

PHILOSOPHY OF IBN TUFAYL

Z. A. SIDDIQI

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ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH
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PHILOSOPHY OF IBN TUFAYL

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Foreword by

PROF. MIR VALIUDDIN




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FOREWORD

Ibn Ṭufayl was preeminently a mystic who sought in Sufi practices, in the purification of the carnal Self and body, in cleansing of the heart, in the moral transformation of the inner man, and in the constant and unwearied search for the unity in the multiplicity around, to find a way to surrender self-hood and efface it in that Eternal One Essence which is Divine.

He was an eminent philosopher also, a man of encyclopædic knowledge, occupying a high place in the history of Muslim Philosophy. His greatness can be judged by the fact that he is stated to be the patron and teacher of the renowned Muslim philosopher of Spain, Ibn Roshd.

The most striking thing about Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy is its independent and critical spirit and modern approach to many problems of Philosophy. He is not a blind follower of any of his predecessors—not even of Plato or Aristotle. He freely criticises Fārābī and Ibn Bajja for their inconsistencies and inadequacies. He holds Ibn Sīnā and Ghazālī in great esteem but finds their writings incapable of giving clear guidance to an ordinary seeker after truth. It was customary with these philosophers to speak with two voices—one addressing the ordinary layman and the other meant for the chosen few. That is why we find a number of 'withheld' books attributed to them—books which were meant to be withheld from all excepting those who were competent to receive them. This naturally created some confusion about their points of view and was responsible for some apparent inconsistencies in their philosophies. This caution on the part of philosophers was due to the orthodoxy of the period. Ibn Ṭufayl, however, chose to follow another course. He expressed his views through a philosophical romance—his well-renowned work, *Hayy b. Yaqzān* (or the Living One Son of the Waking One). In this work he depicts the life-story of a solitary child, Hayy b. Yaqzān, found on an uninhabited island. Hayy b. Yaqzān is shown by Ibn Ṭufayl to have discovered the highest truths of science, philosophy, religion and mysticism, in the course of his development. This work is unique in the whole philosophical literature. It has a rare fascination, both for the specialist and for the layman. The layman, most impressed by the story, has access to some general truths about it

only. But the expert or the specialist discovers the deeper meaning lying concealed behind them. There are also many subtle indications of Ibn Ṭufayl's critical and modern approach to problems of philosophy which often escape a casual reader of his philosophical romance. All these facts combined to obscure the real contribution of Ibn Ṭufayl, in spite of his great fame and popularity.

Dr. Zafar Ahmad Siddiqi has, for the first time, reconstructed the philosophy contained in Hayy b. Yaqẓān for the purpose of a systematic and thorough exposition and critical evaluation, bringing out Ibn Ṭufayl's real contribution to philosophy, and has determined his true place as one of the fore-runners of Modern Thought. A tremendous amount of devoted and concentrated labour has been put into the work and the very doing of it, I am sure, has brought and will bring its own reward. The work is sure to be welcomed by all who love truth. I welcome it as a very valuable contribution to the history of Muslim Philosophy.

HYDERABAD,
September, 1965.

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PREFACE

Ibn Ṭufayl occupies an important place in the history of Muslim Thought. He was the patron and, according to some traditions, the teacher of no less a philosopher than Ibn Roshd. In the words of Etienne Gilson he was "a man of encyclopædic knowledge whose learning far exceeded the knowledge of the Christians of his times."

Ibn Ṭufayl has presented his views in the form of a philosophical romance, Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. It is a unique work, difficult to match in the whole philosophical literature of Islām. In this wonderful book Ibn Ṭufayl has depicted the story of a human child who discovers, through his own effort and intelligence, the highest truths of science, philosophy, religion and mysticism. The importance of the book is evident from the fact that it has had its translations in all important languages of Europe.

In 1952, when I was working on the first Urdu translation of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, it struck me that a critical and detailed work on Ibn Ṭufayl was greatly needed. At that time I could not do more than writing a brief commentary on the Philosophy of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān which was published along with my Urdu translation of the book. However, I am happy that my long-cherished desire is being fulfilled in the form of this book—Philosophy of Ibn Ṭufayl. Several aspects of Ibn Ṭufayl have been discussed in it from new angles. For instance, Ibn Ṭufayl's purpose in writing Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, the so called allegorical nature of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, a comparative study of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān with somewhat similar recitals, Ibn Ṭufayl's debt to his predecessors and his influence on subsequent thought, these and other similar problems have been critically examined and discussed. Moreover, an effort has been made to correct many misconceptions about Ibn Ṭufayl and to bring out his real contribution to philosophy. The book is intended to be useful both for the beginner and for the expert. A portion of the work connected with the book has been of the nature of analysis and exposition. In this task I have tried to be as objective as possible. But in evaluations and comparisons, which form a considerable part of the book, I cannot claim the same objectivity. The bias of the writer is bound to colour such discussions--and it is not wholly undesirable in philosophy. However, any constructive criticisms or suggestions would be welcome to me

from my readers who do not agree with my point of view or interpretation.

Now a word about the arrangement of the book. Usually, the notes and references are given towards the end of a book. I have deviated from this general practice. As many chapters of the book occupy sufficient space and can be taken as self-sufficient units, I have given the relevant notes and references at the end of each chapter. I hope my readers will find this arrangement more convenient.

Before concluding these lines I must express my gratitude to my old teacher, colleague and friend—late Prof. M. Umaruddin, whose encouragement and valuable suggestions inspired me to undertake this work. My thanks are also due to my colleague and friend, Dr. Mohd. Noor Nabi, and to my pupils, Mr. Mohammad Rafique and Mr. Anzarul Haq, research scholars of the Department of Philosophy, who helped me in preparing the index and in correcting some proofs of the book. I am also grateful to the Faculty of Arts, A.M.U., Aligarh, for providing necessary grant for publishing the book. Lastly, I must offer my thanks to Mr. Bantu Ram, Manager, Aligarh Muslim University Press for his cooperation in getting it printed.

ALIGARH,
October, 1965.

Z. A. SIDDIQI

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INTRODUCTION

Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Ṭufayl al-Qaisī, the famous Spanish philosopher of twelfth century A.D., is one of those great thinkers whose fame obscures their real contribution. Glowing tributes are paid to his genius. His name is mentioned with reverence. But his philosophy has failed to arouse sufficient notice at the hands of the critics. Historians of philosophy devote but a few pages to the exposition of his views, and this exposition is often one-sided and misleading.

This attitude, however, is not due to any deliberate misrepresentation or malice. The form which Ibn Ṭufayl has adopted for the expression of his views is mainly responsible for it. Ibn Ṭufayl has chosen the form of a philosophical romance as the medium of his philosophy. The name of his only philosophical work available to us is ‘Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān’. It is the story of a human child found on an uninhabited island near southern Indian coast, probably Ceylon.¹ This child, Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, uninfluenced by any human society and uninstructed by any human teacher, learns to satisfy his various practical needs and arrives at the highest truths of science, philosophy, religion and mysticism, through Divine guidance and with the help of his native intelligence and other faculties.

Ibn Ṭufayl shows greatest dexterity in maintaining the interest of the reader and in making his account appear natural and realistic. His style is fascinating and his expression is clear and forceful. These qualities have earned immortal fame for Ibn Ṭufayl and his work.

It would not be out of place here to mention a few tributes paid to Ibn Ṭufayl by various writers. Etienne Gilson describes him as a man of encyclopædic knowledge whose learning far exceeded the knowledge of the Christians of his times². A. S. Fulton regards his work, ‘Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān’, as one of the most interesting works of the Middle Ages, and a work difficult to match in the whole literature of Islam.³ Paul Bronnle considers the story written by Ibn Ṭufayl as a work of such immortal beauty and eternal freshness that will not fade with the passage of time.⁴ A. J. Arberry and Sir Thomas Adams, referring to the celebrated ‘Philosophus Autodidactus’ (the Latin version of ‘Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān’ by Edward Pocock of Oxford) tell us that it attracted the notice of no less a philosopher than Leibnitz and won praise from him.⁵

In spite of these eulogizing comments we are sorry to note that an adequate and detailed analysis of the philosophy of Ibn Ṭufayl is not commonly available. In fact the attention of most of the critics has been arrested by the dramatic aspect of the story of 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān'. That is why, in most accounts of Ibn Ṭufayl, we find that greater attention is paid to the story of 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān' than to its philosophy.

Unfortunately, the same attitude seems to characterize most of the translations of 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān' which seem to have the motive of providing an intellectual entertainment to the public. This is borne out by the fact that practically all English translations of 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān' omit the Introduction with which Ibn Ṭufayl had prefaced his work. A. S. Fulton is frank enough to admit that he, following the example of earlier translations, had omitted the Introduction because it contained nothing of general interest.⁶ This admission is a sad reminder of the fate of Ibn Ṭufayl at the hands of his superficial admirers. Introduction is often the most vital part of the work of an author. It was more so in case of Ibn Ṭufayl who had chosen the indirect method of a story for communicating his philosophical views. His Introduction is really a great aid in understanding the main purpose behind the story and in determining the true character of his philosophy.⁷ But in the absence of this guiding light different critics and historians of philosophy have picked up this or that element from his philosophy which has struck them as most important.⁸

As pointed out earlier, the story-form of 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān' has also served to obscure the real meaning of Ibn Ṭufayl. Ibn Ṭufayl had made 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān' the mouth-piece of his philosophy. His philosophy does not come before us in its complete form at any stage. It grows, step by step, with the development of his hero. Sometimes the latter stages correct and modify the conclusions previously arrived at. One has to build up the whole philosophy with these scattered elements like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Moreover, the book 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān' is such that it does not yield its treasures at the first glance. It is to be read again and again to form a coherent and comprehensive view of its philosophical content.

However, 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān' has remained for several centuries the most popular book of Muslim Philosophy in the philosophical circles of Europe. No other work of Muslim philosophy, perhaps, has had so many translations and editions in various European languages as we find in case of this book.⁹

Another proof of the greatness of Ibn Ṭufayl as a thinker is supplied by the fact that Ibn Roshd, who is acknowledged to be the

greatest Muslim philosopher by most of the modern critics¹⁰ was a pupil of Ibn Ṭufayl.¹¹ It was Ibn Ṭufayl who had introduced Ibn Roshd to the court of Caliph Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf and had urged on him to write on Aristotle's works.

Ibn Ṭufayl deserves our attention for several reasons. His critical attitude and caution in accepting anything as true without sufficient evidence or sound logical reasoning, his avoidance of extreme points of view of different schools, his novel solutions of several problems of philosophy and the modern spirit of some of his ideas and views entitle him to be ranked among the pioneers of modern philosophy. We cannot go in further details here as these are the points which are to be discussed and substantiated at relevant places in this book.

It is, however, gratifying to note that recent times have seen an increasing interest in the philosophy of Ibn Ṭufayl, particularly among the 'Arab writers. Some books have recently appeared on Ibn Ṭufayl.¹² Some Encyclopædias and Histories of Muslim philosophy in 'Arabic have started paying greater attention to his life and work.¹⁴ But the treatment of his philosophy is still sketchy and brief. Many important aspects of his philosophy do not get as much light as they deserve.

In this book I have discussed several critical issues about Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy. I have tried to discuss his philosophy in relation to his period, in relation to his predecessors, and in relation to subsequent philosophical thought. I have further endeavoured to determine the true character of his philosophy and the exact nature of his contribution, which will enable the reader to assign him his due place in the history of human thought.

The book, however, does not claim finality. I have tried to be objective, but at places I have had to venture my own interpretation of facts. This interpretation may not be acceptable to some scholars, but I am sure it will stimulate them to further thinking on Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy. And if it does so the purpose of the book is served.

NOTES & REFERENCES

1. Ceylon has been selected as the scene of the story probably because, according to a religious tradition, the first man Adam is believed to have descended on earth at this place. Moreover, the 'equable and moderate temperature' of the place is utilized by the author for supporting the version of the spontaneous birth of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān through the interaction of natural elements. Cf. The History of 'Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān' (Simon Ockley's translation as revised by A. S. Fulton), pp. 39-42.
2. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages—Etienne Gilson. p. 217.
3. The History of 'Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān'—Translation by Simon Ockley (Revised) pp. 5, 18.
4. The Awakening of the Soul, (A translation of the selected portions of 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān') by Paul Bronnle, p. 12.
5. Avicenna, Scientist and Philosopher, ed. J. M. Wickens (1952), p. 23.
6. The History of 'Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān'—Translation by Simon Ockley (Revised) p. 37.
7. I have translated this Introduction in English and attached it to this book as an Appendix.
8. For instance, De Boer, in The History of Philosophy in Islam, and O' Leary, in Arabic Thought and its Place in History, and some other writers also have given central importance to the problem of the relation of Religion to Philosophy. No doubt, the concluding portion of 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān' suggests that. But after going through the Introduction one will hesitate to accept this point of view, as we shall discuss in Ch. IV of this book.
9. Some of the important translations and editions are mentioned below :—
 - (i) Hebrew translation and commentary by Moses of Narbonne, 14th century.
 - (ii) Latin version from Hebrew by Pico della Mirandola, 15th century.
 - (iii) Latin translation under the title 'Philosophus Autodidactus' by Edward Pocock Junior (with 'Arabic Text'), 1671.
 - (iv) Reprinted, 1700.
 - (v) First Dutch translation from Latin by J. Bouwmeester, (a friend of Spinoza), 1672.
 - (vi) Republished at Amsterdam, 1701.
 - (vii) Another issue with original 'Arabic Text and notes by the Orientalist, H. Reland, 1701.
 - (viii) English version by George Keith the Quaker, 1674.
 - (ix) Another English translation by George Ashwell, 1636.

- (x) Another English Translation from 'Arabic by Simon Ockley, 1708.
- (xi) Reprinted, 1711.
- (xii) Again reprinted, 1731.
- (xiii) The Life and Surprizing Adventures of Don Antonio de Trezzanio, (A Crusoe story paraphrased and modified from Ockley's version), anonymous, 1761.
- (xiv) The Awakening of the Soul (A translation of the selected portions of 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān') by Paul Bronnle, 1904.
- (xv) German translation from Latin by George Pritius, 1726.
- (xvi) German translation from 'Arabic by J. G. Eichhorn, 1783.
- (xvii) French translation with 'Arabic text by Leon Gauthier 1900.
- (xviii) Spanish translation by F. Pons Boigues, 1900.
- (xix) Russian translation by J. Kuzmin, 1920.
- (xx) Russian translation by Angel Gouxalex Palencia, 1936.

Note :—Besides these there have appeared two Urdu translations recently, one by the writer of these pages [1952] and the other by Dr. S. Mohd. Yusuf [1955].

10. Cf. (i) Arabic Thought and its Place in History—O' Leary, p. 252.
- (ii) History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages—Etienne Gilson, p. 217.
11. Cf. (i) ابن طفیل و قصہ حی بن یقظان (عربی) - عمر فروخ صفحہ ۳۱
- (ii) ابن رشد - محمد یونس فرنگی محل (اُردو) صفحہ ۴۹
12. تاریخ فلاسفۃ الاسلام تالیف محمد لطفی جمعہ (اُردو ترجمہ
از ڈاکٹر میرولی الدین) صفحہ ۱۷۴
13. Cf. (i) ابن طفیل و قصہ حی بن یقظان - عمر فروخ
- (ii) فلسفہ ابن طفیل - الکتور عبدالحلیم محمود
14. Cf. (i) اعلام الفلسفہ العربیہ
- (ii) تاریخ الفلسفہ عربیہ - حنا الفا خوری - خلیل الجر
- (iii) تاریخ فلاسفہ الاسلام - لطفی جمعہ
- (iv) دائرۃ المعارف الاسلامیہ
- (v) الفلسفہ فی المشرق - یوسف موسی

CHAPTER I

PERIOD OF IBN ṬUFAYL

I.—Significance of the Environment

The philosophy of an individual does not grow in a vacuum. It is organically related to his environment. The environment influences the philosopher in many ways. He imbibes the aims, ideals, and aspirations of his society. He often gives expression to the unconscious yearnings of his times. and above all, he faces the challenge of his age and tackles the unsolved problems of his society. Consider for a moment the Advaita Vedantism of Shankara¹, or Philosophy of Illumination of Suhrawardī Maqtūl.² Is it conceivable that these philosophies could have originated anywhere except the places of their birth? Even the self-taught solitary philosopher of Ibn Ṭufayl, Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān is not free from the influences of the society. He is represented to be completely isolated from the society. But is he really so? He is a creature of Ibn Ṭufayl's mind, and as such shares in his experiences, breathes in and takes inspiration from his environment. 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān would not have been what he is had Ibn Ṭufayl lived in any other country or in any other period of history. So, for true understanding and appreciation of the philosophy of 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān', which in fact is the philosophy of Ibn Ṭufayl himself, we must make a review of the period of Ibn Ṭufayl, and study the main trends and characteristics of the period.

To get the true historical perspective, we have to pick up the thread of narration a bit earlier. We have to begin with the Muslim rule in North Africa, which would supply the necessary background to Ibn Ṭufayl's period.

II.—The Muslim Rule in North Africa

The Berbers

Before 'Arb invasion, North Africa, west of the Nile valley, was occupied by the Berbers. These Berbers were an old race and had inhabited the land from the time of the earliest Pharaohs of Egypt.³ They were hardy and brave people like the desert men of 'Arabia. Their language also bore close affinities with semitic languages. This has led some writers to infer that the 'Arabs and the Berbers were perhaps derived from the same common stock—the neolithic race. The two wings of

the race, eastern and the western, were segregated from one another and developed their peculiar characteristics. The Berbers were very conservative people and, inspite of their passing contacts with different civilizations, they had retained much of their original character.

The 'Arab conquest of North Africa in 665 A.D. brought the two wings together—one infused with the dynamic force of Islam, and the other retaining the unsophisticated culture and vitality of an old race. At the time of the 'Arab invasion the Berbers were under the nominal control of the Byzantine Empire. So the 'Arabs had to face the Greek army which they easily defeated. But after the conquest, when they tried to settle down in the country, the inter-action between the 'Arabs and the Berbers was inevitable. At first, there were revolts and conflicts. Some new Berber states came into being as a defence against the 'Arab rule. But gradually their resistance gave way and they began to embrace Islam in large numbers.

When an unsophisticated social group is converted to a new faith we usually find two important phenomena. In the first place, the new faith gives them an enthusiasm and orthodoxy which moulds their lives into a rigid discipline. Secondly, some of the old ideas and practices still survive but they are given a new complexion and orientation in the light of the new beliefs. The same happened to the Berbers after their conversion to Islam. Two characteristics were most prominently exhibited by them—a very orthodox and puritan attitude towards religion, and a superstitious reverence for saints.⁴ This attitude of reverence made them absolutely submissive to their leaders who appeared before them as saints or religious reformers. The very term 'Murābiṭ' lends support to our statement. It is commonly used for saints in Morocco. But it literally means "those who serve in frontier forts or Ribāṭ." The two apparently divergent meanings of the term are explained by the fact that the soldiers and officers who served in those forts used to be a strange combination of military valour and religious piety.⁵

O'Leary mentions another interesting trait of the Berbers that they offered refuge and welcome to every lost cause of Islam, so that every heretical sect and every defeated dynasty made its last stand there.⁶ He attributes this fact to their dissatisfaction and aversion against the 'Arab rulers. But this explanation seems to be unconvincing. Had there been any real hostility or aversion against the 'Arabs it would have expressed itself against Islam. The case of Persia provides a clear illustration of this truth. Reaction against the 'Arabs led them to hate everything connected with the 'Arabs, and gave rise to a movement of revivalism—taking pride in everything belonging to pre-Islamic

Persia. This attitude has been most forcefully expressed by Firdausi⁷, in his *Shāhnāmāh*, in the reply of the Persian king Yazdgurd to the 'Arab messenger.⁸ But the case of the Berbers is different. Their devotion to Islam is beyond question. They were staunch supporters of the cause of Islam, as they understood it. It was their zeal for Islam, combined with their credulous and dynamic character that made them give shelter to the new movements and new sects of Islam. Whenever any leader worked on their religious sentiments and appealed to them in the name of Islam their response was direct and uninhibited.

There were occasional frictions and jealousies also between the 'Arabs and the Berbers but when they combined in a concerted action against their common foes they became irresistible. The conquest of Spain in early 8th century A.D. was the work of the joint army of the 'Arabs and the Berbers. Thus Andalusia became a district attached to the kingdom of Ifrikiya.⁹

The next few centuries witnessed further interaction between the 'Arabs and the Berbers, both at the cultural and the political levels. Sometimes, due to petty conflicts and tribal jealousies, a number of small states sprang up. Sometimes, the powerful hand of a reformer or a dynamic leader united them into a single power. The names of Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn and Ibn Tumart furnish conspicuous illustrations of such dynamic leadership.

With this brief introduction let us now proceed to consider various Muslim dynasties that ruled over Spain. The first important dynasty were the Umayyads of Spain.

III. The Umayyads of Spain

After the fall of the Umayyads in Syria (750 A.D.), an ambitious member of the dynasty,¹⁰ 'Abd al-Raḥmān (731-788 A.D.) ibn Mu'āwiyah b. Hishām came to Spain and, with his courage and military genius, established his independent power in Spain, with its seat of government at Cordova¹¹. It reached its zenith under 'Abd al-Raḥmān III (912-961 A.D.), who was first to declare himself as an independent Caliph. 'Abd al-Raḥmān III was succeeded by his son al-Ḥakam II (961-976 A.D.). For sometime the Umayyads ruled Spain with remarkable vigour and magnificence. Their rule was characterized by great progress and prosperity. But with the lapse of time the dynasty had spent up its force and vitality. The wealth, prosperity and luxury undermined the sturdiness of the 'Arab character. Internal conflicts and factions weakened their power. The whole of Andalusia was split up into a number of independent principalities¹². The Christian powers took advantage of the situation and their frequent attacks added to the confusion and

anarchy that was already prevailing. At last, Mu'tamid, the king of Seville, along with other Muslim princes, made a joint appeal to the king of Morocco, Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn, to defend them against the tide of Christian conquests. Yūsuf came to their rescue but, finding them too weak to stand on their own legs, established his own power in Spain. Thus the glorious dynasty of the Umayyads of Spain came to an end. They were succeeded by the Murābiṭs whom we shall consider in another section.

IV.—Characteristics of the Umayyad Period

The Umayyad rule in Spain lasted for more than two hundred fifty years. It was a period marked by highest material and intellectual civilization. The Umayyad rulers were very refined and cultured men. They exhibited most of those characteristics which were found among their counterparts in Asia, at the time of their zenith. They were brave, tolerant, and great patrons of Art and learning. They patronized literary arts and poetry and employed Greek artists and architects. They also appointed Christians and Jews on high posts. With all this liberal attitude they were firm in their religious faith. Through pilgrimages they kept contact with the East and looked towards their brethren in the East for guidance in religious matters. They accepted the Qur'an, the ḥadīth and the Islamic jurisprudence as it was being developed in the East.

It is true, they did not show much taste for philosophy. They did not take any interest in Greek learning and Greek philosophy. The period did not produce any great philosopher amongst the Muslims. But it was not due to any official ban on philosophy. Several other factors were responsible for it. In the first place, the rigid orthodoxy of the period was the main reason. The Spanish Muslims were mainly interested in the study of the Qur'an, the traditions of the Prophet, and the canon law. The masses looked at philosophy with suspicion. The rigid orthodoxy and conservatism of the period are reflected in the works of the famous theologian, Ibn Ḥazm.¹³ He was an adherent of the school of Dā'ūd az-Zāhirī¹⁴ in canon law. He believed in taking the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet in the strictest and most literal sense, and rejected the principles of analogy¹⁵ and *taqlīd*¹⁶ altogether. He recommended that every man should study the Qur'an and the traditions for himself. In theology he was opposed to anthropomorphism and subscribed to the 'Asharite doctrine of Mukhalafa—the doctrine that emphasizes the difference of God from all created things, so that no human attributes can be applied to God in the same sense.

Ibn Ḥazm was a great scholar and a sharp controvertialist. He criticized the schools of the 'Asharites and the Mu'tazilites both. He had earned great fame during his own life time. According to the statement of Dozy he was "the most learned man of his age" and "the most fertile writer that Spain has produced."¹⁷ But D. B. Macdonald calls him "an impossible man, belonging to an impossible school" and "a hopeless crank."¹⁸ One finds it difficult to reconcile these two divergent opinions with one another. We should not, however, forget that Ibn Ḥazm belonged to another age and we should not judge him by our modern standards. Ibn Ḥazm was very much the product of his age and, with all his learning and scholarship, he represented his age in its orthodoxy as well. It was this orthodoxy of the period that did not permit open reception to philosophy among the Muslims. Ibn Masarraḥ of Cordova was the only exception. But he too had to suffer his writings being consigned to flames. Moreover, finding the city-life uncongenial to his philosophical temperament, he had to retire with his pupils to the solitude of the mountains, and for this reason he was called al-Jabalī (the man of mountains).¹⁹ This state of affairs was not due to the narrow-mindedness of the rulers. Some of the Umayyad Caliphs were great scholars. With regard to Ḥakam Dozy is of the opinion that "so learned a prince had never reigned in Spain."²⁰ The same author tells us further that Ḥakam used to have his agents at Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, etc., who copied or bought for him ancient and modern manuscripts at any costs. The catalogue of the library of the Caliph occupied fortyfour volumes and all these volumes had been read by Ḥakam, and most of them had been annotated by him. Often, the books composed in Persia and Syria reached him through his agents before they were read by the scholars in the East. The University of Cordova, which was patronized and maintained by Ḥakam, was the most renowned Institution in the world at that time.²¹ It attracted students, Christians, Jews and Muslims, not only from Spain but also from various parts of Europe, Africa and Asia.²² Compare with this picture the picture of Spain that we get during the days of Ibn Abī 'Amir.²³ When Ibn Abī 'Amir ascended to power and became the minister, he summoned the distinguished divines of his time to the Library of Ḥakam and asked them to destroy all the books on Philosophy, Astronomy and other sciences that were obnoxious in their opinion.²⁴ And this he did just to win the orthodox public opinion on his side, although he was himself a learned scholar inclined to philosophy. He promoted 'Arab culture and civilization in Spain and encouraged the development of various sciences. Historians, scholars and poets used

to accompany him on his expeditions and Abī 'Amir used to attend their discussions and discourses. He himself was a distinguished poet and had written a valuable work on "Arabic Literature." He was even inclined to philosophy and patronized philosophers. But he earned the displeasure of 'Ulemā and *Fuqahā* on account of his unscrupulous means in gaining power. He got his name included in the *Kluṭbah* along with that of the Caliph and ultimately assumed the title of al-Manṣūr billāh. There was a plot to assassinate him. It did not succeed but Ibn Abī 'Amir got the warning and realized the popular feeling and the resentment of the religious class against him. So, to win them over to his side, he got the secular books of al-Ḥakam's Library burnt under his orders.

There was such a hold of religion on Spanish Muslims that parties contesting for political power often used to seek verdict (*fatwa*) from theologians in support of their claims and actions. An interesting illustration is to be found in the *fatwa* issued by several theologians urging on Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn to intervene in the affairs of Andalusia.²⁵ Similar *fatwas* used to be issued by theologians condemning certain books that were not to their taste. When Al-Ghazālī's book «أحياء العلوم الدين» reached Spain the Qādī of Cordova, Ibn Ḥamdīn declared that any man who read Al-Ghazālī's book was an infidel ripe for damnation²⁶

In short, we find two conflicting trends in Spain of the Umayyad period. On the one hand, there was great patronage of learning on the part of the rulers who were themselves great scholars; on the other hand, the masses were extremely orthodox in matters of religion, and the religious scholars and theologians had great hold on them. So the rulers were often obliged to seek their favour by persecuting the philosophers and the so called free thinkers.

V. The Murābiṭs

We have seen how Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn, the king of Morocco, came to help the declining Muslim states of Spain and finally established his power. Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn was the 1st ruler of the Murābiṭ dynasty in Spain.

The term Murābiṭ, as mentioned before, was used for saints in Morocco. Its application was extended to the rulers of the dynasty²⁷ that we are considering now, as they were staunchly religious people and represented a movement of religious revival which had also brought political unity and power in its wake. Yaḥyā b. Ibrāhīm of the clan of Jidāla, a branch of great Berber tribe of Latuna, was the leader of this new movement.²⁸ He went on a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1036 A. D. On his return journey he stopped at Qairawan,²⁹

The Muwaḥḥids, like the Murābiṭs, were of Berber origin. They too were connected with a movement of religious revival, started by Ibn Tumart. The very name of the dynasty, Muwaḥḥids meaning Unitarians, suggests a religious connotation. The dynasty derived its name from the founder, Ibn Tumart, who used to call himself Al-Muwaḥḥid.³⁶

Ibn Tumart (1073-1130 A.D.),³⁷ the founder of the dynasty, is a most interesting figure. O'Leary describes him as "a strange combination of fanatic and scholastic."³⁸ No doubt, he was a learned scholar, imbued with a religious zeal for reform. He wrote a number of books including one on Tawḥīd and the other "Kānz al-'Ulūm" dealing with religious philosophy.³⁹ He was a man of firm determination who minded no risks and shirked no obstacles in seeking his goal. He, like all great leaders and reformers, understood the psychology of men around him, particularly the masses, and inspired them with awe and reverence. He was an ambitious man too. Even when his condition was no better than that of an ordinary mendicant, he used to dream of kingdoms and thrones. A man with such strangeness could be either a lunatic (of the paranoid type) or an inspired person. But the lunatics do not found kingdoms and do not revolutionize societies. However, let us have some more details about his career.

Ibn Tumart was a native of Morocco. His real name, according to Ibn Khaldūn,⁴⁰ was Amghār, which in Berber means 'Chief'. Ibn Tumart, in the same language, means son of "Omar the Little". He had derived this name from his father who was known by the name of Tumart.⁴¹ His full name, however, was Abū 'Abdullah M. Ibn Tumart.⁴² He was a descendant of 'Alī, the 4th Caliph of Islam and the son-in-law of the Prophet. He also claimed to be a Mahdī. According to certain traditions of the Prophet, a Mahdī (the rightly guided one) will come to the rescue of Islam when it is faced with a crisis. Some critics have doubted the authenticity of this tradition. However, the concept has been a source of inspiration to many and there have been several claimants of the title of Mahdī in the history of Islam. The Shī'ite sect attaches a particular significance to the concept. According to them, Mahdī is the name of the twelfth Infallible Imām who has already been born and will make his appearance at the proper time. This has led O'Leary to suppose that Ibn Tumart introduced shī'ite ideas into Morocco. But, as we have said earlier, the concept of Mahdī has no exclusive connection with the Shī'ite doctrines. The religious doctrines of Al-Muwaḥḥids give a lie to it. Moreover, the fact that Ibn Tumart was a pupil of Al-Ghazālī and a follower of Ibn

Ḥazm and Da'ūd az-Zāhirī clearly indicates that he could not be a Shī'īte.

Ibn Tumart was a follower of Ibn Ḥazm in canon law. This explains the rigid orthodoxy of his views. There is also great resemblance between several doctrines of his sect and those of Ibn Ḥazm.

Ibn Tumart made extensive travels in Asia and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. During these travels he came under the influence of Al-Ghazālī. It is said that he met Al-Ghazālī at Damascus and shared his retreat, for some time, in the mosque of the Umayyads.⁴³ Then, on his second visit to Syria he attended the lectures of Al-Ghazālī at the Nizāmiyya, in Baghdad.⁴⁴ An interesting episode of this period has been recorded by some writers.⁴⁵ One day, when Al-Ghazālī was taking his class, the news reached him that the Murābiṭ king, 'Alī bin Tāshfīn, had ordered his books to be destroyed. This enraged Al-Ghazālī and he foretold that his (i.e. 'Alī's) power would be destroyed and overthrown by one who was present among his audience. This seems to have given Ibn Tumart new hope and enthusiasm. He longed and prayed to God that he may be chosen to fulfil this mission. We are not concerned with the super-natural aspect of this version, but it gives support to the fact of Ibn Tumart's meeting with Al-Ghazālī, and his being a pupil of Al-Ghazālī. Rene Basset, however, holds the view that Ibn Tumart and Al-Ghazālī had never met.⁴⁶ We do not find sufficient grounds to doubt the evidence of two earlier historians—Al-Marrakushī and Subkī. Moreover, the fact that Ibn Tumart shows deep influence of Al-Ghazālī in his life and work reinforces our presumption. As D.B. Macdonald points out, Ibn Tumart worked for the same revival of faith and religious life in the West which Al-Ghazālī aimed at in the East.⁴⁷ Further, it was he who was responsible for introducing the orthodox scholasticism of Al-Ghazālī to the West.⁴⁸

Ediogn Hole represents Ibn Tumart as a clever and deceitful man, and tells us that once he entered into a plot with a man named Wansherishi. Wansherishi, for some time, posed as a silly and idiotic fellow. Then one day he came forward with a learned discourse on the Qur'an and connected subjects. This change he explained by telling the people that an angel had washed his heart and filled it with gnosis. According to Hole, this 'miracle' was brought about to give support to the waning influence of Ibn Tumart.⁴⁹ But this estimate is in flat contradiction with other reports about his character. Margaret Smith tells us that since a very young age he was renowned for his piety.⁵⁰ Moreover, his ascetic life and orthodoxy cannot be reconciled with the above-mentioned charge. The fact seems to be that very often superstitious stories

gather round such spiritual leaders. Some such story seems to have been interpreted by Hole as the deceitful working out of a miracle by Ibn Tumart.

Ibn Tumart showed great zeal for *نهى عن المنكر* and *أمر بالمعروف*.⁵¹ There are several episodes of his life telling us how he was put to great troubles on account of this habit.⁵² At Mecca he was roughly treated for his blunt attempts at reform. His cynical ways and puritanical criticism of people made him unpopular in Egypt. Once, on a sea voyage, he tried to force his reforms on the crew. They were unsporting enough to throw him into the sea, but, fearing some spiritual consequences of their profanity, they took him back into the ship. At Mahdiya he was staying in a wayside mosque. As the mosque was situated on a thoroughfare all sorts of people used to pass that way. This gave Ibn Tumart ample opportunities for the exercise of his mission. Whenever a man with a musical instrument or a jar of wine passed before him he would pounce upon him and smash the offensive article. This won him many enemies among the rich but the masses held him in great esteem. When the complaints against his high-handedness reached Amīr Yaḥyā he did not consider it wise to take any action against Ibn Tumart. So the Amīr called him, showed all respect to him and politely asked him to leave that place. He moved to Bijaiya in Algeria but was soon forced to leave that place too. His next refuge was Mellala. It was here that he met a young man of Berber origin, named ‘Abd al-Mumin who was proceeding to the East, in search of knowledge. Ibn Tumart’s superior insight told him that he was the right man for carrying out his mission. He invited him to work for his mission, promising honour and greatness of both the worlds as a reward. The youth agreed and from that time onward the two worked together.⁵³

It was the time when the Murābiṭ dynasty had lost its original puritanism. Luxury and wealth had undermined their vitality. The royal family of Morocco often indulged in practices which did not fully conform to Islamic law. This gave Ibn Tumart an opportunity of making himself un-welcome to the Amīr. But he had won such prestige and reverence among the masses that even the Amīr hesitated to do him any harm. One day, Ibn Tumart forced his way through the guards and took his seat upon the throne that was laid to receive the Amīr. Neither the Amīr, nor the guards had the courage to interfere with him in public. However, he was privately asked to leave the city. Ibn Tumart moved to Fez but after some time returned to Morocco. This time he had a more serious adventure. Sāra, the sister of the

Amīr 'Alī, was in the habit of riding in public without a veil. Ibn Tumart saw her one day in that unconventional state, pulled her off the horse and showered abuses at her for her deviating from the established custom. He even went so far as to insult and rebuke the Amīr in the mosque.⁵⁴ This was an open clash with the royal family. He thought it wise to escape to Tinamel and there raised the banner of revolt against the Murābiṭs. Ibn Tumart could not live to see the successful termination of this rebellion. He was killed in a battle. But his pupil and successor 'Abd al-Mumin succeeded in translating his dreams into reality, by seizing the whole empire of the Murābiṭs. Thus came into power the new dynasty of the Muwahhids. Their rule lasted from 1146 to 1268 A. D.

We have traced the life history of Ibn Tumart at some length because it was his character and personality that determined, to a large extent, the character of the dynasty. 'Abd al-Mumin (1130-1163 A. D.)' who succeeded Ibn Tumart, was a product of his teachings and an embodiment of his aspirations and ideals. His rule lasted for thirty three years, from 1130 to 1163 A. D. Most of his time, however, was spent in brilliant campaigns, wresting power from the states into which the Murābiṭ power was split up. He was succeeded by his son Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf (1163-1184 A. D.). Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf inherited from his father a vast empire, spreading over North Africa (from Atlantic coast to Egypt) and including a large part of southern Spain. The Murābiṭ rulers owed nominal allegiance to the Eastern Caliphs, but Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf assumed independent power under the title of the Commander of the Faithful.⁵⁵ He had inherited all the good qualities of his brave father, of which he gave a good account in many battles against the Christian powers that were trying to menace Muslim Spain from time to time.

In 1184 A. D. he made preparations for a decisive battle against the Christians. He laid the siege of Santarem and sent a formidable fleet to attack Lisbon. But his plans could not materialize, as he was wounded at the siege of Santarem, and a month later died on his way back to Seville. His body was taken to Tinamel in North Africa and was buried by the side of 'Abd al-Mumin and Ibn Tumart.

He was succeeded by his son, Abū Yūsuf al-Manṣūr (1184-1199 A. D.) who was a brave soldier and a patron of learning and philosophy, like his father. The period of Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf and Abū Yūsuf al-Manṣūr was the golden age of Spain from the point of view of philosophical development.⁵⁶ Our philosopher Ibn Ṭufayl, and Ibn Roshd belonged to this period and their careers were connected with the courts

of these two patrons of learning. But it was their private and personal hobby to encourage philosophy and to participate in philosophical discussions. Their public administration was strictly based on the Qur'an and the Shari'a. The Muwaḥḥid rule lasted for about a century and a half. The Christian attacks and internal dissensions soon completed their downfall. With the fall of Morocco in 1269 A.D. the dynasty came to its final end.

VIII—Characteristics of the Muwaḥḥid Rule

In dealing with the life history of Ibn Tumart we have already anticipated several characteristics of the rule of the Muwaḥḥid dynasty. The dynasty was of Berber origin, and so its rulers showed all those dynamic qualities which characterized the Berber race. They were deeply religious also, like the early Murābiṭs. They too were the product of a religious revival and their personalities carried on them the stamp of the most dynamic figure of the leader of the movement viz. Ibn Tumart. Their rule was consciously based on a religious doctrine which demanded a pure conception of Tawḥīd (Unity of God) purged of all anthropomorphic elements, and strict conformity to the Qur'anic principles and the traditions of the Prophet. They based the Muhammadan Law on these and not on limited human reasoning. These principles were laid down by Ibn Tumart and they clearly revealed the influence of Ibn Ḥazm and Da'ūd az-Zāhirī on his religious doctrines. Ibn Tumart had also been a pupil of Al-Ghazālī and his followers also showed some influence of Al-Ghazālī's philosophy and his orthodox religious outlook.

As we have seen before, some of these Muwaḥḥid rulers were great patrons of learning and philosophy and some of them were great scholars themselves. The two traits of their personality—their orthodoxy and love of learning and philosophy—had found a compromise. In their private capacity they enjoyed the company of philosophers, presided over their discussions and took delight in philosophical speculation. But discharging their duties as the Heads of a Muslim state they did not want to budge an inch from the orthodox way. This, however, did not prevent them from appointing philosophers on high positions, showering favours on them, and consulting them in all important matters. The philosophers themselves had accepted the situation willingly or unwillingly. They were content with the position that philosophy is the privilege of the chosen few. They enjoyed perfect freedom to speculate. But the masses were not to be initiated into its secrets, and their simple faith and discipline was not to be disturbed.

The favours and prestige enjoyed by Ibn Ṭufayl at the court of Abū Ya'qūb of Spain are a clear indication of the philosophical interests of the Muwaḥḥid Caliphs. The facts about the first interview of Ibn Roshd with the Caliph, Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf, as given by 'Abd al-Wāhid al-Marrākushī⁵⁷, throw great light on the scholarship and philosophical attainments of the Caliph. When Ibn Ṭufayl introduced Ibn Roshd to the Caliph, the first question that the Caliph put to Ibn Roshd, after the preliminary formalities, was, "What is the nature of Heavens according to the philosophers? Do they take it to be eternal or created?" Ibn Roshd was a little embarrassed at this question. He feared lest his reply should go against the susceptibilities and the bias of the Caliph. Then the Caliph, addressing Ibn Ṭufayl, began to discuss the question himself. First he mentioned the views of Plato, Aristotle and other philosophers and then stated the criticism put forward by Muslim philosophers against these views. He showed such depth of knowledge and mastery of details that surprised Ibn Roshd. Ibn Roshd, encouraged by this jesture of Caliph, also participated in the discussion. The Caliph was impressed by Ibn Roshd and gave him a robe of honour and a horse. From that time onward, Ibn Roshd also enjoyed the favours and the patronage of the Muwaḥḥid Caliph. But when the frank and bold expression of his philosophical views came in clash with their religious policy the Caliph Abū Yūsuf al-Manṣūr did not hesitate to dethrone him from his place of honour.⁵⁸

These two trends seem to characterize the whole history of Muslim rule in Spain. The patronage of philosophy and religious orthodoxy coexisted. The rulers generally were much fond of philosophy but at the same time they were very strict and firm in their religious faith and administrative policy. Even when some of them were not so strict the regard for public sentiments forced them to curb the freedom of philosophers. The masses in Spain mostly consisted of the Berbers and the 'Arabs. They were unsophisticated people of simple faith and looked at philosophy and the philosophers with suspicion. The philosophers who occupied high positions because of their talents had often their enemies and rivals among the influential class. These men often exploited the public sentiments and made them demand the downfall of a certain philosopher or philosophers. And the rulers had often to bow before the verdict of public opinion.


It was this socio-cultural or religio-political environment in which Ibn Ṭufayl lived and compiled his work 'Ḥayy b. Yaqzān.' With this background in view, it is not difficult to guess why he chose the form of a story for the expression of his views. It also explains his extreme caution and moderation in handling the delicate problems of philosophy. The problem of the relation of Religion to Philosophy was the most

thorny problem of the period, which offered a challenge to the philosopher. Ibn Ṭufayl accepted the challenge and offered a solution of that problem, which perhaps moulded the policy of the government and influenced the subsequent philosophical thought as well, as we shall discuss in our last chapter.

Let us now proceed to the narration of the life history of Ibn Ṭufayl.

