would leave the organized Church completely at the mercy of change.

Many scientists are prepared to join them on that ground. Even a psychologist experienced in handling scientifically the personality problems of many individuals, though obviously in a different way from that of Freud or Forsyth, has announced his "belief in the divine moral order expressed in the ten commandments and in the life of Christ ; and the acceptance of the Church as the chief, even though imperfect, vehicle of religious truths that are

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greater than science, and values that are higher than reason.”¹ Moved by the same realizations, a modern novelist,² formerly with more of a reputation for highly entertaining flippancy than for introspection, has written us a sermon on the text, “The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.”

But these men who wrought destruction in religious beliefs actually did not say anything in their hearts, which were eager to continue in faith. It was from their heads that the new impulse came.

No scientist worthy of the name will follow any of these escapes to religion, no matter how great his sympathy with a society in torment or individuals in extremities. For he holds the search for truth to be the noblest aim—and as for human suffering, he knows that no people have ever been permanently happy or successful by cherishing an illusion. He recognizes in such pragmatic arguments as that men will turn to religion in their troubles an argument equally applicable to drink and drugs. He has more respect for the proud unreason of the religious man, like Mac-Murray, who cries, “It is high treason to say you believe in God because it is helpful to believe in Him.”

Stoically to follow science into its bleak altitudes is the only course left to us. But who knows, if we penetrate by holding on to scientific methods more patiently, and further than many of our too rash fellow-scientists have done, we may yet reach something as valuable as all that was lost with religion?

For further related reading see :

HIRSCH, W., *Religion and Civilisation : the Conclusion of a Psychiatrist*. New York, 1912.

LINK, H. C., *The Return to Religion*. New York, 1937.

NICHOLS, B., *The Fool Hath Said*. London, 1937.

LYND, H. M., and LYND, R. S., *Middletown in Transition : a Study in Cultural Conflicts*. New York, 1937.

WELLS, H. G., *The Soul of a Bishop*. London, 1917.

¹ Link, H. C., *The Return to Religion*. New York, 1937.

² B. Nichols, *The Fool Hath Said*. 1936. I do not at all agree with Mr. Nichols's arguments in spite of their delightful style, but only with his main conclusion.

CHAPTER VI

A PSYCHOLOGIST RECOGNIZES THE GROUP MIND

To judge by their present activities, most psychologists have drawn in with their scientific pap and later accepted with blindly dutiful zeal the traditional antipathy of science to religion. They will discuss religion only as a perversion, and the soul they will not mention at all. As Sheldon timely remarks, "For years psychologists have shouted down the soul with an intensity which recalls the puritan shouting down his sexual consciousness." In view of the anthropological history of the word "soul" there is scientific justification for caution, but not for a taboo. And even a taboo should be lifted now that psychology is coming of age and achieving power to deal with difficult issues.

But the psychologists have jostled each other to be first in routing the shattered remnants of religious forces from the battlefield of human thought. The situation is considered to be, as we have said, that since the physical sciences have shown how illusory religious notions are, psychological science will show through what flaws in the mind the illusion is created and sustained.

If they have met any opposition at all in this simple endeavour it has been from none but those insignificant deserters from the battle of human thought who cry, from miserable fastnesses of superstition, that all scientists are "fools of reason." My criticism in this chapter is precisely the converse, namely, that psychologists have failed to follow reason enough. Instead they have persisted conservatively in a dull habit of destructive analysis of religion. It is amazing that none of these psychologists has perceived, as he helped clear the ground of the litter

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of broken religious dogma, that his own science marked out clearly the foundations for a new and nobler structure of scientifically founded religion. For, as I hope to show in the following pages, the last of the sciences is performing the miracle of transferring religion from the mean and cramping foundation of dogmatic superstition to the basis of limitless growth found in science.

In passing we may conjecture that the psychologist's failure lies in ignorance of his own personal psychology. Most of the great names in psychology to-day belong to a generation which had some embarrassing conflicts with a moribund but still formidable and politically dangerous religion. Freud was in the forefront of that generation. Forsyth, who has written the most clear and comprehensive exposition of the destructive psychological approach to religion, relates that as a child he was at enmity with his authoritarian religious teachers, and that they prophesied for him a very bad end. Biographers' details are more than details to the psychoanalyst, and it is of interest that Dr. Forsyth, like H. G. Wells and other vigorous opponents of religious orthodoxy, recalls putting up a brave fight against the chilling experience of baptism at the font. However, it is not for a psychologist to emphasize to any psychoanalyst the immense importance of infant trauma.

Regarding such educational influences G. K. Chesterton once remarked, "The best relation to our spiritual home is to be near enough to love it. But the next best is to be far enough away not to hate it." For scientific purposes, however, it is necessary to achieve such detachment that we neither love nor hate it. Unfortunately psychology as a science drags in its train a rabble of camp followers interested in anything but psychology as a science. Thus we are not surprised to find a member of the first sect of psychoanalysts explaining from the depths of his sectarian omniscience that, "God is permeated by wonder and its accompanying sense of mystery—a typical childish feeling which should normally be outgrown in adult life." If it were not presumptuous to set a physicist's view of science against the utterance of so rigorous and old-established a science as psychoanalysis, one might put some faith in Einstein's

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view that, "the most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all true art and science."

Doubtless when psychoanalysis is as old as physics it will, if it still exists, be a helpful branch of psychology in the study of the human soul. At present, though psychology literally means "the science of the soul," the word soul is practically taboo in psychology, and most of the profound human problems which arise from what used to be called the soul and God have been completely neglected. Naturally an experimental science has to concern itself first with the simpler problems, but the progress of experiment has already been so successful that the time seems ripe for at least the envisaging of greater issues in scientific terms.

There are already in psychology certain conceptions and some experimental research results which offer a basis for an entirely new and constructive scientific approach to religion. The first and most important of these comes from social psychology. It is the notion of the Group Mind, which McDougall¹ developed in 1920, without, however, dwelling upon the implications for religion. While clinical psychology has been destroying religious beliefs, social psychology has been holding out the possibility of new religious foundations. But since the claims of clinical psychology have been more spectacular and the growth of a painstaking experimental social psychology has been slow, the public has not yet perceived that what psychology takes away with one hand it more than gives back with the other.

Elements of the modern conception of a group mind are found in Hobbes, Hegel, Bosanquet, and others. The essence of the notion is that in any organized group of human beings there exists a super-individual mind, built up from, yet greater than, the sum of the individual minds.

For some reason a habit of verbal thinking persists in the average layman, and even among some physical scientists, which makes such a notion seem absurd when it is first encountered. Yet the evidence is open to the observation of every one, and, as I shall show, it is irrefutable.

¹ W. McDougall, *The Group Mind*. London, 1920.

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In an earlier work I dealt with the multifarious possibilities of error in the verbal thinking of philosophers,¹ and I find a similar scepticism in Freud's attitude to the present question when he says, "Philosophers stretch the meaning of words until they retain scarcely anything of the original sense ; by calling ' God ' some vague abstraction which they have created for themselves, they pose as deists, as believers before the world." Our desire is not to pose as believers or unbelievers, but to approach the matter with an open mind initially free from religious beliefs. The group mind must rest on its own merits, must be freed from entanglement with philosophical systems, must not be given a false outline even by the word " mind," but must be represented by the properties which in fact we find it to have. If the label " mind " is to be used, it must not be applied in any vague, mystical, or metaphorical sense, but because, pending the invention of some other word, it describes what we speak of, and in the sense in which mind is commonly used by every one.

What do we mean when we speak of any individual mind ? We mean that the individual is alive, that he responds to stimulation, that he has emotions and appetites, that he acts and wills to do certain things, that he decides between different courses of action, that his behaviour shows evidence of memory and of some constant habits and sentiments which constitute his personality. If we are not behaviourists—it is of no great relevance to the detection of mind—we also assume that he is conscious. Further, as biologists, we expect the behaviour characteristic of mind to be invariably associated with some physical grey matter, either in one mass as in the vertebrates or in more scattered masses as in the invertebrates.

Now consider any group—from a ship's crew or a football team to a nation. The group, if in a healthy state, acts in a unified way towards some definite end, as an individual does when sane. It responds as a whole to external stimuli. It shows evidence of emotion and heightened excitability, which you can perceive in an individual by his pulse or his language. Similarly you can perceive in a football crowd

¹ *Psychology and Social Progress*. London, 1931.

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a common wave of emotion, reddening a thousand faces, or read in the newspapers of a nation the more wild expressions which mirror a heightened feeling tone. The behaviour of a nation reveals idiosyncrasies of habit and native temperament as does that of individuals. There is a memory of its past and of incidents occurring between itself and other groups. The "group memory" is stored partly in individual minds and partly in the archives of libraries. There are persisting sentiments, partly in the form of national traditions, which mould each new generation of group protoplasm, and which issue in behaviour giving character to the group mind. And the conflicting feelings and attitudes of a group issue, through newspaper discussions, ballots, and organized political committees in acts of will which alter the face of the earth.

Just how memories are stored, feelings excited, or actions expressed we need not expound in any detail here. A parallel could not in any case be worked out because we do not know these things of the individual mind either. All we know are the manifestations of stimulation, emotion, memory, and will. The question of group mind structure, though a fascinating one, cannot be approached here more than to observe that most mental features of the group mind are carried in the individual minds. The individual mind mirrors in miniature the group mind, yet no individual mind, not even the comprehensive minds of politicians, or of literary or scientific men, can subtend the whole range of awareness of the group mind. Nor can any individual mind, however great its feeling or desire to act, equal the power and intensity and richness of feeling included in the group mind.

The objection commonly raised to the use of the same term for both the group and the individual manifestations of mind is that the individual mind has a greater unity than the group mind. In the former there is supposed to be one consciousness and one mass of nerve tissue. But such an assertion merely shows ignorance of the individual mind. We now know that there can be two or more separate consciousnesses—co-consciousnesses—in one mind, and that even the unity of consciousness and action in the healthy

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individual is only the result of binding together many would-be-independent impulses and feelings. In this respect the study of the individual mind has been helped by our knowledge of the group mind, for the structure of contending subordinate group minds, of repressing and repressed elements, and of a hierarchy of functions, observed in the group mind, has proved an enlightening model for exploring the individual mind.

As for the trivial objection that the physical elements—the individual brains and records—of the group brain are in no fixed geographical relation to each other, whereas those of the individual mind are localized in one cranium, it is scarcely worthy of discussion. The physical elements of a group mind may be physically bunched together as in a ship, and may vanish together at its sinking. The same cells of the individual brain, on the other hand, as Lashley has shown, may work in different combinations at different times. But the important thing is that the elements of the group mind should be in communication, by sight, speech, writing, telephone, or other means, so that each portion of nervous tissue can react appropriately to whatever is affecting all the others. Whether the portions of grey matter are separated by interstitial tissue and communicate by nerve threads as in the brain or are separated by brick walls and communicate by electric wires as in the group mind is of little consequence. Nor are the idioms of communication important providing they are appropriate to the mental experience to be transmitted: lovers may communicate by hand pressures and mathematicians by symbols: each maintains a group awareness of some form of initially individual excitation.

Naturally there are different types of group mind just as there are different kinds of individual mind, and the less organized kind of group mind, the crowd, is lower than any individual mind, unless we look for the latter far down in the scale of animal evolution.

There is an old saying, *vox populi, vox dei*, which has been used now seriously, now satirically, with a wealth of profound intuition in both meanings. The voice of the crowd is not even an echo of the voice of God, but it is

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equally certain that the highly organized and integrated self-conscious group mind, containing more individuals than any brain has cells, exceeds quantitatively and qualitatively any performance of which an individual mind is capable.

A most interesting study could be made of the parallels between various types of individual mental structures and group structures. For instance, "split personalities" are observable in both. In both there are changes of mood, for just as different instinctive drives dominate the individual at different times, so the mood and policy of nations alters as different thrusts of political demand come to power in the government. In both there are distinct kinds of breakdown to which particular types of internal organization are particularly prone. There are hysterics and manic depressives, obsessionals and anxiety neurasthenics among the nations. The cycle of confidence and depression in the business activity of the group which now puzzles the economist may well depend on a similar mechanism to that which causes alternations of confidence and depression in the energies of the individual of cyclothyme temperament.

An harmonious character in either mind depends on the organizing of drives in such a way that all the needs of the body politic receive some degree of satisfaction. Without this there must be some kind of civil war or mental conflict leading to the repression of one force by another. And it would seem that the same evils arise from repression in the group as within the individual mind. The government of the day representing the open, self-conscious, and "respectable" forces of society, maintains unity, order, and its own supremacy by driving underground the elements opposed to its policies, the discontented or the disintegrative. Similarly the ego, or self-regarding sentiments, drives into the limbo of the unconscious the individual urges not compatible with the dominant ego. The government, or the ego, which fails to allow some expression to all the elements which might help to compose it, and which represses too extensively, is heading for a state of internal strain and possibly a violent overthrow. A revolution in the group is paralleled by a religious conversion in the individual: Russia is the Scrooge in the *Christmas Carol* of the nations.

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All these relationships are matters for statistical, experimental, and clinical research in the life of the individual and the group. They concern the psychologist rather than the philosopher. Indeed it is most important here, and henceforth to save this study of the group mind from contamination with the philosophical assumptions of Hegel's deification of the state. McDougall, as a psychologist and also as a believer in individuality and internationalism, is equally explicit in sundering his concept of the group mind from that of the "State, super-individual and semi-divine" of Hegel, before which it is axiomatic that all men must bow down, renouncing their claims to freedom and personal judgment.

The particular beliefs or prejudices which clash with Hegel's prejudices are not so good a cause for rejection of the latter as is the divorce of the Hegelian concept from the need of scientific investigation. This precious philosophical view had best be preserved, with all its elaborations and mystical associations, from the possibility of growth. Most arbitrary of all its assumptions is the fixation of group mind at the level of the national group and its denial of smaller or larger group minds. Psychologically there are clear evidences of group minds of some degree of organization in a cricket team, a school, a city, a church, a regiment, the staff of a newspaper, a university, or the whole of civilized mankind. If there is anything in judging ideas pragmatically by the taste of their fruits the Hegelian philosophy, which was admittedly instrumental in giving sanction to the World War, has made a grievous error in this arbitrary blindness to any group other than the state.

Because of this error there has been a revulsion of attitude against accepting the whole idea of the group mind. In Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, which expressed the outlook of a disillusioned generation, even the common soldiers, dimly conscious of their victimization by a faulty system of ideas, begin a philosophical examination of what lies behind the words "Germany," "France," "Britain." No English soldier had any personal quarrel with a German soldier, so, they conclude, it cannot be the people who want to fight. Is it then so many

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acres of land labelled England which declare war on so many acres called Germany? I forget the outcome of their reasoning—I think they decided the war was due to personal ambition on the part of the Kaiser and other rulers—but the method they employ, which is that of ignoring all but personal and material factors in the situation, is the faulty one so frequently used even by people better educated and with less cause for bias than those unfortunate soldiers possessed.

In the first place the existence in common speech of terms for the group mind, its feelings, attitudes, and behaviour, indicates that something exists which is most conveniently handled in thought in this way. When we say, "Great Britain is distinctly uneasy over the situation," or "The committee has decided to act in such and such a manner," we mean that groups of people have experienced certain thoughts, feelings, and attitudes and possess an organization capable of putting their decisions into effect. We are speaking of no mythical, ideal entity present only in verbal thinking, but of certain agglomerations of matter and consciousness quite as real as any individual.

If philosophers are sometimes woolly-minded, the law, on the other hand, errs on the side of not recognizing anything which it is not absolutely bound to recognize. Yet hard-headed law repeatedly admits the existence of an entity over and above that of the individuals who compose it. It lays down rules of behaviour for corporations and limited companies, and admits that a ship (not the material vessel) has liabilities distinct from those of the captain, the crew, or the owner.¹ Dealers in hard cash, the banks and the economists, have also long recognized the workings of something vaguely thought of as "the public mind," and have clamoured for psychologists to discover its workings.²

¹ Robinson, *Law and the Lawyers*. New York, 1935.

² Thus the 1937 review of economic conditions by the National City Bank of America makes the following observation: "The business of the country is an aggregate of the actions and policies of millions of individuals and corporations . . . it might be supposed that their difference of opinion would cancel out. But that is not always the case. They are all subject to the same economic and psychological influences. By and large they tend to go forward together, planning and spending confidently; and conversely they curtail and economize together."

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Alas, the psychologists, obsessed by Behaviourism and every other "ism" which rears its vain head between the psychologist and his subject matter, have only just become aware of the great problem of the group mind; they are just beginning to see the wood in spite of the trees.

For further related reading see :

CHESTERTON, G. K., *The Everlasting Man*. London, 1925.

McDOUGALL, W., *The Group Mind*. London and New York, 1920.

WELLS, H. G., *What are we to do with our Lives?* London, 1931.

CHAPTER VII

THE NASCENT SOUL OF SOCIETY: THE THEOPSYCHE

LET no more time be wasted considering whether the group mind can be said to exist ; for there are so many fascinating questions awaiting investigation in regard to its properties and characteristics. In the first place the group mind has a property of inertia, of carrying on the characteristics which men have given it long after those men have died. In its basic life it is potentially immortal, growing into the future as far as the human race itself shall grow. On the hilltop above my home is a circular clump of trees. Records show that it has been there at least five hundred years, but no individual tree which then looked over the valley exists to-day. Only the wood lasts on, the same wood, with the same profile which has delighted men's eyes these many generations.

The more complex properties of the group mind can be understood only after we have classified the relation of the individual to the group mind. The individual gives to it and he takes away, but what he gives often stays, and what he takes away generally leaves the group mind unimpoverished. Practical psychological observations are best made at first on small groups, *e.g.* the school. Now it is a commonplace among teachers that a school spirit or tone exists which is not entirely attributable to any single boy or collection of boys. The "gestalt" or pattern psychologists have long argued convincingly that, especially in psychological matters, the whole is more than a sum of its parts. There is either something new in the pattern of the elements or some "creative synthesis" whereby new qualities are produced from the fusion of the given qualities.

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As yet we know nothing about the alchemy whereby this group spirit is distilled from the character of individual minds, but we do know that the group mind acts powerfully in moulding individual minds. It is a devastating yet salutary experience to take a piece of paper and list those ideas which are genuinely our own creations, and those which we have taken over as our own from parents, teachers, friends, and books. Our thoughts, our ways of feeling, our pleasures, our type of humour, even our most intense convictions are commonly grafted upon us, as gently as a mother clothes a naked child, by the group mind. It could, at any moment, hold each one of us bankrupt of all mental form. Each individual mind is a part of the minds of all men living and still more of all men dead. For the slow gains of history, the discoveries of scientists, the phrases of poetry and song, the patterns of human nature hewn out by dramatists, and all the accumulated experience of man about life and the universe are an intrinsic part of each individual mind. Each can rearrange a little the furniture he has been given, but in the vast majority of people individuality is the name given to their inability to grasp more than a small fraction of all that the group mind covers. To each is given some power of selection, a possibility, generally no more than unconsciously used, to invest ideas with new patterns of emotional force—that, plus a little intellectual inventiveness, generally used in nothing but conversational wit. Environment, from the day of our birth, tends to treat us as vessels, of varying capacities, into which can be poured the social heritage that has its sources in Plato and Jesus, Galileo and Newton, Confucius and Shakespeare, and indeed in all the greater and lesser contributors to culture since culture began.

To state this fact is not to surrender to Fatalism. One thinks of the age-old query in the philosophy of Omar Khayyám :

Said one among them—" Surely not in vain,
My substance from the common Earth was ta'en
That He who subtly wrought me into shape
Should stamp me back to shapeless Earth again ? "

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In every man there is the possibility of contributing something new through his own true individuality, *i.e.* through that part of his individuality that is not merely passive. Therein lies our personal immortality. This gift to the group mind may be on the intellectual level—Spearman has shown in detail how such entirely new mental constructions come about.¹ On the other hand, it may be a new emotional adjustment through which society benefits. As yet we know little more than that some processes of trial and error, through courageous life experiment, may produce such increments of growth of the group mind. But they also serve who only preserve in their own lives the good features in the group mind against the constant battering of disintegrative forces.

From a broad scientific standpoint our immortality is plainly of two kinds. We have a biological, physical immortality in our children, who perpetuate the dispositions, temperaments, and intelligences of their parents. Through this similarity they are living forces tending to foster the same kinds of values as those which we have ourselves most naturally loved. It could reasonably be maintained that this biological immortality alone is more satisfying than any of the internally contradictory phantasies of traditional religion. For certain features of the desire for immortality persist because we have never tasted of its fulfilment. Most religious sects imagine they would be perpetually entertained by the novelty of wings and harps. A representative of more sophisticated opinion, Mr. Winston Churchill, thinks of the entertainment he would get from a dialogue between Plato and his friend Lord Balfour. "When I go to heaven," he confidently banters, "I shall try to arrange a chat between these two on some topic not too recondite for me to follow." It is possible, however, that they would quarrel continually, or that the dialogue would be drowned by the roar of football crowds or radio enthusiasts likewise pursuing perpetual happiness in their own way.

When all is said, the only thing we lose by avoiding this kind of immortality, is the satisfaction of contact with old friends. It may be objected that we also lose, in merely

¹ C. Spearman, *Creative Mind*. London, 1930.

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biological immortality, the satisfaction of our own entirely unique personal continuity, since in each generation there is a break, a reshuffling of the germinal genes and chromosomes, a slight reorientation of the living forces of the next individual. But are we so sure that the pattern of our own living personality remains so very fixed? The individual arrested in immortality at fifteen would be very different from the "same" individual translated to immortality at fifty. The continuity of our consciousness is destroyed even by each night's sleep and the individual awakes each day in some way altered. Is this so different from his dying in sleep and continuing as his children?

Clarification of the forms of immortality is essential for understanding religion. William James¹ has rightly remarked that "religion, for the great majority of our own race, *means* immortality, and nothing else"; while poets and philosophers from earliest history to modern times have wrestled with the riddle of death:

Through laughter, through the roses, as of old,
Comes Death, on shadowy and relentless feet,
Death, unappeasable by prayer or gold;
Death is the end, the end!²

There is something in all but the simplest minds that strives for a more direct and individual persistence than is given in biological immortality; for a persistence of the things concerning which the individual strives and hopes and fears, and for a persistence of those strivings themselves. This desire may or may not be met by the second form of immortality which scientific observation is able to recognize. To understand this second form one must note that in the group mind every individual's words and actions, every precept, emotional expression or example of conduct, spreads out in a widening circle of consequences in the lives of his contemporaries and his posterity.

The laws of physics, which permit energy neither to be created nor destroyed, and the principle of determinism, of inevitable cause and effect, running throughout the

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 524.

² Rupert Brooke, *Second Best*.

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universe, ordain that every mental state or physical occurrence shall be a consequence of all that has gone before. Every kind of thoughtful action, every act characterized by truth and beauty, generates similar acts in others, and contributes something to the growing heart of goodness in the group mind.¹

Acts and ideas and feelings reverberate down the ages, and coalesce and favour the development of their own forms. The hard and honest thinking of the scientist and his devotion to truth, wring discoveries from the stubborn grasp of Nature, which continue in the service and thought of man, a beneficent immortality increasing human power, and favouring the realistic ways of thinking originally found in the scientist. The new visions and heightened experiences of artist, poet, and musician continue like melodies played on the instruments of each new generation of brains. They persist as experiences in a living, immortal group mind. The vitality and joy which invests them does not end. As Cicero observed long ago, "A short life is given us by Nature, but the memory of a well-spent life is eternal." Actually we have to deal with the persistence of something more than memories: the immortality of attitudes, of joys, and æsthetic experiences, of heroisms and modes of self-expression.

Surely this immortality is as superb in conception as any conceived in primitive forms of religion ! It omits only an integrated self-activity in the ideas that go on.² It adds

¹ It may be objected that in certain instances good acts, instead of continuing goodness, help evoke acts of opposite quality, good being transmutable into evil. For instance, excessive kindness to a child, causing him to be spoilt, will leave an aftermath of evil. This example shows the common fallacy in such arguments: the kindness that spoils is more an indulgence of the giver's feelings than real kindness. Virtue that is true cannot result in an evil aftermath. The quality of means is here more important than the appearance of ends.

² This the poet laments:

And my laughter and my pain,
Shall home to the Eternal Brain
And all lovely things, they say,
Meet in loveliness again.

But

There's little comfort in the wise.

