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A STUDY IN
LANGUAGE AND MEANING

(A Critical Examination of Some aspects of Indian Semantics)

BISHNUPADA BHATTACHARYA.

CALCUTTA
PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHERS
1962



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
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First Published in 1962

149 94

B669 S

PRINTED IN INDIA
Set in 12pt. Baskerville type

AND

PUBLISHED BY SRI S. K. BASU OF THE PROGRESSIVE
PUBLISHERS, 37, COLLEGE STREET, CALCUTTA-12
AND PRINTED BY SRI A. N. MUKHERJEE, AT THE
M. I. PRESS, 30, GREY STREET, CALCUTTA-5

P R E F A C E

LANGUAGE has been studied in India both in respect of morphology and of semantics from very ancient times. The relation of language with thought is so intimate and fundamental that scarcely one can be thought without the other. This truth was recognised from a very early date, even in the *Sūtra*-period. Moreover, thought can be made objective and communicable only if it is vested with linguistic symbol. The metaphor will not be unwarranted if it is said that language is thought externalised and objectified. It had been a debated issue whether the relation of language and meaning is constitutional and natural or conventional and accidental. The latter alternative is the conclusion of the Naiyāyikas and the student of Nyāya is too familiar with the arguments that have been propounded in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* in support of the theory and in refutation of the opposite theory. The Mimāṃsists and the Grammarians endorse on the contrary the opposite theory—viz., that language and thought, though not ontologically identical, are logically inseparable. The philosophers of the Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist schools of thought have, however, advocated a theory different from both and there is an appreciable difference in the arguments and in the conclusions which have been sponsored by the Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas themselves. Later on, the relation of language and thought has been studied both analytically and synthetically by the logicians of the Navya-nyāya school with their characteristic thoroughness and precision. Analytically, the unit of language was disco-

vered to be the irreducible minimum of judgment called proposition or sentence. But though the sentence is the irreducible logical structure which can have a theoretical and practical value, it was recognised that the sentence is a synthetic whole made up of constituent terms cemented by a relation. Hence, the logical necessity of the study of terms and their relation.

In the first chapter of the present dissertation the constitution of words, which are the elements of a sentence and function as terms in a proposition, has been studied from the metaphysical point of view. Though the examination of this topic may appear to have little practical significance so far language as the medium of thought is concerned, yet a student of philosophy who will not take for granted the arbitrary concepts of empirical thought as ultimate principles has every reason to be interested in the metaphysical speculations on the ultimate nature and constitution of words that have been expounded by us in the first chapter. In the second and third chapters I have studied the problem—viz., the relation of words and meanings, from the standpoint of the Grammarians, Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas, and I hope that the speculations recorded in them will not fail to interest even a modern mind. It appears to us that so far as the speculative activity of the human mind is concerned it is problematic whether the march of time with the progress of science and its varied applications in the practical field has been able to render the findings of the ancient thinkers of India antiquated and out of date. Without prejudging the issues and without assuming the role of an advocate holding a brief for any party, I may be permitted to observe that the speculations of the ancient thinkers of India on the subject will not fail to stimulate the interest of a modern student who finds it difficult to have access into the origi-

nal writings for their inadequate knowledge of Sanskrit. Sanskrit which has been developed and enriched by the speculation of men of outstanding intellect for thousands of years and from all parts of the Indian sub-continent deserves intensive study at the hands of modern scholars. Though it must be recognised that much has been done by scholars of the world—Europe, America, Japan and India, in modern times, yet without the slightest suggestion of disparagement it may be legitimately asserted that the actual achievement is only a small fragment of what remains to be done. The difficulties of a modern Research Scholar are manifold. Apart from the lack of financial help which makes it impossible for them to have books of their own, the researches of previous scholars have left very little scope for embarking upon subjects of wide general interest. Almost in every field of Indological study the contour has been surveyed and the general features have been mapped out. What now remains is the study of particular problems with all their difficulties. It will not be inexcusable diffidence if a modern student entertains the apprehension that the result of his labour will appear to be much too academic and technical. A Sanskrit scholar who has bestowed years of labour on the acquisition of mastery over the language which is stupendous in its vastness and variety alike can best turn to account his knowledge by trying to make it the universal property of humanity. Inspired by this idea I have endeavoured to represent the thoughts of the master minds of India in a particular field to the best of my ability and light.

In conclusion I may be permitted to draw the attention of the prospective reader to the fourth and fifth chapters that deal with the connotation of words. I may be excused for saying that I have broken new ground here. Of course, the Buddhists' position has been faithfully represen-

ted in the *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*.¹ But my approach has been rather from the standpoint of the student of philosophy of language than of metaphysics. I have also made my study more comparative and accordingly the Naiyāyika standpoint has been given as thorough a treatment as the Buddhists' position together with the position of the Mimāṃsists and the Grammarians. The last two chapters which deal with the problems of syntax and the theories called *Abhihitānvaya-vāda* and *Anvitābhidhāna-vāda* ought to be regarded as original contributions. In Chapter VI I have tried to utilise all the available data having some bearing on the study of the vexed and abstruse problems of syntax, save those featuring in Gangeśa Upādhyāya's *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* and Vyāsa Tīrtha's *Tarka-tāṇḍava*—which I have deliberately eschewed for fear of making the present dissertation too much lengthy. The treatment of the two theories of *Anvitābhidhāna-vāda* and *Abhihitānvaya-vāda* in Dr. Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti's *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar* has been rather scrappy. In Chapter VII I have tried to make them as comprehensive as my resources permitted. Of course, I have dealt with the position of the Mimāṃsists of the Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara schools, the speculations of Gangeśa Upādhyāya and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī with the illuminating disquisition on the subject by Brahmānanda in his commentary on the *Advaita-siddhi* called the *Laghu-candrikā* being left out.

I worked under the guidance of Dr. Satkari Mookerjee M.A., Ph.D., the then Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University, and the subject of my study was suggested to me by him. I had the privilege of studying difficult philosophical texts with him and thus clarifying

¹By Dr. Satkari Mookerjee M. A., Ph. D. (Published by the University of Calcutta, 1935).

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many points in the abstruse dialectics of the ancient Indian thinkers. This dissertation was submitted as a thesis for the Premchand Roychand Studentship in Arts of the University of Calcutta in 1945 and is now being published with a few minor variations. I would be happy if it is able to attract the attention of the scholars and arouse their interest in a comparatively neglected field of Indological research.

Dated, Calcutta,
November 7, 1962.

Bishnupada Bhattacharya.

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CHAPTER ONE

CONSTITUTION OF WORDS : SPHOṬA THEORY OF GRAMMARIANS

BEFORE we proceed to the study of the functions of words, it is but legitimate that we should examine the nature of words themselves. What is the use of having recourse to words and sentences in preference to other means—like the movement of limbs and mimes, for expressing our feelings ? How can words, composed of unmeaning letters as they are, hope to convey any idea at all ? Can individual words be isolated by a process of abstraction from the various sentence-units ? These are vital questions that must be satisfactorily answered, before the study of the functions themselves is seriously taken up.

The development of language is the most striking phenomenon in the history of the civilization of mankind. How inarticulate ejaculations gradually crystallised into articulate word-units is still a mystery to the students of philology. But it is not difficult to imagine that mimes and exclamations yielded place to distinct words and sentences because of the advantage that the latter undoubtedly possess over the former. While ejaculatory sounds and mimes can express only a very limited variety of feelings intended to be conveyed, and that too not unequivocally, the words, if properly used, have the inherent capacity to convey just those ideas that one intends to convey. This question was first broached by Yāska in the introduction to his *Nirukta*, where he has endeavoured

to justify linguistic usage on grounds of expediency and parsimony.¹

The next question is more fundamental and has a very far-reaching philosophic import. A word, if duly analysed, is nothing but a mere juxtaposition of discrete and meaningless sounds,—without any nexus to hold them together and make a significant whole out of the non-significant parts. Our organs of articulation are so constituted that it is beyond our capacity to utter more than one sound-unit at a moment. Thus when we state that “the word *gauḥ* means a particular species of animal” we are simply begging the question and using a language that cannot stand the test of scientific investigation. For, we are presupposing thereby the unitary character of the sound-group *gauḥ*—which is *prima facie* untenable². Thus the claim that the words constitute the most suitable vehicle for the communication of our ideas falls to the ground. Philosophers have tried to evaluate the claims of the rival theories whether it is the constitutive letters, syllables or whole words that possess significance. We therefore propose to embark upon a discussion of the problem as it has been debated among the rival thinkers.

We should note at the very outset that the investigation of the nature of words forms one of the main topics in treatises on *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vyākaraṇa*. The Naiyā-

¹*aṇiyastvācca śabdena saṃjñākaraṇaṃ vyavahārārthaṃ loke—Nirukta*, 1.2. which has been explained by Durga as follows : “..... abhinayā api vyāptimantaḥ pāṇivihārākṣinikocādayaḥ/taireva kārya-siddhir astu iti/...satyam, abhinayā api vyāptimantaḥ/natu aṇiyāṃsaḥ/te mahatā yatnena vyāpnuvanti na ca niḥsandigdham kurvanti/.....” —pp. 49-50 (Bombay Sanskrit Series Edn.)

²Compare : *atha varṇāḥ śabdaśabdena ucyante te ca arthapratipāḍakāś tathā’pi śabdād ityekatvaṃ vibhaktyartha na saṃgacchate/śabdebhyaḥ pratipadyāmahe—iti vyavahāraḥ syāt/—Nyāya-Maṇjarī*, Vol.1, p. 339. (Chowkhamba Edn.).

yikas and Mimāṃsakas are agreed in their denial of the metaphysical reality, called *sphoṭa*, which according to the Grammarians, possesses the capacity for revealing meanings. And yet, their respective view-points differ from each other in conformity with their mutually varying metaphysical doctrines. So we should better deal with the Grammarians' approach towards the real nature of words first, and then examine the criticisms of the Naiyāyikas and Mimāṃsakas levelled against it.

The first distinct reference to the theory of *sphoṭa*, though not in so many words, is to be met with in Yāska's *Nirukta*. Here Yāska refutes the view of Audumbarāyaṇa that the classification of words into four different categories—viz., *nāma*, *ākhyāta*, *upasarga* and *nipāta*, is impossible, as there is no existence of a word as distinct from the sound-units that follow each other in quick succession.¹ Yāska answers the objection by asserting that as words are ubiquitous and eternal there is no difficulty in the way of the above classification.² Here Yāska has adopted the Mimāṃsaka doctrine of ubiquity and permanency of words, which will be explained in detail later on when we come to deal with the Mimāṃsaka attitude towards *sphoṭa*.

The Grammarians contend that the meaning that is comprehended from a particular word is not due to the momentary sound-units that go to its formation, but it is generated by the eternal and indivisible *Word-Essence* (*sphoṭa*) which is alone significant. The letters³ merely

¹Indriyanityaṃ vacanam ity-Audumbarāyaṇaḥ/ tatra catuṣṭvaṃ nopapadyate'yugapadutpannānāṃ vā śabdānāṃ itaretaropadeśaḥ śāstrakṛto yogaś ca—*Nirukta*, 1. 2.

²vyāptimattvāt tu śabdasya—*loc. cit.* Vide Skandaswāmin's comm. on the above text. Vol. I, pp. 16-17. (Edited by Dr. L. Sarup).

³Throughout the discussion the term 'letter' should be taken to mean the 'sound-unit' represented by it.

serve to manifest that eternal *sphoṭa*, just as the particulars serve to manifest the universals that are eternal and ubiquitous. Patañjali has noticed this theory of *sphoṭa* in his gloss on P. I. 1. 69. : *evam tarhi-sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ/ dhvaniḥ śabdagaṇaḥ*.

The opponents might argue : The Vaiyākaraṇa conception of *śabda* as *sphoṭa* which is totally different from the sounds of letters that are perceived is alogical. For, if the letters serve only to manifest the eternal and immutable *sphoṭa*, it might be asked whether they do so severally or conjointly. The first alternative is impossible because in that case the first letter alone would suffice to manifest the *sphoṭa*, and all subsequent letters would be useless repetitions. The second alternative too is untenable inasmuch as an aggregate of the momentary sounds of letters is a fiction. Consequently, the Vaiyākaraṇas themselves cannot be immune from the main difficulties by positing dogmatically the entity of *sphoṭa* that cannot stand critical test.¹

To this the Grammarians' reply would be as follows : The opponents' repudiation of *sphoṭa* on the ground that letters are incapable of manifesting it either severally or conjointly is devoid of reasons. For, the very first letter itself manifests the immutable sound-unit. Nor can it be argued that the remaining letters would be utterly redundant thereby. For, they help to make the apprehension of the sound-unit more explicit and vivid, just as repeated observation of a precious stone helps the connoisseurs in grasping thoroughly its real essence.² The Grammarians,

¹nanu sphoṭavyaktau api idānīm kva gatāste varṇānām vyastasamastādi-vikalpāḥ ? āha ca Bhaṭṭaḥ—“yasyānavayavaḥ sphoṭo vyajyate varṇabuddhibhiḥ/ so'pi paryanuyogena naikenāpi vimucyate/” -iti/—NM. Vol. I, p. 339.

²Cp. “sāmastyena tu tadvyaktiḥ sarvānte maṇitattvavat”—*Vākya-paṭīya*. Vide also NM. Vol. I, p. 340.

moreover, contend that though the existence of *sphoṭa* is commonly established by Inference (*anumāna*), yet it is capable of being cognised through Perception (*pratyakṣa*) as well. We say that the word ‘cow’ means a particular species of animal. This unity of the word ‘cow’ corresponding to the unity of the meaning is obviously felt and no sophistry can explain it away. It is not plausible to argue that this singular and unitary conception is illusory as it is in reality the perception of more than one letter-unit, just as the perception of ‘forest’ as a singular concept is illusory, the objects of perception in this case being the ‘trees’ that make the forest. Had it been an illusion it would have been supplanted by a subsequent valid cognition. But as the unity of the perceptual cognition is never overridden or contradicted by any subsequent cognition, it would not be reasonable to repudiate its validity.¹

The Mimāṃsakas, however, do not favour the *sphoṭa*-theory of the Grammarians. According to them there is no separate entity called *sphoṭa*—indivisible and immutable, apart from the sound-units that are immediately perceived. Śabara in his *Bhāṣya* on *JS*. I.1.1.5. cites the view of Upavarṣa—an ancient Mimāṃsaka, to the effect that the letters alone constitute the word.² In order to understand the position of the Mimāṃsakas *vis-à-vis* that of the Grammarians, we must have to take note of their peculiar tenets regarding the nature of sound. Sound, according to the Mimāṃsakas, is not a momentary phenomenon, as the Naiyāyikas hold. It is eternal and omni-

¹*Nyāya-mañjarī*, Vol. I, pp. 340-41.

²*Op. cit.* Vol. I. p. 45. (ĀSS. Edn.). Śaṅkarācārya in his *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* on *BS*. I. 3. 28 has referred to Upavarṣa’s view : “varṇā eva tu śabdaḥ-iti Bhagavān Upavarṣaḥ”—p. 325. (NSP. Edn. with *Bhāmātī* and *Kalpataru*).

present. Nor it is a 'quality' inhering in Ether (*ākāśa*).¹ It is in reality a substance, just as Earth and Water are substances. In the light of these fundamental differences in respective doctrines, we must approach to study the *sphoṭa*-theory advanced by the Grammarians from the Mimāṃsaka viewpoint.

Thus the sounds conveyed by letters being permanent and omnipresent an aggregate is not impossible, a contingency that forced the Grammarians to posit the entity of *sphoṭa*. But if we probe somewhat deeper we would find that the difficulty is not altogether absent even though the Mimāṃsaka viewpoint be accepted. For, all the sound-units of individual letters being equally omnipresent and eternal, it would be impossible to decide which of them would form a group to convey a particular concept. And in the absence of any crucial test in favour of one group as against another no conceptual cognition would be possible.² Moreover, the letters themselves cannot be taken to have the power to signify any definite idea. Had it been so, both *nadī* and *dīna* would have conveyed the same idea, as the *śāme* letters enter into their formation. If, however, to avoid this difficulty it is argued that the letters as arranged in a particular sequence are capable of conveying a definite concept and any change in that sequence would entail a corresponding change in the idea, the position is not improved any the least thereby.³

¹Vide : śrotamātrendriyagrāhyaḥ śabdaḥ śabdatvajātīmān/ dra-
vyaṃ sarvagato nityaḥ Kumārīlamate mataḥ/viyadguṇatvaṃ śab-
dasya kecid ūcur maṇiṣiṇaḥ/pratyakṣādivirodhāt tad Bhaṭṭapādair
upekṣitam/—Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's *Mānameyodaya*.

²athāpi Mimāṃśakamatena nityaḥ śabda iṣyate, tatrāpi sattayā
yaugapadyasya sakalavarṇasādhāraṇatvāt kena varṇasamudāyena
ko'rthaḥ pratyāyyeteti nāvadhāryate—*NM.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 337.

³Cp. Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on *BS.* 1. 3. 28. (p. 330). Vide : "yāvanto

For, it is not possible to attribute any sequence, either in space or in time, of sound-units that are eternal and omnipresent—as the Mimāṃsakas would have us believe. The Mimāṃsakas might meet this objection by stating that though sounds of letters *per se* are omnipresent and eternal, they must have to be manifested through the contact of organs of articulation if they are to form themselves into what we call *a word* and express a definite idea. Consequently those letters alone would be said to constitute a word which are actually uttered. The contention that spatio-temporal sequence is inconceivable with regard to ubiquitous and eternal sounds is similarly based on an erroneous conception of the real viewpoint of the Mimāṃsakas. For, though the letters themselves are eternal and omnipresent, their manifestation is momentary. Thus temporal sequence is certainly conceivable. But one might argue: The manifestation of individual letters being thus transitory in character, the objections that originally applied to momentary letters would be *mutatis mutandis* applicable in this case too. For, it might be pertinently asked whether the manifested sounds reveal the sense severally or conjointly. The Mimāṃsakas can accept neither of these alternatives for reasons that led the Grammarians to the conception of *sphoṭa*. To this the Mimāṃsakas would reply: Though the manifestations are momentary, yet each of them leaves behind an impression, which being aroused after the manifestation of the last letter of a particular word, helps us in recollecting all the sound-units simultaneously in just the very sequence as they were originally manifested, and thus these sounds as finally recollected would signify the particular idea.¹ Consequently the apprehension of the oppo-

yādṛśā ye ca yadarthapratipādanē/ varṇāḥ prajñātasāmarthyās te tathaivāvabodhakāḥ” —*Śloka-vārttika* : *Sphoṭavāda*. v. 69.

¹athavā kramopalabdheṣvapi varṇeṣu mānasam anuvyavasāya-

nents, viz., that different words having the same constituent sound-units would not be distinguishable from each other is altogether groundless inasmuch as the final recollection would be fully cognizant of the sequence as well. There is still another difficulty to be overcome before the Mimāṃsakas can hope to carry conviction to the opponents. The latter might argue : Granted that the manifestations leave behind them the impressions that give rise to the final recollection of the letters, is it not logical that the recollections of individual letters should be in the same sequence in which they were manifested instead of simultaneously? So what is gained by postulating one total recollection based on synthetic impression? The Mimāṃsakas would assert that the successive individual impressions in combination with the last impression do produce one synthetic impression which ultimately causes the simultaneous recollection of the letters which reveal the particular meaning.¹ Now the Grammarians might retort : The process contemplated by the Mimāṃsakas in which a series of letters is supposed to convey a meaning is certainly tortuous as contrasted with the theory of *sphoṭa*. The postulation of *sphoṭa* as a *tertium quid* is a much simpler way for accounting for our verbal cognitions, as it does not assume illogically that impressions can produce impressions. But the Mimāṃsakas may urge : The Grammarians' theory of *sphoṭa* is much more tortuous and cumbersome than what it appears to be at first sight. For, while we have assumed merely that primary impressions them-

rūpam akhilavarṇaviśayaṃ saṃkalanājñānaṃ yad utpadyate tad arthapratyāyanāṅgaṃ bhaviṣyati/...sa cāyaṃ saṃkalanāpratyayaḥ smaryamānānubhūyamāna-prāktanāntyavarṇa-viśayatayā citrarūpā upeyate/yadi vā'ntyavarṇe'pi tirohite bhavan asadvarṇagocara eva na citrākārah so'rthapratītihetur eka eveti niravakāśā vyastasaṃstāvikaḥ pāḥ/—*NM. loc. cit.*

¹*Nyāya-Maṇjarī*, Vol. 1. p. 347.

selves are capable of producing further impressions, the Grammarians posit, in addition to the primary impressions that are common to both the theories, a host of unwarranted facts—viz., the entity of *sphoṭa*, its distinction from constituent letters, its indivisibility and so on.¹ But, after all has been said and done, one important question still remains to be answered—viz., what is the advantage of recognising the permanency of sound-units if their manifestation is still regarded as transitory? To understand the the Mīmāṃsaka standpoint we must have to study their outlook in respect of the Vedas. The Vedas, the Mīmāṃsakas assert, are not the handiwork of a personal omnipotent God as the Naiyāyikas contend. They are eternal and self-existent. Were it not the case, the Vedas could not possess that validity which is held to attach to them. They would have become circumscribed temporally and spatially in the sense of having a beginning just as all poetic works have. They could not have been the repository of eternal and self-evident Truths, being the product of a personal God who is as susceptible to fallibility as all mortals are known to be, and there would be an end to all talks of self-authoritativeness that is attributed to the Vedas. To avoid this contingency the Mīmāṃsakas postulate the eternity of the sounds that constitute the Vedic *mantras*. The Vedic *mantras* being eternal and self-existent independently of any personal God, no suspicion as to their fallibility can at all arise.² The words composed of eternal sounds are eternal as are the sentences made

¹Cp. “sadbhāva-vyatirekau tu tathā’vayavavarjanam/tavādhikam bhavet tasmād yatno’sāvarthabuddhiṣu”—*ŚV. Sphoṭavāda*. v. 94. Vide also *NM*. Vol. 1. p. 347.

²tad evaṃ sarvapramāṇānām svataḥ prāmāṇye siddhe samānanyāyatayā śabdasyāpi tathaiva prāmāṇyam bhavati...puruṣadoṣānu-praveśakāritaḥ kvaciddhi viplavaḥ/taduktam-“śabde doṣodbhavas tāvad vaktradhīna iti sthitiḥ”—(*ŚV.*)/...vede tu praṇetuḥ puruṣasyā-

of eternal words. Thus, the Veda in its entirety is co-existent with the ideas that are eternally present.

But the Naiyāyikas do not acquiesce with the Mīmāṃsakas in regarding the Vedas as self-subsistent. They uphold with great vigour the existence of a personal God who is the creator of the Universe as also of the Vedas that derive their validity from the infallibility and omniscience of the Creator. Consequently the Vedas being thus created, it cannot be reasonably maintained that the words and letters constituting them are self-existent and eternal, independently of that omnipotent God the Creator.¹ But if we leave this fundamental difference of metaphysical doctrines out of account, there is very little difference between the respective approaches of the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas towards the *sphoṭa*-theory of the Grammarians. The Naiyāyikas too regard the letters themselves, as recollected through the instrumentality of the impressions, to be expressive of particular ideas. We have noted above that the Grammarians cite in favour of their theory the usage—viz., that ‘a particular word signifies a particular sense.’ Such a usage, they maintain, can be justified only if it refers to the unitary and indivisible Word-Essence. But if it refers to the discrete letters as such, it must be pronounced as erroneous. To this the Naiyāyikas reply: True,

bhāvāt doṣaśaṃkaiva na pravartate, vaktradhīnatvād doṣāṇām/ na ca bādhakapratyayo’dya yāvat vedārthe kasyacit utpanna iti nirapavādaṃ vedaprāmāṇyaṃ/āha ca—“tatrāpavādanirmuktir vaktrabhāvāt-laghīyaśi/vede tenāpramāṇatvaṃ na śaṅkāṃ adhigacchati”—iti—*NM.* Vol. I, p. 154.

¹Lucyate—Mīmāṃsakā yaśaḥ pivantu, payo vā pivantu, buddhi-jādyāpanayanārthaṃ brāhmīghṛtaṃ vā pivantu, vedastu puruṣapra-ṇīta eva, nātra bhrāntiḥ/—

yathā ghaṭādisaṃsthānād bhinnam apyacalādiṣu/
saṃsthānaṃ kartṛmat siddhaṃ vede’pi racanā tathā//

—*NM.* Vol. I. p. 216. *Vide also ibid.* p. 229.

in popular usage the singular number is invariably used. But it would not be a sound method of ratiocination to postulate the entity of an indivisible *sphoṭa* to make it conform with the popular usage which not infrequently runs counter to the real nature of things.¹ But if in despite of this the opponents insist strongly on a satisfactory explanation of the popular usage, the Naiyāyikas are ready with one. They would argue that the letters themselves are many, yet the final recollection, cognizant of the individual letters as described above, is one and indivisible, and the unity of this final recollection is sufficient to account for the unity that is presupposed in the popular usage cited above.² What more, the Naiyāyikas turn the table against the Grammarians themselves and argue that the postulation of *sphoṭa* cannot save them from the charge that was brought against the Naiyāyikas and Mimāṃsakas. For though by positing *sphoṭa* the Grammarians can satisfactorily explain the unity, they are on the other hand unable to defend the use of the term *śabda*. The term *śabda* denotes the audible sounds and not *sphoṭa* which is capable of being cognised through *mental perception* alone.³ Thus the Grammarians' conception of *pada-sphoṭa* as an immutable entity is not based on sound logic.

We have thus far discussed the problem as to how discrete letters formed into particular groups called 'words' can express distinct ideas. We are now in a position to

¹yadapyabhāṇi—śabdād arthaṃ pratipadyāmahe iti vyavahāraḥ sphoṭapakṣasākṣitām evāvalambate....varṇaśabdavādinām anupapanno'yaṃ vyavahāraḥ śabdād arthaṃ pratipadyāmahe-iti/ucyate—kim anena upapannenānupapannena vā kṛtyam/yadyayam upapadyate tataḥ kim, athāpi nopapadyate tataḥ kim/na hi lokavyapadeśanibandhanā vastusthitir bhavati/—*NM*. Vol. I. pp. 349-50.

²*ibid.* p. 350.

³kiñca sphoṭapakṣe sutarām anupapanno'yaṃ vyapadeśaḥ śabdād-iti/ prātipadikasyārthasyābhāvāt/nahi varṇavat sphoṭe śabda-śabda-

deal with the next issue which is equally important—viz., whether it is logical to isolate individual words from a sentence which alone conveys a complete sense-unit. This also is an extremely controversial topic, and here too the Grammarians' view differs from that of the Mimāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas as on the issue of *pada-sphoṭa*.

The Grammarians argue that in our day to day conversation we invariably use a sentence to communicate our ideas to others. Words are rarely, or never, seen to be used singly in our discourse. So it is but proper to maintain that the whole sentence taken as one single unit is expressive of the particular sense-unit, which too is likewise indivisible. If, on the other hand, the sentence be conceived as being composed of individual words, the judgmental thought would never arise. For, it might be asked whether the words express the final relational thought severally or conjointly. The first alternative is *prima facie* impossible. The second too is not logically sound. For, the words being momentary and discrete, as were the letters constituting a word, their collection becomes a figment. Consequently, we must have to abandon the theory that words themselves signify the relational thought that comes into being as soon as a sentence is heard. There is still another argument, the Grammarians contend, in favour of the sentence being reckoned as an indivisible unit as the word composed of isolated letters was taken to be in the case of *pada-sphoṭa*. For, when the expression *hare'va* is heard the resultant relational thought is cognised distinctly even though one fails due to ignorance of the laws of euphonic combination to recognise discriminatingly the two words *hare* and *ava*.¹ Thus we

tvam prayuñjāno dṛśyate vyavahartṛjanah/arthapratipattihetutvaṃ
śabda-lakṣaṇam asādhū/dhūmādibhir vyabhicārāt/—*NM. loc. cit.*

¹Cp. 'hare'vetyādi dṛṣṭvā ca vākyasphoṭaṃ viniścinu'—*Vaiyākaraṇa-*

are perforce led to the conclusion that a sentence is as much an indivisible unit as a word. The letters that constitute a sentence only help in the manifestation of that eternal *sphoṭa*, which in this case is styled as *vākya-sphoṭa*, and it is the latter that conveys the final relational thought, just as in the case of an unrelated concept it was the *pada-sphoṭa* alone that was really expressive and not the letters that merely revealed it. Consequently, it is erroneous to split up a sentence into so many word-units and to classify the latter into four or five different parts of speech—viz., *nāma*, *ākhyāta*, *upasarga*, *nīpāta* and *karmaprayacanīya*, as is commonly done. The Grammarians repudiate such a procedure in strong terms because it is logically unreal.¹ Now it might be argued that if, as the Grammarians maintain, the *vākya-sphoṭa* alone be really expressive, how can they be justified in positing the *pada-sphoṭa* as a separate entity, every act of communication being judgmental in their opinion? To this the Grammarians would assert: The *pada-sphoṭa* has been noticed by us not because of its reality. It is undoubtedly a fiction inasmuch as there is no separate existence of words apart from the sentences of which they are integral parts, just as it is a mistake to split up words into so many letters or to analyse them into roots and suffixes.² All this is the outcome of nescience which obscures the true vision and precludes all possibility of getting a glimpse of the underlying reality. We analyse

bhūṣaṇa-kārikā, which has been explained by Koṇḍabhaṭṭa in the *vr̥tti* as follows : atra ādinā viṣṇo'va ityādi gr̥hyate/atra padayoḥ spaṣṭam ajñāne'pi samudāyavyutpattiyabodhād āvaśyikaiva samudāyaśaktir iti bhāvaḥ—p. 240. (Bombay Sanskrit Series Edn.)

¹“dvidhā kaiścit padaṃ bhinnam caturdhā pañcadhā'pi vā/ apoddhṛtyaiva vākyebhyaḥ prakṛti-pratyayādivat/”

²“pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā na ca/ vākyāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kaścana/”

—VB. *Kārikā*. 66.

sentences into different parts of speech, and the latter again into roots and suffixes because it would have been impossible to know severally the relations that subsist between the numerous propositions on the one hand and the corresponding judgmental thoughts expressed by them on the other.¹ By analysing the propositions into distinct terms it becomes easy to grasp the relations subsisting between the latter and the particular concepts, linguistic usages being facilitated thereby. So *pada-sphoṭa* is posited not as *the* ultimate reality, but as a step forward along the path leading to the realisation of the latter, which is *Sabda-brahman*. The conception of *pada-sphoṭa*, though as unreal as a snake-in-the-rope, is helpful inasmuch as it disciplines and orients our mind and enables it consequently to realise the *vākya-sphoṭa* which is more real in comparison with *pada-sphoṭa*.² But from the standpoint of transcendental reality even a sentence is as much unreal and illusory as a word, since both refer to the world of appearance. Every act of communication is false as it presupposes the reality of the phenomenal world, which is illusory and *non est* being hypostatized by the mind labouring under the influence of nescience. The ultimate truth according to the Grammarians is *Śabda-brahman*, the *sphoṭa par excellence*, out of which all the cognizable phenomena evolve and in which they are finally merged. The articulate sounds that manifest the immutable *pada-sphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa* are similarly unreal, being evolutes of *Śabda-brahman*, which is

¹tatra prativākye samketagrahaṇāsambhavāt tadanvākhyānasya laghūpāyena aśakyatvācca kalpanayā padāni pravibhajya pade prakṛti-pratyaya-bhāga-kalpanena-kalpitābhyām anvaya-vyatirekābhyām tattad-arthavibhāgaṃ śāstramātraviśayaṃ parikalpayanti smācāryāḥ —Nāgōji Bhaṭṭa's *Vaiyākaraṇa-Siddhānta-Manjūṣā*, pp. 5-6. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Edn.)

²atra vākyaṛthasya āpekṣikaṃ satyatvaṃ draṣṭavyam/sarvavyavahārasya asadviśayatvāt—*VSM.*, p. 413. *Vide* also *NM.*, Vol. I. p. 343.

incapable of being revealed by any determinate instrument of knowledge, and can be realised in the mood of ecstasy only through indeterminate perception by virtue of the highest mental discipline. When that supra-mundane reality is comprehended, the entire phenomenal universe ceases to be, being absorbed in the substratum out of which it sprang up, in the same way as an illusory snake superimposed on a piece of rope loses its entity as soon as the rope, the substratum of the illusion, is cognised in its intrinsic aspect *quâ* rope. But on this side of the transcendental plane when we are under the spell of nescience, the physical universe alone seems to be real, and all our linguistic usages couched in the form of sentence-units must be taken to be pragmatically valid. Thus from the standpoint of mundane reality it is the *vākya-sphoṭa* that is the ultimate Truth, the entity of *pada-sphoṭa* being noticed solely with a view to leading to the realisation of the former, though from the viewpoint of transcendental reality both of them are equally false and unreal.¹

The Naiyāyikas, as has been observed before, criticises the above view of the Grammarians. They do not repudiate the reality of words even though they be isolated from a sentence, and explain the origin of *verbal knowledge* (*śabda-bodha*) arising out of a sentence on lines indicated above in connection with the discussion about the nature of words. Just as in the case of single words the cognition of the last letter being reinforced by the simultaneous recollection of the preceding ones conveys the particular concept, so also with regard to a sentence the cognition of the final letter of the concluding word in conjunction

¹iha tu etāvataiva punaḥ prayojanam/varṇapadapūrvako vyavahāro na bhavātīti vākyena loke vyavahārāt, tasya cāvayavāvayavi-vyavasthānupapattir nirvibhāgam eva tad vācakam, nirvibhāgaśca tasya vācyo'rtha-iti/...avidyāvastheyam varttate - tatreyam vartanī

with the collective recollection of the preceding words expresses the relational thought-unit that follows in its wake. What more, the substitution of one word by another brings about a corresponding change in the final relational thought, which is a composite of the different concepts. So by applying the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference (*anvaya-vyatireka*.) it is easy to discover that words are individually significant.¹ As for the claim of the grammarians that *śabda-brahman*, that inarticulate *sphoṭa* in the form of internal consciousness, is the ultimate reality out of which evolves the entire phenomenal universe—the Naiyāyikas regard it as fantastic in the extreme, there being no logic to substantiate it. An account of that doctrine together with the criticism from the Naiyāyika standpoint would be elaborately noticed in a later section when we come to discuss the relation between the words and their meanings.

The Mīmāṃsakas too fall in line with the Naiyāyikas in confuting the doctrine of *vākya-sphoṭa*. They cannot, consistently with the canons of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* relating to the application of *mantras* in rituals, deny the reality of individual words independently of the sentences of which they are members. If the words be regarded as utterly non-significant, the aphorism laying down such operations as *ūha*, *tantra*, *prasāṅga* etc. relating to particular words would become absolutely meaningless and lose all their scope.²

yathādrśyamānaivāstu/ vidyāyām sarvam evedam asāram-iti padena varṇena vā vyavahārābhāvāt tasya kevalasyāprayogāt tatsvarūpam asyām api daśāyām na vāstavam iṣyate-iti/—*NM*. Vol. I. p. 344.

¹ataśca sāvayavau vākya-vākyārthau padopajanāpāyābhyaṃ tadartho'pajanāpāyadarśanāt/...yo'rtho yaṃ śabdān anugacchati sa tasyārtha ityavasīyate/ tat katham asatyā bhāgāḥ/—*NM*. Vol. I. p. 354.

²nanu varṇānām tadatiriktasphoṭasya vārthapratyāyakatvāmśe prakṛtautpāttikasambandhādhāratvāmśe vā tulyatayā prayatnapurāḥ-

The Vaiyākaraṇas, however, might meet this charge by asserting that it is with a view to upholding the validity of such operations taught in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* that they too have been forced to accord a limited reality to the *pada-sphoṭa*, as also to the sense expressed by it.¹ But it is to be noted in this connection that the celebrated Mīmāṃsaka Maṇḍana Miśra, who is known to be a direct disciple of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, upholds enthusiastically the reality of *sphoṭa* as a metaphysical entity confuting the Bhāṭṭa thesis to the contrary. He is a fervent supporter of the Vaiyākaraṇa doctrine and an uncompromising critic of the Bhāṭṭa viewpoint. In one of the introductory verses of his *Sphoṭa-siddhi*, a critique of the *sphoṭa*-theory of the Grammarians in all its ramifications, Maṇḍana Miśra stigmatises the opponents of the *sphoṭa*-theory of the Grammarians, of whom Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, his preceptor, is perhaps the most renowned precursor, as 'lacking wisdom' (*durvidagdha*) in respect of the issue under discussion—too strong an expression to be used by a disciple with reference to his erstwhile preceptor.²

Bhāmaha in his *Kāvyaḷamkāra*, again, has strongly attacked the *sphoṭa*-theory in his own way. He discards

saram sphoṭapratīṣedho nirarthaka iti cet na/ yataḥ sphoṭapakṣe hī niravayavaṃ vākyam niravayavasya vākyārthasya vācakam, avayavāstu padātmakā varṇātmakāśca mṛṣābhūtā itīṣyante/ tataśca pada-tadavayavāśritasya ūhāder mahāvākyāvayavāvāntara-vākyārtha-prayājādyāśritasya prasaṅga-tantrādeś ca uttaratra vicāryamāṇasya mṛṣātvam syāt/ atas tatsatyatā-siddhyartham sphoṭanirākaraṇam-iti na niṣphalam/—*Prabhā* on *Śabara-Bhāṣya* on *JŚ. I. 1. 5*.

¹Vide *VSM*. p. 6 and Durbalācārya's *Kuñcikā* thereon. Also *ibid.* pp. 403. ff.

²Vide : *durvidagdhair avakṣipte darśane pada-darśinām/ yathāgamaṃ yathāprajñam nyāyaleśo nidarśyate/—Sphoṭa-siddhi: Kārikā 2*. Compare also the comm. *Gopālikā* of Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara on the above verse. *Ibid.* p. 8. (Madras University Edition, 1931).

the *sphoṭa*-theory on the basis of the Buddhistic tenet that repudiates the reality of any integral whole apart from the parts composing it. In his view, the integrity and entitative distinctness of a particular word like 'cow' consist in the component letters, or rather sounds themselves, as arranged in a particular sequence and nothing more. There is no necessity of postulating the reality of a *tertium quid*, a metaphysical entity called *sphoṭa*, eternal and transcendental. As Bhāmaha sarcastically observes: "Our salutations to those learned theorists (viz. the Grammarians) who alone constitute the sole authority as to the ascertainment of this truth."¹

¹Cp. *Kāvyaḷamkāra*, VI. 8-15.

CHAPTER TWO

THE RELATION OF WORDS WITH THEIR MEANINGS : THE GRAMMARIANS' VIEW-POINT

IN the preceding section we noted *en passant* the Vaiyākaraṇa claim that the ideas signified by words are nothing but evolutes of *śabda-brahman*, the Ultimate Reality. They contend that even our minutest psychical process is inextricably bound up with the cognition of the word expressive thereof. Whenever we have to refer to a particular cognition we characterise it invariably by qualifying it with the corresponding word. We say: 'Cow' is the form of the cognition (*gaur-iti jñānam*). So too is the case with the meaning connoted by a particular word. Here again the word and its meaning are completely identified in our usage.¹ We say: *This is 'cow'* (*gaur ayam*). Here the *substance* 'cow' as referred to by the demonstrative pronoun *this*, has been identified with the word-unit *cow*. Identification of words with *qualities* and *actions* is also noticeable in instances like—*ayam varṇaḥ śuklaḥ, ayam calaḥ*. This identity of *śabda* on the one hand with the *cognition* and its *content* on the other, as also the constant association of cognitions with *śabda* as the invariable determinant, constitute the basis on which the Grammarians' thesis of *śabda* being the ultimate and all-pervading reality is grounded. This also

¹gaurityeṣa hi nirdeśo vācya-tadbuddhi-vācinām/ kastvayā drṣṭo'rtha iti prṣṭo gaur-iti, kīdṛśaṃ te jñānam utpannaṃ gaur-iti, kīdṛśaṃ śabdaṃ prayuktavān asi—gaur-iti/—NM. Vol. II. p. 100.

explains Patañjali's dissertation in the *Paspaśā* which opens with the interrogation: *atha gaur-ityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ*. For, the word *gauḥ* is identified as much with the substance 'cow' as with its attributes, viz. qualities and actions, of which it is a mere collocation, as Patañjali along with the author of the gloss on the *Yoga-sūtra* hold in common. This mutual identification leads to confusion of words and their meanings, and it is with a view to solving this tangle that Patañjali launches on a discussion about the nature of *śabda* in the introductory section of his *Mahābhāṣya*.¹ Both these contentions—viz. the ultimate reality of *śabda* (*śabdādvaita-vāda*) which is the substratum of the world of appearance, and the mutual identity of *śabda* and *artha* (*śabdādhyāsa-vāda*), that constitute the key-stone of the Grammarians' system of metaphysics, have elaborately been controverted by the rival schools of thought. We propose to record below the dialectics of this rival school of metaphysics in some detail.

Let us first take up the question of *śabdādvaita-vāda*. To understand the Vaiyākaraṇa position fully we must know something about the generally accepted views regarding the nature of our cognitions. Cognitions are usually classified into two broad divisions—viz. determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*). Our perceptual knowledge too can be classed under either of these two heads—according as it is cognizant of an object as characterised by a *universal*, a *quality*, an *action*, a *name*, or an object as totally divorced from any such determinant, in the latter case it being equivalent to what is called sensation by western writers on psychology. Of these two types of

¹sarvatra śabdabhānam ityayam arthaḥ—'atha gaur-ityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ'—ityanenāpi sūcitaḥ.../ śabdārthayor avibhāgādeva paspaśāyām 'atha gaur ityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ'—iti praśnaḥ/ kiñca tatpraghaṭṭake jātādīnām śabdatvam āśaṅkitam tadvivikta-śabdatattvājñānāt/ na

perception the Buddhists regard the indeterminate one as alone valid, the determinate perception being invalid based as it is on the above-mentioned determinants that are purely subjective constructions (*kalpanā*) without any objective reality to correspond with.¹ The Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas however uphold the validity of both. But the Grammarians differ from both these views inasmuch as, according to them, it is the determinate perception that is the only possible type of perceptual cognition. They not only deny all validity of the indeterminate perception, but they argue that it is not at all conceivable and must be condemned as a chimera. For, in every cognition, whether it be perception or otherwise, the object is comprehended together with the term expressive thereof. We cannot conceive of anything without being at the same time aware of the *nomenclature* that is associated with it. Thus every act of our knowledge is relational, its content being invariably determined by a *name*. If the name is extracted from the form of cognition, it ceases to be a cognition as it lacks illumination *per se* and consequently is as much inert as a jar made of clay. It is the name that illu-

caivam api guṇādīnāṃ gośabdatvāśaṅkā katham, tena śabdena teṣāṃ tādātmyābhāvāt—iti vācyam/ nirantaratvarūpāyutasiddhatvavad-avayaviśeṣānugata - sāmānyaviśeṣarūpa-guṇasamūhasyaiva dravya-tvāt/ “striyām”—iti sūtre ‘dravye ca bhavataḥ kaḥ sampratyaayaḥ ? guṇasamudāyo dravyam’ -iti Bhāṣyāt/ ‘kaḥ ca prati avayavo guṇaḥ ? samudāyaṃ prati’- iti “saṃkhyāyā avayava”- iti Pātañjala-Bhāṣyācca —VSM. p. 365.

¹tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ yaj-jñānam artharūpādaū nāma-jātyādi-kalpanā-rahitam—Dinnāga’s *Nyāya-praveśa*, p. 7. (GOS. Edn.). Tatra nāma-kalpanā yathā dīṭha-iti/ jātikalpanā yathā gaur iti/ ādiśabdena guṇa-kriyā-dravya-parigrahaḥ/ tatra guṇakalpanā śukla-iti/ kriyā-kalpanā pācaka iti/ dravya-kalpanā dandīti/ ābhiḥ kalpanā-bhī rahitaṃ śabda-rahitaṃ svalakṣaṇahetutvāt/ uktaṃ ca—na hyarthe śabdāḥ santi, tadātmāno vā, yena tasmin pratibhāsamāne te’pi prati-bhāserann-ityādi—Haribhadra-sūri’s comm. thereon. *Op. cit.* p. 35.

mines our psychical processes, just as according to the Vedāntist viewpoint it is the *brahman* that illumines the inert objects of knowledge.¹

Now it might be argued that the Vaiyākaraṇ view that all forms of our cognition are of necessity interpenetrated by *names* is a dogmatic assertion. The cognition of a new-born child cannot but be indeterminate in nature, as there is no possibility of its being determined by a *name*. The child being totally ignorant of the conventional relation (*saṃketa*) subsisting between the object of cognition—say, a ‘cow’, and the term expressive thereof—viz. *gauḥ*, cannot be aware of the term when the cow is perceived or recollected.² So we must have to reckon indeterminate perception too as a form of valid knowledge. The Grammarians, however, would not be hood-winked by such sophistry. They contend that the perceptual cognition of a newborn child even cannot but be determinate, though it must be conceded that in this case the awareness of the *term* as a determinant is not so vivid and distinct as in the case of the cognition of a grown up man. The *term* as a determinant is still there—howsoever unmanifest and inarticulate it might be. Though the child has no knowledge of the relation between the word and its meaning in his birth, yet the possibility of its being invested with an impression of the pre-natal knowledge of the *relation* cannot be ruled out³. Thus it must be admitted

¹Cp. “na so’sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte/ anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāṣate/” -*Vākya-pāṇīya*, I. 114. Also : “vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī/ na prakāśam prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī/”—*ibid* I. 125. *Vide* also *NM*. Vol. II. p. 99.

