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THE PROBLEM OF FACT

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

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PREFACE

In the following pages a theory concerning the status of the world in our knowledge has been developed. In the recent western philosophical thinking much as been said and written regarding this. But all the attempts in this respect begin and end almost in mid-way. It appears to me that the reason for this is that the concept of "Fact" has been taken by the Western philosophers to be sufficient to explain itself. I have tried to show that much more is presupposed in any study of factuality and it may lead us much beyond. I have therefore tried to clarify the presuppositions and the conclusions that follow from the study of Fact. Accordingly, the present work may be broadly divided into three parts : (1) The considerations preceding any systematic theory concerning Fact or the world. (Ch. I). (2) The nature of the world we know and other considerations arising in this connection (Chapters II, III and IV). (3) The conclusions we arrive at after the study of Fact and its presuppositions. However, as my main concern remains a consideration of the status of the world in our knowledge, I have concentrated more on the Chapters II, III and IV, which, I think, provide an exhaustive analysis of what we understand as the world and also of what we call the knowledge of the world—on almost a new plane of thinking. The matter in Chapter I and that in Chapter V do not receive such exhaustivee xposition, as the limited explanation offered is thought to be sufficient to help us to understand the central theme of the present work, namely, the problem of Fact.

With regard to the title "The Problem of Fact", I need urge that it is so termed only because I have found that almost all the attempts in the west to solve the riddle of the status of the world have resulted only in producing even more muddle and misunderstanding. So that, even its supposed solutions stand only as problems — the reason for this being, they end

and start in mid-way. It is therefore apparent that *without* the presuppositions and the conclusion (Chs. I & V) the whole discussion in the second, third and fourth chapter would appear to be leading us nowhere. Hence the conclusion, in this respect, is not a mere summary of what has been said in preceding chapters, but rather a natural outcome of these: a solution to the problem of Fact as it develops through these chapters. With respect to the importance of the problem, there is little, I think, that can be mentioned here by way of information. The problem has remained a matter of fascination from the very dawn of philosophical thinking. With the rise of science, however, it has received a new impetus, with the result that it is one of those few problems which have very much exercised the attention of present day philosophers, though without any satisfactory result. I do not claim that the theory advanced in the following pages is conclusive in all essential respects. But I am confident that, besides providing a new view on modality and also on falsity and negativity, it presents a line on which we may resolve the problem in some definite way, while at the same time following the methodology of linguistic analysis and that of experiential analysis.

I am thankful to Dr. Daya Krishna who went through some of the following chapters and encouraged me by sympathizing with and commenting upon the general line of thinking elaborated in this book. My thanks are due also to Dr. S. K. Saksena for his valuable suggestions.

The present work was completed originally as a research thesis and was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Saugar in December 1961. I am grateful to Dr. K. Bhattacharya, who happened to be one of the examiners of my thesis, for encouraging and assisting me in getting the thesis published in the present form.

Santiniketan,
West Bengal, India
30th Nov. 1965

R. P. P.

ABBREVIATIONS

EUS	. .	Encyclopædia of Unified Sciences.
FFF	. .	Fact, Fiction and Forecast.
FLP	. .	From a Logical Point of View.
HK	. .	Human Knowledge.
LK	. .	Logic and Knowledge.
SNT	. .	Semantics and Necessary Truths.
SP	. .	Studies in Philosophy, Vol. II.
TLP	. .	Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
JP	. .	Journal of Philosophy.
Mind	. .	Mind (New Series).
PAS	. .	Proceedings of Aristotelian Society (New Series).
PASS	. .	Proceedings of Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume.
PR	. .	Philosophical Review.
RM	. .	Review of Metaphysics.

CONTENTS

THE PROBLEM OF FACT AND OBJECTIVITY

1. What we call the *problem of fact*, or the *problem of the status of the world in our knowledge*, has occupied the attention of a vast majority of philosophers in all ages. A solution to this problem has very often been taken to be a solution seeking to determine what there *is*. One may indeed be satisfied with such a solution. But to us it appears that unless it is determined that the *known* is the same as the objective ground of our knowledge it is almost impossible to uphold such a view with any degree of consistency. However, to deny that the *known* involves an intimate reference to the objective ground of our knowledge would be simply absurd—not only linguistically, but even logically—since whatever is known is always so with respect only to some *that*. But this fact alone does not help us to understand the objective ground of our knowledge. Hence in dealing with the problem of fact, or the problem of the status of the world in our knowledge, the question regarding the nature of the objective ground of our knowledge needs to be dealt with first. The latter is very often taken to be the *problem of Objectivity* in epistemology, which, it is sometimes supposed, excludes *prima facie* the consideration of Subjectivity. What appears as untenable in this view, however, is the exclusion of Subjectivity in so far as we find that a consideration of Subjectivity is necessary in order to understand Objectivity.

Further, it is to be noted that the problem of fact is not the same as, or inclusive of, the problem of Objectivity: Facts undoubtedly are objective; but so are the no-facts, such as falsity, negativity, etc. (Ch. IV). Objectivity, on the other hand, is a general notion in the spirit of which both facts and no-facts partake. But, again, it should be clear that Objectivity

is not the same as the totality of facts and no-facts[1]. For, our understanding of facts and no-facts being objective is so not only because there are facts and no-facts, but also because the latter have a peculiar relationship with Subjectivity. It cannot be maintained that facts *qua* facts, or no-facts *qua* no-facts, are objective.

Hence, Objectivity itself is not factual.[2]

2. Now, before we start to deal with the problem of Objectivity, or for that matter with that of factuality, we must show that the problem establishes itself as a *philosophical* problem in the face of criticisms which stem from certain philosophical quarters.

A. In the first place, there are Logical Positivists[3] who deny any such problem to be philosophical unless it is concerned with definitions,[4] i.e. with what it is tautological. That the concern of

[1] A direct realism, which preaches 'actualism' or 'factualism', may hold that everything is fully actual, fully determinate and particular. It consists in an attempt to reduce Objectivity into "the real facts." *Vide* D. Williams, "Mind as a Matter of fact", RM, 1959, p. 209. Wittgenstein appears to hold a similar view: TLP, 4.1272, where he declares that 'object' is a pseudo-concept.

[2] F. H. Parker in his criticism of Williams, RM, 1960, p. 513, observes, "one can of course claim, without self-contradiction, that what is objective is a non-factualistic *materia prima*, or, on the other hand, that every neat fact is under the hat."

[3] Russell offers a precise exposition of the Logical Positivist's position in *International Review of Philosophy*, No. 11, 1950: "A philosopher is a logical positivist if he holds that there is no special way of knowing peculiar to philosophy, but that questions of facts can only be decided by empirical method of Science, while the questions that can be decided without appeal to experience are either mathematical (tautological) or linguistic."

[4] Ayer maintains that philosophers' proper concern is with definitions, i.e. with the "definitions of the corresponding words," and not with the analysis of the same. For, he says, it is only in a Pickwickian sense that "facts," "things," etc. can be said to exist to be analysed (*vide* A critique of Logical Positivism, by C. E. M. Joad, pp. 25, 70). We admit that particular facts are no concern of philosophical analysis. But we highly suspect the view, if Ayer holds it, that there cannot be a study of facts in philosophical analysis in any sense except the tautological. That definitions are also a matter of synthetic understanding (*vide* N. C. Lossky, Analytic and Synthetic propositions etc., p. 10) may be still another point of controversy. For, definition of empirical concepts "contains a unity of characteristics of an object which exists in the world." (*Ibid*).

the problem, as stated briefly above, is not tautologies is obvious. To call factuality factuality, or Objectivity objectivity, even if such an attempt involves linguistic elaboration, would lead us nowhere, except for showing us one of the modes of description which we employ for clarifications, and which for that very reason fails to convey any information of non-linguistic consequence. Hence a solution of the problem from the standpoint of tautology or definitions is either trivial or nonsense. It either does not give us any understanding of Objectivity, or it shuns it altogether, not allowing it to be *expressed* (this Ch., 3). Thus, it deliberately ignores that phase of our understanding which is objective, and that phase of Objectivity which is *understandable* (Ch. II, 7C-D).

Again, that any explanation of the problem in terms of pure linguistic elaborations or definitions is sure to fail is clear; since, Objectivity asserts itself in the form even of a linguistic phenomenon which expresses anything that is meant to be communicable, i.e. (here) definitions. So that, any such linguistic elaboration by itself cannot show *why* it asserts a fact of definition and not that of experience, and, further, *why* it asserts *a* fact. Such questions cannot be answered unless it is seen that our understanding of facts involves some specific notion of factuality, which in its turn shares in the common ground of Objectivity.

Nor is a purely *empirical* understanding of the problem helpful. If factuality is something simply given in experience, there should not be any knowledge of no-facts (which are certainly there in our knowledge), unless the latter must be as much *given* and consequently be as much *public* in character (which they are not, e.g. in dreams) as are facts. But, if no-facts are *as much given* in experience as facts themselves, then one can hardly draw a distinction between a factual and a non-factual understanding; for, then, the latter would as much resist our attempt at correction, and consequently we would never be able to maintain which of our knowledge is valid and which invalid. A pure pragmatic criterion for disting-

uishing facts from no-facts would not appear to be of much help here; for it would throw the world into an unmanageable chaos, itself floating directionlessly with the climate of change in human purpose and historical necessity. But clearly this is not the picture of the world which we understand as the world of facts (Ch. II, 7), a systematic, ordered world as manifest in our knowledge of the world.

It may perhaps be argued that factuality is something *constructed in an individual's experience*, as keeping with certain conditions under which the individual places some situations as facts and others as no-facts. The most critical aspect of this view is that it is absolutely impossible to demonstrate, keeping oneself well within this view, that "certain conditions", under which the individual operates, might belong to more than one individual (for such a demonstration would necessarily transgress the individual's experience). Any such view, therefore, is certainly erroneous as it threatens to reduce the whole world into a mess of subjective solipsism. It can be disproved simply by appealing to one's own process of experience: If experience means a cognitive awareness relating 'I' to 'things-I-am-not', then certainly 'I am' not conscious of any such *construction* in 'my' experience.

But, then, if the problem of fact, or that of Objectivity, is soluble neither analytically nor empirically, it must be taken up by philosophy, which in its turn is neither purely analytic nor merely empirical. The logical positivist may argue, however, that if the understanding of factuality, or that of Objectivity, is neither analytical nor empirical, it must be *non-sensical*. Now, if anything is called non-sensical[5], then

[5] Only if by "non-sense" is meant that which has no reference to empirical propositions, or that which can only be "shown" but cannot be "said", (*vide* TLP, 5.2, 6.22, 6.11; M. Black, PASS, 1938-39, p. 53n) can the dilemma be resolved that even 'non-sense' can stimulate, i.e. even non-empirical propositions can give us genuine information. The only difference, then, between an empirical and a non-empirical proposition would be that, while an empirical proposition has an extralinguistic reference (thus expression being accidental in this case), a non-empirical proposition is to be understood only in the form it is expressed (thus

the corresponding statement itself would be either true or false. If it is true, then it establishes *a* fact, and leaves out the problem as to under what conditions it could be true, or established a fact. And, if it is false, then it does not affect the problem at all. Hence the necessity for a consideration of the nature of factuality, and therefore also of Objectivity, remains as before.

The problem of fact, or the problem of Objectivity, therefore, is understandable neither analytically nor empirically. Nor is it non-sensical. It is *philosophical.*

B. Secondly, there are the existentialists who show so much concern with Subjectivity, or with what they call "human-situations", that they are very often led to the view that the problem of Objectivity belongs to some field other than philosophy. But, as in their understanding of human-situations the existentialists never seem to be unconcerned with Objectivity, the phase of Objectivity in human-situations demands their serious attention — though it is entirely a different thing that in their enthusiasm for pursuing Subjectivity they fail to give due consideration to Objectivity. Such a failure on the part of the existentialists has proved to be disastrous: they constantly arrive at absurd conclusions. A probe into the nature of Objectivity, we think, is the proper way to understand the real nature of Subjectivity (as we shall see presently, and in Ch. V). For, Subjectivity, being itself *non-objective*, as per definition of Subjectivity, cannot be examined in and by itself: any such examination works only on such notions as 'I-am-not'.

Hence, even a thorough-going philosophy of Subjectivity cannot overlook the problem of Objectivity *in toto.* It cannot arrive at a consistent conclusion without satisfying the latter.

3. The question, "What is Objectivity?" needs now to be answered. The answer is: whatever is experienced or understood

expression being a necessary characteristic of philosophical propositions). *Vide* K. C. Bhattacharya, SP, pp. 102-3.

as an *other* to the Subject is Objective[6]; and in as much as the latter is 'Other-to-the-Subject' it is *independent* of the Subject[7]. In order that the Subject should feel objectivity, which it does feel, it is necessary that, in such a state, there is something which is not the same as the Subject itself.

Further, the independence of Objectivity *qua* otherness is an argument for the *independence of objects* (things in experience): Their independence is the logical necessity for there being a subjective awareness of their objectivity. Hence no self-consistent subjective solipsism, with respect to the knowledge of the world, is possible (Ch. II, 7B).

But it is to be noted that an attempt, most often by the realists who argue from the independence of things in experience, to place both the objects of experience and the Subject at the same *level of being*[8] is sure to produce a grave philosophical error. Objectivity is independent only because of the *presence of confronting otherness* with respect to the Subject. In all our experience the Subject is felt to be *existing*, but the object thereof is felt only to be *present*. Hence, the realists' proof of *existence* of the objects of experience[9], in so far as it

[6] The latin word for "object" is "objectus", which means "to throw over against". This meaning presents a clear understanding of what has been called "an other to the Subject." In Indian thinking, Objectivity has been given the status of *being* not-the-same-as-the-Subject, and confronting-the-Subject in its not being the same as the Subject. (*Vide* Brihdaranyaka, 1,4,2: DVITIYADVAI BHAYAM BHAVATI).

[7] However, the duality of Subjectivity and Objectivity is not *ultimate:* only the latter necessarily implies the former and not *vice-versa*. (*Vide* Murti, AJNANA, Pt. III, p. 182n; also Ch. V, 15 C-D).

[8] Weiss in his 'Modes of Being; part I, distinguishes between four categories of being: Actuality (individual entities), Ideality (a standard of value), Existence (a vital on-going), God (a unity). Presently we are concerned only with the first and third categories of being, viz. Actuality and Existence. However, Weiss' classification of Being into four categories is not acceptable to us, in so far as we regard *unity* and *actuality* to be not quite separate (Ch. II, 6A), and in so far as we are unable to *say* anything of God's being beyond the possibility of "God's Existence" (Ch. III, 10B).

[9] *Vide* G. E. Moore, "Refutation of Idealism", *Mind*, 1903, p. 453: He argues that without admitting the independent existence of the objects of experience we

is based on the presence of the latter to the Subject, is unintelligible in as much as the realists regard both the Subject and the objects as *existing*.

The Subject is known to be existing only when it is *expressing* itself; so that when we say that the Subject exists, we mean by that assertion simply this: the Subject-exists-as-expressing[10]. Consequently, the Subject failing to express itself is also not *known* to be existing, such as in a deep dreamless sleep. With Objectivity, on the other hand, the case is quite different: the whole Objectivity is something *expressed* before the Subject, which we call its "presentness" to the Subject. This is most obvious in the case of situations which are actually present: factuality is understood as actuality, as being actually present, i.e. as having a form of presentness which does not change with respect to the same situation (Ch. III, 10A). Not each and any Objectivity is understood as actually present, e.g. negativity and falsity (Ch. IV, 14B).

However, a state of *pure-Objectivity* may well be postulated without plunging into logical inconsistency. That is to say, Objectivity would have been existing in the sense that, had Objectivity been the Subject, it would be knowing itself to be expressing.

4A. Whatever we have said about Objectivity so far is perhaps sufficient to demonstrate that the *foundations of Objectivity* lie in the relation of the latter with Subjectivity[11]. But,

cannot maintain consistently either the presence of knowledge or the existence of the Subject.

[10] Cf. H. Dingle, "The Philosophical view-point of a Scientist", PAS, 1938-39: "—— in each and every act of thought, the Subject should be regarded as inevitably stationed at the *present*, and the object as inevitably in the *past*" (p. 126, italics ours).

[11] Wittgenstein seems to maintain that, although there is the 'philosophical I' which conceives the world to be 'my world' (TLP, 5.641), there is nothing in *my world* to lead *me* to conclude that there is an *I* —— the Subject (TLP, 5.633). Now this appears to be a self-refuting view. If it is *my world*, then it must be determined by *me* or *I*, the latter being the precondition of '*my* world'. There is, of course, nothing *in* the world to lead me to say that there is an *I*; but the whole (my) world presupposes the *I* —— the Subject —— in order to be what

what is the nature of this peculiar relation? To answer this we must consider the different expressions of the expressing Subject. Three modes of expressing Subject may be distinguished in the following forms:

(*i*) "The sky *appears* blue."

(*ii*) "I am *this* (e.g. the speaker)."

(*iii*) "I am *happy*."

The first mode of expression is important as showing the Subject, 'I', in the state of *non-distinction* from what is Objective: a human-situation of object-among-objects, as the existentialists call it. It is the most primitive kind of self-awareness. It is obvious that personal pronouns can be easily eliminated from such expressions.

The second mode of expression is important in view of the following points: (*a*) Here the Subject is *known* to be *distinct* from what-it-is-not, or from what is its object—a human-situation of subject-among-objects, as the existentialists call it. (*b*) But, the Subject here appears to have the peculiar characteristic of being *defined* by the *this*—its object. Now, anything defined takes the form of definition, so that here also the *defined subjectivity* must be objective, as defined by its object *this*. But, then, what is it which, in spite of being objective, gives the impression of being subjective? Obviously, objects as such are never confused with Subjectivity in any experience or understanding. It is rather the *understanding* of objects, or for that matter of whatever objective, which gives us such an impression. That is, whenever we say, "I understand—" we find that 'I' is somehow inseparable from the corresponding understanding. Yet it is equally true that 'I' remain as much conscious of 'my' understanding, or for that matter of all the mental phenomena, as of the world 'out-there'. So that, in respect of its *presentness* to the Subject, the *mind* or the mental phenomena should be as

it is. Thus, in Wittgenstein's example, 'a field of sight' by itself may not entail an eye, but it's very possibility rests on the presence of the latter. The possibility of this presence is no doubt extra-empirical.

much objective as the objects themselves (Ch. II, 7C). Subjectivity *qua* Consciousness, therefore, is not the same as the mind or the mental phenomena. The former simply acknowledges (as the SAKŚI) all objectivity including the mental phenomenon; and as such it neither *defines* nor is *defined* by anything besides itself. That is, Consciousness is never known as something objective—an other to itself (Ch. V, 15C), nor is anything objective known as some consciousness—involving nothing else but itself. That Subjectivity gets confused with something objective, as in case of the form of subjective expression under consideration, can be easily accounted for if we recognize that Subjectivity *qua* itself cannot involve a differentiation—difference being a function of Objectivity (Ch. II, 7D); so that, a state of confusion between the Subject and Objectivity remains undifferentiated, *unless* the Subject is in the state of its pure expression. The state of pure expression is reached in the third mode of subjective-expression as stated above. Our consideration of the second mode of subjective expression, therefore, suggests that the existentialists are wrong in taking the human-situation involved here as one of subject-among-objects. For, what they regard as subject in this case is not the Subject, but only the mental-phenomena; and the latter appear to be distinct from the corresponding objects only in so far as mind is the principle of understanding Objectivity rather than being itself an object (Ch. II, 7D-E).

Now, the Subject *qua* Consciousness must be accepted as the *premiss* of all objective knowledge. For, as it has already been said, it is only by confronting Consciousness that anything gets the status of an *object* or of being *objective*. It is to be noticed that it is only in the analogy of the identification of *this* with *I* that any objectivity is apprehended as such. That is, Objectivity acquires the character of otherness only because there arises somehow the occasion for such an identification between the Subject and the mental phenomena: Subjectivity in its own state never acknowledges any

otherness and consequently no objectivity in that state obtains (Ch. V, 15C-D). It is in the sense of this identification, therefore, that Subjectivity is said to be the *ground* of Objectivity: without this ground no Objectivity *qua* otherness is possible.

It is, however, not contradictory to *assume* objects as not confronting the Subject. Meinong's objects of assumption may perhaps provide us with examples of such objects. But any such *assumption* can neither be conclusively established nor be finally refuted, since such objects of assumption cannot be felt as being *present*, let alone as being *existent*. The Kantian understanding of things-in-themselves too, accordingly, is such an assumption. Now, since the only state of being which does not involving *presentness* is that of *existence*, any such assumption may be said to be one pertaining to *pure-Objectivity*, i.e. Objectivity as existing. That the notion of 'pure-Objectivity' is necessary in order to explain the whole presentness or appearance is to be seen later in this chapter.

In the meanwhile, let us consider the third form of subjective expression, "I am happy." Here the Subject is in the state of crossing-over the boundaries of Objectivity *qua* otherness. *Pure-Subjectivity* is a state of experience where Objectivity as otherness is completely dissolved (Ch. V, 15C), but *not* Objectivity as content, i.e. Objectivity in its essence. Objectivity-as-not-confronting-the-Subject, as not-felt-as-an-other, is the peculiar characteristic of this mode of Subjective expression. It helps us to discover the fundamental inadequacy in the thinking of those philosophers, e.g. the existentialists, who regard Objectivity *qua* otherness to be inseparably related to Subjectivity *qua* consciousness.

Now, since Objectivity *qua* otherness is not felt in this state, that Objectivity which obtains here in its essence can be regarded as the character of the subjective expression itself. But, if Objectivity in its essence is never dissolved, and if it is capable of being felt as an other to the Subject, Subjectivity, even though providing the *ground* for Objectivity and the

premiss for our objective knowledge, cannot be its essence[12]. Hence, Objectivity as such *must* be postulated in order to explain the peculiar phenomenon of Objectivity involved in our understanding. So, *pure Objectivity is a necessary postulation of existence to explain what appears*; even so this postulation need not lead us to affirm the real *existence* of objects or what Kant calls "noumenon".

B. Now, we suppose, it is clear that a demand for *semantical* analysis of the word "I" is just meaningless. For, the word "I" is not on a par with such words as "chair", "air", and so on, i.e. words standing for something objective. The Subject, as per definition, being non-objective, is *unmeaningful*. So that, "I" cannot properly be said to refer to Subjectivity: "I" is atonce the meaning as well as the *symbol* of Subjectivity.

Hence both the notions of Subjectivity and Objectivity are *significant*, though what is *meaningful* is only the objective. The philosophical discipline of *analysis*, therefore, can have its scope only in the realm of *meaningfulness* or Objectivity. Further, such titles as "the philosophy of Subjectivity" and "the philosophy of Objectivity" are misleading, in so far as they suggest that either Subjectivity or Objectivity can be dealt with exclusively.

5. In view of the above, it is clear that our method in the following chapters would not be one of mere *linguistic analysis*. It would rather consist in following the full implications of objective experience. Hence, for us, both *linguistic* as well as

[12] It is to be noted, however, that Objectivity as the characteristic of subjective expression accounts for the *individuality* of Subjective existence, and Objectivity as the essence of objects' presence accounts for the *public character* of the latter. If, e.g., *this* (stone) is *something* for me, *this* will be taken to be so by others, in so far as others would use the word "this" as indicative of the thing in question, or for that matter of anything that can be spoken of in this way. The Subject, *per contra*, is not a subject for any two or more persons. And at the same time, Subjectivity with respect even to *another* person, and to Objectivity *qua* otherness, cannot be intelligible as relating to the Subject which involves no otherness — of whatever sort. Hence the Subject represented by "I" is peculiarly individual, in the sense that in communication "I" is never taken to be representing

experiential analysis[13] stand as genuine methodologies. The reason why we hesitate to depend fully on linguistic analysis is this that we have no guarantee, as yet, from the philosophers of language that language can adequately, or even clearly, express whatever we experience and understand.[14] Again, language may have such characteristics as may not belong to the understanding-of-the-world proper.

With regard to experiential analysis, there may be implications — from objective experience — which are not the same for everybody. But this can be explained: Different persons are guided by different interests, and in most cases, also by uncritical presuppositions. Keenness of intellectual insight too plays an important part.

But let it be assured that this method (of experiential analysis) does not always lead one to psychology. The fundamental difference between this method and psychology is that while the latter may hesitate to move ahead with logical implications at the cost of experiential data, and therefore may remain stuck to concrete experience, experiential analysis need not

the *two* parties in the communication: it always remains one and the same (Ch. V) even though an other stands out against it.

[13] P. Butchvarov in his "On an Alleged Mistake of Logical Atomism" (*Analysis*, 1959, p. 136-137) has drawn up a distinction between the two methodologies and has shown the cause for the preference of one to another. "The reason for the substitution of language for ideas was probably the wish to eliminate the irrelevant psychological connotation of the Humean version." But this preference for linguistic methodology proved to have its own drawbacks, i.e., it led to "equally irrelevant linguistic connotation" (*ibid*) against which Wittgenstein had issued a timely warning: "Does not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of thought processes which philosophers have held to be so essential to the philosophy of logic? Only they got involved for the most part in inessential psychological investigations, and there is an analogous danger with my method." (TLP, 4.1121). And according to some students of Wittgenstein, "The development represented by Carnap and his school seems to be a fulfilment of this expectation." (*Vide* Anscombe, Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 86). Carnap's view has been criticised by a Czech logician, K. Reach in the *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Sept. 1938, "The name relation and the logical antinomies."

[14] Heidegger's reaction in this respect is even more sharp. He writes in his "Plato's Doctrine of Truth": "The 'doctrine' of a thinker is that which is left unsaid in what he says . . . . ."

be found wanting in logical rigour. And to attain logical rigour even experiential analysis must involve linguistic analysis. 'Perception with clarity' is the watch-word of our method.

This method we call the *philosophical method*. The importance of this method becomes clear only when we realize the difficulty implicit in the very nature of philosophical problems. In this connection two sorts of problems need to be differentiated. First, there are problems which can be answered in a clear and precise way because of a definite method followed in seeking the answer — thus questions such as "When did Alexander come to India?" or "How much did it rain at Saugor this year?" or "What is three times three?" can be answered definitely by applying a clear-cut method in each case. But, secondly, there are problems such as "What is supreme Good?" or "What is the nature of Objectivity and Subjectivity?" or "What is a fact?" which defy any such definite answer, because there is no well-defined way to approach these problems. They cannot be resolved simply by empirical observations and interpretations, or by *a priori* manipulations. The method of approach in answering the latter type of questions is called "philosophical", which, though not definite, is yet capable of giving convincing results.

THE NATURE OF FACT

6A. Facts are undoubtedly objective, but not everything objective is factual. Objectivity is factual only when it displays *public character:* obviously, there cannot be a state of objectivity which is both private and factual. Such a public character is determined with respect to the following conditions:

(*i*) Objectivity displaying public character has an *ostensive reference:* whatever constitutes a fact must be something *given*, as may be experienced[1]. Accordingly, a fact, as expressed in ordinary language, always has one of the following forms (or various combinations of these):

(*a*) 'That this is red.' (*b*) 'That this is *a* man.'

(*c*) 'That *all* men are mortal.'

(We shall see later that facts concerning relations are not fundamentally different from these: this Ch. 8B.) Evidently,

[1] Whatever is experienced is usually taken to be something 'given'. And the latter is so in cases both of mediate and immediate experience. However, in case of the 'given' in an immediate experience, as it is dealt with in ordinary language, there is involved a difficulty which is due to the class-character of almost every linguistic-form. Yet, if we take care only to note that in so far as a mere linguistic consideration is involved, the class-character of linguistic-forms has only an epistemological singificance — the significance that we need not use new linguistic-forms for every experience — and not a logical one with respect to the experience expressed through these linguistic-forms, the difficulty is happily resolved. So, the logic of the expression such as "This is white", as recording an immediate experience, does not necessarily lead to the view that our experience of the *white* now is just an instance of the class 'white'. It is not contradictory to maintain that only *this* is white in the world and is experienced to be so (*vide* Duncan Jones, "Universals and Particulars," PAS 1933-34, p. 85). In case of the 'given' in a mediate experience, on the other hand, the class-character of linguistic-forms comes to its full use, since here what is apprehended as 'given' is not simply what is present *now* but the latter as related with *all* that which is similar to it (this Ch., Footnote 3). (For the givenness in case of general facts, see this Ch., 9B).

none of these can be reduced to the other remaining forms — though all of them relate to some experience. Facts of the forms (*a*) and (*b*) are expressed respectively through the combination of a name[2] (the N-sign "this" in (*a*) above) with a first-level[3] predicate and the combination of a name (the "this" in (*b*) above) with a second level[3] predicate. The case of facts of the form (*c*) is quite different and would be dealt with only at a later stage (this Ch. 9).

(*ii*) Objectivity displaying public character must fall in a *system* (this Ch. 7E): facts are not only non-contradictory with respect to each-other, but they also live in a harmony of mutual involvement. The acceptance of one fact in a system of facts naturally leads us to the acceptance of *all* the rest (in that system). Further, the discovery of one fact generally leads us to the discovery of a series of other facts which fall within the same system or in some wider system which includes

[2] The word "name" is used here and in the following pages in the sense in which a word is taken to denote a situation of acquaintance. Names, in this sense, have only a reference but no meaning. As such only "this," "that," etc. can be taken as names. Such names as "Socrates," "table," etc. are only descriptions (*vide* Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," LK, p. 200).

[3] First-level predicates, e.g. "white," are those predicates which point to the given in mediate or immediate experience, while the second-level predicates are those predicates which refer to the given only in mediate experience. The difference between the two kinds of predicates may be understood thus: when, e.g., such an expression as "This is white" is used, it may be so used as to express what is immediately experienced (this Ch., Footnote 1). On the other hand, in case of the usage of a predicate like "man" (note that "man" may also be used as a subject-term in a sentence), it is logically necessary to have more than one experience with respect to a situation called "man"; for, otherwise, we would have to change the convention in our language of saying "This is *a* man," "That is *a* man," and so on. That is, we would have to abolish the use of class-concepts; for the use of the expression like "— *a* man" is significant only when there are numerically different situations called "man". The expression "This is *a* man", therefore, is used not to record strictly an experience of any one moment, but rather to record a relation between several moments of experience with respect to different yet similar situations (this Ch. 9A). Hence, "This is white" and "This is a man" when expressed in the form "This x" may be misleading in so far as the form "This x" ignores the essential difference between expressions of the two *kinds* of facts, viz. first-order facts, or facts of the form (*a*), and second-order facts, or facts of the form (*b*). (See also Ch. III, 11 A-B).

all the discovered facts which remain included in, or involved by, the previous system.

(*iii*) Objectivity displaying public character denies any factual possibility of its opposite (Ch. III, 10A): facts-in-a-system are atonce the *judged* (as facts) as well as the *judge* (in their capacity of rejecting anything as non-factual which threatens to break the system)[4]. Hence, there cannot be negative facts (Ch. IV, 14).

B. The *no-facts* and *arti-facts of reason* lack the fulfilment of at least one of above mentioned conditions. Thus, the arti-facts of reason, or logical facts, generally lack the fulfilment of the condition (*i*) above, while no-facts may fulfill any of the first two conditions but never the condition (*iii*). Hence no-facts and arti-facts of reason, in the strict sense of the word "fact", do not have public character. Yet they cannot be called "private," since being objective, they are as well a matter of inter-communication between persons. Obviously, what can be strictly private is only the Subjectivity, which is the principle of individuality (Ch. I, Footnote 12).

7. Now, what we call facts determine the world, and constitute it both as a *limited whole* and as a *systematic whole*.

A. The way in which the world is determined by facts will be discussed later in this section. In the meanwhile let us consider the view of the world as a limited whole. Obviously, the world is limited with respect to the *boundaries of factuality*; and the boundaries of factuality are determined by (a) Subjectivity[5],

[4] Just as logic and mathematics aim at universal agreement in theory, any system of knowledge relating to the world aims at an universal agreement in experience, in practice. (*Vide* Cambell, What is Science, pp. 30n). And such an universal agreement is possible only when its possibility is prejudged in experience (i.e. if it is extra-experiential in case of science), as is the case with axioms of logic and mathematics (i.e., the possibility of an universal agreement on an axiomatic system is extra-axiomatic — that cannot be demonstrated within that system). Hence the possibility of this agreement is prejudged in a system; so that, what threatens to produce disorder within that system is rejected off-hand.

