INDIA A STUDY IN FUTURISM



AM RATNA GUPTA

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INDIA

A Study in Futurism

FOREWORD BY P. N. HAKSAR
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY R. C. DUTT

Edited by
SHYAM RATNA GUPTA

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



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उपाध्यक्ष
योजना आयोग
नई दिल्ली
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
Planning Commission
New Delhi

FOREWORD

I am torn between two conflicting emotions in responding to the invitation of Mr. Shyam Ratna Gupta to say a few words on "Futurism in General". My first reaction is to revolt against putting into circulation another "ism". Futurism can neither be an ideology nor a science. I do not believe that it is possible to predict the precise manner in which a given socio-political system would evolve. As for determining "normative choices" for the future, frankly I do not understand how are these to be derived. I also suspect that excursions into "Futurism" are often motivated by a desire to escape from the obligations of understanding the past and the present.

I agree with the observations made by Mr. R.C. Dutt that "a more meaningful exercise in futurism is to study the present and the past and to determine the factors which, on a normative view, should be worked on, developed and shaped for the future".

However, how does one study the past? This in itself raises the whole problem of having a view of history. As for the present, is there an objective view of the present? Even more difficult is the question of establishing a causal connection between the past and the present; for it involves elaborating a theory of social change. What is that theory? I feel that every scholar writing on one aspect or another of the

future must lay bare the inarticulate major premises of his reasoning.

I began by saying that I am torn between two conflicting emotions. Perhaps a calmer view of "Futurism" might be to take comfort in the knowledge that from times immemorial mankind has always been interested in knowing his own future, that of his near and dear ones, of his society or of his country. We always had soothsayers, astrologers, crystal-gazers, palmists, readers of tea-leaves, gypsies and so on. Why then object to "Futurism"?

In a country like ours so hag-ridden with superstition and held in captivity by miraclemen, astrologers, and species of brokers between God and man, an attempt to apply scientific methodology to a study of our society is, of course, to be welcomed. We might endeavour to see whither it might go if, for instance, population continues to grow at whatever rate it is growing; or capital formation remains stagnant at a particular point or surplus wealth is not distributed to create everwidening employment opportunities; or whether agricultural production might not be sensitive to water, seed, fertilizer, pesticide and credit if the sharecropping system were to continue. All these and many more questions can be subjected to detailed study on the assumption that the evolution of India can be isolated from the interaction of the rest of the world on us. If "Futurism" means all these things and more, let us have it.

New Delhi

(P. N. Haksar)
17.5.76

EDITOR'S NOTE

Towards the middle of 1972, it was decided that, to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of independence, beginning from 15 August that year, the *Indian and Foreign Review*, a political-literary fortnightly, published from New Delhi, should attempt to bring out a special number, as other newspapers, magazines and journals were proposing to do not only throughout the country but also in other countries.

At that point of time, in spite of the significant progress and substantial achievements made by India in various fields of activity, she still faced a multiplicity of problems of a varied nature. Secondly, as the *Review*, since it started publication on 15 October 1963, had not published any special number, it was felt that, notwithstanding the importance of the occasion, we might do something more than merely "write up" free India's creditable performance. Thirdly, it was clearly realised that growth and progress, which must necessarily be accompanied by social, economic and political changes, possibly at an accelerated pace, had added to the complexity and magnitude of the problems of India and the world.

When I placed these views before Mr. R.C. Dutt, a senior officer of the Indian Civil Service, he generally endorsed them but suggested, with rare prescience, that we might project possible lines of advancement in various areas in the coming years against the background of the trials and triumphs of free India. This suggestion—a minute seed, so to say, for a study of futurism, possibly the first of its kind in India—was a

novel one, and I followed it up by consulting groups of intellectuals in academic circles in Delhi and other parts of the country. I thought that we might attempt articles on futurism but added that the scope and development of topics should be left to the discretion of the authors themselves, as they could draw profiles, in segments of their specialisation, of future India. It was also obvious to all of us that as future history or prospects in the coming years must necessarily be informed by and interpret processes of definable continuity, as also, of course, of discontinuity, these articles should deal with India's multi-directional advances in the preceding twenty-five years as well. Happily I had an overwhelming response from many of the writers and their articles, somewhat disparate though they turned out to be, which were to be published in our 15 September 1972 number, spilled over into the succeeding one, as the former had already far exceeded the average format of 28 pages and had turned into a "bumper" issue of 52 pages.

Ever since these two numbers were published, there has been a steady demand for copies of them from all over the world, especially from institutions engaged in futurology. Within the country also, generous references were made to this political-literary endeavour on futurism, as it was regarded in some ways as breaking new ground in free India. Among these references was one made by the late Mr. Durgadas, a veteran journalist, having an incomparable news sense, who, in his political commentary of 26 September 1972, wrote in what might be best called a critical appreciation of futurology:

"Meanwhile, the intellectual elite which feels politically paralysed is deriving satisfaction from a study of futurology. This hobby has been helped by the special number of the *Indian and Foreign Review* to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of independence. This publication...is largely designed for readers overseas. The issue is dramatised as 'a study in futurism' and two contributions make sensational forecasts.

"The author of the article on *India in 1997*...derides prophets of doom 'about India in decades ahead' and particularly questions the note of pessimism struck by a Japanese analyst who, projecting into the year 1984, states that in addition to

social backwardness and the chaos which come from the complexity of race, religion, the caste system and language differences, 'the extreme poverty of most of her people will prevent India from developing modern industries as fast as she would wish to in the coming twenty years'.

"The contributor forecasts on the other hand: 'Before the year 2000 dawns upon India, we are likely to witness what seems impossible at present—the demise of the clerks; the phasing out of typists and stenographers; and the retreat of the book-keepers and accountants... Coinciding with the demise of this white collar class will be the emergence of a class composed of highly skilled personnel indispensable to the working of both the private and public sectors. These researchers and technicians working in areas as wide apart as genetics and satellite communications will be engaged largely in the generation and processing of information. Even political processes will increasingly depend upon them.'

"The final conclusion of the writer is quite hair-raising: 'This coming class is likely to be both internationalist as well as anti-bureaucratic in its ethos, because of the nature and quality of its work functions. The ascendency of this class will alter the parameters of politics as it has been understood so far—it will bring with it the security and the fraternal ethos of the competent and the eclipse of governance by charisma.'

"As if to complete the picture, the *Review* publishes an interview with Dr. Richard Buckminster Fuller, a scientist, architect, humanist and philosopher. Contending that 'poverty is the consequence of ignorance', Dr. Fuller states: 'It is highly feasible with the resources now at our hand to take care of entire humanity with the highest standard of living known to any millionaire. And all this can be accomplished by 1985 without anybody profiting at the expense of others, without anybody interfering with another. All this can be done. Therefore, it is not how we should adjust between rich and poor, it is how everybody should be rich, not by getting tied up with properties and securities; but by being free from them. You need not have property and security to be rich.' "[1]

This long commentary by a purveyor *par excellence* of daily

events in India, taken together with the introduction by Mr. Dutt in the following pages,[2] adds a very relevant footnote to futurology, no less to its *raison d'etre* than to its limitations. Subsequently, many others commended this study in varying terms which heightened the interest of the readers and raised the demand for copies of the *Futurism* number. It was, therefore, decided that we should accept an offer from an independent publisher and put the articles into a less perishable form, that is, in a hardbound cover.

In this anthology on futurism, the articles, as they were originally written, have been reprinted, with two postscripts being appended to two of them by the respective writers themselves. Others who were invited to oversee their own thinking from the vantage point of 1975, after a lapse of nearly three years, did not consider it necessary to qualify what they had written before.

As the original suggestion for a study in futurism came from Mr. Dutt, we approached him to write an introduction to these articles in its present form and comment on the myths and realities of futurology. We also requested Mr. P.N. Haksar, who had participated in the "Club of Rome" meetings on behalf of India, to give us his reaction to our venture. His "few words", which we have published as a Foreword to the book, give cautious support to a study of "futurism" and should serve as a sombre warning to futurologists.

It is hoped that the anthology will be of much interest to the wider circle of futurologists in the world who might look for a special "Indian angle" in this field in a global setting.

We are grateful to Mr. Haksar for his stimulating "few words"; to Mr. Dutt for his elucidatory Introduction; to our contributors who most magnanimously agreed to reproduction of their articles in book form with alacrity as well as enthusiasm; and to Abhinav Publications for undertaking to publish this anthology.

S.R.G.

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INDIA : A STUDY IN FUTURISM

INTRODUCTION

R. C. DUTT

In his editorial note Mr. Shyam Ratna Gupta has attributed to me the sowing of "a minute seed" for a study of futurism.[1] While making the suggestion that I did for the special number of the *Indian and Foreign Review* in August 1972 to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of independence of our country, it was, however, not futurism in the literal sense of the term that I had in mind. The eminent journalist, the late Mr. Durgadas, whom the editor has quoted, would be right in ridiculing such an effort at futurology as the product of frustrated minds, as he has hinted, of the intellectual elite.[2] But futurology, or futurism for short, need not be such a vain effort.

Mr. Gupta has shown enterprise in developing the "minute seed" in more than one issue of the *Review*, and has now undertaken the task of preparing an anthology of the articles on the subject. I am grateful to him for asking me to write an introduction to the anthology, and I feel privileged to introduce a collection of essays by some of the acknowledged experts who look forward to the future in their respective fields of specialisation.

Futurism, to my mind, is no idle speculation. It is not just wishful thinking, nor is it even a mere scientific projection from present conditions. As one of the eminent contributors, Dr. Rajni Kothari, has stated, it is "rather one of offering normative choices" for the future. "The only rational way of

approaching the future in a fast changing world", he has rightly added, "is to design one realistically and then seek to realise it."[3]

I am happy that this feeling also finds an echo in Dr. Satish Arora's article in which he remarks: "...that beyond esoteric exercises in forecasting there lies a normative dimension that informs all speculation." It is not merely, as Dr. Arora goes on to say, that "analyses of the future often can be more revealing of the passions and conflicts of the present than they are of the future, upon which these are presumably focused."[4] Mere projections of such passions and conflicts, however useful they may be for an analysis of the present, will have little validity for future action. It is the vision of the future, realistically created, that can inspire the present generation to build a better and a happier future.

When I suggested to Mr. Gupta in 1972 that this number should look forward to the future, it was this "normative future" that I hand in mind. The special issue of the *Indian and Foreign Review* to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of our independence should, I felt, not content itself merely with reviewing the past, as is the usual practice with such numbers. A review of the past performance, with its successes and its failures, undoubtedly has its utility, but it is not enough. The utility of such a review of the past lies in the lessons it provides for the future. The future is not, and cannot be, unrelated to the past. Even a revolutionary change as had happened in the Soviet Union in 1917 had its roots in the past. The revolution was possible because the conditions had been built up for it over the past years. Nevertheless, these conditions by themselves would never have introduced the revolutionary changes they did, unless men of vision, basing themselves on the present situation built up during the past years, had clear concepts of what they wanted to build for the future.

It is this vision of the future that has inspired men and women throughout history to acts of sacrifice and valour and has sown the seeds of progress. In our own country, the freedom struggle is replete with such instances. While the large masses of people were assailed with doubts, a handful of determined patriots dreamt dreams of the future and laid the

foundations of a struggle for independence. Their dreams were not unrelated to the past. They could not hope to build on something that was not. And yet it was not a mere scientific projection of the conditions of the present. There was a normative element, a value preference in the future they foresaw. Fifty years before independence, that is in the closing years of the nineteenth century, few would have been bold enough to predict that within half a century India would be free. Even twenty-five years before independence, that is in the early 'twenties of this century, there was no lack of people who took a gloomy view of the political future of the country. And yet it is within the memory of the older generation still living that those in the forefront of the political struggle in the early 'twenties talked of *swaraj* in our lifetime. It was this faith that moved them and sustained their effort.

Were they mere visionaries? It would have been easy in pure logic, in a scientific effort to project the present into the future, to confound these "visionaries" and to "prove" that the factors against India attaining independence twenty-five years hence were more weighty than those in favour of such an event. The improbable, however, happened; the more probable receded into the background. Two factors contributed to this. The first was a discerning, normative value selection of the favourable factors, however clouded they may have been by adverse circumstances at the time. The second was the faith that, given devoted effort and the requisite sacrifices they called for, the improbable could not only be made probable but real.

I recall that in April-May of 1945 I had the good fortune to come closely in touch for several weeks with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, then a prisoner in a special jail in a Bengal district. Along perhaps with the majority of our educated countrymen I was feeling very despondent then about the prospects of India winning freedom in the near future. I conveyed this feeling of despondency to the Maulana Saheb, and I had no difficulty in marshalling my arguments in support of the feeling. The "Quit India" movement of 1942 had failed, I pointed out, or had at least been effectively suppressed. Britain, as one of the allied powers, had practically

won the war. The country was quiet, though perhaps sullen. Why should the British concede independence to us in these circumstances, I asked, specially when they had succeeded in resisting our efforts during the worst days of the war, when they needed our help and cooperation most? Perhaps in logic I was right. Perhaps a scientific effort at futurism would have accepted my view. And yet the Maulana Saheb did not agree, and he proved right. He did not argue with me, but his faith was unshakable. He merely stated that India in 1945 was not the same as she was before the war. Britain will have to do something to meet our demands, he affirmed. Events proved his faith far sounder than my logic.

The desire to peep into the future is perennial in human minds. A popular manifestation of this desire is the faith which large numbers of persons all the world over display in astrology. It is unnecessary to enter here into a discussion of the basic truth or otherwise of this cult. Two points are, however, worthy of notice. The first is that astrology is based on the assumption that the future is, at least to an extent, predetermined. To that extent it discounts the part played by voluntary human effort in shaping the future.

I am aware that believers in astrology will dispute this criticism. They argue that astrology does not discount or discourage human effort. It merely indicates trends. Astrology only forecasts the direction of human effort, and the consequences of such effort. Even if this is accepted, the second point arises. A knowledge of the future based on astrological forecasts is bound to sap human initiative and effort. Such knowledge may satisfy human curiosity but it does little more. A man who feels that even his effort is preordained can act at best as an automaton, a robot; but lacking faith in his effort, singly and collectively, to shape the future he can hardly function as even a catalytic agent for a change.

Futurism, to provide an incentive to the human will, cannot accept predeterminism. On the contrary, it must be based on the faith that the future is what we collectively make of it. Futurism is neither unbridled wishful thinking, nor is it an all-correct and precise prognostication. An exercise in futurism, as in many other fields of social sciences, is based on imponderables of human behaviour. Of the numerous trends of collective behaviour available at any point of time,

it needs value judgement to decide which specific trend should be regarded as dominant and should, therefore, be projected into the future. Even such projections, however sound and scientific as they may be, are likely to be vitiated by patterns of future behaviour. But more than that, scientific projections by themselves have no essential value in shaping human affairs. They can satisfy the perennial human curiosity about the future, but provide little incentive to action.

A more meaningful exercise in futurism is to study the present and the past and to discern the factors which, on a normative view, should be worked on, developed and shaped for the future. The future is not predetermined. Even the dialectical view of history must concede this element of freedom for human behaviour. The contradictions which arise may be solved in more ways than one. The actual solution must necessarily depend on the pattern of human behaviour, and such human behaviour can be influenced by determined action.

Indeed, the concept of planning which we have adopted in our country in common with several socialist countries is based on this view of futurism. It is in fact an exercise in futurism. We frame plans for five years and have, in the background, perspective plans for much longer periods. They represent attempts to harness the forces of today, based on the experience of yesterday, for a better tomorrow. Planning is not crystal-gazing, a helpless abandon to what must inevitably be. Nor is it divorced from the present and the past in an attempt to build an elusive future. The essence of planning lies in specifying and articulating the desired situation aimed at for a point of time yet to arrive, and in specifying in actual terms the resources that should be deployed and the action that should be initiated to precipitate that desired situation. It is an exercise to visualise and thereafter try and attain a future which is both worthwhile and realistically practicable, given, of course, the will and the effort to attain it. Planning in an extreme sense is both a corrective and a constructive activity. It denotes that individuals can shape their own destiny to a large extent. It thus gives an incentive to the will and a direction to the effort.

The essays in this anthology have kept the normative in view, whether this has been stated expressly or not. The problems and difficulties of the present—and they are enormous by any standard—have not converted the writers into prophets of doom, like the Japanese analyst referred to in the editor's note.[5] India is not unused to such gloomy prophecies. Our erstwhile colonial rulers were never tired of telling us that Indians never were and never could be a nation, so strong were the divisive factors in "the geographical area called India". The diversities still remain in customs, languages and religions, but they have not divided us. The national consciousness has manifested itself at every crisis the nation has faced, external or internal.

Obviously, those who saw the divisive forces and magnified them to keep India in political subjection failed to notice the unifying factors, or at least underplayed them. Similarly, those who see in India today only social backwardness, the evils of the caste system and the illiteracy and ignorance of large sections of our population, fail to see the strivings of the people to remove these very obstacles, their urges—political, social and economic—and their hopes and aspirations for a better life, which sustain and move the nation and which will undoubtedly enable them to rise above their differences and their backwardness.

The collection of essays in the anthology is not the product of idle and frustrated minds, but the result of analysis in various fields of national activity by intellectuals who are in tune with the national ethos. The interview with the architect, philosopher and humanist, Dr. Buckminster Fuller, by the editor conveys a refreshingly optimistic message of economic prosperity to a country engaged in a grim struggle against poverty as epitomised in the slogan *Garibi Hatao*.[6]

While conveying my thanks once again to the editor, I congratulate him on having focused our attention purposefully on the future which holds immense possibilities for a developing country like ours and to which we look forward for the fulfilment of our hopes and aspirations.

1

INDIA IN 1997 : SOCIAL FUTURES

SATISH K. ARORA

Twenty-five years are not quite a generation; but a quarter of a century does appear to be a long time. Conceptions of time can be tricky: to those of us who were old enough to have seen, if not quite participated, in the nationalist movement for freedom, and can still recall vividly the state of mind on 15 August 1947, it seems a short span of time since we became a free people.

Yet, project twenty-five years ahead and ask for images of India in 1997, and you are likely to elicit either blankness; visions of a country with its major problems resolved; or, even more likely, simple projections of past experience into the years ahead.

Exercises in anticipating the likely contours of the future are seldom performed without revealing the personal prejudices and preferences of the forecasters. Ask about the future and you have created one of the more imaginative versions of those psychological tests which, while showing nothing to the uninitiated, draw out of the innermost recesses the hopes and fears, perhaps seldom consciously articulated.

