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Pressure Groups and Political Culture

A comparative study

Francis G. Castles

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FRANCIS G. CASTLES

This volume offers a new approach to the study of pressure groups, whose importance in the British political system has been increasingly recognized in recent years. Mr Castles seeks to throw light on this topic, firstly by examining the theoretical approaches to an understanding of their role in the political process and secondly by presenting a number of specific studies. For the first time, in one volume, the reader can become acquainted with pressure groups in continental Europe, Scandinavia, the United States, the totalitarian countries, and the emergent nations. The study is comprehensive in itself and also an invaluable guide to more detailed work in this field of political science.

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Pressure groups and political culture

A comparative study

by Francis G. Castles

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

This series of paper-back monographs is designed primarily to meet the needs of students of government, politics, or political science in Universities and other institutions providing courses leading to degrees. Each volume aims to provide a brief general introduction indicating the significance of its topic e.g. executives, parties, pressure groups, etc., and then a longer 'case study' relevant to the general topic. First year students will thus be introduced to the kind of detailed work on which all generalizations must be based, while more mature students will have an opportunity to become acquainted with recent original research in a variety of fields. The series will eventually provide a comprehensive coverage of most aspects of political science in a more interesting and fundamental manner than in the large volume which often fails to compensate by breadth what it inevitably lacks in depth.

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H.V.W.

Contents

	Acknowledgments	*page* ix
	Preface: the 'science' of politics	xi
1	Pressure group theory and its problems	1
	Pressure group studies	3
	The problems	6
	The structural-functional approach	9
	The structural-differentiation approach	13
	Conclusion	17
2	The emergent nations	19
	The undeveloped country—traditional society	19
	The developing nation—transitional society	22
	Possibilities for the future	29
3	Totalitarianism	32
	The irrelevance of doctrine	32
	The methods of repression	33
	(i) *Total terror*	34
	(ii) *Total regimentation*	35
	(iii) *Total control of opinion*	40
	The value-orientated nature of totalitarianism	42
4	Continental Europe—the politics of immobility	44
	The fragmentation of political culture	44
	Party-group relations	47
	The constellation of political forces	51
	Value-oriented nature of politics	52
	The use of violence	55
	The decline of extremism	56
5	Scandinavia	60
	Group consensus	60
	The party system	63

5 Scandinavia—*continued*
The group universe page 65
Finland 69
Attitude groups 71

6 The Anglo-American system—the autonomous interest group 73

The process of interest articulation 73
Some theoretical considerations 82
Attitude groups in America 84

7 Attitude groups in Britain 88

Norm-oriented and value-oriented groups 88
The reaction to strain 91
'The world's slow stain' 94
The tactics of persuasion 96

8 Conclusion 100

Initial hypotheses 100
Typological conclusions 103
Pressure groups and political culture 105
Suggestions for further reading 107

Bibliography 109

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F.G.C.

To Margaret

The general tone of political studies is not, I think it will be almost universally admitted, a scientific one. More to the point, it is felt in many quarters that it neither could nor should attempt to 'ape' the aims and methods of the scientific disciplines. The study of Politics is here at variance with developments in other branches of the Social Sciences. Economics has developed an avowedly empiricist and positivist approach to its material, and Sociology, at least the more modern schools, seems to be following in its footsteps. Despite this, Politics has on the whole eschewed the 'nomothetic' generalizing methods of its sister disciplines, and has largely contented itself with either philosophic speculation or the 'ideographic', historical approach.

This preface, and indeed the whole of this book, is a plea for Politics as a discipline to make itself more 'scientific'. This does not imply any desire to 'ape' the methods of the Physical Sciences as such, but instead of making our primary task the description and 'understanding' (Verstehen, as Weber called it) of past concatenations of events, we should attempt some more general classification of political phenomena and, moreover, evolve hypotheses capable of testing and refutation; our eventual aim being at least some minimal ability to predict the likely outcomes of a number of political events.

Even to suggest the possibility of a predictive science of

Politics is to run into the philosophical problem of the value-impregnation of supposedly factual material in the study of man. The discipline of Politics is, in a sense, more introspective than many others, in that it is constantly querying its own right to be a discipline at all, much less a scientific discipline. All scientific studies are at their outset faced with methodological problems which threaten their very existence; in the case of the Natural Sciences, one only has to mention Hume and the problem of induction. One might even make the generalization that it is precisely those disciplines which are most introspective about their methodological problems that find it hardest to get off the ground. The only way to achieve results is to look at problems and come to conclusions, which may or may not be valid. It is by their results ye shall know them! If we attempt a science of Politics, and none of our hypotheses can be validated, we may begin to doubt the feasibility of the whole project, but if we merely argue about whether such a science is possible we will never be in a position to know if we were right or not. In brief, what I am arguing is that, even if a science of Politics is impossible due to value-impregnation of fact, the best way of proving such a proposition is to attempt to refute it, by being Political Scientists rather than Philosophers or Historians.

The object of this work on Pressure Group Politics is to set up a number of hypotheses and to attempt to test them in the light of varying political conditions in different nations. As so often happens, I am sure that by the time the monograph is finished there will be more unanswered questions than when we began. This is by no means an admission of defeat, since the object of any study such as this is to open up new avenues of research. Indeed, it is not only the unanswered questions which may need to be looked at, but also those to which the author has attempted a solution. As Professor Popper points out, it is not verification which is a pre-requisite of science, but the attempt at refutation (Karl

Popper, 1957). It is only insofar as criticism does not produce a series of contradictions to one's conclusions that one can have any grounds for satisfaction with them.

One further comment is in order in regard to the way in which the material in this book is arranged. Although the formulation of hypotheses is our major task, it is also very necessary to delineate the types of phenomena which are amenable to such explanation. Thus Chapter I advances a series of explanatory hypotheses as to the way in which certain kinds of groups behave and may best be analysed, whereas the following chapters are intended for the most part to be typological rather than explanatory in purpose. We say for the most part advisedly, since it will become apparent as the book proceeds that a number of generalizations about the relationship between political culture and the type of group activities current in a particular political system are being advanced. Although our major task is to delineate the characteristics of the group structure in various political contexts, this need not preclude an interest in the nature and origins of that structure. In the conclusion it is hoped that we can make some of these generalizations about the connection between group activity and political culture more explicit.

In a sense the material contained in this monograph is not original: what we will do is take a new look at the field of pressure group behaviour, which already possesses a not inconsiderable literature on some topics. In some respects our desire to generalize may provide a useful introduction to the field, since it will be necessary to give some critical examination to the work that has gone before. On the other hand, and for the same reason, little direct reference is made to the actual working of particular pressure groups, a procedure which both our space and schematic approach preclude.

The justification, then, for this book is the desire to ask some new and pertinent questions about a particular area of political activity, namely pressure group behaviour. Its

value lies, I hope, in the attempt to make generalized statements applicable to group activities in a number of political systems. Such generalizations may be found untenable without considerable modification. This would not be surprising in such a relatively unexplored field. What is to be hoped is that the questions will be answered, whether by the author or by those who follow him.

1

Pressure group theory and its problems

The study of pressure groups as such is a comparatively recent one, dating from Arthur F. Bentley's *The Process of Government*, published in 1908. That this is so is evinced by the almost total confusion of terminology which reigns in the field. Even the term 'pressure group' is not accepted by some writers on the grounds that the word 'pressure' has pejorative connotations. This being the case, and in order to induce clarity into our subsequent discussions, we shall define some of the more basic points before we proceed. The criticism of the terms because they have pejorative implications is an example of value-impregnation of fact, a phenomenon we have already remarked, but one which seems not unduly difficult to dismiss. The importance of a term to a scientist is its exact defined connotation, not its implication to the uninitiated. However pejorative a term, if we only use it to describe something in accord with a strict definition we can hardly go wrong. Thus we will define pressure groups as 'any group attempting to bring about political change, whether through government activity or not, and which is not a political party in the sense of being represented, at that particular time, in the legislative body'. This definition has the virtue that it stresses the fact that pressure for political change may in certain 'political cultures', particularly in

totalitarian regimes and to some extent in primitive societies, not be exerted to change policy, but to change the government, and indeed the form of government. The pressures for political change are in all societies omnipresent, and to ignore, say, 'nationalist movements' under this heading is to neglect any similarities imposed on groups by virtue of the factor they have in common: the exertion of political pressure. Even within our own political culture, as we shall see, some groups are more likely than others to feel that the only solution to their problem is the removal of the government, and, if necessary, the forcible imposition of their views. This is particularly true of the minor parties, which our definition includes.

We shall make a sub-classification of pressure groups according to more widely accepted criteria (H. Eckstein, 1960; Allen Potter, 1961) and suggest they fall basically into one of two categories:

(i) The 'interest' group which is set up to protect shared sectional interests.

(ii) The 'attitude' group set up to achieve a specifically delimited objective or cause and which is defined not in terms of the common interests of its members, but in relation to their shared attitudes.

It may be felt that these groups in practice overlap considerably, and of course they do to some extent, but for the most part, one is able to assign a group to one or other of the categories quite easily. The potential membership of an interest group is defined quite simply by the number of individuals belonging to that particular section (thus the Automobile Association has a potential clientele consisting of all British vehicle owners). On the other hand, the possession of a shared attitude is a subjective criterion which makes it harder to delimit a group's potential membership. Interest groups are on the whole permanent groups which act as the section's spokesman as long as the section exists, whereas attitude groups are at best semi-permanent, in that

they only exist as long as their objective or cause remains unattained.

Pressure group studies

Having defined our terms, let us then examine briefly the sort of work that has been carried out in the study of pressure group behaviour. It is interesting to note that the interest in pressure groups is contemporaneous with two significant developments in the field of Politics. One of these was the pluralist conception of society which to some extent replaced the idea of the individual citizen faced by the monolithic sovereign State. Pluralist theory posits a series of mediating groups between State and citizen, a balance of forces which produces in their conflict social consensus and social policy. With the beginnings of government intervention in the economic sphere, even before the beginning of this century, it came to be felt in some circles that only by organized group action, the combination of the power of a large number of individuals, could the defenceless citizen be protected from the omnipotent State.

The other simultaneous development was the growth of big business and big labour, the large corporations which came in some cases to rival the power of the State. Much of the theorizing about pressure groups has concerned their desirability and much of the confusion on this subject stems from an inability to separate these two developments. We may point to pressure groups as the mediator between State and citizen, or suggest they provide a useful channel of democratic participation between elections, and therefore conclude that they are desirable. At the same time, we may be disturbed about the growing power of vested interests exercising great influence behind locked doors—in other words, Finer's *Anonymous Empire*.

Being more interested in what pressure groups do than in

whether it is a good thing that they do it, we shall proceed to review the current state of studies in this field. Perhaps the single most striking aspect here is that contemporary study has been almost exclusively on interest rather than on attitude groups. This is to a very great degree a result of the fact that the study of groups is largely a phenomenon of the Anglo-American political scene in which attitude groups do not play as large a part as in other political cultures. Finer's work *Anonymous Empire* is a good example of an emphasis on interest groups to the exclusion of other considerations. In it he catalogues the main components of the British 'group universe' as follows: the business Lobby; the Labour Lobby; the co-operative movement; the professions; civic groups, churches and educational organizations. Those bodies which might be described as attitude groups are included under civic groups, a term singularly inappropriate to describe the more militant wing of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. What information we have on attitude groups is largely the result of books appearing on the more controversial groups —e.g. Christopher Driver's *The Disarmers* and Tom Driberg's recent work on the Moral Rearmers. Such works are in general of an historical and descriptive nature and not intended to give any more generalized insight into the workings of similar groups; in a word, they are untheoretical.

This last comment is not applicable to the various studies of interest groups as such; there have been various suggestions as to how such activities might be analysed. One example is provided by Harry Eckstein's analysis of the British Medical Association, in which he categorizes the determinants of pressure group activities under the following headings (H. Eckstein, 1960, Chapter I):

(i) The *form* of their activities. Various factors influence the channels of pressure group activity, among them being the nature of the governmental structure, the activities of government (in the sense of which branch

plays the major part in decision making), and the ethos of the political system insofar as it is favourable or inimical to pressure group activity as such.

(ii) Their *intensity* and *scope*. Intensity refers to the fervour with which an objective is pursued, and also to the group's persistence. Scope denotes the 'number and variety of groups engaged in politics'. The determining factors here are such characteristics as the social legitimation of group activity and the group's specific aim, and also the extent to which the political structure is able to fulfil the demands made of it.

(iii) Their *effectiveness*. The determinants of major importance here are a group's physical resources, its wealth, membership in relation to potential membership (as we have seen, this is more important in the case of interest groups), and its expertise.

Eckstein further notes that groups tend to articulate themselves on the pattern of the governmental institutions with which they have dealings. That is to say, they develop a similar hierarchy, and in the case of the B.M.A. he illustrates the close ties between the associational hierarchy and the civil service. Other issues which have received some theoretical attention have been the existence of what John Kenneth Galbraith calls 'counter-vailing' pressures (J. K. Galbraith, 1958), i.e. where the existence of one interest or attitude group is to some extent cancelled out by one with a contrary purpose—for instance, anti-blood sports groups are to some extent neutralized by the Field Sports Society, which has on occasion been able to mobilize up to 100,000 members (Allen Potter, 1961). The phenomenon of 'over-lapping' membership is another which has been discussed, because it provides a curb against the unbridled use of pressure group power. The fact that one is a member of both the R.S.P.C.A. and the Field Sports Society means one is only against fox hunting 'in principle'. One last, much discussed aspect of interest

group activity is the 'potential group', that is to say, a group which comes into existence when there is a threat to its implicitly held values. In effect, of course, every group was once a potential group until some sort of threat was felt. An example here might be the gradual growth of the Noise Abatement Societies in the face of ever-increasing jet air transport.

The problems

Thus while it is possible to point to a certain amount of research in the field we may also note certain deficiencies. Most specifically, the state of research on pressure group politics presents two basic problems if we are ever to attain some general categorization in theoretical terms of group politics as it operates in differing political systems. These may be delineated as follows:

(i) The emphasis on interest groups has led to not altogether acceptable generalization of the categories used in their study to pressure groups as a whole. As an example of this we may take Finer's definition of the Lobby, that is to say, the sum of groups operating within the Polity: 'The sum of organizations insofar as they are occupied at any point in time in trying to influence the policy of public bodies, though unlike political parties, *never themselves prepared to undertake the direct government of the country*' (Finer, 1958, p. 2) (my italics). What must be noted here is that while such a definition may be entirely fitting for an interest group, it is by no means so obviously applicable to an attitude group, such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The history of this movement would seem to indicate that, even if it was not as such an 'organization willing to take over direct government of the country', certain integral groups contemplated action whose logical consequences must have in-

cluded such an act. In this context we may note various proposals for putting up 'unilateralist' candidates, 'Voter's Veto' (a campaign designed to see that voters did not vote for any multilateralist candidate), not to mention the activities of the Committee of One Hundred. (See later chapter 7, Attitude groups in Britain).

Very often, too, conclusions holding true of interest groups are more dubious in the context of the attitude group. Thus the conception that the group will be articulated on the basis of the governmental institutions with which it deals seems inapplicable to a number of protest movements. Their activity is very largely restricted to 'grass-roots' campaigning; they attempt to activate a body of opinion behind their views, but without formal representation to the powers-that-be. That this is so is one reason that C.N.D. was able to preserve a loosely organized campaign structure over a number of years, a structure which at no time involved formal membership, a criterion of prime importance in determining the 'effectiveness' of interest groups. Indeed, much of Eckstein's analysis is vitiated by the attempt to apply categories applicable to groups which consult and negotiate with government departments (interest groups) to the study of attitude groups, which in many instances do not. It is reasonable enough to postulate that the structure of government and its activities are the major determinants of the type of action carried out by those groups which attempt to get favourable administrative and legislative decisions from the government; it is altogether another matter to expect a group which envisages a major alteration in social norms or values to behave in such a way. Thus we may conclude that in any future analysis of pressure groups there is a need for greater concentration on the distinctive aspects of the attitude group.

(ii) The second problem with which we are faced is presented by pressure group study's very nature, as an Anglo-

American discipline. The modern political analyst professes to be interested in the comparative study of political institutions, but is it in fact possible to apply the categories developed for the analysis of interest groups in other political systems? This question is more apparent when we ask ourselves what constitutes a pressure group in the 'underdeveloped' nations. Here we find few sectional groups representing large sections of the population; the groups which do exert power tend to be parts of the traditional aristocratic elite, bureaucracy, church, or perhaps most frequently, the armed forces. Unfortunately the Anglo-American analysis of pressure groups includes none of these, since they are traditionally regarded as politically neutral. But we do not need to go far afield to see the error of this view. The French Army Revolt and de Gaulle's subsequent rise to power are illustrative of the fact that under certain circumstances (in this case the aftermath of the Indo-Chinese war and the continuing Algerian war of independence) sufficient strain may be produced to activate such groups, even in Western political systems. Furthermore, if we look only at European systems of government, we can see aspects of pressure politics that do not occur in the Anglo-American framework. There is, for instance, the phenomenon of the colonization of a political party by a pressure group, or the converse, where a political party controls the activities of a supposedly autonomous group; an example of the former would be the influence of the Catholic Church on the French Christian Democratic Party (the M.R.P.) and of the latter, the Communist Party's control of a large part of the French trade union movement (the C.G.T.). All this indicates the need for a comparative approach to the study of pressure groups; an approach which explains, not only the variations we have noted as between interest and attitude groups, but also the cross-cultural differences we have just noted.

The structural-functional approach

When we say there is need for a comparative approach we do not, in fact, mean that the more conventional methods of the discipline of 'Comparative Politics' are the most appropriate. Basically these methods would appear to fall into two categories:

(i) The 'country-by-country approach. The objective here is the presentation of a political system in its total configuration. As an example we might cite Sir Ivor Jennings' *The British Constitution*, which deals with all aspects of the British political structure.

(ii) The comparison of a particular political institution as it operates in the context of varying political environments. An example here would be K. C. Wheare's *Legislatures*.

There is no doubt that for many purposes both methods have their advantages and there is no doubt at all that both have a large and influential body of academic adherents. Nonetheless, as B. E. Brown points out, both suffer from a fundamental weakness, that such descriptive work, however many countries are dealt with, is in no sense cumulative. A great deal of information, mainly of an empirical nature, may be derived from both the above approaches, but neither is really able to relate salient features of disparate political systems. We have here what Brown calls the 'layer-cake' approach, since 'the result is to put one layer of information on top of another and so on until the observer runs out of countries, time or interest' (B. E. Brown, 1962, p. 2).

As an alternative to the methods described we suggest the use of structural-functional analysis as a theoretical approach capable both of helping to explain the phenomena with which we deal in Politics, and also as a valid basis for comparison within and between political systems. This approach stresses a number of concepts which would be important in a comparative context. One is the idea of system.

