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
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*THE ENIGMA OF MENACE*

Sir Victor Goddard

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THE  
ENIGMA  
OF  
MENACE

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*Atlantic Books*

STEVENS & SONS LIMITED  
1959

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Stevens & Sons Limited  
1959

*To the Memory  
of  
H. M. T.  
who preferred to make friends  
of his enemies*

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## *Preface*

THIS preface is not concerned with the subject-matter of the book but is chiefly concerned to allay the ill-effects on the argument which could arise from religious susceptibilities of any kind.

The problems of peace and power present a difficulty for writers which did not exist before the days of Darwin and his disciple, Marx. Then, there was Authority—Authority unassailed by science though questioned by philosophers—in a set of human object-lessons framed in what was then undoubtedly *holy* writ. By those stories, human experience and feeling in any situation could be measured; they were there as Everyman's set of reference gauges, or guides to character and conduct. Most of those *Old Testament* down-to-earth and governmental stories were known from childhood throughout Jewry and Christendom; and half Islam knew them, too. They were the *lingua franca* and touchstone of moral judgment in the affairs of the known world—excluding the Orient, which could hardly be called “known.”

It cramps the style of Western writers on human problems of government and force to be debarred from using that handy tool-set of biblical analogues, but Darwin and Marx have made it *outré* to invoke “the Scriptures,” either way—for or against. It is immaterial that neither of those men, any more than the rest of us, really understood the hidden meanings of those stories, for those meanings have remained hidden. Indeed, the very obscurity of some of them is enough justification for dropping their use. But the point is

this: whereas the “authorised” meanings were, a century ago, universally authoritative and could be quoted as requisite without loss of intellectual respectability, nowadays one is not merely not expected to agree with them, one is expected not to *disagree* with them; “the Scriptures” are expected to be ignored altogether.

In defence against any charge of brashness in this matter it may be fair to urge that it is only in recent times that widely published works have given hitherto missing clues to the decyphering of esoteric parables. In the Tower of Babel story, to take the simplest example, the difference between building with stone and brick is the difference, when Man is trying to elevate himself on a solid basis of human reasoning to a higher plane of understanding, between employing fundamental truth, on the one hand, and a fabrication of fact, or artefact, on the other. Again, if “water” really is the code-word for “living truth” as distinct from what is “dead right” (stone or rock), there can be an altogether different meaning for Noah’s Flood.

Various kinds of people care very much: the Cataclysmists and those who trade in terror, care; so do the Fundamentalists—indeed *all* Deists care, and so do the oceanographers and . . . well, now you come to think of it, it *is* interesting! But, about the Deists, it is not so easy to cite acceptable exemplars of Deists as it is of Humanists. Deists have so many different gods. The Humanists, supposedly by Deists, have but one god—Man. Some Deists regard man as infinitely small and low, and their own concepts of God as infinitely long and high, so narrowness could be an inherent characteristic. Others take much wider, deeper views. Others

are frankly exclusive. So this difficulty about standards of values is by no means the prefatorial side-track it may have seemed to be at first sight.

Again, in any serious study of life and death, it is inevitable that the word God shall appear. But it is quite impossible for the *meaning* of that word to appear. And there will be no attempt, either in arrogance or in humility, to offer any opinion on the Truth concealed in that word. All that will be permitted is to call attention to opinions that have been expressed by others down the ages in regard to certain sacred concepts.

May the author, then, be pardoned for occasionally bringing the insights of the Scriptures to the aid of his arguments.

\* \* \* \*

The thoughts which are expressed in this book are offered as a stop-gap—something to tide-over a period of danger. It is clear that man does not understand the human situation in which he finds himself—and the author is no exception to that generalisation: man needs more clarification. It is becoming increasingly evident that that clarification is not likely to come through the intellect—not through books—but only by grace of insight, or inspiration, or example. Meanwhile, for practical purposes, it is necessary to have a holding-position which at least appeals to both heart and mind.

All this book attempts to do is to offer a point of view and suggest a policy—not for the West, particularly, but for any nation or coherent group of nations. If that policy is to be adopted it will have to be backed. *How* is not the subject of this study.

An American Senator, in the author's house many years ago, complained that the hardest friends to suffer gladly were those whose intellectual level was not up to the level of their sympathy; folk who tried to talk helpfully when they might better have held their tongues. He cited a lady to whom he said, in kind reproach for an outrageous statement: "Mary, my dear, do you *never* think before you speak?" To which Mary instantly replied with the unanswerable question: "How would I *know* what I think till I've heard what I've *said*?"

To discover what he really thinks is also necessary for the thinking man, especially when he comes to think about life and death, peace and war, radioactivity and nuclear weapons. He may not be able to *know* anything, but he can at least know what he thinks *should* be known. Maybe that is as good a reason for writing a book as for reading one. And if no book on one's own chosen subject exists, what is there to do but accept Hobson's choice, and write it oneself?

R. V. G.

BRASTED,  
KENT.  
September, 1959.

## *Acknowledgments*

MANY have given much that cannot be acknowledged because one is ignorant of their having given, or because of forgetfulness or whatever. I acknowledge the probability of shortcomings and error and hope that I may be forgiven for them. Many friends and others may recognise their own contributions: I beg them to believe me to be capable of gratitude.

# 1

## *Peace in Prospect*

It is always either before noon or after noon. That is a personal matter, depending upon where you are. Most of us like to divide our world into two in that kind of way. Left or right. High or low. Black or white. Hillsmen and plainsmen.

It is sufficient merely to make the contrast in order to reject it. In the end, whether you are free or bound, wise or foolish, confident or afraid, harsh or kind, is a subjective affair. All those states are matters of your own opinion. There is no freedom like the freedom of a jail for those who prefer that kind of life, as, indeed, some do. (Did not Bunyan, for one?) On the other hand, there are many who enslave themselves to controversy and discord while in the pursuit—as this book is—of agreement and harmony. It may be as well that that should be said before any controversial word is uttered.

The aim of this book is to discuss peace under menace, or the approach to peace through strength. There we have a trinity of pregnant words; *peace* implying a state of mind and of living, *through* implying a state of movement and progress, and *strength* implying a state of ready potency and power. The question is, upon which of those three states is it at this time most necessary to concentrate? And the answer at this time seems to be: on the one which is at the place where understanding is now most necessary, and that is at the place of power. For power is surrounded

by fear and fear is the chief inhibitor of understanding, the enemy of love and the frustrator of harmony. Yet, in some degree, fear is a necessity. Just as the pain sensation produced by our nerves is a necessity for the exercise of care in the preservation of our bodily members, so must there be some degree of menace-sensation in the nerve system of society if its members are to be preserved. This book is, therefore, concerned with menace—menace of all degrees, up to that of total extinction, as though a man were standing in danger, not with his life in his own hands, contemplating suicide, but at grips with an unknown adversary in the dark, the darkness being such that the man believes himself to be at the edge of a cliff about which he has been warned. Perhaps his greatest need is not for strength to overcome, but for the light of day. Then, he may see his true circumstances and the nature of his adversary. Perhaps, after all, it is time and grace that most are needed for his understanding and his overcoming? And perhaps the menace can prove to be benign?

The *throughness* of this book's approach is a recognition that the world in which we live is dynamic, not static. For we live in a world of continual change in which nothing stays put for ever: sooner or later, all falls to the ground and, like the stones at Stonehenge, has to be either resurrected or superseded. We are at this time experiencing the throughness of going through but not the throughness of being through. We have not reached that moment of throughness which comes to the mountaineer when, after ascending a mountain through swirling mist, he emerges above it all—that feeling of overcoming which thrills the airman, when suddenly the turbulence, invisibility and

menace in the clouds give way to the brilliant glory of that totally other world beyond.

We aim to arrive at a realm of total peace—the peace that comes like a new revelation when you are through. The concept of peace we have in mind is not a mere absence of conflict and strife in a world of war-minded nations and war-afflicted mentalities: the kind of peace we aspire to is a serenity of trust which is free from any shade of menace and can therefore only be found beyond the manifestations and mechanisms of military power. But that affirmation does not, alas, answer the question of power, and the *going through* power, nor does that definition of peace have practical relevance in a world of menace.

At this time we are under a shadow. The shadow of menace is at its blackest, and if its removal is a prerequisite for real peace, surely the only way to lift it is to reduce the scale of the pent-up forces of potential destruction.

It is at that point of departure that this book begins.

So much depends upon the ideas we hold about the world we seem to live in. Whether it is essentially one thing more than another: more mental than material, more spiritual than either, or whether it is a unity, a parable or just an enigma. Are the potential forces of destruction physical or mental? Are armaments themselves arranged in a scale of descending morality, or is the menace not rather in the accumulation of evil forces channelled by perverted minds? Is the reduction of the shadow to be achieved negatively by elimination of certain kinds of weapons, or is it to be achieved positively by a diffusion of more light, more understanding, more good will? Under what influences

*is the human spirit more likely to exert itself positively to remove its own burdens—under conditions which contain an element of fear—or under conditions which make no call upon man's courage to overcome? The answer to that question is conditioned by man's belief in the nature of man. The history of man is one of the spirit of man overcoming the nature of the beast, not of merely denying the nature of the beast and pretending that that is not man's historical background.*

At the present time, Western man in so-called Christian countries is sub-consciously, at least, in a state of apprehension if not of conscience-stricken fear. Well may he fear that by his support of the concept of menace and his acceptance in the last resort of the principle of strife, regardless of the possibility of its consequences being wholly and intolerably destructive, he is committed to a policy which is unethical and un-Christian. And he may feel that nag of doubt whether or not he himself has any particular allegiance to the Christian faith or, indeed, has any depth of understanding of its inner significance and tenets. Vaguely he may believe that God is Love. Mainly he would reject the idea that God is All.

The discussion of peace is apt to be unpeaceful. Man is not conditioned to peace: he is much more conditioned to the beast in man. He may be aware that the beast must be overcome; that essentially the lion must lie down with the lamb, but what source of wisdom can he surely look to for a guide to the practical course of action? Many voices answer at once, each with a different reply, and in a moment the seeker's mind becomes confused with the implications not of peace, but of war. For when peace is discussed

it is almost never against a background of known peace but against a background of known war or feared war. So the argument degenerates into measurements not of peace but of menace, not of life and fulfilment but of death and destruction.

A study of light does not immediately lead to a plunging into darkness; nor does an essay on love require hate to be written in every line. Why is it then that when we want to talk about winning peace, making peace, keeping peace, our minds almost immediately swing to the contemplation of coercion and strife, weapons and war. *Si vis pacem para bellum* (If you wish for peace, prepare for war) is the language of two thousand years of European civilisation. It has been the language of the nations of the West throughout the Christian Era.

That phrase—The Christian Era—seems to imply that there has been a prolonged period during which Christian thought has been dominant. It seems to imply also, that the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, in so far as they are accepted in the merely historical sense, have been correctly interpreted, clearly understood, widely accepted and generally followed. It seems further to refer to a non-existent civilisation in which altruistic and unemotional love has been the basis of all action: a period of history when there should have been no war: an era of peace. And if those appearances are all belied, as indeed they are, by the facts of history, the Christian reply is that that can only be because the doctrines of Christianity have been shamefully and deliberately disregarded. The greater probability is, however, that a number of important aspects of the doctrine have been misapplied or misunderstood. In particular, it seems to be necessary to

investigate again the Christian doctrine about the use of force. For it is certain that until a new understanding is found, or until a new enlightenment is received and systematised into a form that people generally will use for practical purposes as well as for spiritual development, the great majority of Christian people will adhere to what little they may have learned of orthodox Christianity in childhood, and that is a theology which is primarily related to "Gentle Jesus, meek and mild" and interpreted to mean much less than those words should mean. In the main, however, the Christian Era is no more than a name for a prolonged period of double thinking and frustrated idealism.

Although man is a weapon-using animal, he is also something quite otherwise. The most probable explanation of this other quality is that man is evolving, gradually. If the evolution is progressive the other-wisdom—the other-wisdom—of man will become more apparent. If it is regressive, reversion to animal, or extinction are the alternatives, and the experiment in this present phase will have found its completion in extinction.

Present appearances indicate that progression and regression are, as ever, happening together and that each, respectively, is accompanied by rising confidence, and rising fear. Those who are most confident are those who are most conscious of the higher sources of this world's power: the positive aspects. Those most afraid are chiefly aware of the lower resources of this world's power: the negative aspects. And there are many standing uneasily between confidence and fear, perplexed by the enigma of menace. It is to those who thus stand between that this book is chiefly addressed.

It is because of man's negativism about peace that the pages of this book wear the look of being leaves of yet one more book about war. But the book is not about *warfare*: it is not concerned with military strategy and tactics, nor with the conduct of war; it does not prognosticate about an imaginary Third World War. Indeed, the aim of the book is towards the prevention of war through inward conviction of war's futility for achieving any good purpose. So the book is really about order and patience and peace. But, as has already been said, it is also about strength and counter-menace, and it is addressed to those crusading humanitarians who deeply believe that prohibition of the possession of weapons of maximum menace will make their use in war less likely than it is now. It is addressed more particularly to active workers for disarmament than to those passive preservers of the *status quo* who are not appalled by the state of menace that now exists.

There are many, of all shades of opinion, who want the United Kingdom to renounce her existing obligations to her allies without those allies, more especially the United States, renouncing their agreed defence obligations to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. Such people are not likely to be readers of this book. But how desirable it is that they should recognise that defence is not war, nor weapons; but that it is basically a dedicated state of mind and that defence is an allegiance in strength for holding peace, not strife.

## 2

### *War in Retrospect*

THE past sixty years have been, almost continuously, years of war and rumours of wars; more so, it seems, than ever before. Reasons of all kinds are offered and accepted for turbulence in social and national relationships. Depending upon your slant of mind you may be convinced that the causes of war spring from economic unbalance, from warmongering cartels, from religious intolerance, wickedness in high places, intransigence of the proletariat, the peculiarities of the relative motions of planets and stars, man's lust, or God's wrath. Or you can side with those who see mankind as the puppets of external forces of evil, as the exploited dupes of ruthless men-behind-the-scenes, or as the victims of the folly of their own cumulative aggressiveness, waywardness, or vanity. But of all the causes of war that can be cited, the one which most easily gains credence as the "real" cause of war is the existence of powerful armaments in the hands of militarist governments. The cause of war that is most seldom cited as a major cause of war is the appearance of weakness as viewed through the eyes of an ambitious enemy when contemplating the object of his envy.

It must be admitted at once that, without a shadow of doubt, two world wars have supervened upon periods when the rate of build-up of armaments was phenomenal and when at least one of the governments concerned was pursuing an essentially militarist policy

for gaining political objectives by the threat of force, if not by overt aggression.

Against this truth must be laid two facts. The long reign of international peace known as the *pax Britannica* which prevailed through most of the nineteenth century is attributed by historians to that great deterrent to military action which existed, all over the world, in the might of the British Navy. For those who hold that great military power makes for war, that is one contrary fact. The other is the well-accepted historical fact that Britain's role in Europe for three hundred years was to contrive, amongst powerfully armed nations, to maintain a balance of power which, *only when it failed*, broke down into war. For while that balance was maintained it acted as a perpetual guardian of that kind of peace which, although often little better than an absence of actual warfare, fostered great cultural and economic human advances which made for international development and wider human sympathies.

The historical inferences to be drawn from the study of armies and armaments are twofold. First, it is clear that war between sovereign nations does not occur when major military menace inhibits aggression, or when a stable balance of major Powers is seen to exist. Secondly, the concept of balance-of-power has now lost the meaning it held before the days of aerial bombs, when power for conquest could be measured and balanced in terms of thousands or millions of armed men. Stalemate, not balance, is the state produced by the existence of megaton bombs, and there can be no measure of balance as between man-power and bomb-power. All that can be safely said about balance now is that there is a balance of awe—a

balance of menace. There is certainly not a balance of *power*—for power is a capacity to *do* something, to make or create or achieve something by design. Menace is not creative, it is simply prohibitive. And the question which must be answered is: is it a good thing that sheer menace should take the place of power for conquest?

The Soviet-Communist, the Hitler-Nazi and—in Soviet eyes—the American-Capitalist bids for world dominance have each held some supposed possibility of enabling a single nation to control world policy. But throughout all these latter years of struggle the persistent striving by the United Kingdom, in peace and war, for some kind of balance of menace has shown the United Kingdom to be a stabilising influence in a fermenting world. Twice in world wars the achievement of some form of balance has averted a prospect of world subjection to a single nation. Since the United Kingdom ceased to hold the position she held in the nineteenth century there has been no real prospect of a repetition of a world-wide dominance by a single great Power; no prospect of a single nation maintaining, by the menace of deterrence, unilaterally and over a long period an existing state of peace. Apart from a brief period when it seemed possible that the sole possession of nuclear weapons might give the role of sole arbiter of peace to the United States, the twentieth century has until recently witnessed little else in that context but the precarious balance of menace, and the influence of that menace upon the conduct of a number of local and limited small wars. Latterly the balance of menace, such as it has been, has had the effect not of totally preventing war but of stultifying its purposes. None of the five wars fought

since the termination of the Second World War has, in fact, achieved the objectives of any of the contestants: all five have ended in a minor readjustment only of the *status quo ante*: none has proved to be "worth while," politically. If war experience in the atomic age is taken as a pointer to the future, it can only be an encouraging pointer, for it points conclusively to the futility of war as a means for achieving positive political advantage. But it now seems that this futility of war as a means of policy is the consequence of there being an overall balance of major menace. For in every case from Korea to Suez hostilities conducted with so-called conventional weapons have, almost each time more rapidly than the last, been brought to an end by the pressure of major menace. Whether this has been advantageous or not may be disputed, but whether it should be encouraging to those who believe that war is a reliable medium through which to pursue political advantage is hardly now in question.

