

ADVANCED STUDIES  
IN  
INDIAN  
LOGIC & METAPHYSICS

Sukhlalji Sanghvi

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*Reprint*


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## EDITOR'S NOTE

Born in Dhandhūka, Ahmedabad collectorate, in 1088 or 1089, Ācārya Hemacandra came popularly to be called 'the omniscient one of the Kali age' (*kalikālasarvajña*). He had indeed some claim to this hyperbole, for he was by far the greatest encyclopaedic mind in medieval India. 'His strength,' says Jacobi, 'lies in encyclopaedical work rather than in original research, but the enormous mass of varied information which he gathered from original sources, mostly lost to us, makes his works an inestimable mine for philological and historical research'.

In medieval India, however, there was hardly anything like disinterested learning in the modern sense. Scholarship was dominated by the practical aims in view, which, under the circumstances, had inevitably been of a religious nature. Hemacandra was a Jaina by creed and all his activities—literary, philological, philosophical, scientific and even directly political—were designed to serve the cause of Jainism. Gujarat, as is well-known, is a stronghold of the Jainas. But it originally became so under the initiative of Hemacandra: he induced Jayasiṃha Siddharāja (A. D. 1094-1143), one of the most powerful kings of Gujarat, to favour the Jainas and actually converted his successor king Kumārapāla to Jainism. As a scholar, poet and philosopher, too, Hemacandra was above all a Jaina. To the students of Sanskrit literature, he is perhaps best known by his epic poem *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita*, describing the legendary and mythological history of the world as conceived in Jainism. To the modern philologists, his most significant contributions are a complete Sanskrit and a Prakrit grammar, two Sanskrit dictionaries called the *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* and the *Anekārthakośa*, a dictionary of popular Prakrit idioms called the *Deśināmamālā* and his manuals of Poetics and Metrics. His Prakrit grammar was edited and translated by Pischel (Halle, 1877-80), who also edited the *Deśināmamālā* (Bombay, 1880). His *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* was edited by Bohtlingk and Rieu (St. Petersburg, 1847) and Zachariae edited the *Anekārthakośa* (Vienna, 1893). He also 'provided his sect with textbooks of the principal Indian sciences, so that the Jainas were enabled to compete successfully with their Brahmanical rivals'.

In the field of philosophy, Hemacandra's most significant contribution was the *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā*. As edited and extensively annotated by Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghvi, it was published in the Singhi Jaina Granthamala, Calcutta 1939. Pt. Sukhlalji, who was eighty on December 8, 1960, does in an important sense carry the heritage of Hemacandra. It is not simply that he, too, is a Jaina and belongs to Gujarat, but in the much more important sense that he is a rare specimen of that scholarship which is as thorough in philosophy as in any other branch of ancient learning. In him we come across the encyclopaedic mind again, though devoted mainly to the traditional line of scholarship. And this has made his edition of the *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā* so invaluable: particularly his annotations to the text are full of such wealth of Indian philosophical materials as the parallel of which

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is not easy to come across in the writings of the modern scholars in India and abroad. But Panditji would not write anything except in the vernacular languages—in Hindi and Gujarati—and that has kept such an important contribution to Indian philosophy hitherto unavailable to the English knowing readers.

I am deeply grateful to my friend Sri Krishna Kumar Dixit for first suggesting the idea of publishing in our journal *Indian Studies : Past & Present*, Panditji's *Introduction* as well as the *Philosophical Notes* to the *Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā* in English rendering. An English translation of the *Introduction* had already been prepared by Dr. Indukala Jhaveri of the H. K. Arts College, Ahmedabad ; the Jnanodaya Trust of Ahmedabad kindly offered this to us for publication. And thanks to the untiring devotion and superb skill of Sri Dixit himself, the English rendering of the *Philosophical Notes*, too, were at last ready for publication : Sri Dixit is in close touch with Pandit Sukhlalji and, under his advise, selected and arranged the *Philosophical Notes* in such a manner as could serve the purpose of an independent book on Indian philosophy, and he did the English rendering of the notes himself.

The *Introduction* and *Philosophical Notes* appeared in *Indian Studies : Past & Present*, Vol. II, Nos. 2 & 3. Before issuing this reprint in its present book-form, we requested Panditji to contribute a special *Preface* for it. He has been extremely kind to agree to this. He further complied to our suggestion that this book should be entitled *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics*.

We are grateful to Jnanodaya Trust, Ahmedabad, for the kind permission to issue this book in its present form. Professor Haridas Sinharay has kindly gone through the proofs and Sri Balin Roy extended various other helps.

Debiprasad Chattopadhyay  
Editor, *Indian Studies : Past & Present*

## PREFACE

At the time of editing *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* I had written notes on several philosophical technical terms occurring in the text and had added to it a long Introduction by way of preface. Now that these Notes and the Introduction are being published in English I feel obliged to explain, in brief, the aim I had in view while writing them. This, I think, should enable the English reader to adopt a certain approach towards the material in question.

*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is an important—though incomplete—writing by Ācārya Hemacandra on Jaina Logic. The available portion of this text discusses, briefly but lucidly, and from the Jaina standpoint, the philosophical concepts like *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *pramātā*, *pramiti*, etc. ; here there frequently occurs a mention—and sometimes also a criticism—of the positions adopted by the other systems in this connection. In the course of editing the text and of conducting research work thereon the idea occurred to me that in case it continues to be taught and studied according to the old Indian tradition of teaching and studying prevalent among our Pandit circles, neither the teachers nor the students will be able to grasp the import of the relevant philosophical issue in their proper historical development. It was my own experience of student days that even the most competent and sympathetic teachers of a particular philosophical system would seldom care to look into the order of development undergone by this system and the historical relation in which it stands to the other systems. The result was that a student remained almost ignorant of the historical development and of a comparative estimate of the system he chose to study. And when some exceptionally brilliant student with curiosity unbounded placed even before the ablest of his teachers a query concerning some problem, but from the standpoint of a non-partisan, historical, comparative study, what usually happened was that the query would be curtly brushed aside.

Doubtless, the *gurus* who taught me the various philosophical systems were most thorough scholars of their respective systems and hearty was their affection for me ; but none of them even hinted to me that one's grasp of various philosophical issues becomes considerably objective when study is undertaken from a historical and comparative standpoint. And my experience was that all who, like me, studied exclusively according to the old style found themselves in a predicament similar to mine. However, I should here also make mention of one special advantage that is enjoyed by those who study exclusively according to the old style. When, on the one hand, a student is brilliant and his curiosity intense, while, on the other, the teacher is a competent authority on the subject-matter concerned, the study, undertaken according to the old style, of this subject-matter invariably throws on its vitals a light that is deep and of a most desirable type.

I had studied philosophy according to the old style of the Pandits and had certainly derived a number of advantages therefrom ; nevertheless, when I first undertook the writing and research work and, at the same time, consulted the outstanding works written and edited by the various Indian and foreign scholars, I became conscious of one great shortcoming of mine. The shortcoming was my inability to make out how as a result of mutual discussion and criticism the various philosophical systems of India influenced one another either negatively or positively, by whom and when was this influence exercised, and what was the extent thereof. I even failed to judge correctly as to whether the discussion of a particular issue on the part of more than one philosophical system was a parallel development or a development brought about as a result of mutual influence. A deep consciousness of the shortcoming in question forced me to traverse a new path. The new path consisted in an attempt at first accurately grasping the teachings of the basic texts of the various philosophical systems and then trying my best to determine the historical interconnection between the philosophical issues and to make a comparative study of these issues as discussed by the various philosophical systems. Side by side with this new attempt on my part went on the editing of several Jaina and non-Jaina texts and conducting research thereon ; besides, I undertook some translation work. In the course of all this activity I became firmly convinced that the study of any philosophical system inevitably demands certain prerequisites and that these prerequisites include a fairly accurate understanding of the historical interrelationship obtaining between the various philosophical systems of India.

Impelled by this conviction, I have made, in these Notes and the Introduction, an extremely modest and humble endeavour keeping in view the noble aim that the current studies in Indian philosophy become open-minded and open-hearted—with *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* acting as a pretext.

*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is a text on Logic written from the Jaina standpoint. It was therefore absolutely necessary to make it clear in the Introduction as to what the Jaina standpoint is. However, unless one knows the distinguishing marks of the standpoints adopted by the different philosophical systems of India he cannot at all understand the particular nature of the Jaina standpoint and the relation in which it stands to the other standpoints. Hence it is that the Introduction first of all states the standpoints adopted by the different philosophical systems of India.

The various philosophical standpoints are rooted in the various views as to the comparative strength of the different organs of knowledge. Therefore, with a view to laying bare the respective spheres of application of the various organs of knowledge a classification has been made of the philosophical views as to the nature of the organs of knowledge. Afterwards, under the title 'The Total Extent of the Knowable Sphere' it has been shown how various views as to the knowable sphere have emerged depending on the various views as to the comparative strength of the different organs of knowledge. In addition, several other more or less important problems have been briefly touched upon in the Introduction.

Notes are many. In *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* there are defined and discussed a number of such concepts which, if they are to be understood properly, demand a delineation of their development from a historical standpoint and of their nature from a logical standpoint. The Notes in question have been written with this understanding in view. It can easily be seen that Notes written from the standpoint above recommended, even when they directly concern the concepts upheld by a particular philosophical tradition, are, in the final count, of help in understanding the corresponding concepts of all traditions whatsoever. And if this be true, it logically follows that Notes written on the topics covered by *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* can be of considerable help in understanding the corresponding concepts of all traditions whatsoever.

Really speaking, as I have above pointed out, one aim in writing these Notes and the Introduction to *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* has been to pave the way for a broad-based study, in some form or other, of all philosophical traditions.

For thousands of years the currents of philosophical speculation have run their course in India and with the passage of time they have gained in logical subtlety ; but these have been seldom, if ever, subjected by the Indian scholars to that type of investigation which has come from the pen of the Westerners since the last century or so. For example, the thorough researches of Prof. Jacobi and others in the Jaina scriptures have not been matched by any undertaken by a scholar who is himself an upholder of the Jaina tradition. Similarly, the academic endeavour of no Buddhist monk will stand comparison with that of a scholar like Prof. Stcherbatsky who has thrown a veritable flood of light on Buddhist Logic. Dr. Thibaut, apart from translating into English the *Bhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, has offered, in his introductory remarks, a penetrating study of the issues involved, a study which has perhaps not been surpassed by any Śaṅkarite or Rāmānujite scholar however acute. And not even the thoroughest of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars have been able to pursue that marvellous analytical method which Prof. Ingalls of the Harvard University has adopted in presenting the materials for the study of Navya-Nyāya Logic.

On the one hand, we find that the various philosophical traditions of India today include a number of such eminent scholars of extraordinary calibre whose help the Western scholars are eager to seek and who can, if they so desire, throw, in a most competent fashion, very great light on their respective subject-matters ; on the other hand, there is no dearth in any philosophical tradition of such important text which are bound to attract the attention of the philosophical world in case they are supplemented by Introduction, Notes, etc. based on a thorough study of their respective contents. E.g. *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayantā, *Ślokavārtika* of Kumārila, *Pramāṇavārtika* of Dharmakīrti, *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarākṣita, *Kusumāñjali* of Udayana, *Tattvārthaslokavārtika* of Vidyānanda, *Syādvādaratnākara* of Vādidēva, *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya are some of the texts which deserve an original, penetrating study and an investigation undertaken from a broad-based, historical standpoint. But in spite of all this the truth

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remains—and it is a matter for anxious thought—that the same texts which have been edited and translated so admirably by the Western scholars had (or have) come out in so poor a quality when edited and translated by their Indian counterparts. So far as I can see, the explanation of this state of affairs lies in the fact that the old style Indian educational centres are inclined to attach chief importance to the literal meaning of the texts and have therefore become extremely narrow in their vision, while, on the other hand, the Indian colleges and universities undertake studies that are extensive in their sweep but such as seldom enter into the heart of the matter. I am therefore of the view that our style of teaching and studying needs revision. With this aim in view I have attempted these Notes and the Introduction. Of the limitedness of the scope of my attempt as also of the shortcoming vitiating it I am more aware than anyone else, but for the present, sympathetic friends are presenting it before the English reader as it stands.

Ahmedabad

4. 5. 61.

Sukhlal

## 1. THE NATURE OF THE JAINA STANDPOINT ( *dr̥ṣṭi* )

Indian philosophical systems fall under two main classes ; some of them are realistic (*vāstāvavādin*) and others idealistic (*avāstāvavādin* ; illusoristic ?). Those which view the gross (*sthūla*) world, i. e. the world apprehended by the empirical (*laukika*) organs of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), to be as real as the subtle (*sūkṣma*) world, i. e. the world apprehended by the transcendental (*lokottara*) organs of knowledge,—that is to say, those which maintain that there is no difference between the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and the absolute (*pāramārthika*) truth, that all truth is of the same kind though differing in degree, that all objects revealed (*bhāsita*) through whatever organ of knowledge are equally real even if this revelation (*bhāna*) be relatively full or meagre, clear or vague, and that even real objects are capable of being expressed in words (*vāṇī-prakāśya*)—are realistic systems. They may also be called positivistic (*vidhimukha*) systems or systems talking in terms of “it is thus” and “it is so” (*idamitthaṃvādin, evamvādin*). They include the Cārvāka, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, and Sāṃkhya-Yoga systems, the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools of Buddhism, the Madhvite school of Vedānta, etc.

Those which view the external (*bāhya*), perceptible (*dr̥śya*) world to be unreal (*mithyā*) and the internal (*āntarika*) one alone to be ultimately real (*parama-satya*)—that is to say, those which, having classified truth into the empirical and the absolute, the apparent (*sāṃvṛtika*) and the real (*vāstavika*), treat as unreal everything that is apprehended by the empirical organs of knowledge and is expressed in words—are idealistic systems. They may also be called negativistic (*niṣedhamukha*) systems or systems talking in terms of “it is not so” (*anevamvādin*). The Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda schools of Buddhism, the Śaṃkarite school of Vedānta, etc. are systems of this type.

Its basic attitude of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) notwithstanding, the Jaina standpoint is absolutely realistic (*ekāntataḥ vāstāvavādin*) in nature. For according to it too, the objective truth (*bhāva-satyatva*) revealed through sense-perception (technically called *mati-jñāna*) etc. is on a par with that revealed through transcendental intuition (technically called *kevala-jñāna*), that is to say, the two types of truth may differ as to their quantity but not as to their quality and nature. Sense-perception etc. reveal a few substances (*dravya*) and a limited number of their modes (*pariyāya*) while transcendental intuition reveals the totality of substances and the totality of their modes, but the two do so in precisely the same manner and with precisely the same sort of validity. Thus even though the Jaina system

grants that certain extremely subtle objects (*sūkṣmatama bhāva*) are incapable of description (*anirvacanīya*) it insists that the objects capable of description (*nirvacanīya*) are nevertheless real. This however is not the case with Śūnyavāda, Śaṅkarite Vedānta, etc.

## 2. THE UNCHANGING CHARACTER (*aparivartīṣṇutā*) OF THE JAINA STANDPOINT

Now the important question to be considered is whether the realistic nature of the Jaina standpoint as outlined above has retained the same form throughout the course of history or a change in some form or other has been introduced in it by someone at some period. An allied question will be : If the Jaina standpoint has all along retained a fixed nature and, unlike the Buddhist and Vedāntic traditions, has undergone no change or development of thought, what can be the reason for it ?

The available history of the Jaina tradition reaches as far back as pre-Mahāvīra times, and ever since the realistic nature of Jaina standpoint has remained absolutely unaltered in essence—as is also the case with the philosophical systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, etc. Of course, the Jaina philosophical literature, like the philosophical literature of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc., testifies to a gradually developing subtlety and clarity in regard to the descriptions (*vyākhyā*), definitions (*lakṣana*), and logical justification (*upapatti*) of the categories (*padārtha*) like 'organ of valid knowledge' (*pramāṇa*), 'object of valid knowledge' (*prameya*), etc. —so much so that Jaina philosophers like Yaśovijaya have even employed the refined Navya-Nyāya technique in their further analysis of the Jaina descriptions and definitions ; nevertheless, throughout the course of history the realistic nature of the Jaina standpoint has not in the least undergone that type of change which we come across in the Buddhist and Vedāntic traditions.

The Buddhist tradition was certainly realistic to begin with, but the two schools of Mahāyāna, viz. Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda, brought about a radical transformation in it. As a result, its realism changed into absolute idealism (*āikāntika avāstāvavāda*). This is what we mean by the change of outlook (*drṣṭi-parivartana*) within the Buddhist tradition. The same was the case with the Vedāntic tradition. Upaniṣads and Vedāntasūtras contained vague seeds (*aspaṣṭabīja*) of idealism together with clear-cut indications (*spaṣṭa sūcana*) of realism, but Śaṅkarācārya interpreted all this only idealistically and thus laid the solid foundation of that idealism which, as a result of further development and change of outlook, subsequently branched forth into a number of schools like *drṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda* etc.<sup>1</sup> Now this changing character of the Buddhist and Vedāntic traditions and the unchanging character of the rest ones impel us to investigate into the causes of this divergence.

Idealism, which considers the gross world (*sthūla jagat*) to be an empirical reality (*vyāvahārika satya*) or an unreality (*asatya*) and the internal world (*āntarika jagat*) to be the sole ultimate reality (*parama satya*), can possibly arise only when either the process

1. A solipsistic trend within Śaṅkarite Vedānta. According to it, the world lasts only so long as it is perceived. The word literally means 'the doctrine that whenever a thing is seen it is created. Tr.

of analysis (*viśleṣaṇa-kriyā*) or the process of synthesis (*samanvaya-kriyā*) is carried to its logical extreme. We find that this condition (requisite for the rise of idealism) is absent in all the philosophical traditions except the Buddhist and Vedāntic ones. Buddha analysed everything, gross as well as subtle, to such an extent that no scope was left for anything of the nature of a permanent substance (*sthāyi-dravya*). In the Upaniṣads, on the other hand, the process of synthesizing all diversities (*bheda*) and varieties (*vividhatā*) culminated in the postulation of one permanent principle (*sthira tattva*) in the form of Brahman. In due course, Lord Buddha's acute-minded disciples developed the Master's analysis to such an extent that the continuous substances (*akhaṇḍa dravya*) and the substantial diversities (*dravya-bheda*) of our everyday use (*vyavahāropayogin*) were reduced to bare names; what remained as absolutely real was something momentary but indescribable (*anirvacanīya*). Similarly, the spirit of synthesis reflected in the Upaniṣadic principle of Absolute Brahman was developed by Śaṅkarācārya to such an extent that the empirical world so full of diversities (*bheda-pradhāna*) was ultimately reduced to a bare name and an illusion (*māyā*). Of course, had there been no extremist analysers (*aikāntika viśleṣaṇakārin*) like Nāgārjuna and extremist synthesisers (*aikāntika samanvayakārin*) like Śaṅkarācārya, the distinction between the empirical and the absolute truth would not have made its appearance in these two traditions. Even then, we should not forget that the capacity to give rise to an idealistic outlook was inherent (*nihita*) in the very ground (*bhūmikā*) of the Buddhist and Vedāntic traditions, and that such a capacity was entirely absent in the ground of the realistic systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, and Sāṃkhya-Yoga systems undertake not only analysis but also synthesis. And since they attach equal importance (*sama-prādhānya*) and ascribe equal competence (*samāna-balatva*) to analysis and synthesis they do not declare one to be real at the expense of the other. Hence there is neither scope for nor possibility of idealism finding room in these systems. This explains why these systems throughout remained realistic even though they too produced plenty of acute-minded thinkers who were match to Nāgārjuna, Śaṅkarācārya, etc. The same applies to the Jaina system of philosophy. Starting with an analysis (of the real) into different substances (*dravya*) the system no doubt goes to the length of analysing even the subtlest modes (*pariyāya*), but in spite of his accepting the reality of the modes that are the final resultants in this analytic process the Jaina does not reject the reality of permanent substances as will do the Buddhist. Likewise, starting with the synthesis of the modes and the substances the Jaina system ultimately arrives at the one principle of reality (*sat-tattva*), but it does not deny in the manner of Brahmavāda reality to the diversity of substances and to the modes that are the resultants in the analytic process. All this was possible because Jainism relatively acknowledged the equal competence (*tulya-bala*) and equal truth (*samāna-satya*) of the two standpoints, viz. the standpoint of substance (*dravyārthika dṛṣṭi*) and the standpoint of modes (*pariyāyārthika dṛṣṭi*). Consequently, we do not find in it either extreme analysis as we do in Buddhism or extreme synthesis as we do in Vedānta. And this, in turn, is why the realistic nature of the Jaina standpoint remained unaltered in essence.

### 3. THE SPHERE OF APPLICATION (*śakti-maryādā*) OF AN ORGAN OF KNOWLEDGE ( *pramāṇa* )

What is the universe ? What is its nature ? What are its constituent elements (*tattva*) ? What is the nature of these elements ? —these and others are the questions that have not been answered by philosophers in a uniform fashion. It is so because one's answer to these questions depends upon his view as to the competence (*śakti*) of the organs of knowledge, about which philosophers hold divergent views. The views held by the Indian philosophers as to the degrees of competence (*śakti-tāratamya*) of the various organs of knowledge can be classified as under :

1. Those advocating sole competence of sense-organs (*indriyādhipatya-vādin*).
2. Those advocating sole competence of non-sensuous organs (*anindriyādhipatya-vādin*).
3. Those advocating equal competence of sense-organs and non-sensuous organs (*ubhayādhipatya-vādin*).
4. Those advocating sole competence of the Scripture (*āgamādhipatya-vādin*).
5. Those advocating incompetence of all organ whatsoever (*pramāṇopaplava-vādin*).

[1]. *Indriyādhipatya vāda* : According to this view, the competence of an organ of knowledge is solely dependent on sense-organs while the mind (*manas*) can at the most follow sense-organs but can never originate true knowledge without their aid, that is, concerning things (allegedly) beyond the reach of sense-organs. On this view, true knowledge, if at all possible, can be had only through sense-organs. The view is upheld by the Cārvāka system alone. Not that the Cārvāka repudiates the organs of knowledge like inference, verbal testimony, etc. which are a matter of our everyday practice, and yet he declares himself to be an advocate of perception—and sense-perception at that—being the sole organ of knowledge. This only means that according to the Cārvāka, an empirical organ of knowledge—be it inference, verbal testimony, or any other—is not valid unless its findings are confirmed by sense-perception. In other words, the Cārvāka has no objection to a piece of knowledge being regarded as valid in case it is not contradicted by sense-perception.

[2] *Anindriyādhipatya vāda* : By “non-sensuous organs” (*anindriya*) we understand three internal organs (*antaḥ-karaṇa*), viz. *manas*, *citta*, and *ātman*.<sup>2</sup> And the second view under consideration regards a non-sensuous organ in the form of *citta* as the sole organ of true knowledge. The view is upheld by Śūnyavāda, Vijñānavāda, and Śaṅkarite Vedānta. According to it, true knowledge can be generated by nothing save the purified *citta*. The upholders of this view flatly deny the competence of sense-organs to generate true knowledge, and they aver that sense-organs are not only cripple but also deceptive. The idea underlying this contention is that a piece of knowledge which is contradicted or unconfirmed by the findings of *citta*—particularly of the *citta*

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2. These terms are almost untranslatable, but let us say that *manas* is the organ of empirical introspection (and an accessory to sense-organs), *citta* the organ of transcendental realization, and *ātman* the ultimate principle of consciousness--Tr.

purified by meditation (*dhyāna-buddha*) is never valid even if it be reckoned as such in our everyday dealings.

[3] *U bh a y ā d h i p a t y a v ā d a*: The third view does not advocate in the manner of the Cārvāka the sole competence of sense-organs and incompetence of the mind-absolutely-unaided-by-sense-organs; nor does it advocate the sole competence of the non-sensuous *citta* and incompetence or deceptivity of sense-organs. According to this view, sense-organs can become competent enough—even if with the aid of the mind (*manas*)—and generate true knowledge; on the other hand, there are according to it cases where a non-sensuous organ originates true knowledge even without the aid of sense-organs. Hence the epithet *ubhayādhipatya-vāda* attributed to this view. It is upheld by the systems like Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā etc. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga system, even while acknowledging the competence of sense-organs, regards *antaḥ-karaṇa* as capable of independently generating true knowledge. What the Sāṃkhya-Yoga says of *antaḥ-karaṇa* the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika says of *manas*. However, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga does not regard *ātman* as capable of independently generating true knowledge, and that is because the system attributes to *buddhi* the capacity for generating true knowledge while treating the conscious principle *puruṣa* as devoid of all change (*niratiśaya*).<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does regard an *ātman* as capable of independently having true knowledge—even if God be the only *ātman* of this type; for God, according to the system, is devoid of a body and a *manas* and yet capable of having knowledge. The Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika are also upholders of this view, for they too consider sense-organs and *manas* to be equally competent for generating true knowledge.

[4] *Ā g a m ā d h i p a t y a v ā d a*: The fourth view accepts, concerning certain matters, the competence neither of sense-organs nor of non-sensuous organs but of the scripture alone. This view is upheld only by the Pūrya-Mīmāṃsā. Of course, concerning ordinary matters the system upholds the *ubhayādhipatya* view as do the Sāṃkhya-Yoga etc., while it is only concerning transcendental merits (*dharma*) and demerits (*adharmā*) that it accepts the competence of the scripture and of it alone. And even though for the Śaṅkarite Vedānta the scripture constitutes a principal authority concerning Brahman the system does not fall under this fourth view, for it also admits concerning this very Brahman the competence also of an *antaḥ-karaṇa* purified by meditation.

[5] *P r a m ā ṇ o p a p l a v a v ā d a*: The fifth and the last view denies the competence of an organ-of-knowledge as such, be it a sense-organ, an inference, or a scripture. According to this view, there is no perfect organ competent enough to generate true knowledge. All organs of knowledge are for it either cripple or deceptive. The upholder of this view is called *tattvopaplava-vādin* (lit. 'one who throws overboard all categories') who is but the Cārvāka gone extreme. The view has been expounded in clear-cut terms by Jayarāṣi in his *Tattvopaplavasimha*.

3. *Puruṣa* is the Sāṃkhya-Yoga equivalent for *ātman*. The idea is that an organ of knowledge must undergo some change in the course of acquiring knowledge, but since *puruṣa* is devoid of all change it is not an organ of knowledge---Tr.

Of these five views, the third, viz. *ubhayādhipatyavāda*, is accepted by the Jaina system. For it no doubt maintains that sense-organs are competent to generate true knowledge, but it goes on to add that each of the two non-sensuous organs, *manas* and *ātman*, is capable of independently generating true knowledge. As for an *ātman*'s independent capacity to generate true knowledge, the Jaina system differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in that the former attributes this capacity to all *ātman*s without exception while the latter to God alone. The Jaina system repudiates *tattvopaplavavāda* because it, unlike the latter, does accept the competence of several organs of knowledge. It opposes the Cārvāka view of 'sole competence of sense-organs' because it, unlike the latter, does accept the independent competence of two non-sensuous organs. It rejects Vijñānavāda, Śūnyavāda, and Brahmavāda because it, unlike the latter, does accept the competence of sense-organs. Lastly, it is opposed to *āgamādhipatyavāda* because it, unlike the latter, accepts, concerning transcendental merits and demerits the competence also of the two non-sensuous organs, *manas* and *ātman*.

#### 4. THE TOTAL EXTENT (*vistāra*) OF THE KNOWABLE SPHERE (*prameya-pradeśa*)

One's view as to the extent of the knowable sphere depends on his view as to the competence of the organs of knowledge. Thus for the Cārvāka, who believes in the sole competence of sense-organs, the sphere of the knowable remained confined to the gross, perceptible (*drśya*) world, while for those who acknowledged the competence of a non-sensuous organ this sphere got extended in various ways. Whoever believed in the competence of a non-sensuous organ admitted the existence of a subtle (*sūkṣma*) world over and above the gross (*sthūla*) one. However, even when philosophers agreed as to the *existence* of a subtle world they held divergent views as to the *nature* of this world, views that followed from their respective lines of speculation and the traditions handed down to them. These views and schools based thereon may be divided into two broad groups. One of these groups comprises those views which conceive the subtle world as composed of physical (*jaḍa*) as well as conscious (*cetana*) elements (*tattva*), the other those which conceive it as composed only of conscious elements or of consciousness (*caitanya*) as such. Here let us take note of one distinction between the Western and Indian philosophies. In India there arose no philosophical system which posited subtle physical elements at the root of the gross world while denying the existence of all subtle conscious elements; on the other hand, there have here arisen systems which posit nothing except subtle conscious elements at the root of the gross world. It is in this sense alone that India may be regarded as a spiritualist (*caitanyavādin*) country.<sup>4</sup>

Indian philosophical speculation has got a bearing on the religio-ethical doctrines of rebirth (*punarjanma*), efficacy of all action (*karmavāda*), bondage (*bandha*), emancipation (*mokṣa*),—doctrines that are universally accepted by all who believe in

4. The suggestion is that the West has and India has not produced "systems which posit subtle physical elements at the root of the gross world while denying the existence of all subtle conscious elements". Such systems may be characterized as "subtle materialism" as contrasted with the Cārvāka's gross materialism. And India may be regarded as a spiritualist country because it produced no 'subtle materialism' even if it did produce gross materialism---Tr.

a subtle conscious element and who therefore seek within the framework of their respective philosophical tenets to bring these doctrines in line with the notion of a conscious element. Within the circle of the philosophical systems that posit subtle elements there are current the following four theories on whose basis attempts have been made to demonstrate the relation of the gross world to the subtle one and to explain causation :—

- [1] *Ārambhavāda* [ Theory of Novel Creation ]
- [2] *Pariṇā mavāda* [ Theory of Real Modification ]
- [3] *Pratītyasamutpādavāda* [ Theory of Dependent Origination ]
- [4] *Vivartavāda* [ Theory of Illusory Modification ]

[1] *Ārambhavāda* : To put it in a nutshell, it has got the following four characteristic features :—[i] the positing of an infinite number of mutually distinct [ *paraspara-bhinna* ] ultimate causes [ *mūla-kāraṇa* ], [ii] the positing of an absolute distinction [ *ātyantika bheda* ] between the cause and the effect, [iii] the assertion that a cause—be it eternal [ *nitya* ] or transient [ *anitya* ]—remains unchanging [ *apariṇāmin* ] during the course of the creation of the effect concerned, and [iv] the assertion that an altogether novel [ *apūrva* ] effect, that is, an effect that was non-existent [ *asat* ] before its creation [ *utpatti* ], is created and lasts for a limited period of time [ *kiñcitkālīna satā* ].

[2] *Pariṇā mavāda* : Its characteristic features [ given below ] are just the opposite of those of *Ārambhavāda* :—[i] the acceptance of one single ultimate cause [ *mūla kāraṇa* ], [ii] the positing of a real non-distinction [ *vāstavika abheda* ] between the cause and the effect, [iii] the assertion that even an eternal [ *nitya* ] cause exists and functions in the form of a changing [ *pariṇāmin* ] entity, and [iv] the assertion that a particular effect exists in its cause and all particular effects taken collectively exist in one ultimate cause throughout the course of time [lit. in all the three periods of time], that is to say, the total denial of the creation [ *utpatti* ] of an altogether novel [ *apūrva* ] entity.

[3] *Pratītyasamutpādavāda* : Its three characteristic features are :—[i] the positing of an absolute distinction [ *ātyantika bheda* ] between the cause and the effect, [ii] the total rejection of a persisting cause, changeless [ *nitya* ] or changing [ *pariṇāmin* ], and [iii] the assertion that an effect that was non-existent [ *asat* ] before its creation comes to be created.

[4] *Vivartavāda* : Its three characteristic features are :— [i] the positing of an absolute reality [ *pāramārthika satya* ] which neither produces anything nor undergoes any change [ *anutpādaka, apariṇāmin* ], [ii] the total rejection of the suggestion that the manifest [ *bhāsamāna* ] world—either gross or subtle—is created [ *utpanna* ] [out of a first cause] as also of the suggestion that it is evolved [ *pariṇata* ] [out of a first cause], and (iii) the assertion that the gross world possesses an unreal ( *avāstavika* ) or imaginary ( *kālpānika* ) existence, in other words, that it is merely an illusory ( *māyika* ) appearance ( *bhāsa* ).

[1] *Ā r a m b h a v ā d a* : This theory maintains that there exists an infinite number of subtle elements in the form of atoms whose mutual combinations ( *pārasparika sambandha* ) result in the formation of an altogether novel gross, physical world which later on perishes

for good (*sarvathā naṣṭa*). According to the theory, these subtle constituent-elements (of the physical world) are beginningless, endless, and changeless (*anādi-nidhana, aparīṇāmin*), and if there is at all any change it is in their qualities (*guṇa*) and attributes (*dharma*). Having thus established the relation of the gross physical world with the subtle physical elements the theory goes on to posit the existence of subtle conscious elements. It thus posits an infinite number of mutually distinct (*paraspara-bhinna*) conscious elements which too are beginningless, endless, and changeless. And just as having conceived the subtle physical elements as utterly changeless (*aparīṇāmin*) this theory posits in these elements the separate existence of qualities and attributes that originate and perish (*utpāda-vināśa-śālin*), so also having conceived the conscious elements as beginningless, endless, and changeless it posits in these elements the separate existence of qualities and attributes that originate and perish. On this theory, the gross physical world is related to the subtle physical elements as an effect (*upādeya*) is related to its material cause (*upādāna*); on the other hand, the relation of the gross physical world with the subtle conscious elements is one of mere conjunction (*saṃyoga*).

[2] *Parīṇāmavāda*: It is of two kinds, viz. (a) *Pradhānaparīṇāmavāda* or 'Theory of the Real Modification of Pradhāna' and (b) *Brahmaparīṇāmavāda* or 'Theory of the Real Modification of Brahman'.

(a) *Pradhānaparīṇāmavāda*: According to this theory, there lies at the root of the gross world a subtle element called *pradhāna* which exists not in the form of an infinite number of mutually distinct atoms but in a continuous form (*akhaṇḍarūpa*) far subtler than that of atoms, and which, though beginningless and endless like atoms, is not changeless like them but constantly undergoes multifarious types of modifications (*nānā-parīṇāma-parīṇata*). On this theory, the gross world is nothing except the totality of perceptible modifications (*dr̥śya parīṇāma*) of the subtle element *pradhāna*. Thus unlike atomism (*paramāṇuvāda*), *Pradhānaparīṇāmavāda* does not conceive the subtle element as changeless, nor does it consider the gross physical world to be an altogether novel creation out of this subtle element; for according to the latter theory, the subtle element *pradhāna*, which is doubtless as much physical as are atoms, constantly goes on getting modified into various perceptible, physical forms. Having maintained that the relation between the gross physical world on the one hand, and the single subtle-but-physical element *pradhāna* on the other is one of non-distinction (*abheda*), this theory goes on to posit in the subtle world conscious elements as well. These conscious elements are infinite in number as they are in *Ārambhavāda*, but the two differ in that the conscious elements of *Ārambhavāda*, though themselves changeless, are possessed of qualities and attributes that originate and perish while those of *Pradhānaparīṇāmavāda* are not possessed of any such qualities and attributes. Since this latter type of conscious elements are utterly changeless (*kūṭastha*) they cannot undergo any modification, since they are utterly attributeless (*nirdharmaka*) they cannot act as seat of qualities and attributes. *Pradhānaparīṇāmavāda* argues that since it is the subtle physical element which possesses qualities and attributes that originate and perish, the conscious elements must

be somewhat different from the physical one in this respect ; for if conscious elements too possessed qualities and attributes of that type there would be nothing to distinguish them from the subtle physical element. Hence the theory maintains that if the subtle conscious elements are at all to be posited it is proper for the sake of distinguishing them from the subtle physical element that they be conceived as not only attributeless but also changeless. Thus it was that conscious elements found room in *Pradhānapariṇā-mavāda* but in the form of attributeless and changeless entities.

(b) *Brahmapariṇā-mavāda* : This theory, which seems to be only a development of *Pradhānapariṇā-mavāda*, granted that there lies at the root of the gross world some subtle element which is the cause of the gross world. But it saw no sense in positing subtle conscious elements distinct from and standing alongside of the subtle, physical causal element, *pradhāna*—more so when these conscious elements were absolutely functionless ( *akiñcitkara* ) ( like an *ajāgalastana* ). This theory not only realized the futility of the separate existence of the conscious elements as posited by *Pradhānapariṇā-mavāda* but also considered it unnecessary to assume that these conscious elements are infinite in number. Accordingly, the new theory visualized the subtle world in such a manner that it would not only properly explain the creation of the gross world out of the subtle one but would also eliminate the flaw inherent in the futile (*niṣprajana*) assumption of an infinite number of good-for-nothing (*akiñcitkara*) conscious element. Thus it posited at the root of the gross world not two mutually opposite (*paraspara-virodhin*) types of elements—one physical and the other conscious—but just one conscious element called Brahman ; this Brahman was conceived as a changing entity ( like *pradhāna* of the earlier theory ) so that it was possible to explain the gross world—consisting of physical as well as conscious entities—as one emerging ( *āvirbhāva* ) out of the single conscious element Brahman and merging back ( *tirobhāva* ) into the same. The only point of difference between *Pradhānapariṇā-mavāda* and *Brahmapariṇā-mavāda* is that according to the former the physical element constantly undergoes change ( *pariṇāmin* ) and the conscious elements remain utterly unchanging ( *apariṇāmin* ), whereas according to the latter the ultimate subtle element, which is exclusively conscious, itself undergoes change and from it there subsequently arise two streams of change ( *pariṇāma-pravāha* )—one physical and the other conscious.

[3] *Pratītyasamutpāda-vāda* : According to this theory too, there lie at the root of the gross physical world two types of subtle elements, one physical and the other conscious, the former called *rūpa*, the latter *nāma*. In this theory the subtle elements of the physical as well as conscious types—and not the subtle elements of the physical type alone, as in *Ārambhavāda*—are considered to be atomic ( *paramāṇu-rūpa* ). However, even though atoms are posited here as in *Ārambhavāda* they are here conceived in a totally different manner from those in *Ārambhavāda*. In *Ārambhavāda* atoms themselves are no doubt supposed to be changeless, but the theory posits in these atoms a series ( *paramparā* ) of qualities and attributes that originate and perish ;

*Pratītyasamutpādvāda*, on the other hand, conceives in its own distinctive manner the series of qualities and attributes that originate and perish but it posits no permanent (*sthāyin*) atomic substance (*paramāṇu-dravya*) in the form of the substrata (*ādhārabhūta*) of these qualities and attributes. Similarly, according to *Pratītyasamutpādvāda*, there exists no permanent conscious element, single or otherwise. All that the theory maintains is that there exist in the subtle world the physical series of states that originate and perish as also the conscious series of states that originate and perish, but that the latter type of series are as much devoid of permanent substrata as the former type. The atoms are here called ‘atoms’ (*paramāṇu*) because they are subtlest (*sūkṣmatama*) and impartite (*avibhājya*), and not because they are permanent, impartite substances. On this theory, it is senseless to postulate permanent substances over and above qualities and attributes that originate and perish, just as it is futile to postulate utterly changeless (*kūṭastha*) conscious elements utterly devoid of qualities and attributes. Thus the theory posits in the subtle world two types of streams (*dhārā*) which are by nature totally distinct from one another and are yet not totally immune from exerting influence on one another. This theory differs from *Pradhāna-pariṇāmavāda* and *Brahmapariṇāmavāda* in that, unlike the latter two, it does not believe in the existence of a permanent substance of any type whatsoever. According to it, even if there exist no permanent substances in the form of fixed resting media (like a *Kīlak* or *Śaṅku*) it is the nature of an outgoing (*pūrva*) modification-moment (*pariṇāma-kṣaṇa*) that while perishing it gives rise to the incoming (*uttara*) modification-moment, that is to say, the mere existence of the moribund (*vināśonmukha*) outgoing modification-moment is sufficient to produce the incoming modification-moment without requiring a fixed substratum. It is owing to this that the theory is called *Pratītyasamutpādvāda* (i.e. Theory of Dependent Origination). Really speaking, *Pratītyasamutpādvāda* is *Paramāṇuvāda* (atomism) as well as *Pariṇāmavāda* evolutionism and yet essentially different from both.

[4] *Vivartavāda*: It is of two main kinds, viz. (a) *Nityabrahmavivartavāda* or “Theory of Illusory Modification of the Eternal Brahman” and (b) *Kṣaṇikavijñānavivartavāda* or “Theory of Illusory Modification of the Momentary Consciousness”. According to both, the gross world is a mere appearance (*bhāsamātra*), a mere imagination (*kalpanā-mātra*), a product of illusory or of past mental impressions (*māyājanita*, *vāsanājanita*). *Vivartavāda* maintains that the universe cannot be such an entity as may contain elements—external or internal, gross or subtle—that are mutually distinct (*prthak*) and discontinuous (*khaṇḍita*). On its showing, whatever is real in the universe can be just one because the universe is really continuous (*akhaṇḍa*) and impartite (*avibhājya*). And to conclude from it, the apparent dualities (*dvandva*) of attributes (*dharma*) such as external and internal, long and short, far and near, are simply chimerical (*kālpanika*). Thus on this theory, the gross world of our everyday experience (*loka-siddha sthūla viśva*) is but a product of imagination (*kālpanika*) and an apparent reality (*prātibhāsika satya*); on the other hand, the ultimate reality (*pāramārthika satya*) remaining hidden beneath (*tala-nihita*) the gross world and is amenable to pure meditation (*viśuddha-dhyāna-gamyā*), which, in turn, is why its true nature eludes an ordinary man’s (*prākṛta jana*) grasp.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā accept *Ārambhavāda*, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Caraka, —the physician—*Pradhāna-pariṇānavāda*. *Brahmapariṇānavāda* has found favour with the old Vedāntists like Bhartṛprapañca and Vallabhācārya among the moderns. *Pratītyasamutpādvāda* is upheld by Buddhists, *Vivartavāda* by the adherents of Śaṅkarite Vedānta, *Vijñānavāda*, and Śūnyavāda.

The following seems to be the historical course of development of the above narrated theories and the ideas underlying them. To begin with, the enquiry into causal relationships (*Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*) was confined to the physical world and to it alone. Gradually, when conscious elements lying beyond the physical ones were discovered and posited, the theory of causation—in the form of a theory of permanence-in-change (*pariṇāmi-nityatva*)—which had already been applied to the gross, physical world was extended to these conscious elements as well. But then arose the question: How are we to distinguish the conscious elements from the physical ones if both are permanent-undergoing-change (*pariṇāmi-nitya*)?—and this impelled the thinkers to retain the concept of conscious elements but to view these elements as permanent-devoid-of-change (*kūṭastha-nitya*) while applying the theory of causation, i.e, the theory of permanence-in-change, only to the physical realm. Now began an investigation into the nature of permanence-without-change (*kūṭastha-nityatā*) that had thus come to be attributed to the conscious elements. And then ultimately vanished not only this concept of permanence-without-change but also that concept of permanence-in-change which had till now found application in the physical realm; what remained to be admitted was just the stream of modification (*pariṇamana-dhārā*). Thus overdone analysis (*ātyantika viśleṣaṇa*) culminated in the doctrine of mere modifications (i.e. modifications without a substantial identity), in momentarism (*kṣaṇikatvavāda*). On the other hand, overdone synthesis (*ātyantika samanvaya*) gave rise to the doctrine that consciousness is the sole ultimate reality (*caitanya-mātra-pāramārthika-vāda*). On having hit at one ubiquitous (*sarva-vyāpaka*) conscious element the synthesis-minded philosophers saw no need for positing any independently real, physical element. And then they said to themselves, “When there is no independently real, physical element of any kind why should even the apparent (*dr̥śyamāna*) stream of modification (*pariṇamana-dhārā*) be deemed real?” This type of speculation resulted in the emergence of the doctrine that consciousness is the sole ultimate reality, a doctrine according to which all diversity and the entire physical world are altogether imaginary.

The different stages in this line of development can be summarily represented thus :—

- [1] Permanence-in-change (*pariṇāmi-nityatā*) attributed only to the physical realm.
- [2] Permanence-in-change attributed to the physical as well as conscious realms.
- [3] Permanence-in-change attributed to the physical realm and permanence -without-change (*kūṭastha-nityatā*) to the conscious.
- [4] (a) Both permanence-in-change and permanence-without-change rejected and the reality of a mere stream of modifications (*pariṇāma-pravāha*) accepted.

(b) The reality only of consciousness—of consciousness in the form of something permanent-devoid-of-change (*kūṭastha-nitya*)—accepted while everything else declared to be imaginary (*kālpānīka*) or unreal (*asatya*).

Coming to the Jaina system, we find that it posits over and above the perceptible world an infinite number of two utterly distinct types of subtle elements, one physical and the other conscious. The gross world is according to it only an effect (*kārya*) or modification (*pariṇāma*) of the subtle physical elements. The subtle physical elements of the Jaina system are atomic in nature but they are far subtler than the atoms posited in *Ārambhavāda*. Even though an atomist, the Jaina conceives the atoms as constantly undergoing change (*pariṇāmin*) precisely in the manner of the *pradhāna* etc. of *Pariṇāmavāda*; and the gross world is according to him but a transformation (*rūpāntara*) or modification (*pariṇāma*) of these very atoms. Really speaking, the Jaina is a *pariṇāmavādin*. However, there is a difference between *pariṇāmavāda* as advocated by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, old Vedānta, etc. and the same as advocated by the Jaina: In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system *Pariṇāmavāda* has been applied to the physical element alone while the conscious elements have been left untouched thereby; on the other hand, in Bhartṛprapañca etc. *Pariṇāmavāda* has been applied to the conscious element alone. As contrasted with these two, in Jainism *Pariṇāmavāda* has been applied to the physical as well as conscious, the gross as well as subtle; in one word, the Jaina *Pariṇāmavāda* may be called an all-comprehensive (*sarva-vyāpaka*) *Pariṇāmavāda*. In a sense, even Bhartṛprapañca's *Pariṇāmavāda* may be called an all-comprehensive *Pariṇāmavāda*, but "all" for Bhartṛprapañca means the conscious Brahman alone and nothing else while "all" for the Jaina means the physical as well as conscious elements.<sup>5</sup>

Thus both *Ārambhavāda* and *Pariṇāmavāda* find a full recognition and attain a harmonious synthesis everywhere in the Jaina system. However, there is in this system no scope whatsoever for *Pratītya-samutpādavāda* and *Vivartavāda*. Inasmuch as the Jaina system regards all real things as permanent-undergoing-change (*pariṇāmi-nitya*) and all of them as equally real, it is opposed to *Pratītyasamutpādavāda* and *Vivartavāda*—as are also the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, etc. Again, the Jaina system is one with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, etc. in recognizing the plurality of conscious elements, but its conception of them is in many ways different from that of the latter systems. In the Jaina system a conscious element is not an ubiquitous substance as it is in Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, etc., nor is it atomic in size as it is in Viśiṣṭādvaita etc., nor merely a substanceless (*nidravyaka*) stream of cognitions (*jñāna-dhārā*) as it is in Buddhism. The conscious elements posited by the Jaina are medium-sized (*madhyama-parimāṇa-va*) and are capable of expanding (*vistāra*) and contracting (*saṃkoca*). To that extent

5. For both Bhartṛprapañca and the Jaina everything is a modification of some permanent substance; but Bhartṛprapañca would say that everything is a modification of the one conscious substance Brahman while the Jaina would say that everything is a modification either of a physical substance or of a conscious substance—Tr.

they are not much distinct from the physical elements. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Yoga systems, an ordinary soul (*jīvātman*) is akin to the supreme soul (*paramātman*) in that both are a soul, i. e. a conscious entity, but there is a fundamental difference of nature between the two owing to which an ordinary soul can never become the supreme soul, nor was the supreme soul ever an ordinary soul suffering bondage. The Jaina system is quite opposed to this thesis as are also Vedānta etc. According to it, there is no natural difference (*sahaja bheda*) between an ordinary soul (*Jīvātman*) and an almighty soul (*Īśvara*); for the capacity to become a supreme soul (*paramātman*) is common to all ordinary souls, a capacity that may—and does—become manifest (*vyakta*) when means (*sādhana*) for it are available. However, the Jaina system does differ from Vedānta insofar as the latter is believer in one supreme soul (*eka-paramātma-vādin*) while the former, because of its acceptance of a plurality of conscious elements, is in principle believer in a plurality of supreme souls (*bahu-paramātma-vādin*).



## ANEKĀNTAVĀDA—THE PRINCIPAL JAINA CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN LOGIC

The first and the foremost of the contributions—one that is the key to the rest—made by the Jaina savants to Indian Logic (*pramāṇa-śāstra*) is the systematic exposition (*śāstrīya nirūpaṇa*) of *Anekāntavāda* or the Doctrine of Non-Absolutism and (its corollary) *Nayavāda* or the Doctrine of Partial Truths.