This concept in part owes its intellectual origin to the study of Physiology, which pictures the organism as a self-maintaining system, the continued existence of which is promoted by the fulfilment of certain basic functions. Within this system are others, such as the endocrinal system and the nervous system, which through constant interaction and reaction with the organism's environment, preserve a balance which is called 'life'. Without in any way trying to stretch this analogy too far, it seems a very fruitful approach to society to see it in terms of a social system containing within it a number of sub-systems, which interact with each other. Talcott Parsons in his work *Economy and Society* delineates four such sub-systems: adaptive, goal attainment, integrative and latency. The adaptive sub-system is that through which the society's resources are allocated, the goal attainment sub-system is that through which the society's shared goals are put into practice, this being particularly important to us, since this sub-system is largely synonymous with what we call the Political. What is of relevance here, however, is the concept of interchange at the boundaries of sub-systems; it is in this sphere that the economic affects the political and so on. The idea that Politics, Economics, etc., are interconnected is nothing new, but Functionalism does at least have the virtue that it stresses the fact. Moreover, it stresses not only a one-way traffic; interaction is mutual and not only between the systems we have mentioned; at the integrative boundary the 'support' of political groups is exchanged for authoritative policy decisions, that is to say group demands are met in return for endowing individuals with powerful 'status-roles' (Talcott Parsons, 1965). In the specific context of political studies we get the concept of 'political culture', which forms an environment or backdrop to the political stage and forms the attitudes of the actors and shapes the workings of the political institutions they have set up (Almond and Verba, 1963).

A further conceptual advantage of this approach is its idea of 'function'. Having earlier pointed out the lack of any

cumulative method in the study of comparative Politics, I should like to suggest how the concept of function can help us. The goal attainment sub-system exists because for society to continue it must postulate certain ends chosen from a limited set of alternatives, and for these ends to be translated into concrete action necessitates requirements or functions of the system. As an example we will cite Gabriel Almond's division of political functions as presented in the introduction to Almond and Coleman's *The Politics of Developing Areas*. Here he posits a balance of input and output functions that the political system must carry out:

Input	*Output*
Political socialization and recruitment	Rule making
Political communication	Rule application
Interest articulation	Rule adjudication
Interest aggregation	

With two exceptions the natures of these functions speak for themselves. Interest articulation is the function typically carried out by pressure groups in the Anglo-American political system, that is to say, the expression of group interests and attitudes. Aggregation is the process whereby these interests and attitudes are put into coherent programmes among which the electorate can choose; it is, in fact, the function fulfilled by the political parties.

Without suggesting that this list of functions is in any way definitive, we must stress that here we have a number of activities which any political system must by definition carry out; by comparing the style in which this is done and the institutions set up for this purpose, we may have a legitimate basis for the comparison of political systems; one that by relating political systems in terms of their functions is truly cumulative and, moreover, one that conforms to the criteria for a scientific typology (C. McKinney, 1957). As an example we can argue that many of the differences apparent between British and French pressure group activities are a result of

the different degrees to which they articulate and aggregate interests, whereas using the 'layer-cake' approach, the impression is of totally disparate institutions.

Comparison on a functionalist basis is not common in political science and in the field of pressure groups the only work is again by Almond; this is contained in an article entitled 'Interest Groups and the Political Process' (contained in Macridis and Brown, 1964). It is argued here that we may distinguish at least four types of political system in which the particular political institution termed the pressure group operates in different ways. The bases of differentiation here are the above mentioned functions of interest articulation and aggregation. These systems are:

(a) The Anglo-American. Here the institutions carrying out the separate functions are sharply differentiated and each is bureaucratized. In other words, pressure groups articulate interests, which are aggregated by party organizations and presented as workable alternatives to the electorate.

(b) The underdeveloped countries. Where poor political communication and a consequent high degree of interest latency leads to competition for power within the framework of the traditional elite.

(c) France, Italy, etc. While parties and groups are fully bureaucratized, they are not always autonomous of each other, as our earlier example of colonization indicated. The process of colonization must not be understood in too narrow a sense. Throughout this book it will mean not merely the takeover of group by party or vice versa, but the domination of the policy of one by the other, or setting up of new organizations to express the group or party policy. Thus political parties in the underdeveloped countries have on occasions set up trade unions reflecting their own policy, where none may have existed previously.

(d) Scandinavia and the Low Countries. Parties tend to be aggregative and party-group relations are organized on a consensual basis.

We shall refer to this schema again in our formulation of typology of political systems for the analysis of pressure politics.

The structural-differentiation approach

The functional approach solves our problem of comparison, but we have yet to find a valid distinction between interest and attitude groups. If we are to remain true to our functionalist, comparative approach we cannot define the difference as substantive ones of tactics employed by the various groups. Any distinctions drawn in this way would probably only be applicable, in any case, to the Anglo-American political system. We may, perhaps, best regard the problem as one of differing approaches to the political functions carried out in particular systems. Groups arise because they either wish to preserve or regain the *status quo*, or because they have reasons to desire to change it. We may use what is called the structural-differentiation model to outline the different ways in which groups react to the strain of these problems. Basically the model visualizes the social system in terms of four separate conceptual components:

(i) Values: which are the most generalized ends or ultimate legitimations of purposeful behaviour (e.g. democracy, 'free enterprise', etc.).
(ii) Norms: which are more specific regulatory principles which are necessary to realize values (i.e. the rules of elections specifying how democracy is to be attained).
(iii) Mobilization for motivation: which defines how individual action is mobilized to achieve the ends defined by norms and values (e.g. the various forms of social organization; small peasant farms versus collective farms).
(iv) Situational facilities: which are the means actors utilize to attain their goals (i.e. tools, skills, awareness of the consequences of their action, etc.) (Neil Smelser, 1962, Chapter 2).

These components are ordered in their level of generality; that is to say, an attack on values necessarily undermines all the other components, whereas conflict about situational facilities need affect no other component but itself. Although speaking of these components as *things*, it must always be remembered that they are conceptualizations and that their ordering is a *logical* one which is not intended to be reified.

Now if we assume that at any particular time these elements of social action are in a stable relationship to one another, we must ask what will be the likely reactions of groups and individuals to changes which impinge on this stable balance. To take an example to illustrate what may not be clear, assume a political system of the following type:

(a) Values—democratic.
(b) Norms—free elections, civilian and military bureaucracies subservient to civilian political direction.
(c) Mobilization for motivation—freely competing organizations, e.g. trade unions bargaining with employers' organizations, both voluntarily organized.
(d) Situational facilities—scarce resources distributed according to a modified system of perfect competition.

What is going to be the result of this system's involvement in a modern war with a totalitarian nation? If, in fact, this type of political system is not particularly fitted to fighting such a war, individuals and groups in this society are going to feel a strain imposed on them by the divergent demands made on them, and create pressures for at least a partial modification of the system. Such changes might include more authoritarian leadership (the Romans' election of a Dictator for six months in time of war); the abandonment of elections and greater political decision-making by the military; the abandonment of the strike weapon for the period of the war and the channelling of essential raw materials into the war effort, and perhaps some redistribution of income.

What we wish to illustrate here is that these changes may come about by one of two mechanisms, i.e. that the reaction

to strain imposed by changes in the social system's environment may take one of two forms:

(i) *'rational' structural differentiation*: here a strain will be felt in terms of a decrease in inputs of goal attainment for the acting units, that is in a decrease in the satisfaction the actor receives from the political system. Such a strain is removed by defining in which of the components of action it occurs (for instance, a dissatisfaction with 'free competition' because of the inequality of income distribution that results), and restructuring the components until the strain is removed and a new stability or balance achieved. The necessary condition for such a restructuring is the *'rational'* (that is in terms of the 'logic of the situation') identification of the source of strain, and the respecification of each component below it in level of generality. In terms of our example, an awareness that the value of democracy is to some extent incongruent with efficiency in war leads to a restructuring of the other components of the system so that the war may be pursued more adequately (elections are abandoned because such normative regulations are inimical to strong leadership, etc.) (Talcott Parsons, 1961).

The application of this schema to the realm of interest groups is instructive. Groups of this kind exist to protect the interests of their members; they come into operation when they feel their interests threatened. The trade union which puts in a wage claim because it feels the interests of its members in the financial sphere have been neglected as compared with other sections of industry is an obvious example. Here we have a strain on the mobilization for motivation component caused by changes in the environment; the union, by attempting to raise wages, is trying to resolve the strain. The result is usually some compromise between the union's and the employer's interests, and at least to some extent the balance between goal attainment in the various sectors of industry is restored. The potential groups' emer-

gence is also explicable in these terms; they arise because a a strain on one of the components of action activates latent interests. This is borne out by Graham Wootton's account of the rise of the service men's organizations in response to the changed conditions of the 'citizens' war' (Graham Wootton, 1963).

(ii) On the other hand, strain may lead to a redefinition of the components of social action in terms of *'generalized belief'*. The reaction to strain is a belief about its causes which is defined rather by its 'generality' than its 'rationality'. Such a belief has the function of redefining the actor's situation, but in a peculiar way, which short-circuits the normal process of respecification of the components of action; instead of looking for a solution at the next highest level of generality, it finds a solution ready made at the highest level, and instead of restructuring each component, it applies the ready-made solution at the level on which the strain is manifest. Thus, for instance, a strain in the normative component will be met by a demand for the reconstitution of the *entire* normative order. An extreme example of this type of belief might be that in the early years of the last war, when the United States was suffering a considerable loss, a body of belief grew up which attributed this to the lack of energy of the Jews both at the front and at home, (G. W. Allport and L. Postman, 1961) whereas in reality the strains were attributable to an unaccustomed censorship of the Press and a lack of preparedness for war. The 'generalized belief' identifying the Jews as culprits naturally led to a solution involving some amount of racial persecution (Neil Smelser, 1962).

Analysis in these terms is, at the very least, partly applicable to our distinction between interest and attitude groups, and is certainly illuminating in regard to some of the manifestations of pressure politics which were inexplicable within the framework of Anglo-American interest group studies. The

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament may in some of its aspects be regarded as being articulated on the basis of a 'generalized belief'. It posited an absolutely efficacious belief that with nuclear disarmament all international problems would be solved. The belief was a solution to the strain felt by some in a world in which the 'nuclear sword of Damocles' (Wayland Young, 1959, p. 55) is poised, and the individual feels he has no control over his life chances. A lack of restructuring of the components of action is seen in the almost total lack of any practicable proposals for disarmament with any possibility within the present framework of international society. This type of analysis also provides possibilities for the study of nationalist movements, which tend to be value-oriented (that is to say directed towards a total regeneration and change of social values); the French army revolt, which involved a generalized belief in the inability of civilian forces to maintain the values of French society, and an equally strong belief that this was the sacred duty of the officer corps; and the infiltration of groups by ideologically oriented parties.

Conclusion

We are now in a position to carry out a comparative study of pressure group activity, examining most particularly whether the type of pressure group, interest or attitude group, varies significantly from one type of political culture to another. We are, moreover, able to distinguish between different attitude groups on the basis of whether they are oriented towards value or normative components, and may be able to distinguish patterns of behaviour typical to each. These considerations will not, of course, preclude us looking at more conventional aspects of pressure group activity, their relations to parties and government, etc.

We have mentioned Almond's typology of political systems and it is this we shall use for our examination of pressure

groups in differing political contexts. Some modification of the basic four-category classification does, however, seem necessary. One might suggest that the category 'underdeveloped' countries is somewhat all-embracing and needs to be refined. As such, the situation in which political communication is poor and interest latency high is most typical of the truly agrarian society untouched by Western colonialism. Once colonialism is present and any degree of modern industry introduced into the economy a number of interest groupings tend to arise, creating a somewhat different political configuration. For the purposes of further exposition we shall call agrarian countries 'undeveloped', and others we shall call 'developing'. These, as all the other categories, are in some sense ideal typical constructions. We would also add another category to the four Almond outlines in this particular article, and this is the totalitarian Polity. Its inclusion is dictated by the simple fact that it dominates a large part of the modern world. (Almond does, however, deal with this phenomenon in an article entitled 'Comparative Political Systems'.)

We shall examine the activities of pressure groups in each of the six political systems outlined, both in relation to their political culture and also from a structural viewpoint. As was stated in the Preface, our intention here is primarily typological in that we wish to classify political systems in terms of the relative predominance of interest and attitude groups operating in each particular context, and also according to the respective roles they fulfil in them. Having done this, we shall turn to attitude groups, looking at them in the specific British context; the object of this detailed study will be to offset the undue emphasis on interest groups we have mentioned. Our last chapter will be an attempt to relate the hypotheses developed in Chapter 1 to the conclusions derived from our study of the pressure group systems of different nations.

2

The emergent nations

The underdeveloped country—traditional society

Although this political system is to be distinguished from the transitional polity that develops out of it, our attention to it may be brief since it has few, if any, empirical correlates in the contemporary world. The traditional society of tribalism, Oriental despotism and feudalism has everywhere been disrupted by contact with the modern industrial nations of West and East. The concept of the 'undeveloped' country is in the nature of a 'pure' or 'ideal' type, which may prove an effective basis for comparison with other political systems, since they have all ultimately developed from a variant of such a system. Insofar as any nation's politics approximate to the model we shall illustrate, they are the 'neo-traditional' oligarchies, such as Nepal, Jordan and Ethiopia.

Almond's characterization of the underdeveloped nations, as being typified by poor political communication and a consequently high degree of interest latency, is true to some degree of all the new nations of Asia and Africa, and also the older established countries of Latin America, but it is particularly appropriate to the traditional societies existing prior to the introduction of industrialization. What we have called poor political communication is manifested in a large peasant group (typically consisting of over 75 per cent of the

population) which is almost totally unaware of the political process. The peasant is tied to the soil by the exigencies of his vocation, and his horizon is bounded by the local village or tribal community. Centralized political organization is not uncommon in nations, which have such characteristics. Indeed, much of Asia and the Middle East was dominated from time immemorial by centralized, despotic autocracies, but these were political forms in which only a minute section of the populace participated. The peasant's only conception of government may be an intermittent demand for taxes or corvee labour. This situation precludes the existence of associational interest groups, since there can be no clear awareness of group interests as a whole. The peasants cannot, as Marx remarked of a similar French traditional society, form a class 'for themselves': 'Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organization, they do not form a class' (Karl Marx, 1935, p. 109).

Apart from tribal societies, the government in such polities is typically supplied by an aristocratic elite, which is faced only by a small and dependent middle class of traders and intellectuals. Traders and craftsmen are dependent, since they must find their livelihood in supplying the ruling elite; and the intelligentsia is basically a 'sacred' one, preserving and carrying out the traditional religious rites, whose existence is a function of the continuance of traditional ways of life. The aristocratic elite is itself composed of family, religious, bureaucratic and military sections which, while they frequently come into conflict, do not do so over policy issues, but over the allocation of office and authority. It is this competition for power and prestige which explains the instability of particular ruling groups in such societies. The jockeying and manoeuvres of the aristocratic cliques is basically concerned with the group's goal attainment in the sphere of mobilization for motivation, rather than any commitment

to value or normative change. Thus in the 'neo-traditional' oligarchies approximating to our model of the undeveloped nation, we must be wary of applying Western ideological labels to groups within the aristocratic elite. Laos is an example, in which competing groups have assumed neutralist, leftist and other labels, while pursuing what appears to be a traditional dynastic wrangle.

The lack of political communication is not merely an impediment to the growth of interest groups, but also to the growth of political parties of a modern kind. While many so-called parties with widely different programmes have appeared in Nepal since 1950, when the Rana elite relinquished some measure of control, none of them has any mass membership, and they consist of tiny leaderships rapidly changing policy and political alignments (Saul Rose, ed., 1963, Chap 5). Moreover, attitude groups on any scale are similarly retarded in a polity where widespread organization proves impossible. There is little comprehension of a societal pattern, which could be altered by purposeful action, whether rational or non-rational. The only dissidence that occurs tends to be sporadic and limited in scope, being of the type Smelser delineates as the 'hostile outburst' (Neil Smelser, 1962, Chap. 8) against the individual tax-farmer or landlord.

Despite an apparent instability within the elite, this type of political culture is essentially unchanging. It is dominated by a form of economic production which fluctuates around a static norm, rather than showing a sustained growth rate. It rests on the traditional ways of thought, customary behaviour and acceptance of the hierarchy of traditional authority. Innovation is frowned upon, although innovation may very occasionally change the balance of society so that a different form of traditionalism appears. It is a form of society in which the vast mass of people have no perception of politics at all, where the term political culture may itself be a misnomer in implying that such a perception exists, where none does.



The developing nation—transitional society

To examine the functions of interest articulation and aggregation in the undeveloped system is to look at the reasons why they are not carried out. A similar examination of the developing countries must stress the emergence of groups carrying out these functions, but at the same time emphasize their precariousness and lack of autonomy from each other. Both the development of these functions and the fragility of the organizations maintaining them are to be seen as results of the culture conflict of traditional societies with modern nations, expressed in the phenomenon of colonialism and the consequent introduction of modern industrial technology. This culture conflict may be thought of as the coexistence of two separate political cultures, traditional and modern, within the same social system. The type of politics that emerges is dependent on the strains and frustrations inherent in their interaction, and whether they can be resolved without violence.

Colonial occupation or indirect rule through an indigenous elite creates a potential for greater political communication. Both imported media of mass communication, and the social co-operation inherent in the new forms of economic production introduced, have this effect. As Marx pointed out factory production is a potent agent in the politicization of the proletariat. Moreover, the introduction of industry creates new social groupings, while weakening the traditional peasant way of life. Industry must create a working class, even if the capitalists are foreign based. Middle-level management may to some degree devolve on indigenous groupings, as may tasks in the new administrative and legal systems brought into being by the colonists. Such occupations require training, and a new middle class with modern orientations tends to evolve with new educational opportunities. Even though it did not exist before, the stimulus of foreign-owned industry and the changes in the occupational structure may give rise to a cer-

tain degree of native entrepreneurship and thus a small indigenous capitalist class. It is, however, interesting to note that this class, though not colonialist, is not always entirely indigenous. It is quite frequently a racial minority, such as the Indians in East Africa, who take this role. One must further note that this development of a class interest is not the same as the creation of a formal grouping. Very often in such countries there is a diffuse interest in the sense of an ill-defined group of people supporting certain kinds of policy, without being properly able to articulate their views, either because communication is not adequate or because they lack political competence.

These developments are steps in the direction of a more modern type of political setting, but because they are imported from outside the society, and in many areas take place with considerable rapidity, they are likely, as Eisenstadt suggests, to be of a most uneven character. There is, for instance, a lack of balance between local and central levels of organization. The colonial regime is conducive at the central level to reforms in administration, tax-gathering, military techniques, and the legal system, and may foster some sort of market and money economy. Often in this process the colonialists are aided by the indigenous rulers, who regarded it as the only way to maintain some semblance of their former power: 'After 1884, the Vietnamese monarchy showed that it had more fear of the peasantry than of the French conquerors, by coming to terms with the French. Vietnam became a protected state, where colonial administration took over all policy-making and modern technical functions, leaving the Mandarins with the duties of maintaining order and collecting taxes in the countryside' (Nguyen Kien, 1963).

The objective of the regime is in certain respects to get the population to accept aspects of a modern institutional order organized according to the principles of what Eisenstadt terms 'universalism, specificity, and common secular soli-

darity'. At the same time, and with rare exceptions (e.g., the Indian Civil Service) a conscious attempt is made to prevent the social effects of these changes filtering to the communal level and leading to articulated political demands. The population is 'denied above all full participation in a common political system and full integration in a common system of solidarity' (S. N. Eisenstadt, 1961, p. 16).

