Ratanbai Katrak Lectures 1956

The Western Response to Zoroaster

. Duchesne-Guillemin



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RATANBAI KATRAK LECTURES

1956

THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO ZOROASTER

BY

J. DUCHESNE-GUILLEMIN

PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LIÈGE

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TO
THE MEMORY OF
MY MOTHER

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ERRATA

p. 6, l. 20, *for* Gaures, *read* Guèbres
p. 36, ll. 19, 20, 24, *for* Mithra *read* Mitra

I

THE PRE-HISTORY OF IRANIAN STUDIES

In his Ratanbai Katrak lectures, my predecessor, Professor W. B. Henning, gave a stimulating definition of the religion of Zoroaster: 'As are most dualistic movements,' he said, 'it is perhaps best understood as a protest against monotheism.' Dualism, he argued, always emerges as an answer to the problem of evil, which in turn presupposes belief in one good and omnipotent God.

I first thought that this position of Henning was as novel as it was arresting, and that when he wrote that he might well be accused of failing to say anything 'new', he underrated his own originality. I see now that I was mistaken, as far as the position I have referred to is concerned, for the same line of reasoning had already been followed by Spiegel in 1873. In the Vorrede to the second volume of his *Eranische Altertumskunde*, Spiegel tells us in effect that after first thinking of dualism as a link between polytheism and monotheism—as a necessary stage in a linear evolution—he has come to realize that some powerful monotheism must have preceded dualism:

> It is only when one has come to admit one omnipotent, omniscient creator, who created the world with all there is in it, that the question arises why everything in the world does not go according to the will of the creator and ruler, why not only praiseworthy undertakings of the creatures go wrong but also things happen of which he cannot possibly approve. In one word: the question arises as to how evil came into the world. An attempt to answer this question: such is dualism in its different forms.[1]

[1] 'Erst wenn man zur Annahme eines allmächtigen und allweisen Schöpfers gelangt ist, welcher die Welt und Alles was in ihr ist geschaffen hat, entsteht die Frage, woher es denn komme, daß in dieser Welt nicht Alles nach dem Wille des Schöpfers und Regierers derselben geht, daß nicht blos lobenswürdige Unternehmungen der Geschöpfe fehlschlagen, sondern auch sonst Dinge sich ereignen, die unmöglich die Billigung des Schöpfers finden können. Mit einem Worte: es entsteht die Frage, wie das Böse in die Welt gekommen sei? Ein Versuch diese Frage zu beantworten ist der Dualismus in seinen verschiedenen Formen' (p. vi).

It has seemed to me interesting to put the two statements together, and this leads us to ask ourselves another question: Did other Western scholars share this view of Spiegel and Henning? Shall we perhaps recognize in it one constant in the history of ideas and interactions between Iran and Europe? Will not other constants become manifest in the course of a review of our studies? Henning himself—in his customary concise manner—suggested this broadened field of inquiry when he wrote the following:

> The denial that Zoroaster was a dualist has been made, firstly, by Parsee theologians who are apt to regard the attribution of dualism as an insult to their prophet and themselves. However, their writings on this point are clearly apologetic. Early in the last century they were attacked by Christian missionaries, who revived the hoary arguments against dualism stored up in the works of the Fathers, and thundered against the Parsees as St. Augustine once had thundered against the Manichaeans. Driven on the defence, some of the Parsee theologians raised the status of their good God, depreciated the rank of the Evil Power, and so assimilated their religion to Christianity.[1]

These remarks might have been worth some development. The allusion to John Wilson's book on the Parsee religion will have escaped nobody, though it may be useful to look it up; on the other hand, Henning's words might give the impression that the encounter in modern times between Parseeism and Christianity only dates back to the nineteenth century.

I propose, therefore, to survey the whole history of our Zoroastrian studies from the point of view of ideas, opinions, and judgements. This, I think, has never been done before. There are, of course, several *exposés* by Hovelacque, Darmesteter, Feer, &c.[2] but all of them aim at tracing the progress of research, at showing the chain of studies and discoveries that have led to the present state of knowledge.

I admit that facts are more important than opinions, and that many of the old opinions or theories we shall quote may seem to be of little more than historical interest, but since no scholar, however desirous of objectivity, could ever dispense with theoretical

[1] *Zoroaster, Politician or Witch Doctor?*, 1951, p. 47.

[2] Hovelacque, *L'Avesta*, 1878; Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, vol. i, 1892; L. Feer, 'De l'histoire et de l'état présent des études zoroastriennes ou mazdéennes, particulièrement en France', *Rev. hist. des religions*, 1882, pp. 289 seq.

background, our venture will be justified. Indeed, the more we are suspicious of theories—as causes of prejudice and bias—the more eager we should be to pin them down, to trace them to their origin, and to define the mental attitudes from which they proceed.

There is, for instance, a dangerous way of attributing to authors thoughts or deeds which they allegedly had to keep secret. Henning justly blamed Herzfeld for intimating that if Zoroaster, a close collaborator of Darius in the crushing of the Gaumāta rebellion, was not mentioned in the royal account of the affair, it was at the request of Zoroaster himself who wished to work in the dark.

Now the same pattern of reasoning appears to have been used by other scholars in our field, including Anquetil-Duperron and Henning himself.

The latter, to leave aside Anquetil for the moment, makes a brave inroad into the unverifiable when he writes about prophets of dualism: 'How could they be expected to admit in public the mere possibility that their chosen side, whose support they demanded, might lose the great battle? But in their hearts they knew that the possibility existed, however much they hoped and even believed that victory would be theirs.'[1]

Henning's remark is at any rate suggestive, for it states in a vivid concrete manner the problem of Fate and Liberty.

. . . . . .

Thomas Hyde and Anquetil-Duperron: these two names glitter in the long hazy dawn of modern Zoroastrian studies; Thomas Hyde in Oxford at the end of the seventeenth century, Anquetil in Paris and India in the latter half of the eighteenth; Hyde with the first attempt at a synthesis, Anquetil with the discovery of the Avesta.

Another half century was yet to elapse before Rask, Bopp, and Burnouf could begin really to read this book. These scholars remained dependent for their judgement on Parseeism, not only upon philological facts which they elucidated, but also upon ideas and opinions once put forward by Anquetil, Hyde, and others.

It may be surmised that Anquetil would not have embarked upon his life-long adventure had he not read the *De vetere religione Persarum* of the Oxonian professor. What were in turn the main sources at Hyde's disposal?

[1] *Zoroastr*, p. 48.

Antiquity had come to regard Zoroaster and the more or less spurious Magi as precursors and vouchers of its own wisdom, both pagan and Christian.

Zoroaster was supposed to have instructed Pythagoras; philosophy, astrology, alchemy, theurgy, magic, &c., all looked upon the Persian and so-called Chaldean doctrines as in a mirror, and well they might, since most of the works that went under the names of those sages were in fact apocrypha in which a massive projection of Greek conceptions mingled with a vanishing dose of genuine Iranian ideas.[1]

This movement culminated in the ascription of the Chaldaic Oracles to Zoroaster or his Magian disciples by Plethon, decidedly to Zoroaster himself by Plethon's copyists and editors.[2] Plethon made these writings the basis of his Compendium of the Zoroastrian and Platonic systems. Indeed, his *magnum opus*, the Laws, was placed under the double patronage of Zoroaster and Plato.[3]

Plethon started the long, chequered history of the relationship between humanism and Christianity. Among those who attempted a compromise between Christianity and Platonism, itself supposed to have derived from Zoroaster, we may cite not only Bessarion, Pico della Mirandola, Marsile Ficino, and Erasmus, but also Francescus Patricius, the editor of the larger recension of the Chaldaic Oracles, who wrote that 'Zoroaster, first of all people, almost laid the foundations, however rough, of the Catholic faith'.[4]

To the Christians, Iran had always been, above all, the home-

[1] The texts are to be found in the book of Bidez and Cumont on *Les Mages hellénisés*, Brussels, 1938. Incidentally, the two learned editors seem to have had an exaggerated opinion of the part played in the blending of Greek and Iranian or Babylonian ideas by the hypothetical 'Hellenized Magi'.

[2] See Bidez–Cumont, ii. 251 seq., against Kroll. So already in Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, iv. 1 (Leipzig, 1743), p. 43, cited by F. Masai, *Pléthon et le platonisme de Mistra*, 1956, p. 233, note. However, the difference between Plethon and his successors must not be overrated since for Plethon, who had little sense of history, to ascribe the Oracles to the Magi or to their master Zoroaster amounted to one and the same thing. In fact he does speak several times, in the course of his commentary, of τὸ *Ζωροάστρου λόγιον*, as quoted by the Bidez–Cumonts themselves.

[3] See Fragment O 112 in Bidez–Cumont, ii. 257. I cannot find anything in support of Kroll's assumption, endorsed by Gray in Jackson, *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*, 1898, p. 260, that Hierocles, ten centuries before Plethon, wrote such a compendium.

[4] 'Zoroastrum catholicae fidei omnium primum etiamsi rudia fere jecisse fundamenta.' Quoted by Kroll, *De oraculis chaldaicis*, 1894, p. 1, note.

land of the Three Wise Men who, guided by a star, had come to prostrate themselves at Bethlehem. Moreover, following the Jewish tradition, the Christians identified Zoroaster with Ezekiel, Nimrod, Seth, Balaam, and Baruch; even, through the latter, with Christ himself.[1] Zoroaster and the Magi could therefore be cited by the Apologists, from Justin onwards, as among those external witnesses whom they called upon to corroborate, and justify to pagans, the truth of Christianity.

On the other hand, Zoroaster was the founder of a particularly abominable superstition—Chaldean astrology and magic. In the pseudo-Clementine Recognitions, for instance, he appeared as the arch-heretic. In addition, Iran was also the land of the Manichees and was supposed, therefore, to be the source of Catharism, that major heresy of the Middle Ages. For Catharism was constantly identified with the religion of Mani by the advocates of orthodoxy. It appears, in fact, to have been a form of Gnosticism devoid of any special connexion with Manichaeism, but the first heresiologues in the eleventh century, at least those who, like Adémar de Chabannes, had a measure of culture, quite naturally looked to the Fathers of the Church and their anti-Manichaean polemics for better intelligence of and arguments against the contemporary heretics.[2]

Barnabé Brisson, who published in 1590 his *De regio Persarum principatu*, apparently did not know of the ascription of the Oracles to Zoroaster, for he does not count them among his sources. He does, however, assert (p. 188) after several Ancients, that Pythagoras had visited the Persian Magi. He says nothing, on the other hand, of any relationship of Christianity to their religion—a kind of paganism which ignored God and adored Jupiter, the Sun, or Mithra, Ormazd, Ahriman, &c. He only mentions Iran's influence on the Samaritans: 'Samaritanos', we read on p. 185, 'quod a Persis originem ducerent, ignem more Persarum coluisse', apparently meaning the disciples of Simon the Magus.[3]

[1] See Windisch, *Die Orakel des Hystaspes*, 1929, pp. 14–25, and Bidez–Cumont, i. 42 seq.

[2] Arno Borst, *Die Katharer*, 1953, p. 2, n. 7.

[3] Brisson can hardly have heard of the identification of Zoroaster with Azaziel of Samaria, attested in Theodore bar Konai. See Benveniste in Bidez–Cumont, ii. 103, n. 3.

Brisson's work belonged, however, to the tradition of the humanists in that it was based exclusively on ancient sources and dealt with the Persian religion as a thing of the past, the author being apparently unaware that it had survived in Persia and India and could be observed as a living reality. Such was, a century after Brisson, the position of Thomas Stanley, who wrote the first comprehensive history of philosophy, with chapters on the Chaldeans and Sabaeans. It was reserved for others to compare the ancient sources with modern evidence from Persia and India.

This second fount had in fact begun to flow abundantly in the seventeenth century—quite apart from what Marco Polo and Oderic de Pordenone had to say about the native place, Savā or Kāshān, of the Three Magi, who were connected by legend with the origin of the fire-cult in these regions.[1]

In 1660 there appeared *L'Estat de la Perse*, by Father Raphaël du Mans, a French Capuchin friar who had spent many years at Ispahan. His work seems to have been translated into Latin, judging from a reference in Hyde,[2] and, as travelling in Persia became quite fashionable,[3] it was pillaged by Tavernier, Thevenot, and Chardin. Du Mans has a few pages on the Gaures, whom he knew to be survivors of the ancient fire-worshippers. 'When asked whether they hold it for their god, they answer that they do not, that they hold it for the noblest and most profitable of elements, &c.'[4]

Tavernier drew also from Fr. Gabriel de Chinon's *Relations nouvelles du Levant*, published at Lyons in 1671: an act of plagiarism with which Hyde was to reproach him (p. 567). However, Tavernier devoted a chapter to the Gaures and in it we find what seems to be the first reference in modern times to Christianity in

[1] Their testimonies are corroborated by documents in Syriac, the *Book of the Bee*, *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, Semitic series, I. ii. 85; in Arabic or in Uighur Turkish, F. W. K. Müller, *Uigurica*, i. 7–9; Bang, *Muséon*, 1926, pp. 46 seq.; see Fr.G. Messina, 'Cristianesimo–Buddhismo–Manicheismo', in *Collana di studi storico-religiosi*, i (1947), 104 seq. (translated by J. M. Unvala, Bombay, 1956); and Ugo Monneret de Villard, *Le legende orientali sui Magi evangelici*, Città Vatic., 1952.

[2] 'Docet nos D. *Sanson* in *Hodierno statu Persiae*', Hyde, *De vetere Persarum religione*, p. 106.

[3] On travels in Persia in the seventeenth century see Ch. Schefer's Introduction to his edition of Raphael du Mans's book (1890).

[4] 'Interrogés s'ils le tiennent pour leur Dieu, ils répondent que non, mais bien pour le plus noble et profitable de tous les éléments', &c. (p. 43).

connexion with the Persian religion: 'It is easy to judge that they [namely the Gaures] have had a confused knowledge of the mysteries of the Christian religion, as had several heathen peoples before.'[1] He also claims to have seen their sacred book: 'J'ai vu ce livre qui est assez gros.'[2]

We may mention in this place that J. F. Pétis de la Croix, another Capuchin, had in 1670 been instructed by Colbert to collect manuscripts, the Avesta amongst them, and that he stayed at Ispahan in 1674 with Father Raphaël du Mans.

The most complete account of the Persian Zoroastrians in the seventeenth century was to be found in the *Travels* of the Chevalier de Chardin, who knew they were akin to the Parsees of India. At least one sentence is worth quoting: 'I have had in my power for three months the great book they have now in which all their religion is written down, with many other things that are mixed up with it.'[3] An appetizing piece of news for young Anquetil!

In Chardin's *exposé* of their beliefs, we encounter for the first time a Supreme Being, superior both to minor gods and to the two principles. The name of the god is given almost exactly: Yezd for Yezdān, but it does not appear that he is identical with Ormazd, the good principle.

Chardin's sketch will, of course, be known to Anquetil, who will quote from it in his *Exposition du système*, as well as from Mandelslo on the Parsees. Before Mandelslo, the first traveller to describe the Parsee religion was Henry Lord, who was chaplain at Surat in 1630 and published, the same year, *A Display of Two Forraigne Sects; the Sect of the Banians, the Ancient Natives of India; and the Sect of the Persees, the Ancient Inhabitants of Persia.* This book, chiefly based upon Mirkhond, *Les Estats et empires*, retraces the history of Persia only as far back as the last Sassanian king. Perhaps the most interesting thing about it is that its translator,

[1] 'Il est aisé de juger qu'ils [viz. les Gaures] ont eu une connaissance confuse des mystères de la religion chrétienne, comme l'ont eue avant eux plusieurs peuples d'entre les païens', Book IV, ch. viii, *La Religion des Gaures, qui sont les descendants des anciens Persiens, adorateurs du feu*, p. 97.

[2] Ibid.

[3] *Premier voyage d'Ispahan à Bander Abbassi*, vol. viii, p. 363 of Langlès' edition, 1881: 'J'ai eu en mon pouvoir pendant trois mois le grand livre qu'ils ont à présent où toute leur religion est écrite, avec beaucoup d'autres choses qui y sont mêlées.'

Briot, in 1672, had the good idea of adding 'a collection of several passages that can serve to show the difference there is between these people and those of the past'.[1] The collection was somewhat haphazard but at least the problem was posed: the time had come for a Thomas Hyde.

Mandelslo, whose *Relation du Voyage des Indes* was translated from the German and printed as a sequel to Olearius in 1659, devotes five pages to the Parsees, refugees from Persia, and is more explicit than Lord on their theology. They believe, he says, in only one god, surrounded by seven servants: Mamasda, Bhaman, Ardybesth, Sarywar, Espander, Anwerdath, and Ammadath, each ruling his respective province.[2] So the Amshaspands arrive upon the scene of European scholarship! And let us note that Ormazd is supposed to be one of them, subordinate, like all the others, to the only God.

A third kind of source, besides ancient authors and modern travellers, became available in the seventeenth century—namely, the Arab authors. Extracts from Shahrastānī's *History of the Sects* were published in 1649 by Ed. Pococke in his *Specimen historiae Arabum*. Hyde, who knew Arabic, also quotes Ibn Shahna, *De primis et postremis*,[3] and Al Biruni's *Chronology*.

As for direct sources on Zoroastrianism, the small Avestan fragments known to Europeans were of no avail, being undeciphered, but Hyde had an *Arda Vīrāf* in Persian and such late compilations as the *Zardusht nāme*, the *Saddar*, and the *Farhang i Jahāngīrī*.

Finally, since a relationship was perceived, notably by Hyde, between Parseeism and Manichaeism, we may add here the principal sources about this 'heresy' from which one could draw in his time: Shahrastānī, Chondamir, Mejdi, Epiphanius, Eusebius, and Cyrillus; the *Acta Archelai* (edited by Zacagni in 1698), the *Fragmentum graecum de Manichaeis*, edited with notes by D. Tollius in his *Itinerarium Italicum*; lastly, a work by Beyerlink from which Hyde quotes on p. 286 of his book. It should be recalled above all that Manichaeism still lingered in European memories as a burn-

[1] *Histoire de la religion des anciens Persans, extrait d'un autre livre écrit en persan, intitulé Zandavastaw, qui contient toutes les cérémonies . . .*, pp. 209–38.

[2] And twenty-six others which he enumerates from Saroch to Dephdin (*sic*).

[3] *De vetere Persarum religione*, 160 seq. There is a MS. of Ibn Shahna in the Bodleian.

ing subject. This is why Hyde, who was obviously prejudiced in favour of the Zoroastrians, took such pains to clear them of the blame of dualism.

Before we pass on to the learned divine, who according to Wilson was nearly as much a Zoroastrian as a Christian, we must mention three books published towards the end of the seventeenth century, thus a few years before his, in which Zoroastrianism plays a part.

The first is Stanley's *History of Philosophy*, already cited above. It had a second edition in 1687 and was condensed that year in the *Bibliothèque Universelle* by Le Clerc, the famous Protestant polemicist, who was also to translate it into Dutch in 1702. This adds to the non-comformist flavour of the original, the uncle of whose author was Marsham, the free-thinker.

In d'Herbelot's *Bibliotheca orientalis*, 1697, we read this laconic statement: 'The ancient Persians have it that Zoroaster was more ancient than Moses, and there are Magi who even maintain that he is none other than Abraham and often call him Ibrahim Zardusht.'[1] The bearing of this contention on Christian apologetics is not even hinted at.

Quite different is the attitude of Pierre-Daniel Huet, bishop of Avranches. His *Demonstratio evangelica*, published twelve years earlier, centred around the age-old problem already alluded to above: How is it that pagan religions have some features in common with Judaism and Christianity? The Fathers Justin, Athenagoras, Clement, and Origen had endeavoured to show that paganism either preserved something of a primitive revelation or had borrowed from Judaism: they thought both arguments would facilitate the conversion of pagans. In the seventeenth century, which was one of intense religious controversy, we find Grotius saying: 'Nulla est causa cur inter impossibilia habeatur restitutio dissoluti corporis, cum viri eruditi, Zoroaster apud Chaldeos, Stoici prope omnes, et inter Peripateticos Theopompus, eam et fieri posse et futuram crediderunt.'[2]

On the other hand, a very different explanation was put forward by people like Marsham in his *Chronicus Canon Egyptiacus*,

[1] 'Les anciens Persans veulent que Zoroastre soit plus ancien que Moïse, et il y a des Mages qui prétendent même qu'il est le même qu'Abraham et qui l'appellent souvent Ibrahim Zardusht' (p. 931).

[2] *De veritate religionis Christianae*, 1627, II. ix. 96.

London, 1672, or John Spencer, whose *Dissertatio de Urim et Thummim* was published at Cambridge in 1670. To them the coincidences were due to the Jews having borrowed from neighbouring peoples. It is probable, as Dupront has shown in his book *Pierre-Daniel Huet et l'exégèse comparatiste au XVII^e siècle*, Paris, 1930, that such were the adversaries against whom Huet wrote his *Demonstratio*.

Huet generally revived the arguments of the Fathers, only adding to them much new evidence, taken from all possible peoples in all possible times. The danger of this position was soon seen by Bossuet, who wrote: 'J'en ai vu qui disaient que si l'on trouve tout dans les livres des payens, on reprochera au christianisme de n'avoir rien appris au genre humain.'[1] In the case of Zoroaster: 'ex hac dissertatione clarissime patet Zoroastrem ipsum esse Mosem et vetustissimae Persarum religionis fontem esse mosaicam Legem.'[2] In other words: 'Huet prouve assez bien'—to quote an appreciation by the 'philosopher' Flexier de Réval—'que Zoroastre est un personnage fabuleux, inventé d'après l'histoire de Moïse.'[3]

Hyde's large book *De vetere religione Persarum*, Oxford, 1700, is the first attempt at a synthesis on the subject. Based on all the sources available at the time, it marks an epoch and was to influence all subsequent researches. It reflects also all the previous ideas on Zoroaster and is, moreover, highly representative of the seventeenth-century mentality.

To Hyde, Zoroaster not only had been the preceptor of Pythagoras: he had prophesied about Christ and borrowed from Ezra and other Jewish prophets. There must have been something about him and his disciples that made God select the latter for this sacred role. What was it? 'Cur Deus Persas prae aliis gentibus dignatus est favore tantae religionis, ipse melius novit.' But it can be for no other reason than that they were the only people (with the Jews) who had preserved from the beginning some knowledge and cult of the true God. In reforming the Persian people, Zoroaster chiefly repeated the work of Abraham, who had succeeded for a time in

[1] *Correspondance*, iv. 337.
[2] Quoted by Dupront, p. 33.
[3] Quoted after Raymond Schwab, *Vie d'Anquetil-Duperron*, 1934, p. 93.

converting them from Sabeism to the religion of the only God. Thus, in his portrayal of Zoroaster and his religion, Hyde is bent on showing them in the light most favourable to Christian eyes. Zoroastrians were always monotheists, rendering to God alone a divine cult, whereas Mithra and Fire received merely civil honours (p. 120). It is true that the ancient evidence generally makes out the Persians to be either polytheists or dualists. But this is due, according to Hyde, first to the fact that 'Graeci qui idolatrae erant non possunt aliter nisi suo stylo loqui de Persis'; secondly, to Herodotus describing not the reformed Persians but those who still believed in Sabeism (the Muslim term for paganism); thirdly, with regard to dualism, the testimonies of a Damascius or a Plutarch are not ignored but they 'indubitably' refer to heretics who, like the Manichaeans and Mazdakites, believed in two eternal principles, or to *magos veneficos* like those Plutarch describes performing their *diabolicam magiam*. All these should be carefully distinguished from the orthodox, about whom Hyde draws evidence from two groups of sources: first the modern Gabrīs and Parsees who according to the European travellers, Chardin and Mandelslo, give themselves out as monotheists, worshippers of Yezd, namely, of a God who had priority over the demon Ahriman;[1] similarly, Shahrastānī states that the 'true' magians believed that God only was eternal, whilst Darkness was created; on the other hand, the same Shahrastānī also gives evidence on the Zervaniyya, and this is borne out by what Theodore of Mopsuestia (in Photius) has to say on Zurvān the supreme God, father of Ormazd and Ahriman.

Hyde was thus confusing two or three kinds of monotheism, but he had the merit of emphasizing for the first time the belief in Zurvān. It remained for his successors to try to conciliate this belief with the other Persian tenets. This is what Anquetil, for one, was to endeavour.

Hyde and Anquetil are separated by two events of fundamental importance: one was, of course, the discovery of the Avesta by Anquetil himself; the other was that intellectual revolution lately called *la Crise de la conscience européenne* (Paul Hazard), which made the *siècle de Voltaire* so different from the *siècle de Bossuet.*

[1] p. 161: *Farhang i Jahāngīrī.*

Whereas Hyde's treatise is the work of an apologist, of a man to whom everything in human history gravitates around Christianity, Anquetil, although a faithful Roman Catholic and perhaps no less religious a man than the Oxford divine, claims in the Preface to his *Zend-Avesta* to have one interest—Man. Anquetil was of his time, a time characterized by a secularization of knowledge and a return to the ideals of Renaissance humanism.