In another chapter we will be considering whether "conventional" war has any rival attractions for humanity and whether the conventions should be pitched at a level of lethality which was common practice in war at the end of the Second World War or since. But at this moment we need to give retrospective attention to the most unconventional war of recent times fought, however, with strictly conventional weapons to an ignominious standstill—a standstill which was enforced by the now conventional threat of the use of unconventional weapons by outsiders; that is to say, by major nuclear menace.

The Suez war was at first a preventive war in which, almost without bloodshed and by a brilliant

tactical surprise, Israel frustrated an impending invasion by Egypt. Then it became a war in which the United Kingdom and France, forcing a halt upon the victorious Israeli army, set about securing the Suez Canal. Finally, it was a cold war fought by unlikely "allies," the Soviet Union and the United States, to stop the United Kingdom and France from regaining the control of the Suez Canal seized from them by Egypt. Thus the Suez war was a war to stop a war, to stop a war, to stop a war! And it stopped. It was stopped by nuclear weapons in being.

In effect, Suez was a war in which France and the United Kingdom fought to prevent Egypt from being deprived of the Suez Canal by Israel! That is a fact which is not commonly admitted to be a fact, it is so controversial and paradoxical. As ever, in matters of war it is difficult to get the facts correctly aligned. In this particular case it is particularly important to clarify the facts, for the Suez war contains lessons of profound significance which deserve to be known free from all prejudice, if only that were possible. We need to go back to an earlier starting-point to see the Suez event in truer perspective.

By various means, chief of which was the financial and moral support coming out of the United States, the mandated territory of Palestine, already agreed to be a national home for Jews, became translated into the independent Republic of Israel. Thus the United Kingdom became, for the second time, politically responsible for a major affront to the prospective unity of an exclusively Arabian Middle East, and Israel became the common phobia of the Middle-Eastern countries and their only practicable common focus for joint action. The Nasser-Arab plan, with the aid of

the Soviet Union's armaments, was that there should be a concentric attack on Israel by Egypt, Syria and Jordan, when all three were ready to act together. Egypt got her Soviet-equipped armoured forces first, so she was ready first. Under Soviet advice her two newly equipped armoured divisions were deployed; the first, in *offensive* tactical positions close to the borders of Israel for invasion, and the second, in *defensive* tactical positions close to the borders of Cyrenaica, whence it was expected that the United Kingdom could counter-invade to re-secure the recently seized Suez Canal.

Neither Jordan nor Syria was ready with its re-armed forces when Egypt took up her positions for attack on Israel.

Seeing that the intentions of Egypt were clearly aggressive, and that, once launched into action, Israel would be powerless to destroy armoured forces of that magnitude and strength, Israel consulted with the French on the crucial point of aggression. Israel asked France to say whether the Egyptian deployment of tanks, aimed at the heart of Israel, was an aggressive deployment, or not? In the view of the French, it was. Was there, Israel then asked, any chance of the existing Israeli Army being able to stop the Egyptians once they got going into the attack? In the view of the French there was no chance. If, then, the Israeli Army cut off the petrol supplies of the offensively poised Egyptian armoured division by an encircling movement through the desert, and if, later, the matter came before the Security Council, would France say, on behalf of Israel, that the action was defensive and not aggressive? The French agreed that they would

say in the Security Council that the action was defensive.

Now that was the "collusion" of the French with the Israelis about which there was so much speculation without answer. And that was the plan of action which the Israelis put into effect. They swiftly made their way through the supposedly impenetrable soft-sand desert to the south of the Egyptian deployment on hard desert land and cutting behind the sleeping Egyptian armoured division, destroyed in the rear its supplies of fuel. And before the Franco-British forces had moved in to quell the incipient war, the Egyptian armoured division had succumbed, almost without firing a shot, to the encircling column of Israeli light-transport infantry. Meanwhile, other Israeli forces moved up to the Suez Canal and would have been over it and on to Cairo, unopposed, but for the Franco-British ultimatum. Thus the Suez Canal, and probably Egypt itself, was rescued from capture by Israel, and the canal (contrary to all intention) preserved for the country that had both taken it by force (unopposed) and blocked it while believing it must be lost to them. And that preposterously paradoxical result was secured by the equally paradoxical alliance of pressures exerted upon the United Kingdom by the Soviet Union and by the United States.

The nuclear deterrent worked. The United Kingdom was deterred. How much the deterrent effect was due to external pressure and how much was due to internal pressure of fear, public opinion or second thoughts is still a moot point. But for broad historical purposes the cold war from the United States and the Soviet Union prevailed upon the United Kingdom and thence upon France and upon Israel, and, last,

upon the apparent first aggressors, Egypt. Thus ended that war to stop war. The *status quo ante* was restored with loss of great treasure and prestige but with relatively little loss of life.

There seem to be four main points to observe in this most unconventional war. The first point, to recapitulate, is that five Powers each acting independently of the United Nations Organisation acted successively to destroy a war at three different levels. First, Israel acted to immobilise Egyptian forces poised to strike. Secondly, France and the United Kingdom acted to frustrate the incipient war between Israel and Egypt. Thirdly, the Soviet Union and the United States acted independently to destroy the incipient war between the alliance of the United Kingdom with France against Egypt, and this was most effectively achieved by menace and its consequences in fear.

The second point is that aggression is a matter of overt intention not necessarily of overt action. It is aggression to array in fighting formation (and with every other manifestation of intention, including belligerent propaganda and intimidation) invasion forces beyond the defensive powers of the country threatened. Demands posed upon the fact that the invasion forces arrayed were but one of three enemy armies in a planned three-to-one encirclement constituted aggression. Aggression therefore consists primarily in overt intention presented as threat backed by forces poised for the execution of the threat and ostensibly capable of achieving it. Against that kind of aggression the United Nations Organisation had not then the power to act effectively. So, on the facts as they have been proved to be, and setting aside those prejudices which exist in regard to Israel's past history, who can honestly

arraign Israel for her purely defensive action in cutting out the fuel supplies of her avowed enemy and intending destroyer? What else, short of a nuclear counter-threat (had Israel possessed any such menace of her own to wield) could frustrate a sudden and swift armoured invasion of Israel under cover of darkness? No wonder Israel aspires, now, to hold weapons of maximum menace as the only sure means of neutralising Nasser's repeated threats and continuing plans for Israel's extermination.

Thirdly, the action of the United Kingdom and France was, rightly or wrongly, to frustrate the Israeli-Egyptian War. It is easy, and justifiable, to say that that action was solely to regain control of the Suez Canal. But manifestly, whatever may have been the ulterior motives, the stated motive was justified and fulfilled: the Israeli-Egyptian War *was* stopped and the *status quo* in fact *was* restored. It is by no means certain what would have happened had Israel at that time conquered Egypt as she well might have done after her miraculous David-and-Goliath victory in the desert.

Finally, the nuclear menace was invoked and was decisive in its effect upon the United States no less than upon the United Kingdom. But whether or not that menace alone would have deterred the United Kingdom, its effect on the United States was sufficient to make that country really hostile towards the action of the United Kingdom, and that was what was finally decisive.

In all the tangle of national passions and national divisions the United Nations Organisation played a part—a part, let it be noted, that was entirely ineffective in removing the latent Egyptian aggression on Israel;

a part that remained entirely ineffective until the fighting had been halted by the independent action of individual national governments.

The Suez war may prove to have been the last of the series of international wars fought under the shadow of the nuclear deterrent, for since each has successively and rightly been brought to an ignominious and inglorious halt, it must be seen that war as a means to an end can no longer be expected to produce the desired result. If there is anything else in that painful episode for which every one may rightly feel especially grateful it need not only be for the fact that maximum menace ended the fighting, it could also be for the fact that the whole episode *looked* so futile and inglorious. That is the look that aggression-made war should always be seen to wear. And the appearance that counter-aggression had perhaps best be seen to carry is not one of triumph but of humility. It has, on the whole, had that appearance in the United Kingdom.

And now one last point about war in recent retrospect.

It is highly important that everyone who discusses war should know what is being denounced when war is denounced as folly or as crime.

#### What *is* war?

Invasion itself does not constitute war. Invasion and threat of invasion constitute aggression, unless that invasion or the threat of it is a proper response to outright aggressive incitement to defence against mortal danger. Invasion may or may not be resisted by force: until it actually is resisted there is no war. Even then, the resistance of the defender by force does not constitute war if, in fact, his opposition causes the

aggressor to desist from his aggression and withdraw. War is constituted when the aggressor, not having been deterred by the menace of opposition, brings his weapons into action against the resistance of the defender. It is then, at that third stage, that the aggressor confirms himself as the war-maker and creates a state which *is* war. In such a war, it is not the defender who is engaged in folly, it is the aggressor who is committing the folly of being a war-maker and the crime of seeking to wrest advantage by force of arms.

War is a state of fighting made by at least one persistent aggressor: or it may be made by two or more opposed aggressors. Commonly it is said that it always takes two to make a war and the usual implication of that catch-phrase is that the two parties to the fighting are equally culpable for the breach of peace. It is probable that neither is without fault in the matter, but it is certain that both are not *equally* culpable, for there is no absolute equality in creation, not even in split hairs. There is always a greater and a lesser even although sometimes none can distinguish for certain which is which. A safer and less invidious statement than that it takes two to make a war is that it takes *three*—three stages: aggression, resistance to aggression, and persistence in aggression. In that matter the major aggressor is he who in his heart is most determined to produce a situation in which, by force if necessary, he can aspire to gain positively for himself more in his own appraisal of value than he bargains or fears to lose. It is that assessment of relative gain by force which demarcates, for all but the true pacifist, the line between relative right and wrong, placing the defender in the right and making the war for him a righteous war. And he will do well to

remember that righteousness is a relative term with no absolute validity. Defensive war, then, can be seen as a virtue when it swiftly compels the aggressor to reassess negatively his prospects of gain and to see the greatest advantage in ceasing to fight. Defensive war can make no claim to virtue when it is half-hearted in fierceness and proficiency, for then it only makes the course of evil longer and its havoc deeper. It is better to give in unless you are going to go all-out.

In this discussion it is essential to be clear and accurate about the meanings of words. *Resistance*, for instance. We have seen that resistance which merely opposes, statically, may perhaps succeed in halting aggression. But that is rare. Where there is no menace behind the resistance it does not repel. Resistance which is static and has no apparent capability of dynamic force will never deter. No wonder that such resistance is ethically despicable. What deters is forceful determination. Hence, resistance must be prepared in tooth and claw to overcome dynamically the evil of aggression with the good forces of courage, determination and strength. And the ethical question then arises, to what extent and in what circumstances does menace constitute a fulfilment of divine law in the matter of overcoming?

The purpose of the next chapter is to examine the ethics of defence in this context. The concern of this present discussion is to establish that in any war the aggressor and not the defender is automatically in the wrong, that there is no virtue in static resistance which cannot become dynamic, and that because of the deterrent force of "the great deterrent" no aggressive war fought since the Second World War has been effective in changing the *status quo*.

Whether or not those three points have been established, it has certainly not been established that the existence of the great deterrent has prevented the outbreak of highly dangerous wars and it may be concluded from that fact that deterrence, with swift mobility, is needed at all levels in the scale of force if, indeed, it is required that *all* warfare must be totally prohibited for the sake of the best interests of all concerned.

For it is clear that the remote menace of major nuclear weapons among the Great Powers does not deter China, for instance, from involving small countries in a fringe region, such as Laos, in warfare. In such cases, perhaps deliberately engineered for other purposes, deterrence of a different order is required. And when war operations are actually in progress, deterrence from the aggravation and continuance of those operations by the application of local menace-dissuasion upon the aggressor, needs to be put into effect instantly. But that is a highly theoretical matter which is well beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to say that, hitherto, all attempts to compel "virtue" by forcibly compelling external conformity with sectional predilections for moral conduct have, throughout history, chiefly succeeded in fostering the opposite of the "virtue" desired. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that war is the negation of civilisation and therefore remarkably inappropriate among civilised people. The focus, then, is upon civilisation and the place of military menace amongst civilised nations.


# 3

## *Human Feeling and Menace*

### *Humanists and Deists*

THERE is no end to diversity. And if, as is usually supposed, there is purpose in diversification—in the infinity of variety which exists in nature even among things which seem at first sight to be identical—why should the desire to secure uniformity of opinion be so prevalent in human relationships? Perhaps the clue to the answer is in the question. Uniformity seems to promise security and strength. Paradoxically, however, the belief that uniformity makes for strength is constantly belied in the realms of the human spirit. In the pattern of life music can be discerned amid the chaos of becoming, of being and growing and living and dying and becoming again. And in music there is infinity of variation; of melody, discord, harmony, unison—but little of monotone.

Those who are chiefly concerned about the enigma of menace are also concerned about the welfare of mankind. They may be actuated by compassion or by fear, by affinity, by a sense of order, by tradition or prejudice or logic or philosophy. They may be religious, agnostic, pacifist, rebellious, authoritarian, subservient, fearful, mystical, astrological—they may be of any persuasion or none but they all have one common feeling, that there is a need to foster the fruitful progress of mankind. Beyond that point there may be no other point of general agreement—certainly none



on the assertion that war is wholly inimical to the progress of mankind.

With so great a diversity of opinions and beliefs it may seem impossible to make any simple division into two categories which will represent satisfactorily the whole range of people who are seriously concerned about human feeling and menace. It would certainly not be helpful to suppose that categories must necessarily be antagonistic; they could well be complementary, like male and female, or left and right, but the idea of opposition cannot be extinguished: it has to be accepted and understood.

It could be argued that all who are really concerned with this problem are equally really religious but only in the sense that they believe in some concept of life and humanity and are tied *to* that belief or *by* that belief, willingly or by some compulsion. For religion is that which ties or binds the mind of man to an allegiance, and it implies an allegiance to authority which itself is a source or reservoir of power. But by common understanding religion normally means an allegiance to a system of beliefs relating to a spiritual power unseen which can be mystically discerned as benign, transcendent and yet immanent—altogether beyond but altogether within.

And that shows the parting of the ways between the Deists and the Humanists. All world religions postulate what is postulated in the Christian faith. They may postulate also what is not in the Christian faith but will not quarrel with the main tenets of that faith. And all Humanists postulate what is postulated in dialectical materialism. They may postulate also what is not in dialectical materialism but will not quarrel with the main tenets of that philosophy.

Probably the four most potent and "successful" religions the world has known in all its recorded history are those which have been successively represented, first, out of ancient mythologies, by the Jews as interpreted or "fulfilled" by Jesus of Nazareth and later formulated into Christianity; by Buddha, a prince in India 500 years before Christ, and translated into Buddhism; by Mahommet and established as Islam within 500 years after Christ; and, latterly, an ancient pragmatism restated by Karl Marx, a nineteenth-century emigré in England, and now established worldwide in the names of Communism and Materialism. For simplicity and for western thought it is convenient to represent the foregoing systems, together with all the other unnamed varieties of religion, as being divisible into two categories which are greatly, but differently, concerned with human feeling and menace. Arbitrarily, these categories can be called Deist and Humanist. They might otherwise have been called, more narrowly and exclusively, Christian and Materialist, but the latter names have stronger overtones of prejudice and tighter bonds of limitation than the former.

Humanists, regarded broadly, may be said to be those who believe in the external Republic of Man and the theory that to realise that republic society must be thoroughly reorganised. Deists are those who believe in the eternal Kingdom of God and the concept that to realise that kingdom man must be individually and inwardly reborn. Humanists believe in evolution and revolution. Deists believe in evolution and a kind of involution. The beliefs of both categories are, of course, much wider than is here stated and both have regard to a potential or inherent unity in mankind either of man's designing or of God's design. Both,

as regards temporal life, hold to similar standards in ethics: in matters regarding death they diverge. But the main divergence comes at the point where Deists postulate, in their calculations of purpose and meaning, the eternal life of the soul, while Humanists will allow no more than the finite life of mind and body. The majority of Deists, however, seem to find themselves disinclined to accept spiritualist or reincarnationist attitudes of mind which take temporal, worldly account of personalities continuing, after death, to have active participation in the affairs of this temporal world. This means that for all practical purposes, Humanists and Deists are agreed about the paramount importance of justice, preferably immediate justice, in human affairs. Speaking generally, they decline to accept the proposition that justice is *not* the major concern of mankind and is *not* the major criterion of conduct by which man can be distinguished from the animal world: they hold that it is, or must be made to be. Hence the Christian injunction, "Judge not that ye be not judged," is one of the least regarded of all Christian precepts. The western world is so immersed in the tradition of material progress that it cannot avoid paying the price of that tradition. For that reason, Humanists and Deists are both materialists—the Deists because they cannot help it even although they hardly admit it. Newton, who invented the word gravity, is held to have proved that material is the source of its own power of attraction, that its power of attraction caused stars, suns, planets and their satellites to come into ordered shape and motion; *thereafter* came life in vegetable and animal forms evolving into sentient, mental creatures,

themselves creative of tools, languages, arts and images, and eventually of gods.

