CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT STUDIES VOL. XXXVII.

A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF
INDIAN THOUGHT AND ITS SOCIAL MARGINS

BY

SWĀMĪ AGEHĀNANDA BHĀRATĪ

THE
KHAMBA SANSKRIT SERIES OFFICE
VARANASI-1 (India)

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDY SIMLA

THE
CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT STUDIES
Vol. XXXVII

A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF
INDIAN THOUGHT AND ITS SOCIAL MARGINS

BY

SWĀMĪ AGEHĀNANDA BHĀRATĪ
Professor of Anthropology
Syracuse University, New-York,
U. S. A.

THE
CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT SERIES OFFICE
Post Box No. 8. Varanasi-1 (India) Phone : 3145

Publisher : The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi-1
Printer : Vidya Vilas Press, Varanasi-1
Edition : First, 1964.
Price : Rs. 15-00





..... तन्नो देवी प्रचोदयात् ॥

To the Sacred Memory of

the late Swami Viśvānanda Bhāratī

my revered *ācārya,*

who taught me that Wittgenstein and Śaṃkarācārya

are no less compatible than

making a statement and making a house,

trouble shooting and tiger shooting,

feeling comfortable and feeling one's way.

PREFACE

This book is meant primarily for an Indian audience. Occidental readers—and they will form a large secondary audience, as it were—will perhaps not be able to enjoy and benefit from this study, not so much due to the subject matter which would be familiar to Western orientalists, but because of the style and the technique used in this book.

It has been my experience that learned Indian audiences, which have been exposed to Western critical modes of research, and to reading and writing English rather than their own Indian vernacular, use a style and diction which must be regarded as archaic, or at least obsolete, in the Western world, particularly in North America. I have also had the experience, during the long years of my university teaching at Indian schools, that the sort of English which is now used in British and American universities does not catch the attention of an Indian audience, however learned. On the other hand, British authors, philosophers, anthropologists, and orientalists alike, who wrote around the turn of the century, whose language is now considered clumsy and pompous are appreciated by Indians in scholarly audiences, particularly by the teachers of the present young generation of Indian scholars.

Repetitions, seemingly inordinate emphasis on certain points of discourse, a pedantic if not truculent diction is palatable to many Indian audiences, when it would be distur-

bing and possibly irritating to a modern Western audience of a parallel scholarly standard.

However, I do feel that Western audiences can successfully absorb this study, if they make it a point to de-ethnocentrize themselves, as it were, in a stylistic sense. Anthropologists, and orientalists, especially in North America, have recently been studying enormous amounts of literature written by Indian authors in the English language, and it is they chiefly who will without any difficulty read and appreciate the various subjects dealt with in this book.

Also, as the text progresses, it makes less and less compromise with the archaic disposition of style in an Indian audience, becoming increasingly geared to modern diction, in the hope that the Indian audience will catch on to this more succinct and less vague style of our own age. I have long felt that the clumsy diction of the English and American writers of the last century has hampered the intellectual progress of Indian students of philosophy and culturalogical themes. In addition to this, the popular writers of Hinduism, Swami Vivekananda and his numerous followers, monastic and lay, have impeded intellectual advancement due to their strong anti-intellectual tenor. There is in India, up to this date, a great fear obstructing intelligent minds—the fear of sounding impious or out of the tradition; this fear has to be suspended, if Indian intellects are to join ranks with occidental compeers. There can be no compromise with obsoleteness.

On a first glance the topics subsumed under this title might seem highly disparate. However, this is not so.

Starting from what is closest to the scholastic mind of the Indian, that is to say pure speculation, pure contemplation, structural and highly abstract logical, epistemological, and religious ideas, we proceed to topics which utilize the speculative frame of mind but which lead up to purely pragmatic topics in the sociological sense. Poetry and poetics seem to be a transitional element in the Indian tradition; this is why it had to be sandwiched between purely speculative and purely sociological chapters. The case of India is entirely unique, and moreover, no check list of scholarly procedure can be applied to India on the basis of another cultural region. The demarcations between purely theoretical and pragmatic ideas and situations are tenuous, if not entirely fictitious. What seems to be a highly abstract chain of consideration to the Western scholar is not regarded as self-contained abstract theorizing by a learned Indian audience.

Both Indian and Western audiences may take objection to the long and over-technical title of the book. However, I do not believe that the caption is in any way overdone, nor that it could be shortened without losing its import. I use the term "Functional" and "Analysis" very much in the sense modern linguistic philosophers do; it is a minute enumeration or description of the involved items, each of which is then taken to its logical and intellectual consummation, without consideration for the possible taboos involved for the audience whose tradition is being dealt with. Thus, if a topic, or a text is **apauruṣeya** *in the Indian context it does not mean that analysis should stop short of it. In such*

cases we simply have to use an objective rubric; the fact that we talk about a notion which is supposed to be of supernatural relevance in a specific tradition does not bar even the traditionalist from a critical treatment of the topic. This, however, is something which learned Indian audiences have yet to discover : stepping out of the old tradition in order to write critically about it does not mean relinquishing it.

There has been no such thing as textual criticism in the Western sense, in the Indian tradition. Commentaries have been heaped upon commentaries, and new commentaries tended to be more elaborate, but were never critical in the sense of complete criticism. If philosophy, as we think it does, has a therapeutical job to do, it cannot stop before topics which have not been critically treated within a specific tradition, however hallowed. In other words, whereas the Indian commentators were critical of each other, of a different group, they never criticized the **śruti**, *not so much due to any psychological taboo, but due to the definitional importance of* **śruti**; *once* **śruti** *is supposed to be self-evident in the sense a logical syllogism is self-evident, criticism cannot enter until this claim is disputed ;the challenging of such a claim itself, alone would constitute the beginning of actual criticism within a tradition. This has not happened in India, so far, except in the form of 'heresy' — as in Buddhism etc. — which belonged to the same genre, i. e. religion and theology.*

Occidental audiences may feel askance about the second clause contained in the title. "Social Margins" would seem

to imply, for the Western sociologist, a study of social structure and social pragmatics. In the case of India, however, the methodical demarcation between the social and the purely intellectual is, again, purely fictitious. Here, "social" means anything affecting social events, anything affecting social life either directly or indirectly; this is not a vague statement, for in the case of India, the intellectual, speculative, quasi-philosophical framework is so intensively interwoven with social life that we cannot make any demarcation in the manner Western or Occidental sociology has been or has thought to be able to do.

The original inspiration for this book came from an extended lecture tour in Japan a few years ago, where I discussed themes of Indian philosophy, religion and semantics at several universities in Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka. I almost forgot the notes I had taken in the course of those lectures, including the response of my Japanese colleagues, mostly Buddhist scholars, and, I might add, devout Buddhists themselves. It was only quite recently, here at Syracuse, New York, that discussions with some of my colleagues and friends prompted me to go over those lectures, and to review their subject matter in the light of information which was new to the student of Indian society and of Indian thought. My thanks go especially to the Chairman of my department, Dr. Paul Meadows; to the members of the small, pleasant, and pervasive circle of friends who provided both a delightful and a learned environment, as well as a participant audience to my experiences, which I have learned to view in a more detatched fashion than I was able to when living in Asia. I

am indebted to Dr. Ronald Leifer, professor of psychiatry at New York, Upstate Medical College; Dr. Ernest Becker, professor of anthropology at the same school; Dr. H. V. Günther, formerly at Banaras Sanskrit University; and to other comrades-in-arms on three continents.

I dedicate this book to the sacred and revered memory of my **ācārya** *the late Swami Visvananda Bharati, the one person in the tradition who could and did inspire both piety and criticism.*

Agehananda Bharati
Syracuse, U. S. A.
October 2, 1963

CONTENTS



A Functional Analysis
of
Indian Thought And Its Social Margins

CHAPTER I

METHODOLOGY FOR INDIAN STUDIES : LINGUISTIC MODELS AND SPECULATIVE THEORIES

The task of grappling with Indian thought and its social manifestations is stupendous for several reasons, and this enquiry aims at suggesting a methodology which is new in its anthropological context, and not too old in its philosophical application. Modern anthropology has its present centre in America, although it was imported into this country, wholesale, from Europe. Franz Boas the German, Tylor and Radcliff, and before them the venerated Frazer have been regarded as the fathers of modern anthropology, and their spiritual offspring now fills American chairs in anthropology. In German speaking Europe, especially in Austria, the term "ethnology" connotes what Anglosaxon academia refers to as "cultural anthropology", and in those continental countries, "anthropology" means physical anthropology, and is taught from a different chair altogether ; so are paleontology and archaeology, the former—styled *Urgeschichte* 'original history' in Germany and Austria, borders on the natural science; the latter is an historical discipline and requires—in Europe at least—a large amount of classical and philological knowledge. In North America, archaeology is usually taught in departments of anthropology, but

both the philological and the historical aspect tend to be suppressed due to the fact that anthropology has developed a more or less overt antipathy toward diachronical and classical studies. How this happened in America is an interesting but irrelevant story, for our purpose ; but summarily it can be said that the American anthropologist has been more interested in non-literate societies, especially the indigenous North American Indian peoples, and has incorporated structural and descriptive linguistics which is decidedly anti-philological and anti-classical. The rift between the old-time philologists with their top-heavy Greek-Latin and Indo-European literary orientation and the linguistic structuralists and descriptivists appears to deepen as the years go by. This is regrettable and indeed, quite detrimental to our own interest for, as we shall see, the acute insight of American behavioural science into cultural and social patterns, as well as the minute tools of analytical philosophy—which had its roots in England in this century—would be an invaluable methodical aid to the study of Indian patterns of thought and of its social implications, were American cultural anthropology and analytic language oriented philosophy less averse to classical and philological training.

There is one thing American behavioural scientists, and their European votaries—there has been a strong feedback from here into Europe—will have to realize sooner or later : that mere behaviouralistic approaches are insufficient for the study of peoples and groups which stand in an ancient tradition–*pāraṃparā*–and that the field methods

applied to preliterate groups just do not succeed with groups that have a highly literary tradition. Quite recently, some Indian anthropologists who got their training here in America, and their American tutors and colleagues, have hit upon a helpful terminological stratagem : they refer to the literary and the pre-literary patterns respectively, as the 'great traditions' and the 'little traditions'. Milton Singer, David Mandelbaum, the late Radcliff-Brown *in nuce*, M. N. Srinivas, the late D. N. Majumdar, S. C. Dube, and others have found this model helpful; although I am on the whole sympathetic to it, I believe that it could become fully operational only if Indian and occidental scholars come to grips with certain semantic difficulties blocking full communication on the highest possible levels of abstraction. This is an important feature in any sort of scientific discourse, but it is so glaringly essential in the case of highly refined and sophisticated thought models which have to be discussed cross-culturally, that one often wonders how the somewhat naive assumptions of the diehard anthropologist with naively phenomenological orientation could have even been thought to suffice for the analysis of complex, highly abstract patterns of thought. Let us face it : anthropologists and ethnographers have so far not been students of modern philosophy (in America, where the nationwide professional association encompasses over 1500 teaching anthropologists, there is but one scholar professionally interested in philosophy,[1] and even his

1. Prof. David Bidney (University of Indiana, Bloomington)

philosophical thought is hampered by the Hegelian tradition. Those very young cultural anthropologists and sociologists in America—especially the followers of C. Wright Mills and Dewey—who feel that there must be a rapprochement between philosophy and cultural anthropology—are not interested in analytic philosophy, largely because they assume—wrongly, I believe—that analytic philosophy sympathizes with statistical and quantificatory methodology in the sciences of man, and it is the quantifying approach that they want to overcome.

Thus, the situation is pretty grim : philologists of the classical type abhor both phenomenologically oriented anthropology and ethnography, and analytic philosophy ; modern, analytic philosophers are so fascinated by their own esoterism, that they hardly ever condescend to look into the sciences that deal with men in societies ; and cultural anthropologists seem afraid of the classics, and of Sanskrit *a fortiori* ; and yet, it ought to be evident that the 'Big Tradition' in India cannot be studied except in a very supercilious way without a good philological knowledge of the language and its literature[1]. It often seems to me—I admit this is a mean thought—that the

---

who wrote a book "Theoretical Anthropology" (Columbia University Press, New-York 1953), which is about the only fully philosophically oriented work in anthropology; there are sporadic readings in philosophical approaches to culture in the various British and American anthropological journals, but they are rare and unco-ordinated.

1. Vd, J. F. Staal "Sanskrit and Sanskritization", in *Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. XXII—3, 1963.

phenomenological emphasis on anthropological field-work, just like the synchronic approach of much contemporary linguistics with its fashionable disdain of literature, of 'meaning' and semantics, and its corollaries in psychology and sociology, is a cover-up mechanism for the lack of the sheer knowledge of the languages involved. The reaction of American scholars against the top-heavy, Germanic and European ethnocentric philology and the last century's *Geisteswissenschaften* with all their inane pompousness is understandable and I have full sympathy with it; and of course, I am the last one to deny the ingenuity and importance of synchronic, direct, structural approaches to language and thought: but, *quod licet Iovi non licet bovi*—it is just not possible to deal with the Sanskrit languge as one would and should deal with Navaho or Zuni or other unwritten languages, because 'big tradition' entails a literary lore, necessitating sophisticated handling of great amounts of indigenous, written literature. A Ramakrishna Paramahamsa may act similar to, or perhaps really quite alike a Mexican Indian shaman, but sheer phenomenological description of what they do is of little use in inferring or predicting cultural behavior of the respective groups; the shaman's and the Paramahamsa's pathologies may be similar, but nothing culturally important follows from this similarity; for a valid scientific treatise on the two, much more has to be known about the Paramahamsa's background, which is part of the Big Tradition, than about the shaman in Mexico, who does not affiliate with any literary tradition. Acceptance of a script for a language which had not

used any script, and which therefore has had no literature except oral lore—which does not qualify a tradition as 'big' in the sense used by the aforesaid Indian and American anthropologists—does not suffice to render a culture as part of a 'big tradition'. It is of course an arbitrary decision, to a great extent, how far back we would push the criterial time limit, but this is not really very important. Whether a culture has had a written literature for three hundred years or for three thousand, both participate in a 'Big Tradition'. If this were not so, North America would not qualify as a 'Big Tradition' vehicle, unless its European antecedents are incorporated. This, however, would not be fair—there is 'real' American literature, there is 'real' American music, and 'real American art'; the fact that its origins are elsewhere is again not relevant, for origins are always 'elsewhere' at some time in history; apart from such highly adventurous but not too sound nationalistic speculations as Tilak's and his followers, the Sanskrit element, preceded by Vedic literature, had its origins outside what is now India or Pakistan—candid, linguistic evidence forces us to admit that. Also, there is nothing wrong except to the mind of the jejune chauvinist, if origins of one's culture lay in a geographically extraneous region.

Once the 'big' and 'little' traditions terminology is accepted by anthropologists and other social and behavioural scientists, intellectual and academical integrity has to admit that big traditions simply need more attention

and more preparation, in a purely quantitative sense, than little, unwritten traditions.

With the great love for models which behavioural scientists have been evincing in their methodologies since the turn of the century, it must follow that more complicated, and more sophisticated models would have to be found for the study of more complex, and more sophisticated societies. If a thematic model, say, for the Pueblo Indians of the Southwestern region of the USA contains x referential items, a model for the Bhils of Central India would have to contain more—it would have to contain x items plus a number 'y' of items referring to the old environmental background, the proximity and interfusion of the Bhils with their 'Big Tradition' neighbhours [1]—a proximity continuing through many centuries—the Śabarī of the Rāmāyaṇa is referred to, in fairly old folklore, as a Bhil woman—; and, if a group within the Big Tradition—say, the Kayasthas of Northern India or the Samurai of Japan or the Buddhist clergy of Thailand—is to be studied, a model would have to contain x plus y plus z items where z would represent a range specific to Big Traditions.

---

1. The standard work is still the late Rev. W. Koppers "*Die Bhils von Zentralindien*" F. Berger, Horn (Austria) 1948. It is established that the Bhils, who now speak an Indo-Aryan dialect, have lost their original language, which must have been of the Proto/Indian or Mundari type.

I believe I have found such a model for the Big Tradition in India; I have adumbrated this model in a recent monograph published in Spain[1]; apologetically aware of the horrendous nomenclature, I have called this model " Syncretistic Parallelism ", and it is this which I shall present in the first section of this book. Because this book is written primarily for an Indian audience, conversant with the somewhat obsolete philosophical terminology of the last century rather than with that of modern analytical thought, I have to use quite a bit of terminology which I myself regard as rather ineffectual and pompous—the latter being, however, a purely stylistic matter and hence not quite as important; I do censure, however, the Indian philosophy teachers' love for sesquipedalian words and for edifying pomposity which has done to him what it did to German and British thinkers in the last century : somehow, balmy words and phrases seemed to make them think that their content was important and 'spiritual.' The simple, terse, sober, uninspiring terminology of modern analytical thought does not satisfy the desire for the sort of aesthetic satisfaction which both last century Europeans and 20th century Indians seem to relate to the weight of philosophical content.

* * *

1. A. Bharati, "*Paralelismos sincretisticos. Un metodo euristico.*" FOLIA HUMANISTICA, 1-3, 1963, Barcelona (Spain)

CHAPTER II

THE SYNCRETISTIC MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF INDIAN THOUGHT AND ITS SOCIAL MARGINS

The matter of this chapter is new, if taken as a whole. Pieces in it are old and no detail may bring anything unknown to the student of the history of philosophy, as details never do. The title alone may be misleading in many ways. Very often, a proper name with a technical adjective signifies or indicates a system of thought, as 'creative evolution,' 'emergent evolution,' 'psychophysical parallelism,' 'pre-established harmony,' etc. Now this method does not aim to be a system of thought. It is meant to be a method, and if it is to be shelved along with books on methodology, I would prefer this classification to any other one. If I claim this method to be new, I mean of course no more than that I have not found this particular approach (i.e. of syncretism and parallelism) in any other system or method of thought. Much may seem new to the western reader who is not versed in Indian and Oriental Philosophy and as to the eastern reader, it goes without saying that he will not appreciate much in this study unless he has had some more than the average reading in the letters of the West. But the comparative philosopher, as I said, is not likely to find anything he has not met with, in some form or another, in other authors, so far as details are concerned.

Stressing the fact that I do not claim to establish a new system of thought does not yet clear me from the possible charge of aiming at inaugurating a school—my school of thought. A method can form a school just as much or more readily than a system of thought can do. Kant's is the critical method, and it was this method that has made thinkers Kantian rather than the transcendental system worked out in the *Critiques*. As an individualist and esthete, I shun the idea of making a school apart from its being a fatiguing effort. Scholastic collectives must follow in its wake, though discipline may camouflage it for a while. The individualist who goes in for thought-regimentation thereby forfeits his title. As an esthete, I detest the idea of being quoted as a *guru* even by the learned.

This study is arranged more or less in the traditional manner of works on systematic philosophy. It has been desirable to coordinate it with the classical philosophical disciplines. The order of the chapters may be unusual, though, as method generally precedes esthetics. This alteration, however, is not accidental. Although esthetics has been accepted by now by most authors as the fourth discipline, I had to insert it before taking up method (which I reject to a large extent). If there is any method, it must derive its values from esthetics to the same degree as from the other disciplines.

Many works on philosophy would be easier reading if their central ideas were given synoptically in their

introduction. Many writers, on the other hand, declare that no important work can eschew some unwieldy paragraphs.

The scientist on the other side, claims that nothing of value needs complicated diction. I would vote somewhere between these two extremes. I say that some thoughts of value can be put briefly, others cannot. But where a synopsis could clearly be given, it is more often than not omitted in the prefaces. I suspect that this neglect is never quite unavoidable, and very often deliberate. If the reader gets the where-abouts in a nutshell right at the outset, he may be satisfied in the bookshop already and may not care to buy the whole book. Obfuscating and mystifying the subject may be the actual intention, when the ideas are feared not to be sufficiently interesting or original—yet no synopsis can suffice if the book be a classic; the real philosopher must be studied and no amount of commenting will make direct reading dispensable. You may have worked through all of what Caird, Prichard, Vaihinger and Paton have written on Kant, yet without having done at least one Critique yourself, you cannot be called a student of Kant. The best of these commentaries never supersedes this need. On the other hand, it presupposes the reading of the original or its simultaneous study. Now working through; say the 1st Critique is a toilsome affair indeed, but always worthwhile—and indispensable for the intellectually honest student of philosophy; of course there are scores of teachers of this

subject at all the universities of the world, who will admit in sincere hours that they have not touched the great originals nor even their translation. The Hindu pandit's outspoken contempt for the indologist who speaks and writes Indian philosophy without mastering Sanskrit and without constantly and copiously quoting the texts is well known and his attitude is positively obnoxious to the critical scholar, yet there is a vague kind of sanity in it, though we may brand it as primitive with some right. The pandit with his tough-headed fundamentalism would indeed be the ideal scholar could he combine it with a critical approach to its subject matter.

Now then : syncretistic parallelism is a philosophic method to explain a complete conscious life—an attempt for the primacy of the spirit. A primacy not over and against matter, but over the real enemies of the spirit, grown from its own soil : over bias, superstition, fanaticism. And positively a way to individual independence. Philosophic thought alone is the means to the end; clarification of whatever can be clarified, the intermediary method. In India particularly, philosophy of this kind is usually charged with being mere intellectual game. It is; and I do not mind this charge at all, but take it as a praise. There is much talk about the Divine Līlā in Hinduism—and also about our essential unity with the Divine Substance; why should we not then share the divine game in our sphere, the intellectual? So far as the philosophic portion is con-

cerned, syncretistic parallelism is an intellectual game—and an interesting one. We have lost patience listening to the said charge; of all theoretical subjects taught from academical chairs, it is philosophy alone that should have no justification.

It is, I believe, not so much the difficulty of verification of philosophical sentences as contrasted by the scientific verification which is the method of scientific proof, that accounts for the vagueness of popular discrimination. Many scientific statements are mere hypotheses—and the not yet varified can be said to have a status as bad as the unverifiable. The reason for the misuse of the term philosophy in literature other than technical, results from that very vagueness of the term itself. The man in the street (in the West) knows approximately what geography and chemistry deal with—he does not know what philosophy is about; because to know that means already to know quite a lot about philosophy.

How then does syncretistic parallelism attempt to fulfil its promise? It is no system, as I said, and the attempt is exhausted in its method. Syncretism in this method means two things: first, an equal approach to a study of as many different ways of philosophizing as possible, without a view to establish the eminence of any philosopher over any other one, but solely with the intention to obtain intellectual information (contrary to inspiration, which is non-intellectual). It prohibits the formation of a new system out of bits of

the philosophies availed of for that would be eclecticism, which is very different from syncretism (the terms are astoundingly often confounded). This prohibition is consequential to the invariable injunction to suspend judgment, which injunction is part of the syncretistic parallelist method. The suspension of judgment, again, is a function of the dialectical position of the method, which is not an antithetical and no longer an only synthetic one, but introduces a new function which we could call apothesis or sometimes parathesis ; apothesis and parathesis replace the old synthesis, and partly applies alongside with the latter, as an alternative. This suggests a quaternal dialectic instead of a trinary one.

The second meaning of syncretism in syncretistic parallelism refers to the other term in the method, viz. to parallelism and its implications. Syncretistic parallelism practices two ways of conscious activity : the discursive way and its opposite, the non-discursive, or contemplative, which I will style the concursive throughout the book. The first meaning of syncretism clearly implies philosophical study (i.e., the "intellectual game" scorned by Swami Vivekananda and his votaries) it is a syncretistic (unpreferential) study of as much philosophy as feasible in a life. Concursive thought is tantamount, I think, to the *bios theoretikos*, the vita-contemplativa, and to "*spiritual life*"—Italics, because I am very much afraid of this term which has come to be as vulgarly hackneyed a term int he East as it is vague

or meaningless in the West). The second function of syncretism is that it syncretizes discursive and concursive thought; "concursive" means 'intuitively trained'.

Since both discursive and concursive thought have to be practised side by side, parallelism is implied. It means just this indicated parallelity of our two ways of thinking.

I shall frequently use the Indian word *sādhanā*, which has a highly technical connotation in such contexts, and to which only Vivekananda gave the interpretation of "spiritual practice"; but though this would be a perfect rendering if one could confine it to what he meant by it, we have to abandon it for the benefit of our Western readers, some of whom may be tempted to understand church-going or the sacraments as included; in fact, an authority like Sir John Woodroff (A. Avalon) holds that the Roman sacraments are powerful *sādhanās*; this, I am afraid, may be correct from none but his particular tantric standpoint, which is shared by few and shunned by many.

There is another formal and at the same time negative reason why syncretistic parallelism cannot be a system, but only a method. A system can have a limited number of followers only, and they must, to varying extents, oppose other systems, i.e. those that stand against their views. A method of course will have numerically limited adherents, too, but the limits will not be so narrow. The same

method may lead up to diametrically opposed systems with equal consistency (Hegel's method of course is so typical an example that it need hardly be mentioned). Syncretistic parallelism extends over all systems and may well include all future systems of thought.