NOTES & REFERENCES

1. Cf. Indian Philosophy—Radha Kṛishnan.
2. Cf. Development of Metaphysics in Persia—Mohd. Iqbal.
3. O'Leary, p. 226.
4. See the article on Belief in Spirits in Morocco by Dr. Wastermarck (*Humaniora* I (i)—Abo, Finland, 1920). Also, *Le Culte der Saints Musulmans dans l'Afrique du nord* (Geneva, 1905), by Dr. Montel.
5. O'Leary, p. 229.
For further details see *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, I, 318-320.
6. O'Leary, p. 230.
7. Firdausī (920-1035 A.D.) was a Persian poet who flourished in the reign of Maḥmūd of Ghazna.
8. زشیر شتر خوردن وسو سمار
عرب را بجائے رسیدست کار
که تخت کیان را کنند آرزو
تغویرتواے چرخ گردان تفو
(شاه نامہ فردوسی)
9. Ifrikiya was the name given to the province lying next to Egypt. West of it lay Maghrib which was divided into two parts, Central Maghrib and Further Maghrib. Further Maghrib spread to the Atlantic coast.
10. It is said that the uncle of 'Abd al-Raḥmān, Maslamah b. 'Abd al-Malik, had predicted about his future greatness. Since then he entertained an earnest desire to become a ruler Cf. *A Political History of Muslim Spain* by S. M. Imamuddin, p. 34.
11. 'Abd al-Raḥmān was declared Amīr in 756 A. D., when *Khuṭbah* was read in his name at Archidona, the capital of Regio.
12. For further details see 'A Political History of Muslim Spain' by S. M. Imamuddin.
13. Abū Muḥammad 'Alī b. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm (998-1063 A.D.) belonged to a Spanish family of converts. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. VII. (1955).
14. Da'ūd az-Zāhirī—was born in Kūfa (815 or 817 A.D.) of a Persian family, and died in Baghdād in 883 A. D. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. IV. See also *Biography of Da'ūd (Ṭabaqāt)* by al-Subkī.



15. In the absence of a clear injunction about a particular situation, to draw inference from a somewhat similar case about which there is a clear verdict.
16. Following authority or accepting the dictum of a recognized and authentic teacher.
17. Spanish Islam by Reinhart Dozy (Eng. Tr. by Griffin Stokes), p. 577.
18. The Development of Muslim Theology and Jurisprudence by D. B. Macdonald, p. 110.
19. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. IX, the article, "Muslim Philosophy in the West," p. 888.
20. Spanish Islam—Dozy, p. 454.
21. Spanish Islam—Dozy, pp. 454, 455.
22. History of the 'Arabs—Hitti, p. 530.
23. Ibn Abī 'Amir was born about 942 A.D. He rose to power from a low status, with his own efforts. After the death of al-Ḥakam II, about 977 A. D., his power reached its zenith and the Caliph Hishām II, who was only an inexperienced boy, was a puppet in his hands. He died in 1002, at the age of sixty one.
24. Spanish Islam—Dozy, pp. 490, 491.
25. Just to give some idea of the *fetwa* we may reproduce its concluding words, which ran as follows : "We take it upon ourselves to answer before God for this decision. If we err, we consent to pay penalty in another world, and we declare that you, Amīr of the Muslims, are not responsible therefor; but we firmly believe that the Andalusian princes, if you leave them in peace, will deliver our land to the infidels, and in that case you must account to God for your inaction." Spanish Islam—Dozy, p. 712.
26. Ibid p. 712.
27. The Murābiṭs were also called Mulaththamīn (the people of the veil) as they belonged to a tribe which used to wear litham (veil) to protect themselves against the burning sands of the desert. See 'The Political History of Muslim Spain' by Imamuddin, and also 'People of the Veil' by Lord Rennel of Rodd.
28. Cf. A Political History of Muslim Spain by S. M. Imamuddin, p. 156.
29. Qairawan was the first city founded by the 'Arab settlers after their conquest of North Africa in 665 A.D.
30. Abū 'Imrān was a pious Muslim and a Mālikite Professor of Law.
31. Cf. Histoire des Berbers et des dynasties musulmanes de l' Afrique Septentrionale (Paris).
32. O'Leary, p. 234.
33. خلافت موحدین—عبدالواحد المراكشی صفحہ ۱۷۶

34. Cf. ابن رشد و فلسفة — فرح الطون صفحه ١٥
تاريخ فلاسفته الاسلام — لطفى جمعه صفحات ١٨٩-٢٠٥
35. O'Leary, pp. 240, 241.
36. Al-Ghazālī, the Mystic—Margaret Smith, p. 64.
37. Some historians give his date of birth as 1078 A.D. Cf. The Political History of Muslim Spain by Imamuddin.
38. O'Leary, p. 246.
39. Al-Ghazālī, the Mystic by Margaret Smith, p. 64.
40. Cf. History of Berbers by Ibn Khaldūn (French translation).
41. Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. II, p. 425.
42. Al-Ghazālī, the Mystic by Margaret Smith, p. 63.
43. Al-Ghazālī, the Mystic—Margaret Smith, p. 63. (See also Ṭabaqāt-Subkī, p. 26).
44. Ibid p. 63.
45. Cf. (i) خلافت موحدین — عبدالواحد المراكشى صفحه ١٧٦
(ii) Al-Ghazālī, the Mystic—Margaret Smith, pp. 63, 64.
46. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Article on Ibn Tumart.
47. J. A. O. S. (1899) D. B. Macdonald, p. 113.
48. O'Leary, p. 247.
49. Andalus, Spain under the Muslims—Ediogn Hole, pp. 26, 27.
50. Al-Ghazālī, the Mystic—Margaret Smith, p. 63.
51. Ordering the people to do the right, and prohibiting them from doing the wrong. The Qur'an enjoins upon every Muslim to perform these two duties.
52. O'Leary, pp. 247, 248.
53. خلافت موحدین — عبدالواحد المراكشى صفحه ١٧٨
54. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. VII. Also see Tārīkh al-Daulatāin by Al-Zarkashī and Kitāb al-Mu'jib by 'Abd-al-Wāhid al-Marrākushī.
55. The Commander of the Faithful (اميرالمومنين) was the title reserved for the Caliphs.
56. O'Leary, p. 250.
57. خلافت موحدین — عبدالواحد المراكشى صفحه ٢٣٩
58. تاريخ فلاسفته الاسلام — لطفى جمعه صفحات ١٨٩-٢٠٥

CHAPTER II

LIFE OF IBN ṬUFAYL

The full name of Ibn Ṭufayl was Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Ṭufayl al-Qaisī. He was an 'Arab by origin and had descended from the famous 'Arab tribe of Qais, as the last part of his name indicates. De Boer, however, tells us of another version of his name, i.e. Abū Ja'far in place of Abū Bakr.¹ This information is based on the M.S. in the British Museum (Tr. by Pocock). It is possible that the second name, Abū Ja'far may have been derived from the name of one of his sons. But we have no corroborative evidence for it. In any case, Ibn Ṭufayl is the more widely known name, and it is by this name that we will refer to him in these pages.

Ibn Ṭufayl was born at Wadi Ash, which is now known as Guadix, and is about forty miles North East of Granada. His date of birth is believed to be somewhere between 1100 and 1110 A.D. The details of his early life and education are not fully known. But it is certain that he absorbed all the scientific and philosophical knowledge available to that age. He made special studies of Medicine, Mathematics, Astronomy and Philosophy. He was also a poet and some of his poems have been preserved to us in some histories of the period.² According to the statement of Ibn Khaṭīb, Ibn Ṭufayl got his medical education at Granada.³ It has also been stated that he practiced medicine at Granada for some time.⁴

Nothing is known with certainty about his teachers. Al-Marrākuṣī represents him to be a pupil of Ibn Bājja.⁵ De Boer also accepts this version.⁶ They are led to this view perhaps by some apparent similarities in their philosophies or simply by the fact that Ibn Bājja was an elderly contemporary of Ibn Ṭufayl. But it appears that the holders of this view did not care to read the full text of Ibn Ṭufayl's book. In his Introduction, Ibn Ṭufayl has made some unfavourable comments on Ibn Bājja's philosophy and has unequivocally stated that he had never had an opportunity of meeting Ibn Bājja personally.

His official career bears testimony to his versatile genius. He first acted as Secretary to the Governor of Granada,⁷ and, according to one version, also acted as Governor of the place at some stage of his career.⁸ Then he became the Vazīr of Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf and also served as his Court Physician.⁹ But the French orientalist, Leon Gauthier doubts that Ibn Ṭufayl ever held the office of the vazīr.¹⁰ B. Carra de Vaux, supporting the point of view of Gauthier, relies on

the argument that Al-Bitrūdī, who was a pupil of Ibn Ṭufayl in astronomy, calls him Qāḍī.¹¹ But in the presence of more positive evidence of others the negative argument mentioned above does not deserve much credit. Much force of this argument is lost when we consider that very often a great personage is not referred to by his official designation among his intimates but by his more homely titles.

Ibn Ṭufayl, as the Grand Vazīr of the Caliph and also as his personal friend, had great influence over the Caliph. According to the statement of ‘Abd al-Wāḥid al-Marrākushī, Ibn Ṭufayl was so much loved by the Commander of the Faithful that he used to stay successive days and nights with him without leaving the place.¹² The Caliph used to pass most of his leisure time discussing different problems of philosophy with Ibn Ṭufayl.

Ibn Ṭufayl was a man of retiring nature, “more fond of books than of men.”¹³ He spent most of his time in the great library of Abū Ya‘qūb, which, according to some estimates, was nearly as big as the once famous library of Al-Ḥakam.

Ibn Ṭufayl used his influence with the Caliph in introducing and recommending men of learning to the favours of the Caliph. Once the Amīr expressed the wish to find some philosopher who could analyse and explain the works of Aristotle. Ibn Ṭufayl recommended Ibn Roshd for this purpose.¹⁴ This reflects not only the nobility of his soul but also his confidence in his own scholarship. A man of superficial learning will never recommend a real scholar to the favours of his patron.

In 1182 he resigned his post as Royal Physician due to old age, and was succeeded by Ibn Roshd.

After the death of Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf, his son Abū Yūsuf al-Manṣūr became the Caliph. He was also a great scholar and a great patron of learning.¹⁵ But he was even more orthodox and more strict in religious policy than his father. It is said that he had been guilty of some indiscretions in his youth. Moreover, for the safety of his empire he had to kill his uncle and cousin.¹⁶ Though he had repented afterwards yet these incidents had cast a gloom over his nature, and had resulted in making him more severe and harsh. The treatment that he meted out to Ibn Roshd is a sad page of Spanish history.¹⁷ However, Ibn Ṭufayl continued to enjoy Caliph’s favours and to hold his official position at the Court.

In 1185 Ibn Ṭufayl died at Morocco and was given a ceremonious burial. The Caliph himself attended the funeral.

Ibn Ṭufayl, no doubt, was a man of encyclopaedic learning. He was a many-sided genius. He had made extensive studies in literature and his style of writing showed great literary beauty and artistic

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qualities. According to the testimony of 'Omar Farrukh, in sweetness of expression and charm of diction his style resembles that of Al-Ghazālī.¹⁸ He was also distinguished for his knowledge of medicine, and according to the evidence of Ibn Kḥaṭīb, had written two books on medicine.¹⁹ Ibn Aṣība'a tells us, on the authority of Ibn Roshd, that Ibn Ṭufayl had written a book, *في البقع المسكونة والغير المسكونة* and had some special views about the heavenly bodies.²⁰ Ibn Ishāq Bitrūdji, who was a pupil of Ibn Ṭufayl and a specialist of Astronomy, informs us that his teacher Qāḍī Abū Bakr Ibn Ṭufayl had told him that he had discovered a new system to explain the movements of heavenly bodies and that system was different from and superior to that of Ptolemy. De Boer doubts the validity of this statement and interprets it as implying merely Ibn Ṭufayl's inclination to adhere closely to Aristotle rather than to Ptolemy.²¹ But the opinion of De Boer is merely based on his guess and is not supported by any reasons.

Ibn Ṭufayl's command of scientific knowledge is also an established fact. In tracing the development of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān he gives sufficient glimpses of his knowledge of Anatomy, Physics, Mathematics, Astronomy, Geography, etc. Some of his ideas are strikingly modern.²² But we will have occasion to say more about it in the last chapter.

The greatest contribution of Ibn Ṭufayl, however, is in the field of philosophy. It is rather surprising that a great philosopher like Ibn Ṭufayl should have left only one work, i. e., 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān' But Ibn Roshd, while discussing Aristotle's Logic, in his commentaries on Aristotle, states that Ibn Ṭufayl had also written a book on that subject.²³ George Sorton informs us that Ibn Ṭufayl had written a commentary on Aristotle's *كتاب الآثار العلوية*.²⁴ Al-Marrākushī speaks of another book of Ibn Ṭufayl on Soul, which he claims to have seen in Ibn Ṭufayl's own handwriting.²⁵ But 'Omar Farrukh is of the opinion that it must have been the very book 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān' that Al-Marrākushī had seen.²⁶ No doubt, Al-Marrākushī sometimes bases his opinions on insufficient or unreliable evidence. But in the present instance, he refers to his own personal observation. Moreover, he was not unfamiliar with 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān.' He refers to it elsewhere as a book "intended to explain the origin of human species."²⁷ It shows that he had read at least the first few pages of the book. So it is unlikely that, coming across the same book for the second time, he should take it for another book dealing with Soul. Al-Marrākushī also tells us that he had seen several works of Ibn Ṭufayl on Philosophy, Physics and Metaphysics, etc.²⁸

Ibn Ṭufayl had some correspondence with Ibn Roshd with regard to the latter's book *الكليات*.²⁹ But unfortunately, no work of Ibn

Ṭufayl, except Ḥayy b. Yaḡzān, is available to us. But even this one work is sufficient to give him an immortal place in the history of philosophy.

Ibn Ṭufayl's greatness as a scholar and a philosopher is also proved by the fact that an eminent thinker like Ibn Roshd was his pupil.³⁰ 'Omar Farrukh includes Abū Bakr Bundūd Bin Yaḡyā al-Qarṭabī also among his pupils.³¹ He bases his statement on the evidence of Al-Marrākushī.³² But Luṭfī Jum'a refers to Abū Bakr Bundūd as a pupil of Ibn Roshd.³³ His source of information is also the same i. e. 'Abd al-Wāḥid al-Marrākushī.³⁴

The second version, as given by Luṭfī Jum'a, seems to be more reliable to us, and the following considerations lead us to this view:

Abū Bakr Bundūd was distinguished for his knowledge of Theology and Islamic Jurisprudence. He had no fame for philosophy. So it is more likely that he might have been a pupil of Ibn Roshd who was an expert in these subjects also and held the office of Qāḍī of Cordova for a long time. There can be, however, another explanation which would resolve the apparent contradiction in the two versions. The words of Al-Marrākushī are as follows: "It was related to me by one of *his* pupils, the Jurist and Professor (العلامة) Abū Bakr Bundūd bin Yaḡyā Qarṭabī that he had heard the philosopher 'Abd al-Walīd, (i. e. Ibn Roshd) saying it on several occasions that....."³⁵ Now, the pronoun '*his*' which is shown in italics in the above quotation, may be taken to refer either to Ibn Ṭufayl or to Ibn Roshd. Al-Marrākushī might have had in his mind Ibn Roshd but 'Omar Farrukh understood it to imply Ibn Ṭufayl.

Another important pupil of Ibn Ṭufayl was Al-Bitrūdī, the famous specialist of Astronomy.³⁶ But he too was not a philosopher.

Ibn Ṭufayl was a pious man. But it is interesting to note how he has been sometimes mis-represented in the West. It has been stated that he gained something of a reputation for magic in the West.³⁷ It is another instance, like the miracle story about Ibn Tumart, of the legends woven round the figure of a great man. As Ibn Ṭufayl was a first class physician also, it is possible that some one might have described his cures as 'magical' and this mode of description was taken on its face value by some uncritical historian and found its way in a book like Columbia Encyclopaedia.

However, more reliable sources tell us that he was a man of calm and quiet nature. He had great revulsion against the masses. He liked seclusion and had become all the more seclusive towards the later period of his life. He did not possess the courage to face opposition or to

express his views openly before public. Inspite of his philosophical interests he was a pious man with a deeply religious personality.³⁸

Keeping in view these temperamental qualities and traits of Ibn Tufayl, and the characteristics of the period, it is not difficult to understand why he chose the medium of a story for the expression of his views.

NOTES & REFERENCES

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2. Cf. خلافت موحدین—عبدالواحد المراكشى صفحات ۲۳۸-۲۳۹
3. تاريخ فلاسفة الاسلام—لطفى جمعه صفحه ۱۳۳
4. The History of 'Ḥayy Ib. Yaqzān'—Translation by Simon Ockley (Revised), Introduction by A. S. Fulton, p. 10.
5. خلافت موحدین—عبدالواحد المراكشى صفحه ۲۳۷
6. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Article on Muslim Philosophy in the West by De Boer, p. 888.
7. تاريخ فلاسفة الاسلام—لطفى جمعه صفحه ۳۳
8. The History of Ḥayy b. Yaqzān—Translation by Simon Ockley (Revised), Introduction by A. S. Fulton, p. 10.
9. 'Arabic Thought and its place in History by O'Leary, p. 251.
10. Ibn Ṭufayl—Leon Gauthier, p. 6.
11. Encyclopaedia of Islam Vol. II, Article on Ibn Ṭufayl by B. Carra de Vaux.
12. خلافت موحدین—عبدالواحد المراكشى صفحه ۲۳۸
13. History of Philosophy in Islam by De Boer, p. 182,
14. تاريخ فلاسفة الاسلام—لطفى جمعه صفحه ۱۳۴
15. تاريخ فلاسفة الاسلام—لطفى جمعه صفحه ۱۸۴
16. تاريخ فلاسفة الاسلام—لطفى جمعه صفحات ۱۷۹-۱۸۰
17. تاريخ فلاسفة الاسلام—لطفى جمعه صفحات ۱۸۹-۱۹۰
18. بن طفيل وقصه حى بن يقظان—عمر فروخ صفحه ۳۸
19. تاريخ فلاسفة الاسلام—لطفى جمعه صفحه ۱۳۳
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23. ابن طفيل و قصه حى بن يقظان—عمر فروخ صفحات ۳۲-۳۳

24. Cf. History of Science—George Sorton.
25. Cf. كتاب المعجب—عبدالواحد المراكشى
26. ابن طفيل و قصه حى بن يقطان—عمر فروخ صفحه ٣٢
27. خلافت موحدين—عبدالواحد المراكشى صفحه ٢٣٧
28. خلافت موحدين—عبدالواحد المراكشى صفحه ٢٣٧
29. دائرة المعارف الاسلاميه—صفحه ٢١٣
30. Cf. (i) ابن طفيل و قصه حى بن يقطان—عمر فروخ صفحه ٣١
(ii) ابن رشد—محمد يونس فرنكى محلى صفحه ٤٩
31. ابن طفيل و قصه حى بن يقطان صفحات ٣١ - ٣٢
32. خلافت موحدين—عبدالواحد المراكشى صفحه ٢٣٩
33. تاريخ فلاسفة الاسلام—لطفى جمعه صفحه ١٧٣
34. Cf. كتاب المعجب—عبدالواحد المراكشى
35. خلافت موحدين—عبدالواحد المراكشى صفحه ٢٣٩
36. Cf. تاريخ فلاسفة الاسلام—لطفى جمعه
37. The Columbia Encyclopaedia ed. William Bridgwater and Elizabeth J. Sherwood, (1956) p. 941.
38. ابن طفيل و قصه حى بن يقطان—عمر فروخ صفحات ٣٧ - ٣٨

CHAPTER III

THE LIFE HISTORY OF ḤAYY BIN YAQẒĀN'

Ibn Ṭufayl offers two versions about the birth of 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān'. The first version is an attempt to rationally explain the spontaneous birth of a child, without father and mother, through the interaction of natural elements.¹ The second version gives the popular account of the birth in conformity with ordinary laws of nature.

I.—The Version of Spontaneous Birth of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān'

According to the first version, there is an island amongst the Indian islands, in Indian ocean, situated under the equinoctial.² This island enjoys the most equable and perfect temperature because it receives its light from the highest point in the heavens,³ and the sun shines over it vertically twice a year only. For the rest of the year it declines six months to the north and six months to the south, with the result that the place is neither too hot nor too cold.⁴

In this island, in a piece of low ground, some mass of earth got fermented in course of time.⁵ This fermented mass had a perfect equilibrium of heat, cold, moisture and dryness, so that none of them prevailed over the other.⁶ The middle part of this mass came nearest to the temper of human body and was fit to form the seminal humours.⁷ In short, all the elements which go to form the body of a human child were present. The most equable temperature of the place, the perfect equilibrium of heat, cold, moisture and dryness, the exact temperature of the fermented mass analogous to that of human body, all this resulted in the combination of these factors in the exact proportion and contributed to the formation of the body of a child, just as the fetus is formed and develops in mother's womb.

First, in the middle of the fermented mass, by reason of its viscousness, there arose a small bubble which was divided into two chambers by means of a thin partition, and was full of a spirituous and aerial substance. It had the most exact and perfect temperature imaginable.⁸ Then a soul⁹ was joined to it by the command of God.¹⁰ It was joined to it in such a way that it could hardly be separated from it even in thought. This soul continually emanates from God, just as the light flows from the sun and illumines the world.¹¹ This soul acts upon all creatures but its effects are more visible in some than in others.¹² It is just like the light of the sun falling on different bodies and illumining them according to their capacities.¹³

Now returning to our account. When the soul was joined to that receptacle all the faculties were subordinated to it by the command of God.¹⁴ Opposite to this receptacle there arose another bubble. It was divided into three chambers by thin membranes, with passages from one to other. It was also filled with an aerial substance which was somewhat finer than that of the first. A number of faculties were established in this receptacle also and they were all subordinated to the soul. These faculties were entrusted with the work of protecting the soul and communicating everything to it.¹⁵

Near these two bubbles there arose a third bubble which was filled with aerial substance somewhat grosser than that of the first two. It contained some other faculties which were also subordinated to the soul and were appointed to serve it.¹⁶

These three receptacles stood in need of one another. The first wanted the other two as its servants, and they wanted the assistance and guidance of the first as their Master.¹⁷

The first receptacle, because of the power and the flaming heat of the soul that was joined to it, was formed into a conical figure, like that of fire.¹⁸ This was the heart. The second was the brain and the third was the liver.¹⁹ As the heat found in the heart may result in the destruction and dissolution of humours it was necessary that there should be some organ to supply for this defect. This function was entrusted to liver.²⁰ The heart also needed some organ to inform it of what is useful and what is harmful for it, so that it may assimilate the former and repel the latter. This work was entrusted to the brain.²¹ The brain presided over all things relating to the sense and the liver dealt with all things pertaining to nutrition.²² Thus they served the heart and the heart supplied them heat to sustain them along with their faculties.²³ A number of ducts and passages, arteries and veins were established between them.²⁴ Similarly, muscles, bones, skin and other parts developed just as a fetus develops in the womb of the mother.²⁵

At last, when the child was complete in all his parts, the coverings of the mud burst asunder and the infant opened his eyes into this world.²⁶ Feeling hungry he cried for food, and a roe who had lost her fawn heard him and felt compassion for him. She suckled him and adopted him as her young one.²⁷

II.—Popular Version of the Birth of 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān'

According to the second version of the story, there was another vast island in the neighbourhood of the first island.²⁸ It was very fertile

and well-populated. A prince of proud and jealous disposition ruled over it. He had a sister gifted with exquisite beauty. He would not marry her to any one as he did not consider any one worthy of her hand.²⁹ At last, a relation of the prince, named Yaqqān, succeeded in winning her love, and married her privately in accordance with the customary rites. In course of time she gave birth to a child who was named 'Ḥayy b. Yaqqān', i. e. Ḥayy the son of Yaqqān.³⁰

The princess, being afraid of her proud and haughty brother, put the baby into an ark, closed it fast and, with the help of some of her servants and friends, set it afloat into the sea, in the darkness of night.³¹ She did it with a heavy heart, praying to God in these words :

"O God thou formedst this child out of nothing,³² and didst sustain him in the dark recesses of my womb, till he was complete in all his parts; I, fearing the cruelty of this proud and unjust king, commit him to thy goodness, hoping that thou who art infinitely merciful, will be pleased to protect him, and never leave him destitute of thy care."³³

As it was the time of a high tide the ark was carried by the waves to the other island, and was left there in a safe and sheltered place by subsiding waters.³⁴ The winds blew a heap of sand together between the ark and the sea so that he was safe from the dangers of a future tide.³⁵ The child, feeling hungry by now, began to cry. The cries were heard by a roe who had lost her fawn. She felt pity and tender affection for him. The nails and the timbers of the ark had already been loosened by the waves. The roe, with the help of her hoofs, opened it and suckled the child. From that moment onward she protected him and nourished him like a mother.³⁶

The rest of the story is common in both the versions and it is as follows :

III.—Early Development of Ḥayy

Ḥayy began to develop in the company of the deer and under the loving care of the roe. There was a good and abundant pasture in the island and there was no beast of prey. The roe had plenty of milk with which she maintained the little child.³⁷

The roe suckled him until he was two years old.³⁸ Now he could walk a little and began to breed his teeth.³⁹ The roe showed him the way to fruit trees and places of water. When the sun was hot she sheltered him, and when it was cold she warmed him with her body. When the night came she brought him back to his place.⁴⁰

When Hāyī heard the voice of any bird or beast he tried to imitate it and came very near it in his imitation. He could imitate the voices of the deer so perfectly that there was hardly any sensible difference. He could express himself exactly as they did under the stress of various wants and emotions.⁴¹ This helped him to develop such a close acquaintance with the wild beasts that they were not afraid of him, nor he of them.⁴²

By this time Hāyī began to develop the power of imagination and thinking. He could fix in his mind ideas of things when they were no more present to his senses. This led him to have desire for some of them and to have aversion against some others. Thus he passed from the stage of perception to that of concepts and conceptual thinking.⁴³

With the development of thinking he began to compare himself with other animals.⁴⁴ He found that they were swift and strong and were armed with such natural weapons as horns, teeth, hoofs, spurs and nails.⁴⁵ On the other hand, he was slow, weak and defenceless. It proved a great handicap to him in his contests with other animals. For instance, when there was a quarrel over gathering of fruits he could neither beat them off nor run away from them.⁴⁶

He also observed that his fellow fawns had smooth foreheads at first, yet horns grew on them, later on.⁴⁷ Similarly, they were weak in the beginning but became strong and swift afterwards. He eagerly waited for the same to happen to him, but he was disappointed⁴⁸

About the same time, the sense of shame began to emerge in Hāyī. He observed with grief and shame his own nakedness, while in other animals he found that they were mostly covered with hair, wool, feathers or tails.⁴⁹

All these handicaps pained him very much and he could not understand the reason of this difference.⁵⁰ By this time he was about seven years of age.

His intense feelings about these handicaps and need for self-preservation put him on the path of creative thinking and invention. He took some branches of a tree, removed the twigs and the leaves and made them smooth. Thus he made clubs for the purpose of attack and defence against wild animals.⁵¹ Similarly, he made two coverings with some broad leaves, one to wear on the front side, and the other to wear behind. He tied these coverings to his waist by means of a girdle made of the fibres of certain trees.⁵² This made him conscious of the superiority of his hands over the forelegs of animals.⁵³

He had compensated for his handicap but there was a difficulty. The leaves soon dried and dropped away. Thus he had to repair and

renew his coverings frequently.⁵⁴ He tried to find some better device. He thought of taking the tail of some dead animal and wearing it himself. But he found that all the beasts avoided the dead bodies of the fellow animals. He had the apprehension that it may be unsafe and harmful for him.⁵⁵ This marks the beginning of reasoning in H̥ayy. One day he saw the carcass of a vulture, and found that no animal showed any particular aversion to it. He cut off its wings and the tail and drew out its skin, which he divided into two equal parts. One of these parts he put on his back and the other, on his front. He fixed the wings on each arm, and the tail he wore behind.⁵⁶ This dress brought him several advantages. It covered his nakedness and kept him warm. Moreover, it made him look so formidable that none of the beasts, except the roe, would come near him.⁵⁷

IV.—Death of the Roe and H̥ayy's search for its Cause

As H̥ayy grew up the roe became old and weak. Now H̥ayy had a chance of repaying the debt he owed to her. He took care of her, led her to best pastures and plucked wild fruits for her.⁵⁸ But she became weaker and weaker every day and ultimately died. This was a great shock for H̥ayy. His grief was unbounded.⁵⁹ The death of a near one makes man reflective and inquisitive. The same was the case with H̥ayy. He had a desire to know the cause of this phenomenon.⁶⁰

He had observed in himself that his eyes could not see when there was an obstacle before them. He could not hear when he put his fingers into his ears. He could not smell anything if his nostrils were closed. From this he had concluded that all his faculties were liable to impediments, and that their operations could be restored only by removing those impediments.⁶¹ So he peeped into the eyes and ears of the roe and also examined other parts of her body in order to find out any possible impediment. But he found no visible defect or impediment in any external part of her body.⁶² This led him to suppose that there was some hurt in some internal organ of such vital importance that no organ could function without its help.⁶³ He concentrated all his attention and effort on finding out that organ. Here we find clear beginning of inductive reasoning in H̥ayy. He observes a situation, the death of the roe which raises a problem in his mind about the cause of that phenomenon. Then, with the help of his past experience, he proceeds to frame a suitable hypothesis to explain the phenomenon.

He knew from his personal experience that all the parts of the animal body were solid except three cavities, the skull, the chest and the belly.⁶⁴ He argued to himself that that vital organ must be in one of those cavities. As the whole body stood in need of that organ,

it was most probably in the middle one, i. e. the breast.⁶⁵ He was reminded of the fact that he had felt the presence of some such organ in his own body.⁶⁶ It was always active and constantly beating within his breast. He could stop his hands, feet, eyes, ears and nose, etc. from functioning but he could not conceive the possibility of stopping that organ even for the twinkling of an eye.⁶⁷ It was for this reason that he used to take special care to protect his breast from being pierced by the horns of those wild animals with whom he was sometimes engaged in fighting.⁶⁸

V. Hayy's Discovery of the Animal Spirit

He decided to open the breast of the dead roe in the hope of reaching that organ and removing the impediment from it.⁶⁹ At first he feared lest his operation should do more harm than the disease itself.⁷⁰ He tried to recall if any animal, after reaching that state, ever returned to its normal condition.⁷¹ He could not find any such instance. He concluded that if the roe was left in that condition there was no hope of her getting well again. But if he tried operation on her body there might be some hope.⁷² He took some fragments of flints and splinters of dry cane and sharpened them to serve as knives.⁷³ With these he opened the ribs and cutting through the flesh he reached one of the lungs. First he mistook it for that vital organ. But when he saw that it leaned sideways he was satisfied that it was not the organ he looked for, because, according to his way of reasoning, that vital organ should have been in the centre.⁷⁴ Proceeding further, he found the heart covered by the lung on one side.⁷⁵ He wanted to know whether it was similar on the other side of it.⁷⁶ When he found that it was so, he was assured that the organ was really in the middle position.⁷⁷ The regularity of its shape, the firmness of its flesh, its being guarded by means of a stout membrane, and above all, its central position, persuaded him that it was the goal of his search. He examined it thoroughly, and, perceiving no apparent defect, he opened it. He found two cavities in it. One of them, on the right side, was filled with clotted blood.⁷⁸ The other one on the left was empty.⁷⁹ This made him argue to himself thus: That congealed blood, which filled one of the cavities, was just the ordinary blood. He had often seen blood flowing out of the body of an animal and congealing shortly. Moreover, it was common to all parts of the body. He had often lost much blood in his fights with wild animals, without damage to his vital functions. So that congealed blood could not be that being which he was looking for.⁸⁰ As far as the second cavity was concerned, he could not suppose that such a fine chamber had been made in vain.⁸¹ That being which was responsible for the functioning

of the whole body must have resided in it.⁸² When it left the body its departure resulted in the privation of the sense and cessation of all motion of the body.⁸³

Ḥayy had no hope of its returning to the body. It had left the body when it was whole and entire. It was highly improbable that it should return to it when operation had caused such ruin and havoc to it.⁸⁴

It made Ḥayy realise that his mother, the roe, was not the body but that something which had departed from it.⁸⁵ All the actions of the body proceeded from it. The body was a mere instrument for that being, just like his weapons with which he fought against the wild animals.⁸⁶ Thus all his care and regard for the body of the roe was transferred to that being which governed it.⁸⁷ In the meantime, the carcass of the roe began to disintegrate, and an obnoxious smell emanated from it. This increased his aversion for it.⁸⁸ But he did not know how to get rid of it. At last he saw two crows fighting bitterly with one another. One of them killed the other and dug a pit with his claws and buried the body of his adversary.⁸⁹ Ḥayy condemned, in his heart, the crow's act of killing,⁹⁰ but admired his cleverness in burying the dead body. He did the same with the carcass of the roe.⁹¹ Here, we find an indication of the development of moral sense in Ḥayy.

Ḥayy now concentrated all his reflection on the being which moved and governed the body. He observed that rest of the roes were of the same form and figure as he saw in his mother.⁹² This led him to infer that every one of them was moved and directed by a being similar to that which moved and directed his mother previously.⁹³ This increased his affection for them and he used to keep in their company for the sake of their likeness with his mother.⁹⁴

Ḥayy observed that every individual animal or plant had a great many more like it. He wanted to know if there was any being like himself. But he did not find such a being in that island.⁹⁵ As the island was surrounded by the sea he had no idea of any other land beyond it.

VI. Discovery of Fire

One day it so happened that a thicket of canes caught fire through friction. Ḥayy was very much surprised at the phenomenon. The brightness of its light and its power in consuming everything and changing it into its own nature impressed him very much.⁹⁶ His admiration for it and his natural boldness prompted him to touch it. It burnt his fingers. Then he caught hold of a half-burnt stick by the end which was as yet untouched by fire and brought it to his lodging (cave).

There he kept the fire and went on adding dry grass and wood to it so that it may not be extinguished.⁹⁷ He admired the fire very much and tended it night and day. He considered it most wonderful and the most excellent of all things that were around him.⁹⁸ It supplied him light and heat in the absence of the sun. He was persuaded that it was one of those celestial substances that were shining in the firmament.⁹⁹

To test its power he used to throw all sorts of things into it. He found that it consumed and vanquished all bodies, sometimes quickly and sometimes slowly, according to the degree of combustibility of those bodies.¹⁰⁰

Once he put into it some sea animals which had been thrown ashore by the water. It produced a smell which stimulated his appetite. He tasted of them and found them delicious.¹⁰¹ Thus he acquired the habit of eating meat, and for this purpose he applied himself to fishing and hunting.¹⁰²

Reflecting over the beneficial effects and the extraordinary power of fire he began to think that the substance which had departed from the heart of his mother, the roe, was most probably something of the nature of fire.¹⁰³ He had observed that the body of the animal was warm as long as he lived, and became cold immediately after death. Moreover, he had noticed greater degree of heat about his breast where the heart was situated. These facts confirmed him in his opinion and gave him the idea to dissect a living animal, to see if the substance residing in the heart was really like fire.¹⁰⁴ He took a wild beast, tied him down, dissected him and opened his heart. He found that the left cavity of the heart was filled with airy vapour which looked like a mist or cloud.¹⁰⁵ When he put his finger into it he found it intolerably hot, and the animal immediately died. From this he concluded that it was this hot vapour which moved and directed the body of an animal and its departure from the heart caused death.¹⁰⁶

Hayy performed dissection on many more animals, both living and dead, to know more about various parts of animal body and the way they enjoyed communication with that hot vapour. Thus he got the highest degree of knowledge of animal anatomy that was possible to a specialist in this field.¹⁰⁷

VII. Unity of Animal Body

Hayy clearly saw that every animal, inspite of the multiplicity of his organs and limbs, was one in respect of that vapour or spirit,¹⁰⁸ which dwelt in the heart and from there was diffused among all the members. This spirit was the Master of the body and all the organs or the limbs were its servants or instruments. Just as he made use of

different instruments and tools for different purposes, similarly, that spirit made use of various organs for different functions.¹⁰⁹ No organ or limb could function without having correspondence with that spirit, through proper passages, nerves, etc.¹¹⁰ The nerves derived the spirit from the cavities of the brain and the brain had it from the heart.¹¹¹ This animal spirit is one though its influence is diffused throughout the body.¹¹² It is the source of all the functions of the body. All actions and functions really belong to it.¹¹³ Its action, when it makes use of the eye, is sight; when of the ear, hearing; when of the nose, smelling; when of the tongue, tasting; and when of the skin and flesh, feeling.¹¹⁴ Similarly, motion and nutrition were its functions when it made use of the limbs and the liver.¹¹⁵ When the passages through which an organ or limb receives this animal spirit is damaged or obstructed the corresponding member ceases to function.¹¹⁶ When this spirit departs wholly from the body the whole body stops functioning and is reduced to that state which is called death.¹¹⁷

VIII. Hayy's Contrivances to satisfy his Practical needs

Hayy had made these discoveries by the time he was twenty one years of age.¹¹⁸ Besides, he had learnt to make good many pretty contrivances to satisfy his practical needs. He made himself clothes and shoes of the skins of the wild animals he dissected.¹¹⁹ He made thread with the hair or with the bark of the stalks of Mallows or Hemp trees, etc.¹²⁰ He made awls of thorns and splinters of cane whose edges he had sharpened.¹²¹ Observing the swallow's nest he built for himself a dwelling place with a store-house and a pantry. He protected the house with strong doors made of canes.¹²² He took birds of prey and trained them for hunting.¹²³ He kept poultry for their eggs and chicken.¹²⁴ He made spears by fixing the horns of the buffaloes on strong canes and clubs made from trees.¹²⁵ He made a shield for himself by folding the hides together.¹²⁶ He captured wild horses and asses and tamed them for riding.¹²⁷ He made bridles and saddles for them from the strips of the skin and the hides of the beasts.¹²⁸ This enabled him to chase the swiftest animals of the island.¹²⁹

Hayy had been busy so far with learning various practical things about life. His scientific investigations had not proceeded beyond the animal anatomy and the properties of a few things connected with his needs. Now he enters the stage of classification and tries to reduce the multiplicity of nature to higher and higher unities.

IX. Different Species of Bodies and their Unity

He proceeded to examine the nature of bodies. He found himself surrounded by so many bodies, viz. animals, plants, minerals, stones,

earth, water, vapour, snow, flame, etc.¹³⁰ He observed in them different qualities and actions. They agreed in some respects and differed in others. Fixing his mind on their common qualities, he thought they were one.¹³¹ But in view of their differences they appeared as great many.¹³² The same he found in his own person. When he looked at his various organs and their differences he found that there was a plurality in himself.¹³³ Each organ, in turn, could be divided into a great many parts. On the other hand, he perceived that all his organs were conjoined together to make one whole.¹³⁴ No doubt, different actions and functions seemed to distinguish them from one another but these actions and functions proceeded from the animal spirit. So [from the point of view of this animal spirit too he was one].¹³⁵

He considered different animals and found that every individual of them was also one.¹³⁶ Then he looked at different species of animals and found that all the individuals of each species were exactly like one another, in shape and functions. From this he concluded that the spirit which actuated any species was one and the same, and the multiplicity of individuals in the same species was like the multiplicity of parts in the same individual person.¹³⁷

Then he considered all the species of animals together and perceived that sensation, nutrition, and movement were common to them all.¹³⁸ As these actions proceeded from the animal spirit, it was one and the same animal spirit which actuated all living creatures.¹³⁹ That spirit was divided into so many hearts just as the same water may be poured out into different vessels. The differences and peculiarities of species were like the differences of temperature in the water contained in different vessels.¹⁴⁰ Thus he regarded the whole animal kingdom as one in relation to the animal spirit that worked in it.

Similarly, he contemplated the different species of plants and found that the individuals of every species showed some common characteristics.¹⁴¹ Then, taking all the species of plants together, he found that they agreed in the function of nutrition and growth.¹⁴² He thought that there must be something in them analogous to the animal spirit from which their common characteristics proceeded. In view of that spirit the whole vegetative kingdom was one.¹⁴³

Then he viewed the kingdoms of animals and plants together. He found that they both agreed in the functions of nutrition and growth.¹⁴⁴ The animals no doubt, showed some functions over and above these, viz. sensation, apprehension and movement. But he had observed something analogous to it in plants also.¹⁴⁵ For instance, the plants extended their roots that way the nourishment came; and some flowers turned themselves towards the sun. Thus he was led to the conclusion that plants and animals were one in respect to that spirit which was common

to them both.¹⁴⁶ In one case, (i. e. animals), it was more perfect, and in the other case, (i. e. plant), a bit restrained.

He next considered the inanimate objects, such as stones, earth, water, air, flames, etc. They all had the common characteristic of being extended in three dimensions, i. e. length, breadth and thickness.¹⁴⁷ Their differences lay in different qualities that belonged to them. Some of them were coloured, others not; some were warm, others, cold, and so on. But he found that these qualities were liable to change.¹⁴⁸ The bodies that were warm grew cold, and those that were cold became warm. Again, water was rarefied into vapours, and vapours were condensed into water. This showed that all those bodies were at bottom one and their differences were accidental to them.¹⁴⁹

Then taking the animals, plants and inanimate objects together, he tried to find out if they possessed any principle of unity. He found that they were all bodies.¹⁵⁰ They did not differ from one another in this respect. They differed, of course, in their functions and acts.¹⁵¹ But these acts were perhaps not essential to the body itself, and proceeded from something else. If the peculiar act of a body could be produced somehow in another body that body would be just like the first.¹⁵² So, viewing the bodies as abstracted from their peculiar functions, he concluded that they were all one.¹⁵³

This was the end of his scientific voyage. Now he enters the domain of philosophy and wants to discern the nature of body as such, abstracted from all properties and differences that give multiplicity to it.

X. Essential Nature of Body

He considered all sorts of bodies to discover their underlying unity. He found that they all had a tendency either upward or downward.¹⁵⁴ For instance, a stone or water will always tend to go downward unless it is interrupted in its course by some other object. On the other hand, smoke will tend to go upwards, and if intercepted by an arch or dome, will divide to the right and left and will resume its upward journey. Similarly, if a leather bag is filled with air and is held under water it will strive to get up and rise to its place of air.

Hayy did not find any body that was devoid of both these qualities, i. e. gravity and levity.¹⁵⁵ But he could not take either of them as constituting the essence of body, because there were heavy bodies that were devoid of levity, and there were light bodies that were devoid of gravity.¹⁵⁶

He compared the heavy bodies with the light bodies and found that they were one and indistinguishable in respect to their corporeity,¹⁵⁷

(i. e. just the fact of being a body). But because of an attribute (levity or gravity) super-added to their corporiety, they were distinguished from one another.¹⁵⁸ However, mere corporiety is never found to exist. It is always corporiety and some attribute superadded to corporiety that we come across. Thus bodies consist of two aspects; one is corporiety, and the other is some attribute or attributes superadded to it.¹⁵⁹ In the former aspect all bodies are one and indistinguishable. It is the latter aspect that gives them their distinctive features, individuality and multiplicity.

