

# THE STUDY OF INDIAN AND TIBETAN THOUGHT

*Some Problems and Perspectives*

INAUGURAL LECTURE

DELIVERED ON HIS ENTRANCE INTO OFFICE AS  
PROFESSOR OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY, BUDDHIST  
STUDIES AND TIBETAN AT THE UNIVERSITY  
OF LEIDEN ON THE 12th MAY, 1967

BY

**D. SEYFORT RUEGG**



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E. J. BRILL  
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*Mr President and Members of the Board of Curators,  
Rector Magnificus and Honoured Colleagues,  
Professors and Docents in the University,  
Students at Leiden University,*

*Ladies and Gentlemen,*

Under the general and very comprehensive heading of Indian philosophy and Buddhist studies are included a considerable number of the most valuable intellectual achievements known to us from the history of civilization and thought which are of interest to us both in themselves and from the comparative point of view. Even at the present time many of the peoples of South, Central and East Asia are the inheritors — conscious or otherwise — of these great achievements inasmuch as their civilizations continue to be deeply marked by elements ultimately derived from these foundations.

It is especially appropriate that studies such as these should be carried on in the university in which Hendrik KERN worked, and in an institute named after him. Already a century ago this pioneer of Indology devoted his attention to many of the branches of Indian studies not only within the confines of the subcontinent but also outside its geographical limits, thus demonstrating that he was keenly aware of the wide diffusion and broad historical significance of Indian civilization; and it is to KERN's credit in particular that he clearly perceived the

relevance and importance of Buddhist studies. In this respect I should also like to recall that, in a public lecture given in Leiden in 1931, J. Ph. VOGEL drew attention to the universal 'cosmopolitan' significance of Buddhism as a religion and cultural force which not only helped to link together the far-flung provinces of India but also brought much of Central, East and South East Asia into contact with India.<sup>1)</sup>

For my own part I feel it a great honour to have been called to such a centre of studies as Leiden University. I also deem it a privilege to be able to work in association with the Kern Institute of Indology whose director, Professor KUIPER, with his keen awareness of the cultural significance of Indian studies has continued to give to this institute a breadth of outlook in keeping with the tradition just mentioned.

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A survey of many of the problems and perspectives in the field of Buddhist studies with special reference to the philological side was given here a decade ago, and there is therefore no need to repeat what was said then; for despite the appearance in the mean time of a number of important works in this field it can be said that the tasks ahead of us remain very much the same as then defined.<sup>2)</sup> I should accordingly like to approach the subject from another angle and to single out just a few

1) J. Ph. VOGEL, *De cosmopolitische beteekenis van het Buddhisme* (Leiden, 1931).

2) J. W. de JONG, *De studie van het Boeddhisme, Problemen en perspectieven* ('s-Gravenhage, 1956).

topics of special interest in Buddhist studies from the point of view of Indian philosophy and religion. Let me emphasize from the outset that the philosophical side cannot usually be divorced and treated entirely separately from the religious without a certain more or less arbitrary compartmentalization, for no hard and fast dividing line can normally be drawn between the philosophical and the religious in either India or Tibet. Indeed, the Sanskrit work *dharma* (Tibetan *chos*) covers a whole complex of ideas belonging to the philosophical, religious and sociological domains which can only be separated one from the other for the particular purposes of a given specialized analysis.

It is, I think, correct to say that Buddhism was never exclusively either a purely moral teaching or some more or less 'aristocratic' doctrine destined, in the framework of a satiated or pessimistic world-view, to provide an escape from the ills and suffering of the world. It is rather a comprehensive soteriological teaching necessarily involving a philosophical foundation — which has a number of features in common with other Indian systems — and including an elaborate cosmology closely linked with the stages of meditation. In short, Buddhism is what is commonly referred to as a philosophy and a religion.

