

THE ETHICAL SYSTEM UNDERLYING THE QUR'ĀN

S. H. AL-SHAMMA

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IM HOPFER-VERLAG TÜBINGEN



**INDIAN INSTITUTE OF
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THE ETHICAL SYSTEM UNDERLYING THE QUR'ĀN

a study of certain negative and positive notions

S. H. A L - S H A M M A

Thesis presented to the University of Edinburgh

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DEDICATED
TO
MY MOTHER
AND TO MY TEACHERS
REV. DR. W. MONTGOMERY WATT
PROF. DR. R. PARET

DATA ENTERED

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GENERAL PREFATORY NOTE

Although the Qur'an is essentially a religious book, there are many obiter dicta bearing on the things of this "nearer life", and ethical implications come perhaps first in the things of this nearer life.¹ Short of a lexicon which records all ethical terms and phrases, this study fulfils partly such a projected lexicon. It is, however, interested in more than merely defining or clarifying certain terms and expressions, as these in themselves are not the aim of scientific research, the aims is to reach concepts, in the present case, ethical ones.

There are various ways of looking at Qur'anic ethics. In this study thea are looked upon in the simple way of negative and positive ethics, or, in the language of the Muslim jurists, 'nawāhi' and 'awāmir' respectively. Such a symmetrical approach to a supposed system or code of ethics is the most primitive and can be traced back to the earliest ethical system, which is preserved in the British Museum in the Memphite drama.² Hence the present study is composed of two lists: the first is concerned with what the Qur'an considers as vicious. The second list consists of the Qur'anic virtues almost directly opposing the vices discussed in the first list. Both lists represent, however, the principal vices and the virtues. The representation is justified, in most cases studied below, by the great number of passages involved. The vices, so runs the Qur'anic argument, are Jahilite; while the virtues are purely Qur'anic. Any comparative study, and this is outside the scope of this study, would show that the Qur'anic ethics are selective regarding the pre-Qur'anic Arabian ethics.³ Thus, e.g. some virtues are praised by both the Qur'an and the pre-Qur'anic Arabs, the so-called 'mākārim al-akhlaq'. Other categories of ethical concepts can be discerned, though all are in a way, derivable from the positive and negative notions mentioned above.⁴

The method used in this study is based mainly on discussing relevant passages clustering around a certain root, in most cases more than one root is needed, because synonyms abound in the Qur'an. Thus essentially my approach is textual and closely related to the letter. An alternative approach could be: one thinks first of ethical concepts (e.g. good, responsibility, obligation) and then attempts to find out our whether this or that Qur'anic passage coul be brought forward to support the argument. This latter approach, used by Dr. Draz in his thesis 'La Morale du Coran'^{4a}, is liable to encroachments

of foreign influences in the same way as happened to the commentators of the Qur'ān amongst Moslems.⁵

My linguistic approach must not be confused with the so-called Linguistic Philosophy. Two points of comparison with this latter might help in showing the nature of the problem and therefore the method which should be followed in this work. Firstly, the Linguistic Philosophers handle problems finished from the stand point of other philosophers. The present study starts from what might be called "embryonic problems". Secondly, the use of dictionaries, which is so essential to the Linguistic Philosophers, cannot be of much help in the case of the Qur'ān, at least at present, because the Qur'ān is, mainly, its own dictionary.

As modern studies on the Qur'ān are still in a very elementary stage, the results, even the method, of this study are bound to be conditional and dependent on fresh discoveries in other fields of Qur'ānic studies. Thus the problem of chronology is far from being fixed. Nöldeke's work⁶ on the subject, which is followed in this study and has usually been accepted among scholars during a whole century, has been challenged recently by Bell in his translation of the Qur'ān. Another important point is the boundaries between the subjects discussed in the Qur'ān. Thus legal, political, ethical and other social aspects, as well as religious ones, mix with one another. Hence a fair appreciation of the rôle of any of these subjects is dependent on a better presentation of the rôle of the others. That is why it is difficult to presume that the implication of a passage is ethical when a political or a religious implication might be the case. A third problem is the lack felt today of authentic pre-Islamic literature. Much of the literature contemporary to the Qur'ān is also lost to us. Thus, while considering the Qur'ān today as self-explanatory might be a methodic necessity, the scene will be greatly changed when more authentic literature of earlier times can be discovered.

To be fair to Islamic studies on the Qur'ān, one can say that there is really much good in them if only that "good" could be systematically studied and presented to us in modern terms.

In the West during the last century, there are many valuable writings on the Qur'ān; most of which are interested in foreign - mainly Jewish or Christian - influences. There is still much to be said on the true positive contribution of the Qur'ān.⁷ Very closely related to this is the Arabian background of the Qur'ān, since any Jewish or Christian influences are not originally Arabian.

What is published on Qur'ānic ethics in modern times, apart from the work of Dr. Draz mentioned above, is hardly worth mentioning. In the *Encyclo - pedia of Islam* (in both editions) there are few articles on Qur'ānic ethics the legal and the theological elements being dealt with much more than the ethical. In this connection a German thesis by C. J. Evans (*Die Idee der Sünde im Koran*, 1939) must be mentioned. This thesis collects twenty roots in the Qur'ān which bear on the idea of sin. Apart from mentioning that the Qur'ān looks at the notion of sin from a treble standpoint (pp. 41 ff), namely sins committed against God, other human beings or against one's own self, Evans hardly tackles anything else.⁸

MISCELLANEOUS POINTS

All quotations from the Qur'ān are adopted from Bell's Translation. Bell's wording is accepted by the present writer except when I have transliterated the text. In the case of main points of difference between myself and Bell, I have commented briefly on what might be considered as an alternative translation.

The first sixteen chapters of this work begin with an introductory section which mentions usually the main roots or words around which the discussion will be carried. The meaning of the words and a general comment are given in this section also. The relevant passages are then discussed in chronological order, and arranged in most cases in four periods, three Meccan and the fourth Medinan (according to the arrangement of Nöldeke-Schwally). These four periods could be further subdivided, as has been done by Caetani (*Annali Dell'Islam*, I, pp. 196 ff). It has been found in some cases that a whole period does not say much about the subject under discussion, and in such cases a fusion of two periods is more suitable. Each chapter ends with a conclusion, while in Chapter XVII concluding remarks on the whole work will be provided. The order of the conjugational forms of Arabic verbs (Form I and so on) is adopted from Lane whose numerical order is now universally accepted in the West. Each root is mentioned at least once in its primitive form (sc. its consonantal letters), but often the mention of the root is not sufficient from the standpoint of the meaning. That is why in the majority of cases Form I (third person singular masculine past tense) is mentioned beside the root, or other conjugational forms are given as well, in order to clarify the point under discussion. Commentaries other than the Kash-

shāf of Zamakhshari have rarely been used; the special interest in the Kashshāf is its great concentration on linguistic approach to the Qur'an. Rarely any biographical note on the life of the Prophet will be discussed in this study in spite of my indebtedness to most Western studies in the last hundred years or so on the subject.

Regarding the terminology, I need mention a few words. Perhaps I may be permitted to invent the English words *Jahilite* (-s) and *Jahilism*, terms which correspond to *jahili* and *jahiliyah* respectively. By the term *Jahilite* I mean "all ethics dismissed by the Qur'an as related to Arabian times of paganism and go explicitly against the positive ethical teachings of the Qur'an". Hence *Jahilism* may be understood as "an ethical barbarism". The introductory chapter to this study will deal with the development of these terms.

In referring to the chronological order, I mention either period or stage. "Period" has the specific sense given to it by Nöldeke-Schwally, as stated above. "Stage" is used in a general sense to mean less than a period, or more than a period, according to the associations of the term. I also use "verse" and "passage". By the first I understand the technical sense as shown in the Official Egyptian Edition of the Qur'an, or Flügel's edition. The numerical order of these two editions is not the same. Bell follows the order given by Flügel, and I have followed Bell automatically, regarding the numerical order of the verses, since I quote from him. The difference between the two numerical orders comes from splitting the one verse in the Egyptian Edition into two in that of Flügel's, or combining two verses in the former into one in the latter. These differences can be easily traced. By a Qur'anic "passage" I mean simply the general sense, hence a passage may be less than a verse or a number of verses. Lastly, the references in the footnotes are often given in a contracted form, the bibliography at the end of the work will give all the details regarding these references.

Chapter I

JAHILISM

The root *jh* is not the only one which can help in indicating the outstanding negative aspects of Qur'anic ethics. Many other roots could satisfy the limited purpose of this study as much as the root *jh1*. A start, however, must be made somewhere. Besides, *Jahilism* (and *Jahilites*) 'al-*jāhilīyah* is the best word among Muslim authors, and in the West too, which refers to the life and institutions of the pre-Qur'anic Arabs, and the Qur'ān itself is partly responsible for that.

The root *jh1* is mentioned twenty-four times, and well shared between the last three periods of the Qur'ān⁹. These three periods, as will be seen in this study, portray the greatest interest the Qur'ān can show in moral ideas, while the first (Meccan) period is extremely interested in religion. Hence, for purposes of this study, no harm is done if we do not find any mention of the root *jh1* in the first period. It will be seen in this chapter that the six derivatives of the root *jh1* used in the Qur'ān are not all used in a technical sense. In the majority of cases the neutral or the primitive sense of the root is implied.

As to the meaning of the root *jh1*, two principal senses seem to have attracted the scholars, in the original sources as well as in the West. One sense is "ignorance" and in the words of Rāghib¹⁰, "the mind's voidness of knowledge". Tabārī and some other commentators insist on this sense almost to the exclusion of the second sense which will be mentioned later. In twenty out of twenty-four cases in which a derivative from the root *jh1* is mentioned, Bell uses "ignorance" or "ignorant". Horovitz¹¹, too, takes the same line. But ignorance and mind's voidness of knowledge do not seem to interest people, mainly illiterate.

In this connection one might refer to Abu-*Jah1* who seems to have had Abu 'l-Hakam as his real name¹² until the other name came into existence. The root *h k m*¹³ indicates "wisdom". What underlies "wisdom" here is not a Socratic but essentially a practical sense. It implies arbitration and the like¹⁴. This leads to the second sense of the root *jh1*, namely to be or to become rude, uncontrollable, 'saffīh¹⁵, or in one word "barbarian" according to the famous studies of Goldziher.¹⁶

The reconciliation of both views shows a typical Qur'anic way of handling the

available Arabic words and expressions. Thus it is highly probable that the first sense identified apparently, in the eyes of the Qur'ān with páganism and ignoring the Revelation, is only an afterthought on the part of the Qur'ān; while the second sense is the real primitive meaning. This is tantamount to saying that the Qur'ān, in introducing some new ideas to the Arabs, had to enlarge or modify some of the former expressions. The critic needs then to find out the border-line between the primitive and the secondary meaning, or the development of technical terms for which the new ideas of the Qur'ān are responsible.

Ibn Manzūr¹⁷, in commenting on 'jāhilīyah', says that: "it is the state of pre-Islamic Arabs, namely ignoring - he uses 'al-jahūl' - God, praised be He, and His messenger, the laws of religion, boasting of genealogies, pride, despotism 'tajabbur' and the like". It may be added that the ethical traits just mentioned do not underlie the word 'jāhilīyah' for someone who lived before the Qur'ān. Nevertheless, this latter had his own ethical traits underlying the same word. A pre-Qur'ānic Arab could never understand the first - religious - part in Ibn Manzūr's definition.

For the purpose of the present study, such ethical implications as the ones just mentioned by Ibn Manzūr are concentrated on, while any other implication, religious or otherwise, will not have any great share in the discussion.

The root *jh1* is twice mentioned in the second period, twelve times in the third period, and ten¹⁸ times in Medina.

THE MECCAN STAGE

Para. 1. 25,64

The servants of the Merciful are those who walk humbly upon the earth, and when the 'jāhilūn' address them, say: "Peace".

In such an early passage 'jāhilūn' seems to contrast with the "servants of the Merciful", hence the technical sense of the word 'jāhilūn' is hardly absent in the passage unless its chronology is contested.¹⁹ But it is possible that other passages, lost for us now²⁰, paved the way for the use of 'jāhilūn' in a technical sense in the passage under consideration. The

meaning underlying 'jāhilūn' seems to be derived, inversely, from the two characteristics of the "servants", namely that they are humble and react peacefully. Hence the Jahilites are supposed to be men of pride and war. It is possible, however, that the passage originally meant to comment mainly on the behaviour of the "servants" (the virtuous), and by jāhilūn not a so-called Jahilite is meant, but anyone who is not as perfect as these "servants of the Merciful".

Para. 2. 27, 56.

Here Lot uses the word *tajhalūn*, applying it to his people, because they "come to men in lust instead of women". In the preceding verse (27, 55) Lot has condemned this as "indency". Thus a Jahilite is an indecent - homosexual - person. In the present case, as in para. 1, the root *jhl* may yet have been used in a technical sense, but from what will be said in Chapter II and Chapter IV on pride and indecency, one is able to attribute some Jahilism - in its later Qur'ānic technical sense - to the word *tajhalūn* here.

Para. 3. 11, 31.

In this verse, and those which precede or follow it, an ideological argument is supposed to take place between Noah and the nobles of his people who ask him to "drive away those who have believed", because, according to verse 29, they are "the basest". In the controversial argument the same word *tajhalūn*, as in para. 2, is applied to the nobles - by Noah. Tabari²¹ understands the word to mean: "to be ignorant of one's own duties". Zanakhshari's²² interpretation of the word is his preferred and often used word *tasfahūn* (of the same root as *safīh* mentioned in the introductory note above). The nobles in this case are, among other things, very proud and class-conscious; cf. para. 1.

Para. 4. 11, 48.

Noah, again, prays now for his unbelieving son; but God admonishes him not to be one of the *jāhilīn*. The verse reads:

He said: "O Noah, he is not of thy household; verily it *innahu* is a deed not upright, so do not ask Me what thou hast no knowledge of; I admonish thee not to be one of the *jāhilīn*.

Bell, in a footnote commenting on the verse, remarks that "it" mentioned in the verse, "probably refers to Noah's prayer... but Moslems... interpret the phrase as referring to the son..." This remark of Bell is justified when one re-

members a variant of the verse where, instead of "do not ask Me", one finds "asking Me"²³, in which case the prayer of Noah is more than probably meant. But what Bell believes as probable in his remark has been already thought of in the same way in the traditional commentaries; thus both Tabarī²⁴ and Zamakhsharī²⁵ find it natural as well as implied in the traditional interpretation that either the son or the prayer is to be considered as "not upright".

Beside this point of understanding the actual wording of the passage, one may observe that the word "knowledge" mentioned in the passage may imply, by way of contrast, a lack of knowledge or simply ignorance in those who are called *jāhilīn*. While this is not impossible, it is more probable that by *jāhilīn* is meant the ones who do not behave in an upright way. Also loving a son for no other reason but for his sonship, though he is not the upright man²⁶ or a believer, is something condemned repeatedly in the Qur'ān.

From all that has been said it seems that underlying the root *jh1* in the passage under discussion are both the original sense of the root and the newly introduced shade of meaning added by the Qur'ān. In other words, the word "*jāhilīn*" is swollen to such an extent as to indicate the following meanings: disbelief, acting against uprightness and ignoring the godly knowledge.

The original sense partly twisted, again to suit the Qur'ānic outlook, is seen in accusing Noah of behaving unwisely and pleading for his son just because of the blood-relationship.

Para. 5. 12, 33.

He said: "My Lord, I prefer the prison to that to which they invite me; if Thou dost not avert their guile from me, I shall play the youth with them, and become one of the *jāhilīn*.

Here, as in para. 2, a *jāhil* is an easy prey for a condemned sexual temptation - in the present case, the other sex is named.

Para. 6. 12, 89.

He said: "Do you know what ye did with Joseph and his brother, when ye were *jāhilūn*."

Although the word "know" is mentioned, it is used in a neutral sense and cannot be contrasted with the sense of *jāhilūn*; since from the details of the

*story of Joseph as given in surah XII, one may gather that the wickedness of his brothers consisted of jealousy, attempting to murder a brother, telling lies, etc. All these traits are simply of ethical implication and have much to do with the primitive sense of the root j h l. Thus a Jahilite according to this verse is morally condemned for various reasons none of which has anything to do with ignorance.*²⁷

Para. 7. 28, 55.

When they hear vain talk they turn from it and say: "We have our works and ye have yours; peace be with you! We want nothing to do with the jāhilīn."

A Jahilite according to this passage involves himself in "vain talk", a trait related further in the passage to the opposite of peace. By denying the peace sālām to a Jahilite, the Qur'ān seems not only to prepare the way for coining Islam through it for religious purposes, but also it is indicating by such a denial that the Jahilites in their ways of life are far from being peaceful, even when they are involved in "vain talk".

To explain better what is meant by "vain talk" in the Qur'ān, one may refer to other parallel passages. Thus the (virtuous) believers (in 19, 63) do not hear vain talk (in Paradise), they have instead peace. In (23, 3) the believers in this world turn from vain talk. Later, in Medina, the vain talk is associated with oaths and contrasted to "what the hearts have amassed" (sc. intentions) (2, 225).

All these instances may indicate the ignorance or lack of will, or both, as lying behind the vain talk. From this, and the lack of peace in a Jahilite, one may easily contrast him with a ḥalīm as has been done by Goldziher.²⁸

Para. 8. 39, 64.

Say: "Other than God shall I serve, do ye urge me, o ye jāhilūn?"

Here, as in para. 4, both senses of the root j h l may be involved. A Jahilite, according to the present passage, is either ignorant (sc. of the true God) or intolerant of another's faith.

Para. 9. 7, 134.

Now Jahilism is more clearly related to paganism and idolatry. The word tajhalūn is applied to a people asking for an idol to be worshipped,

"... O Moses, make for us a god as they have gods..."

Later, in Medina, we shall see that the term *jāhilīyah* denotes, among other things, paganism.

Para. 10. 7, 198.

Take (the line of) disregarding (or "pay no attention to insults"), urge to good conduct and turn from the *jāhilīn*.

Here Zamakhshari²⁹ finds *jahīl* as opposed to *hilm* (self-control). The same view has been adopted by Goldziher.³⁰ Besides there is justification in Zamakhshari's concluding remark on the passage when he declares: "This verse is one of the best examples in the Qur'ān in dealing with ethical ideas." The passage clearly shows, however, that by denying "good conduct" to the *Jahilites*, *Jahilism* is made a resort of bad conduct.

It may be added that the "urging to good conduct" mentioned above is a call to change the old ethical views, and the Qur'ān seems to pledge itself to bring about such a change.

Para. 11. 46, 22.

He said: "Knowledge is with God; I deliver to you the message with which I have been sent, but I see you to be a people *tajhalūn*. Cf. paras. 4, 8 and 9.

The shade of meaning underlying the root *jhīl* here has a theological value: God's knowledge contrasts with the spiritual ignorance of the pagans, an ignorance which has, quite obviously, nothing to do with illiteracy.

Para. 12. 6, 35.

If their turning away is a great thing to thee, then if thou art able to seek a hole in the earth or a ladder to the heaven, so as to bring them a sign ... so be not thou one of the *jāhilīn*.

Here, what might look like a superstitious attitude on the part of the *Jahilites* is aroused by the divine claims as to the origin of the Qur'ānic message. But this argument cannot conceal the fact that *Jahilism* in this passage is identified with superstition. Besides, the root *jhīl* now, as in a few cases above, is really involved with religious implications rather than ethical.

Para. 13. 6, 54.

Now for the first time the infinitive *jahālah* is used. It seems as if the instances of the root *jh1* previously used are a sufficient justification for using an infinitive form. The main point in the passage reads:

... whoever of you does evil in *jahālah*, then afterwards repents and does right ...

Two alternative interpretations can be given to this *jahālah*: either it means, committing fault through negligence; or it indicates simply *Jahilism*. The first interpretation seems more likely, in which case the primitive sense of the word is alone retained. Nevertheless, as the contrast between evil and right is explicitly mentioned in the passage, and as the root *jh1* has so far several times been used hinting at one or another aspect of pre-Qur'ānic Arabian ethics, then an embryonic form of *Jahilism* in its technical sense may be underlying *jahālah* now.

Para. 14. 6, 11.

The same *Jahilite* superstitious attitude as in para. 12 is continued now:

Even if We had sent down the angels to them ... but most of them
yajhalūn.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD.

Para. 15. 16, 120 31a

The passage is repetitive in its wording; cf. para. 13.

Para. 16. 2, 63.

Here, Moses, when asked by his people whether he is mocking them, replies, "God preserve me from being among the *jāhilīn*." This special meaning is mentioned only here. It is, however, related to the shade of meaning mentioned in para. 7.

Para. 17. 2, 274.

... The good which ye contribute is for the poor ... the *jāhil* think them rich because of their self-restraint *ta'a ffuf*; but one may recognise them by their mark; they ask not importunately of the people... It seems first that according to this passage a *Jahilite* lacks in intelligence. But *jāhil* here has hardly any technical sense, and the word does not seem to imply more than the primitive neutral sense. The self-restraint mentioned in the verse as an ethical quality seems to imply the same quality of *hilm*,

and both are opposed to Jahilism.

Para. 18. 3, 148.

Now another infinitive form is used, namely the famous word *jāhilīyah*.

The passage reads:

... a part of you were concerned about themselves, thinking about God
what is not true - the thoughts of *jāhilīyah*...

"Paganism", chosen by Bell, is the best English word for *jāhilīyah* and in this translation the religious system is mainly meant. But beside this major religious implication, one may point to the egoism pressed on the people who are likened to the *Jahilites*. Also, *Jahilism* is accused of hesitant (suspicious) thoughts, which do not seem to have any truth behind them. According to *Tabari*³¹ and *Zamakhshari*³² the hypocrites are meant in this passage. This new shade of meaning is typically *Medinan*, and appears in *Medina* for the first time. Thus in spite of its religious use, *jāhilīyah* stands clearly for describing some of the ethical traits. Later uses of the same form will show more ethical implications.

Para. 19. 4, 21.

The passage is repetitive in its wording, cf. paras. 13 and 15.

Para. 20. 33, 33.

The women of the Prophet are warned not to, "swagger about in the manner of the former *jāhilīyah*". The adjective "former" shows that *jāhilīyah* is almost defined and restricted once and for all to the *Arabian pre-Qur'ānic paganism*. Besides, *Jahilism* is accused of loose morals; cf. paras. 2 and 5.

Para. 21. 33, 72.

Verily We offered the trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains,
but they refused to bear it ... man bore it; verily he has become affected
with wrongdoing and *jahūlā*.

Jahūl is an adjective like *jāhil*, although with an intensive signification, as the later grammarians said. Both forms occur once each in the *Qur'ān*.

As to the meaning of the whole passage, it is difficult to decide. *Tabari*³³ and *Zamakhshari*³⁴ explain the word trust as if it were the obedience which man shows to God. Bell finds this obedience "rather forced". It seems, on the other hand, difficult not to find in this trust some form of responsibility entrusted to man, though by wrongdoing (and *Jahilism*) he falls short of achiev-

ing his responsibility. The nature, perhaps, of this responsibility or trust a mānah is not impossible to identify with the whole of the Qur'ānic message, in both its religious and ethical aspects.

(The word wrongdoing in the passage translates *zalūm*, a derivative of the root *zlm* which will be the subject of Chapter VII on transgression.)

Para. 22. 48, 26.

This verse, which is considered to have been delivered just after Hudaibiyah truce³⁵, describes the agitated state of some of the Prophet's followers as being a "fierceness" like "the fierceness of the *jāhilīyah*". This fierceness is contrasted further in the verse with the *sakīnah* (sc. calmness, but here a state of self-control and assurance is meant). Besides, the *Jahilite* fierceness is contrasted with piety.

All these circumstances show that *jāhilīyah* now stands for several ethical aspects in the life of the pre-Qur'ānic Arabs, and the word *Jahilism* can imply both paganism as a religious system and the moral life as embodied in various institutions and ideals.

Para. 23. 49, 6.

O ye who have believed, if a reprobate come to you with a report, be clear (about it), lest ye commit a *jahālah* against a people. and find yourselves regretting what ye have done.

For Bell "stupidity" translates *jahālah* here, and *safah* in 7, 64f. The meaning of *jahālah* is almost defined in the text of the verse above, with which can be read the verse discussed in para. 13. In both cases the word means: committing fault through negligence. This sense is almost the primitive sense of the root *jhl* and can be put into the one word of Bell without much risk.

Para. 24. 5, 55.

In the verse (5, 54) the Prophet is to judge between those who ask him for judgment, by what God has revealed to him; he is warned further against following their "lusts" in his judgment. The next verse reads:

Do they then desire the (mode of) judgment of the *jāhilīyah*...
Hence a *Jahilite* act of justice is based on lusts, or partiality, if "lusts" could be so understood. The two verses, however, confront and contrast the divine justice with the human one; or, to translate the same thing into other words, the *Jahilite* justice and the Qur'ānic one.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this introductory chapter is to examine the contents of any suitable root so that a working list of so-called vices and virtues can be provided. The root *jh1* has achieved this limited purpose, though in an absolute sense there cannot be any such key-position for the root *jh1* or any other root.

At least three out of twenty-four cases of the root *jh1* are repetitions; this characteristic will be met in the majority of roots in the Qur'ān. In a few cases the root *jh1* has been used in a religious sense so that there is nothing ethical to discuss. This second characteristic will be met almost always in this study. But, despite these two limitations, more than half the cases have shown in this chapter pure ethical implications, and will help as a general guide in the following seven chapters of the first part of this study.

The development of derivation from the root *jh1* and the use of the derivatives show some characteristics:

The twenty-four instances of the root *jh1* are delivered in a time-span of about fifteen years, since they begin to appear in the second period (cf. N-S, 70), and their distribution is scattered over nearly three quarters of the Qur'ānic text.

The verbal form *yajhalūn* or *tajhalūn* occurs five times in Mecca and never appears in Medina. The plural form *jāhilūn* or *jāhiliyah* occurs eight times in Mecca, but only once in Medina. The infinitive *jahālah* occurs once in Mecca, and three times in Medina. All other three forms are Medinan: the two adjectives *jāhil* and *jahūl* occurring once each, and the infinitive *jāhiliyah* occurring four times. Thus, if the chronology is to be believed, one finds that the Medinan period is greatly different from the Meccan period in expression, even when one single root is considered. Of course, such discarding of Meccan expressions is not to be expected in all other cases in Medina; nevertheless, even to a smaller extent, the Medinan expressions are different from the Meccan. As to the meaning, the development is deeper, since the same expressions may be used with different meanings. The root *jh1* cannot be typical of all other cases however.

Lastly, one may conclude on the root *jh1* that it shows more fertility and variety in Mecca, while the Medinan period shows more stability. This goes in line with the well-known theory, namely that of Meccan enthusiasm and the Medinan cool calculations. ^{35a}

Chapter II

PRIDE³⁶

In paras. 1 and 3 the Qur'ān has shown its disagreement with such traditional notions of pride and class-consciousness. The commentators look upon pride as the greatest of all sins.³⁷ This characteristic seems to have been well-known among Bedouins, as they have been from time immemorial an "intensely proud"³⁸ people³⁹. Thus the Qur'ān is showing the virtue of the town-dwellers,⁴⁰ by attacking the Bedouin pride. In a sense, then, the Qur'ān is accelerating the natural death of Bedouinism.

In the following discussion the root *kbr* will provide most of the examples, but some other roots will be partly studied as well.

The root *kbr* seems to have a primitive meaning which it still retains; thus: *kabura* means, he or it became great in size⁴¹. The Qur'ān itself preserves this sense in its purity, but in many cases the sense is, he or it became proud⁴². Although in English the word "proud" may be taken in a good sense, it is usually taken in a bad sense, such as: "disposed to take an attitude of superiority to and contempt for others ... haughty ..."⁴³. Lane, in commenting on the root *kbr*, finds this same sense⁴⁴. The Qur'ān, however, does not forget to apply some derivatives of the root *kbr*⁴⁵ to God, in which case the meaning is: Majesty and the like, but it is mostly pejorative when applied to other beings.

THE FIRST PERIOD

In the case of the root *jh1*, it was found that it did not occur in such an early stage. But now, the (Form X) *istakbara* is mentioned at least once.

Para. 25. 74, 23.

Then he drew back and looked great.

The passage is applied to an opponent who did not want, apparently, to listen to the new message. Thus a sympathiser with this opponent might find no ethical wrongdoing in his act. But from later developments of the root *kbr* it will be seen that the amoral religious indifference underlying the word *istakbara* here is made to embrace purely ethical traits related entirely to human actions.

A reference to other roots shows the notion of pride in better ethical contexts.

Para. 23. 92, 8⁴⁶.

But as for him who is niggardly, and prides himself in wealth
istaghna.

Lane finds that istaghna⁴⁷ means, "he became free from want . . . or satisfied with it, or him". The concomitant word "niggardly" justifies Bell's version. The same word is explained by Zamakhshari⁴⁸ in this way, "he prides himself in the desires of the world." Thus the word istaghna does seem to have, in addition to its primitive sense, a Qur'anic shade of meaning, namely the sense of greatness and pride which is felt as a result of having wealth. A minor additional evidence in this connection is that both istaghna and istakbara, in the previous paragraph, are of the same conjugational structure (sc. Form X).

Para. 27. 93, 9-10.

So as for the orphan be not (thou) overbearing⁴⁹; And as for the beggar,
scold not.

In these two verses the notion of pride is shown through the alleged Meccan treatment of two categories in the society, i. e. the orphans and the beggars. To be overbearing to an orphan, however, is not so much a matter of pride as a lack of love and kindness; although part of the attitude is, at least, some sort of pride. The same thing applies to the scolding of a beggar.

Para. 28. 68, 13.

An opponent is here described as, "Gross, but yet highly-esteemed⁵⁰". If the passage is correctly rendered, its effect is to undermine the respect paid undeservedly to certain people. The nature of pride here stems from looking after high estimation in the eyes of others without justification, since the people so doing are "gross".

Para. 29.

The root tghv (or tghw) seems to imply pride. Bell gives the following different renderings of the same root:

atghā . . . they . . . transgressed 53, 53

taghā . . . he has become presumptuous 79, 17

taghīn . . . the proud transgressors 78, 22

tāghūn . . . proud transgressing . . . 51, 53 (also, 52, 32).

The original sources share with Bell this understanding of the root *ṭ g h y*⁵¹. The fusion of transgression with pride is a process which is not abnormal in the Qur'ānic text. Similar cases will be met again and again in this study.

THE SECOND PERIOD

The root *kbr*.

Para. 30. 37, 34.

In this verse the sinners are said to adopt a proud attitude when asked to believe in Monotheism. Also, the people of Noah, because they do not respond to him, are "self-conceited" (71, 6). Pharaoh and his nobility "thought themselves great and were a high people" (23, 48), because they find the followers of Moses are nothing but "slaves" (23, 49).

Para. 31. 25, 23.

Those who do not hope to meet Us say: "Why have not the angels been sent down to us . . . ?" Verily they have a conceit of themselves *istakbarū*, and have behaved with insolence great.

Thus the refusal of the opponents to accept the religious call is reflected in their asking for angels to be sent down to them. But this refusal is related further by the Qur'ān to a feeling of conceit (or pride), to behaving in an insolent way. The root *kbr* does not provide any other instances in this second period. Other passages, in this period, of various roots may help to add to the argument on pride:

Para. 32. 54, 23-6.

In these verses the people of a former prophet disagree with him, and they seem to be jealous of his position; besides, they consider him,

One single human being from amongst us shall we follow . . . he is a liar insolent *ashir*.

The word *ashir* does not occur anywhere else in the Qur'ān (twice in two consecutive verses). Although according to Bell and Lane⁵², the word is considered as a synonym of *mustakbir*, one has to think twice when confronted with such odd occurrences. The context of the passage resembles that of others given above, and as the intransigent disobedience or indifference grows on the part of the people, the prophet's adjectives grow in number as well. *In* the case of the passage just given, it is the prophet's turn to incur the adjective "insolent" from his people. Apart from the controversial implications

of this situation, one may say that insolence (pride) is considered as an ethical trait which keeps its bad sense even when used in such a controversy. The adjective "liar" is often heard in the Qur'ān, and will appear several times in this study, in a religious sense.

Para. 33.

The root 'l w (to be high, or to be haughty and proud) is used (44, 18 and 30), once in a command not to be "high against God" and once attributed to Pharaoh who is described as "high", and "extravagant". Such negative qualities are to be contrasted with a virtue attributed to Abraham's son, who is described as, "mild tempered" *halīm* (37, 99 of the second period).

Para. 34.

The root *t g h y*, referred to before in the first period, occurs now at least three times: (20, 25 and 45-7).

Go to Pharaoh, he has become arrogant, And speak to him gently, mayhap he will take heed or fear. They said: "Our Lord, we are afraid that he may break out upon us, or become arrogant."

Thus the trait of arrogance (or pride) is coupled with an aggressive behaviour and contrasted to "gentle", persuasive argumentation.

Para. 35. 38, 1.

... those who have disbelieved are in pride *'izzah* and schism. Zamakhshari⁵³ explains *'izzah* thus, "too proud to surrender". The concomitant "schism", however, shows that this pride is based on disunity; hence it might be bound to disintegrate of itself.

Para. 36.

The root 'l w (to be proud) seems to recur again in connection with the miracles of Moses to Pharaoh and his people:

27, 14

They gainsaid them, though they themselves were convinced of them, out of wrong-doing and pride; see what was the latter end of those who wrought corruption.

Though in para. 31 the signs are denied to the proud Meccan opponents, now, on the contrary, their counterparts are permitted the miracles. Apart from this, pride is attacked again with the added force of wrong-doing and corruption, besides the wavering attitude towards the miracles.

From all these examples the notion of pride is more and more fused with ethical implications and concomitants, as follows:

Contempt for slaves	para. 30
Asking for descent of angels	para. 31
Believing	para. 32
Extravagance	para. 33
Aggressive attitude	para. 34
Schism	para. 35
Wrong-doing and corruption	para. 36

This whole range of meanings accompanying the notion of pride and identified with it in one way or another, establishes pride in the second period as one of the greatest faults in the ethical life of the Jahilites.

THE THIRD PERIOD

Now the root *kbr* occurs in about forty cases, only a quarter of which is helpful and relevant to the present discussion, and most consist of repetitions, or imply primitive senses of the root *kbr*, or are employed in purely religious contexts.

