

# PERSPECTIVES

ON THE

# NATIONAL EMERGENCY

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INSTITUTE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT  
Mussoorie (India)


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# PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY


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## PREFACE

ONE of the major functions of the National Institute of Community Development is to initiate discussion on matters of the moment and to study and examine their implications for the development process in India. With these aims in view a special series of lectures was organised at the Institute to analyse the contemporary Indian scene from the points of view of different social science disciplines. This little volume brings together the texts of the four talks in this series. These talks aimed at analysing the sociological, psychological, political and administrative perspectives of the emergency and were intended to encourage discussion and thought on the different aspects of the problems posed by the state of national emergency. They are being made available in print to a wider audience in the hope that they will stimulate further thinking on the subject.

The views expressed in the talks are those of the speakers and do not reflect, in any sense, a formal position adopted by the National Institute. At the request of the Institute, the speakers refrained from making an overly theoretical presentation in their talks and in preparing the text for publication they have been persuaded to avoid heavy scholarly documentation. Altogether these talks reflect the thinking of speakers representing four social science specialities, and are not intended only for the specialists. It is to be hoped that they will stimulate discussion in the thinking segments of our society to whom they are addressed.

*Mussoorie,  
October 2, 1963*

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[Cover by Shri Satindra Sharma]

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## *SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE*

*S. C. Dube*

**G**RAVE crises bring into the lives of nations, as they do into the lives of average men and women, an intense and profound moment of truth. The powerful impact of these moments shatters many fond images and destroys several cherished myths. Recovering slowly from their impact, a dazed nation finds itself awakening to a new sense of reality: the mist of wishful day-dreams begins to lift and illusions induced by national self-hypnosis start clearing up. These are moments of great agony and often of excruciating pain, but they hold out before the nation, as it were, a cruel and unflattering mirror in which it can view itself for once as it actually is, divested completely of the deceptive gloss and make-believe halo that mystify and glorify the national image. These can be moments of great consequence if the nation can persuade itself to desist

from the easy but futile course of shedding tears of self-pity and to rise with a grim determination to face the reality.

## **The Moment of Truth**

The distasteful happenings along India's northern frontiers, particularly the shocking retreat and withdrawal of our defence forces against the invading hordes of China, confronted India with such a moment of truth. Through the shock and shame of a series of rapid military reverses, India had a traumatic experience—an experience that revealed both the strength as well as the weakness of her national character. It occasioned serious heart-searching and thorough introspection. In consequence, the country today has a different and perhaps a more realistic image of itself. Subjected to cold scientific analysis the latent and manifest dimensions of this experience bring out to the fore certain aspects of ideological, motivational and institutional inadequacies that merit serious thought and correction. The truth of the situation is unpalatable in some respects, but it must be faced. There is little room for self-complacency if further—and worse—tragedies are to be averted.

## **The Tragedy and the Aftermath**

The Chinese attack on NEFA and Ladakh was not entirely unexpected; we had its dangerous forebodings for a long time. Yet, when the blow fell, the country was not prepared for it. There was a pathetic, if not pathological, reliance on the fragile thread of some hope. The danger was perceived as real, almost as imminent, but there was always the hope of some last-minute intervention to avert the final crisis. Also, to a degree,

there was faith in the charisma of the top leadership and confidence in its ability to meet the situation. What happened in those few fateful days was a stunning experience. The much anticipated intervention from unforeseen quarters did not materialise. Charisma of the leadership failed. What was viewed as a near and yet unaccountably as a remote possibility did in fact become a reality. Under the shadow of the tragedy the mood of the country was one of frustration and anger. Happily, however, there was more anger than frustration.

This brings us to a heart-warming aspect of the tragic sequence of events. In the face of the threat to the country's territorial integrity and national sovereignty, India found herself united. The Chinese aggression accomplished in a few days what numerous conferences on national integration had failed to accomplish in many years. National solidarity generated by the threat from China inspired hope in many hearts. Given a cause, the Indian people could forget parochial rivalries, brush aside regional, linguistic and sectarian differences, and curb the divisive tendencies that pose a threat to the unity of the nation. This is a sign of hope, but not without an element of despair. Is the positive content of our nationalism so weak that we need an aggressor at our door-steps to keep us united? In the hour of crisis the sense of solidarity was real, but will it be lasting?

While the unity and the sense of purpose among the common men were real, on the elite level the picture was perhaps not quite the same. There was consensus in regard to ends but not in regard to means. Some elements at least in the political sector viewed the emergency as an opportunity rather than as a problem, and sought to utilise it to gain their narrow personal, factional or party ends. In many instances the words and actions of this element did not bear evidence of responsibility born out of political maturity and discipline. Where constructive statesmanship was called for, some of the leaders were indulging in hysterics of impotent rage. It is not the intention here to suggest that free expression of opinion should have been

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stified by the party in power, but the desirability of achieving a broad area of agreement in regard to both ends and means in a constructive approach to meet the crisis certainly deserves to be emphasised. And the latter unfortunately was lacking in the political process of the country even during the crisis.

Unilateral declaration of cease-fire by China was welcomed with a sigh of relief. At the moment the guns are silent, and an uneasy truce prevails. But the danger is by no means over. Dark and ominous clouds of war still hover on the Himalayan skyline; the prospects of peace are uncertain. Even under these conditions the country appears to be reverting to type. Once again there is excessive reliance on the fragile thread of hope—hope of preventive intervention from uncertain quarters. Once again there is return to faith in charisma. Once again there is a tendency to relapse into a mood of self-complacency.

### **Sociological Analysis**

In handling certain types of problems the social analyst has necessarily to be impressionistic. Where he has no empirical evidence to guide his analysis, he has to rely on intuition and imagination. In looking at the sociological perspectives of the emergency I am most unashamedly doing so.

What are the factors responsible for the mood of uncertainty that largely prevails in India today? Is a sociological analysis of the situation possible? Howsoever inadequate my analysis, I shall attempt to answer.

First, our ideology is feeble and it is poorly articulated. Nationalism, the faith and the creed of the pre-independence era,

began losing its hold on the people, curiously enough, once freedom was won. It no longer inspires and motivates us in the way it used to in the years of the struggle for national independence. Many symbols of the past have either lost their significance or their meaning has changed beyond recognition; new symbols have yet to replace them. It is true that we are exhorted time and again to work for the achievement of the socialist pattern of society and for the realisation of the goals of social justice enumerated in the Directive Principles of State Policy, but somehow these ideals have failed to catch the imagination of the intelligentsia that used to be in the vanguard of the nationalist movement. Their acceptance appears to be a matter more of form than of real conviction. Even those who accept these ideals with a measure of conviction, do not work for them with the requisite zeal and honesty. In the absence of ideological prime-movers the society is tending to drift. Coupled to this is the factor of poor ideological articulation. Between the elite and the masses there is a considerable gap; the national aims and social goals as perceived by the two do not coincide. The consequences are obvious. In the absence of a clearly grasped national aim the masses are too easily lured by the narrow issues of local, regional and sectarian politics.

Secondly, our society is fast developing into what may be called an ambivalent society. A certain measure of ambivalence is perhaps inevitable in a transitional society, but when ambivalence assumes the proportions of an all-pervasive attitude and begins to breed a general attitude of indifference and cynicism, it must be regarded as being symptomatic of a pathological condition. The malady has spread considerably among the urban-educated. Its proportions at present may not be alarming, but its implications both for the present and for the future should not be lost sight of. Rootlessness, a by-product of ambivalence, leads to self-oriented action, and detracts from clear conceptualisation of national goals. It goes without saying that this trend obstructs concerted action towards attainment of common goals. Faulty socialisation, weak sanctions and poor enforcement of these sanctions are the major factors responsible for this growing ambivalence.

Thirdly, our society continued to be largely a segmentary society. Within the facade of national unity, segmentary structural units are still strong and maintain considerable hold over their members. Powerful vested interests are entrenched in many of these units. Such units often operate within a framework of values that is different from what may be regarded as the general framework of national values. These vested interests seek to safeguard their privileges by trying to perpetuate the units themselves, and the existence of a different sub-cultural scheme of values helps rationalisation and sub-cultural legitimisation of deviant behaviour. Persistence of such groups, with an individual ethos and idiom, blocks national cohesion and weakens the efforts at united action for common ends. Parochial and sectional loyalties thus gain supremacy over the larger national loyalty.

Fourthly, ritualism still enjoys a measure of paramouncy in our society. This point requires some theoretical elaboration. In contemporary sociological theory five principal modes of individual adaptation in relation to cultural goals and institutionalised means have been identified. These apply with equal validity to crisis situations also. When one accepts the defined goals as well as the institutionalised means for their realisation, the attitude can be described as one of *conformity*. *Innovation*, on the other hand, involves acceptance of the goals but not of the means. *Ritualism*, the third type of adaptation, signifies rejection of the goals but acceptance of the means. Passive rejection of both goals and means is termed *retreatism*. Finally, rebel activity towards both goals and means is termed *rebellion*.

Can we analyse in this framework the patterns of individual and group adaptation to goals and institutionalised means in the context of the present crisis? Happily there is not much evidence of retreat or of rebellion. Unhappily, efforts at innovation also do not appear to be particularly strong. We are thus left with conformity and ritualism. I may be pessimistic, but it appears to me that our conformity is more symbolic than

real. In context it tends to be ritualistically-oriented rather than genuinely task-oriented. The emphases are more on form than on spirit. Where a burning passion is needed we are perhaps too easily satisfied with gestures. In all seriousness let us ask ourselves the question—Is the emergency a live issue with us? Rituals of knitting and fund-raising apart, what other evidence do we have to offer, in the form of concrete action rather than in the shape of pious and patriotic words, to prove that we are living through a grave crisis? Rituals can be invested with a meaning, content and purpose, but our efforts at doing so have so far been pitifully weak.