The shift in emphasis in the treatment of Buddhism came about with the realization that the theory of liberation as generally conceived in it implies the existence of some kind of philosophical theory in which intellectual understanding ( : *prajñā*) and knowledge ( : *jñāna*) have

an essential part to play. And it has also come to be realized that the word *duhkha* (Pāli *dukkha*) usually translated 'suffering' denotes not only suffering in the ordinary sense but also that which is 'unsatisfactory' from the philosophical point of view because it is subject to decay and destruction. The term *duhkha* accordingly figures in a triad of terms which includes in addition the impermanent (*anitya, anicca*) and the non-self (*anātman, anatta*);<sup>3)</sup> and it comprises not only sensations that are painful but also those that are pleasant and neutral.<sup>4)</sup> All that belongs to the domain of 'name' and 'form' (*nāmarūpa*) — in other words all that is included in the fivefold classification of factors serving as the basis for clinging attachment (*upādānakandha*) — is then *duhkha*.<sup>5)</sup> In this sense the concept of *duhkha* or Suffering is in no wise pessimistic, an epithet which is anyway quite unsuited to describe Buddhism either as a philosophy or as a religion and way of life.<sup>6)</sup>

3) V. e.g. *Ānguttaranikāya*, I, p. 286; *Samyuttanikāya*, III, p. 67-68 (Pali Text Society editions).

4) V. *Samyuttanikāya*, IV, p. 216-217.

The position of the Ābhidharmikas differs from that of the Saṃtānikas on this point and is more involved. Cf. L. de LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, *L'Ābhidharmakośa* 6, p. 129, and Sarvāstivāda, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 5 (1937), p. 102 note 3; N. Aiyaswami Sastri, *Pañcavastuśāstra*, Introduction, p. xiii (in *Viśvabharati Annals* 10).

5) V. *Samyuttanikāya*, III, p. 21.

6) The *dukkhasatya* is the first of the Four Noble Truths (*āryasatya*) of Buddhism. But this fourfold scheme starting with *duhkha* is not peculiar to Buddhism; and it is found also for example in UDDYOTAKARA's *Nyāyavārtika* (on *Nyāyabbāṣya* 1.1.1): *heyabāṇopāyādbigantavyabhedāc catvāry arthapadānī samyag buddhvā nibhreyasam adhigacchatīti* *heyam duhkham . . . | etāni catvāry artha-*

Let us now briefly consider a few phases in the history of Buddhism and some of the problems they pose.

The canonical Nikāyas, which constitute the oldest available Buddhist scriptures, have, thanks to the splendid achievements of scholars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, been available for some time in Pāli, the only language apart from Chinese in which the majority of these particular scriptures have been handed down. However, the Pāli texts hardly give us the very words of the Buddha in the language in which he taught; and in order to reconstruct his teaching as accurately as possible it is therefore necessary to compare the Pāli canon as preserved by the Theravāda school with those

*padāni sarvāśu adhyātmavidyāśu sarvācaryair varṇyanta iti* Here that which is to be eliminated (*beyā*) is explained as suffering (*duḥkha* cf. 1.1.2; 21-22); that which brings it about (*nirvartaka*) is ignorance and desire (*avidyātrṣṇe*); elimination (*hāna*) is knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*) and its means (*upāya*), i.e. the philosophical science (*śāstra*); and that which is to be attained (*adhibigantavya*) is liberation (*mokṣa*). The four factors thus enumerated by UDDYOTAKARA are therefore parallel to the four āryasatyas of Buddhism. See also *Yogaśūtras* 2.16 f.

A comparable set of four factors is to be found in the *Yogabhbāṣya* 2.15 (p. 168): *rogo rogahetur ārogyam bhaiṣajyam*; these are explained there as the stream of rebirth (*samsāra*), its cause, liberation (*mokṣa*), and the means (*upāya*) by which the latter is achieved. It is conceivable that the *Yogabhbāṣya* was influenced on this point by Buddhism, as it certainly has been elsewhere; but the influence of the medical school can also be traced here.