Before Voltaire's works and Diderot's *Encyclopaedia*, Bayle's *Dictionary*, probably the greatest book to appear in the first half of the eighteenth century (first editions 1697, 1702, 1715, 1720), was most representative of the new attitude. Bayle, who made a special study of Manicheism and introduced into French the word *dualisme*, which Hyde had coined in Latin, saw the weakness of the latter's argument on the alleged monotheism of the Zoroastrians. Shahrastānī's evidence on the supremacy of Ormazd could be explained as follows:

> Zoroaster's followers have charitably lent to their reformer, in their own interest, the doctrine that the evil principle was created by God. They have been doing so ever since they were submitted to the hard rule of the Mohammedans who abhor them and call them idolaters and fire-worshippers. They wanted to avoid exposing themselves even more to their hatred and insults.[1]

Bayle's attack on Hyde was to be carried on by l'Abbé Foucher. Meanwhile, Hyde was faithfully followed in England by Prideaux, the dean of Norwich, who in his *History of the Jews*, 1715–18, gave a chapter to Persian religion on the ground that Zoroaster, who lived under Darius, was versed in the Jewish religion, to the extent that he may have been born a Jew; he seems at any rate to have had Elias, Ezra, and Daniel for his masters. On the state of the Persian religion prior to Zoroaster we are indirectly informed by Isaiah xlv. 1, 5, and 7: 'Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus. . . . I am the Lord, and there is none else, there is no God beside me. . . . I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace,

[1] *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, s.v. Zoroastre. This seems the source, by the way, of Gibbon's note to chapter viii of his *Decline and Fall*: 'The modern Parsees (and in some degree the Sadder) exalt Ormazd into the first and omnipotent cause, while they degrade Ahriman into an inferior but rebellious spirit. Their desire of pleasing the Mahometans may have contributed to refine their theological system.'

and create evil: I the Lord do all these things.' Since these words are addressed to Cyrus, Prideaux argues, they must allude to the doctrine of the Persian Magi who believed that Light and Darkness, Good and Evil, were sovereign beings and did not recognize the Supreme Being who is superior to them. There is no doubt that this gave Zoroaster the idea of reforming this absurd dogma of the magian theology.

Prideaux clearly depended upon d'Herbelot and Hyde. However, his compendium, as we learn from l'Abbé Foucher, was known to everybody. For example, Anquetil-Duperron quotes from the 1728 edition. And it may well be that Prideaux was the link between Hyde and Anquetil.

Parallel to this Hyde–Prideaux–Anquetil line of descent we may trace another, running from Bayle to Voltaire through Andrew Michael Ramsay. This adventurous Scot (who was for some time a protégé of Fénelon, was received at Oxford in 1729, and set himself to exporting British Freemasonry to the Continent) used Zoroaster in his *Travels of Cyrus*, an imitation of Fénelon's *Télémaque* published in 1720, as a mouthpiece for a kind of Spinozism revised, as it were, by Newton, although he claimed in his Preface to have ascribed nothing to the ancients, with regard to religion, which was not authorized by express passages. The Magi and their chief are supposed to have believed in the unity of the world, but to have maintained Providence: 'Matter does not obey the laws of a blind mechanic; it is the body of the great Oromazes whose soul is Truth, &c.'[1]

Hyde's most vigorous adversary was l'Abbé Foucher, a prolific scholar who published in the *Mémoires de l'Académie* a great number of papers, the first five of which appeared before Anquetil sent news from India of his discovery of the Avesta. In the first one he blames Hyde for having 'the rashness of disputing the validity of the unanimous testimony of the Ancients and of accusing of ignorance or calumny those who have represented the Persians as fire-worshippers and dualists'. Farther on: 'I may flatter myself on serving Religion more effectively than did the learned English-

[1] Quoted in French by P. Vernière, *Spinoza et la pensée française*, 1954, p. 403. Translation mine. The English version published in the bilingual edition does not contain this passage and is more faithful to Porphyry's famous notice that Ormazd's body was made of light, whereas his soul was truth.

man, by showing, on the example of the Persians themselves, that peoples deprived of the light of Revelation, however enlightened they may otherwise have been, far from preserving natural religion in all its integrity, have always dishonoured it by some capital error.'[1]

The second paper deals with the dualism of the ancient Persians. Those of 1755 purport to solve the discrepancy between the ancient evidence and our modern oriental sources on Zoroaster by defending the old theory found in Pliny and accepted by some modern scholars that there were two Zoroasters: 'The Scholars willingly admit of several Zoroasters; this is a comfortable solution of the difficulty, but the point would be to discover these different Zoroasters in history, to fix their time, to indicate the kings under whom they lived, &c.',[2] which Foucher then endeavours to do. Suffice it to say that to him it was the second Zoroaster who introduced Zurvān and was the master of Pythagoras.[3]

The publication of Anquetil's *Avesta* in 1771 did not abate Foucher's vigour or deflect him from his course of reasoning. In his 1777 paper, *Supplément au traité historique de la religion des Perses*, he does see the contradiction between the Zervanism of Theodore of Mopsuestia and the dualism of the Avesta and the Bundahišn, where the traces of the alleged supreme God are very scarce indeed. But, as we shall see, Anquetil-Duperron was up against the same difficulty.

Even before Anquetil had set foot on Indian soil, no less a personage than Voltaire had entered the ideological field of battle: in his *Essai sur les mœurs*, 1756, he admits, like Foucher and others, that there was a second Zoroaster. But the main reason for his

[1] '. . . la hardiesse de s'inscrire en faux contre le témoignage unanime des anciens et de traiter d'ignorants ou de calomniateurs ceux qui ont représenté les Perses comme des ignicoles et des dualistes' (p. 104). Farther on: 'Je puis me flatter de servir la Religion plus efficacement que n'a fait le docte Anglais, en montrant, par l'exemple même des Perses, que les peuples destitués de la lumière de la Révélation, quelque éclairés qu'ils aient été d'ailleurs, loin de conserver la Religion naturelle dans toute son intégrité, l'ont toujours déshonorée par quelque erreur capitale' (p. 105).

[2] 'Les savants admettent volontiers plusieurs Zoroastres; c'est une solution commode pour se tirer d'embarras, mais il s'agirait de découvrir dans l'histoire ces divers Zoroastres, d'en fixer l'époque, d'indiquer les Rois sous lesquels ils ont vécu', &c. (p. 255).

[3] The same opinion was later entertained by Herder, Zoega, and Guigniaud.

interest in either prophet is that they provide him with a weapon against Christianity, to *écraser l'infâme*. Moses was not unique: truth could be found in non-christian tradition. Huet's *Demonstratio evangelica*, that painstaking catalogue of resemblances between paganism and Christianity, was made to boomerang, in the sense that Bossuet had foreseen, and to challenge the Church monopoly of truth for the benefit of 'natural religion'.

Anquetil's departure for India raised high hopes in the ranks of the philosophers. This chapter has been dealt with in a masterly fashion by Raymond Schwab in his *Vie d'Anquetil-Duperron*, Paris, 1934. I may, therefore, be very brief on this subject. Anquetil, in his letters from India and on his return, little by little shattered these expectations by his refusal to see anything in the Avesta that could be used against Christianity. Voltaire, Grimm, and Diderot were conspicuously disappointed. In the article on Zoroaster in his *Dictionnaire philosophique*, Voltaire insisted on Anquetil's courage and character and on Hyde's competence. And he avenged himself for his disillusionment by writing his impertinent paragraph on 'l'abominable fatras que l'on attribue à ce Zoroastre'—a phrase too famous to need quoting here in full. Yet, he adds, 'on parle beaucoup de Zoroastre et on en parlera encore'. Indeed!

I may also be very brief on the attacks which were directed at Anquetil from other quarters: England was no doubt irritated to see the celebrated Hyde lose his sovereignty over Iranian studies. It took about thirty years for the last resistance to surrender to the authenticity of the Avesta.[1]

Meanwhile, Voltaire's or Diderot's attitude was to survive essentially unchanged:[2] to a Goethe in his *Parsee Nameh* (*West-östlicher Diwan*, with *Noten* on the Ancient Persians), to a Byron in *Childe Harold*, to a Wordsworth in the *Excursion*, the Persian religion remained the model of a natural, reasonable religion, later corrupted by priestly fanaticism. Shelley, incidentally, struck a more

[1] In Germany Anquetil's results had met with immediate approval, thanks to Kleuker's translation of his work, Riga, 1776–7, and subsequent studies by Kleuker and others.

[2] See also de Pastoret, *Zoroastre, Confucius et Mahomet*, 1787; Volney, *Les Ruines*, 1791, &c. Zoroaster figured also among the heroes of Sylvain Maréchal's *Dictionnaire des Athées*, 1800—and as Sarastro in the *Zauberflöte*.

personal note in his famous discourse of the Earth in *Prometheus Unbound*:

> Ere Babylon was dust,
> The Magus Zoroaster, my dead child,
> Met his own image walking in the garden.
> That apparition, sole of men, he saw.
> For know there are two worlds of life and death:
> One that which thou beholdest; but the other
> Is underneath the grave, where do inhabit
> The shadows of all forms that think and live,
> Till death unite them and they part no more.

I have searched in vain for a definite source for this particular episode: unless I am mistaken, it is of Shelley's own invention. He appears to have freely combined the account of Zoroaster's visions with that of the faithful soul's encounter with the Daēnā after Death. In order to convey what he considered essential in the Zoroastrian message, namely, a secret correspondence and attraction between visible and spiritual realities, he fashioned a new Zoroaster, thus following Ramsay's example and anticipating Nietzsche's audacious *Umwertung* of Zoroaster.

On the other hand, there survived in the wake of encyclopaedism the tendency to find an Iranian origin for Christianity, or, as H. H. Schaeder puts it: 'With the knowledge of the Avesta there arose the temptation to search for concealed sources of primitive Christianity in the Iranian religion. Already Lessing—in the *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*—had failed to defend himself against it, Herder succumbed to it, and up to our time it exacts its regular victims.'[1]

To return to Anquetil-Duperron. The most interesting point in this context is the prominent place he gives the first principle, Zurvān, in the system. His *Exposition du système théologique des Perses*, read to the Academy in 1767, deals first with Zurvān, then with Ormazd and Ahriman. He has to confess, as Hyde had done, that this supreme being is much too seldom remembered, and he

[1] *Goethes Erlebnis des Ostens*, 1938, p. 134: 'Mit dem Bekanntwerden des Awesta erhob sich die Versuchung, in iranischer Religion verborgene Quellen des Urchristentums aufzusuchen. Schon Lessing—in der *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*—hat sich ihrer nicht erwehrt, Herder ist ihr erlegen, und bis zum heutigen Tag fordert sie ihr regelmäßiges Opfer.'

accordingly tries in his *Zend-Avesta*, published five years later, to indicate what may have caused this silence. And here is that flight into the unverifiable to which I was alluding at the beginning of this lecture: 'La connaissance du cœur humain a pu porter ce législateur à ne pas insister sur une vérité dont il craignait qu'on n'abusât.' Otherwise, he goes on, the people, feeling themselves under the sway of a Being who commanded both good and evil, might have abandoned themselves to fatalism. (A rather disconcerting remark, by the way, on the part of a Christian!)

In fact, this theory that Zoroaster (and the *élite* of Zoroastrians) were Zervanite monotheists was from now on, obviously on the authority of Anquetil, adopted by the majority of writers. Wilson in 1830 could cite Gibbon, Lord Woodhouselee, Sir John Malcolm's *History of Persia*, Sir Graves Haughton, Enfield, Creuzer, and Stuhr, as against only l'Abbé Foucher and Erskine.[1]

Wilson himself stood on the side of the majority, and this may account for his rather tortuous line of argument against the Parsees. He could otherwise, it seems, have quite simply accused them of dualism and shown in the good old manner of the medieval heresiologues that their god (Ormazd) was not really God, since his power was limited by that of an independent evil being (Ahriman). Instead of which he argues in this way: your god (Ormazd) cannot be the veritable supreme God you pretend he is, since there is above him another being—Zurvān. Wilson thus uses against Ormazd all the evidence on Zurvān that can be culled from Greek, Armenian, and Arabic authors (already quoted in Hyde) or from Iranian sources (as tapped by Anquetil). But he then proceeds, after thus dethroning Ormazd, so to speak, in favour of Zurvān, to show that the latter himself cannot be the true God either:

> If Zaruāna be indeed the Supreme Divinity [he argues], then to talk of him as merely Time, or Fate, or Destiny, or Eternity; to ascribe the principal works of creation and providence to one of his creatures; and to exclude him from all but occasional worship, is the quintessence of impiety. A God who has not divine attributes; who has not performed,

[1] Erskine's essay 'On the Sacred Books and Religion of the Parsis', *Trans. Bombay Lit. Soc.* ii (1819), 318. Wilson should in fact have added 'Zoega, Tychsen et autres, qui niaient que le dogme d'un principe suprême, antérieur à toute dualité, soit enseigné dans les livres zends, ou même ait été connu des Médo-Perses avant leur commerce avec les Grecs.' (Guigniaud's note to his translation of Creuzer, i. 696.)

and who does not perform, the divine works of creation and providence; who is not entitled to be considered paramount in the inquiry and contemplation, and love, and worship, and service of man, is a monstrous birth of the depraved imagination of man, from which every pious mind must revolt with horror.

Thus far the eloquent missionary on p. 142 of his *Parsi Religion* (Bombay, 1843). I think it was rather interesting to show how, after enrolling Zurvān against Ormazd, he called upon Ormazd (and Ahriman) against Zurvān. Really, how were the Parsees to defend themselves against this double offensive? However expressly they blamed Zervanism as a heresy, a long time was yet to elapse before they could get rid of the Zervanite argument. Indeed, it was only with the publication of Zaehner's book, *Zurvan, A Zoroastrian Dilemma*, Oxford, 1955, that the relationship between Zervanism and Mazdeism was put into satisfactory perspective. We can see now that Mazdeism was the official religion of most Sassanian rulers, but that Zervanism, which had begun to spread in the latter half of the Achemenian period, was in fact the religion of the people in so far as the latter remained untouched by Mazdean propaganda.[1] The Magusaeans, for instance, those 'occidental magi' who lived outside the Sassanian empire, were Zervanites. So also were the common people to whom Mani preached his religion.

As for the accusation of dualism, it will be discussed in the course of these lectures.

For the moment a last quotation may illustrate the view that was prevalent in Wilson's time:

The religion of the Zend having degenerated into a gross dualism and mere ceremonial worship under the Arsacides, their successors, the Sassanides, were now making every effort to restore its ancient purity; and in the assemblies of the Magi the supremacy of the one great first principle (Zrvan akarana) had been acknowledged, and Dualism with its adherents (Magusaeans) condemned. It is probable that this division amongst the believers in Parseeism first suggested to Manes the idea of uniting Christianity with the system of the rejected Magusaeans.[2]

[1] See now, however, Mary Boyce, *Some Reflections on Zurvanism*, BSOAS, 1957 (read in the proofs).

[2] An extract made by Wilson, p. 148, from J. Gieseler's *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte* (six volumes, 1824–57).

This is the exact opposite of the picture at which our modern research has arrived!

Our survey[1] has now reached the end of what may be called the pre-history of Iranian studies since, by the time of Wilson's book, Burnouf's *Commentaire sur le Yasna* had been published. The Avesta was becoming really accessible, like the Pahlavī books, as the most secure, if not the only legitimate basis for an appreciation of Parseeism. All the earlier research had, in consequence, to become obsolete.

Meanwhile, the great discovery that had given the key to Avestan and Pahlavī—that of the relationship of Iranian with Sanskrit (and other Indo-European languages)—was pregnant with new possibilities for the interpretation of the religious facts of Iran.

[1] Further references will be found in Clemen, *Religious geschichtliche Erklärung des Neven Testaments*, 1924.

II

THE INDO IRANIAN PERSPECTIVE

BOPP was first to note the connexion between Avestan *daēva-* and Sanskrit *dēva-*, Avestan *ahura-* and Sanskrit *asura-*. The notion of a common origin of the civilizations of Iran, India, &c., yielded interesting if premature theories in J. G. Rhode's *Die heilige Sage und das gesammte Religionssystem*, 1820, in Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie*, 1819–21, &c.,[1] where an Iranian origin of all culture was vindicated. But the first scholar to combine direct knowledge of the original texts with a desire for historical synthesis was Martin Haug. Out of the bulk of the Avesta he extracted the Gāthās as the only works attributable to Zoroaster and made them the basis of a new assessment of the prophet's doctrine: he drew a distinction between the prophet's monotheism and the dualistic views reflected in later writings such as the Vendidād, as well as between his theology which was monotheistic and his speculative philosophy which was dualist. The latter distinction enabled Haug to affirm that 'a separate evil spirit of equal power with Ahuramazda, and always opposed to him, is entirely foreign to Zarathushtra's theology'.[2]

As for the two creative spirits,

they form only two parts of the Divine Being. But in the course of time this doctrine of the great founder was changed and corrupted, in consequence of misunderstanding and false interpretation. Spentōmainyush was taken as a name of Ahuramazda himself, and then, of course, Angrōmainyush by becoming entirely separated from Ahuramazda was regarded as the constant adversary of Ahuramazda; thus the Dualism of God and Devil arose. Each of the two spirits was considered an indepent ruler endeavouring to destroy the creation of the other, and thus both waged constant war. This Dualism is best perceived in the first fargard of the Vendidād,

[1] Goerres, in his *Mythengeschichte*, cited by Creuzer, had made a nice parallel of dogma and forms of the religions of Iran and India.

[2] *Essays on the sacred Language, Writings and Religion of the Parsis* (2nd edition by West), p. 303, 1878.

whilst, on the other hand, the ancient Aryan paganism reasserted itself in the Yašts. This dualism in turn brought about a reaction in the form of a new monotheism, namely, Zervanism, a belief that was common in the time of the Sassanians.

This theory was not only eagerly adopted by the Parsees, to whom it was put forward in a lecture delivered at Poona in 1861, because it appeared to vindicate their original monotheism against Wilson's accusation, but also became classic in Europe and was to remain so, if not unchallenged, for about seventy-five years: it is still, in substance, the position of Lehmann in Chantepie's *Lehrbuch*, 1925, and of Schaeder in *Corona*, 1940 (p. 596). It had its dubious points, notably its view of the relationship, in Zoroaster's mind, between Ormazd and the two Spirits, but at least the Zervanite ghost had been laid for a long time to come and, above all, the texts were placed in their true chronological perspective: Gāthās, Yasna haptaŋhāiti, Yašts, Vīdēvdāt.

Iranian philology had become fully established, and it would be difficult in our short survey to acknowledge all the lasting contributions that were made since then to the elucidation of Zoroastrianism. But we only want to show, let it be remembered, how the scholars still obeyed diverse tendencies which influenced their interpretation of the facts. Before we do this, however, we may put in a few words on three books which are representative, each in its own way, of a broader public response to Zoroaster.

The Iranian prophet has never been a truly popular figure in Europe,[1] and it is significant that the only literary work that calls him by his real name, Nietzsche's *Also sprach Zarathustra*, 1885–7, should present a picture of him which is the almost exact opposite of truth. This was deliberate on the part of Nietzsche, who was not at all ignorant of the real Zoroaster, but wanted to use him as a mouthpiece for his own message. The public, however, did not see the difference and Nietzsche's enormous irony was lost. We have his own disappointed confession about this in *Ecce Homo*:

> I have not been asked [he complains], I should have been asked what the name Zarathusthra means in *my* mouth, in the mouth of the first Immoralist: for what makes up the enormous uniqueness of that Persian

[1] Marion Crawford's novel *Zoroaster*, 1885, is the exception that confirms the rule.

in history is exactly the opposite of it. Zarathushtra was the first who saw in the battle of good and evil the very wheel in the course of things: translating morals into metaphysics, as power, origin, aim in itself, such is his work.[1]

Be that as it may, Zoroaster thus became part of an attempt to emancipate modern man from Christianity. This was in the Voltairian tradition.

Samuel Laing's book, *A Modern Zoroastrian*, 1887, though on a more popular level, is even more representative of this tradition. Zoroastrianism is there adorned with all the virtues of which Christianity is supposed to be devoid, such as rationality, simplicity, contact with nature, appeal to the vital, constructive instincts. Above all, Zoroaster is praised for his dualistic solution of the problem of evil, a solution which has the merit, essential in the author's eyes, of fitting in with the laws of physics. 'Samuel Laing', we read in a review of his book in the *Illustrated London News*, 'a veteran public man, who has during forty years past, after gaining high mathematical honours at Cambridge, been constantly employed in Board of Trade official administration, or in the duties of a member of Parliament, or as Finance Minister of India, or as Chairman of the Brighton Railway Co., is not likely to be a dreamy idealist, or a scholastic bigot.' He may have become acquainted with Parseeism in India. He combines his knowledge of it with the philosophy of Herbert Spencer and Thomas Huxley and, above all, of Emerson, whose essay *On Compensation, or Polarity*, served him as a starting-point. His book, one of several dealing with 'Modern Science and Modern Thought', nowadays makes entertaining reading with its distinct nineteenth-century flavour.

Its positivistic trend was to be carried to the extreme in a recent work which also, like the book of the Scottish disciple of Emerson, points to the New World, for it is written by an American geographer, E. Huntington. This scientist devotes a chapter of his *Mainsprings of Civilization* (Yale, 1945) to a study of the Parsees.

[1] 'Man hat mich nicht gefragt, man hätte mich fragen sollen, was gerade in meinem Munde, im Munde des ersten Immoralisten, der Name Zarathustra bedeutet: denn was die ungeheure Einzigkeit jenes Persers in der Geschichte ausmacht, ist gerade dazu das Gegenteil. Zarathustra hat zuerst im Kampf des Guten und Bösen das eigentliche Rad im Getriebe der Dinge gesehen: die Übersetzung der Moral ins Metaphysische, als Kraft, Ursache, Zweck an sich ist sein Werk' (p. 117 of the Insel edition).

Their religion plays scarcely any part in it, except in so far as it defines them as a separate community. They are taken as an illustration—perhaps the best possible one—of the beneficent effects of repeated processes of selection. Their case is compared with that of the English Puritans who, fleeing from religious molestation in the seventeenth century, left for America, where their offspring still occupy the highest positions. Undoubtedly the conditions under which these displacements were made, the many deaths, and no doubt the discouragement of some, only allowed the fittest and most resolute to survive. Such must have been the men and women, real heroes, who founded the Parsee community of India. It is explained in this way that they form there the most active, enlightened, and enterprising minority. If they are engineers, civil servants, bankers; if they manage cotton mills and railway companies; if they distinguish themselves by their philanthropy, by the number of their works of relief, their hospitals, their orphanages, their schools, it is because they are the descendants of a party of lordlings who, rather than submit to the Muslim conquerors of their native Iran, clung to their national religion as to a symbol of independence and took refuge in the mountains until some of them had to flee to India.

But to return to a less secular study of them. Iranian philology had, of course, its part to play in all the 'schools' which competed and successively held the field in the science of religions. This was the case with the 'naturalistic school', born about the middle of the nineteenth century of a combination of Vedic philology and comparative linguistics (distinctly a *mariage d'amour*). James Darmesteter, in his book *Ormazd et Ahriman*, 1877, unreservedly adopted the method of Kuhn and Max Müller and proved that Zoroaster was—a personification of thunder.

After this *péché de jeunesse* Darmesteter abandoned *l'école étymologique ou védisante* for *l'école traditionnelle ou historique*[1] and finished by producing not only his monumental translation of the Avesta, part of which first appeared in Oxford in Max Müller's *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. iv, 1880, and vol. xxiii, 1883, but also a theory[2] on its origin and composition which convinced nobody: the system of

[1] *Zend-Avesta*, vol. i (1892), pp. viii seq.: *Histoire des études zoroastriennes*.
[2] Ibid., vol. iii, pp. iii seq.

abstract entities surrounding Ahura Mazdāh was to him so redolent of neo-Platonism that the Gāthās must be late forgeries composed under the influence of Hellenizing Jews, like Philo of Alexandria.

This was an unexpected variant on the theory of a Semitic influence on Mazdeism, a theory which, put forward by Spiegel, was to be taken up again by de Harlez, the Belgian Monseigneur, and lastly by Pettazzoni in his *Religione di Zarathustra*, Bologna, 1920.[1] Whereas, according to Darmesteter, both monotheism (as illustrated in the Achemenian inscriptions) and dualism are in Iran anterior to the Semitic influence, the other three scholars agree on deriving monotheism from Palestine.

Fr. Spiegel tried to show that the Hebrews had given to Iran not only the idea of God but also their notion of creation *ex nihilo*, the part played by the number six in creation, the deluge.[2] (Conversely, they received from Iran their Paradise and their Tree of Life.) De Harlez, followed by Pettazzoni, restricted the alleged source of influence to the great Jewish prophets, whose message was supposed, however indirectly, to have reached Zoroaster.

This view had an almost automatic corollary with regard to Zoroaster's originality. If he received from the Jewish prophets their solid monotheism, he could himself have invented dualism only. Indeed, his attitude, if original at all, could best be understood as a protest against monotheism.

The theory of such a Hebrew influence on Iran has now ceased to be tenable since it has become apparent that Zoroaster lived in eastern Iran and had no contact with the West. It is true that Geldner, Bartholomae, and others still tried to combine the divergent traditions about the prophet's birth-place by saying that he was born in Media but had to flee to Bactria or Seistan. But Nyberg has pointed out that all the notices giving him out as a Mede, as well as those connecting his reform with western Iran, proceed from a desire in Sassanian times, when official Mazdeism had its centres in the West, to create the conviction that this had always been so. It has thus become very unlikely that Jewish monotheism influenced the birth of Zoroastrianism.

[1] Pettazzoni has dropped this view in his later studies on Monotheism. See his *Essays on the History of Religions*, 1954.

[2] *Eranische Altertumskunde*, ii. 449 seq.

Conversely, Iranian dualism may very well at a later stage have contributed to bring about the transformation that can be observed in the Jewish religion from the Exile onwards. For this there is a much better case, and we shall return to it at the end of these lectures.

A parallel and equally important question was that of Iranian influence on Greek thought, a matter which will also be discussed farther on.

To return to the nineteenth century. After Haug, Darmesteter, de Harlez, and Spiegel, we ought to remember Tiele and Justi.

C. P. Tiele, who once (in his *Godsdienst van Zarathushtra van haar ontstaan in Bactrië tot den val van het O. P. Rijk*, Haarlem, 1864) concurred with Haug in the view that Mazdeism and Vedism were born simultaneously of a schism in the old Aryan religion, later on wrote an independent synthesis in his *Geschiedenis van den Godsdienst tot aan de Heerschappij der Wereldgodsdiensten*, Amsterdam, 1895, with a fine analysis of Zoroaster's reform.