Does the poet feel the same in age? And does he forget that his personal

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the possibility of ideas expanding in intensity and influence till they far surpass their first glowing in an individual mind. But its relation to biological immortality is a close and organic one. A system of ideas sits most comfortably on minds similar in structure to those which created the ideas, so that the aristocrat and the Chinaman are correct in emphasizing the importance of familial persistence. On the other hand, whatsoever is good and true and beautiful will last in all group minds. Furthermore, it is certain that ideals and ways of thinking can, over many generations, mould a population by Darwinian selective survival towards a biological type suited to those ideals.¹ The two kinds of immortality interact. To ask which is "more important" for the group mind is to pose a question which is insoluble in that form; but it is evident that men of great vision, religious leaders, scientists, and artists have regarded their spiritual immortality as of more value to society than their biological survival, and a whole Church, by insisting on celibacy in its priesthood, has embraced the same view. Research might answer the question for particular classes of individuals, yet one is tempted to say meanwhile that there can be few whose contribution to society is so increased by their freedom from family cares that they are justified in sacrificing biological immortality.

The suggestion has been implied above that the structure of the group mind is such as to favour in some way the preservation of good as opposed to evil actions and thoughts. To justify that suggestion would require a great assembly of instances. So brief a treatment as this will have to content itself with the assertion that evil actions, by the very nature and definition of evil as that which is opposed to group welfare, must in time, if not immediately, mutually cancel and destroy each other. Actions are evil because

death is no sudden change? We die from day to day as we withdraw our activity from one sphere of activity or another. An ageing man may withdraw from, say, the political world, and then from his club, and so on till he is just a spinal animal. A poet may die as a poet long before he dies as a man. Some individuals can rightly be described as always half-dead. Death is a relative matter; it is a base line of life, and why should we deplore the final stage more than any other?

¹ This notion is discussed more fully in my book, *The Fight for Our National Intelligence*.

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they are non-contributory, untrue to life, mutually contradictory, selfish rather than outwardly directed, tending naturally to become null and void. I think Whitehead is asserting the same view when he says, "There is self-preservation inherent in that which is good in itself."

Few riddles have tormented the religious philosopher so much as the problem of evil. We will return to offer a more complete solution in the next chapter. Enough if we grasp here the immense significance of the group mind in its main outlines. That significance has escaped psychologists too long, and even a philosopher of the standing of Bertrand Russell has said, "To expect a personality to survive the disintegration of the brain is like expecting a cricket club to survive when all its members are dead." Yet both of these expectations come true and through the operation of the same principle, the group mind. The truth is that of the old cry, "The king is dead. Long live the king!" Protoplasm lives on discontinuously; the mental life and its traditions constitute a living continuity.

As one examines this notion of immortality within the group mind it becomes evident that different individuals achieve widely varying degrees of immortality. Since we do not survive as a whole, since the evil elements are arrested and only the unselfishness and that which is of value to the group mind lives on, it is true to say that the evil man has little or no immortality, but that the saint becomes almost pure immortality. The immortality of Christ pervades almost all our lives, moulding them towards happiness and peace and love. The immortality of Shakespeare in the spoken word, the thought and wit and wisdom over a large part of the earth is only a little less striking. In our modern realistic modes of reasoning and in our powers over Nature we enjoy the immortality—indeed we are the immortality—of the thought and will of great scientists from Newton to Pasteur, and of all whom they have inspired.

Immortality is a matter of degree, but that degree is far from being decided by the talents which a man is given at birth. The humblest men and women may achieve great

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immortality. For it seems reasonable to conjecture that the cohesion of the group mind is the prerequisite of all else, and that cohesion is maintained by the love and self-abnegation of every individual in his daily life. The devoted mother, the common soldier giving his life for the group ideals upon the battlefield, are equally essential to the group development and share in great measure the foundational elements in its immortality. If we accept the intuitions of Christ in this as in other fields as being contingently the nearest approximation to truth that human wisdom may attain, it is evident that love and humility, sincerity and faith in fellow-men, have as great an immortality value as power, mental capacity, or creativeness.

To commence an investigation of the group mind in what purports to be a study of religion may have seemed to the reader at first somewhat strange, but the reasons for doing so must have become increasingly clear as the qualities of the group mind emerged. It is evident that many of its properties are undoubtedly those which in intuitive and traditional literature have been repeatedly ascribed to God.

This mind is a super-individual consciousness with which the individual can maintain communion. He depends upon it, and it exercises a benevolent intervention in his life. He is, spiritually, and in some sense physically, created by the group mind. In serving it he is doing precisely what has been defined as the worship and service of God. It is the cumulative reservoir of super-individual wisdom and it defines, by the conditions of its existence, the commandments of morality. It is the assurance of immortality, which is to be obtained only by giving one's life to it. It gives to the individual faith to carry out those tasks valuable to the community which chance and accident and evil may interrupt in the individual's life.

There is not a phrase or metaphor in the essential scriptures of great religions which does ring true when applied to the group mind. Seeking to define more precisely the qualities of the group mind one finds oneself compelled to resort to words hitherto used in theology rather than in science. For example, how should one

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characterize the individual qualities that have immortal value from those which disappear each generation in the dross of mere individual animal life? Precisely the word we want exists in the term "divine." If we assign the term divinity to the "group mindedness" of things, then it is obvious that personalities such as those of Christ are almost wholly divine. But there is some measure of divinity—of godlikeness—in Buddha and Plato, Michelangelo or Beethoven, and in every individual, however insignificant, who has some concern for the good aspirations of his fellow-men.

Men are reluctant to apply to new entities terms having associations with notions they have forcefully discarded. Those people of intelligence and goodwill who have broken away from traditional religious systems, not in a spirit of wanton hostility, but from the force of logic, the advance of knowledge, and the refusal of religion to give up its dogmatic basis, are still variously groping for a means of defining their awareness of something greater than themselves. They may say like Haeckel that their strivings are towards the trinity of Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. As a typical modern holder of this standpoint we may take Professor J. B. S. Haldane, who writes, "It is . . . in our active ideals of truth, right, charity and beauty . . . and fellowship with others that we find the revelation of God."

Such a substitution of abstract ideals for an active relation to a purpose or plan has a Confucian-like static quality; but most western thinkers have retained the more dynamic concepts associated with Christianity. Thus in Wells we find the comprehensive statement, "I do not believe in the least that either the body of H. G. Wells or his personality is immortal, but I do believe that the growing process of thought, knowledge and will of which we are parts, of which I am part, and of which you are a part, may go on growing in range and power for ever. I think that man is immortal, but not men. . . . Our individuality is, so to speak, an inborn obsession from which we shall escape as we become more intelligent. . . . If I had the time and erudition I think I could make an argument to show that this idea of the immortal soul of the race, in which our own lives are like passing thoughts, is to be found in what

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Confucius calls the Higher Person, in what St. Paul calls the New Adam, in the Logos of the Stoics, in the modern talk we hear of the Over-man or Super-man." Similar views will be found in Shaw's prefaces, in connection with the notion of the Life Force, with which we may deal in the next chapter.

William James limited his description to the following: "The practical needs and experience of religion seem to be met sufficiently by the belief that beyond each man, and in a fashion continuous with him, there exists a larger power that is friendly to him and his ideals," giving "an assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and, in relation to others, a preponderance of loving affection."

What strikes one about all these examples of the ideas of eminent thinkers or of movements which have broken away from traditional church worship is that they might be applied without any essential contradiction to the group mind. Naturally it is unlikely that all those notions mentioned, for instance by H. G. Wells, would be found to have exact correspondence with the characteristics of the group mind as we yet know them. Because they are different in origin from the group mind, which rests on a basis of scientific observation, and because the properties of the group mind can only be filled in from further investigation, it is unlikely that any of these approximations made before the rise of psychology as a science will be found free from error. They are not substitutes for the group mind; but the group mind could have been a substitute for them, performing the service for man which their inventors craved, yet, unlike these notions, being firmly based on closer scientific observation.

Moreover, both the religious and the free-thinking approaches share the common truth of the group mind. J. B. S. Haldane expresses the current view of their irreconcilableness when he asserts, "If we attempt to make a mechanistic interpretation the sole basis of our philosophy we must abandon completely our traditional religious beliefs." I don't know whether Haldane means by mechanistic "deterministic," *i.e.* scientific, or whether he refers to that peculiar delusion of the non-biological sciences that

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only inanimate matter—and never consciousness—is real. If, as I presume, he is not concerned with the latter trivial view he is, as we have seen, wrong in maintaining science and religion to be irreconcilable. For the last of the sciences clearly leads straight to a construction similar to God. Even the demand of Dean Matthews, that any philosophical construction shall not be substituted for God if it fails to account for the conscious, human, kindly qualities which we intuit in God, is met. For the group mind is something distilled from those essentially human and purposive qualities to which, as the most valuable and significant in our universe, we are drawn.

So far it is possible to proceed noting only the great gains which the psychology of religion acquires through considering the group mind. But it would be no service to our study to slur over the difficulties which now begin to accrue. For instance, it is whispered that the group mind is not always possessed of qualities greater or more noble than those of the average man. The mind of a mob is indeed notably inferior in all but emotional intensity. What size and structure are necessary in a group before the higher characteristics of group spirit emerge? If God emerges from the group mind, at what point of its evolution does this significant event occur; or have we to deal wholly with a continuous change, only to be described appropriately by the formulæ of mathematical covariation? Again, is the group mind for all practical purposes to be identified with our living fellow-men, so that the modern tendency to substitute service to the group for service to God will receive support from our present analysis? Furthermore, are there no items in the traditional references to God, and His functional relation to man, which fail to conform with, or cannot be derived from, the notion of the group mind?

Since psychologists have yet failed to investigate the group mind, since its most able sponsor, McDougall, in his highly original introductory study has stopped short of these issues, there are no ready-made authoritative answers and we must explore the questions at leisure in a subsequent chapter. Suffice it if the present chapter has demonstrated that a great positive contribution concerning the realities

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behind religious thought can be made by psychology. All man's religious efforts are not lost ; all his thinking of God has not been a delusion ; at worst it has been the substitution of simple and childlike symbols for a reality too complex long to be held in the focus of attention. We work with no lesser margin of illusion than when we salute a flag or accept paper money in lieu of real wealth.

The social and psychological benefits which are so rich a reward for belief in God may not therefore be as ill-founded and spurious as we feared. Had Freud been as good a social psychologist as he was a clinician he would not, therefore, have been forced to deny the psychological viewpoint itself. For this is what he did when he asserted that since the religious man is still as much a prey as the irreligious to ills and disasters, and still subject to the powers of Nature, he gains nothing but the cold conclusion that the God which he has found is merciless or powerless or inscrutable. Freud cannot see what Job gained by refusing to curse such a God. Yet from the psychological viewpoint the gain is enormous, namely, the absence of fretting and bitter recrimination in the face of irremediable evils, in increased social solidarity, in peace of mind and assurance of ultimate victory through God in man's long struggle with his environment. As we shall see later, there is a gain in the dynamics of individual energy and in the directing of social effort.

The present introductory investigation of the group mind and its place in thought would not be complete without emphasis on the great dependence of the characters of the group mind upon those appearing in individual minds. It might be asserted, for instance, that the group mind has most of the qualities assigned to God, except his benevolence and concern for the individual. Great societies have sometimes had little concern for the lame, the halt, and the blind. But no great society since the emergence of Christianity—since this new pattern of God spread through the whole of society—has shown ruthless indifference. The group mind may have, on a right basis of population, many of the qualities of God. Benevolence, love, and hatred of unnecessary suffering must be present in individual minds

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if they are to suffuse the group mind. Similarly, purposiveness in the group mind largely, but perhaps not entirely, emanates from individual minds. At least it is clear that the miracles performed by small groups of enthusiasts—by, for example, the early Christians or Garibaldi's thousand volunteers—come of closely unified and intense individual consciousnesses.¹ Nevertheless, in the end there is something beyond individual minds. The fabric of thought, the noble virtues, the lofty laws of good living acquire a power greater than that of men themselves.

First the qualities must exist in the individual, but to this must be added each individual's awareness of others in the same state. Communication is essential. Men who love goodness, truth, or beauty, if they are to sustain and be sustained by the faith and purpose of the group mind, must know, and preferably not by intuition alone, that other men, however few, or remote in space or time, are working with the same faith towards the same beloved goals. A universal awareness of the universal pattern is essential to its existence. Just as an army or a nation would not exist if it did not exist in the minds of its component individuals, labelled with *Italia* ! or *England*, or a flag of stars and stripes, so the super-national entity which is God cannot exist without common awareness of its purposes.

Thus we come to a conclusion curiously resembling that of Descartes ; that God exists because the idea of God exists ; or the saying of Voltaire that if God did not exist it would be necessary to invent Him ; or the conviction of Rousseau that "if God is not in us, He never existed." Does each of these, in his piety or irony or rationalist fervour, express, despite himself, an awareness of this vital attribute of the group mind ? God truly emerges from the group mind only at that stage of development when an adequate conception of his nature, origin, functions, and capacities

¹ This is no denial of the earlier statement that the group mind can fashion individual minds. That also is born out by history. Bismarck planned the conquests of Prussia by a calculation as to what peoples could be absorbed into the Prussian nation without modifying its group mentality. Recently it has been shown that the French Foreign Legion is able to mould the most diverse material to its own type.

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grows up in a sufficient number of human brains. Beyond this point we may call the group mind the Theopsyche, to indicate its divine properties.

For further related reading see :

McDOUGALL, W., *Religion and the Sciences of Life*. London, 1935.

WELLS, H. G., *God the Invisible King*. London, 1917.

MATTHEWS, Dean W. R., Contribution in *The Mind*, edited by W. S. Macdowall. London, 1927.

CHAPTER VIII

SCIENCE DISCOVERS A BASIS FOR MORALITY

By the majority of anthropologists it is agreed that morality and religion are to be found budding from a common stem, in all eras and among all peoples of the earth. The manifold taboos which regulate the lives of savages are as closely connected with their colourful background of animism as the ten commandments of Moses are bound up with the one true God. For that reason it is impossible for us to pass the stage we have now reached in the psychology of religion without beginning to examine the great framework of morality within which we live and die.

True, many thinkers—notably good atheists—have protested there is no necessary connection of morality with religion; whilst the possibility of intellectually sundering the two has quite often become manifest. We may observe, for instance, that Confucianism is a system of morals practically devoid of religious emotion, whilst in most societies one can point to lesser rules of conduct, equivalent to our civil law, which have from the beginning been considered free from divine jurisdiction, adjustable, open to legislative amendment.

The rationalist destruction of religious superstition has therefore naturally been a signal for the critical demolition of privileged, divinely derived moral law. First the minor fissures in the traditional edifice have been clearly demonstrated, then they have been extended until the whole has appeared highly insecure to critical examiners. Thereafter the rationalists have set out to build morality on entirely fresh foundations. We will follow these enterprises in more detail, since their history clarifies and leads up to a scientific understanding of the relation of morality to religion. The

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unthinking are often prone to mistake their boredom with the nagging "don'ts" of morality for a dullness in the subject itself; but any approach to life's problems leads eventually to the wisdom that morality is the most crucially important issue upon which man's happiness depends. And apart from its importance it possesses a grandeur akin to that found in the unchanging laws of nature.

The first of the more ambitious attempts at a rationally derived morality is associated with the name of Auguste Comte. We can gain most, however, by studying the sufficiently clear and developed systems expounded by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The latter, as is well known, insisted that the real object of all morals is the common good: "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." He contended it was the proper business of legislators to derive and adapt laws according to this principle, rather than to be hide-bound by religious text or tradition.

That this principle had a reasonable amount of truth in it is evidenced by the sound success which attended legislation on these lines, and indeed it has been followed implicitly as a practical maxim in most legislatures; although in some issues, as *e.g.* divorce, ecclesiastical precedent has proved too strong for it.

Nevertheless there have been, as the philosophers foresaw, certain limitations to its validity. For, in the first place, what brings happiness is sometimes difficult to define, and even when the goal is clear the sociologists may find it a complicated puzzle to work out the effects of any given measure in advancing us towards or withholding us from that goal. To calculate how a change in property distribution, or divorce regulations, or incentives in industry will affect the sum total of human happiness is a task for genius.

But the truth of the rationalist system does not stand or fall with its practicability or even with the validity of this particular agreed goal. Those who hated Mill's dethronement of the religious sanction in morals were especially inclined to pick holes in his ultimate goal, miscalling it "the greatest pleasure of the greatest number"; as if Plato

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had not riddled that objective with criticism long ago in *The Republic*! The main contention of a rational approach to morals is that we set up *some* agreed objective for society as a whole, and derive our moral laws for individuals in the way which best assures society's reaching that goal. The objective might be "the largest physically healthy population," or "the greatest production of works of art," or "the least economic difference between individuals," or "the greatest aggressive strength of the nation as a whole," or any one of the notions that have intuitively appealed to moralists from time to time.

Obviously there are enormous opportunities for error in the choosing of a goal, since no sound general principle of choice has yet suggested itself. Incidentally one of the commonest errors lies in mistaking a means to any end, *e.g.* temperance, chastity, honesty, for the end itself. Consequently, although many think Mill's utilitarian definition of the actual goal to be in some obscure sense slightly askew, his main rationalist viewpoint, once anathema, is an accepted habit of thinking among most educated people to-day. Thus, for example, when a scientist like Thorndike¹ takes up the question of analysing the psychological needs of a good life he implicitly takes the goal of morality to be something akin to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Nevertheless it is possible to point to many first-class intellects which have found it impossible to accept any rational or scientific road to the fount of morality. Kant, as we know, fell back upon his almost mystical "categorical imperative"—an absolute and innate moral sense in man. Newton never questioned the divine origin of the ten commandments. The majority of physical scientists indeed have been quick to say that science has nothing to do with values, and to deny the possibility of any scientific approach to morality.² Bertrand Russell, attacking religion, is nevertheless sure that science has nothing to say about values,

¹ E. L. Thorndike, "The Goal of Social Effort." *Sociological Review*, 1937.

² A scientist, nurtured in a family having three generations of eminent scientists, in a letter to the present writer, remarks: "I have never felt sympathetic towards any attempt to derive morality from a rational basis."

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and cannot prove such propositions as "it is better to love than to hate," and this view is echoed in a thousand modern disclaimers to the effect that science in itself can give no guidance as to the proper ends of living.

Scientifically expressed, the view we are considering is that clearly propounded in Huxley's famous Romanes lecture: namely, that the laws of the universe are themselves devoid of moral colouring, but that man, though he is part of the universe, finds himself possessed of some innate drive which makes him dissatisfied with this amorality.

With this viewpoint I find myself entirely unable to agree, and I have challenged the position recently in dealing with a number of sociological problems upon which it impinges.¹ It springs from a Victorian conception of science, and is no longer tenable to those who have watched science penetrate into sociology and have grasped the real range of scientific method. In saying this I do not deny that it is contingently best for men to consult their intuitions, and follow their profoundest moral feelings rather than to depend on a shaky scaffolding of logic, especially when the results of pure rationalism suggest crude behaviour which would conflict with those feelings.

But I contend that the real and ultimate principles of morality are to be reached by following fearlessly to the end the rationalist path upon which Mill set out. Then we shall find that morality is not beyond the realm of science, but is the last problem to which a refined and comprehensive science can come.

Morality is included in science by two steps: (1) the goal of human endeavour is not invented from the philosopher's inner consciousness, but is deduced from the observation of man's strivings in the general biological setting; (2) the specific laws of behaviour which will best enable men to approach this goal are calculated according to the facts and principles supplied by sociology, biology, economics, and psychology.

The derivation of the main goal, from the general observation that all living things strive towards higher levels of

¹ *The Fight for Our National Intelligence*. London, 1937.

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evolution, I have worked out elsewhere ¹ more fully than is possible in this space. Science may deduce it, like the need for food, both from observation of behaviour and from introspection of urges. Furthermore, to the sceptic or the philosopher who loses himself in abstruse speculations, this goal can still be justified by the practical argument that even if we are now unable to see so clearly as to agree on the goal of human purpose we have better hopes of doing so when our intelligences are more evolved. The man lost in some odd corner of a familiar city does not stand still ; he presses on to the next corner at which he may expect to recognize some friendly vista.

The belief that the end and aim of all moral laws must be nothing less than the evolution of man in intelligence and nobility is one which has budded in many modified or partial forms in the last hundred years, ever since men became aware of the idea of progress.²

It riots in naïve infancy in Nietzsche's doctrine of the superman ³ and achieves a mystical adolescence in Shaw's and Bergson's writings concerning the " Life Force." Its relation to Mill's " greatest happiness of the greatest number " could only be settled by fine sociological analysis. This much is clear, however, that since happiness is the state resulting from satisfying the deepest instinctive urges of our being, the goal of evolving must be one to which the pursuit of self-expression and happiness is bound to lead, since our urges seem, from a conspectus of the natural world, to result in evolution.

Let us grant then that the goal of moral law is the growth of the group mind ⁴ in wisdom, power, and love for ever. Morality is, then, the condition of emergence of the group

¹ *Psychology and Social Progress* and *The Fight for Our National Intelligence*.

² I need scarcely remind the reader that the notion of progress is a very new one, being unknown to the Greeks or the Middle Ages, and having no very general hold even at the time of the Renaissance. Men lived and died in a static world that was going nowhere. See Bury, *The Idea of Progress*.

³ *Beyond Good and Evil*.

⁴ I substitute the " group mind " for the average individual, physical man because man only achieves his fullest expression in the group mind, and his level of evolution is most easily deduced from that product which gives him meaning.

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mind—or, if you will, of God. Our difficulties begin only when we turn to the derivation of specific moral laws from this goal. For in the first place we are met by the astounding discovery that these laws are apparently the exact opposite of those which religion and humanity have bred into our bones.

Evolution appears to take place through competition, strife, and the survival of the fittest. It is true that a few benevolent old gentlemen, misled by the eloquence of Lamarck and a few badly performed experiments,¹ have convinced themselves of the truth of the comforting theory that each generation is born a little better because of the yearnings and strivings of its parents. Biologists, however, find no evidence of inheritance of acquired characteristics. There is no omnibus highway to evolution, but only a devious and thorny path of trial and error. Nature pours out innumerable new beings each differing a little, in an erratic way, in hereditary make up, and the sieve of environment allows the passage only of those possessing some advantageous inheritance. Evolution is therefore assured only by our co-operating with Nature in its vigilant and ruthless elimination of the less fit.

So complete is the opposition of this ruthlessness to all that we have intuitively felt to be righteousness that most thinkers have shied at entering such an avenue of thought. Hence it remains largely abandoned or unexplored. Nietzsche for a while blustered, in the face of an unsympathetic world, his poetic conviction of the truth of this new morality beyond traditional good and evil, but he made no logical and scientific attempt to work out its consequences in the lives of individuals and nations.

Yet all the time this strange "morality" has existed in a certain form in our midst, and has been vigorously propounded by leaders who act but do not speak. I refer to the ethics of nationalism, exemplified in the belief that murder in warfare is not murder at all, but a highly moral and heroic act.

¹ I trust this will not be misunderstood as a reference to the remarkable experiments, unfortunately as yet unconfirmed, on maze learning in rats, carried out at Duke University.

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This topic may be taken as the crux of the conflict between Christian ethics and what we may call "evolutionary ethics" as they achieve expression in the modern world. The former has generally been preached as true morality, whilst the latter has not been regarded as ethics at all. In the last century quite intelligent people by a collusive self-deception reconciled Christianity with aggressive nationalism, but at present, except for a few determined followers of Nietzsche or Hegel, the exponents of evolutionary ethics are guiltily aware of a logical incompatibility with Christianity, and prefer to act without attempting verbal justification of their actions. For although nationalists are more aware of the moral implications of their actions than they used to be, they are still not aware that they in fact represent a consistent system of ethics.

McDougall, always awake to the fundamentals of a situation, has already observed the opposition of these two systems of ethics,¹ referring to those, such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Mohammedanism, which advocate kindness and brotherly love among all men as "universal ethics," whilst those which advocate mutual help only between members of a group, with a ruthless survival of the fittest operating between groups, he calls "nationalist ethics." Here I shall employ the term "evolutionary ethics," since "nationalist ethics" is only a particular manifestation—often a blind manifestation—of the wider principle.

As has been mentioned, the proponents of nationalist ethics have made such a poor business of finding philosophical justification for the blind and instinctive idealism of their patriotic actions that they are forced to submit to being maligned as evil and selfish reprobates by the exponents of universal ethics. Attempting to justify themselves they often get into logically ludicrous positions, for their task is not so easy as that of adherents to the simpler principles of universal ethics. A few, like Treitschke, have clearly recognized the functional purpose of national rivalry in the plan of evolution, but they have failed to explain why the same evolutionary demand should not be

¹ *Ethics and some Modern World Problems.*

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able to justify the absence of any law but rivalry and selfishness between individuals. They see "nature red in tooth and claw" in the animal world, but fail to disprove the necessity of this individual struggle among men also.

The answer to this dilemma, and one which reconciles evolutionary ethics with men's intuitive feelings and aspirations, lies, I believe, in the fact that the type of human being we desire to evolve is one who is capable of achieving his fullest expression only in groups. For it is only in groups that highly evolved individuals can achieve anything of lasting value. Survival of the fittest, operating for countless generations on individuals as such, might produce beings of great strength or intelligence, but they would lack the essential qualities which make achievement through common purpose possible.

