

THE SOVIETS AND AFGHANISTAN

CYRIAC MAPRAYIL

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
First Indian edition 1986

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ISBN 81-85047-07-3



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G1886

Published by :

S.K. BHATIA

for RELIANCE PUBLISHING HOUSE
3026/7H, Ranjit Nagar, New Delhi-110008
Phone : 586889

Printed in India
at Print Craft (India)
New Delhi-110 028

*This book is dedicated to the memory of
Indira Gandhi
who defended freedom and independence in the
Third World*

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Preface

Afghanistan, which embraces strategic areas in Central Asia, had on her borders imperial Britain until the Bolshevik Revolution. Russia acquiesced in 1873 in Britain's claim to have Afghanistan under her sphere of influence. But when Britain found it difficult to enforce her claim she invaded Afghanistan in 1879 and British control of Afghan foreign relations was made part of the settlement that followed. Therefore, Afghanistan was prevented from having any contact with any country other than Britain. The same arrangement continued until the treaty of Rawalpindi of 1919 that followed the third Anglo-Afghan war of which Amir Amanullah was the prime mover.

With the rise of Amir Amanullah, Afghanistan embarked upon a new phase in its foreign policy. He found Bolshevik Russia more sympathetic to Afghan aspirations than imperial Russia. With the dawn of Soviet-Afghan friendship, Afghanistan thought that she had nothing to fear from her powerful neighbours north or south. During the inter war period, Afghanistan established diplomatic and commercial relations with many countries. Afghan foreign policy was seriously interfered with during the Second World War by the Anglo-Soviet demand for the expulsion of Axis nationals from their country. The Afghan King and cabinet concurred reluctantly with the demand.

After the Second World War, the U.S. filled the vacuum created by the British departure from Asia. Afghanistan profes-

sed a policy of equal friendship towards both the Soviet Union and the U.S. A flow of Soviet and American aid into Afghanistan followed. Despite such assistance, Afghanistan remains poor and undeveloped. Afghan poverty made the Soviet system attractive to the Afghan peasantry. Geographic nearness made Soviet friendship a necessity for the Afghan Government. Nevertheless Afghanistan professed a policy of non-alignment. This policy suited the Soviet Union too. The 1978 coup which brought about a communist government in Afghanistan took everyone by surprise, possibly even the Soviets.

The Islamic revolution in Iran which deposed the Shah introduced a new factor in the area. It cast a shadow over the the newly formed communist government in Kabul. The Soviet military move into Afghanistan in 1979 is to be seen against this background. Afghanistan in 1979 found herself in a position similar to that in 1879—one hundred years before.

This book surveys and analyses some of the important relationships between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union since the revolution in 1917. Some considerations which might have relevance to the working out of a peaceful settlement in the region are presented here.

I am grateful to Shri S.K. Kochhar of UBS Publishers Distributors Pvt. Ltd. and Shri S.K. Bhatia of Reliance Publishing House for their kind help in connection with the publication of this book.

Feb. 4th 1986

CYRIAC MAPRAYIL

Acknowledgements

In one way or another, very many people have helped me during my research, notably amongst these are Professor David Dilks, Professor James Joll, Professor Ram Rahul, Professor Edward Ellsworth, Major John Harrison, Dr G.J. Alder and Dr Teresa O'Donovan. Mr Martin Moir of the India Office Library and Records and Miss Travis of the India House Library, deserve special mention as do Valda and Diana who showed enormous patience and skill in preparing the typescript.

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Introductory— An Historical Perspective

The history of the region, now known as Afghanistan, has mainly been shaped by its geographical position. It has had the misfortune to hear the tramp of invaders marching towards the rich Indus plains led by such famed conquerors as Alexander the Great, (fourth century B.C.), Genghis Khan (thirteenth century) and Nadir Shah Afshar (eighteenth century). Because of her location as a 'highway of conquest' Afghanistan was vulnerable to invasions from the west as well as from Central and Southern Asia. Thus the region inhabited by the Afghans became part of Alexander the Great's conquests in the fourth century B.C., when he overran the Persian empire. Later, Bactria and Kabul came under Graeco-Buddhist rulers, while in the seventh century Arab conquerors ruled the area. Mongols like Genghis Khan and Tamerlane (1336-1405) governed the region after conquering it and later it became part of the great Moghul empire and remained so until 1720.

A. *Strategic Position of Afghanistan*

Afghanistan, which took its name from the dominant ethnic group, the Afghans¹, did not take its geopolitical shape until 1947.² Until then same parts of it were small, independent tribal

units and some others formed parts of the Indian and Persian empires. However, in 1709 the Ghilzais³ (under Mir Wais), the second largest of the Afghan tribes revolted against their Persian rulers, and the Khandahar region became an independent tribal unit. This was the first move towards forming a 'federation' of the tribal territories. In like manner, in 1716 the Herat region became independent of Persia after a revolt by the Abdali tribe. Other tribes followed suit. In the wake of the Afghan movement towards independence, starting at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Lahore and Delhi⁴ came under the sway of the Afghans, a process which continued till it was checked by the British expansion in the east. Its frontiers receded, and by 1826, when Dost Muhammed became the Amir of Afghanistan, the kingdom's frontiers comprised roughly those of the present day. Afghanistan was scarcely a nation, but was rather more like a very loose and informal grouping of tribes for the whole of the eighteenth and a large part of the nineteenth century.

Because of its geographical position, Afghanistan had faced pressures from Russia and British India. Afghanistan as it constituted itself in 1917 was the result of border settlements with Russia in 1873, 1887 and 1895, with Iran in 1905 and with British India in 1893. The frontiers of Afghanistan were demarcated from Russia in the north by a line running from Zulfiqar at the north-west corner, joining the Oxus river in the district of Kham-i-Ab and skirting Lake Victoria to the junction with Sinkiang on the inaccessible range of Sarikol. Then, from the east, the boundary ran along the North-West Frontier Province of India. It reached Baluchistan at the Gomal Pass and, from Koh-i-malik-Siah in the south to Zulfiqar Pass it ran parallel with the Iranian frontiers.

The British wanted Afghanistan to serve as a buffer state between India and Russia. To achieve that objective they seemed prepared to go a long way, to the extent of installing a puppet leader and, if need be, even of conquering the country. This attitude was shown in the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars,⁵ both of which were initiated by the British Government.⁶ The Afghan consent to the Treaty of Gandamak

(May 1879), dictated by the British, bound the Amir to follow British advice on Afghan foreign relations. However, it must be remembered that there were times when the preoccupation of the British elsewhere meant that they did not want to take a stern line with Afghanistan, but were willing to meet Afghan demands. Besides, the British feared that if they pressed Afghanistan too hard then the Amir might make terms with Russia. At the same time the British were anxious not to share a land frontier with Russia. This gave the Afghan Government a better bargaining position than the size of the country and its meagre wealth would ordinarily have commanded.

B. Russia's Southward Expansion

After the 1815 settlement of Vienna, Russia felt able to turn her attention from European affairs to territory in her immediate neighbourhood, namely, Central Asia. The Russian Government accordingly sent expeditions into various provinces of Central Asia to explore commercial and military prospects. To the south-east of Russia were the three Khanates of Kokand, Bokhara and Khiva and the region called Turkestan. Khiva and Bokhara seem to have received greater attention from the Tsarist Government at that time. Khiva was seen as a barrier to Russian economic expansion into Bokhara, and as a strategically important post on the way to Merv, which was a base close to Herat. It is difficult to deny that the Russian expeditions were partly meant for military gains which could lead to territorial expansion. As mentioned above, Russia had started exploratory adventures during the years that followed the settlement of Vienna, and she adopted a similar policy after the peace of Paris in 1856. An army of 150,000 men moved to the Steppes of Central Asia and, after the conquest of the Caucasus, marched through the plains between the Alatan range and Jaxartes (Syr Darya). By 1863 the distance between the Russian empire and British India was reduced from 4000 to 1000 miles. However, it was not all due to Russian advance. The Bombay Presidency had by then extended its frontiers from Kathiawar to the head of the Bolan, and the Bengal Presidency from the

Sutlej to the Khyber.⁷ In 1864 the Russians reached the borders of Kokand, Bokhara and Khiva; in 1865 Tashkent was occupied; in 1867 the new province of Russian Turkestan⁸ was constituted, and Bokhara had to accept the position of a subsidiary ally of the Tsar; in 1868 Samarkand, previously temporarily occupied, was annexed; and Russia occupied Khiva in 1873 and Kokand in 1875.

British India's fear of Russia, then at a striking distance from the north-eastern province of Afghanistan, had increased. Sir John Lawrence, the retiring Viceroy of India (1864-69), who advocated a firm non-forward policy in North-West Frontier, revealed the growing anxiety when he wrote :

'it (Russia) cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan or in those of any state which lies contiguous to our frontier... If this failed, we might give that power to understand that an advance towards India beyond a certain point, would entail her in war, in all parts of the world, with England'.⁹

Lord Clarendon at the Foreign Office, who subscribed to the anti-Russian stance of Palmerston, took Sir John Lawrence's comments seriously. He thought the solution to the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the East lay in mutual recognition of some designated neutral territory between their territories.¹⁰ The Tsar Alexander II (1855-81) welcomed this proposal and stated that he looked upon Afghanistan as being completely outside Russia's sphere of influence.¹¹

Britain was anxious to define her boundary in the northern frontier with Afghanistan, for that would be the line which British forces would have to defend. She could not tolerate any Russian interference south of the Oxus, which formed a natural frontier; this she had also made very clear to the Russians. Nevertheless, agreement was reached on the general principle that everything in the possession of the Afghan Amir would be considered as Afghan territory.¹² The Russians, in return, asked Britain for an assurance that she would

‘use all her influence with Sher Ali, in order to induce him to maintain a peaceful attitude’.¹³

However, in November 1871, the Russians denied absolutely that Sher Ali had any right to Badakhshan and Wakhan. They considered Badakhshan as a strategically important area because it was contiguous to Kokand, Bokhara and Kashgar (Sufu). Thus, they feared that if it should come under Afghan rule it could be used for Afghan intrigue and as a springboard from which to intrude into areas considered to be within the Russian sphere of influence. The Russians wanted to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a powerful Muslim country which might intrigue against them in Russian-controlled areas inhabited by fellow-Muslims in Central Asia. According to the 1873 Granville-Gorchakoff Agreement the Oxus river marked the northern frontier of Afghanistan. This agreement was based on the assumption, on the part of the British Government, that Badakhshan and Wakhan were to the south of the river Oxus. In fact both countries had territories on both sides of the river.¹⁴

Abdur Rahman, who became Amir in 1880 (–1901), alarmed by the Russian activity on his northern frontier, asked the British Indian Government in 1882 to define his boundaries. He was told by the Viceroy that the matter was closed, according to the 1873 arrangement. However, when Lord Ripon, the Viceroy (1880-84) asked Abdur Rahman to declare his boundaries in the north-east of Afghanistan, the latter did so by laying claim to Shighnan, Wakhan and Roshan. In order to assert his claim he marched his troops into Roshan. Afghanistan also claimed a right to certain trans-Oxus territories since Wakhan, Ishkashan, Gharan, Shighnan and Roshan were districts bisected by the Panja river. When the Russians protested against Amir’s advances to the north of the river, that violated the terms of the 1873 arrangement, it was felt in India that should the Afghan troops withdraw, Russia would secure a permanent footing in an advanced and most important strategic position. Moreover, from the southern skirts of the Pamir, Russia could communicate in one direction with her militar

outposts situated at Kokand and Samarkand, and also through her control of the Baroghil Pass, which gave her easy access to both Kashmir and Kabul through the open valley of Gilgit and Chitral. By the capture of Khiva and the annexation of the Khivan territory in 1873 Russia had secured the possession of a very strategically important point in Central Asia. The Russian expansion into Turkoman¹⁵ territory had been prevented by the lack of transport facilities. To compensate for this, in 1881 the Russians had built an extension of the railway from the eastern shores of the Caspian to Qizil Arvat. From then onwards, Russia could station a sizeable force in the most remote area of her Transcaspian territory.

Her successful southward expansion would have damaged the traditional British reputation of military superiority, believed in by her neighbours, particularly Persia. From Merat Ararat to Askabad and beyond, the Russian border was co-terminous with the Persian border. The presence of a Russian fleet in the Caspian and the new facility of troop movement by train gave Russia a superior striking position in relation to Persia. Use of the conquered Turkomans as the vanguard of her armies was another obvious advantage in Russian expansion. Terrified by the defeat of their brethren at Geok-Tepe in 1881 by the Russian general Mikhail Skobelev, the inhabitants of the Tejend Oasis offered their submission to the conquerors. That Submission brought Russia a territory which was within 30 miles striking distance of Sarakhas and within a radius of 232 miles of Herat.

'If England does not use Surrukhs [sic] for defence, Russia will use it for offence'.¹⁶

In 1884, the occupation of Merv took place. Since Merv was only a week's march from Herat, the conquest of Merv meant Cossack and Afghan met for the first time. In the following year, an event occurred which brought British India and Russia to the brink of war—this was the Russia attack on, and occupation of, the Afghan town of Panjdeh. Russia's interest in that strategically important area of Turkestan, bordering

Afghanistan, becomes evident if one examines the development of the Russian railway system. A rail link was extended to Merv (1886) and from there to Samarkand (1888) ; and a further extension linked Merv with Kushk (1898), and Samarkand with Tashkent.¹⁷ The railway network was of strategic importance in the event of any Russo-British military engagement in India, the Kushk post being only 70 miles from Herat. From Krasnovodsk on the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea, to Orenburg (Chkalov) on the extreme south-east of Russia proper, a single line extended 2300 miles. Orenburg is the point of junction between the railway systems of Russia proper and the Trans-Siberian railway, so that the new line to Tashkent not only brought European Russia close to Central Asia, but also formed a link with the Far East. Krasnovodsk had steamer communication with Baku on the Caspian, which was indirect railway communication with Moscow, and was also connected by rail with Batumi (Batum) on the Black Sea. Thus, it was only two days' journey for the large Russian garrison in the Caucasus, and was conveniently connected with Russia proper. If Russia moved further south, her logical step would have been a dash upon Herat.

'At Kushk...the whole of the garrison of Central Asia is within 30 hours' journey by train, and a column could be concentrated there, flung upon Herat, and have commenced shelling the citadel before it was known in Kabul or Quetta that the Russians were on the move'.¹⁸

Thus Russia was in a position to occupy Herat whenever she wanted, so argued those who genuinely feared a Russian invasion. They saw no reason why Russia, who 'had been expanding east and south at a rate.....of 55 square miles a day',¹⁹ should stop her southward expansion at Herat. In effect, the problem of the defence of British India amounted to the problem of how to contain Russian expansion southwards. Britain was committed to safeguarding Afghan integrity.²⁰ The whole of Asia watched to see if she was able and willing to fulfil this pledge.

There might have been neither a real threat from Russia, nor a Russian plan to conquer British India. Nevertheless, the fact that the threat was taken seriously by the British and Indian Governments is of relevance and importance. Lord Lytton made it clear in 1877 when he spoke of Russian aggression as 'a very real, a very close and a very ponderable danger'.²¹ What he said was symptomatic of how the British Government in Europe and Asia for half a century or more thought of Russian policy *vis-a-vis* British global power. The trusted Commander-in-Chief Lord Roberts (1835-1893) categorically stated his conviction that war between Russia and England was inevitable.²² British fear of Russia could not be better expressed than in the words of Lord Wolseley, who wrote that: sooner or later I am sure we must fight Russia for India'.²³ Statesmen like Salisbury, Lansdowne, Hamilton and Curzon²⁴ could also be quoted as holding the same opinion, and there is ample evidence to show that fear of Russian aggression was genuine and widely held. The fact that British fear of a possible Russian war against India from a Central Asian or an Afghan base was not without some foundation becomes clear from statements made by Russian officials. The Russian Foreign Minister, Giers, declared in 1883 that Central Asia provided Russia with 'a basis of operations which, if required, could be offensive'.²⁵ Indeed, Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917) wrote to his sister (2 Nov. 1899) at the close of the nineteenth century that

'the strongest fleets in the world can't prevent us from settling our scores with England precisely at her most vulnerable point. But the time for this has not yet come; we are not sufficiently prepared for serious action, principally because Turkestan is not yet linked up with the interior of Russia by a through railway line.'²⁶

The Tsar had also boasted that he could change the course of the Boer War by marching his Turkoman army to the Afghan frontier. Any British administrator responsible for India had to be prepared for the worst. Even many British statesmen who doubted that Russia would invade British India believed that

by exerting pressure on Britain's 'pressure point in Asia',²⁷ she would use her position in Central Asia to keep British troops in India busy. Meanwhile, she would move towards her prime aim, namely, a passage to the Mediterranean.

C. *British Designs on Afghanistan*

British anxiety and suspicion grew over the future shape of Anglo-Afghan relationships in the 1870's when contact and communication increased between the Amir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali,²⁸ and the Russian government, through the intermediary of Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan. British anxiety, first expressed publicly by the Liberals, was even more intensely felt by members of the Disraeli Government (1874-1880). Disraeli had succeeded Gladstone as Prime Minister, Salisbury had succeeded Argyll as Secretary of State for India and Lytton had succeeded Northbrook as Governor-General. This change in the Cabinet caused a sharp shift in foreign policy not only in Europe, but also in Asia, the former to some extent being a reflection and an extension of the latter.

Disraeli concluded that Russia was expanding militarily and making dangerous strategic gains in Asia. How the Russians proposed to exploit their Central Asian gains in their handing of Afghanistan was not very clear. Their conduct was ambiguous. The Afghan Amir, who had previously consulted the British Government on all matters of foreign policy, no longer did so, and the British suspected that he was holding conferences with Russian message-bearers, who were thought to have been more than just letter-bearers.²⁹ Although the Russian Government assured the British Government that the letters were only friendly exchanges, they refused to discontinue them, even when asked to do so.³⁰ In the early 1870's British policy towards the Amir, Sher Ali, was to regard him as a trustworthy friend whose good faith and special understanding with the British Indian Government would counteract Russian expansion. But in 1873, Viceroy Northbrook's proposals for

strengthening relations with the Amir were turned down by Gladstone's cabinet. Although Northbrook was in favour of granting the Amir an absolute assurance that Britain would defend Afghanistan against a Russian attack, he was only authorized from London to give a conditional assurance. So the Viceroy told the Afghan Foreign Minister at a conference at Simla in July 1873 that

'if he [Amir] unreservedly accepts and acts on your advice in all external relations we will help him with money, arms and troops if necessary to expel unprovoked invasion. We are to be the judge of the necessity.'³¹

Sher Ali, in turn, made friendly overtures to Russia, thus proving himself unworthy of the trust and friendship of the British, although his motives could have been to press the British to agree to Northbrook's original suggestion to Gladstone's Government.