There are two mutually distinct, fundamental standpoints (*dr̥ṣṭi*) for looking at the universe—one is that which tends towards generalization (*sāmānya-gāminī*), the other that which tends towards particularization (*viśeṣa-gāminī*). The former starts with the observation of similarities (*samānatā*), but it is gradually inclined to emphasize non-distinction (*abheda*) and finally views the universe as rooted in something one and single; hence it arrives at the conclusion that whatever is an object of awareness (*pratīti*) is, really speaking, some one single element (*tattva*). Thus passing beyond the initial stage (*prāthamika bhūmikā*) of viewing similarities the standpoint in question culminates in viewing essential identity (*tāttvika ekatā*); whatever element is here asserted to be the sole object of awareness is also declared to be the sole reality (*sat*). Owing to its excessive preoccupation with the one ultimate real, this standpoint either fails to take note of diversities or it takes note of them but dismisses them as empirical (*vyāvahārika*) or non-ultimate (*apāramārthika*) because according to it unreal (*avāstavika*). This applies to all diversity we are aware of, be it diversity in respect of time (*kālakṛta*: as, for example, that between the antecedent seed and the subsequent sprout), or diversity in respect of space (*deśakṛta*: as, for example, that between the simultaneously existing *prākṛtika*, i.e. physical, modifications like jars, cloths, etc.), or innate diversity irrespective of space and time (*deśa-kāla-nirapekṣa sāhajika*: as, for example, that between *prakṛti*, i.e. the root physical element, and *puruṣa*, i.e. the root conscious element, or that between one *puruṣa* and another).

As against this, the second standpoint sees dissimilarity (*asamānatā*) everywhere, and gradually searching for the root of this dissimilarity it finally reaches that stage of analysis (*viśeṣaṇa-bhūmikā*) where even similarity, (*samānatā*), nothing to say of identity (*ekatā*), appears to be something artificial (*kr̥trima*, unreal); hence it arrives at the conclusion that the universe is but a conglomeration (*puñja*) of several discrete existents (*bheda*) utterly dissimilar from one another. According to it, there really exists no single element (at the root of diversities), nor does there obtain any real similarity (between one existent and another). This applies to single elements like

*prakṛti* which (allegedly) pervade all space and persist for all time, as also to single elements like atoms which (allegedly) are mutually different substances (occupying different points in space) but ones that persist for all time.

The above-stated two standpoints are fundamentally different from one another, for one of them is based exclusively on synthesis the other exclusively on analysis. These two fundamental lines of thought (*vicāra-saraṇi*) and the derivative lines of thought developing out of the two give rise to a number of mutually conflicting views on a number of topics. We thus see that the first standpoint with its tendency to generalization led to the formulation of the doctrine of 'one, non-dual *Brahman* (*Brahmādvaita*)—the sole real element—occupying all space and time (*samagra-deśa-kāla-vyāpin*) and free from the limitations of space and time (*deśa-kāla-vinirmukta*). This doctrine, on the one hand, dubbed as unreal (*mithyā*) all diversity and all organs of knowledge taking note of this diversity, while, on the other hand, it asserted that the real-element (*sat-tattva*) lies beyond the reach (*pravṛtti*) of speech (*vāṇī*) and logic (*tarka*) and is amenable to bare experience (i. e. experience untrammelled by speech and logic) (*mātra anubhava-gamya*). Likewise, the second standpoint with its tendency to particularization led to the formulation of the doctrine of 'an infinite number of discrete existents, each different from the rest not only as to its spatio-temporal location but as to its very nature'. This doctrine too, on the one hand, dubbed all non-distinction (*abheda*) as unreal while, on the other hand, asserted that the ultimate discrete existents lie beyond the reach of speech and logic and are amenable to bare experience. Thus both the doctrines in question did ultimately arrive at one common conclusion, viz, that whatever is revealed by speech and logic is a nullity (*śūnya*) while the ultimate reality is amenable to bare experience; but their ultimate objectives (*lakṣya*) being utterly different the two came in headlong clash and emerged as rivals to each other.

There also came into existence a number of lines of thought that either sprang from or were related to these two fundamental lines. Some of them accepted non-distinction (*abheda*) but only in respect of space and time or in respect of mere time, that is, not in respect of essential or substantival nature. Thus one line of thought did posit multiplicity of substances but regarded them all as eternal from the point of view of time and ubiquitous from that of space; the Sāṅkya doctrine of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* (*prakṛtipuruṣa-vāda*) is an instance in point. Another line of thought came to attribute a comparatively greater extension to the sphere of diversity. Thus even while positing entities that are eternal and ubiquitous this line also posited a multiplicity of entities that are physical by nature (and hence occupying different points in space); the (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) doctrine of atomic-as-well-as-ubiquitous-substances (*paramāṇu-vibhu-dravya-vāda*) is an instance in point.

It was but natural that the standpoint of exclusive non-dualism (*advaita-mātra*) and exclusive monism (*san-mātra*)—a standpoint tolerant of no diversity in any respect—should lead to the formulation of numerous doctrines based on the acceptance of non-distinction (*abheda-mūlaka vāda*). And this is what actually happened. Thus this standpoint gave rise to the doctrine of *satkāryavāda*, according to which there is a non-

distinction between a cause and its effect ; similarly, it gave rise to the doctrine of non-distinction between an attribute ( *dharmā* ) and that which possesses this attribute ( *dharmīn* ), a quality ( *guṇa* ) and that which possesses this quality ( *guṇīn* ), a substratum ( *ādhāra* ) and that which is supported by this substratum ( *ādheya* ), and so on and so forth. On the other hand, the standpoint of exclusive pluralism ( *dvaita-mātra* )<sup>6</sup> and exclusive distinction ( *bheda-mātra* ) led to the formulation of numerous doctrines based on the acceptance of distinction ( *bheda-mūlaka vāda* ). Thus it gave rise to the doctrine of *asatkāryavāda*, according to which there is absolute distinction between a cause and its effect ; similarly, it gave rise to the doctrine of absolute distinction between an attribute and that which possesses this attribute, a quality and that which possesses this quality, a substratum and that which is supported by this substratum, and so on and so forth. Thus we find that in the field of Indian philosophical speculation a number of mutually antagonistic views ( *mata* ) and systems ( *darśana* ) arose out of the fundamental standpoint of generality ( along with its derivative standpoints ) and the fundamental standpoint of particularity ( along with its derivative standpoints ). These views and systems, without caring for the element of truth that might underlie a rival view or system, made it their prime concern to attack one another.

The doctrine of pre-existence ( *sad-vāda* )—be it non-dualistic ( as in Vedānta ) or dualistic as in Sāṅkhya—cannot achieve its basic aim without accepting *satkāryavāda*, according to which there is a non-distinction between a cause and its effect ; on the other hand, the doctrine of pre-nonexistence ( *asad-vāda* )—be it applied to momentary entities as in Buddhism or to static and eternal entities as in Vaiśeṣika etc.—cannot achieve its basic aim without accepting *asatkāryavāda* ( according to which there is absolute distinction between a cause and its effect )<sup>7</sup>. Hence *satkāryavāda* came in clash with *asatkāryavāda*. Similarly, the theory of permanence-without-change ( i. e. eternity : *kūṭasthatā*, *kālika nityatā* ) and all-pervadedness ( i. e. ubiquity : *vibhūtā*, *daiśika vyāpakatā* )—a theory resulting from the doctrine of pre-existence, dualistic or non-dualistic—came in clash with the theory of spatially as well as temporally impartite, ultimate elements ( *deśa-kāla-kṛta-niraṃśa-aṃśa-vāda* ), that is, with the theory of impartite moments ( *niraṃśa kṣaṇa-vāda* )—a theory resulting from the doctrine rival to the doctrine of pre-existence. Now those who regard the entire universe as some single ( *eka* ), continuous ( *akhaṇḍa* ) element ( *tattva* ) as also those who regard it as a mere conglomeration ( *puñja* ) of impartite ( *niraṃśa* ), ultimate elements ( *aṃśa* ) could achieve their respective aims only by maintaining that the ultimate real posited in their respective systems is incapable of definition and description through words ( *anirvacanīya*, *anabhilāpya*, *śabdāgocara* ) ; for if the real is capable of definition through words it can be neither some single, continuous

6. Here “*dvī*” stands not for ‘two’ but for ‘more than one’ Tr.

7. By *sadvāda* or the doctrine of pre-existence we mean the doctrine that an entity exists always ( or it is not a real entity ) : by *asadvāda* or the doctrine of pre-nonexistence we mean the doctrine that a real entity—at least in case it happens to be a produced entity—exists only for an interval of time ( possibly for one moment ) Tr.

element nor a multiplicity of impartite, ultimate elements, and this, in turn, is because definition puts an end as it were to continuity ( in one single form ) as well as to impartibility. Thus the theory of indefinability (*anirvacanīyatvavāda*) arose as a natural corollary to the doctrine of one continuous real as also to the doctrine of impartite distinct reals. But this theory was taken exception to by the Vaiśeṣika logicians and others who averred that to describe and define every real entity (*vastumātra*) is not only a possibility but an accomplished fact. Thus arose the theory of definability (*nirvacanīyatvavāda*) that came in clash with the rival theory of indefinability (*anirvacanīyatvavāda*).

In a like manner, some people upheld the view that it is dangerous to arrive at a final conclusion by means of an organ of knowledge—of whatever sort—unaided by reason (*hetu*) or logic (*tarka*); others, on the contrary, maintained that logic possesses no independent force, and that the Scripture, inasmuch as it does possess an independent force, is the senior most (*mūrdhanya*) of all organs of knowledge. Hence the clash between these two viewpoints. Again, the fatalist (*daiva-vādin*) would say that everything depends on fate (*daiva*) and that human endeavour (*puruṣārtha*) is independently of no avail, the protagonist of human endeavour would maintain just the opposite view that man's endeavour is independently capable of delivering the goods (*kāryakara*). Thus each thought that the other was in the wrong, Likewise, one one-sided view (*naya*) emphasized the importances of the denoted entity (*artha*) at the cost of the denoting word (*śabda*), the other that of the denoting word at the cost of the denoted entity; and the two argued against each other. Similarly, some thought that absence (*abhāva*) is an independent entity alongside of the positive one (*bhāva*) while others that it is but of the nature of the positive entity, and thus developed the attitude of hostility between them. Furthermore, some thought that an organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the resulting piece of knowledge (*pramiti*) are utterly distinct (*atyanta bhinna*) from the knower (*pramātā*) concerned, while others that they are non-distinct (*abhinna*) from the latter. Lastly, some emphasized that the sole means for attaining the desired (ultimate) result is action performed in conformity with the *Varṇa-Āśrama* rules, others insisted that knowledge alone will lead to (absolute) bliss, while still others maintained that devotion (*bhakti*) is the only instrument for realizing the summum bonum. Thus on a number of major and minor problems pertaining to metaphysics and ethics several such views had been in vogue as were extremist (*ekānta*) and wholly antagonistic to one another.

On noticing this debating sport (*vāda-līlā*) indulged in by the advocates of the extremist doctrines (*ekānta*), the following question occurred to the teachers who were inheritors of the non-absolutist (*anekānta*; non-extremist) standpoint: Why are these doctrines—each claiming to be true—so much in conflict with one another? Is it that *none* of them contains *any* element of truth, or that *each* of them contains *some* element of truth, or that *each* of them contains the *whole* truth? The cogitation over this question furnished these teachers with a clue that would put an end to all conflict and reveal the whole truth; the clue was the non-absolutist standpoint that forms the ground (*bhūmikā*) of the doctrine called

*Anekāntavāda*. This standpoint enabled our teachers to see that all particular theory based on logic ( *sayuktika* ) is true to a certain extent and from a certain point of view. However, when a particular theory, refusing to take into account the line of thought and the sphere of application ( *simā* ) of the rival theory, imagines that everything lies within the sphere covered by its own standpoint it turns blind to the truth contained in this rival theory. And the same thing happens with this rival theory ( that is to say, it too imagines that everything lies within the sphere covered by its own standpoint ). Under these circumstances, justice demands that a theory be tested keeping in view its specific line of thought and its specific sphere of application, and in case it passes the test it should be treated as an aspect ( *bhāga* ) of truth ; subsequently, a sort of necklace ought to be prepared with the various aspects of truth---uncontradictory of one another---acting as diamonds ( *satyāṃśa-rūpa-maṇi* ) and the idea of whole truth acting as the running thread ( *pūrṇa-satya-rūpa-vicāra-sūtra* ). These considerations impelled the Jaina teachers to synthesize ( *samanvaya* ; harmonize ), on the basis of their non-absolutist standpoint, all the theories that were then prevalent. And this is how their thought ran. When certain pure ( *śuddha* ) and selfless ( *niḥsvārtha* ) minds are cognizant of similarity culminating in identity and when certain other minds ( no less pure and selfless ) are cognizant of ( diversity culminating in ) impartite ultimate elements, how can we say that one of these cognitions ( *pratīti* ) is valid and the other not ? If one of these cognitions is somehow treated as invalid the same logic will compel you to treat the other as equally so. Moreover, granting that one of these cognitions is valid and the other not, you will have to offer a logical explanation ( *upapatti* ) of what in our everyday dealings ( *sārvajanika vyavahāra* ) is taken as forming the object of the cognition---of identity or of diversity as the case may be---dismissed as invalid. Certainly, a mere assertion to the effect that one of these cognitions is valid and the other not will not mean a logical explanation of our everyday dealings, empirical ( *laukika* ) or śāstric ( *śāstrīya* ). Nor can you leave these dealings unexplained. So the monistic-*Brahmavādin's* explanation of the phenomena in question will lie in treating as a product of ignorance ( *avidyā-mūlaka* ) all diversity and our cognition thereof, while the momentarist's explanation will lie in treating as a product of ignorance all similarity or identity and our cognition thereof.

These thoughts led the advocates of *Anekāntavāda* to realize, in the light of their non-absolutist standpoint, that all cognition---be it cognition of identity or that of diversity---is after all valid ( *vāstavika* ). A cognition is valid in relation to its own object, but when it arrogates to itself the right to demonstrate the unreality of the object of another cognition seemingly contradictory of itself it turns invalid. The cognition of identity and the cognition of diversity seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truth ( *pūrṇa-pramāṇa* ). As a matter of fact, both these cognitions are valid so far as they go, but neither is the whole truth though each is a part ( *aṃśa* ) thereof. The total nature of reality ought to be such that these seemingly contradictory cognitions might reveal it in their respective ways but without contradicting one another and might both be treated as valid insofar as both go to reveal the total nature of reality. This synthesis, that is, the idea that the two cognitions in

question have two different spheres to operate in ( *vyavasthā-garbhita vicāra* ), enabled the advaocates of *Anekāntavāda* a to see that there is no real conflict between monism ( *sad-advaita* ) and pluralism ( *sad-dvaita* ), for the total nature of reality comprises identity as well as diversity, generality as well as particularity. For example, when we think of that huge mass of water and disregard its place, time, colour, taste, dimension, etc. it appears before us in the form of one single entity called ocean. On the other hand, when we take into account the place, time, etc. of this very mass of water we begin to see a number of oceans---small and big---instead of one ;gradually, we do not even perceive even a single drop of water but certain impartite elements like colour, taste, etc., and, eventually, they too appear as nought ( *śūnya* ). Cognition of the mass of water as one single ocean is valid, and so also is its cognition as ( a conglommeration of ) ultimate elements. The cognition of one ( single ocean ) is valid because it views diversities ( *bheda* ) not as standing out separately from one another but as together exhibiting one common form ; likewise, the cognition of diversities-as-to-spatio-temporal-location-etc.---diversities which totally demarcate ( *vyāvṛtta* ) the elements concerned from one another---is valid because these diversities are actually there. Inasmuch as the mass of water is in fact one as well as a multiplicity, our cognition of it as one single ocean is as much valid as our cognition of it as a multiplicity of ultimate elements ; but since neither of these cognitions grasps the total nature of reality, neither of them is the whole truth, though the two together do constitute the whole truth. Analogously, when we view the entire universe as one single real, in other words, when we take note of “existence” ( *sattā* ) which is common ( *anugama-ka* ) to all diverse existents, we say that all reality is one and single ; for while taking note of the all-comprehensive ( *sarva-vyāpaka* ) “existence” we are aware of no diversities demarcated from one another, and that, in turn, is because all diversities are here revealed as exhibiting one collective and common form, viz. “existence”. Hence the epithet “Monism” or “Doctrine of Non-dual Reality” ( *sad-advaita* ) attributed to this viewpoint. When we confine our attention to what is common to all existents and call the universe ‘( one single ) real’ ( *sat* ) the denotation of the word “real” becomes so wide as to exclude nothing ( i. e. no existing entity ) whatsoever. However, when we view the universe as possessed of the mutually demarcated diversities of qualities and attributes, it no more appears in the form of one real ( *sat* ) but becomes a multiplicity of reals. In that case, the denotation of the word “real” undergoes corresponding limitation ( for now we do not at all speak of real in general but only of this or that type of real ). Thus we say that some reals are physical while some conscious ; going further in the direction of noticing diversities we say that there are a number of physical reals and a number of conscious reals. Thus when we view the one all-comprehensive real as divided into mutually demarcated diversities, it appears before us as a multiplicity of reals. This is the viewpoint of “Pluralism” or the “Doctrine of Diverse Reals” ( *sad-dvaita* ). Thus the monistic and pluralistic viewpoints are valid in their respective spheres, but they will go to constitute the whole truth only when they are combined together as complementary to each other ( *sāpekṣa-bhāvena* ). This then is the synthesis, arrived at from the non-absolutist standpoint, of monism and pluralism which are generally supposed to be mutually antagonistic.

The same idea can be elucidated with the help of the illustration of trees and the forest. When the several, mutually different, particular trees are viewed not in the form of this or that particular tree but in a collective, general form designated "forest" the particular features of these different trees do not cease to exist but they are so much absorbed (*līna*) in the general feature---observed for the time being---of these trees as to appear to be non-existent. In this case we see the forest and it alone, and our outlook may be characterised as monistic. Again, sometimes we take note of these trees one by one, that is, in the form of particular entities. Here we see the particular entities and them alone, and the general feature of these entities is so much absorbed in their particular features---observed for the time being---as to appear to be non-existent. Now an analysis of these two cognitions (*anubhava*) will suggest that neither can be regarded as solely true, i.e. true at the cost of the other. Both are true within their respective spheres but neither represents the whole truth; for the whole truth lies in a proper synthesis of these two cognitions. Only such a synthesis can do justice to the two cognitions, viz. cognition of the forest in general and cognition of each, single, particular tree, both of which are uncontradicted (*abādhita*). The same holds good of the monistic and pluralistic world-views (that is to say, they too represent the whole truth only when properly synthesized).

The above was an account of the monism *versus* pluralism controversy in regard to features that might be spatial (*daiśika*), temporal (*kālika*), or non-spatiotemporal (*deśakālātīta*); there is a special controversy between the doctrine of temporal generality (*kālika sāmānya*) or eternalism (*nityatvavāda*) and the doctrine of temporal particularity (*kālika viśeṣa*) or momentarism (*kṣaṇikatvavāda*). These two doctrines too seem to be mutually antagonistic, but the non-absolutist standpoint suggests that there is no real conflict between the two. Thus when an element (*tattva*) is viewed as being continuous (*akhaṇḍa*) throughout the three periods of time, that is, as beginningless and endless, it is certainly eternal (*nitya*), for in that case it is of the form of a continuous flow (*akhaṇḍa pravāha*) that has no beginning and no end. But when the same element—undergoing that continuous flow—is viewed as divided in terms of relatively large or small temporal units (*kāla-bheda*) it appears as having assumed a limited (*sīmīta*) form which lasts for this or that interval and which therefore has a beginning as well as an end. And in case the interval in question is too brief to admit of further dissection by means of intellectual weapons (*buddhi-śāstra*), that portion of the element-in-continuous-flow which occupies this interval is called momentary (*kṣaṇika*) because smallest possible. The words eternal and momentary are considered to be each other's antonyms (*viruddhārthaka*); for the connotation of one includes lack of a beginning and of an end (*anādi-anantatā*) while that of the other possession of a beginning and of an end (*sādi-sāntatā*). However, viewing from the non-absolutist standpoint, we can see that the same element which is called 'eternal' insofar as it is of the form of a continuous flow may also be called 'momentary' insofar as it undergoes a change (*parivartana*) or a new modification (*paryāya*) every moment. The basis of one viewpoint is the observation of beginninglessness and endlessness, that of the other the observation of beginnings and ends.

But the total nature of a real entity comprises the lack of a beginning and of an end as also the possession of a beginning and of an end. Hence the viewpoints in question, though true within their respective spheres, will yield the whole truth only when properly synthesized.

This synthesis, too, can be elucidated with the help of an illustration. The total life-activity of a tree—right from the beginning until the time of fructification—completes its course only by flowing through the successive stages represented by the seed, the root, the sprout, the trunk, the branches and twigs, the leaves, the flowers, the fruits, etc. So when we view an entity as a 'tree' we have in mind the total life-activity continuously flowing through these various stages. On the other hand, when we grasp, one by one, the successively emerging elements—like root, sprout, trunk, etc.—of this life-activity we have in mind but these various elements, each possessing a limited duration. Thus our mind takes note of the life-activity in question sometimes in one continuous form and sometimes in a discontinuous form, that is, element by element. On closer investigation it becomes evident that neither is the continuous life-activity either the whole truth or but a product of imagination, nor are the discontinuous elements either the whole truth or but a product of imagination<sup>8</sup>. Even granting that the continuous life-activity absorbs within itself the totality of discontinuous elements or that the discontinuous elements absorb within themselves the total continuous life-activity, the fact remains that a real entity, viewed in its total nature, is continuous as well as discontinuous, and that therefore it is grasped only when both these aspects of its nature are (separately) taken note of. These two aspects are both real so far as each of them goes, but they become totally real only when synthesized. To view the tree as a beginningless and endless flow in time is to indicate it as an eternal entity, to view the tree as made up of (the successively emerging) elements is to indicate it as a transient or momentary entity. The transient constituent elements (*ghaṭaka*) are inconceivable without a substratum in the form of an eternal flow, and this eternal flow is inconceivable without those transient constituent elements. Thus the view that eternity is real while transience unreal and the view that transience is real while eternity unreal give rise to the eternalism *versus* momentarism controversy which, however, is eliminable from the non-absolutist standpoint.

The non-absolutist standpoint also eliminates the controversy between the doctrine of definability and the doctrine of indefinability. For according to it, only that aspect of an entity's nature is amenable to description (*pratipādyā*) which can be made an object of convention (i.e. conventional attribution of words: *saṅketa*). Now even though a convention is established by *buddhi* (i.e. intellect) which is subtle in the extreme (*sūkṣmatama*), the object of this convention must be some gross (*sthūla*) aspect of the nature of an entity; for there are innumerable (subtle) aspects of an entity's nature which are inherently incapable of description through words. It is in this sense

8. That the continuous life-activity is the whole truth and discontinuous elements but a product of imagination is the eternalist's position, that the discontinuous elements are the whole truth and the continuous life-activity but a product of imagination is the momentarist's position. Tr.

that the one continuous real ( *akhaṇḍa sat* ) as well as the impartite moment ( i.e. ultimate element ) ( *niraṇśa kṣaṇa* ) are indefinable, while the gross entities of medium duration ( and extension ) are capable of definition. Thus the doctrine of definability and the doctrine of indefinability—applied to the entire universe or to an element thereof—are true within their respective spheres and wholly true when taken together.

Nor is it self-contradictory to view a thing as a positive entity and also as an 'absence'. For a thing is never cognized either solely through its positive traits ( *mātra vidhimukhena* ) or solely through its negative traits ( *mātra niṣedha-mukhena* ). E.g. the milk is cognized as milk and also as not-curd, i.e. something different from curd. This means that the milk is of a positive-cum-negative nature ( *bhāva-abhāva-ubhaya-rūpa* ). Thus it is not self-contradictory to maintain that a thing is a positive entity and also an 'absence', for two different cognitions take note of these two aspects of the thing's nature. Similarly, the non-absolutist standpoint resolves the controversy as to whether the members of other similar pairs ( *dvandva* )—e.g. 'attribute and the possessor of the attribute' ( *dharma-dharmin* ), 'quality and the possessor of the quality' ( *guṇa-guṇin* ), 'cause and effect' ( *kārya-kāraṇa* ), 'substratum and superstratum' ( *ādihāra-ādheya* )—are identical with one another or different from one another.

When the authoritativeness ( *āptatva* ) and the validity-of-source ( *mūla-prāmāṇya* ) ( of a verbal testimony ) are in doubt, it is always well to decide an issue after examining ( *parikṣā* ) the matter ratiocinatively ( *hetuvāda-dvāṛā* ) ; but in case the authoritativeness ( of the testimony in question ) is beyond doubt, resort to ratiocination only leads to an infinite regress and is to be discarded. In this latter case reliance on the Scripture ( *āgamavāda* ) has to be our sole guide. Thus both ratiocination and reliance-on-the-Scripture have a scope, but they apply to different subject-matters ( *viśaya* ) or to different sorts of exposition ( *pratipādana* ) of the same subject-matter. In one word, there is no conflict between the two. The same is the case with the doctrine of Fate ( *daiivāda* ) and the doctrine of Human Endeavour ( *pauruṣavāda* ), for there is no conflict between them either. In those cases where endeavour based on rational calculation ( *buddhi-pūrvaka pauruṣa* ) is an impossibility, problems can be solved only by the doctrine of Fate, where endeavour of this type is possible the doctrine of Human Endeavour is in place. Thus the doctrine of Fate and the doctrine of Endeavour can be reconciled harmoniously, provided one keeps in view that the two cover different aspects of life.

The non-absolutist standpoint easily succeeds also in eliminating the opposition between the 'doctrine of absolute presence of the effect in the cause' and the 'doctrine of absolute absence of the effect in the cause'. For according to it, the effect ( *kārya* ) is present as well as absent in the material cause ( *upādāna* ). E. g. even before it is actually turned into a bangle, a piece of gold has the capacity ( *śakti* ) to turn into a bangle ; thus viewed in the form of a 'capacity' ( *śakti* ), that is, in the form of something non-distinct from the cause, the effect can be said to be present even before it is actually produced. However, even though present in the form of a capacity, this effect is not there to be seen ( *upalabdha* ), because the absence of necessary accessories ( *utpādana-sāmagrī* ) has prevented it from

emerging into being, i.e. from being produced ; in this sense the effect is absent ( before it is actually produced ). Again, after the bangle has disappeared and the material concerned turned into an earring, the bangle is doubtless not there to be seen, but since even the gold-turned-into-an-earring possesses the capacity to turn into a bangle, the actually absent bangle can be said to be potentially present in this gold.

The Buddhist's 'doctrine of mere conglomeration of atoms' ( *kevala-paramāṇu-puñja-vāda* ) and the Naiyāyika's 'doctrine of an altogether novel composition' ( *apūrva-avayavi-vāda* ) come in conflict with one another. But the non-absolutist standpoint with its acceptance of *skandha*, which is neither a mere conglomeration of atoms nor something so contradictory of experience ( *bādhita* ) as a composite standing over and above its component-parts, properly resolves the conflict and works out a flawless synthesis of the two doctrines. Thus the non-absolutist standpoint has impartially synthesized, on so many questions, the current doctrines that were clashing with each other. And in the course of its doing so, the doctrine of *Nayas* ( *nayavāda* ) and the doctrine of *Bhaṅgas* ( *bhaṅgavāda* ) follow as a natural corollary ; for a proper formulation of non-absolutism requires as its preliminary an analysis of the different stands and viewpoints, a demarcation of their respective subject-matters, and a determination of their roles concerning one and the same subject-matter.

No one corner of a house makes the whole house, nor do the different corners of this house lie in one particular direction. The view ( *avalokana* ) had of the house from one of the two opposite directions—like south and north, or east and west—is certainly not full but nor is it false. It is the totality ( *samuccaya* ) of the views had of the house from different possible angles which may be called a full view of the house. Thus the view had of the house from one particular angle is a necessary part of the total view of the house. Analogously, the formulation of thoughts and views ( *cintana-darśana* ) concerning the nature of an entity or of the entire universe is accomplished from various stands ( *apekṣā* ). And a stand is determined by a multiplicity of factors like the innate constitution ( *sahaja racanā* ) of the mind, the impressions ( *saṃskāra* ) received from outside, the nature of the object thought about, etc. Such stands—for thinking about the nature of things—are many in number. And since these stands form the basis or the starting point of the viewing process ( *vicāra* ; lit. thought-process ) they are also called 'angles of vision' ( *drṣṭikoṇa* ) or 'points of view' ( *drṣṭibindu* ). The harmonious totality ( *sāra-samuccaya* ) of the thoughts and views concerning a thing formed from different stands—however contradictory of each other in appearance—is called the total view or the non-absolutist view of this thing. The view formed from a particular stand is a part of this total view, and though the different such views ( i. e. the views formed from different particular stands ) are ( seemingly ) contradictory of one another, they are really uncontradictory of one another inasmuch as they all find synthesis in the total view.

When a mind ignores and takes no account of diversities—qualitative ( *guṇa-dharma-kṛta* ) or essential ( *svarūpa-kṛta* ) as well as numerical ( *vyaktitva-kṛta* )—while confining its attention to mere continuity ( *akhaṇḍatā* ) the universe appears to it as one and continuous. Understood from this standpoint of non-distinction ( *abheda* ), the word

'real' means something one and continuous ( and nothing more ), and this type of partially true understanding of things is technically called *sañgraha-naya* ( where 'naya' stands for a partially true understanding of things ). The view taken of the universe from the standpoint of diversities—qualitative as well as numerical—is technically called *vyavahāra-naya*, for here special importance is assigned to the diversities on which is grounded our everyday experience ( *loka-siddha vyavahāra* ). On this view, the word 'real' denotes not something one and continuous but things different and discontinuous. When this tendency to take note of diversities confines its attention to mere temporal diversities, and concludes that the present alone is real because it alone is capable of performing a function ( *kāryakara* ), that is to say, when the past and the future are excluded from the denotation of the word 'real', there results a partially true understanding of things which is technically called *rjusūtra-naya*. It is so called because it seeks to avoid the labyrinth ( *cakravayūha* ) of the past and the future while sliding along the straight line ( *rju-rekhā* ) representing the present.

The above-stated three attitudes consider the nature of things without basing themselves on ( the consideration of ) words and their qualities and attributes. Hence the three resulting understandings are designated *artha-naya*. But there are also possible attitudes which consider the nature of things basing themselves on ( the consideration of ) words and their qualities and attributes. The understandings resulting from these attitudes are designated *śabda-naya*. Grammarians are the chief advocates of the various *śabda-nayas*, for it is on account of the divergent standpoints upheld by the grammarians that one *śabda-naya* differs from others.

Those grammarians who regard all words as impartite ( *akhaṇḍa* ) or etymologically underived ( *avyutpanna* ), certainly, do not base on etymology their distinction of the meaning of one word from that of another, but they too hold that words mean different things according as they possess different attributes ( *dharma* ) in the form of gender, person, tense, etc. This type of distinguishing the meaning of one word from that of another is called *śabda-naya* or *sāmprata-naya*. On the other hand, those grammarians who regard all words as etymologically derived ( *vyutpanna* ) posit distinction between the meanings of even such words as are generally admitted to be synonymous ; this view, according to which ( for example ) the synonyms like 'śakra', 'indra', etc. have different meanings, is called *samabhirūḍha-naya*. Lastly, there is a view according to which a word applies to a thing not in case this thing *sometimes* satisfies the etymology of the word in question, but only in case this thing is for the time being satisfying this etymology.<sup>9</sup> This view is called *evambhūta-naya*. Apart from these six logical *nayas* there is a seventh called *naigama-naya*. 'Nigama' literally means local convention ( *deśa-rūḍhi* ), and this seventh *naya* stands for the view which includes—in accordance with local conventions—all kinds of doctrines of distinction and the doctrines of non-distinction.<sup>10</sup> These are

9. E. g. 'go'—the Sanskrit word for cow—means 'that which moves'. Hence on this view, a cow cannot be called 'go' when it is not actually in motion.—Tr.

10. More literally, 'naigama-naya' may mean understanding based on the convention of the market-place. Really speaking, it is not a considered conviction concerning the nature of things but just an uncritical

the seven chief, (not all) *nayas*, and, really and generally speaking, whatever understanding of things results from the adoption of one particular standpoint rather than any other is the *naya* corresponding to that standpoint.

The Jaina texts also speak of the two *nayas* called *dravyārthika-naya* and *pariyāyārthika-naya*; however, these are not something over and above the above-mentioned seven *nayas* but a mere broad classification (*saṃkṣipta varḡikaraṇa*) of and an introductory ground (*bhūmikā*) to these very seven *nayas*. *Dravyārthika-naya* is that line of thought which takes 'substance' (*dravya*) into account, that is, which takes into account what is general (*sāmānya*), common (*anvaya*), non-distinctive (*abheda*), or unitary (*ekatva*) about things. The *nayas* called *naigama*, *saṃgraha*, and *vyavahāra* are comprised within *dravyārthika-naya*. Of these, *saṃgraha-naya*, inasmuch as it takes note of pure non-distinction, is the pure (*śuddha*) or basic (*mūla*) *dravyārthika-naya*; but even *vyavahāra-naya* and *naigama-naya*, which no doubt take note of certain distinctions, are invariably cognizant also of non-distinction of some type or other. Hence it is that these latter two *nayas* are also classed under *dravyārthika-naya*, but they are *dravyārthika-nayas* of an impure (*aśuddha*) or mixed (*miśrita*) type (and not of the pure and basic type as is *saṃgraha-naya*).

*Pariyāyārthika-naya* is the name for that line of thought which takes 'modes' (*pariyāya*) into account, that is, which takes into account what is particular (*viśeṣa*), exclusive (*vyāvṛtti*), or distinctive (*bheda*) about things. The remaining four *nayas*—i. e. *rjusūtra* etc.—are comprised within *pariyāyārthika-naya*. Consideration of distinctions by a neglect of non-distinctions starts with *rjusūtra-naya*, and hence the Texts call this *naya* the *prakṛti* or root-basis (*mūla*) of *pariyāyārthika-naya*. The remaining three *nayas*—i. e. *śabda-naya* (*sāmprata-naya*) etc.—are in a way the amplifications of this basic sort of *pariyāyārthika-naya*.

Similarly, the line of thought which attaches sole utility to knowledge will be called *jñāna-naya* while that which attaches sole utility to action will be called *kriyā-naya*. In short, the total—i. e. non-absolutistic—view of the universe is unlimited (*niḥśīma*) because the *nayas* that form the basis of this view are unlimited (in number).

The multifarious views concerning one and the same entity that result from the adoption of the various stands (*apekṣā*), angles of vision (*drṣṭikoṇa*), and approaches (*manovṛtti*) constitute the foundation of *Bhaṅgavāda* or the Doctrine of Manifold Judgment. When two views whose subject-matters are diametrically opposite of each other are sought to be synthesised, and with this end in view such (simple) judgments are formed as give expression to the positive as well as negative aspects of the (two) subject-matters in question, the result is a (complex) sevenfold judgment (*saptabhaṅgī*). The Doctrine of Partial Truths (*nayavāda*) is the basis of the Doctrine of Sevenfold Judgment (*saptabhaṅgī*), and the latter doctrine aims at an all-comprehensive (*vyāpaka*) harmoniously synthesised—i. e. non-absolutistic—understanding of things. Just as inference-for-the-sake-of-others (*parārthānumāna*)—i. e. inference expressed in the form of verbal

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acceptance of whatever views are offered as and when occasion arises. There is also another interpretation of the word "*naigama-naya*", but that is not relevant in the present context.—Tr.

propositions—is resorted to when one seeks to convey to others a piece of knowledge that he has come to acquire through some particular organ of knowledge, similarly, resort is taken to the simple judgments that go to constitute a complex sevenfold judgment when one seeks to convey to others how certain mutually contradictory traits are harmoniously synthesized in one single whole. Thus the Doctrine of Partial Truths (*nyāvāda*) and the Doctrine of Manifold Judgment (*bhaṅgavāda*) are natural corollaries to the non-absolutistic standpoint.

True, in the Vedīcist philosophical systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, etc. and so also in the philosophy of Buddhism, we often come across a tendency (*drṣṭi*) to view the same thing from different standpoints and thus synthesize its various aspects ;<sup>11</sup> but the utmost insistence (*ātyantika āgraha*) that *every* aspect of *everything* must be viewed from *every* possible standpoint, and the unflinching faith that the consummation of all thought-process lies only in a synthesis of all possible standpoints, are to be found nowhere except in the Jaina system of philosophy. It was as a result of this insistence (and this faith) that the Jainas gave birth to those independent (*svatantra*), systematic disciplines (*vyavasthita śāstra*) called ‘Doctrine of Non-Absolutism’ (*anekāntavāda*), ‘Doctrine of Partial Truths’ (*nyāvāda*), and ‘Doctrine of Sevenfold Judgment’ (*saptabhaṅgī*), disciplines which became a part and parcel of their treatment of Logic (*pramāṇa-śāstra*) and on which no other school produced even a single or even a minor text. Though an advocate of *Vibhajyavāda* (Doctrine of the Avoidance of Extremes) and *Madhyamārga* (Middle Path), the Buddhist system, remained blind to the element of permanence exhibited by a real entity, and hence declared everything to be but momentary. Similarly, though actually employing the word “*anekānta*” to characterize their own standpoint,<sup>12</sup> the Naiyāyikas could not help harping on the thesis that atoms, souls, etc. are absolutely unchanging (*sarvathā aparīṇāmin*). Again, the Vedāntists, even while taking recourse to the various standpoints called ‘empirical’ (*vyāvahārika*), ‘ultimate’ (*pāramārthika*), etc., could not help insisting that all standpoints except the standpoint of *Brahman* (*Brahma-drṣṭi*) are of an inferior—or even utterly false—sort. The only reason for this anomaly seems to be that these systems did not imbibe the spirit of non-absolutism to the same extent as did the Jaina. Thus the Jaina synthesizes all the standpoints and, at the same time, grants that all these standpoints are equally competent and true so far as their respective spheres are concerned. Since the Jaina’s non-absolutistic standpoint and the systematic treatises composed by him on the subject, concern themselves exclusively with the time-honoured philosophical controversies like identity versus difference, generality versus particularity, eternity versus transience, etc., it might appear, at first sight, that all this is repetitive, hackneyed, and something lacking in originality ; but the spirit of accep-

11. See *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, p. 2 ; *Siddhānta-bindu*, p. 119 seq. ; *Vedāntasāra*, p. 25 ; *Tarkasaṅgrahadīpikā*, p. 175 ; *Mahāvagga*, 6. 31.

<sup>12</sup>, Nyāya-bhāṣya, 2. 1. 18.

ting ( nothing save ) the total ( *akhaṇḍa* ), living ( *sajīva* ), and all-sided ( *sarvāṃśa* ) truth—a spirit reflected in the standpoint and the treatises in question—which is so characteristic of the Jaina and which found entrance in Logic through him, is capable of successful employment in all the fields of life, and may on that account be regarded, not unduly, as a contribution made to ( Indian ) Logic by the Jaina savants.

—Translated by Dr. Indukala H. Jhaveri

# PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES

## TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES

The following Notes do not occur in the body of Panditji's writing in the order we have given them. Hence our ordering needs an explanation. *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* being a text on *Pramāṇa-śāstra* (i.e. Logic understood in a broader sense so as to cover all that goes under the title "Epistemology"), it is but natural that most of these Notes should deal with logic and epistemology. But since the problems of logic and epistemology are after all not quite unrelated to those of metaphysics, some of the metaphysical problems too have been raised by Ācārya Hemacandra in his Text, and hence by Panditji in his Notes. Thus we see that the first 27 Notes pertain to the problems of Logic and the last 3 to those of Metaphysics. The Notes on Logic are again subdivided into three groups, viz. (i) those dealing with the problems of knowledge in general, (ii) those dealing with the problems of perception, and (iii) those dealing with the problems of inference.

(i) Coming to the Notes dealing with the problems of knowledge in general, we should first of all make clear to ourselves as to what is the Indian philosopher's word for "knowledge". Indian philosophers make a distinction between *pramāṇa* and *jñāna* (having for its synonyms *bodha*, *upalabdhi*, *paricchitti*, *saṃvitti*, etc.) and they are of the view that *pramāṇa* is but a subspecies of *jñāna*. The distinction between *pramāṇa* and *jñāna* is roughly parallel to that between knowledge and cognition, and just as the precise point of distinction between knowledge and cognition will differ from philosopher to philosopher, the precise point of distinction between *pramāṇa* and *jñāna* differs from philosopher to philosopher. With a view to avoiding participation in the controversy, we have left the word '*pramāṇa*' untranslated, and have translated the word '*jñāna*' as cognition—with the result that the word 'knowledge' occurs very rarely in our translation. However, in Note 2 it became impossible to avoid translating '*pramāṇa*' as valid cognition and in Note 3 to avoid translating (*prāmāṇya*) as validity of a piece of cognition. This should not mislead one into thinking that all Indian philosophers are of the view that, a piece of cognition denied the appellation '*pramāṇa*', is necessarily invalid. Incidentally, we should note that the word '*pramāṇa*' means not only a particular type of cognition but also the instrumental cause of this type of cognition, as also that the Jainas understand by the word '*jñāna*' just determinate cognition (their word for indeterminate cognition being '*darśana*'). In order to acquaint ourselves with the various points that have been raised in the course of this discussion on *jñāna* and *pramāṇa* we should read Notes 1-7. It is to Panditji's credit that the few pages of his writings convince us (i) that none of the discussions into which our philosophers have entered is pointless, and (ii) that none of our philosophers has hesitated to side with a rival of his in case he is convinced that this rival is taking a correct stand on a particular question. Note 8 is a class by itself. It has been included here because our ignorance of Jaina Logic is enormous—almost as

enormous as was our ignorance of Buddhist Logic before Stcherbatsky wrote his magnum opus. Of course, the points that need clarification in Jaina Logic are of a different sort from those that need clarification in Buddhist Logic, but Panditji's treatment of the former points is as much illuminating as Stcherbatsky's treatment of the latter.

( ii ) As dealing with the problems of perception, are included three Notes, viz. 11-13, which might appear to be out of place. For determining the nature of sense-organs, *manas*, and soul is a metaphysical problem ( and determining the nature of soul also an ethical problem ). We grant all this, and yet feel that things that have been said in these three Notes have an important bearing on the problems of perception as such. For the rest, the Notes of this group can speak for themselves. Only one wishes there was an independent Note on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition of perception.

( iii ) Notes dealing with the problems of inference are in a way the most important group. For the cut and dried scheme that is offered to us—ever since the days of our Intermediate class-lectures on Logic—in the name of 'Indian Logic', does not really deserve that title. This, in turn, is because Indian Logic is a much more variegated type of study—and a study having a long history behind it—than is generally supposed to be the case. In short, there are four chief schools of Indian Logic, viz. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the Buddhist school, the Mīmāṃsā school, and the Jaina school, and each is an independent ( though not isolated ) growth.\* To use the terminology of parliamentary democracy, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician is the Leader of the House, the Buddhist logician the Leader of the Opposition, the Mīmāṃsā and Jaina logicians leaders of two considerably strong Opposition Groups, the former tending to side with the Leader of the House, the latter with the Leader of the Opposition. We are thankful to Panditji that he has enabled us to visualize the serious discussions our ancestors conducted in the field of logical studies.

( iv ) Lastly, there is a short group of Notes dealing with some of the most fundamental problems of metaphysics. According to one way of looking at things, the nature of permanence and the nature of change constitute the two most important topics for metaphysical speculation. Panditji subscribes to this line of thought, and his discussion will be thoroughly enjoyed by those who share his belief. But even for others, it should mean enough food for thought.

Distinction between the Age of Scriptures and the Age of Logic is a concept characteristic of Panditji. Without meaning disrespect to either Age, he tells us that the chief preoccupations of the former were spiritual, those of the latter empirical. Let us try to grasp this distinction as best as we can.

—K. K. DIXIT

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\*So far as my reading goes, the idea was first expressed by Mahapandit Rahul Sankrityayan in his English Introduction to *Pramāṇavārtika* published in 1943 from Kitab Mahal, Allahabad.

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## (i) On Problems of Knowledge in General

### 1. IS COGNITION SELF-REVELATORY (*sva-prakāśa*) OR NOT-SELF-REVELATORY (*para-prakāśa*) ?

In philosophical circles there has taken place a prolonged and multi-sided discussion on the question whether cognition is self-revelatory or not-self-revelatory. Before we proceed to consider the various views upheld on this question, it is necessary to bear in mind certain general points that will enable us to ascertain the precise idea involved in the concepts 'self-revelatory' and 'not-self-revelatory'.

1. Some philosophers submit that cognition is by nature perceptible (*pratyakṣa-yogyā*) while others maintain just the opposite view. Thus according to the latter, cognition is by nature non-perceptible (*parokṣa*) not perceptible (*pratyakṣa*). Thus, positions on the question whether cognition is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) or non-perceptible (*parokṣa*) constitute the cornerstone (*mūlādhāra*) of the discussion whether cognition is self-revelatory (*sva-prakāśa*) or not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*).

2. When it is said that cognition is self-revelatory (*sva-prakāśa*) what is meant is that a piece of cognition is perceptually revealed by itself, i.e. is perceived by itself (*sva-pratyakṣa*). On the other hand, when it is said that cognition is not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*) what is meant is either that a piece of cognition is perceptually revealed by another piece of cognition, i.e. is perceived by the latter (*para-pratyakṣa*) or that a piece of cognition is inferentially revealed by another piece of cognition, i.e. is inferred by the latter (*para-anumeya*).

3. When it is said that cognition is self-perceptible (*sva-pratyakṣa*) it is not meant that a piece of cognition is incapable of being known through inference etc.; what is meant is that a piece of cognition at the time of its origin is known perceptually by the cognizer concerned and only non-perceptually by others, while at a later time it is known only non-perceptually even by this very cognizer.<sup>13</sup> The same thing applies to the contention that a piece of cognition is not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*) in the sense of being perceptible by another piece of cognition (*para-pratyakṣa*); for here also what is meant is that a piece of cognition is perceived by another piece of cognition acquired by the cognizer concerned and acquired simultaneously with (rather just after) the former cognition, that is to say, it is not perceived by a piece of cognition acquired by another cognizer or acquired at a later time.

Buddhists belonging to the Vijñānavāda school (NB. 1. 10), Prabhākarite Mīmāṃsakas,<sup>14</sup> Vedāntists,<sup>15</sup> and Jainas are advocates of the self-revelatory character of

13. 'Yattvanubhūteḥ svayamprakāśatvamuktaṃ tadviśaya-prakāśanavelāyāṃ jñāturātmanastathaiva na tu sarveṣāṃ sarvadā tathaiyeti niyamo' sti, parānubhavasya hānopādānādiliṅgakānumāna-jñānaviśayatvāt svānubhavasypāyatītasajñāsiṣamiti jñānaviśayatva-darśanācca.'—Śrībhāṣya, p. 24.

14. Sarvavijñānahetūtthā mitau mātari ca pramā / Sākṣātkartṛtvasāmānyāt pratyakṣatvena sammatā // —PP, p. 56.

15. Bhāmatī, p. 16. 'Seyam svayamprakāśānubhūtiḥ'—Śrībhāṣya p. 18. Citsukhī, p. 9.

cognition. However, they are not all unanimous as to the nature of cognition. Thus according to Vijñānavāda, there exist no objects apart from cognition <sup>16</sup> while a particular piece of cognition is possessed of a particular form (*ākāra*). According to Prabhākara, external objects exist (*Br.*, p. 74) and are knowable (*saṃvedya*). According to Vedānta, cognition, being essentially (*mukhyatayā*) of the nature of *Brahman*, is eternal. The Jaina, like Prabhākara, posits the existence of external objects and treats cognition as a generated (*janya*) phenomenon. Nevertheless, all these philosophers are unanimous in holding that cognition as such (*jñāna-mātra*) is self-perceptible (*sva-pratyakṣa*), that is, that all cognition, whether acquired through perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*), or memory (*smṛti*), notices its own nature by way of direct observation (*sākṣātkāra*) while it is called 'inferential', 'verbal', 'mnemic', etc. owing to the nature of the object grasped (*grāhya*). In other words, even though differing as regards their respective generating conditions (*sāmagrī*) and pertaining to objects that are differently characterized as 'capable of being perceived' (*pratyakṣa*), 'capable of being inferred' (*anumeya*), 'capable of being recalled' (*smartavya*), etc., the various types of cognition like perception, inference, memory, etc. are, all of them, perceptually cognizant of their own nature (i.e. of themselves).<sup>17</sup>

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga <sup>18</sup> and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika <sup>19</sup> philosophers regard cognition as not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*) in the sense of being 'perceptually cognizable by something other than itself' (*para-pratyakṣa*). They hold that cognition is by nature perceptible but that it is not self-perceptible, for according to them the perceptibility of a piece of cognition is due to something other than itself. Thus according to (some of) them, all cognition, whether perceptual, inferential, or mnemic, is perceptually cognized by an after-cognition (*anu-vyavasāya*).<sup>20</sup> However, even while these philosophers agree in maintaining that a piece of cognition is perceived by something other than itself, they differ as to the identity of this 'something other than itself'. For according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, this 'something' is the after-cognition which arises in the wake of a particular piece of cognition and which takes perceptual cognizance of this piece of cognition, while according to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, this 'something' is pure consciousness (*caitanya*) which constitutes the essence of *puruṣa* (i.e. soul) and which takes perceptual cognizance of all *buddhi*-modifications-of-the-form-of-cognition (*jñānātmaka buddhi-vṛtti*).