Finally, let me refer to some elements in our political culture that account for the situation in which we find ourselves today. The politics of agitation comes more readily to us than the politics of construction. What was an effective tool against the British may not be equally effective against the enemy across the frontier. This is a commonplace enough observation, but the contemporary political trends do not bear much evidence of the realisation of its true import. As if by instinct, we turn to the politics of agitation for the solution of our problems. Add to this the tendency to seek easy scapegoats and to rationalise our failures in reference to them. For every failure there is some one to blame, but the culprit is almost always some one other than the person or the group pronouncing the verdict. Why can we not own up our faults? Whom will this ephemeral solace of putting the blame on other quarters deceive permanently? Let us be blunt. This art of self-deception has been practised on a national scale far too long, and it is about time we did something to halt it. By all means let us pin-point the failings on those who err, but in the process let us not completely absolve ourselves of our own share in these failings by treating ourselves as embodiments of innocence and righteousness. In our politics, and so also in our every day life, we tend to preach rather than practice. Can we not, for a change, reverse this process? And we excel ourselves in utopia-building. The limit is perhaps higher than the sky when we think and talk of our Utopia Unlimited! The con-

textual realities of a crisis do not admit of pipe-dream solutions. The present emergency has painfully brought home to us this realisation, but unfortunately we learn as slowly as we forget. A re-orientation of our attitudes in this sphere is urgently indicated.

### **The Tasks Ahead**

Let us now address ourselves to the inevitable question—Where do we go from here ?

Nations learn as they live. Crises can be great educators, but only if the people undergoing them have a will to benefit from the lessons inherent in the experience. At the very least, they offer a shock-therapy. The results depend, however, on the mood and the receptivity of the nation, for the efficacy of any therapy depends in a large measure on the willingness of the patient to profit from it. The painful experience with China in the recent past has done at least one service to India : it has forced the Indian people to have a second—critical and appraising—look at themselves. Given the will, the nation can diagnose its ills and cure itself. With imaginative handling we can even go a step further and utilise this opportunity to eradicate some of the chronic and deep-seated social and cultural maladies that have been plaguing our national life for a long time.

Adequate motivation and high morale are the two imperatives for a nation facing the threat of war, and to sustain them an appropriate ideological and institutional framework is necessary. It is essential to recognise in this connection the vital linkages existing between them, because in the absence of such



recognition, comprehensive planning for building and maintaining both morale and motivations would not be possible.

Our first requirement in this context is a clear and firm image of the nation. History and patriotic sentiments will have to continue to be the essential components of this image, but in addition to them it will have to include much more. What we need today is an image that is positive and forward-looking in its content. The uses of the past are obvious, but no nation can live on nostalgia alone. It should also be recognised that sentiments without proper direction all-too-easily tend to become trite and banal. It is essential therefore to build into the new image a clear definition of the goals to be pursued and also of the means through which they are to be attained. The common man cannot identify himself too closely with an abstract concept that is not functional to him in terms of his daily needs and significant life interests. The identification is more real and meaningful when the individual learns to see in the image certain personal stakes that are of vital concern to him. The image of India built during the years of the freedom struggle is no longer adequate; the urge for liberty that inspired it is already an accomplished fact. Threats to liberty can still partially activate it, but unless it offers a unity of purpose and a sense of direction, taking a long-range view of national development, it will perhaps not be very effective. Naturally such an image cannot be built and maintained in an ideological vacuum. It is thus necessary to invest into the image an appropriate ideological content.

No social system can maintain itself only on images and ideologies. For their sustenance an institutional framework with a built-in system of incentives and controls is necessary. Within this system desirable traits and attributes should find approval, stimulation and encouragement. Clear-cut sanctions, on the other hand, should be effectively enforced to hold in check patterns of thought and action that are not in conformity with the broad national aims. This is needed both in times of

peace and of war; under the conditions of emergency its desirability becomes all the more pressing.

Let me not be misunderstood. I am not making a plea for totalitarianism of any kind. My case is for social character and discipline, which are perhaps two essential preconditions for the success of democracy. In the context of a national image, I have spoken throughout of *an* ideology and not of *the* ideology. In a country where so little has been done and where so much more remains to be done, a broad democratic consensus in regard to its control issues is necessary. If we can unite against the Chinese aggression, I can see no reason why we cannot unite against poverty, disease and ignorance. In the absence of clear ideological articulation it is difficult to visualise how we can evolve into a task-oriented society. My insistence on a firm system of positive and negative sanctions consisting of incentives and controls also need not frighten any one. Such a system, in some form or the other, operates in all societies; what we need to do in reference to the situation obtaining in India today is to give it a clearer definition and bring its central emphases into sharper focus. Poor enforcement can all-too-easily kill the best of ideologies. If our convictions are right, let us be firm about them.

Earlier in the talk some of the sources and factors of our motivational and institutional inadequacies have been listed. To be able to meet threats from without, we have first to meet the threats present within. Let us recapitulate some of these factors. Indifference, ambivalence, complacency, drift and inertia constitute the psychological dimension of the internal malady. A segmentary social system encouraging divisive tendencies, pronounced ritualistic overtones in our behaviour-patterns, and immaturity of our political processes which lack the essential attributes of responsibility and discipline, have been identified as the weaknesses on the institutional order. Positive steps will have to be taken against them. My argument is that the present emergency provides a specially favourable climate for doing so. This opportunity must be utilised,

for neglect could be fatal. While the urge lasts, we can work in a determined manner to stabilise the unity of purposes and the sense of direction acquired during the emergency. This would help towards eradication of our motivational inadequacies, namely, indifference, ambivalence, complacency, drift and inertia. An effective system of sanctions, it is hoped, will provide correctives to our institutional inadequacies.

Strength of character and a sense of security, may I add, are the sources of genuine motivation and morale. Pep psychology will be of little avail if the basic urge itself is weak. Propaganda of the opposite camp succeeds in seducing only those whose convictions are shaky. Let us, therefore, try and strengthen this basic urge and attempt to relate the convictions to vital life interests. This poses a challenge to the development worker and constitutes the supreme test of his constructive abilities.

In conclusion, let us not hypnotise ourselves into believing that the problem is simple or that it admits of any easy solution. Image-building is easy, but image-maintenance is difficult. Ideologies cannot be implemented with the same ease with which they can be formulated. People can give their blood, sweat and tears to "ideals" provided they are not empty words. They will sacrifice their life for the flag, but only if it is a vital symbol and not just a piece of cloth. Investing a system of meaning into our symbols and images is perhaps the most urgent task of the day. Words unsupported by example and concrete action will not sustain either of them. Let us accept the challenge. The time is now.

## *PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE*

*Kali Prasad*

**N**ORMAL behaviour is adjusted to stable and relatively predictable modes of activity. Reactions are structured to fairly structured stimulus situations in one's cultural environment. The individual (as also a group) is so groomed in his cultural ways and mores that he reacts to any change in his environment in established patterns of responses which he has learnt from infancy. This makes for conformity and develops a sense of security and assurance based on homeostatic equilibrium represented in traditional forms of behaviour.

This equilibrium may be upset by any or all of the following:—

- (a) Physical catastrophes;

- (b) Radical changes in the established social organisation, and
- (c) Moral crises involving individuals and groups as a whole.

With reference to our own country the disruptive factors which have operated in one way or another have been :

- (i) Racial or regional or so-called cultural superiorities,
- (ii) Provincial or regional stereotypes,
- (iii) Excessive traditionalism,
- (iv) Language-barrier,
- (v) Rigid hierarchies making communication and mobility difficult,
- (vi) Cultural nostalgia or romantic revivalism.

To these may be added a physical catastrophe like an earthquake or social-political catastrophe like invasion and war. This last one is represented by the recent Chinese invasion of our country.

### **The Patterns of Emergency Reaction**

The most characteristic consequence of an emergency situation is disorganisation of behaviour. It gives rise to confusion of goals and ends and to actions ill-suited to achieve specified objectives. When such a situation occurs, conflict, tension and anxiety would arise and enthusiasm to face the danger though present may not sustain itself at a sufficiently significant level. This state of affairs is unfortunately seen in the country today. Immediately after the invasion there was spontaneous upsurge of emotion and enthusiasm but unfortunately it could not be maintained at that level for long and it has not been canalised in a constructive manner. For though there is an emergency there is hardly a *feeling of emergency*. It is not suggested that there should be a kind of 'war psychosis' based upon fear and uncertainty, but a realisation that since the country is engaged in what is likely

to be a long protracted war, there should be re-orientation in the conduct of internal and external affairs of the country. At the social-psychological level this reorientation would involve :

- (a) change in *attitude* of individuals and groups;
- (b) change in our *perceptions*;
- (c) change in our *images*;
- (d) change in our *ideologies*.

### Changing Perceptual Attitudes

A perceptual attitude is a personal outlook on the world, embodying in perceptions one of the ego's adaptive needs. It is a style of reality testing. Obviously, there are individual differences in perceiving. If we understand these differences we can understand differences in individual or group behaviour. The assumption that the external world is the same for all perceivers is entirely mistaken, for there is no standard objective world except through the slow process of compromise with a number of repetitive reality experiences. As perceivers we all perceive our own private world, and gradually make necessary adjustments in the organisation of an external objective world. This process is dynamic and changing. The perceptions and attitudes of today are not necessarily going to be the same tomorrow. A shift of interest, a traumatic experience, a crisis in the life of an individual or the group would make all the difference. There is experimental evidence that our perceptions change in stress situations, that emotional strain changes our attitudes even to commonplace objects; that interpersonal relations like friendship and hostility-patterns change; that frustration-aggression modes alter; that communication-systems get bogged and distorted; that even relationships in a primary group such as the family are warped; that people of other groups and countries are seen in entirely new ways, in new perceptions and so on.

All these changes are occurring today in the context of the emergency caused by the Chinese invasion. Our perception of objects, persons, situations and countries has suffered change. The priorities in food, in production targets, in inter-group relationships change, but change is not marked equally in all spheres. In some areas it has been spontaneous, in others, it is a response to modes of organisation or manipulative action by Government. In this case, for instance, legislative processes like the declaration of emergency by Law has inevitably involved every citizen in a situation *which he has to recognise as such*. This recognition does not necessarily mean personality-involvement but only a *formal* or *cognitive identification*.