F. Justi, apart from his *Iranisches Namenbuch*, his contribution on History to the *Grundriß*, &c., also wrote a synthesis on Mazdeism, in the *Preußische Jahrbücher*, 88, 1897. The main point in Zoroaster's reform is his monotheism, although the notion of the conflict of good and evil, 'often a pretext in Indo-European religions for mythological variations, is used to transform them by transferring them to the sphere of human morality and so to make them the basis of a new *Weltanschauung*'. However, this dualism is, with Zoroaster, still less radical than it was to become: this results from Y. 44. 5, where Ahura Mazdāh is supposed to have created both light and darkness (P. 69 and 234).

The turn of the century was a new epoch, marked by the completion of the *Sacred Books of the East* and the publication of Franz Cumont's monograph, *Textes et monuments relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, 1896–9, by Jackson's *Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Iran*, 1898, a life of Zoroaster written, with too little historical criticism, from the Iranian sources, with a discussion of his date and birth-place and accompanied by a collection of all classical passages relating to the prophet, plus the Chaldaic Oracles; and, above all, by the appearance of three invaluable books, the *Avesta* edition by Geldner, the *Grundriß der iranischen Philologie*, and

Bartholomae's *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, which provided the students of Iranian religion with almost all the best possible instruments. They might therefore have been expected to make considerable progress. On the contrary, there ensued for several years a period that may be called one of consolidation. In his survey of Iranian religion, 1900–10, published in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1914, Lehmann complained that the study of Mazdeism had no recognized master: he denied this quality even to Bartholomae, who had, he said, no eye for theological problems. (Jackson's contribution to the *Grundriß* was rather disappointing in its lack of problems.)

Moulton's *Early Zoroastrianism*, to which we shall return presently, had not yet appeared. The American L. Mills, professor at Oxford, took rather unnecessary pains to refute Darmesteter's theory; we shall meet him again when dealing with the Iran–Palestine relationship.

Meanwhile Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, that last monument of a time perhaps gone for ever, gave a large collection of articles on Iranian religion. The attention of the scholars was rather focused on the Middle-Iranian texts, chiefly of Manichaean content, owing to the discoveries in Central Asia, the most notable exception being Andreas and Wackernagel's new translation of the Gāthās, based on a theory to which W. Henning, following Bailey, was only to give the final blow in his article 'The Disintegration of the Avestic Studies', *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1942.

To return to Moulton. In *Early Zoroastrianism*, 1913 (The Hibbert lectures for 1912), he insisted on Zoroaster's monotheism, ascribing to the Median Magi (as Nyberg was to do) the radical dualism which characterizes Zoroastrianism from the later Avesta onwards. He made a special study of the peculiar relationship of Ahura Mazdāh to the Amәša Spәntas. He insisted, as Jackson had done, on the doctrine of Free Choice. Finally, he devoted a chapter to the relations between Zoroastrianism and Israel.

His last book, *The Treasure of the Magi*, was published posthumously at Oxford in 1917. He had written it not only as a scholar, summarizing the results arrived at in *Early Zoroastrianism*, but as a Christian missionary who had by then acquired direct knowledge

of Parseeism in India. In this respect he renewed Wilson's famous venture. But whereas his predecessor had been anxious to win over the Parsees by showing them the absurdity of their religion, Moulton worked on the principle set forth in the Gospel: 'I am not come to destroy but to fulfil', and tried to represent Christianity as the Crown of Zoroastrianism.

E. Reuterskiöld's study of Zoroaster's position in the history of religions, *Zarathustras Religionshistoriska Ställning*, attracted little attention, owing perhaps to the time of its publication (December 1914). The author, who had previously studied the Lappish culture, insisted on the social aspect of Zoroaster's reform, which he interpreted as closely connected with the adoption of sedentary life, and on his having reduced it to the level of 'natural religion'. For the rest, his book, based on years of study of the best authorities, from Jackson's *Zoroaster* and Lehmann's *Zarathustra, en bog om Persernes gamle tro*, 2 vols., 1899–1902, to Bartholomae's Gāthās, was to a large extent forestalled by Moulton's work.

In 1918 Bartholomae at last gave his own synthesis on Zoroastrianism, in his lecture *Zarathustra's Leben und Lehre*, published in 1924. He put forward the theory, which he admitted could not be countenanced by quotations from the Gāthās, that Zoroaster's reformation had developed in three stages. In the first one, the prophet had the revelation of monotheism and began to preach it in his native place, somewhere in Media. Then, as he met with some resistance, he had to make room for evil and evolved the theory of the two principles. Finally, he had to flee to eastern Iran, a more backward country, still chiefly nomadic, where he found acceptance by introducing the sedentary way of life.

Meillet, in the last of his *Trois Conférences sur les gâthâs de l'Avesta* delivered at Uppsala in 1924 (published in Paris the next year), insisted on the social character of Zoroaster's reform. The blood sacrifice, which he opposed, was clearly a matter that concerned the wealthy rulers, for it was an instrument of their power. Zoroaster preached for the benefit of the poor, oppressed herdsman. This accounted for the abstract character of the new theology. 'The husbandman', as Meillet puts it, 'is not interested in an "aristocracy" of gods who are far from him; he thinks only of the "democracy" of the forces that can serve or harm him.' But

since justice is impossible in this world, it is announced that the final retribution is reserved for the after-life. The conclusion is worth quoting in full:

> Every student of the Gāthās has seen that the moral notions therein are connected with economic and social facts. But what we should look for is not the contrast between husbandman and nomad. . . . We have rather to do with the old opposition of rich and poor, of war-like aristocrats and peasants. Only this opposition accounts for the dominating importance attached by ancient Zoroastrianism to the doctrine of after-life retribution.[1]

This inference, which one should think was inspired by the Marxist theory of religion, was discarded by O. von Wesendonk in his book *Das Wesen der Lehre Zarathushtras*, published in 1927. This author had devoted a previous work, *Urmensch und Seele in der iranischen Überlieferung*, to combating Reitzenstein's contention that the Hellenistic myth of the soul and of primal man originated in Iran: we shall return to this question in another lecture. In the other book just referred to, Wesendonk not only rejects Meillet's conclusions on the grounds that they sound too modern and that Zoroaster was himself an aristocrat, but, bearing in mind Reitzenstein's comparison of Zoroaster with Plato, he is anxious to point out that his principal achievement was that he placed the Wise Lord in his spiritual sphere, outside the visible world, 'whose contrast with the spiritual being constitutes the true Dualism of Zarathustra's doctrine', an achievement parallel to that to which Plato attained 'thanks to his own reflexion, not, as one would suppose, under the influence of Zarathushtra, whose doctrine had long ceased to be understood'. This contrast between spirit and matter is much more pronounced than the widespread, primitive opposition between the world of spirits and the visible environment of man; and it is much more significant than the dualism of good and evil, also a rather common notion, illustrated in Babylonian mythology and elsewhere. This fundamental distinc-

[1] 'Tout savant qui a étudié les gâthâ a vu que les conceptions morales y sont liées à des faits d'ordre économique et social. Mais ce qu'il y faut chercher, ce n'est pas le contraste entre l'agriculteur et le nomade. . . . On est bien plutôt en présence de la vieille opposition des riches et des pauvres, des aristocrates guerriers et des cultivateurs. C'est cette opposition qui, seule, rend compte de l'importance dominante attribuée par le zoroastrisme ancien à la doctrine de la rétribution après la mort.'

tion between spirit and matter, together with the impersonal conception of a God whom no traditional term for 'god' is deemed worthy of designating, is what constitutes the essence of Zoroaster's message.

Wesendonk, moreover, emphasized the fact that Zoroaster, with all his lofty ideals, was no dreamer but had both feet firmly planted on the ground (a phrase already found in Geldner's article in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*). For this combination of high ethical feeling and unsentimental *Tatkraft*, Wesendonk saw in him a representative of the occidental attitude. He went a step farther when he added: 'That uncertain mixture of striving towards the finest Spirituality and the urge to struggle with tangible reality pervades all Europe and perhaps shows itself at its clearest in the German.'[1]

Finally, it is interesting to note that Wesendonk also discussed what we may call the Zervanite theory. The importance of Zervanism had lately been re-emphasized by Junker,[2] Schaeder,[3] and others, perhaps under the stimulus of the theory of an Iranian influence on the Greek religion of Time which Eisler put forward in that fascinating book, *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt*, 1910. The problem of Zervanism was also briefly dealt with in Christensen's *Étude sur le Zoroastrisme de la Perse antique*, 1928, a book chiefly devoted, on the other hand, to establishing a relative chronology of the Yašts, and in his article, 'A-t-il existé une religion zervanite?', *Monde Oriental*, 1931. Two other scholars, about the same time—the late twenties—joined in what amounted to a Zervanite revival in our studies.

Benveniste, in his Ratanbai Katrak lectures delivered in Paris in 1926,[4] distinguished between Zervanism and Mazdeism in the testimonies of the classical authors about Iran. His little book is characterized throughout by a method which in ancient times would have placed him among the χωρίζοντες. Whereas his predecessors, among them Clemen, the editor of the *Fontes religionis*

[1] 'Jenes unsichere Gemisch aus dem Streben zur feinsten Geistigkeit und dem Drang zum Kampf mit der greifbaren Wirklichkeit durchzieht ganz Europa und tritt vielleicht am deutlichsten im Deutschen zutage' (p. 55).

[2] *Ueber den iranischen Ursprung der hellenistischen Aionvorstellung*, 1922.

[3] *Urform und Fortbildungen des manichäischen Systems*, 1927.

[4] Published three years later in an English translation, *The Persian Religion according to the chief Greek Texts.*

persicae, 1920, aimed at harmonizing all the pieces of evidence into one picture, Benveniste kept them apart by postulating as many religions as were deemed necessary. Herodotus bore witness to Iranian paganism, the Achemenian inscriptions to a cult of Auramazda quite untouched by Zoroastrianism (the position already adopted by Meillet); Zoroastrianism was described by Theopompus and Plutarch, who appeared also to have known of Zervanism, which in turn was the object of Strabo's testimony.

The same tendency was to be illustrated, a decade later, in Nyberg's book with the significant title of *Die Religionen* (in the plural) *des alten Iran.*[1] But before we examine Nyberg's contribution in this and other writings, we ought to mention four other books, three of which have a comprehensive character.

Meillet's *Conférences* gave the initial stimulus to Maria Wilkins Smith's *Studies in the Syntax of the Gâthâs of Zarathushtra*, 1929, which, apart from a transliterated text and a word for word translation, set forth a theory of the Amәša Spәntas as 'aspects' of Ahura and 'virtues' of man, mostly along the lines already followed by Hübschmann, *Ein Zoroastrisches Lied*, 1872, and Moulton.

Lommel, in *Die Religion Zarathustras*, 1930, gave a systematic, perhaps too systematic, account of the prophet's doctrine; we shall have occasion to refer to it on two or three special points. Lommel generally discusses the views of his predecessors, without, however, giving precise reference to their works. It was quite the opposite case with another volume published about the same time, L. H. Gray's Ratanbai Katrak lectures, *The Foundations of Iranian Religions*, 1929. In this book the indefatigable editor of the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* aimed at giving an extensive repertory of references to sources, both Iranian and foreign, and to modern interpretations. But it is a collection of little monographs on all the Zoroastrian gods and demons rather than a synthesis. Not that it was lacking in new suggestions, as we shall see when dealing with the Amәša Spәntas.

A. Christensen's *Die Iranier*, 1933 (in the *Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft*) shares the characteristics of both the last-mentioned books in that it gives, like Lommel's book, a comprehensive picture and, like Gray's, precise references to modern

[1] 1937 in Swedish, 1938 in German translation.

studies. But it is too concisely conceived (as required by the collection) to enter into detailed discussions.

To return to Nyberg. In his Paris lectures, 'Questions de Cosmogonie et de Cosmologie mazdéennes', published in the *Journal Asiatique*, 1929 and 1931, the Swedish scholar made a decisive contribution to the study of Zervanism by isolating the Zervanite relics in the Bundahišn. He emphasized both the antiquity of Zervanism and its predominance under the Sassanians. Along the same lines Christensen came to the conclusion that the Sassanids were Zervanites and that only after the Arab conquest did a Mazdean reaction set in with the expurgation from the sacred writings of most of the Zervanite portions.[1]

Nyberg worked for several years at his great book on the religions of ancient Iran. This extremely personal and rather embarrassing pioneer-work is characterized by its making use of ethnographical comparisons and this on two main points. Leaning on the researches of the school of Andrew Lang and Father Schmidt, Nyberg maintained that Iran must have shared with most of the archaic peoples the belief in a great god, who after creating the universe had withdrawn into a state of lofty indifference. Zurvān had been one such god, from very primitive times onwards, especially in the west of Iran. Ahura Mazdāh had been another in the East—well before Zoroaster was born—and in Persia.[2]

Nyberg had something new to say on Zoroaster. This was the second point on which he made use of ethnographical data. Two studies, published simultaneously in 1935, appear to have prompted him to consider Zoroaster in the light of Shamanism. One was an Uppsala dissertation by D. Strömbäck, *Sejd, Textstudier i nordisk religionshistoria*, in which Shamanism was harnessed to the explanation of *seiðr*, viz. soothsaying, in the Old Norse Sagas; the other was an article by the Swiss scholar Meuli on 'Scythica', published in *Hermes*, which interpreted the Scythian custom of bathing in hemp-fumes, as reported by a well-known passage in Herodotus, iv. 75, in the light of modern accounts of Shamanism. In this

[1] *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, 1936 (2nd ed., 1944).

[2] This line of research was soon carried farther by two of Nyberg's disciples, G. Widengren, *Hochgottglaube im alten Iran*, Uppsala, 1938, and S. Wikander, *Vayu*, Uppsala, 1941.

Nyberg saw a clue to the Gāthās: it only remained to look for evidence in them that Zoroaster had been a kind of Shaman.

Moreover, Nyberg combined with this ethnographical point of view a new, bold application of Christensen's analytical method in the hope of reconstructing Zoroaster's historical milieu, the circumstances and phases of his activity. Zoroaster emerged from this study, not as a reformer so much as a defender of the tradition of his Gāthā community against the encroachments of a neighbour tribe, the more revolutionary Mithra community.

It is worth mentioning that another attempt was soon made, partly in protest against Nyberg's, to place Zoroaster in a concrete environment, this time in the full light of the Achemenian court: reviving, after Hertel, the old identification, mentioned by Ammianus Marcellinus, of Vištāspa, Zoroaster's protector, with his namesake the father of Darius, E. Herzfeld, a versatile archaeologist and discoverer of inscriptions, built with amazing obstinacy what appears to us to be little more than a learned novel: *Zoroaster and his World*, Princeton, 1947.

Both attempts were the target of Henning's criticism and witticism in his Ratanbai Katrak lectures.

One should, however, avoid a purely negative attitude, at least as far as Nyberg is concerned. Indeed, Widengren's recent study, 'Stand und Aufgaben der Iranischen Religionsgeschichte', *Numen*, 1955, is largely a vindication of his master's views, in the somewhat watered-down edition given of them in Pedersen's *Illustreret Religionshistorie*, Copenhagen, 1948. It was quite useful, for one thing, to combat the tendency to judge Zoroaster either as a philosopher of the Greek type or as a modern social reformer.

But an even more decisive advance came from another quarter. This is the last trend that remains to be considered in our survey. It may be labelled a revival of comparative mythology. This branch had fallen into discredit about eighty years ago, owing to its own excesses, and yielded to ethnological research, thanks primarily to Andrew Lang. It did not survive into the twentieth century except in the work of two scholars who may be cited as mere curiosities: G. Hüsing, *Die iranische Ueberlieferung und das arische System*, 1909, and *Der Mazdahismus*, 1935 (posthumous), where the moon and several animals are made to explain almost everything; and

J. Hertel, who in a series of studies on *Die arische Feuerlehre*, 1925, &c., saw fire almost everywhere.

It was left for scholars like Lommel, or Güntert in *Der arische Weltkönig und Heiland*, 1923, to revive it by combining it with some of the results of its rival and successor, the ethnological and sociological method. In its new form it did not primarily compare words any more but rather ideas or practices, and it took care, on the other hand, always to distinguish between universal facts which the ethnological investigation had recognized as such, and facts limited to Indo-European peoples and therefore available for reconstruction.

This new method is illustrated in Wikander's maiden book, *Der arische Männerbund*, 1938, in which a sociological and ethnological notion, the *Männerbund*, is applied for the elucidation of an aspect of Iranian religion, that aspect incidentally which Zoroaster rejected.

However, the chief exponent of the method was G. Dumézil. His very first studies, *Le Festin d'immortalité*, 1924, *Le Crime des Lemniennes*, 1924, exhibit the characteristic combination of comparative Indo-European linguistics with socio-ethnology. That he should have been led to adventurous conclusions he was later on to disavow was not due to a faulty method but to his as yet imperfect mastery of it. Be that as it may, these first books of his brought about a sharp reaction on the part of Benveniste in a study, written with the collaboration of L. Renou, *Vr̥tra et Vr̥θraγna, Étude de mythologie indo-iranienne*, 1934, under the motto: 'Mythologie comparée si l'on veut, mais d'abord, mythologie séparée.' The inquiry, based on a sound and thorough appreciation of all the linguistic facts, aimed at reviving the old hypothesis that Vərəθraγna contained as its first member the abstract *vərəθrəm*, not the name of a dragon, Vr̥tra, a purely Vedic development; but it did not do justice to the fact that this god or hero is connected with the theme of dragon-killing, not only in India but also in Iran, though not in the Avesta.

Anyhow, Dumézil pursued the exploration of his new field, where he was soon to strike gold. In 1934 he published *Ouranos-Varuṇa, Étude de mythologie indo-européenne*, in 1935 *Flamen-brahman*. The linguistic comparisons are still debatable, although

supported by considerable factual evidence, and the books may therefore be ranged in Dumézil's preliminary period. They led him to a discovery that was the more valuable as it had not been looked for—the principle of tri-partition in Indo-European society and religion.

The two words dealt with in the first volume are not phonetically identical, although the differences between them are not insurmountable. But if we are to take these in our stride, we must have good reasons in favour of the semantic equivalence.

Previously, comparatists would start from the physical sense, the concrete meaning indicated by the Greek word *οὐρανός* 'sky', and seek to find the same meaning for Varuṇa. This was bound to fail. Dumézil proceeded the other way round. He took as his point of departure the personality of Varuṇa, as a sovereign god, a king-god, a character already well established by Bergaigne and Güntert. It enabled him to harness the myths and rituals about Varuṇa and Indian kingship to the interpretation of the Greek tale concerning Ouranos.

The difference between the Greek legend and the Indian myth can be accounted for: the Indian myth tells of avoided mishap, it is the beginning of a reign; the Greek legend tells of actual mishaps, it is the end of a reign. To quote Dumézil, p. 86, 'the difference is mainly due to the fact that the Ouranos-legend is a tale told by the Greeks, who had lost from the first even the word for king: **reg-*, whereas the Varuṇa legend, in a milieu where the **reg* had survived for some time with his ancient character, remained a living myth, the oral component of the consecration ritual.'

Having thus successfully attacked the problem of Indo-European religion from the social angle, Dumézil then proceeded to elaborate the picture. In his next book, *Flamen-brahman*, he revived an old comparison which is also open to some doubts from the phonetic point of view: we must suppose a slight variation

**bhlagh-men-* ~ **bhlagh-smen-*
brahman- ~ *flamen-*

But the many resemblances in the meaning of the two words strike out mere coincidence: Dumézil drew up, for instance, a considerable list of all the taboos to which the *flamen dialis* and the *brahman*

have to submit themselves: neither may ride on horse-back, draw near to a funeral pyre, &c.

However, it was not until three years after publishing his book *Flamen-brahman* that Dumézil made his most important discovery, when it suddenly occurred to him[1] that the *flamines dialis*, *martialis*, and *quirinalis*, respectively devoted to the three gods Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus, corresponded to the three Indian castes *brahman-* (ruling), *kṣatriya-* (military), and *vaiśya-* (working), and to the legendary division of early Rome into Ramnes, Luceres, and Tities. This indicated an Indo-European tri-partition of society, reflected in religion. Then, in *Mythes et dieux des Germains*, 1938, Dumézil showed that this structure had left traces not only in Italy and India, two domains in which famous coincidences had already been recognized in religious vocabulary, but with the Teutons as well: Oðinn (sovereign god), Thōrr (war god), Freya (fertility, prosperity goddess).

A brilliant confirmation of this was given in Dumézil's next book, *Jupiter Mars Quirinus*, 1941, where a piece of Teutonic mythology and one of Roman pseudo-history were made to illuminate each other.

Teutonic mythology tells of a war between the Ases and the Vanes, at the end of which the latter, defeated, transferred their own gods to the victorious Ases. Now, the gods of the Ases were Oðinn and Thōrr; those of the Vanes were Njörðr, Freyr, and the goddess Freya, so that the conflict appears as a kind of class war between the first two classes and the third one, resulting in the latter's subjection. This is essentially the plot of an episode in Roman prehistory, the Sabine war. The Ramnes, partisans of Romulus (first class) and Luceres (Lucumo, second class), realizing that they lack an essential element, fecundity, fight the third class, the partisans of Titus Tatius, a Sabinian chief, with the result that the Sabine women are transferred to the authority of the chiefs and warriors, thus contributing their share of fecundity and prosperity to the establishment of a complete society.

We have seen so far how Dumézil combined evidence from mythology and ritual (Ouranos–Varuṇa), or from mythology and pseudo-history (war of the Ases and Vanes, rape of the Sabine

[1] See the Preface to the second edition of *Mitra-Varuṇa*, 1947.

women). In another book, *Mitra-Varuṇa*, 1940, he gave a new example of the flexibility of his method, which led him to his second most important discovery. He brought to light fundamentally identical traits about the Luperci (in ritual practice at the end of the year in Rome), the Kentauroi (in more or less poeticized fables in Greece), and the Gandharvas (in Indian legends which do not entirely conceal a background of new-year ritual).

Having thus recognized the Indo-European character of that class of beings, a kind of wild exuberant gang of young dare-devils —at once mythical, ritual, and social—the following is what matters for our knowledge of the system: the Luperci are the exact counterparts of the *flamens*: for instance, the *flamen dialis* may never be naked, the Luperci must always be so; they wear a ring; the *flamen dialis* may only wear one which is open and hollow; the Luperci sacrifice dogs, whereas the *flamens* may neither touch nor name a dog, &c. Now the Luperci are said to have been established by Romulus. Dumézil finds the opposition between Romulus and Numa (the alleged second king of Rome) to be identical with that between Varuṇa and Mithra. The latter opposition had already been pointed out by Güntert:[2] Mithra is the sovereign in his reasoning, clear, regulated, calm, benevolent, sacerdotal aspect. Varuṇa is the sovereign in his combative, inspired, violent, terrible, war-like aspect.[1] In a word, Varuṇa is more of a magician, Mithra more of a jurist; but between these two aspects there is not conflict, there is collaboration: they are the two complementary sides of sovereignty. In the Roman pantheon, the distinction is between Jupiter summanus and Dius fidius.

It has its parallel in Teutonic mythology: besides Oðinn or Wotan there is Tyr or Ziu, the first a violent magician, the second a serene jurist. But we cannot follow all the applications in Roman, Teutonic, or Celtic mythology of the principle of bi-partition of sovereignty. What is important to us is that, together with the tripartition of society, it constituted a key to that most characteristic and puzzling feature of Zoroaster's doctrine: the entities which surround his god Ahura Mazdā[2] and are later known as the

[1] *Der Arische Weltkönig*, p. 123.

[2] Only this spelling remains possible after F. Kuiper's convincing demonstration in *Indo-Iranian Journal*, I (1957), pp. 86 seq.

Immortal Beneficent, Amәša Spənta. This we shall show in our next lecture; it will appear also that, conversely, the elucidation of this Iranian problem was to cast considerable light on the primitive Indo-European system, bringing about a new enrichment of Dumézil's general theory.

III

THE AMƏŠA SPƏNTAS

THE problem of the nature and origin of the Amәša Spәntas has been approached from several angles. Some scholars like Lehmann and Gray tried to derive their abstract meaning from a concrete one; others, notably Darmesteter and Tiele, started from the abstract one and from the affinity of these beings with the Indian Ādityas, an affinity already recognized by Roth.[1] Yet others, with Oldenberg[2] and Pettazzoni,[3] surmised that both groups had a common origin in the planetary system of the Babylonians.

Such were the conflicting hypotheses that had been advanced by the time of Geiger's study, *Die Amәša Spәntas*, 1916. Fourteen years later Lommel still rejected them all: neither the abstract nor the concrete meaning could explain each other; the affinity with the Ādityas was a remote one, for there remained the fact that not a single name was common to both groups; as for the planetary hypothesis, it was quite unfounded. But this negative verdict did not do justice to some particular conjectures which would have been worth mentioning; most of them were cited by Gray in his *Foundations of Iranian Religions*, with a few more of his own.

Moulton had already noted that Vohu Manah 'significantly replaces Mithra as lord of cattle' in the Gāthās, a correspondence which Christensen had also indicated.[4] Gray (p. 35) went farther and advanced the hypothesis that **vohumanah-* was formerly an epithet of Mithra.

Concerning Aša, he was led astray by this entity's frequent association with Ātar into considering it (p. 43) to be the Iranian counterpart of the Vedic Agni. On Xšaθra he made the interesting remark that it was practically an Iranian counterpart of the Vedic Indra. Regarding Haurvatāt and Amәrәtāt, he cited (p. 53)

[1] *ZDMG*, vi. 70.
[2] Ibid. l. 60 seq.
[3] *Studi Ital. di Filolog. Indoeurop.* vii. 3 seq.
[4] *Acta Orientalia*, iv (1926), 102 seq.