XI. Form and Matter

Ḥayy had analysed body into two aspects, corporiety and something superimposed on corporiety. This analysis corresponds to the distinction of Form and Matter as upheld by Plato and other philosophers. It was Ḥayy's first lesson in philosophy as the knowledge of these forms is derived not through sense but through an intellectual apprehension.¹⁶⁰

Now, Ḥayy began to think that it was really the form of a body which was responsible for all its peculiarities and functions. The animal spirit, which was a fine body and which he had admired so much for its wonderful functions, must also possess a form, something superadded to its corporiety.¹⁶¹ In reality it was this form that was responsible for those wonderful actions. It was the same as philosophers call the animal soul.¹⁶² Similarly, the plants must also possess their peculiar form which may be called the vegetative soul.¹⁶³ The inanimate objects too had their form which was responsible for their properties and actions. It is generally known as their nature.¹⁶⁴ All his regard and esteem was now transferred to the form or the soul and he wanted to know more about it.¹⁶⁵

Ḥayy considered different objects of the world from this point of view. He found that there was a hierarchy of forms. For instance, earth, stones, minerals, plants, animals and all heavy bodies had one common form from which proceeded their downward movement.¹⁶⁶ A class in this category, (i. e. animals and plants), agrees with the rest in the first form yet has another form also superadded to it, from which flow nutrition and growth.¹⁶⁷ Again, a group of this class, i. e. animals, has the first and the second form in common with inanimate objects and plants but has a third form also superadded to them from which arise sensations and movements.¹⁶⁸ Moreover, he perceived that each species of animals and plants showed certain characteristics peculiar to it. These differences, he thought, must be due to some additional form peculiar to them.¹⁶⁹

It was evident to him that some objects of the world possessed a simple form while some other objects possessed a more complex and richer form. As he wanted to understand the nature of form more closely he thought it better to concentrate on those things which exhibited form in its simplest.¹⁷⁰ In this effort he became acquainted with the so called 'four elements', earth, water, air and fire.¹⁷¹

Ḥayy had made himself familiar with so many forms but he had not fully understood the nature of corporeity. He wanted to know if there was any attribute common to all bodies which he should take as constituting the meaning of corporeity. He did not find any such attribute except the notion of extension. Extension was common to all bodies—they all had length, breadth and thickness.¹⁷² But he could not find any body in nature which possessed just extension and nothing more.¹⁷³ There was always something superadded to extension. There was something in which that extension did exist. A body was the combination of these two notions, extension and something in which that extension existed.¹⁷⁴ To understand more clearly the nature of this 'something' behind extension he made some experiments with clay.¹⁷⁵ He took a certain quantity of clay and moulded it into different shapes, one after another. He made it into a spherical shape, then into a cubical, then into oval, and so on. The clay could not remain without assuming some particular shape, dimensions and proportions. But the two notions (clay and its shape) were not identical. The clay remained the same but the shape changed every time in his experiment. Shape and dimensions that kept on changing represented to him the notion of form;¹⁷⁶ and the clay, that remained constant, represented the notion of corporeity or matter devoid of all forms.¹⁷⁷

XII. Inference about an Immaterial Agent

Ḥayy now takes another step forward. Observing the occurrences of nature and constant change of one form into another¹⁷⁸, he inferred the existence of an Agent¹⁷⁹ as the efficient and ultimate cause of all these phenomena. The actions and functions which he had previously attributed to the form of bodies now appeared to him as proceeding from this Agent. This Agent was the source of the changes of forms too. And what was a form but the disposition of a body to act in such and such a way.¹⁸⁰ In reality it was the Agent, and not the form, which was responsible for those acts. Thus he had an earnest desire to know this Agent more distinctly. He first looked for it among the sensible things. But they were themselves liable to corruption and change, and so could not be that Agent.¹⁸¹ By this time Ḥayy was twenty-eight years old,

XIII. Heavenly Bodies

He reflected on the nature of the heavenly bodies to see if the Agent was to be found among them. He knew that the Heavens and all the luminaries in them were bodies extended in three dimensions.¹⁸² But the question was whether they were extended to infinity or they were circumscribed by any limits. With ingenious arguments he proved to himself that the body of Heaven, and in fact every body, was finite.¹⁸³

Then he wanted to know the shape of the heaven. Observing the circles described by different planets in their movements, and seeing that the sun, the moon, and the stars set in the west and rise in the east, and on the basis of similar astronomical observations, he concluded that the Heaven was of a spherical figure.¹⁸⁴

When he considered the whole orb of the Heavens it appeared to him that earth, water, air, plants, animals and the like were all contained in it, and it formed one compact whole like the body of an animal.¹⁸⁵ Thus he acquired the idea of the Universe.

XIV. Is the World Eternal or Created in Time ?

The next question which occupied his mind was whether the world existed eternally or it was created in time.¹⁸⁶ The question puzzled him very much and he could not decide this way or that. Both the alternatives were supported by plausible arguments and both suffered from certain difficulties and disadvantages.¹⁸⁷ At last he gave up the idea of proving it one way or the other. What was material to him was the fact that the world, whether it was eternal or created in time, stood in need of an Immaterial Agent or an Incorporeal Creator.¹⁸⁸

XV. Attributes of the Immaterial Agent

All the interest of Hayy was now centred on knowing this Immaterial Agent. Being immaterial, it was obvious, He could not be apprehended through senses or imagination. He must be free from matter and from properties of body. Then from the wonderfulness of His workmanship he inferred such attributes as knowledge, wisdom, power, beauty, elegance and perfection. From the fact that He sustained all creatures he inferred His benevolence and mercy, and so on. In short, Hayy conceived Him as possessing all attributes of perfection and as free from all attributes of imperfection.¹⁸⁹ Hayy was thirty five years of age by now.

He was so much inflamed with the desire of this supreme Agent

that his thoughts were withdrawn from the creatures. Whenever his eye fell on any object he perceived in it the work of that Agent.¹⁹⁰

XVI. Knowledge of the Supreme Agent through Immaterial Essence

Having attained to the knowledge of the Supreme Agent and His attributes, Ḥayy asked himself about the means by which he had acquired that knowledge. As the Supreme Agent was free from all the properties of body it was impossible to apprehend Him through sense or imagination. Obviously, he had apprehended that Being through his own essence which was also immaterial.¹⁹¹

Now Ḥayy began to look down upon his body as insignificant and worthless and all his thoughts were concentrated on his noble essence¹⁹² through which he had known the Supreme Agent or the Necessarily Existent Being.

XVII. Immortality of the Soul and its Reward and Punishment

Ḥayy wanted to know whether his noble essence was destined to perish or was it of perpetual duration. He argued that since it was not a body it could not be liable to corruption or destruction.¹⁹³ He was also desirous of knowing about the condition of his essence after being separated from the body. He tried to solve this question by means of an analogy. Suppose there is a man who has enjoyed the sight of beautiful and glorious objects. If he is deprived of his vision his desire for those objects will still continue and he will feel extreme pain and grief over his loss.¹ Similarly, if a man, after knowing the Perfect Being, turned his face against Him and remained absorbed in sensuous pleasures till death overtook him, he will continue in that state of privation which would be a source of great torture and suffering for him, specially when there would be no objects of sense to distract his mind.¹⁹⁴ On the other hand, if there was a person who had known the Supreme Being, His Beauty, splendour and Perfection, and had remembered Him till his death, he will continue in that extreme joy and bliss for ever.¹⁹⁵ Besides these two classes, there is a third category of those who were never acquainted with that Being, nor had they heard anything about Him during their lives. They will not feel any pains as they will have no sense of their loss. This is true of brutes and of men who are in the same stage of development.¹⁹⁶

These considerations made Ḥayy very anxious to have the vision of the Necessarily Existent perpetually before him so that death may

not overtake him when his thoughts were removed from Him.¹⁰⁰ But he found it very difficult. He tried to observe various kinds of animals to see if any of them enjoyed that vision, so that he may learn from him the way to salvation. But it appeared to him that none of them had any knowledge or desire of that Being.²⁰⁰

Looking at the spheres and stars and finding them bright, remote from change and corruption, and engaged in regular motions, he was persuaded to believe that they possessed immaterial essences which were acquainted with Him and enjoyed the Vision all the time.²⁰¹

XVIII. What constitutes the suitability of a Body to receive the Noble Essence?

Then Hayy began to consider what should be the reason that he alone of all living creatures should possess an essence like that of the Heavenly bodies.²⁰² Was his body different from other bodies so as to be able to receive that noble essence?

To understand these differences he looked again at different bodies and studied the principles underlying them. This is what he discovered.²⁰³

The bodies which came nearest to purity and had least mixture in them were least disposed to corruption, e. g. gold and jacinth.

The bodies which were mixed and compounded of contrary things were most disposed to corruption because of the conflicting tendencies of different elements.

The bodies that had a single form superadded to their corporiety were far removed from life and had fewest actions, e.g. the four elements.

The bodies that were endowed with several forms had stronger manifestations of life and more numerous operations, e.g. plants and animals.

If there is a compound body in which no element prevails over the other but all combine in a most equal and harmonious way, then it will have a rich form, unopposed by a contrary form, and will be more disposed to life. And if the forms are so joined to matter that they cannot be separated from it then the life would be most durable, vigorous and manifest.

He thought that the heavenly bodies were simple and pure and had no opposition to their form. This was the secret of their power and durability.²⁰⁴ The animal spirit came nearest to the Heavenly bodies.²⁰⁵ It was a mean between all the elements and so it was capable of receiving the highest form and showing greatest manifestations of life.²⁰⁶ And it was for the same reason that his essence, like the essence of the Heavenly bodies, possessed the Necessarily Existent

Being. Other animals lacked this noble essence. It suggested to him that he had been created for a nobler purpose.²⁰⁷

In short, he came to the conclusion that his noble essence, which gave him the knowledge of the Necessarily Existent Being, was something Divine, not subject to corruption. It could not be described by any attributes of body, nor it could be apprehended through sense or imagination.²⁰⁸

XIX. Practical Programme of Life—the three Assimilations

Ḥayy decided to chalk out a programme for himself, in order to realize the highest end of his life. He found that there were three aspects of his nature. In his body he resembled the irrational animals and beasts. In respect to the animal spirit which resided in his heart he resembled the Heavenly bodies.²⁰⁹ And in his immaterial essence he resembled the Necessarily Existent Being.

To satisfy all these aspects of his nature, he thought of three kinds of assimilations. The first assimilation required that he should imitate the actions of the animals²¹⁰ in nourishing his body and protecting it from harm and injury. The second assimilation required that he should imitate the Heavenly bodies.²¹¹ The third assimilation consisted in trying to assimilate, more and more, the attributes of the Divine Being.²¹² It was to be achieved by knowledge, contemplation and vision of the Divine Being, and by trying to be as much free as possible from all bodily properties. This third assimilation was his highest goal in virtue of his possessing the immaterial essence, and it was to be desired for its own sake.²¹³ The second assimilation also helped in attaining to the vision but it was not without mixture. It was necessary as a precondition and preparation for the third assimilation.²¹⁴ The first assimilation was, in a way, a hindrance to the vision. But it was necessary for the preservation of the animal spirit which was the basis of the second assimilation²¹⁵ He, therefore, decided not to indulge in it more than what was absolutely necessary²¹⁶ For this purpose he imposed certain restrictions on himself and made elaborate rules²¹⁷ about his diet, etc. Some of these rules are given below :

He will eat, as far as possible, the pulp of the fruits which were fully ripe and had seeds in them to produce others of the same kind.

He will always take care to preserve the seeds and will not throw them in such places as were not fit for their growth.

If such pulpy fruits were not available he will take some variety of herbs, etc., choosing that variety only which was in abundance. He will also take care that he does not pull up anything by its roots.

If he could not find any vegetables or fruits he will take some living creature or its eggs. But he will always choose that variety which is plentiful so that he may not destroy any species totally.

With regard to the quantity of food he decided that he would eat just so much as was necessary to satisfy his hunger.

As for the timings, he would not seek the food again unless he felt some disabling weakness in himself.

In the beginning he was reluctant to eat anything at all. To eat a plant or a living creature would mean destroying a work of the Creator and opposing His design.²¹⁸ But abstinence seemed to lead to the dissolution of his own body which was a higher and more excellent work of the Creator.²¹⁹ So he decided to eat under above mentioned restrictions.

In connection with the second assimilation he tried to imitate the Heavenly bodies in various ways.²²⁰ They were beneficial and source of advantages to other creatures. He also tried to be benevolent and helpful by removing those things from plants and animals that were obstructive or harmful. If a stone stopped the flow of water he would remove it from its path. He watered the plants and fed the hungry animals. Observing that Heavenly bodies were pure and bright, he would keep his body and clothes clean and apply fragrance to them. He would make circular movements like them and take rounds of the island. The Heavenly bodies, in his opinion, enjoyed constant and uninterrupted Vision of the Divine Being. He also tried to concentrate on the contemplation of the Divine Being, withdrawing all his thoughts from the sensible things. During this condition he had some vision of the Divine Being but his bodily faculties would soon assert and interrupt him.

Then he took to third assimilation.²²¹ He first considered the attributes of the Necessarily Existent Being. He found them of two kinds,²²² (i) positive attributes like knowledge, wisdom and power, and (ii) the negative attributes as immateriality and freedom from bodily attributes.

With regard to the assimilation of the former he came to the conclusion that to know Him was to be like Him, because His knowledge and His Essence were not two different things.²²³

In imitating the negative attributes²²⁴ he tried to strip himself of all bodily properties. He cut himself off from everything, confined himself to his cave, and sat there with his eyes shut and his head bowed down, meditating upon the Necessarily Existent Being. He would remain in this condition for days together, without eating anything. He used to be so much absorbed in contemplation that everything would

disappear from his view except his own essence. Ultimately, the Heavens and the earth, and whatever is between them, and all spiritual forms together with his own essence disappeared and there remained nothing but One, True, Perpetually Self-existent Being.²²⁵ In this state he saw such splendour and beauty that no eye hath seen, no ear heard, nor hath it ever entered into the heart of man to conceive.²²⁶

Before communicating further details about the mystical experiences of Ḥayy, Ibn Ṭufayl warns his readers that they should not crave a description of what is impossible to describe.²²⁷ It is just as if one should have a desire to taste colours. The only way to the knowledge of that state is to have that state.²²⁸ However, he promises to convey something from it figuratively and by way of parables, without knocking at the door of truth.²²⁹ And this is what he relates:

XX. Mystical Experiences of Ḥayy b. Yaḡzān.

When Ḥayy came to himself from that mystical state which was like a state of intoxication, he began to think that his own essence did not differ from the Essence of that Truly Existent Being and that there existed nothing except His Essence. The apparent multiplicity of essences he tried to understand through the analogy of the sun and its light. Just as the light of the sun seems to be multiplied according to the multiplicity of bodies on which it falls, but in reality it is only one light, similarly, it was the Essence of the Truly Existent One which appeared as so many essences in different creatures.²³⁰

He was strengthened in this belief by another argument also. To know the Essence of the Truly Existent Being is to have that Essence. Since his Essence had the knowledge of Truly One, so he possessed the Essence of the Truly One with his own essence. But it was not capable of multiplicity so the Essence of the Truly One and his own essence were one.²³¹

In this connection Ḥayy perceived that the notions of much and little, one and many, etc., have essential reference to bodies.²³² With regard to the Essence of the Truly Existent Being or other immaterial essences we cannot say that they are one or many. Even in case of this sensible world, Ḥayy thought, it was difficult to decide whether it was one or many.²³³ How much more difficult it should be in case of the Divine world where the terms one and many do not apply? In fact, no words of our language can express anything belonging to that world without insinuating some wrong notions.²³⁴ The truth about that world can be known only by attaining to it, by having direct experience or vision of it.²³⁵

With this explanation Ibn Ṭufayl proceeds to describe the experiences of Ḥayy b. Yaqzān, repeating the warning that his words should not be understood in their ordinary sense but should be taken figuratively. This is what Ḥayy experienced when he attained to the state of total absorption and union with the Truly Existent Being :

He saw that the highest sphere had an immaterial essence which was not the Essence of the Truly One nor the sphere itself, nor it was any thing different from them. It was like the image of the sun in a well-polished mirror. We cannot say about this image that it is the sun or it is the mirror, yet it is not distinct from them. Ḥayy saw in the essence of that highest sphere such beauty, perfection and felicity that no words can express.²³⁶

Then he saw the next sphere, the sphere of the fixed stars. In this sphere too he saw an immaterial essence which was not the Essence of the Truly One, nor the essence of the highest sphere, nor the sphere itself, and yet it was not different from them. It was like the image of the sun which is reflected upon a mirror from another mirror facing the sun. He observed in this essence also the same splendour, beauty and felicity which he had observed in the essence of the highest sphere.²³⁷

Similarly, he observed the essences of different spheres. About any one of those essences it could not be said that it was the essence of the Truly One, or it was one of those essences that went before, and yet it was not distinct from them. It was like the image of the sun reflected from one glass to another, according to the order of spheres. He saw in every one of those essences such beauty, splendour, felicity and joy as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.²³⁸

Coming down to the world of generation and corruption he perceived that it too had an immaterial essence. It was not the same as any of the preceeding essences, and yet it was not different from them.²³⁹ This essence had seventy thousand mouths, and every mouth had seventy thousand tongues with which it praised and glorified the Essence of the Truly Existent One²⁴⁰. In this Essence too he saw the same perfection and felicity which he had seen in others.²⁴¹ This essence was like the image of the sun in fluctuating water, reaching it through a series of intermediary mirrors. Then he saw his own essence²⁴² and similar other essences as parts of that essence, if we may be allowed to speak of parts and whole in this context. They appeared as many in relation to the bodies to which they were joined. But from the point of view of their source, they seemed to be one. In fact, the terms one and many do not apply to them. In these essences too he observed such beauty, splendour and felicity as no eye hath seen, no ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.²⁴³

Ḥayy also saw a great many essences which resembled rusty mirrors, covered with filth and having their faces averted from the mirrors that reflected the image of the sun. They were afflicted with great pain and torment on account of their privation.²⁴⁴ Besides, there were essences which appeared and took form and were soon dissolved.²⁴⁵

After a little while, when Ḥayy came to himself and his consciousness of this sensible world returned to him, he lost sight of the Divine world. He longed for it and tried to return to it. Gradually it became easier and easier for him to attain to that state and to stay in it longer. Thus he continued till he was about fifty years of age.²⁴⁶

XXI. Ḥayy meets Asāl

Now, in the neighbouring island there lived two men, Asāl and Salamān. They belonged to a sect founded by one of the ancient Prophets—a sect which tried to convey the truth about realities of the Divine world by way of parables and metaphors.²⁴⁷ The two men, Asāl and Salamān were deeply religious but Salamān was content with the literal sense of various statements of his religion, while Asāl was more inclined to search for the deeper meaning and mystical interpretation of religion. Salamān had a more social nature and tried to practice religion in relation to society. Asāl, on the other hand, was a man of retiring nature, given to contemplation.²⁴⁸

Asāl came to the island where Ḥayy was living, to pass his days in solitude, meditation and devotion.²⁴⁹ One day, Asāl and Ḥayy chanced to meet one another. Asāl had no doubt that it was some religious person, like himself, who had retired to that island to lead a solitary life. But Ḥayy could not identify Asāl, as he had not seen any being like him so far. Asāl, fearing interruption in his meditations, tried to avoid him, and ran away from him. Reaching a safe distance he engaged himself in prayers and invocations in a most humble and devoted way. Ḥayy, on account of his natural curiosity, had pursued him thither and was observing him from a hidden place. He recognized in Asāl a being like himself. His devotional behaviour convinced him that he was one of those essences which had the knowledge of the True One. So he approached him with a desire to be acquainted with him. But Asāl took to his heels. Ḥayy ran after him and overtook him.²⁵⁰

Asāl was at first afraid of Ḥayy. But Ḥayy, through tender sounds and jestures, convinced him that he meant no harm.²⁵¹ Asāl tried to speak to him in different languages that he knew but Ḥayy did not understand him.²⁵²

Asāl had brought some food with him from the other island. He offered it to Ḥayy but Ḥayy did not know what to make of it. Then Asāl tasted it himself and made a sign to Ḥayy to do the same. Ḥayy

at first refused, thinking of the rules that he had prescribed to himself. Then he ate a little of it to please Asāl. He found it delicious. But he felt sorry and repentant on breaking his rules.²⁵⁸

Ḥayy tried to return to his state of contemplation but the vision did not return to him. He decided to spend some time with Asāl in the sensible world so that his curiosity about Asāl may be fully satisfied and he may be able to return to his contemplation uninterrupted.²⁵⁴

Asāl, with the hope of initiating him in his own religion, tried to teach him language. He showed him particular things and pronounced their names. He asked him to do the same. In this way he taught him all the nouns and also the way to connect them in speech.²⁵⁵

After picking up the use of language, Ḥayy related his whole story to Asāl. Asāl immediately recognized the truth of his statements about the Divine world and realized that all those things which the religion had taught him about God, Angels, Books and Messengers, the Day of Judgment, Hell and Paradise, were symbols of what Ḥayy had seen in his mystical states.²⁵⁶ Thus he got that enlightenment for which his heart was craving and he was convinced that the teachings of reason and tradition were in perfect harmony.²⁵⁷ Thenceforth, he began to look upon Ḥayy as one of the saints of God and took him as his guide and teacher.

Ḥayy, on the other hand, learnt from Asāl about the conditions of life and society on the other island and also about the religion which they professed.²⁵⁸ When Asāl acquainted him with the account and description of the Divine world, Hell and Paradise, Day of Judgement and Resurrection, etc., Ḥayy understood them easily and did not find in them anything contrary to his own experiences.²⁵⁹ He recognized that the describer of those things was true in his description and sincere in his words, and was a true Messenger from his Lord. He affirmed his veracity and bore witness to his Divine Mission.²⁶⁰

Then he enquired about other precepts and rites of worship taught by that Messenger. When he was told about the Prayer, Alms Fasting and Pilgrimage, etc., he accepted them and undertook to practise them in obedience to his orders.²⁶¹

XXII. Relation of Religion to Philosophy

But two things about his teachings he could not comprehend. First, why did the Messenger of God choose to express the truths of religion in parables and metaphors.²⁶² Secondly, why did he allow men so much indulgence in worldly matters, like food, trade and other such things? His feeling was that one should eat only so much as was just sufficient to

keep him alive. Moreover, the religious laws relating to alms, trade, usury, punishment for theft, etc. appeared superfluous to him.

Feeling great sympathy and pity for mankind, he drew up a plan in consultation with Asāl to go to the other island to preach the truth to its inhabitants.²⁶³ When they reached the other island, Asāl introduced Ḥayy to his old friends and companions. Asāl's friend Salamān now ruled over the island. He also sympathized with their mission. But when Ḥayy tried to communicate to them the inner secrets of religion they misunderstood him and developed hatred and antagonism against him.²⁶⁴ To his great disappointment he found that the majority of mankind were no better than brutes. Their desires and aspirations were confined to this material existence alone. They could not see beyond. So all his counsel was lost on them. It made them all the more obstinate and confirmed in their ignorance.²⁶⁵

Ḥayy was now convinced that it was futile to speak to them of the pure truth or to ask them to do more than what they were doing. The majority of them derived no benefit from religion except in relation to the things of this world.²⁶⁶ He realized that the Messenger of God had adopted the right course. There could be no better way of dealing with them.²⁶⁷

He went to Salamān and his friends, and apologized to them for his previous views. He exhorted them to stick firmly to the performance of the external rites and to keep within the bounds of the Law.²⁶⁸ He warned them against the neglect of religious performances and the love of the world. He did so because he was convinced that there was no other way of salvation for them. If they were raised to the realms of speculation it would be worse for them.

At last, Ḥayy and Asāl took their leave and returned to their island where they passed their days in meditation, seeking the vision of God.²⁶⁹

NOTES & REFERENCES

1. The question of the origin of Ḥayy b. Yaqzān is not vital to the story. But Ibn Ṭufayl, through the first version, wants to show the rational and scientific possibility of the birth of first man, Adam, without father and mother. But for those who cannot accept this explanation he offers a more common-place version. This shows his caution in avoiding dogmatic adherence to a point of view which is not rationally certain.
2. H. Y. O. section 1, p. 39. (H. Y. O., will be used for Ockley's tr. of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān).
3. Ibid. 1, p. 39.
Ibn Ṭufayl gives in this connection some details about the causes and transmission of heat which have a modern touch about them.
4. Ibid. 2, p. 42.
5. Ibid. 6, p. 45.
6. Ibid. 6, p. 45.
7. Ibid. 6, p. 45.
8. Ibid. 6, p. 46.
9. Ockley has used the word 'spirit' in this context. The original word used in the Arabic text is «روح». So we have translated it as 'Soul'.
10. H. Y. O. 6, p. 46.
11. Ibid. 6, p. 46.
12. Ibid. 6, pp. 46, 47.
13. Ibid. 6, p. 46.
14. Ibid. 8, p. 48.
15. Ibid. 8, p. 48.
16. Ibid. 8, pp. 48, 49.
17. Ibid. 9, p. 49.
18. Ibid. 9, p. 49.
19. Ibid. 9, p. 50.
20. Ibid. 9, pp. 49, 50.
21. Ibid. 9, p. 50.
22. Ibid. 9, p. 50.
23. Ibid. 9, p. 50.
24. Ibid. 9, p. 50.
25. Ibid. 9, p. 50.
26. Ibid. 9, pp. 50, 51.

27. H. Y. O. 9, p. 51.
 28. Ibid. 3, p. 43.
 29. Ibid. 3, p. 43.
 30. Ibid. 3, p. 43.
 31. Ibid. 3, p. 43.
 32. This fragment of the sentence has been derived from the Qur'an (XVII, 16). Ibn Tufayl is very fond of using the Qur'anic verses and phrases, fitting them in his own narration.
 33. H. Y. O. 3, p. 43.
 34. Ibid. 4, p. 44.
 35. Ibid. 4, p. 44.
 36. Ibid. 5, p. 45.
 37. Ibid. 10, p. 51.
 38. Ibid. 11, p. 51.
 39. Ibid. 11, p. 51.
 40. Ibid. 11, p. 52.
 41. Ibid. 11, pp. 52, 53. Ibn Tufayl believes that the animals possess a rudimentary language of sounds by which they express their various needs and emotions.
 42. Ibid. 11, p. 53.
 43. Ibid. 12, p. 53.
 44. Ibid. 12-13, pp. 53, 54.
 45. Ibid. 12, p. 53.
 46. Ibid. 12, p. 53.
 47. Ibid. 13, p. 53.
 48. Ibid. 13, p. 54.
 49. Ibid. 13, p. 54.
 50. Ibid. 13, p. 54.
 51. Ibid. 14, p. 55.
 52. Ibid. 14, pp. 54, 55.
 53. Ibid. 14, p. 55.
- It is interesting to note how Ibn Tufayl anticipates some modern ideas. According to Darwin and other Evolutionists the superiority of human hands has been a very important factor in his evolution.
54. Ibid. 14, p. 55.
 55. Ibid. 15, p. 55.
 56. Ibid. 15, p. 56.
 57. Ibid. 15, p. 56.
 58. Ibid. 15, p. 56.
 59. Ibid. 16, p. 56.
 60. Ibid. 16, p. 57.

61. H. Y. O. 17, p. 57.
62. Ibid. 17, p. 57.
63. Ibid. 17, p. 58.
64. Ibid. 18, p. 58.
65. Ibid. 18, p. 58.
66. Ibid. 18, p. 59.
67. Ibid. 18, p. 59.
68. Ibid. 18, p. 59.
69. Ibid. 19, p. 59.
70. Ibid. 19, p. 59.
71. Ibid. 19, p. 60.
72. Ibid. 19, p. 60.
73. Ibid. 19, p. 60.
74. Ibid. 20, p. 61.
75. Ibid. 20, p. 61.
76. Ibid. 20, p. 61.
77. Ibid. 20, p. 61.
78. Ibid. 20, p. 61.
79. Ibid. 20, p. 61.
80. Ibid. 20, p. 62.
81. Ibid. 20, p. 62.
82. Ibid. 20, p. 62.
83. Ibid. 20, p. 62.
84. Ibid. 21, p. 63.
85. Ibid. 22, p. 64.
86. Ibid. 22, p. 64.
87. Ibid. 22, p. 64.
88. Ibid. 23, p. 65.
89. Ibid. 23, p. 65.
90. Ibid. 23, p. 65.
91. Ibid. 23, p. 65.
92. Ibid. 23, p. 65.
93. Ibid. 23, p. 65.
94. Ibid. 23, p. 65.
95. Ibid. 23, p. 66.
96. Ibid. 24, p. 66.
97. Ibid. 24, p. 67.
98. Ibid. 24, p. 67.
99. Ibid. 24, p. 67.
100. Ibid. 24, p. 67.

101. H. Y. O. 25, p. 68.
102. Ibid. 25, p. 68.
103. Ibid. 26, p. 68.
104. Ibid. 26, p. 69.
105. Ibid. 26, p. 69.
106. Ibid. 26, p. 69.
107. Ibid. 27, p. 70.
108. It is the same as animal spirit referred to by Descartes and other philosophers.
109. H. Y. O. 28, p. 70.
110. Ibid. 29, p. 71.
111. Ibid. 29, p. 71.
112. Ibid. 29, p. 71.
113. Ibid. 29, p. 71.
114. Ibid. 29, p. 71.
115. Ibid. 29, p. 71.
116. Ibid. 29, p. 71.
117. Ibid. 29, p. 71.
118. Ibid. 30, p. 72.
119. Ibid. 30, p. 72.
120. Ibid. 30, p. 72.
121. Ibid. 30, p. 72.
122. Ibid. 30, p. 72.
123. Ibid. 30, p. 72.
124. Ibid. 30, p. 72.
125. Ibid. 30, p. 72.
126. Ibid. 30, p. 73.
127. Ibid. 30, p. 73.
128. Ibid. 31, p. 73.
129. Ibid. 31, p. 73.
130. Ibid. 32, p. 74.
131. Ibid. 32, p. 74.
132. Ibid. 32, p. 74.
133. Ibid. 32, p. 75.
134. Ibid. 33, p. 75.
135. Ibid. 33, p. 75.
136. Ibid. 34, p. 75.
137. Ibid. 34, p. 76.
138. Ibid. 35, p. 77.
139. Ibid. 35, p. 77.

140. H. Y. O. 36, p. 77.
141. Ibid. 36, p. 78.
142. Ibid. 36, p. 78.
143. Ibid. 36, p. 78.
144. Ibid. 37, p. 78.
145. The unity of plants and animals is a modern idea. It is surprising how Ibn Ṭufayl anticipates the discoveries of scientists like Bose and others.
146. H. Y. O. 37, p. 79.
147. Ibid. 38, p. 79.
148. It is the same argument which had led Thales to believe that all things are derived from one common substance, water. Cf. History of Early Greek Philosophy by Burnet.
149. H. Y. O. 38, p. 80.
150. Ibid. 39, p. 80.
151. Ibid. 39, p. 80.
152. Ibid. 39, p. 80.
153. Ibid. 39, pp. 80, 81.
154. Ibid. 40, p. 81.
155. Ibid. 41, p. 82.
156. Ibid. 41, p. 83.
157. Ibid. 41, p. 83.
158. Ibid. 41, p. 83.
159. H. Y. O. 41, p. 83.
160. Ibid. 42, p. 84.
161. Ibid. 42, p. 84.
162. Ibid. 42, p. 84.
163. Ibid. 42, p. 84.
164. Ibid. 42, p. 85.
165. Ibid. 43, p. 85.
166. Ibid. 44, p. 86.
167. Ibid. 44, pp. 86, 87.
168. Ibid. 44, p. 87.
169. Ibid. 44, p. 87.
170. Ibid. 45, p. 88.
171. Ibid. 45, p. 88.
172. Ibid. 46, p. 89.
173. Ibid. 46, p. 89.
174. Ibid. 47, pp. 89, 90.
175. Ibid. 47, p. 90.
176. Ibid. 47, p. 91.
177. Ibid. 47, p. 91.

178. H. Y. O. 48, p. 92.
179. This argument will be explained more thoroughly in the next chapter.
180. H. Y. O. 49, p. 93.
181. Ibid. 50, p. 94.
182. Ibid. 51, p. 95.
183. The details of the argument will be given in the next chapter.
184. H. Y. O. 53, pp. 97, 98.
185. Ibid. 54, p. 99.
186. Ibid. 55, p. 100.
187. Ibid. 55-56, pp. 99-102.
188. Ibid. 57-58, pp. 103-105.
189. Ibid. 59-60-61, pp. 106-108.
190. Ibid. 62, p. 109.
191. Ibid. 63, pp. 110, 111.
192. Ibid. 63, p. 111.
193. Ibid. 64, p. 112.
194. Ibid. 65, p. 112.
195. Ibid. 65, pp. 113, 114.
196. Ibid. 66, p. 115.
197. Ibid. 66, p. 116.
198. Ibid. 66, pp. 114, 115.
199. Ibid. 67, pp. 116, 117.
200. Ibid. 68, p. 117.
201. Ibid. 69, pp. 118, 119.
202. Ibid. 70, p. 119.
203. Ibid. 70-71, pp. 120-122.
204. Ibid. 71, p. 122.
205. Ibid. 71, pp. 122, 123.
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208. Ibid. 72, p. 124.
209. Ibid. 72, p. 124.
210. Ibid. 74, p. 126.
211. Ibid. 74, p. 126.
212. Ibid. 74, p. 126.
213. Ibid. 75, p. 127.
214. Ibid. 75, p. 127.
215. Ibid. 75, p. 128.
216. Ibid. 76, p. 128.
217. Ibid. 77, pp. 129-131,

218. H. Y. O. 77, p. 128.
219. Ibid. 77, p. 128.
220. Ibid. 79-80-81-82, pp. 132-136.
221. Ibid. 83, p. 136.
222. Ibid. 83, pp. 136, 137.
223. Ibid. 83, p. 137.
224. Ibid. 84, pp. 138, 139.
225. Ibid. 85, p. 139.
226. Ibid. 85, p. 140.
227. Ibid. 86, p. 140.
228. Ibid. 86, p. 141.
229. Ibid. 86, p. 141.
230. Ibid. 87, p. 142.
231. Ibid. 88, p. 143.
232. Ibid. 88, p. 144.
233. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
234. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
235. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
236. Ibid. 91, p. 147.
237. Ibid. 92, p. 147, 148.
238. Ibid. 92, p. 148.
239. Ibid. 93, p. 149.
240. Ibid. 93, p. 149.
241. Ibid. 93, p. 150.
242. Ibid. 93, p. 150.
243. Ibid. 93, p. 150.
244. Ibid. 94, p. 150.
245. Ibid. 94, p. 151.
246. Ibid. 98, p. 155.
247. The reference is obviously to Islam.
248. H. Y. O. 101, p. 157, 158.
249. Ibid. 102, p. 158, 159.
250. Ibid. 105, p. 161, 162.
251. Ibid. 106, p. 162.
252. Ibid. 107, p. 163.
253. Ibid. 108, p. 163, 164.
254. Ibid. 109, p. 164.
255. Ibid. 109, p. 164, 165.
256. Ibid. 110, p. 166.
257. Ibid. 110, p. 166.
258. Ibid. 111, p. 167,

- 259. H. Y. O. 111, p. 167.
- 260. Ibid. 111, p. 167.
- 261. H. Y. O. 112, pp. 167, 168.
- 262. Ibid. 112, p. 168.
- 263. Ibid. 112, p. 168.
- 264. Ibid. 113, pp. 169, 170.
- 265. Ibid. 117, p. 172.
- 266. Ibid. 117, p. 173.
- 267. Ibid. 119, p. 175.
- 268. Ibid. 119, p. 175.
- 269. Ibid. 119, p. 176.
- 270. Ibid. 120, p. 177.

CHAPTER IV

PHILOSOPHIC DOCTRINES OF IBN TUFAYL

Ibn Tufayl has built up his philosophic doctrines step by step, carrying the reader with him through various stages of the development of Ḥayy, who serves him as his mouth-piece. This method has advantages as well as disadvantages. The advantages consist in the fact that we are acquainted with the starting point and the data, the premises and the nature of arguments on which the final results are based. But the disadvantages lie in its inability to give us a unitary picture of the whole philosophy. In following the psychological details of the intellectual voyage of our hero we often lose sight of the logical relation of various parts of his philosophy. So it requires to be supplemented by a method in which we start with the end-products i. e., final results of the philosophy, and try to analyse them into their constituent elements, particularly attending to their organic relationship. It is this method which we propose to follow in these pages, in giving an exposition of Ibn Tufayl's views on the 'Holy Trinity' of philosophy, God, Soul and the World, and other connected problems.

A. GOD

I. Proofs of the Existence of God

Ibn Tufayl offers the following arguments for the existence of God :

(i) All bodies that we see around us are subject to generation and corruption.¹ They are coming into existence and then disappearing after sometime. In other words, they are all produced anew. There was a time when they were not there; and at a certain point of time they began to exist. Whatever comes into existence or is produced anew must have a Producer or an Agent, to bring it into existence.² Now suppose, in explaining the existence of a body, we assume another body to be its producer. Being a body, it will also be subject to the law of generation and corruption, and will itself stand in need of a producer, to account for its existence. If this second producer or agent is also a body it will need another producer, and that, still another, and so on. If we go on supposing every producer or agent to be a body we shall be involved in an 'infinite regress', which is rationally unacceptable. We must stop at some ultimate Agent or Producer who should not be a body. This Immaterial Agent is God.

Even if one does not find the evidence for total corruption in some bodies, he cannot deny the fact of partial corruption or change.³ All bodies, in this world of generation and corruption, are subject to change. Change always implies a change in form.⁴ We always find bodies changing from one form to another. Water is rarefied into vapours, and vapours are again condensed into water. A piece of wood, if it is burnt, changes into coals, ashes, flames and smoke. The smoke, when its path is obstructed by a solid object, sticks to it in the form of soot.⁵ Now, reason demands that there should be some cause to explain these changes of forms. If we assume a body, as cause, to explain the change of form in another body, this cause will also be subject to the change of form and will need another cause to explain its change. If that cause is also a body it will need another cause, and that still another, and so on, leading us to an infinite regress. To avoid it we shall have to believe in an Immaterial Agent as the First Cause.

This Immaterial Agent or the First Cause is God. He has no cause of His own existence, but is the cause of the existence of all other things.⁶ He is the Necessarily Existent Being, i. e., He must necessarily exist if the existence of other things is to be explained rationally.

(ii) The second argument is derived from the very notion of form.

With regard to the matter or corporeity every body would be just like any other body. It is the form which gives a body its special character and individuality. All its qualities and functions seem to proceed from its form.

There are different objects in nature, which are classified under various classes on the basis of their actions and functions.⁷ Some of them, like stone, earth, water, air, etc., show elementary functions. This leads us to believe that they have an elementary form or a simpler form. Some other objects, like plants and animals, show more varied and complex functions. This makes us attribute a higher and richer form to them.

It is this form which, in popular language, is referred to as the animal soul or the vegetative soul or the nature of inanimate objects.

But have we really seen the form or soul or nature of these objects? Have we penetrated behind an object to see that mysterious something which is called its form, and have we actually seen its functions and acts proceeding from that form? No. We have simply seen those functions and actions, and nothing more. On the basis of these functions alone we have supposed that there is a corresponding form. In fact, form is nothing but the disposition of a body to produce such and such action.⁸ Those actions could be very well conceived to belong to another body.⁹

For instance, we can imagine fire with a cooling function, and ice with a burning function. In that case their forms would be reversed. Thus it is clear that we do not see any form in any object. What we perceive is certain actions proceeding from a body. This fact we express by saying that the body has fitness or disposition (or form) to perform those actions. But we do not see any necessary connection between those actions and that particular body,¹⁰ nor do we see any form from which those actions are emanating.¹¹

Now the question is : How to explain those actions, if we have done away with the form? What is the efficient cause behind those actions? The body itself cannot be such a cause because those actions have no essential connection with body. If some other body is supposed as the efficient cause for the actions of this body then the same difficulty will arise. The actions will have no essential connection with that body also. Thus we are left with no alternative but to assert an Immaterial Being as the efficient cause for all the actions and changes that we perceive in bodies, in the physical world. 'This Immaterial Being, the Efficient Cause of all the phenomena, is God. It is God who moves all things and who acts in all things.'¹² In support of his point of view Ibn Tufayl refers to a tradition of the Prophet which says, "I am his hearing by which he hears, and his seeing by which he sees."¹³

Some persons may not find this argument convincing. They may say: If Ibn Tufayl is postulating one Immaterial Agent to explain the functions of different bodies, what was the harm in attributing those functions to the 'forms' of those bodies? In other words, why should he not suppose so many immaterial agents (forms) instead of one Immaterial Agent? To this Ibn Tufayl would reply that plurality has application only to the bodies and what possesses bodily attributes. It is irrelevant in connection with the spiritual world. The Immaterial Agent, whether connected with the actions of one body or of many bodies, in every case, is one and the same. In fact it is above the distinctions of one and many.¹⁴ All that is important for our purpose is the fact that the Immaterial Agent is necessary to explain the phenomena of the world.

(iii) Ibn Tufayl's third argument is based on the mystical experience or intuition. This mystical experience, according to Ibn Tufayl, is such that no man can ever conceive it.¹⁵ It is immediate, unique and personal. One who has this experience does not entertain the slightest doubt about its validity, but others cannot be convinced of it rationally because it cannot be communicated to them. The only way to know it is to have it.¹⁶ However, Ibn Tufayl tries to give some idea of it by way of parables and metaphors, "without knocking at the door of Truth".¹⁷ This is how he describes it :

"Then both the Heavens and the Earth, and whatsoever is between them, and all spiritual forms, and corporeal faculties, and all those faculties which are separate from matter, (namely the Essences which know the self-subsisting Necessary Being), all disappeared and vanished like scattered dust, and amongst these his own Essence disappeared too, and there remained nothing but this one, True, perpetually Self-subsisting Being."¹⁸

In this state, in short, the mystic witnesses that which "neither eye hath seen, nor ear hath heard, nor hath it ever occurred to the heart of man."¹⁹

The mystic does not find in this state anything contrary to what his reason tells him. But this experience differs from the rational knowledge in so far as it exceeds it in clarity and the degree of pleasure and felicity derived from it.²⁰

(iv) An interesting aspect of Ibn Ṭufāy's arguments is the fact that he tries to prove the Existence of God both from the eternity and non-eternity of the world.