[5] Cf. TLP, 5.632, "The Subject does not belong to the world but is a limit of the world."

and (*b*) what is neither Subjective nor factual — negativity[6] (Ch. IV, 14B). Negativity cannot be spoken *referentially*, since only factuality can be so spoken; yet negativity, being objective, can be spoken sensibly or meaningfully.

Just as, before there can be any meaning to the significant proposition that the world *I* know is my world (for I am definitely not identical with my world), *I* must precede any knowledge of what I call "my" world (Ch. I, 4 & Footnote 11), so also the precondition of the significance of negativity is the presentness of corresponding actuality (Ch. IV, 14). Thus:

$$N \xrightarrow{\text{presupposes}} W \xrightarrow{\text{presupposes}} S$$

The direction of relationship shows that negativity is no more essential for the being of the world than is the world essential for *my* being.

It is to be noted now that the limits of the world are *shown* in the language we intelligibly use to express facts; and the former is apprehended in yet a clearer way only with the help of significant negative expressions (Ch. IV, 14D). A consideration of language, therefore, is very important in any account of the world.

Language is the principle of expression[7] of that which is

[6] Negativity must be understood as something essentially distinct from Subjectivity: the latter is an epistemological necessity and therefore may be known *per se*; negativity cannot be similarly known (Ch. IV, 14).

[7] It would of course be interesting if we can determine whether the world itself divides into facts. Unfortunately such an answer is beyond our competence. Our concern is only with the world as we know it, and the implications of our knowledge of the world. We have suggested earlier that the world we know exhibits the character of a whole, a system, which cannot be spoken of in the language of facts. This view in its turn has two important consequences: (1) we know the world as divided into facts, and (2) the division of the world into facts *is* possible because we have precise *linguistic-forms* to express, and hence to give definite shapes to what we understand as facts (see Waismann, "Verifiability", PASS 1945, pp. 14-64). So the nature of facts is essentially bound up with the way we apprehend and use the linguistic-forms (though this is not to suggest that the very nature of linguistic-forms is the nature of facts). Language, therefore, is not less, nor more, than the principle (and not a mere medium) of that which we intelligibly express.

communicated. Evidently, language *qua* a series of symbols is an actual situation and is not 'principle of expression' in that capacity. It is principle of expression only as exhibiting a capacity to convey the understanding of facts. Hence, it is important to note that that which is communicated or conveyed through factual linguistic expressions is not the fact itself, but only the understanding of the corresponding fact. That is, in communication, only the *form* of a fact is communicated — the presupposition of the act of communication being the *universality* of the form of the fact communicated, as against the *particularity* of the constituents of the latter (this Ch., 8). Now, what we call the "form" of a fact is the definite structure of the constituents which constitute that fact[8]. Thus, in communication of the fact, for example, 'That this is bright now,' what is communicated is not the brightness, a sensation, nor even the situation of brightness; for, everybody who understands the corresponding linguistic expression "This is bright now" need not experience what is bright at that time, though he can *understand* what is *meant* by this linguistic expression. So, to say that a person understands the statement is only to maintain that he grasps the meaning of that statement. And, again, he understands the statement not bit by bit, taking every constituent word in isolation, but rather *seeing* at once the whole meaning of the statement, i.e. a 'meaning-whole'. It is this 'meaning-whole', with respect to the statement expressing a fact, which reveals the structure of the corresponding fact. That is, sentences as 'meaning wholes' *show* the logical structure of the facts which they express. Then, to say that I understand a statement is the same as saying that I understand the *structure* of the corresponding fact (though not necessarily having at the same time an experience of its constituents — the presence of the latter cannot

[8] Cf. TLP, 2.033, "The form is the possibility of the structure." Fundamentally, Wittgenstein is right. But we differ from him in so far as we regard the form of a fact to be not a mere possibility of structure, but rather such a possibility actualised (Ch. III, 12B).

be denied, since otherwise I cannot understand even the corresponding 'meaning-whole', the pre-condition of the presence of such a 'meaning-whole' being, that the meaning of all the words in that statement, having ostensive reference directly or indirectly, are understood). But to say that I understand the structure of a fact is not to commit myself to the presence of understanding as *something* over and above the structure of the corresponding fact. "To understand" means simply a conscious state with respect to the structure of a fact. Accordingly, understanding cannot be regarded as separate from that to which it relates, since any statement 'p', as believed, already *has* the possibility of the corresponding understanding. If this be not the case, the statement 'p' cannot be a *factual* statement; i.e. to have a fact *p* is already to have it understood, or, otherwise, there is no such fact as *p*.

Now, what are the constituents of a fact can be related only in one way *within* that fact; so that 'understanding', in the above sense, serves as a *name* to point out the structure of that fact. And such a name must be a *logical name*, since, unlike ordinary names (this Ch., Footnote 3), it cannot be used to name the structure of any and every fact, but only of that fact to which it relates[9].

B. But, then, how (by what process) do we recognize that we understand a fact, e.g. 'That this is bright now'? This recognition of understanding comes in two separate, yet continuous, processes: (*i*) A sensation or immediate experience of brightness — a moment of reflexive attention of the form 'This here now,' which may be followed by a state of mediate experience. That is, the process from sensation to mediate experience, if any, is one from a determination of

9 The assertion obviously is tautological. Wittgenstein wrote (TLP, 5.542) that "A believes P," "A thinks P," "A says P" are of the same form as " 'P' says P." We understand that what he meant by this is much like what we have said. So that, 'P' can be taken as the name for *P*. And this should be logical also, if we are correct. In what he further writes, ". . . . here we have no co-ordination of a fact and an object . . ." etc., he explicitly refuses the claim of anything 'mental' as equally substantive. Accordingly, 'P' just exhibits the structure of what is referred to by *P*, and is indicative of nothing besides.

character(s) to that of order(s) in a single stream of observation. The controversy between physicalism and phenomenalism regarding whether the world can be explained by referring to elements of phenomena or to that of the physical world is entirely a different question and does not concern us here. However, one thing is quite clear, namely, whether physical situations or phenomenal situations — both are established *in* the process of observation; so that they both relate to the facts of observation. Any attempt to reduce one into the other is an impossible task, as they relate to two essentially different kinds of experience in the same stream of observation[10]. (See this Ch., Footnote 3).

(*ii*) A belief associated with experience, which renders the latter acceptable as a part of the stream of observation. Our belief in an experience is a sort of assertion to the effect that our behaviouristic (e.g. linguistic) disposition at a particular moment *truely* records the situational-effect relating to that moment of experience, such that we would continue to be disposed in the same way with respect to the experience in question. In case of a mediate experience, however, the corresponding belief is extended to experiences which are *similar* (with respect to their situational-effect) to the experience to which the belief originally related.

Such an account of 'belief' appears to be necessary, because it explains not only that 'belief' plays an important role in our recognition of the understanding of a fact, but also that 'belief' is non-psychological, for to say that "I believe that —" is not to say that "I have an inclination to believe that —." Belief, in the above sense, is possible only because being confronted by a situation we behave in a certain way so as to give recognition to the effect that the situation has on us. Further, it is only a belief that is the proper subject-matter of what we call "true" and "false" in our knowledge of the world (Ch. IV, 13 A).

[10] *Vide* Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, Ch. IV, Sec. 14. Also Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, Ch. 10.

So, an experience in its capacity of giving us the corresponding situational-effect *and* as vouched by a belief is a *fact* with respect to the situation experienced. The conjunction of these two factors which go into the making of a fact is obviously inevitable; since any experience as lacking the association of the corresponding belief ceases to relate to the corresponding situation after the moment of its occurrence, and, hence, should not properly be called a fact with respect to that situation: In fact if there is no more a (linguistic) disposition, a belief, with regard to its occurrence the very possibility of its recall is eliminated. That is to say, unless an experience in the capacity of an actual occurrence is put in some form (linguistic or memory images) it cannot be known to be so, except at the particular moment of its occurrence.

Now, let us consider those situations which we do not experience, e.g. historical events, or scientific situations like 'atoms', 'neutrons', and so on, but which we still believe. Any instance of such a belief obviously lacks the corresponding situational-effect, in as much as the corresponding situation cannot now be experienced; though, that the statements with respect to such beliefs can be "observational statements"[11] is not denied in principle. In such cases, then, we have no experience in the capacity of an actual occurrence. Here we cannot start with experience. So we face the problem as to what sort of situations we want to look for. It is such a consideration which leads to the method of hypothesis both in history and in science, the fundamental advantage of which is to put the apparently different and disconnected possible situations into a single system[12]. That such possible situations may be systematised in more than one way shows that the understanding in respect of their factuality is determined with respect to more

[11] *Vide* Neurath, EUS, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 14.

[12] *Vide* D'Abro, The Development of Scientific Thought, Ch. 37, "On Methodology of Science." In History the method of hypothesis is a bit controversial. But to us it seems quite legitimate: *Vide* "From Facts to thoughts", *Philosophy*, April, 1960, by N. Rotenstreich.

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than one such system. That the "observation statements" relating to such situations become factual, because they are capable of falling within a hypothetical system, shows that *belief*, in such cases, lies with a system and not with any single "observation-statement" or a possible experience. Any "observation statement" or a possible experience is, therefore, a matter of *disbelief* only when it does not fall in any hypothetical system. Still another important character of such instances of belief is that they are, in a very important sense, *extra-personal:* in other words, no hypothetical system is a totality of a single person's "observation statements". It is, therefore, that to have faith in scientific and historical knowledge is already to transcend all kinds of solipsism — factualitic as well as subjective. The latter, because we already accept such "observation statements" meaningful as do not relate to our own actual experience: Price's argument for 'other minds' is based on this very reasoning: there are other minds because I understand such observational statements as do not relate to my own experience. And the former, because by bringing in hypothesis first and then determining factuality, we have already crossed the boundaries of pure factuality[13].

Further, a matter of belief needs to be differentiated from a matter of opinion. *Opinions lack a situational effect as well as an evidence of a hypothetical system;* they also lack a belief which in their case is filled up by a personal conjecture. A personal conjecture means the possibility of a logical structure of thought, i.e. a thought-form, which may or may not fit in the system of the world. But there is no *a priori* way for deciding whether or not it actually fits. We would call hereafter such thought-forms *neutral thought-forms* — most important of

[13] J. O. Wisdom, "Esoftericism", *Philosophy* 1959, p. 344, while criticising the doctrine of verifiability, says that in case of hypotheses "We can pass only from the theory to experience (though to new as well as to familiar sorts) — that is in the reverse direction. We can pass (deductively) from the wave-equation or quantum hypothesis to the spectroscope observation, and also to other things, perhaps unlimited in number, but there is no way of getting the wave-equation from any of these observations."

these being one relating to God's Existence—as they are neither entailed nor denied by the system of actualised thought-forms or of the structures of facts. Hence, "to say of any matter that it is a matter of opinion or a matter of speculation or conjecture is not to say that questions concerning it are not questions of facts."[14] That is, matters of opinion today may yet be matters of belief tomorrow (Ch. III, 12B).

C. There is still another question to be answered: what is the structure of a fact? We have already observed that a factual sentence, as a meaning whole, shows the structure of the fact to which it relates. Now, a 'meaning whole' is what we call a 'proposition' or a 'thought' which, as expressed in a sentence, is either true or false (Ch. IV, 13A). Here one thing is quite obvious, namely, that the structure of a fact is the *expressed thought* of that fact. (Note: thought is always expressed.) "To think" means to understand a logical form, i.e. to understand some actual or possible structure. Further, since a 'meaning whole' is not simply a combination of the bits of the meanings of the words in a sentence, the structure of a fact as relating to the corresponding 'meaning whole', unlike what constitutes the structure, is *simple*. Consequently, an attempt to get at the structure of facts through an analysis of sentences which *show* these structures is bound to be futile. But to maintain that sentences can be put in a comparatively more adequate form, so as to *show* the structure of the fact more accurately, is quite justifiable. For, the sentences *show* the structure of facts either adequately or inadequately. That is, in ordinary language we may have more than one combination of words to express what we understand, but not all these need be equally good combinations. The question of deciding which one is the best of all is really the most difficult problem. The decision seems to be guided by a sort of self-evidence that a particular expression carries with it in respect of

[14] Peter Herbert, "The Nature of Fact," in Conceptual Analysis, ed. A. Flew, Ch. VII, p. 137.

the understanding it involves. An inadequate sentence, accordingly, may be put in adequate form, which involves only an analysis of the combination of words and not an analysis of the structure of the corresponding fact, which is only *shown* in such combinations.

It is often suggested that the recognition of the structure of a sentence, which follows from the identification of the constituents of that sentence, viz. names and predicates, leads to the recognition of the structure of the corresponding fact. This may well be the case, but we do not know of any good argument to support such a contention. No criterion for identifying the precise structure of a sentence with respect to the fact it relates seems to have been given so far. Though Russell and Stebbing suggest that two sentences have an identical logical form (=structure) if there is (1) one to one correspondence of the terms in both, (2) identity of arrangements of the terms in both as shown by the dispositions of the logical constants, and (3) identity of category of corresponding terms in both — to which Wittgenstein adds a further condition, namely, that corresponding terms must be of the *same kind* in the sense of making sense or non-sense in the same contexts[15] — yet these conditions do not appear to be much helpful in identifying the structure of a single sentence. What they really do is a sort of arrangement of sentences of the same functional level. Wittgenstein himself came to observe later: "An atomic form cannot be foreseen. And it would be surprising if the actual phenomena had nothing more to teach us about their structure. To such conjectures about the structure of atomic propositions we are led by our ordinary language which uses the subject-predicate and the relational form. — These forms are the norms of our particular language into which we project in *ever so many different* ways *ever so many different* logical forms. And for this very reason we can draw no conclusions — except very vague ones — from use of these

[15] *Vide* Max Black, "Some Problems connected with Language", PASS, 1938-39, p. 61.

norms as to the actual logical form of the phenomena described."[16]

Now granting, as we did before, that the linguistic forms are after all the forms which we must *use* in order to express the form of situations, and that linguistic forms, as expressed, however vaguely, lead us ultimately to facts, i.e. to the determination of situations (this Ch., Footnote 1), we should look for the form of a factual sentence in order to apprehend the form of the corresponding fact. This view is further strengthened because in ordinary language a fact is expressed in more than one sentence-form, and all these sentence-forms may not express the fact with the same degree of accuracy. If we know that one sentence-form expresses the form of the fact more accurately than the other, we grant the corresponding sentence the capacity to express the form of the fact *more* adequately. But this very reason prevents us from granting this latter sentence the capacity to express the fact *perfectly*. For, what can be comparatively more accurate may still be imperfect. The difficulty, therefore, in admitting that the structure of a sentence can be taken to represent the logical form or structure of the corresponding fact, is mainly due to this that there are more than one sentence-form in ordinary language relating to the same fact. If granted a kind of language in which there is only one sentence-form to express each fact, e.g. in recent ideal language constructions, then, of course, the form of a fact would be taken to be expressed perfectly by the corresponding sentence-form. Supposition of such a language indeed solves the problem of determining the precise structure of a single sentence which, in its turn, may lead to the recognition of the precise structure of the fact to which that sentence relates. But such a language, if any, would be practically useless, because it would render the business of explanation and description in that language impossible. For the very presupposition of *explanation* and *description* is that that more

[16] "Logical Form," PASS 1920, pp. 163-164, italics author's.

or less adequate sentence-forms can be used and that more than one sentence is required to explain or describe a single fact.

We had an occasion to observe early in this chapter that facts constitute the world and that the structure of a fact is the expressed thought of that fact: from this it follows that there cannot be an unthinkable world. An unthinkable world is no world. Thought, then, represents the logical form of the world. That is, thought displays the actual or possible structure of facts. Thought as representing the logical form of the world is, therefore, the same as the totality of all content-less structures with respect to the contents which may fit in those structures, i.e. contents of the world. Accordingly, a *form-less* content is something pre-logical; and therefore any content is *logically* possible only when it relates to a content-less structure or a thought-form. This, however, does not amount to an assertion of ontological priority of the thought-forms over contents. What it asserts is only this that the knowledge of a content is possible only when the latter fits in some thought-form[17]. As such, thought exhibits the possibility of some definite occurrences, i.e. the possibility of such occurrences of contents as may fit in the respective thought-forms. In this connection, the conviction presupposed in the scientific approach to the world that the world is *knowable* and *usable* is worth our consideration. The argument runs thus: the world (='nature' for the scientist[18]) is knowable because there is nothing in actuality

[17] Quine, "On what there is," FLP, pp. 13-15, would perhaps maintain that what is *content* in this sense is the value of a variable. We think that, if Quine's view is granted, variables used in logic and mathematics become the possibilities of the occurrence of such contents. And because they are such possibilities even logic and mathematics cannot be treated as entirely bereft of such contents. They are formal only in the sense that they take different thought-forms and their relations into consideration without considering as to what actual or possible occurrences of contents these thought-forms and their relations might relate to.

[18] 'Nature', according to scientists, is everything that is not man, that is, not all men. In the present context, however, it is to be understood that 'nature' is everything that is not subjective. Since scientists regard observation—all mental activities in the scientific discoveries—to be the essential part of the data

to make it unknown; it is just what is known and, though it may be unknown, there is no question of its being unknowable.[19] If this argument is granted, and we do not see any reason not to do so, then obviously knowability comes out to be the character of the world itself; so that no idea of *philosophical agnosticism* can be entertained. But to deny philosophical agnosticism is not to deny scientific agnosticism.[20] That is, we cannot pretend to say that the world is knowable unless we reject the kind of agnosticism which asserts that the world as a whole, or in part, is unknowable. But to reject this kind of agnosticism is not to reject the view that within the knowability of the world, there are, and may be, certain steps which remain unexplained, which defy every kind of explanation, *at the present state of knowledge*, i.e. with respect to a particular understanding of the world. An obvious argument in favour of scientific agnosticism is that a particular understanding of the world *may not* be the *only* understanding with respect to the world (this is the very idea of possibility). But, at the same time, it is impossible to conceive of anything,

they receive through such observations, the view of 'nature' as everything except subjectivity, we think, does not go contrary to the established scientific convictions. (*See* Campbell, What is Science, p. 11-12.)

[19] *Vide* K. C. Bhattacharya, SP, p. 108n. Also Husserl, Ideas, sec. 2, 27. Husserl observes that values and uses practically belong to the nature of the world. As phenomena stand in immediate relation with us, we are *naturally* inclined to use them; and, also, the situation around us, as if itself urges to be dealt with. "These values and practicalities, they too belong to the constitution of the 'actually present' objects as such." (*Ibid.*, p. 103.)

[20] Scientific agnosticism proceeds from the essential belief that at any given time our understanding of the world may not be the only understanding. This D'Abro calls (Evolution of Scientific thought, Ch. 37, p. 39) "The limitation of human mind itself" which is misleading in so far as it suggests that human mind is something different from what is known. But in what he says, viz. "All we can ever do is to interpret A in terms of B, and B in terms of C (and so on)," so that however far we go we can never avoid an ultimate unknowable — a problem of explanation is displayed, problem that there may be infinite understandings of the world in succession, such that we can never at a point stop and can say that there is now no understanding further—(this, however, is different from saying that some part of the world may not be understood at all, for nothing can be the part of the world as may not be understandable).

either the world as a whole or in part, which does not have its corresponding understanding.

Now, what has been called "knowability" is obviously *given* in and through the world itself. So that there remains hardly any justification in separating the 'knowability' or *thought*—in the capacity of a separate substance—from what is known. Since knowability and usability are attributed to the world, it presupposes an implicit belief that *thought* is somehow invariably related with the world or actuality as the principle of understanding of actuality, in virtue of which the latter is known and used. Accordingly, the view that the world is knowable amounts, more or less in the Aristotelian way, to the assertion that the form (thought-forms) of the world is not external from the latter either in the fashion of Platonic "Ideas" or in that of Kantian "Reason", both of which sharply distinguish the principle of understanding and actuality, which results in the *creation* of a purely formal world. Now, even if it be granted that there is such a formal world, the problem 'how this world can be related to actuality?' crops up. It is difficult to see the relation of the two worlds unless they are *essentially* related, i.e. unless their relation is prior to the possibility of their being entirely distinct terms of the relation. If they are related, as both Plato and Kant maintain, the relation must be far from accidental, in the sense that it is always difficult, and even impossible, to conceive of anything (relating to the world of actuality) without entertaining the form of its understanding. That such a relation is a non-accidental relation is again brought out, as every fact carries with it a sort of self-evidence, which can be possible only when every fact is self-subsistent with respect both to its *form* as well as its *constituents*.

So, what led both Plato and Kant to the erroneous view they upheld was perhaps the impression which thought or understandability provides regarding its applicability (the latter being wider in scope than actuality to which it applies). But this indeed is no good reason to fall a prey to such views as

those of Kant and Plato. Kant was able to recognize somehow that thought is intrinsically related to actuality; but he could not explain how such a relation is rendered possible if both thought and actuality are fundamentally different. Perhaps Kant's trouble was that he could talk of forms without contents but not *vice versa*. But this difficulty very easily vanishes if the distinction between Objectivity and factuality is clearly apprehended; so that, thought is not only the principle of understanding the world, but rather of the whole Objectivity (Ch. I, 4A) which includes the world. And, therefore, just as it is continuous with Objectivity, so also it is continuous with the world or actuality.

So far we have been talking of 'thought' without giving any *personal* reference to it, i.e. without using the expression "my thought". This we have been doing deliberately, because, we think, that the world can be talked in terms of thought-forms, without referring at the same time to any particular person's thought. The philosophical problem of 'other minds' or that of solipsism appears to be a pseudo philosophical problem, which is felt to be genuine because we have the habit of using particular language-forms. Thus, we very often talk of "other's feeling (a pain)" or of "other's thought" and then wonder *how* we could ever come to know of such a feeling or a thought? Obviously we cannot become the other person in order to know the other person's feeling of pain or thinking a thought, due to the simple reason that anything like this would involve contradiction: While becoming the other person, I would at once be myself *and* the other person who I am not, hence denying thereby that the phrase "other-person" is meaningful. A solution quite often suggested to overcome this impasse is that the knowledge of 'other minds' is due to a sort of inference from certain *behaviours* of other persons. But this solution seems to presuppose what it ventures to answer For, unless other persons are already taken to be intelligent, how could it ever be possible to know that their behaviour is intelligent? Nothing can prevent me from supposing that all

behaviour of other persons, which seem to be *like* those of mine, are merely reflexive or mechanical involving no intelligence on the part of the agent[21]. It appears that every solution suggested to demonstrate the presence of 'other minds' really *creates* the problem of 'other minds'.

The problem thus created is of the hypothetical form: "Granting that there is at least *one* (my) mind, how is it possible to say that there are other (than my) minds?" The problem in the present form is, then, not one requiring *proof* for the presence of 'other minds' but only an explanation of the latter. That is, the problem is not one regarding the *being* of the 'other minds' but regarding only an *explanation* of what we intelligibly speak of as "other minds". Obviously, such expressions as "one" or "any", being exceptive or anomalistic, can be significantly used *only* when they imply, besides the 'one' or 'any', the notion of 'another'[22]. Accordingly, the saying that "There is only one mind" makes sense only because there have been other minds: the expression "only one mind" has the function of delimiting or restricting, which can be executed only if the concept of "mind" is 'plurable'[23]. It may be suggested that "mind" can be used in non-plurable sense in a statement such as "only I can feel my pain." But such a statement is either tautological or meaningless. It is to be noted that a statement such as "There is only one July 9, 1927" is a tautological statement, in the sense that the other dates in July, 1927 are not July 9, 1927 and only July 9, 1927 is July 9, 1927. But this very assertion shows that, though a date is singular and unique or different in some respects, nevertheless is plural in other respects. It is, in fact, impossible to *talk* of anything singularly unique in *all* respects

[21] Even if such behaviours are taken to be intelligent it is difficult to see how statements about what is called "mind" can be equated to statements about behaviour so as to prove the presence of 'other minds' (*vide* A. J. Ayer, "Other Minds," PASS vol. xxi, p. 193).

[22] *Vide* S. C. Coval, "Exceptive & Other Minds," *Analysis*, June, 1959.

[23] See, *Ibid.*, p. 138.

except in terms of tautology. So that, such statements as "there is only one mind", "There is a mind", and so on are *meaningful* only if the presence of 'other minds' is not denied. To deny this is to cease to talk meaningfully even of 'one (my) mind'. Hence, to attach a personal reference to any thought is simply a linguistic convention. The expression of the form "my (one) mind" is meaningless in either way: it is meaningless because there can hardly be any meaning to the expression "*my mind*" or "*your mind*" and so on; and if they have meaning at all, they mean more than *your* or *my* mind. But how is it that we come to retain this meaningless usage? The explanation, we think, is simple. The criterion of individuality (= person) is not thought, but subjectivity *qua* consciousness, which is wrongly identified by us with thought (Ch. I, 4). Owing to this false identification we come to talk of the world as "my world", plunging thereby into a solipsism which in fact is never there. Thought (i.e. mind) of the world remains the principle of understanding objectivity, and therefore of the world, and *as such* remains the same with every individual. That what one *feels* may not be the matter of any other person's feeling, even though the latter may know that the former is feeling in a certain way, can be accounted for by the fact that different persons may be confronted with different situations. Thus, if a person X knows that another person Y is in pain, then Y's pain constitutes a situation for X, which X knows — a situation which is quite different from the situation which confronts Y, in which Y feels pain. Hence, in order to have *knowledge* of Y's pain it is not necessary for X to be *in* pain (like Y).

Thought, or what is vaguely called "mind", is therefore simply a name for all those formal possibilities which are the same with everybody. As such, there is no such thing as 'your mind' and 'my mind': What really obtains in this respect is only that at a particular moment 'your' or 'my' consciousness is confronted or limited with respect to a certain objective activity which is called "a mind" or "a thought" as relating

to that consciousness. It may perhaps be said that we have dissolved the problem of 'other minds' only to discover the problem of 'solipsism' in the disguise of 'other consciousness'. But that this is not the case should be obvious. For, consciousness has been said to be the principle of individuality, and not that of the understanding of the world; so that, even if there are individuals, each in their own consciousness, or each as a Leibnitzian monad, all can possess the same understanding of the world. Further, since understanding itself is not apart from Objectivity, in understanding the world, persons understand each other.

D. Now, thought or mind *qua* the principle of understanding Objectivity functions in certain definite ways — ways which are responsible for determining the world as we know it. These definite ways of understanding with respect to situations understood are as follows: (1) a situation is determined by *itself*, (2) a situation is determined by *similar* situations, and (3) a situation is determined by involving other situations *different* from itself.

An understanding involved in cases of immediate experience (this Ch., Footnote 1) is one concerning the situations determined by themselves. That is, no situation in immediate experience can be known or understood unless it exhibits some character. It is just trivial to suggest that there cannot be a situation without a character: The point here is not this. It is rather that a situation, in the present sense, can be known only when it is known to be characterized: A situation, as involved in an immediate experience, is only a *phenomenal* situation, and, therefore, the unity of such a situation consists in the moment of its characterization. From this it follows that there cannot be *more than one* situation at an instance of characterization in immediate experience. It is therefore that in immediate experience the situation known must be determined by itself.

An understanding involved in cases of mediate experience, however, cannot but concern itself with more than one

situation. That is, no *physical* situation can be known unless it is understood to fall in at least one order. (Roughly speaking, by 'order' we mean that quality of a situation which is essential for that situation being a member of the class determined with respect to that quality. In contrast, 'character' is that quality of a situation which may not relate the situation to a class. For further discussion on the difference between 'character' and 'order,' see this Ch. 8-9.) A situation falling in some order means that more than one situation fall in that order. That is, a physical situation is determined only as relating to other similar situation(s). For example, when I say that A and B are red, I understand that with respect to redness both A and B are similar. In the same way, let us suppose, A and B are similar also with respect to their character as square. So that, now we call A "a red-square" and B "a red-square." Obviously, then, what we understand by the expression "A is a red-square" (or "B is a red-square") is not the same as the understanding of the expression "A is red." The determination of A or B as *a* red-square is different from the determination of the former *as* red (or *as* square), in that while the former determination is the determination of a situation with respect to at least one other alike situation — there is no sense in the expression "A is *a* red-square" if only A is to be 'red-square' — the latter may be a determination relating itself only to a single unique situation (see this Ch. footnote 3).

But when we say, as in the above example, that A and B are red-squares we are not thereby committing ourselves to the view that they do not have any other determination than their determination as red-squares: they may involve quite other determinations besides. Thus while A may be a 'big' red-square, B may be a 'small' one. So that, A and B may have different characters, in spite of their falling in the same order; and, consequently, A and B may be determined as defferent from each other. The situations called "men" are different in this sense, even though in certain ways they are alike, i.e. as falling in the same orders.

3

Now, it is to be noted that the determination of mutual difference between situations is not derived either from uniqueness of situations (the first kind of determination) or from the alikeness of situations (the second kind of determination). A simple reason for this is that the determination-as-difference is as much ultimate in our understanding as either the determination-as-uniqueness or the determination-as-alikeness. But this reason may not appear to be convincing; for, it may be asked, what after all is a determination-as-difference but the determination of different characters? Our reply to this is: determination of different characters is *not the same* as determination-as-difference, for the latter relates directly to situations and not to characters. Moreover, different characters may be determined with respect to a single situation, and it would be absurd to suggest that that situation is different from itself. Hence, what may appear to be consistent in this regard is only that certain situations are determined as different with respect to their determination as having different characters. But even such a view would prove to be immoderate and inconsistent, because a difference between *possible* and *actual* situations is not based on such an understanding. A possible situation is not determined as *having* any character (Ch. III, 12). Further, it may be pointed out that uniqueness or partial identity between situations is possible because the latter are different. That is, every case of determination-as-difference must be as spontaneous as the determination-as-uniqueness or determination-as-alikeness; i.e. if the latter does not follow from the former, then also we have no grounds to maintain that the former follows from the latter (Ch. III, footnote 12).

A further point of interest needs to be added here. Suppose I have before me a white and granular substance which I (after sometime) rightly apprehend as sugar. Now the question arises, whether in my observation, or for that matter in anybody's observation, the white and granular substance was sugar before it was recognized as such? The question is

obviously absurd, since had it been sugar in my observation, I would never have mistaken it for salt (before I recognized it as sugar). But, also, it cannot be argued that what is now present before me, as it is, was either sugar, or salt, or - - - - before I or anybody apprehended it as sugar. What is worthy of one attention in this connection is this that in such an apprehension, in knowledge, everything is distinguished as determined, whether rightly or wrongly, by the determinants which the objects of observation do not possess before we know them. It is this kind of determination, a kind of observational definition of the situation observed, which can provide us with any necessity in empirical knowledge (Ch. III, 11). Accordingly, if I say "sugar" for sugar, it of course is not a tautology: it is rather a case of observational definition which can never be contradicted or rendered false. This is true both in the case of physical situations as well as in that of phenomenal situations. This view of observational definition in our knowledge further strengthens the case of *difference* as a fundamental way of understanding. For, if understanding-as-difference is not regarded to be fundamental, we cannot explain why there be different observational definitions with regard to situations, unless the latter are originally different with respect to their understanding. So that, if the situations are originally different, their understanding(s) in that respect must be similarly original. Hence, we must accept that difference is one of the fundamental ways of determining situations; it makes possible innumerable different observational definitions (Ch. III, 12).

E. Hitherto we had been discussing the view that the world is determined and limited in respect of facts, and some other issues associated with it. Now let us consider the nature of the world as it is understood to be a systematic whole. The question to be dealt with here is, whether the world is just a *totality* of facts[24] of a *system* of facts? It seems more than possible

[24] *Vide* Wittgenstein, TLP 1.1, "The world is the totality of facts and not of things." Compare, "The world is the totality of objects that can be known through

that the world is a systematic world, i.e. a system of facts. If it is not a systematic world, it must be admitted that either our thinking of the world as a systematic world is a grave cosmological error, which it is beyond our capacity to correct, or we think unsystematically, so that it fails to relate to what otherwise may be a systematic world. That we do not think unsystematically of a systematic world and the *vice versa* is obvious, since, if that be the case, we must be thinking otherwise of the world, so that our thinking could never represent the form of the world. But the possibility that we can think, or may be thinking, otherwise of the world is at least not a logical impossibility: philosophical agnosticism may still pose itself to be a logically possible faith among faiths. But its pretensions are immediately obvious. For, then, we cannot say, as we do not think, anything about the world, not even that it is a totality of facts. But this is a self-refuting conclusion: we are able to think or talk of that (the world) which we cannot think or talk.