The Disraeli Government agreed that action, rather than words, was needed to safeguard the border. Salisbury approved the occupation of Quetta, for the control of Quetta meant the control of the road to Kandahar, thus placing the British in a strong position to repulse any invading army approaching either through the Khyber, or the Kurram, or the Bolan Passes. Quetta was taken over in accordance with the treaty signed with the Khan of Khelat in 1876. Salisbury thought that should the Amir refuse to accept British Agents, the Khelat base could serve as

'the father of the Central Asian Mission of the future. The agent would reside nominally with the Khan but chiefly at Quettah...he would have leisure for collecting information from Candahar, Herat, Cabul and Balkh'.³²

Then Salisbury tried to win over the Afghans for permission for a British Agent to reside at Herat, which the Amir had previously been prepared to grant in return for a written assurance of help, should the need arise.³³ However, negotia-

tions in Peshawar between the Amir and Lytton's Government failed.³¹ It can be argued that Salisbury, who pressed for action, did not believe that the fear of a Russian invasion of India was a real one.

'I agree with you in thinking that a Russian advance upon India is a Chimera. But I am by no means sure that an attempt to throw the Afghans upon us is so improbable'³²

Salisbury wrote to Northbrook. Salisbury genuinely feared that the Russians, through their Agents, political and military, would penetrate and control Afghanistan to the detriment of British India.³³ Salisbury also thought that acquiescence in the Russians' growing influence in the region could have an impact on events in Europe.³⁴ The failure of the Afghan and the Indian Governments to reach an understanding probably showed not only that the Amir was unwilling to concede to Britain that which he was unwilling to concede to Russia, but also that Afghans viewed Russian power as being on a par with that of Britain. Thus, acceptance of a British Agent would have made it difficult to refuse the appointment of a Russian Agent.

When the European powers sat at the Conference of Berlin³⁵ to take Russia to task, she was looking elsewhere for opportunities to expand further. The Russian Government worked diligently to get a foothold, at least initially a diplomatic one, in Afghan territory, and they offered to make a special treaty with the Amir. Before the Amir could give an answer to the offer, columns of Russian troops under General Stolietoff marched from Tashkent towards the Afghan frontier in June 1878 and entered Afghan territory without consent. In the meantime, news of the Berlin Settlement of 1878 had reached Kabul, and the Russian troops withdrew soon afterwards.

Although Salisbury assessed Russian capabilities³⁶ realistically and ruled out capability of a Russian invasion of India, Lytton

would not adopt a watching position. This was partly because he was afraid of the Amir's friendship with Russia, and partly because, as long invasion of India by Russia remained

'a common topic of conversation in every assemblage of chiefs between Tabriz and Peshawur,'⁴⁰

he had to be seen to be doing something. Lytton was determined to send a mission to Kabul even if it was not welcome, since he had already concluded that the Amir's hands were slowly slipping away from Indian control. The following words explain Lytton's state of mind:

'The Amir's policy was to make fools of us in the sight of all Central Asia and all India, without affording us any pretext for active resentment. My object was naturally to force the Amir either to change his policy, or to reveal it in such a manner as must make the public a partner with the Government in the duty of counteracting it.'⁴¹

On 14 August 1878, Lytton wrote to the Amir informing him that Neville Chamberlain was shortly leaving for Kabul to see and discuss with him some urgent matters of mutual concern. Having received no reply, on 21 September Lytton sent Neville Chamberlain⁴² there. Major Fazi Mohammed Khan, under the Amir's orders, refused the British mission permission to enter Kabul. Meanwhile a reply from the Amir, although unsatisfactory to the British Government, did arrive on 19 October, 1878, and on 2 November Lytton sent an ultimatum to the Amir to the effect that he should receive a British mission by 20 November. The Amir sent no reply. On 21 November 1878, the Viceroy sent a letter to the Amir declaring war (the second Anglo-Afghan war) on Afghanistan⁴³, and Britain reacted to Sher Ali's defiant attitude by a speedy and successful invasion of Afghanistan. While Generals Browne and Stewart led the columns via the Khyber and Bolan Passes respectively, Major-General Roberts led the column through the Kurram Valley. The Amir, finding himself in a tight corner, abdicated in favour of his son Yakub Khan, with whom Cavagnari signed the treaty

of Gandamak¹¹ late in May 1879. Under this treaty the British gained 'the strategic districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi as well as the Khyber Pass. The new Amir not only conceded that the British Viceroy in India would act as advisor on Afghan foreign policy, but he also agreed to accept a permanent British representative at Kabul. In return the Amir was to receive a subsidy of 160,000 a year. Cavagnari, who had signed the treaty of Gandamak, became the first President, but he was murdered in a Afghan army mutiny in September 1879 within a few weeks of assuming office in Kabul. As a result Roberts occupied Kabul, and Amir Yakub was forced to retire.¹⁵ Abdur Rahman, Amir Sher Ali's nephew and grandson of Amir Dost Muhammed, who lived in Samarkand under Russian protection, immediately sought to return to Afghanistan. Lytton contacted him through the British political Officer at Kabul, Lepel Griffin, and entered into negotiations with him, which were interrupted by the arrival of Lord Ripon¹⁶ as the new Viceroy in June 1880. Under his guidance, Griffin reached an understanding with Abdur Rahman by which Britain kept control of Afghanistan's foreign relations and the Amir was promised a subsidy in return.¹⁷ The Amir was told that Britain would be satisfied with having an Indian Muslim rather than an Englishman as her Agent in Kabul. However, Afghanistan's role of defending the Indian empire soon became a matter of urgency to the British Foreign Office because Russia tried to coerce¹⁸ the chiefs of Merv to render allegiance to the Russian Emperor. A map produced by the Russian War Office about that time showed the boundaries of Merv stretching southwards until it touched the Harirud near Herat. Russia had often assured the British Foreign Office that she was not interested in annexing or occupying any new territory¹⁹. Contrary to their denial of any expansionist motives, during ambiguous talks with the British Government the Russians annexed areas like Khiva. Despite their assurance to Britain that Afghanistan was outside their sphere of influence, they appeared ready to violate that understanding. Lord Dufferin (Viceroy 1884-88) wrote about the situation thus :

'The authority of the Russian executive is so slight, the control it exercises over its distant agents and military chiefs is so unsteady and its policy is designedly tentative, while the forces which stimulate the aggressive instincts of the nation are so constant, that little reliance could be ultimately placed upon mere verbal guarantees'.⁵⁰

The British Government could no longer rely on the verbal assurances of the Russian Government. Undoubtedly, the ambiguity of Russia's position caused the British to seek an understanding with the Russians. Granville, at the Foreign Office, took up the idea of a joint delimitation of the disputed areas. Consequently, Britain sent a mission headed by Sir Peter Lumsden for this purpose, but Russian cooperation was not forthcoming. The Russians named General Zelenoi to head the Russian boundary mission, but, due to illness, he was not able to undertake the task until February 1885. Probably the Russians were playing for time, so that they could gain control of all the nomadic Turkoman tribes. The British Government regarded the Panjdeh area, situated on the Russo-Afghan frontier, as lying within the Afghan sphere; but the Russians wanted it declared independent of the Amir, and also appeared to claim territory which the British considered to be an integral part of Afghanistan. Britain insisted that all such matters should be settled by the Delimitation Commission. But before this could be done, Russian forces took up a position near the town of Panjdeh and later occupied the Zulfiqar Pass. The British argued that if the Amir had to give up Panjdeh he should at least be allowed to retain Zulfiqar. Gladstone, as a Liberal politician, was against involving British India in expensive military operations and approached the issue in a rather conciliatory manner. He suggested that Zulfiqar, which was of much less strategic importance to Russia, be procured from the Russians as a concession to satisfy the British public. Thus, Gladstone managed to avoid a confrontation with Russia. When this Panjdeh crisis developed, Abdur Rahman was in Rawalpindi in consultation with the new Viceroy, Lord Dufferin. Dufferin promised him assistance if there should be

war with Russia. But Britain was reluctant to declare war on Russia, contrary to the expectations of the Amir. Such reluctance probably made the Amir aware that in future he should not expect Britain to wage war for Afghan interests, unless they were directly tied to British interests.

The Afghan boundary from the west of the Oxus to Zulfiqar was formally established in 1886⁵¹, and for the next six years frontier disputes did not arise. When they did arise, the area of dispute lay further east, in the Pamirs,⁵² and it was not until 1895 that these were resolved by an agreement between Russia and Afghanistan, by which the former surrendered that part of Darwaz which lay south of the Oxus and the latter relinquished her claim to the territory north of the river Panjan.⁵³ The years that immediately followed the 1895 border agreement were marked by a gradual relaxation of the Anglo-Russian rivalry. It must be added, however, that the relaxation was more marked in Europe than in Asia, where the Russians continued to strengthen their communication network. Between 1899 and 1904 they linked the Trans-Caspian line with the Orenburg-Tashkent line at Kushk on the Afghan frontier, and in 1900⁵⁴, the shock and resentment of the British Indian Government, they even expressed their intention of trading directly with Turkestan and Kabul, which had been made possible by development of the railway.

In 1901 Abdur Rahman died and his elder son, Habibullah, ascended the throne. During the last years of his reign, relations with India could have been more cordial if the Amir had been allowed to have direct contact with the British Government in London. The new Amir, Habibullah, was told by the British Government that, since a treaty with any oriental ruler ceased to be binding with his successor, Anglo-Afghan treaty relations needed renewal. In 1905,⁵⁵ after hard and lengthy negotiations, Sir Louis Dane signed a treaty on behalf of British India. Habibullah was more favourably inclined towards Britain than his father, and certainly tried hard to project an image of a friendly ally to both the Russians and the British, though on certain occasions he displayed pro-Russian leanings.

He could not afford to offend his northern neighbour, in case her intrigues should strengthen the position of his brother Nasrullah. During his visit to India, at the time of Lord Minto's administration, the Amir is reported to have told Lord Kitchener at a dinner party that

‘he knows perfectly well that his own people would resist the appearance of British arms in their country.’⁵⁶

The Amir, apparently, wanted the British Government to understand that if this happened he would ask the Emperor of Russia for help.

In 1907 the Anglo-Russian Convention was signed, by which Russia finally accepted that Afghanistan was outside her sphere of influence and agreed to conduct her relations with the Amir through the British Government.⁵⁷ The chief reason for Russia's willingness to sign this treaty, which contained similar terms to other previously suggested, was very probably that she had fought an expensive and unsuccessful war with Japan (1904-5) following which she had faced serious internal unrest. Doubtless, the fear of the possible danger in Europe from a common enemy—Germany—helped both Britain and Russia towards a reconciliation.⁵⁸ Moreover, Russia regarded the treaty, by agreeing not to alter the political status of Afghanistan, as an assurance that Britain would not annex it. Besides, exclusion of Russian control of Afghanistan did not deprive Russia of her non-political links with Afghanistan. The Amir declined to sign the treaty, but that had little effect on the understanding reached between India and Russia. By not signing the document, the Amir kept his options open, though he would not dare open the door of Afghanistan, which Britain had closed, to foreigners. That situation may partly explain why German agents failed to persuade the Amir to break with the British Government before or during the First World War.

The Bolshevik Revolution (1917) wrought great political changes in Russia, in both her internal and external affairs;

therefore, in Afghan eyes this had almost totally eliminated the relevance and significance of an Anglo-Russian understanding. Afghanistan felt that she could begin a new course of foreign relations, since she was no longer hemmed in on either side. Moreover, Amanullah, who came to power in Afghanistan in 1919 was an Amir with a new vision and a different approach.

REFERENCES

1. Major ethnic groups are : (1) the Afghans (2) the Tajiks (3) the Uzbeks (4) the Turkomans and (5) the Hazaras; in non-ethnic sense the word 'Afghan' is nowadays used to denote all who inhabit present day Afghanistan. There is no satisfactory explanation of the origin of this word. For a probable explanation, see H.W. Bellew, *An Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan* (Working, 1891). pp. 189-207.
2. G. Singh, *Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of Modern Afghanistan* (Bombay, 1959), pp. 24-39.
3. Major Afghan tribes are : (1) the Abdalis or Durranis (2) the Ghilzais (3) the Waziris (4) the Khattaks (5) the Afridis (6) the Mohmands (7) the Shinwaris and (8) the Yusufzais. The Abdali tribe provided all the rulers of Afghanistan with the exception of Bach-i-Saqao.
4. In 1756 Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1773) first king of Afghanistan occupied Delhi and in 1761 he defeated the Sikh army near Lahore.
5. The two wars occurred from 1838 to 1842 and from 1878 to 1879 respectively.
6. C.U. Aitchison, *Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries* (Calcutta, 1929), XIII, 220.

7. (a) Annexation of Sind in 1843 ; (b) Annexation of Punjab 1849 ; (c) Treaty of Jacobabad with the Khan of Khelat in 1976 by which British India acquired Quetta. See C.U. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, XI, 362-64.
8. General Kaufmann was appointed its first Governor-General in 1867.
9. C.U. Aitchison, *Lord Lawrence and the Reconstruction of India under the Crown* (Oxford, 1897), pp. 185-86.
10. Clarendon to Buchanan, British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, 27 March 1869 ; Correspondence respecting Central Asia, C 704 1873 LXXV p. 719.
11. "Sa Majeste Imperiale considere l'Afghanistan comme entierement en dehors de la sphere ou la Russie peu etre appelee a exercer son influence". Gorchakov, Russian Foreign Minister to Brunnow, Russian Ambassador in London, 7 March 1869, *Ibid.* p. 720.
12. Gorchakov to Brunnow 13 Nov. 1871 ; Correspondence respecting Central Asia, C 704 1873 LXXV p. 770.
13. Gorchakov to Brunnow 31 Jan. 1873, Correspondence respecting Central Asia, C 699 8173 LXXV p. 709.
14. When the Afghan Amir questioned the validity of the Oxus line as forming the northern frontier of Afghanistan Rawlinson, a member of the Secretary of State's Council of India, supported the Amir's claims to territories north of the river and thought that the 1873 agreement was wrong only in letter but not in spirit.
15. The Turkoman are one of the ethnic groups who live in the north of Afghanistan. They speak Turkic dialects and belong to the Hanafi Sunni sect. At present they number about 125,000.
16. Sir C.M. MacGregor. *Narrative of a Journey through the province of Khorassan and on the N.W. Frontier of Afghanistan in 1875* (London, 1879), II, 32.

17. It was General Komarov who annexed territories along the rivers Murgab and Kushk after defeating the Afghans at Kushk in 1885.
18. D. Fraser, 'The Strategic Position of Russia in Central Asia', *Proceedings of the Central Asian Society*, (12 June 1907), p. 17.
19. D.N. Dilks and R. Bridge, *The Great Game*, (No. 48 in the series on the British Empire : Time-Life Books/BBC, 1972).
20. "The Simla Agreement of 1873, though it gave only a conditional promise of help in the event of foreign aggression, in reality involved a moral and a political obligation which the British Government would have ignored at their peril". A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch, eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919* (Cambridge, 1923), III, 83.
21. Lytton to Salisbury, 16 July 1877. Layard papers, British Museum. Additional MSS 39164, vol. CCXXXIV.
22. *The Defence of the North-West Frontier of India* : note by Sir F. Roberts, 22 June 1883. IOR, L/P & S/18/A 117.
23. Minute on the Report of the Indian Mobilisation Committee by Lord Wolseley. 25 August 1889 Public Record Office, War Office 33/49.
24. G.N. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*. (London, 1889).
25. Giers to Mohrenheim, 6 August 1883. A. Meyendorff ed.. *Correspondance Diplomatique de M. de Stal* (1884-1909) (Paris. 1929), I, 18.
26. Text in Krasny Arkhiv, 1934 LXIII, 125-6 Quoted in B. H. Sumner, *Czardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East 1880-1914* (London, 1942), p. 8.
27. D.N. Dilks, *Curzon in India* (London, 1969-70) I, 171.
28. Sher Ali ruled Afghanistan from 1863-1865 and 1869-78. 1865-67 his half-brothers ruled. In November 1878 Sher Ali abdicated and fled. He died in 1879. Sher Ali had

British subsidy and friendship from the very start of his reign. But when he asked for an absolute guarantee that Britain would defend him in case of Russian attack the Viceroy refused.

29. 'We have received, from an unofficial source, information, which we are of course unable to verify, that secret nightly conferences are taking place between him and the Ameer'. Seccombe to Tenterden, 17 Oct. 1876, Correspondence respecting Central Asia, C 2164, 1878 LXXX p. 83 (537).
30. 'rare relations of our authorities in Central Asia with the latter Amir had never borne any other character than one of pure courtesy in conformity with local usages in the East'. De Giers to Loftus, British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, 5 March 1877, *Ibid.* p. 106 (560)
31. Telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, 24 July 1873. Correspondence respecting the relations between the British Government and that of Afghanistan since the accession of Ameer Sher Ali Khan ; C 2190 1878-79 LVI p. 108 (482).
32. Salisbury to Lytton, 22 August 1876, see Lady G. Cecil, *Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury* (London, 1922-3), II, 74.
33. Memorandum of conversation between the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and Kabul envoy 19-20 July 1873, C 2250 1878-9 pp. 673-676.
34. Despatch from the Government of India to Salisbury, 10 May 1877, C 2190 1878-79 LVI pp. 534-546.
35. Salisbury to Northbrook, 19 Feb. 1875, see Lady G. Cecil *op. cit.*, II, 72.
36. *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, III, 76.
37. Russia always had ambitions in the Black Sea. Britain tried to employ the Turks as guardians of the Gate to the Black Sea. Russian control of the Black Sea and the pass-

age between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean would have meant a challenge to British naval superiority, upsetting the balance of power in Europe. Britain thought that the ultimate security of her empire *i.e.* of the naval route to India, Singapore and beyond, which a Russian fleet could threaten in the Mediterranean, required the preservation of the balance of power not only in Asia but also in Europe. Russia, on the other hand, tried 'to keep England quite in Europe by keeping her employed in Asia'. G.N. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question* (London, 1889), p. 321.

38. Russia's unprovoked war against Turkey (April 1877) and the Treaty of San Stefano that favoured Russia brought Britain and Russia to the brink of a war. At that juncture the German Chancellor Bismark called a conference in Berlin (1878) to revive the treaty of San Stefano. Apart from Britain, Russia, Germany and Turkey, France Italy and Austria-Hungary were also represented at the Conference. Britain was represented by Beconsfield, Russia by Gorchakoff and Germany by Bismark. The treaty of Berlin was concluded in July 1878, establishing peace in Europe. *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* III, 132 ff.
39. Lady G. Cecil, *op. cit.*, II, 128 and 142.
40. Sir Henry Bartle Edward Frere (Governor of Bombay 1862-67), *A Letter to Durand* (Bombay, 1898), p. 44.
41. Lady B. Balfour, *Lord Lytton's Indian Administration* (London, 1899), p. 285.
42. General Neville Chamberlain (no relation of the British Prime Minister of that name) was Commander-in Chief at Madras.
43. In the wake of Persian and Russian designs vis-a-vis Afghanistan the Directors of the East India Company and the Government in London decided in 1836 that it was about time to make sure that the Afghan Amirs turned positively pro-British. Viceroy Auckland (1836-42) sent

Alexander Burnes to Kabul in 1836. Since the Amir, Dost Muhammed, demanded too high a price for his friendship, the Government of India decided to overthrow the Amir and restore the pro-Indian Amir, Shah Shuja, to the Afghan throne. As a result the first Anglo-Afghan war (1838-42) took place. The Afghan throne had to be returned to Dost Muhammed in 1842.