(1) If the world has been produced anew it is obvious that it could not have come into existence of itself. There must have been some Agent to produce it. And this Agent could not be a body. If it is a body it would be a part of the world and consequently a being produced anew. So it will stand in need of another cause or Agent to have produced it. If this second Agent is also a body it will need a third, and the third will need a fourth, and so on ad infinitum, which is absurd. Thus we have to believe that the world was produced by an Immaterial Creator, having wisdom, knowledge and power, etc.²¹

(2) Now, suppose the world is eternal—it has always been as it is now. Then its motion must also be eternal. And eternal motion would obviously be infinite. There should be a mover for this motion. If we suppose this mover to be a power diffused through a body, or even through the body of the world, it will be finite, as the world itself and all bodies in it are finite.²² A finite cause cannot produce an infinite effect i. e., the eternal motion of the world. The power which moves the world and the Heavenly bodies, therefore, should not reside in any body but should proceed from a Being free from bodily attributes, i. e., an Immaterial Agent. This Agent must possess knowledge and power so as to be able to produce such wonderful and regular movements as we find in the heavenly bodies, etc.²³

An objection may be raised here. If God and the world are both co-eternal, how can one be the cause of the other? Ibn Tufayl anticipates it and solves the difficulty in the following way: The world must be posterior to God in nature, if not in time. Suppose you take a body in your hand and begin to move it. The movement of the body will depend on the motion of the hand but will not be posterior to it in time²⁴ Similarly, we may take the world as caused and created by the Immaterial Agent, out of time.²⁵

No doubt, Ibn Tufayl has solved the difficulty in an ingenious way but his argument seems to be exposed to another serious objection. His way of thinking poses the world as a rival to God and thus cuts at the very root of Theism. This objection is met by Ibn Tufayl through his analysis of body and mystical interpretation. Body is a combination of Form and Matter. But matter cannot subsist without form and form cannot exist without the Immaterial Agent,²⁶ i. e., God. Hence the world is nothing but the manifestation of God. It is not an independent Being limiting or negating God.

(v) Another subtle argument used by Ibn Tufayl is based on the knowledge of God. It has not been expressly mentioned but can be inferred from some of his statements: I have the knowledge of an Immaterial Agent. Being Immaterial, His knowledge is his presence. To know Him is to possess Him. But this Immaterial Being cannot be present but with Himself and His very presence is His Essence. It means that I have that Essence in so far as I know Him.²⁷

II. Attributes of God

God is the Immaterial Agent who has produced and created all things. He is the necessarily Existent Being. He has no cause of His own existence, but is the cause of the existence of all other things.²⁸

He is the creator of all things.²⁹ When He would have anything done, His Command is Be, and it is so.³⁰

All things are dependent on Him while He is independent and free of them.³¹

He is the Maker and producer of the forms. He is the efficient cause behind them. All the functions and actions, that are generally attributed to forms, really proceed from Him. He is our hearing by which we hear, and our seeing by which we see.³²

He is the source of all bodies and all forms. Matter is inconceivable apart from form and form proceeds from God; so the whole world of bodies, forms and matter, is derived from God, and is nothing apart from God.³³

He is the true, perpetually self-subsisting Being. There exists nothing but the Essence of this True One.³⁴ From the wonderfulness of His workmanship we infer His accurate wisdom, subtle knowledge, unlimited power and infinite Perfection.³⁵ The smallest atom, whether in Heaven or Earth, is not unknown to Him; no, nor any other thing, whether lesser or greater than it.³⁶

He is the maker of the world and has the full command and knowledge of it. "Shall not He know it that created it?" He is wise, omniscient.³⁷ When we perceive beauty, elegance, perfection, strength or excellence of any kind among His Creatures, we are led to infer that the Agent (God) from whom all these qualities flow must possess them in more perfect and complete form.³⁸

He has given such wonderful bodies to animals and has taught them how to use them for different purposes of life. Moreover, He has provided for their needs in abundance. It shows He is exceedingly Bountiful and Gracious.³⁹

He is incorporeal and cannot be perceived by the senses, nor apprehended by the imagination.⁴⁰ As He is incorporeal and immaterial, to know Him is to have Him.⁴¹ It is our immaterial essence alone by which we can know Him.⁴²

He is free from matter, and the properties of body. He is separated from every thing which we can perceive by our senses or reach by our imagination.⁴³

He is free from all attributes of imperfection. The notion of imperfection is nothing but mere non-existence.⁴⁴ How can He partake it? He is pure existence. He gives being to everything that exists. There is no existence besides him.

It is interesting to compare Ibn Ṭufayl with Spinoza with regard to this point. Spinoza, discussing his theory of Substance, puts forward the maxim that all limitation is negation.⁴⁵ The critics have been at pains to explain it and to reconcile it with Spinoza's Theory of Attributes and Modes. However, it can be easily understood in the light of Ibn Ṭufayl's remark that all imperfection is nothing but mere non-existence. As Spinoza was familiar with Ibn Ṭufayl's work, 'Ḥayy b. Yaqzān' it would not be far from the truth if we suppose that he was influenced by Ibn Ṭufayl in his Philosophy.

In short, God's attributes are of two kinds,—(i) positive, as knowledge, power, wisdom, etc., and (ii) negative, as immateriality.⁴⁶ Immateriality does not merely imply the fact of not being a body, but it also signifies freedom from every thing that has the least relation to body.⁴⁷ His negative attributes require that He should not be likened to a body. But His positive attributes too demand that they should

not be interpreted in any bodily sense. For instance, multiplicity is an attribute of bodies. There can be no multiplicity in God—not even in His attributes. The Divine Essence is not multiplied by these attributes. All of them are one—they are nothing but His real Essence.⁴⁸

III. Relation of God to Soul

Descartes had first proved the existence of the Ego and then, from its idea of Perfection, had derived the existence of the Perfect Being, i.e., God.⁴⁹ Ibn Tufayl reverses the order. He first proves the existence of God and then, from this knowledge of God, proceeds to infer the reality of his Soul. His argument is as follows :

I have knowledge of God, and apprehend the Divine Essence. But this Divine Essence or the Necessarily Existent Being is immaterial and free from all bodily attributes. He cannot be apprehended by body, or by any faculty residing in body. It follows, therefore, that I have apprehended Him through my own Essence which is immaterial like Him.⁵⁰

This immaterial essence or soul is derived from God. It proceeds from God just as light emanates from the sun. It is joined to body so closely by the command of God that it can hardly be separated from it, even in thought.⁵¹ It should not, however, be understood to mean something that is subtracted from the Divine Essence and added to the body. No. It is a command of God which is related to the body in a unique way, so that we are not able to say that it is inside the body or outside the body, or whether it is identical with the body or distinct from the body. This soul is acting upon all creatures but some show strong manifestations of it while others, very dim impression of it. It is due to their varying capacities to receive it. Thus the nature of the inanimate objects, the vegetative soul, the animal soul and the noble Essence of man are all derived from God.⁵² These differences can be illustrated by the analogy of the light of the sun falling on different bodies. Some bodies, like thin air, do not seem to reflect this light at all; others, like unpolished opaque bodies, show a little reflection of that light. The polished bodies, like looking glasses, reflect the light in the highest degree. Some of these polished bodies not only reflect the light but also give an image resembling the sun. Lastly, there are some bodies, like lenses, which collect so much light as to produce fire.⁵³

In this example, the last but one category represents man. Man can be compared to those polished bodies or mirrors which reflect the

image of the sun. In other words, man alone has an essence resembling the Divine Essence.⁵⁴ This is the sense of the Prophet's tradition that God created Adam in His own image.

Now, the last category represents the Prophets, in whom this image prevails to such a degree that it consumes all else.⁵⁵

In fact, the relation between God and the Soul is unique. We cannot say about the soul that it is God; nor we can say it is distinct from God. It is like the image of the sun being reflected in a mirror. We cannot say that this image is identical with the sun, or with the mirror. Yet it is not different from them.

But this is only an analogy and analogies are never perfect. In case of the light or image of the sun we find a body or mirror already present to receive that light or image. But in case of the forms or souls proceeding from God there is no body prior to them. It is this very emanation that gives existence to bodies. Bodies are combinations of matter and form. Matter is nothing without form and form is nothing independent of God. So the whole body comes from God. It is not something over and above God, but only a manifestation of God.⁵⁶

There is another important point to be borne in mind in this connection. These essences (or souls) do not imply a division of the Divine Essence. In reality nothing is separated or substracted from God. God remains as He is. The generation or destruction of bodies neither adds any thing to God nor takes away anything from Him.⁵⁷ Similar is the case with multiplicity. The Divine Essence does not become 'many' on account of these essences; nor these essences can be said to show multiplicity side by side with God. Ibn Ṭufayl solves this apparent paradox by pointing out that separation and union, aggregation and distinction, agreement and difference, multiplicity and singularity are words which can be understood in the context of the sensible world only. They have no application to the Divine world.⁵⁸ It would not be out of place here to remark that Ibn Ṭufayl does not seem to be in sympathy with the abstract notion of pure Unity. This fact is borne out by his remarks on Al-Ghazālī, in his Introduction.⁵⁹ There he refers to a statement of Al-Ghazālī to the effect that 'those who have attained to the vision of God or Union with God are aware of the fact that God has an attribute which goes against the notion of pure Unity'. Ibn Ṭufayl does not challenge this statement of Al-Ghazālī but simply shows his disagreement with the view that it implied multiplicity in God.⁶⁰ And this is quite consistent with his general point of view as discussed above.

In short, Ibn Ṭufayl believes that all souls are derived from God. But man possesses a soul or Immaterial Essence like the Immaterial Essence

of the Divine Being. He tries to support it by two arguments. First, the fact of knowledge of God leads him to believe that he has an immaterial essence through which he knows Him.⁶¹ Secondly, the mystical experience convinces him of the same fact. When he returned to himself from mystical state, which was like a state of intoxication, he was convinced that his own essence was not different from the Essence of the True One but that both were one and the same thing.⁶²

IV Stages of the Emanation of Form or Soul from God

Ibn Ṭufayl seems to be in agreement with the neo-Platonic idea of emanation. He also seems to be in agreement with Farābī and Ibn Sīnā that only one can emanate from the One.⁶³ But he does not follow them in details. He takes the central idea from them and develops it in his own way, on the basis of his own mystical experience. As he has made Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān his mouth-piece, let us follow the mystical experiences of Ḥayy as described by Ibn Ṭufayl:

“Having attained this total absorption, this complete annihilation, this veritable Union, he saw that the highest sphere, beyond which there is no body, had an essence free from matter, which was not the essence of that One, True One, nor the sphere itself, nor yet anything different from them both; but was like the image of the sun which appears in a well-polished looking glass which is neither the sun nor the looking glass, and yet not distinct from them. And he saw in the essence of that sphere such perfection, splendour and beauty, as is too great to be expressed by any tongue, and too subtle to be clothed in words; and he perceived that it was in the utmost perfection of delight and joy, exultation and gladness, by reason of its beholding the Essence of that True One, whose Glory he exalted.”⁶⁴

In the same manner he saw the essences of other spheres, one by one, and found the same beauty, splendour, felicity and joy as he had perceived in the first, which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, and which hath not occurred to the heart of man.⁶⁵ It was true about each one of these essences also that it was not identical with the sphere or spheres or with the preceding essences, nor it was distinct from them. Lastly, he perceived that this world too had an immaterial essence like the rest, but this essence had seventy thousand faces, and every face seventy thousand mouths, and every mouth seventy thousand tongues with which it praised and glorified the Essence of the True Being. This many-faced essence included his immaterial essence and those of others like him. All these essences exhibited the same elegance, beauty

and perfection as was found in the preceding essences, and what was true of them was true of these also, i. e. they were neither identical with bodies or other essences nor distinct from them.⁶⁶ These essences appeared to be many from the point of view of the bodies in which they were manifested. But considering their immaterial nature and their common ultimate source they were all one.⁶⁷ Their relation to the source can be explained through an analogy. Suppose there is a series of mirrors reflecting the image of the sun, in a descending order. The first mirror receives it directly from the sun; from the first it reflects in the second, and from the second in the third, and so on, ultimately falling in fluctuating water where it appears as multiplied.⁶⁸ Now, with regard to these images we cannot say that they are identical with the mirrors or with the sun, or with one another; nor we can say they are different from them. When we look at the mirrors in which they are being reflected we call them 'many'. But looking at their source we will say it is nothing but one and the same sun which is being reflected in many mirrors.⁶⁹

Here Ibn Tufayl anticipates an objection. According to the Decree of Reason a thing must be either one or many. The same must hold good of the spiritual world of the immaterial essences.⁷⁰

Ibn Tufayl answers this objection in two ways. First, the analogy of the Sun and its images in a series of mirrors offers a solution of the difficulty. Here we find that there is unity in one sense, and multiplicity in another. The same may be said of these immaterial essences.

The second solution that he offers is more philosophical and more subtle. He says that multiplicity and singularity, separation and union, agreement and difference, and for that matter all words with which our ears are familiar, have essential reference to bodies or things connected with bodies. When we use these words to express the truths of the Divine World they always insinuate some wrong notion about them. In fact, those truths are above these distinctions and thus ordinary rules of antithesis or contradiction do not apply to them.⁷¹

Moreover, even with regard to the physical world, it is difficult to decide whether it is one or many. Take for instance any body and consider whether it is one or many. With regard to its constituent parts and their divisibility, it is a multiplicity beyond comprehension. But considering the relationship and compactness of the parts, even the whole physical world may be regarded as one huge body.⁷² When it is so with regard to the world of bodies how can we say about the Divine World whether it is one or many?

V. Relation of God to the Physical World.

Ibn Tufayl, like Spinoza,⁷³ seems to believe in Pan-Psychism. Every object of the world has a soul. This soul is joined to the body by the command of God. This soul is continuously emanating from God and is acting on all things, but different bodies manifest it in varying degrees, according to their capacities to receive it.

This soul, emanating from God and uniting with a body, is the 'form' of the body. The body comprises two notions—matter and form, corporiety and something superadded to that corporiety. Now matter or corporiety is something inconceivable without form. And form, as we have seen, proceeds from God. In fact, it is nothing distinct from God. Thus the forms depend on God and bodies depend on forms. So the whole world of bodies depends on God, and is nothing apart from God.

Far from being a rival to God, or a hindrance to belief in God, the physical world, with its changing phenomena and occurrences, serves as an argument for the existence of God. Every body that is created anew and every form that comes into being requires that there should be a maker or producer to bring it about. To avoid the infinite regress we have to believe in the Necessarily Existent Being as the ultimate Immaterial Agent behind all these changes.

Ordinary Theism treats the physical world as a stumbling block in its way. But it is different with Ibn Tufayl. Even the question of the eternity of the world does not bother him. If the world is eternal, it is still in need of God and is dependent on and derived from God, and not a rival being, other than God.⁷⁴

B. Soul

I. Form or Soul

Soul is the 'form' of body. A body consists of two aspects, matter and form.⁷⁵ Matter is common to all bodies. They are indistinguishable from one another with regard to matter. Matter is the same as corporiety—just the fact of being a body. Matter or corporiety is not yet a body—nay, it cannot even exist without something superadded to it, i. e., form. It is the form which distinguishes one body from another. The form makes the body what it is. All the properties and functions of a body proceed from its form or soul, as we may call it.⁷⁶

II. Grades of Soul

The differences that we find in bodies, with regard to properties and functions, are all due to their form or soul. The animal soul is

responsible for the peculiar functions of an animal—sensation and movement. The vegetative soul is responsible for the peculiar functions of the plants—nutrition and growth. Similarly, the form of the inanimate objects (their nature) is responsible for their functions—levity or gravity.⁷⁷

Thus it is clear that bodies show different grades depending on the simplicity or complexity of their forms. Some bodies have an elementary form only, e.g., air, water, earth, etc. So a few elementary functions proceed from that form, such as gravity, levity, cold, etc. The plants possess this first form in common with the inanimate objects. But they have another form superadded to it, from which proceed their peculiar functions—nutrition and growth. The animals possess the forms of the inanimate objects and of the plants in common with them but have a third form also, which is the source of their peculiar functions—sensation and movement.

Now, man possesses the forms of the inanimate objects, plants and animals, in common with them, and also his own peculiar form which is the source of his reasoning, contemplation and knowledge of God.⁷⁸ In ordinary usage, it is this peculiar form of man alone that is referred to as soul.

Here, a possible misconception may be corrected. We have spoken of the several forms of man, animal or plant. However, it should not be taken to mean that these forms remain distinct and separate from one another and have real plurality in them. No, it is from the point of view of the resulting functions, and for the purposes of comparison, that we speak of several forms. In fact, plurality is inapplicable to them, as they are immaterial.⁷⁹

Not only the several forms of the same individual are one but, according to Ibn Tufayl, the innumerable forms in the whole Universe are all one and indistinguishable from God.⁸⁰

If forms are all one, why do they show such a plurality and differences of grades? Ibn Tufayl's answer is this. With regard to their source, i.e. God, they are one. With regard to the bodies in which they are manifested, they are many.⁸¹

The bodies manifest them in varying degrees because of their varying capacities to receive them. Just as some bodies reflect the light of the sun more strongly than others, similarly, the effects of the soul are more visible in some bodies than in others.⁸²

III. The Animal Spirit and the Soul

Now let us see how this form or soul is related to the animal spirit. The animal spirit is a fine hot vapour residing in the heart of the animal.

As it too is a body, it is composed of two aspects, form and matter. We have seen that form is the source of all properties and functions of a body. So the functions which seem to proceed from the animal spirit are really due to the form of the animal spirit. Further, an animal body, or a species of animals, or the whole animal kingdom is one in relation to the animal spirit from which its common functions proceed. When the form of the animal spirit is seen to be the source of those functions, it becomes the chief Principle of Unity underlying those bodies.

Moreover, the animal spirit is a superior body resulting from the most perfect and harmonious combination of various elements. That is why it is capable of higher manifestations of soul—the animal soul. And this is the secret of the rich and varied functions of an animal body.

IV. Soul and the Physical World

The soul is the principle of Unity underlying the physical world. It is an immaterial principle and so there can be no multiplicity in it. As the physical world is a huge body and body is composed of Form and Matter, so there is a world-soul corresponding to the body of the world. This world-soul includes other forms and essences without becoming a plurality itself.

A body comes into existence when the form is joined to it. Without form it is inconceivable. It is dependent on form and derived from form. So is the physical world.

Again, it would be wrong to suppose that the Matter (of the physical world) existed prior to form, and then, at a later stage, the form was joined to the matter. In fact, matter is mere nothing without form. Take away all form (shape, colour, properties and functions, etc.) from a body and nothing would be left there. So bare matter, divested of all forms, could not have existed. From this it logically follows that the physical world (of bodies), with all its matter, owes its existence to the form or the Soul.

V. Human Soul

Human soul refers to the peculiar form of man. Like other forms and souls it also proceeds from God. It is joined to the human body by the Command of God. But it is not some thing placed in the body. We cannot say that it is inside the body or outside it. These terms (outside and inside) have application to the relation of two bodies and the soul is not a body. Its relation to the body is so intimate that we cannot separate it from the body even in thought. It constitutes the

essence of the body. But again, as essence it is not to be located in any part of the body. It is connected with the whole body, or rather, its benefits and manifestations extend to the whole body.

We may raise here the question of the individuality of human soul. On a superficial glance it appears that Ibn Ṭufayl merges all souls in all-embracing Divine Essence. But that is not really so. He neither sacrifices unity for the sake of multiplicity, nor multiplicity for the sake of unity. He affirms God as the real Agent and Efficient cause behind all phenomena, yet it does not entail a denial of human freedom and responsibility. He solves this apparent paradox by pointing out that the terms one and many, singularity and plurality do not apply to the spiritual world. If these terms do not apply to the truths of that world the contradictions based on these notions cannot be ascribed to it either.

This is something like Kant's solution of the problem of freedom. Kant affirms it as a truth of noumenal world, which cannot have any clash with causality which refers to phenomena.

VI. The Beginning and End of Human Soul

In this world of generation and corruption death signifies corruption or change of form. When a body gives up its form and assumes a different form we call it death. It is the death of a flower when it changes into dust. Fire is dead when it is reduced to ashes. Thus it is clear that death or corruption is the fate of the bodies. What is not a body is free from death and corruption. Soul is an immaterial essence and it remains so for ever. Corruption and dissolution cannot touch it. In other words, it is immortal. It is the connection of the soul with the body that comes to an end—the body dies and assumes the form of the dust. But the Soul does not die with the body.⁸³

Similarly, the connection of the soul with the body has a beginning in time. It is an event produced anew. But the soul itself, viewed apart from the body, is not created in time.⁸⁴ It was eternally present with its source.

In this sense, however, all the forms, even the forms of inanimate objects or plants are immortal and eternal. Being immaterial they must all be imperishable.

It is another way of saying that their source is immortal and imperishable and with the dissolution of the body they will return to their source. This does not prove personal immortality. But so far as the human soul is concerned Ibn Ṭufayl seems inclined to believe in personal immortality. As we shall see in connection with views regarding the Reward and Punishment of the next life, Ibn Ṭufayl speaks of

everlasting joy and everlasting misery,⁸⁵ which imply the continuity of the soul's existence after death.

If some one were to ask him how the individuality and immortality of human soul can be reconciled with the Unity of God he will give the oft-repeated answer that the Divine world is such that the notions of our sensible world do not apply to it.

VII. Human Soul and the Knowledge of God

God is an Immaterial Essence, free from all attributes of body. He cannot be apprehended through senses or imagination. But the human soul, which is Immaterial like the Divine Essence and is derived from Him, has the capacity to know God.⁸⁶ The animals and other creatures of this world, who do not possess this noble essence, have no knowledge of God. The reason why human essence alone can know God is this. God is an Immaterial Essence. To know Him is to possess Him. To possess Him is to be like him. So His knowledge is His actual presence. Now this presence cannot be with the body. Nor can the body possess Him or resemble Him. Obviously, it is the immaterial human essence through which one can have knowledge and vision of God.⁸⁷

VIII. The Reward and Punishment of the Soul in the Hereafter

The question of the reward and punishment of the soul in the next life is a delicate problem of Religion. Most religions promise some kind of reward to the virtuous, and threaten the evil-doers with some kind of punishment, in the life after death. Islam does the same. It gives a graphic description of the pleasures of the Paradise and of the tortures of the Hell. Now the rationalists sometimes raise the following objections against the Islamic view of reward and punishment. First, why should God feel pleased or displeased with an insignificant being like man? It reduces Him to the status of a despotic monarch who wants to impose His will on others. Secondly, why the pleasures and pains of the next life should be described in such sensuous terms? Several answers have been given to these objections. But Ibn Tufayl tries to answer them in his own mystical way. He says: When a man endowed with sight has his eyes open we say that he sees actually. When his eyes are shut, then we say that he sees potentially or he has the power to see.⁸⁸ Now if a man has never actually apprehended any object he will have no particular desire for it (e. g. a man who is born blind).⁸⁹ But if he once used to apprehend the object actually and then he is reduced to the state of 'power' only, he will naturally have a desire to apprehend 'in act', and

will feel grief and sorrow over loss of it (e. g. a man who has lost his sight recently).⁹⁰ The more beautiful and glorious is the object the greater would be his grief for the loss of it.⁹¹

A man who is deprived of sight would feel greater grief than one who is deprived of smelling, because the objects of sight are more beautiful and perfect than those of smelling.⁹² But if there is an object of infinite beauty, glory and perfection, and one is deprived of the sight and knowledge of it after being once acquainted with it, his anguish and suffering would be unlimited. On the other hand, one who continues to enjoy the sight of it, his felicity and joy would have no bounds.⁹³

So this is the essence of the Punishment and Reward of the next life, according to Ibn Tufayl. One who devoted himself, during his life time, to seeking the knowledge and vision of the Divine Being (who is most Perfect, Beautiful and Glorious) will continue to enjoy that sight and vision after his death and will be in a condition of unbounded felicity and joy for ever.

On the other hand, a man who had some knowledge and notion of that Being and His Perfection but turned away from Him and remained so till death overtook him, will be deprived of that vision and will feel inexpressible anguish and torture on that account.⁹⁴

Now there are several categories, according to Ibn Tufayl, in this respect :

(i) Those who were never acquainted with the Divine Being and never heard of Him in this life, will have no desire for Him, and will feel no pangs on being separated from Him in the next life too. The desires for sense objects will also disappear with the death of the body. So their souls will practically disappear. Animals deprived of a rational essence, and human beings who belong to the same stage, come under this category.⁹⁵

(ii) Those who did acquire a notion of this Being and His Perfection during their lives but afterwards turned away from Him and remained in this condition till death, they will have a desire for that vision and, being deprived of it, will feel lasting pain and torture. Their suffering will be all the more intense as there will be no objects of sense and sensuous pleasures to engage them.⁹⁶

(iii) Those who acquired the notion of the Self-subsisting Necessary Being, and with all their thoughts and abilities sought His knowledge and vision they will enjoy uninterrupted vision in the hereafter as there would be no objects of sense to distract them, and they will be in a state of everlasting pleasure, joy and felicity.⁹⁷

Thus Ibn Tufayl explains the Reward and Punishment of the next life as a natural outcome or a logical consequence of the life in this

world. One gets what he seeks. If one turns his face against the sun he himself is responsible for not seeing the sun. Similarly, if a man seeks the vision of God he will find it. If he turns his face he will be deprived of it.

This is the answer of Ibn Ṭufayl to the first objection mentioned in the beginning of this section. The second objection is also met indirectly by the same answer. The sensuous and physical description of Paradise and Hell is by way of metaphor, to suit the general level of understanding. Its essence lies in the joys of the vision of God and pangs of separation from Him.⁹⁸

These were the conclusions to which Ibn Ṭufayl was led through his reasoning. He finds their confirmation in his mystical experiences also. In his mystical experience, in connection with the last stage of emanation, Ḥayy finds three categories of immaterial essences. He saw some immaterial essences that were beholding the Divine Essence and had great felicity and perfection.⁹⁹ There were some immaterial essences who were like rusty looking glasses covered with filth. "They had turned their face against the source of light and so were deprived of the vision of God. They were in infinite pain and misery—they were scorched with the fiery veil of separation and sawn asunder by the saws of repulsion and attraction."¹⁰⁰ Besides, there were some other essences that appeared and straight way vanished—they took form and were soon dissolved.¹⁰¹

These three classes exactly correspond to the three categories discussed before.

C. THE PHYSICAL WORLD

I. Ibn Ṭufayl's Notion of Body.

When we look around, the first thing that meets our glance is the body or bodies. To discover the true nature of these bodies has been the object of philosophy from the days of Thales.¹⁰² Ibn Ṭufayl also starts with the same quest. He bases his philosophy on the notion of Body. This is how he proceeds in the analysis of Body.

The notion of Body comprises two aspects—corporeity and something superadded to corporeity, i. e. form.¹⁰³ Corporeity (just the fact of being a body or having extension) is common to all bodies. They are indistinguishable from one another in this respect. It is something superadded to corporeity which distinguishes one body from another. It makes a body what it is. It is responsible for giving individuality and its peculiar characteristics to the body.

This corporeity and something superadded to it correspond to the distinction of Matter and Form as held by philosophers.

So a body is composed of matter and form. To make this distinction clear Ibn Tufayl gives an illustration. Take a ball of clay. It has a certain proportion in its dimensions. Now change it into a cubical or oval figure. The proportions and dimensions have changed. Yet something has remained the same which we call clay. The clay which remains the same throughout the various alterations represents the notion of 'matter'. The particular proportions and dimensions that it successively assumes represent the notion of 'form'. It is obvious that neither of them can subsist without the other. The clay cannot be found without certain proportions and dimensions. Similarly, these dimensions and proportions cannot be found to exist by themselves.¹⁰⁴

The analogy of clay and its particular proportions does not fully apply to form and matter. In fact the clay is not equivalent to matter because it already possesses certain attributes which distinguish it from wood, iron, gold, etc. Matter, on the other hand, is a notion devoid of all attributes. The moment any attributes are added to it it becomes a body, and remains matter no more.

II. Grades of Body, according to Form

We have seen that form is responsible for the distinctive features, properties and functions of a body. Bodies are distinguished from one another with regard to their forms.

Bodies show a graded classification on the basis of their common functions or similarity of form, e. g., man, animal, plant and inanimate objects. The inanimate objects have the poorest form as they show a few elementary functions only, e. g., levity, gravity, etc. The plants have a higher form because they, in addition to the functions of inanimate objects, show their peculiar functions also, viz. nutrition and growth. Animals possess a still higher form as their functions include sensation and movement, in addition to the functions of the preceding two classes.¹⁰⁵ Man has the highest form. He possesses the forms of inanimate objects, plants and animals, and also his own peculiar form, i. e., rational soul.

Now, if we search for those bodies which possess the simplest form, we arrive at the (so called) four elements—earth, water, air and fire.¹⁰⁶ These are the bodies with the simplest form, and it is with their different proportions and combinations that complex bodies result.

We see that bodies differ with regard to their function and durability. What is the principle behind these differences? Why some bodies

have easier access to the state of life ? Why some bodies are less subject to corruption than others ? Ibn Ṭufayl explains it thus:

The Bodies whose essence was endowed with most forms had the richest operations and had more ready entrance to life.¹⁰⁷

The bodies which had one single form only, like four elements, were lowest in the rank of existence. They had a very weak life. Their operations were weak because every one of them had an adversary to oppose its tendency.¹⁰⁸

The same is the case with some compound bodies in which the elements have not mingled harmoniously. They are at war with one another and try to oppose and neutralise one another with the result that ultimately one of those elements prevails. So the compound shows the nature of that prevailing element, with very little portion of life.¹⁰⁹

But if there is a compound body in which the elements were all equally mixed, and the nature of one element did not prevail over others, but all worked and cooperated harmoniously, then this body will have nothing contrary to its form, and will be most disposed to life.¹¹⁰

Now, animal spirit¹¹¹ is such a body. It has most even temperature. It is of the nature of a mean between all the elements. That is why it is capable of receiving the Form of animality.¹¹²

As the animal spirit has no opposition to its form, and the forms of all the four elements have been harmoniously merged together in it, it shows no absolute tendency, either upward or downward. If it were possible to put it in the middle space it would remain there. If it is moved locally it will move in a round way and would assume a spherical figure.¹¹³

In short, the animal spirit has a most superior body, just like the Heavenly Bodies.¹¹⁴ Through the resemblance of the animal spirit with the Heavenly Bodies Ibn Ṭufayl is seeking to explain various questions about the nature and movements of Heavenly Bodies. However absurd and ridiculous these views may appear to us yet they mark his effort to find a rational and scientific explanation of some observed phenomena.¹¹⁵

III. Unity of the World

It has been the yearning of philosophy to discover a principle of unity behind the multiplicity of the world. Ibn Ṭufayl also tries to reduce the multiplicity of bodies to unity through the following arguments :

- (1) In spite of the apparent multiplicity of bodies the whole world, the whole orb of Heavens and what is contained in it,

is one thing, compacted and joined together. The multiplicity of bodies within it does not disprove its unity. It is like the multiplicity of limbs in an animal body.¹¹⁶ Even a small body like a stone or a piece of iron is not an absolutely simple body. It is composed of smaller parts. Similarly, we may take the whole world as one huge Body composed of smaller parts. Its continuity and compactness make it one.

- (2) All bodies, from the point of view of their matter or corporeity, are indistinguishable from one another. They all have extension. So this matter or corporeity is the common principle behind all bodies.¹¹⁷ But matter is a weak basis for unity, because, in ultimate analysis, it is reduced to nothing. Ibn Tufayl, therefore, proceeds to point out a more reliable principle of unity, i. e., form.
- (3) The form is that which distinguishes one body from another. It appears to be a source of multiplicity. But we find one form changing into another. The ice changes into water and the water condenses into ice. The wood changes into coal and the coal changes into smoke, and so on. Thus the change of bodies from one form to another suggests that they are at bottom one.¹¹⁸
- (4) An important argument for the unity of bodies is derived from the nature of Form. A body is composed of matter and form.

In matter, we have seen, bodies are indistinguishable from one another. Forms give them multiplicity. But, are forms really multiple? Ibn Tufayl answers it in the negative. Forms are immaterial. The notion of multiplicity does not apply to them.¹¹⁹ As forms constitute the essence of bodies, so bodies are in their essence one.

- (5) Again, all bodies are subject to generation and corruption. They stand in need of an Immaterial Agent, the necessarily Existent Being. In relation to this Being, and in being produced and controlled by Him, they are all one.¹²⁰
- (6) Lastly, we have the mystical argument. A mystic, during his mystic states, sees all forms emanating from God, just as light proceeds from the sun. Suppose this light of the sun, reflecting through a series of mirrors, ultimately falls on fluctuating water. There, the image of the sun seems to be multiplied. But in spite of this apparent multiplicity the sun and its light are one. Similarly, the graded emanations of

Immaterial Essences of different spheres and a thousand-faced essence of this Physical World do not imply any multiplicity in God. Being immaterial, they are all one with God.¹²¹ They appear 'many' in relation to bodies. But bodies depend wholly on these essences. Matter too is nothing apart from them. The whole world owes its reality and existence to these emanations from God. It is nothing apart from God. So in reality it is one.

IV. The Reality and Status of the World

The sensible world, according to Ibn Ṭufayl, does not possess any independent status or reality. It is like a shadow of the Divine World.¹²² It stands in need of the Divine world; the Divine world does not need it. It proceeds from God. As the forms emanate from God the world also comes into being.

Ibn Ṭufayl does not deny the existence of the world or its reality as such. But as an independent being and as a rival to God it has no reality.

In a sense, he takes it even as immortal. "It is absurd," he says, "to suppose a possibility of its annihilation because it follows the Divine world."¹²³ The corruption of the world, according to him, does not mean total annihilation but change from the present form to some other form. He tries to find support for his point of view in the verses of the Quran, describing the Day of judgement as "the day when Earth will be changed into another Earth, and the Heavens likewise."¹²⁴ In short, the world is nothing but the manifestation of the Divine Essence. So long as the Essence is there the manifestation will continue though modes of it may change.

V. The World is Limited in Space

According to Ibn Ṭufayl the notion of unlimited or infinite body is absurd.¹²⁵ He tries to prove it by an ingenious argument. The argument is primarily meant to prove the Heavenly body to be finite, but it applies to all bodies with equal force. It is as follows:

It is obvious that body of the Heaven is terminated on this side which is facing us. Suppose it is infinite on the other side. Further, suppose two parallel straight lines are drawn through the body of the Heaven ad infinitum. Now cut off a long part from one line. Is it still infinite? No. If it is taken to be infinite it will be equal to the other line, which is obviously absurd, as a part has already been cut off

from it. Thus it is finite. Now add to it the part which had been cut off from it. The line still remains finite because by adding one finite to another finite you cannot get an Infinite. This finite line is just equal to the other line as it has regained its cut-off part. The other line too is therefore finite. But it has been drawn throughout the length of the Heavenly body. So Heavenly body must also be finite.¹²⁶

In a similar way, we may suppose two parallel straight lines drawn throughout the body of the world, extending *ad infinitum* on both the sides. Then cutting off a portion from one of the lines we render it finite. And by adding the cut-off piece we restore it to its previous length and make it again equal with the other line. But it still remains finite. And thus the other line is also proved to be finite, and so also the whole world.

VI. Is the World Eternal or Created in Time?

The question of the eternity of the world has been a thorny problem for theistic philosophy. But it is here that Ibn Ṭufayl shows the great strength of his philosophy and his modern spirit. He finds plausible arguments on both the sides and does not commit himself either way. His subtle and penetrating arguments remind one of the Antinomies of Kant.¹²⁷ It is surprising to see how, long before Kant, he boldly affirmed the limits of human knowledge and tried to set limits to human reason.

First, he examines the thesis that the world is eternal. He finds the following objections against it :

- (1) The notion of infinite existence is as absurd and inconceivable as the notion of infinite extension.¹²⁸
- (2) The world cannot be said to be more ancient than its accidents and phenomena. Now these accidents are produced in time. It means that the world itself has been produced in time. So it cannot be eternal.¹²⁹

Now, taking the antithesis that the world is not eternal or it has been produced in time he finds it equally impossible to believe, on account of the following arguments :

- (1) To believe that the world was produced in time implies that there was time before it. But time is inseparable from the world and its phenomena.¹³⁰ So the world could not be supposed to be later than time. In other words, it has had no beginning in time and so it is eternal.¹³¹
- (2) Moreover, if the world was produced anew it needed a producer. Why did this Producer make the world at a particular moment and not at another time ? Was it because of

some new chance or happening? But it was not possible. The world had not yet come into being and so there could be no happening to serve as occasion for creating the world. Was it due to some change in His own nature? But there was nothing besides Him to produce that change. So we cannot suppose the world to have beginning in time.¹³²

Finding arguments on both the sides equally forceful and cogent he gives up the effort to prove it this way or that. But he wants to see what implications the two positions have for his belief in God. He finds that both the views lead him to the same conclusion that there is an Immaterial Agent or Creator.

If the world was created in time it was obvious that it could not have come into existence of itself, and needed an Agent to produce it. If that Agent is supposed to be a body then it would be a part of the world and a created being itself. So there must be an Immaterial Agent as the producer of the world.¹³³

Now suppose the world to be eternal. The motion that we find in the world, for instance in the Heavenly bodies, must also be eternal. The eternal motion would be something unlimited and infinite. The power that produces this infinite effect should also be infinite. But this infinite power cannot be found in a body as all bodies are finite and a finite body cannot possess infinite power. So there must be an Immaterial Agent possessed of infinite power and perfection, as the mover of the world.¹³⁴

That a finite body cannot possess infinite power is proved by Ibn Ṭufayl by the following argument :

Any power which is diffused through a body is divided when the body is divided; and it is doubled when the body is doubled. Take for instance a stone. It possesses gravity—tendency to go downward. If you divide the stone into two parts the gravity will also be divided. If you add to it a stone of the same size the gravity will be doubled. If you go on adding stones, the gravity will go on increasing. Since the stone, being a body, will always be finite, there shall always be a possibility of adding more to it. Similarly, there will always be room for increase in its gravity. So the gravity possessed by a stone will always be finite. The same is true of other bodily attributes and powers.¹³⁵

Thus Ibn Ṭufayl is able to prove the need for an Immaterial Agent even on the basis of the eternity of the world.

But here a difficulty arises. If God is eternal, and the world is also eternal, how can one be the cause or the producer of the other? Ibn Ṭufayl solves this difficulty in a subtle way. The world, he says,

is posterior to God in Nature if not in time.¹³⁶ The world is caused and created by Him out of time. This he tries to explain by means of an analogy. Suppose you hold a ball in your hand and then move your hand. The movement of the ball is not posterior to the movement of the hand yet it is caused by the hand and is dependent on the hand. The same relation may be conceived between God and the world, if the world is to be taken as eternal.¹³⁷

But a more serious objection may be raised against this position. If the world is supposed to be eternal it becomes a rival to God and leads to Dualism. Ibn Tufayl's answer to this objection is typical of his philosophy. The world being a huge body consists of matter and form. Matter has no independent reality. It depends on form and form is dependent on God. It is a mere disposition to produce certain actions. The reality of the whole world consists in its disposition to be moved by this Mover or the Immaterial Agent. It can never be his independent rival.¹³⁸

D. SOME OTHER IMPORTANT PROBLEMS

I. The Summum Bonum of Human Life

The highest Happiness, or Summum Bonum of human life is the knowledge and vision of God,¹³⁹ and Union with God. There are several considerations leading to this position :

- (i) There is a nobler part, a rational soul, in man which distinguishes him from other animals. It shows that he is destined for a higher end.¹⁴⁰ And that higher end is the knowledge and vision of God.
- (ii) The human soul is an immaterial form or essence which resembles the Divine Essence and is derived from Him.¹⁴¹ It is natural that it should have inclination towards its source.
- (iii) We have seen that God is the true Agent behind all occurrences and phenomena of the world. Whatever elegance, beauty or perfection we find in any object it proceeds from God who is infinitely more elegant, beautiful and perfect.¹⁴² He alone should be the true object of our love and yearnings.
- (iv) The mystical experience confirms these conclusions of our reason. The mystic states reveal Him to be possessed of such beauty, elegance, splendour and perfection that no eye has ever seen, no ear ever heard, and no heart has ever conceived. The mystic finds in that vision such supreme joy, bliss and happiness that cannot be expressed in words. Now

it is no more a question of arguments but a matter of direct attraction.¹⁴³ Having tasted that pleasure once one cannot desire anything else. He wants to have that vision perpetually before him, and not to lose sight of it for a moment.

- (v) Moreover, if one understands the nature of the reward and punishment of the next life he knows that to be indifferent to that vision in this life may mean eternal misery, agony and torture.¹⁴⁴

Here a question may be raised as to the possibility of that vision or union. Ibn Ṭufayl most categorically believes that it is possible—nay, his whole philosophy is based on this belief.

First, he acquires the knowledge of God through rational method. Then through contemplation and mystical experience he is confirmed in it. He argues to himself like this: God is an Immaterial Essence. He cannot be known through sense or imagination. Since I know him I also possess an immaterial essence like Him. Moreover, for the same reason that He is an Immaterial Essence and I am also an immaterial essence, in knowing Him I come to possess Him and become one with Him.¹⁴⁵ However, the final proof of all this, according to Ibn Ṭufayl, lies in attaining to that state.

II. The Method of attaining to the Vision of God and Union with God

According to Ibn Ṭufayl, human nature comprises three aspects—the gross physical body, animal spirit, and the immaterial essence (the rational soul). In the first he resembles the brutes; in the second, heavenly bodies; and in the third, God. To satisfy all these aspects three “assimilations” are necessary for him. The first assimilation consists in imitating the actions of the animals;¹⁴⁶ the second, in imitating the actions of the heavenly bodies;¹⁴⁷ and the third, in trying to resemble God or to be one with God.¹⁴⁸ The third assimilation is desired for its own sake as it leads to the vision of God which is the highest end of man. The second assimilation (the preservation of animal spirit) is necessary because it too leads to the vision of God but not in an unmixed way.¹⁴⁹ The first assimilation is apparently a hindrance to the vision but it is also indirectly necessary as it is a necessary means of preserving the animal spirit.¹⁵⁰

The first assimilation implies two kinds of duties :

- (i) To make up for the deficiency of the body and to provide it with food, etc.
- (ii) To save the body from external dangers and injuries,

In this connection Ibn Ṭufayl preaches a most ascetic way of life. As indulgence in physical desires diverts the mystic from pursuing his highest end—the Vision of God, Ibn Ṭufayl would have forbidden it totally. But it is necessary to preserve the body for the sake of animal spirit and it is necessary to preserve the animal spirit for the sake of the Vision of God. However, Ibn Ṭufayl permits only the minimum possible attention to the needs of the body. Moreover, plants and animals are works of God. To eat them would amount to destroying the works of the Creator and opposing His design.¹⁵¹ But total abstinence would lead to the destruction of a higher work of God, i. e., human body. He prescribes, therefore, that food may be taken under very rigid restrictions—just so much as is necessary for keeping the body and soul together.¹⁵²

In connection with the second assimilation he finds it necessary to imitate the three kinds of attributes possessed by Heavenly bodies :

- (i) They are clear, bright and pure, free from all dirt; and their motion is circular.
- (ii) They are a source of advantage to others as they provide light and heat to other creatures.
- (iii) They are continually beholding the Necessarily Existent Being and have a desire towards God, and are obeying His will.