Now, if the world is not a systematic world, and if it is only a totality of facts, then the facts it comprises of must be mutually *disconnected*. If facts are mutually disconnected, then it cannot be shown as to why a single or two or three or any number of facts *less than all* may not constitute the whole world. To argue that the world cannot be constituted, for instance, by a single fact, because there *are* more than one fact, would not be satisfactory; since facts, as entirely disconnected, may remain entirely aloof, so that any *one* of them may constitute a whole world by excluding all the rest. In this way, there may be a world of one fact, a world of two facts, and so on, leaving us to the absurd choice of selecting among these *the* world, or the world of *all* facts. Hence, when we say that the world comprises of all facts, it becomes meaningful only if we understand that there is a *system* of facts, which denies that there may be a world even of one fact. For it asserts that even the

experience, known in terms of orderly theoretical thought on the basis of direct present experience." Husserl, Ideas, p. 52.

acceptance of one fact involves the acceptance of all the rest; so that the world cannot be constituted by less than all the facts.

8A. To talk of the under-structure, the substantial ground, of the world, or to talk of facts with respect to their constituents or contents, is to a great deal a logical or analytical task.[25] The simplest units of our knowledge of the world are *facts* and not what constitute facts. So that any attempt to get at the constituents of the world involves a logical analysis of facts. But, then, from where should we start our analysis? We think that a comparatively less disputed starting-point would be to see that facts, though they have a simple structure, are always *complex* with respect to what constitutes their structure. And this is simple to see: Had that which constitutes the structure of a fact been not complex, the structure of that fact would have remained indistinguishable from its constituents. Thus, suppose that there is a language in which for a sentence stating a fact we need utter only one word.

[25] It is therefore that whatever is said in this connection is not to be taken as a *hypothesis* regarding the under-structure of the world. The fact seems to be that what is postulated to explain the overt phenomena in philosophy has the character of *pure-Objectivity* (Ch. I, 4) and therefore is beyond any objective experience and belief. Hence whatever is said with regard to the under-structure of the world may as well be overlooked. What is important to note here is simply this that the substantial ground of factuality is complex. The following discussion between Russell and Carr (LK, p. 202) is particularly interesting in this connection:

Mr. Carr: You think there are simple facts that are not complex. Are complexes all composed of simples? Are not the simples that go into complexes themselves complex?

Mr. Russell: No facts are simple. As to your second question, that is, of course, a question that might be argued - - - - whether when a thing is complex it is necessary that it should in analysis have constituents that are simple. I think it is perfectly possible to suppose that complex things are capable of analysis *ad infinitum*, and that you never reach the simple. I do not think it is true - - - -. I do myself think complexes (facts) - - - - are composed of simples - - - -.

Accordingly, Wittgenstein's argument that what constitutes a complex cannot itself be complex is at least not a logically tenable view. Russell, after having passed forty years since the above discussion took place, maintains: "I have since become more convinced than I was then that there is no reason to expect analysis to arrive at simples." (My Philosophical Development, p. 222).

Obviously, then, the understanding of such a fact would not give us the least idea of its structure as being distinct from what constitutes the latter; that is, in such a statement the meaning of that word would be identical with the meaning-whole expressed by that word-sentence. But a position like this is never involved in our understanding of any fact. We are always able to distinguish names, predicates and relations from the proposition or the 'meaning-whole' in any factual sentence (Ch. II, 7C).

It may be suggested, however, that facts, with respect to their substantial ground, are a *continuum*, so that the constituents even though complex cannot be apprehended as such. That is, though names, predicates, etc. can be distinguished from the corresponding 'meaning whole' in a factual expression, it is just possible that it is due merely to the linguistic character of the latter; for after all in understanding a factual sentence we always feel the continuity of constituents of the latter. This sort of argument tends to develop into the assertion that the world is a grand continuum: if it is possible to do away with the complexity of the constituents of a fact, a distinction between the corresponding structures of facts also goes with it, and with that goes the very difference between facts; and therefore no separate or distinct constituents can be identified either in one fact or in all facts, i.e. the world. Now, the fundamental weakness of this view of fact-as-continuum is that it cannot account for the real situation, namely, that every fact is apprehended to be distinct from another, so that we can talk of more than one fact. Our talking of different facts cannot be attributed to any character of the language in which we so talk; for, the difference between facts can at once be related to the difference in corresponding experiences and understandings. Further, even if the view of fact-as-continuum is granted, it cannot be shown as to how one continuum (as fact) *qua* itself can be distinct from another. One possible way to get away from this difficulty would be to maintain that our minds somehow cut the continuum into parts which

are different and distinct (facts) with respect to the different sizes into which our minds have cut the continuum.[26] But, if this be the case, mind is either external from the continuum or is implicit in it (in the capacity of its understanding). If mind is external from the continuum, there is the old problem of the determination of the relation between the two (this Ch. 7C). And if mind is implicit in the continuum, it must also be continuous with the continuum; but then if it cuts the continuum into parts (facts), it denies its very right of being the principle of understanding the world-as-continuum and thereby fails to be implicit in the latter. The difficulty is pretty obvious: the view of fact-as-continuum denies the distinction of the structure of facts from what constitutes this structure, thereby denying the very difference of one fact from another, which in its turn results in reducing the whole world into a single fact (which obviously is not what corresponds to our experience and understanding). So the assertion that the world (or a fact) is a continuum amounts to the denial of the assertion that the world is what is all the facts in a system or even in a totality. But, then, the status of the world as a continuum cannot be spoken or understood!

The view of the world as all the facts, on the other hand, allows us to talk meaningfully both of the world and of the denial of the view of fact-as-continuum. It is to be noted that in our factual understanding something is understood about something, so that every factual understanding involves always more than one objective factor. For example, with respect to our understanding of the fact 'That this is red (now)', we say that here (at the space-time *tr*) is an experience as vouched by a belief in that experience, such that, besides the belief, there is at least one thing in the experience which

[26] Cf. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p.p. 388n. "- - - - in order that the human mind may be able to represent relations between phenomena, there must first be - - - - distinct facts, cut out in the continuity of becoming. And once we posit this particular mode of cutting up such as we perceive it today, we posit also the intellect such as it is today, for it is by relation to it, and to it alone, that reality is cut up in this manner."

is red but which is *not* identical with red. If there were to obtain such an identity, we need not say "This is red": instead, simply "The red" would express the understanding of the fact in question, which can never be the case since no fact 'That the red' or 'That the rose' is ever understood—yet this precisely should be the state of affairs if we refuse to admit that in our factual understanding more than one objective factor is involved. The situation would be different, however, if we refer to a thing and say "This red" or "This rose", for what we mean here is that "What I am referring to is *this* which is red (or which is a rose)", or "I referred to this *as* red (or as a rose)." This incidentally suggests that what is called "knowledge by acquaintance" resembles that which is called "knowledge by description" in a very important sense. If somebody asks me, "Did you see that table over there?" my reply would perhaps be, "Yes, I did. It is a small table, brown in colour, square in size, with four legs, shining—" and so on. And this is how we get acquainted with things: whether we know things by acquaintance or by description we know them *as* something. This is a very important characteristic of factual understanding. It makes clear at once that what we ordinarily call "things" cannot be constituents of facts, for to know a thing is already to understand a fact. Thus, to say that X knows Y is already to say that X knows *about* Y (for, there cannot be a knowledge either by acquaintance or by description of Y unless something is known about Y). So, when we say that a fact displays a complexity of constituents with respect to its structure, we do not thereby mean that such constituents are our commonplace things.

B. So the question remains: what are the constituents of a fact? We could determine so far only this that there should be more than one such constituent, (so that a single fact or all the facts can never be in a continuum) and that their constituents cannot be regarded as common-sense things. We noted also that in our understanding of facts we understand

something about something. Now, what is this *something* about which something is understood? Any attempt to answer this would again lead us to say something about it, and so on, until we stop short of saying anything *about* it. That is, we always talk *about* something and very often talk many things *about* the same thing. This kind of analysis is due to Aristotle. Aristotle groups the predicates which may be asserted of a subject-term under a number of headings. Each such group is called a category. Thus, under the category of "quality" fall such predicates as "red", "wise", "sweet", and so on; and under the category of "relation" fall such predicates as "bigger than", "next to", and so on. Now, these predicates must be predicated of a subject, and some subjects, according to Aristotle, are first substances—things of which any predicate in any of the categories may be predicated but which themselves may not be predicated of anything. In a way, then, a substance must be prior to its possible predecates, it must be logically separable from them in order that it may have them affirmed of itself. For example, a substance is not red, but *something* of which the quality *red* may be predicated, something which may be black or red or green, and so on. As such, the Aristotelian first substance might as well be said to be colourless. This is what Wittgenstein appears to have in mind when talking of 'objects' as substance of the world,[27] which, he says, are colourless[28]. Such *objects* quite obviously cannot be contemplated unless attached with some predicate(s). In this way, according to both Aristotle and Wittgenstein, in order to account for the understandability of factual statements, it is necessary to take notice of these *first substances* or simple objects as constituents of facts. Wittgenstein goes a step further still: facts are composites only of such factors as are ultimately simple, objects—in Wittgenstein's phrase—or of such factors as are liable of analysis into such simples. (see this Ch. Footnote 25). Accordingly, even

[27] *Vide* TLP., 2.021.

[28] *Ibid.*, 2.0232. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, pp. 58-60.

predicates and relations may ultimately be reduced to such objects.

Now, obviously, these *simples* (objects) appear to be the products merely of the analytical understanding of factual statements. The possibility of their presence, therefore, is only due to their capacity to explain the under-structure or substantial ground of facts, and therefore they can be present only in virtue of their capacity to occur in a fact. Be as it may, it is clear that if all the facts are given—which is the world—thereby also all the objects are given. Again, since the objects can be given only in virtue of their occurrence in the composition of facts, they are always given in particular ways; so that we cannot properly talk of the totality of objects,[29] but only of the *system* or configuration of objects. But if an object *occurs* in a system or a configuration of objects, there is nothing to exclude the possibility that it *may occur* in such configurations as are entirely new. That objects occur in systems or configurations suggests that their capacity to occur in a system or in a configuration must be immanent in the nature of objects themselves.[30] (To argue that some powerful agent like God or Reason may induce this system among the objects which are otherwise entirely separate would be illogical in the present context, as it can neither be proved nor be disproved either by resorting to experience or to logic. Hence this cannot be a sound argument in its capacity as an explanation. Any argument seeking to explain anything regarding the world must be capable, at least in principle, of proof or disproof either empirically or logically.) To maintain that the system is immanent in objects themselves amounts to saying that they are *functionally* inclined to each

[29] See, TLP., 5.5561.

[30] Wittgenstein, TLP., 2.0123, maintains that all the connections lie in the objects. But, if this is so, we do not see how these objects can ever get rid of these connections, and avoid falling in some system. For the state of their not falling in any system would be one of logical non-presence, as in that case they cannot be called even abstractions: since what is an abstract is something presupposing an objective context. *Vide* Goodman, Structure of Appearance, VII, 8.

other. That is, regarding their occurrence, the objects must overlap each other, which would constitute the relation or connection between the objects, with respect to which they are said to fall in a system or configuration.

Having considered the view of objects *qua* simples, which include even the predicates and relations, let us now examine the view that predicates and relations cannot be treated as objects. It appears to be quite legitimate to hold that in the present context predicates and relations cannot be treated as objects,[31] because to treat them so would necessitate a change in the view of objects as colourless or qualitiless in order to accommodate such objects as 'red', 'taller than', and so forth. But, what if we regard predicates and relations as a different set of objects (than first-substances) inhibiting the world?[32] For example, should we treat predicates and relations to be such objects as may be functionally inclined towards more than one first-substance at the same time? Now, even if they are treated in this way, it is difficult to see how they can be different from the objects which are first-substances. For the latter can similarly be said to be functionally inclined towards more than one predicate or relation at the same time. This can be seen in the following way: suppose that the world comprises just of A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4, B_1, B_2, B_3, B_4 objects in which A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4 are first-substances (one set of objects) and B_1, B_2, B_3, B_4 are predicates or relations (another set of objects), and their various overlapping functions constitute configurations (as shown in the figure on the next page) which show that no set of objects is in principle less or more functionally inclined (to the other set of objects) than the other.[33] What are called "firstsubstances", then, appear to have the same possibility of

[31] Wittgenstein in his pre-Tractatus note-books wrote: "Properties and relations are objects too." (16.6.15). He does not give any reason why he abandoned this view in Tractatus.

[32] *Vide* Moore, Some Main problems of Philosophy, pp. 312n.

[33] The figure on the next page is drawn only to show that there cannot be two (or more) *kinds* of objects. Hence, if both predicates and relations and first-substances are taken to be of the *same* kind — a view which is as much difficult to maintain



occurrence in an infinite number of contexts as do the predicates and relations (regarded as objects), so that hardyl any distinction can be drawn between different *kinds* of objects. If they are objects, they are all objects without involving any qualitative difference or without involving the impression of being a 'first' or a 'second'. But this is a self-refuting view, since to admit predicates like "red", "green" (and also relations) as objects is to presuppose a qualitative difference among objects. Evidently, any attempt to give predicates and relations the status of such objects would be fallacious, for what have been called "objects" by Aristotle and Wittgenstein are *logical* entities, while what are called "predicates" and "relations" are entities in *experience*. Such objects are invoked to explain the world that we experience and not to inhibit the world of experience *side by side* the entities in experience: the fact that a particular experienced entity, e.g. a colour-appearance, cannot be abstracted from its correlative point of space-time, nor can it be "actually lifted out of the stream of experience"[34] shows the difference between experiential and logical entities. But, since experiential entities cannot be thus abstracted without involving unintelligibility with respect

consistently, as we shall see presently — the figure above does not explain what we have earlier called "overlapping of objects."

[34] *Vide* Goodman, Structure of Appearance, vi, 1, p. 148.

to them and to the context wherefrom they are abstracted,[35] the simple units of experience cannot be these experiential entities but only the *experiential individuals*. For example, in a colour-experience what is experienced is not just a colour, but is a-colour-at-a-space-time. Now, since an experiential individual cannot be treated as a factor in experience (for it is continuous with the whole of experience), the occasion of the occurence of an experience is already an occasion to see a complex situation. The assertion, for instance, "This is red here now (at space-time *tr*)" involves a highly complex situation (of which it is an assertion). The 'this' in the above assertion, accordingly, would stand not for *an* (simple) object, but for the whole complexity or complex situation of which *red* is asserted to be the character (at the space-time *tr*). This 'this' may have yet other characters. Now, it is interesting to note that even if such *characters* relating to some particular space-time belong to the 'this', they cannot lead us to establish *this* as, for example, a 'table'—no matter how many of these characters as belonging to 'this' may be determined. The characters which determine a physical thing like 'table' are quite different—the word "table" is to be used with reference to these characters at *all* space-time, because the presence of such characters is beyond a particular space-time (this Ch. 9C).

It is to be noted in this connection that if 'predicates' are treated as characters of complexes (in the above sense), 'relations' too come out to be the characters of these complexes. The language of relation, or 'relation' in all forms of its expression, involves the understanding that there are at least two sets of determined characters, regarding two or more different complexes, which by functioning in certain ways with respect to each other give the impression of there being another type of characters, viz. relations. In the case of relations, therefore, to have a relation means

[35] *Ibid.*

always to have two or more than two complex situations, as the case may be, i.e. the relation being dyadic, triadic, and so on; to have a 'predicate' means, on the other hand, that we may have only one such complex situation. So, fundamentally, the facts of relations, with respect to all their significance, are the same as the facts of predicates.

Now, the difficulty that is felt in accounting for "predicates" and "relations", as shown above, suggests that the Aristotelian and Wittgensteinian account of the analysis of factual expressions in terms of objects *qua* first-substance is to some extent erroneous: that is, the assertion that the logic of language may permit us to arrive at such objects in order to account for the under-structure of the world does not appear to be quite satisfactory. For, these objects, according to them, are 'colourless'; and to admit *predicates* (and *relations*) as such objects would be to admit, for example, that colours are colourless! But, then, if the predicates and relations are not admitted to be such objects, what are they? If they are held as qualifying the subject *this* in the assertion of the form "This is red," and if *this* is an object, then since there are no substances except such objects, *red* cannot qualify *this*, unless it itself be an object. And we are back with the same difficulty. The difficulty appears to be with "this" and not with the corresponding quality like "red". 'This' does not appear to stand for an object *qua* a first-substance but only for the complexity of which 'red' is a character which helps us to determine the former in our knowledge. So, our language need not give us any clue leading to such simple objects (except the wrong one as is the case with Aristotle and Wittgenstein). Obviously, no language goes beyond what is understood, and what is understood is only a certain situation, i.e. some complexity. Hence simple objects do not appear to be those entities which we arrive at in the process of analysis; analysis may as well go on *ad infinitum* without giving us any simples (see this Ch. Footnote 25). Accordingly, the notion of such

objects is of the nature of a *pure postulation* (Ch. I, 3) which we may choose because it explains the nature of facts, of all facts (=the world); and not because it follows from the logic of language. As to the question, what constitutes a fact? or, what are the constituents of facts, the world? no definite answer can be given except that it is complex: the factors which go into the making of this complex cannot be determined either as simple or as complex.

C. It is obvious in the light of the above however that *space* and *time*, considered in themselves, are mere abstractions from *experiential individuals*.[36] Since an experiential individual relates to others of its kind, in the immediate continuity of a single stream of experience, the former's space-time aspect gets determined with respect to its relation with the latter. Thus, a point of space s at which the colour-appearance C occurs at time t is determined with respect to other such occurrences at the time t, i.e. with respect to the whole visual field at the time t. Now, though it is never hard to suppose that at the time t only one such occurrence takes place, it is obvious that in that case there would be no concept of "space" at that time. The concept of "space" is the logical plane for the possibility of more than one such individual occurring at the same time; that is, *the possibility of the occurrence of more than one such individual at all the times.* But, it is not necessary that multiple individuals should in all cases involve the notion of space. For, it is just possible that no two or more individuals may occur at the same moment, involving thereby no need to distinguish one point of occurrence from another in order to distinguish between two or more non-simultaneously given-occurrences: it is just possible that all individuals occur at a single point of occurrence, and therefore each occurring at a different moment; so that, if these occurrences are to be distinguished, they invoke the distinction with respect to different

[36] We shall hereafter use the word "individual" in place of "experiential individual". The latter will be used only if we want to emphasize the corresponding experience.

occasions (times) of occurrences, and not with respect tont differe *points* (space) of occurrences relating to which they are the same. Now, with *time* the case is just the contrary. Time is the possibility of one individual succeeding the other and so on. 'Change', therefore, is the nucleus of the concept of 'time'. If we suppose that *all* individuals occur simultaneously, we need not entertain any concept of "time". Thus, *space* and *time* are both *differentia* of individuals—extensionally and temporally respectively. It is, therefore, that the world, as a composite of *all* facts, cannot be said to be *about* any time or space. All facts are about all the times and all the space, so that the world also remains likewise, and is thus co-extensive with all space-time.

Thus, *space* and *time* are peculiar kinds of relation between different (experiential) individuals. They behave at once as experiential entities, as in case of a colour-appearance in an experiential individual, and as a kind of relation between two or more such individuals. But if they are to be called relations, relations of individuals, it has to be admitted that they are *necessary* relations of these individuals, other relations—but for the exception of the relation of 'identity'—being contingent. As such, they can always be discerned in the constitution of facts relating to sense-fields. Facts can be said to be about the space *s* if facts relate to individuals which occur in a visual or tactual sense-field. Facts about a time *t* may, however, relate to any sense-field, i.e. they are facts about those individuals which, as falling within a system, one either preceded or followed (or both) by at least are individual.

9A. Now, since two or more individuals can occur at the same time or at different times or both, the two or more individuals of the same nature, of the same logical form, with respect to their certain character(s), may occur at the same time or at different times or both, and at each time of occurrence their nature remains the same. This harmony which runs between the individuals of the same nature with respec

to their character(s) is called "order"[37] of those individuals. It is to be clearly understood that what is here called "order" is not the same as "class". For, a *class* is the *sum* of its members, while an *order* cannot be spoken of as having members. Thus, several things are said to be *green* because they are understood as belonging to a single class "green". That is, there is an understanding of the class "green" because there are *green things*. But, how is it that several things are understood as green? Because, there is an *order* running through those things, or because they are of the same nature with respect to at least one character. So, the understanding of the class "green" rests on the possibility of there being an *order* in and through the things to which that class relates. Thus, the notion of 'order' is indicative not of something complex, as in case of a class: *order* is the *uniformity of character(s)* of certain individuals.[38] That is, an *order* remains undifferentiated, irrespective of the difference between the individuals to which it relates. In short, class relates to individuals, whereas order relates to characters.

B. The presence of the understanding of *order* is a significant feature of our knowledge in so far as it provides us with a clue to understand the nature of what we call "general facts", which has remained a matter of great controversy among the philosophers. That *general facts* are not mere generalizations of those instances to which they relate appears to hold good; for, as Russell has pointed out, a general fact presupposes a sort of harmony running through all its instances which is prior to all generalizations. Accordingly, a general fact is not just a totality, a class of all particular facts to which that general fact relates; for, it is necessary to know prior to the determination of such a totality the respect in which it is a

37 *Vide* Goodman, Structure of Appearance, Ch. ix.

38 It is to be noted, however, that even if *all* characters of certain individuals or situations are identical, those situations would be understood as different (this Ch. 7D).

totality[39]. That is, a general fact is not *about* the particular facts to which it relates. For example, to say that "All men are mortal" is *not* to say that "*x* is mortal," "*y* is mortal," "*z* is mortal," *and so on*: since, the use of the phrase "and so on" is meaningful only when it is determined with respect to something more definite than what appears to be at the first glance. But, even so, a general fact cannot but relate to particular facts. So the problem is pertinent: general facts are *not about* the particular facts, yet they cannot but relate to these very particular facts. A solution to the problem is this: A general fact is not about the particular facts to which it relates, but it is *about the order(s) of all those particular individuals which the particular facts relate.* Hence, a general fact of the form 'That all men are mortal' presents really no problem with respect to inductive inference. What a general fact really states is that there is obtaining some *actual* order(s) among certain individuals, and that it is such order(s) which determine what individuals (besides the given ones) are to be related to that general fact. Let us, for instance, take the general fact 'That all men are mortal'. What is here understood by "all men"? Surely, we cannot go on counting 'x, y, z,—all', unless we know definitely where we have to stop and say that "these are *all*" which is not possible due to our limitations. In the

[39] *Vide* Russell, LK, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," V. Also, My Philosophical Development, p. 226: "No particular A is a constituent of the proposition 'all A is B' and the proposition can therefore be understood if you know the meaning of 'A' even if you have never seen an 'A'." Compare, "The synthetic premise in question, involving the notion of allness, must always be presupposed whenever the reductive definition under discussion is applied to a universal statement, and hence the attempt to eliminate "(x)" from it by means of that definition is comparable to the attempt to catch one's own shadow." SNT, p. 147. Arguing from the impossibility of an extensional account of a general fact, Pap suggests "the unique significance of such a statement could be grasped by simply grasping the meaning of the logical constants involved, without even the question of 'what there is'." (*Ibid*, p. 148). But, according to our exposition of the matter, general statements are uniquely significant with respect to the question of 'what there is' though they do not relate to the latter directly or in terms of a single given experience.

present instance of general fact, it is *mortality* that defines or determines certain individuals as are designated by the general concept or G-sign "man" (Ch. III, 11B). It should be clear immediately that *mortality* is only *one* order among many which determine the individuals called "man". Thus, if we say that there are exactly the individuals—A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, the different *orders* that run through these individuals may affect the latter in various ways:



Now, if all the common orders of the group DEGH (namely, these orders: '——'=moratality (decay), '——'=rationality, '.....' = animality(being instinctive); other orders being, '- - - -' = whiteness, ' ' = immovability) are understood by the general concept "man", then the individuals D,E,G, and H would be called "man" (all men). But as the order 'mortality' runs through all the given individuals, all of them would not be called "man"; for an individual called "man" is transected by three orders simultaneously, as is obvious from the figure drawn above, which is not the case with other individuals, viz. A, B, C, F, and I. The transection of more than one order through a single individual may be called "overlapping of orders." Accordingly, the configuration E in the above example (figure) provides the highest occasion for such overlapping of orders. So that, E, as called "a man", exhibits the capacity of falling in yet another order. But

obviously the order, '- - -' which transects E is not an order with respect to the individuals called "man". Hence, with respect to E *qua* a man the order '- - - -' or whiteness would be called "a character", the presence or absence of which does not make any difference to E being called "a man". The case would be different, however, if there are to be such individuals as may show a tendency of falling in an order which directly excludes any of the orders essential for any individual being a man. For example, God may be rational and yet immortal, so that He can never be called "a man" (in the same language). Now since the overlapping orders are not determined in our knowledge in such an absolute way, it is very difficult to define a general concept like "man"[40]. Further, there is the difficulty with respect to accidental orders relating to man, e.g. the colour 'red' of human skin, which is just a *character* in respect of some men who have such skin, but an order with respect to *red things*.

So, in case of the general fact 'That all men are mortal' only one order, viz. mortality, has been asserted of man, which, therefore, cannot be taken as the whole definition of "man", but only as one among many orders which constitute such a definition, to which every individual called "man" *must* comply in order to be understood as man. Such predicates as "rationality", "animality", mortality", etc. are attached to the subject term "man", since the latter cannot be understood without a reference to them.

The suggestion that propositions relating to general facts be stated in *hypothetical* form is therefore of great value. Accordingly, the hypothetical form of the proposition "All men are mortal" is:

$$(x)\ (Hx \supset Mx).$$

[40] Cf. C. G. Hampel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," Readings in Philosophy of Science, ed. Feigl, "—— the problem of an adequate definition of purely qualitative (universal) predicates remain open.' And a term is universal if its meaning can be conveyed without explicit reference to any particular object.

But this form is misleading in so far as it may suggest (*a*) that an extensional account of general facts can be given, i.e. supposing as if all things called "man" can be counted, and (*b*) that both the predicates (H=man, M=Mortality) have equal ostensive significance (Ch. III, 11B). It is to be noted that such a suggestion is not intrinsic with the form of the expression. For, in an instantiation of this expression, in the form:

$$Ha \supset Ma,$$

it is never suggested that a particular individual or thing *is* a man. What both these forms of expression suggest is only that if something is a man, then it should be mortal; for, it *cannot* be that something is *both* a man and a non-mortal,

$$\backsim(\exists_x)\ (x \text{ is a man.} \backsim(x \text{ is mortal}).$$

So it is obvious that what is here called "man" is defined with respect to mortality, though this definition is not complete as relating to the full understanding of the G-sign "man". A similar understanding of the present instance of factual expression is further brought out in the form of the corresponding counter-factual conditional which tries to establish a causal relation between its antecedent and consequent terms. (Ch. III, 12A). Thus, if it is said,

"Had a man been God, he would have been immortal", an obvious tendency to define "man" by "mortality" is displayed. A similar tendency is displayed even more clearly if it is said, "Had God been a man, He would have suffered death". Here, again, in order to be a man, He must be a mortal being. It is clear, however, that mere mortality would not have provided us with an occasion to call Him "a man", (He might have been an ape, or a goat, or a tree, and what not). But His being *a man* would surely have provided us with a sufficient cause to believe that He is mortal. Now, such a cause certainly does not relate to a situation where one individual produces the other; it rather relates only to the recognition that a certain general concept is defined in respect of certain orders. The case of understanding "causality" in this sense, therefore, is *analytic* — in the sense that it refers to

the relation of meanings only: There are, no doubt, genuine problems connected with the notion of causality (Ch. III, 12A) such as that of prediction, the association of similar or dissimilar characteristics, and so on which we shall deal with later.

Obviously, then, a general fact, though it has an implicit ostensive reference in virtue of which it relates to particular facts, is not *about* any or all of these particular facts. It is *about* the order(s) of such individuals as remain identical in nature with respect to the order(s) and in virtue of which they are designated by a general concept like "man". Further, a general fact is not about any particular space-time, since an order is not understood as either preceding or following (or both) some other order(s).

C. Now, what has been called a "particular fact", to which general facts are said to be relating, needs consideration. The first-order facts (see, this Ch. 6A, Footnote 3) of the form 'That this is red' are no doubt particular facts relating to the experience of *phenomenal* situations. The second-order facts of the form 'That this is a man' are the other kind of particular facts which relate to the experience of *physical* situations. We cannot call the fact of the second kind a first-order fact, as it uses a second-level predicate "man" (this Ch. Footnote 3); nor can it be called a general fact since *this*, in this case, is denotative of something experienced at a particular space-time, of an experiential individual, and the predicate "man", even though understandable in terms only of the corresponding orders, is asserted of what is thus experienced and not of those orders. A second-order fact, then, relates atonce to an experiential individual and the order(s) with regard to which the individual is determined.

Now, if it is said that "This is red, is a man," or "x is red and is a man," it remains intelligible with respect to both of the predicates "red" and "man". But the attribution of these two predicates makes a lot of difference regarding the intelligibility of the subject term "This", or "x". For, when it is asserted that "This is red" or "x is red" it is quite possible that

nothing more or less than what *is* the case at the moment of experience is asserted. But if asserted that "This is a man", many more cases (a complex situation) are asserted. Obviously, by using the predicate "man" one is sure that *this* is not *the* man; because whatever is understood to be a man is never thought as exhausting the corresponding order(s). So that, the attribution of *man* to *this* is possible only when we can significantly use such expressions as "This is *a* man," "That is *a* man," and so on. That is, the understanding of the expressions like "This is *a* man" depends on several understandings of the kind "*x* is a man"—where *x* is a *variable* applicable to *all* cases which possess the order(s) defining the G-sign "man". So, it is the *immediate difference* that the predicate "man" displays with respect to the individuals like 'this', 'that', etc. which forms the nucleus of the understanding of the form of the expression "This is a man." But this immediate difference is also an occasion of the *immediate relation* of the predicate "man" with the corresponding individuals. That is, the individuals (both phenomenal and physical) in experience carry their understandability with respect to their forms; and to that extent they are self-evident, as being understood immediately either in their own capacity with regard to their respective forms (or characters) as in case of the facts of the form 'That this is red', or in the capacity of the identity of their forms (or orders) as in case of the facts of the form 'That this is a man', or in the capacity of both, e.g., as 'That this is red, is a man'. So that, what is understood as "This is red" may also be understood as "This is a man", and therefore again as "This is red, is a man", or as "This man is red".

Now it is clear, then, that first-order facts invariably relate to phenomenal situations and involve no understanding of orders. General facts, on the other hand, are *about* orders, as we have already made clear. So, the particular facts to which general facts may relate can only be second-order facts which involve understanding of the orders of respective physical situations. Evidently, no extensional account of

general facts can be given; that is, e.g., the general fact 'That all men are mortal' cannot be said to be *about* the facts 'That this is a man', 'That that is a man', and so on; for, it is *not* about any experiential individual 'this', 'that,' 'thot', etc., but rather *about* the order(s) with respect to which all these individuals are called "man". Hence, a general fact, unlike first-order and second-order facts, is not about experiential individuals—i.e. either phenomenal or physical individuals. But it *relates* to these individuals; for, otherwise, it cannot be even about the orders of these (physical) individuals.

In short, a general fact, as distinct from first-order facts and second-order facts, is a fact in its own right. All facts have, however, fundamentally the same nature in respect of their structure and substantial ground. A general fact is so called only because it relates to the understanding of generality, just as a first-order fact relates to the understanding of particularity, and a second-order fact relates to the understanding of generality-in-relation-with-a-particular. They are equally important and fundamental. Hence, they all atonce go into the construction of the world; and, consequently, the world of our knowledge itself is neither more nor less than *all* these facts.