44. Despatch from the Government of India forwarding Treaty of Peace, C 2362 1878-9 LVI pp. 691-693.
45. He resided at Dehra Dun till his death in 1923.
46. The general election had replaced Beaconsfield by Gladstone as Prime Minister, Cranbrook by Hartington at the India Office, and Salisbury by Granville at the Foreign Office. Lord Ripon took Lord Lytton's place (8 June 1880).
47. Memorandum of Conversations between Amir Abdur Rahman and Lepel Griffin, British Political Officer in Kabul, 31 July—1 August 1880, F.O. 65/1104.
48. G.N. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889* (London, 1889), pp. 111, 120.
49. E. Thornton, British Ambassador in St. Petersburg to Earl Granville 29 April 1882, Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asia; C 3930 1884 LXXXVII pp. 77-78.
50. Dufferin to Salisbury, 16 March 1880. F.O. 65/1099.
51. T.H. Holdich, *The Indian Borderland 1889-1909*, p. 169. But an agreement on the exact location of the frontier was signed only in July 1887.
52. A. Meyendorff, *Correspondence Diplomatique du Baron de Staal*, II, 157; F. Roberts, *op. cit.*, II, 446; Abdur Rahman, *Autobiography* (London, 1900), I, 285.
53. Agreement between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia with regard to the sphere of influence of the two countries in the region of the Pamirs: C 7643 1895 CIX pp. 160-61.

54. *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919*, I, 241-150, 306.
55. C.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties...*, XIII, 282-83.
56. Minto to Morley, 16 January 1907, Morley Collection, IOR, MSS Eur D 573/11 p. 14.
57. C.U. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, XIII, 221-22.
58. See a rather interesting article on this subject by B.J. Williams, "The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907", *The Historical Journal*, IX (1966), 360-373.

2

The Impact of Bolshevism on Afghan Nationalism

The end of the second decade of the twentieth century heralded a new phase in the social and political life of Afghanistan. Amir Amanullah's introduction of domestic reforms and revision of Afghan foreign relations were symptomatic of the new era. The force which persuaded the new Amir to revise Afghan Foreign policy could be called nationalism, if that word is used in its broad sense. Bolshevik thought, with its emphasis on self-determination,¹ gave the Afghans a new ideal, and Communist Russia, which replaced the Tsarist expansionist Russia, provided them with a new and sympathetic neighbour.

It the Tsarist regime, which collapsed with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, deserved little sympathy from the peasants of strictly Russian origin it merited much less from the minority community of Turkish origin, mainly Muslims, who on the eve of the debacle numbered about twenty million.² In 1901 when the 'policy of russification'³—regarded by Muslims as a threat and an attack on their faith and culture—was started by the Government, their feelings of being oppressed reached a climax. More than fifty thousand Crimean Tartars emigrated. Muslims were deprived of their lands and possessions during the years of

Tsarist rule on the pretext that 'not being members of the nobility (they) had no right to hold land'.⁴ By 1917 the Tsarist Government seems to have confiscated the richest Muslim lands in Siberia, Kazan, the Volga area, the Caucasus, the Transcaucasus, the Crimea and Turkestan.

The leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution intended their uprising and seizure of power in Russia to bring about human equality not only within the country, but also in the world, for they rejected foreign occupation, colonialism and economic exploitation. Consequently, the Revolution claimed to usher in a new series of liberation movements.⁵ The emergence of an ideological and classless, Soviet society increased the anxiety of colonial powers, such as Britain about their overseas possessions. These feelings of anxiety were intensified when *Izvestia*, the official Soviet news organ, published details of the Allied Secret Agreements concerning the future of Turkey and the Near East. The Bolsheviks' success depended on gathering wide support among the population. In addition to the Soviet population, their appeal was intended for the Muslims not only inside, but also outside, the country. The Soviet message reached Afghanistan through the British-Indian press. But it reached the Afghan public through *Siraj al-Akhbar*.⁶ On their accession to power the Soviets addressed both the Muslims of the Soviet Union and the East :

'Henceforward your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are declared free and...We declare that the secret treaties of the dethroned Tsar regarding the annexation of Constantinople...are now null and void...Constantinople must remain in the hands of the Muslims...We declare that the treaty for the partition of Persia is null and void...the treaty for the partition of Turkey...is null and void .. Overthrow these robbers and enslavers of your Country ! You yourselves must arrange your life as you yourselves see fit. You have the right to do this'.⁷

This appeal was published in *Izvestia* of 5 December 1917, and was followed, in January 1918, by the establishment of a Commissariat for Muslim Affairs under Tartar Chairmanship.

The Bolshevik leaders strove to create the impression that the Revolution was also directed to the liberation of the Orient, particularly the Muslims. Russian Muslims were even told that the Soviet regime would be established on the principles of the Quran and the Shariat.

'Having become Communist sympathizers while remaining Muslims, they attempted to discover points in common between the two ideologies and tried to reinterpret the classical ideas of Islam as equivalents of the Marxist thesis, e.g. the internationalist, anti-capitalist or anti-racialist character of Islam and of Communism, without, however, feeling obliged by this attempt at harmonization to accept the dialectical materialism and the atheism of Marxism'.⁸

The educated Afghans' opinion of the new Soviet regime may have been formed, to some extent, by the brochure on Bolshevism in the Quran, which the Indian revolutionary leader Barkatullah wrote. It was published in Afghan, Arabic and Persian. statements like

'while the Amir was recently out for a walk the wireless station in Kabul attracted his notice, and he went to the Palace and from there 'he sent a message of thanks to Comrade Lenin', and thereby 'renewed the friendship between the two Governments'.⁹

should certainly have enhanced this new attitude among the Afghans towards the Government of what was now the U.S.S.R. The Bolsheviks' tolerance towards the Muslim faith was in marked contrast to their persecution of the Christians in Soviet Russia, whom they regarded as agents of counter revolution.

To show that the success of the October Revolution and the liberation of the Muslim world were interdependent and complementary, the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 5 December 1919 declared :

'the conviction has penetrated the Muslim East that the R.S.F.S.R., located as it is between capitalist Europe and the

peoples of Asia enslaved by imperialism, is their stronghold in their struggle for liberation from national oppression'.¹⁰

The Bolsheviks intended such statements to advance their policy to the world, in general, and the Muslim peoples, in particular. In this way, the revolutionaries might have convinced many that they truly advocated independence both inside and outside Russian borders. The Soviet administration was generous enough to include in its foreign policy priorities the liberation not only of Turkey and Iran, but also Afghanistan, which according to them was under British domination. The Soviet Union had established friendly relations with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey in 1921 although communist parties were forbidden in those countries. As has been noted, as a result of the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-79), Afghanistan had to accept British control of her foreign policy exercised through the Viceroy of India. Even the settlement of the border demarcation dispute—by Afghan acceptance of the Durand Line with its modification of their boundaries—favoured India. Amir Amanullah, influenced undoubtedly no less by the Young Turks (1908-18)¹¹ and the Iranian revolutionaries¹² than by the Russians, intended to abrogate British domination.¹³ His first message to the nation showed that he wanted Afghanistan to exercise the Sovereign rights of a free and independent nation. In the same message Amanullah repudiated all treaty obligations with Britain.¹⁴

The accession to the throne of Amir Amanullah had marked a new era and had put Russo-Afghan relations on a different footing. The new Russian leader, Lenin, and the Afghan ruler, Amanullah, shared a common distaste for British colonialism on their doorsteps. Both were determined to bring about emancipation of the people in neighbouring countries. The Amir's appreciation of the Russian leadership was expressed in a letter dated 7 April 1919. General Wali Khan, who was sent (on 14 June 1919) on a mission to Moscow¹⁵ received a hospitable reception and the Afghan mission was told that

'Soviet Russia will give you (Afghanistan) that assistance, as she herself is fighting against international Imperialism and for the rights of the oppressed nations of the whole world'.¹⁶

Wali Khan, in a meeting with Lenin, presented the letter¹⁷ he had brought from the Amir of Afghanistan. It seemed that the Afghans entertained the idea of a defensive alliance with the Soviets, but the Soviets had not decided on any formal agreement, although they were prepared to help the Afghans with technology and defence.¹⁸

While the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford (1916-21), was non-committal in his reply (15 April 1919), Lenin unconditionally recognized (27 May 1919) Afghanistan's right to independence and indicated his willingness to establish diplomatic relations.¹⁹ The third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), by now under way was neither lost by Afghanistan, nor won in military terms.

'Both sides would claim victory in this war. The British were to be outraged when Afghanistan erected a monument to the month's fighting and called it a victory monument and included a lion in chains'.²⁰

Not only did the Soviet recognition of Afghanistan's independence give valuable moral support to the country when she was at war with India (1919) but, because the Soviet threat in the north had been removed, the Afghans could concentrate all their force against British India. The Afghans were emboldened by Soviet encouragement and guidance into feeling that they were fighting not only for full national independence but also for something even beyond it—Muslim faith and culture. Lenin told the Amir that the Afghan people were undertaking the historic task of uniting and leading all enslaved Mohammedans to freedom and independence. Thus, the Afghan Amir and those who shared his views felt that they were fighting for far more than mere national independence.²¹ The reaffirmation of Afghanistan's independence and the establishment of a regular diplomatic relationship were achieved by the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of February 1921, despite the opposition of Afghan Anglophiles. Moreover, the treaty led to the securing of similar recognition from Britain, for in the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement of March 1921 reference was made to the

‘independent state of Afghanistan’.²² Recognition was further reinforced by a treaty with Britain, in the following November, which formally recognized Afghan independence and confirmed existing Afghan boundaries. Afghanistan thus regained control of her foreign policy which Britain had exercised for the previous forty years. The treaty with Britain expressed the Amir’s desire to return to the traditional Afghan policy of seeking a balance of power, because he was becoming increasingly apprehensive of Soviet intentions in Central Asia, following the establishment of a Soviet Government in Bokhara in September 1920.²³

REFERENCES

1. President Woodrow Wilson too had spoken of self-determination and a respect for the rights of small nations. But British Imperial policy towards Asia and Africa was in any significant sense unaffected by Wilson’s statement. So far as British India was concerned it should be mentioned, however, that the promises of constitutional change contained in the declaration of policy announced by the Secretary of State for India, Montagu, on 20 August 1917 showed that Britain was not and could not afford to be totally insensitive to world opinion in general and that of the United States in particular, on whom she depended considerably in the later stages of the First World War. Montagu’s attitude reflected willingness for a change in British imperial policy on the part of a small but significant section of the British parliamentarians.
2. B.H. Sumner, *Survey of Russian History* (London, 1947). p. 171.
3. ‘Essentially, this (russification) was an attempt to introduce a new secular ideology of state, to supplement the traditional basis of legitimacy—the claim to loyalty to

a monarch divinely sanctioned—with a new principle—the sovereignty of the Russian nation’—Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire 1801-1917* (Oxford, 1967), p. 737.

4. I. Spector, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World 1917-1958* (Seattle, 1959) p. 31.
5. E.H. Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia : The Bolshevik Revolution 1871—1923* (London, 1950-53), III, 296.
6. It was edited by Tarzi (see Biographical Notes). The language was Persian—language of the Afghan elite. It appeared twice a month (1911-1919). The paper had a wider circulation than one would have imagined due to Amir Habibullah’s interest and patronage. In 1919 the paper received a different name (*Aman-i-Afghan*), a different editor and a different set of priorities as an official government organ.
7. J. Degras ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (London, 1951) I, 16.
8. P.M. Holt and others eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge, 1970), I, 654.
9. Weekly Report of the Special Bureau of information, week ending 13 Nov. 1920IOR, L/P & S/10/887 P 8982/20.
10. I.V. Kluchnikov and A. Sabanin (eds.), *Mezhdunarodnaya politika noveishego vremeni v dogoverakh, notakh i doklariasiakh* (Moscow, 1925-28), II, 420, quoted in I. Spector, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
11. R.R. Maconachie *A Precis on Afghan Affairs*, I, 46. See IOR, L/P & S/20/B 285.
12. According to the British representative in Kabul the Nationalist Government of Reza Shah who came to power in Iran in 1921 was ‘having a very pernicious effect already’ on the Afghans. Telegram from the British representative in Kabul to the Government of India on 28 Jan. 1921 quoted in R.R. Maconachie, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
13. *Survey of International Affairs 1920-1923* (London, 1925), p. 32.

14. *Papers Regarding Hostilities with Afghanistan* 1919, Cmd. 324 p. 4.
15. He reached Moscow on 10 Oct. 1919. He was accompanied by Kazim Bey and Barkatullah.
16. *Central Asia, Persia and Afghanistan* Nov. 1919, IOR, L/P & S/18/A 184 p. 10.
17. Lenin answered this letter on 27 Nov. 1919.
18. *Central Asia, Persia and Afghanistan* Nov. 1919, IOR, L/P & S/18/A 184 p. 10.
19. Amanullah to the Viceroy 3 March 1919, Cmd. 324 p. 3. Amanullah's letter to Lenin was sent on 7 April 1919. Although the Viceroy was slightly quicker than Lenin in sending a reply the Viceroy's reply was considered unduly slow because the Amir had expected a quicker reply from the Viceroy.
20. R.T. Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929 : Faith, Hope and the British Empire* (New York, 1973), p. 68.
21. 'A belief is abroad that the new policy of the British Empire is to crush Islam. We could have no better opportunity than the present to show the falseness of this idea by a lenient and unaggressive attitude towards Afghanistan'. Sir Hamilton Grant, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to Major General Sir George Roos-Keppel, 20 June 1919, IOR, L/P & S/10/809 part 4 P. 4776/19.
22. Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, 16 March 1921.
23. Said Alim Khan (Ex. Emir of Bokhara) *La Voix de la Boukharie opprime* (Paris, 1929). This booklet describes conditions in Bokhara after Soviet occupation, see IOR, L/P & S/10/950 part 3 p 4781/29.

3

The Dawn of Soviet-Afghan Friendship

Initially, an Afghan mission was sent to Moscow under Wali Khan in June 1919.¹ On 3 September 1919 this was reciprocated by the arrival in Kabul of a Soviet mission under Bravin's² leadership, which was received by Amanullah on 4 September 1919. Negotiations started on Soviet-Afghan cooperation³ and eventually, both sides seemed to agree to Soviet Russia conceding territory in the Panjdeh area to Afghanistan and providing arms, money and technical help, in exchange for the Amir's co-operation in anti-British activities in India and the frontier areas. Bravin's negotiations, however, were overshadowed by Afghan activities in Soviet controlled Central Asia. An ever-increasing number of Afghan agents entered Soviet territory, ostensibly to spread Pan-Islamic and pro-Bolshevik propaganda, but the Soviets suspected the Amir's motives.

Soviet suspicions of Afghan intentions were strengthened when they found Afghan influence had penetrated into the Merv area. In addition, there were rumours of an embryonic Central Asian Muslim Confederation of which Afghanistan would be the centre⁴. It was to replace Turkey's old Caliphate role. Apparently, negotiations for a treaty between Afghanistan and

Soviet Russia did not make any progress for the next three months. Negotiations to set up friendly links between India and Afghanistan were influenced, and to a certain extent conditioned, by those taking place between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

Regarding Anglo-Afghan negotiations, the Amir wrote again to the Viceroy on 5 Nov. 1919, expressing his desire to settle the border disputes, on condition that British India would suspend all hostile actions against the border tribes. In order to avoid dashing the Amir's hopes, and to lessen tension between the two countries, the Viceroy finally replied to the Amir's earlier letter. He invited the Amir to explain why he had not so far complied with the clauses of the treaty. The Viceroy, who had better knowledge of Afghan sensibilities than the Secretary of State for India, showed more willingness to be accommodating. He was prepared not only to send a delegation, but also to make further concessions so that the Amir might reach a better understanding with Britain. He saw clearly that, at a time when Britain was ready to make a commercial agreement with the Bolsheviks expecting the Amir to remain unfriendly to the Russians was unwise and unfair. He thought that a Soviet-Afghan understanding was compatible with Anglo-Afghan or Anglo-Soviet understanding. The Amir wrote to the Viceroy justifying his relations with the border tribes and the Bolsheviks. In his opinion, the whole Islamic world was moved by those same feelings which had awakened the border tribes. They wanted the same liberties as others. The Amir declared that his links with Soviet Russia helped protect the rights of Muslims in that country and especially in Bokhara. He stated that the former type of British friendships was not consistent with nation's independence. The Amir's analysis of the dilemma of a small country betwixt two major powers with conflicting interests is notable. He wrote :

'As regards Bolsheviks for many years Afghanistan was in distress between Great Britain and Russia, latter of whom seized Kushk and Panjdeh and former still more extensive lands to south and east'.⁵

The fate of Afghanistan was decided by and between them.

Amanullah, who displayed a continued interest in reaching a better understanding with Britain, requested the Viceroy to arrange for an Afghan delegation to be received in England. He wanted to find out how London felt about the fate of the Caliphate and the protection of the Islamic holy places. The Amir claimed to represent, in addition to Afghanistan, the small Muslim-dominated Central Asian regions (Turkestan, Bokhara, Khiva, etc.). A visit by such a delegation would have displeased the Russians if they had concluded that the British were encouraging Afghan designs on their southern frontier. If the delegation had found out what the allies, including Britain, really thought of the fate of Caliphate, more harm than good would have been done. Such information could easily have persuaded the Afghans to become militant champions of the Pan-Islamic cause. So London was not prepared to welcome such a visit. Instead, the Viceroy⁶ and the Amir agreed to meet at Mussoorie. When the Afghan delegation,⁷ led by Tarzi, arrived at Mussoorie (14 April 1920), British influence in Persia had waned, and the anti-Bolshevik forces had disintegrated, leaving the Bolsheviks in firm control in Turkestan, which allowed them to support the anti-British forces in Afghanistan. British hold on India was under increasing threat by strikes and riots following the Amritsar (Jallianwala Bagh) massacre.⁸ The Viceroy was facing widespread Muslim unrest, expressed through the Khilafat movement and Khilafat organized *hijrat*.⁹ Amir Amanullah's invitation¹⁰ to *hijrat* and the consequent movement of some 40,000 Indian Muslims to settle in Afghanistan proved a serious embarrassment to the British Government in India. Although Amanullah did not expect his invitation to be taken seriously, the fact that it was taken up greatly strengthened his bargaining position at the negotiating table at Mussoorie.¹¹

Suritz,¹² who was appointed Russian envoy to Afghanistan in place of Bravin in 1919, had reached Kabul in January 1920, three months before the Conference of Mussoorie. On his arrival, the Amir seemed inclined to a friendship

treaty with Russia, but the Russians did not want to antagonise the British, with whom they hoped to establish normal relations, just as the British were 'entirely opposed to attempting any *entente* with Afghanistan as against Bolsheviks'.¹³ All they really wanted was Afghan sympathy for their administration and therefore no treaty was concluded.