This imbalance of modern institutional settings in administration, and traditional ones in political participation, is only one of a number of ways in which the developing country differs from the more gradual evolution of modern political forms in Europe. Perhaps the most significant difference lies in the fact that modern technology and its fruits are introduced into a society before that society has the indigenous economic potential to inaugurate such production itself. This may lead to an aspirational style of politics, in the sense that groups are given a vision of what they would like to achieve without have the resources at their disposal to fulfil such aims. In such disparities of aims and potentials lies much frustration for those actively modernizing intellectuals, who may lead the nationalist movements of their countries; and they may provide an impulse towards an authoritarian approach towards increasing economic production, in as far as such an approach is regarded as a speedy means to this end.

The contradictions and ambiguities of the colonial situation cause strains for the new classes created by modernization, but also for the traditional groupings, whose greater, if still very limited, potential for political communication makes possible a limited degree of articulation of grievances. Among the strains felt by the peasants, the need to produce single crops for feeding the urban areas, and the necessity of dealing with middlemen are among the most potent. But, perhaps, those most disruptive of the traditional way of life are the changes introduced in the pattern of land-ownership. While in the past the peasant was not necessarily the owner

of his land, he was by custom secure in the use of it. 'But with the introduction of contractual agreements, mortgages and alienability of land, this security ended and many peasants found themselves without land to till' (Max F. Millikan & D. L. M. Blackmer, 1962, pp. 15, 27). The strain on the old middle class of traders and artisans is a result of the competition of modern industry, which threatens to proletarianize them. It is possible that the old aristocratic elite may, unlike other groupings, afford the colonial power some assistance in order to preserve its position, which is being rapidly eroded by changes in forms of ownership. Part of the elite may, however, form an opposition to the colonial rule, precisely because they object to the disruption of the traditional way of life. The strain is particularly great for tribal leaders, since modernization threatens not only their own status, but 'tribal prerogatives as a whole' (Max F. Millikan & D. L. M. Blackmer, 1962, pp. 15, 27).

The strains felt by the new classes are a direct result of the culture conflict which created them. The working class is drawn from the countryside into the impersonal factory organization. The worker is expected to replace traditional with instrumental loyalties, to live the anomic urban life, where formerly he was bound by affective ties to family, kin or tribe. The indigenous capitalists are also subject to strain insofar as they feel menaced by the huge foreign concerns with which they have to compete. It is, however, the newly-created intelligentsia which is most subject to frustration and alienation from the political system. We have already mentioned that the aspirations created by the example of modernization may themselves be a strain, but the very social structure and experiences of the group may be frustrating. The very fact that they have had a Western education gives them modern orientations, which may often cause psychological conflict with their traditional backgrounds and early upbringing. Moreover, as Shils points out, due to the structure of economic development and colonialism, there are few

markets for intellectual skills, and many may be unemployed and underemployed (Edward Shils, 1960). Having been trained for leadership roles, the colonial-aristocratic regime denies them virtually all entrance to the political process.

The expression of the strains felt by these various groupings might be thought to create a situation in which competing interest groups might arise to articulate their frustrations and try to alleviate them. That this is not the usual course of development is a result of the focus given to strain by the very existence of the colonial regime. It is possible for each group to attribute its problems to the continuance of colonialism, and so create a unity of interest in a nationalist movement. The indigenous capitalists are faced by foreign competition, as indeed are the old middle class. To the new working class, the significant factor is not merely that they conflict with management, but that the management is a creation of the colonial power. The traditionalist forces in the aristocratic elite explicitly blame colonialism for its disruptive efforts, as do the peasants implicitly. The intellectuals' position is ambivalent, for they revolt against colonialism largely because they admire many of the facets of modern life: 'They do so precisely because they admire it (the West), and at the same time see the West as denying them, through colonialism, their opportunity to make their own country more like the West' (John Kautsky, 1962, p. 48). That such a focus is given to the multiple strains is in particular a facet of the fact that interest groupings are by no means fully differentiated at this stage, or indeed capable of articulating clearly defined, negotiable interests. Their demands express strain and unrest of an amorphous kind without particularizing it and identifying the precise mechanisms for resolving tension. Moreover, the result of the fact that the population is still relatively functionally undifferentiated is that politicians are forced to make mass appeals and so foster an ideological diffuseness finding its only focus in nationalism. Anti-colonialism, in a sense, becomes a panacea for all ills;

in other words, it becomes a value-oriented belief, redefining the whole structure of social action. Nationalist movements become collective behaviour movements, not necessarily because their intellectual leaders are unaware of the problems of modernization and industrialization that their nations will face after independence, but because only by ignoring them can they create a united mass movement. Difficulties may, however, arise because the generalized belief may instil itself in many minds, especially the younger generation, creating intensified frustrations after independence, simply because the success of the movement did not fulfil all the aspirations of its participants: did not, in other words, resolve all the old strains. Herein lies the dynamic 'second wave' revolutions, such as that which took place so recently in Nigeria.

The strong emphasis of the national movement on modern, usually non-religious symbols of group unity, and its huge expenditure of effort to avoid dissensus remain potent forces long after independence has been achieved. The nationalist leaders have been accustomed in their struggle with the colonial regime to identify themselves completely with the interests of the nation or 'people', and when they come to wield the authority of the state, they tend to identify state and nation. Because they feel that the state represents the totality of the nation, they are intolerant of criticism, which may frequently come to be regarded as subversive. Not only are the nationalist attitudes unlikely to foster the acceptance of legitimate opposition, but they also affect the style of the emerging interest organizations within the polity. Trade unionism, at least in South Asia, received most of its original impetus with the growth of nationalism. The trade unions, because the colonialists regarded them as Western-type institutions, often were not as drastically repressed as the more overt political organizations, such as parties. Consequently they provided a channel of mobility for the aspiring politically-conscious intellectuals, as well as an economic weapon against colonial domination. As a result of this, the trade

unions in the period prior to independence often formed a mere adjunct to the nationalist movement, subordinating their industrial aims to the more fervent political cause. Since independence, the more moderate leadership of these unions have made attempts to turn them into pragmatic bargaining instruments, but often unsuccessfully. Their strategic position in the process of modernization has inclined parties to attempt either to gain ascendancy over them, or to create them where they may not have previously existed; that is, to colonize them and gain control of their policy through the provision of finances, leadership and favourable labour legislation. The very fact that much of the leadership was originally inducted by wider political motives, rather than by the narrower desire to foster the advancement of their members in the specific factory context, means that there is a constant pull towards sacrificing the members' aims as trade unionists to the imperatives of rapid modernization. And this tendency is, moreover, fostered by the still very traditional and often apathetic orientations of that membership. 'There is, therefore, a distinct possibility that even Western-oriented labour leaders, particularly in view of their strong political ambitions, may be tempted to subvert the purposes of trade unions in order to achieve centralized direction and control over the industrial working force in the interests of more rapid economic development' (George E. Lichtblau, 1954, pp. 99-100).

We have stressed the strains attendant on modernization and the intellectuals' desire to industrialize the economy. But after independence, the continuing substratum of traditional attitudes and their resistance to modern forces may provide other and more serious strains, which affect those groups fully capable of articulating them. The group, perhaps, most fully able to do this is the military, which unlike other groups was, except in sub-tropical Africa, fostered by the colonialists, organized on a very largely modern basis of functional specificity, and supplied with many of the skills and artifacts of

the industrial West. The military is not in Western terms a pressure group, but as one of the few forces capable of effecting rapid change in the developing nations, and one which has inducted a large number of intellectuals into the younger officer strata, it is clearly unlikely to stand above civilian conflict, as is its traditional role in the West. Indeed, it has been suggested that a series of reform coups carried out by the military is the nearest approximation to gradual change of a constitutional type that is possible in these nations; it is at least less violent than the revolutionary wars of Vietnam, Malaya, etc. 'Frequently reform *coups d'état* should be viewed not as a pathological, but rather as a healthy mechanism of gradual change, the non-constitutional equivalent of periodic changes in party control through the electoral process' (Huntington, ed., 1962, p. 40). Such reform coups appear to follow a dialectical pattern with a 'radical' reform coup attempting to consolidate the modernization process, and after a time being succeeded by a 'conservative' one, which is actuated by the feeling that traditional forms are being too rapidly eroded. Thus Peron's coup d'etat of 1943 is seen as radical, and being reinforced by its alliance with labour in 1945, and the 1955 officers' coup as conservative reaction to rapid change (Huntington, ed., 1962, p. 40). It might well be argued that the Peron case is not typical of the 'radical reform coup', and that his movement had a much wider mass base than is usual in the case of a coup d'etat. Even if this is so, it still would appear evident that Huntington's views are applicable to many of those countries where military coups are endemic, even though the form of such coups may differ considerably in other ways, including the degree to which civilian control is reinstituted later on.

The possibilities for the future

The examination we have made of some of the general features of the impact of colonialism and industrialization in

the developing countries has indicated the great difficulties under which interest groups labour, if they exist at all. Continuing modernization is likely to mitigate many of these difficulties insofar as it creates a series of differentiated role structures, and so the potential for differentiated interest group activity. For instance, the expansion of professional opportunities may in itself tend to depolitize the intellectuals and draw them into interest organizations representing their particular skill structures. The sort of Western parallels one has in mind are groups like the British and American Medical Associations. Until the pool of intellectual leadership in society is absorbed by competing organizations, a charismatic and value-oriented political system is likely to continue. On the other hand, it is often the case that the urge to forced and rapid modernization may further impede the development of interest groups, as was true of Stalin's forced industrialization of the late twenties and thirties. Political groupings may be organized into the monolithic unity of national front organizations. Immediate interests may be neglected in an attempt to achieve the one over-riding objective of modernization, which in its intensity and its disregard for other social tensions comes itself to resemble a generalized belief. In these developments lies the path to what Kautsky calls 'the totalitarianism of the intellectuals' (Kautsky, 1962), although as we shall argue in the next chapter, authoritarianism is perhaps a more appropriate word in this context than totalitarianism.

Whether the polities we have described will develop a system of competing and, at least, semi-pragmatic interest groups, as has been the case in Colombia, Turkey and Mexico, or whether they adopt the authoritarian course, is both a function of the speed of social change and the traditional structure of the original society. In the countries mentioned change was a reaction to foreign influence, but was itself introduced by indigenous groupings, for instance Kemal Attaturk's military coup in Turkey. It would appear that the

chances of a system of competing interest groups in the new nations of Africa and Asia depends largely on the degree to which the colonial power made some attempt to introduce modern forms in a gradual fashion into the political as well as the industrial and legal systems, and the degree to which some balance between traditional and modern groupings can be achieved. In India, the induction of indigenous elements into the civil service has fostered a relatively stable and well-functioning administrative system. At the same time, traditional community interests have been allowed an increasing influence at the State, if not the national, level. The interpenetration of modern and traditional political cultures has indeed gone far enough for at least one commentator to describe the result as a unique Indian variant of democracy (W. H. Morris-Jones in Saul Rose, ed., 1963, Chapter 2).

3

Totalitarianism

The irrelevance of doctrine

Although Almond does not include this category in his typology of party-pressure group relations, it seems worth discussing it, because of its importance in the history of the last few decades and because it is frequently suggested that some of the developing countries might follow this path. In reality, this latter point is rather dubious, for even the nations most frequently mentioned in this context, Nkruhmah's Ghana, Mali, etc., with their mass one-party systems, have as yet shown no signs of elevating terror for its own sake to a principle of government as was the case in Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia. One of the chief features of totalitarian movements is their non-utilitarian philosophy stressing the triumph of their millennial beliefs in the distant future, but the desire for rapid modernization in the developing countries is, if nothing else, the epitome of utilitarianism, the dream of a vastly improved material civilization. While the aim of leaders in these countries is modernization, it is most unlikely that they will develop the full panoply of totalitarian rule. Their methods may not be democratic and they may feel that a completely directed economy may be the only means to their end, but it is more appropriate to describe the resulting type of government in terms of degrees of authoritarianism rather than by the title totalitarian.

Various writers have tried to distinguish types of totalitarian government on the basis of their doctrines, and most particularly by the groupings which initiate such regimes. Thus Kautsky delineates two types: 'the totalitarianism of the aristocracy' into which category Nazi Germany, Franco's Spain and Mussolini's Italy fall, and the 'totalitarianism of the intellectuals', the principal example being the U.S.S.R., but also including a number of nationalist movements in the new nations (John H. Kautsky, 1962, Chapter 4). Lipset's categorization is even more complex, distinguishing as he does: 'Fascism—Left, Right and Centre'; the type depending on the movement's class support. Thus Nazism becomes 'Fascism of the Centre'; Peron's regime in Argentina 'Fascism of the Left'; and Pilsudski's regime in Poland 'Fascism of the Right'. (S. M. Lipset, 1960, Chapter 5.) Classification of this kind may have a value in delineating the different forces giving the initial impetus to a movement attempting to bring about totalitarian rule, but it is inadequate for explaining the nature of the movement once it comes to power, since totalitarianism is set apart from other political systems precisely by the fact that it seeks to destroy all class groupings and that its doctrines do not posit concrete goals, but provide an excuse for movement for movement's sake. Russia in 1938 was not the 'totalitarianism of the intellectuals', it was totalitarian for the very reason that Stalin's purges had destroyed the intellectuals; contrariwise, Peron's Argentina was not totalitarian, simply because his rule rested on Leftist support. It is not the ideology of totalitarian regimes we must discuss, but their methods, for in this type of polity methods of political control become the only essential principle of government.

The methods of repression

Although disagreeing with Kautsky's division of types of totalitarian rule, we may follow his general classification of

the methods such regimes adopt. These methods may basically be regarded as the psychological, social and economic pre-conditions for the destruction of class and interest organizations of all types; and insofar as such groupings are instrumental in the maximization of a nation's utilization of its resources, their destruction must from an utilitarian point of view be regarded as dysfunctional. The methods we shall deal with then are what Kautsky calls 'total terror'; 'total regimentation'; and 'total control of opinion' (John H. Kautsky, 1962.)

i. *Total terror* The totality of the apparatus of terror is, perhaps, the most popularly identified feature of the totalitarian regime. The point to be noted, however, is that terror is not used merely against the real enemies of the regime, as has been for the most part true of past revolutionary movements. Robespierre's 'terror', although on the surface having similarities to totalitarian purges, was directly aimed at eradicating those political forces standing in the way of the emancipation of the bourgeoisie. A similar policy is carried out in the early days of the totalitarian movement coming to power. Thus Hitler destroyed the various sources of working class leadership and Stalin removed the Trotskyite and Bukharinite factions. But in these latter cases the campaign of terror carried out by the secret police did not cease with the elimination of these groupings, but proceeded to terrorize apparently arbitrarily chosen 'objective' enemies of the regime: the Jews, the 'Eastern sub-men', those with bourgeois antecedents, etc. Men are no longer maltreated for their crimes, but as 'carriers of tendencies' (Hannah Arendt, 1958, p. 424), for their vices; and while punishment is appropriate to crime, extermination is the fate of the vicious. As Hannah Arendt points out, such methods are a means to the elimination of man as a legal and moral entity and indeed to the destruction of the uniqueness of the individual: 'Totalitarianism strives not toward despotic rule over men, but to-

ward a system in which men are superfluous. Total power can be achieved and safe-guarded only in a world of conditioned reflexes, of marionettes without the slightest trace of spontaneity' (Hannah Arendt, 1958, p. 457). The fear of the purge, the knock at the door in 'Nacht und Nebel', or denunciation, is destructive of all spontaneous social groupings. Social atomization results from a situation where such fears lead to mutual suspicion permeating all relationships. To talk openly, even with members of one's own family, is impossible, where a particular subject may tomorrow be classified as subversion with retrospective effect, and where 'guilt by association' is a working principle of so-called justice. Social atomization creates for the first time in history a political system based on the isolated individual; one in which neither the traditional tribal or kinship groups of the undeveloped country, nor the class or interest groupings of the more industrially advanced Western nations serve to mediate between him and the personification of authority, the Leader. It is the type of polity that J. S. Mill feared might result if liberty was not preserved as the foremost principle of democracy; if it was allowed to degenerate into '... the only despotism of which, in the modern world, there is real danger —the absolute rule of the head of the executive over a congregation of isolated individuals, all equals but all slaves' (J. S. Mill, quoted in Bernard Crick, 1964, p. 64).

ii. *Total regimentation* Total regimentation is the obverse aspect of total terror, in that where the latter destroys the psychological potential for cohesive group action, the former eradicates the social groupings already existent in society and replaces them with an artificial unity. Totalitarianism is in a number of respects a product of some degree of modern industrial technology. Social atomization cannot be brought about where traditional collectivities are still the predominant form of social organization. This in itself argues against full scale totalitarianism in the developing nations, which are

still not far from this stage. It might be suggested that Russia in 1917 was only just emerging from the traditional way of life, but the point that must be remembered here is that Russia did not become totalitarian until some years after Stalin assumed the leadership of the CPSU(B). In the intervening period, policy had in many ways facilitated the development of structural differentiation and with it the appearance of diverse social interest groupings. Lenin had encouraged the growth of independent trade unions and so strengthened the identity of the working class; an independent peasantry had been created by the legalized expropriation of the Czarist landowners and even the weak and doctrinally despised middle class had found opportunities for consolidation of its position during the NEP period. All these developments created a higher degree of political communication and political differentiation by the late 1920's than is the case in most of today's developing countries,

Germany's case was somewhat different. Here there was no need to create a potentiality for mass participation since Germany by the 1920's was, despite all her setbacks, one of the most industrially advanced nations in the world. Indeed, the impetus for the rise of Fascism came from the fact that to some degree at least, the high level of structural differentiation within German society was breaking down to leave free-floating masses that became the movement's rank and file supporters. The strains inherent in the Weimar political system were such that many individuals opted out of the structure, searching only for a millennarian belief that would offer them a psychic security that the republic could not give. It was particularly among the old middle class, overshadowed as they were by the newer forces of big business and big labour, that this process took place. This fact, moreover, reconciles the apparently diverse views of commentators, some of whom insist that Nazism was a phenomenon of the middle class and those who maintain that it stemmed from mass political apathy. The truth was that much of the middle

class in Germany was politically apathetic and alienated from the state; it had in part adopted the mass mentality, which was to be the predominant feature of the totalitarian regime in power.

The first step such a regime takes on coming to power is the destruction of all potential centres of authority other than its own. This means in effect the removal of all class and interest groupings in the society, and indeed this is the first task of the apparatus of terror, the SA, SS or NKVD. In Germany, trade union leaders were to bear the initial brunt of the concentration camps, since Hitler, unlike Stalin, did not at the beginning feel the need to destroy completely all technical, managerial and military elites as long as they were under firm control by the party. Stalin was throughout more thorough-going in removing all potential opposition. Collectivization, 'dekulakization' and attendant famine caused a death-roll to be numbered in millions, but was totally effective in destroying the growing peasant class cohesion. Moreover, the fact that the regime was a proletarian dictatorship did not mean that the working class was to be allowed any independent existence. Trade unions lost their collective bargaining function and competition designed to divide man from man was introduced by the Stakhanovite system. The elite of the party and the bureaucratic managerial strata were not exempt from this policy either, and were periodically purged. As we have pointed out earlier, by 1938 the 'Old Bolsheviks' no longer existed, they were either in exile, in labour camps, or sentenced to death by their own confessions.