FACTUALITY AND MODALITY

10A. It is almost customary to regard facts to be contingent. But *they* do not seem to be either necessary or contingent. Facts are simply what they *are*. A fact cannot be necessary: since no fact either by itself, or by something else, ever necessitates its being. That is, the *presentness* of what is a fact carries no *rule* or *law* of its being so. Whatever we know as necessary is definitely so *according* to some normative rule or law, but no such law is ever discovered in the world *side by side with facts*: Nothing in the world suggests that something *must* be the case. What is suggested thereby is only that something *is* the case, and that the latter, as associated with a belief, may perhaps continue to be so in the future, or perhaps has continued to be so in the past. If we take into account the different kinds of facts, i.e. 'That men are mortal', 'That this is red', and 'That this is a man', we find that all such facts are *parts* of the totality of facts which is the world —they are about *some* situation, and not about the *whole* situation or about the whole world. Now, one may argue that since facts form parts of the world, they are necessary with respect to the positions they occupy in the system of the world. Obviously, it cannot be argued against this that even *in* the world their respective positions are just accidental; for, "The world" is understood as a "system of facts", so that, in this system, facts are determined, and therefore their respective positions cannot be regarded as accidental. But, then, what about such a system of facts? There obviously is no necessity about there being *such* a system of facts: There may be, or could have been, a world in which we might have such a fact as 'That all men are red', or where the expression "This red" would have been unintelligible for want of the determinant 'red'. Again, the

system which is said to be obtaining between facts is necessitated just by the presence of facts, so that facts cannot be said to be necessary with respect to this very system without resorting to a sort of circular agrument.

Hence it appears quite legitimate to hold that no normative rule or law is possible in our knowledge with respect either to a single fact or to the totality of facts. That all experiences, with regard to their respective individuals, are genuine and unchangeable in that respect is a quite different matter: experiences are conditioned by what is actually there. But the presentness *qua* actuality is never known to be conditioned by anything else.

B. Are facts, then, contingent? It is quite frequently suggested that what merely *is*, is contingent: No way is possible from 'is' to 'must be'. But this suggestion does not appear to be valid. What *is*, or the presentness, is of two sorts epistemologically: that which *is* —may be negated, and that which *is* — is never negated. For example, what may appear to *be* a snake is negated when the same thing is known to be a rope; but the latter continues to be so as not being negated. Now, if both the epistemic senses of presentness are granted (and we do not see why they should not be), then we arrive at an unpleasant conclusion, namely, that both facts and no-facts are contingent. For, if in one case presentness can be negated, there is no *prima facie* reason for not negating the presentness in second case. So that, at least at this very important level, we are forced to accept that facts and no-facts are on the same footing. The situation becomes still worse when we realize that no-facts, unlike facts, are ostensively vacuous (Ch. IV, 13-14).

Again, let us ask, what does the negation of a fact entail? Perhaps we cannot *see* a factual answer to this: The negation of a fact is simply unintelligible. It is clear that we cannot think otherwise of what is a fact, *such that* such a thinking should itself be factual, i.e. have factual import.[1] This view

[1] Hume argued that because we can think or imagine otherwise of a fact the latter must be contingent. We think that there is a lot of differenc

should be granted, because no fact can cancel another: they are not only irreducible to one another, but also they do not negate each other. However, it is not as much clear that a fact cannot entail a no-fact, though the converse is both logically and epistemologically a valid contention: the realization of a no-fact may lead one to discover what really is the case, the fact, which cannot be the starting-point, i.e. the no-fact. If he finds that the result is invariably the same (i.e. the point of start), then the point, the no-fact, wherefrom he starts must itself be factual, so that his determination of the starting-point as non-factual must have been erroneous. That is, a fact can lead only to a fact. (In the second chapter we argued that facts involve each other.) It appears, then, that it is impossible to produce a negation of a fact. Both facts and no-facts lead to facts. Negation is never factually obtained (Ch. IV, 14B-C). Now, it may be argued that this is after all not a logical impossibility, but only a factual one. The invocation of logical possibility or impossibility does not appear to be of much help here: We think that if facts follow any logic, it is their own logic: the form of a fact is not imposed on it—it is rather continuous with the latter (Ch. II, 7A-B). Moreover, logical possibility or impossibility is governed by certain normative rules, whereas it is almost impossible to discover any such rule in our experience of the world. But if we take logic to be presenting us with thought-forms that are not logically impossible or contradictory, then, for example, "There is God" and "There is no country by name 'England'" are *logically* possible. Now, the latter thought-form is directly rejected as factually impossible by the fact 'That there is a country by name "England"'. Facts, *ex hypothesi*, disallow the corresponding negation—so that no negation is factually possible. With regard to the thought-form "There is God", it is clear that it is factually possible, since it is negated neither

between thinking, i.e. being a factual thought-form, and a fact. And the possibility of the former in no way brings any modal effect on the latter. In what follows we shall try to bring out this point clearly.

by a *single fact nor by the totality* of facts. Perhaps, then, what is *factually* impossible or possible is a thought-form, which is or is not in conflict with a fact. Facts are, therefore, not contingent in any ordinary sense of the word. That is, facts are *modally neutral.* What is necessary or contingent or even impossible is only a thought-form: A factual thought-form needs to be differentiated from the corresponding fact (Ch. II, 7A-B).

C. It may perhaps be argued that facts, in the light of the above, are necessary from one point of view and contingent from another; that is, they are necessary in so far as they cannot be negated and contingent in so far as in some possible world their absence may be thought. The case of their contingency may be further argued by suggesting that, in case of errors, there is nothing to compel us to correct them as soon as they are committed. That is, we may commit an error and may remain ignorant with respect to that error: we may mistake a rope for a snake and may remain unaware of this error for ever, so that the corresponding experience, as vouched by a belief, would remain a no-fact with respect to the actual situation.[2] But any view which renders something as both necessary and contingent at the same time is bound to be inherently inconsistent. The case of the necessity of facts, we think is neutralized as soon as the two arguments — (*a*) facts cannot be negated, and (b) there is no law to compel us to correct an erroneous or non-factual knowledge, i.e. a no-fact does not *by itself* lead us to a fact — are brought together. For, while (a) suggests that facts are necessary (b) suggests that they are not, thus giving us an inconsistent modal view of facts. In the same way, the case of contingency suggested in the argument that the absence of a fact may be thought in a possible world

[2] An error is corrected only when it is found to be inconsistent with the experiences of one's own or that of others' with respect to the same thing or when it leads to a disappointment in the desired action or expectation. But none of these conditions serve as a normative law for the correction of an error, since the latter may well go undetected.

appears to misfire. As we have already urged, a factual thought-form is quite different from the corresponding fact: what is a fact is a factual thought-form realized in the world, while what is a factual thought-form may be thus realized (actual) or unrealized (possible), i.e. a thought-form may relate to an actual structure or to a possible structure (Ch. II, 7C). Accordingly, what is said to be the absence of a fact-in-a-possible-world must relate to a factual thought-form and not to the corresponding fact. Hence this argument cannot render a fact *contingent*. That is, a factual thought-form is contrary with respect not to a fact, but with respect only to a thought-form.

Hume argues for the contingency of facts from almost a similar view of factual contrariety: "The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality."[3] Now, if this affirms only the possibility of factual thought-forms, then, as shown above, it presents no difficulty. A thought-form can affect only the thought-form of a fact, i.e. it can only suggest that the understanding with respect to a fact is not necessary in so far as the contrary understanding regarding the individual(s) which a fact relates is equally possible. But let us suppose that a contrary thought-form may be positively confirmed, or may be realized, in the world: so that there may actually be *contrary facts*. Accordingly, the facts of the form 'That this is red,' 'That this is a man,' and 'That all men are mortal' would have as their contraries, respectively, 'That this is not red,' 'That this is not a man,' and 'That no man is mortal'—the latter realized as facts in the same world: If they are said to be realized in some other (say a possible) world different from *the* world, then we do not see how they can stand as contraries, or for that matter, in any other relation, to facts which constitute *the* world. What seems to be more

[3] An Enquiry into Human Understanding, Sec. iv, pt. 1.

plausible a view is that a possible world is simply a name for the totality of all unrealized factual thought-forms (this Ch. 12B) which stand as contraries (and not as contradictory, as "p· ⌐p", which is never factual) or as neutral (e.g. "There is God") to the realized thought-forms corresponding to respective facts.

Now let us take the first pair of contraries: the thought-forms of the two facts being "This is red" and "This is not-red." Obviously, both the forms may be true, i.e. both thought-forms may be realized; but, then, they should be thought-forms corresponding to two *different* facts. That is, the "this", in the above sentential forms, is an ostensive sign for the individuals to which the corresponding facts relate, such that these individuals are not the same in two given cases. These facts relate, *ex hypothesi*, to what we have called "instances of characterization in immediate experience," or "phenomenal situations" (Ch. II, 7D), and accordingly are about different individuals. That is, it is just possible that a particular phenomenal situation is characterized as *red*, and the next which immediately follows the first is *not-red*[4]. So, being about different individuals and about different characters of the latter, no factual impossibility arises with respect to the realization of the two given thought-forms. It should be noted, however, that if what is *not-red* is not positively determined (=is not positively confirmable) with respect to the individual *this*, to which it is attributed, then what we understand here is simply that this *this* does not have the same character as the *this* has which is positively determined as *red*. But in that case the two corresponding facts cannot be contraries; since, then, the so-called fact 'That this is not-red,' as not positively

[4] It is however a highly controversial matter whether an instance of not-red should have another colour or not. For, if it does have another colour, then we should not say that what is thus coloured is an instance of not-red, unless we have established that any two colours must be mutually exclusive (or even contradictory). But, on the other hand, once we have determined something as not-red, then obviously red and not-red must be mutually exclusive (Ch. IV, 14B).

determined, is not a fact at all as it asserts no character of the individual *this*.

With regard to the second pair of contraries corresponding to the facts 'That this is a man' and 'That this is not a man', we can say the samething which we have said above regarding the first pair of contraries relating to phenomenal situations, except that now it relates to physical situations. That is, here too, it cannot be maintained that something belongs to that very *order(s)* (man) to which it does not belong (not-man). Hence, the two thought-forms, "This is a man" and "This is not a man," cannot both relate to facts if *this* is treated as the common individual in two cases. But, then, what can be realized as a fact is only the former; that is, the fact of the form 'That this is a man'—if it is not so, then 'That this is not a man' cannot be a fact either. For, in the second case, the *this*, the individual, is again devoid of any character or order. That is, the latter is not positively determined. But, if the two given thought-forms relate to two individuals, such that while one exhibits such order(s) as leads us to call it a *man* and the other does not exhibit that order(s) but some other order(s) which leads us to call it, say, a *stone*, then it is again a recommendation to judge the two individuals as different with respect to orders they exhibit. So, in order to be a fact, 'That this is not a man' must be of the form, e.g. 'That this is a stone.' Obviously, then, it becomes difficult to see how this fact can render the other fact, viz. 'That this is a man', contingent.

Now, it may be argued that though the contingency of the facts, namely, 'That this is red' and 'That this a man' may not be established as shown above, yet since one individual is determined in one particular way and the other in another particular way—so that the two ways of determination are mutually contrary—this itself may be an argument for their contingency: Is it not true that they are so determined just accidently, so that, with regard to corresponding facts, the understanding of an individual as exhibiting some order or

having some character is merely contingent? We think that this argument is not valid. It is to be noted that if facts are demonstrated to be contingent, then what is needed to bring about this effect is not that their respective contrary thought-forms are possible, but that their *substantial* ground is accidental —which cannot be demonstrated within philosophy. So, even if we can talk of thought-forms as being possible or contingent, the same cannot be said of the facts themselves. Further, if both a fact and its contrary are positively determined, then, as we have seen above, there cannot be, properly speaking, a contrariness between the facts. Accordingly, it would simply be absurd to suggest that a fact could be otherwise. But if it is argued that an individual may be variously determined, and therefore one determination cannot be regarded as necessary with respect to that individual, we need only urge that since all such determinations determine an individual with respect to the fact of which it (the individual) is the substantial ground, to deny a particular determination of an individual amounts to denying the corresponding fact. Thus, such a proof of contingency of facts may well prove to be fatal in so far as it leads to denial of facts.

The contrariety in case of the pair of thought-forms "All men are mortal" and "No man is mortal" provides a characteristic example of what a factually impossible thought-form would be like. According to the understanding of the fact of the form 'That all men are mortal' (Ch. II, 9B), its contrary is just impossible: contrary of such a fact may at best be taken as a suggestion for a change in the meaning of some general concepts in ordinary language (this Ch. 12A). But this change does not affect the analytical character of the understanding of a factual expression in which those general concepts occur. Lewis says[5] that an explicative statement which "relates a meaning to a meaning" is analytic, and an analytic truth (unlike, of course, its linguistic expression) is not relative to

[5] *Vide* SNT, pp. 103-104.

linguistic rules at all. A change in linguistic rules entails a change in the sentence by which an analytic truth is expressed, but it cannot affect the analytic truth itself. Now this may well seem to be a mere truism[6], but is nevertheless significant in view of the fact that the modern analysts very often show a tendency to see the world in the way they analyse language; so that, they may hold that the expressions like "All men are mortal" and "No men are mortal" are both equally significant *empirically* in a natural language like English. Our point, on the other hand, is that both cannot be equally empirically significant in the same natural language. (The difference is because while according to the analysts, the question is one of proper linguistic usage, for us it is a question relating to the proper understanding of the world.) Hence, unlike in case of the first two forms of facts, no factual contrariety is possible with regard to the thought-forms relating to general facts. We can change the usage of the words like "man" in our language, but cannot bring a change in the *facts* which are expressed through these words in certain combinations of words.

In short, what is possible or necessary is only a thought-form, a proposition. Hume's argument that (matters of) facts are contingent, since their contrariety is possible, is to be understood in this light; that is, modality not with respect to *what* we understand, but rather of our *understanding* (of the world). Hence, necessity and contingency form not the objective background of our knolwedge of the world, but are rather determinations *within* our knowledge of the world.

11A. Now, before we start to consider the question of modality with respect to thought-forms or propositions, the following points need be noted: (*a*) A thought-form or proposition is always something expressed, i.e. through signs or symbols (including memory images). Though we shall talk frequently in terms of linguistic signs, memory images themselves should be understood as capable of being expressed through linguistic

[6] As Pap has pointed out, SNT, p. 104.

signs. (The only reason for not directly dealing with such images in this respect is simply to avoid unnecessary psychological confusions). (*b*) What we mean by "language" in talking of "the expression of thought-forms" is such a series of signs which we call "natural" or "ordinary" language. A highly formalized scientific language may perhaps be found inadequate to deal with the task we are just to set on. Husserl's *Lebenswelt* or the world of ordinary language is in this respect different from what is the scientific world or the abstract world referred to by a highly formalized language.[7]

In our formulation of the general structure of ordinary language, a system of signs, through which factual thought-forms are expressed, we would have to adopt, besides logical or non-referential signs (L-signs) like "or" ("v"), "and" (" . "), "If. . . . then" ("⊃") etc., referential signs of the following sort:

1. *Name signs* (N-signs) such as "this", "that", "thot", etc. N-signs *always* denote, i.e. have simple reference to experiential individuals, and always occur as subject terms in factual linguistic expressions.

2. *Character signs* for first-level predicates and relations (Pc-signs) such as "red", "blue", "round", "deep", "cold", etc. (or let us designate them by the symbols —M, N, O, P,- - -): Pc-signs have simple referential function if they occur as predicate terms with a N-sign in a factual linguistic expression. Pc-signs always have a *designatory*[8] function in the sense that they stand not for individuals themselves but for certain characters of individuals. Terms standing for actual relations in ordinary language are Pc-signs (Ch. II, 8B): while relation terms are two (or more) place character signs, as they relate

[7] *Vide* John Wild, "Is there a world of Ordinary Language?" PR 1958, pp. 460n: Though we, for ourselves, do not think that the 'lebenswelt' and the 'world of science' are *fundamentally* different.

[8] For a difference between "denotatory" and "designatory" functions of a sign, see Morris' paper on "Theory of signs", EUS vol. I, No. 2. Signs, accordingly, always refer to something, but what they refer to need not always be objects or individuals. (Ibid, p. 4).

to two (or more) N-signs, predicate (or property) terms *qua* Pc-signs are one-place character signs as they relate to one N-sign.

3. *Order signs* for second-level predicates (Po-signs): such as "man", "colour", "animal", etc. (or let us designate them by the symbols A, B, C, D,- - -,): Po-signs have an indirect and complex referential function of predicate terms in a factual linguistic expression as associated with a N-sign or with a Pc-sign. Po-signs are used only as referring to a physical situation —things or events. These signs can also be used as Genus-signs (or G-signs), if certain objects or events are grouped together with respect to certain order(s). But in so far as the referential function of Genus-signs is concerned, it remains the same as of the corresponding order(s).

There are, then, these three types of referential signs in an ordinary or natural language. Unlike other relations, the relation of reference between a sign (or signs) and the world has a peculiar characteristic, namely, that there are not two distinct terms of the relation as distinguished from the latter which holds between the two terms —some non-linguistic situation in the world and the linguistic sign(s). This is due to the universal character of thought for which signs are mere vehicles. Thought is here the relation between sign(s) and the non-linguistic situation: in case of such a relation, thought expresses the form of the fact corresponding to that situation and thereby becomes atonce the significance of the sign(s). The sentences, or sign-combinations, which display this characteristic relation of reference are called *empirical* propositions. Reference, in this sense, is not a question of meaning, but rather is a question of *meaningful assignment* of signs to situations in the world. A question of meaning, we think, is a question of assigning understandability to signs, which, it is very often and perhaps quite justifiably held to be possible with the help merely of syntactical rules: The question of meaningful assignment of signs to situations, on the other hand, is one concerning a determination of the reference of signs to what they refer.

These two questions, namely, of meaning and of reference, may well overlap each other, but are definitely not identical. The syntactical rules can, no doubt, attach meaning to signs[9], but they cannot determine the linguistic reference to a non-linguistic situation. So that, if a system of signs, or a language, has to have a reference to the world, such a reference must be independent of syntactical rules, and must have an independent referential meaning with respect to its relation with the world. So, if a language has any definite relation to the world, then it must be according to some rules independent of such syntactical rules: the former we shall hereafter call *rules of reference*[10].

B. Rules of reference are essentially bound up with the ways in which we understand the world. In our understanding of the world we find that any situation is either determined by itself, or with respect to other alike situations, or with respect to several situations as are different from it (Ch. II, 7D). As relating to the above three ways of understanding, we have the following three rules of reference:

R. I. "This.That.Thot (M v N v O v P–v - - -)", or the rule about a simple function of Pc-signs, as related with N-signs: a combination of signs referring to some (*one*) situation, which is referentially meaningful for the person who is acquainted with the situation.

The N-sign "This", "That", etc., in the present case, have a denotatory function only as associated with the corresponding Pc-signs (M, N, O,- - -). That is, accordingly, no situation in immediate experience can be known unless it exhibits a

[9] As has been successfully shown in Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language, or even by Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, the latter positively forbiding us not to refer to the world: Their sole business is linguistic analysis. This thesis has been vigorously attacked by Russell in My Philosophical Development, pp. 215-30. He wonders whether philosophical analysis is worth anything if it does not invoke a clearer understanding of the world or at least a reference to the latter.

[10] Cf. Körner's ("Reference, Vagueness, and Necessity," PR 1957, p. 363) definition of "Rules of Reference" as "those governing the assignment or refusal of predicates to what is given in perception."

character. Hence, N-signs like "this", "that", etc. cannot said to be denoting a situation unless they are associated with *at least* one Pc-sign. But it is obvious that more than one character may be known to be determining the same situations, if of course these characters occur at the same moment of characterization —though the situation, thus determined by one or more characters at once, cannot be more than one situation: The unity of a situation in immediate experience is, after all, the moment of its characterization; so that there cannot be more than one situation at one instance of characterization in immediate experience. Accordingly, since before a characterization no situation can occur in knowledge, every situation presents the possibility of *any* characterization. Hence the use of non-exclusive "v" L-sign between any two or more Pc-signs in the formulation of above rule. But, since no phenomenal situation can obtain without being actually observed, their number is always limited and they are mentioned in definite numbers, as for instance in the formulation of this rule. This marks the characteristic difference of a phenomenal situation from a physical situation —the concept of possibility therefore being applicable only to the latter. However, a single instance of characterization ascertains the occurrence only of one *phenomenal situation.*

R. II "This . That . Thot . - - - (A v B v C v - - -)," or the rule about a simple function of Po-signs, as related with N-signs: a combination of signs referring to some situations — things or events — and is referentially meaningful for the person who is acquainted with these situations.

N-signs ("this", "that", etc.), in the present case, have a denotatory function *only* as associated with the corresponding Po-signs (A, B, C, - - -). That is, accordingly, no physical situation can be known unless it is known to exhibit *at least* one order. Here, again, a physical situation is not something predetermined: in our knowledge it is always defined with respect to some order(s), since it is always with respect to some orders(s) that a thing or event is known as such. The L-sign

"v" between the Po-signs is used in non-exclusive sense, because an occasion of the occurrence of one order with respect to a physical situation may be an occasion of the occurrence of some other orders. Physical situations are usually defined with respect to more than one order. For example, *man* is defined with respect to at least three orders, namely, *rationality*, *animality*, and *mortality* (Ch. II, 9B). But, since the same order must *ex hypothesi* (Ch. II, 9A) belong to more than one situation, and since it is never determined in our knowledge as to which other situations an order belongs, the L-sign "." is put between N-signs precise number of which is left open. Obviously, then, if there is a Po-sign which relates only to one situation, it must *ex hypothesi* be a Pc-sign, and not a Po-sign; and, consequently, the situation to which such a sign is predicated is not a physical situation, but a phenomenal situation.

The L-sign "v" between Po-signs, accordingly, shows that orders as applied extensionally to situations, must apply to more than one situation. If, for example, "red (x, y)" and "square (y, z)," then there is only one situation which is both 'red' and 'square', and if, suppose, we have the Po-sign "red-square", then no other order than one designated by this Po-sign can be asserted of y: the assertion of other orders with respect to y would, then, only be accidental characters of y, unless, of course, they are shown to be co-extensive with the order *redsquare*. The presence of some other orders which may be co-extensive with *redsquare* cannot be denied; hence the use of L-sign "v" (non-exclusive "or") between Po-signs.

The unity of a physical situation, unlike that of a phenomenal situation, is determined as relating to its accidental character(s). If, per chance, it has no accidental character, then mere *difference*[11] determines this unity (Ch. II, 7B).

[11] Such a difference is called "numerical difference", as against the former (between properties) which is called "qualitative difference." Obviously a numerical difference can be understood only if difference is taken to be independent determination (Ch. II, 7D). Wittgenstein, in Tractatus, successfully used the

R. III. A rule about referential function of the combinations of sets of Pc-signs and Po-signs: this is a rule governing a highly complex referential function of the following possible combinations of the sets of Pc-signs and Po-signs: (*a*) combinations of the sets of Pc-signs, (*b*) combinations of the sets of Pc-signs and Po-signs, and (*c*) combinations of the sets of Po-signs. In all of these various combinations, however, the possible property of the referential function of these combinations is one of the following: *inclusion* (—), *exclusion* (|), *overlapping* (O), *inclusion-or-exclusion* (+), *exclusion-or-overlap* (⊙), *inclusion-or-overlap* (⊖), and *exclusion-or-inclusion-or-overlap* (⊕). The only condition for the obtaining of any of these properties is that the corresponding combinations are allowed a finite extension[12], and that these combinations are taken to be relating only to physical situations (because they only provide the occasion which is needed to ascertain these properties, which obtain only if there are more than one situation in our observation: phenomenal situations being unique and occurring only one at an instance of characterization fail to provide such an occasion).

Let us now examine the nature of these properties as they relate to referential functions of respective combinations of P-signs (predicate signs): some of the various (finite) combinations of Pc-signs, with respect to their referential function, as related to their respective N-signs, are, for example, these:

MNT (This)
MOS (That)
PR (Thot)
OQMS (Thet)

Or we express the same as follows:

This . That . Thot . Thet . (M v N v O v P v Q v R v S v T).

Here (i) the property *exclusion* is mainfest in the Rf. (=

concept of numerical difference as an independent determination in his explanation of the under-structure of the world.

[12] The condition must be granted, because in case of an infinite extension with regard to such a combination no definite relationship between the constituents of the combination can be determined.

referential function) of MNT as related to the Rf. of PR; a similar relation holds between PR and OQMS. That is, with respect to these Pc-signs "This" and "That", on the one hand, and "Thot", on the other, cannot be substituted; (ii) the property *inclusion* is manifest with regard to Rf. of OQMS and Rf. of MOS, i.e. with respect to these Pc-signs "That" is always a specifying instance for any occurrence of "Thet" and hence can be substituted for the latter as its specifying sign; (iii) the Rf. of MNT as related to the Rfs. of MOS and OQMS exhibits the property *overlap*: that is, instances "This", "That", and "Thet" are interchangeable or substitutable with respect (only) to the character sign M in virtue of which they have partial identity.

Further, in the above mentioned sets of character signs, the Pc-signs M, and O and S transect at once the situations denoted by N-signs "This", "That", and "Thet", and "That" and "Thet" respectively. So that, in the given combinations of Pc-signs there are three orders (Po-signs) A, B and C, corresponding to M, O and S respectively. Among these orders, A, with respect to its referential function, exhibits the property *inclusion* in its relation to B and C: (A — BvC); B and C are *co-extensive* with respect to their Rfs. Hence, the difference between the Rfs. of the sets of Pc-signs and that of Po-signs is obvious; and this difference is very important, because it is largely the overlooking of this distinction that gives rise to some very common confusions which we shall come to presently. In the meanwhile, it is to be noted: (*a*) In the given example, it is the orders corresponding to the Rfs. of Po-signs A, B, and C which determine the situations corresponding to N-signs "This", "That", and "Thet", and hence the character Q in the situation *Thet*, and N and T in *This* are only accidental. That is, whether a character sign assigned to a situation is accidental or not depends on what character signs make the orders with respect to which a certain physical situation is determined and is known as such. (*b*) There is a *limiting rule* with regard to physical situations to

the effect that the latter are defined or determined through certain orders, such that this rule renders the statement logically true that all the physical situations determined through these orders are assigned a general concept[13] — a G-sign in ordinary language. Thus, if "That" and "thet" are taken to be defined with respect to the orders A, B, and C, then there is a sign Ψ in ordinary language which may at once be used to stand for "That" and "Thet", though meaningful only as relating to the corresponding order signs. In ordinary language, words like "man", "table", "soil", etc. are such signs. Accordingly the sign-combination "All men are mortal" is significant in this sense, without involving at the same time an *extensional* reference to the world. In our actual understanding of the world, however, we do not clearly apprehend all those orders which may provide a clear definition of a G-sign like "man". Hence, with respect to the understanding of such signs, we always remain uncertain, except, of course, in case where it is related to certain order(s) which we know definitely to be defining such a G-sign. So that, even if we do not know what actually are all the orders which define a G-sign, say "man", we can use the statement "All men are mortal" with a sense of certainty; and this is the reason why such a sentence should be regarded as necessary in an ordinary language.

But no combinations of the sets of either Pc-signs or Po-signs are taken to be definite (this does not include the cases relating to the just stated 'Limiting Rule' concerning Po-sign combinations) in ordinary language and scientific discourse, since they are vague or "open" —as applying to the same or new situations-in-the-future. Thus, for example, still other (new) possible combinations with respect to the

[13] A general concept or a G-sign in ordinary Language, though in principle determined with respect to all the orders of those situations to which it is assigned, is known to be so with respect only to certain limited orders to which it is related in practice. Hence a G-sign is to be regarded as "open", in the sense that it may yet include orders which are not related to it at present. (Ch. II, Footnote 40).

Rfs. of the above mentioned sets of Pc-signs may be as follows:

MOS (QT) (Thit)
PR (NSO) (Thut)
QS (Thyt)

Or the same may be stated as follows:

Thit . Thut . Thyt (M v N v O v P v Qv R v S v T).

In the above sign-combinations, one of the given Rfs. is 'MOS (QT) O PR (NSO)' though the Rf. of the possible combination MOS (QT) with regard to the actual combination PR stands only in a relation exhibiting the property *exclusion*. Similarly, 'MOS(QT) — QS', though actually the two stand in a relation with the property *overlapping*.

It is in view of these *possible* sign combinations that no strict relations with properties *exclusion* and *inclusion* are entertained (except in case of G-signs). Every single determination of a physical situation is perhaps vague and open in this sense. Hence the following sub-clauses of the rule R. III:

R. III (i): The properties of all possible relations between (finite) sets of P-signs are only these: *overlapping*, *inclusion*, *exclusion*, *overlapping-or-inclusion*, and *overlapping-or-exclusion*.

R. III (ii): If the property *overlapping* is once ascertained in the relation between (finite) sets of Pc-signs, it can never change into a relation having the property *exclusion*, as relating to situations to which the sets of P-signs presently relate or to new situations which they may relate. On the other hand, the property *exclusion* or *inclusion* ascertained in a relation between (finite) sets of Pc-signs may change into *overlap-or-exclusion* or *overlap-or-inclusion* respectively, as relating to the same or new situations, but never into *inclusion* or *exclusion* respectively.

R. III (iii): The property *exclusion-or-inclusion-or-overlap* cannot be ascertained with respect to a relation holding between any given (finite) sets of P-signs however open, because it exhausts all the possibilities of combinations of P-signs at once, and thereby displays no significant Rf. It displays a purely logical function which does not concern us.

Similarly, the property *exclusion-or-inclusion* cannot be ascertained of a relation between any (finite) sets of P-signs —not because it exhausts all the possibilities of combinations of P-signs, but because, according to RIII (ii), neither inclusion can turn into exclusion nor exclusion into inclusion.

These Rules of Reference need to be supplemented by the following considerations: (*a*) There need not be a separate rule of reference for negative (empirical) statements. The latter may be regarded as denials of the Rfs. of positive (empirical) statements; that is, denials of the functions of (empirical) statements which refer to some situation(s). (*b*) All these rules, as based respectively on ways of understanding (Ch. II, 7D), are *prescriptive* and not descriptive. The rules as formulated above are not themselves propositions[14]: They do not express thought-forms. Hence they can neither be necessary nor be contingent themselves. They are rules for a system of signs —for ordinary language, and they render the expressed throught-forms in that system *factually* necessary or contingent, possible or impossible. (*c*) If the expressed thought-forms in ordinary language have any definite modal referential function, it must be according to certain definite usage (other than syntactical) of the signs which these thought-forms employ in that language. That is, if usage is regarded as determining such rules of reference, then evidently the latter becomes imperative in order to determine which of our knowledge of the world is necessary and which contingent. Without such rules, all thought-forms, all knowledge, in the presence of possible contrary thought-forms, would be merely contingent: The confusion between factual possibility and logical possibility has led the logical positivists, including Hume, to declare that all factual knowledge is merely contingent. Rules under discussion not only render what involves

[14] Pap observes: "a rule, obviously, is not a proposition, i.e. something that could significantly be said to be *known to be true*." (SNT, p. 72, italics author's). Also, these rules help us to determine what statements are referentially meaningful, though they themselves are neither true nor false.

reference to the world correct or incorrect, but also provide justification for the view that what is incorrect must be put in accordance with the rules: that is, in accordance with what should be correct. Thus, the rules render correct reference intelligible as a matter of necessity with respect to our understanding of the world; so that the correctness or truth of a proposition may well coincide with its being necessary[15]. (*d*) Hence, the rules of reference are *normative*: to act according to these rules means that the latter lead to correct referential function of a sign-combination; but a violation thereof demands correction according to the rules. For example, a game of chess can be played only when there are moves according to some rules of chess: Hence such moves are necessary with respect to those rules. But whereas rules of a game such as chess can be arbitrarily changed, no such possibility can be entertained in regard to the rules of reference, since the latter are at the same time indicative of the ways in which we understand the world. So, what we are going to demonstrate as necessary or contingent in the following pages is merely due to these ways of understanding, even though such ways of understanding are themselves neither necessary[16] nor contingent. That is, if these rules are violated, we cannot talk of the world. Let us try to violate, for instance, the limiting case of R III. The rule asserts that the combination of signs of the form "All men are mortal" relates to certain orders (and that it is its sole function as it stands). We have already noticed what sort of referential function this prescribes. Now let us try to violate this rule by putting the sign "red" in place of "mortal", in

[15] Cf. Pap, *ibid*, p. 127: "- - - the same intellectual operations by which we would normally establish such a proposition as true also establish it as *necessarily* true." (This is about factual entailment, but it appears to be in conformity with what we have just said.)