### Formal Identification

In order that such an involvement should occur (as it must, if emergency means anything) a number of processes must be released and must operate at higher levels of efficiency. Among these may be mentioned: propaganda; communication-systems; new orientations in educative processes; new emphasis on integrative forces, new levels of co-operation and mutual tolerations; trust and confidence; new perspectives on national and international problems and new adjustments to these on the individual as well as national level; in short, a *new image*.

This new image would see our own people no less than others in a new way. Somehow, the older image of ourselves has had two divergent aspects *viz.* (1) that of people who achieved heroic heights in the struggle for independence and (2) people who by and large are sunk in the morass of extreme poverty, ignorance, indolence, rigid traditionalism, conservatism, poor moral standard etc. Somehow, both these faces of the image are still with us (and with others—outsiders). The question of the 'truth' or

'validity' of the image is irrelevant; its presence or its factual character is important as a social-psychological reality.

## Changing our Self-Image

The problem is how to change the image and how to identify any change that may have occurred or is occurring. This is obviously a problem for research. An impressionistic picture can, however, be given and some recommendation be made. The first important step is to consider how our *self-image* can be changed : changed in a direction that may be required in the present circumstances. This involves self-examination and self-criticism. We have to be aware of our own character traits and motivational systems. For instance, we may become aware of our habit of not being able to appreciate adequately co-operative work, our habit of suspicion and distrust which throws us back on caste or sub-caste relationships as the *maximum source of security and self-assurance*. This intensely limited outlook anchored in kinship ties has to be modified by a process of *enlargement of the self* such as occurs in the growth of the child between the age of 6 to 10 years. When the growth is not normal, enlargement and broadening of the view suffers constriction and shrinkage. In such cases paranoid personality develops with its numerous delusional systems and distorted images, not only of the self but of all others. The *principle of enlargement* requires that the individual should be encouraged by process of education and other socialisation techniques to go on seeking larger and larger degree of identification. To begin with, the child is conscious of itself, its own body and at the most the body of its mother( which it considers as an extension of its own). Later he separates and identifies with his group, then his immediate neighbours, the town, the country etc. At any of these stages there may be traumatic experiences which would distort this development. If in his growth-adventure the child goes on from one satisfactory system of security to another (from the mother, peers, townsmen and country) then he is able



to acquire a proper perspective of his own identity and of others. It is important to emphasise that in the *normal* course such enlargement and identification would occur *i.e.* given the accepted modes of socialisation processes. Unfortunately these processes have not operated in a satisfactory manner in our own context. In the emergency situation, stress has to be placed on this matter. For instance, we must see that internal solidarity and cohesiveness are realised, that individual and small-group interests are subordinated to larger, national interests; that there should be preparedness for sacrifices, for adjustment and for co-ordination and in general an attitude of co-operation and helpfulness. This is a matter of *training* and training requires the provision of necessary mechanisms for achieving it. There may be a short term and a long term programme. The short term programme would take advantage of the current situation and propaganda in this connection. One of the main requirements here is to see that the morale of the people is kept as high as possible. For, once individuals or groups actually believe and are convinced about the rightness of their cause, their attitudes toward action crystallise quickly and behaviour leads to appropriate action.

### **Stress Situation and Morale**

Morale is tested in crisis. The patterns of adjustment of individuals or groups, in response to the situation of stress, would determine the level of morale. Basically, a critical situation (crisis) implies a threat to the ego or self-esteem of the individual or the group and his morale would be determined by the manner in which he meets his frustration and difficulties. For instance, when there is overwhelming threat to security as in a surprise attack by an armed enemy, the group may be scattered and there may be a wild scramble for safety on the part of individuals. Here there might be considerable sagging of the morale of the group unless there is a strong leadership and there is confidence in the inherent strength of the group and in its cause. Quite

often groups which suffer initial set-backs are able to sustain their morale and are roused to fresh action leading to success.

It is well-known that armies, like any other large group, include persons who are particularly unfit to endure the stress and strain of fighting. Mental disorders and neuroses often occur. It would seem that the less literate and intelligent soldiers develop bodily symptoms like hysteria but the more literate and intelligent develop obsessional and other neuroses in which the 'symbolising functions' play a prominent part. For this reason psychopathology and psychiatry have come to occupy a very important place today in the army. If there is a large number of psychoneurotic breakdowns in the army, its morale is bound to be low. For this reason a great deal of care has to be taken in army selections. The techniques of selection today stress the importance of tests for personality adjustment, including tests for endurances, emotional maturity and capacity to face dangerous situations with patience and fortitude. For this purpose, apart from intelligence tests, clinical interviews and personality inventories, *situation-tests* are also used.

## Psychological Support


High morale among the non-fighting population is equally important. The army has to be supported by the civilian population not merely by providing for its efficient maintenance, but also by giving it the necessary psychological and moral support. The front is vitally dependent upon the factory worker as well as the farmer for its supplies (the sinews of war); but this would be possible only when the civilian worker himself has a high morale. For maintaining this morale at a high level the techniques of appropriate propaganda and censorship are important. Rumours have to be countered by correct information. The use of mass media is specially important in this behalf. The radio, the film,

the press and other communication systems such as the Panchayat Ghar, clubs etc. should make a concentrated effort on dissemination of correct information of relevant facts. The distortions by enemy propaganda would be remedied in this way.

The civilian population must receive authentic news and facts so that it can project an appropriate image of the enemy. For instance, in the case of the present Chinese invasion, the image of the Chinese has inevitably suffered a change. The earlier image of the Chinese as peace-loving, tradition-bound and philosophically detached people has now changed into the image of ruthless, sly, perfidiously suave and unprincipled individuals. This indeed is the reality today. And it is important that this reality is continually perceived in order that complacency does not occur and that morale is kept at a higher level. The importance of image-making in the development of morale cannot be over-estimated and in planning propaganda or counter-propaganda it has to be constantly kept in mind. We must 'plan' and 'design' the image that we wish to project, filling in details according to the needs of the situation. The media of communication must then be used to see that this image is widely incorporated in the framework of our thinking and in our everyday perceptions. The image will activate ideas and arouse appropriate emotions in the interest of integrated action. The mechanism of its operation includes conscious and unconscious processes which have their anchorage in the cultural milieu in which the individual has been brought up. The operation of these processes helps crystallise many forms of behaviour including the strengthening of confidence in oneself and in one's cause, which goes with high morale.

### **Leadership and Morale**


We have mentioned above that morale is a function of leadership. Leadership may be authoritarian or democratic. In the



former there is a one-way process from top to bottom and morale depends on the character and personality of the individual (or oligarchic group) at the top. Here propaganda consists in brain-washing, 'captive audiences' and people are kept completely insulated from the contact of outside reality. If there is a breakdown at the top (e.g. order, counter-order, leading to disorder) morale cannot be boosted by any means. It is true that the successes of such leadership may be very spectacular, but it is also true that its failures are equally striking. On the other hand, democratic leadership implies a many-sided process in its group dynamics. Here all the members of the group have a *sense of participation* and a feeling of identity with the purposes and goals of the group. This makes the individual feel important and gives him a sense of pride and prestige which develops high morale. Also morale thus developed is likely to remain firm and stable and would withstand stress and difficulties for a long time. It can overcome the perpetual crisis of confidence inevitably associated with authoritarian leadership. For instance, when fear develops from a diffused state of uneasiness where individual feels 'rattled' to the extremes of terror characterised by complete loss of self-control, precipitating into helplessness and panic, a democratic group organisation would meet the situation much better and restore confidence much more easily. One of the ways by which fear may be controlled is to prepare a man beforehand by a full exposition of possible dangers rather than by suppressing the fact. It is known that when the whole situation is made clear, it equips the individual with necessary courage and resourcefulness to meet the danger. The propaganda technique in this context would be different from the authoritarian situation in so far as it would lay bare the dangerous aspects of the situation so that knowledge helps to conquer fear.

### Integration and Emergency : A Psychological Problem

(a) While achievement of independence has given a vague feeling of freedom, a feeling of *individual worth and recognition*



has still to be developed. The prestige of the individual has to be rehabilitated. As a result of centuries of dependence and the consequences of special order which has submerged masses of people to an 'inferior' or 'second and third category' of individuals, consciousness of freedom and its implications for the individuals in all strata has yet to be developed and realised. This is basically a psychological or social-psychological problem. Economic and social development would help this, but societies have been known where economic adequacy alone has not helped realise their status and prestige as human individuals.

(b) With the advent of freedom was expected a sense of solidarity and unity in the country which has not come. The fundamental unity of the country as a whole has still to be realised. This realisation assumes awareness of common interests and, more than this, the sense of *belongingness* to a common cultural heritage, common symbols, myths and legends and common system of values.

(c) Language can operate as a divisive as well as a cohesive factor.: Linguistic romanticism and linguistic fanaticism have prevented integration. While the need for communication on an all-India basis is recognised by all, the question as to the extent Hindi or any other language is going to fulfil this function remains a difficult one. The formula in this regard may be : mother tongue, Hindi and English (and where Hindi is the mother tongue, another Indian language preferably a South Indian language); English to continue in universities till such time that Hindi can replace English. Hindi as language for communication and administration, not for literary or 'cultural' purposes. In this regard some of the other regional languages are (to date) much richer.

(d) Dynamics of communication : The paramount need is need of easier and speedier communication. Apart from physical

or material communications, there is the process of communication that stresses the need for development of attitudes of understanding and fellow-feeling, of participation and co-operative living, of the sharing of cultural norms and values, of the assimilation of diverse modes of symbolic behaviour, of the transmissions and evaluation of functional categories like power, authority, confidence etc. The processes and levels of communication of these different forms of behaviour with their peculiar patterns of distortions and consequent anxieties need most understanding and sympathetic evaluation. All this would imply flexibility of thinking and imagination associated with higher reaches of the educational process.

(e) Familial upbringing and schooling would need a shift in emphasis from the rigid 'we-group' attitudes to more inclusive groups and wider areas of *identification* until all regions and the country as a whole may come more and more in one's orbit of interest. This again is a matter of training and cultivation.