Therefore it is only by the survival of groups as such, through intertribal warfare or international rivalry that Nature can evolve the genetic basis of the inborn elements for such qualities as sympathy, unselfishness, self-sacrifice, and the capacity for enthusiastic co-operation. For the groups composed of races well-endowed in these will (intelligence being equal) live and flourish where biological material less well endowed will be killed, dispersed, or starved.

The failure of would-be followers ¹ of evolutionary ethics to show that altruistic human qualities, rather than brute strength and ruthlessness, are commanded by the conditions of evolution accounts not only for much of the hostility to an evolutionary basis of morals, but also for the failure to perceive that a most important organic link exists between Christianity and evolutionary ethics.

For universal ethics are seen in the end to be definitely

¹ Among outstanding scientists there is one gratifying exception: the Russian naturalist Prince Kropotkin, who in his book *Mutual Aid; a Factor in Evolution*, brings observational evidence to bear on a sorely neglected aspect of evolutionary processes. The neglect of the evolutionary approach to morality is so marked that it can only be explained by specific emotional resistances due to its stirring banned drives in the unconscious. In three previous publications I have given a more or less clear statement of the principle involved, but though able reviewers have commented on far less vital items they have in every case passed over this thorny issue in complete silence.

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an extension of evolutionist ethics, and the forbidding path from which so many have turned with revulsion rewards the more determined explorer by leading him in the clear light of logic to that world of kindlier values in which others only find themselves through the uncertain invitation of intuition.

If kindness, altruism, and all the attitudes which cherish the vitality and security of the group tend to become ideals and habits of thought through the operation of evolutionary pressures over long ages we must not be surprised if sooner or later they become ends in themselves, so that the more intellectual leaders take the seemingly logical step of extending them to all mankind.¹ Whether this overstepping of the boundary of the group is right is another question. If progress proceeds only by the fullest competition between groups which are internally closely knit by love, but externally governed only by the necessity of proving their biological worth, this step of world-wide generalization of love is a mistake, for it destroys the very conditions of competition in which love had its function of granting superior solidarity. I must confess that when first approaching the derivation of morality from science I was halted by logic at nationalist ethics: conflict of groups, without let or hindrance, seemed the only necessity for the evolution of desirable individual or group qualities in man. I viewed universal ethics as a false extension of an intra-group attitude, palliated by some minor gains in human sensitivity through the elimination of the most ruthless forms of competition.²

But further considerations, admittedly of a subtle and seemingly hair-splitting nature, will show that the extension is not false. In the first place it is possible that the next necessary phase in mental evolution requires as a condition of its appearance a sensitiveness incompatible with survival through the brutality of war. That in itself is only an argu-

¹ There is a transition phase between pure nationalism and pure universalism, shown best by Mohammedanism which at certain phases of history was indistinguishable from Arabic world conquest and drew upon nationalist urges, but Christianity has also been uncertain at times as to whether brotherly love should be extended to the heathen.

² *Psychology and Social Progress*, chap. iv.

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ment against war, not against unmitigated economic and cultural rivalry, policed against war.

A more embracing argument needs to be considered, however. That which is better may be helped to evolve out of man either because we hate what is defective and regressive or because we love what is fine and noble. As usual the positive attitude is the more important. If instead of nations proceeding to conflict, with much mutual ill-will and suspicion, they regarded each other as co-operators in the joint plan of evolving nobler types, the new psychological attitude would be more in keeping with the real purposes and conditions of life. For we do not know where that nobler type will appear. With all the goodwill in the world we cannot recognize it except through the test of rivalry with older biological types. Consequently we must agree to work out in friendly rivalry and to the fullest extent the possibilities of each distinct racial mixture or national culture.

Just as the scientist puts his many experimental liquids in different test tubes, so by the conditions of evolution discovered by Darwin and others since his day we see that it is necessary for Nature to experiment with a diversity of men. If a human biologist planned the experiment in accordance with our hearts' desire for universal happiness he could do no better. For although in each group the individuals in control may deliberately seek to improve their culture in accordance with the highest ideals they possess, and to improve their biological quality by social and eugenic programmes aimed at eliminating inherited defect, they cannot be entirely sure of their direction of progress being correct, since they tread into the unknown. For example, we may agree that a type should be bred with greater health, energy, love, curiosity, and mental capacity. But who knows whether it is desirable to breed a race taller or shorter in stature, or what type of temperament is best suited for the most stable and enterprising civilization? Research can do much, but in the end the only research that works consists in the community entering on a course of deliberate and boldly planned adventures in breeding, seeking, by as blind a process of trial and error

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as that adopted by Columbus, new ways of life as yet beyond our ken.

To put all humanity into one ship, as many who misunderstand the spirit of the brotherhood of man would have us do, would be a tragic mistake. Not all the racial groups which embark on their own experimental course will arrive. Complete failure, with the necessity of scrapping an entire racial or cultural experiment, may nevertheless be rare. Nations furnished with keen eyes of social and biological research will recognize soon enough when they are obviously going into a cul-de-sac, as Japan did when she saw the advantages of western culture and realigned herself vigorously. There may, on the other hand, be Abyssinias and Hawaiias, and races such as the negro which hardly seems to compensate for its lack of mental capacity by endearing qualities of humour and religiosity. We need kindness and consideration for those branches of man which are doomed to wither : we are all due to become cast-off branches as the main stem singles itself out and soars upwards. Not by war, nor by harassing economic pressure, but by gradual restriction of births, and by life in adapted reserves and asylums, must the races which have served their turn be brought to euthanasia.

The schemes for world fusion of cultures and races are thus perverse and reactionary, being founded upon universalist ethics, which constitute a misconception of Christianity and a bastard offspring of evolutionary ethics. Until Nature and individuals are prepared to face the truth of evolutionary ethics they will continue to follow its precepts in that secretive and nasty fashion which comes of the belief that what is not universalist ethics is not ethics at all. Or else, like the logical German, they will revolt against universalist ethics and accept an Hegelian view of the amorality of the state, a view which is as erroneous and partial a conception of evolutionary ethics as is found in universalist ethics.

Only when the architectonic grandeur of the whole scheme is envisaged will the process of competition between groups become accepted in a co-operating spirit and with the elimination of war and other crudities which hamper the

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essential working of the scheme. Internationalism rather than world fusion is indicated, and machinery for continuous adaptation and readjustment of growing and waning peoples rather than a legalistically conceived maintenance of the *status quo*.

Because all men are properly a part of the same great plan their competitiveness and rivalry must be within a circle of fundamental mutual love. And this is further necessitated by the psychological truism that groups, like individuals, can give of their best, without wastage of energy in suspicion, hatred, and intrigue, when their security from unfairness, cruelty, or violence is assured.

The last and most important reason why the struggle must take place under conditions of universal toleration, benevolence, and respect is that the required product of this process of evolution must be an individual best adapted to maximum performance under such conditions. For the purposes of gaining mastery over the universe cannot be most efficiently performed by beings ideally adapted only to gaining power over each other. If we wish to find the swiftest runner we arrange for the race to be run under fair conditions in which victory is to be gained only by good running ability. The tree of evolution is littered around with the branches of species which have lost themselves to higher evolution by specializing in enormous weapons of offence or cunning and selfish devices of parasitism. One may reflect also on the discovery of the psychologist who put twelve gophers in a cage having ten nests. The gopher is a pugnacious creature which will fight to the death for the possession of a nest. A spirit of pugnacity having been excited by the initial shortage of nests, the stupid creatures apparently found themselves unable to forget it. The psychologist returning found two gophers left alive, sitting in nests at opposite ends of the cage, with bodies of the remaining gophers and eight empty nests scattered between them.

For the purpose of evolving nobler types capable of the fullest expression of their instinctive energies in a socialized form it is necessary that success to individuals or groups should come under conditions of love—mutual love—which

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assures fair play, or not at all. And since love "vaunteth not itself" and is "not puffed up" it is only in the tranquillity of a charitable atmosphere that the failure will at once accept his failure, with dignity and without despair, knowing that his efforts—his demonstration of himself—has been as necessary a part of the plan as is the sifting of the successful. Society's casualties in the struggle towards higher levels of living—namely, the sick, the neurotic, the criminal, the relatively mental defective—deserve the same care and honour as an army's casualties upon the battlefield.

The philosophy that "life is a fight," and that evolution is served by fighting is perverse. Evolutionary ethics command us to live our lives happily: conscious competition is no good. In the end, therefore, we find that a scientifically based evolutionary ethics leads to something very different from "nature red in tooth and claw." It brings us by firm logical steps to a new viewpoint which has already been intuitively reached by approaches so diverse as that of Christianity emerging mystically from the East or the ideal of fair play emerging prosaically from Anglo-Saxon democratic life. It is expressed in the cross and the parable of the talents or in the words of a poet of English youth:

To set the cause above renown,
To love the game beyond the prize,
To honour, while you strike him down,
The foe that comes with fearless eyes.

For further related reading see :

- HUXLEY, J. S., *Religion without Revelation*. London, 1927.
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CHAPTER IX

SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AT THE CROSS-ROADS OF TO-DAY

By observing from a scientific standpoint the striving of living matter to evolve to fuller living, and the conditions under which such striving issues in successful evolution, we have found it possible to arrive at a basis of morality, which is best labelled as "evolutionary ethics." By this standard both universalist and nationalist ethics are seen to be fragmentary and distorted views of the truth, but, of the two, nationalist ethics is probably the more bankrupt of justification. For as a result of the psychological—and probably physiological—conditions of good mental performance and the structural demands of a great society it is necessary that the higher steps of evolution should be essayed in an atmosphere of confidence and love. Indeed, a good deal of the support for an ethics of love arises from the psycho-physiological superiority of love to hatred motivation.

The statement of this principle at once throws into the field of intellectual discussion and practical morality a rich variety of new matter—especially concerning modern problems—for debate and calculation. Indeed, since it brings morality within the pale of the sciences, it makes possible for the first time explicit logical discussion and experimentation where before there was dubious faith and myopic intuition.

But first the principle must withstand attacks. One of the first which the searching and helpful critic will make may be formulated in the question as to whether a love which condones all failures must not in the end produce failures. Or, more broadly viewed, is it not possible that

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the game of evolution among men will be brought to a standstill if their mutual forbearance leads them, in the interests of effortlessness, to a lazy declaration of abandonment of emulation and rivalry?

In so far as this is a question of dynamic psychology there are two reasons why such stagnation would not supervene. First, men are not entirely moulded by the social atmosphere, but possess, in health, powerful innate drives to power and mastery which would not tolerate inaction. Secondly, the moulding social environment, love itself, is not indiscriminating. By the terms of our principle it must be love of the best, even though it include pity of the worst.

There is, however, an external guard against inaction. Whatever perverse truce the human participants might decide to call among themselves there remains an outer world of storm and earthquake, famine and deadly disease germs. This supremely unbribable environment presents an utterly unyielding reality against which the desires of men fling themselves in vain, and attain no satisfaction except it be through hard reasoning, intelligence, self-control, and strength. Mankind, like the crew of a storm-tossed vessel, cannot arbitrarily make pacts between its members which pass beyond the degree of indulgence compatible with the safety of the whole. There is a majesty about the inexorable laws of morality which is caught by all great artistic renderings of man's life. It appears in the Greek plays, in Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, or in such an æsthetic modern novel as *Point Counter Point*.

The matter is of practical importance because, in the absence of any appreciation of evolutionary ethics, men easily fall into the assumption that they can make pacts of mutual indulgence, and there is a constant sentimental tendency to interpret universalist ethics in that degraded sense. In industrial cities in England and America, and probably even more so in countries for which no statistics are available, the birthrate of the unemployed is greater than that of the employed. An unemployable person gets more sympathy if he has twelve children than if he has none, yet his comparative disservice to the community is undeniable in most instances. There are business men, who

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may or may not be right, saying to-day that the whole economic structure of our civilization is being undermined by the systematic process of taking the talents from the five-talented man to give to the incapable. There are medical men who warn us constantly that because those who are saved by miracles of preventive or remedial medicine are permitted to breed freely, the standard of fitness of civilized nations is being increasingly debased. In short, it is possible that we are enacting economic and medical indulgences within the group which will not permit the group to meet the demands of external reality, that we are attempting to be liberal to each other with gifts we do not rightly possess, that we squander the hard-won earnings of science to increase the numbers of people who have never acquired the discipline of science, and that a widely applied misunderstanding of Christian charity is heading us for evolutionary disaster.

The ruling of nationalist ethics on these matters is not clear, for although national strength is weakened by the economic drain of supporting the unemployable and the sick, and through medical attention to the congenitally unfit, the nation gains in solidarity through the psychological attitudes arising from the individual's sense of security and his reciprocation of devotion to the group. In the light of evolutionary ethics, however, the position is clear. Since the preservation of the atmosphere of love is the first necessity the group must look after the lame, the halt, and the blind, and survive or founder as a whole. But those groups which have reached a sufficient level of intelligence will make sure by eugenic measures that the success of the group in performing the higher achievements of civilized life is not destroyed by the drain of economic resources or by progressive impairment of racial qualities. Those which have not reached that level are doomed to failure, for Christianity is impossible without eugenics, or rather, eugenics is a growth of Christianity.

The main theorem of evolutionary ethics bristles with riders and corollaries. One of the curious corollaries is that it is the duty of the individual not to adapt himself too far to conditions to which he is not naturally adapted;

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for if he does so he postpones the elimination of a maladapted type. It is his duty to live out happily his own nature and manifest his own individual qualities, that the extinction or profusion of his type may more readily take place. The individual with, for example, an "inferiority complex," who by the excessive striving of over-compensation gets himself into a position for which his powers are not really adequate, benefits no one, and least of all himself. And a savage, for example, might be justified in adapting from a congenitally uncivilizable nature to a highly complex civilization only in so far as it helps others to adapt, but not to the extent of neurosis. This truth has been intuitively reached and powerfully expressed by Christianity, which bids a man live out his life in the confidence that God is with him and under the sole condition that he loves others, a condition which precludes his taking any unfair advantage or false position. One finds that wisdom again in one of the greatest of modern novelists, D. H. Lawrence, when he insists that a man should not try to live out of his natural class, socially, morally, financially, or intellectually.¹

It would next be interesting to see what sort of a rider may be built on our theorem when it is applied to the topical issue of militancy or pacifism. The most interesting intellectual treatment of the matter in recent years is undoubtedly that of Aldous Huxley,² in which he adopts the same standpoint as Heard that "objectives are little in comparison with the means and purposes used to give [them] effect." But his approach remains largely through imagination and intuition. Considered from a systematic scientific standpoint, the answer to this question as to whether force is ever necessary seems to be that the purpose of evolution is served at different stages by different means.

Among intelligent people who have grasped the idea of evolution and are pledged to "reality thinking" in regard to current events, it is essentially a simple matter to bring about co-operation in experimental competition without

¹ A truth overlooked by many well-to-do parents who are able to send, by virtue of wealth, a dull child to schools catering for the more highly gifted.

² Notably in *Eyeless in Gaza* and *Ends and Means*.

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recourse to war. They will arrive experimentally at rough criteria of success by which expansion or retraction of races and cultures can be agreed upon. They will be patient in their observations and decisions, and will not consider the grasping of material resources to be as important as making cultural and eugenic progress with the existing resources. In this connection we may note that Iceland, one of the poorest countries in natural endowment, has contributed more men of eminence in letters and science than any other country on the same basis of population. Finally, they will invent the machinery of an efficient police force,¹ not being so unrealistic as to imagine that human nature is yet capable of perfection.

But before this degree of intelligence and self-consciousness is reached by all, the plan of non-violent evolution is rendered impossible by the combination of life vigour and stupidity in some or all. This cruder stage is seen in its simplicity in the animal world, where mental conceptions of the whole plan are impossible and where evolution proceeds with the most prodigal physical suffering.

Not to have grasped the necessity of evolution and of love is to partake of the worst of both phases of development ; for the animals, though they suffer physically, are spared the mental suffering of foreknowledge. Yet mankind is doomed, unless education is miraculously successful with the less intelligent types, to labour under the disadvantages of mixed levels and methods of competition ; for the range of human intelligence and of the will to co-operate is so great that there are bound to be peoples obstinately persisting at the stage of mental adjustment when war is the only method of competition of which they are capable of enthusiastic understanding. And, like lunatics, they will need to be restrained by force, passive or active.

But there is much nonsense talked about force, as if the

¹ The League of Nations, armed, offers the means of ensuring such non-militant, cultural, and economic group emulation. But it would need to be supplied with the necessary diagnostic data for bringing about readjustments. At present it is both conceived and furnished to fulfil a static, legalistic purpose. Naturally its purpose will fail, and it will receive no armed support by progressive nations until it aligns itself with evolutionary purpose.

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line between physical violence and mental suasion could really be drawn, or as if passive resistance were incapable of causing so much suffering as clear-cut violence. The methods of India have no claim to moral superiority over the methods of Germany.

In every generation there will be Christlike leaders calling on men to compete only within the circle of love and by higher methods. If there are enough intelligent men to respond to that call the new system of world regulation could be inaugurated. But it is better for those who have not evolved to the level of perceiving such a vision to compete through war rather than not to compete at all. And even those belonging to the flower of civilization must always be ready, in the last resort, to give their lives under the bloody exchange rate of the old scheme in order to defend and inaugurate the new. It is an utterly perverse morality which teaches that an evolved people should consider means more important than ends to the extent of passively allowing a barbarous but warlike people to overrun them. Few things are more loathsome than war, but the ideal of death in battle is the highest morality until the next stage of evolution becomes possible, in which the aim is to serve with one's life instead of with one's death. And patriotism is satisfying to the primitive soul just because it is a half-way stage to true religion. In his *Psychology of the Promethean Will* Sheldon has expressed the truth—the unpopular truth, which can so easily be “twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools”—that “In war I am lifted to a higher plane, and I feel the heroic ecstasy that is the heritage of the brave. Even in mortal agony I breathe through the nostrils of the eternal hero.”

Therein lies the reply to the seductive argument of Heard or Huxley that means are more important than ends. Huxley remarks (*Ends and Means*), “Is it possible to achieve progress in charity by means that are essentially uncharitable? . . . We must conclude that it is not.” But the butterfly cannot become a creature of the air until it has passed through the chrysalid stage. Civilization has difficulty in pulling itself clear of barbarism because it allows too long a pause to ensue between the cessation of

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natural selection and the inauguration of eugenics. The flower of culture is consequently in frequent danger from the unextirpated weeds of barbarism. The purpose of evolution is served by every peace-loving individual who takes up arms to break a crazed and driven foe, to restrain the criminal and succour the lunatic. "War to end war" is not necessarily a false idealism. Moral force must be prepared to vindicate its assumption of superiority in the grim realities of physical force. Force and bloodshed are valuable means to valuable ends respective with the engineer and the surgeon. Because we live in a period of change, and are grasping at a new level of morality, the decision in each instance of choice between war or pacifism is a difficult one, requiring, not an easy generalization, but a searching examination in the light of first principles—those of evolution.

This particular dilemma of transition is only one of many. Behaviour that is moral in one generation may be shown by research to be immoral in another, because of changing circumstances. Much of the repressive Puritan or Victorian attitude to sex expression may seem unnecessary in an age of effective contraception. This example, however, will suffice to show that rational ethics must be very comprehensive in assessing all material and psychological consequences if it is to be sound. For the inquiries of such psychologists as Freud and McDougall show how pervasive and cumulative is the sublimated energy of the sex instinct, and how important it is for the higher creations of civilization. Unwin has corroborated this by a parallel observation in anthropology in which he shows, through a comparison of many cultures, that the higher the culture the more deep-seated are the inhibitions set upon direct sexual expression. The rationalistic and intellectual circles which assume, as is well shown in Aldous Huxley's novels of half a generation ago, that the separation of sexual satisfaction from its biological consequences left no moral meaning in sexual activity, was, therefore, faulty—not in principle, but in having too narrow a conception of what is meant by consequences, in relation to the evolution of the group mind. It is interesting to notice that the above

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writer has definitely veered in later writings to the more Christian standpoint on excessive sensuality, though apparently by intuition rather than by reasoning through evolutionary ethics.

Through such instances one can see that society must have an adequate supply of watchers in the field of sociological and psychological research, in order that the consequences of modified moral laws may accurately be worked out. In these matters too great a conservatism is paid for even more heavily than a fondness for novelty. Either procedure, without the guidance of moral research institutes, means that society can only rectify its ways after something in the nature of a social tragedy.

It is because the word "morality" has been allowed to become associated with nothing more than a cramping system of static and therefore obsolete regulations that the modern world has come to a state of stupid apathy in regard to a subject that is properly of vital and even dramatic interest in the advance of mankind. The flow of human effort becomes diluted of zeal rather than obstructed by positive sins.

Freud falls a victim to this all too prevalent inability to perceive the dynamic consequences of dilution when he rashly comments: "That the consolation of religion may be compared to that of a narcotic is prettily illustrated by what is happening in America. There they are now trying—plainly under the influence of petticoat government—to deprive men of all stimulants, intoxicants and luxuries, and to satiate them with piety by way of compensation."

Religion is failing to maintain the tonus of the spiritual muscles. The common man can regain surprise and anger over moral questions if he realizes that to-day, as Joad has aptly said, "Morals are rules of spiritual hygiene, to be cultivated in the interests of intenser living. Sloth, And evolutionary ethics has aims beyond even intenser living for the living. It is concerned not only with sin as a refusal to make the best of individual possibilities, but with failure to make the best out of the whole race and with disservice to that group mind which is a part of God.

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Research alone can show just how closely the welfare of the community, which modern reformers are attempting to ameliorate without reference to constructive morality, depends intimately upon the correctness of moral laws and the zest with which they are followed by the community. In Chapter V. we have dealt cursorily with some suggestive connections between religious decay and racial suicide. The connection of moral stagnation with such symptoms as the differential birth-rate, which, as I have shown elsewhere, may well wreak havoc in the edifice of civilization, has been discovered in historical instances by so shrewd an observer as Galton¹ when he wrote of Greece: "We know, and we may guess something more, of the reason why this marvellously gifted race declined. Social morality grew exceedingly lax; marriage became unfashionable, and was avoided; many of the more ambitious and accomplished women were avowed courtesans, and consequently infertile, and the mothers of the incoming population were of a heterogeneous class . . . for . . . where the manners are as dissolute as those of Greece in the period of which I speak, the purity of a race would necessarily fail. If . . . the breed . . . had maintained its excellence and had multiplied and spread over large countries, displacing inferior populations, it assuredly would have accomplished results advantageous to human civilization, to a degree that transcends our power of imagination."

This instance of the very far-reaching effects of a relatively slight moral flaw upon the biological and material conditions of a people is of some topical interest, because statistics show that we ourselves are in the preliminary stages of the same social disease, whilst our moral viewpoint continues to be unadjusted to a positive evolutionary standpoint.

Perhaps one should say rather "consciously unadjusted," for, as has been shown in the previous chapter, Christianity is in essence and implicitly in close harmony with evolutionary ethics. We are therefore to this extent protected from the severe form of disease of decadence that attacked the Greeks: that whereas Greek morality was static,

¹ Sir Francis Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, p. 331.

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having in view a stable, self-satisfied, and unprogressing state of humanity, the morals of the Hebrew religion from which Christianity budded were dynamic, strained with a forward momentum, looking to some future perfection beyond the immediate desires of the people. It is this investment of emotional interest in the life of the future, this love and concern for the well-being of children yet unborn, which is also an essential characteristic of evolutionary ethics.

Furthermore, although the Christian dictum that all souls are of equal potential significance has repeatedly been twisted to mean that all men are equal; or prostituted to indulgent ends quite opposed to evolution, there seems to be no doubt among those versed in theology that different levels of life are acknowledged in the spirit of Christianity to have different values to God. That acknowledgment is thrown down in such comments as "You are worth far more than many sparrows,"¹ and receives a powerful expression in the parable of the talents, "Unto him that hath . . ."

For those interested in a retrospective analysis of Christianity and in the history of intuitive thought it would be a most profitable diversion to trace in the Scriptures the precise phrases which express in a beautifully incisive manner the inspired insight of men arriving emotionally at the identical conclusion which one reaches more slowly, exactly, and surely by the scientific steps of evolutionary ethics. Every one of the salient conclusions of science there receives poetic expression. Whether we find the emotional dynamics of sexual sublimation into the life of the group mind caught in such a clean-cut utterance as, "Blessed are the pure in heart for they will see God," or the futility of faulty evolution through aggression (such as we discussed in the last chapter) despised in the prophecy, "Blessed are the meek, the merciful, the peacemakers," we are made aware of an eloquence which fits the frame-flesh moulds and sustains the skeleton.

If this harmony of Christian and other ethical systems

¹ St. Matthew x. 30.