At a time when some of the more serious and imaginative minds of our time are passionately devoted to explorations of

the unknown—for that is what the future really is—it is necessary to emphasise that beyond esoteric exercises in forecasting there lies a normative dimension that informs all speculation. Analyses of the future often can be more revealing of the passions and conflicts of the present than they are of the future upon which these are presumably focused. All of this is by way of scoring some of the pitfalls future analyses abound with.

Pessimistic Analysts

It will be helpful for us to scan what experts outside our country, professionally engaged in unravelling the future, see as likely futures for India. There is often a profound pessimism about India in decades ahead. A responsible and sensitive Japanese analyst projects into the year 1984 and notes: "I am pessimistic about India, the second largest country in Asia. In addition to the social backwardness prevailing over her vast territory, and the chaos which comes from the complexity of race, religion, the caste system and language differences, the extreme poverty of most of her people will prevent India from developing modern industries as fast as she would wish in the coming twenty years."[1]

These images of India are widely diffused. Consider also one of the earliest and most influential of treatises on the future—Kahn and Wiener's *The Year 2000.* Published in 1967, it estimates that India will need 117 years to catch up with the United States. This is in fact a widely accepted orientation to our future: it is generally assumed that India will take generations, and, indeed, may never "catch up" or "bridge the gap" between herself and the developed world. Not only is our poverty seen as too deep, but it is felt that the sheer weight of our population will prevent us from moving ahead.

How seriously need we take these pessimistic prognoses? Imagine, for instance, if forecasters in the 17th century had projected a future of America based upon the fact that at that time her colonialists averaged thirteen children per family. Even the rather alarming, yet highly influential Club of Rome's report on *The Limits to Growth* is forced to concede that "the relation between crude birth rates and GNP per capita of all

nations of the world follows a surprisingly regular pattern. In general, as GNP rises, the birth rate falls . . . . Wherever economic development has taken place, birth rates have fallen."

Social Transformation

We also know that, especially given today's levels and rates of technological advance, there is no inevitability about having to pass through all the stages other nations have passed through in former centuries. China, for instance, participating in the jet age, never made or flew a reciprocating engine or a propeller-driven airplane.

India's nuclear energy programme, imaginatively conceived and boldly executed, places her among the world's most advanced, and is a prime example of what is feasible for this nation to achieve. Even more important leaps can be made in the areas of socio-political organisation.

The gloomy forecasters tend to emphasise what probably *will* be, largely by extrapolating trends from the past and present. Without underestimating the importance of these trends, we may emphasise what *can* be. By locating this analysis between "can be" and "will be", essentially a two-fold problem presents itself. We need to recognise that a social transformation is currently taking place, due to the slow, erratic, often unanticipated redistribution of resources such as wealth, education and political power. This is an ongoing process, the effects of which we must come to terms with in any contemplation of our future. But we shall also take into account another possible process—the purposive redistribution of resources in such a way that the pains associated with the ongoing social transformation can be eased, and the newly evolving social structure modified according to a pattern of our own design.

An important force operating on the potential for further social transformation is the value structure. Everywhere in the world at one time or another religion has provided rationalisation for the distribution of resources in such a way that charitable transferences by the rich to the poor alleviated the guilt of the former and simultaneously kept the latter "in their place". There are few societies in the contemporary world

where these older ideological patterns can continue to persist unchallenged. The sweep towards egalitarianism is beginning to influence even the most feudal of societies; it obviously will have that much more impact upon states which have committed themselves to socialist creeds. Thus it is possible to predict that if, twenty-five years from now, planned actions have not followed upon the reiteration of such value goals, social transformation will take place with even greater adverse effects upon all sectors and upon the viability of the socio-political order.

Value Commitment

Value commitment and change will also operate in other areas in even more subtle ways. Take, for instance, attitudes towards work and leisure. Some scholars have claimed that the values embodied in the "protestant" ethic and achievement motivation, having largely accounted for development in the West, should be cultivated in underdeveloped nations as well. But while they urge these values upon us, their own societies are undergoing profound rethinking about the place of work and leisure. Because of growing affluence, advancing technology and shifting values, especially among the young, planners predict that in the future there will be shorter work weeks, more flexibility about hours, and reduction of tension around work and production.

What about India ? Need we experience one psychic upheaval through cultivation of a neurotic work ethic, only to have to plan for another to reduce this type of stress ? Our people have often been stereotyped as those who do not lay undue emphasis upon the work aspect of their lives, who tend to value relaxation, familial ties and human intercourse. If we assume that there is a kernel of truth in these generalisations, need we be so intent on drastically altering the priorities of our value structure ?

If we are intent on it—and in our most advanced industrial and management sectors these are now the norms being inculcated—then twenty-five years hence we may well find ourselves in precisely the position of many developed countries today—shortening work hours, urging people to "slow down", feeding them chemicals to calm their psychic nerves.

If, on the other hand, we anticipate this process, we may be able to preserve characteristics indicative of mental health, and work out a plan that there be shorter working hours for greater numbers of employed persons, harmonically combined with utilisation of advanced technological hardware for greater production.

Abolition of Poverty

What about aspects of social transformation which tend to stem from measures connected with the redistribution of wealth ? Already, of course, there have been changes in India. The easier and more dramatic flattening of the social hierarchy took place first with the withdrawal of colonial personnel, then by measures such as the retraction of the extraordinary privileges of former ruling princes, and the limitation of land ownership through zamindari abolition.

Our rural structure has been compared to an onion, with some of its outer layers having been peeled off one by one: the benefits of this process have accrued to those layers immediately below; while the most submerged sections—like landless labourers—remain as they have been for ages, squeezed to a subhuman margin of subsistence. In the rural areas, as much as half of our population—landless labourers, tribals and peasants with less than two-and-a-half acres—may have grown relatively poorer *vis-a-vis* other rural classes; while in the urban areas, during the last decade, consumption by the poorest ten per cent appears to have decreased.

Land distribution does not appear to have changed for the past two decades; and neither has the number of poor living below a basic minimum standard of consumption.[2]

Are these the trends to be projected into the future ? The process of squashing the more obvious of socio-economic peaks is largely an act of symbol manipulation, if the leavening action is limited to the top. Given the age we live in, the prevailing ideology and the growing universality of politics-by-protest, there is need to alter purposively this pattern of wealth redistribution or, predictably, social upheaval will be the norm considerably before 1997.

There is already recognition of this by Indian planners. The fourth plan (1969-74) argued that in the short run "no signifi-

cant results can be achieved" by measures aimed at equalising incomes. Today, India's planning commission goes so far as to suggest that the reduction of poverty should form the main thrust of the fifth plan (1974-79), and in this very emphasis is contained an element of "historic inevitability". While avoiding any reference to actual equalisation (except indirectly to the subject of land reforms), the commission's brief and lucid document admits that "the economy now has reached a stage where larger availability of resources make it possible to launch a direct attack on unemployment, underemployment and poverty, and also assure adequate growth".[3]

Rural and Urban Changes

Admittedly measures such as land reforms had been stressed before, but this year there is apparently more vigour—and perhaps even more consensus—for pushing them through. Consider for a moment that the land reforms are carried out with a thoroughness that is necessary. Our countryside, after this successful land redistribution, will have effectively eliminated the larger holdings and created what in fact will be a nation of small farmers.

Clearly, given the ideological rhetoric that has always accompanied land reforms everywhere, the contemplated redistribution will have been interpreted as a "radical" measure. Yet, at least one unanticipated result may ensue: nations of small landholders, cultivating their own soil with their own labour, have been conspicuously conservative in their political bias. It is just possible then that a "radical" land reform measure will have silently brought into being a "conservative" political environment.

While changes in our rural environment seem imminent, a profound social transformation also is likely to occur in the urban areas, due less to any ideologically inspired policies, more to effects of technological advance and automation. Before the year 2000 dawns upon India, we are likely to witness what seems impossible at present—the demise of the clerks; the phasing out of typists and stenographers; and the retreat of the book-keepers and accountants.

In sectors where routine processing of information is a major activity, now carried on by a legion of clerks, the

technology is now available for processing volumes or information at fractions of the costs presently involved, and at rates which can immensely speed up the decision process. The choice between efficiency and low costs, and inefficiency and high employment rates will be forced into the political arena unless preventive steps are adopted to absorb the white collar legions into other sectors.

Because this stratum constitutes a sizeable proportion of our urban population, and security of tenure has been a particularly sensitive matter among them, political agitation and struggle is a certainty unless planners for the future prepare answers to such fundamental questions as: where will all the clerks go? will there be alternative routes charted, or retraining programmes ready for execution at appropriate junctures?

Contingency Problems

There are also contingency problems to aggravate potential unrest. The radical reduction of clerks will involve changes in status and deference patterns. We know something about the often counterproductive political behaviour of individuals who are downwardly or upwardly mobile. Will we be prepared for what may happen when a whole class loses its former status? When not merely the members of a given class but the entire social structure will be in a state of rapid flux?

Another interesting problem arises out of the relationship between town planning and social transformation. Seemingly based on a premise of the immutability of the fourfold division of our bureaucracy, government housing policy has reinforced a conspicuously segmented social hierarchy. Our clerks like those on the other three rungs have been housed according to their status.

If they change their status and become dispersed among other occupational groups, will the segregated residential pattern still be serviceable—or desirable ? Twenty-five years hence, the highly regimented residential patterns of a so-called futuristic planned city like Corbusier's Chandigarh may be shown not only as obsolete but as a symbol of rigidly bureaucratic predispositions.

Coinciding with the demise of the white collar class is the

emergence of a class composed of highly skilled personnel indispensable to the working of both the private and public sectors. These researchers and technicians, working in areas as wide apart as genetics and satellite communications, will be engaged largely in the generation and processing of information.

Invisible Colleges

As they grow in absolute numbers and become cognisant of their indispensability to those in political and economic power, we visualise that they will exercise considerable pressure for participation in decision-making processes. This will first take the shape of "invisible colleges"—groups without formal structure but with fairly extensive communication links in particularly sensitive positions to advance or retard alternative futures. Political processes will increasingly depend upon them. This coming class is likely to be both internationalist as well as anti-bureaucratic in its ethos, bacause of the nature and quality of its work functions. The ascendency of this class will alter the parameters of politics as it has been understood so far—it will bring with it the security and the fraternal ethos of the competent and the eclipse of governance by charisma.

An important role in almost all alterations of the social structure will be played by the communication revolution. We stand on its brink and it will alter the psyche of the Indian people as well as the nature of the society in ways we have barely hinted at, and in directions which we can only dimly perceive.

The expansion of radio broadcasting facilities to blanket the entire nation is a goal we can achieve any time we so desire; within the decade of the 'seventies, large areas of our country will be served by television networks which will facilitate participation in national affairs as well as provide windows to the world outside.

The multiplicity of communication channels—print, sound, film and television—means that messages will be transmitted in both greater volume and diversity; each media will reinforce the other, aiding in the creation of a genuinely national community where the number of shared symbols can

become greater than those that are more strictly parochial.

To a large extent, the direction of societal and political alteration will depend upon the openness of the channels through which communications flow. Presently, we have a mix in which one medium—the radio—is controlled by the government; and the other medium—the press—is largely controlled by a handful of private business houses.

Communication Flows

Television also, quite likely, will operate under official patronage and control (although there has been discussion, but no decision, regarding the desirability of an autonomous body assuming responsibility for this most powerful of media). With the pattern of control so largely centralised and unidirectional, governors will be able to instantaneously communicate instructions, preferences and prejudices downward to the masses, but there will be few mechanisms for any reverse flow or feedback.

Whether consciously intended or not, the media can increasingly become a manipulative device. If the trust towards greater participation in the shaping and sharing of power assumes greater momentum, dissatisfaction with emergent communication networks is bound to ensue, seriously affecting both the political apex and the rungs below it.

Even apart from social and political reactions, technological advances presently available can and probably will increasingly alter currently emergent patterns. On the one hand, decentralised programming and production, even on the local level, will become feasible; on the other hand, satellite transmissions of television programmes will make their own dent. People in 45 countries have already simultaneously viewed the same worldwide television programme; in 1971 alone worldwide satellite television increased by almost 50 per cent.

Another device, the transmission of voice-and-picture across continents, is currently in use. Once such technical devices become more widely diffused, it may be difficult for even the more determined of communication controllers to maintain strictly one-way communication flows.

The medium will affect the content of the messages. If,

moreover, socio-political commitment combines with technological imperatives operating in the same direction, popular participation in the total flow of communications can be vastly increased.

Educational Revolution

Education, similarly due to be swept into the communication revolution, can equally, if not more effectively, bring about social transformation in the country. A major disappointment in the first quarter century of independence was the failure to carry through a revolution in education—a revolution for which there was a demand, for which the persons, skills and equipment were not beyond our means. Education was extended, of course, but in a most dangerously skewed fashion. In comparing 1960-61 with 1950-51, the number of colleges increased 253 per cent, while the number of general schools increased 73 per cent, and vocational schools only 31 per cent.[4] After nearly a generation we still have many more illiterates than literates. A neglect of the highest order has thus marked our first twenty-five years of freedom, but this persistent failure of policy is likely to reverse itself as the disfunctionality of our educational policies becomes transparent.

The political health of our society will make it necessary that in the next quarter of a century we proceed swiftly to plan for the extension of literacy to all. There are innumerable and not very expensive ways of doing so. Educational television programmes, for instance, can be relayed to villages without schools, where para-educational staff, who have previewed the programmes, can use them as take-off points for instruction.

Already a battery-operated television set has been designed and manufactured for special use in areas with uncertain or non-existent electricity supply. Its front-end converter receives satellite programmes directly; it consumes 60 to 70 watts of power as compared with 200 watts of power required by normal sets; its operation is simpler; its cost is less; and 90 per cent of its parts are manufactured indigenously.

The problem of teacher shortage in rural areas can also be solved in other ways. Often it is said that urban-educated teachers are unwilling to serve in rural areas, thus resulting sometimes in unemployed teachers in the cities and a shortage in the countryside. This problem will automatically be solved in time, as growing towns creep closer to the villages; and villages, having greater access to basic amenities, become increasingly more desirable as residential areas. But that is a time we cannot afford to wait for.

Higher Education

In the meantime ingenuity in the area of teacher transfers is required. As is contemplated in the case of doctors, newly qualified teachers can be enlisted for rural service of one to two years, teams of teachers with their families can be despatched to outlying rural areas, where temporary mobile quarters can be provided and amenities installed in an inexpensive effective way both to satisfy the teachers' needs and serve also as models for the community. The use of semi-educated youth to train still less educated persons has also been used to good effect in countries as diverse as republican Spain and Cuba: variations could be worked out here, given commitment to the task. If measures of this type were enacted and proper follow-up provided, India might well unleash a literate responsive and creative citizenry considerably before 1997. An educational policy of this order might prove to be of greater significance than any other social policy pursued by our government.

But what of higher education? While expansion has been extraordinary, capacity to provide qualitatively valuable instruction and research facilities has steadily deteriorated. Because of this deterioration and the general lack of resilience, one can visualise that small, less hierarchical institutions, specialising in interdisciplinary research, will dot the various regions of our country in the next two decades.

Operating on budgets that are heavy on research expenditures but low on administrative paraphernalia, and providing for extraordinary flexibility in rules and regulations, these small and creative centres may very likely become internally

the most democratically operated and externally the most respected institutions in the country, increasingly relied upon for consultation by both national and state governments.

As for the universities themselves, not only in India but everywhere in the world university education will be undergoing spectacular change, including reassessments of hitherto unquestioned relationships that have normally prevailed between the teachers and the taught.

New Technology

Two trends are especially apparent: education will become increasingly individualised in the sense that the content will be available in the mixes largely derived from the inclinations and choice of the student; and teaching will be increasingly done through techniques independent of a classroom instructor.

As technological advances increasingly contribute to the students' independence from the teacher, a more egalitarian system will evolve, with carryover effects into other societal relationships. This is a worldwide trend; and its relevance for India is especially great since status differentiation has for too long been overemphasised, even to the detriment of the learning process.

One major thrust of the new technology—whether we refer to programmed materials or television—is that it begins to support the self-dependent aspects of the learning process. As processes of information acquisition, storage, processing and retrieval become mechanised, and knowledge becomes more easily and independently accessible, much of what is presently considered esoteric and mystical will become unmasked. Such developments will not only facilitate a movement toward fraternal rather than authoritarian relationships between students and teachers; they may presage an end to academic pigeon-holing; for, in time, school, college and university may blend into one another without the qualitative rank connotations presently sanctified.

In this rather brief consideration of some of the more important facets of social transformation, it has been indicated that the tempo of individual and institutional change will

step up at hitherto unimagined rates. The "hardware" aspects of the unfolding future are bound to impinge upon India as they will upon the rest of the world; technological change will be inescapable. But of even more critical importance to the quality of life in India of 1997 will be the series of necessary, concomitant policy choices.

Politics of Participation

This "software" component will be much more difficult to execute successfully, for choices which affect the rate of the nation are seldom selected on the basis of objective feasibility and the collective good alone. Preferred options in all societies are often those that maximise the future of governing elites and particular institutions rather than society as a whole. But as information and skills begin to saturate our society, it will become difficult to resist pressures from below; and new modes will have to evolve for the shaping of critical decisions now routinely made at the top.

It would appear that these pressures would become irresistible over time. No doubt, such pressures can be controlled: an Orwellian future in which the iron heel of bureaucracy grinds for ever and ever on the face of the ordinary citizen has a persuasive nightmarishness that cannot be brushed aside lightly. But that future is scarcely inevitable. If we willingly move steadily away from the politics of manipulation to that of participation, then we may have surprised the skeptical, even pessimistic futurists outside and among us.

The special quality of India has been the creation of a social order choice for the individual.

So far, these limitless choices have been in the area of personal salvation and issues of the other world. Our challenge lies in bringing about within this century a decisive movement towards the creation of a social order in which more and more of us can exercise a widening range of choices for the social order and ourselves—here and now.

2

THE TASKS AHEAD

GIRILAL JAIN

The tasks ahead for the next 20 or 30 years are not very different from what India has been trying to achieve in the first 25 years of independence—to strengthen its political institutions, ensure political stability, build a strong economy, assure social justice for about 120 million people who are economically depressed, provide gainful employment to millions of young men who enter the labour market year after year, reduce disparities, control the growth of population and integrate different religious and linguistic groups with the broad national mainstream without doing violence to their distinct personalities.

These goals are obviously not fully consistent with each other. Any meaningful attempt to reduce disparities must, for instance, involve curbs not only on big business houses but also in course of time on medium industrial enterprises and traders with the inevitable risk of slowing down the tempo of economic activities.