Such was the position of Afghanistan in relation to Soviet Russia that she was in a sound bargaining position in mid 1920. London was ready to approve the Viceroy's generous approach, which promised to agree to the setting up of Afghan consulates in various Indian cities.

Dobb,¹⁴ then Secretary to the Indian Government in the foreign department, and Tarzi, the Afghan Foreign Minister, headed the British and Afghan delegations respectively. The first meeting took place on 17 April 1920 at Mussoorie. In his opening statement, Dobbs raised the question of Afghan intrigues with the border tribes and the Bolsheviks. Tarzi revived the issues of the British attitude to Afghan independence, the Afghan tribes on the British side of the Durand line and the Caliphate of Turkey. Interestingly, the Afghan Foreign Minister said that, however much they might have considered certain issues to be of extreme importance, they were prepared to be flexible on them if they were offered sufficient aid. The same point was emphasized by Ghulam Muhammad when he told Sir Abdul Kayum that

'they could easily get rid of the Bolsheviks and restrain Indian seditious if it were made worth while. They wanted to know how much the British would give'.¹⁵

Significantly, the Afghans urged Britain to assume exclusive responsibility and interest in the development of the Afghan economy. The Indian Delegation thought that British flexibility over the border tribes (e.g. the conceding of Waziristan) would persuade the Amir to an understanding with Britain, because Afghanistan was disenchanted with Soviet policy in Central

Asia (particularly in Bokhara) and needed British support to counter anti-Bolshevik moves in this area. Dobbs told the Afghan delegation that Britain wanted primarily to restore normal relations between the two countries. He also pressed the British Government to give some territory to the Afghan as a face-saving device. Dobbs wanted to present Afghans on matters of importance—such as the border tribal policy and the Turkish treaty—with a series of *faits accomplis* which although open to explanation, could not be modified and against which it would be useless for them to protest. The British Government refused to offer the subsidy except on the conditions previously but to the Amir.¹⁶ Without the right to control Afghan foreign relations Britain was thus reluctant to offer monetary aid.

Meanwhile the Russian envoy Suritz tried to conclude a Soviet-Afghan treaty; Dobbs thought this could be forestalled by an Anglo-Afghan treaty. Thus he drafted an agreement recognizing Afghanistan's independence and right to consular representation, in exchange for an Afghan promise to meet British demands on the tribal issues. His draft agreement provided for a subsidy and some assistance, but since the British Government was not in favour of concluding such a treaty immediately with Afghanistan, the draft agreement was not submitted to the Afghan negotiators. At the last meeting of the Mussoorie Conference (24 July 1920) Dobbs put the contents of the draft into a memorandum but postponed the conclusion of a treaty to a later date.¹⁷ The Afghan delegates to Mussoorie left for Kabul on 29 July 1920 with a copy of this memorandum¹⁸. A few days later the Viceroy wrote to the Amir :

‘Trust that in this memorandum you will find evidence of the sincere goodwill of the British Government towards Afghanistan and I wish to assure you that if, after having fully considered this statement, you desire to conclude a treaty of friendship, and if the attitude of your Government and officials is clearly consistent with that desire, there will be no obstacle on the part of my Government to negotiating a treaty’.¹⁹

It should be kept in mind that during the months of August and September (1920) Soviet Russia and Afghanistan were also negotiating a treaty. In September, the draft of a Soviet-Afghan treaty was signed in Kabul by the Afghans. It was then sent to Moscow for ratification. The effort to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union is to be seen as part of the new approach adopted by the Afghans in their foreign policy, namely, not having exclusive ties with any one country. After the Amir had studied the memorandum on 6 Oct. 1920 he wrote to the Viceroy that he was prepared to agree to a treaty based on its contents.

Delhi consulted London about sending a mission. But when the news of a possible Russo-Afghan treaty reached the Viceroy who was still in favour of an Anglo-Afghan treaty, he telegraphed (12 Oct. 1920) to the Secretary of State for India :

'But we have now to choose either absolute aloofness from Afghanistan, or participation with Bolsheviks in financing Afghan Government and developing the country; unless we declare war on Afghanistan...The exclusive domination of Afghanistan, which we should doubtless much prefer, has been rendered impossible by development of events, unless we go to war'.²¹

The Secretary of State for India telegraphed in reply (29 Oct. 1920) that the Russo-Afghan treaty of 13 Sept. 1920 made it impossible for Britain to authorize the payment of a subsidy and the granting of military assistance to Afghanistan. He thought:

'Therefore if it should turn out to be true that an agreement on the lines indicated by the evidence now at our disposal, has actually been concluded between Afghans and the Bolsheviks, and that the former are not prepared to repudiate it. it would be impossible for us to contemplate a treaty of friendship with the Amir'.²²

The Viceroy informed the Amir of his objection to having Soviet consulates at Ghazni and Kandahar and his determination to continue operations against the Wana Wazir. The Amir assured the Viceroy that the

'matter of consulates at Kandahar and Ghazni has not yet been formally and finally arranged, so they will never be established for the purpose of causing harm and creating mischief to your dominions'.²³

The Viceroy was convinced of the need for a quick settlement with the Amir and of his genuine desire to conclude a treaty with India. London came under strong pressure from Delhi to send a delegation to Kabul. Finally, though reluctantly, London approved this in early December 1920. The British Government decided not to 'take the responsibility of overruling the considered opinion of the men on the spot'.²⁴ The delegation reached Kabul on 7 January 1921. By then the international situation affecting India, Britain and Afghanistan had changed somewhat. Russia, after overrunning Azerbaijan and establishing Soviet rule in Armenia, was in a stronger position; Jemal Pasha had trained the Afghan forces and was stationed in Kabul.

At this Conference the Afghans had second thoughts about their suggestion made at Mussoorie to seek British economic aid for developing their country, and made it clear that they would not accept this if it entailed a supervisory role for Britain. They were not prepared to promise that the Russians would not be granted permission to open consulates on the south eastern border of Afghanistan. Dobbs had been authorized by the Viceroy to promise a reward for Afghan neutrality, as well as the establishment of an Afghan legation in London. However, he desired to exclude Russian consulates from south eastern Afghanistan. When the Afghans saw that Britain and the Soviet Union had signed the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement (21 May 1921) they thought it unwise to remain adamant. The Afghan king made it clear to the British

delegate that his country faced a choice between the Soviets and the British, as long as the latter was adamant on the issue of the consulates. The Amir added that he was inclined to support the British on condition that, if the Soviet-Afghan treaty were to work against Afghan interests, Britain would go to Afghanistan's rescue with arms and money. Soviet Russia's unwillingness to give independence to her Central Asian States inclined him towards Britain. Basically, it seemed that all the Amir wanted from Britain was an amnesty for the tribes who had supported him during the Anglo-Afghan war. The Afghans were not prepared to enter into an exclusive pact²⁵ with the British, but the British Government still seemed to want that commitment which the Afghans viewed as control of their foreign relations in a new guise. By the time (15 Jun. 1921) approval from London had been obtained for an Anglo-Afghan treaty the Russo-Afghan treaty had already been ratified in Moscow on 28 Feb. 1921.²⁶

The central Government in the Soviet Union considered of immense importance the appeasement of their Muslim subjects, partly by a benevolent foreign policy towards Muslim Afghanistan, and partly by an internal policy based on promises of autonomy to their own Muslims. Through friendship with Afghanistan, the Russians endeavoured to demonstrate their supposed commitment to ethnic diversity within the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, besides, being a country bordering on British India, offered the Russians a chance to befriend a neighbour who could be used to embarrass or even threaten the Indian Government. Ratification of the treaty with Russia took place in Kabul on 13 August 1921. Dobbs lost no time in writing to the Afghan Foreign Minister for the details of the treaty, but Tarzi did not reveal its contents and told Dobbs that he could read it in the newspapers. It was, however, on 3 September 1921 that the Afghans officially informed the British Indian delegates in Kabul of the terms of the Russo-Afghan treaty. Dobbs was reluctant to leave the negotiating table at Kabul without some kind of neighbourly agreement between the two countries. He told Tarzi at the fifth officials

conference held at Paghman on 19 September 1921 that he wanted

'to make it quite plain that in spite of the fact that we are not making a treaty of special friendship with Afghanistan, we shall expect her to show and shall be ready to show to her the same neighbourly attitude which is observed between ourselves and other neighbouring nations, with whom we have no treaty of special friendship'²⁷

On the Afghan side, the Amir joined the negotiations, but seeing the lack of progress, proposed to break with the Russians by repudiating the Russo-Afghan treaty. It was then that the Amir and Dobbs entered into a treaty of good neighbourliness, which allowed the Afghans to import arms through India and included a promise to the British to keep Soviet influence away from the border areas, while it permitted British India to continue its policy of tribal 'pacification' in the Waziristan area. The treaty was signed on 22 Nov. 1921. The Amir announced the conclusion of the treaty on 1 Dec. 1921. He made it clear that it fell short of a treaty of friendship which, according to him, could not be entered into without taking into account the British attitude to the Turkestan frontier and the Indian independence movement. Dobbs was nevertheless pleased with the outcome. He wrote :

'In all but name the treaty is one of friendship, giving us what we had wished far more cheaply than had been contemplated'.²⁸

The British Indian concern with Russian influence on the frontier was recognized and the treaty did not include a commitment to pay a subsidy to the Afghan Government. A subsidy could, of course, have provided India with an effective instrument for occasional blackmail, but Afghan dependence on India for communication with foreign countries left India with a strong lever.

It is true that Amanullah was eager to establish closer relations with Soviet Union but he was not prepared to turn his

back on British India. In like manner, although Britain distrusted the new Amir and his policies—so much so that Patrick, of the Political Department (India Office), could write in 1929 quoting Sir Norman Bolton²⁹ that Britain should not do anything

‘to lose our present good reputation with the Mullahs : thanks to not being identified with anti-Islamic reforms.³⁰

They did not want to push him further into the Russian camp.

The Bolsheviks who had taken control of the Russian Government with the slogan ‘power to the people’ appeared to recognize the various forces of nationalism, including that of the Muslims who had formed an important part of the former Tsarist empire³¹ Lenin had declared :

‘As regards the national question, the proletarian party first of all must advocate the proclamation and immediate realization of complete freedom of secession from Russia for all the nations and peoples who were oppressed by Tsarism, or who were forcibly kept within the boundaries of, the state, *i.e.* annexed’.³²

There was anxiety in Britain that Afghan-Soviet friendship would result in a military build up in Afghanistan. Although the Soviet Union also looked on Afghan aspirations with sympathy, she was not strong enough to risk a confrontation with Britain. Her priority was international recognition and preservation of domestic stability. Rumours also circulated of Amnullah’s desire to develop a Soviet-trained air force, which would undermine the traditional military superiority of the British. Britain feared and indeed had suspicions about the speed and enthusiasm with which countries hostile to Britain, namely, Turkey (Turko-Afghan Treaty of 1 March 1921), Afghanistan, Iran Perso-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 22 June 1921) and the Soviet Union, seemed to find a common cause ; and the latter was thought to be arranging the alliance³³. The British

envoy in Kabul, Humphrys, wrote home in 1924 that he had been told by the Turkish Minister that the

'Amir is intrigued with the idea of being proclaimed Caliph, for Central Asia, Afghanistan and Mahomedan India'.³¹

The Turko-Afghan Treaty was signed (1 March 1921) in Moscow. But Suritz (Soviet envoy Dec. 1919—July 1921) made it clear that

'a condition of Bolshevik support was that there must be no activity against Russia or its possessions. For the same reason the Bolsheviks excluded Bokhara, Khiva, Turkestan and the Caucasian republics from the scheme'.³⁵

The newly found enthusiasm for the Soviet Union received a set back at the news of Soviet actions in the Central Asian republic of Bokhara. Russian attempts to annex the areas were fought back by Muslim freedom fighters (Basmachis).³⁶ Amanullah offered his moral support to them.³⁷ Amir Said Mir Alim Khan, ruler of Bokhara, had to flee to Afghanistan in 1921. The Soviet Union demanded that Afghanistan should withdraw her forces from the border areas. Amanullah, who found himself isolated, decided to seek a normalization of relations with Britain and the Soviet Union. Otherwise, by alienating the Soviets and the British simultaneously, Amanullah would have cut off all sources of outside aid. Amanullah was confirmed in his decision of drifting back to a policy of seeking a balance of power in the area with a rapprochement with Britain partly due to Britain's consolidation in the North-West Frontier Province³⁸ and partly due to increasing apprehensions about Soviet intentions.³⁹

The only major event that happened in Afghanistan's relations with the outside world, after the Khost rebellion but before the Amir's trip abroad, was Soviet occupation in 1925 of Urta Tagai, an island in the river Oxus. As a result of Afghan protests, a Soviet-Afghan joint commission studied the dispute and

decided that the island should belong to Afghanistan. The Soviet Union agreed. The apparent Soviet compromise on that issue led to the signing of Treaty of Non-Aggression and Neutrality between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in 1926.⁴⁰ On 14 September 1926 at a private interview Amanullah told Humphrys that his

'eyes had been opened by the Urta Tagai incident to the imminent danger of Russian penetration of his northern provinces'.⁴¹

and that the new treaty with the Soviet Union was

'intended solely to protect Afghan territory against further Russian aggression, in so far as it was possible to do so by a paper agreement'.⁴²

Amanullah visited Europe from December 1927 to July 1928. In Europe he visited Italy, France, Germany and England. In England he was well received by King George V. After his London visit Amanullah told Humphrys that 'he had completely abandoned his former suspicions about British policy'.⁴³ On his return journey he visited the Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran. Amanullah drew more ideas from Europe on what to do to take his country into the twentieth century. From the success he saw in Mustafakend's Turkey and Reza Shah's Iran, Amanullah was more optimistic about the chances of transforming Afghan society and therefore more determined.

Surveying these events, it must be admitted that Soviet goodwill boosted the morale of Amanullah and put him in an advantageous bargaining position during the post war (third Anglo-Afghan war) negotiations. The British willingness to yield to the Afghan demand for complete freedom in conducting foreign affairs is in part explained by the new development. However, Soviet-Afghan friendship did not grow steadily. The Afghans soon realized that the Soviet leaders were not entirely sincere in their intention to promote Muslim nationalism⁴⁴ within the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the suppression of the

autonomy of Bokhara. It also became clear that the Bolsheviks were actually less interested in keeping the Muslims happy than in coming to an understanding with Britain. Friendship with Afghanistan did not matter except as an instrument for the Soviet policies of consolidation at home and furtherance of an *entente* with Great Britain. Once those objectives were achieved Afghanistan became less important. Soviet leaders; and when Anglo-Soviet relations cooled, Afghan-Russian relations warmed up and vice versa.⁴⁵ Although there was an attempt to rouse Amanullah to take an anti-British position and he was praised for his reforms, the Soviets moved to his aid only when they suspected that the British might put their own candidate on the throne. But the Soviet action was too late to make any significant difference to the outcome. He is reported to have said in Bombay on his way to exile that the Soviets had

‘estranged him from the British, the traditional friends of his father and grand-father (and)...when the crisis came had not lifted [a] finger to help him’.⁴⁶

In fact the main thrust of the Soviets in the Far East was in China. The so-called ‘Asia Detour’ of the twenties represented the attempt of the Soviets to bring to power there political groups which were sympathetic to them. The policy was not successful.

Afghanistan, after the First World War, faced problems which foreshadowed those that the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa had to deal with after the Second World War. In the forties and fifties these countries were asked to choose between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in order to maintain viable economies. Afghanistan was pushed to choose between Britain and Soviet Union. The economic backwardness and cultural differences of the newly emerging nations in Africa and Asia made them after the Second World War particularly vulnerable to the ill-effects of U.S.-Soviet involvement in the so-called ‘Cold War’. In like manner, the strategically important and geographically peculiar position of Afghanistan,

in addition to her economic needs, made her particularly vulnerable to the ill-effects of Anglo-Soviet rivalry in the East in the second decade of the twentieth century. After World War II, a number of countries in Asia and Africa, and most prominently India, avoided involvement in the Cold War by being non-aligned and created an international pressure group, 'the third world', which used the United Nations General Assembly as their forum and fulcrum for pushing their problems and points of view. Amanullah, forced with somewhat similar dilemma, tried with some degree of success to preserve his country from alignment with either the Soviet Union or Britain by forming new ties with powerful nations—Italy, Germany and Japan—a difficult but classic diplomatic chess game for rulers of small and vulnerable nations.

REFERENCES

1. See p. 27.
2. Paul Alexander Bravin, a Bolshevik, was Soviet representative in Tehran in 1918.
3. *Afghanistan : The Bolsheviks in Central Asia and Afghanistan* 30 March 1920, IOR, L/P & S/18/A187.
4. See p. 34.
5. Telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, 20 Feb. 1920, IOR, L/P & S/10/819 p. 2731/19.
6. On 9 March 1920 Lord Chelmsford invited the Amir to send a delegation to Mussoorie.
7. In addition to the Foreign Minister Tarzi the delegation included Ghulam Muhammad, Minister of Commerce, Abdul Hadi, officer in charge of Frontier Affairs, Divan

Niranjan Das, Finance Member ; and Colonel Pir Muhammad.

8. General Dyer had ordered his troops to fire into a packed crowd confined in a enclosure resulting in 379 dead and 1208 wounded. This incident occurred on 13 April only a few weeks after Amanullah was crowned (25 Feb. 1919). Cmd. 771.
9. *Hijrat* : Movement of Muslims from a country where they are not free to practice their religion to country where they are. *Hijrat* from India took place between May and August 1920. On 9 Aug. 1920 Amanullah through a firman stopped the flow of men into Afghanistan. R.R. Macdonachie, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 & 31.
10. In his speech on 20 Feb. 1920 on the occasion of the anniversary of the murder of his father.
11. For details of the Mussoorie Conference see IOR, L/P & S/10/809 and 811 ; for a resume of events since the Treaty of Rawalpindi see 'Report on the Kabul Mission' by H. Dobbs, Chief British representative, 9 Jan. 1922, IOR, L/P & S/10/961 p. 427/22.
12. Jacob Suritz was Russian Charge d' Affaires at Copenhagen in 1918. Bravin was instructed to remain in Kabul and assist Suritz.
13. Telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, 8 June 1920 ; IOR, L/P & S/10/912 part 1 p. 4514/20.
14. Dobbs was assisted by S.E. Pears, Revenue Commissioner of Peshawar, Lt. Colonel S.F. Musprat, General Staff, India and Sir Abdul Qayum.
15. *Afghanistan : Relations from signing of Treaty of Peace August 1919 to despatch of Mission to Kabul Jan. 1921*, 14 Feb. 1921, IOR, L/P & S/18/A190 p. 7.
16. *i.e.* that Afghanistan should stop intrigues with the tribes, deny bases to aliens in Afghanistan and be tough with the Indian agitators.

