THE CHRISTIAN SIGNIFICANCE OF KARL MARX

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

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INTRODUCTION

THE TREMENDOUS IMPACT of Communism on the life of the world is one of the clearest demonstrations of the far-reaching practical effects which may flow from apparently highly-theoretical sources. Nobody watching Karl Marx at work in the British Museum towards the middle of last century would have imagined that what was going on in his mind would one day have drastic influence on the lives of millions of men and women all over the world. Yet, since Lenin and his associates set out to base the whole life of Russia on the principles first elaborated by Marx, there can be no doubt about it. The work of Marx was influential enough in the socialist parties of Europe before World War I: the history of Soviet Russia since 1917 has focused the attention of the world upon it in a quite new way. It simply cannot be ignored.

There is some ground to be cleared before we get to work on the main thesis of this book.

The book itself is written primarily for Christians who are prepared to do some work on Marxism because they are convinced—whether they accept the Marxist analysis or not—that Communism is a momentous fact of which Christians are bound to take account. To-day there is a tendency to suggest that Communism is washed-up as a philosophy and discredited as a political technique. To write a book on Communism—so some would say—is to flog a dead horse. Even Russia has discarded the pure form of it, and we are beginning to realize that the Marxist analysis does not explain contemporary changes. We have been misled by an over-emphasis on the economic, and we can see from the virility of nationalism and the varieties of modern fanaticism that the " spiritual " forces are more potent than we had been taught by Marxism to believe.

It is worth setting down the general line of this argument, and to take the opportunity of insisting, for those who are inclined to be influenced by it, that especially for students and young people in industry it simply does not correspond with their situation. To them Communism presents itself as the most coherent philosophy and the greatest single emotional drive that this generation has to deal with.

If this fact did not create an audience ready to hand, I should be inclined to write a book in the form of a warning against accepting the conclusion that Communism with its alleged " over-emphasis on the economic " is dated and discredited. The chronic temptation to by-pass economic demands in the name of the " spiritual " is too easily exploited by the forces of reaction and counter-revolution, and it is pretty clear that the total effect of the line of argument I have outlined is to provide an excuse to do so. So much is probably worth saying to check those who might lay the book down, assuming that it was written by someone who hadn't read his Drucker and his Mannheim, and who was living still in the " romantic " world of the nineteenth-century revolutionary—the world of class-war and proletarian struggle. Christians who are at grips with contemporary realities know that Communism is a very live option for their contemporaries: it has strength and coherence enough to win some of the best of our people, and those who reject it for other options are usually no more admirable or significant for doing so.

There is a second line of argument which operates to divert Christian attention from the plain issues which Communism puts up. The burden of this is that in some absolute fashion Christianity and Communism are in opposition, and that this fundamental antagonism makes discussion worthless. Communism is materialistic and Christianity is a spiritual religion . . . or, Communism does away with private property while classic Christian doctrine holds it necessary to man's true good . . . or, Communism attacks the sanctity of family life, which Christianity cherishes as an ordinance of God. But it won't do to foreclose discussion on grounds like these: for whatever our conclusions before this book is through, we shall

certainly discover in the course of it that these distinctions are over-simplifications: that Communism is not materialistic in the ordinary sense, nor is Christianity a spiritual religion; that Engels, rightly or wrongly, claimed that Communists were the true defenders of " private property "; and that one of the grounds for the initial Communist assault on Capitalism was that it made the reality of family life impossible.

All this is too epigrammatic to be enlightening, but again it is probably worth setting down to make it clear that the issues may be quite other than they are often supposed to be, and that Christian integrity requires that they be fairly and honestly dealt with.

What then is our business with Communism? What is the approach to it which Christian integrity requires? In the first place Christian integrity exacts a strict regard for facts. The Christian knows that all truth is to be honoured, because all truth belongs to Christ, even when it does not acknowledge Him. The man who is afraid of facts does not believe in God, and it is an elementary Christian obligation to submit to the discipline of rigorous scientific study.

Our business, therefore, is certainly not to put up a Communist straw man so that with Hallelujahs and Christian " Huzzahs " we can knock him down again. It is not even in the first place to " find a Christian answer " to Communism. Rather it is to expose ourselves to the full impact of Marxism, so that it may have its full chance to convince us.

The only adequate way to do this is to read the Marxist stuff. But some will first want convincing that that work is worth doing, and others may feel they have not the time and equipment to do it, much as they might want to. So the first three chapters of this book are simply a straight exposition of Marxist doctrine: an attempt to help Christians to " find their way about " in this field of study. There is no Christianity in them at all, except the Christian responsibility of the author to do the job fairly. The fourth chapter is a study of the kind of criticism Communism has had to meet, apart from any specific criticism Christianity has to make. It is an attempt to discover how far historical change and later criticism have

affected Marxist "orthodoxy". By the end of Chapter IV, then, Communism has had its chance to convince us—if I have done my work fairly—so that when we come to bring Christian doctrine to bear on it we are dealing with the thing at its full-blooded best, and not with the palsied, straw-man version of it which is sometimes butchered to make a Christian holiday.

And one final word to determine our approach. The convinced Marxist will tell you that it is no use trying to understand Communism in any fundamental way except from within the Communist Party, for Communism is not an abstract theory to be approached with scientific detachment, but the basis of a revolutionary movement in which theory and practice are held inextricably together for the sake of the validity of both. It sounds an impossible demand, yet it has a ring rather like the Gospel insistence that he who does the will shall know the doctrine. This at least we may agree: that there is small chance of coming to real grips with a theory like the Communist theory, which was wrought out amid social conflict in an endeavour to understand and direct it, unless we ourselves feel the weight of the conflict and are in our measure immersed in it; unless, that is to say, we feel as in our own bodies the shameful weight of exploitation, poverty and war, and have a living concern to lift these heavy burdens off men's backs.

Yet we cannot make sense of the practical results of Marxism and neglect its theoretical foundations. For Marx himself and for all his genuine followers philosophy and action belong together; to understand Marxism without putting in some work on Marx's philosophy is simply not possible.

This book expounds Marxism as a system of thought and practice in order to draw out its significance for Christians, and it necessarily pays equal attention to its philosophical basis and to its practical results. I believe that for the most part it is reasonably clear and readable, but some who are strange to the ways of philosophy may find the first chapter heavy going. It may be of use if I set down some preliminary definitions.

The whole of Western thought has been deeply influenced by the astonishing culture which flourished in ancient Greece

some four centuries before Christ. The leading ideas put forward by Plato, and after him, with modifications, by Aristotle, were taken up into the Christian tradition and lasted on until the end of the Middle Ages and the coming of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Indeed, the great medieval culture was largely a synthesis between Greek and Hebrew thought, and the change which came over Western minds about the sixteenth century was the break-up of this synthesis.

Certain terms which may be found puzzling in the opening chapter of this book belong to this Greek tradition and the history of its relation to other elements in our Western heritage. *Platonism* covers the system of ideas associated with the work of Plato himself and his disciples in subsequent ages. *Dialectic* comes from a Greek word for conversation, or discussion—a method of arriving at truth through the conflict of opposing ideas in debate. *Idealism* does not mean the pursuit of "ideals" (as it is commonly understood nowadays), but a view of life which gives priority to an ideal world which is yet held to exist, in some sense, already. We may see this last distinction more clearly if we take as an example the notion of law. We have the laws made by man, whether by a parliament or by an autocrat, which may be just or unjust, or a bit of both. But we judge whether they are just or unjust by reference to a body of general principles which give us a notion of justice. These general principles are still human ideas, subject to error, the best we can do. It is possible to hold that these principles themselves are the reflection of a perfect law, which is part of the ultimate nature of things even if it cannot be fully grasped by finite minds or perfectly embodied in legal codes. Plato would have held this view. Against him would be arrayed the various " naturalistic " interpretations, which see law as the product of purely material causes or selfish interests, understandable without recourse to any " ideal " law.

Plato regarded all things in *this* world as reflections, or shadows, of their ideal counterparts in the heavens. The real world was, for him, the world of " ideas ": the actual world in which we live was in a sense a shadow world, at best an approximation to reality.

What happened at the Renaissance was that men began to turn away from this view and to take the natural world on its own merits. They were immensely interested in *this* world and saw no reason for referring it to any " ideal world ". Their thinking became, therefore, more and more " naturalistic ", and a conflict was created between the " idealists "—the descendants of Plato; and the naturalists—children of the Renaissance. The debate went on, in one form and another, until the nineteenth century, when Hegel, the German philosopher, discovered a fresh approach to the problem which seemed to offer more hope of a solution. What Hegel did was to revive the notion of dialectic and use it to interpret the world and human history.

Dialectic was in the first place, as we have seen, a method of discussion. Truth was arrived at by the conflict of opinions in debate. But what was true of these " artificial " discussions seemed to be true of the human mind in general: one view held the field until it was challenged by its opposite. Out of the ensuing conflict a third view arose, more adequate to the facts than either of the original positions. This in turn held the field until it called forth its own contradiction, and so on throughout history. Hegel sought to combine the two views represented by the idealists and the naturalists by applying this " dialectic " to the whole world process. Plato's " world of ideas " was real; so, also, was the " natural world ", but in a sense greater than Plato had allowed when he saw it as a mere reflection or shadow of the world of ideas. The struggle of the Idea to embody itself in the material world set going a process of struggle which is the ultimate stuff of history. Spirit (or Idea) in conflict with matter produced history; history unfolded itself through a series of contradictions and conflicts, each producing the next stage, just as a debate ends not in the complete victory of either view but in something which was not apparent before the two views met in conflict. It is, therefore, a dialectical process. Hegel expressed this in the terms: thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

But Hegel still left the world of Idea, or of Spirit, as the primal element in the process. It was the Idea which unfolded

itself in history, reaching ever fuller and more perfect expression of its own nature in and through the material world and human society. Marx, as will become clear in the following chapters, reversed this view. For him the world of ideas was the product of material process. He stood Hegel's philosophy on its head and claimed that only then was it right way up.

I have deliberately omitted any direct treatment of the Soviet Union. I have my own opinion about Russian Socialism, but I don't hold it with any particular confidence because I don't think all the evidence is in. I could wish that those who hold a different and less favourable opinion would use a like reserve. What I have tried to do is to provide background material which is necessary if we Christians are to judge rightly about Russia and about many another contemporary fact and problem. But this at least I will say. Leaving aside the more vicious kind of anti-Soviet bias, conscious and unconscious, there seem to me to be two kinds of prejudice in the discussion of Russia: the prejudice of the honest secularist who feels that Russia must be vindicated at all costs, because otherwise man's greatest scientific achievement is discredited; and the prejudice of the Christian who feels that on no account must the secular experiment of the Soviets be allowed to be succeeding, for if it does succeed, what room is there for Christianity? I hope that there is enough in this book to deliver us from both these equally disastrous phobias.

CHAPTER I

WHAT COMMUNISM IS: *The Period of the Manifesto*

"Karl Marx made a man of me." G. BERNARD SHAW

"Read Marx and inwardly digest." D. D. CARMICHAEL

KARL HEINRICH MARX was born in Prussia in 1818, the son of a Jewish lawyer. His mother was a Dutchwoman, and the financial difficulties in which the family lived are reflected in her saying that "If Karl made a lot of Capital, instead of writing a lot about Capital, it would have been much better". Karl Marx himself was sent to study law at Bonn, but removed after a year to the University of Berlin, because his interests were widening and his thirst for intellectual enlightenment was such that he felt it could be satisfied only in what was then the centre of philosophic culture.

He worked like a galley-slave, taking the whole of knowledge for his province, and finding his way from abstract idealism to the Hegelian dialectic, which seemed to him to offer a living interpretation of reality and relief from the barrenness of the Kantian abstractions. By the time he removed to Paris he had developed his criticism of Hegel in the direction of a new formulation, and when he met Friedrich Engels in Paris in 1844 they found that they were blood-brothers in a new understanding of philosophy and of social change. Engels was two years younger than Marx, the son of a prosperous manufacturer and himself engaged in commerce. From 1844 till the death of Marx in 1883 they worked with complete understanding to provide the revolutionary movement with a working theory and a fighting strategy, and after Marx's death Engels laboured through recurrent illness to complete *Das Kapital* from Marx's notes, to initiate and supervise

the work of translation into English and other languages, and to carry on not only revolutionary polemic but a prolonged defence of Marx's integrity as a scholar in the face of the assaults which developed against the alarming new theories and their first exponents. Engels died in 1895.

The Communist Manifesto, the joint work in which Marx and Engels set out their general view of history and of social change, was published in 1848. It ended not with a theoretical conclusion but with a revolutionary slogan:

> " Let the ruling-classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.
>
> Working-men of all countries, unite! "

Of the *Manifesto* Engels was able to write in 1888 that it had become " undoubtedly the most widespread, the most international production of all Socialist literature, the common platform acknowledged by millions of working-men from Siberia to California ".

From 1850 Marx lived in England. Engels, after a period in Manchester, worked for the most part from Paris. Their collaboration was one of the most single-minded and influential in history, whatever we may think of its results.

In the statement of it which we owe to Marx and Engels Communism is two things: a way of looking at the world and a method of changing it. On the Communist view these two are one, for " to understand the world is to be able to change it " and, conversely, those who are able to change the world have the only kind of understanding of it that is of interest. If, in its first aspect then, we call Marxism a " philosophy ", let it be on the understanding that it is " a philosophy which is the end of all philosophy ", for it expressly sets itself to make war against every kind of philosophizing which deals in pure speculation, or bare theory. It will have no theory or metaphysic which is not intimately related to activity. Theory and practice belong together, and neither can have validity without the other. How then did Marxism arrive at this point?

. . . . . .

The Renaissance initiated a process of philosophical debate which Hegel brought to a climax. Renaissance thought set over against Platonism and idealism an emphasis on naturalism and realism, a this-worldly view-point which was reflected not only in philosophy in the beginnings of the scientific outlook, but in the abandonment of medieval and symbolic art for the realism of the Dutch interior and the concentration on the immediate impact of experience without asking questions about ultimates. Walter Pater summed it up once for all at the end of *The Renaissance*:

> " Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some tone on the hills or the sea is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive for us and for that moment only. Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end. . . .
>
> To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. . . . While all melts under our feet, we may well catch at any exquisite passion, or any contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon to set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the senses, strange dyes, strange colours and curious odours, or work of the artist's hands, or the face of one's friend. . . . With this sense of the splendour of our experience and its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort to see or touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see or touch. . . . Of this wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire for beauty, the love of art for art's sake, has most; for art comes to you professing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for that moment's sake."

This was all very well as a practical conclusion when men had abandoned dualism and other-worldliness and the Church's testimony to the supernatural. But it was impossible for serious speculation to beg the questions which classical philosophy had posed about the relation of idea and thing, form and substance, and of the ultimate ground of existence, whether in eternal flux or unmoved Mover. Hegel's unique

contribution was to bring classic idealism and Renaissance naturalism into philosophic relation. This he achieved by introducing the concept of " dialectic ", and interpreting the nature of reality as a continuing debate, in which progress comes about, as in discussion, by the opposition and conflict of ideas or propositions. Reality is not static, nor is it a smooth progression, without conflict. It moves as a debate moves. . . . " Yes—No—Nevertheless. . . ." It was the Socratic method of getting at truth: it must be transferred from the sphere of logical enquiry and used as a key to the interpretation of reality. This is the Hegelian dialectic—thesis, antithesis and synthesis—and it is this philosophic method which enabled him to make a creative contribution to the endless discussion between idealism and materialism, between classic philosophy and Renaissance naturalism. For in his conception the ultimate Idea is in a dialectic relation to the world of nature, and history is the story of this dynamic struggle:

> " The Absolute concept does not only exist—where unknown—from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. . . . Then it ' alienates ' itself by changing into nature, where, without consciousness of itself, disguised as the necessity of nature, it goes through a new development and finally comes again to self-consciousness in man . . . completely in the Hegelian philosophy."[1]

In this doctrine of the " impregnation " of nature with Spirit, or with the " Absolute concept ", Hegel thought that he had not only provided the final philosophic synthesis and ended the arid controversy between idealism and materialism, but that he had done so in the form of a new apologia for Christian orthodoxy, in fact a re-statement of it. The theological objection to it, of course, is that it gives man a status and right *in himself* as the expression of the divine, apart from redemption, which no responsible Christian thinking would concede to him. The distortion of Christian doctrine which Hegelianism involves is seen in sharper focus in Hegel's doctrine of the state, which he sees as " the fullest historical expression of the

[1] F. Engels: LUDWIG FEUERBACH.

immanent activity of the divine Spirit".[1] His world-view gives validity if not divinity to human life as such and supremely to its expression in the state. It provides no standing-ground from which man can be called in question, or the state can be judged; it is one more unsuccessful attempt to use philosophy to strengthen the Christian case.

But our concern with Hegelianism is not in the details of its relation to Christianity, or the details of its developed doctrine; but simply in its relation to Marxism, for in Marxism "the dialectic of Hegel was placed upon its head, or rather, turned off its head, on which it had been standing before, and placed upon its feet again".

The relation of Marx to Hegel needs to be stated more precisely, and at some length.

Both Marx and Engels in their twenties were ardent "Young Hegelians". They were captivated by the possibility which Hegel offered of escape from the barren antagonisms of philosophic debate. Not only did Hegelianism offer intellectual satisfaction, but the dynamic concept of the Idea in dialectic relation to nature and history promised a basis for action, for intelligent participation in the work of the world and the affairs of nations. At the age of twenty-three Marx dedicated a Doctor's thesis to his future father-in-law with the words:

> "Would that all who doubt of the Idea might be as fortunate as I, to admire an ever-young old man, who greets each advance of time with the enthusiasm and poise of the Truth, and with that conviction-deep, sun-clear Idealism, which alone knows the right word to call up all the spirits of the world, who never recoils before the shadows of reactionary spectres, before the oft-clouded sky of the times, but with godlike energy and manly sure glance pierces always through all metamorphoses to the empyrean which burns in the heart of the world. You, my fatherly friend, have always been to me a living *argumentum ad oculos,* that Idealism is not a fancy, but a truth."[2]

[1] Gwilym O. Griffith: INTERPRETERS OF MAN, p. 11.

[2] Quoted in Max Eastman's MARXISM: IS IT SCIENCE? p. 61f. Marx is speaking of Hegelian Idealism.

And Engels at the age of twenty-two:

> "That everlasting struggle and movement of peoples and heroes, above which in the eternal world soars the Idea, only to swoop down into the thick of the fight and become the actual, self-conscious soul—there you have the source of every salvation and redemption, there the kingdom in which every one of us ought to struggle and be active at his post. . . ."[1]

It is clear even from these quotations that, so far from being blind to the refinements of speculation, Marxism was rooted in a vital awareness of the issues which philosophy raises, and that those who accuse Marx and Engels of vulgar materialism simply convict themselves of ignorance of Marxist origins. Authoritative Marxism is well aware of its roots in previous philosophies, as well as of the reasons for its differences from them. Lenin said:

> "It would be a very serious mistake to suppose that one can become a Communist without making one's own the treasures of human knowledge. It would be mistaken to imagine that it is enough to adopt the Communist formulas and conclusions of Communist science without mastering the sum-total of different branches of knowledge, the final outcome of which is Communism. . . . Communism becomes an empty phrase, a mere façade, and the Communist a mere bluffer, if he has not worked over in his consciousness the whole inheritance of human knowledge . . ."

What then did Marxism make of Hegelianism, out of which it stemmed? Hegelianism is already to be distinguished, on the one hand, from Platonic idealism, which will attribute reality only to the eternal or the "spiritual"; and, on the other hand, from Renaissance naturalism, which will attribute reality only to the passing flux of "things". In Hegel reality is to be interpreted by the ingression of the divine Idea into the world of things, which, by this ingression, is charged with

[1] Ibid.

dynamic possibilities of change. The pattern of this change is the dialectic—the thesis, antithesis and synthesis—which gives us the clue to history.

Where does Marx go from here? He retains the pattern, but he sets it—so he claims—the right way up. Marx says in effect to Hegel: "Many thanks. You have done more than all the philosophers before you have done. You have given us the key—the dialectic—but you're trying to fit it into the door the wrong way up. Let me have it . . . presto! See: turn your dialectical idealism into dialectical materialism, and the lock will really yield."

Dialectical materialism: that is the Marxist key to reality, the new instrument, not of knowledge only but of control of the historic process. Men must not henceforward interpret the world of things in terms of the divine thought or idea which impregnates it: rather, thought is to be understood as the product of a dialectic process in the world of things itself. Reality is not "thought-moving-matter", but "matter-in-motion" which, among other things, produces thought. From this starting-point Marx had his answer to the two key questions of all philosophy: the question, in the first place, of the relation of thinking to being, of spirit to nature; in the second place, the question of the possibility of any human knowledge of reality at all, that is to say, the question how far our thinking is thinking about real things.

The first question Marx would answer somewhat after this fashion. Marxism stands over against idealism not in denying spirit or ideas, as crude materialism does, but in accepting all spiritual existence, all thought, as a product of matter-in-motion and dependent upon it. The Marxist answer to the second question is that our knowledge of reality is given us not in speculation—for speculation always leaves open the question whether or not we are speculating about anything real—but in practical activity. We know the world only by living in it; we understand the world when we are able to change it. Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach* (Ludwig Feuerbach was considered by Marx and Engels the greatest of the "contemplative materialists") has these two key sentences:



"The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."