By that order of events, beauty and truth and divinity come *after* and *out of* material, and God is made for man. But Newton said no such thing: he said the opposite. He declared that the source of all was spiritual. Had he, instead of mathematically postulating gravity as the god of material conduct and creativity, persisted with his prior thought that every natural phenomenon is more related to a vortex than to a lode-stone, the materialism in which we now live might have been more aligned to the deism of Newton's own beliefs. For his rejection of the vortex principle there is a very human explanation: Newton is said to have disliked the misuse Descartes had already made of that idea, by which he had put it into public disrepute.

Darwin, following the tradition of Newtonian cosmology—though not following the spiritual philosophy of Newton—postulated the evolution of man out of animal, and thereby undermined the Genesis story of creation—the generally accepted basis of the Christian faith. He discarded the missing link offered by his precursor in the theory of evolution, Alfred Russel Wallace, whose particular inspiration was that mankind was potentially raised to his superiority above the world of animals not merely by physical and intellectual evolution but by divine infusion of the celestial soul of Man into simian minds and bodies. That influx—that spark of God—brought with it, Wallace declared, a consciousness of the spiritual source of life and was, and still is, the essential factor which eternally distinguishes the consciousness of man from the consciousness of animals. And that, said Wallace,

constitutes man's title to lordship in this world. As the idea of the higher, divine influx into the consciousness of man was rejected by Darwin, no wonder that same concept, and all "religion" with it, was also rejected by Darwin's most famous disciple, Karl Marx. Marx's contributions to human thought and the idea of human dignity are undoubtedly stupendous, but on the negative side, also stupendous, Marx's chief claim to fame is that he disallowed not only the idea of the human soul, let alone the priority of claim of the human soul over all other worldly claims, but also the existence of any purpose in creation. In that matter, at least, Marx is now represented by that doyen of Humanists, Bertrand Russell, who with courage and humour snaps his fingers at eternity and affects to accept permanent death as the final lot of man and, paradoxically, as his source of life initially. It is necessary to have the Bertrand Russell standpoint clear, for Bertrand Russell is the mental leader of millions of modernist materialists with profound humanitarian sympathies. Among men of English tradition the two thinkers who perhaps most objectively represent the categories of Deist and Humanist are Wallace and Russell.

Deists, represented in this country chiefly by churchmen of widely varying opinions, but also by would-be Christians of all kinds, falteringly hold the view that we are all members one of another, bound together by a love-wisdom which is often conspicuous by its disruption. Most of them are vaguely aware that there is a terrible dichotomy in their assertions about the Will of God and War.

That Christians should go to war "righteously," in face of all that they believe was said by Jesus about

the merits of pacifism, is incredible to pacifists and to many who are by no means pacifist. For Jesus, to orthodox Christians, is not only the Christ, the Living Son of God; he is the spiritual body of Christianity. What he said on the subject of strife surely is clear and final—or should be for Christians.

Now, as all Christians know, Jesus is credibly reported to have said, in Aramaic, words which mean “Love your enemies, bless them which persecute you, render to no man evil for evil. Do unto others as you would they should do unto you. If a man strike you, turn the other cheek. He that liveth by the sword shall perish by the sword. Thou shalt not kill. Blessed are the meek and the peace-makers.” And not only did he say such words, he evidently lived, and died, by those precepts. For, although manifestly capable of freeing himself from every kind of privation and anxiety that befell him in life, he chose to accept, “that the scriptures might be fulfilled,” the most degrading, dismal, terribly painful and disappointing death which could be conceived, rather than give the slightest appearance of being untrue to his inward convictions of the Will of the Deity within him and of his appointed role of fulfilment.

From the point of view of the true Christian that may seem to be a coldly objective statement of fact. But this book is not written specifically for Christians; it is written for people who may know little and care less about religious organisations, as much as for those who are in them. And there are other facts, which must now be brought into the discussion of the Christian viewpoint about menace and even about actual fighting. Equally, they need to be stated

without special regard for religiously conventional attitudes of piety and reverence of externalised kinds.

### *Christianity and Force*

Two propositions in particular perhaps most need to be borne in mind when relating the subject of this book to Christianity. The first is the virtual certainty that, in claiming that he "came to fulfil the law" of the Jews, not that he came to make new laws, Jesus was talking in the poetry of parable. This needs illustrating with an example of a poetical parable—or miracle if you prefer. At Cana, initiating the teaching of his mission, Jesus showed his purpose as being, initially, to fill vessels of *stone* (i.e., of Truth, e.g., the ten-commandments-in-stone) with clear *water* (of Truth—the living Truth for living) and that subsequently he would also be the transformer of the *water* of earthly-living Truth into *wine* (of heavenly-living, transcendent Truth). Those who have read it will recall that in that parable-miracle at Cana, the wine provided was astonishingly super-abundant and gracious.

All that, for those who can take it, is a parable about the creation of man and the subsequent creation of a higher consciousness which passes human understanding but can be mystically known in some measure by those to whom the experience—the grace—of Heavenly Truth is given.

The receiving of that *wine* can be one of the signs of re-birth. It can be the initiation of the mystical experience of the new man. A slow process but, eventually, a necessary one—or so Christians believe.

The second proposition is that the esoteric teaching

of Jesus was specifically not concerned with "Kingdoms of this world." This was declared on various occasions. It was most notably declared at the end of that hasty, tripartite trial before the Crucifixion, in which the Jewish ecclesiastical authority, the Edomite shaikh, Herod, puppet king of a province of Palestine, and the Roman Imperial Governor in Jerusalem, Pilate, all took part. Perceiving the kingliness of Jesus, an impression which he later recorded on the crucifixion cross, Pilate asked: "Why, if you are a King, do not your servants fight for you?" The answer he received was: "If my kingdom were of this world then would my servants fight that I be not delivered to the Jews." That was about the last thing that Jesus said to Authority, and it seems also to be about the last thing that Christians really consider. The clear inference to be drawn is that in the affairs of this world's governance—"the things of Caesar" as Jesus called them, as distinct from the inward relationship of the individual human and spiritual being to God and man—there was a proper place for the use of force negatively, for prevention. Jesus had already declared that there was no place for force in the worship of God, spiritually. And he had also shown that there was place—in the Gentile exterior of the Temple, at least—for the use of physical and mental force violently and negatively in the "kingdoms" of that cosmopolitan world. Indeed, that Temple incident was part of the legal justification for the Crucifixion.

Many Christians sincerely hold that Jesus discredited altogether the existence of "kingdoms of this world" as being no longer necessary once men came to understand and apply the doctrine of the Kingdom of Heaven, and began living in the belief that eternal

peace and felicity are potentially *within* every man alive. This is the main stumbling block in all religions. It is to do with Time. It is the problem of time and timelessness: eternity. Meanwhile (*i.e.*, *temporally*) we have to consider the validity of worldly power in the mind of Jesus. Seemingly, it needs to be judged in the light of other statements and contacts which Jesus is reported to have made during his short period of public life.

Students of the more acceptable (Gospel) accounts of the doings and sayings of Jesus will recall his pleasure at the attitude of a certain Roman army officer whose servant was ill and for whose cure he invoked a word of healing power from Jesus. What drew the particular commendation of Jesus was the Centurion's prayer, "Speak the word only and my servant shall be healed. For I also am a man set under Authority." The Centurion knew what could be done when one was submissive to, and the agent of, a great and higher source of power. Did Jesus have feelings of disapprobation of that soldier's calling, as a soldier? Evidently not. Nor did he have any fault to find with their profession when confronted with Roman soldiers of the army of occupation in Palestine. Yet he foresaw that that army would eventually destroy the Jewish system in Palestine and the Jewish Temple at Jerusalem. Indeed, it was that thought of war in the unholy Holy Land and, in particular, the destruction of Jerusalem which brought him to tears. The pathos was not in the Roman military suppression of Jewish insurrection but in his own countrymen's rejection of their spiritual opportunity and heritage. How eloquent is that peculiarly English expression of exasperation at stupidity, *Jesus wept!*

From all accounts, up to and including his final arrest, Jesus seems not to have been opposed to the maintenance of law and order under the menace of military power. And when with clairvoyance he "saw" Jerusalem in the ruination of war, he was not so much concerned with the external effects of war and destruction as with the internal ignorance of the victims about what "belonged to their peace." Had they but known, they would not have let political aspirations produce that fatal state of insurrection which led to suppression by the forces of law and order and the bloody destruction of their nation.

If it is difficult for Christians to hold a definite opinion about the ethics of war, it need not be difficult to hold a clear and consistent view about the attitude of Jesus towards menace. His comments upon menace in Jewish law and tradition are illuminating. But like all codified systems of law which inevitably become archaic as times and manners change, Jewish law was found by its critics to be full of inconsistencies. Jesus was therefore often put on the spot about the supposed conflict with the law which his teachings implied. It is too easily ignored that Jesus habitually quoted to the "lawyers" some one or other of the less familiarly known passages of existing Hebrew law which they could themselves have known; he was not then giving new teaching. Nor do most Christians know, or like to admit, that much of what is claimed as being essentially novel in the teaching of Jesus was, in fact, a weaving of quotation of existing and recorded Jewish wisdom. Hebrew scholars maintain, for instance, that every phrase in "The Lord's Prayer" was drawn from earlier documents available to the Jews as

officially adopted scripture. Maybe that claim is not wholly justifiable. But it is certainly true to some significant extent.

### *Christianity and Punishment*

In law, menace is inherent. All law-enforcement involves menace. There must be penalties, not for the sake of inflicting "justly merited" pain, nor to bar "unmerited" freedoms, but to deter. Alas, the infliction of penalties, whose true purpose is not to injure anyone, injures not only those punished but also those who inflict the penalties. The self-injury done to the inflictor is subtle, it appears in various forms: resentment, vindictiveness, pride of power, self-righteousness, disdain, sadism, remorse, separation, fear of revenge. To make matters worse, the inflictor of punishment magnifies his own share of the punishment by not perceiving that the justification for inflicting suffering upon another is *not* that it is socially necessary thus to uphold the principle of deterrence, but rather is it to mark the failure of deterrence in that instance. In short, the deterrent was not a real deterrent for the culprit; seeing him punished may make the deterrent real for all concerned.

Of the victim of punishment it can be said—and often is said with needless asperity—that he is responsible for his own ills. Especially is that so when his trouble comes from non-acceptance and not mere ignorance of the necessity for a system of menace-deterrence. It may be cold comfort to him that the suffering he bears is not borne as retribution but as a living example for the sake of all those others who might go the same way.

The known, but not popularly practised, law for the amelioration of the psychological effects of punishment on both the inflictor and the victim is the human or, if you prefer, divine law of forgiveness. That was the law of atonement in ancient Jewish times. It was not novel in the teaching of Jesus. The “novelty” in this matter was not one of doctrine, it was that Jesus *practised* continual forgiveness and demonstrated its efficacy for healing injuries of a psychological, and hence bodily, kind.

In these days of hazy, spoilt-childish Christianity, it has become common to suppose that forgiveness can be or should be a substitution for the infliction of penalty; that it should be a remover of the need for menace. What is ignored is that forgiveness is simply a healing grace, as much for the victim of crime as for the criminal himself. It anneals and resolves those dangerous bendings of spiritual force which spring from resentment and malice.

The law of appropriate penalty which is guaranteed to knock the dividend out of apprehended crime is the old Jewish law, “An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” That law was quoted by Jesus as an archaic law. But it was neither challenged nor refuted by him. Had he not said that his purpose was to fulfil the law? —to complete it? His proposed completion of the act of punishment, on both sides of the case, whatever was the legal penalty, was forgiveness—to assuage the mental reverberations of crime and punishment. “Forgive your enemies” like “love your enemies” surely is concerned with a mental attitude to their mentality, or lack of it; a spiritual attitude to their spirituality, or

lack of it; it is not an injunction to remove the penal menaces provided by the law.

The appeal for forgiveness, to "fulfil" the deficiency of love in the harshness of penalty and to complete the purpose of the law (which is peace), is simply an appeal for human and divine understanding. There is no basis for the popular "gentle-Jesus" ideal being represented as excess of leniency. Nor will it do to imply that Jesus was namby-pamby about menace. "Whosoever shall say unto his brother, 'Thou fool!' shall be in danger of Hell-fire." There's a hell-fire statement for those who may be interested. It may be urged that, again, Jesus was quoting "the language of stone." But the writer, St. Matthew, asserts that that hell-fire remark was an original threat by Jesus himself in contrast to a much less menacing quotation of law which preceded it. The remark may have been intended to shock by its disproportion; it may have meant that the menace-deterrence against intemperate judgment is a burning remorse which remains until extinguished by forgiveness. But, as written, it is a merciless hell-fire threat. In some respects and on some occasions Jesus displayed characteristics of thought which, to the objective student of scripture, though not to the mentally conditioned Christian, do not exclude him from the hell-fire category—the men-of-menace. Evidently, however, that is not inimical to his being also, and fully, a man of love. The Centurion would certainly have understood that duality.

### *Christianity and Hate*

It may be more difficult for Christians to be sure about the attitude of Jesus to the use of power for destruction.

There is the enigmatic case of the miraculous withering of a fig tree which was found to be without figs when it should have been bearing last year's fruit. There is the incident of the destruction of a herd of swine. And there is the history of the scene of violence in the Temple when Jesus, taking the law into his own hands and armed with a weapon of his own making—a whiplash of cord—caused, and personally led, the destruction of the cosmopolitan currency exchange and the market for sacrificial animals established with priestly consent in the Court of the Gentiles, creating thereby what is described as a headlong scene of chaotic disorder. Of course it can be urged that the chaos and strife aspects of this incident are recorded *only* in the Gospel of St. John. But St. John's is the most intimate and loving gospel of the four and perhaps the most deeply inspired. And, of course, it can be urged that the power employed to clear that "den of thieves" (words attributed to Jesus) was a spiritual power: that the whip which Jesus had himself made with his own hands was only a symbol and not a lethal weapon. But the point at issue cannot be evaded: did Jesus, or did he not, use compulsive force with menace, even if only emblematic menace, to drive out men and beasts who, in his view and in all true conscience of things divine, were invaders? Was the operation defensive or offensive? Was it actuated by love or hate, or both at once?

Those are hard questions for Christians. They are not so hard for Humanists to answer. If the Christian reply is that the incident was apocryphal, or a parable, or exaggerated, what then in the gospels of Christianity is not apocryphal, or a parable, or exaggerated? When Jesus referred to the Pharisees in highly

derogatory terms were his remarks those of a man who loved the men who were Pharisees? When he said that it were better that a man who offended against the "little ones" should "have had a mill-stone hanged around his neck and he be cast into the sea," was it a remark indicating his traditional love of sinners? Of course it was not. Those incidents, even if they are also parables with special meanings, are indications that there are sayings and doings of Jesus which are not easily related to the traditional view of him and which do not seem to be congruent with the current meaning of the words "meek and mild." They are to do with the hatred of hypocrisy.

### *Christianity and Government*

The fact is that the majority of people brought up in the Christian tradition do not get beyond the teaching normally given to children where the aim is to encourage obedience and subservience in the affairs of this world—an attitude which Jesus never himself made dominant in his teaching. In regard to matters of political responsibility and tribute he said: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's." In regard to matters of the Kingdom of God to which all Jews were fully committed by their own sacred laws, Jesus said: "Render to God the things that are God's." The trouble with the Jews, as with us, was that they were not doing either of those duties whole-heartedly: they were resenting Caesar and insulting God and were chiefly concerned with temporal power for themselves—as who indeed is not, even to this day? It can still only be a very small minority who *know* the Truth and the Way, and some of them may be soldiers, like

the Centurion who knew that *all* power comes from higher authority.

In this matter there is not much to choose between Jew and Gentile, or between Deist and Humanist, on the whole. The fact is, we live in two worlds without knowing it, and constantly, therefore, we are liable to defile the higher world with the commerce of the lower. Similarly, we may easily confuse the councils of the world of struggle with the counsels of the world of peace, not recognising that in the world of peace the power of grace works inwardly to transform the man for wiser action, whereas in the world of struggle the power of force acts externally to modify or control the organisation.

The Christian injunction as regards the conduct of the world's affairs is not merely "Render to Caesar . . ." it is, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." The latter command implies mutual acceptance of equality of circumstances. It can be held to include, for instance, the "neighbour" aspect of two opposed fighter-pilots, approaching each other for battle. It can equally be related to two neighbouring nations under mutual nuclear menace. In such situations the love aspect may fail to be dominant but the mental attitude can be entirely without hate. The accepted circumstances are similar; neither party is doing to the other anything that he is not prepared to have done to himself. They are in circumstances of agreed equality albeit of menace, and so the command at that level is not denied. If this is found hard to accept, consider the situation as between Canada and the United States now, and as it will be when Canada also has nuclear weapons. We live in a world of relativity. The love we know, unless we happen to be mystics, is relatively

pale and dim, but not to be called less than love unless it turns to hate. And when considering menace and restraint there comes to mind the command to "turn the other cheek" when affronted. Whoever relies upon a Christian complying with that command should remember that he has but *one other* cheek to turn.