17. *Afghanistan : Relations from signing of Treaty of Peace August 1919 to despatch of mission to Kabul, Jan. 1921*, 14 Feb. 1921, IOR, L/P & S/18/A190 pp. 9-10.
18. For a copy of the memorandum see IOR, L/P & S S/10 809 part 10 p. 6870/20.
19. *Afghanistan : Relations from signing of Treaty of Peace August 1919 to despatch of mission to Kabul, Jan. 1921*, 14 Feb. 1921, IOR, L/P & S/18/A190 p. 9
20. 'Report on the Kabul Mission' by Dobbs, Chief British Representative, 9 Jan. 1922, IOR, L/P & S/10/961 p. 427/22.
21. Telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India. 21 Oct. 1920 quoted in R.R. Maconachie, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
22. Telegram from the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, 29 Oct. 1920 quoted in R.R. Maconachie *op. cit.*, p. 51.
23. *Afghanistan : Relations from signing of Treaty of Peace August 1919 to despatch of mission to Kabul, Jan. 1921*, 14/ Feb. 1921, IOR, L/P & S/18/A190 pp. 11-12.
24. Extract from conclusions of the meeting of the Cabinet 6 Dec. 1920, IOR, L/P & S/10/810 part 9 p. 8764/19.
25. The arrival in Kabul of the newly appointed Russian Ambassador Raskolnikoff (6 July) and Turkish victories over the Greeks helped towards this mood.
26. According to the treaty Afghans were given permission to import goods through Russian territory tax-free. While the treaty also promised one million gold rubles a year, the Afghans promised not to enter into agreements of any kind with a third country that would be harmful to the Soviet Union. The treaty also permitted the Russian to open consulates in Afghanistan.
27. Sir Henry Dobbs, British Representative (Kabul Mission) to Denys Bray, Secretary to the Government of India

(Foreign and Political Dept.), 21, Sept. 1921, IOR, L/P & S/10/956 part 2 p. 4739/21.

28. 'Report on the Kabul Mission' by Dobbs, Chief British Representative, 9 Jan. 1922, IOR, L/P & S/10/961 p. 427/22.
29. He was Chief Commissioner of the N.W.F.P. Dec. 1924-Dec. 1925.
30. I.O Pol. Dept. mintue by Patrick, 4 Jan. 1929, IOR, L/P & S/10/1261 p. 76/29.
31. In 1916 there were about 25 million Muslims of Turkish origin in Russia. I. Spector, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
32. V.I. Lenin. 'The Agrarian and National Programmes' in *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1970) II, 66.
33. I.O. Pol Dept. note prepared at Lord Winterton's suggestion for information of the Secretary of State, 12 Oct. 1925, IOR, L/P & S/10/1152 p. 3198/25 ; "The Note shows clearly the dangers to be apprehended. In my opinion, this is the most important Soviet move against India which has yet occurred and will, in some respects (though not necessarily in a military sense) be harder to frustrate than similar attempts on the North West Frontier via Afghanistan". 'Note by Lord Winterton', 13 Oct. 1925, IOR, L/P & S/10/1152 p. 3198/25, Mustapha Choakiev, "The Bolsheviks and Afghanistan". *Asiatic Review XXV* (July 1929) 497-516.
34. Humphrys to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 8 April 1924, quoted in R.R. Maconachie *op. cit.*, p. 263.
35. A Confidential Note (unsigned and undated) : 'Bolshevism and India', IOR, L/P & S/10/1108 part 3 p. 1115/24.
36. "According to may German colleague, a secret movement for the reinstatement of the ex-Amir, supported by the Afghan Government, has been frustrated, for the time being at any rate, by the outbreak of the Khost rebellion". Maconachie, H.M. Charge d' Affaires in Kabul to Ramasy

MacDonald, 2 Oct. 1924, IOR, L/P & S/10/1051 p. 4453/24.

37. "There seems good reason to believe that the Amir of Afghanistan is giving what help he can without committing himself officially to the ex-Amir of Bokhara", 'North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary' No. 3 for the week ending 20 Jan. 1921, IOR, L/P & S/10/967 p. 1144/21 : See also 'Diary' for the week ending 3 Feb. 1921, IOR, L/P & S/10/967 p. 1338/21.
38. R.R. Maconachie, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
39. "It is also reported that the Amir realises that the Bolsheviks only wish to use Afghanistan as a stepping stone to India and that this would result in nothing but evil to his country". 'North-West Frontier Province, Intelligence Bureau Diary for the week ending 27 Jan. 1921', IOR, L/P & S/10/967 part I. p. 1338/21.
40. C.U. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, XIII, 228 and Appendix XI.
41. 'Note by Sir Francis Humphrys on an interview with His Majesty King Amanullah' (The interview took place on 7 Sept. 1926), 14 Sept. 1926, IOR, L/P & S/10/1101 p. 3481/26. The Urta Tagai incident caused the C.I.D. to appoint (17 March 1927) a Sub-Committee under the Chairmanship of Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, to report on the question of defence of India on its N.W.F. with special reference to the question of Russian aggression in Afghanistan. See P.R.O. Cab. 16/83/158-D for the Sub-Committee Report of Dec. 1927 ; see also IOR, L/P & S/10/1232 part 3 p. 5856/28 for a statement (dated 3 Jan. 1928) by Birkenhead on the conclusions of the Sub-Committee according to which : "the army in India was short of some 2,500 British officers and some 15,000 men to meet the war requirements".
42. *Ibid.*
43. Telegram from Humphrys to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 7 Sept. 1928, IOR, L/P & S/10/1215 part

I p. 5453/28 ; for details of Amanullah's reception in England 3 March to 5 April, IOR, L/P & S/10/1223 part 6 2341/28.

44. "The Soviet Government have profited at our expense by proclaiming themselves the champions of Islam, and ourselves the enslavers of it". 'A Note on the Future of Central Asia. British or Russian Predominance', by R. Sinclair. (He says that it was the outcome of a discussion he had with Sir A. Hirtzel.) 24 July, 1922, IOR, L/P & S/ 10/837 p. 3822/22 : Sir Arthur Hirtzel was assistant under-secretary of state 1917-21, deputy under-secretary of state 1921-4, and permanent under-secretary of state 1924-30.
45. Soviet-Afghan relations received a setback in 1921 when the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement was signed. See the text of the trade agreement signed by Sir Robert Horne, President of the Board of Trade for Britain and M. Kressin for the Soviet Union, 16 March 1921, IOR, L/P & S/ 10/912 part I p. 1508/21.
46. Telegram (no. 829) from Major E.I.R. Wickham in Bombay to the Government of India, 28 May 1929, IOR, L/P & S/10/1301 p. 8056/29. The Soviets were not prepared to jeopardize the negotiations which were taking place at that time between Britain and the Soviet Union for improving relations between the two countries.

The Second War And Anglo-Soviet Intervention In Afghanistan

The Japanese army marched into Manchuria in 1931. Apprehensive of a Soviet takeover of their country, the Afghans saw merits in seeking security through participation in international organizations. But with the Soviet Union not yet a member of the League of Nations, the advantage of joining the League was limited. Indeed, Moscow could well have regarded their application for the League of Nations membership as a hostile gesture. King Nadir Shah was ready to join the League as early as 1931 and he wanted to see what impact, if any, the organization had on the Sino-Japanese conflict and the issue of General Disarmament. In 1931 British Government Officials felt that they

'have actually no option but to tell the Afghan Government (if they ask us but not otherwise) that His Majesty's Government and the Government of India will vote for their admittance'.¹

The British Government were asked by the Afghans what they would be prepared to do in the event of a war between

the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Both London and Delhi took a cautious line. Britain told Kabul that she was not in a position to give Afghanistan any absolute guarantee of protection against any possible Russian aggression on her northern border. Britain no longer controlled Afghan foreign relations, nor was she eager to resume that responsibility. In August 1932 in reply to an inquiry, the British Cabinet authorized Maconachie to convey to Kabul the message that

‘a Soviet attack on Afghanistan would be regarded by His Majesty’s Government as an attack on British and Indian interests, and would force them to take the steps normally taken by the Government of a State when its interests are seriously threatened’.²

The British offer was limited to diplomatic pressure. The Cabinet in 1934 reaffirmed the existing policy. London also advised Afghanistan to become a member of the League of Nations. In September 1934 the Soviet Union joined the League as did Afghanistan.

Ironically, Afghanistan joined the League (1934) when the nations of Europe were losing confidence in the organization. The Afghans did not put much faith in it either although they had a vague hope that the League might offer Afghanistan and other weak nations an increased measure of protection against open aggression by their more powerful neighbours. Their vague hope vanished when in 1935-36 Mussolini invaded and overran Ethiopia, ignoring the League’s protest and sanctions. Afghanistan was dismayed at the European powers’ indifference when efforts to promote collective security crumbled.

Germany, with her readiness to provide long-term credits to Afghanistan at a time when no other country was willing or economically able to do so, served as the main counterbalance to Russian or British influence on Afghanistan. Afghanistan wanted a powerful country with no political interests in Central Asia to undertake projects of development for her. In 1935 a

German expedition was permitted to explore certain unexplored parts of Afghanistan such as the valleys of Nuristan. Germany became the most important third power in Afghanistan. A weekly air service was opened in 1937 linking Berlin with Kabul.

Japan's development as a major military and commercial power made an impact on Afghanistan. Japanese commercial interests in Afghanistan were also powerful factors in influencing the Afghan strategy of persuading her neighbours that they could not have things entirely their own way. In November 1934 the Afghan Foreign Minister Faiz Muhammad confided to the British envoy that 'the usefulness of Japan to Afghanistan lay in the fact that Japan was the natural enemy of Russia'³. In Moscow the Afghan Foreign Minister and the the Soviet Government agreed on a ten year extension of the Soviet-Afghan Non-Aggression Pact of 1931. While in Moscow the preliminary talks for the 1937 Saadabad Non-Aggression Pact between Afghanistan, Turkey, Iraq and Iran also took place. Turko-Afghan relations, which had reached a low ebb following Amanullah's overthrow, however, had improved subsequently. The Afghan Government turned to Turkey for military instructors and medical experts. For her part, Afghanistan did not fail to take into account Turkish attitudes towards world events in general and British affairs in particular. It was under Turkish sponsorship that Afghanistan entered the League. The Turko-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance of 1928 was renewed on 31 December 1937 for ten years. The Afghan Foreign Minister visited Teheran in July 1937 to sign the Four-Power Pact⁴. Thus Afghanistan sought strength in Pan-Islamic unity; she joined Turkey, Iraq and Iran in the Non-Aggression Pact of Saadabad (1937), which represented a small but decisive step towards the resurgence of Islam in Politics in general and the consolidation of Islamic Policy along the southern borders of the Soviet Union in particular.

If a war in Europe which involved Germany took place, it would certainly have repercussion in Asia. In such a contingency

it was vital for Afghanistan to know the attitude of her big neighbours towards Germany. But when Germany became increasingly hostile to those neighbours, the Soviet Union and British India, the question arose whether co-operation with Germany might not draw Afghanistan into international conflicts. Afghanistan had reason for concern because politically she had strategic importance to all in the event of a world conflict.

In July 1939 a trade delegation headed by Georg Ripken, one-time secretary of the German legation in Afghanistan, reached Kabul at the invitation of Afghan Government. Negotiations resulted in the conclusion of a comprehensive trade agreement⁵. In August, 1939 the Afghan Government told Ripken of their intention to remain neutral. Ripken appeared to be appreciative of the Afghan dilemma. After consulting the Afghan parliament, King Zahir Shah issued a decree on 6 September 1939 proclaiming Afghan neutrality. The decree also restricted the activities of the belligerent powers on Afghan soil.

The Afghans could not take advantage of the credits the Germans offered as the German industry was then naturally geared to the production of war weapons. In fact Afghanistan was exporting more to Germany than she was importing from the latter. During his negotiations in Kabul, Ripken also conferred with the Italian envoy Pietro Quaroni. Italian intelligence agents engineered some pro-Axis activities on the frontier with the co-operation of the Fakir of Ipi⁶, who attracted some adventurous Germans and Italians to his base on the Indian frontier. The Germans knew that attempts to keep Axis pressure on India needed the co-operation of the frontier Afghans. In July 1939 Quaroni proposed close Italo-German co-operation in economic and political matters, in view of the importance of India in the event of their military conflict with Britain. Quaroni had even suggested to Ripken that the ex-Amir Amanullah, then in exile in Italy, could be reinstated on the Afghan throne. Ripken, however, favoured co-operation with the existing regime of Zahir Shah⁷.

With the outbreak of the Second World War the agents working for the Axis powers⁸ entered the scene with the intention of forcing Britain to maintain a large number of troops in India in general and on the North-West Frontier in particular. But with the war the Indian National Congress⁹ gathered more force and the fear of the Japanese entering India through her North-East Frontier became a matter of more serious concern to Britain ; the North-East Frontier assumed more strategic importance. Of course, funds for counter raids came mainly from the Indian tax payer¹⁰.

At the outbreak of the Second World War, with the possibility that the Axis powers might win over Afghanistan to their side, Britain saw the relevance of Afghan neutrality. During the Second World War it was not the Soviet Union but Germany (or a German instigated Soviet-Union during the Soviet-German Pact—1939-41) that Britain was afraid might stand in the cockpit of Asia. Britain wanted Afghanistan to maintain a benevolent neutrality in all circumstances. She thus hoped to make sure that if Afghanistan was not going to give them any positive help, at least she did not add to their difficulties from a military point of view. Afghanistan told the British that the very best she could do for them was to stay neutral. She simultaneously told the Germans that Afghanistan could not join them till the German army had reached the Afghan border.

Soviet-Afghan relations were tense during mid-1940. Soviet troops were stationed in large numbers along sections of the Afghan border. The British envoy in Kabul in his report to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the year 1940 wrote that 'the issue (for the Afghan Cabinet) was between Britain and Germany, and it is to the credit of the Afghan Government that they chose Britain'¹¹. According to him the cabinet wavered for a few days.

Relations between Afghanistan and Russia, however, improved following the conclusion of Soviet-Afghan Commercial Agreement of July 1940. In the early 1940's the most impor-

tant event that affected Afghanistan's foreign relations was the Anglo-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance concluded on 12 July 1941. The German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 was by then a *fait accompli*. This Anglo-Soviet agreement radically changed the political situation in Europe and Asia. Afghanistan, however, could not afford either to provoke or displease any of her neighbours. The Afghan Government prevented propaganda activities by any of the belligerents and periodically King Zahir Shah issued royal decrees reaffirming his nation's neutrality. Afghanistan did not find it easy to satisfy both sides. When Allied forces occupied Persia in the last week of August 1941, the Afghans expressed their resentment. The occupation took place because the Secretary of State thought that the

'large and highly organised German colony in Persia has... been acting as centres of Axis propaganda and at any time when Hitler gave the word, they could precipitate a crisis in Persia'.¹²

Britain viewed the continued presence of Axis nationals as a

'disturbing influence on the frontier tribes with results that are likely to be even more embarrassing to the Afghan Government than to the Government of India'.¹³

Besides, according to a joint memorandum prepared by the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and India, it was thought that

'in the present war it will be very important to His Majesty's Government and to the Government of India that Afghanistan should be on their side, at least to the extent of (maintaining) benevolent neutrality. The Germans are already, the largest foreign colony in Afghanistan'.¹⁴

The War Cabinet eventually decided that they should bring 'diplomatic pressure to bear on Afghanistan to get rid of the

German colony¹⁵. In the autumn of 1941 the British and Soviet Governments sent¹⁶ almost simultaneous requests to the Afghan Government for the expulsion of all Axis nationals except those working on diplomatic missions.¹⁷ The Soviet Minister in Kabul justified the demand on the basis of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1931 which stated that in case of war with a third power both would maintain a strict neutrality and not permit their territory to be used by a third power to the injury of the other. Both the Soviet and British Governments, particularly the latter, were cautious enough not to precipitate a crisis by asking Kabul for the closure of the Axis legations in Afghanistan. Explaining their line of action the British Foreign Office told the U.S. Government in a telegram that

‘if they refused we should be compelled to use force if they agreed, they might so undermine their own position in Afghanistan that disorders would ensue.. we do not wish to risk bringing about the fall of the present Government’.¹⁸

This was consistent with their main object in Afghanistan which was ‘to ensure that conditions there should not increase our military preoccupations or threaten the security of the North-west Frontier of India’.¹⁹ The Afghans were, however, angry at the joint Anglo-Soviet request. They knew that they had maintained neutrality. They were also aware that neutrality tended to favour the Allies; and they did not deserve such rough treatment. In any case, the Afghans, being independent by nature, did not like being told what to do. The Afghan Prime Minister was however pragmatic enough to see that Afghanistan had no choice but to comply, regardless of the eventual out-come of the struggle in Europe. That realistic assessment spared Afghanistan the treatment meted out to Iran for rejecting similar Allies demands. Both the Afghan National Assembly and the Afghan Council of Ministers, therefore, took the decision to expel Axis nationals from the country. Fortunately for the Afghans the Germans understood their dilemma.²⁰ They knew that Afghan leaders feared that the fate of Iran would befall their own country. They also knew that in

the changed situation Afghanistan depended much on India for its imports. A German delegation with a skeleton staff of ten persons remained in Kabul continuing its intelligence activities and maintaining secret radio transmissions. Such activities were, however, suspended in October 1943 when it was believed that the Russians had gained possession of the German code. After the Germans departed the *Loe Jirga* met to approve the Government's decision to accede to the Allies' demand. The Assembly expressed its support for 'the policy of absolute neutrality that has so far been pursued by the Government'.²¹

At this stage the Government in London, which did not want to do anything that would undermine the credibility of the Afghan Government among their own subjects, instructed Sir Francis Wylie, H.M. Minister in Kabul, to offer the Afghan Prime Minister a gift of £500,000 in instalments spread over two years. The first instalment was to be paid soon after the first group of Axis nationals had crossed the frontier in order to help 'stiffen the Afghan Government against possible rising (by) internal opposition and give them immediate resources for bribery'.²² The British envoy took the sum to the Afghan Prime Minister on 30 November and the Prime Minister received it with gratitude.

During the closing months of 1943 the war moved in favour of the Allies' cause and the Afghans regarded Britain and India in a more favourable light. Afghanistan became increasingly dependent on India which, at considerable costs to its own limited resources, did everything possible to provide Afghanistan with sufficient supplies²³ of consumer goods such as petrol and sugar. Although it was at India's expense, Britain managed to keep Afghanistan neutral and happy. At the end of the war the Afghans felt that their policy had been wise.

With the withdrawal of Britain, Pakistan emerged as a new force on Afghanistan's border. The North-West Frontier Province became part of Pakistan. The Afghan Amir objected to that arrangement. The Afghans complained:

'six or seven million Afghans in India who are non-Indians and whose country was forcibly annexed to India only recently have been denied the freedom to choose their future themselves'²¹.