Para. 37, 41, 14.

... They thought themselves great in the earth without justification, and said: "Who is greater than we in power? ...

Here "great" translates *istakbarū*, and "greater" *ashadd*. The sense is strongly related to pride. But the special shade of meaning in the present case is the pompous feeling in oneself, and the false priority which one may bestow upon one's own self to the detriment of other people in society. Thus the implication of pride is not so much ethico-religious, as is the case in the second period, but primarily social and political. This does not mean that the new nuance suppresses the older one. Thus, for example, one finds in 16, 51 the contrast of pride to obedience in which, perhaps, both the individual and the social factor are fused. Again, in 14, 24, those who claim greatness (the proud nobility?) are contrasted with the weak and the oppressed; cf. further 34, 30-2; 40, 50-1.

Para. 38, 10; 79

... Hast thou come to us in order to turn us away from what we found our fathers practising, and the greatness *kibrīyā* in the land may belong to you ...

This verse continues the impression gained in the previous paragraph, namely the relationship of pride (greatness) to political rule. If the passage be Medinan, as is believed by Bell, then its political context can be easily understood. But the passage shows more than that. It shows how the opponents fear that their rule may be overthrown; and this is more related to the Meccan situation, since at Medina the Prophet will be invited from the very beginning to rule. The other part of the argument, namely the clinging to the practices of their fathers, is more Meccan than Medinan, as will be shown in the following chapter.

The passage under discussion, like para. 32, attributes the pride (in this case *kibriyā'*) to the (virtuous) prophet. Thus, as one can never conjecture that a Jahilite, according to the Qur'ān, would consider the notion of pride in a bad sense, the only way to understand pride here is simply to identify it with political power and leadership. It is possible, however, that the passage, being apparently Meccan - for in Mecca one may opine that it was the Meccans who were clinging desperately to their power and rule - is simply ridiculing the Meccan's attitude. In other words, as the Qur'ān wants us to believe that a prophet would not look after greatness as a political power or as a feeling of pride, the opponents are unjustified in their belief that the prophet wants "greatness in the land".

Para. 39.

"Assumption of greatness" is coupled with "plotting of evil" (35, 41). The passage seems typical of the last few years in Mecca, when the Moslems were undergoing their worst hardships, and the plotting of evil, even if it never actually happened, was at least a possibility inside this or the other camp. Thus the passage continues the building up of the notion of pride in its new direction, linking it with all the main political events. In 7, 46 pride is coupled with the amassing of wealth. Thus one observes that the notion of pride has had in the third period one significant orientation, namely the political one. In this, various shades of meaning have appeared, but the variation between them is not very great. Such an obvious stability of meaning leads on to the cold attitude towards the notion of pride later in Medina.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

We have now very few reminiscences of the notion of pride. Indeed, instead of the complaint heard in Mecca about pride, the Medinans show their characteristic defects, such as hypocrisy, which will be studied in Chapter VIII. Also, the Medinans are continuously asked to obey more and more. One may say that the Merchants of Mecca are more in touch with the Bedouin traditional pride and self-glorification than the more docile peasants of Medina.

Para. 40. 2. 81.

The Jews are addressed:

... Whenever then a messenger comes to you with what ye yourselves do not like, do ye act proudly *istakbartum* and brand some as liars, while some ye kill?

The same root *kbr* is used in two other significant instances, once applied to the hypocrites, and once in an opposite sense to the Christians, as follows:

63, 5. Here, the hypocrites are said to look away from the messenger, "trying to look great".

5, 85.

... thou wilt find those of them who are nearest in love to those who have believed to be those who ... count not themselves great.

While in the first two instances the same Meccan arm (i. e. the taint of pride) is carried against the new Medinan opponents, in the third instance the opposite of pride (humility) is applied to an obviously virtuous category of people.

CONCLUSION

Thus pride seems to have flourished in Mecca far more than in Medina, and to have been related to ethico-religious traits in the first half of the Meccan stage (i. e. the first two periods), while in the third period it is related to social, mainly political, life.

The few statistical facts given below show how the various nuances are bound to grow or fade according to their relative frequency.

The root **kbr.**

The Period	The Number of Verses	The Ethical Implication
The First	One	Religious
The Second	Eight	About two are ethical, the rest are neutral or religious.
The Third	Forty-two	Some ten are ethical.
The Medinan	Seven	Some three are ethical.

The root **tghy** referred to above only in the first two periods occurs (see Evans, *Die Idee der Sünde im Koran*, 28) thirteen times in the first period, ten in the second, four in the third, and only twice in the Medinan period. The statistics of the two roots just given justifies the reference, in the first two periods, to some roots other than **kbr.** Also, in the case of both roots, the decline in use is tremendous in Medina, so that the notion of pride has almost been dismissed, or, in other words, it has been replaced by a focussing of attention on other notions.

Chapter III

FATHERHOOD AND SONSHIP

It is not the natural bonds due to fathers and sons which are attacked by the Qur'ān but, as will be shown presently, the blind following (the conservatism?) of fathers, and the tribal attitude towards sons. Hence, the words "fathers" and "sons" are used sometimes in a neutral sense, i.e. simply to refer to fathers and sons, while in other passages the same words convey either a bad sense, as has just been mentioned, or a good sense (a moral virtue) as will be shown in Chapter XI.

In the following two sections the blood-relationship in its tribal (and perhaps national) sense is discussed.^{53a} In this, again, the Qur'ān seems to adopt the standpoint of town-dwellers; and tribalism - as identified with conservatism and preference for sons - is therefore denounced.

(a) FATHERHOOD

Para. 41.

In the first period we see the following rather neutral passage which states: 80, 34 ff

... a man shall flee from his brother

From his mother and his father ...

Each man of them that day will have business to occupy him.

It is possible that in this passage the way is partly paved for the later arguments against clinging to fathers, and the fear of any innovation just because of such an attitude.

THE SECOND PERIOD

Para. 42. 37. 67. They found their fathers erring

68. And in their footsteps they stream along.

The whole of the second verse in this passage may be expressed by the one modern word "conservatism". The parallelism may not be very exact, though an appeal at least is made to think afresh and accept innovation courageously.⁵⁴ The passage, also, may mean that one must needs beware the erring fathers or the way wherein they err.

Para. 43.

The passage 26, 72 ff. speaks of the idols:

... Do they hear you ... Or profit you or harm? They said: "Nay, we have found our fathers doing thus ... "

(Also 21, 53 ff; 27, 81 ff.)

Now the "irrationality" in being a pagan is aggravated, according to this passage, by following the fathers' example.

Para. 44.

In 19, 43 ff. Abraham addresses his pagan father, saying:

... there has come to me knowledge which has not come to thee; so follow me ...

Art thou averse to my gods, O Abraham? If thou dost not refrain I shall surely stone thee ...

He (sc. Abraham) said: "Peace be upon thee! I shall ask pardon for thee..."

Fatherhood in its Jahilite sense is reversed now, it is a father who has to follow his son, because the latter has "knowledge". It is religious knowledge, hence it might not have much ethical significance, but the result may be to shatter the Jahilite notion of fatherhood. This is further shattered by the concomitant information given in the passage above about the aggressiveness of the "ignorant" father and the mildness and peacefulness of the "inspired" son.

Para. 45. 43, 22.

Thus We never before thee sent a warner to any town, but the affluent of it said: "We found our fathers following a common religion millah, and we on their footsteps do follow close."


This passage shows that those who insist on following the fathers are simply the "affluent". Thus conservatism is conjoined with the preserving of the vested interests of the affluent. With this is to be read the following verse (43, 28):

Nay, I (sc. God) have given these and their fathers enjoyment of life until there has come to them the truth ...

Para. 46. 23, 85.

We and our fathers have been promised this aforetime; this is nothing but old world tales.

Since the denial of Resurrection does not seem to be based on rational premisses nor on mere coincidence, it is sheer conservatism again in its pejorative sense.



THE THIRD PERIOD

Para. 47. 45, 24.

And when Our signs are recited to them as Evidences, their only argument is: "Produce our fathers, if ye speak the truth."

Basing the truth of anything on the reproduction of fathers is not a rational argument, though it is not less rational than what is claimed in the "signs" themselves. The opponents may be asking for their fathers only for the sake of guidance and as an authority.

Para. 48. 11, 111.

So be not in dubitation on account of what these people serve; they serve only as their fathers served before them ... (Cf. also, 31, 20; 34, 42.)

The denouncement of idols, here, is coupled with an ironical treatment of the "fathers". Thus to denounce idolatry means denouncing the Jahilite notion of fatherhood, and vice versa. Also, consolation and confidence are given to the Prophet, a concomitant which implies that the opponents and their fathers are wrong and are apt to be overthrown. The Jahilites, on the contrary, are described in the Qur'ān as lacking in confidence, as will be shown in Chapter VIII.

Para. 49. 7, 27.

When they commit an indecency, they say: "We found our fathers doing this ..."

What is called "indecency" here would not be named so by the Jahilites. In the next chapter the main aspects of indecency in the eyes of the Qur'ān will be discussed. Now it needs only to be observed that the following of the fathers is further denounced by its conjunction with committing indecency. It may be observed that the passage is ironical, however.

Para. 50. 7, 69.

... will ye dispute with me about names (sc. idols) which you and your fathers have named, for which God has sent down no authority? ... (cf. also 53, 23 and 12, 40.)

There is no authority for idols, and therefore there should be none for the fathers as well. Both idolatry and fatherhood - in its bad sense - are denounced as devices which, according to the passage, are mere "names". This argument is similar to the argument of the opponents when they denounce this or that aspect of the Qur'ānic message as, "nothing but old world tales"; cf. para. 46.

Para. 51.

In 7, 172 the sinners on the Judgement Day are made to say:

... It was our fathers aforetime who associated a shraka ... wilt Thou then destroy us for what the workers of vanity (al-mubtīlūn) did?

Here an idolator is simply identified with someone who corrupts or works vanity. The first trait is religious while the other is strictly ethical, and it seems that the one is made dependent on the other. Besides, the passage makes the sinners renounce their fathers, and this reinforces the attack on the Jahilite cult of the fathers.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

Para. 52.

As the authority of the nascent society increases rapidly, there will not be much need to refer to fatherhood in its former sense. Some passages, however faint and repetitive, show the continuity of the notion of fatherhood in its Medinan colour:

2, 165

... they say: "Nay, we follow what we found our fathers doing" - even though their fathers were utterly without understanding ... (Cf. also 5, 103).

58, 22

One does not find a people who believe ... in friendly relations with any who obstruct God ... even though they were their fathers, or their sons ... (Cf. 9, 23-4.)

(b) SONSHIP AMONGST JAHILITES

Para. 53.

In very early passages (74, 12 ff) the greed for wealth is identified with that for more sons, and both are denounced as Jahilite traits. In 68, 13 f. sonship in its bad sense is coupled with pride and greed. In 70, 11 the sinner on the Judgement Day would wish to ransom himself with his sons; but he is unable, of course, to do so. In this passage an aspect of individualism is preached, in which a man is judged according to his merits and demerits. But on the other hand the vanity of the Bedouin pride in sons is an aspect of desert collectivism. Thus the Meccan opponents are able to agree with the Qur'ān on the first aspect, though not on the second. This example may imply that the town-dwellers of Mecca could not get rid of many Bedouin traits, but the Qur'ān could.

THE SECOND PERIOD

Para. 54.

Now a new phase of Jahilite sonship is revealed in that the Jahilite prefers sons to daughters.⁵⁵ The context of such passages is religious and related to pagan Meccan goddesses, but the ethical and social aspects are not completely absent in it. For example:

37, 149. Consult them then: "Has thy Lord daughters and they sons?"

154. What is wrong with you? How ye judge!

43, 15. Or hath He taken ... daughters, and honoured you with sons? (Also 17, 42 etc.)

Para. 55. 71, 20.

... they have opposed me, and followed him whose wealth and *walad* only increase him in loss.

In all previous passages "sons" translated *banīn*, and "daughters" *banāt*. Now *walad* is believed by Bell to mean "children", though the context seems rather to mean "sons" only, cf. para. 53. As the passage is believed to be of the second period, then it is natural for the Meccan opposition to appear, together with such Jahilite traits as are mentioned in the passage, namely, love of wealth and pride in sons. These traits and that of opposition constitute loss in the eyes of the Qur'ān.

Para. 56. 71, 28.

... they will lead astray Thy servants, and their every birth will be a scamp unbelieving *lā yālidū illā fājiran kaffāran*.

29. O, my Lord ... increase not the wrong-doers except in ruin.

Here, again, as in the previous paragraph, both sons and daughters might be understood under the verb *yālidū*. But as all nouns and pronouns in the passage are masculine, and because the sense of the context requires mention of blame with the characteristic of Jahilites, sons only, to the exclusion of daughters, are meant. The word "ruin" mentioned in the second verse corresponds to the "loss" of the previous paragraph. Thus the passage expands the comment on the Jahilite notion of sonship, saying: once the fathers are leading the others astray, then their sons are apt to do the same thing.

Para. 57. 18, 44.

Wealth and sons are the adornment of the nearer life, but the things which remain, the works of righteousness, are ... better ...

Here a mild contrast is made between sons and wealth, on the one hand, and the works of righteousness on the other. If this passage could be related with the previous ones above on the notion of sonship, then it adds the following shade of meaning: not sons as such, but pride in sons or preferring them to daughters, together with other related aspects, are what is condemned by the Qur'ān. ⁵⁶

THE THIRD PERIOD

Para. 58.

Now we are confronted with an unbelieving (Jahilite) son, while his father belongs to the community of the believers. It is the story of Noah and his prayer to God to rescue his son:

11, 47. ... O my Lord, my son is one of my house-hold ... Thou art the worthiest to judge ...

48. He said: "O Noah, he is not of thy house-hold, verily it ⁵⁷ is a deed not upright ...

It seems as if Noah is behaving in a Jahilite manner when he clings to his son because he is a member of the household. Nevertheless, Noah is reminded that he should not cling to a Jahilite sonship, and apparently he accepts the reminder and gives way to uprightness.

Para. 59. 31, 32.

... a father wālid will not make satisfaction yughni for his child walad, nor a child be making satisfaction for his father at all.

Here wālid - walad can be understood either as father-son or parent-child. Bell seems to compromise with both. It seems more natural to accept the alternative father-son, since the preceding and the succeeding verses are involved in a controversial argument against the Jahilites, and discounting the Jahilite significance of fathers and sons is an important factor in such an argument. In contrast to Jahilite tribal notions, this passage specifies the responsibility of the individual in regard to himself.

Para. 60. 34, 34.

... We have more numerous possessions and children a wlādān and we are not the sort of people to be punished.

34, 36.

Neither your possessions nor your children are the thing which will bring you into close proximity to Us, but only who has believed and done uprightly...

The punishment mentioned in the passage is that which is due to happen on the Judgement Day. But it is very clear that the Jahilite, according to the passage, thinks himself too strong on account of his children (sons) and possessions to be punished even when he is not upright.

Coming now to the end of the Meccan stage one feels sure that the notion of sonship has established itself in Mecca, but this establishment will soon give way in Medina, just as in the case of the Jahilite notion of fatherhood.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

Now, as will be shown in Chapter XI, there is more room to speak of parental and filial bonds. The following instances show the decline of the notion of sonship in its bad sense.

Para. 61. 64, 15.

Your wealth and children *a wla'd* are indeed a trial ... (Cf. also 8, 28.)

There is more than a mere reminiscence of the Meccan argument, though the notion of *fitnah* (trial, temptation; cf. Chapter VIII, on vices of the intellect) is essentially Medinan, and comes perhaps in the forefront in the argument of the passage just given.

Para. 62.

In some later passages, children (sons?) are not to divert one from the remembrance of God (63. 9), nor to be considered as dearer than Him (9, 24).

Para. 63. 9, 55.

Let not therefore either their wealth or their children *a wla'd* excite thy admiration; God intends simply to punish them thereby ... (Also, 9. 70 and 86.)

The passage is similar in its contention to Meccan passages, even the idea of punishment equals the meanings underlying the words "loss" and "ruin" mentioned in paras. 55-6. The passage is most likely carried now against the Hypocrites⁵⁸ (the Jews may be specially meant).

Para. 64. 5, 21.

... "We are the sons and beloved of God": say: "Why then does He punish you for your sins? Nay ye are human beings (part) of those whom He hath created: He forgiveth whom He pleaseth ...

Here "sons" is only metaphorically used, and in itself is not relevant to the present discussion. But in the second part of the passage after "say", the

responsibility of each individual is once more mentioned; cf. para. 59. This latter notion contrasts, of course, with the Jahilite notion of sonship which implies a sort of primitive collectivism.

CONCLUSION

Some aspects of Jahilism have been studied in this chapter; they are closely related to Bedouin life. Though the Meccan opponents were town-dwellers, they seem to have preserved some pride in Bedouin conservatism, or respect for what their fathers and ancestors had bequeathed. Besides, the significance of sons for the Bedouins, in their feuds and fightings, seems also to have been known amongst the Meccans.

It is possible to assume that part of what the Qur'ān mentions in regard to Bedouin life was accepted by the Meccan opponents, though for reasons of prestige or politics or lack of insight, they seem, in their arguments with the Prophet, to have pleaded for complete attachment to the fathers and sons. That is one reason for the decline, in Medina, of the Jahilite notions of fatherhood and sonship, since Medina - in a large part of it - invited the Prophet from the beginning to rule and preside over them. In other words as the Meccan stage of the Qur'ān does not seem to have changed the family life of the Meccans very much, because only a minority were converted to the new religion, the Qur'ān finds in Mecca sufficient reason to attack the Jahilite ethics concerning fathers and sons. In Medina, the rapidity of conversion to Islam, the fighting between the two camps and what they provided, in a number of cases, in turning fathers against sons, and other ideological and practical factors, are the cause for the Qur'ānic lack of interest in Medina in attacking the Jahilite notions of fatherhood and sonship.

Lastly, the Qur'ān is silent about the Jahilite attitude towards mothers. This attitude could be deduced, at least to some extent, from the manner in which the Jahilite differentiates between his sons and daughters, preferring male to female children. Thus the Qur'ān, by showing the Jahilite disregard towards certain categories of women, is preparing the way for more equality between the sexes.

Chapter IV

INDECENCY

This chapter is concerned with what the Qur'ān declares to be immoral, in matters of sex, among the Jahilites.⁵⁹ Some of the ten roots studied in the present discussion, though often mentioned throughout all the periods of the Qur'ān, do not seem originally to have had any relationship to significations like indecency, lust, and the like. Others, though they seem originally to be related to various aspects of indecency, are rarely mentioned or occur in some periods of the Qur'ān rather than others. Though not exclusively related to indecency, the following ten roots provide the best passages concerned with the theme of the present chapter.

Sh, h, w (or sh, h, y): the original or primitive sense of this root, which is still retained in the Qur'ān in the Meccan stage, is, "to desire, to have an appetite for food or drinks" (cf. ar-Rāghib, Lane and Lisān). The secondary - apparently Qur'ānic - sense of the root is to have lust for an object of sex which is illegal, or to have an unlawful desire (for sex or other objects). Bell in ten cases translates the root shhw to mean "desire", and in three to mean "lust". Indeed, in more than three places the root shhw is related to the second meaning, as will be seen presently.

Para. 65.

In the first period (77, 42; 52, 22; 56, 21) the root shhw simply conveys the original sense ("to have an appetite for food", applied to inhabitants of Paradise).

Para. 66.

THE SECOND PERIOD

Now the secondary sense makes its appearance in the following general way: 19, 60.

... who have corrupted the Prayer, and followed their own desires
shahawāt; so ... they shall meet perversion.

Thus desire is branded for the first time. Hence, to follow one's own desires is conjoined with corruption and perversion. Both these concomitants are, in spite of the religious context in which they are used, at least partly connected with this new shade of meaning of desire.

Para. 67.

The original sense of the root *shhw* recurs again, though in a more general way than in para. 65, as follows:

43, 71 ... there is what the soul desires *tashtahi* ... (also, 21, 102).

Para. 68. 27, 56.

Do ye come to men in lust *shahwatan* instead of women ...

Thus *shhw* develops in a more specific sense than in para. 66 to mean sodomy. With this one reaches the final development in the Qur'ānic use of words derived from the root *shhw*. In the next two periods the development, if any, will be slight.

Para. 69.

THE THIRD PERIOD

16, 59

And they appointed for God daughters ... and they have what they desire!
(sc. sons).

As the Jahilite preference for sons is condemned (cf. Chapter III, section (b)), then "desire" in this passage implies a longing for a wrong object. Thus the object of desire, and not desire itself, is what is condemned; cf. para. 66.

In 34, 53 the sinners, "are shut off from what they desire (sc. Paradise)". Here the original sense of the root *shhw* is used, and hence no novelty. In 7, 79 also the same sense as in para. 68 is repeated.

Para. 70.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

3, 12.

Made attractive to the people is the love of desires *hubb ashshahawāt*,
wives and children *banīn* and hoarded hoards of gold ... such are the
goods of this present life, but with God is the best place of resort.

Although what is understood here by "desires" is not, perhaps, to be taken in any other than a neutral sense, it is, to some extent, contrasted with "the best place of resort"; hence the secondary meaning of the root *shhw* is partially expressed here.

Para. 71. 4, 32.

... those who follow lusts *shahawāt* desire *yurīdūn* that ye should fall mightily away.

Here *shahawāt* stands as a general word for sin (or crime). In such a generalization one may read all the shades of meaning, hinting at traits which have already been given in this chapter.

(In this connection one may refer to the root *hw*y as an important one for providing similar passages to those given above. It seems that *hw*y in its original sense is almost synonymous with *shhw* in its original sense, but the Qur'ānic usage of the former relates it to the vices of the intellect; cf. Chapter VIII.)

Fhsh. This root occurs twenty-four times; in twenty-three of them Bell understands it as "indecency" and once as "unseemliness". The root *fhsh* is used, without exception, in an unpraiseworthy context. This characteristic may contribute to the fact that the meaning is not changed or modified by the Qur'ānic usage. According to ar-Rāghib⁶⁰ *fhsh* stands for "what is excessively dirty in words or deeds". Lane⁶¹ finds that *fuḥsh* is a sort of *jahl* and contr. of *ḥilm*". In many cases in the Qur'ān, as will be presently shown, the sense of *fuḥsh* approaches the English word "lust"⁶².

Para. 72.

THE SECOND PERIOD

53, 33

Those who avoid heinous crimes and indecencies unless by inadvertence... This is, perhaps, the first passage in which *fa wāḥish* is mentioned. The official Egyptian edition of the Qur'ān mentions that this verse is the only Medinan one in the whole of the surah. According to Bell it is Medinan too. According to N-S⁶³ it occurs in a surah of the first period, but this verse with a few others is considered to be revealed "somewhat later" than the rest of the surah. The passage, however, may be ranged with the two following verses of the latest surahs in the second period:

17, 34.

Avoid fornication⁶⁴, verily it has become an indecency and is bad as a way.

27, 55.

... Do ye commit indecency (sc. sodomy) with your eyes open.

Thus the very general sense in which *fawāḥiṣh* is used in the first instance, which seems also a pre-Qur'ānic usage, is specified in the latter two instances to mean *fornication* and *sodomy* respectively. The Qur'ān may be responsible for this specification. Some of the instances of the root *fhsh* in the next periods will be understood in this sense.

Para. 73.

THE THIRD PERIOD

The root *fhsh* occurs now about nine times. In one case it approaches the idea of niggardliness, as pleaded by commentators of the Qur'ān, though the general primitive sense may be more natural.

16, 92.

... God commandeth justice and kindness, and giving to kindred, and forbiddeth indecency *fahshā'* and disreputable conduct and greed ...

Again the general sense may be understood in (12, 24) where *fahshā'* is coupled with evil, but the specific sense, as given in the previous paragraph is more likely.

She was fascinated with him, and he was fascinated with her; had it not been that he saw a proof of his Lord'; thus (it was) in order that We might turn away from him evil and indecency ...

The general sense is observable in most of the other instances in this period, thus:

In (7, 27) the *fahshā'* is related (by the Jahilites, perhaps, in an ironic sense) to traditionalism and fatherhood. In (7, 31) it is related to guilt and unjustified greed; cf. 16, 92.

Para. 74.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

The root *fhsh* occurs now twelve times; most of them are repetitive. Some examples may suffice.

In (3, 129) *fāhishah* is coupled with committing a wrong against one's self. In (4, 26) a *fāhishah* is a specified illegal act (sc. to marry a father's wife after him). In (4, 30) a *fāhishah* means adultery for which "punishment" is mentioned, though exercising patience is recommended. In (65, 1) to commit *fāhishah* by a woman gives her husband the right to hasten her divorce though the 'iddah has not yet been completed. Cf. 33, 30; 24, 18.

Thus the root f ḥ s h in Mecca or in Medina shows two meanings. One general (primitive) which can be identified with any illegal or unacceptable act or which simply points to sin (or crime) generally; and the other specific which is identified with certain aspects of sexual ethics (e.g. fornication, adultery, slander) which seem to be introduced by the Qur'ān.

OTHER ROOTS

Para. 75.

The first period does not use any of the relevant roots studied in this chapter in a context connected with indecency specifically. Thus, as in the case of the two roots studied above, the following examples all begin with the second period.

Baḡhiyy in (19, 20 and 29), meaning "harlot", occurs in a context where it is understood that the term implies social indignations as much as immorality.⁶⁵

In (54, 37) rāwada (to solicit), though it might be understood in a general sense, still bears on immoral love temptation as the passage is connected with Lot and his people's interest in homosexuality, which is denounced by the Qur'ān; cf. para. 68. (Cf. further the same verb rāwada in 12, 23 and 30 etc. of the Third Period.)

In (21, 74) khabā' th might mean "foul deeds" in general, but sodomy is mainly understood as underlying the word.

Thus, though infrequently, the second period mentions the immorality of a few aspects of sex which will be described later in some detail.

Para. 76.

THE THIRD PERIOD

Now the verb rāwada (to solicit) recurs seven times in surah XII. Except in 12, 61, where a neutral sense is meant, it is always connected with love temptation between the two sexes. This, in addition to what has been mentioned in para. 75, makes the act of soliciting - in cases where sodomy and adultery or fornication are implied - prohibited in the eyes of the Qur'ān.

The root khyn (to betray) occurs twice, bearing on treachery in matters of sex; cf. 12, 52. In 40, 20 a derivative from khyn is used a third time in a context where the sense is doubtful and not specially connected with sex.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

The word *bighā'* (prostitution) from the root *bghy* occurs only once, and its context hints at a known institution amongst Jahilites.

24.33

... compel not your maids to prostitution ... in order that ye may seek the chance gain of this present life ...

Khabīth is used in (24, 26) meaning "unchaste", and the passage seems to inflict a social punishment in addition to the moral and religious punishment of unchastity, as follows:

Bad women *al-khabīthāt* to bad men, and bad men to bad women,
good women to good men ...

Thus the passage prevents the marriage of anyone who dares break the ethics of sex brought by the Qur'an. Indeed, one half of surah XXIV (vv. 2-33 and vv. 57-59) deals with what is accepted and what is rejected in sex morals⁶⁶. But many of these passages will be dealt with in Chapter XII.

In a middle Medinan passage (4, 29) the slave-girls are warned against receiving paramours *muttakhidhāt akhdān*, and this is coupled with the committing of debauchery *musāfiḥāt*. In a late Medinan passage (5, 7) both ethical traits of "choosing paramours" and "committing debauchery" are denied to men in general (sc. the Moslems).

The root *khyn* recurs in Medina, too; but in none of the thirteen times in which it is found is there any ethical connotation in regard to sex. It has usually a political or a religious implication.

CONCLUSION

There is hardly any need to prove the laxity concerning sex in pre-Qur'ānic times, especially amongst the Bedouins.⁶⁷ The poets of the desert, with their idealization of love, brought about the loose morals found in the settled societies of Arabia.⁶⁸ Desire leads easily to adultery and fornication, sodomy, soliciting and seduction, and the seeking of paramours. As the Qur'an attacks these aspects as purely Jahilite, it attacks the unjustified slander and the baseless casting of imputations. Thus the Qur'an attacks what might be called the Jahilite double standard of morality, i.e. preaching and/or glorifying chastity and behaving otherwise, or even preaching otherwise. Indeed, many examples

can be provided where the same (pre-Qur'anic) poet glorifies both chastity and unchastity according to whether he is describing his wife or his last beloved. Chastity will be studied in Chapter XII when the Qur'anic view on this present chapter will be easier to understand.

Chapter V

GREED AND NIGGARDLINESS

This chapter will indicate the Qur'ānic attacks against Jahilite love of wealth, and the desire to enlarge one's possessions beyond reasonable limits. With this the Qur'ān attacks two other traits which seem corollaries to the first: (a) the lavish expenditure of money and other possession, which is general amongst Bedouins; and (b) the opposite vice of avarice or niggardliness,⁶⁹ especially evident in a mercantile society like that of Mecca at the time the Qur'ān began its work.

From all this it does not follow that the Qur'ān preaches asceticism, in regard to wealth and property, or does not consider wealth a good thing to be enjoyed and appreciated.⁷⁰ Lack of bare necessities - such as food - is not a virtue, though it might be a form of punishment (e.g. 7, 127 of the third period reads:

We took hold of the House of Pharaoh with famine years, and lack of fruits, if mayhap they might be mindful).

or a testing of the truthfulness of the virtuous who have to learn that patience and endurance are numbered among the cardinal virtues (cf. the early Me-dinan passage which reads:

2, 150

We shall surely try you with some experience of fear and hunger and defect of property ... so give (thou) good tidings to those who patiently endure.)⁷¹

Most of the quotations in this chapter are those in which the word *māl* (wealth, goods, properties ... cf. Lane, art. *mwl*) occurs. But many other passages can serve the purpose of the discussion; e.g. the root *bkh*1 (to be niggardly) and root *bdhr* (in its Form II seems to mean, to squander), or expressions like, to keep the hand chained to the neck, or to spread it wide open (17, 31).

Para. 78.

THE FIRST PERIOD

The main arguments appear in their basic lines as early as the first period. The word *māl* occurs a dozen times. Other words and expressions bearing on the subject will be interesting too.

In (74, 12-5) God declares that He "appointed an extensive wealth" for man, and "made everything smooth" for him. But man (v. 15) longs for *yātma'* more. Hence in such an early passage it can be seen that the Qur'ān does not consider the mere gaining and the actual owning of wealth to be wrong; the vice creeps in when there is an avaricious attitude towards wealth. It will be seen from what follows how this line dominates the whole Qur'ānic outlook towards wealth (and poverty).

Para. 79. 111, 2.

His wealth and what he has piled up have not profited him.
Cf. also 92, 11; 69, 28.

Now to pile up *kasab*⁷² wealth equals *yātma'* (to desire or long for more wealth) met in the previous paragraph. In both cases the notion of greed is considered as unpraiseworthy and unprofitable in the long run. It is also contrasted with salvation, if the phrase "have not profited him" can be read so.

Para. 80. 104, 1-3.

Woe to every maligner, scoffer,
Who gathers wealth and counts it over,
Thinking that his wealth will perpetuate him!⁷³

The ironical wording of the second verse above cannot be missed. Again, the notion of greed comes in the forefront, conjoined with such moral traits as being "maligner" and "scoffer"; and the passage hints at the existence of the other world, by way of contrast.

Para. 81. 90, 6.

He says: "I have wasted wealth untold".

Here is, perhaps, a repetition of a Jahilite saying concerning a show of generosity, and the like. Though charity, as shown in Chapter XIII, is commendable, the wasting of wealth, or having pride in such a display, are not virtuous. Such a wasting coincides with what is considered as the dearest thing to a Jahilite's heart, namely "fight, wine, gambling and love".⁷⁴

Para. 82. 68, 13 f.

Gross, but yet highly esteemed,
Because he has wealth and children *banīn*.

Thus one should not be highly esteemed, because of wealth and children, when he is gross ('utull). This latter word is found only once in the Qur'ān, and hence its real meaning might be doubtful, though the previous verse (12) could explain more, as follows:

A hinderer of the good, evil-disposed and guilty.

Para. 83. 89, 20 f.

Ye devour the inheritance indiscriminately,
And ye love wealth ardently.

A new aspect of greed comes forward here, namely enriching oneself on account of what might look like entrusted inheritance (especially, perhaps, that of the orphans - a line of argument which will be met with repeatedly in the Qur'ān).

Para. 84. 69, 28 f.

My wealth has not profited me,
My authority *sultāniyah* has gone from me.

Although *aghnā* (profited) in para. 79 had, apparently a religious implication (sc. salvation in the other world), the same word now is obviously related to worldly authority, a state of affairs which explains quite plainly the (Jahilite) Meccan opposition.

Para. 85.

The derivative notion of niggardliness is treated equally in several passages in this early period. In the previous paragraphs niggardliness has been implied in such passages as that quoted in para. 80: the following quotations show it more explicitly.

92, 8 and 10.

But as for him who is niggardly *bakhila*, and prides himself in wealth,
We shall assist him to difficulty.

The boasting of a Jahilite in para. 81 of lavishly expending one's own wealth, is more to be appreciated against a Bedouin background with the idealization made of it by the poets. The opposite of such boasting is the avarice, which is more often mentioned, and easily understood against a mercantile type of so-

ciety like that of Mecca. Thus, while a Bedouin would consider the spending of his wealth a cause for fame and reputation (cf. para. 81), a merchant from Mecca, on the contrary, might find his real fame and authority in adding to his wealth, or, at least, leaving it untouched through avarice (cf. paras. 80 and 84). Other examples are:

53, 35

(A Meccan is meant) Gives little and is mean.

70, 18

And gathers and hoards.

A bold step towards generalization is reached in (70, 19 ff):

Verily man was created avid (of gain)

When evil affects him, apt to grieve,

When good befalls him, grudging manū'a.

Coming now to the end of the first period, one has the feeling that this period, though known for its purely religious ideas, proves amply its interest in such a worldly topic as that of the present discussion. The variation of words and expressions connected with notions of greed and avarice and other derivative aspects is a proof of the importance given to them.

Para. 86.

THE SECOND PERIOD

Some additional shades of meaning may be found in the following few examples:

71, 20

... they have opposed me, and have followed him whose wealth and children only increase him in loss.

23, 57 f.

Do they think that the wealth and children with which We enlarge them ... are among the good things? Nay ...