But there is one group of people that cannot use syncretistic parallelism as their method : the fanatics. The parallelist may gladly connive at the hypocrite, for he is corrigible ; he knows that he is wrong and may change one day. The fanatic believes he is right—that is his main symptom, and I am almost inclined to claim the reverse as equally correct. He who believes he is right is a fanatic—in the making at least. He certainly is biased (and bias is the surest path towards fanaticism). I have never found a better definition of prejudice than Mendelsohn's sentence: *se credere hūbere veritatem.* That may include even the skeptic—though least of the lot—when he thinks that he is *right* with his skepticism ; that is, when he mistakes skepticism, which is a method, for a *system.*

* * *

Ever since oriental thought received its attention in the study of philosophy, the terms "dualism" and "monism" along with a large series of other terms, have been obfuscated up beyond repair. These had been difficult terms with various connotations even before Max Mueller introduced them for labelling several Indian systems. The dualism of the Academy and the Stoa meant some-

thing very different from that of Scholasticism and both are not intended any longer in modern philosophy, since Descartes. Formally, all these usages are permissible. The linguistic basis is the safest one in any attempt to delimit equivocal philosophic terms; for linguistics has become a real science in the strictest sense; like psychology, it is moving away more and more from the Arts into the Science Faculty. So unless we are unanimously clear about a technical term it is always safe to rafer it back to its original meaning, that is to the root-meaning it had in the language it was borrowed from. For the comparative philosopher, this is a most important regulation, and the fact that until this day students of Indian and Western Philosophy have not been really trying to unmix ambiguous terms, has resulted in many awkward and crude misinterpretations of both the sides. The most basic name 'philosophy' itself has not been translated properly into Indian languages, and the usual rendering of "*darśana*" has been doing great damage all the while. Philosophy is not understood thoroughly in its present connotations by Indian Scholars, and they tend to abuse it as it does not fit into their concept of *darśana*—which of course it does not. Their irritation, however, is not justified, and this is precisely the charge the linguist has to make in that he can claim that the philosopher should not flout philology completely. There have been fine scholars of Indian theology in the West—and they were philologists primarily; it was Max Mueller again, who said emphatically that the Aryan Problem was a philologists's problem. For if we don't go so far, we

must, as students of comparative philosophy, at least own the rudiments of philology. The Western student of Indian Philosophy would not dare—if he is sincere—to enter upon the study of Indian thought without acquiring some rudimentary knowledge of Sanskrit; now there are more Indian students of Western Philosophy than vice versa—as yet, that is—but there are few among them who ever think of doing some Greek and Latin ; yet, Greek and scholastic philosophy is taught at Indian universities and graduates in philosophy are supposed to have some idea about Plato and Thomas. It is not to blame our good-willed and eager Indian students for their omission—it is certainly not their fault, as hardly any of their teachers have hitherto put much stress on the necessity of the study of the occidental classical languages; but the Westerner who tries to read Indian philosophy in translation is looked at with scorn by the pandits—and rightly so I must say ; there are, of course, less good renderings of Indian philosophy into European languages than there are well-translated Greek and Latin classics. Anyway, although we would be lenient about the lack in occidenal philological thoroughness in India, as students of comparative philosophy (if we claim to be such) we should at least try to understand what philosophical termini mean in the languages they are taken from. As far as Indian Philosophy is concerned, there is an age-old constant emphasis on *vyutpatti*–etymology—and even the scriptures themselves are full of it, though we often find quaint analogy in them rather than actual etymology. But this was not so with Pāṇini, who possibly a

contemporary of Thales, devised etymological rules which have not been outdated today. But this laudable attitude should be held *pro paris partibus*, and if it is not done, then indignation about different readings is not appropriate. Ever since I have been discussing problems of comparative thought with colleagues and other students in India, I have been in without fail for the same charge and challenge—that philosophy in India meant something different from what it meant in the West; that Indian Philosophy was "spiritual" and esoteric, and no "intellectual game"—and that Western Philosophy was its opposite, and what is more—that it was therefore wrong ! But the crude and simple fact is just this : my permanent critics from Srinagar to the Cape Comorin and from Bombay to Calcutta—and there are many of them—will not go into the philosophical and etymological meaning of 'philosophy'; they hear the English 'philosophy' and wrongly identify it with *darśana* ; "philosopher", simply means the friend of wisdom, and he need not necessarily want '*mukti*' or liberation from the wheel of existence, if, for instance, he does not axiomatically accept the doctrine of rebirth and possible salvation therefrom. 'Darśan' comes from *dṛś*, 'to see,' and this of course means a charismatic experience, something concursively obtainable. If the true meaning of philosophy were 'darśan,' then the charge of an orthodox Indian audience would certainly be justified. But as the matter stands, 'darśan,' which we find as the translation for 'philosophy' in all dictionaries of Indian languages—compiled by Indian and Western authors alike—is simply a wrong

rendering, and such insight would save much energy and trouble in discussions of this type. The urge toward philological research (which means something quite different from 'learning languages') is extremely weak among Indian academicians and hence the philosophical instinct quite undeveloped (I was astonished to hear some of the very best Indian scholars pronounce 'philology' invariably as 'ph-i-lology, the—i like in *mind*'' that is—this revealing that the identity of this compound with the one in the always quite correctly pronounced 'philosophy' is not apprehended).

For the newcomer acquainted with philological method the naivete of otherwise scholarly persons in India in philological respects, must be striking. I have had a long argument with a learned monk on the problem, and he proved quite incorrigible in his philological naivete. There is wide agreement on the meaning of the term '*upaniṣad*,' with Western as well as Indian indologists. It means something like ' a close sitting' by the teacher, as opposed to its evident deuteronym 'pariṣad', which stands for an open assembly. Upaniṣad meant the intimate sitting together of preceptors and disciples for the purpose of esoteric instruction; consequently upaniṣad came to mean something like '*Geheimlehre*' and that is how Deussen translated it. Now Śaṃkarācārya once derives it from the root—*śad*—'to decay' i.e. as 'making ignorance decay'. Now Śaṃkarācārya employs this philologically impossible etymology for purely didactic reasons, and this had

become an ancient custom by his time : the texts commented upon are, as we said, full of such naive etymology. I actually doubt whether the preceptor himself believed in this particular etymology—at least he might have been agreeable to the philologically correct interpretation in his less enthusiastic hours. The grammarian Paṇini—also a pious man no doubt—who lived well over 1000 years before Śaṃkarācārya, seldom allowed himself such enthusiastic anologies. On the whole, it seems, the philological sense degenerated rather than grew in the history of Indian thought, until the advent of Navya-Nyāya.

Philosophy and *darśan* are thus two fundamentally different things, and anything but identical. The Indian philosopher blames, 'philosophy' for being non-spiritual in the sense of *darśan*—intellectuality of course is non-spiritual; it is opposed to spirituality, in method and aim alike. The test for intellectuality is perseverance in logical thought. I would be tempted to call it the logical will, but willing being another faculty altogether, and not at once compatible with the enactment of logical thought, such a term would be vacuous. Will, for philosophers and some psychologists is an emotive term. Negatively and formally it could perhaps be defined as that conative function which excludes ratiocination. That every decision, as based on an act of ratiocination has emotive tone, is a statement that does resolve this disparity. An example makes this quite clear : if I will to have an apple or a pear—

I simply like it better and no one would call me a fool for it. But even if I will to be a communist rather than a capitalist, or vice versa, I do not will it because I have applied all my intelligence and arrived at a conclusion which I just follow up, but I will it because I like it. And if I apply reason and judgment, I can do so but partially, and this partiality is prompted by my predilection—which are factors in my will; certain axioms and lines of argument in the system I decide to accept, are more agreeable to me in so far as I am will, and the axiom of the opposing system will be blurr ed forme; if I could be totally objective—that is if I could be totally without a 'will', the strength of the opposite arguments would be in a balance in my mind, in the long run—providing I could ratiocinate without willing. And if I succeed in practising pure intellectuality (to the exclusion of any volition except that to think), I am not likely to decide for the one or the other. If any pair of thinkable opposites arrests my attention at all, I will suspend judgment, avoid a conclusion and meditate into a theoretical eternity—and this is part of our method.

So if we elaborate our criteria of intellectuality, we would add and thereby delimit: it is perserverance in logical thought with the exclusion of any 'willing' apart from the will to practice such thought permanently. Now only can we style this 'the logical will'.

Logical thought, again, must comprise more today than it did only 40 years back, i.e. before the inaugu-

ration of the Viennese School and its so much more fertile disintegration. We must be ready to appreciate the Organon even after a study of the Tractatus and of The Open Society. Even if analytical philosophy could convince all of us, and once for all, that Aristotelian Logic was wrong logic, we must be fair enough to admit that Aristotle and even Hegel had the logical will, if they were quite wrong (which would have to be argued at length)—they would have been wrong because they could not know better. It is sheer fanaticism to claim *post mortem* that they did not *want* to know better. Let us surmise they would have consigned their logical works to the flames if they had been convinced of their falsity—such action would have sufficed to satisfy any criterion of logical will, but in a fatuous manner. For us today, this logical will means a new sort of readiness : to suspend judgment in purely speculative and even purely logical issues in controversial issues of equal force,—and withhold applause, until the theory is unequivocally proved or rejected by the competent to the degree in which we would reject the geocentric conception as against the heliocentric : we have the right to call a person propounding geocentricity a crank. But unless a similar degree of unanimity is reached—and it is not quite sure whether a degree of unanimity can be reached that would be quantitatively corresponding to that in the pure sciences—we cannot even dismiss Plato and Aristotle and their votaries as imbeciles as some would do today. Concretely, the logical will today would manifest

itself in any such instance as the one chosen here : today he has logical goodwill, who will study Aristotle and Carnap and see the plausibility for the time being, of both, at least historically. Possibility may be more than reality, but with the non-existentialist additional clause : until a unanimous conclusion is reached, if it can ever be reached ; the last conditional is to be stressed in our particular method of analysis. Now assuming the day came when all agree Aristotle was wrong : then of course 'logical will' would have to reject the logic of Aristotle, but even then without abuse. Historically Aristotle was as right as we would be if he were unanimously refuted ; his was as logical a will as our's would be in the instance. We could disclaim Aristotle's logical will only if we knew for certain that he had an ulterior motive when he wrote the Organon ; that he was intellectually dishonest. There are a few very brilliant authors today who would allege him and others with these charges, to whom the history of philosophy had hitherto given a place of honour. But the proof of the charge of insincerity is even more difficult to bring, and unanimity on such a charge will hardly ever be reached. It is even rash to charge redoubtable cases with unphilosophical motives. It may be that Descartes made a compromise in order to save himself and his books from the stake ; but if we think he might have been choosing this alternative rather than risking his life's work to be destroyed along with himself, he seems to be somewhat exonerated. Gassendi made no compromise, but inspite of it, it is

hard to say for us whether he was therefore morally superior to Descartes ; there can be fanaticism in such a kind of defiance (I would not claim Gassendi was a fanatic, but take the instance) and if we hold fanaticism to be worse than hypocrisy—which is again a question of valuing predilection—any fanatic, even the fanatic of 'truth' will be less acceptable than the man of prudence, who need not even be a hypocrite. Of course, I cannot say whether Cartesius was a hypocrite or not ; seeing the approximately equal number of thought historians on the condemning side as there are on the defending, I withhold my judgment ; and I withhold it all the more because without applying a 'will' to judge and conclude, and weighing up evidence and thinkabilities for and against him with a will to do so with my intellect alone—surmising that the previous study of all evidence available on the matter could have created a pure balance—it is psychologically and logically impossible to arrive at a conclusion the one way or the other. And this is precisely what I want as a syncretistic parallelist.

I have chosen Descartes as a random figure only ; anyone else about whom there is a dispute of a disciplinary kind—logical, ethical, and aesthetical, would do for the purpose, provided the strength of both sides is virtually equal. What I intend to show is this : we can by practice of this peculiar type of discrimination learn to think without a 'will', e.g. with without a slant, except the will to think thus ; this practically will-less,

pure thinking, I call intelligising (this is of course my own reading of intelligising and many will disagree). Now this intelligising is the only subjectively valid proof, I think, of emotive balance. By it we can ascertain whether or not we have been influenced emotionally by one alternative of the issues in question, or by the other. If we master the capacity of intelligising and apply it in any given instance, we must *not* come to a conclusion one way or the other; or in other words, no alternative conclusion must seem compelling. If we *do* come to a conclusion, however, then that will show that we have been predilectively influenced. Banal-concretely, our emotion has been appealed to by the one and appalled by the other alternative. It is important to remember, however, that only such pairs of issues would fall under this method of analysis, which cannot be solved by the means of logical and other intellectual analysis.

As to the psychological possibility of such intelligising, I must ask my readers to be patient for the time being and to surmise that some particular sort of ratiocination practice can effect it. To many, right now, this capacity of intelligising must sound like a surreptitious claim to perfectly rational agency—a thing which Kant, as a moral philosopher especially, dismissed as utopain, and the host of religious-minded as heresy. On the other extreme I am afraid, this claim will not have too many friends either. The psychologist on the one hand and the scientific empiricist on the

other are likely to reject such a suggestion axiomatically : there can be no thought uninfluenced by emotive factors, and by that complex which is comprehensively styled 'will'; or—thought and will have no real demarcations whatever. I am aware that there can be a huge number of objections to this premiss, and rightly so, if any standpoint be taken from a particular system or discipline. But let us not forget that we are trying a method and that even if ontologically such a demarcation could be proved impossible, it can nevertheless be assumed methodologically. We know many such methodical axioms, which have no ontological basis or whose ontological basis is not clear. Take the best known example of sunrise and sunset; it works as our time-table indirectly for almost all our wordly concerns, yet we know quite well that no actual rising or setting is involved. Time is not divided into years, days, months, and smaller units—but we could hardly do without the calendar—we are born nominalists—or we are primitive. The Wedda aborigine of the Andamans has no calendar in our sense, though even he has a name for the year. There is no ontological calendar in the universe, but there are many methodical ones.

Bowne once said it was the happier type of people who could live without a hypothesis. We take the cue from him and modify it. He is the happier thinker who can live without a conclusion. We have said that the criterion of successful pure intelligising in controversial issues, was the abeyance of a conclusion ; if we arrive

at a conclusion in favour of one of two antithetical terms, it proves that we were influenced by emotion, to use the crude and wide term again, or that we had failed in applying pure intelligising to the issue. This would seem to many as simple skepticism in disguise. It certainly is skepticism if we understand skepticism as a method, and not as a Pyrrhonic system. As a method, I think, it is incumbent on any thinker, to some extent—*"skopein"* means 'to see', 'to observe', and the opposite *"doxein"*, however, means 'to show'—and the trouble is that one can show many a thing one has not seen before, nor observed. I cannot see or observe the correctness of many canonical statements, but I can well show it, in the sense of 'pointing toward it'; and what I 'point out'—with or without a will to derive from it an injunction that I can pass on to my audience—may well be just a facet of my belief, my conviction, my experience or realization. I may be, to give a concrete example, blindfolded by someone who I trust wants to teach me typing most efficiently. Then he tells me he has placed a typewriter on the table in front of me and leaves the room, when others enter, who are quite unaware of the situation. I may, on being asked, 'point out' or show them the typewriter, though I have not seen or observed it. Well, it may be a typewriter for that, but it may as well be a a hollow cucumber with a plume stuck to its top—if for instance, my tutor had put it there with the intention of having some fun at my expense. He may have had entirely different reasons, too, as for instance to humble my pride, or to take a subtle kind of impersonal revenge

for a similar feat meted out to him before. On my part, I am right to claim I am "showing" the typewriter without having seen it, for I believe my friend is an honorable man. My 'showing' is thus literally a 'dogma'. What is wrong here is just what is wrong with all dogmas : the proponent believes his sources to be reliable—whether these sources are books, prophets, gurus, or private experiences. This is what most of the Indian systems call *śābda*—testimony, or *āptavacana* 'the dictum of the fit, of the reliable', and many Indian schools place it on an equal validity level with such other epistemic proofs as direct perception or inference. The same, though more aggressively so, holds for Islamic and Christian doxology. (This does not touch Husserl's usage of doxa at all, of course, for his *doxa* encompasses *episteme* in its critical connotation). Now in an office of the American Express Company, neither the audience nor the blind-folded trainee would be left to uncertainty for a long time. But suppose again this strange event takes place in a village in the Andamans, where no typewriter had ever been seen ; the blindfolded subject of instruction is the eldest of the village and he is trusted by one and all ; the prospective teacher is a stranger whose good intention may be either believed or doubted : if he places a cucumber there and calls it a typewriter and explains its use to the folks who don't know what writing is, the 'typewriter' may have come to stay. I am then quite sincere about my 'typewriter', and my audience is convinced ; yet neither is right. It is similar with the prophet : he is as sincere as his votaries are convinced ;

of course we do not know whether they are wrong, for there is no judge in a position to observe from the outside. Yet *skepsis* after this consideration, does seem to me a fitter method than *dogma*.

In India then, the fight is between two disciplines which are curiously mixed into one and this mixture is held up with tough perserverance. In Europe, the philosophical chair was separated from the theological faculty, and that ended medieval philosophy. In order to introduce the possibility of modern philosophy in India and to end its scholastic period, this very severance will have to be effected. There is virtually unanimous dislike for this idea in India ; Dr. Radhakrishnan believes not only in the inextricability of theology and philosophy, but warns us not to try for a separation ; and there are hardly any Indian philosophers, who do not share his view. The reason is an unnecessary phobia, which again results from a purely linguistic error ; '*darśan*' is a wrong translation of 'philosophy'. This charge will be rejected along with its really harmless implication ; it will be stamped as neo-positivist and there is hardly any trend in modern philosophy which seems so unacceptable to the present Indian philosopher as analytic philosophy : somehow they feel the analyst would try to analyze away what is holy, old, and revered—well, he certainly would for these adjectives would be the first objectives of his scrutiny.

The Indian philosopher is orthodox ; if he were not, he would be excommunicated. I met a very fine philo-

sopher, and when asked whom I regarded the best scholar on Indian philosophy, I mentioned a name, whose eminence few doubt in philosophically interested circles in India ; but I got a frown and the response was typical : but X is not a good Hindu. The academician's natural retort that the query was after eminence in scholarship is not accepted and resented as frivolous. On discussing the schedule for a graduate course in Western Philosophy, a younger professor suggested that at least one philosophical realist might be read in metaphysics (Bradley rules supreme and stands for the ultra-modern at Indian universities)—the seniormost professor rejected the suggestion saying that this was India, after all ; and if Bradley was not quite up-to-date, well, anything back to 1500 B. C. is up-to-date in Indian philosophy. That is true, but that is just the trouble. The old man meant it as a eulogy, the younger one who knew the Viennese School and the Principia, took it as a derogation of Indian philosophy. There is this aura of sanctity created around anything that brings edification similar to the one the educated Hindu experiences where Hindu philosophy = theology is concerned. Western Idealism somehow provides this emotion, for all the differences between its notions and those of the canonic Indian texts. There are realistic schools in Indian philosophy, but the urge toward a teleological classification and valuation is so strong in India that all those realistic ways of philosophising are made subservient or ranked below the nonrealistic systems. The method followed in India to accomplish this is

ingenuous : in any anthology of philosophical systems, the realistic ones are put first—their elucidation forms the first chapter ; the succeeding chapters gradually supersede the earlier ones—and knock them out; a kind of Socratian procedure. This procedure of course is also followed by the few schools which want to establish realism as the final truth. Modernophobia is the most typical negative trend of our present-day philosophers in India. Modern philosophy ends before 1920 for them. Pragmatism, positivism are anathema ; analytic philosophy and existentialism are sheer hybris.

Buddhist philosophy teachers in Eastern Asia turn the tables around, they appeal to Heracleitus and Hume and Bergson, and despise the other ; but this is analogous to the Hindu procedure. It is all the method that counts. To find ideological satellites all over the world is, I believe, an attempt to bolster up a feeling of certainty, which is absent when contact with a new linguistic and cultural medium is recent and not yet too well established. And the language Indian philosophers must speak if they want to speak along with the West, is indeed quite new to them ; it is much easier to learn to use an old language which one can acquire as historical terminology. The Western indologist has spoken the historical language well and he has impressed the pandits. Max Mueller was christened 'mokṣa-mūla' which Sanskrit pun of his name means 'root of redemption'. Several Hindus have become Buddhist converts after reading Edwin Arnold—an

amazing thing which proves how well an historical language can be absorbed if the student is willing to be impressed. I shall have to aver at a later stage, that this 'historical language' is a sort of naive language, when I equate the naive with the pre-critical, the dogmatic, and lastly, the concursive. The remedy in India would be quite simple; Indian philosophers—college and university teachers of philosophy, I mean—would have to do consciously, what the middle-ages did unwillingly; there the separation of the philosophical chair from the theological chair came about gradually, not without considerable friction even after the decree was issued; there might have been more of it had the scholastics known what was brewing—and when the Sorbonne actually summoned lay teachers to the new chair, it was too late. Well, in a way the Inquisition made up for it a bit later. All this is unnecessary in the case of India, and if philosophy teachers in that country one day agree to settle their respective domains, they will prove they have learned a lesson from the history of Western thought. What actually is it, that would have to be done? Without taking recourse to any alien terminology, those who would rather be ranked among philosophers than among theologians, would have to renounce one of their traditional '*pramāṇas*' or 'proofs of knowledge'. With the orthodox '*dārśanik*' the Indian theologian-philosopher—three such epistemological proofs are held eqnally valid: direct perception, inference, and testimony. The sanskrit term for the latter is, as we have already stated, *śābda*, which simply means 'word', i.e.

in the sense of the 'Word'—or *āptavacana*, i.e. 'testimony of the *āptas*'. *Āptas* are persons who have reached sagehood which is, in India, nothing less than the state of salvation. Well, *āptas* are the authors of the canonical scriptures, and their validity may not be doubted by the votary, although he may read his own meaning into each and every one of their dicta. There has never been one commentary universally recommended or enjoined in the Hindu tradition, because there is no church that could do so. But tolerance ends where the scripture itself is concerned; it is *apauruṣeya*—'not man-made', and the *āptas* are the mouthpieces of these truths. The intension of the word *āpta* prevents doubt as to their reliability—*āpta* implies one who has certainty in the matter involved. This is a certainty by definition or ascription ; in other words the proposition 'an *āpta* has certainty about statements of the tradition' is an analytical sentence. Strangely enough, there has been no question as to who is entitled to ascribe *āpta-hood* to a person. True, certain *lakṣaṇas* (signs) are given to enable us to recognize an *āpta*—but who again, established these *lakṣaṇas ?* An *āpta* himself ? It often seems as though that was what we should believe. Vyāsa, the mythical author of the epics and many other semicanonical works, gives such *lakṣaṇa* in various places. And Vyāsa is an *āpta*. But this is awkward ; *āptas* are self-styled charismatics. Up to this day, the Hindu has not been sufficiently sophisticated to take offense at this ; it is quite common in these days that a man who wants to be famous in his line unhesitatingly

declares himself to be so, in public. I know many monks of my Order, who naively sign with H. H. (His Holiness) prefixed to their names. Except for some few cynics, hardly anyone takes objection to it. Obviously, the argument is that only the sage can know and recognize his sagehood, and he alone can proclaim it; no one else has the means to find it out if not through the *lakṣaṇas*, and these are given by the sage himself or any of the predecessors he acknowledges. A pious view. Ramakrishna said it was the dancer alone who could tell a good dancer. The Śaivites of South India say 'only Śiva can tell if the man who wears the ochre robe is a genuine monk or not'. This is perfectly true, but few in India will try to see that a dancer is a profession different from sagehood; so even is mathematics. The analysis of words and semiotics in general, will always be taboo for the religious, and heresy for the theologian.

The Indian theologian will have to renounce *śābda* if he wants to be a philosopher. If he cannot dispense with it, he will remain in the old chair; he will remain a theologian. From the comparative standpoint this alone can serve as the distinguishing criteria: the philosopher is he who avails himself of any thinkable *pramāṇa* barring that of testimony *śabda* and those who insist on the validity of *śabda*, will be theologians once for all.

The eleves of the Academy had to declare solemnly they would not swear by any name, and they added:

not even by the name of Socrates. This attitude is often professed in India, but in practice it is the guru, the preceptor, whose words are accepted in toto in the end, and the average Hindu is admittedly a *guruvādi*, i.e. a man who has surrendered all his judgments to his preceptor. Many modern Hindus will deny this latter clause vehemently, but if you press your point hard enough in any debate, it will all boil down to this : arguments fail, and hence we believe in our guru. We believe in him, not because he solved the arguments, but because we believe that he has gone beyond them. We do not so much care for his having solved a problem intellectually—it is weakness to try that—but we care for his not having had these problems or for his having overcome them ! These trends of thought are typical of the modern Hindu as they were of the ancient, and the modern Bengali saint Ramakrishna is so popular in intelligent India because he was so typical. 'God is formless', he said to the schoolmaster M., his overwhelmed devotee, 'and he has also form ; and he is also many more things'. The difficulty of the contradiction, and the infringement on the law of the excluded middle does not strike him—he is beyond the problem ; and it does not strike his devotees either, though they may be professors of mathematics and not at all beyond the problem in any way, which they will humbly admit. 'When once we reach this state, we shall not feel this difficulty either', they will continue. Not feeling the difficulty is a desirable state for them. But Ramakrishna, it ought to

be remembered, probably never had the problem all his life—he was too rustic in his early youth and too much absorbed in his mystical experiences, too much 'beyond' the problem, when he had grown older. Neither of it was and is the case with his present-day followers : they have the problem—the law of contradiction holds for them and they know it; they do not have Ramakrishna's whole-hoggedness, his unique perserverance and his desire for mystical adventure. And suppose they could acquire it—which they hope they will at some time or other—it would mean their abrogation of logical thought. 'No', is the stereotype reply, 'spiritual experience does not deny the laws of logic, but it supersedes them. Logical truth is a lower truth, mystical truth the highest truth.'

In a recent excellent study Professor Edwin Shils* of the University of Chicago has dealt with this intriguing aspect of the modern Indian intellectual's attitude; he feels guilty, in many ways, for having lost the naive spiritual kingdom of Ramakrishna.

The argument does not end here—both sides have yet to carry on for a considerable length of time. But we cannot follow up the argument any further right now, as it would confuse our purpose. By now Hindu readers would think me a traitor. But I am not going to spare the accidental audience either. Right between—I must mention that I do not mean the exception on

* E. Shils *The intellectual between Tradition and Modernity : The Indian Problem,* Mouton & Co., The Hague. 1961.

either side—I am very well aware of them : there are rationalists in India (that is the word used in India for all those who deny traditional authority of any kind and try to think for themselves), and there are mystics in the West. Their numbers are increasing—on both sides. I propose, however, that the proportion in the increase is not equal, the West has more converts to spiritualism to show than India to intellectualism. The reason is historical accident : the West has more things to be fed up with, and India does not yet have them. There is a surfeit in discursive achievement, palpable to any Westerner except the nausea-proof philosopher, even though some may like to make nausea part or basis of their philosophy, as some existentialists do. In India, there is no general surfeit with 'spiritual' life, for the spiritual man is naturally happier ; that does not mean he is necessarily wiser, as many would claim. Escapism may not be the object of the mystical adept, but the escape is complete with mystical success ; the mystic is like a girl who wails for her lover—if he finally elopes with her, she may be quite happy about it, after the accomplished fact, though elopement had not been her intention. Intellectualism is not only impious if driven too far, it is also very strenuous in the Indian climate, as it involves a change in a well accepted sanctioned outlook, so the pious can be combined with the pleasant, or at least the not exactly unpleasant.