On the question of *duḥkha* in Buddhism in general v. Th. STCHERBATSKY, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna* (Leningrad, 1927); pp. 55-56 (where the term is rendered by 'phenomenal existence'); H. von GLASENAPP, *Nachwort zu H. OLDENBERG, Buddha*<sup>13</sup> (Stuttgart, 1961), p. 416; E. LAMOTTE, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, I (Louvain, 1958), p. 29; E. CONZE, *Buddhist Thought in India* (London, 1962), p. 34 f. ('ill').

scriptures belonging to the Sarvāstivāda and other schools preserved in Buddhist Sanskrit and Prākrit, with their Chinese translations, and with the corresponding translations in the Tibetan bKa'gyur. In this way we may be able to go back to a fairly early stage in the history of Buddhism, which may conveniently be termed proto-canonical.<sup>7)</sup>

While we are fortunate in possessing a number of general accounts of these canonical texts and of their contents based chiefly on the Pāli sources and the Indo-Sinhalese tradition, relatively few detailed studies of particular philosophical problems have hitherto been published. As an example of a minute philological study of a term of fundamental philosophical importance a monograph on the term *dhamma* in the Pāli canon and its commentaries published as long ago as 1921 still stands supreme, and almost alone.<sup>8)</sup> Concerning the philosophical significance of the *dharma*-theory, particular mention should be made of the well known work by Th. STCHERBATSKY (F. ŠČERBATSKOJ) in which it is interpreted as a doctrine of pluralistic character which constitutes the "central conception" of Buddhism;<sup>9)</sup>

7) This expression proto-canonical seems preferable to pre-canonical, which can be misleading (see below); however its use in no way implies acceptance of the Urkanon theory of H. LÜDERS and his followers.

8) M. und W. GEIGER, *Pāli Dhamma vornehmlich in der kanonischen Literatur* (Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-philologische und historische Kl., XXXI. Band, 1. Abh., München, 1921).

9) Th. STCHERBATSKY, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"* (London, 1923). In this publica-

and also of H. von GLASENAPP's long article on the same subject in which the uses of the term *dhamma* in the Pāli canon have been analyzed and compared with further developments in the Pāli scholastic literature (Abhidhamma, etc.) and in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kosa*.<sup>10)</sup> Although von GLASENAPP differs from STCHERBATSKY in emphasizing the distance separating the scholastic theories of the Adhidharma from the earlier doctrine presented in the Sūtras, he has sought to show that the basic philosophical conception expressed in the *dharma*-theory is the ultimate foundation of Buddhism, and that this theory was from the outset phenomenological and dealt with what he termed existential elements (Daseinselemente).

Von GLASENAPP's observations on this point, and the criticisms they imply, relate in particular to the hypothesis advanced by those scholars<sup>11)</sup> who assume the existence of a so-called 'pre-canonical' Buddhism rather

tion Stcherbatsky gives an interpretation suggested by his pupil O. ROSENBERG (*Die Probleme der Buddhistischen Philosophie*, Heidelberg, 1924, a German translation of a work originally published in Russian in 1918).

10) H. von GLASENAPP, Zur Geschichte der buddhistischen Dharma-Theorie, *Zeits. d. Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 92 (1938), pp. 383-420.

11) V. e.g. St. SCHAYER, Precanonical Buddhism, *Archiv Orientální* 7 (1935), pp. 121-132, and New Contributions to the Problem of Pre-hīnayānistic Buddhism, *Polski Biuletyn Or.* 1 (1937), pp. 8-17. Schayer's views were largely by A. B. KEITH, Pre-canonical Buddhism, *Indian Historical Quarterly* 12 (1936), pp. 1-20. — Cf. also J. PRZYLUSKI, *Le bouddhisme* (Paris, 1932), and La théorie des skandha, *Rocznik Or.* 14 (1938), pp. 1-8; J. PRZYLUSKI et E. LAMOTTE, Bouddhisme et Upaniṣad, *Bull. de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient* 1932, pp. 141-169.

different from the canonical, and who maintain that, in this putative early doctrine, the word *dharma* denoted a permanent and spiritual entity opposed to the sensuous and transient (included under the term *rūpa*).<sup>12)</sup> In the words of one of the chief advocates of this hypothesis, St. SCHAYER, 'the [classical] *dharma*-theory is not the oldest Buddhist philosophy and . . . it has been preceded by an earlier, pre-hīnayānistic doctrine, which was not a *dharma*-theory'.<sup>13)</sup> According to their hypothesis, then, in the earliest Buddhism *dharma* was analogous to the Upaniṣadic *ātman/brāhmaṇ*.