In these passages wealth - with the concomitant, children - is only a sham through which a warning is delivered, and a punishment is, apparently, expected.

Para. 87.

In the story of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba (17, 15-45) the same Qur'ānic

dichotomy recurs again, namely that of the acts of a virtuous prophet and those of his evil opponents (Jahilites). This story may be briefly given as follows:

On learning that the Queen and her people pride themselves in their wealth and revere the sun, Solomon sends them a letter asking them not to act proudly. The queen, instead of showing her people's "strength and fierce warlike spirit", uses bribery in the form of a gift. But Solomon refuses the gift, and says (v. 36):

... Will ye add riches to me, though what God hath given me is better than what He hath given you? Nay, it is ye who in your gift do rejoice.

From this example it is evident that the legend of the Queen of Sheba may be aptly applied to the Arabian situation. Thus the Jahilite characteristic of the Queen of Sheba cannot be overlooked, namely pride in wealth and physical strength. When she is asked not to act proudly, she thinks of sending a gift, while the main demand of Solomon has been in effect neglected. It is not impossible that, in accordance with the tradition, the Quraysh really wanted to silence the Prophet by a gift of money and to set aside his message. The Prophet's answer to the Quraysh would be no different, then, from that of Solomon (v. 36). This satisfaction in godly qualities and rewards rather than in wealth is observable in other passages, e.g. (18, 37 f.):

... If thou thinkest me inferior to thee in wealth and children,

Possibly my Lord will give me something better ...

Cf. also 18, 44.

Para. 88.

On the notion of niggardliness the Qur'ān gives some new formulations in the second period too, as follows:

25, 67.

Who when they contribute are neither extravagant nor stingy, but between
the two he is right. ^{75a}

In para. 81 the lavish expenditure of money was denounced as a Jahilite trait; stinginess has been denounced several times. Thus it is natural, when speaking about the ideal man - as the text above presumes - to find the direct opposite expressed - by way of negating the Jahilite traits.

In another passage the notion of avarice is so widely generalized that the whole of mankind seems to be implied.

17, 102.

... If it were you who had in your power the treasures of the mercy of my Lord, you would in that case keep a firm grip for fear of expense; man is parsimonious.

One cannot, however, stress the generalization of this passage, since it is the wrong-doers who are meant, as v. 101 shows. Besides, man's parsimony here is more a glorification of God's generosity and mercy than a factual judgement on man generally. Such encroachments between the ethics of God and man are inevitable, and they lead to various interpretations according to whether they are too much or too little stressed.

Para. 89.

THE THIRD PERIOD

The word *māl* - mostly in the plural form *amwāl* - occurs now eight times only, a fact which may indicate some lack of interest in devoting much space to the notion of greed. The content of the few quotations given below does not show real and direct interest in greed and avarice, and it is more a repetition of earlier arguments than a new argument.

30, 38.

What ye give for usury that it may increase amongst the wealth of the people will gain no increase with God ...

This is the first time that usury is connected with greed as another Jahilite trait. There is a possibility, as pleaded by Watt,⁷⁵ that the passage is Medinan. Also, the expression *amwāl an-nās*⁷⁶ (the wealth of the people) occurs in three other passages,⁷⁷ all of which are Medinan. But the passage, according to N-S is of the third period. Besides, one may always plead that as Mecca was a mercantile city-state, usury is one of the most apparent targets.⁷⁸

Para. 90. 11, 31.

... I ask you not for wealth in return for it; no one is responsible for my reward but only God ...

Here, as in para. 87, the spiritual mission of a messenger is transformed into financial terms, or, in the eyes of the Qur'ān, into Jahilite ones. The tradition mentions that the Quraysh tempted the Prophet with wealth in order to deviate from his message; the passage above is either responsible for the

thoughts which arose afterwards with the development of Qur'ānic exegetics, or it is in itself a record of what really happened. Once more, however, wealth is looked upon in a derogatory way. The contrast of the material reward with that of the spiritual is explicitly given in the passage.

Para. 91. 11, 89.

... does thy Prayer command thee that we should forsake what our fathers served, or doing what we will with our property?

Here the selfish usage of one's own property is linked with the pagan sunnah. It appears that the asking for charity, as for example in para. 89, has evolved such a selfish expression on the part of the Jahilites, who take their love of personal property as a right which must not be challenged.

There are many other passages bearing on wealth as a trait; e. g. (10, 88) in which wealth seems to encourage the (Jahilite) nobility to err from the way of God; and (34, 36) which contrasts uprightness with pride in possessions and sons.

Para. 92.

One more evidence showing the lack of interest, in the third period, in arguments on greed and other related traits, is that the notion of niggardliness (bukhl and other synonymous expressions as those mentioned in the first two periods above) is not explicitly mentioned. Such faint hints as the following may give some remote evidence to the contrary:

41, 5 f.

... woe to the Polytheists, who do not give the Zakāt ...

The latter part of the passage is judged by Bell as a Medinan revision; besides, even if it were Meccan, as judged by N-S, it does not bear directly on niggardliness.

Para. 93.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

Now a revival is clearly observable after the long break of the third period. The contrast between the two aspects of māl is sharper than ever, though more prominence is given to māl as used for charity than to the other side, as will be seen in Chapter XIII.

2, 248. In this passage the Jews are ranged as a class of Jahilites. They contest the kingship of a person over them.

... seeing we are more entitled to the kingship than he, and no abundance of wealth has been given him ...

As in para. 84 wealth and authority are conjoined, according to the Qur'ān, in the Jahilite mind. The Qur'ānic reaction to this is given further in the same verse, "God ... hath increased him (sc. the king) amply in knowledge and stature". In para. 91 uprightness was contrasted with wealth, now "knowledge and stature", i.e. the mental and physical integrations *baṣṭa tān fil'ilm wal jismi*.

Para. 94. 64, 15.

Your wealth and children are indeed a trial ...

Cf. also 8, 28 where wealth is described as a temptation.

Such vices which are concomitants of wealth, i.e. "trial" and "temptation", are typically Medinan, as will be shown in Chapter VIII.

Para. 95. 57, 19 f.

... this present life is play and sport and show, self-glorification amongst you, and vying in wealth and children ... this present life is only enjoyment of delusion.

The ascetic flavour of this passage is very strong. Also, though wealth and children (sons?) are specially mentioned from Jahilism, the whole of human life is considered. This is doubtless to prevent too much concentration on the spiritual side. If, however, one takes the whole passage as simply a call for less concentration on greed and children (sons?) and other traits which correspond to certain moral weaknesses, then much confusion would be discarded.

Para. 96. 4, 33.

... do not consume your property among you in vanity ...

If gambling⁷⁹ is what is meant here, then it is another concrete Jahilite trait conjoined with greed. In the very last surah (5, 92) gambling is explicitly prohibited. Such a late judgment on some national sports (*maysir*) may hint at the minor significance of the object prohibited. The gain (and loss) from gambling resembles, however, the gain (and loss) resulting from the institution of usury, which is equally prohibited; cf. para. 89.

Para. 97.

Several passages, concerned with greed, repeat similar shades of meanings as the Meccan ones. For example, (4, 2) repeats the judgement against consum-

ing the inheritance of the orphans, and describes the Jahilite trait involved as "a great crime".

There is a warning in (9, 34 f) against consuming the wealth of others unjustifiably; also the amassing of gold and silver is specially mentioned as a vicious trait. In (9, 55 and 86) the wealth of the rich people is described as a punishment for them in this life.

Para. 98.

As the notion of greed recurs, now, so also does the notion of avarice. The root *bkh1* only occurs about eight times. Other roots bearing on avarice also occur. A few examples may suffice.

64, 16.

... those who are protected from niggardliness of soul are the ones who prosper.

Here the trait is spoken of not in connection with a Jahilite, but with a Moslem. The phrase *shuhha nafsihi* ('one's own niggardliness) seems to bear on human nature in general, i.e. the phrase seems to imply niggardliness per se. This reading is identifiable with (17, 102) para. 88.

Para. 99. 47, 39.

If He asks you for them (sc. *amwāl*) and importunes you, ye become niggardly and it brings out your ill-will.

40

... some are niggardly; but any who are niggardly, are only niggardly to themselves; God is the Rich ...

Cf. also 3, 175.

Thus if (64, 16) para. 98 is read with the present passage, one would find that being generous never means to get rid of all that one may possess (if 47, 39 means that one has to contribute a part, only, of what one has).

Lastly the contagiousness of avarice is recorded.

57, 23

... God loveth not any crafty boaster -

24

Such as are niggardly and urge niggardliness upon the people ...

CONCLUSION

Although in the Qur'ān poverty is not declared to be a virtue, yet love of wealth, greed, and niggardliness are denounced explicitly. As the argument is usually concerned with wealth, the Qur'ān seems to imply that it is not a vice to have a reasonable amount of money and property. In other words, as will be shown in Chapter XIII, what one gains by honest effort without harming another is, in the eyes of the Qur'ān, legitimate, and there is nothing to prevent one's wealth from growing, especially when one pays the alms. But in view of the general egalitarian outlook - though rather faintly exposed - one would use the term "reasonable" just mentioned to be the Qur'ānic limit to the wealth one may have; anything beyond that seems to be deplorable. Also, as more passages are concerned with attacking avarice rather than the lavish expenditure of money - and wealth - one would say that the Qur'ān in this connection is more concerned with the settled Meccan life than with the nomadic Bedouin life. Also a middle way between the settled and the Bedouin societies seems to be indicated: since to work and make profits (*kasaba*) are encouraged, and the wasting of what one has is deplored. On the other hand, the levelling down of excessive riches, and the living of the life of the average person are very Bedouin traits which are strange to the Meccan opponents. All this is further explained in Chapter XIII, on charity.

Chapter VI

HATRED AND HOSTILITY⁸⁰

The state of Jahilite tribalism, whether among the Bedouins or the town dwellers, involves, among other things, continuous hostile activities between groups or individuals. The incessant state of war and of individual killings is one of the main features of Jahilism according to the Qur'ān and to what is known from other available sources such as poetry.

A few roots will now be discussed. Most important among them is the root 'd w (or 'd y), on which the following note seems helpful.

'd w has nine conjugational forms (from the first to the tenth except the ninth⁸¹). Four of these forms are used in the Qur'ān; and perhaps all of them are familiar in the pre-Qur'ānic times.⁸² Such unusual richness is responsible for the difficulties in understanding the various forms of this root in the Qur'ān.⁸³

One of the difficulties about this root is that the same conjugational form may have different meanings, while, on the other hand, two or more forms may indicate almost the same meaning; a characteristic which is observable in other roots of similar conjugational elasticity.

Ar-Rāghib in his *Mufradāt* defines *al-'adwās* "the passing of or the deviation from the limits, and the negation or deviation from homogeneity *al-'adwāt-tajāwuz wa munāfāt al-ilti'ām*".⁸⁴ Such a definition though helpful cannot show all the shades of meaning underlying the various derivatives from the root 'd w. *ista'dā*, for example, means "he demanded vengeance or avengement". It also means "he asked for help" (Lane). Another example (Lisān) is the old' phrase *qawm'idā*, which seems to mean: being strange and/or distant from each other, being in a state of hatred, and, lastly, being in a state of actual hostility and war. This phrase, which seems very Jahilite in its implications, could have been developed along the following lines: because one is distant from another they are strangers, once one is a stranger all rights are forfeited except the rights of hatred and friction.

All this, briefly stated, may lead to the study of hatred and hostility on both personal and communal levels in the Qur'ān.

Para. 100.

THE FIRST PERIOD

The root 'd w recurs about a hundred times in the Qur'ān, but it is difficult to find it in more than three places in this stage.
68, 12.

A hinderer of the good, evil-disposed mu'tadi and guilty.
Cf. also 83, 12.⁸⁵

70, 31.

But whoever allows his desires to go beyond that - they are the transgressors al-'ādūn.

Though in the first two instances a very general (and religious) sense may be underlying the word mu'tadi, the third instance related to transgression in matrimonial bonds uses 'ādūn in a more specific and ethical sense. But even in this latter case, the root 'd w is connected to the "passing of limits" only; a sense which may be the primitive one of the root 'd w, though the root neither in this case nor in the two previous cases gives any clue to other shades of meaning, i. e. those of hatred and hostility which will be developed later.
Para. 101.

Other examples of other roots may be mentioned.
108, 3.

It is he who hateth thee shāni' who is the docked one.
93, 3.

Thy Lord hath not taken leave of thee, nor despised thee qalā.

Both verses are intimations to the Prophet; in the second no ethical implication can be easily found, since the notion of hatred is not between human beings. In the first case, the Prophet's opponents seem to have called him abtar (the docked) because he did not have any son. The epithet abtar may be no more than a factual statement. By reversing the statement against the opponents, one cannot say easily whether any real hatred has been involved.

The root krh, does not occur in this first period at all, but occurs forty-one times in the following periods.

Thus one may say that the first period does not seem to refer explicitly to the notions of hatred and hostility, despite the frequent repetition of them in the

other three periods.

Para. 102.

THE SECOND PERIOD

The recurrence of 'd w amounts to some eighteen times. Although the meaning of 'd w in most of these cases is "enmity" or "hostility", it bears mainly on a very general situation as the context is related in the majority of cases to biblical materials about former prophets. A few instances will suffice.

Speaking of the Fall, God addresses mankind, (20, 121 f):

... enemies one to the other; and if there come to you from Me guidance
Then whoso followeth My guidance ... shall not become miserable.

The religious context here is very strong, since if one does not accept the religious guidance, one is living in a state of enmity towards other people. The only clue to an ethical significance of the passage is the relating of enmity to misery.

Para. 103. 43, 67.

Close friends will on that day be hostile, one to the other; except those who show piety.

Here the Jahilite amity between friends is contrasted to the new notion of piety. According to this passage, enmity is spoken of as an established notion in the new message of the Qur'ān, when ideological bases are endangered; though, as will be shown in Chapter XIV, love and brotherhood are given some precedence over rival notions.

Para. 104. 17, 55.

Say to my (sic) servants (that) they shall speak that which is best; verily Satan stirs up strife amongst them; Satan has become to man an enemy manifest.

Verbal - and harsh - argumentation is denounced here, and described as a reason for strife yanzaghu and enmity. Though the passage refers to any argumentation, one could safely gather from it that argumentations concerning the old tradition and the new message are what is meant. Also as the whole Meccan stage is devoted to persuasion only, the passage under discussion confirms such an attitude.⁸⁶

Para. 105.

Other than the root 'd w, one may refer to the root krh, which seems to occur now in three places.

43, 78.

We brought you the Truth but most of you are to the Truth averse.

Cf. also 23, 72.

As "truth" here hints at the entire message, with whatever religious and ethical meanings might be implied in that, then to be averse to such a truth one cannot grasp an ethical sense in a specific way. In the last passage in which *krh* ~~the~~ *were* mentioned a more ethical understanding is available as follows: 17, 40.

The evil of all that has become . . . distasteful.

In the verses (23-39) just preceding this passage, among other things, a brief list of *Jahilite* ethical traits is mentioned.

Para. 106.

THE THIRD PERIOD

As this period marks an interval in which the Moslem camp was weak and in a very dangerous position, notions of hatred and hostility do not come in the foreground; they are described indirectly by speaking of olden times and biblical prophets. The root 'd w recurs some twenty times, but very few of these cases may add anything to the discussion. Some reference will be made to a few passages in relation with other roots.

41, 34.

Good and evil are not on the same footing; repel (the evil) with what is better, and lo, he between whom and thee there is enmity will be as if he were a warm friend.

The attractive force of love is here preached as more successful than the counterpart notion of hatred. Such a peaceful outlook is typically Meccan (cf. para. 104 of the second period). This leniency, very characteristic of the Prophet's dealings, cannot be missed throughout the *Qur'ān*, except where the essentials of religion are concerned.

Para. 107. 7, 53.

Call upon your Lord in humility . . . He loveth not the ill-disposed (or "those who provoke hostility").

The spirit of peacefulness (humility) is again, as in the previous paragraph, contrasted with a spirit of hostility. Though the quality of humility is directed towards God, its ethical significance is obvious (cf. Chapters II and X), since

its contrast "ill-disposition" or "provocation of hostility" are purely of this world and related entirely to Jahilite ways of fighting and frictions which were continuously carried on.

Para. 108.

In (7, 126) a biblical prophet addresses his people, saying:

It may be that your Lord will destroy your enemy ... that He may see how ye will act.

Apart from what consolation such a passage may involve, it denounces, again, enmity and hostility, and indicates that the repulsion of enmity is but a reward of this world bestowed only upon the virtuous (i. e. the believers). In the concluding part of the verse one may read that enmity is a just punishment to a Jahilite way of life; hence it is likely to appear again if one does not act properly; i. e. if one behaves as a Jahilite does.

Para. 109.

In verse (11, 30) Noah speaks to his people about his message saying:

... shall we cause you to adhere to it, though ye be to it averse?

In a similar scene to this, the believers and their opponents in Mecca are referred to in the following verse:

40, 14.

So call upon God, directing to Him the religion, even though the unbelievers dislike (it).

In both these passages the root *k r h* is used. It is translated in the first instance as "averse" and in the second instance as "dislike". Thus the hatred, or rather the hostility, of the two camps is expressed in the most general way, without bearing on any special aspect of life but on the religious outlook generally.

The same line of argument is found in many other passages of this period, e.g. 40, 10.

... God's hatred *m a q t* is greater than your hatred to yourselves ...

Here by God's hatred His punishment is meant, as the preceding and the following verses (cf. 40, 9 ff) clearly show. Apart from the religious significance, one finds that the traditional feuds and hostilities are contrasted here with God's punishment which is meant to replace these old hostilities by a new ideological bond of love and unity, as will be shown in Chapter XIV.

Para. 110.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

At this stage physical fighting and a continuous war of wits are waged incessantly, and so one expects a greater intensification of notions of hatred and hostility. But, on the other hand, the real building of a society on a big scale, is a typically Medinan phenomenon; that is, the ideological bonds of brotherhood come into wide-scale effect in Medina. But though the general scene is more intensified in Medina than in Mecca, the understanding that hatred and enmity - in Qur'anic terms - are Jahilite traits is the same whether it is Mecca or Medina.

The root 'd w now recurs fifty-five times, i.e. some fifteen times more than in the whole Meccan stage. Other roots which have been used in Mecca are used as well. Though Jahilite institutions and ideas are still described as hated things, the hypocrites and/or Jews are treated for the first time as objects of hatred - in Mecca we knew the polytheists (or simply, the sinners) as the category of men against whom the Qur'anic hatred is directed. Thus the following passage accuses the Jews, saying:

2, 38.

... Humiliation and poverty were stamped upon them ... because they had been disbelieving in the signs of God, and slaying the prophets unjustly; that was for the opposition and enmity they had been showing.

This passage can be read alternatively as follows: the Jewish enmity and opposition, resulting in disbelief and killing, lead to humiliation and poverty. This passage and others of similar content or meaning (e.g. 3, 108), though closely related to biblical materials, seem hardly to be foreign to the actual events, as the following Medinan verse shows:

8, 30.

(Recall) when those who have disbelieved were plotting against thee, to bring thee to a stand, or kill thee, or expel thee; they were plotting ...

Thus the moral of enmity, apart from its religious significance, is closely related to what might be called the disunity of the Jahilites, related in the case of the Jews to their political disobedience to the Prophet in Medina.

Para. 111. 2, 173 f.

... retaliation in the matter of the slain is prescribed for you ... if anyone is forgiven anything by his brother, let him follow (it) with what is reputable, and pay with kindness. ... if anyone provokes hostility after that - for 'urūq is a painful punishment.

As this passage is related to judging between the followers of the Qur'ān themselves, and not between them and the opponents, its bearing on the present subject may not be very great. But the relation of this piece of Qur'ānic criminology to the following view on the conduct of war (between hostile camps) is undeniable. 2, 186.

Fight ... those who fight you, but do not provoke hostility.

189.

Fight them until there is no persecution ... then if they refrain, let there be no enmity, except against the wrong-doers.

190.

... if any make an attack upon you, make a like attack upon them ...

There is much resemblance between this passage and the previous one in which we referred to retaliation. In both cases a punishment should be inflicted, but this punishment should not be too severe. In both, the principle in mind is to correct a wrong, and not to inflict evil. In the first passage forgiveness is preached; that is, lightening the punishment is a virtue. In the second case, a hostile camp is to be fought only when it provokes hostility; otherwise it must be neither attacked nor hated.

Such peaceful and just - or even mild - dealings are found in early Medinan passages; though even in the later and so-called aggressive passages the principle of just dealing is essentially preserved.

Para. 112. 58, 10.

... do not converse of guilt and enmity and opposition ... but converse of virtuous conduct and piety ...

Here the notion of enmity per se is considered, as in para. 104. The virtuous are not to carry on Jahilite habits of reviving old feuds and the like, a subject on which a large part of Jahilite poetry is written.

Para. 113. 60, 1 f.

... do not take My enemy and your enemy as friends ... Ye secretly show them love ... If they come upon you they will be enemies to you and will stretch both hands and tongues against you for evil ... ⁸⁷

The passage seems to defend the carrying of information which might be used against the safety of the community. While mere conversing on the subject of enmity is contrasted with "virtuous conduct", as in para. 112, the Qur'ān now states that the Jahilites show enmity physically and verbally, - this is apparently what underlies the expression "stretching of hand and tongues". Lastly, despite the aggressive tone of the passage, it seems to preach equality in matters of enmity when a hostile camp is concerned; cf. para. 111.

Para. 114. 60, 7.

... is possible ... that there shall be love between you and those of them with whom ye have been at enmity ...

The reconciling tone of this passage towards the enemies of yesterday shows the difference, perhaps, between the Qur'ānic and Jahilite enmity: the first confined to an ideology⁸⁸, while the second is personal (or tribal).⁸⁹

Of the other roots bearing on the present theme, one may cite the following examples:

Para. 115. 5, 3.

... let not the hatred *shān'ān* of a people ... incite you to provoke hostility *ta'tadū*; assist each other to virtuous conduct and piety, and do not assist each other to guilt and enmity *'udwān* ...⁹⁰

This passage clearly indicates the difference between hatred as an individual-psychological attitude and (provocation of) hostility as a political-social one. In various parts of this chapter the Qur'ān has shown how, in the Jahilite mind, the two attitudes are associated together, while the Qur'ān seems to differentiate between them. The result of this differentiation is to condemn hatred as such. Hatred in verbal expression is condemned also; cf. paras. 104 and 112. As to the actual fighting resulting from hatred, the Qur'ān seems to justify it only in self-defence; cf. para. 111. In addition the Qur'ān justifies such hostilities when ideological aspects are involved; cf. paras 103 and 113.

Para. 116.

In a number of verses, in the last surah of the Qur'ān, the Jews are mentioned in connection with the notions of hatred and hostility. In all these passages there is nothing which is not in line with what has been attributed to the Jahilites in earlier passages. A few examples may suffice:

5, 16. Here the Jews are declared to have "hard hearts", an expression which might mean that they excel in hatred. In the same verse they are spoken of as being continuously treacherous.

5, 67.

Though the Jews are not mentioned here, they are most likely implied, as follows:

Many of them does one see vying in guilt and enmity, and in their consuming of what is prohibited (probably usury) ...

That the Jews are meant here appears clearly from the following verse (5, 69) in which the Jews seem to take pride in their wealth - a very Jahilite trait.

The Jews say' "Surely the hand of God is fettered!" ... Nay, both His hands are wide open, He giveth liberally ...

In (5, 82) the Jews are cursed because of their rebellion and hostilities *yā'ta-dūn*; further they are accused of "not restraining each other from disreputable conduct which they practised".

These examples show, among other things, the relationship between a certain number of qualities which are judged by the Qur'ān to be vices. This relationship between enmity and other Jahilite vices has been shown before against Jahilites in Mecca. Now, in Medina, other categories of people, e.g. hypocrites, Joubters, Jews or the People of the Book in general, are judged by the same standard.

CONCLUSION

Although strict classification is not to be sought in the Qur'ān, in the case of hatred and hostility the two notions seem to be understood in the following way in the Qur'ān:

- (a) as individual and social;
- (b) as personal (-tribal) and ideological;
- (c) as denoting hidden attitudes and as an expression both in word and deed;
- (d) as between two camps or doctrines and as between the followers of the same doctrine.

The few examples from the Qur'ān discussed in this chapter do not show all these different classifications equally well, but this might still apply even if all the relevant Qur'ānic passages were discussed. Nevertheless, the classifications just mentioned are sufficient to form some view of the Qur'ānic meaning.

The Qur'ān rarely refers to individuals who are hated - the odd case of Abu Lahab (surah CXI) and his wife is an exception. Of course such expressions as

sinners or criminals and the like refer to an entire society, or a class of a society. In the biblical materials in the Qur'ān there are certain individuals, e.g. the Pharaoh (of Moses), who are described as sinners; but nevertheless such individuals are considered as representative of a certain class at the time the Qur'ān was revealed.

This leads to the second aspect. The Qur'ānic notion of hatred is based on a doctrine, i.e. on an ideological basis; hence, any personal or tribal hatred is discarded by the Qur'ān as a Jahilite attitude; cf. paras. 103 and 105.

The two latter aspects may be treated together. Any sort of hatred - intended or expressed, verbal or physical - is considered as a vice when exercised by the followers of the Qur'ān. This is further explained by the fact that followers of other doctrines, especially the Jahilites, live in a state of hostility with each other. But when coming to the question of how a follower of the Qur'ān should treat another of a different doctrine, we cannot grasp a definite trend, according to different periods or contexts. On the whole, hatred as a feeling or an intention may be considered as a vice in an absolute sense throughout the Qur'ān. Also, hatred expressed verbally between a Moslem and a non-Moslem seems to be discarded as a vice. But in both these aspects, a critic may say that the Qur'ān only intends to win the opponent. As to hatred expressed physically on a large scale against opponents of other doctrines, one finds several aspects involved. In the Meccan state, persuasion and not fighting is always preached. Even if a Moslem is fought, the Qur'ānic attitude is to wait for the last judgement, and usually God's punishment is meant. In Medina, one finds besides the Meccan persuasive tone the advice to fight back when provoked. The sheer aggressive declaration of hostility is hardly regarded as a virtue except in the beginning of the very late Medinan surah (IX), where the Jahilites are mentioned to be fought until they believe in God.

Various other aspects of the problem of this chapter will be treated in the following chapter, on transgression, as well as in Chapters XIV and XV.

Chapter VII

TRANSGRESSION

Apart from the first chapter, all other chapters studied above have been concerned with specific notions: pride, indecency and so on. Transgression, however, is general in two ways. Firstly, the roots which indicate it, such as *zlm*, may imply anything related to sin in its religious sense, or to crime in its moral sense, and lastly, to anything disreputable in the eyes of the society or illegal. Secondly, the generality of transgression becomes apparent when one realises that there are at least some twenty roots, occurring altogether one thousand and one hundred times,⁹¹ all of which express transgression in one way or another.

This chapter is a continuation of the previous chapter for more than one reason. The root *zlm* on which the present chapter is based seems to mean originally the same thing as 'dw.⁹² This latter root has been studied in the previous chapter mainly when related to the notions of hatred and hostility, but its primitive sense (transgression) was not absent in some of the cases at least. The notion of transgression covers, according to the Qur'ān, both hatred and enmity, though it covers explicitly or implicitly several other specific Jahilite traits, if not all of them.

The root *zlm* occurs about two hundred and eighty-nine⁹³ times, and it is more frequent than any other of the roots indicating the same meaning. For this reason the present discussion is devoted to it alone.

Para. 117.

THE FIRST PERIOD

Rarely, in this first period, may the significance of words and expressions be clarified. In the case of the root *zlm* all its uses in this early stage seem of a more religious than ethical character, thus:

53, 53

... the people of Noah ... did wrong and transgressed.

51, 59

For those who have done wrong is a portion((Hell?)) like the portion of their fellows ...

52, 47

For those who have done wrong is a punishment ...

In all these instances the root *zlm* (translated: to do wrong) is too much involved in a religious context to be of any ethical significance. In the only remaining instance of *zlm* in this period, in the parable of the blighted garden (68, 17-33), a wrong-doer *zālim* is a person who is not charitable to the poor (v. 24), and he is presumptuous (v. 31).

Para. 118.

THE SECOND PERIOD

From now on *zulm* (wrong-doing) is identified either with specific *ahlīlīt* traits or with transgression in general, especially in the sense of injustice. Thus (37, 113) reads:

... some who do well, and some who wrong themselves manifestly. ⁹⁴

Para. 119. 26, 228.

And vindicate ((sc. the righteous)) themselves after they have been wronged; those who have done wrong will one day know what ... they will experience.

The limited significance of the passage cannot be missed, i.e. what one does (good or bad) is related to one's own person. But in such an early instance the good and the bad are not yet easily identifiable. Cf. also 20, 110 f.

In this same passage the two characteristics of transgression (or wrong-doing) seem to be established, namely the injustice of both bearing and inflicting transgression. This corresponds to the Qur'ānic conception of the bilaterality of justice (as will be shown in Chapter XV) which can be seen in the following Medinan passage:

2, 228

... they have the same right as is exercised over them ...

Para. 120. 17, 35.

Do not kill the person *an-nafs* a whom God hath made inviolable except with justification; if anyone is killed wrongfully, We give to his next-of-kin *walīy* authority, but let him not be extravagant in killing ...

This passage confirms in a more concrete way what has been said in the previous paragraph. Besides, it brings the domains of ethics and law together in the matter of the legislation mentioned in it. The passage preaches just punishment in the sense of inflicting an equal injustice (punishment) on the person who did the wrong. Here the individualism and the spirit of a settled society are as great as in para. 118. Although the passage does not mention explicitly that

the killer will be executed, that may be understood from the following passage, early third period, (16, 127):

If ye take vengeance, take it only in the measure that vengeance was taken from you ...

See also 2, 173 ff., early Medinan.

Or this Medinan passage (4, 122):

... Whoever does evil will be requited for it ...

Para. 121.

The punishment inflicted on a transgressor is not always equal to the wrong he has done, often it is less; since repentance on the part of the transgressor and pardon on the part of the wronged are usually preached, e.g. (27, 11):

Except any who may have done wrong, and then after evil have substituted good ...

Cf. also 19, 60 f.

Para. 122.

Lastly, *zulm* (transgression) is conjoined to several Jahilite traits, e.g. in (27, 14) it is conjoined with pride; in (19, 60 f.) with following desires.

Para. 123.

THE THIRD PERIOD

Now we have a few more shades of meaning in regard to the notion of transgression (or wrong-doing). As the root *zlm* is mentioned some hundred and thirty times in this period, it is doubtful whether the following few instances represent the main aspects of interest.

In (11, 33) the Prophet seems to answer his opponents about their class-consciousness regarding the weakness (or poverty) of his followers, thus:

... but I do not say to those whom your eyes contemn that God will not give them good ... in that case I should be among the wrong-doers.

Cf. also 6, 52.

Although it is the story of Noah which is discussed here (cf. 11, 27-50), the Meccan atmosphere is very obvious. Thus, according to (v. 29), the nobility argue with the Prophet refusing him because, among other things, his followers are among "the basest" and hence they have no "superiority". In the following verses many Jahilite well-known traits will be shown. Thus the Prophet dissociates himself from his opponents because he thinks them wrong-doers *zāli-mīn*; and the transgression of the opponents has a number of ethical as well as religious traits.

Para. 124. 11, 119

Thy Lord was not one to destroy the towns wrongfully *bizul min*, their people being upright *livers*.

Cf. also 28, 59 and 6, 131.

Here, besides the religious context, an ethical sense seems to underlie the passage, namely that if one is not living a good or upright *muslih* life then destruction awaits one. This sense is more clearly expressed in the following passage:

12, 23

... the wrong-doers will not prosper.

Para. 125.

Transgression is related to oppression (42, 40) and persecution (10, 85). These latter two aspects are understandable now that the Prophet is bearing his worst moments of oppression in the latest years in Mecca. But both oppression and persecution are, on the other hand, derivative notions from the Jahilite traits of hatred and hostility studied in the previous chapter; hence their relationship to transgression.

Para. 126.

Lastly, one may refer to the notion of wronging one's own self in the special following context.

35, 29

... some of them wrong themselves, some of them act in moderation, and some of them take precedence in good works...

Once again the responsibility of the individual seems to confirm itself; cf. para. 113.

Para. 127.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

The notion of transgression now takes a new momentum as new legislations grow rapidly, in addition to all other political, military, and social events, which all need fresh formulation of what is meant by wrong-doing and injustice. 42, 38 ff.

The recompense of an evil deed is an evil like it, so if anyone pardons and makes peace, it rests with God to reward him; verily He loveth not those who do wrong.

But surely if any vindicate themselves after wrong done them, then against such there is no way (to punish).

There is a way only against such as do wrong to the people, and act oppressively in the land without justification; for such is a punishment painful. 95

In three verses of this passage "wrong" always translates the root *z̄lm*. In the first verse the individual - in the singular - is exemplified; but in the next two verses the group is meant. Besides, it is doubtful whether the individuals and groups spoken of in the whole passage are meant to be those who are of the same society (or community) or those of contrasted societies. The boundaries, in this passage, between what pertains to this world and what pertains to the next world are not clear-cut. Lastly, there is some doubt as to the chronology of at least part of the passage. 95 If the whole passage could be taken together it says that wrong or transgression is intolerable and must be punished. The doubt arises, however, as regards the agent who inflicts the punishment on the transgressor. According to (v. 38) the wronged is restricted from being such an agent by preaching pardon and peace to him; otherwise the individual is entitled to vindicate himself if he so wishes. In the case of a group, especially when it deals with another group of a different ideology, to vindicate oneself seems to be considered more as a virtue than it is in the case of an individual; i.e. the individual is somewhat discouraged from vindicating himself (v. 38) while the group is encouraged to do so. But the encouragement in the latter case is qualified, in the sense that an extreme punishment is undesirable; and (v. 40) seems to consider such a punishment as "unjustifiable". The whole passage seems to treat the individual and collective crimes and the feuds resulting from them. The Qur'ān in this passage seems to take the authority, in dealing with the crimes, from the hands of the individuals and puts it into the hands of a government (or God and His Last Judgement).

Para. 126. 2, 189.

Fight them until there is no persecution . . . then if they refrain, let there be no enmity, except against the wrong-doers *a z - z̄alimīn*.