Moulton's suggestion that they may have been the Iranian representatives of the Indo-European celestial twins. Of Ārmaiti, 'who clearly appears as an earth-goddess in Y. 47. 3 where Spənta Mainyu creates her to give pasture to kine', he cited (p. 50) Moulton's etymology **ara mātā* 'earth mother', but apparently did not know in time of Wesendonk's article in *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft*, 1929, pp. 61 seq., on *Arəmati- als arische Erdgottheit*, which concluded as follows:

> Therefore Arəmati-, whom Zarathushtra in the Gāthas treats as an abstract force, is nevertheless to be considered an original earth-goddess, although her character had, already with the Indo-Iranians, been overlaid by that of Piety and Devotion. Reminiscences of an Arəmati as an ancient earth-goddess have survived in India at least in traces, whilst a stronger tradition in this respect seems to have existed with the Iranians. It is important for the Zoroastrian method to see how the east-Iranian religious founder employs inherited material, &c.[1]

All this was indeed pointing in the right direction. The ground was prepared for a Dumézil. Nevertheless, the question was then obscured for some time by Nyberg's attractive contention, in his *Religionen des alten Iran*, pp. 87 seq., that the Amәša Spəntas designated collectivities and were to be explained as such: an interpretation which, taking no account of the abstract morphological structure of most of these names, could lead nowhere.

The illumination came when Dumézil, already in possession of his two principles, functional tri-partition and double sovereignty, thought of applying them to the analysis of the Amәša Spəntas, then of comparing these not with the Ādityas but with the list of Mitanni gods. This document, where Mitra, Varuṇa, Indra, and the Nāsatyas are clearly recognizable, had received the beginnings of an elucidation in Christensen's article cited above: this scholar had pointed out the opposition between the first two gods, who were *asuras*, and Indra who was a *dēva*. It remained for Dumézil to

[1] 'So ist die bei Zarathuštra in den Gāthā als eine abstrakte Potenz behandelte Arəmati- doch wohl als eine ursprüngliche Erdgottheit zu betrachten, deren Charakter freilich bei den Indoiraniern bereits von dem der Frömmigkeit und Andacht überwuchert war. Erinnerungen an Arəmati- als alte Erdgöttin haben sich in Indien wenigstens in Spuren erhalten, während bei den Iraniern eine stärkere Überlieferung in diesem Sinne zu sein scheint. Für die zarathustrische Methode ist es von Wichtigkeit zu sehen, wie der ostiranische Religionsstifter ererbtes Gut verwendet, &c.'

generalize the remark in order to obtain a complete justification of the list, and at the same time a clue to the Amәša Spәntas; this can be tabulated as follows:

First function	Varuṇa Mitra	Aša Vohu Manah
Second function	Indra	Xšaθra
Third function	2 Nāsatyas	Haurvatāt Amәrәtāt

Ṛta, the exact equivalent of Aša in Vedic, was notoriously connected with Varuṇa. As for Vohu Manah it is difficult to distinguish it from Aša when they are mentioned separately; but it follows from many passages in which they are named together that Vohu Manah bears the same relationship to Aša as Mithra does to Varuṇa, as Dius fidius to Jupiter summanus, &c. I shall presently try to show this in detail. Moreover, it will be seen that the affinity of Vohu Manah with Mithra, as pointed out by Moulton, Christensen, and Gray, is thus safeguarded.

Xšaθra, already connected with Indra by Gray, is shown to have in Iran itself an affinity with the warrior class: among the Ossetes there is an adjective representing **kṣatraka* that designates this class, corresponding to Skr. *kṣatriya*.

The couple Haurvatāt–Amәrәtāt corresponds to the Nāsatyas or Aśvins, as Moulton had seen, not only as patrons of health and longevity, but even in their myths. The angels Harūt and Marūt, representing in the Qur'ān and in Jewish literature Haurvatāt and Amәrәtāt, as their names clearly show, are actors in an adventure, the seduction of a woman, &c., which bears a close resemblance to one of the myths relating to the Nāsatyas in India.

Such was the substance of Dumézil's book, *Naissance d'Archanges*, the first idea of which was conceived one evening in February 1945 and which appeared a few months later. He was later to find an illustration of his system, as far as the Vedic gods were concerned, on a Luristan cylinder.[1] As for the Amәša Spәntas, two of them remained unexplained: Spәnta Mainyu and Ārmaiti. Their elucidation was the subject of another book, *Tarpeia*, published in 1947.

Dumézil showed that Ārmaiti is in some instances the equivalent

[1] See *Revue Hittite et Asianique*, 1950, pp. 18 seq.

of the Iranian goddess Anāhitā, who in turn has for an Indian counterpart the river goddess Sarasvatī. In support of this, Lommel showed in his contribution to the *Festschrift Weller*, 1954, pp. 405 seq., that the name Arədvī Sūrā Anāhitā was probably made up of three epithets of a **Haravhatī*. On the other hand, each of the three epithets expresses the relationship of the goddess with one of the three functions: *arədvī* 'humid' (third), *sūrā* 'strong' (second), *anāhitā* 'immaculate, pure' (first).

As to Spənta Mainyu and his evil counterpart Aka or Ahra Mainyu, Dumézil compares them with the two Vāy of Pahlavī books, the good and the bad wind, who come first in everything, and to Vayu who is expressly stated to have a good aspect (and implicitly a bad one), is the first incarnation of Vərəθraγna, and who presides over the entrance to the hereafter. Similarly, the good and the bad spirits stand at the origin of things.

Symmetrically, Ātar 'Fire', comes at the end, as Agni does in India. These features are older than the Indo-Iranian period, since they have their counterpart in Rome, with Janus as a double-faced beginner and Vesta at the end. Our results so far may be tabulated as follows:

Janus bifrons	Double Vāyu	Spənta—Aka Mainyu
Jupiter Dius fidius	Varuṇa Mitra	Aša Vohu Manah
Mars	Indra	Xšaθra
Quirinus	2 Nāsatyas	Haurvatāt/Amərətāt
	Sarasvatī	Ārmaiti
Vesta	Agni	Ātar

But Dumézil made yet further applications of his method, one of which in his book *Aryaman*, 1949. In India Aryaman is often associated with Mitra, not with Varuṇa, so that he may be said to belong to the Mitra half of sovereignty. Exactly the same relationship is attested in Iran, if we bear in mind that Vohu Manah is the Gāthic counterpart of Mithra, in the famous prayer Y. 54, the first lines of which can be thus rendered:

> Let the dear Airyaman come for support
> of Zarathushtra's men and women,
> for support from Vohu Manah.

Besides, Aryaman is in the Veda a patron of marriage, in the Avesta, of healing: the Wise Lord asks him for help against all diseases. In compliance, Aryaman performs the ceremony of *gaomaēza*, which consists of drawing drills and digging holes according to a set pattern, then pouring out bull's water and washing oneself therein. In the Vedas, the Angirases, a class of mythical priests, had received from the god a wonder-cow, but they did not know how to milk it. It was Aryaman who showed them how to do it, thus becoming a benefactor to the mass of the people.

This last characteristic is borne out by his very name, which is transparent: Aryaman is the patron of Aryanity, of all Aryans.

This study of Aryaman was in turn to throw new light upon the nature of the Ādityas, of whom he is one. For it dawned upon Dumézil, at this stage of his research, that perhaps all of them had, like Varuṇa, Mitra, and Aryaman, something to do with the function of sovereignty. He accordingly set himself to elucidate in *Les Dieux des Indo-Européens*, 1952, pp. 54 seq., the relationship of each of the Ādityas to either aspect of this function. Both Aryaman and Bhaga proved to be associates of Mitra, the former specialized in the maintenance of the people, the latter in the distribution of riches; each of them had a Varuṇian counterpart in Dakṣa and Aṃśa.

It only remained to look for their equivalents in Iran. Although neither Aryaman nor Bhaga was known to the Gāthās, their place was occupied there by two entities, resulting from their transmutation in the ethical system of Zoroaster: Sraoša 'Obedience, Discipline' and Aši 'Retribution'. Only Dakṣa and Aṃśa, the Varuṇian counterparts of Aryaman and Bhaga, seem to have no opposite numbers in Iran, but this has little importance since they seem at any rate to be artificial creations: Varuṇa had, indeed, no need for associates of this kind, being more remote from the world than Mitra.

On the other hand, Dumézil in his paper on 'Viṣṇu et les Maruts', *Journal Asiatique*, 1953, pp. 1 seq., proved another Indian god to have been sublimated into the Zoroastrian system. Viṣṇu's name, whatever its etymology, seems to have been understood as containing the prefix *vi-*, meaning 'dispersion', and replaced by the more moral, more regular Rašnu.

In support of this kind of explanation we may here adduce two parallels. One is the well-known creation of post-vedic *sura-* 'god', notoriously built on an analysis of *asura-* into *a-sura-*. This new creation took place when *asura-* had assumed a distinctly unfavourable meaning. It is thus closely parallel to the transformation of Viṣṇu when this god was regarded in Iran as too multifarious, too versatile to be safely accepted into the Zoroastrian system.

The other parallel is to be found in Barr's explanation of Av. *drəgu-*, *driγu-* in *Studia Orientalia Pedersen*, 1953, pp. 21 seq., as a positive counterpart, formed by Zoroaster, of an inherited **adrigu-* (Skr. *ádhrigu-*). This is only an hypothesis, not a fact as in the case of *a-sura-*, but Barr might have invoked the latter in support of it. We might in conclusion tabulate the three instances as follows:

Iran	India
**Višnu-* > *Rašnu-*	
**adrigu-* > *drigu-*	*asura-* > *sura-*

The principle of tri-partition found a final application in the elucidation of the *fravašis*.[1] The relation of this important and previously obscure notion to the second function was perceived simultaneously by Dumézil in his above-mentioned paper and by Kaj Barr whose contribution to the *Festskrift Hammerich*, 1952, *Irans profet som teleios anthropos*, can be summarized as follows. In a Dēnkart passage (vii, Madan, p. 600, ll. 20 seq.) we read that, in order to form Zoroaster, the perfect man—who, it was said elsewhere, assumed in his person the three classes—priest, warrior, and husbandman—the union of three elements was necessary, namely, the *x^{v}arr*, the *fravahr*, and the *tan gohr*. The latter's meaning is obvious: 'corporeal substance'. In his interpretation of the other two, Barr depended on Bailey's important remarks in *Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth Century Books*, Ratanbai Katrak lectures published in 1943, pp. 1 and 109 seq., but with some alteration of what is said there about the *x^{v}arr*: whereas Bailey renders the term as 'riches', Barr stresses the fact that these are riches received from heaven, 'al god gave som kommer ovenfra', and translates accordingly 'divine benediction'. I should propose

[1] To say nothing of those pointed out by Benveniste, *Journal Asiatique*, 1938, pp. 529 seq., and J. D.-G., *Anthropologie religieuse*, 1955, p. 97.

a more concrete 'heavenly favour'. Anyhow, the *x^{v}arr* is the appanage of kings, of rulers, the blazon of sovereignty: it represents, therefore, in the formation of the person of Zoroaster, the part of the first function. Since the third one, which has to do with nourishment and subsistence, is obviously represented by *tan zohr*, there remains only the second to correspond to the *fravahr*. The latter was for a long time misinterpreted by our scholars, but Bailey showed that the native tradition had already distorted the meaning of this term by seeing in it, through etymology, either the notion of choice or that of nourishment or growth. The word appears actually to belong to the root of *vərəθra-* 'defence, resistance', and to be akin to Middle-Persian *gurt* 'hero', a fact that throws light upon the names of Φραόρτης, Fravṛtiš, literally 'eminent hero'. The conception that applied this term to the manes (India's *pítaraḥ*) is that of a defensive, protective force emanating from a ruler, even after his death. This originally aristocratic notion seems to have been vulgarized, as in late classical Greece where everyone after death is a hero, or in Egypt where everyone is an Osiris. Every man, at least every just man, had his *fravaši*, that is to say, possessed, beyond death, a protective force. This force, it should be noted, did not exert itself in his favour, as would that of a guardian angel, but to the benefit of those who invoked it.

On the other hand, this force that survives the deceased person must already have existed when he was alive: it is sometimes an equivalent of the soul, *urvan-*, Y. 26. 7. (More frequently, a distinction is made between the two terms.) The *fravaši* came ultimately to be conceived as pre-existent: Y. 24. 5 cites 'the *fravašis* of the dead, of the living and of the unborn'.

In the Dēnkart text analysed by Barr, the *fravahr*'s relationship with the second function is confirmed by one particular of the legend: it is in the form of a hōm-plant that Zoroaster's mother had absorbed the *fravahr* of the child to be born. It is a well-known fact that the haoma was related to the cult of Mithra—the Iranian substitute for Indra—in other words to an essentially warlike cult.

Despite Dumézil's publications, and the adhesion of such a prudent scholar as Barr, for instance, scepticism is still current in many quarters as to the possibility of explaining the Amәša Spәntas.

H. H. Schaeder could excusably write in 1940 (*Corona*, ix. 575 seq.) that they were chiefly *ein Stilmittel* and that it was therefore contrary to the style of the Gāthās to try and extract dogmatic statements from the often quite haphazard context in which such and such a power of God was named. But W. Lentz, as late as 1954 in his study of *Yasna 28, kommentierte Übersetzung und Kompositions-Analyse*, still contends that if one does try to characterize each of the entities, one is bound to come to conflicting conclusions. For instance, he easily triumphs over Barr and Benveniste (p. 963) by quoting them successively on Aša: 'Aša', writes Barr in his paper on *drəgu* (p. 40, note), 'seems to dispose of the necessary strength to enforce authority on those who will not surrender to the new order of pastoral life. Thus it comes about that Aša has the *aoǰah*, the physical strength. . . . It is no doubt significant that . . . it is Aša that gives vigorous support (*aoǰōŋhvaṯ rafənō*) to overcome the hostile (Y. 28. 6)'; on the other hand, Benveniste wrote in his *Infinitifs Avestiques*, p. 78: 'We shall see it shape itself into a purely passive notion. Far from being able to help man, this entity needs their support.'[1] But may not one only of either statements be based on a careful analysis of the texts?

Lentz nevertheless proceeds by quoting Dumézil's comment on the last quoted passage, that *aoǰōŋhvaṯ rafənō* could equally be related to Vohu Manah or to Aša.

Dumézil is also criticized by Gershevitch, who writes[2] that Aša's role in Y. 29. 3 is too uncertain to serve as chief argument for Dumézil's theory on the functions of the Amәša Spəntas and then offers a rather desperate translation of his own. But even admitting that stanza 3 provided the chief support for the theory, namely, that Aša does not heed the needs of men, it was not the only one: there is still stanza 6 with its clear second line to confirm it: *nōiṯ aēvā ahū vistō naēdā ratuš ašāṯciṯ hačā* 'Indeed not a lord, nor yet a judge has been found in accordance with Righteousness' (Maria Smith's translation). The question needs therefore to be re-examined.

Before we proceed to do this, however, I ought to mention

[1] 'Nous la verrons se constituer en notion purement passive. Loin de pouvoir aider les hommes, cette entité a besoin de leur secours.'

[2] In a review of my *Hymns of Zarathushtra* in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Soc.*, 1952, p. 174.

Lentz's theory that the Gāthās had no linear continuity, that they presented only arbitrary recurrences of several themes, like Hāfiz's Odes or Mossadeq's speeches—which is, I venture to submit, tantamount to chaos. We must wait until Lentz, who has analysed only Y. 47 and 28 so far, has dealt in the same manner with the fifteen remaining poems. Meanwhile, each time we show a logical sequence between any two or more successive stanzas we shall raise an innocent obstacle on the path of our learned colleague's demonstration.

Thus the Amәša Spәntas present themselves in their hierarchical order in the following passages.

Y. 45, the most didactic of all, gives in the last three stanzas a sort of synopsis: stanzas 8: Mainyu and Aša; 9: Aša, Vohu Manah, Xšaθra; 10: the same plus Ārmaiti, Haurvatāt, and Amərətāt.

Towards the beginning of the same poem, we had, more simply (as I already pointed out in *BSOAS*, 1950): stanzas 2: the two Mainyu; 4: Aša, Vohu Manah, Ārmaiti; 5: Vohu Manah, Haurvatāt, Amərətāt.

Y. 44 offers a simpler sequence, both towards the end: stanzas 14 and 15: Aša; 16 Vohu Manah; 17 Haurvatāt and Amərətāt; and at the beginning: stanzas 3: Aša; 4: Vohu Manah.

A last remark before we try to discriminate between Aša and Vohu Manah. Dumézil has rightly insisted on a circumstance that makes the demonstration a delicate one. Even if we knew for certain that Zoroaster did know and adopt a hierarchy of entities reflecting the hierarchy of gods, we could hardly expect him simply to propound this system, for he must have been anxious above all to express the subordination of them all to the Wise Lord. Distinctions were thus apt to be abolished. For instance, whereas in Y. 33. 12 Aša gives *hazō āmavaṯ* 'strong aggressive power', and Vohu Manah *fsəratūm* 'refreshment', the two statements are, so to speak, telescoped in Y. 43. 4 'through the heat of fire which increases Aša (or: increases through Aša) comes the aggressive power of Vohu Manah'. In 49. 7 Aša and Vohu Manah are interchangeable: '(The soul) shall hear through Aša (respectively: Vohu Manah).' Y. 53. 3 tells of union with all three members of the Triad: *manaŋhō ašahyā mazdåsčā taibyō dāṯ sārəm*. It is union with Aša and

Vohu Manah that enables Ahura Mazdā to act, 45. 9: 'May the Wise Lord, through the intimacy of Aša and Vohu Manah, prosper our cattle and our men.' The same three come together, 33. 7; in 48. 11 Ārmaiti, Vohu Manah, and Xšaθra are called; similarly, Vohu Manah and Aša are named in one breath with other entities: 33. 3, 49. 7, 12; 50. 1, 48. 12.

Here is now the evidence, classified under six headings, of the distinction between Aša and Vohu Manah.

(*a*) Y. 28. 8. Ahura Mazdā (the Best One) is in accord with Best Aša, whilst man asks for Vohu Manah. 43. 2: 'The wonders of Vohu Manah which thou (Ahura Mazdā) wilt give through Aša.' 46. 12: 'Men were born, through Aša, who prosper living things by the zeal of Ārmaiti; the Wise Lord shall unite them to Vohu Manah.' 53. 5: 'people should vie in Aša for the possession of Vohu Manah.'

Aša and Vohu Manah are not interchangeable. Man may, it is true, possess Aša, 46. 15, *šyaoθanāiš ašəm xšmaibyā daduyē* 'You have secured for yourselves Aša', but this does not happen through Vohu Manah.

(*b*) In Y. 29 it is clear, however we translate 3a, that as long as only Aša is involved (stanzas 2, 3, and 6) there is no remedy for the ox's distress; then, the invocation of Vohu Manah in stanza 8 is the turning-point of the drama: 'Whom hast thou who with Vohu Manah may take care of us two for men' (Gershevitch's own translation, *JRAS*, 1952, p. 174): the solution is found. As Barr remarks, the irresponsive attitude of Aša so far may refer especially to the past. For as soon as the name of Zoroaster is put forward Aša becomes active: stanza 10, *yūžəm aēibyō ahurā aogō dātā ašā xšaθrəmčā avaṯ vohū manaŋhā* . . . 'Do you for them, O Lord, give strength through Aša and that measure of xšaθra through Vohu Manah . . .'. Even then, in Barr's words: 'It is no doubt significant that Mazdā is asked to give strength through Aša and xšaθra through Vohu Manah.'[1]

Y. 30. 8, the Xšaθra will be conferred by Vohu Manah upon those who have delivered evil into Aša's hands. The latter also in 44. 14, see below.

[1] Similarly Y. 33. 12, seen above.

Y. 32. 9, the ox complains to Aša (as in 29) because the bad rulers oppose Vohu Manah.

Y. 33. 5, whilst the straight paths are from Aša (*ašāṯ*), the Xšaθra is of, or from, Vohu Manah (*vaŋhəuš manaŋhō*). Similarly 31. 10, the master or lord is *ašāvan*, whilst the farmer is of, or from, Vohu Manah.

Y. 46. 7, through the deeds of Vohu Manah the fire Aša is realized. Y. 50. 9, Aša is praised through the deeds of Vohu Manah.

Aša is alone in charge of justice. One wishes it to be *aojōŋhvaṯ* at the time of retribution (43. 12); Y. 44. 14: 'Shall I deliver evil in the hands of Aša?' Y. 51. 10: 'Aša do I call to me to bring good reward.' But to deserve the latter one has to perform deeds of Vohu Manah (34. 13/14) which give Haurvatāt and Amərətāt (45. 5).

(*c*) In the questions on creation, Y. 44. 3 and 4, only Aša is named in stanza 3, in connexion with the sun, moon, and stars; then, in stanza 4, where only Vohu Manah is invoked, we obviously descend to a lower level. It is true that a reference seems still to be made to the sky: 'Who set firmly the earth below,' *nabåscā avapastōiš*, 'and the *nabah-*, that it shall not fall?' But this sky has obviously more to do with the wind and clouds, mentioned farther on, than with the luminaries. It is nearer to the earth, so near that it might fall upon it: it is the atmosphere (*Luftraum* in Bartholomae). Vohu Manah's domain is thus clearly inferior to that of the more remote Aša.

(*d*) Y. 46. 18, Zoroaster makes promise to men through Vohu Manah but strives to satisfy the Wise Lord through Aša.

(*e*) Y. 46. 2 is quite clear: 'Teach through Aša the possession of Vohu Manah.'

Y. 34. 7 and 8 require a discussion. We read in 7a, 'Where will your faithful be in possession of Vohu Manah?' 7c is at first sight ambiguous: *naēčim tām anyəm yūšmāṯ vaēdā ašā aθā nå θrāzdūm* 'I know none other but you . . .; then save us . . .'. Where does *ašā* belong? Stanza 8 gives the clue: *yōi nōiṯ ašəm mainyantā aēibyō dūirē vohū as manō* 'They who have not known Aša, far from them is Vohu Manah'. The sentence in the preceding stanza will accordingly be rendered: 'I know none other but you through Aša; then save us.' The same opposition between knowledge and possession is illustrated farther on, stanza 12c, *sīšā nå ašā paθō vaŋhāuš*

xᵛaētāng manaŋhō 'Teach us through Aša the easy paths of Vohu Manah'; and continued in 13a: 'That way of Vohu Manah, well made by Aša itself.'

Y. 48. 3 is puzzling: 'The best of doctrines which the beneficent Lord teaches through Aša . . . knowing through the strength of Vohu Manah the secret doctrines.'

Y. 33. 5, the straight paths are in accordance with Aša (*ašāṯ ā*).

One should learn Aša, 43. 12. At the same time, it is Vohu Manah, as being more accessible, that one consults in order to know what it is proper to know according to Aša, 44. 8: 'That . . . which I ask through Vohu Manah and which it is proper to know according to Aša.' Or, a little farther on, stanza 13, people are reproached for neither following Aša nor taking counsel with Vohu Manah.

When only one of the two entities is named, it is said that man follows Aša (34. 2), strives towards Aša (28. 4), maintains Aša (31. 7, 43. 1, 46. 2), delivers evil unto Aša (44. 14, quoted above), consults Aša (51. 10), calls for him (48. 11). But it is Vohu Manah that comes: 28. 6, 43. 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 44. 1, 46. 3, 49. 1. Similarly, 51. 16, in two stanzas where both entities are involved, Vohu Manah appears to be the normal approach to Aša: 'Vīštāspa in the ways of Vohu Manah has attained the doctrine which the Wise Lord has conceived through Aša.'

Y. 50. 6, 'To me Zarathushtra, the prophet and sworn friend of Aša, may the creator . . . show, through Vohu Manah, his precepts, that they may be the path of my tongue.'

(*f*) Y. 48. 6: 'The Wise Lord through Aša makes the plants to grow for Ārmaiti and the latter with Vohu Manah gives strength to men.' Similarly, Aša gives fecundity in Y. 33. 11 and 43. 16. On the other hand, it is through Vohu Manah that Ahura Mazdāh furthers one's living possessions, 46. 13, so that there is no difference between Aša and Vohu Manah with regard to fecundity.

Yet, other differences still are discernible:

A man's Vohu Manah is on a level with his deeds and words: 33. 14. There is no mention of a man's Aša;

with *šyaoθana* 'deeds' (or with *uxda*), Vohu Manah is in the genitive (so is Ārmaiti), whereas Aša is in the instrumental;

ašāṯ appears ten times (with or without *hačā*), whereas we

have only one occurrence of *akāṯ manaŋhō* (47. 5), *vaŋhāuš manaŋhō* (50. 1), *mainyāuš vahištāṯ* (33. 6), *xšaθrāṯ* (32. 2.).

All this confirms Aša's relative remoteness as compared with Vohu Manah's proximity to man.

On Xšaθra and the pair Haurvatāt–Amərətāt we shall not repeat Dumézil's demonstration that they belonged respectively to the second and third functions. About Ārmaiti, who was polyvalent, we may add one remark.

Among all the passages where she is associated with several entities, there is a curious one that might be called the Election (by the Lord) of Ārmaiti. Says the Lord, who is already in company of Vohu Manah, Xšaθra and Aša, to all the beings who beg for his bliss: 'Your beneficent, good Ārmaiti do we choose; she shall be ours.' Is it not perhaps from then on that Ārmaiti is counted among the Aməsa Spəntas?

There are no less than three passages where her absence is conspicuous: thus in the last stanza of Y. 29 where Aša, Vohu Manah, and Xšaθra are invoked: *kudā ašəm vohučā manō xšaθrəmčā*. The close resemblance of phrasing brings out the contrast with 51. 4: *kuθrā yasō hyən ašəm kū spəntā ārmaitiš | kuθrā manō vahištəm kuθrā θwā xšaθrā*. . . .

Now the absence of Ārmaiti is not peculiar to one stanza of 29: she is lacking in the whole poem. Would it be too rash to conclude that, when Zoroaster composed this hymn, where Barr has found an allusion to Aša's former total aloofness, Ārmaiti had not yet been integrated to the system? She was not indispensable, since all the functions were already provided for. Even after she was integrated, as in Y. 31 (stanza 12), she seems to be superfluous and for that reason omitted when Haurvatāt and Amərətāt, the entities of fecundity, are named: so in stanzas 6 and 21 of the same hymn.

There is only one other hymn, Y. 50, from which Ārmaiti is absent. Nothing prevents us from supposing that both hymns, Y. 29 and 50, were more ancient than the rest of our collection.