Accordingly, three kinds of duties are enjoined upon a mystic :¹⁵³

- (i) He should keep his body clean and pure, and should occasionally indulge in a kind of ecstatic dance—a circular motion round his own self.
- (ii) He should show benevolence and kindness to all beings—even to plants and inanimate objects. He should remove obstacles from their way.
- (iii) He should concentrate on the Divine Essence, and should try to seek His Vision, cutting himself off from everything else.

With regard to the third assimilation, Ibn Ṭufayl recommends the imitation of the Positive and Negative attributes of God.¹⁵⁴

- (i) The positive attributes are knowledge, power, wisdom, etc.
- (ii) The negative attributes imply freedom from all bodily attributes and imperfections.

In both these attributes the mystic has to guard against the error of ascribing bodily attributes or limitations to God. One important attribute of bodies is multiplicity. The Divine essence is to be conceived as free from multiplicity. The attributes of God are in reality one with His Essence.

Moreover, as the Divine Essence is Immaterial it cannot be present anywhere but with itself.¹⁵⁵ It cannot be known by the sense or imagi-

nation. It is through our immaterial essence (the rational soul) that we know Him. To know Him is to possess Him and to be one with Him, because there can be no duality or multiplicity in the Divine Essence.¹⁵⁶

Thus the proper way of imitating the Divine attributes is to know Him, and to seek His Vision. This can be achieved by withdrawing from everything other than God (including one's own self), and concentrating all thoughts and meditations on the Divine Essence, His knowledge and Vision.¹⁵⁷

This is in brief the practical programme laid down by Ibn Tufayl for attaining to the highest happiness (Summum Bonum) of human life. It is clear that he prescribes three kinds of duties—duties to God, duties to self and duties to others. The first type of duties are most important, and serve as the basis of the other two kinds. The Vision of God is desired for its own sake, while preservation of the body and the animal spirit is necessary as a means to this end. In a way, all duties are duties to God. But since in having the knowledge and Vision of God lies perfection and happiness of the soul, we may say that all these duties are duties to the self as well. They are the way to self-realization.

It is significant to remember that Ibn Tufayl recognizes duties to animals, plants and inanimate objects even.

III. Theory of Knowledge

In modern philosophy theory of knowledge has assumed special significance. Before constructing their philosophical systems various philosophers deem it necessary to decide as to the nature and source of knowledge. In some cases philosophy has been equated with an epistemological enquiry.

At the very outset of modern period we have two rival schools of philosophy—Rationalism and Empiricism.¹⁵⁸ The rationalists, like *Descartes*, *Spinoza* and *Leibnitz*, hold that reason is the source of all knowledge. The Empiricists, like *Locke*, *Berkeley* and *Hume*, consider all knowledge to be dependent on sense-experience.

It is a peculiar feature of Ibn Tufayl that he cannot be brought under either category. He does not exclusively subscribe either to Rationalism or to Empiricism, but combines in his theory of knowledge elements of both the schools. In this respect he is somewhat nearer to *Kant*. For *Kant*, mere experience, without the synthetic activity of the mind or understanding, cannot give knowledge.¹⁵⁹ *Kant* utilizes this analysis of knowledge to arrive at his well-known position, confining all knowledge to phenomena and excluding noumena from its reach.

But Ibn Ṭufayl believes in three stages of knowledge :

- (i) Empirical knowledge, e.g., knowledge of every-day life or the scientific knowledge gained through Induction.
- (ii) Rational knowledge, e.g., philosophical knowledge about soul and God arrived at through Rational method.
- (iii) Intuitive knowledge, i.e., knowledge and Vision of God gained through mystic experience.

Let us consider these stages or forms of knowledge, one by one.

1. Empirical Knowledge

Ibn Ṭufayl believes in the usually-accepted five senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These five senses function with the help of the animal spirit.¹⁰⁰ The seat of the animal spirit is the heart. From the heart it reaches the brain. The sense organs receive the animal spirit from the cavities of the brain by means of nerves.¹⁰¹ The brain gets the report of the functioning of these organs through the same passages i.e. nerves. The brain is the seat of several faculties which are concerned with various functions, e.g., perceiving and discriminating colours, smells, tastes, etc., feeling pleasure and pain, pleasant and unpleasant, being attracted to the former and repelled by the latter, memory and imagination, etc. Thus we see that Ibn Ṭufayl seems to incline towards the school of Faculty Psychology,¹⁰² which betrays the influence of Aristotle on him. It is also significant that he subscribes to the same division of human mind into three aspects (cognition, affection and conation) as advocated by Stout and some other modern psychologists.¹⁰³

About the functioning and limits of the sense there is a very significant passage in *Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān* which [shows Ibn Ṭufayl's great insight and depth of knowledge. We may quote it here at some length:

"He was desirous to know by what means he had attained this knowledge, and by which of the faculties he had apprehended this Being, i.e., God. At first he examined all his senses, viz. his hearing, sight, smelling, tasting and feeling, and perceived that all these apprehended nothing but body, or what was in body. For the hearing apprehended nothing but sounds, and these came from the undulation of the air, when the bodies are struck one against another; the sight apprehends colours; the smelling, odours; the taste, savours; and the touch, the temperature and dispositions of bodies such as hardness, softness, roughness and smoothness.

Nor does the imagination apprehend anything but that which has

length, breadth and thickness. Now all these things, which are thus apprehended, are the adjuncts of bodies.”¹⁶⁴

This, however, should not be interpreted to mean that Ibn Ṭufayl is in perfect agreement with the Empiricists with regard to his analysis of sense-experience. He also recognizes the part played by reason or intellect, without which there would be no knowledge worth the name. The following quotation will bear it out.

“For that understanding which he, and such as he, mean is nothing else but that Logical Faculty which examines the individuals of sensible things, and from them gets an universal notion.”¹⁶⁵

These words clearly indicate that Ibn Ṭufayl, while speaking of this logical faculty, had Inductive reasoning in his mind. In tracing the development of Ḥayy b. Yaḡẓān he shows greatest command over Induction and scientific method. Ḥayy’s various discoveries and inventions,¹⁶⁶ his acquaintance with the properties of different objects,¹⁶⁷ his classification of natural objects into various classes and species,¹⁶⁸ and above all, the search for the cause of death,¹⁶⁹ all reveal his familiarity with Inductive method and its intricacies. It is perhaps due to his training as a physician.

Moreover, Ibn Ṭufayl is not one-sided in his use of Induction. He considers deduction to be an integral part of his method. He employs deductive verification for the confirmation of his results. Unlike Francis Bacon, he has no aversion to hypothesis.¹⁷⁰ He starts his enquiry with some hypothesis¹⁷¹ which he frames with great care and caution, in the light of his past experiences, or on the basis of plausible reasoning. Then, through some crucial observation or experiment, the hypothesis is rejected or verified.

In short, Ibn Ṭufayl makes use of the scientific method with the same precision and thoroughness as we find in scientific researches to-day.

2—Knowledge based on Rational Method

We have discussed Ibn Ṭufayl’s views with regard to empirical knowledge. Even at this stage he is not a pure empiricist, for he believes in the part played by the intellect in drawing universal notions from particulars.¹⁷² But if we take his philosophy as a whole he clearly inclines towards Rationalism and Idealism. For instance, referring to Ḥayy’s discovery of forms Ibn Ṭufayl says: “And thus he attained a notion of the forms of the bodies, according to their differences. These were the first things he found out, belonging to the spiritual world; for these forms are not the objects of sense, but are apprehended by intellectual speculation.”¹⁷³

This quotation is very significant as it brings to clear relief what Ibn Tufayl understands by philosophical or intellectual speculation. The discussion of all those realities or truths which cannot be perceived through senses or through imagination comes under this head. It is this theoretical speculation that leads him to the notion of the forms and the Immaterial Producer of forms. Again, it is the same philosophical speculation or rational method that enables him to regard the necessarily Existent Being as the source of all immaterial essences (forms or souls), and makes him conceive the Divine world as transcending the notions of unity and multiplicity.¹⁷⁴

Ibn Tufayl is most emphatic with regard to the supra-sensuous nature of this knowledge. He believes that there is an immaterial essence (the rational soul) in us which is the source of this knowledge.¹⁷⁵

3. Knowledge based on Intuition or Mystic Experience

This is the highest kind of knowledge according to Ibn Tufayl. When the seeker after God concentrates all his thoughts and meditations on God, withdrawing his thoughts from everything else, he sometimes enters into a state of total absorption. Then the Heavens and the earth, and whatever is between them, and all immaterial essences including his own essence, disappear like scattered dust and there remains nothing but the One, True, Perpetually self-existent Being.¹⁷⁶ During this state, which is somewhat like a state of intoxication, the mystic witnesses that which neither eye hath seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of any man has ever conceived.¹⁷⁷ He finds such joy and felicity in this state as no words can describe.

This experience possesses the following characteristics, according to Ibn Tufayl.

- (i) It is immediate and direct. There is no process of reasoning or inference involved in it.¹⁷⁸
- (ii) As it is direct and immediate it carries its own certainty with it. The man who has this experience does not entertain the slightest doubt about its truth.
- (iii) It is personal and private.
- (iv) It is non-communicable. It cannot be expressed in words. However, some remote and indirect ideas about it may be conveyed through metaphors and parables.¹⁷⁹
- (v) Since it relates to the Divine Essence and the spiritual world it is free from all attributes of physicality; it cannot be had through sense or imagination or any other physical faculty. Its source is the immaterial essence in us.¹⁸⁰

- (vi) The distinctions of multiplicity and unity, many and one, much and little, which are intelligible with reference to bodies only, have no application to it.¹⁸⁰
- (vii) At the time of this experience the mystic is simply absorbed in it.¹⁸¹ But on returning to his normal condition he draws certain inferences from it and tries to 'rationalise' on its basis.

Now, it is significant how these three stages of knowledge are related to one another. Ibn Ṭufayl does not take them as isolated and independent of one another. They indicate a progressive gradation corresponding to the stages of development of human knowledge. The third stage, no doubt, represents the highest stage of knowledge. But one should first pass through the second stage—the stage of intellectual knowledge—to prepare himself for the third stage. Here Ibn Ṭufayl seems to be in agreement with the modern advocates of Intuitive knowledge, like Bergson¹⁸² and Iqbal.¹⁸³

Again, a similar relationship exists between the first stage and the second stage. The Reason or Intellect cannot operate without the data of empirical knowledge. It is significant that Ibn Ṭufayl has no use for purely apriori arguments for the Existence of God. First, he shows the development of empirical knowledge, in Ḥayy, upto a certain stage. Then, in the light of this knowledge and experience, Ḥayy acquires the knowledge of Forms. Perceiving the changes of forms in bodies he makes a search for the cause or the Producer of these forms. Ultimately, to avoid infinite regress, he arrives at the notion of an Immaterial Agent as the efficient cause of all the phenomena. Only in this last step he may be said to be going beyond the limits of all empirical knowledge and experience. But this last step was made possible by the earlier steps based on experience and empirical knowledge.¹⁸⁴

Some superficial readers of Ibn Ṭufayl are puzzled by the two apparently diverse trends of his philosophy. On the one hand, he is a Rationalist,¹⁸⁵ relying on the rational proofs for the existence of soul and God. On the other hand, he is a great advocate of the Intuitive method, and a champion of mysticism.

However, if we understand the nature of his mysticism and its relation to the 'Intellectual knowledge' the apparent contradiction will disappear.

Ibn Ṭufayl, in his Introduction to Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān, makes this point very clear. First, he gives a very significant and important quotation from Ibn Sīnā to explain the nature of mystic states.¹⁸⁶ Then he most expressly says that nothing is revealed in these states that may be contradictory to what is revealed through intellectual method. However,

there are two points of difference. The former (the mystic state) is distinguished from the latter (knowledge based on theoretical method) in being marked by far greater clarity and in being accompanied by excessive joy and felicity.¹⁸⁷ He gives a beautiful example to illustrate this point. Suppose there is a man who has been born blind but is endowed with keen intellect and strong memory. He is brought up in a city with which he is quite familiar. He moves about freely and recognizes persons and objects by means of his senses other than sight. He even knows the distinctions of colours with the help of their names and descriptions. All of a sudden his eye-sight is restored. Now, he goes round the city and does not find anything contrary to his former belief. But his present state of knowledge differs from his former state in so far as it is far more clear and is accompanied by great joy and pleasure. Similar is the difference between the state of intellectual knowledge and the mystic state.¹⁸⁸

Ibn Tufayl believes that the mystic experience, by its very nature, is non-communicable. If any one tries to express it in language it will change its nature and will become something belonging to the second stage, i. e. intellectual knowledge. Moreover, it will be susceptible of varied interpretations and different expositions, making it difficult to arrive at the truth.¹⁸⁹

IV. Ibn Tufayl's Philosophy of Language

The problem of language is closely allied to the problem of knowledge. During recent years it has assumed special significance due to the development of the schools of Logical Positivism and Philosophical Analysis.¹⁹⁰ However, philosophy of language is much older than these movements. The credit of pioneer work in this field is usually given to Locke and Hume. But here again, as in Induction, we find Ibn Tufayl to have laid the foundation of the philosophy of language, several centuries before Locke and Hume.

Ibn Tufayl frequently enters into the discussion about the nature of language, its possibilities and limits. He believes that language has developed in the context of the physical world. It has essential reference to bodies, their properties and adjuncts. It is not capable of expressing the truths of the Divine world which is far removed from bodies and their attributes. Whenever we employ any such word, as our ears are used to, to describe these experiences, it insinuates some physical attribute or notion contrary to those truths.¹⁹¹ Ibn Tufayl is very emphatic on this point. He says: "And whosoever asks to have that state explained, asks an impossibility; for it is just as if a man should have a mind to taste colours, quatenus colours, and desire that black

should be either sweet or sour.”¹⁹² It is because we cannot express anything by words, which is not first conceived in the heart,¹⁹³ and the truths of the Divine world are such that no man has ever conceived them.¹⁹⁴

In his views Ibn Ṭufayl seems to be anticipating two divergent schools of thought. On the one hand he is in perfect agreement with the Logical Positivists, like Wittgenstein and others, in regarding language as confined to the sensible phenomena only.¹⁹⁵ On the other hand, he seems to anticipate Kant in a way. Kant, on the basis of his distinction between Phenomena and Noumena, had asserted that the forms of our understanding and categories of our knowledge do not apply to the latter.¹⁹⁶ Ibn Ṭufayl maintains that the truth of the Divine World cannot be expressed in words. It amounts to the same thing. What cannot be expressed in words, cannot be conceived either. So the Divine world for Ibn Ṭufayl, like the ‘Noumena’ of Kant, transcends the ordinary categories of knowledge and lies beyond the reach of language. Kant promises a glimpse of the noumenal Realities (soul and God) through the practical consciousness or practical Reason. Ibn Ṭufayl, trained in the traditions of Oriental Mysticism, believes in direct intuitive experience or Vision of God. But he is very emphatic with regard to the impossibility of bringing this experience under familiar logical forms or within the bounds of language. That is why, in referring to the beauty and perfection of the Divine world he so often repeats the statement that ‘no eye hath seen, no ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive’. It is not the fact of its rarity but the nature of this experience that forbids communication. If every human being could be so fortunate as to be blessed with this experience even then it would be impossible to convey it through words for the simple reason that our language has a necessary physical bias and those truths belong to a different category. To illustrate his point Ibn Ṭufayl just takes one example—the notion of ‘one and many’. Logical understanding tells us that a thing should be either one or many. But Ibn Ṭufayl would say that ‘one’ and ‘many’ have reference to bodies only. We cannot say about the immaterial essences that they are one or many.¹⁹⁷ In reality, they are above these distinctions. That is why the emanations of different essences or the presence of different attributes does not imply a multiplicity in God. Nor can we speak of a pure abstract unity in the case of the Divine world.

Similarly, no words of our language can be applied to the Divine world, in their usual sense.¹⁹⁸ All explanations or descriptions of those states should be taken as metaphors, or by way of parables.

Here a question arises. If Ibn Ṭufayl believes that the Divine world transcends all forms of language and thought how can he assert

the harmony between the Intuitive knowledge and the intellectual knowledge ? How can intellect deal at all with the truths of that world which is inaccessible to it ? Ibn Ṭufayl would answer this objection by pointing out that the harmony should be taken in a general way—not with regard to details. At the intellectual level there is only a dim and vague knowledge of these truths—a sort of indirect acquaintance, just like the indirect acquaintance of the blind man with the colours through their names. But at the intuitive level there is direct acquaintance, which may be compared to the state of a man whose sight has been restored. Now he actually understands what colours are like.¹⁹⁹

- Returning to Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy of language. It is obvious that he does not regard language to be coextensive with thought. He believes that there are many things that our heart conceives yet they cannot be expressed in language.²⁰⁰ Then there are things (truths of the Divine world) which no one can ever conceive because they transcend the categories of our thought. There is no question of expressing them in words. Ibn Ṭufayl believes that mystic experience takes place without the help of language and words. Ordinarily, when we have an experience, say of green colour, there is a simultaneous judgement, viz. 'There is a green colour', or "I am seeing a green colour before me." This judgment may be explicit or implicit, yet it is there. But the case is different with mystic experience, according to Ibn Ṭufayl. The experience is such that no words are adequate to express it that is why Ḥayy b. Yqẓān', the imaginary hero of Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophical romance, is shown to have passed through all stages of mystic development without developing the ability of language. Ibn Ṭufayl, in one of his passages, most clearly and beautifully brings out this fact. He says :

"And then both the Heavens and the Earth, and whatsoever is between them, and all spiritual forms...disappeared and vanished "like scattered dust", and amongst them his own essence disappeared too, and there remained nothing but this One, True, Perpetually Self-existent Being, who thus spoke in that saying of His (which is not a notion superadded to His Essence): To whom now belongs the Kingdom ? God the One, the Almighty, which words of his Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān understood, nor was his being unacquainted with words, and not being able to speak, any hindrance at all to the understanding of them."²⁰¹

Here Ibn Ṭufayl is hinting at the possibility of communication from the Divine Being without the medium of language.²⁰²

V.—How Religion is related to Philosophy

Ibn Ṭufayl has dealt with this problem towards the close of his book. According to some historians and critics it was the main object

of Ibn Ṭufayl, in writing Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān. We have already seen that the problem of the relation of Religion to Philosophy had assumed vital importance in the period to which Ibn Ṭufayl belonged.

Anyhow, the views of Ibn Ṭufayl on the relation of Religion to Philosophy may be summarized as follows:

From the point of view of the ultimate truth there is perfect harmony between religion and philosophy.²⁰³ There is nothing in religion which may contradict our rational conclusion, or philosophy. An unbiassed philosopher can discover all the truths of religion with the help of his experience, reasoning, contemplation and intuition.

Philosophy and Religion both aim at the same Ultimate Reality, the truly self-existent Being, i.e. God. But with this fundamental agreement there are some difference also.

(1) Philosophy relies on experience, reasoning and intuition as its method or as means of knowledge. The Prophets too have intuition and direct experience but the main source of their knowledge is revelation from God. In other words, they do not reach the stage of direct knowledge through preliminary intellectual effort, but are brought to it direct by the Grace of God. It is wrong to suppose, as 'Omar Farukh seems to imply,²⁰⁴ that Ibn Ṭufayl regards the status of the Prophet as inferior to that of the philosopher. Ibn Ṭufayl shows great reverence and respect for prophethood. He severely criticises Fārābī for equating prophethood with the faculty of imagination and for holding philosophy as superior to it.²⁰⁵

In fact he never made a comparison between a Prophet and a philosopher. However, we find a comparison between a follower of the Prophet and the model of a true philosopher, viz., Asal and Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān. In this comparison Ḥayy comes out in a more favourable light.²⁰⁶ The reason is obvious. So far as the ordinary adherents of religion are concerned their beliefs are based on traditions. They have had no direct and personal experience of those truths.

(2) There is another important difference between religion and philosophy. Philosophy tries to grasp the truths of the spiritual world as they are in their true, direct and naked form. Religion, on the other hand, expresses them in an indirect form—through metaphors and analogies.

(3) Philosophy is meant for the chosen few—for those who have reached a particular level of intellectual development, and are endowed with a particularly inquisitive and contemplative nature.

Religion is concerned with the reform and welfare of mankind in general.

(4) The point of view of philosophy is personal, while that of religion, social and collective. Philosophy is something private and

personal for a man. It tells him the way to his highest happiness and personal salvation. But religion tries to uplift the masses and teaches the art of living together in society.

(5) Philosophy aims at the whole truth and demands total absorption in it, and undivided devotion to it.

Religion tries to enlighten its followers to the extent of their capacities. It gives a 'necessary minimum' for them, and beyond that minimum allows them indulgence in worldly affairs, under certain prescribed rules and restrictions.

The source of these differences lies in the fact that the Prophets have as their mission the benefit of mankind in general. The masses, unfortunately, are at a very low level of development. All of them, with a few exceptions, are just like irrational animals or brutes. They cannot see beyond this sensible world. All their desires are confined to the objects and pleasures of this life and they have no care for the next. They seem to have no craving for the knowledge of God or the Divine world.²⁰⁷ It is with such men that the Prophets have to deal mostly. So they prescribe a 'necessary minimum' for them.

It is the wisest course about them, for they have no other way to salvation. If they are raised to the realms of speculation it will add to their confusion. They will waver in their beliefs and will fall headlong into errors. Similarly, if they are asked to devote their whole time to the contemplation and Vision of God, they will turn their backs upon religion, and will thus be totally deprived of its benefits.²⁰⁸

Before closing this discussion it seems desirable to remove certain misconceptions that are likely to arise in connection with this problem.

We have already challenged Omar Farrukh's interpretation of Ibn Ṭufayl's views on Prophethood. Omar Farrukh further represents Ibn Ṭufayl as implying that salvation reached through religion is of a lower grade than that reached through philosophy.²⁰⁹ Here again Omar Farrukh is taking into consideration the lowest level, 'the minimum necessary' of religion. But religion does not forbid a man to go beyond. A man of higher aspirations can aim higher, and religion offers sufficient guidance for such persons also.

In a way, Ibn Ṭufayl implies the superiority of religion over philosophy. In spite of all his mystic development and philosophical attainments, Ḥayy b. Yaqzān is ultimately shown by Ibn Ṭufayl as "believing in the Prophet, and affirming his veracity and bearing witness to his Divine mission"²¹⁰ Moreover, he accepted his teachings with regard to prayers, alms, fasting and pilgrimage and such other observances, and began to practise them in obedience to his commands.²¹¹

NOTES & REFERENCES

1. H. Y. O., 50, p. 94.
2. Ibid. 49, p. 92, 93.
3. Ibid. 50, p. 94.
4. For the explanation of Form see section I, Part C of this chapter. Here it may be briefly mentioned that Body, according to Ibn Tufayl, comprises two notions, matter and form. Matter is that common aspect in which all bodies are indistinguishable from one another. Form is what distinguishes one body from another. All the qualities, shape and functions of a body proceed from its form.
5. H. Y. O., 38, p. 79.
6. Ibid. 63, p. 109.
7. Ibid. 44, p. 85.
8. Ibid. 49, p. 93.
9. Ibid. 39, p. 80.
10. Ibid. 39, p. 89.
11. Here, Ibn Tufayl is anticipating Hume's analysis of cause. Hume's doctrine of causality is mainly based on the denial of necessary connection between cause and effect. Cf. Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, Part III, Sec. II.
12. These views have close resemblance with the Occasionalism of Guillinx and Malebranche. They believed that body and mind cannot influence one another. They are only the occasional causes while God is the real, efficient cause.
13. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhari bk. 81 : Ch. 83.
14. H. Y. O., 89, p. 145.
15. Ibid. 86, pp. 140-141.
16. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
17. Ibid. 86, p. 141.
18. Ibid. 85, pp. 139-140.
19. Ibid. 85, p. 140.
20. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction, (see Appendix).
21. H. Y. O., 56, pp. 101, 102.
22. For the proof of the finite nature of bodies, see section V, Part C, of this Chapter.
23. H. Y. O., 57, p. 104.
24. Ibid. 58, p. 106.
25. Ibid. 58, p. 106.
26. Ibid. 58, p. 105.

27. H. Y. O., 88, p. 143.

This proof comes very near to the Proofs of the Existence of God given by St. Anselm and Descartes. See for reference, *Meditations on the First Philosophy* by Descartes, and *History of Medieval Philosophy* by M. De Wulf p. 125.

28. Ibid. 63, p. 109.

29. Ibid. 58, p. 106.

30. Ibid. 58, p. 106.

The last sentence has been quoted from the Qur'an (xxxvi, 82).

31. Ibid. 58, p. 105.

32. Ibid. 58, p. 105.

33. Ibid. 49, p. 92.

34. Ibid. 87, p. 142.

35. Ibid. 59, p. 106.

36. Ibid. 59, p. 107. This last sentence has also been borrowed from the Qur'an (XXXIV, 3).

37. Ibid. 56, p. 102. Here again we find a quotation from the Qur'an (XVII, 14).

38. Ibid. 60, pp 107, 108.

39. Ibid. 60, p. 107.

40. Ibid. 58, p. 102.

41. Ibid. 88, p. 143.

42. Ibid. 63, p. 111.

43. Ibid. 57, p. 104

44. Ibid. 61, p. 108.

45. Cf. *Ethics* of Spinoza and *Spinoza's Philosophy* by M De Wulf.

46. H. Y. O., 83, p. 136.

47. Ibid. 83, pp. 136, 137.

48. Ibid. 83, p. 137.

This doctrine betrays the influence of the Mu'tazilites on Ibn Tufayl.

49. Cf. *Meditations on the First Philosophy* by Descartes.

50. H. Y. O., 63, p. 111.

51. Ibid. 6, p. 46.

52. Ibid. 6, pp. 46, 47.

53. Ibid. 6, p. 46.

54. Ibid. 5, p. 47.

55. Ibid. 7, pp. 47, 48.

56. Ibid. 58, p. 105.

57. Ibid. 87, p. 142.

58. Ibid. 89, p. 145.

59. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction, (see Appendix)
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid. 63, p. 111.
62. Ibid. 87, p. 142.
63. لا يصدر عن الواحد الا واحد
64. H. Y. O., 91, p. 147.
65. Ibid. 93, p. 149.
66. Ibid. 93, p. 149.
67. Ibid. 93, p. 150.
68. Ibid. 91-92-93, pp. 147-150.
69. Ibid. 91-92-93, pp. 147-150.
70. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
71. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
72. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
73. Spinoza believes in a Psycho-Physical Parallelism which is based on the Monism of Substance. For details see Ethics by Spinoza.
74. H. Y. O., 58, p. 105.
75. Ibid. 41-42, pp. 83, 84.
76. Ibid. 43, p. 85.
77. Ibid. 44, pp. 86, 87.
78. Ibid. 44, pp. 86, 87.
79. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
80. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
81. Ibid. 93, pp. 149, 150.
82. Ibid. 6 pp. 46, 47.
83. Ibid. 64, p. 112.
84. Ibid. 93, p. 149.
85. Ibid. 66-67, pp. 113, 117.
86. Ibid. 63, p. 110, 111.
87. Ibid. 83, p. 143.
88. Ibid. 65, pp. 112, 113.
89. Ibid. 65, p. 113.
90. Ibid. 65, p. 113.
91. Ibid. 65, p. 113.
92. Ibid. 65, p. 113.
93. Ibid. 66, pp. 113, 114.
94. Ibid. 66, pp. 114, 115.
95. Ibid. 66, p. 115.
96. Ibid. 66, p. 115.
97. Ibid. 66, p. 116.

98. The famous Urdu poet, Ghalib, has expressed the same sense in a beautiful verse :

ہر چند ہو مشاہدہ حق کی گفتگو
بنتی نہیں ہے بادہ و ساغر کہے بغیر

(دیوان غالب—ردیف ر)

99. H. Y. O., 93, p. 149.
 100. Ibid. 94, pp. 150, 151.
 101. Ibid. 94, p. 151.
 102. See The Early Greek Philosophy by Burnet Ch I.
 103. H. Y. O., 42, pp. 83, 84.
 104. Ibid. 47, pp. 89, 90.
 105. Ibid. 42, p. 48.
 106. Ibid. 45, pp. 87, 88.
 The Theory of Four Elements is borrowed from the Greek Philosophy. Empedocles is said to be its founder. For reference see Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers by K. Freeman (Sec. 31).
 107. H. Y. O., 70, p. 120.
 108. Ibid. 70, p. 121.
 109. Ibid. 70, pp. 121, 122.
 110. Ibid. 71, p. 122.
 111. For details about Animal Spirit, see the previous chapter.
 112. H. Y. O., 71, pp. 122, 123.
 113. Ibid. 71, p. 123.
 114. Ibid. 71, p. 123.
 115. The discussion of the animal spirit and the Heavenly Bodies marks the weakest spot in Ibn Tufayl's philosophy. But it would be unfair if we judge him by our modern standards. Such views were common among the medieval and ancient philosophers. Even philosophers like Plato and Aristotle were not free from them. See, for instance, Plato's Timaeus and Aristotle's De Caelo.
 116. H. Y. O., 54, p. 99.
 117. Ibid. 48, p. 92.
 118. Ibid. 38, pp. 78, 79.
 119. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
 120. Ibid. 49, pp. 92, 93.
 121. Ibid. 91-92-93, pp. 147-150.
 122. Ibid. 97, p. 153.
 123. Ibid. 97, p. 154.
 124. Qur'an XIV, 49.

125. H. Y. O. 52, p. 92.
126. Ibid. 52, p. 95, 96.
127. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason by Kant.
128. H. Y. O., 55, p. 100.
129. Ibid. 55, p. 100.
130. Ibn Tufayl's conception of time seems to have a modern touch about it. He shows awareness of the intricacies of the problem of time and its relation to the world of phenomena.
131. H. Y. O., 55, pp. 100, 101.
132. Ibid. 55, p. 101.
133. Ibid. 56, pp. 101, 102.
134. Ibid. 57, pp. 103, 104.
135. Ibid. 57, pp. 103, 104.
136. Ibid. 58, p. 106.
137. Ibid. 58, p. 106.
138. Ibid. 57, p. 104.
139. Ibid. 67, p. 116.
140. Ibid. 72, p. 124.
141. Ibid. 88, pp. 143, 144.
142. Ibid. 60, p. 107.
143. Ibid. 87, p. 142.
144. Ibid. 67, p. 116.
145. Ibid. 88, p. 143.
146. Ibid. 74, p. 126.
147. Ibid. 74, p. 126.
148. Ibid. 74, p. 126.
149. Here Ibn Tufayl comes very close to Plato's view. According to the latter, we know Ideal world, with all its beauty and perfection, through reason alone. But the sensible objects, in so far as they are copies of that ideal world, can also give us a glimpse of that ideal beauty, but it is clothed in sensuous details.
150. H. Y. O. 75, p. 127.
151. Ibid. 77, p. 128.
152. For further details please see the previous chapter.
153. H. Y. O., 80-81-82, pp. 133-136.
154. Ibid. 83-84, pp. 136, 139.
155. Ibid. 88, p. 143.
156. Ibid. 88, p. 143.
157. Ibid. 84, p. 138.
158. See for details The History of Philosophy by Windelband, The History of Modern Philosophy by Falkenberg, The History of European Philosophy by Bertrand Russell, etc.

159. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason by Kant.
160. H. Y. O. 29, p. 71.
161. Ibid. 29, p. 71.
162. For details of this school see Contemporary Schools of Psychology by Woodworth.
163. See Manual of Psychology by Stout.
164. H. Y. O. 63, pp. 109, 110.
165. Ibid. 90, p. 146.
166. For instance, see Ḥayy's preparation of dress for himself, (H.Y.O., 15, p. 56).
167. See Ḥayy's discovery about fire (Ibid. 24, p. 66).
168. Ibid. 34-35-36, pp. 75-78.
169. Ibid. 17, p. 57.
170. Ibid. 17, p. 58.
171. Ḥayy's investigation about the cause of death, and his dissection performed on the dead body of the roe, furnish beautiful examples of the use of Hypothesis.
172. H. Y. O. 90, p. 146.
173. Ibid. 42, p. 84.
174. Ibid. 63, p. 111.
175. Ibid. 85, pp. 139, 140.
176. Ibid. 85, p. 140.
177. Ibn Ṭufayl's Introduction, (see Appendix).
178. H. Y. O. 86, p. 141.
179. Ibid. 66, p. 111.
180. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
181. It is just like Bradley's 'whole of experience' which is above relational way of thought. See "Appearance and Reality" by Bradley, for details of his position.
182. Bergson also believes that intellectual discipline is a necessary condition for Intuition. Cf. Creative Evolution by Bergson, p. 186.
183. For Iqbal too there is no contradiction between Intellect and Intuition. Intuition only supplements and completes the work of intellect. Cf., Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Iqbal.
184. It would be interesting to compare Ibn Ṭufayl's three stages of knowledge with Sri Aurobindo's various "levels of consciousness." For Aurobindo too, the higher level of consciousness does not exclude the lower level, but presupposes it as a necessary condition. Cf. Life Divine by Sri Aurobindo.
185. Even as a Rationalist, his Rationalism is limited and curtailed. Unlike other Rationalists, he recognizes the importance of empirical knowledge and Induction. Moreover, he frankly admits the inability of human reason to solve certain problems e. g. the problem of the eternity of the world.

186. Ibn Ṭufayl's Introduction, (see Appendix).
 187. Ibid.
 188. Ibid.
 189. Ibid.
 190. Cf. (i) Language, Truth and Logic by Ayer.
 (ii) Philosophy and Logical Syntax by Carnap.
 (iii) An Examination of Logical Positivism by Weinberg, etc.
 191. H. Y. O., 89, p. 145.
 192. Ibid. 86, p. 141.
 193. Ibid. 86, p. 141.
 194. Ibid. 93, p. 150.
 195. Wittgenstein, who is one of the founders of Logical Positivism, sums up his position in the form of a maxim which runs as follows : The sense of a proposition is the method of its verification. See for details Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein, p. 63.
 196. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason by Kant.
 197. H. Y. O., 88, p. 144.
 198. Ibid. 90, p. 146.
 199. Ibn Ṭufayl's Introduction (See Appendix).
 200. H. Y. O., 86, p. 140.
 201. Ibid. 85, pp. 139, 140.
 202. The Urdu Poet, Ghalib, refers to such an experience in one of his verses :

کس منہ سے شکر کیجئے اس لطف خاص کا
 پرسش ہے اور پائے سخن درمیاں نہیں
 (دیوان غالب-ردیف ن)

203. H. Y. O., 110, p. 166.
 204. ابن طفیل و قصہ حی بن یقظان-عمر قروخ صفحات ۸۱-۸۳
 205. Ibn Ṭufayl's Introduction, (Appendix).
 206. For instance, Asāl begins to look upon Ḥayy as his spiritual leader and guide.
 207. H. Y. O., 117-118, pp. 172, 173, 174.
 208. Ibid. 119, pp. 175, 176.
 209. ابن طفیل و قصہ حی بن یقظان-عمر قروخ صفحہ ۸۳
 210. H. Y. O., 111, p. 167,
 211. Ibid. 112, p. 168.

CHAPTER V

CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

We have so far confined ourselves to a faithful and systematic exposition of Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophical position. Before attempting this exposition we gave a summary of the story of Ḥayy b. Yaqzān on which we have based our account. In the first two chapters we have discussed the general trends of the period of Ibn Ṭufayl and his life-history, which serve as the necessary background for the understanding of his point of view. We have avoided raising the critical issues as far as possible, so that our comments and criticisms may not interfere with the understanding of the original position. It is always useful to have a sympathetic understanding of the picture as a whole, before dissecting it and subjecting it to a critical analysis. Now, we are in a position to undertake this latter task. For this purpose, we propose to divide our discussion in various sections, dealing with critical problems relating to different aspects of Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy.

I. Ibn Ṭufayl's Purpose in Writing Ḥayy b. Yaqzān.

It is interesting to note that different critics and writers have read different purposes into the work of Ibn Ṭufayl. It often happens with a great thinker, whose philosophy comprises several aspects, that subsequent thinkers pick up this or that element from his philosophy, which strikes them as most important. In case of Ibn Ṭufayl there is a definite reason also which leads to these divergent views. His choice of a story as the medium of his philosophy has contributed, in no small measure, to this divergence. The writer of a story has the advantage of concealing his real intentions behind the details of the plot. Thus we find different persons interpreting his intention and purpose in different ways.

‘Abdul Wāḥid al-Marrākushī, the famous historian of Spain, is of the view that Ibn Ṭufayl's purpose in writing Ḥayy b. Yaqzān is to explain the origin of human species.¹ This view is obviously wrong as Ibn Ṭufayl has only incidentally touched upon the problem of the spontaneous birth of Ḥayy, in the earlier portion of his book. It is just one version out of the two given by Ibn Ṭufayl. It does not form vital part of the book. It appears that ‘Abdul Wāḥid had hurried through

the first few pages of the book and had based his opinion on the contents of these pages alone.

Dr. Yusuf, who has brought out an Urdu translation of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, is of the opinion that the main purpose of Ibn Ṭufayl was to show how *المفرد الواحد* (one who has been all alone from his very birth) can manage to satisfy his physical and spiritual needs.² This point of view lays stress on the story-aspect of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān but does not specify the main purpose behind the story.

Somewhat allied to this is the view of A. S. Fulton who characterizes the book of Ibn Ṭufayl in these words: "It is the pilgrim Soul's upward progress ; its return home to its "Father" through a series of ascending stages. In short, one of the main objects of this modest little book is nothing less than to dramatize the process of continuous development from sense perception upto the beatific Vision of the One."³ This really sums up the whole story of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān but does not tell us which part of the story is most important. Moreover, it unnecessarily tries to give a Christian touch to the story.

Von Grunebaum describes the book, Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, as "an autobiography of the confessional type."⁴ To some extent it is true, but it does not convey the whole idea of the book. - No doubt, Ibn Ṭufayl has made Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān the mouth-piece for his own thoughts and experiences. But why has he selected a solitary man, brought up in isolation from society, as his hero ? The purpose of 'confessions' would have been better served by a direct narration like that of Ghazālī⁵ or St. Augustine.⁶

O'Leary seems to give central importance to the theme of the relation of religion to philosophy.⁷ The little space that he allows to Ibn Ṭufayl, in his book, is devoted mostly to the description of the two islands and the meeting of Ḥayy and Asāl—the portion dealing with the problem of the relation of religion to philosophy. Shustriy also subscribes to the same view but he includes science also in his trio. He suggests that the object of Ibn Ṭufayl was to prove that there is no antagonism between philosophy, religion and science—all are the same and harmonious with one another.⁸

The problem of religion, no doubt, is an important problem, but it is not the only problem, nor the most important problem of the book. The problem emerges, in clear perspective, only towards the end of the story. It is not the vital part of the plot, but only incidental to it. So we cannot agree with the view that assigns foremost position to this problem. With regard to Shustriy's assertion that philosophy, religion and science are all the same and harmonious with one another, we do not find much evidence in favour of this thesis, in Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān.

According to De Boer, the principal endeavour of Ibn Ṭufayl was to combine Greek Wisdom and Oriental Science into a modern View of the World.⁹ In a general way the statement may be true about Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophical effort but it does not indicate the specific purpose of Ibn Ṭufayl in writing Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān.

The famous Orientalist, Carra de Vaux quotes Ibn Ṭufayl as having said in his Introduction that the object of philosophy is Union with God. So Ibn Ṭufayl's purpose, according to Carra de Vaux, in writing Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, was to throw light on the way to the attainment of this goal.¹⁰ Unfortunately, we do not find the statement, referred to above, in Ibn Ṭufayl's Introduction. However, the initial remarks of Ibn Ṭufayl do show that he is writing the book in response to the request of a friend who had asked him to explain some of the secrets of the Eastern philosophy presented by Ibn Sīnā.¹¹ In the same Introduction, Ibn Ṭufayl has tried to distinguish between knowledge gained through intellectual method and knowledge based on mystic intuition or ecstasy. It is the latter that he promises to convey, however indirectly, through Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. Thus it is obvious that Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān is primarily a Treatise on Mysticism, although it includes other aspects as well.

But late Professor Ali Mahdi Khan of Allahabad University (India) challenges this view, in these words:—

“It is rather unfortunate that Ibn Ṭufayl indulged in Mysticism towards the close of his book, but probably it does not form an integral part of his philosophy.”¹² This view is obviously wrong as it goes against the explicit statements of Ibn Ṭufayl in his Introduction.

Avoiding the one-sidedness of these interpretations, Kamāl Yāziji has thought it safe to enumerate several purposes underlying Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. Some of them are mentioned below.¹³

- (1) To show that human intellect can apprehend the highest truths through reasoning and contemplation.
- (2) The perfect human intellect does not stand in need of Shari‘at for its progress and culture.
- (3) To present the philosophical problem in a simplified manner, for the masses.
- (4) To impress on the ordinary students of philosophy that true knowledge consists in the apprehension of the truths of the Spiritual world, grounded in the belief in God.
- (5) The fact that Ibn Ṭufayl has adopted the form of a story implies that instruction should be given to men in accordance with their capacities,

- (6) The value of a thing depends on its ultimate result; for instance, the eternity and non-eternity of the world both lead to the notion of an Immaterial Agent.
- (7) Knowledge, in the beginning, is based on senses, then on inference and theoretical investigation. But in the last stages it depends on an inner Intuition.
- (8) The laws of nature are practical expressions of the Divine will.
- (9) There is an essential harmony between nature created by God and the words revealed by God. If there is any apparent disharmony the revelation should be interpreted so as to remove that discrepancy.
- (10) Ibn Ṭufayl follows the method of experience and investigation, not only in philosophical problems but in the matters of every-day life also.

This is the sample of purposes enumerated by Kamāl Yāziji. Similarly, he adds several other minor items to the list. But the most fundamental and primary objective of Ibn Ṭufayl, according to Yaziji too, is to show the harmony between Sharī‘at and philosophy.¹⁴

In our opinion, each of the above mentioned views is partly true. But we have no reason to doubt the testimony of Ibn Ṭufayl himself, who unequivocally tells us that the book has been written to convey, in an indirect form, his own mystic experiences, and to encourage and persuade his readers to follow the mystic path.¹⁵ This is undoubtedly the central purpose of the book. But mysticism itself, as Palmer says, is an attempt at reconciling philosophy with religion, and assigning an allegorical interpretation to all religious doctrines and precepts.¹⁶ Thus it is natural that, side by side with the exposition of his mystical point of view, Ibn Ṭufayl should also take up the problem of the relation of religion to philosophy. Moreover, the problem had assumed a special significance in that period and offered a challenge to the philosophers. It can be taken as the second important purpose of Ibn Ṭufayl.

But why does he present his mystic philosophy through the medium of a story? We shall discuss this point in a subsequent section but here it may suffice to say that the delicacy of the subject-matter recommended this to Ibn Ṭufayl. ‘Omar Farrukh tells us that Ibn Ṭufayl was a timid man and did not possess the courage to express his views publicly.¹⁷ So he made Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān the mouth-piece for his views. But why did he think it necessary to make a solitary and isolated child his hero? Most probably because it gave him an opportunity to make a beginning from a blank sheet, as was done by Descartes and Bacon. He wanted to show that his philosophical conclusions are so inevitable

and beyond doubt that any unbiased and unsophisticated thinker would reach the same position.