[16] *Vide* Max Black, "Necessary Statements and Rules," PR 1958, p. 321. It may perhaps be asked: can we conceive any other ways of understanding? If not, why not we call the present ways of understanding necessary? The answer to this question is quite clear: that we have certain ways of understanding does not indicate any necessity about the same. As we have argued in case of *facts* above, mere *presentness* does not necessitate the being of what is present.

the above statement, so as to make it read, "All men are red." This latter statement is obviously referentially incorrect, since "red" referred to as a Po-sign, in this context, is not a Po-sign, as it is not co-extensive or identical with any or all of those orders which define "man," i.e. the orders which transect at once those situations to which the G-sign "man" is to be assigned. That is, "red" in its relation with the sign "man" is an accidental sign (a Pc-sign) — if the combination of these two signs has to have any referential significance; that "red" is an accidental sign follows from the interpretation of the limiting case of R III with the help of R III (ii) which states that the relation of the sets of P-signs exhibiting the property *exclusion* (note that "man" is a set of Po-signs, Man = df. ABC) may change into a relation having the property *overlapping-or-exclusion*, but never into one with the property *inclusion*; so that even though "red" (= df. D) is excluded from "man" (ABC) — (ABC⏐D), yet at certain occasions it may overlap the latter — (ABC◯D); hence it cannot be correctly expressed as "ABCD" (= "Man is red" or "All men are red") — as D being co-extensive with ABC, or as "ABC — D," i.e. the referential function of D being included in that of ABC (or even as "D — ABC") — but only as ABC ⓓ D. Accordingly, only the statements of the form "This (some) man is red" can be correct. But, "This man is red" does not become necessary because of its apparent conformity to R I. For, even if the same man "this" is assigned the Pc-sign "red", no inconsistency occurs in taking "this" to stand for the same man. In fact, the statement above does not conform to RI, for it is of the form, "This is man, is red" (see Ch. II. 9C). (*e*) To assign signs according to the given rules is at once to confirm corresponding rules of reference. But this confirmation, as we shall see later, may be of two sorts: full and partial. Only a full confirmation involves the necessity of corresponding thought-form.

C. Now, all the factual thought-forms conform to these rules. That is, factual thought-forms conform to one or the other

rule, and thus have a linguistic expression which exhibits a precise reference in virtue of which thought-forms are related to the world. Thought-forms, as has already been said, are either realized or unrealized. The totality of thought-forms, realized and unrealized, is the totality of all the consistent logical propositions. Only what is self-contradictory is logically impossible[17]. Hence every thought-form, whether realized or not, must be internally coherent: so that, also, factual propositions cannot be self-contradictory. (But this is to not to suggest, as F. H. Parker does[18], that some actual situation in the world might yet be a "simultaneously self-contradiction", i.e. "what is logically or really impossible is intentionally (cognitively) possible". As Weiss points out, this is in direct conflict with the statement that "what is not realizable in this world is an impossibility for this world; real possibilities must therefore be realizable"[19], which Parker accepts. Moreover, as we demonstrated earlier, everything that is in the world must be understandable, or be capable of having a thought-form, i.e. must be knowable; so that there cannot be such a possible impossibility as Parker supposes there to be.)

Now, *all* the logically possible thought-forms cannot be factual, e.g. universal thought-forms like "(x) (x = x)", "(p) (px v ~ px)", and so on; though what is factually possible must also be logically so. This, because what is logically possible must be the presupposition of our knowledge of the world: for example, the notion of self-identity "(x)(x = x)" must be admitted before anything in our knowledge is determined, because anything can be determined only if it remains what it is. Let us suppose that there is a situation *a*, determined with respect to the character *red*, then the same situation *a* cannot be determined with respect to the character *not-red*,

[17] Cf. Weiss, "Real Possibility", RM 1954-55, p. 669, Thesis 1, "The self-contradictory is impossible; whatever is possible must therefore be internally coherent."

[18] Parker's comments on Weiss' Thesis 1, RM 1954-55, p. 678.

[19] Weiss, op. cit., p. 670, No. 11.

or the absence of red: as determined by the absence of *red* it cannot be the same situation *a*, i.e. *a* is either self-identical or self-contradictory. If self-contradictory, then it is ununderstandable and what is un-understandable is factually impossible. Thus, logic, in this sense, is always at the background of our knowledge of the world. Now, we know that the only condition for a proposition to be logically possible is that it is not self-contradictory. What conditions are there, on the other hand, for any proposition to be *factually* possible? Obviously, the mere non-contradictoriness of a proposition is not sufficient to render the latter factually possible. Non-contradiction is necessary but not a sufficient condition for the latter. For, a non-contradictory proposition may be vacuous, e.g. "What is true of all is true of any," "For every x, x is P or non-P," "For every x, x=x" or even logically contingent propositions like "p ⊃ q", "(x)(Tx ⊃ Qx.Tx)", and so on. A sufficient condition for a proposition being factually possible, besides the necessary condition that the latter must be internally consistent, is that it has a correct reference to the world; (as will be seen later, an apparent reference of a proposition to the world need not make the proposition factually possible: it must have *correct* reference): and any reference can be regarded as correct only when it conforms to some explicit or implicit rule. In case of logical necessity, what is logically necessary is a proposition which is tautological, e.g. "p.q⊃ p," "(x) (x=x)", and so on. In case of factual necessity, if any, a mere tautology would not do; here we need those rules of reference which render some propositions unalterable with respect to their referential function, thereby rendering them necessary. Accordingly, while we can talk of all logical propositions and therefore also of all propositions — logical and factual — as being logically possible, some propositions or thought-forms can be talked of as being factually possible too: just as there may be propositions which are only factually necessary, factually neutral (and also factually impossible expressions in ordinary language).

Factually necessary propositions are of the form (i) "All men are mortal," (ii) "This is red", and (iii) "This is a man." The case of propositions of the form "All men are mortal" has already been discussed (Ch. II, 9B); and here it only needs to be remembered that it is not merely analytical in the sense of being vacuous — as the modern analyst would point out. Its referential significance in this respect has been made obvious elsewhere (Ch. II, 9B). The propositions of the last two forms would, however, look strange as candidates for factual necessity. But, they would not seem to be so very strange if we remember that any candidate for factual necessity must confirm some rule of reference (though not all propositions confirming to such rules need be so, as would be seen later). Thus the propositions expressed in (ii) and (iii) confirm respectively R I and R II. That is, the mere assertion of these propositions renders the whole R I and R II apprehensible respectively: that is, they involve a complete confirmation of the respective rules. Let us explain this: what the R I asserts is that any N-sign denoting a situation is determined with respect to at least one Pc-sign. In the expression of thought-form "This is red" or "This Q" just this rule is confirmed. Similarly, what the R II asserts is that a N-sign denoting any (physical) situation is determined with respect to at least one order-sign or Po-sign. In the expression of thought-form "This is a man" or "this A" just this rule is confirmed. That is, if the *raison d'être* of these rules is understood, the whole argument becomes clear, namely, that phenomenal situations are known only in virtue of their characters, and physical situations are there in our knowledge only because they fall in one or the other order(s). (Ch. II, 7D.)

There may, however, be an argument against accepting the above mentioned thought-forms as necessary on the basis of the following:

1. The positivists — both modern and classical — argue that propositions referring to individuals, or particular situations in the world, must be contingent: according to them, only certain logical entailments are necessary.

2. The contrary thought-forms of these propositions are possible.

3. All necessary statements are time-independent; the present propositions appear to be about certain times.

Leibnitz — generally regarded a champion of anti-positivism — was the first exponent of the view that all singular statements like "Cæsar crossed the Rubicon" are contingent, and of the view that only contingent propositions assert the being (= presentness) of the individuals or particular situations. And this conclusion is drawn from the following premises: (*a*) a statement, the grammatical subject of which is a definite description, cannot be true unless there is a situation denoted by the description; and (*b*) any proper name is synonymous with definite description. Now, if the proper name "Cæsar" is synonymous with the description "The Roman Emperor who was stabbed by Brutus", then consider the historical statement "Cæsar was stabbed by Brutus": would this statement be contingent or necessary? In the light of Leibnitz' theory it is both necessary as well as contingent — necessary, because its denial would involve self-contradiction, that the person who was stabbed by Brutus was not stabbed by him; and contingent, because it refers to an individual[20].

It is clear, then, that Leibnitz' assertion, as it stands, cannot be true: If it is true, it appears that it is only partially true: only some particular sorts of singular statements are contingent, in the sense of asserting the being of an individual or a situation. Regarding the cases where the being of individuals or situations is not pre-determined (that is, prior to the determination of their characteristics), it is impossible to see how the corresponding propositions can be altered with respect to these situations, if the latter are once rightly determined. As we have observed before, this sort of determination in our knowledge is actually a sort of definition which asserts itself. It appears to have been taken for granted that whatever

[20] This point is originally made by Pap, SNT, p. 18.

(statement) refers to the world must be contingent. Surprisingly, nothing, not even the rules of reference, suggests such a conclusion. There is perhaps only one conceivable argument, forwarded by Hume, in support of this view, namely, that a contrary of any factual statement is logically possible. But this hardly helps to establish the view in question. For, it is factually impossible to establish a factual contrariety of a realized singular proposition which conforms either to R I or to R II. Thus, the proposition "This is red", as realized, cannot admit of a contrary for the same *this*, i.e. of the N-sign for a situation to which the Pc-sign "red" is assigned. A thought-form realized with respect to a phenomenal situation cannot factually admit of a contrary thought-form (though this is purely logically possible). That is, a contrary thought-form can be factually possible only in the sense that it may be realized with respect to other similar cases. Thus Parker wrote: "whatever has become really actual is not really possible (though the other individuals of the same type may be)."[21] To hold that a contrary thought-form is factually possible (of the thought-form, e.g. "This is red") is to admit the assertion that the former is realizable, with respect to the same *this*, at some other time. If so, the thought-form at that time would deny the referential function of previous thought-form (viz. "This is red"). But, then, any determining characteristic of a phenomenal situation cannot be denied without plunging into a sort of unintelligibility — as has been remarked earlier; if possible, only some other characters may be added to the present character(s) (according to R I). This excludes *prima facie* the possibility that the contrary thought-form (viz, "This is not-red") can be realized as referring to the *same* phenomenal situation. The same thing applies to thought-forms relating to physical situations expressed in conformity with R II. Two further points need to be added to this as a way of clarification: (*a*) We think that an actual

[21] RM 1954-55, p. 678, No. 2.

situation cannot be talked of either as possible or as necessary — as we have already demonstrated earlier: an uneasiness with regard to this is felt throughout in the discussion on Weiss' theses[22]; only thought-forms or propositions can be regarded as possible, etc. (*b*) If our view is acceptable, and it is granted that there may be certain rules of reference, then what Parker terms as "actual" becomes "thought-forms realized", which as confirming R I or R II become necessary.

Finally, the impossibility of contrariety with respect to thought-forms of the form "All men are mortal" is even more obvious, since in this case a contrary of the given thought-form cannot even be entertained; for, here, unlike in case of the other two kinds of thought-forms, is a statement which applies to all similar cases so as to render it impossible to conceive of any situation similar to the given one such that what is thus conceived denies this very similarity, i.e. the significance of that G-sign which groups these situations together. Hence its contrariety can only be factually impossible.

In the above consideration, therefore, we get the first set of some factually necessary and some factually impossible thought-forms — the latter, accordingly, being mere expressions that are intelligible, intelligible sign-combinations — possible logical thought-forms. These thought-forms are definitely so (factually necessary and impossible) according to the rules of reference we have stated, and not merely because they are internally coherent and incoherent respectively.

Let us now consider the criterion of time-independence for necessity of a thought-form[23]. Clearly, since "All men are mortal", with respect to the corresponding fact, is not about

[22] *Vide* Weiss, "Real Possibility", RM 1954-55, and comments on his theses by Parker, Goodman, Wild, Haring, Stallknecht, and Thompson.

[23] *Vide* Carnap, "Truth and Confirmation", in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. by Feigl and Sellars. Carnap uses time-independent predicates in order to show the difference between the concepts of truth and confirmation.

any particular time (Ch. II, 9B), it is time-independent. The difficulty seems to arise with respect to other two kinds of thought-forms, expressed in the statements of the form "This is red" and "This is a man;" for they are realized at some particular time, so that they may well appear to be time-dependent. That this is not the case should be clear in view of our contention that necessity of a thought-form depends not on realization of the latter at some particular time, which is not sufficient to render it time-dependent, but rather on its capacity to involve a *complete* confirmation of a certain rule of reference: We shall see later that mere realization of a thought-form is not always a condition for its being factually necessary. In cases of thought-forms under consideration, all depends on whether such a thought-form, when realized, involves complete confirmation of some rule of reference. But, then, what involves a complete confirmation of a rule of reference must be time-independent: for, even one instance of such a confirmation renders the corresponding rule valid for ever (and not only for that particular occasion of confirmation); so that a thought-form involving a complete confirmation of a rule of reference becomes necessary with respect to that rule. That is, such thought-forms, though realized always at a particular time, are yet time-independent with respect to their confirmation of the whole convention which renders them intelligible and with respect to all alike thought-forms. Accordingly, thought-forms expressed in the statements, "This is red (v green v square v ---)" and "This is a man (v a horse v a stone v ---)" conform to actual modes of our understanding of the world, corresponding to R I and R II, involving thereby the very assertions which go into the making of R I and R II, viz., that no phenomenal or physical situation is determined without an acquaintance with a character or an order respectively.

This incidentally brings out certain points to our notice: (1) The concepts of "truth" and "necessity" or "contingency" are different. The concept of "truth" relates merely to the

question whether or not a thought-form is actually realized. If a thought-form is realized, the corresponding belief or linguistic expression is called "true" — a sign-combination involving correct reference. But, as we have already remarked, all sign-combinations involving correct reference are not necessary. For example, the statement "This man is white", which, let us suppose, is true with respect to what it refers, is yet not necessary as relating to the corresponding thought-form. The reasons for this we have shown elsewhere in this chapter. Further, only beliefs (and not thoughts) are, properly speaking, either *true* or *false* (Ch. IV, 13A). Concepts of "necessity" and "contingency", on the other hand, depend on whether a realized thought-form completely or partially confirms a rule of reference: a complete confirmation leads to the notion of necessity for the proposition so confirming the rule; a partial confirmation involves contingency of the corresponding proposition (this point is to be dealt with presently in this chapter). Thus, an occasion of truth of a belief may perhaps be the occasion also of the necessity of the corresponding thought-form, though from factual necessity of a thought-form it always follows that the corresponding belief is true. (2) To say, for example, that "It is necessary that *this* is red" is not to say that "*this* is *necessarily* red". This provides argument for what N. L. Wilson terms as "contingent meaningfulness" of that which is necessarily true[24]: though a statement is necessarily true as an expression of the determination of corresponding situation, it is just possible that the world would have been otherwise; so that the world have had no corresponding understanding, a thought-form; and therefore that the statement expressing the latter is factually meaningful involves simply contingent meaningfulness. Further, what confirms a rule is the whole thought-form, and not any single P-sign like "red", "man", etc. That is, if something is rightly apprehended as *red*, then it cannot be said that the *red* so

[24] "Existence Assumptions and Contingent Meaningfulness," *Mind*, 1956.

apprehend is necessary for that situation, but only that the apprehension of that situation *as* red is necessary, for otherwise the situation cannot be what it is, i.e. as it is understood.

Let us now consider R III, which in fact is a rule relating to all factually *possible* thought-forms (except its own limiting case of the form "All men are mortal"). All thought-forms that are possible or contingent confirm (partially) this rule of reference. Thought-forms are *contingent* when they are realized and partially confirm R III, and they are *possible* when unrealized, but not in conflict with any realized thought-form. Accordingly, any factually incoherent and contrary thought-form, in the above sense, is ruled out as a factually impossible proposition. The latter display their logical significance only because certain signs can be arranged in such a way that their referential confirmation would go directly against some actually realized thought-form, i.e. against some true belief. Thus, if a thought-form "This is red" is actually realized, of the same *this* the thought-form "This is not-red," though logically significant (logically possible), is yet factually impossible. But, on the other hand, a thought-form "This is green," of the same *this*, is not factually impossible, even if the moment of determination of *this* as *green* is the same as the moment of determination of the *this* as *red*. It is so, because R I is of the form "This . That (M v N v O v - - -)", which by the logical rule of distribution becomes "This (M v N v O v - - -) . That (M v N v O v - - -)," so that, if M = red and N = green and the L-sign "v" between M and N is non-exclusive, it is referentially understandable that both the character-signs "red" and "green" may be related to the same N-sign "This".

The case of thought-forms as only *partially* confirming R III should now be considered. By partial confirmity of a rule we mean that no single instance, or all the actual particular instances put together, may render the corresponding rule valid with respect to the entire scope of application of the latter. We have already seen that R I and R II involve full

confirmation with respect to their application. A full confirmation of R III is, however, impossible, unless we accomodate the possibility of combinations of the sets of P-signs displaying the properties exclusion-or-inclusion and exclusion-or-inclusion-or-overlap. But this we have already rejected for obvious reasons. Such an essential incompleteness with respect to the confirmation of R III may perhaps lead some philosophers to think that R III cannot properly be called a rule of reference[25]. But we believe that no such view need be accepted, unless it is shown that all the possible referentially significant combinations of P-signs derive their significance only from rules of simple sign-combinations — R I and R II. The fact is that while R I prescribes the relation of N-signs with Pc-signs, and while the R II prescribes the relation of N-signs with Po-sign (and perhaps also a certain relation of inclusion of Po-signs in some G-sign, i.e. of all those Po-sign which define a G-sign), R III prescribes *all* the possible combinations of P-signs, together with G-signs, which are not conformable to the first two rules: R III being *referentially* normative must be as good a rule as are the first two rules. Accordingly, R III is concerned with various inter-relations of different sets of P-signs, with an obvious or tacit reference to situations (i.e. as related obviously or tacitly to some N-signs), which are vaguely characterized. Hence, whichever thought-form is asserted in this sense — i.e. whichever thought-form occurs in this context — whether realized or not, is always tacitly assumed to be incomplete (susceptible of change in form); and, therefore, the rule which it confirms is confirmed only partially.

12A. The essential openness of the world, in our knowledge, has led to certain troublesome consequences, most important of these being *indeterminism* in our knowledge of the world. Indeterminism in our knowledge of the world means that no definite or static property of overlapping or exclusion or

[25] *Vide* Körner, "Ostensive Predicates", *Mind*, 1951, pp. 80-83.

inclusion in a relation between any sets of characters or orders can be established — these relations are always subject to change (see formulation of R III above). This is clearly manifest in the problem of *causation* or *physical laws*: unless it is established that there obtains a necessary connection between the occurrences of one character or order (or a set of these) and that of the other, it cannot be denied that whatever connection holds at present between the two cases of occurrances is just accidental. Thus, there are G-signs in our language, like "man", which are defined with respect to some orders (Ch. II, 9B); when we are confronted with an actual physical situation we call it, for instance, "a man". Now, if "mortality" is one of the orders defining this G-sign "man", so that we say of that physical situation that "This man is mortal," then though we are expressing a thought-form which is actually realized (a belief which is true), it is yet open to further enquiry, namely, what has led us to call the corresponding individual "mortal"? Mortality is not a manifest character of this man. An obvious answer would be that the very fact that we call it "man" leads us to call it "mortal" — since whatever is man is mortal. That is, the argument suggests that the expression of the thought-form "$(x)\,(Hx \supset Mx) \supset (Ha \supset Ma)$" is valid. (Here H = man, M = mortal, x = any individual, a = particular individual). Yet the validity of this expression does not establish that "$(\exists_x)\,(Hx.\ Mx)$" ($\exists_x$ = an actual individual) is valid — which is what is required if the above argument is valid. Hence, in the expression of the thought-form "This man is mortal" the use of the G-sign "man" must be more or less superfluous. That is, even if we show that all the other defining orders of the G-sign "man" are given, how are we justified to infer the order *mortality* on the basis of those other orders? So the question is, if it is maintained that a G-sign is intelligible only as defined by all the orders that define it, but if in our knowledge only some of the latter are present, how can we account for our awareness of those orders which are not actually

present in our knowledge but are nevertheless involved by those that are present?

It is to be noted that such a question can be raised only with respect to *orders*, i.e. only with respect to situations defined by Po-signs, since any notion of *cause* (or law) holds only in the case of physical situations. A consideration of phenomenal situations, or that of Pc-signs as relating to respective phenomenal situations, always results in the discovery of a relation having the property *exclusion*[26], which allows no inference from one or more characters to others (of the same or different situation)[27]. For example, our apprehension of something as *red* would never lead us, by *inference*, to any further determination of what is thus *red.*, e.g., as *square* or *round*. The only way to progress in our knowledge of a phenomenal situation is a further apprehension — which indeed may follow the first apprehension It is therefore that no amount of phenomenal apprehension can ever lead us to determine a phenomenal situation as a physical situation: an occasion of the apprehension of a physical situation being at once an occasion of a tacit inference, i.e. apprehension not of a mere character but of an order. Naiyayika school of Indian Philosophy has brought out this point distinctly in maintaining that an occasion of mediate perception is at once the instance of perceiving the present situation and a universal situation, an order with respect to the present situation (e.g. 'Ghata' and 'Ghatatva').

[26] A relation between any two or more Pc-signs exhibits the property *exclusion* in the sense that, as these signs relate to N-signs denoting phenomenal situations, the presence of a Pc-sign gives us no ground to pass from it to some other Pc-sign as relating to the same N-sign or to some other. But, on the other hand, since Po-signs can be further grouped in G-signs, it appears to be possible to pass from one or more orders to others.

[27] This however does not affect the view that facts form a system (Ch.II, 6A); for, in a system of facts, the latter are said to be involving one another, but not *causing* each other: a fact involves the other not because it causes the latter, not because the system is immanent in those facts, but *because* it is pre-immanent in the whole world. That is, it is purely *a priori*.

It is to be noted further that combination of Pc-signs and Po-signs are uninteresting: such instances always provide an occasion of the presence of *exclusion-or-overlap* property, i.e. all Pc-signs are only *accidental* signs with respect to Po-signs, whether they relate to the latter or not. If they relate, e.g. in the thought-form "This man is white" (but not "This man has a colour"), "white" is just an accidental sign, since its contrary thought-form "This man is not-white" or "This man is black (or red, or yellow, or ---)" may be true. This is factually possible, not only because the colour of human body may change, but also because *white* is not necessary, a defining order, of that physical situation as *this man*. Hence, in such cases there will always obtain *overlapping* property. But, since there may be occasions when a thought-form like "This man is red" fails to be realized, character-signs like "red", in such cases, would not be associated with the corresponding Po-signs. Hence, in all combinations of Pc-signs and Po-signs a constant property *exclusion-or-overlapping* obtains.

As we come to consider the combinations of the sets of Po-signs, we discern two clear cases: (1) A property *complete inclusion*, in case of relations between certain Po-signs and a G-sign; the latter, therefore, has been demonstrated as necessary with respect to the corresponding thought-forms. (2) A property *complete exclusion*, in case of relations between certain Po-signs and a G-sign; the latter, therefore, provide us with some factually *non-law statements* (which are always true); e.g. when on finding that all the books in that Book-case are Hindi novels, I say, "If you take out any book from that Book-case, it would always be a Hindi novel," or simply that "All books in that Book-case are Hindi novels," which is overtly similar to, but in fact entirely different from, the *statements stating laws* such as "All gases at constant pressure expand with increasing temperature," or "All metals are conductors of electricity." The difference between these thought-forms, expressed by two sorts of statements, it is argued,

is one concerning finite and non-finite scope[28] respectively. As the statements stand, it may be quite so. But a further important point needs to be mentioned: our apprehension of an occurrence of the sets of orders in the first case is quite different from that in the second; that is, the books and the Book-case are two distinct situations, and therefore their correlated apprehensions and their space-time aspects must be different too. In other words, whatever *book* is kept in whichever *Book-case*, irrespective of any time and place, it would always yield the property *exclusion*, that is, in a relation between the sets of orders with respect to *book*, on the one hand, and *Book-case*, on the other. (Though it is not denied that some characters may turn out to be the same in both cases, e.g. redness of both the books and the Book-case.)

Now, what we generally call the relation of cause and effect with respect to (physical) situations does not belong to any of the two cases just considered. Our understanding of a relation of cause in some set of orders requires a single process involved from the aspect of the situation called "cause" to that which is called "effect". But, then, what exactly is the nature of the relation of causation — or that of the relation between "cause" and "effect"? To this end, let us consider the following examples:

1. All gases at constant pressure expand with increasing temperature.
2. All metals are conductors of electricity.
3. Fire burns.
4. If a match is scratched, it would light.

Ordinarily, the above statements would be treated as laws, corresponding to respective physical situations, in the sense

[28] Cf. The Structure of Scientific Thought, ed. by E. H. Madden, sec. 4, "The Meaning of 'Cause' and 'Law'," p. 205; "These (non-law) statements, to be sure, assert universal correlations, but the items correlated do not belong to an infinite calss. — A law is the universal conjunction of terms which belong to a non-finite class or the universal conjunction of terms which belong to a finite class but are deductively derivable from other universal conjunctions which contain only terms of a non-finite scope."

that they are, or can always be, put in a statement of hypothetical form, "whatever is so and so, is such and such."[29] There is a somewhat similar suggestion from philosophers who maintain that lawfulness of a statement must be analysed in terms of counterfactual inference. Counterfactual forms of four statements mentioned above would be, for example, these respectively:

1. If this book be a gas, it would expand at constant pressure with increasing temperature.
2. If this piece of wood be a metal, it would conduct electricity.
3. If water be fire, it would burn.
4. Had the match been scratched, it would have lighted.

The first thing to be noted about the form of a law-stating counterfactual conditional statement is that its antecedent is so formulated so as to give always a false protasis, because it is meant to assert, perhaps, that whatever *other* conditions are there than that which is really required to produce the situation stated in the consequent or apodasis of the counterfactual are just irrelevant. Thus, in the first example, whether or not this book is a gas is not the import of the protasis of the counterfactual: it is rather — what would have been the case if *this* (book) were a gas (though we definitely know that *this* is not a gas). Surely, in that case, only something about what we call "gas" is to be forwarded as apodasis of the counterfactual. Similarly with respect to the second and third cases of counterfactual. The fourth case, however, may appear to provide us with some difficulty — on this interpretation; but that it really does not create any difficulty can be seen in that what is asserted in this case as antecedent or protasis, namely, "Had the match been scratched," is meant to assert that if

[29] See G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 120, "We do not call a hypothetical statement a 'law', unless it is a 'variable' or 'open' hypothetical statement, i.e. one of which the protasis can embody at least one expression like 'any' or 'whenever'. It is in virtue of this feature that a law applies to instances, though its statement does not mention them."

a certain condition had obtained (though really it did not), then there would have been a certain result. In this case, obviously, it is not made explicit that, under whatever conditions, the obtaining of antecedent situation would always lead to the situation stated in the apodasis[30]. For example, for the apodasis "match would have lighted" to follow, what is required is not only that "match had been scratched," but also that "match was dry enough, enough oxygen, was present, and so on." Now, in case of the first counterfactual the condition is stated in the apodasis itself, viz. "it (gas) would expand at constant pressure with increasing temperature". Obviously, there is enough justification for maintaining that some conditions(s) must be there in order to produce some situation in its capacity as an effect. That there may be more than one such condition hardly affects the contention. Thus, surely a gas would expand with increasing temperature when put to constant pressure, but, also, it may expand when put to some other conditions(s), which, let us say, we do not know yet. Hence such a condition — which accordingly is only sufficient and not necessary — may be explicitly mentioned along with the effect (the resultant situation), or may be left unstated. In the second and third case, the condition(s), sufficient to bring out the effect, has been left unstated, which shows not that a metal being conductive of electricity or fire that burns is *sui generis*[31], but that the condition(s) is either left unstated or remains yet to be determined.

So, besides the fact that a law-stating counterfactual may present certain logical difficulties[32], there is still another aspect of counterfactual or law-like statements which is even more interesting: whether a G-sign, or a set of orders, is *open* with respect to what is asserted of it in a counterfactual statement? That is, for instance, what if a gas is never put at a

[30] N. Goodman, FFF, Pt. 1, "The Problem of relevant conditions."

[31] Whether a causal process can be self-initiating may be a point of controversy in philosophy.

[32] *Vide* N. Goodman, op. cit., Ch. I, Sec. 1.

constant pressure, no metal is ever brought in touch with electric current, no body ever contacted fire, and no match was ever scratched? If such be the case, should we still call gas "gas", metal "metal", fire "fire", and match "match"? If we do call them "gas", "metal", "fire", and "match" respectively, even under these circumstances, then, obviously, we cannot formulate the corresponding law-stating counterfactuals; since, then, a gas would be "gas" even if it does not expand at constant pressure with increasing temperature, and similarly with metal, fire, and match. That is to say, for example, that "gas" is an open G-sign — in the sense that *referentially* it would be meaningful whether or not the situation called "gas" involves the understanding that given under a constant pressure it expands with increasing temperature. It may perhaps be suggested that that gas expands at constant pressure with increasing temperature might have been a later discovery which applied however to all gases. Now, in this connection, we want to bring to notice an important distinction between those orders (though not definitely determined, and it is not the task of philosophy, we think, to determine them) which determine some physical situation as *gas*, and those orders which in their determination of the latter are co-extensive with the former only by virtue of some specific conditions: so that the presence or absence of the latter sort of orders hardly makes any difference to the set of those orders which determine some situations as *gas*. But, let us suppose that a physical situation — a gas — cannot be called a "gas" unless it expands at constant pressure with increasing temperature: the language of formulation to this effect may appear to be a little awkward, but if we remember the claim of the scientist that no G-sign is pre-determined so that it is always open so as to be defined with respect to forthcoming orders, it might well appear to be plausible. If this is granted, then what a law-like statement such as "All gases at constant pressure expand—" etc. conveys is merely the suggestion that the G-sign "gas" should be used *also* as defined by (understood

with respect to) "expands with increasing temperature at constant pressure." Accordingly, a law-like statement of this sort—the corresponding counterfactual—may be taken as a recommendation concerning the usage of a G-sign. Something like this is suggested by Henry Hiz[33]: a contrary-to-fact conditional might be interpreted as a metalinguistic statement, telling us something about what can be inferred in a given system of statements. But, then, what the law-like counterfactual "If water be fire, it would burn" suggests is much more than this: it no doubt suggests that the G-sign "fire" must be defined with reference to the order *burn*; however, it further suggests that that fire burns depends on no further condition, unlike the case in which the expansion of gas with increasing temperature does under a certain condition, namely, that gas is put under constant pressure. Similarly, that a metal conducts electricity does not seem to depend on any further condition; at least we do not know of any such condition. It may be suggested that such conditions are implicit. But, then, what is thus implicit displays two different possibilities of its presence. First, it may be made explicit in the due course of time, so that even such an implicit condition is only external: hence, even if 'fire' is to be defined in terms of 'that which burns', along with other orders, the latter would be merely co-extensive with those orders which independently (of conditions) or inherently determine the physical situation called "fire". Secondly, in the absence of any knowledge of such an additional or external condition, it is just possible that what is presumed to be an implicit external condition is in fact one of the necessary conditions for a physical situation being called "fire", i.e. its very being as *fire* may determine that it *burns*. So, while the statement that "Fire is that which burns, and that which —" etc. may be valid, the statement that "Gas is that which expands with increasing temperature, and that which—" etc. may very often be invalid; for, the latter statement

[33] "On the Inferential sense of Contrary-to-fact conditionals," JP, 1951, p. 586.

is qualified by at least one condition, namely, that gas expands etc. under a constant pressure, which must be stated so as to render it valid. With regard to a G-sign representing some physical situations, therefore, there appear to be two sorts of defining orders: (i) *intrinsically defining orders*, or what we may call "dispositions[34]," and (ii) *externally defining orders*, which form the nucleus of our understanding of a causal relation between two or more sets of orders.