Until now - and throughout the whole Meccan stage - the infliction of punishment has been in the hands of God, and in most cases punishment has been explicitly stated to be carried out on the Last Day. But now the idea is introduced of avengement by the whole society against the wrong-doers or rather the persecutors, who are apparently the pagan Meccans. Not only fighting but also enmity *'udwān* are permissible if they are used against the wrong-doers.

Para. 129.

In the matter of the new regulations made by the Qur'ān concerning divorce, the husband is asked to "retain his wife reputably" or "send her away with kindness", otherwise he is "transgressing against the limits" (2, 229). Again (2, 231) compulsion used by husbands against their wives (in the matter of divorce) is an aspect of transgression, as follows:

... retain them reputably ... do not retain them by compulsion that ye may transgress *lita't adū*, if one does that, he has injured *zalama* himself ...

Para. 130.

Non-contribution to the poor, and some aspects of profiteering such as usury, are understandably among the wrongs; e.g. (2, 255) and (2, 270); the consumption of the orphans' heritage is another wrong (4, 11); see also (4, 34 and 4, 158 f.).

Para. 131.

The utterance of evil speech is declared as undesirable except if one has been wronged (4, 147). Earlier in the second period evil speech has been declared as a cause of strife (17, 55). This is more elaborated in a late Medinan passage (49, 11) as follows:

... let not one group make mock of another, who are possibly better than they ... do not scoff at each other, or revile each other with nicknames; reprobate conduct is a bad name ... those who do not repent - they are the wrong-doers.

Para. 132.

Other transgressions, committed in the community of the believers, as is often the case in Medina, are declared as wrong-doings, e.g. (9, 23) which declares a friendship with fathers and brothers who are pagans as wrong-doing; (5, 43) demands repentance after committing wrong-doing; (5, 106) considers the falsification of a testimony as wrong-doing.

CONCLUSION

The antagonism of the Qur'ān to opposite ethical views is expressed either by referring these views to specific ethical qualities (as has been done in Chapters II-VI above), or referring them to notions of a general nature (as has been done in Chapter I above, and is also attempted in the present chapter).

The notion of *zulm* in the Qur'ān indicates injustice when it is related to judicial situations, but it means what is bad and wrong in a general sense whether (judicial) judgements are concerned, or simply any other act. Also, the root *zlm*, as is the case with the root *jh1*, refers inevitably to what is religiously wrong or bad. But as the root *zlm* appears some three hundred times, it shows, more than *jh1*, the strictly ethical contexts underlying its various uses.

One may find, roughly speaking, the following stratification of men resulting from the ethico-religious notion of transgression in the Qur'ān:

- (a) In Mecca the believers en bloc stand against the transgressing polytheists, or *Jahilites*.

In Medina, we still meet the division of men into believers and *Jahilites*, but the terms are more qualified now as follows.

- (b) (Reprobate) Moslems as against (true and virtuous) Moslems, and
- (c) Moslems as against all other communities, in which the *Jahilite* polytheists are conjoined with Jews (and perhaps Christians, too).

This stratification is further justified by what has been said in the previous chapter on hostility and hatred.⁹⁷

Chapter VIII

VICES OF INTELLECT

"Ignorance" is, according to what has been said in Chapter I above, one of the meanings underlying "jhl"-passages. But as the Qur'ān in its argumentation against the Jahilites does not refer to the mere fact of not knowing certain things on the part of the opponents, in referring to "ignorance" the Qur'ān is obviously indicating certain vices of intellect in the Jahilite ethical code or outlook.

The vices studied in Chapters II-VII above are related to various domains of individual and social Jahilite ethics, and all constitute in the eyes of the Qur'ān an ideological attack against the opponents. In the present chapter, however, the Qur'ānic handling of the pure intellectual weakness of the Jahilites will be more properly studied.

This chapter is divided into the following three sections:

- (a) Certain aspects of "znn"-passages.
- (b) Doubt and hypocrisy.
- (c) Temptation.

These three sections, however, do not show more than part of the Jahilite vices of intellect;⁹⁸ nevertheless, they show quite clearly the main outlines. The Qur'ān in treating these vices is looking, continuously, towards gaining more followers, and disarming the opponents.

(a) CERTAIN ASPECTS OF "ZNN" PASSAGES

The root *znn* occurs sixty-nine times. The words derived from this root mean in certain cases "lack of knowledge or ignorance, uncertainty or dubious knowledge"; in other cases the same words mean "knowledge and certainty".⁹⁹ This leads to the impression that in a third category of cases the words derived from this root are simply equivocal. But as there are unequivocal words standing for knowledge (*'ilm*) and certainty (*yaqīn*)¹⁰⁰ one may concentrate, with sufficient justification, on the first class of meanings, namely where "dubious knowledge and ignorance" translate the root *znn*.¹⁰¹ In some three-quarters of the cases in which this root occurs the meaning underlying it is understood in a bad sense.

As to the translation of the root *znn* in Bell's rendering "to think" is used in more than half the cases, and "to opine" in more than a quarter of the

cases, and differently in the remaining few cases.¹⁰² It seems that the Qur'ānic word *ra'y* has been mostly in Bell's mind when he came to think of *zann*. The following discussion will show to what extent this latter argument is true, and whether *zann* means, "evil opinion, or ignorance" or not, in this or that particular passage.

Para. 133.

In the first period, the root *znn* occurs some eight times.

84, 14.

And he thought *zanna* that he would not be set back.
(i.e. that his property would continue ... Bell).

75, 28.

And he thinks that the parting (death?) has come.

These instances, although they do not convey, perhaps, more than the primitive - and neutral - sense of the root *znn*, show in the first passage the linking of pride in wealth with the (false or evil?) idea that this wealth would continue. In the second instance, although the verse given above does not imply that *zanna* (thinks) is used in a bad sense, the preceding and succeeding verses speak about the sinners on the Last Day, and such a context might hint at some derogatory shade of meaning attached to *zanna*.

Para. 134.

THE SECOND PERIOD

The root *znn* occurs now in some fifteen cases. In about thirteen of them the root is applied to or associated with wrong-doers.

53, 23¹⁰³

... they only follow opinion *zann* and their own liking ...
29¹⁰⁴

... they simply follow opinion and verily against the truth opinion
avaleth nothing.

In the first verse the association with the root *hwy*¹⁰⁵ makes the opinion *zann* evil and bad. Besides, from both verses one may understand how the stereotyped form "following opinion", which will be mentioned several times in the Qur'ān, is meant to show that an "evil opinion" is identified with lack of truth.

Para. 135. 38, 23.

... David thought *zanna* that We had somehow tried him, so he asked pardon ...

Here, *zanna*, though applied to a believer, implies nevertheless some supposed wrong for which pardon is asked. Again, "the thought" or "the opinion" are associated with something evil, however trivial.

Para. 136. 38, 26.

We did not create the heaven and the earth ... to no purpose; that is the opinion of those who have disbelieved ...

Apart from the religious argument underlying this passage, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that the Qur'ān attacks the Jahilites for their thought that "heaven and earth" are purposeless. This is, of course, another aspect of the Jahilite dubious knowledge and uncertainty according to the Qur'ān.

Para. 137. 21, 87.

... when he went at cross purposes and thought that We would not have power over him; then he called ... verily I have been one of the wrong-doers.

Here Jonah is spoken of. Again, as in para. 135, a believer is the subject of the sentence, in which the (evil or bad) thought *zann* is described, almost as in the previous paragraph, as purposeless. The impression that one gets from the passage is that Jonah, at least at a certain time, is behaving as a Jahilite; hence his being "at cross purposes" and his description of himself as a wrong-doer; his *zann*, then, cannot but be evil and uncertain.

Para. 138.

In a dialogue between Moses and Pharaoh, a passage reads:
17, 103

... O Moses, I think thee enchanted,
104

... O Pharaoh, I think thee outcast.

Here the primitive neutral sense of *znn* is apparently meant, though the concomitant words "enchanted" and "outcast" partly turn the sense of *znn* towards a context of controversy and uncertainty.

Para. 139.

THE THIRD PERIOD

The root *znn* occurs now about twenty-seven times. Many of them are, as is very usual in this period, repetitive. The following few examples may suffice:

41, 21

... ye thought that God did not know much of what ye were working.

22

That thought of yours ... has destroyed you ...

Although *zann* might have been used in its original sense, the turn of phrase in which it is used makes the Jahiliye thought opposite to the full knowledge of God, in the first verse; and a cause for destruction in the second.

Para. 140. 11, 29.

The nobility ... said: "We do not see thee to be anything but a human being like ourselves, strange in opinion *ra'y* and we do not see that any follow thee but the basest of us; we do not see that ye have any superiority over us; nay, we think *nazunnu* ye are lying.

7, 64

... We think *nara* thou art in stupidity and we think *nazunnu* thee one of the false.

The idea of opining on the part of the Jahilites in these verses is mocked at by the Qur'an by relating it to various Jahilite traits, mainly pride and stubbornness. The two other traits of stupidity and belying are directed against the Jahilites and related to their (false) opining and conjecturing.

Para. 141.

Lastly, in the following example the opining *zanna* is related to a feeling of uncertainty:

10, 23

... the waves come at them from every side, and they think they are engulfed ...

In a passage of the second period *zanna* is used in a similar figure of speech as follows:

18, 51

The sinners saw the Fire and thought they were about to fall into it ...

In both verses given above there is a possibility that *zanna* is used in its primitive sense, but in both cases nothing is expressed except a vague feeling. Sinners are meant in the first of the two verses, and mentioned explicitly in the second.

Para. 142.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

Now *znn* occurs some twenty times, though little can be added to what has already been mentioned. The following verse adds a new shade of meaning, however.

49, 12

... avoid much suspicion *zann*, suspicion is sometimes a sin; do not pry into each other's affairs, or go behind each other's backs ...

Also, as new categories of men are encountered in Medina, mainly Moslem doubters and hypocrites, it is natural to apply to them the vice of opining with all the Meccan shades of meaning attached to it; cf. (2, 73), (3, 148), (33, 10), (24, 12), (48, 6 and 12).

In the next two sections other vices of intellect will show more clearly, perhaps, what the Qur'ān means by false opining, or having uncertain knowledge, or being ignorant.

(b) DOUBT AND HYPOCRISY

The Qur'ān, like any new message, stirred various degrees of doubt, ranging from mere hesitancy and honest doubt to hostile suspicion and hypocrisy. Most of these attitudes are related by the Qur'ān, as has been the case in the previous section, to ignorance at best, or to evil dispositions at worst. As to the honest doubt on the part of those newly brought to the outlook of the new message, the Qur'ān allows a certain extent of freedom to doubt, with a reservation that certainty has to be reached and the mind will have to overcome its scruples.

This section is based on a selection of "ryb - shkk - mry - n fq" - passages, in addition to such expressions as, "those in whose hearts is disease". This latter expression and the relevant passages of the root *n fq* seem to be Medinan.

The three roots *shkk*, *ryb* and *mry* all mean, "to doubt", with some additional shades of meaning in the case of each root.¹⁰⁶ Thus *ryb* seems to be

doubt plus some emotional disturbance or agitation.¹⁰⁷ Also, *mry* adds the shade of "contention and disputation".¹⁰⁸ Other shades of meaning will be mentioned throughout the discussion. The root *nfq* bears mainly on the notion of hypocrisy. It is possible that some of the "hypocrites" are no more than those "doubters" indicated by the other roots just mentioned.¹⁰⁹ The line between a *Jahilite* doubter (or a Jewish hypocrite) and a Moslem who may have some scruples is not sharp and can never be sharp if one thinks of the possibility of claiming something and behaving in an opposite direction.

Para. 143.

THE FIRST PERIOD

53, 11 f.

The heart did not falsify what it¹¹⁰ saw. Do ye debate *tumārūn* with it as to what it sees?

Here the reference is to one¹¹¹ of the Prophet's visions, which is not accepted by his opponents. Another verse reads:

53, 56

So upon which of the benefits of thy Lord dost thou cast doubt *tatamārā*?

The preceding verses speak about the olden transgressing peoples and how they met with just punishment. Both passages just given do not show that the notion of doubt is really described or even hinted at. As no other example on root *mry* or the other roots *shkk* and *ryb* can be found in this first period, one may safely conclude that the first Meccan period does not seem to be concerned with the notion of doubt at all. This leads to the confirmation of the general impression that the first four years or so are characterised by their peacefulness; though it is more correct to say that they represent the quiet which precedes the tempest.

Para. 144.

THE SECOND PERIOD

Now all the three relevant roots expressing the idea of doubt do occur, but only a few times each, e.g.

44, 8

Nay, they are in doubt *shakk*, playing about.

The preceding and succeeding verses show that the "doubt" mentioned here is related entirely to a religious context, namely the refusal to believe in the religious call of the Qur'ān. In other passages doubt (or contention) is more related to ethical than religious notions, as follows:

50, 24

Hinderer of the good, hostile, contentious *murīb*.¹¹²

18, 22

So do not dispute *tumāri* in regard to them except on a plain issue
mirā'an zāhiran ...

52, 30¹¹³

Or do they say: "A Poet, upon whom we may await the uncertainty *rayb* of Fate".

In the first of these three verses doubt (contention) is clearly condemned by the Qur'ān by relating it to other Jahilite traits. In the second verse, the Prophet seems to be addressed concerning the legend of the Seven Sleepers; thus if any significance could be deduced from this "*rayb*" -passage, one would think that disputation is not only denied to Jahilites, but also to followers of the Qur'ān as well. The third verse uses *rayb* partly in a metaphorical sense; though, on the other hand, *rayb* in this passage is used in a bad sense,

Para. 145.

THE THIRD PERIOD

As the Meccans grow more intransigent in their attitude to the new message, the Qur'ānic arguments regarding the notion of doubt are more explicitly expressed than before, thus:

11, 65

... dost thou forbid us to serve what our fathers used to serve? Truly, we are as regards what thou callest us to in doubt *shakk* disquieting *murīb*. Also, 11, 111.

Thus doubting the new message and its basis is related here to the Jahilite notion of fatherhood. The Qur'ān by this association undermines the Jahilite "doubt"; hence, "God sends astray any one who is extravagant, suspicious *murīb*" (40, 36).

Para. 146.

In a passage speaking about olden peoples (42, 13), one reads that, "their di-

vision into parties" was "out of mutual jealousy". The passage concludes with "they are in doubt disquieting". This reflection, which is made concerning other peoples, may describe the *Jahilite* Arabian scene with all its divisions and hostilities. Relating this to a state of "disquieting doubt" adds another bad sense to the "doubt" of the Meccans, and makes it a cause-and-effect in the turmoil of the *Jahilite* traits.

One may conclude the Meccan stage with the observation that almost nothing is observable in Mecca as regards the doubts or scruples among the followers of the Qur'ān themselves. The notion of doubt is essentially treated as a *Jahilite* trait, and occurs among *Jahilites*.

Para. 147.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

Now the notion of doubt is in most cases mixed in the same passages with the notion of hypocrisy. In this and the next paragraphs, examples on the root *n f q* and such an expression as "the diseased hearts" will be discussed in a chronological order, as usual in this work; but almost all the interesting cases in which the other roots bearing on the notion of doubt, and treated in the Meccan stage above, will be met with in the same passages.

22, 52¹¹⁴

That He may make what Satan has thrown in a test of those in whose hearts is disease and those whose hearts are hard - verily the wrong-doers are in schism far-reaching.

This passage deals with the question of abrogation. But apart from this, something about hypocrisy is said. According to N-S¹¹⁵, the expression, "those in whose hearts is disease" is equal in the Qur'ānic style to *munāfiqūn*. Besides, both expressions (the first occurs twelve times, and the second thirty-six times - other derivatives of the Form III *nāfaqa* are included), are Medinan. The other concomitant phrase "those whose hearts are hard" occurs seven times in the Qur'ān; five of them are Medinan, and the rest belong to the third period. This latter expression may be a link between the doubt in the Meccan stage and hypocrisy in the Medinan stage. Also, being "in schism" added now to the notion of hypocrisy, has been met in Mecca (para. 146) in the form of "division into parties" as attributed to those who are "in doubt disquieting".

All these associations show the link between notions belonging to the same category of ideas, namely doubt and hypocrisy.

Para. 148.

The whole passage 2 - 18 is concerned with the diseased in heart, who are, at least in this case and according to the commentators, ^{115a} the Jews. These diseased in heart are treated as: deceivers (v. 8); liars ¹¹⁶ or accusers of falsehood (v. 9); corruptors (v. 10); stupid *sufahā'* (v. 12); makers of fun ¹¹⁷ (v. 13); proud transgressors (v. 14); and followers of error (v. 15'). It is very obvious that most of these traits are pure Jahilite ones, which have already been studied, or hinted at, in the previous chapters. Besides, the root *khd'* (to deceive), used in this passage, occurs only in Medina; it is applied to the Jews again in (8, 64).

Para. 149. 8, 51.

... the Hypocrites and those in whose hearts is disease were saying: "Their religion has deluded these people ...

The conjunction of "hypocrites" and "those in whose hearts is disease" can hardly indicate two different categories; cf. paras. 147-8. The reproduction of the hypocrite's saying about "delusion" is a proper Qur'anic way of expression aiming at reversing the saying back on the hypocrites; cf. the application of *khd'* to the hypocrites in para. 148.

Para. 150. 47, 22.

... thou seest those in whose hearts is disease looking at thee with the look of one already faint in death, more fitting for them obedience and reputable speech!

This is occasioned by the reluctance of the so-called hypocrites to fight. The notion of the "diseased heart" seems now to be applied to a part of the new followers of the new message, or those who may be called the Moslem-doubters. The branding of these hypocrites or doubters with cowardice (i.e. the faint looking) and disobedience is a challenge to the opponents of the new message and a show of force. Again in (47, 31 f.) the diseased-in-heart are further described as men of "ill-will" who have "evasive speech". In (3, 161) they say, "with their mouths what was not in their hearts".

Para. 151.

In (57, 13) the hypocrites are addressed, as follows:

... ye tempted yourselves and put off and doubted, and dogmas deluded you ...

Cf. also 4, 156; 24, 49; 9, 45;

Delusion is now clearly claimed against the hypocrites; cf. para. 149. Also doubt, studied earlier in this section, and temptation, which will be studied in the next section, are attributed to these hypocrites, who seem to gather around their name more and more of the Jahilite traits; that is why one finds from now on the conjunction of hypocrites and unbelievers, e.g. (4, 136 ff; 33, 1; 66, 9; 9, 98). Also, as a considerable part of surah XXXIII is occasioned by the Day of the Trench, the hypocrites are the main object of attack, the argument against them, however, does not add much to what is already known *about them*.

Para. 152.

Surah LXIII is interesting; it is called after the hypocrites (*al-munāfiqūn*) and its first eight verses concern them directly, thus: the hypocrites are liars, whose "hearts are sealed" (i.e. because of their unbelief); reprobates and ignorant.

Para. 153.

Various categories of men are related and united to each other very closely in the following passage:

9, 45

... those who do not believe ... whose hearts have become doubtful ...

Coming now to the end of the Medinan period, one cannot miss noticing how the vices of intellect are growing. In the following, and last, section in this chapter, the notion of temptation - though very complicated in its various applications - will show the same Qur'anic rigour against the Jahilites, namely that of uncertainty and hesitancy and evil or ignorant opinion, though this time it will be put in new phases.

(c) TEMPTATION

The notion of temptation, as will be shown presently, has complicated religious relationships. Thus the Qur'an refers to God as tempting the believers and the unbelievers - for different reasons - and tempting Satan as well. Man in his turn tempts God, too. Temptation is identified with punishment - if one is an unbeliever, and with grace and mercy - if one is a believer. Also, the same words which mean temptation are used in some contexts to mean dissension and persecution or repression.

If the religious associations of temptation are put aside, the ethics of Qur'anic temptation seem to be as follows. As the previous two sections have shown, temptation is linked with the uncertainty of mind, and thus it may be taken as an-

other vice in the list of vices of intellect. That is why temptation is a grace when it leads to a deeper faith in the virtues of the Qur'ānic call, or when it leads a Jahilite to renounce his Jahilism and enter with certainty into the circle of the followers of the Qur'ān. Temptation, on the other hand, is a bad symptom and a punishment when it leads a Moslem to doubt or waver, or when it allows a Jahilite to remain in a state of dissension, or in extreme cases when it means persecution of the believers in the Qur'ānic message.

Two roots seem to be the best means in the present investigation, namely *bly*¹¹⁸ and *ftn*, occurring thirty-eight and sixty times respectively.¹¹⁹ According to *Mufradāt*, *Lisān* and Lane these two roots mean originally, to tempt, to test. These original meanings, which are clearly observable in the Qur'ān, will be examined now as they develop. Para. 154.

THE FIRST PERIOD

86, 9

On the day when the secrets will be tried *tublā*. Trial, according to *Zamakhsharī*,¹²⁰ may be taken in the original sense of "realizing and testing".

The additional Qur'ānic shades of meaning appear, however, as early as the following passage.

89, 14 ff.

As for man, when his Lord tries *ibtalā* him, and gives him honour ... He says: "My Lord hath honoured me;" But when He tries him, and stints for him his provision, He says: "My Lord hath scorned me."

The passage seems to convey that men's wealth or poverty are occasioned by God's trial or temptation. What lies behind this argument, on the religious side, is to relate God to the daily life of man, a relationship meant to ask men to believe in God. But, on the other side, by relating trial to man's love of honouring and largeness of provision - which are Jahilite traits¹²¹ - the Qur'ān is implying, perhaps, an attack on the attitude of trial. It is obvious that this attack is meant in one case only, i.e. the case of resisting Jahilism; but it is not meant, of course, to convey that God is unwise in trying man, or that man is unwise in accepting the challenge of the trial and fulfilling its far-reaching implications, by being kind to the orphan and feeding the poor

(89, 18-9), and, in a word, achieving that which is deemed virtuous in the eyes of the Qur'ān. It may be added that, as this is a very early passage, one cannot understand fully what is meant here by trial until further help can be gained from later developments.

Para. 155.

The other root *f t n* exists, in the first period, in at least two interesting passages, as follows:

68, 4-6

For thou art engaged in a mighty task. So thou wilt see, and they will see, Which of you is the afflicted *al-maftūn*.

51, 13 f.

On a day when on the Fire they shall be tried *yuf tān*: "Taste your trial *fitnah* . . .

In the two passages the notion of trial is understood in a bad sense, that of affliction; the affliction is expressed metaphorically in the second passage. By relating these passages to (89, 14 ff.) mentioned in the previous paragraph, one may say more clearly now that trial (or temptation) is to be experienced by both the good and the bad, but the affliction harms the bad only, by testing the Fire as punishment.

Para. 156.

THE SECOND PERIOD

The power of temptation is displayed now on a larger scale. Although God uses temptation wisely, man seems to be disapproved of, always, when he tempts. It is characteristic of the Qur'ānic style and way of thought to make the same notions applied to man applicable also to God, though only in a sublimated and exalted way.

As to the new shades of meaning, one may mention the following. In (20, 87) temptation is conjoined with leading others astray. In this passage it is God who is tempting, but it is man who is leading others astray. Temptation as leading to rebellion is emphasized in another passage as follows:

37, 162

Nor one to rebellion against Him will ye tempt.

Although in both passages temptation and what it leads to are understood in a purely religious sense, namely that of unbelief, one observes that temptation of men by men is understood as a sin. In other words, it is only God who can

tempt men and bring about whatever changes He will; man is simply forbidden to do so unless he behaves as a prophet; cf. the following passage: 25, 22.

... We made you a test fitnah one to the other whether ye would endure ...

The virtue of endurance is, perhaps, to resist the temptation of living and believing as a Jahilite does.

Para. 157.

THE THIRD PERIOD

In the previous two periods, the notion of temptation has been identified with that of punishment in the other world. Now with the hardships of the Moslems and their sufferings in the third period, temptation - or at least the words bearing on temptation - is identified with the "distress" (39, 50) and "persecution" (10, 83 and 85) inflicted on Moslems by their Jahilite opponents. It is wrong, perhaps, to speak of identification when the new shades of meaning are so different. Nevertheless, the development of temptation seems to transform it from one variety to another, without losing the previous sense.

It is possible also that the temptation - as distress or persecution - inflicted on the believers is not a punishment - as in the case of the wrong-doers - but only a means to increase their rewards or test their truthfulness; cf. (29, 2) para. 158.

Para. 158.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

29 1 f. ¹²²

... Do the people an-nas think that they will be left (in the position) that they say: "We have believed", without their being tried?

We tried those who were before them, and God will surely know those who have spoken truthfully, and He will surely know those who speak falsely.

Thus temptation is a sort of hardship meant to test the truth of faith. In such a case, similar to that given in para. 157, temptation is not to be understood in a bad sense, cf. e.g. (20, 87) para. 156. This application of temptation to believers is in direct contrast to its application to the hypocrites, as follows:

5, 5... those in whose hearts is an inclination to fall away, they follow the ambiguous part of it (sc. the Qur'an), out of desire of dissension fitnah ...

Again in (57, 13) the munāfiqūn are named, and addressed as follows:

... ye tempted yourselves ... and doubted, and dogmas deluded you ...
Cf. also 33, 14; 5, 45; 5, 54 (?).

The expression "those in whose hearts is an inclination to fall away" (3, 5) seems to be equal to similar expressions already mentioned, e.g. paras. 147 f., which all seem to indicate hypocrisy.

Para. 159.

In para. 157 *fitnah* (in the sense of persecution) is suffered by a party of believers at the hand of an unbeliever. Now, in (2, 187), the same word is used in almost the same sense, but the context is different. It reads:

Slay ... and expel them from whence they have expelled you: persecution al *fitnah* is worse than slaughter ... such is the recompense of the unbelievers.

Cf. also 2, 189 and 214; 8, 40; 4, 93 and 102; 24, 63.

It seems as if *fitnah* (temptation, persecution) here retains an early sense (cf. 51, 13 f. para. 155), namely that of punishment; but in this case punishment is inflicted by those who have been wronged. Several *Jahilite* traits are conjoined with *fitnah* in its bad sense: e.g. *fitnah* and intolerance (2, 214); *fitnah* and corruption (8, 74); *fitnah* and enmity (4, 102).

Para. 160.

Lastly, one may refer to a new shade of temptation, applied again to believers.
8, 28

And know that your wealth and children are a temptation and that with God is a great reward.

Here the believers (cf. 8, 27) are addressed. The association of temptation with wealth and children, on the other hand, reminds one of a *Jahilite* background. It is possible to presume that the verse is, simply, a comment on what might have remained among some Moslems, for various reasons, of love of wealth and children in a *Jahilite* way; hence, the temptation of wealth and children is only a revival of *Jahilism*.

In (60, 5) the believers pray to be saved from temptation (by disbelievers). In (5, 54) the Prophet is addressed as follows:

... judge between them ... do not follow their lusts, and beware of their tempting ya *fitnu* thee away from any part of what God hath sent down to thee ...

Do they then desire the (mode of) judgement of the Time of Ignorance
jahiliyah?

In all these cases temptation is an inclination to commit any minor or major fault considered by the Qur'ān as a vice.

CONCLUSION

The selected number of notions, studied in this chapter and considered as vices of intellect, follow from the Qur'ānic argument that its opponents are ignorant, hence they are suspicious, doubtful, (and in extreme cases, hypocrites), and subject to the evils of temptation. These different vices are not only applied to the Jahilites and the opponents in general, but are applied, though mildly, to the (virtuous) believers as well. In this latter application the vices do not lose their blameworthy sense, they are simply treated as vices which might, or do, affect even the believers. By this wide application, and keeping always the bad sense, the Qur'ān shows a certain high level of generalization, as has been observed in the previous chapters, especially in Chapter VII on transgression.

The Qur'ānic silence in Mecca about the notion of hypocrisy, and its milder tone in expressing the notion of doubt in Mecca than in Medina, may be explained as follows:

In Mecca the Qur'ān seems to have preferred a peaceful course, even in argumentation. But as this course appears to have failed in about a dozen years, the Median period shows its aggressive tone. Another explanation, which may serve as a complementary one rather than an alternative, is that the new message was rather stronger in Medina than in Mecca.

This chapter has discussed the Qur'ānic purpose in weakening to the utmost the intellectual position of the opponents, principally the Jahilites. This purpose is also shown in the struggle against the same intellectual vices among the faithful. The vices of intellect are simply part of a whole system, named vaguely in the present work as Jahilism.

PART II

Chapter IX

PIETY 123

Examples of the use of the root *wqw*¹²⁴ will now serve to explain the Qur'anic notion of piety. Two main difficulties hinder the discussion. Firstly: "piety" ((*taqwā*)) is not a real ethical notion, it is essentially a religious attitude, though it may have its influence on, and relationships with, ethical notions. Secondly, and this is in part a corollary of the previous objection, *taqwā* in the primitive sense of the word is not a direct opposite of *jahālah* or *jāhiliyah* studied in Chapter I.

As to the first of these difficulties or objections, one may partly answer that "*wqw*"-passages have, perhaps, as many ethical implications and associations as most of the other passages already discussed in this study. The English word "piety" is merely an abstraction which can hardly be equivalent to any Qur'anic word without some reservation. In answer to the second objection, one may mention other roots such as: 'mn, slm, slh and others of a general nature. Although the root *wqw* is by no means the only one which can be discussed in this connection, it is no less representative of what the Qur'ān means by a counterpart of *Jahilism*.¹²⁵

The root *wqw* has several primitive senses, none of which indicates piety. This latter notion was probably introduced into Arabic with the introduction of the Qur'anic message, and, as elsewhere in the Qur'ān, an appropriate root has been adopted without cancelling the previous senses. According to the lexicographers (e.g. ar-Rāghib, Lane and Dieterici¹²⁶) the primary meanings of the root *wqw* are: to fear; to preserve; to be cautious of; to guard against and to warn.¹²⁷ That is why ar-Rāghib understands the (Qur'anic) *taqwā* as, *ja'l an-nafs fi wiqāyatīn mimmā yuakhaf* (i.e. preserving, or guarding oneself against what one is afraid of). Thus *taqwā* in the religious context may be taken as meaning essentially "fear of God"¹²⁸; in an ethical context it is essentially what "motivates all good works"¹²⁹.

In all primitive and Qur'anic senses the root *wqw* occurs in two hundred and fifty-nine cases.¹³⁰

Para. 161.

The root *wqw* occurs in the first period at least a dozen times. Bell, in most

cases, uses "piety" or "pious" to translate it, but these translations are not necessarily the best in all the passages. Thus:

92, 5 f.

So as for him who gives and shows piety *ittaqā*; and counts true the best (reward).

92, 14 ff.

So I warn you of a fire ... Avoid it shall the most pious *al-atqā*,
Who gives of his wealth to purify himself *yatazakkā*.¹³¹

In these early instances the Qur'ānic piety is strongly related, on the one hand, to purely religious ideas, and on the other hand, to the virtue of charity,¹³¹ or simply the duty of helping the poor.

Para. 162.

In another passage (91, 7-10) a contrast of a very general implication is made, in which *taqwā* (piety?) seems to be identified with the idea of good, and its opposite with that of evil. The passage reads:

By a soul and what formed it *wa nafsin wa mā sawwāhā*.
And implanted in it its wickedness and its piety *fa alhamahā*
fujūrahā wa taqwahā. Prospered has he who purifies it, Fails
has he who corrupts it.

The generality of the contrast between *taqwā* and *fujūr* may be reflected on that of self-purification *zakkahā*; hence this latter notion is no more restricted to charity in the narrow sense of the word, as has been the case in the previous paragraph, but a general implication of learning how to be good may be the underlying sense. Besides, *taqwā* in the passage above is either equal to the sum total of virtues, or it is what "motivates all good works" according to Gibb's remark mentioned above.

Other instances of this early stage mention the root *wqw* in the primitive sense, or in a purely religious sense, and neither can be of any relevance in the present context. For example:

73, 17

How then will ye protect *tatqaqūn* yourselves, if ye disbelieve, from
a day ...

Or, 96, 11 f.¹³²

Hast thou considered if he be following the guidance,
Or urging to piety?

Para. 163.

THE SECOND PERIOD

Now, in surah XXVI which contains some seven stories of previous messengers sent to peoples who are essentially wrong-doers (cf. vv. 9, 51, 111, 128 etc.) or, more simply, Jahilites. These people are called to piety (the phrase "alā tattaqūn?" is usually used); cf. vv. 10, 106, 124 etc. In this whole surah several Jahilite traits are mentioned, and the call to piety seems to be the cure given for these traits.

Para. 164. 15, 45 ff.

... those who show piety ... We have removed any malice that may have been in their hearts, As brothers ...

"Malice" ghill here seems to stand for what is bad generally, since ghill literally means "chain". This generality gains more by the addition of the notion of brotherhood.

Para. 165. 19, 14.

... he was pious and dutiful bārr towards his parents, and was not a tyrant, rebellious.

Thus piety is conjoined with the notion of filial bonds on the one hand, and on the other hand it is contrasted with tyranny and rebellion. Both associations, needless to say, show piety in very concrete ethical contexts. Besides, the root brr (from which bārr is derived) expresses piety in some of its Medinan uses (cf. 2, 41, 172; 3, 86; 5, 3), in which piety is understood as "virtuous conduct";¹³³ or the fulfilment of "good works".¹³⁴ If these latter developments of the root brr are not yet understood in a middle Meccan passage, the contrast of piety, in the verse above, with tyranny and rebellion, may suffice to show the identification of piety with such implications of the root brr as the verses just mentioned indicate. In (19, 97) being pious is contrasted with the state of being contentious ludd.

Para. 166. 38, 27.

Or shall We make those who have believed and wrought the works of righteousness aṣ-ṣāliḥāt like those who cause corruption in the land; or shall We make those who show piety like the vicious?

Several roots, indeed, are conjoined with the root wqw in explaining what the Qur'ān means by piety as the basic virtue; and the root slh comes, per-

haps, first among these roots. Thus, *as - sālihāt*¹³⁵ (virtuous conduct or good deeds) may explain the ethical character of *taqwā* as the *summum bonum* of Qur'ānic virtues.

Para. 167.

Lastly in the second period, the following passage is of special significance. The passage (25, 64-73) lists a number of religious and ethical virtues - among the latter come the following: humility; charity; unjustified or unjust killing; chastity; and working good (or righteous) deeds. The bearers of these virtues are called (v. 74) *al-muttaqīn*.

