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
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HONG KONG AND ITS PLACE IN THE FAR EAST

By HAROLD INGRAMS, C.M.G., O.B.E.

Anniversary Lecture delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society on June 25, 1953, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., in the chair.

IN a world in which more and more people who live in colonies are becoming nationalist minded and showing a dislike of colonial status, it is refreshing to contemplate an important colony which not only seems to like it (if its apparent lack of any marked enthusiasm for constitutional advance is any criterion) but in circumstances of peculiar difficulty makes a tremendous success of itself, and is indeed very much of a show place.

The circumstances of Hong Kong are, however, so different from those of any other colony that I do not think it is possible for those who regret the natural aspirations of the inhabitants of other colonies to run their own affairs to find any clue in Hong Kong which could suggest that, if the methods of Hong Kong were employed elsewhere, things might be otherwise.

The reason is to be found principally in the make-up of the population and its outlook. This has, for the past few years, been enormous: about $2\frac{1}{4}$ million packed into 391 square miles and mostly into the city and island of Hong Kong, 32 square miles, and the city of Kowloon. The population in these two cities is, of course, overwhelmingly Chinese in number, but they can claim to be very cosmopolitan as well, for even if the actual proportion of other races is small, the non-Chinese play a tremendously important part in Hong Kong affairs. There are some 10,000 citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies and of Commonwealth citizens. Of these about 2,500 are Indians whose former homes are now either in India or Pakistan. The figure does not include members of the armed forces and their families. There are 3,000 British subjects of Portuguese origin and about 2,000 aliens, chiefly continental Europeans, Americans, and Portuguese born in the Far East. Of course, there are a number of other colonies with populations as mixed, but in most cases a substantial proportion of each element regards itself as being citizens of the colony with a stake in it, even if they are not yet fully prepared to look on members of other elements as full fellow citizens with equal rights.

In Hong Kong only the British Portuguese, the Eurasians, and an undetermined number of Hong Kong born Chinese are prepared to say, "This is my home, my native land." The total number is perhaps as little as 10,000 and, though some people would put the figure as high as 100,000, whatever it is it is only a small proportion of the total population. These people certainly want to remain British, and if there were more of them they might no doubt develop a nationalist movement. As things are, they prefer a crown colony régime under which their way of life is not

threatened by any other larger group. The Indians, too, are probably mostly British in sympathy, having a loyalty, I fancy, rather to the abstract Britain represented to them by the spirit of the old régime in India rather than to Hong Kong. The British, of course, are mostly expatriates who look forward to retirement at home and would probably wish to see Hong Kong remain under the crown colony system.

But the really determining factor in Hong Kong's political future is the enormous Chinese population and in the Chinese character itself. This latter is the really important thing. If the ordinary Cantonese could have his way, he does not want to be bothered with politics at all. He is primarily a cheerful, industrious individualist and realist. He wants nothing better than to be allowed to work and make money for himself and his family with as little interference as possible. He regards everything, his Government, even his gods and his religious system, from the standpoint of how they benefit him. If they do that he appreciates them: if they do not, he discards them or does his best to keep out of their way. He takes the negative Confucian attitude over his neighbours: "Don't do to others what you would not have them do to you." He believes in minding his own business and does not think his neighbour's is any concern of his. One of the proverbs most frequently quoted to me by Chinese was "Sweep the snow from your own doorstep, but don't bother about the ice on your neighbour's roof."

The Chinese pride of race is, I think, a secondary characteristic because Hong Kong seems to show that if it is not offended, the Chinese is ready to let his realism decide whether it is better to live under one flag or another. He would certainly prefer it to be a Chinese flag if life under it was at least no worse for the satisfaction of his primary desires than under another. But it is extremely important to remember Chinese racial pride: and when one considers Chinese civilization and culture and the length of time it has endured, it is more than obvious they have something to be proud about.

These days, of course, it is no more possible for the Chinese to keep free of politics than it is for us. Even the Bedouin in his desert and the African in his forest has little more success. The present pressure of politics gives at least some Chinese the choice of a life under a Communist régime or being in Hong Kong under the British flag. By far the greatest number of Chinese in Hong Kong are temporary migrants who have come there because it offers a better chance of survival than outside. They can make a better living there and they do not experience more interference from Government than is essential. They can also look to Government for security and to the law to see that their rights are protected. If you are interested in business—and what Chinese is not?—a place where a contract is respected is a good place. But this preference for Hong Kong does not make them into Hong Kong citizens with a Hong Kong-British loyalty. Their pride of race forbids this and, since they are realists, they are never quite sure which way the cat will finally jump, so they sit on the fence.