"The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways, the point is to change it."

In philosophic terms, then, Marx flatly denies the first principle of speculative philosophy, which is that the spectator of the game of life sees most of the game. Only the player knows how the game goes and can become proficient in it. Hence the vital unity of theory and practice: no true theory without practical activity; no sound practice without valid theory.

How does all his philosophic effort to put an end to philosophy issue in the Communist Party and the revolutionary struggle? Marxist theorists claim that their method has a revolutionizing effect in every branch of scientific work, but our special concern is its influence upon the understanding of history and upon social theory. When the Marxist uses his clue to history he brings to light two fundamental dogmas: *economic determinism* and *historical materialism.*

Economic determinism is the application to historical study of the fundamental principle that spirit is dependent upon nature, that thought is inescapably conditioned by matter, because it is a product of matter-in-motion. In historical terms this means that if you want to make sense of any historical epoch—to understand its culture, its philosophy, art, religion and political life—you must look at the material conditions underlying this cultural growth. No man is other than the creature of his material environment, and the fundamental fact about his material environment is the way in which he gets his living. On this view, the reality of thought, imagination, religious sentiment, political idealism, and so on, is not denied —"thought is what it is, and not something else": what is denied is that thought is free of the material conditions which permit and which stimulate intellectual activity, or free of the material stuff with which thought must grapple if it is to be valid thought at all.

Historical materialism is a further application of the same

method of analysis. Not only is each separate epoch a living matrix of economic and spiritual factors in which the economic is, as it were, the fundamental stuff and the spiritual the superimposed pattern, but the developing process of history must be interpreted in the same way. The transition from one historical epoch to another is the result, not of the free decision of men's mind to change the pattern, but of a shift in the structure of the fundamental stuff, compelling a change in the pattern. The transition may be easy or arduous, swift or slow, according as men's minds grasp what is happening and flexibly adjust themselves to it: but the shift in the economic base is the primary thing. Without it the change would not take place; without an understanding of it the change cannot be interpreted or controlled.

These two principles together provide the Marxist method of historical analysis: they make up the economic interpretation of history, which can best be understood if we see how, in fact, it is applied.

The key is the dialectic method. All history is a dialectic struggle inherent in the historical process itself. Primitive societies have a communistic basis and primitive culture, that is to say, primitive religion reflects the clan life and the direct relationship to the natural environment of a pastoral people. This primitive pattern breaks up, not primarily because of added religious enlightenment or cultural development, but because of an alteration in the material basis of life. The stimulus of material need produces the tool to assist cultivation; the appearance of the tool upsets the simple balance of life and creates inequality. It puts the beginnings of economic power in the hands of those who hold the tools, and we see the beginnings of a class-division between those who pass from owning the tools, to owning the land, because they hire the labour of others to use the tools, and so increase their own cultivated holding. From that first shift in the primitive material basis of life all history has been the history of class-struggle. The development of feudalism, in which a landed aristocracy depended upon the serf-labour of landless peasants, was, according to this view of history, the logical outcome of

the first use of tools. Feudalism produced, on the basis of its own productive relations—that is, the social relations which were produced by the economic set-up—its own culture and its own political arrangements, in which were reflected the dominance of the landed barons and the subservience of the landless masses, able to live only by labouring and fighting for their feudal lords.

But why does one society thus give way to another? For feudalism in its turn was ended, not by the peasant risings (for they were beaten down), but by the growth within feudalism of a new social class, the burghers or the bourgeoisie, which took power to itself, broke the power of the landowners and took control of our modern mercantilist civilization. In a sense, to the Marxist, the question "Why?" is meaningless. As to *why* the pattern of history should follow a dialectic scheme there is no answer. The fact is that it does, and that scientific analysis—"free from idealistic fancies", as Engels puts it—shows that it does. The classic statement of this historical dogma is that with which *The Communist Manifesto* opens:

> "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class-struggles.
>
> Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carrying on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the ruin of the contending classes. . . .
>
> The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.
>
> Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat."

In the next two chapters we shall see what history since 1848 has done to illustrate or deny this fundamental thesis; but we begin to understand how it came about that Marx and Engels are remembered not simply as the philosophical antagonists and successors of Hegel, but as the fathers of modern revolutionary socialism, and the founders of the Communist Party. For see where their work brought them.

They discovered that dialectical materialism provided a key to understanding the historic process. They found that, according to the dialectic scheme, every type of society was in unstable equilibrium because it carried within itself the conditions of its own transformation (thesis, antithesis . . .), and that each new synthesis had been brought about by the process of class-struggle, by the supercession in power of one economic class by another. But so far there had been no final synthesis. In 1848 capitalism was rapidly piling up the conditions of its own destruction. It had shattered the feudal pattern of life by bringing together great masses of labouring men to serve industry in the production centres of western Europe and America. Industry thus created the proletariat, uprooted from any connection with the land, having no share in ownership of the means of production (the primitive tool had now become the huge industrial plant) and able to live only by selling their labour-power at a price which would profit the owners, who lived by manufacture and by trade. All this was taking place by no man's design, save that each man sought his own interest in the class-situation in which he found himself, whether as capitalist or as worker. Nor was the process itself disastrous: for the changing technique, which capitalism had developed, had increased productive possibilities immeasurably beyond anything that feudalism could have known. Even urbanization was not itself inherently bad, according to Marx and Engels, for by it the masses were rescued from " the idiocy of rural life ". The Marxist concern is not to pass a moral judgment upon the historic process or those who play their part in it, but to point out that here and now, under developing capitalism, the usual contradiction is appearing, and that unless it is understood and dealt with there can be nothing but

disaster. Like previous social crises, this one can only be resolved "either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes".

For this is what is taking place. The possessing class in its own interest must buy labour-power at less than the price for which the finished goods will sell—much less in fact, for other costs must be allowed for and the goods must still sell at a profit—and this means that the workers are for ever unable to buy back the goods they make, for they have not the financial means to do so. In its simplest terms, therefore, the dilemma of capitalist production is that its interests demand, on the one hand, low wages and, on the other, high prices for finished goods, and these are contradictory.[1] This contradiction has three distinct effects:

(*a*) It creates competition among manufacturers for their share of the limited market. This competition, in the nature of the case, must intensify, because improved industrial techniques—new inventions, labour-saving devices and the like—at the same time increase productivity and, by cutting down the number of workers, decrease the demand for finished products and so contract the market. This is the root of imperialism, which springs from the need of capitalist production for an ever-expanding market for finished goods which cannot be sold at home. "The need of an ever-expanding

[1] There is not space, nor am I competent to deal with the details of Marxian economics. The key to them is the theory of surplus value or the labour theory of value, according to which the contribution of labour-power, which is the principal ingredient in industrial production, always receives less than its share of (the money-price of) the finished product. This creates an accumulated debt owed to the workers, and an indictment of capitalist industrialism. My own lay judgment is that nothing essential to the Marxist analysis depends on the validity or otherwise of this theory, and I am supported by an article by Margaret Cole in the FABIAN QUARTERLY for April 1943, in which she says:

"Marx was a brilliant advocate: he excelled in taking his opponents' arguments and turning them inside out to suit his own moral ends. Thus, he turned Hegel upside down to make the materialist conception of history, which is a fine argumentative weapon, and a faith to fight for. Similarly, in the field of economics, he countered the classics with the labour theory of value, which formulates the *faith* that the working-class get a rotten deal from the capitalist, but has no particular relation to the facts of economic life."

market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere."[1]

(*b*) It breeds a deepening antagonism between the owning- and the working-class (between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, in the Marxist phrasing). The interests of the workers are in high wages and low prices, that of the owners in low wages and high prices. The interests of the workers are in full employment: the interests of employers lie in the maintenance of a surplus pool of labour so that labour can be bought at a competitive price. The interests of the employers (the immediate interests) are to cut costs and increase productivity by improved industrial methods: for the workers, every improvement in industrial technique means less demand for labour, increased threat of unemployment.

(*c*) The workers must therefore either compete against one another for the decreasing number of jobs, or band together for mutual support in bad times, and for a just share of the proceeds of industry at all times. Hence the development of trade unions and the organization of the political working-class movement.

According to the Marxist analysis each of these factors must take on ever-increasing importance. There will be fluctuations in terms of the trade cycle,[2] but each depression will be deeper than the last, and the intermittent booms will grow progressively shorter. The issue may be postponed for a time by the opening up of new trading-areas throughout the world: but the developing pattern is clear and the logic of it inexorable. There is no future save deeper enslavement for the working-class, until society undergoes radical transformation and the contradictions of capitalism are done away with in a new economic arrangement.

It is here that what might be a theoretical analysis begins to

[1] COMMUNIST MANIFESTO.

[2] Possibly the best easily-available exposition—from a Marxist point of view—of the way in which the contradictions within capitalism work out in boom and slump is in John Strachey's books THE COMING STRUGGLE FOR POWER and THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALISM.

have revolutionary meaning: for we have seen that Marx made "practical activity" the very condition of knowledge of the real world. In such a world of class-struggle, knowledge of the historic process can be won only by participation in the struggle. Practical activity "can only be conceived and rationally understood as revolutionary practice".[1]

Marx and Engels not only defined revolutionary activity as the condition of any valid knowledge of contemporary history and all historical understanding as enforcing the urgency of revolutionary activity, but they set themselves to work out the revolutionary strategy which the historical situation required, and became the mentors of the working-class movement. 1848 was "the year of revolutions". Everywhere the workers were stirring to protest against their conditions. Chartism had provided the British labourers with a cohesion they had lacked before, and in the 'thirties and 'forties England, Scotland and Wales were all rocked with strikes. In 1848 the ink had hardly dried on the *Communist Manifesto* when Paris was in the throes of revolutionary turmoil, and there were echoes in Belgium and in Germany. In the Marxist view another historical order was in the process of dissolution, having failed to adjust itself to the changing productive relations. But this revolution would be different from any of its predecessors, because the industrial proletariat was unlike any other revolutionary class in history. The proletariat has "nothing to lose but its chains" and therefore its interests lie in revolution: but, precisely because it has nothing to lose, it is distinguished from, for example, the class of the bourgeoisie who superseded the feudal lords. Each preceding revolution was carried through by a sectional group in the pursuit of its group interests, and its members had no sooner expropriated the previous economic overlords than "they began to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to the conditions of their appropriation". But the proletariat has no sectional interest, for it is not a minority group.

"The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, inde-

[1] THESES ON FEUERBACH.

pendent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air."[1]

The working-class cannot free itself without freeing the whole of society from recurrent class-struggle. Its triumph is the triumph of humanity, which takes control of the economic process in the workers' revolution, and establishes the classless society.[2]

The details of this revolutionary process, as Marx and Engels pictured it, can be seen more clearly in relation to the role of the Communists. According to the *Manifesto*, they were to be, not "a separate party opposed to other working-class parties", but rather the self-consciousness of the working-class movement as a whole. They were to qualify themselves for leadership by the quality of their understanding of the nature of the historic struggle, and so lead the workers of the world into revolutionary action in accordance with the historic destiny of their class. The term "self-consciousness" is important here, because Marxism pictures in the most graphic way the epochal character of the transition to the classless society. In this transition occurs something entirely new in history. In all previous revolutions there has been an element of automatism: none of the contending parties has understood the nature of the struggle into which it was forced by economic interest. Now, in Marxist theory and in the Communist consciousness, mankind takes an intelligent purchase on its own destiny. The historic process cannot be diverted. Man is not free to that extent. But in understanding it man enters upon the only freedom which has meaning, the freedom which consists in "the knowledge of necessity". In one sense history only now begins. All previous epochs, because of that automatism and unself-consciousness, had the

[1] THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO.

[2] This is the social theory reflected in the refrain of *The Internationale*:
"Then, comrades, come rally, and the *last* fight let us face,
The Internationale *unites the human race*."

character of " pre-history ". With the dawn of the classless society man at last enters into his inheritance.

The transition will be difficult in the measure in which men resist the inevitable. Resistance may be expected to come from the possessing-class, for no possessing-class in history has yielded up its prerogative without a struggle. Communists as such have no hankering after violence and will not use violence first: but realism demands that the working-class be prepared for resistance and be ready to deal with it.

During the crisis of the revolutionary struggle such democratic machinery as exists is bound to become inoperative, and, for a period, the revolutionary party must be prepared to take control of the situation. This is the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and will last until the control of the productive resources of the society is firmly in the hands of the working-class, and as long as there remains a danger that the expropriated groups may attempt to set the clock back by some form of counter-revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat will then give way to a fuller type of democratic freedom than men have ever known.

That is the main strand of Communist doctrine in its unity with revolutionary practice. The next chapter takes up some of the questions which have so far been intentionally left aside.

CHAPTER II

WHAT COMMUNISM IS: *Some Key Terms*

> " People who are materially secure always speak about ideals: people who have nothing but their ideals talk about material conditions." ANON

IS THERE any topic under heaven other than Marxism of which discussion is more bedevilled by loose use of terms? Apart from the pure panic which used to be associated with the very names of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky, and the emotional horror attached to the word *Bolshevik* (which, on being looked at steadily, means only " a majority-man ", and refers to the debates within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the early years of the century) almost all the terms which are necessary for a serious discussion of Marxism are surrounded by such an emotional aura and have been so distorted in discussion that they have to be either discarded or translated. The preceding chapter of interpretation is as free of untranslated technical terms as I can make it, but it seems worthwhile to set down here a sort of extended glossary, as a further aid to our understanding of Marxist fundamentals.

(*a*) *Class and Class-Struggle*

It is sometimes implied in discussion that what the Communists are after is to arouse hatred between classes, to split a more-or-less united and harmonious society into warring groups by setting one section against another. This charge may or may not have some substance in it as far as this or that group of Communists is concerned. We come to that later. The question here is fundamental Marxist doctrine, and in that setting these two terms have a very well-defined, scientific and unemotional meaning.

What Marx and Engels were after was a scientific sociology, and when they conclude that "all recorded history is the history of class-struggle" they are stating what they conceive to be a scientific conclusion.

A "class" on their view is not a group of people either conscious of their own unity or conscious of their own superiority to other people. The fact of class may be quite unconscious and unacknowledged and has in fact been so throughout history. But that does not make it less real. Again, a distinction of classes is not a distinction between better and worse people, superior and inferior. It is not a moral judgment at all: it is a scientific, historical, sociological judgment. A class is a group of people in society, whether they recognize each other or not, whose economic interests are in fact broadly identical, because they are in the same relation to the productive process. We shall consider in Chapter III how far such classes are clear-cut and recognizable in contemporary society. But the essential thing, as far as Marxist doctrine is concerned, is that a class is a fact of social life, not a self-conscious group of people who look down their noses or across their barricades at other people. For example, the wage-earners in capitalist society may in fact be very disunited indeed. Individuals among them may have no keener ambition than to be capitalists themselves. They may be all for middle-class prosperity and upper-class manners. But none the less a scientific analysis of capitalist society will be bound to recognize a class of wage-earners, whose relation to the productive process is, as a matter of fact, different from that of the owners and employers, because they will in fact be differently affected by any change (e.g., the introduction of machinery) in that process.

The class-struggle, therefore, or class-conflict, which is such a bogy to amiable people who desire nothing better than that folk should pull together, is not in the first place a propaganda slogan for promoting bloody revolution. It may become such: but, as the Marxists first use it, it is a technical term for a fact of social life, the fact that there are in society groups whose economic interests do conflict. The prime example in our

society is the interest of the manufacturers in high prices and low wages: the interest of the workers in low prices and high wages. The conflict may be obscured in times of prosperity for the whole society, but will always come into the open when times are bad, because the employer then, no matter how benevolent he may be, must either cut wages, sack " hands ", or go out of business. To accept the fact that this is so is to accept the fact of class-conflict.

Class and class-conflict, then, represent a fact of industrial life—a disease and not a remedy. The Communists at least do something to promote a remedy when they call attention to the disease.

(*b*) *Property*

The fundamental source for the understanding of the Marxist teaching about Property is that section in *The Communist Manifesto* headed " Proletarians and Communists ".

Marx and Engels here reply to the charge that Communists are the enemies of private property. They point out that property relations (that is to say, who holds property and the basis on which it is held) have nothing absolute about them but have in fact been altered historically again and again. Feudal property gave way, not willingly but perforce, to bourgeois property, that is, to the state of society in which the dominant property-owners are manufacturers and financiers. The feudal lords, to go further back, held their property because they were victors, or had chosen the side of the victors, in previous social struggles. So where do we find an absolute title to property?

Communism certainly proposes to disturb the existing property relations, because " modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that is based on class antagonisms, or the exploitation of the many by the few ".

" We Communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as

the fruit of a man's own labour, which property is alleged to be the groundwork of all personal freedom, activity and independence.

Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already abolished it, and is still destroying it daily.

Or do you mean modern bourgeois private property? . . .

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society.

In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend."[1]

Summarily put, then, the intention of basic Communist teaching is that the reality of property for the masses depends upon breaking the monopoly in property held by a restricted class. Marx and Engels, that is to say, present themselves in the *Manifesto* not as the enemies of private property for the " small man ", but as its defenders. Here again we shall have to ask in Chapter III how far their analysis holds good for the twentieth century. But it is worth suggesting at this point that a good deal of anti-Communist polemic would have to be scrapped or re-written if this fundamental point were remembered. For example, I think I could undertake to compile two columns of extracts about property, the one taken from Marxist text-books and the other exclusively from the various Papal Encyclicals on the Social Order, and defy anyone to tell from which source they respectively came. That is because the fundamental " right to private property " which Catholic doctrine insists on has nothing to do with the bourgeois mon-

[1] COMMUNIST MANIFESTO.

opoly in property against which the *Communist Manifesto* —like the Encyclicals—was directed.

(c) *Democracy and the State: The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*

Communism is again and again reproached with being undemocratic, and therefore foreign to the British genius. It is worth noticing how careful authoritative Marxism is with its definitions at this point.

The first thing to mark is the distinction—not peculiar to Marxism—between *political* and *economic* democracy. If democracy is the actual expression of the will of the people in government, then clearly we need to devise such political instruments as will make the people's will effective. That is the intention of the British parliamentary system, with its party relations, its adjustment between legislature, executive and judiciary, its *Habeas Corpus* and—fundamentally—its universal franchise.

We have to notice, though, if we are to make a fair estimate of the character of Marxism, that there are two ways in which this political order is dependent on the economic process.

(1) Even the secret ballot does not necessarily mean that the intelligent will of the people for their own good finds expression at elections. It is true that the English squire, for example, cannot follow his tenants into the polling-booth and dictate how they vote, nor can he victimize them afterwards if they vote against the squirearchy; but his influence can be very effective against the kind of local political work which alone can teach the people the facts of political life. It is common knowledge how heavily established interests came down on early attempts at political and trade union organization.

Then again, we have the formal liberty of the press to form public opinion, and that is a very precious liberty indeed. But the creation and operation of powerful newspapers depends on capital expenditure which is only possible for those who are already firmly entrenched in industry and finance. So a political democracy, formally free, may in fact be directed by

the opinion-forming newspapers of powerful privileged groups. At the present moment[1] in Britain we are faced with the paradox of a gigantic newspaper combine like the Beaverbrook Press campaigning, it may even be without conscious hypocrisy, for the "small man", while its own newspapers oust the local journal from bookstalls all over Britain. Yet even such a blatant contradiction as this can be put over where there is money enough to peddle it in the super-efficient publicity style of the mammoth press.

The same dominance of privilege over opinion could be traced, though less directly, in education, where influential jobs are normally held by those who have been able to buy educational privileges, and who are likely in consequence to be consciously or unconsciously in alliance with the society which gave them their chance.

And so it goes on. Leaving out of account all grosser forms of bribery and corruption, there is clearly an actual dominance, even in a formally-real political democracy, of groups who hold a strategic position economically, and can therefore manipulate the instruments which form public opinion and so direct the vote.

(2) The holders of economic power in society can either interfere to prevent the establishment of political freedom, or interfere at the point where political freedom might be used to bring about a shift of real power.

The Spanish War of 1936-38 was an instance of the former process; Fascism, in one of its aspects (see Chapter III), of the latter. But we can put the essential point in general terms. Political democracy is always less than real democracy, and always in danger, if it is not grounded in a democratic economic order. Even where political democratic ideals are plainly written into the statute-book as in Britain, there is always the danger that when any economic crisis develops, and real economic changes are necessary, these changes will be resisted by threatened economic groups, and the political instruments of government may have to test their strength against that of economic privilege.

[1] 1945.