Zoroaster's system, if it abolished all the ancient gods, did not leave vacant the places they had occupied in the world or in the

people's minds: their respective functions, half cosmic, half human, were now strictly subordinated to the new god. In a way Zoroaster not so much innovated as restored the traditional hierarchy, which a certain form of cult, encouraged by certain rulers, had deranged. These war-like rulers, who, 'to please the people', like fabulous Yima, sacrificed bulls and distributed their flesh, were to be held in check. The restored hierarchy ensured protection to the herdsman, and generally to all non-violent people, under the just sway of a beneficent prince.

The one god—the model of this earthly ruler, or his sublimation—was born, if I may anticipate the subject of our next lecture, from a realization that the Lord of Justice was one with the deity that 'took care'. The Lord was *spənta* 'beneficent'. Since he was also identical with Spənta Mainyu, the creative spirit, he was, so to speak, three gods rolled into one, the counterpart, all to himself, of *Varuṇa, Mithra, and Vāyu. The other entities were related to him, though not quite so tightly, for while he *was* Aša, Vohu Manah, Spənta Mainyu (the Triad), he merely *possessed* the other: *his* was Ārmaiti, *his* was Xšaθra, *his* were Haurvatāt and Amərətāt, &c.

Thus were all the functions of the old gods either submitted to him or absorbed into him. But only the better half of each was so retained. For the Lord, who was just and good and creative, could have nothing to do with what was wrong, evil, or destructive.

His adversaries were conceived as essentially negative: another major point in Zoroaster's system. Over against life there was non-life; truth or righteousness had for its opposite lie and deceit; to the beneficent spirit was opposed the destructive or evil one; to the good mind the bad one; to Ārmaiti Tarōmaiti, &c. Therefore nothing ought to be expected from them or asked from them. The chief error, the capital sin, was to render them a cult in the hope of placating or propitiating them.

It lay in everyone's power to separate himself from those who did sacrifice to them. Everyone had, moreover, the duty of opposing them, of combating them until they were annihilated and the Lord held sway over them all.

IV

THE GREAT GOD AND ZOROASTER'S SYSTEM

IN order to endorse Henning's contention that Zoroaster's religion was 'a protest against monotheism', we should at least be entitled to affirm that the religion into which he was born was monotheistic. If so, who was the only or supreme god? Was it Ahura Mazdā, or Zurvān, or another?

To deal first with Ahura Mazdā, our answer will depend on our proving his existence independently of the Zoroastrian tradition. Now since our only evidence of him outside the Avesta[1] is to be found in the Achemenian inscriptions, we must examine the question whether the Achemenids were Zoroastrians.

Here I must confess, in Moulton's words (*Early Zoroastrianism*, p. 56), to not a few pendulum swings from one side to the other. In my *Zoroastre* eight years ago I reluctantly concluded after many hesitations that a religion of the great Ahura Mazdā had probably existed in Iran prior to Zoroaster. I did not discuss the matter again four years later in my *Ormazd et Ahriman*. But I have since been impressed by arguments, new at least to me, put forward respectively by Barr and Tavadia, to the effect that Ahura Mazdā was Zoroaster's own invention (or discovery). Lately, the case for the negative was again made, without reference to the two last-named scholars, by G. Widengren in his well-documented *Stand und Aufgaben der iranischen Religionsgeschichte*, pp. 86 seq., so that we feel obliged to submit the whole question to an agonizing reappraisal.

There are several points on which the Achemenian religion appears to have differed from Zoroastrianism, either by omission or by divergences.

[1] Apart from the alleged *Assara mazaš* in the Assurbanipal tablets, now convincingly shown by Ungnad, *Orient. Liter. Zeit.*, 1943, cols. 193 seq., to have nothing to do with the Iranian god.

First the omissions:

1. There is nothing typically Zoroastrian in the picture Herodotus draws of the Persian religion. This argument, put forward by Widengren, is hardly conclusive, as Herodotus may very well have described a popular, archaic state of things in contradistinction to official innovations.

2. The prophet is not named in the inscriptions, but we might fairly say with Moulton (p. 48) that this is no stranger than the omission of Paul's name in an historical rescript by some pious medieval king, perpetually ascribing his triumphs to the grace of 'God and Our Lady', but silent about the Apostles, to whose writings he would of course attribute the whole of his religious belief. This parallel did not convince Casartelli, however.

3. The term *spənta*, so important in Zoroaster's reform, is lacking, although it did exist in Old Persian, as attested later in arm. *Sandaramet* and 'Cappadocian' *Sondara*. One might answer that texts essentially political in character must not be expected to reflect even important details of religious nomenclature.

4. Ahra Mainyu is not named. This may be due to the fact that in the Gāthās and perhaps for some time to come the name of the Evil Spirit had not yet crystallized; moreover, the king may not have felt obliged to mention the Devil; lastly, there is frequent reference if not to *druǰ*-, at least to a fair equivalent thereof, allowing for the dialectal difference, *draŋga*-. This proves the existence of some sort of dualism, roughly comparable to that of the Gāthās, if less marked than that of the later Avesta.

5. None of the entities, so characteristic of the Gāthic doctrine, is named, except, by Xerxes, Arta. *Xšaṣṣa* has no eschatological meaning. *Vasan*- and *šiyāti*-, adduced by Moulton as equivalents of Vohu Manah and Haurvatāt, would be very loose renderings indeed. Thus, the Gāthic system is reflected, if at all, in a very attenuated form.

6. Hardly any of the many commandments of the *fravarāne* creed is mentioned except, in the Xerxes' inscription, that of fighting the *daēva* and their worshippers. The Achemenian kings must have had their own way of adhering to the Zoroastrian religion!

As for the divergences:

1. Darius uses *pat*- and *mar*- in their non-*daēvic* meaning 'to

fall' and 'to die'. But it is only in the later Avesta, not in the Gāthās, that these verbs have a *daēvic* value.

2. The same applies to the omission of *yazata-*. But the inscriptions, moreover, use *baga-* in the generic sense of 'god': this is alien to the whole Avesta, but may simply reflect a dialectal divergence.

3. The only word for priest in the inscriptions is *magu-*, which appears only once in the (later) Avesta. But it seems somehow connected with genitive *magavan-*: either it was a popular form of it (Schaeder, *OLZ*, 1940, c. 375), or both words were derived from the same root. Whatever the reasons for the almost complete avoidance of *magu-* in the Avesta, they may have been lacking with the Medes and Persians.

4. *brazmaniya-* of the Xerxes' inscription has no counterpart in the Avesta. It was a survival from the Indo-Iranian period, as proved by Skr. *brahman-* (to say nothing of lat. *flamen*). This is undoubtedly an archaic trait, untouched by the Zoroastrian reform.

5. So were the practices of burying kings in caves or monuments and offering sacrifices in their honour (cf. Widengren, pp. 56–57). This brings us to sacrifice, especially blood sacrifice. Well attested with the Achemenids, it was condemned by Zoroaster, but it was apparently difficult to extirpate for it is not only praised in the Avesta, but actually ordered, in its more modest form—the sacrifice of sheep—by so orthodox a king as Šāpūr I (*Kaʿaba*, ll. 19 seq. of the Parthian version). Thus, only the Gāthic doctrine, not the later one, is violated by the Achemenids.

The same is true of their belief that Auramazdā was not the only god, but merely the greatest of all. This does not contradict the Avesta, from the Yasna haptaŋhāiti onwards, where polytheism is conspicuous.

Nevertheless, it would seem easier to think that the Achemenids had never heard of Zoroaster and his reform. But we have only seen one aspect of the problem. Let us look at the other.

1. If Darius and Xerxes were not Zoroastrians, then there must have come a time when Zoroastrianism was adopted in Persia: this must have occurred not later than 441, when, according to Hildegarde Lewy and H. S. Taqizadeh's independent and converging calculations, the Zoroastrian calendar came into force.

Now if the two religions were so widely apart as to prevent our deriving the Achemenian from the Zoroastrian, the adoption of the latter by, say, Artaxerxes I must have been something like a revolution. How is it, then, that there is not the slightest record of this alleged conversion? The only new religious fact of which we hear, namely, the cult of Mithra and Anāhitā, would prove, if anything, that Artaxerxes II was moving away from the pure doctrine of the prophet.

Or will it be said that the adoption of Zoroastrianism by the Achemenids was a gradual process? But then, if Zoroastrianism was thus susceptible of gradual adoption, why not admit that Darius already embraced it in some attenuated form?

2. Another objection is derived from the name of Ahura Mazdā. It is not that its Old Persian form as a fixed compound (except in one repeated occurrence in Xerxes) is obviously 'later' than its Gāthic counterparts, for linguistic evolution may proceed at a different pace in different dialects; but the name does look, with its abstract second part, as if it had been coined, or at least selected, by the same mind that conceived the system of abstract entities subordinated to this god, in other words by Zoroaster. In favour of this, K. Barr produces two further arguments in his recent book *Avesta* (in Danish), 1955.

First he remarks (p. 37) that:

> Zarathushtra did not let pass any of the old Aryan god-names. It would be surprising if, to name the Godhead who, in the form given to him for ever in the Gāthās, was so much his own conception, he had picked up a designation in the pagan pantheon which he had thoroughly condemned.

Then, in the more technical notes at the end of the volume Barr analyses the name as follows (p. 208):

> In the Gāthās, Ahura and Mazdāh are not always used indifferently. In the profession of faith Y. 27. 13 Zarathushtra realizes for Mazdāh the acts of Vohu Manah and for Ahura the Dominion. Mazdāh is the Godhead that watches, as a Providence, over the welfare of the pastoral people, whereas Ahura is the Lord who holds sway over it. . . . Mazdāh must designate 'one who takes heed of things', an attribute which qualifies the omnipotent Ahura as the one who vigilantly keeps an eye on everything, examines and takes care of everything. The same charac-

teristic is expressed in Y. 45. 4: 'The Lord who sees all.' But he is also, as were the old gods Mitra and Varuṇa, the Lord who cannot be deceived. As Lord, Ahura, and as Providence, Mazdāh, Zarathushtra's Godhead is a sublimation of the old sovereign-gods Varuṇa and Mitra.

One could invoke against this the convincing interpretation given of Plutarch's (*Ad principem*) Μεσορομάσδης by S. Wikander, *Orientalia Suecana*, I, as composed of *Missa*+*Auramazda*. For if Mithra were already included, so to speak, in Auramazda, how could he once more come to be associated with him? It may be replied that by the time Ahura Mazdā reached Persia, his double origin had been forgotten, so that he could now without pleonasm enter into a new association with Mithra—or more precisely, with the latter's local form, Missa.

3. One of the names, perhaps the most frequent one, by which the Zoroastrians designated themselves was *mazdayasna-*. Now would they have chosen this word, as Lommel among others observes,[1] unless Mazdā was peculiar to their religion? It is true that Nyberg[2] meant to reverse the argument by saying that the Medic variant of the word, **mazdayazna*,[3] proved the existence of an independent cult of Mazdā in the West. But it may be replied that this form was the natural, automatic transposition of the Avestan into Median. So the argument subsists.

4. A final argument in favour of the Zoroastrianism of the Achemenids is adduced by Tavadia, without any express reference to predecessors.[4] If Ahura Mazdā had already been adored in pagan Iran, one would surely expect a Yašt in his honour after the pattern of the old, genuine ones (to Mithra, Anāhitā, Tištrya, &c.). 'The fact that there was none must be considered conclusive for the non-existence of an Iranian god called Ahura or Mazdā or both as the model for Zarathushtra. The argument that it must have been purposely destroyed cannot be taken seriously.' Indeed, why should the authors of the Yašts have destroyed it, only to find themselves obliged, in order to fill an obvious gap in the collection, to concoct the actual colourless, miserable Ormazd Yašt?

[1] *Die Religion Zarathustras*, p. 16.
[2] *Die Religionen des alten Iran*, p. 342.
[3] See Hartmann, *OLZ*, 1937, c. 157.
[4] 'Zoroastrian and Pre-Zoroastrian, *à propos* of the Researches of Dumézil', *Journal of the Bombay Royal Asiatic Soc.*, 1953, p. 175.

To sum up, we now feel compelled to believe that the Achemenids, starting with Darius, were Zoroastrians—in their own way. The considerable differences we have pointed out will be accounted for partly as the result of the evolution of the Gāthic doctrine since Zoroaster's death, partly as its deliberate adaptation, on the part of Darius, to the needs of his composite empire.

That the doctrine of Zoroaster did not come down the centuries unaltered is apparent from the later Avesta. The form in which it reached Persia, probably carried by the Median Magi, may have partly coincided with the Avestan picture, namely, as far as concessions to polytheism and tolerance of blood sacrifice are concerned, but differed from it on other points. However this may be, Darius probably gave a revised version of the doctrine as he came to know it. As a ruler over so many different provinces and countries he was not interested in the sharply defined, dogmatic system of a specialized clergy. The time had not yet come for a Mazdean 'Church' in the Sassanian fashion. This would indeed have contradicted Darius's whole attitude towards the subjects of his young empire.

The revolt of Gaumāta, admittedly a primarily political move, did after all have a religious side that can best be understood as the attempt by the priestly caste to overstep the bounds set to their ambition by a sensible monarch. The Darius who rebuilt the *āyadana* they had overthrown, presumably the places of worship of 'all the other gods there are', was the same man who apparently discarded everything in Mazdeism that might alienate the people's good will rather than consolidate the empire. He had, for instance, no use for the eschatological meaning of *xšaθra-*/*xšaṣṣa-*: the Gāthic insistence on a kingdom to come seemed out of place; for what mattered was to give out one's own royal rule as the rule of God, already materialized. The other entities may have seemed superfluous since Auramazdā contained them all anyhow.

If we accept this interpretation we can consider Xerxes' inscription with its mention of Arta and its order to fight the *daēvas*, and the introduction of the Zoroastrian calendar under Artaxerxes I, as successive symptoms of the Magi's progress at the Achemenian court.

Another 'great god' who may be alleged to have existed in the pre-Zoroastrian religion is Zurvān.

Our oldest-dated mention of this god only goes back to the fourth century B.C. if the notice in Damascius of Rhodes is really based on Theopompus; it is confirmed somehow by the mention in Berossus of a mythical king Zerovanus.

G. Widengren[1] produced from the Nuzi tablets a name *dZa-ar-wa-an* (in compound names *za-ar-wa*). Although Bailey has shown that further evidence is needed before it can be used in the problem of Zurvān,[2] we may keep it in reserve.

The myth of Zurvān, as told by the Christian apologists, was denied all antiquity by H. Schaeder.[3] Against this, Widengren put forward a new argument.[4] The Iranian Zurvān performed offerings in order to get a son, who would be called Ormazd and create the sky and the earth. To this corresponds the Indian myth about Prajāpati, the great god who was the first to perform the *dakṣayana* offering in order to get an offspring. This correspondence proves, according to Widengren, that in both cases we have to do with the High God out of whom the universe emanates. And this confirms the antiquity of the Iranian myths about Zurvān.

This is sound reasoning, and Schaeder's hypothesis that these myths were Christian caricatures meant to ridicule the Persian religion must definitely be discarded. But what exactly may we conclude? That there existed both in Iran and in India, therefore probably already in Indo–Iranian times, a myth in which a great god, before the world was created, made sacrifices in order to get an offspring. It is not at all certain that in the oldest form of the myth the god gave birth to twins, for there is no trace of this in India. This will recur later on in the discussion.

However, there is good reason to believe that Time had already been divinized in old Iran, for it survived in popular legend. This results from Wikander's paper[5] showing that the tales about the national hero Rustem and his father Zāl-zār, King Minuchihr's counsellor, in Firdousi's Shāhnāmeh are based upon the historicization of old popular myths about Vāyu and Zurvān.

[1] *Hochgottglaube*, p. 310.
[2] *Trans. Phil. Soc.*, 1953, p. 39.
[3] *Zeitschr. d. deutsch. morg. Ges.*, 1941, pp. 290–9.
[4] In the 2nd edn. of his *Religionens Värld*, p. 71.
[5] *La Nouvelle Clio*, 1950, p. 310.

Zurvān can best be understood in relation to Vāyu—conversely, what will be said of the latter will confirm Zurvān's antiquity. Vāyu, a god of Indo-Iranian origin, must have been known to Zoroaster. His nature has been beautifully elucidated by the researches of Wikander and Dumézil, a clear synthesis of which can be read in the best of the recent *exposés* on Iranian religion: Barr's *Avesta*, pp. 42 seq.:

> Vāyu was master over life and death and indifferent to men's happiness or unhappiness. This two-fold nature was too well ingrained to allow itself to be obliterated, even under the censure of Zoroastrianism. Vayu is worshipped in his Yašt as the god 'with superior action', but only that part of him is honoured which 'comes from the Good Mind'. The pious clearly knew that Vāyu has two sides, and it could not be ignored that he hunts, attains and vanquishes both creations, that of the good spirit and that of the evil. All life is in his power. As a power that man feels directly, Vāyu is the swift one, who goes straight to his aim, the intrepid one. As such he is the first incarnation of Vərəθraγna the god of victory. The Aryans saw in Vāyu both the real wind that blows, hurries forth in the storm with violence and swiftness and is not to be resisted, and the first cosmic life-principle. In all living beings Vāyu is the life-breath, in the Cosmos he is the breath of Life. But Vāyu is also the wind that all the living breathe out at death. So he is both the god of life and death.

Vāyu or Vāta is well attested in Vedic India; but since his twofold character does not appear there, it might be doubted whether it went back to Indo-Iranian times. Here the Latin parallel comes to our aid: Janus bifrons, a proof that the twofold god of beginnings was already an Indo-European conception.

What was the relationship between this god of hap and mishap and the other god of fate, Zurvān or Time? Prior to Wikander's paper cited above, Nyberg had gone to great lengths towards the elucidation of both gods, but they appeared to him so similar that it seemed unlikely that they ever coexisted in the same cosmological system. Wikander has now discovered that one was father to the other. In Barr's summary:

> The mighty warrior Rustam is an epic replica of Kərəsāspa the Vāyu-hero, who swings the club and slays the dragon and is already in the Avesta a human-heroic incarnation of the terrible wind-god Vāyu. His father Zāl was born with white hair and was called at once zār or pīr,

'the old one'. He says of himself 'my years are innumerable'. He survives his son who has been champion of the realm at least for 500 years, and no mention is made at all of his dying. The name Zāl 'the decrepit one', as well as the adjective zār 'old' are probably originally epithets of the god of Time. To quote Wikander himself: 'It is as incarnations of Zurvān and Vāyu that Zāl and Rustam live incomparably longer than all the other persons in the epic and that, of the two, the one who incarnates Zurvān enjoys the greater longevity.' Their mutual relationship is admirably defined by Barr: 'Zāl is in contradistinction to the indomitable, active Rustam, the passive but wise counsellor whose wisdom is timeless.'

We have now assembled all the elements available for an appreciation of Zoroaster's originality.

Zoroaster cannot have been ignorant of the god of fate, who prayed for an offspring, or of Vāyu, his son, the ambiguous patron of beginnings, master of life and death. He had no need of the former, once he had conceived his own god, Ahura Mazdā, as a synthesis of the Varunian and Mithrian aspects of sovereignty: there was no room for a god of Fate in a conception which may indeed be best understood as a protest against fatalism. But Vāyu's two antagonistic halves were destined, in a transposed form, to play a part in the new theology, to become the chief exponents therein of what dualism must have already existed.

Stories of primeval twins, for instance, must have been current, as they are among Amerindians. To take a less remote example, Yama had in India a twin sister, Yamī. There were in primitive Iran, like almost everywhere else, with the Celts, the Slavs, the Ainus, &c., good and bad powers, gods and demons, priests and sorcerers. It is well known that the conflict between forces of good or order, and forces of evil or disorder, has an important place in the cosmogony of the Babylonians (Marduk–Tiāmat), of the Greeks (Zeus–Titans), and in the whole Egyptian religion, where it has political and military aspects as well as a cosmic one: Re, the sun, struggling with Apophis, and Osiris fighting Set (a local god submitted to the empire) are archetypes of Pharaoh combating rebellion, disorder, and evil.

The Veda, with its opposition of *ṛta* and *druh*, shows that the antagonism between good and evil had already been clearly formu-

lated if not personified in Indo-Iranian times. Zoroaster lifted it to the dignity of a major cosmic cleavage. To this end he used the two antagonistic halves of Vāyu or rather, since Vāyu had to disappear like all the ancient gods, he used their corresponding entities. These were fair substitutes, judging from the Vedic term *manyu-*, which, like Vāyu himself, has a very active, dynamic meaning and a twofold one at that: in German translation, *Mut-Unmut*, and was, moreover, sometimes personified as a deity.

Something of the opposition between Vāyu as god of life and Vāyu as god of death is taken over in that between the mainyu who chooses life and the one who chooses non-life, although their main role is probably to exemplify the choice between good and evil.

But their inclusion in the system posed a delicate problem—of genealogy. Whose sons were these twins? Zurvān was out of the question, albeit the Zervanites persistently maintained that he was their father, and in the sense of the old mythology were probably right.

Could it be Ahura Mazdā? As the creator of all things, of light and darkness, &c. (Y. 44. 5), it might seem that he could, but this would have implied that he, the good god, had begotten not only the good spirit but the evil one as well, a notion absolutely repugnant to Mazdeans, at least in Sassanian times. Here remained a flaw in the system, and I wonder if this may not account for the discrepancies in the relationship of Spənta Mainyu with Ahura Mazdā: sometimes the former is said to be the latter's son, sometimes he is Ahura Mazdā's own spirit (in this case a synonym for the latter's *xratu*), sometimes he is Ahura Mazdā himself (a view which was to prevail when Ormazd came to occupy the place of Spənta Mainyu on a level with Ahriman).

Some moderns have meant to help Zoroaster out of this alleged difficulty, like Guizot in this note to his translation of Gibbon: 'Ahriman is not forced to do evil by his invariable nature (as Gibbon contended); the *Zend Avesta* expressly recognizes that he was born good, that he was originally light; but envy rendered him evil; he became jealous of the power and the attributes of Ormazd; the light of Ahriman was then turned into darkness and he was precipitated into the abyss.' I must confess I cannot find this in Anquetil's or in any other *Zend Avesta*.

Lommel appears curiously inconsistent on this subject. Commenting (p. 22) on Y. 30. 5: 'Of these two spirits, the evil one chose to do the worst things; but the Most Holy Spirit, clothed in the most steadfast heavens, joined himself unto Righteousness', Lommel contends that Zoroaster expresses here how Good and Evil entered the world, namely, through the Choice and Free Will of the Spirit. This is supposed to be Zoroaster's own doctrine. But, Lommel goes on: 'On the contrary, religious controversy comprehended the two spirits as Good and Evil themselves, as personifications of the two opposite ethical notions, which amounted either to assuming the contrasting duality as primordial and unexplained, or, in the Zervanite view of Ormazd and Ahriman being born from a common father, to transferring the contrast on to this supreme Being.' Lommel will thus have us believe that in the prophet's conception, evil entered the world through the free choice of the Spirits, who were therefore previously innocent and might thus both have Ahura Mazdā for their father, a thing which Lommel later on proclaims impossible (p. 27) as far as the Evil Spirit is concerned.

von Wesendonk more objectively admits that the question of the ultimate origin of evil is left unsolved in the Gāthās:

> The question of the origin of evil, which was the subject of so many theological and philosophical speculations, is not satisfactorily answered in the Gāthās. . . . There, as in the myth of Lucifer the fallen Angel, it seems that the evil spirit, who with Zarathushtra nowhere appears as a clear-cut personality, came independently to his evil choice, the question remaining open, however, as to the origin, both in him and in men, of the evil inclination.[1]

We may conclude that the only way to account for these difficulties is to consider the two spirits to be adaptations of old myths to a system into which they could not be perfectly fitted. The noted discrepancies then reflected Zoroaster's own unphilosophical

[1] *Das Wesen der Lehre Zarathuštras*, p. 25: 'Die Frage der Herkunft des Übels, die den Gegenstand so mancher theologischen und philosophischen Betrachtung abgibt, wird in den Gâthâs nicht einwandfrei beantwortet. . . . Hiernach scheint wie in dem Mythus von Lucifer, dem gefallenen Engel, der Entschluß zum Schlechten im bösen Geist, der bei Zarathustra nirgends als fest umschriebene Persönlichkeit erscheint, selbständig gereift zu sein, wenn auch die Frage offen bleibt, woher der Hang zum Üblen bei ihm wie bei den Menschen herrührt.'

fashion of coping with the impossibility of reconciling God's omnipotence with his goodness. No Mazdean, apparently, ever saw the problem in these terms. They never conceived totality in so absolute a manner, creation as so all-embracing as to include the principle of evil. To them—to the more intelligent among them—Ahriman with all its power was a kind of negative limit to Ormazd's being and activity. We must not compare them with the Fathers of the Church or the neo-Platonists: they were rather on a level with the classical Greeks, with a Plato to whom matter appeared as merely a limit to the power of the Good.

Zoroaster did not succeed in eradicating the ancient cult-forms: never were all the Iranians persuaded that nothing was to be gained from worshipping the *daēvas*, however malevolent. Already in the Yasna haptaŋhāiti the waters are invoked, the haoma and the *fravašis* held in honour. Hymns to deities alien to the Gāthic doctrine are then incorporated in the liturgy.

It is in the matter of the haoma cult that the contradiction seems at its sharpest. If Zoroaster condemned it, how can it have come to form the very centre of Zoroastrian sacrifice? Two solutions have lately been proposed for this difficulty. Nyberg contended that so great a change could only occur with Zoroaster's approval. But he did not produce any proof of this alleged volte-face. Recently Zaehner in his little book *The Teachings of the Magi*, p. 127, briefly suggested that Zoroaster had perhaps not condemned the cult of the haoma in itself, but only a certain form of it that was associated with blood sacrifice. The argument is based on Y. 32. 14, where there is a clear allusion to the haoma under the traditional epithet of *dūraoša-* 'he from whom death flees'. If Zoroaster was attacking the haoma cult in itself, Zaehner contends, he would scarcely have made use of the very epithet ascribing to the plant the property of conferring immortality. It may be replied that Zoroaster may have described or designated the ritual in the words of those who performed it. The epithet was then ironical in his mouth. Indeed, another passage does contain a straightforward condemnation of the haoma: 48. 10 'When wilt thou smite this filth of a drink, *mūθrəm ahyā madahyā*, through which the sacrificers, &c.'