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with evolutionary ethics is real it may seem difficult to explain the obstinate and ineffable moral resistance to Christian pacifism offered by the warrior hero, or by bourgeois competitive civilization to the squalid equalitarian sharing of goods and opportunities found in primitive communist societies. But this is essentially the opposition of the spiritually adventurous to what they recognize as an emotionally immature interpretation of Christianity, and is often buttressed by a moral insight into the purposes of evolution. In other instances it may be based equally on selfishness or on an interpretation of evolutionary ethics, as in Hegelianism, quite as erroneous and partial as the interpretation of Christianity against which it persists in stalemate.

After this brief digression into some practically important riders on the general theorem of evolutionary ethics we have to conclude the chapter by returning to an essential question with which we began, namely, as to how morality is related to religion. If by God we mean the vast group mind of civilization, alive with infinite potentialities and growing in power and wisdom continuously, His relation to morality is the closest of organic necessities, for moral laws become, by the definition of evolutionary morality, the very conditions of God's existence and unfolding which are set by the nature of the universe.

So far from scientific investigation leading to the view that religion and morals may be separated, it shows that the latter can have no meaning without the former. A belief in God as the eternally significant part of the universe, together with love for the nature of God, is the sanction from which morality draws its strength and indeed its very purpose in existing.

Because the nature and needs of the group mind are in a state of continual emergence, it is an error for men to attempt to fix moral rules once and for all. This deduction has been approached by Whitehead from a different angle when he says that God's "purpose is always embodied in the particular ideals relevant to the actual state of the world." God is to be served in one age by martial courage and blind devotion to a particular experimental tradition

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of ideals, in another by the implanting of standards of austere self-denial and attention to the poor and needy, and in another by determined but self-effacing devotion to the growth of truth, of wisdom and of knowledge concerning the universe. Thus new virtues constantly appear, blossoming on the stem from which the older standards of character are still growing.

Moral laws can be carved on tablets of stone only if the stone is perishable. For they must properly be regarded as working diagrams for the most effective construction of a great and vital group mind of the future. Like the laws governing some marvel of engineering or of organic cell growth they have a cold, detached beauty of their own, giving us the austere delight which we experience in moral beauty. For they partake of the mystery and the majesty of those great scientific principles which govern the universe, and from which they derive. To the scientist they are the miraculous laws by which the life of God emerges from the dust.

For further related reading see .

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CHAPTER X

SERVICE : TO GOD OR FELLOW-MEN ?

THE time is ripe to take stock of the position we have reached ; to turn around and face the difficulties which beset our synthesis ; to temper in the fire of criticism the construction as yet only roughly fashioned.

Our deductions have been that in any group of people there arises a group mind, enormously varying in character according to the intelligence of the constituent individuals, the complexity of organization of the community and the degree of its self-consciousness as a group. Since religious life first began this group mind may be said to have possessed and has certainly continuously developed the qualities which men have actually attached to a symbol known as God.

The group mind is characterized by moral strength, super-individual wisdom and benevolence. In its consciousness all good actions come to fruition, and all evil actions are annihilated. Through his contributions to it the individual achieves immortality. It is capable of emotional communication with him such that he gains therefrom reinforcement of all noble purposes and an assurance of victory in face of evil.

Moral laws may be scientifically derived from our knowledge of the group mind, for they constitute the conditions of its existence and its further evolution. Such derivation is possible only by means of a well-founded sociology, comprising a knowledge of the interaction of physical, economic, and psychological factors in our daily lives. Because conditions are constantly changing and God is in a process of continual emergence, moral laws require continuous modification ; but, as far as a preliminary analysis can show,

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the existing Christian ethics are substantially those which would be scientifically derived from evolutionary principles.

Now it would be a mistake to imagine that the above discoveries, sound though they may be in themselves, suffice without further investigation to clarify the purpose of all forms of religious activity observable in society, or to answer all the riddles of theological speculation. Rather do they bring to our awareness further enigmas in the more remote darkness and cause us to stumble upon a fresh host of stimulating questions. What is the meaning, if any, of such well-worn religious expressions as "The fear of God"? Can there be any reality in the function of prayer? Is it desirable to educate the coming generation to an attitude of emotional dependence on the group mind, similar to that traditionally inculcated with regard to God? Does service to the group mind boil down to nothing more than service to fellow-men, as maintained in Communism? How is one to reconcile the absolute goodness and wisdom attributed to God with the merely potential and imperfect virtues of the group mind? And how can the group mind be the resort of truth when it is obvious that intense conflict may continue between even quite highly developed group minds such as those of nations? Finally, what is the relation of the group mind to the universe as a whole?

The conflict of Communism with religion, of the view that service to men is better than the worship of God, is a practical issue in the world at the moment, and it is increasingly answered by a drift of emancipated people from dogmatic religion to rationalist group service. Really we have to decide on a matter of degree, for all religions have stressed love of one's neighbour, and have had communicants at one extreme like Martha, or St. Francis of Assisi, who thought primarily of practical service to their fellows, and anchorites or monks at the other, who believed in a life of austere worship and contemplation of the qualities of God Himself. Communism or modern secular morality is only the asymptote to which one end of the curve of religion has always tended.

As protagonists representative of these opposing points of view at the present moment, we may take Professor

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Whitehead and Gerald Heard. Whitehead has expressed in eloquent yet philosophical language the convictions of those who think that religion has to do with something beyond man, and that its duties are never sufficiently discharged by social service or the maintenance of human solidarity. He writes : " Religion is solitariness, and if you are never solitary you are never religious." But for Heard " Eternal life lies in returning to the general life," whereas for him the individual isolated with his God is " solitary, malicious, mad " ; since " in humanity, owing to the rise of individual self-consciousness, it is normal for the individual, because individuality is itself an abnormal psychic condition, to live most of his time in a sense of sunderment and loneliness, which state, when it becomes unbearable, he allays, with different degrees of success, with drugs, with sex congress, with religious practices, more successful if they are such as to allay individuality, less if ultimately the emotional condition they create tends to reinstate the sense of separateness." Incidentally it is not with this analysis of the religious emotion into herd instinct and sex instinct that the opposing school would quarrel, but only with the assertion that the herd instinct energy is properly expended wholly in its original unsublimated form, *i.e.* upon the herd.

Undoubtedly the general trend, both of philosophical thought and of the unanalyzed opinions of the average man, is towards the position taken up by Heard. Expressed according to the individuality of the writer, it will be found in Wells,¹ in Russell, in Shaw. It is implicit in Freud's appreciation that : " It is one of the few noble and gratifying spectacles that men can offer when in the face of an elemental catastrophe, they awaken from their muddle and confusion, forget all internal difficulties and animosities, and remember the great common task, the preservation of mankind against the supremacy of nature." In the common man, as in these writers, the swing of opinion does not so

¹ " The desire for service, for subordination, for permanent effect, for an escape from the distressful pettiness and mentality of the individual life, is the undying element in every religious system. The time has come to strip religion right down to that ; to strip it for greater tasks than it has ever faced before."—*The Open Conspiracy*.

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much represent a changing position in religion itself as a complete exodus from decaying religious belief, apparently blasted by science, to a secular viewpoint.

To carry the discussion into politics is perhaps gratuitously inviting a rude entanglement of the already complex web of argument upon the horns of massive political prejudices. Yet we must follow the argument whithersoever it leads, and there is no avoiding the conclusion that certain political movements—those of the extreme right and left—are bound up with this increasing emphasis on the existing group, and the implicit denial of the value of individualities guided by nothing but the authority of God. Communism is perhaps more emphatic than Fascism in its rejection of religion. In Spain, Fascism is even yoked with the Church, and that this is more than an accidental union is evidenced by Unamuno's sympathy with Fascism. As we shall see later, the religious adjustment which we know as resignation has its essential part in some social structures. But both agree in being tired of liberal individualism, and the same view is expressed in English thought by Heard when he insists: "The world is tired of individualism, which economic-dominated minds call by its economic symptom, capitalism."

Without prejudice to the economic or political movements at the moment associated with this philosophy, I would maintain that this movement towards purely human solidarity is an utterly false solution of the problem of human adjustment to the universe. It is wrong because it fixates the individual's emotional loyalties and dependencies upon an existing order of society and the ideas cherished by his existing fellow-men. This path towards solidarity, uniformity, stability, aggressive strength, and group self-absorption, this ideal of the world as one harmonious anthep is a deliberate turning into that cul-de-sac of evolution which tempted the bee and all the arrested species of the insect world. Such organization may give man bread, but man does not live by bread alone.

Man seems chronically uncertain of his status in the universe. At one moment he is convinced that he is "a little lower than the angels," at another, with the facts

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of astronomy before him, he considers himself a meaningless chemical accident on a fourth-rate planet. His political behaviour at the moment suggests the belief that he is the peak and summit of evolution, beyond which no further progress is conceivable. When he achieves perspective, he will see the necessity of designing social life with a view to evolution. Thus every man admittedly has to escape from the obsession of his own individuality, but not into the darker prison of obsession with the present glory of his fellow-men.

The dynamics of social evolution will be more evident if we examine the usual structure of modern societies. Statisticians tell us that in almost every measurable human character—from stature to intelligence or emotional attitudes—a random sample of individuals will be found spaced out in a “normal curve” of distribution. That is a bell-shaped curve showing that most cases cluster about the average, while a “tail” of increasingly gifted individuals dwindles in numbers towards the extreme of high endowment, and a balancing, symmetrical tail diminishes towards the zero of endowment.

Now if some dictator of fashion were to enforce upon all the wearing of a standard ready-made suit of clothes cut for the average man, the unfortunate misfits and rebels against his enterprise would be found in the two extremes of the symmetrical distribution curve, consisting of the undersized and the oversized. Similarly, with a standardized culture, the rebellion against the manners and recreations and beliefs of the majority will come from the notably defective in intelligence and the notably gifted, or those who are extreme in that particular constitutional endowment to which the popular habit is adjusted to.

However, intelligence is the most important single quality yet measured in psychology. We know that people on the lower fringes of mental variability—the imbeciles and idiots and those up to an intelligence quotient of about eighty—will be maladjusted because the common standards of life are too exacting and burdensome. They constitute the vagabonds, the oppressed, the criminals, the social problems, the paupers, the scorned and rejected. The

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upper fringe is constituted by equally lonely and maladjusted people, who can find no satisfaction in the puerile goals and pedestrian advance of the mediocre average, and who suffer from being condemned to a pattern of life which is irksome because it offers no prospect of group endeavour in the directions which would be most natural to them. Yet it is these disgruntled upper eccentrics who are somehow responsible for social advance ; for society progresses like a caterpillar getting a grip on new ground by its head portion and dragging the main body forward by this purchase.

Consequently to demand conformity to the average, to ask that the loyalties of all parts of society be faithfully directed inwards to its centre of gravity, is to call halt to progress. Whether a state actually dictates and enforces such conformity or not is immaterial, for the same end is achieved quite as effectively by the psychological device of holding up the existing group as the individual's god—the object of his ultimate loyalties and worship. The lover is a more devoted servant than the coerced slave. If the herd instinct, with all the power of the gregarious impulse,¹ all the desire to serve, to escape from loneliness, to maintain super-individual loyalties, becomes tied up in the group, the individual will be completely responsive to its aims, gain satisfaction only in so far as he conforms, suffer from deprivation and guilt if he thinks on his own. He will possess a conscience modelled by the group and will lack any uninvested super-personal energies free to promote dissident schemes necessary for novelty. He will not grope into the darkness away from the warm hearth of humanity. Some other form of emotional adjustment was evidently at work in Columbus, in Newton, in Darwin, in Mohammed, and in Christ.

To insist on this fatal weakness of state-worship is not denying the easily demonstrable advantages which accrue

¹ The significance of the gregarious impulse in human life is seldom sufficiently stressed. Its power and its mode of action is best grasped by studying animal species related to man. Köhler, as a result of close psychological observations, insists: "The group connection of chimpanzees is a real force of sometimes astonishing degree."

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from the dog-like devotion of individuals to the pack. Military strength, social solidarity, the boundless energy of a maniac emanating from the absence of internal conflicts, checks, or hesitations, and a heightened self-consciousness through the religious concentration of the individual upon the state. There is undoubtedly an increased efficiency in all conservative, automatic, well-worn paths of activity: only the ability to develop is lost. The short-sighted, over-active individuals who so commonly frequent politics, who have constructed those masterpieces of reptilian evolution, the Communist and Fascist totalitarian states, have long been blind to that more remote but fatal nemesis which awaits such structures.

For, as we have seen, it is through dissident minorities that progress (and retrogression) take place. One thing is certain, that in the long run the majority is always wrong. It was wrong about Christianity at the time of Christ, wrong about astronomy at the time of Galileo, wrong about witchcraft, wrong about slavery in 1800; and it is wrong to-day in supposing there is no alternative between adherence to hide-bound theology and recourse to scientific atheism.

Some minority is always in possession of the greater light, but no one will know of it if its eccentricity is instantly snuffed out. Wherefore the political invention of efficient means of forcing minorities into conformity is the most dangerous and diabolical device which has yet appeared to stultify evolution. It has been invented in a time of insecurity and in the interests of safety; yet not to evolve is in the end to be unsafe, to become maladjusted to a changing environment, to be wrapt in delusions of self-sufficiency, to awake like Rip Van Winkle to a nightmare. The process has occurred in Japan, in Germany, in Abyssinia, but it could happen equally to mankind as a whole, indeed to any group capable of enforcing within itself uniformity and self-absorption.

For such groups, development, if it occurs at all, can occur only in convulsions under the impact of external forces. Or the group may progress through its developing minority seeking safety temporarily in a less regimented

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organism. Karl Marx escaped from an absolutist Russia to a liberal country where he could lay the foundations of a new Russia. But with the more efficiently absolutist Russia of to-day, where can the new ideas germinate freely which will produce the Russia of to-morrow? ¹ The need of provision for variability—the lesson of Marx's own life—has not been grasped.

Let us next look at this conflict from the point of view of the heretical individual. It is evident that there are times in history when, unless some few men are capable of titanic efforts, in face of indifference or hostility, yet without loss of heart or faltering of purpose, the group is committed to stagnant dissolution or headed to perdition. Yet these independent characters must not be so divorced from human purposes and feelings that they react with the delusions of the schizophrenic lunatic or the egocentricity of the criminal.

By what means then are they to maintain their organic connection with society, their goodwill, their unity of purpose with similar minds remote in time or space, and, indeed, their very sanity? Since they are human, their lonely vigils on the mountain peaks of thought must be made endurable by some vision of home and the warm hearth of humanity. Their course of action must be piloted by reference to some fixed star beyond their immediate world.

Of course, it is possible to deny that they need have any emotional dependence on a power outside themselves. Many psychoanalysts will insist that the true ideal of human adjustment is that of the "emotionally mature individual" who feels no need of attachment to any one, and acts in accordance with rational ideas and ideals. Now, even if this goal of education be sound, it presents an ideal which cannot, owing to constitutional and other deficiencies, be realized in practice with most people. Even people of great gifts vary enormously in their need for emotional dependency, and it is improbable that more than

¹ It appears, for instance, that social psychologists in Russia are forbidden to take into account, or even to discover, inherited individual differences in mental capacity.

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a small fraction would achieve such isolated stability, despite ideal education. If the rest are going to lean on anything, it is best that they should lean on God, rather than give their whole devotion to chance individuals or doubtful institutions, for thus only will the most permanent stability ensue in their own lives, and the greatest service to the human spirit be simultaneously achieved.

But this ideal of "mature adjustment" itself may not be true, and though space does not permit any ample discussion of the subtle issues involved, we can set out major reasons why it is not sound. Finding that the neurotic has not outgrown childish emotional dependence, the psychoanalysts have concluded that the ideally adjusted person is one completely independent. This is not good logic, nor is it good psychology. It fails to consider the dynamics of social psychology. An individual without emotional ties would be a public danger, the nearest approach to the fabulous moral imbecile. To say he is attached to abstract ideals and virtues is not enough. Reason is not a force, it is only the tool of forces, and does not itself impel a man in any direction. Men of great intelligence have, owing to emotional paralysis, sat still and starved to death, and it is not through reason that any man keeps himself breathing. The individual must be impelled to act by emotional attachments to things or ideas outside himself, but an abstract virtue or ideal is not an end in itself; it is only the way of attaining an end. Man's progress demands individuals strongly emotionally entangled in ends outside themselves; and healthy, undeluded human nature being what it is, the individual who is to give of his efforts will require some sense of reciprocated feeling, or at best of communion, with those for whom he strives.

A psychological study of the fate of those who happen to be out of key with the society of their day would perhaps clarify matters here. We will concentrate on the maladjustment of the talented; the psychological problems of the under-endowed will be more appropriately studied later. In recent years some able researchers¹ have taught us a lot about the personality development of the highly gifted

¹ e.g. Dr. L. S. Hollingworth.

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child. Though he is generally more emotionally mature than the average child,¹ he is nevertheless especially liable to suffer from a warping of emotional development through his isolation and lack of common interests and sympathies with children of his own actual chronological age. Furthermore, he more quickly grows beyond the wisdom of authority, and also encounters at an early age philosophical problems which the average child meets much later, and which the dull individual is never troubled by at all.

Researches show that as an adult he is likely to be radical in opinions and to encounter much opposition from his fellows. Indeed the history of social advance is but the story of endless conflict between these eccentrics and the massive, entrenched average, which is all too prone to confuse them with the eccentrics on behalf of eccentricity. In one age as saints, in another as scientists or political reformers, they have been burnt and banished, ostracized and starved. Many have become cynical or embittered, despotic, self-centred, or mad. Even the most socially minded have frequently been, like Voltaire, Schopenhauer, Russell, or Shaw, too inclined to scourge the common man with sarcasm and irony, and to feel no sympathy with his lowlier gropings. Yet a few have persisted patiently and charitably in their devotion to the common good.

Whence this difference in growth among the great mal-adjusted? Christ was clearly a person of great intellectual penetration, born to be most happily adjusted to a life of rich culture, because sensitive to the best that art and philosophy could offer. Yet He was able to renounce that entrancing prospect and to turn without bitterness to a life of persecution. Like others among the emotionally healthy section of the gifted, He was able to draw upon some hidden source of companionship and moral confidence, which enabled Him to insist on different standards from those of his fellow-men, yet without being forced by hostility and insecurity into hating them.

¹ See Terman, *Genetic Studies of Genius*, vol. iii.

² I have known highly able children of six and seven become greatly concerned about human mortality and religious problems, for contact with which, naturally, no one had prepared them.

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Clearly these leaders and men of genius did not lean upon the existing group or even upon the existing group mind. There was no thought in the world at the time of Christ so developed as Christianity. Some power gave Him confidence and security in a new inner development which could not be aided by the group, and until the last hour of agony upon the cross He had faith that some power in the universe supported Him in His lonely heresy.

At this point the argument may sound suspiciously like a reversion to the view we have already rejected in Chapter III. ; namely, that we should believe in God, existent or non-existent, because it helps man to live well, nobly persisting in indispensable services to society. But it is intended as nothing more than a demonstration of the value of attachment to something existing beyond the body of men actually constituting any living group. Even if further investigation should prove this argument to require modification or to be wholly false, our subsequent proof that some entity of great importance for humanity, yet different from existing men, actually exists, would stand in its own right. The proof that society needs or does not need such an entity is no proof of its existence or non-existence.

I think that even the rationalists would agree that the psychological adjustment of the individual must be directed to a future rather than a present state of society. It is obvious that a man who is going to shift a weight from one point to another adjusts his balance so that he will regain it when the weight has arrived at its new position : he is adjusted to be in equilibrium with the desired end state, and he can only do that by losing his balance in regard to the existing state. Similarly, a good educational psychologist to-day plans a child's training so that he will be fit for the world in which he will grow up rather than adjusted to transient or moribund points of view in the world of his childhood. This is a point overlooked by the psychoanalyst who regards perfect adjustment to the existing world as an ideal adjustment.

Now the older vintage of rationalists and materialists will probably wish to avoid these strange new psychological considerations. They will say that the motive power of a

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progressive society can be provided without attaching the individuals of the present society emotionally to some windlass rooted in the future. They will point out that it suffices to engender a progressive spirit in society and to attach the individual's loyalties to the ideal of a progressive society. But who knows which is the direction of progress until some scouting party of eccentrics has discovered it? And even if the direction in which this army is facing happens to be the correct one, what guarantee is there that it will be under an impulsion to move? Narcissistic societies will experience little attraction to anything beyond themselves. To be emotionally centred on an existing society is to be powerless to unchain any potent emotional drive towards a set of values and standards different from those approved by that society. It is through individuality, developed in relation to something beyond the group, that the growth of society is assured.

If for a moment we assume that this entity which gives emotional anchorage may be best described by the traditional label "God," then the above paragraphs permit of summary in the somewhat scriptural assertion that the salvation of society, and the happiness of both types of extreme variants, lies in a proper relation to God, *i.e.* the Theopsyche. The lower variant, doomed by the deficiencies of his nature to conflict with and default from the average standards of society, can achieve happiness and avoid criminal self-assertion by submission; and that submission is alone possible by a vision which gives him a place in the purpose of God and an assurance of benevolence (when he accepts the will of God, *i.e.* the progressive desires of the group). Similarly the upper variant is rescued from cynicism and despair and the prison-house of indissoluble individuality. The need for God, therefore, is great in proportion as man's non-adaptation to existing circumstances is great. A society without awareness of any need for God is one which is about to stagnate. God is the property of the divinely discontented, not of the human cattle perfectly adapted in their communal stalls. The picture of Christ between two robbers is the perfect symbol of the world's variants, bound by a common maladjustment.

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Critics of religion have pointed out, with some justification in factual observation, that a belief in God is often no more than an excuse for human laziness and inaction. If the above analysis is correct, precisely the opposite relation holds when God is rightly conceived.

To clarify the nature of this entity which lies beyond the existing group, and to discover if we have any justification in applying to it the word "God," will be the purpose of the next chapter.

For further related reading see :

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CHAPTER XI

BEYOND THE THEOPSYCHE: THE UNIVERSAL REALITY

THE group mind, it has been shown, has many of the properties traditionally assigned to God. Are those properties such that it is capable of fulfilling the functions of the entity which we have spoken of as existing beyond contemporary society, and does it in fact exercise such functions?

Some evidence will be presented later to show that at any given moment the group mind is wiser and nobler in moral outlook than the mind of any individual present in the group. Yet it is always far below the perfection supposed by religious people to be characteristic of God. And though for the lower variants of population the group mind exercises most of the benevolent and watchful functions of God, it cannot account for all the behaviour of the higher variants. Christ, for example, clearly drew upon something beyond the group mind of His day.

Are we then to suppose that the leading individual minds, and to some extent and in relatively indirect ways the lower variant minds, have relations with some more evolved group mind of the future? Yet how can men have relations with some more evolved group mind of the future? For how can men have relations with what does not yet exist? It is obvious that men can have relations with the noblest of the existing group mind. Through books and societies, music and religious services, and the love and sense of purpose reciprocated by their fellow-men, they have contact and support as real as that from any living individual friend. They can stretch out across the centuries to the great minds of the past; they can receive and they

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can give. But how can they receive emotional support from the group mind of to-morrow when they do not know reliably what its opinions will be ?

Now it is possible that individuals of great intellectual power, and possessed of sufficient emotional maturity, courage, and vitality to brave a step in the dark, could construct for themselves by the process of eduction which Spearman has described in *Creative Mind* an accurate conception of the group mind that is to be. On the intellectual side such a construction could be entirely accurate, being founded on logic. Thus the inventors of a new flying machine may be sure that it follows logically in its construction from sound principles ; they can be sure of it in so far as they are careful in their logic and in their premises. But men who aspire to a new art or religion can be sure of nothing beyond their own goodwill and sincerity. Experiment in emotional values is faith plus blind experiment. Those leaders who act upon such products of their own enterprise are therefore acting only on a probability, not a certainty, that they represent the group mind which is to emerge. Their sincere will to evolve the new group mind is their only certain connection with it ; for the rest they must stand or fall with the ideas they have adopted ; they must give support to, rather than receive support from, the group mind with which they are mainly concerned.

Their relation to the unemerged group mind is therefore scarcely reciprocal. What they give depends for its vitality on their own minds ; they can expect no spontaneous help or stimulation in return. Whatever emotional support or spiritual communion they receive, whatever serenity and determination they possess, comes from their own minds and the existing group mind. They are the revealers and constructors of God. They are the Life Force working out its latest aims. They have attained to that vision of Spinoza which so impressed Goethe, and which continues to be the highest sentiment men have to learn, that "he who truly loves God must not desire God to love him in return." The implication that a man's relation to the group mind depends greatly upon his individual gifts is one worthy of further consideration in a later section.

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We have spoken of the group mind as continuously emerging, in the manner already demonstrated by history. To what perfection does it emerge, and what are the conditions of its emergence? In answering such a question one could all too easily become lost in philosophical speculations too much dependent upon the structure of our own minds, and too distorted by the limitations of our present knowledge to be fruitfully employed in a scientific discussion.