The Communist theory, as it was originally set out, therefore, tried to take account of the real limitations of political democracy in a non-democratic economy. Communists differed among themselves whether or not the political and parliamentary process could be used for working-class ends. There were those who maintained that it could; and those, on the other hand, who held that this was only an illusion, and that the working-class should be taught to rely on their own strength and not on parliamentary method. These latter maintained that under capitalism the state-instrument and parliament were not free to function in the interests of the people as a whole, but only as " a committee for the administration of the affairs of the bourgeoisie ". In any event, whether it was judged good strategy to get to the centre of political power by taking parliamentary office, or whether it was conceived that the instruments of bourgeois political power must be crippled or broken by strike or civil war, it was certain, on the Marxist view, that these organs of political power must eventually be taken over by the working-class under the leadership of the Communist Party. Then new organs of government would be set up—instruments of working-class and not of capitalist power. But before this could happen there must be an interim period to accomplish three things:

(1) The working-class[1] would have to be educated to understand that power had been taken in their name, and prepared for the exercise of it. This process would be more or less complete before the revolution took place, but there might still be much to do.

(2) The actual transfer of economic power from private to public hands must be carried through (" the expropriation of the expropriators "), and industry, including agriculture, set going upon a socialist basis.

(3) The revolutionary leaders must mobilize and lead resistance to any counter-revolutionary move either from within the country or from outside, and break the power of such a

[1] The " working-class " in any normal situation will include the peasants. They in fact may need more convincing than any other group that the revolution is in their interests.

counter-revolution. It is worth reading the history of the revolutionary years in Russia to see how these three phases of the interim period did actually work out, but the general point here is that, until these three things are accomplished, no secure political order can be built to take the place of the previous governmental system. The gap between the two must in practice be filled by the Communist Party itself, wielding power in the name of the working-class. This period is the period of " the dictatorship of the proletariat ", which should give way to a new and more complete democratic order as soon as the new economy is secure and functioning. Strict Communist theory maintained that this state-power would then " wither away ": in the smoothly-functioning classless society no coercion would be necessary, because there would be no class to dominate another. This is a large question. But in theory at any rate it is clearly democratic, as democratic at any rate as the Civil War in England or any other attempt to establish the rights of common men by force against tyranny. Given the Communist premise that parliamentary democracy is in fact the tool of economic tyranny, then the dictatorship of the proletariat is the substitution of one dictatorship for another, with the advantage that the new form of (Communist) state power knows its responsibility to prepare the way for full democracy.

The Communists would maintain that the class-war *in* every nation is at least as real and at least as vital for human happiness as the present war *between* nations. The period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, therefore, is precisely analogous to the situation at present (1945) in Europe, where order is being maintained, after the ousting of the oppressors, by force of arms by the victor powers, pending the time when free elections can be held.

(d) Religion and Morality

It is worth looking here at the Communist version of morality, not so much because it is liable to misrepresentation, as because it is peculiarly difficult for folk brought up in another tradition to understand it.

Mixed up in our Western European inheritance are two elements: the Jewish belief in divine government, with its clear legal requirements which are summarized in *The Ten Commandments*, and the Greek conception of a fixed divine order, which can be more or less completely represented by rules of human behaviour and of social life. It is vital to realize that for the logical Marxist all this is cancelled, " washed-up ", finished, incredible, entirely mythical.

Take these two, Greek philosophy and Jewish religion, and see what Marxism makes of them.

We have seen how the static Greek conception of the idea and the ideal world was thrown into dynamic conflict and flux by Hegel, and how Marx found this same flux and conflict, not in the world of ideas, but in the world of things and men, of history and society. So there are no longer, for the Marxist, any transcendent standards or fixed rules—nothing but the " rules " of the historic process itself, which moves by dialectic struggle towards the classless society and the sovereignty of the people.

As for Jewish religion, this for the Marxist is only one variety of religion in general; and " religion-in-general " is no better than a fairy story, a piece of wishful thinking. In its primitive form it is simply a mythical product of simple men's imagination personifying the natural and material forces of the world. Here Marxism took over the theories of nineteenth-century rationalism, but gave them a particular development in terms of its own understanding of human culture. For religion, they said, which begins with primitive man's personification of natural forces, persists in society because it serves the intelligent ends of the exploiters and provides comfort for the unintelligent exploited peoples. The exploiters—whether they be kings or capitalists—patronize religion and make an ally of it because, with its otherworldliness, its emphasis on the importance of spiritual perfection as compared with material satisfaction, its promise of heavenly compensation for the ills of this life (" pie in the sky when you die "), its making a virtue of humility and submission, it is the best possible instrument for keeping the people quiet under

tyranny, for persuading them to endure quietly all kinds of affliction and oppression. It is the perfect "opium of the people" (it was in fact Charles Kingsley, the Anglican cleric, who used this expression first of all). Then again, religion is fostered by the unconscious desire of the people themselves to avoid facing facts. They tend to shirk the realization that their happiness is in their own hands, and rather than accept the responsibility of a strong struggle for justice and the classless society, they turn to the satisfactions of spiritual piety as a compensation for present injustice.

Religion is thus kept in being by the self-interest of the exploiters and the timidity of the exploited, and the Church and the priests live quietly and prosperously as the paid lackeys of the dominant class and by the offerings of the deluded people, until the dominant class and its handmaid the Church are swept out of the way by the insurgent proletariat. The first struggle, as Lenin said, is therefore the struggle against religion. The people must have the scales of superstition stripped from their eyes before they can see the real situation and the real remedy for it.

Whether that is or is not a fair and complete account of Jewish religion and of the Christianity which stemmed from it we have still to discuss, but once this view is accepted radical consequences for morality logically follow. There is no longer any divine government or absolute moral order; there are no set codes, no fixed rules. The only guidance for conduct is the scientific understanding of nature and of history. If a man wants to cross the road, as Lenin said, he must for safety's sake find out which way the traffic runs. So the man who has his life to live must learn the rules of the world's road, he must "get the hang of" the world in which his life is to be lived. He must understand, primarily, the nature of the historic process and the fact of the class-war. If he is a member of the working-class his historic role is "to be loyal to his class". If he is a member of another class, then common-sense and enlightened self-interest demand that he accept the fact that his class is historically doomed. He must therefore move across into alliance with the working-class

which has the future in its hands.

It is very important to see that this view of things produces its own heroism and its own heroes. But what is so difficult for non-Marxists to grasp is that the code of Marxist behaviour is utterly different from that in which Europeans have been traditionally reared. It knows no law except the necessities of the class-war, no obligations except to serve the revolution. From this starting-point things normally forbidden become not only permissible but obligatory. It is pointless to indict Marxism because it tolerates or even encourages ruthlessness, lying and the weapon of terror, or because we find among the Communists the kind of laxity in personal behaviour which conventional morality condemns. To that kind of attack the Marxist is invulnerable, unless it can be shown that the kind of conduct in question is defeating the purpose of revolution. His form of morality means sitting lightly by conventional obligations. To trample on compassion, to put aside personal ties and obligations, to accept the label of an unscrupulous and undependable person, for the sake of the Party and the Cause, may be a real kind of heroism.

> "He reads Machiavelli, Ignatius of Loyola, Marx and Hegel; he is cold and unmerciful to mankind, out of a kind of mathematical mercifulness. He is damned always to do what is most repugnant to him: to become a slaughterer in order to abolish slaughtering, to sacrifice lambs in order that no more lambs may be slaughtered, to whip people with knouts so that they may learn not to let themselves be whipped, to strip himself of every scruple in the name of a higher scrupulousness, and to challenge the hatred of mankind because of his love for it—an abstract and geometric love."[1]

The great Polish-born leader of the German and European revolution, Rosa Luxembourg, lived as an ascetic, was content to be without nationality, left her lover and married a man for whom she had no personal affection, all in the service of

[1] From a portrait of a logical revolutionary in Arthur Koestler's DARKNESS AT NOON, p. 146.

revolutionary strategy. She wrote near the end, "I hope to die at my post, in the street or in prison." When, as an old woman, she was led to her death:

> "Before the door a trooper named Runge was waiting with orders from Lieutenant Vogel and Captain Horst von Pflugk-Hartung to strike her to the ground with the butt of his carbine. He smashed her skull with two blows and she was then lifted half-dead into a waiting car, and accompanied by Lieutenant Vogel and a number of other officers. One of them struck her on the head with the butt of his revolver, and Lieutenant Vogel killed her with a shot in the head at point-blank range. The car stopped at the Liechtenstein Bridge over the Landwehr Canal, and her corpse was then flung from the bridge into the water, from which it was not recovered until the following May."[1]

Her own account of the motive of revolutionary morality reads like this:

> "If in spite of all the violence of its enemies the contemporary workers' movement marches triumphantly forward with its head high, that is due above all to its tranquil understanding of the ordered objective historical development, its understanding of the fact that 'capitalist production creates with the necessity of a natural process its own negation—namely, the expropriation of the expropriators, the Socialist Revolution'. In this understanding the workers' movement sees the firm guarantee of its ultimate victory, and from this source it derives not only its zeal, but its patience, not only strength for action, but also courageous restraint and endurance."[2]

Lenin's life bears the same marks of selflessness and disinterestedness. It was shortened by the ceaseless labour of Communist leadership and he died burnt-out by the struggle to provide the necessary theoretical guidance for the Russian Revolution.

Whatever our judgment of Marxism, this kind of conduct

[1] ROSA LUXEMBOURG: Paul Frölich.
[2] Ibid.

is not contemptible: but there are one or two comments to be made here.

(1) Logically, the Marxist ought to deal in no motives except those of expediency and revolutionary necessity. Actually, in all Communist literature the categories of morality come creeping in. The concern for justice, a righteous indignation against tyranny, the strong challenge to self-sacrifice, to loyalty—these are the stock-in-trade of revolutionary propaganda. Logically, they have no place: actually, they appear regularly.

(2) In point of fact the revolutionary movement does not produce the kind of libertinism which one might expect to follow the repudiation of any absolute moral standards. Lenin, as a logical Marxist, can give no reason for avoiding sexual promiscuity except, "who would want to drink from a glass from which many others have drunk?"; but there appears to be something in devotion to the revolutionary cause itself which breeds self-discipline and sometimes asceticism.

(3) As the years move on the clear lines of Communist orthodoxy on this matter tend to become blurred. The Russians have appealed frankly to the most traditional and non-Marxist human motives during the war against Germany, so that one finds in their propaganda utterances like this:

> "Hitler has released the Germans completely from moral emotions—from all sense of pity, nobility, honesty, and respect for the human being, from the natural and *absolutely* essential love for everything that is alive. . . .
>
> For us, international rights and codes are not an old telephone-book which can be discarded, as Hitler thinks it can, as all his Germans think it can, who *joyfully jumped across the borders of morality*, and went for a joy-ride over fields of blood and suffering.
>
> Almighty God, what swine these people are. . . ."[1]

Our business in this chapter is primarily with Marxism as a logical system: but this is a warning against treating it solely as a logical system and not also as an historical movement of

[1] Alexei Tolstoy in SOVIET WAR NEWS WEEKLY, December 23rd, 1943.

human persons. The entirely logical Marxist is probably as much an abstraction as the entirely Christian Christian.

(e) Communism and Socialism

We have given a summary but reasonably complete account of the outlines of the Communist theory. But one cause of confusion is the failure clearly to distinguish between Communism and Socialism. They are, as a matter of fact, by no means entirely separate, but a certain amount of definition is required.

In the first place, as we have seen, Communism is a comprehensive world-view, implying its own version of morality and its own programme and strategy for social change. But within this general scheme there is a narrower sense in which the term *Communism* can be used. In this sense it refers to the final stage of social development when, in the classless society, the state has withered away, and industrial production has reached such a stage that there is no longer any competition for material goods. This final Communism is not pictured as succeeding immediately on the overthrow of capitalism. There intervenes a socialist stage in which, while the means of production are collectively owned and administered, work is rewarded according to its social usefulness, and, since production is still short of the total human demand, it has to be distributed unequally in proportion to the value of work done.

In this scheme, then:

Socialism is that stage of social organization which follows on the overthrow of capitalism, the stage in which the principle of material distribution is from each according to his ability, to each according to his work (or worth).

Communism succeeds on socialism when production is at such a pitch that everyone can have without struggle whatever material goods are necessary for happiness, and when the principle of distribution is from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.

A good deal of talk at cross-purposes could be avoided if it were remembered, for example, that Russia has never claimed

to be Communist in this final sense. What it does claim is that, under the leadership of the Communist Party, it has instituted socialism, where skilled workers are materially rewarded for their work by a greater share in the total product, and where since, for instance, there are not yet enough cars to go round, the privilege of owning a car is reserved for those who have specially earned it.

Of course, while socialism is used in this sense of a particular type of economic organization in which the main means of production are collectively owned, it has also been used in the wider sense of a general philosophy and a progressive social morality. In this sense the term socialism is wider than Communism, and the Communist Party is normally found as one party among others in the general socialist movement.

CHAPTER III

WHAT COMMUNISM IS: *The Twilight of Capitalism*

"Always remember that one is given by fate only one lifetime in which to live and work for humanity. There is no greater crime in my opinion than to renounce the world, no matter for what excuse. If anything should happen to either of us, never say, 'It is finished.' For we have both lived for one purpose, the emancipation of the working-people. If by chance one of us has to leave this work before it is done, then let the other go on and see it through—not in the spirit of holy self-sacrifice—as a monk or a nun—but even more in the fullness of human experience. What we miss we can find only in knowing humanity more deeply and not in the ever-narrowing experience of private memories. Life for me has only been worthwhile in so far as I have been able to show, even to a few people, the way to *forward* living. And above all, whatever happens, let us never for one instant, on the slightest excuse, forget that we are human beings and belong to the brotherhood of man. Tyrants and hermits are tarred with the same brush. Whatever happens you must go on *living*—there are so many years of grand work ahead."

Letters of CLIVE BRANSON: This one written shortly before he was killed fighting the Japanese on February 25th, 1944. He was a member of the Communist Party.

SO FAR we have been concerned with orthodox Marxism in its original expression, taking the main line of it and avoiding all sectional quarrels and niceties of interpretation. We turn now to ask how far this orthodox theory has stood the test of history, how far it does interpret for us the events of the century since the *Manifesto*.

Two main trends in line with Marxist prophecy can readily be seen: the vast imperialist expansion of Britain and the capitalist development of America; and the deepening of economic crisis in the highly-industrialized countries of Europe.

Take these in turn:

1. *Imperialism*

According to Marxism[1] every highly-industrialized economy under capitalism has an inherent tendency to expansion, due to its insatiable need for markets. For markets, not for raw materials, as some suggest who maintain that " free access to raw materials " will solve industrial and international problems. Raw materials are profitless to capitalist industry, unless it can work them up into finished products the price of which will clear the cost and more. How does this inherent pressure towards expansion develop? Reduced to its simplest terms it has to do with the contradiction within capitalism arising from the manufacturers' simultaneous interest in high prices and low wages. Wages enter into costs and, therefore, must be kept as low as possible; profits depend on the margin of prices over costs, so that prices must be kept as high as possible. But since, broadly speaking, it is only the workers who can buy the finished goods, low wages drive down prices on the internal market, for competition between producers tends to force down prices to the level which the consumer can pay. When the contradiction becomes irreconcilable, that is, when competition forces prices down to a level at which industry cannot profitably produce, there is a deadlock, industrial stoppage, " slump ".

> " Trade comes to a standstill, the markets are glutted, the products lie in great masses, unsaleable, ready money disappears, credit vanishes, the factories are idle, the working masses go short of food because they have produced too much food, bankruptcy follows upon bankruptcy, forced

[1] See especially V. I. Lenin: IMPERIALISM: THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM.

> sale upon forced sale. The stagnation lasts for years, both productive forces and products are squandered and destroyed on a large scale, until the accumulated masses of commodities are at last disposed of at a more or less considerable depreciation, until production and exchange at last begins to move again. By degrees the pace quickens; it becomes a trot; the industrial trot passes into a gallop, and the gallop passes into the mad onrush of a complete industrial, commercial and credit steeplechase, only to land in the end, after the most breakneck jumps—in the ditch of a crash. And so on again and again. We have experienced it five times since 1825, and at this moment (1877) we are experiencing it for the sixth time."[1]

That same alternation of boom and slump has continued to our own day, the even pattern of it broken by two world wars. Within a capitalist economy, working in a limited area, there is no solution for this dilemma. The industrialist caught in the slump is helpless, whatever his goodwill towards his workers. If he does not cut costs, he will go under in the competitive struggle for whatever profitable business there is: if he does cut costs, it means the sack or a wage-cut for his employed workers.

Besides issuing in mass-unemployment for the workers themselves, a slump reduces the number of productive units and strengthens (relatively) those that survive. In every recurring slump some firms go under, or are bought out by stronger units and combines. This means a cumulative trend to monopoly, balanced on the workers' side by organization for self-protection by trade unions (see below). But the trend to monopoly, it is important to realize, does not get rid of the contradiction we have noticed. The simultaneous movement in an industry keyed to profit is towards high prices and low wages, and unregulated industry can't have it both ways—as long as its own workers are also the consumers of its manufactured goods.

"As long as its own workers are also the consumers of its manufactured goods. . . ." That is the point at which the

[1] F. Engels: ANTI-DÜHRING.

imperialist drive starts. Fundamentally imperialism stems directly out of the inner contradiction in every capitalist area between the high profits and low costs, which is deadlock unless the goods which cannot be sold to the workers at home can be sold at a profit overseas.

> "The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery by which (capitalism) batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate."[1]

At a later stage in the process the export of capital becomes relatively more important than the "dumping" of goods overseas. The developing monopolies in the parent countries manœuvre for the right to develop new industries "on the spot". So that everywhere you look there is a jockeying for position. American cars sell their way on to the English market and into Germany; Belgian, German, British and American capital burrow into China until Japan, too, takes a hand. Britain and America have immeasurable advantages in the imperialist struggle, the former because of the immense "living-space" of her empire and her maritime dominance; America because she, too, is strategically placed for trade with East and West, and has the inherent industrial strength to exploit this position.

There are other factors involved. For example there is the urge towards fresh fields of investment for surplus capital: there is the quest for cheaper labour than union-organized workers will provide—but these are subsidiary parts of the pattern in the first place and do not destroy its main outline. What they do in fact is to complicate the problems of expanding business by increasing the number of productive units overseas and so taking up the "slack" of the market which might have eased the pressure on home-based industry.

2. *Developing Revolution*

While the Anglo-American imperialist drive was going forward, what of the rest of Europe? Marx and Engels foresaw

[1] THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, (I) "Bourgeois and Proletarians."

developing crisis. Engels noticed that Britain was favourably placed not only because of her Empire "living-space" but because her strong democratic tradition might provide the mechanism of change without recourse to revolution. But for the rest of Europe they saw the "year of revolutions" (1848) as the prelude to deepening civil strife in every country. It was imminent in Germany; France, too, was ripe for it, and the fate of France and Germany determines that of Western Europe.

What did in fact take place?

An abortive revolt in Germany failed in 1848, and there was no renewed outbreak of revolutionary effort there, only the long struggle of Marxist Social-Democracy against the power of the Bismarck regime. It was not till the time of the first World War that Germany again saw open revolt. Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht opposed the war of 1914-18, with very great courage, from its beginning to its end. They kept alive by daring leadership, through repeated imprisonment and constant repression, the traditional Marxist strategy of turning "imperialist war into civil war", and they were the inspiration of the workers' movement which issued in revolt—the Spartakus Rising—in the early days of January 1919.

Revolution in Germany was long-delayed, but up to the fateful accession of Hitler to power in 1933, Germany was busy demonstrating another aspect of the Marxist theory—that a developing industrialism, deprived of opportunity for expansion, must make war. There are three reasons for this: first, it is the only way of winning opportunity for trade and investment; second, it is a way of using up surplus productive resources; and third, it is a way of diverting the internal pressure towards revolution by conscripting the potential revolutionaries and by unifying the nation against the real or imaginary enemy. Germany made war against France in 1870 and against Europe in 1914, and through and in spite of these diversions unemployment increased to 6,000,000, and the strength of the Communist Party to over 2,000,000 in 1933.

Meanwhile, France had her own internal troubles. The

revolt of the Paris Commune was bloodily suppressed in 1871. But France has been rent by internal dissension ever since, and has been driven by industrial necessity into disastrous ventures like the rape of German industrial resources in the Saar and the Ruhr after World War No. 1.

Even privileged Britain, sitting on top of the world in a trading sense,[1] was uncomfortably reminded that the mellow sun of Victorian commercial prosperity was reaching only the upper crust of British society, and that the lower strata were cold and hungry and restless. The workers' movement of Chartism was at its peak of strength in 1842, and staged its last great movement of protest in 1848. From that point there was the slow consolidation of trade union strength, with rare outbursts of open revolt, like the wave of strikes which began among girl match-workers in East London in 1888. This strike was assisted by Eleanor Marx (the talented daughter of Karl Marx) at Beckton, and developed into the strike for the " dockers' tanner ", which gave a tremendous impetus to trade union recruitment.

Meanwhile the British political Labour movement was developing on its own pattern, in alliance with the trade unions. How far this alliance has been fruitful and how far it has hampered the Labour movement is a question outside the main line of discussion.