As regards the Hong Kong-born Chinese, a few, as I have said, are largely British in sympathy, but for the most part their race gives China pride of place in their hearts, even if their intellects are with us. They

regard Hong Kong as part of China, but for many reasons would not wish to see it under any but British rule. Some of these belong to the reform movement which does look for constitutional advance on the lines of that granted to so many colonies; but theirs is not a very strong movement. Although the way has been open for Hong Kong to have a new constitution since the war was over, no marked enthusiasm for it has been shown. Last October the Secretary of State announced in Parliament that he had authorized the increase of Elected Members on the Urban Council from two to four, but that, after consultation with the Governor, he thought the time was inopportune for major constitutional changes.

So you see that for different reasons most sections of Hong Kong opinion much prefer that Hong Kong should remain as it is. There is little likelihood of a strong Hong Kong nationalism developing in any foreseeable period.

Hong Kong's development as a highly successful colony under a crown colony system of government stems, of course, from its rôle as a trading port. I shall have something to say about its trade later, for that has a great bearing on its place in the Far East; but at the moment I should like to say something about its career as a colony.

Hong Kong owed its origin to the fact that the British and Chinese differed as to the methods under which trade could be successfully carried on. British merchants, all of them free traders, did not like Chinese restrictions on the way they were to trade, and as British they found the regulations which governed their life in Canton degrading. Hong Kong was occupied not, as the first official despatch from the Colonial Office said, with a view to colonization, but for diplomatic, commercial, and military purposes. The main purposes were, of course, commercial: it was in the early days useful for diplomatic purposes for much the same reasons as for commercial. The military purposes were to defend it as a trading port. The British went into the barren island which Hong Kong then was and said it was open to anyone to come there and trade in the British way. It was a typically British compromise.

The Chinese accepted the invitation and came each year in increasing numbers. Hong Kong prospered because British and Chinese found that their ideas of the conditions in which trade could prosper were essentially the same. It adopted, and has clung to ever since as far as it could, a free trade policy, and this fits in exactly with the Chinese character as much as it does with that of the British merchant. British and Chinese together have made Hong Kong what it is and neither partner could have done without the other. British initiative, Chinese industriousness, and their common instinct for trade have been equally indispensable in their mutual co-operation.

So for a hundred years in the spirit of this co-operation Hong Kong grew and prospered. There were serious setbacks in the early days, but they were overcome and the general tendency was always upwards and onwards. Hong Kong's path was never entirely smooth because it depended for its prosperity on external circumstances entirely beyond its control. It was at the mercy of every wind that blew: it could never dictate to outside influences, it could only attract. Its prosperity always

depended in great degree on trade with China, and since it was always useful to China it always survived. It grew to 1½ million by 1941.

On Christmas Day of that year Hong Kong was occupied. It was as though an extinguisher had been suddenly put on a brightly burning light. Three years and eight months later the extinguisher was taken off and the light again lit. It burnt, of course, dimly at first, but in the few years which have elapsed since August, 1945, it has burnt more brightly than ever before. When the British Pacific fleet sailed into the harbour on August 30 with Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt to assume the military administration of the colony, they found that the ex-internees of the Government Service who had been released a few days before had already at least applied the match to the wick.

It was a challenging situation which met the new administration. The population was down to 600,000, and 80 per cent. of them showed signs of malnutrition. There was ruin everywhere. But there was the one supreme asset. "At no time," it was reported, "did the public mind waver from its initial confidence in a golden future for the colony and its people." They set to and cleared things up, and then they started not only rebuilding but extensive new building. They built not only in the literal sense but in every field of a community's activities.

The building in the literal sense has been quite spectacular. We went over one new primary school which any Educational Authority in this country would have been glad to have. It accommodated one school of 500 children each morning and another each afternoon. It had been built by the colony's Public Works Department in thirteen weeks. They also built the new Queen's College—a secondary school for 900 boys—in twenty-one weeks. We saw one large seven-storey Victorian office block demolished in a week or two, and I see in the 1952 annual report a picture of the modern thirteen-storey block which has been completed on the site. The extent of the building since the war has quite transformed the look of the colony.