Now what is the syncretistic challenge to the West, as far as it is intellectual ? The charge is that no

solutions of problems dear to men have been satisfactory, because they were no full solutions. The two extremes which permit a large number of intermediaries are, either to trust the discursive faculties of the race and to carry them as far as one can; knowing of course as all intelligent men do, that they can only clarify a certain segment of problems, and that they radically exclude the possibility of a solution of the basic questions, as life, death, god etc.; these are no 'problems' at all, but probably cultural urges trying and training our fantasy, that most precious gift. Problems are questions that can be solved in principle, or perhaps are even likely to be solved in time. Questions that cannot be solved in principle because the tools are lacking, or because they are absurd or such, are no problems at all: 'problem' is a misnomer. By now we know approximately which sets of questions can be named problems, and which are just a waste of time: this is one of the instructions that the philosopher can give to the scientist in due return for the many instructions he has received from the latter. We may and should strive to be able to enumerate, one day, all the factors that bring rain, thus enabling us to predict the event with complete accuracy, locally and temporally. The tools are available in principle, and will be increasingly so in course of time. But questions about life after death, retribution, and the nature of god are useless in all senses, except for the purposes of art, and for sharpening our imaginations, and for inspiration. However these are questions only, not "problems".

So either the Western intellectual squeezes by with what he has and tries to be happy with it; or he denies discursive thought any useful capacity to solve 'questions', and turns either a skeptic or pious. Of late, the existentialist has been trying hard not to escape at all despite the abominable certainty of Nothing—and his is perhaps a genuinely new approach to the matter.

Those who deny the possibility of knowledge—the true skeptics or the true believers, commit one fallacy : they take the questions of which they despair, for problems on a level with real problems, that is soluble questions. And that is entirely their fault. There are two ways out of this despair : the one is the analyst's (positivist is a bad name for it wrongly conjures up Comtean spirits that are as dead and gone for the scientific empiricist and analyst as for the remaining metaphysicians)—he simply denies the problem, dissolving the question as nonsense and linguistic error. The other is the syncretistic parallelist's way, that is the one we are expounding in this study. The analyst is not much of an esthete unless we apply very far-fetched criteria, and press them hard (a strenuous, unaesthetic procedure) and the analyst invariably has some arrogance about him; it may be extremely subtle, though, but I daresay I could point it out in most cases. And in a way, he is also an escapist—rather, he does not enter the dangerous ship because he denies it the title of a ship. He would not say it was a bad ship, but no ship at all.

As Jaspers put it, "not knowing" to the positivist is "not yet knowing", and if it is not that, the quest is a pseudo-quest. The existentialist way is of course very different, as it does not believe in a possible solution; the existentialist philosopher knows there is no solution, and moreover, no harmony. He is quite happy in his forlornness '*Verlorenheit*'; it seems he would be disappointed rather than delighted if by some speculative miracle answers to the 'questions' were found for him; a simple answer, or a definition, is pedestrian. He has traits of the skeptic, but he even goes part of the way along with the analyst when he denies problems in his very peculiar way. If esthetic attitude is to involve hedonic tone, then the existentialist is not much of an esthete either; he is certainly quite unhedonic. But he is not arrogant; not even Sartre—he is '*verzweifelt*' 'despaired'—that is his professional credo. The arrogant philosopher is never aware of his arrogance, unless he is a phony philosopher. But the existentialist is well aware of his shortcomings, and confession is part of his method. This is quite laudable, but makes painful reading.

We are talking about contemporary philosophy in the West; it is undue labour to criticize the system-makers up to and including Hegel; this type of criticism is boring and trite. We know by now that system-making is futile. Today that is; it was necessary for 2000 years in order to realize that it had been futile all the time. Existentialism, scientific empiricism,

and pragmatism, etc,—all these are methods and I hope that none of their votaries claims them to be systems; that would be forefeiting the dignity of the school and the masters. In criticizing Western intellectuals in juxtaposition with the Indian thinker, we are criticizing their methods not their methods as such, but their claims to the application of their methods. In rejecting an important set of propositions as merely interesting tautologies, or in proving metaphysical problems to be spurious problems, the analysts imply that they are, correctly speaking, not worthwhile—and thereby they tacitly assume that the analytical method covers all worthwhile fields. They would concede to metaphysical speculation the place of a kind of game, a game of words, but not a permissible *Sprachspiel* in the Wittgensteinian sense; but that does not qualify as an equal philosophical endeavour. Wittgenstein ends his Tractatus saying 'whereof one cannot speak, of that one must be silent' the sentence is extremely ambiguous, but Wittgenstein was hardly aware that one day a Hindu thinker could read the Tractatus; and what he might make out of it, would make Wittgenstein wonder in his grave; for a Vedantic translator, the sentence entails mysticism which inevitably brings about new metaphysical propositions—and non-sense. We shall yet have to see whether he did not actually imply some kind of mysticism; if he did he was not aware of the fact that silence is broken by the mystic himself in course of time; else we would not know what mystics are and that there have been any. And what they *say*, again,

is non-sense. Did Wittgenstein mean to enjoin this type of silence ? Perhaps. But the trouble is that a host of ardent followers who deem themselves potential sages by virtue of their belief in the silent master, break his silence. If Wittgenstein wrote the sentence for the ones already silent, it was redundant; but mystically oriented readers will make a mess out of it. They will be loud mystics, and if they happen to read more, they will be metaphysicians and talk nonsense. Why, the numerous neo-converts to Vedanta and Buddhism in the West are the best examples. So the charge is this, that the philosopher in the West, except where he is a metaphysician, or where he emulates Oriental ways—an occurence not too rare today—simply overrates the applicability of his philosophy and of his method. Where he does not do that, he declares what is outside the ken of his method as philosophically irrelevant. If he is a skeptic he declares it to be unknowable—; this would be a noble declaration, but one which tends to make its propounder complacent. Of course, his kind of complacency is much less obnoxious than that of the believer—actually, it may even be attractive. To me, the skeptics and agnostics belong to the more agreeable type of fellowmen in the history of Western thought.

Now although the arguments of the modern philosopher may be correct when they go out to prove non-relevance of unsoluble questions, these questions are nevertheless there. It is quite thinkable that they

do not bother him; the more successfully he specializes in his branch of thought, the less are they likely to bother him. The pure analysts, the scientific empiricists, I happen to know are quite happy or at least not unhappier than those who think about the great 'questions' —and they are certainly happier than those who believe these questions are 'problems'. We may feel amused at the cock that does not leave the chalk-circle in which he feels to be entirely caught. Only some more sympathy for the rooster is justifiable, simply because he did not draw the circle himself.

It will be natural that my criticism of Indian Philosophy was that of the logician, whereas my criticism of the Western Philosophy is that of the esthete. I do not think it possible to criticize both from the standpoint of one and the same discipline; true, even the best logician can be criticized by an inferior one, if he pledges himself to find a mistake; and almost any kind of thinker can be charged with being unesthetical because the field of attack from the esthetical side is so vague as yet and so vast, the criteria so subjective, the emphasis so different with different critics. Our criterion is on an altogether different level. We do not criticize the logician for possible mistakes and miscalculations, nor the metaphysician for his obscurantism, nor the mystic for his vision. We would not launch a word of criticism if they did not claim to be philosophers as well. Philosophy has at least three disciplines, and a man who works in one of them only, is not yet a philosopher. Of course, he

is free to have his particular interest; he must have it indeed. It is wrong to accuse a person for the interests he holds—a very common wrong in India. But that must not induce him to neglect the other disciplines with a motive; he may have to do it for lack of time: his problem may belong to any one discipline which absorbs all his time—,and that is all right. Deriding the other disciplines or neglecting them as irrelevant is, however, unphilosophical. If there can be no metaphysics for the analyst, he has yet to study what has been said in that discipline, even though it was non-sense.

We can criticize the *only* logician, the *only* metaphysician, the *only* mystic, as philosophers who believe in the variety of philosophical disciplines and we do so if they claim to be philosophers as well and by virtue of their singular approach. The logician who rejects mysticism because he has no formula for it, is no philosopher, and the mystic who holds the logician to be a child groping in the dark, because his mystical experience convinces him of the redundance in discursive thought, is no philosopher. It is one of the criteria of the genuine thinker that he constantly deals with matters he has rejected as a result of his own method. If he, for instance, concludes all religious experience is humbug, he will have to study this humbug with the same zeal he applies to his own pet set of studies. This holds for the philosopher alone—the scientist cannot afford it, he does not have the time.

The conviction of the validity of one's method is necessary, but it must not be extended to quests one's method is not meant for. In case of emergency, a skillful artisan may manage to hammer with a plier and to pull a nail with a hammer, but the tools have their particular scopes and they are at least inadequate for works outside their scope. The piece which has been hammered with a plier may look well hammered if the plier was well handled, yet more often than not something awkward will be noticed by a fellow artisan. It is analogous with our discipline: the logician criticizes the mystic and vice versa, applying their own tools and one can tell it. Moreover, strength of conviction is no proof of the other's wrongness, nor of one's own being right. Unconsciously, however, it is precisely this which infuriates thinkers and sets them against each other. And this is obviously jejune and absurd. It boils down to a proposition which says something like 'You are wrong because my conviction of being right as against your view is stronger than your conviction of your being right as against my view'. This is a stupid suggestion on the face of it, because, again, degree of conviction is neither measurable nor comparable; and it is more important to be true of its content. This is a truism by now, but truisms are helpful at times in order to spot stupidity.

Summing up, the method of syncretistic parallelism is one which combines discursive thought with mystical practice, each in its own right, each without infringing upon the other. It aims at diminishing or eschewing

the suspicion and dislike which separate the philosopher and the mystic from each other. It aims at combining the two opposite possibilities in one person, without rejoining the two faculties, which fortunately had been separated in Europe, in the 14th century. As for India, the separation has yet to be made. Then only can Indian humanistic academia stand side by side with their Western counterparts, then only can the occidental thinker be a match to the yogi, the Indian mystical preceptor, who will no longer have to hold that 500 B. C. is modern once for all.

* * *

CHAPTER III

CRITICAL APPROACH AND ANALYSIS OF INDIAN THOUGHT

In this chapter, I shall frequently use "western," and shall use it as a synonym with "critical." This equivocation is pedagogical rather than lexicographical; and it is, perhaps, also therapeutic. The critical standpoint is western only when Indian thought models are concerned, because objective, tradition-excluding criticism is new, and does not have much sympathy and little following in India. In this fashion, communism or the concept of democracy or even that of a nation are "western," when used in India—for they are wholesale occidental imports. It goes without saying that there is no such thing as one "western" standpoint in philosophy, even less than there is such a thing as one eastern standpoint. For western includes everything from Athens to America, and it would be foolish to tackle problems of Indian Thought from any such wide and vague basis. By "western standpoint" in this series I mean something much narrower than this. I mean the attitude toward Indian Thought that would probably be taken by contemporary western thinkers like Russell, the analysts, the scientific empiricists, and perhaps the pragmatists—roughly, the standpoint of modern analytical thought, such as is prevalent today in all Anglo-Saxon countries, and frequent in conti-

nental Europe. I exclude, however, such contemporary lines of thought as existentialism, and though this may disappoint some, I have nevertheless reason to exclude it—methodical reasons. For what we want to show is contrast and methodical comparison — I personally am a great admirer of some existentialist thought, but it can hardly be a tool for our special juxtaposition—viz. toward Indian Thought, for the existentialist would probably, faced with Indian Philosophy, try to interpret it in such a manner that the result would be an existentialized Indian philosophy or an Indianized existentialism—from which growth we would not learn much. Apart from it, I hold that existentialism is not really representative of modern western thought.

The one difficulty about our series is the lack of actual material for such a comparative study ; for the western thinker of the tougher kind—teachers of philosophy as an academical discipline, at western universities, do not yet take Indian philosophy seriously, simply because they know nothing about it—nor can they really be blamed for it, for this is the age of specialization and enough is to be done to grapple with the hypertrophic problems of such western disciplines of philosophical research as probability, mathematical logic, semantics, functional analysis, symbolic logic, etc., branches of learning which are really quite new and completely absorbing. In the West, those who do deal with Indian Thought are indologists, oriental scholars, who usually take in philosophy as one subject

along with others—Sanskrit, literature, poetry, art. The western indologist or orientalist, on the other hand, is not usually interested in the contemporary academical philosophy of his own region—in fact I know of not more than three yet who could be called academical philosophers in the western sense, and oriental scholars simultaneously. This is an enormous shortcoming so far as I can see, but neither the professional occidental philosophers nor the orientalists seem to have any qualms about it.

When an occidental scholar, trained in the western tradition of thought, sets about to study Indian philosophy, he feels nearly always, and quite soon, that it is axiomatically uncritical. When compared with what at least contemporary academical philosophy in the West professes, there is no doubt that this is true. India is completely tradition-bound in her philosophy, Philosophy, in India, is still the *ancilla theologiae*, or rather, it has not been recognized as a separate or separable pursuit. The Indian pandit, on the other hand, finds western thought uninspiring and its targets essentially futile, for they neither yield, nor claim to yield, results which he has been thinking of as consummative.* When put radically, it comes to a point when the modern western thinker refuses to grant the pundit the title of a philosopher in spite of whatever wide traditional learning he

---

* For a new, exquisite study of this problem, see Karl H. Potter, *The Presuppositions of Indian Philosophy*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood N. J., U. S. A. 1963

may own, whereas the pundit denies this title to the western thinker because, viewed from his own tradition, the western thinker's efforts are vain, and not even hard.

This appears puzzling and unpleasant, especially as mutual antagonism resulting from mutual denigration has caused much bad blood on academical rostrums in India. However, the remedy is surprisingly easy, and still more surprisingly unknown. I am exposing a most incredible philological error, which is, so I think, solely responsible for this feud. It goes back to one of the pioneers of oriental research in the West, Prof. Max Mueller of Oxford, punned into *mokṣa-mūla* by our pun-loving frinds, the pundits. Mueller did the mischief, unwittingly and with the best of intentions, when indology was not only a novel craze, but virtually his own monopoly. Mueller had never been to India, and lexicographical errors are almost inevitable without prolonged field-work. The error, which has had such unpleasant and unforeseeable effects, was that he translated the Sanskrit word *darśana* as "philosophy," and vice versa. Now strangely enough, this absolutely faulty rendering has never been challenged by any lexicographer—either western or Indian; I checked all the published Sanskrit-and-European dictionaries—and their number is considerable by now, on this matter, and I have not found a single one where *darśana* is not interpreted, among other meanings, of course, as "philosophy" but then the trouble is, that it has many meanings *except* this one. But you can well imagine

how deeply such an error gets implanted if it stands uncorrected throughout almost a century. Now the rest follows—when a pundit thunders against western "philosophy" as barren and unholy and insouciant, he does so because he has *darśana* in mind when he says "philosophy," and naturally he does not find there what he finds in *darśana*—he finds no trace of *darśana* in it, for modern philosophy not only lacks every criterion of *darśana*, but it also painstakingly excludes anything that may smack of *darśana*, as non-relevant to its method. As it is, neither etymology nor usage warrants the translation. *Darśana* derives from the root "*dṛś*" (Gr. *deik-ny-mi*), which literally means "to see," "to perceive"—and *darśana* in its technical sense conveys intuition, not discursiveness and ratiocination. Now is there a technical equivalent of *darśana* in the West? There are two, but neither of them is "philosophy." They are theology and mysticism—and we might say the Indian concept of *darśana* is a blend of the two, such as has never been taught in the West for any length of time—it was only the Neo-Platonists, Plotinus especially, whose work would appeal to the pundit as a *darśana*. Mysticism and theology have never been different things in India ; they have been serving as instruments of mutual proof, whereas in the religious traditions of the West, in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam the two were separate indeed and viewed each other with eternal suspicion or contempt. "Philosophy," at least in the connotation it has gained by now, is methodically opposed to both—it tends to defy traditional lore, and

tries to keep out mysticism at least consciously, though of course it enters in surreptitiously even into the works of the brainiest.

It has now to be asked if there is anything at all in the Indian tradition which would merit the title "philosophy". The answer is yes, but it is not found in *darśana* texts—it is to be found in *genres* which the orthodox tradition in India never ascribed to "*darśana*". These other genres, however, are less important in India's cultural history than "philosophy" has been for that of the West. "Philosophy," is closer to what Kautilya termed *anvīkṣikī*, i.e. the science that avails itself of direct inspection and inference. Kauṭilya enumerates the sciences that come under *anvīkṣikī-vidyā* and these roughly correspond to what the West meant, at one time or the other, by "philosophy"—it would include epistemology, ontology, and of course logic. The etymology, to state it for sure, is quite clear—those objects that can be directly perceived—*pratyakṣa*—and those that can be inferred by syllogistic or other methods of valid reasoning—*anumāna, arthāpatti*—are *anvīkṣikī*. Philosophy is a Greek and an eminently European word, *darśana* is uniquely Indian.

It is relatively easy to formulate the methodical distinction between "*darśana*" and "philosophy.". In the West, such a distinction would work when topics are being assigned to philosophy or theology, respectively. *Darśana* assumes three truth-tests : direct perception—*pratyakṣa*, inference—*anumāna*, scriptural or

esoteric testimony—*śabda* or *āptavacana*. This has been the classical trifolium throughout the long history of Brahmanical *darśana*. Only in very recent times, in the Bengali-cum-Mithilā school of reformed logic—*Navya-Nyāya*, *śabda* as an instrument of proof has been challenged and finally has come to mean, in that school, something quite different, which we cannot, however, deal with here. You will feel that for the western thinker, who prides himself on having a secular mind, these three epistemological proofs or validations apply to any kind of theology, but to theology only. And the western scholar would extend "theology" to non-theistic system as well, as Sankhya, or to early Buddhism and Jainism; "theology" as a classificatory term should refer to a method, not to its contents. The *anvīkṣikī*—sciences in India were those that accept but the first two proofs and dispense with *śabda*. We might put in somewhat hazardously, saying that philosophy is *darśana* minus the third *pramāṇa*; to the Indian mystic (not to the pundit, who is his clandestine opponent), such *darśana* is in principle acceptable, for he (the mystic) takes *darśana* in the literal sense—he sees something truly, and cares little for scholastic corroboration. Against this, it may be argued that the Buddhists and to an extent, the Jainas, denied *śabda* as a *pramāṇa*. Yet, I think theirs was a kind of courtesy denial, in line with their freethinkers' prestige: denying as they did the power of validation to the Vedic scriptures, they had to deny it to their own if they were to be consistent. In practice, however, their canonical

literature proved to be about as much binding to them in the theological sphere as the Vedic texts were to the Brahmins. The assumption is often made that Buddhism is closer to the western analytical method than Brahmanical doctrine is not very well founded, though there seems to be some reason on the surface. But analysis in the sense that applies to modern thought is entirely unknown as yet on the traditional scene in India, hence viewed with the utmost misgivings by teachers of philosophy at Indian universities, who are supposed to inform their students about modern western thought. If there is anything in India that approximates the analytic method, it is *Navya-Nyāya* rather than Buddhist Logic — though its masters did pay the traditional homage to the scriptures, they did not really worry about them; there is also the strange fact, which might throw some light on the antagonism toward analytical methods, that the Hindu pundit today looks at *Navya-Nyāya* with covert displeasure—it smacks of heresy to him, or is at least a very uncanny apparatus; his official charge, of course, would be that it does not lead to *mokṣa*; it is a correct charge—logic certainly does not, but then there is philosophy for once, not theology. In the total bulk of Indian thought, *Navya-Nyāya* is like a drop in the sea, and moreover it is quite regional an affair—it is hardly known outside U. P., Bihar, and Bengal, and I have met several pundits in the South who had never heard its name, or pretended not to have heard it. Even the Pundit schooled in *Navya-Nyāya*, pays his actual allegiance to some

kind of Vedanta or the other—he studies *Navya-Nyayā* as a kind of hobby. I once asked a young pandit in Mithila, who had been reading *Navya-Nyāya* along with the more orthodox systems, whether he did not feel the particular excellence of that system. No, he said and shrugged his shoulders—*Navya-Nyāya* consists of definitions only; this was meant as a criticism, naively—for definition is indeed the main object of modern analysis.

The late R. G. Collingwood taught that metaphysics was a historical discipline—the historical discipline in systematic philosophy—according to him, the job of the metaphysician is to tell what axiomatic assumptions have been made or are being made within a particular philosophical pattern—not why they have been made; nor whether there is any logic in it, but just what those axioms are or have been. To the Indian thinker, certain *pramāṇas* are unquestionable, *śabda* most strikingly; he is chiefly a metaphysician on this count—the Upaniṣads tell us the whole host of axiomatic assumptions; then the *ācāryas* and *bhāṣyakāra-s* and other commentators attempted to rationalize those axioms. Now, building a system of thought on certain assumptions which have to remain unchallenged for reasons of ecclesiastical loyalty is genuine theology. We have the strange and unique phenomenon in India, that metaphysics was older than theology, a thing which I don't think has any parallel anywhere. The axioms propounded in the canonical sciptures of the Brahmins are of course very different from what a modern western

metaphysician would accept, they are too numerous and too farfetched;—the Upaniṣadic seers could not yet avail themselves of Occam's Razor—it was later Indian thinkers who applied a similar technique, yet quite some time before Occam. There can be no doubt that western thought has always been tending to find methods—even previous to Occam—where axioms of an over-imaginative or esoteric kind were either eschewed or at least reduced to a minimum. All Indian philosophy up to this time was axiomatic in this sense.

There was, however, one magnificent exception in ancient time, more impressive than other achievements on account of its age, the Mādhyamika school of the Buddhists, Nāgārjuna and his commentator Candrakīrti as well as his subsequent disciples. It is the only system of Indian thought which does not accept any premises, any irrefragable presuppositions, and which postulates methodical non-validity for any assertion in the final analysis. Much, later, Śriharṣa, a Brahmin scholar tried to apply a similar method within the Brahmin texture, and he admitted his indebtedness to the heretic Buddhists. In India today, Nāgārjuna and his school are known but to the specialists. The teachings of the Mādhyamikas spread out thousands of miles beyond the mountains—but in the country of its origin and in the immediately adjacent countries which follow Theravāda, it did not find lasting appeal.

In Europe, the theological chair was separated from the philosophical chair with the mutual pledge of non-

interference, in the 14th century through a weighty edict of the Sorbonne in medieval Paris—and on the whole, its ordinance has been implemented in subsequent centuries. Thenceforth, the philosopher professed to concern himself with discursively knowable matters only, leaving to the theologian what cannot be thus known.

In India, a less organized attempt had been made in an almost mythical age. Jaimini, traditionally the propounder of the Pūrva Mimāṃsa, which is reckoned to be the most orthodox among the six Brahmanical systems of thought that claim to be exegeses of the Vedic Scripture and its philosophical implications—taught emphatically that everything in the Scripture has to be understood to convey some entirely supernatural truth, not rationally accessible, simply because the Veda tells us only such things which we cannot grasp through any other source. Nothing in the writ pertains, so holds Jaimini, to a universe which could be comprehended by rational and empirical means—so that, i.e., if there be the mention of a tree in the Veda, that tree cannot be any tree of our botanical world, because a natural tree can be described by a secular science such as botany. His would have been a case where the theologian inaugurates the segregation of the faculties—in the West, it had been the discontented philsopher who rebelled. However, Jaimini's hint was not heeded, and no serious attempt towards such separation was ever contemplated. The western scholar feels that India's speculative development is retarded, that India is yet in her scholastic age—in an age similar to that

European era of thought where philosophy and theology were thought to be the same thing.

Is there any philosophy in India which is not chiefly theology, then ? I don't think there is any entirely secular philosophy that holds its place. It is hard to say what the future will bring, and whether or not the pundits will persist in their splendid isolation. That there is no detheologized philosophy in India is a fact hardly anyone would dispute, even if he does not accept my distinguishing criteria. There was, of course, the mythical Carvāka and the Lokāyatas, but we know virtually nothing about their doings and their doctrine, all that is extant being six verses of doubtful origin and age.

A teacher of philosophy in India today who teaches his own ideas, when they happen to differ from traditionally acceptable views, or when he does not try to corroborate them with scriptural notions, is automatically dubbed "westerner"—a philosopher who makes philosophy after a western fashion, i.e. after his own fashion. Now there are quite a few Indian teachers of philosophy who just do not care about the label they are given ; but there are others who for reasons of their own would like to be reckoned as Indian thinkers—there is great beauty in the Indian esthetic tradition, and if an Indian born into it wants to identify himself with it, he can hardly be blamed—; then what about a thinker who wants to be understood as an Indian philosopher and yet give his own ideas, independent of or even in contradiction to scriptural tenets ? Well, he is just not

expected to do any such thing. The Hindu thinker has been and is still expected to be an exegete and nothing but that—novel ideas are suspicious, heretical, unwelcome—in short, they are "western." The psychology behind this state of affairs is immensely complex and extends into diverse fields—from invectives against free speculation, it stretches to pamphlets and sermons against lipstick and powder-puff. The leaders of Hinduism today tell their eager flock that these are not indigenous. Hinduism and chauvinism have become inseparable. And yet, the beauty-aids of ancient Indian women were far more complex, expensive, and sophisticated than these poor contemporary fabrics—could some rouge be brewed along with the chanting of mantras, it would perhaps be held conducive to the realization of old standards of Hindu womanhood.

The central charge of the modern Indian philosopher—theologian against the West is regrettably trivial, and unfounded. Wherever you meet Indian intellectuals in the world, they will give you the neat information that India is "spiritual" and the West "materialistic"—it is the Hindu stock-in-trade, and I would not mention it but for the fact that the very best thinkers of modern India keep feeding this line. I fear this jejune generalization goes back to the well-meant, but ill-informed expostulations of some really good men of 19th and early 20th century India, like Vivekananda or Tilak.

This contention has important ramifications which we shall have to discuss in the next chapters, from a

semantic and ethical point of view. But here I shall conclude with my ideas on the basic difference in the Indian and the (modern) western attitude to matters of thought. Though I do not believe that there is such a thing as Western Thought and Indian Thought in watertight compartments, I do hold that there is a predominantly different attitude held by each : let the stress be on " predominantly," for of course there are persons and moods on either side which would fall in line with what is prevalent on the other. I think the West is predominantly *critical* and discursive in its philosophical attitude. The attitude opposed to the critical or discursive attitude is what I like to call the "*enthusiastic*" attitude. The distinction between "critical" and "enthusiastic" as contraries of philosophical approach is my own terminology. I think this distinction is very important, even if it were only for the purpose of debunking the said trivial and wrong generalizations proferred by our Indian colleagues. I excluded the existentialists from the umpire's chair because they too are largely uncritical, and entirely "enthusiastic" in its literal sense--the German idiom "*des Gottes voll*;" Jaspers, the least exasperating among existentialist writers, declares the essence of philosopy to be *Betroffensein* (i.e. "to be affected"). The enthusiastic mind is "affected" by the injuctions of tradition, the preceptor, or by its own mystical vision—it willingly sacrifices the right to its own rational jurisdiction, like the Professor of Indoctrination in Bertrand Russell's *Zahatopolk.*

Although I hold this distinction (critical mind vs. enthusiastic mind) to be fundamental, I should not like to press it too much—it is thematic rather than historical. For well over fifteen hundred years, the West had been teaching enthusiastic philosophy and there are quite a few who would fain continue—but many of us call those centuries the Dark Age. There were no critical centuries in India to counter the case, but there have been short critical phases, and sporadic critical schools as the ones mentioned before, and they merit indeed the admiration of the most radical analyst of our day.