(f) Since most of one's attitudes are already well-formed early in life *before the university stage, the university can perhaps canalise some of these and modify them.* These attitudes are mostly built round hierarchical organisation of the social structure in which an individual has 'his place assigned by birth'. The attitudes imply inter-group tensions, frustrations and repressed hostilities, aggression and free-floating anxieties. Sometimes these repressed hostilities break out into open conflict but ordinarily this does not happen though the 'tension' always remains, in the form of prejudice, stereotypes, etc. The reduction of this 'conflict' or tension would depend upon :

- (i) reduction of hostility, which depends upon minimisation of frustration and insecurities and their attendant anxieties;
- (ii) proper canalisation of existing hostilities, through sanctions, diversions, redefinition of situations, etc.

Thus the anxiety and frustration which our social order continually generates can be reduced to manageable proportions only if at least two conditions are fulfilled : First, if our physical and economic situations are reasonably comfortable and secure, and, secondly if we derive adequate security and gratification from satisfactory inter-personal relationships. If people are anxious and frustrated by society and if, moreover, they live in social isolation, many of them will try to discharge their aggression explosively through acts of violence or hostility.

In attacking many specific phenomena of social pathology, one is attacking 'symptoms'—not 'causes'. The result, if successful at all, will be merely to shift the causes of hostility not to eliminate them. An attack upon 'causes' must consist : (a) in ameliorating basic situations which are productive of hostilities; (b) in devising improved techniques of child socialisation and of subsequent inter-personal relations so that the total amount of 'free-floating aggression' is decreased.

(g) Information, education and propaganda are likely to reduce these tensions and conflicts. Ordinarily those who have information about other people and groups have more favourable attitudes than those who do not have such information. Also, information is more effective when it is presented as part of the ordinary action of a group. Discovery of facts by members themselves leads to the reduction of prejudice. Change of attitudes of groups is more effective than of the isolated individuals. When individuals are able to identify their own values and life-activities with individuals of other groups, tensions are reduced; hence where inter-personal relations in groups are concerned, the key word is "*Personalise*".

(h) *Direct re-orientation of values* may be achieved in the following order of effectiveness : (1) direct personal communication, (2) radio, mass media, printed material. But this may vary according to the nature of subject, type of appeal, type of audience etc.

For instance, attitudes of aggressive nationalism go with the following 'cluster': *Nationalism, outgroup prejudice, conventional and rigid moral codes and religiosity*. This emphasises the dangers of nationalism. But while this has to be guarded against our problem is to achieve national unity and integration. Sharing of common values, 'the core values' of our culture, would enable identification in a much greater degree than by any other means.

### **Our Young Democracy and Emergency**

Our young democracy with its proposed aim of a socialist pattern presents a rather unique situation. Our present social organisation is a caste-based hierarchy with varying degrees of rigidity, with practically insignificant mobility along vertical dimensions and with status being determined by birth rather than achievement. This basic structure being anti-democratic could favour a leadership that is in conformity with established values. The situation is paradoxical: a tradition-centred social organisation with orthodox values of pre-industrial culture and the super-structure of democracy, a modern industrial democracy with the values of industrial culture. The experiment on which we have launched is unique in contemporary times. The difficulties that are occurring today in various spheres can be understood when we realise this new situation—new wine in old bottles. Leaders selected on adult franchise in a democratic manner are hardly able to develop attitudes and temper congruent with democratic leadership. And so also the followers. The relation between the two takes after known patterns that are basically authoritarian and not recognisably democratic. Hence, failure of adjustment with the resultant stresses and strains. Even in countries which have been democratic for long, the difficulties are great, and in our situation they are understandably far greater. For when an established social order is once disturbed it takes some time for equilibrium to return at a new level. This is a period of transition, of travail and a supreme effort under the stimulus of clearly



thought out philosophy is necessary today to organise into a purposeful unity all the divergent tendencies that are coming to the surface. For this, co-operation of *all* the echelons of leadership, not merely the top, is essential, for they must all be involved in decisions made and feel that they are participants in programmes of action. Involvement and active sense of participation or sharing must be trained into the habit of *integrative living*.

## ***POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE***

*R. F. Kothari*

**F**OR any nation, war is an event that calls forth two fundamental responses. First, it forces attention to the problem of immediate consequence, to the defence of the nation and physical and material mobilisation. Secondly, however, it leads to fundamental soul-searching, a re-appraisal of one's policies, assumptions and associations, one's way of dealing with men and nations. War is thus a moment as much of introspection as of external trial and preparedness.

Further, in a century of far-reaching social and economic changes, war also throws into *defensive* the entire way of life of a nation, its social philosophy and ideological moorings. These tend to be threatened in the pre-occupation with more imme-

mediate goals. The attempt to ensure unity and eschew disaffection leads to a subtle mixture of conformism and opportunism that are inimical to healthy political growth. The temptation to short-circuit the fight against political opposition becomes irresistible. This gives rise to a known dilemma of modern wars, that a free country is led to assume some of the character of its totalitarian adversary, thus forcing the community to guard further its intellectual and moral defences against ever-mounting pressures from both within and without.

Such are the basic issues strikingly brought home to the Indian people by the Chinese Communist invasion. We have suffered a big blow. Our national ego has been profoundly hurt. Our assumptions have been rudely shaken. Our complacency, our illusions, our shyness in facing realities and hesitancy in dealing with them have been revealed as patent weaknesses.

The upshot is most unfortunate. We are threatened with a sudden arrest of our national growth of development. There is no denying the fact that this nation had made great strides in political and economic development. Nor can one deny that she was building up an impressive alternative to both the capitalist and the communist models of growth. At a time when the communist experiment in China was showing signs of strain and possible failure, the Indian alternative was demonstrating its superiority and attracting widespread attention.

All this has now received an unfortunate set-back. Peace was a pre-condition of our development; we somehow failed to see that peace was something that simply could not be taken for granted. The Chinese aggression has unsettled this primary pre-condition of our growth towards strong nationhood. Nothing which has happened in our post-independence history is as fundamental as the Chinese intrusion in our soil. The India that we knew since 1947 will never be the same again.

On the other hand, the Chinese invasion has given us a jolt which might prove beneficial in the long run. Firstly, it has brought to the surface some of our profound weaknesses. A chronic state of indecision, an inability to face unpleasant facts and a lack of a sense of priorities were forcefully brought home to us when we as a nation stood on the brink of disaster. Secondly, the war released unlimited reserves of energy and an infinite potentiality for great deeds. Indeed, a leadership which never tired of complaining of lethargy and inertia in the masses was itself found lagging behind by an awakened people that rose to the challenge as a man; it appears that many of our theories regarding 'public co-operation' and 'popular initiative' will have to be revised. Thirdly and more concretely, the war solved for us problems which baffled us for so long; the bogey of national disintegration has been exploded, the language issue has been shelved, the gold problem is being tackled and overdue monetary and fiscal reforms seem likely to be undertaken at last. The shock we have received is both rude and salutary; its painful convulsions will force us to rid ourselves of a mass of superfluity and inertia.

The situation which now faces the country after the cease-fire is far more serious. We have been rightly warned against a renewal of complacency as a result of the present cease-fire. That the process of mobilisation of resources on which we have entered should continue unabated is very clear. But the position is far more complicated; to be simple in such matters is also to be rash. There are several implications which need a careful and detailed examination.

We may do this by first examining our whole approach to national mobilisation and then considering the actual problems that face us.

National mobilisation is not a new problem with us. It is a constant problem of a society undergoing transformation. It is a product of pressure and response. Its extent depends

on the intensity of the pressure and the sensitivity of the responding society.

Politicians and academicians have from time to time provided prescriptions for mobilisation in such societies. These are normally based on certain assumptions regarding the nature of a developing society. In India there has been a noticeable shift in approach. In the first flush of enthusiasm after independence, the emphasis was largely on what had to be done and how it was to be done. The enthusiasm may perhaps have been peppered with impatience which was inevitable. But with fulfilment lagging behind expectation, there came a sudden shift. It began to be said that the 'social conditions' were not favourable; that the people were not ready for change. From then on, the approach was to change the people, to 'educate' them, to 'integrate' them and to make them 'co-operate'. With this change, curiously, there was a slackening on the other front—the front of doing and organising. Mobilisation came to be considered a function of 'enthusing' the people whom we called 'docile' and 'backward'. Paradoxically, such a shift in emphasis also brought a shift in responsibility. By shifting the emphasis from the detailed administration and execution of programmes to exhorting and sermonising the people, responsibility for failures was also passed on. If we failed, the people were to blame, not the Government. Among other things, this introduced a whole lot of sophistry and rhetoric in our public life. It also led to a wide gap between word and deed. The view of mobilisation as primarily a function of organisation, of continuous effort, gave way under the impact of the ideology of total change. Because the response was not 'total', the pressure was relaxed.

The view held by many intellectuals and leaders that mobilisation—whether for development or for defence—is a 'total' process is confusing in society like ours. That this total process can be carried through only by breaking it up into a number of specific chains is lost sight of.

It is not clear to me why we should involve all the people in our programmes? Can only government-directed programmes build up the nation and the economy? We do not seem to realise the value of people being left alone to pursue their own enterprise with their own initiative. We do not also seem to fully appreciate the totalitarian implications of such an approach which curbs initiative, which impinges on privacy, and which does not even allow people to make mistakes and learn from them. I submit that for economic development, or even for defence, such an approach of total involvement is not necessary and is positively dangerous.

## **Diplomatic Front**

Meanwhile, there are many practical problems demanding urgent attention. On the diplomatic front, we have a long leeway to make up. The situation is in many ways opportune if we know how to act. Although the Chinese succeeded in isolating us, their open attack has rallied a good deal of support for us. The task is to consolidate this support in a lasting manner. The first thing is to deter and disengage the enemy, militarily, diplomatically and economically. We must bring to an end our conflicts with Pakistan and Nepal.

We should draw close to our other neighbours, such as Burma and Ceylon, on the plank of anti-communism. Indeed the need is to launch an all-out diplomatic offensive to isolate the Chinese. Japan, Malaya, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos—these are our natural allies in the Asian constellation of forces. Most of the Arab World, both republic and monarchic, cannot go against us. Even the greater Sinophiles, Indonesia, New Guinea and Ghana, can be skilfully handled. As for the larger balance of power in the world as a whole as well as in the communist bloc, it is bound to favour us.