Kumārila alone regards cognition as not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*) in the sense of being 'inferentially cognizable by something other than itself' (*para-anumeya*), for according to him, cognition is by nature non-perceptible (*parokṣa*) and is to be known by means of

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16. 'Sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ'—*Br.* p. 29. 'Prakāśamānastādātmyāt svarūpasya prakāśakaḥ / Yathā prakāśo' bhimatastathā dhīrātmavedinī //—*PV.* 3.329.  
 17. 'Sarvavijñānahetūtthā... yāvatī kācid grahaṇasmarāṇasvarūpā.'—*PP.* p. 56.  
 18. 'Sadā jñānāścittavṛttayastatprabhoḥ puruṣasyāpariñāmitvāt. Na tat svābhāsam dṛśyatvāt.'—*Yoga-sūtra*, 4. 18. 19.  
 19. 'Manogrāhyaṃ sukham duḥkhamicchā dveṣo matiḥ kṛtiḥ'—*Kārikāvalī*, 57.  
 20. *Anu-vyavasāya* is knowledge (possibly) arising in the wake of a piece of cognition and taking perceptual cognizance of this piece of cognition.—*Tr.*

an inference where ‘cognizedness produced by the concerned piece of cognition’ (*tajjanya jñātatā*) acts as probans, that is, by means of an inference of the type where the existence of a cause is inferred from that of its effect (*kārya-hetuka kāraṇa-viṣayaka anumāna*) (*SD*, p. 157). None except Kumārila is of the view that cognition can be known only non-perceptually (*atyanta-parokṣa*). Prabhākara also speaks of *jñāna* being inferred from effect-in-the-form-of-cognition (*phala-saṃvitti*), but this is something altogether different from Kumārila’s talk of cognition (*jñāna*) being inferred from effect-in-the-form-of-manifestedness (*prākāṣya-rūpa phala*). For according to Kumārila, what we infer from manifestedness (*prākāṣya*) is cognition (*jñāna*) that is an inherent property (*samaveta guṇa*) of soul, while according to Prabhākara, what we infer from effect-in-the-form-of-cognition (*samvid-rūpa phala*) is the physical causal aggregate consisting of sense-object contact etc. (*sannikarṣādi jaḍa-sāmagrī*) generative of the property cognition (*jñāna-guṇa-jamaka*).<sup>21</sup> This employment of the word ‘*jñāna*’ in the sense of a causal aggregate is to be defended by treating ‘*jñāna*’ as a formation with suffix ‘*an*’ indicative of instrumentality added to the root ‘*jñā*’ ‘to cognise’.

It is on account of his acceptance of the traditional Jaina view that cognition as such is self-perceptible, that Ācārya Hemacandra attributes self-determination (*sva-nirṇayatva*; self-cognizability) to cognition and refutes the doctrine of not-selfrevelatoriness in both its above-stated versions. His arguments in support of his own position and in refutation of his rivals, as also his manner of offering (*upanyāsa*) perceptual and inferential evidences are of a piece with those occurring in texts like *Prakaraṇa-pañcīkā* of Śālikanātha, *Śrī-bhāṣya*, etc. He has likewise followed these texts in his consideration of the objections raised against his position by the rival systems.

*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā Tīppaṇa*, pp.130-32 ;  
*Darshan Aur Chintan*, Part I pp. 110-12

## 2. THE LOGICAL TRADITION (*Tārīkika Paramparā*) OF DEFINING PRAMĀNA (*Pramāṇa-lakṣana*)

In the available history of the logical tradition of defining *pramāṇa* (meaning both valid cognition and the instrument of valid cognition) Kaṇāda occupies the first place. Through his aphorism *Aduṣṭam vidyā* (9. 2. 12) Kaṇāda has indicated that the general definition of *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) ought to be based on the consideration that the cause of a valid piece of cognition is pure, i.e. free from defects (*kāraṇa-śuddhi-mūlaka*). The lacuna caused by the omission of a general definition of ‘*pramāṇa*’ in the aphorist Akṣapāda’s series of definitions was filled by Vātsyāyana<sup>22</sup> with his etymological interpretation (*nirvacana*) of the word “*pramāṇa*”. In this Vātsyāyana

21. Saṃvidutpattikāraṇamātmanāḥsannikarṣākhyam tadityavagamyā paritūṣyatāmāyusmatā.—PP, p. 63.

22. Upalabdhisādhanāni pramāṇāni iti samākhyānirvacana-sāmarthyāt boddhavyam pramāṇyate anena iti karaṇārthābhīdhāno hi pramāṇaśabdaḥ.—NBh. 1. 1. 3.

did not—as did Kaṇāda—care to note that the *cause* of a valid piece of cognition has to be pure, but, keeping in view just the effect called cognition (*upalabdhi*), he defined ‘*pramāṇa*’ as ‘that which causes cognition’ (*upalabdhi-hetu*). In the course of meeting objections urged against Vātsyāyana’s definition-based-on-etymology, Vācaspatimiśra<sup>23</sup> rendered it complete by inserting in it the word ‘*artha*’ (i. e, object) and by taking the word “cognition” occurring therein to stand for the valid sort of cognition (*pramāṇa-rūpa jñāna-viśeṣa*) rather than cognition as such (*jñāna-sāmānya*); this completed definition (i. e. the definition that ‘*pramāṇa* is valid cognition of an object’), which Udayanācārya<sup>24</sup> in his *Kusumāñjali* characterizes as “one accepted by Gautama’s School” (*Gautama-naya-sammata*) and which in its entirety has been paraphrased by him in his own language, is the general definition of *pramāṇa* endorsed by all subsequent Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts. Now three things are particularly noteworthy in this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition of defining *pramāṇa* in general :—

1. Indication to the effect that the cause of a valid piece of cognition has to be pure, i. e. free from defects.

2. Inclusion in the definition of the word “*artha*” standing for the object-of-cognition (*viśaya*).

3. Absence in the definition of all mention as to whether a piece of cognition is self-revelatory (*sva-prakāśa*) or not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*), as also absence in it of all hint as to whether or not the object of a valid piece of cognition has to be some novel (*apūrva*) and hitherto-unknown (*anadhigata*) entity.

Although Prabhākara<sup>25</sup> and the Mīmāṃsakas following him treat as *pramāṇa* (i. e. valid cognition) all non-mnemonic cognition whatsoever (*anubhūti-mātra*), Kumārila and his school of Mīmāṃsā have formulated such a general definition of *pramāṇa* as draws upon both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist traditions;<sup>26</sup> for the adjective ‘originating from a non-defective cause’ (*aduṣṭa-kāraṇa-ārabdha*) occurring in this (Kumārilitic) definition indicates in the manner of Kaṇāda that the cause of a valid piece of cognition must be free from all defect, while the adjectives ‘uncontradicted’ (*nirbādha*) and ‘pertaining to a novel object’ (*apūrvārtha*) occurring in it bring it in line with the Buddhist tradition.<sup>27</sup> The verse

*Tatrāpūrvārthavijñānaṃ niścitaṃ bādhavarjitam !*

*Aduṣṭakāraṇārabdhaṃ pramāṇaṃ lokasammataṃ !!*

23. *Upalabdhimātrasya arthāvyabhicāriṇaḥ smṛteranyasya pramāśabdena abhidhānāt.*—Tātp., p. 21.

24. *Yathārthānubhavo mānāmanapekṣatayeṣyate //*

*Mitiḥ samyakparicchittistadvattā ca pramāṛtā / Tadayogavyavacchedaḥ prāmāṇyaṃ Gautame mate //*—NK. 4. 1. 5.

25. *Anubhūtiśca naḥ pramāṇam.*—Br. 1. 1. 5.

26. *Autpattikagirā doṣaḥ kāraṇasya nivāryate /*

*Abādho’ vyatirekeṇa svatastena pramāṇatā // Sarvasyānupalabdhe’ rthe prāmāṇyam smṛtiranyathā / -SV, Autp. Śl. 10.11. ‘Etacca viśeṣaṇatrayamupādādānena sūtrakāreṇa kāraṇadoṣabādhakajñānarahitam agrhīta- agrāhi jñānaṃ pramāṇam iti pramāṇalakṣaṇam sūcitam’.* -SD, p. 123. ‘Anadhigatārthagantṛ pramāṇam iti Bhaṭṭamīmāṃsakā āhuḥ. -Siddhāntacandrodaya, p. 20.

27. ‘*Ajñātārthajñāpakam pramāṇam iti pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam*’. -PST, p. 11.

is attributed to Kumārila, and two things are particularly noteworthy about it :—

1. Inclusion in the definition of the word ‘*apūrva*’ (meaning hitherto-unknown) in the form of an adjective of the object-of-cognition (*artha*).

2. Absence of all hint as to whether a piece of cognition is self-revelatory or not-self-revelatory.

In the Buddhist tradition Diñnāga<sup>28</sup> has included in his general definition of *pramāṇa* the word “self-cognition” ( *sva-saṃvitti* ) in the form of an adjective of the effect (i. e. as standing for the effect of a *pramāṇa*). In the definition given by Dharmakīrti<sup>29</sup> in *Pramāṇa-vārtika* we find the adjective ‘*avisamvādin*’, which resembles the adjective ‘*pravṛtti-samartha*’ ( i. e. one leading to successful action ) occurring in Vātsyāyana and which is a synonym for ‘*nirbādha*’ occurring in Kumārila and others ; in the definition given by him in *Nyāya-bindu* ( 1. 20 we find him speaking of *artha-sārūpya* ) ( i. e. possession of the same form as the object ) ( as being the essence of a *pramāṇa* ) as had been done by Diñnāga. Sāntarakṣita’s definition represents a synthesis of the ideas underlying those of Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti ; for it runs as follows :—

*Viṣayādhiḡatiścātra pramāṇaphalamīṣyate !*

*Svavittirvā pramāṇam tu sārūpyam yogyatāpi vā !!*

(TS. k. 1344)<sup>30</sup>

Here also two things are particularly noteworthy :—

1. Introduction of the idea of self-cognition (*sva-saṃvedana*)—an idea till now absent in all traditions—and hence indication to the effect that the question whether a piece of cognition is self-revelatory or not-self-revelatory is now on the agenda.

[ Asaṅga and Vasubandhu had laid the foundation of Vijñānavāda, but its stout defence came from Diñnāga. And it was in connection with the formulation and defence of Vijñānavāda that there came into prominence the doctrine of self-cognition or self-revelatoriness which, in turn, influenced, in one form or another, other philosophers as well. —See *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 12. ]

2. Clear recognition in the manner of the Mīmāṃsaka that cognition pertaining to a hitherto-unknown object is alone *pramāṇa*.<sup>31</sup>

Siddhasena and Samantabhadra<sup>32</sup>—the first logicians of the Śvetāmbara and Digambara Jaina traditions respectively—both included in their respective definitions of *pramāṇa* the adjective “*sva-para-avabhāsaka*” (i.e. revelatory of itself and of a not-self) meaning “*sva-para-prakāśa*” ( i.e. that which illumines itself and a not-self). In Siddhasena’s definition the word “*bādha-varjita*” (i.e. immune from contradiction ) conveys the same

28. Svasaṃvittiḡ phalam cātra tadrūpādarthanīścayaḡ / Viṣayākāra evāsya pramāṇam tena mīyate // —PS. 1. 10.

29. Pramāṇamavisamvādi jñānamarthakriyāsthitiḡ / Avisamvādanam śābde’ pyabhiprāyanivedanāt // —PV. 2. 1.

30. The meaning of this *kārikā* will become quite clear in Note 4. Tr.

31. See quotation from *Pramāṇa-samuccaya-ḡikā* in Footnote 27. Tr.

32. ‘Pramāṇam svaparābhāsi jñānam bādhavivarjitam.’—NA. 1. ‘Tatvajñānam pramāṇam te yugapatsarvabhāsanam.’—AM. 101. ‘Svaparāvabhāsakam yathā pramāṇam bhuvī buddhilakṣaṇam.’—Bṛhat Svayambhūstotra, 63.

idea as *'bādha-varjita'* in the Mīmāṃsaka and *'avisamvādin'* in Dharmakīrti. Akalaṅka<sup>33</sup>—the systematizer (*prasthāpaka*) of Jaina Logic—has at some places inserted both the adjectives *'anadhigatārthaka'* (i.e. pertaining to a hitherto-unknown object) and *'avisamvādin'* (i.e. uncontradicted) while at other places he has also lent support to the use of the adjective *'sva-para-avabhāsaka'*. Māṇikyanandin<sup>34</sup> who follows Akalaṅka, by juxtaposing the words *'sva'* (i.e. self) and *'apūrvārtha'* (i.e. hitherto-unknown object) in the same compound, unified the tradition founded by Siddhasena-Samantabhadra and developed by Akalaṅka. Vidyānanda,<sup>35</sup> departing from this tradition of Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandin, preserved through the word *'svārthavyavasāyātmaka'* (i.e. that which determines itself and the object) the description given by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra but discarded the words *'anadhigata'* and *'apūrva'* that had occurred in the description given by Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandin. In the Jaina tradition of defining *pramāṇa* the word *'vyavasāyātmaka'* (i.e. determinate) appears for the first time in Vidyānanda, but it was already quite familiar in the context of Akṣapāda's definition of 'perception'.<sup>36</sup> Abhayadeva<sup>37</sup>—the commentator of *Sanmati*—followed Vidyānanda, but he substituted the word *'nirṇīti'* for the latter's *'vyavasāya'*. Vāḍidevasūri<sup>38</sup> has only repeated Vidyānanda. Āc. Hemacandra, after pondering over the proprieties and improprieties involved in the various above-mentioned Jaina and non-Jaina traditions, included in his definition just three words, viz. *'samyak'* (i.e. right), *'artha'* (i.e. object), and *'nirṇaya'* (i.e. determination). In view of the above-delineated Jaina tradition it has to be admitted that Āc. Hemacandra arrived at his definition through a series of eliminations and amendments. He discarded the word *'sva'* that had been inserted in their definitions by all the Jaina teachers preceding him. He selected Abhayadeva's *'nirṇīti'* in preference to *'avabhāsa'*, *'vyavasāya'* etc. of others and then change it into *"nirṇaya"*. Lastly, he introduced the word *'samyak'* which was already available in Umāsvāti, Dharmakīrti, and Bhāsarvajña,<sup>39</sup> and thus finalized his definition, viz. 'right determination of object' (*samyagarthanirṇaya*).

Though not differing as regards their essentials, the various general definitions of *pramāṇa* proposed by the different Śvetāmbara and Digambara Jaina teachers exhibit considerable verbal difference. This difference is partly indicative of a real development of

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33. 'Pramāṇamavisamvādi jñānam, anadhigatārthadhigama-lakṣaṇatvāt.'—AŚh, AS, p. 175. 'Uktaṃ ca—"Siddham yanna parāpekṣam siddhau svapararūpayoḥ / Tat pramāṇam tato nānyadavikalpamacetanam"'—NVT, p. 63. The *kārikā* in question occurs in *Siddhiviniścaya* which is definitely a writing by Akalaṅka.
34. 'Svāpūrvārthavyavasāyātmakam jñānam pramāṇam'—PM. 1. 1.
35. 'Tatsvārthavyavasāyātmajñānam mānamitīyatā / Lakṣaṇena gatārthatvāt vyarthamanyadvīṣeṣaṇam //—TSV. 1, 10. 77; PPar, p. 53.
36. 'Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam.' NS. 1. 1. 4.
37. 'Pramāṇam svārthanirṇītisvabhāvam jñānam.' SMT. p. 518.
38. 'Svaparavyavasāyi jñānam pramāṇam.' PNT. 1. 2.
39. 'Samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgāḥ.' Tattvārthasūtra, 1. 1. 'Samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhiḥ'. NB, 1. 1. 'Samyaganubhavasādhanam pramāṇam.' NSa. p. 1.

thought, but it is also due to the variety of contemporary literature studied by this or that teacher. The difference can be summarily subdivided into four heads :—

( i ) Firstly, there is the definition of Siddhasena-Samantabhadra which contains the word 'sva-para-avabhāsaka' and which is possibly not free from the influence of the Vijñānavāda. Buddhist discussion on self-cognizability and otherwise (of a piece of cognition), for the idea is absent in the earlier Āgamic texts. ( ii ) Secondly, there is the definition of Akalaṅka-Māṅikyanandin containing the words 'avisamvādin' and 'apūrva-anadhigata' which are undoubtedly taken from the Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas. ( iii ) Thirdly, there is the definition of Vidyānanda, Abhayadeva, and Devasūri, which is simply a verbal paraphrase of the one put forth by Siddhasena-Samantabhadra but which has come to acquire a more specific meaning as a result of substituting the word 'vyavasāya' or 'nirṇīti' for 'avabhāsa'. ( iv ) Lastly, there is the definition of Āc. Hemacandra which has been finalized by eliminating the words 'sva' 'apūrva', 'anadhigata', etc.

(PMT, pp. 5—8 ; DC I, pp. 117—21)

### 3. VALIDITY OF COGNITION (*Prāmāṇya*)—IS IT INTRINSIC (*Svataḥ*) OR EXTRINSIC (*Parataḥ*)?

The discussion as to whether the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition are intrinsic or extrinsic is a topic of frequent occurrence in philosophical literature. Historically viewing, the discussion seems to have originated in two schools of thought, one admitting the validity of Vedic testimony (*veda-prāmāṇya*) and the other denying it. When the Jainas, Buddhists, and other (heterodox) thinkers repudiated the validity of Vedic testimony, their Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā counterparts, who were advocates of the validity of Vedic testimony, started offering arguments in support of this validity. It appears that the discussion originally pertained only to verbal testimony (*śabda-pramāṇa*) but that once it entered the field of Logic its scope was universalized, and consideration whether the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition are intrinsic or extrinsic began to be applied to all cognition without exception. 40

In this discussion there were at first two chief contending parties, one comprising the Jainas and Buddhists who were proponents of the invalidity of Vedic testimony (*Veda-apramāṇyavādin*) and the other comprising the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, etc. who were proponents of the validity of Vedic testimony (*Veda-prāmāṇyavādin*). But different proponents of the validity of Vedic testimony argued their case in different ways. Thus the theistic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system based its defence of the validity of Vedic testimony on the alleged divine origin of the *Vedas*. And when the validity of Vedic testimony

40. 'Autpattikastu śabdasyārthena sambandhastasya jñānamupadeśo' vyatirekaścārthe'nupalabdhe tat pramāṇam Bādarāyaṇasyā napekṣatvāt.' Jaiminisūtra, 1. 1. 5. 'Tasmāt tat pramāṇam anapekṣatvāt. Na hyevam sati pratyayāntaramapekṣitavyam, puruṣāntaram vāpi ; svayaṃpratyayo hyasau.' Śābarabhāṣya, 1. 1. 5 ; Br. 1. 1. 5. 'Sarva-vijñānaviśayamidaṃ tāvat pratīkṣyatām / Pramāṇatvā-pramāṇatve svataḥ kiṃ parato' thavā //—SV, Cod., Śl. 33.

was thus proved to be extrinsic, it was concluded that the validity of the remaining types of cognition, that is, of perception etc., is likewise extrinsic. The same reasoning was in the sequel extended so as to arrive at the conclusion that the invalidity of a piece of cognition is equally extrinsic. <sup>41</sup>

Being no theist, the Mīmāṃsaka certainly could not derive the validity of Vedic testimony from God's authorship of the *Vedas*. He therefore accepted Vedic testimony to be self-valid (*svataḥ-pramāṇa*), and, with a view to buttressing this position, demonstrated the self-validity of the remaining types of cognition like perception, etc. <sup>42</sup> However, the invalidity of a piece of cognition remained extrinsic even in the eyes of a Mīmāṃsaka. <sup>43</sup>

The available texts of the Sāṅkhya system give no indication as to what stand it takes on the question under consideration, but the statements of Kumārila, Śāntarākṣita, and Mādhvācārya go to suggest that the system regards as intrinsic the validity as well as invalidity of a piece of cognition. <sup>44</sup> May be the old Sāṅkhya literature on the topic has perished. Writings of the above authors also make mention of a viewpoint which is diametrically opposed to the one adopted by the Mīmāṃsaka, that is, of the viewpoint according to which the invalidity of a piece of cognition is intrinsic while its validity is extrinsic. In the *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha* passage '*Saugatāścaramaṃ svataḥ*' (p. 279), this is no doubt given out as the Buddhist viewpoint, but the Buddhist viewpoint as presented in *Tattvasāṅgraha* is quite different from it. It is possible that the viewpoint attributed by *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha* to Buddhists is the viewpoint of some other branch of Buddhism.

Śāntarākṣita has elucidated the Buddhist position as follows :—“Of the four views, viz. ( i ) that both the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition are intrinsic, (ii) that both its validity and invalidity are extrinsic, ( iii ) that its validity is intrinsic and invalidity extrinsic, and (iv) that its invalidity is intrinsic and validity extrinsic, none is the Buddhist view, for all these views are uniquely regulated (*niyamita*) while Buddhists accept no unique regulation on this point. That is to say, from the Buddhist viewpoint, both the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition can well be intrinsic in one case and extrinsic in another. Thus in the case of repeated acquaintance (*abhyāsa-daśā*) the validity as well as

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41. Pramāṇato'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyādarthavat pramāṇam—NBh, p. 1; Ttp. 1. 1. 1. 'Kiṃ vijñānānāṃ prāmāṇyamaprāmāṇyaṃ ceti dvayamapi svataḥ, uta ubhayamapi parataḥ, āhosvidaprāmāṇyaṃ svataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ tu parataḥ, utasvit prāmāṇyaṃ svataḥ aprāmāṇyam tu parata iti. Tatra parata eva Vedasya prāmāṇyamiti vakṣyāmaḥ Sthitametadarthakriyājñānāt prāmāṇyaniścaya iti. Tadidamuktam. Pramāṇato'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyādarthavat pramāṇamiti. Tasmādaprāmāṇyamapi paroḁsamityato dvayamapi parata ityeṣa eva pakṣaḥ śreyān.' NM, pp. 160-74; Kand., pp. 217-20. 'Pramāyāḥ paratantratvāt sargapralayasambhavāt / Tadanya-sminnanāśvāsānna vidhāntara-sambhavaḥ //—NK, 2. 1; Tattvacintāmaṇi, Pratyakṣa. pp. 183-233.
42. 'Svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyamiti gamyatām / Na hi svato'satī śaktiḥ kartumanyena śakyate' //—SV, Sū. 2, Śl. 47.
43. SV, Sū. 3, Śl. 85.
44. 'Kecidāhurdvayaṃ svataḥ.'—SV, Sū. 2, Śl. 343; TS ( and TSP ), k. 2811 :—'Pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ Sāṅkhyāḥ samāśritāḥ'; Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha, Jaiminiya. p. 279.

invalidity of a piece of cognition ought to be treated as intrinsic while in the case of first acquaintance (*anabhyaśa-daśā*) they both ought to be treated as extrinsic".<sup>45</sup>

The Jaina position exactly tallies with the Buddhist case as presented by Śāntarakṣita. That is, it too treats the validity as well as invalidity of a piece of cognition as intrinsic in the case of repeated acquaintance, and extrinsic in the case of first acquaintance. This position is clearly stated in the relevant aphorism itself of *Pramāṇanaya-tattvāloka*. Although Āc. Hemacandra, following in the footsteps of the author of *Parikṣāmukha*, raises in his aphorism the question of intrinsicity and extrinsicity only as regards the validity of a piece of cognition (and not also as regards its invalidity), Devasūri's aphorism is fully representative of the Jaina tradition on this score. Thus we read : *Tatprāmāṇyam svataḥ parataśceti*. *PM*, 1. 13. *Tadubhayamutpattau parata eva jñaptau tu svataḥ parataśceti*. *PNT*, 1. 21.

This discussion on intrinsicity versus extrinsicity has gradually developed so much that all philosophical systems consider, invariably and at length, three separate questions enquiring as to whether the origin (*utpatti*), the knowledge (*jñapti*), and the effectivity (*pravṛtti*) of the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic.<sup>46</sup> And extremely terse (*jaṭila*) works—so full of subtle refinements (*pariṣkārapūrṇa*)—like *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, *Gādādhara-prāmāṇyavāda*, etc. have come to be written on the subject.

(*PMT*, pp. 16-18 ; *DC I*, pp. 122-24)

#### 4. THE EFFECT (*phala*) OF A PRAMĀNA

The discussion as to the nature of *pramāṇa* and of its effect occupies an important place in philosophical speculation. The matter had been given consideration even in the Age of Scriptures (*Śruti-Āgama-Yuga*), that is, in the period preceding the Age of Logic (*Tarka-Yuga*). Thus *Upaniṣads*, *Piṭakas*, and (Jaina) *Āgamas* all speak of the effect of knowledge—of right knowledge (*samyak-jñāna*). In this Age, the Vedist, Buddhist, as well as Jaina traditions are found to submit that the effect of knowledge consists in removal of ignorance (*avidyā-nāśa*) or in cognition of things (*vastu-viśayaka adhigama*)—but all this was said from a spiritual (*ādhyātmika*) point of view, that is, from the point of view of the attainment of transcendental release (*mokṣa-lābha*). In that Spiritual Age, knowledge was considered to be of use simply because it removed our nescience (*avidyā*)—i. e. ignorance (*ajñāna*),—acquaints us with the real nature of things, and thus ultimately results in our attaining transcendental release.<sup>47</sup> But in the Age of Logic, the question was considered

45. 'Na hi Bauddhairesām caturṇāmekatamo'pi pakṣo'bhīṣto'niyamapakṣasyeṣṭatvāt. Tathāhi—ubhayamapyetat kiñcit svataḥ kiñcit parataḥ iti pūrvamupavarṇitam. Ata eva pakṣacatuṣṭayo-panyāso'pyayuktaḥ. Pañcamasyāpyaniyamapakṣasya sambhavāt.'—TSP, k. 3123.

46. PKM, p. 149 ff.

47. 'So'vidyāgranthiṃ vikaratīha saumya.'—Muṇḍakopaniṣad, 2. 1. 10 ; Uttarādhyāyanasūtra, 28. 2. 3 ; 'Tameṭaṃ Vuccati—Yadā ca nātvā so dhammaṃ saccāni abhisamessati / Tadā avijjūpasamā upasanto carissati //'—Visuddhimagga, p. 544.

also from an empirical (*vyāvahārika*) point of view. This is why in the discussion conducted on the question—of *pramāṇa* and its effect—in the Age of Logic, we find exhibited the transcendental (*alaukika*) viewpoint that is characteristic of the Spiritual Age, as also the empirical (*laukika*) viewpoint that is characteristic of the Age of Logic.<sup>48</sup> The discussion from an empirical viewpoint of the question of *pramāṇa* and its effect consists in considering as to what in everyday practice (*vyavahāra*) is accomplished (*siddha*) by a *pramāṇa* directly, and what through intermediary links (*paramparayā*); whether or not a *pramāṇa* ultimately leads to transcendental release is no concern of this viewpoint. For the empirical viewpoint seeks to consider the effect of a *pramāṇa* even in the case of those persons who are unauthorized for transcendental release (*mokṣānadhikārin*).

All the three traditions that discuss in the Age of Logic the question of *pramāṇa* and its effect consider two chief points, viz. (i) whether a *pramāṇa* and its effect are mutually distinct or non-distinct, and (ii) what constitutes the effect of a *pramāṇa*. The Vedicist traditions like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, etc. treat the effect of a *pramāṇa* as absolutely distinct from this *pramāṇa*,<sup>49</sup> the Buddhist treats the two as absolutely non-distinct.<sup>50</sup> The Jaina, in line with his general non-absolutistic approach, treats a *pramāṇa* and its effect as partly distinct and partly non-distinct.<sup>51</sup>

As to the nature of the effect of a *pramāṇa*, the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā hold an identical view.<sup>52</sup> Thus according to them all, the chain of activities starting with the functioning (*vyāpāra*) of a sense-organ and culminating in the decision to accept, reject, or ignore the object concerned (*hānopādānopekṣā-buddhi*), consists of links which are of the nature of *pramāṇa* in relation to their respective successors,—and of the nature of an effect-of-*pramāṇa* in relation to their respective predecessors. That is to say, on this view, the sense-organ is a *pramāṇa* but no effect-of-a-*pramāṇa* while the decision to accept, reject, or ignore the object is an effect-of-*pramāṇa* but no *pramāṇa*, but the three intermediate stages, viz. sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*), indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka*), and determinate perception (*savikalpaka*), are a *pramāṇa* in relation to their respective successors and an effect-of-*pramāṇa* in relation to their respective predecessors. Here even an effect-of-*pramāṇa* is no doubt called also a *pramāṇa* but it is so only in relation to the succeeding effect which is quite distinct from itself. Thus on this view, a *pramāṇa* and its effect clearly turn out to be mutually distinct. The same sort of distinction has been kept in view by Vācaspati Miśra while elucidating the Sāṅkhya position on the question of *pramāṇa* and its effect.<sup>53</sup>

48. '...tattvajñānānīḥśreyasam.'—VS, 1. 1. 3. '. tattvajñānānīḥśreyasādhighamaḥ.'—NS. 1. 1. 1. 'Yadā sannikarṣastadā jñānam pramitiḥ, yadā jñānam tadā hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalam.'—NBh, 1. 1. 3.

49. SV, Pratyakṣa., Śl. 74, 75.

50. PS, 1. 9. NBT, 1. 21.

51. 'Karaṇasya kriyāyāśca kathañcidekatvaṃ pradīpatamo'vigamavat nānātvam ca paraśvādivat.' ASh, AS, pp. 283-84.

52. 'Yadā sannikarṣastadā jñānam pramitiḥ, yadā jñānam tadā hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalam.' NBh, 1. 1. 3; SV, Pratyakṣa., Śl. 59-73; PP, p. 64; Kand, pp. 198-99.

53. Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī, k. 4.

In the Buddhist tradition two views are held as to the nature of the effect of a *pramāṇa*. According to one, the effect of a *pramāṇa* consists in cognition of an object (*viśayādhiḡama*); according to the other, it consists in self-cognition (*sva-saṃvitti*). Of these two views—both occurring in Dinnāga<sup>54</sup>—the first alone is mentioned and elucidated by Dharmakīrti<sup>55</sup> and his commentator Dharmottara, but Śāntarakṣita gathers together these views, logically justifies (*sayuktika upapādana*) them, and brings out the distinction between the two. Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla clearly state that according to realism (*bāhyārthavāda*)—the doctrine Pārthasārathimiśra characterizes as Sautrāntika, the formal similarity (*sārūpya*) obtaining between a piece of cognition (*jñāna*) and its object (*viśaya*) is (to be treated as) *pramāṇa* while cognition of the object in question (*viśayādhiḡati*) is (to be treated as) the effect of *pramāṇa*, and that according to idealism (*viññānavāda*)—the doctrine Pārthasārathi characterizes as Yogācāra,—self-cognition (*sva-saṃvedana*) on the part of a piece of cognition is (to be treated as) the effect of *pramāṇa* while such a capacity (*yogyatā*) is (to be treated as) *pramāṇa*.<sup>56</sup> Here we should keep in mind that with the Buddhist a *pramāṇa* and its effect are, both of them, the properties of the concerned piece of cognition, and that the two are said to be non-distinct (*abhinna*) simply because they are not two different entities.<sup>57</sup> Kumāriila (in *SV, Pratyakṣa*, Śl. 74 ff.) has assailed this Buddhist thesis of non-distinction (*abheda*) between a *pramāṇa* and its effect, and has lent support to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of distinction (*bheda*) between the two; Śāntarakṣita, in return, has met Kumāriila's objection word by word, and has demonstrated the logical propriety of the Buddhist thesis in question (TS, k. 1340 ff.).

In the Jaina tradition Siddhasena and Samantabhadra are the first logicians to have given consideration to the problem of the effect of a *pramāṇa* also from an empirical viewpoint. On this question the two teachers have expressed similar ideas and in similar words (NA, k. 28; AM, k. 102). According to both, the immediate effect of a *pramāṇa* is removal of ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*) but the remote effect can possibly be the decision-to-accept-or-reject-or-ignore-the-object. Three things are particularly noteworthy in this contention of Siddhasena and Samantabhadra:

1. The mention of removal-of-ignorance as the effect of *pramāṇa*, a mention absent in the Vedicist as well as Buddhist traditions.
2. Absence of the idea—characteristic of the Vedicist tradition—that the intermediary links (lying in between the initial functioning of a sense organ and the final decision to accept etc.) are *pramāṇa* in relation to their respective successors and effect-of-*pramāṇa* in relation to their respective predecessors, an idea absent also in the Buddhist tradition.
3. Absence of the mention as to whether a *pramāṇa* and its effect are mutually distinct or non-distinct.

54. PS, 1. 10-12; SV, Nyāyaratnākaratīkā, pp. 158-59.

55. NB, 1. 18-19.

56. 'Viśayādhiḡatiścātra pramāṇaphalamīṣyate / Svavittirvā pramāṇam tu sārūpyam yogyatā'pi vā //—TS, k. 1344. SV, Nyāyārathākara, pp. 158-59.

57. Thus strictly speaking, for a Buddhist the relation between a *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* is not that of cause and effect (*kārya-kāraṇa-sambandha*) but rather that of determinant and determined (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka-sambandha*). See NBT, 1. 21.—Tr.

After Siddhasena and Samantabhadra our attention is chiefly drawn by Akalaṅka who, while accepting all that was said by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra on the question, also expressly takes a stand on the two points left untouched by them, that is to say, Akalaṅka says in so many words that with Jainas the relation between a *pramāṇa* and its effect is one of distinction-cum-non-distinction (*bhedābheda*) (*ASh, AS*, pp. 283-84) and he also takes clear note of and endorses—in a fashion characteristic of the Jaina—the relativistic Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā position according to which the intermediary links (in the causal chain of a cognitive process) are, each of them, *pramāṇa* as well as effect-of-*pramāṇa*<sup>58</sup>. On the question of *pramāṇa* and its effect, Māṅikyanandin (in *PM*, 5. 1 ff). and Devasūri (in *PNT*, 6.3 ff) repeated in their respective aphorisms what was said by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra ; at the same time, even though they aphorized Akalaṅka's idea that with Jainas the relation between a *pramāṇa* and its effect is one of distinction-cum-non-distinction, they did not do the same with Akalaṅka's other idea that the intermediary links (in the causal chain of a cognitive process) are, each of them, *pramāṇa* as well as effect-of-*pramāṇa*. Vidyānanda's sharp intellect took note of the concept "removal of ignorance" (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*) and of the phrase "determination (i. e. cognition) of self and of a not-self" (*sva-para-vyavasiti*) (occurring in the definition of *pramāṇa*), and he submitted that to say that the effect of a *pramāṇa* is removal of ignorance, is to say what the Sautrāntika means when he tells us that the effect of a *pramāṇa* is determination-of-a-not-self (*para-vyavasiti* ; cognition-of-an-object) and the Yogācāra when he tells us that the effect of a *pramāṇa* is self-determination (*sva-vyavasiti* ; self-cognition) (*TSV*, p. 168 ; *P Par*, p. 79) ; Prabhācandra in his *Prameyakalamārtaṇḍa* and Devasūri in his *Syādvādaratnākara* follow Vidyānanda. By now it seems to be the settled view of Jaina logicians that what Siddhasena and Samantabhadra call 'removal of ignorance' is in fact 'determination of self and of a not-self'.

Āc. Hemacandra in his treatment of the topic, no doubt gathered together these views of the Jaina logicians that had preceded him, but he also contributed something new to the discussion. Thus unlike Prabhācandra and Devasūri, he does not identify 'removal of ignorance' with 'determination of self, and of a not-self', but treats the two as two different effects of *pramāṇa*. Though in answering the objections against the doctrine of non-distinction between a *pramāṇa* and its effect—objections that had been urged by Kumārila and met by Dharmottara in his commentary on *Nyāyabindu* and by Śāntarakṣita in *Tattvasaṅgraha*—Āc. Hemacandra simply follows the Buddhist line of defence he has here displayed, in an attractive logical style, his command over Grammar. As on so many others, so also on the question of regarding the intermediary links (in the causal chain of a cognitive process) as *pramāṇa* as well as effect of *pramāṇa* Āc. Hemacandra literally follows in his aphorisms the line of argumentation laid down by Akalaṅka. Thus we find in these aphorisms a possible synthesis—undertaken in accordance with the Jaina standpoint—of the Vedicist, Buddhist, and Jaina traditions on the problem of *pramāṇa* and its effect.

(*PMT*, pp. 66-69 ; *DC I*, pp. 151-54)

58. 'Bahvādyavagrahādyaṣṭacatvāriṃśat svasaṃvidām /  
Pūrvapūrvapramāṇatvaṃ phalaṃ syāduttarottaram //'—Laghī, 1. 6.

## 5. IS RECOGNITION (*smṛti*) A PRAMĀNA ?

On the question whether or not memory is *pramāṇa* or *pramā* (both meaning the same thing) there are two traditions—the Jaina and the non-Jaina. The Jaina tradition considers memory to be a *pramāṇa* and classes it under non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) *pramāṇas*; the non-Jaina tradition—be it Vedicist or Buddhist—does not consider memory to be a *pramāṇa*. Of course, even those who do not consider memory to be a *pramāṇa* do not say that it is an *a-pramāṇa*, i. e. an invalid cognition (*mithyā-jñāna*); all that happens is that they do not call memory by the name *pramāṇa*.

The root of the controversy whether the word “*pramāṇa*” should not be employed to denote mnemonic cognition, lies in the history of Scriptures (*dharma-śāstra*). In the Vedicist tradition, the *Vedas*—also called *Śruti*—are alone considered to be valid as the basic Scripture; on the other hand, the *Smṛti* texts like *Manu* etc., even though valid in the form of a Scripture, have their validity dependent on *Śruti*, that is to say, only that *Smṛti* is valid which is based on or uncontradicted by *Śruti*, in other words, a *Smṛti*'s validity (as a Scripture) is not independent but dependent on the *Śruti*'s validity (as a Scripture).<sup>59</sup> This ruling (*vyavasthā*) concerning the validity of a text as a Scripture was being given consideration by the Mīmāṃsā system since very old past. When the question arose of determining the validity of *smṛti* understood (not as certain texts claiming Scripturship but) as ordinary mnemonic cognition, the Mīmāṃsakas seem to have just generalized the position they had come to adopt on the question of the validity of *smṛti* understood as certain texts claiming Scripturship, that is to say, they gave the ruling that memory (*smṛti*), since its validity depends on that of the earlier non-mnemonic cognition (*anubhava*) which is its cause, is not an independent *pramāṇa* (just as *Smṛti*, since its validity depends on that of *Śruti*, is not an independent Scripture). This theological-cum-logical ruling (*nirṇaya*) given by the Mīmāṃsā system—so much concerned with Vedic ritualism (*vaidika-dharma-jīvin*)—has, in all probability, influenced the remaining Vedicist systems like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, etc.<sup>60</sup> Hence it is that these systems are unanimous in their view—supported though it might be by different arguments in different cases—that the word “*pramāṇa*” is not to be employed to denote mnemonic cognition.

Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila are of the view that mnemonic cognition, since its sole function lies in making us apprehend something that was grasped by an earlier piece of non-mnemonic cognition, is not the revealer of some novel object (*anapūrvārthaprakāśaka*) and is the cognizer of what has already been cognized (*grhītagrāhin*).<sup>61</sup> Śrīdhara, the

59. 'Pāratantryāt svato naiṣām pramāṇatvāvadhāraṇā / Aprāmāṇyavikalpastu draḍhimnaiva vihanyate // Pūrvajñānaviṣayaṃ vijñānaṃ smṛtirucyate / Pūrvajñānādvinaṃ tasyāḥ prāmāṇyaṃ nāvadhāryate' —Tantravārtika, p. 69.

60. 'Etaduktam bhavati—sarve pramāṇādayo'nadhigatamarthaṃ sāmānyataḥ prakārato va'dhigamanti, smṛtiḥ punarna pūrvānubhava-maryādāmatikrāmāti, tadviṣayā tadūnaviṣayā vā, na tu tadadhikaviṣayā, so' yam vṛttyantarādviṣeṣaḥ smṛteriti vimṛṣati.'—Tattvavaiśārādī, 1. 11.

61. 'Tatra yat pūrvavijñānaṃ tasya prāmāṇyamiṣyate / Tadupasthānamātreṇa smṛteḥ syāccaritarthatā //' —SV, Anu., Śl. 160; PP, p. 42.

follower of Praśastapāda, basing himself on the Mīmāṃsā line of reasoning, argues (in *Kand.*, p. 257) that memory falls outside the circle of *pramāṇas* because it cognizes what has already been cognized. But Jayanta, the follower of Akṣapāda, pursues another line of reasoning. He thus argues that memory, since it comes into being at a time when the real entity (*artha*) constituting its object (*viśaya*) is absent, is something not born of a real entity (*anarthaja*) and hence a non-*pramāṇa*.<sup>63</sup> Jayanta's present argument has been refuted by Śrīdhara.<sup>63</sup> Vācaspati Miśra, who too is a follower of Akṣapāda, offers a third argument. He submits that memory should not be treated as *pramā* because popular usage (*lokavyavahāra*) is not in favour of calling memory a *pramāṇa* (i. e. *pramā*). Hence it is that in his account of *pramā* (given in *Tātp.*, p. 20) Vācaspatimiśra leaves out memory and considers only the remaining types of cognition. Udayanācārya, after refuting all the arguments offered by these earlier logicians in support of the contention that memory is not a *pramāṇa*, follows the suggestion of Vācaspatimiśra and maintains that non-mnemonic cognition (technically called *anubhava*) should alone be treated as *pramāṇa* because it alone is an independent piece of cognition; thus Udaynācārya thinks that memory is not *pramāṇa* because it is dependent on *anubhava*, and that this train of reasoning of his is in accord with popular usage.<sup>64</sup>

Buddhists too do not consider memory to be a *pramāṇa*, and their argument is akin to that of the Mīmāṃsaka or the Vaiśeṣika, that is, they too argue that memory is not a *pramāṇa* because it cognizes what has already been cognized (*TSP*, k. 1298). However, we cannot say that in adopting this position the Buddhist was influenced by the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of ritual, as were the systems like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, etc., for the Buddhist was not at all a believer in the validity of Vedic testimony. What is actually the case is that, there arises no question of memory being treated as a *pramāṇa* in a system like Buddhism where all knowledge-involving-thought (*vikalpajñānamātra*) is declared to be no *pramāṇa*.<sup>65</sup>

Jaina logicians criticize all these views which deny to memory the status of a *pramāṇa* on the ground that it cognizes what has already been cognized, that it is not born of a real entity, that popular usage is against calling memory a *pramāṇa*, etc.; and their contention is that memory ought to be treated as a *pramāṇa* because it is true of facts (*saṃvādin*), just

62. 'Na smṛterapramāṇatvaṃ gṛhītagrāhitākṛtam /  
Api tvanarthajanyatvaṃ tadapramāṇyakāraṇam //—NM, p. 23.

63. 'Ye tvanarthajatvāt smṛterapramāṇyamāhuḥ teṣāmatītānāgataviśayasānumānasyāpramāṇyaṃ syāditi dūṣaṇam.' *Kand.*, p. 257.

64. 'Katham tarhi smṛtervyavacchedaḥ? Ananubhavatvenaiva. Yathārtho hyanubhavaḥ prameti prāmāṇikāḥ paśyanti. "Tattvajñānāt" iti sūtraṇāt. Avyabhicāri jñānamiti ca. Nanu smṛtiḥ pramaiva kiṃna syāt yathārthajñānatvāt pratyakṣādyanubhūtivaditi cet. Na. Siddhe vyavahare nimittānusaraṇāt. Na ca svecchākalpitena nimittena lokavyavahāranīyamanam, avyavasthayā lokavyavahāraviplavaprāsaṅgāt. Na ca smṛtiḥtau pramāṇābhīyuktānām maharṣiṇām pramāṇavyavahāro 'sti, pṛthagānupadeśāt.'—NK, 4. 1.

65. 'Gṛhītagrahaṇānneṣṭam sāmvṛtam . . .' (Sāmvṛtam-vikalpajñānam—Manorathanandīkākā)-PV, 2.5.

as perception etc. are treated as *pramāṇas* because they are true of facts. <sup>66</sup> There is no difference of opinion among the Jainas on this point, and in treating memory as a *pramāṇa* (in *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 23) Āc. Hemacandra has simply followed the established Jaina tradition.

That mnemonic cognition is true of facts is acceptable to all (Indian logicians), and so there is no material difference of opinion on this issue; the difference only arises when some agree and others refuse to call memory a *pramāṇa*.

(PMT, pp. 72-74 : DC I, pp. 167-69)

## 6. IS CONTINUOUS COGNITION ( *dhārāvāhika jñāna* ) A *PRAMĀNA* ?

Whether memory is or is not a *pramāṇa* is a problem that has been considered by the Indian systems of Logic ever since their inception, but the problem whether continuous cognition (of the same object) is or is not a *pramāṇa* seems to have arisen, for the first time, in the Buddhist system with Dharmakīrti. And once it found footplace in one system of Logic the problem became a problem for all the systems : hence arguments and counter-arguments were offered on the question, different views were upheld, and definite traditions established.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers like Vācaspati, Śrīdhara, Jayanta, Udayana, etc. <sup>67</sup> all grant that continuous cognition takes cognizance of what has already been cognized, but they agree to treat such a cognition as *pramāṇa*—and this they do without positing ‘awareness of minute divisions of time’ (*sūkṣma-kāla-kalā-bhāna*) (as is done by some other philosophers). This is why these philosophers do not define *pramāṇa* as cognition of something hitherto unknown (*anadhigata*).

Among Mīmāṃsakas, both the Kumārīlite and Prabhākarite traditions are in favour of treating continuous cognition as *pramāṇa*, but the two have adopted different lines of defence. Prabhākarite Śālikanātha <sup>68</sup> argues—without positing ‘awareness of minute divisions of time’—that continuous cognition is *pramāṇa* because it is non-mnemonic (*anubhūti*) sort of cognition, and the argument bears a clear imprint of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition.

66. ‘Tathā hi amuṣyāpṛamāṇyaṃ kuto’ yamāviṣkurvīta, kim gṛhītārthagrahītvāt, paricchittiviśeṣābhāvāt, asatyatīte’rthe pravartamānatvāt, arthādanutpadyamānatvāt, viśamvādakatvāt, samāropāvyavacchedakatvāt, prayojanāprasādhakatvāt vā’.-SVR, 3. 4.

67. ‘Anadhigatārthagantṛtvam ca dhārāvāhikavijñānānāma dhigatārthagocarāṇāṃ lokasiddhapramāṇa-bhāvānāṃ pṛamāṇyaṃ vihanatīti nādriyāmahe. Na ca kālabhedenānadhigatagocaratvam dhārāvānāt. Na cādyenaiva vijñānenopadarśitatvādarthasya pravartitvāt puruṣasya pṛāpitatvaccottareṣāmapṛamāṇyameva jñānānāmiti vācyam. Na hi vijñānasyārthapṛāpanaṃ pravartanādanyat. Tasmādarthapradarśanamātravyāpārameva jñānaṃ pravartakaṃ pṛāpakaṃ ca. Pradarśanaṃ —Tātp., p. 21. ; Kand., p. 6’ ; NM, p. 22 ; NK, 4. 1.

68. ‘Dhārāvāhikeṣu tarhyuttaravijñānāni smṛtipramoṣādaviśiṣṭāni kathaṃ pramāṇāni ? Tatrāha-anyonyapattiriti na pratīti utpattito vā dhārāvāhikavijñānāni parasparasyātīserata iti yuktā sarveṣāmapī pramāṇatā’.-PP, pp. 42-43 ; Br. p. 103.

On the other hand, Kumārilite Pārthasārathi <sup>69</sup> posits 'awareness of minute divisions of time' and then goes on to maintain that continuous cognition is *pramāṇa*; for the Kumārilite tradition, since according to it a *pramāṇa* must have for its object something altogether novel, could not defend the *pramāṇa*-ship of continuous cognition otherwise (i. e. without supposing that newer and newer minute-divisions-of-time are taken note of during the course of a continuous cognition). This Kumārilite position seems to bear an imprint of the Buddhist and Jaina views.

Coming to the Buddhist tradition, though Dharmottara <sup>70</sup> makes no express mention of continuous cognition, the general tenor of his statements suggests that he was inclined to treat such a cognition as no *pramāṇa*. In his commentary on *Hetubindu*, Arcaṭa <sup>71</sup> has, incidentally but clearly, formulated his view on the question of continuous cognition. He there maintains that a *yogin's* continuous cognition is *pramāṇa* because it involves awareness of minute divisions of time while, on the other hand, an ordinary man's continuous cognition is no *pramāṇa* because it involves no such awareness. Thus in the Buddhist tradition continuous cognition has been treated as *pramāṇa* or no *pramāṇa* according as the cognizer concerned is of this or that type (i. e. a *yogin* or an ordinary person).