In the matter of traditional Christian ethics, there can be no halfway house about the use of force. Either there must be complete pacifism and total renunciation of all kinds of force, or else there must be power of maximum menace for deterrence with lesser deterrents available at every level to inhibit all potential war. But if Humanists can find it in their hearts to make an organisational compromise on the basis of ethics, they must surely remember that if the scale of menace which existed "conventionally" before the Second World War was not sufficiently great to deter the ambitions of Hitler, the same "conventional" level of menace, even in these days, could equally attract aggression and fail to deter the beginning of a third world war, if nuclear weapons were to be abolished. In a "conventional" world war, during the usual three years of conventionally conditioned, ineffective struggle, the warring Powers concerned would, in desperation, again have made for themselves nuclear bombs for "righteous" and hot-blooded use. Then, the last state of that war could be much worse than the end of the Second World War—indeed it could be The End. The cause of that state would not be the prior existence of nuclear weapons but their premature abolition.

The embarrassment that may be caused by being confronted, in a secular book such as this, with statements about Christianity and Christ is deplored. But

the common assertion that the teaching of Christ was ever concerned with rearranging the external things of Caesar is far more deplorable in view of his explicit statements to the contrary. Direct action upon external matters of organisation and politics were expressly ruled out of the doctrine of Jesus on his way to realising the Christ, the inward Man of God. The purpose of the Christ idea is inward regeneration: the yeast working in the dough to make the bread rise and form. Good government can only come from good citizens. Good institutions can only come from good members. Nothing can be basically changed by external treatment. The purpose of the crucifixion of Jesus and his transfiguration into Christ—that cross-over of death into life—was to “*fulfil* the law and the prophets”; to terminate an old tradition and begin anew. The new tradition was not to include the idea that man’s nature could be transformed by prohibition or by external law and order; that was the old tradition; that was what “the law and the prophets” were largely concerned with; they had been fulfilled and all the penalties paid. The new tradition was to be that man can be transformed only by *internal* law and order within the individual. In that tradition the work of the inward spirit must not be muddled-up with the organising machinery of world affairs. In world affairs peace must be kept by power of menace. In the human heart peace must be found through love. In due course, transformed men-of-grace would transform the machinery of government—as indeed they have. The new tradition puts the horse before the cart. Is it not in this sort of rational duality that Humanists and Deists might well find a basis of agreement? The double thinking that confuses personal

spiritual matters with organisations, deifying the latter, characterises Humanists and Deists alike and makes man no longer an individual soul but a cog in a machine that is *driven*, willy-nilly, by external power. The opposite view of this is that individual man is the only agency for world transformation. With this view goes the assurance that human power can only flow outwards from an inward source. And this, all nature shows.

It is surely because of the muddle that for nearly two thousand years has persisted in presenting a spurious image of Christ-law-maker, Christ-politician, or Christ-pacifist, Christ-external organiser, that many distracted Christians, tiring of "Christian wars" on the one hand and "Gentle Jesus" on the other, have turned their minds to the more oriental teachings of Hindu seers. And, there in the Bhagavad Gita, will be found Arjuna confronted by imminent battle asking Krishna the same ethical questions that puzzle us westerners today, but which cause no qualms of conscience in the Kremlin. To Arjuna come the self-same answers that would, many Christians like to suppose, have come from Jesus: static resistance against active evil is of no avail: evil must be dynamically overcome if once it goes into action: evil must be overcome with the good forces, the positive forces of courage, self-sacrifice, skill, endurance, and devotion. In short, "Resist not. Overcome!—If you lose your life in the attempt, you will regain it in the outcome of sacrifice." But, alas, that latter encouragement can hardly appeal to stoical Humanists who think they have but one life to lose, and none to gain.

Finally, it is to be hoped that pacifists who have toiled through this chapter, will be able to take

comfort from the earlier advice given to Arjuna about restraint from actual strife. We find recorded in the same great poem of Hindu mysticism that Arjuna was also advised against fighting in words like those used by Christ speaking through St. Paul: "As much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men." It lieth in us, now, to present an enormously powerful inducement towards living peaceably: the deterrent of the nuclear menace.

### *Lower and Higher Peace*

This chapter has been concerned with human feeling about two kinds of peace; the peace of Caesar which comes upon society externally through good organisation protected by determined menace, and that less definable peace of a higher order which seeps into society from "elsewhere," actuated by good will engendered by love. No doubt, most people agree upon the desirability of others keeping the peace. On the whole, however, it does seem that human feeling is increasingly in favour of peace, wanting it in both ways, but still supposing that government can compel peace into the heart of man.

The majority would agree, if they ever considered the matter, that the higher order of peace is more likely to be widely experienced when a secured peace-of-Caesar prevails, *provided* the prevailing Caesar is basically aiming also at that same higher order of peace through good will and individual freedom. On reflection, then, it seems that human feeling which has been in any degree influenced by Christian thinking is potentially agreeable to rendering to Caesar the things

that are Caesar's provided he does not make the profound mistake of trying to control the things that are God's—or, if you prefer it, the things of the Spirit of Man. Fortunately the traditional human feeling of English-speaking democracy has long been aligned to the idea that there is divine purpose in the concept of human freedom; something devilish in the use of tyrannical military force for suppressing freedom and something totally devilish in totalitarianism's tyrannical techniques. At various times of testing, and in the eyes of the world, this breed of people, despite all its renowned pride, has been seen to have the willingness—the true meekness—to risk final destruction over those beliefs.

Latterly, with faltering and trepidation, we seem to have been learning that meekness had better not be accompanied by, nor mistaken for, that imposter pseudo-brother, weakness—the progeny of half-heartedness out of fear. Alas, that the meanings of great words, like the meanings of great ideas, always become debased by unheeding usage. For, meekness in its true meaning is not a discarding of strength; it is an offering of strength-in-being, accepting all risk of sacrifice. And, for illustration, this definition of meekness may remind those who know the story, of the patriarch Abraham leading his own son to sacrifice and, because of his integrity and sincerity, maintaining the heritage unbroken.

# 4

## *Morals and Weapons*

### *Morals and Ethics*

THE English language is said to be the richest and most flexible of all languages; it has a word for every shade of meaning. That may be, in part, because so many words which sound alike have so many different meanings. But at the same time—and this may be a disadvantage—so many words have meanings which overlap. Ethics and morals, for instance. The language being alive, its members gradually grow into mental shapes which seem best to suit requirements for meaning. For the study of menace as represented by weapons it will thus be permissible to see a distinction between ethics and morals which is not rigidly cast in the dictionary.

In the last chapter, ethics was seen to be the discussion of right and wrong as a matter of principle. What is ethically right is what should be the pattern of right thinking and right conduct for the greatest good of man in matters of choice. With this meaning, ethics is seen to be coupled with wisdom in the shaping of universal ideals.

In this chapter, morals and morality are seen against a background of ethics: they appear as the individual's own measure of individual integrity in relation to what *he* considers to be right. The moral thing is not seen as a matter of principle so much as a matter of response to belief about what is acceptable

to a conditioned mind, and that mind is inevitably to some extent the victim of precept or prejudice. From the *acceptable* right thing it is an easy short step, for the majority, into the *conventionally* right thing. The moral man can be entirely unethical in the sense that he has never considered ethics and cares nothing about the *theory* of right and wrong, or the *theory* of good and evil. The moral man obeys his conscience where it conflicts with his instinct, and in that no-man's-land of don't-know-for-certain-and-don't-much-care the moral man prefers to stick to the common-sense of the situation, or to the conventions adopted by his own group. To the moral man, conscience is the guide: he usually does not concern himself about the meaning of conscience or how much of ethics there is in its make-up.

For most of us, conscience is probably not always the "still, small voice" which utters the essential word of truth in moments of doubt; it is much more the prompting of a habit of thought engendered by instinct, heredity, authority and training, or by awareness of the acceptable line. And from that it often appears that moral action is not essentially ethical action but conduct calculated not to engender unpleasant negative reactions such as hate and fear and grief.

As has already been suggested, the traditional basis of western morality is related to concepts of kindness, live-and-let-live, love your neighbour as yourself, render to no man evil for evil, and it is not immediately apparent to the peaceably-minded, kindly-natured person how or when, if indeed at all, he should countenance what, for him, has every appearance of forceful unkindness. What is he to think, for instance,

of the fighter pilot going into mortal combat? Or of the men whose task in war is to destroy with bombs from the air? He will see a distinction in those two roles and may, on the basis of his own prejudices, moralise about them.

But if we accept with gratefulness the deliverance those men wrought, how can we, at the same time, denounce their actions as immoral? Most of us cannot do that even if we would. Convention, if not common-sense, prevents us. We may rationalise; we may say that we cannot judge certainly whether more force was used than was necessary for acceptable ends. We know that the doing was terrible and that its consequences were terrible but find that the outcome was acceptable. So, as we cannot denounce the morality of the men who killed because they were themselves killed in the killing, or at least, risked death, we may find an easier way out of the problem: we denounce, instead, the higher authority, or the enemy. And when we find that that is no escape from the moral dilemma, we may denounce, instead, the inanimate instruments of death and destruction, with emphasis on the most terrible type of weapon. And thus the weapon is awarded a grading in the scales of morality. And hence it is that convention overcomes both judgment and conscience, and morality becomes related to size. Small weapons are labelled conventional and moral: large weapons are stigmatised as immoral. Then, because of the patent illogicality of such judgments, we multiply the aspects of immorality which the most feared weapons are said to embody and fail to recognise that in our moralisings what we are subconsciously most concerned to do is to allay our fears. And if we are honest and fairly instructed we will find that, for reasons of

human psychology, ethics and morals have parted company. And whereas we may wear the guise of humanitarians actuated by love of our fellow men, inwardly we may be actuated by the fears of death and deprivation into developing not love but hate for those who may very well be dedicated to our service and willing to risk all they prize for our protection. When hate is engendered out of fear it is not the hater with his inward force of evil that is held to be culpable for his want of self-control, but the master of the menace mounted for that fearful man's security.

Admittedly, and obviously, that is only a partial picture. But it is a sketch of the state of mind that seeks the half-way house for a refuge between the menace of maximum deterrence and the menace of total disarmament and seeks justification in terms of morals.

Anyone born in the nineteenth century is likely to remember heated talk about the immorality of "dum-dum" rifle bullets—alleged to have been used against British soldiers in the war in South Africa as the twentieth century began. Was there any other weapon-morality problem in those days? Not memorably so, unless it was the contamination of wells and water supplies. War was conventional: weapons were conventional: morals were conventional. In that epoch of subdued but sustained sea-power, the torpedo was the modern terror-weapon: the weapon of maximum menace. It was morally acceptable. After all, was it not solely for sinking warships? The question of humanity didn't come into it, then: who ever heard of a torpedo being aimed at *people*?

Yet it was in that first decade of this latter half-century of strife that moral attitudes about every kind

of weapon, from machine-gun to H-bomb, and about every kind of weapon-vehicle from submarine to rocket, began to be declared in new terms. Inquiry into the morality of weapons and their means of employment has now traversed the entire range of weapon-menace from flat-nosed rifle bullets (whose crime was that they did not make a clean wound) up to H-bombs with power to sear a whole city by a single blast and to change the nature of future generations of living creatures for the worse. Yet, still, there is no finality of judgment.

Apart from the real pacifists, who abhor all use of coercion by force, including that of a policeman, to achieve or frustrate any purpose, there has been perhaps some general if tacit agreement that morality demands, first, the removal of the greatest menace to civilisation—the H-bomb in all its varieties. That being so, no one any longer greatly bothers about dum-dum bullets or any other “unconventional” weapon all the way up the scale. Gas-warfare and germ-warfare and every other kind of weapon-horror, short of the H-bomb, have been lost in the overwhelming shadow-horror of nuclear bombardment.

Such is the state of horror-repression that if any thought of toxic gases or cultured serums rises to the surface for military discussion it is apt to be forced down again by agreement that the topic is no longer militarily interesting; or, anyway, not beyond the reassuring fact that tear-gas is benign for maintaining civil order in times of riot and the equally acceptable thought that the mass use of cultured serums is acceptable for the prevention of epidemic or endemic disease. Beyond those points of approval, gas and germs as

military topics for public discussion seem now to be taboo.

But should it not be more consciously recognised that the only justification for public complacency about gas and germs is that the nuclear menace overshadows all? Remove that shadow of the wings of death—the shudder of “the arrow that destroyeth in the noon-day”—and those other over-shadowed horrors, presently lost in the gloom of aerial menace, would quickly re-emerge to loom as large and lurid as the erstwhile nuclear menace. Or, if that was not immediately so, the reason for delay in the rise of level of gas- or germ-terror talk would be the fact that there has, so far, been no gas- or germ-*Hiroshima*—no historic drama to give the grimdest reality to those secret weapon menaces which have long existed in the past and exist now in forms more horrible than ever.

Nor must it be supposed that the effective banning of *poison* gas would be the end of *terror* gas. Terror is to do with thinking; it is not physical, but mental.

Amongst a great variety of weapons which have latterly come under development or investigation is a non-poisonous gas which when mixed with air for breathing greatly accentuates a man's, or an animal's, capacity for apprehension and fear. The cat that breathes this mixture sees a mouse as a menacing monster she dare not challenge and from which she *must* escape. The fact that the mouse is also frightened eludes the cat's attention because of the massive spell of fear under which she is terrorised. To all appearances, the cat is dominated by the mouse.

For “cat and mouse” the military defence-thinker reads “man and man.” And so he must, knowing

how military aggressors think, and knowing that it is his duty to plan defence.

It sometimes seems that too many of us decline to interest ourselves in the meaning and uses of menace, and that this may be due to misconceptions about the relative potency of the things employed to menace. The normal attitudes of cat to mouse and mouse to cat are mental attitudes which have evolved out of many generations of experience. The cat, whose biggest and fiercest manifestation is the tiger, is not normally impressed by the fact that at the elephantine end of that zoological family which includes the mouse there stands the most powerful of all quadrupeds. But it does appear that, after a few whiffs of a particular, non-poisonous inhalant, the cat's sense of proportion about mice alters so radically that she completely changes her character and acts as though the mouse offered for her teasing were not only an unassailable monster but an aggressively menacing antagonist. Here may be, in the example of this "intimidating gas," not only a new weapon-menace, but a new analogy for abdication. How much enfeebled in judgment can a nation be by fear? How much cowardice can come from a morality based on unethical morals?

### *The Morals of Menace*

All life and history witness to the curious process by which the weak things of this world confound the strong—a process in which the sense of proportion is destroyed before judgments of great importance are made. Gradually there is built up by the prevailing winds of prejudice such a mountain of sand—the symbol of disintegration—that the way to the country

beyond remains for ever barred, closed by a weakness towards truth.

This present study of menace is made for the sake of that "country beyond," that same country towards which the crusaders against the more horrible weapons are also faithfully if fearfully battling their way. The purpose of this study is not to circumvent the mountains, or even to fly over them, but by applying understanding to prejudice, to bestir the wind to blow from another quarter and sweep the way clear for progressive thought.

The menace of weapons is a real menace, but the barrier which that menace creates is not a physical barrier, it is a mental one, like "the iron curtain." Its substance is fear—very reasonable fear based on experience of war—and it leads to the belief that all menace is wholly evil; or, it leads to a fatalistic view of menace as a Sword of Damocles that must in the end be fatal to mankind unless the most talked-of part of that total menace—the armoury of nuclear weapons—is quickly removed from any possibility of employment.

The menace must be distinguished from the prejudices it feeds. Neither the weapons nor the prejudices can rightly be called evil. The *motive*-menace behind the *weapon*-menace can be good or evil, but those whose fears are most inflamed are apt to assert that menace is solely produced *by* evil and *is* wholly evil, forgetting that menace lies not in material things but in motive. What brought the atom bomb into existence was, in fact, intense fear. But fear of what?—fear of world tyranny. Such fear cannot lightly be called evil, and nor can the weapon it produced. The real menace to mankind was not the bomb but the

motive of tyranny that evoked the fear that urged the scientists to produce the bomb that burst at Hiroshima! The H-bomb is the child of revolt against tyranny. Its descendants have grown so numerous that they have become a population-of-menace that can be called tyrannical or stabilising or apocalyptic, depending upon the prejudices and insights of the assessor. This is no unctuous comment on the relative character of people and nations: it is simply a statement of historical fact. Were there no tyranny there would be no tyrants and no tyrannical weapons. While tyranny exists, weapons will exist whose capacity for creating fear is commensurate with the capacity of tyranny itself for creating fear, and so the vicious vortex of tyranny is formed. No country is free from it, and none can therefore be altogether free from weapons.

But if any country can be said to be free from major tyranny, can it then free itself from the weapons of counter-tyranny? Can the people of the United Kingdom, for instance, decline a major part in the policy of nuclear deterrence? Or should they simply recognise that the United Kingdom cannot be a *major* nuclear power and that they would, therefore, not only be militarily safer but ethically wiser to leave the whole of nuclear deterrence to the two major Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union?

That is the main question that this book seeks to answer, yet it may be that that question is not fundamental enough to satisfy some of the crusaders against weapons of maximum menace; it may be that no question will satisfy which does not face the moral issue and admit of the declaration that, *whatever other nations may do*, the United Kingdom must absolutely renounce nuclear weapons. That is an increasingly

common standpoint and it is, in fact, the main reason for this study having been made. Against that intransigent attitude of abdication this study of menace offers an even more fundamental creed which eschews the quest for humanity in warfare as a means for advancing the humanity of mankind. It denounces the demand for the elimination of the most dangerous weapons from the armouries of nations, simply because their existence on both sides—on *all* sides—deterring possessors from the use not only of *those* weapons but of *any* weapons, lest the most dangerous should eventually be used. Thus, while the abolitionists claim that the H-bomb is a menace to civilisation, this counter-creed cites the H-bomb as the destroyer not of civilisation but of the very thing that would otherwise destroy civilisation—*war*. For, if not, and war begins with weapons of any kind, who can tell how it will end? It is totally unavailing to cite, as evidence of moral restraint in war on the part of belligerents, the rejection in the Second World War of poison gas as a weapon. Had gas been regarded as more efficacious, more controllable and reliable than fire and explosion, gas would have been used. The “humanity” or otherwise of the use of gas has always been a talking point on which political statements have been made. But the military fact is, fire and explosion were militarily preferred, and that is the only valid reason why gas was not used. It was militarily rejected before that rejection was called moral.