There is perhaps one way of reconciling Nyberg's and Zaehner's

hypotheses—by supposing that this latter passage belonged to an earlier stage in Zoroaster's career when he still disapproved of the haoma, whereas Y. 32 reflected a subsequent compromise.

One fact speaks in favour of this conjecture: Y. 48, which unreservedly condemns haoma, *may* be ascribed to a relatively early period, for it shows Zoroaster still in search of a protector: 'May good rulers', he exclaims (stanza 5), 'not bad ones, rule over us!'

It may thus be admitted that the haoma cult was already part of the liturgy in Zoroaster's time. The other features mentioned above were apparently added afterwards. Zoroaster ignored the *fravašis*, probably on account of their connexion with the second function, as stated above. He knew instead, with regard to pyschology, the *daēnā*. Concerning this notion I beg to draw attention to the new and, to my mind, satisfactory explanation offered by Pagliaro in his paper 'L'Idealismo Gathico', from which I may be allowed to extract the following.[1] After briefly citing the translations given by Bartholomae (geistiges Ich, Individualität), Lommel (geistiges Urwesen or Geist-Person), Meillet (personnalité religieuse), Pavry and J. D.-G. (conscience),[2] Pagliaro states that it seems beyond doubt that the word must be connected with the verb *dāy-* 'to see'. Then, instead of interpreting it as '(the faculty of) vision, das Schauen', with, as a corollary, 'the (religious) view' as the literal sense of *daēnā* 'religion', Pagliaro adduces the Graeco-Latin parallel εἶδος 'species', and concludes that, 'in correlation to gaēθa "living being" which indicates the forms of the material world, *daēnā* serves to designate the image, the species; the ulterior meaning is that of model, type, kind, genus, and finally of nature, essence'. On the relationship of the *daēnā* to the soul and, on the other hand, on the two meanings of the *daēnā*, we may quote this passage from Pagliaro's paper as typical of this scholar's attitude to Zoroaster and Plato:

> In the Gāthās the manner in which the *daēnā* is assumed by the individual is not stated in explicit terms. But it was certainly meant in the sense of that freedom of choice between good and evil which is at the basis of the dualistic conception: whoever takes sides assumes a

[1] Published in *Saṁjñavyākaraṇam, Studia Indologica Internationalia*, Poona–Paris, i (1954), 9.

[2] The comparison with Skr. *dhḗnu-* 'female', recently revived by Widengren, *Stand und Aufgaben*, p. 33, seems out of the question.

spiritual essence in conformity to one or the other principle. Only in this sense does Zarathushtra's preaching, with its inherent proselytizing effort, appear justified. (It is therefore something quite different from the choice of a *βίος* made by the soul before being re-born into the world, as described in Plato's *Republic*, Book X). This *daēnā* motif had a moderate success in ulterior theological speculation, since it was partly absorbed into the *fravaši* 'protective spirit, genius', which has a more religious, less speculative value and is not mentioned in the Gāthās.

. . . On the other hand Ahura Mazdāh also has his *daēnā*, like man, of whose spirit he is an hypostasis; the *daēnā* of the only god, viz. his essence, is religion, an abstract image of the deity. The semantic evolution from 'essence, spiritual image (of the deity)' to 'religion' can be legitimately inferred from passages such as Yasna 44. 11 (in D.-G.'s rendering): 'Shall Ārmaiti extend to those to whom thy essence (religion) is proclaimed, O Wise One. From the beginning was I chosen for this by thee. . . .'[1]

Schaeder maintains that the eschatological meaning of the *daēnā* is a late development, alien to the prophet's genuine thought.[2] A general reappraisal took place, according to Schaeder, after the death of Zoroaster, when the renovation of existence, which he had hoped to witness in the flesh (Y. 30. 9), did not appear to be forthcoming, or perhaps even in his lifetime. Thus the first and second existence, meaning the corporeal and spiritual, came to mean life and after-life; the *činvatō pərətu-*, formerly the space between two fires in a form of ordeal, became the 'bridge of the requiter'; the House of the Song, Ahura Mazdā's dwelling during

[1] 'Nelle Gāthā la modalità dell' assunzione della daēnā da parte del singolo non appare dichiarata in termini espliciti. Ma essa è certamente da intendere nel senso di quella libertà di scelta fra il Bene e il Male, che è alla base della concezione dualistica: chi si schiera volutamente da una parte o dall' altra viene ad assumere un' essenza spirituale conforme all' uno o all' altro principio. Solo in questo senso appare giustificata la predicazione con il suo immanente sforzo di proselitismo. (Si tratta, dunque, di cosa ben diversa da quella scelta del *βίος*, che l'anima fa prima di rinascere al mondo, nel libro X della Repubblica di Platone). Questo motivo della daēnā ha avuto nella elaborazione teologica ulteriore poca fortuna, poichè è stato in parte assorbito dalla fravaši "spirito protettore, genio" che ha un valore più religioso e meno speculativo, e di cui nelle Gâthâ non si ha parola.

'D'altra parte anche Ahura Mazdâh ha una sua daēnā, come l'uomo, del cui spirito egli è ipostasi: la daēnā del dio unico, cioè la sua essenza è la religione, immagine astratta della divinità. . . . Il passaggio di significato da "essenza, immagine spirituale" (della divinità) a "religione" desume come ovvio e legittimo da passi come . . .'

[2] 'Zarathustras Botschaft von der rechten Ordnung', *Corona*, ix (1940), 575 seq.

the performance of ceremonies, became the fourth circle of Paradise. Recently Humbach, in his papers published in the *Münchener Studien*,[1] also tried to minimize the eschatological element in the Gāthās. But, like Schaeder, he is at great pains indeed to show that Zoroaster lived in the present and that his references to the origins are traditional, and that those to the final rewards are relative to this earth.

I would suggest that the contradiction, which has puzzled all the scholars, may be more apparent than real. Zoroaster may have ignored eschatology in the ordinary sense of the term, because to him the end was near: the advent of the rule of God, with the chastisement of the *daēva* worshippers, was to take place on this earth. To what extent he may have felt obliged to postpone the event, or to translate it into terms of after-life, we shall never know.

It is nevertheless interesting to note how he used and transformed old mythologies in his conception of the renovation of existence. As Lommel rightly pointed out:

> The doctrine of the final transforming action of Fire is certainly connected with widespread old myths about the end of the world—that can bring about its renovation—in a general conflagration. There exists, however, alongside this mythological connexion, another one, that with the ordeal, a practice current with the Iranians and which consisted either of treading between two fires or of having molten metal poured on a part of the body. Such ordeals are here magnified to cosmic proportions and applied to the two armies of the truthful and the liars.[2]

Nor were the old cosmogonical myths acceptable to Zoroaster, unless thoroughly transformed. It is probable, as Loisy, Lommel, and Pettazzoni have seen (contrary to Cumont),[3] that the slaying of the Primal Bull by Ahriman, as told in the Bundahišn, was a late adaptation of the old myth illustrated in the Mithra mysteries, in which Mithra was the protagonist in a creative, fecundating drama. Zoroaster could not but condemn this, along with the practice of blood sacrifice. The Zoroastrians who later, in a time of syncretism, readmitted the story, could no more conceive this

[1] *M. St. zur Sprachwissenschaft*, Hefte 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 (the last two in 1955).
[2] *Die Religion Zarathustras*, p. 222.
[3] Loisy, *Les mystères païens et le mystère chrétien*, p. 192, n. 2; Pettazzoni, *Misteri*, 1923, p. 258; Lommel, *Die Religion Zarathustras*, p. 182.

slaughter as the work of a beneficent god: it was therefore supposed to be Ahriman's deed. As for Zoroaster, he propounded instead the drama of the Ox's soul.

With regard to the legends relative to Primal Man, Zoroaster rejected Yima as responsible for introducing blood sacrifice, and ignored Manu (attested only, as far as Iran is concerned, in the name *Manuščiθra-*).[1] Only later did *Gaya- marətan-* emerge as the new type of primal man. This may have been primarily, as shown in Hartman's *Gayōmart*, 1953, a creation of Zervanites who depended on the passage of the 'Myth of the Choice' in Y. 30 where both elements of the name occur.[2]

This new figure was, anyhow, integrated into the scheme of world-periods, as shown by Lommel, p. 137. That he was indeed a foreign body in the system results from the fact that:

> No passage says of Gayomard that Ormazd created him; he simply exists for a tri-millennium, during which he does nothing and signifies nothing, and his only mission is to be killed by the evil fiend, not in this period but only in the next one. Only as a further application of the ternary and decimal principles has he to live for another 30 years during this next tri-millennium. It is remarkable that Hamza al Isfahani allots him only these 30 years; Hamza who accepts 12,000 years in all, thus including period B, leaves the latter completely empty and in so doing betrays the fact that other authors only used Gayomard as a desperate means of filling this period.

The question of the origin and development of the doctrine of the tri-millennia is a complicated one, which has long challenged the sagacity of our scholars, in our time Benveniste, Nyberg, Lommel, and Zaehner.

Zoroaster had abolished the worship of Time or Fate. To him, the world was filled with the struggle of the Creative Spirit against the Destructive One, up to the latter's annihilation and the former's everlasting triumph. After the death of the prophet the belief must have spread that his advent had ushered in a new phase in the cosmic battle. Thus do we read in Y. 9. 15 that at his birth the demons, who had previously walked freely on the earth, had to take refuge under its surface. Then he was supposed to have

[1] Manu was indeed probably the same as Yima: both are sons of Vivasvant, cf. Zaehner, *Post-script to Zurvan*, p. 247. [2] But see Hoffman, MSS. 11.

successors in the work of salvation,t hree of them, each coming at the end of a millenium to usher in a new one. This made up for a period of 3,000 years from Zoroaster to Final Salvation. Symmetrically the struggle between Ormazd and Ahriman was supposed to have occupied the same lapse of time before the prophet's advent. This would account for 6,000 years. But two further tri-millennia appear to have been added, according to the account given in Bundahišn 34, before Opposition began. These two periods were characterized by the unchallenged reign of Ormazd, during the former as a purely spiritual creation, whereas the latter was marked, as we have just seen, by the appearance of Gayomard.

Bundahišn 1 gives a rather different account which has been thoroughly dealt with by Zaehner, *Zurvan*, pp. 99 seq., and *Teachings of the Magi*, pp. 33 seq. This scholar has tried to explain the distinct anomaly in Section 16, where it is said that although Ahriman lay crushed, he created the Lying word and the Evil Mind. How could he do this, Zaehner asks, if he was unconscious?

I shall not repeat his convincing demonstration, which is easily accessible. My reason for mentioning it is that it shows a trace of Zervanism in the Mazdean cosmology. But I want to confess a perplexity of mine, concerning sections 12 and 13, which read as follows (in Zaehner's rendering):

> 12 And Ormazd said to the Destructive Spirit, 'Fix a time so that by this pact we may extend the battle for nine thousand years.' For he knew that by fixing a time in this wise the Destructive Spirit would be made powerless. Then the Destructive Spirit, not seeing the end, agreed to that treaty, just as two men who fight a duel fix a term (saying), 'Let us on such a day do battle till night.'
>
> 13 This too did Ormazd know in his omniscience, that within these nine thousand years three thousand would pass entirely according to the will of Ormazd, three thousand years in mixture would pass according to the will of both Ormazd and Ahriman, and that in the last battle the Destructive Spirit would be made powerless and that he himself would save creation from aggression.

Let us see how the scheme was supposed to work: Ormazd's supremacy, 3,000 years; fight, 3,000 years, with a final battle—presumably at the end of this second period—when Ahriman is defeated and Ormazd reigns for ever. Now this makes up for

only 6,000 years unless we give two periods either to Ormazd's supremacy or to the mixed state, which is contrary to the text.

It seems to me that the only way to account for this discrepancy is to conjecture that the theologians started from a doctrine of the three times or moments, well attested in Manichaeism, of which it is a main tenet (*bundahišn*, *gumēčišn*, *vičārišn*) and summarily translated it (within the frame of the millennial scheme) into a doctrine of the three periods, overlooking the fact that three moments mark only two periods, the third one corresponding to eternity.

V

IRAN AND GREECE

IT remains for us to examine the relationships of the Iranian religion to Greek thought and to Judaism: two problems which present themselves in very different terms. Whereas the Jews, as the Chosen People, never acknowledged any foreign influence on their religion, the Greeks very soon showed themselves eager to appear as the heirs and successors of the Eastern Sages. Both certainly exaggerated in opposite directions.

To take the Greeks first, Th. Hopfner showed that the farther the notices of ancient authors are distant in time from the alleged borrowings, the more detailed and precise they become.[1] Undoubtedly there are striking similarities of doctrine between Iran and Greece. Even leaving aside for the moment the Hellenistic period with the emergence of Gnosticism, we can enumerate dualism, the divinization of Time, the division of world history into definite periods, the notion of a world-soul, fire as a symbol of cosmic law, the pre-existence of ideal models of things. . . . How are all these resemblances to be accounted for? Our scholars differ widely in their attitude to this question.

There are those who, like Eisler in his *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt*, 1910, exalt the Iranian influence, placing it at the very origin of Greek philosophy and of Orphism; Reitzenstein, who represents Plato as heavily in debt to Zoroaster, took over Eisler's views, notably in his lecture *Altgriechische Theologie und ihre Quellen*, 1924, and prolonged them with the help of an Iranist, H. Schaeder, with whom he published *Studien zum antiken Synkretismus*, 1926. J. Bidez was a more moderate exponent of the same tendency: his attention had been drawn by W. Jaeger's *Aristoteles*, 1923, to the contacts that were historically attested between the Magi and the Academy. In his book *Eos, ou Platon et l'Orient*, 1945, he may be said to have shown what the Greek thinkers *might* owe to Iranian doctrines.

[1] *Orient und griechische Philosophie*, 1925.

Other scholars have been anxious to refute these theories, and it is remarkable that two of them should have published independently, without knowing each other because of the troubled times, two books identically negative in their conclusions, namely, J. Kerschensteiner, *Platon und der Orient*, Stuttgart, 1945, and W. Koster, *Le Mythe de Platon, de Zarathustra et des Chaldéens*, Leyde, 1951.

Many hellenists, it must be added, prefer simply to ignore the question. Finally, there are those who, without deciding the question historically, are aware of its interest from a comparative point of view. They would endorse F. M. Cornford's remark:

> Whether we accept or not the hypothesis of a direct influence of Persia on the Ionians in the VIth century, no student of Orphic and Pythagorean thought will fail to see between it and the Persian religion such close resemblances that we can regard both systems as expressions of one same conception of life, and use either of them to interpret the other.[1]

It is, we may add, perhaps in the same sense that Aristotle saw a connexion between the dualism of the Magi and Plato's system. For it is far from certain that this amounted in his mind to an historical connexion. He may have meant that the two systems were analogous.

The influence of Zoroastrianism on the modern view of philosophy was considerable, if indirect. The word *dualismus*, coined by Hyde, was taken over by Bayle, then by Leibniz. Christian Wolff, the master of Kant, extended its use to metaphysics, applying it to the Cartesian doctrine which sees thought and matter as two mutually independent substances. Against this dualism Kant reacted (as also already Spinoza), then Fichte and Hegel with idealism, the positivists with materialism. The Cartesian attitude may in turn be considered a sequel to the Platonic reaction which, at the Renaissance, superseded Aristotelian scholasticism.

The whole history of Western philosophy appears in this light as an alternation of dualism and monism, since Aristotle was already combating Plato's dualism and since his own monism, with that of the Stoics, was succeeded by a period of pagan and christian neo-Platonism up to the Aristotelian revival in the twelfth century.

[1] *From Religion to Philosophy*, p. 176.

Plato himself did not invent dualism *ex stirpe*, for it was foreshadowed by Empedocles, Anaxagoras, the Orphics, and Pythagoreans.

Outside Europe, dualism appears in India in Saṃkhyā-philosophy, but it is mostly denied or overcome in the dogma of Advaita 'non-duality'. In China it takes different forms, starting from the elementary one of Yin-Yang opposition. Generally speaking, a distinction may be made between cosmological, anthropological, ethical, and epistemological dualism; a particularly important form has been defined by Simone Pètrement as transcendent dualism, which opposes God and the world.[1] According to this philosopher, this kind of dualism characterizes the awakening of philosophical conscience, which is generally succeeded by the monistic tendency, with metaphysical stiffening, until the next dualistic revival sets in.

Before we proceed to a sketch of the history of Greek thought along such lines, we may be allowed to offer a small contribution[2] to the question of the mutual dependence of Greece and Iran.

Few articles have had so much bearing on the study of this question as Alb. Götze's *Persische Weisheit in griechischem Gewande*, published in the *Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik*, 1923.

The Bundahišn and the Dēnkart, which teach, among other dogmas, the doctrine of the spiritual pre-existence of the world, date back, in their extant redaction, only to the ninth century of our era. They certainly reflect more ancient speculations and indeed give themselves out as paraphrases or summaries of lost parts of the Avesta. But the Avesta was itself a composite work, the different parts of which dated from different epochs, from Zoroaster's Gāthās, at least six centuries older than our era, to the additions made under Šāpūr, about a thousand years later.

In such circumstances, an Iranian doctrine can hardly be dated without some outward help. It is such a help that Götze thought he had found in an extract from the *Περὶ Ἑβδομάδων*, to which his attention had been drawn by Franz Boll. (This particular, it will be seen, has its importance.) The Greek work states *inter alia* how

[1] In two books, *Le Dualisme dans l'histoire de la philosophie et des religions*, 1946, and *Le Dualisme chez Platon, les Gnostiques et les Manichéens*, 1947.

[2] Published in French in the *Harvard Theological Review*, 1956, pp. 115 seq.

to each part of the human body there corresponds a part of the universe, a doctrine also taught in the Bundahišn. Admittedly, the natural first reaction of a hellenist when confronted with this Greek–Iranian parallel is to conclude that, since the Greek text goes back at least to the fourth century B.C., the borrowing must have been made, if at all, by Iran from Greece. This is the reaction of Wesendonk, who makes this charge against Götze: 'Auf den naheliegenden Gedanken, hellenistische Einflüsse im großen Bundahišn zu suchen, ist er nicht gestoßen.'[1] This is rather amusing, for so well aware was Götze of this possibility that he contemplated it in the very first lines of his paper. 'Wesendonk muß davon nichts gelesen oder wenigstens nicht verstanden haben' is Reitzenstein's amiable comment.[2] The whole of Götze's argument aimed, indeed, at showing, after proving the two documents to resemble each other too much to be independent, that only the Iranian could be the original.

His thesis, the merits of which we shall examine presently, was either accorded an enthusiastic reception or regarded with embarrassed scepticism. It could not leave one indifferent. Reitzenstein found in it the most emphatic sanction provided by an orientalist of his theories on the Iranian origins of Greek mysticism and a new impulse to the development of these views. The Dāmdāt Nask, a lost book of the Avesta paraphrased in the Bundahišn, could now be assigned, thanks to the alleged Greek borrowing, at least to the fifth century B.C. Plato might therefore have known it and drawn from it by the handful. This is what Reitzenstein pointed out in the *Studien*, where his collaborator Schaeder edited afresh, in their Bundahišn formulation, the Iranian cosmological doctrines, alleged sources of Plato's idealism and dualism.

The immensity of this new vista caused the more prudent philologists to hesitate; but most of them, instead of revising the whole question, were content to by-pass it, by showing, for instance, that Reitzenstein had several times misused the Iranian evidence,[3] or to shut their eyes, like Wesendonk. Only two, M. Wellmann and W. Kranz, both eminent hellenists, have gone below the surface.

[1] *Urmensch und Seele*, 1924, p. 122.

[2] *Studien zum antiken Synkretismus*, 1926, p. 124.

[3] See my *Ormazd et Ahriman*, 1952, with reference to studies of Koster, Festugière, &c.

But the former considered only one-half of the problem and could not therefore come to a general conclusion, whereas the latter did take up the whole question but appears to have concluded wrongly.

Götze's thesis was based on two main arguments. Firstly, the *De Hebdomadibus* doctrine emerges in Greece in a sudden and isolated manner, like an erratic block (p. 79). The chances are therefore that it was of foreign import; it was then probably conveyed by the school of Cnidus, which must have been in communication with Persia thanks to the Greek physicians at the Achemenian court.

Secondly, the Greek document does not offer a homogeneous, coherent doctrine; it can only be understood as an awkward adaptation: 'Ohne die persische Parallele läßt sich die Anordnung des Heptadisten nicht verstehen.'

The first argument was already considerably weakened by Wellmann, who detected in this alleged erratic block many elements belonging to the stock of Pythagorean ideas[1] and showed, moreover, that the doctrine as a whole, far from being certainly Cnidian, belonged rather to the Cyrene school; this moves us away from Iran and leaves out of the question the Greek physicians employed by the Persian king. So much for Wellmann's paper.

W. Kranz takes up the argument again[2] and finds the heptadist's doctrine, or a similar one, in several Greek works: books I and IV of the *Περὶ διαίτης* and a tragedy of Choirilos.[3] The 'erratic block in Hellas' appears thus to have brothers, as Kranz puts it (p. 131) without apparently shrinking from the contradiction. But this is not the main point of his article, the chief feature of which is the important and unexpected discovery that the Greek text taken by Götze as a basis for comparison had been unduly truncated by Boll, who had studied it before him. One must add several lines to it in order to elicit a complete structure. We meet here Götze's second argument, based on the alleged incoherence of the Greek text. The latter, once joined together again, reveals itself as

[1] *Die pseudo-hippokratische Schrift Peri Hebdomadon: Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft und Medizin*, 4, 1, 1933.

[2] In his paper *Kosmos und Mensch in der Vorstellung frühen Griechentums*, *Nachr. Göttingen*, 1938, pp. 121 seq.

[3] That the fragment belonged to Choirilos the tragic, not to his namesake the epic poet, was seen by Koster, *Le mythe de Platon . . .*, p. 31.

strongly built. The universe is there traversed upwards, in seven stages:



(The truncated text had only Earth–Water–Air–Moon; the earth and the water being each divided into three layers, this gave apparently enough elements to constitute the heptad; the moon was even superfluous, it must be confessed.)

Only the complete system can account for the equation moon-sensus, or rather, in the reconstructed original, *σελήνη-φρήν* (where *φρήν* meant 'the midriff' and was no more correctly understood by the Latin translator). The midriff divides the body through its middle, and so is the moon (viz. the sphere of the moon) equally distant from the centre of the world and its periphery.

This last particular would suffice to prove that we have to do with a conception that visualizes the world not as a scale of steps, but as a complex of concentric spheres. This is confirmed by the identification of the Firmament with the Skin, of the Stars with 'the warmth that is under the skin': obviously, what envelops the body is compared to the envelope of the universe; the latter is therefore conceived as spherical, whereas in more primitive myths, among the Chinese or in the Veda, it is to the head of man that the sky corresponds, as being simply the highest step in the ladder of the universe. The Greek document manifestly offers us the 'new conception' of which Nilsson, after Eisler and Burkitt, has shown the revolutionary impact in the religious sphere.

Nothing of this grandiose system is found in the Iranian document, in which the identifications, when not simply obvious, like that of the earth with the flesh, of the bones with the mountains, of the blood in the arteries with the water in the rivers, of the breath with the wind, are quite different from the Greek identifications.[1] The absence of a comparison of the hair with the vegetation,

[1] There is no reason to insist, any more than Götze himself, on the Iranian pair *marrow–metal*, the alleged model for the comparison of *medulla cerebrum semen* and *quod in terra calidum humidum*, the difference being explained by Av.

a current metaphor in Greek poetry and mythology, can now be accounted for; there was no room any more for this equivalence in a system where the parts of the world and those of the body were ranged, as far as possible, inside out: the hair and hairs, even more external than the skin, would have had to have as their cosmic counterpart something beyond the firmament, not the terrestrial foliage.

To sum up, Kranz has demonstrated, even better than he thought, that the Greek doctrine is a coherent whole. It escaped him that he was thus ruining Götze's main argument in favour of an Iranian origin of this doctrine. Since he also devalued the other argument, that of the 'erratic block in Hellas', by finding brothers to this only child, Götze's thesis may be considered refuted.

However, we remain confronted with the problem to which Götze had the merit of drawing attention. The resemblance in doctrine between the Greek documents and the Bundahišn, limited though it is, requires an explanation.

The notion of macro-microcosm was not limited to Greece, Iran, and India: it is found elsewhere in the rudimentary form of a myth in which a primal giant is killed and the parts of his body give birth to the parts of the universe. With the Scandinavians, Ymir is slain by Ođin, Vili, and Ve: from his flesh they build the earth, from his blood the water, from his bones the mountains, from his hair the trees, from his skull the sky, &c. This recalls the cutting up of Puruṣa in Ṛgveda X. 90 and the murder of Gayōmart by Ahriman in the Bundahišn. Grimm's *Mythologie*, p. 433, had already adduced the Cochinchinese parallel, which A. Olerud takes over in his thesis *L'Idée de macrocosmos et de microcosmos dans le Timée de Platon*, 1951, p. 147. It is even more interesting to fill in the space between Central Asia and China, thanks to the studies of Harva and Eberhardt who find with Altaic peoples and with the Chinese a similar myth of cosmogonical dismembering. When the giant P'an-ku dies, the Chinese say, from his breath is born the wind, from his voice the thunder, from his left eye the sun, from the right one the moon, from his hair the plants, &c.

aγō xšuστəm, literally 'metal in fusion', a compound phrase of which only the second term, 'in fusion' was allegedly retained. One wonders really how the translator from the Persian into Greek could have misunderstood the striking image of metals in the bowels of the earth, like marrow in the human body.