On the question whether continuous cognition should or should not be regarded as *pramāṇa* the Jaina texts on Logic follow either of the two traditions, the Digambarite and the Śvetāmbarite. According to the Digambara tradition, a continuous cognition is *pramāṇa* only in case it takes note of specialities (*viśeṣa*) like moments (*kṣaṇa*) etc. and thus produces knowledge of newly specialized objects (*viśiṣṭapramā-janaka*) (every moment); on the other hand, if a continuous cognition takes no such note of specialities, it is no *pramāṇa*. Similarly, this tradition further maintains that a continuous

69. 'Nanvevaṃ dhārāvāhikeṣūttareṣāṃ pūrvagrāhītārthaviṣayakatvādapramāṇyaṃ syāt. Tasmāt "Anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam" iti pramāṇalakṣaṇam....Tasmāt yathārthamagrāhītagrāhi jñānaṃ pramāṇamiti vaktavyam. Dhārāvāhikeṣvapyuttarottareṣāṃ kālāntarasambaddhasyāgrāhītasya grahaṇāt yuktam pramāṇyam. Sannapi kālabhedo'tisūkṣmatvānna parāmṛśyata iti cet; aho sūkṣmadarśī devānāṃ priyaḥ! Yo hi samānaviṣayayā vijñānadhārayā ciramavasthāyoparataḥ so'nantarakṣaṇa-sambandhitayārthaṃ smarati. Tathā hi—kimatra ghato'vasthita iti pṛṣṭaḥ kathayati—asmin kṣaṇe mayopalabdha iti. Tathā prātarārabhyaitāvatkālam mayopalabdha iti. Kālabhede tvagrāhite kathamevaṃ vadet? Tasmādasti kālabhedasya parāmarśaḥ. Tadādhiyācc siddhamuttareṣāṃ pramāṇyam.'—SD, pp. 124-26.

70. 'Ata eva anadhigataviṣayaṃ pramāṇam. Yenaiva hi jñānena prathamamadhigato'rthaḥ tenaiva pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ prāpitaścārthaḥ tatraivārthe kimanyena jñānena adhikaṃ kāryam. Tato'dhigataviṣayamapramāṇam.' NBT, p. 3.

71. 'Yada kasminneva nīlādivastuni dhārāvāhīnīndriyajñānānyutpadyante tadā pūrveṇābhinnayogakṣematvāt uttareṣāmindriyajñānāmapramāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ. Na caivam, ato'nekanta iti pramāṇa-samplavavādī darśayannāha—pūrvapratyakṣaṇena ityādi. Etat pariharati—tad yadi pratikṣaṇam kṣaṇavivekadarśino dhikrtyocyate tadā bhinnopayogitayā pṛthak pramāṇyāt nanekāntaḥ. Atha sarvpadārtheṣvekatvādhyavasāyinaḥ sāmvyavahārikān puruṣānabhipretyocyate tadā sakalameva nīlasantānamekamarthaṃ sthīrārūpaṃ tatsādhyāṃ cārthakriyāmekātmikāmadhyavasāyantīti pramāṇyamapyuttareṣāmaniṣṭameveti kuto'nekantaḥ?'—Hetubinduṭīkā, p. 37.

cognition, even while producing knowledge of specialized objects (every moment), is no *pramāṇa* so far as the aspect of substance ( *dravyāṃśa* ) is concerned (because it produces no specialised knowledge concerning this aspect) and is *pramāṇa* so far as the aspect of specialities ( *viśeṣāṃśa* ) is concerned ( because it does produce specialized knowledge concerning this aspect), that is to say, the same piece of cognition is *pramāṇa* as well as no *pramāṇa* according as its object is this or that ( i. e. a speciality-of-a-substance or the substance itself). A careful scrutiny ( *pūrvāparāvalokana*) of the commentaries of Vidyānanda, the follower of Akalaṅka, and Prabhācandra, the follower of Māṇikyanandin, leads to the present conclusion.<sup>72</sup> For when Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandin, who are one with the other Jaina logicians in frankly admitting memory to be a *pramāṇa*, urge, in agreement with the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka, that a *pramāṇa* must have for its object something hitherto-unknown or novel, their words cannot be interpreted as meaningful except on the above explained stand (as to the nature of continuous cognition), and here it is immaterial as to what was Vidyānanda's or Prabhācandra's own personal view of the matter.

Buddhists<sup>73</sup> consider both thought (*vikalpa*) and memory (*smṛti*) to be no *pramāṇa*, Mīmāṃsakas consider only memory (*smṛti*) to be no *pramāṇa*. Hence the purpose behind their insistence that a *pramāṇa* must have for its object something hitherto-unknown or novel is clear. But that cannot be the purpose behind a Jaina's insistence to the same effect.

Scholars following the Śvetāmbara tradition are unanimous in considering continuous cognition to be *pramāṇa* just like memory. This is why none of them at all maintains that the object of a *pramāṇa* must be something hitherto-unknown or novel. Not only that, they say, in so many words, that a piece of cognition taking cognizance of an already known object (*gr̥hīta-grāhin*) is as much *pramāṇa* as that taking cognizance of a hitherto-unknown one (*agr̥hīta-grāhin*). Thus since, according to them, a piece of cognition does not cease to be *pramāṇa* in case its object happens to be something already known, they maintain neither that no continuous cognition is *pramāṇa* nor that a continuous cognition is *pramāṇa* in respect of one sort of object and no *pramāṇa* in respect of another sort.

Even among Śvetāmbara teachers, Āc. Hemacandra's position is in a way novel, for—and that is remarkable—he establishes *pramāṇa*-ship of continuous cognition by showing that cognition of an already-cognized-object (*gr̥hīta-grāhi-jñāna*) is on a par with cognition

72. 'Gr̥hītamagr̥hītam vā svārtham yadi vyavasyati / Tanna ioke na śāstresu vijahāti pramāṇatām //'' -TSV, 1. 10. 28.; 'Pramāntarāgr̥hītārthaprakāśitvaṃ prapahcataḥ / Prāmānyam ca gr̥hītārthagrā-āvāhyakṣavijñānsyaivaṃ labhyeta kena sā //'' -TSV, 1. 13. 94.; 'Gr̥hītagrahaṇāt tatra na smṛteścet pramāṇatā / Dhūr-avādivyāghātaḥ pramāṇapratipanne' rthe pramāṇāntarpratipattirityacodyam. Arthaparicchittiviśeṣ-pratipadyamānam pramāṇāntaramapūrvārthameva vṛkṣo nyagrodha ityādival.' -PKM, p 16.
73. 'Yad gr̥hītagrāhi jñānam na tatpramāṇam, yathā smṛtiḥ, gr̥hitagrāhi ca pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvī vikalpa iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabddih.' -TSP, k, 1298.

of a to-be-cognized-object (*grahiṣyamāṇa-grāhi-jñāna*) (so that if the former is no *pramāṇa* the latter should follow suit).

(*PMT*, pp. 11-14 ; *DC I*, pp ; 163-66)

## 7. IS RECOGNITION ( *pratyabhijñā* ) A *PRAMĀNA* ?

In connection with the problem of recognition philosophers have held divergent views on two points, viz. as to whether it is *pramāṇa* and as to its nature. The Buddhist tradition treats recognition as no *pramāṇa*, for, being an advocate of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*), it dismisses as unreal all permanence (*sthiraṭva*) which is what is supposed to constitute the object of recognition. On its showing, cognition of (alleged) permanence, being in fact cognition of mere similarity, is illusory.<sup>74</sup> But philosophers belonging to the two non-Buddhist traditions—i. e. Jaina and Vedicist—agree in treating recognition as *pramāṇa*. It is on the basis of *pramāṇa*-ship of recognition that these philosophers refute the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇabhāṅga*) and defend ( the reality of ) permanence (*nityatva*, *sthiraṭva*). Unlike the Vedicist traditions such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, etc., the Jaina tradition does not believe in the reality of absolute permanence (*ekānta-nityatva*), that is, of permanence-without-change (*kūṭastha-nityatva*); but since it does believe in the reality of permanence-in-the-midst-of-the-successively-emerging (-and-perishing) states it too is in favour of attributing *pramāṇa*-ship to recognition.

As to the nature of recognition, there are three main views, viz. the Buddhist, the Vedicist, and the Jaina. According to the Buddhist view, what is called “recognition” is not one single piece of cognition but a combination of two pieces of cognition, viz. memory and perception, given one name.<sup>75</sup> [The alleged one object of recognition has an element of ‘that’ and an element of ‘this’. Of these] the element of ‘that’, being something past *atīta* and hence open only to non-perceptual cognition (*parokṣa*), here becomes an object of memory and can never become an object of perception, while, on the other hand, the element of ‘this’, being something present (*vartamāna*), here becomes an object of perception and can never become an object of non-perceptual cognition. As against this Buddhist view according to which recognition is a combination of two pieces of cognition differing from each other in that the object of one of them is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) and that of the other non perceptible (*parokṣa*), the Vedicist systems like Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, etc. maintain that recognition is one single piece of cognition of the nature of perception, and not a combination of two pieces of cognition, one perceptual and the other mnemonic. (According to these Vedicist systems), there is no doubt a general rule (*sāmānya niyama*) to the effect that the object of sense-perception must be a present entity, but an exception to this rule has to be allowed when certain particular causal aggregate (*sāmagrī-viśeṣadaśā*) obtains there. Thus while seeking to justify (*upapādana*) the perceptual character of recognition, Vācaspatimiśra says that sense-organs, which (generally) grasp only present entities, succeed in producing recognition, because with

74. *PV*, 3. 501-2 ; *TS*, k. 447.

75. ‘. . . tasmād dve ete jñāne sa iti smaraṇam ayam ityaṅubhavaḥ,’ -*NM*, p. 449.

impressions (*saṃskāra*) or memory acting as an accessory, they become competent to grasp a present-entity-as-qualified-by-a-past-state (*atītāvasthāviśiṣṭa-vartamānagrāhin*).<sup>76</sup> Jayanta follows this statement of Vācaspati and also adduces a new argument. Thus he says that in the wake of perception had by a sense-organ-assisted-by-memory (*smaraṇa-sahakṛta-indriya-janya pratyakṣa*) there arises a mental cognition (*mānasa jñāna*) which is called 'recognition'.<sup>77</sup> In this statement of Jayanta seems to lie the seed of the later Naiyāyika's thesis on extra-ordinary (*alaukika*) perception.

Jaina logicians do not agree with the Buddhist in maintaining that recognition is but a combination of two (independent) pieces of cognition, nor do they agree with the Naiyāyika etc. in regarding recognition as but a variety of sense-perception. With them recognition is a type of non-perceptual cognition (*parokṣa jñāna*), and they are of the view that in the wake of sense-perception and memory, there arises a mental cognition of a sui generis (*vijātīya*) type that takes cognizance of two-entities-as-somehow-related-to-each-other (*saṅkalanatmaka jñāna*); it is this mental cognition which they call 'recognition'. This ruling of Akalaṅka (given in *Laghī.*, 3. 1 ff.), which is essentially akin to Jayanta's thesis on mental cognition, has been accepted by Jaina logicians without a voice of dissent. Admitting recognition to be of the nature that accords with this ruling (of Akalaṅka), Āc. Hemacandra refutes the rival views and defends his.

Mīmāṃsakas (*SV, Sū. 4, Śl. 232-37*), Naiyāyikas (*NS, 1. 1. 6*) etc. consider *upamāna* (i. e. Analogy) to be an independent type of *pramāṇa* supposed to take cognizance of similarities and dissimilarities. Again, these philosophers are of the view that many a relative (*sapratīyogika*) cognition—e. g. cognition of longness (*dīrghatva*), shortness *hrasvatva*, etc.—is but perceptual. Jaina logicians have, unanimously and since the very beginning, treated all these (i. e. similarity, dissimilarity, longness, shortness, etc.) as specific objects of "recognition" which is with them an independent *pramāṇa* and a subspecies of *matijñāna*.<sup>78</sup>

(PMT, 75-76 ; DC I, 170-71)

## 8. THE JAINA CLASSIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE

The problem of knowledge has been treated in the Jaina tradition in two ways, viz. that based on the Āgamic classification, and that based on the logical classification. The treatment where knowledge is divided into *mati, śruta*, etc. is the one based on the Āgamic classification, the treatment where it is divided into *pramāṇas* like perception etc. is the one based on the logical classification. An unmixed instance of the first type of treatment is *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*, an unmixed instance of the second type is *Nyāyavatāra*.

The old and original treatment of knowledge in the Jaina tradition is the one based on the Āgamic classification; it is not yet possible to say with certainty as to who first

76. Tātp., p. 139.

77. 'Evaṃ pūrvajñānaviśeṣitasya stambhāderviśeṣaṇamatītakṣaṇaviṣaya iti mānasī pratyabhijñā.' -NM, p. 461.

78. *Matijñāna* is the technical name for one of the five types of knowledge admitted by Jaina Āgamas.-Tr

introduced in this tradition the treatment based on the logical classification. *Sthānāṅga* and *Bhagavatī* are two among the eleven *Āṅgas* supposed to be composed by Gaṇadhara, and they are certainly old also. But even though these texts contain clear mention of the logical classification<sup>79</sup> there seems to be no difficulty in conjecturing that this mention has been inserted there in *Sthānāṅga* and *Bhagavatī* some time after Bhadrabāhu, the author of *Niryuktis*; for *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*, which is supposed to be a composition by Bhadrabāhu and where the very start is made with a discussion on knowledge, accepts the Āgamic classification but does not even mention the logical classification. It appears that till the time of *Niryuktis* the Jaina teachers discussed the problem of knowledge basing themselves on the Āgamic classification but were not entirely ignorant of the discussion on *pramāṇas* going on in the other traditions. Not only that, as and when occasion arose, they even employed (with amendments if need be) the *pramāṇa* methodology (*pramāṇaśailī*) of those other traditions. Thus in *Daśavaikālika-niryukti* supposed to be a composition of Bhadrabāhu, we get a discussion on inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) where the stand taken on the question of the number of steps in an inference-of-others (*parārthānumānāvayava*) is altogether different from that of the other traditions (*Gāthā* 50).

Āryarākṣita, who was Brahmin by birth and had become a Jaina monk after having studied Brahmanical texts, seems to be the first to have adopted, in his *Anuyogadvāra* (p. 211), the fourfold classification of *pramāṇas* into *pratyakṣa* (i. e. perception), *anumāna* (i. e. inference) etc.—a classification already accepted in Gautama's system (*NS*, 1. 1. 3.) It cannot be said with certainty as to whether the twofold classification of *pramāṇas* into *pratyakṣa* (i. e. perceptual knowledge) and *parokṣa* (i. e. non-perceptual knowledge) which Umāsvāti adopts in his *Tattvārthasūtra* (1. 10-12) is his own or one belonging to an earlier teacher. It seems that at the time when Āgamas were edited (*saṅkalanā*) portions containing the fourfold classification of *pramāṇas* as also those containing the twofold classification, found entrance in *Sthānāṅga* and *Bhagavatī*. However, even though both these classifications had found place in the Āgamic texts, the Jaina teachers chiefly gave special thought to the twofold classification. The obvious reason for this is that the fourfold classification really belongs to the Nyāya system—and is therefore referred to by Umāsvāti as a *nayavādāntara* (*Tattvārthabhāṣya*, 1. 6)—while the twofold classification is the Jaina teachers' own. This is why all Jaina texts on Logic base their treatment of *jñāna* and *pramāṇa* on this twofold classification. And that precisely is the reason for Āc. Hemacandra's adoption of the twofold classification.

Under the influence of the logical systems of philosophy like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc., the Buddhist monks had long since left the field assigned to them by *Piṭakas* (*piṭakocita-maryādā*) and had entered the arena of debate and of the logical treatment of *pramāṇas* (that goes with debate). Gradually, the Jaina monks too could not remain immune from

79. 'Duvīhe nāṇe paṇṇatte—taṃ jahā—paccakkhe ceva parokkhe ceva., -Sthānāṅgasūtra, 2, p. 49A. 'Ahavā heū cauvvīhe paṃ. taṃ. paccakkhe, aṇumāṇe, ovamme, āgame. -Sthānāṅga, 4, p. 254A. 'Se kiṃ taṃ pamāṇe? Pamāṇe cauvvīhe paṇṇatte, taṃ jahā-paccakkhe ..... jahā aṇuogadāre tahā neyavvaṃ.' -Bhagavatīsūtra, Ś 5, U 3, Part 11, p. 211.

the influence of this logical treatment undertaken by the Vedacist and Buddhist philosophers. Hence it was that Jaina teachers undertook a classification of *pramāṇas* basing themselves on the classification of *jñāna* that had been handed down to them by their tradition ; and on the question of this classification-of-*pramāṇas* of theirs, they even entered into discussion with the teachers of rival persuasions. Although Āryarakṣita, in the course of his classification of *pramāṇas*, had already clearly pointed out that *matijñāna* comes under *indriya-pratyakṣa* (i. e. sense-perception) and *śrutajñāna* under *āgama* (i. e. verbal testimony), the Jaina authors on Scriptural and logical topics were constantly faced with the question as to whether *anumāna* (i. e. inference), *upamāna* (i. e. analogy), *arthāpatti* (i. e. implication), etc., which the various other traditions accepted as *pramāṇas*, are or are not *pramāṇas* in the eyes of the Jaina tradition. And if *anumāna* etc. are *pramāṇas* why is it that they are not independently treated (by the Jainas) or shown to be falling under some independently treated *pramāṇa* ? To this question an answer seems to have come for the first time from Umāsvāti (*Tattvārthabhāṣya*, 1. 12) who suggested that *anumāna* etc., which are *pramāṇas* according to the other traditions, fall either under *mati* or under *śrutra*, that is, under one of the *parokṣa* (i. e. non-perceptual) *pramāṇas*. It is this answer of Umāsvāti that Pūjyapdāa literally adopts (*Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1. 12).

The Jaina tradition had come to specially prefer the twofold classification rather than the fourfold, and this was all for the good. Thus *Nandīsūtra* undertook a detailed treatment of the problem of knowledge basing itself on the twofold classification. However, though the basis of this treatment on the part of the author of *Nandī* was the twofold classification, he incorporated in this treatment two points also from Āryarakṣita's treatment based on the fourfold classification. The first point is that sensory knowledge, which is what commonsense understands by *pratyakṣa* and which the non-Jaina logicians treat as *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, is given the status of *pramāṇa* even in the Jaina tradition, and in doing so *pratyakṣa* is subdivided (*Nandīsūtra*, 3) into two types, one covering (the transcendental perception) *avadhi* etc. which Umāsvāti has treated as independent *pramāṇas* and the other covering sense-perception. The second point taken by the author of *Nandī* from Āryarakṣita is that what the other systems call *āgama pramāṇa* is the same thing as *śrutajñāna* and is a subspecies of the *parokṣa* (i. e. non-perceptual) type of knowledge.

Though the Āgamic treatment of knowledge continued, the tendency to logical argumentation gradually gained ascendancy in the Jaina line of thought. The result of all this is *Nyāyāvatāra*. In it we get a logical treatment of knowledge based on the twofold classification of *pramāṇas*. Its chief aim is to offer an account of inference (*anumāna*, *nyāya*) according to the Jaina way of looking at things. Though the major part of *Nyāyāvatāra* is concerned with the problem of offering an account of the subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa*, we are not here told—as was done in the writings of the later teachers—that these—and no more—are the subspecies of *parokṣa pramāṇa*. Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa, in his voluminous *Bhāṣya*, logically incorporated in the twofold classification of *pramāṇas* the Āgamic fivefold classification of *jñāna*, and by calling sense-perception “*sāṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa*” (*indiyamanobhavam jaṃ taṃ saṃvavahārapaccakkham—Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya*, *Gāthā* 95) he also, for the first time, eliminated the discrepancy—pointed out by the anti-Jaina

logicians—vitiating the twofold classification—made by Āryarakṣita and accepted by the author of *Nandī*—of *pratyakṣa* into the sensory and the non-sensory. The discrepancy was as follows. When the Jaina system calls only that knowledge *pratyakṣa* which is born of *akṣa* (i. e. *ātman*) alone it becomes self-contradictory for it to call sensory perception *pratyakṣa* (for sense-perception is not born of *ātman* alone). However, Kṣamāśramaṇajī did all this, but did not tell us that these—and no more—are the subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa* according to the Jaina tradition.

Thus even though alongside with the Āgamic treatment of knowledge (and with somewhat greater prominence than the Āgamic treatment) the logical treatment of *pramāṇa* was also taking place in the Jaina tradition, the anti-Jaina logicians were pestering the Jaina with the question : Granting that *anumāna*, *āgama*, etc., which others treat as independent *pramāṇas*, are but subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa* according to you, what precisely is the number of the subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa* and what the definition of each ?

On the basis of the available literature it can doubtless be said that the question was first answered by Bhaṭṭāraka Akalaṅka, and his answer is extremely clear-cut and definite. Akalaṅka, in his *Laghīyastrayī*,<sup>80</sup> maintained that the five subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa* are ( i ) *anumāna* (i. e. inference), ( ii ) *pratyabhijñā* (i. e. recognition), ( iii ) *smaraṇa* (i. e. memory), ( iv ) *tarka* (i. e. knowledge of invariable concomitance), and ( v ) *āgama* (i. e. verbal testimony) ; and he also clearly defined each of these subspecies. We see that this classification offered by Akalaṅka solved all those problems which frequently arose in the course of the Āgamic as well as the logical treatment of knowledge. The result was that all post-Akalaṅka logicians—Digambara as well as Śvetāmbara—followed the path laid down by Akalaṅka, and composed more or less lengthy texts basing themselves on Akalaṅka's very words (or their equivalents) and developing his very ideas in this or that direction. Yaśovijayajī, the greatest among the Jaina logicians (*Jaina-tārkika-mūrdhanya*), does the same. Here one thing has to be kept in mind. The same Akalaṅka who, by enumerating and defining the subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa*, succeeds in giving a Jaina account of *anumāna*, *arthāpatti*, *upamāna*, etc. which are independent *pramāṇas* according to the other traditions is also the author of *Rājavārtika* ; however, in *Rājavārtika*, while showing that these *pramāṇas* accepted by the other traditions fall under the recognized Jaina types, Akalaṅka follows, so to say, not the line of argument of *Laghīyastrayī* but that of *Tattvārthabhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Even then, Akalaṅka's line is slightly different from that of *Bhāṣya* and *Siddhi* (*Rājavārtika*, p. 54). Akalaṅka has seen to it that his fivefold classification of *parokṣa-pramāṇa* does not go against the synthesis worked out by the earlier teachers like Umāsvāti etc. while, at the same time, a meaning is given to the identification—made in *Āgama*, *Niryuktis* etc.—of *matijñāna* with *smṛti*, *sañjñā*, *cintā*, *abhinibodha*.<sup>81</sup>

80. 'Jñānamādyam matih sañjñā cintā cābhinibodhanam / Prāñnāmajojanāccheṣam śrutam śabdān-  
uyojanāt // ' -Laghī. 3 l. , Autocommentary 3.1. : 'Sūriṇā-Akalaṅkena vārtikakāreṇa.' -Siddhivini-  
ścayaṭīkā, p. 254B.

81. Akalaṅka treats the set 'smṛti, sañjñā, cintā, abhinibodha' as synonymous with the set 'smṛti, pratyabhijñā, anumāna, tarka'.-Tr. /

All this goes to explain why Akalaṅka's classification of *parokṣa-pramāṇa* and his definition of each subspecies of it is upto this day acceptable to all Jaina logicians. It is this very classification which Āc. Hemacandra adopts in his *Mīmāṃsā* and makes the basis of his treatment of the topic.

(PMT, pp. 19-23 ; Not selected in DC)

## (ii) On Problems of Perception.

### 9. THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION IN GENERAL

Before considering other topics connected with the problems of perception we must first be clear in our mind as to what was the definiendum with the ancient sages (*ṛṣi*) when they set to themselves the task of defining 'perception', that is, as to whether they regarded definition as applicable only to the cases of generated (*janya*) perception or—as was the case with the later-day Naiyāyikas—as applicable to the cases of generated as well as of eternal (*nitya*) perception. So far as we can see, no ancient authority---not even any of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors who are certainly no atheists---has offered a definition that applies to generated as well as eternal perception. In all ancient basic texts (*mūlagrantha*)---whether written by theistic philosophers or by atheistic ones---account has been given only of the generated perception. That eternal perception is a possibility or that God---and He alone---is competent to have eternal perception, is not even indicated (*sūcana*) in any ancient text.<sup>82</sup> As against the Mīmāṃsakas who sought to defend the authoritative character (*pramāṇya*) of Vedic texts, on the (alleged) ground that these texts are an impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) composition, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system no doubt argued that Vedic texts, being a verbal composition (*śabdātmaka*), are transient (*anitya*) and that therefore their authority rests not on their being an impersonal composition but on their being a composition by some (competent) person. But none of the ancient Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors clearly mentions God as the author of the Vedas. These authors---adopting a procedure different from that of the Mīmāṃsakas---established the authoritative character of Vedic texts on the ground

82. VS, 3. 1. 18 ; Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam. -NS, 1. 1, 4 ; 'Prativiśayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam.'-SK, 5 ; Sāṅkhyasūtra, 1. 89 ; Yogabhāṣya, 1. 7 ; 'Satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇām.....'—Jaiminisūtra, 1. 1. 4 ; 'Ātmendriyamano'rthat sannikarṣāt pravartate / Vyaktā tadātve yā buddhiḥ pratyakṣaṃ sā nirūpyate //—Carakasamhitā, 11. 20.

that these texts are composed by sages who are an authority (on the subject-matter concerned) (*āpta-ṛṣi-praṇīta*); thus the answer of these authors to Buddhists, Jainas, etc. who disputed the authoritative character of the *Vedas* (*Vedāpramāṇyavādin*) consisted in arguing that the *Vedas* are an authoritative text because they are composed by sages who are an authority on the subject-matter concerned.<sup>83</sup> The later interpreters of the Nyāya system conceived God as the creator of the universe, the author of the *Vedas*, and the possessor of eternal knowledge, but none of the ancient Sūtra-texts belonging to the Vedist tradition either clearly establishes God's creatorship of the universe and His authorship of the *Vedas* or anywhere even mentions Him as the possessor of eternal knowledge. It is thus absolutely definite that all ancient definitions of perception are meant to be applicable only to the cases of generated perception. It is certain topics connected with this generated perception that we now proceed to consider:—

(1) EMPIRICAL ( *laukika* ) AND TRANSCENDENTAL ( *alaukika* ) PERCEPTION :

Even though the thing sought to be defined in ancient times was generated perception, the fact remains that all philosophers barring the Cārvākas divided this generated perception into two kinds, viz. empirical and transcendental. All these philosophers treat as empirical perception the perception---had either through sense-organs or through *manas* alone---of a present entity; the transcendental perception is named differently in different systems. Thus in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga,<sup>84</sup> Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,<sup>85</sup> and Buddhist<sup>86</sup> systems the transcendental perception is named *yogī-pratyakṣa* (i. e. yogic perception) or *yogī-jñāna* (i. e. yogic knowledge) and is supposed to be born as a result of competence acquired through yogic practices (*yogajanya-sāmarthyajanita*). The Mīmāṃsaka too, who is deadly opposed to the idea of omniscience (*sarvajñatva*)—particularly to the idea of perceptibility (lit. direct cognizability) of the transcendental merits and demerits (*dharma-adharma-sākṣātkāra*),—posits as a subsidiary (*aṅga*) to transcendental release (*mokṣa*) a kind of self-cognition (*ātma-jñāna*) which is, really speaking, yogic or transcendental.<sup>87</sup> In Vedānta, it is witness-consciousness -of-the-form-of-God (*Īśvara-sākṣi-caitanya*) that stands for transcendental perception. In Jaina philosophy, the Āgamic tradition insists that transcendental perception alone be treated as perception,<sup>88</sup> for according to this tradition, perception (*pratyakṣa*) is ex hypothesi something not born of sense-organs. Thus as a matter of fact, what the other philosophical systems treat as empirical perception is treated by the Āgamic Jaina tradition as a case not of perception (*pratyakṣa*) but of non-perceptual knowledge (*parokṣa*).<sup>89</sup> However, the logical tradition in Jaina philosophy divides perception into two kinds, designating as *sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa* what other systems call empirical perception and as *pāramārthika*

83. NS, 1. 1. 7; ibid. 2. 1. 69; VS, 6. 1. 1.

84. Yogasūtra, 3. 54; SK, 64.

85. VS, 9. 1. 13-15.

86. NB, 1. 11.

87. 'Sarvatraiva hi vijñānaṃ saṃskāratvena gamyate / Parāṅgaṃ cātma-vijñānādanyatretyavadhāraṇāt //'  
—Tantravārtika, p. 240.

88. Tattvārthasūtra, 1. 22.

89. Tattvārthasūtra, 1. 11.

*pratyakṣa* what they call transcendental perception. And the cause of *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* is, according to this tradition, *labdhi*, i. e. special competence of soul (*viśiṣṭa ātma-śakti*), which is, in a way, but the Jaina counterpart of 'competence acquired through yogic powers' (*yogaja dharma*).

## (2) CAN TRANSCENDENTAL PERCEPTION BE INDETERMINATE ?

The question next arises whether transcendental perception is exclusively indeterminate, or exclusively determinate, or both indeterminate and determinate. There is no unanimity in answering this question. According to the Buddhist logicians and the adherents of Śāṅkarite Vedānta, <sup>90</sup> transcendental perception has to be but indeterminate, and never determinate. Rāmānuja <sup>91</sup> holds a diametrically opposite view, viz. that all perception, empirical as well as transcendental, has to be but determinate and never indeterminate. <sup>92</sup> The other Vedīcist traditions like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. seem to be of the view that transcendental perception may be either indeterminate or determinate. We say "seem to be" because the staunch Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña (in *NSa*, p. 4) has clearly spoken of the two sorts of yogic perception, viz. indeterminate and determinate,—notwithstanding the fact that old texts like *Kaṇādasūtra* and *Praśastapādabhāṣya* contain no clear indication to that effect. According to the Jaina tradition, transcendental (i. e. *pāramārthika*) perception is of both sorts, indeterminate as well as determinate. For the Jaina's *avadhi-darśana* and *Kevalādarśana*, both of which are of the nature of 'cognition of the general, i. e. of mere existence' (*sāmānya-bodha*), are indeterminate transcendental perception, while his *avadhi-jñāna*, *manahparyāya-jñāna*, and *kevala-jñāna*, all of which are of the nature of 'cognition of the specific, i. e. of particulars' (*viśeṣa-bodha*), are determinate transcendental perception.

## (3) WHAT IS THE DETERMINANT (*niyānaka*) OF PERCEPTION-SHIP (*pratyakṣatva*)

The question next arises as to what element (*tattva*) is the determinant of perception-ship, that is, as to what is that on account of which a piece of cognition (*bodha*, *jñāna*) is called 'perception'. This question too has not been answered unanimously. According to neo-Śāṅkarite-Vedānta (*navya-Śāṅkara-Vedānta*), the determinant of perception-ship is that type of non-distinction (*abheda*) between consciousness-of-the-form-of-*pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-caitanya*) and consciousness-of-the-form-of-object (*viśaya-caitanya*) which *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*

90. Indian Psychology : Perception, p. 352.

91. 'Ataḥ pratyakṣasya kadācidapi na nirviśeṣaviśayatvam.'—Śrībhāṣya, p. 21.

92. As Panditji now recognizes, this formulation needs correction. Rāmānuja posits both the indeterminate and determinate sorts of perception, though he is of the view that the former type takes cognizance of 'existence' plus a fewer number of particulars (of the object concerned) while the latter that of 'existence' plus a large number of particulars. That is to say, Rāmānuja is not of the view that indeterminate perception takes cognizance of mere 'existence' (of the object concerned). This is why in the next Note Rāmānuja is not included among those who deny indeterminate perception.—Tr.

(p. 23) describes in details. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Buddhist, and Mīmāṃsā systems, the determinant of perception-ship is the fact of having been born of a contact (*sannikarṣa*), that is, whatever (cognition) is born of a contact—empirical or or transcendental—is perception. In the Jaina system, two things have been regarded as determinant of perception-ship ; thus according to the Āgamic tradition this determinant is the fact of being dependent (for its birth) on soul alone (*ātma-mātra-sāpekṣatva*) (*Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1. 12.) while according to the logical tradition, an additional determinant is the fact of having been born of sense-organs and *manas* (*indriya-mano-janyatva*) (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 1. 20.) Really speaking, the logical Jaina tradition follows the Vedicist systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc.

#### ( 4 ) POSSIBLE TYPES OF PERCEPTION :

The question arises as to whether perception is only of the indeterminate type or it can also be of the determinate type. In answer to it the Buddhist submits that perception can be only of the indeterminate type. The remaining systems are, however, of the view that perception can possibly be of both types, indeterminate as well as determinate. <sup>93</sup>

#### ( 5 ) A DEFINITION COMMON TO BOTH THE GENERATED AND ETERNAL TYPES OF PERCEPTION :

Uptil now, the philosophers, while defining perception, used to keep in view only the cases of generated perception ; but in medieval times, i. e. after the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system clearly made room for God in the shape of the creator of the universe and the author of the *Vedas*, Divine perception came to be regarded as an eternal verity, and hence there arose for the theistic philosopher the problem of formulating a definition common to the generated and eternal types of perception. The first attempt at formulating such a common definition seems to have been made by Bhāsarvajña ; for he defines perception (*pratyakṣa*) as “right non-indirect (i. e. direct) cognition” (*samyagaparokṣānubhava*) (*NSa*, p. 2), a definition applicable to the cases of generated as well as of eternal perception. Likewise, Śālikanātha, the follower of Prabhākara, when he characterized perception as “direct awareness” (*sākṣāt-pratīti*) (*PP*, p. 51), was only offering an alternative definition of perception that will cover the sensuous (*indriya-janya*) perception of external objects as also the non-sensuous (*indriya-ajanya*) perception of soul and of cognition (*PP*, p. 51.) Bhāsarvajña’s phrase “*aparokṣānubhava*” and Śālikanātha’s “*sākṣātpratīti*” were elucidated in a new terminology by the neo-Naiyāyikas when they offered as a definition common to the generated as well as eternal types of perception the phrase “a piece of cognition not having a piece of cognition for its *kaṛaṇa* (i. e. instrumental cause)” (*Muktāvali*, p. 52). Jaina logicians too were faced with the problem of formulating a common definition of perception. Of course, since the Jaina is no believer in eternal perception, the problem for him was not one of formulating a definition common to the generated and eternal types

93. For a more precise treatment of the problem see the next Note.— Tr.

of perception ; his problem rather was one of formulating a definition common to the empirical (*sāṃvyaṅhārika*) and transcendental (*pāramārthika*) types of perception. The problem seems to have been tackled for the first time by Siddhasena Divākara, for by characterizing perception as “cognition of a non-indirect (i. e. direct) type” (*aparokṣa jñāna*) he has turned “non-indirect cognizability” into a definition that is common to the empirical as well as transcendental types of perception ( *NA*, 4 ). We cannot be definite whether Bhāsarvajña’s employment of the word “*aparokṣa*” in his definition of perception is or is not influenced by the similar practice on the part of Siddhasena ; what is certain is that within the Jaina fold Siddhasena is the founder of the tradition of defining perception in general as “non-indirect cognition”.

#### ( 6 ) ELIMINATION OF DEFECTS :

Siddhasena no doubt defined perception in general as “non-indirect cognition”, but this definition suffers from a defect that cannot remain concealed from an acute-minded logician. The question is : If perception stands for “non-indirect cognition”, what does “indirect cognition”, stand for ? To say that indirect cognition stands for non-perceptual (*a-pratyakṣa, pratyakṣa-bhinna*) cognition will be to commit the fallacy of ‘mutual dependence’ (*anyonyāśraya*).<sup>94</sup> The first attempt in the direction of removing this defect and elucidating the nature of “non-indirectness” (*aparokṣatva*) seems to have been made by Bhaṭṭāraka Akalaṅka. For in crystal-clear words he declared that a cognition which is lucid (*viśada*) is perception (*Laghi*. 1. 3 ). This declaration did two things : it contained a general definition of perception and at the same time it removed the ‘mutual dependence’ above pointed out. For now perception was not defined in terms of ‘non-indirectness’ which stands in need of a prior definition of “indirectness”. Not only that, Akalaṅka’s skill in formulating definitions (*lākṣaṇikatā*) also unfolded (*spṛṇṇa*) the meaning of the term “*viśadya*” ( i. e. lucidity )—what is more, a meaning that applies to empirical perception as also to transcendental perception. “*Viśadya* ( i. e. lucidity )”, he says, “consists in generating a type of objective awareness (*pratibhāsa*) that is distinct from that generated by inference etc.” (*Laghi*., 1. 4 ) This attempt on Akalaṅka’s part at formulating a general definition of perception and at unfolding its meaning found reflection in all Jaina logicians—Śvetāmbara and Digambara—who came after him. Some of them substituted the word “*viśada*” by “*spaṣṭa*” ( e. g. *PNT*, 2. 2 ), others retained it ( e. g. *PM*, 2. 3 ).

As on so many others, so also on the question of defining perception, Āc. Hemacandra follows Akalaṅka, so much so that he has even retained the latter’s word “*viśada*” and his interpretation thereof. The fact of the matter is that Akalaṅka’s definition has become so deep-rooted that even the most modern logician Upādhyāya Yaśovijayajī, when he defines perception, bases himself on the same.

( *PMT*, pp. 132-35 ; *DC* I, pp. 155-59 )

94. The idea is that you cannot first define perception as ‘non-indirect cognition’ and then define indirect cognition as ‘non-perceptual cognition’. However, the identification of *parokṣa-jñāna* with *apratyakṣa-jñāna* is not at all invalid, and that is why we have elsewhere translated ‘*parokṣa-jñāna*’ as ‘non-perceptual cognition’.—Tr.

## 10. THE NATURE OF INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION

The three following meanings of the word “*darśana*” are current in all traditions:— (i) visual perception (e. g. *ghaṭa-darśana* = visual perception of jar), (ii) direct cognition (e. g. *ātma-darśana* = direct cognition of soul), (iii) a system of philosophy following a particular tradition (e. g. *Nyāya-darśana* = Nyāya system of philosophy; *Sāṅkhya-darśana* = Sāṅkhya system of philosophy). But two meanings of this word are peculiar to the Jaina tradition and are to be found in no other; they are (i) faith (*śraddhāna*) and (ii) cognition of the general (*sāmānya-bodha*) or bare cognition (*ālocana-mātra*).<sup>95</sup> Thus in Jaina Scriptures faith-in-truth (*tattvaśraddhā*) is called *darśana*; see, for example, *Tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam*. (*Tattvārthasūtra*, 1. 2). Likewise, the cognition (*bodha*) of a thing’s bare-existence-without-any-particulars (*nirviśeṣasattāmātra*) is also called *darśana*; see, for example, *Viśaya-viśayisannipātānantarasamudbhūtasattāmātragocaradarśanāt*. (*PNT*, 2. 7) In this way, there are, in all, five meanings of the word ‘*darśana*’, and we presently intend to consider the fifth of these meanings, viz. cognition of the general (*sāmānya-bodha*). Here six points deserve consideration :

### ( 1 ) ITS EXISTENCE ( *astitva* ) :

The existence of a type of cognition where a thing’s bare-existence (lit. self-nature) -without-any-particulars (*nirviśeṣaṇasvarūpamātra*) is revealed (*bhāsita*) is accepted, under one name or another, by all the traditions except three. That ‘cognition of the general’ which the Jaina calls ‘*darśana*’ is called ‘*nirvikalpaka*’ or ‘*ālocanamātra*’ by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and the Pūrva as well as Uttara Mīmāṃsā. The Buddhist tradition, too adopts for it the name “*nirvikalpaka*”. Thus all these traditions agree in maintaining that all cognitive process (*jñāna-vyāpāra*) invariably (*anivārya-rūpeṇa*) takes its rise in a cognition which grasps the bare existence (*sanmātrasvarūpa*) of the object concerned, but where nothing is revealed in the form of a qualifier or a qualificand (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-rupeṇa bhāsita*). But the two Vedāntist traditions of Madhva and Vellabha as also a third tradition

95. When we say that the word ‘*darśana*’ stands, in the Jaina tradition, for bare cognition or *ālocana* (also called ‘*anākāra upayoga*’) we are keeping in view the very much well known stand taken by both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions. Otherwise, the word is used in the two traditions in many other senses as well. For example, on one view, a piece of cognition (*bodha*) arising directly, that is, without requiring a probans (*liṅga*), is *anākāra-bodha* or *darśana* while that arising through the instrumentality of a probans is *sākāra-bodha* or *jñāna*; on another view, a piece of cognition grasping only the present entities (*varṭamānamātragrāhin*) is *darśana* while that grasping the present, past, as well as future entities (*traikālikagrāhin*) is *jñāna* (*Tattvārthabhāṣyaṭīkā*, 2. 9); finally, the Digambarite commentary (on *Saṭkhaṇḍāgama*) *Dhavalā* also adopts the view that a piece of cognition grasping only soul (*ātmamātrāvalokana*) is *darśana* while that grasping external objects (*bāhyārthaprakāśa*) is *jñāna*. This third view is mentioned in *Bṛhaddravayaṅgrahaṭīkā* (*Gāthā*, 44) as also in Abhayacandra’s commentary on *Laghī*, 1. 5.

of Bhartṛhari and the grammarians preceding him<sup>96</sup> do not admit the existence of 'cognition of the genral' anywhere in the course of cognitive process. According to all these three traditions, a piece of cognition that is revelatory of no particulars (*viśeṣa*) and of no relation of a qualifier to its qualificand (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*) is an impossibility ; thus on their showing, even in its most initial stage (*prāthamikadaśāpanna*) a piece of cognition brings to light some particular or other even if a mere gross (*sthūla*) one, and from this they conclude that all cognition whatsoever is determinate. And by indeterminate cognition they only understand the cognition which reveals comparatively fewer particulars (and not one which reveals *no* particulars). Of these three traditions which regard all cognition as determinate, the grammarian's seems to be the oldest, and maybe Madhva and Vallabha simply took it up from Bhartṛhari.

## ( 2 ) ITS DIVISION INTO THE EMPIRICAL AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL ( *lāukikālaukikatā* ) :

All the traditions which posit indeterminate cognition agree in admitting the existence of empirical indeterminate cognition, that is of indeterminate cognition born of sense-object contact, but the question is whether they also admit the existence of transcendental indeterminate cognition. Both the Jaina and Buddhist traditions posit a type of indeterminate cognition which arises independently of sense-object contact and on account of *yoga* or special competence of a soul (*viśiṣṭa-ātma-śakti*). Such a transcendental indeterminate cognition is known as *yogi-samvedana* in the Buddhist tradition and as *avadhi-darśana* and *kevala-darśana* in the Jaina tradition. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā systems admit the existence of *yogins* of various grades (*vividha kakṣā*) and of a yogic transcendental cognition on their part ; hence there seems to be no incongruity (*bādhaka*) in surmising that these systems too admit the existence of transcendental indeterminate cognition. And if this surmise be correct we can say that whichever system has posited indeterminate cognition has maintained that both determinate and indeterminate cognition may be either empirical or transcendental.

## ( 3 ) NATURE OF ITS OBJECT ( *viśayasvarūpa* ) :

All advocates of indeterminate cognition hold that indeterminate cognition has bare existence (*sattāmātra*) for its object, but they are not unanimous as to the nature of this existence (*sattā*). Hence it is that different systems happen to hold different views as to the object (*viśaya*) to be grasped (*grāhya*) by indeterminate cognition. According to the Buddhist tradition, 'existence' (*sattva*) stands for the capacity to perform a function (*arthakriyākāritva*) and can belong only to momentary particular (*kṣaṇikavyaktimātraparyavasita*), while according to Śāṅkarite Vedānta, it is the continuous (*akhaṇḍa*), ubiquitous (*sarvavyāpaka*) *Brahman*, which is neither limited in space (*deśa-baddha*) nor limited in time (*kāla-baddha*), that is of the nature of existence (*sattva-svarūpa*). According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā systems, 'existence' (*sattā*) stands for mere being (*astitva-mātra*) and is of

96. Indian Psychology: Perception, pp. 52-54.

the nature of a universal (*jātisvarūpa*), that is, something different from the 'existence' posited either in Buddhism or in Vedānta. In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Jaina systems, existence (*sattā*) is neither confined to a momentary particular, nor is of the nature of *Brahman* or of the nature of a universal. Since these three traditions preach the doctrine of permanence-in-change (*pariṇāmi-nityatva-vādin*), existence (*sattā*) is, according to them all, of the nature of origin-cum-destruction-cum-permanence (*utpāda-vyaya-dhrauṇya-svarūpa*). Be that as it may, the fact is undisputed that all advocates of indeterminate cognition treat bare existence as the object to be grasped by indeterminate cognition.

#### (4) ITS EXCLUSIVELY PERCEPTUAL CHARACTER

( *mātrapratyakṣa-rūpa* ) :

A type of cognition may be either perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) or non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) in character ; for example, determinate cognition is of this type, that is, it is either perceptual or non-perceptual in character. But all advocates of indeterminate cognition are of the view that indeterminate cognition is exclusively perceptual in character. Nobody says that a piece of indeterminate cognition may possibly be non-perceptual in character ; for a piece of indeterminate cognition, whether empirical or transcendental, since its origination (*utpatti*) is not mediated by (*vyavahita* ; dependent on) another piece of cognition, is a cognition of direct—and hence perceptual—character. However, the Jaina tradition should be taken as maintaining that indeterminate cognition (*darśana*) can possibly be non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) in character ; for even though the (later) Jaina logicians have chosen to call the really non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) *mati-jñāna* an “empirically perceptual cognition” (*sāṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa*) and are, to that extent, justified in likewise attributing the name “empirically perceptual cognition” also to that *darśana* (i. e. indeterminate cognition) which constitutes the starting-point of the *mati-jñāna*-process, the fact remains that the old Āgamic tradition—which is innocent of the distinction between a real (*pāramārthika*) and an empirical (*sāṃvyavahārika*) perception, and whose typical representative is *Tattvārthasūtra* 1. 11—treats *mati-jñāna* as exclusively non-perceptual (*parokṣa-mātra*) in character. Thus according to the (old Āgamic) Jaina tradition, sensuous indeterminate cognition (*indriyajanya darśana*) is non-perceptual (*parokṣa*)—and not perceptual (*pratyakṣa*)—in character. To sum up, following a particular (i.e. old Āgamic) convention adopted by the Jaina logicians, one may say that indeterminate cognition (*darśana*) can possibly be either perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) or non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) in character. So far as the *avadhi* and *kevala* types of indeterminate cognition (*darśana*) are concerned, they are exclusively perceptual in character (*mātra-pratyakṣa*) ; on the other hand, the sensuous type of indeterminate cognition (*indriyajanya darśana*) is (really) non-perceptual but empirically perceptual. Nevertheless, according to the (strict) Āgamic tradition, the sensuous type of indeterminate cognition is exclusively non-perceptual in character (*kevala parokṣa*) while the non-sensuous (*indriya-nirapekṣa*) types of indeterminate cognition, i. e. pieces of indeterminate cognition of the types *avadhi* etc., are exclusively perceptual (*kevala pratyakṣa*).

(5) ITS CAUSAL AGGREGATE ( *utpādaka-sāmagrī* ) :

The causal aggregate of the empirical indeterminate cognition (*laukika-nirvikalpaka*)—called *sāṃvṃyavahārika darśana* in the technical terminology of Jaina Logic—includes sense-object contact as also light etc. (in case needed). But transcendental indeterminate cognition (*alaukika-nirvikalpaka*)—called *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* in the technical terminology of Jaina Logic—originates on account of the special competence of a soul (*viśiṣṭa-ātmaśakti*) and without requiring sense-object contact. Thus on the question of the causal aggregate of indeterminate cognition, there is no difference between the Jaina and non-Jaina traditions. However, there is a peculiarity about the stand adopted by Śāṅkarite Vedānta on this question. For according to it, the impartite (*akhaṇḍa*) cognition-concerning-Brahman (*Brahmabodha*) originating from (the hearing of) the Great Utterances (*Mahāvākya*) like 'Tattvamasi' (i. e. That art thou) is also of an indeterminate type. Thus words are here considered to be a possible cause of indeterminate cognition, a position not acceptable to other traditions.

(6) ITS PRAMĀNA-SHIP ( *prāmāṇya* ) :

Even the non-Jaina traditions are not unanimous on the question whether indeterminate cognition is *pramāṇa*. The Buddhist and Vedānta systems not only treat indeterminate cognition as a *pramāṇa* but go to the extent of maintaining that it is the chief (*mukhya*) and the real (*pāramārthika*) *pramāṇa*. There is no unanimity within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika fold on the question whether indeterminate cognition is *pramāṇa*. According to the old tradition, indeterminate cognition is *pramāṇa* as has been made clear by Śrīdhara (in *Kand.*, p. 198); Viśvanātha too argues (in *Kārikāvali*, k. 134) that indeterminate cognition is *pramā* because whatever is not a case of illusory cognition (*bhrama-bhinna*) is *pramā*. But according to the new tradition founded by Gaṅgeśa, indeterminate cognition is neither *pramā* nor *apramā* (i. e. no *pramā*). For whether a piece of cognition is *pramā* or no *pramā* is, in this tradition, determined by whether this cognition presents the object concerned as qualified in this way or that (and by similar considerations) (*prakāratādi-ghaṭita pramātvā-apramātvā*), while indeterminate cognition, since it does not at all present its object as qualified in some way or other (*prakāratādi-śūnya*), is neither *pramā* nor no *pramā* (*Kārikāvali*, k. 135). Since on such matters the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Sāṅkhya-Yoga generally follow the lead of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, these former systems should be taken as adopting, on the question whether indeterminate cognition is *pramā*, the same type of views as have been adopted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. What particularly deserves notice is the stand maintained by the Jaina tradition on this question.