In place of the old interest organizations and class groupings, new ones are set up, sometimes with a similar nomenclature to those existing in the Anglo-American political system. These groupings are, however, unlike their predecessors in being compulsory and in having no permitted rivals. The new organizations lose their function of aggregating interests and formulating demands, and become agencies run by the regime as organs of supervision. This is clearly true of

the Nazi Labour Front, which replaced the formerly divided trade union movement and was a massive structure encompassing a compulsory membership of twenty-five millions. As Franz Neumann points out, it had no economic functions whatsoever, differing in this respect from the more genuinely corporatist structure in Fascist Italy, and served to spread Nazi propaganda, to tax the working classes, and to atomize them still further (Franz Neumann, p. 417). The foremost supervisory agency under the totalitarian regime tends to be the National Front organization, which is designed to give the impression that the regime represents all social elements, and that where previously these elements had been divisive, they are all now unified behind the Leader. The East German National Front may serve as an example. To it are affiliated all parties, trade unions, youth organizations and cultural groupings; its decisions are invariably by acclamation rather than ballot, and its chief functions appear to be the setting up of single lists for the election of deputies to the Peoples' Chamber and various propagandist activities (John H. Hertz, 1960). The fact that such organizations give an impression of monolithic unity, that interests have ceased to be divisive, is in itself proof that either totalitarianism has completely succeeded in its aim of social atomization or is evidence of the decisive role of coercion in their activities.

The destruction of rival sources of authority and legitimacy and the process of social atomization itself creates a situation in which concerted opposition to the regime is virtually impossible. This is especially true of the inner party organization, which is never allowed to form stable cliques with permanent interests *vis-à-vis* the Leader. The chief means of effecting this policy is the continuous 'multiplication of offices' (Hannah Arendt, 1958, p. 399) by the regime. The structure of authority is always shifting without the superseded agency always being aware of its loss of power. Alternatively the shift may lead to the purge of the formerly authoritative section of the elite. In this way it is possible to

prevent the growth of a stable hierarchy of expectations, which might erupt into a challenge to the leadership. The notable feature of the Russian and the Nazi regimes was that there were no palace revolutions attempted, and indeed it was precisely non-Nazi elements that organized the abortive coup of 1944. It is for the reasons given above that organizations such as the SS, NKVD, etc. cannot be given even the status of institutional pressure groups, for without a stable hierarchy of expectations they can have no interests as a group.

Nonetheless, the 1944 Putsch does indicate that there was some opposition in Nazi Germany. The reason for this is the fact that isolation of the individual and the destruction of autonomous social groupings did not go as far in Germany, at least until the war started, as it did in the U.S.S.R., where no such events took place. One difficulty the Nazis had to face was breaking down a structural differentiation far more well established than in the Soviet Union. For instance, although the Catholic Party, the Zentrum, its press and youth organizations were destroyed or taken over, it was much more difficult to prevent individuals looking to their priests for a lead and heeding any denunciation of the regime they made. In the last event, priests met their deaths in concentration camps, but even this often only succeeded in providing the priest's congregation with a martyr. In other words, remnants of the old social order lived on to some degree below the surface of political behaviour and occasionally manifested themselves in the various underground organizations: the Communist 'Rote Kapelle', the pacifist 'White Rose' and various others (Terence Prittie, 1964).

A still more important source of opposition was caused by the fact that Hitler left a number of social groupings relatively intact. The most significant of these was the Reichswehr, and it was here in the army, where social atomization had not been effected, that most of the plots against the regime were hatched. Unlike the Red Army, which was per-

meated by political commissars, who effectively prevented treasonable cliques from forming, the German army officers could discuss their feelings about Nazi rule without fear of betrayal. The frequency with which senior generals were solicited to aid subversive plots, and the fact that they never informed the civilian authorities, whether or no they were themselves in favour of such schemes, testifies to the maintenance of the ethic of solidarity of the Prussian officer corps. The military elite was in reality the only major functioning interest group left in society, and in 1944 it was very nearly Hitler's downfall.

iii. *The total control of opinion* The last method of totalitarianism we shall discuss is the total control of opinion, which is carried out by propaganda and censorship. The propagandist aims are basically two: to destroy the old ideas and to integrate the isolated individual into a pattern of political belief corresponding to the regime's ideological disposition. The methods of control utilized for this purpose make for a unique pattern of political communication within the polity. In effect, political communication is modalized, so that instead of being a two-way flow of demands from groupings within the populace and decisions filtered down from the governmental apparatus, virtually only the latter is in evidence under totalitarian rule. It is to be noted that, at least in part, this type of political communication is a result of modern advances in the scientific use of the mass media, that were not available to the despotisms of the ancient world. Only radio, the press, and modern means of transport make possible the complete control of populations far distant from the capital city.

Propagandists strive to make the isolated individual find his only security in his identification with the all-embracing and omnipotent ideological movement. Strangely enough, even the purge helps to bring about such a result, since each generation of the elite is dependent on the government for

the purges which make its elevated position possible, while at the same time identifying itself with the movement's present policies in order to avoid being purged itself (Hannah Arendt, 1958, pp. 431-4). As in the case of all the past 'idealist' movements with aims of world domination, the process of indoctrination starts at a very early age. In both Russia and Germany, total regimentation began well before children left school and its aim was not merely supervisory, but to instil a sense of dedication to the regime. The Nazi's numerous organizations for this purpose indeed included one for the six-to-ten year olds, called the 'Hitler Pimpfe'. Almost a decade after Stalin's death (1962) the membership of the Komsomols, or Young Communists, included 45 per cent of the 15-26 age group, and the group's propagandist activities included the annual publication of twenty-three million books and pamphlets, and two hundred newspapers and magazines with a circulation of over twenty-two millions (Brzezinski & Huntington, 1964, p. 82).

The peculiar modalization of political communication does not necessarily mean that interest articulation is always completely absent under such regimes. Insofar as they have any utilitarian goals other than the sheer maintenance of their total authority, they must be responsive to those interests which facilitate action towards these goals. Thus the Nazis in preparing for their military ideological crusade had to take heed of those industrial concerns producing the instruments of war. Similarly, since the death of Stalin, the system of 'democratic centralism' which had formerly been the epitome of a completely modalized form of political communication, has become a more sensitive instrument for filtering back to the elite vague disquiets about the running of the administrative machine; and factory productivity councils have a similar function, as well as forming a useful 'transmission belt' for providing information on policy decisions. This increase in responsiveness in the Soviet system is very much a product of the genuine desire to diversify industry and in-

crease the manufacture of consumer goods; for while it may not be true that the Leader, with total methods of control at his disposal, need take any heed of his subjects' interest, if he has any rational utilitarian goals himself he will find that the full panoply of the apparatus of terror is destructive of the very aims he hopes to achieve. What the Leader can do, however, is to make all accession to demands from below look like benign wisdom from above.

The value-oriented nature of totalitarianism

Totalitarian movements are an example of the lengths to which value-oriented behaviour may go. Both the German and Bolshevik variants were the results of intense strain. In one case it was provided by the chaotic ethos of Weimar republicanism and the nihilistic intellectual currents caused by the breakdown of imperialism and the First World War; in the other by the strain created by the attempt to realize an ideology of socialism designed for an advanced industrial civilization in a backward agrarian nation. The ideologies of both were so short-circuited and non-utilitarian that their realization was posited in the distant future. Hitler's regime was to be 'Der dritte tausendjährige Reich' and Communist dreams were only to be fulfilled when the whole world had adopted their ideology. Until that date, what was important was the movement for its own sake. It must never become institutionalized and regularized as have the major world religions, which also began their careers as messianic value-oriented movements. This is the reason that terror could not cease when the real enemies of the regime had been decimated; the 'objective' enemies of the regime defined its purpose, its belief that it was moving toward its inevitable and predetermined end, world domination.

The nature of the totalitarian state necessarily defines all normative change as *per se* illegitimate. Since all change of the peaceful reformist type is taboo, however petty the origi-

nal cause of strains in the society, it takes on the form of an attack on the society's basic values: 'While individual strikes are almost impossible, and hopeless as far as potential results are concerned, there are no proper political conditions for general strikes and they can occur only in exceptional situations. Whenever individual strikes have taken place, they have usually turned into general strikes and have taken on a distinctly political character' (Milovan Djilas, 1957, p. 110). This remark by Djilas about the 1956 East German rising seems to be appropriate to all totalitarian polities. As a general rule, all attempts at normative change not initiated by the regime itself, are identified with an often artificially created outside enemy, which is frequently used to create an internal unity. One example of this is the identification of all non-Nazi opposition as being the instrument of an 'international Jewish conspiracy' ... or the identification of the Hungarian revolutionaries with pro-Western forces, when in reality many were agitating for a more 'genuinely socialist' society. This last provides yet another example, if one were needed, of the tendency of all reformist movements under such a system to define their aims in terms of the society's total value system. It also points to the truth that terror in its turn breeds violence, for only by such tactics can the reformer escape the fate that awaits him in Buchenwald, Auschwitz or the extermination camps of Siberia.

4

Continental Europe— The politics of immobility

The fragmentation of the political culture

The political style of many of the Western European democracies is often characterized in terms of continuing political instability. To the Anglo-American observer, at least, the most noticeable features are a succession of short-lived ministries, unstable party coalitions, the occasional dramatic intervention of the army in politics and the occurrence of revolutionary or quasi-revolutionary situations. The political parties and groups are seen to be uncompromising and ideologically intransigent in their behaviour. It is this type of political system we now wish to look at. In looking at the dynamic of this political ferment we hope to some degree to examine the part pressure groups and parties play in creating the dominant style of politics, but our most important task must remain the delineation of the typical configuration of group activity. We shall direct our attention to the two major nations exhibiting such historical features: France (at least until 1958?), and Weimar Germany, and, to a lesser degree, modern Italy. In the case of the two former nations we shall also examine the most recent developments in order to see whether a new and distinctive style of politics is not being created.

Analytically we may characterize the unstable polity in terms of fragmentation of the political culture. A consensual political system indicates that in some sense citizens regard

the national political community as more worthy of loyalty than sub-groups within it. Following Almond's argument (G. Almond, 1964) we might suggest that loyalty within the political systems we are discussing is primarily to political 'sub-cultures', rather than to the community as such. The system is unstable because instead of legitimacy being inherent in the constitutional-legal structure, it rests within separate sub-cultures, which accept no common belief system facilitating genuine, if limited, agreement. In such a system consensus is replaced by patched-up compromise. It is the sort of polity whose basic political philosophy, insofar as it has one, may best be described in terms of the type of political pluralism Neumann suggested underlay the Weimar Republic: 'Pluralism conceives of the state not as a sovereign unit set apart and above society, but as one social agency among many, with no more authority than the churches, trade unions and political parties or occupational and economic groups' (F. Neumann, 1963, p. 10).

The alienation of groups from each other and from the political system as a whole is the keynote of the sub-cultures, and their creation is, at least in part, historically attributable to the unevenness of social and economic change. Almond's article distinguishes a Catholic 'Ancient regime' sub-culture differentiated from more modern groupings by the fact that the middle classes of the 19th century were unable to effect a thorough-going secularization of the political culture. Southern France, Bavaria and Southern Italy illustrate that such sub-cultures exist in all three nations, and that they are, moreover, associated with economies which have only been industrialized to a minimal degree compared with each respective nation as a whole. Today it is in Italy that the greatest contrast exists between a prosperous industrial North and a poverty-stricken South based on the primitive 'latifundia' system of land ownership. Moreover, modernization can itself create alienated groups. For some it spells social and economic decline and consequently strain. Indeed, it is precisely a situa-

tion of this kind which explains the rise of Poujadism among small French shop-keepers with 'mixed' incomes in the middle fifties.

A fragmented political culture arises not merely from the unevenness of change, but also from the conflict and interaction between a rigid class system and the organizational prerequisites of a newly-emerging industrial society. The economic liberalism of the middle classes, produced by industrialism and commerce, was naturally antagonistic to the rigid power structure which the medieval absolutist monarchies had, in large part, inherited from feudalism. This clash which occurred in late 18th century France, with its violent over-turning of feudal lines of stratification, and more important, its philosophy, which justified the revolution, was to create deep divisions in the French national vision. The most important of these was between what David Thomson calls the 'political' and 'social' strands of the revolutionary tradition (Thomson, 1964, Chapter 1) For beyond achieving political liberalism, the revolution promised, but did not give, social equality. This was to create on the Left a constant demand that the 'true' aims of the revolution be realized, and explains one of the deep-rooted causes of the alienation of the French working class from the political system, which persists today in the shape of a massive vote for the Communist Party.

The problem of the middle classes in middle 19th century Germany was greater than that of the revolutionaries of 1789, both because of their relative weakness and because they had to achieve liberalism and national unification at the same time. The relinquishment of the leadership of the national movement to the Conservatives under Bismarck, and the subsequent capitulation of the National Liberals illustrate the great differences between French and German political development. Instead of establishing a bourgeois republic, the German middle class in its attitudes and behaviour became assimilated into the Junker class. Bismarck in a sense suc-

ceeded in removing the political intermediaries in the class system. The gap between the working class and the political elite was too wide for the former to be able to envisage breaking it down without revolutionary violence.

Almond further suggests (G. Almond, 1964) that in these political systems political roles will tend to be embedded in the sub-cultures rather than individuated by the legal-institutional framework. In other words, sub-cultures try to build themselves up as 'states within states' and so maintain their independence from the alien political system. This deliberate policy of isolation tends to be self-generative in the sense that isolation fosters alienation and vice versa. The colonization of groups by parties and parties by groups, which as we shall find is a distinctive feature of this type of polity, is all a part of this process. The working class party which attempts to take over or create a trade union is trying to create an exclusive sub-culture within which members can carry on their life's activity without taint from the rest of society. This type of organization has always been a feature of Catholic areas, in which religious schooling is regarded as an important function of the Church, and can also be seen in the modern European mass Communist parties whose whole series of ancillary organizations provide, just as the Church did, protection from 'cradle to grave'. The German Social Democratic Party faced by hostile anti-socialist laws similarly turned inwards toward developing a mass trade union organization, social security schemes, etc. The Catholic Church has itself in recent times expanded its coverage and organized separate trade unions for Catholic workers.

Party-pressure group relations

A three-fold classification of group-party relations seems appropriate to the unstable political system we have described:

i. *Pressure groups* Firstly, groups may act on parties in a

similar way to that in the Anglo-American system. We say 'similar' rather than the same, because obviously values and institutional arrangements will have some effect on the modes and tactics of pressure group activities. Although we have stressed the unevenness of economic and social development in these countries, they are by most standards relatively highly industrialized, and have developed a great array of associational interest groups for the articulation of demands. Such groups may be analysed in terms of 'form', 'intensity and scope' and 'effectiveness' of group activity, just as Eckstein attempts to do for the B.M.A. (See Chapter 1). These groups will attempt, as they do in Britain, to influence parties at election time, though as Lavau points out in the French case their methods may differ from those in Britain. The reason for the difference is probably one Eckstein describes as being operative as between British and American pressure groups: the different evaluation of the legitimacy of group activities. In Britain the attitude has been described as 'the old Whig theory of representation' (S. H. Beer, 1957, p. 614) which legitimates the articulation or particular interests, whereas in France the tradition of Rousseauan democracy defines such activities as *per se* illegitimate. Representation is not democracy, but to mandate your Deputy on a specific issue, which was the practice in France, is more in the tradition which does not permit intermediaries between people and government (Lavau, 1964).

Other groups' action tends to be continuous; as in Britain, influence is exercised on Parliament and the Administration, although, of course, a different balance of power between the institutions makes for somewhat different tactics. Obviously in the Weimar Republic, where much of the law was enacted by government decree, pressure on Parliament was less appropriate than in nations where this was not so. Most pressure group activities are episodic or defensive operations stimulated either by hostile government legislation or the activities of other groups which threaten the established

position of the interest group (see section in Chapter 1 dealing with the structural differentiation framework). The real similarity to the Anglo-American system is shown in that those that seek the benevolent neutrality of the ministries do not want to have too close relations with the political parties, for it is more than possible that the ideological bent of the party may clash with sectional interests. Thus when these groups do work through parties they tend to prefer the more 'supple' ones—that is to say, the parties of coalition, of 'immobilism', the parties that keep the system running (in the IV republic: the Radicals, Independents, URAS and UDSR; in Weimar: the Centre, the Left Liberals and to some degree the SPD). In a sense this shows a realistic appreciation of the nature of the political system, since in each country these parties were virtually the only lever of favourable decisions that might be applied without being, perhaps, permanently colonized by an ideologically minded party.

ii. *Colonization by a party* This type of party-group relationship is illustrated well by the French Communist control of the Confederation Générale du Travail. Instead of being an interest group attempting to articulate group demands, it became a mere instrument to be used in whatever way was likely to gain most dividends in destroying the political system. The CGT is not the only organization controlled in this way—the Communist Party in attempting to become a 'state within a state' has, as we have stated, set up a large number of ancillary organizations, and infiltrated others to provide services for its members, but also to exert pressures on or against the respective governments. The French peace movement is an example here. Apparently the 'Mouvement pour la Paix' is to a great degree a Communist Front organization having about a million members. Colonization of this kind may have various adverse effects on the interests of group members and on the efficacy of the political process as a whole. As for the former, the worst example lies

in a divided working class movement in each of the three nations. Indeed, in Italy the trade union movement is not merely divided between Socialist and Communist sections, but the Christian Democrats also have a labour organization. Moreover, the Social Democrats have themselves been divided into two antagonistic groups (the Nenni and Saragat Socialists) until 1966. This division is reflected in the Parliamentary arena by the impossibility of joint action by the Leftist parties and indeed, in the IV Republic, we find a huge political party (the Communists) which for ideological reasons would not take part in government and so attain the reforms it demanded so strenuously at the polls. From the point of view of the political system, Almond suggests that such colonization leads to a lack of aggregation of interests and that instead what reaches the legislature are 'diffuse uncompromising tendencies' both from Left and Right. Since no party has the strength to form a government by itself we find that Parliament becomes an arena for propaganda rather than a serious instrument of decision making (Almond, 1964).

iii. *Colonization by a group* The third type of party-group relations occurs when a group colonizes a party. Here, of course, the Catholic Church is a major example, for not only do Catholic parties exist in all three countries, but the Church has made efforts to organize labour as an adjunct to the respective parties. Another example would be the way in which the German industrialists attempted to finance and manipulate the small Rightist parties of the early Weimar period, including the Nazis, in order to disrupt the republic they so hated. In actual fact the Reichswehr attempted to do much the same; indeed, Hitler's first contact with the German Workers' Party (as the Nazi's immediate predecessor was called) was as an agent for the Army's Political Department. In all these countries a combination of fragmented political culture and an electoral system containing some measure of proportional representation tends to make parties dependent

on specific groups. Parties do not, as in Britain and America, attempt to attract the votes of the opposition, they are competing for the votes of an almost fixed clientele, and instead of attracting votes away from the opposite end of the political spectrum they attempt to take votes from their more similar rivals. In other words, they compete with precisely those groups they will be allied with in any coalition government formed. In this way minority parties come to depend on the loyalty of particular groups whom they can under no circumstances afford to alienate. Such loyalties can be manipulated by enemies of the political system to divide natural coalition allies, as the Gaullists did in 1951 by bringing up the hoary issue of Church schools in order to divide the Socialists and the Catholic MRP.