The Chinese documents allow us to date back to at least the eleventh century this archaic myth, which probably was part of the ideology of human sacrifice, as shown by Rönnow,[1] and, as such, widespread in the world. It is found in ancient Babylonia with the slaughter of Tiamat giving birth to the world and that of Kingir engendering mankind. It is thus extremely likely to have been current with the Indo-Europeans too: for why should they be an exception? It is therefore, with the Teutons, the Iranians, and the Indians—in the Edda as in the Bundahišn and the Veda—a common heritage. The Greeks, it is true, seem to have forgotten it before they came down to the Aegean shores: Homer has no trace of it, nor has Hesiod, and the notion of microcosm, when it appears in the fifth century, looks like a novelty indeed. Now, this reintroduction of abolished conceptions is probably, as in the case of the 'orphic' cosmogony of the famous hymn to Zeus (already adduced by Götze), due to the Dionysiac religion with its myth of the cutting up of Zagreus, and to the whole orphico-dionysiac movement. Olerud, who believed in a borrowing from Iran, spoke of 'possibilités que présente la religion de Dionysos de s'assimiler la spéculation orientale de macro-microcosme'. If the hypothesis of an Iranian loan is abandoned, we shall rather conclude that a barbaric myth, known to the Thraco-Phrygians since the times of the Indo-European community, caught up with the Greeks, carried on the Dionysiac wave.

But this mythology does not suffice to account for the system of the *De Hebdomadibus*: it has only provided the substratum for it, namely, the notion of a piece to piece correspondence between the human body and the world. Other elements have come in, to give the system its sevenfold and astronomical structure.

These two words, sevenfold and astronomical, obviously point to the East. As to the former, 'Die Sieben als Herrscherin ist Orientalin', writes Kranz, p. 149. 'Already in the eighth century, if not earlier, it must in this role have invaded Greece via the Ionian coast and have been adopted chiefly by the cult of Apollo.' But it is Babylonia, not Iran, that is now concerned.

[1] In his studies on the 'Pravargya' (*Monde Oriental*, 1929, pp. 113 seq.), on *Zagreus and Dionysos* (Religion och Bibel, 1943, pp. 14 seq.), and on *Dionysos och Orfeus* (cited Olerud, p. 143, n. 1.)

As to the astronomical conception of concentric spheres surrounding an Earth floating in space, this conception—related to the very essence of the list of equivalents in the Greek treatise—is none other than the great intellectual innovation which, born partly under Babylonian influence and upheld first by Anaximander, then by Aristarch of Samos, was profoundly to modify, with Plato and his successors, the bases of Greek religious feeling.

The Bundahišn text, given its late date and the lack of any earlier evidence, must contain a borrowed part, notably the counting in series of five terms. Did this come from Greece, where it is found in the *Timaeus*, or from India, where already the *Upaniṣads* and the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* know it? Either explanation is possible, since doctrines of either country were avowedly incorporated in the Sassanian Avesta. Anyhow, the Bundahišn shows a development of the doctrine in the dualistic direction and, finally, as Götze surmised, rather severe alterations which prove that it was no longer well understood.

We may now pass to a sketch of the history of Greek thought from the point of view of dualism,[1] and, more generally, of a comparison with Iran. The possible contacts, on a few particular points, will be pointed out as we proceed.

Most of the Pre-Socratics, along with Hesiod, see the world as a struggle, a tension between opposites. But this opposition resolves itself through the triumph of Zeus (according to Hesiod) or (according to the Orphics) with the advent of Justice. Anaximander makes Justice regulate the interplay of physical opposites. He sees them first evolving from the undetermined.

As Anaximander believed in the regulation of opposites by a universal law, so did the Pythagoreans believe in Harmony. Besides, they opposed the One to the Many, and philosophy has consumed itself since then in trying to derive the latter from the former. Eleatism was one of the attempts to overcome the Pythagorean dualism.

Pherecydes knew metempsychosis, therefore the spiritual and

[1] This is to appear, considerably revised with the help of the Editors, as part of the entry on *Dualismus* in the *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*. Quotations should be made only from this German adaptation.

moral duality that is implied in it. But he resolved the physical duality into a harmony of opposites (which foreshadows Heraclitus). This harmony is symbolized by the marriage of Zās and Chthoniē and is regulated by Time. The latter is divinized: by simple word-play, he is identified with Kronos.

This divinization of Time, also found in Orphism, is one of the points on which an Iranian influence has been conjectured. According to the orphic theogony in Hieronymos and Hellanikos, Time is a winged serpent with the head of an animal. This makes one think of the lion-headed deity in the Mithra mysteries, in which nearly all scholars, since Zoega, agreed to recognize a representation of Time. However, Zaehner and myself contend that this lion-headed figure was not Infinite Time but Ahriman as Prince of this world: a gnostic conception, cognate with Orphism but not with Pherecydes' system where Time is the supreme god, nor with another Orphic tradition, in which Damascius sees the ordinary Orphic theogony, which gives the god no more exotic epithet than 'ageless', 'great', 'with imperishable designs'; this concurs with the allusions of Sophocles and Pindar, who therefore can no more be cited (as they were by Eisler) as witnesses for the antiquity of the monstrous figures of Time.

To sum up, Chronos 'Time' has nothing specifically Iranian in the classics and Pherecydes. The sheer fact of his emergence as a god in the history of Greek thought is none the less remarkable: we are compelled to think of Zurvān.

Heraclitus, who seems to have stressed the role of struggle in the world and whom Hegel and Marx took as their forerunner, believed nevertheless in a Logos or a Nomos. The essence of this intelligible law was fire. This reminds us of the connexion of Fire with Ṛta 'the true Order' with the Indo-Iranians. Heraclitus has been suspected, for this and other reasons, of drawing from Iranian sources. Thus Luigia Stella pointed out other traits with the Greek thinker which have an Iranian appearance: his scoffing at anthropomorphic images and at bloodshed in the cult, his contempt of corpses as objects worthy of being thrown away as rubbish.[1] Here the exaggeration in the comparison is manifest, for

[1] In a paper on 'Eraclito, Efeso e l'Oriente', *Rendiconti Accad. dei Lincei*, 1927, pp. 571 seq.

what is there in common between the magian rite of exposing the dead and Heraclitus' hostility to all funeral ritual? Heraclitus is an adversary of all religious practices; he does meet the Iranian attitude on two points: the absence of divine images and the proscription of blood sacrifice. But the latter feature is not peculiar to Iran, and another one with Heraclitus runs counter to Zoroaster's doctrine: he makes no exception for the cult of Fire, which Zoroaster extolled. Their agreement on the conception of fire as a symbol of universal order is, however, more than fortuitous. Perhaps either thinker started from a common heritage: the notion of a world order, already made explicit in Greece and expressed in Indo-Iranian by the term Ṛta, and with which was associated the vison of omnipresent Fire.

Be this as it may, one sees in Greece as in Iran the prelude to a dualistic conception more important than the doctrine of opposites which it supersedes. The law of justice represents divine action in the world; to define which action was the main objective of all the early Greek philosophers, as we know from the works of Jaeger[1] and Guthrie.[2] To these thinkers the world appeared as a giant bubble floating in a mass of divine fire or ether, from which it received life. To Anaximenes, for instance, the world breathes: it has a wind-soul, and this soul is the divine. Similarly, Pythagoras teaches that outside the sky there is the *pneuma apeiron*, from which the world draws its breath. Like the world, man has a soul, which is the divine in him. And this soul is, for the Orphics, a breath from the great breath. We cannot help thinking of Vāyu, the all-pervading wind, master of life and death, breath of man and of the world, and of his associated entity *Mainyu*, the Spirit. Here again we may have to do with a background of common heritage from Indo-European times.

The above picture could easily be made to mean that the world resulted from a thickening, a coarsening of the divine substance, and that our soul, imprisoned in its crude envelope, had fallen from a divine abode. Sects developed in which the initiates were aware of an immortal part within themselves: Empedocles felt

1 *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, 1947.
2 'The Presocratic World-Picture', *Harvard Theological Review*, 1952, pp. 87 seq.

himself a fallen god walking among mortals; to prove which he threw himself into Etna. His universe was submitted to the conflict of Love and Hatred, that rule alternately. This is strongly reminiscent of Iran, except that in Greece the alternation is ever-recurrent whereas in Iran each of the two Spirits rules only once.

A dualistic myth was at some relatively late date grafted on to the essentially monistic ideology of the Dionysiac religion. The god was said to have been killed and eaten up by the Titans, who in turn were punished for their crime—the significance of a cosmogonic sacrifice being no longer understood (as with the sacrifice of the Bull in Iran). They were burnt to ashes. From the latter, mankind was born. This accounted for the divine part in man, since the Titans had assimilated the substance of a god.

The main duty was to separate again what had been mixed—an attitude which was to be typical of Manichaeism—to liberate the soul and restore it to its divine abode. The means to this end could be bought from wandering sorcerers, sellers of charms, &c.

Such means were rejected and condemned by Plato. To him, the only way of attaining the divine was by imitating it. But since, following Anaxagoras and Xenophanes, he stressed the spiritual, non-material nature of God, he aggravated at least virtually the separation between God and the universe, opposed to each other as good to evil. This could result in the pessimistic dualism of the Gnostics.

Plato's distinction of spirit and matter was typically Greek, resulting from a multiple tradition—Ionian, Pythagorean, Eleatic, and Sophistic. The opposition between mind and matter had already become an epistemological one: between physical and mathematical science. In this, perhaps Greece's most original achievement, Plato's position differed essentially from Zoroaster's. To the Iranian prophet the distinction was merely between visible things and the superior realities to which his ecstasies, his meditation and devotion gave him access. That there could exist such a thing as the critical problem, he had certainly no inkling.

Plato combined Eleatism with Ionian physics into a new dualism in which the domain of thought and that of sensation are radically opposed to each other; the *Phaedo* is pervaded by a *Weltflucht*, by a longing towards something different. But, in his doctrine of

methexis (participation) Plato combated at once Orphism, according to which becoming has no connexion with being, and Sophistics, which left the spirit no access to truth. His doctrine of the soul, mythically propounded in the *Timaeus*, has been understood in a monistic, optimistic fashion: evil is the absence of God, and the individual soul has a free choice. He would not hear of two spirits, a good one and an evil one. He expressly rejected this in the course of his myth of the *Politic*: the world goes alternately right and wrong, like a wheel turning back and forth. Now this cannot be due to the action of two different gods, one good and one evil, but only to the fact that the world now obeys God's impulse, now is left to itself. Plato may be alluding to the Iranian doctrine: it is only to refute it. In the *Laws* he seems to have believed for a moment in the possibility of a wicked soul, but it is rather a plurality of souls than the world-soul, for the latter can only be good.

Reitzenstein suspected Plato's world-soul of being a replica of Vohu Manah, which was, he stated, Ahura Mazdā's action in the universe. He might as well have chosen *Spənta Mainyu*. Anyhow, we have seen that the notion of a world-soul had long been in existence in Greek tradition prior to Plato. It provided him with an admirable means of linking up the material world with the world of ideas: as a breath, it animated the world; as a mind, it arranged it in an intelligible fashion. There is no room for an Iranian loan here.

On the other hand, it is interesting to compare Plato's and Zoroaster's fundamental attitude, as Simone Pètrement did ten years ago with the zest of a born philosopher, a pupil of Alain, and an intimate friend of Simone Weil.

Simone Pètrement takes her departure in the Gnostic experience of a God alien to the world, inaccessible. This dualism between the world and God—she calls it, as we have seen, transcendent dualism—is, to her, psychologically antecedent to the more common dualism which opposes good to evil within the world. Transcendent dualism, she feels, was Plato's, perhaps already Socrates', essential intuition: to Socrates, at least as we see him through Plato's eyes, to know that we know nothing is the essential wisdom —not simply the first step to wisdom, but perhaps the only certi-

tude ever attainable. Similarly, to know that you are lost is the condition to be saved—indeed it is salvation itself.

This great paradox of our intellectual and moral life, this great otherness of God was surmised by Simone Pètrement to have been experienced by Zoroaster also. Had he not perceived in ecstasy a Being utterly distinct from this ordinary, worldly experience, would he have felt and grasped with such vigour the conflict within the world of the forces of good and evil?

Both Plato and Zoroaster are thus seen as Gnostics *avant la lettre*. As far as the former is concerned, this represents a common trend, recently denounced by Nils Almberg. In his thesis *Platons Världssjäl och Aristoteles' Gudsbegrepp*, 1941, a book which seems to have escaped the notice of Simone Pètrement—and of Festugière, author of four volumes on *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* —the Swedish scholar shows how the neo-Platonists, and after them all the modern scholars, have imagined Plato positing the world-soul expressly to bridge the gap between God and the world. In this they lent him their own attitude. Plato himself never felt such a distance between God and the world that a third term should be deemed necessary to link them up: to him, the world-soul, a traditional conception, was inferred from the contemplation of the world order, as was God; like God also, it was the reason, the *nous*, the harmony of spheres without which the world order would be unexplained.

To understand the difference between Plato's attitude as it was and the view his distant disciples the neo-Platonists took of it, a sketch of the evolution of philosophy in the interval will be useful.

Of Plato's disciples, who claim to be his heirs, some were dualists, the others monists. Aristotle went the monistic way in criticizing Plato's dualism: he replaced the separate Ideas by immanent Forms. Between what Plato separated, he seeks an organic bond. He is the first to construct a *Stufenkosmos*. After him, participation (*methexis*) becomes with the Stoics generation, with the neo-Pythagoreans explication, with the neo-Platonists emanation, and finally, with the mystics, illumination.[1] For Philo the Jew the universal becomes personal, philosophy thus tending to regress into myth, as in Gnosticism: he, like the great Jewish

[1] Cf. Ernst Hoffmann, *Platonismus und Mystik im Altertum*, 1935.

prophets, has a transcendent conception of God; he needs a mean term between God and the world: it will be the Logos, taken over from Heraclitus, &c.

Posidonius, concerned with reconciling the opposites through the doctrine of means, is the first who interprets the world-soul as a mean term.

Plutarch also is obsessed by the notion of a mediation between two radically separate principles. Seeking authorities for his own views in Egypt and above all in Persia, he sees in Mithra essentially a mediator.

The evolution of Platonism in the first centuries of our Era, important as it is for the formation of the Christian dogma, is not well known. The notes in Proclus on Numenius, Harpocration, Atticus, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, &c., arise from the urge to refute, through and beyond these philosophers, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

The Alexandrian period is dominated by the following conceptions: the astral religion which Plato had implanted, which had been developed in the *Epinomis*, with Aristotle, the Stoics, &c., leads to fatalism. A remedy to the latter is found in magic, in the mysteries, oriental or otherwise, which revive the Orphic notion of *soma-sema* and the conviction that the soul, fallen into a degraded universe, belongs beyond the world. The Gnostics and some Hermetists, in whom the *Weltflucht* is emphasized, explain creation itself as the consequence of a Fall.

Plotinus, who seems first to have shared the view of the Gnostics of the Roman branch of the sect whose library has lately been discovered at Nag-Hammadi, reacts against them, reproaching them with the coarseness of their conceptions and their blasphemy against the universe. To him, the world is not the consequence of a Fall, but of an effulgence. Only the individual soul has fallen. He tries to overcome the metaphysical dualism, and so do his successors, all claiming allegiance to Plato. As Simone Pètrement puts it, Plato is dualist in the second century and monist in the third. There subsists, nevertheless, with all the neo-Platonists a dualism which is a heritage more ancient than Plato himself: matter or evil is a separate principle, irreducible to God.

The neo-Platonists' view of Plato should not therefore be dis-

missed off-hand. They could legitimately find in his *Weltflucht*, in his deep dualism, the roots or seeds of their own attitude. The problem is what relative importance is to be assigned to this feature in a complete appreciation of Plato's teaching.

There is a parallel problem about Zoroaster: may we trace back to him, to the Gāthās, the origin of the Gnostic movement?

VI

IRAN, ISRAEL, GNOSTICISM

THE question of the part played by Iran in the origins of Gnosticism is one in which not only Iran and Greece are involved but also Palestine. It seems, therefore, advisable to reserve it for the end and to deal first with the relations between the Iranian religion and Judaism.

Although the Jews felt themselves in honour bound not to acknowledge any debt to their neighbours in religious matters—Yahweh was a jealous god—they did adopt some religious features from abroad; this is easy to show on several minor points, less so in more important, but also less precise, matters like dualism, angelology, and eschatology. It should, however, be stressed, with Bertholet in his lecture *Das religionsgeschichtliche Problem des Spätjudentums*, 1909, that despite all this borrowing, the Jews did maintain their religious apartness. Honour was safe after all.

The Iranian influence on post-exilic Jewish religion was estimated as decisive not only by Iranists like L. Mills who, in a rather prolix style, dealt with it in several books, from *Zaraθuštra, Philo, the Achaemenids and Israel*, 1906, to *Our own Religion in ancient Persia*, 1913, but also by many Semitists like Stave, *Über den Einfluß des Parsismus auf das Judentum*, 1898, and E. Böklen, *Die Verwandtschaft der jüdisch-christlichen mit der parsischen Eschatologie*, 1902, or by Bousset, whose *Die Religion des Judentums im späthellenistischen Zeitalter*, in its third edition revised by Gressmann, 1926, remains the best representative of this tendency. The same view is also upheld by a scholar who seems at home both in Iranian and Semitic studies, namely G. Widengren; besides his 'Stand und Aufgaben der Iranischen Religionsgeschichte' in *Numen*, 1954, pp.16–83, and 1955, pp. 47–134, already cited, see now 'Juifs et Iraniens à l'époque des Parthes', in *Vetus Testamentum*, Supplem. iv, 1957, pp. 223 seq., where will be found additional bibliography. The historian E. Meyer also shared these

views, in his *Geschichte des Altertums* and, more fully, in *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, ii, 1921. Von Gall, in his *Basileia tou Theou*, 1926, gives a detailed catalogue of points of similarity, always concluding in favour of a Jewish dependence upon Iran. As for Ch. Autran, author of *Mithra, Zoroastre et la préhistoire aryenne du christianisme*, 1935, and *La Préhistoire du Christianisme*, 2 vols., 1941–4, he may be cited as one of those victims (in Schaeder's words) who periodically yield to the temptation of finding in Iran secret sources of Christianity. Already Volney, to cite only the most famous of them, ascribed to Parsee influence the beliefs that appear in post-exilic Judaism in the Immortality of the Soul, in Hell and Paradise, in the revolt of the Angel, chief author of the evils of Mankind, &c. (*Les Ruines*, 1791, chap. xxi).

Many scholars still accept this hypothesis as a demonstrated fact; so, for instance, Rudolf Otto, *Reich Gottes und Menschensohn*, 1934. On the contrary, a few like Scheftelowitz appear reluctant to admit any Gentile encroachment. The last named, in *Die altpersische Religion und das Judentum*, 1920, in his zeal to defend his native religion from any suspicion of dependence, sometimes shoots obviously beyond the mark. If he finds the same fact on both sides, he refuses to deduce from it an Iranian origin even if it is attested much later on the Jewish side. For instance, the dogma that the souls of the just will enjoy God's company and that Paradise is an abode of light, a belief already taught by Zoroaster, does not appear in Jewish literature prior to the Talmud, Enoch, or the Psalms of Solomon. It must, nevertheless, according to Scheftelowitz, be of Jewish origin.

Christian scholars like Father J. Lagrange, who in his paper 'La Religion des Perses, la réforme de Zoroastre et le Judaïsme', *Revue biblique*, 1904, proved to be among the very few who adopted Darmesteter's view of the Philonian origin of the Gāthās; Bishop N. Söderblom in the last part of *La Vie future d'après le Mazdéisme*, 1901, or the Rev. J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, 1913, chap. ix, found it difficult, as Christians, to admit a large Iranian influence on their religion. Moulton writes (p. 296) 'that the difference of setting is so complete that we have not to argue against the perversely ingenious people who write as if there was a complete set of Sacred Books of the East in Aramaic on the shelves of a public

library in Nazareth or Capernaum.' However, the interesting point is not that Moulton and others shrank from acknowledging the debt of Christianity, but that Zoroastrianism prompted them to a fresh analysis and appraisal of their own religion from the comparative point of view. The best example of this will be found in Moulton, and there is little that we could add to it.

However, a new survey of the whole question has become necessary, owing, on the one hand, to the new data provided by the Dead Sea Scrolls, and, on the other hand, as will be seen, to our better appreciation of Zervanism.

Yahweh was so extolled and purified by the prophets that the need came to be felt for bridging the gap between His transcendence and the world. The Logos, which Philo borrowed from Greek philosophy, was but one of the abstract solutions which presented themselves, besides Wisdom, Glory, the Spirit, &c. The Wisdom of God is mentioned in Proverbs, Jesus ben Sirach, the Wisdom of Solomon, the Slavonic Enoch, &c. She is the beloved one and counsellor of the Lord, the friend and guide of men. Her intrusion into Judaism is so abrupt that a foreign influence seems likely. But we are embarrassed to find for her a prototype in Iranian religion. Was it Vohu Manah, or Ārmaiti?

The Spirit, or Holy Spirit, is comparable to Spənta Mainyu, and so are God's six potencies, in Philo's speculation, to the Iranian entities. Since the latter were known to the Greeks, there would be nothing surprising if Philo had heard of them. In fact, he mentions the Persian doctrine of the virtues of God as something familiar.

But the similarity is limited to a general analogy: there are no individual correspondences. The faculty of abstraction may have developed with the Jews under the influence of Hellenism.

The case is different with post-exilic soteriology. After the Exile, the traditional expectation of a King-Messiah, from the house of David, who would restore Israel as an independent nation and make her triumph over all her enemies, yielded gradually to a conception that was both more universal and more ethical. The salvation of Israel remained essential; but it was to take place in the setting of a general renovation. The appearance of the Saviour would signify the end of this creation and the birth of a new

world; his judgement on Israel's enemies would be a general judgement, separating mankind into the good and the wicked.

The transformation was a gradual one, so that, for instance, to the second Isaiah the hope in a universal kingdom of God, a hope that had superseded that in Israel's restoration, had nothing eschatological about it: it had nothing to do with the 'end of the world', a notion unknown to the author. In spite of this, the new conception, universal and ethical in character, is so reminiscent of Iran that many scholars do not hesitate to attribute it, with Bousset, to an influence from that country, especially as no strong personalities are found in Israel in the last centuries before our era who could account for such a profound alteration.

However, the resemblance between the Messiah and the Saošyant remains rather vague and general unless the following points are included in the comparison. The notion of an eschatological saviour appears to be connected, both in Iran and in Judaism, with that of a Primal Man. On the other hand, the Saviour may be himself a victim, so that he redeems himself as he redeems mankind. This requires closer examination.

First, can the Son of Man be compared to Gayōmart? The former, as he appears in Daniel and Enoch, seems a purely eschatological figure, quite distinct from the Primal Being to whom Job and Ezekiel allude (Job xv. 7–8: 'Art thou the first man that was born? or wast thou made before the hills? Hast thou heard the secret of God?'; Ezekiel xxviii. 2 seq.: 'Because thine heart is lifted up, and thou hast said, I am a God, I sit in the seat of God, &c.'). Nevertheless, the very phrase 'Son of Man' does imply a sort of archetype or prototype. But it is on the Iranian side that the comparison is wanting, for Gayōmart, an essentially cosmogonical figure, is not attested in an eschatological role prior to the Pahlavī books.[1] The fact that the Avesta puts him in one series with Zoroaster and the Saošyant does not at all imply that the three were considered as one and the same being, or even as forming a lineage.

As to the second point, the notion of the saved saviour, *der erlöste Erlöser*, whatever its starting-point in Judaism—probably

[1] Windischmann, *Zoroastrische Studien*, 1863, pp. 241 seq., pointed out the relations between Primal Man and Saviour. But they are all of late date.

with the second Isaiah's Man of sorrows (chap. liii)—or its affinity with the widespread theme of the Suffering Just One, its appearance in Iran is, except for one late, dubious allusion, strictly limited to Manichaeism, so that Reitzenstein's assumption of an Iranian *Erlösungsmysterium* is baseless unless we contend that everything in Manichaeism has an Iranian origin, which comes very near to begging the question.

A third possibility for a precise comparison is indicated by Widengren in his paper, already cited, *Stand und Aufgaben der iranischen Religionsgeschichte*, pp. 105 seq.: the notion of a God incarnate, of a divine saviour, would have originated in Mithraism. Since, however, Widengren announces a full treatment of the subject, we must reserve our judgement on this alluring hypothesis. Suffice it to observe that the chief document in this respect, the passage in *Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum* by the Pseudo-Chrysostom, is suspected, like all similar commentaries or paraphrases, of being a Christian forgery in support of the Gospel story, and that, should it be genuine, it takes us back only to the fourth century.[1] Moreover, the allusion to Mithra is very veiled indeed. We seem at first to be placed in the right setting:

> [The Magi] would ascend a certain mountain situated there which was called in their language Mount of Victory, and which contained a certain stone-cave and was adorned with fountains and rare trees; which having ascended, they washed themselves and afterwards would pray and praise God in silence for three days; so did they from generation to generation, always expecting that star of blessedness to arise among their own, &c.,

but then the picture is spoiled, as far as the Mithraic atmosphere is concerned, when we read that the star 'appeared to them descending upon that Mount of Victory, having in it a form like that of a small child and over it the image of a cross . . .'.[2]

As for the Oracle of Hystaspes, although going back to the second century A.D., it may still be too late even in its alleged Iranian original to be adduced as the source of an essential Christian doctrine. It was undoubtedly, as was seen already by Kuhn, *Festgruss Roth*, 1893, pp. 217 seq., then by Ganschinietz, then by

[1] See Cumont, *Les Mages hellénisés*, ii. 118.

[2] Apparuit eis descendens super montem illum victorialem, habens in se formam quasi pueri parvuli et super se similitudinem crucis.