In the Jaina tradition, the question whether indeterminate cognition is *pramā* arose only after the advent of the Age of Logic—and not before. For in the preceding period, its approach to problems (*drṣṭi*) was exclusively ethico-spiritual (*mātra āgamic*), and from the ethico-spiritual standpoint the question does not at all arise whether indeterminate cognition (*darśanopayoga*) be called *pramāṇa* or *apramāṇa*. From this ethico-spiritual standpoint, a piece of cognition, whether indeterminate (*darśana*) or determinate (*jñāna*),

can be only right (*samyak*) or wrong (*mithyā*). Again, the rightness or wrongness of a cognition is here judged on the basis of spiritual considerations (*ādhyaत्मिकabhāvānusārin*). Thus according to this standpoint, in case a person (*ātman*) has reached at least the Fourth Stage in Spiritual Progress (*caturtha guṇasthāna*), i. e. has attained right-hood (*samyaktva*), all his cognition—whether pertaining to generalities or to particularities—are treated as right (*samyak*) and as conducive to transcendental release (*mokṣamārgarpa*). Thus from this ethico-spiritual standpoint, the indeterminate cognition of a person who is possessed of right-hood (*samyaktva-yukta ātman*) is right while that of a person who holds a wrong viewpoint (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi-yukta*) is wrong—so that even such indeterminate cognition as is ordinarily (*vyavahāre*) considered to be wrong, illusory, or contradicted, is right in case it occurs to a person-possessed-of-right-hood, while even such indeterminate cognition as is ordinarily considered to be non-illusory and uncontradicted is wrong, in case it occurs to a person-holding-wrong-viewpoint. <sup>97</sup>

The above relativistic account (*āpekṣika varṇana*), presented from the ethico-spiritual standpoint, of rightness and wrongness of indeterminate cognition is based on the fact that Abhayadeva—the commentator of *Sanmati*—has treated indeterminate cognition as *pramāṇa*, as also on the fact that Upādhyāya Yaśovijayajī has told us that even doubt etc. are cases of right cognition when accompanied by a right viewpoint (*samyag-dṛṣṭi-yukta*). Otherwise, the old Āgamic tradition—and one common to Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras—is not of this view, for according to it all indeterminate cognition—whether of the visual (*caḥṣu*) type, or the non-visual (*acaḥṣu*) type, or of the *avadhi* type—is just indeterminate cognition, that is to say, none of these indeterminate cognitions is here called either right or wrong or both right and wrong—unlike the determinate cognition (*jñāna*) of the *matī*, *śruta*, and *avadhi* types which are, each of them, divided into right one and wrong one. From this we are to conclude that indeterminate cognition (*darśana upayoga*), since it is utterly formless (*mātra nirākāra*), cannot be conceived of either as accompanied-by-a-right-viewpoint (*samyag-dṛṣṭi-yukta*) or as accompanied-by-a-wrong-viewpoint (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi-yukta*). That is to say, indeterminate cognition—be it of the visual type, or of the non-visual type, or of the *avadhi* type—is just indeterminate cognition, and should not be called either right indeterminate cognition (*samyag-darśana*) or wrong indeterminate cognition (*mithyā-darśana*). This is why all these types of indeterminate cognition are treated as mere indeterminate cognition in the First Stage of Spiritual Progress as in the Fourth Stage. The idea has been expressed by Gandhahasti Siddhasena as follows: “*Atra yathā sākārāddhāyaṃ samyagmithyā-dṛṣṭyorviśeṣaḥ naivamasti darśane, anākāratve dvayorapi tulyatvādityarthah*”.—*Tattvārthabhāṣyaṭīka*, 2. 9.

This much about the Āgamic (i. e. ethico-spiritual) standpoint according to which Umāsvāti has divided cognitions into right and wrong ones. But with the advent of the Age of Logic there arose the question of *pramā*-ship or otherwise of indeterminate cognition,

97. ‘Samyagdṛṣṭisambandhinām saṃśayādīnāmapi jñānatvasya Mahābhāṣyakṛtā paribhāṣitatvāt’—*Jñānabindu*, p. 139B; *Nandīsūtra*, 41.

and thought was given to this question not with spiritual considerations in view (*ādhyātmikabhāvānusārin*) but with objective considerations in view (*viśayānusārin*)—as was already being done by the logicians belonging to the non-Jaina traditions. So now we have to consider the question whether the logical Jaina tradition treats indeterminate cognition as *pramāṇa* or *apramāṇa* or both.

Even from the logical point of view there is no unanimity within the Jaina fold on the question whether indeterminate cognition is *pramā* or otherwise. Generally speaking, all logicians—whether Śvetāmbara or Digambara—place indeterminate cognition outside the sphere of *pramāṇas*. For they all seek to refute the Buddhist contention that indeterminate cognition is *pramāṇa*, and they all insert in their respective definitions of *pramāṇa* some word like 'nirṇaya' (i. e. determination) or 'jñāna',—a word standing for 'cognition of particulars' (*viśeṣopayoga-bodhaka*)—with a view to indicating that 'darśana' (i. e. indeterminate cognition), which stands for 'cognition of the general' (*sāmānya-upayoga*), falls outside the purview of these definitions.<sup>98</sup> Thus the logical tradition of not treating indeterminate cognition as *pramāṇa* is common to both Śvetāmbara and Digambara texts.

Abhayadeva—the commentator of *Sanmati*—no doubt calls (in *Sanmatiṭīkā*, p. 457) indeterminate cognition *pramāṇa*, but his statement should not be taken as formulated from the logical point of view. For while commenting on an Āgama-dependent (*āgamānusārin*) text like *Sanmati*, he keeps in view only the Āgamic (i. e. ethico-spiritual) standpoint and agrees to attribute the name '*pramāṇa*' to right, indeterminate cognition (*samyagdarśana*); but that he does not mean to treat indeterminate cognition as *pramāṇa* from the logical point of view, that is, on the basis of objective considerations, becomes clear from the context.

Of course, there appears to be involved a self-contradiction in Upādhyāya Yaśovijayajī's stand on the question of *pramā*-ship or otherwise of indeterminate cognition. Thus at one place he identifies indeterminate cognition with *naiścayika avagraha* that follows in the wake of *vyañjanāvagraha*,<sup>99</sup> and since it thus becomes a part and parcel of the *mati*-process it becomes a *pramāṇa* like *mati* itself. But at another place, viz. while interpreting Vādidevasūri's aphorism on the definition of *pramāṇa*, he says that the aphorism contains the word 'jñāna' with a view to excluding *darśana* (i. e. indeterminate cognition) from the purview of *pramāṇas* (*Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 1). Thus at one place his statement suggests that indeterminate cognition falls totally outside the sphere of *pramāṇas*, while at another place it suggests that indeterminate cognition, being of the nature of *avagraha*, somehow falls within the sphere of *pramāṇas*. To us it appears that his intention is somewhat different in this latter statement. For maybe he intends to say that *naiścayika avagraha*—which is no doubt a part and parcel of *mati*—is incapable of impelling-to-or-restraining-from-action (*pravṛtti-nivṛtti-vyavahāra-akṣama*) and is therefore not to be counted as a *pramāṇa*. And with this intention in mind he can maintain, without involving himself in a self-contradiction, that indeterminate cognition falls outside the sphere of *pramāṇas*.

98. Lagṇī. PKM, p. 8; PNT, 1. 2.

99. Tarkabhāṣā, p. 5; Jñānabindu, p. 138.

In *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* Āc. Hemacandra has, incidentally and thrice, expressed his views concerning indeterminate cognition. Thus while explaining the nature of *avagraha* he says that *darśana*, which is of the form of an indeterminate (*avikalpaka*) cognition, is not identical with *avagraha* but the material cause (*pariṇāmi-kāraṇa*; lit. 'cause that persists in the midst of changes') thereof and it is born after the sense-object contact but before *avagraha*. (*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, 1. 1. 26) Again, while dismissing as *apramāṇa* the indeterminate cognition posited (as *pramāṇa*) by the Buddhist he says that such a cognition is not *pramāṇa* because it is not-of-the-form-of-a-determination (*anadhyavasāya-svarūpa*) while cognition that is of the form of determination (*adhyavasāya, nirṇaya*) is alone *pramāṇa*. (*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, 1. 1.6) Lastly, while explaining the meaning of the term '*nirṇaya*' he says that it stands for the cognition which is not indeterminate (*anadhyavasāya, avikalpaka*) and is not of the form of doubt (*saṃśaya*). (*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, p. 3) All these statements of the Ācārya go to suggest that he considers to be identical with one another what the Jaina tradition calls '*darśana*' and what the Buddhist tradition calls '*nirvikalpaka*', and that he refuses to treat *darśana* as *pramāṇa* on the ground that it is of the form of an indeterminate cognition (*anirṇayasvarūpa*), a refusal made from the logical and not from the ethico-spiritual point of view—as was also the case with all other Jaina logicians barring Abhayadeva.

And what Āc. Hemacandra calls the material cause (*pariṇāmi-kāraṇa*) of *avagraha* should be taken to be identical with what Upādhyāyaji has called '*naiścayika avagraha*'.

(*PMT*, pp. 124-30 ; *DC I*, pp. 72-78)

## 11. THE NATURE OF SENSE-ORGANS

In connection with consideration of the nature of sense-organs the following topics are found to have been discussed by the philosophical systems :—

Etymological derivation (*nirukti*) of the word "*indriya*", the material cause (*kāraṇa*) of sense-organs, their number (*saṅkhyā*), their respective objects (*viśaya*), their form (*ākāra*), their mutual distinction and non-distinction (*pārasparika bhedābheda*), their species (*prakāra*), their capacity or otherwise to grasp a substance as well as its qualities (*dravya-guṇa-grāhitva-viveka*).

A perusal of the literature available to us has led us to opine that the earliest case of writing down an etymological derivation of the word "*indriya*" occurs in an aphorism of Pāṇini. <sup>100</sup> Though the available *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali contains no comments on the Pāṇinian aphorism offering the derivation in question, it is likely that some older Commentary or Commentaries did comment on this aphorism. Be that as it may, it seems clear that the occurrence in the Buddhist and Jaina texts of the Pāṇinian derivation of the word "*indriya*" is due to some sort of tradition (current among the Buddhist and Jaina circles) of studying Pāṇini's Grammar. And once this derivation found place in

100. 'Indriyamindraliṅgamindradṛṣṭamindrajṣṭamindradattamiti vā.'— 5. 2. 93.

so venerated (*pratiṣṭhita*) a Buddhist text as *Visuddhimagga* <sup>101</sup> and in so venerated a Jaina text as *Tattvārthabhāṣya* <sup>102</sup> it became a fit topic for all important philosophical texts that were subsequently composed in the Buddhist and Jaina traditions.

In this history of the etymological derivation of the word “*indriya*” two things are noteworthy. Firstly, the Buddhist grammarians—both those who wrote independently and those who commented on Pāṇini—have given this derivation a comparatively greater prominence in their writings; the independent Jaina grammarian Ācārya Hemacandra<sup>103</sup> has likewise given it a very great prominence in his aphoristic text on grammar and in his own commentary thereon. Secondly, leaving aside the case of some very late commentaries on *Pāṇinisūtras*, we do not come across the derivation in question in a philosophical text belonging to the Vedicist tradition as we do in those belonging to the Buddhist and Jaina traditions. As has happened in so many other cases, here also it seems that an etymological derivation offered by the grammarian found place in some philosophical texts of the Buddhists and Jains and thus became a topic for discussion also for philosophers.

An old Vedicist philosophical text like *Māṭharavṛtti* <sup>104</sup> no doubt contains an etymological derivation of the word “*indriya*”, but this derivation is peculiar (*vilakṣaṇa*) and is very different from that found in the Pāṇinian aphorism and in the Buddhist and Jaina philosophical texts.

It appears that in those old days the offering of an etymological derivation ( of the important words employed ) was considered to be so necessary a task that no intelligent (*buddhimān*) author could afford to neglect it. And while offering etymological derivations the authors would make ample exhibition of their ingenuity (*svatantra kalpanā*). This was done not only in the case of Prakrit and Pali words but also in that of Sanskrit words. Etymological derivation of the word “*indriya*” is an instance in point.

An interesting point is that when the etymological derivation of the word “*indriya*”—a derivation no more confined to the field of grammar—entered the field of philosophical speculation it began to bear a sectarian (*sāmpradāyika*) stamp. Thus Buddhaghoṣa, who

101. ‘Ko pana nesam indriyaṭṭho nāmāti? Indaliṅgaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho; indadesitaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho; indadiṭṭhaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho; indasiṭṭhaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho; indajutṭhaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho; so sabbopi idha yathāyogaṃ yujjati. Bhagavā hi sammāsaṃbuddho paramissariyabhāvato indo, kusalākusalaṃ ca kammaṃ kammesu kassa ci issiriyabhāvato. Tenevettha kammaṣaṅjanitāni tāva indriyāni kusalākusalakammaṃ ulliṅgenti. Tena ca siṭṭhānīti indaliṅgaṭṭhena indasiṭṭhaṭṭhena ca indriyāni. Sabbāneva panetāni Bhagavatā yathā bhūtato pakāsītāni abhisambuddhāni cāti indadesitaṭṭhena indadiṭṭhaṭṭhena ca indriyāni. Teneva Bhagavatā munīndena kānici gocarāsevanāya, kanici bhāvanāsevanāya sevītānīti indajutṭhaṭṭhenāpi indriyāni. Api ca ādhipacca-saṅkhātēna issariyaṭṭhenāpi etāni indriyāni. Cakkhuvīññāṇādippavattiyam hi cakkhādīnaṃ siddham ādhipaccam, tasmim tikkhe tikkhattā, mande mandattāti. Ayaṃ tāvettha atthato viniccayo.’—*Visuddhimagga* p. 491.

102. *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, 2. 15; *Sarvārthasiddhi* 1. 14.

103. ‘*Indriyam*’—*Haimasabdānuśāsana*, 7. 1. 174.

104. *In’ iti viṣayāṇāṃ nāma, tāninaḥ viṣayān prati dravantīti indriyāni.*—*Māṭharavṛtti*, k. 26.

otherwise follows Pāṇini in his derivation of the word “*indriya*”, understands the word “*indra*” to mean Sugata ( i. e. Buddha ) and thus seeks to justify his derivation. Jaina teachers, on the other hand, have understood the word “*indra*” to mean just a *jīva* or *ātman* ( i. e. soul ); thus unlike Buddhaghōṣa, they have not interpreted the word to mean a Spiritual Guide ( *tīrthaṅkara* ) they hold in veneration. Had the derivation in question been adopted by a Vedicist philosopher like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who believes in God’s creatorship of the world ( *iśvarakartṛtvavādin* ), he might have even interpreted the word “*indra*” to mean God and thus justified his derivation !

According to the Sāṅkhya system, the material cause ( *upādāna-kāraṇa* ) of sense-organs is *abhimāna* which is a kind of subtle substance ( *sūkṣma-dravya* ) born of *Prakṛti* ( *prakṛti-janya* )—( *SK, k. 25* ). The same is the Vedānta position. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the material cause of sense-organs are the five *bhūtas* like earth etc. which are all physical substances ( *jaḍa-dravya* )—( *NS, 1. 1. 12* ). The same is the Pūrva-mīmāṃsaka’s position. According to the Buddhist system, the five well-known sense-organs, since they are born of *rūpa*, are of the nature of *rūpa* which is a particular kind of physical substance ( *jaḍa-dravya-viśeṣa* ). The Jaina system likewise maintains that the material cause of sense-organs is a particular kind of *puḍgala*, i. e. a particular kind of physical substance ( *jaḍa-dravya-viśeṣa* ).

The five visible forms ( *bāhya ākāra* )—viz. ear-drum ( *karṇa-śaṣkulī* ), eye-ball ( *akṣi-golaka-kṛṣṇasāra* ), nose-cavity ( *tripuṭikā* ), tongue ( *jihvā* ), and skin ( *carman* )—which are popularly considered to be the auditory, the visual, the olfactory, the gustatory, and the tactile sense-organ respectively, are, according to all the philosophical systems, merely the locii ( *adhiṣṭhāna* ) of these various sense-organs and not the sense-organs themselves.<sup>105</sup> As for sense-organs, they are supposed to be certain supersensuous entities—whether born of *bhūta* ( as according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. ) or born of *ahaṅkāra* ( as according to the Sāṅkhya etc. )—residing in the visible forms in question. The Jaina system, by attributing the name “*dravyendriya*” to these physical locii of sense-organs, seeks to suggest this very idea, viz. that these locii are not themselves sense-organs. For according to the Jaina system as well, sense-organs are supersensuous ; however, they are not of the form of certain physical substances—of the *bhautika* or *āhaṅkārika* type—but of the form of certain capacities of the conscious type ( *cetana-śakti-viśeṣa-rūpa* ) technically called “*bhāvendriya*” or “*mukhyendriya*”. Over and above these, a sixth sense-organ ( *indriya* )—of the form of an internal sense-organ ( *antarindriya, antaḥkāraṇa* )—has been posited by all the systems under the name “*manas*”. These six cognitive sense-organs ( *buddhīndriya* ) may thus be regarded as a concept common to all the systems—except for the fact that the Sāṅkhya system makes the total eleven by positing five additional (sense)-organs like speech ( *vāk* ), hands ( *pāṇi* ), feet ( *pāda* ), etc. under the common name “*karmendriya*” ( i. e. conative sense-organ )—( *SK, k. 24* ). Just as Vācaspati and Jayanta<sup>106</sup> have argued against the Sāṅkhya idea of regarding the so-called “*karmendriyas*” as sense-organs, so also does Āc. Hemacandra who, on this point, simply follows the earlier Jaina teachers like

105. *NM*, p. 477.

106. *Tātp.*, p. 531 ; *NM*, p. 483.

Pūjyapāda etc. 107

Now here arises a question : When the ancient Jaina teachers like Pūjyapāda and the modern scholars like Vācaspati, Jayanta etc. offer a powerful refutation against the Sāṅkhya thesis of eleven sense-organs, why do they—or someone else—not refute—or even mention—the Buddhist *Abhidharma* thesis<sup>108</sup> of twenty-two sense-organs ? There is no ground for the supposition that these authors were not conversant with any Sanskrit *Abhidharma* text. What seems to have occurred to these authors is that since it is a routine custom (*sādhāraṇa prathā*) with the *Abhidharma* tradition to call a mental capacity (*mānasa śakti*) a sense-organ, it is no use mentioning or refuting this tradition (on the question of sense-organs).

That each of the six sense-organs has for its object (*grāhya viṣaya*) one fixed (*pratiniyata*) quality (or a group of qualities—as in the case of *manas*) from among sound, colour, smell, taste, touch, etc. is a view common to all the systems, but on the question of the perceptibility of a substance (*dravya*) the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system differs from others. The other systems, while admitting that different qualities are perceived by different sense-organs, further argue that since a quality is non-distinct from the substance of which it is a quality, all the sense-organs are competent to perceive qualities as well as substances ; this, however, is not the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā systems, according to both of which the visual sense-organ and the tactile sense-organ are alone competent to perceive substances (*Muktāvali*, ks. 53-56). It is this difference of opinion which Āc. Hemacandra, following the earlier Jaina teachers, brings out by offering a twofold etymological derivation of the words “*sparśa*” etc.—one derivation, viz. *bhāva-pradhāna vyutpatti*, making these words stand for the qualities ‘touch’ etc., and the other, viz. *karma-pradhāna vyutpatti*, making them stand for the substances ‘touched’ etc.

The discussion whether there is only one sense-organ or there are many of them is very old in philosophical traditions—(*NS*, 3. 1.52). Some are of the view that there is only one sense-organ, and they defend their position by suggesting that this one sense-organ undertakes different functions (*kārya*) from different seats (*sthāna*) ; this view is opposed by those who believe in the plurality of sense-organs and who therefore insist that sense-organs are many and nothing but many. Āc. Hemacandra, adopting a non-absolutistic approach characteristic of the Jaina mode of argumentation and following the tradition laid down by the old Jaina teachers, works out a synthesis of the view that the different sense-organs are absolutely different from one another and the view that they are absolutely identical with one another ; he also answers the objections that these extremist views urge against each other.

107. Tattvārthabhāṣya, 2. 15 ; Sarvārtahasiddhi, 2. 15.

108. Katamāni dvāvīṃśatiḥ. Cakṣurindriyaṃ śrotrendriyaṃ ghrāṇendriyaṃ jihvendriyaṃ kāyendriyaṃ mana-indriyaṃ strīndriyaṃ puruṣendriyaṃ jīvitendriyaṃ sukhendriyaṃ duḥkhendriyaṃ saumana-syendriyaṃ daurmanasyendriyaṃ upekṣendriyaṃ śraddhendriyaṃ vīryendriyaṃ samādhīndriyaṃ prajñendriyaṃ anājñātamañjñāsyāmīndriyaṃ ājñendriyaṃ ājñātāvīndriyaṃ.—Sphuṭārthā, p. 95 ; Visuddhimagga, p. 491.

The question as to what number of sense-organs are possessed by this or that species of living beings (*svāmitva-cintā*) is also considered by the philosophical systems, but no other system discusses this question in so great details as does the Jaina. The Buddhist system discusses the question—but in lesser details than the Jaina. Āc. Hemacandra presents the entire Jaina stand on this question by quoting verbatim from *Tattvārthasūtra* and its *Bhāṣya* (both following the eleven *Āṅgas*).

(PMT, pp. 38-41 ; DC I, pp. 134-38)

## 12. THE NATURE OF MANAS

Philosophers hold different views as to the nature (*svarūpa*), material cause (*kāraṇa*), function (*kārya*), attributes (*dharma*), locus (*sthāna*), etc. of *manas*, and these views are, in short, as follows. Vaiśeṣikas (*VS*, 7. 1. 23), Naiyāyikas (*NS*, 3.2.61), and Pūrva-mīmāṃsakas—who follow the former two (*PP*, p. 151) are of the view that *manas* is atomic in size and hence eternal and causeless. According to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Vedānta (which follows the Sāṅkhya-Yoga), *manas* is not atomic (*paramāṇu*) but quite small (*aṇu*) in size and is a produced (*janya*) entity born either out of the *prākṛtika* element *ahankāra* or out of nescience (*avidyā*).<sup>109</sup> According to the Buddhist and Jaina traditions, *manas* is neither ubiquitous nor atomic in size ; they regard it as medium-sized (*madhyama-parimāṇavat*) and a produced entity. According to the Buddhist tradition,<sup>110</sup> *manas* is of the nature of cognition (*viññāna*) and in the form of the cognition of one particular moment it is a peculiar type of cause (technically called '*samanantara kāraṇa*') of the cognition of the succeeding moment. According to the Jaina tradition, *paudgalika manas* is born of the extremely subtle physical substance called '*manovargaṇā*' and it, like body, undergoes change every moment ; on the other hand, '*bhāva-manas*', since it is of the nature of cognitive potency (*jñāna-śakti*) and cognition (*jñāna*), is born of the conscious substance (*cetana-dravyajanya*).

According to all the systems, it is the function of *manas* to produce qualities like desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, etc. and the experience of these qualities—even though these qualities belong to *ātman* according to the systems like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Jaina, etc., to *antaḥkāraṇa* according to the systems like Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Vedānta, etc.,<sup>111</sup>

109, 'Yasmāt karmendriyāṇi buddhīndriyāṇi ca sātvikādahankārādōtpadyante mano'pi tasmādeva utpadyate.'—Māṭharavṛtti, k 27.

110. 'Viññānaṃ prativijñaptiḥ mana āyatanam ca tat / Śaṅāmanantarātītam viññānaṃ yaddhi tanmanaḥ //—Abhidharmakośa, 1. 16. 17 ; TS, k. 631, 'Yat yatsamanantarairuddham viññānaṃ tattanmanodhāturiti. Tadyathā sa eva putro'nyasya pitrākhyāṃ labhate tadeva phalamanyasya bījākhyāṃ. Tatthehāpi sa eva cakṣurādiviññānadhāturanyasyāśraya iti manodhātāvākhyāṃ labhate. Ya eva ṣaḍ viññānadhātavaḥ sa eva manodhātuḥ. Ya eva ca manodhātusta eva ṣaḍ viññānadhātava itītaretarāntarbhāvaḥ ...Yogācāradarśanena tu ṣaḍ viññānavyatirikto'pyasti manodhātuḥ.'—Sphuṭārthā, p. 40, 41.

111. 'Tasmāccittasya dharmā vṛttayo nātmanaḥ.'—Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha, Pātañjala., p. 352.

and to *manas* itself according to the Buddhist system. *Manas* has a role to play in the generation of (lit. is a *nimitta* of) cognition-through-an-external-sense-organ (e. g. cognition of colour etc.) as also in the generation of cognition-without-an-external-sense-organ (e.g. cognition of desire etc. ) and of similar (i. e. psychological) qualities. No system except the Buddhist maintains that desire, aversion, cognition, pleasure, pain, impression, etc. are the qualities of *manas*. For according to the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Jaina systems, these are the qualities of *ātman* (i. e. soul), while according to the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Vedānta systems, they are the qualities of *antaḥkaraṇa* ; on the other hand, the Buddhist system, since it posits no *ātman* apart from *manas* (technically called *nāma*), maintains that desire, aversion, cognition, impression, etc. (which, according to the other systems, are the qualities of *ātman* or of *antaḥkaraṇa*) are the qualities of *manas* itself.

Some philosophical traditions—e. g. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist<sup>112</sup>—treat *manas* as located inside the heart (*hṛdaya-pradeśa-vartin*). But the traditions like Sāṅkhya-Yoga cannot treat *manas* as located inside the heart ; for according to them, *manas* is a part and parcel of subtle body (technically called *liṅga śarīra*) composed of eighteen elements, and since it seems proper to suppose that the subtle body occupies the entire gross body it should follow that according to the traditions in question, *manas* occupies the entire gross body. As for the Jaina tradition, it is unanimous that *bhāva-manas* is located inside the *ātman*, but there is difference of opinion as to the location of *dravya-manas*. Thus *dravya-manas* is located inside the heart according to the Digambara tradition, while we come across no mention of any such position in the Śvetāmbara tradition. It appears that the Śvetāmbara tradition is of the view that *dravya-manas* occupies the entire gross body.

(PMT, pp.42-43 ; DC I,—139-40).

### 13. THE NATURE OF ĀTMAN AND THE MODE OF ITS REVELATION

[ I ]

All the systems which believe in transmigration (*punarjanma*) and transcendental release (*mokṣa*) posit an element *ātman* (i.e. soul) apart from the physical entities like body etc. This *ātman* may be regarded as ubiquitous by some and as non-ubiquitous by others, as one by some and as many by others, as momentary by some and as eternal by others, but all have to posit nescience (*ajñāna*) or something of the sort as the causal factor responsible for transmigration. Hence all philosophers have to face the following questions :—When did the causal factor responsible for transmigration come to be related with *ātman*, and what is the nature of this relation ? If this relation is beginningless, how can it come to an end ? Once this relation is ended, what prevents it from being established again ? And these questions have been answered in an essentially identical

112. 'Tāmraparṇīyā api hṛdayavastu manovijñānadhātorāśrayaṃ kalpayanti.'—Sphuṭārthā, p. 41.

fashion though in different technical languages by all the different systems which posit transcendental release in the form of cessation of the transmigratory cycle (*apunarārttirūpa mokṣa*).

All are unanimous in maintaining that the relation with *ātman* of the causal factor responsible for transmigration is beginningless ; for all of them are of the view that it is impossible to determine the time when this relation originated, if at all *Ajñāna*, *avidyā*, *karma*, or whatever be the name given to the causal factor responsible for transmigration, all have to posit such a relation of the non-physical element (*amūrta tattva*) *ātman* with some subtlest physical element (*sūkṣmatama mūrta-tattva*) as continues so long—and only so long—as *avidyā* or *ajñāna* or (i. e. nescience) lasts. There is therefore no dispute among the dualist (*dvaitavādin*) systems as to there taking place a relation between the physical and the non-physical. And just as *ajñāna*, even if beginningless, comes to an end, so also does this relation (between the physical and the non-physical) come to an end—after knowledge (*jñāna*) has destroyed *ajñāna*. And since no defect whatsoever—and hence no *ajñāna* etc.—can possibly arise after the acquisition of complete knowledge (*pūrṇa jñāna*), the general relation between the physical and the non-physical (i. e. their bare existence by the side of one another), which is no doubt there even in the state of transcendental release but is now not born of *ajñāna*, results in no transmigration (after the attainment of transcendental release). That is to say, the relation between the physical and the non-physical is born of *ajñāna* in the state of transmigration and is not so born in the state of transcendental release.

*Ātman*, while in transmigratory state, is, in a peculiar way, associated with *prakṛti* according to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, with atoms according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, with *avidyā* or *māyā* according to Vedānta, with *rūpa* according to the Buddhist, and with *karmic* atoms (*karmāṇu*) according to the Jaina (the technical name for *ātman* being 'puruṣa' in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system and 'nāma' in the Buddhist). All these views have arisen in the course of reflection on transmigration and transcendental release.

(PMT, pp. 34-35 ; Not selected in DC)

[ 2 ]

With Indian philosophers *ātman* has always been the chief and the final topic of contemplation ; the rest of their concepts have arisen during the course of their investigation into (the nature of) *ātman*. This explains why a good number of views—quite contradictory of one another—as to the existence and nature of *ātman* have made their appearance in the philosophical literature since very old past. In the pre-Upaniṣadic times we already come across systems which posit an absolutely permanent (*sarvathā nitya*), i. e. permanent-devoid-of-change (*kūṭastha*), *ātman* and which are known as *Aupaniṣada*, *Sāṅkhya*, etc. The Buddhist idea of an absolutely momentary soul (technically called 'citta' or 'nama') is at least as old as Gautama Buddha. An intermediary trend between the extremist doctrines (*ekānta*) of absolute eternity (*sarvathā-nityatya-vāda*) and absolute momentariness

(*sarvathā-kṣaṇikatva-vāda*)—a trend synthesizing these two—is the doctrine of permanence-in-change (*nityānityatvavada*) which has found a clear-cut application to the teaching on *ātman* at the hands of Mahāvīra in the (Jaina) Āgamas—(*Bhagavatī*, Ś. 7 ; *Uttarādhyayana*, 2). An extremely lucid and logical defence of the Jaina thesis on *ātman's* permanence-in-change comes from Kumārila—that prince of the Mīmāṃsakas (*Mīmāṃśaka-dhurīṇa*)—(*SV, Ātma.*, Śl. 28 ff.) in the same fashion as is found in the Jaina texts on Logic. In this connection Āc. Hemacandra has corroborated the Jaina view-point by a verbatim quotation of verses from *Tattvasaṅgraha*, but these verses, being in fact a summary of the corresponding verses of Kumārila's *Ślokavārtika*, represent the Mīmāṃsā viewpoint itself.

Rudiments (*bija*) of the views as to whether cognition and *ātman* are self-revelatory (*sva-prakāśa*) or not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*) are to be met with also in the literature of the Age of Scriptures,<sup>113</sup> but the elucidation and corroboration of these views chiefly took place in the Age of Logic. Only from the viewpoint of Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila, according to whom a piece of cognition is unknowable-through-perception (*jñāna-parokṣa-vādin*), has it been proved that cognition as well as *ātman*—an entity which is non-different (*abhinna*) from cognition—are unknowable-through-perception (*parokṣa*), that is, are exclusively not-self-revelatory (*mātra parāvabhāsin*). On the other hand, from the viewpoint of Yogācāra Buddhism, it turns out that since there exists nothing apart from consciousness (*viññāna* ; cognition) and since consciousness is self-cognizable (*sva-saṃvidita*) cognition as well as *ātman*—an entity which is of the nature of cognition (*jñānarūpa*) are exclusively self-revelatory (*mātra svāvabhāsin*). Here also the Jaina system adopts a position that is in conformity with its non-absolutistic nature. Thus Siddhasena is the first among Jaina logicians to have frankly declared that cognition as well as *ātman* are self-revelatory (*svāvabhāsin*) as well as not-self-revelatory (*parāvabhāsin*) (*NA*, 31). Āc. Hemacandra has merely repeated Siddhasena.

One of the adjectives through which Devasūri has sought to distinguish the Jaina view of *ātman* from the non-Jaina views is 'body-sizedness' (*dehavyāpīva*) (*PNT*, 7. 54, 55). Āc. Hemacandra has not included this adjective in his aphorism laying down the Jaina view of *ātman*. As a result of this omission there arises (in view of the already existing identity between the Jaina and Kumārilite views on *ātman's* permanence-in-change) the danger of the Jaina view of *ātman's* size being confused with the Kumārilite view of the same. With a view to obviating this danger, Āc. Hemacandra pointedly remarks that he subscribes to the doctrine of a body-sized soul but that, unlike other Jaina teachers, he has made no mention to that effect in the aphorism because that would serve no purpose in the present context.

( *PMT*, pp. 70-71 ; *DC* I, pp. 113-14)

113. 'Tasya bhāsā sarvamiḍaṃ vibhāti. Tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvam.'—Kaṭhopeniṣad, 5. 15.

[ 3 ]

In the aphorism Āc. Hemacandra has characterized *ātman* as self-revelatory (*svāvabhāsin*) as well as not-self-revelatory (*parāvabhāsin*). We have already made brief remarks on these two adjectives : the following comments are being added because it is necessary to view the issue from another possible angle.

The word “*svāvabhāsin*” (i. e. self-revelatory) may mean either ‘that which reveals itself’ or ‘that which is revealed by itself’, but there is no material difference between these two meanings. For both seek to convey the idea of “self-luminosity” (i. e. *sva-prakāśatva*) which, in its turn, stands for self-perceptibility (*sva-pratyakṣatva*). But the two meanings yielded by the word “*parāvabhāsin*” (i. e. not-self-revelatory) are by no means identical. ‘That which reveals a not-self, i. e. something other than itself’ is the first meaning and one which is mentioned by Āc. Hemacandra himself in the commentary ; ‘that which is revealed by a not-self, i. e. by something other than itself’ is the second meaning. These two meanings seek to convey two different ideas ; for the first indicates that *ātman* is by nature an illuminator of other things (*svabhāvataḥ para-prakāśaka*), the second that *ātman* itself is by nature illuminable only by something other than itself (*svabhāvataḥ para-prakāśya*). Here it has to be understood that the second of these meanings (viz. ‘that which is revealed by something other than itself’) is intended to stand for the *ātman*’s being perceived by something other than itself ; the first meaning (viz. ‘that which reveals something other than itself’) on the other hand, is intended to stand for the *ātman*’s being just a revealer of other things—be this revelation perceptual or non-perceptual. Now all those systems which posit entities other than *ātman* do treat *ātman* as the revealer of things other than itself (i. e. *parāvabhāsin* in the first meaning) ; and on all these views, just as *ātman* is revealer of things other than itself, be the revelation perceptual or non-perceptual, so also it is, somehow or other, revealer of itself as well. Hence the difference of opinion among philosophers centres around the question whether *ātman* is or is not its own perceiver (i. e. not around the question whether *ātman* is or is not its own revealer).

Only those systems can be the advocates of *ātman*’s self-perceptibility which are of the view that cognition is self-perceptible and that it is identical—totally or partly—with *ātman*. Thus the Śāṅkarite and Rāmānujite schools of Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems, the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism, and the Jaina system are of the view that *ātman* is self-perceptible (*sva-pratyakṣa*)—even though some of these systems maintain that *ātman* is of the nature of pure and eternal consciousness (*śuddha nitya caitanya*), others that it is of the nature of generated cognition (*janya jñāna*), still others that it is of the nature of consciousness as well as cognition ; for all these systems are of the view that *ātman* is (somehow) identical with cognition while all cognition is self-perceptible. Kumārila is the only philosopher who is of the view that cognition is non-perceptible (*parokṣa*) but that (as in Vedānta) *ātman* is self-perceptible (*sva-pratyakṣa*). The reason seems to be that Kumārila (unconditionally) accepts the scriptural account of *ātman*’s nature, while the scriptures are categorical in preaching the self-revelatory character of

*ātman*. This explains why Kumārila, <sup>114</sup> in spite of his advocacy of the non-perceptibility of cognition, is left with no alternative but to treat *ātman* as self-perceptible. <sup>115</sup>

The view that *ātman* is perceived by something other than itself (*para-pratyakṣa*) can be maintained only by those systems which treat cognition as somehow different from *ātman* but a quality thereof, be this cognition self-perceptible (as according to Prabhākara) or not-self-perceptible (as according to the Naiyāyika). Thus, according to Prabhākara, *ātman* is perceptually revealed (*pratyakṣarupeṇa bhāsita*) in all cognition (*samvit*) whatsoever, be this cognition perceptual, inferential, or of any other type. There is a difference of opinion in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. The system's adherents, old as well as new, are unanimous in preaching that *ātman* is perceptible by something other than itself (*para-pratyakṣa*) so far as the case of a *yogin* is concerned; for all of them are of the view that *ātman* is directly observed (*sākṣātkāra*) in yogic perception. <sup>116</sup> They however hold divergent views on the question so far as it concerns the case of an ordinary mortal (*asmaḍādi arvāgdarśin*). The old Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika teachers treat an ordinary mortal's *ātman* as an object of inference (*anumeya*)<sup>117</sup>—and not at all of perception, while the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika teachers, by treating such an *ātman* as an object of mental perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*), <sup>118</sup> bring it under the category "perceptible by something other than itself" (*para-pratyakṣa*).

Those who regard cognition as something different from *ātman* are bound to maintain that no cognition, yogic or otherwise, being present in the state of transcendental release (*mokṣa*), an *ātman*, while in that state, is neither a direct observer (*sākṣātkartā*) nor an object of direct observation (*sākṣātkāra-viṣaya*). There is a vast variety of views on this question which is, however, here out of context.

(PMT, pp. 136-37; DC I, pp. 115-16.)

#### 14. THE BUDDHIST DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

In Buddhist Logic there are two traditions of defining 'perception'—one which does not include the word "non-illusory" (*abhrānta*) in the definition, the other which does. The first tradition is initiated by Dinnāga, the second by Dharmakīrti. Thus the definition and description given in *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (1. 3) and *Nyāyapraveśa* (p. 7) follow the first tradition, those given in *Nyāyabindu* (1. 4) and its commentary by Dharmottara etc. the second. Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* (k. 1214) lends support to the

114. 'Ātmanaiva prakāśyo' yamātmā jyotirīritam!—SV, Ātma., Śl. 142.

115. In the light of this, we should correct the earlier formulation where it was said that both cognition and *ātman* are, according to Kumārila, exclusively not-self-revelatory.—Tr.

116. 'Yuñjānasya yogasamādhijamātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣādātmā pratyakṣa iti.'—NBh, 1. 1. 3; 'Ātmanyātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam.'—VS, 9. 1. 11.

117. 'Ātmā tāvat pratyakṣato na gr̥hyate.'—NBh, 1.1.10; 'Tatrātmā ca manaścāpratyakṣe'—VS, 8. 1. 2.

118. 'Tadevamahampratyayaviṣayatvādātmā tāvat pratyakṣaḥ'—NV, p. 342; 'Ahaṅkārasyaśrayo'yam manomātrasya gocaraḥ.'—Kārikāvali, k. 55.

second, i. e. Dharmakīrti's, tradition. It seems that by the time of Śāntarakṣita the Buddhist logicians had already been grouped in two camps, of which one, taking the definition of perception to be complete without the inclusion of the word "non-illusory", sought to apply Diñnāga's definition even to the cases of (illusory) perception of yellow conch-shell etc. (*TS*, k. 1324). Śāntarakṣita answers this group (of Buddhist logicians) in such a manner that justice is done to Diñnāga's definition-without-the-word-"non-illusory" while at the same time a real value (*vāstavikatva*) is attached to Dharmakīrti's tradition of including the word "non-illusory" in the same definition. In the eyes of Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla, Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti deserved equal honour, and that is why they sought to harmonize the two mutually contradictory traditions current among the Buddhist logicians.

In the non-Buddhist texts on Logic both these Buddhist traditions are sought to be assailed. In Bhāmaha's *Kāvya-lankāra* (5. 6, p. 32) and Uddyotakara's *Nyāya-vārtika* (1. 1. 4, p. 41) mention is made of Diñnāga's definition of perception, while in the writings of all the post-Uddyotakara Vedicist authors—e. g. Vācaspati (*Tātp.*, p. 154), Jayanta (*NM*, p. 52), Śrīdhara (*Kand.*, p. 190), and Śālikanātha (*PP*, p. 47) it is Dharmakīrti's definition that is put forth as a prima facie view.

In the course of their refutation of the Buddhist definition of perception, the Jaina teachers have made mention of and argued against both the Diñnāgite and the Dharmakīrtian traditions. In *Nyāyāvātāra*—supposed to be written by Siddhasena Divākara—the definition of *pramāṇa* formulated according to the Jaina tradition includes the word "bādha-varjita" (i. e. immune from contradiction), and the question is worthy of consideration whether it is a reflection (*pratibimba*) of the word "avyabhicārin" occurring in Akṣapāda's definition of perception (*NS*, 1. 1. 4), or an imitation (*anukṛti*) of the word "bādha-varjita" occurring in the definition (of *pramāṇa*)—attributed to Kumārila—*Tatrā-pūrvārthavijñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ bādha-varjitam*, or a paraphrase (*rūpāntara*) of the word "abhrānta" occurring in Dharmakīrti (*NB*, 1. 4), or an original idea (*maulika udbhāvana*) of Divākara himself. In any case, it is definite that Āc. Hemacandra's refutation of the Buddhist definition of perception keeps in view the Dharmakīrtian and not the Diñnāgite tradition. (*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, p. 23).

On the question of interpreting the word "kalpanā"—a constituent of the phrase "kalpanāpoḍha" (i. e. free from *kalpanā*)—occurring in the Buddhist definition of perception several different views were current among the Buddhist logicians, a situation, of which some idea can be formed from Śāntarakṣita's detailed discussion of the matter (*TS*, k. 1214 ff). The refutation of the Buddhist position undertaken in the Vedicist and Jaina texts on Logic—a refutation so full of consideration of the various pros and cons (*ūhāpohātamaka*)—is also a testimony to the fact that different meanings were being attached to the word "kalpanā".<sup>119</sup> Particularly, when we glance at that exclusively refutative (*kevala khaṇḍana-pradhāna*) text *Tattopaplava* (p. 41) we have before our eyes a huge

119. *NV*, p. 41; *Tātp.*, p. 191; *NM*, pp. 92-95; *TSV*, p. 185; *PKM*, p. 18. B.

collection of almost all the current and possible meanings of the word “*kalpanā*” and of almost all the possible views held on the question.

Notwithstanding all this, Āc. Hemacandra mentions in his text not all but just one of the views on the nature of *kalpanā*—the one which is offered by Dharmakīrti (*NB*, I. 5) and is accepted and defended also by Śāntarakṣita (*TS*, k. 1214).

(*PMT*, pp. 50-51 ; *DC I*, pp. 160-61)

### 15. THE MĪMĀMSĀ DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

In the Mīmāṃsā system the first indication as to the nature of *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* (i. e. perceptual knowledge) is to be found in Jaimini’s aphorism (1. 1. 4). On this aphorism, interpretations and comments—other than what we find in Śābara’s *Bhāṣya*—were offered. Among these, Bhavadāsa’s interpretation was to the effect that in the aphorism in question a definition is predicated of the word “perception” (*pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-vidhāyaka*) (*SV*, *Nyāyaratnākaraṭīkā*, *Pratyakṣa.*, Śl. 1) ; on the other hand, according to another interpretation, the word “perception” is here predicated of a definition (*pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-anuvādaka* *SV*, *Pratyakṣa*, Śl. 16).<sup>120</sup> Besides, there was a commentary (*Śābarabhāṣya*, 1. 1. 5) which read the aphorism differently by introducing in its word-order a change to the effect that the words ‘*ta*’ and ‘*sa*’ should exchange their places.

Kumārila has refuted the view that in the aphorism a definition is predicated of the word “perception”, as also the view that in it the word “perception” is predicated of a definition ; but finally, he lends support, in a novel fashion, to the view that in the aphorism the word “perception” is predicated of a definition (i. e. that the aphorism sets forth a definition of perception). Again, Kumārila has refuted—as has also been done by Prabhākara in *Bṛhatī*—the view according to which the word-order of the aphorism needs a change (*SV*, *Pratyakṣa*, Śl. 1-39). This Jaimini’s aphorism on the definition of perception has been refuted by all non-Mīmāṃsā logicians—Vedicist, Buddhist, as well as Jaina. In the Buddhist tradition it seems to have been refuted for the first time by Diñnāga (*PS*, 1. 37), and Śāntarakṣita etc. have followed suit. In the Vedicist tradition it seems to have been refuted for the first time by Uddyotakara (*NV*, p. 43). Vācaspati simply comments on Uddyotakara (*Tātp*, p. 155), but Jayanta (*NM*, p. 100) has elaborated this refutation and quite independently. In the Jaina tradition the first refutation of the definition in question seems to have come from either Akalaṅka or Vidyānanda (*TSV*, p. 187, Śl. 37) whom Abhayadeva (*SMT*, p. 53) etc. follow. The way Āc Hemacandra has followed the earlier Jaina logicians on the question of refuting Jaimini’s aphorism is but a reflection of Jayanta’s corresponding performance in *Mañjarī* (p. 100), as is also the case with other Jaina texts on Logic (*SVR*, p. 381).

In the course of his refutation Āc Hemacandra refers to Kumārila’s manner of maintaining that in the aphorism the word “perception” is predicated of a definition, as also to that suggestion for introducing a change in the word-order of the aphorism.

(*PMT*, pp. 51-52 ; *DC I*, p. 162)

120. Thus on Bhavadāsa’s interpretation the aphorism gives an additional information concerning perception, while on the second interpretation, it sets forth a definition of perception.—Tr.

## 16. THE SĀNKHYA DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

In the Sāṅkhya tradition there are three ways of defining perception : the first is Vindhyaśāsin's definition which Vācaspati (*Tātp*, p. 155) quotes under the name of Vārṣaṅya, the second is Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's definition (*SK*, k. 5), and the third the definition given in *Sāṅkhyasūtra* (1. 89).

The Buddhists, Jainas, as well as Naiyāyikas have refuted the Sāṅkhya definition of perception. But the noteworthy thing is that the definition of Vindhyaśāsin has been refuted by all, that of so old a teacher Īśvara-kṛṣṇa by Jayanta alone (*NM*, p. 119), while that given in *Sāṅkhyasūtra* by not even a single ancient teacher.

The first Buddhist critic of the definition in question seems to be Diñnāga (*PS*, 1. 27), the first Naiyāyika critic Uddyotakara (*NV*, p. 43), and the first Jaina critic Akalaṅka (*Nyāyaviniścaya*, 1. 165).

Āc Hemacandra in his refutation of the Sāṅkhya definition follows the earlier teachers, but this refutation particularly resembles that of Jayanta (*NM*, p. 109). For it was Jayanta alone who refuted Vindhyaśāsin's way of defining perception as also Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's, and Āc. Hemacandra simply repeats Jayanta's words in his refutation of the two definitions.

(*PMT*, pp. 52-53 ; *DC I*, p. 163).

### ( iii ) O n P r o b l e m s o f I n f e r e n c e

## 17. THE NATURE OF INFERENCE AND THE HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT IN INDIAN LOGIC

The word "*anumāna*" (i.e. inference) means two things, viz. inferential cognition (*anumiti*) and the instrument of inferential cognition (*anumiti-karaṇa*). Thus when the word stands for an abstraction (*bhāvavācin*) it means inferential cognition, when it stands for an instrument (*karaṇavācin*) it means instrument of inferential cognition.

The word "*anumāna*" consists of two parts, viz. "*anu*" and "*māna*". "*Anu*" means 'after' and "*māna*" means 'cognition', so that "*anumāna*" means 'a cognition taking place after some other cognition'. But this other cognition has to be a particular type of cognition, a type which alone acts as the cause of inferential cognition ; and 'cognition of pervasion (*vyāptijñāna* ; cognition of invariable concomitance), otherwise known as 'consi-

deration of the probans' (*liṅgaparāmarśa*), is the type in question. One outstanding difference between perceptual cognition and inferential cognition is that the former is not necessarily caused by another cognition while the latter is necessarily so caused; it is this idea that is conveyed by the part "anu" present in the word "anumāna". Although there are certain types of non-perceptual cognition—e.g. cognition through analogy (*upamiti*), cognition through verbal testimony (*śābda*), and cognition through implication (*arthāpatti*)—which are generally not treated as the cases of inferential cognition, the fact of the matter is—and the Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist systems recognize it—that *pramāṇas* are of only two types, perceptual and inferential. As for the remaining types of non-perceptual *pramāṇa*, they can all be somehow treated as cases of inferential *pramāṇa*—as has been done by the two systems just referred to.

Whatever be the object of a piece of inferential cognition and whatever the type of probans causing it, it is definite that all such cognition must have a piece of perceptual cognition somewhere at its basis. For an inferential cognition having no perceptual cognition somewhere at its basis is an impossibility. Thus while perceptual cognition comes into existence without at all depending on inferential cognition, inferential cognition comes into existence only in dependence on perceptual cognition. It is this idea that has been expressed by the Sage (*ṛṣi*) Gotama through the phrase "*tatpūrvakam*" (i. e. preceded by it, that is, by perceptual cognition) occurring in the definition of inferential cognition given by him in *Nyāya-sūtra* (1. 1. 5.)<sup>121</sup> And the idea has been incorporated in the definition of inferential cognition given in *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* (*k.* 5) etc.