Russia, of course, has been the gigantic revolutionary phenomenon of this last century. The struggle against Tsarism went on continuously till 1905, when, after a year of mounting disorders, the power of the revolutionary movement appeared to be broken by the massacre of workers outside the Tsar's Winter Palace. But the war of 1914-18 and the military disaster which fell on Russia brought another opportunity. The Kerensky government took power in February 1917, to be displaced by the brilliantly-led Bolsheviks under Lenin in the following " October Revolution ". The success of the Bolsheviks introduced a new factor altogether into the whole

[1] During the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, Britain added 4,754,000 square miles to her Empire. France did almost as well in quantity if not in quality—3,583,580 square miles, while Germany had to be content with 1,026,200 square miles.

European situation, and the final results are still entirely unpredictable.

Our general conclusion so far is that Marx and Engels were broadly right to picture the century since their time as one of developing capitalist crisis and recurrent war. To bring the picture up to date we should include the British General Strike of 1926, the world slump of 1929-34 (when the total of unemployed in the major industrial countries exceeded 30,000,000), the renewed threat of depression in 1938 when British unemployment figures again rose close to 2,000,000, the aggression of insurgent Japanese imperialism in 1932 and throughout the next decade. But our concern at the moment is not so much to fill in the details of the picture as to see how far the other aspects of Marxist theory have been borne out by events.

In the first place we have to look at a number of factors which are said to have upset the Marxist scheme and rendered Marxism largely irrelevant as a guide to our contemporary situation. The most important of these is what is called "the disappearance of the proletariat".

In Britain the reality of political democracy has made it necessary for successive governments to take far more care of the destitute than did the comparatively irresponsible autocracies of the Continent. British democracy "compelled the exact minimum of human responsibility that had to be taken if the decaying corpses of the destitute were not to rot in the streets".[1] Through the sovereign Parliament the people really have power, power precariously held and vigorously resisted by reaction, but power enough to bring about an increase in the beneficent activities of government. The standard of physical life has been gradually raised. So that, whereas the Marxist proletariat was pictured as having "nothing to lose but its chains", now the ordinary working-man, and that not only in Britain, has at least a few things more to lose, since he can count, however bad the times are, on having a "dole" and a shelter, meagre indeed, but better than destitution. Bernard Shaw, noting the difference in revolutionary prospects

[1] J. Middleton Murry: THE DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY, p. 40.

which this change has brought about, sardonically and succinctly maintains that, "You can buy off any revolution with thirty bob a week." Has the revolutionary prospect really been as drastically altered as that, from the days when Marx and Engels dreamed of socialist change as imminent all over Europe? Middleton Murry puts it more carefully:

> "As 'the social State' becomes more effective and beneficent, so steadily the revolutionary potentiality of the proletariat 'which had nothing but its chains to lose' began to diminish. It began to have more to lose than its chains. It was decreasingly under the compulsion of primitive life-instinct to move to revolutionary action. The original Marxist proletariat had to be revolutionary to avoid physical extinction. That is not true of the English working-class to-day: therefore the proletariat does not exist, in the original, dynamic Marxist sense."[1]

Marx did not need to tell the European workers why they should revolt. They could feel the reasonableness of revolution through their own empty bellies and ill-clad backs. That motive—the consciousness of underprivilege and of radical inequality—still operates in Britain as elsewhere; but there would not appear to be any sign that it operates strongly enough to bring revolt, to make men willing for the cost of open struggle. They still hope for more benefits from the source which has given benefits before. The promise of "social security" is in the air, and it is no part of our present business to prophesy whether these promises can be made good or not. Meanwhile the measure of social security which men already have, and the promise of more, are enough to damp down revolutionary fires.

Other factors operate in the same direction. The trade unions have won real benefits for the working masses, and their apparent power is greater than it ever has been. There are those who complain of the unions' readiness to make bargains with the owners which benefit their own members immediately in terms of wages, but which have the indirect effect

[1] THE DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY, p. 41.

of holding prices high and so victimizing the consumers generally and their own members indirectly. However that may be, and leaving aside the question whether the trade union leadership is aware of the class-character of society and fit for working-class leadership, the practical effect of trade union organization is away from the clear-cut revolutionary alternatives of orthodox Marxism. Where Marxism saw working-class organization as the means by which the workers were to be mobilized for the class-war, and saw strikes as " schools of war ", the average trade unionist is far from being conscious of his organization as an instrument of revolution. Rather he tends to feel an interest in the prosperity of capitalist business, relying on his union to win him a share of the spoils.

Still another factor tends in the same direction. The development of joint-stock companies has distributed the ownership of industry. The effects of this tend to be exaggerated because, while small packets of shares are held by a myriad of share-holders, effective ownership of key industrial enterprises has continued to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. None the less, it is certainly a fact that the growing number of small investors has tended to obscure the clear-cut confrontation of the possessors and the dispossessed, as in the orthodox Marxist picture. Against this should be set, however, the elimination of small units of business by gigantic industrial and commercial combines, chain-stores and the like, and the consequent increase in the number of employed persons who live only by the sale of their labour-power—or by the " dole " in bad times.

The picture nowadays is sufficiently complicated to make it difficult to recognize the Marxist proletariat as a clear-cut social group, or as a potential revolutionary force. Since, then, on Marxist theory, the proletariat are to free all men by freeing themselves, has their " disappearance " not put an end to revolutionary chances and to the Marxist scheme?

It is tempting to think so, but there is one very simple reason against it. Even if you get rid of the proletariat by turning them into social beneficiaries or small capitalists, that

does nothing to get rid of the fundamental contradiction within capitalism. Capitalist industry, whether organized on a monopolist pattern or not, cannot afford to raise social benefits to the point at which the incentive to work will be removed. Yet if social benefits (the " dole ") remain lower than minimum wages, and private business, by the improvement of technique, tends to dispense with labour, the number of unemployed will grow and there will still remain the fundamental and cumulative difficulty of disposing of the finished product. Hence the present talk of a renewed export drive on the part of Britain and America with the ending of World War II. Yet the world-market was unable before the war to absorb the industrial production of Britain and America, even without the new complication of colonial and Dominion industrialization, to look no further afield. To the ordinary man it looks like the renewal of imperialist competition and the trade cycle once again.

At any rate it is impossible to make sense of the contemporary world unless we take account of the character of capitalist production, and for that we are indebted, whatever modifications in detail we are forced to make, to Marx. We can dismiss the notion, congenial though it is, that the extension of the franchise, the increase of social security and the growing membership of the trade unions constitute a revolution in a quiet way, which disproves the Marxist theory and makes unnecessary the violence which Marx and Engels feared. Although Britain has so far been able to hold off an open clash of interests, the examples of Spain in 1936, Belgium, Italy and Greece in 1944, are evidence of the unreconciled contradictions that still remain. And the world is filled with violence.

But what of fascism? Is this not a new factor in the situation, and does it not embody a form of social organization other than those which Marx envisaged? There are as many explanations of fascism as there are writers about it, but I don't myself believe it is anything like so far outside the purview of Marx and Engels as is sometimes asserted, nor do I believe that fascism, either in Italy or Germany, is intelligible

unless we take account of what they wrote in the *Manifesto* in 1848:

> "The lower middle-class, the small manufacturer, the shop-keeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle-class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay, more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their present, but their future interests; they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat.
>
> The 'dangerous class', the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue."

It would be possible to give a reasonably complete account of German nazism in terms of that paragraph: the desire of the middle-class to avoid revolution, the willingness of the dispossessed to be bribed by the reactionaries and mobilized into uniformed and paid anti-revolutionary corps. Opinion will differ indefinitely about the extent to which outraged nationalism, Hitler's demagogy and "master-race" psychology come into the picture: but neglect the economic factor and the thing makes no sense at all.

The more important practical question is how far the type of political and economic order instituted by National-Socialism has power of survival; especially since there was a tendency before the war and may be after it to think fascist organization worthy of imitation, as an alternative to radical socialist change.

There are technical aspects to this question which are beyond me. I simply give the impressions of a layman in economics for what they are worth. Their value is simply that they do keep in mind fundamental Marxist distinctions and they may help to indicate the kind of questions Marxist

doctrine would teach us to ask about fascist organization, as about other political and economic devices.

There are massive similarities between German nazism and Italian fascism, and certain differences between them. Italian fascism was the earlier growth, and it had time to develop as a peace-time economy, while the character of German nazism was always dominated by the overriding necessity of making war. So it was in Italy that an attempt was made to develop a type of industrial organization which would deal with the deep antagonisms of a capitalist order, without altering its fundamental class-character or doing away with private ownership. The Italian " corporation " was a well-marked economic arrangement whereby the independent trade unions were incorporated in an industrial pattern which nominally provided that the direction of a particular industry should be in the hands of a council representative of owners and workers, responsible finally to the government. The real character of such an arrangement depends upon two factors: first, the balance of power between owners and workers, and second, the nature of the forces represented in the government itself. Such an arrangement is only tolerable if the government is sufficiently representative of the people as a whole, and sufficiently dominant over industry, to ensure that the owners neither plunder the workers nor ally themselves with the workers in their particular industry to plunder the consumer (i.e., the nation as a whole). In point of fact in Italy this arrangement worked-out on a national scale precisely as do " production councils " in Britain in war-time, to take an example nearer home. Such councils are also jointly representative of employers and workers, and their responsibility is to the government for efficiency and maximum production. But so long as industry remains keyed to profit (even if profits are restricted) and the owners retain the private title to the productive machine, the workers' representatives complain that they have a voice but no power. So in Italy the militant forces of labour saw the " corporate state " as a real destruction of their organized power. To them it appeared simply as a device for clamping the power of big business more firmly on the

workers' necks, by taking away the power of the trade unions and by subjecting them—in the name of national unity—to a state oligarchy doing the work of capitalist interests. The corporate state denies in practice the real opposition of classes, and so can only "unify the nation" by subjecting one class to another, in this case, the workers to the owners. That is why fascism was established in Italy only in the face of workers' opposition, by oppression and gangsterism. And that is why, with the military defeat of Mussolini's government, the organized power of the Italian workers has been felt again, for the establishment of the reality of political and economic democracy and the recovery of real working-class participation in industrial control.

In Germany there was the same sinister attack on the trade unions and working-class as soon as Hitler took power. They were the first to feel the weight of nazi tyranny, and their destruction was virtually complete. Big business in Germany paid a heavy price for its acceptance (if not its positive support) of Hitlerism as an alternative to left-wing revolution. Capitalism was held to ransom for the price of German rearmament, for the cost first of nazi party organization and then of a growing army. Profits were limited, but profits remained, and as long as profits remained even at the maximum rate of six per cent industry could only continue to function by the progressive depression of workers' standards.

That is the essential meaning of fascism both in its Italian and its German form. The logic of capitalism is that there must be increasing difficulty on the internal market. Industrial efficiency increases unemployment and produces a glut of goods and slump. This must issue in industrial stoppage, internal discontent and eventual revolution unless (1) some way can be found of freezing the internal economy and keeping the workers quiet under increasing impositions, and (2) an external market can be found for the finished products of industry. This is the straight way to fascism and war. Rigorous control is imposed on the workers—nominally, in the name of national unity, actually, for the sake of industrial peace under capitalism—and production is diverted to armaments,

partly because they themselves represent a type of product which can be sold internally (i.e., which can be bought out of taxation for eventual export through gun-muzzle and bomb-rack), and so keep the wheels of industry turning; and partly because there is the desperate chance that by successful war new markets (*Lebensraum*) can be secured. The chance of such an economy running a "normal" course is limited by the disruptive elements it obviously contains.

This type of economic organization retains all the basic contradictions of monopoly-capitalism, though under it the wheels of industry might continue to turn at the price (1) of an indefinite restriction of the profits of industry, (2) of an indefinite depression of the workers' standard of life, and (3) of permanent mobilization for war.

If that estimate is even approximately accurate, then fascism, so far from being a hopeful alternative to capitalism or socialism, is no more than an organized intensification of capitalist crisis, speeding the drive to war. It is a "counter-revolution before the event", which by staving off socialist change and attempting to congeal the *status quo* does no more than evade the real economic issue.

One question remains. Hitlerism in its origin may have been the instrument of big business for the destruction of German revolution: but has it not developed into a dynamic movement of a "religious" (racial and nationalist) character, which has taken the reins into its own hands so that not only the German people but big business, too, have become victims of its fanaticism?

Whatever measure of truth this theory has, it is perfectly consistent with basic Marxist doctrine. For while Marxism affirms that every historical movement is economically conditioned, it recognized that the forces of fear or hate or resentment, or of group solidarity, which are bred by economic conditions, have an innate strength of their own, and may even "kick-back" to affect the economic situation or even take charge of it, just as the revolutionary zeal bred in one man by his own hunger, or the hunger of his class, may become a consuming motive making him indifferent to food or comfort.

Marxism, then, maintains itself as a scientific sociology, affording a key to the developing historical process and a valid account of the contemporary situation. But is it a complete account? That raises more fundamental questions which are taken up in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM

> ". . . the attempt to create a religion of Marxism *will fail*, and it will fail because it represents the attempt to religionize a theory. No theory can be converted into a religion, and Marxism is essentially a theory of social evolution based upon certain fixed postulates. You can no more make a religion of Marxism than you can turn the equations of Euclid into poetry."
>
> MAX PLOWMAN

MARXISM IS an indispensable key to history. Its essential doctrines stand, and the contemporary process of social change is inexplicable without taking account of them. It is a scientific sociology.

But a scientific sociology is not a complete philosophy, and Marxism in its original expression claimed to be a complete philosophy, not in the sense of giving an exhaustive account of the universe, but in the sense of defining a method of approach to reality which implied a definite view of the nature of reality itself. The basic doctrines of Marxism have been under debate for close on a century now, and space will not allow anything like a thorough account of that discussion, even if I had the equipment for it. What I am doing is quite arbitrarily to select three particular types of criticism, partly because they all seem to me personally to be significant, and partly because they are so thoroughly diverse. The choice of Eastman, Koestler and Macmurray also has the advantage that they are all very much alive and kicking in current controversy, so that we are taking part in a living and contemporary discussion. Eastman is quite outside the Christian camp; Koestler, while he uses Christian imagery in his last

book to hint at an undefined conclusion, himself makes no explicit profession of Christian faith; and Macmurray, while he counts himself a Christian, does not in fact make use of the terms of Christian orthodoxy, though he does make it his business to expound what he considers to be the view of history and society which is characteristic of Judaism and its heir, Christianity. At any rate, the criticisms of Marxism which we take out of their writings are not specifically Christian criticisms. They are criticisms which might suggest themselves to anyone seriously concerned to ask whether, apart altogether from any explicit Christian judgment, the Marxist approach to reality does offer us a key to it, or whether Marxism contains errors of method or doctrine which make it invalid.

The first type of criticism, that of *Max Eastman*, represents the virtual rejection both of Marxist theory and practice by a former staunch adherent not only of Communist philosophy but of the Communist revolutionary movement. Eastman was prominently engaged in revolutionary activity both in Europe and America in the early part of the century, and his writings were very influential in winning adherents for Marxism, particularly among intellectuals. He split with the Communist Party and the Soviets to join Trotsky and to defend him in his exile from the U.S.S.R., and has now stepped right outside the socialist movement, rejecting Marxism on philosophical grounds[1] and socialism because, as he wrote in *The Readers' Digest*, " it does not jibe[2] with human nature ". In his *Marxism: is it Science?* he explains:

> ". . . I still believed in that system of revolutionary engineering perfected by Lenin. I believed it to be effective, not only for the seizure of power and establishment of a proletarian dictatorship, but for the development of such a dictatorship into a free and equal society. I still had hopes of that society in Russia. The direct result of Lenin's experiment, the totalitarian state of Stalin, and its by-products, fascism and nazism, have convinced me to the contrary."[3]

[1] STALIN'S RUSSIA AND THE CRISIS IN SOCIALISM.
[2] American for " agree ".
[3] Op. cit., p. 215.

His writings gather up most of the relevant philosophical criticisms of dialectical materialism, and they have the merit of being written in a far more trenchant and readable fashion than is common in philosophy.

Arthur Koestler is a Hungarian socialist writer who went through the European revolutionary movement and was interned by the French in one of the incredible camps where many hundreds of fighters for the Left were confined who fled from Spain when Franco got the upper hand in the Civil War. His experiences in Spain and in internment are in *Spanish Testament*, but his most important books are *Darkness at Noon* and *Arrival and Departure*, written since he came to England to serve through the war in the Pioneer Corps. Together these books constitute the most acute account of Communist Party psychology which has been written in English. *Darkness at Noon* is the better book. It is pure polemic in the form of a novel, directed against what Koestler regards as the subtle moral and psychological tyranny of the Party and against Russian " totalitarianism ". *Arrival and Departure* attempts one further step in a positive and rather cryptically Christian direction, but the alternative to Marxism is not developed and the book ends enigmatically.

John Macmurray's careful discussions of Communism are to be found in all his books. *Creative Society* is the most direct discussion of the relation between Christianity and Communism. *The Clue to History* is a thorough-going analysis of what Macmurray regards as the peculiar contribution of Judaism to our understanding of history and of the nature of the rule of God. *Freedom in the Modern World* contains the most straightforward account of Macmurray's own approach to the problems of individual and social life. It is very clearly related—though I am not clear how far Macmurray is indebted—to the " I-Thou " philosophy of Martin Buber, which J. H. Oldham and others have been active in commending to the attention of British Christians.

(*a*) *Marxism as Utopianism*

Eastman's fundamental criticism is that dialectical material-

ism, far from being scientific, is fundamentally religious and incorrigibly Utopian. This requires some definition.

For Eastman, the characteristic scientific attitude is the rigorous acceptance of the world as it is. The only safeguard against religious or idealist illusions, which bemuse thought and confound practice, is to approach all experience empirically, that is, without any preconceived notions about "the nature of reality" or "the purpose of existence" or "the goal of history". He quotes Bertrand Russell: "The kernel of the scientific outlook is the refusal to regard our own desires, tastes and interests as affording a key to the understanding of the world," and radically contrasts this primal element in scientific study with the chronic tendency of the idealist to make the world in the image of his desires. By whether or not it is a science in Russell's sense Marxism must stand or fall. It claims to be such a science, but Eastman concludes that it is itself founded on a gigantic act of "religious faith", the dogma that history is working inevitably for the establishment of the classless society.

How does this illusion creep into Marxism? Marxism itself affirms that all social consciousness is the product of social and historical factors, of the conditions of man's existence. That is to say, all thinking about society is conditioned by the facts, not the facts by the thinking. The Marxist is not put out when some objector then asks whether this does not make Marxism itself a vulnerable theory, since it, too, must be the reflection of social conditions at a particular time. The reply is that Marxism is unique in its acceptance of the fact that social thinking is socially conditioned. The acknowledgment of the primacy of social fact over social thinking delivers Marxism from the illusions of previous philosophies, and by giving the Marxist an instrument of self-criticism allows him to function as the interpreter of the actual pattern of social change, and of the dialectic movement of history towards the triumph of the proletariat and the abolition of classes. The Communist Party, since it is true to the Marxist method, is therefore qualified to be the consciousness of the revolutionary class, the proletariat in whose hands the future lies. The fallacy of

all this, says Eastman, is obvious. It is a complete begging of the question. Marx and Engels are right in their discovery of economic determinism, of the effect of the material conditions of life upon the intellectual and artistic structures of man's thought and imagination, upon his philosophy and his religion. For that we are eternally indebted to them; but when they go on to set Communist social consciousness free, as it were, and to affirm that the Communist dialectic view of history enables us to describe the future and the goal of history, then they themselves pass from science to religion, from empiricism to Utopian phantasy. If Marxism simply said that classes have existed and do exist, and that man's actions in society must take account, therefore, of the fact of class and of class-tension, then they are scientists stating a scientific conclusion. But when imagination runs riot and they extend this to a dogma about the future development of society, then they become useless from the scientific point of view. What they are then doing is to read their own revolutionary purposes into the historic process, just as primitive man created, out of imagination, a God whose function it was to minister to man's own desires. Communists want the classless society, so they affirm that history is like an escalator which lands men inevitably where the Communist wants to go. Now no scientist standing half-way up an escalator would dare to say anything with confidence about what things are like at the top. It is the dogmatist, the religious person, the idealist, who looks piously upwards and describes imaginatively what things are like up there. In point of scientific fact the even progress of the moving staircase so far (supposing history to show even progress in any defined course) does not prove that the stair does not take a turn higher up, in an entirely unpredictable direction. This in fact has happened during the last century, and Eastman contends that the enslavement of Marxism to its " escalator " dogma has left it quite incapable of interpreting or dealing with the move of Russia away from a classless society and towards a new type of totalitarian tyranny and a new form of class-society. Communism in fact, like any other religion, is unable to admit the existence of facts which deny

the truth of its dogma. Hence the idealization of the very un-ideal system of Soviet Russia.

Eastman makes a distinction which in itself is important, whether his general conclusion holds or not. There is a difference, he points out, between saying that history presents us with certain limiting conditions of which all action must take account, since it cannot alter or transcend them; and saying, on the other hand, that every action is determined by the conditions, so that life and history can be infallibly predicted. To state the former position, says Eastman, is the essential contribution of Marxism: the trouble is that it is tempted to stray towards the latter.