In this connection it is desirable to consider the sub-title of the book, which seems to have some significant indications with regard to our present problem. The sub-title of the book, in some editions, is given as *اسرار الحكمة المشرقية* (Secrets of the Philosophy of the East). There are reasons to believe that Ibn Ṭufayl himself gave this sub-title to the book. In his Introduction he clearly mentions that he intended to explain the secrets of the Mashriqīyah (i. e. Eastern) Philosophy as presented by Ibn Sīnā.¹⁸ The contents of the book, however, show his bias towards the philosophy of Illumination (Ishraq). So some critics are of the opinion that *اسرار الحكمة الاشرافية* (Secrets of the Philosophy of Illumination) would have been a more apt sub-title. Fortunately, in some editions of the book, as mentioned by Carra de Vaux, it is actually given as *اسرار الحكمة الاشرافية*.¹⁹ Now it raises another question. How did these two apparently differing versions find their way into the book? Which of them represents the intentions of the author more truly? A solution of this difficulty is offered by Max Horten. He tries to read *مشرقية* (Mushriqīyah) in place of *مشرقية* (Mashriqīyah), and insists that his is the correct reading. By so changing the vowel he believes that *مشرقية* comes to mean the same as *اشراق*. So *الحكمة المشرقية* stands for the *Philosophy of Illumination*. He objects to its translation as the Philosophy of the East on the ground that it is really the western Philosophy as its origin can be traced to Plato.²⁰ It is a significant suggestion no doubt, and, from the point of view of Arabic grammar, there is some plausibility in this interpretation. But the difficulty is that the word *مشرقية* is never used in 'Arabic language in this sense; and in language, particularly in Arabic, the usage is more reliable than a mere grammatical justification. This inclines us to reject the explanation offered by Max Horten.

However, there is another way of reconciling the two versions. We maintain that the two sub-titles, in reality, signify the same thing. *الحكمة المشرقية* obviously refers to the Philosophy of Illumination. But *الحكمة المشرقية* is usually translated as the Philosophy of the Orient. Now Orient has a special significance in the literature of mysticism. Jujānī (a disciple of Ibn Sīnā), in his commentary on Ḥayy b. Yaqzān of Ibn Sīnā, writes: "Orient is the place where the sun rises; the author defines the Orient as the place of Form and the Occident as the place of Matter..... and Matter has the nature of non-being."²¹

So Orient, in Ibn Sīnā's Recital, and also in that of Suhrawardī,²² signifies the region of Light or the place of Form. We find similar

ideas in the Gnostic texts also. For instance, the Hymn of the Soul (in the Act of Thomas) depicts the story of a young prince who sets on a journey to Egypt, from his native land, the Orient, in quest of the matchless pearl.²³ In this story, Orient signifies the region upward or the spiritual world—the abode of the pure beings of light.

From this discussion we can clearly see that Oriental philosophy does not simply mean the philosophy of the Oriental people. It has a deeper significance. It is somewhat equivalent to the philosophy of Light. Since religious and mystic elements have been dominant in Islamic Philosophy so the whole of Islamic Philosophy is sometimes designated as the Oriental Philosophy.

But the term primarily and strictly applies to philosophies like those of Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī and Ibn Ṭufayl. Viewed from this point of view it becomes immaterial whether we read the sub-title of Ibn Ṭufayl's book as *اسرار الحكمة المشرقية* or *اسرار الحكمة الاشرافية*. In both the cases it signifies the same thing, i. e., philosophy of Light. It is the presentation of this philosophy which is the primary purpose of Ibn Ṭufayl.

II. Forerunners of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān

Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān has often been described as an allegory. In fact it is a story intended to describe the mystic experiences of Ibn Ṭufayl and to throw light on some important problems of mysticism and philosophy.

However, Ibn Ṭufayl is not the first philosopher to use the story-form as the medium of his views. Before him several other writers have tried somewhat similar experiments. To understand the full significance of Ibn Ṭufayl's effort it would be useful to consider it along with other similar attempts. It would enable us to see how far Ibn Ṭufayl has been influenced by those examples, and how far does his effort show uniqueness and originality.

Ibn Sīnā's recitals—Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān and 'Salamān and Absāl—and Ibn Bajja's "تدوير المتوحد" are often mentioned as forerunners of Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān.²⁴ No doubt, there are some affinities between them. But with a few affinities there are vital differences also. Moreover, we do not see any reason why the comparison should be confined to these alone. There are many other works which would make equally significant studies, side by side Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān of Ibn Ṭufayl. It is with this aspect of the problem that we propose to deal in this section.

But before proceeding further it would be profitable to say a few words about the reasons why a philosopher is tempted to have recourse

to an allegory, in preference to a direct expression of his views. There may be different reasons for it :—

- (i) Sometimes it is used to make the ideas more fascinating. The allegory captures our imagination and fancy more readily than an ordinary narration. That is why poetry often makes use of the allegorical form.
- (ii) Sometimes the ideas are so abstract and difficult that they cannot be grasped by the common people. The allegory makes them intelligible and accessible to such people also, who cannot grasp truth in its abstract form.
- (iii) Allegorical form is also used, sometimes, to disguise one's meaning. A direct expression of one's views may be too offensive to an important section of the people. The allegory renders it innocent and harmless.²⁵ This is one of the reasons why the mystical literature abounds in allegories. The mystics often deviated from the orthodox view-point of religion. In a society based on religion an open revolt against religion could not be tolerated. The mystic, who had an urge to communicate his views and experiences to others, could do so only by clothing them in the garb of an allegory. Thus he escaped the censure of the formalists and the orthodox people. But those who were guilty of indiscretion in these matters had to pay the penalty with their lives. The case of Ṣhihābuddīn Suhrawardī Maqtūl is a clear illustration of this fact.²⁶
- (iv) Sometimes the author wants to vest his views with higher significance and authority and so traces them to a higher source, with the help of an allegory.
- (v) Henry Corbin, the French Orientalist, offers an interesting and original view-point in this connection. He objects to the use of allegorical adaptations for such narrations. He criticises the commentators and interpreters of these "Symbolic Visions" for their attempt "at reducing the ineffable reality, that can be spoken and seen in symbols, to the plane of logical patencies."²⁷ In other words, he wants to emphasize the fact that the so called allegories are as direct an expression as possible of the realities experienced by the mystic philosophers.

Corbin has expressed these views with regard to the Visionary Recitals of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), but they apply, with greater justice, to the works of Ibn Ṭufayl also. Ibn Ṭufayl is never tired of reminding us that the truths of the divine world can neither be conceived nor

communicated directly. All that he promises to convey through his book is an indirect expression of those truths, through metaphors and parables.²⁸

There is another misconception about Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān which should be corrected here. Several critics have tried to interpret Ḥayy in a symbolic way. For instance, De Boer sees in Ḥayy 'the personification of the natural spirit of mankind illuminated from above.'²⁹ A. S. Fulton considers Ḥayy as the symbol of pilgrim soul. The story depicts 'the pilgrim soul's upward progress and its return home to its Father.'³⁰ Carra de Vaux takes Ḥayy as the symbol of Reason. Ibn Yaḳẓān (the son of the Wakeful One), according to the same writer, suggests that Ibn Ṭufayl regards Ḥayy as Son of God.³¹ Kamāl Yāziji is of the opinion that Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān represent the bright (pure and uncorrupted) human intellect that is seeking God.³²

In our opinion all these views are off the point. They take it for granted that Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān is an allegory, and so they proceed to decipher its symbolism. They are led to this view by the supposed similarity between Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān and Ibn Sīnā's Recitals—'Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān' and 'Salamān and Absāl.' Ibn Sīnā has undoubtedly made use of allegory. In the recital of Salamān and Absāl, towards the close of the Story, Ibn Sīnā himself admits this fact in these words :--

"If among other recitals, the recital of Salamān and Absāl has struck thine ear, and its development has been well narrated to thee, then know that Salamān is a figure typifying thyself, while Absāl is a figure typifying the degree thou hast attained in mystical gnosis. Therefore, resolve the symbol, if thou canst."³³ Various commentators have accepted this challenge of Ibn Sīnā and tried to resolve the symbolism.³⁴

On the analogy of Ibn Sīnā the critics have tried to discover symbolism in Ibn Ṭufayl also. Ibn Ṭufayl's own statements in his Introduction and in the main text of Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān have also been wrongly understood to give support to this interpretation. Ibn Ṭufayl, after stressing the impossibility of directly expressing the truth of the Divine world, promises a sort of indirect description of those truths through metaphors and parables.³⁵ This statement was interpreted to mean that every thing said by Ibn Ṭufayl had a symbolic significance. But it was not the intention of Ibn Ṭufayl. The use of metaphors and parables referred to the analogy of the Sun and the Mirrors and such other metaphors in the book. These analogies were the nearest approach to the relation between God and the Immaterial Essences that Ibn Ṭufayl wanted to convey. But why should Ḥayy be used as a symbol? What truth did he intend to conceal? What advantages did he stand

to gain by means of this alleged symbolism? Ibn Ṭufayl's own statement in his *Introducción* establishes it beyond any shadow of doubt that he is giving an account of his own intellectual and spiritual development through the medium of Ḥayy.³⁶ To give a dramatic touch to the story and to throw incidental light on certain secondary issues, Ibn Ṭufayl has vested Ḥayy with certain peculiar qualities. But the obvious moral of the story is that the experiences narrated by Ibn Ṭufayl belong to a human being and any other human being can have them if he tries earnestly. That is why Ibn Ṭufayl invites his friend to traverse the same path.³⁷

There is another reason which seems to be responsible for the symbolic interpretation of Ḥayy. There is a tendency among certain Orientalists, like Carra de Vaux and A. S. Fulton, to regard Ibn Ṭufayl as a thorough-going Neo-Platonist. But they do not find in his work any direct mention of 'Active Intellect' and 'need for unification with Active Intellect,' and such other saturated concepts of Neo-Platonism. But interpreting Ḥayy as symbol of intellect or Active Intellect they gain their point. Moreover, by a literal translation of the name of Ibn Ṭufayl's hero they prove him to be the Son of God.³⁸ Thus Ḥayy becomes a symbol of the Active Intellect (i. e., Archangel Gabriel) and of the Son of God (Christ) at the same time. And the mystic progress of Ḥayy is now taken as the journey back to the Father, i. e., God. This interpretation is obviously far-fetched and unwarranted. According to our interpretation, Ibn Ṭufayl has chosen the name Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān to imply that his hero, who was not taught by any human teacher, received his inspiration and guidance direct from Divine grace. It has a metaphoric significance only. Had Ibn Ṭufayl intended Ḥayy to represent the Son of God he would not have given the popular version of his birth through human parents.

In view of these considerations we reject the symbolic interpretations of Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān and believe that Ḥayy stands for an unsophisticated natural philosopher, who has been used by Ibn Ṭufayl as his mouth-piece. Similarly, Salamān and Asāl are not to be taken as symbols of any abstract qualities. They are the types of men ordinarily found among the followers of religion. The former represents those who lay emphasis on form; while the latter represents those who emphasize the inner spirit of religion.

This much about the alleged symbolism of Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān. Now let us come to our main purpose, i. e., the comparative study of Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān along with somewhat similar recitals.

1. Parmenides' Celestial Ascent

Parmenides³⁹ is perhaps the first philosopher who has used the story-form to convey his philosophical ideas. He has expressed his views through a beautiful poem. This is how he begins his narration.

"The Car that bears me carried me as far as ever my heart desired, when it had brought me on the renowned way of the goddess, which leads the man who knows through all the towns. On that way I was borne along.....when the daughters of the Sun, hasting to convey me into the light, threw back their veils from off their faces and left the abode of Night.

"There are the gates of the ways of Night and Day. They are closed with mighty doors, and the Avenging Justice keeps the keys that fit them. Her the maidens entreat with gentle words and cunningly persuade to unfasten without demur the bolted bars from the gates.Straight through them, on the broad way, did the maidens guide the horses and the Car, and the goddess greeted me kindly and took my right hand in hers, and spoke to me these words:

"Welcome O Youth, that comest to my abode on the Car that bears thee tended by immortal Charioteers. It is no ill chance but right and justice that has sent thee forth to travel on this way. Far, indeed, does it lie from the beaten track of men! Meet it is that thou should learn all things, as well as the unshaken heart of well-round truth, as the opinions of mortals in which is no true belief at all."⁴⁰

After this prologue Parmenides gives the details of The Way of Truth and The Way of Belief (opinions of the mortals), through the mouth of the goddess. But this part is irrelevant for our purpose.

2. Zarathushtra's Ecstasies

In Zoroastrianism we find a similar ascent. Zarathushtra's ecstasies lead him to the presence of Ahuramazda and the Archangels.⁴¹ It is something like Buddha's attaining to gnosis (گيان) in course of his meditations. Since these personalities are also claimed as Prophets of two famous religions we leave out further details of their inspirations from our account.

3. The Hymn of the Soul

In the medieval Christian literature we come across an allegory in the form of the Hymn of the Soul (in the Act of Thomas). The Hymn

narrates the story of a young prince who sets on a journey in quest of the 'matchless pearl'. He proceeds from his native land, the Orient, and goes to Egypt. There he partakes of some food which makes him forget his origin and purpose. At last a 'messenger' comes from his parents and awakens him from his forgetfulness. He puts on his garment of light, and taking possession of the 'matchless pearl' sets out for his homeland, the Orient.⁴² The Symbolism of this story is so transparent that we may not dwell upon it any further.

4. Ibn Sīnā's Recitals

(i) **Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān**: The following is the summary of Ibn Sīnā's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān:—

The writer, who is desirous of reaching God, meets a Sage whose name is Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. The Sage warns the writer against his companions—the passions and the physical organs, etc. The road which leads to his goal is forbidden to him unless he is separated from his companions. The guide also tells him of the three climes; one between the Occident and the Orient; the other, beyond the Occident; and the last, beyond the Orient. No one can reach the last two regions except the elect—those who gain sufficient strength by immersing in the water near the spring of Life.

According to Corbin, Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān represents the Active Intellect or the Archangel, Gabriel.⁴³

(ii) **Ibn Sīnā's Recital of Salamān and Absāl**.⁴⁴ Salamān and Absāl were half brothers on the mother's side. Absāl was marked for his beauty, intelligence and noble character. Salamān's wife developed passionate love for him and tried to seduce him. But Absāl resisted the temptations. She got him married to her sister and slipped into her bed on the first night. But a flash of lightning revealed her identity and Absāl repulsed her contemptuously. Now Absāl set on a journey to conquer East and West on behalf of his brother. He routed the enemies of his brother and made great conquests. But Salamān's wife made officials of the army betray Absāl and so he was defeated and wounded in the battle. A wild beast nursed him and fed him with her milk. Recovering from his wounds, he again came to the help of his brother and defeated his enemies who were besieging him. This time Salamān's wife entered into a plot with a cook and a major domo who administered poison to Absāl and he died.

Salamān, struck with grief, gave up his kingdom and retired to a life of prayer and devotion. The Lord revealed to him the truth about Absāl's death. So he condemned his wife, the major domo and the cook to drink poison and to die.⁴⁵

We have referred to the attempts of Fakhruddīn Rāzī and Naṣīruddīn Tūsī at interpreting the symbolism of this story.⁴⁶ Henry Corbin, however, perceives in the story "the autobiography, the adventure of the mystical soul", "and not some trite allegory of the union of soul and body without any bearing on the context of mysticism."⁴⁷

5. The Hellenistic Version of Salamān and Absāl.⁴⁸

In ancient times, there was a King named Heramanos, who ruled over Byzantine Empire. He had great aversion to women yet he had desire for a son. The Sage, Aqliqulas, determining a suitable 'ascendancy' by astrological observation, put a little of the King's semen in a mandragora and left it in a suitable environment, till it was ready to receive a soul. Thus, through an alchemical operation, a child was born who was named Salamān. A beautiful young woman, Absāl, was appointed as his nurse. When Salamān grew up he fell in love with Absāl. Now he began to neglect the orders of his father and his higher goal – the pursuit of the world of light and ideal realities. The King, with the help of the sage, tried to dissuade him from indulging in the world of sensible things. The Sage also promised him a Celestial bride who would be united to him for all eternity. But his love for Absāl was too strong for these temptations,

Salamān planned to fly away with Absāl from the Kingdom of his father. The King was enraged and punished them by destroying the spiritual entities of their desires. Now they could not unite in spite of their ardent love. Finding this punishment intolerable they plunged themselves into the sea. Salamān was rescued by the order of the King but Absāl was allowed to be drowned. Salamān's grief knew no bounds. The Sage again came to his rescue. In company with Salamān, he offered invocations and prayers to Venus for forty days in a cave. On each day Salamān saw the form of Absāl and enjoyed her company and conversation. At the end of forty days the figure of Venus herself appeared, wrapped in exquisite beauty and perfection. Salamān fell in love with her and cried out, "O Sage, help me. I want naught save this figure." Here the story ends.

Tūsī tries to decipher the symbolism of the story in the following manner :—

The King is the Active Intelligence; the Sage is the guidance that it receives from the Intelligence above it; Salamān is the thinking Soul; Absāl, the vital powers of the body; their punishment is the persistence of the soul's inclinations despite the physical decline due to old age; the suicide of the two lovers is their fall into death; Salamān's escaping death from drowning is the survival of the immortal soul, and so on,⁴⁹

According to Corbin, however, the figures of the story typify the states and relations of consciousness. "The King-father is the world of traditional consciousness, the masculine world of Day, the world of official norms and strict imperatives of reason. Absāl typifies the feminine world of premonitions of coming birth, of palingeneses still closed in second Night, with no norm except the spontaneities of love. Between these two universes, these two faces of the soul, consciousness is constantly being rent asunder. So long as the mystical child born of the mandragora has not succeeded in integrating these two worlds with its being, the lamentable vicissitudes and failures described by the recital will be repeated. This integration is the outcome not of a rational dialectic but of a terrifying and painful experience, nothing less than a descent into the depths, such as a spiritual initiation cannot but be."⁵⁰

The influence of Jung's psychology of the Collective unconscious is clearly visible in this interpretation.⁵¹ It is not possible to find any verification for such details but the central point of this interpretation seems to be substantially correct—that the story is an intimate account of the experiences, conflicts and final integration of the consciousness in a mystic.

This Hellenistic version is important because Ibn Sīnā seems to have drawn upon it, both in his characters and theme.⁵² But there is one important difference. The original version had an obvious Platonic bias. Salamān, from the love of a sensible beauty passes on to the love of the ideal beauty. Ibn Sīnā gives the story a clear neo-Platonic turn. But in spite of Ibn Sīnā's modification the original story continued to inspire mystic literature of Islam.⁵³

6. Ibn Sīnā's Recital of the Bird

A troop of birds fell into a snare spread by a party of hunters. For some time they felt the pain and the misery of their bondage and imprisonment in a cage but gradually got accustomed to it and forgot their previous state of freedom.

One of these birds, whom Ibn Sīnā makes to narrate this story, one day saw a party of free birds. Though a cord was still tied to their feet yet they had freed their heads and wings and were ready to fly away. These birds also enabled the encaged one to gain a similar freedom and so they all started on a flight to their desired goal. They passed several enchanting scenes and crossed beautiful mountains but the fear of falling again into the hands of the hunters spurred them to further flights. Ultimately they were told that there is a city beyond

the eight mountains where the supreme King resides. He alone could give them permanent shelter and deliverance from injustice and suffering. When they reached the presence of the King and narrated their story, he said to them, "No one can unbind the bond that fetters your feet save those who tied it. Now will I send them a Messenger to lay it upon them to satisfy you and to remove your fetters. Depart, then, happy and satisfied, with the King's Messenger." The story ends here but Ibn Sīnā, in the Epilogue, adds these words: "How many of my brethren will there not be who, my recital having struck their ears, will say to me, 'I see that thou art somewhat out of thy wits, unless sheer madness hath fallen upon thee.....'" Then he replies to their criticism by saying, "But in God be my refuge, towards men my freedom"⁵⁴

According to Corbin this Recital too is an account of Ibn Sīnā's mystic experiences. The Recital depicts the story of initiation into the mystic path. The Messenger of the King signifies the Active Intelligence or the Archangel Gabriel or his Perfect Nature. The story teaches us the moral that the desired goal, freedom from the fetters and bondages of the world, cannot be achieved by an escape from life. The fetters are to be unfastened in the context of this life, under the guidance of the Messenger of the King.

There is a similar recital attributed to Al-Ghazālī.⁵⁵ It is interesting to compare it with the recital of Ibn Sīnā. Though the themes are somewhat similar yet the tone and the conclusions of the two recitals are fundamentally different and are typical of their authors.

7. Al-Ghazālī's Recital of the Bird

There was a big assembly of the birds including all varieties and species. The birds thought that they should have a King and decided to approach the bird 'Anqa for accepting this honour. They learnt that 'Anqa resides in a distant and inaccessible island and the way to that island lay through endless deserts and unsurmountable difficulties. They, however, set on the journey. Many perished on the way and only a small band reached the island. They found the King in an inaccessible castle. When they sent word to the King about the purpose of their journey the following answer came from Hīm. "You have wearied yourselves in vain. We are King, whether you consent or refuse, whether you come or depart. We have no need of you." On hearing this answer they succumbed to despair and shame. But then a heartening message came, "Away, away with despair. For only they who are without faith despair of God's mercy (Qur'an XII. 87). Now that you have experienced the measure of your impotence to know our measure, it befits us that you have here your dwelling."

The symbolism of this recital is obvious. The content of the story is typical of Al-Ghazālī's philosophico-mystic position. It is not the mystic's struggle but the Divine grace that leads to gnosis and deliverance from doubts.

8. 'Attar's Recital—The Language of the Birds

In this connection one feels tempted to refer to 'Attar's Recital, the Language of the Birds (*منطق الطير*), although chronologically it comes after Ibn Ṭufayl's work. It is a vital part of the series and throws significant light on some intricate problems of mysticism.⁶⁶ As it has some affinities with Ibn Ṭufayl's ideas we give a brief summary of it below :

SUMMAEY OF 'ATTAR'S LANGUAGE OF THE BIRDS

Thousands of birds set out on a journey in quest of Sī-Murgh, which was their cherished object of love and adoration, and their desired goal. A few of them, only thirty, reached the destination. Others perished on the way or gave up the quest. The thirty birds got a glimpse of the Majesty, Beauty and Grandeur which was indescribable. The herald of His Majesty brought the following message to them : "O raving band, who dyed yourselves like the rose with the blood of your hearts, whether you exist or do not exist in the Universe, the King exists no whit the less eternally. Hundred of thousands of Universes filled with creatures are as an ant at the gates of the King." But to their relief the birds were given a mysterious scroll and were asked to read it to the end, for its symbols contained the secret of their adventure. This mysterious scroll was the document that Joseph, (the symbol of most exquisite beauty), had presented to his step brothers. It was a reminder to them of their disgraceful act in parting with their lovable brother, Joseph. Now the birds were asked to decipher the symbols of that document. When they tried to decipher it, it raised in the mind of each of them the same reproach : "Knowest thou not, O wretched creature of naught, that at each moment thou sellest a Joseph."⁶⁷ When the mystic pilgrims became conscious of this fact their souls were overwhelmed by trouble and shame, and this purged their hearts of their impurities. The Sun of nearness shone upon them and they beheld the beauty and grandeur of the Sī-Murgh. But it was a meeting of the Self with the Self. The Sī-Murgh was none other than the Reality underlying those thirty birds. They were amazed to find that there was Sī-Murgh twice, and yet there was only one; yes, one alone and yet many.

In the conclusion 'Attār emphasizes the impossibility of expressing the mystery in language. He holds that there must be no sacrifice of pluralism to monism, nor of twoness to Unity, and so on.

9. **Shihābuddīn Suhrawardī Maqtūl's Recitals**

Shaykh al-Ishraq Suhrawardī has written several treatises on mysticism, some of which have allegorical form. We have already referred to the Recital of the Bird which is attributed to him but in reality is a Persian translation of Ibn Sīnā's recital. However, the most important of his Recitals is his Occidental Exile.⁵⁸ It finds its point of departure in the concluding lines of Ibn Sīnā's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. The Sage, Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, after pointing at the way leading to God and the prerequisites of the journey to God, says to the adept: Now, if thou wilt, follow me, come with me toward Him. Peace. Ibn Sīnā ends the story at this point. But Suhrawardī is not satisfied with this abrupt ending. He picks up the thread of narration and depicts the journey of the Occidental Exile (the mystic soul) to the Orient (the place of light). In his prologue to the Occidental Exile he invites his readers to first read Ibn Sīnā's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. But it has close affinities with Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān too. Suhrawardī is a younger contemporary of Ibn Ṭufayl. Ibn Ṭufayl died at the age of 75 years or so, in the year 1185. Suhrawardī was put to death at the age of thirty six or so, in 1182. Though we do not know the exact dates of the completion of the two works, yet in view of the older age and seniority of Ibn Ṭufayl, we can safely assume that Suhrawardī was familiar with Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy and must have necessarily been influenced by his ideas, specially because both of them are prominent exponents of the philosophy of light. In view of these considerations it would not be proper to include Occidental Exile among the forerunners of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. However, for the continuity of the series and for the benefit of a comparative study we take the liberty of quoting it here in some details.

SUHRAWARDĪ'S AL-GHARĪBAH AL-GHARBIYAH

I and my brother, Asim travelled from Trausoxania to Qayrawan. The unjust inhabitants of that city knew that we were descendants of the Shaykh Hadī b. Abī al-Khayr al-Yamanī. They imprisoned us in a cave (or a Well). A lofty palace overlooked the cave. In the evenings we were allowed severally to come out of the well and to go to the palace. But the mornings had to be spent in the dark prison. The

time I spent in the palace was enlivened by the reminiscences of Yemen which had its symbols in the light and the fragrance that permeated the whole place. So we had longings for our native place. In the course of our downward and upward movements in day-time and by night, we once saw the Hudhud. It had brought a letter from our Father who had remonstrated with us for our forgetfulness in return for His love and anxiety. He had called upon us to come away to Him at once. He had also advised us to get rid of all that might encumber us at the time of our voyage across the Nile.

So we embarked upon the journey homeward. The ship that carried us had to weather the fury of the waves which brought death and destruction upon my "son" (Cf. the Quran on the Deluge). In order to avert the danger I had to face, I had to part company with the gazelle which had suckled me (in my childhood). And I had to scuttle the ship lest I should excite the avarice of a King (Cf. the Qur'an on al-Khiḍr).

We passed the city of Yājūj and Mājūj. The demons (Jin) who served me raised a Barrier to forestall the evil creatures. Further on, I had a view of the desolate habitat of 'Ād and Thamūd.

I took the earth and the heavens and the Jin and put them into a glass container I had designed. Then water parted off from the mass and the air evaporated. I put the heavens on the Spheres. Subsequently, the revolutions that took place brought the Sun and the moon and the stars into being. I then devised fourteen Tābūts. The way of God was pointed out to me. I woke up to realize that it was my Way.

My sister who had been asleep amidst the darkness of the night had been exposed to the influence of Incubus. But then I saw a Lamp whence light radiated far and wide. Then the Sun shone forth. But the source of its rays could not be discovered by any one—except by its Creator and by those who may be firmly established in Knowledge (Cf. the Qur'an).

With us we had a flock of sheep which we had to abandon in the desert. Earthquake and Thunder destroyed them.

When the distance had been traversed, I had a glimpse of the heavenly bodies. When I approached them, I could hear their Symphony. The sound through which their teachings were communicated to me resembled the sound of bells (Cf. the description of Revelation in Bukhārī). The pleasure I had experienced was likely to dis sever my life from all that had gone before.

But the Fish that had devoured me (Cf. the story of Yūnus) disgorged me. On regaining free activity, I betook myself to the Stream

of Life. On my way to it, I found a Rock. I asked the Fish and the Fauna that basked in the shade : What is the Rock and the place to which I have come ? The fish I had addressed plunged into the water to thread its labyrinthine course. And I heard it say : 'This is what we looked for (Cf. the story of Moses and his Companion). You have come to Mount Sinai.

On climbing up, I saw our Father resplendent with Light so intense that it could cause the heavens and the earth to fall to pieces. With tears in my eyes, I prostrated myself before Him and told Him of my sufferings in the prison at Qayrawan. He said: 'Now you are free. However, it is necessary for you, later on, to go back to the western prison. This warning filled me with grief and consternation. I implored my Father to make things easier for me to bear. He said: 'The Return is inescapable. But you can have glad tidings on two counts. First, on your return to prison, it will be possible for you to ascend up to Our presence whenever you will. Secondly, there will be a time at last when you will depart from the Western Cities never again to go back to them.' From these words I took comfort.

And my Father said: 'This mountain is Mount Sinai. Still higher up beyond this mountain is the abode of my own Father. I am related to Him as you are related to Me. And we have other ancestors till at last the genealogical series comes to an end with a Great-grand-father. All of Us are the servants of that prime Ancestor who is Supreme above all supremacy.'

Since I had been a prisoner in the Western Regions in the midst of a people not describable as Believers, the events narrated above brought joy and felicity. But the pleasurable experience thus acquired soon disappeared, for it was a dream that comes and goes. May God free us from the bondage of Matter and Nature.

And let this story be called al-Gharibah al-Gharbiyah.

Now, it is obvious that it is an allegory with a complicated symbolism. Suhrawardī is fond of using the Qur'anic situations and verses and the traditions of the Prophet in the course of his narration which add to the complication of his symbolism. Very often one set of symbols imperceptibly gives place to another set, one metaphor changes into another metaphor. Thus the sense is confused beyond comprehension. However, leaving out the complicated details, it is obvious that the exile into the Occident represents the journey and the adventure of the Soul in this world. The Orient stands for the angelic world or the world of Light which is the true abode of the soul. The descent of the soul into this world is its imprisonment in matter. The message through Hudhud stands for revelation. The ascent on the Mount Sinai,

to the presence of the Father, symbolizes the highest mystic experience which reveals the genealogy of the Soul, after neo-Platonic fashion, from the Primal One, through several intermediary stages. The soul after this mystic ascent, has again to go back to the western prison. But it will not be possible for it to attain to the presence of the Father i. e., to have that mystic experience again, until it is finally released from the prison of the matter and returns to its homeland, the Orient.

The bias of neo-Platonism and of the Ishrāqī philosophy is quite evident in the story.

10. Hermit's Guide of Ibn Bājja:

Ibn Bājja's Hermit's Guide (تدبير المتوحد) has often been mentioned as a forerunner of Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqzān. In this treatise Ibn Bājja lays down the programme of life for the solitary Individual, who is his model of a philosopher. Such a solitary individual or individuals who are seeking perfection should try to live in a model State. The model state of Ibn Bājja's conception will have no need of magistrates and Physicians. The interpersonal relationships in that state will be based on love. Every member of the state will be guided by perfect knowledge and rational motives, and there will be no cause for friction. But for the realization of such a state it is necessary that all the members of the society should have attained a high degree of perfection. So long as this condition has not been fulfilled the solitary individual or individuals would be like strangers in their own society. Nevertheless they should live and behave as if they are members of a perfect State. In other words, the solitary individual or individuals will live in the Society yet they would be isolated and secluded in it. They should not mingle with common people who are seeking baser ends of life. They should not waste their time in trying to reform other people but should pursue gnosis secretly as if it is something to be ashamed of. They should continue in their own way, seeking their highest good i. e., Union with the Active Intellect. To attain this Union they will have to pass through a certain programme consisting of various types of activities. Ibn Bājja divides these activities into three kinds—bodily activities, spiritual activities and rational activities. The bodily activities are to be indulged in just to the minimum necessary limit. The spiritual activities are to be followed more frequently but they are necessary only as a means to the third grade, i. e., rational activities. The rational activities are an end in themselves, and they are to be pursued for their own sake. The first type of activities can help him to live as a man, the second raises him to the status of higher

beings; and the third enables him to assimilate Divine Attributes. In this third programme lies his highest happiness and perfection.

Ibn Bājja, however, does not recommend absolute withdrawal from Society. But the solitary individual or individuals will try to create a model Society within the Society in which they can move and mix with persons of their own level—those who are moved by the rational end of perfection.

11. A Folk Story from Andalūsia

Before concluding this section it would not be out of place to refer to a story which has also been mentioned among the sources of Ibn Ṭufayl. *Jracious Baltazar* refers to a story which was famous in the folk lore of Andalūsia in the days of Ibn Ṭufayl.⁶⁰ The story is woven round the figure of Alexander. It is said that Alexander found a big statue in an island, with some words inscribed on it. When Alexander got the writings on the statue translated by a scholar it was found to be the life-story of the person whom that statue represented. He was the grandson (from the daughter's side) of a king. As soon as he was born his mother threw him into the sea. The waves carried him to an uninhabited island where a female deer nursed him. When he grew up his mental faculties also developed. Then another man reached the island who taught him and imparted learning to him. This man was in reality the son of the Vazir and the father of the youngman. The King being displeased with him on account of his secret marriage with his daughter had thrown him on this island. Ultimately, a ship passed their way and picked up the father and the son.

III. General Remarks—A Comparative Study of the Recitals

After giving brief summaries of these Recitals it seems proper to mark their similarities or dissimilarities with Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān*, and determine their influence, if any, on the latter.

Let us, first of all, compare Ibn Ṭufayl's *Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān* with Ibn Sīnā's Recitals—'*Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān*' and '*Salamān and Absāl*'.

According to Ibn Ṭufayl's own admissions he has borrowed the names of his characters from Ibn Sīnā.⁶⁰ The title of his book, *Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān*, has also been borrowed from Ibn Sīnā's work having the same title. The themes of both the philosophers relate to mystic philosophy. Both have chosen the story-form as their medium. Ibn Ṭufayl, in constructing his philosophy, acknowledges his debt to Ibn Sīnā and claims to have written *Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān* to explain

certain points of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy. Besides this outward resemblance, there are some similarities in contents also. Ibn Sīnā's Ḥayy b. Yaqzān plays the part of a Sage or a Guide on the mystic path. Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqzān also serves as a guide to Asāl whom he meets on the island. Ibn Sīnā's Ḥayy b. Yaqzān warns his follower that unless he is separated from his companions—the passions and the bodily organs, etc.—the road that leads to his goal (i.e., God) will be forbidden to him. Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqzān seems to give the same message. His life has been so regulated by reason from the very beginning that there is very little room for passions. Moreover, when he consciously chalks out a programme of life for himself, to attain to the vision of God, he allows himself indulgence in bodily wants just to the extent necessary for keeping body and soul together. It seems that he has killed all his desires and passions. Only one desire is left in him and that is for God.⁰¹ In *Salamān and Absāl* of Ibn Sīnā a wild beast is shown to have nursed and fed Absāl with her milk, when he was wounded on the battlefield. We find a similar phenomenon in Ibn Ṭufayl, when the infant Ḥayy b. Yaqzān is nursed and reared by a female deer on the island coast.

But with all this apparent resemblance there are fundamental differences between the works of the two masters. In the first place, Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqzān is not an allegory in the strict sense of the word. The characters of Ibn Ṭufayl are not symbols of any abstract qualities as we find in the recitals of Ibn Sīnā. It is only the mystic experience of Ḥayy, particularly about the relation of God to other Immaterial Essences, that finds expression through analogies and metaphors of the Sun and its reflection in the mirrors. This may be taken as the allegorical part of the story but it was necessitated by the limitations of language. Ibn Sīnā's recitals are true allegories. The allegory is used there not as an inevitable necessity but as an ornamental medium. The views expressed through these allegories could be very well conveyed through direct narration.

The motive to conceal the real meaning also does not apply to these recitals as the points contained in them find mention in several other works of Ibn Sīnā.⁰² The only subject of these recitals seems to be to convey some mystical ideas in an interesting way so as to make them accessible even to the lay man. But Ibn Ṭufayl has a definite purpose in using the story-form for conveying his philosophy. First, he wants to show the natural and inevitable character of his philosophy. Secondly, he wants to avoid giving a direct shock to the Orthodox public opinion of his period.

Ibn Sīnā's recitals have value in so far as they are typical of his views. But they are very brief and deal only with specific problems and

with some particular aspect or aspects of mysticism. Ibn Ṭufayl expresses his whole philosophy in the story-form. Nay, even the practical training, scientific learning and the development of religious and mystic ideas have been described in a most graphic and realistic manner. And all this had to be discovered by Ḥayy without the aid of a teacher. This further adds to the difficulty of Ibn Ṭufayl's task. But in spite of these restrictions Ibn Ṭufayl succeeds in retaining the high standard of the story and making it a master-piece of literature. His language and style is far superior to that of Ibn Sīnā.⁶³ According to Brockelmann Ibn Sīnā's Ḥayy b. Yaqān is a "dry allegory" as compared to Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqzān.⁶⁴

The Hellenistic version of Salamān and Absāl is the forerunner of Ibn Sīnā's Salamān and Absāl and so it also has an indirect bearing on Ibn Ṭufayl's book. But its structure is Platonic while Ibn Ṭufayl, like Ibn Sīnā, shows clear leaning towards neo—Platonism. Moreover, Absāl, in the Hellenistic version, is a female character, and symbolizes the bodily passions and powers. In Ibn Ṭufayl's story Absāl is a pious devotee, seeking God through prayers and meditations. Thus we see that Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqzān does not show any direct resemblance with Hellenistic version of Salamān and Absāl, either in objectives or in plot and characters. But there is one thing which Ibn Ṭufayl seems to have borrowed from this story. The Hellenistic Story describes the birth of Salamān through an alchemical operation. A somewhat similar explanation is given by Ibn Ṭufayl about the spontaneous birth of Ḥayy b. Yaqzān, with the difference that Ibn Ṭufayl adds to this explanation elements from his knowledge about natural sciences, Geography, physics, etc. Moreover, Salamān was shown to have been born without a mother, the semen of the King Hermanos being left in a mandragora to develop into a human child; but Ḥayy b. Yaqzān was represented by Ibn Ṭufayl to have been born of natural elements only, without the intervention of father or mother.

Now coming to the Recital of the Bird by Ibn Sīnā. Though it seems to be much different from Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqzān, in outward story and characters, yet there are some underlying similarities between them which attract our attention. In the first place, both the stories deal with mystic themes. They try to convey, through the story-form, the highest type of the mystic experience that has fallen to the lot of their authors. The stories possess a common nucleus of content which is indicative of the possible debt of Ibn Ṭufayl to Ibn Sīnā's Recital of the Bird. For instance, the description of the beatific Vision, as given by Ibn Ṭufayl, has striking resemblance to the description of the beauty and grandeur of the King (God) as given by

Ibn Sīnā. We find the following words in Ibn Sīnā's Recital of the Bird :—

"Whereupon my brothers pressed upon me, urging me to recite to them the beauty of the King, I shall describe it in a few summary yet sufficient words. Harken! whatever be the beauty that thou beholdest in thy heart, without any alloy of ugliness—whatever perfection thou imaginest, untroubled by any defect—in the King I found it, who is in full possession thereof. For all beauty in the true sense is realized in Him; all imperfection even in the sense of a metaphor, is banished from Him."

Again, in the same recital, we find Ibn Sīnā denouncing reason in these words :—

"How many of my brothers will there not be who, my recital having struck their ears, will say to me : 'I see that thou art somewhat out of thy wits, unless sheer madness hath fallen upon thee. Come now: It is not thou who didst take flight; it is thy reason that has taken flight' To these imaginary critics Ibn Sīnā gives the following retort : 'But in God be my refuge; towards men, my freedom.'"

We find the exact echo of these words in Ibn Ṭufayl when after describing the mystic experiences of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, he condemns his imaginary critics in the following words :—

"And here methinks I see one of those bats, whose eyes the Sun dazzles, moving himself in the chain of his folly, and saying, 'This subtilty of yours exceeds all bounds, for you have withdrawn yourself from the state and condition of understanding men, and indeed rejected the authority of Reason.....'"⁶⁵

Thus it will not be unfair to suppose that Ibn Ṭufayl was familiar with Ibn Sīnā's Recital of the Bird and, to a certain extent, had been influenced by it. But it will not be fair to stretch the resemblance too far. There are fundamental differences also between the two stories. Ibn Sīnā's Recital of the Bird is an allegory while Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān of Ibn Ṭufayl is not. Moreover, the former deals with the possibility of realizing the mystic ideal in this very life and throws light on various stages of mystic path and the hardships through which a mystic has to pass. If we accept the interpretation of Henry Corbin and others,⁶⁶ that the noble Messenger is the Active Intellect, then the story has an obvious neo-Platonic bias. Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān of Ibn Ṭufayl also deals with the mystic Ideal and its realization but it deals with many things more. It deals with practically all the problems with which the philosophy of that period was faced. It too has leanings towards neo-Platonism but

Ibn Ṭufayl does not seem to be committed to any particular school of thought completely.

Al-Ghazālī's Recital of the Bird has no direct bearing on Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. But a comparative study of the two will enable us to appreciate the worth of the latter in a better way. Al-Ghazālī's recital is a brief allegory written in the typical style of Al-Ghazālī. The quotations from the Qur'ān and Arabic verses are liberally used. The grim tone and the moral of the story are typical of Al-Ghazālī's philosophy and personality. It has anti-intellectualistic bias. It is not through rational contemplation or personal effort that the mystic is admitted to the Divine presence but it is the Divine grace consequent upon the realization of ones' impotence to know God that leads to the final goal. In other words, it is love and the torments of the beloved's inaccessibility that are emphasized by Al-Ghazālī. In contrast to Al-Ghazālī, Ibn Ṭufayl sounds a more optimistic note. He is not anti-intellectualistic in his approach. Reasoning forms part of the mystic journey, at least in its initial stages. Moreover, the emphasis in Ibn Ṭufayl is on the Vision of God and its accompanying bliss and joy, and not on His inaccessibility and its consequent torments. Apart from this difference in the tone and the outlook, Al-Ghazālī's Recital of the Bird is only a modified version of Ibn Sīnā's Recital. Its importance lies in its being just a link in the series of similar recitals. But Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān has an independent value as a unique work in the whole field of philosophical literature.

We have mentioned Farīduddīn 'Attār's Recital, Language of the Birds, as a continuation of the series, but as 'Attār comes after Ibn Ṭufayl we will discuss his recital later, in connection with the influence of Ibn Ṭufayl on subsequent writers.

With regard to Suhrawardī's Occidental Exile and Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān one cannot fail to mark the close affinities between the two.

Both have presented their ideas in the form of stories. Both take their point of departure from Ibn Sīnā's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. Both have dealt with mystic themes and show their bias towards neo-Platonism and philosophy of Light. But Occidental Exile is an allegory with very obscure symbolism. Its symbols are not easy to decipher even for a most sophisticated philosopher. Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān is not an allegory but a lucid description of the intellectual and mystic development of a man—the supposed hero of the story. No doubt the hero, Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, is an imaginary character but the experiences attributed to him are the genuine experiences that can occur to an exceptionally gifted real man.