Nevertheless, we must make contact at least with the ideas of "emergent evolution" and of the "Life Force" which have risen to popularity as explanatory themes during the last fifty years, and which have been adopted in religious systems by many rebels from dogmatic religion. The "Life Force" under the stereotype "élan vital" is found as a master principle in the writings of Bergson¹; it is implicit in Nietzsche; it pervades with the tenacity of a religious faith the works of Bernard Shaw.

The doctrine of emergent evolution, for which in its clearest expression we have to thank Lloyd Morgan, likewise had its origin in the ferment of thought arising around the last century's discovery of evolution, and finds its greatest support similarly among an emancipated and scientifically educated section of the population. Its main theme, which is merely descriptive rather than explanatory, is that in the process of evolution entirely new forms of being are created, differing qualitatively, indeed modally, from the preceding forms. By some it is understood to mean that we should even be unable to deduce or predict, no matter how complete our scientific knowledge and our awareness of the sequence of cause and effect, the nature of the new emergent. A "creative synthesis" has taken place. Thus a chemist perfectly acquainted with the properties of sodium and chlorine, but not having actually seen the product of their combination, would be unable to predict the salt taste of common salt; it is a new "emergent." This is a doubtful annex to the theory: to know all the properties of sodium and chlorine would involve knowing something of all the substances in which they occur.

¹ Bergson, H., *Creative Evolution*. Trans. 1911.

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Emergent evolution in its main thesis describes the tendency of the universe to evolve towards ever more complex forms. From the simple elements come more complex compounds. When the compounds reach a certain degree of complexity living matter merges. After aeons of evolution the higher forms of life begin to show unmistakable signs of mind and consciousness. It is supposed that when mind becomes sufficiently highly organized there must appear in the universe some new quality, at the nature of which, dimly seen through the dark glass of our too animal lives, we can only guess, and which we describe meanwhile as God.

Without losing ourselves in vast complexities beyond man's present power of reasoning, we can understand the scientific possibility that these emergent qualities are present and potential in matter from the beginning, requiring only certain kinds of organization in order to make their appearance. Thus the first part of this book has been a study of arguments that the qualities which we have been accustomed to designate as those of God are discernibly present, in continuously emerging form, in any aggregate of human minds acquiring increasing organization. Similarly, most biologists could assemble demonstrations that some signs of mind, of sensitivity, impulse, consciousness, or choice reaction, are present in living substance from its lowliest forms. Across the bridge from dead to living matter we cannot yet clearly see ; but we find "fatigue" in metals, we observe something strikingly like a nerve current in iron wire in nitric acid ; we can simulate animal behaviour by mechanical and electrical contrivances, and find at least suggestive hints in many fields.

It is feasible, therefore, and even probable, that all the great developments which we see transpiring in the universe, and all the remarkable emergents, are nothing but the unfolding of properties already potentially present in the atom. God, or at least the group mind, would thus be an intrinsic part of the universe itself. And perhaps it is not merely the conceit of the human mind which causes us to consider mind as the most valuable and significant thing in the universe.

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On this line of reasoning all those religious attitudes, both archaic and modern, which worship the universe itself and which are usually assembled under the label "Pantheism," are not so remote from the religion of mind, *i.e.* conventional religion, as many people have supposed. At worst Pantheism can be accused of being a little out of focus, of failing to separate from the whole its most significant part; or at least that part most valuable for human moral development. Nevertheless many great minds, sickened by the pettiness and idolatry of one or another of the Churches that worship God as a magnified human being, have embraced Pantheism, or some mystical communion with Nature, or the worship of the Life Force, of which we are all part. Goethe expresses the idea both precisely and nobly when he says, "The persuasion that a great creating, regulating and guiding Being conceals himself, as it were, behind Nature, to make himself comprehensible to us—such a conviction forces itself on us all."¹

To which entity are we most justified in applying the term "God"—to the group mind or to the universe itself? By dazing ourselves with philosophical speculation we could conclude that these two entities are virtually one. If God is the group mind then He is intrinsically present all the time, even though historically He has at any given period only become partially manifest. We may say, "What is time, and does time matter?" Time is a riddle against which many philosophers have battered their heads in vain. We do best to accept it at its felt, lived value, refusing to be led astray by such expressions as the "eternal present," or into believing that the special theory of relativity does away with its uniqueness. Equally we sell the new birthright of scientific common sense to the old harlot of philosophical sophistication if we play with the idea that the mind itself puts order, and modality, and time into the universe. At most we could follow Whitehead were he to put more precisely his statement implying that God is inherent and unfolding in the universe, the act by which the future emerges: "He confronts what is actual in it

¹ *Autobiography*, Book 4.

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[the Universe] with what is possible for it. Thus he solves all indeterminations."

Dismissing any far-fetched attempts at reconciling in a monistic unity two entities—the Theopsyche and the universe—which are at any given time patently different, we will attempt to study the relation between them. Let us first realize the part which the universe plays in the shaping of the group mind itself. Despite the convictions of Lamarck, the ingenuity of Samuel Butler, or the eloquence of Bernard Shaw, intelligent opinion increasingly aligns itself with the scientists who maintain that evolution does not take place through the inheritance of characteristics deliberately acquired by strivings of past generations. There is, as we have already said, no "inheritance of acquired characters." The particular forms which new species assume, and the direction in which evolution proceeds, are not due to the intention of the Life Force itself. Selective survival, operating essentially in the manner described by Darwin, and through the influence of social and physical environment, is responsible for the forms which living matter assumes.

Living matter seems to have only the undifferentiated will to live ; it is its impact upon environment which forces it into millions of specific expressions. New mutations bubble up ceaselessly from the spring of life, but it is fitness to the environment that decides which of these shall persist. Legs grew on the first amphibians because such projections proved an advantageous means of locomotion on land, but in the hundreds of thousands of years which this construction required there was time for trial and rejection of thousands of alternative, useless, or harmful anatomical growths. Similarly, the huge brain cortex which gives us intelligence evolved because the happenings in our universe are such that judgment and the power to remember the past in detail are distinct aids to survival.

At higher levels—at the level of evolution of the group mind—there is no reason to suppose that any difference in the mechanism of evolution arises. Life continues to try out new forms as the Life Force forces itself onwards, but the impress of environment decides the shape which

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shall be given to these new forces. Primitive man becomes blindly attached to all sorts of social customs—some cruel, some pointless, some valuable, some filthy, some advantageous—and the tribes which happen to adopt those most hygienically and morally sound are most likely to survive and prosper. At later stages in the emergence of the group mind reasoning doubtless plays a part by facilitating the choice of more adapted ways of living, but always man is bound to reach the frontiers of his knowledge and is then forced to experiment blindly, and to learn by the blows of environment or not at all.

Consequently the universe stands in the relation of mentor to the group mind or *Theopsyche*. It continually gives it the impress of its own form. The group mind, as the price of its progress, must reflect in itself the truths of Nature and the immutable principles according to which the universe is constructed. The relationship is essentially similar to that which Freud has described between the untutored individual mind—the *Id*—and its environment. Governed by the pleasure principle, the natural seeking of living matter for its satisfaction, the *Id* insistently demands, "I want"; but reality replies with its implacable statement "It is." As a child grows from infancy a part of its mind—the *Ego*—accepts and becomes acquainted with the limitations imposed by reality, in order that the organism may more realistically achieve its ends. Thenceforth the conflict is no longer between the individual and his environment, but between the unconscious *Id*, still dominated by the pleasure principle, and the conscious *ego* reflecting reality, and governed by the reality principle in its thinking.

A similar drama of development takes place in the group mind of man, but it is on a grander scale, and the adjustments which have to be learnt concern also reality thinking on internal mechanisms—the mechanisms of social life. By the economic demands of Nature, by famine and war, by disease and the various consequences of moral depravity or slothful self-sufficiency, the group mind is forced, in order to attain its goal of fuller living, to embody in itself the virtues of logical thinking, of moral restraint, of honesty and kindness. It is led to give value to things in accordance

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with the values which they really have in the universe, to esteem quiet courage and power and knowledge above the first naïve assessment. The Theopsyche is the "Ego" of the group mind.

Here the distinction between the group mind and the principle of the universe becomes clarified. The former manifests qualities commonly assigned to God—power, morality, loving-kindness—but only relatively to man's display of weakness. It is not omnipotent; only the universe itself remains supremely powerful, sublimely assured in its laws, eternal in its duration. But the group mind is always growing, acquiring more perfectly the expression of the Universal Reality, tending towards an ultimate identification with the universe. In the interests of clear discussion we will refer to the conscious group mind—conscious of its religious purpose—as the Theopsyche, the God mind that is distilled from the interaction of all individual minds. All that which is inherent in the laws of the universe we will call the Universal Reality.

Now historically the term "God" has not only been applied to the Theopsyche in the manner already indicated, but also to the Universal Reality; indeed, much confusion of thought concerning the characteristics of God arise from this dual symbolism. For the Universal Reality, though it exceeds the Theopsyche in power, is conspicuously unendowed with love.

The Universal Reality doles out what Herbert Spencer called a "discipline of natural consequences." Its justice differs from the merciful justice of the Theopsyche in that ignorance or weakness is not accepted as an excuse. Disease strikes because we have not yet struggled out of our ignorance; war takes its toll when we have become weak or foolish. Everywhere:

The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: Nor all thy Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.

Yet men have come to respect this austerity and then to love it. It becomes increasingly accepted in the reality

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thinking of the Theopsyche. Huxley, in a famous passage, defends its acceptance as the whole of education.¹ In the ancient world the Jews seem to have been the first to cease imputing disaster to evil spirits or devils and to begin ascribing catastrophes to their own shortcomings, believing their sufferings to be imposed as a punishment by God. At first the Assyrians were viewed as hostile to the God of the Jews, but deeper insight enabled the Jews to regard them as a tool of God, a scourge to bring the people out of sloth or iniquity. Further insight might have led to a vision which revealed all strife, all impacts with environment, as a challenge to rectify errors and deficiencies.

On the whole, however, because such an advance in thought is made at the expense of the pleasure principle, the recognition of God as the discrepancy between man's group mind and the full measure of the universe has been slow. Some part of the modern tendency to substitute society for God, to adhere to the less exacting rules of an indulgent society rather than to the unchanging demands of the Universal Reality, can be considered due to this constantly regressive craving. Perhaps that is why men closely in contact with Nature have never been quite so godless as those in cities. Men are constantly escaping from the country to the city. They wish to avoid slavery to wind and weather, they prefer to face something more easily cajoled than fierce tide or refractory earth, they desire to escape the searching questions imposed by the loneliness of Nature; so they retreat towards the comfort of warm humanity.

In the end mankind as a whole must face reality even if individuals desire to creep permanently under the shadow of the Theopsyche. Indulgent people must suffer from

¹ " . . . The fortune and the happiness of every one of us, depend upon our knowing something of the rules of a game infinitely more difficult and complicated than chess. The chessboard is the world, the pieces are the phenomena of the universe, the rules of the game are what we call the laws of Nature. The player on the other side is hidden from us. We know that his play is always just, fair, and patient. But we also know, to our cost, that he never overlooks a mistake, or makes the smallest allowance for ignorance. . . . What I mean by education is learning the rules of this mighty game."

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their rulers, who are more in touch with reality, that severity which they would not face in Nature itself.

Thus we face the enigma of pain, which has so puzzled lovers of men, who have constantly thought of God as the Theopsyche and wished not to see Him as the Universal Reality. Mental frustration and physical pain are consequences of the courageous thrust of the Life Force against the Universal Reality, as a result of which the Theopsyche is continually emerging. To see pain in its purposeful perspective does not solve our perplexity to the extent of reconciling us to pain. It should never induce the perversion of desiring pain for its own sake, but it should enable us to acquire the vigorous acceptance expressed by Browning :

Then, welcome each rebuff
That turns earth's smoothness rough,
Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but go!

A good case could be made out for the contention that periods of trial and stress and circumstances of environmental severity have been followed by greatest progress. It is striking, for example, that each of the four great ice ages which closed down on Europe left behind it a significantly higher type of human being than had existed before.

But there is also ground for the suggestion that as man becomes more evolved the frequency of pain and suffering diminishes, or at least is transferred from a violent reality to a continuous and modified existence in imagination. The lower animals may not have any memory or anticipation of pain, but their lives are full of unmitigated suffering, wounds, disease, and death. Man to-day has less physical suffering, with or without wars, than men of primitive times. Evolution is more a matter of mental tensions. As the Theopsyche proceeds to acquire more and more completely the image of the Universal Reality, as it gains in knowledge, power, and intelligence, in control of its emotions, in the kindness of man to man, and in the acceptance of scientific reality thinking, so suffering diminishes towards a vanishing point.

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If the Theopsyche continually approaches towards a perfect reflection of the Universal Reality there must come a time when they are one, or at least when the Theopsyche is in perfect contemplation of the Universal Reality and therefore of itself. To that fusion, since it embodies all the qualities that have been ascribed to God, confusedly in two forms, we can best apply the term "God." God is then the end result of all evolution and the solution of all pain. If we consider on philosophical grounds that time is something of an illusion and has no meaning in relation to God, then this God is perpetually present in all His qualities, but from a more common-sense standpoint God is present consciously but imperfectly in the Theopsyche, and perfectly, but unconsciously, in the Universal Reality.

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CHAPTER XII

THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL VINDICATION OF MYSTICISM

IN the light of this distinction of Theopsyche and Universal Reality many apparent contradictions in religious tendency and moral intention become resolved.

For example, thoughtful religious people have often been puzzled by the rift in religious attitude which the philosopher Whitehead comments upon " 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,' says the proverb. Yet this is an odd saying if it be true that 'God is Love.' " Clearly the first applies to God as the Theopsyche. For until man has lost his child-like self-conceit, and realized his own triviality and helplessness before the infinite mystery and power of the Universal Reality, he cannot be sobered into habits compatible with his gaining increasing mastery and security. Only those who have appreciated the magnitude of the universe, its sublime but pitiless indifference to man, are likely to be capable of that concerted and concentrated effort by which man can acquire something of its power. On the other hand, in the development of the Theopsyche, which must be bound together by the cement of mutual love and have pity to succour all its children, man does rightly to bear ever in his mind that "God is Love."

Historically the duality appeared again and again. We have already seen what the Jewish seers made of it. Freud, glancing farther back, reminds us that "The most gifted people of the ancient world dimly surmised that above the gods stands destiny and that the gods themselves have their destinies." Above various Theopsychies stands the same Universal Reality. I think, though my knowledge of theology is insufficient adequately to muster evidence,

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that the differing emphasis in the viewpoint of St. Paul and that of the gospels of St. Matthew, St. Luke, and St. John arises from the former being more hardened in the acceptance of God as the Universal Reality, the latter more completely impressed, through Christ, in God as the benign Theopsyche.

There is scope for a great historical and sociological study of the manner in which the relative prominence of Theopsyche and Universal Reality has varied with different epochs, different political and economic conditions, and different degrees of development of the Theopsyche. Perhaps the Universal Reality was the first superpersonal entity to impress man; the dictum of anthropologists that "Fear first made gods in the world" would seem to say as much. Classical antiquity saw a phase in which men were more absorbed in the gods that symbolized themselves, *i.e.* the Theopsyche. Then, in the Middle Ages, they were again conscious of the great gap between their own miserable culture and the lofty mystery of the Universal Reality.

Joad has eloquently described the medieval attitude: "Realizing the insignificance of the human spirit in the vast immensity of the Universe, unimpressed with the importance of themselves and their fellows, imbued in fact with a sense of sin, it did not occur to men of pre-Renaissance civilization to identify perfection with the future improvement of themselves. For them there was another world, more real because more perfect than this one, before which they abased themselves in humility and awe." This is the spirit which caused the great cathedrals to soar towards heaven. We sense both its wistfulness and its unshakable conviction of the omnipotent and the sublime in the superb art that it has left behind.

The observation that a heightened awareness of the Universal Reality tended to coincide with a richer sense of sin permits of being more clearly understood when we have dealt with the psychology of the religious consciousness of guilt. For the present it is a partial explanation that the moral law of the Universal Reality is more harsh than that of the Theopsyche, punishing us whether we sin

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wilfully or not. A slip on a mountain-side, a little carelessness at the wheel of a car are punished as severely as the most vile intentions of covetousness or adultery. The Theopsyche rejoices rather in the good that is in men and is temporarily patient with their faults. At its best, it aspires to follow the words of one who stands in the forefront of the present Theopsyche, the dying Christ, saying: "Forgive them, for they know not what they do." This duality was observed by Schopenhauer when he said: "Religion has two faces, one very kindly and one very sullen."¹

Not that the Theopsyche is incapable of severity or of inculcating a sense of sin. In so far as it is delegate of the Universal Reality, reflecting the principles that reside in it, it admonishes those who fall far short in the development of their talents and who show no love or service. As a parent may withdraw affection from a child to compel it to develop away from undesirable behaviour, or as an advanced nation may force civilized standards of behaviour upon a backward one, so the Theopsyche must suppress, coerce, and lead. And since it is the backward portions of the community which will be most frequently the object of these activities, it is not difficult to see the reason for the at first surprising fact that in some communities it is the most evil and useless who seem most conscious of God. Just as a man discovers his conscience most readily when he contemplates evil, so a marked concern with an externalized God (in Theopsyche form) is not an unusual feature of a backward group.

In comparatively modern times an awareness of the Universal Reality has perhaps expressed itself more in Protestantism than in Catholicism, and has come to clearest expression in Puritanism. It is not surprising that those who are accustomed to the relatively benign intervention of the Theopsyche speak of "your northern religions, harsh and bitter as your skies." Nor is it surprising that Protestantism has proved the most common jumping-off point for those who would dispense with the conception of a personal God altogether in order to stand in direct relation

¹ Dialogue on "Religion."

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to a scientifically conceived universe. To be a part of the Theopsyche itself in its newest contacts with the Universal Reality is to be relatively unaware of the Theopsyche, as a man takes for granted the ground on which he stands. Nevertheless to take anything for granted to such an extent that one denies its existence is an error ; and the hostility of the Christian and other Churches to Pantheism or that simple identification of God with the universe, which is involved in the worship of the Cosmic Purpose, is well founded. Actually, the objection commonly raised by the theologians—that if man, as a part of the universe, is a part of God, then the evil that is in man must also be a part of God—is relatively meaningless. For evil is not a substance but a set of actions which, if our conceptions of social psychology are correct, necessarily cannot contribute any enduring feature to the Theopsyche. The error in Pantheism would seem to be rather in refusing to recognize that the head—the growing head of the Theopsyche—is more important than the inexpressive body. It is a result of faulty values, and a failure to see that the Theopsyche in the future gains all the powers of the Universal Reality, and possesses from the beginning a warm identification with human life which is foreign to the Universal Reality.

Yet the attitude of the Nature mystics, of Wordsworth and Richard Jefferies and Miguel de Unamuno, based in Pantheism, is no more false than that of the Church worshippers who see only the Theopsyche. Indeed it is less so. For the mystics do not deny the Theopsyche, they only ignore it while they are concerned to grasp some new truth from the universe itself, with which the Theopsyche will ever after be enriched, as human enjoyment is increased by the artist's seeking new beauty without any deliberate intention to serve his fellows.

The mystic's adoration goes out to some essence of the universe, something in tree and mountain, sun, or star which he cannot define, yet with which he is confident of the deepest communion, and as to the supreme moral influence of which he is never in doubt. From an intuitive standpoint, it is difficult to doubt the genuineness of this experience when one reads Wordsworth's lines :

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And I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts ; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man ;
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things. Therefore am I still
A lover of the meadows and the woods,
And mountains ; and of all that we behold
From this green earth.

Scientifically considered, such Pantheism is pure animism. Yet if what we have said about life being implicit in the structure of matter is correct, animism is scientifically realistic, for the universe contains the purest and most impersonal qualities of mind ; it contains indeed the un-emerged Theopsyche.

Now, if we examine the adjustment of the mystic worshipper of the Universal Reality from the point of view of the welfare of his fellows, *i.e.* from the social and moral point of view, we find a situation very similar to that of the individual whose loyalties are to the Theopsyche rather than to any group of living men. Indeed, it is a continuation of the same problem ; the worshipper of the Universal Reality is one step farther from concern with existing groups than is the individual attached to the Theopsyche. But for such an adjustment to be profitable for society and correct for the individual, the individual must in this case occupy a special position : he must be a leading part of the Theopsyche, requiring to take little from it and prepared to give much to it. Attachment to the Universal Reality is the limiting position of attachment to the Theopsyche of the future, for in the end the Theopsyche of the future becomes a perfect reflection of the Universal Reality.

If the mystic's attitude lacks this intention to contribute more to the existing Theopsyche by reason of his experience with the Universal Reality, then his behaviour perhaps deserves that label of "escape from reality," which the unsympathetic are prone to give it: Even so, it is an escape

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of spiritual value, harmless to others and useful to himself. A recent textbook on social psychology observes that the mystic is freed from any sense of competition with his fellows. At best he gives to them, at worst he ignores them. It concludes: "Mysticism may partially free the individual from competitiveness . . . but [it] . . . is clearly an escape from the cultural surroundings." First, one may ask whether it is so great an error to escape from the "cultural surroundings" of our modern urban life? And how is society as a whole to escape unless individuals, by momentary communings with a noble landscape, keep alive the vision of something better than the present, towards which we all have to strive?

As for conscious competition, is it not realized by all psychologists to be most dangerous as the main motif either of education or of social advance? Sir Percy Nunn illustrated his wisdom as an educator when he pointed out the fatal course of diseased competition, that, "Like alcohol, though it begins by stimulating, it finishes by bringing all to the same dull, if not brutish level." For conscious competition draws all the energies into the rut of producing greater and greater efficiency in some accepted form of competition. The steam engine was not invented by a competitive group of human weight-lifters; they could think only in terms of bigger and better muscles. Rome, in spite of, or rather because of its concentration on warlike arts, could think of no better technique of sea warfare than to reduce sea battles to the accepted methods of land warfare. There was more creation in one idle Greek than in all the competitive servants of Rome.

The perpetual danger of society is that it will fail to break from the inveterate circle of its own culture. The practical, socialized men, the scornors of mysticism and introversion, are those who continue most efficiently to practise the errors of their ancestors. They absorb themselves in the "real world" of what is and make society into a snake that has seized its own tail, doomed to move for ever dazedly in a circle.

This is the fundamental error in the form of religion which exalts society, and which is apparent in such view-

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points in psychotherapy as that of Link.¹ He insists that the individual must be absorbed in society, and adds: "The danger of over-extraversion is far more remote than the danger of excessive introversion." For the individual this may be true, but not for society. Practically all the great innovators and discoverers have prized their isolation, their intense inner life; their communion with something beyond the group. Regarding a typical discoverer in the simplest physical sense, the first circumnavigator of the world, Magellan,² his biographer remarks: "Taciturn and reserved, always enwrapped in a cloud of loneliness . . . this perpetual solitary was environed with ungraciousness." Of a discoverer in the most complex world of moral values we are told that he spent forty days and nights in the wilderness, and was constantly withdrawing to quiet places to think and pray.

What these simple psychologists and moralists fail to realize is that it is possible for a love of man to go with a dislike of crowds, and that the greatest service to man is done by those who persistently look through and beyond him. The superman is not man, nor may he be produced by slavish service to the desires of existing men and sub-men. Heard's attempt to confine religion to an awareness of human solidarity has already been examined; his denunciation of the solitary eccentric can now be appreciated in its proper perspective. He tells us, "the ascetic is simply the individual suddenly condensed into a passionate egoist unable to lose himself in life and there dominated by the terror of being lost in death." This overlooks all the qualities in asceticism except those which are found in the individual who has failed in asceticism. The ascetic has refused to lose himself in life in order that he may better live on in the future life of the group mind. He desires a spiritual life in place of a biological immortality. He fails to dissolve his life in that of the group because he is concerned to establish, by his example, a new attitude in the group, one prepared to sacrifice the present for the future. By such restraint Christianity has established itself in the pattern of a future-

¹ *The Return to Religion.*

² Stefan Zweig, *Conqueror of the Pacific.*

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tending religion. And this in its turn makes possible a new attitude to material and biological processes. For example, the development of a true eugenic concern for the generations of the future is scarcely conceivable without the prior discipline of Christianity, a discipline which has as part of its basis the refusal of the individual to express all his loyalties and attachments directly in the existing group or the existing life.

A scientific approach to this problem of human energies in relation to the Theopsyché and the Universal Reality therefore leads to the conclusion that the brotherhood of man is not a full expression of the moral trend which exists in living matter. The magnificent solidarity of the human race, the self-effacing love of man for man in the sufferings and death which accompany our strange, great adventure, is one of the noblest spectacles in the pageant of life. There is only one thing nobler and that is the undefeated spirit of the lonely individual, striving for his comrades of the future in the face of the taunts and misunderstandings of his fellows, sincerely loving those who hate him, serenely prepared for whatever fate may hold. For the love of God includes the love of man, heightened in so far as they strive towards what is God. But the love of man need not include the love of God ; it may be arrested at a mutual condonation of man as he is, pleasure-loving, static, semi-bestial.