Whether Marxism does or does not go too far towards a dogmatic statement about the inevitability of the historic process is an interesting and intricate question. Many Marxists would deny that any such dogma was integral to Marxism, and I should myself want to set two considerations against Eastman: first, that a moving staircase is a pretty inflexible piece of apparatus, and, given the validity of the Marxist account of history so far, Marxists might fairly maintain that the triumph of the proletariat was no more than a reasonable scientific hypothesis based on evidence, even if the statement of it in some Marxist writings has had a religious or Utopian colour. And, second, I do not think that the Communists are arguing in a circle when they maintain that Marxism is free of the relativity of all other thinking about society, and so has a peculiar validity of its own. Another prominent aspect of Marxist teaching is that " freedom is knowledge of necessity ", and the fact that Marxism begins with the acknowledgment of the conditioning effect of social and economic factors gives it an initial and definite advantage, which it can hold as long as it is rigorous in self-criticism from its own point of view.

However, we can only leave Mr. Eastman to wage his private war against the Communists. Our business is simply to notice the kind of criticisms which can be levelled at Marxism from the point of view of natural science and logic. The variety of Marxist thinking is such that it is impossible to say,

in general, whether these criticisms hold or not. My own judgment is that a careful statement of the Marxist point of view would take the sting out of them. The serious practical question which Eastman raises, whether Marxist dogmatism has opened the way for totalitarianism in Russia, is referred to in the next section.

(*b*) *The Problems of Mortality and Compassion* [1]

Koestler's point of view, to my mind, is more important than Eastman's. He probes much deeper. Eastman's is too much like logic-chopping and, good as he is at it, I do not believe that any amount of logic-chopping can bring us to grips with Marxism, either in alliance or opposition. For Marxism is far more than a logical system, if it is that at all.

The two elements in Koestler's criticism which seem to me of particular importance relate to two matters of primary concern for all philosophy—the problem of human virtue and compassion, and the human fact of death. In Koestler's discussion these two problems are inextricably linked, which is of peculiar interest to Christians, in view of the way in which sin and death are also inextricably linked in Christian doctrine.

Koestler's essential thesis (though it is not the only theme of *Darkness at Noon*) is that the Marxists' refusal to take death seriously as tragedy makes for a failure in reverence for life and so for a general failure in compassion and in consideration for individuals. Conversely, the complete relativity of Communist morals, the reduction of every moral consideration to that of sheer expediency in the service of the revolution, itself opens the way to ruthlessness of every kind, and regard for human life goes down the drain with every other kind of obligation except that to the Party. In fact, in the exigencies of the revolutionary struggle it is necessary to make light of death and to sit lightly by human life—one's own and that of one's comrades and friends, and that of one's enemies. The former may have to be sacrificed at any time if Party strategy requires it; and the latter cannot be held of any account if it

[1] This section incorporates an article previously published in *The Presbyter* in the spring of 1945.

gets in the way of the programme. The only way to avoid intolerable moral conflict is to " write down " the value of human life and of the individual person until it is only a unit in a mathematical equation, to be manipulated unemotionally in the work of revolutionary engineering.

Two symbolic figures in Koestler's novel are used to make these points:

The hero, Rubashov, is a revolutionary leader who is intended to represent, in a sort of composite figure, the " Old Bolsheviks " who were liquidated by Stalin in the interests of his own dominance or of Party and national unity, according as one chooses to regard it. During his days of Party loyalty, Rubashov had a stenographer, Arlova, who became his lover and for whom he had a very deep and genuine affection. She came under suspicion for intrigue against the Party programme, and Rubashov, though he had no real belief in her guilt, let her go to torture and to death without any attempt to defend her, because no personal ties of any kind should be a motive for questioning the Party judgment. And what in any case was the life of one person—even if that person was Arlova—compared with the necessity of purging the Party of any possible traitors? Far better, on strict Communist logic, that some innocent persons should suffer in a more or less careful purge, than that any danger of internal betrayal should remain. So that is the end of Arlova.

Then there is Little Loewy. He is a revolutionary of the old authentic school. He is a worker himself, taught to count himself an international revolutionary, a man without country, and, because of his activities during a lifetime of Party obedience, harried by the police of many countries.

He was arrested in France. . . .

> " He served his sentence, and gave his cell companion, a tramp, a course of lectures about the resolutions of the last Party Congress. In return the latter let him into the secret of catching cats and selling their skins. When the three months were over, he was taken by night to a wood on the Belgian frontier. The gendarmes gave him bread, cheese, and a packet of French cigarettes. ' Go straight on,' they

> said, ' in half an hour you will be in Belgium. If we ever catch you over here again, we'll knock your head off.' . . .
>
> Unfortunately, Little Loewy was arrested again after a few weeks, for in Belgium, too, one was supposed to have identity papers. Followed, in due course, expulsion, release, second arrest, imprisonment. Then one night two Belgian gendarmes took him to a wood on the French frontier. They gave him bread, cheese, and a packet of Belgian cigarettes. ' Go straight on,' they said, ' in half an hour you will be in France. If we catch you over here again, we'll knock your head off.' "

He drifts about, living on the bark of plane-trees and by a precarious trade in cat-skins, which bring " if they are young and not mangy, the equivalent of half a loaf of bread and a packet of pipe-tobacco ". This is the true revolutionary: his loyalty to the Party makes him content with any hardship, and theoretically prepared for any crime: but it does warm his heart because within the Party he can count on comradeship and the unity of those who know what it is all about and are themselves bound by the same loyalty. Then the Party line changes. Devotion to European revolution is cut across by the necessity of defending the " One Socialist Country ", and Little Loewy comes under suspicion from the Party leadership because he finds it difficult to adjust his mind to the theory that now, when the interests of the Soviet Union are in question, the workers themselves may be betrayed and German nazism must, if need be, be assisted. This is beyond him. For one unquestioned loyalty there are now two conflicting loyalties—to all that he has learned in a lifetime of work for the Party, and to a new " Party line ", which looks to him like the betrayal of the working-class but is convincingly expounded by the leadership as dictated by the necessities of the moment. Rubashov himself is sent to deal with Little Loewy. He knows that he must either convert the old revolutionary to a line in which he himself only half believes, or hand him over to Party vengeance and necessary " liquidation ": for if he will not himself accept the new line then his influence among the workers must be destroyed. Rubashov's

immediate problem is solved, for Little Loewy's response to a clear statement of the new Party line is to hang himself. So that is the end of Little Loewy.

But neither Arlova nor Little Loewy are dead for Rubashov. He himself is arrested because he is suspected of half-heartedness about the new policies dictated by "No. 1" and the Communist Party. During his interrogation, before he is brought to public trial, the whole issue of revolutionary morality is debated between him and his questioners.

A shrewd Communist called Ivanov debates with Rubashov the case of one Bogrov, an engineer who was liquidated—by death after torture—because he persisted in his view of submarine design against that of No. 1 and the Party.

> "'Bogrov advocated the construction of submarines of large tonnage and a long range of action. The Party is in favour of small submarines with a short range. . . . Big submarines mean: a policy of aggression, to further world revolution. Small submarines mean: coastal defence—that is, self-defence and the postponement of world revolution. The latter is the point of view of No. 1 and the Party.
>
> Bogrov had a strong following in the Admiralty and among the officers of the old guard. It would not have been enough to put him out of the way; he also had to be discredited. A trial was projected to unmask the partisans of big submarines as saboteurs and traitors. We had already brought several little engineers to the point of being prepared to confess publicly to whatever we liked. But Bogrov wouldn't play the game. . . . In a public trial he would only have created confusion amongst the people. There was no other way possible than to liquidate him administratively. Would you not have done the same thing in our position?'
>
> 'You did not hear him whimpering,' said Rubashov."

That is the issue. Does revolutionary necessity override every human consideration—Arlova, Little Loewy, Bogrov—for if it does then every kind of ruthlessness is justified, and death is a triviality (or at least must not be admitted to be anything else). It is the impossibility of finding any answer to

the rigid Communist case that brings Rubashov eventually to make in the public trial the public confession that Party strategy requires of him, and to accept the shot behind the ear as his own way out of intolerable moral conflict.

Arrival and Departure takes up the same debate. Its hero, Peter Slavek, is a young man bred in revolutionary activity so that no other life and no other standards seem possible for him. From sheer revolutionary integrity he endures the horrors of fascist torture-chambers, betraying nothing except in a spasm of intolerable agony—and even that momentary betrayal is smothered in a gag with which the torturers had stopped his mouth. Later on, in a near-delirium of self-analysis, he goes over the whole business of motives. He is now free of any delusion about the purity of the Party or of the revolutionary cause: and he sees, too, under psychoanalysis, that his own willingness for sacrifice has as much to do with an infantile guilt-complex and a subconscious desire for expiation as it has with intelligent revolutionary conviction. So the allegiance by which he has been held is twice-debunked: the cause is not worthy and his own motives are mixed and partly pathological. Yet the end of the book finds him held by the same primal demand to strike a blow for justice: he turns from a life in America with the girl he loves to plunge into the heart of Europe again, to use his revolutionary experience in the fight against fascism. As to his motives, he himself is not clear. He writes a short allegory which suggests that the whole question of moral motive is a complete riddle. In a parable of the Last Judgment men are equally condemned for indulging in compassion which is yet not compassionate enough:

> ". . . The trial of the first defendant had begun. He stood facing the Court, a lean ascetic man with a stoop.
> 'How do you do? ' asked the judge in a terrible voice, which echoed throughout the dome.
> 'Humbly, my Lord,' said the defendant. . . .
> 'He has sacrificed his fortune to help the poor,' said Counsel for the Defence. . . .
> 'On what did you dine to-night? ' roared the Judge.

'On a glass of milk and a crust of bread, my Lord,' said the defendant.

The Prosecutor rose. . . .

'A child starved in China while he guzzled his milk and bread,' he shouted.

'Condemned!' roared the Judge."

and for allowing compassion to interfere with needful ruthlessness:

"'He never killed a fly,' said the Defender.

'The flies he did not kill brought pestilence to a whole province,' said the Prosecutor."

And that is the insoluble riddle. If one goes all the way with the logical Communist then a whole abyss of horror opens up, any kind of ruthlessness is justified if the end is good enough, and the human purpose of the revolution is swallowed up in a kind of impersonal "engineering programme" to which multitudes of ordinary human beings must be sacrificed if need be. If, on the other hand, one turns away in horror from this logic, and begins to indulge in compassion and consideration for individuals and the rest—where is the end? A province may be devastated because a man "will not kill a fly". The good of the greater number may be menaced by unwholesome tenderness for ones and twos. Is one not thereby disqualified from taking any effective public action at all?

So far there is no answer from Koestler. Before Peter Slavek leaves to obey his simple impulse of justice he writes to his Odette:

"I'll tell you my belief, Odette. I think a new God is about to be born. That is the kind of thing one is only allowed to say at certain moments; but this is the moment, because in a few minutes I shall depart.

Praise to the unborn God, Odette. Don't try to divine his message or the form of his cult—this will be after our time. The mystics of to-day are as trite as the political reformers. For we are the last descendants of Renaissance-Man, the end and not the beginning. . . ."

This is an interesting comment on the contention in the first chapter that Marxism is in fact the logical development of Renaissance naturalism. But if there is to be a revulsion from this to a new age of religion and of objective morality—what kind of religion and what kind of morality? Who is " the unborn God "?

(*c*) *Reality as " Super-Organic "*

John Macmurray finds in Marxist realism an affinity with Judaic religion, which insisted that the material world must be taken with the utmost seriousness because in it God is working out His purpose of establishing a co-operative commonwealth—the Kingdom of God of the Gospels, the classless society of the Communist scheme. Judaism and Marxism are at one, according to Macmurray, in their thoroughgoing rejection of any kind of otherworldly dualism. For Judaism history is the sphere of God's activity: for Marxism history is the area of dialectic struggle. But in both the process is conceived as issuing in the triumph of the common people, and the Christian who is true to his Judaic inheritance—which is most fully expressed in the teaching of Jesus—will recognize that the Communist intention is the Christian intention, and that even the imperfect achievement of Russia is yet the nearest approximation to that intention that history has seen.

What then is his criticism of Marxism? The same point is made in two ways.

(1) Marxism and " official Christianity " are held to be opposite errors, each holding one aspect of a double truth which ought to be complementary. Christianity is true as to theory, Marxism as to practice. Christianity affirms that history is the sphere of God's rule but in fact is so yoked to vested interest and bemused by otherworldliness that it will not yield to God's demands. Marxism is busy about the actual carrying into effect of the will of God but will not expressly acknowledge him. Official Christianity is like the son in the Gospel who said " I go " and went not: while Communism is like the other son who said " I go not " but

went. Clearly Marxism has the advantage here; and, in the inexorable purpose of God, the unrepentant Church will be swept out of the way, while the Communist purpose will be vindicated. Meanwhile, Marxism does its own cause desperate harm because its failure to acknowledge God is a failure to acknowledge human kinship. A narrow party loyalty is substituted for human solidarity. The class-enemy becomes an object of mere hatred, and so Communism becomes a kind of tribal religion instead of a universal faith. Communism, then, needs for its complement the Jewish-Christian affirmation of the brotherhood of man in God: Christianity needs for its complement the Communist programme of social change, which is the contemporary expression of God's purpose to create a co-operative commonwealth. Only in the unity of Christianity and Communism can theory and practice, faith and works, be brought together.

(2) Reality, according to Macmurray, is not merely organic as Marxism would have it. It is super-organic and cannot be understood unless we take account of the reality of " friendship-relations ", of the activity of " persons in fellowship ". Personality and fellowship (the " I-Thou " relationship) are categories just as real as those of physics, chemistry and biology. For Marxism, history is an organic process. Macmurray, while he holds this true as far as it goes, wants to super-impose another category, not a supernatural category for all supernaturalism is anathema to him, but this super-organic category of " personality-in-fellowship ".

The point is clear enough and does not need to be elaborated. Communist rejection of religion (not its thoroughly-justified rejection of otherworldly pseudo-religion) and of the super-organic elements in existence robs it of the only basis on which universal brotherhood can be built.

CHAPTER V

WHAT CHRISTIANITY HAS TO SAY

"I believe in one God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, And of all things visible and invisible: And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, Begotten of His Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God, Begotten, not made, Being of one substance with the Father, By whom all things were made: Who for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven, And was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, And was made man, And was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate. He suffered and was buried, And the third day He rose again according to the Scriptures, And ascended into heaven, And sitteth on the right hand of the Father. And He shall come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead: Whose Kingdom shall have no end. And I believe in the Holy Ghost, The Lord and Giver of Life, Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son, Who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, Who spake by the Prophets. And I believe one Catholic and Apostolic Church. I acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins. And I look for the Resurrection of the dead, And the life of the world to come. AMEN."

COUNCIL OF NICAEA, A.D. 325

SO MUCH by way of exposition of the Communist case. Communists may well complain that the analysis is not thorough enough, and critics of Communism that justice is not done to them. The charges cancel out in a way, but they are probably both true. For, after all, the book so far has had a definite and limited purpose: as I put it in the preface

—to help Christians to find their way about in this field. Not to supply the answers, but to show how Marxists go about their theory and practice, and to show, too, the kind of questions their doctrine raises among men concerned like them to understand society and to change it. I have tried to keep Christian considerations out, and to consider Marxism on its own merits as a matter of fact and of doctrine. But now Christian considerations come in with a vengeance, and the rest of the book is concerned with nothing else. Marxism—here is the movement and here is the doctrine. What has the Christian faith to say about it? Notice that I do not ask: What is the Christian answer to it? And that for two reasons. In the first place, such a way of putting things almost invariably springs out of prejudice, and Christian prejudice is quite as bad as any other prejudice if it obscures the facts or clouds judgment on the facts. In the second place, Christianity and Communism cannot be compared directly with each other as if they were of the same kind. Christianity is not a science like geometry or biology. Up to a point it is as meaningless to ask, What is the Christian answer to Marxism? as it is to ask, What is the Christian answer to Euclid? The analogy is not exact, for even as a science Marxism is a good deal more comprehensive than Euclidean geometry, and there is a good deal more to Marxism than sociological science. Then again, Christianity is not a philosophy of the classical kind, the product of speculation; nor is it a philosophy of the theory-action, world-transforming kind which Marxism claims to be; nor is it simply a programme for social action.

A comprehensive positive account of Christianity is out of the question in the space we have. That is why I have prefaced the chapter by the Nicene Creed. For I am writing primarily for Christians, and must assume a working knowledge of the terms of Christian doctrine, of which the Nicene Creed is a summary statement. All that I can hope to do is to draw out the significance of this doctrine for our estimate of Marxism. It is an approach to Marxism we are after, and to outline an approach is the limit of what we shall attempt. What is the significance of Karl Marx for Christians? For that, if

it were not so cumbersome, would have been the title of the book.

It is impossible to set out Christian doctrine with any kind of thoroughness; it is equally impossible to deal with the Communist case point by point, testing its theoretical and practical soundness. You have a very vigorous, not to say vicious, example of that kind of detailed criticism in H. G. Wood's *The Truth and Error of Communism.* But I am not concerned to argue the rightness or wrongness of Communism on this or that point of doctrine or emphasis. In particular, I should think it entirely wrong-headed to imagine we do Christianity a service by proving that idealism has truth, or elements of truth, as against Marxist materialism. What the Christian Gospel affirms is not the primacy of the spiritual over the material, or the power of ideals in history, but the rule of God over all. It affirms that "God comes first, and not man", but it is not in the least concerned to argue that the thought precedes the act in man's individual and historical existence. That is another reason for placarding the Nicene Creed by way of introduction; for the historic creeds of the Church are important not only for what they say but for what they do not say.

The real starting-point for our thinking (and while, as Karl Barth says, Christian thought can start with "a dead dog or a flowering branch", this is the logical starting-point for all Christian thinking) is the substance of the apostolic teaching (the *kerygma* of the New Testament), the message which, as heralds of the Gospel, the apostles understood they were commissioned to declare. The most precise account of what the apostles said and the order in which they said it is in C. H. Dodd's *The Apostolic Preaching and Its Development.* This is Dr. Dodd's summary of the primitive Christian message. He derives it directly from the Epistles, and finds it to agree with the speeches in the Book of Acts:

"The prophecies are fulfilled, and the new Age is inaugurated by the Coming of Christ.
He was born of the Seed of David.

He died according to the Scriptures, to deliver us out of the present evil age.
He was buried.
He rose on the third day according to the Scriptures.
He is exalted at the right hand of God, as Son of God and Lord of quick and dead.
He will come again as Judge and Saviour of men."[1]

Now there is a feeling about that when the Christian message is set down in this way it is taken right out of the realm of practical affairs and becomes of no relevance for individual and social conduct. What I want to argue is that it is precisely when it is stated in terms like these that it becomes intensely and illuminatingly relevant for personal and social conduct, especially in connection with our particular problem.

The first thing to notice about this summary is that it is virtually unintelligible except to those who know the message of the Old Testament concerning God and His rule. For it is a statement about history and about God's rule in and over history, grounded in the Old Testament, but building forward, as it were, from the fulfilment of Old Testament promise in the life and act of Jesus Christ, to a further climax in the day in which " God shall judge the world in righteousness by that man whom He hath ordained ". In other words, you have an account of the process of history which is as precise after its own fashion as the Marxist, though its starting-point and its perspective are different. The history of Israel is the type under which all history is examined, with the " one redemptive act from the Manger to the Cross " as its centre, and the final judgment of Christ as its climax still to be realized.

Now this has very positive implications for our study of Marxism, but before we come to them it is worth pointing out that there are no easy parallels between this world-view and that of Communism. There are certain similarities in the pattern which make it very tempting to equate the two, as John Macmurray seems for all practical purposes to do in *Creative Society*. These are the analogies that are most commonly drawn, with one or two comments on them:

[1] THE APOSTOLIC PREACHING, p. 28.

(1) The equation of the Kingdom of God of the New Testament with the classless society of the Marxist scheme.

This is one of the ways in which some types of liberal Christianity have tried to come to terms with Marxism: but it won't do. It won't do, even though the parallel is more tempting than generally appears. For example, Marxism not only says that the competitive order of society must give way through socialist change to the classless and co-operative order of Communism, but holds that it is only when this transformation takes place that mankind will become truly human. When socialism comes, then real history will begin, with humanity in real and conscious control of its own destiny. Before socialism comes you have only *pre*-history—a level of existence which is something less than the fully human or the truly social, with humanity held in bondage to forces which it does not understand and cannot intelligently control. Take that picture seriously and it is very tempting to draw up the following equation:

pre-socialist man	equals	unredeemed man
classless man	equals	redeemed man
classless society	equals	kingdom of God.

(2) Then again, if the Kingdom of God is the classless society which is to be the result of socialist change, the proletariat which is the instrument of this change is, as it were, the founder of the Kingdom. Macmurray develops this, maintaining that the term Son of Man, when Jesus uses it, refers to the common man, the working-man, the ordinary stuff of humanity, and that when Jesus speaks of " the Son of Man coming in his kingdom " He is referring to the entry of the common people into their inheritance by way of the triumph of the working-class. This is worked out in some detail. Macmurray points out that in the Gospels it is foretold that the Kingdom will come suddenly, when least expected, possibly in a time of general unbelief in its coming at all: " When the Son of Man cometh, will he find faith in the earth? . . . When they say peace and safety, then sudden destruction shall come upon them." So, in the Communist scheme of things, the hour of

revolution strikes when things are at their worst, when the capitalist crisis is at its deepest. People then think there is no hope of a change for the better. That is not true. What is true is that there is no hope of a change for the better except by revolution, and at that very hour the revolution comes, the inner contradictions of capitalism work themselves out, and under the leadership of the Communist Party the proletariat (the contemporary Son of Man) gives the last push to the ill-balanced structure and the whole society topples to come right side up—in the new classless society. The proletariat is Messiah, the agent of the purposes of history or of the purposes of God, which, on this view, are one and the same thing.