The elimination of weapons by categories upwards from the least to the greatest would be more in line with the creed of this book, but prohibition is no guarantee. The only humanly acceptable safeguards are knowing and understanding. By those two factors

only is the elimination of war itself possible; and the elimination of war is the real quest.

Undoubtedly it is a right thing to seek to establish the maximum humanity in the conduct of international affairs. But to seek to make *war* humane—war, which is the essence of inhumanity!—is not only vain folly, it is “the highest treason”—seeking the right thing for the wrong reason. For it is out of fear of man that man hopes to moderate war and does not reject its necessity. But it is out of love of mankind that many seek to make physical warfare more and more intolerable and, thus, totally unacceptable save as a means to arrest the start of warlike action—unacceptable even to totalitarian and atheistic nations which scorn the ways of gentleness and officially believe in the evolution of man through the survival of the toughest.

And this is the great paradox of our times, on this side of the curtain. For, here, we find mild-minded Christians in league with Communists for banning nuclear weapons. The Christians, supposing that unredeemed human nature will inevitably incur the penalty of war sooner or later, seek to limit the penalty by contriving that war shall be made a kinder and milder experience. The Communists, exploiting the influences of the mild-minded Christians and the irresolute semi-pacifists in democratic countries, seek to deprive the major “capitalist-imperialist” democracies of their power to overawe. The alliance of Communists and Christians could be encouraging were it not so Gilbertian by reason of the perversion of morals involved. The consequence of muddling “the things of Caesar” with “the things of God” is that it produces the kind of mental chaos in which communism thrives.

Whether that is a desirable state to encourage is a matter of opinion. The evidence of history in regard to the progress of man can be used to show merit in all the different circumstances of peace and war, but the evidence of the human heart is that free co-operation at all levels in circumstances of ordered security for the weak, and of wide-open opportunity for adventure for the strong, is what the heart of man most deeply desires to see established by Caesar under the grace of God. Meanwhile, the Caesars of this world, who know no God but themselves, must be kept in circumstances which they naturally do understand—the power of material. For that reason, absolute firmness in absolute menace backed by absolute moral resolution seems to appeal to those of the western democracies who have endured two world wars of appalling sacrifice. Having seen the consequences of failure to make menace sufficiently menacing to deter; of failure to *appear* sufficiently strong in the will to resist aggression, they have reason to believe that nothing less than the maximum of material power will overawe materialist oligarchies.

That may be an intellectual stand to take. It is also a moral stand. And it offers, for so long as it can be held, a protection in which processes of higher understanding can evolve in a world which is showing many signs of an awakening from the materialist dream of a passing era.

Determination to rely on material strength in material matters is understandable, and so is total renunciation of appeal to force or menace. But there is no abiding half-way house in those philosophies. St. George and St. Francis are friends united in a

common ideal but they cannot combine their personalities.

There is a deep-seated belief that major war sometime, somewhere, is an "inescapable necessity," in the conduct of international affairs. For that reason it is held that war needs to be made more acceptable, more tolerable as a course of action. It is, of course, moral to use no more force than is necessary. But to postulate that war is inevitable is almost to postulate that it is right not to do the utmost to prevent its being an acceptable course of action. And that seems to be quite one of the most immoral of all concepts about war and weapons—the highest treason against all those who have sacrificed themselves to bring to an end the reign of the beast in man, which condones the use of physical force for achieving positive results for gain.

In their opposition to acceptance of the inevitability of war, pacifist and soldier are found side by side. Total disarmament and total menace are two notions with but a single purpose: the total prevention of war. Where the pacifist and the soldier part company is in the method of halting a course of evil. The soldier's method is to compel the restoration of conditions for the enjoyment of peace by absorbing through his own sacrifice the forces of evil. The soldier is everyman—every man and woman—who is fired into action by an ideal for which he is prepared to sacrifice all that he possesses. Anyone who is not prepared for that degree of sacrifice is not a soldier—not a *real* soldier. The purpose of the soldier in time of peace is to show that the material fortress of civilisation is held with the utmost might, while morality and reason may come together under the grace of Heaven and the power of peace.

*Menace versus Tyranny*

But the purpose of this chapter has been, not to discuss morals and man, but morals and the weapons of menace. And the conclusion that must be recorded is that those two concepts, morals and weapons cannot be placed in the same category. Morals are mental: weapons are material—materialisations of the mind of man. In generations to come, historians may observe that the invention of weapons of maximum menace brought home to the mind of man the utter futility of external force as a means for man's internal regeneration, and confronted him with the menace inherent in the mentality of the beast. If so, it is probable that those same historians will observe that the era of peace which ensued came about not because of a pseudo-pacifism which made a god of weakness, but because of a courage and a faith which, soldierlike, did not flinch from overawing the systems of worldly power built up on the denial of the eternal sanctity of the individual human soul. For, in the endless end, will not the individual soul, if it is eternal and immortal, prove to be greater than any transient and temporal kingdom of this world, or any so-called civilisation the world has yet boasted?

Idealistic prognostications are easier to state than to bring to realisation. But little progress in the overcoming of danger can be achieved by those who will not face the immediate danger and see beyond it. In this, our vision will be clearer if not blinded by the prejudice that, in peacetime, it is weapons that constitute the danger to be overcome. We may then see that the real danger is tyranny of the kind that first

brought nuclear weapons into existence for tyranny's destruction in 1945.

But tyranny, believing only in material power, can only be overawed by the thing in which it most believes—menace.

# 5

## *Scales of Menace*

### *World Suicide?*

ALTHOUGH intellectually one may be convinced that menace does not reside in weapons but in the mentality of the owners of weapons or those who may gain control of them, the man-in-the-street and certainly the woman-in-the-home will doggedly maintain that nuclear weapons are fantastically dangerous. Whether or not the abolition of nuclear weapons would bring to public consciousness the various other and even worse dangers in the way of weapons of mass disease or poison, or, which is much more easily practicable against the United Kingdom, total starvation by submarine action, is not much considered. Nor is much thought given by the layman to the fact that thermonuclear explosions can now be produced on a relatively small scale, which means in this context of menace, that the nuclear abolitionists are demanding not only the elimination of weapons of maximum menace but also of lesser weapons all down the scale of nuclear menace to the level of infantry weapons.

Many who see the difficulties in the way of prohibition of H-bombs take an ingenious line of argument to show that external prohibition is not called for: inhibition will have the same effect. They start from the presumption that it is unthinkable that nuclear weapons (meaning those of catastrophic menace) will

ever actually be used. Therefore, such weapons do not constitute a real threat and, therefore, they have no purpose and are neither a safeguard to civilisation nor a danger to an aggressor and might as well be sunk in the ocean or converted into useful atomic fuel. But, by the same argument, they might as safely be left in store until the price of atomic fuel goes up! Such arguments become shaky when it is recognised that no method of international inspection can protect nations against the possibility that some H-bombs, or H-rocket warheads, would be kept in store after it had been declared that all had been sunk in the ocean.

By no means all nuclear abolitionists are actuated by fear of the consequences to western civilisation. There are plenty who would most stoutly declare that, for their part, they are willing to face death and destruction, maiming—anything rather than the acceptance of totalitarian slavery. And they would add that their own posterity would be of the same mind even if they were born as genetic freaks. But what makes those people nuclear abolitionists is the belief that man could and might utterly frustrate the divine purposes of life in this world, chief of which is that man should elevate his being to divinity and not descend to the level of the beast.

That argument is a very weighty one against which the plea of deterrence can hardly prevail. To answer it satisfactorily is not possible except in terms of faith. The God-fearing man who intellectually desires, as well as he may, to believe in the omnipotence of God may feel compelled to admit the possibility of world-omnipotence by man or the Devil in man. In that case, it is both easy and scientifically admissible to assert that man can, if he wishes, make bombs of infinitely

greater menace than the H-bomb. This needs to be considered seriously.

The fantastic power of destruction of the so-called Hydrogen bomb is commonly held to be at the top of the scale of menace. But that is only because no nation has yet seen fit to go to the infinitely greater extreme of explosive power which could be procured by the agency of some element other than hydrogen; for instance, cobalt. By such means, an effect upon mankind and his civilisation could be produced at one stroke which would be as catastrophic as the supposed disappearance of the highly civilised continent of Atlantis when the Earth gave way, so it is said, and millions of lives and all that had been achieved in millions of years of the evolution of man was consequently engulfed in the ocean which flooded the low-lying land of the whole world and brought all civilisation to an end. The evidence for that catastrophe is esoteric, not conclusive! Those who believe chiefly in the "laws" of physics can explain it in relation to the cooling of a sphere and the crumpling of its surface. Those theosophists who believe in the Masters of Wisdom hold that the obliteration of Atlantis was caused by divine decision in order to close an earlier chapter in the evolution of sentient man. No one has yet formally recognised that event as the suicide of a doomed civilisation. But at least it seems likely that such a dramatic holocaust had its major cause in mentality as much as in materiality. Basically, it is this sort of feeling that actuates the fears of mankind, nowadays, as we contemplate the possibility of the suicide of Civilisation. No wonder the weapon abolitionists are rampant.

From that sort of fear there is no escape for those humanists who hold that the governance of this world's affairs is *entirely* in the hands of man-on-Earth. But those Deists who hold that man's dominion is confined to the management of created things, for good or ill, and does not extend to the ordering of the planet's whole being and its reason for being, can take very considerable comfort in the reflection that it will not actually prove to be within the power of man-on-Earth to bring into chaos or frustration the purposes and being of this planet. It may seem that with a few cobalt bombs man could destroy all life on the Earth. The probability is that the free-will of man is not as unlimited as that. Whether or not civilisation is to be destroyed may well depend on whether in some higher realm of control the present condition of life on Earth is worth preserving for transformation into a higher state. Judgment of that seems to be beyond the estimation of man-on-Earth. But the world-wide acceptance of tyranny might make the world into an ant-hill with all the appearances of futility which such an organisation would present. And that might reasonably be a state which, viewed cosmically, should be exterminated. It is basically to prevent such an ant-hill development that the maximum menace of nuclear fusion bombs was called into being. It looks, if we do not lose our nerve, as though that purpose is now coming near to being fulfilled.

#### *New Scale of Nuclear Weapons*

This chapter is not concerned with measuring dangers: it is concerned with efficacy of menace. The differences between danger and menace may be numerous

and somewhat subtle, but only one difference need be cited for this discussion. Danger is a potentiality for producing consequences which have no purpose. Menace is purposeful and is calculated accordingly.

Until recently, the menace of nuclear weapons has been related almost exclusively to devastation on a great scale. The demand for the elimination of such weapons has always had that sort of menace in mind—and still has. But the time has come to show that if the moralistic demand for limitation of destructive power is to result in the banning of all nuclear weapons the result will not only be, as has already been shown, to make war more likely to occur but also, more likely to render warfare far less able to be brought to a speedy termination, which is the chief moral justification for engaging in warfare at all.

The situation has now become radically changed by the evolution which has been taking place latterly in nuclear weapons: specialised weapons are being developed for strictly defensive, selective and local purposes. The small-scale nuclear weapon has already appeared.

A major defensive weapon now under development is a nuclear-armed missile for explosion high in the sky—a counter-weapon weapon—for the destruction of hostile nuclear weapons in flight in aircraft or in inter-continental missiles. From the explosion of such high-altitude weapons there need be no problem of radioactive fall-out. Thus, nuclear weapons which began as bombs of outrageous and indiscriminate aggressive potency are now to be found in a category which is strictly defensive—to stop aggression, and to stop it without harm to life, in the stratosphere. Their existence, coupled with the modern arts of radar-

telescope detection and electronic-computery will stand as a menace-deterrant to the aggressor.

Much lower down in size, power and altitude will come the future thermo-nuclear grenade of the sort that might be fired from the barrel of a rifle to destroy, for instance, a low-flying armoured helicopter in a 100-yard sphere of fire, or that might be used for other local tactical effects. Such weapons, whether of great size or small, are nuclear weapons. And they are weapons which can be graded in a scale of menace comparable with the scales of menace applicable to so-called *conventional* weapons. The banning of nuclear weapons is thus seen to be something quite other than its sponsors suppose.

The rocket weapon first-mentioned above for the highest skies, could so menace the plans of an enemy intent upon a nuclear attack of the "Pearl Harbor" kind as to cause the whole project to be abandoned. The second, the nuclear grenade, could arm one superlative grenadier with the momentary fire-power of a brigade. Dangerous? Of course. But safety depends on danger, as we have seen; it depends on menace-deterrance. Infantry weapons of that character would make infantry warfare *unthinkable* as infantry warfare. That is to say: the tactics of infantry in such circumstances could hardly be thought-out and planned as infantry tactics. In short, the possession of minor nuclear weapons in minor defence units could act as effective deterrents to minor land operations. And so on, right up the scale. For it is by the scale of deterrent offered that military plans of operations are most prone to rejection. It is the persistent absence of intermediate deterrents of sufficient tactical power which is really the principal cause of current war anxiety.

Menace-deterrance is the whole object of weapons at all levels. Their actual use for killing is the measure of their failure to deter. The skill of the commander lies chiefly in his capability for judgment of the moral effect of deterrence and its application at the various tactical levels of his command. Mobility and flexibility are chief factors in application, and in both those aspects of tactics it is relative smallness of weapons, in bulk and in numbers, for a given effect which is the major necessity for military security. Thus, minor nuclear weapons would become of paramount significance in land battle; indeed, in any battle. That being so, they will be made. And because of their efficacy they will act as the major deterrent to battle—and hence to war itself—at every level from the potential local minor skirmish up to the scale of the great deterrent against major war.

Therein lies the answer to the "futility" argument stated in the first paragraph of this chapter and so often harped upon by nuclear abolitionists. The "futility" argument for abolition is futile the other way round: it would, if accepted, debar the further development of minor nuclear weapons which, because of their vast scale of effect in relation to the size of the tactical unit employing them, bid fair to deter military operations of any character between nuclear-armed powers. And thus the logic of deterrence is restored and the moral purpose of menace reinforced.

What makes for sanity in this matter is its very unthinkability in terms of continuing strategy or tactics. If the consequences of action cannot be thought out, a coherent plan cannot be made. If there is no reasonable assurance of continuity from the outcome of a battle, the battle is pointless and will not be

fought. The unthinkable of nuclear warfare which initially was an epithet with moral implications of a negative kind is thus shown to have distinctly positive, not to say virtuous implications, after all. If major war has become unthinkable, there is no sense in thinking about it. Before long, even military-minded folk will give up doing so—provided the “unthinkable” weapons are not prematurely abolished.

### *Gradation of Nuclear Menace*

Many who would be content to believe that last statement, if they could, are prevented from doing so by their honesty. They cannot honestly believe in the power of a deterrent which they do not believe anyone honestly has the determination to “use.” It is not their honesty which is at fault but their logic and their percipience!

Their logic is at fault in supposing that there is any *use* for a deterrent but to deter. If a deterrent does not deter it ceases to be a deterrent in the sense that logic requires. The philosophy of deterrence is constantly bedevilled by misunderstanding of the meaning of it. The deterrence is not in the bomb but in the determination behind it. Bluff may work for a while, and on occasions, but if there is no determination, there can, in the long run, be no deterrence. And the reason why there is no adequate determination nowadays is not because of imagination and understanding but because of a *want* of imagination and understanding of facts.

For years past there have been two fixed ideas about war in the minds of Western free citizens. The first is that there really is danger of war with the Soviet Union. The second is that the explosion of even *one*

nuclear bomb would necessarily be immensely catastrophic. Neither of those ideas is logical, both are fanciful: each is blindly feared. It is most desirable that these two matters, at least, should be looked at more objectively in our pursuit of understanding of the meaning of menace.

The Soviet Union has nothing to gain by war but much to gain through the *fear* of war. That vast collection in one continent of many different and mutually antagonistic peoples speaking 150 different languages can more effectively be kept under the domination of the Kremlin if they are all given a common phobia of "imperialist-capitalist war-mongering encirclement." Under that artificial magnification of menace, the peoples of the Soviet states can be induced to forget that the imperialism that holds them under tyrannical sway is the imperialism of the Kremlin: the war-mongering of which the Soviet nations hear so much from the Kremlin is the daily commerce of the propagandist machine. Hitherto, through all those years of Stalinist terror-control, cohesion in the Soviet Union has been produced by fear at every level. Now, at last, there is increasing evidence that a change is coming.

Indeed, the Kremlin men would have every reason for being fearful of retribution from the Western countries closest to them if those countries were to be freed. But they know that there is no prospect of that fear having any substance unless the Western free countries aid and abet the quest of the satellite countries for freedom, and thereby expose the Soviet Union (more particularly the Ukraine and Russian Soviets) to a rearmed and reunited Germany. To prevent the Western democracies from bringing about

the freedom of those captive countries, the Kremlin keeps up the pressure of fear of war in the minds of Western countries. It is under the influence of those fears that the Western countries are divided in their allegiance to their own alliance and lacking in the kind of determination which makes deterrence deter. But with or without determined deterrence, there are no reasonable grounds for fear of war with the Soviet Union direct. On the other hand, reasonable fears *do* exist that, because of lack of determination in the West, totalitarian expansion will occur in many regions, extending still further the frontiers of tyranny. Indeed, fighting or capitulation may occur about Berlin—but not major war.