The cultured occidental today has read, in translations, the Bhagavadgita and the Upanishads, as he has read the Tao-te-ching and the Analects. In the same manner; the educated Hindu is fairly familiar with Plato, Kant, and even Russell. What strikes the sympathetic western student of Indian lore is its inspiration and edification, its enormous esthetic appeal—and if he is a modern philosopher, he is struck along with these by the lack of descriptive propositions. On the other hand, what offends the intelligent Indian student of western philosophical literature is the lack of inspiration, of "vision"—for these, he has to go back to ancient Greece, he finds them abundantly in Plato whom he loves. The Indian philosopher loves Plato in a fashion none of us can possibly emulate. For while the most Platonic philosopher in the West has today changed his outlook a great deal as he deals with the philosopher-king, there is little or no change

in the pundit's appreciation of his own masters of yore. Take the scholastic commentators on the *prasthānatraya*, the Vedantic *ācāryas* and their disciples, and compare their output with that of our present-day pundits who comment upon the selfsame tradition as the only thing worth writing about. There is very little change noticeable after 1000 years, except that the language has become more technical, more insipid, less poetical and less elegant—yet, apart from this there is no change of outlook since what the elders wrote. There has been no critical scrutiny of the text, there have been but reiteration and reformulation, and very much complacence all over.

I have tried to show that the western philosopher's criticism is directed chiefly against the usage of the word "philosophy" for Indian speculation; he would admit terms like theology, mysticism, and metaphysics—especially if he holds with most modern thinkers that metaphysics is not philosophy in the academical sense any longer. He further turns against the common Indian contention that India's spirituality stands over against western materialism; further, he feels that the basic difference in the respective approaches to philosophical problems is that the West has been, or is, predominantly critical, whereas India is predominantly enthusiastic. *It has yet to be seen, whether a judgment of value follows from this confrontation.

* * *

* For a more elaborate and more specified handling of this

A semantic and linguistic analysis of the most frequent terms and concepts used in Indian thought is really the need of the day, particularly as it has not been attempted at all for Indian thought, least of all by an Indian scholar. The strong aversion of Indian philosophers against semantic methods is understandable only as a kind of self-defence; for semantics does cut at some of the major roots of traditional Indian thought, just as it cut at the Stagirite roots in Western countries. I would permit, however, that what has universal validity and importance in Indian philosophy is not affected in any way be semantic analysis—this point will be worked out in the next section.

The necessity for linguistic analysis arises from the fact of the vagueness of natural languages. The poet is more ancient than the logician in every language, the magician is still older, and natural man is the oldest. The grammarian comes in somewhere between the poet and the logician. Now the confusion between logic and grammar is ubiquitous—it has been hampering Indian thought just as much as it marred western philosophy. But the crucial difference is that about 80 years ago, western thought became aware of the immense fallacies that derived from the ageold confusion of grammar and logic—Frege, Peano, and then in recent

---

theme, vd. my chapter "Radhākrishnan and the Other Vedanta" in *The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan*, in Library of Living Philosophers, Tudor & Co., New York 1952; also, Dr. Radhakrishnan's reply in the same volume.

times, the Viennese and the British analytic schools—it was they who initiated a line of study which is changing the entire picture of philosophical speculation more than any novel method of philosophical enquiry ever did before.

The basic error—the error from which Plato and Aristotle suffered just as much as the Indian seers—was the notion that grammatical rules are logical, and that logical truth follows from correct grammar. This is wrong, for language is a natural thing not a logical one—grammar is the description of something that occurred and occurs, something empirical, whereas logic is the sciences of pure form, of the strictly non-empirical. Natural language (i.e. spoken language or extinct languages—Vedic, Sanskrit, Japanese, English) as opposed to special language or artificial language (i.e. mathematical and physical symbols, codes, the functional expressions of symbolic logic)—is full of natural ambiguity, of vagueness,—and this is quite all-right, for otherwise normal human communication would not be possible. The poet must use vagueness as one of his chief tools, and so does the mystic. The Veda calls the supreme deity *kavi*, poet, and the Greek word (verb) from which " poet " derives, *poiein*, means " to do," " to make." To put it facetiously, it was the poet who created language, or the magician, but certainly not the logician. But the early logician erred, because he derived his rules from grammar, and kept erring until he created a logical grammar—and this is

only a recent achievement, and again, a western achievement, though there have been some approximations in India, devoid of mutual alignment and organization—Buddhist Logic was keenly aware of the dangers of language and its ambiguity—Dharmakīrti pondered all his life about it; 12 centuries after him, the Brahmins of Mithila and Navadvip became anxious again.

Sanskrit is slightly better off than Greek and Latin. But perhaps just because it was incidental, the importance of its ambiguities was not so systematically realized as in the West—though there not until the last 70 or 80 years. In European languages, derived as they are from Greek and Latin in their cultural parlance, there is but one word for "is," the 3rd person auxiliar of "to be." Now this word has what Stebbing and Russell call "systematic ambiguity" — it has two entirely different meanings and usages. The one is the copulative meaning, as in "Varānasi is a city of learning;" the other is the existential meaning, as in "there is treachery in this world." The existential meaning can alternately be expressed through the ugly word "exists". Russell once said that it is a shame on the face of humanity that this ambiguity had not been recognized in two thousand years of thought. When I said Sanskrit was incidentally better off, I was referring to the two words that exist in that language for "is," i.e. *asti* and *vartate*. The two are sometimes interchangeable, but their separate sememes provide an easy and natural tool for semantics in India at some

future date—*asti* of course would be the copula, *vartate* would have to be the logical index to existence. But this distinction was unfortunately never made, and like Aristotle and traditional western logic, Indian logicians never felt that nothing whatever followed to exist from *asti* or *bhavati* when used as copula. Take the *mahā-vākyam*, the chief doctrine of the *śruti* — "*aham brahmāsmi*", I am Brahman. "*Asmi*" here a copula, an equation of "I" and "Brahman"—the Vedāntācāryas have no doubt emphasized with tremendous elan the equational function of the *asmi*, but at the same time all of them, Śaṃkarācārya and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in particular, wrongly taught that the existence of Brahman followed from this *mahāvākyam* just like the existence of "I" (*aham*), when in fact the existence of neither follows from the *vākyam*, because the *asmi* is just no existential index, but purely copulative. In order to infer existence of Brahman and I from it, the *ṛṣi* would have to extend the *vākyam* and add a clause like "and Brahma is (= exists), and I am (= exist)"; here, the Jewish God for once was a better logician, for he calls himself Jahwe, I am That I am—though I doubt whether he was that on purpose. Brahmin tradition, however, would not be harmed at all by admitting this shortcoming, for the existence of Brahman and of I might be proved from other texts in abundance —but not from this *mahāvākyam* nor in fact from any of the four great dicta of the Vedānta, in all of which the auxiliary has copulative use.

It was the non-distinction between the two totally

different functions of "is" that made Aristotle and his followers for over 2000 years believe and teach that every proposition must be of the subject-predicate form; such an error follows from this non-distinction as a matter of course. The identical error is being kept up in India, where the distinction is not yet known or not yet heeded.

The central charge the Indian philosopher-theologian makes against the western thinker is that the latter does not seem to be concerned with "Truth". This charge is quite correct, but then due to weighty considerations the western philosopher has come to the conclusion that Truth with capital T is useless for him because it has no explicable meaning, or what works out to be the same, too many meanings. For the western logician, there are only "truths", spelt with capital T only when they stand after a fullstop. Truths are facts or events, or correct descriptions of things. The ideal of modern logic is to assign, if possible, one meaning only to one symbol; "truth" cannot stand for anything but these, and theology cannot be admitted through a back-door, due to the aforesaid pledge of the Sorbonne. Let it be quite clear, that "Truth" thus capitalized, viz. the translation of the Skr. *sat* or *satyam*, to the Hindu thinker means no fact or event of any kind, nor even some metaphysical *totum* of all facts and things and events, but it is a theological term only, denoting the Supreme Entity, the Absolute, a complete synonym of Brahman—in fact this synonymity is expressly declared

hundreds of times in the canonical text and the commentaries, but the heteronymity to "truth" as fact is of course nowhere mentioned, because truth as fact, or truth in the sense of modern semantics is just not the same word in Sanskrit—there are several words that would correspond to this, but *sat* and *satyam* simply do not. My scruples are therefore not directed against the ancients nor against the contemporary Hindu Pandit who does not use English—for he does not challenge western method for its lack of interest in capital "Truth"; it is the knowledge of English which in India usually stands in inverted proportion to the knowledge of Sanskrit—I am annoyed with the ever-growing brand of mongrel pundits, who have no longer the feel for Sanskrit, and who also do not realize the amount of sophistication necessary for putting Indian thought into western idiom correctly. Due to their lack of linguistic feeling, they seek for something in western thought which is no longer there, and quarrel with the western thinker because they can't find it. The western thinker must refuse to deal with "Truth" unless he is a declared theologian or a mystic, for the truths he is interested in are those which are discursively understood; capital Truth has the difficulty that it cannot be understood. It is a less professional but, when couched in English or any other European language, I think a surreptitious synonym for God, who is no longer the most important concern to the modern philosopher.

The next example of basic Indian jargon is the verb

"to know" and the noun "knowledge". Here the case is more delicate than in the last instance, for here it definitely goes back into the canonical texts themselves. The root in Skr. is *jñā*, cognate with Gr. *gno* as in *gignosko*, and Latin *cognosco* etc. There can be no doubt that the root originally meant "to know" in the ordinary, objective sense—to know an object in a realistic situation. But Brahmin speculation has develop a highly specialised meaning-complex around this root. In all Brahmin absolutistic speculation, the ultimate problem is the merger of the individual self with the absolute spirit, which merger is postulated either as partial or total in varying degrees according to the various schools. And the verb that has come to be employed to establish the link was our *jñā*, "to know"; it is by no means known why this has been so, but I would venture to say this was so for two reasons—first, it had been amply used in the ritual language of the *saṃhitā*-portion of the Veda and in the Brāhmaṇas, viz., in the concluding passages of each section, called *phalaśruti*, after the model "he who knows this to be so and so, will obtain this or that"; secondly, with the forest-*āśramas* and other hermitages growing in importance, and with study and contemplation gaining momentum, the activity of 'knowing' and the most frequent morpheme for it, *jñā*, was felt to be the noblest and hence the most adequate—for by that time thinking had become a nobler activity than doing. But this is hypothesis—and whatever the reason for this choice—its penetration took at least 500 years until it

was fully established—the fact remains that in metaphysical language, in the Brahmin tradition, *jñā*—had come to have an implied technical meaning, viz. "to be the same as," "to be identified with." The nominal derivative is *jñanam*, lit. 'knowledge'; as a speculative term it does not mean object knowledge, but a mental state of intuited identity with the *noumenon* experienced therein. But the ancient trick in the matter has been to use diffusely, in the same texts, the word *jñā*—in its pristine, simple sense of objective knowledge; I don't know whether this kind of "double-think" ever became conscious to its propounders—let us amicably presume it did not; which does not exonerate the modern savants who ought to know better. Take the *śruti* "*brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati*"—the Knower of Brahman is Brahman; here, the root *vid*—by analogy with *jñā*, has assumed the same ambiguity in a very early text. As a salutary device, similar to my previous suggestion to employ *asti* and *vartate* with separate intention, I would suggest to so distinguish *jānāmi* from *vedmi*, where philologically the latter would perhaps be more entitled to stand for the monistic complex, as it does in the *śruti* just mentioned; in English, there is only 'to know,' but in German, for instance, there is "kennen" and "wissen," the former linguistically cognate to *jñā*, the latter to *vid*.

Secondary derivatives have caused a lot of misinterpretation and one of them quite a bit of mischief into our day. There is the word *sarvajña*, and *sarvavit*, lit.

translated, it means omniscient, all-knowing. This epithet, in some *śruti* passages and much important *bhāṣya*-literature, especially with Vācaspati Miśra, Vidyārṇava, and at a later time, Vijñānabhikṣu—does not usually refer to the Absolute, which is its canonical referend—but to the person who has attained *jñanam*—i.e. who is in the state of the experience of oneness with the Absolute, in *kaivalya*. Now if we bear in mind that "*sarva*" is freely used as a synonym for *brahman* (as in the *mahāvākyam* "*sarvam khalvidam brahma*") it should be quite clear that *sarvajña* means nothing of the kind the Latin 'omniscient' means—for Latin in its theological usage, and through it, all European languages, employ 'omniscient' only for the Deity—omniscience being coextensive with the Christian concept of God. Now 'omniscient' does of course include knowledge of the atom and of non-Euclidean geometry; but the English-knowing Hindu philosopher wrongly infers therefrom, that *sarvajña* also implies such knowledge—of course it does not, if it is used to describe a *mukta*, a perfected soul who has realized identity with the Absolute. In short, *sarvajña* is a complete synonym of *brahmajña*, and nothing else, except when it is used as an epithet of the Absolute. A person who merits the scholastic description *sarvavit* has experienced oneness with *brahman*, but he knows nothing about Einstein or the quantum-theory, unless of course he has studied them as a mathematician or a physicist, with an additional, unrelated effort. True, the *śruti* uses such equivocality, *kiṃ jānan sarvaṃ vijānīyāt*—'knowing

which (c. f. *brahman*) he may know everything'—but we overcome this difficulty even as orthodox Hindus if we read with Ānandatīrtha '*kiṃ sarvamīti*,' i.e. understanding '*kim*' and '*sarvam*' to be of identical meaning as a kind of pedagogical pleonasm. The trouble with our present Hindu scholars is that they firmly believe a realized sage does know Einstein and Max Planck without having studied them, by virtue of his being *sarvajña*—a cross example to exhibit how important a semantic approach would be on the Indian philosophical scene.

The paradox that sounds obnoxious to the western student—that the preceptors of Indian philosophy wax eloquent over the ineffability of supreme knowledge, setting out to write volumes upon volumes on the unspeakable, indescribable—has its explanation in this very same equivocal use and should give no cause for ennui.

The corollary to this argument pattern is the orthodox Indian thinker's notion that all philosophizing is a means to an ulterior end—that end is eschatological, it is salvation, variously styled *mukti*, *mokṣa*, *apavarga*, *turīya*, and *nirvāṇa* for the Buddhists. Now of course there can be no complaint about such and similar hopes and aspirations so far as the philosophical layman is concerned—I don't think any western scholar would scoff at the desire for redemption common to all Indians and for that, to all religious people. But what he certainly criticizes is that the desire of the common man or of

the mystic should hold a *fortiori* for the philosopher qua philosopher. The enforced loyalty to the ultimate postulate of *mukti* right throughout all philosophizing has, I believe, jeopardized free speculation even where there was a will for it. The unchallenged view in Indian thought is that the ultimate concern of the philosopher is *mukti*, and that all logic and other disciplines are but ancillary to the ultimate goal of life. True, there have been philosophers in India who were most probably not interested in salvation when they wrote logic—whatever their private outlook might have been. Prof. Helmuth von Glasenapp told me that Immanuel Kant's, 'Critiques' were entirely *different* from his own little, square, private religion—for outside his professional work as a philosopher, he seems to have been a good and fairly simple protestant. It seems Gautama and Kannada, and the new Nyāya philosophers could hardly have felt that *mokṣa* was the aim of their logic—though of course they said it was, putting the traditional eulogy at the beginning as a kind of formal invocation ; one gets this feeling right at the beginning of such outstanding logical works as the Siddhānta Muktāvali. This institutionalized panegyry often sounds unconvincing and naive, and yet its naivete prevents a western student from calling it intellectually dishonest. The idea that *mokṣa* is the *summum bonum* and hence the only real concern of the best man, is very ancient, and its extension into purely scholastic pursuits understandable. But what is old is not necessarily good, even in philosophy—homage to the antique should not imply suspen-

sion of criticism ; I somehow cannot bring myself to think that teachers like Gaṅgeśa, Śriharṣa, or Śrivallabha should really have believed that their logical interest was subservient to their desire for *mukti*.

We must now proceed to the critique of Indian ethics. Analogously with logic, there has been no really secular ethical speculation in India--not even the lawgiver-patriarchs like Manu and Parāśara, whom I regard as non-secular legalists, not as teachers of moral science. In spite of my predilection for logic, I readily admit that ethics is a more important study than logic in the universe of culture. It is for this reason that I am more concerned about the lack of philosophical ethics in Indian Thought. Theological method is common to India and the West—in the West, where doctrine about the Divine is dealt with. Theological ethics, or ethics bound up with religion as its constant reference, is a theological discipline and has no place in philosophy, whose pursuit is secular, and an end in itself. C. D. Broad distinguishes between teleological and deontological ethics—those who hold a life to be morally good in which good actions and attitudes are motivated by some ulterior purpose—are teleological moralists, regardless whether their ulterior purpose be the achievement of a saturated bank-account, or *mukti*. Those who see good deeds as deeds without any ulterior motive whatever--secular or religious, as intrinsically fitting, are called deontological moralists by the Cambridge professor. Quite evidently, then, all theological or

religious morality is also teleological, and theological Indian thought has always been : the idea of an action that is good in itself could not be understood by an orthodox Indian thinker, because the goodness of an action or an attitude can be gauged solely by its conduciveness to *mukti* in the long run. For the Hindu, the Buddhist, and the Jain alike; that action is good which either leads toward *mukti*, or which does not deflect from the path towards *mukti*, and that is less good in the degree in which it diverts from the ultimate pursuit. The Indian theologian, like other theologians in the world, has never been interested in good actions as actions for their own sake—I have observed and tested that the pundit is not able to understand the phrase 'good for its own sake' in the sense western ethics uses the phrase.

Now if I want to know why an action A is morally better than an action B, and if I am told that A is better because it either conduces to *mukti* or does not disturb our efforts towards *mukti*, and B is not so good because it does the contrary, then I am not being told anything about the action, nor about its ethical merit, but I am told something about *mukti*, which had not been my question. The answer, therefore, is not a philosophical and not an ethical answer, but a theological one. Ethics is a secular science, which had its roots in the reaction against popular and sacerdotal religion and cult, in Greece. In India, on the other hand, the reaction against ritualism was not ethical, but mystical. This is an important point—the reactions incidentally

took place in both parts of the world at approximately the same time : of the two possible reactions against sacerdotism and ritualism, the West has chosen or chanced upon ethics, the East, particularly India, upon mystical practice and its speculative counterpart, metaphysics. Just as I am sure mystical knowledge is an Eastern discovery, I am just as sure that ethics, as yet, has been an entirely western concern. Christianity blurred the issue to an extent, for its samaritanism and its good deeds have been employed as standing examples for ethical speculation. There have been ethicists who were also Christians, not because they were Christians, but in spite of it. Christian ethics is a contradiction in terms just like Hindu ethics, because their method is theological, not philosophical—and ethics is a discipline under the philosophical chair. Usurping it for theology is not justifiable at any time, because there is such a thing as a patent for a philosophical term—ethics has first been a philosophical term and if theology tries to use it, it is sheer plagiarism.

Except for Christianity, however, the West has had a real ethical tradition just like India has had a real mystical tradition—(in the West; there never was an unbroken mystical tradition, there were sporadic mystics, usually seen as on the fringe of heresy). That ethics is a thoroughly western discipline, accounts for the lack of an equivalent Indian lexeme, though there are many attempts on today by Indian lexicographers to create a word—eventually it may be found, but we hear '*nitiśāstra*' frequently quoted as

the equivalent, which is entirely wrong; it is wrong for the same reason for which I deny Manu and Parāśara the title of ethicists; so are *dharma, vinaya,—caritra*—etc.

If Carvāka had written more, or if more works of his ancient school were extant, then, paradoxically enough, they might have supplied an ethical teaching—for an ethical doctrine must be autonomous which it cannot be so long as the religious preceptor must be consulted in the end. Carvāka's votaries might have developed an hedonistic or eudaimonistic world-view, had they not been overwhelmed entirely by the mightly spiritual predilection of Indian thought. This line was taken up by the late M. N. Roy, who liked to call himself, facetiously I believe, a modern Carvāka, but who did not succeed as his interests and associations were political rather than scholastic.

In aesthetics, however, the western scholar will have to bow low before the achievements of the ancient Indian thinkers.

Aesthetics is a descriptive discipline like ethics—just as ethics tries to find meāning and application for such words as 'good,' 'morally fitting,' etc., esthetics tries to find a meaning for words like 'beautiful,' 'nice,' 'elegant,' etc. Esthetics is not the criticism of art, but the criticism of taste. It must be said that the modern Hindu thinker's esthetic insight is poor. Perhaps it cannot be helped that good Hindus, be they labourers or university-teachers, fill their walls uncritically and naive-

ly with reams of those atrocious oleographs depicting the Hindu pantheon, nor that women use these as icons for their daily worship; that is another chapter. But what must be challenged from a scholarly or philosophical viewpoint is the attitude of the Indian thinker who endorses this all-India scandal and who finds reasons for its continuation. India created the loveliest works of art, and in breath-taking quantities; also, she created an entirely unique system of aesthetical thought, the theory of *rasa*; up to this day, she has the best dancers and traditional musicians—but along with these, those multicoloured abominations fill the land. What are the reasons for this state of affairs? Well, on the social, political, economical side there are many including the bad influence of the Christian missionary and of British puritanism, to which great Indians, like Tilak, Vivekānanda, and Gāndhi unwarily succumbed when they began to feel and to propagate compunctions about the sensuous *joi de vivre* exhibited in ancient Indian literature, sculpture, and painting. I think the chief reason for their denigration of that deep, almost unfathomable element in the constitution of the traditional Indian mind was expedience—political and social: the enormous complexities of Indian thought which had been offering both rigid asceticism and exuberant, controlled indulgence as means of mystical realization and experience, the tantric tradition which had been running as a parallel current with the denial of the senses as media of spiritual practice—this complexity did not seem desirable, or it was too complex for the new

puritan. The line of teachers in this renaissance, starting with Rammohun Roy in Bengal and lasting through Vinoba Bhave today, stressed the ascetic aspect of Hindu thought, chose the simplest among the vast bulk of Indian doctrine—especially the Bhagavadgitā, and used puritanical language for its sermon, no doubt, influenced by pre-Victorian English with which they had first been acquainted at school and which lingered in all they spoke and wrote, even when they taught in their vernacular.

* * *

Philosophy in the modern critical sense is not to be found in *darśana*-literature; but it is found in other categories of literature, in fact, in almost all the literary genres of the Indian tradition. The extraordinary and certainly true notion of the Indians has always been that whatever is to be known, must be learnt from a special *śāstra* or from a specially qualified preceptor or *ācārya*, whether that is the knowledge of the Supreme Spirit or the art of love-making. In Śūdraka's Mṛchchakaṭikā, a thief comes on the scene, and before he sets out to enter the house in which he wants to do his day's labour, he invokes the tradition of teachers going back to the God Indra, who has, among numerous other portfolios, that of the preceptor of thieves and robbers.

In spite of my acerbous tone in cultural criticism, I believe that the Indian concept of tradition is one of the most marvellous cultural concepts anywhere. The Sanskrit word for tradition is *parampara* lit. that which goes

from the far to the yet farer — conceived in both temporal extensions. Now the fact is, that with regard to *paramparā*, the Indians have really proved of unmatched endurance. In the field of art, thought, worship, and the elegant life, wherever these were still in the fore, there was an entirely unbroken tradition noticeable, going back to some mythical inception and persevering in vestiges today. This can easily be traced by the scholar in the fields of thought and the *belles lettres*. In the field of art, as well as in more intimate fields, the *paramparā* can be apprehended only with a particular intuition which the outsider has to train himself for. Let us watch a performance of Bharata Nāṭyam in some temple in South India ; and then compare with it, say, a ballet performed by The Royal Ballet in Covent Garden — a ballet depicting some Euripidian drama or another ancient episode. There is a basic difference. Apart from techniques, settting, costume, music, etc., I feel the main difference lies in the fact that the Indian performance has an organic link with the past — look at the pillars and walls in the surrounding temple, the sculptures show the identical dance-scenes, even the dancers look very much like those on the walls in stone. Flesh or stone, they invoke Śiva and Śakti, the divine preceptors of the art, and it is genuine worship, genuine involvement, not just a part of the performance ; the entire performance is ritual — that is why it has its most fitting stage inside the temple. In the West, in spite of the most magnificent execution, you somehow feel what an amount of choreography has gone into it, how hard it is to get

things together — and you have the feeling of a highly intelligent, but a highly laboured opus. The concept of *paramparā* in philosophical writing, and in mystical practice, is a *conditio sine qua non.* Almost every Upaniṣad, and in fact every canonical text, and every commentator, commences the work with the *guru – paramparā*, or concludes it with this enumeration of the line of teachers that have preserved and elaborated the basic idea. Hence, the reverence for the *ācārya*, the *guru*, the preceptor — be he a dancing-master or a spiritual guide ; the *śloka*, known to every sophisticated Hindu in every line of cultural activity, says *gurur brahmā gurur viṣṇur gurur devo maheśvaraḥ, gurureva sākṣād brahma, tasmai śrī gurave namaḥ* – i. e. the *guru* is verily Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, he is truly the personified Absolute, obeisance to the *guru.*

It might be held that the idea of *paramparā* is a mere convention, a formality. This is not true. The Indian thinker rests completely in the *paramparā*, he feels safe and secure in it, he builds on something that has a strong psychological foundation. He is just the opposite of the existentialist philosopher in the West, who wants to start afresh every moment. The permanent heart-ache of the western thinker is his constant doubt about his own originality. He must contribute something, else he feels his work is futile. The Indian thinkers never had such qualms, nor such ambition — they would say their job is *paramparā-rakṣā* — preserving the tradition. Of course, this has its parallel in Christian theology — but only

there in the realm of western thought ; in India, it is all-pervading, philosophy is just a species under the genus *paramparā*.

The second unparalleled notion, particular to Indian philosophy and mysticism, is what is meant by the term *adhikāra-bheda*. The term is tremendously old, we find it in Yāska's commentary on the *saṃhitā*. Literally, it means "difference in right," but of course in no legal sense whatever ; *adhikāra* means the right to do a certain thing, right in the sense of entitlement through capacity. Now this refers most definitely, though of course it has never been so formulated, to the psychical and somatic constitution of the individual, just as it refers to (this is the traditional definition) the area of scholastic and ritualistic practice to which a person is entitled by his birth. This has often been challanged by Indian reformers — Buddha and Mahavira were perhaps the first who challenged it, and M. Gandhi the most recent. The impatient western view-point, too, can hardly accept the dictum that a person is entitled to study a particular branch of learning, or prevented from doing so, by the fact of his birth into a higher or a lower caste ; viewed from this angle, *adhikāra-bheda* has often led to fatuous excrescences – but so did the western Freigeist, and it would be a barren endeavour to show which of the two has done more harm.