Not every interpretation of this kind has this precision, and I am not certain that Macmurray would accept it as a fair account of his complex position. But I think it is a fair reading of *Creative Society*, where the question is particularly dealt with, and in various degrees it colours the thinking of many liberal Christians, who want to come to terms with Marxism if they can only find some way of making it consistent with the Christian scheme as they understand it.

This whole line is wrong because it involves a misreading of the primitive Christian message. It means forcing Biblical Christian doctrine into a this-worldly frame, and into such a frame it simply will not fit. Here are some of the things that have to be kept in mind if the Biblical scheme is to be preserved.

(1) God is not to be equated with history, or the will of God with the historic process. That is the double meaning of the Creation and the Fall. In Creation, God is Lord of history: He "makes all things out of nothing by the word of His power". He is not subject in any way to historical necessity. He is free to work by law or by "miracle"—and historically He does work by both. He is bound to His world by no kind of necessity except the initiative and compulsion of love, from which flowed Creation itself. Love assumes freedom, the freedom of rebellion or rejection by the beloved person. So it is as between God and man. And man's freedom to rebel is

all-too-certainly taken advantage of. The story of the Fall is the assertion that this world, which belongs to God by creation and by right of His sovereign love, does *not* belong to Him by free consent of its people. It is a world in rebellion: and this not only at the level of conscious human purposes, but at a deep unconscious level involving all nature, and even the economic processes which affect man's life. It is impossible to give an account of this view of history without retaining the figure of Satan, as God's adversary, the instigator of rebellion and the agent of corruption in the whole created world, whose service man chooses against God.

When we take the Fall seriously, in this sense, we can no longer equate the historic process with the direct will of God. What happens in history is ordained by God in that it is either the response to His direct will or the ordained consequence of the choice of evil. Not only therefore is God free of historical necessity because He is history's living Lord, but the man who serves God may find himself, not in line with the historic process which is the Marxist's only sanity, but against it, even to the point of historically fruitless martyrdom. In other words, while on the Marxist view the only sane and valid action is action which accepts the logic of the historic process and conforms to it, the Christian, who serves not the historic process but the living will of God, may be compelled to stand against the stream of history, even as a forlorn protesting voice. This inevitably follows from the recognition that God is over and above the world of His own making. It is not a romantic or ultra-heroic stand. It has in fact the most serious practical and political consequences, as we shall see.

(2) The Kingdom of God is of a different order from the classless society, or any other historical arrangement, however desirable.

Nicolas Berdyaev has called on Russian exiles in Paris for co-operation with the Soviets on the ground, among others, that " Like Christianity, Communism calls for the overcoming of the state of nature by a higher and nobler condition ". That is true, and co-operation with the U.S.S.R. is important on a

variety of grounds, but we still need to be wary of this equation.

In the first place, the Bible testimony to the Kingdom or Realm or Rule of God does not primarily refer to a state of things which is one day to be realized. It refers to the present fact that God rules as the Lord of history and of the lives of men. He rules none the less truly and powerfully for man's rebellion. The rebellion means that God's rule manifests itself in judgment and not in fullness of joy. We need to hold fast to this affirmation that when we speak of the Kingdom of God we refer to the fact of God's rule; for it is only by keeping this clear that we shall avoid the vain and meaningless controversy, entirely at cross-purposes, whether man can or cannot " build " the Kingdom of God. God's rule is living and real. No work of man can make it more living and more real. He rules either with the consent of man, or without it. But rule He does, " setting up or casting down according as His will is done ". The normal form of the parables of the Kingdom in the Gospels is not, " This is what it will be like when God's Kingdom gets built . . ." but, " The Kingdom of God is like unto . . ." that is to say, " If you want to understand how God rules . . ." or, " Here is how things work out under the rule of God. . . ." It is only if we make the Kingdom of God some state of things still to be realized that we get landed in the futile discussion of how much God will have to do with its building and how much man. God's Kingdom is from everlasting, it is " among us " in Christ. The choice for man is whether he will accept the privilege and obligations of its citizenship, or remain within it as a troublemaker and a rebel. But nothing man can do or leave undone increases or diminishes the Kingdom's power.

The Kingdom of God is still further to be distinguished from the classless society of the Marxist scheme. For the classless society is entirely within history, while the rule of God, which is real and powerful in history, transcends that history whose bound is death, and includes the eternal world where, according to the Gospel, death is swallowed up. So, when rebellion is finally overcome and God's dominion is undisputed, the

vision includes not only the replacement of competition by co-operation and class by classlessness, but the overcoming of death, so that there is no more sorrow, crying, or tears.

The " coming of the Son of Man ", then, is not the inauguration of a new epoch in history, or the succession of pre-history by real history. It is the putting of a period to history and the inauguration of a new order of being, in which mortality and sin are overcome and destroyed, and " whatsoever worketh abomination or maketh a lie " is utterly done away. This unimaginable climax of history is " the coming of the Son of Man ": once and for all to be distinguished from any earthly group, even from the triumph of the working-class or of the militant proletariat. The Son of Man is the Lord Christ Himself, who according to the apostolic *kerygma* holds all the authority of God Himself, and will have the last word on history, on nations and on men.

There is literally a universe of difference between this testimony that history will have a verdict delivered on it—and that we know who the Judge is, though the verdict itself is hidden—and the view which sets the end of history within history itself. For even the highest of human or moral or social ends—and the classless society is a very high end indeed—if it is made into an absolute, can be used to justify any means. The only safeguard against totalitarian claims on the part of the state or party—or church—is the recognition that state and party—and church—have a calling to fulfil and a reckoning to give, and that the issue will not be settled within the human and historical order.

This is worth dwelling on, because it is not easy to make clear the practical and political relevance of eschatology to a Christian generation which has been nurtured in the belief that only ethical and idealistic considerations have weight. The expectation of the Last Judgment—and the recognition that, since Christ is judge, " the sign of the Cross will be in heaven when the Lord comes to judgment "—is the true ground of humility. The church, or state, or party which will not submit itself to this judgment, which exalts its own self, or its own purposes, or its own programme into a *summum*

bonum for man's life, is wide open to the temptation to titanism and totalitarianism. It is easy for Christians to see and acknowledge this about states or parties, but not so easy to acknowledge it about "Christianity" itself and about the Church. Yet the only safeguard against an intolerant churchmanship—and against the temptation of the Church to usurp the functions of the state before the Day when both can disappear—is the recognition by the visible Church that it, too, with all institutions which breed thorns and thistles as well as sound grain, must come up for sifting and winnowing at the end of the day; so that it must not be too ready with judgments lest itself be judged.

There is deadly danger for any philosophy or sociology or theology which sets the end of history within history itself. It can do so only by neglecting the gigantic, overshadowing, limiting fact of mortality and so throwing its whole perspective out, but it also involves the delusion that something *total* can be built in an order of things which of its nature is transitory, transitional and non-total, and that delusion breeds idolatrous and totalitarian claims. It has the further disastrous practical result in Christian practice of leading to a too-ready withdrawal of Christians from the messiness of society in general into a kind of close-corporation Christian fellowship, in neglect of the fact that, no matter how close you make the corporation or how carefully you purge it, it will quite certainly include within itself that "thorns and thistles" problem which torments the world outside.

No: the Biblical account of things is inescapably dualistic. It sets heaven and earth in radical opposition, and when it brings them together with a clap in the Incarnation the miracle of reconciliation is more transforming than those can imagine for whom heaven and earth were never radically separated at all. But what we have to combat now—and this will bring us close to an understanding of the way in which the Christian world-view relates to the Communist—is the idea that the radical dualism of the Bible is idealistic and anti-materialist. For it is nothing of the kind.

The Creation is a creation of the heavens and the earth,

that is, of the totality of finite things both spiritual and physical, and the Fall also involves the whole. God's lordship is total. He has power over the whole material world and a loving concern for it, and, when the mischief wrought by rebellion has to be set right, the redemption that God works is a total redemption, touching both spiritual and physical in one redemptive undertaking. In detail the Bible confirms this materialistic concern. When, in the myth of the Garden, man loses his inheritance and becomes the man we know—historical man, natural man, sinful man, fallen man—the typical problems in which he is involved are problems of the material order. First, the problem of the land and of wresting a living from the land ". . . thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee . . . in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread . . ." and the Law which God gives to preserve man from the destructive anarchy of sin is concerned primarily with the right ordering of the material world. The source-book Deuteronomy is very largely compound of detailed regulations about economic matters—touching land-tenure, conditions of labour, payment of wages, the care of the landless persons and so on. In Deuteronomy, too, and in Samuel we find the second problem of man's life in history—the political problem—beginning to emerge. There is a concern about the conditions of just rule in society, about the need for a central authority to check anarchy, with the inadequacy of merely local magistrates and the popular demand for a king who will be a focus of internal order and the organizer of external defence. Both in Deuteronomy and in Samuel warnings are given in the name of God against irresponsible state-power and the necessity of a constitutional check upon it: all bringing us close to the perennial problems of man's historical existence. For it is these two questions, the economic and political, which are the recurring problems of social organization and the subject-matter of Marxism. So far from the Bible turning our attention away from them to an other-worldly or purely spiritual concern, the prophets were continually involved in a struggle to have the Law of God obeyed in those areas of life where it was meant to apply, in the sordidly

material affairs of the market-place and the political order. Amos, in his eighth chapter, for example, traces spiritual disorder in the nation—a "famine of the word of God"—not to a neglect of preaching or of the temple services, but to the fact that commercial life is corrupt. The Jews, like the rest of men, were chronically inclined to avoid the rigorous demands of God's material will by retreating into a detached and cloistered piety—to try to placate God by feast-days and solemn assemblies and ten thousand rivers of oil—and the prophetic calling was to insist that this kind of detached piety, this veritable opium of the people, God cannot abide.

The dualism of the Bible which affirms God in heaven and man on the earth is not a metaphysical dualism, like that of Plato or Hegel, which gives priority to the spiritual. It is a moral or personal dualism by which man is seen to be in rebellion against God so that his whole spiritual and physical, economic and political existence is out of order. And when God sets out to reconcile man to Himself in Jesus Christ it is a reconciliation of the whole man that is achieved. When the Creeds affirm that God became man they are not making a philosophical statement about the interpenetration of the material by the spiritual, or about the fusion of the two, or anything of that kind. They are not affirming a metaphysical monism against a metaphysical dualism. They are declaring that God came to visit man in a personal fashion—the personal God to the personal man, the man who is both spirit and flesh—to redeem both spirit and flesh, equally corrupt and equally subject to death.

Understanding this Biblical dualism in some degree, we can set out the Biblical view of history in its proper order; for it has a proper order which can be compared with that of the Marxist. It falls into periods or "dispensations". Dispensations is a useful word because it fixes attention on the free activity of the free God, who dispenses His charity and His judgment as He will to whom He will. History had a beginning, according to the Biblical testimony, in the utterly undetermined act of God. History as we know it—subject to corruption and death, compound of pain and joy, sinful con-

flict and the struggle for existence—had a beginning in the Fall. From that period of the Fall begin God's gracious dealings with men to undo the effects of their rebellion, to restore them to their inheritance and to the fullness of His original intention for them. The Law itself is of grace. It is a device of God's love to save men from the worst results of their rebellion, pending their full restoration; and the age of the prophets, which follows on the calling of Israel and the giving of the Law, is the time of the "Old Covenant". We can call the Old Covenant a covenant of works, so long as we remember that that covenant, with any good that can come of it, is all of the grace of God; but the New Covenant which is foretold by Jeremiah and initiated in the birth of Christ is decisively not of works. After that most crucial act of God in Christ which opens with the Incarnation and ends with the Ascension and the sending of the Holy Spirit; from the time when the apostles take up their commission to declare that God has laid sovereign claim to His world—this is the age of the Church, the age in which the evangel is to be declared by the work and witness of the believing Community. This is the "little while" before the Last Judgment, "between the lightning of Christ's first coming and the thunder of His second", a time of unutterable crisis and urgency, in which the Church, with utmost tenderness and compassion, must be moving across the world and along all the ways of men with the testimony to God's sovereign love in Christ and His inescapable claim to the world of His making and redeeming. "Then cometh the end . . ." for history will have an end as it had a beginning, and the end, like the beginning, is in Christ. The worlds which "were framed by the word of God" will be judged by that same Word which is Christ.

That is the outline of the calendar of the Church. It is clearly the order of the *kerygma* and the order of the Nicene Creed. It means that, transcending every secular interpretation of history—as, for example, that illuminating interpretation in which primitive society gives way to feudalism and feudalism to capitalism—there is a world view of which the Incarnation is the centre and the Gospel gives the meaning.

That pattern remains the ground-plan of the historic process, however much it may be blurred by church-apostasy, or overlaid by humanly-momentous events in the secular world. To accept it and take it seriously means that, in our contemporary world, for example, we shall allow ourselves to be governed not only by the fact that we live in the twilight of capitalism and the socialist-fascist struggle for power, but by the fact that we live in the urgent moment between Christ's Ascension and His coming to judge the world. If we take both with real seriousness, we shall forget neither our political obligation nor our evangelical responsibility. For we shall know that both are laid on us by God.

We have seen that the material facts of life and the economic and political elements in history are the peculiar concern of the Bible. This means that Christianity is not in the least concerned to defend spirituality or idealism against materialism. It is no part of the Christian thesis that ideals have been more powerful in history than brute facts: as if God were able to manipulate ideas, but a bit helpless when it came to the sphere of the material and economic, so that to acknowledge the power of hunger and class-interest and natural and biological causes was to rob Him of His prerogatives. In fact, if we let the doctrine of the Fall have its proper place in our thinking, we shall find nothing inherently unlikely in the Marxist account of history as the history of class-struggle; that is, as the clash between groups whose economic interests are opposed. It may be interpreted in too absolute a fashion by this or that Communist; but, if we want to correct it or to emphasize other factors, it is not because we have any Christian interest in disproving it, but simply as a matter of evidence. How far, in any particular culture, the complex development of art, or philosophy, or religion, depends on psychic and how far on economic factors is to be settled by discussion. The Christian's only interest is in getting at the truth of the matter. If he has taken his Bible seriously, he will not be taken aback in the least to find that economic interest conditions very largely the ideas men hold, and determines very largely the action that they take as individuals and as groups. We ought

therefore, if the evidence warrants—as I am very sure that it does—to be ready to accept Marxism as giving us the essence of a scientific sociology, as giving us a clue to the dynamic of social change which is necessary if we are to act intelligently. That "history is the history of class-struggle" is as true a generalization as can be made in this field. Unless we take the Marxist generalization seriously we shall be without an essential key to the understanding of the life of our own time.

Christianity then can reckon with the truth in historical materialism and with the fact of class-struggle. There is nothing in Christian doctrine to make them intolerable. Rather the contrary. For as Brunner says: "Wherever man goes and whatever man does, he goes and does as a sinner" so that it is more plausible to argue, as the Marxist does, that man's life is conditioned by his greed than to argue, as the idealist tends to do, that his ideals and aspirations are transcendent over his greed. No understanding either of the state or of the Church, for example, is likely to be valid unless it takes account of this. The state is never the completely disinterested servant of justice: it is always, in greater or less degree, perverted to serve the interests of the dominant class in society. The Church is never the completely disinterested servant of the Gospel: it is always, in greater or less degree, perverted to become the handmaid of the dominant class. We shall serve well neither state nor Church unless we know these dangers and rightly safeguard against them.

But we must go somewhat deeper. For the Marxist doctrine of contradiction within capitalism and the conflict of classes is only one aspect of its dialectic approach to reality explained in our first chapter. The tensions within society, according to the Marxist, are of a type with the dialectic tensions which belong to the very nature of reality itself, and offer a guide to all scientific study. How far the dialectic approach is fruitful and how far misleading in biology or chemistry I have not the least notion. J. B. S. Haldane and others claim that it is indispensable, but they do not by any means carry all their colleagues with them. It is quite certain that most of us who want to understand Marxism from the Christian point of view

will have to do without a considered judgment on all this. We can test it only in the field of our own specialty.

There is, however, something to be said here which is relevant to the whole discussion of the relation of Christian doctrine to scientific truth. Suppose it to be true—as it is broadly true in history and sociology—that the dialectic approach gives us a clue to understanding of facts and events—what then? The Christian has nothing but thankfulness for any clue which will deepen understanding of the real world and its nature: for it is only by understanding the real world that we can serve God in it and rightly use our dominion over it. Marxism then teaches us to understand that there is dialectic struggle in history—between one social order and its successor, between class and class. That is true, and may hold of other fields as well. Let us have the most complete account of the world that science, including Marxist science, can give us. It remains that the only account of any field of investigation which give us its meaning is a *total* account, and it is clear that there are facts of history and of life which are simply not included in the Marxist scheme, or are, from our Christian point of view, inadequately described.

Some Christian apologists would say that Marxism fails to give us an adequate account of personality, or of sin, or of morality, or of death. We have discussed John Macmurray in this connection, and there are crucial questions to be asked of Marxism along this line. But my own conviction is that, in this matter as in every other, it is far better that Christianity should take its own standing-ground and argue from its own starting-point: and that starting-point is the history of Israel and the events to which the Apostolic preaching and the Church both testify. For Christianity does not rest upon an empirical (scientific) investigation of the nature of the world, any more than it rests upon philosophic speculation about the nature of God. Christianity rests upon the historic fact of Christ, upon the prophetic witness which testified of Him and upon the apostolic witness in which the meaning of His Coming is set forth.

The question, then, is whether Christian doctrine gives a

valid and true interpretation of these facts. Marxism generally does not deal with them at all. It tends to lump Christianity with religion in general, that is, with man's beliefs about God, or the gods, and the practices of piety which follow from these beliefs. But Christianity is not touched by a criticism of religion-in-general. The Church did not come to its faith by arguing the existence of God and then giving Him a peculiar Christian colour in the light of the person and teaching of Jesus. The Church finds the fact of Christ compulsive of belief in God, and finds the gigantic act of faith, which is the history of the Jewish people, vindicated and more than vindicated in Christ's coming.

Why, then, do we believe the apostolic doctrine and refuse to admit any other interpretation of the fact of Christ? Summarily we would give two reasons. The first is that the history is of a piece, and that only the doctrine of the apostles and the teaching of the creeds takes adequate account of the whole of it. But that is not a statement that everyone can test, and faith is not normally dependent on it. The other reason is, to put it in Christian terms, that "the Holy Spirit testifies" to the truth of the doctrine. This is not as subjective as it sounds by a long way. In the first place, the doctrine is not a purely personal doctrine. It speaks to man's whole nature, telling him of the meaning of his existence, of the nature of the world and his place in the world in relation to things and to neighbours, to life and to death. In this comprehensive sense it "speaks to our condition". That is to say, it tells us the truth about ourselves so that without this clue we know we could not have understood ourselves. And it tells us the truth about ourselves without the vast gaps which any merely scientific account of things must leave. Just as, when a man is addressed by his friend, he knows what no science could have told him—that he is made for friendship; so, when man is addressed by God in the Gospel, he knows what no science could have told him—that "God has made us for Himself and our hearts are restless till they rest in Him". In other words and in the simplest possible words, for Christianity is for babes and for grown men content to be babes, in the

Gospel we recognize the Father's voice and by that Voice we are assured and reassured that we are His children—no less and no more.

There is much more to be said about the way in which the truth of the Gospel is conveyed to us by the Church and the Book, but it is important for our present purpose to see how far the Christian understanding of man and his world can be put into terms that will relate it to the Marxist scheme.

Christians, like other folk, must try to get their particular message into contemporary terms if it is to be even interesting, though anything like a full understanding of it depends upon a man's grappling, sooner or later, with the Bible message in Bible terms. I believe that contemporary terms will more and more be Marxist terms, if only because of the inevitable interaction of Western and Russian thought in Europe. This ought to be encouraging rather than discouraging to the Christian preacher, for though, as we have seen, there are no easy analogies to be drawn between Christianity and Marxism, any more than there is straight opposition between them, yet there is a dialectic in the Christian scheme which can be made meaningful to those who have been trained in Marxist terms. Marxism speaks of a struggle within history out of which new things are born. Christianity speaks of a struggle between heaven and earth—between God and the world—out of which a New Creation is born. As the Old Testament puts it, " God has a controversy " with His people, which is very near to the original meaning of dialectic in the Greek schools. The prophets are God's spokesmen in this controversy, till the things they stammer to say are clearly spoken by the incarnate Word which is Christ. The coming of Christ is the climax of that dialectic struggle between God and man which is the theme of the Old Testament, and out of that climax—the creative travail of Christ in His conflict with evil—the New Order is born which is called the New Creation, the earnest of which is the Church. As long as the world lasts the conflict continues and the fullness of the New Order is not disclosed—and that time of waiting and of struggle with the forces of evil is comparable in thought with the period in Marxism between

the actual revolution and the coming of final Communism, the period before the state has withered away and while everything is of an interim and transitional character. So, in the deeper Christian interpretation of things, the Church and the state must exist together until the final Coming of Christ—and any notion that one can do without the other springs from the illusion that history is already over and the fullness of the Kingdom come. The Kingdom *has* come. We know the meaning of the struggle and we know that revolutionary victory was won in the Cross and Resurrection; but "the travail of Christ's soul" goes on. His sufferings must be "filled up" by the witness of the Church; and that struggle and that suffering will not be ended till He Himself puts an end to it. Then and then only will the state "wither away" and the Church with it, for "there is no temple" in that restored Eden.