The constellation of political forces

In general terms we may say that each of these countries had numerous small parties with extremist Right and Left wings of varying size, which were against the 'system'. In the Third Republic after 1930, there were the Communists and various small Fascist groupings; after the war, the Communists and Gaullists; in the Weimar Republic, the Communists and the Nazis; in Italy, the Fascists appeared immediately following the First World War and after the Second, small Right extremist groups are faced by a huge Communist Party. In between these forces come the small middle class parties of coalition and to some degree the moderate and gradualist Socialist parties. On their shoulders rests the task of maintaining the system intact, and the constant reshuffling of coalitions is an attempt to do this without making concessions to the extremes. It has been suggested that this type of governmental instability might be obviated if an electoral system were adopted which was less conducive to splintering of parties. But in a political culture as fragmented as these, such a solution is inappropriate. As Duverger points out

(Duverger, 1964, p. 228), in Italy the adoption of plurality voting would lead to a polarization of the extremes, which would result in a Communist takeover, or a less overtly totalitarian but nonetheless authoritarian government by the Christian element, which would justify itself by pointing to the dangers of the former eventuality. Much the same could be said of any attempts to institute the two-party system in Weimar Germany or IV Republic France. It is, as Phillip Williams has argued (Williams, 1964), 'immobilism' more than instability, which characterizes these systems. The unstable coalitions of the centre hid a fixed determination to do nothing which will upset the existing balance of forces. For a large part, the only form of agreement between different political sections is the agreement to do nothing. Doing nothing may in itself exacerbate some sections, however, since such a system is not basically flexible in face of social and economic change. How long it will take a section to become so alienated that it will gain the strenth to overturn the system depends on the forces of the centre, for their ability to effect social change and so ameliorate the section's grievances is a concomitant of their strength *vis-à-vis* the extremes. It is precisely because the centre middle class parties were weakest in Germany that the Weimar Republic succumbed to Fascism, whereas the Third Republic did not.

The value-oriented nature of politics

Before dealing with the prevalence of value-oriented attitude groups in these countries, it must be remarked that the phenomenon of colonization of groups by parties is, of course, a major aspect of the value-orientation of these political systems. It is precisely because parties are value-oriented and ideologically exclusive that they desire to build up ancillary groupings, and it is the exclusive nature of their belief systems that make inter-party or inter-group consensus impossible. Neither the Communist nor Fascist millennarian

beliefs permit of any compromise with the system, there is no middle way between sell-out or takeover. This is not true of either parties or groups in the Anglo-American system. There is a consensus about values, and dispute is typically about the specific regulations used to realize these values. Thus the British peace movement, with the miniscule exception of the British Peace Committee, which is Communist controlled, has attempted to realize the aim of nuclear disarmament without ever trying to change the form of government. Moreover, the movement was very conscientious in trying to foster an anti-Communist image. On the other hand, as we have seen, the largest of the French peace organizations was Communist dominated, and expressed the same antagonism to the form of the state.

The dominance of the value-oriented approach to politics in this type of political culture is perhaps most classically illustrated by the French Army intervention in 1958. Until this time the armies of Western Europe had been regarded as traditionally politically neutral, indeed they are still not viewed by Anglo-American observers as pressure groups at all. After World War II a number of factors combined to make the army politically aware, and conscious of its alienation from the community at large. The conflicting demands for the army's loyalty from Vichy, Algiers, and London itself had a part in this. The Indo-Chinese war and the Algerian conflict was to complete the process. The army blamed the politicians at home for stabbing it in the back in Indo-China. With these strains was developed a generalized belief, which explained how all the problems might be solved in a simplistic way. This belief was the theory of 'revolutionary war', the view that international Communism is waging a world-wide conflict by means of guerilla war, propaganda, insurrection and terrorism. The justification of the French army became the part it was playing in an ideological world crusade against Communism. In face of its enemies the army's solution was to emulate the Communists' tactics; to set up a rival ideology,

a 'myth' in Sorel's sense, which could capture the minds of the Algerian Muslim population, and with the ideology utilize such guerilla tactics as the development of 'parallel hierarchies' of authority, intensive propaganda and regrouping of population. The strain which forced the army into this set of beliefs was defeat at the hands of small terrorist forces; the only way to absolve the army from blame was to posit a world-wide conspiracy, and traitors at home. The simplistic nature of such a belief system is shown in the refusal to believe in the indigenous power of nationalism, and to insist that it must have been introduced from outside (Raoul Girardet, 1962).

Indeed, the use of simplistic conspiracy theories to explain strain is a constant feature of French political history. To some elements of the Right, the revolution of 1789 appeared to be a plot by the Freemasons. The generalized belief inherent in 'Action Française' stated that 'anti-France', the Jews, Freemasons, Protestants and emigres, had consciously conspired against the true and unchanging Catholic France, and that without the restoration of the monarchy they would plunder and betray her. The 'myth of the 200 families' and the 'mur d'argent' was a simplistic explanation for the failures of the Cartel du Gauche in the twenties, and subsequently was used by the Fascist groups (with the addition that the '200 families' were Jewish) as a justification for their policies (Anderson, June 1965). In Germany one need go no further than the Nazis for conspiracy theories. The belief that the army had been stabbed-in-the-back in 1918 served a similar function of explaining defeat, as did the myth developed by the French army in 1958. Hitler's international Jewish conspiracy created a scape-goat on which the strains inherent in the worsening position of the lower middle classes squeezed between big business and big labour could be blamed. While one is discussing Fascist groups it is worth mentioning that the fragmented nature of political life activated certain groups into a political awareness, where similar

groups in the Anglo-American context would have remained strictly neutral. This is particularly so of ex-service groups after the First World War, which in Germany created the Right-wing Freikorps, which took part in the Kapp Putsch, and in France in the Croix du Feu, whose aim was to 'restore the "mystique" of sacrifice for the fatherland, consecrate itself to the duty to France', and which nearly brought the Third Republic to its knees in 1934.

The use of violence

Attendant on the value-orientation of politics goes the use of violence as a tactic for achieving one's aims. This is in complete contrast to the Anglo-American system, where direct action is rare and the use of violence totally illegitimate. The French army revolt and the various attempted coups of the early Weimar period are the most blatant examples, but were by no means the only ones. In both France and Germany there were para-military organizations attached to the extremist parties. Under Weimar this went so far that almost all the sizeable parties had fighting organizations: the Nazis, of course, its Sturm-Abteilung and Schutzstafel (SS); the Communists, the Rötfrontkämpfer, and the German Nationalists, the Stahlhelm. Even the reformist SPD in face of provocation of this kind was led to organize its own formation in the Reichsbanner. Even those groups we characterized as resembling the British use tactics of a kind uncontemplated in that country. In the Fourth Republic, strike action was used as a weapon by groups varying from customs officials to local mayors. Refusal to pay taxes is another weapon, which has been known to lead to violence. Moreover, it was not only the small groups which used extreme methods. On various occasions there were shopkeepers' strikes, and in 1949 the corn-growers withheld supplies from the market to make their point.

Before going on to discuss modern French and German

government we briefly reiterate our major points. The countries we have discussed are deeply divided, in part, due to uneven social and economic development. This division is expressed in ideological cleavages and alienation from the political system as a whole. Political alienation fosters what we have called colonization, both in order to consolidate the section's strength, and preserve its ideological purity. Such a system may be dysfunctional in the sense that it generates violence and may prevent the aggregation of interests, dividing interest groups with similar demands but different ideologies.

The decline of extremism

The agreement to do nothing, the 'immobilisme', that so typified the Parliamentary system of the Fourth Republic, did not always mean that nothing was done. Where Parliament was incapable of aggregation of interests and decision-making the process to some extent devolved upon the Administration. The Monnet Plan, which in its way was the equivalent of the West German 'Economic Miracle', never came before the Assembly. Indeed the attitude of the Administration was in some ways a precursor of the technocracy of Gaullism. As Antoine Pinay said in 1952, 'The remedies are neither on the Left nor the Right. They have no Parliamentary label. They are technical steps, which must be taken in an atmosphere of political armistice'. The most important point, however, is that social and economic change fostered by the Monnet Plan for economic reconstruction and expansion seems to have had some effect in mitigating political divisions and changing the style of pressure group activity.

In regard to this change the arguments of David Thomson seem most relevant ('Parties edged out of the new politics', *Times*, 21 Sept., 1965). He suggests that what is called the depolitization of the Fifth Republic, involving a shift of power to the Executive and the deliberate weakening of the role of Parliament and parties, is in reality a 'transfer of some

political functions to occupational groups representing sectional interests'. What has happened is that: 'The traditional party roles of influencing electoral opinion, voicing grievances about Government measures, and exerting persuasion and pressure on the administration, have been more and more assumed by organizations ranging from the farming and industrial "patronat" to the trade unions'. This change has had three effects. It has altered the focus of pressure group attention from Parliament and deputies to government departments and their ministers. Such a focus is similar to that in Britain, although it appears that, to some degree, the French tradition of direct action has been carried over into relations with the government. Moreover, with increasing government intervention in the economy and planning the area of activity of occupational interest groups has widened. Indeed the very process of planning means an extension of government consultation with interested groups. It is in the nature of the issues of political dispute, however, that the greatest transformation has occurred. The major issues that interest the dominant occupational groups are 'bread and butter' questions rather than ideological disputes. As Thomson says, this is most significant in a country where the old ideological cleavages have tended to persist and where formerly economic argument was clothed by political principle. It may well mark a decline in underlying division in the French political culture, when an interest group feels itself able to put forward purely self-interested arguments for its sectional view instead of appealing as formerly to the 'poor and innocent'.

The West German political scene has also seen a decline in ideological conflict. With one exception, the recent growth of the National Democratic Party, Western Germany may be characterized as having two large pragmatic bargaining parties of the Anglo-American type and a number of small and declining ideological groups. This change is sometimes attributed to a new electoral system with plurality voting and

a 5% threshold for representation in the Bundestag. But our previous argument about electoral systems must relegate this factor to being merely a contributory cause. The basic change in Germany is the disappearance from the class structure of a number of significant groups as a result of the devastation of war, deliberate Allied policy after it, and the changes wrought by Erhard's 'Economic Miracle'. What Kautsky calls 'totalitarianism of the aristocracy' is now impossible; for the landowners, the large Prussian estates and Junkerdom are irrevocably dead. The cabal, which this faction and their German National Social connections formed in the later years of Weimar, cannot recur. A further change has taken place in the structure of industry with the decartelization of the post-war period and the increasing power of the trade unions. Although German industry has strenuously resisted such measures, it seems that a repetition of decision-making behind the throne in the fashion of Stinnes and Thyssen is an unlikely eventuality. Moreover, the officer corps, although it has on occasions conflicted with the civil power on purely military matters, is no longer a social elite standing above society, but seems to show a basic acceptance of the Republic; it is no longer alienated from the political system as it was in pre-war years (Kogon, 1964, pp. 162-3).

An illustration of lessened division in society can be seen in the trade union movement. The major federation, the DGB unites something like six million members, including Catholic elements. It is supposedly politically neutral; and the very fact that when conflict occurred in 1953, because it was argued that the federation's official policy was too favourable to the Social Democrats, there was no split and indeed the leadership made strenuous efforts to avoid the stigma of partisanship, is an indication of how far Germany has progressed from ideological dogmatism and pressure group colonization. Moreover, although the Christian Democrats are greatly influenced by Catholicism, there is a large Protestant element among the membership. It is a 'supple' aggre-

gative party, for while covertly epousing free enterprise principles, its Parliamentary group contains a considerable trade union membership.

Despite such changes, commentators stress that the continuance of democratic institutions, and an instrumental, consensual approach to politics, is to some degree dependent on continued economic prosperity. The divisions within the society have not entirely disappeared, but have in some measure gone under the surface of political behaviour. Attitude surveys indicate that about 10% of the population actively sympathize with Nazi ideas, and even more significantly, only 25% of the population felt they would actively oppose the reinstitution of a Fascist state (Heidenheimer, 1965, pp. 72-9). It is reasonable to suppose that the social and political strains resulting from economic depression might well reactivate the ideological cleavages that still exist in Germany. In fact, it is significant that the most successful post-war Rightist party, the already mentioned National Democratic Party, has sprung into existence when Germany is at last experiencing the slowing down of the 'Economic Miracle'. It may well be true that such a conclusion is also appropriate to France, where economic expansion has made it possible for all groups to better their sectional position without necessarily conflicting seriously with their rivals. Recession might once more harden the lines of conflict. It is possible that the stability of the Fifth Republic depends more on economic expansion than on Charles de Gaulle.

5

Scandinavia

Group consensus

In the last few decades, Scandinavia has achieved a reputation for an almost unique social and political culture; a way of life combining the virtues of liberal democracy and the maximum of social welfare; a way of life that some have described as 'the politics of compromise' (D. A. Rustow, 1955). We shall initially look at the historical factors making for a polity in Sweden, Denmark and Norway which has not been typified, as has much of the rest of Western Europe, by social dissensus and cleavage. Most importantly, we shall examine the system of interest group representation, asking what part it plays in the consensual nature of Scandinavian politics; for unlike France, where until recently the keywords of pressure politics have been 'violence' and 'alienation', in Scandinavia they have been 'peaceful relations' and 'social integration'.

Among the historical factors mitigating the development of a divisive political culture in Scandinavia was the weakness, and in some areas the non-existence, of the feudal system. For instance, in Sweden throughout the Middle Ages the people were able to wield some influence through provincial assemblies, and despite periods of absolutism, institutions such as the Riksdag or National Assembly came into existence at an early date. Instead of the serfdom of Continental Europe the Northern countries had a largish indepen-

dent peasantry. The main result of this factor was that the rigid status-class system of the feudal period did not need to be broken down with the coming of industrialism. Instead of a revolutionary ferment directed at the entrenched power of the aristocracy, there was a peaceful transition from the power of the landowners and clergy to that of the haute bourgeoisie.

Other historical influences contributing to a unified political culture were religious homogeneity and the lack of external conflict. The Reformation did not divide Scandinavia as it did Germany, but provided her with a united evangelical Lutheran faith to which the vast majority of the populace subscribed. Thus we do not find a Catholic peasant subculture resistant to the modernization of political and economic systems as in France and Germany, and it was possible to found agrarian parties which represented genuine economic interests rather than disguised religious ones. The Scandinavians have, perhaps, also been fortunate in being off the path of major European conflict, at least until the beginning of World War II (the only exception being Sweden's great power status under Gustavus II Adolphus). They have been able to shelter in their neutralism from the forces of nationalism and conflict which caused such bitterness and division in Continental Europe. Only in Finland has this not been true, and we shall deal with this atypical case at the end of the chapter.

The lack of a divisive political culture is reflected in two further Scandinavian developments, which differentiate her politically from her Southern neighbours. The first is the peaceful constitutional change to parliamentary government with the preservation of the monarch as head of state. Indeed, the continued existence of monarchy itself testifies to the lack of violence of the change. The constitutions of these nations are for the most part the products of the 19th century; indeed the Swedish Instrument of Government of 1809 is the oldest written constitution in Europe. This was a time when

the concepts of ministerial responsibility and universal suffrage were undreamt of, yet they were introduced, at least in Sweden and Norway, without basic constitutional amendment (universal suffrage: Norway in 1913 and Sweden after World War I).

Secondly we may note that the transition from an agrarian to an industrially based economy has been one which has been achieved without the tumult and dislocation which occurred elsewhere (though there was considerable emigration to the U.S.A. in the late 19th century). All the Scandinavian nations are greatly reliant on agriculture, and indeed Denmark exists as an exporter of foodstuffs. The percentage of the population working on the land has decreased considerably; in Sweden from 70% in the 19th century to about 30% at present. Despite this, however, the cultural gap between town and country has not increased, and in fact the Swedes have deliberately worked to see that industrialism did not lead to squalid urbanism, and the percentage living in the countryside is still about 50%.

What we have tried to emphasize so far is that Scandinavia has escaped, at least in part, many of the factors which contributed to the divided political cultures of Continental Europe. The result has been a party system and pressure group universe, which has not been based on total alienation both from the governmental system and other groups. Within an homogeneous political culture, groups and parties have interacted within a common frame of reference, out of which, to some degree, has appeared a consensus about the roles of state, party and interest organization. If we are to relate the differentiation of the functions of interest articulation and aggregation to the process of industrialization and modernization, we might suggest that the uniqueness of the Scandinavian political culture results not so much from the level of industrialization (which is not greater than in the rest of Europe), but from the evenness of the process by which it took place.

The evenness of change and its concomitant, the lack of alienation, has led to parties based on economic interest rather than ideological considerations. As Nils Andren suggests of Sweden, 'The importance of social and economic factors for the party system is reflected in the fact that changes in social structure rather than fluctuations in public opinion seem to be of paramount importance for the relative strength of parties' (Nils Andren, 1961, p. 23). Moreover, of course, the fact that parties are non-ideological and reflect the same social forces as the major interest groups facilitates a consensual relationship between them. The lack of serious cleavage in society has meant that particular party divisions have not been subsumed by any more serious and general political conflict, and this, combined with the use of proportional representation, has led in all three kingdoms to a multi-party system. Perhaps the most important feature of the major parties is their acceptance of the parliamentary system. This is best illustrated by what seems to be the deviant case of the Norwegian Social Democrats' adherence to the Third International just after World War I, for by 1923 the link was severed because the majority of the socialists could not accept party directives from Moscow demanding the reorganization of the party and the acceptance of atheism. The very fact that small Communist parties are freely tolerated in all the Scandinavian countries is an indication of the strength of the democratic tradition in the area.

The party system

The typical configuration of parties in the three Northern kingdoms is as follows:

(i) *Social Democratic Labour Party*. This is the largest party in all three and has since the thirties either been in a majority position or the dominant partner in coalition governments with only very brief periods in opposition (as in

Norway today). Policy has been extremely gradualist and in contrast to the British Labour Party's policy of nationalization in the period following World War II, there has been a preference for fostering the co-operative movement and only setting up public corporations where private enterprise is not willing to take the risks involved. The Social Democratic parties have close ties with the central trade union federations, though unlike Britain, where affiliation occurs, it is at the local branch level, and in Denmark this is not permitted.

(ii) *Centre Party*. This is an agrarian class interest party whose main importance lies in coalition with Social Democrats, especially in Denmark. Its policy favours state intervention at times of depressed agricultural prices.

(iii) *Liberal Party*. This is the party of the period of democratization, whose traditional demands were fulfilled with the inauguration of universal suffrage. It remains as a middle class party with a policy of 'social liberalism'.

(iv) *Conservative Party*. As with the British Conservative Party, it protects the status quo. It has gradually accepted social service provisions, but believes that social change should be slower and that government initiative is too great.

Naturally party nomenclature varies from one country to the other, but the substance of the division remains similar. While there is considerable competition between the parties, disagreements are not basic, as is illustrated by the joint declaration of all Norwegian parties following World War II: 'Social legislation will be developed with a view to rendering public relief services superfluous. The social insurance schemes will be co-ordinated so as to constitute a universal social security system covering sickness, disablement, unem-

ployment and old age. The problem of family allowances will be subjected to renewed consideration' (Quoted in William L. Shirer, 1956). This was at a time when British Conservatives were opposing similar measures on a principle of free enterprise.