The issue of Pashtunistan* made initial relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan very tense. But Pakistan's association with the Commonwealth and participation in the U.S. sponsored regional security alliance (Seato) made it possible for Britain and the United States to exert a conciliatory influence on Pakistan and Afghanistan, since they were dependent on U.S. aid. The anti-Soviet stand which had traditionally been reflected in British Indian policy towards Afghanistan continued to be reflected in Pakistan's policy towards Kabul, which drew closer to the Soviet Union,²³ reversing the position she had embraced for the country prior to the Indian independence. In the years immediately after World War II the U.S. served as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. In a sense the U.S. took the role of Britain. The influence of the U.S. in Afghanistan was certainly different from that formerly exercised by Britain, a power that controlled the adjoining territory. Officially, Afghanistan proclaimed her continued neutrality and with much geopolitical relevance.

When the former Prime Minister Doud proclaimed the Republic of Afghanistan in 1973 and was declared its President and Prime Minister, he adopted a policy softer than had been expected towards Pakistan and a more balanced approach towards the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

With the formation of the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan", Afghanistan moved closer to the Soviet Union than at any time before. Nur Mohammad Taraki became its Prime Minister. He led the Khalq-Parcham regime after the coup d'état in April 1978 (Taraki and Karmal led the Khalq and Parcham factions respectively).

*Pashtuns resident in Pakistan desired as independent state.

It was in July 1977 that the Khalq (the people) and the Parcham (the banner) parties reunited on a common programme of opposing the old regime. The new Government promised to remain 'a faithful member of the United Nations and the Non-aligned Countries'. But Taraki was overthrown in September 1979 by Hafizullah Amin, who succeeded him as the Prime Minister (it was he who had engineered the sudden coup which brought Taraki to power), and then his own overthrow in turn in December, 1979 by Babrak Karmal made neutrality very difficult. Karmal was appointed Vice-Prime Minister under Taraki soon after the 1978 coup. He found himself out numbered by the Khalq faction and was appointed ambassador to Prague. He lost his post but remained in exile in Eastern Europe, having been accused of treason.

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9. At its annual session at Wardha (Oct. 1940) the Congress criticized the policy of the Government of India towards the border tribes and assured them that the "people of India will gladly develop friendly contacts with the trans-border tribes and thus put an end to a conflict which is harmful to both".
10. Statement showing cost of Military Operations on the North West Frontier of India (see IOR R/12/112)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Amount (Rs.)</i>
1918-19	1,56,86,485
1919-20	23,87,44,327

1920-21	19,16,26,414
1921-22	6,39,57,539
1922-23	3,33,33,678
1923-24	1,20,12,035
1924-25	2,72,784
1925-26	1,32,560
1926-30	negligible
1930-31	89,87,000
1931-32	9,000
1932-33	7,24,000
1933-34	30,63,000
1934-35	1,77,000
1935-36	42,13,000
1936-37	30,56,000
1937-38	1,61,54,000

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16. The British Government sent their request on 9 and the Soviet Government on 11 October 1941.

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23. Squire to Eden, 19 Jan. 1945, 'Political Review for 1944', IOR, L/P & S/12/1572 Ext 540/45.

24. Mir Muhammad Siddiq wrote in *Anis* 21 June 1947 under the title 'Practical proposals for the solution of the Frontier problem', see IOR, L/P & S/12/1811 Ext 1199/47.
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Soviets in Afghanistan and a Basis for a Settlement

Babruk Karmal's coup presented the international community with an Afghanistan problem. It was with his seizure of power that Soviet troops appeared in Afghanistan. It has been charged that Karmal was installed by the Soviets after having been smuggled back into Afghanistan from his exile in Eastern Europe just a few days before the coup. Due to the continued presence of Soviet troops, Karmal is not seen to be effectively in control of the country; the minimum requirement for his Government to be recognized would be permanent withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Soviets maintain that they will pull out their troops if asked to do so by the Afghan Government. As yet, Karmal has not made such a request. As far as the international community is concerned, this stalemate can be resolved only by persuading the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan.

Not many constructive proposals for a solution to the Afghanistan problem have been put forward. Most knowledgeable observers since the onset of the crisis on one occasion or another have supported the neutralization of Afghanistan which is supposed 'to provide a face-saving device' for the Soviet Union to withdraw her forces from Afghanistan. In fact, neutralization would take away the inherent right of this country

to a free existence. It will, for example, make it impossible to be militarily aligned with another country even if in accord with the best interests of international peace and probity. It would prevent Afghanistan from expressing her opinion on any international issue where superpowers do not see eye to eye, even when truth and justice warrant it. If a country is prevented from framing its foreign policy by having to accept a neutrality imposed from outside such neutralization would amount to the institutionalization of an unacceptable *status quo*. Afghanistan then would be the prototype of a new kind of colony created by the superpowers and maintained under joint (U.S.—Soviet) or multiple supervision. The Soviets want Afghanistan immediately neutralized while the U.S. wants to see Soviet troops withdrawn as a condition *a priori* to neutralization! If a country invades and occupies another country, should not the international community demand nothing less than an unconditional withdrawal of the occupation troops? Unfortunately the West did not take this step and neutralization came to the fore as an alternative. Lord Carrington has become one of the strongest advocates of neutralization. If invasion of a country is followed by neutralization, what will be the fate of other small and poor nations in a similar predicament? If neutralization is an acceptable policy to forestall further Soviet interventions in the area should not the West call for the neutralization of all those countries of the third world that are vulnerable to outside intervention?

If the Soviet Union moves her troops into a non-satellite European country, would neutralization of that country be an acceptable solution? If neutralization will prevent a country from interfering in the affairs of another nation why not neutralize the 'great' powers, starting with the Soviet Union and the United States? Is it not the aggressor rather than the victim that needs to be punished?

No nation in this day and age can and will accept a status imposed upon it from outside. The advocacy of such a measure amounts to a subtle, though unintended, cover-up and indeed acceptance of what has taken place in Afghanistan. If such a

precedent is established it will be very damaging to the stability and integrity of the international community.

Given the situation as described and at this juncture, the search for a solution to the Afghanistan problem should :

(1) *accept that there was an Afghan problem before Babrak Karmal came to power.*

It must be recognized that Afghanistan had a communist Government before the Soviet troops were 'invited' in. No solution that is proposed can disregard that fact. It was by a coup that Taraki and his communist colleagues seized power from Daud and his non-communist colleagues. (Daud had seized power from his uncle King Zahir Shah in a bloodless coup in July 1973). The inauguration of a communist Government in this Islamic and tribal society created problems. But neither the Afghan communists nor their tactics (coup for example) were imported from the Soviet Union. It is not Karmal's communism nor in principle even the method he used (the coup) to seize power that turned an Afghan problem (of Afghan making and thus to be sorted out by the Afghans themselves into an Afghanistan crisis (a problem for the international community). Even the fact that there are so many Soviet troops in Afghanistan should not in itself worry the international community. The crux of the problem is who invited whom : did Karmal invite the Soviets to install Karmal in Kabul. The basic question is to determine : is Babrak Karmal in control or are the Soviets using him as mere puppet ?

(2) *acknowledge the unmentionable (Iranian) factor*

The West's hypocrisy and naivety in not acknowledging or having anything to do with the Shah of Iran the moment the throne started to slip away from him have had serious consequences for Afghanistan. The universal conspiracy of silence about Iran after the Shah is reflected in the West's mass media. There has been little objective assessment of the possible impact of Iranian developments on her neighbours Pakistan and

Afghanistan. This unmentionable factor has a vitally important Afghan dimension.

Afghanistan under Taraki faced opposition from within his country and from without. It should have been clear to observers that the religiously-inspired Iranian revolution just beyond the borders of Afghanistan placed the Afghan experiment at a serious risk from outside subversion. The Western mass media seemed to suggest that whereas developments in Iran were inevitable, the communist government in Afghanistan could not be permanent and in any case Iran would 'tackle' Afghanistan in due course. A sudden influx of Afghan workers who returned from Iran (not the result of any explicit Iranian policy) made conditions difficult for the new rulers in Kabul. The Iranian development was an unmentionable factor also in Afghanistan; the Afghan leaders did not wish to appear afraid of the conservative Islamic religious revolution that swept up to its borders. Western hostility to a communist Afghanistan made the Government in Kabul entirely dependent on the Soviet Union. Zia in Pakistan saw the changed circumstances in Afghanistan as a heaven-sent opportunity to get his regime accepted the legitimate by the international community. Pakistan told the U.S. and the Chinese Governments that she could not be ignored, regardless of their previous criticisms of her Government. She also told her oil rich Arab allies that by providing cash for the Pakistani junta they would in fact be investing in the maintenance of Islam. Zia got a face-lift when the U.S. Government under Carter bargained for his friendship and the European press brought to public notice Zia's 'charitable' works among the Afghan refugees. Zia was seen to be 'an ally to be supported as a bastion of the free world' (*The Times*, 23 Jan. 1980).

(3) *accept that the Soviet Union could not realistically ignore what was happening in Afghanistan.*

The Soviet Union, the sixth largest Muslim power, with 'an Islamic population rising much faster than the Slav', has every reason to be worried 'that the wave of Islamic fundamentalism

might spill across the frontier' (*The Sunday times*, 30 Dec. 1972). But despite this fact it is reasonable to believe that Soviet feelings of comradeship with the Afghan Government were not solely responsible for the decision to prevent it from being overthrown by anti-Government forces. Military and strategic considerations were doubtless crucial factors in the decision of the Soviets to intervene in Afghanistan. The Soviets may have misunderstood what would be the reaction of the Americans, who had stood by seemingly helpless while their ambassador was assassinated, their embassies were set on fire, and their citizens were taken hostage! It is doubtful whether the Soviet intervention would have been as blatantly military without the rapid growth of unrest in Afghanistan and the parallel collapse of Western influence in Iran.

(4) *acknowledge that neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. can/or should attempt to decide the future development of mankind.*

Detente, a policy of the superpowers, cannot be pursued regardless of cost to the international community, nor can it as practised at present be a passport to peace in our time. Superpowers and their satellites seem to ignore the fact that real detente is indivisible. Much of what the superpowers have done since World War II has served only to polarize the nations. The superpowers and their satellites still show a lack of understanding of the non-aligned movement and the outlook of the countries that support it. Indeed the Afghanistan problem seems to have been presented to the international community as another test case in which nations are expected to take sides. The U.S. 'hurried' to make the Afghan situation an East-West problem. The Reagan administration has already warned that American economic assistance to countries will be related to political support of U.S. positions. Political 'quo' for economic 'quid'. That means poor countries which need U.S. aid should think twice before they express their views on matters of international concern.

(5) *acknowledge that the non-aligned movement to which most of the nations of the West Asian area including Afghanistan be-*

long has a moderating and progressive role to play in any international dispute because of its approach to world problems. Although its members are not often taken seriously enough by most of the developed countries, they are sufficiently respected as a movement by the international community at large. The U.N. should turn to the non-aligned nations to take a lead on the Afghan issue.

A democratic and non-aligned country like India which is friendly with Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and the U.S. should be invited to play a constructive role in the Afghanistan problem. India in fact should have been the first Asian country to be consulted on the Afghanistan crisis by any country that sincerely wanted to pursue a realistic proposal for settlement of the issue. No proposal, for that matter, can have any viability unless approved and actively supported by the countries immediately affected.

(6) *accept that there is no short cut to a dialogue with the Soviets on this issue.*

It is difficult to know what are the Soviet objectives unless a dialogue is started with them. As the German Chancellor Schmidt said in Madrid: 'At difficult times like this, we need to talk more nor less' (*Time*, 21 Jan. 1980). It is to be regretted that some Western politicians are using the present situation to show the world that they have always been correct in their analysis of Soviet expansionist intentions. Possibly the Soviets have occupied Afghanistan to make the West in some meaningful discussion about detente on a global basis. German politicians seem to think that Afghanistan is 'too distant' a problem and that it should not distract them from their 'ostpolitik'. For them, Afghanistan was a *de facto* Soviet satellite even before it was occupied. Other countries seem to be exploiting the situation for economic advantage; they are interested in arms deals with the countries involved in the crisis. Such opportunism reveals an emptiness of vision and a distortion of values from which one hoped the world had moved away. One does not need a great deal of political insight to see that no Muslim

Government of the area can afford a military pact or understanding with the West even if Britain or the U.S. could provide them with a false sense of security. What the Shah and Iran have gone through is too real to be forgotten.

The U.S. showed a form of political immaturity throughout the Afghan crisis by refusing to engage in serious discussions with the Soviets. Washington did talk earlier with Moscow when vital American interests were involved. The American political leaders thought that the Soviets might intervene to gain the release of the U.S. prisoners in Iran. In the closing months of the Carter administration the rhetoric engaged in by the American President and his official representatives needlessly envenomed U.S.—Soviet relationships. Diplomacy cannot solve all problems, but rhetoric without diplomacy escalates them.

(7) *Strengthen the Afghan people.*

The Afghans have gone through a difficult period of economic and political instability as a result of several coups and counter-coups. Afghanistan and her people badly need freedom from foreign interference to allow a recovery from the stagnation and neglect from which the Afghan economy is suffering. No major catastrophe will befall the Afghan people if the present administration is recognized and as a result the hands of the present leaders are freed. (No perceptive observer of Afghan affairs would imagine that all Afghan leaders have overnight become dedicated adherents of the Soviet system.) Sooner or later it is likely that some Afghan leader will stand up and tell the Soviets that they are no longer required in Afghanistan. Such a move will be feasible only if the country is not condemned to be completely dependent on Soviet economic ties for survival. Before the recognition is accorded the present Government in Kabul, and on-the-spot study should be made to find out to what extent Babrak Karmal is in control even if he needs some foreign troops to maintain law and order. The priority of the international community should be to safeguard the interest of the Afghan people. Amin's Uganda, Franco's Spain and Mao's China did not disappear because of inter-

national disapproval. Only the political will and determination of the people in these respective countries brought about political changes. The people of Afghanistan will find it difficult to pull themselves together if they are left in isolation and poverty. If the people of Afghanistan are neglected by the Western powers, the ruling junta is more likely to convert them to its viewpoint.

Babrak Karmal was not an outsider to the communist clique that seized power in 1978. He was deputy Prime Minister and Vice-President of the Revolutionary Council in 1978. Taraki had to fight for his survival as a leader of the team which seems to indicate that he had a leadership problem. Taraki sent Karmal outside Afghanistan (as ambassador to Prague) in order to consolidate his position and his line of policies. Such a move seems to indicate that Taraki had already sown the seeds of contention from the beginning of his term of power and that Karmal probably was an important rival at the juncture. The Karmal-Taraki understanding fell apart when the Parcham-Khalq understanding failed due to ideological differences.

The international community will find it easy to recognize Karmal once it is apparent that he is in control of his country without outside help. If Karmal asks the Soviet Union to withdraw her forces she may well agree provided a communist Government remains in control of Afghanistan.

GLOSSARY

Amir	Ruler ; nobleman.
Arbab	A Chief.
Beg	A title of honour used to indicate high tribal status.
Durbar	Reception.
Fakir	A holy man.
Farmān (Firman)	Decree of a ruler.
Haji	A Pilgrim to Mecca.
Hanafi	An orthodox school of Islamic law founded by Hanifah (699-767).
Jagir (Jaghire)	Indian land tenure.
Jihad ('Jehad)	A holy war.
Jirga	A tribal assembly or council.
Loe Jirga	Grand Assembly of Afghanistan under the chairmanship of the King to discuss general policy.
Kafir	Unbeliever—used for non-Muslims.
Khassadar	Representative of a tribe responsible for carrying out its engagements with the Afghan Government but paid by the Government. An irregular soldier. Tribal militiaman.
Khel	Clan.

Khilafat	The Muslim Movement in India active between 1920 and 1922. Comes from Khalifa.
Lakh	100,000.
Lashkar	A tribal force ; tribal army.
Malik	A headman, village Chief.
Maulvi	A Priest.
Mufti	A Magistrate, legal counsellor.
Mullah	A Muslim Priest.
Nawab	Deputy ; a title used by the Governors of the provinces in India.
Pir	A spiritual guide.
Powindar	Migratory Afghan tribesmen.
Qazi	A magistrate, judge.
Sardar (Sirdar)	Title ; Military Chief ; Member of Royal Family.
Shariat	Holy law of Islam.
Wali	Governor.

APPENDICES

1. CONVENTION CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN
GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, 31 August 1907

The High Contracting Parties, in order to ensure perfect security on their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in these regions a solid and lasting peace, have concluded the following Convention :

ARTICLE I

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan.

His Britannic Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and they will not themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening Russia.

The Russian Government, on their part, declare that they recognise Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government; they further engage not to send any Agents into Afghanistan.

ARTICLE II

The Government of His Britannic Majesty having declared in the Treaty signed at Kabul on the 21st March 1905, that they recognise the Agreement and the engagements concluded with the late Amir Abdur Rahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal government of Afghan territory, Great Britain engages neither to annex nor to occupy in contravention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan or to interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the Amir fulfils the

engagements already contracted by him towards His Britannic Manesty's Government under the above-mentioned Treaty.

ARTICLE III

The Russian and Afghan authorities specially designated for the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces, may establish direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character.

ARTICLE IV

His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Russian Government affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter obtained for British and British-Indian trade and traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of trade establish the necessity for Commercial Agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had to the Amir's sovereign rights.

ARTICLE VI

The present arrangements will only come into force when His Britannic Majesty's Government shall have notified to the Russian Government the consent of the Amir to the terms stipulated above.

2. SOVIET-AFGHAN TREATY SIGNED AT MOSCOW, 28 February 1921.(I.O.L/P & S/10/1131)

For the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic :

Georgy Vasilievich Chicherin
Lyov Mihailovich Karahan.

And for the Government of the Sovereign State of Afghanistan :

Muhammad Valy Khan
Mirza Muhammad Khan
Gulyam Sidlik Khan.

The above-named plenipotentiaries, after mutual presentation of their credentials, which were found to be in due proper form, have agreed as follows :

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties, recognising their mutual independence and binding themselves to respect it, now mutually enter into regular diplomatic relations.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties bind themselves not to enter into any military or political agreement with a third state which might prejudice one of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE III

The legations and consulates of the High Contracting Parties shall mutually and equally enjoy diplomatic privileges in accordance with the uses of international law.

Note I. —There shall be included in that category:—

- a) The right to hoist the State flag.
- b) Personal inviolability of registered members
- c) Inviolability of diplomatic correspondence and of persons fulfilling the duties of couriers with every kind of mutual assistance in these matters.
- d) Communication by telephone, wireless and telegraph, in accordance with the privileges of diplomatic representatives.
- e) Extritoriality of premises occupied by legations and consulates, but without the right of giving asylum to persons who are officially recognised by their local Government as having broken the laws of the country.

Note II. : The military attaches of both Contracting Parties shall be attached to their legations on the basis of equality as regards the above.

ARTICLE IV

The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to the opening of five consulates of the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic on Afghan territory and of seven consulates of Afghanistan on Russian territory, of which five shall be within the boundaries of Russian Central Asia.

Note. : In addition to the above, the opening of further consulates and consular points in Russia and Afghanistan shall be arranged in each particular case by special agreement between the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE V

Russian consulates shall be established at Herat, Meimen, Mazar-i-Sherif, Kandahar and Gazn.