New Technology

The introduction of new technology by definition accentuates rather than decreases social disparities because those

sections of society which are already privileged by virtue of superior education and resources are most likely to take advantage of the opportunities it creates.

This is the experience of all countries with the exception of China where Chairman Mao Tse-tung has been trying to combine technological advance with spartan egalitarianism. But the battle seems hopeless because it is reasonably certain that not many Chinese leaders and bureaucrats appear to share his utopianism.

In the case of India, as in that of most other developing countries, the difficulty of combining economic advance with social justice is aggravated because society as a whole is only gradually emerging from hundreds of years of stagnation—this is a relative concept and not an absolute one—and any attempt to shackle its most enterprising section can produce serious debilitating consequences. Also, the bureaucracy is neither sufficiently socially-conscious nor competent to handle efficiently the task of administering a welfare state even if resources can somehow be found.

Magnitude of Tasks

Similarly, it is not easy to reconcile the need for political stability with the growth of political consciousness. On the contrary, the latter cannot but create acute tensions in the context of scarcity of resources and the revolution of rising expectations. The rapid spread of modern education which, on the one hand, erodes the hold of religion and old social institutions and, on the other, creates a vast army of ill-qualified men and women who are as often unemployable as they are unemployed, complicates the job of responsible political leadership as well as of the managers of the economy.

Needless to add that promotion of unity amidst the kind of diversity that prevails in India is not so easy. It is indeed no exaggeration to say that not a single society in human history has successfully tackled or even attempted a task of this magnitude. On the contrary most communities faced with the problem of sizeable racial, religious, linguistic and cultural minorities have sought either to exterminate and expel them or assimilate them so as to blur, if not extinguish, their

separate identities. In cases where either of these "solutions" has not been available, they have either tended to split (Austro-Hungarian empire), to practise segregation (South Africa) or maintain an uneasy form of coexistence (the United States). India may not be unique inasmuch as other societies, too, face similar problems. But the scale in our case is frightening.

Social Justice

But however contradictory the tasks, they have to be tackled more or less simultaneously. There is no escape from them for the simple reason that the edifice we are seeking to build can be seriously weakened if we neglect for long any one of the problems confronting us. For example, the absence of an attempt to assure social justice for the weaker and historically oppressed sections of society can, in the context of the spread of education and political consciousness, jeopardise democratic institutions and the prospects of orderly growth. By the same token, failure to convince at least the major religious and linguistic minorities that their identities are secure can unleash forces of disruption on the one hand and of repression on the other.

Contrary to what may be called the comprehensive Indian approach, Pakistan, especially after General Ayub Khan seized power in 1958, pursued the two goals of stability and economic growth to the exclusion of almost all other objectives. This naturally produced dividends in the economic field in West Pakistan. The western world was so impressed by this that in the latter part of the sixties it came to be described, like South Korea and Formosa, as a model for other developing countries. But the consequences are there for everyone to see.

Bangladesh has broken away after one of the cruelest civil wars in our times. In what is left of Pakistan, many of President Bhutto's present difficulties are the result of his predecessors' indifference to such problems as land reforms, rights of workers and other unions, aspirations of the Sindhi people who have been reduced to an inferior status in their own province by the more enterprising, resourceful and educated

immigrants from India (at the time of partition in 1947) and other parts of Pakistan.

Priorities for India

This is not to deny that the Indian experiment also ran into serious difficulties in the mid-'sixties as a result of the cumulative impact of various factors—the death of Mr. Nehru in May 1964, the inconclusive war with Pakistan in September 1965, rise in prices, widespread droughts in 1966 and 1967 leading to a big drop in agricultural production and a shortfall of eight to ten million tons in food supplies which had to be made good by imports from the United States, and the absence of a firm, united and dynamic leadership in the ruling party.

After the general election in 1967 which gave the Indian National Congress a small majority in Parliament and deprived it of power in a majority of states without throwing up a viable alternative or alternatives, it required courage on the part of anyone to believe that in a couple of years the country could again pull itself together and resume the march forward towards its cherished goals.

All this is recalled to make the point that Mrs. Gandhi has brought the country forward so that it can tackle effectively some of the major problems facing it. And if this invaluable asset is squandered, India can find itself in a difficult situation once again.

My own priorities are relatively orthodox. These are economic growth, population control, administrative reforms to improve the competence of the civil service and the strengthening of the party structure.[1] But whatever one's priorities—the scope for difference of opinion among rational and pragmatic Indians is not all that great—there is no time to lose.

Fortunately for India, the external environment promises to be more favourable than it has been in the last one decade or even longer. Pakistan obviously remains the key factor.

This means that if that country settles down as a friendly neighbour willing to cooperate in the common task of improving the lot of the two peoples, India need not be distracted by external considerations from the urgent task of minding its domestic problems.

Optimistic View

Since so much has been written on Indo-Pakistani conflicts, specially the Kashmir issue in the recent past, it is pointless for me to go over the ground all over again, except to say that the prospects of reasonable, if not cordial, relations between the two countries are better than they have been ever before.

In taking this optimistic view I am persuaded that the passions generated by the Muslim League's campaign for Pakistan in the 'forties and the partition riots of 1947 have more or less been exhausted. In both countries a new generation of men and women has grown up which has no experience or memory of those tragic events. The Pakistani ruling elite has, it is true, promoted "hate India" campaigns in the mistaken belief that these would strength the bonds of unity. But propaganda can never take the place of direct and personal experience.

It also seems to me that the Pakistani ruling elite and people are beginning to reconcile themselves to the fact that they cannot achieve parity with a country ten times their size. Pakistan's search for parity was a hang-over from the pre-partition period when the Muslim League had demanded parity with the Congress in respect of representation in the central government. It is over with the break-up of Pakistan and the establishment of a sovereign Bangladesh.

This assessment may appear to be unduly optimistic so long as there is no juridical settlement of the Kashmir issue and so long as President Bhutto continues to talk of supporting the right of self-determination for the people of the state. But in the historical perspective the Pakistanis themselves must feel that their hostility is an exercise in futility. They can only hurt themselves if they pursue the old policy because it will accentuate their feelings of self-pity and helplessness.

The larger international environment is also changing for

the better. After the Moscow "summit" last May, there can be little doubt that the United States and the Soviet Union are entering an era of active cooperation. This is no longer just a question of avoiding direct confrontation—the rules for crisis management had been worked out at the time of the Cuban conflict in 1962 since when there has been no direct confrontation between them. Now the superpowers are evidently getting ready for something much more ambitious and positive.

Elimination of Tension

Simultaneously, there has been a marked improvement in Sino-U.S. relations so much so that when American planes bomb North Vietnam fairly close to the Chinese border, Peking no longer worries about its security. While it is highly deplorable, to put it mildly, that Washington should have used the improvement in its relations with China to step up bombing raids on North Vietnam, it is indisputable that President Nixon's trip to Peking last February and the negotiations that have preceded and followed between the two governments have eliminated a major source of tension in international relations.

The breakthrough in Soviet-U.S. and Sino-U.S. relations has not yet been accompanied by a defusing of the Sino-Soviet military confrontation along the 4,500 mile-long common border. But this can only be a matter of time. In a triangular situation no two countries can aoffrd for long to remain hostile to each other when the third is busy strengthening its ties with both of them without conceding to it a very privileged position. Also, much of the ideological controversy between Moscow and Peking has lost, whatever relevance it might have once possessed.

All this has a bearing on the Indian subcontinent in that it is at least possible to look forward to a time when external powers will not interfere too much in its affairs and leave the countries to work out proper equations among themselves and concentrate their efforts and resources on the solution of internal problems.

Excessive concern for foreign affairs in the last two decades has been the result of the cold war and it must end with the end of the phenomenon that made it possible for poor and weak countries to believe that they could influence the course of events outside their borders.

3

WORLD ORDER PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE

RAJNI KOTHARI

In providing a brief diagnosis of contemporary world reality, looked at from the perspective of the "third world" countries, outlining a preferred model for the future and indicating a few concrete steps towards a preferred world, the methodology followed is not one of making "scientific" projections from present conditions but rather one of offering normative choices with regard to the kind of future during the last decade of the 20th century that is desirable and suggesting ways of moving towards it.

For it seems that the only rational way of approaching the future in a fast changing world is to design one realistically and then seek to realise it.

Contemporary Ills

In the present-day world, GNPs are rising everywhere but their benefits are being confined to small metropolitan elites who derive their political support from external linkages rather than by identification with their own people; the spatial distribution of land and other resources continue to work against the poorer regions of the world; the gospel of

"modernization" has released forces which produce ethnic cleavages, internal violence (civil wars, police excesses and the brutalities of the armies) and armed conflicts between neighbours often encouraged by the big powers; the economic "gap" continues to widen and "minimum" conditions are becoming increasingly hard to achieve in large parts of the world. The upshot is a widening chasm and a growing north-south hiatus.

The resulting pattern of dominance has, on the one hand, produced a division of the world between dominant and dependent states; on the other hand, it has also created deep cleavages within the latter, between a tiny "modernist" elite and the people at large, between the urban centre and the rural periphery, between the educated and the uneducated.

There is, no doubt, continuous growth in aggregate wealth even in the poorer countries but the bulk of the increase is concentrated in the hands of small parasitic elites who are in much closer alliance with the elites of metropolitan areas than their own people.

Power Patterns and Trends

The rest of mankind in the peripheral regions lives in misery, below the poverty line, suffering from malnutrition and psychic impotency and lethargy, and producing agricultural goods and raw material for world industry only to be fobbed off their produce through an invincible network of economic exploitation.

Thus the way world power patterns and social and demographic trends are developing, there seems to be no escape from a continuous fragmentation of political structures and a growing state of isolation and alienation of contemporary man.

The basic issue in restructuring world order is to establish the autonomy and potency of the majority of nation states and to realise the value of equality among them so that the larger values of individual autonomy and freedom, justice in the distribution of worldly goods and participation in decision making structures can be attained.

From this general diagnosis of contemporary reality follows my preferred model of a world order. In order that the individual is secured maximum autonomy and freedom, in order that political communities are enabled to reach minimum plateaux of economic welfare and social justice, and in order that we minimise the dangers of international violence, we have to admit three different levels of goal-fulfilment—the individual, the national and the international—in our scheme of things.

Levels of Fulfilment

For achieving both the realisation of autonomy for the human being and forging satisfactory states of community and fellowfeeling among men through their participation in the political community, it is necessary to provide greater rather than lesser autonomy to individual states, a majority of whom are not autonomous at present.

Autonomy, freedom, well-being and justice have to be built *at a number of levels* so that ordinary men and women can realize these values. Neither the spectre of an overriding world government in the image of some transcendental ideology nor just a "smashing" operation in the hope that it can do away with all encumbrances holds any attraction for us.

Perhaps such an approach comes from the background of an ancient civilization seeking to reorder its elements on the basis of a new consciousness—seeking actively to realize preferred values through a series of challenges and encounters in the real world. Our very realization of the stupendousness of the task makes us averse to the hollow sounds of comfortable angry men from the West hopping from one aeroplane to another in a bid to transform the whole world—the latest edition of the "whiteman's burden". Hence, our somewhat different perspective.

Removal of Inequality

The principal stumbling block—the overriding hurdle—that stands in the way of achieving these conditions of life is not the absence of a centralised world authority but rather the present structures of dominance and inequality in the world:

the absence of real autonomy for individual states. Our preferred world should do away with this inequality and this dominance or at least bring them within limits.

This means two things: one in regard to launching a struggle for the removal of persisting mechanisms of perpetuating inequality and dependence, and the other in regard to devising international institutions which will strengthen such a goal.

End to Big Power Politics

In regard to the former, it is necessary to come to grips with the reality of international politics. So long as the less powerful and poorer nations of the world will remain disunited and fall a prey to the manoeuvres of big power politics, there seems to be little chance of achieving real autonomy for them or the conditions for a successful solution of their internal, social and economic problems.

There is need to join forces, declare collective goals and confront the existing manipulators of international politics with a sound strategy of bringing an end to their dominance, helped in this no doubt by dissenting and more civilized forces within the dominant nations, but mainly relying on their own strength. For this it is necessary to engage in a federalising process in these regions, leading in due course to more integrated political entities.

There is need to make the number and diversity of nation states more rational and manageable, and conducive to the values stated earlier. There is need for a smaller number of nations (or perhaps multi-national federations), each large in size and efficient enough in carrying out economic and political functions to realise the twin conditions of autonomy and equality that we have postulated.

This will also make for near about equal representation at the world level so that the various international institutions will operate in a truly participant manner, avoiding the present situation in which the existence of a plethora of diverse and atomised political units can be manipulated to serve the interests of a narrow oligarchy of international power.

The second aspect of the preferred world is the nature of the international system. There ought to be a complex of international institutions geared to the promotion of real autonomy and equality to both individual national units and individual citizens of all these units.

National and World Institutions

Three kinds of institutional complexes will be needed. First, there should be a complex of welfare and cultural institutions at the world level which will seek to eliminate gross inequalities in the access to technology, means of production, education and the relationship between land and living beings. These themselves, with the cooperation of individual political units in the underdeveloped regions, will plan and undertake economic enterprises backed by sufficient resources to balance and counter monopolistic corporations.

Secondly, there should be an international political structure to represent all the nations of the world and back up welfare and cultural bodies with sanctions and resources. Thus while the institutions of a participant democracy will function mainly within national communities, they will also be significantly supplemented at the international level.

Thirdly, there should be a set of institutions designed to project human rights and standards of justice wherever these are violated. This should include an authoritative court of justice, a council of world jurists and a commission for human rights and social justice.

Fourthly, there should be a world security system that will both enable a significant transfer of resources from "defence" to "development" and minimise conditions of violence that prevent the autonomy of both individual human beings and the political units in which they live.

Thus, as we conceive of the world, say, twenty-five years from now, we visualise a system in which the autonomy of the national political community is both retained and (in the case of the large number of "dependent" nations) considerably augmented.

This will, however, be in part supplemented and in part countered by (i) a sharp reduction in the number of units comprising the international community, making them roughly equal in population and size, access to resources, and social and cultural diversity and richness, and (ii) an authoritative complex of world institutions that will prevent exploitation and dominance.

The world political system will thus in its spirit and essence (as well as in its institutional structure) operate at both "national" levels with appropriate "intermediate" levels built into it.

Progress Towards Just Society

Finally, while we provide for political autonomy of each of these communities, it is hoped that, thanks to the intellectual movements that will bring the desired world about, there will be consensus between these communities in at least one respect, namely, in the admission of individual worth and autonomy as the final end of social organisation, and hence in the availability of democratic participation the world over.

Justice and non-violence, the other two values of such a world, will follow as behavioural components of this fundamental consensus on the value of the autonomy of the individual and his right to participate in the institutions of social democracy and influence its decision-making apparatus to the extent that he desires to.

For the kind of world we prefer, it is clear that appropriate processes and structures for the translation of our world order values will have to be evolved *within* domestic political systems as much as, and perhaps sooner than, within the international system.

Few will deny that man's striving for devising rational modes of government and justice has a long way to go even in respect of micro levels, not to speak of more inclusive structures. Some have held the view that the principal stumbling block in the way to bring about modes of civil government that will ensure progress towards a truly democratic and just human society is the nation state itself. We do not share this view, although we should like to add immediately that we do not also subscribe to any absolute concept of

national autonomy and sovereignty.

In the model of preferred world that we are proposing, national political communities will have to move towards:

(i) institutions for optimum participation of people at different levels; (ii) commitment to principles of equality of all men, a minimum standard of welfare for all including the lowest deciles of the economic structure, and a maximum beyond which no one should be allowed to go, both for reasons of equality and limiting the adverse effects of high incomes and too much prosperity; (iii) balance between enlightened initiatives (based on a total perspective) of central authority and decentralised structure of decision-making, planning and preservation of diverse regional cultural personalities; (iv) fundamental commitment to individual human rights, violation of which should lead to legitimate intervention by both the national central authority and, in cases of mass violation of human rights, by the international court of justice and the council of world jurists; and (v) internal territorial restructuring to maximise the values and processes—both in regard to maximising a "federal polity" and an optimum strategy of "size of units".

Economic Model

Here two aspects may be commented upon, for they have relevance to both domestic and world-level policies. First, the economic model entailed in our preferred world will need to move from the present *growth-based model* aimed at an aggregate production target to a *need-based model* defined by reference to the principles of individual autonomy, social justice and political community from which no one is excluded.

This will call for a revision of a whole lot of basic perspectives that have guided the model of industrialization and seem to have been accepted by intellectual and political elites in large parts of the world, for instance, in respect of rural-urban ratios, economies of scale and choice of technologies.

It will give much more importance to small rural as against large metropolitan units, its minimum satisfaction levels as

against constantly expanding consumption standards and the growth of a parasitic urban middle class, and to a policy of transfer of resources from "developed" to "underdeveloped" regions, classes and ethnic groups *within* nations.

The second aspect relates to the problem of "size of units"—an issue that is again relevant to both domestic and world considerations. National political units ought to be federal in character combining the advantages of both large and small size.

"Fair Deal" Units

Our own preferred model here is for fairly large-sized nations composed of fairly small-size sub-national units arranged along two or three levels (states, districts, communes, etc.), each enjoying a measure of self-government. At the domestic level it is necessary to maximise participation, social justice, "development" as a means of providing a fair deal to all and a non-violent mode of managing and absorbing conflicts and tensions.

All this is best achieved if the constituent states or provinces of a nation state are small, compact, single language units, characterised by ease of travel and communication, and dynamic enough to minimise elite-mass distances and facilitate a circulation of elites and counter-elites. On the other hand, the economies of larger scale will be ensured by the total size of the nation being large, either in population and area, or in productive potential, or both.

The model of such a preferred world is of a not-too-centralised system. It has considerable autonomy for individual political units for pursuing a whole lot of functions, but is balanced by an institutional complex at the international level whose principal function is to counter and correct world imbalances in technology, resources and political power, enabling national units to enjoy real autonomy and freedom.

It attempts on the one hand to prevent interactions whose outcomes are harmful—dominance, exploitation, violence—and on the other to respond to needs and demands of individuals and communities the world over. But it is still a limited institutional system, leaving a great deal to voluntary and community efforts at various levels, and leaving the

human individual autonomous to pursue his own spontaneous and idiosyncratic urges as well as urges that are inspired by certain transcendental values of his own civilisation.

The vision that inspires us in this whole exercise is not one of a preferred social and political order where everyone falls in line and efficiency is the principal criterion, but rather of a state of creative anarchy in which there is scope for diversity and the pursuit of life as perceived by individuals and their place in nature and in the cosmos.