The philosophical development (*dārśanika vikāsa*) of the account given of the nature, classification, etc. of inferential cognition can best be followed if it (i. e. this development) is divided into three periods, viz. the Vedicist Period, the Buddhist Period, and the Navya-Nyāya Period.

## I. [ VEDICIST PERIOD ]

On consideration it appears that the task of defining inferential cognition and of offering a systematic account (*śāstrīya nirūpaṇa*) thereof was first undertaken in the Vedicist tradition, an undertaking variously developed by the different branches of this tradition. When, where, and by whom was the task first undertaken? How much time was taken by its initial development? What were the fields covered by it?—are the questions which will, perhaps, ever remain unanswered. However, here also it is definite that the initial stages of the development in question are found recorded in the other (i. e. non-philosophical) ancient texts of the Vedicist tradition.

121. Just as the phrase '*tatpūrvakam*' is indicative of the relation of antecedence and consequence (*paurvāparya*) between perception and inference, so also in the Jaina tradition we come across the phrase '*maipuvvaṃ jeṇa suyam*' (*Nandīsūtra*, 24) which is indicative of the relation of antecedence and consequence between *mati* (standing for perceptual cognition) and *śruta* (standing for non-perceptual cognition). See *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, *Gāthās* 86, 105, 106.

This stage of development should be called Vedicist also because the Jaina and Buddhist traditions not only had no part in the initiation of this development but had, in the beginning, literally adopted from the Vedicist tradition the systematic account under consideration. Two slightly different accounts of inference—both belonging to the Vedicist period—are to be found in two Vedicist traditions :—

( i ) The first is the tradition of the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā systems. The texts which are at present with us in the form of unmistaken (*spaṣṭa*) representatives of this tradition are the two *Bhāṣyas* of Praśastapāda and Śābara. Both these texts mention just two types of inference,<sup>122</sup> a mention indicative of some identical tradition of thought (*vicāra-paramparā*) being at the root of the two. Personally speaking, I am also of the view that the Mīmāṃsā and Vaiśeṣika traditions were initially identical (*abhima*)<sup>123</sup> and that the two got separated into two different paths of development only in the course of time.

( ii ) The other Vedicist tradition includes the systems of Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, and Caraka ; it mentions and describes three types of inference.<sup>124</sup> The words by which the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā systems designate the two types of inference accepted by the two are virtually identical, while the words by which the three systems—viz. Nyāya etc.—belonging to the other tradition designate the three types of inference accepted by the three are actually identical. However, the examples quoted by the different systems (by way of elucidating the nature of the types of inference accepted by them) are not identical.

In the Jaina tradition, the first mention of the three types of inference is found in *Anuyogadvārasūtra*—a text belonging to the first Century A. D. ;<sup>125</sup> and the words by which these three types are here designated are literally the same as in the Nyāya system. However, one peculiarity of the examples quoted in *Anuyogadvāra* of the three types of inference is that through their division and subdivision they succeed in incorporating also the Vaiśeṣika-cum-Mīmāṃsā tradition of accepting only two types of inference.

The Buddhist tradition contains an account only of the three types of inference accepted in *Nyāya-sūtra*, an account so far found recorded in just one text *Upāyahṛdaya* (p. 13). Even if *Upāyahṛdaya* is not a writing of Nāgārjuna—as is generally understood—it must be a pre-Diñnāga text. Thus we see that as late as the 4th or 5th Century A. D. the Jaina and Buddhist texts simply adopted the account of inference as given in the two above-stated traditions of the Vedicist period ; that is to say, upto this period

122. 'Tattu dvidham—pratyakṣato dṛṣṭasambandham sāmānyato dṛṣṭasambandham ca.'- Śābarabhāṣya, 1. 1. 5 ; 'Etattu dvidham—dṛṣṭam sāmānyato' dṛṣṭam ca' - Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 205.

123. The Mīmāṃsā system with "*Athāto dharmajijñāsā*" as its first aphorism starts with an account of *dharma* and so also does the Vaiśeṣika system with "*Athāto dharmam vākyāsyāmaḥ*" as its first aphorism. Again, the aphorism "*Codanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmah*" ( of the Mīmāṃsā system ) conveys the same idea as the aphorism "*Tadvacanādāmnāyasya prāmāṇyam*" ( of the Vaiśeṣika system ).

124. 'Pūrvavaccheṣavatsāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca.'—NS, 1. 1. 5 ; Mātharavṛtti, k. 5 ; Carakasamhitā, Sūtrasthāna, ŚI. 28-29

125. 'Tivihe paṇṇatte taṃ jahā—puvvaṃ, sesavaṃ, diṭṭhasāhammavaṃ.'—Anuyogadvāra, p. 212A.

the Buddhist and Jaina traditions simply follow the Vedicist ones on the question of *pramāṇa* in general and inference in particular.

## II. [ BUDDHIST PERIOD ]

The Buddhist period (in the development of the account of inference) starts with 5th Century A. D. We call it the Buddhist period because the till now current treatment of inference—a treatment worked out on the lines laid down by the Vedicist tradition—was most forcefully opposed by Diñnāga who, in addition, offered a new definition—and a new classification—of inference from his own Buddhist standpoint.<sup>126</sup> This new understanding (*prasthāna*) of inference on the part of Diñnāga was accepted by all later Buddhist teachers<sup>127</sup> who, following Diñnāga, refuted those very definition, classification, etc. of inference recognized in the Vedicist traditions like Nyāya etc. which the eminent Buddhist logicians of the earlier period had themselves adopted.<sup>128</sup> Now onwards, the Vedicist and Buddhist logicians were arrayed in two hostile camps from where attacks were hurled at the rival, and one's own position defended. Commentators and subcommentators of *Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya*, like Uddyotakara, Vācaspatiśra, etc., vigorously refuted the definitions of inference offered by the Buddhist logicians like Vasubandhu, Diñnāga, Dharmakīrti, etc.,<sup>129</sup> a refutation replied back by the Buddhist logicians who arose in succession.

The Buddhist period influenced the Jaina tradition as well. On seeing that the definition, classification, etc. of inference recognized in the Vedicist tradition were being assailed by the Buddhist logicians, the Jaina logicians like Siddhasena<sup>130</sup> too offered an independent definition (of inference) from their own standpoint. Bhaṭṭāraka Akalaṅka did not rest content with that definition offered by Siddhasena, for he, following the pattern set by the Buddhist logicians, also clearly initiated the process of refuting the classification etc. (of inference) recognized in the Vedicist tradition,<sup>131</sup> a process detailed and developed by the later Digambara logicians like Vidyānanda etc.<sup>132</sup>

There are two outstanding features of this new Buddhist period : firstly, independent formulation of definition etc. of inference in the Buddhist and Jaina traditions, and refutation by them of those very definition etc. recognized in the Vedicist tradition which were once adopted by the teachers belonging to these traditions themselves ; secondly, refutation on the part of the Vedicist scholars of the Buddhist account of inference and defence on their part of the account offered by the earlier teachers belonging to their own (i. e. Vedicist) tradition. About the second feature one thing—though of minor importance—is noteworthy, and it is that the definition of inference

126. PS, 2. 2 ; Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, p. 236.

127. 'Anumānaṃ liṅgādarthadarśanam'—Nyāyapraveśa, p. 7 ; NB, 2. 3 ; TS, k. 1362.

128. PS, pari. 2 ; TS, k. 1442 ; Tātp., p. 180.

129. NV, p. 49 ; Tātp., p. 180.

130. 'Sādhyāvinābhūto liṅgātsādhyaniścāyakaṃ smṛtam / Anumānam ..'—NA, 5.

131. yāyaviniścaya, 2. 171, 172.

132. TSV, p. 205 ; PMK, p. 105.

offered by a Vedicist scholar like Bhāsarvajña was to an extent influenced also by the Buddhist definition, <sup>133</sup> a characteristic that was constantly marking the Jaina logician's definition ever since the beginning of the Buddhist period. <sup>134</sup>

### III. [ NAVYA—NYĀYA PERIOD ]

The Navya-Nyāya period starts with Upādhyāya Gaṅgeśa, who, while retaining the definition of inference offered by the earlier Vedicist teachers, introduced in it such subtle refinements (*sūkṣma pariṣkāra*) <sup>135</sup> as were honoured in later times not by the Navya-Naiyāikas alone, but by all the Vedicists who took to refining (the definition of inference). By the time of this new refinement the Buddhist logicians had almost disappeared from the Indian scene; hence there arises no question of this refinement being accepted or rejected in the Buddhist texts. This was, however, not the case with the Jaina tradition which has continued to flourish in India in the post-Navyanyāya period as in the earlier. Nor can it be said that there has been no Jaina logician who had mastery over the vitals (*marmajñā*) of (the literature of) the Navya-Nyāya period; for the Jaina tradition has produced, in the person of Upādhyāya Yaśovijayajī (for example), an acute-minded logician who was a keen student of the Navya-Nyāya texts like *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, *Āloka*, etc. However, not even in Upādhyāyajī's writings like *Tarkabhāṣā* etc. do we come across an acceptance or refutation of the refined definition of inference the Navya-Nyāya period offered. For *Tarkabhāṣā*—Upādhyāyajī's chief work dealing with *pramāṇas*—retains the same definition of inference as had been accepted by the earlier Śvetāmbara and Digambara logicians.

The definition of inference offered by Āc. Hemacandra is the same as was established and defended by the old Jaina logicians like Siddhasena and Akalaṅka; he inserts no amendment in it, nor deletes anything from it, nor adds anything to it. However, one thing is noteworthy about Āc. Hemacandra's account of inference. He omitted that passionate refutation of the threefold classification of inference recognized in Vedicist tradition which had become customary with all the earlier Jaina logicians—not excluding the Śvetāambaras like Abhayadeva, Vālidevasūri, etc. <sup>136</sup> We cannot say whether Āc. Hemacandra did so because he wanted to be brief or because he saw an inconsistency in such a refutation. At any rate, the omission on Āc. Hemacandra's part of the refutation of the threefold classification of inference recognized in the Vedicist tradition eliminated one inconsistency that had cropped up in the Jaina texts—particularly in those belonging to the Śvetāmbara tradition. The credit for eliminating this inconsistency certainly goes to Āc. Hemacandra. And here was the inconsistency. An author like

133. 'Samyagavinābhāvena paroṣānubhavasādhanamanumānam'—NSa, p. 5.

134. NA, 5; Nyāyaviniścaya, 2.I; PPar, p. 70; PM, 3. 14.

135. 'Atītānāgatadhūmādiññāne'pyanumitidarśanāna liṅgam taddhetuḥ vyāpārapūrvavartitayorabhāvāt kintu vyāptiññānaṃ karaṇaṃ parāmarśo vyāpāraḥ.'—Tattvacintāmaṇi, Parāmarśa., pp. 536-50.

136. SMT, p. 559; SVR, p. 527.

Āryarākṣita—supposed to be a *Pūrvadhara* and an *Āgamadhara* (i. e. one well-versed in the scriptural texts called '*Pūrva*' and '*Āgama*')—had accepted and defended in great details the threefold classification of inference recognized in the Nyāya system, while the same classification was passionately refuted by the Śvetāmbara logicians like Abhayadeva etc. who were successors of the same Āryarākṣita. The Digambara tradition may be said to suffer from no such inconsistency, for this tradition does not at all regard Āryarākṣita's *Anuyogadvāra* as an authoritative text. Hence if the Digambara logicians like Akalaṅka etc. refuted the threefold classification of inference recognized in the Nyāya system, they could not be charged with going counter to the path laid down by their own earlier teachers. But this does not hold true of the Śvetāmbara tradition. For the Śvetāmbara logicians like Abhayadeva etc., who refuted the threefold classification of inference recognized in the Nyāya system, were the followers of Āryarākṣita who had earlier defended the same classification; hence this refutation on their part was glaringly out of tune with that defence offered by their own earlier teacher.

Ac. Hemacandra perhaps realized that, as a result of following the Digambara logicians like Akalaṅka etc., the Śvetāmbara logicians had involved themselves in a contradiction with their own tradition. And this realization seems to be responsible for the omission, in his Commentary, of the refutation of the threefold classification of inference. Maybe, it was in deference to this Hemacandrian elimination of inconsistency that Upādhyāya Yaśovijayajī did not undertake, in his *Tarkabhāṣā*, a refutation of the threefold classification of inference recognized in the Vedicist tradition, even though he did undertake a refutation of the fivefold characterization (of probans) (*hetu-pāñcarūpya*) recognized in the Nyāya system.

(PMT, pp. 138-42; DC I, pp. 174-79)

## 18. IS TARKA A PRAMĀNA ?

Centuries before the time of Lord Mahāvīra, Buddha, and Upaniṣads, the verbal root '*ūh*' (*Ṛgveda*, 10. 131. 10) and '*tarka*' (*Rāmāyaṇa*, 3. 25. 12)—as also various formations derived therefrom—were current in Sanskrit and Prakrit languages.<sup>137</sup> In the *Āgamas*, *Piṭakas*, and philosophical *sūtras* these words have been used in various context—and in various meanings that slightly differ from one another.<sup>138</sup> However, one element is common to all these meanings, and it is the element indicative of a cognitive process of the form of ratiocination (*vicārātmaka jñāna-vyāpāra*). In Jaimini's aphorism and in the commentaries of Śabara etc.<sup>139</sup> thereon the idea is expressed by the word '*ūha*'

137. 'Upasargāddhrasva ūhateḥ.'—Pāṇinisūtra, 7. 4. 23; 'Naiṣā tarkeṇa maṭirāpaneyā.' Kaṭhopeniṣad, 2. 9.

138. 'Takkā jattha na vijjai.' Ācārāṅgasūtra, 170; 'Vihimsā vitakka.' Majjhimanikāya, Savvāsava-sutta, 2. 6; 'Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt.' Brahmasūtra, 2. 1. II; NS, 1. 1. 40.

139. 'Trividhaśca ūhaḥ. Mantrasāmāsaṃskāraviṣayaḥ.' Śābarabhāṣya, 9. 1. 1; Jaiminīyanyāyamāivistara, Adhikaraṇa 9. 1. 1.

and Jayanta in his *Nyāya-mañjarī* (p. 588) refutes the same, taking it to stand for inferential (*anumānātmaka*) or verbal (*śabdātma*) cognition. *Nyāya-sūtra* I. 1. 40 offers a definition of *tarka*, which contains the word ‘*ūha*’, and the purport of the definition is that ratiocination of the form of *tarka* is not itself a *pramāṇa* but merely a mental process (*manovyāpāra*) favourable to *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇānukūla*). Later Naiyāyikas have attributed one fixed meaning to the word “*tarka*” and have elucidated it. Their ruling (*nirṇaya*) is that *tarka* is not a cognition of the nature of *pramāṇa* but a temporarily entertained cognition (*āhārya-jñāna*) of the nature of “supposition of the presence of a probans (which is actually absent) necessitating the supposition of the presence of the probandum (whose presence is an obvious absurdity)” (*vyāpyāropa-pūrvaka-vyāpakāropa-svarūpa*),<sup>140</sup> a cognition which, by removing the doubt that a proposed probans is irrelevant (*aprayojakatva-śaṅkā-nirāsa*) or that a proposed relation of invariable concomitance is a case of non-invariable concomitance (*vyabhicāra-śaṅkā-nirāsa*), acts as an auxiliary (*sahakārin*) and an aid (*upayogin*) in formulating a relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti-nirṇaya*) (*Cintāmaṇi, Anumāna*, p. 210 ; *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*, 1. 1. 40). Since old times the Nyāya system has refused to treat *tarka* as a *pramāṇa*.<sup>141</sup> And with the development of the system, plenty of clarification has been offered as to the meaning of the word “*tarka*” and as to the utility of *tarka*, a fact attested by the subtler and subtler texts that have been composed on the subject ever since the time of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya.

Buddhist logicians (*Hetubinduṭīkā*, p. 17), too, though granting that thought in the form of *tarka* (*tarkātma vikalpajñāna*) is of value in formulating a relation of invariable concomitance, do not treat *tarka* as a *pramāṇa*. Thus we have the Mīmāṃsā tradition which treats *tarka* as a *pramāṇa* and the Nyāya-cum-Buddhist tradition which treats *tarka* as *apramāṇa*-though-an-aid-to-*pramāṇa* (*apramāṇarūpa, pramaṇānugrahaka*).

In the Jaina tradition, the second among the types of *matijñāna*—which is a *pramāṇa*—is called ‘*ihā*’ which, in fact, stands for ‘a cognitive process of the form of consideration of the pros and cons’ (*guṇa-doṣa-vicārātma jñāna-vyāpāra*) ; and Umāsvāti has used the word “*ūha*” and “*tarka*” as synonyms for this “*ihā*” (*Tattvārtha-sūtra*, 1. 15). After the Jaina tradition had assumed the task of offering definition, classification, etc. of *pramāṇas* from the logicians’ standpoint, Akalaṅka seems to be the first to determine the nature, object, and utility of *tarka* (*Laghī.*, Autocommentary, 3. 2), and he has been followed by all later Jaina logicians. The Jaina tradition is one with the Mīmāṃsaka in treating *tarka* as a cognition of the nature of *pramāṇa*. According to the Jaina logicians, the word “*tarka* or “*ūha*” stands for ‘cognition of a relation of invariable concomitance’ (*vyāptijñāna*). Thus the word “*ūha*” or “*tarka*”, which was known to the Aryan tradition (*Āryaparampārā*) since long past, was attributed by Akalaṅka to a subspecies of non-perceptual *pramāṇa* (*parokṣa-pramāṇa*). Hence it is that while the Naiyāyikas like Vācaspatiśra<sup>142</sup> sometimes suggest that the ‘cognition of invariable concomitance’ (*vyāptijñāna*) is a mental perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*), sometimes that it

140. Roughly speaking, *tarka* can be equated with *reductio ad absurdum*. Tr.

141. NS, 1. 2. 1.

142. Tātp.; pp, I59-67; NM, p. 123.

is an ordinary perception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*), sometimes that it is an inferential cognition (*anumiti*), and so on and so forth, the Jaina logicians always urged that 'cognition of invariable concomitance' is of but one nature and that this nature, is grasped by what they call "*tarka*". Āc. Hemacandra simply endorses this old tradition.

(PMT, pp. 76-77 ; DC I, pp. 172-73)

### 19. THE NATURE OF VYĀPTI (i. e. RELATION OF INVARIABLE COMCOMITANCE)

In *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* 1. 2. 10 is offered a definition of *avinābhāva* (i. e. non-presence [of probans] in the absence of [probandum]). Now the question arises why Āc. Hemacandra, after having defined *tarka*, seeks to define *vyāpti* which was (in the course of discussion on *tarka*) given out as the object to be grasped by *tarka* (*tarka-viṣaya*). The answer to this question is as follows. In his commentary on *Hetubindu*, Arcaṭa, in order to bring into prominence certain particular aspects of the problem, gives a very attractive account of what he calls 'vyāpti understood as a character of the probans' (*vyāpya-dharma-rūpa vyāpti*) and 'vyāpti understood as a character of the probandum' (*vyāpakadharmarūpa-vyāpti*). And Āc. Hemacandra, with an eye to making handsome selection from all possible sources (*cakora-dṛṣṭi*), could not resist the temptation of assimilating this account of Arcaṭa. As a result, we find him incorporating it verbatim in his aphorism and the commentary thereon.

The question before Arcaṭa was : If *vyāpti* is, like conjunction (*saṃyoga*), a relation obtaining between two entities (*dviṣṭha-sambandha*), why is it not the case that just as the proposition 'X is in conjunction with Y' is not different from 'Y is in conjunction with X' the proposition 'X is the probans and Y its probandum' is not different from 'Y is the probans and X its probandum', that is to say, in case X is a probans and Y its probandum why is it also not the case that Y is a probans and X its probandum? Arcaṭa tells us that this question was raised by some logician having "Ācārya" for his pen-name. And Arcaṭa answers it by maintaining that *vyāpti* is not a symmetrical relation (*ekarūpa sambandha*) but a non-symmetrical relation where the relata concerned, viz. *vyāpya* (i. e. probans) and *vyāpaka* (i. e. probandum, exhibit two mutually different types of characteristics (*vibhinna svarūpa*), which, in turn, explains why we can infer from the existence of probans—the possessor of one particular type of characteristic—the existence of probandum—the possessor of another particular type of characteristic, but not vice versa. In other words, the relation of probans and probandum (*gamyagamakabhāva*) is not symmetrical (*sarvatra aniyata*), just as the relation of substratum and superstratum (*ādihārādheyabhāva*) is not. 143

In those olden days, the contingency of the relation of probans and probandum turning out to be a symmetrical relation was sought to be obviated by logicians like

143. Here the words "symmetrical" and "non-symmetrical" mean roughly the same thing as they do in Russell and his school of Mathematical Logic. Tr.

Arcaṭa, through maintaining that *vyāpti* is of two sorts (i. e. that *vyāpti* characterizing the probans is of a different sort from that characterizing the probandum). But with the maturing of the science of Logic, another—and more satisfactory—manner of meeting the contingency in question was found out. Gaṅgeśa, the founder of Navya-Nyāya, has considered in his *Cintāmaṇi* ( *Gādādhari*, pp. 141-390 ) a number of definitions—prima facie as well as final—of *vyāpti*. The prima facie definitions ( *pūrvapakṣa-vyāpti* ) seek to present, in a refined form, the nature of *avyabharitatva* (i. e. absence of absence-of-invariable-concomitance) <sup>144</sup> which is but another name for *avinābhāva* or for what Arcaṭa calls ‘*vyāpti* understood as a character of the probans’ ( *vyāpyadharmarūpa vyāpti* ). On the other hand, the final definition of *vyāpti* ( *siddhānta-vyāpti* ) presents, in a refined form, the typical characteristic of a probandum ( *vyāpakatva* ), <sup>145</sup> a characteristic which Arcaṭa calls “*vyāpti* understood as a character of the probandum” (i. e. *vyāpakadharmarūpa vyāpti* ). That is to say, while Arcaṭa granted that *vyāpti* can be understood as a (typical) characteristic of the probandum, though he went on to add that the existence of the entity characterized by *vyāpti* of this sort, i. e. the existence of the probandum, cannot enable us to infer the existence of something else (say, of the probans), Gaṅgeśa, refusing to attribute the name ‘*vyāpti*’ to the typical characteristic of a probandum, calls this characteristic just ‘*vyāpakatva*’ and goes on to add that ‘*vyāpti*’ stands for “coexistence ( *sāmānādhikarāṇya* ) (of the probans) with an entity characterized by *vyāpakatva* thus understood”. <sup>146</sup> This account offered by Gaṅgeśa is particularly subtle. And had Āc. Hemacandra come across the account of *vyāpakatva*, *avyabharitatva*, etc. offered by the logicians like Gaṅgeśa, he must have made use of it in the present context.

In the texts on Logic “*vyāpti*, “*avinābhāva*”, and “*niyatasāhacarya*” (i. e. invariable concomitance) are well known as synonymous words. The nature of *vyāpti*-understood-as-*avinābhāva* has been treated by the entire lot of Jaina logicians like Māṇikyanandin ( *PM*, 3. 17, 18) etc. , but the new idea suggested by Arcaṭa has been incorporated, perhaps, in no other Jaina text on Logic.

( *PMT*, pp. 78-79 ; *DC I*, 180-81)

## 20. THE NUMBER OF STEPS ( *avayava* ) IN AN INFERENCE-FOR-OTHERS

( *parārthānumāna* )

There is diversity of views as to the technique of presenting ( *prayoga-paripāṭi* ) an inference-for-the-sake-of-others ( *parārthānumāna* ). Thus Sāṅkhya logicians are of the view that an inference-for-others requires just three steps in the form of *pratijñā* (i. e. statement of the thesis sought to be established), *hetu* (i. e. showing that the subject of the thesis is

144. ‘Na tāvadavyabharitatvaṃ taddhi na sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvaṃ, sādhyavadbhinnasādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvaṃ .....sādhyavadanyāvṛttitvaṃ vā.’ *Cintāmaṇi-Gādādhari*, p. 141.

145. ‘Pratiyogya-sāmānādhikarāṇayatsamānādhikarāṇātyantābhāvapratiyogitāvaccchedakāvaccinnaṃ yan-na bhavati.’ *Gādādhari*, p. 391.

146. ‘Tena samam tasya sāmānādhikarāṇyaṃ vyāptiḥ.’ *Gādādhari*, p. 391.

possessed of the probans concerned), and *dr̥ṣṭānta* (i. e. formulating the concerned relation-of-invariable-concomitance or *vyāpti* and illustrating the same). The Mīmāṃsakas too, according to Vādidevasūri, (*SVR*, p. 559) admit the necessity of just three steps, but Āc. Hemacandra and Anantavīrya tell us that the Mīmāṃsakas admit the necessity of four steps (*Prameyaratnamālā*, 3. 37). Śālikanātha—the follower of Prabhākara—in his *Prakaranapañcikā* (pp. 83-85) and Pārthasārathimīśra in his commentary on *Ślokavārtika* (*Anumāna*, Śl. 54) make mention of just three steps. Thus the statement of Vādideva accords—and that of Āc. Hemacandra and Anantavīrya does not—with what Śālikanātha and Pārthasārathi say. Hence if the statement of Āc. Hemacandra and Anantavīrya as to the Mīmāṃsaka's acceptance of four steps is not a mis-statement, we have to understand that they had before them—and hence mentioned it—some Mīmāṃsā tradition which accepted four steps. The Naiyāyikas admit the necessity of five steps (*NS*, 1. 1. 32). According to the Buddhist logicians, the maximum number of steps is two—viz. *hetu* and *dr̥ṣṭānta*—(*PV*, 1. 28 ; *SVR*, p. 559) while the minimum necessary step is *hetu* (*PV*, 1. 28). In the midst of this diversity of views, the Jaina logicians have, since the time of *Niryuktis*,<sup>147</sup> adopted on this question—as on many others—a position that is in conformity with their non-absolutistic standpoint. All Jaina teachers—Digambara as well as Śvetāmbara—are of the view the number of steps (requisite in an inference-for-others) is not fixed but may be more or less according as the hearer concerned is less or more competent.

Māṇikyanandin recognizes (*PM*, 3. 37-46) *pratijñā* and *hetu* as the two minimum necessary steps, but he concedes that one or more of the remaining three steps—viz. *dr̥ṣṭānta*, *upanaya* (i. e. pointing out that the case under consideration is a case falling under the *vyāpti* formulated in *dr̥ṣṭānta*), and *nigamana* (i. e. reiteration of the thesis as conclusively established)—may also be required in dealing with certain types of hearers. The words of Āc. Hemacandra's present aphorisms and of his commentary thereon go to indicate that the view expressed in Māṇikyanandin's aphorism and in its commentary by Prabhācandra etc. is also his view, that is to say, Āc. Hemacandra too is of the view that *pratijñā* and *hetu* are two minimum necessary steps while three, four, or five steps may be required in special cases. However, Vādideva's view is different, for he, in his own commentary on the text touching upon the subject (*SVR*, p. 548), goes to the extent of granting that in dealing with a particular type of hearers one single step, viz. *hetu*, might alone suffice, a position already granted by Buddhists. As for the remaining types of hearers, Vādideva says that some of them may require two steps, viz. *pratijñā* and *hetu*, some three, viz. *pratijñā*, *hetu*, and *dr̥ṣṭānta*, some four, viz. *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *dr̥ṣṭānta*, and *upanaya*, and some five, viz. *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *dr̥ṣṭānta*, *upanaya*, and *nigamana* (*SVR*, p. 564).

Here one historically important speciality of the Śvetāmbara tradition as distinct from the Digambara is worth noting. No Digambara teacher has even taken note of the

147. 'Jiṇavayṇaṃ siddhaṃ ceva bhaṇṇae katthai udāharaṇaṃ / Āsajja u soyāraṃ heū vi kahiñci bhaṇṇejjā // Katthai pañcāvayavaṃ dasahā vā savvahā na paḍisiddhaṃ na ya puṇa' savvaṃ bhaṇṇai handi saviāramakkhāyam.' Daśavaikāika-niryukti. Gāthās 49, 50.

ten steps<sup>148</sup>—different from the ten steps spoken of by Vātsyāyana<sup>149</sup>—which are mentioned and described in that *Niryukti* ascribed to the very ancient Bhadrabāhu, while, on the other hand, all Śvetāmbara logicians (*SVR*, p. 556), having granted that in certain particular cases even more than five steps may be required, go on to name and describe the ten steps precisely after the manner of the *Niryukti* in question. The root of this divergence seems to lie in the rejection on the part of the Digambara tradition of the ancient literature like *Āgama* etc.

Māṅkīyanandin says in his aphorism one thing that seems remarkable. Thus he tells us that two steps and five steps are required in two different types of spheres, that is to say, two is the number of steps to be employed in the course of a debate (*vāda-pradeśa*) but either two or five steps may be employed (keeping in view the competence of the hearer concerned) in the course of a systematic exposition (*śāstra-pradeśa*). And what is to be remembered about Vādideva's stand is that he, like Buddhists, grants that *hetu* is the only step required when the hearer happens to be specially learned (*viśiṣṭa vidvān*) (i. e. expert in the subject-matter under consideration. But to neither of these effects has Āc. Hemacandra made any clear mention.

(*PMT*, pp. 94-96 ; *DC I*, pp. 181-83)

## 21. THE ASPECTS OF THE NATURE OF A PROBANS ( *hetu-rūpa* )

As to the aspects of the nature of a probans, the following four traditions are current among philosophers :—

( 1 ) the Vaiśeṣika-cum-Sāṅkhya-cum-Buddhist tradition, ( 2 ) the Nyāya tradition, ( 3 ) one anonymous tradition, and ( 4 ) the Jaina tradition.

According to the first tradition, the nature of a probans has got three aspects, viz. ( i ) presence in the subject (of the thesis sought to be established), (*pakṣa-sattva*), ( ii ) presence in a homologue (*sapakṣa-sattva*), and ( iii ) absence from heterologues (*vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti*). The adherents of this tradition are the Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṅkhyas, and Buddhists, of whom the Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṅkhyas seem to be older. The Buddhist logicians are obviously influenced by Kaṇāda's twofold division of *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇa-dvaidhyā*) into perception and inference, and it appears that they have likewise been influenced by the Vaiśeṣika thesis of the threefold nature of a probans (*hetu-trairūpya*).<sup>150</sup> In the course of his account of the nature of a probans, Praśastapāda himself quotes a *kārikā* which mentions

148. 'Te u painnavibhattī heuvibhattī vivakkhapaḍiseho diṭṭhato āsaṅkā tappḍiseho nigamaṇam ca.' Daśavaikālika., G. 137.

149. 'Daśāvayavāneke Naiyāyikā vākye saṅcakṣate jijñāsā saṁśayaḥ śakyaprāptiḥ prayojanaṁ saṁśayavyudāsa iti.' NBh. I. 1. 32.

150. Prof. Stcherbatsky is, however, of the view that it is the Vaiśeṣikas who have been influenced by the Buddhists in their acceptance of the doctrine of the threefold nature of a probans. See 'Buddhist Logic'. Vol. I, p. 244.

the doctrine of the threefold nature of a probans as the doctrine upheld by Kāśyapa.<sup>151</sup> The same three aspects of the nature of a probans are mentioned by Māṭhara in his *Vṛtti* (*Māṭharavṛtti*, k. 5). The Buddhist texts like *Abhidharmakośa*, *Pramṇāsamuccaya*, *Nyāyapraveśa* (p. 1), *Nyāyabindu* (2. 5 ff.), *Hetubindu* (p. 4), *Tattvasaṅgraha* (k. 1362), etc. have all taken these three aspects to constitute the definition of probans and have accordingly defended the doctrine of the threefold nature of a probans. The delineation of the three aspects of the nature of a probans and the defence of the doctrine of the threefold nature along with a refutation of the rival doctrines have been undertaken in the Buddhist texts on a much larger scale than in any exclusively Vaiśeṣika or Sāṅkhya text.

The Naiyāyikas admit, in addition to the above three, two more aspects of the nature of a probans, viz. (i) absence of cancellation-of-the-thesis(-on-the-part-of-another-*pramāṇa*) (*abādhitaviṣayatva*) and (ii) absence of a counterbalancing probans (*asatpratipakṣitatva*); they thus advocate the doctrine of the fivefold nature. It cannot be said with certainty as to who first started this advocacy, but may be Uddyotakara is the person—(*NV*, 1. 1. 5). Arcaṭa, the commentator of *Hetubindu* (p. 205), and Śrīdhara, the follower of Praśastapāda, have sought to cover within (the scope of) the doctrine of the threefold nature (the scope of) the doctrine of the fivefold nature. And though this doctrine of the fivefold nature has been described and defended by all later Naiyāyikas like Vācaspati (*Tātp.*, 1. 1. 5), Jayanta (*NM*, p. 110), etc., it has not remained static (*sthira*) like a dead organism (*mṛtaka-muṣṭi*; lit. the fist of a corpse). For Naiyāyikas like Gadādhara, through their stand—laid down in the texts on *Avayava* etc.—that *vyāpti* (i. e. its invariable concomitance with the probandum) and *pakṣadharmatā* (i. e. its characterizing the subject of the thesis) are the two features needed by a probans in order to enable us to infer the probandum concerned (*gamakatopayogi-rūpa*), have implicitly suggested (*saṃsūcana*) that the essential aspects of the nature of a probans are but three (rather than five). Thus the early Naiyāyika's rigid insistence in favour of the fivefold nature got loosened so as to permit an acceptance of the doctrine of the threefold nature.

Besides the tradition which accepted the doctrine of the fivefold nature, there was also a tradition—mentioned and refuted by Arcaṭa<sup>152</sup> and attributed by him, in a general fashion, to “Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, etc.”—which accepted the doctrine of the sixfold nature, that is, a tradition which accepted an additional aspect in the form of ‘knownness’ (*jñātatva*). The old Nyāya view that a probans-as-being-known (*jñāyamāna liṅga*)

151. ‘Yadanumeyena sambaddham prasiddham ca tadanvite / Tadabhāve ca nāstyeva talliṅgamanu-  
māpakam // Viparītamato yatsyādekena dvitayena vā / Viruddhāsiddhasandigdhamaliṅgam  
Kāśyapo‘bravīt //’—Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 200; Kand., p. 203.

152. ‘Śaḍlakṣaṇo heturityapare Naiyāyikamīmāṃsakādayo manyante. Kāni punaḥ ṣaḍrūpāṇi hetostai-  
caturtham rūpam, ...tathā pakṣadharmānvayavyatirekākhyāṇi tathā abādhitaviṣayatvam  
tadekasāṅkhyam...yadekasāṅkhyāvachinnāyām pratiheturahitāyām hetuvyaktau hetutvam tadā  
gamakatvam na tu pratihetusahitāyāmapi dvitvasāṅkhyāyuktāyām...tathā jñātatvam ca jñānaviṣa-  
yatvam ca, na hyajñāto hetuḥ svasattāmātreṇa gamako yukta iti.’—Hetubinduṭīkā, p. 205.

is the instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) of inferential cognition (*anumiti*)—a view sought to be refuted in the later Nyāya texts ( *Jñāyamānaṃ liṅgaṃ tu karaṇaṃ nahi*'-*Muktāvali*, k. 67) —was perhaps rooted in this tradition upholding the doctrine of the sixfold nature.

The Jaina tradition maintains that a probans has but unitary nature, viz. 'absence in the absence of the probandum' (*avinābhāva*). This tradition does not say that the three or five or any number of aspects pointed out by others are (always) non-existent (*asat*) there in a probans, but it submits that since it is sometimes possible to draw a finally conclusive inference (*nirvivāda sadanumāna*) even in the absence of these aspects numbering three, five, etc. , it is not easy to determine the common nature of all probantia except by admitting that they are all absent in the absence of their respective probanda. Thus the three or five aspects are but details (*prapañcamātra*) of certain possible cases of 'absence in the absence of the probandum'. Though Siddhasena in his *Nyāyavatāra* has characterized probans as 'absent in the absence of the probandum' (*sādhyāvinābhāvin*), Pātrasvāmin is, perhaps, the first defender of the position that 'absence in the absence of the probandum' is the sole nature (*ekamātra rūpa*) of a probans. This Jaina position that 'absence in the absence of the probandum' is the sole nature of a probans has been presented—and refuted—as Pātrasvāmin's position by Śāntarakṣita in *Tattvasaṅgraha*.<sup>153</sup> It appears that Jaina logicians of the earlier period simply maintained that the nature of a probans consists in 'absence of the probandum', while the logical defence of the position along with a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of the threefold nature came, first of all, from Pātrasvāmin.

The following *kārikā* refutative of the Buddhist doctrine of the threefold nature has been quoted by Akalaṅka, (*Nyāyaviniścaya*, p. 177) Vidyānanda (*P.Par*, p. 72), etc. :—

*Anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim |*

*Nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim || ,*

and this ought to be Pātrasvāmin's composition. It is the refutation of the rival doctrine of the threefold nature which Pātrasvāmin first undertook in the Jaina tradition that has become model for all subsequent Jaina logicians—Śvetāmbara as well as Digambara—like Akalaṅka ( *Pramāṇasaṅgraha*, p. 66A ) etc. In due course, a refutation of the doctrine of the fivefold nature was added to this refutation of the doctrine of the threefold nature. Thus we find in the later Digambara and Śvetāmbara texts on Logic—e. g. in the writings of Vidyānanda ( *P.Par*, p. 72 ), Prabhācandra ( *PKM*, p. 103 ), Vādīdevasūri ( *SVR*, p. 521 ), etc—a detailed refutation of the doctrine of the threefold nature as well as of the doctrine of the fivefold nature.

Following this tradition ( of the earlier Jaina logicians ), Āc, Hemacandra refutes the doctrine of the threefold nature as also the doctrine of the fivefold nature. So far as its content is concerned, Āc. Hemacandra's refutation is similar to that of the earlier teachers like Vidyānanda etc. , but verbally it stands particularly closer to the one we find in *Prameyaratnamālā* of Anantavīrya. Here also—as in many other cases—Āc. Hemacandra

153. 'Anyathetyādinā Pātrasvāmimatamāśaṅkate—nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim / Anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim //—TS, ks. 1364-69.

betrays a feature which, in a way, distinguishes him from the preceding Jaina logicians ; the feature consists in merely acquainting ( *saṅgrāhakamātra* )—however briefly—the Jaina tradition with a new ( i, e, non-Jaina ) idea. Thus we see that while presenting the prima facie Buddhist case in support of the doctrine of the threefold nature, Āc. Hemcandra quotes a lengthy passage from Dharmottara’s commentary on *Nyāyabindu*, a quotation not to be found in another earlier text on Jaina Logic. Though the passage in question is from a Buddhist logician, students of Jaina Logic ought to pay particular attention to it—even if in the form of the presentation of a prima facie view.

The *kārikā* “*Anyathānupapannatvam* etc.” quoted above is doubtless valid and is therefore (deservedly) honoured in the entire Jaina tradition—so much so that Vidyānanda has, in imitation, composed another *kārikā* containing only a slight variation and seeking to refute the doctrine of the fivefold nature ( *P.Par*, p. 72 ). Now this *kārikā* ought to have been honoured only on logical grounds and only in the field of Logic, but its non-logician devotees ( *atārkika bhakta* ) were so much overwhelmed by it that they sought to enhance its prestige with the help of sheer cock-and-bull stories. And this tendency grew so wildly that even authors on Logic became its victim. Some said that the original author ( *kartā* ) and bestower ( *dātā* ) of the *kārikā* was the Tīrthānkara named Sīmandharasvāmin ; others said that the goddess named Padmāvati brought it from Sīmandharasvāmin and handed it over to Pātrakeṣarisvāmin. Thus a *kārikā* which is fully capable of coming from the mouth of any logically-minded person had to be born, on account of the attitude of blind worship ( *andha-bhakti* ) developed towards it, in the mouth of Sīmandharasvāmin—( *SMT*, p. 569 ). Be that as it may, Āc. Hemacandra makes use of the *kārikā*. However, it seems almost certain that Pātrasvāmin, the probable author of this *kārikā*, belonged to the Digambara tradition ; for those cock-and-bull stories concerning it—stories concocted out of an attitude of blind worship—are current only within the Digambara tradition.

( *PMT*, pp. 80-83 ; *DC I*, pp. 184-87 )

## 22 TYPES ( *prakāra* ) OF PROBANS

In the Jaina tradition we find Akalaṅka’s writings ( *Pramāṇasaṅgraha*, pp.67-68 ) to contain an account of the types of probantia, but a clear-cut classification of probantia—entity ( *vidhisādhaka* ) or it enables us to infer a positive ( *niśedhasādhaka* )—is to be found only in the writings of ( the later authors like ) Māṅikyanandin, Vidyānanda, Vidyānanda, Devasūri, and Āc. Hemacandra. The classification undertaken by Māṅikyanandin, that we find in the Jaina texts is mainly based on *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* ( 9. 2. 1 ) and Dharmakīrti’s *Nyāyabindu* ( 2. 12 ). In *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* a clear mention is made of five types of probantia, viz. probans that is an effect ( of the probandum ) ( *kārya* ), one that is a cause ( of the probandum ) ( *kāraṇa* ), one that is in conjunction ( with the probandum )

(*samyogin*), one that resides-by-*samavāya*-relation (in the probandum) (*samavāyin*), and one that is contradictory (of the probandum—rather of that whose absence is the probandum) (*virodhin*). In *Nyāyabindu* (2. 12) probantia are said to be of three types, viz. probans that is a sub-class—or an equivalent class—(of the probandum) (*svabhāva*), one that is an effect (of the probandum) (*kārya*), and one that is non-cognition (of the probandum—rather of that whose absence is the probandum) (*anupalabdhi*); again, non-cognition is here subdivided into eleven types,<sup>154</sup> but each is treated as capable of enabling us to infer an absence and none as capable of enabling us to infer a positive entity. Akalaṅka and Māṅikyanandin accepted this ‘non-cognition’ posited in *Nyāyabindu*, but they introduced much amendment and addition in the idea. By “non-cognition” Dharmakīrti understood all such non-cognitions (*anupalabdhi*) and cognitions (*upalabdhi*) as enable us to infer an absence—and it alone: but non-cognition, according to Māṅikyanandin, enables us to infer an absence as well as a positive entity. Not only that, Māṅikyanandin is also of the view that even cognition enables us to infer an absence as well as a positive entity.<sup>155</sup> Vidyānanda’s classification is based on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. For in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* we are told that either (i) an absence (*abhūta*) enables us to infer a positive entity (*bhūta*), or (ii) a positive entity (*bhūta*) enables us to infer an absence (*abhūta*), or (iii) a positive entity (*bhūta*) enables us to infer another positive entity (*bhūta*).<sup>156</sup> To these three Vidyānanda adds the fourth alternative, viz. an absence (*abhūta*) enables us to infer another absence (*abhūta*), and thus he gives us an exhaustive catalogue of the non-cognitions as well as cognitions which enable us to infer a positive entity as also of those which enable us to infer an absence—( *P.Par*, pp. 72-74 ). After thus making the Vaiśeṣika classification exhaustive, Vidyānanda goes on to determine the exact number of types and subtypes of probantia, and in this connection he has quoted a set of mnemonic *kārikās*<sup>157</sup> attributed to certain earlier teachers; thus Vidyānanda seems

154. ‘Svabhāvānupalabdhiryathā nātra dhūma upalabdihlakṣaṇaprāptiśānupalabdheriti. Kāryānupalabdhiryathā nehāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni dhūmakāraṇāni santi dhūmābhāvāt. Vyāpakānupalabdhiryathā nātra śiṃśapā vṛkṣābhāvāt. Svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhiryathā nātra śītasparśo’gneriti. Viruddhakāryopalabdhiryathā nātra śītasparśo dhūmāditi. Viruddhavyāptopalabdhiryathā na dhruvabhāvī bhūtasyāpi bhāvasya vināśo hetvantarāpekṣaṇāt. Kāryaviruddhopalabdhiryathā nehāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni śītakāraṇāni santi agneriti. Vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiryathā nātra tuṣārasparśo’gneriti. Kāraṇānupalabdhiryathā nātra dhūmo’gnyabhāvāt. Kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhiryathā nāsyā romaharṣādiviśeṣāḥ sannihitadahanaviśeṣatvāditi. Kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhiryathā na romaharṣādiviśeṣayuktapuruṣavānayaṃ pradeśo dhūmāditi.’—NBT, 2. 32-42.

155. PM, 3.57-59, 78, 86.

156. ‘Virodhyabhūtaṃ bhūtasya. Bhūtamabhūtasya. Bhūto bhūtasya. —VS, 3. 11-13.

157. ‘Atra saṅgrahaślokaḥ—Syātkāryaṃ kāraṇavyāpyaṃ prakṣahottaracāri ca / Liṅgaṃ tallakṣaṇavyāpterbhūtaṃ bhūtasya sādhakam // Soḍhā viruddhakāryādi sākṣādevopavarṇitam / Liṅgaṃ bhūtamabhūtasya liṅgalakṣaṇayogataḥ // Pāramparyāttu kāryaṃ syāt kāraṇaṃ vyāpyameva ca / Sahacāri ca nirdiṣṭaṃ pratyekaṃ taccaturvidham // Kāraṇād dviṣṭhakāryādibhedenodāhṛtaṃ purā / Yathā ṣoḍaśabhedam syāt dvāvīṣṭatividham tataḥ // Liṅgaṃ samuditam jñeyamanyathānupapattimat / Tathā bhūtamabhūtasyāpyūhyamanyadapīdrśam // Abhūtaṃ bhūtamunnītaṃ bhūtasyānekadhā budhaiḥ / Tathā’bhūtamabhūtasya yathāyogyamudāharet // Bahudhāpyeva-

to suggest that in his present classification he has based himself not only on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* but also either on some Jaina logician like Akalaṅka and Māṅikyanandin or on some Buddhist logician.

Devasūri seems to have based his classification on that of *Parīkṣāmukha*, but he has introduced the following changes :

While according to *Parīkṣāmukha* six types of cognition ( 3. 59 ) and three types of non-cognition ( 3. 86 ) enable us to infer positive entities, according to *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka* six types of cognition ( 3. 64 ) and five types of non-cognition ( 3. 99 ) do the same ; again, while according to *Parīkṣāmukha*, six types of cognition ( 3. 71 ) and seven types of non-cognition ( 3. 78 ) enable us to infer absences, according to *Pramāṇanayatatvāloka*, seven types of cognition ( 3. 79 ) and seven types of non-cognition ( 3. 90 ) do the same.

Like Vidyānanda, Āc. Hemacandra bases his classification on both *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and *Nyāyabindu*, but in one respect he differs from the former. Āc. Hemacandra does not treat a non-cognition as capable of enabling us to infer positive entities, that is to say, he accepts the Nyāyabindu position that a non-cognition enables us to infer only absences. However, these various classifications, even though they somehow differ from one another and even though the resulting number of the types and subtypes of probantia is different in different cases, do not differ as to their essentials. Vācaspatiśra ( *Tātp.* , pp. 158-64 ) has refuted not only the classification accepted by the Buddhists but also the one accepted in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*.

( *PMT*, pp. 83-85 ; *DC I*, 188-90 )

### 23. WHETHER EFFECT ALONE OR CAUSE ALSO IS A PROPER PROBANS AND SOME ALLIED PROBLEMS

All logicians are agreed that an effect is a proper probans ( for inferring the cause concerned ) ( *kāryaliṅgaka anumāna* ), but they differ as to whether a cause is a proper probans ( for inferring the effect concerned ) ( *kāraṇaliṅgaka anumāna* ). Buddhist logicians—particularly Dharmakīrti—nowhere concede the possibility of an inference-with-a-cause-as-probans ( *kāraṇaliṅgaka anumāna* ), but the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas have always been of the view that such an inference is possible. Āc. Hemacandra, following in the footsteps of the earlier Jaina logicians, defends, with a good amount of fanfare, the possibility of an inference-with-a-cause-as-probans. By means of the epithet “*Nyāyavādin*” Āc. Hemacandra here refers to Dharmakīrti, and though he refutes the view upheld by the latter he has great regard for him, a regard expressed through the phrase “ even by so subtle an observer ( *sūkṣmadarśināpi* ) ( as *Nyāyavādin* ) ”.

As to the possibility of an inference-with-an-effect-as-probans ( *kāryaliṅgaka anumāna* ), there is no difference of opinion. But there is difference of opinion as to the

admissibility of certain instances of it. Thus the proposed inference “A living body possesses an *ātman*, because it possesses life etc.” (*Jivaccharīraṃ sātmaṃ prāṇādīm-attvāt*) is treated by Buddhists not as a valid inference (*sadanumāna*) but as an invalid one (*mīthyānumāna*); that is why “life etc.” (occurring as probans in the inference in question) is quoted by them as a case of pseudo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*) (*NB*, 3. 99). Unlike other philosophers, Buddhists do not believe in an eternal *ātman* residing in a living body; hence in their eyes it is not valid to infer the existence of *ātman* from the existence of life etc. On the other hand, philosophers like Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Jainas etc., that is, all those philosophers who believe in the existence of a separate (and eternal) *ātman*, are of the view that it is valid to infer the existence of *ātman* from the existence of life etc. Hence it is that philosophers believing in the existence of *ātman* do not consider “*sapakṣavṛttitva*” (i. e. presence in a homologue) to be an indispensable aspect of the nature (*anivārya rūpa*) of a valid probans. Thus according to these philosophers, a probans, which is just absent from all heterologues (*kevalavyatirekin*) is a valid probans—irrespective of whether it is or is not also present in a homologue; on this understanding, life etc. become a valid probans for inferring *ātman*.<sup>158</sup> This position has been defended in great details by the Naiyāyikas and Jaina logicians alike.