But the really interesting side of the *adhikāra-bheda* concept is that it assigns adequate methods to differently constituted individuals, a thing western scholasticism and

western mysticism alike have never systematically propounded. The matter is most evident in the *sādhanā*-complex, as meditation and worship. There is no one method or content of meditation, but there are a definite number of meditation-patterns, or models. The job of the individual aspirant is to find out at first, into which of them he can fit — and the preceptor being an experienced psychologist — the *lakṣaṇas* or criteria of a *guru* often sound like a poetic paraphrase of a projective test — it is his duty to initiate the disciple into the meditation which alone fits him. Hence, the stress on the *gurukula*, the 'clan of the teacher'—they have to stay together for a long time just to establish transference — a sort of prolonged psychoanalysis.

In order to bring the meaning of *adhikāra-bheda* into relief, I shall exemplify it through the two most radically opposed *sādhanās* and show how it works with them. There is, on the one end, the *gāyatrī-mārga* ; it is the most orthodox method of contemplation, theoretically prescribed for every Brahmin. Its core is the *Gāyatrī-Mantra* of the Ṛgveda, which has the first place among all Vedic texts ; in translation it sounds a bit trivial like most extremely sacred texts — it is an invocation to the supreme deity to enlighten the mind with right knowledge and to incite it to work toward right knowledge. Around this *mantra*, for 50 years or more, the Brahmin has to arrange his multifarious ritualistic and meditative practices. If he succeeds — and that of course requires tremendous endurance — he gradually frees himself from worldly

desire and achieves *mukti* at the end of his life. There is nothing spectacular about this well-used path, but I should say it is the most typically Indian path. I have often noticed the chagrin with which orthodox Brahmins, particularly in South India where the tradition is the purest, talk about the various methods of yoga and other esoteric disciplines, all of which is new-fangled and redundant to them, they despise it in their heart of hearts, no such extra-curricular efforts are necessary, they would say, to achieve *mukti* — he who does the duties prescribed by his *dharma*, i. e. the regulations that obtain for his caste, achieves *mukti* when all is over. But it is understood that only the twice born has the right to the *Gāyatrī-sādhanā*, for it is the *adhikāra* for the twice-born.

The other extreme is the Śākta meditation, which belongs to the tantric tradition, and which centres on the deity conceived as Power and as Woman, the cosmic Dynamis. In its most extreme forms, it involves the use of such *padārthas* or ceremonial ingredients as meat, wine, and sexual intercourse, often extra-marital. Now these *padārthas* are taboo for the Brahmin, and so is the type of meditation that goes with it. Tantric Orders will not accept Brahmins, and Brahmins would not join them. The various left-handed tantric meditations and rites, fraught though they are with sundry physical and psychical dangers, are supposed to lead to the goal in a very short time — this is what most Brahmins will readily admit, owning also that their Gāyatrī-meditation takes incomparably longer time to fructify. But then he pre-

supposes a distinct spiritual capacity, which he would explain through metempsychosis on the basis of the accepted axiology ; which really does not matter even when viewed from the standpoint of modern critical thought — metempsychosis is a heuristic explanation, and provided it serves its purpose — i. e. the transcending of normal consciousness, its value cannot be impugned.

I have just mentioned the word *padārtha*, and would emphasize its unique significance. It means, I used the word above, an 'ingredient,' i. e. an item necessary for the realization of the aim set for any particular ritualistic observance and for any *sādhanā*. The use of a generic term like '*padārtha*' is psychologically very sound — for without it the variety of items could not be subsumed in an individual's mind as belonging to his *sādhanā*. Take such variegated things into account as — the *mantra*, the seat on which you meditate, the place where you worship, the idol, the rosary, all the manifold accessories of the Hindu formal worship, but then breath-control (*prāṇāyāma*), *ghī* (melted butter), *mudrā** (hand-postures or a cereal aphrodisiac), various articles of food, sexual union in the lefthanded rites, — all these are *padārthas* ; in no European language is there a term that would comprehend objects of such enormous difference — the lack is simply due to the lack of a mystical tradition in the West, to which I referred in my former lectures. The West is often puzzled by what seems to it the contradiction in spiritual

* In the Buddhist Vajrayāna *mudrā* (tib. *phyag rgya*) means the female partner or adept in erotocentric *sādhanā*.

and philosophical matters, the paradoxes of Indian religious practice. The answer to it — an answer which does not of course mean anything to the lay westerner because with the word he lacks the concept — lies in the Indian notion of the *padārtha*, deeply ingrained in all traditional *sādhanā* in India.

The reason why western intellectuals during the last 100 years have turned away from Christianity, seeking their consolation either in purely academical pursuits or in art or in esoteric organizations that have been shooting up like mushrooms in the West, often with an eye to eastern models, is that with the increase of discursive knowledge and interest the acceptance of dogma became less and less possible. Now within the Christian denominations, the emphasis on dogma varies widely ; the oldest church, the Roman Catholic creed, puts the greatest stress on dogmas, and from the original seven a rather large host of supplementary dogmas and minor articles of faith have accumulated. Now in India, there has never been any such thing as a dogma in the Christian or Islamic sense — which could be defined as an article of faith which is obligatory, and the denial of or formulated disbelief in which would automatically bar one from the fold.

We have to see whether there is anything in India which in its general effect would be an analogue to the Mediterranean type of dogma. There is very little of it. There is, in fact, but one belief, that is common to all religions, and fundamentally so, which have originated

in India — i. e. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism : that is the idea of metempsychosis, of the necessity of rebirth and of the final possibility of release from this necessity. Except for the infamous Carvāka, there has been no thinker, seer, or religious teacher in India who did not take rebirth for granted. One does often wonder how ever so critical minds never got the idea of challenging this axiom — well, as philosophers it is not our job to speculate upon the reasons that might have been underlying this general axiom — the question has to be dealt with by an anthropologically oriented history — there are several hypotheses about the matter. In addition to this one belief which is common to all Indian-originated religions, Hinduism has as one second item the acceptance of the Vedic authority — but that is all. Apart from it, even if we call these two things dogmas, the odium of compulsion has somehow never really adhered to them. There have been some later *ācāryas*, who virtually denied rebirth, or denied it the importance it was otherwise given — I am thinking mainly of the author of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, a work of the 10th century probably — who says it is fools only who pay any heed to the various speculations on rebirth. And as to the acceptance of Vedic authority — well, the scope of individual interpretation is unlimited, and the teachers of India have always found means to establish the link between their ideas and the canonical texts.

I found that this last statement feels frivolous to the western theologian, but I don't think it is. The Indian

is a born heretic, if the word is understood in the western, i. e. the Christian sense. The Christian mind feels the non-existence of an all-valid interpretation of Indian scriptures to be a lack, just as he feels the non-existence of a Hindu Church to be a shortcoming. In a way, it is— strong organizations vouch for an average degree of discipline, whereas discipline has been left to the individual in India's scholastic and monastic tradition — early Buddhism and the *sangha* were the one great exception; yet I believe that one of the reasons why Buddhism did not stay in the country of its birth, was just the rigour of the *sangha* -- the idea of a church is unpalatable to the Indian mind. I think in this age of political collectivism and totalitarianism, the kind of free individualism Indian thinkers before 1800 have always lived and propounded, would be a way out of the mire of anxiety and hopelessness.

I have indicated that the Indians developed a unique theory of aesthetic value. The theory of *rasa* has nothing faintly equivalent in any part of the western tradition. What is *rasa*? It literally means 'juice,' 'taste.' Its technical meaning, however, became 'aesthetic sentiment,' and Indian poetics, literary criticism, music, dance, sculpture, even philosophy, took in *rasa* as one of the inescapable criteria. Even the logicians of the *Navya Nyāya* call themselves *rasika*, dry though their speculations may seem. Yet, the term is appropriate, for anything exciting, like intellectual keenness, the joy of discursive thought and solution, the pleasure the mathematician feels in

tackling intricate problems — and the problems themselves — all these come under *rasa* — or *rasa* can be predicated of them, if they are to stand traditional criticism.

The exalted usage of the word is very old indeed. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad of the Black Yajurveda says *raso vai saḥ* — "He (i. e. the Brahman) is *rasa*." The concept of *rasa* again is a glue that ties the most divergent things together into a system of specified progress — in our Vedic and Tantric juxtaposition, it is *rasa* that gives aesthetic value both to solitary ascetic life, and to controlled sense indulgence as visualized and practised in the tantric schools.

I think introducing the term *rasa* into western critical apparatus would help to solve the main mystery of mystical literature there as well : the Song of Solomon in the Old Testament, the erotic allusions used in the language of the mediaeval mystics of Germany and Spain — much of the scholastic, anti-mystical bent in the West did not find a place for that language within its religious expression.

The *rasa* theory, and its application as a stylistic criterion has given poetic merit to the driest of scholastic literature. It was only in India that grammarians succeeded in writing grammars that make beautiful reading, as did the works of the great commentators. How desirable it would have been for the great German philosophers to have an equivalent theory, is felt by anyone who has had to read Kant and Fichte in the original — doing

which has once elicited the words 'how lucky Kant was not to have to read Kant' from a renown critic.

But undoubtedly the most unique contribution of India to the world is yoga in its wider sense — not the philosophical system that has the name, the fourth of the six systems of the Brahmanical tradition -- there is hardly anything novel in it, it being a direct take-over more or less, of Sāṁkhya speculations. The innovation upon Sāṁkhya is that a personal God *Īśvara* is introduced as a possible object of meditation. Old commentators frequently don't distinguish Patāñjali's yoga from Sāṁkhya as a philosophical system -- the old Sāṁkhya is called *nirīśvara*, Patāñjali's yoga *seśvara-sāṁkhya* by many of them.

But the universal importance Patāñjali's work is bound to gain in not too distant a future, lies in its practical discipline, and it can be said without exaggeration that he was the preceptor of systematized, variegated, teleologically well-defined meditation. The first *sūtra* of his work gives the gist of all yogic praxis — i. e. *Yogaścittavṛtti-nirodhaḥ* — "yoga is the blocking of the discursive functions of the mind." The joint efforts of all western psychology, analytical and therapeutic, of the last 80 years seem to point toward an ideal state of mind such as Patāñjali had conceived 2000 years ago. We have to be cautious, however, of the enthusiasm for all things Indian, and especially for yoga, shared by an ever-increasing number of disillusioned occidentals. I don't think yoga is the panacea for all modern evils including

the nuclear threat and political indoctrination. But I do think that yoga — like all Indian thought-products has a tremendously important potential for the individual in the West, wavering between cynicism and neurosis. The beauty of yoga-praxis is that it does not at all require any set of beliefs to support it. Here the momentous distinction between the prophet and the seer comes in – there have been no prophets in India, though there have been seers. No Indian teacher ever claimed from his pupils that his own beliefs should be shared by them -- he showed a method of meditation, controlled its progress, and there his function ended, and he knew it. Patāñjali, however, went a step farther — he taught that no objective truth whatever followed from the mystical experience of the individual adept, no even from that of a group of adepts who have similar experiences. The prophets of the Mediterranean traditions — Jewish, Christian, and Muslim alike -- were bad philosophers and their speculative flaws had to be tarnished by subsequent generations of logicians. The prophet is he who believes and teaches, and insists on the belief in his votaries, that his mystical experiences prove or show some objective existence -- f. i. that from the fact of his having seen God, or from the fact of his having talked to an angel, the existence of God or angel followed. Modern analytical philosophy propounds the theme that experience not shared by a compresent majority of cognitive minds, nor shareable by it, does not confer existential status on the contents of that experience. Patāñjali and his followers put it much simpler when they taught that the *iṣṭam* — i. e. the divine

form chosen for meditation has but the role of a landmark and that any statement about it apart from its function as such an object is futile. Thus, yoga would show a singular way of religion without the possibility of fanaticism -- for fanaticism follows from prophecy in due course.

The last idea that lacks parallel in the West is that of *samanvaya*, i. e. reconciliation of diverging philosophical views. It is what I am trying to formulate in contemporary terminology, as syncretism -- as opposed to eclecticism, which means building a new system out of patches of older ones. *Samanvaya* never tries to persuade others to accept any particular code, but tries to find the speculative instrument of philosophical understanding between the different schools. Our contemporary philosophers' attempt to create a universal scientific system of symbols, a language that would convey identical notions to the historian, say, and the mathematician, is a real attempt at *samanvaya*. But what is more important, *samanvaya* is ethically sound – it is a unique practice in philosophical good-will.

* * *

The last section of this chapter tries to adumbrate the one attempt done in traditional India, to create a method for intellectual thought through theologically unhampered logical tools. Professor Ingalls* of Harvard has pre-

---

* D. H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic*, Harvard Oriental Series Vol. 40, Cambridge, Mass., 1951. A more specialized follow-up by way of

viously written an introduction to the material produced by the School. Only Mahāyāna Buddhist logic of Dharmakīrti's variety, is a match for the acumen of Navya Nyāya doctrine, in the Indian tradition ; both together would form a methodological transition to an indigenous modern Indian logic.

Navya Nyāya means literally "the new logic." It is juxtaposed with, or rather, it reforms the *prācīna* or ancient Nyāya, or still more precisely, it is the name given to a new phase in the development of Brahmin logic, i. e. the phase that was inaugurated by the Nayāyikās' anxiety about and their vindication in face of Śrīharṣa's formidable attack.

The Nyāya is the only school of logic in the Brahmin tradition, and is listed first among the six philosophical systems. This does not indicate any supremacy *vis-a-vis* the other systems -- in fact the Indian tradition often places the inferior item first, arranging the subsequent items in an ascending scale of merit, topped by the item which the specific school holds to be the best, superseding the preceding ones — but it certainly does indicate its methodical importance. There has been no logical argument in India, which did not presuppose familiarity with

---

interpreting Navya Nyāya logic in modern logico-analytical terms was made by a student of Prof. Ingalls, Prof. Karl H. Potter, in his translation, edition, and investigation of *The Padārthatattvanirūpanam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi*, Harvard—Yenching Institute Studies No. XVII, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, which I reviewed in *Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger* (Germany), Vol. XI/8, 1958.

Nyāya, if not as a total system of thought, at least as a basis for dialectical skill and terminology.

The *Nyāya-sūtras*, ascribed to a mythical seer Gautama belong to the category of *śāstra*, like the *Brahma-sūtras* or the *śrauta*-texts. They are certainly very old, and some western scholars place them to about 200 years earlier than the Buddha, Indian scholars would add another two or three centuries in their estimate, thus making them almost contemporary with the oldest Upaniṣads by occidental estimate.

Just as the *sūtras* of all lines of traditional thought have their manifold exegeses, so have the *Nyāya-sūtras*, in Nyāya-Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, who seems to have flourished in the 2nd century A. D., a somewhat younger contemporary of Nāgārjuna. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa was perhaps acquainted with the Mādhyamika-Kārikā philosophy, judging from his somewhat supercilious hints about the Buddhist heretics and their logic based on *śūnya*. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *kārikas* are the standard commentary of the old Nyāyā.

The Navya-Nyāya tradition commenced in Mithila, not too far from the Buddhist university of Nalanda, on the northern side of the river. The competition between the three centres — Nalanda of the Buddhists, Mithila of the Brahmins, and Vaiśāli of the Jains — was keen for centuries, providing a model for dispute training even among the Tibetan scholastics. Today, the three institutes have been revivified by the Indian authorities and have begun to flourish.

Owing to certain intrigues within the folds of the Mithila scholars,. the centre shifted away from the place into Navadvīp in Bengal, around the end of the 17th century, and ever since the school has been known as Navadvīp school of logic.

However, and in spite of the fact that its revolutionary character was realized by the logicians all over India, its adherence remained somewhat parochial, and its techniques are hardly used outside the fold of the Navadvīp-cum-Mithila pundits in India. Also, the ultimate loyalty of the Hindu pundit, even if he is a logician, is to some school or the other within the Vedānta complex, and one has the feeling that logic is hardly pursued by anyone today for its own sake in India.

I shall now evaluate some of the salient points of the new Nyāya literature and compare them with relevant themes in contemporary western logic. I select the place of induction and reasoning, as this is a comparatively succinct topic and it yields itself well enough to our comparison ; and of course, logic like any other topic should be viewed from the standpoint of latest research in the subject. It goes without saying, that enormous advance has been made in this subject in western countries during the last 50 years — applying its results as criteria of comparative examination is but fair.

Reformed Nyāya arose through Gangeśācārya's magnificent critique of Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, which in its turn had been aimed at refuting Udayana's logical optimism as voiced in the latter's *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. In

a sophisticated survey, the laurel should certainly go to Śrīharṣa in the total complex, not so much for his acute criticism, but for his philosophical impartiality -- for he probably was the first Hindu thinker who philosophized for the sake of philosophizing, and showed that this is a separate, intellectual enterprise with no bearing, negative or positive, on scholastic or theological loyalties.

The most exciting thing about Navya-Nyāya seems to me their perpetual adherence and elaboration of their ancient axiom that reason is no instrument of knowledge at all, that it is just a kind of accessory, and its function purely heuristic. Udayana's term for inductive reasoning is *āhāryāropa*, which Professor S. Bagcchi interpreted well enough as 'imaginary assumption.' Udayana holds valid induction has some kind of cognitive, though indefinite status as a logical instrument. Udayana made persistent use of the rubric-term *tarkayāmi* in logical parlance, and that exactly corresponds to the occidental use of the Cartesian stock-in-trade *specie argumenti* — 'for argument's sake.'

Modern logicians may feel embarrassed about the stereotype of the Nayāyikas' *paradigmata* — their partiality to fire and smoke, lakes and mountains resembles the western philosophers' conspicuous love for furniture — and has its Indian thematic parallel in the snake and the rope in metaphysical speculation, — but the greater cause for misgivings is that they seem to illustrate the basic idea that there are only subject-predicate propositions -- and it is almost certain that Indian logicians, with the

exception of the Buddhists, shared this shortcoming with Aristotle's logic, by convergence. However, it seems to me that primitive syllogistic inference was not the main interest of the new Nayāyikas — ; their focal point was ascription of its particular logical status to each proposition.

Udayana and most of his fellow logicians thought that hypothetical inference and judgment constitute the essence of inductive reasoning -- which is true in a way – and in the way of traditional formal logicians of the west, they tend to have doubts about the logical status of and about the formal validity of inductive reasoning. Navya Nyāya realized that the inclusion of hypothetical judgment into the category of formally valid judgments was but a linguistic legerdemain, and that their enumeration along with categorical judgments was logically unjustifiable.

Now, of course, the fact is that categorical judgments of the universal type are hypothetical in the last analysis— a discovery of modern logic : we cannot really be angry with Udayana and Gaṅgeśa for not having read Russell. But the important achievement of the Indian logicians of the reformed Nyāya was that they were keenly aware of the pitfalls of language, and of the necessity of linguistic analysis separate from grammatical ruling.

We can now see how Navya Nyāya improved upon the older school in the definitive distinction between hypothetical judgment and error -- which had been highly unsatisfactory in old Nyāya. True, the phenomenon of

āropa is there in both — but I think it is a psychological phenomenon rather than a logical one ; the erring person is not aware of attributing an invalid predicate to a subject — whereas in the case of *āhāryāropa* the ascription of an invalid, or uncertain predicate to the subject is conscious.

Now the definition of this 'assumption' initiated through the rubric *tarkayāmi* is as acute as could be —

sva-viruddha-dharma-dharmita-avacchedakaṃ
sva-prakārakam-jñānam-āhāryam,

i. e. a judgment which has an attribute as its predicate, whose contradiction is known as a true determination of the subject.

Our new logicians were aware that reasoning involved complex judgments, but the idea that a complex judgment was something qualitatively different from a simple or a single judgment does not seem to have occured to them ; references to the complexity of judgments (such words as *vikīrṇa* and *vistrita* are used) are frequent no doubt, but their occurrence is sporadic and unsystematized. Navya-Nyāya was initially not aware of the numerous logical forms of propositions ; I believe that had the idea of *vikīrṇatā* or *vistāra* been systematically elaborated or even merely arranged, Indian logic might well have presaged the dicta of contemporary western logic by three centuries. Their tools were as acute as those of modern logic though they were not so sophisticated, and from a modern view-point, the lack of sophistication is certainly held against them, just as it is held against Aristotelian logic.

In historical merit, I believe the Navya-Nayāyikas' views about the value of inductive reasoning lies somewhere between Mill and modern logic — they argue better than Mill, but not quite as well as contemporary logic ; and the reason for the latter seems to me that the Indian logicians were hampered by the triviality of the paradigmata they used — I cannot work this idea in this frame, but there seems to be good reason that naive instances mar progressive argument, and that the famous 'Socrates is a philosopher' has been accountable for much retardation in western thought. The Indian logician will have to abandon the lake, the mountain, the fire, and the smoke.

Probability, which has been one of the most controversial themes of late in western thought, does not seem to have been allotted a status separate from that of hypothetical assertion – both the concepts appear to be subsumed under *sambhāvanā*. Udayana assigns to it almost complete force as a proof of non-contradiction, in which he would come close to Professor Kneale, the doyen of British probability theory.

There are a few works in India that have had a revolutionary character much in the way of the Kantian Critiques. Gaṅgeśa's Nyāyatattvacintāmani is one of them. His treatment of *vyāptigraha* (induction) is succinct and pellucid. He shows its main function to be the *reduction ad absurdum* of the wrong one of two alternative propositions. Very much like Stebbing and Russell, he teaches a plurality of causes in any causal

nexus, where the older Nyāya believed in a one-one relation of cause and effect.

It is interesting to note in conclusion that more recent Nayāyikas, as for instance Mathuranātha taught that knowledge gained by induction is of a perceptual rather than of an inferential character. In a way, the Indian controversy between those who give an inferential ticket to inductive argument and those — fewer in number and importance — who concede a perceptual character to it, is analogous to the contemporary dispute about logical constructions, or logical fictions. It now remains to be seen whether the new Nayāyikas trees and lakes and smoke are meant by them to convey symbols for hard data, for sensa, or whether they already are the Russellian Constructions. Such interest must open an entirely fresh field of comparative study, and of course it will require students who are equally conversant with Sanskrit as they are with contemporary western logic — a case for truly cosmopolitan academia.

CHAPTER IV

THE PHILOSOPHICAL OUTLOOK : INDIA AND THE WEST

When an occidental sets about studying Indian thought, he feels nearly always convinced that it is uncritical. When compared with what at least the academical occident professes as philosophy, there is no doubt that this is true. It is by now a tritism that India is basically traditional in her philosophy. Here, philosophy is still either the *ancilla theologiae* or it is not even recognized as a separate pursuit. There has been much and not always pleasant eloquence on the side of the pundits, and their denigration of the critical thinker haunts the scene of Indian Thought today. I believe there would be less personal venom if the lay public in so far as it is interested in philosophical problems which are neither patented nor even the prerogative of the learned, would keep a somewhat more respectful distance when the dispute is on; I also believe in inviting an ever increasing laity to concern itself with these problems, though with more sobriety than hitherto displayed. I have criticized the popularizers of philosophical and theological problems at many places. There are some of the kind in the west, too, but they do not usually command more respect than that given to good reporters and journalists. Here in India, however, those popularizers have been the objects

of unanimous praise, because, like myself, they were also fond of fancy-dress; thence it comes that a nation that owns very much and acute intelligence and a keen zest for enquiry has, in the last century, given in to the temptation of meddling with discourse which ought to be somehow standardized. The time is only just over when Swami Vivekananda's enthusiastic writings were texts at Indian universities; yet the wishful thought lingers on that arming oneself with the output of the Swami and of a subsequent host of similar popularizers entitles one to umpireship between the orthodox pundit and the critical philosopher. However, it does not.

A comparative survey like the one we intend here and can necessarily touch just a few typical features, must ostracize a most treacherous philological error — the error that has spread veritable hatred between good people, between the pundit and the philosopher. It was Prof. Max Muller, punned into *mokṣa-mūla* by our pun-loving friends, who did the mischief many years ago, when Indology was an entirely novel craze. He did it quite unintentionally, due to his lack of information. He had never been a field-worker, for as against the notion current in this country even amongst well-informed scholars, Muller never set foot in India. Had he come, he might have revised and corrected his lexicographical howler : the howler that translated *darśana* by "philosophy," and *vice versa*. When a pundit thunders against "philosophy", he does so because he thinks it to mean *darśana* when he finds no trace of *darśana* in it; and

indeed it is anything but that, and lacks all criteria of *darśana* as a matter of course. As it is, neither etymology nor usage warrants any such translation. "*Darśana*" derives from the root "*dṛś*" (Gr. *deik-nymi* etc.) which means to see, to perceive, and *darśana* means precisely what western tradition would call theology *and* mysticism; I stress *and* because the two have never been different things in India; they have served as instruments of mutual proof, whereas in the Judaeic, Christian, and Islamic West the two were separate and viewed each other with eternal suspicion or contempt. "Philosophy", on the contrary, at least in the connotation it has gained by now, is very different from these — it tends to defy traditional lore as proofs for anything, and it tries to keep out mysticism at least consciously, though there are quite a few exceptions to the latter clause at this very time in Continental thought.

It might then be asked if there is anything at all in the Indian tradition that would correspond to "philosophy." The answer is yes, but with the proviso that what so corresponds has by far not any such importance for India's as "philosophy" has for European cultural history. "Philosophy" would be well translated — as far as its purely discursive disciplines, as logic and, if we believe in it, epistemology go — by the technical term *anvīkśikī* ; as such we find it in Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra* (the classical work on Hindu Polity and Economics, often likened to Macchiavelli's treatise, and written in the 3rd or 2nd century B. C.), and in some other,

more recent texts. Kauṭilya enumerates the sciences that come under *anvīkṣikī-vidya* and these roughly correspond to what at some time or the other the West meant by "philosophy." The etymology of the term is clear : those objects that can be directly perceived (*pratyakṣa*) and those that can be inferred by syllogistic or immediate methods of reasoning (*anumāna*), are *anvīkṣikī*. Philosophy is a Greek and European word, *darśana* is uniquely Indian. We should therefore not be surprised to find that "philosophy" is found in any *śāstra* except *darśana-śāstra* ; and whenever "philosophy" does come in, as it does oftentimes, in *darśana*-literature, its ancillary status is assumed. We do, however, find philosophy — and very much of it — in *śāstras* belonging to various disciplines of Brahmanical learning, and where the pundit of today might not conventionally expect to find it : in economics and polity (*artha-śāstra*), in poetics (*kāvya-śāstra*), where there are some unique and unparalleled aesthetic treatises — unparalleled in the entire western tradition ; in the art of disputation (*tarka-śāstra*) which contains almost all of the matter treated in the Organon and the posterior analytic ; in mathematics and astronomy (*gaṇita-śāstra*), and last not least in the elaborate Hindu erotics (*kāma-śāstra*), which is proudly classified among the canonical texts. It is only in the India of today that the bulky *kāma*-literature with commentaries as pedantic and tedious and with the elan of other commentaries on drier subjects is frowned at or even hushed-up : in a century and a half, the missionary of Christ and his jargon have surreptitiously usurped

arbitration in matters of decorum in Hindu-English : to which important matters we shall revert later.