Footsteps into Future

There remains the question of how to move towards the preferred world. In fact, the relevant strategies follow from our model itself, which is not just a statement of values but includes structural and institutional properties. Mainly, there are three sets of strategies involved.

Firstly, it is clear in our minds that the next twenty to twenty-five years should see a period of conflict between the big powers on the one hand and the other national communities on the other. The driving force of contemporary history is creative nationalism and an urge towards achieving greater self-respect and autonomy among national societies of the so-called third world. This will need to be effectively organised and I see no escape from this confrontation.

Secondly, in so organising themselves, it will become incumbent upon these countries to resolve their mutual differences and move towards a process of federalisation (a) in different regions and (b) across these regions on the basis of a perception of common interest, *a la* Bandung or Belgrade or the "group of 77", or some variant thereof.

To begin with, these federations will need to be in the form of economic cooperation and a pooling of educational manpower and technical know-how and scientific and bureaucratic competence. As this is achieved, it will be possible to move towards federated political units. By the 1990s this can lead to a world of fewer units, each enjoying the necessary autonomy and together approaching a measure of equality and fraternity.

Thirdly, it will be necessary to launch movements of effective counterforce *within* the dominant metropolitan powers themselves. These will have to be intellectual movements, propelled by a moral energy that is derived from a consciousness of the injustices of contemporary reality; movements which will have to gather sufficient resources and strength to upset the institutionalised concentration of power and resources in these countries.

Accent on Autonomy

A number of these countries are highly authoritarian in their internal make-up, where the legal constitution has been undermined by the growth of military power and its global engagements. It will be necessary for the radical of the "new left" variety to meet the crisis in their own countries before undertaking their worldwide missions.

If they succeed in undermining the corrupt and debased institutional arrangements of these societies they will have simultaneously contributed quite significantly to the removal of patterns of dominance and injustice in the world as a whole.

The chief merit of our thinking here is the value of autonomy—for the individual and, hence, for the state. As a corollary to the value of autonomy, we are also guided by the value of equality among men and among nations. We want a world order based on the autonomy of each and the equality of all states.

The steps that we have outlined are all in the direction of achieving the necessary conditions for realising these values. We have no great attraction for grandiose schemes of either international or world authority. The world has already learnt at great cost that all such designs become insufferable leviathans in disguise. 1-

4

BUCKMINSTER FULLER : WORLD OF 2001 A.D. AN INTERVIEW

SHYAM RATNA GUPTA

With your deep insight into the past as well as the future, could you tell us what kind of a world is likely to emerge in 2001 A.D.?

Well, the shape of our planet will not be physically altered. We have to remember that humanity is very tiny. Our planet is 8,000 miles in diameter, the highest mountain is five miles and the deepest ocean five miles—or ten miles between the highest mountain top and the bottom of the ocean. In 8,000-mile diameter, ten miles are 1/800th only. If you take a 12-inch globe, 1/800th is invisible. A globe of 12 inches polished in steel would probably be rougher than our planet.

One Humanity

You and I average, may be, five feet. If a thousand people stand on each other's head, we will have one mile. If we have 10,000 people standing on each other's heads, that would be the difference between the highest mountain and the deepest ocean. We just saw that 10 miles are invisible. You and I are 1/10,000th of the invisible.

Our planet will not look different in 2001 A.D. as seen

from outside. Humanity may have resolved a great many questions in the interim period but evolution will have taken a large hand over and above human endeavour. Man tends to think that he is playing a much more important part in the universe than anybody else. I would expect that in 2001 A.D. the United States, India, China, the Soviet Union might be mere names or words because all humanity would have become one people.

The very nature of relationship of man to his universe is changing. He has a mind which is able to understand principles which are cosmic, to understand the gravitational system cohering the enormous universe. A little man on board a tiny planet, absolutely invisible, has been able to inventory the relative abundance of all the chemical elements of all the stars, visible to telescopes, in the heavens. He has a mind which is fantastically developed, but his "muscles" are insignificant, though he is still playing a game on our planet of "muscles", of guns which are "technical muscles".

Having arrived at world citizenship, humanity, enjoying global resources, will have before it a completely different situation from the one existing at present, of each holding off others from its own area, or a nation feeling as if it can only survive by itself.

Technological Innovations

Could you identify some of the important technological or engineering innovations which might occur in the next twenty years in the field of scientific knowledge?

Scientific knowledge is acquired, of course, through observations based on our experiments. Experiments are made with tools. So science and technology consist of the knowledge gained through the microscope and the various forms of great telescopes for probing the universe.

When we talk about applied science, we speak about technology itself. I would think that the greatest innovation in technology will be in the realm of doing more with less. For example, there will be a great increase in the tensile and comprehensive strength of alloys or other substances, even such substances as plastics and glass. Man will do most of his

compressive designing with liquids and gases. Nature's trees are compression of liquids, of water and gases, tensionally cohered with crystalline substances. Crystalline substances will be used for tension, and compression by hydraulics which are non-compressible. Local shock loads will be taken by the compressibility of pneumatics.

We will be able to enclose whole areas as large as New Delhi with single, clear-span structures that are so light that they can be easily air-delivered. In other words, there will be approximately an invisible environmental control.

Will social sciences and moral sciences also simultaneously register improvements of this nature?

So far social sciences have been unable to find one single generalised law. Physical sciences have discovered a great many laws. As for moral science, the philosopher has discovered principles which in metaphysics seem to hold true. But they cannot be demonstrated by experimental evidence other than human, personal experience. The models evolved by social scientists are based on assumptions which it is hoped will hold true but never do. So I don't expect much to come from social sciences.

I expect everything to come from the architectural design of the universe and from the laws that are operating which a physical scientist undertakes to discover. The environmental-producing conditions are going to spell out completely the limits and potentials of human behaviour.

Man and Technology

What will be the sum total of the effect of such advancement on human beings?

There seems to be a great deal of misunderstanding or misapprehension regarding technology. The physical universe consists of 92 generative elements. Each one is unique in its behaviour. The way in which a chemical associates crystally, hydraulically, numerically, the way in which the environment itself is governed by all-embracing gravity—these are the laws of technology. Nothing could be more extraordinarily technological than the eye with which you are observing me at this moment.

To be able to communicate with each other involves our brain, which physically comprises quadrillions of atoms in the most magnificent, electro-chemically-designed coordination. Nothing could be more extraordinary in technology. When human beings talk of technology as something to be afraid of, it is because they have seen humanity "misemploying" technology. Man is born naked and utterly helpless, but with only the beautiful technological equipment which he uses unconsciously but is completely ignorant of. So I do not set much store by the negative statements made regarding technology or importance of man in the universe. Unquestionably man has a great function to discharge. That is why he has been designed to be part of this extraordinary omni-intercomplementary universe.

Do you anticipate a great deal of harmony between technology and human beings?

I would say that humanity had made some misassumptions long ago. The sensory capability of man, to see, smell, hear, touch, covers only about one millionth of reality. We did not know this until we entered electromagnetics. We can now show a chart indicating the unique frequencies and temperatures of all chemical elements. When we see the "red-orange-yellow-green-blue-indigo-violet" of the spectrum, that is only one millionth of its total known range. The new reality we are beginning to be aware of involves the myriads of frequencies. If we tune into one of them, we can get the programmes being broadcast by one of the communication satellites, we can get all the information about what is going on all over the planet and around within the universe right in this room from electro-magnetic wave reality which passes through all the walls and other objects. That is the reality.

Metaphysical is Eternal

Humanity is not paying enough attention to this new reality. The newspaper's picturable front-page "reality" is irrelevant to the great invisible reality of the universe.

Man yesterday assumed that everything of reality was physical. He said there was a great difference between warm, soft flesh and cold, hard stone. One of his first questions is: Is it

animate or inanimate? As we made further discoveries in the fields of biology and chemistry, which were thought of as separate, we gradually discovered cells, found closeness between them, and came to bio-chemistry. Then within the structure of cells we discovered genes, chromosomes, etc. Within the teams of virologists we have chemists, biologists, mathematicians. The virus specialists were too busy to report to society that no threshold exists between inanimate and animate. The inanimate atoms entirely constitute "living" cells. The virologists say that what is inanimate, the atom, comprises everything that is physical. What is animate is not physically identifiable. Life has no weight; physical experiment shows no weight is lost when man dies. Whatever is life is immeasurable, weightless. Life is absolutely metaphysical, completely abstract and weightless.

Key Molecules

Human society has to adjust its concepts. There have been many who intuitively assumed something like this to be true. But we know now that by scientific resolution or physical experiment we exclude everything which we call life.

There are astrochemists who now have discovered critical enzyme building interstellar molecules. In these they discern the "key molecules" to the chemistry of life. But life is not chemistry. When humans die all the chemistry remains. Once I have made this distinction as sharp as we can, we bring in metaphysics, the capability to discover principles and the *principle* of principles. A principle must be inherently eternal. The physical is discontinuous; the great continuity is metaphysical. Human society has to adjust itself to this state of affairs.

This is absolutely fascinating. What pitfalls do you see in the way of improvement of human environment?

Only the relative rate at which man can learn to overcome his misinformedly conditioned reflexes and yield to his actual, experimentally acquired knowledge. We have known for 500 years that the heavens are not revolving round the earth. But all the scientists still see the sun going down. We have done nothing to correct our reflexes. In critical moments human beings behave under the influence of their reflexes, not reason.

We must adequately inform our youth, not misinform them. But the superstitions we have around the world obstruct the realisation by man of the successes he can achieve on our planet. So complete are these reflexes that what man calls his house may actually be an inheritance from a great-grandfather. He considers the house with big walls secure. But that is not so. Environmental controlling will come finally, which we will not even see. We can do so much with so little gradually.

Greatest Pollutant

It has been stated that poverty is the greatest pollutant of humanity. Is it possible to bring about a better understanding between the rich and the poor?

My answer to your first question makes this question obsolete. I would not say that poverty is a great pollutant; poverty is the consequence of ignorance. The great pollutant is ignorance.

Fear and ignorance probably are by far the greatest pollutants. It is highly feasible with the resources now at our hand to take care of entire humanity with the highest standard of living known to any millionaire. And all this can be accomplished by 1985 without anybody profiting at the expense of others, without anybody interfering with another. All this can be done. Therefore, it is not how we should adjust between rich and poor, it is how everybody should be rich, not by getting tied up with properties and securities, but by being free from them. You need not have property and security to be rich.

Sometime ago it was reported that you were designing houses for the teeming millions. Could you tell us something about this?

I am going to start from the end—to harmonise life with environment. Truth is always in harmony. If houses are properly designed, you would not see them. Supposing we hurt our forefinger, then we are astonished what amount of task it has been doing. When I feel well it is because I do not feel anything. It is because there is no physical interference with universe. It is the same way about the metaphysi-

cal attunement to the houses and environmental controls. It should not impede the utmost enjoyment of the universe.

What is your message to the youth of 1970s who will soon occupy the world's stage towards the end of the century?

I would like to go away from the word "stage" because it connotes a wide flat world, with four corners and ups and downs. All this was invented by man to accommodate misconceptions.

No Rulers in 2001 A.D.

As you know from geometry, all the perpendiculars to the same plane must be parallel. They can go only in two directions—up and down. What is one man's "up" is not other man's "up". Let us have better words for this spherical planet experience. Man cannot be playing on a stage; it is to be on the planet or rather our spaceship—the earth which is revolving 60,000 miles an hour around the sun, fantastically designed to take care of humanity despite his ignorance of the grand design of the universe. We were born absolutely ignorant, and where we are going now is to a great victory—a victory worthy of celebration. All humanity is born to be a success and not a failure. You don't have to "earn" your living. It was born yours. I find there is a deep intuitive awareness in the world that we are going to make further such discoveries.

You have convinced our readers that the world in 2001 A.D. will be vastly superior, materially and morally, than it is today. Perhaps you can give us a brief picture of such a world?

I would think everything there would be most surprising. All the operative conditions will come to recognise telepathy as ultra-high frequency field electro-magnetic wave propagation. Humanity will know what the rest of the humanity is thinking. We will not need rulers because, being well informed, we will see individually and mutually what needs to be done. We will understand with one another what needs to be done; we will do things with spontaneous coordination. There can be nothing more surprising than this. We will be ONE WORLD.[1]

5

INDIA'S SECURITY NEEDS IN 1975-2000 A.D.

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

An assessment of equipment requirements in qualitative terms to safeguard India's security over the next twenty-five years need not be an exercise in crystal-gazing and astrological predictions.

At the same time, a mere linear extrapolation on the basis of current threats and already developed technologies is easy enough but is not likely to evoke much of credibility in the light of major discontinuities in the developments in South Asia during the last one year.

World of 1950s

While reviewing the events of the last twenty-five years and casting our mind back to 1947, it might have been possible for us to trace at that time the political outlines of the world of today; but in technological terms it would have been more difficult to have predicted the current developments in all their magnitudes. The Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, visualised in early 1940s that the USA, the USSR, China, Britain (if it managed to retain part of its empire) and India would emerge as the major powers of the world. Today the first

three are major powers. Britain is not, but in its place one might substitute western Europe.

India, though now recognised as a dominant regional power, is still not regarded a major power in global terms. Mr. Nehru did not, however, visualise the phenomenal growth of Japan.

By early 'fifties he could anticipate that the Soviet Union was not thinking of dominating western Europe and that China and Soviet Union would not constitute a monolith. Though he did not articulate it, one could easily infer that he considered the United States as an aggressive power. A brief reference to the Indian assessment of the late 'forties and early 'fifties is made here to highlight that this turned out to be more correct than almost all western assessments of the day.

The western assessments went wrong in regard to the Soviet Union, Sino-Soviet relations, military pacts, the pace of nuclear proliferation, and China's ability to threaten international peace and security. They were also wrong in assessing the Soviet and Chinese capabilities in developing sophisticated military technologies. While a vast literature was produced on defending "freedom and democracy" against communist onslaught, the real underlying purpose was to create a network of regimes sustained by militarism and neo-colonialist links.

No "Export" of Revolutions

Against this background the likely developments in international security environment in the next quarter century have to be assessed. The traditional cockpit of wars in the world, the industrialised Europe, is now a settled area, and the present indications are that peace is not likely to be disturbed there.

The Soviet-German treaty, the Berlin treaty and increasing contacts between eastern and western Europe are happy auguries of a stable situation there. After 1948 there has been no communist revolution which some western commentators used to attribute to the Soviet Union as one of its "exports". The formation of communist regimes in China,

North Vietnam and Cuba are clearly recognised as of indigenous nationalist origin.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to talk of world centres radiating revolution. Barring the Indochinese peninsula, which is linked with China's national security, the Chinese have not supported national liberation wars in any significant measure anywhere in the world.

Only the United States and, to a considerably lesser extent, the Soviet Union and China have demonstrated the capacity to support wars. Japan, the U.K., France and West Germany might have necessary economic potential and industrial capacity for similar ventures.

But the trend in western Europe is towards a reduction of defence expenditure.

Academic Legerdemain

Of late one finds a number of academicians of the west putting forward plausible theories of the decreasing utility and stability of military power, and the very instance of the most wanton and genocidal use of military power is cited to support the thesis that the use of tremendous military power does not readily yield political results aimed at. But what is overlooked is that this conclusion is not shared by the decision-makers who alone count in these matters. Also, on the whole, such arguments, put forward at a time when the most barbarous ecocide and genocide are being perpetrated, highlight the irrelevance of such academic legerdemain to the real world. Accompanying such sophistry is the propaganda let loose through various agencies which serve the interests of some of the major powers, give misleading reports about the developing countries, and try to divert attention from the real causes of international insecurity—namely the interventionist policies of major industrial powers of the world.

China and India, as populous countries attempting to industrialise themselves and thereby becoming independent major powers with their potentials fully developed, pose a question mark to the old international system. However, China by equipping itself with deterrent weapons systems is

trying to insulate itself from the interventionism of big industrial powers. India, on the other hand, continues to be somewhat exposed.

The entire industrialised area of the world now consists of two alliance systems equipped with mutual deterrent weapons systems. A few industrial countries which are not in the alliance system manage their non-alignment mainly because of their geographical situation.

By the two superpowers agreeing between themselves that each power would avoid getting into a confrontation situation with the other, the countervailing restraint caused by uncertainties involved in a likely escalation had been removed and this could contribute to unleashing of the aggressive tendencies of the more interventionist of these superpowers.

Policy Aims

Since the industrialised areas of the world form a high stake to the superpowers, this aggressive tendency might possibly be directed towards the "third world".

This tendency might take one of the following forms: (i) establishing influence and control over mini-and micro-mini states and using them in the U.N. and elsewhere to pursue the policy of freezing the *status quo*—power-wise and technology-wise; (ii) spreading the activities of multinational corporations controlled by a superpower and operated in the interest of that power; (iii) perpetuation of restrictive practices in regard to trade and transfer of technology, fast depletion of the resources of developing countries in the interest of the developed countries; (iv) link up with alienated elite groups, militarists and individual dictators to manipulate the nations of the developing world; (v) direct and indirect pressures on "third world" nations not amenable to the hegemonial policies of the concerned great power; (vi) assistance to dissident elements and subversion; and (vii) outright intervention.

The fiscal, trade, economic, political, foreign aid and military policies are probably coordinated to achieving such

foreign policy aims of superpowers. Their policies of acquiring military bases, rendering military aid, strategic, and general purpose and counter insurgency forces have to be viewed against these objectives that they seem to have in view.

India's plans to equip herself militarily in the next twenty-five years will have to take into account this whole spectrum of threats. To borrow a phrase from some of the western strategists, the *nuclear king* today preserves peace in the world. The detente between the USA and the USSR, the normalisation of relations between the USA and China and the nonescalation of the confrontation between China and the USSR are all traceable to the balance of nuclear terror.

Nuclear Powers

Hence, the most effective way of reducing the temptation for the big powers to pursue interventionist policies in and around India is for this country to raise the risks of interventionism and add to their uncertainties by acquiring deterrent systems. A review of the events of last twenty-seven years bears out that most of the conventional wisdom on the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the economics of nuclear weapons is clever propaganda put out by western commentators or western "front" organisations for the benefit of leaderships in non-nuclear weapon countries.

The only way in which the irresponsibility and interventionism of the leaderships of some of the big powers can be deterred and the risks of world war reduced is to increase the uncertainties for them, and not to play into their hands by allowing them to form a cartel in nuclear weapons.