In what we have said above, it is clear that *dispositional* statements are factually necessary with respect to their thought-forms—the latter corresponding to what we have called general facts (Ch. II, 9B). It is to be noted, therefore, that if dispositional statements are also taken to be examples of statements stating causal relations, then there is at least one sense in which the relation of causality is necessary. But such a view is not convenient to hold; for, as has been maintained above, in every process of causation an explicit extra-condition is necessary, since, otherwise, in the process of causation the two aspects of the latter—as "cause" and "effect"—cannot be distinguished. Further, if what we have said about dispositional statements is correct, then their respective counterfactuals are either trivial or misleading (viz. the counterfacts "If this piece of wood be metal, it would conduct electricity," and "If water be fire, it would burn"). They are trivial since, for instance, if "fire" and "water" are factually different G-signs, understood respectively with regard to different Po-signs, then to assert that they are so determined is just to say nothing new. It should be remembered, therefore, that if a counterfactual is really genuine, it must exhibit some relation of causation, in the sense that whatever other factors are present, if a certain condition obtains, then a certain effect follows. Again, they are misleading, since, for

[34] Cf. Goodman, FFF, pp. 43-44. "The disposition statement says something exclusively about the internal state of w (a physical situation), while our original counterfactual says in addition something about the surrounding circumstances."

instance, the counterfactual statement "If water be fire, it would burn" promptly suggests that the corresponding G-sign, "Fire", may be understood without involving the understanding that it burns. Thus, if supposing that nothing was ever put on fire, or that no electric current happened to pass through a metal, how could we then understand the dispositional statement "Fire burns" or "Metal conducts electricity"? The question involved in this problem is not so striking; since, it is just possible that we have not actually determined all the orders which in their totality determine intrinsically a physical situation. Let us imagine of the first ever community of men on earth no member of which had as yet died: how could have any one then conveyed to the members of that community that 'men are mortal'? He must have treated his statement quite true. Had someone objected to his statement, he would have perhaps requested the sceptic to wait and see if what he uttered was true. Now, though it is true that not any one in the community can wait and see *all* the members of that community dying, yet insofar as the person making the statement is concerned, his request is to treat the G-sign "man" not as closed, but rather as open.[35] But the openness of G-signs like "man" is not, as it is sometimes supposed, indicative of their essential vagueness, but only of the future possibility of some new understanding of the situation

[35] In every scientific system it is necessary to regard some G-signs as primitive (see Carnap, "Testability & Meaning," *Phil. of Science*, vol. 3, p. 449; Kaplan, "Definition & Specification of Meaning," JP, 1946, 281-8; Hampel, "Fundamentals of concept formation," EUS, vol. 2, No. 7, p. 28-29). In empirical analysis, determination of characters is a matter of empirical fact and is both necessary and sufficient for the realization of the thought-form under consideration. Goodman, however, objects to this (op. cit., p. 50), for he maintains that "There is no positive virtue in not defining disposition terms." What is primitive in science need not be taken to be so in philosophy. But the question, we think, is not so much of science or philosophy; it is rather — whether we can definitely determine any physical situation without knowing that it is defined by certain definite orders? Our answer is that — we cannot, since otherwise every physical situation, like any phenomenal, would be always undetermined and floating.

to which G-signs relate. Hence, we think that the confusion between *dispositional orders* and *casual orders* can be avoided if we differentiate between statements *of* physical situations and statements *about* physical situations. Statements *of* physical situations are those statements which state a physical situation *as defined by certain orders without reference to any further condition* (with respect to specification of this definition). Statements *about* physical situations are statements which state a physical situation *as defined by certain orders with reference to certain further conditions* (in order to specify such a definition). That these conditions are not always specifiable[36] has appeared to be a peculiar difficulty attached with the problem of counter-factual statements. But this difficulty, we think, is in the nature of the case itself, for what the whole formulation of a counter-factual conditional conveys is this: (*a*) it is an assumption or a supposition[37], other factors than this assumption being irrelevant; and (*b*) what is thus assumed to be the case is open, the corresponding G-sign being not fully defined.

Now, the orders which define a certain physical situation under certain conditions always present some difficulty, as pointed out by Hume, which has been escaping all attempts at its satisfactory solution so far. The difficulty seems to be in the nature of the case. From the formulation of R III it is obvious that no relation between two sets of Po-signs is factually determinate. It is therefore that ultimately such indeterminate properties as *exclusion-or-overlap* and *inclusion-or-overlap* weretreated as possible with respect to factual relations. Now, if we talk of relations of causality in terms of linguistic reference corresponding to R III, then we should say that two sets of Po-signs, with respect to some particular situations, stand *always* in such a relation that the property *exclusion* or *overlapping* obtains. At the same time, they associate *always* in a certain temporal sequence with respect to the orders they relate

[36] Goodman, FFF, Pt. I, Sec. 2.

[37] R. M. Chisholm, "Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference", The Structure of Scientific Thought, ed. Madden, p. 232.

so that that which comes first in this sequence is the *cause* and that which comes later is the *effect*. This formulation may present some difficulty when we talk of such instances of temporal sequence as nights following days (or *vice versa*), though generally days are never thought to be the cause of nights. In any consideration of causation, therefore, a precise way of eliminating such instances must be given. This way is to determine whether the two events or situations which are said to be bound by the relation of causation are result of some common cause. Thus, accordingly, both days and nights, and their definite sequence, are shown to be the result of a certain position and motion of earth in our solar system: so that, in spite of their invariable association, they are not to be regarded as mutually causally related. Let us now consider those instances where two events or situations are said to be causally related. In our formulation above, we maintained that a relation of causation, between two sets of Po-signs, is determined as displaying the property *exclusion* or *overlapping*. If it be so, we would be admitting types of cases which, according to R III, may have the property *overlap-or-exclusion*. But, then, if this is admitted, the case of causality as a fixed or necessary relation (association) between two events is defeated. That the property of fixed *exclusion* may turn into that of *overlap*, with respect to the corresponding relation, shows almost the same sort of possibility as stated in case of the relation between days and nights. For example, that "gas expands with increasing temperature (=G), (gas put) at a constant pressure (=H)" may be seen to be following in all its instances from yet another condition J: then, J becomes the common condition for the occurrence of GH, so that, the relation between what was previously conceived as the condition (H) and the effect (G) does not provide us with any striking situation; since that both G and H may follow from the condition J shows that the nature of relation may change so that the property *exclusion* may also change into that of *overlapping*. The relation between J and HG can similarly be extended: i.e. they too may be open to

certain new possibilities. This is why all the thought-forms relating to relations of causation are merely factually contingent if realized. But, even if such a thought-form is contingent, it does not affect the view that it serves as an 'inference ticket[38],' or serves the purpose of predicting future course of events. A prediction does not specify any particular situation in the world; it rather operates in a certain range of cases: that is, what a prediction specifies is a certain thought-form, and not an actual situation to which the latter, when realized, relates. Thus, let us ask, what does the following statement about a match which is not yet scratched state: "If you scratch this match, it would light," i.e. what understanding does it convey to the listener of the statement? Obviously, the listener cannot see the match lighted simply by understanding the statement, though he understands pretty well the meaning of the statement (even if, let us suppose, the listener has never seen a match lit by scratching). What, then, should be suggested to the listener is that if he can bring about a certain condition (can act in a certain way) he would meet with a certain kind of effect. The most operative part of a prediction, therefore, is certainly a suggestion for an action or an experience leading to the expected result — it is so at least in ordinary life. But, let us further suppose that the listener, while completely agreeing with the person making the statement (knowing fully well that the scratching of the match would lead to the effect that it would light), lights the match by putting it on burning coal instead of lighting it by a scratch. Now, of this match let the person say, "Had the match been scratched, it would have lighted." What does such a statement refer to, and how is it understandable? Certainly, the match is now no more there, so that it could be scratched and let it be known that it would light because of that scratch; yet the statement is understood as referring to this very possibility. What then is this peculiar possibility over and above the match that is already lighted

[38] *Vide* Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 121.

(though not by scratching)? According to the suggestion, which we have already made, such a possibility must be only a thought-form with respect to the match that would have lighted if scratched. Accordingly, a counterfactual does not state, in its law-stating form, in its capacity as an instrument of prediction, any actual situation: it states always the corresponding possibility of certain situation, which may or may not obtain[39]. No thought-form carries with it the evidence that it must be realized, though what is an actual situation must have the corresponding thought-form[40].

So, it is important to note that not all thought-forms are those possibilities which serve the purpose of prediction. Only contingent thought-forms can do this, and contingent thought-forms are those realized thought-forms which are not necessary (i.e. statements conforming not to R I and R II). Thus, e.g. the factually impossible expression "A and not-A" serves no purpose of prediction. Similarly, a logically possible thought-form like "A or not-A" cannot serve the purpose of factual prediction. What we have called "neutral" thought-forms, like "God Exists", also are of no avail. Hence, unless the nature of factual possibilities is specified, we cannot decide the exact scope of factual prediction, and therefore, those aspects of the world which we call "past" and "future" also remain obscure.

B. Paul Weiss suggests[41] that real possibilities have "a being

[39] Compare: Chisholm's view that law-stating statement always exhibit an assumption, expectation, rather than an actual situation. ("Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference," in Structure of Scientific Thought, ed. Madden, p. 232).

[40] This perhaps may be an argument for the independence of logic from ontology, or from its application to the world. That is, there appears to be no necessity about the logical propositions to have essential application to the world. But this should not be taken as an argument to suggest that thought is therefore essentially different from the world, following Hume's defective dictum that what can be distinguished must be separated. Thoughts, as we have shown in chapter II, can more conveniently be regarded as abstractions from the world itself. And, as we have argued elsewhere, abstractions have no independent reality — they cannot be separated from it, though distinguished.

[41] "Real Possibility", RM 1954-55, p. 669.

exterior to actualities" (the reason for this being, "Otherwise the future would not be exterior to the present," also "there would be nothing to be realized"[42].). However, these real possibilities, he continues to maintain, "must be relevant to actualities, for they are possibilities of this universe and whatever it contains[43]." This undoubtedly is in conformity with what we have already said about factual possibilities, i.e. about all those possibilities which do not conflict with actuality or the thought-forms realized. But, when Weiss distinguishes the logically possible (that which is not self-contradictory[44]) and the ingrediently possible (the possibility of an actual[45]) from what is a real possibility, by maintaining that the former have "no being except in and for thought[46]," he appears to be involved in considerable difficulty with respect to the status of what he calls "real possibilities". Are the real possibilities ontologically real? Weiss seem to reply affirmatively[47]. In his thesis 12 he maintains that real possibilities are internally indeterminate; and by this indeterminacy he means that which has no "content and career" prior to its realization[48]. Now, evidently Weiss' assertion is put in a sort of paradox: If an unactualized real possibility is devoid of any content and career (thesis 12), then what is it other than a mere thought-form (which Weiss denies to a real possibility by contrasting it with the logically possible and the ingrediently possible)? Weiss may perhaps draw support by pointing to his thesis 14 — "Every real possibility must be realized at some time." But, while replying to the comments on his theses he admits, that Mrs. E. S. Haring's suggestion that the ingredient possibility

[42] Ibid., Thesis 4.
[43] Ibid., Thesis 5.
[44] Ibid., Thesis 1.
[45] Ibid., Thesis 2.
[46] Ibid., Thesis 4.
[47] Though in thesis 11 he maintains that real possibilities are something realizable, and not something already realized. Ibid., p. 670.
[48] Ibid., p. 670.

is the actual, somehow purified[49], is an advance over his own original thesis, and that Stallknecht's and Wild's objection to his view that ingredient possibilities have their being only in and through thought is right: even while admitting this, he seems to be persistently obliterating Goodman's objection to the view that real possibilities must be realized[50]. For, Weiss argues that what cannot be realized in the world is not possible with regard to the latter[51]. With this is attached his stimulating thesis that what is the future of the world is all the real possibilities (thesis 3), and, therefore, what is actual has only a different *type of being* from what is really possible[52]. But then, if Weiss's view is granted, two grave consequences follow: (1) What is the *present* of the world is the sort of being which Weiss calls "actuality", and what are *possible* must be different from this actuality, and further, only real possibilities form the *future* of the world. If so, is Weiss implying that no prediction can be made from present to future — future being mere possibilities detached from actuality? This obviously is an untenable view, as we shall see later. But, (2) if Weiss does not accept what is thus untenable, he must fall back to the view Goodman expounds, viz. an event is to be considered actual irrespective of the time of its occurrence — past, present, or future: but as related with Weiss's thesis that every real possibility has to be realized this view again has its own difficulty.

So, Weiss' thesis on 'real possibility' appears to be both incomplete as well as confusing. Granting that real possibilities are self-consistent and relevant to actuality and are not *mere* thought-forms, what type of being have they if they are said to have no content and career? Obviously, Weiss has either confused the question of reference of a statement with that of its understandability, or attached no meaning to his

[49] Ibid., p. 675, point 1, and p. 682, Reply 2 and 4.
[50] Ibid., pp. 681-682.
[51] Ibid., reply 3.
[52] Ibid., reply 8.

statement that real possibilities have a different type of being than that of actuality. If no meaning is attached to the type of being with respect to these possibilities, then we cannot simply discuss the view; since, in so far as we are concerned, we fail to see any special type of being for these possibilities. The view, however, that the question of real possibility has often been confused with respect to *referential function* and *understandability* of a statement[53] is more plausible. Attempts to eliminate such possibilities perhaps arise from such a confusion. Thus, Quine (and with him a host of modern analysts) shows great keenness to shave off what he calls[54] "Plato's beard" with the help of Occam's razor, an attempt which can be successful only if a real beard grows on Plato's chin, i.e. only when it has some kind of being, as the actuality has. Such a beard on the face of actuality is, in fact, only a philosopher's dilemma: what are called "real possibilities" have no *type* (or kind) of being — this can be verified by making an actual excursion into the proper field of possibilities.

F. B. Fitch states the case of real possibilities as follows: "If there is such a realm of possibles, then every logically consistent group of attributes must be exemplified in the realm of possibles. Thus, if greenness and gianthood are logically consistent attributes there must be a green giant in the realm of possibilities."[55] Let us designate 'greenness' and 'gianthood' by

[53] Both functions of a sentence are not identical, because, what has a reference must be understood, while what is understood need not always have a reference, e.g. the propositions of logic and mathematics.

[54] "On What There Is," FLP, p. 2 and 5. The beard which Plato grew, the realm of Ideas, was misunderstood for an actual beard only because he talked as if there were entities — instead of talking in terms of thought-forms.

[55] JP, vol. LVII, 1960, "Symposium: Reference and Existence," p. 641: In the scheme of philosophical analysis, Fitch thinks, the possibility that greengiant exists turns into a paradox — as such, analysis is suggestive of "existence" being an attribute like "green" or "gianthood". But this is not our problem at least: since, in philosophical method we supplement linguistic analysis by experiential analysis (Ch. I, 5). So that in our whole discussion on *being* in the first chapter, neither "Existence" nor "Presentness" present themselves as attributes of anything. According to our scheme of analysis they are primitive terms in any

Po-signs A and B respectively, so that the combination of A and B, AB (Greengiant) is perfectly *understandable*. Now, what some philosophers generally imply is that such an understandability is capable of giving rise to an ontological commitment with respect to some actual situation, an actually present greengiant. But, to our surprise, we find that nobody who maintains that he understands "greengiant" associates his understanding with some actual situation. It is rather, at least in so far as it appears to be so, the philosopher's too much concern with language that leads him to suppose such an association. And this is where the sole confusion between the two functions of a statement lies. That AB is *understandable* does not normally commit it to have a *referential significance* — that is, unless it is stated in conformity with R II as "This (A v B)", which does not convey that the *This* must have both A and B as orders (however, that it may have both is not denied). That is, the understandability of the sign combination "This (A v B)" — which is possible because of its being not factually impossible—does not by itself lead us to the assertion of a realization of the thought-form expressed by it. It is this sort of understanding which renders what is really possible to be a mere thought-form[56] which may or may not be realized (Ch. II, 7C-E). Hence one of Weiss' important theses, viz., that all real possibilities must be realized should be rejected. Weiss' thesis presents a highly deterministic future of the world, a "closed world", and Wild's complaint, in effect, of restriction of "the range of real possibility too narrowly, so

philosophical theory of the world, and not something to be understood further in terms of something else.

[56] It is interesting to note that Quine rejects or eliminates such possible entities are Santa Claus because he does not "countenance" them, which is suggestive of the idea that the same, e.g. Santa Claus, were countenanced by children at Chirstmas. But if Santa Claus is never there how is it that it is countenanced even by children? Weiss suggests that non-countenancy here is one of the proposition and not of an entity: I refuse to countenance a hundred-tusked elephant but not the elephant itself. So what we refuse to countenance is never on entity, for there is no *question* of there being an entity: what we really refuse to accept in such cases is perhaps only that a certain belief is true.

narrowly in fact as to jeopardize genuine freedom of choice in which I believe. Courses of action I freely reject after deliberation were really possible *before my final choice*. Hence what is really possible at this time (before choice) is broader than 'the future that will be'[57]'', is quite justifiable. This, we think, is even more justifiable with respect to what we have called neutral thought-forms, such as "God exists", which no actually realized thought-form can either reject or entail, yet which is made the very basis of all real possibilities by Weiss[58]. This view (of Weiss) follows naturally from his thesis that all real possibilities *must* be realized. But, as we have seen, if real possibilities are unactualized thought-forms, self-consistent and consistent with actualized thought-forms, and if there is nothing to lead us to say that they must be realized, the whole argument of Weiss collapses. A neutral possibility like "God exists" proves to be the strongest of those thought-forms which may or may not be realized, though as real possibilities they belong to the unforeseen future of the world. It is to be noted that a thought-form, a possibility, that may be realized, is not one concerning our knowledge of the future. Goodman says, "If a train is late and I say that it possibly had an accident, I am saying no more than that I do not know that it has not had an accident[59]." Accordingly, a possibility is only relative to our knowledge. But we think that it is not so much concerned with our knowledge: it is not only the uncertainty of future happenings, but also the present state of actuality to which a possibility is thought to be related.

Before we take up the view of possibility as related to actuality, the problem of prediction needs to be resolved. What Weiss calls "ingredient possibility" provides perhaps the best clue for prediction. He admits that an ingredient possibility has a being not only in thought but also in the

[57] RM 1954-55, p. 673, point 2.
[58] Ibid., p. 670. thesis 15.
[59] FFF, pp. 54-55.

context it is realized[60]. But he does not (nor does Stallenecht) specify the precise nature of such ingredient possibilities. Stallenecht is satisfied by pointing out that such a possibility "is a feature of this context (i.e. of its actualization)," and therefore we cannot say that "it has no being except in and for thought." This no doubt is a valid contention, but it needs further specification so as to clear the way in which a certain possibility is ingredient to the corresponding actuality. Let me take you to a fire-place and say, "If you put your hands in the fire, it will burn them." You would most likely admit that what I said was true, without actually putting your hands in the fire. It may perhaps be said that you regard the statement true because you your-self (or perhaps through others) have learnt that such statements are true. But, let us suppose that when I took you to the fireplace, what you saw there was not actually fire, but rather something like it in appearance; so that the statement you had treated as being true was in fact false. This instance serves to suggest some important points: (1) in our knowledge at least, it is not a physical situation that determines its determinants, but the *vice versa*; so that we must take dispositional properties (intrinsically defining orders (Ch III, 12A) to be primitive in our understanding of the physical world. And, therefore (2) what comes *first* in our knowledge is the possibility of a (physical) situation, that is, e.g. that the fire will burn —*not* because it is possible with respect to fire, but rather *because* it is possible that the fire burns. This accounts for the fact that when confronted with a certain physical situation you thought that it might burn. It could not have burnt, because what you were confronted with was not fire, but something like fire (i.e. something which might have some other determinants or dispositional orders). It is this sort of possibility, we think, which an ingredient possibility. It serves to clear philosophy of at least one puzzling paradox — the paradox of "future". This

[60] See, N. P. Stallenecht's comments (Nos. 2 & 4) on Weiss' Thesis, which Weiss accepts.

paradox can be formulated thus: with regard to the aspect of futurity of the world we take *ex hypothesi* that nothing is realized, yet when we say, for example, "fire will burn," what we imply is that there is a time t when, though nothing is realized yet the statement "fire burns" is true. Now it is to be noted that there cannot be a time t unless something is realized at t, i.e. unless there is some *actual* occurrence at t (Ch. II, 8C); hence either there is no time t in what we call "future" such that "fire burns" is true with respect to that time, or there is already a time t such that "fire burns" is true with respect to it, and hence an actual situation is present. The second alternative is obviously absurd, since if something is already present in the future, there is no sense in maintaining that there is a future, as distinct from present, or, that there are possibilities or thought-forms that may or may not be realized, or, what is the same, that there is any genuine problem of prediction. But, then, if the first alternative is accepted, there can be any meaning to the statement, for example, "the fire will burn if you put your hands in it tomorrow morning," since there cannot be a tomorrow morning prior to the occurrence of the fact that fire burns now. The philosophical theories of induction, we think, fall short of accounting for this paradox, the only way out from which is to regard time as absolute, which, we believe, no philosopher seeking to provide grounds for induction can maintain with justification. That is, if induction be made the basis of prediction, then prediction would lose its power of foretelling future events. For, generally speaking, what the process of induction asserts is that if an occurrence of certain situations has always been seen in the past to be uniform, patterned in a certain definite way, then it would continue to be so in the future — a view which obviously makes an ingredient possibility follow from the coresponding actuality (and not, as we have suggested, make an actuality follow from the corresponding possibility). But, let us ask, if we take an ingredient possibility as following from the corresponding actuality, how can we then take such a possibility as suggesting

that a similar actuality would follow it? When Hume questioned the authenticity of the prediction of future course of events, he was really up against such an argument: The possibilities, if they follow from actuality, are possibilities with regard to the present, and not with regard to the future. Moreover, to maintain that they are possibilities *also* of the future is to commit the absurdity that some actual situation is actually occurring in future; for, to say, e.g. that "fire will burn tomorrow morning" on the basis of the statement "fire burns" as inductively established, is to make the statement "fire is burning tomorrow morning" inevitably follow from the statement "fire burns": a possibility established by inductive process can point only to an actual position, and not to a potentiality. And thus once again we fall back to the aforesaid paradox.

This unpleasant position, as we have already pointed out, can be avoided by maintaining that "fire burns *because* it is possible for it to burn." This obviously puts no paradox with respect to future. To say that "fire will burn tomorrow morning," accordingly, presents no difficulty with respect to the future: for, if fire burns because it is possible for it to burn, this does not commit us to a confirmation of the statement "fire burns" with respect to anytime in the future. As possibility precedes actuality, the former remains as much plausible in the future (and also in the past) as in the present. In fact, it seems very difficult to draw an explicit difference between what is ingrediently possible and what is actual. An ingredient possibility may perhaps be taken as *the capacity that is actualized*, and *not* that which *will be* actualized. (It is perhaps therefore that the predictive function of a scientific law is not one of declaring something about the future, but only what is most conducive to the meaningful understanding with regard to the past and the present.[61]) Again, by putting possibility before actuality we allay the Humean scepticism in this respect;

[61] Campbell, What is Science, p. 69, "We do not try to find laws that will predict; we only try to find laws that will order the experience that we have."

since, now, it is no more held that we predict future because we observe the present and the past. On the contrary, we make the present and the past as much stand on possibilities as the future is supposed to be. So that, if the present can be what it is, due to respective possibilities, so can be the future.

But by putting possibilities before actuality we may be asked to face the difficulty, namely, why should not we then regard the present to be just accidental? For example, that fire burns, or has always been found burning when something is put in it, may just be accidental, unless it is shown that fire cannot but burn if you put, for instance, your hands in it. Our answer is: in our knowledge, possibilities come, no doubt, later than their corresponding actualities; but logically, they must come before the actualities, if there is to be any meaningful prediction—and not a mere guess—of the future as based on actuality: whether the present is accidental or not is entirely a different question. A further difficulty in maintaining that possibility precedes actuality is with respect to the status of the present. To say, "It is possible therefore fire burns" does not imply that when, for instance, it is 9.30 in the morning of the 25th July 1960 (or any time in the past) then and only then fire burns: what it really implies is the truth of statement, "fire remains and burns"—i.e. fire remains so long as it burns—and this statement, in its significance, extends to any length of time in the past and in the future. That is to say, for the presence of fire, every time-instant at which fire remain is the *present* for it. So what we call "future" remains included in this present. But this is a purely objective view: From the standpoint of our limitations in knowledge, we can only predict the course of events in the future. Our predictions are most accurate when they relate to dispositional orders of the situation predicted. The degree of accuracy in prediction falls with the attached conditions for application of orders with regard to the situation; since, as we have already seen, the relation that obtains between the conditions and the effect is always open, i.e. the determination of possibility with regard to causal

orders is a highly complex affair, which cannot be adequately fixed in our knowledge.

Finally, let us ask: Is that which is possible for the future also possible for the past? Aristotle regards statements about the future as neither true nor false, because the corresponding events have not taken place *yet*; but of statements about the past, he says, they must be either true or false. This Aristotelian view has aroused much discussion in the comtemporary philosophy: Thus, while Lukasiewicz supports the argument forwarded by Aristotle in his own formulation of three-valued logic, a host of other philosophers, C. A. Baylis, W. V. Quine, G. Ryle, Donald Williams, and others have objected to Aristotle's view. Baylis suggests[62] that it is no better to argue that a statement referring to the future cannot be either true or false, on the ground that there is not yet any definite event with which it can agree or conflict, than to argue that one referring to the past cannot be true or false, on the ground that there is no longer any event to make it such. Donald Williams, while making a similar point, says, "all these arguments are strangely selective — in making much of supposed difficulties about the future which are quietly ignored as they equally affect the past and the present[63]". We can see in the light of our formulation of possibility above, how wide of the mark these arguments are. The very first thing to be noted in this connection is the question of contingency (with which Aristotle is primarily concerned in his view of a statement as true or false).[64] With regard to the view that Aristotle accepted the either-or truth-value of statements of the past and the neither-nor truth-value of statements of the future, it is to be noted

[62] "Are Some Propositions neither True nor False?" *Philosophy of Science* III (1936), pp .156-166.

[63] "The Sea-fight Tomorrow," Structure, Method, and Meaning, ed. by Henle and others (1951), pp. 214-294.

[64] *Vide* R. Taylor, "Future Contingency,' PR 1957, p. 16. "It was not just their (i.e. events') temporal distance that bothered him (Aristotle), but their contingency, or rather, the contingency of some of them. There is thus in Aristotle's philosophy no general denial of truth about the future."

that what he perhaps meant was only that while statements about the past have a definite reference, i.e. they either have or do not have the corresponding actual situation, statements about the future involve no question of such a reference, which may very well be due to our limitations in knowledge (as we have mentioned earlier) — so that their truth-value remains to be assigned. But this is quite different from the question of possibility with respect either to the future or to the present. Possibility has been shown to be pervading all the three temporal aspects (past, future, and present) of the world. And unless we adhere to some such view it is difficult to see how a statement about the past, e.g. "the Giants might have lost in 1954 to the Indians" or "There would have been a possible visual experience, had I turned my eyes to the right a moment ago" would be regarded as referentially meaningful[65]. Now, though the very understanding of that temporal aspect of the world which we call "past" suggests that the thought-forms of the above mentioned statements can never be realized *now*, the movement of time being assymetrical, yet it is not worthwhile to suppose that there was a sort of necessity for their not having been realized in the past: i.e. these thought-forms might have been actualized. Accordingly, the statement, "The Giants might have lost in 1954 to the Indians" remains devoid of a definite truth-value. It is to be noted, however, that this neither-nor truth-value of a statement about the past is not in conformity with the statement, "the Giants won in 1954 against the Indians". It may perhaps be asked, if the Giants actually won in 1954, how is it possible to hold that they might have lost in 1954 ? The answer we think is simple: because it is possible to understand the statement, "The Giants might have lost in 1954," and what is understood meaningfully, without being in variance with some true statement, is never incompatible with what is actuality — which is the argument for holding that a thought-form

[65] *Vide* Goodman, RM 1954-55, pp. 681-682.

corresponding to such a statement is possible. But (unlike statements about the future) "The Giants might have lost in 1954," "Cæsar might not have crossed the Rubicon," etc. are those statements which never have a reference to that which they would have referred had their corresponding thought-forms been realized. That is, with regard to their referential function, these statements are definitely not on a par with statements concerning the future. For, while the precise referential function of the latter is yet to be decided, whatever has already happened cannot be undone; and, therefore, a statement such as "The Giants might have lost in 1954," or "Cæsar might not have crossed the Rubicon," cannot be actualized with respect to their respective thought-forms. Such thought-forms may be understood as *past-possibilities* — possibilities which were actualizable in the past, but somehow did not actualize. There is a further evidence to show that irrespective of whether or not a possibility is capable of actualization, no either-or truth-value can be attached to it; and this is as much true of future possibilities as of past-possibilities. We do not see how Aristotle, by his argument that the past cannot be undone, can argue that *all* statements about the past are either true or false[66] — though it is quite a different thing to hold that due to purely pragmatic interests, i.e. due to the knowledge that the past cannot be undone, we may assert that possible thought-forms concerning them can never be actualized, or that no reference of such statements can be established. Thus Taylor quotes Aristotle, "No one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and capable of being otherwise." But, then, "what is past is not capable of not having taken place."[67] There may of course be an attempt to justify this statement by saying that "past" is synonymous with "that which really actualized before now," which may well seem to threaten the exclusion of what we have called past-possibilities from the past. But this

[66] R. Taylor, op. cit.
[67] Ibid, Footnote 51.

would be a wrong understanding of "past". Let us suppose that past has exactly the time-instants "---t, m, n" (*n* representing the immediate past, *m* representing the immediate past with respect to *n*, and so on). The sequence of time "---t, m, n", then, forms the temporal aspect of the world called "past", during the course of which the only actual events are "---a, b, c." Now, for an actual event to occur, it is necessary that it should occur at some time. Let us suppose that *a*, *b*, and *c* are the events occurring at *t*, i.e. they simultaneously occur at *t*. Now, does their simultaneity exclude the possibility that any event *d*, e.g. God exists, could have occurred at *t*? Obviously it does not, since any number of events can be taken as simultaneous with *a*, *b*, and *c* at the time *t*. But, it may be pointed out that this may be true of what we have called "neutral possibilities" (possibilities which may extend into the past as well as into the future and even the present) such as "God exists". But, if, let us further suppose, *a* is an event at *t* expressed by the statement "The Giants won in 1954," how can, then, "The Giants might have lost in 1954" be a possibility at *t*? For, had the latter thought-form been realized at *t* it would have definitely rendered the former statement false. So that, if we admit such past-possibilities, even the past would have been otherwise. We willingly admit this: everybody, we think, would admit that the past *would have been* otherwise (e.g. had I been reading the book a little while ago in my study, I would have missed the sunset), which is quite different from saying that it *can be* otherwise. The whole trouble is really about "would have been" and "can be". If we can get rid of these relative phrases in our language and consider the real world, we would find that "The Giants would have lost in 1954 (though they did win in 1954)" is perfectly intelligible; since, what it states is simply this: before the Giants won in 1954, there were both the possibilities — of their winning the game and of their losing the game. Now, if of these only the former possibility is realized, it does not tell us anything about the latter possibility. What it tells us is

only this that the possibility that the Giants would lose in 1954 cannot now be actualized, and not that it is, or had been, not a possibility at all. For, as we have already said, possibility precedes actuality and not the *vice-versa*. The whole world is infested with potent possibilities which may or may not (*cannot* — in case only of the past aspect of the world) be realized: though constituents of the world are only those possibilities which *are* (tenseless) realized. Unactualizable possibilities (e. g. mere past-possibilities), even though they do not go into the constitution of the world, have yet another important function: they exhibit the self-negating function of Objectivity, which in its turn exhibits the limits of the world. As to the precise nature of this self-negating function of Objectivity, we turn to the next chapter.

FACT, FALSITY, AND NEGATION

13A. We agree with Russell in maintaining that what can properly be called "true" or "false" is only a belief[1]. A belief, as we have said before (Ch. II, 7B), is a "behaviouristic disposition"[2] with respect to some actual or possible experience. The significance of a belief is that unless we are disposed in a certain way with respect to what we experience or may experience, the latter is bound to vanish after the moment of its occurrence. Belief, accordingly, is a dispositional way in respect of what we experience — either in the form of memory-images or in the form of linguistic expression. Now, since memory-images can always be expressed in language, to avoid unnecessary complexities, we would deal only with linguistic expressions when talking of beliefs. In this sense, therefore, we may regard a linguistic expression with regard to a belief to be a *linguistic disposition*, that is, if we choose to use the former with regard to the same experience later or even with regard to other similar experiences. But it is to be noted that not every linguistic expression is a linguistic disposition or a belief. Thus, as Russell says, when an actor exclaims, "This is I, Hamlet the Dane," nobody (not even the actor himself) believes him; still nobody takes him to be lying. We think that those linguistic expressions, which do not record a situational-effect with respect to some actual or possible experience, are incapable of expressing a belief (Ch. II, 7B). In the above example, the statement of the actor, "This is I, Hamlet the Dane," if it records any situational-effect, it

[1] *Vide* HK, p. 129.