The second reason given above for want of determination behind the mounted menace of the H-bomb was that it is not believed that such weapons could ever be used other than catastrophically: that the use of *one* would immediately start a chain-reaction of a universally destructive kind, H-bombs by the hundred or by the thousand being exploded world-wide in a holocaust of insanity and despair. That is the very thought that the Kremlin encourages the Western states to believe, but never publishes in the Soviet Union. It has no substance of probability: no more than the universally feared obliteration of London had as the first expected act of the Germans in the Second World War. Military measures have military objectives; they are always designed to secure what is desired: the overmastering of the will of an enemy. They are always designed with at least some regard to economy of force. Nuclear warfare would be no exception to that rule. It is *advantage* that is desired, not chaos.

For example, let it be supposed that, at the time of the Suez operation, the threat of nuclear action on the part of the Soviet Union had had real substance behind it. And let it be supposed, further, that the United Kingdom, not being deterred, had persisted in her action to secure the Canal. It must then be supposed that nuclear action would have been taken by the Kremlin and some supposition must be made about what form it would have taken: general holocaust?—metropolitan intimidation?—or military inhibition of the continuance of the Suez operations by the United Kingdom's forces? Every consideration leads to the virtual certainty that one nuclear weapon, only, would have been used; that it would have been used in a locality where its effect would have been to inhibit the Suez action; that it would have been exploded at a height such that its effect was no more than was calculated as necessary to have the effect of stopping the operation and, finally, that the manner of the explosion would have been such as to cause the minimum of anxiety to other countries and the maximum admiration on their part for the efficiency with which the task was performed. The casualties would have been slight.

Intelligent conjecture is no substitute for certainty but it is infinitely preferable to the wild imaginings engendered by blind fear. Whether or not any such action would or would not have taken place in any circumstances is not the point at issue. The only point in thus visualising a nuclear threat being put into action is to show that the pattern of military method is not affected *in principle* by the increased lethal capacity of weapons: weapons of any kind can always be used with reduced lethality, diminishing to vanishing

point—to zero. Students of bombing operations in support of the civil administration in protectorates or in mandated territories know that "air control" has been exercised most effectively on a great many occasions by the menace of non-lethal action by bombers dropping live bombs in a manner sufficient to overawe and to demonstrate a convincing degree of determination.

Failure to produce conviction, of course, leads to the development of stronger measures and to less discrimination, but the commitment of the whole of his own limited resources to an action with unlimited consequences in a state of general unthinkability could only be the action of a madman intent on his own destruction. If nuclear weapons are used, they will in the first place be used to stop something happening. That is a politico-military certainty for any country which prefers not to risk total obliteration. If they do not stop that thing happening, a further judgment will have to be made having regard to the fact that in the first instance the scale of menace for prevention was not correctly judged and applied.

Scales of military menace are matters of judgment. But ever since Hiroshima it has been supposed that they are not matters of good judgment and are not likely to be. Hiroshima, in fact, was not a matter of normal military judgment. None of the commanders in the Pacific area had any control of that operation: it was ordered politically from Washington by men who were convinced of the dire necessity for terminating the war. They succeeded within three days. Their success may have initiated the end of war on this planet by inducing a better understanding of the right uses of menace and of the virtue of war-prevention by strength and courage. But if that proves

not to be so, and war is not prevented, it is greatly to be hoped that the cause of that failure will not be due to the fact that fear got the upper hand of courage and made men in freedom mistake their leaders for tyrants. The danger is that by poltroonery we may rob our leaders of the freedom to choose the means of maximum menace, and fail to provide them with deterrent weapons of the maximum efficiency at every level. Deterrence must cover every level in the scales of military menace to inhibit every kind of war, or, if need be, to arrest and destroy every aggressive action aimed at securing political advantage by means of military power. It is no use having only great weapons or only small. If you are going to have weapons at all you must have the lot, or quit the arena of major Powers. France understands that.

### *International Democracy and Menace*

Conspicuously absent from the foregoing discussion of scales of menace is the Security Council of the United Nations Organisation which, constitutionally, was intended to be at the head of all deterrence from military action in world affairs and the chief wielder of military menace against aggression. Where there is no determination there can be no deterrence, and while the rule of veto applies in the Security Council it can have no sure determination. The Council of the Assembly can exert, and has already exerted, considerable force of deterrence by moral suasion backed by majority opinion. It is probable that the time will come when it will also have at its disposal armed forces —some standing power of menace of its own. As that time approaches, the principles advocated in this

chapter may gain increased acceptability, especially among the smaller nations who are now being confronted by the dilemma of whether or not they should follow the example of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States in the matter of nuclear armament.

It was natural for the United States to prefer that no other country should be able to challenge her in the matter of military menace but the argument of existing fact is stronger than logic. If menace means anything it means power for bargaining, and the more countries there are with menace the more unlikely it becomes that one country can make a one-sided bargain involving force.

Hitherto, international politics has never been in any full sense a democratic process, whatever that may be. If the pattern of democracy is that of Ancient Greece, then democracy is dependent upon slavery. If the United Kingdom is the model, then democracy depends greatly upon an authoritarian party-dictatorship of a mild kind. This system exists in varying degrees in all democratic countries. The so-called democracy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has hitherto been a democracy founded on tyranny and serfdom: it continues to rely upon tyranny for executive action, albeit less so than ever heretofore. But in the United Nations, democracy has rested chiefly upon power-groups.

There can be no true democracy of nations in the United Nations under the present system and it may be doubted whether there should be. But when many nations are armed with weapons of maximum menace, as they are now beginning to be, there will be a new equality between the so-called great and small which

will tend to reduce the disparity of control exercised by the great Powers, and this might well make for greater security among small nations at enmity with each other. For just as the great nations armed with nuclear weapons can none of them be denied a hearing and none, faced with the nuclear menace of the other, can impose its will without grave risk to its own security, so also will no nation, great or small, confronted by a nuclear-armed small nation have the power of overriding strength when the possession of nuclear weapons is no longer confined to the few. Aggression and the adventurous use of force for political objectives will then more widely become a matter of supreme danger. At the same time the cost of armaments would then, surely, gradually induce all nations to seek a less expensive security under a collective international system of menace and force. In such a system, nations would need to be democratically represented and would increasingly have to surrender sovereignty in the matter of international relations. Any nation which, meanwhile, quitted from its task of maintaining a strength of power properly related to its responsibilities would become increasingly dependent upon others for ensuring its protection.

The acceptance of the foregoing argument for multiplying the number of nations with nuclear strength depends entirely upon a prior acceptance of the thesis that any reliance upon the use of force for positive political gains in the international field is not only known to be a forlorn hope but must be *seen* to be a forlorn hope by the menaces mounted to prevent such an enterprise going into action.

While the contrary opinion prevails; that is to say, while it continues to be held that the building-up of

forces for conquest or for maintenance of existing conquest should not be opposed everywhere by weapons of maximum menace, there is no prospect of a full democracy of nations within the United Nations Organisation. For, those nations which remain determined to have their right-of-conquest unopposed by any subject nation or by any free nation cannot be members of a really democratic system and will never surrender a degree of sovereignty to a higher organisation which they will by no means surrender to a lower. In a *democracy* of nations, what is sauce for the goose has got to be sauce for the gander.

At the present time many nations which have long established their nationhood are held in subjection by major Powers. The freeing of those nations by force is unethical and, fortunately, impracticable militarily. But it is likely to become a voluntary possibility when, and only when, the United Nations Organisation has established a collective system of force embodying menace. That system of force will need to be sufficient to overawe the current anarchy of nations and to inhibit the deliberate stimulation of international frictions by powers which have a vested interest in unrest. But while the power of veto remains, it seems that no progress can be made in the centralisation of world security and that, meanwhile, the equalisation of menace all down the scale of weapon deterrence and broadly across the geography of nations is likely to prove to be the surest means of preventing aggression.

Although the causes of friction which already exist are deliberately inflamed by those who seek to gain advantage by trouble, or who seek to weaken the free countries by fear; and although such action dangerously increases the risks of local insurgence or small

wars, yet, as has already been shown, the various local limited wars fought since the Second World War have never achieved the purposes of the assailants but have ended fruitlessly because, ultimately, superior international pressure of nuclear-armed nations has enforced a halt of hostilities. Who, in the face of this history of deterrence against military aggrandisement, can assert that in no circumstances can the consequences of menace be benign?

# 6

## *Scales of Suffering*

### *Suffering is Acceptance*

MENACE implies a prospect of suffering.

It is no use considering menace and war if one is not prepared to consider objectively the meaning of suffering. It is essentially a subjective experience and everyone supposes that he knows what he means by it. The probability is, however, that he does not really know what suffering means. Pain he knows: he may suppose that pain *is* suffering, forgetting that suffering is the acceptance of both pleasure and pain.

The purpose of life is living: the purpose of living is life. But to live is to suffer. Suffering is acceptance of the conditions of living: living is learnt by suffering, by accepting and transforming. Transforming is struggle: the fight for life. Struggle is a measure of the misunderstanding which exists between good and evil: life and death. Suffering is not struggle any more than it is pain: it accepts them both.

Pain is a measure of non-acceptance, of resistance to transformation, of resistance to the transformation of life through the overcoming of death. More simply, it is life's reaction to death. In life we cast a shadow: the shadow of death, life being internal and death external. Death is seen externally and feared: life is lived internally and loved. Life is all: death is nothing.

If these ideas, these statements of opinion, were universally *known* to be fact we should not be discussing menace and war; we might instead be enjoying enlightenment and peace. But that is what we are not experiencing. Nevertheless, that argument for peace is the *real* pacifist's contention, although, being a pacifist, he cannot logically engage in contention. He may *know* about life and death, and regard pain as resistance, suffering as acceptance, and so on. But he cannot communicate it. Meanwhile, the compassionate man in the sufferance of struggle is by no means sure whether, in this world of struggle, the shadow of death and the menace of pain are good or evil. To him it may seem to be more a matter of opinion than of conscience. Or, perhaps, not a matter of mental or spiritual judgment but, rather, one of emotion. For the compassionate man, compassion is probably the key word.

What makes struggle unacceptable is pain. Compassion is evoked by pain—self-compassion or selfless compassion. It is that quality which characterises alike the Humanist and the Deist in their resistance to the idea of menace, lest the menace should be fulfilled not in its purpose of protection but in its failure and pain. Nevertheless, menace is the safeguard of every living thing in nature, for without menace to protect it, nothing lives. We have to suffer that fact to be so. That is to say, we have to accept it.

This brings us to the point that seems most to need understanding in the context of menace. Non-acceptance of the principle of menace comes from compassion which fosters the idea that the purpose of living is loving. It is not; the purpose is life. Loving is the means whereby we accept. If you are a Deist

you say "God is Love" and in the same breath if you really *are* a Deist you must say "God is All." Hence, God is Life. And since life is not death and death is life's negation, not part of the All, it must be shadow: the Shadow of Death. So Love, for the deist, becomes the means whereby man accepts All: himself, his circumstances, his world, his neighbour, his enemies, his All—God. He never accepts death, the external shadow—not if he is a Deist. But evil he accepts as that which is to be transformed, as good going the opposite way. And that is the basis of struggle; not a basis of hate.

Hate is love going the opposite way: the means whereby you *reject*. In the struggle you accept your adversary: you suffer him and, if you can, you overcome. You may hate, and thus reject, the evil by which you suppose your adversary to be actuated. But you will be foolish to hate *him*. For, as hate rejects, it can achieve nothing positive; it cannot overcome.

In order to overcome, it is essential to understand. Overcoming is not essentially a process of destruction; it is a preliminary to transforming. In a very real sense you have to love your enemy to overcome him. You have to accept him and suffer him. A classic example of this is to be found in the mental relationship of Montgomery to Rommel.

Montgomery, in a very certain way, *loved* Rommel; like a brother. He studied him in every way and sympathised with him in all his difficulties. In the end, he knew Rommel through and through; loved him as himself. Montgomery and Rommel, like Tweedledum and Tweedledee, *agreed* to have a battle. They chose their battle-ground and fought; not in blind hate but in calm judgment and in the spirit of

dedicated men. And because Montgomery had the requisite resources he overcame, not once but many times.

But the overcoming was by no means all under the control of Montgomery. There were other agencies in the overcoming. For instance, there were the bombers which were menacing the internal power of Germany. It was the menace of the bombers over Germany that deprived Rommel of the air power he needed for the protection of his resources for battle. His fighter squadrons were, for him, fatally depleted by being moved back to Germany. So, when we feel grateful to Montgomery, we have to feel grateful also and equally to "Bomber" Harris. This is not so easy to do, because we do not accept the "All" in war, the all-in war. Compassion is most strongly evoked by the pain we know, and the pain we mostly knew about then was not the sufferings of soldiers in the desert but the sufferings of civilians at home. Those who suffered—accepted—the All in war, accepted it as the means of overcoming evil in action. They were not blinded by hate of their enemies. But since those days, compassion and fear have weakened our judgment about the means of our deliverance.

### *Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima-Nagasaki*

The war which, by aggression, Japan sprang upon the United States in 1941 opened with terrible one-sided destruction from the skies. In 1945 that war was closed in like fashion even more terribly, and the tables were turned. That was justice. It was not mercy. It was necessary. And it has made deterrence deter.

Pearl Harbor is a classic example of non-deterrence against attack. From the purely military point of view, it was the quintessence of military planning and execution. No civil authority had any hand in it. The timing, the target, the method, the precision and the command were all strictly military. The attack marked a climax of military-minded conventional warfare. It marked the climax to five years of victorious war of outright aggression from start to finish, accepted and applauded by civilian and democratic people of Japan. They acclaimed it as their war of Liberation.

“Hiroshima” is a classic example of deterrence from the continuance of fighting. It was the quintessence of civilian planning and execution employing airmen under an uncomprehending military cloak. Of course, it was militarily executed, but the timing, the tactics, the weapon and the decision were all civilian as, indeed, was the target. That attack marked the end of major conventional war and of the distinction between soldier and civilian. With no feeling of moral judgment it can be truly said that the acceptance of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombings and the suffering of them belonged chiefly to the civilian “soldiers” on both sides; people who were only “soldiers” by virtue of the fact that they participated in the fighting, not because they were consciously prepared to perish by the sword they wielded.

But here again, compassion for the pain we know, at least by hearsay, affects our judgment of right and wrong. In fact, in the matter of justice and deterrence, we cannot be sure about rights and wrongs: we can only judge by results.

In terms of total pain—horror, terror and death—

neither of those two classic air attacks (Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima-Nagasaki) came near to the total of pain in long drawn-out agony that fell upon the millions of suburbanites of Tokyo, for instance, when those bamboo-town-dwellers were under continuous incendiary attack for many days and nights. In retrospect it is the total of inflicted pain that ought to be weighed when consideration is given to the morality of action. In that matter, there is not much ground for preferring "conventional" weapons to unconventional weapons. In the scale of relative human pain, were not one thousand times more killings, deaths, disease, deprivation and destruction brought about in those years of "conventional" war than all the total of pain caused by that sudden *termination of warfare* wrought at Hiroshima-Nagasaki? But measure as we may the scales of pain and the suffering of living, we can only measure in temporal terms, not in the terms of eternity.

### *Vindications of Menace*

In terms of total pain the Asian conflict which ended so terribly with the nuclear bombings in Japan was, again, small compared with the enormous agony of the conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the countries laid waste between Berlin and Moscow, millions died, and millions are still in some degree of bondage or destitute as refugees. The deterrence of "conventional" forces failed to deter from aggression and, thereafter, ever since, terror has reigned in death, destruction, disease or deprivation.

The scale of pain accepted by those nations on the other side of Europe far exceeded all that can be

imagined by the West. How then can the West begin to imagine the scale of pain that would have to be suffered if, through lack of deterrence, the economic problems of China in the years to come should result in the teeming millions of that continent being thrown into conventional conflict with the eastern members of the Soviet Union?

It is fruitless to engage in argument about the merits of one kind of ideology against another in this context. Facts have to be recognised—the fact that Eastern life is increasing at a rate of many millions a year in conditions which will not support that life. The “conventional” outcome from such conditions is war. It is clear that the existing conventions have to be changed, between now and that potential time of catastrophe. And it should be noted, in passing, that the People’s Republic of China is not a member of the United Nations Organisation. To the question of why that is so, there is no simple answer.

Similar anxieties but of different economic and ethnological backgrounds are growing in India, Arabia and Africa. Great forces of human nature are at work which man has to learn to control. In varying degrees the dynamism of revolt and change-by-force is festering everywhere where prospect of gain or security is seen to be there for the grasping by the strong.