Today, the nuclear weapons are in the hands of two powers which were till recently imperialist. One power is currently playing an imperialist role, and two others profess to play a global role. In other words, the present five powers which have the nuclear weapons are the worst combination that is possible, and represent a maximum threat to world security.

Any addition of nuclear capability by non-imperialist powers

will, in fact, add to international security by increasing the uncertainty of these powers. Therefore, in the next twenty-five years the issue of acquisition of strategic weapons system will become increasingly relevant for India.[1]

The recent trends in sophisticated conventional weapons are disturbing. Weapons like highspeed, lowflying deep penetration aircraft armed with laser and teleguided weapons have created an impression among the advanced industrial countries that wars could be conducted in an aseptical manner with minimum casualties for themselves, inflicting at the same time serious damage on the industries and infrastructure of developing countries.

"Bombing back to stoneage with 'smart' weapons" is now mentioned in the military and political circles of certain big powers in a tone which is used by doctors talking of lobotomy for a schizophrenic patient.

There is hardly any noticeable difference between the attitude of such people and that of a Goering who used to boast about what *Luftwaffe* could do to cities of his weaker opponents. In this respect the United States is the only power which is in a position to conduct wars thousands of miles away from its shores.

India's Needs

The Soviet Union and China do not possess that kind of capability at present. The U.S. navy has plans to modernise its fleet at a cost of $50 billion and this would give the United States the capability to intervene in the "third world" with impunity. Any attempt on the part of other powers to emulate the United States in constructing long distance naval projection forces would increase international insecurity further. It would also then become necessary for India to acquire adequate sophisticated conventional forces to deter intervention against her interests.

India must have adequate capability to deal with local conflicts such as the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 or the one of

the type we had in 1962 on the northern borders. This needs a sizeable force and stockpiles of equipment and their being positioned correctly to deal with conventional attacks.

India today has the fourth largest army and the fifth largest airforce. But her navy needs to be strengthened to bring it up from the present ranking around eighth or ninth place to fourth or fifth place in the world.

At present India spends a modest 3.6 per cent of its GNP on defence. India has been subjected to external aggression in 1947-48 (Kashmir), 1962 (northern borders), twice in 1965 (Kutch in April and Kashmir in August-September) and in 1971—five times in twenty-five years. Most of the countries (especially the industrialised countries) which have not had such real justification to be concerned about external aggression spend much more than India in terms of percentage of GNP on their defence.

Secondly, the thesis that a high defence expenditure and a high rate of economic growth are mutually exclusive propositions is a piece of neo-colonialist propaganda, meant for the consumption of the gullible in the "third world". All the industrial countries (with the sole exception of Japan which is also now joining the trend) have combined high defence outlays with high economic growth rates.

Intellectual Bondage

In India the thesis that defence expenditure should be kept low to step up economic development was popular in the 1960s as a convenient alibi to those who could not explain satisfactorily their failures in economic management. Even in India it is now clearly recognised that economic development cannot go forward smoothly in an atmosphere of insecurity and military inadequacy.

An appropriate strategy has to be devised to coordinate defence and economic planning as has been done for decades in the socialist countries. Similarly, the defence research and development (R and D) and civil R and D have to be integrated to obtain optimal results for both sectors.

What has been standing in the way of efficient, economic management, rapid attainment of social justice, reduction of

disparities and development of adequate sophisticated defence capabilities is, in my opinion, an elite section of opinion which has developed in the last twenty-five years. This is a phenomenon peculiar to some countries of the "third world". Of late, both due to internal and external developments, this outlook and line of thinking are under increasing pressure.

As we cast off this intellectual bondage, India's rapid economic development is likely to be managed with an optimum—and, consequently, an increased—allocation for defence, to enable this country to develop an overall balanced capability in strategic deterrent weapons systems, highly sophisticated conventional weaponry, and an adequate conventional force to deter the spectrum of threats to the South Asian region.

6

FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 'SEVENTIES

SISIR GUPTA

There are far too many variables among the factors determining India's foreign policy to permit any predictions regarding its future course. For one thing, India is not so powerful as to be able to influence decisively the evolution of world politics and hence much of her foreign policy and relations will be determined by what happens in other parts of the world and what other countries do.

For example, India has made it clear that she is greatly interested in the development of friendly relations with China. And yet whether she will succeed in achieving her objective depends largely on what China will do in response to India's gesture of friendship. Chinese behaviour, in its turn, will at least partly be determined by the internal developments in China.

Uncertainties

This is just to illustrate that whatever be a country's objectives in the sphere of foreign policy, it just cannot have adequate control over the factors determining its foreign relations and hence there can be unforeseen situations demanding un-

orthodox response. Even the greatest powers of the world find it necessary to readjust continuously their foreign policies to new realities, and a country like India has obviously to keep her posture even more flexible than that of the bigger powers in order to be able to use her limited foreign policy resources to maximise national gains.

There are other uncertainties. It is clear that India's ability to implement her foreign policies will very greatly depend on her ability to improve the country's economic situation and achieve a higher rate of economic growth. What assumptions could one make regarding India's economic performance in the 'seventies is a question beyond the domain of a foreign policy analyst. Yet, he cannot formulate his propositions in a vacuum, taking for granted a certain level of domestic performance in the country. It is necessary to point out these limits within which any exercise in looking ahead at the next decade of India's foreign policy has to be undertaken.

Having said this, one can proceed to advance certain broad propositions regarding India's foreign policy in the 'seventies. The base on which India will attempt to build her foreign relations in the future is what her performance in the last twenty-five years has created.

World—a Better Place

It is obvious that the Indian foreign policymaker today has many advantages over his counterparts who functioned at the time of independence. In many ways, the world itself is now a better place to live in for India and other similar countries. The gap between the rich and the poor nations remains wide and is yawning. Yet, politically certain advances have been made.

The post-war structure of world politics was fundamentally a structure of western dominance over large parts of the world. The inequality of military and economic power at the disposal of the west on the one hand and the rest of nations of the world on the other was of such order that the historical fact of the west's predominance was underpinned by current realities.

In the last twenty-five years the military equation between

the west on the one hand and the socialist countries on the other has changed considerably to the latter's advantage, and the overwhelming majority of the peoples of Asia and Africa have attained their freedom, resulting in the emergence of a more complex international political system.

The west had attempted to build a neo-imperial world order through military pacts and alliances. The nations of Asia and Africa, however, succeeded in defeating that objective through the pursuit of the policy of nonalignment. If the gap between the west on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other has been narrowed, not a little contribution has been made to this by the fact of the emergence of Asia and Africa as important forces in world politics.

In the second half of the last quarter of a century there have been further developments in world politics which new nations would regard as healthy. The military blocs organised in the wake of the cold war have disintegrated and the old bipolar structure has yielded place to a new multipolar system.

This has considerably added to the manoeuvrability of the smaller and weaker countries of the world and to their capacity to sustain their status as fully sovereign states. Above all, the threat of a catastrophic global war has receded and the major powers have devised methods of so regulating their relationship that a minimum degree of accord is maintained among them.

India's Contribution

It would be presumptuous on India's part to claim any decisive role in bringing about these developments. However, it is legitimate for this country to feel that its own emergence as a sovereign republic and the manner it which it so emerged as well as the foreign policies it pursued in the last twenty-five years have contributed in some measure to these healthy changes.

The attainment of freedom by India ushered in the process of decolonisation and the success she achieved in the task of the consolidation of her independence removed the basis of

the old imperial theory that the peoples of Asia and Africa were not yet prepared for independence.

India also made her positive contribution towards the freedom of the colonial peoples in a number of ways. In the United Nations and elsewhere, she roused the conscience of the world and helped to create opinion in favour of the right of self-determination of all nations.

When a crucial struggle between the forces of imperialism and of liberation was raging in 1948-49, India played an extremely important role in mobilising world opinion in favour of Indonesia's independence preventing the Dutch from militarily subduing the people of Indonesia.

Equally important has been India's persistent championing of the cause of racial equality. She had drawn pointed attention to the facts of racial discrimination as practised in some parts of the world. She had also initiated a number of moves to chastise the government of South Africa for its brazen discrimination against the coloured majority.

Dual Foreign Policy

Her policy of nonalignment prevented the west from creating a new edifice of their domination over the new nations. By befriending the socialist states, India helped to end their isolation and created a basis for long-term friendship and cooperation between this powerful group of nations and newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. Above all, India repeatedly championed the cause of peace at a time when the forces of war were constantly threatening to create a global conflagration. She offered her services as a mediator and peacemaker in certain crucial conflicts in the world and thus helped to narrow the gap between the attitudes of the two blocs and created a climate of peace in the world. She also stressed the need for *rapprochement* among the great powers and helped to enlist the support of the entire "third world" behind the process of mitigation of the cold war.

The fact is that with her size and population and with her history, India did count in world politics. Her foreign policy was not insignificant for purposes of redetermining the shape of international relations.

India's successes in improving the climate of regional politics have been more obvious. The partition of India had created enormous problems of relationship between the two successor states and an internecine conflict in the subcontinent was on. India had to live in peace with a state like Pakistan, the ideology and the structure of which were great destabilising factors for life in the entire subcontinent.

India pursued a policy of refusing to be engulfed in perennial hostility between the two countries and offered her hand of friendship to Pakistan while making it clear that she would defend her national interests and safeguard her integrity. This dual policy began to yield results towards the end of the period under review, and the people of Pakistan discovered that their government was attributing to India certain intentions which in reality this country did not have.

This contributed to a democratic upsurge in the two wings of Pakistan resulting in the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign independent republic and the overthrow of the military dictatorship in the residual state of Pakistan.

Continuing Objective

These two developments have transformed the nature of politics in South Asia and created the conditions for an entirely new pattern of relationship among the states of this region. What is more, the change that has occurred in the subcontinent has also vitally affected Sino-Indian relations and it is now legitimate to assume that the realistic leaders of China would find it necessary to lower the sights of their India policy.

It is in the light of the performance of India in the global and the regional spheres that the future of her foreign policy has to be discussed. It is obvious that the consolidation of the gains made in regional politics will continue to be the topmost item on India's list of priorities.

The wars that India was forced to fight with Pakistan would perhaps be viewed by future historians as the inevitable birth pangs which the subcontinent had to experience before friendly and cooperative relations in this area could take shape.

India has always had the friendliest feelings towards the people of Pakistan and it is only the aggressive activities of

their government which led to the conflicts in the subcontinent. The objective of India's policy towards her neighbours is not to build a relationship of dominance and subservience. It is neither India's intention nor it is within her capacity to create a sphere of influence in this region. The continuing objective of her policy, therefore, will be to seek peace and cooperation with her neighbours on the basis of the principles of sovereign equality of nations, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual respect and mutual benefit.

A definite beginning towards the creation of such a relationship has now been made. India's relations with Bangladesh are friendly and cordial, and the Simla agreement has created the prospect of a friendly relationship with Pakistan.[1]

There are a number of problems in regard to Indo-Pakistani relations which are yet to be tackled and it is not impossible that there will be many obstacles in the path of the improvement of relations between the two countries. However, the transformation of the states system in South Asia, the trauma of the defeat in Pakistan and the changed domestic and international realities that the Pakistani elite has to face may all ensure a steady progress towards friendly and cooperative coexistence between India and Pakistan, which have so much in common with each other.

Frame of Friendship

If India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are able to function within a framework of friendship, it will be possible for each one of them to initiate new moves to bring about cooperation among the countries of the region. There are many economic and other considerations which point to the need for regional cooperation among the countries of South Asia. India, as the largest of the countries of the region, has a certain responsibility not only to ensure peace and stability in South Asia but also to promote cooperation in this area. It is, therefore, likely that for the remaining years of this decade India will continue to explore avenues of cooperation with her various neighbours.

If India and her neighbours succeed in creating a new model of regional cooperation and good-neighbourly relations, the

effects of such a development will be felt in other parts of Asia, where there is an equally urgent need for a new approach to interstate relations.

The early 'seventies have already witnessed some interesting exercises on the part of other Asian powers to recast their foreign policies and to defuse local conflicts. The latest of such initiatives has come from the two Koreas which have declared their intention to seek the unification of their country through bilateral pacts and without outside interference. In Southeast Asia as well the nations have been in search of methods to improve relations among neighbours and to pursue the goal of regional cooperation.

But the situation remains extremely difficult in West Asia, because one of the powerful countries of the area regards itself as a western outpost destined to live in a hostile environment for many more years to come. Circumstances, however, may change and new hopes for peace and amity on the basis of the internationally accepted principles of coexistence may arise in that region as well.

Asian Stability

In any event, India's foreign policy may be expected not only to strive for the elevation of international relations in South Asia to a higher level of friendship but also to contribute whatever it can towards the creation of structures of peace and stability in other parts of Asia.

For in many ways stability in Asia is indivisible, an awareness which has impelled this country to adopt its policies towards the conflicts in Indo-China. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from Asia and the curtailment of the role of the external powers in Asian affairs remains a precondition for peace in the continent.

In the larger arena of the world, India can be expected to try to pursue the goal of cooperation among the Asian and African countries and to participate actively in all international efforts to improve the collective bargaining position of the countries of the "third world". In the coming decades, the question of the yawning gap between the rich and the poor countries will assume even greater salience than before.

Undoubtedly, India, as one of the world's poorest and yet largest countries will continue to be in the vanguard of the "third world" struggle for its legitimate rights. This will mean greater Indian interest in the early end of racialism and colonialism in Africa and in the evolution of coordinated attitudes among the poorer countries of the world towards the intricate questions relating to trade aid and development which are dealt with by the UNCTAD.

Structure of Global Politics

In matters relating to the global contest among the major powers, India would certainly continue to be interested in the improvement of their mutual relations through bilateral contacts and the creation and maintenance of a basic structure of accord and amity among them.

The emphasis on the need to struggle against certain aspects of the policies of the major powers would continue not because of any inherent Indian interest in hurting the superpowers but because some of their present policies are not consistent with the needs of world peace and the eradication of the roots of tension and conflict in the world. Any pattern of world order that does not provide for continuous change in the structure of international politics and does not ensure a reasonably rapid progress towards a more just international society cannot last for long. Therefore, in the Indian view, stability will never be identical with *status quo*; and in the great international debate that is bound to occur over the question of a new order in the world, India will inevitably find herself on the side of those who emphasise change rather than continuity in the structure of world politics.

This could create problems for India's relations with some powers, though not with all of them, and the enlightened sections of opinion in the developed countries will hopefully perceive the need to accommodate the views of the "third world" in their schemes for durable peace in the world.

India stresses the need for peaceful changes in the world, and in her view both peace and change will continue to be of equal importance.

7

THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER

J. D. SETHI

The balance of power in Asia is not independent of the global balance of power. If the latter remains unstable or is in disequilibrium, or has elements which are antagonistic to its working, according to rules of the game, the former cannot remain uninfluenced. A global balance of power must by definition be a balance between powers which have global interests. In relation to all the dimensions of power, the USA is the only true global power.

The concept of a power, however, is not static and must be taken as dynamic. Britain was once a global power but now is not much of even a European power. In dynamic terms, the Soviet Union is now emerging as a global power. Indeed strategically it is equal to the USA, because each side has recognised the "overkill" capacity of the other. The strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT) is a full expression of the fact that Moscow and Washington are yet the only two powers making the strategic global balance.

Potential Members

Some analysts now speak of triangular, quadrilateral and even pentangular balance of power, including China, Japan

and the slowly emerging united western Europe, besides the Soviet Union and the USA.

A tripolar global balance of power, not to speak of a pentangular one, belongs to the future. And yet the role of the other three powers, particularly China, is of crucial significance at least in two respects. First, as potential members of the global balance of power, they can play upon the differences between the two global powers to maximise their own gains and options, thus making it difficult for Moscow and Washington to have a common policy for every issue of international importance.

Secondly, they always appear to threaten the balance between the two global powers by their potentiality to tilt the balance on one side or the other, thus making it obligatory for each of the two global powers to seek such accommodation with the emerging regional big powers as yields an expanding role to the latter.

Concepts

A distinction is necessary between the concepts of a *global power*, a *superpower* and a *regional* (*continental*) *power*. A regional power is one which partakes of the regional balance but cannot materially influence the strategic situation in other regions and continents. As such, a regional power is constrained in its policies and actions not merely by other regional powers but also by those outside powers which have the strength and capacity to influence its strategic situation.

A superpower is in a position to have enough power to influence the strategic situation in more than one continent. A superpower also can be called a super regional power. A global power can materially affect the strategic situation in almost all the regions of the world.

As none of these concepts can be taken as static at a given time, a nation may have the potential to belong to any of these three types of categories and yet actually may not be in that position. It may, although not necessarily, move from one level of power to another.

There are nations which have the potential to become regional powers but are too small to ever become either super

or global powers, no matter how much they develop. There are regional powers which may have the potential to become super or global powers but are not in the process of becoming so.

Although the Soviet Union is not a global power in every respect, it is already a global power in the strategic sense and fast developing into that position in other respects. China is a regional power but fast becoming a superpower.

Even from this highly simplified and rather abstracted analysis of the power relations, it would seem that the concept of Asian balance of power is not a very simple one.

Necessary Conditions

For any regional balance of power to be stable and in equilibrium, the following three necessary conditions must be satisfied: (i) for the balance of power to exist, there must be at least two internal powers, with one acting as a countervailing force against the other; (ii) for the balance of power to be stable, there must be more than two internal powers so that any combination of two or more would be able to deter the remaining powers from upsetting the balance; and (iii) either the combined strength of the regional powers should be able to deter outside powers from interfering with the region or the relationship between an internal and an external power should be such as to bring forth an immediate realignment of other internal and external powers so that the balance is not upset.

There is a serious threat to the independence and security of all other nations if only two powers remain dominant, particularly in view of both having recognised the impossibility of a war between the two. A power balance confined to two powers would (i) inevitably produce strong and well-defined spheres of influence, (ii) not deter the intervention of one or both global powers in local conflicts outside their strictly defined spheres, (iii) encourage proxy wars, and (iv) bring maximum pressures to bear upon middle or threshold powers to stop them from developing into relevant powers.

A global balance of power does exist but the conditions for its stability or equilibrium are not satisfied. In fact, there

is a danger that it may develop into a bilateral monopoly of the two powers in many areas of the world, except in Asia in which as external powers they will have to compete with China.

This asymmetry in the respective roles of the two global powers in Asia and the rest of the world is likely to add greater instability to whatever power equations may emerge in Asia, particularly because Moscow and Peking are so frightened of each other that their individual actions might spark off new conflicts at the slightest provocation.