The present pre-occupations of both the western powers and Russia should help us in such an approach; the point is to take timely initiative and drive home the advantages of a favourable world climate. As in everything else, we have been too slow and hesitant here. Our performance on the propaganda front too has been deplorably naive; we give the impression of being too self-conceited to explain our stand to others. It is a policy of losing by sheer default. All this calls for a spirited attack right away.

### **The Logic of the Chinese Moves**

The Chinese can be expected to play their cards with great finesse and a brutal logic. The logic seems to run as follows. The revolution started by Lenin and continued by Stalin and Mao can succeed only by a continuous expansion of the communist sphere of influence. The biggest hurdle to such an expansion is the revisionist Khrushchev and his flirtations with the capitalist and 'reactionary' forces in the world. The only way of bringing Khrushchev to his knees is by forcing him into an open and clear-cut choice between revolution and reaction. The first assault on India forced Russia to declare its support for China. The fact that the support was halting and lukewarm is not important; it is only the beginning of the grand strategy of Mao. The next move is to force India into the Western military camp by another massive attack, provoke America to enter the war and compel Russia to make common cause with China. The ensuing World War III will complete the communist world conquest begun by the great Stalin.

The logic is indeed brutal. Its implications for India are terrifying. The course now openly advocated by a large number of people outside as well as inside the Congress Party is to join the Western alliance and drive out the Chinese by the

help of the American armed forces and full-scale military aid. But is this not precisely playing the Chinese game by making India the theatre of the Third World War? The answer is 'yes' if we believe in the theory of brinkmanship. The line that divides the two; however, is rather thin; when a deterrent force fails to deter, it is forced into brinkmanship. On the other hand, where is the guarantee that America would risk a world war for India's sake?

The situation is truly tragic. It may still be possible to avoid such a clear-cut choice. The need is to enter into a long period of patient negotiations with all the important powers, adopt a flexible policy of piecemeal adjustments, skilfully exploit the difference within the communist bloc, gradually give up our doctrinaire approach towards the western system of alliance, build up our strength by adopting all available methods, and keep our fingers crossed. The most frustrating characteristic of the Emergency is the extreme uncertainty as to what will be the next move of the enemy. We are set on a period of great trial. The two supreme needs of this country; food production and military defence have been woefully neglected. The war has now given us an opportunity of restoring our perspectives and eliminating much waste and superfluity.

On the other hand, the tendency to prune important items of nation-building must be guarded against. The war we face calls for not less but more emphasis on normal development activity. Thus, while rightly strengthening our defence industries, and cutting out all the grand designs of imposing a comprehensive Utopia on our people, we should not lose sight of the compelling need for an increased pace of economic growth for development purposes. The national output must be substantially raised and the share of agriculture and other essential commodities in it must appreciate to a marked degree if we are to avoid war inflation and the consequent strain on the economy.

All this is going to be very difficult. The yearly domestic expenditure of Rs. 300 crore and foreign exchange outlay of



Rs. 50 crore on defence before the Emergency must now be drastically raised. I understand that even in the military lean period of 1963-64, the defence outlay will have to rise by another 500 to 600 crores, assuming that all the foreign exchange needed for armament purchases will be met out of external assistance and that non-Plan expenditure on internal security measures will be otherwise met. This is a big amount and these are large assumptions. In subsequent years, with increasing tempo in the defence build-up, a progressive expansion in domestic and foreign exchange outlays on defence will be called for.

Again, with the already exaggerated assumptions regarding mobilisation of internal resources made in the Third Plan, the scope for tapping further internal finance is severely limited. All this has forced the government to cut the outlay for Plan schemes at the time when this article is being written to Rs. 1450 crore for the year 1963-64. Further cuts may soon be called for. Again, even within the domestic outlay for Plan schemes, a substantial diversion to schemes supporting defence activity will have to be made. Similarly, the political and constitutional limits on U.S. military assistance will call for a sizeable diversion of economic aid to defence supporting items. Our sterling balances have also hit an unusual low. Add to this the scarcity in a war economy of such substantial articles as cement and steel and the greater emphasis on production of such things as woollen clothing, transport and construction; and we can see the drastic revision of the entire structure of our Plan.

## **Critical Position**

essentially political; it is aimed at discrediting the Indian experiment. The least we can do is to harness the entire administrative structure at various levels—including the 'multi-purpose' Community Development set-up—for the single purpose of the production of essential commodities. This will call for a substantial cutting down of other items of expenditure and effecting large economies in administrative costs.

### **Arrears on the Political Front**

On the administrative and political fronts, we have many arrears to clear. There is need for renewal and reshuffle all along the hierarchy. The top leadership has so far failed to take steps needed in the interests of efficiency and economy. While the surgical operation of the war forced the pace of one or two crucial decisions, the halting and uncertain approach to problems of re-organisation inhibited the supreme opportunity of 'cleansing the Augean stables' and providing the country with a clean and efficient administration. It remains to be seen how far the new vigour instilled by the Ministries of Defence and Economic Co-ordination will rationalise and give a sense of purpose to both the machinery of government and the political hierarchy.

War is normally a solvent of a whole lot of accumulated waste which is bound to take place under a system of political spoils. It is also a time when solutions otherwise considered to be drastic get not only easily accepted but also make for a new release of enthusiasm and energy. It was all to the good that a sudden and full-scale purge under the pressure of external panic was avoided. With the respite now provided, the time has come for administering the necessary shake-up to the governmental machine. It is also time for the leadership to show

some imagination in dealing with chronic problems such as tax evasion, large-scale smuggling and administrative corruption, by demonstrating effectively that it means business. The need is for a few demonstrative measures—dismissing a few civil servants, throwing out a few Ministers, acting firmly on judicial reports over businessmen's corrupt dealings. Only so can we enthuse the people and release their latent energies for concrete items of development. We must, of course, always guard against repressive measures, but if we confuse punishment that is deserved with repression, we shall soon land ourselves into an *efficient* regime the only way out of which will be a violent revolution and a 'strong man'. If we are to avoid this and if we are to have the maximum co-operation of the people, more potent sources of discontent will have to be removed. Lapses which may have been overlooked for so long now assume serious proportions. Corruption and favouritism in the distribution of benefits and the performance of public functions become intolerable to a people asked to tighten their belts and make sacrifices for the sake of the country. War is usually a time for a greater improvement in standards of public life. The present crisis will provide a serious test of the character of our administrative and political leadership.

All of these are but aspects of the overall organisational drive needed to meet the requirements of a country simultaneously fighting for national defence and social and economic development. What sustains such a drive? The question brings us to the most important aspect of national mobilisation—the ideological aspect. There is need to provide a new idealism to the people, something which gives meaning and purpose to their endeavours. The nationalist struggle provided us with such a purpose. With the attainment of independence, it was necessary to have a new basis for our strivings. In this we have completely failed. Our approach to nation-building has been either too administrative or too poetic. Cut and dried doctrines on the one hand and jargonism on the other have blurred our objectives and purpose.

We failed to drive home to our people that it is not so much the Himalayan ranges that we are out to protect; it is rather our whole way of life, our commitment to democracy, freedom and peaceful transformation towards a new order of existence. It is not so much a border conflict that we are engaged in; it is a conflict of two civilisations. Instead of sharpening our differences; however, we have consistently played down such differences. Are we still afraid of hurting our Chinese friends? It seems that the hangover persists. We have not sufficiently realised the threat posed by the present war to our survival as a democracy.

### **The Test of Democracy**

The Emergency has disturbed all our endeavours at democratic nation-building. Among other things, it has brought about a shift of power back to the Centre. The tremendous strides made by the country in political development, the large dispersal of power to lower organs of government and the ruling party, and the relatively successful implementation of a number of political innovations were all put to trial. Indian democracy was put to an acid test. We are still in the middle of such a test and although we have been able to absorb the initial shocks, the durability and resilience of our institutional structure is yet to be fully tried.

The reasons for the disruption of democracy have widely varied from country to country. But a real or imaginary external threat has always provided a suitable climate for undermining constitutional government. When the threat assumes the character of a long drawn-out conflict, the struggle for democracy becomes particularly difficult. To come out successfully from such a struggle, we shall have to face squarely the issues

forced on us by the Chinese onslaught—issues that go far beyond the immediate needs of defence.

### **Benefit of Democratic Idealism**

As a rule, a democracy compared to a totalitarian regime suffers from the handicap of not being able to turn its fine and subtle values into a militant ideology. However, in times of trial, the democracies of the world have not failed to rally their people for defending the ideals for which they and their countries stood. Such an idealism is of infinite importance not only for mobilising the country on all fronts, but also for using the war as a spur for greater productive output for peaceful purposes.

More than all this, such an idealism creates a new sense of unity and solidarity in the nation and lays a firm basis for democratic convictions in the people. Ideals for which a nation goes to war are then not easily given up. On the contrary, the energy they release provides greater vigour and stability to a country's institutions. This would be our greatest gain from the present struggle provided we preserve our balance and refuse to give in to provocation.

There is an inherent danger for an under-developed society to break down under strain. There is also the danger of government in such a society riding rough-shod over its critics in the name of national emergency and the fear of disaffection. Our capacity to arrest such tendencies will depend upon how clear we are in our perspectives, in our sense of priorities, and how sincere we are in what we say and profess.

More than all this, however, it will depend upon our ability to organise, on a disciplined execution of concrete programmes, and on our determination to eschew inefficiency and waste. In the absence of an efficient organisation, ideologies degenerate into shibboleths and rituals. The task we face is to turn the war to our productive advantage; not to be agonised so much over the uncertainties of the next Chinese move, but to put our own house in order—ideologically, organisationally and administratively.

Historically, India's record in facing external invasions is not altogether reassuring. As a historian put it bluntly the other day, the record is that all major invasions have succeeded. The reasons for this are not difficult to see; our own house was never in order. What we lacked was not ideology. We never lacked in our Dharma Sutras. What we lacked was organisation, efficiency, discipline, determination. In a word, we lacked an action perspective in whatever faced us. More than any time in the past, it is this action perspective that we need the most today.