It is not difficult to imagine, for instance, the demand that could arise in a despotic Arabian country to annex the territory and resources of an oil-rich but militarily small neighbouring State. Various reasons could be advanced in justification, or they could be fabricated. In the absence of any really prohibitive deterrent the deed could be done over night. There would then be the possibility of an operation of the

Suez type, or of a United Nations intervention. Judging from what has not been done in the past by international combinations to arrest and reverse local aggressions—aggressions which have subsequently led on to war operations on a great scale—it seems that the most humane requirement for ensuring the rule of law is to ensure that every great political attraction is protected by a correspondingly great and, potentially, an immediately effective deterrent. Conventional forces with no certain means of ensuring the exclusion of intruders into a territory are not enough to safeguard weak States and keep the peace. A sufficiently great deterrent would be. And although it would be preferable for such a deterrent to be in the hands of an impartial international organisation capable of swift action, there is unfortunately no such organisation in being. Not yet. For that reason the deterrent needs to be in the hands of the country whose attractiveness to aggression is the source of its danger, or else in the hands of a trusted ally committed to the protection of the small State and thoroughly awake to all that threatens.

Nuclear weapons of greatly varying potency can now be applied with lethal effects which may be modified at will by the choice of the position, geographically and as regards height above the ground, where any single one of them is to be exploded. With that power of thought and discrimination, "unthinkable" in those circumstances is not a valid word. That being so, it can hardly be argued that the calculated use of one such weapon, immediately, for the frustration of aggression in the desert would not be humanely preferable to the "conventional" alternative. For the "conventional" course would involve protracted

military operations, employing men and weapons in thousands to restore a political situation which, meanwhile, had lost its proper significance by reason of the damage inflicted by the aggressor upon the object of his covetous lust.

Or, since this example may seem merely hypothetical, let the same principle be applied to an actual and very costly war in recent history. Korea. And if the Korean War is not considered an adequately disastrous example, let whoever doubts it visit that beautiful but pitifully crippled and distressed country.

That war began because of doubt about a line being held. That famous line of demarcation between the forces of the United States and those of "Communist" Northern Korea, backed by the Soviet Union, could have been held indefinitely until Korea as a whole was stabilised, had there been sufficient menace. It needed to be made certain beyond a peradventure that incursion across that line would have been met, not by conventional manoeuvrings of troops and guns, aircraft and ships, but by a calculated nuclear annihilation of the aggressing enemy's means of movement at the vital place. And would not this have been infinitely preferable to the vast terror, casualties and still continuing misery of the protracted military operations which, after years of frustration and agony, petered out in little better than the *status quo*? The scale of suffering that should have been offered as a certainty was far less, infinitely less, than the scales suffered because there was no deterrent.

In all this reconsideration of the dead and useless war of Korea, it must be remembered, with full respect and without rancour, that it was not the United Nations which initiated that war for prevention of

aggression: it was the United States, acting alone. True, the United Nations came in at once and took responsibility, but the initiation was unilateral. It may have to be unilateral again.

The scales of suffering are heavily weighted against war by the very experience of war. The tragedy is that the scales of judgment are so heavily weighted against menace for the prevention or cessation of war by means which are not yet conventional.

The greatest practical plan of deterrence from the continuation of war which has ever been put into force was the threat by the United States issued to Japan in 1945 that if Japan did not cease warlike action, the United States would destroy, successively, twenty Japanese cities. The process of destruction began. Upon that plan and as a part of it, there supervened the Hiroshima-Nagasaki attacks. That was enough. The war stopped. And ever since then the great deterrent to war has prevented what Hitler foretold and the Soviet Union up till now has continued, albeit needlessly, to fear—total war between the Western allies and the Soviet Union.

The scale of suffering accepted by Japan and by the world in the Hiroshima-Nagasaki disasters-of-war has been vindicated, chiefly by the fact that such weapons amid all others have not had to be brought into effect in Europe. Whatever may be the present state of relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western alliance, it is virtually certain that the tyrant, Stalin, was deterred more than once from recourse to measures that would have led to war, by understanding the meaning of Hiroshima and by divining the courage of the Western nations which he strove so hard to weaken by every device of Muscovite cunning.

In that connection, countries whose civilisation has passed beyond the phase of tyranny need to beware of a new cunning which has latterly been developing to make them afraid not of nuclear war but of nuclear deterrence, so that they are in danger of adopting nuclear disarmament in the face of nuclear-armed tyrants. This new danger has been magnified by widely stimulated credence in a section about the evil that may come from, for instance, Strontium-90 in the fall-out from nuclear weapon tests. The pseudo-scientific scare-mongering deliberately fostered around radio-activity in food has been conclusively exposed as false. But, alas, too many of us are prone to believe more in bogies of negative menace belonging to fictional "science" than in the positive facts which have emerged from real scientific research into radio-activity in vegetation, in animals and in food, and man's power to expel that danger naturally and normally.

In the ordinary way of revolution, matters eventually settle down, fears subside, policies change, trade is seen to be more rewarding than ideology, understanding is found to be better than fury. Then suffering of the pains of living is seen more clearly to be acceptance of the circumstances. May it be accepted by all who have control of unregenerate humanity that, in the nature of the evolution of man from beast, menace and compassion must go hand-in-hand.

# 7

## *The End of Menace*

### *The New Era*

THE present era began nearly two thousand years ago and is now, in the view of many observers, tired to death. It has been called The Christian Era—misleadingly so, many would say, seeing that the majority of the inhabitants of the world have no knowledge of Christianity, and the majority of those who have some knowledge of it suppose it to be a cult of capitalist-imperialism with a very long record of “idealised” war-making. Worse than that, the sceptics would assert with great force of reason that the majority of Christians who claim to practise Christianity do not know and never have known the real meaning of “The Christ” and that short of being reborn, they can hardly expect to know it, seeing that rebirth is a cardinal requirement of the faith.

Nevertheless, these last twenty centuries can pertinently be called the Christian era, because no other single concept of the significance of man, no other single example of the significance of man, no other Man, has made so deep an impression on the mind of man and on the conduct of the affairs of mankind throughout those 2,000 years than the Man who, as it were, “invented” *Our Father in Heaven* and said in his curiously surprising way that for heaven one must inquire within; the Man whose name is in constant use as an oath, or as an exclamation, but which can hardly,

without embarrassment, be mentioned in ordinary talk—and, probably rightly, very seldom is.

If, in fact, the Christian era is passing away, that can only be because another era is coming in to supersede it. For there apparently must *be* an era to live in!

A remark such as that, although not calculated to arouse the resentment of Christians, will nevertheless have that effect. The Christian era will not pass, they would say, until Christ is recognised and worshipped universally in spirit and in truth; and then, *The Kingdom* will come on Earth. Meanwhile, they might add, there may be Armageddon and the Apocalypse and other strange terrors, all of which can be very bad for non-Christians.

Christians who hold that view, and there may not be so many who now do, may find it best to concede the possibility that they may have misunderstood the meaning of Christ. And those others who hold the view that a new era must necessarily be heralded by a Messiah may also need to recognise that that idea, while certainly *their* idea, is not one that is necessarily compulsive upon their God. The notion that there can be no new era without some new transcendental revelation is not necessarily one that will greatly disturb the majority of those who take a wide view of the affairs of man. Most people seem to be satisfied that if mankind is indeed now “entering” a new era, then that era is likely to have a name which is concerned with material science. There are those who might, unscientifically, claim that the astrologers support that view; for the astrological prognostication is that the “Aquarian Age” is now beginning to envelop mankind in an era of questioning and of revolutionary

discoveries of new modes of thought and living—an era in which mankind will make great advances in the control of the natural circumstances of man. Be all that as it may, there is still plenty of room for doubt about a new era.

### *Remarriage of Science and Faith?*

Every generation since Ezra (supposedly) wrote the book of Genesis in Babylon, has preferred to suppose that it lives in an age of enlightenment. Latterly, enlightenment has been called science. And people like to suppose that the age in which they live is one that is moving progressively to a higher and better state of humanity. But perhaps they do not recognise that an "age of science" should mean an age of knowing the truth.

Deeply thinking people seem to be aware that, except by revelation or by mystical experience, no one can ever know the Truth; even the mystics can only know a flash or gleam of the Truth. For Truth is a very relative term and Truth is not much concerned with trivial and superficial fact.

For hundreds of years, science and religion in the West belonged to each other; they were one, based on the cosmology of Genesis as it is materially understood. But for hundreds of years, latterly, science and religion have been split in two. Now, they begin to appear to be ready to start coming together again. Eddington, Jung and Einstein seem, accidentally, to have become the unconscious leaders of the reunion. Due to them, and to men of their bent, opinions have greatly changed. It has been found that material—hard-fact matter—is essentially empty and paradoxically

non-material, and that matter is electrical energy, itself an enigma. The infinitely small "ultimate" particle of matter is not, it turns out, at all ultimate nor is it really a particle, but a wave-motion—except when a wave-motion turns out, after all, to be a particle. Or, perhaps it might even be both at once.

Gradually it is becoming evident that there is no finality about the inwardness of material, any more than there is finality about the outwardness of material as perceived in the galaxies of stars and spiral nebulae in space. And space and time have been found to be not the "real" realities they seem to our senses to be. But as we have no more than our senses to sense them with, it isn't sensible to worry too much about what they *really* are. Anyway, they are ideas. It has also been recognised that life is not limited to living creatures and vegetation as hitherto supposed; inanimate things, including metals, are found to have a degree of life. The dividing lines between animal, vegetable and mineral have become blurred. With all that, it is now possible to contend that the mind of man (whatever that may be) is basically in close association with what is called Universal Mind. On this hypothesis, Saul of Tarsus was well "on-the-beam" of modern psychology and sociology when he said, speaking in the name of Christ, that we are all members one of another. Many surprising discoveries have confronted those who think deeply but separately in science and in religion, leading some of the more adventurous among them to see, albeit dimly, a unity that pervades all diversity, and a power of infinite capacity that may be available to all in a triune world of body, mind and spirit.

If that is so, it would seem that the stage is, after

all, nearly set for the coming of a new era: the idea of the sanctity of the soul of man—the Christ in man—having sufficiently penetrated at last to enable a new era to begin. For that is what modern science seems to be boiling down to, though the language used by scientists in the van of real understanding is not allowed to appear so naïve as that.

### *Beyond War into Commonwealth*

Powered flight, radio-telegraphy and X-rays, coming in at the turn of the century were, for Rudyard Kipling, the harbingers of a new era, as is shown by his story of adventure, *With the Night Mail*, and in his even more prophetic phantasy, *As Easy as A.B.C.* That story opened with a decision being taken by the executive members of the international Aerial Board of Control ordering a fleet of rocket-lifted aircraft from bases one side of the Atlantic Ocean to go to a city on the other side. They were required for an emergency task of civic control. Intelligence had been received that a mass-meeting for a supposed community-rousing purpose was billed to take place that night in a certain suburb of a great city. The purpose of the air mission of the A.B.C. was to cause that event, by persuasion, to be abandoned. The mission was swiftly and humanely discharged, and this sketch of the incident, no doubt, carries a sinister suggestion of authoritarian power.

The action of that story took place, however, at a time in "future" history when war as a human activity had already been universally recognised as the folly it always was. War, therefore, had become a thing of the past, and so had oligarchies and great social

organisations of mass power and the negation of individual freedom in society.

That story was situated in a fictional new era: not the real new era we are now most assuredly approaching if the leading nations who hold the fort of human civilisation do not lose their nerve and, out of fear lest the ingenuities of man's contriving get fatally misapplied, abdicate, renouncing the proper exercise of the restraining power and judgment at their disposal. To be afraid of the thing you have only created in order to make the other man afraid, is like children playing ghosts. To respect a deterrent for what it is, is good sense and not to be confused with materialism.

To conclude the story . . . The preoccupation of Kipling's Aerial Board of Control was a simple and necessary one even in a world enjoying universal peace. It was to discourage the intrusion of mass organisations upon the privacy of the individual!

That human world-power should have no higher claim upon its resources than the protection of the privacy of the individual could only mean that Kipling visualised a world in which the sanctity of the individual soul was reckoned as transcending the authority of any organisation framed for the service of mankind. And that seems to be a world erect, not topsy-turvy. A world recognising the Christ in every man. Fanciful? All creation was, first, imagination.

If, as few will doubt, we are already actually in a new era of communication, so are we also in a new era of society and government. The turn of the century was a turning away from feudalism and a turning towards social combination; it marked for the United Kingdom the turning-point from the era of Empire to the era of Commonwealth.

At this time the Commonwealth stands as the only body of world nations in which, each with sovereign freedoms, each has sacrificed to each other measures of sovereignty and power in a common allegiance. This pattern has assuredly become the object of emulation of the United Nations Organisation, itself a herald of a new era. Lenin had a similar ideal for the U.S.S.R.

At least, in the fields of sociological organisation and international human understanding there are signs of a new era having begun.

### *Power for Peace*

Power, the first quest of ambitious man, exceeding all other quests of vanity, is "god" to men who are chiefly concerned to secure the satisfactions of mastership. This is the male instinct: it is the male response to scarcity, for it is the only means of ensuring the distribution of commodities.

Commodities themselves are dependent upon power for their production. The most pressing of all economic problems in this age of rising standards of living is power—electric power in particular. There is a world shortage of power of every kind. Given power, man could satisfy all his economic needs. When he can do this he will no longer require to deprive others of theirs, and need no longer fear aggression. Armaments will cease to have significance. In all logic, war should then be a thing of the past. Against this, it may be urged that war is a macrocosm of many microcosms of evil, and that war will never be abolished until all evil is abolished. But, in effect, evil comes from fear and fear comes from deprivation and scarcity. At least, therefore, in the material sense it

seems reasonable to assert that war could have no point when there is no longer a scarcity of essential commodities. This, indeed, is the problem that political and economic philosophers are all chiefly concerned about.

Thinking then of material security, a new era in abundance of power may be expected to begin to appear with the evolution of ultra-high-temperature generators such as "Zeta," born out of H-bomb technology. For, when "Zeta's" progeny can be made to transform sea-water into power, employing a cycle of operation that requires no fuel to keep the process going, nuclear power will be dirt cheap and unlimited. But such things have yet to be evolved. If you do not believe too strongly that war comes from spiritual causes but can admit that it comes chiefly from economic causes, from the shortage of power, then you may concede that Zeta is potentially the essential symbol in the material world of the new era when disarmament can gradually become a universal fact, world wide. For then, say by A.D. 2000, even the thousand million inhabitants of China will be beginning to find that they *can* be fed, clothed and sheltered without the normal ravages of flood, famine and disease and without recourse to war with their neighbours. China is cited as an example of the whole world of humanity in its constant struggle for existence. But that potential revolution in the economies of China depends, of course, on much besides economics, engineering and medical science.

The new era needs to be one in which the aim is not to have mere existence or even high-standard existence; the aim must be to have life and to have it abundantly so that people live for living. In the passing era it has seemed—and still to many it seems—

that the world was made to be a place for struggle, for *getting*; a place for forgetting. It has not commonly been seen that the world was created to be a unity rejoicing in peace. Such a realisation of purpose may be remote; it may seem to have no particular relevance to the "unseen" world as it is "seen" by spiritualists; but that is no reason for questioning the logic of it. Whether such a world can be approached depends a good deal on arranging for fear to be put where it properly belongs and, the Deist would say, on the will of man becoming more aligned to the Supreme Will. Perhaps, long before 2000, a more general credence in that concept will have been induced into materialist philosophies, if only to keep abreast of science! In that event there is a prospect of a wise new world overtaking a merely brave new world.

Meanwhile, medical scientists are beginning to find that the "gifts" of diagnosis and healing come from somewhere other than medical science allows, and can be projected in ways that are peculiar, not to say miraculous. By means which have new techniques and new names—Radiesthesia and Radionics, for example—applied with old and mysterious pharmaceutical practices, such as homoeopathy, a new era in the overcoming of psychosomatic diseases of all kinds is beginning to show that the healing and curative forces of life at all levels may emanate from a realm that is beyond mind and science. But meanwhile, on the other hand, the application of psychological discoveries to the enslavement of man under materialistic systems of totalitarianism darkens the human scene in countries where it is by no means universally accepted that freedom is an essential condition for human progress.

Cultural and economic developments of even the most altruistic kinds are almost impossible to achieve in the face of ignorance and popular prejudice: it is, therefore, inevitable that measures of mass compulsion will continue to prevail until, gradually, there is recognition among those to be benefited that the price of freedom is a better understanding of social responsibility. It is of no avail to deplore or deny the fact that much good comes out of evil. By the appalling evils of endemic Mongolian czardom, for instance, whether of the pre-revolution or post-revolution (Leninist/Stalinist) manifestations, the Soviet Union has been rife with rampant evil. But that is not to condone evil, nor does it deny that there may well seem to be "principalities and powers" behind the organisers of tyranny. Nevertheless, much good is emerging from the inward spirit of the people who, in changed circumstances, are better able to express themselves as creative members of socially awakened, communicating and co-operating nationalities. This betterment might have been done otherwise, but despite all evil courses, greater understanding is emerging as new generations arise; as though spring were following a long winter. A doubt remains, however, as to whether the appearances—the new look—we applaud are not almost entirely confined to the animal, vegetable and mineral planes of existence rather than being imminent in *human* life at a level above social organisation.

There is no virtue in belittling social progress. But if that social understanding is to grow positively, is it not more likely to grow out of the most compelling of all human forces—the force of positive example? Despite all the reaction and repression that prevails in countries whose populations are living below acceptable levels of

economic security, a great deal of example is being shown in the matter of altruistic action by nations whose economic resources are more highly developed. There is, however, great urgency for much more to be done in the matter of capital development to enable countries of low economic productivity to break through into the conditions of productivity which highly capitalised countries can achieve. Birth-rates in those economically handicapped countries are all the time overtaking the improved resources for maintaining and raising the economic levels. This points again to the need for understanding of social responsibility usually called, for short, Education. But it also points to the need for cheap power and to the hope that lies in the projects called Zeta, Alpha and DCX for nuclear-fusion power. The productivity which will ensue, when power is no longer limited to the Earth's dwindling resources of chemical fuels, should be capable of removing altogether the social reproach and menace which are inherent in the "underdeveloped" countries where material technology lags so far behind the requirements for satisfying man's minimum material needs, let alone his real human needs.