Ibn Ṭufayl has wonderfully succeeded in expressing most clearly and forcefully the whole of his philosophy and the most delicate mystic experiences through the medium of the story. At the same time, he has done full justice to the literary and artistic side of the work. In short, simplicity and directness of Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān and its wonderful plan appear in sharp relief, when contrasted with the obscurity and vagueness of Suhrawardī's Occidental Exile.

Now coming to Ibn Bājjā's تدير المتوحد (The Hermit's Guide). It has often been mentioned as a precursor of Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān. No doubt, in several of his ideas Ibn Ṭufayl shows clear debt to Ibn Bājjā. But it would be wrong to suppose that Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān is nothing but an enlarged edition of Ibn Bājjā's work. They have points of agreement as well as points of difference, as we shall presently see.

Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān is in the form of a Story, while the Hermit's Guide is an ordinary philosophical treatise.

The object of Ibn Bājjā is collective rather than individualistic. He wants to realize an Ideal State or society within the society, and tells us how the solitary individual or individuals, as citizens of that Ideal State should behave. Ibn Ṭufayl's point of view is individualistic. He is concerned with the mystic Ideal—the programme for the salvation of each individual.

Ibn Bājjā wholly relies on intellect or reason. The highest end, according to him, is union with the Active Intellect. But Ibn Ṭufayl believes in a direct apprehension or intuition which is superior to intellectual apprehension.⁶⁷

So far as the originality, artistic ingenuity and fascinating style of Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān is concerned it has no parallel.

But inspite of these fundamental differences Ibn Ṭufayl shows agreement with Ibn Bājjā in several points: Both show disgust of the masses and the society in general. Both consider it futile to waste their time in trying to reform the masses. Both believe that the highest truths should be concealed from the masses. According to Ibn Bājjā, gnosis should be pursued as if it is something to be ashamed of.

Both of them recommend a kind of seclusion from the Society and favour association with kindred souls only.

Lastly, the detailed instruction and programme of life which Ibn Ṭufayl has chalked out for Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān (i. e., the three assimilations) are wholly based on the three kinds of activities recommended by Ibn Bājjā for the solitary individual or the hermit. This cannot be treated as an accidental similarity or coincidence. It shows that Ibn

Ṭufayl has borrowed from Ibn Bājjā on a vital point in his philosophy. It is perhaps because of this debt that Ibn Bājjā's influence on Ibn Ṭufayl has been so much emphasized by various writers.

The folk-story referred to by Graciam Baltazar has certain incidents in common with Ḥayy b. Yaḳzān. The secret marriage of the King's daughter, throwing of the son into the sea, nursing of the child by a female-deer, etc., find an exact echo in Ibn Ṭufayl's work. But there is nothing strange about it. It is only an incidental part of Ibn Ṭufayl's story, relating to one version about the birth of Ḥayy b. Yaḳzān, that reproduces some incidents of the folk-story. Even then it is not the only source. We find, in the Bible and the Qur'an similar stories about the birth of Moses. In fact, a story-writer does not usually create incidents or situations but borrows them from real life or from other stories, and weaves them into a new pattern of his own. His greatness lies in the originality of his total pattern and his treatment of the subject-matter of the story. From this point of view Ḥayy b. Yaḳzān still remains unsurpassed, whatever be the debt of Ibn Ṭufayl to this or that author with regard to scattered fragments of the story or the details of its subject-matter.

IV. Ibn Ṭufayl's Predecessors

The critics and interpreters of Ibn Ṭufayl are not all agreed as to the characterization of his views. This is perhaps natural in case of a philosopher who has chosen an indirect form, the medium of a story, for the expression of his views. Thus we find a bewildering divergence in the interpretations of his philosophy. The same divergence makes it difficult to name the sources that have exercised a determining influence on his philosophy. However, in the light of our studies and analysis we will try to find out the truth in this matter.

Let us first mention different opinions and statements by some responsible writers on Ibn Ṭufayl.

According to De Boer, Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy is a combination of Greek science and Oriental wisdom, fitted into a modern view of the world.⁶⁸ The system of Ethics, which Ibn Ṭufayl has presented in the book, is regarded by De Boer as having Pythagorean appearance.⁶⁹

O' Leary is of the opinion that Ibn Ṭufayl's teaching is in general conformity with that of Ibn Bājjā.⁷⁰

A. S. Fulton holds the view that it was Al-Fārābī from whom Ibn Ṭufayl drew his inspiration most.⁷¹

Further on, the same author gives expression to the view that the story is fashioned out of neo-Platonic and Aristotelian elements, with here and there a confirmatory passage from the Qur'an.⁷²

Gordon Leff, discussing the sources of Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy, refers to the mingling of Plato and Aristotle, with further addition of the view of light as the fount of being, gradually fading the further it goes from its source in God.⁷³

Carra de Vaux regards Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy as 'neo-Platonic Scholasticism in its most mystic form.'⁷⁴

'Omar Farrukh also subscribes to the same view and takes Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy as a product of neo-Platonic mysticism.'⁷⁵

According to A. J. Arberry and Sir Thomas Adams it was Ibn Sīrā's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān that inspired Ibn Ṭufayl to write his book.⁷⁶

Dr. 'Abdul Ḥalim Maḥmūd denies the influence of Al-Fārābī or Ibn Bājjā on the philosophy of Ibn Ṭufayl. He does not take him as a follower either of Ibn Sīnā or of Al-Ghazālī but regards him as following his own independent line of thought.⁷⁷

In our view Ibn Ṭufayl is indebted, more or less, to all these philosophers as pointed out by his interpreters, but he is not wholly committed to any one of them. He is one of those philosophers whom it is difficult to bring under any one category. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā, Al-Fārābī, Al-Ghazālī, Ibn Masarraḥ, Ibn Bājjā have all contributed to the shaping of his views. Even some traces of Pythagorean, Indian and Persian influences are also visible in his philosophy. But it should not be understood to mean that there is nothing in Ibn Ṭufayl but an echo of his predecessors. In this section we propose to trace various elements of Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy to their sources and to discuss the nature of debt that he owes to them.

1 Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus

Let us first begin with the influence of Plato and Aristotle on his philosophy. Ibn Taīmīyya regards him as a peripatetic.⁷⁸ No doubt, several Aristotelian elements are fitted in his philosophy but he differs from Aristotle on many fundamental points. His discussion of Form and Matter, classification of nature into three kingdoms—inorganic objects, vegetative kingdom and animal kingdom—his doctrine of the Plurality of Forms, his leaning towards the doctrine of the eternity of the world, his view that the end of every object is its perfection, and many such ideas can be traced to Aristotle.⁷⁹ But Ibn Ṭufayl has not borrowed these elements directly from Aristotle. They have reached him through Ibn Sīnā, Al-Fārābī and others. As the analysis of the Body and the doctrine of Form and Matter form the starting point of his philosophy, and they carry the mark of Aristotelian teaching, one gets the impression that Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy is

Aristotelian in essence. But the mystic elements in his philosophy give a lie to this supposition. These trends bring him closer to neo-Platonism, and also to some elements of Plato's philosophy. His insistence that matter is mere non-being and that Form is every thing, his philosophy of the relation of One and many, his consideration of knowledge as the supreme good of man, his view that the sensible objects also give a mixed vision of God, remind one of similar doctrines in Plato. But he seems to have no sympathy with Plato's theory of Ideas, the most vital part of his philosophy. He does not subscribe to the unlimited Rationalism of Plato. In this respect he differs from Plato and Aristotle both and shows leaning towards neo-Platonism. He believes with Plotinus in a mystic pantheism.⁸⁰ He takes help of the principle of emanation, although in a metaphoric way, deriving everything from God. He considers the vision of God and Union with God as the highest good of man. He gives to love and supra-rational intuition or direct observation an important place in his philosophy. He derives these elements not directly from Plotinus but from his predecessors among Muslim philosophers. However, Ibn Ṭufayl's greatest credit lies in his critical attitude and in separating what is acceptable from what is unacceptable in a philosopher.

He fits the acceptable elements into his philosophy, leaving out the crudities and extremes for which he does not find warrant. It has been rightly remarked about Ibn Ṭufayl that "he does not follow the emanationist neo-Platonic astronomy which Al-Fārābī and Avicenna had introduced into their otherwise Aristotelian description of the world above the moon and which Avempace and Averroes accepted without criticism. He rather inclines towards Islamic Theology in this respect and does not establish any 'secondary causes' as the powers ruling the different celestial spheres. God, the highest being, is the only efficient cause."⁸¹ It shows that Ibn Ṭufayl can hold his own when great figures of Islamic Philosophy, like Al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Bājjā and Ibn Roshd succumb to the powerful currents of thought peculiar to their age.

2. Al-Fārābī

Now coming to the influence of his immediate predecessors on his philosophy. Let us begin with Al-Fārābī. Ibn Ṭufayl, in his Introduction, severely criticises Al-Fārābī for some of his contradictions.⁸² He emphatically denies any influence of Al-Fārābī on his main position. He is rather strongly opposed to Al-Fārābī's sole emphasis on intellect. He criticises him for equating prophethood with an intellectual capacity.⁸³ He has no sympathy with his belief in Union with Active

Intellect as the highest stage of perfection. Again, Al-Fārābī's emphasis on 'organized society' is absent in Ibn Ṭufayl. Ibn Ṭufayl emphasizes individual salvation and recommends a kind of withdrawal from society. In view of these facts it is difficult to agree with those who regard him as a follower of Al-Fārābī or see in his philosophy major traces of the influence of Al-Fārābī. However, in some details we find Ibn Ṭufayl showing agreement with Al-Fārābī. The doctrine of the Unity of Intellection—that intelligent and the intelligible are one—finds an echo in Ibn Ṭufayl's view that to know God is to be one with God. Like Al-Fārābī, Ibn Ṭufayl also regards a minimum satisfaction of bodily wants as necessary for the realization of the highest good. The distinction between the ignorant masses and the selected few as emphasized by Ibn Ṭufayl in the last section of Ḥayy b. Yaḡẓān, has also some resemblance with Al-Fārābī's view that the majority of the people can have imaginative knowledge of the prophetic and philosophic truths by means of allegories, and can achieve Sa'adah by imaginative knowledge and by action according to that knowledge.

3. Ibn Sīnā

Now coming to Ibn Sīnā. We find that Ibn Ṭufayl shows greater influence of Ibn Sīnā than of any other philosopher. In his Introduction to Ḥayy b. Yaḡẓān he acknowledges the fact that he is writing the book to explain "the principles of the philosophy of Illumination" of Ibn Sīnā. In his criticism of other philosophers he spares no one except Ibn Sīnā. In explaining the nature of the direct and intuitive knowledge of the saints (اوراک اعلیٰ ولایت) he quotes sympathetically from Ibn Sīnā. The very name of the book, Ḥayy b. Yaḡẓān, and the names of its characters (Ḥayy, Asāl and Salamān) have been borrowed from Ibn Sīnā. Besides, there are many points of agreement in details between them.

Ibn Ṭufayl's conception of Form and Matter has been borrowed from Ibn Sīnā, while the latter borrowed it from Aristotle. Ibn Sīnā's emphasis on corporiety and analysis of body also find echo in Ibn Ṭufayl and serve as the starting point of his philosophy.

The doctrine of the plurality of Forms, an obviously Aristotelian element, reaches Ibn Ṭufayl through Ibn Sīnā. Like Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Ṭufayl also distinguishes between the vegetative soul, the animal soul and the human soul. He further agrees with Ibn Sīnā in his doctrine of oneness of soul. Both believe that souls are numerically distinct by reason of their bodies. Ibn Sīnā regards human soul as identical with intellect. Ibn Ṭufayl calls it the rational essence or

rational form of man. Both of them regard the form as the true cause of a thing. For Ibn Sīnā, matter is mere receptivity. For Ibn Ṭufayl it is nothing by itself. It comes into being with the individualization of the form. Both are of the view that the plurality of Intelligible forms does not plurify God. Their ideas regarding time are also similar. Ibn Sīnā believes that time is inseparable from motion. If there were no motion there would be no time. Ibn Ṭufayl considers time as inseparable from the occurrences of the world. So there can be no time before the existence of the phenomenal world. Ibn Ṭufayl's argument for the existence of an Immaterial Agent based on the eternity of the world has also been derived from Ibn Sīnā. Ibn Sīnā, discussing the cause of the eternal motion of the celestial bodies, holds that eternal motion is identical with infinite motion. A body cannot be its cause. So there must be an Immaterial Agent as its cause. But there is one important difference between their points of view. Ibn Sīnā believes in intermediary intelligences as causes of motion. But for Ibn Ṭufayl God is the cause. Ibn Ṭufayl believes in the rational essences of the spheres. He also believes that these essences enjoy the contemplation and vision of God. But he is not prepared to go the full length of the emanation theory as upheld by Al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and other neo-Platonists among the Muslim philosophers. Moreover, Ibn Ṭufayl does not subscribe to the doctrine of the Agent Intellect. He does not accept the union with the Active Intellect as the highest goal. He is not a complete follower of neo-Platonism in this respect. The fundamental difference between Ibn Ṭufayl and the neo-Platonists among the Muslims (including Ibn Sīnā) lies in the fact that Ibn Ṭufayl does not show as much reliance on intellect, for giving the highest knowledge, as is done by these neo-Platonists. For him the relation between God and the human soul or other essences is not susceptible of being explained by reason or of being expressed in language. Philosophers who try to make that relation intelligible through emanation theory or any other theory try the impossible. Ibn Ṭufayl is wise enough not to do that. He regards it as a matter of direct intuition. He tries to give only a remote and indirect idea of it through metaphors. These metaphors (of the light of the Sun and its reflection in different mirrors, one after another) has some resemblance with the theory of emanation. But Ibn Ṭufayl further limits the resemblance by insisting that this analogy should not be taken too literally.

So in our view, Ibn Ṭufayl is not a faithful follower of Ibn Sīnā, even, although he holds him in great esteem and borrows freely from him in working out the details of his philosophy. Ibn Sīnā is more of a rationalist than Ibn Ṭufayl. He has tried to fit neo-Platonism in

Aristotelian frame work but the two trends do not seem to be fully compatible. This confusion among the Muslim philosophers arose from the so called Theology of Aristotle, which passed among them as an Aristotelian work but in fact it was borrowed from the Enneads, Book IV-VI of Plotinus.⁸⁴ But Ibn Ṭufayl is free from this confusion. He is not committed to follow Aristotle or Plotinus or any other philosophers, not even Ibn Sīnā. He selects the acceptable elements from different sources and moulds them into a pattern of his own.

4. Al-Ghazālī

In discussing the influences on Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy the name of Al-Ghazālī cannot be ignored. His influence is not so apparent, yet it is there. Apparently there are basic difference between them. Al-Ghazālī holds reason and intellect in contempt while Ibn Ṭufayl believes that reason can give us knowledge of God, but this knowledge is inferior to the knowledge of the saints. In other matters too (e.g. causality, etc.) Al-Ghazālī is sceptic about the powers of reason, but Ibn Ṭufayl considers it a reliable guide, so far as it goes.

In their ethical outlook too they show some divergence. Ibn Ṭufayl's ideal is individual salvation but Al-Ghazālī emphasizes social obligations also and shows keen appreciation of socio-cultural problems of man.

But inspite of these apparent differences there are some basic affinities in their philosophies. Both are mystical in their outlook. Margaret Smith⁸⁵ attributes to Al-Ghazālī the belief in the theory of emanation on the ground that he speaks of the Unitarian seeing things as a multiplicity, but he sees the many as emanating from the one, the supreme; and also because he (Al-Ghazālī) states that God is the First in relation to existent things, and all have emanated from Him in their order.⁸⁶ In our view, Al-Ghazālī's attitude to emanation theory is similar to that of Ibn Ṭufayl. He accepts the underlying principle of it but does not subscribe to its details. It is interesting to note that Ibn Ṭufayl was aware of this point of view of Al-Ghazālī. In his introduction he mentions the charge brought against Al-Ghazālī by his critics, of introducing plurality within the Divine Being. Ibn Ṭufayl indirectly supports Al-Ghazālī by saying that in his opinion he (Al-Ghazālī) is one of those persons who have attained to the highest degree of Happiness, and who have arrived at these noble sacred positions.⁸⁷ In fact Ibn Ṭufayl's own views are in line with Al-Ghazālī on this point, which may be taken as an indication of the influence of the latter on his philosophy.

Ibn Ṭufayl shows another marked resemblance with Al-Ghazālī with regard to the Ishrāqī aspect of his philosophy. Al-Ghazālī makes

frequent use of imagery derived from light to express his meanings. In emphasizing the Unity of God and in refuting the Christian doctrine that Christ was God he puts forward the analogy of the mirror. One who looks in a mirror which reflects a coloured object, and supposes that reflection to be the form of the mirror, is mistaken. To strengthen his analogy he quotes the following lines of the poet Ibn 'Abbād:

“Fine is the glass and the wine is fine:
They are comingled and seem to be one,
As if there were only wine and no glass,
Or as if there is only glass and no wine.”

Again, Al-Ghazali goes on to say: “The term ‘light’ applied to any but Him is merely metaphorical, without real meaning—God is the highest and ultimate light.⁸⁸ Al-Ghazālī also makes use of the analogy of ‘the light of the sun falling on the moon, then on the wall, and, then on the floor’. Then he concludes, “The term, ‘light’, therefore, can worthily be applied only to ultimate light, above whom is no light and from whom light descends upon all else”⁸⁹

We have quoted Al-Ghazālī at some length in order to show how closely and faithfully Ibn Ṭufayl follows him in his analogies and metaphors.

Margaret Smith regards this use of imagery derived from light as of Hellenic origin,⁹⁰ and quotes Plotinus as regarding knowledge as “the light within the soul which enlightens it, a light lit from above which gave the soul its brighter life⁹¹. But it is not necessary to go as far as that. The analogy of light is so common and so obvious that we find it in most religions and in many philosophies. The Qur’an also makes use of the symbol of light at various places.⁹² So it is more probable that the Muslim philosophers borrowed this symbolism directly from the Qur’an.

Another important agreement is found with regard to their theories of knowledge. Margaret Smith sums up Al-Ghazālī’s theory of knowledge by enumerating the following five faculties possessed by human soul:⁹³

- (1) The sensory faculty
- (2) The Imagination
- (3) The Intelligence
- (4) The Reasoning power
- (5) The Divine prophetic spirit or intuition

If we study Ibn Ṭufayl closely we will find that knowledge, according to him does not fall outside these five sources. But for the sake of convenience he divides knowledge into three grades:

- (1) Knowledge of physical things

(2) Knowledge of Metaphysical things

(3) Knowledge of saints

These grades of knowledge virtually exhaust the kinds of knowledge enumerated by Al-Ghazālī.

There are other minor points of resemblance also but we leave them out.

5. Shahrastānī

Ibn Ṭufayl is also indebted to Shahrastānī (1086-1153) for some of his arguments. His argument or rather illustration about the eternity of the world and its relation to God has been derived from Shahrastānī. Shahrastānī illustrates the relation between God and the world by means of the analogy of the sun and its rays. Both may be eternal and yet the sun is the source (or cause) of its rays. He also gives the analogy of the hand and the sleeve. The hand moves with the sleeve but the movement of the sleeve is dependent on the hand⁹⁴. Ibn Ṭufayl expresses the same sense by the analogy of the hand moving with a ball. But Shahrastānī has gone further in the analysis of the argument. He explains why temporal priority does not apply to God. It is because God is not of time and His being is not temporal.

Again, the credit for the ingenious proof to show that bodies are essentially finite, by supposing two infinite lines drawn through them, goes to Shahrastānī⁹⁵. Ibn Ṭufayl has borrowed it from him. But the achievement of Ibn Ṭufayl lies in fitting it into the framework of his philosophy.

6. Ibn Masarraḥ

In discussing the influences on Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy it is but natural that we should pay special attention to Spanish philosophers. In this connection two names seem to be noteworthy—Ibn Masarraḥ and Ibn Bājja. Though Ibn Ṭufayl does not show his indebtedness to these philosophers in his fundamental position—he rather criticises Ibn Bājja severely for his too much dependence on intellect—yet he agrees with them in many details.

Ibn Masarraḥ was born in Cordova, in 883 A.D. and died in 931 A.D. His father was inclined toward asceticism and he studied Muʿtazelite and mystical philosophy in the East. Ibn Masarraḥ founded an Ishrāqī and pseudo-Empedoclean school of philosophy in Spain. Finding the city life uncongenial to his taste he retired with his pupils to the solitude of mountains. This earned him the title of al-Jabālī 1197—18

(the man of mountains). Ibn Masarraḥ, in his philosophy, shows a strange combination of Mu'tazelite doctrine of freedom and a mystical philosophy of illumination. With Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā he believes in the emanation theory and the existence of immaterial essences. According to him prophecy is "a philosophic sanctification, a purifying illumination which is the result of an ascetic rapture."

Now it is evident that Spain had a tradition of mystical philosophy before Ibn Ṭufayl which must have necessarily influenced him. An interesting feature of this tradition was the alliance between neo-Platonic Ishrāqī mysticism and Mu'tazelite rationalism. Ibn Ṭufayl imbibed this tradition and that is why his philosophy also tries to combine the two trends. The influence of Ibn Masarraḥ is also visible in the Ishrāqī aspect of Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy—his metaphors of the light of the sun and its reflection in different mirrors, etc. His emphasis on withdrawal from society also finds support in Ibn Masarraḥ's retired life and seclusion. Some traces of emanation theory and belief in immaterial essences also show his agreement with Ibn Masarraḥ. But these were the common property of the Muslim philosophers and it is not necessary that Ibn Ṭufayl should have borrowed them from Ibn Masarraḥ particularly. However, it shows that Ibn Ṭufayl did not effect a sudden breach from the existing tradition in Spanish philosophy. But he did not agree with Ibn Masarraḥ with regard to his Empedoclean bias. Moreover, he does not subscribe to the philosophic interpretation of prophecy as offered by Ibn Masarraḥ. He simply asserts the agreement between mystical intuitions and prophetic revelations but does not further explain the nature of the latter.

7. Ibn Bājja

With regard to Ibn Bājja Ibn Ṭufayl is very critical in his Introduction. No doubt, there is a fundamental difference between their approaches. Ibn Bājja preaches the logical approach to ultimate Reality. He was anti-mystical and criticised Al-Ghazālī for his leanings toward Sufism. He held that man can achieve the greatest happiness "through knowledge and thought and not by mortifying the senses and exaggerating the imagination as the sufi devotees do".

But in spite of this fundamental difference Ibn Ṭufayl admires Ibn Bājja's "penetrating mental powers, and sound method of enquiry."⁹⁰ It is to be remembered that Ibn Ṭufayl believes in the harmony between the theoretical knowledge (ادراک اهل نظر) and the intuitive knowledge (ادراک اهل ولایت). He gives credit to Ibn Bājja for having attained to the former. Since Ibn Ṭufayl's book, "Ḥayy b. Yaqẓan", combines

both the approaches it is obvious that his theoretical and rational approach, so far as it goes, must show agreement with Ibn Bājja.

Moreover, in many details and practical teachings, Ḥayy b. Yaqqān shows marked resemblance with *ندير المرحد* of Ibn Bājja. Ibn Bājja was the first Spanish philosopher to make a distinction in his works between religion and philosophy. This distinction finds an important place in Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy and moulds his theme to a considerable extent.

8. Some other Influences

So far we have been discussing the influences of particular philosophers on Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy. It will not be out of place here to take note of some wider influences, as some critics have pointed out. The foremost influence on Ibn Ṭufayl is that of Islam. Ibn Ṭufayl is at pains to bring his philosophy in conformity with the Qur'an. He quotes the Qur'anic verses frequently in support of his point of view. It is not a shallow and superficial loyalty. He believes in Islam and has a firm faith in God and the Prophet, as pointed out by his biographers. In his Introduction he criticises Al-Fārābī for his equating prophethood with an intellectual power and for other unorthodox beliefs. To reconcile philosophy with Islamic faith was a real problem with Ibn Ṭufayl and he found the solution of this problem, like many others, in a sort of mystical philosophy expressed through Ishrāqī imagery. This imagery of light itself betrays various influences—the influences that can be traced back to Qur'anic source, to neo-Platonism and to the ancient Zoroastrian philosophy of Persia.

In his Ethics Ibn Ṭufayl reveals some influence of Pythagorean teachings, as has been pointed out by De Boer.⁹⁷ To some extent we may discover the Buddhistic and Indian influences also in the asceticism and dietary restrictions imposed upon himself by Ḥayy. But this is a common feature of several forms of mysticism which may or may not betray the influences of Indian philosophy and Buddhism.

V. Identification of Ibn Ṭufayl's Philosophical Position

Having pointed out various influences on Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy we are in a better position to determine the exact character of his philosophy and to identify his position. Is it Rationalism or Mysticism or what? We have said earlier that it is difficult to bring Ibn Ṭufayl under any one category. He is not a Rationalist in the ordinary sense because he believes in a supra-rational intuition and also takes the help of experience in building up knowledge, at least in the initial stages

of his philosophy. But he also makes reason his guide in discussing various problems of his philosophy. He believes that reason, if rightly used, can discover the metaphysical truths—the nature of the body, soul and God, and their inter-relationships. But reason has its limits. It only gives a general and vague sort of knowledge of ultimate reality. It cannot reveal its ultimate nature to us. It does not bring us face to face with ultimate reality. In other words, reason is inadequate and insufficient for the highest knowledge of Reality. It is mystical intuition which gives us the direct experience and vision of God.

It is obviously a mystical position. Whatever be the initial path, be it sense-experience or reason, but when a philosopher reaches this stage he deserves to be called a mystic. That Ibn Ṭufayl is a mystic philosopher is not open to doubt. There are so many reasons that compel us to regard him so :

- (i) He speaks of direct observation, intuition and immediate presence of Divine Being.
- (ii) This direct observation or experience is accompanied by clarity and extreme joy and ecstacy.
- (iii) This experience cannot be expressed in language. The things that are revealed during this experience (for instance relation of the One to many), cannot be understood or made intelligible by reason.
- (iv) A certain way of life or a practical programme is necessary to qualify for that experience. In other words, it comes through practical striving and not by mere theoretical contemplation.
- (v) Ibn Ṭufayl also refers to the experience of union with God. During that experience all essences and everything, including the self of the mystic, disappear and there remains nothing but the Divine Essence.
- (vi) He considers God as the object of highest love and strongest yearnings. It is not a mere intellectual curiosity that leads one to seek the knowledge of God. Having come to know the attributes of Perfection possessed by God one is irresistibly attracted towards Him, to the exclusion of all else.
- (vii) Ibn Ṭufayl distinguishes between theoretical or metaphysical knowledge (ادراك اهل نظر) and the knowledge of the saints (ادراك اهل ولايت). He criticises Ibn Bājja for denying the latter and for confining himself to the former only. He has no sympathy with philosophers like Ibn Bājja and Al-Fārābī on account of their intellectual approach and shows

respect for men like Al-Ghazālī and such other mystic philosophers.

- (viii) He explains away matter as unreal or nothing—as a mere fitness for receiving certain forms. Then he denies the independent existence of forms and regards them as manifestations of Divine Essence. In spite of their apparent plurality they do not plurify God. This is a kind of Pantheistic Idealism combined with Ishrāqī mysticism.

But it is to be remembered that Ibn Ṭufayl's mysticism, considered in all its details, is of a unique pattern. It cannot be equated wholly with neo-Platonic mysticism or with Ishrāqī philosophy or with any other particular system of philosophy.

VI. Ibn Ṭufayl's Influence on Subsequent Thought

As most of the histories of philosophy have failed to do full justice to Ibn Ṭufayl and his philosophy it is but natural that his influence on subsequent thought should also remain obscure. But such a powerful current of thought cannot sink into oblivion without leaving important traces of its impact on the surroundings. Moreover, Ibn Ṭufayl was undoubtedly one of the greatest philosophers of his period. The evolution of thought, which is a continuous process, could not have taken a jump over him. Ibn Ṭufayl reveals the traces of the influence of his predecessors. His successors should carry over, and they do carry over, the marks of his influence.

1. Ibn Ṭufayl's Influence on Spanish Thought

(i) *Ibn Roshd*: Ibn Roshd was the younger contemporary and, according to some traditions, a pupil of Ibn Ṭufayl. Ibn Roshd's philosophy is the work of his own independent and vigorous mind, yet it is not free from Ibn Ṭufayl's influence. It is true that Ibn Roshd deviates considerably from Ibn Sīnā's traditions in philosophy. He revolted against the predominance of neo-Platonism and followed Aristotle more closely. But it was Ibn Ṭufayl who had prepared the way for this divergence. He had already made a beginning in this direction by dropping the neo-Platonic astronomy and the doctrine of intermediary intelligences. Again, Ibn Ṭufayl had deviated from Ibn Sīnā on another point. Ibn Sīnā regarded the One alone as necessary. So he needed a hierarchy of emanations, from intelligence to intelligence, which was independent of the One. Ibn Ṭufayl does away with this hierarchy and regards God, the necessary Being, as the uncaused cause

of all multiplicity. Ibn Roshd shows agreement with Ibn Ṭufayl on this point. He holds that God, as pure act, is Himself the Intelligible or the first Intelligence. He is the uncaused cause and source of every thing.

One element of neo-Platoism (i. e., the doctrine of Active Intellect) which had been dropped by Ibn Ṭufayl, is still found in Ibn Roshd's philosophy. Even on this point he does not fully agree with Ibn Sīnā. For Ibn Sīnā the function of the Active Intellect was to create forms. For Ibn Roshd, its function was to transform potential being into actual being. Since all form is actual and all matter is potential it is the Active Intellect that gives form to matter or makes it actual. This is the solution of the problem of the eternity of matter advanced by Ibn Roshd, and it is identical in substance with that of Ibn Ṭufayl.

But the greatest and closest influence of Ibn Ṭufayl is visible in Ibn Roshd's views on the relation of philosophy to religion. Ibn Roshd divided men into three classes :

- (a) Those who had attained to the highest state of wisdom and needed absolute demonstration to convince them.
- (b) The dialectical men who were satisfied with probable arguments.
- (c) The simple and the unenlightened ones for whom faith and obedience to authority was sufficient.

The Qur'an, he believed, was addressed to all the three classes of men. Every one had a right to interpret it according to his own capacity and understanding. Its exterior, with symbolic meanings, was meant for the un-instructed. Its interior, with a hidden meaning, was meant for the philosopher.⁹⁸

If there was any conflict between the apparent text of the Qur'an and its demonstrative conclusions the philosopher could find the underlying harmony. But he should not divulge the deeper meaning of the Qur'an to the inferior minds who are not capable of grasping the truth. In all these ideas one finds an echo of Ibn Ṭufayl's views and traces of his direct influence.

(ii) *Ibn al-ʿArabī* : Ibn al-ʿArabī of Murcia (1165-1240 A.D.) is another important Spanish philosopher who comes after Ibn Ṭufayl. He is an adherent of Ishrāqī mysticism and a follower of Waḥdat-al-Wajūd in its extreme and most mystical form. Though in his extreme point of view he goes far beyond Ibn Ṭufayl, yet it seems quite reasonable to suppose that the tradition of Ishrāqī mysticism should have reached him through Ibn Ṭufayl. In his *Futūḥāt* he describes the celestial ascent of two persons; one is a philosopher relying on his own reason and judgment, and the other is an adept initiated into the tradition by a master,

The philosopher is denied access to the regions which are reached by the adept.

The anti-intellectual bias of Ibn al-ʿArabī is absent in Ibn Ṭufayl but the allegorical form of the story betrays the influence of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān and other similar stories in the mystic literature of that period.

Besides this formal resemblance there are further agreements between them in some matters of details. Ibn al-ʿArabī, like Ibn Ṭufayl, makes use of the metaphor of the mirror to express the relation between God and the phenomenal world. The analogy of body and its members given by Ibn al-ʿArabī, to express the unity of being, also reminds one of similar statements of Ibn Ṭufayl in his Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān.

(iii) *Ibn Sabʿin* : There is another Spanish philosopher, ʿAbd al-Haqq ibn Sābʿin (1217-61) who was also an advocate of the philosophy of light. He wrote a book named *Asrār al-Ḥikmat al-Mashriqiyah*. It will be remembered that the sub-title given to Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān had the same wordings. So it is probable that Ibn Sābʿin was inspired by Ibn Ṭufayl's work to write his book.

With regard to the development of Muslim philosophy in the East the influence of Ibn Ṭufayl seems to be negligible, or very remote and indirect. Many exponents of Ishraqī philosophy and mysticism appeared in the East, such as Shihābuddīn Suhrawardī Maqtūl, Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī, Farīduddīn ʿAttār, Jāmī and others. But it cannot be asserted with certainty that they owed all their ideas to Ibn Ṭufayl. They can be more justifiably connected with the neo-Platonic and Persian traditions.

2. Influence on the Western Philosophy

The western philosophy, however, tells a different tale. The two greatest philosophers of Spain, Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Roshd, made great impact and exercised direct influence on the development of philosophy in medieval Europe. To understand the nature of this influence closely we will have to turn to the conditions obtaining in Spain of those days.

(i) *Jewish Philosopher—Moses Maimonides*: In the early days of Muslim rule in Spain the Jews enjoyed peace and prosperity which was denied to them in many other countries of Europe. It brought them nearer to the Muslims and made them adopt ʿArabic language as their medium of thought. Many of them mastered ʿArabic learning and philosophy available in Spain. Inspired by a similar religious interest they often moulded their philosophico-theological speculation on the pattern of the writings of the Muslim philosophers that impressed them. It was natural that they should be drawn more closely to the Spanish

Muslim philosophers who flourished about the same period. These Jewish philosophers of Spain transmitted the ideas of Muslim philosophy, and specially the ideas of Muslim philosophers of Spain, to the Christian world. The most noteworthy among these Jewish philosophers of Spain were Solomon Ibn Gabirol (1021-1058) known to the scholastics by his Latin name Avencebrol or Avicbron, and Moses ben Maimon or Moses Maimonides (1135-1240). The former inclined towards neo-Platonism which had earned him the title of Jewish Plato. The latter showed greater affinity with Aristotelianism. He was well-known among the scholastics for his famous work "Guide for the Perplexed." This work, on many vital points and arguments, reveals the clear influence of Ibn Tufayl's teachings.

Maimonides believed that pure Intelligences are free from matter, and that celestial bodies are also composed of matter and form, but their matter is different from that of terrestrial bodies. He believed in God as necessary Being and the primary mover. He does not regard the question of the eternity or non-eternity of the world as capable of demonstrative proof, but tries to establish the existence of God, whether the world was created in time or existed from all eternity. He also tried to harmonize between the Old Testament and philosophy. All this clearly shows his closeness to Ibn Tufayl's views on philosophy.

(ii) *Thomas Aquinas*. Maimonides in turn influenced Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.), one of the greatest figures in Christian philosophy.

According to Etienne Gilson, their (of Maimonides and Aquinas) philosophies, barring a few items, "were in harmony with one another on all the really important points."⁹⁹ The argument about the existence of God, irrespective of the eternity or non-eternity of the world, also appears in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.¹⁰⁰ Thomas Aquinas also accepted from him the distinction between Faith and Reason which plays so important a part in his philosophy and in the writings of other Christian philosophers.

There is one difference, however. Unlike Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Roshd, Maimonides believed in the priority of revelation. He starts with the tenets of Jewish faith as given in the old testament and tries to justify them rationally, with arguments borrowed from Ibn Tufayl or other Muslim philosophers. It was this aspect of philosophy which exercised a formative role in the subsequent development of Augustinianism and Thomism in the 13th and 14th centuries.

In the beginning, St. Thomas, under the influence of Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā inclined towards the neo-Platonic conception of God as an indirect mover. But later on he turned to the Aristotelian conception of God as the first Mover. This may have been due to the influence of

Ibn Ṭufayl who was the first among the Spanish Muslim Philosophers to free himself from the unlimited allegiance to neo-Platonism.

The Augustinian school adopted the doctrine of Active Intellect preached by Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, to harmonize with the theory of "illumination from God." This modification saved the individuality of the soul which was threatened by extreme neo-Platonism. This again is a point which brings them closer to Ibn Ṭufayl.

The influence of Ibn Ṭufayl was not confined to Jewish philosophers or to a few Christian philosophers alone, but it was extended to the whole Christian world in the Middle Ages. Spain was the centre of learning to which Philosophers and scholars were drawn from various European countries, and after drinking deep at this fountain of learning they carried away the ideas of Muslim philosophers to their respective places, and influenced others who came in contact with them. It is not possible to discuss here the debt that each philosopher owed to Ibn Ṭufayl or to other Muslim philosophers of Spain, but we can just take note of some land marks or important trends in that direction.

(iii) *The Philosophy of Light and its Influence on Augustinian Scholastics.* We have seen that the movement of the Philosophy of Light, which reached its climax in Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn al-ʿArabī had been popular in Spain. The illuminative life and the symbolism of light were also present in Christianity from the very beginning. For instance, a mystical movement in Syria, in pre-Islamic days, emphasized the three stages of mystic experience—Purgation—Illumination—Perfection.¹⁰¹ Dionysius, a Syrian monk, writes: "Every process of illuminating light, proceeding from the Father, whilst visiting us as a gift of goodness, restores us again gradually as a unifying power"¹⁰² But as the Spanish Arabist, Asin Placios points out, it was from al-Andalusia (Spain) that the ideas of this school (of light) were transmitted to the so called Augustinian scholastics, such as Alexander Hales, Duns Scotus, Roger Bacon and Raymond Lull."¹⁰³ The same author finds a close connection between Dante and Sufism.¹⁰⁴ "An essential element", he says, "of Ishrāqī philosophy—the metaphysical doctrine of light with which we shall be concerned later—reappears in the Divine Comedy."¹⁰⁵ Gordon Leff, in his book, *Medieval Thought*, also admits the powerful effect of the theory of light upon later Christian thought.¹⁰⁶

(iv) *Roger Bacon (1214-1294 A.D.)*: Besides this influence, we also find evidence of more direct and closer indebtedness to Ibn Ṭufayl in case of some important philosophers and writers. For instance, Roger Bacon¹⁰⁷ is generally regarded as the first champion of Inductive method in medieval Europe. He was the first person in the history of 1197—19

human thought to have used the term 'scientia experimentalis' (Experimental Science) in its present connotation. The following quotation will throw light on his views: "There are, in fact, two ways of knowing: reasoning and experiment. Theory concludes and makes us admit the conclusion, but it does not give us that assurance free from all doubt in which the mind rests is the intuition of truth, so long as the conclusion is not arrived at by way of experiment. Many people have theories on certain subjects, but as they have not had experience of them, these theories remain unutilized by them and incite them neither to seek a certain good, nor to avoid a certain evil. If a man who has never seen fire were to prove by conclusive arguments that fire burns, that it spoils and destroys things, his listener's mind would remain unconvinced, and he would not keep away from fire until he had put his hand or some combustible object in it, to prove by experience what theory had taught him. But once having made the experiment of combustion, the mind is convinced and rests on the evidence of truth; reasoning, therefore, is not enough, but experiment does suffice. That is clearly evident in mathematics, whose demonstrations are the surest of all."¹⁰⁸ We have given this long quotation from Roger Bacon to emphasize his contribution in this direction. Long before Francis Bacon,¹⁰⁹ he enumerated four obstacles which should be removed from the path to learning.¹¹⁰ These obstacles are : (i) Blind belief in authority. (ii) The fact that men are imitating each other, in spite of thousand falsehoods current among men. (iii) The reign of prejudice. (iv) Pride which leads men to conceal their ignorance and display mock learning.

Roger Bacon conceives experiment as of two kinds, one internal and spiritual (like mystic experience) and the other, external, based on senses. It is the latter that is the source of all our veritably certain knowledge and of experimental sciences.

Thus we see that Roger Bacon was one of those pioneers who have been responsible for ushering in an era of scientific progress and empirical method in European thought. But on a close study of Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān one is struck with surprise at the close affinity between Ibn Ṭufayl's theory of knowledge and that of Roger Bacon. Ibn Ṭufayl also accepts reason, sense experience and internal experience (i. e. mystic experience or intuition) as the only sources of knowledge. Moreover, his elaborate description of the empirical learning in the life-story of Ḥayy b. Yaḳẓān entitles him to be ranked as the forerunner of the two Bacons who are usually regarded as the founders of the Inductive method of knowledge. Their affinities cannot be explained away as matters of mere coincidence.

In view of the popularity of Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān in medieval Europe and Roger Bacon's mastery of Arabic language and oriental learning it will not be too much to suppose that Roger Bacon was well-acquainted with Ibn Ṭufayl's ideas and had been consciously influenced by them.

(v) *Francis Bacon*: Francis Bacon (1561-1626) is another English philosopher who has made great contribution to the development of Inductive method. In his chief work, *Novum Organon*, he has formulated the principles of this method.

Francis Bacon has stressed the need of freeing the mind from various idols before starting the voyage for true knowledge. These idols are :

- (i) Idols of the Tribe (i.e. false ideas common to human race).
- (ii) Idols of the Den (i.e. the prejudices of the individual).
- (iii) Idols of the market (i.e. false ideas arising through human intercourse or through the improper use of language).
- (iv) Idols of the Theatre (i.e. assumptions and false theories of the philosophers).

But we find that the views of Francis Bacon are nothing but an echo of the views of Roger Bacon. And since Roger Bacon is indebted to Ibn Ṭufayl, Francis Bacon too cannot be said to be independent of Ibn Ṭufayl's influence.

(vi) *Spinoza*: Not only the two Bacons but the modern philosophers like Spinoza and Leibnitz were also familiar with Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān and were impressed by its philosophy. The touches of oriental mysticism in Spinoza's philosophy may, in some measure, be attributed to Ibn Ṭufayl's influence.

Ibn Ṭufayl's mysticism, however, begins with reason or intellect and ends with Intuition. That is why he distinguishes between Intellectual Comprehension (ادراك امل نظر) and Comprehension of the Saints of God (ادراك امل ولايت). It seems that Spinoza's philosophy is confined to the former stage alone. Even his Love of God is intellectual.

(vii) *Defoe's Robinson Crusoe and Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān*: Before ending this section it will not be out of place to make some reference to another important evidence of Ibn Ṭufayl's influence, not in philosophy but in the field of literature. The famous story of Robinson Crusoe, written by Daniel Defoe¹¹¹ in 1719, seems to be an imperfect copy of Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān.¹¹² The philosophical romance of Ibn Ṭufayl offers an interesting study along with Defoe's Robinson Crusoe. Defoe's work has enjoyed exceptional popularity and fame in the history of English literature. Robinson Crusoe, the hero of Defoe, is a shipwrecked

sailor who reaches the shore of an uninhabited island. With his inventive genius and practical ability he constructs various things and provides for his different needs. Thus, he passes his time in that island till some passing ship picks him up and carries him once again to the civilized society.