When the scientist builds his mechanical highways into the unknown he generally finds the irresponsible poet already established at his journey's end. Our conclusion is not so different from that of Chesterton, surveying the philanthropist :

Abou Ben Adhem . . .
Mellow with learning lightly took the word
That marked him not with them that love the Lord
And told the angel of the book and pen :
" Write me as one that loves his fellow-men :
For them alone I labour ; to reclaim
The ragged roaming Bedouin and to tame. . . .

Plot out the desert into streets and squares ;
And count it a more fruitful work than theirs

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Who lift a vain and visionary love
To your vague Allah in the skies above."

Gently replied the angel of the pen :
" Labour in peace and love your fellow-men ;
And love not God, since men alone are dear ;
Only fear God ; for you have cause to fear."

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CHAPTER XIII

A SOLUTION TO THE RIDDLE OF CONFLICTING IDEALISMS

THE last major difficulty in the conception of the Theopsyche resides in its apparent lack of unity and integration.

While we have been assuming a group mind for mankind, the reader may have been asking himself where such a unified mind is to be found, what actual printed words express its thoughts, what executives realize its intentions. It has already been noted that each group with any sort of behaviour reminiscent of a mind must have some structure. A family, a committee, a regiment, a political party, a nation—all of these we recognize, perceiving their feelings, memories, and purposeful action. We may also recognize that they are related in an inclusive structure, a hierarchy of dependent and subordinated sub-groups, just as the interests and competing impulses of an individual mind become loosely integrated in a single hierarchy forming the self which controls the whole organism.

But no special demonstration is required to convince one that this integration in our existing social life is more marked at some levels than others. Indeed it looks as if group minds are closely knit up to the level of nationhood, and that thereafter any genuine integration is conspicuously absent. It is more than a manner of speech to say that Great Britain has decided to do so and so ; that America feels strongly opposed to such and such a course ; or that French culture is thinking along certain lines. Above these national minds there may brood a shadowy world-mind, but does it really possess the highly-organized, integrated actuality which we think of in defining the Theopsyche ?

Great though a nation may be, replete with the wisdom

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and humanity of great minds and guided by noble traditions, it yet falls short in some way of the God-like qualities which can more safely be postulated for the mind of all mankind. For nation disagrees with nation ; it can forsake truth and it can show unscrupulous qualities incompatible with goodness.

A more comprehensive viewpoint will reveal, I think, that the behaviour of nations is not to be judged in the same moral terms as that of individuals. Different goals and a different part to play in the purpose of the whole, result in a need for different moral values. The group mind of the nation may not be so ignoble an entity as the naïve individual would like to assume. But even if it were, we can look to a group mind which transcends the national mind. For the notion that no common mind binds the individual minds of all the earth is an error consequent upon an over-emphasis of the political ties in group mind structuration.

Even on the political level there are tangible super-national ties in alliances and ententes and in the embryo League of Nations. There are international organizations among more intelligent people, especially among the followers of the sciences and the arts, which throw bonds of intellectual stimulation and friendship across national boundaries. The greater part of the solidarity of the world Theopsyche, however, seems to arise from the common elements of culture, of moral valuation, and of human aspiration which are shared by the individuals in all civilized and some uncivilized groups.

In the moral field, for example, there are virtues of courage, honesty, and fair-dealing, of hospitality, kindness, and self-sacrifice, of intellectual sincerity and truth-seeking, which men recognize and honour in other men wherever a certain level of development has been surpassed. There are ideals of wisdom, beauty, and strength which bind good men over all the earth. And—the misrepresentations of cynics notwithstanding—these ideals are not altogether forsaken even when the most violent hostility and warfare exists between group and group.

Naturally in the heat of emotional disputation it is

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difficult to perceive such common purposes. Russell, for example, takes Haldane to task for supposing that any common ideals really exist. "Does he really think," asks Russell, "that Hitler and Einstein have one ideal, though it has different aspects?" To answer that question would require a careful sociological inquiry into the consequences of the alternative courses of action prescribed by the conflicting ideals, but it is obvious that the ideals have a great deal in common—human welfare and happiness—and in so far as they differ, that difference may be due to different approaches and a catering to the needs of men of different levels of intelligence.

In short, despite the slight differences of ideal which arise from the special situations of groups and their biological, racial, constitutional needs, there remains a great common possession of ideals, betokening the possibility of some degree of common political organization. The group mind arising from such features may be said to bear roughly the same relationship to the highly-structuralized national group mind as the autonomic nervous system bears to the central nervous system. Thought and intention is formed slowly and expressed inco-ordinately in the unorganized group mind bound only by the common mind of individual thought. The later development of political organization and specialization permits a more rapid and integrated reaction. The Theopsyche is only at the beginning of that self-conscious control, but investigation would show, I believe, that the organic unity which possesses through the universal interchange of cultural interests, and the common loyalty of men to profound universal values, is already enough to give it greater powers and nobler qualities than belong to any single national mind.

What the thinker obsessed with the conflict of national sub-groups overlooks is that these differences of ideals play an important and essential part in the development of the Theopsyche. Evolutionary morality indicates that variation of race and culture is a required condition of progress. Man must agree with man to disagree and to follow the common duty of living out life as his culture and racial constitution indicates. The first duty of each individual

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is to the Theopsyche, to the common plan of human development. His second duty arises from the first contract, and it consists in wholeheartedly playing the game of following his own race and culture to greater glory and more supreme service or to stagnation and perdition.

Race and culture are, of course, not entirely independent variables. A Chinaman does not prefer Chinese to European culture because he can demonstrate that its values are better, or even because his nostalgia urges him to invent reasons; he does so because it is adapted to his racial constitution as a well-worn shoe is to the shape of the individual foot. And if he alters his culture or borrows from the West, the new pattern will still be in accord with his physiological and temperamental needs. The study of psychological and physiological differences among races is in such early infancy that practically no predictions are possible as to the limits of adjustment of any race to any culture. Moreover, we are not concerned with limits but with optimum conditions. White men can live in the hottest part of the tropics, but they suffer from physical diseases and neurasthenic mentality in so doing. Negroes can live in the most complex white civilization, but they suffer from a higher crime rate and alter the tone of the whole city in which they happen to live.¹ The lower average mental capacity of the negro arises from a smaller skull capacity which is as racially characteristic as the greater projection of his heel at the other end of the skeleton.

At first, we have to speak only of differences, and never of superiorities or inferiorities. Is the natural musical talent of the Alpine racial elements in Central Europe inferior or superior to the physical endurance of the American Indian? Is the shorter stature of the Japanese a defect in relation to the greater size of Europeans? Is the athletic frame and large heart of the Nordic Englishman or native Hawaian an advantage or disadvantage in civilization? The answer is in every case that it depends upon the kind of civilization. Each constitutional trend causes the

(4,722) ¹ Thorndike, E. L., *How Good is Your City?*

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specific race or racial mixture concerned to be most happily adapted to a certain type of culture.

From this it follows that there will exist between national sub-groups some irresolvable differences of ideals ; that is to say, differences which no reasoning or will to conform can eliminate, any more than early training can cause cows to eat meat or cuckoos to build robin's nests.

Already there has been some shrewd observation and speculation as to the effects of racial differences on religious ideals. McDougall¹ has developed a theory as to why the Mediterranean race prefers Catholicism and the Nordic Protestantism, a theory more satisfactory to the facts than is any historical explanation. Ludendorf² has built a doubtful edifice upon the relatively convincing observation that the German, on the whole, tends to feel God within himself, and to believe human nature intrinsically good, whereas the Mediterranean projects God outwards, labours under a sense of sin, and proceeds by appealing for help from without. Chesterton, in his remark that "Confucianism may be a civilization, but it is not a religion," shows equally the inability of one racial type to think in the terms of another.³

What all religions must have in common, if they are religions rather than patriotisms, is a sense of the plan of the whole, an intention on the one hand to contribute to the universal goods, such as scientific knowledge, and on the other to live out fully the possibilities of the sub-group concerned. Thus, the great contributions of various groups, of the Jews to religion, of the Germans to science, of the Spanish and Portuguese to exploration, have been contributions to the Theopsyche as a whole, and there is no group so small or backward, but that it seems to have given something to the whole. Incidentally, this contribution can only

¹ *National Welfare and National Decay.*

² *Deutsche Gott Glaube.*

³ Professor Burt has pointed out that the Nordic and Mediterranean races are the most strongly conative (*i.e.* restless and striving) compared with the Alpine and Mongoloid peoples. It is as one would expect that the most active would be the first to realize obstruction, to become fatalistic, or to achieve a strong consciousness of "the will of God"; and this we find to be the case.

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attain its fullest and most perfect expression when the group is one of biologically similar individuals. The injunction, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them," is impossible of realization when sympathy is confused by differences of taste, but unless full unity is possible perfect expression cannot ensue.

On the other hand, the clash which arises from each racial sub-group, pursuing its own self-expression, even if that clash descend to the crude solution of violence and war, is also contributory to the development of the Theopsyche. For the highest development of the Theopsyche depends on the evolution of the highest human type, which frequently requires the replacement of indubitably backward peoples by a more evolved stock, if possible, by peaceful methods, *e.g.* through a differential birth-rate.

The ethics of this matter have been dealt with earlier in the chapter on evolutionary morality, where it was shown that the individual who makes a cheap argument by calling war simple murder, and who judges the behaviour of nations to be less ethical than that of individuals, has lost his sense of direction in the greater system of morality. It has well been said that for a time, in the Great War, a spirit arose in modern man which was the closest approach that this generation had known to a truly religious experience. One reason why it is desirable that religion should be freed from the millstone of dogma and reinstated on a progressive scientific basis is that men shall be able sincerely to experience the religious purpose in peace. Only thus will the men of vision and self-sacrificing determination cease from forcing the dull majority into the scheme of evolution by shattering them in disastrous wars. War is a calamity and a confession of failure to grasp life purpose at a higher level, but it has been a highroad to nobility at a lower level, and God has been served by those who went to battle intent on serving God.

Our present concern, however, is not so much with morality as with the accompanying emotional expressions, and the sense in which the individual is related to God—to the Theopsyche and the Universal Reality—when he is engaged in a clash of sub-group minds, commonly nations.

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Not only the racial strains, but also the cultural variations among people of identical strains, are tested out by competition. Frequently the growth of the Theopsyche is brought about by a higher culture interfering with a lower one. The barbarous and cruel customs of Abyssinia are replaced by Italian roads and hospitals, schools, and books. The too individualistic and economically self-seeking spirit of the Chinese causes difficulty in organizing any enterprise for the country as a whole, so that the Japanese, more well-knit and capable of losing the individual in the group, thrust back Chinese culture before their own, in spite of great inferiority of numbers and no greater intelligence.

We may notice in passing that the differences which result in one group mind being far more powerful, wise, and highly-developed than another, are often extremely slight as seen in the individual and frequently subtle and unexpected in their nature. Seeing an Abyssinian and an Italian side by side, one would scarcely expect a group of the latter to be more formidable in war! Or observing how apparently similar the intelligence of the average German is to that of the average Spaniard, one is at a loss to account for the far greater contribution to culture made by a nation of the former. There is a field of vitally important research here, in working out the cumulative effect upon the group mind of small differences in the individual use of mental energy, in ability to co-operate, in capacity for sympathetic enthusiasm for the purpose of the group and capacity for sublimation of energy from sexual and primitively instinctive ends.

The impact of the higher group mind upon the lower one, in the service of the Theopsyche, may be no more pleasant for the lower than is correction by a teacher to the wilful child corrected. Yet the wiser individuals in such groups, the more religious ones, have, in the manner which we recognized in the Jews, regarded the coercive power as a tool in the hands of God. Like the Arabs under French domination, they have striven to the utmost for their own culture, and when it was patent that they were dealing with a group mind more powerful than their own, they have accepted the change as the will of God, recog-

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nizing that there must be some superior elements in the culture imposed on them which they should acquire. The more highly-intelligent the people the less the need for force; the Japanese westernized themselves in an extremely short time. The belief in God and his purpose facilitates such adjustments to progress.

That the dominant groups believe themselves to be serving the purpose of God is not so great a tribute to their religious sense. Speaking of the English colonists, in his *Epic of America*, Adams emphasizes their godliness, and adds, "in their minds it was the hand of God that slew Indians for them." Historically it seems to have been the people most self-disciplined in the ways of God who have been the dominant groups, and the instruments for passing on to others the ideals and restraints which those group minds had never achieved. A group of unimportant Arabs, plus an idea of God more advanced than that of neighbouring peoples, became the great world force of Islam. As Aeschylus¹ observed so long ago, "He is to be feared who fears the gods."

To perceive the development of God in the apparent chaos of group conflict, to observe clearly the lines of moral duty solving the confusion of individual loyalties towards the state and God, is to achieve serenity where the irreligious only arrive at cynicism or a blind and suicidal patriotism. At the moment of writing the Atlantic democracies are bewildered, envious, and hostile at the rise of Germany, Italy, and Japan, countries in which individuals have disciplined their indulgences as to a religious purpose. These nationals fear the gods even though they are partly false gods, in comparison with the vast numbers in our democracies lacking any super-personal aim. Their rise should be welcomed by the religious man as reassuring evidence that in spite of modern wealth and ease, we shall not be allowed to sink into stagnation or adopt foolish social practices in fatal detachment from the stream of evolution.

We disagree with the totalitarian states in their elevation of the state soul above that of the Theopsyche, but

¹ *Septem Daces.*

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we must recognize that those states have elements of purpose which our democracies have lost. Whereas a Chinese author has just written a pleasant book on *The Importance of Living*, these purposeful communities are more in earnest about the importance of dying, for goals beyond ourselves. Through the interaction of these cultures both will be enriched and purified or one will prove so false as to be swept away. But, as religious people have always recognized, the anvil as well as the hammer is essential to the purposes of God. And when men become brothers in competition, all will be equally beloved by the world Theopsyche they create.

For further related reading see :

McDOUGALL, W., *National Welfare and National Decay*.

CHAPTER XIV

THE EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF GOD

To follow the steps of scientific method when approaching so complex a subject as religious psychology in so limited a space is possible only if the reader is prepared to grant, by shrewd inspection, some short cuts which may be superficially suspect.

I am conscious of an unusual dearth of experimental evidence in these chapters, and I find pages of writing when these should properly be well analysed tables of statistics. These things will come in the textbooks requisite for a more advanced investigation. Their omission betokens no lack of belief in the necessity of maintaining the inductive, empirical scientific spirit. But the materials for our reasoning have so far been available in the experience of every observant and well-informed person. And our task has been to clear the ground of inveterate orthodox religious pre-conceptions, re-arranging the data from the standpoint of sceptical but unbiassed observation of man and Nature. We have to make a scientific biography of God.

Because we are about to deal with such a radical new arrangement of the data it is necessary to remind the reader that theological habits of thought will be prone to re-establish themselves insidiously when we approach the familiar ground in which they once held sway. One must insist on their bankruptcy, visible in the fact that despite hundreds of years of thought on these lines by very able minds, the field remains a refuge of chaos and a junk heap of unsolved problems.

That bankruptcy is evident equally in practice; for if the theory is muddled it is not surprising that applied

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religion should function badly. The Churches, it is admitted on every hand, have failed to progress, to retain their part in serving and leading society, whereas the institutions having some scientific leavening—the schools, the economic machinery of government, the medical and health services—have functioned in healthy accord with a changing society. The latter have escaped from the dead hand ¹ of authoritarian learning, struggled beyond the pales of intuition and guesswork, into a new realm of scientific investigation, planned experiment, rational and enlightened control.

I have remarked elsewhere ² that man's treatment of the mentally ill seems the most barbarous and incompetent chapter in the whole account of his modern endeavours, but on fuller consideration I think that distinction should be accorded to his handling of religion since the beginning of the scientific era. That these two fields vie for such a distinction must be due to their common possession of an extreme complexity rooted in the mystery of the human mind. However, one of them at least has come wholly within the sphere of scientific method, and we may now reasonably expect the other to follow.

The triumphs of physics and chemistry preceded those of psychology and anthropology because men were prepared earlier to approach these subjects scientifically and because in the beginning their problems were less abstruse and difficult. Only in the last decade have men considered the possibility of an equally scientific approach to religion. Theology has long been thought of as the essence of all that is opposed to science; but actually the new theology is the latest cornerstone of the sciences. At the moment it lies just beyond the most advanced frontier of science, and it can be fruitfully studied only when physics and chemistry have become familiar landmarks, when physiology and biology are far advanced, and when psychology and anthropology have become well established.

¹ This is more than a fairly apt epithet; the "mortmain Acts" in England and other European countries, devised to keep too much property from falling into the hands of the Church, undoubtedly had much to do with the relative freedom of progress in the countries which adopted them and the arrest in the countries, like Spain, which did not.

² *Crooked Personalities, in Childhood and After*. London, 1938.

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Unfortunately, in this endeavour there will be almost as much opposition from backward scientists as from expert theologians. There are scientists who would gladly ignore certain fields of experience, who consider it beneath the dignity of science to investigate, for instance, psychic phenomena, and who assume that any statement containing the words "God," or "love," or "immortality" cannot be scientific. Perhaps science has been too long obsessed with analysis, trying to reduce all the meaningful variety of life to units of time and space and matter, or to some monistic conception beyond these. Such analysis is desirable, but it must not deny the existence of the more complex entities that can be built out of these elements. Its task is to synthesize and see new wholes as well as to reveal new entities by analysis. And the syntheses are generally more important for daily life than the analyses. Few of the chemical elements have much importance in applied chemistry, but the chemists' synthetic creations have opened up new worlds in industry and medicine. To be blind to those highly complex syntheses of observation which exist in the Theopsyche, in God and personal immortality, is to miss the greatest contributions of science.

But at this point in our investigation, as we begin to follow up from the properties of the Theopsyche and to approach matters of applied religion in social life which have hitherto been considered matters of opinion only, or which have proved refractory to solutions by dialectic and intuitive methods, the need for experimental, statistical and other techniques characteristic of more advanced psychology becomes insistent.

One stands on the threshold of a host of fascinating questions concerning the mental life of our time and the manner in which it will develop or respond to this influence or that. For the first time we may be able to understand the patterns in that fossilized sociology, which is the history of man, or to put in the hands of governments and social reformers a means of predicting the changes in any group mind which will follow from the application of their remedies. If the past course of psychological discovery is any guide we shall unearth many mechanisms surprisingly

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different from popular preconceptions and enter a new field full of radical revisions of our ideas.

Our questioning should be concerned to find out, for example, what changes in the behaviour of individuals and groups follow upon their appreciation of the reality of the Theopsyche ; to understand first how defective, relatively, is the adjustment of those who work with some personalized symbol of God ; to discover the way in which the science of the Theopsyche is best taught to the young. There are a whole set of questions concerning the effect of religious belief or its absence upon spending and the economic stability of groups. The incidence of delinquency, neurosis, and insanity is clearly likely to have important relations to the group outlook and to the ratio between speed of progress and changing adjustments to the Theopsyche.

Through statistical analysis and experiment one could ascertain how various political, domestic, and religious attitudes interact. What is the effect of the social security of parents upon the delinquency rate, the ability to learn and the social friendliness of children ? How far is it safe to leave the quantity and quality of literature and drama to be decided by commercial demand ? Does the continual drip of advertisements of bad taste wear away some stone of social conscience or sensitivity ? What are the measurable effects of beautiful surroundings in terms of finer moral behaviour ? Which improvements in political, economic, and recreational life are barred by the limitations of inborn mental capacity in the species of men which constitute the group ? And in what manner do various features of group life—its kindness, its interest in culture, its susceptibility to change, its freedom from economic panic, its freedom from physical disease, depend on the summation of small inborn or acquired traits in individuals ? Why is the political life of England almost free from the abuses and vulgarities which characterize it in America, and why is the American university, on an average, so much more progressive and alive to new fields of research than most English institutions ?

These are but a fraction of the questions regarding group mechanisms needing solution if we are even to begin to

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understand the superbly intricate workings of the Theopsyche ; but few of them can possibly be answered in more than a tentative fashion to-day. A great research has to be organized which is nothing less than an experimental study of God. To introduce the idea that God should be regarded as a legitimate object of experimental investigation is not to imply or invite any diminution of that reverence towards God which has dominated religious thought and which, as far as we know, is a sane and desirable emotional relationship in well-adjusted societies and individuals.

Science is itself a monument to man's reverence for universal truth and his tireless interest in what lies beyond appearances. Indeed, as I have pointed out elsewhere,¹ some part of the conflict of science and religion is a competition of rival recruiting agencies for men measuring up to the same altruistic and serious standards of mentality. In both scientist and priest there is a contempt for trivial and temporary values, a sense of obligation to mankind as a whole, and a profound humility before the mystery of creation. The priest is perhaps more of an artist, content with the image given by his imagination, but inspired by a desire to transmit that vision to others. The scientist is impelled to laborious researches by the mystery of a glory half-revealed. He pursues a Holy Grail with a mystical conviction that some day he, or men who follow after, will be bequeathed a transfiguring illumination of the reality behind matter. Whether he is searching in the vast starry spaces, peering into the tiny miracles of the atom, delving into the protoplasmic mysteries of nerve and brain, or watching the strange tale of statistics which record the life processes of that great leviathan, society, he is imbued with a piety as profound as it is unself-conscious.

Yet, if religion is to be annexed by science, it must yield to no immature science. Its intuitions must not be ruthlessly crushed by a superficial logic. Those scientists who have not yet become masters of their trade, who see no place for insight in preliminary stages of investigations, who have not learnt the essential lesson that great error can arise from logical reasoning on insufficient data, or who speak

¹ *Psychology and Social Progress*. London, 1933.

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as if any theory is likely to be eternally accepted, would produce havoc in this most complex of sciences. Most of the late nineteenth-century rationalists committed all these errors, especially that of assuming they had all the necessary facts, although practically all the field which we now know as psychology was unknown to them. Blind to half the world of experience and guided only by a narrow humanitarianism, the rationality of which they never questioned, they exercised a pompous dictatorship over sociological questions, denying human inequality, labelling national competition as wholly evil, announcing God to be a myth and immortality a prejudice. That these rationalists on the whole achieved good, by virtue of their irrationality, is no excuse for delivering bound to their mercies this extremely complex subject, within the boundaries of which they have so far succeeded in being merely destructive. The social psychologist who handles these questions must be subtle enough at times to say with the philosopher Tertullian, "Credo ergo absurdum est."

Neither should we unwittingly allow ourselves to do injustice to those who approach life from a religious or artistic point of view, by forgetting that science permits explanations of life on at least two distinct but parallel systems, with the possibility of translation taking place between them. If I take a wine-glass to my lips and swallow the wine the physiologist can explain my actions by describing how the wine affects certain types of taste bud on the tongue and how the electro-chemical changes in nerve tissue are reflected to and from my spinal cord, causing chemical breakdowns in certain muscles, resulting in the movements of swallowing. But since practically all nervous action is accompanied by consciousness, the process can equally well be explained in causal terms (using the "unconscious," an entity with definite properties, when the whole process is not conscious) on a psychological level. Then I describe the taste of the wine and my impulse to swallow it.

These two systems are not mutually exclusive. A full description of life requires that both be considered, but since they are parallel it is sufficient for purposes of scientific prediction to use one only, and usually it doesn't much

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matter which we choose. A person's behaviour, including his physiology, at present admits of more accurate observation, so that science on the whole prefers the description from the outside to that resulting from internal introspection. In everyday life, however, and as individuals enjoying our internal experience, we generally show a marked preference for the opposite method of description. We do not say, "The sound waves impinging on my ear resulted in such and such changes in my brain cortex and cerebellum, which were reflected into the sympathetic system and actuated my lachrymal glands." We prefer to say, "I was so moved by the beauty of the music that I cried." And our choice is not merely due to the relative simplicity of the conscious processes: it is because consciousness is what we live to enjoy, whereas we value the parallel physiological changes on which it is borne along only as a man values the mechanism of his motor car.

In addition to this difference of descriptive level there is a difference of purpose in description. Thus, even conscious experiences can be described either from a detached and systematic scientific standpoint, or with the personal interest of the full-blooded experiencer. A scientific description of the occasion when you stole a policeman's helmet in a students' rag may include such statements as that you were actuated by the herd instinct, or that certain visceral or gland changes took place in a certain "gestalt," or that various emotions and perceptions occurred in your consciousness. You yourself, however, consider you have given a true explanation to the magistrate when you say, "I got excited with the crowd and snatched the officer's hat."

Artistic people often manifest sharp hostility to what they call the "cold, isolated, meaningless world of science," implying thereby that science is incapable of giving a true account of the whole of our experiences. This is a misunderstanding: the scientific approach is the only one capable of giving a true picture of our relation to the universe, but our concentration on the picture should not prevent our living the colours that undoubtedly belong in it. To know the structure of the Theopsyche, to be intelligently aware

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of the dynamics of our individual relation to it, should not prevent our enjoying that experience, any more than a doctor's understanding of the physiology of thirst prevents his simple appreciation of a drink.