[2] Cf. HK, p. 161, "A belief--- is a certain kind of state of mind or body or both --- I shall call it a state of an organism, and ignore the distinction of bodily and mental factors."

records only an impossible one: no body can atonce be himself and another than himself, i.e. the actor *and* Hamlet the Dane. Accordingly, sentences occurring in fiction, mathematics, logic etc. do not express belief, so that the question of their being true or false (in the present sense) does not arise. Such statements are no doubt understandable; but they involve no question of reference. That is, only those linguistic expressions involve belief which involve also a question of reference: in case of the above example, whether or not this can be asked as a genuine question, "Is this actor Hamlet the Dane?" Obviously, neither the actor himself nor the spectators ask such a question. Similarly, consider the expression, "The sky-flower is green." It, indeed, is understandable, yet involves no question of reference: nobody asks,[3] "Is the sky-flower green?"

The question of reference, and consequently, the question of truth or falsity of a belief, arises only when the corresponding linguistic expression exhibits a reference. Now, in order to exhibit a reference, the linguistic expression must be according to some rule of reference (as elaborated in the preceding chapter). According to the principles underlying the rules of reference, the form of a belief, "This is red (v square v loud v---)" is always true. For, as we have mentioned earlier, phenomenal situations corresponding to such beliefs are determined as being immediately experienced; and, no situation determined in an immediate experience is, *ex hypothesi*, erroneous with respect to such a determination, so as to be able to render the corresponding linguistic expression or belief false. Thus, for example, if we fix our eyes on a point of space, and if at different moments of our gazing at that point we spontaneously record different colours with respect to that point, we would hold all the determinations of that point to be equally

[3] It may perhaps be that a child or an idiot may ask such a question: but let us not put such questions on a par with the question like "Is Mr X in the house?" which is a question of reference, because there is nothing like impossibility of Mr. X's presence in the house, though Mr. X may not be present there for some time. On the other hand, questions like "Is the sky-flower green?" obviously relate to impossible situations.

genuine. That is to say, all spontaneous appearances must be accepted as determining their respective status — a *fait accompli*, always remaining only as accomplished or realized. Since the duration of the presence of a phenomenal situation in experience is only the moment of its presence, it cannot be put to examination within that very moment of experience, nor can it be put to any examination *after* the corresponding experience has passed, or rather leaped, into another; because, *ex hypothesi*, an appearance or a phenomenon is said to be present only so long the corresponding experience lasts, after the passage of which a disappearance, a denial of that appearance follows *by itself*. This disappearance proves not that the determination in experience corresponding to the phenomenal situation disappeared was erroneous, but only that *now* we have *another* determination in experience with respect to a *different* situation (phenomenal or physical). The cases of constantly changing moments of immediate experience or phenomenal determination, or that of one experience passing into another, is very important in view of the Advaita concept of Brahmana, if the latter be regarded as a constantly changeless or undifferentiated moments of immediate experience.[4] It is interesting to note that the epistemological import of both of the above mentioned cases of immediate experience is the same. That is, epistemologically, a constantly changeless experience and a constantly changing experience, with respect to their determination, are undeniable from without; and, consequently, are impossible of being rendered erroneous: that is, they are self-evident and no error is possible with regard to them. Another important feature of these cases of immediate experience is that thought (or mind) never *feels* its presence at such moments; for, the very moment of experience in such cases is the moment of knowledge[5]. The

[4] *Vide* Northrop, Philosophy — East and West, ed. Moore, C.A., p. 193.

[5] Cf. Russell, My Philosophical Development, p. 141. "In most senses of the word, 'knowing' an event is a different occurrence from the event which is known; but there is a sense of 'knowing' in which, when you have an experience, there is no difference between the experience and the knowing that you have it."

presence of *feeling thought* is necessary, however, in order that there be an error or a falsity — as we shall see presently.

B. While discussing the case of determinations in immediate experience, we tried to make out that an error with respect to these, or falsity with respect to the corresponding beliefs, is impossible; for, in such determinations or beliefs, neither a denial from without nor a feeling thought is involved. In what follows we would try to see that while denial or rejection (from without) is the very nucleus of falsity, a feeling thought is the necessary condition for its being so. It is quite evident that thought's presence is felt only when at least one physical situation is involved in our experience, i.e. when we have a mediate experience. Such instances of experience, as has been mentioned earlier, are recorded by expressions such as "This is a man," "Some (all) men are vegetarians," "Women are noisy," and so on. An experience of a physical situation, or a mediate experience, involves determination of orders. And orders, *ex hypothesi*, involve experience of more than one situation which have at least one identical character, i.e. an order, besides other characters. Further, a physical situation, unlike a phenomenal situation, *must* endure beyond the moment of its experience; for, otherwise, the determination of orders in our experience would become impossible: i.e. we would not be able to *see* the identity of character, or an order running at once through more than one situation. (In case of an immediate experience always only one situation is involved.) Thus, let us take the following figures for different situations:



We describe these figures as "squares", as all of them have some indentical characters, e.g. all their angles are right angles and in each figure their respective lines, dots, and points, from one angle to the other, are straight and have equal length — though with respect to some other characters they are different, e.g. they are unequal in area, and are differently constituted by lines, dots, and points. So, if *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* be the given situations, then we call, for instance, *a* "a square", that is, *a*'s being a square is determined, in the present example, by the status of *b*, *c*, and *d* as squares (Ch. II, 9A). Now let us consider another figure:



Fig. e

which we may perhaps call "a square". But our saying so would be false with respect to the belief "Fig. e is a square," since on close observation we find that the constituent lines m-o and m-n of the Fig. e do not have the same length as that of the lines n-p and p-o, and, consequently, the angles ∠mop, and ∠omn are not right-angles. Here, then, the same Fig. e, or what is logically the 'this' of the belief, "This (= the Fig. e) is a square," endures beyond one moment of experience; that is, the same *this* persists as a subject of two (or more) moments of experience, so that the *this* is present here in the capacity of a subject of mediate experience. Now, these different moments of experience, with respect to the same situation, need not be the same as regarding their respective determination of the given situation. Thus, in the case of Fig. e we notice

that at the first moment of our experience we determine it as "a square", while at another moment of experience we find it as not possessing the order "square". On the other hand, the figures *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d*, are determined as squares at every moment of our experience of the latter; and, therefore, as conforming to the rule of reference R II, they are necessarily so. But, it is not clear yet, why we regard one determination in experience as genuine and another as erroneous, even though they relate to the same situation. How is it, for instance, that a determination of the Fig. e as "a square" is erroneous and its determination as "not-a-square" is genuine? It may perhaps be thought that if at one moment of experience Fig. e is determined as *a square*, then the expression which correctly records the corresponding situational-effect, viz. the belief "This (=Fig. e) is a square," *must* be true. Obviously it cannot be so, if we regard the belief "This (=Fig. e) is not-a-square" to be true also. So, here we are confronted with one of the most precarious problems in epistemology. It is sometimes explained away by saying that *our* interests and attitudes decide the correctness and incorrectness of such determinations: but this view cannot be accepted, since, for instance, in spite of all my interests and intentions I find myself unable to regard a square as a triangle, or a burning coal as a stream of water. There are, however, others who think that the very *objective basis* of falsity is different from that of truth. If so, there must be *two knowledge*, corresponding respectively to truth and falsity, and each as much correct as the other: But this is absurd. There are still other attempts to solve the riddle of falsity which need no particular mention here, since they all try to solve this difficulty, but unfortunately fall short of being satisfactory in the light of objections we have just mentioned.

Now, at least one thing seems to be quite clear in this connection: our experience cannot be made the basis of falsity, since there is no further ground to judge the validity of an experience, and since no experience can reject the other. That is, *all* experiences are equally genuine. What, then, is the

explanation of falsity? Any explanation of falsity must keep in view the two fundamental factors involved in our understanding of the cases of falsity, viz. (1) the nucleus of falsity consists in negation, and (2) the objective ground of falsity and truth must be the same. Let us try to find out a solution which satisfies both the conditions.

Suppose, a physical situation is determined at one instance of experience as a "pillar" and at another as a "man". Now there are two ways in which these determinations may be recorded: "This is a pillar *and* a man," and "This is a pillar *or* a man." As the first expression violates the rule of reference R III, we reject it as not being a significant expression or a belief: that is, because, a physical situation cannot be determined even at different instances of experience, both as a *pillar* and as a *man*, however erroneously. RIII explicitly states that if between two sets of Po-signs (here "pillar" and "man") there is a relation exhibiting the property *exclusion*, it cannot turn into a relation with the property *inclusion*; so that nothing can be both a man and a pillar. Hence the linguistic expression "This is a man *and* a pillar" is *referentially* nonsensical. The relation of the two sets of Po-signs, as relating to G-signs "man" and "pillar", can at best be made to turn into one exhibiting the property *overlapping*, which means that a physical situation may obtain which has some orders of *pillar* and some of *man*, e.g. the life-size statue of a man which is neither a man nor simply a pillar. But, such a situation, if any, with respect to its determination through some orders of *man* and some of *pillar*, cannot be said to be relating either to the G-sign "man" or to the G-sign "pillar", since the latter always display the property *exclusion* with respect to the referential function of the combination of their Po-signs. Now, as the relation between the two given sets of Po-signs, "man" and "pillar", exhibit the property *exclusion*, the linguistic expression which records this fact is — "This is a man *or* a pillar." Further, since this expression relates to the *this*, as determined in experience, it is true as conforming the RII — though it relates

to the *this* which is differently determined as a man and as a pillar. Now, if the given situation, as denoted by the N-sign "this", is determined first as a pillar and then (next) as a man, and if we continue to be disposed (linguistically) with respect to that situation in terms of the latter determination and not in that of the former, we would call the expression "This is a man" true, and the expression "This is a pillar" — which ceases to be a belief any longer — false. That is, in cases of subsequent experience of the given situation *this*, we continue to use the linguistic expression "This is a man." Further, since the N-sign "this", as denoting a physical situation, remains the same in two cases of its different determinations as a "pillar" and as a "man", and since we know that it is *referentially* impossible to define "this" in terms both of a "pillar" and of a "man", we reject its determination as a "pillar" when we find that we are no more linguistically disposed in that way. In case of the Fig. c above, which was first determined as a *square*, but later denied of such a determination, the same process is involved. We regard the expression "Fig. c is a square" false because in subsequent observation of the Fig. c we find that we are no longer (linguistically) disposed in that way.

Here, then, there are two important points to be taken care of: first, unless we have the *next* determination of the given situation as a man, a given determination of the situation as a pillar cannot be rendered erroneous; and, secondly, the question how the same *this* could be determined once as a pillar and later as a man? that is, what is the explanation of the identical ground of both truth and falsity? To take the first point first. A genuine case of falsity *must* be related to a situation which is determined *more than once*, such that the determining sets of orders of at least two such determinations form a relation with the property *exclusion*. Accordingly, examples such as different appearances of the same stick as bent inside water and as straight out of water, are not genuine instances of erroneous determination (here there are rather two determinations

relating to two different situations, viz. the stick *and* the stick-in-water). Further, if a next determination of the *same* situation is necessary for there being an error, beliefs pertaining to phenomenal situations cannot be rendered false; because no *next* determination of the *same* phenomenal situation is possible. Even in cases of the determinations of physical situations we may find instances where, since no next determination follows, an erroneous determination is never rejected. For example, a man who, while on his way, mistakes a rope for a snake and somehow never comes to know that what he thus took for a snake was actually a rope, would never reject his determination of the latter as a snake. It is clear, then, that a belief in order to be rendered false *always* presupposes the corresponding true belief; but, conversely, a true belief never stands in need to be related to the corresponding false belief. This would help us to understand later that although falsity itself has no actual content, it nevertheless relates to actuality in an important way.

Let us now take the question of the ground of falsity. As we have already noticed, even a false belief must have a ground, since it records some determination in experience, and since no experience is possible without a ground whereof it is an experience. Again, if a false belief has no ground, how are we to distinguish a *false* linguistic expression from a non-sensical one such as "virtue is a square", or "Quadruples eat nine"? Accordingly, when a situation is first determined as a *pillar* but discovered later to be a *man* the question naturally arises whether or not the ground of these determinations is the same? If the two determinations do not have the same ground, there is no sense in taking one to be false and another to be true. But, at the same time, if they both have the same ground, what is the *differentia* between truth and falsity? If the ground of falsity and that of truth be the same, then there not only remains no point in calling one belief "true" and another "false" — since, as all experiences are genuine, both correspond to equally good determinations of the same ground —

but also it leads to a *referentially* nonsensical assertion with respect to that ground — for, if they both relate to the same ground and both record actual determinations in experience, the expression of the form "This is a man *and* a pillar" must be a true belief, which it is not. It may be pointed out further that according to our own assertion, falsity consists in negation, so that, if a true belief is of the form "a is A" and if it rejects the corresponding false belief, the latter must essentially be of the form "a is not-A", which shows that for the ground *a*, not-A is rejected or eliminated. That is, accordingly, Not-A is no more a determination *of* the ground *a*. A belief is regarded to be false only when it is rejected in the light of a true belief; and this rejection is not a business of compromise, a treaty between two warring parties, but a clear declaration of defeat on the part of one party, or even a complete wiping out of the defeated party. Thus, when I accept the belief "This is a man" as true, then I admit in clear terms that my previous belief, viz. "This is a pillar," is false; so that, it appears not to be the same *this* which is determined as a *man* and also as a *pillar*.

Now, leaving for a while the objections raised above as they stand, let us ask: when we know a belief to be false what actually do we *know*? Before we attempt to answer this question, it should be clear that a distinction between true and false beliefs can be made *not* only on the basis of their respective grounds, but also on the basis that the contents of the two may be essentially different. So that, if *ground* is not admitted to be the differentia between falsity and truth, there may be their *contents* to distinguish between the two. Now, coming to the question of knowing falsity, we maintain that in knowing falsity we know the *content of falsity*; and the content of falsity is differentiated from that of truth, because the content we know in case of falsity looses its contact or reference to the world in spite of itself. That is, we *know* the content of falsity to be *not the same* as the content of the corresponding true beliefs. But, then, what is the content of a belief? The content

of a belief, in all cases of belief, is its thought-form. The content of a true belief may be said to be its *actual content*, because it is a thought-form realized (Ch. III, 12B); the content of a false belief is only a *possible content*, because it is a thought-form unrealized. The possible content of a false belief is manifest in the problematic character of falsity. When we speak out, for example, "The planets are round," and say that it is *this* (or *that*, or *thot*, and so on) with respect to which the given belief is true, it is quite intelligible; but our utterance of the belief, for example, "The Sun moves round the Earth," and saying that it is *this* or *that* with respect to which the given belief is false, it is quite unintelligible, since there is no such situation as the Sun-moving-around-the-Earth. So, when we say that the belief "The Sun moves round the Earth" is false, we cannot say that it is false with respect to *this* or *that* unless we know *what* is *this* or *that*. And the whole riddle of falsity is that, in case of falsity, the *what* never becomes *this*. Hence, it is the *what* only that is known as the content of falsity, and since *what* is never an actuality — a *this* or *that* — its *referential significance* can be explained only if we carry this *what* into the realm of possibility. Again, since this *what* can never become something actual, it must be confined only to the realm of *past-possibility*.

Now, before we poceed to see the nature of falsity in the light of past-possibility — the latter as its content — we can take up the objections to the view that falsity and truth have the same ground. Since possibility precedes actuality (Ch. III, 12B), we can safely hold to the view that falsity and truth have the same ground, without falling at the same time a prey to any of the objections mentioned above. It is perhaps the only view which can be safely maintained and defended against possible objections. For, in spite of all such objections, it looks quite unintelligible as to why one belief be called "false" and another "true" if they relate to *different* grounds. Further, if the view of "different grounds" is admitted, then there results a chaos in the picture of the world we know. But, it must be

granted that the view pertaining to "same ground" is essentially erroneous, *if* it maintains that the same ground under question is *actuality* (for actuality in order to be coherent cannot admit of contrary determinations of the same situation). The view of "same ground" can be admitted only in the realm of possibility — since possibility is a sort of constant leap into actuality. That is, prior to a determination, a situation is possible of any determination. In fact, the presence of a situation itself is the possibility of any determination. Again, since it is a possibility of determination, more than one determination may follow; but, then, only such a determination is to be regarded as correct, and therefore the corresponding belief as true, which has some possibility actualized, i.e. some thought-form realized, while that determination is to be taken as incorrect, and therefore the corresponding belief as false, which has some possibility failing to be actualized, some thought-form failing to be realized. In a case of false belief, where a thought-from fails to be realized, the possibility, the thought-form, is most obviously alienated from actuality, and consequently there is exhibited thought's most feeling presence.

C. In the light of above it is clear that possibility is the *ground* of falsity (as well as that of truth) and that past-possibility is its *content*. The latter needs elaboration. Since what is false can never be true, the content of a false belief must not be something *actual*, i.e. it must be a past-possibility which is the only possibility never actualized or realizable (Ch. III, 12C). This *past-ness* is the fundamental character of falsity. As K. C. Bhattacharya has put it: "When we disbelieve the content of a belief, we understand the content, — not by itself but *as* what we believed. We are thus conscious of the belief as past but as the belief is now understood *only* as rejected, we may say that to reject it is to *have* it now in the mind *as past*. 'As past' means 'as rejected': the consciousness of the pastness of a belief is but the consciousness of the belief being rejected."[6]

[6] SP. 198, Italics author's.

Further, when we talk of possibilities, we should remember that they are *not* grounded in actuality. An error, and therefore the corresponding falsity, consists in holding *what* is purely a possible understanding of some situation *as* its actual understanding. Thus, the experience of an illusory snake (or an illusory pillar) is only one of the possible understandings with regard to the given situation *prior to its determination* as a *rope* (or as a *man*). The determination of the given situation as a *rope* is only a possibility actualized. That is, the *this* in the true belief "This is a rope" was not correctly determined before its determination as a *rope*, and therefore before there was the true belief "This is a rope," the *this* presented almost any *possibility* of determination, including its determination as a *snake*. But once there is the correct determination of the *this* as a *rope*, we declare the other determination (of the same *this* as a *snake*) to be incorrect, and therefore the corresponding belief to be false. Now, what is the content of the false belief "This is a snake"? We have already seen that such a content must be a past-possibility. What is this past-possibility in the given case of false belief? It is the understanding of the expression "This would have been a snake," that is, the understanding that prior to the determination of the *this* as a *rope*, the former had *had* the possibility of both the determinations (viz. as a rope and as a snake). Falsity, therefore, consists in replacing the expression "This would have been a snake" by the expression "This *is* a snake." Such a transition in our understanding takes place because possibility, as per definition, is something which is always ready to jump into actuality: When it does jump we get falsity.

Now, possibility is not something *completely* detached from actuality. What may be completely detached from actuality is only impossibility. A possibility is always a possibility-for-actualization. A past-possibility is something which *was* actualizable, but somehow did not actualize. So, past-possibilities exhibit a peculiar relation with actuality — they appear to be *related* as well as *separated* from the latter.

Accordingly, falsity behaves in the same way. This obscure nature of falsity comes out clearly, however, if we consider the significance of falsity in our knowledge. Falsity presents itself in our knowledge not just to be rejected: the very function of rejection or cancellation of falsity in knowledge is a very important function. While getting rejected, falsity *limits* actuality — a function which is necessary for a clear understanding of actuality. In fact, the whole realm of past-possibility appears to be an important function of Objectivity, which aims at specifying the limits of actuality. My contention, for instance, that the *this* is correctly determined as a *rope*, leads me by itself to reject the previous determination of the *this* as a *snake*. In the function of rejection, the *this* specifies itself as something unique (N-sign "this"), as something similar to some other situations (Po-sign "rope"), and as something different from other situations (called "not-rope," i.e. Po-signs other than "rope"). Every correct determination in this sense is atonce a case of affirmation *and* that of a rejection or negation. But the function of rejection is felt only when what should be the determination-as-difference somehow emerges to be the determination-as-sameness, and is subsequently discovered to be inconsistent in the capacity of such a function. Thus, in the above example, the determination of the *this* as a *snake* is in fact the determination-as-difference, but it emerges to be the determination-as-sameness (which in fact is the *this* as a *rope*, because the *this* here is correctly determined only as a *rope*, which therefore is the determination-as-sameness with respect to the *this*, while the determination of the *this* as a *snake* is therefore the determination-as-difference). It is in this manner that falsity appears to be related with actuality — because of this specific function. Further, when the determination-as-difference is established with respect to the *this*, i.e. when the determination-as-difference *qua* the determination-as-sameness is rejected, then this very rejection becomes the nucleus of falsity. Except for this rejection nothing can be false. Again, since this function of rejection is atonce

the function of determination (i.e determination-as-difference), the significance of falsity comes out to be grounded in this very function of Objectivity (Ch. II, 7D). Truth rejects falsity, but falsity in its turn specifies truth.

14A. In maintaining that every determination is a case of affirmation and rejection or negation, the function of rejection, on the one hand, and that of negation, on the other, are said *not* to be one and the same, in spite of the assertion that both have the same aim, viz. that of limiting actuality. The difference between rejection and negation is the very difference between falsity and negativity. And the difference is this: rejection relates to past-possibility *as confused* with actuality, while negation relates to past-possibility *as differentiated* from actuality. But, just as rejection does not establish falsity *side by side* with actuality, similarly negation does not establish negativity *side by side* with actuality. So, both have the same function; only the mode of their function is different. Since not all cases of past-possibility involve a confusion with actuality, though they always involve a differentiation from actuality, all falsity lead to negation, but not the *vice versa*.[7]

B. Now, negativity *qua* past-possibility can neither be *actually present* nor be *existent*. For, as we have already maintained, a possibility involves neither *actual presence* nor *existence*, since an *actual presence* is the presentness of facts (Ch. I, 3) and the only existent is Subjectivity (Ch. I, 3). Hence the very status of negativity as past-possibility leads us to say that it cannot be something actually present or existent. But there are philosophers who maintain that "All negation is real."[8] They argue that as every negative implies a positive, so does every positive imply a negative: Consequently, negativity must form an aspect of actuality, i.e. negativity, in order to form

[7] Cf. A. C. Das, Negative Fact, Negativity and Truth, p. 146: "falsity and negation in fact fall apart from each other, though it is often the case that the situation of falsity leads to a relevant negation."

[8] Bradley, Logic Vol. II, Terminal Essays, p. 665." - - - it (negation) is real just because it is relative."

this aspect, must be *actually present*. Thus Bradley holds that, regarding whether affirmation or denial are co-ordinative, we may say that in the end they are so, because the conscious use of ideas implies both a positive and a negative aspect. Obviously, this view has been stated with some qualification, viz. it is only in the realm of ideas (as the idealists understand it) that negation is felt *side by side* with affirmation: that is, as both Bradley and Bosanquet admit, negation is more *reflective* than affirmative[9]. Further, neither Bradley nor Bosanquet appear to hold that negation itself is an affirmation. But, then, how otherwise is a negation significant? Obviously, a negation is significant not because it affirms itself, but rather because it affirms something which it is not, i.e. something positive. Thus, for example, in every case of my pointing to a physical situation and saying "This is not a snake" I do not affirm *this* as a *non-present* snake, but rather affirm that *this* is some*thing*, not-snake — and "not-snake" means anything other than snake, e.g. a rope. On the other hand, when I know *this* as a rope, I may not *side by side* know that *this* is not-a-snake, not-a-stick, and so on. My knowledge of *this* as not-a-snake, however, presupposes some such knowledge as this-is-a-rope. This pattern in our knowledge of the world cannot be reversed: An attempt at determination of what the situation, the *this*, is *not* would always yield a state of indetermination; for example, if *not-yellow* is determined with respect to the situation *this table*, and we are left to determine what is *not-yellow*, we may say that *not-yellow* is any other colour except yellow, which in its turn would lead us to say of *this table*, "This table is either blue, or red, or green, or—." Now, unless *a* colour is specified with respect to *this table*, we cannot arrive at a determinate knowledge of the latter in respect of its colour. It may perhaps be suggested that we can proceed further by eliminating again the colours which *this table* has not have.

[9] Bradley, Logic, Vol. I, p. 115, Vol. II, pp. 665f. Bosanquet, Logic, p. 280, writes, "---in the beginning of knowledge negation is a degree more remote from reality than affirmation."

Thus, for instance, we may further say that "This table is not-green," and again "This table is not-blue." But the point is, can we stop anywhere and say that no further elimination is possible? We cannot, since the relation of Po-signs "table" and Pc-signs "green", "blue", and so on, is only accidental; so that, the process of elimination may go on *ad infinition*, depending on the fact that this table might possess numberless colours. Further, if I take directly an example from the perceptual field, I find that when I perceive a table, I never *perceive* it as *not-yellow*, or *not-green*, but *always* as, say, brown. Hence, Russell rightly maintains that the person "would know a buttercup is yellow, but he would not know that it is not-blue."[10] According to him, anyone who knows everything that could be expressed without using "not", or an equivalent word, would know the whole world, i.e. would "know everything."[11]

Hence, negation in order to be significant must ultimately point to the corresponding affirmation, since it cannot affirm itself, i.e. it cannot affirm an *actual absence* (side by side with *actual presence*). Every negation has the character of being reflective only because it involves an affirmation relating to other-than-itself: for, if this affirmation is to be taken as the affirmation-of-negation itself, an actual presence of absence must be admitted, and therefore also that the occurrence of negation is spontaneous rather than reflective.

There are some, however, who regard negation to be spontaneous; they give the function of negation an independent status of determination (Anupalabdhi or non-cognition). It is argued that in a negative cognition, operative in the field of perception, a reference is actually made to *what* is then absent there as a fact, i.e. an actual assertion is made. Let us now

[10] HK, p. 137

[11] Cf. R. Wells, RM, Vol. 3, 1949, "The Existence of Facts," p. 11. If one were to draw up "an inventory of all existents that comprise the world," he might have to include negation of facts, but not negative facts, i.e. existents nameable only by expressions containing "not" or equivalent.

ask: what sort of experience is a non-perception? A lack of perception? But this is no perception. The confusion, with regard to this view, is perhaps between non-cognition as a mode of understanding and non-perception as a mode of experience. It can hardly be denied that non-cognition is a mode of understanding, i.e. non-cognition *qua* the understanding of difference, and indeed a very important one, because in its absence all determinations would be vague (Ch. II, 7D). But, since non-cognition, thus being a form of understanding, is no perception, it cannot be argued that it involves an actual presence of absence. There are cases, no doubt, where absence is felt, such as the absence of water in a jar, or the absence of cow in the field, or the absence of Mr. X in this room. Or, let us consider a still more concrete example of these circles:[12]



Fig. 1



Fig. 2

A person who passes from Fig. 1 to Fig. 2 in his observation may feel that Fig. 2 is empty, and therefore may persist in telling us that his perception of Fig. 2 as *empty*, as lacking something which Fig. 1 has, is as much immediate and spontaneous as the perception of Fig. 1. But, then, there is another person who somehow observes Fig. 2 only, and whatever he tells us about the latter is definitely different from the report of the first man. That is, say, two persons, one acquainted with Fig. 1 and another not acquainted with it, regard Fig. 2 respectively, as an empty circle, a circle where a dot in the centre is missing, and a space encircled. Obviously, then, it is only in the first case that there is a non-perception. Now, if absence has an actual presence, it is hardly intelligible as to

[12] The example is taken from R. Taylor's "Negative Things", JP, 1952, p. 444.

why both the persons do not have the same non-perceptual *experience*. Non-perception, on part of the first person, follows only because he had previously perceived that which he thought to be absent later with respect to his perception of Fig. 2. But, when the second man observes Fig. 2, he tells us that what he perceives is a circle, and if asked what he thinks to be *absent* from that circle, he would reply that almost anything except the circle is absent from the field of his perception. This is important: whatever is absent, the second man determines through his thinking, i.e. there is not an awareness of absence along with the corresponding perception[13] (provided, of course, there was not any suggestion in the past of something being present in the same or similar perceptual field). Moreover, if the awareness of absence, as in case of the first person, is equated with the absence of perception, it strikes straight at the theory that absence is actually present or is factual: No instance of an absence of perception can produce a perception of absence.

But, it is to be noticed that in maintaining that the perception of Fig. 2, for being treated as empty, depends on the perception of Fig. 1, we are not committed to the view that the emptiness of Fig. 2 is *inferred* from the perception of Fig. 1. There is no need for inference if we take the non-perception of the dot in Fig. 2 for the absence of the dot. Obviously, a non-perception of the dot is *ipso facto* the same as a knowledge of the absence of the dot. That is, as we have already said in the preceding chapter, the whole significance of negation, and therefore also of absence, lies in its capacity to deny *reference*; and, since a denial of reference is in no way a reference itself, there remains no need either for establishing an absence as an actual presence, or for giving its knowledge an inferential status. But it may be thought that the very assertion

[13] *Vide* R. Demos, "A discussion of certain type of Negative propositions," *Mind*, 1917, p. 189. "---negative facts are nowhere to be met with in experience." If they are ever perceivable, they are at any rate not perceived in the same direct way that positive situations are perceived.

that the case of non-perception is not a result of inference is indicative of the fact that the former is spontaneous or immediate. Thus, Taylor writes, "the only 'evidence' we would cite for the fact that there is no dot in the circle is simply the fact that there is no inference here at all, that the perception of this fact is as immediate as the perception of the circle itself."[14] Similarly, J. N. Findley observes, "Absences and lacks are perfectly specific and distinct, just as the holes in the piece of lace have shapes and characteristic as the actual embroidery. We do not create such absences or lacks by our thinking, but discover them in the same way that we discover the Milky Way."[15] Both Taylor and Findley, therefore, appear to hold that the lack of inference in negative judgements is an *evidence* of the latter being immediate. But, we think, such a view is fundamentally wrong; for, it is not only that inference is not responsible for negative determinations, but also that the latter *depend* on the corresponding positive determinations, as is amply clear in case of the example given above; so that, they cannot be immediate. It seems that the very word "non-perception" is redundent, for in almost every case of perception we may say that what we perceive could be perceived together with other things. Hence, the significant point that Taylor or Findley may bring out is not that negative determination is as much immediate (as positive determinations), but only that a negative determination is not due to pure-thinking or imagination.

But this may not satisfy our critics. It may be pointed out that it can be assumed that a person knows, for example, that a table is not-green — when he knows it to be brown — only when he realizes that it is not both green and brown; but, then, the latter is an independent negative fact. That is, in order to have such a knowledge, he must know that some properties seem to be contraries; for instance, if a thing has the properties M, N, and O, it somehow does not also have the

[14] Op. cit., p. 445.

[15] Meinong's Theory of Objects, p. 55.

properties P, Q, and R; the latter, in that case, are the contraries of the former. Knowledge pertaining to this is a "pure negative knowledge," i.e. knowledge of a negative fact.[16] Accordingly, such statements as "X is not both green and brown" cannot be rendered into or derived from something positive; for, it is simply an ultimate fact about *X* that if it is brown then somehow it is also not green. Now, such an argument depends clearly on the phenomenon of *difference*. Bradley regards 'difference' to be the subject matter of negation.[17] In one of the preceding chapters (Ch. II, 7D) we maintained that difference is a fundamental way of understanding, because it cannot be explained by either uniqueness or partial identity of situations, since both the uniqueness and partial identity of situations as much presuppose difference as difference presupposes uniqueness and partial identity.[18] Now, if our treatment of 'difference' is correct, the argument that difference establishes an "ultimate (negative) fact" must be erroneous. For, as a fundamental way of understanding, it establishes *not only* negative determinations but also positive determinations. In fact, as Spinoza maintains, *omnis determinatio est negatio* — no determination is possible without negation; that is, every case of (positive) determination is also a case of negative determination, so that a negative determination is not something fundamentally different from the corresponding positive determination. Thus the significance of the statement "X is not both green and red"[19] lies in the understanding that two unique situations — X's being green *and*

[16] Taylor, op. cit., p. 439. H. H. Price, Negation (Symposium), PASS Vol. IX, p. 107, says that such examples of negation as "red is not green" are originally negative and are "independent of eliminative processes and stands, so to speak, on their own feet."