The prospect of cheap power to relieve the toil-wastage of under-nourished manpower may still be far off, but a much nearer prospect is the general development of automation to eliminate the economically prohibitive drudgeries involved in the production of consumer goods. This boon to man, if only it is accepted and operated as such, can and will be happily applied all over the world, although, for the usual reasons, it is likely to be delayed and unhappily misapplied. Automation will necessitate social change at the same time and the same rate as it enables social

change to be made. If the transition is handled wisely it will not result in the multiplication of triviality in social habits; it will create a qualitative change in current social values. In that respect, the prospect is that creative art, creative thought, creative relationships will be universally stimulated. This will surely come about not only through existing means of human communication, but through all the oncoming developments of radio inception, perception and reception up to and including applied telepathy—all of which belong to the evolutionary forces of the new era. For does it not already appear that there is a single spectrum of sensible frequencies, or wave-lengths, from the slow beat of sound, through heat and light and on through radio to the post-ultra-high-frequencies of mental thought—and on to what beyond?

### *The Phase of Fear*

The trends towards freedom and imaginative evolution which are the proper fruits of peace, prosperity and security depend primarily upon freedom from fear, or, in other words, *belief* in security. While there continues to be apprehension that the existence of great military power has war as its purpose, people will fear. While there continues to be universal suspicion of intended aggression and widespread cynicism about the ethical and moral “virtue” of mounting prohibitive deterrence (on the grounds that major weapons could not be used without suicidal, genocidal consequences) there will be deep continuing fear. Fear is deliberately created by negative propaganda to undermine the positive determination of men and women of goodwill and their willingness to face courageously the consequences

of honourable commitments. Such propaganda takes a form that is easily accepted, notwithstanding its basis upon an hypothesis that has been historically falsified. It asserts that no nation could possibly face the horror of nuclear warfare. But in their move towards nuclear weapons Japan is in fact doing just that. She is facing the known and experienced horror of nuclear warfare, imagining how much worse it could be, and determining to prevent its happening again by every available power of deterrence.

So much of the fear generated is in response to a public appetite for excitement. But there is a great deal of real fear that is based entirely on false premises. It is known, for instance, that the Communists have popular war-cries about world-wide expansion : “Death to the Bourgeoisie ! ” “ Down with Capitalism ! ” Of course they do. Every popular movement has to get up steam and, of course, there has been good reason for believing that those ideas were, and are, intended by the Bolsheviks and Trotskyites to be believed by all concerned—to keep up steam ! But those war-cries are also much appreciated as propaganda by anti-Communists, to keep up steam in anti-Communism. The notion that Communism is going to master the world is as absurd as its counterpart, that the “ Capital-imperialist ” nations intend to overthrow that highly capitalised and imperialist combination called the Soviet Union. Whatever may be the tenets of Marxism, the Soviet Union is *not* intent upon world domination. It is hard to consider dispassionately the menace that exists between that country and Western Powers : it is not hard to consider dispassionately the menace that potentially exists between that same country and the People’s Republic of China. The idea that those two

groups will combine under a single government and a single policy is as absurd as the idea that the one could contemplate the conquest of the other by any means. Thus it should be seen that the whole complex of fear of war between nuclear-armed nations is fantastic.

At last it is beginning to be recognised that our fears, and the neuroses which come from them, are largely of our own making; that the way to get rid of them is not to rid ourselves of the external weapons of protection but, rather, to dissolve the internal weapons of self-destruction—silly, wicked and baseless ideas—which are thrust into our consciousness by those negative influences, the principalities of evil. They have a vested interest in terror, for they belong to the levels of life below the truly Human level.

While all these fantastic notions inspired by fear continue to be held and played upon, there is little prospect of a new era appearing as a reality of new being. But once a different set of ideas really begins to become established in the minds of men the ideas that might-and-menace of arms, skill in using them, proper self-confidence and mutual co-operation in strength are all, rightly, the marks of responsibility, protection, security and peace; then, the negative mental tide will turn. For weapons are not only a means of extending the animal principle of tooth and claw; they are a means of restraining the animal in man from acting as such against his own kind. When that basic means of control is accepted for what it is, the scales of menace can be reduced, beginning preferably with a successive reduction of the numbers of men trained in the arts of fighting, and ultimately completing disarmament by the reduction of the weapons of maximum menace—not the other way round.

### *The Flickering Light*

A fairly general opinion is that *the* menace of life is death—death in its varying degrees of dying. An incident in the life of all things is certainly death! That is indisputable fact in regard to any living creature that has not by some means achieved immunity from the “incident” known as death. Records of immunity from death are not plentiful: historically, it was evidently a matter of official, if not compulsory, belief for Jewry that a certain prophet of Israel, called Elijah, was carried into another existence without death. The practitioners of Yoga also have views based on “experience” of transition without death. Although the Easter story is the foundation stone of their religion, Christians are somewhat equivocal on the point; generally they agree that death is an incident. But there is general disagreement about whether death is an incident *en passant* (a great deal of evidence to the contrary is cited), or whether it is a prolonged phase of elsewherelessness—that is to say a transitional sleep, or dream, or life prior to something else, beyond that incident or phase called death.

The subject is an enthralling one and customarily *taboo*. Death is, nevertheless, a great human enigma. Everyone wants reassurance on the subject—as they do, also, on the subjects of life and love. Each is an enigma and each is shadowed by menace.

As has already been said, the original and fully authorised Christian viewpoint about death was that in certain circumstances man can avoid the negation of death; he can undergo a process of total inward regeneration provided he is re-born of “water” (living Truth) and the *Holy Spirit*. Basically, in its first

generation, that is what Christianity was chiefly concerned about—the transforming of the life of the individual so that he could live in amity and not die. The process of total regeneration was originally, in the Christian context, demonstrated not solely by a Nazarene carpenter's adopted son but by a mixture of somewhat rough types, historically and apocryphally certified to have been men of unsatisfactory character. As portrayed with inspiration in the world's most famous conversation-piece painting—Leonardo da Vinci's *The Last Supper*—they are made to appear very unlike the traditional conception of "holy" men. The only educated man among them, it will be remembered, was cast for a particularly distasteful scripture-fulfilling role which, at the appropriate time, he was bidden to do quickly. And all the others, not more than a few hours after that solemn ceremony of communion, displayed their inherent feebleness of character. The remarkable and astonishing thing about those men, or a number of them, was the regeneration that did in fact occur in their lives and characters and abilities, if not at once, then gradually in later years.

With the addition of, from the Christian point of view, a highly unattractive Roman-Jew from Tarsus—also admitted to re-birth for no demonstrable merit other than outstanding recalcitrance—that group of men, some women and friends, have revolutionised world attitudes to life and living.

The turning-point for Saul of Tarsus was a dumfounding and blinding mystical experience. He remained physically blind for years—a real psychosomatic example of self-punishment. His "vision" and his blinding occurred a few hours after he had been aiding,

abetting and observing the lynching of a young re-born Jew called Stephen. It seems that Saul saw Stephen's life as a spiritual body wafted away in a manner that was not like death, but like transition.

Since the days of those outstanding examples of life-transformation, a great many millions have been called to follow suit, but relatively few seem to have been altogether regenerated. The reasons for this are not as clear as they are said to be. It has been popularly supposed for many hundreds of years, as the result of deliberate teaching, that this particular gift of regeneration is reserved for people who achieve certain standards of scriptural knowledge and bind themselves irrevocably to certain affirmations of esoteric speculation called creeds. Nothing could be less authoritative in origin. None of the early Christians were in any such way formally trained prior to admission, nor were they formally bound, afterwards. And it is they who should best know what was, with high authority, regarded as necessary qualification for the grace of rebirth—for simply *starting* the process—and they did not specify any of the formalities subsequently invented.

Whatever it was, the Christian process had highly remarkable results; so much so that every kind of repressive measure taken by the Roman authorities—prison, chain-gangs, galley-slavery, death, torture, being thrown to the lions—all these had the reverse of the effect intended on the allegiance of those already set in the process. Oppression increased their enthusiasm and their numbers. So numerous and influential did they become that they had to be officially recognised, officially organised, officially approved—indeed, their codified system, for such had it become, was formally

adopted as the state religion in Rome, the capital of the World's leading Empire. But that codification and the resultant elaborations adversely affected the essential freedom and simplicity of the Christian cult. For religion means that which binds or to which you are bound, as well as meaning that to which you freely or willingly adhere.

Every impartial investigator has to admit that sincere personal surrender to the tenets of a spiritual faith have resulted, and continue to result, in the transformation of personalities and in great elevation of personal perception and powers. This is true of devotees to any of the five great religions. Christianity has been selected for special mention, not because it has the most numerous following, but because it has had the greatest influence in the shaping of modern civilisation. On the other hand, it cannot be claimed that nobility of character is not equally attainable by adherents to other faiths. Nor can it be denied that men of profound significance to the welfare of mankind, by their self-sacrificing devotion to human service and by their exercise of spiritual power, have given no allegiance to any of those faiths. Because of these facts, and for other reasons, there is widespread scepticism, now, about the relative merits and efficacies of the practice of any of the various creeded or organised Deisms—of which there are hundreds—as compared with the varieties of Humanisms—of which Communism is the most numerous, the most creeded and the most organised.

But in the Western world there is a growing conviction that none of the great "prophets" of any of the Deistic religions ever required from any man the kind of things that are most popularly done in their

names, and that have been done in their names for centuries past. In that general connection, even Karl Marx was heard to declare that he himself was a very bad Marxist! Equally, there is a growing supposition that reinterpretation of the essential truths of life is necessary for each of the great faiths. In short, there has latterly been a great increase of intellectual and ritualist interest in every kind of approach to the higher development of man. And there is a great variety of obvious reasons why that should be so. Only one of those reasons is the prevalent state of fear about weapons. By far the greatest reason for the increase of interest is the widespread feeling that *organised* religion is not concentrating on the essential requirements now, any more than it was at the end of the last era when that fact was the one and only matter concerning a State professional organisation and hierarchy which Jesus of Nazareth showed any determined and continuing desire to reform.

### *The Passing Era*

Without much doubt of any kind, the era that began about one thousand, nine hundred and forty-five years ago was not a material thing: it was not a mental thing and certainly not an organisational thing: it was an awakening of the sleeping beauty in man—that trinity of body, mind and spirit in which spiritual force is the key to mental and physical regeneration. It is equally certain that most of the records about it were destroyed by counter-propaganda, by persecution, by distortion and exaggeration and by that war in Palestine which destroyed Jerusalem about

forty years after the Crucifixion of Jesus. Such oral records as survived were carried in the minds of people who had met the man himself and had heard and seen him in action; they were preserved by those who felt his power in themselves and so came to know its meaning, and they were handed on by word of mouth. Years later they were written down in response to popular demand, and "records" were invented, as was the custom of those times. So the whole issue became very confused and has been the subject of controversy ever since.

In view of all that, it should be surprising to find that after over a thousand years of State-organised Christianity, Christian wars were being fought ostensibly for Christian purposes which, in fact, had economic and political aims. But, in fact, *nothing* can be surprising about organised religion any more. Crusades were at least stimulating to patriotism. But they had nothing whatever to do with spiritual regeneration. Of all the travesties of faith which could injure a faith's purposes, surely none could be more harmful than the insanity of mixing up the quest for external, temporal power with the personal and inward quest for spiritual grace. That is adultery. And all those familiar claims made in time of any war that God favours one set of people more than another seem, in the case of Christianity, to neglect the claim that God is Love and the manifest fact that man in war is exercising his own will, perhaps as rightly as he knows how, in the proper interest of his own Caesar.

But despite all that, the central idea of the Christian faith has remained and is vitally active in the world today; by no means only in organisations known by religious names.

The justification for offering this sketch of the scattering of a great idea is the increasing evidence of its accepted relevance to this study. Those who are not being driven by fear, or by the prevalent manifestations of fear, to remove the *objects* of fear—weapons—instead of the *causes* of fear—worldly frustration—are increasingly perceiving that the third element of the trinity of human life is the deepest object of life's quest. And this, perhaps, is the most hopeful sign of all the signs of the coming of a new era. Statistically, in terms of proportionate numbers, the adherence of adult people to any of the generality of organised systems for spiritual enlightenment may be discouraging to the organisations concerned. Potentially, however, the demand for spiritual enlightenment is enormous. Perhaps it can too easily be forgotten that, in essence, enlightenment is not organisational, nor doctrinal but purely personal. People personally may desire to be re-born by Truth out of the Holy Spirit so that, in due time, they may have the growth of spiritual grace to *know* the will of God, and do it. Meanwhile they may well think it best to keep their powder dry.

### *The Human Trinity*

These brief indications of trends towards a new era may have shown that on the physical, mental and spiritual planes of living there is increasing positive evidence—despite all the negative, destructive aspects of current affairs—of re-generation.

The enormously significant human developments now going forward seem to demand, for stability, that the human trinity of matter, mind and spirit be kept in proper relationship.

To secure the most favourable economic conditions for the break-through from sub-standard economic existence to the level of re-generative economies, like those of the more industrialised nations, requires great application of capital resources. To secure the break-through from an existence seemingly dependent upon economic-materialism into a life of human fulfilment of a different kind, seems to require a *pax atomica* which is understood to be what it is, the flaming sword which warns and guards against intrusion, aggression and war. That is the ultimate justification for overwhelming menace; to hold the peace of Caesar for the time being, whatever the nature of Caesar's laws, in at least some of the kingdoms of this world.

We can do a good deal, nowadays, about matter and mind, as every dictator has found. What we cannot do anything about in a scientific way, so far as we know, is the arbitrary allocation of the power of the spirit of Man, or the gift of the grace of God, if you prefer—for there is but *one* spirit, according to Saul of Tarsus. That evidently is a grace that grows within a man and unites with the spirit of other men, to make beauty and healing and life more abundant. Like other peaceful virtues, it grows best in circumstances that are not so disrupted by evil perversions that peace of mind cannot prevail.

If that concept about “the third element” becomes more generally acceptable, may not the conditions be set for the right sort of surrender, not to totalitarian materialist oligarchies but to the Power that is really behind All? This might make for a steadier, perhaps swifter, transformation of human life on Earth, if indeed that Power has a purpose for Earth and Mankind. If the wisdom of Tibet is any guide in this

matter, elevation to higher levels of Human beings above those of the sentient beast, from which mankind has been making its slow and painful ascent for millions of years, is a matter of major concern not only for men on earth but also for Human Beings "elsewhere" in an ascending hierarchy to the Immanent Infinite.

Alas, Tibet's determination over the centuries to live in another world, secret from the actual world of nations, protected only by its mountains, its isolationism and an esotericism not fully shared by the people, has provided the rest of the world with a pathetic example of the need for balance in the trinity of mankind's affairs. The hermit nation is no more suited to the family of nations than is the hermit man to the family of man. So, "the things of Caesar" having been neglected in Tibet, that ancient and venerable religious civilisation has succumbed to an alien Caesar. Meanwhile, as if to show that the world is not a completely isolated family of nations, evidence accumulates, regarded by some as compelling, of the interest shown by beings from elsewhere who operate flying saucers, of a technology far surpassing earthly skills and knowledge. The earth may not stand alone in its material power.

### *The Fulfilment of Man*

No one can be content with the idea that for evermore man is to be saddled with the necessity for mounting fantastic menace against the propensity of man to dominate man. But, for the time being, that assuredly is the propensity of "economic man," accustomed as he is to scarcity markets and the use of force to secure

his physical needs. Perhaps two ineffable things are now needed, above all else, in each of the three worlds of man—the physical, the mental and the spiritual; those two abstractions are *power* and *time*—power to know, act and love aright, and time for “the third element” to work its healing and regeneration. Then, before this new era becomes old in unfulfilled promise the true Human Spirit of man may gain the allegiance of a mankind which at last discerns that we are members of a unity of the whole Earth created totally for the fulfilment of mankind and, through him, the fulfilment of all other creatures.

This surely is a prospect that is not without appeal to Humanist and Deist alike: a prospect of infinite attraction worthy of all man’s power of creative imagining, adventure, endeavour, co-operation and dedication. This is no new vision, but it is capable of fulfilment only by the inflow of transcendent spiritual power paralleling the transformations now increasingly coming about through enhanced resources of terrestrial power in the physical and mental planes of all the activities of mankind. This is a prospect of a world freed from war by being freed from want; a world, meanwhile, which can be freed from fear by the known and trusted willingness of at least one nation—which has faced extinction more than once before—being more fully than ever willing to risk extinction rather than permit the blasphemy of world-wide tyranny.

That nation will rightly be wary of reverting to conventions of strength that can be seen to be weakness and exploited as such. Real strength at each and every level of menace alone can give a prospect of fulfilling

the Earth at every level of being. If, as the Humanists rightly claim, man on Earth is man's chief business; and if, as the Deists rightly claim, man was destined to have dominion over all the Earth and every living creature—the prospect of peace through strength is wholly attuned to the Human Spirit of Man. And that, after all, *is* the fulfilment of Man.

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