It is important to note that the method adopted by SCHAYER and his followers in interpreting the Buddhist canonical texts consisted not in starting from those doctrines which are most frequently and regularly attested in the canon as a whole and in holding them to be the oldest and basic teachings of Buddhism, but in singling out on the contrary passages which set forth a doctrine in a particular way differing entirely from the majority of statements on the same subject elsewhere in the canon and in taking just these apparently aberrant passages as vestiges of a pre-canonical Buddhism which the later redactors of the extant canons omitted, or did not venture, to remove from their scriptures. As recently defined by an advocate of this method, it is based on the principle that 'it is not the concordance of sources which guarantees for us the ancientness of a given conception

12) Cf. also M. FALK, *Nāma-rūpa and Dharma-rūpa* (Calcutta, 1943), and *Il mito psichologico* (Roma, 1939).

13) St. SCHAYER, *New Contributions . . .*, p. 15.

(the latter could stem from an innovation common to all the Canons), but precisely the fundamentally aberrant character of a doctrine'.<sup>14)</sup> The Buddhism they have reconstructed in this fashion these scholars have alternately (and somewhat misleadingly) named pre-canonical, pre-hīnayānistic and pristine (primitif).<sup>15)</sup>

14) C. REGAMEY, *Le problème du bouddhisme primitif*, *Rocznik Or.* 21 (1957), p. 49.

15) Inasmuch as we have little reason to think, in the present state of our knowledge, that we shall be able to go very far behind the extant canons and discover an 'original' Buddhism that preceded them, it would seem advisable to avoid using the expression pre-canonical (especially if this word presupposes some reconstructed 'Buddhism' or 'Sākyan religion' quite different from the Buddhism known from our sources). For the same reason, although it is not methodologically misleading like the word pre-canonical, the expression pristine or original (primitif) is also inadequate since it is a moot point whether a doctrinal system reconstructed after a critical comparison of the extant canons can be proved to be identical with the original doctrine of the Buddha. Such a reconstructed doctrine could better be termed proto-canonical.

Nor is the expression pre-hīnayānistic appropriate since much of what is thus implicitly characterized as hīnayānistic in the canon is in fact the common property of Buddhism as a whole including the Mahāyāna (e.g. the *dharma* theory, *nairātmya*, etc.). Such a vague and all too popular use of the term *hīnayāna* should be avoided in any case because it is already preempted in our sources to designate something rather different, *i.e.* a doctrine and method characteristic of certain types of Buddhists who follow neither the *bodhisattvayāna* (or *mahāyāna*) nor the *pratyekabuddhayāna*, and it should therefore not be stretched to cover quite distinct notions and problems. It would then seem preferable not to use the word *hīnayāna* to designate the predecessor of the Mahāyāna and instead to call this predecessor the Buddhism of the Āgamas; in certain contexts the latter might also be referred to as the Śrāvakayāna, as the Mahāyānist doxographers themselves do.

In short, *proto-canonical* seems to be the best description of the Buddhism reconstructed by means of the critical comparison of the old canons belonging to *Āgamic* Buddhism.

The importance for the historian of Buddhist and Indian philosophy of the historical and exegetical problems thus raised is clear: while this reconstructed 'Buddhism' resembles the contemporary non-Buddhist systems of India in several respects it is difficult to discover many points in common with the Buddhism attested by the majority of our sources and to understand how such a teaching could have developed into the doctrines we thus know as Buddhism.<sup>16)</sup> All concerned will no doubt agree that it is essential not to take isolated passages out of context and to base a reconstruction on what may in fact be nothing but untypical utterances; indeed, let us not loose sight of the possibility that, in a corpus of texts as large as the Buddhist canons transmitted by the various schools, we must be prepared to find on occasion variant formulations, and also what might be described as figurative expressions. Now a method which lays stress on 'aberrant' statements and at the same time discounts the doctrinal system attested in the majority of texts could very well be no less misleading than a method proposing to conclude from the