Achievements in other fields are no less remarkable. Early in 1950 Hong Kong felt that it was pretty well equipped to deal with about a million inhabitants; but for about four years now it has had to deal with double that number. The estimated population has remained fairly steadily at 2½ million over the last two years. Accommodation and overcrowding therefore still remain major problems.

Three years ago when I studied Hong Kong, the extra million plus tucked itself away into old and insanitary tenements and new but equally insanitary squatter colonies. In the former people lived at approximately one family to 64 square feet of floor area and eight or more families shared a kitchen and latrine. In some I saw the kitchen and latrine were even combined. The squatter colonies could spring up almost overnight on any available hillside. They had no legal existence, but they were otherwise very much there. Some of them held as many inhabitants as a reasonably sized town, and they included squatter factories, cinemas, shops, and even fire brigades. There had even been squatter colonies on roof tops, but these had been suppressed earlier.

At first, of course, Hong Kong hoped that the problem of population

would be solved in a natural way by the settling down of things in China and the consequent return of its surplus population. Since, however, this has not happened, Hong Kong seems to have got down to the task of fitting itself to deal with a permanent population much larger than anything it had previously anticipated.

As its population increases Hong Kong embarks on fresh water schemes. Its existing reservoirs hold 5,970 million gallons. It has started building another to supply an extra seven million gallons a day. About 40 per cent. of Hong Kong Island's water has to come from the mainland, and it crosses the harbour in submarine pipes. Big housing schemes have now been embarked upon, and in each of the last two years an increasing number of families with a limited income who would otherwise be housed in slums in tenement houses or squatter colonies are getting the chance to moving into small flats of modern design. In January, 1952, Government announced a resettlement policy for squatter colonies, and considerable progress has been made in it. The scheme includes the resettlement of squatter industrial workshops, scope for the development of cottage and home industries, schools, and welfare centres. By the end of the year twenty-six factories were operating or under construction, and 2,900 huts, housing about 3,900 families, had been removed. Fire, of course, was a major danger in these squatter areas: there were seven major fires in squatter areas during the year, in which 15,000 people were involved. All these were given the opportunity of resettlement.

Fire is, of course, one of the gravest dangers to these squatter colonies: but perhaps the possible health dangers to the colony are even greater. Cleansing Augean stables would be child's play to the Hong Kong health department and Urban Council, but it would take me too long to quote statistics and explain their significance. However, although the general overcrowding led to an increase of such diseases as enteric fever, diphtheria, and tuberculosis, there was a reduced incidence of these notifiable diseases, and the case fatality in a number of such diseases has shown dramatic falls from 1946 to 1952—*e.g.*, enteric fever from 50 per cent. to 12.8 per cent. Dysentery from 38.5 per cent. to 15.9 per cent. Tuberculosis from 65.9 per cent. to 24.1 per cent. There was only one case of small-pox last year, and there has not been a case of plague for years and years.

The medical and health achievement in Hong Kong is indeed very great. Infantile mortality, which was 617 a thousand in 1935, in 1940, 327 a thousand, in 1946, 89.1, in 1950, 99.6, was in 1952, 77.1. Hospital beds have been increased to 4,337.

The way Hong Kong has coped with increasing demands for education since the war is illustrated by some more remarkable figures. At the end of 1950 there were 162,000 children in primary and secondary schools, and the number of children estimated not to be in school was 50,000. In 1951 there were over 187,000 children in school, and in 1952 another 20,000 were taken in. Government expenditure on education rose from nine million dollars in 1947/48 to an estimated twenty-five million dollars for 1952/53.

And it is interesting to note that Government has recently done much to improve education for citizenship in schools. Indeed, a great deal has been done in the last few years to make the people of Hong Kong more

conscious of civic duties. One of the most interesting developments in recent years is in the field of community development. There is a Cantonese word "Kai Fong" which means "neighbours," "responsible citizens" or "elders," and for centuries there was a significant amount of communal service undertaken by Kai Fongs in urban society in South China. On this traditional basis Hong Kong has developed Kai Fong welfare associations to deal with free schools and clinics, recruitment for St. John Ambulance Brigade, provide children's playgrounds and so on. By December, 1949, there were four associations. At the end of the following year there were fourteen associations with 53,800 members, and at the end of last year, twenty associations with 209,400 members.