The methodical distinction between *darśana* and philosophy is easy to formulate ; in the West, something like it would work in assigning topics to philosophy and theology respectively. *Darśana* believes in three truth-tests : in direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and scriptural testimony (*śābda or āptavacana*). This has been the classical trifolium throughout the entire history of Brahmanical *darśana* ; only in very recent times, in the Bengali-cum-Mithila school of Reformed Logic (*Navya-Nyāya*), *śabda* came to mean something more sophisticated and more acceptable to this century — I cannot deal with it here. You will easily see that these three epistemological proofs (*pramāṇas*) or validations apply to any kind of theology, even where there is no "*theos*", as in Buddhism and Jainism. Not so in philosophy : roughly spoken, philosophy, and the *anvīkṣikī*-sciences in India, accept only the first two proofs and dispense with the third. We could put it somewhat superciliously saying that philosophy is *darśana* minus the third *pramāṇa* — to the Indian mystic, such *darśana* is acceptable in principle, as we shall see in a later section. Against this, it might be argued that the Buddhists denied *śabda* as a *pramāṇa*, so did the Jainas, somewhat more clandestinely. Yet, I think theirs was a kind of courtesy denial, in line with their free-thinkers' prestige : as they denied the power of validation to the Brahmins' Veda, they had to deny it to their own Scripture if they

were to be consistent. In practice, however, their canon is about as binding to them in the theological sphere as the Vedic canon is to the Brahmin. The assumption often voiced here, that Buddhism is closer to the western analyst in spirit than the Brahmanical doctrine is not too well founded, though there is reason for it beyond doubt. Analysis in the sense that applies to analytic thought in the West today is entirely unknown on the Indian scene hence viewed with the utmost suspicion by teachers of philosophy at Indian universities who are supposed to inform their students about modern western thought. Navya-Nyāya is again an exception — though it does pay the traditional homage to the Vedic authority, it is not interested in that authority, and to most pundits Navya-Nyāya smacks of heresy, or at least it is uncanny to them. A young pundit, who had done Navya-Nyāya along with the more orthodox systems, as an optional subject, shrugged his shoulders when I eulogized that school as something novel : it consists of definitions only – he said, and that was meant as a criticism. Apart from it, this amazing school has been kept localized — it is confined almost entirely to the place of its origin now, after about 300 years. In the South of India, you find hardly so much as its name.

To the Indian philosopher, then, certain *pramāṇas* are unquestionable — hence, the Indian philosopher is chiefly a metaphysician, if we call a metaphysician one who builds up his philosophy on certain axioms which he just accepts as beyond further analysis; these axioms

will be very different from what a modern western metaphysician would accept, and would often seem to him farfetched. Most definitely, western thought tends to find methods where axioms of such esoteric type are eschewed or at least diminished to a minimum. In India, all philosophy hitherto taught was axiomatic in this sense. There was one magnificent exception in ancient times, more impressive than other achievements because of its age. It was the Buddhist *mādhyamika* — or *śūnyavāda* philosophy of Nāgārjuna (about 150 A. D.) and his disciples. Much later, a Brahmin scholar, Śrīharṣa, tried to apply a similar method to the Brahminical texture and in that attempt he was admittedly not original, and owned his debt to the heretic Mādhyamikas. It is the only system in Indian thought which does not make any propositions, and which methodically postulates the final non-validity for any assertion. In India, however, Nāgārjuna is today but a name in the history of thought. His teaching spread into Tibet and China, where it was preserved and enlarged, hospitably and brilliantly understood, in the canonical and commentary collections of the Lāmās, the Kanjur and the Tanjur, and there it remained a kind of fossil, albeit a stupendous one. It has not found any traditional adherents in India, the country of its birth, nor even in the other neighbouring countries which follow the Theravāda Buddhist tradition. If there is any notion in the history of Indian thought akin to Russell's logical fictions or logical constructions, it could be found in Nāgārjuna's *Kārikās* and in Candrakīrti's commentary. On the whole it can be said that

Indian philosophy explicitly or implicity accepts the word or the Scripture as *pramāṇa :* the Brahmin (blithely) the Vedic *śruti*, the Jainas the Niganthas, and the Buddhists — with the aforesaid reservations — their *Tripitaka.* What I have done here is itself a piece of metaphysics, if we follow Collingwood's description of this science as a historical discipline : a metaphysician is a scholar who tells you what basic, axiomatic assumptions have been made by certain people at a certain time— not to question why and how, but just to say that. The Indian assumptions of this axiomatic type are but two — strangely enough and counter to the usual view that western philosophy of the traditional and scholastic kind believed in fewer axioms than her Indian counterpart. But whereas the Aristotelian tradition (that includes the Stagirite's critics as well) rests on a stately list of axioms and categories, and lends itself to the formation of ever statelier lists, Indian tradition has ultimately but two : the axiom of a moral nexus, with a law of retribution more or less impersonally conceived — the *karma*-complex — and the acceptance of the canonical text as philosophical evidence, where other philosophical evidences such as logical apparatus fail. Many scholars, both Indian and occidental seem to hold that India philosophizes upon the groundwork of a large number of axioms : which brings in its wake the famous world-egg (*Brahmāṇḍa*) resting on the tortoise and the tortoise resting — where ? Or, the sanctity of the cow and of animals in general, etc. This, however, is not much better than LIFE and TIME wisdom, and if orthodox

Hindus support such views — they do so for many reasons whose elaboration would be tedious and probably unpleasant — they are just as wrong. For Hinduism could immediately and completely dispense with the Brahmā-Egg as with the sanctity of the cow, without the least detriment to its tradition, though possibly with some detriment to various interests vested in a particular reading of its tradition — the reading which insists on the radical importance of such things as the Brahma-Egg and the cow. But the *Brahmāṇḍa* is only one of the numerous cosmological myths which we find strewn into scholastic literature, without which that literature would have the same scholastic merit (though not the same richness and elegance) and without which that literature would be considered just as orthodox as with them; and beef was the ancient Aryan sages' staple-diet. It is thinkable that India will take to meat-eating again, as her proud forefathers did with vigour and without any scruples, as it is possible that no Brahmin will insist on the Brahmā-Egg 200 years hence, even if the Brahmā-Egg has not by that time suffered beyond repair through the atom or other vicious contraptions; yet, Hinduism will not have changed a bit in its essence : the Hindus will have modified part of their customs. Even today and perhaps for hundreds of years, good Brahmins ate meat and have eaten meat (though not beef for at least 1000 years),*

* The enjoyment of meat and wine bore no stigma in old days ; even Sītā, Rāma's chaste spouse, the most ethereal of the great old ladies of India, takes to them with a vengeance upon her liberation from the demon's hands. I quote in

and many good Hindu scholars did not believe in the importance or even the existence of the Brahmāṇḍa. But if the majority of the Hindus ever consciously deny that the Vedic word is a *prāmāṇa* on a par with *pratyakṣa* or inference, or if they deny the law of *karma*, then Hinduism will be dead. Beef or no beef, Egg or no Egg, gods or no gods, God or no God — all this has always been of secondary importance for a definition of Hinduism. If beef-eating can be found in the Veda with some measure of unanimity, and if God can be found denied in the Veda, both beef and No-God are all well and orthodox. The commentator has had all the freedom in India; no one commentary is incumbent on all Hindus — what a tremendous difference from the Roman Catholic tradition, where even the Bible must not be read in toto without certain prescribed commentaries or, what is worse, without certain omissions. Whereas in the West, in the Catholic age at least, the commentary is implicity canonical along with the Word, there was never any trace of such stricture in India. The Hindu would not appreciate the Protestant Christian's claim to have greater intellectual freedom than the unreformed Catholic — protestantism, from the Hindu angle, can be said to be but slightly more liberal than the original church : for no

translation "..... when the son of Raghu had come into the thick Ashoka-grove, he sat himself down on a seat splendid to behold, decked with many flowers and strewn with Kusha-grass, and he took Sita by the hand and gave her pure, sweet, heady beverage to quaff, as Indra did to Shachi. The tenderest meat, etc. were speedily brought etc....." (Rāmāyaṇa, Uttarakāṇḍa, VII /42/ 18–19.)

ever so independent reformed commentator could deny the existence of a Creator-God without pain of excommunication. Not so in India : if an *ācārya* cared to disprove such existence from the Scripture, he will be reckoned quite orthodox : the great Śaṃkarācārya virtually did that as he conceded his *Īśvara* a rather meagre status, i.e. within the realm of *māyā*, within phenomenal existence, though His place is the most exalted in the phenomenal hierarchy.

In Europe, the theological chair had been separated from the philosophical chair with the pledge of mutual nonencroachment, in the 13th century through a weighty ordinance of the Sorbonne, at Paris and on the whole, the ordinance was implemented in later centuries. Henceforth, the philosopher professed to concern himself with discursively knowable matters only, leaving to the theologian what is not thus knowable.

In India, there was a hint at a similar procedure, though again only once. Jaimini Ācārya, the ancient, almost mythical propounder of the *Purva Mimāṃsa* philosophy, which is one among the six orthodox Brahmanical systems of thought which claim to be exegeses of the Vedic Scripture and of its philosophical implications — teaches emphatically that everything said in the Scripture must be understood to convey some completely supernatural truth, simply because the Veda tells us such things only which we cannot grasp through any other source ; nothing in the Writ pertains, so says Jaimini, to a universe which could be

understood by rational means — so that if there be the mention of a tree in the Veda, that tree cannot be any tree of our visible or even of our dream-world, because such a mundane or quasi-mundane tree could be described by some mundane science — such as botany or psychology. His would be a case where the theologian himself inaugurates the separation of the two faculties : in the West, it was the discontented philosopher who rebelled. Jaimini, however, does not have many professed followers today, and any such separation was hardly ever seriously contemplated.

Is there any philosophy in India which is not chiefly theology ? Hardly — and it is hard to say what the future will bring, and whether or not the pundits will persist in their splendid isolation. That there is no de-theologized philosophy in India is a fact hardly anyone would dispute who accepts our distinguishing criteria. There was, of course, the mythical Cārvāka and the Lokāyatas, but we know virtually nothing about him and his doctrine, except that his other name was Bṛhaspati, that he preached the wisdom of the world and that he denied immortality of any kind ; all in all, six verses ascribed to him are all that is extent, and whatever is being construed upon them seems to me highly fanciful. Recently a man died, who liked to call himself a modern Cārvāka, and perhaps rightly so : the late M. N. Roy, a Brahmin like his antique forerunner Brihaspati ; it is only regrettable that Roy was not good in metaphysics -- he was a social and political thinker ; and he did not live

to work out his plan to re-establish Cārvāka and to restore to him the status he undoubtedly deserved.

Any teacher of philosophy in India today who teaches his own ideas, when they happen to differ from traditionally acceptable views, is automatically dubbed a "westerner," i. e. a philosopher who makes philosophy after the western fashion. M. N. Roy's predilection for the philosophical approach and the attainments of the West were known and he never made a secret of it ; but there are others who would prefer to be sheltered in the fortress of the Indian tradition, or reasonably stay there for its infinitely richer aesthetics (for lack of occasion I must state here dogmatically, that western aesthetics so far as it is a philosophical discipline, is no match for the philosophical aesthetic of the Hindu, who can prove music and dance to be parts of his metaphysical system) ; staying there, such a person may nevertheless like to give his own, independent ideas independently. He is not expected to do any such thing, I am sorry to say. The Hindu thinker has been and still is expected to be an exegete and nothing but that — novel ideas are suspicious, heretic, unwelcome — or in short, they are "western." The psychology behind this state of affairs is immensely complex and extends to vastly different fields : for example, to the lipstick and to the powder-puff. The leaders of Hinduism today inveigh against them because they are not indigenous, and Hinduism and chauvinism have become inseparable. The ancient Indian women had beauty-aids far more complex, expensive and sophisticat-

ed than these poor fabrics : could some rouge be brewed along with the chanting of *mantras* it would perhaps be preached as conducive to the realization of the high ideals of Hindu womanhood.

So far we have only been juxtaposing some patterns of Indian and western thought, and no really fundamental difference has been shown. There is, however, such a real difference. The differences usually spoken and written about amongst Hindus are regrettably trivial and indeed imaginary: Indian "spiritualism" *vs.* Western "materialism" is the stock-in-trade;* I fear these jejune generalizations go back to well-meaning, but ill-informed men, like for instance Swami Vivekananda. We shall have to discuss them at another place. The real difference seems to lie in the different attitude to philosophical problems as a whole. India has all along been preeminently enthusiastic and eventually non-discursive ; the West has been preeminently critical and discursive. Let this be no hard and fast demarcation. The distinction between "critical" and "enthusiastic" as contraries of philosophical attitude is, I believe, my terminology and I have often written and spoken about it in India, where it seems very important to me, particutarly for the purpose of debunking the said trivial and wrong distinctions. The root-stem of "critic —" is the Greek *krin* —, and means to sift, to separate (originally proba-

* vd. my article *'Spiritual vs. Materialistic' — a corrective analysis''* in THOUGHT, New — Delhi, March 1962, p 12–14, 13–15.

bly to remove chaff from grain); critical thought is thought that separates from an accumulation of data, from a bulk of knowledge, what is obtained from sources extraneous to the individual who undertakes such "separating." "Enthusiastic" comes from the Greek "*en-thousiazo*," and the official etymology is "to be filled with a deity (*theos*)" (comp. the German "*des Gottes voll.*") With some philological ingenuity, however, the root "*thyo*" could be brought into connection with it. "*thy-esthai*" means to be strongly shaken, moved — by some demon or god, I would imagine; its other meaning becomes sacrifice — in thaumaturgical transference the deity is moved by the sacrifice, compelled to accede to the will of either the priest of the sacrificer who engages the priest : the entire Vedic ritual presupposes this situation. The Greek root "*thy*" is the Sanskrit root "*hu*" (P. T. *juhomi*, N. *hotā* the chief priest) — where it always meant "sacrifice." The enthusiastic mind is the mind that is strongly "affected" (like Jaspers *Betroffensein*" as a virtual criterion of philosophical contemplation). The enthusiastic mind is affected by the tenets of the tradition, the preceptor, or by its own mystical vision — and it has sacrificed the right of its own rational jurisdiction, like the Professor of Indoctrination in Russell's *Zahatopolk*.

Though I hold this distinction (critical — enthusiastic) to be fundamental, I would not like to press it too hard — it is thematic rather than historical. For well over fifteen hundred years, the West was teaching

enthusiastic philosophy — but today we call those centuries the Dark Age. There were no critical centuries in Indian Thought — though there were shorter critical phases, and sporadic critical schools (the Mādhyamikas and other Mahāyāna-Schools among the Buddhists, a small part of the Vedāntic tradition, and the recent Navya-Nyāya) — all of which merit the admiration of the most radically analysts in the West.

The educated occidental today has read, in part at least, the Bhagavadgītā and the Upaniṣads, as he has read Laotze's *Tao-te-Cing* and Kung-fu-tse's *Analects* ; in the same manner, the educated Hindu is acquainted with Plato, Kant, and Russell in the same degree, or rather a bit better. What strikes the intelligent western reader of the Indian lore is the inspiration and edification and the enormous aesthetical appeal to our sentiments — and the lack of descriptive propositions ; and what offends the intelligent Indian student of western philosophical lore is the lack of all these things, except when he goes to the ancients or to their modern imitators. But while the most Platonic philosopher of today has changed his outlook a good deal as he deals with Plato, there is little or no equivalent change in the pundit's outlook. Take the scholastic commentators on the *Prasthānatraya* — the Vedantic *ācāryas* and their disciples, and compare their output with that of our present-day pundits who comment upon the tradition as the only thing worth commenting upon. Their language has become more and more technical, less and ever less poetical and beautiful — yet

what they write shows no difference in their outlook from what the elders wrote. When we scrutinize this vast bulk of scholastic and exegetical literature we find that it is really only the style that has changed considerably since the time when the canonical scriptures were codified over 2000 years ago. There is no critical analysis of the text, there is only reiteration and re-formulation.

The central charge of the Indian philosopher against western philosophy is that the latter does not seem to be concerned with "Truth." By "Truth" thus capitalized, the Hindu thinker means no facts of any kind, nor even a metaphysical totum of all facts and things and events, but by "Truth" he means the supreme entity conceived in his particular tradition : this is always a spiritual, non-discursive entity, a theological entity. It follows that the Indian thinker misses precisely what the western philosopher can no longer deal with, because he has passed all of it to the theological faculty 600 years ago and he is loath to ask it back from there.

In my contribution to "The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan" in the Series of Living Philosophers,* I offered some criticism of Dr. Radhakrishnan's work on this very same count : that he seems to favour the perpetuation of scholasticism in Indian thought — viz. of a science that comprises theology and philosophy in a single Chair ; in his "Reply to Critics" at the end of the volume, Dr. Radhakrishnan very acutely analyzes this particular criticism and brings his points for such perpe-

* Tudor Inc., New York 1952.

tuation ; they are entirely acceptable, and yet I believe the risk of an intellectual stalemate is great unless criticism can theoretically be extended to the *śruti*. As it is, criticism can not be thus extended, for the *śruti* is *apauruṣeya*, i. e. not of human origin, which assumption seems to imply exemption from criticism, for the Hindu. Any scholar who does criticize the *śruti* is an heretic by definition ; that is how Jainism and Buddhism were heretical creeds from the very beginning.

The western scholar must refuse to deal with "Truth" unless he is a theologian, and for him it is just a less professional synonym for God. It is no longer a subject for philosophy qua philosophy, though it had been that for fifteen hundred years : voila the Dark Age.

With the mystery-shrouded exception of Cārvāka, all Indian thinkers had to fit their logic into the redemptive frame. Many of them had immense logical talent and learning — yet they had to renounce its claim at every instance where they would have had to admit conflict with the *śruti*. The Indian philosopher, if he insists that he be counted amongst the orthodox, must proclaim that all philosophical argument is unimportant vis-a-vis the claim that salvation — variously styled *mukti*, *mokṣa*, *apavarga*, *kaivalya*, *turīya*, *nirvāṇa*, etc. — is the sole real concern of the philosopher and all logic and other philosophical discipline but ancillary to it, There have been philosophers in India who were most probably not interested in salvation — Gautama and Kaṇṇāda hardly were — yet they had to pay lip-service to the rule, and it often

sounds unconvincing as well as naive : it is this naivete which prevents us from calling such literature intellectually dishonest. Today, however, it cannot be got away with in spite of all efforts to keep up the scholastic status quo – and I believe intellectual ostrich playing should be overtly brandished and opposed on the academical rostrum in India — many notions revered on account of their age will have to be challenged and partly eliminated. What is old is not necessarily good, even in philosophy — and homage to the antique does not imply suspension of criticism. This awkward reverence toward ancient words in India is the intellectual corollary to the insurmountable patriarchism of the Hindu society — yet I think it could be modified even before modern India has realized the futility of patriarchism, and its immorality.

Theological method is largely common to India and to the West. Ethics, as long as it is bound up with religion, must needs become a theological discipline and has then no place in philosophy were it stands as a secular pursuit. C. D. Broad distinguishes between teleological and deontological ethics ; those who hold a life to be morally good in which good actions and attitudes point to some ulterior purpose — are teleological moralists (quite regardless of whether the ulterior purpose is the achievement of a saturated bank-account, or salvation and *visio beatifica*). Those who appreciate good deeds as deeds without any ulterior motive, as intrinsically good or morally fitting, are deontological moralists. Quite evidently, all theological morality is teleological, and

here more than through any other approach do we feel how purely teleological, and theological Indian thought has been : no action is good in itself, because the goodness of an action or an attitude can be gauged solely with ultimate reference to *mukti*. For the Hindu (and the Buddhist and the Jain), in the last analysis only that is good which is conducive to *mukti*, and that is bad which diverts from its pursuit. The Indian theologian, then, like every theologian, has never been interested in good actions for their own sake (I think he would not be able to understand "good for their own sake" as we use the phrase) ; how indeed could he be, when good deeds done for their own sake are rivals to the cause of theology ? If the theological chair monopolizes the right to moral arbitration, legislation, and jurisdiction, then no outsiders who claim similar rights can be welcome. In India, the law-giver has always been a priest : Manu was the most brahmanical of the Brahmins. Something seems to be common to all Asian people : their law-givers are sacerdotal legislators ; both Manu and Hamurapi were priests.

The Christian and Muslim divine posits a final state of beatitude ; it seems to me that their more orthodox ideas about the constitution of beatitude are cruder than their Indian counterparts. Or rather, their conception of some kind of beatific vision or a dwelling with the Lord is just a part of the chances offered to the devotee by the Hindu eschatoloist ; it roughly corresponds to the *sālokya*-form of *mukti* which figures so prominently in the Vaiṣṇava and Saiva theologies.

Except for Christianity, however, the West has had a real ethical tradition — why, ethics is so thoroughly western a term, that it is a sheer impossibility to translate it into non-European languages, though there is no lack in attempts to give such renderings — we hear *nītiśāstra*, *ācāra – vijñāna* and sundry more offered to the Indian student of western philosophy who is to be persuaded to read texts in the vernacular ; none of these denote ethics. The ethicist tries to develop an autonomous doctrine of values and the moral good. Hedonism is such a doctrine and the great Greeks taught it. As I shall elaborate at a later stage, I believe the entire *śruti* can be read to mean hedonism -- and my particular axe is the *ānanda-mimāṃsa* of the Taittiriya — Upaniṣad. The good life is, according to all who look sensible to me, the balanced life — balanced and rich in pleasure, and with the motto *variatio delectat* ; and to us, *variatio* would seem to be implied by "balanced life" rather than some of the antique excrescences — the Stoic and the Cynic *apathia* and *atarraxia*. The teaching that we should be good for no reason but that it is a pleasure to be so seems to me the only sound moral standpoint, and is certainly the most autonomous : it does not require props and crutches from alien entities, from a deity, a moral law superposed from without, and a nonethical tradition. Its additional attraction for the western philosopher is that it is only with informed hedonism that Occam's Razor has a real edge.

The West of today has by no means come round to hedonism in its ethics -- far from it. Most moral philo-

sophy today there is strongly anti-hedonist ; several analysts even, who profess not to be interested in ethical problems *per se* betray a clandestine dislike for hedonistic views -- for their language, that is.

In India today, a hedonistic view of ethics is unthinkable, and my idea that the *śruti* could be read to mean hedonism is considered entirely heretic, so far as heresy has a prohibitive status on the Hindu scene. The reason however, is disappointing — hedonism is brought into a vague and entirely uniformed connexion with the all-Hindu lable "materialistic." It is nonsense, and it would really not require much additional learning to see that it is. Hedonism is the teaching that says that the things we should strive for are the things that give us pleasure. I cannot here adduce the counter-arguments of Moore's *Principia* — they are much too sophisticated for the Indian scene — for such arguments would presuppose age-old acquaintance with such ethical propositions which have been commonplace in the Hellenic West, and which are entirely unknown in India. For our pundits, it should be taught that any way of life can be referred to an hedonistic world-view ; though it must sound naive to western ears, and even trite, it seems novel and unheard of among Hindus, that "pleasure" may mean other things than woman and wine — the saint Ramakrishna Paramahamsa kept teaching all of his disciples, lay and monastic, that the only great temptations, and the only mundane pleasures worth-while were *kāminī -kañcana*, which mean about the same. That asceticism and yoga-practices, and

fasting and austerities- may give enormous pleasure to a certain type of men and women who are, it is evident, numerous in this hot and poor country, and that the obeisances paid by the average Hindu to the holy and austere, obeisances intricate and variegated, can yield pleasure even to the perfectly extravert and to him who has not got the least inferiority-complex — all this is either unknown to the pundit, or if it is known it is kept to himself so successfully that even the vilest critic can't bring it out.

The spiritual jargon pervading modern India with amazing homogeneity revels in such distinctions as "high" and "low" for various ways of life. It has proved intellectually and perhaps even morally disastrous — at least if we take a more sophisticated view of the moral life ; it has lead to such triviality in life and word as could hardly be equalled by an Irish country preacher. I often wonder why no Holy Writ has ever declared platitude to be sinful speech, as it did impious speech and obscene speech ; I think this lack might be made up for some time, and in India with her wonderfully flexible textual tradition this should not be impossible. In the West, philosophers who persist in writing platitudes whenever they write — are scorned for it ; in this country, the audience is at the most bored ; there is no criticism of platitude and triviality, and in the modern vernaculars there is hardly a word which would connote them ; nothing is an offence unless and until you have a word for it. In English, "high" and "low" have no philosophical meaning —

thus used, they are good enough for Sunday sermons and like them, recognized as rightfully trivial. Unless we get a word for triviality, tritism, hackneyed, in the Indian vernacular, we cannot preach the intensive hatred the ethicist must learn to bear them.