[17] The Principles of Logic, Vol. II, Terminal Essays. 6, pp. 664-66.

[18] Cf. Bradley, Ibid, p. 664, "Diversity as experienced implies partial sameness, identity."

[19] This is not the same as saying "something *cannot* be both green and red simultaneously" — the possibility of something being both green and red simultaneously may not be denied (Ch. III, 11B).

X's being red — are not identical, i.e. they are different; so that, if *X* is only one situation, then it is either green or red but not both: If *X* is red, then X's being green becomes a possibility with respect to *X* which cannot *now* be obtained — i.e. X's being green is a past-possibility — and therefore can be negated in regard to the fact that *X* is red. Hence we see how from uniqueness follows difference and from difference follows negation (X's being *not both* A and B, if *X* is A, then *X* is not-B); and just as we do not take *uniqueness* or *partial-identity* as being positive-in-themselves, similarly *difference* need not be taken as being something negative-in-itself: As fundamental ways of understanding, they all relate to determinations of positive situations.

It is to be noted further that not each case of difference need be taken to give us significant negation. Obviously, such negative statements as "Virtue is not an elephant," or "The present queen of England is not a number," or "No woman is a man," etc. are not treated as significant. In the first place, it appears that all those cases of negation are *insignificant* which relate either to two or more Pc-signs or to two or more Po-signs; for, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, the relation between Pc-signs or between Po-signs, taken individually, is such that it *always* has the property *exclusion*, so that such negative statements as "Green is not red", or "Mortality is not white," or "Intelligence is not wise," etc. are all insignificant. Secondly, the cases where a Po-sign is combined with other Po-signs in such a way that the relation between the two always yields the property *inclusion*, no significant negation is possible. For example, if the G-sign "man" is determined with respect to the orders mortality, rationality, and animality, then the expression, for instance, "This man is not mortal", or "Man is not rational", would be an example of insignificant negation. Clearly, then, what can be regarded as *significant* negation appears to be only those cases of expression where the two or more terms involved in a negative statement stand in a relation exhibiting the property *overlapping*, and such a

relation can hold only between a set of orders or a G-sign, on the one hand, and on the other a Pc-sign or a Po-sign. Here it is to be remembered once again that two G-signs stand always in a relation having the property *exclusion*; hence no significant negation can be based on such a relation. Thus, the negative expression "No woman is a man" is not a significant negation, because in the relation between two G-signs "woman" and "man" there always obtains the property *exclusion*. But, Pc-signs like "intelligence" stand in such a relation to the G-signs "woman" and "man" that it exhibits the property *exclusion-or-overlap*; a negation to this effect may be significantly expressed as "Some women are not intelligent", or "This man is intelligent", etc.

The difference between *significant* and *insignificant* negation is, in fact, wider than what appears to be at first sight. A significant aspect of this difference is that, while a significant negation leads us to see that its corresponding positive statement is *referentially* meaningful, an insignificant negation does not have the same function. Thus, the negative statement "This is not a man" makes us see that the corresponding positive statement "This is a man" is referentially meaningful as conforming to the rule of reference RII. On the other hand, in case of an insignificant negation, like "Green is not red," we see that the corresponding positive statement "Green is red" is equally referentially meaningless. This reveals two important points: (*a*) Only those negations are significant which are based on the fact of difference involved in relations between a set of orders or a G-sign on the one hand and a Pc-sign or a Po-sign on the other; (*b*) since only significant negations relate to referentially meaningful statements, only they relate to past-possibilities: insignificant negations, on the other hand, relate to factual impossibilities.[20]

[20] Mabbott calls insignificant negations "turkey carpet judgements," i.e. unmeaningful togetherness of words which are meaningful otherwise ("Negation", PASS, 1929, p. 68). Hence, he maintains, there must be some connection between

C. There are some who attempt to establish the real presence of absence by arguing that "denials which are denials of nothing are not denials in any sense at all."[21] Accordingly, negative statements like "faires do not exist"[22] can be meaningful only when this statement must have some objects of reference for its subject term[23]. So that, when we say that "fairies do not exist" it is understood only as *positively referring* to the absence-of-fairies, which cannot in the same way be understood by some positive statement[24]. Now, what exactly is designated by the term "fairies" (granting that the term "fairies" is equivalent to the expression "winged type creatures")? Clearly, "fairies" cannot designate the corresponding thought-form or idea, since, as Ingram-Pearson says, the statement "fairies do not exist" would then mean "ideas of fairies do not exist" which happens not to be the meaning of the original statement "fairies do not exist". Hence, Ingram-Pearson concludes, there must be entities other than the term and ideas — the *objects* of reference.

Let us now try to see what a person means when he denies the presence of fairies. Does he mean that "really present fairies as such are really absent"? This obviously is no more possible than is the position that a white-thing *qua* white is black.[25] What is perhaps more plausible is the view that a person uses the expression "fairies do not exist" in such a way that any reference to real absence or real presence is excluded; so that, the only significance of an affirmative or negative statement

the subject and the rejected predicate. That is, the predicate must be suggested as "possible", and "to be possible" means to be one of a set of alternatives judged true of a universal of which the subject is a particular case. (Ibid., p. 67).

[21] Clive Ingram-Pearson, "On talking about Non-Existence", RM, 1959, p. 353.

[22] Here and in the following discussion in this section "existence" should be taken as meaning "presence". We differentiate between "existence" and "presence" (Ch. I, 3).

[23] Ingram-Pearson, op. cit., p. 353.

[24] Ingram-Pearson, Ibid., p. 355.

[25] *Vide* M. M. Schuster, "Concerning Non-Existence", RM 1960, p. 522.

with respect to the term "fairies" is merely a tautology: "really present fairies are really present", or "really absent fairies are really absent", where no question of *reference* is involved.[26] But the question remains, what is the *absence* or *presence* of fairies? Ingram-Pearson's whole difficulty appears to rest on his understanding of the term "presence" as "already a meaning or interpretation."[27] So that, according to him, "presence (of situations, or, as he says, of entities) is not primarily a question of reference, but that of absence." That is, he maintains, prior to considering their absence there "is no sense at all in which existence (=presence) is attributed to entities (= situations) - - -."[28]

But, what is difficult to understand in Ingram-Pearson's argument is this: Why should real presence be "a meaning or interpretation" and real absence not? He gives no reason for this. Further, it is hard to understand why "real absence" must be a consideration subsequent to that of "real presence"? Plato's procedure shows that the mere fact of having two of a kind is sufficient to initiate a study of what we mean by "two of a kind."[29] Nowhere in this is an understanding of absence presupposed. Ingram-Pearson appears to have chosen to plunge into difficulties rather than explaining them away. His conclusion that statements which purport to deny real-presence simply fail to do so, or in striving to do so involve themselves in contradiction, is the result of his straining the term "non-existence" too much: his view of non-existence is one of non-*existence*, i.e. a special kind of existence. And this erroneous view is the consequence of still another: Ingram-Pearson thinks that the subject term of a statement must have an object of reference (or else they would be about nothing and therefore no denials at all). Denials, obviously, do not establish *what* they refer, but only *state* that what they refer to

[26] Ibid., p. 523.
[27] Op. cit., p. 358.
[28] Ibid., p. 359
[29] *Vide* M. M. Schuster, op. cit., p. 523.

is not actually present. Denials such as "fairies do not exist" are denials not of something really absent or present, but, of the affirmation of the corresponding positive statements, like "fairies exist."[30] It is really an affirmation which *presupposes* — though it too does not *establish* — something actually present, without which an affirmation carries no referential sense. A denial corresponding to such an affirmation, if any, simply shows that the subject term of the affirmation has no denotative value, i.e. there is *nothing* which conforms to the definition of the subject term by a predicate. This is most obvious in the cases of negation following from falsity. Thus, the negation following from the false expression "This is a snake" would be "This is not a snake", so that what the latter expression establishes is that here there is no situation which conforms to the definition of the N-sign "This" by the Po-sign "Snake". Hence there is nothing like *really absent*; all denial statements can be regarded significant simply as negations of corresponding linguistic expressions conforming to the rules of reference. Since negations involve affirmation, they are significant only as relating to significant affirmations of things-positive or actuality and not to things-negative or Nothingness. There are, therefore, no negative things.

D. Now, let us try to determine the precise relation of negation with actuality. In this connection Schillar's remark needs consideration: "negation is always a 'subjective', or better a *human* device of thought."[31] He further writes that negation is "a confession of human weakness that cannot go directly to the positive core of reality. — It is always relative to human purposes."[32] Schillar appears to suggest as if there is some aspect of "the positive core of reality" which is permanently concealed and therefore is always beyond human-knowledge due to human limitations; negation is significant

[30] Cf. Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 303: "to deny always consists in setting aside a possible affirmation."

[31] Formal Logic p. 139, Italic author's.

[32] Ibid.

with respect to this hidden aspect of reality. Here there is much confusion to be cleared away. First, what is "an-absence-of-a-thing" is not the same as "an-absence-of-the-knowledge-of-a-thing": we can be conscious of a thing being absent, so that, in this case, what can be significantly referred to is only the knowledge of the absence of a thing and not the absence of the knowledge of a thing[33]. Schillar seems to fall a victim to this very error: ngation is never a matter of human ignorance — a failure to reach reality. For, a moment of ignorance is no moment of significant knowledge of *what* we are ignorant. The case of ignorance as a basis for negation may however be forwarded by arguing, had all the facts been known to us there would have been no negative judgements; so that, if negations *are* there in our knowledge, their presence simply shows that they are there only because we are ignorant with regard to *all* the facts[34]. Frankly speaking, we do not understand this argument: Had we been knowing *all* the facts, we must also be knowing the *difference* that may occur between all those facts. But then, every occasion of difference in our knowledge, we have already urged, is an occasion of the occurrence of a negation — significant or otherwise. In case of the knowledge of *all* the facts there would only be insignificant negation, since here all the relations of P-signs would be definite and not open, i.e. no property of *overlapping* would be found to be obtaining in that case. But all this does not prove that ignorance can be made basis of significant negation. What it shows is only that if all possible absence of things in all possible locus is determined, the picture of the world in such a knowledge would be precise by itself, which otherwise in order to be precise needs the corresponding possibilities to be negated — as we shall see presently.

In the second place, there appears to be hardly any relation between negation and human-purpose, though cases are not wanting where an instance of negation is shown to be relative

[33] *Vide* A. C. Das, Negative Fact, Negativity and Truth, pp. 50-51.
[34] E. G. Mabbott's argument in "Negation", PASS, 1929, pp. 73-74.

to human-purposes. Thus, for example, a thief may see an absence of gold in a room, while a house-wife may see an absence of furniture in the same room. Now in spite of this apparent relativeness of negation, what really makes it possible is *not* certain human-purpose, but the possibility of the relation of the G-sign "room" with such G-signs as "gold" and "furniture", i.e. the possibility of the co-presence of orders defining "room" and orders defining "gold" or "furniture". This can be supported by the following example: In spite of my strong desire to ride a big elephant, I do not look into my room and say that the elephant is absent from the room, or that there is no elephant in the room; for I know that my room cannot accommodate an elephant, i.e. the G-signs "room" and "elephant" do not stand in such a relation as to give a significant negative expression, "The elephant is not in the room". Further, there may be negations which involve no relativity with human purposes: I see my old village after a long time and remark at the first sight of it (i.e. seeing that now there are big houses in place of small ones), "It is not the same village now!" So, the relativity of negation with human-purposes is only accidental. Finally, even if the cases of negation are taken to be concerning the limits of human-thought, we hardly need reaffirmation of our position that limits of thought is nothing different from the limitation which relates to our understanding of the world, and that what cannot be understood does not belong to the world (Ch. II, 7C). This sense of limitation follows in our understanding of the world only because the world itself is precise, i.e. it could be known in a definite way. Hence, even if Schillar calls negation "subjective", it makes no difference to the status of the former. After all, our thoughts, including even doubts and ignorance (= knowledge of the thing-absent), are equally objective (Ch. I).

In maintaining that every negation, as expressed in ordinary language, is a thought-form, it has been shown that the possibility which a negation relates to is a past-possibility; and, as per definition, a past-possibility can never be actualized,

that is, a negation cannot be *actual*. So that, a situation present in the world cannot be a nothingness; and therefore negativity cannot be an actual presence — although negativity *qua* objectivity cannot be bereft of its presentness (Ch. I, 3). Now, what is the relation, if any, of this presentness with what is *actually* present? This relation is clearly manifest in the function of negation in our knowledge of the world, which consists in *showing* the limits of the world (Ch. II, 7A). The world, as all the facts, no doubt, is limited with respect to the boundaries of facts themselves (Ch. II, 7A); yet this boundary, in our knowledge of the world, becomes obvious only because negations clearly demarcate it. It is this very demarcation which is the relation between factuality or actual presence and negation's mere presentness. Thus, e.g., the two facts 'That this is red' and 'That this table is square' are so *qua* a belief associated with some experience, and their respective significant negations "This is not red" and "This table is not square" reveal the precise nature of those facts by providing us with the understanding that "This" and "This table", as subject-terms of the beliefs corresponding to the facts, cannot be associated with whatever is "not-red" and "not-square" respectively. It may perhaps be argued that if a negation shows only the limits of factuality, in the way mentioned above, then it does not appear to be significant any more than is the negation, e.g. "Virtue is not square". That such an argument is off the mark can be seen by taking into account the several relations of P-signs we have expounded earlier. Obviously, then, the reason for insignificance of the negation, "Virtue is not square" is that the two P-signs in their relation exhibit the property *exclusion*. But, the same argument cannot be given for the insignificance, if any, of the negation "This is not-red" and "This table is not-square", because both "red" and "square", as related to "this" and "this table" respectively, exhibit the actualization of only one of the several possibilities. This, however, may not satisfy those who maintain that if a situation is determined as *red* or as *square*, then to say

that it is not the case that the same situation is either *not-red* or *not-square* is to say nothing significant, or to say anything that is essentially different from what has been said earlier regarding the situation as *red* or as *square*. Now, this argument as it stands is no doubt correct. But it does not affeect our position: We are not maintaining that if a situation is determined in a certain way, then it is not the case that it is not determined in just that very way: this of course provides us with no significant negation.[35] What we are maintaining rather is that if a situation is determined in a certain way, then it *cannot* be the case that it may be determined in just the other way. So that, if the facts are 'That this is red' and 'That this table is square', then it *cannot* be the case, with regard to the same *this* and *this table*, that the signs "not-red" and "not-square" may be related to them respectively. The difference, in the two cases of negation above, between "is not" and "cannot" is highly important: "is not" says nothing beyond what *is* the case, i.e. the fact; "cannot" says something which does go beyond what is the case, in the sense that the situation with respect to which the fact is now understood *was* a potential ground of still other (opposite) understandings before its realization as a fact. So, a negation in this case asserts not *simply* what is already said in the corresponding factual statement; it asserts over and above that the other (opposite) possibility of understanding of the ground — than the fact which is realized of this same ground—cannot now be realized, i.e. it is a past-possibility. In so asserting, it specifies the fact and draws a clear line between what is a fact and what is a no-fact.

In short, negativity has an important function in our knowledge of the world: it reveals the limits of the latter, but even being so, it depends on the world for its function. The ground, however, of both negativity and the world is Objectivity. Hence, the negative function in our knowledge is a function of Objectivity, which aims at specifying the limits of the world

[35] What the formal logic deals with is perhaps this sort of negation, where "p= ⌐ (⌐ p)" is taken to be the core of understanding negation.

which too is objective. The question, therefore, whether Objectivity in its capacity as a function of negation may annihilate itself or not, i.e. the question of absolute negation or Nothingness, is important. An absolute negation would only mean the negation of the whole Objectivity including the world. Whether such an understanding of the negative function of Objectivity is commendable or not is to be considered in the following chapter.

CONCLUSION: METAPHYSICS

15A. From factuality to negativity is a long and tedious journey. It takes enough of our patience to tread along the zig-zag and narrow path of Objectivity holding together facts on the one end and no-facts on the other. In the very beginning of our endeavour we marked the inconvenience in case we miss any of the two ends. That is, an explanation of one cannot be given unless we end or start with the explanation of the other. And in order to give an explanation of the two on the same level, we must stick to the same ground of explanation. This ground, we noticed, is adequately provided by the notion of Objectivity *qua* otherness (Ch. I, 1). Hence Objectivity provides itself as the *materia prima* of both facts and no-facts. But one thing still stands in need of clarification, namely, *how* is it that in the state of pure Subjectivity the state of Objectivity *qua* otherness is dissolved (Ch. I, 4). With this question we enter the proper field of *metaphysics*. In whatever we said hitherto, we were always talking either of facts or of things-other-than-facts as are helpful in understanding the former. But, now, in the following few pages, *facts* and *no-facts* are not our primary concern: We are now concerned with what the whole study of facts and no-facts ultimately amounts to. It is therefore that we have brought metaphysics in to be considered only as a way of conclusion, as following from the study of facts and no-facts.

The inclusion of metaphysics in this particular chapter is important from yet another standpoint. In recent years we have seen so many refutations of metaphysics, and so much energy spent on this account, that it very often appeared as if metaphysics is something essentially evil-disposed. All the good and noble philosophers, aflame with a revolutionary

zeal of reform, are pledged to put it to an end once and for all. But, alas! their attempts have been proved futile: Their weapon, *language* has at last been shown to be not sharp enough to match the edge of metaphysics. And the edge of metaphysics is felt most at the boundaries of factuality, where negativity emerges as an independent function of Objectivity (Ch. IV, 14) and takes our brave and honest philosophers of language by surprise, who otherwise regard negation to be a mere *logical* function (Ch. IV, footnote 35). We have shown negation to be an *objective* function, and it is in this capacity that it can be related to factuality, if at all. It can be maintained, moreover, that falsity (as involving negation) is something extra-linguistic, which obviously it is. Supported by such considerations we enter the forbidden territory of metaphysics.

Again, there is the case of absolute negation, which is not intelligible in the same language of discourse which deals with facts. For, language *qua* the principle of the expression of understanding (Ch. II, 7A) renders certain types of thought-forms necessary (Ch. III, 11C), the latter being incapable of elimination in that language. Or, rather, a single, or the whole realm of thought-forms, cannot be denied in its own expression; since any such expression establishes rather than denies it. It is therefore that, while discussing the case of negation (Ch. IV, 14), we were forced to recognize negation as a positive function of Objectivity, illuminating the boundaries of factuality; and, consequently, we attributed *presentness* to past-possibilities. About absolute negation, on the other hand, nothing can be *said*, since here nothing can be understood. For, an absolute negation is an occasion neither of possibility nor of actuality. Hence, nothingness as such is neither Objective nor Subjective. It cannot be spoken of therefore either sensibly or senselessly. For, what can be spoken either sensibly (=meaningfully) or senselessly (Ch. I, 4B) is only that which is capable of expression in language, namely, the understanding of Objectivity (meaningfully) and experience

of Subjectivity (meaninglessly). So, in case of "nothingness" we meet with the strangest inhabitant of philosophy. Yet it does not appear to be impossible. Its impossibility may lead us to grave consequences: how otherwise would one be able to maintain consistently that *all* the facts may be known? Any notion of the totality of facts presupposes a limitless beyond, which is not the same as the difference between all the facts, the latter being only an occasion of insignificant negation (Ch. IV, 14D). It is to be carefully noticed that an insignificant negation is not the same as nothingness or absolute negation. The former is still within Objectivity and indeed limits factuality.

It is clear that any notion of the totality of facts cannot be such that this totality is infinite. However, the very notion of the totality of facts must involve a limitless beyond, an infinitude. Now, as this infinitude is the presupposition of all totality, it cannot be said to be relative to the latter. Nothingness and factuality are, therefore, independent of each other. It should be evident, however, that this argument cannot be countered by maintaining that we need not consider "the totality of facts" at all. As we have already urged (Ch. II, 6A, 7E), one of the conditions of factuality *qua* itself is that a single fact cannot but fall in a system which includes all the other facts, which is an important criterion differentiating between facts and no-facts. Further, are we willing to maintain that not *all* the facts may be known? But this is absurd, since facts *qua* facts *must* be known. Further, what is thus beyond *all* the facts cannot even be the Subject or Subjectivity, for the latter is not relative to the former, as it involves no otherness with respect to factuality or Objectivity. So, the infinite beyond which factuality involves is nothingness. Evidently, the latter cannot be the same as Objectivity *qua* possibility which gives birth to factuality by actualizing itself. For, Objectivity is nothing more or less than the possibilities actualized and unactualized. We are, therefore, confronted with the problem, *what* is the status of nothingness? To get an

answer to this confronting problem we must tread into metaphysics.

B. Now, the whole account above of nothingness is perhaps sufficient to show that it can neither be experienced nor be understood. So that, the very occasion of no-experience and no-understanding should be the occasion of nothingness. Hence its difference from factuality should be obvious: factuality being that which can both be experienced and understood. Similarly its difference from negativity consists in that, while negativity, though it cannot be experienced, can yet be understood, nothingness cannot be even understood. It is to be noted further that factuality, though capable both of experience and understanding, is not exhaustive of *all* experience. Subjectivity is different from factuality in that while the latter may be both experienced and understood, the former can only be experienced. As we have already said, whatever is taken to be understandable must be capable of *meaningful* expression in language. Accordingly, we maintained, the whole realm of Objectivity is thus understandable. It is perhaps therefore that some philosophers prefer to attach the notion of understandability to the meaning of words — a view which, we think, is not essentially different from ours. Thus Russell writes, "---the only thing you can really understand (in the strict sense of the word) is a symbol, and to understand a symbol is to know what it stands for."[1] What Russell calls "understanding" may be equated with what we have called "meaningful expression in a language" (Ch. I, 4B). But in order to be meaningful, let it be noted, a linguistic expression need not always involve a question of reference (Ch. III, 11A). The meaningfulness of an expression depends rather on its capacity to involve Objectivity *qua* otherness. That Subjectivity is not capable of such a meaningful expression has been already demonstrated. Hence, with regard to Subjectivity there is no understanding, though *experience* in this context

[1] LK., p. 204-205.

cannot be denied. In the preceding pages we had been talking of *experience* only as it is involved in our knowledge of Objectivity. But it should be clear now that experience in the context of Subjectivity is not impossible. In the first chapter we proceeded by a pure espistemic necessity to consider the status of Subjectivity as *significant* with respect to our knowledge of the world. This epistemic significance needs, however, to be reasoned out to its full implications. If Subjectivity is significant, but cannot be understood, there is only one way to grasp its significance, viz. *experience*. For, that which is neither understood nor experienced is simply nothing. Hence, Subjectivity can be significant only *as* experience. It is important to note that when we talk of experience in the context of factuality and when we talk of it in the context of Subjectivity, their respective epistemic imports are different: We talk of experience *of* factuality, but experience *as* Subjectivity. As is obvious, "experience of factuality" always involves something which the experience is not, i.e. the otherness; but, on the other hand, in case of "experience as Subjectivity", experience and Subjectivity come out to be one and the same, since here the otherness vanishes (Ch. I, Definition of Subjectivity). It is because of this state of non-otherness that Subjectivity *qua* consciousness must be considered only as significant, and not as meaningful.

There may perhaps be some who would object to what we have just said by asking, why should not we conversely say "experience *as* factuality"—in the sense that just as understanding is a function of Objectivity so is consciousness. Such a view is essentially erroneous, since the very status of Objectivity is one of *otherness*, and logically nothing can be regarded as an other which relates to nothing else but itself. If Objectivity does relate to something else for its being an other, then to speak of "experience *as* factuality" results only in a full-size contradiction; since, here the state of non-otherness obtains, and, consequently, that of non-Objectivity. The question, why consciousness should not be treated as a function of Objectivity?

can be met with similarly. If consciousness is taken to be a function of Objectivity, it involves us in contradictions. First, to treat consciousness as a function of Objectivity is to maintain that Objectivity involves no otherness, and if it involves no otherness then no Objectivity in our knowledge should be ever felt; for, then, what else remains to feel Objectivity *qua* otherness? To suggest, however, that Objectivity involves otherness with respect to its function is again a denial of otherness as the character of Objectivity; since, as we have already shown in the first chapter, all such functions share in the generality of Objectivity, and, consequently, are incapable of providing that with respect to which Objectivity *qua* otherness is significant. Secondly, whatever is a function of Objectivity is only a possibility, as differentiated from actuality (Ch. III, 12). Consciousness *qua* a function of Objectivity must be, accordingly, an unactualized possibility. Obviously, it cannot be a past-possibility since it is not negated by factuality as something unactualizable. But, it nevertheless determines the boundaries of factuality (Ch. II, 7A): the world is limited in respect both of Subjectivity and negativity. And, if it determines the boundaries of factuality, it cannot be even a possibility *qua* potential actuality, since a possibility is an occasion of the possible extension in the boundaries of factuality and not the occasion of its delimitation. Hence, consciousness cannot be regarded either as a past-possibility or as a (potent) possibility — let alone as factuality. But, then, how otherwise is it significant as a function of Objectivity? One thing, however, is clear wherein lies the nucleus of the contradiction involved in view of consciousness *qua* a function of Objectivity: consciousness does delimit the world, yet it is not a past-possibility; and the only function of Objectivity capable of this delimitation is a past-possibility — all past-possibilities. Hence the view of consciousness *qua* a function of Objectivity must be essentially erroneous.

C. As we have clarified in the first chapter, Subjectivity *qua* consciousness is neither possible nor actual, i.e. it is not a

presentness, but only *Existence*—the latter being the occasion only of undifferentiated experience. In the second chapter we noticed that *difference* is one of the fundamental modes of understanding (Ch. II, 7D); and since the latter ralates only to Objectivity, in case of experience with respect to Subjectivity, there cannot be a differentiated experience. Hence, an occasion of undifferentiated experience *must* be one of non-otherness—a state, therefore, of non-Objectivity. But, then, what is a state of non-Objectivity? Does this state involve a *complete annihilation* of Objectivity? This we have denied earlier: in experience of Subjectivity what is annihilated is only its character of otherness and not its content (Ch. I, 4A). This content of Objectivity cannot be annihilated simply because the modes of being—Presentness and Existence—are independent (Ch. I, 3). But, on the other hand, the character of otherness of Objectivity can be annihilated because it is relative to consciousness. It is to be noted that the otherness of Objectivity is involved only while the subject is conscious of the latter. It cannot be maintained that just as Objectivity is an *other* with respect to the Subject, the latter is an other with respect to Objectivity; since Subjectivity *qua* consciousness is the only expressing being (Ch. I, 3) capable of acknowledging otherness. Further, Subjectivity *qua* itself can never to be an other to itself (Ch. I, footnote 12): otherness is the character only of Objectivity. So, the otherness of Objectivity can last only during the moments of its confronting otherness. Yet when this character ceases to *be* with respect to Objectivity, at the moments of Existence in experience, it does not mean that Objectivity itself ceases to *be*: after all Objectivity is never reduced to mere nothingness. That is, even at occasions of Existence in experience, Objectivity *qua* its content remains, though not as confronting the Subjectivity *qua* Existence in experience. So, here, we meet with a peculiar situation in which the whole Objectivity *qua* otherness is annihilated.

Now here there is a very delicate point in metaphysics: are we to regard the state of no Objectivity-as-otherness as

the state of nothingness? Further, what is the difference between nothingness, even as the infinite beyond of the world, and Subjectivity *qua* consciousness? Philosophers like Hegel maintain that ultimately there is no difference between pure nothingness and pure Being (=Existence), and some Buddhists reduce both Subjectivity and Objectivity to Nothingness. We maintain that any such view is utterly untenable, simply because a state of nothingness is a state of no-experience and no-understanding while that of Subjectivity and Objectivity is one of experience, and experience and understanding respectively. Hence nothingness cannot be the same as Objectivity or as Subjectivity. But, it may be pointed out that since both nothingness and Subjectivity involve no otherness, how can both be differentiated in the state of undifferentiated experience: are they not therefore identical? This argument may appear to be crucial to our view, but really it is not: the argument overlooks what we have maintained about the being of Subjectivity, namely, Subjectivity exists as expressing. And it is only Subjectivity which so exists. But, then, what *is* nothingness?

D. Before taking up the case of nothingness for further consideration, let us consider again *experience* with respect to Subjectivity. Experience *as* Subjectivity must be a state of infinite freedom. Here there is no otherness to confront the Subject. Accordingly, the Subject and freedom must be one and the same: Subjectivity with no confronting otherness is limitless. In the first chapter (4A) we had have an occasion to observe that the subjective expression of the form "I am happy" exhibits the true nature of Subjectivity, in the sense that here happiness reveals the all-comprehensive limitless identity of Subjectivity. Subjectivity in its pure expression cannot but be all-comprehensive; because, in the absence of Objectivity *as* otherness, in such a state, *only* Subjectivity remains to be apprehended. But, as we have just said above, Objectivity in its content is not annihilated even at this stage. Obviously, the mode of its being *now* is not one of presentness

— for, the latter is always a state of experience or understanding of otherness, and Subjectivity *as* experience is no state of otherness in experience. If so, what is the status of Objectivity *as* content? Objectivity as bereft of its otherness is no more objectivity *qua* itself, the very possibility of its presentness being the presence of otherness. But, Objectivity *qua* pure Objectivity (Ch. I, 3) is something which may *be* without involving otherness. So that, if Objectivity-as-content remains even in the state of Existence, it remains in the capacity of pure Objectivity. But the state of pure Objectivity is nothing more or less than the state of Existence (Ch. I, 4A), and pure Objectivity *qua* the principle of existence is no longer different from Existence, which is Subjectivity. Hence, since in the state of pure Objectivity the status of Objectivity-as-content can no longer be differentiated from the former, there does not remain even the *possibility* of presentness, let alone the actual phenomenon: all that remains is all-pervading Existence. So, Subjectivity *qua* itself is limitless and undifferentiated being, and therefore whatever is beyond and within such a state is Existence. As such, in the state of Existence *nothingness* is as much impossible of any being. It cannot be experienced. But in the state of Subjectivity-as-experience *all* is experience. So there cannot be nothingness here. In the state of *presentness*, on the other hand, whatever is present must have the corresponding understanding, and since nothingness has none, it is not within even Objectivity *qua* otherness. Hence, nothingness has no *sort* of being — it has no status! It is, therefore, just an unintelligible fiction: in the state of presentness it is infinitely beyond — hence remaining unintelligible, and in the state of Existence it vanishes, so that no question concerning it arises. Nothingness, accordingly, is the unintelligible *par excellence*! And what we have been saying of it so far is no less unintelligible.

Finally, pure Objectivity *qua* the principle of existence of objects is expressive of the way the finite passes into the infinite, or in the state of Existence. As we have already seen (Ch. I, 4A), the finitude of Objectivity *qua* otherness is nothing

but its own creation: it is due to the confusion of mind with Subjectivity, the former treating itself as identical with the latter, which is responsible for the situation of otherness. So, Objectivity itself creates and removes its boundaries. When such a boundary is created then the *differentiated* world (of facts) and possibilities (including no-facts) come into being, and consequently the knowledge of finite and presentness. On the other hand, when the boundary is removed, then what we have in knowledge is the undifferentiated infinite. And, since the state of undifferentiated infinitude is one of limitlessness, all the knowledge or experience, or for that matter anything, remains undifferentiated from everything else; so that, every expression in language, of this state, also remains undifferentiated with respect to its meaning. To look for a meaning in a metaphysical statement, therefore, is simply absurd. However, metaphysics, in spite of its being unmeaningful, is an occasion of significant expression in language, though the *how* and *why* of it cannot be explained, nor can it be demonstrated: it can only be *shown*—only those who *see* can understand it.

Such is the fate of Objectivity, and with it that of facts, in metaphysics. The philosophers who claim to know and explain the world hesitate to move ahead when it comes to the abandonment of their favourite dogmas. It is simply regrettable that they are not sufficiently bold to strike at the biased opinions of this scientific age, and face the light of reason, which alone, we think, is supreme in accounting and explaining the world of facts.

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


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