This, I think, shows how wrong it would be dogmatically to insist that the Chinese *cannot* learn to live and work in the spirit of a positive democracy. As evidence that they probably can, I myself place even more stress on all that has been done in recent years by Chinese themselves and in co-operation with Europeans in the field of social welfare. I found the youth and child welfare work being undertaken in Hong Kong moving and inspiring. Much that has been done—and it would take me far too long to record it satisfactorily—has stemmed from people like those whom Military Government in the early days of the liberation described as dedicating themselves to public service. They were mostly lowly paid Government servants who called themselves the Endeavourers. They gave their spare time, and more than their spare cash, to run welfare work, and Military Government described them as a "shining example."

I should not be at all surprised to find that Hong Kong was approaching democracy in our sense with a Chinese realism by practising it first and thus discovering its value. In due course perhaps they will find that there is a greater relevance to the spirit of its practice in such of its forms as universal suffrage, parliamentary and local Government, than they have suspected.

All these developments in social services are very much a feature of post-war Hong Kong, and credit is due not only to the Hong Kong Government, but to many private organizations and to individuals as well: as much to people with only moderate means but a great sense of personal service as to wealthy philanthropists with a great sense of charity. There is no doubt that Hong Kong is doing a lot to show a considerable number of Chinese that there is a better way of life than Communism—and a better way too than the graft-ridden régime of Chiang Kai Shek.

The organization of post-war Hong Kong has become much more like that of a normal colony. Pre-war it had not even an Agricultural Department. The Department was formed in 1946, and its growth and development have been very rapid. It is interesting to note that the first acting head of the Department was a Jesuit priest, Father Ryan, who is the superior of the Order in Hong Kong and well known to everybody who knows the colony. If I started to bring personalities into this talk, there would be very many names I ought to mention; but there seems to me something so striking and out of the ordinary about the way in which a team of Jesuit priests helps the colony that an exception is perhaps justified.

One of them, Father McCarthy, is a chemist, and he has done much in

experimentation for the Agricultural Department to make night soil a safe fertilizer. Another priest, Father O'Dwyer, is unofficial Adviser on Co-operatives. He was sent round the world to study them at Vatican expense, and when I was in Hong Kong he spent his time advising the Vegetable Marketing Organization. In 1947, the first full year of its life, this Organization handled 19,427 tons of local vegetables and 7,658 tons of imported. In 1952 the figures were 46,043 tons of local vegetables and 12,071 tons of imported. Others of this remarkable team include a professor of economics at the University, and an expert on drama who has done much to popularize Chinese opera in translation and also produces a first-class magazine for the colony. Another, Father Morahan, makes a very fine unofficial District Commissioner, and has done much to increase a civic spirit amongst the fishermen of Aberdeen and Aplichau Island.

The Agricultural Department does much by demonstration, and the quality and quantity of rice produced has been increased; vegetable growing has been developed as the figures I have just indicated show, and much has been done to improve poultry and pigs. This helps to increase the amount of food locally produced, though of course Hong Kong could never hope to produce all its own food requirements. It grows about 20,000 tons of rice, and its pig population, when I was there in 1950, was something over 30,000. It consumed in 1952 about 250,000 tons of rice, and no fewer than 695,658 pigs.

Talking of Co-operatives reminds me that, although it is not easy to induce the individualist Chinese to be a good co-operator, very considerable progress has been made in that field; and the Vegetable Marketing Organization and the Fish Marketing Organization will in due course become Co-operative concerns. This latter Organization is entirely self-supporting, and it has been planned so that it may eventually be taken over by fishermen and run by them.

In this way also the Chinese in Hong Kong are learning how democratic institutions can work and benefit them. The Fish Marketing Organization, which started after the war, has handled an ever-increasing quantity of fresh fish. In 1946 the figure was 1,904 tons, and in 1952 it was 26,380 tons, thanks to improved methods of handling and to restrictions placed by the Kwangtung authorities on the import of salt or dried fish from Hong Kong. The quantity of salt and dried fish produced has been reduced considerably, and it is now all for local consumption. In 1946 the figure was 12,592 tons, and in 1952 it was 8,067 tons.