²“asti hyālocana-jñānaṃ prathamam nirvikalpakaṃ/ bāla-mūkādivijñānasadṛśam śuddhavastujam/”—*SV*.

³yadi tūcyate-bālānām tiraścām cā’vikalpakaḥ pratyayaḥ vyavahāraś ca-iti—tanna/ teṣām api sūkṣma-vāg-upapatteḥ/ tredhā hi vā-

that the word is the constant determinant of our cognitions and it cannot be dissociated from the latter without at the same time destroying their very essence.

It is but a step from the above doctrine to the theory of *śabda* being the Ultimate Reality, the material cause of all this phenomenal universe, which is but an evolute of *śabda-brahman*, just as according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers the universe is the outcome of a gradual process of evolution of the primordial matter (*pradhāna*).¹ As the Grammarians argue : Since every object of our cognition is comprehended alongwith its concomitant word-element, therefore the latter must be regarded as one of the constitutive elements of the former, just as 'clay' is regarded as the sole material cause of all earthly substances, inasmuch as the cognition of clay is common to all perceptions of objects that are known to be products of clay—like the

caṃ vibhajante- vaikhari, madhyamā, sūkṣmā ceti/ yathoktam—
“śabdabrahmaiva teṣāṃ hi pariṇāmi pradhānavat/vaikhari-madhyamā-
sūkṣmā-vāgavasthā-vibhedataḥ/”—iti/ kiṃ punar bālānāṃ sūkṣma-śab-
da-sadbhāve pramāṇam ? pratyayatvam eva/ pratyayā hi te katham
aśabdā bhaviṣyanti, asmadādipratyayavad eva/ katham avyutpannā
bālāḥ śabdenā'rthān yojayantīti cet, na/ prāgbhavīya-śabdavāsanā-
vaśād upapatteḥ/ asti hi teṣāṃ bhavāntariya-śabdavāsanā/ sā'dṛṣṭa-
vaśād abhividyaktā satī śabdasmarāṇam upakalpayati/ tataḥ sūkṣma-
śabda-sambhinnaṃ artham bālo'pi pratipadyate/—Sucarita Miśra's
Kāśikā on *ŚV*. Pt. I. p. 248. (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series Edn.).

¹Cp. “śabdabrahmaiva teṣāṃ hi pariṇāmi pradhānavat/ vaikhari-
madhyamā-sūkṣmā-vāgavasthā-vibhedataḥ/”—cited anonymously by
Sucarita Miśra in his *Kāśikā* (vide *supra*) as also by Rṣiputra Para-
meśvara in his comm. *Gopālikā* on Maṇḍana's *Sphoṭa-siddhi*, p. 6. Vide
also : “śabdasya pariṇāmo'yam ityāmnāyavidō viduḥ/ chandobhya
eva prathamam etad viśvaṃ vyavartata/”—yathaivānye kārya-kāraṇa-
bhāva-mātram ācakṣāṇaḥ kāryeṣu kāraṇa-dharma-samanvayaṃ dṛṣtvā
vyāvṛtta-bhedaṃ sūkṣmam asaṃvedyaṃ sarva-vikāra-śaktyanugataṃ
pratyastamita-vyaktiśaktirūpam aṇugrāmaṃ pradhānaśaktisamūham
avidyā-kāraṇaṃ janma-pariṇāmāsamsargaṃ vivartaṃ vyavasthā-

jar, the cup, the plate and so on.¹ All external objects are thus products of *śabda-brahman* which, though one and indivisible and eternal, appears to be many and liable to spatio-temporal determination as long as we are susceptible to cosmic nescience, just as to a man of defective eyesight the clear and indivisible space appears to be divided by so many coloured lines that have no objective reality at all.² But when we have overcome that nescience—which is the sole cause of multiplicity and distinction, the ultimate Reality—viz. *śabda-brahma*, is comprehended as One and Immutable—divested of all plurality and differentiation, and the external world, which is as unreal as a snake-in-the-rope, ceases to be.

But this theory of evolution out of the immutable *śabda-brahman*, on the analogy of the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution out of the primal stuff, has been subjected to severe criticism by the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Buddhists alike. The foremost objection against such an hypothesis is that the Grammarians' assumption that all our cognitions are associated with words—on which this imposing metaphysical superstructure has been founded—is altogether base-

payanti, tathaivāmnāye saṃhṛta-bhogya-bhokṭṛ-śakter vāgātmano bahudhā kāraṇatvam āmnātam/—*Vākya-pāṇīya*, I. 121 and Bhartṛhari's own gloss thereon. (Ed. by Pt. Cārudeva Śāstrin, p. 103). See also Śāntarakṣita's *Tattva-Saṃgraha*, Kārikā 128. (GOS. Edn.).

¹Vide Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* on *TS.*, Kārikā 128. Vol. I. p. 68.

²Cp : “yathā viśuddham ākāśaṃ timiropapluto janaḥ/
saṃkīrṇam iva mātṛābhiś citrābhir abhimanyate//
tathedaṃ amṛtaṃ brahma nirvikāram avidyayā/
kaluṣatvam ivā'pannaṃ bheda-rūpaṃ prapadyate//”

—cited by Bhartṛhari in his gloss on *Vākya-pāṇīya*, I.1. These verses are commonly ascribed to Bhartṛhari himself. But as these and other verses are introduced with the words ‘*tathā hyuktam*’ it is plausible that they have been quoted from some other work of different authorship. (Ed. Pt. C. D. Śāstrin, p. 8.)

less. It might be held that the association of *śabda* with the objects of our cognition is capable of being cognised by perception. But to this the opponents ask : Is this perception dependent on sense-organs or is it introspection ? The first alternative cannot be accepted since sensual perceptions can comprehend external objects alone—like colour, smell etc., and consequently cognitions being internal, their attribute—viz. their association with *śabda*, is incapable of being cognised through sensory perception. The second alternative too is equally untenable inasmuch as, though cognitions can be perceived through introspection, yet their attribute *śabda* is not so perceivable.¹ Now the Grammarians might argue that since *śabda* and *artha* are mutually merged (*anuviddha*), when the latter is perceived the former too must be perceived. But this argument also is not strong enough to support their thesis. For, it might be asked : What is the meaning of this merger (*anuviddhatva*) ? Does it mean co-existence of the two elements in the same substratum or their complete identity ? The first alternative is untenable. For, while in perception the jar is *out there* in space, the word expressive thereof—viz. *ghaṭa*, if at all perceived, is in the ear-drum of the percipient. The second alternative too is logically absurd. If two things are to be at all identical they must be invariably cognised by means of an identical sensory organ. We cannot identify *colour* and *touch* for while the former is the object of visual perception, the latter is perceived by means of the tactile sense. *Śabda* and *artha* too being cognised by different sense-organs cannot be identified. For, while we

¹śabdānuviddhatvasya jñāneṣu apratibhāsāt/ taddhi pratyakṣeṇa pratiyate, anumānena vā ? pratyakṣeṇa cet kim aindriyakeṇa, svasaṃvedanena vā ? na tāvat aindriyeṇa—indriyāṇām rūpādinīyata-
tvena jñānāviśayatvāt/ nāpi svasaṃvedanena—asya śabdāgocaratvāt/
—*Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*, pp. 39-40 (NSP. Edn.).

see the blue colour with our eyes, we hear the word *nīla* with our ears. Thus the colour *nīla* and the word *nīla* cannot be held as identical.¹ The Grammarians' claim that the perceptual cognition of a new-born child even is associated with the cognition of the corresponding term, howsoever unmanifest that might be, is equally devoid of all reason. The case is not improved either by invoking the instrumentality of the impression produced by the antenatal knowledge of the conventional relation (*saṃketa*). Had it been a fact there would have been no need of learning these relations between words and their senses *de novo*. If recollection of words is possible on the part of a new-born child, it becomes *prima facie* inexplicable how in the course of a few years that capacity of recollection becomes completely extinct.² To argue that the impressions are subsequently destroyed and the child is thus incapacitated for further recollection for which a fresh acquisition of the knowledge of those relations becomes necessary is of no avail. For, there can be no logic behind the contention that while the impressions of a quick-born child in spite of its experiencing the pangs of birth remain unimpaired, they are gradually effaced out of its soul in the course of two or three years, without any evident cause to account for

¹athārthasya tadanuviddhatvāt tadanubhave jñāne tadapyanubhūyate ityucyate / nanu kimidaṃ śabdānuviddhatvaṃ nāma/ arthasya abhinna-deśe partibhāsaḥ, tādātmyaṃ vā/ tatrādyavikalpo'samīcīnaḥ/ tadrāhitasyaivārthasya adhyakṣe pratibhāsanāt/na hi tatra yathā puro'vasthito nīlādiḥ pratibhāsate, tathā taddeśe śabdo'pi—śrotr-śrotrapradeśe tatpratibhāsāt/ ... nāpi tādātmyam—vibhinnendriya-janita-jñāna-grāhyatvāt/ yayor vibhinnendriya-janita-jñānagrāhyatvaṃ na tayor aikyam - yathā rūpa-rasayoḥ/ tathātvam ca nīlarūpa-śabdayoḥ/ śabdākāra-rahitaṃ hi nīlādirūpaṃ locana-jñāne pratibhāti tadrāhitas tu śabdaḥ śrotra-jñāne—iti kathaṃ tayor aikyam ?—PKM., p. 40.

²Vide Sucarita Miśra's *Kāśikā* on ŚV. Pt. I. p. 249.

this total extinction, thus necessitating the learning of those relations afresh.¹ The postulation of an unmanifest and inarticulate sound, like *paśyantī* and *sūkṣmā*, made by the Vaiyākaraṇas to fit in with their theory of *śabda-brahman*, the omnipresent and immutable entity, is equally a travesty of facts, being contrary to the accepted connotation of the term 'sound' (*vāk*) which is used to refer to articulate and audible letters, words or sentences alone and not to the imperceptible *word-essence* as well as the Vaiyākaraṇas have rather arbitrarily assumed.² Thus perception cannot comprehend the invariable association of *śabda* and *artha*.

It is alike futile to resort to Inference (*anumāna*) for proving the aforesaid thesis. The basis of a valid inference is the universal concomitance between the probans (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhya*) standing to each other either in the relation of causality (*kārya-kārṇa-bhāva*) or identity (*tādātmya*). But in the present case no such probans is possible. Even if there had been one leading to the inference of the association of *śabda* and *artha*, no validity would have attached to it, contradicted as it is by perception, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, which is

¹aṭha matam—parastād asya saṃskāro naśyatīti, tanna / yasya hi nidhanena yonīyantrapīḍayā ca saṃskāro na vinaś'aḥ, tasya katham akasmād eva dvi-trair eva varṣaiḥ saṃskāranāśo bhavati—*Kāśikā*, loc. cit.

²saṃhṛtāśeṣavarṇādi-vibhāgā tu paśyantī, sūkṣmā cāntar-jyotī-rūpā vāgeva na bhavati/anayor arthātmadarśanalakṣaṇatvāt, vācastu varṇa-padādyanukrama-lakṣaṇatvāt/tato'yuktam etallakṣaṇa-praṇayanam - "sthāneṣu vivṛte vāyau kṛtavarṇaparigrahā/ vaikhari vāk pravyokṛtṇaṃ prāṇa-vṛtti-nibandhanā/ prāṇavṛttim atikramya madhyamā vāk pravartate/ avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛta-kramā/ svarūpa-jyotir evāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāganapāyinī/ tayā vyāptam jagat sarvaṃ tataḥ śabdātmakam jagat/" -ityādi /—*PKM*. pp. 41-42. The above verses are cited by Bhartṛhari in his gloss on *VP*. I. 143.

a stronger instrument of knowledge than inference and consequently has the power to override the latter.¹

Even the theory of evolution out of the unmanifest and immutable *word-essence* (*śabda-vivarta-vāda*) taken by itself, apart from all other considerations, is an empty dogma with no basis to stand upon. For, what is the exact meaning of the term *vivarta* that the Grammarians so frequently use? If it signifies transformation (*pariṇāma*) from one state to another, as the transformation of *milk* into *curd*, the unity of *śabda-brahman* sought to be established by the Grammarians cannot hold good. For, just as *curd*, though merely a manifestation of *milk*, is different from the latter and is as much real as *milk* itself, so too this visible universe, though an evolute of *śabda-brahman*, would be different from the latter having reality in its own right. Consequently multiplicity would supplant unity. Moreover, on this view, *śabda-brahman* being susceptible to transformation becomes reduced to a transient entity and the Grammarians' doctrine of immutability falls to the ground.² If, however, it is maintained that the *word-essence* in the course of evolution is not itself transformed and retains its distinctive essence so that its immutability is not impaired, —it might be asked why the cognition of the external objects is not accompanied by the cognition of the corresponding word-elements. Had it been so even a deaf person would have been able to comprehend with his eyes the

¹anumānāt teṣāṃ tadanuviddhatva-pratītir ityapi manorathamātram—tadavinābhāvi-līṅgābhāvāt/ tatsambhave vā'dhyakṣādi-bādhita-pakṣanirdeśānantaram prayukyatvena kālātyayāpadiṣṭatvācca/—*PKM.*, loc. cit.

²vivartavādo'pi na samāñjasaḥ / tathā hi vivarte kṣīram iva dadhirūpeṇa pariṇāmitvena vikāritayā vā kṣīrāder ivānityatva-prasaṅgāt/ tathhābhāve' pi ca nādvaitasiddhir dadhna iva kṣīravikārasya śabdavikārasyārthasya tato'nyatvāt/—*NM.* Vol. II. p. 102.

word *ghaṭa* which, the Vaiyākaraṇas argue, is identical with the jar itself.¹

Now, the Grammarians might interpret their thesis in another way. *Śabda*, when cognised, has the power to conjure up before our mind fictitious objects that have no external reality at all, just as a magician by means of necromancy can present before our eyes various forms and colours that are totally *non est*, and it is from this standpoint that the Grammarians assert the universe to be a *vivarta* of *śabda-brahman*. Such a defence, the Naiyāyikas contend, is extremely unconvincing. For, according to the Naiyāyikas, the external world is as much real as the *śabda-brahman* of the Grammarians, so that it is not possible to repudiate its objectivity as in the case of objects presented in a state of dream.² That would be another version of solipsism and the Grammarians could aspire to be no better than the camp-followers of the heterodox Buddhist subjectivists³.

To appeal to the instance of the illusory cognition of the silver-piece in the mother-o'-pearl for an elucidation of the term *vivarta* is equally effete. For, there is ample

¹śabdātmakam hi brahma nīlādirūpatam pratipadyamānam svābhāvikaṁ śabdarūpaṁ parityajya pratipadyeta aparityajya vā ? ..dvi-tīya-pakṣe tu nīlādisaṁvedanakāle badhirasyāpi śabda-saṁvedana-prasaṅgaḥ, nīlādivat tadavyatirekāt/ yat khalu yadavyatiriktam tat tasmin saṁvedyamāne saṁvedyate, yathā nīlādisaṁvedanāvasthāyām tasyaiva nīlāder ātmā, nīlādyavyatiriktaś ca śabda iti/—*PKM*. p. 43.

²athārthapratibhāsam asatyam api indrajālavat upadarśayati śabdaḥ - ityayaṁ vivartārthaḥ, so'pi na yuktaḥ/ bāhyasya vastunaḥ padābhidheyasya jāti-vyaktiāder, vākya-vācasyāpi bhāvanādeḥ pūrva-prasādhitatvāt/...na ca indrajāla-māyādivat ayathārthatāyām kimapi kāraṇam utpaśyāmaḥ/—*NM*. loc cit.

³Sucarita Mīśra stigmatises the Grammarians' views as *bauddha-gandhi*—i. e. savouring of Buddhistic dogmas. *Vide* : “evaṁ hi Baudhdha-gandhi-Vaiyākaraṇā manyante”—*Op. cit.* Pt. I. p. 275. Nāgojibhaṭṭa,

reason for the cognition of the silver-piece in the nacre, which though different in some respects are also similar in others, and that accounts for the illusion. But *śabda* and *artha* being poles asunder in their respective characteristics and totally dissimilar from each other, there can be no illusory superimposition of the latter in the former, as the Vaiyākaraṇas would have us believe.¹

The Vaiyākaraṇas might, however, fall back upon a different interpretation. It might be contended that *śabda-brahman*, like the personal and omnipotent God the Creator in the other orthodox systems, is the efficient cause—the Creator of this phenomenal universe, and that is why the universe is called the *vivarta* of *śabda-brahman*. This contention too is not reasonable. For *śabda-brahman*, though it might be the Ultimate Reality as the Grammarians would fain try to establish, is an inert and unconscious principle. To ascribe the power of creation to it, as to a conscious Godhead, is not logically justifiable. If, however, consciousness too is attributed to *śabda-brahman*, besides omnipresence and eternity, it becomes identical with the God of the Naiyāyikas, differing only in name, so that there is left nothing new in the Grammarians' system of metaphysics.² To maintain the causality of *śabda-brahman* on the analogy of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of

too, in his *VSM.*, anticipating such a possible indictment, differentiates the Vaiyākaraṇa doctrine as stated above from the subjectivism of the Buddhist philosophers. Cp. “etenāsato bhāne Bauddha-matapraveśa ityapāstam/ tena tatra āropita-sattvasyāpyanaṅgikārāt/ ātmanas tenānaṅgikārācca/”—*Op. cit.* p. 280.

¹Vide *NM.* Vol. II. p. 102.

²atha Śabda-brahmaiva sṛjati jagantītyayaṃ vivartaprakāra ucyate, so'pi na samyak, acetanatvena śabdasya īśvarasyeva sraṣṭṛtvānupapat-teḥ/...atha “vijñānaṃ ānandaṃ brahma”—iti āgamavacanāṃ anusarātā vibhutvam iva cetanatvam api śabdabrahmaṇo varṇyate tarhiśvarasyaiva śabdabrahmeti nāma kṛtaṃ syāt/—*NM.* Vol. II. pp. 101-102.

atomic causation is equally invalid. For, every physical product, whether it be a jar or a piece of cloth, is composed of smaller *parts*, the *whole* inhering in these parts. But if *śabda-brahman*—the unitary and indivisible entity—be regarded as the material cause of the universe, everything would then be indivisible and part-less—a contingency that must be avoided on pain of conflict with the uncontradicted verdict of perception.¹ The theory of causation with regard to *śabda-brahman* is easily refutable on other grounds as well. Had *śabda* been the material cause of the numerous material objects constituting the universe, all of them should have been produced simultaneously and not in succession, for the causal efficiency of *śabda*, the immutable entity, being eternally present and self-sufficient there can be nothing to deter the simultaneous production of all conceivable effects.² The Grammarians might now take a last stand in defence of their theory of unity—viz. *śabdādvaita-vāda*. They might refer to the scripture attesting to the reality of *śabda-brahman* : “One must have to comprehend the reality of *śabda-brahman* as well as *para-brahman*. The knowledge of *śabda-brahman* leads to the realisation of *para-brahman*”. Thus the Grammarians’ thesis is based on a valid scriptural foundation and cannot be demolished with the aid of adverse polemics alone. To this the Naiyāyikas’ reply would be as follows : Is the dualism of *śabda-brahman* and *para-brahman* as envisaged in the above scriptural text real or apparent ? To accept it as real would be self-defeating as it would

¹na ca paramāṇuvad asya kāraṇatvam/ avayava-samavāyena prthivyādeḥ kāryasya grahaṇāt/—*ibid*.

²nāpi śabdāt utpattiḥ/ tasya nityatvenāvikāritvāt, krameṇa kāryot-pādavirodhāt sakalakāryāṇaṃ yugapad evotpattiḥ syāt/ kāraṇavaikal-yāddhi kāryāṇi vilambante nānyathā/ taced avikalam kim aparaṃ tair apekṣyaṃ yena yugapanna bhavyeḥ/—*PKM*. p. 44.

strike at the very root of the theory of non-dualism preached by the Vaiyākaraṇas. Nor is it sane to see *brahman* in every corner as the validity of the above text would suggest. The acceptance of the second alternative too would be compromising to the Grammarians' position, for *śabda-brahman* would lose all its claim to ultimate reality which would attach to *para-brahman* alone. Consequently, the Grammarians must abandon their fantastic thesis and acknowledge defeat, which is the only course open to them.¹

We must now turn to the *śabdādhyāsa-vāda*—that purports to defend the identity between *śabda* and *artha* as envisaged in the popular usage on the theory of superimposition of *śabda* on the *cognition* and its *object*. Though the doctrine of *śabdādhyāsa-vāda* is closely related with the theory of *śabdādvaita* yet we propose to deal with it separately in some detail. Kumārila, the great Mīmāṃsist teacher, devoted a considerable section of his *Śloka-vārttika* on *JS. I. 1. 4* to the discussion and refutation of this peculiar doctrine of the Grammarians. Our survey would be mainly based on Kumārila's text, which has also been scrupulously followed by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya-mañ-jarī* in reviewing the Grammarians' position.

We noted at the very beginning of the present dissertation how in popular usage we refer to the cognitions as also the objects as being characterised by the corresponding terms standing in the relation of identity with the former. The term *gauḥ* not only stands for the particular sound-group—viz. *g*, *au*, *ḥ*, but also for the cognition and the substance 'cow' which is the object thereof. This

¹ *yadapyucyate* - "dve brahmaṇī veditavye śabdabrahma param ca yat/ śabdabrahmaṇī niṣṇātaḥ param brahmādhigacchati/"-iti, tadapi brahma-subhikṣam atyantam alaukikam ekatarasya brahma-ṇaḥ kālpanikatvāt/ akālpanikatve vā katham advaitavādaḥ/ tasmāt kṛtam anena śabda-brahmaṇā/ ...—*NM. Vol. II. p. 103.*

identity, as presupposed in the popular usage, is not real—the Grammarians argue. *Śabda* and *artha* are totally dissimilar and discrete and the identity between two such dissimilar and discrete entities cannot but be unreal, and is caused by an illusory superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the former on the latter. This is how the Grammarians justify the popular usage.

Kumārila's animadversions against the above Vaiyākaraṇa viewpoint are extremely keen and revealing. He has exposed with characteristic thoroughness the utter weakness of such a thesis and the gross oversights on the part of its propounders. He argues : The main postulate that our popular usage presupposes the basic identity of *śabda* and *artha* is an unwarranted hypothesis. We noted how the Grammarians' contention—viz. that all our psychical acts are *imbued* with the awareness of the corresponding *terms*, is a purely dogmatic assertion. There is knowledge of the thing-in-itself (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), undetermined by any nomenclature prior to our acquisition of the knowledge of the relations subsisting between the words and the objects signified by them, as in the case of a new-born child or a mute animal. Thus the constant accompaniment of *śabda* and *artha* is an unproven hypothesis.¹ In our subsequent conceptual cognitions too when the thing is cognised along with the term expressive thereof we do not identify the two, for their respective instruments of cognition being different we are able to discriminate one from the other.² What more, a particular word is used with a view to signifying a particular *attribute* of a substance, composed of infinite attributes as it is, to the exclu-

¹na cāvikalpitaḥ śabdād iti vācyo na gr̥hyate/ tenāgr̥hītaśabdo'pi gotvādīn pratipadyate/—ŚV. v. 176 on JS. I. 1. 4.

²śrutisaṃsparsābodhe'pi naivābhedopacāratā/ vivekād artha-śabdānāṃ cakṣuḥ-śrotradhiyā kṛtāt/—loc. cit.

sion of all others, and thus it is a means to a definite end, just as a lamp is a means to the cognition of the jar and its colour, which is the end in view. To identify the means (viz. *śabda*) with the end (viz. *artha*) would be tantamount to identifying the lamp with the jar—absurd on the very face of it.¹ Kumārila, further, puts a query to the Grammarians : Do you hold that all our cognitions of the different categories—viz. *jāti*, *dravya*, *guṇa* and *kriyā*, are *invariably* aware of their identity with the corresponding terms ? To answer in the affirmative would take away all force from their doctrine of super-imposition (*adhyāsa*) which presupposes a *real difference* between the thing super-imposed and the object of superimposition. A negative answer too would not save them any more from the fallacy. For, if it be admitted that we are constantly cognisant of the real difference of the two entities—viz. *śabda* and *artha*, all talks of superimposition would automatically cease, since it implies besides the basic difference, occasional identification as well. So the theory of illusory superimposition forged out by the Vaiyākaraṇas has no factual basis.² This illusion of identity and of superimposition consequential thereupon is caused by the unscientific popular usage that indiscriminately identifies the *śabda* with the *cognition* and its *content*. We simply express what has been already cognised by us by means of *śabda*, because there is no other possible means of expression besides *śabda*, not that the thing cognised is identical with the *śabda*.

¹anantadharmake dharminyekadharmāvadhāraṇe/ śabdo'bhyupāyamātram syāt nātmādyhāropakāraṇam/ na copeye'bhyupāyasya rūpādhyāsaḥ prasajyate/ na hi dīpendriyādinām rūpādyāropa iṣyate/—*ibid.* vv. 178-79. *Vide also NM.* : na hyupāyād abhinnatvaṁ tadupāyasya yujyate/ rūpasya na hyabhinnatvaṁ dīpād vā cakṣuṣo'pi vā/—*loc. cit.*

²nityaṁ yadi ca gotvādi śabdarūpeṇa grhyate/ rūpāntaraṁ na dṛṣṭam ced bhedādhyāsau kuto nvimau/ yadyabhedo na mithyātvam

Consequently, the identity envisaged in linguistic usages is an illusory one and has no objectivity. So to conclude *superimposition* on the strength of this trivial evidence cannot but be extremely fallacious. Besides, the *word*, the *cognition* and its *content* are actually felt as different in essence from one another. While the *word* (viz. *gauḥ*) is felt as a composite of discrete sounds—viz. *g*, *au*, and *ḥ*, the *object* cow is perceived as a particular type of animal having a particular arrangement of limbs, and the *cognition* that is aware of both is nothing but a formless consciousness-unit (*nirākārā samvittiḥ*) having the property of illumination inherent in it.¹ The theory of *śabdādhyāsa* involves other fallacies too. For, if it is maintained that *śabda* is identified, by virtue of superimposition, with *artha*, then in the case of a homonym the different meanings would become identical—all of them being identical with the self-same word. For example, the homonym *akṣa*—meaning a *die*, a *sense-organ*, an *axle*, being identical with all the three objects, the latter too should be regarded as mutually identical—which however is not the case. To infer the existence of three different *word-units* (*pada-sphoṭas*) from the comprehension of three different senses would be of no avail. For, when we comprehend the particular word *akṣa*, there is doubt as to which of the three meanings is intended to be conveyed. This is due to the similarity of constituent

bhedaś cet syāt svarūpataḥ/ nādhyaropa-prasaṅgaḥ syād bhrāntyā
tvadhyāsakalpanā/ —*ibid*.

¹api ca yadi śabdād abhinno'rthaḥ pratibhātyeva ko'dhyāsārthaḥ?
adhyāsa-bhramas tu Vaiyākaraṇānām ekākāra-nirdeśa-doṣanirmitaḥ/
yathā—'gaur ityeṣa hi nirdeśo vācya-tadbuddhi-vācīnām/'—kastvayā
dṛṣṭo'tha iti pṛṣṭo—gaur-iti, kīdṛśam tejñānam utpannam—gaur-iti,
kīdṛśam śabdām prayuktavān asi—gaur-iti/ tata eṣa bhrantīḥ/ vastu-
taṣṭu viviktā evaite śabda-jñānārthāḥ/ taduktam—'gavi sāsnādimadrū-
pā gādirūpā'bhidhāyake/ nirākārobhayajñāne samvittiḥ paramārtha-
taḥ/'(ŚV.)—iti//

letters of the word *akṣa*, that are common to all the three cases. Had the *word-units* been intrinsically dissimilar from one another there would not have been any doubt at all as to the meaning, which must have an element of similarity as its basis.¹ Conversely again, synonymous words like *hastāḥ*, *karaḥ*, *pāṇiḥ* etc., that signify the same idea would be expressive of different ideas instead of an identical sense, if the theory of superimposition is adopted inasmuch as they differ in respect of their constituent letters.²

Besides, what can be the basis of superimposition between *śabda* and *artha*? Superimposition commonly takes place either on the basis of *similarity*—as for example, the superimposition of the silver-piece in the nacre, or by reason of the *transference* of one's attributes on to the other (*uḥa-rāga*) as in the case of superimposition of red-ness on a piece of crystal on account of its being imbued with the red hue of the *japā* flower.³ But none of these can hold good in the present case. For, there is no similarity between *śabda* and *artha*—which, as the Grammarians hold, is merely an appearance without any objectivity at all.

¹evam indriyajeṣviva na śābdeṣvapi pratyayeṣu śabdaḥ svarūpam adhyasyati -iti yuktam/ yadi ca śabdaḥ svarūpenārtham pratipādayati tadā'kṣa-śabdasyaikyād devana-vibhītaka-rathākṣeṣu tulyā pratītiḥ syāt/ na ca akṣa-śabdā bhinnā iti vaktavyam, rūpapratyabhijñānānapāyāt, taduccāraṇe ca artha-trayyāṃ saṃśaya-darśanāt/ -NM. Vol. II. p. 101. Vide ŚV. loc. cit. vv. 186, 189-90.

²api ca paryāyeṣu hastāḥ, karaḥ, pāṇir-ityādiṣu śabdarūpabhedādhyāśapakṣe arthabuddhibhedāḥ prāpnoti, na cāsau asti-iti nādhyāsaḥ/—NM. loc. cit. Vide : kara-hastādi-śabdebhyaḥ śabdarūpasya bhedataḥ/ bhinnor'athaḥ sampratīyeta tadadhyāropakalpane/—ŚV. loc. cit. v. 208.

³ātmādhyāśaś ca sādṛśyād uparāgācca jāyate/ -ŚV. loc. cit. v. 209. api cāyam adhyāsaḥ sādṛśyād vā bhavati śuktau iva rajatasya, uparāgād vā—maṇau iva japāruṇimnaḥ/—Sucarita Miśra's comm. there on.

The second variety is equally impossible. For, *śabda* and *artha*, being removed in space from each other, one cannot transfer its attributes to the other. To argue that *śabda* is reflected in *artha* in the same way as the disc of the moon, though far removed, is reflected in the waters of a lake, is not an effective mode of reasoning. For, *śabda* being devoid of colour is incapable of being reflected.¹ What more, this superimposition as based on the transference of attributes is possible in those cases alone where the object of superimposition and the attribute superimposed are both cognizable by means of the same sense-organ. But when they are perceivable through different senses there cannot be any superimposition at all. For instance, when we perceive a piece of crystal through the *tactile sense*, we are not at all aware of the superimposition of red-ness on it, which can be perceived by means of the organ of vision alone. Similarly, the superimposition of *śabda* and *artha* is utterly inconceivable, they being cognizable through different sense-organs.²

¹Cp. *ŚV. loc. cit.* vv. 210 ff. *Vide* also—"śabda-gandha-rasādīnāṃ kīdṛśī pratibimbātā/".

²na ca bhinnendriya-grāhyam kiñcid astyanurāgakṛt/ nahi lākṣā-nurakte'pi sphaṭike dhīs tvagādibhiḥ/—*ibid.* Cp. kiñcā'yam anurāgaḥ samānendriyagrāhyeṇaiva dṛṣṭaḥ/ cākṣuṣasya maṇer aruṇimnā cākṣu-ṣeṇaiva/ nahi sphaṭike'nubhūyamāne cākṣuṣo'ruṇimā tam anurañjaya-ti/ evaṃ śrautaḥ śabdaḥ na cākṣuṣam artham anurañjayitum śaknoti-tyāha -'na ceti'/—Sucarita Miśra's gloss thereon.

We should note here that Maṇḍana Miśra, the celebrated Mīmāṃsist, records three different views, most probably all of them advanced by different sects of Grammarians, in respect of the relation between the word and the object signified by it. Cp. "nanu evaṃjātiya-keṣu eva abhedavastubuddher ekaśabdātmakatvam upāgaman/ na hi avastuṣu saṃsargasamūhā'tyantāsadādiṣu saṃsargiṣu vā nānātmasu ekavastupratibhāsaḥ sambhavati/ vinaikasya śabdātmanaḥ pratyāsāt, parī-ṇāmād, vivartād vā/ -iti"—*Vidhi-viveka*, pp. 286-87. While *śabda-pratyāsa-*

vāda, which is but another name of *śabdādhyāsa-vāda*, and *śabda-pariṇāma-vāda* envisage the reality of the phenomenal world of experience besides the *Word-Essence*, the exponents of *śabda-vivarta-vāda* repudiate the reality of the objects signified by words and as such can be justly ranked with Vedantists as being upholders of a pure and unqualified Monism. *Vide* Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāya-kaṇikā* on the above *Vidhi-viveka* text : pratyāso'dhyāsaḥ/ yathā vastutaḥ svaccha-dhavale lākṣārasāvaseka-tiraskṛta-dhavalimni sthaviyasi sphaṭika-maṇau tanīyastayā lākṣālakṣaṇa-dravyāgrahaṇāt lākṣāguṇāropeṇa aruṇaḥ sphaṭikamaṇir-iti matir adhyāsaḥ/ ...pariṇāmo'pi yathaikam suvarṇa-tattvaṃ kaṭaka-mukuta-karṇikāṅguliyādibhedena vipariṇāmate, tathā śabdatattvaṃ api nānāpadārtha-rūpeṇeti/ etasmiṃśca darśane bhedānāṃ kathaṅcit padatattvāt bhinnānām pāramārthikatvaṃ/ ...vivartastu yathā mukhaṃ anekeṣu maṇi-kṛpāna-darpaṇādiṣu sadbhuteṣu vivartamānam tacchāyāpattau vibhinnavarṇa-parimāṇa-deśaṃ cakāsti/ natu tatra tattvāt bhinnavarṇa-parimāṇa-deśāni mukhāni santi/ evaṃ anādyavidyayā vāsanopadhānavāśāt padatattvaṃ ekam anekapadārthātmanā prathate, natu padārthās tato vibhidyamānātmanāḥ paramārthataḥ santi/ ete pratyāsa-pariṇāma-vivartā matabhedena mantavyāḥ/ -iti—*loc. cit.* (Medical Hall Edition, Benares, 1907). It must, however, be observed that for a proper understanding of the *śabda-vivarta-vāda*, of which Bhartṛhari is the unique propounder, one must have to pass through the two earlier theories that are but convenient and necessary stepping-stones towards the realisation of the Ultimate Unity of the *Word-Essence* which the Grammarians of the school of Bhartṛhari seek to establish. Cp. "vivartavādasya hi pūrva-bhūmiḥ/ vedānta-vāde pariṇāma-vādaḥ"—*Samkṣepa-sārīraka*, II. 61.

CHAPTER THREE

THE RELATION OF WORDS WITH THEIR MEANINGS : (CONTD.) THE POSITION OF THE BUDDHISTS AND VAIŚEṢIKAS.

OUR utterances can be classified into two broad divisions according as they are in the form of *single isolated words* or *sentences* consisting of more than one word syntactically related to each other.¹ In the present section we propose to limit our discussion to the realm of isolated words—or logical *terms* alone, postponing for the time being the analysis of sentential utterances and their significance for a later treatment.

Thus far our discussion chiefly consisted in a review of the Vaiyākaraṇa viewpoint. We noted how the Grammarians' thesis—viz. that *śabda* is the ultimate reality out of which evolve all this phenomenal universe lacking objectivity of its own, is an unproven hypothesis destitute of sound reasons. Neither the relation of causality nor that of identity can subsist between the two entities. But it might then be asked : If there be no basic relation between *śabda* and *artha* to link them together, how can a term convey a particular idea of an object ? There is complete unanimity as to the expressiveness of words, and there must be shown sufficient reason to account for this phenomenon. Different answers are given by philosophers

¹dvidvidhaḥ śabdaḥ - padātmā, vākyātmā ca/ ...—NM. Vol. I. p. 140.

of different schools to this query. The present section would be devoted to the examination of the view held by the Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika philosophers, who regard the sense comprehended from a particular word as being inferred from the latter.¹ Let us examine the Vaiśeṣika viewpoint first.

It must be admitted that a particular word has some sort of relation with the particular idea signified by it, for otherwise there can be no *raison d'être* of our conceptual cognitions. We cognise 'fire' from 'smoke', because they stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. But what can be the nature of relation between a *word* and the *object* cognised therefrom? It is quite evident in the light of the previous discussions that there is no natural relation between a particular word and the object as between fire and smoke. The Vaiśeṣika atomists would solve this impasse in the following way: All our conceptual cognitions are obviously cases of Inference. Inference has for its basis a necessary and invariable relation between the object inferred (i. e. the *probandum*) and the object leading to the inference of the former (i. e. the *probans*). This condition is satisfied in the case of our conceptual cognitions. To English-speaking people the word 'cow' has a necessary relation with the object 'cow', that is as much fixed and invariable as the relation between fire and smoke, the only difference being that while in the latter case it is *natural* and as such independent of human will, in the former it is *artificial* owing its being to the convention of a particular community. Substitute this *conventional relation* for *causality* and there remains nothing to distinguish a case of verbal cognition from genuine cases of inference. The analogy can be

¹Cp. "tatrānumānam evedam Bauddhair Vaiśeṣikaiḥ smṛtam"
—*ŚV. Śabda-pariccheda*, v. 15.

pushed farther. Just as in the case of inference—viz. of fire from smoke, the knowledge of the relation is necessary and not the relation *per se*, so too in the case of verbal cognitions the knowledge of the conventional relation is essential.¹ There are other points of affinity too between inferential and verbal cognitions. A *word*, like a *probans* in inference, gives rise to the cognition of an object which is not immediately perceived, just as smoke leads to the knowledge of fire which is not in itself the object of perception². Moreover, the idea conveyed by a word is of the nature of a *universal* as is the case with inference where the smoke can generate the cognition of the *fire-universal* and not of any *particular* fire-entity.

But these arguments in favour of reckoning verbal knowledge as a species of inference have been refuted alike by philosophers of Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya schools. The first objection to the above view is that the essential factors of inference are lacking in the case of verbal knowledge. No doubt, the *conventional relation* (*samaya*) is present here in lieu of such necessary and invariable relations as *causality*, *identity*, *antinomy* etc. that underly genuine cases of inference. Yet that is not all. To be styled as inference, the process of conceptual

¹śabdādīnām anumāne'ntarbhāvo'numānāvyatiriktatvaṃ samānavidhitvāt, samānapravṛttiprakāratvāt/ yathā vyāptibalenānumānaṃ pravartate tathā śabdādayo'pityarthaḥ/...samānavidhitvaṃ eva darśayati—yatheti/prasiddhaḥ samayo'vinābhāvo yasya puruṣasya tasya liṅgadarśana-prasiddhyanusmaraṇābhyām/...tāvaddhi śabdo nārthaṃ pratipādayati yāvad ayam asyāvyabhicārityevaṃ nāvagamyaṭe, jñāte tvavyabhicāre pratipādayan dhūma iva liṅgaṃ syāt/—Śrīdhara's *Nyāya-kandalī* on *Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya*, pp. 213-14. (Viz. Sans. Series Edn.).

²itaś cānumānaṃ śabdaḥ—arthasyānupalabdheḥ/ pratyakṣeṇānupalabdihārthaviśayatvāt/—Uddyotakara's *Nyāya-vārttika* on Gautama's *Nyāya-Sūtra*, II. 1. 49.

cognitions should fit in with the established schema of syllogistic reasoning. If it fails to be on all fours with that schema it must be pronounced as being a different category of knowledge altogether. Let us first closely examine the contention of the Vaiśeṣikas who endeavour to equate conceptual cognitions with inferential knowledge. They argue, as has been repeatedly noted above, that a particular sense, the object *cow* for example, is inferred from a particular word—the word *cow* in this case. Now it might be asked : What would be the form of the *proposition* in this case ? Is the object *cow* the subject (*pakṣa*) and the term *cow* the probans (*hetu*) ? An affirmative answer is not possible. For, the idea of the object being inferable and consequently as yet unknown, it cannot be regarded as the subject of the premiss that must be known and perceived—as for example, the *hill* (*parvata*) that is immediately perceived.¹ To maintain that the *term* *cow* is itself the subject as well as the *probans*, the *object* *cow* being the *probandum*, is equally futile. For, it would then involve the fallacy of *petitio principii* where the probans is a part of the *thesis* or *premiss* (*pratijñā*) itself.² Now, it might be pointed out by the Vaiśeṣikas that the criticism on the ground of the *probans* being indistinguishable from the premiss itself is not fatal to their position. For, in the inference—viz. “This *smoke* is fiery, because it is *smoke*”, the probans and the subject are identical and yet the reasoning is not fallacious as was to be expected on the showing of the opponents. Similarly, there can be no fallacy if the *term* *cow* itself be the subject as well as

¹ anumāne sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī pratiyate/ śabdād arthānumāne ko dharmī ? na tāvad arthaḥ, tasya tadānīm apratīyamānavāt/—*Nyāya-kandalī*, p. 214.

² atha śabdo'rthavattvena pakṣaḥ kasmāt na kalpyate/ pratijñārthai-kadeśo hi hetus tatra prasajyate/ -*ŚV. loc. cit.*

the probans.¹ But this argument overlooks the essential difference between the two cases. For, in the inference of fire in the subject smoke, the term smoke that is the subject of the premiss—viz. “This smoke is fiery”, refers to a *particular* smoke-entity, while the probans smoke is of *universal* import, and consequently their identity is apparent only and not real. But the term cow which is posited as the *subject* as well as the *probans* is of identical import representing as it does the immutable and unitary word-unit *cow*. So, there is no real fallacy of *petitio principii* in the former case, but in the latter it is unavoidable.² Even if all this is admitted, the relation between *śabda*—the subject (*pakṣa*), and the idea (viz. of *cow*)—which is the probandum (*sādhya*), still remains unspecified. For, it is quite evident that the relation of conjunction (*saṃyoga*)—as between the ‘hill’ (*pakṣa*) and ‘fire’ (*sādhya*), cannot hold good between *śabda* and *artha*. Nor is the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) any more possible.³ To argue that *śabda* and *artha* are linked together on the basis of the relation of *expressiveness* is to presuppose the very thing that is going to be in-

¹nanu yathā ‘agnimān ayaṃ dhūmaḥ, dhūmavattvāt, mahānasa-dhūmavat’ -ityuktam “sā deśasyāgni-yuktasya dhūmasyānyaiś ca kalpitā” -iti (*ŚV. Anumāna-pariccheda*, v. 48) evaṃ gośabda eva arthavattvena sādhyatām, gośabdatvāt ityādi sāmānyam ca hetūkriyatām -iti/ -*NM*. Vol. I. p. 140.

²pakṣe dhūmaviśeṣe ca sāmānyam hetur iṣyate/ sāmānyam gamakam nātra gośabdatvam niṣetsyate/ vyaktir eva viśiṣyāto hetuś caikā prasajyate/—*ŚV. Śabda-pariccheda*. vv. 63-64. *Vide* also Pārthasārathi Miśra’s gloss thereon.

³naiva śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ kaścid asti/ ...nahi śabdārthayoh kuṇḍa-badarayor iva saṃyogasvabhavāḥ, tantu-paṭayor iva samavāyātmā vā sambandhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyate/ tanmūlatvācca sambandhāntarāṇyapi na santi/ taduktam--‘mukhe śabdām upalabhāmahe, bhūmāvartham’ -iti—*NM*. Vol. I. p. 220.

ferred. Moreover, if verbal knowledge is to be equated with inferential cognition, *śabda* and *artha* must be shown to be spatio-temporally associated. But that is *prima facie* absurd. Spatially the two entities are removed from each other—for, while *śabda* is in the ear-drum, the object specified by it is “out there” in space. As to temporal association too there is no concomitance between them. For instance, the utterance of the term *Caesar* is not accompanied by the presence of the Emperor of that name. Thus the *conventional relation* (*samaya*) that is imposed by us for our own expediency is not necessary in the same degree as *causality* or *identity* is held to be necessary, and consequently can ill serve as the basis of inferential reasoning.¹ Another argument against the Vaiśeṣika viewpoint is that the sense designated by a particular word varies from one country to another. This is quite unlike the fixed relation between fire and smoke that never varies in any age or clime.² Lastly, had verbal cognition been a species of inferential knowledge its authenticity would have depended on the validity of the syllogistic form alone and not on the reliability and authoritativeness of the speaker—an extraneous factor altogether, as is really the case.³ Thus the Vaiśeṣika thesis has to be abandoned

¹nāpygni-dhūmayor iva śabdārthayor asti avinābhāvanīyamah/ deśa-kāla-vyabhicārāt/ tadvyabhicāraś ca asatyapi Yudhiṣṭhire kalau Yudhiṣṭhira-śabdaprayogāt, asatyām api laṅkāyām jambūdvīpe laṅkāśabdaśravaṇāt// tasmād anumāna-sāmagrīvailakṣaṇyāt śabdo nānumānam/—*NK.* p. 214. *Vide* also *NM.* Vol. I. p. 141.

²ito’pi nānumānam, deśaviśeṣeṣu arthavyabhicārāt/ na dhūmo vahnīm kvacid vyabhicarati, śabdastu svārthaṃ vyabhicarati/...—*NK.* *loc. cit.*

³yadi ca śabdo’numānam trairūpya-pratityā’sya prāmāṇya-niścayaḥ syāt/ nāptoktatva-pratityā/ tatpratityā tu niścīyamāne prāmāṇye anumānād vyatiricyate eva, evaṃ vaidharmyāt/—*NK.* p. 214.

as erroneous since it fails to satisfy the basic requirements of syllogistic reasoning.

The Mimāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas have closely investigated this important problem. The Mimāṃsakas contend that just as the property of burning inheres in fire by its very nature and cannot be dissociated from the latter, so too the property of expressiveness is the very essence of words. The term *ghaṭa* signifies the object known as jar, since the expressiveness with reference to that particular object is eternally existent in the former and is one of its constitutive elements. But this peculiar tenet of the Mimāṃsakas has evoked a good deal of opposition from the Naiyāyikas. It might be contended that the expressiveness being the natural and inherent property of words, a child would be able to comprehend the meaning of a particular word even when he first hears it, though he might be completely ignorant of the relation of the word with the object signified by it. It does not require the property of burning as inherent in fire to be known for our fingers to be scorched. Fire burns our fingers even if its property of burning remains for ever unknown. To this the Mimāṃsakas would reply : Words though possessed of the eternal property of expressiveness cannot convey the idea of the corresponding objects till the conventional relation (*samaya*) is grasped. This is not peculiar to words alone. Our different sense-organs are invested with the capacity of revealing the respective objects—e. g. the eyes can reveal colour, the ears sound and so on. But they do not always reveal those objects, because they require their contact with the respective objects. So too the expressiveness of a particular word with regard to the particular object signified by it, though self-subsistent and eternal, is in need of the knowledge of the conventional relation peculiar to a particular community or

region to be fully operative.¹ Thus the expressiveness of words consists in their immutable property (*śakti*), in the conventional relation (*samaya*), and in the recollection of that relation which is the operation or function (*vyāpāra*)—all taken together and not severally. The property (*śakti*), whether of production or illumination, cannot be self-sufficient and must need the aid of *relation* and *operation* or *function*—the two other factors that must be present in order to make that property effective. But again it might be asked : Is this natural property of expressiveness as inherent in words restricted with reference to particular ideas ? For instance, can the word *ghaṭa* convey the particular idea of jar alone ? This is what is to be expected. For, our different senses are possessed of the capacity of revealing respective objects alone. Our eyes can reveal the colour alone and not smell. So too the lamp that can illumine the colour of objects is incapable of revealing the taste. Thus, this limitation of respective properties as observed in other instances, is what is naturally to be expected in the case of words too. But this our anticipation fails in this particular case. We find different senses being expressed by the self-same word in different regions. For instance, the same word *caura* means *thief* in the Āryāvarta region, while in the Deccan it means *cooked rice*. Had the Mīmāṃsaka thesis of inherent eternal property of expressiveness with regard to words been valid, such unrestricted communication of ideas would have been impossible. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka hypo-

¹nanu sati svābhāvike sambandhe vyutpannavad avyutpannasyāpi bodhaḥ syāt/ na hi agnir aviditaśaktir na dahati —ityatra pratyak-
 ṣādeḥ svābhāvike'rthapratyāyakatve satyapi yathā indriyasannikarṣā-
 pekṣā tathā'trāpi saṃketagraha-sacivasyaiva bodhakatvam ityāha/—
 Jayatīrtha's *Nyāya-sudhā* as cited by Koṇḍabhaṭṭa in his *Vaiyākaraṇa-
 bhūṣaṇa*, p. 189 (BSS. Edn.).

thesis must be condemned as absurd.¹ The Mimāṃsakas' reply to this criticism would be as follows : We do maintain that the property of expressiveness is eternal and naturally inherent in words, and is restricted to one particular idea alone. That numerous ideas are comprehended from the self-same word does not annul the validity of our thesis. Though the property of expressiveness is unitary and restricted, yet it is susceptible of variation according as the conventional relation varies from one clime to another. Note, for instance, the illusory knowledge of silver in the nacre. Our organs of vision are actually brought into contact with the nacre—which is the substratum of the illusion, as well in both cases of perception—whether it be valid or illusory. This contact (*sannikarṣa*) of the sensory organ with the object is identical in both cases. And yet at one time we perceive nacre and at another a silver-piece. Would it be sane to argue on this ground of variability that the property of illumination as inherent in the organs of vision is not natural ? Similar is the case with regard to expressiveness of words as well. The property though unchangeable and restricted to a particular object alone appears as variable along with the changeability of the conventional relation—which being the product of human will is liable to constant variation. While a particular *conventional relation* runs parallel to and alongside of the natural inherent property of expressive-

¹athāpi svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ sarvair evārthaiḥ samaṃ āsthīyate, kasyacit kenacid eva samaṃ vā/ nādyah/ —śabdārthavyavasthā'nupapattē/ antye ārya-mlecchānāṃ aniyamā-bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ/ tathāhi—āryā hi yavaśabdaṃ dīrgha-śūke prayuñjate, dīrgha-śūkam eva ca ca budhyante/ mlecchās tu priyaṅgau prayuñjate priyaṅgum eva ca budhyante—ityevam aniyamaḥ svābhāvikyāṃ śaktau na syāt/ nahi paradīpo rūpaprakāśanaśaktiḥ rasam api prakāśayati/—*Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa*, loc. cit.

ness, others again run counter to it.¹ Now, it might be urged by the Naiyāyikas that if in addition to the postulation of the natural efficiency of words the knowledge of the conventional relation too is posited as a necessary element, what is the use of the former? Why not substitute the conventional relation alone as the necessary factor in generating the verbal cognitions?² To this the Mimāṃsakas would reply: The Naiyāyika contention that conventional relation alone as forged by a fiat of Divine Will (*Īśvarecchā*) is sufficient to account for the comprehension of particular ideas from particular words lacks foundation altogether. For, had will—whether it be divine or human—alone been the cause of our conceptual cognitions, every word would have conveyed every sort of idea—there being no factor to check its freedom. Besides, on our part, there is sufficient ground for positing the entity of conventional relation as being auxiliary towards making the inherent efficiency of words effective and operative. For, just as the relation of universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*) as subsisting between fire and smoke, though eternally present independently of any human will, is not comprehended till the observation of numerous instances of concomitance helps us in being aware of it, so too, the natural property of expressiveness, though eternally

¹yadvā svābhāvikī śaktir ekatraivāsti/ vyutpattivaśāt vyavahāra-niyamasambhavāt/yathā khalu śūktisannikarṣeṇa cakṣuṣā kaścit śūktikāṃ pratipādyate, kaścīd rajatam/ na caitāvatā cakṣuṣo'rtha-pratyāyakatvaṃ na svābhāvikam/ tathā śabdasyāpi śaktyanusāry-ananusāri-vyutpattilakṣaṇa-sahakārivaśāt aniyame'pi svābhāvika-śaktisadbhāvaḥ sambhavati/.iyān viśeṣaḥ—śabdaḥ saṃketenāpi bodhako na pratyakṣam iti/—*VB., loc. cit.*

²nanu svābhāvikasambandha-grāhakatvena saṃketāvaśyakatve kiṃ svābhāvikyā śaktyā? atha asati svābhāvike sambandhe saṃketanīyama eva katham syāt?—*VB., loc. cit.*

present in words, is in need of the knowledge of the conventional usage that helps only to *suggest* it. Human will is incapable of imparting to words the property of expressiveness that does not belong to them in their own right. We can neither impart, by any fiat of our will, to fire the property of quenching thirst, nor can we take away from it the property of burning that naturally inheres in it.¹ The Naiyāyika viewpoint is, moreover, contrary to our experience. They hold that the *word* as heard helps us in recollecting the corresponding *idea*,—linked as they are on the basis of the conventional relation superimposed by human will. It is common experience that the knowledge of one of the *relata* brings about the recollection of the other *relatum*. The perception of an elephant would invariably lead to the recollection of the elephant-driver—constantly associated as they are. So too is the case with *śabda* and *artha*. The *perception* of the one leads to the *recollection* of the other.² But such a view is obviously

¹ko'yaṃ samayo nāma ? abhidhānābhidheya-niyamanīyogaḥ samaya ucyate/..saḥi puruṣakṛtaḥ saṃketaḥ/ nahi puruṣecchayā vastu-niyamo, vakalpyate—tadicchāyā avyāhataprasaratvāt/..nacaivam asti/ nahi dahanam anicchann-api puruṣo dhūmāt na taṃ pratyeti, jalaṃ vā tata icchann-api pratipadyate/ tatra yathā dhūmāgnyor naisargika evāvinābhāvo nāma sambandhaḥ, jñaptaye tu bhūyodarśanādi nimit-tam āśriyate, evaṃ śabdārthayoḥ sāmsiddhika eva śaktyātmā sambandhaḥ, tadvyutpattaye tu vṛddhavyavahāra-prasiddhisamāśrayaṇam/ svābhāvike sambandhe satī dipādivat kiṃ tavyutpattyapekṣaṇeti cet—na/ śabdasya jñāpakatvāt/...śaktis tu naisargikī yathā rūpaprakāśinī dipādes tathā śabdasyārtha-pratipādane/ tasmāt na samaya-mātrād arthapratipattiḥ/—*NM.* Vol. I. p. 221. Comp. “nahi svato'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena pāryate”—*ŚV.*

²padajanyapadārthasmarāṇaṃ vyāpāraḥ/ ..padajñānasya hi eka-sambandhijñānavidhayā padārthopasthāpakatvam/ śaktiś ca padena saha padārthasya sambandhaḥ/ sā cāsmāt śabdād ayam artho boddhavya-itīśvareccārūpā—Viśvanātha's *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* : *Śabda-khaṇḍa*. *Vide* the following statement of Mr. Bertrand Russell that bears a

erroneous. The knowledge of *that-ness* (*tattā*) which is the very essence of recollection is absent in the case of conceptual cognition. When we comprehend a particular idea from a particular word, the content of the resulting introspection is neither *recollection* nor *inference*. It is a *tertium quid*, totally distinct from both the forms of knowledge. Our introspection is of the form : We are aware that the particular word *expresses* the particular idea.¹ And this property of expressiveness, which is peculiar to words alone, has been styled *śakti* or *abhidhā* (denotation) by the Mīmāṃsakas, and must be differentiated from the conventional usage (*saṃketa*, *saṃaya*, *āptopadeśa* or *vṛddha-vyavahāra*, as the Naiyāyikas have variously called it), which is but auxiliary to the comprehension of that self-existent and eternal property, though the Naiyāyikas might postulate it as the sole cause of our conceptual cognitions and dispense with the above-mentioned property of expressiveness as being irrelevant and superfluous. Moreover, had the expressiveness of words depended solely on the conventional usage and had no objectivity of its own, the linguistic usage would have been indistinguishable from other symbolic acts such as mimes, that signify ideas, not because they have any inherent property of expressiveness, but

close similarity to the above view of the Naiyāyikas : “The meaning of an object-word can only be learnt by hearing it frequently pronounced in the presence of the object. The association between word and object is just like any other habitual association, e. g. that between sight and touch. When the association has been established the object suggests the word, and the word suggests the object, just as an object seen suggests sensation of touch, and an object touched in the dark suggests sensations of sight.”—*An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 67. (Second Edition. 1943).

¹padebhyaḥ smṛtir eva iti na yuktaṃ tattā'nullekhāt/...kiñca śābdayāmi ityanuvyavasāyāt na smṛtitvam anumititvaṃ vā tajjanya-pratyayasya/—*VSM*. pp. 59-60.

because a tentative relation has been interposed between those symbolic mimes and the ideas they represent. Such is also the case with strokes of the whip, the hook, and the goad which, though by themselves destitute of any significance, are found to convey definite ideas to the horse, the elephant and the ox respectively, because of the relation that has been artificially improvised by the trainers thereof. The adoption of the Naiyāyika view-point would have reduced words into mere symbols like the strokes of the goad and the hook.¹ Now at this stage the Naiyāyikas might revive the old question—viz. whether the efficiency of words is restricted to a particular idea alone—as one should expect it to be on the analogy of the natural efficiency of our sensory organs, as has been shown above in some detail. The Mīmāṃsakas might meet this challenge by maintaining that a particular word is invested with the efficiency of expressiveness with reference to a particular idea alone. The comprehension of other ideas is due to our illusory knowledge as to that efficiency. There is another solution also. It might be held that the identity of words conveying more than one sense is only apparent and not real, being caused by the similar arrangement of letters, accent etc. Thus, the word *gauḥ* that expresses the idea of cow is different from the word *gauḥ* that signifies 'earth'. For, the efficiency being different in each case, the substratum

¹api ca samaya-mātra-śaraṇaḥ śaktisūnyaḥ śabdaḥ katham akṣi-
nikoca-hastasaṃjñādibhyo bhidyeta/ sa hi tadānīm kaśāṅkuśa-pratodā-
bhighāta-sthānīya eva bhavet/ tathā ca śabdād arthaṃ pratipadyā-
mahe iti laukiko vyapadeśo bādhyeta/ samayāt arthaṃ pratipadyā-
mahe iti syāt/ -NM. Vol. I. p. 222. Śālikanātha in his *R̥juvimalā* on
Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* explains the expression *kaśāṅkuśapratodābhighātavat*
as : kaśāṅkuśapratodaiḥ aśvebha-vṛṣabhāṇām abhighātavat/ pratodaḥ
prājanam/ - *Op. cit.*, p. 192 (Madras University Press).

of that efficiency must be different too, since they stand to each other in the relation of identity as is the prevailing dictum.¹ A third solution to the problem might also be offered. It might be argued that just as different entities like taste, colour and smell inhere in the self-same substance—viz. the mango-fruit, so too diverse efficiencies (viz. of expressiveness) capable of conveying diverse ideas might inhere in the self-same *word-unit* without breaking up its unitary character. Thus in this view the identical word is expressive of more than one idea in contradistinction with the above-mentioned view that words vary along with the variation in their meanings—though they might appear to be identical owing to similarity in formation.²

Thus, to sum up our discussion about the nature of the relation between words and objects signified by them: A diversity of opinions is to be found with regard to the specific character of the relation between words and ob-

¹arthabhedāt tat-tādātmyāpannaśabdeṣu bhedaucityenā'rthabhedāt śabdabheda ityupapadyate/ samānākāratvamātreṇa tu eko'yaṃ śabdo nānārtha iti vyavahāraḥ/ tasya nirūpakāśrayabhedābhyāṃ bheda ityeke/—*VSM.* p. 54. 'śakti-śaktimator abhedāt'—Comm. *Kuñcikā* thereon. To argue that difference of efficiency need not, of necessity, split up the unity of the substratum, on the analogy of the unity of the lamp that removes darkness, burns the wick, reveals colour etc., possessed as it is of the respective efficiencies, is fallacious. For, the lamp *per se* is not invested with all these efficiencies, but as reinforced by other causal factors, so that the totality in each case is different. *Vide* : drśyate hi avilakṣaṇam api vilakṣaṇānekakāryakāri/ yathā pradīpa eka eva timirāpahārī, varttīvikāra-kāri, rūpāntaravyavahāra-kārīti cet, na/ vaicitryāt kāryasya/ —“ekasya na kramaḥ kvāpi vaicitryaṃ na samasya ca/ śaktibhedo na cābhinnāḥ svabhāvo duratikramaḥ/”—Udayana's *Kusumāñjali*, I. 7.

²anye tu ekatraivāmra-phale rūpa-rasa-gandhādīnāṃ bhinnānāṃ tādātmyavat ekatraiva śabde'nekārthanirūpitāni bhinnāni tādātmyā-

jects. While in the one extreme we are confronted with the theory of *śabdādhyāsa-vāda* of the Grammarians seeking to establish the identity of the two entities, in the other extreme we have to face the radical hypothesis of the Buddhists repudiating the reality of any sort of relation between *śabda* and *artha* and condemning all our conceptual cognitions as being illusory like the cognition of duality in the unitary lunar orb. And in between these two extremes, we have the views of the Vaiśeṣikas, upholding a sort of necessary and invariable relation between *śabda* and *artha* akin to the relation of universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*) as between smoke and fire, comprehending conceptual cognitions within the sphere of inferential knowledge. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, though however agreed as to the implausibility of the Vaiśeṣika thesis, differ among themselves. The Mīmāṃsakas, opposed as they are to any conception of theism in metaphysics and maintaining as they do the intrinsic nature of the validity of our verbal cognitions,¹ are led to maintain the thesis of eternal and inherent potency of expressiveness with regard to words, relegating conventional usage to a secondary position of an auxiliary element. But the Naiyāyikas whose metaphysical scheme is essentially theistic, hold the relation between *śabda* and *artha*—lacking any inherent connection *inter se*, as the Mīmāṃsakas vainly try to establish, as wholly artificial, improvised as it is by Divine Will, and consequently reject the inherent potency,

nītyāhuḥ/—*VSM.* p. 56. “*bhinnāni tādātmyāni/* arthabhedena na śabdabhedah/ anantavyaktikalpanāpatteḥ/ tasmād ekavṛntagatāneka-phalavat ekasmin śabde nānārthasambhavaḥ—iti bhāvaḥ”—*Comm. Kuṇḍikā* thereon, p. 57.

¹vedaprāmānya-siddhyartham autpattikatvam iṣyate svatantrāgamavādidbhiḥ/ -Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*, p. 350. ‘svatantrāgamavādidbhiḥ—Mīmāṃsakaiḥ’—Śālikanātha thereon.

as posited by the Mimāṃsakas, as being wholly superfluous and unnecessary.¹

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¹ēṣa eva cāvayor viśeṣo yadeṣa śabdārtha-sambandha-vyavahāras tavānādir mama tu jagat-sargāt prabhṛti pravṛtta iti/ adyatve tu śabdārtha-sambandha-vyutpattau tulya evāvayoḥ panthāḥ/ tatrāpi tavāyaṃ viśeṣo yat tava śaktiparyantā vyutpattir mama tu tadvarjam iti/ —*NM*. Vol. I. p. 224.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONNOTATION OF WORDS

Now that we have concluded our dissertation on the relation between words and objects, we are in a position to study the different categories of objects that constitute the *connotation of words* (*pravṛtti-nimitta*). The word *cow* conveys a category of object essentially different from what is conveyed by the word *red*. It is our aim to examine the distinctive nature of each of these categories—which from now on we propose to style as the *connotation*, which is as nearly as possible the English equivalent of the Sanskrit term *pravṛtti-nimitta*, the literal English rendering of which would be “an attribute (of the object concerned) that occasions the use of the particular word (to the exclusion of all others).” It is important to note at the very outset that the study of the connotation of words is closely interlinked with the study of ontological categories, and any change in our ontological outlook would involve a corresponding change in our view regarding the *connotation* of words. Grammarians, Mimāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas and Buddhists—all differ in their views regarding the *connotation* of words, as is to be expected in consonance with their respective metaphysical doctrines—no two of which are found even partially to agree. Mammaṭa in his *Kāvya-prakāśa* has succinctly noticed the views of the four above-mentioned philosophical schools, without however pausing to examine their respective worth.¹ Our present study would also proceed along these lines—though we propose to

¹gauś śuklaś calo dīttah - ityādaḥ catuṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ
—iti Mahābhāṣya-kāraḥ/...sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ jātir eva ityanye/ tad-

enter somewhat deeper into the problems involved so that the basis of this difference in outlook might become evident.

It is convenient to begin with the Grammarians' theory as first adumbrated in distinct terms by Patañjali in his *magnum opus*—the *Mahābhāṣya*. In so far as the metaphysical doctrines of the Grammarians can be gathered from that work, it is evident that Patañjali himself maintained the existence of only *four categories* (*padārtha* or *prameya*)—viz. universal (*sāmānya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*kriyā*), and substance (*dravya*), though there were rival doctrines in the field as well, as we shall see later on. This theory of four ontological categories, exhausting among themselves the whole cognizable universe, is not peculiar to the Grammarians alone. In this respect the followers of the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva-mimāṃsā are in complete agreement with them.¹ They too uphold only the four above-mentioned categories, denying all reality to such categories as *viśeṣa* and *samavāya*—which are posited by the philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school as being independent entities altogether. The reason for this aversion on the part of the two principal philosophical sects—viz. the Grammarians and the Bhāṭṭas, with regard to the last two categories, is not far to seek. For, while the Grammarians and Bhāṭṭas confine their inquiries to the commonsense world—to the world that is cognizable by means of the normal efficiency of human sensory organs unreinforced by any suprahuman or trans-

vān, apoho vā śabdārthaḥ kaiścid uktaḥ/ iti grantha-gaurava-bhayāt prakṛtānupayogācca na darśitam—*Op. cit.* Chap. II.

¹*dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānyāni catvāra eva padārthā—iti Tautātītāḥ/—Padmanābha Miśra's Setu on Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya* (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Edition), p. 104. The followers of Kumārila are designated as Tautātita.

cendental mechanism, and build their metaphysical structures on the basis of the findings of such absolutely secular inquiries, the philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school extend their field of metaphysical inquiry beyond the limits of the commonsense world so as to embrace even those categories that are susceptible not of normal perception—but of that supernormal type of perception which is possible for the Yogins alone by virtue of some sort of occult efficiency that is inherent in their sensory organs, but denied to common men. This would be evident from a comparison of the two sets of categories that are respectively posited in the two schools. While the categories set down by the Grammarians and Bhāṭṭas are all capable of normal perception, the two additional categories (viz. *viśeṣa* and *samavāya*) posited by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theorists can be the objects of Yogic perception alone—even on their own showing. The philosophers of the Bhāṭṭa and Grammatical schools have rendered their metaphysical systems more practical and less cumbersome by refusing to introduce this additional leaven that has been admitted by their opponents with scant deference to the verdict of the experience of common man.¹

Let us first examine the Grammarians' theory, which has exercised no little influence on later speculations about the meaning of words. The author of the *Dhvaṇyāloka* extols the Grammarians as being in the forefront of all learned men—the *primus inter pares*.² Patañjali is the greatest exponent of the theory that goes in the name of the Grammarians and which we are going to examine.

¹*viśeṣa-samavāyau tu śaśaviśeṣa-sabrahmacārīṇau, tatsiddhau pramāṇābhāvāt—Māna-meyodaya* of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, p. 288. (T. P. H. Oriental Series.)

²*prathame hi vidvāmso vaiyākaraṇāḥ—vyākaraṇamūlatvāt sarva-vidyānām—ibid. Uddyota I.*

In the introduction to his *Mahābhāṣya* and in various other places of that *Great Commentary*, Patañjali has definitely recorded four distinct categories, which we have already referred to just now. And just as the cognizable universe is composed of these four different categories—viz. *universal*, *quality*, *action*, and *substance*,—so too the *words* that are expressive of those things must of necessity differ *inter se* in view of the difference in their import, and fall under four distinct groups.¹ Thus, there are terms expressive of *universals*, of *qualities*, of *actions*, and of *substances*—and they are as distinct from one another as the categories they signify. In the sentence—“The *white cow X* is running” (*gauś śuklaś calo dīttah*), the four terms constituting the sentence—viz. *X*, *white*, *cow*, and *running*, are not synonymous, though they refer to the self-same object—which is *X* (*dīttah*). Had they been of identical import there would have been no justification for the use of all the four terms, which would have involved an unavoidable tautology just as the sentence—“*a jar is a pitcher*” is tautologous.² And of these four terms in the above sentence, the term *cow* is a *class-name* (*jāti-śabda*), standing

¹tatra vidhivādinaś codayanti—yadi bhavatām dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyalakṣaṇā upādhayo viśeṣaṇāni śābdapratyayaṃ prati nimittāni paramārthatō na santi - tat katham loke daṇḍityabhidhānapratyayāḥ pravarttante dravyādyupādhinimittāḥ ? tathāhi—daṇḍi viśāṇītyādīdhīdhvanī loke dravyopādhikau prasiddhau, śuklaḥ kṣṇa-iti guṇopādhikau, calati bhramatīti karmanimittau,...gaur aśvo hastīti sāmānyaviśeṣopādhī, iha tantuṣu paṭa-iti samavāyabalāt/ tatraiśāṃ dravyādīnām abhāve daṇḍītyādī-dhīdhvanī nirviśayau syātām-iti/—*Tattvasaṃgraha-Pañjikā*.

²gauś śuklaś calo dīttah—ityādīnām viśayavibhāgo na prāpnoti-iti ca tadupādhāveva saṃketah/—*KP. Ullāsa* II. “tathā hi gotvarūpajātīmān śuklatvarūpaguṇavān calanarūpakriyāvān dīttanāmā’yam iti tātparyeṇa ‘gauś śuklaś calo dīttah’—iti prayoge gavādirbhīś caturbhir api śabdair ekā saiva govyaktir ucyate iti pravṛttinimittasya

as it does for the *cow-universal* (*go-tva*), which is common to all the members comprised within that particular class. The other two terms—viz. *white* and *running*, connote *quality* (*whiteness*) and *action* respectively, while the fourth term *X* (*ditthaḥ*) signifies the blank stuff, the discrete individual entity, the substratum of the above-mentioned three attributes—viz. the universal (*go-tva*), the quality (*śukla-tva*), and the action (*calana*),—though of itself devoid of all attributes—the *substance* of Aristotle's metaphysics. Thus, we are led perforce to acknowledge four distinct groups of terms on the basis of their connotative difference on pain of judgmental absurdity arising out of verbal tautology. We must however take up the consideration of each of the above four species of terms, so that the difference in their respective connotations might be clinched further.

The terms like *cow*, *horse*, *dog*, *elephant* etc. are class-names, as they signify universals—viz. *cow-universal*, *horse-universal* etc. There is much difference of opinion among the various philosophical sects as to the objective reality of universals. The Buddhists repudiate such a synthesizing positive entity as a universal, which according to the orthodox philosophers is as much real as the component members subsumed under that universal. The Buddhistic conception of universals is purely subjective and negative as we shall see later on when we come to examine the Buddhistic theory of concepts. Let us now concentrate

bhedo na syāt, vyaktivādimāte vyakter eva pravṛttinimittatvāt, tasyāś ca vyakteḥ prakṛte ekatvād iti/ tathā ca - viśayavibhāgābhāve gavādiśabdānām 'ghaṭaḥ kalaśaḥ' ityādīnām iva ekārthavācakatayā saha-prayogo na syāt/'—*Bāla-bodhinī* of Jhalkikar thereon. (BSS. Edn.) *Vide* also : vyaktiḥ sabdārtha iti mate 'gauś śuklaś calo ditthaḥ' ityādīnām sarveṣāṃ viśeṣya-svarūpamātraparatvena ekārthatāpattiḥ/--*Ekāvalī* of Vidyādhara.

our attention on the Grammarians' viewpoint. The Grammarians' arguments in favour of the terms like *cow*, *horse*, etc. being class-names expressive of universals can be summed up as follows : It has already been noted that a word expresses a particular object because there has been a relation between the two entities—be it natural and inherent or artificial and improvised. Now, what can be the other relatum that is brought into relation with the term *cow* ? One might reply that the term *cow* is related to a particular cow-entity—call it *śābaleya*. Had it been the case the term could not have signified other cow-entities (*bāhuleya* etc.) save that particular cow *śābaleya*, inasmuch as no relation has been established between the term *cow* and other individual cows besides the *śābaleya* one. If however it be maintained that other individual cows would also be signified by the term *cow* besides the particular *śābaleya* individual in spite of their numerical difference, and even in lack of any ostensible relation, it would lead to grave logical absurdities. For, there would be no bar for even a horse being signified by the term *cow*, in so far as the former stands on the same footing with the other individual cows—like *bāhuleya* etc., numerically different alike as they are from the *śābaleya* entity and equally lacking as they do any relation with the term *cow*. Moreover, to argue that the relation of the term *cow* is established with all the individual cows *severally* is to ask us to believe in an impossible feat. For, it is not in the power of any individual man to be acquainted with all the cow-entities that exist—not to speak of the past and future cow-entities that are *ipso facto* incapable of perception. And lacking such an all-embracing acquaintance with the individual cows,—past, present, and future, it is idle and futile to talk of the relation being established *severally* with the latter. Thus the suggestion that the term *cow* signifies an

individual cow (*go-vyakti*) is feeble and absurd on the very face of it.¹ Consequently, the only possible answer can be that it is the cow-universal—that unvariant principle inhering in each and every individual cow, that is the connotation of the term *cow*. That immutable and ubiquitous universal remains unchanged—despite all changes of the individual members—that can be red or white or black. No doubt the objectivity of such a universal has been questioned seriously by the heretic philosophers. But, as we shall see later on in connection with the Buddhistic theory of *apoha*, the arguments against the admission of such a unitive principle are not convincing, and the negative concept of *apoha*, that the Buddhists put forth in lieu of the positive universal of the orthodox schools, can ill serve the purpose of synthesis and fails to account for the felt positivity of our conceptual thoughts. That the universal is the import of such terms as *cow*, *horse* etc. can be easily demonstrated by an appeal to psychology. For, whenever the term *cow* is uttered we are aware not of any particular cow as such,—possessing some definite colour or dimension, but of cows in general divested of all particularities.² Had it been otherwise, there would have been but little difference between perception and verbal knowledge. For instance, when we *perceive* fire with the aid of

¹yadyapyarthakriyākāritayā pravṛtti-nivṛttiyogyā vyaktir eva tathāpi ānanyāt vyabhicārācca tatra saṃketah kartum na śakyate/—*KP. loc. cit.*, which has been explained by Govinda in his *Pradīpa* as follows : kiṃ hi vyaktiṣu sarvāsu saṃketagraho vyavahārāṅgām uta yasyām kasyāñcit/ nānyaḥ—ānanyāt/ nāntyah—vyabhicārāprasaṅgāt/ yatogrhitasaṃketagopiṇḍa iva ghaṭāder api gopadāt pratītiḥ prasaktā/ agrhitasaṃketatvasya tulyatvāt/ kiṃca na yatra saṃketagrahas tasyāpi pratītiḥ—iti vyabhicārānna vyaktau saṃketah/—*ibid.* pp. 21-22. (NSP. Edn.).

²*Vide* : nahi gaur ityukte viśeṣaḥ prakhyāyate—śuklā nilā kapilā kapotiketi/—*Mahābhāṣya* on P. I. 2. 64.

our *tactile sense* we are aware of its scorching heat. But when we hear the word *fire* or *heat* we are never aware of that heat. If it were maintained that the word *fire* signifies a particular fire-entity with all its individual and distinctive attributes—viz. colour, heat, dimension etc., there would have been nothing to resist the possibility of our sensing those attributes which alone constitute its essence and being, just as in an act of perception we are able to cognise distinctly those attributes. The cognition of fire as arising out of the term *fire* is blurred and indistinct with all its distinctive attributes hidden from our consciousness, while the perception of the self-same entity perforce thrusts upon our consciousness all those qualities with an unmistakable impact and vividness.¹ Thus it must be admitted that it is the *universal* that is signified by terms like *cow*, *horse* etc. inasmuch as the conceptual cognitions generated by those terms are not cognisant of distinctive attributes—of which the particulars are merely but a totality. For, it might be laid down as a general dictum that—what is not invariably present as a content in the cognition generated by a particular term, say *cow*, cannot be regarded as the connotation of that term.²

¹yathā hi uṣṇādyarthavisayendriyabuddhiḥ sphuṭapratibhāsā vedyate na tathā uṣṇādiśabdbhāvinā/ nahi upahata-nayana-rasana-ghrāṇādayo mātuliṅgādiśabdaśravaṇāt tadrūpa-rasādyanubhāvino bhavanti, yathā'nupahata-nayana-rasana-ghrāṇādaya indriyadhiyā' nubhavantah/ yathoktam- "anyathaivāgnisambandhād dāhaṃ dagdho'bhimanyate/ anyathā dāhaśabdena dāhārthaḥ sampratīyate/"—iti—*Pañjikā* on *TS. kārikā* 879. Vol. I. p. 280. *Vide* also : śataśo'pi gaur ityukte śuklatvādi-viśeṣānavagamapūrvam sāmānyasya śabdato'vagateḥ sā śabdaśakyā/ dravyasyaiva śakyatve tu tasya guṇasamūharūpatvena śuklatvādiviśeṣāvagatiprasaṅgaḥ/—*VSM*. p. 472.

²Cp. na sa tasya ca śabdasya yukto yogo na tatkr̥te/pratyaye sati bhātyartha rūpa-bodhe tathā rasaḥ/—*TS. kārikā* 880 and Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* thereon. Vol. I. p. 280.

We must now pass on to the second category of words—viz. the words that signify *qualities*. As instances of that species we might refer to such words as *red* and *white*, *sweet* and *bitter* etc. There is an essential difference between the ontological status of *universals* on the one hand and *qualities*, and for the matter of that, *actions* also on the other. And it is this basic difference that has led Patañjali to postulate a separate species of words besides those signifying *universals*. For, whatever might be the difference between perception and verbal cognition, the latter must follow the lead of the former and take note of these categories, that are discriminated in perception.¹ Now what is the difference between a universal—say, cow-universal (*go-tva*), and a quality—say, white-ness (*śukla-tva*)? The latter is as much indissociable from its substratum as the former. We cannot divest an individual cow of its white colour any more than we can dissociate from it the class-characteristic—viz. cow-hood, without destroying its very individuality.² The question is pertinent no doubt, but an answer too is not inconceivable. Bhartṛhari in his *Vākya-pāṇīya* has offered a solution. According to him the *universal* is the quintessence of the individual and remains unchanged through all its duration. As he has succinctly stated : The universal imparts life to an individual (*padārthasya prāṇa-pradaḥ*). But howsoever closely interwoven the qualities (and actions also) might be with their substratum—the *substance*, they cannot be conceived of as being the *esse* of the latter. They are merely the differentiating factors (*viśeṣādhāna-hetu*)—the differentia of

¹*Vide* : “pratyakṣaviśaye vṛttir iṣṭā śabdānumānayoḥ”.

²nahī jātyādinirmuktaṃ vastu dṛṣṭaṃ kadācana/ tadvimokena vā tāni lākṣādi-sphaṭikādivat/—*ŚV.* v. 144 on *JS.* I. 1. 4, as also the illuminating comments of Sucarita Miśra in his *Kāśikā* thereon.

Aristotelian Logic, serving only to mark them off from all other individuals belonging to the same genus or to a different one. There would be no inconsistency in imagining a *cow* changing hourly its colour as a chameleon does. But to conceive of a cow changing its generic attribute *cow-universal* and at the same time remaining a cow is as much fantastic as to imagine a circle shedding off its circularity and remaining a circle nonetheless. As Bhartṛhari has stated : A cow-entity *per se* is neither distinguishable from other entities nor is it affirmable as *a cow*. Its positive character of being a cow as also the negative character of being different from what is not cow is not intrinsic but only derived from the inherence of the universal *cow-hood* in it. Had it been otherwise there would have been no difficulty in recognising from afar a cow-entity as cow and as distinct from horse etc., even though the universal cow-hood might not be cognised owing to its outlines being blurred through distance. But we can neither recognise nor describe a cow as cow from a distance till the universal cow-hood—which is the basis of any such affirmative or negative cognition or description, remains uncognised.¹ The *qualities* and

¹uktam hi Vākyapadīye—‘na hi gauḥ svarūpeṇa gaur nāpyagauḥ/ gotvābhisambandhāt tu gauḥ’—iti/—*KP. Ullāsa* II. For an elucidation of this statement of Bhartṛhari *vide* the following passage of Jagan-nātha’s *Rasagaṅgādhara* : ayam hi jātirūpaḥ śabdārthaḥ prāṇada-ityucyate/ prāṇam vyavahārayogyatām dadāti sampādayatīti vyupatteḥ/ taduktam—‘nāhi gauḥ svarūpeṇa...’—iti/ asyārthaḥ—gauḥ sāsna-dimān dharmī svarūpeṇa ajñātagotvakena dharmisvarūpamātreṇa na gauḥ, na govyavahāranirvāhakaḥ/ nāpyagauḥ- nāpi gobhinna iti vyavahā-rasya nirvāhakaḥ/ tathā sati dūrād anabhivyaktasamsthānatayā gotvā-grahadaśāyām gavi gaur iti gobhinna iti vā vyavahāraḥ syāt/ svarū-pasyāviśeṣāt ghaṭe gaur iti gavi cā’gaur iti vā vyavahāraḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ/ gotvābhisambandhāt gotvavattayā jñānāt gaur gośabda-vya-vahārya iti/—*Op. cit.*, p. 182 (*NSP. Edn.* 1939).

actions are mutable¹ being extraneous to the being of a particular entity—be it cow or horse, but the universals cow-hood, horse-hood etc. are immutable and unvariant, persisting throughout the life-history of that entity and making it what it is. This basic difference between universals on the one hand and qualities and actions on the other has been taken note of by the Naiyāyikas as well. For though all of them are equally related with their substratum through the instrumentality of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) and as such are indistinguishable on that count, yet their respective mode of inherence in each case has been differentiated by the introduction of the time-factor. The relation of universal and its substratum—the substance, is congenital, there being no intervening sequence between the latter's birth and the aforesaid inherence with the universal. No sooner is a jar produced than the jar-hood inheres in it.² But such is not the case with qualities. The Naiyāyikas interpose a moment's intervention between the production of an entity—say, a jar, and the inherence of qualities in it. This distinction is no doubt unsatisfactory from the empirical standpoint and is only a dogmatic assertion of the Naiyāyikas to make it conform with their peculiar etiological tenet that envisages a relation of causality between a substance and its qualities in lieu of the relation of identity-cum-difference posited by the Grammarians as also by such non-absolutist philosophers as the Mimāṃsakas and Jainas. Nevertheless it is important in so far as it stresses logically the ontological difference between the two categories and gives additional weight to

¹Cp. “sattve niviśate’paiti—” the definition of a *quality* from the Vaiyākaraṇa viewpoint.

²jātaś ca sambaddhaś ca - ityekaḥ kālaḥ/—Uddyotakara in his *Nyāya-vārttika*.

the Vaiyākaraṇa view that differentiates them purely on empirical grounds. Now it might be asked : What is the reason of grouping such terms as *white*, *red*, *sweet*, *bitter* under a separate category ? Why not remove the dividing barrier and put the terms *cow*, *horse*, *sweet*, *bitter*, *white* etc. under the same class ? Is it not a fact that the term *white* signifies the universal *white-ness* as characterising all the different *white patches* of varying shades ? Should it not, therefore, with deference to our experience as also to logic, be regarded as a class-name—connoting a universal, along with such undisputed class-names as *cow*, *horse* etc. ? The problem is very subtle, no doubt, and the opinions are divided—as in the case of so many other abstruse problems of philosophy. Patañjali, in his *Mahābhāṣya* on P. V. 3. 55 enjoining superlative suffixes after terms expressive of *qualities* to signify comparison, has discussed with his characteristic thoroughness the topic at great length and has made the issue, as far as the Vaiyākaraṇa standpoint is concerned, sufficiently clear. We commonly say—“Milk is whiter (*śukla-tara*) than butter.” Had *white-ness* been an immutable and unitary entity like the *cow-universal* such a usage would have been grammatically as well as logically unjustifiable. There can be no comparison of a unitary entity with respect to its own self, save on the basis of an illusory polarisation. Comparison presupposes entitative difference (*bheda*)—be it real or apparent due to superimposition (*āroḥa*). Had the particular *white colour* of milk been identical with the particular *white colour* of butter, the proposition would have been as much unmeaning as the assertion—“*I am stronger than myself*.” Thus, to uphold the significance of the above proposition we must have to maintain perforce that the white colour in each case is numerically different.¹ Patañjali, in consistency with his

¹kiṃ punar ekaṃ śauklyam āhosvit nānā ? kiṃ cātaḥ ? yadyekaṃ

fourfold classification of terms, maintains the unity of *qualities*. The quality in this case known as *white-ness* is an individual having no second. The difference in degrees of *white-ness* in different patches of white-colour cannot argue the *real difference* of the instances of white-ness themselves. The colour *white* in milk and butter is identical. Their difference is apparent, the difference of their substratum—the *substance*, being superimposed on *white-ness*, which *per se* is destitute of all degrees that form the basis of comparison. Just as the self-same piece of crystal appears to be different owing to the superimposition of different hues of flowers like the blue lotus and the rose, so too the quality known as *white-ness*, though immutable like the *universal*, appears as variable owing to the superimposition of attributes of varying substances in which it inheres. Patañjali clarifies his position further by proposing another solution. The less or greater degrees of white-ness is not due to the actual difference of particular instances of white-ness *inter se*, but is caused by an inter-mixture of other colours—like *black* or *yellow* or *blue*, that either obscure or enhance the *white-ness* which is unitary all the same, howsoever much we might cognise their difference that must be ultimately repudiated as illusory. As for instance, the fragrance of the *mallikā* flower seems to be enhanced as it is mixed with the fragrance of *jasmine* or lotus.¹ Thus according to Patañjali qualities are as much particulars as individuals like *Devadatta* and *Yajñadatta*. Udayana however in his *Kiraṇāvalī* on the *Prāśastapāda-Bhāṣya* has cri-

prakarṣo nopapadyate/ nahi tenaiva tasya prakarṣo bhavati/—*Mahābhāṣya*, *loc. cit.*

¹astu ekaṃ śauklyam/...nanu cōktam-‘prakarṣo nopapadyate, nahi tenaiva tasya prakarṣo bhavatīti’/ guṇāntareṇa pracchādanāt prakarṣo bhaviṣyati/—*Mahābhāṣya*, *loc. cit.*, on which Kaiyyaṭa comments :

ticised this doctrine of unity and immutability of particular types of quality such as *white-ness*, *sweet-ness* etc., as proposed by Patañjali and his followers. The immutability of particular types of quality, such as *white-ness*,—Udayana observes, is untenable. For, we experience *black-ness* in jar and the emergence of *red-ness* as it is put into the furnace. And such experiences attest the impermanence and multiplicity of qualities instead of their immutability and unity.¹ Udayana however does not commit himself to the view—as might appear to be owned by him from the trend of his argument seeking to establish the multiplicity of qualities like *white-ness*, *sweet-ness* etc.—that there is a *universal white-hood* (let us say, to avoid confusion with the *quality white-ness* which according to the Grammarians is one and eternal) characterizing all particular white patches of varying luminosity, just as there is the universal *cow-hood* synthesizing the different cow-individuals that are distinct from one another in colour, shape, and dimension. For on such a view there would be *the fallacy of cross-division* (*jāti-sāṅkarya*) due to the co-inherence of two

guṇāntareṇa pracchādanād-iti/sambhedāt, miśrīkaraṇād ityarthah/ yathā hi jātyutpalādivāsītāyā mallikāyāḥ/—which again has been explained by Nāgeśa in his *Uddyota* as follows : *sambhedād-iti/ guṇāntareṇa kṣṇādinā pracchāditatvāt apakarṣaḥ/ aujvalyādiguṇāntarācchāditasya ca prakarṣa iti bhāvah/*—*ibid.* Vol. IV. p. 378. (NSP Edn.) *Vide* also Nāgeśa's *VSM* : *athavā eke (scil. śuklādayo guṇāḥ) niravayavāḥ, nairmalyādiguṇāntaramiśraṇāt prakarṣa-iti bhāvah/ yathā jātyutpalādi-vāsītāyā mallikāyā gandha-prakarṣaḥ/* —*Op. cit.* p. 458.

¹ye punar āhuḥ śuklatvādikam eva sāmānyam nāsti, kutas tadavāntara-tāratamyam iti/ ekaikā eva hi śuklāruṇādi-rūpavyaktayo nityā api anityābhiḥ dravyavyaktibhir vyajyante/ tāratamyam tvamūśām āśrayamiśratayā,—yathā yathā hi dhavale kṣṇadravyānupraveśas tathā tathā tāratamyābhāsa iti tad ayuktam/ teṣām āśrayasthitau api pāvakaśaṃyogāt pūrvarūpanivṛttir uttararūpotpādaś ca na syāt/—*Op. cit.*, pp. 47-48. (*Benares Sanskrit Series Edition*).

mutually exclusive universals—viz. white-hood (*śuklatva*) and cow-hood (*go-tva*), in the same substratum—viz. the individual cow.¹ Śālikanātha in his commentary *Rju-vimalā* on Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*, however, has endeavoured to support the unity and immutability of particular types of quality—as Patañjali maintains. He argues that the difference that is experienced in particular white patches cannot be construed as being an evidence of a real entitative difference, as it can be accounted for by the presence of extraneous elements. The argument that has been raised by Udayana against the unity and permanence of quality-types on the basis of the disappearance and emergence of varying qualities like the *black-ness* and *red-ness* in the self-same substance 'jar' which is their substratum can also be satisfactorily accounted for on the basis of unity,—as Śālikanātha observes. For, though black-ness (*śyāmatva*) is one and eternal, yet it is experienced as being destroyed because of the destruction of inherence (*samavāya*) which links the *quality* with the *substance*. So also the quality of *red-ness* though by itself present everywhere all time, ubiquitous and eternal as it is, is felt to be produced because of the actual production of inherence in the jar. Thus the actual production and destruction of inherence are falsely superimposed on the qualities that are *per se* unitary and permanent and ubiquitous. Though according to the Naiyāyikas inherence is one and eternal yet the philosophers of the Prābhākara school, differing as they do from the Bhāṭṭas in positing the reality of inherence as a separate category, uphold its multiplicity and impermanence.² Consequently the Naiyā-

¹astu tarhi śuklatvādikam sāmānyam eva-iti cet/ na, gotvādinā parāparabhāvānupapattau jāti-sāṅkhyā-prasaṅgāt/—*loc. cit.*

²ghaṭa-samavāyah paṭa-samavāya iti bhedavyavahāra-darśanāt

yika thesis that the qualities of *white-ness*, *red-ness* etc. in earthly atoms are produced through heat (*pākaja*) while in objects that are products themselves like *jar* or *cloth* they are produced through the instrumentality of the respective qualities of the material causes (viz. earthly atoms) thereof is an unproven hypothesis.¹ Now it might be contended by the critics that the particular *white colour* being thus proved to be a unitary, ubiquitous and eternal principle like *cow-hood* inhering in numerous individuals it should be regarded as a universal like the latter satisfying as it does all the conditions of a *universal*—viz. unity, permanence, and subsistence in the substratum through the relation of inherence.² Thus in lieu of *white-hood* as synthesising the different white patches being con-

samavāyo nānā—iti Prābhākaraḥ/- Mallinātha's *Sārasaṃgraha* on Varadarāja's *Tārkika-rakṣā*, p. 56. (*Medical Hall, Benares.*). For the refutation of *samavāya* from the Bhātṭa standpoint vide Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa's *Māna-meyodaya*, pp. 288ff. (T. P. H. Oriental Series Edn.). According to the Bhātṭas *inherence* is nothing but identity-cum-difference. Comp : tasmād avayavā'vayavinoḥ guṇa-guṇinoḥ jāti-jātimatoḥ kriyā-kriyāvatoś ca parasparam tādātmyam eva sambandhaḥ/—*ibid.* p. 291.