Āc. Hemacandra follows the same procedure and argues that since a probans can possibly remain a valid probans even in the absence of “presence in a homologue” “presence in a homologue” is not an (indispensable) aspect of the nature of a (valid) probans. Thus while refuting the Buddhist thesis—particularly as presented by Dharmakīrti—that doubt as to whether a proposed probans is or is not present in a homologue (*anvayasāndeha*) makes this probans a pseudo-probans of the *anaikāntika* type, Āc. Hemacandra says that pseudo-probans of both the *anaikāntika* and *viruddha* types are due only to “absence-in-all-heterologues” (*vyatirekābhāva*) {i. e. neither is due to “absence of presence-in-a-homologue” (*anvayābhāva*)}, In *Nyāyabindu* Dharmakīrti has maintained that a pseudo-probans of the *anaikāntika* type may be due either to “absence of absence-in-all-heterologues” (*vyatirekābhāva*) or to “doubt as to presence-in-a-homologue” (*anvayasāndeha*),<sup>159</sup> a position Āc. Hemacandra seeks to refute. But contrary to what Āc. Hemacandra tells us, Dharmakīrti nowhere maintains that pseudo-probans of both the *anaikāntika* and *viruddha* types and of the *anaikāntika* type in both its subspecies are due only to “absence of absence-in-all-heterologues”. Thus Āc. Hemacandra’s contention “*Nyāyavādināpi vyatirekābhāvādeva hetvābhāsāvuktau*” stands contradicted. Under these conditions, until we come across a passage in Dharmakīrti which corroborates Āc. Hemacandra’s report, we are forced to stretch a bit the meaning of the Ācārya’s words and make them to mean: ‘Even though *Nyāyavādin* too recognizes the two types of pseudo-probans, what the two are due to is “absence of absence-in-all-heterologues” as is admitted by us Jainas, that is to say, both these types of pseudo-

158. ‘Kevalavyatirekiṇaṃ tvīdr̥ṣamātmādīprasādhane paramamastramupekṣitum na śaknuma ityayathābhāṣyamapi vyākhyānaṃ śreyaḥ.’—*NM*, p. 578; *Tātp.*, p. 283; *Kand.*, p. 204.

159. ‘Anayoreva dvayo rūpayoḥ sandehe’ naikāntikaḥ.—*NB*, 3. 98.

probantia ought to be regarded as being due to “absence of absence-in-all-heterologues” about which there is no dispute among the logicians and neither should be regarded as being due to “doubt as to presence-in-a-homologue” ( about which there is a difference of opinion ).’

In this connection let us make one point clear. While defending their thesis on the threefold nature of a probans, the Buddhists treat “presence-in-a-homologue” as one of the three aspects of the nature of a probans, for they think that you cannot say “this probans is absent from all heterologues” unless you at the same time say “this probans is present only in homologues”. Thus on their showing, it is only on account of “presence-in-homologues” that “absence-in-all-heterologues” can be ascertained, be the heterologue concerned with something real (*vastu*) or imaginary (*avastu*); hence in case it is impossible to speak of “presence-in-a-homologue” it is equally impossible to speak of “absence-in-all-heterologues”. But even while “presence-in-a-homologue” and “absence-in-all-heterologues” are so closely dependent on one another they are, according to Buddhists, mutually different; hence it is that they lay equal emphasis on the two. This, however, is not the view accepted in the Jaina tradition; for according to this tradition, the essential nature of a probans consists in “absence-in-all-heterologues” (*vipakṣavyāvṛtti*), of which nature ‘*anvaya*’ and ‘*vyatireka*’ are but two names. Following this line of thought, Āc. Hemacandra finally submits that if *anvaya* means “presence only in the homologues” (*sapakṣe eva sattvam*) it is but another name for *vyatireka* which the Jaina describes as “inexplicability otherwise” (*anyathānupapatti*) ( i. e. absence unless the probandum is present ). In short, what the Buddhist logicians view as two different though mutually dependent aspects of the nature of a probans, the Jaina logicians view as but ( the negative aspect ) ‘inexplicability otherwise’ or ‘absence-in-all-heterologues’, thus ignoring the positive aspect ( viz. ‘presence-in-homologues’ ).

( *PMT*, pp. 85-87 ; *DC I*, pp. 190-91 )

## 24. THE NATURE OF PAKṢA

In connection with *pakṣa*, four questions deserve consideration : ( 1 ) What is the definition—i. e. essence—of *pakṣa* ? ( 2 ) What do the different adjectives occurring in the definition seek to exclude from the purview of this definition ? ( 3 ) What are the forms ( *ākāra* ) of *pakṣa* ? and ( 4 ) What are the types ( *prakāra* ) of *pakṣa* ?

( 1 ) In the field of speculation it was almost established long since as to what the nature of *pakṣa* is, but a clear picture of the concept was offered by Praśastapāda in the course of his definition of *pratijñā* (i.e. thesis sought to be established through inference).<sup>160</sup>

160. ‘Pratipipādayiṣitadharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇo’padeśaviṣayamāpādayitum uddeśamātram pratijñā . Avirodhigrahaṇāt pratyakṣānumānābhyupagatasvaśāstrasvavacanavirodhino nirastā bhavanti.’ Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 234.

In *Nyāyapraveśa* <sup>161</sup> and *Nyāyabindu* <sup>162</sup> the language of the definition was so much well established that all subsequent Jaina logicians—Śvetāmbara and Digambara—have adopted in their texts the Buddhist definition without any variation whatsoever and in those very words ( or their verbal equivalents ).

( 2 ) The three adjectives—viz. desired ( *iṣṭa* ), hitherto unestablished ( *asiddha* ), and uncontradicted ( *abādhita* )—have not been, all of them, interpreted either in Praśastapāda or in *Nyāyapraveśa*, but these texts clearly state as to what the word ‘*abādhita*’ ( i. e. uncontradicted ) seeks to exclude from the purview of the definition in question. <sup>163</sup> *Nyāyabindu* does the same for all the three adjectives. <sup>164</sup> The Jaina texts, likewise, tell us as to what these three words seek to exclude from the purview of the definition. The only difference is that while Māṅikyanandin ( *PM*, 3. 20 ) and Devasūri ( *PNT*, 3. 14-17 ) mention all the three adjectives in the aphorism itself, Āc. Hemacandra mentions *abādhitatva* in the aphorism and the remaining two in the Commentary. Praśastapāda has enumerated the following five types of contradicted theses ( *bādhita pakṣa* ) :

- ( i ) that which goes against a perception ( *pratyakṣa-viruddha* ),
- ( ii ) that which goes against an inference ( *anumāna-viruddha* ),
- ( iii ) that which goes against Scriptures ( *āgama-viruddha* ), ( iv ) that which goes against one’s own system of philosophy ( *svaśāstra-viruddha* ), and ( v ) that which goes against one’s own utterance ( *svavacana-viruddha* ). *Nyāyapraveśa* too speaks of the five types of contradicted theses, but it replaces “*svaśāstra-viruddha*” by “*loka-viruddha*” ( i. e. that which goes against the established social convention ). In *Nyāyabindu* there occurs neither the adjective “*āgama-viruddha*” nor “*loka-viruddha*” and the two replaced by

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- 161. ‘Tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī prasiddhaviśeṣeṇa viśiṣṭatayā svayaṃ sādhyatvenepsītaḥ. Pratyakṣādyaviruddha iti vākyaśeṣaḥ. Tadyathā nityaḥ śabdo’nityo veti.’—*Nyāyapraveśa*, p. 1.
  - 162. ‘Svarūpeṇaiva svayamiṣṭo’nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti.’—*NB*, 3. 40.
  - 163. ‘Yathā’nuṣṇo’gniriti pratyakṣavirodhī, ghanamambaramiti anumānavirodhī, Brāhmaṇena surā peyetyāgamavirodhī, Vaiśeṣikasya satkāryamiti bruvataḥ svaśāstravirodhī, na śabdo’rthapratyāyaka iti svavacanavirodhī.’—Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 234; ‘Sādhyatumiṣṭo’pi pratyakṣādiviruddhaḥ pakṣābhāsaḥ. Tadyathā—pratyakṣaviruddhaḥ, anumānaviruddhaḥ, āgamaviruddhaḥ, lokaviruddhaḥ, svavacanaviruddhaḥ, aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇaḥ, aprasiddhaviśeṣyaḥ, aprasiddhobhayaḥ, aprasiddha-sambandhaśceti.’—*Nyāyapraveśa*, p. 2.
  - 164. ‘Svarūpeṇeti sādhyatveneṣṭaḥ. Svarūpeṇaiveti sādhyatveneṣṭo na sādhanatvenāpi. Yathā śabdasyānityatve sādhye cākṣuṣatvaṃ hetuḥ śabde’siddhatvāsādhyam, na punastadiha sādhyatveneṣṭam sādhanatvenāpyabhidhānāt. Svayamiti vādinā. Yastadā sādhanamāha. Etena yadyapi kvacicchāstre sthitaḥ sādhanamāha tacchāstrakāreṇa tasmin dharmiṇyanekadharmābhuyupagame’pi yastadā tena vādinā svayaṃ sādhyatumiṣṭaḥ sa eva sādhyo netara ityuktaṃ bhavati. Iṣṭa iti yatrārthe vivādena sādhanamupanyastaṃ tasya siddhimicchatā so’nukto’pi vacanena sādhyāḥ. Tadadhikaraṇatvādvivādasya. Yathā parārthāścakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātavāccayanāsanādivad iti, atrātmārthā ityanuktāvapyātmārthatā sādhyā, anena noktāmātrameva sādhyamityuktaṃ bhavati. Anirākṛta iti etallakṣaṇayoge’pi yaḥ sādhyatumiṣṭo’pyarthaḥ pratyakṣānumānapratītisvavacanair-nirākriyate na saḥ pakṣa iti pradarśanārtham.’—*NBT*, 3. 41-50.

“*pratīviruddha*” ( i. e. that which goes against the established convention concerning the meaning of a word ); thus *Nyāyabindu* admits, in all, four types of contradicted theses, viz. *pratyakṣa-viruddha*, *anumāna-viruddha*, *svavacana-viruddha*, and *pratīti-viruddha*. It seems that Dharmakīrti has eliminated the adjective “*āgama-viruddha*” keeping in view the fact that the Buddhist tradition does not recognize ‘*āgama*’ ( i. e. Scriptures ) as a *pramāṇa*. On this question, Māṇikyanandin has followed not *Nyāyabindu* but *Nyāyapraveśa* whose fivefold classification has been accepted also by Devasūri. However, even while following *Nyāyapraveśa* and Māṇikyanandin, Devasūri inserted the word etc. “( *ādi* ) in his aphorism ( *PNT*, 6. 40 ), an insertion which enabled him to speak in *Ratnākara* of two additional types of contradicted theses, viz. *smaraṇa-viruddha* ( i. e. that which goes against memory ) and *tarka-viruddha* ( i. e. that which goes against *tarka* as understood in Jaina Logic ). Āc. Hemacandra accepts in his aphorism the adjective ‘*pratīti-viruddha*’ occurring in *Nyāyabindu* and the remaining five occurring in *Nyāyapraveśa* and Māṇikyanandin, thus making the total six. Māṭhara—who is probably older than *Nyāyapraveśa*—says ( *k.* 5 ) that pseudo-*pakṣas* ( *pakṣābhāsa* ) are of nine types, but he gives no instances of these types while *Nyāyapraveśa* mentions and illustrates the nine types of pseudo-*pakṣas*.

( 3 ) Āc. Hemacandra informs us—as was already done by Māṇikyanandin—( *PM*, 3. 25, 26, 32 ) and Devasūri ( 3. 16-18 )—that *pakṣa* is of two possible forms ( *ākāra* ), viz. the object possessing the characteristic-acting-as-probandum ( *sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭa dharmin* ) and merely the characteristic-acting-as-probandum ( *sādhyadharmamātra* ). In his aphorism ( 2. 8 ) Dharmakīrti speaks of just one form of *pakṣa*, but Dharmottara, in his commentary on this aphorism, enumerates three forms, viz. merely the object ( denoted by the subject of the thesis concerned ) ( *kevala dharmin* ), merely the characteristic-acting-as-probandum ( *kevala dharmā* ), and a combination of the object and the characteristic-acting-as-probandum ( *dharmā-dharmi-samudāya* ). Dharmottara also describes as to what are the different occasions for employing these three different forms of *pakṣa*, a description which is unprecedented ( *apūrva* ). Vātsyāyana ( *NBh*, 1. 1. 36 ) no doubt speaks of “object possessing the characteristic ( *dharmaviśiṣṭa dharmin* ) and “characteristic possessed by the object” ( *dharmiviśiṣṭa dharmā* ) as two possible forms of *pakṣa*, but no text earlier than Dharmottara’s commentary in question, details the different occasions when the different forms of *pakṣa* are to be employed. Dharmottara’s present account was incorporated by Māṇikyanandin—and later on by Devasūri—in the aphorism itself. Āc. Hemacandra follows these two earlier teachers, but incorporates the account in question in the Commentary rather than aphorism—( *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 1. 2. 13-17 ).

( 4 ) Like other Jaina logicians Āc. Hemacandra accepts three types of *pakṣa* ( understood as the object denoted by the subject of the thesis concerned ), viz. that which is established through a *pramāṇa* ( *pramāṇa-siddha* ), that which is imagined ( *vikalpa-siddha* ),<sup>165</sup> and that which is partly established through a *pramāṇa* and partly

165. By “imagined *pakṣa*” is meant *pakṣa* whose claim for reality is under dispute.—Tr.

imagined (*ubhaya-siddha*). There is no difference of opinion about the first type, but there is no unanimity about the remaining two. So far as our information goes, Dharmakīrti seems to be the first logician to have raised objection against the imagined and the partly imagined *pakṣas*. It cannot be said with certainty as to whether Dharmakīrti's objection was directed against the Mīmāṃsaka or against the Jaina or against both. But one thing is certain. The detailed answer to Dharmakīrti's objection is to be found in Jaina texts on Logic and nowhere else, and in the course of their answer all these texts quote that verse (*PV*, 1. 192) from Dharmakīrti where the objection in question is set forth.

It was physically impossible for Āc. Hemacandra to incorporate in his discussion that final and subtlest account of *pakṣatā* which was offered by Gaṅgeśa, the author of *Maṇi* (*Maṇikāra*);<sup>166</sup> but a comparative study of the various old and new definitions of *pakṣa* certainly justifies the assertion that the refined concept of Gaṅgeśa is present—even though in an old terminology and in an old fashion—in all the Nyāya, Buddhist, and Jaina texts of the earlier period.

(*PMT*, pp. 87-90 ; *DC I*, pp. 192-95)

## 25. NATURE OF DRṢṬĀNTA

In connection with *drṣṭānta* the following questions deserve consideration :

1. Is it a part and parcel of inference (*anumānāṅgatva*) ? 2. What is its definition. (*lakṣaṇa*) ? and 3. What is the occasion for its use (*upayoga*) ?

1. Dharmakīrti includes *drṣṭānta* (i. e. the offering of an instance by way of illustrating the concerned relation of invariable concomitance) in the process called “pointing out the three aspects of the nature of the probans” (*hetutairūpya-kathana*)—a process also known as “substantiation of the probans” (*hetu-samarthana*). Hence insofar as *drṣṭānta* is a part and parcel of “*hetusamarthana*” it is a part and parcel of inference (*hetusamarthana* being a part and parcel of inference) ; however, it is so only for a novice (*avidvān*) while experts (*vidvān*) do not require a *drṣṭānta*, they do not at all require *hetusamarthana*, which, in turn, is because they follow the inference as soon as the probans is merely stated (*PV*, 1. 28). Thus *drṣṭānta* is not a part and parcel of inference for experts (though it is so for a novice). Now Māṇikyanandin (3. 37-42), Devasūri (*PNT*, 3.28,34-38), and Āc. Hemacandra (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 47) are all of the view that *drṣṭānta* is not a part of inference, and they have urged various difficulties against its being regarded as useful in an inference ; however, at the same time, they all concede (*PNT*, 3. 42 ; *PM*, 3. 46) that *drṣṭānta* serves as a reminder-of-the-*vyāpti* (*vyāpti-smāraka*) for the dull-witted disciples to whom an inference is being offered. Hence the question arises as to what these teachers mean when they deny that *drṣṭānta* is a part of inference. And

166. ‘Ucyate—siṣādhayiṣāviraahasahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvō yatrāsti sa pakṣaḥ, tena siṣādhayiṣāviraahasahakṛtam sādhakapramāṇaṃ yatrāsti sa na pakṣaḥ, yatra sādhakapramāṇe satyasati vā siṣādhayiṣā yatra vobhayābhāvastatra viśiṣṭābhāvāt pakṣatvam.’—*Anumānagādādhārī*, pp. 431-32.

the only possible answer is that they merely seek to suggest *dr̥ṣṭānta* is not a part of all inference whatsoever (that is to say, they do not seek to suggest that *dr̥ṣṭānta* is not a part of any inference whatsoever). It is this idea that Siddhasena briefly expresses (*NA*, 20). Thus on reflection there appears to be no material difference between the Buddhist and Jaina stands on the question.

2. A general definition of *dr̥ṣṭānta* is given in *Nyāyasūtra*—(1. 1. 25) but in no Buddhist text. Māṅikyanandin too, like Siddhasena, offered no general definition of *dr̥ṣṭānta*, but Devasūri (*PNT*, 3. 40) and Āc. Hemacandra do so. The Nyāya definition of *dr̥ṣṭānta* is so wide that it applies even to the dealings of a general type (*sāmānya vyavahāra*) and not to inference alone; on the other hand, the Jaina definition of *dr̥ṣṭānta* applies only to the cases of inference. The twofold classification of *dr̥ṣṭāntas* into those based on similarity (*sādharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta*) and those based on dissimilarity (*vaidharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta*)—along with a definition of each of these classes—is to be found in an identical form in the old texts like *Nyāyapraveśa* (pp. 1, 2) and *Nyāyāvatāra* (*ks.* 17, 18) and the later texts like *Parikṣāmukha* (3. 47 ff.) and *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* (3. 41).

(3) As to the occasion for the use of *dr̥ṣṭānta*, the Jaina stand is not absolutistic (*aikāntika*). For Jaina logicians are of the view that in the case of inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) *dr̥ṣṭānta* is of use only when the hearer is a non-expert (*avyutpanna*) while in the case of inference-for-oneself (*svārthānumāna*) it is of use only when the cognizer concerned has forgotten the *vyāpti* and needs a reminder—(*SVR*, 3. 42)

(*PMT*, pp. 90-91 ; *DC I*, pp. 195-96)

## 26. THE NATURE OF PSEUDO—PROBANS (*hetvābhāsa*)

[ 1 ]

As to the general classification of pseudo-probantia logicians hold divergent views. Akṣapāda<sup>167</sup> admits and gives an account of five types of pseudo-probantia. Kaṇāda's aphorism<sup>168</sup> makes clear mention of three types, but Praśastapāda,<sup>169</sup> while laying bare the idea underlying this aphorism, makes a fourfold classification. *Asiddha*, *viruddha*, and *anaikāntika* are the types included also among the five admitted by Akṣapāda, but *anadhyavasita*—the fourth type recognized by Praśastapāda—is not to be found in *Nyāyasūtra*. Bhāsarvajña,<sup>170</sup> who follows both Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda enumerates six types which constitute a set consisting all the types accepted by the old Nyāya tradition as also all those accepted by the old Vaiśeṣika tradition.

167. NS, 1. 2. 4.

168. 'Aprasiddho'napadeśo'san sandigdhaścānapadeśaḥ.'—VS, 3. 1. 15.

169. 'Etenāsiddhaviruddhasandigdhanadhyvasitavacanānām anapadeśatvamuktaṃ bhavati.'—Praśastapāda., p. 238.

170. 'Asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikānadhyvasitakālātyayāpadiṣṭāprakaraṇasamāḥ.'—NSa, p. 7.

*Nyāyapraveśa*<sup>171</sup>—a text attributed to Dinnāga—makes mention of just three types of pseudo-probantia, viz *asiddha*, *viruddha*, and *anaikāntika*, a position endorsed and elucidated by all subsequent Buddhist logicians like Dharmakīrti etc. The old Sāṅkhya teacher Māṭhara,<sup>172</sup> too, makes express mention of these very three types. On the question of the number of types of pseudo-probantia Sāṅkhya and Kaṇāda seem to have followed an identical tradition.

The Jaina tradition in fact admits just three types of pseudo-probantia—as do the traditions of Kaṇāda, Sāṅkhya, and Buddhists. Thus Siddhasena<sup>173</sup> and Vālideva (*PNT*, 6. 47) give an account of all the three types, viz. *asiddha* etc., and Āc. Hemacandra follows their example. Āc. Hemacandra refutes the two additional types, viz. *kālātīta* and *prakaraṇasama*, recognized in *Nyāyasūtra*, but he does not refute the additional type, viz. *anadhyavasita*, recognized by Praśastapāda and Bhāsarvajña. On this point there is a divergence of opinion in the Jaina tradition, and it is as follows. Akalaṅka and the Digambara logicians like Māṅikyanandin etc. who follow him admit four types of pseudo-probantia,<sup>174</sup> of which three are those *asiddha* etc. and the fourth a new type called '*akiñcitkara*', a type mentioned nowhere else. But here we should recall that Jayanta<sup>175</sup> has mentioned a prima facie view according to which "*aprayojaka*" (also called "*anyathāsiddha*") is an additional type of pseudo-probans, and the view seems to be older than Jayanta. "*Aprayojaka*" and "*akiñcitkara*" are no doubt two different words, but it appears as if their meaning is the same. However, *aprayojaka* as explained by Jayanta is quite different from *akiñcitkara* as explained by Prabhācandra,<sup>176</sup> the follower of Māṅikyanandin; it is therefore not easy to say that '*aprayojaka*' and '*akiñcitkara*' are the expressions of a basically identical idea. Even then one question arises: When no earlier text on Logic—either Buddhist or Jaina—even mentions '*akiñcitkara*' where does Akalaṅka bring it from? The possibility is that it was on the basis of some older text on Logic which accepted *aprayojaka* or *anyathāsiddha* as an additional type of pseudo-probans that Akalaṅka proposed, in his own fashion, an altogether new type of pseudo-probans called '*akiñcitkara*'. A refutation of this type called "*akiñcitkara*" occurs only in Vālidevasūri's autocommentary on his aphorism—(*SVR*, p. 1230).

171. 'Asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhā hetvābhāsāḥ.'—*Nyāyapraveśa*, p. 3.

172. 'Anye hetvābhāsāḥ caturdaśa asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhādayaḥ.'—*Māṭharavṛtti*, 5.

173. 'Asiddhastvaprātīto yo yo'nyathāivopapadyate / Viruddho yo'nyathāpyatra yukto'naikāntikaḥ sa tu //—*NA*, k. 23.

174. 'Asiddhaścākṣuṣatvādi śabdānityatvasādhanē / Anyathāsambhavābhāvabhedāt sa bahudhā smṛtaḥ // Viruddhasiddhasandigdhairakiñcitkaravistaraiḥ //—*Nyāyaviniścaya*, 2, 195-96; *PM*, 6. 21.

175. 'Anye tu anyathāsiddhatvaṃ nāma tadbhedamudāharanti yasya hetordharmini vṛttirbhavanyapi sādhyadharmaprayuktā na bhavati so'nyathāsiddho, yathā anityā manaḥparamāṇavo mūrtatvād ghaṭavaditi Sa cātra prayojyaprayojakabhāvo nāstīyata evāyamanythāsiddho'prayojaka iti kathyate. Kathaṃ punarasyāprayojakatvamavagatam?'—*NM*, p. 607.

176. 'Siddhe nirṇīte pramāṇāntarāt sādhye pratyakṣādibādhite ca heturna kiñcitkaroti iti akiñcitkaro' narthakaḥ.'—*PKM*, p. 193A.

Now these various traditions as to the number of the types of pseudo-probantia differ from one another only on the question of their number and not on that of the essence of a pseudo-probans. Thus if one tradition gives a particular name to the probantia suffering from a particular type of defect and if another tradition is convinced that these probantia are really defective, this latter tradition will not refuse to treat the inferences concerned as cases of invalid inference ; all that it might possibly do is that it will either include these cases under another type (or subtype) of pseudo-probantia recognized by itself, or it will treat them as cases of pseudo-*pakṣa* etc. (rather than those of pseudo-probans).

Āc. Hemacandra points out (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 2. 1. 16) the impropriety of the employment of the word “*hetvābhāsa*” but defends its employment in the sense of “*sādhānābhāsa*”.<sup>177</sup> He thus kills two birds in one shot, for while seeing the wisdom of following the older teachers he at the same time points out a mistake committed by these teachers. The same sort of wisdom was displayed by Māṇikyanandin. Again, Āc. Hemacandra gave an account of the type called ‘*akiñcitkara*’ which Akalañka—whom he held in esteem—had accepted, but when he saw no reason for treating it as an independent type he composed an aphorism that would lend support to the type in question but would at the same time indicate the impropriety of treating it as an independent type. (*Lakṣaṇa evāsau doṣo vyutpanna-prayogasya pakṣadoṣeṇaiva duṣṭatvāt*’—(*PM*, 6. 39).

[ 2 ]

## I. A S I D D H A H E T V Ā B H Ā S A

In *Nyāyasūtra* (1. 2. 8) the name for ‘*asiddha*’ is “*sādhyasama*”. And *Nyāyasūtra* differs from other texts not only on the question of name but also in some other respect. Thus while other texts give an account of a greater or fewer number of subtypes of *asiddha*, *Nyāyasūtra* and its *Bhāṣya* rest content simply with a definition of *asiddha* in general.

Praśastapāda and *Nyāyapraveśa* give a clear—and almost similar—account of four subtypes of *asiddha*.<sup>178</sup> Māṭhara (*k.* 5) too speaks of four subtypes of *asiddha*, and he probably had in mind these very four subtypes. Dharmakīrti, in *Nyāyabindu*, describes the four subtypes accepted by Praśastapāda etc. , but, instead of following Praśastapāda and *Nyāyapraveśa* in quoting just one instance of *āśrayāsiddha*, he quotes two instances thereof, thus further classifying into two the fourth subtype (viz. *āśrayāsiddha*). Really speaking, Dharmakīrti’s description is but a slightly amended version of the account given in Praśastapāda and *Nyāyapraveśa* (*NB*, 3. 58-67).

177. There is a subtle distinction involved here. “*Sādhana*” stands for the thing acting as probans, while “*hetu*” for the word expressing this thing. And it is Āc. Hemacandra’s contention that a defective probans is in fact a *sādhānābhāsa* rather than *hetvābhāsa*. Tr.

178. ‘Ubhayāsiddho’nyatarāsiddhaḥ tadbhāvāsiddho’numeyāsiddhaśceti.’—Praśastapāda., p. 238 ; ‘Ubhayāsiddho’nyatarāsiddhaḥ sandigdhasiddhaḥ āśrayāsiddhaśceti.’—*Nyāyapraveśa*, p. 3.

*Nyāyasāra* (p. 8) mentions and illustrates fourteen subtypes of *asiddha*, and *Nyāyamāñjarī* (p. 606) formulates a number of subtypes in a similar fashion. In his account of *asiddha* Māṅikyanandin (*PM*, 6. 22-28) simply follows Dharmakīrti, though he changes the latter's terminology. In his commentary *Mārtaṇḍa* (p. 191A) on *Parīkṣāmukha*, Prabhācandra mentions and illustrates a number of such subtypes of *asiddha* as do not occur in the original aphorism, but all of these are taken from *Nyāyasāra*. Āc. Hemacandra's aphorism on *asiddha* follows *Nyāyabindu* and *Parīkṣāmukha*, and his series of illustrations literally follows *Nyāyasāra*. Vālideva's general definition of *asiddha* (*PNT*, 6. 49), since it does not follow Dharmakīrti and *Parīkṣāmukha* literally, appears to be more refined than that of Āc. Hemacandra. The series of illustrations given in the commentary *Ratnāvatārikā* on Vālideva's aphorisms in question is a literal collection of the illustrations occurring in *Nyāyasāra* and *Nyāyamāñjarī*; however in some of these illustrations the arrangement (*vastu-vinyāsa*) is Vālideva's own.

## II. VIRUDDHA HETVĀBHĀSA

Just as *Prāśastapāda* contains only a general account of *viruddha* and does not divide it into subtypes, so also do *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Bhāṣya* thereon. But in spite of this much similarity, the fact remains that the account and illustrations given in *Prāśastapāda* are clearly different from those given in *Nyāyasūtra* and its *Bhāṣya*.<sup>179</sup> It appears that on the question of *viruddha*, *Prāśastapāda* and *Nyāyasūtra* do not follow one common tradition.

*Nyāyapraveśa* (p. 5) mentions and illustrates four subtypes of *viruddha*, and Māṅhara (*k.* 5) seems to accept these very four. *Nyāyabindu* (3. 83-88) exhausts its division of *viruddha* in just two illustrations; afterwards (3. 89-94), it seeks to remove the doubt that "iṣṭavighātakṛt" might possibly be an additional, i. e. third, subtype of *viruddha*, and this it does by showing that the alleged cases of 'iṣṭavighātakṛt' are covered by the two subtypes already recognized. The name 'iṣṭavighātakṛt' does not occur in *Nyāyapraveśa*, but the instance quoted in *Nyāyabindu* (3. 90) as illustrating it does occur there (p. 5). It appears that the subtype of *viruddha* which in *Nyāyapraveśa* is illustrated by "parāṛthāḥ cakṣurādayaḥ" and which is there called 'dharmaviśeṣaviruddha' was given the name 'iṣṭavighātakṛt' by certain circles; it is this latter convention that Dharmakīrti takes note of while seeking to bring the subtype in question under other subtypes. Jayanta (*NM*, pp. 600-1) in the course of commenting on Gautama's aphorism clearly refutes a

179. 'Siddhāntamabhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ.—NS, 1. 2. 6; 'Yathā so'yam vikāro vyakterapaiti nityatvapratīṣedhāt, apeto'pyasti vināśapratīṣedhāt, na nityo vikāra upapadyate ityevaṃ hetuḥ— "Vyakterapeto'pi vikāro'sti" ityanena svasiddhāntena virudhyate. Yadasti na tadātmalābhāt pracyavate, astitvaṃ cātmalābhāt pracyutiriti viruddhāvetau dharmau na saha, sambhavata iti. So'yam heturayaṃ siddhāntamāśritya pravartate tameva vyābanti iti.' NBh, 1. 2. 6; 'Yo hyanu-meye'vidyamāno'pi tatsamānajātīye sarvasminnāsti tadviparīte cāsti sa viparīt- asāadhanād viruddhaḥ yathā yasmādviṣāṇī tasmādaśva iti.'—*Prāśastapāda*, p. 238.

view which subdivides *viruddha* into *dharmaviśeṣaviruddha* and *dharmiviśeṣaviruddha*, a refutation which seems to be directed against that tradition of *Nyāyapraveśa*. The most exhaustive and most complicated subdivision of *viruddha* occurs in *Nyāyasāra* (p. 9) ; there we get eight subtypes, four covering the cases where a homologue exists and four covering those where no homologue exists, and these very eight subtypes (along with their respective illustrations) which occur in *Nyāyasāra* also occur in the commentary on *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* (PNT. 652-53). In the commentary *Mārtaṇḍa* on *Parikṣāmukha* (p. 192A), again, there occur these very eight subtypes recognized in *Nyāyasāra*, but the illustrations given here are in some cases slightly different. Āc. Hemacandra, following the practice adopted in the commentary on *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka*, literally adopted the account of the subtypes in question (along with their respective illustrations) as given in *Nyāyasāra*. He is also convinced by the arguments—offered in *Nyāyamañjarī* and *Nyāyasāra*—in support of the position that four of these subtypes fall under *viruddha* as well as *asiddha*.

### III. ANAIKĀNTIKA HETVĀBHĀSA

About the name of that type of pseudo-probans which later on came to be known as '*anaikāntika*' there are two old traditions, one that of Gautama and the other that of Kaṇāda. What Gautama in his *Nyāya* aphorism (1. 2. 5) calls '*savyabhicāra*' Kaṇāda in his *Vaiśeṣika* aphorism (3. 1. 15) calls '*sandigdha*'. That this difference in nomenclature is somewhat significant becomes clear from later commentaries. This is how matters stand. According to one (i. e. Gautama's) tradition the '*anaikāntikatā*' (i. e. *anaikāntika*-ship of a pseudo-probans lies in its "coexistence with the probandum as well as with the absence of probandum" (*sādhyā-tadabhāva-sahacaratva*) and not in its giving rise to a doubt (*saṁśayajanakatva*), while according to the other (i. e. Kaṇāda's) tradition, the '*anaikāntikatā*' of a pseudo-probans lies in its giving rise to a doubt and not in its "coexistence with the probandum as well as with the absence of probandum". This difference of opinion as to the determinant (*niyāmaka*) of *anaikāntikatā* results in a difference of opinion as to the illustrations (i. e. classification) of the *anaikāntika* type of pseudo-probantia. For example, in Gautama's tradition there can be no place for the subtypes "*asādhāraṇa*" and "*viruddhāvyabhicārin*", for a pseudo-probans belonging to neither of these subtypes coexists with the absence of probandum. These two viewpoints which originally gave two significantly different names for the type of pseudo-probans in question, continued even in later times, but in all subsequent literature on Logic—be it Vedīcist, Buddhist, or Jainā—the name that was adopted (for this type) was "*anaikāntika*"—a name originating in Gautama's tradition—while the name "*sandigdha*" proposed by Kaṇāda went completely out of use.

As for *Prasāstapāda* and *Nyāyapraveśa*, it has not yet been finally decided as to which of them is earlier ; as a result, it is difficult to be certain as to which of them has influenced the other. However, one thing is worthy of note, and it is that *Prasāstapāda* and *Nyāyapraveśa* pursue an identical line of thought but differ on the question of

attaching relative importance to the various subtypes of the type in question. In *Nyāyapraveśa* the type in question is called “*anaikāntika*”—and not “*sandigdha*” (as it is in *Praśastapāda*), but the determinant of *anaikāntikatā* is, according to *Nyāyapraveśa*—as it is according to *Praśastapāda*—the generation of a doubt (on the part of a pseudo-probans) (*saṃśayajanakatva*). Thus while classifying the type *anaikāntika* into six subtypes, the author of *Nyāyapraveśa* makes it quite clear that ‘generation of a doubt’ is the common function of all these subtypes.<sup>180</sup> *Praśastapāda*, like *Nyāyapraveśa*, considers ‘generation of a doubt’ to be the determinant of *anaikāntikatā*, but he refuses to treat as cases of *sandigdha* two subtypes, viz. *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, recognized in *Nyāyapraveśa*; and his objection is based on the ground that the subtypes in question are generative of no doubt.<sup>181</sup> Until we are in possession of such a pre-*Praśastapāda* Vaiśeṣika text or a pre-*Praśastapāda* Buddhist text other than *Nyāyapraveśa* as maintains the position here criticised by *Praśastapāda*, we are, perhaps, justified in saying that *Praśastapāda* is here criticizing *Nyāyapraveśa*. In any case, it is quite certain that *Praśastapāda* has refused to treat *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin* as subtypes of *sandigdha* or *anaikāntika*. But then arises the question: “Are *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin* no pseudo-probans?”, and to this *Praśastapāda*’s answer is highly intelligent. For he says that *asādhāraṇa* is no doubt a pseudo-probans but that since it is generative of no doubt it is not a subtype of *anaikāntika* but an independent type called ‘*anadhyavasita*’; as for *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, he says that it should be treated either as a case of *anadhyavasita* (which is *Praśastapāda*’s equivalent for *asādhāraṇa*) or as a subtype of *viruddha*—(*ayaṃ tu viruddhabheda eva—Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 239). Thus even while refusing to grant that *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin* are generative of a doubt, *Praśastapāda* does bring them under some type of pseudo-probans or other. In connection with this discussion two more points are noteworthy in *Praśastapāda*: firstly, that he posits an independent type of pseudo-probans in the form of *anadhyavasita*, and, secondly, that while entering into the controversy as to whether *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is or is not generative of a doubt he considers illustrations which do not occur in *Nyāyapraveśa*. As for the first point, it cannot be said with certainty whether the word

180. ‘Tatra sādharmaṇaḥ—śabdaḥ prameyatvānnitya iti. Taddhi nityānityapakṣayoḥ sādharmaṇatvādan-  
aikāntikam. Kiṃ ghaṭavat prameyatvādanityaḥ śabdaḥ āhosvidākāśavatprameyatvānnitya iti.’ etc.  
*Nyāyapraveśa*, a. 3.

181. ‘Asādhāraṇaḥ—śrāvaṇatvānnitya iti. Taddhi nityānityapakṣaābhyāṃvyā vṛttatvānnityānityavinirmuk-  
tasya cānyasyāsambhavāt saṃśayahetuḥ kimbhūtasyaśya śrāvaṇatvamiti ....Viruddhāvyabhicārī  
yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtatvāt ghaṭavat; nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt śabdatvavāditi. Ubhayoḥ  
saṃśayahetutvāt dvāvapyetāveko’naikāntikaḥ samuditāveva.’—*Nyāyapraveśa*, pp. 3, 4. ‘Ekasmiṃ-  
śca dvayorhetvoryathokta-lakṣaṇayorviruddhayoḥ sannipāte sati saṃśayadarśanādayamanyaḥ  
sandigdha iti kecit, yathā mūrtatvāmūrtatvaṃ prati manasaḥ kriyāvatvāsparśavattvayoriti.  
Nanvayamasādhāraṇa evācākṣuṣatvapatryakṣatvavat saṃthayoranyatarapakṣāsambhavāt tataścā-  
nadhavasita iti vakṣyāmaḥ.’—*Praśastapāda*, pp. 238, 239.

'*anadhyavasita*'—absent in Kaṇāda—was first employed by Praśastapāda or was even earlier in vogue in the sense of an independent type of pseudo-probans. As for the second point, let us note that the illustration of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* given in *Nyāyapraveśa* is "*Nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt, śabdatvavat; Anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt, ghaṭavat*" (i. e. Word is eternal, because it is grasped through auditory perception, like word-ness; Word is transient, because it is a produced entity, like a jar), while the one given in Praśastapāda is "*Manah mūrtaṃ kriyāvatvāt; Manah amūrtaṃ asparśavatvāt*" (i. e. *Manas* is a *mūrta* entity, because it undertakes motion; *Manas* is an *amūrta* entity, because it is not grasped through touch). Now Praśastapāda's illustration is certainly based on Vaiśeṣika (ontological) positions, but it is surprising that the illustration given in a Buddhist text like *Nyāyapraveśa* is based not on Buddhist (ontological) positions but on a position which is in a way Vedicist (not Buddhist); for Buddhist philosophers do not at all consider "*śabdatva* (i. e. word-ness) to be an eternal universal (*jāti*) as do the Vedicist philosophers like Vaiśeṣika etc. Be that as it may, the controversy continued even in later times.

The master logician (*tārkiakpravara*) Dharmakīrti based his investigation into pseudo-probontia on the Buddhist doctrine of the threefold nature of a probans (*hetutrainrūpya*),<sup>182</sup> a procedure not to be found in any Buddhist text of the earlier period. Dharmakīrti appears to have always had in his mind Praśastapāda's criticism on the question of *anaikāntika*. He defended *Nyāyapraveśa* by answering Praśastapāda's criticism. With Dharmakīrti the determinant of *anaikāntikatā* was *vyabhicāra* (i. e. coexistence of the probans with the probandum as well as with the absence of probandum) as it was with the author of *Nyāyasūtra*, but he also granted the position—exclusively maintained by Praśastapāda and *Nyāyapraveśa*—that 'generation of a doubt' is a determinant of *anaikāntikatā*. The *Nyāyapraveśa* position that *asādhāraṇa* is a subtype of *anaikāntika* was criticized by Praśastapāda on the ground that *asādhāraṇa* is generative of no doubt; Dharmakīrti answered this criticism by offering an illustration different from that given in *Nyāyapraveśa* and by pointing out that the probans in this (new) illustration is generative of a doubt, thus concluding that *asādhāraṇa* is a subtype of *anaikāntika*.<sup>183</sup> Dharmakīrti did not rest content with this much but made another attempt to redeem the prestige of the tradition of Dinnāga—whom he held in esteem. While accepting the argument advanced by Praśastapāda by way of criticizing *viruddhāvyabhicārin* Dharmakīrti met the criticism in question and defended *viruddhāvyabhicārin*—in such a manner that Praśastapāda was answered and Dinnāga's honour saved. In the course of doing so, Dharmakīrti offered an illustration which is different from both that of *Nyāyapraveśa* and that of Praśastapāda, but since it is based on Vaiśeṣika (ontological)

182. 'Tatra trayāṇām rūpāṇāmekasyāpi krūpasyānutau sādhanābhāsaḥ. Uktāvapyasiddhau sādheḥ vā pratipādyapratipādakayoḥ. Ekasya rūpasya'...etc.—NBT, 3.57 ff.

183i 'Anayoreva dvayo rūpayoḥ sandeḥ'naikāntikāḥ. Yathā sātmakaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ prāṇādimatvāditi...At a evānvayavyatirekayoḥ sandehādanaikāntikāḥ. Sādhyetarayorato niścayābhāvāt.' NBT, 3. 98-110.

positions it cannot be unacceptable to Praśastapāda.<sup>184</sup> This prolonged discussion between the Buddhist and Vedicist logicians seems to have culminated in Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*. Jayanta sided with the earlier teachers belonging to his own camp and faced *Nyāyapraveśa* and Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*. He defended in great details Praśastapāda's view that *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvvyabhicārin* are no subtypes of *anaikāntika*, but he at the same time refuses to treat 'generation of a doubt' as the determinant of *anaikāntikatā* (a refusal that goes against Praśastapāda).<sup>185</sup>

Bhāsarvajña takes no note of the controversy going on between the Buddhists and Vedicist logicians, but simply offers eight illustrations (i. e. subtypes) of the type *anaikāntika* (*NSa*, p. 10). Again, he nowhere speaks of 'generation of a doubt' and seems to be a follower of Gautama's tradition.

In the Jaina tradition there occur both the names '*anaikāntika*' and '*sandigdha*'. Akalaṅka (*Nyāyaviniścaya*, 2. 196) employs the word '*sandigdha*' while '*anaikāntika*' is the word employed by the other Jaina logicians like Siddhasena (*NA*, 23) etc. Māṅikyanandin's aphorism on *anaikāntika*—like Āc. Hemacandra's aphorism on the same—is in fact a miniature version (*saṅkṣipta pravicchāyā*) of the corresponding *Nyāyabindu* aphorism. In this connection, the wording of Vādideva's aphorism does not appear to be so refined as that of the aphorisms of Māṅikyanandin and Āc. Hemacandra; for the word '*sandihyate*' occurring in Vādideva's aphorism is redundant. Be that as it may, the procedure adopted by Prabhācandra, Vādideva, and Āc. Hemacandra is identical insofar as they all adopt in their respective works Bhāsarvajña's eightfold classification of the type *anaikāntika* and seek to bring the eight subtypes in question under *anaikāntika* as understood by themselves. The others have taken even their illustrations from *Nyāyasāra*, but Prabhācandra (*PKM*, p. 192) changes some of them.

Here we should remember that no Jaina teacher has taken up the question—discussed in Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika writings—as to whether 'generation of a doubt' or 'coexistence of the probans with the probandum as well as with the absence of probandum' is the determinant of *anaikāntikatā*.

( *PMT*, pp. 96-103 ; *DC I*, pp. 197-206 )

184. 'Viruddhāvvyabhicāryapi saṁśayaheturuktaḥ. Saiha kasmānnoktaḥ....Atrodāharaṇaṁ yatsarvadeśāvasthitaiḥ svasambandhibhīryugapadabhisambadhyate tatsarvagataṁ yathā'kāśaṁ, abhisambadhyate sarvadeśāvasthitaiḥ svasambandhibhīryugapat sāmānyamiti. ...Dvitiyo'pi prayogo yadupalabdihlakṣaṇaprāptam sannopalabhyate na tat tatrāsti. Tadyathā kvacidavidyamāno ghaṭaḥ. Nopalabhyate copalabdihlakṣaṇaprāptam sāmānyam vyaktyantarāleṣviti. Ayamanupalambhaprayogaḥ svabhāvaśca parasparaviruddhārthasādhanādekatra saṁśayaṁ janayataḥ.'—NBT, 3, 112-121.
185. 'Asādhāraṇaviruddhāvvyabhicāriṇau' tu na saṁsta eva hetvābhāsāviti na vyākhyeyete....Api ca saṁśayajananamanaikāntikalakṣaṇamucyate cet kāmamasādhāraṇasya viruddhāvvyabhicāriṇo vā yathā tathā saṁśayahetutāmadihiropya kathyatāmānaikāntikatā na tu saṁśayajanakatvaṁ tallakṣaṇam, api tu pakṣadvayavṛttitvamaikāntikalakṣaṇam'—NM, pp. 598-99.

27. THE NATURE OF PSEUDO—*DRṢṬĀNTA* ( *drṣṭāntābhāsa* )

In connection with inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) the nature of pseudo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*) has been discussed since very old time ; thus a clear and detailed discussion on the subject occurs in *Kaṇādasūtra* (3. 1. 15) as well as *Nyāyasūtra* (1. 2. 4-9). But discussion on the nature of pseudo-*drṣṭānta* does not appear to be that much old ; for had this discussion been as old as that on pseudo-probans it must have found at least some mention in *Kaṇādasūtra* or *Nyāyasūtra*. At any rate, it is clear that the concepts of pseudo-*drṣṭānta*, pseudo-*pakṣa*, etc. were formulated—and became topics for discussion—in later times after the analogy of the concept of pseudo-probans. Whether Vedicist or Buddhist logicians started discussion on these new concepts cannot be said with certainty.

In *Nyāyapraveśa*—attributed to Diñnāga—there are mentioned, in all, ten types of pseudo-*drṣṭāntas*, five types where illustration is grounded in a similarity (*sādharmya*), five where it is grounded in a dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*).<sup>186</sup> But since the type called ‘*ubhayāsiddha*’ is there further classified into two subtypes, we there really have twelve types of pseudo-*drṣṭāntas*, six where illustration is grounded in a similarity, six where it is grounded in a dissimilarity. *Prāśastapāda* too gives an account of these very twelve types, six in each group.<sup>187</sup> The account and classification of pseudo-*drṣṭānta* occurring in *Nyāyapraveśa* are identical with those occurring in *Prāśastapāda*, but the two texts give two different names to the defect in question. Thus *Prāśastapāda* uses the word ‘*nidarśanābhāsa*’ instead of ‘*drṣṭāntābhāsa*’, and it is so because that step (*avayava*) in an inference-for-others which is elsewhere called “*drṣṭānta*” is called “*nidarśana*” in *Prāśastapāda*. Just as the names occurring in *Nyāyapraveśa* and *Prāśastapāda* for *drṣṭānta* in general are but synonyms, so also are the names occurring in these two texts for the various types of pseudo-*drṣṭānta*. Māṭhara (*k.* 5) too prefers the word ‘*nidarśanābhāsa*’, and he seems to be a follower (on this question) of *Prāśastapāda*. Though the total number of types of pseudo-*drṣṭāntas* recognized by *Prāśastapāda* is twelve and that of Māṭhara does not admit *āśrayāsiddha* (of two types, one belonging to the first group and the other to the second) as a separate type of pseudo-*drṣṭānta*.

186. ‘*Drṣṭāntābhāso dvividhaḥ sādharmaṇa vaidharmaṇa ca...tatra sādharmaṇa.. tadyathā sādhanadharmāsiddhaḥ sādhyadharmāsiddhaḥ ubhayadharmāsiddhaḥ ananvayaḥ viparītānvayaśceti... Vaidharmaṇāpi drṣṭāntābhāsaḥ pañcaprakāraḥ tadyathā sādhyāvyaṅgataḥ sādhanāvyaṅgataḥ ubhayāvyaṅgataḥ avyatirekaḥ viparītavyatirekaśceti. ...*’- *Nyāyapraveśa*, pp. 5-6.

187. ‘*Anena nidarśanābhāsā nirastā bhavanti. Tadyathā nityaḥ śabdo’mūrtatvāt yadamūrtam drṣṭam tannityam yathā paramāṇuryathā karma yathā sthālī yathā tamaḥ ambaravaditi yad dravyam tat kriyāvad drṣṭamiti ca liṅgānumeyobhayāsiddhamanugataviparītānugatāḥ sādharmaṇanidarśanābhāsāḥ. Yādnityam tanmūrtam drṣṭam yathā karma yathā paramāṇuryathākāśam yathā tamaḥ ghaṭavat yanniṣkriyam tadadravyam ceti liṅgānumeyobhyaṅgataśrayāsiddhāvyaṅgataḥ viparītavyāṅgataḥ vaidharmaṇanidarśanābhāsā iti.*’- *Prāśastapāda*, p. 247.