An important section of Hong Kong's population, of course, lives its whole life on the water. The number of the boat people is probably about 200,000. There are over 17,000 junks and sampans registered in Hong Kong. Not only do the boat people contribute notably to Hong Kong's food supplies by meeting practically all its requirements in fish, but of course they carry a good deal of Hong Kong's foreign trade. The junks are built there, and junk building is one of Hong Kong's oldest industries.

Although Hong Kong has always had industries, they were never really of major importance until comparatively recent years. The 1914-18 war encouraged the establishment of light industries to produce goods which could not then be obtained from Europe, and imperial preference

in the 1930s gave industry a stimulus and induced local manufacturers to compete in world markets. But the expansion of industry since 1946 has been really spectacular. Local industry now produces about 25 per cent. of all Hong Kong's exports, and there are some 1,500 registered factories manufacturing a wide variety of articles, from rubber shoes to rattan ware and fire-crackers.

Heavy industry is, of course, mainly represented by shipbuilding, for Hong Kong can build vessels up to 10,000 tons. During the first two years of the Second World War it made a substantial contribution in the form of locally built ships. I suppose the oldest of the light industries of Hong Kong are such picturesque things as preserved ginger (whose popularity owed much to Queen Victoria's fondness for it), the making of joss-sticks and fire-crackers and such like things. I saw a pleasant old water-wheel which ground the scented herbs used for making the joss-sticks. Sugar refining and rope manufacturing are old-established industries, and the Green Island Cement Company started work in 1889.

The manufacture of textiles is now one of Hong Kong's most important industries, and it has machinery some of which is better than any in England. The industry employs 30,000 people and covers all processes, including cotton, silk and wool spinning, weaving, knitting, dyeing, finishing and printing. It also includes the manufacture of made-up garments such as shirts, pyjamas, and underclothing.

Eight thousand workers in sixty factories produce a good many of the rubber shoes and boots we use in this country, and we also take a good many of the electric torches which Hong Kong makes. In 1952 it turned out two million dozen; and it makes torch batteries and torch bulbs, too. Enamel ware, vacuum flasks and jugs, paint, aluminium ware, and hurricane lanterns are all made in Hong Kong, and there has been a considerable expansion of the plastic industry—not only the ordinary domestic things we all know are made, but also the traditional Chinese things, such as chopsticks and mahjong sets. But, of course, it is still in the field of commerce that Hong Kong has its greatest pre-eminence.

As I said earlier, the very reason for Hong Kong's existence was as a trading post, and a trading post it has always been. It has always been a well-managed one, a first-class departmental store for the Far East. This has had its educational value, for it has taught the Far East a great deal about Western methods of commerce and the principles on which honest business must be run. But it put business first for a very long time; *laissez-faire* and enlightened self-interest were its guiding principles, and Adam Smith and Bentham its major prophets. To some extent no doubt they still are; Chinese politicians quote Adam Smith in the Legislative Council, and Hong Kong has still a good deal to do before it can claim that social conditions are anything like all they should be. But what has been achieved in a few years and is still being achieved, is, I think, one of the most remarkable things in the history of colonial development.

All this apart, however, Hong Kong's trading rôle is an indispensable one—to us, to Hong Kong itself (for it could not live without it), and to China. Naturally, owing to its geographical position, China was traditionally its major customer. It was the clearing house for goods on their way

to and from South China. The war brought Hong Kong's great commercial machine to a standstill, and the aftermath found a very different Far East.

During 1946 it looked as though economic instability in China might give Hong Kong a temporary advantage in her entrepôt trade, but in 1947 China was forced into foreign exchange difficulties and monetary inflation and imposed severe restrictions on imports. She was ready to take essentials, but you could no longer sell cargoes of such things as toothpaste. Then, too, the rising cost of China products and the military situation in the north made it more and more difficult to deal with Chinese exports. In 1948 conditions in China led to an influx of capital from China to Hong Kong, where conditions were stable, and Shanghai Chinese moved in and a good deal of important industrial development started. But imports intended for China could not be sold owing to the restriction until, owing to shipping strikes in America, merchants were able to liquidate their stock. But trade with China, which, before the war, was about 40 per cent. of Hong Kong's total trade, fell away to less than 20 per cent.