¹We quote here the relevant portion from Śālikanātha's *Rjuvimalā* : nanu pratiguṇyaruṇādīnāṃ bhedāt ekaṃ sāmānyam aṅgīkartuṃ yuktam, anyathā śabdādīnāṃ pravṛtṭyanupapatteḥ/ atrābhīdhīyate—bhinnatvaṃ abhinnatvaṃ vā vastuno bhinnābhinnāvabhāsibuddhīnibandhanam/ tatra tāvad aruṇimādiṣu na bhedabuddhir asti/ yāpi ca paṭumandatādibhir viśeṣair viśeṣabuddhiḥ, sā'pi na svarūpabhedam āvahati—viśeṣamātratvāt/ nanu aruṇimādayaḥ paramāṇuṣu pārthiveṣu pākajāḥ, sarvakāryadravyeṣu ca kāraṇaguṇapūrvā - ityutpattimatvāt aparāparataiva avasīyate/ maivam - kasyāyam abhyupagamaḥ? ākr̥tīvad dravyeṣu guṇaḥ samavaitīti vāyaṃ pratipadyāmahe/ sa guṇasamavāyaḥ kasyacit kathañcit udeti apaiti ca/ na ca samavāyam api nityam ekaṃ abhyupagacchāmaḥ/ tena śakaladravyeṣu eko'ruṇimā aruṇapadābhīdhāniyaḥ-iti/—*ibid.* p. 164.

²yadapi-“bhavantu vā guṇā eva śuklādayaḥ, parantu jagatīgatā ekaikā eva nityāś ca”—ityādinā niruktam, tadapyayuktam/....nitya-

sidered as a universal,—the particular colour *white-ness* itself, which is identical and immutable as the Grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas assert, is made into a *universal*, countervailing all the arguments in favour of recognising it as a *quality* entitatively different from the *universal*. So nothing is gained by repudiating the universal *white-hood* and substituting for it another universal—viz. *white-ness*, the colour itself. The Grammarians, however, at this point, are forced to resort to a ruse to tide over this difficulty. They concede that the colour *white-ness* is as much a synthesizing principle as the class-characteristic *cow-hood*. But while the former is merely a *common characteristic* (*sāmānya*), the latter alone is a *genus* or *universal* (*jāti*). This differentiation has been suggested by Patañjali himself in his *Mahābhāṣya* on P. V. 3. 55 already referred to in which he explains the term *jāti* on the basis of its derivative meaning as being a category that inheres in the substratum by virtue of its very birth, independent of any human effort. If this etymological sense of *jāti* is adopted, such attributes as *cow-hood*, *horse-hood* etc. alone can be strictly considered as *genera* or *universals* inasmuch as they are congenital with their substrata, while the qualities like *white-ness* and *sweet-ness*, and actions like *running*, *cooking* etc. are not so.¹ Thus, if these two aspects of synthesis are discriminated, the Vaiyākaraṇa position urging the unity and permanence of quality-types like *white-ness* etc. can be maintained without reducing them to universals and upsetting the four-fold classification of words that corresponds to the four-fold division of ontological categories

syā'nekasamavetasya jātitvāpatteś ca/—Padmanābha's *Setu* on *Prasastapāda-Bhāṣya*, p. 202. (*Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*).

¹evaṃ ca pācakatvam api sāmānyam bhavatyeva/ jātitvaṃ tu yathā na tathoktam/ “atiśāyane tamab”-iti sūtre Bhāṣye ‘jānanena yat prāpyate sā jātiḥ’-ityuktam/—*VSM*. p. 468.

themselves, as has been already pointed out at the very outset of our present dissertation.¹

All these arguments are *mutatis mutandis* applicable to the terms expressive of actions also—which differ from the qualities ontologically in so far as while the latter are *fait accompli*, the former refer only to a *continuous process*,—a continuity of points in Time. Thus while *actions* have a temporal significance, *qualities* have none. The action-unit—viz. *cooking*, is not a self-sufficient and isolated fact, but a succession of facts stretched through a definite period of time—viz. kindling the cinders, placing the pan on fire, pouring water and putting rice into it, and lastly taking the pan off the oven when the rice has been boiled. All these events *taken together* constitute the action known as *cooking* and not *severally*. Thus temporal sequence is a constituent element of actions of every sort, and consequently enters into the connotation of terms like *cooking*, *running*, etc. as a determinant. But not so with such terms as *white*, or *sweet*, or *loud*. They signify qualities to understand which we are not required to have any knowledge of Time. They have no temporal import at all.

It is now time to pass on to the consideration of *proper names* (*saṃjñā-śabda*) like *Devadatta*, *Yajñadatta*, etc. The term *Devadatta* refers to a particular *individual* as distinct from

¹Professor Bertrand Russell considers *white-ness* etc. as universals like *cow-hood*. As he observes : “....It is obvious, to begin with, that we are acquainted with such universals as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard, etc., i. e. with qualities which are exemplified in sense-data. When we see a white-patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the white-ness which they have in common, and in learning to do this we are learning to be acquainted with white-ness. A similar process will make us acquainted with any other universal of the same sort. Universals of this sort may be called “sensible qualities”. They can be apprehended with less effort of abstrac-

all other individuals in the universe. The one essential difference between *proper names* on the one hand and the three other categories of terms on the other is this that while the usage of the latter is conditioned by the objectivity of one or other of the three attributes—viz. *universals*, *qualities* and *actions*, there is no conditioning factor, the absence or presence of which can prevent or provoke the usage of what are known as *proper names*. The term *cow* would be used only where there is the presence of the universal *cow-hood*. Similarly the terms *white* and *cooking*—would be used where the corresponding attributes of *white-ness* and *cooking* respectively—one a *quality* and the other an *action*—are objectively present. But the application of the term *Devadatta* has nothing objective to correspond with. We might call a dog by the name of *Caesar* as much as the great Roman Conqueror—though there is not the least semblance between the two that can occasion the utterance of the same sound-group. And it is because of this that *proper names* have been significantly styled as *yadṛcchā-śabda*'s—i. e. terms that owe their application to one's own personal caprice or whim. They connote nothing else but the succession of a particular group of sounds. Thus they are self-connotative as opposed to the other categories of terms that signify things that are other than the terms themselves and are objectively real.¹ Consequently in the case of a *proper name*—

tion than any others, and they seem less removed from particulars than other universals are". (Italics ours). The concluding sentence of the passage cited from Russell's *The Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 158-9 shows, however, that Russell is more inclined to regard white-ness etc., as immutable quality-types identical in all substances as the Grammarians maintain than to class them with genuine *universals* like cow-hood etc. as some would fain hold them to be.

¹ditthādiśabdānām antyabuddhinirgrāhyaṃ saṃhṛtakramaṃ svarūpaṃ vaktrā yadṛcchayā ditthādiṣu artheṣū'pādhitvena sanniveśyate

say, *Devadatta*, we comprehend a *substance*—as devoid of all objective attributes like the *universal*, the *quality*, the *action*, and as a discrete entity characterised by the *sound-group* *D-e-v-a-d-a-t-t-a* which alone is the connotation of the term¹. And that is why proper names are called *dravya-śabda*'s inasmuch as they ultimately signify no other objective category but the substance (*dravya*) itself—the substratum of all attributes that remain unexpressed².

Now, at this stage a query might be put : Conceding that there are four distinct categories of words corresponding to four distinct ontological categories—viz. the *universal*, the *quality*, the *action*, and the *substance*, do they connote the corresponding category alone to the exclusion of all others ? Or, to make our position clearer : Do the terms *cow*, *red*, *cooking*, and *Caesar*, signify the universal *cow-hood*, the quality *red-ness*, the action *cooking* and the blank stuff—the *substance* characterised by the particular sequence of the letters *C-a-e-s-a-r* respectively to the exclusion of all others ? Do we apprehend from the term *cow* nothing but the universal *cow-hood* ? Don't we cognise from the term *cow* a particular individual—the *substance* to be more precise, as also the *qualities* that are found associated with that universal, besides the *universal* itself ? Do we not comprehend from the term *cow*, the peculiar formation of the

-iti so'yam samjñārūpo yadrccchātmaka-iti/—*KP. Ullāsa* II, on which Caṇḍidāsa comments : dīthhādīśabdānām svarūpam dīthhādīśabdā eva/—*ibid.* p. 25. (*Princess of Wales Sanskrit Series*).

¹Cp. "There are many men called "Smith," but they do not share any property of Smithyness ; in each case it is an arbitrary convention that the man has that name."—Bertrand Russell : *An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 110.

²evam dīthhādīśabdānām samjñātva-viditātmanām/ abhidheyasya sāmānyaśūnayatvād vyaktivācīta/ - ata eva hi dravyaśabdā ityucyante —*NM.* Vol. I. p. 298.

creature, its docility, and its usefulness as a beast of burden—that are the invariable concomitants of the universal *cow-hood* which alone is regarded as the connotation of the term *cow*? If we do cognise all these things besides the universal, then why is it that the latter alone should be recognised as the connotation to the exclusion of all others? Is it not a dogmatic assertion and nothing more? The same query can be made with regard to terms expressive of qualities like *red*, *white* etc. Do we not understand from these terms the substance too in addition to the respective qualities—viz. *red-ness*, *white-ness* etc. Even *proper names* cannot be exempted from this charge. Do we not comprehend from the term *Caesar*, if we are to be true to our experience, all those *qualities* and *actions* that make up the life-history of that great hero and not merely the taste-less individual as characterised by the sequence of those six letters, destitute of all conceivable attributes and as such uncognisable *per se*? The problem is difficult and different answers have been given by different theorists consistently with the body of the rest of their respective postulates.

The Naiyāyika answer to the above problem seems to be the most rational from the empirical point of view. They maintain that the connotation of a particular term consists in the *universal*, the *qualities*, the *action*, the *substance* as also the configuration of the *substance*—where possible—*all taken together and not severally*.¹ This theory has a great claim to our recognition, being as it is a faithful interpretation of our conceptual thoughts. We have already recorded the dictum that the contents of perceptual and conceptual cognitions are identical. When we perceive a *cow* we perceive not merely the universal *cow-hood* but its dis-

¹*Vide* : jātyākṛtivyaktayastu padārthaḥ—Gautama's *Nyāya-Sūtra*.

tinctive *qualities* and *actions* as also its peculiar *configuration*. So it is but logical that the conceptual cognition caused by the term *cow* would be alike cognisant of all these elements.¹ But it might be contended against this view that if the contents of perceptual and conceptual cognitions be indistinguishable, verbal cognition is reduced to a species of perception and loses its *raison d'être* for being recorded as a separate instrument of knowledge. Moreover, on this view, the difference in vividness between the two forms of cognition becomes inexplicable. To this the Naiyāyikas' reply would be as follows : The identity of contents posited by us in both perception and verbal cognition need not be construed to apply to every detail. We do not maintain that the conceptual cognition of fire is as much cognisant of its *heat* as the perception of the self-same entity. But what we do intend to mean is that though qualities like *heat* etc. might not be comprehended in their specific aspect *quâ* heat etc. in the conceptual cognition of fire, which is a *universal*-term, as in perception, yet those categories are as much present there in their non-specific aspect *quâ* qualities as the universal fire-hood. The difference between the two forms of cognition lies more in the emphasis as to one or the other of the particular elements forming their contents than in the entitative differences of the elements themselves. While perception emphasises the *particular aspect* of an entity as opposed to its universal aspect, the position is just reversed in the corresponding conceptual cognition. The difference lies in the stress and in nothing more.² The identity of contents refers to the

¹pratyakṣaṃ na hi niṣkṛṣṭa-jātyaṃśa-pariveṣṭitam/
 tadgocara-pravṛttaś ca śabdāḥ taṃ kathayet katham/
 —tasmāt pratyakṣaviśaye pravartamānaṃ tatsamānaviśayaṃ eva bhav-
 itum arhati padam, na sāmānyamātraniṣṭham/—*NM.* Vol. I. p. 296.
²natu sarvātmanā pratyakṣatulyaviśayāḥ śabdāḥ, pratipattisāmya-

categories in their non-specific aspects *quâ universals, qualities, actions and substances*, and not in their specific aspects *quâ cow-hood, whiteness*, and so on. No two perceptions even of the self-same entity—say, *fire*, can be identical in their contents if they are considered in their specific aspects. The *visual* perception of fire differs from its *tactile* perception as to their specific contents inasmuch as while in the former *colour* is a constituent element of the content, in the latter it is replaced by *touch*, though the universal *fire-hood* and the *substratum* the *substance*—the unknowable something, are common to both the cases. But if we ignore the specific aspects of *colour* and *touch*, and view them from their non-specific aspects as *qualities*—which both of them actually are, there remains no distinction between the above two modes of perception as they are alike cognisant of the *universal*, the *qualities*, and the *substance*. It is from this basis that perception and verbal cognition too have been identified as to their contents, the difference in this case being somewhat more pronounced than that between cases of perception *inter se* on account of the shifting of the emphasis from the *substance* to the *universal*. That Grammarians too had a definite inclination towards the above view of the Naiyāyikas advocating the *cumulative* aspect of connotations, as opposed to the *isolationist* aspect stressed by the followers of Kumārila, as we shall see presently, has been definitely shown by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāya-*

praśaṅgāt/ naca śabdād indriyācca tulye pratipatti bhavataḥ/ tad uktam—“anyathaivāgnisambandhāt dāhaṃ dagdho’bhimanyate”—ityādi/ - ucyate/...sakalaviśeṣa-grahaṇāgrahaṇābhyāṃ pratipatti-viśeṣa-siddheḥ/ dharmyabhiprāyeṇa ca saṃplavasyoktatvāt/ naitāvatā sāmānyamātraniṣṭhaḥ śabdo bhavati/—NM. Vol. I. p. 296. *Vide also* : indriyaprañālikayā cittasya bāhyavastūparāgāt tadviśayā sāmānyaviśeṣātmano’rthasya viśeṣādvadhāraṇapradhānā vṛttiḥ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam/ —*Vyāsa-Bhāṣya* on Patañjali’s *Yoga-sūtra*, I. 7.

mañjarī. Kātyāyana in one of his *Vārttikas* under P. V. 1. 119, enjoining the suffixes *-tva* and *-tal* after substantives, observes : “(The suffixes) *-tva* and *-tal* (are enjoined after substantives) to signify attributes (viz. *qualities* or *actions* or *universals*) the inherence of which in particular objects (viz. *substance* or *quality* or *action*) provokes the use of those substantives to signify those objects.” Thus, Kātyāyana is definitely in favour of regarding the *substance* possessed of attributes like the *universal*, the *qualities* and the *actions*, as the connotation of a particular word.¹ Patañjali’s statement too in his introduction to the *Mahābhāṣya* suggests the same view. As he has distinctly observed : “The word (*gauḥ*) is that whose utterance gives rise to the comprehension of the dew-lap, the tail, the hump, the hoofs, and the horns (scil. all taken together).” Nothing can be more explicit than this observation of Patañjali as to the *cumulative* or rather *composite* aspect of connotations,—which is the thesis of the *Naiyāyikas*.² That a term expresses all these elements—

¹tathā cāhuḥ—‘yasya guṇasya hi bhāvāt dravye śabdaniveśaḥ tadabhidhāne tva-talādayaḥ’-iti (Kātyāyana’s *Vārttika* 5 on P. V. 1. 119. The proper reading of the *Vārttika* is ‘—*tva-tatau*’)/ guṇasya hi bhāvāt dravye śabdaniveśaḥ iti tadvadvācyapakṣasākṣīṇyakṣarāṇi/—*NM*. Vol. I. p. 297. That *guṇa* in the above *Vārttika* includes *jāti* and *kriyā* too, has been explicitly stated by Kaiyaṣa in his *Pradīpa* thereon : *yasya guṇasyeti*/—guṇaśabdena yāvān kaścit parāśrayo bhedako jātyādir arthaḥ sa sarva iha grhyate/ ...bhāvāt vidyamānatvāt- ityarthah/ dravyaśabdena viśeṣyabhūtaḥ sattva-bhāvāpanno-’rtha ucyate/—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. IV. p. 295. (NSP. Edn).

²Gautamo’pi...‘jātyākṛtivyaktayas tu padārthaḥ’-ityāha/ tatra jātiḥ pravṛttinimittopalakṣaṇam/ ākṛtipadena rūpakriyādiviśiṣṭam avayavasamsthānam jātiliṅgam eva/ ata eva ca ‘gām likha’-ityādaḥ lekhanakarmatvopapattiḥ/ ata eva ‘gaur iti vijñāne pratibhāsamāneṣu vastuṣu kaḥ śabdaḥ iti praśne sāsnaḍivīṣiṣṭasyārthasya kriyāyāḥ, guṇasya, jāteś ca śabdatvaṃ ‘kim yat tat sāsna-lāṅgūla-kakuda-khura-viśā-

viz. the *substance*, the *universal*, the *quality*, and the *action* as also the *configuration*—can be further proved by an appeal to our psychology. For, when we hear the term *mango* (*āmra*) we are invariably found to be inquisitive as to its *taste*—as to whether it is *sweet* or *sour*. This inquisitiveness cannot be explained if a *general* cognition of the qualities—*taste* in this case, howsoever vague that might be, is denied. It is the accepted dictum of philosophers that any enquiry as to the *specific* attributes can be possible with respect to that alone with which one is *generally* acquainted. We cannot ask anything about Caesar if we are in no way aware of his existence—not acquainted with his name even, to say the least. Thus in conformity with this dictum it must be admitted that the awareness of taste is caused by the term *mango*, though not *quâ* taste but *quâ* quality.¹ In the visual perception too of a mango-

nyartharūpaṃ sa śabdaḥ' - ityetad-granthe iti-śabdabalāt, taditi-napuṃsakavaśācca śukla-surabhyādiviśeṣaśabdair vyavahriyamāṇaṃ vasturūpaṃ gandha-sparśādikaṃ ca śabda-ityādyarthakenāśaṅkya 'ne-tyāha - vakṣyamāṇaguṇāśrayaṃ dravyaṃ nāma tat, kriyā nāma sā, uktadravyavṛttir guṇo nāma saḥ, ākṛtir nāma sā'—ityevaṃ teṣāṃ tattvābhāvam upapādyā 'yenocāritena sāsna-lāṅgūla-kakuda-khura-viśāṇināṃ sampratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ' -ityuttaritaṃ Patañjalīnā/ ata eva Kaiyaṭena "atha gaur ityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ" -iti prāśnasya gaur iti vijñāteṣu vastuṣu kaḥ śabdaḥ ityāśayam ukṭvā tānyeva vastūni krameṇa nirḍiśatīti 'kiṃ yat tat sāsna—'—ityādibhāṣyam avatāritaṃ/ 'yena—' ityādisiddhānta-bhāṣye viśānasyopalakṣaṇatvāt guṇa-kriyājātigrahaṇam/—VSM. pp. 458-59. That *sāsna*, *lāṅgūla* etc. include *guṇa*, *kriyā* and *jāli* has been noted by Nāgeśa in his *Uddyota* on Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* under the above-quoted *Bhāṣya*-text : atra viśāṇāntair avayavair guṇādayo'pyupalakṣyante/—Vol. I. p. 16. (NSP. Edn). *Vide* also : atha gaur ityatra gaur ityanenāviśeṣāt jñānamātrasya grahaṇena jñānamātre śabda-guṇa-kriyādi-sāmānya-bhāvasya Bhāṣyakṛtā dhvananāt/—VSM. loc. cit.

¹ata eva cā'mraphalādaḥ śrute rasaviśeṣādijijñāsā/ viśeṣajijñāsā-yāḥ sāmānyajñānapūrvakatvāt/ -VSM. p. 459.

fruit the taste is generally cognised *quâ* taste though not *quâ* sweet-ness or sour-ness, as eyes are incompetent to cognise taste in its specific aspect as *bitter* or *sweet* or *sour*—which is capable of being cognised by the palate (*rasa-nā*) alone. For, here too, the same mood of inquiry is found to follow upon the aforesaid visual perception.¹ Thus all conceptual cognitions being complex by nature it is reasonable to maintain the corresponding connotations too as complex and not merely consisting of a single isolated *universal*, *quality*, *action* or *substance* as the case may be,—abstracted from all the rest.

But the Mīmāṃsakas demur against the above view of the Naiyāyikas and the Grammarians. According to them all terms are in the first instance expressive of *universals*. We have already discussed in some detail the issue as to whether there are *universals* like *white-ness*, *sweet-ness*, *cooking*, *movement* etc. synthesising the varying instances of qualities and actions. Though the Grammarians and Naiyāyikas refuse to accept such universals, the Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa school declare themselves in favour of such a view.² The Bhāṭṭas go farther and regard even the *proper names* which we have seen are denotative of *individuals* as having universals as their connotations. For though the term *Devadatta*, which is a *proper name*, has

¹cakṣurādibhir api sāmānyato rasādigrahaṇaṃ bhavatyeva/ viśeṣas tu rasanāditattadindriyagrāhya eva/ ata eva āmrāphale drṣṭe rasaviśeṣādijijñāsā/

²The Prābhākaras however strictly follow the Grammarians' classification of terms into four different categories as against the Bhāṭṭas who regard all connotations as being essentially in the form of universals. *Vide* : abhidheye hi na kvacid viśeṣaḥ/ ākṛtir vyaktir guṇo vā bhavatu/ na hi autpattikatve kaścid virodhaḥ/ asthāyī cāyaṃ pakṣaḥ/ nāyaṃ rāddhānto yaduta—ākṛtīvacanataiva sarvaśabdānām-iti/ guṇavacanatāpi aruṇādiṣu drṣṭā, vyaktīvacanatā udbhīdādiṣu/ —*Brhatī*, pp. 163-64. *Vide* also Śālikanātha's *Pañjikā* thereon.

prima facie no corresponding objective attributes inherent in the substances referred to by that term that can entail its use, yet on a closer examination we would be able to discern some peculiarity in it that escapes our judgment on a superficial examination. The particular substance which is signified by the proper name *Devadatta* is always in a state of flux—constantly varying in size and colour and action. So though at first sight the substance might appear to be identical all the time, yet on closer inspection it is in reality many. Now, how can the self-same term *Devadatta* apply to more than one substance differing from each other in more than one respect, if there is not an objective *universal* common to all the substances to occasion the use of the identical verbal utterance? The identical word *cow* is used to refer to numerous individual cows—every one distinct from all the rest, only because there is the universal *cow-hood* which is shared in common by all the members. So in the present case too we must have to posit the objectivity of a *universal*—call it *Devadatta-hood*, so that the validity of the use of the self-same term to signify mutually differing substances might be justified. Consequently the proper name *Devadatta* too is of universal connotation. The same thesis might be substantiated by another mode of argument as well,—without affiliating ourselves to the theory of flux advocated by the Buddhists. Even if we admit the identity of the substance throughout its duration, the proper name *Devadatta* cannot but be of universal significance. The word *Devadatta*, granting it to be the name of an identical substance, is liable to variation *per se* as it is uttered by different individuals. The word *Devadatta* as uttered by an octogenarian is different in pitch and intonation from the word *Devadatta* as uttered by a child of five. But, though these two instances of utter-

ance are different we do not fail to recognise the two words as being essentially similar, if not identical. Now, what is this recognition of similarity due to? This cognition of similarity can be explained if we acknowledge the reality of a universal *Devadatta*, like the universal *cow-hood*, common to all particular utterances of that sound-group, which are but instances of the former. This too points to the same conclusion. In either case, we must regard proper names too as being expressive of *universals*—whether they be universals synthesizing the substances signified by those proper names, or universals synthesizing a class of similar verbal utterances.¹ This attempt on the part of the Bhāṭṭas to classify all words under a single category as being expressive of universals has been thwarted by the Naiyāyikas in strong terms. We must now proceed to discuss the criticism of the above view from the Naiyāyika standpoint as also the possible arguments that might be aduced by the Mimāṃsakas in self-justification.

The principal argument of the Mimāṃsakas in favour of promulgating the universal as the sole connotation is that it is the universal alone that is capable of being brought into relation with the eternal words, since both of

¹bāla-vṛddha-śukādyudiriteṣu dīthhādīśabdeṣu ca pratikṣaṇaṃ bhidyamāneṣu dīthhādyartheṣu vā dīthhatvādyastī'ti sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ jātir eva pravṛttinimittam-ityanye/—*KP. Ullāsa* II. Compare the following observation of Mr. Bertrand Russell : "The word "dog" is universal, just as *dog* is a universal. We say, loosely, that we can utter the the same word "dog" on two occasions, but in fact we utter two examples of the same species, as when we see two dogs we see two examples of the same species. There is no difference of logical status between *dog* and the word "dog" : each is general, and exists only in instances. The word "dog" is a certain class of verbal utterances, just as *dog* is a certain class of quadrupeds."—*An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 24.

them are eternally co-existent. Other entities like the particular *qualities* and *actions* and *substances* are susceptible of constant mutation and thus cannot be the fit relata to be linked with the eternal words. What more, the old difficulties on the score of multiplicity and variability that we have already noted at the very outset in connection with our examination of the view advocating the particulars as the connotation of words, would crop up anew.¹ The theory though sound and satisfactory in some respects is easily vulnerable in others. For example, the foremost charge against the theory might be expressed in the following words, as has been actually done chiefly by the Naiyāyikas : Granting that the *universal* is the real connotation of words, how would you explain the comprehension of particular individuals ? All Vedic or non-Vedic injunctions relate to a particular individual. For instance, the injunction—"One should immolate a cow" (*gām ālabheta*), refers not to the universal *cow-hood*, but to a particular *cow-individual*, inasmuch as the *universal* being amorphous cannot be in any way susceptible of immolation. So the comprehension of an individual cow must be admitted even by the Mimāṃsakas on pain of reducing all Vedic injunctions to an unmeaning verbiage. But if the individual be not a constituent element of the connotation of the term *cow* how can its comprehension arise at all ? The Mimāṃsakas might try to answer this indictment in the following manner : We are at one with the Naiyāyikas as with all other theorists in admitting that the individual *cow* is as much comprehended from the term *cow* as the universal *cow-hood*. What we do refuse to acknowledge is that the individual too is a constituent element of the

¹ākṛtivyatirikte'rthe sambandho nityatā'sya ca/
na siddhyetām iti jñātvā tadvācyaṭvam ihocyate//

—Śloka-vārttika : Akṛti-vāda, v. 1.

connotation and is contained within it. To acknowledge two different efficiencies of the self-same word *cow*—with respect to the universal as also to the individual, would be putting too much strain on a word. And consequently such a procedure should be avoided by all means, if there can be found any other method that can sufficiently account for the apprehension of the individual. We regard the *universal* as the real connotation of words in so far as it is the *determinant* while the *individual* or rather the *substance* is the *determinatum* and because every knowledge of the latter must presuppose the knowledge of the former. It is because of this precedence that the *universal*—viz. *cow-hood*, which is the *determinant*, has been reckoned as the connotation of words. The knowledge of the *substance* or the *individual* must, of necessity, arise through implication even though it might not be regarded as the connotation. Thus the Mimāṃsaka has in favour of his thesis the *law of parsimony* as it limits the efficiency of words to the minimum requirement—which is the comprehension of the *universal*.¹ Maṇḍana Miśra, the great Mimāṃsist teacher of the Bhāṭṭa school, expressly states that the individual as the substratum of the *universal* is comprehended through the function of Indication (*lakṣaṇā*), while the latter is denoted through the expressive power of words.² Now, against this

¹na hi vyaṃ vyakti-pratītiṃ bhavantīm apahnumahe, nāpi bhavantīm jātīpratītiṃ apahnumahe—ubhayapratīteḥ pratyātmavedanīyātvāt/ ubhayatra cā'bhidhātṛi śaktiḥ atibhāraḥ śabdasya /anyatarapratītyā cānyatarapratītisiddheḥ/ tatra gośabdaḥ kiṃ jātau varttamānaḥ vyaktim, āhosvit vyaktau varttamānaḥ jātim ākṣipatu—iti vicāraṇāyāṃ jāter viśeṣaṇatvāt pūrvataraṃ pratipattir iti saiva śabdārtho bhavittum arhati, tasyāṃ ca śabdād avagatāyāṃ tata eva vyaktyavagamāḥ setsyatīti nobhayatra śabdō vyāpāraḥ/—*NM.* Vol. I. p. 293.

²jāter astitva-nāstitve na hi kaścid vivakṣati/ nityatvāt lakṣaṇīyāyā vyaktes te hi veśeṣaṇe/—Quoted by Jagadīśa in his *Śabda-Śaktīprākāśikā*.

the opponents might argue. The arguments in favour of the universal alone being the connotation of words on grounds of *parsimony* (*lāghava*) and precedence cannot carry conviction. For, just as the term *daṇḍin* expresses both the *individual* (viz. the staff-bearer) which is the *substance* as also the staff that qualifies it, so too the term *cow* might well express both the individual *cow* as also the determinant—*cow-universal*. But the Mimāṃsakas would defend their position against such an attack by pointing out the fallacy in the instance cited. True, that from the term *daṇḍin* both the *substantive* and the *adjectival* elements are cognised together. But it is fallacious to argue that both of them are expressed by the self-same unit. For, while the term *daṇḍa* is expressive of the staff—which is the *determinant*, the possessive suffix-*in* expresses the idea of the individual—which is the *substantive*. So the two elements are expressed by two different parts—one by the stem and the other by the suffix—into which the word *daṇḍin* is analysable. But the term *gauḥ* being unitary and indivisible is incapable of such etymological analysis. Consequently it can express either the *substantive* or the *adjectival* element and not both simultaneously. And of these it is the adjectival element—viz. the universal *cow-hood*, that is to be regarded as the true connotation, for reasons already stated.¹ Thus far the Mimāṃsakas have well defended their

¹nanu daṇḍi-śabdād iva viśeṣaṇaṃ ca jātīm viśeṣyām ca vyaktīm gośabdād eva pratipadyāmahe/ko'syātibhārah? viśamo'yaṃ dṛṣāntaḥ/ tatra hi prakṛti-pratyaya-vibhāgena dvayapratītir avakalpate/ daṇḍa-śabdaḥ prakṛtir viśeṣaṇaṃ abhivadati, matvarthīyapratyayaś ca viśeṣyam iti/ gośabde tu naiṣa nyāyaḥ sambhavati/ tatra na viśeṣaṇe daṇḍi-śabdo varttate, na viśeṣye daṇḍa-śabdaḥ/ iha tu gośabda eka eva/ sa ca viśeṣaṇe viśeṣye vā vartteta/ viśeṣye varttamāno viśeṣaṇe pramāṇāntaram apekṣate/ viśeṣaṇe tu varttamānas tadavagamāya viśeṣyam ākṣipatīti na kaścid doṣaḥ/—*NM.* Vol. I. p. 293.

position. But the Naiyāyikas, defeated on this point, might revive the old argument. They might state that the isolated *universal* devoid as it is of any pragmatic utility cannot be regarded as the connotation of a word. So from the pragmatic standpoint the individual too must be reckoned as a constituent element of the connotation which is thus a composite. But to this the Mīmāṃsakas would reply : The *universal* too has pragmatic efficiency of its own, amorphous as it is. Is it not a fact that in such injunctions as—“One should buy (*soma-plant*) in exchange for *red* (scil. *a red cow*)”, etc., the qualities like *red-ness* that are amorphous are enjoined as having pragmatic efficiency towards the act of barter ? Just as in these cases *qualities* and *actions* imply their substratum the individual for making the injunctions significant and valid, so too the term *gauḥ* (cow) in such injunctions as “*One should immolate a cow*”, though expressive primarily of the universal *cow-hood*, of necessity implies the substratum of the latter—viz. the individual *cow*, thus rendering the injunction capable of performance and as such valid. Even as our *soul* though *per se* incapable of any action, being amorphous as it is, is actually the agent of all actions through the instrumentality of the material body and the respective sense-organs, so too the amorphous *universal* though by itself lacking any pragmatic efficiency comes to be invested with that efficiency through its being brought into relation with the individual which is its substratum.¹ The

¹yat tu amūrtatvāt jāteḥ na kriyāṅgatvam iti/ naiṣa doṣaḥ/ amūrttānām api guṇa-karmaṇām kriyāsādhana-tayopapattēḥ/ ‘aruṇayā kriṇāti’, ‘abhikrāmaṇ juhoti’—vyaktyākṣepadvāreṇa cālabhāna-viśaṣaṇa-prokṣaṇādiprayogacodanāsu sādhanatvaṃ jāteḥ upapadyate/--“lakṣitavyaktisādhyaṃ tu tatsādhyaṃ kāryam iṣyate/ yathā bhūten-driyot-pādyam ātmakartṛkaṃ ucyate/”—ātmā tāvat sarvakarmasu adhikṛtaḥ kartā ca/ sa cāmūrttatvāt dehendriyadvāreṇa audumbarīsamārjanā-

Mīmāṃsakas have represented their thesis creditably no doubt. But the Naiyāyikas would not be convinced even by these apparently irrefutable arguments. They contend : The Mīmāṃsaka thesis that the individual or the *substance* as *implied* by the *universal* is able to satisfy the pragmatic validity of Vedic injunctions as also of all our ordinary propositions is untenable. The first objection that can be raised against such a view is that the factors that are requisite for *Implication* or *Indication* (*lakṣaṇā*)—that the Mīmāṃsakas posit for the comprehension of the individual—are lacking. Moreover, even if we suppose that the individual is *implied* (*lakṣita*) and not *expressed* (*abhihita*), how can the *number*, *gender* etc., that are expressed by different suffixes enjoined after a stem, be related with the former ? The *number* or *gender* cannot be construed with the *universal*—as the Mīmāṃsakas too admit, being amorphous and unitary as it is. Nor can it be construed with the *individual* if it is *implied*, as the Mīmāṃsakas would fain suppose. For, the prevalent dictum is that the sense *expressed* by the suffix is to be construed with the sense *expressed* by the stem, and not with what is implied thereby. Kumārila himself states : The proposition—viz. “*the smoke is burning*” is nonsensical in so far as the predicate *burning* cannot be construed with the subject *smoke*, nor can it be construed with *fire*, since it is not the *expressed* sense of the term *smoke*, but is only *implied* by or rather *inferred* from the latter.¹ These objections would apply *mutatis mutandis* in the case of the

vyāveksaṇādini kāryāṇi nirvartayan kartā teṣu bhavati, evaṃ jātir api vyakti-vartmanā tannirvarttayanti sādhanatām lapsyate/—“ataś ca jātir evāṅgam iti mīmāṃsakā jaguḥ/ tasyāś cedam kriyāṅgatvām anya-dvārakam ātmavat/”—*NM.* Vol. I. p. 294.

¹atrābhidhiyate—na jātiḥ padasyārtho bhavitum arhati/ padaṃ hi vibhaktyanto varṇasamudāyo na prātipadikamātram/ tatra ca prakṛtipratyayau itaretarānvitam artham abhidhatta-iti sthitam/ dvi-

individual too as implied by the *universal*. Now, the Mīmāṃsakas might state that even the sense *indicated* or *implied* by the stem is at times found to be construed with the sense of the suffix added thereto or with other component words in the sentence. For instance, in the proposition “*The herdsman lives on the Ganges*”, the *bank* of the Ganges, which is but *implied* by the term *Ganges*, is construed with the verb *to live*. So, too, in the present case there would be no real difficulty in construing the *individual* with the *number*, *gender* and other elements, even though it might be *implied* and not expressed. To this the opponents might reply : *Implication* or *Indication* presupposes temporal sequence. But this sequence is not felt between the comprehension of the *universal* and the final comprehension of the *individual*. And failing such an introspective evidence it is not proper to invoke the aid of implication or indication for the comprehension of the individual, which is to be finally construed with the *number*, *gender* etc.¹ Moreover, on such an hypothesis, two different functions—viz. *expressiveness* or *denotation* and *indication*, are simultaneously to be attributed to the self-same word with a view to making the comprehension of the individual possible so that the pragmatic vali-

tiyādis ca vibhaktiḥ prātipadikād uccaranti prātipadikārthagatatvena svārtham ācaṣṭe/ yugapacca tritayaṃ vibhaktyarthaḥ—kārakaṃ, liṅgam, saṃkhyā ca/ na caitat tritayaṃ prātipadikārthe jātau anveti/ na jātiḥ kārakaṃ, na ca jāteḥ stri-puṃ-napuṃsaka-vibhāgaḥ, na cāsyā dvitīyādiyoga-iti/ -NM. Vol. I. p. 294. *Vide* also : padārthānvayaś ca ākṣepite na syāt/ uktaṃ hi tadbhūtādhikaraṇe - “gamyamānasya cā’rthasya naiva dr̥ṣṭaṃ viśeṣaṇam/ śabdāntarair vibhaktyā vā dhūmo’yam jvalatīvat/”-iti—*Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇa*, p. 117.

¹nanu vyaktīlakṣaṇayā sarvam upapatsyate—ityuktaṃ/ naca yuktaṃ uktaṃ/ sakṛt prayuktaṃ padaṃ aṃśena kaṃcit artham abhidadhāti, tato’rthāntaraṃ lakṣayati. tadgatatvena punar liṅga-saṃkhyādyabhidhatte—iti na prātīko’yaṃ kramaḥ/—NM., *loc. cit.*

dity of propositions might be upheld—a position absurd on the very face of it.¹ Now, the Bhāṭṭas might fall back upon their non-absolutistic tenet that envisages a relation of *identity-cum-difference* in lieu of complete difference between the *universal* and its substratum the individual *substance*—so that any comprehension of the *universal* would necessarily include the individual as well. Consequently, the criticism on the score of temporal sequence presupposed by Indication or Inference can have no *locus standi*. But such a defence, the opponents argue, is extremely tortuous and forced on the very face of it. Moreover, the acceptance of this interpretation would compromise the Bhāṭṭa position. For, according to this interpretation the *individual* is as much *expressed* as the *universal* standing as they do in the relation of identity to one another—which is the very opposite of the Bhāṭṭa thesis that recognises the *universal* alone as being *expressed*. Besides, it would be open to all those charges that the Bhāṭṭas have themselves levelled against the view that posits the *individual* as the connotation of a word.² The Bhāṭṭa thesis of the *universal* alone being the connotation of words is controvertible on other grounds as well. If the term *gauḥ* be itself expressive of the universal *cow-hood* alone, what is the significance of the term *go-tva* with the suffix *-tva* added to the stem? Should we consider the terms *gauḥ* and *go-tvam* as being identical in their import and thus regard the suffix as having no special significance of its own? If the answer is in the affirmative—the two statements—viz. “the *cow* is white” (*gauḥ śuklaḥ*) and “*cow-hood* is white” (*go-tvaṃ śuklaṃ*) would

¹sarveṣveva ‘gāṃ naya’-ityādi-jātivīṣṭabodhakavākyaṣu vṛttidvaya-kalpanāyām gauravācca/ yugapad vṛttidvayavirodhasyā’dūṣaṇāpattē ca/ -VB. p. 118.

²jāti-vyaktyor abhedāt dānānvaya iti cet na/ tathā sati vyakter

be exactly interchangeable.¹ The Mimāṃsakas might attempt to meet this charge by taking recourse to some such argument as follows : The term *gauḥ* without the suffix *-tva* is certainly expressive of the universal *cow-hood*—but the *universal* as qualified by its substratum the individual, which is on its part implied or indicated by the former. But the term *go-tva* signifies the universal *cow-hood* alone as abstracted from its substratum the individual. But this is nothing but mere sophistry and is contrary to the accepted dictum that the *universal* as in absolute isolation from the *individual* is nothing but a chimera. A *universal* must always be conceived as being qualified by the *individual* in which it inheres.²

Thus we should adopt the Naiyāyika view that holds the connotation of a particular word as being a composite of the *universal*, the *individual* (be it *substance*, *quality*, or *action*), and the *configuration* thereof (where possible)—all taken together. And this too is the Grammarians' view if we are to rely on the interpretations of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, of Kaiyaṣa and of Nāgeśa. But we should note one important fact before we conclude our present discussion. Though all the above three elements are equally constituents of connotations, being invariably present in all instances as they are, yet the emphasis on any one of these

vāc्यtvam āyātam eva/ ānanyādyūktākṛtyadhikaraṇīyadoṣatādavas-
thācca/—*VB*. p. 119. For the relation of *identity-cum-difference* between
the universal and its substratum *vide* : tena tallakṣitavyakteḥ kriyā-
sambandhacodanā/ vyaktyākṛtyor abhedo vā vāk्यārtheṣu vivakṣitaḥ/
—Kumārila.

¹api ca niṣkṛṣṭasāmānyāṃśavacanatve padsyeṣyāmāṇe gośabdād
gotvaśabdācca tulye pratipattiḥ syātām/gauḥ śuklaḥ—itivacca gotvaṃ
śuklam iti buddhiḥ syāt/ cāturvarṇyādivacca svārthe eva gośabdād
bhāvapratiyayas tva-talādiḥ syāt/—*NM*. Vol. I. p. 296.

²atha manyethāḥ—ākṣiptavyaktikāṃ jātīm gośabdo vakti, bhāva-

elements is liable to variation from one instance to another. In one case it is the universal that is in the foreground, in another the individual, in a third still it is the configuration that is principally intended to be conveyed. Thus in the statement: “*One should not touch a cow with his feet*” it is the universal *cow-hood* as comprising all individual cows that is principally connoted, even though other elements are present there all the same. Again, in the proposition “*Paint a cow*”, the emphasis is on the *configuration* or *outline*,—which alone is capable of being shown in painting or drawing. Similarly in the statement “*Tether the cow*” the emphasis has been shifted from the *universal* to the *individual*, since the statement is made with reference to a particular *individual* alone, and not to each and every individual cow comprised under the universal *cow-hood*.¹

pratyayāntas tu niṣkṛṣṭasvarūpamātraniṣṭhām iti-tad anupapnnam/
anākṣiptavyaktikāyā jāteḥ kvacid api adarśanāt/ -loc. cit. Vide : nirvi-
śeṣaṃ hi sāmānyaṃ bhavet śaśaviṣāṇavat/—Kumārila.

¹sthite’pi tadvato vācyatve kvacit prayoge jāteḥ prādhānyam,
vyakter aṅgabhāvaḥ/ yathā -‘gauḥ na padā spraṣṭavya’ -iti sarvagaviṣu
pratiśedho gamyate/ kvacit vyakteḥ prādhānyam jāter aṅgabhāvaḥ/
yathā -‘gāṃ muñca’, ‘gāṃ badhāna’ -iti niyatāṃ kāmicit vyaktim
uddiśya prayujyate/ kvacit ākrteḥ prādhānyam, vyakter aṅgabhāvo
jātir nāstyeva/ yathā - ‘piṣṭakamayyo gāvaḥ kriyantām’ -iti/ —NM.
Vol. I. p. 297.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONNOTATION OF WORDS (Contd.) : BUDDHISTIC THEORY OF *APOHA* OR NEGATION OF THE OPPOSITE.

IN the previous section we have discussed at length the comparative strength and weakness of the Vaiyākaraṇa, Mimāṃsaka and Naiyāyika theories about the connotation of words. All of them, though differing from one other in more than one respect, are agreed as to the basis in reality of the conceptual cognition as also of the relation subsisting between a particular term and the object referred to by it. But the Buddhist philosophers are opposed to the above orthodox views. They repudiate the realistic basis of the conceptual cognition. They admit however that when a word is heard we cognise a corresponding concept. But they deny the objective reality of that concept. It is as much unreal as the cognition of two moons by a man of defective vision.¹ In the present section we propose to examine the arguments that have been adduced by the Buddhist philosophers to substantiate their thesis and to demolish the view of the orthodox philosophers.