Windisch, *Die Orakel des Hystaspes*, 1929, a combination of Saošyant prophecy with the promise of a Messiah, designed to enliven with Iranian elements the bare narrative of Matthew and so to win over to Christianity Iranians open to Hellenistic culture. But no special connexion with Mithraism is apparent. The *rex magnus de caelo* in Lactantius, whom Bidez–Cumont would identify with Mithra, was, according to Windisch, a mere Christian accretion, evidently borrowed from the Sibylline Oracles.[1]

Generally speaking, it should not be forgotten, when comparing Mithraism with Christianity at its birth, that our oldest monuments of the Mithra mysteries take us back only to the second century A.D.

Finally, there would appear to be yet another Iranian connexion with Palestine in the term *naxčīr*, in Iranian 'hunt', used in the 'War of the Sons of Light with the Sons of Darkness'.[2] But the reason why this term, devoid of any religious meaning in Iran, should be used in Jewish eschatology remains so far completely obscure.[3]

We pass now to Satan and the doctrine of the two Spirits.

A considerable change took place in the conception of Satan. Whereas in the prologue to Job or in the mouth of Zechariah he was but God's humble servant, entrusted with the task of a prosecutor, he then became his adversary. Two successive versions of one and the same story, in Samuel and the Chronicles, show us Satan literally taking the place of God. Samuel tells us how Yahweh's wrath lets itself loose against Israel and how he prompts David to a census of the people. Instead of which we read in the Chronicles: 'Satan arose against Israel and prompted David to a census of the people.'

In Apocalyptic literature also we can with Bousset–Gressmann, pp. 252 seq., follow this newcomer's intrusion. The Jewish Apocalypses were first concerned with a judgement on the rebel angels, the sons and spirits of Belial and Mastema (Book of Jubilees), as well as on the angels who had transgressed their power to punish;

[1] Bidez–Cumont, ii. 372; Windisch, p. 72 (cf. Sib. Or. iii. 651).

[2] See Dupont-Sommer, *Rev. Hist. des Rel.* ii (1955), 25 seq.

[3] It has in fact, as Father de Menasce points out to me, no religious meaning at all and should be translated 'slaughter'.

later on, in the Assumption of Moses, the final decision is conceived as a struggle between God and the Devil; then, in the work underlying the Testament of the Patriarchs, in Sibylline literature, and in the Assumption of Isaiah, Belial appears as the adversary of God.

This implies a pessimistic vision which may be due in part to Israel's misfortunes under Greek and Roman subjection, but it would be rash to deny that the example of the Iranian Devil helped the Jews to transform the ancient prosecutor into God's adversary. A more precise parallel, however, is provided by the doctrine of the two spirits.

Prior to the discovery of the Dead Sea scrolls, we had but scanty references to this tenet in Jewish literature. It had been studied by H. Ringgren in his *Word and Wisdom*, 1947. We knew that Yahweh's spirit was not always good and benevolent. It is told in Judges how Yahweh sends an evil spirit between Abimelek and the citizens of Sichem. When Yahweh's spirit forsakes Saul, an 'evil spirit from Yahweh' besets him instead.

In apocryphal, early Christian, and rabbinical literature the good and evil spirits stood in contrast with one another: the Testament of Judas speaks of the two spirits who serve men, that of truth and that of error; then it goes on to mention a third spirit, which personifies the power of choice: 'And in the midst is the spirit of understanding of the mind, to which it belongeth to turn whithersoever it will.' As a rule, only the good and the evil spirits are named, as in the fourth Gospel; in Hermas they are called 'the holy and the evil spirits who dwell together in man'.

Instead of these laconic mentions, the *Manual of Discipline* found in the Dead Sea scrolls gives us quite a small treatise on the two spirits from which I may quote a few passages in Millar Burrows's convenient translation.[1] We may note beforehand that the fact is stressed that God is the creator of all things and beings: 'From the God of knowledge is all that is and that is to be . . . .'

Then, it continues:

He created man to have dominion over the world and made for him two spirits, that he might walk with them until the appointed time of his visitation; they are the spirits of truth and of error. In the abode

[1] M. Burrows, *The Dead Sea Scrolls*, 1955, pp. 374 seq.

of light are the origins of truth, and from the source of darkness are the origins of error. In the hand of the prince of lights is dominion over all sons of righteousness; in the ways of light they walk. And in the hand of the angel of darkness is all dominion over the sons of error; and in the way of darkness they walk. And by the angel of darkness is the straying of all the sons of righteousness, and all their sin and their iniquities and their guilt, and the transgressions of their works in his dominion, according to the mysteries of God, until his time, and all their afflictions and the appointed times of their distress in the dominion of his enmity. . . .

In these two spirits are the origins of all the sons of man, and in their divisions all the hosts of men have their inheritance in their generations. In the way of the two spirits men walk. . . .

But God in the mysteries of his understanding and his glorious wisdom has ordained a period for the ruin of error, and in the appointed time of punishment he will destroy it for ever. And then shall come out forever the truth of the world. . . .

The text from which these short extracts are taken was, shortly after its publication, made the subject of two independent studies, one by Dupont-Sommer, 'L'Instruction sur les deux esprits dans le "Manuel de Discipline"', in *Revue d'histoire des religions*, 1952, the other by K. G. Kuhn, 'Die Sektenschrift und die Iranische Religion', in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1952. Both scholars made reference to the well-known Gāthic doctrine of the two spirits, but although one of them, after stressing the similarity—with an ethical and eschatological dualism on either side—indicated at least one point on which the Jewish document differed from its alleged Iranian source, namely, predestination, as opposed to the Zoroastrian free choice, it did not occur to either of them, being non-specialists of Iranian studies, to look outside the Gāthās for a possible model.

It is true that the divergence just mentioned can be attributed to its having been adapted to the context of the Jewish religion; so also could the fact that Yahweh is proclaimed the creator of either spirit, which is, as we have seen, contrary to the Avestan doctrine. However, the survival of a pure Gāthic doctrine up to the time of the *Manual* would be something of an enigma, knowing what changes had intervened in Iranian religion since the days of the prophet.

In fact, one feature at least points to a non-Gāthic Iranian source: the identification of the good spirit with light, of the evil one with darkness. This is an identification for which the Gāthās provided at best a modest starting-point, in Y. 31. 7 ('He who thought let the blessed space be filled with light').[1]

This encourages us to seek also a non-Gāthic Iranian source to account for the absence, in the Jewish document, of any reference to what was the very essence of the Gāthic tenet: the role of the two spirits as actors in the drama of choice. (We may note, in this connexion, that this function is apparently so alien to them that it has to be ascribed, in the Testament of Judas just quoted, to a third one.)

Finally, if we recapitulate these features, predestination as opposed to free choice, identification of the two spirits with light and darkness, and add to this their explicit creation by God, we are reminded of the Zervanite myth of a god of Time or Destiny, father of light Ormazd and dark Ahriman. Since this is the form under which the Jews of the first century B.C. may *a priori* be presumed to have known Iranian religion,[2] we are confirmed in our conjecture.

This is corroborated, on the other hand, by what we know through Josephus[3] of the part played by Destiny in the religion of the Essenes, and, through the Dead Sea texts of the importance of lots, times, appointed times with the sectarians of the New Alliance. Here is the passage in Josephus' *Jewish Antiquities*: 'The sect of the Essenes holds that Destiny is master of everything and that nothing happens to men that was not decreed by it.'[4] And here are the relevant passages in the *Manual* and the *Thanksgiving Psalms*. To quote first from the latter (iii. 12; Burrows, p. 404): 'Thou hast cast for man an eternal lot. . . .' From the *Manual* (iv. 24): '. . . and according to each man's inheritance in truth he

[1] See Lommel, *Die Religion Zarathustras*, p. 28.

[2] Widengren, *Stand und Aufgaben*, p. 133, points in the same direction, without, however, drawing any conclusion as to the source of the doctrine of the spirits in the *Manual*. The connexion with Zervanism has been seen by H. Michaud, 'Un mythe zervanite dans un des MSS. de Qumrān', *Vetus Testamentum*, 1955; but see J. D.-G., *Indo-Iranian Journal*, 1957, p. 97.

[3] Quoted by Dupont-Sommer, *Aperçus préliminaires sur les manuscrits de la Mer Morte*, 1950, p. 63. See also *Nouveaux Aperçus*, 1953, pp. 141 seq.

[4] *AJ*. xiii. 5, 9.

does right, and so he hates error; but according to his possession in the lot of error he does wickedly in it, and so he abhors truth.' Farther on, among the Rules of the Order (Burrows, p. 376): 'At their direction the regulation of the lot shall be decided for every case regarding law, wealth, or justice, &c.'; and ix. 16 seq.: 'These are the statutes for the wise man, that he may walk in them with every living being, according to the regulation of one time and another; to do the will of God according to all that has been revealed for each time at that time; and to learn all the wisdom that has been found, according to the times, and the statute of the time.'

In contrast to the solid monotheism of the prophets, both the conception of Satan as God's adversary and the doctrine of the two spirits represented progress in a pessimistic direction; in which a further stage was reached when Satan was called by Paul the 'king of this age', or by John the 'prince of this world'. A similar stage is seen in Zervanism in the concluding episode of the great myth when Zurvān says to Ahriman, 'I have made Ormazd to rule above thee' (Theodore bar Kōnai, Eznik), meaning, as shown by Zaehner, that Ahriman is the prince of this world, but Ormazd rules the world of spirit above.[1] Again, the same conception should be inferred for Mithraism, if the lion-headed figure, generally interpreted, from Zoega to Cumont, as Boundless Time, alleged to be the supreme god, must in fact be recognized, with Legge, Zaehner,[2] and J. D.-G.,[3] as Ahriman; for this cruel, ugly deity clearly appears with his serpent, his signs of the Zodiac, his four wings, as master of this world. This conception is characteristic of Gnosticism, and this leads us to what will be our last problem. We should, however, first complete our survey of the points of comparison between Judaism and the Iranian religion. But we may content ourselves with a brief enumeration of these matters, with which we have dealt in *Ormazd et Ahriman*. They are: the doctrine of millenial periods, the last judgement, the book in heaven where the deeds of men are inscribed, the belief in resurrection, the last transformation of the earth, Paradise either on

[1] *Zurvan*, p. 70.

[2] *Postscript to Zurvan*, *BSOAS*, 1955, p. 237.

[3] J. Duchesne-Guillemin, *Ahriman et le Dieu suprême dans les mystères de Mithra*, *Numen*, 1955, pp. 190 seq.

earth or in heaven, the ecstatic ascent of Enoch and of Ardā Vīrāf from heaven to heaven, hell, the souls of animals accusing man in Slavonic Enoch, 58, as does the Ox-soul in Yasna 29; lastly, in Tobit, the demon Asmodeus, alias Aešma- (*daēva-*).

Mazdean dualism was thought by L. H. Mills to have influenced Hegel's dialectic through the Gnostics, Jacob Böhme, and Fichte.[1] In fact, F. C. Baur showed in *Die christliche Gnosis*, 1835, that German idealism, especially in its Hegelian form, was the Gnosis of the time and a parallel phenomenon to the ancient Gnosis.[2]

It would be interesting to ask ourselves what appealed to moderns in Gnosticism, from the Freemasons or the Romantics to Wilfred Monod or C. S. Jung. It may have appeared as an extreme form of non-conformism, as a free marginal comment on Christianity, preserving under a seemingly philosophical form the quintessence of the great religion, while at the same time providing an escape from historical difficulties (being itself independent of history), or from the shackles of dogma (since its mythology could always be taken in a symbolic sense), or even from conventional morals (since its anti-cosmism oscillated between asceticism and moral indifference); or it may have been welcomed as a protest against monotheism.

Adolf Harnack defined Gnosticism as 'eine akute Hellenisierung des Christentums', a definition long since outdated, since it was shown that Gnosticism was not a deviation from Christianity but an independent movement; that it owed much to eastern religions; that its notion of γνῶσις had little in common with the Greek conception of knowledge.

The oriental element was stressed by Anz, *Ursprung des Gnostizismus*, 1897; by Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, 1907; by Reitzenstein in *Poimandres*, 1906; *Die Göttin Psyche*, 1917; *Die hellenistische Mysterienreligionen*, 3rd edn. 1927; *Das iranische Erlösungsmysterium*, 1921; *Studien zum antiken Synkretismus* (with Schaeder), 1926. While Anz only considered the myth of the Ascent of the soul through the celestial spheres and ascribed it to

[1] It was this conviction which determined Mills's vocation as an Iranist: 'I entered upon Zend philology in the summer of 1876 in order to follow out a study of the history of Hegel's method of procedure', &c., *Zaraθuštra, Philo, the Achaemenids and Israel*, 1906, p. vii.

[2] G. Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion*, 1951, p. 45.

Babylonia, Bousset and Reitzenstein also studied the Primal Man and the notion of the redeemed redeemer, tracing them back to an alleged Iranian original, with secondary Babylonian ingredients. This is not the place to recall the fundamental anachronism in Reitzenstein's method; it has been done elsewhere.[1] It will be interesting, on the other hand, to mention general estimates made by Reitzenstein and by Schaeder of the Iranian religion as compared with the Jewish. The most important agreement between the Zoroastrian and the Manichaean doctrine, also with the Indian religions, Schaeder writes in effect (*Studien*, p. 295), is that they do not aim primarily at expressing the will of God, like the religion of Israel, but rather at giving a comprehensive interpretation of the world. He then adds (p. 297) that with Zoroaster the speculative motive yielded to the prophetic, exhortative, only to reappear the stronger later on.

As for Reitzenstein, he distinguishes two types of religion.[2] In the first one, represented by the Babylonian and the old Israelite religions: 'The god has created or elected for himself a certain tribe and takes care of it, especially of its representative the king, as long as they remain faithful to him; but his sway avails only for the earthly life; no community of nature or hope of after-life unites the people with him.' In the Indian and Iranian religions, on the contrary: 'The soul, at least that of the followers of the true, viz. of the tribal religion, is essentially akin to God and therefore, like him, immortal. Man and God are infinitely nearer to each other.' So far so good. It must be regretted, however, that there was apparently no room in the picture for the Greek religion!

That Gnosticism was indebted to Greece for its structure, although part of its material was oriental in origin, was Schaeder's contention in his lecture *Urform und Fortbildungen des manichäischen Systems*, 1927. He was reproached for this partial reversal to Harnack's conception by H. Jonas, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist*, 1934, who insisted on the irrational character of the term *gnōsis* and on the fact that Gnosticism was much less a philosophy than a mythology.

Jonas also pointed out (p. 76, note) the main defect in Reitzenstein's method, which consisted of projecting a Gnostic myth, that

[1] J. Duchesne-Guillemin, *Ormazd et Ahriman*, pp. 57 and 115.
[2] In the 3rd edn. of *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, p. 6.

of the Anthropos in the Poimandres, for instance, on to a remote Iranian past that could then conveniently be invoked as its source. He also deprecated all attempts at accounting for Gnosticism as the result of particularly hard times. He then proposed, for his part, as a disciple of O. Spengler and Heidegger, to ascribe Gnosticism to the emergence of 'cin neues Weltgefühl' (p. 74), a statement which does look like evading the question of the origins and antecedents of the movement.

A decidedly evasive attitude is that adopted by Festugière who, in his four huge volumes, already cited, on *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, 1949–53, contented himself with writing a history of Hermetism 'plutôt que de me perdre dans la recherche, assez vaine, des sources grecques, juives, égyptiennes ou iraniennes de ces doctrines' (ibid., vol. ii, p. xii), but in fact derived everything from Plato.

The uncertainty of our present attitude on the matter of Gnosticism is well illustrated if we compare the positions of two eminent scholars, Zaehner and Widengren. The former, observing in his book *Zurvan*, p. 79, that 'the idea that the evil deity has control of this world and that the good deity rules on high and far removed from the world is pure Gnosticism', concludes that 'the idea is un-Iranian and would, therefore, be borrowed from a Western source', thus taking 'Gnostic' and 'Iranian' as mutually exclusive.

Widengren, on the contrary, has set himself to exploring, in the Reitzenstein tradition but with increased means, the possibilities of an Iranian origin of Gnosticism. His views, which he will elaborate in forthcoming publications, were put forward in a paper on 'Der Iranische Hintergrund der Gnosis', in *Zeitschrift für Religions- u. Geistesgeschichte*, 1952, Heft 2. He first compares the notion of salvation in Iran and India, and contends that it is essentially the same on both sides, proceeding as it does from a will to transcend the world by uniting one's own soul with the Great Soul. (We may note incidentally that Widengren thus finds himself unwittingly in agreement with Simone Pètrement's thesis on transcendent dualism.)

But, on the Iranian side, the evidence for this pessimistic, anti-

cosmic strain, admittedly not commonly imputed to Iran, is scanty indeed, and it must be confessed that it has generally been overlaid or held in check by Zoroaster's optimistic ethical dualism.

The means of salvation were present in the Gāthic system itself, in the form of man's union with the entities, especially in the union of his Vohu Manah with what was later on (in Manichaeism) to be called the 'Great Vohu Manah' (*Manwahmēd*). This has been studied by Widengren in his book *The Great Vohu Manah and the Apostle of God*, 1945, the main thesis of which is plausible even if we refuse to accept Nyberg's contention, endorsed by Widengren, that *avaŋhānē* in Y. 33. 5 referred to ecstasy, not to death.

The role of Vohu Manah is attested in later Mazdeism in Vīdēvdāt 19. 31–32 where Vohu Manah welcomes the soul into heaven and accompanies it to the golden throne of Ahura Mazdāh. This was analysed by Wikander, who, on the basis of specific details like the robe that is given to the soul, concludes in favour of an Indo-Iranian origin.[1]

The remaining evidence is less important, being either less precise or of later date. Less precise is the use of the notion of 'knowledge' in the Gāthās. It is, indeed, essential to know before one chooses, but this is something different from the *gnōsis* that is the direct means of salvation. Of later date are Pahlavī passages, the Commentary to the *Aogəmadaēča*, *Pandnāmak* 3, 5, and 31, as well as compound-names meaning 'saved by Mithra', or the like. To adduce these facts, and also Zervanism, as evidence in the present case is really begging the question, although it may be alleged, as far as the Mithra-names are concerned, that their value is greatly enhanced by the Avestan evidence on Vohu Manah, since the latter was, in Dumézil's view, the substitute for Mithra.

There remains one last piece of evidence,[2] which is also the *pièce de résistance* in Widengren's *Iranischer Hintergrund der Gnosis*, namely, the conception of the redeemed redeemer. The significance in this connexion of the Syriac Allegory of the Pearl was pointed out by Reitzenstein and is summarized as follows: 'The Pearl which he saves designates the collective soul redeemed

[1] *Vayu*, pp. 26–43.

[2] The notion of the Primal Man as a saviour seems irrelevant since, as we have seen above, it was only at a very late date that Gayomard assumed an eschatological role.

from matter, the sum of the souls that are to be saved. The redeemer descends therefore into matter in order to save the soul, but, if he is to complete his work as a redeemer, he needs himself to be redeemed from the power of material existence.'

Widengren shows that the Syriac narrative goes back to a Parthian original. But this does not preclude some influence from the West, and may we not indeed think of a Babylonian origin? Widengren himself invited us to do so in his earlier study *Mesopotamian Elements in Manichaeism*, 1946, but no reference is made to it in the paper under consideration. He had shown there that the prototype of the Gnostic myth may have been the drama of Tammuz, who descends, combats, suffers, and is imprisoned, before he rises again, a myth which was already interpreted in a late Babylonian text, referred to by Widengren (p. 178), as symbolizing the destiny of mankind.

Be that as it may, Widengren's positive contribution may be estimated as follows. He very appropriately points out traces in Iran of an attitude which survived from the Indo-Iranian past and was obscured by Zoroaster's active ethical dualism but was apt later on to be revived. We thus come to the conclusion that both Iran and Greece possessed, aside from a more optimistic conception, an anti-cosmic strain that could develop into Gnosticism. This strain had, however, its distinctive traits on either side. We may briefly recall, on the Greek side, first, the identification of the Spirit with good, of matter with evil, secondly, the world picture of a scale of degrees (*Stufen-kosmos*) ranging from pure ether to sheer matter, which provided a ready frame for the generalized notion or myth of the fall, fall of the angels, fall of the soul, descent of the saviour, and for the correlative ascent back to heaven.

On the Iranian side the drama unfolded between two poles: two co-eternal spirits. But although the spirit–matter distinction is never identified, prior to Manichaeism, with that of good and evil, there is with Zoroaster the notion, akin to Plato's conception of the spirit–matter relationship, that the evil spirit is purely negative and destructive, a mere limit to God's power.

This conception was later on to coarsen when Ahriman was more and more conceived as a pendant to Ormazd; a gross, rigid

dualism which was notably reflected in the Vīdēvdāt. It was probably the work of the Median Magi, as was shown by Moulton in his *Early Zoroastrianism*, 1913, well before Nyberg propounded the same thesis in his *Religionen des alten Iran*, 1937–8. However, although Manichaeism alone adopted this extreme form of dualism, it may, on the other hand, have combined with the pessimistic, anti-cosmic trend that continued apart from the main current of Zoroastrianism to help in shaping Gnosticism.

The latter, with its asceticism sometimes reversed into ethical indifference, may well have arisen from the encounter of Iranian and Greek elements that were partly similar, partly complementary, without excluding Babylonian and other Semitic elements. The encounter may indeed have taken place on Semitic soil (why not in Samaria?), but probably at different places independently, for Gnosticism was a movement, not a sect.

Gnosticism, once it had become the powerful religion into which it developed in the second and third centuries, was bound to radiate back into Iran. This occurred not only in Zervanism and Manichaeism but was felt even in orthodox Mazdeism. We may recall in this respect the idea that the salvation of the world will be the work of successive saviours who will all be incarnations of one and the same primal saviour. We may refer, on the Christian side, to the Pseudoclementine *Recognitions* where it is taught that the saviour of men must be a man, and that he will be the very one who had already incarnated himself in Adam, Enoch, &c.

The Gnostic tendency appears also in cosmogony. According to at least two texts,[1] when the beings are given their material form, this creation is motivated, with Ormazd, by the need to counter Ahriman's attack. The first initiative to material creation, therefore, comes from the evil spirit.

The end of the world is also sometimes conceived not as the beginning of a new world—of happiness for the good, of chastisement or destruction for the wicked—but as a return unto God, or rather as a reabsorption into him of what had emanated from him.

In cosmology there is a remarkable and well-known compromise

[1] *Škand gum. vič.*, chap. vii; see Menasce's edition, 1945, p. 85; Biruni, cited Nyberg, *Religionen*, p. 481.

between the ancient Iranian religion, which divinized the celestial bodies, and Gnosticism or Manichaeism, which made demons of them. Official Mazdeism saw only the planets as demons, whilst the sun, the moon, and the stars remained gods.

Lastly, when mysticism, under Islam, invaded Iran both from the west and the east, it did find a favourable soil. Indeed, Sohrawardī, who died in 1191, felt himself the heir of both Iran and Greece; thanks to him, for the first and only time the Mazdaean Archangels married their sisters, Plato's Ideas.

POSTSCRIPT

BEING invited to add a postscript some sixteen months after these lectures were delivered, I may avail myself of this opportunity to mention a few recent or forthcoming works.

Marian Molé is shortly to defend a thesis in Paris, in which the Gāthās are considered as essentially cultic: the theory which Mowinckel and others evolved in explaining the Psalms as reflecting New Year festivals is thus for the first time applied to our Iranian texts. This entirely new approach may well mark a turning-point in the history of our response to Zoroaster.

George Cameron, in a lecture delivered at Liège in March 1957, adopted, on the religion of the Achæmenids, a position similar to that which, under Barr's inspiration, has been defended here. It is also, in substance, shared by Molé; three scholars attacking the problem from three different angles have independently reached the conclusion that the Achæmenids, from Darius onwards, were Zoroastrians: thus restoring to Zoroaster the paternity of Ahura Mazdā.

Another spontaneous agreement is worth recording, namely, on the exact form of Mazdā's name, between F. Kuiper, whose article 'Avestan mazdā', *Indo-Iranian Journal*, i. 86 et seq., is mentioned here, p. 36, note, and H. Humbach, who has just written on 'Ahura Mazdā und die daēvas' in the *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, i, 1957.

As to Zoroaster's conception of his god, additional evidence can be derived, I think, from a fresh study of the Ahuna Vairya, the chief prayer of the Zoroastrians. This text was examined by Benveniste at the Cambridge International Congress of Orientalists in 1954; his interpretation, printed in the *Indo-Iranian Journal*, i (1957), 77 et seq., gave rise to two independent reappraisals of the prayer, by Humbach and myself. The former's article, 'Das Ahuna-Vairya-Gebet', published in the *Münchener Sprachwissenschaftliche Studien*, xi, 1957, was handed to me by the author on the eve of the day set for my paper on the same subject at the Munich Congress, 1957.

His interpretation turned out to coincide with mine on several important points. On others we disagreed, but I became immediately convinced that he was right on most. However, since he was not quite happy himself with every detail of his translation, I was led to yet another scrutiny of the text, the result of which is to appear in the *Indo-Iranian Journal.*

Should this interpretation be accepted, the Ahuna Vairya would prove to be an epitome of Zoroaster's reform, a succinct record of that crucial moment when the Entities alienated their respective functions to a God in whom the Mitra-aspect and the Varuṇa-aspect of sovereignty came to be united:

'Just as He is to be chosen by the world, so has judgment, according to Justice itself, of the deeds of the world been given, from Good Mind, to Mazdā,

and Dominion to Ahura, whom they have given as shepherd to the humble.'

*

Ilya Gershevitch's edition and extensive commentary of the Mithra-yasht, now being printed at the Cambridge University Press, represent an approach in which all connexion with Dumézil's work is carefully avoided.

Lastly, the metaphoric interpretation of the Cow-myth, to which Cameron, in a lecture not yet published, is giving a new chance, has been provided with new arguments—notably a reference to the Vedic Vala-myth, by Hanns-Peter Schmidt, 'Awestische Wortstudien', *Indo-Iranian Journal,* i (1957), 164.

The West has not said its last word on Zoroaster.

September 1957 J. D.-G.

N.B.—The bibliographical Index adds a few details to those given in the text or notes.

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