16) It should however be noted that SCHAYER himself disclaimed the intention of postulating an original Buddhism radically opposed to the Buddhism known from the classical sources; see *New Contributions . . .*, p. 13: 'quite impossible [is] the theory that Buddhism was altered by later generations so radically as to make it entirely contradictory to its original form. But truly speaking a metamorphosis is accepted only by Mrs. Rhys Davids, who as a consequence denies the title of Buddhism to the primitive doctrine and calls it "Sākyan religion"'. — On this 'Sākyan religion' v. C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS, *Manual of Buddhism for Advanced Students* (London, 1932), *Outlines of Buddhism* (London, 1934), *Gotama the Man* (London, 1928), etc.

fact that some modern authority on astronomy might somewhere speak of a sunrise or sunset that, at some earlier stage in his work, this same authority did not accept the Copernican theory and still kept to the geocentrism of Ptolemy's cosmology; whereas the proper conclusion would surely be that certain modes of expression have become so firmly fixed in our speech — including even technical and philosophical language — that the most eminent and unimpeachable authority can still make use of them after the *system* in which they had their place has been superseded by the system he himself follows. In other words, these modes of expression become, from the point of view of the latter, figurative. The difficulty the historian has to face in such circumstances is of course how to identify the typical and essential features of a doctrine at a given period so that he can then distinguish in a vast scriptural corpus between doctrinal formulations that are to be understood 'literally' and those that are somehow 'figurative' or 'metaphorical'. By way of anticipation let us note that a comparable problem arises in the case of certain Mahāyānist texts which treat in positive terms of the *tathāgatagarbha* and of the 'qualities' of absolute Reality.<sup>17)</sup>

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Turning now to the origins and historical development of the Mahāyāna, we become perhaps even more aware of the incompleteness of our knowledge, although here the difficulty is due probably less to the inadequacy of our sources than to their superabundance.

17) See below, p. 37-38.

Of all the schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism it is the Madhyamaka, which goes back to NĀGĀRJUNA (*circa* 200 A.D.) and beyond him to the Prajñāpāramitā-Śūtras, that seems to have given rise to the most controversy and misunderstanding amongst both ancient and modern writers. Such misunderstandings and differences of opinion are particularly noticeable as concerns the interpretation of Voidness (*śūnyatā*) — which is not to be understood as the negation or destruction of a thing — and of the method employed by one of the chief branches of the Madhyamaka school which is based — as its name Prāsaṅgika indicates — on the fact that it seeks to demonstrate by the apagogic method that the logical implications ( : *prasāṅga* ) of any position whatsoever are dialectically untenable with respect to absolute Reality (*paramārtha*).

In recent years attempts have been made to formalize the statements of this school with the help of the methods of modern formal logic, but these efforts have not proved very illuminating; <sup>18)</sup> one reason for this may be that, in the last analysis, this school is hardly at all concerned with elaborating logical propositions or with establishing a thesis of its own by means of a syllogism. Rather, it seeks to exhaust, through the process of a *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasāṅga*), all the complementary logical and philosophical positions resulting from the discursiveness (*prapañca*) of dichotomizing thought (*vikalpa*);

18) V. H. NAKAMURA, Buddhist Logic expounded by means of Symbolic Logic, *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* (Journ. of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 7/1 (1958), pp. 1-15.

and in this way it seeks to achieve a pacification of the mind which allows Reality to be known directly as it really is as distinct from the ways in which it may be conceived. <sup>19)</sup>

The other schools of the Madhyamaka have so far been somewhat neglected. Thus the Svātantrikas — who, unlike the Prāsaṅgikas, employ an independent ‘inference’ (*svatantra-anumāna*) or syllogism (*prayoga*) to establish the statements of the Madhyamaka — are only beginning to receive the systematic attention they deserve. Of particular importance for the study not only of Buddhist philosophy but of Indian thought in general will be the thorough examination of the *Tarkajvālā*, a very extensive treatise written in the 7th century by BHĀVAVIVEKA, the chief authority of the Svātantrika school, and containing summaries and discussions of the doctrines of the principal Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools which had flourished in India up to that time. A development of the latter school which at the same time had links with the ‘mentalism’ (*vijñaptimātratā, cittamātratā*) of the Vijñānavāda — the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas — also merits more attention both as a notable later trend in the history of Buddhist philosophy and as

19) Cf. SĀNTIDEVA, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9.35:

yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateḥ saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ |  
tadānyagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati ||

When neither existence nor [its opposite] non-existence is present before the mind, [the latter] because of the absence of any other recourse is without an object and is tranquil. — This verse is traditionally held to express the quintessence of the Madhyamaka teaching.

a school of importance for the study of Tāntrik thought and of the earliest period of Buddhism in Tibet.