The difference between the orthodox and Buddhist viewpoints regarding the connotation of words is nothing but a logical outcome of their different views concerning the ontological categories. The Buddhists unlike the orthodox philosophers repudiate the objectivity of the

¹*Vide* : nahisarvathā śabdārthāpavādo'smābhiḥ kriyate—tasya āgo-pālam api pratītatvāt/ kintu tāttvikatvaṃ dharmo yaḥ paraḥ tatrā-ropyate tasya niṣedhaḥ kriyate/ natu dharmaṇaḥ/ —*Tattvasaṅgraha-Pañjikā*, Vol. I. p. 277.

universal as an independent category. According to them the *universal* is a fiction having no objective counterpart. Nor do they think it necessary to posit the existence of a core of reality—called *substance*, which according to the orthodox philosophers is the substratum of *qualities* and *actions* and *universals*. According to the Buddhists the individual or the *substance* is nothing but a collocation of attributes, apart from which it has no existence at all. If we analyse the constitution of a *substance* we would find it to be composed of certain qualities and nothing more. There would be left no inexplicable residue that might be held to be the substratum of those qualities. Just as a forest has no existence apart from the individual trees that go to make it, so also the *substance* has no objective reality apart from the qualities that enter into its constitution.¹ What more, while according to the orthodox theorists an individual is static though it might pass through various modes and vicissitudes through its duration, the Buddhist philosophers are the advocates of the theory of flux that propounds the momentariness of each individual entity. At no two successive moments is a thing identical. The cognition of identity is illusory. The apparent temporal continuity of an entity is but made up of discrete moments, just as the continuity of the cinematographic pictures is illusory, composed as it is of

¹nanu dharmāṭirekeṇa dharminṇo'nupalambhanāt/ tatsañghamātra evāyaṃ gavādiḥ syāt vanādivat/—ŚV. v. 151 on *Pratyakṣa-Sūtra*, the *Kāśikā* on which quotes the following verse, probably from a treatise of Dinnāga, the eminent Buddhist philosopher : yathā'huḥ—“‘cīṇāni cakṣurādīni rūpādiṣveva pañcasu/ na ṣaṣṭham indriyaṃ tasya grāha-kaṃ vidyate bahiḥ/” -iti/ ato rūpādi-sañghātamātram evedaṃ bahir upalabhyate, na tattvāntaraṃ—vṛkṣa-sañghāta iva vanabuddhir iti/—*Op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 264.

swiftly moving successive snap-shots. The cumulative effect of all these radically differing metaphysical tenets is faithfully reflected, as is naturally to be expected, in the Buddhistic theory of concepts. Thus to understand the Buddhistic theory of concepts we must have to acquaint ourselves with their position regarding universals *vis-à-vis* the orthodox theorists, as the latter supplies the foundation of the former, and as such are indissolubly interlinked.

According to the orthodox philosophers the *universal* is a positive entity that serves to synthesise mutually differing individuals into a particular class. The universal *cow-hood* is a positive entity which is present in all the individual members known as *cow*. The orthodox philosophers regard the universal not merely as a positive entity, but it is ubiquitous and immutable as well. But the Buddhists who repudiate the permanence of everything real cannot but demur to the orthodox thesis that regards the universal as eternally subsistent. What more, all reals are discrete according to the Buddhists and as such they cannot share in common the attribute known as the *universal*, for that would strike at the very root of this self-contained-ness of the reals, which is the key-stone of Buddhistic metaphysics. Dharmakīrti's polemics against the orthodox theory of universals are only too well known to be reiterated here at length. But it might be asked against all this : Admitting that there is no such entity as an objective universal inherent in all the members of a particular class, what is this similarity or rather identity of cognition and verbal usage due to ? Why should all *cows* be designated by the identical term '*cow*' inasmuch as they are all mutually different, as the Buddhists argue ? If this mutual distinction be no bar to all the individual *cows* being referred to by the self-same word—viz. *cow*, members of other classes too would have an equal claim

to that designation. There would be nothing to preclude the possibility of a *horse* being referred to as a *cow*. Consequently the position must be abandoned in view of the utter impossibility of all linguistic usage due to everything being capable of being referred to by every word. The Buddhist reply to this charge would be as follows : True that all cows are as much different from one another as they are from horses and dogs and buffeloes. Yet the individual cows have this much in common that whenever any cow—whether it be red or white or black, is perceived it is cognised as being different from *not-cow*. And this property of being different from *not-cow* which comprises all conceivable objects other than the particular individual cow which is the object of cognition for the time being is compresent in all the individuals classified under the species *cow*. Consequently, it is quite reasonable that the term *cow* would signify this difference from *not-cow*, or to put it succinctly, would signify the negative concept of being *not-not-cow*, rather than the positive *universal* called *cow-hood*, which has no ontological basis, and it would be as much effective as a synthesising principle as the latter. Thus every word has a negative connotation—which is but the *negation of the opposite*. And as negation according to the Buddhist philosophers is but an ideational abstraction¹ and as such illusory, all conceptual cognitions must be repudiated as being false without having any corresponding reality. But this theory of negation of the opposite being the connotation of terms has

¹vikalpaviṣaye vṛttir iṣṭā śabdānumānayoh/
 avastuviṣayāś caite vikalpā iti varṇitam//
 yā ca bhūmir vikalpānām sa eva viṣayo girām/
 ata eva hi śabdārtham anyāpoham pracakṣate//—NM. Vol. I.
 p. 276.

been strongly criticised by Bhāmaha in his *Kāvya-lamkāra*, by Kumārila in his *Śloka-vārttika* and by Uddyotakara in his *Nyāya-vārttika*. We propose to record below, in order, the views of these representative thinkers so that the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* may be understood in a better perspective.

Bhāmaha in the sixth chapter of his *Kāvya-lamkāra*,—one of the oldest, if not the oldest, extant systematic works on Sanskrit poetics, has passingly examined the Buddhist theory of *apoha* in a triplet. His contentions are as follows : If the term *cow* connotes nothing but the negation of the opposite—which is purely a negative concept, how are we to account for the positive concept of a *cow*, which is the uncontradicted experience of everybody ? The self-same term *cow* cannot generate simultaneously the positive concept of a *cow* as also the negative concept of its being different from *not-cow*, inasmuch as a single act of cognition is incapable of comprehending two mutually exclusive concepts of affirmation and negation at one sweep. What more, since according to the Buddhists the term *cow* primarily signifies the idea of *negation of not-cow*, it must be admitted that the negatum of the complex negative concept—viz. *not-cow*, should be comprehended first, inasmuch as the knowledge of negation presupposes the knowledge of the negatum in question—since the latter is the determinant of the former. And if the precedence of the knowledge of *not-cows*, which is the negatum in question, be admitted in view of logical necessity, the Buddhists would find their doctrine involved in a morass of contradiction. For it is but natural to argue that what is comprehended directly without any intervention is the connotation of a word. And as in the present case the idea of the opposite—viz. *not-cow*, is generated directly without any other concept to intervene, and as the idea of its negation—viz. *not-not-cow*, follows in its wake

it follows logically that the concept of *not-cow* is the connotation of the word *cow* rather than its negation—viz. *not-not-cow*, as the Buddhists would fain have us believe. The conclusion is certainly fantastic—and there is no escape from this fiasco if the Buddhists obdurately stick to their absurd hypothesis propounding the negation of the opposite to be the connotation of words.¹

Kumārila's *critique* of the Buddhist doctrine is more elaborate and penetrating. He has devoted a whole section of his *Śloka-vārttika* to the examination of the theory of *apoha* in all its ramifications. As Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has characteristically remarked in his *Nyāya-mañjarī*: Bhaṭṭa (viz. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa) has brandished his sword of polemics with a view to demolishing the Buddhist position of the negation of the opposite being the connotation of words.² Kumārila's animadversions might be briefly stated as follows : The theory of *apoha* is nothing but a

¹yadi gaur ityayaṃ śabdāḥ kṛtārtho'nyanirākṛtau/ janako gavi go-buddher mṛgyatām aparo dhvaniḥ/ arthajñānaphalāḥ śabdāḥ na caikasya phaladvayam/ apavāda-vidhijñāne phale caikasya vaḥ katham/ purā'gaur iti vijñānaṃ gośabda-śravaṇād bhavet/ yenāgopratiśedhāya pravṛtto gaur-iti dhvaniḥ/—Bhāmaha's *Kāvya-lamkāra*, VI. 17-19. These verses occur in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattva-saṃgraha* with certain variations and are introduced by the commentator Kamalaśīla with the remark : 'yadi gaur' -ityādinā śloka-trayeṇa Bhāmahasya matena pratyāyādibādhām udbhāvayati/. Kamalaśīla's gloss on the third *kārikā* of Bhāmaha is as follows : yadi ca gośabdena ago-nivṛttir mukhyataḥ pratipādyte, tadā gośabda-sravaṇāntaraṃ prathamataṃ agaur-ityeṣā pratipattir bhavet/ yatraiva hi avyavadhānena śabdāt pratyaya upajāyate sa eva śabdārtho vyavasthāpyate/ nacā'vyavadhānena ago-vyavacchede matir upajāyate/ ato gobuddhyanutpattiprasaṅgāt prathamataṃ agopratiśedhācca nāpohaḥ śabdārtha-iti/—*Op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 291.

²nanu apoha-śabdārthapakṣe mahatīm kṛpānavṛṣṭim utsasarja Bhaṭṭaḥ/—*ibid.* Vol. I. p. 277.

clever camouflage which seeks to reinstate the orthodox theory of universals in a deceptive garb. The Buddhists argue that the word *cow* connotes the negation *not-cow*. But every negation in the last resort is a positive entity—which in relation to other entities behaves as various types of negation. Thus, the pre-non-existence (*prāg-abhāva*) of *curd* in the *milk* is nothing but the *milk* *per se* viewed with reference to the *curd-entity*. Similarly, the positive *curd-entity* appears as post-non-existence (*dhvāṃśa-bhāva*) of *milk* as viewed with reference to the latter. In the light of this finding as to the essential positive reference in every negation-type it is but logical to assume that the negative concept of *not-not-cow*, which the Buddhists put forward as the real nature of the connotation of the term *cow* and for the matter of that of all terms in general, is also the ultimate analysis identical with and indistinguishable from a positive entity—whether it be a subjective concept or an objective category.¹ The Buddhists might attempt to meet this charge by arguing that the positive entity in requisition is nothing but the real, momentary and self-contained *cow-individual*—intended to be designated by the word *cow*.

¹ *bhāvāntarātmako'bhāvaḥ purastāt pratipāditah/ tatrāśvādi-nivṛtta-ātmā bhāvaḥ ka iti kathyatām/—ŚV. Apoha-vāda*, v. 2. Also cited by Śāntarakṣita in his *TS* (v. 916) on which Kamalaśīla comments as follows: *yena yasmāt prāgabhāvādilakṣaṇaś caturvidhaḥ sarva evābhāvo bhāvāntarātmako vyavasthitaḥ/ yaccoktam—“kṣīre dadhyādi yā nāsti prāgabhāvaḥ sa kathyate/ nāstitā payaso dadhni pradhvāṃśa bhāva-lakṣaṇam/ gavi hyāśvādyabhāvaś ca so'nyonyābhāva ucyate/ śīra so'vayavā nimnā vṛddhikāṭhinyavarjitah/ śāśasṛṅgādirūpeṇa so'tyan tābhāva ucyate/ na cāvastuna ete syur bhedās tenāsyā vastutā/”—iti/ (ŚV. Abhāva-pariccheda, vv. 264ff)/etena kṣīrādaya eva ca dadhyādirūpeṇāvidyamānāḥ prāgabhāvādivyapadeśabhājaḥ—iti darśitaṃ bhavati tatraivam abhāvaśya bhāvāntarātmakatve sthite sati ko'yaṃ bhavad-bhir aśvādinivṛttisvabhāvo bhāvo'bhipretaḥ—iti kathyatām/—Pañjikā*, Vol. I. p. 292.

But such a reply is inconsistent with the Buddhistic theory of discreteness of individuals that are never susceptible of verbal description—which by itself being illusory and ideal can ill serve as a description of the real momentary individual. The Buddhist might however contend that the negative concept of *apoha* in the form of *not-not-cow* is an absolute negation (*prasajya-lakṣaṇa*) and consequently should not be understood relatively with reference to a positive entity. Consequently the above contingency need not arise at all. The Mīmāṃsaka criticism of this Buddhistic stand is as follows : If the concept of *apoha* be held to be an absolute negation (viz. of the opposite), as the Buddhist argues, it would lead to absolute negativism, and make all activities utterly impossible. For, then the concepts cognised should be repudiated as illusory, as their felt positivity is not conveyed by words. What more, negation according to the Buddhists having no objective status, the judgmental thought, being composed of different concepts that are identical with absolute negation, would be reduced to a sumtotal of several negations that would have no extra-mental reference. Thus, the sentences would be held to generate illusory ideal judgments, not paralleled by outer real events. Consequently, the pragmatic efficiency of propositions—which is an undeniable fact, would be thrown overboard. Moreover, on this hypothesis the Buddhist thesis of absolute negation totally collapses. For, if inspite of positing absolute negation as the connotation of words, the Buddhists acknowledge the origin of positive concepts—even though they might be repudiated as ideal fictions present in the mind alone,—what is the logic and necessity of ushering in the entity of absolute negation ? Why not regard the ideal *positive* fictions alone as being the connotation of words ? What more, there is further inconsistency in this thesis inasmuch

as the Buddhists, though refusing to accord any objective status to the category of Negation, do not hesitate to posit the *illusory* entity of absolute negation as being the real connotation of words. If, however, the Buddhists do acknowledge the ontological reality of negation they would be nothing but mere camp-followers of the orthodox *Maiyāyikas*—a prospect that is repulsive to all true Buddhists.¹ The *Mimāṃsakas* bring still another charge against the theory of *apoha* being the connotation of words. They contend : The Buddhists posit that the word *cow* signifies *not-not-cow*. Well, is the negatum of the final negation,—viz. *not-cow* that comprises within its scope everything outside the species *cow*, to be understood in its *universal* aspect, or does it refer to the particular aspect alone ? To be more precise,—do the concepts ‘horse’, ‘dog’ etc., that are the objects of the negation that is *apoha*, stand for the *class*

¹niṣedhamātrarūpaś ca śabdārtho yadi kalpyate/ abhāvaśabdavācyā syāt śūnyatā'nyaprakārikā/ tasyāṃ cāśvādibuddhīnām ātmāṃśagrahaṇaṃ bhavet/ tatrānyāpohavācyatvaṃ mudhaivābhyupagamyate/—*TS.* vv. 919-20. *Vide Pañjikā* thereon : ago'pohalakṣaṇābhāva-vācakaḥ śabdo'bhāvaśabdas—tadvācyā bahir arthaśūnyatā syāt, vasturūpāpahnavaṭ/ *anyaprakāriketi*/ pūrvam vijñānamātravādopanyāsa-kāle bhavadbhir upanyastā, nirastā cāsmābhiḥ/ punar apyatra śabdārthacintanaprastāve saivā'pohavyājenābhihitā, pratīṣiddhasyārthasyā'pavādāt/ tataś ca ko doṣa—ityāha-tasyāñca-ityādi/ tasyāṃ śūnyatāyāṃ vācyāyāṃ śābdīnām aśvādibuddhīnām ātmāṃśagrahaṇaṃ prāpnoti, bāhyavastusvarūpāgrahāt/ evaṃ ca sati ko doṣa ityāha—tatretyādi/—tatraivaṃ sthite sati apohasya vācyatvaṃ mudhaivābhyupagataṃ syāt/ buddhyākārasyānapekṣita-bāhyārthālambanasya vidhirūpa-syaiva śabdārthatvāpatteḥ/ tataś cā'bhyupagamabādhā pratijñāyāḥ-iti bhāvaḥ/—*Op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 293. *Vide also* : kim apohalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyaṃ vācyatvenā'bhidhīyamānaṃ paryudāsalakṣaṇaṃ cābhidhīyeta, prasajyalakṣaṇaṃ vā ?...dvitiye pakṣe tu na kiñcit vastu vācyam śābdīnām ityato'pravṛttinivṛttiprasaṅgaḥ/ tuccharūpābhāvasya cā'na-bhyupagamāt na prasajyapratīṣedhābhyupagamo yuktaḥ, paramata-pravesānuṣāṅgāt/—*Prameya-kamala-mārttaṇḍa*, pp. 432-33.

horse etc., or do they merely signify individual horses and dogs etc. ? If the first alternative is accepted, it would lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*, as according to the Buddhists all generic concepts are nothing but negation of the opposite. And since *horse*, *dog*, etc. as the objects of *apoha* conveyed by the term *cow* are generic concepts, on this alternative, they too must be reducible to the corresponding negation of their opposites, and so on. The second alternative too is similarly absurd, for, as the Buddhists themselves hold, particulars are absolutely inexpressible. Besides, if the Buddhist tenet be properly analysed, the concept of *apoha* appears to be nothing but a purely positive concept despite their protestations to the contrary. For the negation of the negation, which is the form of *apoha*, is a pure affirmation,—as two negatives make one affirmative. The Mimāṃsakas put another query to the Buddhists : Is the negation of the negata—*not-cows*—viz. *horses*, *dogs*, etc., distinct from the negata themselves, or is it identical with the latter ? On the first assumption, the final negation must be a positive entity as a positive entity alone can constitute the negation of a negation. If however the second alternative be accepted the concept of *apoha*—viz. *not-not-cow*, becomes indistinguishable from the negata—viz. *horses*, *dogs*, etc., so that the Buddhists would be compelled to uphold the extremely fantastic view—viz. that the term *cow* signifies the idea of *not-cows*—like *horses*, *dogs*, etc. as the *apoha*—viz. *not-not-cows* has been held, as shown above, to be identical with *horses*, *dogs* etc. that are comprised within *not-cows*.¹ The Mimāṃsakas point out another glaring inconsistency if the Buddhist position be adopted without reservation. The Mimāṃsakas ask : What

¹api cāśvādayaḥ sāmānyarūpeṇa vā'pohyaṇa viśeṣātmanā vā/ na viśeṣātmanā—tadanaṅgatvāt, aśabdavācya tvācca/ sāmānyātmanā tu

would be the connotation of such terms as 'existent' (*sat*), 'knowable' (*jñeya*) etc. in conformity with the Buddhist tenet? The Buddhists would perhaps contend that the connotation of the term *existent* would be the *negation of not-existent*, and that of the term *knowable* the *negation of not-knowable*. But such a reply cannot be substantiated by any amount of logic. For, the reality of *not-existent* and *not-knowable* being a chimera, the complex concepts constituting their negation must be repudiated as figments of imagination too. *Existence* and *cognisability* being co-extensive, the imaginary conception of a non-existent entity that can work as the negatum of the final negation conveyed by the term *existent* is likewise precluded. What more, as an uncognised entity can never be negated, and as cognition presupposes existence—even though it might have no extra-mental reference, the adoption of the Buddhist doctrine would lead to the connotation of such terms as *existent*, *cognisable* etc., being self-negatory in import—which no sane man can profess.¹ What again is the connotation of the term *apoha* itself? The form of the connotation in consonance with the Buddhistic doctrine would be *not-not-*

teṣām api apoharūpatvāt abhāvatvam/ kathañca abhāvasyaivābhāvaḥ kriyate/ karaṇe vā pratiśedhadvayaḥ sa vidhiravatīṣṭhate—iti vidhirūpaḥ śabdārthaḥ syāt/ apohyātmanaś ca turagāder yo'pohaḥ sa tasmād vilakṣaṇaḥ, anyathā vā? vilakṣaṇye tasya bhāvatmatā bhavet/ avilakṣaṇye tu yādṛśa evā'pohyaḥ, tādṛśa eva tadapoha-iti gaur apyagauḥ syāt/—*NM.* Vol. I. p. 276. The whole extract is based upon Kumāṛila's *Śloka-vārttika: Apoha-vāda*, vv. 95-97. Also cited in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattva-saṃgraha*, Vol. I. pp. 304 ff.

¹Comp. *ŚV. Apohā-vāda*, vv. 98-99. *Vide also* : saj-jñeyādiśabdānām apohyanirūpaṇāsambhavāt nāpohavācitvam/ nahi asad ajñeyam vā kiñcit avagataṃ yad vyavacchidyate/ jñātaṃ cet sad eva taj jñeyam ca—ityataḥ katham sacchabdena sadeva jñeya-śabdena ca jñeyam evā'pohyeta/ ajñātaṃ tu nitarām anapohyam, kalpitaṃ tu tad vaktum aśakyam, kalpanayaiva sattvājñeyatvācca/—*NM.*, *loc. cit.*

apoha. But what is the nature of *not-apoha* that is being negated ? The theory too fails miserably to explain the nature of connotation of *negative particles* like 'na' etc., of *prepositions*, and of *verbal forms* that signify actions, since the Buddhists' theory of *apoha* as a concept is a challenge to the orthodox theory of *universals* alone and does not extend to the terms signifying *actions* etc. that are distinct from *universals*.¹

We must next proceed to the discussion of Uddyotakara's criticism of *apoha*. Uddyotakara has noted several other incongruencies in the Buddhist position besides those already referred to above. His contention is as follows : What according to the Buddhists is the negative implication of the word *all* ? Is it *not-not-all* ? But what is the nature of the concept *not-all* like that is being negated ? Is it not purely a fiction ? Now, the Buddhists might strive to maintain their position by pointing out that the negatum of the final negation that is *apoha* is not *not-all*, which is admittedly a fiction, but it is such numbers as *one, two, three* etc., that are certainly as much the opposite of the concept of *all* as *not-all* is. Thus the negative implication of the word *all* would be *not-one, not-two* and the like, so that the Buddhist theory of negation of the opposite would hold good even in this case. The argument, Uddyotakara asserts, is more ingenious than convincing. For, such a course of defence is incompatible with the Buddhist doctrine that repudiates the objectivity of a

¹apohaśabdasya ca kiṃ vācyaṃ iti cintyatām/ anapoho na bhavatiyapohaḥ—kaścāyaṃ anapohaḥ, katham vā'sau na bhavati, abhavan vā kim avaśiṣyate-iti sarvaṃ avācakam/ pratiśedhāvācīnām ca nañādiśabdānām kā vārttā/ atra 'na bhavātīti na'—iti ko'rthaḥ/ upasarga-nipātānām ca katham apohaviśayatvaṃ iṣyate/ yeṣāṃ bhavanto jātivācītvam tadvad-vācītvam vā pratipadyante—iti cet tato'nyeṣāṃ tarhi kā vārttā/—NM., loc. cit.

whole (*samudāya*) apart from the parts (*samudāyin*) constituting it. Consequently, the concept *all*, being purely additive as opposed to synthetic, includes the concept *one* as one of its components, so that the negation of the latter would but be a negation of the former. Thus the Buddhists would be forced to admit that the connotation of the term *all* is self-negatory in character—which is *prima facie* incongruous. The same would be the case with every collective term such as *two*, *three* etc. as also terms expressive of *wholes* as opposed to the component parts.¹ Again, it might be asked : Is the connotation *not-not-cow* conveyed by the term *cow* a positive or a negative entity ? If it be positive—is it identical with the *cow-entity* itself ? Or, is it different from it ? On the first alternative, there is absolute agreement, no doubt. But, then, the Buddhist argument that pure negation is the connotation of a word is surrendered. To adopt the second alternative in view of preserving the negative aspect of *apoha* is not logical too, insamuch as it would be tantamount to asserting that the connotation of the term *cow* is *not-cow*. If, however, the concept *not-not-cow* be purely negative in import there

¹anyāpohaś ca śabdārtha ityayuktam avyāpakatvāt/ yatra dvairāśyaṃ bhavati—tatra itarapratīṣedhāt taditarāḥ pratīyate/ yathā gaur iti pade gauḥ pratīyamānaḥ agauḥ pratīṣidhyamānaḥ/ na punaḥ sarvapade etad asti/ nahi asarvaṃ nāma kiñcit asti yat sarvapadena nivartyeta/ ekādi-vyudāsāt vyāpakam iti cet?—atha manyase ekādi asarvaṃ, tat sarvaśabdena nivartyeta ? —tanna/ svārthāpavādadoṣaprasaṅgāt/ evaṃ sati ekādivyudāsena pravartamānaḥ sarva-śabdaḥ aṅgasya pratīṣedhāt angavyatiriktasya cāṅginaḥ anabhyupagamāt anarthakāḥ syāt/ evaṃ sarve samudāyaśabdā ekadeśapratīṣedharūpeṇa pravarttamānāḥ samudāyi-vyatiriktasamudāyānabhyupagamāt anarthakāḥ prāpnuvanti/dvyādiśabdānāṃ ca samuccayaviṣayatvāt ekādipratīṣedhe pratīṣidhyamānaṃ asamuccayād dvyādiśabdānāṃ anarthakatvam/—*Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 329. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series). Vide also *Tattva-saṃgraha*, Vol. I. p. 313.

would be an end to all pragmatic activities that can be possible only if they have reference to some positive entity. Besides, introspection which is the ultimate arbiter as to the real character of all sorts of experience—whether conceptual or not, is completely unaware of the negative aspect of conceptual cognitions.¹ Let us consider another point : Is the *negation of not-cow*, that is being trotted out by the Buddhists as the connotation of the term *cow*, itself variable in the case of every individual cow intended to be signified by the term *cow* ? If it be variable and discrete it would be as much inexpressible as the individual cows themselves. If on the other hand it is regarded as an unvariant concept, what can be the logic in repudiating the *universal* which too likewise is an unvariant concept and re-instating in its stead the novel concept of *apoha* ?² There is still another objection to be considered : Is the negation of the opposite—viz. *not-not-cow*, which is the connotation of the term *cow*, to be understood as a self-sufficient concept *per se*, or is it to be comprehended on its part as being the negation of the opposite—viz. *not-not-not-cow* ? On the first alternative the universal validity of the Buddhist doctrine would be impaired inasmuch as they admit in the case of *apoha* itself a knowledge of the

¹yaś cāyam anyāpohaḥ—agaur na bhavatīti gośabdasyārthaḥ sa kiṃ bhāvo' thābhāvaḥ ? yadi bhāvaḥ kiṃ gaur agaur iti ? yadi gaur nāsti vivādaḥ/ athāgaur go-śabdasyārthaḥ, aho śabdārthakauśalam/ abhāvas tu na yuktaḥ—praiṣa-sampratipattyor aviśayatvāt/ nahi gośabdaśravaṇāt abhāve praiṣo navā sampratipattiḥ/ śabdārthaś ca pratipattyā pratiyate/ na ca gośabdād abhāvaṃ kaścit pratipadyata-iti/—*NV.*, p. 329. Compare : *TS.* vv. 982-38 and Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* thereon. Vol. I. p. 313.

²ayaṃ cāpohaḥ prativastu eko'neko vā iti vaktavyaḥ/ yadyeko'nekagosambandhī tadā gotvaṃ tad iti/ athānekaś tataḥ piṇḍavad ānantyād ākhyānānupapatter arthapratyayo na yuktaḥ/—*NV.*, p. 330. *Vide* also *TS.* vv. 995-96.

negation in its positive aspect in lieu of its being comprehended as the negation of its opposite. If *apoha* be thus capable of being cognised in its positive aspect irrespective of any reference to its opposite, what harm can there be in admitting the same positive reference in the case of the primary connotation of the term itself without conjuring up the spectre of an intervening *apoha* ? If, however, for the sake of theoretical consistency it is maintained that the *apoha* too can be understood as being the negation of its opposite, there would ensue a *regressus ad infinitum*, as the second *apoha* too can be realised as the negation of its opposite, and so on *ad infinitum*.¹ It is very strange that Dinnāga—the originator of this novel doctrine, did not hesitate to transfer on to *apoha*, which has not the least objectivity, all those attributes that are predicated of the universal by orthodox theorists. Thus we can wind up our criticism of the theory of *apoha* by citing the observation of Kumārila that the Buddhist claim that *apoha* is the real connotation of words cannot be universally valid, though it might hold good in those cases where a word is prefixed by a negative particle, as for example in the word *non-Brahmin* (*a-brāhmaṇaḥ*). But in those cases where words are used without any negative prefix, the connotation has no negative implication at all, but is invariably comprehended as a purely positive concept.²

¹idam ca tāvat praṣṭyavyo jāyate bhavān/ kimayam apoho vācyo' -thāvācyā iti/ vācyatve vidhirūpeṇa vā vācyāḥ syāt anyavyāvṛtṭyā vā ? tatra yadi vidhirūpeṇa tadā'naikāntikaḥ śabdārthaḥ anyāpo- haḥ śabdārtha-iti/ athānyavyāvṛtṭyā-iti pakṣas tadā tasyāpi anyavyavacchedasya apareṇa anyavyavacchedarūpeṇa abhidhānam, tasyāpi apareṇa-ityanavasthā syāt/...—Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* on *T.S.* vv. 997-1000, a verbatim reproduction of Uddyotakara's *Nyāya-vārttika*. *Vid.* pp. 330-31.

²api caikatva-nityatva-pratyekasamavāyinaḥ/ nirupākhyeṣvapohe- ṣu kurvato'sūtrakāḥ paṭaḥ/ taśmād yeṣveva śabdeṣu nañ-yogas teṣu

But the Buddhists would not acknowledge their defeat despite the above scathing criticism of their position by prominent orthodox theorists. They might argue as follows in defence of their position : The criticism of the orthodox philosophers directed against the concept of *apoha* is an outcome of their muddled thought and want of appreciation of the fundamentals of the Buddhistic hypothesis. Misled as they are themselves they try to mislead others by means of their vitiated ratiocinations.¹ The *apoha*, which is the negation of the opposite, can be a positive entity (*paryudāsa*) as well as an absolute negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) destitute of any positive implication. The former again might be of two kinds according as the positive entity in question is an *ideal image* or an *objective entity*. Thus there are three different kinds of *apoha*.² The opponents have been completely blind to this three-fold classification of *apoha*, and have directed their criticism against the Buddhists solely on the false assumption that the latter refer to an objective entity whenever they speak of *apoha*. Consequently their attacks have been mostly ill-directed and wide of the mark.³ To appreciate properly the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* we must have to grasp the difference between its three types noted above. Let us

kevalam/ bhaved anyanivṛtṭyaṃśaḥ svātmaivānyatra gamyate/—*ŚV: Apoha-vāda*, vv. 163-64. *Vide* also *TS*. Vol. I. p. 316 where the above *kārikas* have been cited.

¹anyāpohāparijñānad evam ete kuḍṛṣṭayaḥ/ svayaṃ tuṣṭā durāt-māno nāśayanti parān api//—*TS*. v. 1003.

²tathāhi dvividho'pohaḥ paryudāsa-niṣedhataḥ/ dvividhaḥ paryudāso'pi buddhyātmā' rthātmabhedataḥ//—*TS*. v. 1004.

³ucyate tad etad avidita-bauddhasiddhāntānām abhidhānam—
apoho yadi bhāvātmā bahir abhyupagamyate/
tato bhavati bhāvatkaṃ vāgjālaṃ na tvasau tathā//

—*Nyāya-mañjarī*, Vol. I. p. 279.

first examine the nature of the first type of *apoha*—which is in essence an *ideal image* and has no external reality. We have noted more than once that according to the Buddhists all individuals—whether they might be supposed to belong to the same species or another, are discrete and self-contained. For instance, all individual cows are distinct *inter se* there being no common link to hold them together. But it might be asked : How is it that the cow-entities being mutually distinct are cognised as being similar to one another ? How is it possible, too, to refer them by the self-same term *cow* ? The Buddhist answer to this apparently insoluble query is as follows : True, that all individual cows are different. But it is not altogether impossible to account for the phenomenon of each of them being cognised as mutually similar—viz. as a *cow*, and being referred to by the identical term *cow*. This similarity or rather identity of cognition and expression with reference to different individuals is possible in view of the fact that each of the individual cows, for example, performs the self-same activity and satisfies the self-same need. For instance, each individual *cow* yields milk and carries burdens in just the same way. And this identity of functions is at the basis of the identity of cognition and expression. Thus whenever we perceive a cow, an identical ideal image is generated that characterises the mutually different cow-entities by serving to mark them off from all other entities of a different species—like *horse*, *dog*, etc. Thus the image has no extra-mental reality at all, but is solely an ideal construction caused by the cognition of functional identity of entitatively different particulars. Now, this ideal image, which is non-variant despite the variability of particular instances, is termed as *apoha* since it has a negative implication inasmuch as it is cognised *per se* as being distinct from all other ideal images—e.g. of a horse

or a dog, and functions as a differentia of the particular instance as well by marking it off from all other individuals.¹ The particular cow-entity which is intended to be expressed by the term *cow* is also designated by the term *apoha* inasmuch as it is cognised as a discrete entity—distinct from all other individuals—whether of the same species or not. This *objective apoha* which is another name for the particular instance in question, is the cause of the ideal *apoha*—or the subjective cow-image.² The existence of the third variety of *apoha* as an absolute negation is likewise attested by our introspection, since whenever there is any perceptual or conceptual experience of a *cow* it ultimately takes the form of the following negative judgment—viz. ‘*this particular is not not-cow.*’³ Thus we must have to admit all these three types of *apoha*, as they are attested by our experience. Out of these three types of *apoha*, it is the first variety, which is an ideal image, that is *primarily* comprehended from the term *cow*, argue the Buddhists, since it is the ideal image alone, as for example—the *cow-image*, that is the invariable concomitant of the knowledge of the term *cow*, to the exclusion of the other two varieties of *apoha*—viz. the objective *individual* and the *absolute negation* of the opposite, the cognition of which follows in the trail of the *ideal image* raised by the term *cow*.⁴

¹ekapratyavamarśasya ya uktā hetavaḥ purā/ abhayādisamā arthāḥ prakṛtyaivānyabhedinaḥ/ tām upāśritya yaj jñāne bhātyartha-pratibimbakam/ kalpake’rthāntarābhāve’pyarthā ityeva niścitam/ ... pratibhāsāntarād bhedād anyavyāvṛttavastunaḥ/...tatrānyāpoha ityēśā samjñoktā śaṇibandhanā//—*TS*. Vol. I. p. 317.

²svalakṣṇe’pi taddhetau anyaviśeṣabhāvataḥ//—*TS*. v. 1009.

³prasajyapraṭiśedhaś ca gaur agaur na bhavatyayam/ ativispaṣṭa evāyam anyāpoho’vagamyate//—*loc. cit.*

⁴tatrāyaṃ prathamāḥ śabdair apohaḥ pratipādyate/ bāhyārthādhyaivasāyinyā buddheḥ śabdāt samudbhavāt//—*loc. cit.*

The comprehension of the absolute negation of the contradictory—say, *not-cow*, is only a derivative concept implied, of necessity, by the cognition of the *ideal cow-image*, which is the primary connotation of the term *cow*, since the latter is a distinctive entity as being differentiable from other ideal images—viz. of *horses* and *dogs* and so on. Thus it is but an invariable and necessary appanage of the primary connotation and as such must not be given precedence over the latter. So, too, is the objective individual—whose knowledge is likewise derivative being implied as it is by the primary connotation. The term *cow*, though primarily expressive of the *ideal cow-image*, secondarily conveys the idea of the *objective individual*, inasmuch as there is a necessary link of causation between the perception of the discrete particular—viz. the objective cow-entity on the one hand and the utterance of the word *cow*, as also the resultant emergence of the *ideal cow-image* on the other, so that the cognition of the image cannot but suggest the idea of the individual *cow-entity*, which is the remote cause of the verbal utterance. But we must be careful to note that the idea of the individual *cow* is only a by-product, being conveyed by suggestion as it is through the mechanism of the causal relation.¹ But, in

¹sākṣād ākāra etasminnevaṃ ca pratipādite/ prasajyapratishedho'pi sāmartyena pratiyate/ na tadātmā parātmeti sambandhe sati vastubhiḥ/ vyāvṛttavastvadhigamo'pyarthād eva bhavatyataḥ/ tenāyam api śabdasya svārtha ityupacaryate/ natu sākṣād ayaṃ śābdo dvividho'poha ucyate/—*TS.* vv. 1013 ff. on which *Pañjikā* remarks : tatra sambandhaḥ śabdasya vastuni pāraṃparyeṇa kārya-kāraḥ kabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ pratibandhaḥ/ prathamam yathāsthita vastvanubhavaḥ, tato vīvakṣā, tatas tālvādirispanaḥ, tataḥ śabdaḥ—ityevaṃ paramparayā yadā śabdasya vastubhir bāhyair agnyādibhiḥ sambandhaḥ syāt tadā tasmin sambandhe sati vijātiyavyāvṛttasyāpi vastuno'rthāpattito'dhigamo bhavati/ ato dvividho'pi prasajyapratishedho'nyavyāvṛttavastvātmā cāpohaḥ śābdārtha—ityupacaryate/—*ibid.* Vol. I. p. 319.

reality, the word *cow* is incapable of *directly* conveying the idea of the individual *cow-entity*, because the latter being momentary cannot be brought into relation with the former, which is the pre-requisite of any conceptual knowledge. The usage that the term '*cow*' *expresses* the particular *cow-entity* is only secondary, inasmuch as the *expressiveness* with reference to the individual is nothing but *suggestion* and not *denotation* which subsists between the word *cow* and the ideal *cow-image* consequent upon it. The concept of *absolute negation*, too, resulting in the wake of the awareness of the ideal image is likewise a derivative concept—implied or suggested as it is by the intrinsic essence of the image itself. Thus the orthodox contention, as for example the one raised by Bhāmaha, that if the term *cow* denotes the idea of the absolute negation of *not-cow* without any reference to the positive *cow-concept* which alone has any pragmatic efficiency, another term would be in requisition for the cognition of the latter has no basis to stand upon, since the Buddhists do not maintain that absolute negation alone is the connotation of the term *cow*,—as has been falsely assumed by Bhāmaha, but it is the positive ideal *cow-image* that is the primary connotation of the term *cow*, the idea of the absolute negation of *not-cow* being only a derivative concept. There can be no incompatibility in the position of the Buddhists as represented above on the ground that the self-same term *cow* generates two mutually contradictory ideas of affirmation and negation—as Bhāmaha would maintain. For, while the one is *expressed*, the other is *suggested*. And *denotation*—i. e., expressiveness, and *suggestion* cannot be held to be mutually exclusive and incompatible. Is it not a fact that the sentence—“*Devadatta does not take his meals by day-time and yet he is fat,*” denotes negation and suggests affirmation—scil. of eating by night, without any the least

logical incompatibility? So, what can be the logic in denying this dual function of denotation and suggestion with respect to individual terms as well on the analogy of such sentences?¹ Now, this ideal *cow-image* being constant even though the particular cow-entities might vary according as they are black or white or red, it is regarded as an *objective element*—an objective common factor inhering in all the objective individuals,—and as such deludes us to conceive of it as a *universal*—objectively real. But this is an illusion. Now, the critics might argue: What can be the basis for this illusion? You Buddhists do not acknowledge the objectivity of the category called *universal*. Thus the universal being quite a figment, there can be no ground for the thesis that the ideal image is illusorily cognised as the objective universal, for the cognition of similarity which is the basis of illusion cannot be possible between two entities one of which is practically *non est*. We cannot illusorily cognise a bull's horn as a rabbit's horn—the latter being a fiction. The Buddhist reply to this contention would be: True, that the objective universal is nothing but an ideational abstraction,—a chimera. Nevertheless, the illusion of the ideal *cow-image* as the objective *cow-universal* is possible despite the fictional character of the latter, inasmuch as the ground of this illusion is not the cognition of

¹divābhojanavākyaāder ivāsyāpi phaladvayam/ sāksāt sāmāthyato yasmāt nānvayo'vyatirekavān/ nābhimukhyena kurute yasmāt śabda idaṃ dvayam/ svārthābhīdhānam anyasya vinivṛttiṃ ca vastunaḥ/—*TS.* vv. 1020-21. Comp. Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* thereon: yathāiva divā na bhuṅkte pīno Devadatta-ityasya vākyaśya sāksād divābhojanapratīṣedhaḥ svārthābhīdhānam, gaṇas tu rātribhojanavidhiḥ—na sāksāt, tadvad gaur ityāder anvayapratipādakasya śabdasya anvaya-jñānam sāksāt phalam, vyatirekagatis tu sāmāthyāt/...na hi ago-pratīṣedham ābhimukhyena go-śabdaḥ karoti'tyabhyupagatam asmābhiḥ/ kiṃ tarhi?—sāmāthyād iti pratipāditam/—*Op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 321.

similarity, as is the case between a shell and a silver-piece, —but a short of psychological aberration (*antar-upaplava*) consequent upon the primal and perennial nescience that is the unavoidable heirloom of mankind. Look, for example, at the illusory cognition of duality in the lunar orb by an opthalmic patient. It is in no way based on the cognition of similarity, which is *prima facie* impossible because of the non-existence of the duality of the lunar orb. It is an illusion solely due to some kind of psychical or sensory deficiency without having any ultimate objective entity to explain it. So is it in the present case too.¹ Consequently, there is a wide gulf separating the orthodox theory of objective *universals* being the meaning of words and the Buddhist theory of a purely subjective *ideal image* that has no objective basis, even though it might well serve the functions of the former. What more, the ideal image, though it is purely an intra-mental entity, is cognised as an external category capable of pragmatic activities. This is possible because of the hypostatisation consequent upon inherent nescience.² Now it might be argued by the opponents that the Buddhist thesis—viz., that cow-individuals though different from one another are referred to by the

¹*Vide TS. vv. 1022-23. on which Pañjikā comments as follows : nanu yadi kadācit mukhyavastubhūtaṃ sāmānyaṃ bāhyavastvāśritam upalabdham bhavet tadā sādharṃyadarśanāt tatra sāmānyaṃ bhrāntir bhavet/ yāvatā mukhyārthāsambhave saiva bhavatām sāmānya-bhrāntir upapannā- ityāśaṅkyāha- jhaṭityeva hītyādi/ jhaṭiti - sāmānyadarśanādyanapekṣya dvicandrādijñānādivat antarupaplavāt etat jātām jñānaṃ/ nahi sarvā bhrāntayaḥ sādharṃyadarśanād eva bhavanti/ kiṃ tarhi - antarupaplavād apī'tyadoṣaḥ/—Op. cit., p. 322.*

²*...vikalpa-pratibimbakam jñānākāramātrakam eva tad abāhyam api vicitravāsanābhedopahitarūpabhedena bāhyavad avabhāsamānām lokayātrām bibharti, vyāvṛtticchāyāyogācca tad apoha iti vyavahriyate/ seyam ātmakhyātivādagarbhā saraṇiḥ/—NM., Vol. I. p. 281.*

self-same term *cow*, because of their *functional identity*—like yielding milk and carrying loads, cannot hold good inasmuch as the identity of functions is a myth, since function-entities themselves are susceptible of variation along with the variation of particular cow-entities. Is it not unreasonable to assume that the *red cow* yields just the same milk and carries the same loads as the *white cow* does? So, their functions being as much distinct as they themselves are, how is it possible to account for the use of the identical term *cow* with reference to each of them? The Buddhists' answer to this contention might be expressed as follows: We admit that the issue raised by the opponents is cogent. But our position too is nonetheless sound and reasonable. True, that the function-entities too are variable along with the particulars—such as *cows*, *horses*, and so on. So also the cognitions of these function-entities are mutually different. Yet the determinate knowledge (*pratyavamarśa-pratyaya*) in the shape of the ideal image being a non-variable entity the cognitions which are the causes thereof are regarded as identical, as are the function entities that are the causes of the latter. Thus, the Buddhists do maintain that words primarily refer to a positive entity—viz., the ideal image, howsoever fictional that might be in essence,—the negation of the opposite being suggested or implied, of necessity, by the latter. Consequently, the criticism of Bhāmaha and Kumārila that, as for the idea of the negation the knowledge of the negatum is a prerequisite, the Buddhist hypothesis of absolute negation being cognised *immediately* without the intervening cognition of the negatum in its positive aspect becomes absurd,—has no basis in facts, and is an erroneous representation of the implications of the Buddhistic doctrine of *apoha*. Now, the opponents might point out at this stage that the introduction of a positive entity into

the scheme of the conceptual *apoha* in the shape of an ideal image and postulating it as the *primary connotation* of a word is an altogether new device—a novel orientation improvised by later theorists and does in no way logically follow from the statements of Diñnāga who is the originator of this thesis. Diñnāga categorically maintains that the absolute negation—pure and simple, is the connotation of a word, there being not the least vestige of any element of positivity in it. So, how can the above interpretation of the concept of *apoha* by later theorists, be reconciled with the views of the Master as propounded in his treatise entitled *Hetumukha*?¹ The Buddhist plea would be : Surely the Master denied any the least positivity of verbal concepts, but that denial is from the transcendental standpoint, as from the viewpoint of ultimate truth there is no such thing as a positive synthesising universal or its counterpart the ideal image. But from the empirical standpoint, about which Diñnāga is silent, the above interpretation of the thesis of *apoha* is a satisfactory explanation of our conceptual thoughts. Thus the contradiction apprehended is only apparent and not real.²

Now, the opponents might raise an objection by pointing out that if the Buddhist theory of conceptual *apoha* be adopted, the addition of suffixes expressive of gender, number etc. to words would be logically unjustifiable,

¹syād etad yadi vidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho'bhyupagamya/ katham tarhi *Hetumukhe* lakṣaṇakāreṇa asambhavo vidher uktam?—*Pañjikā* on *TS.*, Vol. I. p. 339.

²asambhavo vidher uktaḥ sāmānyāder asambhavāt/ śabdānām ca vikalpānām vastuto'viśayatvataḥ/—*TS.* v. 1097. Comp. *Pañjikā* thereon : sāmānyalakṣaṇāder vācyasya vācakasya ca paramārthato'sambhavāt, śabdānām vikalpānām ca vastutaḥ paramārthataḥ viśayāsambhavāt paramārtham āśritya vidher asambhava ukta Ācāryeṇa—ityavirodhaḥ/—*loc. cit.*

since *apoha*—an ideal image, a conglomerate of positive-cum-negative implications, which is the connotation of the stem, is absolutely a genderless and numberless entity. Nor is it possible to argue that though the ideal *apoha* is incapable of being determined by any gender or number, yet the discrete particular which is the cause of the former is liable to such sexo-numerical determination and as such these characteristics of the cause being transferred on to the effect which is the ideal *apoha*, the addition of suffixes denotative of gender and number after stems signifying *apoha* is secondarily justifiable. For, according to the Buddhists, the particulars being totally inexpressible are not susceptible of such verbal characterisation, and failing that the original difficulty persists.¹ The Buddhists however would not be put down by such sophistry. They ask : Have the conceptions of number and gender any factual basis either ? Are they not purely arbitrary devices owing their being to convention alone ? Not only do we profess agnosticism with reference to the real constitution of particulars, but also we absolutely deny any connection of particulars with such conceptions as of sex and number and so on. Is it not a fact that the same entity is characterised by all the three genders—as for example, the stem '*taṭa*'—meaning *bank* ? So, lacking any constant relation with a definite gender, how is it possible to characterise the objects sexually ?² Similarly, the number too denoted by the suffix joined to the stem

¹liṅga-saṃkhyādisambandho nacāpohasya vidyate/ vyakteś cāvya-padeśyatvāt taddvāreṇā'pi nastyasau/—*ŚV* : *Apoha-vāda*, v. 135.