Afghan consulates shall be established as follows :

A consulate-general at Tashkent and consulates at Petrograd, Kazan, Smarkand, Meiv and Krasnovodsk.

Note : The manner and time of the actual opening of the Russian consulates in Afghanistan and of the Afghan consulates in Russia shall be defined by special agreement between the two Contracting Parties,

ARTICLE VI

Russia agrees to the free and untaxed transit through her territory of all kinds of goods purchased by Afghanistan either in Russia herself, through State organisations, or from abroad.

ARTICLE VII

The High Contracting Parties recognise and accept the freedom of Eastern nations on the basis of independence and in accordance with the general wish of each nation.

ARTICLE VIII

In confirmation of clause 7 of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties accept the actual independence and freedom of Bokhara and Khiva, whatever may be the form of their Government, in accordance with the wishes of their peoples.

ARTICLE IX

In fulfilment of and in accordance with the promise of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, expressed by Lenin as its head to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Sovereign State of Afghanistan, Russia agrees to hand over to Afghanistan the frontier districts which belonged to the latter in the last century, observing the principles of justice and self-determination of the population inhabiting the same. The manner in which such self-determination and will of the majority of the regular local population shall be expressed shall be settled by a special treaty between the two States through the intermediary of plenipotentiaries of both parties.

ARTICLE X

In order to strengthen friendly relations between the High Contracting Parties, the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic agrees to give Afghanistan financial and other assistance.

ARTICLE XI

The present Treaty is drawn up in the Russian and Persian languages ; both texts are accounted authentic.

ARTICLE XII

The present Treaty shall come into force upon its ratification by the Government of the High Contracting Parties. The exchange of ratifications shall take place at Kabul. In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries of both parties have signed the present Treaty and set their seals thereto.

Supplementary Clause

In amplification of clause 10 of the present Treaty the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic gives the following assistance to the Sovereign State of Afghanistan :

- (1) A yearly free subsidy to the extent of 1 million gold or silver roubles, in coin or bullion.
- (2) Construction of the Kushka-Herat-Kandahar-Kabul telegraph line.

(3) In addition to this, the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic expresses its readiness to place at the disposal of the Afghan Government technical and other specialists.

The Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic shall afford this assistance to the Government of the Sovereign State of Afghanistan within two months after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

3. SOVIET-AFGHAN PROTOCOL REGARDING URTA-TAGAI
signed at Kabul, 15 August 1926.

Delegation of Afghan Government :

President : Aqai Mirza Muhammad Khan
Members : Ghulam Yahya Khan and
Ali Akbar Khan.

Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :

Offg. President : M.B.P. Pestnikoff
Member : Col. A.M. Rix.

The protocol contains the following articles :

I. The Joint Afghan-Soviet Commission recognised it useless to continue to discuss by either of the parties the question regarding the ownership of the Island of Urtta Tagai on legal and historical grounds.

II. On behalf of its Government the Commission of the U.S.S.R., having regard to the unchangeable friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and the exalted Government of Afghanistan and with the object of strengthening these relations, recognises the importance of the predominating economic advantage of the Island of Urtta Tagai to the exalted Government of Afghanistan. The Commission of the U.S.S.R. therefore agrees to the reception of the Island into the complete ownership of the exalted Government of Afghanistan.

III. The two Commissions, on behalf of their respective Governments, agree that a period of six months should be granted to the people of the island for the final selection by them, in accordance with their

own desire, of a place of residence in the territory of either of the parties, and in that case no interference will be made with the emigration of those people with the whole of their belongings who may desire to do so. This period of six months is to be reckoned from the date of signing of the protocol.

IV. Both the Commissioners agree that, with a view to giving this protocol a final legal form, the agreement of the two Governments to the text of this protocol should be confirmed by exchange of notes between his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the exalted Government of Afghanistan, and his Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary on behalf of the U.S.S.R.

V. This protocol has been drawn up, in two copies, in the Persian and Russian languages, both texts having equal force.

4. SOVIET-AFGHAN TREATY (NEUTRALITY)

signed at Paghman, 31 August 1926

(I.O.L/P&S/10/1131)

ARTICLE I

In case of war or military action between one of the Contracting Parties and one or more third Powers, the other Contracting Party undertakes to observe neutrality towards the first party.

ARTICLE II

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to abstain from all kinds of aggression against the other, and will not, even within the territory under its own occupation, take any such steps as may cause political or military injury to the other Contracting Government. In particular, each of the Contracting Parties undertakes that it will not join with another State or States in any political or military alliance or union directed against the other Contracting Party, and, similarly, it will not join in any boycott or financial and economic blockade directed against the other. In addition to this, should the policy of third party State or States be hostile in its action to either of the Contracting Parties, the other Contracting Party undertakes not only to abstain from assisting such hostile policy, but also to prevent the said policy and inimical actions and steps within its own territory.

ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties, each reciprocally recognising the sovereignty and integrity of the other, undertake to abstain from all kinds of armed and unarmed interference in the internal affairs of the other Contracting Party, and also not to join or assist, any other State or States, which may take steps against, or interfere with the other Contracting State.

The Contracting Parties will not permit any groups or individuals in their own territories to establish or to prosecute activities detrimental to the other Contracting Party; or to take steps for the subversion of the established Government of the other Contracting State; or to take any action against the integrity of the territory of the other Contracting Party : or to (mobilise) or collect armed forces against the other Contracting Party; and will prevent them from taking action. Similarly the parties will not countenance the transit through their territories of any armed forces, arms, firearms, ammunition, or the supply of any kind of war materials intended (for use) against the other Contracting Party, and likewise will take active steps to prevent the same from passing through its territory.

ARTICLE IV

The Contracting Parties agree within four months to enter into discussions to determine principles for the solution of differences which may arise between them, and which cannot be settled through the ordinary diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE V

Each of the Contracting Parties, outside the limits of undertakings, the conditions of which are defined in this Treaty, has freedom of action in taking steps to form any kind of relations and any kind of agreement with other States.

ARTICLE VI

From the date of ratification, which should not be more than three months after it has been signed, this Treaty will have the force of law and will remain in force for three years. After the expiration of the said period it will be understood that the Treaty continues for a year more automatically unless either of the Contracting Parties has notified to other Party, six months before the expiration of the period, its desire to terminate the enforcement of this Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Two copies of this Treaty have been written, in Persian and in Russian and both texts have equal force.

Done at Paghman on the 31 August 1926.

(Signed)
Foreign Minister,
Mahmud Beg Tarzi

(Signed)
Minister Plenipotentiary of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics,
L.H. Stark.

PROTOCOL OF THE TREATY OF RECIPROCAL NEUTRALITY AND NON-AGGRESSION CONTRACTED BETWEEN THE EXALTED GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, PAGHMAN, 1305

PROTOCOL

The following signatories, who were correctly empowered to sign the Treaty of Reciprocal Neutrality and Non-Aggression between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the exalted Government of Afghanistan, by permission of their respective Governments, have exchanged the following statements on the occasion of signing the said Treaty :—

His Excellency Aqai Leonid Stark, Minister Plenipotentiary in Afghanistan of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, states that he has received permission from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to certify in the name of his Government that, on the occasion of signing the above Treaty, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having been faithful to the principles of the Treaty of the 28th February, 1921, has no agreement with any State or States contrary to the Treaty contracted on the 31st August, 1926, regarding reciprocal neutrality and non-aggression. Similarly, he states on behalf of his Government that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic certifies that, during the whole of the period for which this Treaty of Reciprocal Neutrality and Non-Aggression remains in force, the said Government will not enter into such Treaties or Conventions as may be contrary to

this Treaty of Reciprocal Neutrality and Non-Aggression. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics trusts that friendly relations between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Afghanistan, based on the Treaty contracted in Moscow on the 21th February, 1921, and on the Treaty contracted at Paghman on the 31st August, 1926, will invariably increase and will be based on the lofty ideal of general peace.

His Excellency Aqai Mahmud Beg Khan Tarzi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the exalted Government of Afghanistan, states that he has received permission from the Afghan Government to certify in the name of his Government that, on the occasions of signing the above Treaty, the Afghan Government, having been faithful to the principles of the Treaty of the 28th February, 1921, has no agreement with any State or States contrary to the Treaty contracted on the 31st August, 1926, regarding reciprocal neutrality and non-aggression. Similarly, he states on behalf of his Government that the Afghan Government certifies that, during the whole of the period for which this Treaty of Reciprocal Neutrality and Non-Aggression remains in force, the said Government will not enter into such Treaties or Conventions as may be contrary to this Treaty of Reciprocal Neutrality and Non-Aggression. The Afghan Government trusts that friendly relations between the Government of Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, based on the Treaty contracted in Moscow on the 28th February, 1921, and on the Treaty contracted at Paghman on the 31st August, 1926, will invariably increase and will be based on the lofty ideal of general peace.

5. TREATY OF MUTUAL NEUTRALITY AND NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND THE U.S.S.R.

signed at Kabul, 24 June 1931
(I.O.R/12/89)

His Majesty the King of Afghanistan and the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., in order to strengthen the friendly and neighbourly relations which happily exist between the two Governments on the basis of the treaty signed at Moscow on the 28th February, 1921 and being confident that these relations will progress without change in the future, have, with the object of promoting general peace, determined to sign the present treaty on the basis of the Paghman Pact, concluded on the 31st August (1926); and for this

purpose have appointed respectively Faiz Muhammad Khan, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Afghan Government, and M. Stark, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan, who having shown their credentials which were found correct, have agreed upon the following articles :

ARTICLE I

In the event of war or military operations between one of the contracting parties and one or more third Powers, the second contracting party undertakes to observe neutrality in respect of the first contracting party.

ARTICLE II

Each of the contracting parties undertakes to refrain from hostile action of any sort against the other contracting party. It will not commit such action in its own country which is under its control, and will prevent in its own territory such activities from all sources as may cause political or military injury to the other contracting party, and especially, each of the contracting parties agrees that it will not participate in any political or military pact or union made with one or more third Powers against the other contracting party, and, similarly, will not take part in any boycott or commercial or economic blockade directed against the other contracting party. Moreover, in the event of a policy pursued by a third Power or Powers being actively hostile to either of the contracting parties, the other contracting party undertakes not only to withhold its support from such hostile policy, but also to oppose in its own country such hostiles activities and actions as may arise from the policy referred to.

ARTICLE III

Each high contracting party recognises reciprocally the rights of the other's sovereignty and the integrity of its territory, and undertakes to refrain from all kinds of armed and unarmed interference in the internal affairs of the other contracting party, and also not to join or assist any other Power or Powers which may take steps to interfere with (the affairs of) the other contracting party. The contracting parties will not allow societies to be established or to carry on their activities in their countries, or individuals to resort to activities detrimental to or to take steps to undermine the established principles of the Government of other contracting party, or to take actions against the integrity of the territory of the other contracting party, and will not permit them to raise or collect armed forces against the

other contracting party, and will also restrain them from (such) activities. Similarly, neither party will countenance the transit through its country of any armed forces, arms, fire-arms, ammunition, warlike stores, and war materials of any kind intended to be used against the other contracting party, and likewise will not permit the transportation of the same through its territory.

ARTICLE IV

In accordance with what has been stated above in this treaty, each of the high contracting parties declares that it neither had nor has any secret or open agreements of any kind with another Power or other Powers contrary to this treaty, and also that, so long as this treaty remains in force, it will not enter into any treaties or agreements which may be in contravention of this treaty.

ARTICLE V

Similarly, each of the contracting parties declares that no agreements whatsoever, with the exception of those already published exist between itself and other Powers which are close neighbours by sea or land of the other contracting party.

ARTICLE VI

Apart from the provisions agreed to in this treaty, each of the contracting parties is absolutely free to take steps to contract all kinds of relations and alliances with third Powers.

ARTICLE VII

The contracting parties undertake that the decision and solution of all controversies arising between them, whatever nature or origin they may be, should always be settled only by peaceful means; and in pursuance of this article the contracting parties may conclude agreements as may be required by the circumstances of each case.

ARTICLE VIII

The treaty is concluded for a period of five years and will come into force from the date of its ratification, which should not be later than two months from the date of signature. Exchange of ratifications shall take place at Kabul within one month after the ratification of the treaty.

After the expiry of five years this treaty will continue in force automatically from year to year, and either of the contracting parties has a right to cancel the treaty, on giving the other party six months' notice, and in the event of either of the parties giving notice (of its intention) to cancel the treaty, the contracting parties will then enter into discussions with regard to the form of the renewal of the treaty.

ARTICLE XI

The treaty has been drawn up in the Persian and Russian languages, and both texts are equally authoritative.

6. AGREEMENT* BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF AFGHANISTAN CONCERNING TRANSIT QUESTIONS. SIGNED AT MOSCOW, on 28 June 1955.

(United Nations Treaty Series)

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Royal Government of Afghanistan, mindful of the friendly relations prevailing between the two countries and acting in accordance with and in furtherance of article 6 of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship of 28 February 1921, have agreed as follows :

ARTICLE 1

The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics grants Afghanistan the right of free transit of goods through its territory under the conditions governing the transit of the goods of any third country through the territory of the USSR.

The right shall extend to all goods, irrespective of their country of origin or of destination, the transit of which through the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not prohibited by law.

*Came into force on 19 September 1955 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Kabul, in accordance with article 8.

ARTICLE 2

Afghanistan grants the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the right of free transit of goods through its territory under the conditions governing the transit of the goods of any third country through the territory of Afghanistan.

This right shall extend to all goods, irrespective of their country of origin or of destination, the transit of which through the territory of Afghanistan is not prohibited by law.

ARTICLE 3

The Contracting Parties shall impose no duties, taxes or charges, irrespective of whether the goods in transit are conveyed directly or are subject to unloading, trans-shipment, warehousing, packing or re-packing for transport.

Charges connected with the handling and forwarding of goods in transit shall be fixed in the territory of each Contracting Party at the lowest rates prevailing at the points at which the consignment is handled or forwarded.

ARTICLE 4

Payment for the transit of goods and for the handling and forwarding thereof under this Agreement shall be effected in accordance with the Soviet-Afghan trade and payments agreements in force by the delivery of goods to be agreed upon by the Parties when the annual Trade Protocols are concluded.

ARTICLE 5

The competent Soviet economic organizations, on the one hand, and the transport organizations and institutions of Afghanistan, on the other hand, shall conclude agreements among themselves with respect to the execution of operations connected with the respect to the execution of operations connected with the conveyance of goods in transit through the territories of the USSR and Afghanistan.

Any disputes which may arise in the application of the aforesaid agreements shall be settled in accordance with the procedure provided for in article 12 of the Soviet-Afghan Trade and Payments Agreement of 17 July 1950.

ARTICLE 6

Unaccompanied personal property of nationals of either country may also be conveyed in transit through the territory of either Contracting Party under the terms of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 7

Customs formalities in respect of goods conveyed in transit through the territory of either Contracting Party shall be reduced to a minimum and the Parties shall introduce appropriate facilities to this end.

ARTICLE 8

This Agreement is subject to ratification.

It shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for five years. The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place at Kabul.

If neither Party has given notice of its intention to denounce the Agreement six months before the date of its expiry, the Agreement shall remain in force for a further period of five years.

Done in duplicate at Moscow, on 28 June 1955, in the Russian and Persian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

By authorization
of the Government
of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics :

I.G. KABANOV

By authorization
of the
Royal Government
of Afghanistan :

Gholum Yahya TARZI

7. AGREEMENT* BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN ON ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION DURING THE PERIOD 1967-1972.

(United Nations Treaty Series)

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Royal Government of Afghanistan,

Considering the friendly relations existing between the USSR and Afghanistan,

Desiring further to expand and strengthen economic and technical co-operation between the two countries,

Have agreed as follows :

ARTICLE I

During the period of the implementation of Afghanistan's Third Five-Year Plan (1967-1972), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Kingdom of Afghanistan shall co-operate :

1. In the completion of construction of the projects and in the execution of the operations provided for in the Soviet-Afghan agreements and protocols on economic and technical co-operation currently in force ;
2. In the construction of the projects and the execution of the operations enumerated in annex 1 of this Agreement and also in the construction of other projects, a list of which shall be drawn up by the Parties following study of the economic and technical reports prepared for each project ;
3. In the construction of industrial enterprises, a list of which shall be drawn up by the competent Soviet and Afghan organizations following preparation and study of reports on the technical feasibility and economic advisability of their construction.

* Came into force provisionally on 6 February 1968 by signature, and definitively on 18 March 1969 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which took place at Kabul, in accordance with article XIII.

ARTICLE II

For the purpose of providing economic assistance to Afghanistan in the construction of the projects and the execution of the operations provided for in article I of this Agreement, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall :

1. Grant to the Royal Government of Afghanistan a loan of 14 million roubles, in addition to the loan 73 million roubles granted to the Royal Government of Afghanistan under the Agreement of 16 October 1961 and on the terms set forth therein, for payment of the expenses incurred by the Soviet organizations in providing technical assistance in the completion of construction of the projects and in the execution of the operations provided for in the annex 2 of this Agreement;
2. Grant to the Royal Government of Afghanistan a loan of up to 65 million roubles at 2 per cent interest per annum for payment of the expenses incurred by the Soviet organizations in the construction of the projects and the execution of the operations provided for in article I, paragraph 2, of this Agreement;
3. Deliver consumer goods to Afghanistan during the period 1968-1972 and grant for this purpose a loan of up to 16 million roubles at 2 per cent interest per annum to defray a portion of the expenses of the projects to be constructed within the framework of Soviet-Afghan co-operation;
4. Guarantee that the Soviet organizations will grant to the Afghan organizations and companies a loan of up to 18 million roubles repayable in instalments over a period of up to eight years and 2-3 per cent interest per annum, depending on the nature and duration of the construction of the projects provided for in the article I paragraph 3, of this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

The loan of 65 million roubles in accordance with article II, paragraph 2, of this Agreement shall be used to pay for :

- The planning and exploratory work to be done by the Soviet organizations;
- The machinery and construction and other equipment as well as materials unobtainable in Afghanistan which are to be delivered

from the USSR, franco ex warehouse Termez or Kushka, including machinery and equipment to be delivered on a lease basis, and also the costs of transporting them to Tash Guzar, Kelif or Sher Khan;

—The expenses incurred by the Soviet organizations in sending Soviet experts to Afghanistan to provide technical assistance on all questions connected with the implementation of this agreement, including the expenses incurred in sending experts to provide assistance in the operation of the projects;

—The expenses connected with the subsistence of Afghan nationals sent to the USSR for industrial training at appropriate Soviet enterprises and institutions.

The Royal Government of Afghanistan shall repay the portions of the above-mentioned loan taken down in each calendar year in twelve equal annual instalments, beginning three years after the year in which the relevant portion of the loan is taken down.

Interest on the loan shall accrue from the date on which the relevant portion of the loan is taken down and shall be paid not later than 1 May of the year following the year for which it is payable. The last payment of interest shall be made at the same time as the last payment on the principal of the loan. The date of the deed of transfer shall be deemed to be the date on which the loan was taken down for the purchase of equipment and materials, and the date of the account shall be deemed to be the date on which the loan was taken down to pay for other types of services and the leasing of machinery and equipment.