Many of the more important early works of the other great Mahāyānist school, the Vijñānavāda, have on the other hand received considerable attention since their Sanskrit originals were published and translated many years ago. A solid foundation for the study of this school is thus already available, although very much naturally remains to be done both in analyzing its doctrines and in following their development up to the 10th/11th century in India, when the school produced several important writers such as RATNĀKARAŚĀNTI and JNĀNAŚRĪMITRA. A solution of the problems concerning the origins of this school and of its earliest treatises (ascribed either to the Bodhisattva or Buddha MAITREYANĀTHA or to ASAṄGA) will require both a careful philological examination of the works in question and a more perfected philosophical analysis of their contents; and the methods of the historian of religion may also be expected to contribute to a deeper insight into the problem of the relationship between MAITREYANĀTHA and ASAṄGA and of the authorship of the treatises ascribed to them.

Unlike the Mādhyamika, who generally accepted (on the conventional level) a realistic view of the world and its processes and who took over a quite traditional theory of knowledge, the Vijñānavādin with his mentalistic orientation was much concerned with the analysis of these processes and with developing a more perfect theory of knowledge. — The Buddhist logicians DIGNĀGA (c. 450-510) and DHARMAKĪRTI (c. 600-660) are

indeed usually reckoned as belonging to the Vijñāna-vāda despite the fact that they did not accept in their system one of the fundamental doctrines of the latter school — the 'store consciousness' (*ālayavijñāna*) <sup>19a</sup>) — and despite the close ties they appear to have had with Sautrāntika thought. These logicians were concerned with topics familiar to philosophers in the East and West such as perception, inference, the syllogism, and valid knowledge together with the means of acquiring it. It is therefore in the study of their doctrines that the methods of modern logic have the best chance of producing useful results; <sup>20</sup>) and amongst the Buddhist philosophers it is consequently precisely these logicians who have received the most attention in recent years, including in I. M. BOCHENSKI's well known work on formal logic. <sup>21</sup>) At the same time, in another recent contribution attention has been drawn to the close correlation between DHARMAKĪRTI's epistemology and his religious position, in which the *buddha* appears as it were as valid knowledge in person (*pramāṇapuruṣa*). <sup>22</sup>)

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### Questions pertaining to the domains of religion and

19a) *Pramāṇavārttika* 3.522 which barely mentions the *ālaya* is not a real exception.

20) See H. NAKAMURA, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-21; J. F. STAAL, Contraposition in Indian Logic, in *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Sciences* (Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress), ed. E. Nagel, P. Suppes and A. Tarski (Stanford, 1962), pp. 634 ff.

21) I. M. BOCHENSKI, *Formale Logik* (Freiburg-München, 1956), pp. 481 ff.

22) V. T. VETTER, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti* (Wien, 1964), pp. 31 f.

also of psychology assume very special importance in the study of what is generally called Tantrism, a movement common — with certain important differences — to Buddhism and Hinduism and also, though perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree, to Jainism. In view of all that has been written about it over the last half century it would be quite untrue to say that Tantrism has attracted no attention; but at the same time it must be conceded that at least some of this attention has been wide of the mark if not patently unfounded and superficial. The difficulties to be encountered in the study of Tantrism are of course very considerable, and they are appreciably increased by the fact that most of the Buddhist texts in Sanskrit on the subject are either lost or have remained unpublished. Fortunately this last obstacle is being removed little by little; and the recent publication of the *Kālacakratantra* for example is of special interest since the Kālacakra system raises questions of fundamental importance in the history of Buddhism and Indian religion and of Indian cultural relations with West and Central Asia.