Wichtig sind auch die Folgen  
für die Umwelt und die  
Gesundheit.

Das ist  
das Ziel.

## *ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE*

*T. Balakrishnan*

**I**T is the task of administration to plan and execute schemes; to mobilise and stabilise; to increase production, restrict consumption and regulate distribution; to remedy, reform and restrict; and to educate, enthuse and exhort. In all this, the administrator is benefited by the perspectives of the situation visualised by the sociologist, economist, political scientist, military expert, psychologist and the like. From all this, the administrator's perspective emerges, shaped also by his own special skills. Here, I should make it clear that by 'administration', I mean not only one or all sections of the salaried officials of the governmental bureaucracy, but everyone of the whole structure of the executive arm of the government. And the term 'administration', refers not only to 'financial' or 'personnel' administration but to the whole complex of schemes and programmes that affect the people and the nation;



Before going to the administrative perspective of the National Emergency, I should like to dwell briefly on two important points. The first is that defence now is not only the concern of the armed forces but of the entire civilian population. It is not the heroic and chivalrous wars of the epics that we are dealing with. Wars are no longer conducted only between armies. The two world wars have vastly extended the nature and scope of the wars and to quote Shri K. M. Panikkar<sup>1</sup>, "the front line and the inner lines of war have got inextricably mixed up and warfare today is between nations and not merely between armed forces." Efficiency of the armed forces is, of course, as important as ever; but without a social cohesion and an emotional integration that ensure the maintenance of national identity and an economic system that succeeds in resource mobilisation and maintenance of production at a level adequate to supply the defence needs and also the basic civilian requirements, the fine fettle of the army will by itself be of no avail. Thus, defence effort consists not only in organising the army and equipping it well but also in co-ordinating the various areas of effort covering the entire nation.

The second important point which I should like to emphasise is the fact that the present situation is not exactly an all-out war situation but one which calls for ceaseless vigil and a state of acute preparedness for war. All of us remember the spontaneous spurt of patriotic sentiments which the Chinese aggression had released. With the passage of time, the vibrations of the stimulus of aggression have slowly started diminishing in frequency and resonance. The perception of the possibility of further danger is there; but the white heat of fervour has started cooling off. This poses a serious problem for the administration which has to go ahead with its programme of mobilisation and regulation as intensively as a war-situation would warrant, but under conditions which are slightly less favourable for the enlisting of unstinted co-operation of the people for the former programmes and their unquestioning acquiescence in the latter, than those which would obtain if a war were actually on. When a war is on, which imposes a calculus of desparation, tears and

suffering, the people are willing to make any sacrifice, are ready to submit to any restrictions and are eager to do their best for the success of any programme initiated by the Government. But in a situation which only calls for a state of preparedness, the demands of the situation become but an abstraction to the people. And, an abstraction cannot rouse the people to such a level of activity and readiness to put up with discomfort as the actuality of a war, though for military, political and administrative reasons, it is necessary to keep up the same level of participation of the people in defence effort and the same tempo of their preparedness. With no war on, there will be a temptation to be slack and indifferent and this temptation has a corroding effect. This has to be combated by education, persuasion and even compulsion and this makes the tasks of the administration in a readiness-situation more trying and more exacting than in an actual war-situation.

Against this background should we analyse the administrative perspectives of the present emergency? I may confess that my analysis is more *a priori* than empirical. Also, I am afraid it is more prescriptive than descriptive. In my view, the administrative perspective indicates a five-fold development. They are :

- (1) Development of Capabilities and Skills; (2) Development of means to satisfy the physical needs of Defence; (3) Development of Efficiency; (4) Development of Leadership; and (5) Development of Morality.

### **Development of Capabilities and Skills**

I propose to divide this facet of the perspective into five components, namely, development of the capabilities of 'integra-

tion' and 'participation' and the skills of resource mobilisation, stabilisation and distribution.<sup>2</sup>

### Integration

At a time like this, the importance of the development of the 'integration capability' which will instil in the minds of everyone in the country a sense of national identity can hardly be over-emphasised. With an imperfect integration, there is every likelihood of civilian morale breaking down under the impact of war. True, that the degree of awareness and the level of deeper perception of the Chinese aggression was found to be very high among the people even in those States far removed from the scene of aggression<sup>3</sup>. But we must not forget that the actual war lasted for a very short period and the privation suffered by the civilian population as a direct consequence of the war on the frontier was not such as to cause demoralisation and a feeling of disintegration. The Chinese aggression has shown that national integration has developed; now every step must be taken to see that this development reaches perfection and to ensure that it will not weaken even against a continuous duration of war with all its attendant calamities.

### Participation

This takes me on to the question of participation. In modern warfare, defence efforts require the participation of everyone of the civilian population in the programmes for defence in some way or the other. This totality of involvement is required for three reasons. First, warfare these days is not confined to combats between armed forces of the warring countries on an earmarked battlefield but is an attempt at total destruction of towns, places of strategic importance, production centres and the like. Therefore, it is necessary to keep up the morale of the entire civilian population in the face of such an

onslaught. And this can be achieved only by developing a sense of national discipline which could be done by organising people in a large number of groups, each entrusted with special functions. These groups bring people together, give them a feeling of confidence and a sense of responsibility and instil in them faith in concerted joint action. Home Guards, Fire-Fighting Squads, Civil Defence Units are all examples of such organised groups.

Secondly, success in war depends on the harnessing of the production potential of agriculture and industry—both big and small-scale—to the fullest extent to the task on hand; and agriculture, small-scale industries and handicrafts in our country are the occupations of millions of peasants and artisans. Unless each one of these persons contributes his best for increasing the volume of production, it is well-nigh impossible to meet the growing claims of defence.

The third reason for the need for developing an aggregative totality of participation in defence efforts is the fact that no scheme for defence mobilisation or no regulation imposed by the Government for defence purposes can succeed except with the will to co-operate of all those to whom these schemes and regulations apply. The apparatus of coercion is, of course, there, but this alone is woefully inadequate if the will to co-operate and a sense of deep-felt responsibility do not exist in the people. To generate and maintain these, it is necessary to develop in all the people a sense of participation and involvement in the defence of the nation.

It may be worthwhile here to mention in brief the action so far taken by the Government to involve all sections of people in defence effort. 'Citizens' Committees have been formed on an all-party basis at the Centre and in all the States. Coming to more concrete measures, the Ministry of Home Affairs has launched a drive to recruit one million Home Guards in urban

and rural areas which they visualise "as a powerful instrument for strengthening the will of the people to stand up to hardship and danger in the country's hour of need". The functions of the Home Guards will be to serve as auxiliary to the police in maintaining internal security, to assist in emergencies like air raid and natural calamities, to form an emergency labour force needed for tasks directly or indirectly connected with the country's defence and to provide essential services such as motor transport, fire brigades, first aid etc. Also, steps have been taken to form Volunteer Service Corps composed of professional people like doctors, Women's Volunteer Corps to pool offers from women for driving, telephone operation, wireless-training etc. and National Volunteer Rifles. It is also proposed to extend the National Discipline Scheme to all the schools in the country in the coming four years. It is noteworthy that in the matter of recruitment of persons for all these, the local self governing units have been closely associated. The introduction of the Village Volunteer Force also deserves particular mention.

All these seem impressive and the initial response of the people to all these schemes was commendable. But the question is, does the same enthusiasm and fervour still obtain and if not what are the tasks for administration to ensure full and willing participation of all sections of the people in all the facets of defence effort?

It is the experience of all of us that shortly after the cease-fire, the general public interest in the crisis started diminishing gradually both in its intensity and in its universality. But the situation is still fraught with crisis-potential and it is the task of the publicity wing of the Government and the Citizen's Committees to enlist active interest of people all over the country in the vital programmes of defence efforts by stressing on this crisis-potential. One of the main reasons for the flagging of fervour is the frustration of the common man on seeing the gap between preaching and precept. I may be saying the obvious, but it is very necessary for everyone in the administration to adhere to

strict codes of honesty, efficiency, justice and fair play without which it is impossible to enlist the willing co-operation of the public. Care should be taken to keep the faith of the people from falling and nothing but precept can accomplish this.

Next I shall turn to an important problem which the administrator has to face in involving a vast majority of the people in defence efforts. It would be necessary to impress on the people the seriousness of the crisis. However cautious one may be, this process of education and exhortation will lead to the creation of some kind of 'war-mind' in the collective. Slowly, the situation may develop when the war impulse will seek vent not only on the enemy or the idea of the enemy but upon all persons, groups and ideas which have for long been objects of anger and hate. As social psychologists will tell us, people live in some kind of "myth or belief system". People do try to invent a devil, a *bete noir*, if none is at hand. And during the time of crisis, laden with suspense and uncertainty, the object of the war-impulse may be transferred from the enemy to these local objects and groups of hate. If some of these hateful groups or persons happen to be too powerful, then the impulse may be turned against other 'devils' which may be invented. This will obviously lead to a very unhealthy and explosive situation. This can be prevented in two ways : by channelising the energy of the people in participation in disciplined organisations of defence and also by meting out severe punishments to those anti-social persons or groups who thrive on the crisis and exploit the situation for unlawful personal gains, against whom a large majority of the helpless public will be nurturing an important anger.

### Resource Mobilisation.

The problem of a nation at war or in a state of acute preparedness for war is to find real goods and services to satisfy the military and civilian needs and to allocate them among their alternative

uses. This means the raising of enough money to pay for all these goods and services. No country, however rich, can have an economic system which can provide all the goods and services that would be required for military purposes on a massive scale during the currency of a situation of emergency and at the same time satisfy all the civilian wants, too. So it is a question of balancing of requirements. Even so, the demands for defence would call for the mobilisation of additional resources to a large extent. Particularly so is our present position. The emergency has necessitated a sharp increase in defence expenditure. And Plan expenditure has also to be stepped up, for, a major bulk of the Plan expenditure is earmarked to build up exactly those aspects of the economy which are vital for defence purposes. The emphasis on defence and the resultant necessity for the acceleration of some Plan schemes require an additional expenditure to a tune of Rs. 610 crore in 1963-64.