But Hong Kong's merchants always show considerable versatility and resilience. Immediately after the war missions went to all nearby countries for supplies and soon each year showed record booms. On account of the disturbed political conditions in China the merchants developed trade with Malaya, Indonesia, Siam, Korea, and Japan. Goods came from the United States, Canada, and Australia as well as Britain. Trade with Africa, the West Indies, and the Middle East increased. Gradually trade with China showed some improvement, and in 1949 the steady decrease in trade was arrested. Imports from China increased by 30 per cent. over those for the previous year, and exports to China nearly doubled. In addition, the steady flow of capital from China continued, and so, therefore, did industrial development. The general boom continued during 1950, when the total value of Hong Kong's trade reached £469 million. There was, for the first time since the war, a favourable balance of trade with China, due in the main to the large-scale buying activities of the Peking Government's trading agencies which resulted in raising the percentage of trade with China to about 30 per cent. of the colony's total trade. So the trade pattern reverted more closely to the pre-war pattern. In fact, total trade with China increased by 97 per cent. over the figure for the previous year.

As I said earlier, Hong Kong's trade is at the mercy of every wind that blows, and since 1949 it has suffered remarkable fluctuations on account of international events. At the beginning of 1951 the great trade boom (measuring trade in terms of value) reached its peak. This was due to the rise in world prices for many commodities on the outbreak of war in Korea.

Since June, 1951, the embargo on trade in strategic materials with China has resulted in a large decline which was carried further by restrictions from the Chinese forming part of the anti-corruption campaign.

The total value of the colony's trade fell from £581 million, the highest ever recorded, in 1951 to £417 million in 1952—a fall of 28 per cent. In 1952 exports of merchandise to China fell from H.K. \$1,604 million to \$520 million.

I met with a good deal of uneasy comment and some strong feeling in

my recent tour in the United States on the subject of Hong Kong's trade with China. One can understand it because America naturally has strong feelings about anything which it believes enables the Chinese to prolong the war in Korea in which so many Americans are risking and losing their lives. But the criticism is extraordinarily ill-informed, and one is inclined to believe that there is an inclination to believe the worst simply because so many Americans have an emotional reaction against colonialism—a subject on which there is a very widespread ignorance in the States.

But whatever Senator McCarthy may say and persuade other people to believe, the solid fact is that there is no trade whatever in strategic materials of any kind between Hong Kong and China. The banned list is comprehensive and rigidly adhered to. Of course, on the other hand, it has to be allowed that Hong Kong *wants* to trade with China. Its instincts are that way, and history has shown it to be right. Trade in its instincts, whatever nationality people are who carry it on, does not bother much about ideologies, and in this case Hong Kong knows perfectly well that much of its survival value is tied up in the use it is to China, whether China is Communist or not. Its survival in the past has certainly been largely because it was of use to China, and in the long run that will continue to be the case. Be that as it may, Hong Kong *does not trade in strategic materials* with China at all.

As I think you will have gathered, the 2½ million people of Hong Kong rely almost entirely on the mainland of China for their food, and, therefore, there is a good deal of local trade in non-strategic materials which the Chinese civil population needs and in return for which the people of Hong Kong are enabled to live.

It would, of course, be asking for Communism in Hong Kong if one were to starve them. As the *New York Times* said in 1951, the subject was being treated with more emotion than reason, and, in fact, relations with the United States are very amicable.

The fact is that Hong Kong is the greatest asset which the free world has in the Far East to defeat Communism. I do not say this from a military point of view, for no doubt Hong Kong is, in terms of modern warfare, not an easy place to defend. Nevertheless, successive British Governments have declared their intention to stand by obligations, to defend and further the interests of the colony, and have endowed it with the largest garrison it has had in its history. There is obviously no sense in making it more difficult to hold Hong Kong than circumstances make it.