The group universe

The lack of political alienation in Scandinavian society has meant that there have been no fears that one class or group would arrogate power and become a 'managing committee' to exploit the others, and consequently there has been little distrust of large centrally organized interest associations. Indeed, it is possible in many ways to talk of Scandinavia as the 'totally organized society'. Sweden provides perhaps the most extreme example; of a total of three million in gainful employ about half belong to the major workers' organization (LO), another third of a million to the white-collar association (TCO), while the farmers, the professionals and employers all have separate interest groups.

The close and consensual relations between groups and parties is seen in the electoral and parliamentary processes. As Gunnar Heckscher points out, in Sweden local lists for parliamentary elections tend to be largely made up of interest representatives in order to attract the floating voter (Gunnar Heckscher, 1964). There is a similar indirect influence on the part of interest groups on the nomination process in Norway (James A. Storing, 1963). The fact that members of a single interest group may be elected by different parties means that they may be forced into opposition at the division box, but there is a tendency in Scandinavian parliaments for group representatives to come together across party lines, when the issue is not one of major political importance. There is moreover the type of co-operation between parties and groups one finds in Britain, i.e. in Sweden SAF, the employers' confedera-

tion, gives funds to both Liberals and Conservatives in order to resist the Social Democrats. Indeed the co-operation on the labour side has been greater than in Britain, as the collaboration of the Social Democrats and LO in issuing a joint post-war programme for the labour movement shows.

It is not merely through party and parliament that pressure groups exert their influence. Employers and workers organizations play an important part in administration and the professional associations help to shape public policy through expert advice and consultation with government departments. This process is most advanced in Sweden, where Royal Commissions play a major part in the formulation of policy and on which the relevant interests are fully represented and so have a chance at an early stage of reaching compromise agreements with other groups, the political parties and administrative organs. Moreover there is a system whereby the government asks groups for memoranda on most government proposals, and unlike other countries, such advice by 'interest' groups is included in the justification attached to a government proposal. In other words, the interest group negotiations and advice are carried out in the full light of publicity. Indeed at least one Swedish commentator suggests that interest groups play a predominant role in government: 'Due to their exceptional strength the organizations, especially the big trade unions, employers', consumers' and farmers' organizations, constitute a kind of extra constitutional power balance system. When the parties in the system arrive at an agreement on some question, the matter is in reality generally decided' (Andren, 1961, p. 20).

This comment is particularly appropriate to labour relations in the three Scandinavian countries. This is precisely the area where group relations in most countries have suffered the worst strain, yet in Scandinavia there has developed a consensual system of industrial relations. In all three nations basic agreements have been arrived at between labour and management regulating the processes through which a dis-

pute may go and how it should be settled. The agreement in Denmark dates from 1899 and in Norway and Sweden from the thirties. They relate to such issues as the limitation of sympathetic strikes and lockouts (Norway), arbitration and decision by Labour Courts (all three countries), and other matters such as productivity, etc. The Labour Court which is the ultimate arbiter in cases of dispute over the interpretation of conflicts is another Scandinavian institution which has succeeded in mitigating group conflict. The high degree of organization on the part of interest groups is another factor working in the same direction. Both employers and workers federations are highly centralized for negotiating (except for the Danish workers), and agreements between the central federations are binding on the members, or at least invariably accepted, as by the member unions of the LO. The result of these innovations is that few disputes ever become strikes; in Sweden only 1/10 of one percent of wage discussions coming to the stage of overt dispute, and in 1952 in the same country only about 110,000 days were lost through industrial conflict. These peaceful labour relations have partly been developed out of a desire to avoid government intervention in industry, but at least in Norway with virtually three decades of Social Democratic government the unions have revised their traditional attitudes in this respect: '... the trade unions approve of state intervention for the solution of disputes which otherwise would endanger the economic progress and reconstruction of the country' (Konrad Nordahl, one-time president of the Norwegian Federation of Labour). The subordination of group to national interest is perhaps best illustrated by the Swedish trade unions' voluntary wage stop in 1949-50 in face of threatened inflation; it was not only voluntary, but suggested by the trade unions.

Two other Scandinavian institutions illustrate the consensual relations of the pressure group universe. The social security systems have been accepted by virtually all sections of society and their institution and operation have been

strongly influenced by pressure group co-operation. For instance, in Norway the medical profession co-operated in the setting up of the health service, their view being summed up by Dr. Karl Evang, one-time Director General of Public Health: 'In countries where the medical profession has violently opposed the insurance schemes, the result has invariably been that doctors have partly missed the opportunity to influence the development themselves, and consequently such insurance has been organized without their co-operation and without that technical guidance which would have been a benefit both to patient and doctor'. Another example is the fact that in Sweden unemployment insurance is operated through trade union voluntary societies in conjunction with government subsidies. The other institution is the vast network of consumer and producer co-operative organizations which have grown up within the framework of the private enterprise system. Agricultural co-operatives have been the major factor in the continued viability of agricultural production in these Northern climes and in the case of the producers' co-operatives, form a major pressure group closely connected with the Centre parties. In a number of spheres, moreover, co-operation has provided amelioration of the economic situation in time of depression; this has been especially so in the Danish construction industry.

Our summary of the political situation in the three Northern kingdoms would be that the evenness of political and economic development has avoided the creation of divisive political sub-cultures alienated from the system and other sub-cultures. Within this framework, pressure groups and parties could develop peacefully, and out of their interactions generate a consensus: '... marked both by the tension between conflicting interests of different groups and by the understanding that the well-being of all groups and of the society as a whole is a condition for the well-being of each individual group' (Andren, 1961, p. 211).

Finland

It must be understood that all previous remarks have not referred to Finland, for the reason that her political development has differed in a number of ways from her other Northern neighbours. Until 1809 Finland was a Swedish province and benefited from the lack of feudal stratification. Unfortunately the creation of a largely Swedish-speaking bourgeoisie in itself made for at least one major division in the political culture. Finland then became part of the Russian Empire and this connection led to a number of divisions in Finnish politics. Towards the end of Russian hegemony the imperial power extended its attempts at Russification with the result that when independence came with the Bolshevik revolution, a section of the Finnish working class attempted to emulate the Russian revolutionaries. The outcome was a civil war in which after a bloody struggle the 'Whites' were victorious. This provides much of the explanation for the much greater animosity between workers' and employers' organizations in Finland compared with the rest of Scandinavia. Relations with the Soviet Union had other effects: one being the continuance of a large Communist Party, especially after the Soviet victory over Finland in World War II. Moreover, frequent military engagement with her powerful Eastern neighbour has caused more disruption in Finland than has been experienced in the rest of neutral Scandinavia.

These historical factors have led to a political culture which can only be described as a hybrid between the 'unstable' democracies of Western Europe and the compromise of Scandinavia. The former may be noted in the fact that Finland, unlike her neighbours, experienced a considerable wave of fascist right-wing activity in the early thirties under the influence of the depression. The so-called 'Lapua Movement' succeeded in 1930 in its aim of getting the Communists banned, and in the next few years initiated a campaign of lawlessness and kidnappings, which culminated in an at-

tempted coup in 1932, after which the government managed to regain control. The social basis of the Lapua Movement was small farmers whose livelihood had been destroyed by the depression. The inter-war period was one of ministerial instability as in Continental Europe, the average government lasting only a year, and Compromise-centre coalitions being the rule.

Since the last war a six-party system has developed, which differs from the normal Scandinavian pattern in two respects. Firstly the language division has led to the existence of the Swedish People's Party which represents the Swedish-speaking part of the middle class. Secondly the Communists are much stronger, and in 1949 they attempted unsuccessfully to bring down the government and take over the Finnish labour federation (SAK). The efforts of the Social Democrats and the unions they control to avoid this contingency has led to a greater integration of moderate leftism within the political culture, and certain other developments also indicate that Finland, despite her continued reliance on Soviet good will, is progressively becoming more like her Scandinavian neighbours. Co-operation has if anything gone further in Finland than elsewhere with virtually 100% membership of agricultural producers' co-operatives and at least one-third of retailing done by the consumer associations. Social security is not as advanced as in the other countries, but by the 1950's at least 10% of the national income was spent on such things as health and social security payments. Most important perhaps, labour relations have improved. Agreement was reached with the employers in 1944 on the Swedish model, whereby SAK and the Finnish Employers' Federation recognized each other as the exclusive bargaining agents between unions and management. Since the war, Labour Courts have been set up, also a system of state mediation in industrial disputes. The growing tolerance of both sides is seen in the Factory Committees set up in 1949 with representatives from both sides, which have considerable influence in the running of industry.

Because the party system is more unstable than in the rest of Scandinavia and viable coalitions are not necessarily possible, it has been argued that too much power is passing into the hands of the monolithically organized interest groups. Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg suggests their power has resulted in the government's freedom of movement being restricted, with the country taking on economic commitments beyond its means (Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg, 1964). The unions and other groups are stronger than the political parties because they possess a virtual monopoly in their field of competence. It might, however, be argued that the increasing strength of pressure groups is a concomitant of the progressive change to the more stable political culture of the rest of Scandinavia. It would however be unwise to conclude that such a change will be too easy. Memories of the civil war still persist, and indeed are a major influence in the persistence of a strong Communist Party. The diverse political history of Finland has yet to be entirely overcome.

Attitude groups

Value-oriented groups have not been vitally important in modern Scandinavian history and except for Finland have a remarkable resemblance to those found in Britain (described in Chapter 7). The only really notable organization of the 'norm-oriented' type which has had great influence in Norway, Sweden and Finland is the temperance movement. In all these countries the movement has had a great success, though Norway and Finland which attempted complete prohibition for brief periods gave it up, largely because it was ineffective (in Finland alcohol consumption actually increased). The strains conducive to temperance success were partly the religious ones which predominated in the U.S.A. (Holtzman, 1966, p. 10) but to some extent, at least in Sweden and Norway, which were among the heaviest drinking countries in the world, it was a rational reaction to a genuine social

evil. In all these countries liquor supply is a state monopoly and alcohol prices are high, and moreover the consciousness of the evil of drunkenness provided by the movement has led to very severe penalties for drunkenness and almost draconian measures for curing it.

6

The Anglo-American system—the autonomous interest group

In dealing with some of the problems of contemporary pressure group analysis in our introductory chapter we gave some attention to the nature of interest and attitude groups within the Anglo-American political system. This exposition suggested that interest groups had been of most exclusive concern of Western political scientists working in the field of group behaviour, and that it was in this area that the most sophisticated theoretical apparatus had been developed. Furthermore, we noted that the analysis of attitude group activity, based on the mobilization of action on the basis of a generalized belief, was virtually non-existent. In this chapter and the next we hope to explore some of the views held about the working of interest groups in the Anglo-American system and to examine further, within the particular context of British politics, the categories we have suggested might be applicable to the theoretical study of attitude groups. We feel that by giving both types of groups their most detailed study within the framework of our own political culture, we may facilitate a deeper understanding based upon the use of data with which we are all, at least, partially familiar.

The process of interest articulation

Judging by some of the writing on the subject of sectional

groups one might conclude that they operated only in the field of economic activity. Although this is by no means the case (various church groups, such as the Methodist Conference, being one exception), it is true that a large number of groups are, at least, in a loose sense economic in origin. This is in itself an indication of the homogeneous and relatively undivisive political culture in which the groups function. 'Bread and butter' issues are a luxury which only those undivided by more serious questions can afford to make their major area of concern. As Graham Wootton says of Britain, pressure groups' claims are usually related to the division of the nation's 'economic surplus'; that is to say, to the lower order components of social action, situational facilities and mobilization for motivation, rather than, as we so often found to be the case, in 'developing' and Continental European political systems, with normative and value questions (Wootton, 1963, Chapter I).

Obviously, one of the empirical reasons for the predominance of economically motivated groups is the fact that many of them are already organized to carry out their functions in the productive sphere, and so the problem of mobilization is less acute than that existing for groups based on more diffuse common interests. On the other hand, the classical theory that dominates much thinking in the field of economic behaviour suggests that the working of the market is distorted if groups go into politics by demanding favourable policy decisions from government. Academics such as F. A. von Hayek maintain that the gradual erosion of free enterprise brought about by government intervention often at the explicit demand of economic interest groups, involves a substantial diminution of freedom in society (F. A. von Hayek, 1949). But as S. E. Finer points out, the trend toward economic groups demanding government intervention and protection is an inevitable one. The economist views the market as an abstraction, but any actor in it realizes that his own personal benefit can be maximized if he attains the favour of the

government expressed in preferential legislation. 'Why should we assume that an individual will seek to maximize his satisfaction *solely* by the processes of the market? It is more logical to suppose that he will try to manipulate his *whole environment*—to create conditions where, if you like, the market is rigged in his favour.' (S. E. Finer, 1958, p. 9.) It is in the desire to maximize satisfaction through the manipulation of the whole environment, most particularly the political aspects of it, that the motivation of both labour and capital for their organization of strong interest groups to represent them, lies.

According to the structural differentiation schema the varying interest groups typically come into existence when a potential group feels its sectional position endangered. This is to postulate that a diffuse unstructured latent interest exists, which may under certain conditions be activated. The fact that the interest is latent, however, means that the diffuse grouping is not necessarily aware of itself as a potential source of political activism prior to the specific circumstances bringing about such awareness. The trade union 'spontaneity' that made itself apparent in the 19th century was a concomitant of worsening economic conditions, and only with its growth did an acknowledgement of the industrial working class as a potential recruiting ground for such movements become general. A group's perception of danger may be expressed in terms of a feeling of 'relative deprivation' compared with other sections of the society. It may take the form of hankering for a previously existing *status quo* (as is true of the origin of the large percentage of employers' organizations), or in the case of those groups perceiving their disadvantageous position for the first time (as was the case of the early trade unions), the desire to alter the existing situation. Once an interest group is operational it is this perception of 'relative deprivation' which motivates its demands. Trade union demands are frequently on the explicit basis of harsh treatment as compared with other groups of workers, and a

similar but implicit assumption is likely to motivate employers' groups, especially when it is realized that classical economic theory suggests that the disadvantaged firm is likely under perfect competition to be priced out of the market. It is the strains stemming from these perceptions of disadvantage that lead to group action attempting to restore a balance of goal-attainment for all the actors in the situation.

Although, as we have said, many groups can be loosely called economic, this does not mean that they are all equally easy to organize. It is a frequent complaint of pressure group theorists that consumer groups are more difficult to mobilize than their producer counterparts, irrespective of the seriousness of the strain to which their members are subjected. The reason for this lies in the relative inability of consumer groups to apply 'selective incentives' (Mancur Olsen Jnr., 1965) and coercion that can be used by the producer groups (the trade union can prevent a man from working, and the employers acting in concert can drive an erring colleague into bankruptcy). This is to imply, with Mancur Olsen Jnr., that the origin of large groups is essentially non-voluntaristic, and that to function there must be an incentive other than the common interest the group pursues. Olsen's argument is based on an analogy with the theory of public goods in economics. His view is that for large groups, group interest and the rational self-interest of members may be at variance. In other words, what is the point of the individual employer expending his resources in participating in group action to attain favourable government legislation, when his own contribution is marginal and the group will be successful without him, so providing him with the desired benefit at no cost to himself. In this sense the common interest of the large group is a public good from which it is impossible to exclude a whole class of potential beneficiaries. Only by coercion or offering other specific rewards can such a group mobilize support (Mancur Olsen Jnr., 1965). For a number of reasons this denial of voluntarism is not destructive of our structural

differentiation analysis of group behaviour. Although it implies that mobilization will be commensurate with ability of a group to apply coercion, it does not deny that the original mobilization is on the basis of perceived strains. All this means is that the political group market can have no pretensions to perfection in the economic sense; group activity does not, in other words, reflect the strengths of the latent interests in society. It is also interesting to note that Olsen's theory explicitly excepts small groups. in which the benefits of participation in group action may be such that it is in the interests of each individual member to support it. Since all great organizations must have small beginnings, this exception allows for, at least, some element of voluntarism in group formation. It may at the same time provide an explanation for the proliferation of small groups in the non-producer sphere, which on attaining some larger membership tend to fold up rather rapidly. One would expect, on the basis of our analysis, that this point of disintegration would occur when the need for coercion became apparent, without the group having any resources to enforce it.

We have so far looked at a number of features common to the organization of associational interest groups in all political cultures. We have, moreover, stressed that this type of group predominates the Anglo-American scene. Although this is so, there are of course a number of differences between pressure group activities in Britain and America. By examining these differences in terms of Eckstein's already mentioned categories of interest group activity, we hope to demonstrate the value of this schema for the analysis of sectional groups within a particular political culture, while at the same time, by the use of a representative set of group examples illustrating the common range of interest groups functioning in the two countries.

The major areas of attention for analysing group differences within each of Eckstein's categories are a nation's institutional setting and its value system. This is particularly

the case in examining the *form of activity* of sectional groups. Britain, with a unitary and centralized form of government, has a single focus for interest group pressures: that is to say, Parliament in the widest sense, including the administration. Indeed, the major focus can be narrowed still further to Whitehall, the pressure groups having recognized the shift in power to the Executive that has characterized 20th century British government. In the United States, the principles of federalism and the separation of powers written into the constitution make for a very different picture. Although one finds similar interest groups, they must operate on two levels, State and Federal. In certain fields, such as education, national pressure groups have been inhibited because the states have exclusive jurisdiction in the field. It may also be the case that opposing interest groups have differential influence at the two levels, and each will try to make the divisive issue the concern of that level of government with which it has the greatest contacts. This was for instance true of the dispute between the small shopkeepers (who had a favourable representation in State legislatures) and the growing chain-store organizations (whose influence lay in Washington). Although certain States were able to pass anti-chain legislation, all attempts to make the laws nation-wide broke on the rocks of chain-store support in the Federal Departments of Agriculture and Commerce and in Congress itself (Zeigler, 1964, pp. 44-46).

The separation of powers provides pressure groups with a further mechanism for opposing abhorred proposals. In the U.S.A. it is possible for the two sides to a dispute to appeal to the different organs of government in order to get a veto on a decision another has made. The Supreme Court has been one of the major agencies for this kind of activity. For instance, the doctrine of states' rights used by the large corporations to avoid congressional supervision has been reiterated continually by the Supreme Court as a counter-weight to Congress's regulatory tendencies. On the whole, it is true

to say that an interest group wishing to maximize its effectiveness must maintain an organization at both State and national level. In many cases organizations appeared on the State level considerably before becoming national entities. This was true of the two major professional groups, the American Medical Association (A.M.A.) and the American Bar Association (A.B.A.).