Though that is sketchy and all too summary, I believe it justifies us in believing that in speaking the Gospel to Marxism we shall learn a great deal about the Gospel which before we did not know ourselves. But it is only if we adopt the authentic starting-point of Christian teaching, which is the *kerygma* of the apostles, that we find ourselves able to take account of Marxism and to make a fair estimate of it.

CHAPTER VI

WHAT CHRISTIANS HAVE TO DO

"The distinction between Christians and other men is neither in country nor language nor customs. For they do not dwell in some place of their own, nor do they use any strange variety of dialect, nor practise an extraordinary kind of life. . . . Yet while living in Greek and barbarian cities, according as each obtained his lot, and following the local customs, both in clothing and food and in the rest of life, they show forth the wonderful and confessedly strange character of their own citizenship. . . . They share all things as citizens, and suffer all things as strangers. . . . They obey the appointed laws, and they surpass the laws in their own lives. . . .

God has appointed them to so great a post and it is not right for them to decline it."

The Epistle to Diognetus
(Second or Third Century)

"Mine be the dirt and the dross
The dust and scum of the earth."

JOHN MASEFIELD: *Dedication*

THE FIRST plain and practical thing to be said has nothing specifically to do with Marxism at all. It is the simple reminder that Christians, by the nature of their existence as physical and social beings, are inextricably involved in all the material and social concerns that affect the lives of normal men. The salvation wrought in Christ does not deliver us from our intimate dependence upon all the normal processes of economic and social living: upon economic order and political arrangements, upon industry, agriculture, sanitation, transport. So long as Christians travel on the same trains and

buses as do their unbelieving neighbours, shop at the same stores and use the same public lavatories, just so long are they inevitably bound in responsibility for the right ordering of production, transport and sanitation, with all the complex manipulation of conflicting interests and material goods upon which tolerable social life depends. On the purely practical level this is obviously so. No one who is involved, as all human beings are, in the texture of economic and social life can in the nature of the case avoid responsibility for it. In this area of life inaction is a kind of action. To be indifferent to the way in which social life is ordered is in fact to take sides—to take sides with corruption and tyranny, graft and reaction, since these social evils feed on the indifference and inactivity of ordinary folk, and count on it for their continuing existence.

That is clear at the practical and common-sense level. But in the light of the Christian Gospel there is a great deal more to be said. What the salvation wrought in Christ does, in this area of life, is to deepen endlessly this sense of solidarity with ordinary men. Outside of the Christian faith this solidarity may be simply a matter of practical fact, and the acceptance of its obligations a matter of paying one's rent in the world. From this point of view citizenship-responsibilities at worst are to be dodged, and at best are accepted as a matter of simple decency. But inside the Christian faith this solidarity is accepted with a kind of exultation. To belong to Christ is to be bound in love and obligation to all the brethren for whom Christ died, and the man in whom that recognition of spiritual unity is quick and keen will see his economic and social interdependence with other men as the chance to give form and practical meaning to his Christian solidarity with them. Allegiance to Christ, then, so far from drawing the Christian apart from ordinary loyalties into a separate sphere of life, drives him deeper into the workaday world of physical and political and social necessities which is the normal environment of normal men. It is there that his loyalty to Christ must work itself out. "Citizenship", as Luther said, "is love of the brethren."

All this implies that Christians in the political sphere are normally, and ought to be, indistinguishable from other men. Politics is the area in which men come together, whatever their ultimate creed, for the handling of certain practical matters which equally concern them all. It is the area in which it is directly determined whether men and women and children shall be housed and clothed and fed adequately and justly, and whether they are or are not to be the victims of exploitation and tyranny. It is the place where men seek to order their life together so that justice and freedom shall be in tolerable balance. Now justice, freedom, economic security, good transport and adequate sanitation are no more peculiarly Christian concerns than are good cooking and competent housekeeping. They are the concern of men as men, and the only distinguishing mark of the Christian in this area of life is his peculiar keenness that those things which are humanly necessary should in fact get done. That is to say, in political affairs the Christian is normally distinguished from other men, not by wanting different things, but by wanting the right things more passionately. For just as there is no peculiarly Christian way of cooking a meal or tending a house, so there is no peculiarly Christian way of ordering the life of a state. In the first case the choice is between efficiency and inefficiency, and the distinguishing mark of the Christian cook or housekeeper is that she should desire efficiency more keenly and detest slovenliness more strongly: in the second case—that of ordering political life—the choice is between justice and injustice, and the distinguishing mark of the Christian is that he (and she) should desire justice more keenly and detest injustice more strongly. Here, of course, I am open to be reminded that in domestic life other values may conflict with efficiency, just as in social life other values may conflict with justice, and that the Christian may well differ from other men about the point at which efficiency or justice should be sacrificed to other "goods". That is true enough. But normally efficiency and justice have high priority and most of those with whom we have to work agree about what they mean. It is within that area of agreement that Christians act like

other people, and are called to act more energetically and sacrificially.

Take another analogy. During the London "blitz", if a bomb fell on a tenement house and buried a group of people in a basement shelter, we enlisted all the help within reach to get those people out. It never occurred to the Christian in the rescue-party to catechize the man working alongside him about his Christian profession or his baptism. Nor did the Christians feel that they must justify their peculiar calling by tackling the debris in a peculiarly "Christian" way. All concerned were essentially agreed about aims and about methods, and the only relevant questions were: How hard were people prepared to work and what risks were they prepared to take? The only way in which it was open for Christians to distinguish themselves was by a special readiness for hard work and an unusual willingness to take risks.

That is the normal character of politics. About Christians in politics there are other things to be said, but that is the first thing. For neglect of that first thing many Christians hang about fruitlessly on the edge of the political struggle because they can see no specifically Christian thing to be done about it. Naturally: there *is* no specifically Christian thing to be done about it, since the political struggle is concerned with human and not with Christian problems as such.

Recently, in Britain, a group of younger Christians were asked to give their views whether or not Christians should take part in politics. Their answers were of two kinds. The first group said that Christians should not take part in politics because they (the politics, mark you, not the Christians) were too corrupt. The other group felt that all Christians should join the Labour Party because that would be so good for the Labour Party. Answers to this kind of question are not always as naïve as this, or as lacking in a proper Christian humility, but it is true that multitudes of socially-concerned Christians feel that their Christianity in itself qualifies them not only for political work but for political leadership. This should be suspicious in the first place because we Christians are supposed to be among men as those who serve and not as those who

lead, but it is wrong-headed in the second place because it clouds the fact that we Christians, like other people, are only qualified to act politically when we have been trained in the humdrum disciplines of political life. The place where Christians ought characteristically to be found is in the place where the drudgery and chores of political work have to be done, in local bodies, trade unions and co-operative movements, at canvassing and accounting, at addressing envelopes and carrying petitions—at all the obscure and unrewarded work upon which wholesome politics depends, yet which tends to be neglected by the office-seekers and self-conscious " leaders ". If Christians come to leadership and to the place where their special insights can be brought to bear in an influential fashion, it can only be by serving their apprenticeship in the humdrum.

If we had taken a doctrinal starting-point for this chapter it would have brought us to this identical point. For the conclusion of Biblical and historic Christian doctrine is that in civic and social matters love works by justice. That is the plain relationship of the Law and the Gospel. The Law of God in the Old Testament is the instrument of His love, by which He saves rebellious men from the worst consequences of their rebellion; for, without the restraint of the Law, there would be anarchy, disintegration and mutual destruction. The state is constituted under the Law of God; hence, for Paul and for Peter, it is the " ordinance of God ", and the Christian owes obedience to it as he does to the Law of God. Whatever sociological explanations we may give for the state, that is the doctrinal account of its nature and function on a Christian reading of the world. That does not mean uncritical allegiance to all states, or uncritical obedience to all laws, as we shall see later in this chapter, but it does mean that in the area of their citizenship Christians take their place like other men as members of the body politic, so that they serve God and their neighbour by being living and active members of that body.

So long, then, as the state functions as an instrument of civic justice, the Christian will serve it with the best service he can give, rejoicing that in this aspect of his life his very solidarity with men opens ways of serving them, and that by the mechan-

ism of government he can feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and love his brethren in practical ways.

That is the normal form of social duty; but the equilibrium which is established under the just state is always precarious, never wholly stable, and always liable to be disturbed by "the unruly wills and affections of sinful men". So the picture of a state wholly conformed to the Law of God and offering no problem to the Christian conscience is, in fact, an abstraction. Always, in historical fact, there are abuses to be guarded against, injustices to be combated in the very constitution of the state itself. Always the state tends to be the instrument, not of the justice of God, but of the selfishness of dominant groups; and, in the extreme case, such abuses may be so flagrant that society is thrown into revolution. These abuses and these conflicts create peculiar problems of civic duty. In our own day they are especially acute; and, as we have seen, the Marxist analysis throws a great deal of light on the reasons for this.

The last hundred and fifty years have been years of deepening social conflict, whether or not we accept the Marxist explanation of it. In our own day unemployment and war have alternated in a sickening way, and whether in war or in revolution very few areas of world society have been exempt from mass violence. Obviously it is not enough to consider Christian duty as consisting only in the normal obligations of a relatively peaceful and smoothly-functioning democracy.

Not only are political decisions difficult, but choices are often so extreme in our day that the masses of men are reluctant to make them. They tend to retreat from political activity and to leave groups of "extremists" to fight the issues out between them. This general tendency to political quiescence—which left Germany, for example, a battleground between Communists and Nazis—is reinforced among Christians by their reluctance to have part in violent action, or to take sides in situations of open conflict. There are great numbers of Christians who are aware of their social responsibility, but feel helpless to do anything about it because they do not want to have a hand in the violent antagonisms which make up so

much of contemporary political life. They either go on making progressive and liberal and democratic generalizations and hoping that the issues can be settled by discussion and the vote, or they retreat to political inactivity.

Among young people in Britain—especially among students—this tendency is pretty plain. It is beyond measure difficult to get any live discussion of political issues among the majority. In the case of students, this is obviously due in part to the short, intensive courses of study and the many additional claims on leisure time caused by the war. But that is not the whole story. Equally if not more important is the psychological, intellectual and spiritual effect of the war itself and the social crisis out of which it springs. There is the sense that events are out of hand, that our generation is in the grip of gigantic forces whose nature no man can understand and which are beyond the power of men or of democratic assemblies to control. The future of society is being shaped by influences impersonal or daemonic, so that intelligent decision or democratic action is impossible or meaningless, and can have no constructive effect. This sense of overmastering "fate" is shattering in its effect on personal and group initiative. It takes the stuffing out of voluntary societies of all kinds, and creates in the majority a numbness of mind and soul, a sense of political helplessness and sheer frustration. They tend more and more to concentrate on their own personal future, on that narrow range of choices which are within their own personal control. They take exams, they fall in love, they marry, they try for a temporary niche of security . . . as a man on a sinking ship might shut himself in his 8 ft. by 8 ft. cabin to keep the illusion of safety for just five minutes more. This is not purely a wartime mood, and the end of the shooting war has left it relatively unaffected. It springs from the totality of social chaos which has been the lifelong experience of the present generation, and it cannot be healed except by a new social cohesion and purposiveness.

In this kind of situation the reaction of minority groups becomes especially significant. There are those, in student circles and beyond them, who refuse to be battered into in-

effectiveness by the violence of events, or to be robbed of political initiative by the turmoil of the times. Among this live minority there are two definable groups, each of which is winning some of the best of our church-trained Christians, and each of which, it is important to notice, represents one possible decision in the dilemma which Arthur Koestler analyses and which was discussed in Chapter IV.

The first group is pacifist. During the war sixty thousand men of military age appeared before tribunals in Britain as conscientious objectors. Most of them were given alternative service, either land work or social work or civil defence of some kind. Many chose the land, not only because it is one way of earning a living without going into war-plants, but as a movement of protest against a war-making, competitive industrialism. This movement has developed in the direction of co-operative land communities, and it is a growing and significant thing. What the total of communities is in Britain it is difficult to ascertain, since they vary from close-knit units to informal and relatively unorganized groups. They vary also in their attitude to Christianity. Some are orthodox, or near-orthodox, and in close relations with one branch or other of the Church. Others have a religious philosophy of a mystical kind, some are under the influence of Aldous Huxley and Gerald Heard, and they shade off into groups which are humanist and humanitarian rather than religious. In type they are generally Tolstoyan and Franciscan: war-renunciation, simplicity of life, strong roots in the land, with a sharing of labour and of income. They are normally not celibate.[1] Although sixty thousand men of military age represent a considerable minority the significance of the pacifist-community movement is not in its numbers but in its composition. It includes some of the best-informed and most sensitive spirits of our time. John Middleton Murry is its leading theorist, though possibly the greatest single apologia for this general line is in Max Plowman's Letters.[2] Its spokesmen would

[1] Particulars of developments in the Community Movement are published periodically in THE COMMUNITY BROADSHEET, Chancton, Dartnell Park, West Byfleet, Surrey.

[2] Published by Andrew Dakers as BRIDGE INTO THE FUTURE.

generally maintain that the present social crisis is too deep-rooted to be got at by any political reorganization, or by economic change, if by that is meant large-scale economic transformation brought about by government action or by mass-pressure. The present industrial order makes for war and totalitarianism, but neither war nor totalitarianism heal the contradictions inherent in it, or check its devilries. As for the prospect of radical transformation of the present order, not only would the human cost of the necessary revolution be too great to be worthwhile, but the people are unprepared for it and, in any case, the situation has deteriorated too far to be retrievable at this stage. Through war and totalitarianism the present order will work its own destruction. The way of realism is to recognize that the world will be a desert, so that sanity demands the planting of seeds of health, or " cells of good living ", in the interstices of the decadent and collapsing social order. These communities based on free association and common labour are to be the seed-beds of a new and co-operative order, keeping the good life alive in much the same fashion as the monasteries kept alive learning and brotherhood through Europe's " Dark Age ".

The other minority movement is towards Marxist Communism. The curious thing is that while Pacifists and Communists are given to anathematizing each other as if they were arch-enemies, they not only accept the same basic analysis of contemporary society, but they tend to include the same kind of people. It is not uncommon to see students of great integrity come to the point at which they feel bound to give their social concern some kind of positive expression; they hesitate, and then go off, some to Pacifism and some to Communism—still the same essential breed of men and women. The fact is that Pacifism represents one arm and Communism the other of Koestler's dilemma, and just as the alternatives are inextricably complicated in Koestler's books, so they are in contemporary life. The Communist sets justice above compassion and is prepared for violence and for blood, if only fascism may be halted and reaction at home defeated. The Pacifist sets compassion above justice and is through with violence

and with blood, being deeply doubtful whether, in fact, war and revolution will bring any of the goods they promise.

That is the contemporary form of the Koestler dilemma, and it is plainly a dilemma for Christians. Their first political obligation is to serve justice, but so difficult is it for those who seek justice to find firm political standing-ground that increasing minorities move into the Pacifist or Communist camp.

It is not my business in this chapter to make up the Christian's political mind for him, even if I fully knew my own. But there are certain positive things to be said. In the first place, as we emerge from the shooting war in Europe, two groups will have a significant contribution to make to the social future. The Pacifists are important for their protest against war, for their sacrificial readiness to pay the price of peace, and for their testimony in word and act to the radical nature of our problem. The other significant group—leaving aside for the moment the peculiar problems of violence and of the Communist " line "—consists of those who have fought the war through and are prepared to go on fighting by every fruitful mode of struggle for essential justice, political freedom and economic democracy. It may be that these two groups, comprising men of essentially the same moral temper, will come together in a new alliance for the next phase of the perennial social struggle, even if they have to forge a new political instrument to do it.

That at once raises the question of what is " a fruitful mode of struggle ". The Pacifists and Communists agree that the problem of constructive social change is passing out of the area of democratic discussion into the area of open conflict. The Communist accepts the necessity of open conflict and is concerned to prepare for it: the Pacifist holds the cost of conflict to be too great and is at work on what he conceives to be the only positive alternative. Even if we continue to hope that the alternatives are not as stark as this, we must still face the possibility that the Pacifists and Communists are right on those things about which they agree. If they should turn out to be right, then we must attempt a Christian approach to the

Koestler dilemma, since it will become a matter of practical decision for us all.

The Christian Gospel implies no absolute prohibition of force in social life. Our Lord's own rejection of it in pursuance of His special work, and His forbidding of it to His followers in their direct dealings with others, does not involve any indifference to the problems of civil order or the maintenance of justice by the state. This is implied in His own relations with soldiers and state officials, and the apostolic attitude to the state as "ordinance of God" is in no way a departure from Christ's own teaching. On this matter we would stand with every responsible confessional statement of the historic Church, giving real authority to the state and allowing it "the power of the sword". The only general complaint that needs to be made against that historic doctrine is that it places far too little emphasis upon the right of men not only to maintain the just state by force, but to overthrow—by force if necessary—the unjust state.

There is, however, one aspect of the divine government of the world which needs to be emphasized in relation to our attitude to force. The "power of the sword" which the state should wield in the interest of justice is made necessary by sin and is itself only an alternative to the worse evils of anarchy. So, in every instance where force has to be called in in the interests of civil order or justice, whether in war or in internal affairs, the Christian will recognize that the very need to invoke force is a confession that there exists a sinful state of affairs which in obedience to God must be put right. The Christian can participate in war or in civil compulsion only with the implied determination that, when force has done what force can do to make and keep the peace, the evils which force implies and in its measure creates will be themselves tackled at the root. If any society goes on using force *as an alternative* to the positive work of social betterment it will find itself driven more and more to the use of such force as will be self-destructive. That is the historic logic to which our Lord was pointing in His "they that take the sword shall perish by the sword". For example, all men of conscience acknowledge that

when Britain took the sword in 1914 for the establishment of European order, it could justify the subsequent slaughter only by a determination to use the respite victory would bring to put right the manifest abuses in international and economic life out of which the war had come. When victory came, and with it the chance for amendment of our corporate life, opportunity after opportunity for constructive change was lost because of the self-interest of nations (including Britain) and of groups within the nations. No radical amendment of corporate life was in fact undertaken, the old abuses remained, and the world moved steadily to another conflict, whose violence all men knew must be immeasurably greater, and its human cost more terrible, than the war of 1914-18. If men and nations persistently reject the absolute demand of love in social life (and the very existence of the state is the witness that they corporately do reject it), and if the temporary respites they win by violence are not used for amendment of life, then, under the divine government of the world, they will be brought to the position where they must either face the demand for radical renewal or be involved in such a welter of violence as will be totally destructive. The Pacifist would say that we are at that point to-day. If we choose to reject his view and his programme, we must turn to examine the alternative. How can Christians participate in the increasingly violent conflicts of international and social life without being involved in unqualified ruthlessness?

We do not know the complete answer: it has still to be found both in Christian theory and practice. It may be that those Christians who have shared in the European "Resistance" will have much to teach us. But from the starting-point we have taken this at least emerges. While we do not operate with any absolute principle of non-violence, we know that both our concern for justice and our suspicion of violence derive from our knowledge of God's government of His world. If we find that our quest for justice is leading us towards the use of such violence as is offensive to our Christian instinct of compassion, we will always rigorously examine the proposed kind of action—whether it be in war, or in revolution, or in restraint

of revolution—to see whether it can or cannot in fact serve justice. We shall have good ground for suspecting the political utility of such policies and programmes as offend our Christian "instinct" when that is tutored by the Gospel; but we shall not be justified—and here is where many Christians neglect the responsibility of relating faith to fact in making their decisions—we shall not be justified in rejecting such courses simply because they offend our instinct. We have an obligation to demonstrate that they have no political utility, and even if we can do so we are under obligation to produce a political alternative, and not simply to retreat to inaction.

It may be therefore that the alternatives are either the pacifist-community line, or else the evolution of a new mode of political struggle which would avoid the socially-destructive kind of violence which civil and international war involve today. The technique of non-violent action is not new. It has been the standard mode of industrial struggle, and has been used powerfully in the cause of Indian nationalism. It may be that the application of such non-violent methods over wider areas of social life would form the basis on which pacifists and other socially-concerned radicals could come together. That at any rate is the area where the contemporary problem lies.