Para. 168.

THE THIRD PERIOD

In the second period the main features of Qur'ānic piety seem to have been established. What remains to be seen, then, in this period and the next is simply a confirmation - with further details in the Medinan period - that *taqwā* is a basic virtue. Thus in (16, 126 ff.) the pious are: well-doers, tolerant in argument, enduring, they do not grieve or feel distress because of others' plots. In (20, 90) the pious person, is again, the one who endures and does good.

In (39, 34) *ṣidq* (verity) is a corollary of piety; cf. (7, 33).

Para. 169.

In (7, 200) the pious are those who "see clearly". This quality of the pious may be contrasted with the stupidity (cf. e.g. para. 23) and the uncertainty (cf. Chapter VIII) of the Jahilites.

Para. 170. 28, 83.

... the future abode; We appoint it for those who do not desire exaltation 'ulūww in the earth, nor yet corruption, and the final issue is to those who show piety.

As in para. 167 the pious are not proud or corrupt. The concluding phrase of the passage (*al-āqibatu li 'l-muttaqīn*) refers to the "future abode", of the pious, though it may indicate, partly, success and happiness awaiting the virtues of the pious in this world, also.

Para. 171. 31, 32.

... show piety ... and be in fear of a day on which a father will not make satisfaction for his child, nor a child be making satisfaction for his father at all.

With this passage linking piety to individual responsibility, which is contrasted with the Jahilite notions of fatherhood and sonship (cf. Chapter III), one may conclude the Meccan stage.
Para. 172.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

Here the root *wqw* occurs in about a hundred and twenty cases. Other roots also imply the notion of piety in a number of cases. It suffices here to mention these other roots of interest in the present connection, they are essentially the following: *slh.*, *sdq.*, *hsn.*, *khyr.*, and *brr.* From this last root, the infinitive *birr* needs a special mention (cf. para. 165). Gibb¹³⁶ in his observations on the Qur'ānic piety remarks that "the test of true belief lay in character and works. If the repeated insistence of the Qur'ān upon good works were not enough, it would be conclusively proved by the comprehensive definition of *birr* in the noble verse"; then he mentions (2, 172) and remarks that "*birr* is thus the crown of true belief". The conjunction of *birr* and *taqwā* as "motivating all good works"¹³⁷ is observed also by Gibb.

In what follows only a small selection of passages will be mentioned, and the only root involved will be *wqw*.
Para. 173.

In contrast to Jahilite traits of ignorance (cf. Chapter I) and uncertainties (cf. Chapter VIII) the pious are said to have guidance (2, 1), knowledge (8, 25) and "assurance *lakfnah*" (48, 26). Hence, the quality of certainty is an aspect of piety (cf. Chapter XVI).
Para. 174.

Several Medinan ethical regulations and legal demands are introduced in connection with piety; for example: the "retributive justice"¹³⁸ in the case of retaliation (2, 175, 190); the making of testamentary declarations (2, 176); reconciliation (or, according to the Qur'ānic expression, "setting things right") (2, 224); acting fairly towards a wife (2, 231, 233, 238, 242; surah LXV; 33, 37); avoidance of usury (2, 278; 3, 125); generosity (2, 238; 64, 16); recording of debts (2, 282 f.); showing thankfulness (3, 119); caring for orphans (4, 10); straightforwardness in speech (33, 70; 58, 10; 9, 120); brotherhood (49, 10, 13); avoidance of suspicion and prying (49, 12); fulfilment of a pact (9, 4, 7, 36, 110); the contrast of piety with hatred and provocation of hostility (5, 11); justice, as an aspect of piety (5, 11); and lastly avoiding the suppression of evidence

(5, 107).

CONCLUSION

Piety, as in the case of other notions in the Qur'ān, is a religious concept, meaning essentially, reverence, obedience and fear of God. But the discussion in this chapter has shown the ethical implications of a certain number of passages, expressing the central concept of a basic *summum bonum*. This concept, in default of a better corresponding English word, is called "piety".

Qur'ānic piety seems to have two ethical forms: one is general, in which piety motivates all the virtues (or good works), and is, in a sense, the sum total of all virtues. The other form is given when any specific ethical virtue is introduced and explained as an aspect of piety. This is, indeed, a Qur'ānic characteristic which is observable in all other cases in this work, i.e. the Qur'ānic use of the term in a general or a particular sense. In the present case of piety, the second sense is specially apparent in Medina.

The notion of piety in this chapter has proved to be not only a useful contrast to the notion of Jahilism and all the traits underlying it, but also it has proved a basic virtue to a number of positive Qur'ānic notions which will be studied in the next seven chapters. These latter notions are, almost, the direct counterpart to what has been studied in Chapters II-VIII above.

Chapter X

HUMILITY

In Chapter II pride has been considered as a Jahilite trait, i.e. a negative ethical notion. It must be remembered that pride is not absolutely a negative notion, since it may be applied to God in a good sense, and consequently it may also be applied in a good sense to the virtuous. By contrast, the notion of humility is accepted by the Qur'ān as a virtue.¹³⁹ But here again, although there is a good sense which views humility as a virtue, there is also a bad sense in which humility means weakness and humiliation. Both senses seem to have a derogatory meaning in the Jahilite mind, while the Qur'ān seems to make the distinction just mentioned.¹⁴⁰

The Qur'ān, in introducing the notion of humility in its good sense, could only fall back on roots which had already expressed only the bad sense of humility. That is why we have to keep in mind in the following discussion two correlations, namely pride-humility and humility-humiliation.

In this connection it seems hard not to relate the Jahilite sense of humility to their tribal warfares and feuds, while the Qur'ānic virtue of humility seems rather to be related to settled towns that have a greater interest in qualities of humility and obedience to a law which is applicable to a wider circle than the members of any one tribe. But this explanation, or any other, can only be valid after the elucidation of the relevant Qur'ānic text.

About a dozen roots express the notion of humility in the Qur'ān. Some of them are used exclusively in a bad sense, e.g. khzy and khd'. Others are used in both a good and a bad sense, e.g. khsh', hbt, khfd, dr', hwn (of, hyn and whn) dhll and skn (in its VIII and X Forms). Other roots seem of doubtful implication, e.g. dh'n and 'nw (or 'ny) each of which occurs only once.

Para. 175.

THE FIRST PERIOD

At this stage some four roots are used, but none of them seems to convey more than a neutral sense as follows. In (90, 12-16) the virtuous man is supposed, among other things, to help "a destitute (person) miskīn down-trodden"

(the kind of help is "feeding on a day of famine"). The word *miskīn* will recur several times, mainly in Medina, always meaning a destitute person to whom a part of the alms should go. Thus the use of *miskīn* appears to be neutral as there seems to be no judgement of value and the reference is entirely factual. In (68, 43) a Judgement scene is reproduced, and the sinners are described as:

Down-cast *khāshi'ah* their looks, humiliation *dhillah* covers them...
Cf. further 79, 9; 88, 2; 70, 44.

The fourth root is used in the following passage:

89, 17 He says: "My Lord hath scorned me *ahānani*".

18 Nay, but ye do not honour the orphan.

19 Nor urge to feed the destitute.

Thus, as in most other cases in this study, the ethical notion is not yet recognisable.

Para. 176.

THE SECOND PERIOD

In several passages the notion of humility is now expressed in its bad sense:, cf. e.g. (54, 7); (20, 134); (27, 34 ff.). But the perception of humility as an ethical virtue appears in this period, as follows:

20, 107

... voices will be lowered *khāsha'at* to the Merciful ...

110

Faces will be humbled '*anāt* to the Living ...

The word '*anāt* occurs only once in the Qur'ān; but despite this oddity its meaning is almost determined by the word *khāsha'at* in (v. 107). Besides, the two words mentioned in this passage, which are synonymous to the four roots mentioned in the first period, have been transformed at a stroke by applying them to God. From now on, this transformation paves the way for a revaluation of terms which previously meant humility in a bad sense but which now indicate a virtue. Thus an extension from the godhead to human relationships now seems natural. The following passages, which may imply a neutral sense, make some contribution to the new notion of humility by pointing to the submissiveness of nature to man, a submissiveness resembling that of man to God.

In (37, 72) the beasts are said to have been made "submissive" to man; in (67, 15) the earth has been made "low" to man. In both cases a derivative from *dhill* is

used, a root which will be used later to indicate the virtue of humility among men.

Para. 177.

A short list of virtues - both religious and ethical - in the beginning of surah XXIII is mentioned, in which (v. 2) humility in prayer is recommended. The same surah (vv. 66-78) declares that an ancient people has been punished for, among other things, acting proudly (v. 69) and "did not humble themselves istakānū to their Lord, nor were they of lowly mind yata darra'ūn" (v. 78). Although in all these cases humility is thought of in conjunction with a religious concept, the emergence of humility as a virtue per se is clear. In the story of John the Baptist (21, 90) humility to God is identified with "vying in good (deeds)".

Para. 178. 25, 64.

The servants of the Merciful are those who walk humbly hawnan upon the earth, and, when the ignorant address them, say: "Peace salāmā". The humble walking mentioned in the passage refers to the physical gestures associated with humility; (cf. 17, 109, "Fall down on their chins weeping, and it increaseth them in humility"). Besides, humility is associated with peacefulness and is contrasted with the behaviour of the Jahilites.

Para. 179.

Lastly, humility in a special case is preached, namely the humility which one has to show towards one's parents.

17, 25

Bear thyself humbly towards them out of compassion wa 'kh fid la humā janāh 'l-dhull mina 'l-raḥmah, and say: "My Lord, have mercy upon them as they brought me up when young."

Although this passage may show the notion of humility as a virtue restricted to the parents, it has the significance of explaining humility as applied in a concrete way in human life. Besides, filial bonds and duties, as will be seen in the next chapter, are among the essential virtues in the Qur'ān, hence the association of humility and compassion towards the parents.

Thus, various aspects of humility, as a virtue, appear in the second period, for the first time. As to the original pre-Qur'ānic sense of the roots in question, it recurs throughout the Qur'ān; cf. e.g. (27, 37): (Solomon and his counterpart the Queen of Sheba)

... assuredly we shall come to them with hosts with which they have no power to deal, and we shall expel them from it abased a dhillah and subdued sāghirūn.

Para. 180.

THE THIRD PERIOD

Now, some of the previous senses are repeated, e.g. phrases like "the punishment of humiliation" and the "punishment of degradation a l-huⁿ (41, 15 f.) are reminiscent of the original sense; cf. further (16, 61), (42, 44), (10, 27 f.), (7, 151). Also, as in para. 176, words usually expressing the meanings of humility or humiliation are applied to the earth (cf. 41, 39), and to bees (cf. 16, 71). In these latter cases some animism may be underlying the sense.

Para. 181.

But other passages give some new shades of humility as a virtue as follows:
7, 53

Call upon your Lord in humility t a d a r r u ' a n and secrecy; verily He loveth not the ill-disposed a l-mu^t a d f n.

As the "ill-disposition" (or "the provocation of hostility") is, as has been argued in Chapter VI, one of the basic Jahilite traits, then it is normal to contrast it with the virtue of humility. The contrast is not, however, direct but only general.

In (7, 92) an explanation of how the virtue of humility is forced upon men is given, thus:

We never sent a prophet to any town but there overtook the people of it bad times and dearth, that mayhap they might humble themselves y a d d a r r a ' ū n.

To what extent the explanation of humility in this passage is rationally tenable seems to be open to discussion. The passage conveys, however, the idea of the importance of humility as an ethical merit. Cf. further (6, 42 f.).

Para. 182.

In (46, 19) a Judgement scene is reproduced, and the sinners are addressed, as follows:

... Ye made away with your good things in your worldly life and enjoyed them, so today ye will be recompensed the punishment of humiliation for having set up to be great in the earth without justification, and for your reprobate conduct.

Here, both correlations mentioned in the introductory note to this chapter are involved. On the one hand, pride is attacked, an indication that humility is desirable. On the other hand, "the punishment of humiliation" with all its Jāhilite rigour is directed against those who are "proud without justification" (sc. the non-humble).

Para. 183. 22, 19. ¹⁴¹

Whom God treateth with contempt yu h in, there is none to honour
mukrim ...

The spaced words in this passage seem to have been used in their original sense, except - and here lies the transformation and the shift of meaning - that it is God, and not the tradition or the tribe, who honours or dishonours.

Coming now to the end of the Meccan stage, one might comment that the weakness of Moslems in Mecca is one main reason for idealizing the virtue of humility - cf. the phrase "bad times and dearth" given as a justification for humility in para. 181. This explanation could only be true if humility as a virtue had not appeared from the second period. Besides, in Medina there will be continuous room for the preaching of humility, even though the Moslems are strong.

Para. 184.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

A few examples may suffice.
57, 15

Is it not high time for those who have believed to humble t a k h s h a ' their hearts to the reminder of God, and to the truth ... ?

Here, humility is partly identified with belief in the religious cause. But as humility is preached not to the Jāhilites but to those who are already believers, one might say that there is here an emphasis on humility as a virtue, an emphasis which brings into relief the significance of being more and more humble. The same root khsh' occurs in another passage in which humility is associated with other virtues, all of which are spoken of as related to Moslems, just as in (57, 15).

33, 35.

The self-surrendering a l - m u s l i m ī n ... the believing ... the obedient ... the truthful¹⁴² ... the enduring¹⁴³ ... the submissive a l - k h ā s h i ' f n ... the almsgiving ... the fasting ... the continent ... ((men and women)) - for them God has prepared forgiveness and a mighty reward.

This is another short list of religious and ethical virtues. "The submissive" (otherwise "the humble") seems to be very near in meaning to two other qualities in the list, namely "the self-surrendering" and "the obedient", though these two latter virtues may be nearer to the religious and political spheres than to the ethical one. This list is not supposed to be complete or necessarily to include all the basic virtues; but as it mentions some of the most basic religious duties or virtues, one may presume that the ethical notions included in it range correspondingly among the very basic ethical values.

Para. 185.

Lastly, one may refer to the very late passage (5, 59) in which the followers of the Qur'ān are described as "humble *adhillah* towards the believers, haughty *a'izzah* towards the unbelievers". Humility and haughtiness are not, here, absolute ethical values, since they change their basic sense according to the religious valuation of a person. Besides, the root *d h l l* is mostly used, in the Qur'ān, in its bad sense (i. e. humiliation); the root *' z z* is used often in a bad sense, where the Jahilite notion of pride is attacked, except of course when it is applied to God. Now both roots are applied to the good believers; it seems as if the old notions have been restored.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter the ethical implications of humility as a virtue have been stressed. By the varieties of expressions bearing on humility the Qur'ān seems to equal humility with the virtue of modesty. But, whatever the far-reaching implications of the Qur'ānic expressions in this connection may be, humility in its first appearance, is related to obedience and reverence to God. As obedience takes a political turn in Medina (cf. 3, 29 and 126; 4, 62; 5, 93 etc.), humility is more and more of a political implication, cf. para. 185. Despite these associations the Qur'ānic use of words, bearing originally on the sense of humiliation, but signifying now humility in a good sense, is a striking blow to the pre-Qur'ānic Bedouin pride even in false or non-existent merits.¹⁴⁴ The description of some physical gestures expressing humility is additional evidence showing the Qur'ānic argument in more concrete ways.

Chapter XI

PARENTAL AND FILIAL BONDS

As the Qur'ān denounces the Jahilite pride in fathers and sons (cf. Chapter III), it is natural now to study the more comprehensive subject of parental and filial bonds as they stand in the Qur'ānic positive list of ethical values.

The Qur'ānic re-arrangement of the family¹⁴⁵ is an attempt to make it a unit; a unit which stands between, and co-operates with, the individualism¹⁴⁶ of its members. on the one hand, and a sort of universal brotherhood¹⁴⁷, on the other. All this brings us to the sociological implications of the Qur'ānic ethics; implications which, however far-reaching, can have no room in the present study. Also, the theme of the chapter is related to what the Qur'ān explains in regard to the bonds towards the near relatives, or the more distant ones¹⁴⁸, which will be mentioned later, in association with obligations due to parents or children.

Para. 186.

THE FIRST PERIOD

In this early stage, the children are spoken of as one of the signs, and as a grace, for which one should, among other things, show thankfulness and behave according to what is good; cf. 74, 13 ff. In 90, 3 parents and offspring are sworn by, as if to indicate their significance among the most important items of creation. In other passages of this early period, the mention of one's creation from male and female may point, at least to a small extent, to the latter respect paid to parents and children of both sexes; cf. 86, 5-7; 53, 46; 75, 37 ff.

Para. 187.

In 80, 34 ff the individualistic view concerning salvation and the judgement of acts is stated. The statement is supported by the addition that a "brother, mother, father, wife and children" are of no avail in saving a man's destiny. The passage is another argument for individualism. But at the same time that it attacks the collectivism inherent in the Jahilite tribal life, the passage seems to imply that the members of one's family are the nearest to a person.

Para. 188.

Lastly, in 81, 8 f. the Jahilite institution of burying a female child is attacked¹⁴⁹ cf. also 6, 152 of the third period.

Para. 189.

THE SECOND PERIOD

Stories of prophets and messengers show them, from now on, as dutiful to their households. Thus Noah prays, saying:

71, 29

O, my Lord, pardon me and my parents, and whoever enters my house believing ...

Muhammed is addressed, as follows:

20, 132

Command thy household ahl to observe the Prayer, and endure patiently in it ...

Cf. 26, 86, on Abraham asking God for forgiveness for his pagan father; and 19, 56, on Ishmael teaching his household ahl the duties of praying and alms-giving. Jesus's "dutifulness" towards his mother is associated with his being not a "tyrant, wretched" (19, 33). Reverence for both parents, according to Torrey¹⁵⁰, "was a cardinal principle of Arabian family life long before Mohammed's time". The Qur'an does not substantiate this in the case of the Jahilite attitude towards his mother. This is shown indirectly by the Qur'anic silence on what a Jahilite would feel or think about his mother. But the Jahilite notion of fatherhood¹⁵¹ has shown that, according to the Qur'an, the excessive reverence of the Jahilite to his father can only exist to the detriment of the duties towards his mother. Besides, the Jahilite preference for his sons¹⁵² is expressed at the cost of his duties towards his daughters.¹⁵³ The generalization of the latter fact leads to the conclusion that the Jahilites, in the eyes of the Qur'an, discriminated against females, and favoured, in general, the males.

Lastly, it may be said that the passage above concerning Jesus' dutifulness towards his mother only shows what is due to both parents, just as in the case of other messengers cited above, since the Qur'an believes in the miraculous birth of Jesus from the Lady Mary. Also, the tender mention of mothers in some later Qur'anic passages, as will be shown later in this chapter, does hint, perhaps, at the less honoured rank of the mother in pre-Qur'anic Arabia.

Para. 190.

A fuller expression than any of the previous ones on filial devotion - reminiscent of the Ten Commandments - is the following one:

17, 24 f.

... with parents (exercise) kindness, whether one or both of them attain old age with thee; say not to them: "Pooh!" and do not scold them but speak to them respectfully;

Bear thyself humbly towards them out of compassion, and say: "My Lord, have mercy upon them as they brought me up when young!"

Here, as elsewhere in the Qur'ān, both parents have essentially the same obligations on their children. Besides, these obligations are explained on the basis of reciprocity,¹⁵⁴ and a child showing respect and compassion towards his - or her - parents is, simply, paying back a debt. But this mutuality is shown only when the filial devotion is discussed and the Qur'ān refers the argument to a more comprehensive, and vaguely natural, sentiment, as follows: 25, 47

... O our Lord, give us comfort from our wives and descendants, and make us to those who show piety an example.

Thus, parental and filial bonds are established for the first time in the second period. These bonds are thought of either as feelings and affections or as duties and obligations. In contradistinction to Jahilite notions of fatherhood and sonship, as has been shown in Chapter III above, the equality of both parents as well as of both male and female children is included in the Qur'ānic ethics within the family life.

Para. 191.

THE THIRD PERIOD

29, 7.

We have enjoined man to deal well with his parents, but if they strive hard with thee that thou mayest associate with Me ... obey them not ...

Thus, according to this passage, filial devotion is not absolute, since it has to be sacrificed when devotion to God is at stake. It must be remembered that this sacrifice does not go beyond disobedience in the matter of returning to paganism; in other respects the children have to bear their pagan parents, "kindly company" (31, 14). This kindness to be shown by believing children towards pagan parents may be contrasted with the behaviour of a supposed idolater who addresses his believing parents, saying:

46, 14

... Fie upon you! Do you promise me that I shall be brought out (of the grave) ...

Para. 192. 31, 13.

We have charged man with regard to his parents - his mother bore him in weakness ... Show gratitude to Me and to thy parents.

Here gratitude to God is equalized with that which should be shown to the parents. Besides, the mention of the physical burden of child-bearing seems to hint at, by way of contrast, the Jahilite aggrandizement of his father.

Apart from these few instances there is hardly anything new in regard to the present theme in the third period.

Para. 193.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

Although this period is known for its fertility as regards many other notions, there is nothing much to be added to the discussion apart from a few passages.

2, 233

... no one is to be charged beyond his means, the mother is not to be oppressed by her child nor he to whom the child is borne by his child ...

This verse concerns regulations on divorce and separation. It seems to me an that a child should not be taken as an excuse to harm the unwanted husband or wife. The same verse speaks in its first part about the duty of mothers to "suckle their children" and of, "the duty of him to whom the child is borne to provide reputably for their food and clothing". Thus the parental obligations are not sacrificed because of a divorce, and the duties of parents towards their young children have to be carried out "reputably *bi'l-ma'rūf*" even in the unfavourable circumstances in which the parents are found.

Para. 193 A. 8, 76.

But those who have believed ... belong indeed to your (community), but those who are related in blood are nearer to each other ...

The passage seems to speak of regulations concerning inheritance; otherwise all believers are one,¹⁵⁵ as the following passage shows:

4, 40

... (show) to parents kindness; also to relatives, orphans, and the poor, to the person under your protection¹⁵⁶ be he relative or not ...

This passage shows that the Qur'ān does not intend to revive Jahilite trends concerning family bonds since kindness is not confined to blood-relationship in the Qur'ān.

Para. 194. 4, 134.

... be furnishers of justice ... even though it be against yourselves, or your parents and relatives ...

Cf. also 2, 118 and 5, 21.

All selfish interests or the interests of parents and relatives have to be submitted, according to this passage, to the requirements of justice; thus the Qur'ān seems to imply the generality of justice, on the one hand, and the narrowness of the family bonds - or those of one's own self - on the other. This, added to (4, 40) para. 193 A, shows us that the concept of community in the Qur'ān is the real unit on which both the individual and the family are dependent.

CONCLUSION

Although there is not much material on the theme of the present chapter in the Qur'ān, the main lines are fairly clear.

First, there is what might be called the equality¹⁵⁷ of affection towards both parents, and towards male and female children.

Secondly, although the Qur'ān attacks certain aspects of the Jahilite family life and tribal relationships, as has been shown in Chapter III, it revives and preaches kindness and affection towards the near and distant members of the family in a way that makes the family a strong unit within the community.

Thirdly, the blood-relationship (which includes the family unit) is dependent, contrary to Jahilite concepts, on the universal bond of brotherhood within the members of the community. Hence, the parental and filial bonds, as well as the bonds which govern all who have blood-relationship to each other, constitute a minor virtue compared with the virtue of brotherhood and love or that of justice, both of which will be studied later in this work. That is why a parental or filial devotion is dependent mainly on whether the parents and children are Moslems. But, it must be added that paganism does not completely forfeit the ethical importance of parental and filial bonds; and with regard to the parents, the Qur'ān mentions clearly that they must be treated kindly even if they are pagans.

Chapter XII

CHASTITY¹⁵⁸

"Chastity", in the teachings of the Qur'ān, "is recommended to followers of Islam as one of the greatest virtues of a Moslem".¹⁵⁹ Besides, the Jahilite laxity, in matters of sex, as has been shown in Chapter IV above, and loose marriages are one of the most striking impressions one gets from reading the pre-Qur'ānic poetry. But this is not the whole story. On the opposite side one finds the acceptance in principle of the polygamous system in the Qur'ān; concubinage is accepted also in the Qur'ān, whereas the pre-Islamic poetry recommends chastity and loyalty in marriage.

With all that modern psychology has revealed on the subject of chastity and its normal and abnormal aspects, and all other problems of the family and matrimonial life, one has difficulty in deciding what one should accept as the most normal in this connection. In what follows, however, some aspects of Qur'ānic chastity in its relation to purity, on the one hand, and its relation to marriage, on the other, will be discussed.

Although about a dozen roots are related to the notion of chastity, the average occurrence of most of them is two or three times - except the root *thr* which occurs thirty-one times, and seems to have meant originally "cleanliness, in a physical sense".¹⁶⁰ In the Qur'ān it means cleanliness in both an original sense and in a figurative sense,¹⁶¹ in which moral cleanliness and chastity are implied. It will be understood in what follows that neither the physical nor the ritual cleanliness is what is relevant to the present theme, it is only the ethical cleanliness or chastity which will be in the forefront of the present discussion, with special attention to the relationship of chastity to marriage.

Para. 195.

THE FIRST PERIOD

Very few verses which have any bearing on chastity seem to occur now. It is mainly because of later developments or "raking over of dry bones"¹⁶² that one might suspect, for example, that the following passage has any relevance.
74, 4

Thy garments purify *tahhir*.

As this passage is very early¹⁶³ and is related to general notions bearing on ethical values (cf. 74, 12-15), then the purification of the garments is closely related to a demand for purity, though chastity is not necessarily meant. It is however characteristic of this stage to speak of most notions in a general way only.

Para. 196.

Late in the first period one finds that one specific aspect of chastity is expressed, in which "guarding the private parts" *lī-furūjihim hāfiẓūn* (70, 29) is recommended. In such an early stage it is not possible to guess what extent of boundaries of legality of sexual contacts exists behind the virtue of "guarding the private parts", though the hint at self-control in regard to sexual desires is not absent.

Para. 197.

THE SECOND PERIOD

Now the recommendation of "guarding the private parts" is given in two different expressions, one similar to that given before in the previous paragraph (23, 5 f.), and the other in the form of *ahsanat farjahā* (21, 91) applied to Lady Mary. In this latter case the virginity of the Lady is referred to as a fact, it is not recommended as an absolute virtue either here or anywhere in the Qur'ān.¹⁶⁴ As to the problem of celibacy, which will come later in a Medinan passage, it is mentioned as a harmless device practised by Christian monks for pious reasons (cf. 57, 27).¹⁶⁵ In the case of the present passages of the second period, chastity is thought of as avoidance of contacts of an illegal nature. None of the relevant passages gives any indication that virginity - or its sister-notion celibacy - is absolutely recommended. The value of the passages can only be understood when they are viewed against a background of legalized forms of sexual contacts.

Para. 198.

The root *thr* occurs now, again, but in a more specific sense than in para. 195; it means now purity from sodomy. Thus the opponents of Lot speak of him ironically, saying:

27, 57

... Expel the family of Lot from your town, they are a folk who make a show of purity *yataṭahharūn*.

There is perhaps more irony when Lot, in another passage,¹⁶⁶ declares:
11, 80

... there are my daughters, they are purer for you ...

As marriage is the usual reason for any sexual contact, there does not seem to be any alarm because of Lot's declaration, there does not seem to be in it more than a condemnation of sodomy.

Para. 199.

THE THIRD PERIOD

The narrative surah XII gives in some parts of it a detailed account of chastity, though both the moral and naturalistic descriptions go hand in hand. Thus despite some response on the part of Joseph to his lover, the wife of his benefactor (v. 24), the response, which is very short and does not seem to be more than mere intention, to an unlawful love-affair is described as "evil and indecency". At a very difficult moment Joseph prays, saying (v. 33):

... My Lord, I prefer the prison to that to which they invite me; if Thou dost not avert their guile from me, I shall play the youth with them, and become one of the ignorant.

Thus, as Joseph reaches his manhood after he has passed his adolescence (v. 22), his heart begins to be smitten by love, with one reservation, namely that he must not approach an unlawful woman. In other terms he has the right to seek only a love which is identified with marriage; the passages quoted in the next paragraph show this identification of love and marriage in a better way.

Para. 200.

The word *istihyā'* (shyness, honest shame)¹⁶⁷ occurs once in the Qur'ān. The pre-Qur'ānic poets always refer to the characteristic of shyness as a main trait in their beloved. Thus shyness in their minds has more of an aesthetic implication than moral. In the following verses the old expression is used in a somewhat similar situation - where a *Jahilite* would like to have a love-affair, no more no less - but the purpose of shyness is transformed so that a happy marriage is the issue. These verses speak of Moses who met two sisters who introduced him to their father.

28, 25

Then one of them came to him ((sc. Moses)) walking with bashful steps
tamshi 'alā *istihyā'* ...

28, 26

Said one of the two: "O father, hire him, surely the best that thou canst hire is the strong and faithful one."

Thus the future wife seems to be the one who behaved bashfully, while the future husband is "the strong and faithful one".

Coming to the end of the Meccan stage, one finds that enough - though little - has been said to show the Qur'ānic insistence on chastity, mainly in two aspects: one the avoiding of unlawful sexual contacts, and the other a basic characteristic of matrimonial life. This latter seems to indicate the intrinsic nature of chastity.

Para. 201.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

In a few passages the words *murahhar* or *rahhaba* are applied to men and women in the stage which precedes the state of marriage, a stage in which chastity and virginity are identified in the case of women, and chastity and abstention from unlawful sexual acts are identified in the case of men. Thus in the next world the "pure spouses" are one of the rewards of good men and women; cf. 2, 23; 3, 13; 4, 60. Also, the Lady Mary is the virgin, for whose purity (or chastity) the birth of a son is one of the rewards (in this world); cf. 3, 37 ff. Cf. also para. 197.

Para. 202.

The root *h̄fz* recurs again bearing on chastity of married couples. Thus the up-right wives are *h̄afizāt li'l ghayb*, i.e. who keep their chastity when the husbands are absent; cf. 4, 38. The passage (33, 35) speaks of several virtues of men and women in general and not specifically husbands and wives, but the following virtues bearing on chastity directly and indirectly are mentioned, namely obedience, truthfulness and continence. In (33, 30-34) the purity (the root *thr* in its Form II is used) of the wives of the Prophet is related to several virtues, namely "obedience and uprightness", "reputable speech" (lest the one in whose heart is disease grow lustful) and "non-swaggering about in the manner of the former paganism *jāhilīyah*."

Para. 203.

The story of Zainab (33, 37), as in the case of Joseph para. 199, shows that natural love growing between a married woman and another man is regarded

in the Qur'ān as a possibility; a possibility which should not, however, transgress the matrimonial bonds. In the case of Zainab, her husband is advised to "keep her and to show piety". In the case of Joseph there was no breach of marriage, and the love was checked by repentance; but now in the case of Zainab, there is a divorce and remarriage to the third person. Thus in both cases there is no allowance for a spontaneous or natural love outside the boundaries of marriage.

Para. 204.

The verse (24, 26) speaks of *at-tayyibūn* and *at-tayyibāt* (good men and good women) and seems to apply them to chaste men and women. It runs as follows:

Bad women to bad men, and bad men to bad women, good women to good men ...

As a preceding passage (v. 23) speaks of "those who cast (imputations) upon thoughtless but believing women under ward ...", it seems that the implication of "good women to good men" hints at marriage and hence not only chastity is recommended, but also a chaste companion is recommended for marriage as well. Besides, "goodness" here indicates the general sense of purity as much as the specific sense of chastity.

Para. 205.

The right to lawful intercourse has some reservations. Thus, during the fasting as covered in (2, 183) and pilgrimage (2, 193), no intercourse is allowed. Also, the question of chastity does not seem to arise before the age of manhood and womanhood is reached. Hence, childhood as the age of sexual innocence ends with "(the age of) marriage" (4, 5); cf. further (24, 31.58) where it is stated that males before the age of adolescence (manhood) are innocent of sexual desire or lust. Besides, a husband has no access to his wife during her menstruation (2, 222).

Para. 206.

After all that has been said about relating chastity to marriage, it is time now to encourage people to marriage, as follows:

24, 32

Settle the unmarried among you in marriage ... if they are poor, God will enrich them ...

Cf. (4, 3) which relates the fear of being unjust to female orphans to the obligation of marrying them. The same passage - and it is the only one in the

Qur'ān - speaks of polygamy. Thus a settling of the unmarried seems to be the real purpose of polygamy.¹⁶⁹

Also, although poverty, according to (24, 32) just quoted, does not seem to be a hindrance to marriage, in the next verse (24, 33) some allowance for the economic factor is made, and the only compensation for marriage seems to be chastity, as follows:

And let those who do not find (means) to marry restrain themselves yasta'fif until God enrich them ...

Women "who are past child-bearing and have no expectation of marriage" are requested to "restrain themselves" (24, 59). Thus it looks as if chastity is a function of marriage and child-bearing.

Para. 207.

The later Islamic institution of veiling is related in an embryonic form to chastity (33, 53). The passage concerns the women-folk of the Prophet only. In another passage, however, a similar context is revealed, and applied to all believing women, as follows:

24, 31

Say to the believing women that they cast down their eyes and guard their private parts and show not their ornaments, except as so far as they (normally) appear, and let them throw their scarves over their bosoms ...

The previous verse to this recommends the males to "cast down their eyes and guard their private parts, that is more innocent for them"; thus, it is not only a matter of external appearance which is required for decent behaviour, but also the intention, as the phrase "that is more innocent for them" indicates; cf. (33, 59). In another passage, again, it is argued that the external expression of chastity is not meant but for sake of the purity of the heart, or, in other words, the intention which lies behind chastity is the important thing and not the mere expression, as follows:

33, 53

... When ye ask them for any article, ask them from behind a curtain hījāb; that is purer for your hearts and theirs ...

CONCLUSION

Two main points, according to which the Qur'ānic notion of chastity is viewed, can be named, as follows:

- (a) in a positive sense, certain intrinsic values of chastity are discussed;
- (b) in a negative sense, chastity is avoiding what is forbidden.

In the positive sense, chastity is related in a general way to purity (or, according to what the Qur'ān would call spiritual cleanliness - hence the relationship of this latter in a mysterious-religious way to ritual or physical cleanliness), goodness, uprightness or piety. With reference to the second sense of avoiding what is forbidden, chastity is expressed in concrete terms and specific contexts. In both senses, however, chastity is closely related to marriage and family life. In regard to this relationship, some of the Qur'ānic recommendations discussed or referred to in this chapter will be given below.