Science may for the first time provide evidence to a reasonable man that his relation of reverence for, and communion with, the Theopsyche or the Universal Reality represents a sane and appropriate adjustment to the reality of things. But the experience itself remains precious, so that he will desire to raise it to its highest expression by prayer and religious service or through the medium of art and natural beauty. Scientific analysis does not imply a cold, destructive approach—unless the attitude is indeed illusory—but the artistic approach alone, on the other hand, implies possibilities of serious error. Artists are notoriously prone to see swans where there are only geese, or dragons where there are but domestic animals. It is best for the artist to colour the structure already made by science. "Meaning," in the sense of what a thing means to you emotionally, is admittedly a description on a different level from a scientific account of its meaning in a purposeful and functional sense, but if we are to be in an efficient relation to our world the first "meaning" must be decided by the second.

Again, a sense of perspective in a scientific treatment of religion requires us not to forget that religious questions can be discussed from at least three aspects, and that many discussions attain a conclusion which is seemingly perfect and yet quite false because they confine themselves wholly to one aspect. One consists in thinking of religion purely in terms of the individual and his emotional life, as some Churches do, and has been recently done by Freud, Jung, and Forsyth, thinking in terms of complexes, libido investments and personal development. Another is the philosophical approach, or to be precise, the approach through ontogeny, which asks how far the human mind is in fact capable of being sure of the cosmic relationship and the existence and nature of God in the way we assume. Such a discussion is taken to its limits by Whitehead and Russell and other modern philosophers. The third approaches

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religion in terms of its social origins, consequences, and purposes.

Though researches may need to be carried out separately from each of these standpoints, and with definite restricted objectives, in the interests of tangible progress, nevertheless it is most important to remember—as psychologists have all too frequently forgotten—that a true picture of reality requires a thorough correlation of all three aspects. We want to know not only what religion does to social life, and what it does to the emotional development of the individual, but also how the dynamic exchanges of mental energy take place between the individual and society. And finally, we want to know what true relation this activity in the specks of human life has to the nature of the universe as a whole.

There will doubtless be some religious men who will agree with the contention of this chapter that religion needs scientific analysis, that such analysis, carved out by a mature science, will not be destructive of the feeling values of religion, and that the methods of research must be comprehensive in approach, but who will still protest at the end that one essential value of religion is lost. They will urge that scientific theories are mutable, unstable, readily reversed by discoveries from day to day, whereas the need which religion sets out to satisfy is for something eternal and immutable, something that outlasts even the unchanging hills and gives us a sense of bedrock stability. As Whitehead has said, religion is "the vision of something which stands beyond, behind and within the passing flux of immediate things."

From this dilemma there appears to be at first no escape. One can, of course, point out that scientific hypotheses are modified rather than completely abolished as new facts appear. Only in rare instances are hypotheses demolished in the dramatic way which newspaper scientists consider necessary for evoking public interest. Even so complete a revolution as the return to Newton's corpuscular theory of light, in preference to the wave theory, involves so slight a change in practical deductions that only the most advanced work in physics is affected. It is conceivable and

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probable that though experimental investigation may explain the detailed mechanisms and add to our knowledge of the richness of relationship clinging about the Theopsyche, its main outlines will remain unchanged.

One thing is certain, that we share with other men a faith in the purpose of the Theopsyche. To demand more is to revert to the child's expectation and assumption of undue simplicity in things. The adult, in contrast, knows the rich variety of history, and future possibility, in the simplest pebble with which the child plays. He can retain the child's simplicity and certainty only with regard to one truth, which remains though all others prove illusory; that he has faith in his relation to the Theopsyche being the most important thing for human life.

CHAPTER XV

THE STATISTICS OF GOODNESS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE THEOPSYCHE

A FIRST experimental approach should be most concerned with defining the nature of the Theopsyche itself. From the point of view of maintaining continuity in religious sentiments it is first most important to classify the qualities of goodness and wisdom which general observation ascribes to it.

An extreme critic, indeed, might question the argument that the group ever acts more wisely than any of its constituent individuals. Fortunately psychologists have very recently begun to attack this fascinating question of group cerebration by experiments on the behaviour of committees and communities.

First they discover that the judgment of the group as a whole is almost always superior in accuracy and intelligence to that of the average individual. Knight, for instance, experimented with thirty-five judges engaged in estimating the intelligence of children. The group judgment, when compared with test results, proved to be more accurate than that of twenty-two out of thirty-five of the individual judges.¹ Again, of forty judges estimating the effectiveness of advertisements, only ten exceeded the accuracy of the group judgment. Even in such a simple and undiscussable impression as that involved in judging the temperature of a room, forty-eight out of fifty-six individuals were less true than the group.

Further experiments bear out what one might reasonably expect, that the superiority of the group mind to the

¹ G. Murphy, L. Murphy, and T. M. Newcombe, *Experimental Social Psychology*, p. 712. New York, 1937.
(4.722)

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individual mind varies with the matter to be understood, being greatest where there is a question of eliminating personal prejudices and bias, in matters of human values, and wherever objectivity of thought is required. But even a group can have illusions: it is possible, as we have said in another context, that there are questions in which "the majority is always wrong." It is certainly true that in some matters—notably those for the technical expert—it has no demonstrable superiority to the individual. Finally, in pioneer morality, the individual reaching out to the group mind of the future may be right where the rest of the group mind is wrong. In most matters experiment shows that the superiority of the group to the individual increases as the absolute size of the group increases.

At Leningrad, Bechterev and Lange¹ studied the procedure by which the group mind arrives at its conclusions—namely, by discussion and interaction of personalities. They found the group superior to any individual in the amount of relevant information that could be brought to bear, and in the variety of approaches and viewpoints influencing decision. The percentage of correct decisions increases with additional discussions, since points overlooked by some individuals, when brought forward by others influence the decisions of the former.

The cerebration of the group mind is superior not only in judgments but also in most forms of creative thinking, and especially in what may be called problem-solving capacity.² These studies are fairly conclusive, but the remaining experiments that have been carried out with regard to the serial effect of mind on mind, the moulding pressure of the group mind on individually created ideas, the growth of attitudes and the relative accuracy of judgment in various fields of human endeavour, are only in their infancy.

Beyond this fringe of group mind processes which most readily lend themselves to experiment lies a vast, unexplored region concerned with emotional and moral maturation, with the development of intuitions of value, and the

¹ G. Murphy *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 717.

² G. Murphy *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 727.

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emergence of nobility of conduct. Precisely the mental strivings which interest us most in the experience of religion are those likely to be last comprehended by scientific experiment.

Nevertheless the above experiments give us a first scientific approach to what would be called in the old terminology the wisdom of God. The problem with which psychology should next busy itself concerns His goodness. In other words, what conditions in the group mind are favourable to its continued advance, to its health, to its care of its constituent minds? Through analysing the evolutionary process we have arrived at the cardinal points in morality, by reference to which research institutions might work out the regulations necessary for an auspicious course of change in society. That is a matter of sound theory, but the present problem concerns the manner in which goodness grows in the community, granted an explicit or implicit awareness of what is good.

Obviously the problems here will be extremely complex, requiring a nice insight into the interaction of physical, economic, genetic, and psychological factors in the production of a good life for all members of the community. At present the magnitude of psychological influences, or at least their rate of exchange into economic coin, seems to be overlooked by many able rationalists, with a resultant over-emphasis of material influences. Karl Marx is a glaring example among these pre-scientific sociologists, but Bertrand Russell is not exempt from the charge when he says, "Even if science had done nothing else for human happiness than increase health and longevity it would deserve our gratitude on this account. Those who believe in the utility of theological creeds would have difficulty in pointing to any comparable advantage conferred." But how could science have arisen at all unless religion had first cemented moral order, economic stability, and the abiding values of peace to society? And what would people devoid of religious purpose do with their health and longevity? As far as sociological evidence goes, they would quickly squander the first in vice and throw away the second in suicide. When one reflects on the cost of war, of political

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dishonesty or individual delinquency, it is difficult to believe that science has yet conferred as great an economic endowment upon mankind as religion has done.

A thousand constituent problems suggest themselves as needing solution in order to get understanding of the main problem of goodness in the group mind. What part do high standards of family life and integrity play in the goodness of community life? What restrictions or advantages are brought to bear on the growths of goodness in the community by a marked social stratification? How far is it valuable to prevent by law foolish expenditure by individuals in betting, drink, vice, or meaningless luxuries? Does the maintenance of some degree of hypocrisy assist the growth of virtuous habits? Is the best community to be built on a pattern of extraversion in individuals or of thoughtful introversion? What is the effect on children of constantly seeing dishonesty and bad taste in advertisements, or the over-emphasis on crime in daily papers? What is the effect on the direction of progress of the group mind arising from the increasing part played by women in politics and administration? Will the increase of leisure lead to an increase or decrease of conscious religious purpose in the community? What will be the effect of an increase in the birth-rate of the less intelligent upon the character of the group mind and the behaviour required by morality?

Experimental studies will in the main be concerned to record how one factor changes with changes in another, and also with the elucidation of "patterns" in the community. There is a whole complex of behaviour patterns associated with, say, Puritanism, Hinduism, or Communism. The first we recognize by such features as asceticism in regard to sex, repressive discipline, interest in commercial success, some lack of interest in the arts. We need scientific demonstration of what economic and psychological conditions in society actually cohere in these clusters, and information as to how far one condition is produced by another. This can only be done by measurement, and social measurement will enable us to predict in what way the group mind will change in goodness in response to social measures.

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We need a research which will enable us at once to be keen spectators and participants regarding the directions in which the great Theopsyche is heading. So far the only soundly scientific research has been directed to analysing the factors which, it is commonly agreed, pull society downwards, degrading and disintegrating the group mind. Thus we have come to know something of the social and individual causation of crime, of neurosis, of lunacy, and of social disorder. It is established, for instance, that delinquency in children is associated with bad marital adjustments in the parents, with being unwanted, with certain physical disorders, with gross precipices in the social contacts of classes, and with inherited low or defective intelligence. It is possible by appropriate statistical techniques to predict the number of crimes by which one year's total is likely to exceed another in virtue of changes in these variables. By such understanding of the goodness of the group mind we can hope better to serve it.

The mutual influences of attitudes within society are by no means always as simple as common sense would suggest: the Theopsyche is indefinitely complex. Carlson,¹ for example, measured in groups of students the strength of belief in a personal God on the one hand, and the strength of conviction regarding the need of pacifism on the other. He also gave tests of intelligence. The result showed a negative correlation, -0.27 ,² between the beliefs in God and in pacifism, and a positive correlation of $+0.40$ between amount of native intelligence and tendency to pacifism. The latter may not surprise us, but the former connection provokes many further questions. It has also been shown³ by several investigators that there is a positive correlation between radicalism, on a radical-conservative attitude scale, and amount of inborn mental capacity.

In judging trends in the group mind or Theopsyche we are given significant help by such discoveries as that of Murphy,⁴ who showed that in educated people liberalism of attitude tends to be associated with a greater number of

¹ G. Murphy, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

² The meaning of the correlation coefficient has been explained.

³ G. Murphy, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 931.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 936.

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things worried about and with temperamental introversion (*i.e.* seclusiveness and reserve). A high degree of certainty and dogmatism in individuals was found to be positively associated with a low information content of the mind. On the other hand, the well-informed person was better able to resist foolish but powerfully reiterated suggestion. Incidentally, these findings enable us better to appreciate the value of the introvert mind in regard to the issue of group conformity and individual adventures in ideas. Murphy's experiments indicate that highly-variant individuals either fall back into the mass opinion or come to hold their eccentric views with extreme conviction. Murphy concludes that "individuals who recognize that their own opinions are those of a minority need some emotional support." A materialistic sociological viewpoint, such as that of Communism, failing to recognize the reality of the continuously emergent Theopsyche, can provide no support for such individuals.

As yet one cannot attempt even a sketch of the psychological structure of the Theopsyche from these few findings, often contradictory and surprising in themselves. That they startle us, and sometimes create more enigmas than they solve, is no matter for regret: the wonder of the Theopsyche is far beyond our present knowing.

The most significant experimental attempt to grapple with the nature of the group mind is undoubtedly that of Thorndike. He has taken the city as his group mind unit, and has correlated for a large number of cities various characteristics of their social life, such as the amount of money spent on education, the infantile death-rate, the rarity of extreme poverty, the number of eminent men, the amount of expenditure per head of the population on the better and poorer types of literature, luxuries, etc., the ratio of jail space to school space, the number of deaths from careless accidents, syphilis, and homicide.

By this concrete and statistical approach we can hope first to discover what general patterns exist in the group mind, at least, in the mind of a city group. And it is found that certain features do, in fact, constantly cluster. They are the qualities which by common consent of most edu-

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cated people would be called the desirable corner-stones of social life. To this constellation Thorndike has affixed the symbol GG, or General Goodness of life.

GG does not correlate with the size of the city, or with its wealth, or with the average income, but it does prove to be related to desirable personal qualities in the citizens. The nature of GG is best illustrated by contrasting the five cities in the United States having highest GG and personal qualities with those lowest in this general factor. From Thorndike's list we find that :

The frequency of high school graduation is twice as great.
The library circulation is three times as great.
The frequency of death from syphilis is one-twelfth as great.
The frequency of death from homicide is one-twelfth as great.

This approach is nothing less than an attempt to discover the framework of the Theopsyche itself : its promise is best assessed by reference to Thorndike's original work.¹

Another series of group mind studies which cannot be overlooked are the comparisons by Dr. J. B. Maller of various equivalent communities to discover what variations of average income, school attainment, health, delinquency rate, etc., are associated with variations in the average level of mental capacity of the group. A comparison of the various districts of New York shows a surprisingly sensitive joint variation in these indexes.² The essential finding is, as with Thorndike, that a general factor of goodness of community life emerges, being at different levels of emergence in different societies.

This study brings us to the much-neglected question of how far the group mind is limited in its qualities by the biological (genetic) qualities of the individuals composing it. Religion has stood firm with democracy in emphasizing the significance and the right to opportunity possessed by each individual soul, but it has not so glaringly com-

¹ Thorndike, E. L., and Woodyard, E., "Individual Differences in American Cities: their Nature and Causation." *Amer. Jour. Sociol.* xliii. 1937. Also, by the same authors, "How Good is your City?"

² J. B. Maller, "Mental Ability and its Relation to Physical Health and Socio-Economic Status." *Psychol. Clin.*, 1933, No. 22.

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mitted democracy's error of supposing that "all men are born equal." Yet here again, though religion has neglected individual differences, individual differences have not neglected religion; for, as McDougall has shown, the form of religious expression varies enormously among groups of different racial constitution exposed to the same religion. And the form of the Theopsyche will depend on the form of religious expression.¹

Ultimately, since the Theopsyche must become perfectly adapted to the Universal Reality, these group differences must vanish, but in the meantime there will be as many gods as there are biological racial experiments, each being an approach to the final expression of God.

Most important of the inborn characteristics of man in deciding the nature of the Theopsyche is his degree of mental capacity. The correlation of differences of group mentality with differences in average individual mental capacity has already been studied by Maller in regard to districts, Porteus and others² in regard to racial groups, and by the present writer³ in regard to a group with changing intelligence. The general development of the group mind, not only in intellectual qualities but also, curiously enough, in moral and emotional standards, seems to depend directly with this level of biological evolution of individuals in inborn mental capacity.

A knowledge of the limits imposed by the average mental capacity, which we know to be largely inborn and inherited, is important in understanding the growth or lack of growth of the Theopsyche. But in understanding its structure it is probably even more important to know the effects which arise in group mental life from differences in the scatter or variability of inborn intelligence within the group.

Freud, in his *Civilization and its Discontents*, has examined the psychological strains and impulses to revolt occasioned in the duller majority through being coerced to the standards of intellectual effort, restraint, and civilized behaviour

¹ The effect of racial differences on the form of religion has already been discussed in Chap. XIII.

² Porteus and Babcock, *Temperament and Race*.

³ R. B. Cattell, "Some Changes in a Community with a Falling Intelligence Quotient." *Brit. Jour. Psychol.*, 1938.

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desired by the more able or stable minority. Every psychologist and every student of neurosis and delinquency is familiar with the general nature of these intragroup pressures, some of which we have already discussed (Chap. X.) in connection with the behaviour of the very dull and the very able variants from group average intelligence.

Whatever the social or economic structure there is a tendency for the more gifted in intelligence to get into the dominating position, and although experimental evidence shows that in general the more intelligent are also the more characterful and humane, there may be some exploitation of the less able. Even if there isn't, a good deal of pressure, mostly indirect, through moral and social customs, and the suggestive effect of prestige, is brought to bear on those naturally less interested in culture.

Now I would argue that this sense of an external coercion towards behaviour that is good for the group has been projected in historical times into a sense of the hand of God. This identification has been recognized equally by the opponents of religion, the Communists, who complain that the ruling class have generally advocated an acceptance of God by the suppressed classes as a good adjustment to their circumstances.

What is overlooked in this contentious atmosphere is that in a harmonious society the will of God, *i.e.* the conditions necessary for the evolution of the Theopsyche towards the Universal Reality, will be to a considerable extent identical with the forces imposed by the most able, the most sublimated and self-sacrificing, controlling group in the community. They are the mediators between self-willed and pleasure-seeking men on the one hand and the Universal Reality on the other. They are the will and conscience of the Theopsyche as it comes to closest grips with the true conditions of reality. Thus they act as a bulwark between thoughtless men and stark reality, reflecting in their habits and ordinances an adapted but still austere picture of reality, more objective than any single individual is prepared to be, also more wise, more virtuous, and perhaps more universally kind.

From this situation one might infer that a sense of God

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as an external reality will be possessed by every stratum morally, socially, or intellectually below this leading group, whereas the individuals of the leading group would be conscious only of God within themselves. Something of this sort can be seen clearly in history. The greatest consciousness of God has been shown by "submerged" races, and those that are having difficulty in living up to the cultural standards of their neighbours. In Europe it is the Mediterranean race, especially in Britain, which has been most subjected to dominion by other races, and it is this race which has developed the most saints, the most profoundly beautiful religion, and the greatest spirituality. The Nordic, on the other hand, as Ludendorff says, "fühlt sich selbst von Gott durchdrungen." The Jews developed their keenest sense of God under the Egyptian rod and the Roman heel, and in America to-day it is to the unfortunate Negro that one looks for the greatest conviction of God's reality.

Sociology and history recognize a variety of processes which are constantly transferring a submerged people into a position of dominance. For example, owing to the differential birth-rate, individuals from the most depressed social classes are constantly filling places at the top of society. Where these processes go on liberally the leading group will itself be imbued with a strong sense of responsibility to an external power, through the persistence of emotional attitudes acquired below, and its songs of power will end with, "Lest we forget, Lest we forget."

Quite apart from this process the untamed leaders of their fellows acquire a sense of God, *i.e.* of the limiting conditions of reality and the virtues necessary to adapt to them, from the pressure of groups outside their own, and from their direct, unmitigated struggle with Nature itself. It is noteworthy that when man is brought closest to Nature he is generally most keenly aware of the true nature of God. The Mongol peoples, for example, are more intensely and austere God-conscious in the Himalayan snows than in the crowded humanity of the Yangtse valley. The inexorable realities of the desert and the sea bring thoughtless men more quickly to a realization of God than does

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the veiled, indulgent, and diverting face of man-made environments. The Vikings, though lords of war and the founders of many European aristocracies, may have avoided so long the effeteness and stupid over-confidence which wrecked other aristocracies because their hearts carried for centuries an impress of the might of the sea and the ruthless discipline of Nature.

In spite of all these influences a society composed of men at very different levels of biological evolution and intelligence will require different attitudes to God and different interpretations of religion at those different levels. For though all must have that fear or respect of God which is the end of the fear of life or death, the lowermost types must, in the interests of their adaptation and the harmony of society, fear God more. For only by the attitude of glad and loving submission can they conform happily to a Theopsyche which they do not understand, and respond with that restraint and service which earns the love and benevolence of the leading powers of the Theopsyche, itself standing as a buttress between them and chaos. This brief passage cannot deal with the full richness of the relation of the Theopsyche and those standing in various dependent relations to it. The defective, the vanquished, the old, serving the Theopsyche faithfully are able to identify themselves with it, to give vicarious satisfactions to their ineffective lives in its triumphs, to achieve wholeness where as individuals they would be deformed.

But at the uppermost levels of the spiritual and cultural scale it is more appropriate for the individual to develop that boldness, adventurousness, and even, perhaps, intellectual arrogance, which will wrench from Nature fresh powers for the Theopsyche. Yet even there respect for the power of reality has its place. Those who would live most dangerously must have the most vivid perceptions of danger if they are to survive. God is served in different ways. Most individuals can decide only by the experience of life the appropriate balance for themselves between submission to what is and defiant attempts at re-creating. Their guiding star must be, like that of the submissive, that what they do they do unselfishly for the love of the

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Theopsyche. And the price of their freedom will be that, unlike the submissive, they can expect no protection from the Theopsyche: they give to it, like gods, but can take little in return.

Like Prometheus, they steal the fire for men, and find no succour from men when the anger of the Universal Reality descends upon them. They die in the flying machine they have dared to build, from the violence of the explosives they have made, or from the virulence of the germs they have imprisoned. They commit the sin of Adam in partaking of the tree of knowledge, and incur for their wilfulness the anger of the gods. Which is an animistic way of saying that they venture beyond the realms of proved knowledge to where learning is to be obtained only by trial and error at the risk of one's life and happiness.

For gifted pioneer personalities, happiness and adjustment lie in a willing acceptance of conflict, war, and adventure in the loving service of the Theopsyche. It is this religious adjustment for which Sheldon has pleaded so eloquently in *The Psychology of the Promethean Will*. He sees a conflict between this conception of religion, and that submissive view commonly taught in the Churches. He identifies it with the old opposition of prophet and priest, or with the spirit of Prometheus as opposed to Epimetheus. He would have religion most concerned "to protect and support the matured mind against the less matured mind," and "to achieve a common purpose at high levels of self-understanding." At times it is like a democratic or less extreme form of Nietzsche's view that the expression of the superman alone really matters, the mass of men being only a background.

This is the religion of the leading group, but it is not all religion. Undoubtedly it is an aspect of religion too little emphasized, so that the higher variants are allowed to fritter away their energy in purely egoistic expression, believing that when they spurn the submissive religion of the masses they reject all religion. It is in some ways a misfortune for society that the unfortunate are the first to see God; for the gifted could do so much more. Only by a psychological understanding of the variations in society,

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and of the directions of effort which contribute at the various levels most effectively to the glory of the Theopsyche, can we hope to re-include within the harmony of religious purposes all the human strivings that properly belong there.

This is only one, even though one of the most important, of the many structural problems of the Theopsyche, which can only be solved by a thoroughgoing empirical attack to reveal its nature through the sciences of psychology and sociology and the greater theology which will one day develop out of them.

For further related reading see :

THORNDIKE, E. L., and WOODYARD, E., *How Good is Your City ?*

CHAPTER XVI
THE DYNAMICS OF MENTAL LIFE IN
RELATION TO GOD

MEN vary in the clarity with which they desire to see their God. St. Augustine was content reverently to say, "His glory is inexplicable, His greatness above our capacity and reach." But we need not doubt that the wonder of what we have yet to discover will equal that vaguely conceived in St. Augustine's imagination. Such a blind reverence as St. Augustine's may invite the shafts of men like Schopenhauer, who reflected, "Religions are like glow-worms: before they can give light it must be dark. A certain degree of ignorance is necessary in every religion." And so we come to the position of Rousseau, exclaiming, "Faith is made sure by understanding. The best of all religions is the clearest. The God whom I adore is not a God of shadows."

The nature of the Theopsyche at any given period should not be beyond our powers of investigation; but the Universal Reality is bound to remain a shadowy reality until the Theopsyche subtends the universe. At present our knowledge even of the Theopsyche is slight, and experimental advance is slow, but that should not necessitate a postponement of the discussion of man's relation to the Theopsyche, for the issues are of a broad kind and their importance is immense.

Already in the closing paragraphs of the last chapter we found ourselves facing what may best be described as the functional relationship of man to God. We want to know in what way the spark of energy which each man constitutes should best contribute to and interact with the vast floating energy of the Theopsyche.

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The problem is one of adjustment, precisely similar to that facing a psychologist who has to help adjust a child's instinctive drives to a difficult home environment. If the Theopsyche is a real and desirable part of our environment, our mental energies should be adjusted to it and should contribute to its maintenance. The matter is important because certain rationalists, arming themselves with psychological terms, have argued that one of the main objections to such notions as those of God and immortality is that they unfit the individual for proper adjustment to the real world.