Now it will be evident to a careful observer that Robinson Crusoe is only an imperfect copy of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. Crusoe's adventures reproduce the practical achievements of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān, without his scientific, philosophical, moral, and intellectual development. Moreover, Defoe's task was much easier. He had to depict the adventures of a grown up adult who was already equipped with the fruits of education, training and experience in a civilized society. But Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān starts with a total blank. He is deprived of all education and guidance from society. He has to learn everything with his own native intelligence and with the resources of his own mind. He learns to satisfy all his bodily needs. Then he proceeds to satisfy his scientific curiosity and seeks the solution of various philosophical, moral and religious problems raised by his inquisitive mind. All this is done in a most natural, realistic and psychological way.

However, it is not our aim here to dwell upon the superior merits of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. Our main concern is to point out the influence that Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān might have exercised on Defoe's Robinson Crusoe. And it is not a mere guess or a wild hypothesis. There are facts to support it. In the first place, there is the internal evidence—the close affinity between the two themes and the working out of the details by the two masters.

Ibn Ṭufayl's work was written probably in the second half of the 12th century A.D., while Defoe's Robinson Crusoe was written about 1719 A.D. Moreover, 'Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān' was one of the most popular books in medieval Europe and every educated and learned man was expected to be familiar with it. Its translations in various languages of Europe began to appear as early as fourteenth century A.D. The first English translation of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān by George Keith the Quaker appeared in 1674. It was followed by another English translation by George Ashwell in 1686. Then Simon Oakley's translation appeared in 1708. It was reprinted in 1711. All these editions and translations of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān come before Robinson Crusoe. It was not possible for a man like Defoe to have remained ignorant of such an important work in those days of scarcity of published books. The literary beauties of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān and masterly treatment of its theme by Ibn Ṭufayl should have given Defoe an idea of attempting a somewhat parallel work in English.

The tendency to imitate the story of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān continued even after Defoe. In 1761, we find "The Life and Surprising Adven-

tures of Don Antonio de Trezzano" being published 'anonymously. It was nothing but a Crusoe story paraphrased and modified from Oakley's version. This shows what a deep impression Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān had made on the literary circles of England.

To sum up, Ibn Ṭufayl exercised great influence on the development of Jewish and Christian thought in medieval ages and thus indirectly contributed to the rise and development of Modern philosophy. The following quotation from O'Leary about the influence of Spanish philosophy on the West is equally true of Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy. "After a chequered career in the east it (philosophy) passed over to the western Muslim community in Spain, where it had a very specialized development, which finally made a deeper impression on Christian and Jewish thought than on that of Muslims themselves, and attained its final evolution in North East Italy, where as an anti-ecclesiastical influence, it prepared the way for the Renaissance."¹¹⁸

VII. Concluding Remarks

So far we have confined ourselves to a systematic exposition and analysis of Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy, its sources and its influence on subsequent thought. Now in this last section we may venture a critical evaluation and assessment of some aspects of his philosophy and its contribution to human thought.

As we have already pointed out in earlier sections, Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān is unique in several aspects. In the originality of its plan and masterly working out of its theme it is unsurpassed in the whole philosophical literature. No other philosophical story can claim the same measure of success as is achieved by Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. Apart from its philosophical aspect, Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān can be ranked among the best classics of the world literature.

So far as the philosophy of Ibn Ṭufayl is concerned, various elements constituting it are not absolutely new. Ibn Ṭufayl borrows freely from Aristotle, Plato, neo-Platonism, Ishrāqī philosophy and similar other sources, but his own genius moulds them into a new pattern. There is a modern touch about his philosophy. His philosophy includes elements from older philosophies but its spirit is modern. Modern philosophy begins in a revolt against dogmatism. It doubts every established opinion in order to reconstruct knowledge on a surer foundation. It is this desire for emancipation of human thought which is prominently visible in the two pioneers of modern philosophy, Descartes¹¹⁴ and Bacon.¹¹⁵ Even the French sensationalist, Condillac

(1715-1780) tries to give the exposition of his philosophy by supposing a marble statue or a human child with marble coverings blocking his senses. One by one, the marble coverings are lifted from various sense organs, and thus Condillac traces the development of sensations and ideas from the very beginning. The idea is that the whole knowledge should be reached by tracing its developmental process so that no uncertainty or unwarranted idea may find a place in knowledge.¹¹⁶ In short, it is this spirit of emancipation and quest for certainty that characterizes Modern philosophy.

Ibn Tufayl's philosophy is also saturated with this spirit. He makes a newly born child the hero of his story. This child is cut off from society. He is deprived of all guidance and benefits of experience of others. Even the use of language is denied to him. Thus, unaided and unguided by any human teacher, he begins to learn about life, about science, philosophy and religion. The same motive is operating here as in case of Descartes and Bacon, that the philosophy developed by this natural philosopher should be free from all bias and dogmatism. It should be the philosophy to which any unsophisticated and unbiassed seeker after truth may be inevitably led, in the light of his own reasoning and experience. However, it is far from our intention to imply that Ibn Tufayl's philosophy possesses all the merits of the modern philosophers or all its elements are acceptable to our modern sense and taste. All that we aim to show is that in certain trends of his philosophy Ibn Tufayl comes very close to some important philosophers of modern period.

Take for instance the sceptic philosopher of Scotland, David Hume (1711-1771). His revolutionary ideas about 'Cause' have earned him immortal fame. He challenges the very basis of causality and denies necessary connection between cause and effect.¹¹⁷ Ibn Tufayl, in his discussion of Form, comes very close to this position. He comes to the conclusion that we have no direct knowledge of the Form of any body. We find a fitness or disposition for certain actions in a body and regard it as its form. These actions do not seem to have any necessary connection with that body. If actions of an animal were to proceed from a plant we would suppose the animal form to be present in the plant.¹¹⁸

The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is universally acknowledged as one of the greatest philosophers of modern period. His contribution lies in giving a critical analysis and justification of knowledge avoiding the extreme points of view of Rationalism and Empiricism. He set limits to human reason and showed that there are matters beyond its reach. If reason tries to indulge in those matters it is involved in antinomies.

This critical spirit is, at times, visible in Ibn Ṭufayl also. With regard to the problem of the eternity or non-eternity of the world he frankly admits the incapability of reason to commit itself either way. Again, in the discussion of unity and multiplicity he shows great reserve and balance in his judgments. He stresses the inaccessibility of 'noumena' for ordinary knowledge from a somewhat different angle—from the stand point of a philosophy of language which is essentially modern in its spirit and scope.

Ibn Ṭufayl, like Kant, is also free from the defect of partiality to reason or to sense experience. In his own way, he gives to them their respective fields of activity. In short, with the help of sense experience, reason and intuition he wants to build up a philosophical system which should satisfy human nature as a whole.

But here again we may stress the fact that we do not claim infallibility for his point of view. His philosophy suffers from various shortcomings. Like all rational systems his philosophy promises more than what it can give. It pretends to discover rationally the nature of the world, Soul and God. It is not free from undue assumptions and logical flaws. His proofs are not conclusive. Their fallacies are too obvious to need any detailed discussion in this section.

Again, the criterion of truth for the mystic experience is wanting. There are assertions and assertions but no proof. However, it may be said in justification of Ibn Ṭufayl that he does not claim for these assertions the status of proved facts. It is a particular type of experience which he refers to. He invites his readers to verify it by undergoing a certain process of discipline. Even then, it may become a certainty for the adept but it cannot become a piece of knowledge for others.

Further, Ibn Ṭufayl is not very convincing in his views about the relation of religion to philosophy. He is guilty of prescribing double standards—one for the chosen few and the other for the masses. His ethics is an escape from the realities of life. It teaches withdrawal from society and from social responsibilities. Ibn Ṭufayl throws out useful hints about the philosophy of language but there is no detailed working out of the problems of language.

The same inadequacy is felt with regard to his description of the psychological development of Ḥayy b. Yaḡzān. He gives just a side light and does not tackle many vital issues connected with this problem. The reason perhaps is that he is dealing with a hypothetical case and not with a living, growing, actual child.

In spite of these shortcomings we must give him the credit of being

a pioneer in many fields. He shows modern spirit and anticipates some modern trends in his philosophy. He is the real founder of the Inductive Method and has successfully used it in building up his knowledge of Science and Philosophy.

Moreover, he must be judged in relation to his period. In the words of E. Gilson, he was a man of encyclopaedic learning, whose learning far exceeded the knowledge of the Christians of his times.¹¹⁹

In short, Ibn Ṭufayl was much in advance of his age. By influencing the Jewish and Christian philosophy of Medieval Europe he prepared the way for Renaissance. Thus he deserves an unquestionable place among the forerunners of modern thought.

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21. Section 10 of the Commentary dealing with the Orient and Occident of the Universe—Juzjānī.
22. Occidental Exile—Suhrawardī.
23. Die Gnosis—Leisegang P. 136 f.
24. Cf. Avicenna and the Visionary Recital by Henry Corbin (English Translation by W. R. Trask) p. 160.

25. It is very much like the Symbolism of dreams, with the difference that dream symbolism is an unconscious process while allegorical representation is deliberately planned.
For details of dream Symbolism see Interpretation of Dreams by Sigmund Freud.
26. Otto Spies and S. K. Khattak, in their introductory note on the life and work of Suhrawardī, write :
“In spite of the storm and stress of youth he did not dare to pronounce his doctrines publicly; and so he clothed them in the garb of allegory. When he later on professed his ideas boldly and openly at Aleppo he had to suffer death for his outspokenness.” (Three Treatises on Mysticism p. 3).
27. Avicenna and the Visionary Recital by Henry Corbin page 169.
28. H. Y. O., 86, p. 141.
29. The History of Philosophy in Islam by D. Boer p. 185.
30. H. Y. O. (Introduction by A. S. Fulton) p. 25.
31. Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. II, p. 424.
32. اعلام الفلسفة العربية صفحات ٨٠٣-٨٠٤
33. Kitāb al-Ishārāt, with Tūsī's commentary.
34. For instance, Fakhruddīn Rāzī is of the view that Salamān represents Adam and Absāl represents Paradise. The story depicts the whole history of psyche, the exile from the Paradise, and the progressive return to the original state of bliss and perfection. (See Fakhr Rāzī's Commentary published at Constantinople 1290 A. H.) According to Nasīruddīn Tūsī, Salamān is the typification of the human soul. Absāl represents the upper face of the soul, the intellectus Contemplativus. Salamān's wife represents the vital powers of the body, or the elementary Matter. Her sister is the practical intellect, which is also the soul at peace. (Cf. Tūsī's Commentary on Ishārāt).
35. H. Y. O., 86, p. 141.
36. Ibn Ṭufayl's Introduction (Appendix).
37. Ibid.
38. Ḥayy=Living; Ibn=Son; Yaqẓān=Wakeful, i. e., God.
39. Parmenides who flourished about 504-500 B. C. was a Greek Philosopher who founded the Eleatic school of philosophy. He is not a mystic Philosopher. His philosophy of Being is based on purely logical arguments. But the earlier part of the poem, describing his celestial ascent, has a mystic touch about it. That is why we have included him in our list. For details see History of Early Greek Philosophy by Burnet (pp. 169-196); also Ancilla to Pre-Socratic Philosophy by Kathleen Freeman (pp. 41-51).
40. Early Greek Philosophy by John Burnet p. 172.
41. Zarathusht-Nāma (F. Rosenberg's Tr.) p. 28.
42. Die Gnosis—Leisegang p. 136 f.
43. Cf. Avicenna and the Visionary Recital—Henry Corbin.

44. The original text of Salamān and Absāl has been lost. But Ibn Sīnā has made a reference to it in *Ishārāt* and Nasīruddīn Tūsī has given a brief Summary of it in his commentary.
45. Cf. *Kitāb al-Ishārāt* with Tūsī's Commentary.
46. See Section II, Ch. V. of this book.
47. Avicenna and the Visionary Recital—Henry Corbin p. 235.
48. The Original Greek version has been lost. We know it through its translation by Ḥunain Ibn Isḥāq (d. 874 A. D.) Tūsī has also given a summary of it in his Commentary on *Ishārāt*.
49. Cf. Tūsī's Commentary on *Ishārāt*.
50. Avicenna and the Visionary Recital—Henry Corbin p. 220.
51. Cf. *Collected Papers of Jung and Psychology of Jung* by Jacobi.
52. Ibn Ṭufayl is also indirectly indebted to the Hellenistic version as he has borrowed the names of his characters from Ibn Sīnā.
53. For instance, the great mystic poet of Persia, Jāmī (d. 1492 A. D.) has written a beautiful mystical epic which is also entitled as *Salamān and Absāl*. It is mostly based on the Hellenistic version.
54. *Risālat al-Ṭayr* was written by Ibn Sīnā in 'Arabic. The original text along with a French translation of it can be found in Mehren's edition. *Shahrazūrī*, a Commentator of Suhrawardī, includes a Recital of the Bird among Suhrawardī's works. But this Recital of the Bird, attributed to Suhrawardī, is found to be a translation of Ibn Sīnā's *Risālat al-Ṭayr*. A translation by 'Umar Ibn Sahtān Sāwajī (middle of the 12th Century) and other Persian translations of the same also exist.
55. Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111 A. D.) is said to have written it in 'Arabic. His brother, Aḥmad Ghazālī translated it into Persian. Some writers on Al-Ghazālī doubt the genuineness of its source but Henry Corbin, Ritter, and Brockelman support its attribution to Al-Ghazālī, and the internal evidence of the work is in their favour. The position taken up in the recital is in strict harmony with Al-Ghazālī's general philosophical outlook.
56. Farīduddīn 'Attār (d. 1229 A. D.) was a mystic poet of Persia. He combines a deep and penetrating insight with poetic imagination. He has a peculiar style of presenting his ideas which is reflected even in the summary given above.
57. Joseph stands here for the eternal self.
58. The 'Arabic title of this recital is *غربة الغريبه* or *غربت الغريبه* as found in the edition of Ahmad Amin, who has published three works in one edition with the title

حی بن یقظان لابن سینا و ابن طفیل و السهروردی
59. *El Criticon*—Jracium Baltazar.
60. However, there is one difference. The three characters of Ibn Ṭufayl have been borrowed from two Recitals of Ibn Sīnā. But one character, viz., Absāl occurs as Asāl in Ibn Ṭufayl, which

implies the difference of a dot only. It is possible that Ibn Ṭufayl had intended it to be Absāl (ابسال) but the dot of ب was omitted by mistake of some one who copied the manuscript and thus it was changed into Asāl (اسال).

61. It is interesting that ‘Omar Farrukh, in his book *ابن طفيل و قصه* criticises Ibn Ṭufayl for excluding women and sex altogether from the life of Ḥayy b. Yaḡẓān. In our opinion this criticism is unjustified as Ḥayy was so absorbed in contemplation on God that it left no room for other desires and passions.
62. See for instance, *Kitāb al-Shifā, Ishārāt, Asrār al-Hikmat al-Mashriqia* etc.
63. Dr. ‘Abdul Ḥalim Maḥmūd, a scholar of ‘Arabic and Philosophy, writes in his book on Philosophy of Ibn Ṭufayl, ‘Ibn Ṭufayl is superior to Ibn Sīnā from the point of view of language and literature. Ibn Ṭufayl’s expression is clear and full of literary beauties. But Ibn Sīnā’s expression is difficult and complicated’.
64. *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur*, 2nd edition.
65. H. Y. O. 89, pp. 144, 145.
66. *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*—Henry Corbin.
67. In this introduction Ibn Ṭufayl distinguishes between *ادراك اهل* and *ادراك اهل نظر* and attributes the latter to Ibn Bājja. See Ibn Ṭufayl’s Introduction (Appendix).
68. Cf. *El Criticon*—Jracion Baltazar (1651).
69. *The History of Philosophy in Islam*—De Boer, p. 182.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
71. ‘Arabic Thought and its Place in History—O’Leary, p. 251.
72. A. S. Fulton’s Introduction to Ockley’s Translation of Ḥayy b. Yaḡẓān, p. 23.
73. H. Y. O. A. S. Fulton’s Introduction, p. 25.
74. *Medieval Thought*—Gordon Leff p. 145.
75. *Encyclopaedia of Islam Vol. II, Article on Ibn Ṭufayl* by Carra de Vaux, p. 424.
76. *ابن طفيل و قصه حى بن يقظان-عمر فروخ صفحه ٨٦*
77. *Ibn Sīnā the Scientist and the Philosopher : Article on Ibn Sīnā by A. J. Arberry and Sir Thomas Adams.*
78. *فلسفه ابن طفيل و رساله حى بن يقظان-ڈاکٹر عبدالحمید محمود صفحات ١٨-١٩*
79. Cf. *رد علي المنطقيين-ابن تيميه*

80. Cf. Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.
81. See *Enneads* by Plotinus, for his detailed view.
82. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Volume XII : Article on Ibn Ṭufayl p. 37.
83. Ibn Ṭufayl's Introduction (Appendix).
84. *Ibid.*
85. *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*—Etienne Gilson, p. 182.
86. *Al-Ghazālī the Mystic*—Margaret Smith, p. 106.
87. *Iḥyā*, IV, pp. 212, 217.
88. Ibn Ṭufayl's Introduction (Appendix).
89. *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, p. 100.
90. *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, p. 110.
91. *Al-Ghazālī the Mystic* by Margaret Smith, p. 106.
92. *Enneads*, V, 3:8.
93. For instance, the Qur'an says *الله نور السموات والارض* (God is the light of the Heavens and the earth).
94. *Al-Ghazālī the Mystic*—Margaret Smith, p. 142.
95. *Kitāb Nihāyātu'l-Iqdām Fī 'Ilmi'l-Kalām* by Al-Shahrastānī, (translated by Guillaume and published by Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 2.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
97. Ibn Ṭufayl's Introduction (Appendix).
98. *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, p. 186.
99. The same idea is conveyed by Rūmī in one of his verses :

من زقران برگزیدم مغز را
پوست رایش سگان انداختم
100. *Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*—Etienne Gilson p. 229.
101. *Contra Gentiles*, II, 32-38.
102. *Illumination in Islamic Mysticism*—Edward Jabra Jurji, p. 4.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
104. Cf. *Islam and the Divine Comedy*—Asin.
105. *Ibid.*
106. *Ibid.*
107. *Medieval Thought*, Ch. IV, p. 145.
108. Roger Bacon was born in England about 1214 A. D. He studied at Oxford and then went to Paris. He was one of the versatile thinkers of his period. He was well-versed in 'Arabic and Oriental learning. His chief works are *Opus Majus* (Longer work), *Opus Minus* (the shorter work) and *Opus Tertium* (the Third work).

109. See *Novum Organon* by Francis Bacon.
110. *Opus Majus*, IV.
111. This fact has been admitted by various writers on Ibn Ṭufayl. Cf.
 - (i) *The Arab Genius in Science and Philosophy* by ‘Omar Farrukh p. 103.
 - (ii) *Muslim Thought, its Origin and Achievement* by M. M. Sharif, p. 103.
112. ‘Arabic Thought and its Place in History—O’Leary, p. 295.
113. Descartes (1596-1650 A. D.) was the famous French philosopher whose method of Doubt earned him the title of the Father of Modern philosophy.
114. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was the English philosopher who, in his *Novum Organon*, formulated the principles of inductive Method. As a pre-condition of true knowledge, he believes, the mind should be freed from all prejudices and preconceived notions—the idols.
115. For details see Condillac’s works :
 - (i) *An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge*, and
 - (ii) *Treatise on Sensations*.
116. Cf. Hume’s *Treatise on Human Nature* (Part III, Sec. II).
117. H. Y. O., 49 p. 93.
118. *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* by Etienne Gilson, p. 217.

APPENDIX

Ibn Ṭufayl's Introduction to Ḥayy b. Yaqzān

All praise is due to God, who is great and greatest of all; who is eternal and most original of all; who is the knower of all things and whose knowledge is most comprehensive; who is wise and the wisest of all; who is merciful and the most merciful of all beings; who is benevolent and the most benevolent; who is forgiving and the most forgiving; 'He who imparted knowledge through the Pen and taught man what he did not know before'. 'Upon thee hath God (bestowed) great favours.'¹ I recite His praises on His great benedictions and offer thanks to Him for His incessant gifts. I bear witness to the fact that there is no God but Allāh; He is all alone and there is nobody to share power with Him; and that Moḥammad (may God bestow His peace and benedictions on him) is His servant and messenger, he who was endowed with pure character, brilliant miracles, mighty proof, and naked sword. May God bestow His peace and blessings on him and his progeny and companions who were persons of high aspirations and endowed with many praise-worthy qualities and excellences. Further, all the Companions of the Prophet and their successors may enjoy God's blessings till the Day of Judgment, and they may enjoy it in abundance.

O my benevolent, sincere and affectionate brother !² May God grant you eternal life and perpetual happiness. You have asked me to convey to you whatever I can of the principles (secrets) of the Philosophy of Illumination taught by (our) master, the great Abū 'Alī Ibn Sīnā. Know then that one who has a desire for an unambiguous truth must seek it and strive his utmost for its attainment.

Your question has created in me a condition which, thank God, has led me to the observation of a state which had not hitherto come under my experience. It has been the cause of my access to a stage which is so strange that neither tongue nor language can express it because it pertains to a way which is different from these ways, and is related to a world which is other than their world. However, this state is full of such joy and ecstasy, such pleasure and contentments that whosoever reaches it and finds access to any of its boundaries, finds it impossible to conceal its reality and to hide its secrets. Such an ecstasy and joy overpowers him that he is compelled to give expression to that condition although he may not be well versed in learning. This

expression is in outline, not in details. He talks about these things without learning any sciences. Thus some of them said in this condition: سُبْحَانِي مَا اعْظَم شَأْنِي ("I am Holy, How great is my status!")³ Some one else said: إِنَّا الْحَقُّ ("I am the Truth")⁴ Another said: لَيْسَ فِي الثَّوْبِ إِلَّا اللَّهُ ("There is nobody in my clothes except God")⁵ As for (our) master Abū Ḥamid Al-Ghazālī (may peace of God be on him), he used this couplet to express his condition on reaching this state:

فَكَانَ مَا كَانَ مِمَّا لَسْتُ أَذْكَرُهُ فَظَنُّ خَيْرًا وَلَا تَسْأَلُ عَنِ الْخَبِيرِ

("What has happened has happened; I do not talk about it.

Think of it in a favourable way but do not ask me about its report.")

In fact, the enlightenment had made him regardful of proper limits and knowledge had given him true insight.

Also consider the statement of Abū Bakr b. al-Sā'i'gh⁶ which he has made in connection with the discussion of the attribute of being united (with God). He says:

"When the meaning intended through this writing is understood, it will be clear that all the teachings of the current sciences cannot be of the same level. A person who understands this meaning attains to a position where he finds himself in opposition to all previous immaterial beliefs. And this condition is too great to be related to physical life. In fact, it is one of those states of the blessed ones which are free from the complexity of physical life and which deserve to be called the Divine states which God (Holy be His name) bestows on whomsoever of His servants He likes."

This is the position to which Abū Bakr Ibn al-Sā'igh has alluded and which is reached through theoretical knowledge and conceptual investigation. And there is no doubt that Ibn al-Sā'igh had reached this stage but had not advanced beyond it.

As regards the position to which we have alluded in the beginning, it differs from this state—although the two are the same in that nothing is revealed in that state which is contrary to what is revealed in this one. However, they differ in respect of the greater clarity (of the state we have described), and the observation of the latter state is possible by means of something that can be described as a 'faculty' in only a metaphorical sense. For we do not find words either in the vocabulary of the common people or in the terminology of the specialists which could describe what it is by means of which such an observation is performed. So the state to which we have referred, and for which your question has stirred our yearnings, is one of those things to which Ibn Sīnā has drawn our attention in these words.

“When the yearnings and efforts (of the seeker) reach a particular stage he catches glimpses of the light of Truth—these pleasant glimpses are like flashes of lightning appearing to him in all splendour at one moment and disappearing at another. As he advances in his endeavours these flashes of light have greater frequency, and at last he is overtaken by them without any efforts on his part. Whatever now he may see his attention is thence directed to the realm of sanctity. For it reminds him of some of the (divine) things, and this gives him an overwhelming experience on account of which he sees God in everything. His endeavour now brings him to a position in which his time is changed into Peace and Tranquility for him. One who was bewildered formerly acquires intimate understanding and the flashes (of the Divine light) that used to meet his eyes now change into clear and steady light. And he attains to an enduring knowledge of God which may be described as an enduring company. This condition endures until he passes through the graded phases described by Ibn Sīnā, and finally attains to the position where the Mystery (i. e. the heart) within him becomes a bright mirror for him to hold up towards the Divine Truth. Then the most excellent pleasures descend upon him, and he is pleased with himself on account of the impressions the Divine Truth has produced on him. In this state, he has a vision of himself on one hand, and the vision of God, on the other. This causes him to be confused and vacillating for a while. Then he loses sight of himself, attending to the realm of sanctity alone. Now if he looks back upon himself, he does so because he sees the self as an observer of God. At this stage is the Union (with God) realised.”⁷

So these are the states Ibn Sīnā, (may God be pleased with him), had to describe. What he meant by all this was that such states are to be experienced intuitively—not by means of theoretical comprehension that comes as a result of deductions in the form of syllogism, or as a result of arranging the premises and drawing the conclusion.

Now to take an illustration that will show you the difference between the knowledge that is possessed by these people and the one possessed by others. Try to imagine the condition of a man blind since his birth. Suppose that (inspite of this disability) his nature is sound, his judgment mature, his memory strong, and his mind steady and balanced. Suppose that this person, since his birth, has lived in a particular city, and with the help of his other senses he has been acquainted with various citizens, with many species of animals and minerals, with the streets in the city and with the highways that lead to it, and with the houses and the market places in it. He knows all these things so

well that he is able to walk unguided in any part of the city, and he recognizes any one whom he meets on his way, taking care to be the first to offer greetings. Further, he even recognizes the colours with the help of their descriptions and some terms which signify those colours. On reaching this stage suppose he is endowed with sight and visual perception. Now he takes a walk going all around in the city. But he does not find anything contrary to what he has believed all the time. He does not find it necessary to question any thing in his new experience. He finds the colours conformable to the marks by which they were formerly represented to him. However, his new experience is marked by two important things, one of which follows from the other. Those two things are great clarity, and intense pleasure.

Now, these persons who have not yet attained to the stage of sainthood (ولاية) are in a state comparable to the condition of this man when he was blind. The 'colours' they know in this state, from their descriptions, are those things which Abu Bakr b. al-Sā'igh found too great to relate to the physical life, and which (he said) are vouchsafed by God to whomsoever of His servants He pleases.

On the contrary, the latter state of the blind man (to whom vision has been restored) is comparable to the condition of those observers who have attained to sainthood, and on whom God has bestowed what we said can be described as a 'faculty' in only a metaphoric sense. And sometimes, although rarely, a man is found who has always been in possession of penetrating insight, open eyes, and who might therefore have no need for theoretical knowledge. When I speak to you, (may God honour you with His love), of the knowledge possessed by the people who depend on theoretical methods, I do not mean things of the physical world that may be known to them. Nor, in speaking of the knowledge possessed by saints do I mean the metaphysical things that may be known to them. These two objects of knowledge are very different from one another and neither can be confused with the other. On the contrary, by the knowledge in possession of those who depend on theoretical methods I mean the metaphysical things known to them, as was the case with Abū Bakr. It is necessary that this knowledge of theirs should be true and valid. Only then this knowledge can be theoretically compared with the knowledge of the saints who concern themselves with the same things—with the addition of greater clarity and intense pleasure. Abū Bakr has disparaged the saints for their references to this (additional) pleasure, and he thinks that it is a product of fantasy. He has promised that he would give a clear exposition of the state of those who have attained to Highest Happiness. It would

be only proper if we said to him, "Do not pass judgment on the permissibility of a thing which you have not tasted. Do not tread upon the necks of the devotees of Truth (صدقین)." As a matter of fact, this man did nothing of the sort, and he never fulfilled his promise. Perhaps, as he has said, he had little time at his disposal, and perhaps the preoccupations of his stay at Wehran (وهران) came in his way. Or he might have thought that if he described these things, he would perhaps have to disclose many facts which could lend substance to criticisms of his life and career, or which would contradict the views (he was known to hold)—on how people should be induced to aim at more and more of wealth, employing all kinds of devices in order to gain possession of it.

Our discourse has gone (but not without some necessity) into questions other than what you sought to know. However, it has been made clear that the thing you are interested in must be identified with one of the following two purposes.

First, you may enquire concerning what is perceived by the people who have attained to sainthood, and to whom direct observation or intuition or 'immediate presence' can, therefore, be vouchsafed. This is something the nature of which cannot be described in a book. Whenever some one intends to describe it, and uses elaborate words in speech or in writing to that end, his description will change its nature—into something that belongs to the other kind of (i. e. theoretical) knowledge. For that experience, when it is clothed in words or sounds and is thus drawn closer to the phenomenal world, cannot retain any feature or aspect of its original condition. It is for this reason that it has been described in diverse ways, and many people who spoke of it went astray from the straight path—wrongly thinking, however, that it was others who have gone astray. And all this has been due to the fact that this experience is unlimited and that it leads upto the Divine presence which reaches out far and wide and which encompasses other things but is not encompassed by them.

Now to explain the second one of their purposes beyond which, we said, your question could not go. What this means is that you can seek to define the state in question after the manner of the masters of the theoretical methods. This, may God honour you with His friendship, is something which is susceptible of being set forth in books and which can be described in various ways. But it is more rare than red brimstone—particularly in our part of the world. For it is of such a strange character that the little of it that can be mastered, is mastered only by a few individuals, one after another. And one who has mastered

it will henceforth speak of it to people only in symbols. For the upright Islamic Faith and the shari'at revealed to Muḥammad have discouraged and forbidden all enquiries into it.

You should not suppose that the philosophy which has reached us through the books of Aristotle and Abu Naṣr al-Fārābī and through Kitāb al-Shifā can meet the need you have felt. Nor has any one of the philosophers of Andalusia expressed himself on this subject in an adequate manner. Men of superior nature, who lived in Andalusia before the spread of Logic and Philosophy, devoted their lives to mathematical sciences. They attained to a high position in these sciences but it was not possible for them to attend to other sciences. Their successors made some advance over them in Logic; but even their enquiries failed to lead them to real perfection. One of them has said :

ريح بي ان علوم الوري
اثان ما ان فيهما من مزيد
حقيقة يعجز تحصيلها
و باطل تحصيله ما يفيد

("I have come to the realization that all our knowledge is of two kinds;

One, that aspires for Reality which defies all attempts to know it, and the other that aims at the Unreal whose knowledge serves no purpose.")

After them other people came who were more profound and who could take a closer view of reality. Of these, Abū Bakr b. al-Sai'gh had the most penetrating mental powers, the soundest methods of enquiry, and the truest insight. But the world diverted his attention (from Philosophy), and his life came to an end before he could have displayed the treasures of his knowledge or revealed the hidden elements of his wisdom. Most of his works which are available are fragmentary and incomplete, e.g. his Kitāb al-Nafs, the Tadbīr al-Mutawaḥḥid, and works on Logic and Physics. As regards his complete works they are short tracts and reductions. Making a clear reference to his own limitations in this respect he has said that meanings he had sought to demonstrate in his treatise on Union (رسالة الاتصال) will not be quite apparent from his words without diligent efforts and hard strivings (on the part of his readers) Further, he admits that in some cases the arrangement of what he has to say in that book is not perfect, and that, if time had permitted he would have been prepared to change it. So

this is what we have learnt about the knowledge possessed by this man. We did not meet him personally. Nor have we come across any books written by some persons who might not be considered as his equals, but who might have been his contemporaries. As regards the next generation (i.e. our own), some persons who belong to it have yet to develop, or their development has stopped short of the fullness (of its measure). There may be some others but we have received no information about them.

As regards the works of Abū Naṣr (al-Fārābī) which are available to us, most of them are devoted to Logic. His writings on Philosophy are full of many doubts. In his *al-Millat-al-Fāḍilah* (the Virtuous Community), he has asserted that the vicious souls subsist for ever—amidst everlasting pains—after the death (of the bodies).⁹ On the other hand, in his *al-Siyāsāt al-Madanīyah* (Politics), he asserts that only the perfect souls are immortal, whereas the vicious ones succumb and pass into nothingness (after physical death). In his *Ethics*,¹⁰ he has described what man's Happiness consists in. According to him, it is realized in this life on the earth. This is followed by works which purport to say that any other thing (than the kind of Happiness in which he believes) that may have been mentioned (by some one else) must be considered as nonsense or as old wives' tales. This shows that he would have all mankind despair of God's mercy; for in consigning both the virtuous and the wicked to non-Being, he has placed them on one and the same footing.¹¹ This is too great a mistake to allow its after effects to be redressed, too deep an injury to allow the wounds to heal. There are some other things, e.g. the hypercritical character of his belief in prophecy which he asserts to be ascribable only to the faculty of imagination (قوت خياله), and which he considers as inferior to philosophy, which have been stated by him in clear terms, but which we need not discuss at present.

As regards Aristotle's works Shaikh Abū 'Alī (Ibn Sīnā) has taken upon himself the task of interpreting them, and following his point of view. In his *Kitāb al-Shifā* he has actually subscribed to Aristotle's views, making the latter's philosophical methods his own. But in the beginning of that book he has also made it clear that the contents of that book must be distinguished from the Truth as he knew it, for he has written that book after the manners of the Peripatetic philosophers. He has further said that one who sought after the indisputable truth must refer to his work on the Oriental Philosophy. Any one who takes care to read Ibn Sīnā's *Kitāb al-Shifā* and Aristotle's works will see that in most cases the two are in agreement—although the *Shifā* contains many things which cannot be traced back to Aristotle. In any case,

if one takes in all the teachings of Kitāb al-Shifā and of Aristotle's works in the apparent sense of their contents, without their hidden meanings dawning upon his mind, even then (as Ibn Sīnā warns us in the Shifā) perfection will be beyond his reach.

As regards the works of Shaikh Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī, the fact that they have been addressed to the masses of men has caused him to bind something in one place and to loosen it in another. He calls a thing heretical in one place, but regards it as permissible in another. For instance, two of the opinions of the Philosophers on account of which he has subjected them to Takfīr (or verdict of heresy) in his Tahāfut al-Falāsifa are their denial of the resurrection of bodies, and their attempt to confine Reward and Punishment (in the Hereafter) to the souls alone.¹² However, in the beginning of his book called the Mīdhān he tells us that these very opinions are held by the leading Ṣūfis. And in his book called al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl w'al Mufaṣṣṣilīh-'al Aḥwāl (Means of Deliverance from Ignorance and the way of the Eloquent Expression of the Mystical States) he says that his own beliefs are like those of the ṣūfis, and that he had arrived at that position as a result of prolonged investigations. So there are many things of this kind which can be perceived by such readers of his books as may study them closely and intently. Actually, he has tried to explain his practice (in this respect) in the latter part of his book Mīdhān al-'Amal. For he says that opinions are of three kinds. First, there are opinions which represent a man's attempt to go with the masses with regard to all they may believe. Secondly, there are those opinions that represent what one would say to persons who ask him questions and make enquiries with a view to being enlightened. Thirdly, there may be opinions which pass between a man and his own self, and which cannot be shared by any one else unless the two should be co-believers in it. Having given all these explanations, Al-Ghazālī says :

“Even if these words contribute nothing but such as may throw your inherited beliefs in doubt, that would be no mean advantage to gain. For he who does not doubt does not think, and he who does not think cannot see. And he who does not see remains in the state of blindness and bewilderment.”

Finally, he quotes the following lines by way of illustration :

خذ ما تراه ودع شيئاً سمعت به

في طلعت الشمس ما يغنيك عن زحل

(Take what you see, and give up what you may have heard.

When the splendour of the Sun is in sight, you have no need for the light of saturn.)

Such, then, are Ghazālī's teachings. Most of them have been expressed in symbolic and indirect terms. Hence they are quite un-instructive to his readers—unless they should be able to bring their own insight to bear upon them, and should have heard them from their author, or should be prepared to understand them by means of their excellent natures which are responsive to the slightest hint. In his *Kitāb al-Jawāhir* Ghazālī tells us that he has written some books which ought to be withheld from unqualified persons, and which are devoted to the Truth in the most explicit terms. Here in Andalusia we have no knowledge of these books. There are some books which have been claimed by some persons to be the 'withheld' books; but the claim is not true. One of these books is called *al-Ma'arif al-'Aqliyah* (Particulars of Rational Knowledge). Another is called *Kitāb al-Nafkh w'al Taswīyah*. In addition to these, there is also a collection of short treatises. Although these books contain some suggestive things, they do not add very much to what is already known about Ghazālī's teachings from the ideas interspersed in his well-known works. For instance, his *al-Maqṣad al-Asna* contains thoughts which are profounder than the teachings of these books; and Ghazālī has indicated in explicit terms that the *Maqṣad* is not one of the 'withheld' books. It follows then, that the books in question (which have come to us) are not the 'withheld' books.¹³

Some of Ghazālī's successors have been misled by a passage in the latter part of his book *al-Mishkāt*¹⁴ which has caused them to imagine that its author must have fallen into grave error whence he could not have escaped. This refers to the passage in which Ghazālī describes those people who have lost sight of the divine Light. From this description Ghazālī has proceeded to describe those people who have come very close to the divine Light. Speaking of them, he says that they must have realized that this Magnificent Being is characterized by an attribute that is incompatible with pure Unity. His critics have made use of these words to show that he believes in some sort of plurality within the divine Being (may He be exalted far above what unjust men say of Him).

For our part, we have no doubt that Shaikh Abū Ḥāmid (Ghazālī) is one of those persons who have attained to the highest degree of Happiness, and who have arrived at these noble and sacred positions (i.e. stages in mystical progress). But his 'withheld' books which are devoted to esoteric knowledge, are not available to us. Hence the Truth to which we have attained has not been gathered from them. All the

knowledge we possess has been derived from a comparative study of the writings of Ghazālī and of those of Shaikh Abū ‘Alī (Ibn Sīnā). Further more, we have tried to view these thinkers in relation to the opinions which have appeared in our own times, and which have found favour with those who pursue philosophical studies. As a result of all these things, the Truth made itself clear to us by theoretical methods in the first instance. Lastly, however, we have acquired in a small measure this familiarity with the method of direct observation which we possess at present. It is for this reason that we consider ourselves well equipped to express our views in such a way that they may be recorded for posterity. And you render us a service, O Interrogator, in that you are the first person to whom we proffer as a gift whatever we may possess, and whom we take into confidence with regard to it. We are doing it because of the sincerity of your friendly attitude and the outstanding qualities of your honesty. However, we must warn you that our presentation of things that we have come to know shall be of no avail if we speak to you of its final results, without showing you how its basic principles have been established. The only thing such a presentation can give you will consist of a mere outline of dogmatic beliefs. And even this much you will get because your friendly and benevolent feelings for us will make you have a favourable opinion of us, without realizing that you should accept our words as they deserve to be accepted. It does not give us pleasure or satisfaction to see you take such an attitude. We want to see you on a higher level; for this lower point of view is not sufficient for salvation even—not to talk of the attainment of the Highest stages. We want to lead you through ways we have already treversed in the course of our wanderings (mystical experiences), and to swim with you across oceans we have learnt to cross—so that all this experience may lead you whithersoever it has led us. And then you will observe and realize, through your insight, what we have observed and realized. This will enable you to know things in your own way, independently of our knowledge of them.

But all this must take a definite and adequate period of time, and it is necessary that you should pursue it in complete freedom from distractions and through the concentration of all the enthusiasm you may devote to it. Should your resolve be genuine, and your intention to devote all your energy to this problem sound, then at the break of dawn your vigilant activity will find its gratification, and you will gather the blessed effects of your diligence. You will have striven to please your Lord, and He will be pleased with you. And I am at your service with regard to whatever you may be seeking and whatever may have attracted your attention and choice. And I hope that in the quest that

follows I may help you to find your way to the path of supreme Meditation which is the safest and the most free from danger and mis-haps. And now if you can betake yourself for a short while to things which encourage and call for an approach to such a path, I am going to tell you the story of Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān (the Living One, son of the Wakeful) and of Asāl and Salamān whom Shaikh Abū, 'Alī (Ibn Sīnā) has mentioned. For in their stories there is an instructive example for those who possess intelligence¹⁶ and "a reminder to one who has a heart, and devotes (his) hearing (to the truth), and bears witness to it."¹⁶

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The last two sentences have been borrowed from the Qur'an
Ibn Ṭufayl often fits the Qur'anic verses in his own language.
The original verses are as follows :
الذى علم بالقلم علم الانسان ما لم يعلم و كان فضل الله عليك عظيما
2. It was customary with these philosophers to preface the exposition of their philosophies with a question from a real or imaginary friend. The same we find in Al-Ghazālī, Ibn Sīnā and others.
3. The reference is to Bā Yazīd Buṣṭāmī.
4. These are the words of Maṣṣūr Hallāj.
5. The reference is to Junaid of Baghdād. The real words attributed to Junaid are ليس في جبهه سواه. But Ibn Ṭufayl has modified them a little.
6. Hbū Bakr Ibn al-Sa'igh (d. 1138), an elderly contemporary of Ibn Ṭufayl, is better known as Ibn Bājja, or Avempace as he is called in Europe.
7. See Ibn Sīnā's Kitāb al-Ishārāt w'al Tanbīhāt ed. by Sulaymān Dunyār, Cairo 1947, Part iii, Section 9 (Maqāmāt al-Ārifīn), p. 225 ff. (Ibn Ṭufayl omits some parts of the passage he has cited and there are some discrepancies between the version he has given and the printed text).
8. Risālat Itteṣāl al-'Aql bi'l-Insān ed. Asin Palacios, Al-Andalus Vol. VII-VIII. 1942-43.
9. The reference to "al-Millat al-Fāḍilah" does not seem to be correct. On the contrary, we find the following passage in al-Madinat al-Fāḍilah which clearly lays down that the ignorant and the vicious will be completely annihilated.
اما اهل مدن الجاهليه فان انفسهم تبقى غير مستكملته وهو الاء هم
الها لكون والصائرون الى العدم على مثال مايكون عليه البهائم والسباع والا فاعى
see al-Madīnat al Fāḍilah ed. F. Dieterici, Leiden, 1895, p. 67.
10. Here the reference is to al-Fārābī's Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, as we do not find any independent work written by him on Ethics.

11. Here Ibn Tufayl's criticism of al-Fārābī does not seem to be justified. If we take al-Fārābī's works as a whole we will find that he believes in the possibility of realizing Happiness in this life as well as in the next. Its realization in this life is partial and temporary ; while in the next life one may have its complete and permanent realization. The case is very much like that of Nirvana of Buddhism.
12. Al-Ghazālī brands the Philosophers with Infidelity for :
 - (i) their belief in the eternity of the universe ;
 - (ii) their denial of God's knowledge of particular things ;
 - (iii) and their denial of the possibility of the resurrection of the dead.

(See Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, Eng. Tr. by S. A. Kamali. Lahore 1958).
13. On the authenticity of these books, See W. Montgomery Watt, "The authenticity of the writings attributed to al-Ghazālī". JRAS, London 1952. pp. 24-45.
14. (The Niche of Light) مشکوة الانوار
15. III : يوسف
16. ق : ٣٧

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
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