The sexual impulse is accepted to be at work at the age of puberty and adolescence; before this age the person is called a child and innocent of sex; hence he is indifferent to chastity. But with the beginning of manhood and womanhood the struggle for satisfying the sexual impulse (in a few places in the Qur'ān love and courting are described) gives rise to the problem of chastity. This problem is viewed as another aspect of the struggle between the forces of evil and good. In most cases marriage is recommended. Some Qur'ānic conditions for marriage are: "right management"; emergence from puberty, chastity, mutual consent. Adequate means are named as a condition for marriage on the part of the man; though the poor are recommended to be chaste and wait until they find the means to support a family. The wife has to be obedient and devout; the husband has to be tolerant, faithful, and just. Both have to be chaste just as before the stage of marriage. Divorce is not encouraged; reconciliation is recommended unless life is intolerable. Lastly, the procreation of children is related to marriage and thought of as one of the best fruits of matrimonial life, or leading to it - as in the case of slave-girls. Celibacy and virginity are never thought of as absolute values.

Chapter XIII

CHARITY

Charity in the Qur'ān, as elsewhere,¹⁷⁰ has moral and material aspects. This chapter deals with the latter. With regard to the moral aspect of charity, it may be better seen in the light of such notions of love and brotherhood, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

The material aspect of charity has been singled out by some scholars¹⁷¹ as the characteristic Qur'ānic virtue. That charity has a very important place in the Qur'ān is undeniable,¹⁷² but that it is the *summum bonum* of the Qur'ānic ethics, or of all Qur'ānic teachings, one cannot easily say. For the purpose of the present study, one may take charity, in both of its aspects, as another concept closely related to the Qur'ānic piety.¹⁷³

To link Qur'ānic charity with the well known generosity of the (Bedouin) Arabs is not far-fetched.¹⁷⁴ But this linking does not exclude a certain amount of borrowing of ideas or terms, which bring the Qur'ān nearer to other related messages.¹⁷⁵ Also, while the Qur'ān never considers poverty a merit or an ideal (e. g. 16, 77, 113)¹⁷⁶, the attack against love of wealth and seeking profit-making, as shown in Chapter V, is obvious.¹⁷⁷ Thus, the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean¹⁷⁸ can be better sought here than anywhere in the Qur'ānic ethics.

The aspect of charity studied in this chapter provides in principle the best example in which an ethic and a legislation can be read together. But the Qur'ān never goes so far in its legislation as to define the exact amount which has to be paid. One may say that the ethic paves the way for a legislation.¹⁷⁹ It was the work of later generations to formulate elaborate laws based on some Qur'ānic embryonic ideas.¹⁸⁰ In the present connection the ethic of Qur'ānic charity will be studied.

Para. 208.

In the first period, which may be called the non-technical stage, various words and expressions are used bearing on the need for beneficence and charity. But none of the later technical terms then existed, except when bearing on other senses, as is seen for example in the case of *s a d d a q a* in (92, 6). This early surah (92) passes what might be read as a rapid judgement on the good and the bad, *inna s a ' y a k u m l a - s h a t t ā* (v. 4), after which a short list

of duties is given to indicate the right way:

5. So as for him who gives a' rā and shows piety,
6. And counts true sādāqā the (best) reward,
7. We shall assist him to ease. Etc.

Verse 5 shows that charity comes at the very top of what seems to be both ethical and religious duties. This charity is urged upon the richer classes only if the word māl (92, 11) is to be understood in English as meaning "extra money" or "excessive riches".¹⁸¹ Towards the end of this same surah (v. 18) "the most pious a-l-a-tqā" is described, first of all, as he,

Who gives yu'ti of his wealth māl to purify himself yatazakkā.¹⁸² One observes that neither sādāqā nor yatazakkā, have, in these early passages, a relationship to their substantives sādāqah and zakāt respectively, which are used later in the sense of alms. They are, however, used in close conjunction with other words conveying the sense of charitable acts. In other short surahs of this early stage, the religious sense gives but little outlet to the notion of charity. Thus, Quraysh in surah (106) have to worship their Lord because they are provided against famine. One may gather from the previous paragraph that part of worship is to act charitably. In surah (93) the beggar should not be rebuked, i.e. to put it conversely, one has to give charity to a beggar.¹⁸³ Even the manumission of a slave is an act of charity (90, 13). The word māhrūm (that who is in need) seems to be a general word indicating the poor class (51, 19) which needs to be helped by the virtuous. Lastly, another function of charity is given in several passages, e.g. (107, 2) and (93, 9), namely that of protecting orphans from need.

Coming to the end of the first period, one observes that: the Qur'ānic passages in the matter of charity are concerned with the settled society of Mecca and they hardly hint at Bedouin life, which is equally hard for all men. The rebuke of beggars and the disregard of orphans have more to do with life in the city of Mecca. On the other hand, one reads in the passages given above a partial solution of the problems of the emergent Moslem community; hence the urge for freeing the slaves. Lastly, despite the fact that not many details can be found on charity and its function in this early period, the ethic of charity in this period - as well as in the next ones - is given greater expression than most other ethical notions.

Para. 209.

THE SECOND PERIOD

At this stage two roots of later significance appear bearing on the notion of charity: they are *zkw* (or *zky*) and *nfq*. Other expressions are not lacking, e.g. the following denominations 'o which charity should be extended seem to be new additions to the categories already mentioned in the first period. Thus *asir* (prisoner) in (76, 8) and *dhū'l qurbā* (the kinsman and *ibn as-sabīl* (the follower of the way) which are both mentioned in (17, 38), all of these classes need to be supported by those who can afford to do so. One may argue that these three classes are either identifiable with, or are implied in, the three classes mentioned in the first period, namely slaves, orphans, and the *mālikūm* or the *miskīn*. The new names, however, show the growing need of the evolving Moslem society for mutual help among its members.

Para. 210.

The Qur'ānic charity is free from Jahilite motives of desire for recompense and gratitude as the following passage shows:

76, 9

"We call you simply for the favour of God, desiring from you neither recompense nor gratitude.

See also (23, 62).

Also the Prophet does not ask the pagan Meccans for any "revenue" on account of his teachings (23, 74). Further, "the works of righteousness" are preferred to "the adornment of the nearer life" (18, 44).

Para. 211.

The right to be rich is accepted in principle. This appears to be a concession to the pagan financiers of Mecca. For example:

43, 31

... We ... have raised some above others in ranks *darāiat*
17, 22

... We have given them preference one over the other ...

Para. 212.

The moralization of the act of charity reaches a certain level of abstraction when relating it to "the good" or "goodness" in the expression *khayr* (pl. *khayrāt*); for example:

23, 62 Those who give ...
 63 These are hastening to the good things ...
 21, 73 ... We have suggested to them the doing of good things, the setting up of Prayer and the paying of the Zakāt ...

Para. 213.

Lastly, one may refer to a few passages where the two roots *zkw*¹⁸⁴ and *nfq* hint for the first time at their later technical use. The substantive *zakāt*, though used in its primitive sense, i.e. "purity", e.g. (19, 14), conveys in the majority of cases the sense of almsgiving, e.g. (19, 32; 23, 4; 21, 73). The use henceforth of *zakāt*, and in the next period of *sadaqah*, as meaning charity and almsgiving, may be meant for literary embellishment, though more probably for the moralizing allusion lying behind the new words.

As to the root *nfq* it refers, in its first available appearance, to the act of feeding the poor (36, 47). In another significant verse, the same root refers to charity, which is qualified as that "right" contribution which is "neither extravagant nor stingy" (25, 67). See also (17, 28) "Give ... but do not squander at all". These illustrations of the principle of the mean,¹⁸⁵ are not explicitly contradicted even in later stages, in which the need for charity grows rapidly.

Para. 214.

THE THIRD PERIOD

In this and the next periods it suffices for the purpose of our discussion to refer to the two roots dealt with in para. 213, together with the root *sdq*. All the three roots are of great technical interest in the Medinan period; but the same interest cannot be attached to them in their uses now. One may raise the question, to what extent had the Prophet a legislative power in the middle or late Meccan stages? Indeed, even if the religious authority in Mecca could have the same legislative effect, it seems that at no time in Mecca was there any chance to think of, or to impose, a fixed percentage on the wealth of the rich.¹⁸⁶ The "fixing" is not formulated even in the late Medinan stage, though in practice a certain minimum seems to have been accepted, as will be shown later in this chapter.

In the third period charity in the form of *zakāt* is repeatedly coupled with other virtues; e.g. (31, 3). Conversely, the opponent *Jahilites* are those who do not exercise the *zakāt*; e.g. (41, 6). Thus *tazakkī* in (35, 19)

seems to convey more than the original sense of purity or purification.

Para. 215.

The root *ṣdq* in what seems to be its first bearing on charity occurs in (12, 88). Both *taṣaddaq* and *muṭaṣaddiq* occur in the passage and are derived from Form V, which is the same as that of *tazakkī* mentioned in the previous paragraph. The two words seem to be synonymous, despite some differentiation between *zakāt* and *ṣadaqah* among Moslems.¹⁸⁷

The root *ṣdq* does not seem to occur again bearing on charity until the next period.

Para. 216.

The root *nfq* occurs in several cases, some of which will be given below. 42, 36¹⁸⁸

... their affair being matter of counsel amongst them, and from what
We have provided them, contribute *yunfiqūn*.

The political implication of counselling each other appears to be the basis for the obligation of charity. In (35, 26) and (13, 22) the contribution is qualified as "secretly and publicly" and "freely, secretly and openly" respectively.

Among the Jahilites, the open or public form of generosity was the rule rather than the exception. In direct contrast to this stands the New Testament (e.g. Mt., 6, 1-4). The Qur'ān seems to make a compromise between these two attitudes, but later in Medina (2, 273) a step nearer the New Testament will be taken.

Para. 217.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

Zakāt. In the standard Collections of Traditions, such as that of Bukhari or Muslim, one gets the impression that *Zakāt* means the legal alms, which are fixed at 2 1/2 and 10 per cent per annum, while a *ṣadaqah* (or *infaq* and various other expressions) is a voluntary contribution. There is some justification for all this in the Qur'ān, as prayer and *Zakāt* are often conjoined as primary duties.

A few examples will be cited below, representing the whole Medinan period, in which *Zakāt* seems hardly to differ from other forms of the so-called voluntary contributions:

In surah 2 the duty of *Zakāt* only occurs in five places, in all of which it is conjoined with the duty of Prayer (vv. 40. 77. 104. 172. 277). The reference in

the first two cases is to the Jews, in the last three cases to the Moslems. The same conjunction of Prayer and Zakāt occurs as early as the second period (e.g. 19, 32, 56); always as a leading prescription upon a Moslem, or a follower of other messages similar to that of the Qur'ān.

As late as surah 9 Zakāt occurs in four places (vv. 5.11, 18.72), always in conjunction with the duty of Prayer. These passages are as follows:

- (1) ... slay the polytheists wherever ye find them ... if they repent and establish the Prayer and pay the Zakāt, then set them free; God is forgiving, compassionate.
- (2) So if they repent and establish the Prayer and pay the Zakāt, they are your brothers in religion ...
- (3) They ... have established the Prayer and paid the Zakāt ... possibly such will be among those who are rightly guided.
- (4) The believers, male and female, are friends one of the other, they urge to what is reputable *ma'rūf*, and restrain from what is disreputable, and observe Prayer, and pay the Zakāt, and obey God and His messenger ...

It is significant to observe that in two of these examples, namely (2) and (4), the material aspect of charity (the Zakāt) is related to what might be called the moral aspect of charity, namely brotherhood and friendship of the believers. Obeying God and His messenger in (4) is a corollary to this community of interest among the followers of the Qur'ān.

One may ask whether such conjunction of Prayer and Zakāt implies that the latter is as universal in its character as the former is, or, is Zakāt imposed on every Moslem? The answer may not be far from the truth if one says that there are indications in the Qur'ān which suggest that Zakāt is needed from the rich in order to be distributed among the poor. The State seems to step in indirectly to supervise such a distribution, as e.g. 9,60 shows.

Para. 218.

Coming now to other forms of contribution, one may suggest that *sadaqah* or *nafaqah* are simply varieties of a Zakāt; they have, however, a minor position beside the latter. Thus while a Zakāt, as indicated in the previous paragraph, is an article of faith, like Prayer, *sadaqah* is equal to a second-rate position; thus failing to fulfil some minor rituals as those covered, for example,

by 2,192 one is asked to compensate "by way of fasting or almsgiving *sadaqah* or pious observance."

Para. 219.

Towards the end of surah 2, vv. 263-277, *sadaqah* occurs three times, while various derivatives of the root *nfq* - Form IV - occur fourteen times. This block of verses exhorts to charity by way of what might be called free contribution. Thus an act of charity should not be followed by resentment and insult, it should not be constituted by unwanted and corrupt things and so on. Whether an act of charity in the form of such free contributions is a part of *Zakāt* or not one is not able to say. Even if there were a difference between the meaning of a *Zakāt* - as a legal obligatory almsgiving - and other forms of charity less obligatory, the following passage shows the fusion, in practice, of both sorts of charity.

9,60

The *sadaqāt* are for the poor and the destitute, for the agents employed therein, for those whose hearts are to be won over, for (the ransom of) slaves, for (the relief of) debtors, for expenditure in the way of God, and for the follower of the way ...

This passage gives a strong hint that the Medinan Islamic State was in growing need of money for the running of its affairs; hence, not only an instituted almsgiving is welcomed but also any other form of contribution. This latter is known collectively in the standard works of *Hadīth* as *sadaqāt at-tatāwwu'* - the Qur'ānic basis for which may be found in the following early Medinan passage.

2,130

... if one does good voluntarily it is better for him *man tatāwwa'a khayran fa-huwa khayrun la-hu* ...¹⁸⁹

Para. 220.

Lastly, one may note that the material aspect of charity can be studied with great detail in the Medinan period by referring to such subjects as: the laws of inheritance; the distribution of the spoils of war; and the prohibition of usury. These related subjects, however appropriate to the theme of this chapter, do not add much to the basic ethical lines; they are essentially a way of putting the Qur'ānic ideal of charity into practice.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that material charity has various aspects in the Qur'ān. The appeal for charity at the beginning is an attempt to bring relief to the poorer classes in Mecca. But little by little charity becomes a safe means for the preservation and the solidarity of the incipient Moslem community; hence manumission of slaves, ransoming of prisoners, and better distribution of inheritance. In Medinan passages the urge for charity serves social purposes as in Mecca, but the State now has more to do with the distribution of charity for its political, administrative and military purposes; hence the problem of the legalization of charity arises mainly in Medina. Nothing is said in the Qur'ān about those who are liable to pay, or the amount to be paid. With this problem one may mention what may be termed its corollary, namely that of Zakāt (meant to be obligatory alms) and sadaqah - and its sister expressions - (i.e. voluntary contributions). It seems that in practice a minimum amount was taken from all those who could afford to pay, both dwellers in towns or Bedouins. This is the Zakāt, so often described with Prayer as main items of faith. As to the voluntary contributions, they seem to be addressed to the town-dwellers, who are well-versed in the teachings of the new message and hence readier than the Bedouins to be more helpful. Besides, one must not forget an economic reason, namely that the town-dwellers were in general richer than the Bedouins who were often near to starvation.

The Qur'ān emphasises the motives and spiritual purposes of almsgiving. Here one must remember that *zakāt* and other words of the same root mean originally "purity", "self-purification" and the like. Also *sadaqah* comes from a root which means "to tell the truth", "to be truthful", "to befriend" and other related meanings.

Chapter XIV

BROTHERHOOD AND LOVE¹⁹⁰

The notions of this chapter are the counterparts of those studied in Chapter VI on Hostility and Hatred, and a continuation of the notion of charity studied in the previous chapter.

Regarding the Qur'ānic words connected with brotherhood and love, the following two questions seem of special interest: How far are the notions of brotherhood and love universal and how far particular? And, what is the significance of these two notions? The two questions correspond to the denotation and connotation of the terms respectively, and they will be studied in the next two sections.

(a) THE QUESTION OF UNIVERSALITY

Blachère¹⁹¹ divides scholars into two camps when discussing a similar question to the one treated now. According to him, Nöldeke, Arnold and Goldziher believe in the universal message of the Qur'ān; while Grimme, Snouck-Hurgronje, Laarmanens and Buhl believe that the Qur'ān is meant for the Arabs only. Blachère's problem is strictly religious,¹⁹² and as such it does not apply to the present study. But even so, one may raise the following ethical question: is brotherhood in the Qur'ān recognized among all men? If the answer is in the affirmative, then love is universal as well. One might say that the Qur'ān preaches universal brotherhood and love in a conditioned sense, that is, the universal message does not embrace the whole of mankind unless all men believe in the message of the Qur'ān. This view is partly confused by two other views. The first is that the Qur'ān is meant exclusively for the Arabs. The second is the Qur'ānic explicit doctrine that Muhammad is simply one of many prophets, and his message is essentially identifiable with other messages sent to other nations outside Arabia. To reconcile all these views or to combine them is not an easy task. It is not easy, either, to separate the religious from the ethical. But despite all this, the Qur'ānic passages quoted below will help to confirm a certain attitude within these conflicting trends.

Para. 221.

THE FIRST TWO PERIODS

The Qur'ān according to 74, 34 is "nothing but a reminder to mankind bāshār". In another verse God on the Last Day addresses men, saying:

77, 38

... We have brought together you and those of olden time a l -
a w w a l i n .

Or 69, 8 f.

Does one see any of them remaining?

Pharaoh and those before him ...

Thus from the beginning, God addresses all men together. Words like 'ālāmīn (worlds), khalq (creatures) i. e. men and several other expressions denote almost all men. It is too early to speak of a universal brotherhood now, though it is a great step towards such a brotherhood when one speaks of the liability, or the duty, of all mankind to believe in God.¹⁹³

Para. 222.

The word insān (man) always appears in the Qur'ān with the definite article a l , except in one odd case (17, 14) in which the word kull (every) preceding it functions almost in the same way as the definite article. The force of a l is often forgotten in English in the translations of the Qur'ān; the rendering of the plural form an-nās is even harder. As a l in the word "Allah"¹⁹⁴ seems to have raised the original meaning (i. e. god, any god) to that of a universal and unique God, so also does it seem to fulfil the same function in the word a l - insān and its plural forms, e. g.

82, 6 f.

O man, what has put thee wrong with thy Lord. the Generous, Who hath created thee ...

Para. 223.

The word a l - insān has two plural forms in the Qur'ān, they are a l - ins and an-nās . The first is rightly understood by Bell as meaning "mankind", e. g. 55, 33. But the second, i. e. an-nās , is often rendered by Bell as "people", just as qawm and ahl . In the very short surah 114 the word an-nās is rendered in two different ways, namely "people" and "men".

Para. 224.

Although mankind - in various expressions - is called upon by God, as the ex-

amples in paras. 221 ff. seem to indicate, only part of mankind, i.e. the believers (the Arabs?), enjoys the favours of brotherhood in the eyes of God, e.g. 77, 14

... some of us are Moslems, and some of us follow devious courses; as for those who have become Moslems, they have endeavoured after a right direction.

27, 54

We delivered those who had believed and had been showing piety.

Thus it appears that not all mankind can reach the right of brotherhood. This latter notion is only conjectured, since it has never been mentioned in the texts given so far.

Para. 225.

As to whether Qur'ānic brotherhood refers to Arabs only, one finds an indication in this connection in a passage found as early as the late second Meccan period, as follows:

26, 194 ff.

... that thou mayest be of those who warn,
In clear Arabic speech ...

If We had sent it down to one of the foreigners,

And he had recited it to them, they would not have been in it believing.

That the reference to "Arabic" here is simply linguistic, there seems to be no doubt; nevertheless, the mention of "foreigners" in the passage does hint at an important fact, namely that Arabs en bloc have been thought of from the very early stages of the Qur'ān. Hints like this latter one are responsible for establishing some sort of spiritual bond between the followers of the Qur'ān; however, such a bond is far from being identifiable in the Qur'ān with what is called nowadays nationalism.

Para. 226.

THE THIRD PERIOD

These are a few verses from an early surah in this period which seem to confirm what has been said above.

30, 8

Have they not travelled about in the land al-ard and seen of what nature was the latter end of those before them ... their messengers came to them ... e

19

... He hath created you of dust, and lo, ye are human kind *bashar*
spreading yourselves abroad. (2)

21

Amongst His signs are ... the difference of your tongues and colours;¹⁹⁵
surely therein are signs for the worlds.¹⁹⁶ (3)

Verse (1) shows the similarity of the Qur'ān to other foreign (biblical) messages; verse (2) refers to the origin of mankind in the eyes of the Qur'ān; verse (3) refers to the differences of colour and tongue. The apparent identity of the messages sent to mankind, as implied in (1) corresponds to the identity of the origin (2). As to the difference between nations and races (3), it is essentially a factual reference. It has nothing to do with any separation between those who are of different colours or tongues; on the contrary, the verse implies the unity of all men, if the belief in God can really be identified with such a unity.

Para. 227.

Before ending the Meccan stage, certain passages may be quoted regarding what might be called the nationalistic trend in the Qur'ān.

41, 2

... an Arabic Qur'ān, for a people *qawm* who have knowledge. (1)

42, 5

Thus We have suggested to thee an Arabic Qur'ān in order that thou mayest warn the mother of the towns and those around it ... (2)

46, 11

And before it is the Book of Moses as a model and a mercy; and this is a Book confirming (it) in Arabic speech, that it may warn those who have done wrong, and good tidings for those who do well. (3)

All three passages insist that the message is an Arabic one, since the Arabs before the Prophet did not have a warner (28, 46). The equivocation arises, however, even in instances of a strong so-called nationalistic trend as the present ones, when one looks closely at the following observations:

The term *qawm* in (1) refers to Arabs, the reference is confirmed in other passages, e.g. 28, 46; but it is so equivocally used (for a people who have knowledge) that those "who have knowledge" can hardly be identified with "Jahilites", which conveys almost the opposite sense. This does not mean that the reference does not include the Arabs; its phrasing does not, however, exclude a tacit reference to a wider circle. The same equivocation follows from

the wording of "warn the mother of the towns and those around it" in passage (2). The sources of equivocation in (1) and (2) can be dispelled when one reads in passage (3) that the Qur'an is simply following previous models; it is only conforming to them.

Although the voice of compromise is not always the nearest to truth, in the case of the Qur'ān it is a one-sided explanation if one resorts to one alternative and judges it as final when other complementary alternatives carry just as much weight. To end the Meccan stage one may conclude that the Qur'ānic message, contrariwise to the Jahilite tribal solidarity, is a clear call to all Arabs. In addition to this, the message is declared to be modelled according to previous messages sent to other nations; therefore, the Qur'ān is not a rigid and exclusive national religion; it has a wider implication than that.

Para. 228.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

The great success gained in this period puts the boundaries of the Islamic message into more concrete form. There is no great change from the position reached at the third Meccan period, however. Such general expressions like *an-nās* often used in Mecca are replaced now by expressions like *al-mu'minūn* or its equivalents.¹⁹⁷ This means that the new message is more assured in Medina than in Mecca, hence it pays more attention to the rapidly growing community of Moslems. The following passages exemplify the Medinan period.

per 2, 114 Neither the Jews nor the Christians will be satisfied with thee until thou followest their creed ... (1)

2, 130 Say ye: "We have believed in God and what has been sent down to us ... and what has been given to the prophets from their Lord, making no distinction between any of them; and to Him are we submissive muslimūn. (2)

8, 73 Those who have believed and emigrated ... and those who have afforded shelter and help, are friends a w l i y ā ' one to the other... (3)

49, 13 O ye people a n - n ā s, 'We have created you of male and female and made you races and tribes that ye may show mutual recognition l i - t a ' ā r a f ū ; verily the most noble of you in God's eyes is the most pious ... (4)

9, 23 O ye who have believed, do not choose your fathers and your brothers

as friends, if they prefer unbelief ... (5)

5, 62 ... take not as your friends those who take your religion as a butt
of ridicule and fun, from amongst those who have been given the
Book before you and the unbelievers ... (6)

In these passages the term *awliyā'* (sing. *walī*) recurs often. The primitive sense of the term, according to Arabic lexicons,¹⁹⁸ is "friend", "protector" or "protected". The latter two senses are originally related to tribal customs. The Qur'ān, however, cuts through this tribalism by applying the term to God and His creatures, or to the Prophet as a *walī* to Moslems (4, 77) and to governors in relation to their subjects (4, 62; in this verse *ulū* seems to be only a variant for *awliyā'*). In the passages quoted above, i.e. (3), (5), and (6), the term *awliyā'* distinguishes very clearly the Islamic community from pagans (the *Jahilites*) on the one hand, and from other similar religions on the other. The similarity with Judaism and Christianity, according to (1) and (2), is considered insignificant unless they come to terms with the Qur'ānic version. The tolerance towards Christians and other non-Moslem believers in God, which is continuously held in the Meccan stage, is not lacking in Medina despite some evidences to the contrary, as passage (4) implies, but this is more explicitly shown in 3, 57.^{198a}

(b) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BROTHERHOOD AND LOVE

Now, a number of Qur'ānic passages bearing directly on notions of brotherhood and love will be discussed. Although the previous section has referred to subjects which are not wholly related to the specific theme of this chapter, it has laid the basic lines within which the following discussion will be fitted.

Para. 229.

The word *akh* (brother), in its singular, dual and plural forms, occurs eighty times. As none of the infinitival forms from the word *akh* occurs in the Qur'ān, one may well gather that most uses of *akh* are only neutral. In Mecca, especially, one rarely finds an "*akh*"-passage which is relevant to the present discussion. A few examples of interest can be found, however.

80, 34 and 70, 12 are both early Meccan passages and denounce the *Jahilite* pride in physical brotherhood. The reference here, as has been shown in more detail in Chapter III, is to the institution of tribal solidarity based on kinship. In such a denunciation there is some preparation for a brotherhood based on an ideal.

In the second period, and in a passage describing the folk of Paradise, one finds more than an allusion to the brotherhood of the believers, as follows:
15, 47

We have removed any malice that may have been in their hearts,
As brothers ...

In this spirit of brotherhood of the community of the believers, one may understand the usual description of any prophet as the brother of his people (e.g. 26, 106; 46, 20), and of his people as his brothers (e.g. 50, 13). But one might say that these latter references are a way of expression (a Sprachgebrauch) which can hardly bear on any ethical implication.

Para. 230.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

These are the main "a k h" - passages:
59, 10

... our Lord, grant forgiveness to us and to our brethren who have preceded us in faith, and set not malice in our hearts towards those who have believed ... (1)

33, 5

... (let them be) your brethren in religion ... (2)

49, 10

The believers are brethren, set things right therefore between your two brethren, and show piety towards God; mayhap ye will have mercy shown you. (3)

Passage (1) is a parallel passage to 15, 47, para. 229. In both cases the brotherhood of believers is coupled with removing of malice *ghill* from the hearts. The case of para. 229 refers to the state of affairs in Paradise; but passage (1) speaks of men on earth. The other two passages (2) and (3) speak of the brotherhood of believers as an established regulation. To "set things right" between such brothers, according to (3), is a normal concomitant to brotherhood.

The short-lived institution of brothering Meccans and Medinans early in Medina is not explicitly mentioned in the Qur'ān. The similarity of this institution to pre-Qur'ānic tribal customs is undeniable. Its abolition seems, however, to be recorded in the following passage:

8, 76

... those who are related in blood are nearer to each other ...

See also 33, 6.

In all this the Qur'ān seems to differentiate between brotherhood as a principle recommended in a general sense to the community of believers and a brotherhood protection meant for administrative purposes. The physical brotherhood does not need to be a confusing element in the present connection. It has been shown in Chapter XI, that the Qur'ān recommends affection and dutifulness towards all members of the family, but such family bonds are always considered inferior when they come into conflict with the essentials of the Qur'ān.¹⁹⁹

THE NOTION OF LOVE

Para. 231.

Love might be as wide as life itself. In the Qur'ān one finds various ways of expressing the notion of love. Generally speaking, Qur'ānic terms such as *birr* and *rahmāh* seem to imply, in certain passages at least, some sort of love; e.g.

2, 224

Do not on account of your oaths make God an obstacle to your acting
virtuously *tabarrū* and piously and setting things right between people
... ((A Medinan passage)).

In some earlier passages the word *barr* is applied to that affection which relates a son to his parents (e.g. 19, 14) or to his mother - in the case of Jesus - (19, 33). The same word *barr* is applied to God (52, 28) and to the angels (80, 15). The other term *rahmāh* - or other words derived from the same root - convey the notion of love in certain cases; e.g. 48, 29 (a Medinan passage) describes the believers in their attitude towards the idolators and that which is among themselves; in the one case they are "violent *ashiddā'* against ...," in the other case they are *ruhāmā'* (compassionate, or gentle and lenient).

If, however, the terms *birr* and *rahmāh* - with various other words derived from the same root - are related to love in a remote sense only, there are other terms of a more direct interest.

Para. 232.

The two roots *wdd* and *hbb* are linguistically the nearest counterparts to the English word "love" but despite this nearness, the two roots in several of their uses in the Qur'ān do not convey the notion of love. Thus *wadda*²⁰⁰ means "he liked, wished, or he would like or wish". In many of its uses in the Qur'ān

the root *wdd* functions, then, almost as an auxiliary verb. In other cases the original sense is quite apparent; e.g. (in Mecca):

85,14 And He is the Forgiving, the Loving *wadūd*.

Or 30, 20

... He hath created for you of your own species spouses that ye may dwell with them, and hath set love *mawaddah* and mercy *rahmah* between you ...

Or 11, 92

... my Lord is compassionate *rahīm*, loving *wadūd*.

In Medina *mawaddah* (love) towards the kinsfolk²⁰¹ is recommended (42, 22).²⁰² In another Medinan passage (60, 7) it is said that God "may appoint that there shall be love between you and those of them with whom ye have been at enmity". The following verse (60, 8) couples love with other Qur'ānic virtues, it reads:

God doth not forbid you to act virtuously towards those who have not fought against you in the matter of religion, and have not expelled you from your dwellings, or to deal fairly with them - God loveth *yuhibb* those who deal fairly.

Para. 233.

The root *hbb* is usually applied to God as in 60, 8, para. 232. It is used also in the early passages in contexts in which the Jahilite "love" for wealth and other worldly desires is denounced; e.g. 100, 8; 89, 21; 75, 20. In the following - late Meccan and Medinan - passages it is said that God does not love the self-conceited (16, 25); the exultants (28, 76); the ill-disposed (7, 53); the extravagant (6, 142); and the treacherous (8, 60). Thus the term "love" in the negative use in which it is used in all these passages does convey almost nothing about love itself. But in a few other verses something positive is implied in "*hbb*"-passages, as follows.

As early as the second period the infinitive *mahabbah* is used in the story of Moses (20, 39) to mean the natural affection shown by an adult towards an infant - any infant. In the third period the other infinitive *hubb* is used in a passage (12, 30) to mean the proper natural love shown by a female towards a male. The same infinitival form is used twice in another passage (2, 160); in the one case it means the love of an idolater towards his gods, in the other case it means the love of a "believer" to God. In a fairly early Medinan passage (3, 12) *hubb*, again, means the natural love shown by men *an-nās* to women - as

well as to sons (or children) b a n i n and other worldly possessions. Then we find in (3, 115 f.) two verbal forms of the root h b b applied in the one case to Moslems' love of the Jews (in Medina), and in the other case to the lack of love of the Jews to Moslems; thus:

... Ye love them but they love not you ... If ye have a touch of good, it annoys them, but if an evil befall you, they rejoice at it ...

The command given here to reciprocate love and hatred with members of other communities is different from the command to show love only towards the community of the believers (59, 9).

Lastly, the following late Medinan passage seems to recapitulate some shades of the root h b b, as follows:

5, 21 The Jews and the Christians say: "We are the sons and beloved of God"; say: "Why then does He punish you for your sins? Nay, ye are human beings (part) of those whom He hath created; He forgiveth whom He pleaseth ... and to Him is the trend."

CONCLUSION

It seems fair to say that the discussion in this chapter leads to the belief that the Qur'ān neither believes in the universality of brotherhood and love, nor to the equation of these two notions with a tribal solidarity or a blood relationship. If these two extremes could be somewhat easily dismissed from the scene, the choice between two other alternatives is not very easy. These other alternatives are: Arabism and the Qur'ānic so-called u m m a h - i. e. the community of believers. That some Qur'ānic arguments side with Arabism in one way or another there seems to be no doubt. But these arguments are overwhelmed by arguments which base the notions of brotherhood and love on an u m m a h of men whose essential relationship with each other is a common belief in an ideology; hence Muhammad is addressed as follows: -

21, 107 We have not sent thee but as a mercy to the worlds.

The logic of the Qur'ān seems to reconcile the trend of Arabism with that of the u m m a h rather than to consider them as conflicting with one another. A critic might observe in this reconciliation some sort of onesidedness for two reasons.

Firstly, a non-Arab in accepting the message of the Qur'ān can only receive it in the best way by learning Arabic and swallowing Arabism. In other words,

as the Qur'ān is in Arabic and it is the last and most authoritative word of God, then the weight of Arabism in the ummāh is surely not mean.

Secondly, other prophets sent by God to other ummāhs, together with their followers, are in a general sense Moslems - i.e. submissive to God. Hence, proper Moslems are instructed to love and to treat kindly and fairly other communities of similar ideologies to that of the Qur'ān. But here again it is the Qur'ān which decides - it is the Qur'ān which shows the common roots and the differences.²⁰³

Chapter XV

JUSTICE

The notion of justice is essential in the fields of ethics and law as well as in religion. The Qur'ān uses the same words to express justice in relation to any one of these; sometimes, also, the implication is too wide to be restricted to one field only. The difficulty grows when in the case of "ḥqq" - passages both senses of justice and truth are fused together in a great many cases.