In the international field Hong Kong has obviously today a very difficult hand to play and it plays it very well. Two or three years ago the Governor said in a speech, "We cannot permit Hong Kong to be the battleground for contending political parties or ideologies. We are just simple traders who want to get on with our daily round and common task. This may not be very noble, but at any rate it does not disturb others. We do not feel that we have a mandate to reform the rest of the world." This describes Hong Kong's traditional line of non-interference in China's affairs which China has always well understood and appreciated. The results may perhaps be seen in the fact that relations with China have quietened down, since the days when the Red Army was actively engaged


in "liberating" China. Incidents on the border and in the waters around the colony have taken place sporadically, but they have not shown signs of developing to dangerous proportions.

To my mind, however, the great value to the free world of Hong Kong rests on the fact that it is the only place in the Far East in which the great freedoms can still be understood and practised, the only bridgehead over which they could be carried into China. In making itself into a model colony, in practising the spirit of democracy as we know it, in showing that the life and well-being of the humblest individuals count (as I have shown Hong Kong is trying to do), in convincing increasing numbers of Chinese that the welfare of their neighbours is their concern, Hong Kong is doing a very fine job, though it would be the first to admit it has still a lot more to do. In the realm of thought, Hong Kong University is the only surviving institute of its kind in the Far East. It is the only crucible in which the best of Western thought can be fused with the best of Chinese thought. It is good to see that during the last two or three years large-scale development has begun in the University. It has had a grant of £250,000 from the Treasury and a further similar sum from Colonial Development and Welfare funds, and it has had a further grant of £1 million by H.M.G. from Japanese assets in the colony. It now has faculties of Medicine, Arts, Civil Engineering, Architecture, and Science.

I think this illustrates what Hong Kong's place in the Far East is. It will continue to be a great emporium, and it will be more and more a beacon of the free world.

Admiral Sir CECIL HARCOURT: You will all agree, ladies and gentlemen, that we have listened to a remarkable discourse on a very remarkable place. I would like to call Hong Kong a beacon in this Elizabethan age. It is kind of Mr. Ingrams to have taken all the trouble he has to prepare the lecture, and we all appreciate the admirable manner in which he has delivered it.

The vote of thanks having been heartily accorded, the meeting terminated.



A DRAMATIST OF TURKISH HISTORY AND HIS SOURCE

GOFFE IN THE LIGHT OF KNOLLES

BY THE LATE PROFESSOR ORHAN BURIAN*

RICHARD KNOLLES' *Generall Historie of the Turkes* (1603) was one of the earliest histories to be written in the English language, and by several discerning judges like Johnson and Coleridge it has been praised as a monument of Elizabethan prose. From the time of its first edition—which was dedicated to James I—it was very popular, and for over a century it was the principal English source for Turkish history.

This, however, should not imply that Knolles was completely original. In his preface he cites as his sources a number of Latin and French authors, while later scholarship has concluded that he was mainly relying on Boissard. At any rate the synthesis was his and he had the flair to make this synthesis both dramatic and colourful. He does not show the impartiality which we expect from a modern historian. He writes with hatred for the enemies of his faith. Yet, true Elizabethan that he was, he seems fascinated by the possibilities of his subject. His theme was the rise of a small nation in three hundred years to an empire without a rival in power and glory. He embellished this theme with all the stories he came across about the ruthlessness of the people and the exotic splendour of their lives.

Thomas Goffe, an obscure university dramatist of the late Jacobean era, found the necessary inspiration and all the material for his two historical plays *The Raging Turke* and *The Courageous Turke* in this *Histoire* of Knolles. Judging by the plays, he was most attracted to those aspects of the book which coincided with the fierce and ambitious nature of the Elizabethans and their unscrupulous pursuit of power. He did not, however, succeed in selecting stories that would have special potentialities for a dramatic handling. A detailed comparison of the plays with the relative chapters in Knolles reveals not only that his source was no other than Knolles, but that his fondness for the spectacular and for extremes in passion had always the upper hand in his work as a dramatist.

Goffe's two tragedies are of special interest to us for being the only plays published between the accession of Elizabeth and the death of her successor to be based entirely on Turkish history. *The Raging Turke* was first printed in a small quarto edition in 1631, *The Courageous Turke* in the following year.

In *The Raging Turke* Goffe's technique seems more elementary, and he slavishly follows his original. But only parallel synopses in detail of the reign of Bayezid II as it is given in the *Historie of the Turkes* and in *The Raging Turke* would bring out the degree of Goffe's indebtedness to

* An obituary notice appears on p. 301.

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