In drawing up the list of projects provided for in article I, paragraph 2, and in determining the extent of the obligations of the Soviet organizations in providing technical assistance in the construction of the said projects, the Parties shall bear in mind that the total expenses incurred by the Soviet organizations in providing technical assistance are not to exceed the amount of the loan of 65 million roubles.

If, however, the total expenses incurred by the Soviet organizations in providing the said technical assistance exceed 65 million roubles, the Parties shall consider the possibility of either deleting certain projects from the agreed list or arranging for Afghanistan to pay the sum in excess under the Soviet-Afghan trade agreement in force.

ARTICLE IV

Repayment of the loans referred to in article II, paragraphs 2 and 3, of this Agreement and payment of the interest accruing thereon shall

be effected by the Royal Government of Afghanistan in the form of deliveries to the USSR from Afghanistan of natural gas and other Afghan goods under the conditions laid down in the Soviet-Afghan trade agreement in force, as follows :

At least three months before the Commencement of each calendar year in which the loans are to be repaid and the interest thereon paid, the Parties shall agree on the quantities of natural gas to be delivered and on the nature, prices, quantities and dates of delivery of goods to be supplied during that calendar year.

If the value of the natural gas and other Afghan goods delivered is not equal to the amount of regular payments due in any given calendar year against the principal of the loan and the interest thereon, the remaining amount shall be paid by Afghanistan in accordance with article 13 of the Soviet-Afghan Trade and Payments Agreement of 17 June 1950 in convertible and other currency to be determined by agreement between the Parties. The conversion of roubles into the other currency shall be effected on the basis of the gold value of the currencies on the date of payment.

Payment of the expenses incurred by the Soviet organization in providing technical assistance in the construction of the enterprises for in article I, paragraph 3, of this Agreement shall be effected in the form of deliveries of natural gas and other Afghan goods under the Soviet-Afghan trade agreement in force, taking into account the provisions of article II, paragraph 4, of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

For purposes of accounting in respect of the utilization and repayment of the loans granted in accordance with article II of this Agreement and in respect of the accrual and payment of the interest thereon, the State Bank of the USSR, or on its behalf the Foreign Trade Bank of the USSR, and the Da Afghanistan Bank shall open for each other special loan accounts in roubles, shall together determine the technical procedure for settlements and the management of the accounts in respect of the loans or make appropriate changes in the previously agreed procedure for the management of the accounts, and shall also, when necessary, agree on the procedure for accounting in respect of the payments provided for in the article II, paragraph 4 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VII

If the gold value of the rouble should change (at the present time 1 rouble=0.987412 grammes of fine gold), the State Bank of the USSR,

or on its behalf the Foreign Trade Bank of the USSR, and the Da Afghanistan Bank shall, on the day on which the gold value of the rouble changes revalue by a proportionate amount the balances in the loan accounts opened in accordance with article VI of this agreement. Any unused portion of the loan shall be revalued in the same way.

ARTICLE VIII

With a view to implementing the co-operation provided for in article I of this Agreement :

1. The Soviet organization shall :

- Carry out the necessary planning and exploratory work ;
- Deliver machinery and construction and other equipment as well as materials which are unobtainable in Afghanistan ;
- Send Soviet experts to Afghanistan to assemble preliminary data, to carry out exploratory work and geological surveys, to provide direct supervision and consultation in the construction of projects by the originators of the plans, to give industrial and technical training to Afghan nationals, and to co-operate in the assembly, adjustment and initial operation of equipment;
- Receive Afghan nationals for industrial and technical training at appropriate enterprises and institutions in the USSR with a view to their subsequent employment on the projects constructed in accordance with this agreement;
- Send Soviet experts to Afghanistan to assist in the operation of the projects constructed with the help of the USSR, as provided in article IX of this Agreement.

2. The Afghan organizations shall :

- Provide the Soviet organizations with such preliminary data required for planning as are available in Afghanistan and co-operate with the Soviet organizations in assembling and preparing other necessary data;
- Consider and, where they are in agreement, approve plans within sixty days after their sub-mission by the Soviet organizations;
- Execute the construction work for the projects and carry out the operations in accordance with the technical specifications, with the technical assistance of the Soviet organizations;

—Execute the construction work for the basic projects and subsidiary installations and supply the labour and such of the requisite materials as are obtainable in Afghanistan;

—Arrange for the financing, in Afghan currency, of the construction work for the projects and the execution of the other operations and, at their own expense provide housing, medical services, essential public utility services and transport for official travel within Afghanistan to the Soviet experts and translators and their families who are sent to Afghanistan to provide technical assistance under this Agreement.

ARTICLE IX

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide technical assistance to Afghanistan in the operation of projects constructed and under construction with the help of the USSR. For this purpose :

Appropriate Soviet experts shall be sent to Afghanistan, in numbers and for periods to be agreed between the competent organizations of the Parties and under the conditions specified in article III of this Agreement ;

Spare parts, materials and replacement equipment required for the operation of the projects shall be delivered to Afghanistan, and the Afghan organizations shall be permitted to make deferred payments over a period of five years at 2 per cent interest per annum.

ARTICLE X

The planning and exploratory work, the delivery of equipment and materials, the industrial and technical training of Afghan nationals and other forms of technical assistance pursuant to this Agreement shall be effected on the basis of contracts to be concluded between the competent Soviet and Afghan organizations, duly empowered for the purpose by the appropriate authorities of the USSR and Afghanistan ; the said contracts shall be considered and signed by the organizations with the least possible delay.

The contracts shall specify quantities, delivery periods, prices and other detailed conditions relating to the provision of technical assistance to the Afghan organizations, the prices of the equipment and

materials to be delivered by the USSR in accordance with this Agreement shall be determined on the basis of world market prices. In addition, the contracts shall specify the obligations of the Afghan organizations as regards assembling preliminary data, the preparation of construction sites, the provisions to the Soviet experts of housing with essential public utilities, medical services and transport for official travel, the consideration and approval of plans, the supply of labour and other matters and shall also specify definite time-limits for the performance of such obligations.

ARTICLE XI

In accordance with the Soviet-Afghan Agreement of 17 October 1963 and under the loan provided for in this Agreement, the Soviet organizations shall provide technical assistance to the Afghan organizations in the expansion of gas-field operations in the Shighbargan, area, including the drilling of development wells, and shall send Soviet experts to assist in gas-field and gas pipeline operations.

The Royal Government of Afghanistan shall repay that portion of the above-mentioned loan in excess of 1.8 million roubles (up to the amount of 16.7 million roubles) which is taken down in each calendar year in equal annual instalments over the following eight years.

ARTICLE XII

Representatives of the Parties shall meet regularly on the proposal of either Party with a view to reviewing progress in the implementation of this Agreement and, if it is deemed necessary to do so, preparing appropriate recommendations. Such recommendations shall be submitted to the Governments of the Contracting Parties for consideration.

The above-mentioned meetings shall take place alternately at Kabul and Moscow.

ARTICLE XIII

This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the established procedure in each country and shall enter into force provisionally on the date of signature and definitively on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which shall take place at Kabul.

Done at Moscow on 6 February 1968, corresponding to 16 Dalv 1346,
in duplicate in the Russian and Dari languages, both texts being
equally authentic.

For the Government
of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics :

V. NOVIKOV

For the Royal
Government of
Afghanistan :

A. YAFTALI

ANNEX I

List of the Projects and Operations
Referred to in Article I, Paragraph 2,
of the Agreement

1. Geological prospecting, geophysical and drilling operations for petroleum and gas in northern Afghanistan.
2. Combined surveying and geological exploration for solid minerals.
3. Construction of housing settlement and construction depot attached to nitrogenous fertilizer factory at Mazar-i-Sharif.
4. Construction of electric power substation in the northern part of Kabul with an electric transmission line from the "vostochnaya" electric power substation.
5. Electric transmission line from the thermal electric power station attached to the nitrogenous fertilizer factory at Mazar-i-Sharif to the town of Balkh.
6. Preparation of non-cultivated land in the area of the Jalabad canal for the cultivation of crops.
7. Planning and exploratory work on the Shibarghan-Herat and Kunduz-Faizabad highways.

ANNEX 2

List of the Projects and Operations
Referred to in Article II, Paragraph 1
of the Agreement

1. Nitrogenous fertilizer factory in the town of Mazar-i-Sharif.
2. "Bagram" airfield.

3. Polytechnic institute in Kabul.
4. Two farms and land reclamation in the area of the Jalalabad canal.

THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS-
AND CO-OPERATION 5 Dec. 78

(Translation)

Article 1 The high contracting parties solemnly declare their determination to strengthen and deepen the inviolable friendship between the two countries and to develop all-round co-operation on the basis of equality, respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Article 2 The high contracting parties shall make efforts to strengthen and broaden mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical co-operation between them with these aims in view, they shall develop and deepen co-operation in the fields of industry, transport and communications, agriculture, the use of natural resources, development of the power-generating industry and other branches of economy, to give each other assistance in the training of national personnel and in planning the development of the national economy. The two sides shall expand trade on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and most-favoured nation treatment.

Article 3 The high contracting parties shall promote the development of co-operation and exchange of expertise in the fields of science, culture, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, sport, and other fields. The two sides shall facilitate the expansion of co-operation between organs of State power and public organizations, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions with a view to making a deeper acquaintance of the life, work experience and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

Article 4 The high contracting parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and good-neighbourliness, as well as the UN Charter, shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity

of the two countries. In the interests of strengthening the defence capacity of the high contracting parties they shall continue to develop co-operation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.

Article 5 The USSR respects the policy of non-alignment which is pursued by a DRA and which is an important factor for maintaining international peace and security. The DRA respects the policy of peace pursued by the USSR and aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all countries and peoples.

Article 6 Each of the high contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not join any military or other alliance or take part in any groupings of states as well as in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 7 The high contracting parties shall continue to make every effort to defend international peace and the security of the peoples, to deepen the process of relaxation of international tension, to spread it to all areas of the world, including Asia, to translate it into concrete forms of mutually beneficial co-operation among states and to settle international disputed issues by peaceful means. The two sides shall actively contribute towards general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

Article 8 The high contracting parties shall facilitate the development of co-operation among Asian states and the establishment of relations of peace, good-neighbourliness and mutual confidence among them and the creation of an effective security system in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of the continent.

Article 9 The high contracting parties shall continue their consistent struggle against machinations by the forces of aggression, for the final elimination of colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations. The two sides shall co-operate with each other and with other peace-loving states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples for their freedom, independence, sovereignty and social progress.

Article 10 The high contracting parties shall consult each other on all major international issues affecting the interests of the two countries.

Article 11 The high contracting parties state that their commitments under the existing international treaties do not contradict the provi-

sions of the present Treaty and undertake not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 12 Questions which may arise between the high contracting parties concerning the interpretation or application of any provision of the present Treaty, shall be settled bilaterally in the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect.

Article 13 The present Treaty shall remain in force within 20 years of the day it becomes effective. Unless one of the high contracting parties declares six months before the expiration of this term of its desire to terminate the Treaty it shall remain in force for the next five years until one of the high contracting parties warns in writing the other party, six months before the expiration of current five-year term, about its intention to terminate the Treaty.

Article 14 If one of the high contracting parties expresses the wish in the course of the 20-year term of the Treaty to terminate it before its expiration date, it shall notify in writing the other party, six months before its suggested date of expiration of the Treaty, about its desire to terminate the Treaty before the expiration of the term and may consider the Treaty terminated as of the date thus set.

Article 15 The present Treaty shall be ratified and take effect on the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification, which is to take place in Kabul.

Done in duplicate, each in the Russian and Dari languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Moscow on 5th December 1978

for the USSR : L. Brezhnev. For the DRA : N. Mohammad Taraki

9. CABINETS SINCE THE 1978 COMMUNIST COUP

1. Taraki Cabinet (30 April 1978)

Mr Nur Mohammad Taraki

Prime Minister

Mr Babrak Karmal

Deputy Prime Minister

Mr Hafizullah Amin	Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs
Colonel Mohammed Aslam Watanyar	Deputy Prime Minister and Communications
Colonel Abdul Qadir	National Defence
Dr Shah Wali	Public Health
Mr Nur Ahmad Nur	Interior
Mr Ghulam Dastagir Panjshiri	Education
Mr. Soltan Ali Keshtmand	Planning
Dr Saleh Mohammed Ziray	Agriculture
Dr Abdulqadir Misaq	Finance
Mr Abdulkarim Shara'i	Justice and Attorney General
Dr Anahita Ratebzad	Social Welfare
Mr Abdul Quddus Ghorbandi	Trade
Mr Mohammed Ismail Danesh	Mines and Industries
Lieut.-Colonel Mohammed Rafi	Public Works
Professor Mohammed Mansur Hashemi	Water and Power
Mr Mahmud Suma	Higher Education
Mr Nizamuddin Tahzib	Border Affairs
Mr. Mohammed Suleyman La'eq	Radio and Television

2. Amin Cabinet (31 March 1979)

Mr Hafizullah Amin (Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs)	Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs
Dr Shah Wali (Public Health).	Deputy Prime Minister and Public Health
*Dr Saleh Mohammad Ziray	Agriculture and Land Reform
*Mr Ghulam Dastagir Panjshiri,	Public Works
*Dr Abdul Karim Misaq	Finance
*Professor Mahmud Suma	Higher Education

*No change.

Maj. Aslam Watanyar (Interior)	Defence
*Dr Abdurrashid Jalili	Education
*Mr Abdul Hakim Shara'i Jozjani	Justice and Attorney General
*Professor Mahmud Hashemi	Water and Power
Mr Sadiq Alemghar	Planning
Mr K Malek Katawazi	Information and Culture
*Mr Faiz Mohammad Ghulabgul	Communications
Mr Sheryan Mazduryar	Interior
*Mr Mohammad Ismail Daneshwar	Mines and Industries
*Mr Abdul Quddus Ghorbandi	Trade
Mr Hussain Mubaraq Shafi	Transport
*Mr Saheb Jan Sahra'i	Border Affairs

*No change.

3 Karmal Cabinet (10 January 1980)

Mr Babrak Karmal	Prime Minister
Mr Assadullah Sawari	Deputy Prime Minister
Mr Soltan Ali Keshtmand	Deputy Prime Minister and Planning
Lt.-Col. Mohammad Rafi	Defence
*Maj. Mohammad Ghulabzoi	Interior
*Mr Shah Mohammad Dost	Foreign Affairs
*Col. Sheryan Mazduryar	Transport
Dr Anahita Ratebzad	Education
Mr Mohammad Khan Jalalar	Commerce
Mr Faiz Mohammad	Border Affairs
Mr Abdul Wakil	Finance
Mr Mohammad Ismail Daneshwar	Mines and Industries
Lt.-Col. Mohammad Aslam Watanyar	Communications

*Member of Taraki Cabinet.

Mr Abdol Majid	Information and Culture
Mr Abdorrashid Arian	Justice
Dr Raz Mohammad Paktin	Water and Power
Mr Gol Dad	Higher Education
Mr Nazar Mohammad	Public Works
Prof. Mohammad Ibrahim Azim	Public Health
Mr Faz Rahim Mohmand	Agriculture and Land Reform

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Abbreviations

B.M.	British Museum
C.I.D.	Committee of Imperial Defence
Doc.	Document
Ext.	External
H.M.	His (Her) Majesty's
I.C.H.R.	Indian Council of Historical Research
I.O.	India Office
I.O.R.	India Office Records
N.W.F.P.	North-West Frontier Province
Pol. Dept.	Political Department
P.R.O.	Public Record Office
S.E.A.T.O.	South East Asia Treaty Organization

Postscript

The Afghanistan problem in 1986 is no longer simply that of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. The issue is not simply that of Soviet support for an unrepresentative Government in Kabul, it also involves Western support for a largely unrepresentative Government in Pakistan.

Since the 1978 revolution in Afghanistan the Superpowers have moved into it and the surrounding areas. The Soviet Union is trying to preserve the status quo—a pro-Moscow Government in Kabul—while the United States is trying to undermine the existing one. The latter does this through their Pakistani allies and the Afghans who live on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Thus, Superpower interference has made it difficult for the Kabul Government to get on with the task of running the country. Afghan tribesmen who were taught to hate and fight the pro-Moscow Government in Kabul are receiving U.S. weapons and Pakistani training to topple the administration. Those who dislike the present administration are organised into an army of liberation with U.S. and Arab aid. As early as 1981, it was reported by Lawrence Lifschultz that there were six different Afghan rebel groups based in Pakistan.

The Soviets are providing every available technique for the Afghan armed forces to subdue and eliminate armed opposition to Babrak Karmal. As the guerillas step up their activities the Government of Babrak Karmal does likewise. In 1984 the

Government launched a series of offences against guerilla centres in the Panjshir, Herat, Kandahar and other regions using helicopter-gunships and fighter-bombers. The Soviet troops deployed were specially trained in mountain guerilla warfare. The tactics showed an intensification of Government strategy. Increasing numbers of citizens are killed as a result of this new strategy while at the same time more are actively involved in guerilla activities. The Helsinki Watch Group in New York reported in December 1984 on various extreme forms of state-sanctioned violence which was carried out against civilians.


Neither the Soviets nor the United States is sensitive enough to the fact that innocent Afghans are being killed. Apparently there is an undeclared Superpower conspiracy to keep the Afghanistan conflict out of the lime-light to avoid open criticism of the war in their respective countries. The United States Government wishes to increasingly entangle the Russians in Afghanistan keeping them so occupied that they will have neither the will nor the resources for similar activities elsewhere. Thus, the United States will have a more open field for its own interventions.

It is very obvious that the United States and the West want the Soviets to loosen their grip on Eastern Europe even at the cost of increased Soviet presence in Asia. The Soviets, however, are reluctant to transfer more divisions from the East European theatre risking a weakening of overall defence preparedness. The Soviets do not see any reason to compromise because they are gradually beginning to realise that as a Superpower they are entitled to have their 'South America' in South Asia. This is a lesson that the United States has long tried to teach the Soviets !

While Moscow wants normalisation of the status quo, Washington wants to keep the fire burning regardless of who and how many get burned in the process. It is estimated that over four million Afghans have fled the country since 1978.

In this situation peace-loving people should try to help the Afghans to help themselves. The fact that the present administration is making serious attempts to eliminate inequality through land reforms, womens' rights, free compulsory primary education and free health care should serve as sufficient justification for giving humanitarian and developmental aid even to Babrak Karmal's Government provided it can be ensured that it reaches all sections of the people and all areas of the country.

Soviet and United States participation in the U.N.-sponsored Geneva talks* is the only hope left for those who hope for a peaceful political settlement to the problem. The forthcoming meeting between Gorbachov and Reagan could result in some kind of compromise solution on Afghanistan if the rest of the world shows adequate concern.



*The talks were begun in 1982 in Geneva between Afghanistan and Pakistan through the U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez (See Asian Recorder, Nov. 5-11, 1985. Vol. XXXI No. 45)

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