The following discussion depends essentially on passages which contain words derived from the roots 'd1 and qst; some interesting cases containing the root ḥqq and the root ḥkm will also be included. All these passages are not likely to answer such radical questions as: what is the nature of justice in the Qur'ān? what is the nature of equality among all men in the Qur'ān? is equality an absolute value or not, and if not, is there in the Qur'ān a generally recognised code to be applied to particular cases? Does cruel justice in juridical matters exclude any mercy in the application of justice? All these questions will not be fully answered below, though the discussion will attempt to find an answer to some of them. The conclusions reached in the previous chapters, especially Chapters XIII and XIV, are of great value in the present case. That is, the real justice is that which implies equality among the community of believers. In some cases, however, a more general view of justice than this can be discovered, i.e. justice which comprehends more than one community and rules all with the same measure.

It cannot be denied that some Qur'ānic virtues are to be found among Arabs in an embryonic form. Thus Arabic hospitality and generosity lie behind Qur'ānic charity. In the present case, the giving of counsel (in the Qur'ān, uḥkum and shāwir and other words of the same roots) and the forms of tribal judicial decisions among Arabs lie behind the notion of justice in the Qur'ān.^{204a}

Para. 234.

THE FIRST TWO PERIODS

In this early stage the two roots 'd1 and qst only faintly express the notion of justice. Thus 'adala in 82, 7 means obviously to proportionate; also ya'dilūn in 27, 61 means to associate²⁰⁴ (i.e. to take other gods as equals to God).

Para. 235. 55, 6.

The heaven He hath lifted, and He hath set up the Balance,
7 That ye may not transgress in regard to the Balance
8 Establish the weighing in justice *bi 'l qisṭ* and make not short the
balance.

This passage needs to be read with a Medinan passage:
57, 25

We formerly sent Our messengers with the Evidences . . . and Balance,
that the people might dispense justice . . .

The words "balance" and "weighing" in these passages translate two derivatives from the Arabic root *wzn*. The first occurrence of "balance" has an eschatological implication, but the concomitant "weighing" in the following verse (55, 8) shows the literal sense of the word "balance". In the last verse "balance" is metaphorically used to mean almost certainly justice. If all the four verses could be read together, one might elaborate the following tentative view: God commands justice; a commandment which is of preponderant significance in His creations. His messengers are ordered to preach, among other things, this virtue of justice; hence, ordinary men have to follow suit. This view is somewhat farfetched, the following paragraphs will justify it to a certain extent.

Para. 236. 103, 3.

... who have believed and wrought the works of righteousness and counselled *tawāsaw* each other to truth *haqq*, and counselled each other to endurance.

Here the word *haqq* implies justice rather than truth. The concomitant "counselled" is evidence that the passage points to a scene of justice. This implication in the word *haqq* is strengthened in the following passage.
70, 24 f.

Those in whose wealth there is a recognised right *haqq*,
For the beggar and the destitute.

Or 38, 25

... judge *uhkum* between men in truth *bi 'l haqq*, and do not follow their desire so that it lead you astray . . .

Here, again, a scene of judgement (justice) which seems to contrast justice, viewed as an impartial force, with a partial arbitration based on individual desires. The Prophet in this passage, however, is given the authority of a head of state.

Para. 237. 17, 17.

When We intend to destroy a town, We command its affluent people and they act viciously therein, so that the sentence against them is justified *fa haqqā*; then We destroy it utterly.

The worldly aspect of the passage is that acting viciously leads to the just punishment of destruction. As often happens in other passages of the Qur'ān the nature of the "vice" is not given. Thus one is unable to find whether this passage shows the so-called cruel side of justice, considered unjust in the eyes of some modern authors,²⁰⁵ or not. Even if one could read into this passage some cruelty,²⁰⁶ other passages in the Qur'ān imply forgiveness and mildness.

Para. 238.

The word *haqq* is often used in a more general sense than any quoted so far; e.g.

17, 83

And say: "The truth *haqq* has come and the false *bāṭil* has vanished; verily the false is apt to vanish."

Para. 239.

THE THIRD PERIOD

Roots 'dl, qst, hkm and hqq.

16, 78

... a comparison, two men, one of them is dumb, having no power over anything ... is he on the same footing with one who urges justice 'adl being set up upon a straight path?

The parable here contrasts the limitations of the idols with God's justice and straight path.²⁰⁷ The scene seems to reproduce the rôle of the wise Arabian arbitrator. In other Meccan²⁰⁸ and Medinan²⁰⁹ passages the wisdom of the Prophet is shown in the same light.

Para. 240. 16, 92.

Verily God commandeth justice 'adl and kindness, and giving to kindred, and He forbiddeth indecency and disreputable conduct and greed ... Thus, while justice in para. 237 approaches the form of the so-called cruel justice, in its present context it is raised to the level of kindness. This attitude is more clearly given in the following passage 42, 38:

The recompense of an evil deed is an evil like it, so if anyone pardons and makes peace, it rests with God to reward him ...

Para. 241. 11, 86.

... give full measure and weigh with justice, and do not defraud the people of their things, and do not work mischief in the land causing corruption.

This goes with para. 235 regarding the weighing and measuring, except that now the passage is of a wider application. The concomitant, "do not defraud the people of their things", is applicable to commercial affairs as far as commerce in those days was understood. The other concomitant, "do not work mischief in the land causing corruption" might be too general, yet it cannot be void of meaning; it can be, at least, explained according to the implication of the former phrases.

Para. 242. 6, 153.

... We lay not upon anyone burdens beyond his capacity; when ye speak, act fairly, even though it be a relative ...

One may render the part of this passage given by Bell as, "when ye speak, act fairly" as follows: "when ye speak, be fair *wa idhā qultum fa - 'dilū*." The passage might imply the institution of Arabian (Jahilite) arbitration, and no more. Yet, it commands quite clearly that one has to be fair in one's speech,²¹⁰ as much as para. 241 recommends fairness in one's acts.

Para. 243.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

This is the period of legislation *par excellence*. Almost every piece of legislation is described as just. In some cases the justice which is attributed to the legislation looks rather like an embellishment. To judge the kind of justice implied in all the Medinan passages is beyond the scope of this chapter.²¹¹ One might examine a few instances, as follows:

In one of the longest verses in the Qur'ān the recording of debts is treated in detail, parts of which will be given below.

2, 282

... when ye contract a debt ... let someone who is able to write, write it down justly between you ...

if he who owes the debt be stupid, or in weak health, or be not able to dictate himself, then let his patron *wālī* dictate with fairness ...

Disdain not to write it down, be it small or great, (stating) the term up to which (it holds). That is more equitable ... take witnesses when ye bargain with each other; only let neither writer nor witness "do an injury to either party"²¹² ...

Thus in one single verse justice is referred to several times. This type of Medinan justice is not only, as in Meccan passages, a matter of general equity. Its administrative significance is very clear. Other Medinan passages may be briefly referred to below.

Justice as correlated to the kind treatment of orphans and wives (4, 3. 126, 128), or to the repaying of entrusted things to their owners (4, 61), or ascribing a child to his natural father (33, 5).

Para. 244.

The giving of judgement between parties is mentioned throughout all the stages of the Qur'ān. Here one may remember the sort of arbitration known before the Qur'ān. But as the Qur'ān makes either God or His Prophet and his administrators judges or agents of justice between men, the scene of Arabian arbitration in its tribal form seems to be far from being explanatory.

Examples:

4, 61 Verily God commands you ... when ye judge between the people to judge with justice ...

49, 9 If two parties of the believers fight ... set things right *aslihū* between them justly, and act fairly; verily God loveth those who act fairly.

5, 46 ... if thou act as judge, then judge between them with fairness ...

These passages and those cited in the previous paragraph show a complete fusion between Jahilite customs regarding arbitration and the law and morality as commanded by the Qur'ānic message.²¹³ The validity or lawfulness of justice in these passages does not concern the community of believers (the Moslems) only, but also extends beyond them, as the last passage²¹⁴ seems to refer to the Jews. Hence, the concept of bilaterality of law²¹⁵ exists at least faintly in the Qur'ān.²¹⁶ One is equally justified in believing in the one-sidedness of Qur'ānic justice, since the Qur'ān is supposed to be the final divine word!

Para. 245.

Lastly, a few Qur'ānic passages on the universality of justice and its absolute significance seem to be of special interest at the end of the discussion.

2, 228

... in reputable conduct *ma'ruf* they have the same right as is exercised over them ...

This is an *obiter dictum* whose content does not extend beyond matrimonial relationships. The universality of the passage can be better understood in the

light of what was said in a previous chapter on the Qur'ānic notion of brotherhood. Another passage extends this universality and bilaterality of justice far beyond the limits of matrimonial life, as follows:

4, 134

O ye who have believed, be furnishers of justice, witnesses for God, even though it be against yourselves, or your parents and relatives, whether (the person) be rich or poor ... so do not follow desire so as to waver ... In another passage justice is recommended even when non-believers are apparently included. The passage reads:

5, 11

O ye who have believed, be furnishers of justice ... and let not the hatred of a people incite you not to act fairly; act fairly that is nearer to piety ... By "people" the Jews are most likely meant. The passage can serve, however, as denoting opponents in general.

CONCLUSION

It seems that the implications of justice are fairly wide, ranging from its consideration as a basic factor in the order of the universe - according to the Qur'ān, justice is a main item in God's creations, on the same level as the Heavens and Earth and Man - to its application to various trivial matters of everyday life.

In the development of justice there seems to be no great difference between the Meccan and Medinan stages. In both stages the judge, acting almost as the traditional arbitrator, has to be fair and impartial. According to the Qur'ān, one can do so by avoiding desires and passions *ahwā'*. This social form of justice seems to conform very much to the Arabian scene where *ma'-rūf* (the widely-known) is at the same time the good and the essence of justice.²¹⁷

The bilaterality of justice in the Qur'ān is shown in its most primitive aspects when the strict (cruel) justice is recommended,²¹⁸ but mercy is often demanded, especially when members of the same community *ummah* are involved. The general impression seems to be that the Qur'ān recommends the strict justice universally, but when it concerns the members of the *ummah*, forgiveness steps in. This leads to the logical conclusion that the *ummah* simply replaces the tribe in the enactment of justice.

On the individual level justice is recommended in deeds and utterances, even when justice has bad repercussions on the just. This individual form of justice is related to the welfare of a person in this world and to his salvation in the next world.

Lastly, despite the fact that there is no room here to discuss later developments in Islamic thought, the so-called Moslem rationalists (the Mu'tazilites) are highly justified in considering justice as one of the two main principles underlying the Qur'ānic teachings.

Chapter XVI

CERTAINTY. 218a

In its intellectual attack on the *Jahilites*²¹⁹ the *Qur'ān* denies them any certainty; they have instead doubts and suspicions and other similar traits which develop in the *Medinan* period into hypocrisy, dissension and the like. In contrast to all this the *Qur'ān* claims authentic knowledge and truth, as well as prescribes or exhorts its followers to be confident and certain.

It is known that, "most great historical religions have advanced the same claims" as to the possession of "a divine revelation".²²⁰ Such claims at worst build up a rigid dogma and a blind certainty. The *Qur'ān* in this connection is no exception as far as the *Qur'ānic* materials in the present chapter are concerned. One may refer, however, to the *Qur'ānic* intellectual attack on the *Jahilites*²²¹ to understand in a clearer and more humanistic context, some of the basis of the *Qur'ānic* certainty. In attempting to elaborate the notion of certainty the *Qur'ān* puts the weight mainly on the shoulders of God. In a few passages only there is an appeal to the human mind and to human contexts.

Also, though certainty is coupled, in the *Qur'ān*, with knowledge and truth, it is more natural, in the context of the *Qur'ān*, to couple it with Faith.²²²

This chapter will study two roots in two sections. They are: *yqñ* (*yaqīnā*) and *wkl* (*wakāla*). Other roots such as *'mn* (lit. to be safe) and *slm* (lit. to be sound and in peace) which mean: to believe and to be a Moslem, respectively, are of great interest, but they do not add much to the discussion.²²³

(a) The root *yqñ*.

This root occurs twenty-eight times distributed almost equally in the four periods. In most of its forms the root *yqñ* means: to know, or to be or become certain of.²²⁴ The root *yqñ* in its *Qur'ānic* usage stands usually in contrast to roots which translate the verb: to doubt, to opine, and the like.

Para. 246.

In an early passage (102, 5 and 7) the expressions, *'ilm al yaqīn* and *'ain al yaqīn*²²⁵ (the true or certain knowledge, and the true certainty) are used in a context in which the *Jahilites* are denied the knowledge of the punishment in the Last Day. The content of such expressions is religious but it is worthwhile to note the coupling of knowledge (and elsewhere truth²²⁶)

with certainty *yaqīn*.

From other passages of the first period the following are especially interesting:

Para. 247. 51, 20.

In the earth are signs for those who are convinced al mūqinīn.

52, 36

Or did they create the heavens and the earth?

Nay, they have no convictions lā yūqinūn.

Such passages have more to do with the ethics of certainty than the previous ones. Thus the passage (51, 20) seems to imply that the Jahilites have to divert their attention from their traditional ideals, and look, perhaps, for something better in the centres of civilization abroad. The purpose of looking into the signs of the earth is to be certain, the implication is that certainty is an ideal to be searched for by the followers of the Qur'ānic message. The Jahilites in (52, 36) are naturally denied such a privilege.

Para. 248.

The following are some of the instances in which the root *yqñ* is mentioned in the second period:

26, 23 ... Lord of the heavens and the earth ... if ye be convinced

15, 99 And serve thy Lord until there comes to thee the Certainty

27, 14 They gainsaid them ((sc. the signs)) though they themselves were convinced of them, out of wrong-doing ...

All the three instances are religious in their bearing, though the third has also something to do with human character.

The first passage given above seems to demand the conviction (or the certainty) of those addressed, before it advances its argument that God is the Creator. But a critic might ask: what is the content of such a previous conviction? The answer perhaps lies in the fact that one needs simply to be receptive.

The second passage seems to convey that finally religion has to build up a sort of "certainty" in the self; if this certainty is not already there, as the previous passage (26, 23) argues that it is, then by way of worship one is supposed to reach the ideal of certainty (in a subjective or an objective sense).

The third passage takes back the argument to that of the first passage, since it says that the (supposed) unbelievers have (as if it were instinctive) all the certainty needed for believing in religious arguments, but for - and this is a significant and human factor - their wrong-doings. Then, conversely, an upright

lawabiding person has, among other things, the virtue of certainty or self-assurance.

It remains for the next two periods, as has often happened in this study, to show the notion of certainty in a clearer human context than in any passage so far.

Para. 249.

Now in the third period, the following passages throw a better light on the notion of certainty.

32, 24 And We appointed from amongst them leaders to guide by Our command, when they endured and of Our signs were convinced.

45, 19 These are demonstrations for the people, a guidance and a mercy for a people who are convinced.

45, 31 ((The Jahilites are made to express)) ... we have only opinions, and do not seek to be convinced.

Lastly the prophet is addressed:

30, 60 So endure (thou) patiently; verily the promise of God is true; let not make light of thee those who have no conviction.

The first and fourth of these passages concern the Prophet. In both, endurance is a concomitant virtue to that of certainty - though *yūqinūn* in the first passage is directly predicated to the leaders (sc. the prophets), while the same word in the fourth passage is applied in a negative sense to the Jahilites. The political implication of the two passages is undeniable. Also, the leadership is endowed not only with certainty and patience, but also claims knowledge, though indirectly, by attaching ignorance to the Jahilites, as follows.

30, 59 Thus doth God set a seal upon the hearts of those who have not knowledge.

Thus ignorance is related to the sealing of the heart - an expression which might be equal to saying that the mind does not function (Cf. e.g. 25, 46 in which it is stated that the Jahilites neither hear nor act intelligently). The argument is at least partly controversial. It implies that the certainty of those who are convinced is not a blind acceptance and a passive resignation. On the contrary, it is a plea that the mind must function; this is a factor - though not the most significant - which seems to be of some importance.

The use of "demonstrations" in the passage (45, 19) above confirms the suggestion just given. The passage indicates explicitly that those who are certain (or convinced, according to Bell's rendering) are presented with demonstrations. These demonstrations are identified later in the passage with guidance and mercy.

Lastly, the third passage (45, 31) carried the argument a step further by declaring that the Jahilites have (erroneous) opinions, a trait which is related to their "not seeking to be convinced".

Para. 250.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

In a famous argument showing the position of the Qur'ānic doctrine among other sister-doctrines, one reads the following:

2, 3 Who believe in what has been sent down to thee, and in what has been sent down before thy time, and of the Hereafter are convinced
yū qinūn. ²²⁷

To comment only on the ethical side of this verse, one observes that to identify the essentials of the Qur'ānic doctrine with similar ones is, among other things, an aspect of certainty and self-confidence. There are many points, both major and minor, in the Qur'ān in which it is clearly shown that the suggested identification is conditional, i.e. on Qur'ānic terms. In a similar argument, the Qur'ān advocates the physical and spiritual fatherhood of Abraham to Arabs. ²²⁸

Para. 251.

In contrast to the argument of identification just discussed, and in a passage significant, perhaps, for its turn of phrase, the Qur'ān states the following (about Jesus):

4, 156 ... those who have gone different ways in regard to him are in doubt about him; they have no (revealed) knowledge of him and only follow opinion ... they did not certainly yaqīnan kill him ...

Here "certainly" is neutrally used, but other points in the passage show some significance. Firstly, the supposed identification with Christianity, as a sister-doctrine, is shattered here in a way very harmful to the Christian cause. Also by applying the same terms as those used already in the case of the Jahilites - i.e. doubt, following opinion and deprivation of knowledge - both Christians and Jahilites are classed in the same category. In such a situation one may ask

whether the belief and confidence in the whole Divine message is to suffer or to gain. The answer is by no means simple. The disagreement seems, first of all, directed not against the whole of Christianity. Secondly, the passage looks like a matter of fact statement rather than an abusive one. That is, the passage seems to indicate that Christians should not go "different ways", in which case the Qur'ān seems to be exhorting the Christians. If this line of argument is not completely untrue, then the confidence in the Divine message as a whole is still safe, and the doctrine of identification is still sound, though from the Qur'ānic standpoint only.

Lastly, as regards the general notion of certainty, the verse under discussion is warning the followers of a sister-doctrine against doubt, ignorance and the following of opinion,²²⁹ since these three items are merely vices in the Qur'ānic ideology.

All this interpretation might be true. A critic, however, is rightly tempted to say that from the turn of phrase in this verse there is a hidden argument which might be stated as follows.

The doctrine of identification is only partly disclaimed here in order that the followers of the Qur'ānic message do not feel too closely identified with - or ideologically dependent on - others who follow similar doctrines. Hence the whole matter may be reduced to an injunction aiming at some independence so that more faith and confidence can be felt towards the Qur'ān.
Para. 252.

Lastly one may refer to this late instance on the root *y q n*:

Do they desire the (mode of) judgment of the Time of Ignorance? But who is better than God in judgment, to a people who are convinced?

Here wisdom and other qualities which are to be found in human acts of justice are applied to God's judgment. It follows from this verse that the conviction (or certainty?) of a Qur'ānic follower is not to be identified with desire or ignorance (*jāhiliyah*), it pertains, apparently, to a much higher level than that.

(b) The root *w k l*.

Para. 253.

In its Form II the root *w k l* means, "to entrust"; in Forms V and VIII it means, "to rely upon or to confide in". Form VIII is usually employed when

the root is used as a verb - except in two cases (32, 11 and 6, 89) where Form II is used. The implication in most cases is that man has to derive his confidence and certainty from God. This authoritarian basis conferred on God as a supreme being has been referred to above, especially in Chapter IX where fear of God has been considered as an essential factor in man's piety.

The root *w k l* occurs about seventy times, nine tenths of which are shared between the third and the Medinan periods. In the Meccan stage as a whole the human free-will seems to be overlaid by too much confidence and dependence on God. A few instances may suffice to show the general trend.

Para. 254. 11, 15.

... God of every thing is trustee *wakīl*.

The prophets trust God first of all, and such trustfulness is conjoined with their hope of success. Thus one of them declares:

11, 90

... I only wish to set things right as far as I am able; my hope of success is in God alone; upon Him I have set my trust and to Him I turn penitently.

Cf. also 13, 29.

Other human beings have to follow suit - cf. e.g. 29, 59. In another passage a group of men are made to express proudly their confidence as follows:

14, 15

And why should we not set our trust upon God, seeing He hath guided us in our ways? Surely, we shall endure patiently under the injuries...

According to 10, 84 "to set a trust upon God" is conjoined with "surrendering oneself to Him" (or to become a Moslem).

Also it is repeatedly mentioned that the Prophet is not a trustee or a guardian *wakīl*; cf., e.g. 39, 42; 6, 60, 107 etc. The insistence on this is, perhaps, an expression of the weakness in the Prophet's position; in the Medinan period, though the same expressions are used, they are neutralized by other passages demanding obedience (confidence?) to the Prophet.

Para. 255.

THE MEDINAN PERIOD

At this stage confidence in God is no less forcefully stated than in Mecca, but such confidence is related in Medina to more and more concrete situations of daily life; e.g.

8, 63 If they incline to peace, incline thou to it, and set thy trust upon God...
3, 118 (Recall) when two sections of you were on the point of flinching, though God was their patron; in God let the believers place their trust.

In the first of these instances the trust in God seems a corollary to the main theme of the passage which is dealing with a political issue. In the second instance, the obviously different themes of the passage are more interrelated, since the placing of trust in God - an expression which says simply that one must be certain and confident - is equal to "not to flinch".

Para. 256.

In the following passage the confidence in God is not only a corollary to, but also almost explained away by the human free-will.

3, 153 ... when thou hast made up thy mind place thy trust upon God ...

One cannot think, of course, of an absolute free-will in a context where it is categorically understood that the speaker is always God. Cf. further 4, 83; 33, 47; 9, 130.

CONCLUSION

Being by its very existence, or definition, a divine command, the Qur'ān could not but relate its notion of certainty to God by way of relying upon Him and taking Him as a trustee. But if the basis of certainty is thus religiously supported, the very treatment of certainty and the importance given to it show more than a mere religious significance.

Certainty, in its subjective sense especially, is of great importance to social movements which aim at a radical change. In this connection, self-confidence is more than mere enthusiasm, otherwise the new ideology cannot live long. Thus though the Qur'ān puts much confidence in God, its direct purpose is to create confidence in its followers. A critic might say, however, that more is said about man's obligation to be certain than about certainty itself.²³⁰ But

this is characteristic of the Qur'ān, which is well-known for its comments on concrete situations related to man's behaviour and intentions more than for its reasonings on basic principles. These latter, if treated at all, are usually touched on in general terms; that is why certainty, in the Qur'ān, pertains to knowledge and truth as contrasted with opinion, doubt, and ignorance.²³¹ The difficulty arises, however, when the Qur'ān identifies, at the same time, certainty with faith, resignation (*islām*), and complete obedience to authority. In this case, if any rational treatment could be made possible, one has to put more insistence on those passages where purely human situations are at stake; this factor is better shown in Medina where the authority of the Prophet grows progressively, and certainty is more related to statesmanlike decisions on the one hand, and to the growing self-confidence of Moslems and their attitude towards their ideology on the other.

Chapter XVII

CONCLUSION

(In three sections)

(a) THE WORD AND THE MEANING

As the theme of this study is an inquiry into the moral philosophy of the Qur'ān, the reader may be tempted now to question whether there is any such philosophy. A strict logician may never be able to solve the problem of expression in a poetic or a semi-poetic work. Indeed, without a fixed meaning a technical term cannot be coined; and without technical terms no concepts in any branch of science or philosophy are clear. Besides, the question of, "who takes what from whom", may have its benefits in certain cases; in the present study, however, this question of origins has been left aside, except to a very limited extent, in order to find out first the bare data of the Qur'ān.

So the core of the problem is, in the most general terms, an inquiry into words and their meanings. In this inquiry we do not need to explain away what we cannot explain, or to dismiss as mere verbalism such a religious work as the Qur'ān, on the one hand. On the other hand, we must not go in the highly interpretative way of Mediaeval commentators.²³² In the following three points some peculiarities of the Qur'ānic expression and how they have been dealt with, in this study, are briefly stated:

(1) The synonyms. The Qur'ān abounds in synonyms and what might be termed semi-synonymous expressions. In this study, in three chapters²³³ out of sixteen, passages revolving around the same word or words of the same root, have served in the elaboration of a certain Qur'ānic notion. In the remaining cases, any notion could only be understood after a search into all the possible expressions in which it could be understood. The risks are very great, since a concomitant adjective, or associated words, might not necessarily imply ideas which could be ranged in the same category of thought.

It has been shown in this study also that words in the Qur'ān are sometimes paraphrased,²³⁴ and the process of paraphrasing either precedes the coinage of a new term or succeeds it.

Lastly, one needs to mention that these synonymous words and phrases might be only partly synonymous. Thus while *anfaqa* and *tasaddaqa* might be completely equivalent expressions, they seem to be only partly equivalent to *tazakkā*.²³⁵

(2) Words with a multiplicity of meanings. This is another factor which complicates an easy understanding of the Qur'ān. Among the scholars who gave an English rendering of the Qur'ān, R. Bell is, perhaps, the keenest to reproduce a true and literal translation, as against a free interpretation. But even Bell could not evade what seemed to him a natural development of meaning. To fix all the different meanings of a certain Qur'ānic word has been attempted in this study, though with various degrees of certainty, according to the evidence available in each case. The rôle of the metaphor in this connection is very great, whether the metaphor is expressed by a single word or a phrase. The definition of lines between the real and metaphorical sense has been going on for centuries. In modern times the work of Sabbagh (*La Métaphore dans le Coran*) is significant in this connection, though it is the first of its kind and cannot be considered a final judgement.

This problem of meaning is intermingled with the development of technical terms. As almost the entire first Meccan stage²³⁶ is rarely devoted to any ideas outside the religious sphere, it seems wise not to look for ethical notions or ethical technical terms in this early stage. It has been shown in this study, however, that in a few cases only an ethical notion might be found in an embryonic form in the first period, hence the expression is ever changing and the recourse to metaphors is frequent. But even when a word is used in a technical sense, there is no guarantee against using the same word in one or another of its previous meanings. For example: in Chapter II, the roots *kbr* (lit. to be or to become great), *'lw* (lit. to be or to become high) and *tghw* (lit. to pass the limit, or to flood), keep throughout the Qur'ān their primitive meanings. They seem, however, to have been used in a secondary sense, namely 'pride'. The diversion to a secondary sense cannot be always as easy to grasp as in the case of these roots. The question is more complicated when a certain term is a loan-word. In this study great attention has been paid to specify any new shade of meaning, and through the cumulative effect of these shades of meaning any word can be more understood. But as the Qur'ān is its own lexicon, we are greatly hindered when a certain word does not occur often enough to be well

understood. The fact that the Qur'ān uses synonyms compensates, however, for the rare occurrence of certain words.

(3) The integrity of a verse. A verse is integral in, at least, two senses, namely the chronological sense and what might be termed the organic sense. "Organic" in the sense that the verse deals with one subject or theme, and not with a multiplicity of subjects. All verses, according to the Official Egyptian Edition of the Qur'ān, are chronologically integral. In the case of Nöldeke's chronological order, a relatively small number of verses are chronologically composite; while R. Bell finds a quite large number of verses which are chronologically composite.

In the organic sense, nobody is able, apparently, to deny the existence of composite verses, especially in the case of those long Medinan verses. Besides, especially in the first period, a certain number of verses are not grammatically complete sentences, and they can only be understood by relating them to a preceding and/or a succeeding verse.

All these difficulties regarding the nature of the Qur'ānic verse led in this study to one of these two courses: Whenever a verse is composite one part of it often satisfies the discussion. But if the verse is grammatically incomplete, or the underlying sense is not satisfactory unless completed by one of the immediate verses preceding or following it, then one needs to use more than one verse, provided that there is a chronological integrity regarding this block of verses.

(b) THE SYSTEM

The difficulties which have been aroused in the previous section, and the allowances made to answer them, reduce the possibility of an ethical system in the Qur'ān to a great extent. But if ethics could be taken away from the realm of metaphysics and absolute values and related to the realm of law,²³⁷ in that case Qur'ānic ethics may be viewed as a code of conduct, or a body of rules. According to Kantorowicz,²³⁸ "rules may be said to constitute a body when they all possess some common characteristic which renders them coherent and interdependent, e.g. that they have the same content ... belong to the same code or to the same State, originate from the same nation, or coincide in time or space ...".

Thus, if Qur'ānic ethics are denied the theoretical systematization, they may still have a certain degree of coherence in practical application. The main characteristics of this coherence may be briefly stated in the following points:

(1) In arguing that certain ethics are not acceptable, the Qur'ān does not miss the opportunity of putting others in their place. Thus, to judge from the present study, in refusing the ethics of pride the Qur'ān preaches the ethics of humility, and likewise with the rest of ethical notions dealt with in this study.

(2) The virtues are usually coupled with each other, so also the vices. Thus we often find in the same verse or in two or more consecutive verses that virtues A, B and C are applied to the person who is not supposed to commit vices X, Y and Z. Hence, terms of approval are bestowed upon the virtuous and his virtues, e.g. "good", "beautiful" and the like; while opposite terms showing disapproval are heaped upon the vicious and the vices.²³⁹

(3) The divine authority from which all Qur'ānic ethics are supposed to follow, gives them a certain aspect of coherence as to their origin.

(4) The Qur'ānic ethics take the Arab nation as their starting point. As far as this study is concerned, Jahilism is the sum total of ethical notions of pre-Qur'ānic Arabs. This Jahilism is at the same time the background against which the Qur'ānic positive ethics are to be understood.

(5) The period of some twenty years from c. 610 to 632 A.D., and the area of North-West Arabia, represent the minimum limits of Qur'ānic ethics, as regards time and space.

(6) Individualism is very strong in Qur'ānic ethical outlook, and the individual is responsible for himself. The individual motives - the Qur'ānic *al-qalb* - constitute a quite important factor in human conduct.

(7) The family is given a special importance in Qur'ānic ethics, so far as the present study is concerned.

(8) Both individual and family are units incorporated in a community - *ummah* - which is based on an ideology.

(9) The last three points lead to the impression that the Qur'ān favours essentially the ethics of a settled society, as contrasted to that of Jahilism, which is based mainly not on an ideology but on blood-relationship. This does not deny the fact that the Qur'ān may have agreed to some of the Jahilite-Bedouin virtues, e.g. generosity, but even in this case the virtues adopted have been moulded, so that they can suit the town-dwellers. Hence the Qur'ānic preference for the principle of the mean.

(c) THE MECCAN AND THE MEDINAN STAGES

The division into Meccan and Medinan, and any further subdivision into smaller units are meant, in principle, to show the natural development of ideas. These divisions have to depend on a reliable chronology, in order to fulfil their function. In spite of any imperfections Nöldeke's chronological order may have, the ethical notions are dealt with in this study in almost all cases according to Nöldeke's order. The main characteristics of the different Qur'ānic stages seem to be as follows:

The first Meccan period does not seem to be very interested in ethical notions, and this occurs in two ways: either the whole notion is lacking, as happens in the majority of cases, or it is faintly depicted as is the case of charity.²⁴⁰ The early passages are too religious to be of any effect in other realms such as that of ethics. One might find, however, some ethical implication in such general terms like *khayr* (Goodness, or the good). For example:

99, 7

Whoever has done a particle's weight of good, shall see it.
Such examples are not only too general, they are also rare.

The second Meccan period is the shortest of all the periods.²⁴¹ It is the first stage, however, in which most of ethical notions dealt with in this study first appear. Besides, the significance of ethical passages in the second period, is even greater than that of the third period, which comprises about the last six years in Mecca,²⁴² and contains about one third of the Qur'ān.

The third Meccan period is remarkable for its long passages of a repetitive nature in which stories of former messengers occupy a large part. Hence its additions, regarding the theme of this study, are very little.²⁴³ In a few cases, however, the third period shows its originality.²⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the third period helps by way of its explanatory descriptions, which correspond to parallel passages of earlier periods.

To appreciate the whole of the Meccan stage, one may apply to it the same term, which described the first period, namely, the generality.²⁴⁵ The message in the Meccan stage had neither a political power nor many followers. The hostility of the opponents in Mecca does not reach a state of war, contrariwise to what will be experienced in Medina. The problems of the Islamic community are not great and they can often be solved according to the tradition.

The two partial emigrations to Ethiopia and the final complete emigration to Medina are external evidences which show the idealistic - a critic might say evasive - attitude of Meccan ethics in the Qur'ān.

As regards the two groups of positive and negative ethics, they both seem to be depicted in general terms in Mecca.

The Medinan stage shows in many of its passages a concreteness which can hardly be seen in the passages of the previous stage. Thus, in those ethics concerned with parental, filial and matrimonial bonds, as well as ethics of justice, the Medinan stage is often clear-cut in its expressions. The repetitive nature of the Qur'ān, however, is responsible for a certain amount of unity of, and continuity between, the Meccan and the Medinan stages. On the other hand, one must not forget the fact that an ethical notion may be, by its very nature, a general one; hence its expression is more likely to be communicated in general terms.

Lastly, one may say that the real political and military powers which started in Medina for the first time, together with the power to mould the individual, the family and the community, both spiritually and socially, all these factors show that the Medinan stage gives more objective and concrete materials than the Meccan stage. These same factors are responsible also for the well known practicality of Qur'ānic ethics.

ABSTRACT OF THESIS

The Qur'an has been throughout the centuries a source of a vast literature. But to modern criticism the Qur'an is still a puzzle in many ways. The problem of chronology has not yet been solved. The variant forms of reading (al-qirā'at) are a cause for interpretations. The lack of sufficient pre-Islamic and contemporary documents, the vagueness of certain terms, especially in the early stages, and the problems of chronology or that of al-qirā'at, all these factors add to our difficulties.

In the field of ethics the Qur'an deals with the main problems which are known amongst moral philosophers, namely the duties or obligations, the good and the bad, and man's free-will and predestination. The largest part of Qur'anic ethics is quite obviously devoted to the treatment of duties, which are presented either as negative qualities, in the form of vices, or as positive qualities, in the form of virtues. Hence, the division of this study into Part One, which deals with a representative list of the most basic negative ethical qualities, and Part Two, which deals with a counterpart list of the main Qur'anic virtues.

The Qur'anic morality is hardly voiced in terms of absolute values: its main aspect seems to be practical. Also, the frequent fusion of the ethical element with other elements, especially the religious one, and the other difficulties mentioned above, all these factors lead to a suspension of judgement as to the existence of a system underlying the Qur'anic ethics - except in an embryonic state. In this latter sense one may consider the Qur'anic duties dealt with in this study as constituting a code of conduct which seems to be satisfactory for the needs of the Islamic community.