Asia is the last place for the USA to withdraw from. After the Vietnam experience the American presence in Asia is likely to take new forms. Encouraged by its latest success in exploiting Sino-Soviet differences and making a show of its military might, it would try to put maximum pressure on, and even adopt aggressive postures against, weaker nations which may be friendly with either Peking or Moscow but not strictly in either's sphere of influence. The despatch of a part of the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh crisis created such a dangerous situation for India. Although the tragedy was averted, the lesson of that move is not lost on New Delhi. Washington seems to believe that instability and uncertainty in Asia is the right situation for it to maximise its gains directly in this part of the world or indirectly in others.

Asian Powers

Moscow's position in Asia now is being threatened both by Peking and Washington. President Sadat's "quit" notice to the Russian advisers from Egypt would make policymakers in Kremlin to evolve new responses to the postures and challenges of the other powers. If Moscow comes to believe that it is not likely to gain anything by maintaining the *status qho* it has been doing so far, it could well try to maximise its gains by adding new instability in Asia.

Thus, the Asian balance of power does not satisfy the conditions of stable and equilibrated balance of power. Indeed since the end of World War II, it never satisfied these conditions, and because of the involvement of all kinds of outside

powers in its affairs, Asia remained the battleground for testing the conflicting policies and interests of outside powers.

Historically, the whole of Asia minus Japan was a colonial territory in one form or another and, therefore, the question of any internal balance of power never arose. After World War II when the nations of Asia became independent, their economies were completely shattered, their policies had to be reconstructed and their military power, except that of India, was almost next to none.

Besides Japan, only China and India had the potential to become regional powers. Japan could not exert itself because of its aggression on the people of Asia during World War II and also because its new constitution imposed on it a non-military role for quite some time. Under the protection of Washington, it developed into a massive economic and technological power. So much so that in economic terms, Japan can be called a global economic power.

China slowly but surely emerged as a powerful nation, united and determined to find its place consistent with its size and resources. India which showed the promise of having made a good beginning in the 'fifties found her progress slowed down in the 'sixties. Less by her own policies and more by the policies of outside big powers, India was forced to accept the position of a sub-regional power.

India's Priorities

Indeed, until the emergence of China as a relevant power, there was no such thing as the Asian balance of power and whatever "balance" existed or whatever conflicts appeared were entirely due to the conflicts of the outside powers having been transferred to Asia.

The policy of "containment" of communist China which the western powers sedulously pursued throughout the 'fifties and 'sixties, the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Asia and the non-emergence of any other internal power resulted in Asia being the testing ground of conflicts and rivalries of the outside powers.

India's priorities, as laid down by the late Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, soon after independence, were based on the

assumption that there would be a situation of relative peace and non-interference in Asia for quite some time and that would provide India time and opportunity to concentrate on her economic development. She could comparatively allot a low priority to building her military power and defence structure.

It was on that basis that while knowing full well the designs of China, Mr. Nehru attempted to build a relation of friendship which he thought both India and China needed for the same reason.

Three developments frustrated Nehru's priorities. First, the continent of Asia got increasingly compartmentalised into four sub-regions, namely, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and West Asia, each drifting away from the other three. This arrangement suited the big powers' interests in Asia.

The Chinese aggression against India was responsible for pinning down India to South Asia. America's war in Vietnam led to the artificial isolation of that sub-region from the others, and despite India's chairmanship of the international commission for Vietnam she was forced to withdraw from playing there any role at all.

In West Asia, the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which the two superpowers were arraigned on the opposite sides, reduced the chances of India playing any significant role. So far as East Asia was concerned, it was always too remote from India for her to play any significant role.

Structure of Pakistan

Second, the artificial and absurd structure of Pakistan, divided into two parts and joined together by colonial relationship and India-baiting, proved a strong temptation for outside powers to create in Pakistan a countervailing military force against India.

So long as Pakistan gave the highest priority to maintaining military parity with India and made it a basis of its relationship with big powers, India was forced to narrow her objectives and focus her foreign policy on meeting that challenge. That India should have made Pakistan the focus of her foreign policy was a major constraint.

So much so that almost all countries having significant interests in South Asia were seriously influenced by it and were forced to imbibe this distortion in their own relations with India and Pakistan. Pakistan, now adequately shrunk and being an area of low technology and poor resource endowment, will never be able to establish military parity with India. However, it would take some time before Pakistan adjusts itself to new realities and it is quite possible that either Peking or Washington or both may persuade Islamabad in believing otherwise. It was to avoid that possibility that the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, showed the utmost generosity to Mr. Bhutto at the Simla agreement in return for his promise on bilateralism.

Sooner or later, Pakistan will have to come to terms with itself. In fact Pakistan is going to face such serious economic and political crises during the next year or so that to solve them it may have to dismantle a large part of its military superstructure. Thus, another major constraint on India's foreign policy is likely to disappear.

With the unlikelihood of Pakistan now becoming an instrument and military bastion for power politics, it would not be incorrect to assume that at least three out of the four subregions, namely, West Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia, would move closer to one another again.

The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation is likely not only to bring about a new power structure in Asia but also somewhat reverse the drift towards instability, power vacuum and the rise of interventionist and hegemonistic tendencies of big powers.

Vision of Asia

Mr. Nehru's vision of Asia, which seemed to recede into history, is now within the firm grip of Mrs. Gandhi. Mr. Nehru had a strong sense of history but not so of time and power. On the other hand, Mrs. Gandhi has revealed an acute perception of power. From now on India is going to be a major Asian power to be reckoned with.

Thirdly, Mr. Nehru would have been able to meet the Pakistani threats but for the Chinese aggression against

India. He never expected that China would commit large-scale aggression over a border dispute. India had been one of the strongest supporters of China and its interests for more than a decade before it committed the aggression.

There was no choice left for New Delhi except to strengthen her armed forces even at the cost of slowing down the programmes of her economic development. Pakistan attempted to take advantage of the post-1962 position, which was marked by a temporary political vacuum as well as slowly emerging new force structure, and committed another aggression in 1965.

Thus, India's plans first to emerge as an economic power and then to devote her resources to defence build-up were pushed back for several years and India could not emerge as a relative power for evolving an Asian balance of power. Nevertheless, from 1965 onwards, even when the economic difficulties increased because of droughts and other unexpected calamities, India slowly went on building her defence structure. New Delhi also found Moscow veering round to India's views about Asian politics, and the two became close allies.

India's Experience

Now that China is fully accepted as a relevant power for Asia by the United States and the Soviet Union, and Japan has decided to build slowly its defence potential, there is no choice before India but to look after her own security with or without the help of others. It will take many years before Japan can emerge as a power as it lacks many strategic advantages which India enjoys.

The future Asian balance of power thus has two possibilities: (i) either China will expand its influence over many parts of Asia and thus work for a unipolar system to dominate the whole of Asia, subject to the interests of Moscow or Washington, or (ii) India will have to become a relative power so that the first necessary condition for an Asian power balance is satisfied.

India's sad experience of the 'sixties unmistakably has led her to conclude that it would be unrealistic for her to rely on the global balance of power for her security. New Delhi has

opted for at least two new policies which marked a break with the past policies laid down by Mr. Nehru. She tried to move closer to one power and despite all her adherence to nonalignment the relationship spread over the whole spectrum of policies—political, economic and military. India also attempted to become self-sufficient in defence production.

New Delhi has learnt from its experience that its security or, for that matter, the security of any "threshold" power cannot be a function of the global power balance, even if one of the powers is prepared to go with it for a while. India has to depend on her own efforts and resources by evolving a matching strategy against that of China.

If China were not a nuclear power, there would be no need for India to deviate from her policy of exploiting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. For several decades India cannot hope to have a credible deterrence against either of the two global powers, but India cannot do without creating a regional deterrence against a regional power which has shown its unlimited hostility to it. Normalisation of relations with China is one thing but preparing for the eventuality of another aggression is different. There are two necessary conditions for a non-nuclear balance of power in Asia: (i) that the global powers are able to arrive at an arrangement in the near future by means of which nuclear weapons of mass destruction are destroyed, and (ii) that China agrees to do it.

Nuclear Options

If neither of these commitments is satisfied, India will have to exercise sooner or later her nuclear option. In the absence of this choice being exercised, there will be no peace in Asia, there will be nothing to stop the external powers to intervene in the affairs of Asia, and there will be nothing to stop China threatening India.

In other words, there will be no such thing as a stable Asian balance of power.

Mrs. Gandhi has told the big powers, both inside and out-

side Asia, that there will be no peace in Asia unless they provide a collective assurance through international institutions for not interfering in the internal affairs of countries or their bilaterial problems, and keep off their rivalries and weapons systems outside the area. That is why she has also suggested some sort of a political understanding and co-operation between non-nuclear Asian powers to come together to put pressure on nuclear powers to agree to a stable arrangement for peace in Asia.

Variables and Options

What are India's options? Given the political constraints, two variables are chosen, three situations or scenarios stipulated, and four types of options identified. The variables are the rate of investment and the progress towards a nuclear-missile programme. In other words, the variables are economic and military powers. The four types of policy options are: strong, weak, binding and Fabian.

There is no difficulty in understanding the first two. A binding option is one which has to be translated into policy because, in a given situation, there is no escape from it. A strong option is distinguished from a binding option by being a deliberate, calculated choice in preference to another choice. The element of a deliberate choice in a binding option is limited. A Fabian option is defined as a cautious, conservative and almost inert approach to relations with another country.

The first scenario assumes a static development in India. The firm rate of investment sways around the current level of 9 to 10 per cent and the nuclear programme is of low profile and confined to peaceful purposes. In such a situation India cannot hope to become an Asian power and will be pinned down to being a sub-regional South Asian power by one or more big powers creating a countervailing force in Pakistan.

India's security will remain threatened by the growing gap between her own power and that of her adversaries. Since the triangular balance by definition cannot provide security for a middle power, the dominant option for India is likely to be the binding option.

The second situation is one in which India decides to make rapid strides towards a rate of investment of 15 per cent

along with an accelerated programme for building a nuclear infrastructure but without going in for nuclear weapons.

Power Balance

Such a decision would require a large-scale effort for self-reliance as well as much assistance from Moscow and some from Washington. This would produce a strong option towards Moscow, and weak but potentially strong option towards Washington. New Delhi may once again become an area of agreement, but still pinned down to South Asia. This would leave only a Fabian option towards China. To have even a weak option towards China the precondition is that the weak option towards Washington should be transformed into a strong one.

The third choice for India is to make a massive effort to reach the targeted rate of investment and go in for a crash nuclear weapons programme. She can have a strong option in regard to Moscow and Washington, and a weak one towards Peking. Once this programme is completed, India will be in a position to have a strong option towards all three super-powers. Indeed, in that case India herself could become a member of the Asian balance of power.[1]

8

PROSPECTS FOR INDO-WEST ASIAN RELATIONS

M. S. AGWANI

Any projection of India's relations with West Asia into the foreseeable future must begin by examining the pattern of relationship that has evolved over the last quarter century and by identifying the elements of continuity and change in that pattern.

In the early years of independence India's approach to West Asia was in no small measure conditioned by the political ethos generated by the struggle for independence at home as well as in several West Asian countries. The nationalist resurgence in the two areas during the inter-war years had served not only to rekindle memories of manifold cultural and intellectual affinities in the past but also forged new bonds of fellowship.

Retrospect

While the nationalist movement in India sympathised with the aspirations of the West Asian peoples, the latter realized that their own emancipation was bound up with the outcome of the Indian struggle. Independent India, therefore, felt emo-

tionally and morally committed to the nationalist aspirations of the West Asian peoples.

During the period of struggle for national independence personal contacts were also established between the Indian and West Asian leaders. Jawaharlal Nehru's abiding interest in Asian resurgence and world affairs led to his close association with Egypt's Mustafa Nahas, Syria's Fairis al-Khuri, and Iraq's Kamil Chadirchi.

The presence of fraternal delegations from Egypt, Iran, Palestine, and Syria became a familiar sight at the sessions of the Indian National congress.

All this added up to an excellent setting for the promotion of political, economic, and cultural relations between India and the West Asian countries. In the political sphere, India was in full agreement with the West Asians on the colonial question.

Approach to Suez Canal

India's approach was based on two principles—support to freedom movements and adherence to a peaceful approach. India sought to advance the cause of freedom but without prejudicing political stability or aggravating international tension.

A classic example of India's constructive role was its approach to the Suez crisis. Soon after President Nasser's announcement concerning nationalisation of the Suez canal, India made concerted efforts to counsel moderation on all sides and to help resolve the dispute in a manner satisfactory to Egypt as well as to the canal users. At the London conference and later in the United Nations, the Indian representatives sought to evolve a peaceful solution which would safeguard the legitimate interests of the canal users without detracting from the sovereign rights of Egypt. At the same time India took strong exception to the British move to set up a canal users' association which might unilaterally assert the users' rights.

The interruption of these efforts by the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt evoked a sharp reaction in New Delhi. Nehru bluntly described it as a "naked aggression", "a reversion to the past colonial methods", and pleaded for

speedy action by the United Nations to halt it. Subsequently, India played an active role at the United Nations in securing the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Egyptian soil and in vindicating Egypt's sovereign rights.

Arab Nationalist Opinion

Similarly, India consistently upheld the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. As a member of the United Nations Committee on Palestine, India firmly opposed the so-called majority plan recommending partition of Palestine. Instead, she put forward, together with Iran and Yugoslavia, the proposal to create an independent federal state of Palestine comprising autonomous Arab and Jewish units.

The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 was attended by the first Arab-Israeli conflict which eventually resulted in Israel's territorial expansion and eviction of over a million Palestinians from their homes.

India rejected the Israeli position regarding its boundaries and favoured restoration of the Palestinians' rights. Moreover, it supported the Arab case for equitable distribution of the Jordan river waters.

These principles also determined Indian policy towards the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Needless to add that India's principled approach to the Palestine question has been deeply appreciated by the Arab governments and public in general and the Palestinians in particular.

An identity of views on colonial and other related questions prepared the necessary common ground for India and West Asia to promote cooperation in other fields of mutual interest.

Among the areas of common concern were the questions relating to security and the power blocs. In the early phase of her relations with the region, India encountered a twofold challenge to her political and security interests: the British drive to bring about a military grouping of West Asian countries which would safeguard its oil and imperial interests in the region, and the Pakistani

design to forge a Pan-Islamic alliance of West Asian countries. While the former threatened to bring the east-west cold war to India's doorstep, the latter sought to isolate India from a region so vital to her security and economic well-being. By 1955 the two forces converged and the Baghdad Pact was born.

While Iran and Turkey joined the pact on account of real or imagined apprehensions of Soviet threat to their security, Pakistan's adherence to it was essentially motivated by its desire to pressurise India. Iraq joined the alliance in the face of strong domestic opposition. The Arab nationalist opinion, on the other hand, interpreted this move as being a calculated attempt by the western powers to prolong their military and political supremacy in the region. Hence, its vigorous opposition to the pact.

Nonalignment and Cooperation

It was against this backdrop that the concept of nonalignment gained widespread acceptance in Egypt and West Asia during the late 'fifties. It inspired the opponents of the Baghdad Pact in Iraq to stage a successful revolt against the pro-western monarchy. In the Lebanon, the votaries of nonalignment brought about the fall of President Sham'un in 1958.

Thus in the critical years of cold war rivalry Arab nationalism successfully resisted the big power pressures which threatened to undermine the security and independence of India as well as of the Arab nations. India also found in the radical trends in the Arab world an effective antidote to the residual pan-Islamic tendencies in the region. The various projects of Islamic alliance originating in Riyadh, Teheran or Islamabad either foundered on the rock of disagreement over leadership or were shelved for lack of public enthusiasm.

All these developments helped create conditions for active cooperation between India and the Arab states in economic, commercial and cultural spheres. The progressive abatement

of the cold war since the early 'sixties opened the way for wider cooperation with the non-Arab West Asian states as well.

Besides, in recent years there has been a marked shift of emphasis in India's approach to the region. This is reflected in the greater emphasis now being placed on economic cooperation. Towards that end, agreements have already been concluded with Iran, Kuwait and Egypt.

The Indira-Nasser-Tito "summit" conference in 1966 positively endorsed the idea of exploring avenues of cooperation in industrial and economic fields. India signed an agreement with Kuwait in 1965 envisaging joint ventures, including shipping companies and industrial undertakings. The same year, the Indian oil and natural gas commission signed an agreement with the Iranian national oil company to prospect, in partnership with an Italian oil company, an offshore area in the Persian gulf totalling 8,000 square kilometres.

The two organisations also agreed to establish an oil refinery, costing Rs. 400 million, and a fertilizer plant in Madras. The offshore oil-field has since commenced production in commercial quantities.

During the same period significant progress has been made in the field of commercial exchanges. This is borne out by the fact that the two-way trade between India and the Arab world alone now exceeds Rs 1,700 million.

New Situations

This survey would suggest that notwithstanding the complexities of the West Asian scene the Indo-West Asian relations have developed steadily and along positive lines.

Of course, there have been some setbacks too. The unseemly developments at the so-called Islamic "summit" conference at Rabat in September 1969 gave a jolt to Indo-Arab relations. No less disappointing was the frigid response of almost all the West Asian states to the massacre of the East Bengalis at the hands of the Pakistani army, and to the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign nation.

All in all, the positive as well as the negative factors point

to the need for constant scrutiny of the rapidly changing West Asian operational environment.

It is indispensable not only to come to grips with new situations but also to anticipate them.

In considering the problems and prospects of India's relations with West Asia, one must first of all identify the crucial areas wherein new developments may help or hinder further progress. Next, one must ascertain the potential of these developments making reasonable allowance for possible alternatives. Viewed thus, the areas of major interest to India are those related to the pattern of great power relationship, intra-regional configurations and economic development.

In recent decades, the economies of West Asian countries have depended largely on agriculture and oil. Oil is the mainstay of the economies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and some minor Gulf emirates. In Iran and Iraq, oil production is a major economic activity. Egypt, Syria and Turkey, on the other hand, rely mainly on agriculture. The Lebanese economy is sustained by its trade and transit services to the Arab hinterland.

Among other resources Turkey has exploitable quantities of iron, copper ores, chrome, and coal. Jordan and Egypt have phosphate deposits, and the latter also produces small quantities of iron, manganese and chromite. Iran too possesses mineral resources other than oil but in small quantities.

West Asian Resources

Broadly speaking, the differences in endowment of resources have yielded two patterns of industrialisation. While in the oil-dependent desert economies emphasis is laid on oil production, refining, and petrochemical industries, the industries in Turkey, Egypt, and Iran are more diversified.