So we have arrived at this point. We discover the normality of Christian social duty. We Christians find our political calling in alliance with normal men to achieve the political ends which normal men value. Our primary Christian contribution, without which we can make no other special contribution of any value, is to work with peculiar devotion for normal human and political purposes. Our essential political concern is social justice, and we will join ourselves to those groups on whose side justice lies and support those agencies which make for social order-with-freedom. The state has the right to our loyalty, since it is essential to the orderly life of the community: without it the weak would be exposed to the excesses of the strong, and the sinful wills of men would make havoc of social life. The particular "state" under which we live will hold our loyalty and call forth our service in so far as and for as long as it performs this essential work of "ministering

justice ", as the Reformed confessions put it. We shall serve it both by conformity and by criticism, and we shall test the state partly by its readiness to allow criticism, since that is one sign of its recognition that it exists not for its own sake but " for the public good ". We shall allow the state the power of compulsion and of punishment, but shall be scrupulous to see that this power is used not only against disorderly and obscure persons who might upset the public peace, but against strong accumulations of selfish power which might threaten the common good.

Because we know the corruption to which the state itself is liable, we shall be wary lest the state forget its function as the ordinance of God " for His glory and the public good " and become an instrument of tyranny or the agent of selfish groups. Our Christian understanding of this danger will be quickened by the warning which Marx gives that the state in any class-society is bound to function, in some measure, as the agent of the dominant economic class. In a situation where the state does fail to function as the instrument of justice, Christian men will be first to challenge it and foremost in the revolt against it. If a revolutionary necessity does arise, the form of Christian obligation is still the normal obligation of normal men, which is to carry through such revolutionary measures as are required to re-establish essential justice. The Christian in such a conflict will serve the revolutionary cause as he would serve the just state—by loyalty and by criticism—but his criticism in each case is of value only in proportion to his practical devotion to the cause of justice itself. He will recognize that in a revolutionary situation the just cause is liable to be betrayed into bad tactics and false propaganda by stupid personal enmities and by sheer vindictiveness; but his criticism of revolutionary tactics will be powerful only in the measure of his devotion to revolutionary aims. In our contemporary world, if he gives weight to the Marxist analysis, he will judge that justice is on the side of the workers of the world and against those who hold private possession of the means of life. If this can be set right by democratic process, well and good; but in Russia, Germany, Spain and France, in a variety

of ways this conflict has driven towards violence and has only been resolved—in so far as it has been resolved—through revolution and through war. Christians ought not to be taken by surprise in a revolutionary situation. Our obligation is loyalty to the revolt if it is just and necessary, and by right of that loyalty a faithful criticism such as we would owe to any rightly-established state.

Concerning the special problem of violence, we have seen that Christians will be suspicious of violence in social relations not only because it bears hardly on their brother men, but because it is always a sign of latent evil which it cannot itself heal. Further, it tends to be made the instrument of enmity and not of justice, and has the quality of aggravating enmities and of multiplying its own horrors. In our contemporary world it creates special problems because of the power of modern technics. We have to take account of the pacifist renunciation of all violent courses, and weigh the strength of the argument that mass-violence has ceased to be useful as a measure of social protection or of social advance. We have to explore the possibility that an extension and development of non-violent methods of social struggle may be our only chance to bring together the pacifist and revolutionary groups, who each represent one significant response to the challenge of contemporary disorder. Meanwhile, we recognize that Christians may rightly take their place either in the pacifist-community movement, or in the political and industrial struggle of the people for economic emancipation and for social peace.

In all this Christians must accept the responsibility of acting according to their best political judgment. The contention of this book is that they will walk blindfold if they do not take account of what Marx has to say. But whatever their judgment may be and whatever political alignment they may choose to take, there is one further matter which is vital to any fruitful social action. Public and corporate activity cannot be divorced from the integrity of the personal life. The first movement of advance against social injustice must be a personal renunciation of the gains of injustice and the acceptance of a real identification with those who bear the weight of it. The pro-

test of the pacifist-community movement against the inequities of our present order and the determination of that movement to embody economic solidarity in their group life is a reminder to the rest of us, who may choose to remain in our place in large-scale society, that we cannot with integrity set ourselves against the inequities of a class-society while we ourselves continue to accept the spoils of the class-war. In terms of the Marxist analysis we would say that, if we are not to remain implicitly in alliance with privileged groups, then we must voluntarily " de-class " ourselves by the practical renunciation of economic privilege. There are some suggestions about the concrete expression of this conviction in *The National Average*, published by the Shadwell Group.[1] It is a record of the experience of one group among many in Britain and elsewhere who are convinced that the struggle for economic justice cannot be waged with integrity by Christians or by others who continue themselves to enjoy an unjust share of economic goods.

It has to be noticed that all these essential disciplines—of personal integrity, of service to the state either by conformity, by criticism, or by revolt—represent the very minimum of social obligation. They represent the demands of justice, not the full demands of love; but love must express itself first of all by justice, and to speak of love when justice is not satisfied is to prostitute the word as we have done in our modern " charity ". As the *Epistle to Diognetus* puts it, Christians must " obey the appointed laws " before they go on to " surpass the laws in their own lives ". They must go the first mile of political duty before they go the second mile of Christian charity. It is when they are diligent about both that they best " show forth the wonderful and confessedly strange character of their own citizenship ".

[1] Obtainable from 4 Charrington Street, N.W.1. Price 4d.

EPIGRAPH

THE HERO, THE COMMUNIST & THE CHRISTIAN

IF THE account of Christian thought and action in these last chapters is a valid one, it puts paid to the shallow notion that Christianity is a device for making bad people into good ones. That is a distinction which Christians explicitly renounce, partly because we acknowledge that we are not fit to make it, and partly because the distinction between the Pharisee and the Publican in any generation so completely dissolves away before the judgment of Christ. The Gospel, of its nature, is addressed with equal urgency to the good and the bad, to the noble and the base. It levels men as sinners that it may exalt them together as children of God. It appears, in fact, that we get the clearest view of the Gospel's meaning, not when we see it directed to the drunkard, or the dissolute (though the inestimable worth it sets on them is one of its glories), but when it is directed to the noblest of the children of men—and among the children of men there is very great nobility.

It seems worthwhile in this epigraph to try to sketch three separate types of humanity, all clearly discoverable in our own day. I have a personal longing to pay tribute to two friends of my own outside the Christian camp who have died in the struggle against fascism since 1936.

The first of them had been a Christian and, like most Christians of sense and sensibility during the war-revulsion years, a convinced pacifist. By 1939, however, he had been so affected by the difficulty of belief in our day, that he had ceased to profess the faith and was living a Bohemian kind of existence in central London. But when war came, it seemed to him that it came by his personal fault, by his slackness in pacifist effort and by his failure to do even what one man could do to tackle war at its roots. His response in integrity, it

seemed to him, could take only one form. Now that war had come, he must take the brunt of it on himself and pay for his sins of omission by laying his own body in the path of fascism in the only way he knew. So, because the tank was a new terror, he offered himself to an anti-tank unit, and died in North Africa in the first rush of the panzers there. His response was not consciously Christian, but it was gloriously manly. So I count him a hero.

The second was a young Canadian who learnt his Communism during a period of rough-and-tumble adventuring in North America after he had finished his college course. He came to New Zealand to set forward his career as a mining engineer, just as New Zealand went into the trough of depression in 1932. He put himself and his career in jeopardy time and time again during 1932-36. He sweated at Marxist theory, he lived in poverty and scoffed at the Christians who made high profession and lived, most of them, just as high. When international fascism struck in Spain in 1936 he disappeared. How he made his way to Spain I have never been able to find out, for he was penniless and he was suspect. But make his way to Spain he did, and at once, and he died fighting in the Republican army before the war had well begun. I count him a Communist hero.

What has the Christian faith to say to men like these? The best I can do meanwhile by way of an answer is in this book. But to make the thing more pointed let us look directly at these three types of men, the Hero, the Communist and the Christian.

The *hero* in our definition is the humane man, the man of integrity. He has much of the stoic in him. He is a constant type in history. He is the man in whom the impulse to holiness overcomes, by some superior chemistry or by the operation of the Holy Spirit, as you care to regard it, the base instincts of lust and greed and pride which are the despair of most of us. By some double portion of that capacity for endurance which is mysteriously part of our human heritage, he achieves what looks like superhuman indifference to the normal kinds of self-indulgence. He is compassionate, trust-

worthy, willing for sacrifice, indifferent to consequence. One can only give examples, but for me the heroic temper is manifest in these three at least, near to our own day—in T. E. Lawrence, in Henry W. Nevinson, in Richard Hillary of the R.A.F. Lawrence's *Letters* are beyond question one of the greatest documents of the human spirit, suffused with truth and tenderness and clear-eyed courage. Nevinson's *Fire of Life*, and the poems and essays gathered in that notable Penguin *Words and Deeds*, are enough to mark him of this company. Hillary's *The Last Enemy* shows the bearing of the hero prostrate under torture, the torture of a burning near to death and the still more painful process of surgical healing. His last letters and his self-sought death in the air show the same spirit of revulsion from everything but the impulse of integrity, for which he finds no scope in contemporary life, except the blind offering of self against Hitlerism. He would keep his soul alive, but only in the sky is integrity secure, and one cannot stay in the air for ever. So he charges upon death.[1]

The hero's temper is the stoic temper at its best. Obedience to the pure motive, refusal to be driven by circumstances; knowing no heavenly good, but cherishing self-respect above every earthly thing. We have it in Lawrence's concern with integrity of life at every level, his attention to the vital detail of paper and of printing, his sacrificial struggle to put perfection of prose on paper in his *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, his costly recovery of the whole story after the heart-breaking loss of the manuscript on Reading Station, his tempering of his own body, his endurance of torture, his quest of obscurity as the only safe place for a man of integrity in a society whose standards he despised. We have it in Nevinson in his physical and mental disciplines, his quick enjoyment of every wholesome gift of life—for of God he professed to know nothing; in his eager, costing sympathy with every generous cause throughout a long life, his indifference to the tormenting pain of a body racked by tropical disease, his carrying into old

[1] There is a finely-sensitive study of Hillary's book and of his mind by John Middleton Murry in THE ADELPHI for July-September 1944.

age of the kind of effort men drop without blame in middle life. He is one chief exemplar of his own maxim for the happy life: "To take your money in one hand and your life in the other . . . both hands open." These are not happy warriors. They are too keenly aware of tragedy. "The still, sad music of humanity" is sounding for them all. But their quality is enough to shake the specious Christian claim that there is no human goodness or greatness outside the profession of faith.

Then the *Communist*. He is the product of our own revolutionary day. At his best he shows the hero's temper of selflessness and endurance. What then is his peculiar quality? There is a discussion of this very question in a book of essays called *Studies in a Dying Culture*, by Christopher Caudwell (Christopher St. John Sprigg), a brilliant Marxist who himself died fighting a rear-guard action against Franco's Moors at the age of twenty-nine. Caudwell examines the character of T. E. Lawrence, whom he calls a "bourgeois hero", using the term "hero" in a sense somewhat different from that I have chosen, but giving us ample material for our purpose.

For Caudwell, as a Marxist, there is no ultimate explanation of the hero's nature. The Marxist puts aside as meaningless all questions about ultimate explanations. There it simply is, in Lawrence, for example, and in Lenin, the product, perhaps, of biological and of social elements, but distinct, recognizable, potent. But potent of what? Why was Lawrence's historical achievement so much less than Lenin's? Because, says Caudwell in a word, Lenin's heroism was yoked to an understanding of the historical situation which Lawrence lacked. So for Lawrence—frustration, loneliness, and a pointless death on a racing motor-cycle, careering to nowhere in particular; for Lenin—fulfilment in the growing achievement of the Soviet Union, the social practice of the Marxist-Leninist theory. Lawrence craved the human values of integrity and community. He saw them denied by the society of his day, so he sought them in its interstices, in the few remaining "pockets" of integral manhood not yet obliterated by the money-motive

or sucked into the swamp of commercialism. He went to the tents of the Arabs, and when the cause he sought to serve there was betrayed—as he saw it—he buried himself in another pocket of real humanity in the ranks of the R.A.F. Lenin, too, sought humanity and community, but he was rid of the delusion that bourgeois and capitalist society could breed it any more. So he took his place in the class which held the future, the working-class whose triumph would be the triumph of universal humanity, the first real possibility of the establishment of universal community.

This is the same distinction which we drew in the first chapter. The human purpose of the Renaissance was to breed a race of heroes, strongly reared on a philosophy of thoroughgoing world acceptance: but it offered no account of the real direction of the world-process. Marxism is Renaissance world-acceptance, with the difference that it claims to show its heroes how to make the world their own by understanding its real nature, so that by the knowledge of necessity they enter into freedom. Caudwell's own homely figure for this is that of a man carving a chicken. The carver is master of the chicken, as man is master of the material world. But there is one right way, and only one, to carve a chicken. The man who knows where the joints are and submits to the anatomical facts of the case can carry the job through: the man who ignores them—he can ignore them if he likes—can only mangle the bird and end by making a literal hash of it. The man who does not understand his own world and its laws has only an illusory freedom. The Communist is the true social anatomist, so that he is the master of the body politic and the truly free man.

The Communist is understandable as a social anatomist, and, if it is historical diagnostics and surgical treatment we want for society, he is our man. But what of compassion? For the hero as we have seen him in Lawrence and Nevinson, for example, is the humane man, the man of compassion, who trembles and faints, like Lawrence, when loyalty to the group and the cause requires the execution of one nameless traitor: who lives restless by day and by night, as did Nevinson, while

the woes of the negroes and injustice done to women remain as wrongs to be righted. It is important to remind ourselves again that Communism was born in an explicit intellectual repudiation of values. Isaiah Berlin, in his biography of Karl Marx,[1] has a picture of the young Marx ruthlessly eliminating from his manuscript any reference to justice, or to the other "bourgeois virtues". But to blue-pencil the references does not eliminate the virtues, and historical Communism is unintelligible, unless it is seen, in one aspect, as a surge of passionate pity for the oppressed and of prophetic anger against injustice. Marx would make his followers social anatomists, knowing nothing of pity. His socialism was to be no crusade but an empirical science. What he did was to give to a generation which was morally stirred by oppression, but intellectually bound to renounce moral considerations, the possibility of "following their moral aspirations without professing their ideals". But to do this he had to assure his followers that the "value"-less universe was in fact working for good, so that they could forget about moral ideals and concentrate on emotionless manipulative surgery, with the unacknowledged certainty that the result would be congenial to their unconfessed compassion. The trouble with this is, that when we are told that our morality is worthless, but that we can achieve moral ends simply by following our instincts of greed and striking down those who oppose us—as the proletariat are to be taught to hate and tear and rend the class-enemy—then there is the danger that the moral end will be lost in a programme of scientific ruthlessness. It is as if the surgeon became so absorbed in the possibilities of his technique that he drove his maddened patient to kill himself and the surgeon. So, instead of the Communist hero whom history does actually show us in Luxembourg and Lenin and in Caudwell himself—strong both in compassion and knowledge—you get the logical party man, the fanatic of social science, devoted to the point of death, but unscrupulous, untrustworthy and cruel.

The first thing to be written about the *Christian* is that he is much more difficult to write about. And that I think is in

[1] Home University Library.

the nature of the case. For one thing, he is not by any means so well marked a type as the hero or the Communist. Even those notable Christians who have been canonized by the Roman Church represent an immense variety of personality and achievement, with differences as great as those between Saul who was called Paul, Henry of France and Francis of Assisi. The Reformed Churches are even more chary of defining the Christian or the Christian saint, and refuse to canonize anyone, leaving the Judgment Day to reveal who belongs to Christ and who does not. You can say that the Christians serve the same Lord or, more abstractly, that their lives have the same focus, or the same point of reference; but, since there is no party line to follow, but only a living Lord to serve, their lives tend to conform to no fixed pattern, but to be carried by the wind of the Spirit into ways bewildering even to their co-believers.

The fact is that the Christian Gospel, of its nature, introduces the men who believe it into a new range of experience and a new set of relationships, which are nothing like so easy of description as the this-worldly frame in which the life of the Stoic hero or the Communist is set. The Christian, by no native decision of his own, but by the irresistible compulsion to belief which is in the fact of Christ, is forced to acknowledge the visible world as one area only of the Realm of God. His horizons are widened to an invisible world, real to him in the measure of his faith in Christ, who reigns there with "a glorious company of angels, and the spirits of just men made perfect". Against that wider horizon the whole earth is in new perspective. Every detail and facet of it is in new and high relief, every human need of a new and terrible urgency: every human and natural beauty is irradiated as the gift of the Father, every human person of inestimable worth. The range of experience which is the familiar ground of the hero is wide open to the Christian, but he walks in it under obedience. He is as keen an anatomist of the body politic as the Communist, and, if need be, as drastic a surgeon, but, because of the worth he sets on every human cell of the body, his attitude is transformed from one of scientific ruthlessness to one of

patient tenderness, none the less strong for that. He is a man of strange scruples and equally bewildering recklessness: he is liable to be thought a bad party man, because the party line is drawn in the dimensions of the visible world, while he lives in the multi-dimensional Kingdom of God. Yet, for the party which truly serves justice, his loyalty will be given in costly ways and beyond normal endurance.

Not only is the Christian man's life grounded in heaven, in a humanly-incredible relationship of abasement and of exaltation, in a living allegiance to an invisible Lord, by whose love the whole earth and all men are glorified, but this side of heaven he is in a new set of relationships, more complex than those of the natural man. All the natural relationships he will take with utmost seriousness—to his kin, to his nation, and to the state which orders its life, and to the whole world of men to whom he has become strangely akin in Christ. But now the Church is his prime loyalty, for his bond to Christ brings him, as an organic member, into that true Church—"sometimes more and sometimes less visible"—which is the Body of Christ and never to be discerned, wherever its outward bounds may lie, apart from the visible unity of believing people around the witness of the Word and Sacraments. The dual loyalty he owes—to the Church, as the sign of his citizenship in heaven, and to the state, which is the sphere of his earthly service of his brethren—will be a recurrent irritation to those to whom this world is all, and worse than an irritation to the state which makes excessive claims and finds them straightly challenged. Yet this Christian, when he is true to his calling, is the salt of society, for it is by his traffic with heaven, in confession, intercession and obedience, that supernatural resources flow to maintain and transcend that justice which is always threatened by human sin.

In practice you will find him—and you ought to find him—where the hero and the Communist are to be found: serving in the midst of the world, in obscure and humble ways, after the fashion I have already spoken of, for his conversion to Christ does not separate, but binds him more closely in the normal stuff of human life. But the atmosphere of eternity

will be about him in his incapacity for resentment, his hatred of nothing but evil, his readiness to abide by the good cause, even when it is a lost cause, his contentment to submit to the judgment of Christ rather than to any human verdict—even "the verdict of history".

ANNOTATED BOOK LIST

(A number of these books are at present out of print but may be obtainable in libraries.)

1. WHAT COMMUNISM IS

A HANDBOOK OF MARXISM. Edited by Emile Burns (Gollancz, 5s.). *Contains all the essential Marxist documents.*

A TEXTBOOK OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM, by David Guest (Lawrence & Wishart, 2s.). *A good outline of the philosophy of Marxism.*

THE COMING STRUGGLE FOR POWER, by John Strachey (Gollancz, 5s.). *The best contemporary exposition of the economics of Marxism.*

THE NATURE OF CAPITALIST CRISIS, by John Strachey (Gollancz, 5s.). *Fuller and more technical.*

2. BIOGRAPHY

KARL MARX, by E. H. Carr (Dent, 12s. 6d.). *Should be compared with the next book by Beer.*

THE LIFE AND TEACHING OF KARL MARX, by M. Beer (Allen & Unwin, 3s. 6d.).

BIOGRAPHY OF KARL MARX. *The official biography published by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.*

MARX, by Isaiah Berlin (Home University Library, 3s. 6d.).

Biographies of Lenin are legion and could all be called partisan by those who disagreed with them.

3. CRITICISM (Chapter IV)

DARKNESS AT NOON, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE, THE YOGI AND THE COMMISSAR, by Arthur Koestler (Jonathan Cape, 8s. 6d. each).

CREATIVE SOCIETY, by John Macmurray (S.C.M. Press, 5s.).

THE CLUE TO HISTORY, by John Macmurray (S.C.M. Press, 7s. 6d.).

MARXISM: IS IT SCIENCE?, by Max Eastman (Allen & Unwin, 7s. 6d.).

THE NECESSITY OF COMMUNISM, THE NECESSITY OF PACIFISM, by J. Middleton Murry (Jonathan Cape, 3s. 6d. each).

THE DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY, by J. Middleton Murry (Jonathan Cape, 10s. 6d.).

4. CHRISTIAN COMMENTARY

BOLSHEVISM, by Waldemar Gurian (Sheed & Ward, 5s.). *A thorough treatment from the Roman Catholic point of view.*

CHRISTIANITY AND CLASS WAR, by N. Berdyaev (Sheed & Ward, 3s. 6d.).

THE END OF OUR TIME, by N. Berdyaev (Sheed & Ward, 3s. 6d.). *Berdyaev is a Russian philosopher, a Christian and an émigré. All his books treat of Marxism either directly or indirectly.*

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION (Gollancz, 6s.). *A symposium containing a great deal of valuable material including essays by John Macmurray.*