²liṅgasamkhyādiyogastu vyaktīnām api nāstyayam/ icchāracita-samketa-nimitto natu vāstavaḥ// taṭas taṭī taṭam ceti trairūpyam na ca vastunaḥ/ śabalābhāsatāprāpteḥ sarveṣāṃ tatra cetasām //—*TS*. vv. 1122-23. on which *Pāñjika* comments as follows : ...vyaktīnām api —ityapiśabdād apohasyāpi/ prayogaḥ—yo yadanvaya-vyatiṛekau

has no objectivity at all. Take for example such stems as *dāra* (wife) and *vipina* (forest). The former is used always in the plural even though there be no factual plurality, while the latter, though it refers to a plurality of individuals—viz. of trees, takes the singular.¹ Had grammatical number and gender been grounded on facts, such phenomena would have been impossible. Thus we must have to admit on pain of logical incongruity that sexo-numerical determination of stems is purely an arbitrary convention destitute of any empirical foundation. Such being the case, what point can there be in the opponents' objection criticising the Buddhist theory of *apoha* from the viewpoint of the supposed absurdity of sexo-numerical determination, while the same contingency is inevitable even if their own theory be adopted? We noted above the opponents' contention that the Buddhist thesis of conceptual *apoha* is not universal, as there is no comprehension of negation in the case of *verbal forms*, such as '*pacati*' ('he cooks') etc. But the Buddhists would not acknowledge the validity of this contention. They argue: It is a universally admitted fact that words are used solely with a view to generating the cognition of the object intended to be communicated for the time being. Does it not follow from this proposition that the connotation of a word has a restrictive implication excluding as it does what is not intended to be conveyed? This is the underlying basis of all sorts of linguistic usage—irrespective of whether they be *verbs* or *nouns* or *adjectives*. Thus whenever the word '*pacati*' is used with reference to someone, it implies of necessity the

nānuvidhatte, nāsau taddharmaḥ/ yathā śītatvam agneḥ/ nānuvidhatte ca liṅga-saṃkhyādi vastuno'nvayavyatirekau—iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ/—*Op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 346.

¹saṃkhyā'pi sāmāyikyeva kalpyate hi vivakṣayā/
bhedābhedaviveke'pi dārādi-vipinādivat//—*TS.* v. 1134.

exclusion of all other action-entities like *running, eating, sleeping* and so on for the time being. So how can it be maintained with any show of reason that there is no negative implication in the case of verbal forms ?¹ The opponents pointed out, as has already been noted, that words like *knowable, existent* etc. can have no negative significance inasmuch as their opposites—viz. *un-knowable, non-existent* etc. being fictional, cannot be the fit objects of negation that is *apoha*. But the Buddhists maintain that the objection has no basis at all. They ask : What is the connotation of the term *existent* or *knowable* ? The peculiar characteristic of these two terms is that they can be significant only if they are used along with other words in a sentence. But in isolation they have no significance at all. For example, in the sentence—“Books, tables and pens are *existent*”, the term *existent* is significant as it has been predicated with reference to some definite objects. But if we say simply “*existent*” it becomes purely an unmeaning sound. In analysing the connotation of the above two terms, therefore, this fundamental fact has to be borne in mind. But the opponents in their zeal for criticism have been oblivious of this basic phenomenon and have attacked the Buddhists on the supposition that they maintain the significance of the above two terms even when they are extracted from their propositional setting and used in isolation. Such an assumption is contrary to the Buddhist position. Nor can the orthodox theorists themselves uphold such

¹abhiprete niveśārthaṃ buddheḥ śabdaḥ prayujyate/
anabhiṣṭavyudāso'taḥ sāmārthyenaiva siddhyati//

.....

tathā hi pacatīyukte nodāsīno'vatiṣṭhate/
bhuṅkte divyati vā neti gamyate'nyanivarttanam//

—*Tattva-saṃgraha*, vv. 1144, 1146.

an hypothesis in view of the contingency noted above.¹ Now, keeping in view the peculiarity referred to above, does it not appear cogent that the terms *existent*, *knowable* etc. when used in a sentence should have in fact a negative implication, as the Buddhists maintain, in common with all other terms ? What then are the negata constituting the contents of the negations connoted by such terms ? What, for example, would be the nature of the negative judgment like that is to be connoted by the word *cognisable* or *knowable* in the proposition “Colour is *cognisable* by means of visual perception” ? It is, assert the Buddhists, the negation of the *doubt* as to whether ‘colour’ is the object of *visual* perception or the negation of the perverse belief that colour is the object of *auditory* perception. Thus, the predication of *cognisability* in the above proposition with reference to the visual perception of colour has an obvious negative implication that no sane man can deny.² Likewise, the term *existent* (*prameya*) can be significant only if it is predicated with reference to a definite subject in a definite context, and then its negative implication would be apparent beyond doubt. Thus in the premiss “Momentariness of sound is *existent* (i.e. a phenomenon whose existence is as-

¹prameya-jñeya-śabdātau kasyāpohyaṃ na vidyate/ nahyasau kevalo’kāṇḍe prekṣāvadbhiḥ prayujyate//—*TS.* v. 1166, on which *Pañjikā* comments : kasya prameyādiśabdasya apohyaṃ nāstītyabhidhīyate ? yadi tāvad avākyasthaṃ padāntarasambandharahitaṃ prameyādiśabdādam āśrityocyate, tadā siddha-śādhyatā/ kevalasya prayogābhāvād eva nirarthakatvāt//—*Op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 356.

²cakṣur-jñānādivijñeyaṃ rūpādīti yad ucyate/ tenāropitaṃ etad-dhi kenacit pratiśidhyate// na cakṣurāśrītenaiva rūpaṃ nīlādī vedyate/ kintu śrotrāśrītenāpi nityenaikena cetasā//—*TS.*, vv. 1171-72, on which *Pañjikā* comments :...śrotrāśrītenāpi nityena cetasā nīlādirūpaṃ vedyate...ityevaṃ yan-mandadhiyā samāropitaṃ tac-cakṣurvijñānavijñeyaṃ rūpaṃ ityanena vākyena niśidhyate/ cakṣurāśrītavijñānavijñeyaṃ eva rūpaṃ na srotrādivijñeyaṃ—ityarthaḥ//—*ibid.* Vol. I. p. 357.

certained by valid instruments of knowledge),” the term *existent* is significant by virtue of its negative implication that vetoes the *existence* of the eternity of sound as propounded by the Mīmāṃsakas. In the light of this disquisition it would be apparent that terms like *existent* and *cognisable* to be expressive are in need of syntactical relatedness, lacking which they are devoid of any connotative efficiency at all. Uddyotakara’s contention, too, that on the adoption of the Buddhist thesis of conceptual *apoha* the connotation of the term *all* would be self-negatory is due to the same confusion. The term *all*, like the terms *existent* and *cognisable*, stands in need of syntactical relation with other words to acquire any significance. ‘*All*’ by itself, has no meaning unless it contains an implied reference to definite objects constituting the universe of discourse. The opponents have erred in their evaluation of the Buddhistic doctrine as they have proceeded on the basis of logical isolation instead of real syntactical relation. Now, in the proposition—“*All* men are mortal”, is it not possible to find any negative significance consequent upon the restrictive force of the term *all*? It is certainly possible. *All* excludes *some*, so that “*not-some* men are mortal” would be the form of the negative judgment constituted upon the basis of the negative implication of the term *all*. *Totality* is a negation of *partiality*. Thus in the above proposition the use of the term *all* serves to dispel the incorrect notion, if any, that ‘some men only are mortal’. Consequently, the attack upon the Buddhists is logically indefensible as it misinterprets the Buddhistic viewpoint.¹

¹vyavahāropanīte ca sarva-śabde’pi vidyate/ vyudāsyam tasya cārtho’yam anyāpohobhidhīṣitaḥ// sarve dharmā nirātmānaḥ sarve vā puruṣā gatāḥ/ sāmastyam gamyate tatra kaścid aṃśas tvapohyate// kecid eva nirātmāno bāhyā iṣṭā ghaṭādayaḥ/ gamanaṃ kasyaciccaivam

The opponents might raise still another possible objection at this point : Admitting that words like *cow*, *jar* etc. are expressive both of the positive *cow-entity* etc. having an objective status and the negative entity of *apoha*, what is to be the nature of the connotation of terms like 'a barren-woman's-son' etc. that have no objective entity to refer to ? And in the absence of any objective particular, which is *apoha par excellence* by virtue of its constitutive discreteness as has been already explained, the Buddhist theory of *apoha* fails in such cases at least, so that the universality claimed of it by the propounders thereof falls to the ground.¹ The Buddhists' rejoinder to the above contention can be put as follows : Even admitting that there is no objective particular that can evoke the use of such terms as 'a barren-woman's-son' (*bandhyā-putra*), 'a rabbit's-horn' (*śaśa-śṛṅga*), 'a sky-flower' (*kha-puṣpa*)—what point can there be in the opponents' criticism ? Each of these terms is *self-connotative* inasmuch as it gives rise to an *ideal image* of the word itself, irrespective of any objective particular whatsoever,—and that is the connotation of a term like *bandhyā-suta*. There would have been cogency in the orthodox criticism, had the Buddhists maintained the *apoha* to be the primary connotation of words. But as has been elaborately shown above, the thesis of absolute nega-

bhrāntis tad vinivarttate// sarvāṅgapratīṣedhaś ca naiva tasmin vivak-
ṣitaḥ/ svārthāpohaprasaṅgo'yaṃ tasmād ajñatayocyate//—*TS.* vv.
1185-88.

¹yasya tarhi na bāhyo'rtho'pyanyavyāvṛtta iṣyate/ vandhyāsutādi-
śābdasya tena kvāpoha ucyate//—*TS.* v. 1202, which has been ex-
plained in the *Pañjikā* as follows : *yasya tarhi*—ityādinā paro'poha-
śābdārtha-vyavasthāyā avyāpitvam eva udbhāvayati/ tathāhi yasya
bandhyāsutādiśābdasya bāhyasutādikaṃ vastu anyavyāvṛttam apohā-
śrayo nāstyeva, tasya kimadhiṣṭhāno'poho vācya ucyate/ avaśyaṃ hi
vastunā'dhiṣṭhāna-bhūtena apohasya bhavitavyam, tasyānyāpohapa-
dārthāvyatirekāt//—*Op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 363.

tion being the primary connotation of words as first propounded by Dīnnāga in his *Hetumukha* was whittled down by later Buddhist theorists so as to conform with the uncontradicted experience of laymen—that is cognisant of the positive-cum-negative concept as its content as also to meet the opposition of the orthodox theorists like Bhāmaha, Kumārila and Uddyotakara. According to this modified version of the theory of *apoha*, the idea of absolute negation was relegated to a secondary position, the positive ideal image being accorded the primary position. Thus in the case of the terms in question the possibility of the ideal image, even though it be of the terms themselves, being unimpaired, the Buddhist theory of *apoha* as interpreted by the moderns stands unassailed though the derivative concept of the discrete objective particular might not follow in its wake.¹ But the opponents might ask : Conceding that the ideal image is the connotation of a term, how is it possible to interpose a relation between the two ? At the very outset of our discussion about the connotation of words it was pointed out that the conventional relation which is the key-stone of any conceptual knowledge becomes impossible if the *variable particular* be regarded as the connotation of a word. Would not the same contingency likewise appear in the case of *apoha* too thus invalidating all its claim to recognition ? Let us soberly analyse the problem. The speaker uses a word solely with a view to transmitting what he is cognisant of

¹arthaśūnyābhijalpottha-vāsanāmātranirmitam/ pratibimbaṃ yad ābhāti tacchabdaiḥ pratipādyate//—*TS.* v. 1204. cf. *śabdaiḥ*—iti/ bandhyāsutādiśabdaiḥ//—*Pañjikā*. ‘*abhijalpa*’, in the above *kārikā*, is a technical term. It has been explained by Śāntarakṣita in the following *kārikā* of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* : so’yam ityabhisambandhāt rūpam ekīkṛtaṃ yadā/ śabdasyārthena taṃ śabdam abhijalpaṃ pracakṣate//—*ibid.*, v. 890.

to the hearer. Thus there can be no difference of opinion as to the fact that there must be absolute identity of contents of conceptual knowledge both on the part of the speaker as also of the hearer. If the term *cow* means one thing to the speaker and quite a different thing to the hearer there would be an end to all linguistic usage. But is not this very difficulty, ask the orthodox critics, inherent in the Buddhist thesis ? The Buddhists maintain that the term *cow* stands for the ideal *cow-image* primarily, both in the speaker and in the hearer. But does not the ideal *cow-image* which is but a form of consciousness itself and as such inseparable therefrom vary from one case to another ? Is it not a fact that the cow-image as cognised by Devadatta—the speaker, is quite a different entity altogether from the cow-image that is cognised by Yajñadatta—the hearer, since the two streams of consciousness are mutually different ? This being the case, is not the validity of the maxim that there must be absolute identity of conceptual contents on the part of the speaker and the hearer flagrantly violated, if the Buddhist theory be accepted without modification ?¹ The Buddhists however would

¹nanu cāpohapakṣe'pi katham saṅketasambhavaḥ/ sāphalyaṃ ca katham tasya na dvayoḥ sa hi siddhyati// vaktr-śrotor nahi jñānaṃ vedyate tat parasparam/saṅkete na ca taddṛṣṭaṃ vyavahāre samīkṣyate// -TS. vv. 1208-09. Comp. *Pañjikā* thereon : pratyātma-vedanīyam eva arvāgdarśanānāṃ jñānaṃ/ nahi anyadīya-jñānaṃ aparoparadarśanaḥ saṃvedayate/ jñānād avyতিরিক্তাś ca paramārthataḥ pratibimbātma-kalakṣaṇāpohaḥ/ tathā ca vaktr-śrotor dvayor api kasyacid ekasya saṅketaviśayasya arthasya asiddheḥ kutra saṅketaḥ kriyate gṛhyate vā/ na hi asiddhe vastuni vaktā saṅketaṃ kartum īśāno'pi śrotā grahītum—atiprasaṅgāt/ tathā hi śrotā yat pratipādyati svavijñānārūḍham arthapratibimbakaṃ na tad vaktrā saṃvedyate/ yacca vaktrā saṃvedyate na tat śrotā—svasya svasyaiva avabhāsasya vedanāt/—*ibid.*, p. 365.

not yield even to this contention. They argue: There would have been cogency in the orthodox criticism based on the absurdity of the conventional relation, had we maintained the reality of the conventional relation as subsisting between the *word* and the *ideal-image* cognised therefrom. The ideal image too is not the *real* connotation of words, though its precedence in cognition has been established at length. That it has been hitherto referred to as the *primary connotation* of words is only to serve as a make-believe. What is really the fact is that the term *causes*, and *not expresses*, the ideal image. Now, though the ideal image thus generated by the term is variable from one person to another, from the speaker to the hearer, yet the mutual difference is not cognised by the persons concerned on account of the nescience—which is the prime cause of such illusions, being the same in each case. Look, for example, at the illusory cognition of duality in the unitary lunar orb by two opthalmic patients. Though they are entitatively different yet their cognitions are identical in contents because of the identity of nescience—which is the cause of the illusion. Both of them refer to their illusory cognitions in identical terms saying: “I perceive two lunar discs”, and they understand each other. This would illustrate the nature of all linguistic usages in general. In essence the concept referred to by a term is variable from one person to another, and has no objectivity at all. Yet verbal usages can satisfy all pragmatic activities by facilitating an interchange of concepts, that are distinct *per se*, on the basis of an illusory identity, since in the last analysis the concepts though differing from each other lead to the attainment of an identical objective particular. Thus it is this final attainment of the identical extra-mental object that is at the basis of this illusory identity of ideal images or concepts as also of the possibility of linguistic usage conse-

quent thereupon.¹ But it may be asked : How is it possible on the adoption of the Buddhistic hypothesis to discriminate between a *true* proposition and a *false* one, inasmuch as in both cases the component words alike give rise to *ideal concepts* alone that are mutually related later on ? And *ideal concepts* being *ipso facto* non-objective and unreal it is idle to talk of *truth* and *falsehood* with reference to propositions. The issue involved is intricate on doubt. But we might summarily note here the solution offered by the Buddhist theorists. The Buddhist answer would be : True, that all conceptual thoughts are universally fictional in character. Nevertheless it is not quite impossible to verify the validity of propositions. It must be conceded by all that propositions give rise to pragmatic activities. And what is this proneness to activities actually due to ? Activities are evoked by an *object* perceived with reference to which we are willing to act. Thus we see *water*, and at once want to drink it feeling that it can quench our thirst. Simultaneously the ideal image of water rises up in our mind, and we utter the word '*water*'. We fail to perceive the difference between the *ideal water-image* and the *glass of water* 'out there' in space. Thus it is this non-perception of the difference between the *real object* on the one hand and the *ideal image* which is essentially false on the other, that lies at the root of all our activities. It is the essential pre-requisite of all our actions—whether they be bodily movements or verbal utterances in the form of propositions. Now, if there be real objects to evoke the proposition concerned to satisfy the pragmatic activities caused by the latter, even though it might be composed

¹svasya svasyāvabhāsasya vedane'pi sa varttate/ bāhyārthādhyava-sayo'pi dvayor api samo yataḥ//—TS. v. 1210. Vide *Pañjikā* thereon. Also : timiropaplutākṣo hi yathā prāha śāśi-dvayam/ sva-samāya tathā sarvā śābdī vyavahṛtir matā//—TS. v. 1211.

of individually fictional concepts falsely identified with real objects,—the proposition is said to be true and valid. Otherwise it is false. The fulfilment of pragmatic activities is thus the test of validity of judgments irrespective of the fictitiousness of the component concepts generated by individual terms. To sum up, in both true and false judgments the constitutive concepts are equally false. Yet in one case they lead to pragmatic activities that satisfy our needs of the moment by enabling us to attain real objects and the proposition is then true, while in the other case it is not so. That illusory concepts can lead to the attainment of objective reals is not a novel phenomenon. The Buddhist theorists point to the illusory cognition of a gem in a gem's rays in one case and in a lamp's rays in another. Both are unqualified illusions and as such false. Yet in the one case the gem is really attained, while in the other it is not, since in the former case the illusion had its root in the real gem in the casket which was not the case in the latter. These two illustrations, argue the Buddhists, would satisfactorily exemplify the problem of propositional validity.¹

¹Comp. yatra hi pāramparyāt vastuni pratibandho'sti tasya bhrāntasyāpi sato vikalpasya maṇiprabhāyām maṇibuddhivat na bāhyārthānapekṣatvam asti/—Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, Vol. I. p. 323. *Vide* also : nanūbhayathā'pi vastuviśayatvābhāve vikalpānām katham vastuni vyavahārāḥ pravarttante/ ...pravṛttis tāvat dṛśya-vikalpayor arthayor ekikaraṇa-nibandhanā dṛśyadarśanāntaram utpanne vikalpe vikalpya tena pratipadyate pramātā, darśanānantaryavipralabdhasu dṛśyam eva grhītaṁ manyate, tadabhimānena ca pravarttate—idaṁ tad ekikaraṇam āhuḥ/...prāptir api dṛśyasyaiva arthakriyākāriṇo vastuṇaḥ pāramparyeṇa tanmūlatvāt kāryaprabandhasya/ dṛśyadarśanaṁ tato vikalpaḥ tataḥ pravṛttir iti/ atha hi mūlavarttinam upalabhya pravartamānas tam āpnoti apavaraka-nihita-maṇiprasṛtāyām kuñcikāvivara-nirgatāyām iva prabhāyām maṇibuddhyā pravarttamānaḥ/ yatra tu mūle' pyartho nāsti tatra vyāmohāt pravarttamāno vipralabhyate—

dīpaprabhāyām iva tathaiva maṇibuddhyā pravarttamānaḥ/ evaṃ ca
 bāhyavastusamsparsāśūnyeṣvapi vikalpeṣu samullasiteṣu bāhyo'rtho
 mayā pratipannaḥ tatra cāhaṃ pravṛttaḥ sa ca mayā prāptaḥ—itya-
 bhimāno bhavati laukikānām/—*Nyāya-mañjarī*, Vol. I. pp. 281-82. The
 source of these two illustrations is to be traced in the following verse :
 “maṇi-pradīpa-prabhayor maṇibuddhyā'bhidhāvatoḥ/ mithyājñānā-
 viśeṣe'pi viśeṣo'rthakriyāṃ prati//.” It has been cited by Mādhavācārya
 in his *Pañcadaśī*, ix. 2, where the commentator Rāmakṛṣṇa ascribes it
 to one *Vārttika-kāra* : samvādibhramavad ityuktam prapañcayitum
 samvādibhrama-pratipādaka-vārttikaṃ paṭhati/. Is this *Vārttika-kāra*
 to be identified with Dharmakīrtti—the author of the *Pramāṇa-
 vārttika* ?

CHAPTER SIX

WHAT IS A SENTENCE ?—ELEMENTS OF SYNTAX

Now that we have discussed in some detail the connotation of individual words it is time to pass on to the study of propositions. What is a proposition ? How is it to be distinguished from an isolated term ? Does it consist in grouping together isolated words irrespective of any semantic or syntactical consideration ? The questions might appear naive and easy of solution at first sight. But in reality they are not so easy as they appear to be and there is much scope for clarification and critical analysis. Bhartṛhari in his *Vākya-padīya* records various views regarding the nature of a proposition that were held by different schools of thought.¹ But despite all these differences there is an underlying unity of opinion as regards the basic characteristics of a sentence. All theorists, belonging to rival camps as they are, do maintain that mere juxtaposition of any and every two or more terms cannot make a sentence. 'Fire is cold' is not a sentence, though it has the outward form of the latter. Why is it then that of the two groups of words—viz. 'Fire is cold' and 'Fire is hot', we must repudiate the one and regard the other as a sentence ? What is the basis of this discrimination ? The obvious answer would be : The component words to constitute a sentence must satisfy the triple requirements of expentancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), competency or propriety (*yogyatā*), and proximity or contiguity (*āsatti*) or *sannidhi*). We must discuss

¹ākhyātaśabdaḥ saṅghāto jātiḥ saṅghātavarttini/ eko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ kramo buddhyanusaṃhṛti/ padam ādyam padam cāntyam padam sāpekṣam ityapi/ vākyam prati matir bhinnā bahudhā nyāyavedinām//—*OP. cit.* II. 1-2.

the nature of each of these three factors that together constitute the formal validity of all sentential utterances.

What is expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*)? It is the foremost requirement of a sentence. When we utter the word “*Enter.....*” to someone else standing nearby and waiting for direction the sense expressed by the word, of necessity, *expects* some other sense expressed by another word competent to be brought into syntactical relation with the former. Without the knowledge of such another concept or concepts the sense remains incomplete. And this incompleteness of sense due to the absence of some other concept or concepts having necessary relation with one another is what is called *expectancy*. Expectancy is in reality a mental state—a particular state of receptivity of the mind, and as such can primarily reside in the hearer of the word or words concerned—as for example, the word “*Enter—*”, since only sentient beings alone can *expect* or *desire*. The sense expressed by the word *enter* cannot possess the property of expectancy as it is purely inert. And yet we say that the *concept* expressed by the word *enter* expects the *concept* expressed by the word *room*, because the state of expectancy which is the attribute of the hearer is transferred on to the concepts cognised from the particular words, so that such usages are secondarily justifiable. This attribute of expectancy, secondarily transferred to the component concepts, is further transmitted to the *terms* expressive thereof so that the usage—viz. that the words ‘*fire is*’ expect the word ‘*hot*’ is tantamount to the statement that the concepts cognised from the words ‘*fire*’ and ‘*is*’ expect the concept conveyed by the word ‘*hot*’ (for the completion of the sense intended to be conveyed).¹ It is this mutual interdependence

¹vākyaśāstramāyagrāhikā cākāṅkṣā/ sā caikapadārthajñāne tadarthānvaya-yogyasyārthasya yaj-jñānaṁ tadviśayecchā ‘asyānvayarthahkaḥ’—ityevamrūpā puruṣaṇiṣṭhaiva/ tathā’pi tasyā ākāṅkṣā-viśaye’rthe

of concepts consequent upon the psychological expectancy—or rather the state of receptivity or suspense of the hearer that constitutes the essence of the element called *ākāṅkṣā*. Udayana, in his *Kusumāñjali* in connection with the refutation of the Vaiśeṣika view that *verbal knowledge* is indistinguishable from *inference*, has discussed with penetrating keenness the nature of *expectancy* as a pre-condition for the comprehension of the relational sense-unit expressed by the sentence. We propose to record below the abstruse dialectics employed by Udayana to further clarify the essence of this important element.

Udayana introduces the issue with the query : What is this element called *expectancy* ? One might try to answer it by saying that it is nothing but the relation subsisting between an adjective and the substantive qualified by it. But to make this relation itself a pre-condition of the relational thought-unit expressed by the sentence is nothing but a case of *petitio principii*.¹ Nor can it be argued that *expectancy* is equivalent to universal concomitance (*avinābhāva*) between the concepts concerned. For such an argument would make relational thought impossible in the case of propositions like ‘a blue lotus’ etc., inasmuch as there is no necessary universal concomitance between the two constituent concepts—viz., *blue-ness* and the *lotus-species*, a *redlotus* being as much possible and common

āropah/ tadevābhīdhānāparyavasānam ityucyate/ ayam artho'rthāntara-sākāṅkṣa—iti vyavahārāt/ pade tu nāropah—mānābhāvāt/ arthabodhottaram eva jijñāsodayācca/ ‘padaṃ sākāṅkṣam’—iti tu sākāṅkṣārthabodhakam ityarthakam/—*VSM.*, p. 297. *Vide* also : parasparavyapekṣāṃ sāmāthyam eke/ kā punaḥ śabdāyor vyapekṣā ? na brūmaḥ śabdāyor-iti/ kiṃ tarhi ? arthayoh/ iha rājā puruṣam apekṣate—‘mamāyam’-iti/ puruṣo rājānam apekṣate—‘aham asya’-iti/—*Mahābhāṣya* on P. II. 1. 1.

¹tatra keyam ākāṅkṣā nāma ? na tāvad viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvaḥ/ tasya saṃsargasvabhāvatayā sādhyatvāt/... —*Op. cit.*, Chap. III., p. 61. (Benares Sanskrit Series).

as a *blue lotus*. But it might be contended that though *blueness quâ blueness* is not necessarily related with the *lotus quâ lotus*, yet *blueness quâ quality* is universally concomitant with the *lotus quâ substance*, so that in the case of propositions like ‘a *blue lotus*’ too the element of *expectancy* as the *universal concomitance* is justifiable on the basis of the universal relation subsisting between the generic concepts of *quality* and *substance* of which *blueness* and *lotus* are but specific instances. Consequently, there can be no absurdity of relational thought in such propositions. But this defence is too weak to stand critical test. If *expectancy* were identical with universal concomitance the two sentences—viz., ‘How clear is the water of the river ! The buffalo is grazing on the bank.’ (*aho vimalaṃ jalaṃ nadyāḥ kacche mahiṣaś carati*) would be reduced to a single proposition, since there being a necessary relation between the *river* and its *bank* they would expect each other. Consequently, they would be syntactically construed with each other so that the intended construction of the word *kacche* as being the member of a separate proposition would become impossible.¹ Now, another explanation of expectancy might be advanced in lieu of the one stated above. It might be argued that *expectancy* as being the essential pre-condition of the formal validity of a proposition is but the inquisitiveness of the hearer. As long as that inquisitiveness or state of suspense of the hearer is not set at rest the proposition cannot be said to be formally valid lacking as it does that completeness and self-sufficiency of sense which is the characteristic of a

¹nāpyavinābhāvaḥ/ ‘nīlaṃ sarojaṃ’-ityādaṃ tadabhāve’pi vākya-rthapratyayāt/ tatrāpi viśeṣākṣiptasāmānyayoḥ avinābhāvo’sīti cet, na/ ‘aho vimalaṃ jalaṃ nadyāḥ kacche mahiṣaś carati’ —ityādaṃ vākya-bhedānupapattiprasaṅgāt/ —*Kusumāñjali*, loc. cit. Vide Varadarāja’s *Kusumāñjali-bodhanī* for an exposition of the above text of Udayana. *Ibid.*, p. 120. (*Sarasvatī Bhavana Texts*. No. 4.).

unit of judgment. If this interpretation be accepted the contingency apprehended above—viz. the merger of the above two propositions into a single proposition, cannot emerge at all. For both the propositions being alike expressive of self-sufficient judgment-units the element of expectancy *quâ* inquisitiveness on the part of the hearer is absent. Thus they are really two sentences and not one as it would have been the case had expectancy been identified with universal concomitance. This contention too cannot be taken to be valid. For instance, when the words—‘*There is a cloth*’ are uttered a particular hearer might be inquisitive as to its specific colour—viz. as to whether it is *red* or *blue* or *white*. Would it be valid to argue on that ground that the words—‘*There is a cloth*’ when used independently do not constitute a proposition, just as they do not constitute a separate proposition when used in conjunction with other words in such sentences as—‘*There is a red cloth*’? But the upholders of the above thesis might try to defend their position by introducing certain modifications into the proposed interpretation of expectancy as being the inquisitiveness of the hearer. They might argue : Inquisitiveness by itself is not required by us to be the pre-requisite of propositions. True, that when the word *cloth* is uttered the hearer necessarily inquires as to its specific qualities and actions that are its

¹nāpi pratipattur jijñāsā/ ‘paṭo bhavatītyādaṁ śuklādi-jijñāsāyaṁ ‘raktaḥ paṭo bhavati’—ityasya ekadeśavat sarvadā vākyāparyavasāna-prasaṅgāt/ —*Kusumāñjali*, loc. cit. Comp. Varadarāja’s comm.—“nanu śrotur jijñāsā ākāṅkṣā/ tasyāś ca ‘vimalaṁ jalaṁ nadyāḥ’—ityetāvataiva paryavasānāt vākyabhedopapattir ityatrāha—*nāpi* -iti/”—*ibid.*, p. 120. Vide also Vardhamāna’s *Prakāśa* : rakta-iti/ yathā raktaḥ paṭo bhavatītyatar raktapadārthānvayaṁ vinā paṭo bhavatītyekadeśo na paryavasyati, tathā raktapadaṁ vinā yatra paṭo bhavatītyeva vākyam udbhāvitam, tatrāpi tanna paryavasyed-ityarthaḥ/—*Op. cit.*, p. 62. (Chap. III).

determinants. And yet it is not feasible to state that there is expectancy with reference to all those specific attributes. Propositional expectancy should be evoked by terms that are actually constituent parts of the proposition concerned and should not be determined with reference to the subjective inquisitiveness of the particular hearer that is variable from one person to another and as such is not a satisfactory criterion with which to test the formal validity of a proposition. Thus, when we say '*The cloth is there*' the word *is* (*bhavati*), signifying the action of *being*, circumscribes the ill-defined zone of expectancy by fixing it down to a specific action to the exclusion of all other possible determinants of the cloth—like its colour, shape etc., for the time being. If again we further add the epithet *red* and say '*This is a red cloth,*' the scope of expectancy is further extended, and *red-ness* is thus ushered in within the orbit of propositional expectancy having syntactical relation with the *cloth* qualified by it and *vice versa*.¹ At this stage Udayana makes a query: Admitting that *expectancy* is the inquisitiveness of the hearer with respect to the concepts that are actually expressed through the medium of words, is it itself to be cognised for the comprehension of the relational thought-unit, or is the latter possible even in the absence of any *awareness* of the former by virtue of its existence *per se*? For instance, when we hear the sentence—viz. '*The king's son is coming*' (*rājñāḥ putra āgacchati*), are we to be aware of our inquisitiveness with regard to the two

¹gunakriyādyāśeṣaviśeṣajijñāsāyām api padasmāritaviśeṣajijñāsā ākāṅkṣā/ paṭa ityukte kiṃrūpaḥ kutra kiṃ karoti—ityādirūpajijñāsā/ tatra bhavatītyukte kiṃ karoti ityeṣaiva padasmāritaviśayā, natu kiṃrūpa ityādirapi/ yadā tu rakta ityucyate, tadā kiṃrūpa ityeṣāpi padasmāritaviśayā syāt/—iti na kiñcid anupapannam iti/..—*Kusumāñjali*, loc. cit.

concepts—viz. *king* and *son*, for the comprehension of their mutual relation as conveyed by the sentence, or is there no need of such awareness the relational judgment being cognised solely on the basis of the *expectancy* that is objectively subsistent between the above two concepts? The first alternative is not possible on the ground that our introspection does not reveal any such awareness of the required *inquisitiveness* that is upheld to be one of the essential pre-requisites of judgmental cognition. Judgmental thought is found to arise even if there be no awareness of the said *inquisitiveness* unlike inference which is not possible unless there is the knowledge of the probans, as for example, of *smoke* in the inference of *fire*. In this respect judgmental cognitions are on a par with perceptual cognitions, since just as in the latter the sense-organs by virtue of their very presence are able to generate the respective perceptions of various categories, so too in the former, *expectancy* that is the basic factor of judgmental cognitions and as such stands in the same level with sensory organs, is capable of generating the relational thought despite its existence being left uncognised. Thus we must give up the first alternative that the proposed *inquisitiveness* itself has to be comprehended in order to have any causal efficiency towards the relational thought following in its wake. Thus we must have to adopt, perforce, the second alternative according to which *inquisitiveness* by itself is capable of generating the relational thought-unit without any knowledge of it being required. Udayana further demonstrates the validity of this thesis by an illustration: When we perceive the outlines of some object from a distance, we are found to be inquisitive as to the specific character of the object—as to whether it is a *tree-trunk* or a *man*. Coming nearer we might perceive it to be a *tree-trunk*. But are we then

aware of the inquisitiveness that led us to the final perception of the object in its specific aspect? Certainly not. Introspection is silent as to the awareness of the inquisitiveness. Similar is the case with propositional expectancy.¹ Besides, there are other arguments too that can invalidate the thesis that the knowledge of the said expectancy itself is also required for the comprehension of the relational thought expressed by the sentence. For instance, when the speaker utters the words '*ayam eti putro rājñah, puruṣo'pasāryatām*' meaning '*There comes the king's son. Remove the man*', and the hearer through inadvertence hears the words '*rājñah puruṣo'pasāryatām*' alone, so that the intended syntactical relation of the word *rājñah* with *putrah* is lost sight of being replaced by that between *rājñah* and *puruṣah*, there is no obstacle towards the comprehension of the relational thought on the part of the hearer—viz. '*Remove the king's man*'. But had the knowledge of the intended *expectancy* been in request the origin of such a judgment would have been impossible.² What more, it is futile to argue inquisitiveness—whether itself known or

¹katham eṣa niścayaḥ sākāṅkṣa eva pratyeti, natu jñātākāṅṣaḥ—iti cet/ tāvanmātreṇa upapattau anupalabhyamāna-jñāna-kalpanā'nupapatteḥ, anyatra tathā darśanācca/ yadā hi dūrāt dr̥ṣṭasāmānyo jijñāsate ko'yam iti, pratyāsīdanīśca sthāṇur ayam iti pratyeti, tadā'sya 'jñātum aham icchāmi'-tyanuvyavsāyābhāve'pi sthāṇur ayam ityarthapratyayo bhavati/ tatthehāpi aviśeṣād/ viśeṣopasthānakāle saṃsargāvagatir eva jāyate natu jijñāsāvagatir-iti/—*Kusumāñjali*, loc. cit.

²yadā hi 'ayam eti putro rājñah puruṣo'pasāryatām'—iti vaktā uccārayati, śrotā ca vyāsaṅgādīnā nimittena 'ayam eti putra'—iti aśrutvaiva 'rājñah puruṣo'pasāryatām' -iti śr̥ṇoti, tadā asti ākāṅkṣā-dimattve sati padakadambakatvam, na ca smāritārthasamṣargajñānapūrvakatvam iti/—*Nyāya-Kusumāñjali*, loc. cit. which has been explained by Varadarāja as follows : na hi rājñā-ityādipadatraya-samāritānām saṃsargabuddhyā tad uccāritam, rāja-puruṣayoḥ putrāpasāraṇābhyām saṃsargajñānapūrvakatvāt/—*Op. cit.*, p. 121.

unknown, to be universally the cause of all judgments, inasmuch as judgmental cognitions are found to arise even in the case of an indifferent person lacking any inquisitiveness at all, not to speak of the awareness thereof.¹ But it may be asked : What then is the nature of syntactical expectancy ? Udayana now offers his own interpretation of the element of expectancy as the basic factor of all judgmental cognitions. His view may be put as follows : Expectancy is neither equivalent to universal concomitance between concepts, nor inquisitiveness of the hearer. It is really equivalent to that element which is capable of giving rise to the supposed inquisitiveness of the hearer. And what is this inquisitiveness ? It is, says Udayana, nothing but the pre-non-existence of the relational thought consequent upon the interdependence of the constituent concepts with the proviso that there is some necessary relation between the component concepts or between the ideas implied by these concepts. Component words are said to have expectancy and are not regarded as constituting a valid proposition until the hearer is able to grasp the relational thought-unit intended to be communicated by the speaker thereof.² As there is no possibility of comprehension of any relational thought in the case of a pure stem divested of inflexional endings—there is no question of expectancy too, since the pre-nonexistence of the relational thought

¹na ca sarvatra jijñāsā nibandhanam, ajijñāsor api vākyaarthodayāt/
—*Nyāya-Kusamāñjali*. Vide Varadarāja's comm : evam ākāṅkṣā nāma
jijñāsā—ityaṅgīkrtya tasyāḥ sattayā vākyaarthajñānahetutvāt liṅgaviśe-
ṣaṇatvaṃ na sambhavatītyuktam/idānīm tu sattayā'pi hetutvaṃ nāstī-
tyāha—na ca sarvatra-iti/—*ibid.*, p. 122.

²ākāṅkṣāpadārthas tarhi kaḥ/ jijñāsāṃ prati yogyatā/ sā ca smāri-
ta-tadākṣiptayor avinābhāve sati śrotari tadutpādyasamsargāvagama-
prāgabdhavaḥ/—*ibid.* Vide the elucidation of this statement in Vara-
darāja's *Kusumāñjali-bodhanī*, p. 122.

is absent.¹ But it may be asked whether this pre-nonexistence of the relational thought is *per se* the basic factor of a judgment or if we are to be aware of the pre-nonexistence itself for grasping the true nature of expectancy. Udayana's answer to this query is as follows : Expectancy *quâ* the pre-nonexistence of the relational thought is not required to be cognised. Its very *esse*, uncognised though it be, would suffice for the requirements of a proposition. Had the knowledge of the pre-nonexistence itself been essential for the formal validity of a proposition, it would involve the fallacy of *petitio principii*. For, as any awareness of the negation, of which pre-nonexistence is but a variety, presupposes of necessity the cognition of its negatum, the awareness of the pre-nonexistence of relational cognition would depend on the previous knowledge of the relational cognition itself, which again on its part involves the cognition of the relation as its content—that is to be generated by the proposition, so that the end is identified with the means,—a *prima facie* absurd position.² But Vardhamāna, the commentator of the *Kusumānjali*, refutes this view of Udayana. He argues : When an isolated word is heard there is no cognition of relational thought. This is an undisputed fact. Consequently, it must be

¹*Vide* : prātipadike saṃsargajñānaprāgabdhāvo nāstīti ata uktam śrotarī'-ti/—Vardhamāna's *Prakāśa* on *Nyāya-Kusumānjali*.

²na caiṣo'pi jñānam apekṣate, pratiyoginirūpañādhīna-nirūpaṇa-tvāt, tadbhāvanirūpaṇasya ca viṣayanirūpyatvāt-iti/—*Ny-Ku.*, which has been explained by Varadarāja as follows : saṃsargāvagamaprāgabdhāvo'pi pratiyogibhūta-saṃsargāvagamanirūpyaḥ, sa ca viṣaya-bhūtasamṣarganirūpyaḥ, sa ca ākāṅkṣādhīnanirūpaṇaḥ—iti itaretarāśrayatva-prasaṅgaḥ-iti/—*Op. cit.*, p. 122. *Vide* also Vardhamāna's comm : saṃsargāvagamaprāgabdhāvo hi pratiyogini tadavagame jñāte jñātavyaḥ, sa ca svaviṣaye saṃsarge jñāte boddhavyaḥ-iti saṃsargasya prāgeva jñānāt vākyaśānuvādakatvāt aprāmāṇyāpattir-ityarthaḥ/—*Op. cit.*

admitted that there is no propositional expectancy in the case. But on Udayana's view the possibility of syntactical expectancy cannot be averted in such cases too, for there being no cognition of relational thought the presence of its pre-nonexistence—which is the definition of propositional expectancy according to Udayana, cannot be precluded. To deny the presence of the said pre-nonexistence again would be equally absurd, since it would lead to the cognition of the relational thought itself in the case of a single isolated word even.¹ Having thus revealed the absurdity of Udayana's position Vardhamāna has offered his own interpretation of syntactical expectancy. He maintains: Syntactical expectancy is nothing but the *non-completion of the relational sense* intended to be communicated by the speaker. A particular term is said to have propositional expectancy with reference to another term, if the non-cognition of the latter is responsible for the absence of the resultant relational judgment of which the former is one of the constituent relata. Keeping in view this criterion of propositional expectancy it is possible to assert that a *substantive*, a *declensional suffix*, a *radical stem*, and a *conjugational suffix*,—all these are mutually expectant, having semantic interdependence on each other for the communication of a particular relational thought-unit, so that they constitute the basic requirements of a proposition that is asserted to be the vehicle of judgmental cognition. Thus to communicate the idea—viz. “*Bring the jar*”, the constituent concepts must be expressed by their verbal counterparts in such a succession of the *stem*, the *nominal inflexion*, the *root*, and the *radical suffix*, as is capable of making the comprehension of the particular relational

¹nanu nirākāṅkṣe taduccāraṇajanyasaṃsargajñānaprāgabhāvasya siddhyasiddhibhyāṃ vyāghātaḥ—*ibid.*, p. 66. (Chap. III).

thought psychologically possible. And in the case of the judgment referred to above—viz. “*ghaṭam ānaya*” (“*Bring the jar*”), the particular sequence would be as follows—viz. *ghaṭa-*, *-am* (denotative of the accusative case), *ā-√nī*, and *-hi* (expressive of the second person Imperative).¹ Thus, in the ultimate analysis, propositional expectancy is reduced to a particular sequence (*ānupūrvī*) of stems and roots and verbal and nominal suffixes—that is fixed in so far as the comprehension of a particular relational thought-unit is concerned. And when this basic requirement of syntactical expectancy is fulfilled a string of verbal utterances is said to constitute a formally valid proposition. This has been made perfectly clear by Jagadīśa in his *Śabda-śakti-prakāśikā* and by the scholiast Kṣṇakānta in his commentary thereon.²

We might now pass on to the consideration of the next factor—viz. *yogyatā*, which we have rendered into English as *competency*. It is however more appropriate to translate it as *syntactical possibility*.³ In the preceding paragraphs

¹*atrāhuḥ/ abhidhānāparyavasānam ākāṅkṣā/ yena vinā yasya na svārthānvayānubhāvakatvaṃ tasya tadaparyavasānam/ nāma-vibhakti-dhātvākhyāta-kriyā-kāraka-padānāṃ parasparaṃ vinā na svārthānvayānubhāvakatvaṃ/—ibid.*, p. 67. Rucidatta has explained *abhidhānāparyavasānam* as follows : *abhidhānam anvayānubhavaḥ/ tasyāparyavasānam anīṣpattir ityarthah/—Makaranda on Vardhamāna's Prakāśa*, p. 16.

²*yādṛśa-śabdānāṃ yādṛśārthaviṣayitākānvayabodhaṃ prati anukūlā parasparākāṅkṣā tādṛśa-śabdastoma eva tathāvidhārthe vākyam/—ŚŚP.*, p. 64, on which Kṣṇakānta comments as follows : *tathā ca yādṛśānupūrvīmattvaṃ sāksāt-paramparā-sādhāraṇa-nirūpyanirūpakabhāvāpanna-yaddharmāvachchinna-viṣayatāśāli-śabdatvavyāpakayatkīncijjanyatānirūpitajanakatāyā viṣayatāvachedakatāyāḥ pariyāptyadhikaraṇaṃ tādṛśānupūrvīmattvaṃ taddharmāvachchinna-tādṛśaviṣaya yātākabodhane vākyatvaṃ iti paryavasitam/—ibid.* (*Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*, 1934).