The objective of financial policy is not merely to raise enough money for defence and development programmes but to raise it in such a way as to ensure the smooth functioning of the economy, correcting the imbalances that may be generated between the different sectors of the economy. Also, the financial policy of the government should be so designed as to achieve the objective of diversion of resources from non-investment and civilian consumption uses to investment and defence uses as may be warranted by the increased defence commitments.

Now, what are the tasks that these measures impose on financial administration? First and foremost, effective collection of all the taxes and other dues to the government has to be ensured. Also, suitable amendments may have to be made to the existing tax laws and executive rules framed under them with a view to expediting collection, economising the cost of the process and rationalising the structure of the collecting machinery. Finally, the development of greater financial responsibility particularly by the local self governing institutions and their elected chairman is one of the greatest needs of the moment.

### Stabilisation

The problem of resource mobilisation during war or preparedness for war is one of maximising the output of real goods and services and allocating them between the most essential military and civilian uses. Such rapid resource mobilisation programmes are always accompanied by inflationary pressures. These can be checked by economic stabilisation which has a three-fold purpose : (i) to ensure the most desirable allocation of resources between defence and civilian production; (ii) to limit the rate and quantum of spending by the public; and (iii) to keep commodity prices, rents, wages etc. at or below a particular level. Fiscal measures like stiff taxation and credit control measures can to some extent bring about stabilisation. But they may not be by themselves sufficient. More direct policies may be required.

Some specific measures of more direct control have already been implemented. The Government have banned forward trading in *gur*, non-ferrous metals, shares, silver and gold to check the speculative tendency in essential commodities. Procurement price for rice for the 1962-63 season has been announced. A High Level Committee on prices is scrutinising current price trends, securing regular relevant information regarding essential commodities and arranging for special inquiries to be made. The Committee has worked out proposals in respect of manufactured articles, the supply of which to the civilian population is likely to be curtailed. As defence demands on woollen textiles are pressing, a Controller for Woollen Textiles has been appointed to regulate the production, distribution and prices of these textiles. Action has already been taken with regard to the display of prices under the Essential Commodities Act.

There are two important administrative implications of stabilisation which I should like to lay stress on. The first is that as Prof. Lionel Robbins<sup>4</sup> points out, when once the government have embarked upon a policy of direct controls of prices and



supply in some portion of the economy, it is necessary for them to be watchful and prevent developments elsewhere from defeating the purpose of the government in introducing these controls. A careful planning for a net-work of controls is very necessary. To quote Prof. Robbins : "In such conditions there can be nothing more dangerous than delaying action in the hope that some fluke of circumstances will make it unnecessary to grasp the nettle."

Secondly, it is important to realise the need for integration of the various controls e.g. production controls, procurement, stabilisation controls, etc. Without proper co-ordination between the different sets of controls, which all arise out of the same basic condition that claims for most resources and goods are far greater than their available supplies, the very purpose of each one of these controls can be defeated or at least hindered. A well-conceived, imaginative and flexible mechanism for integration should be evolved if the common purpose of all these controls is to be achieved efficiently and smoothly.

### Distribution

But, controls are not everything. All these control measures and taxation may not result in the most equitable distribution of income and the vast majority of our people who are poor may find it hard to get essential commodities. So a kind of distribution control which will ensure the availability of minimum basic necessities of consumption to the two-thirds of the Indian people who live on the brink of subsistence or only slightly above this margin is pressingly called for.

The Government have decided to make essential commodities available through a net-work of co-operative consumers' stores. The Government have formulated a four-fold scheme for effecting

distribution of essential goods through co-operatives *i.e.* to organise co-operative stores among :

- (a) the general public in urban areas;
- (b) the industrial workers in the public and private sectors;
- (c) government employees; and
- (d) a scheme for the supply of essential goods to the rural population.

200 wholesale Societies with about 4,000 branches are to be organised in towns having a population of over 50,000 each. Every industrial undertaking with at least 250 employees will have the benefit of a Consumers' Co-operative Society. In rural areas, now, about 15,000 societies undertake the supply of some daily necessities of life. Their number will be raised to 45,000 by 1963-64 and to 80,000 by 1964-65. It hardly needs to be emphasised that unless these societies are organised and run on sound lines—and this proviso is important—proper distribution of essential goods to a vast majority of our population at fair price cannot be ensured.

### **Development of Means to Satisfy the Physical Needs of Defence**

Success in a modern war and adequacy of preparedness for a war depend on sufficiency in the following :

- (a) a trained well-organised army supplied with modern equipment;
- (b) food production;
- (c) a well-knit industrial base;
- (d) oil production; and
- (e) communications system.

In formulating plans for 1963-64, provision has been made for accelerated implementation of projects and programmes directly

related to these sectors. The over-all outlay envisaged in 1963-64 is about Rs. 200 crore more than that provided in 1962-63.

With regard to increasing the manpower in the fighting forces, adequate measures are being taken. Apart from supplies from abroad, accelerated measures are being taken to step defence production up in all spheres. All industries in the public and private sectors have been asked to go ahead with the requirements of defence. The automobile industry is expanding assembling lines for trucks and jeeps to meet the defence needs. Factories to produce certain strategic electronic and radar equipment and electrical cables have been put into commission. The establishment of another aircraft factory is being expedited. Four new ordnance factories have been set up. Special steps are also being taken to develop scientific research specifically oriented to defence problems. The establishment of a high powered Defence Research and Development Council amalgamating the Defence Science Organisation established in 1948 and the Technical Development Establishment is a step in the right direction.

Coming to food production, an additional outlay of Rs. 27 crore has been provided for in 1963-64. The National Development Council has resolved to raise the target for minor irrigation by 50% and that for dry farming from 22 to 50 million acres. The outlay for medium irrigation schemes has been worked out to facilitate implementation of the projects even ahead of schedule. Steps have been taken to strengthen and re-orient the agricultural extension services. The V.L.W. is now asked to give his days and nights entirely to agricultural extension work. High-level teams are being sent out to the different States to facilitate timely action on joint decisions taken by the State Governments and the Central Government. To ensure co-ordination, agricultural production sub-committees of the State Cabinets have been constituted in many States and also official level committees with the Chief Secretary or a senior Secretary to the Government as the chairman to review progress and to expedite issue of sanctions for individual schemes.

For large-scale industries, an additional outlay of Rs. 67 crore has been proposed for the 1963-64 Plan. In the private sector, priority is being given to defence-oriented industries. The target for coal production is also being substantially increased. Small-scale industries are also sought to be brought into the map of defence production. The Central Small-Scale Industries Organisation has made arrangements for small-scale industries to undertake production of a large number of defence requirements. Out of indents placed by the Defence Ministry, a list of 275 items which may be of interest to small-scale industries has been circulated to the Industries Departments of the State Governments.

Regarding oil, measures have been taken to step production up, consequent on the situation arising out of the Emergency. Foundation stone has been laid for the third refinery in the public sector which is expected to yield three million tonnes by 1965-66. An agreement has also been signed with a U.S. concern and the refinery is expected to go on stream within 30 months.

### Communications

For transport and communications, an additional outlay of Rs. 36 crore has been made in the Plan for 1963-64 and in view of the development after Emergency, priorities among the components of the railway plan are being reviewed. The road programme for 1963-64 includes a substantial amount for the additional works undertaken due to the Emergency. By the end of 1963-64, the close of the third year of the Third Five Year Plan period, the expenditure under transport and communications will have been about 73% of the Five Year Plan outlay.

All these are quite encouraging. But it must be admitted the picture is rather disconcerting in the field of agriculture. It is a

disturbing fact that over the last two years, there has been virtually no over-all increase in agricultural production, despite all the expenditure incurred by the Government towards agricultural development. There is a yawning gulf between the irrigation potential targeted to be created and the actual potential created and more disturbing than this, between the potential created and that actually utilised. Assuming that the targets fixed for 1963-64 are reached, the utilisation of the irrigation potential created by major and medium irrigation projects will only be 39.5% of the total five year target of the Third Plan period. This gap between what Dr. Henry Hart<sup>5</sup> calls 'engineering potential' and the 'potential of public participation' is really disquieting. The blame certainly cannot be laid completely at the door of the 'improvident ryot'. At the risk of being trite, I may say that in many cases the failure is due to administrative lags and lack of initiative, zeal and aptitude on the part of field extension staff. Some of the methods suggested by Dr. Hart<sup>6</sup> deserve serious consideration at the present juncture. Apart from the obvious courses of action such as provision of necessary administrative services for the agricultural side of irrigation, assistance in the technique of irrigation etc., he suggests, "variation of administrative patterns and patterns of user participation among the State and regions within the States", considering the difference in soils, market area and cultural tradition. At this hour of Emergency, these problems of agriculture have to be seriously examined and early correctives have to be applied to the administrative processes involved and perhaps also to the very approach to the problem itself.

I have so far outlined only the tasks ahead of administration in the context of the National Emergency. It is clear that to accomplish these an improved, more efficient performance of a systematic nature on the part of those to whom they are entrusted is called for. The dimensions of the commissions have widened; the nature of work has attained more social significance than before; and the demands of the tasks have become more urgent, more exacting. Unless the functional efficiency of the administrative system as a whole is increased, the work cannot be satisfactorily done, the goals cannot be fully realised and the challenge cannot

be confidently met. To this problem of development of efficiency, I shall now turn.

## Development of Efficiency

One of the important perspectives of the Emergency is thus to vitalise the administrative apparatus and make it equal to the ends defined for it and the commissions set for it. There has been a good deal of quantitative expansion of the tasks entrusted to it by the present crisis which also demand a qualitative change in the performance of its functions. This can be achieved, to my mind, by removing certain defects inherent in the organisation and defects which have become a second nature with its members. I shall analyse them under three heads : structural defects, procedural defects and habitual defects.