But the entire region lacks mineral and other resources indispensable for heavy infrastructure industry. Hence the contribution of industry (other than oil production) to the gross domestic product ranges from 5 per cent (Saudi Arabia) to 23 per cent (Egypt).

As regards oil industry there is a pronounced accent on

restrictive action against the major American, British, and French companies which had until recently virtually monopolised the West Asian oil concessions.

Here, two trends are discernible. First, wherever the oil companies have failed to explore and exploit all the areas originally held by them, the terms of the concessions have been modified and the operational areas rigorously delimited. Secondly, there is a growing tendency among the oil states to seek active participation in the production, refining, and sale of oil under the auspices of the newly established state-owned oil companies. Encouragement is also being given to collaboration with new entrants such as the Japanese and Italian oil companies and the oil and natural gas commission of India.

Areas for Further Cooperation

These trends broadly indicate the areas in which there is wide scope for cooperation between India and West Asia in the coming decades. Given the necessary initiative and drive, India can export her oil technology to West Asia on a wider scale than has been possible until now.

The oil states will welcome this because of their anxiety to contain the mighty oil cartels and also because India offers a rapidly expanding market for West Asian oil.

There is also ample scope for collaboration in petrochemical enterprises. The fertiliser plant, currently being set up at Madras with Iranian collaboration, is an encouraging example of further possibilities in this direction.

As for the field of trade all indicators point in the direction of increasing interdependence. India will continue to import long staple cotton and phosphates and is not likely to be self-sufficient in oil in the foreseeable future. Similarly, India's conventional exports to West Asia, such as spices, tea and jute manufactures, can be maintained. But the more promising area appears to be that of non-conventional items like machine tools, iron and steel products, electric gadgets, and industrial plants that holds out the prospect of a real breakthrough.

We may now turn to examine the various possibilities in the field of intra-regional politics. Dissensions and conflicts have been the bane of the West Asian scene in recent decades. Some of these conflicts remain unresolved yet.

To the endemic Arab-Israeli conflict is added the Arab-Iranian confrontation over the gulf. Nor is the end of intra-Arab rivalries in sight.

Emerging Pattern of Politics

It must, however, be noted that much of this turmoil is symptomatic of some far-reaching—and long overdue—changes in the structures of the West Asian polities. Nor is the trend towards cooperation wholly non-existent. Thus despite Arab failure to translate the pan-Arab ideal into political reality no Arab government can afford to ignore the popular "pan-Arabist" pressures.

A case in point is the Saudi Arabian subsidy to Egypt since the June 1967 war. Other developments such as the Arab economic unity agreement (1962) and the recent activation of the Arab development bank are positive indications that diversities of political outlook may not necessarily impede progress towards economic integration.

There is, however, less certainty about the prospects of the regional cooperation for development (RCD), sponsored by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

Of particular interest to India is the future role of Pakistan in the emerging pattern of West Asian politics. Before the liberation of Bangladesh, West Asia had figured prominently in Pakistan's foreign policy perspective. And this interest is likely to continue in the future but with a difference.

In the past, the chief motivation of Pakistan's West Asia policy had been the desire to contain India. However, with its reduced size and resources Pakistan is now confronted with two options. It must either normalise its relations with India on the basis of good neighbourly cooperation or draw even closer to its West Asian neighbours.

It is to be hoped, particularly in view of the Simla agree-

ment, that Pakistan will opt for cooperation with India. As for the second choice, it will not take Pakistan too long to discover that its West Asian allies have no particular interest in bolstering up an anti-Indian stance.

As regards Pakistan's quest for Islamic solidarity, its recent experience should suffice to show that in the final analysis nationalism triumphs over religious affinity.

New Trends

Finally, India must pay attention to the new trends in the sphere of great power involvement in West Asia. In the past great powers had been drawn to this area because of its strategic location astride the junction of Asia, Africa, and Europe. But with the phenomenal expansion of West Asian oil industry in recent decade, geology has replaced geography as a factor lending significance to the region. Its proven reserves of oil comprise 60 per cent of the world's total reserves. And of the world's current oil production of 2,300 million tons, West Asia alone produces around 600 million tons.

Secondly, the cold war alignments of the 'fifties have now practically faded out. While Turkey and Iran have not allowed the CENTO to come in the way of evolving normal cooperative relationship with Moscow, there has been a steady decline in Washington's influence in the Arab world as a result of its near-total commitment to Israel.

The latter trend initially helped swell Moscow's fortunes in the Arab world as evidenced by the Soviet-Egyptian and Soviet-Iraqi treaties of friendship and cooperation concluded last year; but the protracted Arab-Israeli stalemate seems to have halted this process. This reaffirms the Arab yearning to ward off great power hegemony.

On the other hand, the outcome of the recent Moscow "summit" clearly suggests that the two superpowers are inclined to move into an era of stability, accommodation, and coexistence which may incidentally permit the West Asian states to come to grips with the pressing problems of development and progress.[2]

9

THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT : ROLE OF EXTERNAL POWERS

M. S. RAJAN

Since the conclusion in August last year of the Indo-Soviet treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation, and more especially since the end of the Indo-Pakistani war last December and the establishment of the new state of Bangladesh, there has been a good deal of critical comment in the world press and by diplomats and politicians on international relations in the Indian subcontinent.

This has led some people to believe that there have been certain grave changes in the Indian subcontinent which are either presently dangerous to peace and stability in the area or are ominous for the future.

Jaundiced Views

In the estimation of these critics, India has suddenly acquired, by doubtful means, a pre-eminent position which, furthermore, she is likely to misuse for her own nationalistic purposes. Other commentators suggest that India has permitted herself to be guided or influenced by the Soviet view of world affairs, thus allegedly compromising India's nonaligned position and role in world affairs.

These views or beliefs are either wholly jaundiced or exaggerated. The only element of truth in them is that there has been a significant, *not* radical, change in the positions of India and Pakistan in subcontinental affairs. These changes have affected and might affect the nature of Indo-Pakistani relations and are likely to generate a significant shift in the 24-year old positions and roles of the external powers—mainly, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. The other conjectures are due to ideological prejudices or to preconceived notions on the continued validity of the nature of interstate relations in the Indian subcontinent.

Also, there is no justification for thinking that the *status quo ante* was necessarily and wholly good for the peoples of the Indian subcontinent, for peace and stability of the community of nations; or that the changes, present and projected, are so grave as to cause one any anxiety.

Welcome Developments

What, in the main, has happened in the Indian subcontinent? The old Pakistan, which was a political and geographical absurdity, a freak in the society of nations, collapsed in 1971. It survived for some 24 years only because of two reasons—one internal, the other external.

The internal reason was the denial of democracy to the people of Pakistan by the politico-military bureaucratic oligarchy which ruled Pakistan since its establishment. The external reason was the propping up of the old Pakistan by the balance of power operated by two external powers in the Indian subcontinent for the last 20 years—the U.S. in the 'fifties and China in the 'sixties. These two props were closely linked together—one sustaining the other as though there was a conspiracy between the oligarchy that ruled Pakistan and the two external powers. The disappearance, after 24 years, of the old Pakistan was inevitable when these props were removed in 1971.

The establishment, at last, of a democratic government in Pakistan is surely to be welcomed. And there is no reason whatever to shed any tears over the disappearance of the

external balance of power in the Indian subcontinent, operated by the United States and China.

On the contrary, the third party intervention in the affairs of the Indian subcontinent and the operation of balance of power have done immense harm to the governments and peoples of India and Pakistan. It prevented normal, friendly relations between the two parts of an old country. It made simple bilateral problems difficult and insoluble, and helped draw Indo-Pakistani relations into the vortex of international relations and the cold war.

Indo-Soviet Relations

The assumption—all too easily made, without an adequate study of facts or with preconceived ideological prejudice—that India has compromised her independence by signing the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971 is quite contrary to the terms of the treaty and the nature of Indo-Soviet relations.

While Indo-Soviet relations have been very friendly and cordial for the last 15 years, they arise from our identity of interests and outlook on certain aspects of international relations—that is, on strictly pragmatic considerations, not out of ideological or political identity. Indeed, it is highly significant that both in India and the Soviet Union there is now a widespread recognition of their present relations being based on and determined by plain, concrete, mutuality of interests.

India benefits considerably from trade with the Soviet Union, but Indian official spokesmen have little inhibition today as before to comment on those Soviet actions and policies which might adversely affect India. For example, when recently there were some press reports indicating a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to mediate in Indo-Pakistan affairs, as it had done at Tashkent in January 1966 (which, however, was denied by Soviet official sources), the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, remarked in the Indian parliament on 4 April 1972 that "the Soviet Union is a friend of India and we value their friendship. However, anyone who imagines that we shall allow ourselves to be dictated to by third parties in our negotiations with Pakistan, *or in any other matter, foreign*

or domestic, is quite off the mark. Let me make that clear." India also supported the U.N. General Assembly resolution of 17 December 1971, moved by Sri Lanka, declaring the Indian Ocean area a zone of peace which should be kept clear of big power rivalries, while the Soviet Union abstained.

Pakistan-Soviet Relations

As regards the Soviet Union's relations with Pakistan, there is no reason why it should seek to exercise any balance of power *against* Pakistan. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has been steadily cultivating improved relations with that country since the early 'sixties.

Even though the Soviet Union's position and role in the establishment of Bangladesh might appear to be anti-Pakistan and pro-Indian, it was not really so in fact. For example, as late as October 1971, the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr. Kosygin, in a joint communique with President Boumedienne of Algeria, was willing to declare publicly (like the spokesmen of many other states) their "respect for the national unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan", while Indian spokesmen were upholding self-determination for the people of the former East Pakistan. Certainly, the question of Bangladesh did not affect the decade-old Soviet policy of cultivating Pakistan. This was clearly demonstrated by President Bhutto's visit to Moscow in March 1972.

Regarding the Soviet role in the establishment of the new state, it is exaggerated by some commentators, possibly to underplay India's role. Secondly, Bangladesh has promptly declared its adherence to the policy of nonalignment and has sought and secured membership of the Commonwealth. Thirdly, Bangladesh has entered into a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with India, a similar one that India has signed with the Soviet Union. The relations between the new state and the Soviet Union would thus be identical to the one India has with the Soviet Union—friendly, but non-aligned.

What about the attitude of the other superpower, the United States, to the Indian subcontinent? For 18 years the United States had sought to maintain a substantial military relationship with Pakistan which, however, frustrated its desire to maintain close and cordial relations with nonaligned India.

Indo-American Relations

The result is that Indo-American relations have been subject to recurring stresses and strains. These relations reached their nadir last year on account of differing attitudes of India and the United States over the struggle for Bangladesh.

The recent U.S. recognition of Bangladesh and President Nixon's announcement in February 1972 of U.S. desire for a "serious dialogue" with India on their future relations, and his statement that there would be no "U.S.-Chinese alignment" against third countries as a result of his visit to China, would go some way in assuring India of friendly U.S. intentions towards her. However, these assurances were subsequently somewhat toned down by the reference to the Kashmir question in the Nixon-Chou joint statement at the end of the American President's visit to China.

India's Prime Minister too has been publicly reiterating India's continuing desire for friendly and mutually profitable relations with the United States in a spirit of "let bygones be bygones". But the "dialogue" between the two governments has not yet begun.

A hopeful aspect of the situation is the reported U.S. stand that the U.S. government is now not interested in any new defence pact with Pakistan. This factor should have helped to improve Indo-American relations but for the continuing press reports that the U.S. government has permitted the supply of arms to Pakistan through third countries like Jordan, Turkey and Iran.

Further, in spite of Sino-American public assurances that their *rapprochement* would not affect their relations with third countries, there are persistent and cumulative pieces of evidence of some parallelism between American and Chinese policies in respect of South and Southeast Asia. Should this eventually turn out to be anything more than accidental

coincidence, it would gravely affect a wide spectrum of intra-Asian relations.

There is a large question-mark regarding the intentions and outlook of China towards South Asian states.

Chinese Outlook

China continues to maintain close and cordial relations with Pakistan. Reportedly it also continues to supply to Pakistan a large quantity of arms. China is the only major power which has not still recognised Bangladesh; it has also the dubious distinction of having cast its first-ever veto against the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations.[1]

But the more serious factor of uncertainty in the future of international relations in the Indian subcontinent is China's attitude to the new pattern of relations between India and Pakistan. Would China acquiesce in this new balance which is less favourable to Pakistan in relation to India and China itself? Though it is perhaps too soon to expect a clear answer until after the stabilisation of Indo-Pakistani relations, there is already disturbing evidence to the contrary that China has helped Pakistan to equip two additional army divisions to replace those lost by it in the war in December, 1971.

Equally uncertain is China's attitude to normalisation of relations with India. The Peking radio and press, and occasionally its spokesmen too, continue to use strong language condemning and criticising India on a variety of issues. On the other hand, Indian spokesmen have been emphasising that India would like to normalise relations with China. But China has not cared to respond to these overtures, even in respect of resumption of trade relations.

The normalisation of India-China relations is of the greatest importance for peace and stability in the Indian subcontinent, for this is collaterally related to China's relations with the other states of the subcontinent—Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and now Bhutan too. Unless this happens, China will continue to be a disturbing factor in the pattern of relationships among the states of the Indian subcontinent.

This brings us to an analysis of India's role in the Indian subcontinent in the present context. There are three totally erroneous premises which have to be first cleared: that there was peace and stability in the Indian subcontinent during the last 24 years; that, as a result of last year's events, India has suddenly received an accession of strength; and that India is likely to misuse this newly acquired strength and prestige for her own nationalistic purposes.

Base less Assumption

While the first assumption is factually wrong, the other two are also baseless. The new Indian position need not necessarily threaten the security of any state in the subcontinent or the stability of the area. India continues to be the world's largest functioning democracy, with a vigorous opposition and a free press. The chances of India playing power politics with other states are remote. The Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi, has also repeatedly disavowed any desire on the part of India for great power status or leadership of any group of nations. These official precepts are backed by India's performance in conceding to Nepal two decades ago and recently to Bhutan genuine independence when in contrast, under the British rule over India until August 1947, the former enjoyed only nominal independence and the latter was a British protectorate.

Indian spokesmen have given clear public assurances that India would respect the territorial integrity of what is now left of Pakistan, that India would prefer a strong Pakistan to a weak one, and that India would like to resume the traditional economic and cultural relations with Pakistan.

The recently signed Simla agreement between President Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi is a landmark in Indo-Pakistan relations. It promises to open a new and hopeful chapter in their relations. With its implementation in letter and spirit in the coming months, Indo-Pakistani relations would be revolutionised.

India has no serious problems with the other states of the Indian subcontinent—Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. This is equally true of India's other neighbours, Afghanistan, Burma and Sri Lanka. This pattern of relations could be disturbed

only if external powers take a hand in muddying interstate relations in the area.

Thus, the changes that have occurred in the interstate relations in the Indian subcontinent as a result of the events in 1971 are, on the whole, conducive to peace and stability in the area and to the welfare of the peoples of the subcontinent. For the time being, these relations have been detached from the whirlpool of international power politics, and the problems in their relations appear to be more easily soluble than ever before.

POSTSCRIPT (M I D-1975)[2]

The writer's assessment of international relations in the Indian subcontinent in the aftermath of the 1971 war with Pakistan and the role of the external powers in respect of the Indian subcontinent appears to remain substantially valid today, two years later. Even though the explosion by India in May 1974 of a nuclear device once again led India's critics to raise some false alarms regarding India's allegedly changing role in the Indian subcontinent and in international affairs generally, nothing has happened to confirm these fears and suspicions. On the other hand, India continues to urge progressive normalisation of relations with Pakistan. It has maintained close and cordial relations with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

There has been some (but not enough) improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations, consequent on re-opening of communications, travel and trade. However, there is no sign, as yet, of the two countries resuming diplomatic relations[3]. (Pakistan and Bangladesh also have not done so, even though the former has recognised the latter.) The writer's earlier optimism in this respect has not been justified by subsequent events.

Relations with the Soviet Union have remained, as before, friendly, but nonaligned. In respect of relations with the United States, after some evidence and hopes of improved relations during 1973-74, they have once again gone down to a low level. This is due to the U.S. decision early this year to resume arms supplies to Pakistan. China continues to ignore

Indian pleas for resumption of normal relations with India, but continues to maintain the hitherto close and friendly relations with Pakistan. It is also reported to be responding to the friendly overtures of the Bangladesh Government.[1]

10

EMERGING TRENDS IN PICTORIAL AND PLASTIC ARTS

J. R. VERMA

Art developed out of man's urge to express his joy in the world which surrounds him and his instinct to record the beauty of form, colour and movement. Each phase of civilisation has thus produced its own idiom and form of art.

Beginning with the works of sheer beauty of ancient Greeks and Romans, the fresco painters and sculptors of Ajanta, the supreme masterpieces of Michael Angelo and Botticelli, the highly decorative landscape and animal paintings of oriental art, to the abstruse creations of modernist abstractionists like Bracque, Picasso and Dali, the transition over the centuries marks a desperate struggle for liberty and truth and a revolution in subject as well as form. The basic nature of art has not, however, changed and art remains, as ever, a visual language for the expression of ideas.

Futurist Patterns

It is almost impossible, objectively, to analyse trends when one lives in the midst of the events which shape them. It is also in the very nature of art to be unpredictable; the artist

takes it as his essential function to surprise or even shock the public into a new sense of awareness. However, as the artist never works in isolation from his times, we may discern, though indistinctly, some of the main tendencies and directions which art may take in the future, say, a decade hence. Without sounding prophetic as to what precisely would happen, one may hazard a guess as to what complexion art is going to take on, how it is likely to be produced, the way it may be used, and the place of the artist in the years to come.

History bears testimony to the fact that not only coming events cast their shadows before, but also that each art movement has developed as a reaction against the preceding one. The pendulum has swung unceasingly back and forth between classical and romantic, perceptual and conceptual, figurative and abstract and perhaps other poles of expression as well. All movements are further related to a phase of some contemporary social, philosophical and scientific ideas.

The unintelligibility of modern art does not invalidate this point as the eminent composer, Edgar Varese, has justly observed: "Contrary to general belief, an artist is never ahead of his time, but most people are far behind theirs." The fauvist, cubist and futurist paintings developed in Europe not only as a symptom of revolt against the establishment, but also as an expression in art of the insoluble neurosis and irreconcilable contradictions of the twentieth century.