Now the neurotic, who is characterized by loves and hates for objects which have no real importance for himself or the race, illustrates maladaptation by using mental energy where it is purposeless or perverse, and showing lack of it where it is really required. It is a healthy psychological adjustment to experience fear in relation to a mad bull and sexual attraction to an appropriate member of the opposite sex ; but the converse would be maladjusted and neurotic because destructive for the individual and the race.

Since the Theopsyche holds society together, it is obviously a well-adapted relation for the individual to invest a lot of emotional interest¹ in the Theopsyche. But just what attitudes and instincts should function in that relationship is debatable, and one of the chief matters for debate—one which has been the crux of opposition to religion for some time—concerns the part to be played by the sense of guilt or sin.

Russell has argued, as most psychoanalysts do, that a conscientious sense of guilt is quite unnecessary for the maintenance of morality, since an individual can decide rationally what is best for himself and society. Similarly,

¹ Perhaps it is scarcely necessary to-day to remove the extraordinary illusion possessed by some amateur psychologists that because they can reduce the religious interests to terms of natural instincts—sex, self-assertion, gregariousness, fear—they have thereby proved religion to be nothing more than these emotions ! Such instincts are the common coin to which all the interests of culture can be reduced, just as the wonderful chemical processes of the body can all be reduced to calories of heat exchange. To say that all religion is derived from sex, as Cohen does (*Religion and Sex*, New York, 1919) is a compliment to the power of religion.

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Freud has said that a sense of emotional dependence on God is a sign of psychological immaturity.

In opposing these views as false, I am, of course, not arguing against a rational derivation of moral laws by the group as a whole, or against an intelligent interpretation of them by individuals, but against the unsound psychological assumption that the intellect is itself a force to be thrown into the scales against primitive impulses. The intellect is the tool of instincts, helping them to attain their ends, and unless some powerful sentiment is built up in the interest of morality, the intellect will lead to nothing but a careful calculus of pleasure and displeasure.

Moreover, many of the temptations of social life are akin to the dangers of the physical world in that they require a quick "instinctive" reaction. It is not enough for a child to be intellectually aware that high tension electric wires are dangerous, or that statistics show traffic accidents to be very prevalent. He must acquire from others a fear reaction to these things, so that, in moments of absent-mindedness or sudden impulse a counter impulse will protect him.

Of course it is possible to argue, even when the mistaken view of intellect is dropped, that a man may do good because he loves the Theopsyche rather than because he fears it, just as a design may be made evident equally by intaglio or by relief. This distinction of love and fear motivation is, however, in some ways more logical than psychological. The dog brought up by a kind owner generally shows more guilt at wrong-doing than does a dog who is beaten. The child educated by deprivation of affection when he does something wrong is commonly more miserable over his wrong-doing than one more severely brought up, indeed the psychiatrists point out that melancholiacs are more frequently found among the former than the latter. There is no system of adjustment to morality which can work without the attachment of different feelings to right and wrong action.

As for the Freudian eulogy of emotional independence, those who practise it would be a danger to themselves and others, for in actual fact all men are in some way dependent for life and happiness upon the Theopsyche. Its wisdom is greater than theirs, its power can break them, its bene-

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violence can help them towards the realization of their better selves.

I am not arguing against Sheldon's "independence of the Promethean man." There will always be a minority, a vanguard in human progress, having little dependence on the Theopsyche. As we have said, they will give more to it than they receive from it. They will be bound to it by love and never by fear. The temper of aggressiveness in them outweighs that of humility. Yet even they must be in confessed emotional unity with the Theopsyche that they conceive is to emerge : otherwise they are blind egoists or paranoiacs.

And as a practical matter it is and always has been a difficult problem to winnow the fruitful wheat from the obstinate chaff in the group. There are many who are confident and independent to a dangerous degree from sheer lack of imagination to envisage the reserves of power in the Universal Reality or to appreciate the depths of horror and tragedy that go to make up the grandeur of the universe. The fact that disaster often brings an increase in religious interest is not because people are brought to a state of panic unreason, but because many have had to acknowledge for the first time the whole of life, where before they were successfully unconscious of half of it, and have had to adjust their philosophies accordingly.

As we have seen, the individual's dependence on the Theopsyche will vary according to the nature of his gifts, but there are undoubtedly situations in which one man serves the Theopsyche best by happy submission to evils, just as there are others where another man serves best by refusal to tolerate restrictions on his self-expression. It is the task of research to show what evils must be borne with humility on behalf of the welfare of our fellows and the growing Theopsyche, and which should be fought with all the ingenuity of man. Individual decision can still be made—but more soundly—on the basis of this research. In place of this loving acceptance or spirited opposition the psychoanalyst offers us only a cold, fatalistic acceptance. Freud concludes, "As for the great necessities of fate, against which there is no remedy, these he [the rationalist]

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will simply learn to endure with resignation." But surely this stoic fatalism is more likely to blunt the edge of endeavour and encourage habits of resignation than is the dynamic pause of the religious man in his adventurous purpose of progress?

Nevertheless religion has in the past allied itself far too much with the forces of conservation, leaving the innovators to believe they were no part of religion. The Church opposed mechanical and medical science, political reform and state education. Sanitation, steam transport, vaccination, anæsthetics, birth control, have each in turn fought with a costly religious conservatism. This is in part a pandering to the nature of the majority. In the American Declaration of Independence there occurs the significant observation that, "All experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."

Some indication of the almost purely conservative rôle which the Church is playing in the life of the Theopsyche to-day is found in Thorndike's research mentioned above. He discovered the astonishing fact that the total *per capita* church membership in American cities had a *negative* correlation with the general goodness of life in cities. Its correlation with desirable personal qualities was even more highly negative ($-.27$ and $-.22$). Church membership further correlated positively with illiteracy to the extent of 0.62 . These findings may not be so damning as they appear. They may show that the Church appears where it is most needed, as a fire-engine appears at a fire. It is also to some extent effective, as is shown, *e.g.* by the negative correlations of Church membership with numbers of illegitimate births. But the conclusion is inescapable that the Church as a whole is functioning to-day mainly as a means of bringing along the stragglers rather than in leading social thought. In Thorndike's research only the membership of a small group of progressive and emancipated sects showed positive correlation with the GG of the group life.

A religion bounded by dogmatic theology and devoid of a scientific appreciation of the will to evolve inherent in the

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Theopsyche is liable to all sorts of partial and perverse stagnations of the religious impulse. It may trust blindly in Providence, oblivious of such scientifically tainted maxims as "Trust in the Lord, and keep your powder dry," and sink thereby in dull conservatism. Or it may over-emphasize a means to an end, making it an end itself. Because in certain instances that which is good is achieved by self-denial it becomes axiomatic that self-denial in itself is good. Thereby the organism is forced to punish itself.

It is possible that religion has not been entirely mistaken in inculcating general repression—we do not yet know enough about individual and social psychology to decide. It is conceivable that denial of any easy and direct instinctive satisfaction is a necessary condition for a high degree of sublimation of some particular instinct. Moreover, any high degree of damming up of individual instinctive energy is likely to create a fund of floating energy available in society for its more complex purposes and its highest flights of creation. But it may do so at the cost of that energy being poisoned with bitterness and pugnacity. On the whole there can be little doubt that most prohibitions for the sake of prohibition have served no very useful purpose. As Thouless remarks, in his *Psychology of Religion*, it is likely that John Bunyan would have been just as good a man if he had not suffered acute mental conflicts from his overpowering sense of guilt and fear. The balance between expression and inhibition and the decision as to the fields in which inhibition is most needed are questions of the functional relation of individual and Theopsyche which require investigation.

Fear and love are, however, not the only powerful drives in man that have commerce with the Theopsyche: there is the almost equally powerful impulse to self-assertion and mastery. That achieves some satisfaction through the individual associating himself with his God, as it does on a lower plane through his identifying himself with his country; but its major and most appropriate use is in gaining mastery over self and Nature in the interests of the growing Theopsyche.

There are those who serve God, like St. Francis, by self-

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less love ; there are others, notably great scientists, administrators, and soldiers who dedicate their urge to power to the greatness of the Theopsyche. Religion has often been distrustful of this urge to power, has spoken of sinful pride, and at most has given honour to the urge to power—as opposed to love—when it expressed itself in the self-mastery of the anchorite. Heard, incidentally, derides the austerity of the hermit, yet it introduced for the first time into human thought the proof that the sex impulse could be entirely mastered, and thus made possible many developments of civilization.

The urge to power and the urge to love are constantly in conflict in individuals and in society. That conflict is regarded by modern psychology as one of the most important themes in mental life. Religion, properly conceived, must give scope to both, for the growing Theopsyche needs both : love to cement it ; aggression to extend it. There appear to be phases in the growth of the group mind, in some of which love, even to the point of mutual indulgence, is uppermost, and others in which the desire for power necessitates more austerity and cleanses love of all but its most spiritual elements. There are individuals who live their lives comfortably, surrounding themselves with friends and children whom they love, and there are others possessed of an urge to power which causes them to sacrifice love, and especially sexual love, to power. They live on, if their work was for the group, in the immortality of the group mind, but not in any physical immortality. In the life of nations there are phases of fertility and others characterized by aspiration to high standards, puritanism, a low birth-rate, and often aggression against other countries. On the whole the East has shown most the virtues of love ; the West the virtues of well-directed power.

The same theme of conflict runs through Adler's explanation of the neurosis arising from an inferiority complex. The individual afflicted with an inferiority complex is paralysed in his capacity to love others, and to enjoy a sociable give and take, because all his psychic energies are bent to the goal of gaining power. Adler would solve the matter simply by doing away with the competitive

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spirit in society which gives rise to these twisted personalities. But competition seems necessary to the growth of the Theopsyche, for experimental variation must go on. Furthermore, as the reasoning of Chapter X. has led us to believe, it is desirable for the individual to feel a sense of emotional unity with the emerging Theopsyche rather than a sense of solidarity with all living men as Adler demands.

It is not competition, but the spirit in which competition takes place, that is wrong. With a sense of security in God, and a belief that the outcome, whether success or failure, is a contribution to the purpose of God, *i.e.* to the growth of the Theopsyche, competition ceases to have its baneful influence. Having faith in the love of the Theopsyche, accepting personal shortcomings without bitterness or envy, knowing that the humblest service and the most subordinate part, courageously played, is essential to its existence, the individual solves his problem of giving a balanced expression to both love and attainment.

The most ardent defender of purely intuitive religion cannot pretend that, despite ages of experience, it has entirely solved the problem of how the individual can best utilize all his mental energies in a religiously directed life. Priest and hermit, monk and saint, warrior and scientist have experimented blindly with various adjustments to life. A knowledge of the consequences of various adjustments for the individual and the Theopsyche will only be obtained by clearly envisaging the dynamic problems involved, and then approaching them in a scientific and quantitative manner.

For further related reading see :

COHEN, C., *Religion and Sex*. New York, 1919.

FREUD, S., *Civilisation and its Discontents*. Trans. London, 1930.

CHAPTER XVII

WHAT SHALL WE TEACH OUR CHILDREN ?

IF the preceding attempt at a scientific theology is at all correct, God is the most complex entity in the universe with which science has to deal. The path through Science to Faith is not a simple one.

The task of education would therefore be difficult enough in the intellectual field alone, but when we reflect that a long road has also to be trod in the emotional realm, we realize that the love of God is to be considered as the last triumph of wisdom. It is also the crowning corner-stone of education, for it betokens an harmonious intellectual and emotional adjustment to life as a whole. And that adjustment is not the static arrest exemplified in the philosopher, but an adjustment in motion, like the dynamic balance of a good runner.

Educators of ripe wisdom constantly remind us that the greater purpose of education is character education. Character education is impossible without an intellectual appreciation of the framework of morality and religion to which character is adjusted. This is overlooked sometimes even in the modern psychological clinic or consulting room, where the analyst, as Jung has pointed out, may try to bring about an adjustment of the patient's personality to a society and a universe which neither has troubled to try to understand.

Present-day religious education is in a state of chaos. For most people there is much learning and unlearning—but mostly unlearning—and the average man is left to stumble blindly through a series of more or less painful spiritual experiences, of alternate sceptical and insightful phases, until he reaches some sort of adjustment to the existence

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of the Theopsyche and the Universal Reality. For all emotional sensitiveness that beats itself against the universe uncomprehendingly is likely to end in some vague perception of God. Even then his emotional adjustment has no relation to the beliefs he had been taught or the intellectual conceptions—usually negative—at which he has arrived. All this wasted energy, and the crazy mental structure which results, is the cost of living in a period of transition.

The way is now opening to a scientific approach to God. The child who begins to study the stars, who gathers some impression of the vast age of the earth, who follows the varied drama of evolution with keen understanding, will at last be prepared to appreciate the majesty of the Theopsyche, and the intricate laws of its development. History will take on a new significance ; intellect will no longer be at war with religious emotion, and the child will gain a true perspective of the part he can play with his own individuality in the life of the greater Theopsyche.

So terse an indication of the new faith of education that is our hope certainly overlooks a great many obstacles and difficulties. I hesitate to think of the fate of a village preacher who attempts to get the scientific view across even to adults, educated as adults are to-day. I am uncomfortably aware that this book is too technical to help many people, sadly lost in the ruins of religion, whom I should greatly like to help.

What are we to do ? Are we frankly to admit the impassableness for most people of the scientific path to faith ? Are we to retreat again to intuition, which, after all, found a way to God two thousand years or more before the philosophers and the scientists forced their slow roads through the jungle of human experience ? Are we to give up the incisive logic and observation of science in favour of a cruder logic of the heart ?

If theology is a branch of science, education has been so for some time : once adequate research has shown what viewpoints regarding the Theopsyche are sufficiently established to be taught, the science of education should have no insuperable difficulty in finding the best way in

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which to teach them. First we will need intelligence test surveys to decide what degree of complexity of exposition can be understood by various proportions of the population. Then educators must work out graded series of presentations, increasingly symbolic and concrete for the less intelligent.

The theory of recapitulation—that the child in his own development tends to repeat the history of the race—may be of use here as it has been in determining the most natural way of teaching other special subjects. Should the child, recapitulating, begin with vague animism of fairy tales, progress to the crude and symbolic account of God in the Old Testament, and approach the moral teaching of the New Testament just when his scientific education is reaching the point at which a final perspective on divinity, morality, the Theopsyche, and the Universal Reality can be given? It is a question for educational research to answer; the present chapter can hope only to muster the chief issues for research, not to answer these urgent questions.

Further, are equally childish traditional teachings of theology to be tolerated among many adults, because their mental age does not exceed that of some children? Anthropologically we must admit that in modern society we have a variety of peoples existing side by side which represent levels of racial, biological growth, separated by thousands of years in evolution, and which derive from cultural backgrounds separated by at least hundreds of years of history. Where the variability of intelligence level is small, and the cultural background similar, as in the Scandinavian countries, the rationalist's dream of banishing superstition may be possible, but who would hope to achieve one religious synthesis for all people in, say, France, Italy, India, or even some southern cities of the U.S.A. where white and negro and other breeds live in contiguity?

For a long time to come the rationalist scientist, concerned with investigating the Theopsyche, speaking of a Life Force, or believing in a Spinoza-like worship of God, must be prepared to tolerate the remnants of superstition clinging to the religious adjustment of, say, the Unitarian. And such advanced Churches must agree that the more old

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established Churches are also leading certain groups of people to God in the way that is best suited to them. The Protestant should achieve psychological understanding and sympathy for the Catholic's heaven with harps or a church sociably inhabited by plaster saints. It may also be proved true by sociological research that Mohammedanism, with its quaint over-emphasis on the hygienic sins of smoking and drinking, is properly adapted to the stage of development of various peoples. And, judging by the positive moral results, the negro's love of all-too-human Messiahs out of Harlem represents a comprehensible and practicable level of religious expression for him.

Not only will the image of the Theopsyche vary with the distance and angle from which the Theopsyche is approached, but the moral laws by which it is assisted will vary concurrently. While an Einstein may need to be on guard most against a sin of intellectual laziness, a mental defective has to fight most against the temptation to steal his table-mate's breakfast. The ethical standards of whole societies will also vary appropriately, being at a lowly stage most concerned with goals of maximum food and fecundity, and at higher levels with maximum research and education.

Even one individual adult will vary, with sickness, distraction, or age, in the conception of God which he most needs as a fulcrum to his life. Those who believe that they have mastered entirely the complexity of life should gather, for example, from Aldous Huxley's exquisite analysis in *Ends and Means*, just how boundless those complexities can be. We may not always be fit to deal with that complexity, and require some simpler symbol to cling to as the clearer vision fades. We wish to keep in touch with the essential heart of things, but we cannot always do so on the same level of intellectual clarity. Then we must agree that it is better to believe with men who have a childish conception of God than to make the greater error of not believing at all.

All this argument may seem tantamount to a return to existing religious teachings. It is not so. Whatever the viewpoint arrived at in a scientific religious adjustment it would be reached, except for the positively mental defective,

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by a fundamentally different route. It would be based on observation and reasoning rather than on authority. The study of God becomes a branch of science, and the knowledge of God and morality is something that goes on growing indefinitely rather than having to be set for ever in hard and finished outline by seers of ancient times. And throughout, religion would teach nothing about the universe which science would later have to prove untrue.

Moreover, the earlier conceptions of God contain errors as well as symbolic simplifications. For some Churches He is a kind of glorified Victorian father of the family; for others the head of the clerical profession, and even in the Old Testament He is jealous, unjust, and barbarous. Farther back we find religions with a ritual of cannibalism, with degrading sensual orgies, or with a slaughter of babes, as before the gods of Carthage. Each new impulse of religion doubtless discarded the most abject superstitions of its predecessor, but it was also tempted to incorporate key rituals, as Christianity incorporated the devotional elements of paganism.

For these reasons, and because of the fundamental difference in derivation, I suggested in an earlier essay on this subject that we should best avoid intellectual and emotional confusion if the term "God" were dropped altogether when dealing with these notions acquired through a scientific approach. Apart from the intellectual snobbery which causes each generation to believe itself excessively advanced on its predecessor, and which causes an opposition to tradition as irrational, as a torpid and uncritical conformity, there is no adequate motive for such a change. The use of new terms, such as "Theopsyche," for new constellations, meets the need for clarity: for the rest, more confusion of an emotional kind would be caused by the lack of continuity than would be avoided in the intellectual realm by continuity. It is desirable that we should not throw away the great, slow-built, emotional attitudes, with all their poetry and wealth of human associations, which have grown up through the centuries around the concept of God.

This consideration brings us to the crux of the present

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problem of education. If it is true that the only healthy adjustment of man to his environment is one which maintains a harmony of feeling and intellect, the scientific approach by itself is not enough. It provides the basis of harmony, but it does not itself provide the emotional vitality. Undoubtedly there is in science a sense of mystery and of beauty, but it is not the full poetry of religion. As Jung has done so well to emphasize, the religious sense springs to a great extent from the unconscious mind. Consequently the harmony of feeling and intellect is not to be achieved by any superficial intellectual learning: the process of education must be a long and slow one, that the emotions may have opportunity to adjust to the intellect. And the pathway to religion should be paved with perceptions of the beautiful, even if it is fenced by logic. The part to be played by the emotional experiences of ceremony and prayer is a matter for research.

Psychology is constantly indicating the importance of the early years in forming those powerful emotional attitudes which later become part of the unconscious and decide the main outlines of character, making that character dependent or independent, full of hatred or of goodwill and love. If adjustment to the Theopsyche and the Universal Reality is the keystone of the adult character, the main outline of the appropriate attitudes must be developed in infancy, whereas an intellectual justification of these attitudes cannot be given at least until adolescence. That is the great riddle of religious education, which can only be solved by broadly conceived psychological research. A somewhat reactionary psychologist has said, "It is good for a child to learn the Lord's Prayer even though he doesn't understand it fully at the time, for it will build up right habits and attitudes and will leave an impression which will be useful some day."

But the majority of educators to-day are suspicious of habits imposed by authority against the child's own understanding, and are prepared rather to develop in the child a general goodwill toward his fellows, and eventually a sense of responsibility towards society. Morals must be something more than an extension of manners. It may be that

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this naturalistic "social" approach is the best foundation on which to build later a responsibility to the Theopsyche beyond society, but I suspect that the fostering of some unconscious motives, attached to a substitute entity not identical with society, will be necessary from the beginning. Freud has said, "I think it would be a very long time before a child who was not influenced [by adults] began to trouble himself about God and the things beyond this world." The same could be said equally of mathematics, or science, or politics. And we have in the child from the beginning an animistic tendency, a yearning towards poetry and beauty and spiritual values beyond his immediate experience.

The chief remaining alternative is to teach the child to love abstract moral virtues and ideals—perhaps the trinity of Goodness, Truth, and Beauty which Haeckel would have substituted for the Christian Trinity, or the qualities described to the Philippians in that passage which begins, "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honourable . . . whatsoever things are lovely . . . think on these things."

The weakness of this procedure is that underlying all pure rationalism: it produces a static attitude and one built upon no strong motive. A pure, pre-psychological rationalism can give no good reason why a man should love either his sweetheart or his God. As the penetrating novelist of motive, Somerset Maugham, has said, "A man is more likely to be a good man if he has learned goodness through the love of God than through a perusal of Herbert Spencer."

The issues in the psychology of religious education are too complex to be more than outlined here, and clearly a great impulse of research, on a large scale and by the ablest psychologists, is necessary if the new adjustment is to be achieved. It is a sad reflection that the institutions which should be most concerned with this research and education, and which the community has endowed for that purpose, are the least likely to undertake it.¹ A bishop and a labora-

¹ The Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England have some thirty-two million pounds invested. There is nowhere in England any grant for

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tory still go ill together. It is an even sadder fact that the Churches are more likely to retrogress, through the more enlightened men leaving them, than to expand their teachings in accordance with the progress of science.¹ In practice, if not in principle,² they merit all the trenchant criticisms levelled at them by Rationalists from Voltaire to Freud. They are engaged in perpetuating attitudes and beliefs which are going to cause suffering, conflict, and disillusionment to all those young people intelligent enough to respond to modern culture. It is not that the moral principles are wrong, but that the developing adolescent will consider them wrong when he finds they are tied to positively childish dogma.

This retrogression is deplorable because the basic task of spreading Christian love and the simplest Christian virtues over the earth is still far from complete. This task and the greater task of leadership in our scientifically educated world of to-day can only be met by a religious viewpoint founded in scientific investigation. As the Lynds observed in their classical research, "Middletown churches seem to be forever bartering the opportunity for leadership in the area of change for the right to continue a shadowy leadership in the changeless." A powerful lead, whether it be in examining and making more effective the older practices of group worship and individual prayer, or in indicating the desirable goals in such active concerns of to-day as social reform or economic experiment, can

psychological research into either religion or the teaching of religion. It is significant that, particularly in America, there are more scholarships for theological students than there are men to fill them; whereas the most able students in the social sciences are often unable to continue their studies.

¹ As I write these lines the newspapers announce (*New York Times*, April 22, 1938) a manifesto by the Catholic Advisory Council (Church of England) calling on the Church to consider as heresy any doubting of the "historical truth" of the virginal conception, the physical resurrection of Christ, miracles, the existence of good and evil spirits, and the eternal punishment of the finally impenitent.

² By this I do not refer to the practice of individual members of the Church. We have pointed out earlier that the young theological student, as psychological surveys suggest, is generally an extravert, more interested in people than in doctrine, and therefore prepared, in the interests of well-doing, to subscribe to a doubtful dogma, the full implications of which he does not see at the time.

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come only from a religious development having no millstone of dogma about its neck and armed with the truth-seeking intentions of science.

Many have thought in the last generation that science has been followed too far, until it has given us suicidal powers beyond our moral wisdom to handle. We have seen that, in fact, science has not been followed far enough. The balance of human knowledge needs to be redressed by a great impulse of research into the human social sciences ; and if that research is shaped from the beginning towards an elucidation of the goodness in mind, and the outline of the group mind, which we already perceive, we may proceed to the farthest bounds of science with a stout heart.

For to envisage the noble spectacle of the Theopsyche perpetually growing in its relation to the Universal Reality, and to understand one's own fleeting yet eternal part in the great drama of its growth, is to achieve a serenity before all the facts of life and death. That culmination of education provides an adjustment which is necessary and valid at all times and at every age. It is the communion with God which brings strength to every endeavour.

Unlike the God of our childhood the Theopsyche changes, but its change is like that of the sky as the navigator goes to the far corners of the earth : in strange lands new stars appear, but the friendly constellations of home still watch from the horizon. We are part of a great mental and spiritual life that goes forward with increasing vitality towards goals we can only surmise, bearing with it our contribution of life and thought.

Our conception of God and morality becomes something that admits of constant new discovery, that hides within itself truths yet to be understood. It is as if we knew only the base of a great mountain whose peaks are hidden in impenetrable cloud not further to be pierced by intuition but only by the arduous adventures of scientific investigation.

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
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