³The expression is used by Prof. Bertrand Russell in Chap. XIII of

we discussed the nature of expectancy as the foremost element of a proposition, lacking which words are incapable of conveying any relational judgment. But this second factor too is equally important in respect of all sentential utterances. It might be asked : Do the words '*Fire is cold*' constitute a proposition? It must be admitted that there is the required syntactical expectancy as defined by us in so far as there is the fixed sequence and there is the non-completion of the relational thought intended to be conveyed in the absence of any one of the concepts expressed by the constituent terms. Consequently, if expectancy be alone posited as the sole criterion for determining the formal validity of propositional utterances, the string of words—viz. '*Fire is cold*' must perforce be admitted to be a valid proposition. But is it in reality a valid proposition? The answer from a purely commonsense point of view would be in the negative. But why, it may be asked, should we deny the propositional character of the words '*Fire is cold*' despite the presence of syntactical expectancy amongst them? The obvious answer would be : Because there is no *syntactical possibility* between the constituent concepts, the inherence of '*coldness*' in '*fire*' being physically impossible. The significance of the proposition being thus contradicted by perceptual experience, the words '*Fire is cold*' cannot be regarded as constituting a valid proposition capable of generating any relational thought. Now it may be plausibly asked : How are we to determine whether there is the required *syntactical possibility* between words constituting a proposition or not? Vardhamāna, the commentator of Udayana's *Kusumāñjali*, defines *syntactical possibility* as "the

his treatise entitled *An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth*, already referred to in the previous sections.

absence of any such cognitive instrument that is capable of controverting the relational idea sought to be conveyed by a particular group of words".¹ In the expression '*Fire is cold*' the said *syntactical possibility* is lacking inasmuch as there is the presence of the cognitive instrument—viz. Perception, that contradicts the relation of inherence between *fire* and *coldness* as superposed by the proposition. Consequently the cognition of the relational thought in the above expression is checked in view of its coming into conflict with the stronger perceptual experience. Thus the words '*Fire is cold*' cannot constitute a valid proposition nor can they generate the cognition of any relational idea. They are totally insignificant. This is the view of the Naiyāyikas. But the Grammarians would not acquiesce in such a view. According to their opinion, *syntactical possibility* can very well be dispensed with as it has nothing to do with the *formal validity* of sentential utterances. Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa in his *Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhānta-mañjūṣā* has critically examined the Naiyāyika thesis upholding the claim of *syntactical possibility* to be considered as the basic factor of a proposition. We propose to record below the reasons assigned by him for justifying the soundness of the Grammarian's thesis. Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa contends that in the case of verbal cognitions the comprehension of the contradictory idea cannot prevent the cognition of the relational thought-unit sought to be conveyed by the proposition. Nor is it any more necessary to postulate the knowledge of the absence of any such possible contradiction as the cause of the cognition of the relational thought. For, in such sentences as "*There goes the barren woman's son with a chaplet of sky-flowers on his head. He has bathed himself in the waters of a mirage and is holding a bow of rabbit's horn,*"

¹yogyatā ca bādhakamānābhāvaḥ/—*Prakāśa*, Chap. III, p. 67.

we are fully aware of the relational thought expressed by the propositions concerned even though the knowledge of the absurdity of such relations be immediately present before our mind. Can we honestly disclaim our cognition of judgmental thoughts despite the physical impossibility of the relations between the concepts denoted by the constituent terms? Would it be logically sound to repudiate the significance and propositional character of such verbal utterances notwithstanding the undisputed cognition of the relational thoughts therefrom? Certainly not. Their propositional character must be admitted if we are to be true to our experiences, if for nothing else.¹ According to the Naiyāyikas, the words '*He is sprinkling the flowers with fire*' would be non-sensical and incapable of generating any relational knowledge because of the physical impossibility of the relation between the two concepts—viz. *sprinkling* and *fire*. But such a position is psychologically unjustifiable, argues Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa. For, whenever we hear someone speaking the words '*Sprinkle with fire*' we invariably ridicule the speaker thereof and accost him with the remark: "How is it possible to sprinkle anything with a non-liquid fiery substance?" Had the words referred to above been completely non-sensical signifying nothing but themselves, such remarks would have been impossible. Silence would have been more proper than such sarcastic comments, just as a northerner is apt to be silent when he hears the words of a stranger hailing from the land of the Draviḍas, even though the latter might express the self-same idea, physically impossible as it is, in his own

¹śabdaprayojye bodhe bādha-jñānasya apratibandhakatvāt/ tada-bhāvajñānasya akāraṇatvācca/ satyapi bādha-niścaye 'asya kṣaṇipateḥ parārdhaparayā lakṣikṛtāḥ saṃkhyayā,' 'eṣa vandhyāsuto yāti'-ityā-dito bodhadarśanāt/ —VSM., p. 507.

language.¹ What more, the adoption of the Naiyāyika viewpoint would render all philosophical disquisitions *ipso facto* absurd and impracticable. In all serious disputes two or more disputants take part, each representing the views of the school to which he is affiliated. For instance, in a discussion about the category of 'sound' (*śabda*), the Mimāṃsakas would uphold its ubiquity and eternity while the heterodox Buddhists would maintain its transitoriness consistently with their peculiar doctrine of universal flux. Consequently, the views of one disputant would be absolutely repugnant to the other. But if the validity of the Naiyāyika thesis be acknowledged the arguments of the Buddhist in favour of the impermanence of sound would be absolutely nonsensical, nay unintelligible *abracadabra*, in view of the syntactical impossibility of the component concepts from the Mimāṃsaka viewpoint and *vice versa*. This would lead to an insoluble deadlock.² Now, the Naiyāyikas might contend that though in the absence of syntactical possibility there might be non-cognition of the relational thought from a particular group of words, yet there is nothing to prevent the comprehension of the discrete and isolated concepts *per se* in succession, so that the apprehension of a total collapse of philosophical disputes is irrelevant. But the defence is too weak. For the same argument might be employed in the case of groups of words apparently having syntactical possibility, so that the judgment as a *tertium quid*

¹kiñcaivam vahninā siñcati--ityato bodhābhāve tadvākyaprayoktuḥ 'adraveṇa vahninā katham sekaṁ bravīṣi'-ityupahāsaḥ śrotṛbhiḥ kriyamāno'saṅgataḥ syāt/ etadarthakadraviḍabhāṣāśravaṇottaram pāścāttasyeva mūkatā tasya syāt/—*loc. cit.*

²kiñcaivam sati vāde prativādiśabdasyā'bodhakatve tatkhaṇḍana-kathocchedaḥ/—*VSM.*, p. 507.

apart from the component concepts would be a chimera.¹ What more, it is an admitted dictum that all our pragmatic activities can be evoked by the comprehension of the relational thought—whatever that might be. When we run towards a nacre thinking it to be a silver-piece, it is evident that we have already cognised the relation of identity—false though it really be, as subsisting between the nacre and the silver-piece. Not only pragmatic activities, but all our feelings—like happiness and sorrow and anger and envy, can be possible if there be a corresponding cognition of a judgment or relational idea to account for these mental states. Failing that, there would be no activity at all—whether bodily or mental. But if the Naiyāyika viewpoint propounding the element of syntactical possibility as a *sine qua non* towards the comprehension of a relational thought-unit be accepted as valid, we would be perforce drifting towards such a contingency. Now, is it not a fact that when we hear one utter false execrations and curses against our own selves we feel angered? But is there in those cases any shred of syntactical possibility as required by the Naiyāyika theorists? Similarly whenever we hear the recitation of a good poem enriched with poetic metaphors and such other literary embellishments we invariably experience a certain kind of joy for the nonce. But what is this enjoyment of joyous feeling due to? Is there any syntactical possibility in the metaphorical expression ‘moon-face’ that can cause the cognition of the required relational judgment which is capable of accounting for the resulting psychological state of joy experienced by every person that has any the least pretension to litera-

¹na ca etādṛṣeṣu nānvayabodhaḥ, kintu padārthabodhamātram iti vācyam/ sarvatra evam āpatteḥ/—*ibid.* Vide : *naceti*/ yogyavākye eva viśiṣṭabuddhiḥ svīkriyate ityārthaḥ/ *sarvatreti*/ yogyavākye’pi viśiṣṭabuddhyucchedāpattir ityārthaḥ/—*Kuñcikā* thereon, p. 509.

ry taste ? We know by perception that there is a real difference between the *moon* and the *face*. And yet they are identified by the poet's imagination. Thus it might be, that there is the required cognition of the relational idea even in the absence of syntactical possibility, so that our uncontradicted psychological experiences might be properly explained. If it be argued that in the case of such metaphors, too, there is no comprehension of any relation of identity between the two concepts, and yet there is the experience of joy, the Grammarians would raise a counter-contention and ask : Why is it then that there is no such experience of joy when isolated concepts of the *moon* and the *face* are cognised as such *minus* the relation of identity that is interposed by the poetic imagination ? No satisfactory answer can be found to this contention.¹ Besides, ask the grammarians, is it not a fact that in the case of perception relational cognitions are found to arise even though there might be contradictory cognitions present ? For instance, we do perceive a face as being identical with the moon, a piece of stone as the Deity itself, even though we are fully conscious all the time that this identity is false, that the face and the moon are as much distinct as the stone and the Deity invoked. And yet the knowledge of contradiction cannot thwart the perceptual cognition. Similarly, in the case of verbal cognitions, too, the knowledge of contradiction is altogether *effete* being incapable of resisting the origin of the cogni-

¹na ca pravṛttiṃ prati viśiṣṭajñānasya hetuvānurodhena śābda-viśiṣṭajñānasiddhir iti vācyam/ duḥkha-dveṣe'cchā-sukhādāvapi tulya-rītyā taddhetutvena satyapi bādhaniścāye mithyā'bhiśāpagālidāna-rūpakādikāvyaja-duḥkha-dveṣecchāsukhādyanurodhena tatrāpi tadā-vaśyakatvāt/ anyathā vyutpannānāṃ mukhatvam āśrayaś candra-tvam āśrayaḥ—ityato'pi 'mukhaṃ candra'-ityādita iva camatkārā-pattiḥ/—*VSM.*, p. 509.

tion of the relational thought, and as such syntactical possibility as an essential factor of judgmental cognitions need not be postulated at all. Look for example at the following illustration : Suppose a man perceives a real silver-piece and yet due to defect of vision turns away from it in the false belief that "it is not a silver-piece". In the meantime a knowledgeable person comes to the spot and asserts that "it is a real silver-piece". Now the first person who illusorily perceived the silver as not-silver would certainly cognise the relational idea conveyed by the sentence "This is silver" as uttered by the second person and would again run towards the object before him even though the verbal cognition consequent upon the hearing of the sentence referred to above be contradicted by his own perceptual cognition. Thus in this case contradiction cannot be regarded as entailing syntactical impossibility capable of resisting the comprehension of the relational idea. Similar is the case with every other porposition.¹ Now the Naiyāyikas might argue against this criticism as follows : We admit that perceptual relational cognitions are possible even in the presence of contradictory knowledge as in the case of the perceptual comprehension of the identity between the moon and the face contradicted as it is by the perceptual knowledge of the real difference between the two, as referred to above. This is due to the countervailing factor of *subjective will* or *assumptive knowledge* (*āhārya-jñāna*) in favour of the said identity that out-weighs the contrary verdict of the normally valid perception. But in every other form of cognition—whether it be *analogy* or *inference*, the comprehension of contradiction would resist the emergence of the final relational cognitions too, so that

¹nedaṃ rajatam iti bhramavatas tāto nivṛttau āptena 'idaṃ rajatameva' -iti prayukte bādhajñānakāle eva tato bodhāt pravṛttidarśanācca/—*Op. cit.*, p. 507.

for the comprehension of the relational idea there must be the preceding cognition of syntactical possibility as an essential causal factor. That relational ideas are found to emerge from such avowedly syntactically impossible propositions as “Sprinkle with fire” cannot be construed as invalidating the above thesis, for here too the relational cognition might be justified on the basis of the cognition of a false syntactical possibility between the two concepts on the part of the hearer.¹ The Grammarians however refuse to be convinced by such sophistries. They contend that just as *assumptive perception* (*āhārya-pratyakṣa*) is possible by virtue of the fiat of our will that overrides all contradictory evidences, so too *assumptive verbal cognitions* are undeniable in face of syntactical impossibility.² In fact, just as in the case of perception a jaundiced man is apt to perceive a *conch* as yellow though fully aware of its white-ness, so too in the case of propositions apparently lacking any syntactical possibility the cognition of relational thought is unavoidable because of the recollection of the constituent concepts as connoted by the component terms of the proposition concerned. But it might be asked : Admitting that such groups of words as “Sprinkle with fire” constitute valid propositions and are capable of generating the final relational cognitions even though deficient in respect of syntactical possibility,

¹yattu bādhakāle’pi āhāryapratyakṣodayāt pratyakṣānyajñānatvam eva pratibadhyatāvacchedakam vācyam/ tasya cārthāpattisādhāraṇatvena pratibadhyatāvacchadakatvāsambhavāt anumittitvādikam eva pratibadhyatāvacchedakam—iti śābdabodhe tasyākṣiptatvāt योग्या-
ज्ञानां प्रथग एव हेतु -iti/—Comm. *Kuñcikā* on *VSM.*, p. 509.

²bādhakāle’pi āhārya-pratyakṣodayāt icchāyā uttejakatvānuurodhe-
na pratyakṣatvasyaiva pratibadhyatāvacchedakatvāt upanītabhāna-
sādhāraṇa-pratibadhyatāyāḥ śābdabodhāvṛttitvāt bādhakāle’pi āhā-
ryaḥ śābdabodho bhavatyeva—iti bhāvaḥ/—*Kuñcikā*, loc. cit.

why is it that those cognitions are not followed by corresponding pragmatic activities as is usually the case with propositions that satisfy the requirement of syntactical possibility? When we hear the sentence “*Sprinkle with water*” we at once proceed to the performance of the corresponding action. But in the case of the sentence “*Sprinkle with fire*” we do not stir ourselves to any activity at all. How are we to account for this distinction from the viewpoint of pragmatic activities between two propositions—one having syntactical possibility and the other devoid of it, if both of them alike be capable of evoking relational cognitions? The Grammarians’ answer to this contention would be as follows: The opponents’ criticism of our position is altogether irrelevant as it is based on a confusion of two totally divergent issues. Our denial of syntactical possibility as a *sine qua non* of relational cognitions has reference only to the *formal validity* of propositions, while the Naiyāyika uncritically enough confounds it with the issue of *objective validity* of propositions. These two issues must always be kept apart and studied separately. The question of validity of propositions (*śabda-prāmāṇya*)—where validity means objective validity—is a separate problem altogether and may well be the subject-matter of a separate study. For the present, it has no place in the scheme of our discussion that mainly centres round the problem of formal requirements of a certain group of words in order to constitute a proposition capable of producing judgmental cognition. Now reverting to the Naiyāyika contention as to why the relational thought cognised from the proposition “*Sprinkle with fire*” is not followed by the corresponding pragmatic activity, we might state that the cognition of the relational thought-unit carries with itself no guarantee as to its objective validity as well. And all pragmatic activities are possible

if there be the knowledge of objective validity of the relational cognition itself, at least for the nonce. We would never run towards a shell if the relational perceptual cognition of the shell being a silver-piece, howsoever illusory in itself, were not supposed to be valid for the time being. But this knowledge of objective validity of the relational cognition evoked by the proposition "Sprinkle with fire" is rendered impossible contradicted as it is by the verdict of much stronger cognitive instruments such as *perception* and *inference*, and as such the expected pragmatic activity is also checked in consequence. True, that the element of validity of verbal cognitions consequent upon the element of syntactical possibility has an important bearing on the question of feasibility of pragmatic activities, but it would be the height of ignorance to make the verbal cognition a variable of syntactical possibility. Bhartṛhari too has unequivocally asserted that words have the inherent power of calling forth cognitions of ideas that have not the least objectivity, thereby implying the uselessness of syntactical possibility, or its awareness as a causal element of judgmental cognitions.¹ This is not peculiar to verbal cognitions alone. In the case of *perception* and *inference* as well the knowledge of contradiction cannot impede or arrest the emergence of the determinate relational cognition though it might later on be condemned as illusory or false in the light of the contradictory evidence ushered in by a stronger cognitive instrument. For, the emergence of determinate relational cognition—whether it be *perception* or *inference* or *verbal cognition*—

¹...na ca 'vahninā siñca' -ityāditaḥ pravṛttir api syāt/ bādha-jñāne-na jāyamānajñāne aprāmānyaśaṅkāyā janāt tacchūnya-jñānasyaiva pravṛttyupayogitvenā'kṣateḥ/ bauddhasyaiva sarvatra bodhaviśayatvena bādhasyaivābhāvācca/ taduktaḥ—"atyantāsatyapi hyarthe jñānaḥ śabdaḥ karoti hi" -iti/ —VSM., p. 512.

tion, requires nothing but the presence of the totality of those factors alone the combination of which is competent to give rise to that cognition. It does not stand in need of any other extraneous circumstance. As for instance, visual perception is possible wherever there is unimpaired vision besides the presence of the object concerned, the presence of light, as also of the triple contact of the soul with the mind and of the sense-organ with the mind and the object. Thus when there are two different combinations of causes—competent to give rise to two different sorts of contradictory cognitions, nothing can prevent the simultaneous emergence of both of them, though afterwards one must be regarded as valid and the other condemned as false in conformity with the *Law of Excluded Middle*. And of these that alone should be false which was produced by a defective causal combination. But as has been already stressed, this question of validity or otherwise of cognitions should be carefully kept divorced from the question of their origin—that constitutes a problem in itself.¹ This thesis is further corroborated by the statement of Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* on P. III. 2. 124. There Patañjali asserts that occasionally inferential knowledge supersedes perceptual cognition though in the normal course it is the latter that overrides the former in case of mutual conflict. To substantiate his assertion Patañjali refers to the instance of a string with a white-hot piece of iron tied to its end whirled round with great speed, so that to an onlooker it appears as if an iron disc is being moved round. Here

¹vastuto bādhajñānaṃ na kvāpi jñāne pratibandhakam/ tatkāle'pi satyāṃ sāmāgryāṃ jāyata eva jñānam/ tatra sva-sva-sāmāgrivaśāt dvayor api jñānāyor jātayor yatra jñāne sadoṣa-sāmāgrī-janyatva-grahas tatprāmaṇyagraha ityeva maryādā jyāyasī/ yathā 'gehe ghaṭo'-sti', 'gehe ghaṭo nāsti'-iti parasapaparaviruddhe dvābhyāṃ prayukte/—*VSM.*, loc. cit.

perception that represents the string as an iron disc is repudiated as illusory by a *simultaneous* act of inference on the basis of the fact that the heat of the white-hot piece of iron as felt by our tactile sense is *intermittent* and *not continuous* on all sides as it would have been the case had a real heated iron-disc been moving. One might however object that this is no case of supersession of perception by a *simultaneous* act of inference but merely an example of supersession of a *preceding* act of perception by a *subsequent* one. For, what is really the case is that when the movement of the string stops, the *perception* of a white-hot piece of iron tied to the end of the string instead of a heated iron-disc confirms the illusory nature of the former act of perception. But this interpretation is too naïve to be convincing. Are we not aware of the illusoriness of our perception of the moving white-hot iron-piece as a disc *even when it is being actually whirled round* by feeling its touch on all sides? And as such are not the two cognitions—one *perceptual* and the other *inferential*, *simultaneous* and *contradictory*? So what is the point in the Naiyāyika thesis that the knowledge of the contradictory resists the emergence of the relational cognition? And if this be possible in the case of perception what logic can there be in denying its possibility in the case of verbal cognitions, supposing the contradictory knowledge due to the absence of syntactical possibility to be *simultaneously* present? Similarly inferential knowledge is possible even if the probans be *mistimed* or *incompatible*¹ due to the probandum being contradicted by a *simultaneous* act of perception in such cases of reasoning as—“This fire is non-warm, because it is a product”, even though it might be finally repudiated as illusory. So the Naiyāyika contention that inference is

¹The English equivalent of the fallacy called ‘*kālāṭīta*’. See the late MM. Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa’s *History of Indian Logic*.

altogether impossible in the event of the compresence of the knowledge of contradiction is wholly untenable. Thus the knowledge of contradiction cannot arrest the simultaneous emergence of both the antinomic cognitions, though it serves to determine the validity or otherwise of the one as against the other¹. Now the opponents might argue at this stage : Conceding that the knowledge of contradiction cannot resist the emergence of the verbal cognition, but can merely lead to the knowledge of its invalidity as the Grammarians strive to maintain, how is it possible to account for the resultant *sorrow*, *anger* and other feelings that one is apt to experience on hearing utterances of execrations that *prima facie* lack any syntactical possibility, inasmuch as the awareness of invalidity with reference to the emergent judgmental cognitions arising therefrom rules out the possibility of such feelings that can be evoked by a comprehension of validity with regard to those judgmental cognitions ? How can one be angry or sorrowful when he is fully cognisant that the

¹kiñca āsusañcārāt alātacakraṃ pratyakṣeṇa dṛśyate, anekadikkasya rūpa-sahacāriṇaḥ sparśasya yugapadagrahaṇād hetoḥ, anumānād gamyate naitad astīti/ ananyathāsiddhānumānācca tadabhāvajñāne tena pūrvajñānasya bhramatvaṃ kalpyate-iti “*laṭaḥ śatr*—” iti sūtre Bhāṣya-Kaiyaṭayor uktam/ evaṃ ca bādhajñānakāle’pi anumitih svīkṛtā/ atra dṛśyate gamyate iti varttamānanirdeśābhyām ubhayor ekakālikatā sūcitā/ anekadikka-sparśasya yugapadagrahaṇarūpahetor bhrama ityeva tasmin sambhavācca/ pratyakṣasya prabalaṭve tu anumitau bhramatvakalpanam/evaṃ ca bādhasya hetvābhāsatvaṃ anupapannam/ anumitau tena aprāmāṇyagrahasya jananāt/ evaṃ anyatrāpyūhyam/—*VSM.*, pp. 512-13. Comp. also Bhartṛhari’s *Vākya-pāṭīya*, I. 131 cited by Kaiyaṭa in his comm. on the above *Bhāṣya*-text : “sparśaprabandho hastena yathā cakrasya santataḥ/ na tathā’lātacakraṃ vicchinnaṃ sprśyate hi tat/”. For other references to this illustration of *alāta-cakra* in philosophical works *vide* Col. G. A. Jacob’s *Handful of Popular Maxims*, Pt. III, p. 92. (Nirnaya Sagara Press. Second Edition. 1911).

judgmental cognitions caused by the propositions embodying execrations are destitute of the least validity in view of the latter lacking any syntactical possibility? The point is subtle no doubt, but the Grammarians might meet it as follows: We admit that the awareness of invalidity with reference to the relational cognitions aroused by execratory propositions should *ipso facto* prevent the emergence of any such feelings. But the feelings are not produced by the cognition of the relational idea *per se*, as has been falsely apprehended by the opponents, but they are brought about through the instrumentality of the *function of suggestion* (*vyañjanā-vyāpāra*), the nature of which ought to be studied separately. It might however be contended: Would not the same difficulty consequent upon the awareness of invalidity emerge in the case of suggestion too? The answer is: Certainly not. For the cognition generated by *suggestion* can in no way be superseded in view of its invalidity, the function of suggestion being psychological rather than logical.¹

The next item of *contiguity* (*āsatti*) now comes up for discussion. The intended relational cognition cannot arise from a group of words if the terms expressing concepts expecting one another be separated by intervening words not having any immediate syntactical expectancy with the former. Thus syntactical *contiguity* has two component elements: (a) There must be immediacy of two or more concepts that are intended to be related, and (b) secondly, the concepts concerned must be actually expressed through the medium of words and should not be merely present in the mind by virtue of recollection. If any of

¹na ca gālidānādisthale'pi bādhajñānena tatrāprāmāṇyagrahe duḥkhanupapattir iti vācyam/ tato duḥkhābhāve'pi vyañjanājanyajñāne tu na bādhajñānena aprāmāṇyajñānam iti spaṣṭam *Kāvya-prakāśāda*—*VSM.*, p. 516.

these two constituents be lacking there would ensue the absence of the said contiguity, and consequently the intended relational thought would not be comprehended. For example, when we say—“*The mountain has eaten is fiery Devadatta*”, meaning thereby that “*the mountain is fiery*” and that “*Devadatta has eaten*”, there is the absence of the first of the above two constituent elements of contiguity inasmuch as there is temporal intervention between the interdependent concepts due to the utterance of other words in between so that the emergence of the intended judgmental cognition is obfuscated. Again, when we utter the words “*Tether the cow*” intending to mean however “Tether both the cow and the horse (which also is present before us)” the second requirement of syntactical contiguity is violated in view of the concept of *horse* being not expressed through the medium of the word ‘horse’, which prevents the cognition of the intended judgment.¹ But Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa maintains that syntactical contiguity need not be considered as an essential prerequisite of judgmental cognitions. It might be required for those who are deficient in the capacity of comprehending the mutual expectancy of the interdependent concepts, but to those of quick intelligence it is absolutely superfluous.² The absence of contiguity can at best delay the comprehension of the required judgment, but it can-

¹śabdaiḥ sannihitatvena bodhitatvaṃ padārthānāṃ sannidhir ucyate/ ataḥ sannihitavābhāvāt śabdabodhitatvābhāvācca dvedhā sannidhyabhāvo bhavati/ tatra bhinnakāloccāritayor gāṃ ānaya ityatra padayoḥ sannihitavābhāvāt ananvayaḥ/ gāṃ badhāna—ityatra bandhanāpekṣasya dṛśyamānasya aśvasya śabdabodhitatvābhāvād eva ananvayaḥ/ ataḥ śabdapratipannānām eva anvayaḥ iti niyamaḥ sid-dhaḥ/—*Māna-meyodaya*.

²āsattir api *mandasya* avilambena śābdabodhe kāraṇam/...amandasya tu āsattyaabhāve’pi padārthopasthitau ākāṅkṣājñānavato bodho’vilambenaiva bhavātiti na tadbodhe tasyāḥ kāraṇatvam/—*VSM.*, p. 522.

not check it altogether. Do we not comprehend relational ideas from a verse where the concepts intended to be brought into syntactical relation are mostly separated by intervening words that do not directly stand to any such relation ? This is further suggested by a passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* under P. I. 1. 58 : “*na padānta-dvirvacana-vareyalopa-svara-savarṇā-nusvāra-dīrgha-jaṣ-car-vidhiṣu*”, where Patañjali definitively asserts that the required judgmental cognition is possible even though there be lack of contiguity (*ānupūrvya*) with reference to the words denoting concepts that are intended to be syntactically related, provided there be the element of *syntactical expectancy*. As an example he refers to the following apparently enigmatic group of words—viz., “The bull (*anaḍvāham*) carrying water (*udahāri*) who (*yā*) thou (*tvam*) carriest (*harasi*) upon head (*śīrasā*) the pitcher (*kumbham*) O sister ! (*bhagini*) crookedly (*sācīnam*) running (*abhidhāvantam*) hast seen (*adrākṣiḥ*) ? ” where the intended relational idea—viz. “O thou sister ! who carriest upon (thy) head a pitcher of water, hast thou seen a bull running crookedly ?”—is cognised even though the terms are used haphazardly without any heed to the element of contiguity that their semantic interdependence demands.¹ Commenting on this passage Kaiyyaṭa—the scholiast of the *Mahābhāṣya*, refers to the parallel dictum of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* system that envisages the element of *logical sequence* (*arthakarma*) inherent as between two mutually expectant concepts as much stronger than mere *textual sequence* (*pāṭha-*

¹anānupūrvyenāpi sanniviṣṭānām yatheṣṭam abhisambandho bhavati/ tadyathā -“anaḍvāham udahāri yā tvam harasi śīrasā kumbham bhagini sācīnam abhidhāvantam adrākṣiḥ” - iti/ tasya yatheṣṭam abhisambandho bhavati—udahāri bhagini yā tvam kumbham harasi śīrasā anaḍvāham sācīnam abhidhāvantam adrākṣirīti/ —*Op. cit.*, Vol. I., p. 450. (NSP. Edition).

krama) and as such able to supersede the latter when required.¹ In further elucidating this, Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa—in his sub-commentary *Uddyota* on Kaiyyaṭa's *Pradīpa*, refers to the popular maxim known as *rājapura-praveśa-nyāya*—i. e. the simile of the manner of entering a royal city. Just as a mob, when it is about to enter a royal city through a narrow gate-way, must arrange itself into a regular file in an orderly fashion, so too concepts even though expressed by words jumbled up together without any heed as to their syntactical contiguity, of necessity relate themselves with one another according to their inherent expectancy before they can form into a self-sufficient relational judgment.² This view of Patañjali is corroborated by a statement of Vātsyāyana as occurring in his *Bhāṣya* on Gautama's *Nyāya-Sūtra*, I. 2. 9. There it is asserted without the least ambiguity that concepts relate themselves with one another according to their syntactical expectancy even though there might not be the usual propositional proximity in respect of the terms expressive thereof.³

¹pāṭhakramād arthakramo baliyān iti yatheṣṭam abhisambandhaḥ/—*Pradīpa*, loc. cit. For an elucidation of the six varieties of *krama*—viz. *śruti-krama*, *artha-krama*, *pāṭha-krama*, *pravṛtti-krama*, *sthāna-krama*, and *mukhya-krama*—of which *pāṭha-krama* and *artha-krama* are but two instances vide Jacob's *Handful of Popular Maxims*, Pt. III, pp. 86-87.

²arthakramo nāma *rājapurapraveśa-nyāyena* svasvākāṅkṣitārthānvaya-kramah/ evaṃ ca kalpitāsannavākyād bodhaviṣaye tātparyam niyāmakam iti bhāvaḥ/ *Bhāṣyāt* tu āsattyaabhāve'pi padārthopasthitau ākāṅkṣāvaśāt vyutpattyanusāreṇā'nvayabodho labhyate/—loc. cit. For an explanation of the maxim referred to above vide Jacob, *Op. cit.*, Pt. II, pp. 67-68.

³yasya yenā'bhisambandho dūrasthasyāpi tasya saḥ/ arthato hysamarthhānām ānantaryam akāraṇam/—*Op. cit.*, p. 84 (Benares Edition); also cited by Rūyyaka in his *Vyaktiviveka-vyākhyāna*—a commentary on Mahimabhaṭṭa's celebrated treatise on Poetics, where for *asamarthhānām* is read *asamāsānam*. Vide *Vyakti-viveka*, p. 287. (Kashi Sans. Series Edition).

Thus a review of the basic requirements of a proposition, from the standpoint of formal validity of course, reveals that it is *expectancy* alone that matters, the other two elements—viz. *syntactical possibility* and *contiguity*, being unnecessary,—the former being more concerned with the determination of *objective validity* of the judgmental thought than with its *formal legitimacy*, and the latter being rather in the nature of an *auxiliary* than an essential causal factor.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ABHIHITĀNVATA-VĀDA Versus ANVITĀBHIDHĀNA-VĀDA:

BHĀṬṬA Versus PRĀBHĀKARA VIEW REGARDING
THE PROCESS OF VERBAL COGNITION.

IN the preceding section we have discussed the Naiyāyika position *vis-à-vis* the Vaiyākaraṇa thesis with regard to the basic requirements of a formally valid proposition capable of generating determinate judgmental cognition. This leads us naturally to inquire as to the process and possibility of relational cognitions. It is obvious that the concepts expressed by isolated words are discrete and self-contained. But as soon as these words are grouped together side by side according to the requirements of syntax there emerges an altogether new element—a cognition relational in its essence that can in no way be equated with any of the component concepts. For instance, when the word *cow* is uttered we cognise the idea of an individual cow *per se*. But when the words “The cow is white” are heard that isolation breaks down. Here the word ‘*cow*’ refers not to any and every cow-individual—a non-determined and discrete particular, but the cow as characterised by the concept *white-ness*. Nor does the term ‘*white*’ convey the idea of the quality of *white-ness per se*, but as inherent in the substratum of that particular cow individual. Thus there can be no gainsaying the fact that there is absolute difference in the sense of the term as used in isolation from when it is brought into juxtaposition with other terms. It is the comprehension of the *relation* or *mutual interdependence* between the component concepts that marks a proposition from an isolated word. But where does this cognition of relation as a *tertium quid* come from? Is it due to the

inherent capacity of the isolated concepts to bring themselves into relation with one another? Or does relation too fall within the orbit of the connotation of a particular term as does *universal* as well as *quality* and *action* and *substance* as already discussed in a previous chapter, so that it is nothing extrinsic to the constitution of a concept? To put it more plainly, does the word *cow*—e.g. in the proposition “*the cow is white*”, itself connote the idea of the *cow-individual* as characterised by the universal *cow-hood* and as *related to the concept white-ness*, so that the relation becomes an intrinsic part of the connotation itself, or does it connote the idea of the individual *cow per se* destitute of any relation with any particular concept like *white-ness*, in which case relation becomes something extraneous to the connotation of the term, for the comprehension of which some satisfactory explanation has to be sought for? The problem is subtle and abstruse in the extreme—as the eminent Prabhākara himself admits in his *Bṛhatī* on Śābara’s *Bhāṣya*¹ and must have to be tackled with utmost care and highest critical acumen. There are two principal views prevalent on this problem—one being advanced by Kumārila and the other put forth by Prabhākara, the eponymous founders of the two schools of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* system of philosophy, and as in so many other respects they are totally divergent in respect of the present issue as well. According to the followers of Kumārila—the words constituting a sentence first convey their respective meanings—isolated and discrete, and it is these meanings or concepts as denoted by the words that relate themselves together in conformity with the triple requirements of syntactical *expectancy*, *competency*,

¹gahane’yaṃ nyāya-padavī/ katham avagāhaniye’ti yuktā sampradhāraṇā/—*Op. cit.*, Pt. I, p. 360 (Madras University Sanskrit Series).

and *contiguity*,—as already discussed in the last section in some detail. This is known as *abhihitānvaya-vāda*—or the theory that views the judgment arising from a proposition as the relation (*anvaya*) of concepts that are denoted (*abhihita*) in isolation by the constituent words. The exponents of the rival theory of *anvitābhīdhāna-vāda* are the followers of Prabhākara, in whose opinion the judgment that is evidently relational in character is nothing but a juxtaposition of the concepts themselves that are in essence expressed along with the relation that they ultimately bear to one another. The basic difference between these two divergent theories consists in this that while Kumārila and his followers envisage an isolated word as a unit of expression and an isolated concept as a unit of sense, the followers of Prabhākara regard the sentence as a unit of expression the judgment being the true unit of sense in their view¹. It would become plain as we further develop these two theories.

Let us begin with Kumārila's thesis. According to him the words constituting the proposition—e.g. "*Bring the jar*" (*ghaṭam ānaya*), first convey their respective meanings. In respect of the relation (*samsarga*) which is comprehended from the sentence, the component words have no efficiency at all. It falls totally beyond the orbit of the connotation of individual terms. But it might be asked: Wherefrom does this comprehension of the required relation arise? Kumārila states that the *relation* which is the connotation of the *sentence* as opposed to individual terms is attained through the instrumentality of the indivi-

¹atredaṃ vicāryam/ vyutpattir baliyasī—na śabdo'rtham avagama-yati vyutpattim antareṇa/ vyutpattiś ca kiṃ vākyasya vākyārthe, padasya vā padārthe iti/ yadi vākyasya vākyārthe vyutpattis tad anvitābhīdhānam/ padasya padārthe vyutpattau abhihitānvaya-iti/—*NM.*, Vol. I., p. 364.

dual concepts by virtue of their possession of syntactical *expectancy*, *competency* and *contiguity*—that are primarily the attributes of concepts themselves as already made clear in our previous disquisitions. Thus *relation* is not the direct connotation of constituent terms of a proposition, but is intervened by the comprehension of the individual and isolated concepts as communicated in succession that must invariably precede its comprehension. This theory of Kumārila is based on the statement of Śabara under *JS*. I. 1. 25 where the Bhāṣyakāra clearly maintains that the comprehension of the *relation* is possible through the agency of the concepts themselves.¹ But the opponents might contend : If the concepts themselves be capable of *directly* conveying the required *relation* independently of the terms that are totally defunct with reference to the latter, what is the necessity of using words to convey that relation? For instance, when we see a swiftly running patch of white colour, hear the neighing accompanied with the sound of hoofs—there instantly arises in our mind the relational cognition—viz. that “*the white horse is running*”. Here too concepts themselves as cognised through perception, irrespective of any verbal agency, are capable of generating the relational thought-unit concerned. But would that *relation* be regarded as equivalent to the *verbal cognition* of the self-same relational thought or the judgment that arises from the verbal statement—viz. “*The white horse is running*”? Certainly not. The relational thought as conveyed by a proposition is quite different from the one that is comprehended through other instruments of knowledge—whether it be *perception* or *inference* or *analogy*. But if Kumārila’s position be accepted, argue the

¹padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya nivṛtta-vyāpārāṇi/ athe-
dānīm padārthā avagataḥ santo vākyārtham gamayanti/—*ibid*.

followers of Prabhākara, the difference between the above two categories of relational thought cannot be satisfactorily accounted for inasmuch as the comprehension of the component concepts that is posited to be the direct cause of the relational cognition is alike in both the cases.¹ What more, if the verbal knowledge be really the product of the efficiency inherent in concepts and falls beyond the scope of verbal efficiency a separate instrument of cognition *quâ* 'Concepts' (*padārtha*) has to be posited to that end in addition to the six already recognised—contend the critics of Kumārila, inasmuch as verbal cognition stands as a category apart from all other cognitions—whether they be Perception or Inference or Analogy or anything else.² But the Bhāṭṭas might argue in order to differentiate the determinate relational verbal cognition from the corresponding relational cognition generated by other instruments of knowledge by pointing out that while the constituent concepts of a determinate verbal cognition must be expressed through the agency of *words*, in a

¹nanu tathā'pi padānām anvitābhīdhāne sāmānyam na kalpanīyam padasmāritānām eva padārthānam ākāṅkṣādīvaśāt anyonyānvayapratyāyakatvopapatter-iti cet/ maivam/ mānāntarādhigatānām padārthānām vākyārthapratyāyakatvadarśanāt/ nanu—"paśyataḥ śvetimārūpaḥ heṣāśabdaḥ ca śṛṇvataḥ/ khuraniḥkṣepa-śabdaḥ ca śveto'-śvo dhāvatīti dhīḥ//"*(ŚV. Vākyādhikaraṇa, v. 358.)*—iti nyāyāt astyeva padārthānām saṃsargabodhajanakatvam iti cet—na/ anumānāt arthāpatter vā tatra saṃsargāvagamāt//—*Tattva-pradīpikā* of Citsukhācārya, p. 148 (NSP. Edn.).

²nanūktam na mānāntarānubhūtanām artharūpānām vākyārthadhī-prasavaśāmānyam upalabdhām/ upalambhe vā saptamapramāṇaprasaṅgaḥ/—Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattva-bindu*, p. 120 (Annamalai University Sanskrit Series, No. 3.). Also *ibid.*, p. 110. *Vide* also : api ca śabdasāmānyajānyatve vākyārthapratyayasya padārthākhyam saptamam pramāṇam abhyupeyam syāt/ pratyakṣādiṣu tasyānantarbhāvāt//—*TP.*, pp. 148-49.

corresponding relational cognition other than verbal knowledge like Perception etc. this condition is lacking inasmuch as the component concepts there are presented through other instruments of knowledge, so that the argument of the critics of the *abhihitānvaya-vāda* that the acceptance of the Bhāṭṭa thesis would obliterate all distinction between verbal knowledge on the one hand and other categories of cognition on the other has no *raison d'être* at all. In verbal cognition the constituent concepts must be expressed through the denotative function of words and this can be construed as a *differentia* sufficient to distinguish it from all other categories of knowledge. But as against this the followers of Prabhākara might contend : True, that the difficulty can be tided over temporarily by such a course of argumentation, but this would obviously lead to the postulation of a plurality of functions. For instance, in view of the above interpretation of the Bhāṭṭa position, it should be maintained that in addition to the efficiency inherent in individual terms with regard to the comprehension of the corresponding concepts *per se*, the concepts too are invested with an efficiency with reference to the cognition of the relational judgment, as also the fact that the isolated terms have in themselves the further efficiency in respect of investing the concepts conveyed by them with the said causal efficiency with regard to the cognition of the final relational judgment. Thus, on the Bhāṭṭa view there must be postulated a plurality of functions that outrages the basic principle of the *Law of Parsimony* which remains non-violate if the rival theory of *anvitābhidhāna* is accepted, as would be shown later on.¹ To this the Bhāṭṭas might

¹tathā tisraḥ śaktayaḥ kalpyeraṇ, dve vā/ padānām hi tāvat artharūpābhidhānarūpā śaktiḥ, tadartharūpāṇām anyonyānvayaśaktiḥ, tadādhāna-śaktiś cāparā padānām eva-iti/ smāra katvapakṣe tūktam śakti-dvayam/ anvitābhidhāne tu padānām ekaiva śaktiḥ/ tat kalpa-

reply : Admitting that the acceptance of our thesis involves the postulation of a plurality of functions as shown by the opponents, is there any sufficient reason for blindly adhering to the *Law of Parsimony* as if it were something sacrosanct? Is not this sort of fetishism completely irreconcilable with scientific open-mindedness that forms the *conditio sine qua non* of any serious dispute worth the name? We uphold the claim that *isolated words* first convey the ideas of *isolated concepts* which again on their part lead to the cognition of the final *judgment*. And this procedure is confirmed by an impartial analysis of our verbal cognitions. Suppose a person labouring under some inherent psychological delinquency hears a group of words that really constitute a formally valid proposition. Would he not comprehend the isolated concepts expressed by the constituent words of the proposition even though he might fail to realise the relation subsisting between those concepts on account of his mental aberration that resists the awareness of the triple requirements of *expectancy*, *competency* and *contiguity* that exist *per se* as between the concepts? It is quite evident therefrom that words have the inherent efficiency of generating the idea of discrete concepts destitute of the relation that links them together, the realisation of which is dependent upon the awareness of the triple requirements of syntax. And if this be really the case how can one help postulating a plurality of functions, and recognising the

nālāghavāt etadeva nyāyāyā iti/—*Tattva-bindu*, pp. 122-23. *Vide* also : kiṃ ca padārthānāṃ anabhihitānāṃ saṃsargabodhakatvābhāvāt abhihitānāṃ eva tad eṣṭavyam/ tathā ca padārthānāṃ saṃsargapratyayajananasāmarthyāṃ padānāṃ ca padārtheṣu tatsāmarthyādhāna-sāmarthyam iti dvayaṃ kalpanīyam-iti kalpanāgauravam abhihitānavayavādinaḥ.../—*TP.*, on which the commentary *Nayana-prasādinī* observes : atra ca sāmartyadvayābhidhānaṃ prāthamika-padārthabuddheḥ sāhacaryāt smṛitvam abhipretya/—*ibid.*, p. 149.

concepts alone as the proximate cause towards the final cognition of the relational judgment, the words having only a remote bearing on our verbal cognitions? This is further illustrated by the fact that the realisation of the final relational judgment is present or absent according as its proximate cause—viz. the comprehension of the component concepts as expressed by the isolated words, is present or absent, so that the causal efficiency of concepts with regard to the relational thought is logically established beyond dispute by an appeal to the *Joint Method of Agreement and Difference*.¹ But the theorists of the Prābhākara school might argue: Granting that words convey the idea of discrete concepts, totally unrelated with one another, how can the relation be at all cognised, and even so how can that cognition of relation be valid? Suppose a man recollects a *palace* without knowing its exact location—say, *Pāṭaliputra*, and at the same time recollects a different place—say, *Māhiṣmatī*, instead of *Pāṭaliputra*, which is in no way related with the *palace* concerned. Would it not be an implausible fact to connect the *palace* with the country of *Māhiṣmatī* instead of *Pāṭaliputra*, and would not the cognition of such a relation if at all possible be condemned as illusory in view of the complete isolation of the two concepts? And yet the

¹atrābhidhīyate—eṣa tāvad autsargiko nyāyo yad asati balavad-bādhakopanipāte—“sahakāriṇi kārye ca pratyāsannaṃ hi kāraṇaṃ/sati tadbhāvabhāvitve tathā cārthasmṛtiḥ padāt//”—bhavati hi kutaścit mānasād aparādhāt viditapadārtho viditapadarūpamātraś ca cetano na manāg api vākyārtham avagacchati/ avagacchati tu samabhivyāhṛtapadadakadambakopajanitasvārthasmṛtyanantaram/ tad amūṣām eva vākyārthasmṛtinām ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā’satti-sahakārininām kāraṇatvaṃ vākyārthapratyayaṃ pratyadhyavasyāmaḥ/—*TB.*, pp. 111-12. *Vide* also: vinā’bhidheyasmarāṇaṃ anvayāpratipattitāḥ/ tattat-padārthasmṛtayas teṣāṃ anvayabodhikāḥ//—*TP.*, I. 25.

exponents of the theory of *abhihitānvaya-vāda* lead us un-awares to an identical contingency by asking us to acquiesce in the view that the relation falls outside the orbit of the direct efficiency of words and is the product of juxtaposition of concepts totally isolated and as such lacking any essential nexus *per se*.¹ The answer of the followers of the Bhāṭṭa school against this contention would be as follows : The argument of the opponents bespeaks a hopeless muddle of thought consequent upon the confusion of two altogether different issues. True, that in cases of non-verbal recollections of mutually non-related concepts, the comprehension of any relation would be *prima facie* impossible. But why should it be so in the case of the recollection of isolated concepts as generated through the medium of words invested as they are with the triple syntactical requisites of *expectancy*, *competency* and *contiguity* ? The same phenomenon can generate different effects in turn when it is re-inforced by different groups of auxiliaries in succession. For instance, recollection *per se* is capable of generating the mediate cognition of past objects. But reinforced by perception, it is found to be the instrument of a different category of valid cognition altogether—viz. *recognition* (*pratyabhijñā*) that is cognisant of an immediately present object. Similarly, as pure non-verbal recollections of isolated concepts cannot generate the cognition of the relation, there can be no reason why they should equally fail to produce that cognition when they become re-inforced by other auxiliary factors like the verbal medium and the three-fold elements of syntax with regard to which there