### Structural Defects

Structure is very important in that it is a determinant of the whole nature of the process of administration. It fixes positions and levels of responsibility, determines the effectiveness of communication and is a factor responsible for the possibility of effective delegation. One of the important criticisms offered by Dr. Paul H. Appleby<sup>7</sup> about the structure of Indian administration is that there is no structure distinguishing between what are called 'line' functions and 'staff' functions. 'Staff' functions are those connected with planning, financial and personnel controls, legal review of administrative proposals etc. whereas 'line' functions are those connected with implementation of programmes, enforcement of laws etc. At the Centre, except in Ministries concerned solely with the Union subjects, there is only 'staff' function and no 'line' functions whatever. So it is that in

many fields of national importance—agriculture is a case in point—the Centre's power of action is confined to conference-holding and circular-issuing. Under the Constitution, this is, of course, inevitable, but an effective method of real co-ordination could be worked out instead of the present system which is more ritualistic than purposeful. Again, as observed by Dr. Appleby<sup>8</sup> the structure within the Ministries is ill-designed for proper delegation which is the prime necessity for expeditious and effective discharge of administrative responsibility. To quote Dr. Appleby : "delegation is not the abdication of responsibility; it is an enlargement of it. . . . . It is only by development of competence below and exercise of skill in utilisation of subordinate abilities that high responsibilities may be upheld."<sup>9</sup> These words have special significance in the present context, particularly in improving the efficiency of the industrial and commercial undertakings of the public sector.

### Procedural Defects

Coming to procedural defects, I shall confine my attention to the shockingly obstructionist and negative approach that is adopted in the government departments towards scrutiny and review of proposals. First, let us consider the over-devotion to precedent which is generally the basis for scrutiny of any new proposal. This often reminds one of an epigram quoted by Philip Woodruff<sup>10</sup> which seeks to summarise all secretariat procedure :

Secretary to Office :	Any precedent?
Office to Secretary :	No.
Secretary to Governor :	Turn it down?
Governor to Secretary :	Yes.

A waggish statement, may be, but not without truth. Secondly, one finds the same negative approach permeating the entire

process of review of proposals and schemes by the Finance Department. Here again, the approach is fault-finding and the goal is truncating the financial estimates. What is more objectionable is the tendency of the Finance Departments to pronounce judgement on the merits of the programmes sent to them by other departments for financial concurrence. All these breed delay and stifle initiative. Thirdly, we may look at the review function performed by the Auditor General which has come in for rightful criticism in the hands of Dr. Appleby.<sup>11</sup> Here again, the attitude is entirely negative and the effect is repressive. The audit parties are generally too ready to raise a presumption of evil motives from a single case of departure from administrative procedures. A spectre haunts every administrator in responsible position and it is the spectre of the audit party. The reason is the auditors step beyond their rightful domain and start passing judgments on administrative discretions and values of programmes and these are given exaggerated importance by the Public Accounts Committees. So, the general tendency is to 'play safe' and refuse to deviate from the letter of the scripture-rigid rules even if one is convinced that in public interest, a deviation is called for. This cannot be conducive to bold and imaginative action that is expected of the administrator in key positions, particularly in an emergency situation. The unwholesome effect of the negative approach of audit and its insistence to step out of its confines is felt more in the case of public sector undertakings. None will suggest, of course, that scrutiny, review and audit should be dispensed with, but I do wish to stress that if the negative approach in procedures persists, administration cannot carry out its tasks with initiative, vigour and imagination which are necessary even in a normal set up and much more so in a state of emergency..

### Habitual Defects

I shall now turn to habitual defects. The classical and popular criticism against bureaucrats are legion, which need not be repeated here. Suffice it perhaps to say that "aloofness, faulty



handling of the public, lack of initiative, delay, reluctance to take decisions" are some of the attributes to the image of a bureaucrat. These are mostly true and they have almost become a habit with him. And certain modes of approach and view-points are so deeply ingrained in the bureaucrat by being so much in the tradition of his tribe that his very thorough training in the skills and methods of his organisation and his fitness in the frame become a liability to him when he is to function under circumstances that have changed. His abilities are now his inadequacies; and his skills are now his liabilities. This is a condition which Veblen called 'trained incapacity'. And in the words of Edmund Burke : "people may be unfitted by being fit in an unfit fitness". Quite a few individual officials find themselves in this position now. A conscious and earnest attempt should be made by them to fit themselves in a new situation which calls for changed skills and new approaches. It is also to be stated here that when once the structures and the procedures are radically altered, the habits of the individual officials will also undergo a change automatically.

### Development of Leadership

Normally, an average bureaucrat fits in well with the words of Mr. Eliot :<sup>12</sup>

Advise the prince, no doubt an easy tool

Deferential, glad to be of use

Politic, cautious and meticulous

But, under the present conditions such an admixture of qualities of mere technical efficiency, aloofness, personal ambition and expediency is not sufficient. The new situation calls for emergence of qualities of leaderships among the administrators. Qualities of statesmanship, a sense of commitment, determination, human understanding and concern for change are all required to be built up by both the sections of the administrators—those who advise

the Ministers on matters of policy and those field officers who translate the policy into action.

In this connection, it will be worthwhile to recall the famous observation of Karl von Clausewitz,<sup>13</sup> one of the foremost military thinkers, that "war is a mere continuation of policy by other means". This means that war is determined by political aims. He goes on to say : "The war of a community . . . always arises from a political condition and is called forth by a political motive. It is therefore a political act . . . . Policy therefore will permeate the whole action of war and exercise continual influence on it, so far as the nature of the explosive forces in it allow." From this arises the importance of keeping the political objective clearly in view, while being in a state of preparedness and making a country ready to plunge into war if need be. Hysterical demands should not be allowed to blur the view and war-psychosis should not be allowed to develop. Carefully weighed political considerations should influence every important area of defence effort which should be thoughtfully planned with care. If this co-ordination is lacking and if defence efforts are based on hasty or emotional considerations of the moment, it may lead to a dangerous situation. It is here that the Ministers who are 'political administrators', and also their civilian advisers have to show qualities of far-sighted statesmanship.

As I stated earlier, administrative reform is one of the crying needs of the situation. This can be achieved only with the simultaneous operation of leadership in both the political and the administrative levels. The Minister should give his active support to initiate reforms and the permanent official Secretary can do a lot to stimulate such an interest in the former, to maintain it, and to translate it into concrete action. Leadership in administrative reform is thus expected of both the 'political administrators' and the senior officers of the permanent civil service.

Now, a public administrator in the field—particularly a generalist—is faced with the responsibility of reconciling opposing

views in public interest. Normally the tendency is to effect some kind of compromise which more often than not leaves both the parties with a faint feeling of dissatisfaction. By an intelligent appraisal of the situation and with breadth of vision, the official can, by breaking down the contention of each side and bringing the components together in a new arrangement, create a new order, a new perspective which will be acceptable to both the sides—a principle which Miss Follett calls 'constructive conflict'. Such qualities of leadership are expected particularly of the Chief Executive Officers of the local self-governing units who are normally faced with such conflict-situations which are to be satisfactorily resolved in the interests of the smooth running of these bodies which is a more pressing need now than ever.

While on the subject, I should like to dwell briefly on the position of the District Collector. The Collector in India has occupied a unique position which is unparalleled in any modern state. He was—and is—something more than a representative of the Government in the district. Even now, there is nothing that he cannot do or rather nothing that he is expected to be unable to do. He is effective both as a crowd-dispeller and as a 'crowd-compeller'. He is Government personified, a person with seemingly unlimited power and capacity, one who is endowed with almost magical qualities—a charisma. This view of the Collector still gives comfort and a sense of security to the traditional villagers who had long been accustomed to patrimonial leadership and an anthropomorphic concept of the Government. The special position of the Collector, and his 'father image', can be beneficially used at a time of emergency like this.

### **Development of Morality**

Emergency conditions impose a tax on everything including character. But it is one tax which must be evaded. Particularly

so by the officials of the Government whose immorality will demoralise the people and induce them to free themselves from the beneficial bonds of social character. Development of integrity and character among all sections of the people is a vital necessity for a country preparing itself for the eventuality of war and if this idea is to be instilled in the people, it is necessary that all wings of the Government are kept pure and blameless.


There is another kind of morality that should be developed among the public servants. All of us know the multitude of powers which the Defence of India Rules have vested in the Executive—which in effect means vested in the officials of the Government. Certain fundamental rights guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution have been suspended and the powers that the Executive has taken on itself which are not subject to judicial review are really enormous. It requires a development of morality to a very high degree to use these powers justly wherever necessary and not to hesitate to use them when conditions so warrant, resisting the temptation of even the most luring compensation or unyielding to the influence of even the strongest of pressures.

Also under the various special enactments and rules, a very wide discretion has been given to the field officers. It requires again a fine sense of morality to use it in the most human way, without detriment to the ends of the laws.

At the risk of being banal, one may say that whatever be the efficiency the administrative system may develop, whatever be the level of success of the measures to raise resources, whatever be the effectiveness of the publicity campaign, all these cannot sustain the willing participation of the people in the demanding tasks of defence effort, unless the entire system of administration and everyone who comprises that system is an exemplar of character, integrity, honesty and justice.

Notes :

1. Panikkar, K. M. : "Problems of Indian Defence", p. 63.
2. The concept of the development of capabilities of "integration, mobilisation, participation and distribution" has been propounded by Prof. Gabriel Almond.
3. A recent nation-wide study conducted by the National Institute of Community Development on the perception of National Emergency has revealed that the percentage of respondents interviewed in the States in the Western and Southern Zones who were aware of the Emergency was 79.5 and 78.3 respectively.
4. Prof. Lionel Robbins : "The Economic Problem in Peace and War". p. 43.
5. Dr. Henry Hart : "Administrative Aspects of River Valley Development". pp. 62-63.
6. Dr. Hart opp. cit. pp. 54 ff.
7. Please see Dr. Paul H. Appleby's "Public Administration in India—Report of a Survey—1953".
8. Dr. Paul H. Appleby : opp. cit.
9. Dr. Paul H. Appleby : "Re-examination of India's Administrative System—1956".
10. Philip Woodruff : "The Men who Ruled India—The Guardians". P. 216.
11. Dr. Paul H. Appleby : "Re-examination of India's Administrative System—1956".
12. T. S. Eliot : "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock".
13. Karl von Clausewitz : "On War".



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