I said there are only two basic differences in method, between India and the West in philosophy — the first, prevalent enthusiasm vs. prevalent criticism ; the second is that in the main, the West cherished collectivistic ideas and systems, whereas India has been radically individualistic throughout, without exceptions of any importance in the history of her thought. The west had its exceptions : there were individualists among the Greek philosophers and in Rome, there were one or two even in the middle-ages, several in the subsequent centuries, and most of the best thinkers today only in the West are individualists — but really today only. This holds for propounders of the most opposed schools : the analytic philosopher is an individualist because he is a better logician than the Aristotelian was, and on the other end the existentialist is a radical individualist because he has seen the hollowness and meanness and depravity of any form of collectivisim secretly nurtured by dialectic method. In India, there was hitherto no exception to the rule : there was not a single collectivist thinker, and that is one reason why I believe that at least as an academical thesis Communism will not become naturalized in Bharat. The natural poise, as it were, of Indian individualism is a result of the souzerainty of *sādhanā*, compared to

which all scholastic argument and doctrine has been considered as of secondary importance. *Sādhanā* is something inestrangably individualistic for the simple reason that only the individual can perform it — congregation is make-believe at its best, and fraud at its worst. I understand religion to be synonymous and coextensive with *sādhanā* — hence religion is an individual's enterprise. There is accordingly no such thing as universal salvation, for celestial congregations are as fraudulent as terrestrial ones. Some scholars hold that certain forms of Indian thought and *sādhanā* are not individualistic, and the instance usually quoted is Theravāda vs. Mahāyāna Buddhism. In the older Theravāda, the aspirant is said to work out his own *nirvāṇa* and is said to be satisfied with that much ; in the later Mahāyāna, the adept will not attain salvation until he has not helped mankind to attain it before him. The argument is spurious though very common, and the fallacy is of course a crude linguistic one — so much so that even here in India I have come to the conclusion that there is nothing as fascinating as language. The error lies in the use of "mankind" — the word has more than one equivalent in Indian languages. They, however, like "mankind," are no things, but names — only "man" and "men" are things that can do anything. Only "man" and "men" can attain salvation, and perhaps all men can in due course — the mahāyāna adept may well will to help each man to attain it before he does himself — each man that comes in his was as a fellow-adept. But there is no salvation for "mankind," nor for the universe, for there are no

such things. Names cannot attain salvation except if you erase them from all dictionaries for all times. There is no mankind to serve, no humanity to sacrifice for, no motherland to die for — there are only persons for whom these things can be done. I fear it will take the modern Hindu some time to appreciate this simple lesson, for he has been used to wax eloquent over these words. Why so ? Because these names bear a strong emotive charm for the Hindu, who is of all enthusiastic people in the world, the most enthusiastic and most susceptible to verbal inebriation — to find hidden meanings behind words which are not at all obscure is perhaps necessary when obscurity is desirable to bypass the tribulations of our mundane life —this explains to me why the Hindu does not understand what every child will understand if he is told - that "mankind" etc. are simply shorthand for unmanageable enumerations. What happens to the enthusiast is that he thinks he must intuit something in "mankind" that is more, and less comprehensible and obvious than "as many men as I can care for, as are given into my custody." This is dangerous and has shown its danger in the West indeed — though not yet in India : she has not yet been sufficiently warned of the danger — that over "mankind" and "Man" we tend to forget man and men, and translated into the language of political and theocratic power, this very "mankind" and "Man" change from innocuous collective or class-names into the hideous golem.

As yet India has been spared the transition from a

name to a spook. I don't know what the future will bring young Indians are much enamoured with the imports of collectivistic thought ; if the country takes to it in a much larger degree, disavowing its ideologies which are all entirely void of collectivism — then of course those crises and debacles the West has been experiencing in mind and body may well be ahead for this country as well.

CHAPTER V

THE PLACE OF NATURE IN INDIAN POETICAL TRADITION

It would not be possible to assign "Nature" a place in Indian poetry in any manner comparabl to, say, the place it holds in European Romantic poetry, for the primary reason that no such concept ever existed in India. Or, in positive terms, any word connoting "Nature" has long been usurped by the ubiquitous speculative philosopher, by the mystic, the metaphysician, or the theologian on the Indian literary scene. Or still more narrowly, any word which dictionaries translate by "Nature" — like *prākṛti*, *tattva*, *svabhāva* and many more, has long been loaded with ontological significance, which crowds out other possible significations, This has been the case from Vedic times onward, and we may safely say that a purely esthetical contemplation of Nature would have been possible just about only at the time when the first parts of the Ṛgveda were composed, and then again now in the Tagore and post-Tagore era, when the metaphysical momentum seems to relax a bit, at least in the sphere of *belles lettres*.

The first dictum that could therefore be pronounced about "Nature" in Indian poetry would run : the loading of "Nature" sememes with philosophical, cosmological, and theological significance prevents them from being

used as poetical instruments *per se.* This is best shown by the fact that no such word figures in any of the numerous didactic treatises on poetics ; no such word is used as a heuristic category in these treatises, nor does any such term constitute a criterion (*lakṣaṇa*) in the enormous lists of criteria for poetical work in any genre.

All concepts clustering around these words are absolutistic, regardless of which of the three indigenous Indian religious traditions they hail from : "Nature" (i. e. *prākṛti, tattva, svabhāva,* etc,) is a holistic, (and, in the Brahmin tradition, a panentheistic) monistic and teleological concept, and as such it is not analyzable into smaller units. Otto's "Numinous" is no doubt present in much romantic nature poetry in Germany (I am thinking of Novalis, Moerike, Hamann, and even the younger Goethe)- which may be one of the reasons why some poets of that period felt an absorbing interest in Indian poetry (Rueckert, Goethe) — but that was a passing phase in European poetry ; besides, it never had any wide theological backing ; it was, in fact, always bound up with heretical notions in the line of the early German mystics, much of whose work was placed on the Index. In India, on the other hand, the "Numinous" the all-pervading entity had all the theological and sacerdotal sanction — the poet availing himself of it was therefore ranked with the priests : *kavi*, the most direct word for poet, is also an epithet of the Deity.

It might be helpful to express the Indian notion in occidental scholastic and philosophical terms : medieval

scholasticism render the cosmos as "*natura naturans*" and "*natura naturata.*" these terms being almost coextensive with Creator and Creation; the dichotomy is basic to the Christian view, and blurring the distinction is heresy. In India, there can be no such distinction, and when it was brought in at times the *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* were the same entity views in two different aspects; Spinoza's "*Deus sive Natura*" seems to me very close to this ancient, monolithical world view of the Brahmins. One might almost say that a dichotomized view would be a heresy to the ancient Brahmin poet — the Upaniṣad says "the gods use him as a beast of burden, who thinks there is a difference between the individual and the cosmic soul."

Now, if "Nature" is to be used as a poetical instrument per se, it must be supposed to be outside the poet's mind; it has to be, in some manner, a sense object, or a congeries of sense objects. The poet must assume at least a numerical difference between himself as the percipient and the objects perceived; strictly speaking, the radical idealist cannot be a nature-poet, for what he describes is but a description of his own states of mind. Now, although radical idealism can hardly be ascribed to any Indian school of thought except some Buddhist schools, there certainly is a pervasive emphasis on the ontological status of the poet, and here of course there would be some kind of relation to the Homeric concept of the *Poietes* as "the doer, maker." In an important sense, then, "Nature" is an explanation of the percipient's

self, and in our special case, "Nature" — poetry must be a particular way of describing the self of the poet This would give a cue to the fact of the enormous stereotypy of nature-descriptions in Indian poetry: just as the professional theologian speaks about the Brahman, or whatever the fundamental theological notion, in a prolific, yet, stereotyped vocabulary, the poet described Nature using an analogous vocabulary-type: hence the creeper-like brows, the bowstring formed of a row of bees, the sidelong glances, the twittering of the kokilabird, the two filled cups of the rounded breasts, the battle chariot of the rounded hips, etc., ad nauseam. Nature in Indian poetry is never used in a descriptive fashion, but always in emotive-persuasive language.

From this it follows that "Nature" is never an object in Indian poetry, and natural objects — including everything from a stone, a lotus, the elongated eyelashes of the damsels and human society — serve as particular tokens of metaphysical language. It also follows that nature objects in poetry are hardly ever enjoyed in their own right, nor are they used in their own right: they are ever subservient to a super-or non-natural consummation, which is morally neutral, transcending the senses, and hence nonesthetical. Thus, in contradistinction to romantic views of the place of Nature in poetry, and to the romantic usage of nature objects as poetical instruments in other cultures, nature bypasses such primary use in Indian poetry in two ways : intensionally, it is a heavily philosophical term which does not lend

itself to any esthetical interpretation; and extensionally, it is ancillary to a non-poetical, non-social ultimate purpose, i. e. to that of metaphysical transcendence implying emancipation from the sensuous world.

The occidental's attitude toward poetry would be that the implication of all this is a criticism for some sort of shortcoming ; to the Indian, however, the implication is one of praise. The modern Indian thinker is proud of the extra-esthetical purpose of poetry, and *a fortiori*, of the use of Nature in poetry. The founders and exponents of the modern Indian renaissance, beginning with Rammohun Roy, Vivekananda, etc., and continuing with such thinkers as Dr. Radhakrishnan, are satisfied with and rather proud of their monolithic world-view and of the dependent place of Nature within the system. In all, I believe only the exception is the modern Bengali school of poetry, inaugurated by Sarat Chandra and Rabindranath Tagore ; this would show only in their poetical output itself, not however in their critical writings. Tagore in his essay "Sādhanā" undoes this separation of poetry from the religion-speculative pattern. and makes poetry a part of the mystical effort again, quite in line with the Indian tradition.

Bearing these strictures in mind, we can now proceed to the Indian poets' response to nature and its objects. On the whole, I would say, it began — in the earliest documented era, i. e. the Vedic period — with a joyful awe tinged with a mild amount of distrust, shifting gradually to one of tender exhilaration, though hardly of fasci-

nation, due to the basic reserve. The ideal of the Indian thinker being the withdrawal of the senses from, not the identification with the objects, nature-objects have to be internalized : the *kavi* uses them as means to his own meditation, as objects to be got rid of eventually, not to be enhanced unless such enhancement can yield more successful withdrawal in the end (the tantric schools of meditation would hold this latter attitude). This important tendency is aided by the Indian thinkers' predilection for homology, which is shared by the poet : just as the canonical text homologizes the anatomical parts of the sacrificial horse with cosmical entities like the sky, etc., and with certain states of the contemplative's mind (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad — about 9th centuary B. C.) , the poet constantly homologizes nature objects in a sort of ascending hierarchy : the sandel spot between Krishna's brows-homologized with the moon disc between dark clouds — and finally with the peaceful serenity of the yogi's mind amidst the exciting sense-objects.

There is no province in the realm of nature which Indian poetry has omitted from its specific use : the monistic or pancosmic foundation providing the most powerful incentive, all nature objects are arranged in the said hierarchy beginning from the inert stone and ending with the gods presiding over nature, all of which are manifestations of the one numinous imponderable (Brahman in Brahmanism and Hinduism, *Śūnya* in Buddhism). The recurring theological idiom "from the stone up to (and including) the Demiurg Brahmā"

(*āpāśanād-brahmāparyanta*) epitomizes the situation, and it is tacitly assumed by the poets ; I do not know whether any didactic text on poetics (*kāvya, alaṃkāra-śāstra*) says explicitly that all the elements of this impressive Nature-hierarchy are latent tools in the poets workshop, or whether he has to use them with implicit reference to the hierarchy ; but it is abundantly clear to me that this notion has been deeply ingrained in all Indian poets. All nature objects, including the inert stone and the poetic percipient himself are manifestations of this numinous, which must not be called "Nature" if confusion is to be avoided, or unless something like the Spinozian dictum is assumed. Every nature experience including its poetical diction must lead up to the notion of, and what is more, to the intuitive identification with the fundamental, extra-poetical, ontological existence.

The pedantic Theravāda Buddhist might take objection to the above: there was a lot of excellent poetry using nature objects as instruments, and yet there is no such "existence" in Theravāda Buddhism. Such an objection would be tenable if doctrine alone be the reference. As it is, Theravāda Buddhism, is saturated with the "numinous" just as much as any other Indian teaching which postulate it as its supreme entity. For the Hindu, the numinous is both ontological and psychological; for the Theravāda Buddhists (and that would of course include the foremost Theravāda poets like Buddhaghoṣa, Buddha-rakṣita, Mahānāma, etc.) it is purely psychological, i.e. it works in all their writings. It is, of course, quite irrelevant

whether or not a poet consciously asserts his allegiance to a theological numinous or not — the Theravādins have no such allegiance, but their poets share the (psychological) numinous with their Brahmin fellow poets. Aśvaghoṣa's writings are replete with nature-poetry; and though he was the greatest of the late Theravāda or early Mahāyāna writers, and a devout Buddhist, nature objects mean for him, just like for the non-Buddhist poets, instruments toward the ultimate aim of emancipation : objects of which the mind has to rid itself en route to the supreme intuition. The fact that the final aim is doctrinarily different from that of the Brahmins, is annoyingly irrelevant to our study.

Thus, no nature object is left out from the poet's vocabulary, and it is nature procreating itself, which provides the epitome of the absolute, with the natural things and events supplying the most abundant paradigms. The attitude toward nature, viz. natural things and events, lacks all the awe (at least after the earliest Vedic period) which seems to underlie other peoples' poetic vision; there being no creator in Indian thought, the *timor creatoris* never arose; functional demiurges there are — the fourheaded Brahma for instance, but they do not inspire awe — in fact, they tend to be the butt of some irony at their relative impotence: their job is just to create from the matter at their disposal, and they do not even control their own output. The demiurge belongs into the empirical, phenomenal world, i. e. into the same world as the poet himself.

Winternitz constantly spoke about the "love of nature," etc. of the Indian poet; but what he failed to see was just what we have been pointing out here. The Indian poet's love of nature is nothing like the love of nature in the German romantic poet (I do not know enough about non-Indian Asian poetry to extend the comparison) : the German romantic poet loves nature for its own sake, he enjoys it in a hedonistic or eudaimonistic fashion, just as he enjoys other beautiful things (all beautiful things are parts of nature — this much is common to all poetical attitudes everywhere; but it is trivial, and a truism: hence the parenthesis), and he uses them as instruments per se; for the Indian poet, the objects of nature, as all sense objects, and his own poetic art is *sādhanā*, i. e. methodical meditation leading to spiritual emancipation which is different between the different schools of thought; but it is not different in the one fact important for this symposium: this emancipation itself is non-poetical, non-esthetical, non-empirical — in the process of its realization, poetry, and nature-objects are welcome tools — they have no standing apart from this process, they are considered as jejune in their own right.

The unique element in Indian poetry is the assignment of *rasa* to each poetical situation: literally, *rasa* means "juice;" as a technical term in poetics it means both the sentiment created by the poem and attributed to the poetical intention. The number of *rasas* varies between eight and ten with various authors, but I am convinced

by Dr. V. Raghavan's argument,* that there are nine *rasas*, and that the (occasionally) disputed ninth *rasa*, '*śānta*" or "spiritual poise, tranquillity" is the most important underlying all the other eight *rasa* (i. e. the erotic, heroism, disgust, fury, humor, terror, compassion, wonderment). Now if all the *rasa* are eventually founded upon *śānta*, then it follows that they stand lower in the hierarchy of poetical value: *śānta* being directly instrumental to the (non-poetical) state of emancipation, the other eight are subservient to *śānta*. Quite apart from it, the consummate theory seems to be that there is actually only one *rasa* — Raghavan subscribes to this view — and this is in agreement with the canonical text "*raso vai saḥ*" (He, i. e. the Absolute, is *Rasa*) — which epitomizes both the homologizing and the hierarchical attitude of the Indian savant.

I shall finally exemplify my point by some random selections of poetry utilizing nature — after all this, I am wary of using "nature-poetry" — giving translations of passages in a roughly chronological order:

From a funeral hymn from the Ṛgveda (about 1500 B. C.):

"approach the bosom of the earth, the mother,
this earth extending far and most propitious :
young, soft as wool to bounteous givers, may she
preserve thee from the lap of dissolution.
Open wide, O earth, press not heavily on him,

*V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasas*, Madras 1940.

be weary of approach, hail him with kindly aid;
as with a robe a mother hides
her son, so shroud this man, O earth."
(Translated, A.A. Macdonell,"Hymns of the Ṛgveda")

There was hardly any such universal doctrine as that of rebirth at the time this hymn was composed ; yet we find that the nature imagery is indicative of some sort of personal survival principle.

"The warrior's look is like a thunderous raincloud's
when, armed with mail, he seeks the lap of battle .....
"Close to his ear, as fain to speak, she presses, holding
the well-loved friend in her embraces.
Strained on the bow, she whispers like a woman—
this bowstring that preserves us in combat.
These, meeting like a woman and her lover, bear,
mother-like, their child upon their bosom.
May the two bow-ends, starting swift asunder, scatter,
in unison, the foes who hate us.
Her tooth a deer, dressed in an eagle's feathers,
bound with cowhide, launched forth, she flieth onward.
There where the heroes speed hither and thither,
there may the arrows shelter and protect us."
(Translated, R. T. H. Griffith, "Hymns of the Ṛgveda")

This hymn to the arrow might be of about the same age. Although no spiritual principle is involved, it evinces the hierarchical motive : nature imagery is not enjoyed for its own sake ; it serves an axiomatically accepted

higher-order purpose, and at this earliest period, the purpose is not necessarily spiritual or absolutistic.

The White Yajurveda is just slightly more recent in origin. Here is a sample of powerful nature-imagery :

May Agni (i. e. Fire, and the God of Fire) with his fuel hear my calling.
Hear it the Waters and the Bowls, Divine Ones, hear it, Stones,
as knowing sacrifice, my calling. May the God Savitar hear mine invocation.
All hail !
Drawing art thou : I draw thee up that Ocean ne'er may waste or wane.
Let waters with the waters, and the plants commingle with the plants.
That man is lord of endless strength whom thou protectest in the fight.
Agni, or urgest to the fray.....
(Book VI, Vs. 27 ff., translated, R. T. H. Griffith)

A very large percentage of the Vedic hymns is built on the model exemplified in the above hymn to Agni; and the Veda being the supreme canonical literature, its style somehow set the stage for later poetic efforts. The hierarchy of nature objects is evident, so is their hierarchical subservience to an ultimate, non-natural end : sacrifice, the pivot of the Vedic age. "Sacrifice" was then given a philosophical interpretation, and finally identified with the object of sacrifice: meditation being the supreme sacrifice (yajna), and meditation becoming

ontologically one with the meditator as well as the object of meditation in a growingly monistic-absolutistic atmosphere.

Epic poetry is replete with nature objects. In fact there is hardly anything the epic wants to convey, which would not use such imagery leading up toward the doctrine. Though this verse has probably been added to the epic at a later time, it is representative of the epical tenor :

> As long as the mountains stand,
> So long as rivers flow along this earth,
> so long the Song of Rāma
> will be sung in this world
> (Rāmāyaṇa)

In lieu of a sample of Buddhist nature poetry, I shall quote Winternitz's dictum of this matter, in extenso :

> "die Freude an der Natur, die wir schon im Ramayana als einen hervorstechenden Zug indischer Dichtung kennen lernten, die wir noch im Kunstepos und in der Liebeslyrik, ja selbst in der lehrhaften Spruchdichtung bewundern werden, war auch diesen Moenchen (i. e. to the early Buddhist Thera monks) nicht fremd. Mit Behagen verweilen sie, mehr Dichter als Moenche, bei der Schilderung der Wald — und Berglandschaften, in deren Mitte der Weise einsam seinen Meditationen nachgeht. Wenn der Donner rollt und aus finstrer Wolke der Regen herniederprasselt, sitzt der erloeste Moench selig in seiner Felsenhoe-

hle. Und auch der gegen Lust und Leid gleichgueltige Heilige versagt es sich nicht, den Fruehling zu schildern."

(Geschichte d. Ind. Lit., II, 84.)

All this is very true, but as I said earlier, Winternitz just did not see that nature objects were at best an embellishment of the main purpose, i. e. the ultimate intuition. The subjects are not "mehr Dichter als Moenche," in spite of their poetical diction — this diction itself being a part of their *sādhanā*, their meditative exercises. This is most patently brought out in the "Songs of the Senior Nuns" (Therīgāthā, 122 ff) :

"Just as the farmer tills his field, sows the seed and harvests, just like this the nun wants to win Nirvāṇa; when she washes her feet, she sees the water ooze down the rock and stimulated to contemplation by this sight, she controls her heart just as one controls a fine horse ; then she returns to her cloister, takes the lamp and pulls the wick down with a needle, and just as the light of the lamp is extinguished, she attains Nirvāṇa."

The classical period was no less under the sway of our hierarchy : in fact it would seem that the great classical poets were the most conscious of it. Bhartṛhari's "Centuries" are a case in point. Indian pundits contend, somewhat facetiously, that the Century of Renunciation (Vairāgya Śataka) displays more surreptitious concupiscence than the earlier "Century of Dalliance" (Śriṅgāra Śataka). However, the consummate attitude of the poet

using nature-objects manifest itself in the traditional manner :

(from Bhartṛhari's Vairāgya-Śataka)

"When will those days come when I can take my seat on the Ganges' banks on a rock of the snowy mountain, and fixing my thoughts forever on Brahman fall into the deep sleep of contemplation, while the deer fearlessly rub their horns on my limbs ? O mother earth, father wind, friend fire, loved kinsman water, brother ether, for the last time I clasp my hands before you in homage. I now merge in the highest Brahman, since through my abundance of good deeds, born of union with you, I have won pure and brilliant knowledge and thus have cast aside all the power of confusion."

(Translated, A. B. Keith, History, p. 180)

Medieval and post-medieval Vaiṣṇava poetry can be said to be the bridge between the classical and the modern, vernacular age of Indian poetry, particularly in Bengal. The vast lyrical literature centering around the person of Krishna represents to perfection the two traits which are ubiquitous in Indian poetry, with reference to the place it assigns to nature : the ascending hierarchy nature object — the contemplating subject — the ultimate aim of non-natural beatitude ; and homologizations in what the occidental critic would feel to be a hypertrophical degree— this latter trait being bound up with the incredible wealth of synonyms for natural objects. Archer puts it succinctly* :

* W. G. Archer. *The loves of Krishna*, New-York 1957.

"the Indian artist employed poetic symbols to charge his subjects with romantic ardor. Flowers were never merely flowers nor clouds clouds. The symbols of Indian poetry — the lotus swaying in the stream, the flowering creeper embracing a trunk — were intended to suggest passion-haunted ladies. The mingling of clouds, rain and lightning symbolized the embraces of lovers, and commonplace objects such as dishes, vases, ewers and lamps were brought into subtle conjuction to hint at 'the right and true end of love."

(author's quotes ; this implies our "hierarchy" again : for although the instruments are used teleologically, the final cause does not necessarily show up — though it is implied. For "the right end of love" does not stand in its own right — it has to lead up to spiritual consummation) .

The sentiment (*rasa*) of "*bhakti*" — i. e. religious fervour devotion to a personally conceived deity, and "*Śriṅgāra*", i. e. the erotic sentiment, are declared as being identical in this important literary phase. The famous poem "Gītāgovinda" by the medieval Bengali poet Jayadeva not only represents the finest Sanskrit lyrical style, but it is the most fabulous example of this identification : a passionate, detailed poem, using the raptures of sexual indulgence as symbols of the eternal desire of the soul for communion with its lord, and their final absorption in each other.

Vidyāpati, the Maithili poet of fame, who lived slightly

later, composed hundreds of poems in which the two *rasas* have been identified. For example :

"O friend, I cannot tell you,
whether he was near or far, real or a dream.
Like a vine of lightning,
As I chained the dark one (i. e. Radha speaking about Krishna)
I felt a river flooding in my heart.
Like a shining moon,
I devoured that liquid face.
I felt stars shooting around me.
The sky fell with my dress,
Leaving my ravished breasts.
I was rocking like the earth.
I could hear my ankle-bells,
Sounding like bees.
Drowned in the last-waters of dissolution.
I knew that this was not the end.
Says Vidyāpati :
How can I possibly believe such nonsense ?"
(Translated, Archer, "The Loves of Krishna," p. 89 f.)

I said in the beginning that some sort of nature poetry for its own sake, i. e. the use of nature as an instrument per se, could hardly be found in Indian literature except in the very earliest and again in our own era — for different reasons, these two periods seem to be able to enjoy nature in its own right (the different reasons could be styled under the rubrics "not yet" and "no more," respectively : in the early Ṛgveda, the metaphysical

frame had not been cast; in the days of Indian vernacular poetry of this century and the late nineteenth, the frame was felt to be either obsolescent or insufficient, no doubt due to the contact with the West's romantic poetry).

There is a beautiful poem in Tagore's "Mohua," which might be a paradigm of an incipient rejection of the metaphysical cast :

O Waterfall ! in thy clear sparkling stream
The sun and stars see their image.
In a corner of that surface
I sometimes cast my own shadow;
Rock it and mingle with it in laughter.
Thine own rippling music;
Give it voice,
The voice that is eternally thine.
The poet in me is intoxicated this day
With the image, made half of my shadow,
Half of thy laughter.
The flashes of thy sparkling light
Give languages of my heart,
And in thee, O waterfall,
I see incarnate my muse."

(Translated, Aurobindo Basu)

Here at last nature stands in its own right, and the muse appears to be an *ancilla poesiae.*

CHAPTER VI

THE PLACE OF WOMAN IN INDIAN THOUGHT

If you want to be really radical about social studies in a specific culture, you select the topic that is least talked about in that culture, the topic that is felt to be the most delicate there, the topic that is given the most stereotype treatment by the guardians of the tradition of the social group, or tribe, or nation, under scrutiny. In the case of India—not *only* in the case of India—woman is this epitome of cultural delicacy. Not woman as mother, as sister, as daughter-in-law, or as saint, because these are the stereotype descriptions and expostulations referring to woman, in the Indian tradition, but to woman *qua* woman, to woman as the sexual partner of man, not again with a view to motherhood, as mothers of the future citizens of Bharat, of scholars, heroes, and saints, because these are all parts of the stereotype behind which we have to get if the social margin of Indian thought is to be explored to its greatest possible depth.

I shall try to indicate a functional parallel between the Indian thinkers' attitude about their scholastic objects and the Indian traditional and modern scholars' attitude about women, choosing woman as the paradigm rather

than any other social object, because woman presents the most delicate theme, the theme around which the greatest number of taboos cluster, in the Indian tradition, big or little.

I do not think that Indian ideas about woman have undergone any significant changes, in spite of the oft-proclaimed notion that Indian women were honoured and respected in the oldest days, and were less honoured and less respected, losing much of their pristine high status due to the negative influence of invading civilizations. There have been no significant changes, simply because the axioms have remained stagnant : that woman's first, and morally only proper place is that of a mother, and instrumental to it, of a wife, obedient to her husband and to her mother-in-law, to all the people in her husband's house — in short, to all people, is as axiomatic as it was at any time. True, women have become ambassadors and high-commissioners, top figures in political party echelons, vicechancellors at universities, perhaps more than elsewhere. But — and this is crucial — their self-image and the image India conceives of them, remains the same, their modern achievements are marginal embellishments, because they have no freedom to assert their womanhood as such. The noble ladies of ancient and medieval India complained that it was only the *gaṇikās* who had fun and who could aqurie knowledge, and the arts. The 64 fine arts and skills the *hetaira* was supposed to acquire, were inaccessible to the married gentlewoman. This is breaking down, in

metropolitan areas, no doubt, largely through the pioneering efforts of people like Tagore — not so much Gandhi, though, because he was not only not interested in woman *qua* woman, but he resented every possibility of woman asserting her womanhood, and her claim to the enjoyment of being a woman. Arthur Koestler, in his infamous, but important "The Lotus and the Robot" said "that God had created him as man and woman, Gandhi never forgave Him", or words to that effect.