The *scope and intensity* of interest activity is not significantly different in Britain and America. The fervour with which an object is pursued is constrained by the general acceptance that it is illegitimate for groups to 'undertake the direct government of the country' (this statement of Finer's is only inaccurate in the Anglo-American context insofar as it is meant to include value-oriented groups, which are, in any case, extremely small), or to continuously obstruct the implementation of laws already agreed upon by the legislature. The number and variety of groups engaged in politics is very similar, and may be taken as corresponding to Finer's catalogue of group categories we enumerated in Chapter 1 (See page 4). Eckstein argues that the differential legitimation of group activity as such will affect this variable. It is however extremely interesting that while the American ethos is considerably less favourable to group activity than the 'Old Whig theory of representation,' there is, as we have said, a very similar proliferation of groups. This problem may however be resolved by noting a paradox that Zeigler suggests is typical of the American's perception of group activity. Each group member justifies his own activities as being in the national interest; it is only those groups to which one does not belong that are destructive of that interest and so are worthy of disapprobation (Zeigler, 1964, pp. 41-2). This schizophrenic attitude has a remarkable similarity to what Gunnar Myrdal, in speaking of the Negro problem in the U.S.A., calls 'the American Dilemma', the struggle between democratic ideals and the real situation of inequality (Rose, 1948, Chapter I).

As for the issue of *effectiveness*, again similar considerations of size and wealth apply to groups in both countries. In the sphere of technical facilities, groups in both countries have in recent years made steps towards professionalization of their staffs. It has been felt that dedication to the interests of a group is no longer sufficient to qualify those men who have to put over the objectives of the group to the wider public and public officials of various kinds. This trend is most noticeable among the labour unions who instead of belief in the working class cause, demand good P.R. qualifications.

As a last look at the actual process of interest articulation we shall cite a few examples of the historical development of groups, illustrating the elaboration of the structural differentiation process. If this process is operative one would not expect groups to maintain the same form through their history, but to change in response to alterations in the overall political culture. The transition from the undeveloped polity to our own involves a progressive specialization of roles and a transference of tasks from primary, largely clan and kinship groups to secondary functionally differentiated organizations. Thus one might expect that the earlier more primitive pressure groups would be less functionally differentiated and perhaps more violent, because not yet operating within the structure of a generally accepted set of rules. This is true of the early stages of both labour and employers' organizations in Britain and the United States. Both sides were motivated by diffuse fears of the other, and rather than disputes being on specific pragmatic industrial issues, their early quarrels were mainly a questioning of the other side's right to operate at all. This picture would certainly serve to describe the 'open shop' movement waged by the American employers in the last decade of the 19th century and until the First World War. This too was the period of industrial violence in both countries; in the U.S.A. of strike breaking, industrial agent provocateurs, and indeed, in some cases, murder (Zeigler, 1964, p. 129) in

Britain, of the growth of the Triple Alliance and the threat of the general strike.

Today interest groups have become more pragmatic and less violent. In Britain, both the trade unions and employers sit regularly on government sponsored committees. Disputes relate almost entirely to specific issues of wages and working conditions and are conducted within an accepted framework which does not bring into question the status of the disputants. Above and beyond this, in both countries there are institutionalized channels of arbitration very often instituted at the urging of the government. Party-pressure group relations, which formerly often resembled those dominant in Continental Europe, that is colonization, have gradually evolved in the direction of complete differentiation (an issue we shall discuss in the next section). The Trade Union Congress, although still bound by traditional ties to the Labour Party, has made clear its right, at least, to criticize a Labour government in office. Although this may be partly a concomitant of Labour's specific policies, it may also involve an increasing awareness of the findings of political science, which have increasingly demonstrated the powerlessness of the trade unions within the Labour Party structure (R. T. McKenzie, 1955).

Another historical phenomenon that we have already mentioned further illustrates the response of interest groups to changed conditions (it is worth noting that one of the major differences between interest and attitude groups is that the latter often merely redouble their efforts to achieve the original goals in response to conditions that make such goals inappropriate). This is the tendency for interest groups to alter their pressurizing methods in response to a change in the locus of governmental power. It is this factor which explains the growth of the national Lobby in Washington as central government has increased the aegis of its authority, most particularly during the New Deal period.

Altogether, we believe that the preceding analysis of in-

terest group activity within the Anglo-American system has illustrated that it is within polities of this type that we find the widest range of organized sectional groups mobilized on the basis of rational structural differentiation. An interesting confirmation of this finding can be found by comparing the responses of individuals in different nations to questions designed to prove their subjective competence in political affairs. The study we refer to is Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture*, and competence refers to individuals' feelings that they can do something about regulations they dislike. On a national level, over 70% of respondents in the U.S.A. and over 60% in Britain felt that they could do something, whereas in the Continental European countries of Germany and Italy the figures were respectively 38% and 28%. Differences of this kind were maintained whether the strategy chosen was the informal grouping or the formalized pressure group or party (Almond and Verba, 1963, Chapter 7). These differences reflect a genuine difference in the potentiality for affecting legislation and administrative rulings in a relatively homogeneous political culture with a great proliferation of associational interest groups. As the authors conclude, 'Political competence thus grows with higher educational or occupational status, but co-operative competence seems to be rooted in specific national political cultures' (Almond and Verba, 1963, Chapter 7).

Some theoretical considerations of the Anglo-American system

Despite our conclusion of the last paragraph, we do not go beyond suggesting that the Anglo-American system is an homogenous political culture in an ideal typical sense only. Throughout this book we have kept in mind Almond's typology of party-pressure group relations. In the Anglo-American system, he suggests, we find the clearest differentiation of parties and pressure groups. Both are bureaucratized

to a high degree and, more important, autonomous of each other. That is to say the colonization of party by group and vice versa, which we found typical of Continental European politics, is either rare or non-existent. While feeling that as an ideal typical portrait of these polities this is an accurate portrayal, one must insist that this postulated autonomy of interest articulation and aggregation exists nowhere in a pure form. The difference between the Continental European and Scandinavian systems as compared with the Anglo-American is one of degree, not of absolutes. In both the former the operation of economic interest groups activated on the basis of the structural differentiation schema is extremely important. The Anglo-American polities differ only in that here we find interest groups attempting to get parties to adopt their policies, while less than elsewhere dominating the party programme as a whole. This is, for instance, quite clearly the case with the various professional organizations, whose major aims are quite specific, and who try to persuade both parties of the rightness of their case, while at the same time trying to prevent the permeation of political interests into their professional sphere.

In concluding our description of interest group activity we shall mention a few of those exceptions to the ideal picture of interest autonomy and perhaps point to a trend which may reduce it still further. As Richard Rose suggests, there has always been a blurring of the boundary between pressure groups and parties in Britain (Rose, 1965, Chapter VI), the most important manifestation of this being the trade union membership of the Labour Party. Although as we have mentioned, this sort of colonization is by no means as serious as that existing in social democratic and communist movements in Europe, there can be little doubt that there is a certain amount of influence on the decision-making process of one part of the Labour movement by the other. It does today, however, seem doubtful whether the flow of influence is from the group (i.e. the trade unions) to the parties, as it

was in the early days of the Labour Representation Committee. Instead it appears that at least when the Labour Party is in office the flow is reversed. Contributions to party funds from private industry to the Conservative Party in England and the Republican Party in the U.S.A. leave similar doubts about the complete autonomy of these organizations.

Another factor which gives rise to doubt about party-group autonomy is the fact that negotiations between them and between groups and the government are frequently shrouded in secrecy. It is this fact that gave the title to Finer's pioneering work on British pressure groups, *Anonymous Empire*. In the American context it has been suggested that 'behind the scenes' negotiations of this kind are beginning to supersede the more openly formalized contacts. 'The processes of sharing expertize, intellectual resources, financial resources, personnel, as well as attitudes has become much more prevalent and important than formal organizational liaison and co-operation' (Eldersveld, 1964). This it is felt may be leading to a check-mate system among the more important interest groups leading to a situation where 'open and autonomous group competition declines in intensity' (Eldersveld, 1964).

Attitude groups in America

In this chapter we shall restrict our discussion to attitude groups in the U.S.A., since the next chapter is devoted entirely to a study of such groups within the British political system. To a very large degree, the proliferation of such groups is similar in both nations. Just as in Britain there are small left-wing groups and parties of a sectarian variety, there are norm-oriented reform groups on as many topics as individuals feel reform is necessary; varying from anti-nuclear groups like S.A.N.E. to those who feel fluoridation to be a danger to health. As in Britain, ethnic groups form interest groups to protect their common aims and attitudes and to propagan-

dize for their way of life. Sometimes it is difficult to know which function they are carrying out at any one time—this is true, for instance, of the American Jewish Congress, which combines protective functions with a militant Zionism.

There are however two major areas of difference between Britain and America. One lies in the existence of at least one major rift in the political culture expressed in the position of the Negro in American society, and the other is the greater incidence and violence of right-wing groups throughout American history. A rift in the political culture involving the suppression of a sizable minority may not be important, in the sense of leading to violence, under certain circumstances. Such conditions can be summarized as those which make it impossible for the Negro to appreciate his 'relative deprivation'. While the Negro still lived in the South in the period after the Reconstruction, this was the case. But with the demand for labour in the North and the emigration of the coloured minority to these areas, they have been brought into contact with not only the economic organization of the society, but with its social organization as well, and it is here that their lack of privilege has been most evident. Under these circumstances the Negro organizations tend to become more militant and to adopt a generalized belief positing, to a greater or lesser degree, that all personal problems will be solved with the advent of complete integration. It is not just the extremist groups, such as the Black Muslims, that are indicative of this trend, but also the increased militancy of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, that before 1954 adopted the legalistic means favoured by the upper status Negro attempting to gain acceptance by his white social equals. In recent years the local N.A.A.C.P. branches with their higher percentage of low status Negroes have become more activist and other organizations, which though non-violent, have adopted direct action methods such as the sit-in, have come to dominate the integration movement (Zeigler, 1964, pp. 221-6).

The recent growth of the radical Right may be in part a reaction to the increased activity of the groups with which we have just dealt. It is, however, nothing new in American politics and provides an example of what Hofstadter has called 'status' rather than 'interest' politics (Hofstadter, 1964). Generalized beliefs of a similar kind may be found behind the growth of Know Nothingism, the Klu Klux Klan and McCarthyism; the latter, particularly, may be interpreted in terms of a similar status conflict for the old middle classes squeezed between big business and big labour, as we adopted in analysing the alienation of this class in Weimar Germany. The White Citizen Councils of the South are certainly a response to Negro militancy, but their basic motivation is the fears of the lower-class white who, without segregation and the value system accompanying it, would be at the foot of the social ladder. The tendency for such groups to have a conspiratorial theory of history, which we have already noted, is manifested in the John Birch Society's paranoiac fear of creeping Communism. 'The Blue Book', the scriptures of the movement, describes America as the last bastion of anti-Communism, and even that is a brittle structure permeated at many points by Communist intrigue. Perhaps as a last indication of the American political culture's receptivity of right-wing doctrine we might compare the different form of Moral Rearmament's publication *Ideology and Co-existence* as issued in Britain and America. The British edition did not emphasize the dangers of Communism in such a fearsome manner as the American version. Moreover, certain statements in the American edition, which the authors seem to have felt could not be stomached by the British reader, were cut out. Perhaps the most flagrant omission was a quotation from the leader of the minor West German Deutsche Partei, who, working on the principle that all that is not white must be black, manages to imply that General Eisenhower is a Communist. If ever there was a conspiracy, this indeed would have been the greatest. 'If Eisenhower is to face

Khrushchev and his global ideological strategy without having himself an ideology, then the cause of freedom and peace will only lose out. There are in the world today only two global ideologies—Communism and M.R.A.'.

7

Attitude groups in Britain

Norm-oriented and value-oriented groups

The object of this chapter is to illustrate the hypothesis that attitude groups behave in a significantly different fashion from their interest counterparts, and that the major part of this difference is attributable to the fact that such groups are mobilized on the basis of a generalized belief. From our theoretical analysis we should expect such groups to be oriented towards norms and values and our first task will be to distinguish the characteristics of the two types of attitude group according to which component of action they are oriented toward. At the simplest level, the difference arises from the fact that normative change is not *per se* illegitimate, whereas value change is. Indeed, within the democratic structure it is possible to campaign for alterations in the more specific regulatory principles such as those regulating elections and indeed the major political parties provide a channel for occasional respecifications. On the other hand, an attack on values involves a challenge to the whole of the existing value system, the stable balance of the components of action; and while campaigning for such a change of values may not itself be illegitimate (though many systems define it as such —note the illegality of the Communist Party in a number of democratic nations), the achievement of their aim is, at

least from the viewpoint of the society as a whole. The fact that such groups are defined as anti-social in their aims will obviously have considerable effects on their behaviour.

Let us now look at some attitude groups in more detail and examine into which category they fall. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament we have already mentioned. Basically we might suggest that this group was norm-oriented in that while it attempted to change the military sector of society, it was not intent on any alteration of our basic democratic values; indeed the methods used by a major section of the Campaign was specifically oriented to using a major channel of democratic participation, viz. the Labour Party. The essence of the changes envisaged in the military sector can be summed up as 'unilateralism', a policy which included the unconditional renunciation by Britain of the use and production of nuclear weapons and the refusal of their use in her defence.

There were, however, in the anti-nuclear camp a number of smaller groups which might be considered value-oriented. The Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War and the Committee of 100 are two examples. The latter group presented with the same problems as C.N.D. felt that the solution to strain was not merely normative, but lay in the creation of a non-violent society. For instance, their second policy statement contains the following: 'We have found that we cannot oppose nuclear war without addressing ourselves to the causes of war; that we cannot advocate non-violence without considering all the causes of violence; that we cannot resist the 'defence' policy of the government without coming up against the problem of location of power in our society'. In a third statement they went even further: 'We believe that our thinking about non-violence and direct action provides a new basis for making international and domestic decisions'. Or in Smelser's words, the Committee envisaged a modification of: '... those conceptions concerning nature, man's place in it, man's relation to man and the desirable

and non-desirable as they relate to man's environment and inter-human relations' (Smelser, 1962, p. 120).

As another example of the value component in the beliefs of some attitude groups, we might take the Moral Rearmers. They envisage a complete change in human values, which will become the four 'absolutes' of honesty, love, purity and unselfishness. As the Church Assembly report on the organization put it, 'It does not seek to patch up existing systems, but to create a new type of man, a new society, a new civilization, a new culture, a new renaissance' (Church Assembly, 1955).

We might give many examples of norm-oriented groups which are in Britain far more prevalent than their value counterparts. Among them are the Howard League, attempting to reform the prison system, the Abortion Law Reform Society, the Research Defence League, etc. Anti-Vivisection is another directed, as are many, against one specific piece of legislation, the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876, which authorized experiments on living animals under certain stipulated conditions. They do not argue merely on the grounds of the cruelty involved, but that vivisection is itself a poor method of medicinal science: 'The craze for vaccination and immunization . . . products of the animal laboratory and responsible for a good proportion of the total number of animal experiments . . . has failed miserably to afford protection against infectious diseases. Worse than that, it has in many instances propagated the spread of infection and been directly responsible for a number of deaths'.

I think it may now reasonably be assumed that we have established that attitude groups are typically oriented towards normative or value components (though the latter will be oriented toward both since value transcends norms in their level of generality—see Chapter 1). We may now proceed to examine what distinguishes such groups' behaviour from that of interest groups.

The reaction to strain

In a preceding chapter we have suggested that the typical mode of operation of the interest group is compromise, consultations and negotiation. In contrast to this, the generalized belief inherent in attitude groups gives rise to ready-made solutions to strain, universal panaceas which do not allow of compromise—in other words, we would expect faithfulness to principle among attitude groups, rather than a reliance on pragmatic negotiation. Moreover, the nature of the generalized belief posits strain, to a greater or lesser degree, as a most immediate threat whose solution is of great urgency. We would expect to find all these features more readily apparent in the value rather than in the norm-oriented movement. Let us look at more examples to illustrate these points.

The peace movement throughout its history has shown many of the above characteristics. The possession of this or that weapon, or the configuration of power politics, presents a potent threat, whose only solution is total abolition. As Beales, the historian of the peace movement (Beales, 1931), has pointed out, there is a neglect of study of the institutions necessary to bring about disarmament, and instead an emphasis on the danger of the situation. C.N.D. at least at first had as its battle-cry an uncompromising unilateralism with little consideration how it might be achieved in the present world situation. The precursor of the Campaign, the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapon Tests, was a group concerned in its own words with, 'the dangers and horrors of nuclear weapons'. A survey of the 1965 Aldermaston March indicates the generality of marchers' motivations and at the same time the feeling that they were personally threatened. Among the respondents one felt, 'a sense of horror and impending catastrophe'; another young man expressed it more simply by saying that he 'wanted to live' (Lancaster Peace Research Centre, 1965). The urgency of the threat is adequately expressed in Campaign literature—

C.N.D. has issued a number of pamphlets on the danger of accidental war and these stress the likelihood of nuclear war within the next few decades. Moreover, this is a statistical generalization—when they say war will occur within twenty years, they mean it might occur today, tomorrow or next week—there is no way of telling when the nuclear sword of Damocles will descend, only that it will.

The more value-oriented Committee of 100 feels the danger to be even greater. Lord Russell and the Rev. Michael Scott in the Committee's first publication said, 'So far from diminishing, even while the world's statesmen are gathering at the U.N., the dangers of mass extermination are increasing; and the urgency of warning mankind of its peril becomes very great'. The first policy statement talks of accidental war under the heading 'DISASTER ALMOST CERTAIN'. Like certain other groups articulated on the basis of a generalized belief, they tend to see much of the evil in the world as the deliberate agency of wicked beings—in this case a government that does not tell the awful truth to the populace: 'Above all the imminence of all-out nuclear war is ignorantly or mendaciously underestimated in the statements of politicians and in the vast majority of newspapers. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that most of the makers of opinion consider it more important to defeat the "enemy" than to safeguard the continued existence of the species'. A last feature of the Committee helps us to the conclusion of the generalized and absolutist nature of its belief structure; this is their constant comparison of their tactics with those of the early Christian martyrs—they vindicate their civil disobedience by comparing it with disobedience to Caesar, which the Western European tradition manifestly does justify.

The Lord's Day Observance Society is another which specifically denies any desire to compromise. This is apparent in its critique of the Crathorne report on the Sunday observance laws, where it specifically attacks the suggestion that the 'special character' of the Sabbath might be protected by for-

bidding entertainment before 12.30 p.m. on Sunday. I quote: 'This provision, though it may be acceptable to a certain type of churchmanship, more Continental than British, more Roman Catholic than Protestant, more modernistic than scriptural, is of no worth whatsoever to those who recollect God's ordinance that the whole of the Sabbath day be kept holy. This is not a matter upon which such compromise can be accepted'. This particular group is fond of thinking of its opponents as agents of wickedness personified; thus 'free-thinkers' are designated as 'anti-Christian forces marshalled by "that old serpent, called the Devil and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world" '.

If one wishes to look at the short-circuited nature of the generalized belief one need go little further than the animal and health protection groups. Cause and effect arguments are hardly their strongest point! Thus the anti-vaccinationists postulate a causal connection between cancer and inoculations, on the ground that both have increased in the last few decades. Another strange correlation appears on the front page of their quarterly bulletin, The Vaccination Inquirer and Health Review, under the title 'startling fact': 'In the 25 years ended December 1962 nearly two-thirds of the children born in England and Wales remain unvaccinated for smallpox, yet only four children under five died from smallpox; while of the one-third vaccinated, no less than 86 children under five were killed by vaccination, and many more were seriously injured by it'. All this proves is that in a society where a large number are vaccinated, the dangers of contagion from smallpox are less than the dangers of injection; it does not prove that without vaccination the numbers dying from smallpox (plus the number dying from injection) would not be much higher than the numbers dying from smallpox plus those dying from vaccination at present.