Jayanta (*NM*, p. 580), while commenting on the relevant Nyāya aphorism, realized the deficiency resulting from the absence of an account of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭānta* in *Nyāyasūtra*—an account present in the texts of Buddhists, Vaiśeṣikas, etc. ; he therefore accepted the types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* occurring in *Nyāyapraveśa* and thus eliminated the deficiency vitiating the Master's (*mānya ṛṣi*) account—in that spirit of devotion (*bhakti*) which is so typical of the Indian commentator-disciples (*ṭikākāra śiṣya*). In *Nyāyasāra* (p. 13) we get—under the title '*udāharaṇābhāsa*'—those very twelve types, six in each group, which we do in *Prāśastapāda*. Besides, *Nyāyasāra* enumerates eight types of doubtful (*sandigdha*) pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, four where similarity is in doubt and four where dissimilarity is in doubt.<sup>188</sup> The concept of 'doubtful pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭānta*' seems to be of a later origin than *Nyāyapraveśa* and *Prāśastapāda*. Dharmakīrti has given a detailed account of eighteen types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, nine belonging to each group. It seems that Dharmakīrti amended some earlier tradition of admitting eight types of doubtful pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*—a tradition followed in *Nyāyasāra*—and replaced it by his admission of six types of doubtful pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, three belonging to each group. As to the number of types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, their illustrations (some of them exhibiting a sectarian bias), etc. , various gradually developing views continued to be held even after Dharmakīrti.

In the Jaina tradition Siddhasena is the first to give an account of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*. He adopts the word "*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa* of the Buddhist and not the word "*nidarśanābhāsa*" or "*udāharaṇābhāsa*" of the Vedicist tradition. Though in his brief account Siddhasena<sup>189</sup> makes no mention of the total number (of the types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*) he seems to maintain, like Dharmakīrti, that there are eighteen types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, nine belonging to each group. Māṇikyanandin (*PM*, 6. 40-45) abbreviated all the earlier traditions and recognized just eight types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, four belonging to each group ; he also replaces some old illustrations by new ones. Vādidevasūri, though following Māṇikyanandin on the question of illustrations, literally accepts Dharmakīrti's classification, names, etc. of the types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*. However, Vādideva did one new thing in this connection. Dharmakīrti had, in some of his illustrations, belittled the Vedicist *ṛṣis* and Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras, and Vādideva paid Dharmakīrti in his own coin by belittling Tathāgata Buddha in alternative illustrations. Vādideva could not stand the attack made by Dharmakīrti—in the course of his treatment of Logic—on the personalities whom he (i. e. Vādideva) held in esteem ; he therefore came out with a retort against Dharmakīrti in the course of a treatise on Logic itself.<sup>190</sup>

188. 'Anye tu sandehadvāreṇaparānaṣṭāvudāharaṇābhāsān varṇayanti. Sandigdhasādhyāḥ.. sandigdhasādhanāḥ sandigdhobhayaḥ... sandigdhāśrayaḥ... sandigdhasādhyāvvyāvṛttaḥ... sandigdhasādhanāvvyāvṛttaḥ... sandigdhobhayaāvvyāvṛttaḥ.. sandigdhāśrayaḥ ..'—NSa, pp. 13-14.

189. 'Sādharmyeṇātra dr̥ṣṭāntadoṣā nyāyavidīritāḥ / Apalakṣaṇaheūtthāḥ sādhyādivikalādayaḥ // Vaidharmyeṇātra dr̥ṣṭāntadoṣā nyāyavidīritāḥ / Sādhyasādhanayugmānāmanivṛtteśca saṃśayāt // —A. 24-25.

190. 'Yathā nityaḥ śabda'mūrtatvāt, karmavat paramāṇuvad ghaṭavaditi sādhyasādanadharmobhaya-vikalāḥ. Tathā sandigdhasādhyadharmādayaśca, yathā rāgādīmānyam vacanādrathyāpuruṣavat, maraṇadharmā'yam puruṣo rāgādīmatvādrathyāpuruṣavat asarvajño'yam rāgādīmatvādrathyā-

Āc. Hemacandra prefers the name 'dṛṣṭāntābhāsa' to 'udāharaṇābhāsa' and also offers a logical justification for his preference.<sup>191</sup> There are three noteworthy features—all indicative of the author's genius—in Āc. Hemacandra's account of pseudo-dṛṣṭānta : (i) Though in the wording of his aphorism and in his illustrations etc. Dharmakīrti is his model, Āc Hemacandra, unlike Vālideva, does not blindly follow Dharmakīrti

puruṣavat iti. Ananvayo'pradarśitānvayaśca, yathā yo vaktā sa rāgādimāniṣṭapuruṣavat, anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavat iti. Tathā viparītānvayaḥ, yadanityaṃ tat kṛtakamiti. Sādharmyeṇa. Vaidharmyeṇāpi, paramāṇuvāt karmavadākāśavaditi sādhyādyavyatirekiṇaḥ. Tathā sandigdhasādhyavyatirekādayaḥ, yathā'sarvajñaḥ Kapilādayo'nāptā vā, avidyamānasarvajñatāptāliṅgabhūta-pramāṇātiśayaśāsanatvāditi, atra vaidharmyodāharaṇam, yaḥ sarvajñaḥ āpto vā sa jyotirjñānādīkamupadiṣṭavān, tadyatharsabhāvardhamānādiriti' tatrāsarvajñatānāptatayoḥ sādhyadharmayoḥ sandigdho vyatirekaḥ. Sandigdhasādhanavyatireko yathā na trayīvida Brāhmaṇena grāhyavacanaḥ kaścit puruṣo rāgādimattvāditi, atra vaidharmyodāharaṇam ye grāhyavacanaḥ na te rāgādimantaḥ tadyathā Gautamādayo dharmasāstrāṇaṃ praṇetāra iti Gautamādibhyo rāgādimattvasya sādhanadharmasya vyāvṛttiḥ sandigdha. Sandigdhobhayavyatireko yathā, avītarāgaḥ Kapilādayaḥ parigrahāgrahayogāditi, atra vaidharmyodāharaṇam, yo vītarāgo na tasya parigrahāgraho yatharsabhāderiti, Rṣabhāderavītarāgatparigrahāgrahayogayoḥ sādhyasādhanadharmayoḥ sandigdho vyatirekaḥ. Avyatireko yathā, avītarāgo vaktṛtvāt, vaidharmyodāharaṇam, yatrāvītarāgatvaṃ nāsti na sa vaktā, yathopalakhaṇḍa iti, yadyapyupalakhaṇḍādubhayaṃ vyāvṛttam yo sarvo vītarāgo na vakteti vyāptyā vyatirekāsidheravyatirekaḥ. Apradarśitavyatireko yathā, anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvādākāśavaditi. Viparītavyatireko yathā, yadakṛtakam tannityaṃ bhavatīti.—NBT. 3. 125-36.

'Tatrāpauruṣyaḥ śabdo'mūrtatvād duḥkhavaditi sādhyadharmavikala iti. Tasyāmeva pratijñāyām tasminneva hetau paramāṇuvāditi sādhanadharmavikala iti. Kalaśavaditi ubhayadharmavikala iti. Rāgādimānayaṃ vaktṛtvāt Devadattavad iti sandigdhasādhyadharmeti. Maraṇadharmā'yam rāgādimattvān Maitravāditi sandigdhasādhanadharmeti. Nā'yam sarvadarśī sarāgatvānmuniviśeṣavaditi sandigdhobhayadharmeti. Rāgādimān vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo vaktṛtvādiṣṭapuruṣavaditi ananvayaḥ. Anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavadityapradarśitānvaya iti. Anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt yadanityaṃ tat kṛtakam ghaṭavaditi viparītānvayaḥ iti. Vaidharmyeṇāpi ... Teṣu bhrāntamanumānaṃ pramāṇatvāt yatpunarbhrāntaṃ na bhavati na tatpramāṇam, yathā svapnājñānamityasiddhasādhyavyatirekaḥ svapnājñānāt bhrāntatvasyānivṛtteri. Nirvikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam pramāṇatvāt, yattu savikalpakaṃ na tat pramāṇam, yathā laiṅgikamityasiddhasādhanavyatirekaḥ laiṅgikātpamāṇatvasyānivṛtteḥ. Nityānityaḥ śabdaḥ sattvāt yastu na nityānityaḥ sa na san tadyathā stambha ityasiddhobhayavyatirekaḥ, stambhānityānityatvasya cāvyāvṛtteri. Asarvajñō'nāpto vā Kapilaḥ akṣaṇikaikāntavādītvāt, yaḥ sarvajña āpto vā sa kṣaṇikaikāntavādī yathā Sugata iti sandigdhasādhyavyatirekaḥ Sugate'sarvajñatānāptatayoḥ sādhyadharmayorvyāvṛtteḥ sandehāditi. Anādeyavacanaḥ kaścīdvivakṣitaḥ puruṣo rāgādimattvāt yaḥ punarādeyavacanaḥ sa vītarāgaḥ tadyathā Śauddhodaniriti sandigdhasādhanavyatirekaḥ Śauddhodane rāgādimattvasya nivṛtteḥ saṃśayāditi. Na vītarāgaḥ Kapilaḥ karuṇāspadeṣvapi paramakṛpayā'narpitanijapiśītaśakalatvāt, yastu vītarāgaḥ sa karuṇāspadeṣu paramakṛpayā samarpitanijapiśītaśakalastadyathā Tapanabandhuriti sandigdhobhayavyatirekaḥ iti Tapanabandhu vītarāgatvābhāvasya karuṇāspadeṣvapi paramakṛpayā'narpitanijapiśītaśakalatvasya ca vyāvṛtteḥ sandehāditi. Na vītarāgaḥ kaścīdvivakṣitaḥ puruṣo vaktṛtvāt, yaḥ punarvītarāgo na sa vaktā yathopalakhaṇḍa ityavyatirekaḥ iti. Anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvādākāśavadityapradarśitavyatirekaḥ iti. Anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt yadakṛtakam tannityaṃ yathākāśamiti viparītavyatirekaḥ iti.—PNT, 6. 60-79.

191. 'Parārthānumānaprastāvādudāharaṇadoṣā evaite dṛṣṭāntaprabhavatvātu dṛṣṭāntadoṣā ityucyante.' —Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā. 2. 1. 22.

and introduces a slight but intelligent change in the latter's account. Thus Āc. Hemacandra rejects the two ( out of the eighteen ) types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, viz. *ananvaya* and *avyatireka*, recognized by Dharmakīrti, and maintains that the eight types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* belonging to the first group are all of them the cases of ( *ananvaya* ) while the eight types belonging to the second group are all of them the cases of *avyatireka*. And Āc. Hemacandra is in the right. (ii) Āc. Hemacandra accepted Dharmakīrti's names '*apradarśitānvaya*' and '*apradarśitavyatireka*' for two of his sixteen types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* (2. 1. 27), but he gave further consideration to—and amended—the illustrations of the same. Dharmakīrti had borrowed the two types *ananvaya* and *avyatireka* from *Nyāyapraveśa* etc. ,<sup>192</sup> but gave them new—and significant—titles '*apradarśitānvaya*' and '*apradarśitavyatireka*' ;<sup>193</sup> however, Dharmakīrti also retained the titles '*ananvaya*' and '*avyatireka*' for two independent types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, and formulated for these types appropriate illustrations<sup>194</sup> that would suit their respective titles but were absent in *Nyāyapraveśa* etc. Adopting the reformist's standpoint—as was done by Dharmakīrti—Āc. Hemacandra told the earlier teachers like Diñnāga, Praśastapāda, and even Dharmakīrti that the fault with the two types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, viz. *apradarśitānvaya* and *apradarśitavyatireka*, is that they altogether lack a valid *vyāpti* and not that the words '*yat*' and '*tat*' are not repeated in the *vyāpti* or any such thing ; that is to say, according to Ac. Hemacandra, the determinant (*niyāmaka*) of these two types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* is non-formulation of *vyāpti* (*dr̥ṣṭānta-apradarśana*) and not non-repetition (or the words '*yat*' and '*tat*' etc. All the earlier teachers were of the view that in the case of these two types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* an instance—e. g. “like *ākāśa*”, “like a jar”—must be quoted, but Āc. Hemacandra denies the necessity of any such offering of an instance (expressed in Sanskrit by the suffix '*vat*' added to the word standing for a homologue or a heterologue—as the case may be). It is this idea that Āc. Hemacandra expresses in the following words of his Commentary (2. 1. 27) : '*Etau ca pramāṇasya anupadarśanād bhavato na tu vip̥sāsarvāvadhāraṇapadānāmaprayogāt, satsvapi teṣu asati pramāṇe tayorasiddheriti*'. (iii) The third noteworthy feature of Āc. Hemacandra's account is important in many respects. In those days of sectarianism (*sāmpradāyikatā*) when Dharmakīrti had acutely hurt the sentiments of the Vedicists and Jainas and when Vādideva—whom Āc. Hemacandra himself held in esteem—had adopted in relation to Dharmakīrti the policy of 'tit for tat', Āc. Hemacandra displayed intelligent liberalism and sought to mitigate the evil of sectarianism. This seems to be the result of Āc.

192. 'Ananvayo yatra vinānvayena sādhyasādhanayoḥ sahabhāvaḥ pradarśyate. Yathā ghaṭe kṛtakatvamanityatvaṃ ca dr̥ṣṭamiti. Avyatireko yatra vinā sādhyasādhananivṛtṭyā tadvipakṣabhāvo nidarśyate. Yathā ghaṭe mūrtatvamanityatvaṃ ca dr̥ṣṭamiti.'—*Nyāyapraveśa*, pp. 6-7. 'Nityaḥ śabdo'mūrtatvāt...ambaravaditi...ananugāta...ghaṭavat...avyāvṛtta...'—*Praśastapāda*, p. 247.

193. 'Apradarśitānvayaḥ...anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavat iti. Apradarśitavyatireko yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvādākāśavaditi.'—*NBT*, 3. 127, 135.

194. 'Ananvayo...yathā yo vaktā sa rāgādīmān iṣṭapurūṣavat. Avyatireko yathā avītarāgo vaktṛtvāt, vaidharmyodāharaṇam, yatrāvītarāgatvam nāsti na sa vaktā, yathopalakhaṇḍa iti.'—*NBT*, 3. 127, 134.

Hemacandra's liberal desire to make his work on Logic—as he had already sought to make his work on Grammar—a 'favourite of all'<sup>195</sup> (*sarva-pārṣada*). Realizing that the type of taunts Dharmakīrti had hurled against Rṣabha, Vardhamāna, etc. and the type of counter-taunts Vālideva had hurled against Sugata are highly improper in Logic and are in extremely bad taste. Āc. Hemacandra formulated such illustrations<sup>196</sup> as would serve the purpose (of Logic) but would hurt none.

In this connection, another point—of historical importance—also deserves notice. Dharmakīrti illustrates some of his types of pseudo-*drṣṭāntas* by—and considers the nature of probans occurring in—inferences where Kapila etc. are sought to be proved to be lacking in omniscience and authoritativeness; this indicates that Dharmakīrti must have had before him some texts of the nature of Siddhasena's *Sanmati* and Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā* where Jaina logicians sought to refute omniscience and authoritativeness in the case of Kapila etc.

(PMT, pp. 103-8 ; DC I, pp. 207-13)

## ( iv ) On Metaphysical Problems

### 28. THE OBJECT ( *viṣaya* ) OF A PRAMĀNA

Speculation as to the nature of the universe is older even than *Rgveda*.<sup>197</sup> As a result of this speculation there came into existence and developed a number of philosophical systems which can broadly be divided into five classes, viz. ( 1 ) Doctrine of Absolute Permanence (*kevalanīyatvavāda*), ( 2 ) Doctrine of Absolute Change (*kevalanīyatvavāda*), ( 3 ) Doctrine of a Changing Permanent (*pariṇāminīyatvavāda*), ( 4 ) Doctrine of the Changing and the Permanent (*nityānīya-ubhyavāda*), and ( 5 ) Doctrine of Permanence-Coupled-With-Change (*nityānīyātmakavāda*). The Brahmavādin Vedāntists alone represent the first doctrine, for according to them, all change (*anīyatva*) is but apparent (*ābhāsamātra*).

The Buddhists, since they are momentarists (*kṣaṇikavādin*), represent the second doctrine. Systems like Sāṅkhya, Yoga, etc., since they maintain that everything apart from

195. 'Sarvapārṣadatvācca śabdānuśāsanasya sakaladarśanasamūhātmakasyādvādasamāśrayaṇamatiramaṇīyam.'—*Haimaśabdānuśāsana*, 1. 1. 2,

196. *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, 2. 1. 25.

197. 'Ekam sadviprā bahudhā vadanti.'—*Rgveda*, 2. 3. 23. 46. ; *Nāsadiyasūkta*, *Rgveda* 10. 129; *Hiraṇyagarbhasūkta*, *Rgveda* 10. 121.

conscious elements is a changing permanent, represent the third doctrine. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc., since according to them certain entities are absolutely permanent and certain others absolutely changing, represent the fourth doctrine. The Jaina system, since according to it everything whatsoever is permanent-as-well-as-changing, the fifth doctrine.<sup>198</sup> These various philosophical views on permanence and change are found clearly described even in the respective Scriptural texts of the philosophers concerned, texts which also contain some amount of refutation of the rival views—See *Sūtrakṛtāṅga-sūtra*, 1. 1. 15-18. Thus even before the Age of Logic, various views as to nature of the universe had come into being and a relation of mutual antagonism established among them.

Ever since the advent of the Age of Logic, that is, for the last two thousand years, the various philosophical systems, basing themselves on the positions and counter-positions adopted in the earlier period (i. e. in the Age of Scriptures), have been defending their respective positions and refuting those of their rivals with the help of logical arguments. As a result of this battle in the field of Logic, it has become necessary for a philosopher to make clear, after giving an account of *pramāṇas*, as to what according to him constitutes the object of a *pramāṇa*, that is to say, it has become necessary for him first to offer a criterion of objectivity, then to demonstrate that this criterion applies to his own view of reality which is therefore a valid view, and finally to demonstrate that the criterion in question does not apply to the rival views of reality which are therefore invalid views.

Following this procedure current in the Age of Logic, Āc. Hemacandra, in four aphorisms (1. 1. 30-33), first gives out as the nature of the object of a *pramāṇa* what the Jaina considers to be the nature of the universe (i.e. reality) in general, then offers a criterion of reality, and finally demonstrates that this criterion is satisfied only if we accept the Jaina view of reality in general. That a real entity is of the form of a substance and its modes (*dravyaparyāyāmaka*), of the form of something permanent as well as changing (*nityānityātmaka*), of the form of something existent as well as non-existent (*sadasadātmaka*), etc. is asserted in *Āgamas* but without adducing any particular arguments and without offering a criterion of reality; Āc. Hemacandra makes the same assertion on the basis of logic and arguments. In the Age of Logic, there were current several criteria of reality—e. g. the Nyāya criterion of ‘association with existent-ness’ (*sattā-yoga*), the Sāṅkhya criterion of ‘being an object of *pramāṇa*’ (*pramāṇa-viśayatva*), the Buddhist criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’ (*arthakriyāyāritva*); of these, Āc. Hemacandra accepts the criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’, a criterion that seems to have been first formulated by Buddhist logicians (*PV*, 3. 3). The same criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’ applying which the Buddhists had proved the momentary character of every

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198. There is no difference between the third and fifth groups on the question of permanence and change—except that the former treats soul as an exception to the general rule. This is why in the Note after next we get just four groups.—Tr.

real entity and had refuted—on the basis of a massive consideration of the logical pros and cons—the doctrine of absolute permanence (*TS*, k. 394 ff.) as well as the Jaina doctrine of permanence-coupled-with-change (*TS*, k. 1738 ff.) was applied by Āc. Hemacandra with a view to logically defending his own Jaina doctrine of permanence-coupled-with-change, that is, the doctrine of a substance and its modes; and it was with the help of this very criterion that the Ācārya sharply criticized the doctrine of absolute permanence upheld by Vedānta etc., as well as the doctrine of absolute change upheld by Buddhists.

(*PMT*, pp. 53-54; *DC I*, pp. 141-42)

## 29. *DRAVYA* (SUBSTANCE), *GUNA* (QUALITY), AND *PARYĀYA* (MODE)

The Prakrit-Pali word “*dabba*” and its Sanskrit equivalent “*dravya*” are very old. And the various meanings in which the word is used in everyday parlance, in poetry, in grammatical texts, in medical texts, in philosophical texts, etc. appear to have been conventionally fixed long, long ago. This extensive employment of the word has led Pāṇini to assign it a place in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and offer a twofold etymological derivation of the same, a procedure followed by all subsequent grammarians. Apart from the two aphorisms of the ‘*Taddhita* Section’ ( 5. 3. 104; 4. 3. 161 ) where the formation of the word “*dravya*” is explained, Pāṇini has composed a third aphorism in the ‘*Kṛt* Section’ in order to explain the same formation once again. The first derivation according to the *Taddhita* explanation is : *dru* (i. e. a tree or a piece of wood) + *ya* = a modification ( *vikāra* ) or a constituent-element ( *avayava* ) of a tree or of a piece of wood; the second derivation is : *dru* ( i. e. a piece of wood ) + *va* = like a piece of wood, the meaning being that just as a straight and clean piece of wood can be given, with an effort, any desirable form, so also a prince or the like, when subjected to education etc., becomes possessed of any number of good qualities, that is to say, the prince or the like, who is capable of becoming possessed of good qualities is to be characterized as ‘*dravya*’; [ on a similar explanation, money is to be called “*dravya*” because it is capable of doing you a number of good things ( just as a piece of wood is capable of being given any desirable form ) ]. According to the *Kṛdanta* explanation the word “*dravya*” is formed by adding the suffix-denoting-object ( *karmārthaka pratyaya* ) ‘*ya*’ to the root ‘*dru*’ ( meaning motion or attainment ); thus on this explanation, “*dravya*” means ‘capable of attaining’, i. e. ‘that which is capable of attaining various states’. These three derivations offered by the grammarian enable the word somehow to cover almost all the meanings in which it is employed in everyday parlance or in systematic treatises.

Though even in the Jaina literature the word “*dravya*” is used in almost those very meanings which are enumerated above, there are many respects in which the Jaina usage of the word is different from that found in the other systems. For example, when the Jaina divides ‘*nikṣepas*’ into ‘*nāma*’, ‘*sthāpanā*’, ‘*dravya*’, ‘*bhāva*’, etc. ( *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1. 5 ), when he speaks of aspects like ‘*dravya*’, ‘*kṣetra*’, ‘*kāla*’, ‘*bhāva*’, etc. ( *Bhagavati-*

*sūtra*, 3. 19 ), when he divides ‘*nayas*’ into ‘*dravyārthika*’ and ‘*paryāyārthika*’ (*Tattvārthasūtra*, 5. 31 ), when he speaks of ‘*dravyācārya*’, ‘*bhāvācārya*’, etc. ( *Pañcāsaka*, 6 ), and when he speaks of ‘*dravyakarma*’, ‘*bhāvakarma*’, etc., he uses the word “*dravya*” in a different sense in each different case ; however, the sense is in all cases very near to the one yielded by that *Taddhita* explanation according to which a *dravya* is ‘that which is capable of becoming this or that’ (*bhavya*), that is to say, the different senses of the word ‘*dravya*’ are but different ways of conveying the idea of ‘capacity to become this or that’. In Jaina philosophy, the word ‘*dravya*’ is also used in the sense of ‘basic types of entities (*maulika padārtha*) found in the universe’.—e. g. when it is said that ‘*jīva*’, ‘*puṅgava*’, etc. are six *dravyas*.

In Vaiśeṣika philosophy (*VS*, 1. 1. 15), the word ‘*dravya*’ stands for the ‘substratum of qualities and actions’ (*guṇa-karma-ādihāra*) ; thus earth etc. are nine *dravyas* according to the system. When the old *Āgamas* like *Uttarādhyayana* (28. 6) put forward the Jaina thesis on six *dravyas* they too understand the word ‘*dravya*’ in this very sense. Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, has, at several different occasions (e. g. *Mahābhāṣya*, p. 58), spoken of the meaning of the word ‘*dravya*’. Thus at one place he says : “We can break a jar and make a bowl instead, or vice versa, and we can break a bangle and make an ear-ring instead, or vice versa. But in the first case what persists in the midst of the changing forms like jar, bowl, etc. is clay, and in the second case what persists in the midst of the changing forms like bangle, ear-ring etc. is gold. It is what persists in the midst of change, that is, clay in the first case and gold in the second, that is called ‘*dravya*’. “This interpretation of the word ‘*dravya*’ occurs in an identical fashion in Vyāsa’s commentary on *Yoga-sūtra* (3. 13) and it has been adopted also by Kumārila (*SV*, *Vanavāda*, Śl. 21-22). At some other places (*Mahābhāṣya*, 4. 1. 3, 5. 1. 119) Patañjali understands the word ‘*dravya*’ to mean an aggregate of qualities (*guṇa-samuḍāya*) or a stream of qualities (*guṇa-sandrāva*) ; this interpretation is particularly suited to the Buddhist line of thought. “That whose basical character (*maulikatva*) remains unimpaired even in the midst of the emergence of newer and newer qualities (*guṇas*—or, as Jainas will technically put it, *paryāyas*)”—this brief definition of the word ‘*dravya*’ is also given in Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya* (5. 1. 119). All these interpretations of the word ‘*dravya*’—interpretations first made current by *Pātañjala Mahābhāṣya* and later on adopted by *Vyāsabhāṣya Śloka-vārtika*, etc.—are, for the first time, gathered together in the Jaina tradition by Umāsvāti in his aphorisms (5. 29, 30, 37) and the commentary thereon. Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa, in his *Bhāṣya* ( *Viśeṣāvaśyaka*, *Gāthā* 28 ), has made a veritable catalogue of all the interpretations of the word ‘*dravya*’ that had become current by his time and has thus explained the etymology of the word.

Āc. Hemacandra, while enunciating the nature of ‘object of a *pramāṇa*’ in the words of Akalaṅka ( *Laghī*, 2. 1 ), employs the word ‘*dravya*’ in the sense of something permanent or static ( *dhruva*, *śāśvata*, *sthira* ). a sense also given to it by the *Āgamas*, the grammatical texts, and the texts of other philosophical systems. And the etymological derivation which he suggests in this connection is the one that has been offered in the ‘*Kṛt* Section’, viz. ‘*dru*’ + the suffix ‘*ya*’—( *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, p. 24 ).

In connection with the enunciation of the nature of 'object of a *pramāṇa*' the word '*paryāya*' is also used along with the word '*dravya*'. The word '*paryāya*' is very old and quite well-known to the scriptural languages (*śāstriya bhāṣā*) like Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Pali, but the technical meaning attributed to this word in the Jaina system of philosophy is to be found in no other system.

Those properties (*dharma*), peculiarities (*viśeṣa*), and states (*avasthā*) of a substance which originate and perish, emerge and vanish are called in the Jaina system of philosophy "*paryāyas*" or "*pariṇāmas*", for which the equivalent word in the systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. is "*guṇa*". Āc. Hemacandra uses the word "*paryāya*" in the sense of all the properties like qualities, actions, etc of a substance.

In the comparatively older Āgamas like *Bhagavati* etc., both the words '*guṇa*' and '*paryāya*' are used. In the *Uttarādhyayana* (28. 13) the two words have clearly distinct meanings; Kundakunda, Umāsvāti (*Tattvārthasūtra*. 5. 37), and Pūjyapāda adopt these very meanings and defend this adoption of meaning on their part. Vidyānanda offers logical arguments in support of the distinction in question, but Akalaṅka, who preceded him, maintains that there is an identity-as-well-as-distinction (*bhedābheda*) between the meanings of the words "*guṇa*" and "*paryāya*", a position followed by Amṛtacandra as also by Siddhasena in his commentary on *Tattvārthabhāṣya*. On this question, a new line of thinking was initiated by Siddhasena Divākara who maintained that the two words '*guṇa*' and '*paryāya*' are but synonyms, that is, they have one and the same meaning; Divākara's argument in support of his position is that had there been a difference of meaning between the words '*guṇa*' '*paryāya*', Lord Mahāvīra would have spoken of a third standpoint, viz. "*guṇārthika*" standpoint, along with the two well-known standpoints, viz. "*dravyārthika*" and "*paryāyārthika*" standpoints. This argument seems to have influenced Haribhadra who too accepted the thesis of identity (of meaning between the words '*guṇa*' and '*paryāya*'). And though Devasūri (*PNT*, 5. 7, 8) has tried to make out a distinction between the meanings of the two words '*guṇa*' and '*paryāya*' he also seems to be under the influence of the thesis of identity. Āc. Hemacandra did not at all insert the word '*guṇa*' in his aphorism on 'object of a *pramāṇa*', nor did he raise the discussion as to whether the words '*guṇa*' and '*paryāya*' are identical or different in meaning. From this his own position on the question becomes clear, for it means that he too accepts the thesis of identity. The same thesis is accepted also by Upādhyāya Yaśovijayajī. On the basis of this prolonged history it can at any rate be said that in the old Age of Scriptures both the words '*guṇa*' and '*paryāya*' were used while with the advent of the Age of Logic there started a discussion as to whether the two words are identical or different in meaning, and the discussion went on. As a result, different teachers adopted and defended different standpoints on the question. 199

Like the discussion as to whether the words '*guṇa*' and '*paryāya*' are identical or different in meaning, the discussion as to whether *guṇa* and *paryāya* on the one hand and *dravya* on the other are identical with or different from one another also

199. For the entire array of arguments on this question, see *Sanmatīkā*, p. 631, Footnote 4.

deserves notice. The systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. are, since the very beginning, advocates of difference (*bhedavādin*), and hence they are of the view that the qualities and actions of a substance are different from this substance; on the other hand, the advocates of identity (*abhedavādin*) like Sāṅkhya, Vedānta, etc. are of the view that the qualities and actions of a substance are identical with this substance. These 'doctrine of identity' and 'doctrine of difference' are very old, for even Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, carries on an interesting and detailed discussion on the question. Thus he raises the question whether a *dravya* is identical with or different from the qualities like sound, touch, etc.; and after elucidating the two rival standpoints on the question he finally supports the thesis of identity-cum-difference. 200

There is also another particularly noteworthy point. That very thesis of identity-cum-difference between *guṇa* and *dravya* or between *guṇa* and *pariyāya* which was so strenuously sought to be established by the Jaina logicians like Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, etc. was also defended by Kumārila—that titan among the Mīmāṃsakas—most clearly and most logically. (*SV, Ākṛti.*, Śl. 4-64; *Vana.*, Śl. 21-80).

Āc Hemacandra, like the other Jaina teachers, supports the thesis of identity-cum-difference between *dravya* and *pariyāya*.

( *PMT*, pp. 54-57; *DC I*, pp. 143-46 )

### 30. THE CRITERION OF REALITY ( *vastutva* )

The four doctrines of Indian philosophy—viz.

- ( 1 ) the doctrine of absolute permanence (*kevala-nityatvavāda*),
- ( 2 ) the doctrine of absolute change (*kevala-anityatvavāda*),
- ( 3 ) the doctrine of both (absolute) permanence and (absolute) change (*nityānitya-ubhayavāda*), and ( 4 ) the doctrine of permanence-in-change (*pariṇāminityatvavāda*)—are to be detected in a rudimentary form even in the period preceding Lords Mahāvīra and Buddha; however, a clearcut formulation of these doctrines and a logical defence of this formulation are not present there in the literature of that much old period. The

200. 'Kiṃ punardravyaṃ ke punaḥ guṇāḥ. Śabdasparśarūparasagandhā guṇāstato'nyad dravyam. Kiṃ punaranyacchabdādibhyo dravyamāhosvidananyat. Guṇasyāyaṃ bhāvāt dravye śabdaniveśaṃ kurvan khyāpayatyanyacchabdādibhyo dravyamiti. Ananyacchabdādibhyo dravyam. Na hyanyadupalabhyate. Paśoḥ khalvapi viśasitasya parṇasate nyastasya nānyacchabdādibhya upalabhyate. Anyacchabdādibhyo dravyam. Tat tvanumanagamyam. Tadyathā. Ośadhivanaspatināṃ vṛddhihrāsau. Jyotiṣāṃ gatiriti. Ko'sāvanumānaḥ. Iha samāne varṣmaṇi pariṇāhe ca anyattulāgraṃ bhavati lohasya anyat kṛpāsānāṃ yatkṛto viśeṣastaddravyam. Yathā kaścidekenaiva prahāreṇa vyapavargaṃ karoti kaścid dvābhyāmapi na kṛoti. Yatkṛto viśeṣastaddravyam. Athavā yasya guṇāntareṣvapi prādurbhavatsu tattvaṃ na vihanyate tad dravyam. Kiṃ punastattvam. Tadbhāvastattvam. Tadyathā. Āmalakādīnām phalānām raktādayaḥ pītādayaśca guṇāḥ prādurbhavanti. Āmalakaṃ badaramityeva bhavati. Anvarthaṃ khalu nirvacanaṃ—guṇasandrāvo dravyamiti.'—Pātañjala Mahābhāṣya. 5. 1. 119.

idea of impermanence—an idea already in vogue—was so much emphasized by Buddha that it gave rise to two developments in the field of philosophical speculation. Firstly, all the rival doctrines rose against the doctrine of impermanence ( or momentarism ) which they all vigorously sought to refute by establishing their respective positions in their respective manners. Secondly, in the Buddhist tradition itself, the idea of momentarism—which was originally an idea conducive to detachment ( *vairāgya-poṣaka bhāvanā* ) and hence an ethical or moral idea—developed into an all-comprehensive metaphysical doctrine; thus the idea of momentariness became, in the eyes of its defenders as well as of its critics, one among the topics of metaphysical speculations.

For centuries after the time of Buddha and Mahāvīra, we find that, in the field of philosophical speculation, the only criterion for judging the validity of a doctrine has been its capacity to account for ( transcendental ) bondage and release ( *bandha-mokṣa-vyavasthā* ) and for the mechanism of an action yielding its fruit to the actor concerned ( *karṣṭva-phalabhokṣṭva-vyavasthā* ).<sup>201</sup> Buddhists—the advocates of the doctrine of absolute impermanence—defended their position by arguing that in case *ātman* is regarded as permanent it becomes impossible either to account for ( transcendental ) bondage and release or to demonstrate how the doer of action is also the enjoyer of the fruit of this action. And the same was the criticism levelled against the Buddhist by the advocates of absolute permanence like Upaniṣadists etc. ( *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.2.19). Similarly, Jainas, the advocates of permanence-in-change, urged against both the doctrine of absolute permanence and the doctrine of absolute impermanence that, on either of these doctrines, it becomes impossible to explain how ( transcendental ) bondage and release take place, how the doer of an action ( and nobody else ) enjoys the fruit of this action, how performance of meritorious acts like charity etc. and resort to ceremonies like initiation ( *dīkṣopādāna* ) etc. are means to transcendental release.<sup>202</sup>

All rise ( *utthāna* ) of metaphysical speculation ( *tāttvika cintā* ) on the part of Indian systems of philosophy—and more particularly, the nourishment ( *poṣaṇa* ) and development ( *vikāśa* ) of this speculation—has been due to ( a belief in ) the doctrine of *karma* and to a desire ( *bhāvanā* ) to get rid of the transmigratory cycle ( *saṃsāra-nivṛtti* ) and thus attain ( transcendental ) release. It was therefore but natural that, in the initial stages, every system of philosophy should argue, in support of its position and against those of his rivals, in the name of these very “doctrine of *karma*” etc. But when tendency to logical argumentation ( *tarkavāda* ) started gaining greater and greater prominence in this basically spiritual field of philosophical speculation ( *adhyātmamūlaka dārśanika-kṣetra* )—a phenomenon which, in a way, ultimately rendered spiritualism

201. ‘Tadevaṃ sattvabhede kṛtāhānamakṛtābhyāgamāḥ prasajyate—sati ca sattvotpāde sattvanirodhe ca akarmanimittaḥ sattvasargaḥ prāpnoti tatra muktyartha brahmacaryavāso na syāt.’- NBh, 3. 1. 4.

202. ‘Davaṭṭhiyassa jo ceva kuṇai so ceva veyae ṇiyamā /  
Aṇṇo kareṇi aṇṇo paribhuṇṇai pajjayaṇayassa //’—Sanmati. 1. 52 :  
‘Na bandhamokṣau kṣaṇikaikasamsthau na samvṛtiḥ sāpi mṛṣāsvabhāvā /  
Mukhyādṛte gauṇavidhirna dṛṣṭo vibhāntadṛṣṭitava dṛṣṭito’nyā //’—Yuktyanuśāsana, k. 15.

secondary in relation to the tendency to pure logical argumentation—the criterion for judging the validity of the ‘doctrine of absolute permanence’ etc. became different (from what it was in the pre-Logic period). Logic asserted that nothing else but only that thing can be real which is capable of performing a function (*arthakriyākārin*). It seems that the credit for advancing this logical criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’ goes to the Buddhist tradition; it was therefore but natural that the Buddhists should apply this criterion with a view to establishing the doctrine of momentariness and refuting the rival doctrines, and this is what we actually find to have happened. Buddhists argued that nothing that is not momentary can perform a function while nothing that cannot perform a function is real (*sat, pāramārthika*); basing themselves on this sort of *vyāpi* (i. e. relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum), these Buddhists sought to prove that a permanent entity (i. e. an entity lasting for more than one moment) cannot perform a function and hence cannot be real; and with this end in view they considered—and refuted—in a highly elaborate fashion, the two possible alternatives, viz. (i) that a permanent entity can perform a function all at once (*yugapad arthakriyākārin*), and (ii) that a permanent entity can perform a function in the course of several moments (*kramaśaḥ arthakriyākārin*)—(*Vādanyāya*, p. 6). The same criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function—i. e. a criterion with whose help the doctrine of absolute permanence was thus refuted (*TS*, k. 394)—was employed by the Buddhists also to refute the Jaina doctrine of permanence-in-change, i. e. the ‘doctrine of substance and modes’ or ‘doctrine of twofold nature of a real entity’ (*TS*, k. 1738). For Buddhists argued that one and the same thing cannot be both real and unreal because the same thing cannot be both performer of a function and performer of no function. Thus the philosophical systems rival to the Buddhist may be divided into two camps, viz. Vedicist and Jaina.

The first Vedicist philosophers to refute the Buddhist criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’ seem to be Vācaspatiśra and Jayanta. Though the final objective of both Vācaspati and Jayanta is the same, viz. to demonstrate the reality of non-momentary and permanent entities, they adopt different lines of argumentation by way of showing that the Buddhist criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’—a criterion with whose help the Buddhist had refuted the doctrine of absolute permanence—does not apply to a momentary entity itself (i. e. on the Buddhist’s own criterion, a momentary entity ought to be unreal). That a momentary entity is unreal is proved by Vācaspati (*Tātp*, pp. 354-56) after considering the two alternatives, viz. that a momentary entity can perform a function without depending on anything else and that a momentary entity can perform a function depending on other things (*sāpekṣa-anapekṣa vikalpa*); Jayanta (*NM*, pp. 453, 564) does the same after considering the two alternatives—suggested by the Buddhist himself—viz. that a momentary entity can perform a function all at once and that a momentary entity can perform a function in the course of several moments (*kramayaugapadyavikalpa*). Likewise, Bhadanta Yogasena, mentioned as a rival by Kamalaśīla in *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* seeks to refute the Buddhist doctrine of momen-

tarism by considering the two alternatives—suggested by the Buddhist himself—viz. that a momentary entity can perform a function all at once, and that a momentary entity can perform a function in the course of several moments (*TS*, k. 428 ff). Here the title '*Bhadanta*' tends to suggest that this Yogasena was a Buddhist, but until we have a definite proof that somebody within the Buddhist tradition supported the doctrine of permanence (*nityārva*, *sthiratva*), it will be more proper to surmise that our Yogasena was either a Jaina, or an Ājīvaka, or a Sāṅkhya mendicant. At any rate, it is certain that the Buddhist doctrine of momentarism was sought to be refuted by the Vedicist philosophers on the basis of the Buddhist's own criterion of 'capacity to perform a function'.

The other staunch opponents of momentarism were Jainas. In the Age of Logic, they too refuted the doctrine of momentarism by basing themselves on the logical criterion advanced by the Buddhist himself. So far as our knowledge goes, in the Jaina tradition Akalaṅka<sup>203</sup> is the first to refute momentarism on the basis of this criterion. On the basis of this criterion Akalaṅka has refuted the Vedicist doctrine of absolute permanence precisely as did the Buddhists, but at the same time, he has applied this criterion to refute the Buddhist doctrine of absolute momentarism precisely as did Bhadanta Yogasena and Jayanta. In this connection we should remember that though in the Age of Logic the criterion of 'capacity to perform a function' (along with the various accompanying alternatives) came to be accepted as the criterion for refuting and for supporting the doctrines like momentarism etc., the old criterion for doing so—i. e., the criterion of 'capacity to account for (transcendental) bondage and release' etc.—was not altogether discarded but only became secondary in importance.

The doctrine of the twofold nature of a real entity, that is, the doctrine that a real entity is a substance as well as its modes, something existent as well as non-existent, something permanent as well as transient—a doctrine accepted by Jainas, Jaimini-ites etc.—was refuted by Buddhists (*TS*, ks. 222, 311, 312), and Jaina teachers like Akalaṅka etc. answered back this refutation basing themselves on the consideration of the criterion of 'capacity to perform a function' and of the various alternatives resulting from the application of this criterion, a procedure followed by all subsequent Jaina logicians. Āc. Hemacandra does the same by first refuting the doctrine of absolute permanence in the words of Buddhists, and then refuting the doctrine of absolute momentarism in the words of Bhadanta Yogasena, Jayanta, etc. ; at the same time, he applies the very criterion of 'capacity to perform a function' in order to prove the Jaina doctrine of substance-and-modes, and he does so by showing that a real entity as conceived by the Jaina is alone capable of performing a function.

203. 'Arthakriyā na yujyeta nityakṣaṇikapakṣayoḥ /  
Kramākramābhyāṃ bhāvānām sā lakṣaṇatayā matā //'—Laghī. 2. 1.

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Carakasamhitā ( of Caraka )	Nirnayasagar
Haimaśabdānuśāsana ( of Hemacandra )	
Kāvyaśāstrakāra ( of Bhāmaha )	Chowkhamba
Pāṇinisūtra ( of Pāṇini )	
Pātañjala Mahābhāṣya ( of Patañjali )	
Rāmāyaṇa ( of Vālmīki )	
Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha ( of Mādhava )	Abhyankar Shastri's Edition
Tattvopaplavasīmha ( of Jayarāśi )	GOS, Baroda

#### *III. Jaina Texts*

Acārāṅgasūtra	Agamodaya Samiti, Surat
Anuyogadvāra ( of Āryarākṣita )	Agamodaya
AM Āptamīmāṃsā ( of Samantabhadra )	
AS Aṣṭasāhasrī ( of Vidyānanda )	Nirnayasagar
ASh Aṣṭasatī ( of Akalaṅka )	Nirnayasagar
Bhagavatīsūtra	Gujrat Vidyapith, Ahmedabad
Bṛhatsvayambhūstotra ( of Samantabhadra )	
Daśavaikālikaniryukti ( of Bhadrabāhu ? )	Agamodaya
Jñānabindu ( of Yaśovijaya )	Singhi Series, Calcutta
Laghī. Laghiyastrayī ( of Akalaṅka )	Singhi Series
Nandīsūtra ( of Devavācaka )	Agamodaya

NA Nyāyāvatāra ( of Siddhasena Divākara )	Singhi Series
Nyāyaviniścaya ( of Akalaṅka )	
NVT Nyāyaviniścayaṭīkā ( of Vādirāja )	
PM Parīkṣāmukha ( of Māṅikyanandin )	
Pañcāśaka ( of Haribhadra )	
Pramāṇamīmāṃsā ( of Hemacandra )	Singhi Series
PNT Pramāṇanayatattvāloka ( of Vālidevasūri )	Yashovijay Granthamala, Kashi
PPar Pramāṇaparīkṣa ( of Vidyānanda )	
Pramāṇasaṅgraha ( of Akalaṅka )	
PKM Prameyakalamārtaṇḍa ( of Prabhācandra )	Nirnayasagar
Prameyaratnamālā ( of Anantavīrya )	
Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa ( of Siddhasena Divākara )	Gujrat Vidyapith
SMT Sanmatitarkaṭīkā ( of Abhayadeva )	Gujrat Vidyapith
Sarvārthasiddhi ( of Pūjyapāda )	
Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā ( of Anantavīrya )	
Sthānāṅgasūtra	Agamodaya
Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra	Agamodaya
SVR Syādvādaratnākara ( of Vālidevasūri )	Arhat Mata Prabhakara, Poona
Tarkabhāṣā ( of Yaśovijaya )	Singhi Series
Tattvārtharājavārtika ( of Akalaṅka )	
TSV Tattvārthaslokavārtika ( of Vidyānanda )	Gandhi Natharang, Bombay
Tattvārthasūtra ( of Umāsvāti )	Arhat Mata Prabhakara
Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya ( of Umāsvāti )	Arhat Mata Prabhakara
Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣyaṭīkā ( of Siddhasena )	
Uttarādhyayanasūtra	Agamodaya
Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya ( of Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa )	Yashovijay Granthamala
Yuktyanuśāsana ( of Samantabhadra )	
<i>IV. Buddhist Texts</i>	
Abhidharmakośa ( of Vasubandhu )	Kashi Vidyapith, Kashi
Hetubinduṭīkā ( of Arcaṭa )	GOS
Majjhimanikāya	Pali Text Society
NB Nyāyabindu ( of Dharmakīrti )	Bibliotheca Buddhica
NBT Nyāyabinduṭīkā ( of Dharmottara )	Bibliotheca Buddhica
Nyāyapraveśa ( of Diñnāga ? )	GOS
PS Pramāṇasamuccaya ( of Diñnāga )	Mysore University
PST Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā ( of Jinendrabuddhi )	Mysore University
PV Pramānavārtika ( of Dharmakīrti )	
Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā ( of Yaśomitra )	Bibliotheca Buddhica
TS Tattvasaṅgraha ( of Śāntarakṣita )	GOS
TSP Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā ( of Kamalaśīla )	GOS

Upāyahṛdaya ( of Nāgārjuna ? )	GOS
Vādanyāya ( of Dharmakīrti )	Mahabodhi Society, Benaras
Visuddhimagga ( of Buddhaghoṣa )	Pali Text Society
<i>V. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Texts</i>	
Gādādhari ( of Gadādhara )	Chowkhamba
Kand. Kandalī ( of Śrīdhara )	Vizianagaram Series, Benaras
Kārikāvalī ( of Viśvanātha )	Nirnayasagar
Muktāvalī ( of Viśvanātha )	Nirnayasagar
NBh Nyāyabhāṣya ( of Vātsyāyana )	Chowkhamba
NK Nyāyakusumāñjali ( of Udayana )	Chowkhamba
NM Nyāyamañjarī ( of Jayanta )	Vizianagaram
NSa Nyāyasāra ( of Bhāsarvajña )	Asiatic Society, Calcutta
NS Nyāyasūtra ( of Gautama )	Chowkhamba
Nyāyasūtravṛtti ( of Viśvanātha )	Chowkhamba
NV Nyāyavārtika ( of Uddyotakara )	Chowkhamba
Praśastapādabhāṣya ( of Praśastapāda )	Vizianagaram
Tātp. Tātparyaṭikā ( of Vācaspati )	Chowkhamba
Tattvacintāmaṇi ( of Gaṅgeśa )	
VS Vaiśeṣikasūtra ( of Kaṇāda )	
<i>VI. Mīmāṃsā Texts</i>	
Bṛ. Bṛhatī ( of Prabhākara )	Madras University
Jaiminisūtra ( of Jaimini )	
Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistāra ( of Mādhava )	
PP Prakaraṇapañcikā ( of Śālikanātha )	Chowkhamba
Śābarabhāṣya ( of Śābara )	Chowkhamba
SD Śāstradīpikā ( of Pārthasārathi )	Chowkhamba
SV Ślokavārtika ( of Kumārila )	Chowkhamba
Ślokavārtika-Nyāyaratnākaraṭikā ( of Pārthasārathi )	Chowkhamba
Tantravārtika ( of Kumārila )	Chowkhamba
<i>VII. Sāṅkhya-Yoga Texts</i>	
Māṭharavṛtti ( of Māṭhara )	Chowkhamba
SK Sāṅkhyakārikā ( of Īśvarakṛṣṇa )	Chowkhamba

Sāṅkhyasūtra	Chowkhamba
Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī ( of Vācaspati )	Chowkhamba
Tattvavaiśārādī ( of Vācaspati )	Chowkhamba
Yogabhāṣya ( of Vyāsa )	Chowkhamba
Yogasūtra ( of Patañjali )	Chowkhamba
<i>VII. Vedānta Texts</i>	
Bhāmatī ( of Vācaspati )	Nirnayasagar
Brahmasūtra ( of Bādarāyaṇa )	Nirnayasagar
Citsukhī ( of Citsukha )	Nirnayasagar
Śārīrakabhāṣya ( of Śaṅkara )	Nirnayasagar
Śrībhāṣya ( of Rāmānuja )	
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