Cosmopolitan Character

Wars brought a new realism and the old gospel "art for art's sake" yielded to "art for idea's sake". The discoveries in the field of photography, new colour science, optics, electronics and Freud's theories about the working of the human mind opened up new vistas and developed new vision, and the modern artist is out for new worlds to conquer. Wilful distortion of form was justified by Henri Matisse who believed that mere "actuality" is unimportant to pictorial art; Picasso poured forth in quick succession paintings of startling novelty in a variety of styles before he reached the mode that later came to be known as cubism.

Art today has acquired a cosmopolitan character. Fast communications and international interchange of ideas have broken down the old frontiers of thought so that while artists of various styles can now be found in all countries, the styles throughout the world are very much alike, and it is difficult to make out a case for any distinctive national art.

The Indian artist, by and large, has left behind him the traditional styles of the past and in his bid, like his western counterparts, for freedom, has ventured novel and bold experiments. From Raja Ravi Varma, Abanindranath Tagore, Sharda Ukil, Nandlal Bose, Haldar, and Amrita Sher-Gil, to the dynamic modern masters like Bendre, Hebbar, Husain, Gujral, Ram Kinker, Bimal Dasgupta, Jehangir Sabavala, Trilok Kaul, Shanti Dave and others, the tendencies which have developed are a pointer to the shape of things to come. Art exhibitions organised by the Lalit Kala Akademi testify to the growing influence of abstract and extremist tendencies among the young generation of artists. Even Santiniketan, and art institutions at Delhi, Bombay, Baroda, and Lucknow, have given full liberty to the up-and-coming artist to shape his subjects and style. In an age which is exposed to the explosion of ideas, to the proliferation of knowledge and which has apparently no goal, the artist has developed an uninhibited personality and acute individuality. "In periods of transition", wrote S.R. Koehler, "in which some men adhere to old faiths, and others tear themselves away from them while the new faith that is to be their light is still hidden from them all, or at best but dimly seen...individualism asserts itself...there being no generally recognised leaders."

New World of Realities

The attitude underlying modern trends is conditioned by a general widespread anti-authoritarianism and anti-conformism which flourished in the post-war years against the moribund attitudes of established institutions. It is a part of a wider culture which embraces the principle of change as an essential part of creative living and rejects the negative and

destructive forces of war, political expediency and the "rat race" ideal of success.

This new spirit bypasses the old world of preconceived ideas and false absolutes as being simply irrelevant. It proposes an alternative world, not the static utopias of the old-style philosophers and politicians but a world which is created in the process of living, a new world of reality based on the acceptance of relativity and constant change.

The principles underlying the main styles of modern art, cubism and relativity, expressionism and "existential self-creation", surrealism and the new freedom of the subconscious recognise an emerging society which, in its rejection of absolute values, its emphasis on individual responsibility and its unselfconscious permissiveness of behaviour, strives to live out these principles in a new expression of human freedom.

In this context art must, in the years to follow, inevitably take on a new character and, in redefining it, we will have to question and perhaps discard many of the values which we assumed were hitherto inseparable from it—its exclusiveness, its permanence, its established technique, and its very role in society.

Emerging Trends

The emerging trends in art are also bound to correspond to changes which take place in patterns of thinking. We are constantly bombarded by information in a variety of ways—television, radio, the press and advertising in all its forms—and we ourselves must select and create the interrelationships between all the information that is available to us. The understanding of reality in the modern world becomes thus a creative process of establishing significant relationships between different areas and forms of knowledge.

In a world which accepts change, it devolves more and more on the individual to create and recreate his own pattern of reality from the myriad messages which are continuously conveyed to his senses. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that the special concern of most contemporary artists is for ambiguity which results from a new critical exploration of reality.

The artist questions all conventional preconceptions of how we see, think and feel, and rejects the idea that there can be any clear distinction between so-called objective and subjective reality.

Thus the whole process of visual perception has become a key subject for exploration and re-evaluation by artist and scientist alike. Modern art, which questions the relationship between image and reality, teaches us not to be content with formal conceptual ideas or with predefined patterns of understanding.

The emerging trends in art represent all that has been discovered in philosophy, modern science and technology and contemporary research. The practitioner of kinetic art has as his chief aim the "exploration of the dynamism of modern life through painting images of its rhythms and movement", believing that "movement and light dissolve substance" and claiming that "we want to paint not the motor car but its speed". For the futurist, "a galloping horse has twenty legs, not four". He does not want to depict solid masses but the rhythms and lines of movement made by bodies moving in space, following Bergson's dictum: "The material of our existence is nothing but a system of sensations and movements occupying continually different parts of space."

Panorama of Life

The artist who is painting today and will continue for the next decade and more has to concern himself with some immediate aspects of reality. He is to interpret in one way or another the whole panorama of the complex modern life.

In the field of sculpture, whereas earlier works were conditioned by the artist's response to his material and depended on his skill to discover forms which corresponded to the nature of the material, the new sculptor harnesses all types of materials (sheet metal, aluminium, plastics, net, wire, bolts, nails, glass, foam rubber, synthetic resins, etc.) he considers suitable to the shapes which he desires to make. He has at last accepted modern technology and the idea that a work of art can be machine-made.

The new sculpture, like the new abstract painting, is often

based on a carefully worked out formula. It is altogether urban and artificial, and bears no relationship to nature. It reflects the kind of environment in which the majority of people live today.

The wave of modernist western thinking has not left the Indian sculptor untouched. A struggle between the expressiveness and abstract styles of the West and our own traditional values is going on for supremacy and it is quite on the cards that the latter is fast yielding place to the dynamism of the former. The activities of government art institutions, the exhibitions organised by the Lalit Kala Akademi are indicative of the new emerging trends.

Some of our leading lights have left behind them their obsession with the statues of kings and princes and have shown interest in the common man and rural images. This has enabled them to reveal their inner sensitivity in handling subjects like *The Triumph of Labour*, *When Winter Comes* (D.P. Roy Chaudhury), *Mother and Child* (Chintamani Kar), *Hunger* (Sudhir Khastgir), and *Santhal Family* (Ram Kinker).

Free Style

However, the Indian artists are trailing behind their western counterparts. But India has its own rich tradition in sculpture which is flourishing side by side with the western influences. India has had large, anonymous bands of dedicated sculptors who were weavers of dreams and composers of symphonies in stone. Their enchanting creations live through the art treasures in the cave temples, palaces, religious and temporal structures raised during the centuries.

It can be safely presumed that the next decade will not entirely shake off the great inspiration they provide. This can, on the other hand, furnish a powerful basis of development in new directions. Moreover, the basic concept of Indian thought of giving form to the formless is likely to keep many of our sculptors off the track of abstract art.

However, a new phase of sculpture has already begun. There is a growing interest in murals and reliefs and for sculpture in open spaces, which are part of corporate life such as parks and porticos, lobbies and courts of national

and public buildings. Sculpture as decoration or propaganda is no longer considered inferior in status.

The new sculptor who has developed free style has the freedom from subject or theme and commands a wide variety of media. He has already come out of a narrow limited nationalism to an awareness of international horizons and influences. He will insist on orginality and individuality as being prime necessities in art and an adoption of purely sculptural aims and values.

The contemporary art has already ceased to be private and exclusive to an *elite*, and has become more communal and environmental in character. It has felt the need of serving a sociological purpose and has come down from its cloistered existence. A great deal of modern art work in painting, graphics and sculpture seems to demand the natural everyday environment of communal spaces—parks, streets, squares and other places where people gather for relaxation and amusement.

Art for People

Art is always related to the economic pattern of the age and the demands which the public make on the artist. Though the well-to-do collector will always monopolise the works of the great modern masters, the notion that art can be for everyone is no longer considered strange or impossible. In other words, a demand for cheap, non-durable art is creating new patronage among the younger generation. Thus, just as modern needs for practical things must be satisfied mainly by mass production, so the multiple manufacture of inexpensive art is the inevitable answer to the new demand. More and more artists are being attracted to the new idea of using modern technology to produce an art which is accessible to all.

One of the developments which may have the deepest and most lasting influence on the future of art is the renewed influence which the artist is beginning to have on the growth of contemporary ideas. Once valued as a philosopher and thinker as well as an artist, he gradually came to be regarded as an outsider having had nothing to contribute directly

to the main temper of the age. During the past century the mutual suspicion between artist and scientist had created a schism in cultural life. However, there are signs now that art and science are finding common ground in the recognition that one can enrich the other. The artist, while still jealously guarding his individual freedom, is exploring more and more those areas of reality unveiled by science, and no longer hesitates to use machine age technology and its materials.

This new *rapprochement* between art and science also helps in restoring the artist's work to the significance and status it enjoyed in great cultural periods in the past. This recognition may eventually lead to a new comprehension of the creative process which could result in not only new roles for art but could also change every aspect of culture—philosophical, educational and scientific. It will be recognized that the creative impulse is common to all and that each individual has the capacity to make his own imaginative contribution to life if his talents are sympathetically cultivated. As Coomaraswamy said: "The artist is not a special kind of person, but each person can be a special kind of artist."

Quest for Universal Unity

In India particularly, art was valued as one of the main processes by which man might come to know the Unknowable, and the artist as one who in his work revealed the pattern of the cosmos. The intuitive knowledge of ancient people concerning the nature of the universe and its creation is today being substantiated in remarkable detail by the discoveries of science, bringing about a new understanding of the interdependence of all things—a comprehension of the structural unity of the universe which was also the concern of the early mystics and philosophers. Meanwhile, modern art is constantly developing, changing, experimenting and striking new balances with the other activities and achievements of the human mind.

In this context, the scientific adventure of modern man can be seen as simply an extension of man's eternal quest to recreate the unity of the world, to trace his way back from

matter to the original source of energy and light. In this new phase of knowledge the artistic principle is as essential to discovery as it was to the growth of religion and philosophy in the past.

After a few centuries in which the artist had become progressively cut off from the main stream of life, and during which his work was too often reduced to a mere commercial commodity, we may now be witnessing the beginning of an age in which art will regain its true role as a process by which man lives more fully in the exploration of his universe.[1]

POSTSCRIPT (MID-1975)[2]

While art remains a visual language for the expression of ideas, it has undoubtedly undergone a revolution in subject as well as form. The process of *seeing* in itself has presumably remained the same; what has changed is the interpretation and rendering of the *seen* images. The present *milieu* with its attendant tensions, fears and aspirations, has produced a totally new kind of pictorial language and a more conceptual view of art, much of which bears direct comparison with recent scientific discoveries. The new trends continue, since the kinetic art of 1960s, to represent an interaction of art and science. Current experiments in art and technology have stimulated reconsideration of the established boundaries between artistic and scientific activity.

The findings and interpretations of modern psychology illustrate one aspect of the pronounced influence of science on art expression, as, for example, in the case of the surrealists. This has led the new generation of artists to attempt to penetrate and analyse the visual means of expression following, as Kandinsky put it, "the necessity to break through the interior". He called the inner necessity the "dominant rule of art". As a result, a number of artistic modes continue to be evolved in order to attain a deeper sense of pictorial meaning.

The liberating influence of abstract art has also unleashed forces and elements which have dimmed and diffused the traditional boundaries between the two divergent disciplines as art and science. The artist tries to give life to symbolic

images as he perceives them. Even the dream world has become a world of reality for him. Art and science today have combined to produce a therapy for the mentally sick. Spontaneous painting and modelling provide a creative outlet for such cases.

Art and science keep on aiding and abetting each other in many fields and have joined in the common pursuit after truth and exploration of the nature of reality. While inner consciousness has been the object of the new science of psychology, artists have been involved at the same time in research of their own imaginative sources, "the truth behind exterior surfaces", the discovery of the "world behind consciousness". Science continues to provide the artist means and media to find a larger, deeper and richer field of uninhibited modes of expression. It has weaned him out of his cloistered existence and exposed him to the contemplation of outer space and the worlds of experience hitherto unknown.

And yet, conversely, art has revealed itself in many and more obvious ways to the scientist, as, for example, under the microscope in the structural pattern of living tissue. Art has still to play an important role and may be the key to the solving of many scientific problems. When Einstein said: "Beauty is the first test. There is no place in the world for ugly mathematics", he was only reiterating the craftsman's remark that "what looks right is right".

If the "spirit of research and conquest is the paramount soul of evolution", then this evolution will be brought about jointly by those who dedicate their life to art or science. The human mind, activated by an abiding sense of involvement and curiosity concerning all existing phenomena, may lead to still greater discoveries in the field of science; and in art to the most significant modes of interpretation of the panorama of the complex world we live in.

NOTES

EDITOR'S NOTE—*Shyam Ratna Gupta*

1. India News and Feature Alliance (INFA) feature "Political Diary" by Mr. Durgadas—September 1972 p. ix
2. Introduction by R.C.Dutt p. x

INTRODUCTION—*R.C. Dutt*

1. Editor's Note p. 1
2. Editor's Note quoting Durgadas p. 1
3. Dr. Rajni Kothari's article p. 2
4. Dr. Satish Arora's article p. 2
5. Japanese analyst quoted in Editor's Note p. 6
6. Interview with Dr. Richard Buckminster Fuller p. 2

1. INDIA IN 1997 : SOCIAL FUTURES—*Satish K. Arora*

1. Kaname Hayashi, "Patterns of Progress" in Nigel Calder (editor)., The World in 1984, v. II (1965), p. 175 p. 8
2. V.M. Dandekar and N. Rath, "Poverty in India", Economic and Political Weekly, 1971; Planning Commission, Report of the Committee on Distribution of Income and Levels of Living, Part I (1964); Planning Commission, Towards An Approach to the Fifth Plan (1972) p. 11
3. Planning Commission, Towards an Approach to the Fifth Plan p. 12
4. Planning Commission, Report of the Committee on Distribution of Income and Levels of Living, Part II (1969) p. 7 p. 16

2. THE TASKS AHEAD—*Girilal Jain*

1. It is significant that these are also the priorities which generally govern the political and socio-economic programme being implemented since the middle of 1975.

3. WORLD ORDER PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE—*Rajni Kothari*

1. The article was based on a chapter of a title FOOTSTEPS INTO FUTURE, the outcome of the author's involvement in the world order models project in which scholars from various world regions—Africa, India, Japan, Latin America, Middle East, North America, Western Europe, Scandinavia and the USSR—collaborated over the last five years. The title was published in 1975.

4. BUCKMINSTER FULLER : WORLD OF 2001 A.D. : AN INTERVIEW—*Shyam Ratna Gupta*

1. The interview was published with the following introduction:

An incomparable multi-media thinker, fully conversant with the entire spectrum of human knowledge, Dr. Richard Buckminster Fuller, a scientist, architect, humanist and philosopher, is a citizen of the world. Born in July 1895 in Massachusetts, USA, Dr. Fuller studied at Milton, Harvard and the U.S. Naval Academy and has won numerous awards for industrial, architectural and engineering designs. He also holds honours degrees in arts, science, letters, engineering and law from thirty universities.

For many years he has been visiting countries in Asia, Europe and the Americas as a consultant on architectural and engineering assignments. An individualist to the core and a great scientist-philosopher, Dr. Fuller's mission is to "reform the environment of man" or, to put it differently, harmonise technology with life and harness it to serve the needs of man, not let it become his master.

In November 1969 Dr. Fuller delivered the Jawaharlal Nehru memorial lecture in New Delhi, at which he drew attention to the relevance of humanitarian philosophy in the contemporary world. "The intellect, vision and courage of Mahatma Gandhi", he wrote at the end of June 1972, "conceived of passive resistance, with which bloodless revolution he broke the hold on India of history's most powerful sovereignty." He added that "in extension of the Mahatma's magnificent vision we are committed to the design science revolution, by which it is possible bloodlessly to raise the standard of living of all humanity to a higher level of physical and metaphysical satisfaction than that hitherto experienced or dreamt of by any humans." Dr. Fuller said with the utmost conviction that "this can be realised by 1985".

As the inventor of the famous geodesic dome and many other architectural innovations, Dr. Fuller is an acute purveyor of futuristic trends. A bridge between the 19th and the 20th century, the world of 2001 A.D. is to him no less real than that of today.

The article was illustrated with an autographed photograph of Dr. Fuller, who had himself read and re-read every word of the answers he gave to the questions put to him and had modified them in the interests of accuracy and clarity. The interview was originally tape-recorded, edited and was thus finally authenticated by Dr. Fuller.

There were also three photographs which illustrated the article. These were:

(i) Elevation and floor plan of the 4-D dymaxion house, 1928. Fuller calls this the "clean-up model" of two earlier versions.

(ii) Two-frequency geodesic structure shows hyperbolic-parabola (positive-negative curvature) of outwardly-tensed "hypercat" skins which inhibit all flutter.

(iii) Three-way, great-circle grid system which increases efficiency by using the principle of tension as well as compression, permitting coverage of larger areas with less material.

5. INDIA'S SECURITY NEEDS IN 1975-2000 A.D.—*K. Subrahmanyam*

1. India exploded a peaceful nuclear device on 18 May 1974 at Pokharan in Rajasthan.

6. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE SEVENTIES—*Sisir Gupta*

1. The Simla agreement was signed by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, President, now Prime Minister, of Pakistan, at Simla, on 2 July 1972.

7. THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER—*J. D. Sethi*

1. The article was published in two instalments. The concept of "balance of power" in Asia is broadly that of the author's, and is an adaptation of the earlier thinking on this subject.

8. PROSPECTS FOR INDO-WEST ASIAN RELATIONS—*M.S. Agwani*

1. The Suez Canal was officially opened to traffic on 5 June 1975.
2. The article was published in two instalments.

9. THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT : ROLE OF EXTERNAL POWERS—*M.S. Rajan*

1. A joint statement issued on 14 May 1976 at the end of a three-day Indo-Pakistan official level talks at Islamabad stated that the two countries decided to take steps to resume normalisation of relations between them, as envisaged in the Simla agreement of 1972. In a statement made in parliament on 18 May 1976, Mr. Y.B. Chavan, Minister for External Affairs, announced that India and Pakistan have agreed that the entire

package programme for restoration of severed links between the two countries, would be put into effect more or less simultaneously between 17 and 24 July, 1976.

2. The postscript to the article qualifies some of the premises put across by the author.

3. Pakistan and China recognised Bangladesh in February 1974 and August 1975 respectively.

10. EMERGING TRENDS IN PICTORIAL AND PLASTIC ARTS—*J.R. Verma*

1. The article was illustrated with reproductions of specimens of plastic and graphic art. These were:

(1) "Harvest Season" (a Santhal labourer family) by Ram Kinker.
(2) "Naked Play" by M.F. Husain.
(3) "Grief" by Satish Gujral.

2. The postscript to the article amplifies the thinking of the author.

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



INDIA
A STUDY IN FUTURISM