¹ *yadapi matam—svārthasvarūpasmṛtayo'pi hi vastutas tadarthāntarasamgatārthagocarā na svarūpamātragocaram arthāntareṇa ghaṭayati, vibhramaprasaṅgāt/ na khalu prāsādamātrasya smaranto'smarantaś ca taddēśam pāṭaliputram svarūpamātrasmṛtayā māhiṣmatyā enam ghaṭayitum īśate, īśānā vā bhavantyabhrāntāḥ/—TB., p. 113.*

is perfect agreement between the two rival sects.¹ Now, the antagonists might argue : Conceding that the isolated concepts as recollected from individual terms constitute the proximate cause, independently of the words expressive thereof, of the cognition of the resultant relational thought, would it not lead to the postulation of the concepts themselves as the *seventh instrument of cognition* besides the six already existing—as has been previously pointed out ? To this the *abhihitānvaya-vādins* would reply : It is accepted on all hands that *śruti* (direct statement), *liṅga* (mark), *vākya* (syntactical connection), *prakaraṇa* (context), *sthāna* (position) and *samākhyā* (name) are all equally different categories of the same instrument of cognition—viz. *Verbal Testimony*. Of these *śruti*, *vākya* and *samākhyā* alone can be properly regarded as instances of *verbal testimony* inasmuch as they are *verbal* in essence, while the remaining three—viz. *liṅga*, *prakaraṇa* and *sthāna* being non-verbal in essence, devoid as they are of any connection with ver-

¹tad apyasāmpratam/ mā nāma bhūt idr̥ṣaṃ smaraṇaphalasya saṃskāryasya sāmārthyam yat anubhūtā'nanubhūtasvarūpa-tadārtāntarasaṃsargaviṣayam ādhatte smaraṇam samīcinam iti/ sambhavati tu samabhivyāhṛta-padāvali-labdhajanmanām arthasvarūpasamṛtinām ākāṅkṣādirūpa-sahakāribhedopadhānāhita - daśāntaropātta - pramāṇa-bhāvānām anantaradr̥śyamāna - mānāntarānadhigata - svārthaparasa-parasambandha-nirbhāsa-prakāśaphalānām/ anyathā pratyabhijñānam api nopajāyeta/...—TB., pp. 114-16. *Vide* also : na ca padārthasvarūpa-mātraviṣayasmṛtinām anyonyānvayabodhakatvam anupapannam anyatrādr̥ṣtatvāt—iti vācyam/ smaraṇamātrasya sāmārthyābhāve'pi samabhivyāhṛta-padakadambaka-samupajanita-padārthasmṛtinām ākāṅkṣādisahakāriṇīnām sambhavatyeva tadbodhakatvam, sahakāribhedopādānāt/ katham anyathā saṃskārendriyayor anyatra parasparasāṅgatārthāviṣayayoḥ pratyabhijñāyām pūrvāparadeśakālasaṃsr̥ṣṭaika-vastubodhakatvam/ parasparasahakāritayā tathātvaṃ tu prakṛte'pi tulyam/—TP., p. 149, on which the *Nayana-prasādinī* observes : viśakalītapadārthamātrasmṛtinām adarśane'pi padasmāritapadārthasmṛtinām sahakārivaśāt upapadyate-ityarthah/—loc. cit.

bal element in the first instance, should have been properly classed under a different category of cognitive instrument—viz. *Concepti* (*padārtha*). And yet they have been classed together as instances of the self-same cognitive instrument *quâ* Verbal Testimony. Had *Concepti* been recognised as a separate instrument altogether this classification would have been logically unjustifiable. This analogy is applicable *mutatis mutandis* in the case of isolated concepts too.¹ But it might be contended that the inclusion of *līṅga* (mark), *sthāna* (position) and *prakaraṇa* (context) under the species of verbal testimony is justifiable on the ground that there too the final relational judgment *quâ* Injunction (*vidhi*) arises from the direct statement (*śruti*), that must be supposed to be intervening between the cognition of the three above-mentioned elements on the one hand and the final relational cognition on the other. Thus the analogy is false inasmuch as no such verbal intervention is postulated in the case of concepts when they are set down by the followers of Kumārila as constituting the proximate cause of the final judgmental cognition to the exclusion of the isolated terms that according to their view become defunct after they have conveyed the ideas of the concepts themselves. If, however, it is maintained by the Bhāṭṭas in defence of their thesis that even though concepts alone are really the proximate cause of the relational thought, yet there can be no incongruity in considering the latter as being caused by the *verbal statement* composed of isolated terms and thus justifying the

¹na ca padārtha-smṛtīnām smṛtānām vā padārthānām anvayabodhakatve saptamapramāṇābhyupagama-prasaṅgaḥ/ līṅga-prakaraṇa-sthānānām iva śabdapramāṇāntarbhāvopapattēḥ/—*TP.*, p. 149. *Vide : nacetī*/ śruti-vākya-samākāyānām śabdarūpatve'pi līṅga-prakaraṇa-sthānānām na śabdarūpatvam/ atha ca na śabdāt pṛthak-pramāṇatvam, tathopapattir/—*Nayana-prasādinī* thereon.

recognition of verbal testimony alone as a separate instrument of valid cognition in lieu of *Concepts*, in view of the cognition of the isolated concepts being generated by the isolated terms, remote though they be, the opponents would ask : Would not such a course of argument reduce Inference to a sub-variety of Perception inasmuch as it is based on the remote perception of the probans—e.g. of *smoke*, that leads to the inference of the probandum—e.g. of *fire*, so that there would be no incongruity in referring to the latter as being *visually perceived* while it is in fact only mediately cognised ?¹ But the charge is not altogether unanswerable from the Bhāṭṭa viewpoint. They might point out : The opponents' criticism is based on a misconstruction of our true thesis. Though we, the followers of Kumārila, maintain that it is the concepts that stand in a proximate causal relation with regard to the relational cognition, yet we do not absolutely negative the relation of causality, howsoever remote that might at first sight appear to be, that subsists between the words on the one hand and the judgmental cognition on the other. Besides,

¹nanu liṅgādiṣu śrutim kalpayitvaiva viniyoga-pratīteḥ svikārāt śābdatvaṃ na virudhyate/ iha tu padārthasmṛtīnām smṛtānām vā padārthānām anvayabodhakatvam iti vaiṣamyam/ śābdāvagatapadārthajanyatvena anvayapratīteḥ śābdatve cakṣuṣā'vagatadhūmajanya-syāpi vahnijñānasya cākṣuṣatva-prasaṅgaḥ-iti/—*TP.*, p. 150, which has been explained in the *Nayana-prasādinī* as follows : *nanviti/ śābdasyārthasyā'pekṣaṇīyo'rthaḥ śābdenaiva samarpaṇīyaḥ, na pramāṇāntareṇa/ na hi trayo brāhmaṇā āgatāḥ Kaṭhaś ca Māthuraś ca—ityuktvā tṛtīyam aṅgulyā nirdiśantaṃ santaḥ praśaṅsanti, praśaṅsanti tu Kauṇḍinya iti śābdenaiva samarpayantaṃ/ tad ihāpi śrutibhir eva cet tattad-aṅgāni samarpyante samasyante tadā śrutapradhānena, netarathā—iti śrutikalpanayaiva eṣāṃ liṅgādinām viniyojakatvam, na svātantryeṇa/ śrutikalpanāyāṃ ca tvarā-manthara-tāratamyena eṣāṃ prābalya-daurbalye, yathā'ha paramarṣiḥ—“...artha-viprakaṣāt”-iti (JS. III. 3. 14)/ —loc. cit.*

in our view, it is the words alone that are really invested with the power of causation in respect of the final cognition, the intervening recollection of isolated concepts being merely a subsidiary function (*vyāpāra*) of the words themselves, so that the contention of the opponents—viz. that if the concepts be regarded as the sole proximate cause of the resultant relational cognition there would be no place for *verbal testimony* as an independent category in the scheme of cognitive instruments, is wholly without basis. Nor can it be argued that the intervention by recollection of particular concepts that immediately precedes the relational cognition in question would baffle the causal efficiency inherent in the words. For it is an accepted dictum that the *function* of a causal instrument, standing as it does nearer to the effect produced than the latter, cannot override the causality of the instrument itself.¹ As for instance, though a sacrificial act is separated *temporally* from its result—such as *heavenly bliss*, due to the intervention of the imperceptible *transcendental result* (*apūrva*)—itself an effect of the sacrificial performance, that immediately precedes the final bliss—the latter cannot supersede or thwart the causal efficiency of the sacrifice itself with regard to its ultimate effect—viz. *bliss*. It is merely a *function* of the sacrifice and not a *cause* in itself. Similar is the case with words, the recollection of the isolated concepts being an intermedium. If this interpretation be accepted the contingency apprehended by the critics that Inference would be reduced to a type of Perception itself—based as it is ultimately on the latter would also disappear. For, the perceptual cognition of *smoke quā probans* as universally related with the probandum is not caused by vision alone, as it requires the

¹Compare the maxim : *svāṅgaṃ sva-vyavadhāyakaṃ na bhavati*—cited and explained in Col. Jacob's *A Handful of Popular Maxims*, Pt. I.

knowledge of the *universal concomitance* itself. So the final relational Inferential knowledge of *fire* cannot be regarded as being caused by vision alone. For one who does not possess that knowledge of the *universal concomitance* between *fire* and *smoke* even perception of *smoke* would not be competent to produce the knowledge of *fire*, while even a non-perceptual cognition of the smoke-entity would generate the cognition of *fire*, provided there is the knowledge of the required *concomitance*. This proves that the knowledge of *universal concomitance* alone is the direct cause of the inferential cognition, irrespective of the instrumentality of any perceptual cognition whatsoever.¹

In spite of this able and elaborate defence of the theory of *abhihitānvaya-vāda* by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his followers, the theorists of the Prābhākara school would obstinately persist in their indictment.² They maintain : Conceding that the Bhāṭṭas have succeeded

¹maivam/ anvayapratītiṃ janayatām padānām avāntaravyāpāratvāt padārtha-smaraṇānām/ na ca svavyāpāravyavadhānāt vyāpāravataḥ karaṇatvaṃ vihanyate/ yāgādīnām apūrva-vyavadhānena phalāsādhakānām akaraṇatva-prasaṅgāt/ na ca cakṣuṣo līṅga-jñānam avāntara-vyāpārah/ agrhītāvinābhāvasya anumānānudayāt/ acākṣuṣasthale'pi līṅgasya bodhakatvāt/—TP., p. 150. Vide *Nayana-prasādinī* thereon : *maivam-iti/ nātra śabdāvagata-padārthajanyatvamātrāt anvayapratīteḥ śabdatvam ucyate, yenā'numiterapi cākṣuṣatva-prasaktiḥ/ kintu śabdāvāntaravyāpārārūpa-padārthasmarāṇa-janyatvāt/ uktam hi—*“sākṣād yadyapi kurvanti padārtha-pratipādanam/ varṇās tathāpi naitasmin paryavasyanti niṣphale// vāk्यārthamitaye teṣāṃ pravṛttau nāntariyakam/ pāke jvāleḥ kāṣṭhānam padārthapratipādanam//” (*ŚV : Vākyaādhikaraṇa*)—iti//—loc. cit.

²Though Vedāntists scrupulously follow the Bhāṭṭa philosophers in respect of epistemology and metaphysics from the mundane viewpoint—vide the dictum “*vyavahāre Bhāṭṭa-nayaḥ*”—yet a few Vedāntic teachers like Prakāśānanda, the author of the *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, affiliate themselves to the Prābhākara school on the present issue of the process of verbal knowledge.

in logically justifying the position they have taken up, is it not a psychologically absurd explanation of our verbal cognitions? Is it true that we cognise isolated concepts from isolated words? Certainly not. Words are never used singly, nor are the concepts cognised singly as the followers of Kumārila capriciously maintain. Prabhākara in his *Bṛhatī* on Śabara's *Bhāṣya* tauntingly stigmatises Kumārila by referring to him as the "mother's beloved child" (*mātr-priya*) meaning thereby that he has been spoilt by an excess of parental affection that hindered his acquisition of the science of linguistics from a competent teacher without which it is the highest of folly and impertinence on one's part to theorise on the nature of verbal cognitions.¹ He categorically observes: Nowhere, in practice, is a word found to be used singly to express an isolated idea. Even when a word is used singly, the meaning cognised therefrom is necessarily associated with the concept of *existence* (*sattā*) so that the related-ness of the cognition in question cannot be gainsaid.² Thus, it is foolish to maintain, as Kumārila and his followers do, that iso-

¹pada-padārthānabhijñō mātr-priyo bhavān/ —*Bṛhatī* under 7S. I. 1. 25. Śālikanātha in his *Rju-vimalā* brings out the implication of the above statement of Prabhākara as follows: yo mātr-snehānubandhe na gurukule na ciram uṣitaḥ/ —*Op. cit.*, p. 383.

²padārthās tāvat nāvyatiṣaktāḥ kvacit upalabhyante/ antato'styarthena/ —*Bṛhatī*, loc. cit. Vide the following statement of Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* on P. V. 2. 94: "na sattām padārtho vyabhicarati"—which has been interpreted in Kaiyaṭa's gloss as follows: yatra kriyāpadaṃ na śrūyate tatrāstir bhavanti-paraḥ prathamapurūṣo'prayujyamāno'pyastīti gamyate—ityetadāśayena "na sattām padārtho vyabhicarati"—ityuktam/—*Op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 341 (NSP. Edn.). The same dictum is found also in the *Vyāsa-Bhāṣya* on Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra*, III. 17, where the relatedness of all verbal cognitions has been categorically maintained: sarvapadeṣu cāsti vākyaśaktiḥ/ vṛkṣa-ityukte astīti gamyate/ na sattām padārtho vyabhicaratīti/ tathā na hyasādhanaḥ

lated words signify isolated concepts. What is proper is that *propositions* signify *judgments*. A child, that has not yet been acquainted with the linguistic usage and as such is completely ignorant of words and their meanings, first of all hears a *sentence*—e. g. “*Bring the cow*”, as uttered—say, by his old grand-father to his father. He does not at all realise the composite character of the proposition—“*Bring the cow*”, as being made up of isolated word-units, but comprehends it as an indivisible unit of expression. Similarly, when his father performs the action—viz. “*bringing the cow*”, which is the significance of the sentence as a whole, he fails to discriminate between the *concepts* that make up the contents of the action and comprehends it as a unitary thought-unit. He does not as yet know that *bringing* is the idea conveyed by the word ‘*bring*’ or the *individual cow* of the term ‘*cow*’. Both the *proposition* and the *judgment* are to him indivisible units of *expression* and *thought* respectively.¹ But it might be asked : How then does the child acquire the knowledge of individual *words* and their *meanings* ? The answer would be : By a close inspection of insertion (*āvāpa*) and extraction (*uddhāra*) of the component words and the corresponding variation in the

kriyā’sṭīti/—on which Vācaspati Miśra in his commentary *Tattva-vaiśārādī* remarks : loka eva hi padānām arthāvadhāraṇopāyaḥ/ sa ca kevalaṃ padārtham astyarthena abhisamasya sarvatra vākyaarthikaroti/ so’yam avyabhicāraḥ sattayā padārthasya/ ata eva śabdavṛttividāṃ vyavaharo’yaṃ-yatrānyat kriyāpadaṃ nāsti tatra astir bhavanti-paraḥ prayuktavya’-iti/—*loc. cit.*, p. 145 (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series).

¹Comp. “vākyaenaiva hi vākyaārthaḥ prathamam pratipādyate/ upalakṣaṇataś cāsyā sambandhagraha-sambhavaḥ// vākyaṃ go-pada-yuktaṃ yat tat sāsnaḍisamanvitam/ vākyaārtham vadatītyevaṃ vyut-pattiḥ sukaraiva hi//” —cited by Mallinātha in his *Taralā* on the *Ekāvalī* of Vidyādhara. Also found in the *Laṅghu-candrikā*—a comm. by Gauḍa Brahmānanda on the *Advaita-siddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī with slight variations. *Ibid.*, p. 673 (NSP. Edn.).

significance of the propositions. Such being the case it is quite obvious that never can an isolated concept be comprehended *per se*. For instance, when the meanings of the component terms of the proposition "*Bring the cow*" are comprehended discriminatingly, they are comprehended as being related to one another. The term '*bring*' signifying action denotes the concept of *bringing* as related with the concept of the individual *cow*, while the term '*cow*', signifying *substance*, conveys the idea of the *cow-individual* as connected with the particular *action-entity*—viz. *bringing*, so that the *relation* itself enters into the very constitution of the concepts signified by individual terms, and as such there is no necessity to postulate an additional function of concepts themselves with a view to the cognition of the relation which is the connotation of the proposition as a whole being made possible. Thus a judgment is nothing but a mere juxtaposition of the concepts themselves that comprise within themselves the element of relation as a constitutive factor. But to this the *abhihitānvaya-vādins* might contend : Are both the concepts *cow* and *bringing*—viz. in the proposition "*Bring the cow*", that are postulated by the followers of Prabhākara to be constitutionally related to each other, to be denoted through the mechanism of words or not, so that the resultant relational knowledge might be styled as verbal cognition ? If it be argued that both the concepts need not be expressed through the function of denotation, then the required verbal cognition would be possible even if there is the absence of any one of the two words constituting the proposition, in so far as either of the two concepts as denoted by the word expressive thereof would be itself capable of signifying its relation with the other. If, however, the Prābhākaras insist that both the concepts are to be expressed through the medium of words for the cognition of the

relational judgment, then it would involve the fallacy of *petitio principii*. Since, on such an hypothesis, the word *cow* would convey the idea of the concept *cow* as related with the concept of *bringing* only if the latter itself is expressed as being related with the former through the corresponding word and *vice versa*.¹ But the *anvitābhīdhāna-vādins* might try to avoid the fallacy of *petitio principii* by adopting the following course of reasoning : True that words signify concepts as syntactically related with one another. But the comprehension of the relation as a constituent element of the concepts follows in the wake of the comprehension of the concepts *per se* in their non-relational aspect, though it is the function of denotation (*abhidhā*) that is active in respect of both the cognitions. Thus, the issue of interdependence vitiating the thesis of the Prābhākara theorists, as apprehended by the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsists, is easily averted—argue the protagonists of the *anvitābhīdhāna-vāda*. But this explanation is certainly unsatisfactory and contrary to all logic. For if, as the Prābhākaras maintain, the words are competent to convey the idea of concepts *per se* as also of the concepts as related to one another through the mechanism of the self-same verbal efficiency—viz. denotation (*abhidhā*), what logic can there be in maintaining the precedence of one cognition

¹nanu kim anabhihitena padārthena anvitam svārtham avabodhayati go-padam, uta padāntarābhihitena/ nādyah/ ekasmād eva padāt tattad-arthān vitasvārthāvavabodhasambhavana padāntarasya vaiyarthya-prasaṅgāt/ na dvitīyah/ parasparāśraya-prasaṅgāt/ tathā hi gām ānaya—ityatra go-padam yāvat ānaya-padena gopadān vitasvārtho nābhīdhīyate na tāvat tadan vitasvārtham abhidhātum arhati/ evam tadapi padam yāvat svārthān vitam artham gopadam nābhīdadhyāt tāvat tadan vitasvārtham nābhīdhatte/ tataś ca gopadena tadan vitasvārthe'bhihite paścād ānaya-padena tadan vitasvārtho'bhidhātavyah/ sati ca tasmin gopadena svārtho'bhidhātavyah—iti vyaktam eva parasparāśrayatvam/—TP., p. 145.

—*scil.* of the concepts *per se*, over the other—viz. of the concepts as related to one another? Simultaneity in the two cognitions is what is to be expected if the aforesaid Prābhākara interpretation to explain away the fallacy of *petitio principii* be granted to be valid. Moreover, on that assumption either there must be duality of the function-entity called *denotation* or there must be the revival of the self-same unitary denotational efficiency,—both of them being alike unwarranted postulations, the latter more so inasmuch as it is contrary to the established dictum laying down as impossible any resurrection of functions inherent in words, consciousness-units, and actions.¹ But the Prābhākaras might try to escape this contingency by resorting to a clever subterfuge. They might contend: There need not be any reduplication of the function-entity called *denotation*, nor any need of its resurrection—as the opponents apprehend. For, we might easily state, that the primary comprehension of the isolated concepts *per se* from individual words is the outcome of *recollection* due to their natural association—as the Naiyāyikas aver, and not the outcome of the inherent *expressiveness* of words, as denotation is made out to be by the followers of Kumārila, while the comprehension of the concepts as related to one another

¹padārthamātrābhīdhānapūrvake tu tadanvitābhīdhāne dvir abhīdhānam apramāṇam anupapadyamānaṃ cāpadyeta/—*TP.*, *loc. cit.*, which has been explained in the *Nayana-prasādinī* as follows: nanu nātra parasparāśrayatāyā avatāraḥ/ prasparanirapekṣāṇi prathamam padāni padārthān asaṃśṛṣṭān abhīdhāya paścād anyonyānvitānś-tān eva padārthān abhīdhatte/—tatrāha/—*padārthamātreṇi*/ na kevalam evaṃ kalpanāyāṃ pramāṇābhāvaḥ, api tu pramāṇavirodhaś ca-ityatrāha—*anupapadyamānaṃ celi*/ tathā hi saṃśṛṣṭāṃśe'pi cet padāni grhītasamgatikāni, tam api prathamam evābhīdadhyuḥ/ agrhītasamgatikatve paścād api nābhīdadhyuḥ—ityastyevānupapattīḥ/ sa-kr̥t-prayuktaśabdasya viramya-vyārānupapattir vā'nupapattīḥ/—*loc. cit.* Comp. the dictum: “*śabda-buddhi-karmanāṃ viramya-vyāpārābhāvaḥ.*”

that follows upon the wake of the aforesaid primary recollection is certainly due to the function of denotation, as defined by the Bhāṭṭas,—so that the criticism on the score of functional repetition or resurrection falls to the ground. But the argument is not very convincing either. For, the primary *recollection* too of the concepts that is argued to precede the denotation must also be equally cognisant of the *relation* (*saṃsarga* or *anvaya*) as their constituent, since the Prābhākaras themselves hold that all our expressions and cognitions are in essence *related* in constitution. So how can it be possible to recollect isolated concepts *per se*, the original cognition on which the recollection is based being essentially related in character? There must be absolute identity between the contents of the *basic cognition* and the corresponding *recollection* based upon it. We cannot recollect a *cow* when we have merely seen a *horse* instead. Thus to be logically as well as psychologically consistent the Prābhākaras must have to admit perforce that the primary *recollection* too that precedes the subsequent *denotation*, must be cognisant of the concepts *as related to one another* that constitutes the contents of the latter as well. And if this position is admitted the old fallacy of *petitio principii* would crop up once more, that would take away all the force of their thesis.¹ Against this the followers of Prabhākara might maintain: True, that the primary recollection of the concept arising—say, from the term *cow*, should be according to strict logic, cognisant

¹nanu dvir abhidhānām na padajātasya sāhacaryadarśanāt svārtheṣu prathamam smāraṇām paścād anvitābhidhāyakatvābhyupagāmāt—iti cet, maivam/ sāhacaryadarśanadaśāyām anvitanām evānubhūtatayā tathaiva smaraṇasyāvaśyāśrayaṇīyatvāt/ nahi padaṃ padārthamātrapratipattaye prayujyate, kiṃtu vyavahāraya/ sa ca anvita eva—iti katham ananvitānām eva padārthānām padebhyah smṛtiḥ syāt/—TP., p. 146.

also of the relation—say, with the action-unit *bringing* as expressed by the term ‘bring’, as is the final judgment conveyed through the denotative efficiency of words. Yet, in view of the variability of the other possible *relata* and *eo ipso* of the *relations* along with them, the term ‘cow’ generates the recollection of the isolated concept of *cow*—which is the only constant factor, so that the criticism on the ground of interdependence has no *raison d’être*. But this sort of argumentation is alogical. For, in Gautama’s *Nyāya-Sūtra* where the causes of recollection have been exhaustively enumerated there is no reference to *invariability* (*avyabhicāra*) as the cause of recollection. On the other hand *association* (*sāhacarya*) has been enlisted as one of the numerous causes of recollection, and this *association* being noticeable between the concept of *cow* and the other *relatum*—viz. *bringing*, there can be nothing to preclude the possibility of the recollection of the latter too along with the former. The lack of *invariability* cannot act as a check to that recollection since *invariability* has no causal bearing on recollection as is evident from the aphorism of Gautama. Thus the contingency of *petitio principii* stands unassailed on the acceptance of the Prābhākara hypothesis.¹ But the Prābhākaras might argue : Is not this fallacy of *petitio principii* equally present in the thesis of the *abhihitānvaya-vādins* as well, inasmuch as the

¹na cāvyabhicārāt gām-iti padaṃ svārtham eva smārayati, na tu padāntarārtham, vyabhicārāt—iti sāmpratam/ patvabhyāsāhitā hi bhāvanā prabodhavatī smṛtiḥ saṃgīyate/ tasyāś ca prabodhaḥ praṇidhānādījanmā nāvyabhicāra evāyatate/ sāhacaryamātrasyāpi tu sambandharūpeṇa praṇidhānādigaṇapāthāt upapattēś ca tadbodho na virudhate/ tac ca svārthasyeva padārthāntarasyāsti—iti padāntarārthasahitam eva svārtham anākāṅkṣitaṃ sahasaiva smārayet iti hatā vākyaṛt hadhīs tapasvinī/—*Tattva-bindu*, pp. 96-99. Cp. also *TP.*, pp. 146-147. For the causes of recollection vide *NS.* III. 2. 42.

primary comprehension of concepts, argued by them to be the cause of the final judgmental cognition, must of necessity be in the nature of *recollection* and as such must be cognisant of the *relation* and the *relatum* as well—the element of *association* as the basis of recollection being unavoidable there too? The weapon forged by the Bhāṭṭas to assail the Prābhākaras would thus recoil on their own selves. The contention is subtle no doubt, but the Bhāṭṭas might be prompt enough to improvise an equally subtle solution. They would urge : True, that the primary comprehension of isolated concepts, that is postulated by us to be the cause of the final relational cognition is in the nature of recollection. But this recollection of isolated concepts is not based on the element of *association* as the Prābhākaras erroneously think. Had it been so, there would have been recollection of the relation along with the relata—as the Prābhākaras apprehend. But it is brought about through the medium of the *denotative efficiency* of words, in which case however the recollection or rather comprehension is purely of the isolated concept which is the connotation of that particular word and not of the concept as syntactically related with the former besides. Thus recollection based on *association* and that based on *denotative efficiency* being essentially different from each other the counter-attack intended by the Prābhākaras against their opponents on the score of interdependence is effectively disarmed. Thus according to the Bhāṭṭas those concepts alone should have any causal bearing towards the final relational cognition, that are recollected or rather comprehended through the mechanism of the function of *denotation* and not of *association*. The argument seems to be very keen and ingenious. And yet the Prābhākaras obstinately stick to their own thesis. Against the aforesaid Bhāṭṭa solution they contend : If those concepts alone be:

regarded as the cause of the relational verbal cognition that are recollected through the denotative function of words, then in the proposition "*The cow-herd lives on the Ganges*", the concept—viz. *the bank of the Ganges*, as comprehended through the secondary function of *Indication* or *lakṣaṇā*, would not enter into the final verbal cognition as a component as it is not recollected or comprehended through the function of denotation. Moreover, though *association* is certainly a factor of recollection yet *intensity* (*abhyāsātīśaya*) is a stronger factor and as such it is the specific and invariable connotation *per se* that is primarily recollected from a particular word—to the exclusion of other concepts syntactically *associated* with it, which are later on cognised through denotation, urge the Prābhākara theorists, so that there need not be any question of *petitio principii* at all. Thus the Prābhākara position as finally interpreted would stand as follows : *Isolated concepts* are primarily *recollected* from particular words by virtue of their *intensity* and *recurrence*, and later on *denoted along with the syntactical association* based upon the triple requirements of *expectancy*, *competency* and *contiguity*. On this view the judgmental verbal cognition falls within the orbit of *denotation* inherent in words themselves, while on the Bhāṭṭa thesis the judgment is generated through the function of *Indication* as inherent in isolated concepts, which on their part are conveyed through the primary function of *denotation*. Thus there is an unnecessary multiplication of verbal functions, assert the Prābhākaras, if the Bhāṭṭa viewpoint is accepted—which can be easily dispensed with on the Prābhākara hypothesis, so that the Prābhākara assertions do not merely constitute an instance of the fallacy known as *argumentum ad hominem* involving vain recriminations alone, but are based on sound logic and steer clear of all fallacies like *petitio principii*, as erro-

neously alleged by the Bhāṭṭas.¹ As against this defence, the followers of Kumārila might pose a question : Admitting the validity of the Prābhākara thesis—viz. that individual words first of all give rise to the *recollection of isolated concepts* and afterwards convey the idea of the relation with other concepts through *denotation*, would it not make the use of other words in a proposition altogether redundant in view of a single word being capable of *denoting the relational judgment* ? For instance, if in the proposition “*Bring the cow*” the term *cow* first generates the recollection of the concept of the cow-individual *per se* and afterwards *denotes* the idea of the cow-individual as related with the action—viz. *bringing*, what is the use of uttering the other term—viz. “*Bring*” ? It is a mere repetition, as syntactical expectancy is completely set at rest by the denotative efficiency of a single term—viz. ‘*cow*.’ Besides, the word ‘*cow*’

¹maivam/ tvayā’pi padārthaviṣayāḥ pratyayāḥ pramāṇa-viparyaya-saṁśayādiṣu anantarbhāvāt smṛtaya evaiṣṭavyāḥ, tās ca anvitagocarā na svarūpamātragocarā—iti tulyo doṣaḥ/ na ca vācyaṃ—abhidhānataḥ smāritam eva vākyārthānvayi na sāhacaryamātrād-iti/ ‘Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ prativasati’-tyādiṣu padānabhihitatīrādīnām vākyārthānvanvayaprasaṅgāt/ abhyāsātīśayaś ca padārthasmaranaḥhetuḥ/ sa ca yathā padānām svārtheṣu, na tathā’rthāntareṣu/ teṣām vyabhicāritvāt/ tathā ca svarūpamātreṇaiva padebhyaḥ smāritāḥ padārthā ākāṅkṣādimaṇṭaḥ padair anvitā abhidhiyante—iti na parasparāśrayatā/—TP., p. 147, on which *Nayana-prasādinī* observes : atrānvitābhidhānavādī svapakṣadūṣaṇam pratibandhyā samādadadhāti—maivam ityādinā/ padārthā eva padair abhidhiyante, tadanvayas tu lakṣyate—iti yasyābhihitānvayavādinō matam tenā’pi padārthaviṣayāḥ pratyayāḥ pramāṇatve na nābhyupagantum śakyāḥ/ anadhigatārthagantṛtvābhāvāt, sarvasya sattva-prasaṅgacca/ nāpi viparyaya-saṁśayatvābhyām/ yathārtha-niścayatvāt/ ataḥ pariśeṣāt smṛtaya evaiṣṭavyāḥ/ tās ca na padārthamātragocarāḥ, saḥacaritadarśanāt khalvayam saṁskārodbodhaḥ, sāhacaryam cānvitaiḥ padārthaiḥ, na tu ananvitaiḥ—ityāyusmataivāveditam/ tathā ca katham tvanmate’pi padārthamātrasya prathamam smara-

being found to be related with numerous other words expressive of *actions* and *qualities* beside the one—viz. *bring*, found to be associated with it in the proposition “*Bring the cow*”, the term ‘*cow*’ should express the idea of *cow* as related with all such numerous *actions* and *qualities*,—a fantastic feat on the very face of it. Are we then to cognise all those relations from the utterance of the single word ‘*cow*’? Certainly not. Even if such omniscience be admitted to be logically possible, it cannot be designated as any better than total nescience from the standpoint of pragmatic activities, that stand in need of clear-cut specific cognitions as one of their essential preconditions. An ocean of saline water is no better than a vast expanse of waterless desert to one who is thirsty—

ṇam/ so'yam ātmiya eva bāṇo bhavantaṃ praharati—iti bhāvah/
nanu dvividhā smṛtiḥ padajanitā—sāhacaryāt, abhidhānācca/ tatra
sāhacaryam anvite'pi samānam/ abhidhānam tu padārthamātre/ abhi-
dhānadvārā ca yat smāritaṃ tadeva vākyārthānvayopayogi—netarat-
iti brūmaḥ/ ‘Devadatta gām ānaya’—ityādaṃ tatsahacarita-Yajñadat-
tāder anvayādarśanāt/ tato vaiṣamyam iti tatrāha—*na ceti*/ hetumāha—
Gaṅgāyām-iti/ yadi hi abhidhānena smāritaṃ eva vākyārthopayogi
tarhi tīrādipadārthānām vākyārthānvayo na syāt, teṣām abhidhānā-
bhāvāt, mukhyārthasāhacaryāt eva smāritatvāt—ityarthaḥ/ tat kim
evam anupapattisāmyāpādanena nivṛtto bhavān, tathā ca *matānujñā*-
jayakṣma-kakṣikāraḥ syāt—ityataḥ svapakṣe parihāram āha—*abhyāseti*/
—*loc. cit.* ‘*matānujñā*’ is a variety of *nigraha-sthāna* or argumental delin-
quency and consists in mutual recriminations that cannot argue the
validity of either of the two antinomic propositions held forth by the
disputants concerned and as such is a close parallel of the fallacy known
as *argumentum ad hominem* in Western Logic. For a definition of the
fallacy *vide NS. V. 2. 21.* : “*sva-pakṣe doṣābhyupagamāt para-pakṣe doṣapra-
saṅgo matānujñā.*” Comp. also the oft-quoted dictum : “*yatrobhayaḥ
samo doṣaḥ parihāro'pi vā samaḥ/ naikaḥ paryanuyojyaḥ syāt tādṛg-
arthavicāraṇe*” —For exactly similar arguments *vide Vācaspati Miśra's
Tattva-bindu*, pp. 100 ff., on which the passage quoted from *TP.* is
substantially based.

contend the *abhihitānvaya-vādins*.¹ To this the upholders of *anvitābhidhāna-vāda* would argue : True that the term ‘cow’ by itself is capable of generating the cognition of the concept *cow* as *related* with all possible *actions* and *qualities*. But for the communication of a specific relational thought—as for example of the judgment “*bringing the cow*”, it must have to be re-inforced by another term expressive of some specific *action* or *quality*, so that its all-comprehensive significance might be restricted to a specific thought-content that alone has any causal efficiency in respect of our specific pragmatic activities. This is not peculiar to terms alone. Other causes, too, to be productive of any specific effect must have to come into conjunction with certain other specific auxiliaries. For instance, an acorn to be productive of a sprout must be combined with a certain amount of moisture and heat, otherwise the causal efficiency inherent in it would lie dormant and ineffective.² But against this the Bhāṭṭas might contend : The defence is not very convincing. For, just as the term ‘cow’ in the

¹ataś caivam padāntaroccāraṇavaiphalypaprasaṅgāt ekasmād eva padāt taduparañjaka-dvītiyapadārthābhāvāgatīḥ siddhaiva tadapī anyā-nuraktasvārthavācī’tyanenaiva nyāyena ekameva padaṃ akhilapadā-bhidheyārthavācī sampannam—iti tenaiva vyavahāro’stu/ na cāsau sampadyate/ gaur ityukte sarvagunaṅkriyāvagamāt na jñāyate kim upādīyatām iti/ sarvāvagamo hi anavagamanirviśeṣa eva—vyavahārā-nupapatteḥ/ na hi rasavidāṃ pūrṇo’pyabdhir maror atiricyate, salilakāryāniṣpatteḥ/—*Nyāya-mañjarī*.

²yadapī padāntaroccāraṇam aphalam iti tadapī parihṛtam/ padāntara-sannidhāne hi sarvāṇi padāni kṛtsnakārīṇi bhavantiyuktatvāt/ kiṃ padāntarasannidhānena kriyate iti cet, sarva-kāryapakṣe’pi tulyo’yam anuyogaḥ/ samhatyā tu sarvāṇi kurvanti kārakāṇi’tyucyante, tathā padānyapi/—*NM.*, *loc. cit.* Vide also Prakāśānanda’s *Śābda-nirṇaya* (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series) : *Kārikā* 29 : na sāmānyānvayam brūmo viśeṣānvayam eva tu/ arthe’pi codanā tulyāpekṣā ca sahakārī-ṇi//—which has been explained in the gloss as follows : “....atha sam-

proposition “*Bring the cow*”, is capable of signifying the concept *cow* as syntactically related with all possible *qualities* and *actions*, so too the term ‘*bring*’ is capable of denoting the action *bringing* as related with all possible *substances* and *qualities*. And, as such, both being of universal significance, how can one be argued to be restricting the connotation of the other, as the Prābhākaras naively maintain?¹ The answer given by the exponents of the theory of *anvitābhīdhāna-vāda* to this query of the Bhāṭṭa theorists will be found to be not very satisfactory. They invoke the instrumentality of such extraneous factors as *context* etc. with a view to narrowing down the vague all-comprehensiveness of the connotation of a particular word to a specific thought-content that is alone conducive towards the pragmatic activity that constitutes the ultimate object of all linguistic usage.² Now, still another objection might be alleged against the Prābhākara thesis: In a proposition like “*Bring the cow*”, “*Tether the cow*”, “*Milk the cow*” etc.—the composite relational significance of the term *cow* varies according as the action—viz. *bringing*, *tethering*, *milking* etc. related with *cow* varies from one proposition to another. In this case, we must have to postulate a plurality of denotative functions with reference to

sarga-pratipādansamarthā api padārthā na parasparam anapekṣya pratipādayanti, śaktānām api kāryajanane sahakārisavyapekṣatvāt —iti/ śabdeṣvapi tarhi tulyo’yaṃ nyāyaḥ/ ata eva satyapi go-śabdasya yogyetarāśeṣa-padārthaviśeṣasaṃsarga-pratipādana-sāmarthyē sahakārikāraṇasamavadhānabhedena kadācit kvacit eva kārya-hetutvam arthapakṣa iva na virudhyate/—*Op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

¹nanu yogyetarāśeṣaviśeṣa-saṃsargābhīdhānasamarthe go-śabde prayukte ānayatinā tadapekṣito viśeṣaḥ samarpyate/ ānayater api anekaviśeṣasaṃsargasamarthatayā kvacit eva niyamābhāvāt /.....tas-māt na parasparāpekṣasyāpi saṃsarga-niyama-siddhir iti/—*Śabda-nirṇaya*, p. 22.

²*loc. cit.*

the word 'cow', inasmuch as the self-same word is not capable of conveying a plurality of ideas through the mechanism of a single unvariant denotative efficiency. The efficiency must change along with any corresponding change in the concept conveyed therethrough. Consequently, the *Law of Parsimony* so devoutly clung to by the Prabhākaras is flagrantly violated by their own selves. The Prabhākaras however have endeavoured to offer a solution to such a possible contention of the Bhāṭṭas against their thesis. It is an argument based on analogy: True, that the significance of a term, *scil.* 'cow', varies from one proposition to another, but that cannot lead us to the postulation of a multiplicity of function-entities. Does not the self-same efficiency of revealing *colour* in general as inherent in the organ of vision give rise to specifically distinct cognitive images—like *red, white, blue* and so on, according as it is brought into contact with objects characterised by such *colour-entities*? Similarly, the self-same efficiency of words too has the capacity to convey different composite judgments by virtue of those words being brought into relation with specifically different terms.¹

From this rapid survey of the two rival theories it is quite evident that the followers of Prabhākara stand in between the positions advocated by their opponents—the Bhāṭṭas, as also by the Grammarians. For while like the Grammarians they postulate the sentence as a logical unit of expression, and as such repudiate the theory of isolation of terms and concepts as asserted by their rival

¹yathā cakṣuṣo nīla-pītādiviṣaya-sahakāribhedāt eva ekayā'pi rūpa-prakāśanaśaktyā nīlapītādivijñānakāryabhedah/ tarhi śabdeṣvapi sahakāribhedāt kāryabhedo na daṇḍavāritah/—Prakāśānanda's gloss on *Śabda-nirṇaya* : *Kārikā* 31.

theorists—the Bhāṭṭas, yet unlike the Grammarians they do not completely denounce the reality of the isolated concepts, thus falling in line with the Bhāṭṭas, though differing from the latter in admitting its sole reality. According to the Prābhākaras the words connote isolated concepts no doubt, but they denote, besides, concepts as related with one another as well—which the Bhāṭṭas refuse to admit. Thus it would be seen that the Prābhākara thesis is a compromise between the Bhāṭṭa and Vaiyākaraṇa views,—radically distinct as they are, and this has been clearly noted by the author of the *Nyāya-mañjarī* in course of his review of the two theories regarding the process of verbal cognition.¹ In the present section we have only stated the two theories from the viewpoint of the respective protagonists—referring to those arguments and counter-arguments alone that actually feature in the texts of the disputants concerned, without concerning ourselves with the attitude of the theorists belonging to other philosophical sects—chief among whom are the Naiyāyikas.² For, an appraisal of the respective plausibility of the two Mīmāṃsaka theories discussed in this chapter and their repercussion on other schools may well require a separate study.

¹tad evaṃ avayavakāryopalambhāt na Vaiyākaraṇavat nimittānyapi niḥnumahe, kṛtsṇaphalasiddhyavadhi-vyāpārāpariniścayācca nānya-Mīmāṃsakavat śuddhapadārthābhīdhānam upagacchāmahe-iti—*NM.*, Vol. I. p. 367. *Vide also* : na hi bhavatām anapekṣitapadārtha eva Vaiyākaraṇānām iva vākyaṛthapratyayaḥ.../—*ibid.*, p. 369.

²The Naiyāyikas, affiliate themselves neither to the Bhāṭṭa nor to the Prābhākara school as regards the issue of verbal cognition, though erroneously they are regarded as upholding the *abhihitānvaya-vāda* of the Bhāṭṭas. This has been noted unequivocally by Jayanta Bhāṭṭa himself, as also by the great Vedāntist teacher—Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *magnum opus*—*Advaita-siddhi*. Jayanta Bhāṭṭa cites an anonymous verse—

that definitely declares the difference of the Naiyāyika viewpoint from the theses discussed in the foregoing dissertation. *Vide* : taduktam—“matadvayam apīdaṃ tu nā’smabhyam rocatetarām/ kuto’nvitābhidhānaṃ vā kuto vā’bhihitānvayaḥ//”—*Op. cit.*, p. 370. *Vide* also *Advaita-siddhi* : “tārkikamatasya ubhayapakṣabahirbhāvādikam ca *Vedānta-kalpa-latikāyāṃ* vyutpāditam ityuparamyate”—which has been explained in the commentary *Laghu-candrikā* as follows : nanu uktarītyā abhihitānvayā’nvitābhidhānapakṣayor vyutpādanaṃ na yuktam/ tārkikādimatasya tadapraveśāpatteh/ tathāhi—nādyapakṣe tatpraveśaḥ/ tārkikādimate padānām anubhavaprayojakaśaktisvīkāreṇa tasyā eva mūlasambandhatvasambhavana arthasmārakatvāsambhavāt/ nāpyante/ tārkikādibhir anvitābhidhānapakṣasya dūṣaṇāt/ uktam hi *Maṇikārādibhiḥ*—yadyapi padajanya’nubhavaḥ anvitārthaviṣayakaḥ, tathāpi anvitasvārtha-śābdhadhītvena na padajanyaṭā, kiṃtu svārtha-śābdātvena—iti nānvitābhidhānaṃ yuktam iti/—*Op. cit.*, pp. 704-05. (NSP. Edn.). It is to be noted *en passant* that the Naiyāyika thesis is just a modified version of the genuine *abhihitānvaya-vāda* and is actually posed as one of the possible interpretations of the doctrine of *abhihitānvaya-vāda*, as implied by the text of Śabara’s *Bhāṣya* already referred to at the commencement of the present disquisition, in Kumārila’s *Śloka-vārttika* : *Vākyaādhikaraṇa*—with which the *Vārttika-kāra* does not fully concur. This is the root cause of the erroneous belief that the Naiyāyikas are actually followers of Kumārila’s *abhihitānvaya-vāda*. Consequently the Naiyāyikas cannot claim any the least originality as regards their apparently novel thesis in respect of the process of verbal cognition. We must note that it is the Mīmāṃsakas alone who are truly competent to express any view on topics concerned with sentences and sentential cognitions, as it is their exclusive task to analyse the Vedic texts—composed of injunctive propositions as they are, while the Naiyāyikas are primarily concerned with the analysis of possible instruments of knowledge and problems of epistemology. Consequently the greatest weight must attach to the opinions of the Mīmāṃsakas on the issue of verbal cognition and analysis of sentences, while others can only choose to follow them—lacking as they do any independent prerogative of their own, differing though they might be from one another in minor details. *Vide* the significant epithets—*vākya-jñā*, *vākya-nipuṇa*, *vākya-vid* etc. as applied to the Mīmāṃsakas of both sects.

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