The main characteristics of Qur'anic ethical code may be summarily given below, as follows: The objection, in principle, to Bedouin and semi-nomadic ideals, and the preference for ideals of a settled society in which individualism flourishes. The ethical acts are, on the whole, no more judged by their external signs, since the motives and the good will are the source, according to the Qur'an, from which these acts follow. The family has its significance in this ethical code, but it does not encroach on the rights of the individuals or those of the community in general. Thus, while the pre-Qur'anic Jahilite community has taken the family as its basis, almost exclusively, the Qur'an seems to distinguish quite clearly between these three entities, namely, the individual,

the family and the community. The last of these entities provides for, and necessitates the existence of, a form of society (the State), which rules and administers. Although the Bedouin traditionalism, (or its sunnah), is criticized in the Qur'ān, the Qur'ānic dogma (and also the example of the Prophet) seem to take the place of the old tribal sunnah. The Qur'ānic ethical ideals, on the other hand, are quite distinct from the Bedouin customary code of conduct in such ideals as that of humility, chastity, charity, brotherhood and justice. In the religious sphere, the Qur'ānic piety is just the opposite of Jahilite materialism and loose morals. Lastly, the Qur'ānic ethical code is not bound by blood relationship, but on the contrary, it constitutes an ideology whose scope is above both tribal and national bonds.

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" see La Réaume.

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sellschaft.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Cf. Q. 103, 2f.; 2, 172 etc.; also, Schacht, *Origins*, 244f.; Gibb, *Structure of Religious Thought in Islam*, The Muslim World, July 1948, especially pp. 186f.
- 2 Cf. J.H. Breasted, *The Dawn of Conscience*, 29ff.; M. Guidi, art. *Corano*, *Encyclopedie Italiana*. The ethical part of the ten commandments (cf. Exodus, 20, 2, - 17) is also put in the form of thou shalt not and thou shalt, again the same dichotomy of the good and the bad.
- 3 Cf. EI (2), art. *Akhlaq* (R. Walzer and H.A.R. Gibb).
- 4 Al-Aghāni, XVI, 93 (Cairo, no date).
- 4a Published in Cairo, 1954.
- 5 Cf. Goldziher, *Die Richtungen*.
- 6 *Geschichte des Qurāns*, 1st edition in 1860 (written by Nöldeke only); 2nd edition in 1909 (extended by help of Schwally vol. I).
- 7 Cf. Gibb, *The Muslim World*, (Muhammad and the Qur'ān), 119, Ap. 1948.
- 8 After finishing the writing of my thesis, I came recently to know about an unpublished thesis on *Studies in the Ethical Doctrine of the Qur'ān*, by M. D. Rahbar (submitted to Cambridge University in 1953).
- 9 Cf. N-S I, 74.
- 10 *Mufradāt*, see under root *jh1*. This explanation of *Rāghib* is similar to what is meant by 'ignorance' in English. Cf. J. Murray (ed.) *A New Eng. Dict.* art. *Ignorance*.
- 11 *Koranische Untersuchungen*, 61f.; also, cf. Ahrens, *Christliches*, 38f.
- 12 Cf. e.g. T., *Annales*, Ser. I, Vol. III, p. 1315.
- 13 Cf. art. (h-k-m) in Brown, Driver and Briggs, *A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*.
- 14 On *hakam* and the root *hkm*, cf. e.g. Lane, ad. loc.
- 15 Cf. Z., II, 983f. etc.; cf. Lane art. *safah*; "inconstancy, lightness, hastiness".
- 16 Muhamm. Stud. I, 219ff., see with this (p. 4) in the same Vol. I. Prof. Arberry accepts this standpoint of Goldziher and finds it unfortunate that the term *jāhilīya* should be often translated "Age of Ignorance", *The Seven Odes*, pp. 251ff., London, 1957.
- 17 *Lisān*, ad. loc.
- 18 According to N-S I.
- 19 According to Bell the verse's chronology is late Meccan or early Medinan.
- 20 Cf. the Medinan passage (2, 100):
For whatsoever verse We cancel or cause ... to forget We bring a better or the like ...
- 21 XII, p. 18.
- 22 II, pp. 983 f.
- 23 Jeffery, *Materials*, 47.
- 24 Vol. XII, p. 31.
- 25 Vol. I, 615.
- 26 Cf. chapter III, below.

27 Though according to a Socrates or a Spinoza, ignorance is so general as to cover both moral and cognitive implications. But the Qur'an surely does not take such a broad view about the root *jh*l.

28 Cf. Muhamm. Stud., 219ff.

29 Vol. I, 496.

30 Cf. p. 11. 7 above. According to Lane's Lexicon *hilm* is: "clemency, forbearance, moderation".

31a On the chronology of the passage, cf. N-S, 147.

31 Vol. IV, 88.

32 Vol. I, 242.

33 Vol. XXII, 34.

34 Vol. II, 1147.

35 Z. II, 1579 claims that it is delivered at the time of the truce; cf. N-S, 215f.

35a Cf. e.g. Buhl-Schaeder, *Das Leben Muhammeds*, 356ff; also, Caetani, *Annali*, I, 215; Bell, *Muhammed's Religious Activity*, Glasgow University Oriental Society Transactions, Vol. VII, 24, 1936.

36 Pride, in Christianity, is "the first of the seven capital sins", cf. *The Oxford Dict. of the Christian Church*, London, 1957, art. *Pride*.

37 One may refer to T. and Z. in several places; cf. also, Evans, p. 43, who finds that in the category of sins committed by men against other men pride is the worst of all.

38 Bell, *Introduction to the Qur'an*, 4.

39 Della Vida, *Arab Heritage*, Faris (ed.), 49.

40 See ch. X, *infra*, on humility, a virtue very much praised by settled life, though some NT influence may not be absent.

41 See Lane, art. *kabura*.

42 The same development seems natural in other languages, e.g. the English words, "great", and "greatness".

43 New English Dictionary, art. *Proud*.

44 Cf. also *Mufradat*, art. *kabura*.

45 *Megalosine*, lit. greatness, it means "majesty" in the NT. when applied to God, see Arndt and Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the NT*, ad. loc.

46 The chronology of this verse is somewhat doubtful, cf. N-S (pp. 93f.); to Bell the verse is "fairly early". N-S, however, find that the surah 92 as a whole is early too.

47 Cf. Lane, art. *ghaniya*.

48 Cf. Vol. II, 1613.

49 See also 89, 18.

50 The word *zanim* "highly esteemed" is understood differently in *Mufradat*, art. *zana'ma*.

51 Cf. *Lisān* and Lane, art. *taghā*.

52 See art. *ashara*.

53 Vol. II, 1223.

53a The N.T. preaches a doctrine which transcends the family; cf. St. Mark (13, 12):
 Now the brother shall betray the brother to death, and the father the son; and children shall rise against their parents...

54 Moslems, despite the Qur'ānic explicit pleading to the contrary, have fallen back, in various ways, on the Jahilite notion of conservatism, or traditionalism and the blind following of the fathers; see e.g. Watt, M/Mec., 135f.

55 G.G. Bradley in his book, *Lectures on the Book of Job*, p. 30, commenting on the fact that Job has seven sons but three daughters, says: "... in all earlier stages of the history of our race, sons are prized far above their sisters".

56 Cf. Paret, *Mohammed*, 37.

57 Cf. para. 4.

58 Cf. Chapter VIII, *infra*; see also the comment on the verse in Bell's *The Qur'ān*, (in the introductory note to surah IX).

59 Sensuality in general is condemned in the teachings of the N. T. (John, 8, 11); see, Arndt, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the N. T.*, art. *porneia*, which indicates "unchastity" and "every kind of unlawful sexual intercourse".

60 Ibid., s.v.

61 Ibid., s.v.

62 Cf. N.E.D., art., lust: "... Chiefly and now exclusively implying intense moral reprobation: Libidinous desire...".

63 Ibid., 103.

64 Fornication was not a crime amongst the Jahilites; cf. art. *Zinā'*, EI (1), (Schacht).

65 Cf. footnote 64 (para. 72).

66 1. E.g., v. 4. Those who cast (imputations) upon women under ward and then do not bring forward four witnesses scourge... they are the reprobate.

67 Cf. R. Smith, *Kinship*, 143; also R. Levy, *Sociology of Islam*, I, 168.

68 On the influence of the Bedouins on town dwellers, see von Grunebaum, *Islam*, 31, Della Vida, *Arab Heritage* (ed. Faris), 48ff.

69 The word *philarguria* in the N. T. seems to indicate "love of money and avarice" at the same time, as well as other vices, too; cf. *A Greek-English Lexicon*, ad. loc.

70 Cf. Q., 17, 6.

71 Such hints in the Qur'ān are, perhaps, responsible for later ascetic trends in Islam; cf. Watt, *Al-Ghazālī*, 13-4.

72 The root *ksb* originally means, to obtain, to effect profits and the like; see P. Boneschi, *Kasaba Et Iktasaba*, *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, vol. XXX, pp. 17ff., Roma, 1955.

73 Cf. St. Luke (6, 24f.): But woe unto you that are rich... etc.

74 Cf. Dozy, *Spanish Islam*, 14; Goldziher, *Muh. Studien* I, 2.

75a The Aristotelian "mean" is a good comparison in this context, in spite of the many differences between the Qur'ān and the Aristotelian ethics; cf. V. Grunebaum, *Med. Islam*, 233. See further ch. XIII on charity, *infra*.

75 M./Med., 296 ff.

76 cf. Paret, *Grenzen*, p. 25, n. 23.

77 Q. 2, 184; 4, 159; 9, 34.

78 Many other words which are used in a technical sense in Medina for the first time, did occur in Mecca either in a neutral-primitive-sense, or in an embryonic sense justifying the Medinan technical use: usury *ribā* and charity *zakāt* are, perhaps, of this category; see on *zakāt* ch. XIII, *infra*.

79 See Bell's footnote on this verse; also Z., I, 285.

80 In the N.E.D., "Hatred" concerns a "person and his emotion or feeling of hate"; "Hostility", on the other hand, means, among other things, "hostile action exercised by one community, state or power against another; esp. such as involves war." While the Arabic roots, *mqt*, *qly*, *shny*, *krh* and *bghd* translate almost exactly the English word "hatred", some forms and uses of the root 'd w translate "hatred", while others of the same root translate "hostility".

81 Lane misses the seventh form in 'ada; cf. Dozy, *Supplément*, art. 'd w.

82 Cf. the original lexicons, e.g. *Lisān*, art. 'd w.

83 Thus Bell, for example, translates 'ad w in (6, 108) as "in response", adding to it in a footnote the following explanation: Lit. "running", probably "in a race or competition with you". Both the translation in the text and that in the footnote may not be justifiable, since it is a matter of "reviling God without knowledge", hence "transgression" or "enmity" would be more correct. The same word 'ad w Bell translates in another passage as "enmity" (10, 90).

84 Cf. art. 'd w.

85 The whole of surah 83 is considered by Moslems as very late Meccan or early Medinan; cf. N-S, 105. Anyhow, if not whole surahs, single verses can be singled out as belonging to this or that period, if there is justification, even against the obvious judgement of the Moslems.

86 The spirit of persuasion is not abandoned even in Medina, despite all the physical clashes between the two camps; cf. the following late Medinan verse (9, 6):
 If one of the polytheists asks thy protection, grant him protection until he hear the word of God, then see that he reaches a place of security; in a manahu; that is because they are a people who have no knowledge.

87 Also 3, 114 ... they will not fail you in disloyalty; they like what ye are distressed at; hatred has appeared on their lips, but that which their hearts conceal is greater ...

88 Cf. 60, 4: There was a good example for you in Abraham and those with him when they said to their people: "We are quit of you and of what ye serve ... between us and you enmity and hatred for ever until ye believe in God alone ...
 Also cf. 9, 115.

89 Cf. the following two verses bear on the Jahilite and the Qur'ānic attitude in appreciating hatred or enmity:
 9, 4
 ... those of the polytheists with whom ye have made a covenant ... fulfil their covenant ...
 9, 10 In respect of a believer they will not regard bond or agreement; they are the ill-disposed.
 The one-sidedness is obvious however; the Qur'ān speaks for itself and for its opponents as well.

90 Also see 5, 11. ... be furnishers of justice ... and let not the hatred shan'ān of a people incite you not to act fairly ...

91 Evans, *Die Idee der Sünde*, 7-39.

92 Cf. *Mufradāt*, articles 'd w and z̄lm.

93 Evans, *ibid.* 7-11, according to the author *zlm* occurs four times in the first period, sixty-four times in the second period, one hundred and twenty-nine times in the third period, and ninety-one times in Medina. The root *zlm* occurs, indeed, about three hundred and fifteen times, but in some twenty-five cases the root means darkness or being in darkness.

94 Cf. the following very early passage (99, 7f.):
 Whoever has done a particle's weight of good, shall see it; and whoever has done a particle's weight of evil, shall see it.

95 Surah (42), according to N-S, is late Meccan, though (vv. 38-39) seem to them to be Medinan, (p. 158).

98 Cf. Talaat, Sia, *Die Seelenlehre des Korans*, Halle (Saale), 1929.

99 Cf. *Mufradāt*, art. *znn*.

100 Cf. Ch. XVI, *infra*.

101 Ar-Rāghib mentions in his *Mufradāt* that, "zann in the Qur'ān is often used in a bad sense".

102 Lane in his *Lexicon*, translates *zann* as "thought, opinion"; he mentions further that *zann* is, "preponderant belief, with the admission that the contrary may be the case".

103 and

104 On the Chronology, see N-S, 103.

105 The word *hawā* in an early passage (53, 3) means "one's own inclination"; but as the passage speaks of the truth of the Prophet's revelation, one identifies *hawā* with an elusive inclination. This adds to the bad sense in which *zann* is used.

106 See on these roots, *Mufradāt* and *Lisān*, *ad loc.*

107 Cf. Z., I, 199 and 620.

108 Especially, Form III *mārā* and Form VIII *imtarā*.

109 Cf. N-S., 88 on the etymology of the root *nfq* and the various possibilities of its interpretation in the form of *munāfiq* in the Qur'ān.

110 The pronouns may be rendered "he" and "him", i.e. the Prophet; cf. other translations of the Qur'ān, e.g. Palmer's; cf. also T., XXVII, 27ff.

111 Cf. T., XXVII, 25ff.

112 *muri b* may be rendered "doubter" as well; cf. the introductory note to this section above; also, Palmer's *Translation of the Qur'an*, *ad. loc.*

113 On its chronology, cf. N-S., 105

114 See on the chronology, N-S., 213ff.

115 *Ibid.*, 215.

115a See Z. and T., *ad. loc.*

116 Cf. Palmer; also, the version of the text in the Official Edition is *yakdhibun* (who say a lie) and not *yukadhdhibūn* as Bell's rendering suggests.

117 Again, in (9, 65f.) the hypocrites are described as people who mock and play; cf. also (5, 62).

118 Or, *blw*.

119 A third root *mhn* occurs twice only, and very late in Medina, (60, 10) and (49, 3); it does not add, however, to the discussion, since it is meant only in the primitive pre-Qur'ānic sense.

120 *Ibid.*, II, 1597.

121 Cf. Ch. II and Ch. V above.

122 On the chronology, cf. N-S., 154.

123 Piety, as a basic characteristic of the Qur'ān and Muhammad's teachings, is the theme of Tor Andrae's book, *Mohammed, 'Sein Leben und Sein Glaube*, Göttingen, 1932.

x) 97 Cf. Chapters VIII, XIV and XV, *infra*.

124 Or, *wqy*, (even *tqy* is given by the lexicographers).

125 Once again I refer to Goldziher who mentions in this connection that the Prophet's main interest was, among other things, to introduce piety to the *Jahilites* who were interested only in fighting, drinking, play and love; *id.*, 2-4; also R. Dozy, *Spanish Islam*, 12 and 14f.

126 *Handwörterbuch*, art., *waqa*.

127 These primitive meanings gave rise to the Islamic term *taqīyah*.

128 Contrast this with the Greek piety, "the essence" of which, according to Jäger, "lay in giving honour to godhead"; *Paideia*, I, 8. Cf. also *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New-Testament, with Enseignements* which means, among other things, "piety, reverence, loyalty, fear of God ... godliness, religion" (tr.) Arndt and Gingrich, Cambridge, 1957.

129 Gibb, *The Muslim World ("The Structure of Religious Thought in Islam")*, Vol. XXXVIII, 117, April, 1948. Also Blachère, *Le Coran*, III, 1217, *piété*, (index); G-Demombynes, *Mahomet*, 508f.

130 Flügel in his *Concordantiae* mentions two hundred and fifty-six cases only; but cf. Bāqī's *Concordance* (in Arabic), art. *wqw*. Cf. Ch. XIII, *infra*.

132 On the chronology, cf. N-S., 83f.

133 This is the preferred rendering of *birr* according to Bell.

134 Gibb, *ibid.*, 118.

135 The word *sālihāt* occurs over sixty times and is found in all the four periods; in a few cases the same word means "good or righteous women"; cf. *khayrāt* and *tayyibāt*.

136 *Ibid.*

137 Cf. Gibb, *ibid.*, 117.

138 Cf. art. *Kiṣāṣ*, EI (1).

139 This virtue is a well-known Christian characteristic too; cf. St. Matthew, 5, 5. 11; also 1 Peter 5, 5. 6. Cf. Q. (5, 85) which bases the nearness of Christians to Moslems on the fact that the Christians are humble, "la yastakbirūn".

140 The Greeks, too, seem to have understood humility in a bad sense only, until Christianity appeared and reversed the outlook, cf. art. *Tapeinos* in *A Greek-English Lexicon*, by Arndt and Gingrich.

141 On its chronology, cf. N-S., 213.

142 Truthfulness seems to be a virtue according to pre-Qur'ānic Arabs; cf. Watt, *Free Will*, 22.

143 Endurance is, apparently, a pre-Qur'ānic virtue, too; cf. art. *Akhlāk*, EI (2), (Walzer-Gibb).

144 Cf., e.g., the following pre-Qur'ānic anecdote attributed to a Bedouin poet (Ta'abbat Sharran):
The bearer of banners he, the chosen for council he, a sayer of words strong and sound, a pusher to furthest bounds.

145 Lyall, *The Muṣaddaliyāt*, 4. (The Arabic text is given in Al-M.)

146 See Ch. XII on Chastity, *infra*. /144/ *Muṣaddaliyāt*, ed. by Lyall, 14.)

146 Although no special room is given in the present study for the notion and ethics of individualism, in the Qur'an, the latter gives sufficient significance for individualism by which, once more, the tribalism of the *Jahiliyya*

lites is attacked; cf. (35, 19), late Meccan:

One burdened soul will not bear the burden of another ... even though it were a near relative ... whoever seeks purity, to his own advantage he seeks purity; and to God is the trend.

147 See Ch. XIV, *infra*.

148 The relatives are thought of mostly, in the Qur'ān, when division and distribution of wealth are concerned; cf. passages where *al-qurbā* occurs, e.g. 1728; 16, 92; 4, 9.40. Nevertheless, "love amongst kins-folk" (cf. 42, 22, a late Meccan passage, see Bell's footnote to the verse.) It is difficult, however, to prove that love and charity towards the kinsfolk in the Qur'ānic positive ethics are a revival of Jahilite tribalism, despite some apparent resemblance.

149 Christianity, too, attacked the Greek and Roman customs of infanticide; cf. Westermarck, *Christianity and Morals*, 238ff., 237, etc.

150 The Jewish Foundations, 139.

151 Cf. Ch. III, section (a), *supra*.

152 See section (b), CH. III, *supra*.

153 Cf. para. 188.

154 Cf. Ch. XV on justice, below; see further the following Medinan verse: 4, 12

x) ... whether your ((parents)) *ābā'* or your ((children)) *abnā'* are of most benefit to you ye know not ...

156 This translates "al-jār" which is rendered by Bell in (8, 50) as "neighbour"; (see, Lane under *al-jār*). Both versions are true, though the first understands the context against a Bedouin background, while the second chooses a settled society as a background. This is an example, which points to a big problem when it is extended to the whole of the Qur'ān. Cf. Della Vida, *Arab Heritage*, (ed.) Faris, 55f., who pleads for the second alternative. Also, the impression one gets from Torrey's *The Commercial-Theological Terms in the Koran*, and Watt's *M/Mec.* and *M/Med.* is that of the second alternative - though with some compromise in the case of Watt. For the present writer, both factors are present, though with different emphasis according to the case under consideration. Cf. also Lammens, *Le Berceau de l'Islam*, 185f., etc., and Nöldeke, *Arabs (Ancient)*, in ERE.

157 It may be added that male parents and children have a greater share in the inheritance than their female counterparts; cf. e.g., 4. 12. But this does not seem to encroach on the equality between them in the ethical sense.

158 The subject of chastity in the Qur'ān has been discussed in modern times mainly in its relations to family and matrimonial life. One may cite the following works as examples: A. Ali, *Spirit of Islam*; G. Stern, *Marriage in Early Islam*; R. Levy, *Sociology of Islam*; M/Med. B. Farès' *L'Honneur chez les Arabes avant l'Islam* is valuable as regards the origins of many Qur'ānic expressions bearing on chastity.

159 Cf. art. *Chastity (Moslem)* in ERE (Juynboll).

160 Cf. Lane and Lisan, art. *tahara*.

161 Cf. Sabbagh, *La Métaphore*, 142f.

162 Torrey, *The Commercial-Theological Terms*, 6.

x) Cf. Ch. XIV, *infra*.

163 According to N-S it is the second surah in order of chronology; in the Official Egyptian Edition it comes fourth; Bell too considers the first part of the surah as early.

164 The Qur'anic conception of virginity never seems to understand the case as more than the preparatory stage of marriage. Even the Virgin had a son, and the virgins of the other world will be soon married to the virtuous folk; cf. e.g., 56, 34-37.

165 Celibacy in the form of monasticism seems to occur only in (57, 27) which reads:

... Jesus ... We set in the hearts of his followers, kindness and mercy and monasticism they invented it ... out of desire for the satisfaction of God ...

166 Of the third period.

167 Cf. Lane, art. *hyy*.

168 Other derivatives of the same root are employed in the same sense, e.g. the following Medinan passage: 33, 53

... do not enter the houses of the prophet, without observing when he is ready ... that has been insulting the prophet, and he is ashamed of you, but God is not ashamed of the truth ...

169 The same verse (4, 3) declares also: "if ye fear that ye may not be fair, then one (only)". In a later verse of the same surah (v. 128) polygamy is tolerated at the risk of being unjust, it reads:

Ye will not be capable of dealing evenly *ta'dilu* among the women (i.e. your wives) even though ye be eager (to do so) ...

170 Cf. ERE, *Charity* (various sections); also Kittel, *Wörterbuch zum N. T.*, art. *kharis*.

171 E.G. Grimm, *Mohammed*, I, 14, 25, 40 etc. Contrast, Hurgronje, *Verspreide Geschriften*, I, 353 f.

172 Cf. De Boer, art. *Charity (Muslim)*, in ERE; also Torrey, *The Jewish Foundations*, 140 f.

173 Ch. Ch. IX, *supra*.

174 Torrey, *ibid.*

175 Cf. Jeffery, *Vocab.*, articles, *zakā* and *sadaqa*; also Ahrens, *Christliches im Koran*, *siddiq* and *zakāt*, 19 ff.; Horovitz, *Koranische Untersuchungen*, *siddiq*, 49; Torrey, *ibid.*; also Torrey in his well known thesis observes that the so-called Qur'anic commercial-theological terms, "are almost without exception native words ... notably free from foreign elements", *Commercial-Theological Terms*, 3 f. One may add to this that the nativeness of the Qur'anic notion of charity is shown, at least partly, by using several indigenous expressions, despite the fact that *zakāt* and *sadaqa* are loan-words.

176 Contrast, Mt. 6, 25; Luke, 14, 33; 18, 20 ff.

177 It seems that according to the Qur'ān what might be termed the taxed wealth is highly enjoyable and licit.

178 Cf. Goldziher, *Hadith and the N. T.*, 42 f.; also Moscati, *Ancient Semitic Civilization*, 216 f.

179 Cf. Macdonald, *Development*, 66 f; also Anderson in an article in the BSOAS, vol XX, 1957, 13 f.

180 Cf. Anderson, *ibid.* 18

181 See on *māl*, *Lisān*, *Mufradāt*, and Lane, s.v.

182 Cf. on *yatazakkā*, M. Mec. 165ff.

183 On the need of feeding the poor *miskīn*, cf. further 107, 3; 90, 14ff.

184 Cf. M/Med., 369ff.

185 Cf. Goldziher, *ibid.*

186 Cf. M. /Med., 253ff.

187 *Ibid.*

188 Although the preceding and succeeding verses are Medinan, this verse seems to N-S (p. 158) as Meccan; the same verse, according to Bell's re-arrangement, is either late Meccan or early Medinan.

189 The verse in which this passage occurs is related mainly to the institution of fasting, but as "feeding the poor" as a possible expiation *fidyah* for failing to fast, is mentioned in the verse, the passage quoted above may be taken as an explanatory *obiter dictum*.

190 The nearest term in the N. T. to the Qur'ānic words of brotherhood and love is *philadelphia*, which may be rendered also as "brotherly love"; cf. A Theological Word Book, art. Family. Both the Qur'ān and the N. T. seem, by introducing brotherhood and love, based on ideological factors, to transcend a tribal solidarity based on kinship; cf. Ch. III and Ch. VI above. In the Qur'ān, as will be seen presently, the notion of friendship stands often for both love and brotherhood. The three notions, however, are so coupled in the same text, or in parallel passages that they form together a composite concept. Some differentiation between brotherhood and love in the Qur'ān similar to that between hostility and hatred might be helpful, namely that brotherhood is of a social character; while love concerns the individual and his attitude; cf. the introductory note to Ch. VI above. The differentiation cannot be, however, easily defended; since the ideas in the Qur'ān are not often accessible to classification.

191 Le Problème de M., 85f.

192 Among Western scholars who believe that Islam is a national religion one may cite the following authors: Wellhausen, Reste, 65; Torrey, The Jewish Foundations, 2; Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, 78; the same author in a later work (Islam, 66) seems to deviate slightly from his former position. Bell sides with this view too, as the wording of his Translation of the Qur'ān shows; see lastly, M./Med., 143. The opposite view is usually held by Moslem scholars, though it does not lack some Western supporters; cf. A. Ali, Spirit, 138; M. Iqbal, The Reconstruction, 126, 140 etc.; Fyzee, Outlines, 12f. As to Western writers, other than those mentioned by Blachère above, one may mention the following examples, Hirschfeld, New Reserches, 21; Obermann (Islamic Origins), Arab Heritage, ed. Faris, 87; Toynbee, Civilization, 87, 205; Somervell, A Study, 138, 300; Spengler, The Decline, II, 190. Both views are strangely enough, supported in the Qur'ān.

193 Contrast Ch. III above, where the Qur'ān argues how the *Jahilites* built their community on mere kinship; hence, even the notion of nationhood seems to have been vague in their minds.

194 Cf. EI (2) s.v.; also N-S i, 71; Nöldeke, art. Arabs in ERE; Wellhausen, Reste, 184ff; Paret, Mohammed, 16f.

195 Cf. Paret, Grenzen, 21, n. 12, where the author mentions that "the

term *alwān* refers essentially to the colour of the skin, but the meaning might further imply human races, too".

196 The Official Egyptian Edition of the Qur'ān mentions 'ālimin (those who know) and not 'alamīn (worlds); Paret agrees with the first reading, *ibid.* 21. Bell, however, agrees with Flügel who accepts the latter reading.

197 Cf. N-S i, 64.

198 Cf. Lisan, Rāghib and Lane on *walī*.

198a Cf. art. *Toleration* in ERE, especially the section on Mohammedan toleration.

199 Cf. 9, 23, para. 228.

200 Cf. Lane, s.v.

201 The text of this verse is variously interpreted; cf. Bell in his comment on the verse; also see T., XXV, 13ff.

202 On the chronology of the verse see N-S, 157f.

203 In the first section of this chapter it has been tried to fuse the very religious idea, namely that of the Qur'ānic message, with the ethical notions of brotherhood and love. This attempt has been used because of the implications that the religious idea is thought to have and not because of any identification between the Qur'ānic message, or religion, and the very specific notions of brotherhood and love in their ethical contexts.

204a One might recall here that neither Homer nor Hesiod knew the word *dikaiosine* (justice) - instead they designated justice by *dike* (judicial decision) - and *themis* (good counsel); cf. Del Vecchio, *Justice*, 6. Besides, the roots *hqq* and *hkm* in the Qur'ān mean 'truth' and 'justice', and 'wisdom' and 'giving judgement' respectively. Among the early Greeks Dike the goddess of judgements is the sister of Truth; c.f. Del Vecchio, *ibid.*, 6f. Again, the root *hkm* in the O.T. denotes the idea of giving judgements in controversies as well as the idea of wisdom; cf. A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the O.T., art. *h-k-m*.

204 Cf. Z., II, 1586.

205 Cf. Del Vecchio, *Justice*, 86f.

206 Cf., e.g. Q., 3, 128; also Westermarck, *Ethical Relativity*, 71, and *Morals*, 41.

207 Cf. Z., I, 745; also Q., 10, 36:
 ... whether then is He who guideth to the truth *haqq* more entitled to be followed, or he who does not guide unless he be guided? What is wrong with you? How ye judge!

208 E. g. 42, 14; 10, 48 and 55.

209 E. g. ..., 46.

210 The term *s id q* or the phrase *q awl al-haqq* and other expressions in the Qur'ān show that the notion of speaking the truth is another main virtue in the Qur'ān. But the same expressions fuse the religious truth and the ethical truth to such an extent that they cannot often be of any use to the latter.

211 Cf. M/Med., 261, where the Medinan legislations are considered as "social reforms" and "an adequate response to the needs of the times".

212 Cf. Bell's footnote to this verse.

213 In this connection one might recall an interesting theory in which law, customs, and morality are in their contents, "to a considerable extent

the same", though their "forms" are distinguished from each other"; also, "the law is professedly an instrument of justice, which is a moral principle"; Lamont, *The Principles*, 27ff.; cf. with this art. 'adala in *Mufradāt*.

214 Cf. Q., 5, 45.

215 The bilaterality of law and justice was known to the Romans (cf. Del Vecchio, *Justice*, 56) whose influence on the pre-Qur'ānic Arabs seems to be nil; cf. Schacht (*the Law in Unity and Variety*, ed. Von Grunebaum, especially pp. 70ff.

216 Cf. para. 245, *infra*.

217 Cf. Levy, *Sociology*, II, 70ff.; also, Schacht, *ibid.*, "... the Prophet had to resign himself to applying religious and ethical principles to the legal norms and relationships as he found them." (p. 68). Cf. also Q., 31, 16; 7, 192 etc.

218 In this connection one must mention the Qur'ānic command of Holy War *jihād* against the Polytheists, with whom neither peace nor mercy are recommended (cf. e.g. 9, 5). Also, the physical punishment inflicted on the sinners in the next world is well-known and repeatedly mentioned in the Qur'ān.

218a The Qur'ān speaks in most cases of certitude - in a subjective sense - rather than of certainty. In English both words may be used in both a subjective and an objective sense, though there is a tendency to use the word "certitude" in a subjective sense, and "certainty" in an objective sense; cf. ERE, and *English Dictionary* (ed. Murray), art. *Certainty*; Lalande, *Vocabulaire*, art. *Certain*; *The Catholic Encyclopaedia*, art. *Certitude*.

219 Cf. Ch. VIII, *supra*.

220 Cf. *Moral Principles*, ed. Anshen, 380.

221 See footnote 219.

222 Knowledge and truth imply evidence and strict reasoning, while Faith does not need evidence. Thus the Qur'ān is justified, only formally, in contrasting its certainty to opinion, ignorance, and doubt; but in reality this certainty is not based on the elaborate procedures of knowledge and truth, on the contrary, it is rather identified with Faith; see references given in footnote 218a; cf. also, *The Dictionary of Philosophy*, art. *Certainty*.

223 It is of great interest in this connection, too, to study the Prophet's confidence in his mission and his self-assurance and certitude in his visions and revelations and their contents; also, being "the first Moslem" (Q., 6, 163) entitles him to be the best contrast to a Jahilite doubter or a Medinan hypocrite. But all this, though very significant even to a critic, needs to be studied separately.

224 Cf. Lane, *Rāghib and Lisan*, art. *yq̄n*.

225 The expression *h aqq a l yaqīn* (the truth which is certain) is to be found also e.g. 69, 51 and 56, 95.

226 See footnote 225.

227 Cf. also 2, 112 and 74, 31ff. (these latter verses are Medinan incorporated in a Meccan surah, see N-S., 88).

228 Cf., e.g. Q., 22, 77:

Strive for God ... He hath chosen you and hath not laid upon you any straitness in religion - the creed of your father Abraham; He hath called you Moslems.

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229 Cf. Ch. I and Ch. VIII.
230 In this connection it is not unwise to state that, "properly speaking, there is no certainty, there are, only, men who are certain" cf. Lande, *ibid.*
231 This situation on the face of it is similar to what is known in Greek philosophy, except that knowledge and opinion in the Qur'ān refer not only to the human context but also to divine origins. Cf. ERE, *ibid.*
232 Cf. Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung*.
233 See Ch. I, Ch. VII and Ch. IX
234 E.g. the term "hypocrites" and the expression "those in whose hearts is disease"; cf. para. 147, para. 149 and para. 150
235 Cf. Ch. XIII. According to Evans' work 'Die Idee der Sünde im Koran' there are some twenty roots, each of which has often more than one word derived from it, which convey the concept of sin in the Qur'ān. Here the thorny problem of chronology steps in, however
236 Cf. Lamont, *The Principles*, 27f.
237 The Definition of Law, 21
238 According to Berdyaev, "the dualism of good and evil is the presupposition of morality", *The Destiny of Man*, 109.
240 Cf. paras. 207, 208.
241 Cf. N-S, 70.
242 Cf. N-S, 72 ff.
243 Cf. e.g. the third period in Ch. V, Ch. VI and Ch. IX, *supra*.
244 Cf. para. 181 and para. 199.
245 "Generality" here is applied in the sense of, "being opposed to what is specific", as well as in the sense of, "being vague and equivocal".



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