The anti-vivisectionists also provide examples of the absolutism associated with the generalized belief. C. S. Lewis' pamphlet entitled simply 'Vivisection' is an indication, in its

exaggerated viewpoint, of the fervour with which such views are held: 'The victory of vivisection marks a great advance in the triumph of ruthless, non-moral utilitarianism over the old world of ethical laws; a triumph in which we, as well as animals, are already the victims, and of which Hiroshima and Dachau mark the more recent achievements'.

'The world's slow stain'

We should now like to look at the reactions of attitude groups to contact with the real world, where ideals are apt to be tarnished. Value-oriented groups tend to be affected by the extreme negative appraisal they receive from society as a whole and react in one of the following ways:

(i) *Proliferation of aims.* The Committee of 100 may be taken as typical of this phenomenon. An analysis of successive policy statements indicates a search for a consistent philosophy, here found in the Anarchist stream of thought, and partly a psychological reaction to outcast status. Initially there is a specific, if obsessive reflection on the dangers of nuclear war. But in the second statement, as well as a call to prohibit weapons of mass destruction, we find that non-violence is turned into a philosophy: 'We offer non-violent resistance as the way in which peoples can defend their values and their way of life'. There is an explicit rejection of societal values: 'Not all of us are agreed that this means we must reject the political parties and challenge the State in all its forms, but all of us are agreed that there is something seriously wrong with democracy in this country'. A third statement indicates the branching out of aims and value commitments: 'It is not enough to be merely anti-war. We are interested in the problems of building a new non-violent society. We think it essential to undertake this even under the shadow of war and war preparations, we are, for example, actively involved in new thinking and action about educa-

tion, housing health, communications, transport and industrial relations'.

(ii) *Withdrawal from the rest of the community*. The groups that follow this course form close-knit entities which attempt to avoid the disturbing realities of their political impotence. In Britain we might to some extent cite the more virulent racialist groups, in particular Colin Jordan's National Socialist Movement. Some of the smaller left-wing parties also seem to fit this pattern, as to some extent does the Communist Party of Great Britain. The sort of analysis that one may use here is that applicable to the millennarian and chiliastic sects, whose beliefs are in many ways similar. The common belief of an imminent depression that the Socialist Labour League and Oswald Mosley's Union Movement both possess is in both cases the precursor of their respective Socialist and Fascist millennia. Indeed, the closeness of in-group activity in these small attitude groups serves a definite survival function in insulating group beliefs from outside contamination.

The reasons why a value-oriented attitude group should adopt one of these postures rather than another is a subject for further research. It, might, however, be surmised that withdrawal from the community comes at the stage that the value-oriented groups gives up the uneven struggle to change the world, and becomes inward-looking, if only in the hope of passing the word of truth down the ages.

Norm-oriented attitude groups may follow a very different course from those here outlined. They are not necessarily in the invidious position of holding socially unacceptable beliefs and values. It is possible for unilateralists to argue their case in terms of a truly democratic society being a peaceful society, as the anti-vivisectionist is able to appeal to the humanitarian elements in the culture. In this case we sometimes find such groups gradually accommodating with the system and to some degree using the normal channels of interest articulation. As a classic example we shall cite the

Howard League for Penal Reform. This group was founded in the 1880's to protest about inhuman conditions in prisons, including flogging, the silence rule, and conditions of solitary confinement. As changes in public attitude came about they were able to develop direct contacts with the Home Office, and their expert representations to Royal Commissions on the penal system were given considerable weight. Other norm-oriented groups have shown less accommodation, but have maintained specific objectives, in part because it was felt that in this way they had a greater chance of success. Most of the law-reform societies came into this category. One other factor influencing accommodation is a partial success of the attitude group. Such a success gives a vested interest to the group to protect what they have gained. This is true of the Howard League to some degree and at least partially explains why Britain is still the proud possessor of an Anti-Slavery Society.

The tactics of persuasion

Obviously the mode of reaction to the real world, which we have just discussed, is an important factor in determining the type of tactics a pressure group will adopt. The withdrawn group very often, despite its professions to the contrary, has very little interest in major proselytization, but conceives its main function to exist in preaching to the converted. The magazines of the smaller Socialist societies can hardly be expected to induct large numbers of new members, but serve the very important purpose of reaffirming the beliefs of the faithful. On the other hand, the accommodating group's tactics may vary very little from that we expect as typical of any interest group: lobbying, writing to M.P.s, and so on. Nonetheless, there are certain types of tactic which seem to be either unique to some attitude groups, or at least predominantly used by them.

Most interest groups work through Parliament and this

applies to many attitude groups, for instance the successful lobby against capital punishment. But unlike interest groups, a number of attitude groups have put up candidates themselves, or at least contemplated such action. Such attempts are surely an exception to Finer's definition of the Lobby suggesting as it does that pressure groups are 'never themselves prepared to take over the direct government of the country'. The logical implication of candidacy is that one will attempt to exert such control if elected. The ex-service movement after the First World War attempted to mobilize support for Parliamentary candidates, who subscribed to their aims and more important, they formed the small Silver Badge Party (Wootton, 1963). C.N.D. has on occasions contemplated running parliamentary candidates. Mr A. J. P. Taylor suggested at the rally ending the 1960 Aldermaston March that should C.N.D. fail in converting the Labour Party to its views, then the movement would have no choice but to put up its own candidates. Another attempt to put up candidates was made by an organization called INDEC, Independent Nuclear Disarmament Electoral Committee. The Racialists have also made forays into these fields, their greatest success being John Bean's 9% of the poll at Southall in the 1964 General Election. Another attempt at influencing Parliament was the attempt of the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear Warfare to organize a 'Voters' Veto' against non-unilateralist candidates.

Another tactic which does seem to be almost the sole prerogative of attitude groups is what has come to be called direct action and civil disobedience. These tactics have at various times been used by all sorts of norm and value-oriented groups (the Suffragettes being a classic case). It is difficult to argue that this is just intended as a means of influencing the government; the avowed intention, whether or not realistic, is a further attempt at direct control. The protestors are surely saying that here are the policies which no man of principle could support—if not supporting them means being disobedient to the lawfully elected authority,

then that is what must be done. Moreover, many of the demonstrations carried out by the Committee of 100 and in America by the Freedom Riders, were not intended as mere symbolic protest, but as a concrete means of defeating hated policies. This is certainly so of the attempts by Direct Action to block the entrance to rocket sites and to prevent the continuation of work on them. Anthony Weaver in a Direct Action pamphlet suggested that the demonstrators' justification was that 'By accepting arrest and imprisonment on civil disobedience projects, demonstrators show that they obey a higher law than the one which protects and surrounds with secrecy engines of unheard of destruction'. This is admittedly symbolic protest, but indicates a state of mind that would support direct control of the government, if only for the specific purpose of removing the implementors of the 'disastrous' defence policy pursued by Britain.

It may be thought that direct action and indeed violent protest is not restricted to attitude groups at all, instancing perhaps the St Marylebone 'rent strikes' and 'rent riots', which involved the tenants, who surely form an interest group. In this case at least, the contention appears to be inaccurate; the 'rent riots' were to a large extent uninstitutionalized 'hostile outbursts' arising from strain on the mobilization for motivation component of social action (Smelser, 1962, Chapter VIII). Moreover, tenants are not as such an interest group; this is only so if they organize on the criterion of their tenancy; in this case it appears more a case of certain tenants organizing on the basis of shared attitudes towards not only their own exploitation but exploitation in general.

Other tactics used by attitude groups predominantly are, of course, protest marches, which serve the additional purpose of reinforcing group solidarity, pamphleteering, and also the use of fictional material, plays and novels, to illustrate their cause. Moral Rearmament, for instance, have turned play-mongering into an art, and own theatres in many capitals of the world. They also show a whole series of films to au-

diences in the developing countries in their fight against 'Communist Materialism'. C.N.D. was able to utilize literary talents to illustrate its cause. J. B. Priestley's play, *Doomsday for Dyson* found a large audience on B.B.C. Television, and Charles Morgan wrote *The Burning Glass*, in which he considered the theme of the nuclear scientists' moral self-appraisal developed in Robert Jungk's *Brighter than a Thousand Suns*.

Conclusion

Attitude groups are not, then, to be included with other pressure groups; they have distinctive features stemming from their belief structure based on the generalized belief and should be studied in their own right. That is not to say that they should not be considered in relation to interest groups. The two modes of structural differentiation are alternative reactions to strain, but this relationship cannot be apparent except in the overall context of a particular political culture. It is to be hoped that our analysis of the Anglo-American pressure group scene has already made clear this relationship for British attitude groups. Finally, it is apparent that there is a great scope for research into the workings of individual attitude groups in this country and others.

Footnote

Most of the material for this chapter came from the publications of the relevant attitude groups.

8

Conclusion

In our Preface we suggested that this book had three tasks which it might perform. The first was the generation of hypotheses about the way in which particular types of group behave and may best be analysed. The second was the elaboration of a typology of political systems involving a delineation of the way in which pressure groups operate in each one. Lastly we felt that our study of the relationship between political culture and pressure group activities might lead to some, at least tentative, generalizations about the nature of this relationship. Thus in concluding we will attempt to make explicit our findings in each of these fields.

Initial hypotheses

Here we reiterate our hypotheses of Chapter 1 positing the structural differentiation model, in both its 'rational' and 'generalized' forms, as an appropriate tool of explanation of pressure group activity. This we may do with added confidence having examined the way in which interest and attitude groups behave in the context of a wide range of political systems. Interest groups, most particularly economic groups, appear to be amenable to analysis in terms of the 'rational' model characterized by a realist redefinition of the components of action in response to a perceived strain. Although

in actual empirical content this approach may not differ markedly from that employed by the more normal pragmatic treatment of the subject, its advantage lies in the identification of the most pertinent variables for analysis; these being the nature and origin of the strain and the particular component of action affected. Explanation in these terms can be largely reduced, as we have seen in the Anglo-American context, to an analysis of group behaviour in terms of group perceptions of their own position in relation to others and also in relation to their own aspirations, that is to say in light of the concept of 'relative deprivation'. The concept of 'system' derived from Functionalism also provides assistance in directing our attention to the cause of strain; especially we must look at the interchanges across system boundaries for the alterations in the input-output balance of goal-attainment which is the primary agent of strain within the political system. Although again we cannot claim that from an empirical point of view such an approach has any novelty, its value lies precisely in *always* directing our attention to causes of strain lying in the background of the purely political, what we have called the political culture, rather than in the institutionalized superstructure.

Our conclusion in regard to attitude groups was somewhat different. We feel that their activities have certain unique features, which can best be conceptually expressed by reference to the generalized nature of their belief structure. They too are activated on the basis of strain, which can be seen as a form of 'relative deprivation'. But though analysis in terms of the source and nature of strain and the component of action affected is appropriate, the most important feature of their perception of reality is the short-circuiting of the process of respecification of those components. This was abundantly clear in our examination of the animal and health protection societies, but is also applicable to other norm and value-oriented groups, for instance the nationalist movement arguing that the removal of colonial domination is the abso-

lutely efficacious solution to all the problems faced by the emergent nation. Since in looking at both interest and attitude groups we are using the same basic explanatory model certain common variables must be identified, the nature of strain, etc.

However, in examining the attitude group we must ask why a generalized belief is developed; why, in other words, there is a short-circuiting as we have described. This is as we have already suggested a topic for considerable research, but we might indicate a few possibilities. As Smelser argues, the access to the decision-making process for these groups may be a crucial factor. As Djilas's already-quoted comment on strike movements in Communist countries indicates, the lack of institutionalization of normative and value change forces groups to adopt a generalized and violent approach to political action. In other words, where groups find themselves impotent to do anything about perceived strain, they are most likely to generalize their beliefs and suggest a total regeneration of society. This attitude cannot always be regarded as totally non-rational, since where normative and value change is completely impossible, it may be perfectly rational to promote social change to the degree where this becomes possible. However, the value-oriented movement usually does not restrict its aims to value change justified on this basis of 'he who wills the ends also wills the means'; it is also the case that the perception of channels open for change is defective. Here one arrives at another important cause of generalization and this is the psychological attributes of the leaders and frequently the rank-and-file of such groups. In the past, analysis of collective behaviour movements has been almost exclusively in terms of such psychological peculiarities, and although we would maintain that structural characteristics such as the social and political culture are more important causal factors, it must always be remembered that certain individuals show a remarkable propensity to belong to violent, extremist (often millennarian) movements, often not be-

ing unduly concerned with the exact nature of the doctrine they espouse. This factor will be particularly important in analysing those generalized belief movements that have become sect-like preserving the word of truth for future generations and not indulging in activism of any kind. The unfortunate aspect of research in this field is that individuals with psychological peculiarities of this variety are not very enthusiastic about research workers.

Typological conclusions

Our intention is here to draw together the material from our examination of the six political systems we have studied. The first generalization deals with the relationship between the growth of functional differentiation in society and the proliferation of interest groups. Taking the political systems we have outlined in order of differentiation of function (that is in the order they appear in this book), we may note that as differentiation increases so do associational interest groups working within the structure of 'rational' structural differentiation. We stated that in the undeveloped system such groups in the normal sense did not exist at all, the nearest approach being the quasi-institutional cliques forming part of the aristocratic elite. Their development is a feature of the developing system, but here they are likely to be drawn into the aegis of value-oriented nationalist movements. Under totalitarian regimes, such groups are, at least formally, the only type permitted to exist, but they are as we have seen almost completely bereft of their interest-articulation function. Only in the latter three industrialized systems does the interest group come into its own, and this less so in Continental European countries like France, where until recently small-scale production and a political theory stemming from Rousseau, and intolerant of sectional interests, has prevented their full development. This conclusion positing a relationship between functional differentiation and interest

group activity is not surprising, since it is in line with the well established tendency of industrialized nations to replace primary group relationships with secondary organized groups. Moreover, it obviously explains the emphasis of Western political scientists on the interest group to the exclusion of other phenomena, for this is the type of group which dominates the political systems with which they have the greatest acquaintance.

Secondly we may argue that as differentiation increases we also note that those groups which are activated on the basis of a generalized belief tend to become norm-oriented rather than value-oriented, that is to say they attack not the structures of society itself, but certain regulatory principles considered as pernicious. For the reasons given we do not find either type in the undeveloped political system, but with the developing country we find that almost all groups are drawn into the value-oriented nationalist movements. In totalitarian systems all movements based on generalized belief are suppressed, but where they come to the surface we saw that they tended to be of a value-oriented kind. There is, of course, one organization of a value-oriented, extremist type which is not suppressed in such polities, this being the regime itself. Lastly, it was shown that in systems like the French that although movements based on a generalized belief were less frequent, they tended to be of a value-oriented type more than was the case in the Scandinavian and Anglo-American systems. This last conclusion was moderated by the development in recent years of a somewhat less extremist picture in the Continental countries.

The purpose of our typological treatment was in part to see in which political systems our two initial hypotheses were most appropriate for analysis. Very roughly it would seem clear that analysis in terms of 'rational' structural differentiation is most appropriate to the last three of our six political systems, though especially in Continental Europe this must be supplemented by some reference to collective behaviour

movements. It is particularly in developing and totalitarian systems that this latter method of explanation comes into its own.

Pressure groups and political culture

We have already noted that there are relationships between the degree of functional differentiation and the type of pressure group activity in a society. At least one further conclusion seems indicated by our material and that is that the fragmentation of political culture and most particularly the uneven nature of social and industrial change have important effects in making for extremist attitude groups. Eisenstadt points to this latter as one of the most important reasons for the inclusion of putative interest groups into the framework of the nationalist group. Raymond Aron in his word *France: Steadfast and Changing* (Aron, 1960) suggests that French divisiveness must be largely attributed to uneven economic development, and if this is true of France it is equally the case of Germany and Italy. We ourselves have noted that totalitarianism is usually a concomitant of severe strain in a political system of the kinds we have just mentioned; it is, in other words, the most severe reaction to uneven development. In contrast to these situations, countries like Britain and Sweden have had relatively homogeneous change, especially in the economic field. As a result, pressure group divisions have been largely on issues of immediate concern to their members and with relevance to the social problems they face. Instead of reflecting ancient and often irrelevant ideological disputes, pressure groups have reflected relatively accurately the changing social and industrial structure and in accommodating to the system have come to wield much power within it.

At this point we intend to conclude our analysis of pressure groups and political culture. As we originally stated the approach of this book has been highly schematic and

general. Doubtlessly on many issues we have overstated our case, where a careful outline of exceptions might have been more appropriate. However, the justification for the monograph lies precisely in its generality. Ours has been an attempt to analyse pressure groups within their real setting of political culture, and to set out in general terms some of the relationships existing between the two. These views may well be amenable to considerable modification; they are certainly amenable to treatment in greater detail; but what ought not to be ignored is that it is only by viewing groups within this general context that we can understand their behaviour fully, even as they operate in any particular political system.

Suggestions for further reading

This section is designed to direct the attention of the student to those books most fruitful for further study. For the most part they have been mentioned in the text and bibliography, but there are one or two additions.

I Interest Groups:

HARRY ECKSTEIN. *Pressure Group Politics*, George Allen & Unwin, 1960.

This partly theoretical study of interest groups has been summarised in the text. But apart from theoretical interest it serves as a case-study of a professional organisation in its dealings with government.

S. FINER. *Anonymous Empire*, Pall Mall Press, 1958.

This is essentially a study of the way in which interest groups channel their demands through Parliament. It is also a specific indictment of the secrecy in which some groups operate.

H. H. WILSON. *Pressure Group: the campaign for commercial television*, Secker & Warburg, 1961.

A case-study of a particular interest group. It deals mainly with the origins and tactics of the lobby promoting commercial television, and it is possible to identify the types of strain which led individuals to restructure their situation.

II Attitude Groups:

GEORGE THAYER. *The British Political Fringe*, Anthony Bond, 1965.

This journalistic work is a survey of a wide range of the smaller and more 'way out' political groups in Britain. It covers groups as widely separate as C.N.D., the racialists and the Cornish Nationalists.

TOM DRIBERG. *The Mystery of Moral Rearmament*, Secker & Warburg, 1964.

A study of the history of a particular movement of the value-oriented type and one which illustrates the similarity of behaviour based on a generalised belief and the experience of religious conversion.

III Theory:

NEIL SMELSER. *The Theory of Collective Behaviour*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.

This is the basic source of the distinction between 'rational' structural differentiation and action based on a generalised belief.

GABRIEL ALMOND. *Comparative Political Systems; Interest Groups and the Political Process*, both in MACRIDIS AND BROWN (eds), *Comparative Politics*, New York, 1964.

These two articles provide, perhaps, the most easily digestible introduction to the use of structural functional analysis in the sphere of political studies.

IV Pressure Groups abroad:

H. W. EHRMANN. *Interest Groups on Four Continents*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964.

Apart from including the articles on France, Finland and the U.S.A. cited in the text, this excellent collection contains studies of another six pressure group systems as well as a series of discussions on some comparative aspects of pressure group politics.

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

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