There seems to be a pattern pervading all highly patriarchical societies, in India and abroad : women, as soon as they can formulate their ideas, and as soon as they gain status within their husbands' families, as mothers of sons that is, tend to underwrite the patriarchical system, and will persecute any female dissenter more vehemently than the male patriarchs themselves would. The male patriarch has at least a potential desire to please woman, due to perfectly natural and, hopefully, normal causes. This potential empathy or sympathy adds to the patriarchical fury of the matriarch in the house. In the patriarchical society, the matron identifies herself with the patriarchical lawgiver; hence her becoming an ambassador, a college president, or a ranking politician is a vicarious extension of patriarchy, not a move away from it. The Smārta Brahmin gentleman in the South who told me that he would not send his daughter to college — although he could well afford to — because 'only prostitutes learn to sing and dance and mathematics', may have been anachronous in 1955, but it

reflects an attitude which has slipped into the unconscious with the less naively orthodox of modern India.

Thus, to the modern Indian woman, B. A., M. A., or Ph. D., just as to the modern Indian peasant woman, things deep down are pretty much the same as they were when the Aryans had settled in the two river plains. For study, wealth, status and position, all these are acquired and augmented *ad maiorem traditionis gloriam*, to substantiate the official status of women : again, as obedient wives, daughters-in-law, and mothers *only*, or, in case of the few, but numerically increasing number of old maids in the cities of India, to exemplify the services that woman as mother and wife can give to a society in which woman counts only as mother and wife, and where woman as lover has the perpetual stigma of the harlot.

Khajuraho, Konarak, Belur and Halebid are all-right (though Mahatma Gandhi despised them and the late Purushottamdas Tandon wanted to have them torn down) — but these are in stone, and the women are *apsarasas* or *yakṣiṇīs*, never really quite human; for if they were, they would be harlots, sacred or profane.

Did the tantric tradition effect any change in this ideological pattern ? I don't think it really did. For although woman as initiate *vidyā*, or *śakti*, or, in the Buddhist ·Vajrayāna school, as *mudrā* ranks on a par with the male adept as long as the *sādhanā* lasts, she cannot preserve her status outside the ritualistic

situation. Also, the tantric texts themselves echo the all-over ideology of the patriarch whom they tried so valiantly to oppose, because they make 'low' women the best candidates for the *vāmācāra* rites : the *ḍombī*, the washerwoman, the *caṇḍālinī*, the fisher-maiden is an eligible partner, not the Brahmin or kṣattriya lady. This ties in with the subtle, but pervasive feeling India's folklore has sustained through the ages, that lowcaste, darkly pigmented women are somehow more passionate and hence more sinful; "*kālī hai nakhrevālī*;" with a little smirch on the lips of the speaker, is considerably more than just a homely adage in a synchronistic perspective.

I have chosen the topic of woman as the concluding paradigm in this study, because, as the most highly tabooed theme, it lends itself as the illustration *par excellence* for the social margin of Indian thought, and if this can be brought out here, the assorted topics of this study will fully justify the title of the book.

With the exception of the ideologically insignificant albeit scholastically all-important logical and epistemological schools of Indian philosophy, all the great schools — Vedānta, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna Buddhism, and their various offshoots and emulations — postulate two sets of values, and two sets of reality : the absolute or *paramārtha* and the phenomenal or *vyavahāra* (*saṃvṛti*) set, which are mutually exclusive in the sense that their cakes cannot be eaten and had. Now it seems to me that the official, well-stressed, and often reiterated statement about the equality of woman in the 'pure' Hindu tra-

dition — unaffected, that is, by Islamic and other imported models — can be upheld if the speakers use the time-honoured rhetoric of eclecticism — of the type "our scriptures honour women" ; the vast number of texts, Manu, Parāśara, the Bhagavadgītā, and what not, which are replete with disparaging remarks about women, are just not mentioned or are systematically ignored. It can only be sustained, however, with a special type of naivete : the role of woman in society is defined once for all — mother of sons and heroes, wives of noble husbands or ignoble men, but *pativratās* all the same, and perhaps passive participants in the ritual (*sahadharminī*) , though in the latter case a golden image might suffice, occasionlly, as in Rāmachandra's terminal *yajña.* Apart from this definition, there is none, and nothing else is permissible – woman as lover, woman as autonomous thinker, not geared to what the male teachers say or approve of — Gārgī's head would come off her charming trunk if she kept irritating the males around her — these are not even contemplated.

There were some classical genres, now long in disuse and disrepute in all but purely literary discussion, which did give a woman a rather sophisticated, almost humanistic place — the *kāmaśāstra* and *kāvyaśāstra* genres study and explore the possibilities of woman *per se* ; for once their psycho-somatic types are enumerated in whatever fanciful or sterile a fashion, side by side with male types, the male prerogative is, for once, laid aside. But although a Hindu lady may read or act or discuss the deeds of Śakun-

talā or Draupadī, she may not emulate them : the literary genre is watertight and does not permit extraliterary application.

Prof. Mircea Eliade of Chicago University has given us a heuristic device for an ethnological division of the ancient people of India, most helpful for this particular analysis. He wrote* that ancient India had two main populations — the Indians and the Aryans; the latter were relative latecomers — and we take the various populations that might have been there earlier, both Proto-Indian Mundari etc., and Dravidian, as one bloc for our purpose, calling them "Indian' in contradistinction to 'Aryan'. I would now say without qualms that the chief ethnological — not philosophical — difference in the concept of woman lies in the difference between the ancient 'Aryan' and the ancient Indian attitude toward woman, and toward religion. This is an anthropological preamble to a philosophical conclusion, and leads up to the latter — and I am quite deliberately doing something here which is frowned upon in American academia — I am attempting an anthropological and a philosophical analysis of the same topic under one heading :

The Indian (in Eliade's sense) climate was basically matrifocal, sometimes by social law (as among the Nayers of Kerala and some Assamese groups), sometimes in a less institutionalized fashion, by a sort of shared temperament; Kerala, of course, provides the one classical para-

*M. Eliade, Yoga : Immortality and Freedom, Panthcon, New-York 1959.

digm of a matrilineal and matrilocal society, but its 'Aryanization' is occurring right *in our days*, when the modernists of Kerala want to shed the *maramakkaṭayam* system, and change into a good, clean, patriarchal, all-Indian type of inceptively nuclear family structure; which is easy : the Nayer or Menon just leaves his *tārwād*, his mothers house, and settles elsewhere with his wife — conceived in the Aryan fashion as a nuclear spouse bearing children who will bear his name.

The religious parallel is equally interesting, Pre-Aryan India worshipped the *magna maier* as its ubiquitous deity, if we can judge from preliterary archaeological and other admissible evidence such as the clearly non-Vedic elements in early Indian Folklore the mother-goddess, who was also the locus or all eroticity was worshipped in almost all of the areas of the ancient world, and it was perhaps only the Jews who kept her out, and had a hard time to do so — Astarte-Asheroth, the golden calf, and the other pervasive manifestations of female cults surrounded ancient Israel in a conspicuous fashion, and abomination, "*to'ebah*" was virtually identified with matrifocal ritual, and with gynocentric beliefs in general. The goddess, with all the emblems of fertile and aggressive womanhood, must have ruled supreme from Kanyā Kumārī to Kashmere, and in fact she does rule as Kanyā Kumārī and Kṣīr-Bhavānī in these two and many more spots*. In the

*vd. D. C. Sircar, "The Śākta Pīṭhas" JRSAB, XIV, Calcutta 1948, and my "Pilgrimage in the Indian Tradition" in Journal of the History of Religions. Chicago 1963.

oldest portions of the *saṃhitā*, the pristine canonical literature of the Aryans themselves, she had an equal share with her male fellow-gods, gradually losing out in an increasingly patrifocal pantheon; for in due course, her status became more and more subdued, until in later times she changed into the meek spouse or even the handmaiden of a deity conceived as supremely male. In the shrines of average Hinduism, the modest spouse, Lakṣmī or Pārvatī or Sītā, sits at the feet, or on the ascriptively inferior side of the god—the position Aryan India imposed on woman as wife.

India today is one of the most uncompromisingly patriarchical countries, British-puritanically inspired legislation adding to this grievance. As I showed earlier the Indian woman of today accepts this place with little demurring, whatever oratory of self-defence society offers by way of vicarious reconciliation or quasi-compensation. The model is somewhat like this "you (and we.....) women must not have our full share of sexual choice..... because it is impure and you (we) have something nobler ("spirituality," the bearing of sons, the being of chaste wives to husbands of whatever demeanour)..... and, secondarily, you (we) do not really want it." Not that the model covers both men and women, the parlance is shared, because woman in patrifocal societies reinforces the patriarchical argument. I believe that of all classical women, Draupadī might be the exception — she is a strong woman, and seeks her own status in the face of opposition; psychologically, she is the only challenge to Yudhiṣṭhira, in the whole clan.

The Brahmin lawgivers, of course, made no bones about their attitude toward women, nor about wanting their attitudes to be shared. Manu implies the best wife is she who does not talk back, and his classical fellow-lawgivers abound in emphasizing the woman's ancillary position — she is chattel, to her father, or to her husband; she is disenfranchised from autonomy, she always belongs to somebody.

However, we are not so much concerned here with the actual function of woman in Indian society, as with her ascribed statuses. For however vehemently the Indian lawgivers and the socio-religious preceptors denigrated woman *qua* woman, from Yajñavalkya to Gandhi, they never scored a complete victory over her. In folklore and religious narrative, woman asserts herself — at least she successfully tempts the holy, and she chastens the pride of the ascetic, that cynosure of Indian life and of the Indian modal character, and great heroes and gods are born through woman's victory, Ūmā's over Śiva, Menakā's over Viśvamitra.

The Sāṃkhya school of thought is perhaps older than Buddhism, and it has had an enormous influence on Indian thought in later centuries. It teaches a dualistic view of the cosmic order, i. e. that of the unconscious but kinetic principle of action and passion, *prakṛti* 'nature' — here, for once, the ordinary language term coincides with the lexicographical need of the technical term —, and the conscious, knowing, static principle of 'spirit' *puruṣa*; the latter neither participates nor interferes with the events

which constitute *prakṛtī*, the function of the *puruṣa* being analogous to that of a catalytic agent. This ancient dualism has been working in almost every bit of Indian thought, and it has more widely ramified effects than is usually assumed; for not only did it provide the male-female model by anthropomorphic analogy, but I also think that it is at the back of the entire *paramārtha-vyavahāra (saṃvṛti)* dichotomy in all Indian thought to come after Sāṃkhya : the 'feel' for the absolute, unaffected by and inactive vis-a-vis the phenomenal, might well have been due, at all times, to the model set by the archaic Sāṃkhya. The model then made its way into far-off regions, wherever Indian tutelage was accepted — the Tibetan *yab yum* of course, is an obverse replica of the *Śiva-śakti* complex (obverse because, Vajrayāna Buddhism changes the roles of the Hindu theme : *karuṇa* or *upāya (thabs)* are hypostasized as male, identified with the Buddha principle, whereas *prajñā (śes rab)*, intuitive realization, are identified with the female principle, the consorts of the Buddhas. The Chinese *yin-yan* symbolism belongs to the Taoist tradition, but some of the finest scholars* tend to agree that there might have been some Buddhist-Taoist contact in Southwestern China, where Taoism indeed had its origin.

The hermaphrodite pattern of Indian iconography — the *Ardhanārīśvara* complex, and its numerous South Indian variants presupposes an open ended interpretation

*vd. H. Maspero, *"Nourrir le principe vital dans la religion taoiste ancienne —", Journal Asiatique*, Paris 1937, Vol. CCXXVIII.

of the old Śaṃkhya dualism, and the monistic doctrines of the Vedānta and the absolutist Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna Buddhist schools absorbed the fundamental dualism in a sort of integral calculus : for the monistic-absolutistic philosophers, the dichotomy was moved out into method, when the content became monistic—Indian monistic absolutism always rests on a methodological dualism, i. e. the ubiquitous dichotmoy between the *paramārtha* and the *vyavahāra* spheres. This, incidentally, provides the key to the total situation that has baffled western scholars, and annoyed Christian missionaries : how monistic is Indian monism ? How absolute is *brahman* or the Mahāyāna-Vajrayāna *śūnya*, when the phenomenal world has to be eschewed dialectically, before absolutism becomes the orthodox doctrine ? All this appears much clearer when we see this puzzling situation under a Sāṃkhyan rubric which, though not admitted by any except the few Sāṃkhyan pandits, nevertheless creates a *Gestalt* in Indian thought, and as we shall see in the conclusion following immediately, in its social margin, with woman as its paradigm.

Do these overtly gynocentric speculations — tantric and other — really affect the concept of woman as a mundane being ? I don't think they do; but they create a lasting uneasiness, a disparity within the concept of woman in India. The builders of India's society and its cultural preceptors did not really regard woman as on a par with man, their occasional perorations declaring equality do not withstand critical scrutiny; Bhartṛhari

sings their charm, but feels guilty about his own appreciation, which yields the strangely paradoxical result, explicable in elementary psychological terms, that his Vairāgyaśatakam* sounds far more exuberant and passionate in its disclaimer of the senses, than the Śriṅgāraśatakām* which extols them, rather halfheartedly. It often seems that the greatest honour given to woman *qua* woman consists in her being an aid to the male adept's emancipation through a negative office, i. e. through having rejected her allurement.

The tantric thinker and commentator did extol woman as divine, she is either *śakti* or *prajñā*; and both Hindu tantrics and Vajrayāna aspirants use the identical *dhyānam* "*aham devi na cānyosmi...*"; but then again, woman outside the tantric circle, outside the ritualistic-cum-redemptive frame, has no status even with him, and he too is subject to the highly complex frustration and make-shift pattern adumbrated in the above. On the one hand, he extols woman as the receptacle and the representative of the divine, on the other, she is a servant, chattel, a dependent entity, the second at best in the social hierarchy; in tantric and kindred contemplation, she is the ruler, the inscrutable mother, alike in forms of loveliness and horror, outside the *cakra* she is at best a chaste, obedient wife and the mother to the son's of her husband; in the most unsophisticated, pervasive style of Hindu parlance, she will refer to him, or call him, as 'father of so and so' — there is

*q. v. Previous Chapter.

really no accepted equivalent of 'my husband' in unwesternized Indian speech.

This leads us to our conclusion; the parallel between our treatment of Indian thought and of the concept of woman in Hindu society, or in other words, woman as paradigmatical for the social margin of Indian thought, is to be found in the *paramārtha* and *vyavahāra* dichotomy, which I claim to be the most pervasive feature of Indian traditional methodology. This is closely tied up with the Hindu (and Buddhist or Jaina) scholar's traditional profession that his immediate object of research (logic, rhetoric, disputation, and all the rest) is not of ultimate interest to him, that it is ancillary to the *mukti*-complex. I am now reversing the generally held idea that the savants of the Indian tradition who wrote logic and science were *not really interested* in the religious pattern to which they paid lip-service in order to pass parade. I think it is very much the opposite — not only was it no lip-service, but a total and committed admission of a greater teleological concern, that made them write and comment, in logical, or other scientific terminology, *toward* the redemptive framework, toward the *mukti*-complex. Seen in this light, the declarations of Vātsyāyana who assured his readers that he had composed the text in complete austerity, seem much less humorous than they were thought to be so far. Now when we extend this pattern to our final paradigm, it seems to follow that woman, even when viewed in her primary function, i. e. as opposed to the male in the polarprimary relation (i. e.

not as mother, social mate, etc.), cannot be the ultimate focus of enquiry — no more, than logic can be the ultimate focus of the Brahmin, Buddhist, or Jaina logicians— whose ultimate, *pāramārthika* focus lies outside, or if you wish, 'beyond' the immediate object of research, whatever 'beyond' may mean — '*para* —' '*uttara* —' and the other equivalents of 'beyond' are persuasive sememes, nondescriptive in content, in Indian traditional literature.

Now the *Gestalt* remains unaffected — and this is very important—even when the 'ultimate' interest in the study of woman is, say, cultural, or social, and not directly religious. For the *paramārtha-vyavahāra* dichotomy works on many levels, and is relative — psychological and not in any sense ontological — other than in its scriptural archetypes, i. e. in religio-philosophical literature and commentary. Whatever a scholar does, whatever a lawgiver suggests and enjoins, his ultimate object — his *paramārtha* object is different from his immediate object; except for the comparatively narrow genre where the *paramārtha* is the immediate object as well, i. e. in Vedāntic, Mādhyamika, and other nuclear religious literature.

I believe a diagrammatic model might be helpful; it shows how every possible topic — poetry, woman, food. and whatever else Indian written lore, or the Indian 'big tradition' might have used — is approached under the rubric of the ubiquitous dichotomy :

Subject—	Objcct of Immediate Research — —	Final Object
the scholar—	logic, mathematics, *ayurveda*, the 'sciences'	*mukti*, or equivalents (*mokṣa apavarga*, *kaivalya*, *nirvāṇa*, *etc*)
the poet—	drama, lyric, poetics, etc. — — —	*mukti*, „ „
the artist—	dance, song, instrumental music, etc, — —	*mukti*, „ „
the lawgiver—	people, kings, woman, etc. — — —	the ideal society, eventually conducing to *mukti*, or equivalent
Rāmacandra—	Sītā — — — — —	'Rāmrājya', eventually conducive to *mukti* etc.
the tantric *sādhaka*—	woman, ritualistic copulation etc. — —	*mukti*, or equivalents
the orthodox Hindu male—	the orthodox Hindu female — — —	'culture' as conducive to *mukti*, etc.
etc.		
etc.		
any agent—	any object of investigation or instrument of action in culture — — —	*mukti*, complex or *mukti*, ushering pattern
The Cultural Agent in tradition—	the instrument *vyavahāra*, *saṃvṛti*— — —	the ultimate object *paramārtha*

The right column indicates that *paramārtha* is the referend, the inevitably final functor in the Indian cultural action pattern, and 'woman', like 'poetry' are not eligible as final referends. This might look like an orthodox Indian diagram — but the rubric is different : its author regrets this state of affairs as a humanist, and admires it as a lover of tradition.

It might be held against this, that woman is not officially, or even unofficially regarded *qua* woman, in essence in totally different cultural areas; that the 'good' Jewish woman is the good daughter and the good wife in the first place, or that the American woman, ideally, is her husband's companion. All this is true; but quite apart from the irrelevance of such suggestions — this book is about the Indian situation, and does not warrant uniqueness of social patterns — what is unique about the Indian situation as contrary to other culture regions, is precisely the *vyavahāra-paramārtha* dichotomy, which works only in India itself and in the few areas which came under the complete spiritual and cultural tutelage of India (I am thinking mainly of pre - 1955 Tibet, and of Ceylon). Given our chief paradigm, woman, in the comparison with other regions of the world, particularly regions of equally wide cultural achievement and sophistication, the following decisive distinction seems to emerge : in the U. S. A., in the New World and in Europe, perhaps also in Japan and other, non-Indianized *Hochkultur*-areas in Asia, woman is indeed viewed as instrumental toward some wider, cultural, religious, or kinship-oriented aim.

But — and this is the crucial point — in these regions, she is *also* viewed as woman, as an autonomous moral agent with her own sexual and more widely feminine decisions about herself, with a choice of her function. She is so viewed, not perhaps by the clergy and by the 'leaders', but by many, by intellectuals, writers, and others. In other words, the autonomous woman, the woman *qua* woman, as well as her defenders, *have an audience* in these lands; they have *no* audience in India. The Indian male and the Indian woman, with the exception of perhaps a couple of hundreds who have studied analytical philosophy or modern thought in Britain or North America, permit freedom in sexual decisions, autonomy and personal, kinship-independent arbitration only to the harlot. This pattern works so powerfully and pervasively, that the process of falling in line has become automatical, unconscious, even among those who have the qualifications to make cultural criticism. Thus, the girl or the lady who dances *Bharata Naṭyam* before an audience of males and women, does so, if she has learnt the art well, with all the sensuous, tender exuberance the *śāstra* prescribes for the *mudrās* and *abhinayas*; the *gopī* indicates *pīna-payodharā*, 'fat-breastedness' by an unequivocal, charmingly naive gesture, which is not in any sense 'symbolic'; but she does not identify herself with the total symbol. Women who did that, were a *jāti*; the *devadāsī*, the institutionalized, ritualistically condoned harlot alone could be autonomous, that was the *svadharma* of her birth. But any girl, any woman who did not belong to the castes to which feminine behaviour with an erotic emphasis was

ascribed by tradition, would be thought to act meretriciously if she emulated the *gopī*, or *Ūmā*, or Śakuntalā in her life. And of course, the moment a particular kind of action or attitude is thought of as the *dharma* of a particular social group, it can no longer be autonomous in the ethical sense. If a woman can live her own life, making her own sexual choices, only as an institutionalized harlot, as member of a harlot-*jātī*, it means that woman *cannot* act *qua* woman in that society and keep her selfrespect, her integrity.

This is one of the topics Indian thought never even tried to approach; the idea of a meta-language, or a corpus of critique of cultural*, endogenous norms, never occurred to Indians until they were exposed to the West — and they, with some few exceptions, they recoiled from the possibility.

The individual per se, and woman *a fortiori*, must not be nurtured : it must be overcome. sublimated, merged, annihilated, whatever the specific sectarian slant or jargon. The idea of humanism cannot enter so long as the human individual is an instrument to some supra-individual state. The most frequent orthodox criticism of esoteric forms of religion — *sahajayāna*, *puṣṭimārga*, the more erotocentric *bhakti*-cults — has been, and is, that these practices are *pretexts* for indulgence; in other words, that the possible moral autonomy of man and

---

*vd. my article "Cultural Criticism as a Tool for the Social Sciences" Quest No. 33, Bombay 1962.

woman is surreptitiously transferred to the *paramārthika* realm, as it cannot be effected in the *vyavahāra*. But here again, the orthodox critic opts out from any humanist value system, from any cosmopolitan world-view; for he constantly implies that autonomy is bad, that freedom of choice is undesirable. He charges that the *paramārthika* sphere is not taken seriously — which presupposes, at the end of the dialectical chain which brings him to this point of criticism, that the *vyavahāra* is not really important, in the long run. But humanism, morality, aesthetics, philosophy, they all work in the *vyavahāra*, and there can be no moral freedom so long as the *vyavahāra* is not made the moral end.



EPILOGUE

The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series has published works of the most unusual scholarly heterogeneity. I feel that a cultural anthropologist should add his views to the variegated topics some of the finest scholars have dealt with in this Series : a synoptic, yet critical view of Indian thought and its social margins seemed an urgent desideratum.

On three continents, I have been exhorting friends and students to declare their axioms whenever they want to say something to a learned audience. Here, I define an axiom as a set of biases which the individual who has them either cannot or will not eradicate. It is meet, therefore, that I declare my axioms, not so much in the hope that this will mitigate some of the ennui which this book will no doubt cause to many Indian and some occidental scholars, as in the hope that it will make my points more intelligible to them.

First, then, I believe that cultural criticism is the most important pursuit of the anthropologist and -- unconnected with the anthropologist's office — that it is the most important contribution to a greater understanding between different cultural groups ; in this, I stand radically opposed to all those who believe that the showing of similarities is more conducive to the survival of the human race than the showing of differences, in the intellectual order of things. For, if the proposition "let's get together, because we have

so many teachings in common" were true, then the proposition "if scholars prove that we do not have so many teachings in common, we would have to fight" would follow by material implication. The denial of this notion is my basic article of faith, in matters of scholarly discourse.

My second axiom — relevant to the subject matter of this book — is that hedonism in a civilized, refined form is a desirable, valid world-view, and that it is the only autonomous one. Here, I take guidance from Epicurus, who is reported to have said "I do good, and do not commit evil, not because the City of Athens wishes it, nor the Areopag, nor because it is pleasant to the gods, but because it is a pleasure to do good." However, to explain my axiom, good is what the intellectual, trained, sympathetic individual decides to be good in each specific situation — I deny external arbitration, be that of the lawgivers, or the crowd, or of some god.

This study was based on a wide series of lectures on comparative thought and on comparative social systems, which I delivered during the last few years at over a dozen Japanese, Canadian, and American universities, to scholars and students of the liberal arts, and particularly to students of comparative religion and philosophy.

A few words of apology are necessary, together with a few words of warning : there is quite a bit of **Weltanschauung** *contained in these pages. More, no doubt, than is permissible in a purely anthropological tract, less, though, than in an ethical, philosophical tract. It is an experi-*

ment — aimed mainly at a learned Indian audience — in committed, involved anthropology : a well-defined, constantly reiterated philosophical attitude is, in my opinion, as much a tool for culturological research, as the avowedly value-free description of informants' statements.

Being mainly for an Indian audience, familiarity with the numerous Sanskrit **termini** *was assumed. For my occidental readers, I must point out that my use of 'linguistic' and 'philological' does not coincide, in this book, with the use of these terms in a contemporary European and American technical context : I do not presuppose acquaintance with structural linguistics, general semantics, and analytical philosophy for my Indian readers, and hence I use these terms in the connotations known in modern Indian universities.*

Next, lest some should get annoyed at a certain repetitiousness of some arguments (particularly centering on the notions of **darśana, vyavahāra, paramārtha** *and other key-notions) , I would here point out that these complex terms, seemingly innocuous to most Indian scholars so far, had to be approached from slightly diversified angles ; thorough reading and re-reading, however, will show that different facets of the highly structured problems clustering around these terms have been brought out in seemingly similar contexts. Thus, Chapter IV summarized the chief problems of this study, and might profitably be read again by those who would not like to study the elaboration of the themes set in that chapter ; however, the arguments set forth in that chapter are by no means complete, and not*

ultimately negotiable without seeing the full arguments worked out in the other chapters ; and very little about the social margin of Indian thought will be found in Chapter IV.

My profound thanks go to Dean Bailey of the Maxwell School of Public Affairs and Citizenship, Syracuse University, for the financial assistance he granted to me when writing this book ; to Professor Meadows, chairman of my department, and to the Center of Overseas Studies at Syracuse University, for their generous support through easing my teaching load for the purpose of research. They have indeed fulfilled the motto that encircles the emblem of Syracuse University in New-York : SUOS CULTORES SCIENTIA CORONAT, in Sanskrit -- स्वपालकानभिसिञ्चति विद्या संराज्ये ॥ *a thesis equally germane to scholarship in India and the West.*

INDEX