Even more important as a possible source of misunderstanding are no doubt the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the subject. They stem from the highly complex philosophical and psychological foundations of Tantrism, and from the polyvalence of the symbolic systems employed in it to give expression to its fundamental ideas; moreover, none of the many aspects of the plane of ordinary 'mundane' experience is in principle excluded from the purview of Tantrism. And to

this philosophical and psychological complexity there is added a religious one stemming from the fact that the Buddhist Tantras do not hesitate to encompass much of what might be called the pan-Indian religious substratum.

Because of this 'inclusivism' by virtue of which Buddhist Tantrism encompasses the pan-Indian substratum appearing also in Hinduism some writers have indeed gone so far as to speak of syncretism and also of decadence, and to explain thereby the virtual disappearance of Buddhism from India. The facts of the matter are however likely to be less simple; and a comparable 'inclusivist' symbiosis is also to be encountered in other Buddhist countries where Buddhism has nonetheless remained alive in either its Theravāda or Mahāyāna form. — The question as to whether a given feature in Indian Tantrism is 'Āryan' or 'non-Āryan'<sup>23)</sup> and whether, in the case of Buddhism, it is borrowed from Hinduism or not has unfortunately all too often monopolized discussion at the expense of a thorough study of the Tāntrik literature and conceptions and their symbolic systems; but surely such questions — interesting enough in themselves — can only be taken up usefully on the basis of such a systematic study. At all events, references to syncretism and inclusivism hardly suffice

23) The appropriateness of introducing into the study of the religions of classical India the racial and linguistic opposition Āryan/non-Āryan is debatable. Even the *Rgveda* is said to contain certain 'non-Āryan' elements; and throughout the historical period we are dealing, in the Sanskrit sources, with a composite Indian culture springing from a variety of sources.

to describe and explain what was involved when these latter terms are themselves in need of precise definition with reference to the particular processes in question. A systematic study may then reveal that in Tantrism *per se* we are faced in the first place neither by decadence nor even by borrowings or superficial adaptations of foreign elements, but rather by a mode of thought encompassing in its scope all levels of experience starting from the 'lowest' within the mundane (*laukika*) plane and extending up to the 'highest' on the supra-mundane (*lokottara*) one.<sup>24)</sup>

In some previous work on Tantrism there has been a persistent tendency to stress, without due regard to its religious, psychological and philosophical outlook as a whole and without paying enough attention to its symbolic systems, one particular aspect represented in these texts such as the erotic; and the whole problem has thus sometimes been put badly out of focus, for here as indeed in any situation where the data are complex oversimplification and reductionism are quite out of place. This is of course not to suggest that a given level of reference is of such subordinate importance in Tantrism that it can be safely overlooked, but rather that it must be treated in the framework of the system as a whole.

What Tantrism tends to do then is (putting the matter very briefly with all the attendant risks of oversim-

24) On this point see my observations in *Sur les rapports entre le bouddhisme et le "substrat religieux" indien et tibétain, Journal asiatique*, 1964, pp. 77-95.

plification) to take the whole of the psycho-somatic constitution of the practiser (*sādbaka*) as the basis of realization (*sādhana*). This realization either relates to the wordly plane and the 'psyche', including its so-called subconscious side, in which case it conduces to prosperity, the 'magical' powers (*siddhi*) and so forth, or it relates to the level of consciousness and the non-dual Gnosis (*advayajñāna*), in which case it leads to spiritual realization. Inasmuch as the supreme Gnosis is conceived of as immanent in the practiser, and therefore as somehow inherently and naturally present in the relative *samsārik* condition (by virtue of the principle according to which *nirvāna* and *samsāra* are in reality non-dual), Tantrism functions as a rapid Way leading to the 'instantaneous' attainment of Awakening or buddhahood.

No interpretation of Tantrism that is prepared to leave out of account either the complexity of its foundations, outlook and methods or the polyvalence of its symbolism can therefore hope to penetrate its significance. And it is perhaps only now that recent advances in the fields of psychology, semiology, sociology, and religious studies are beginning to provide us with the conceptual and methodological equipment required to analyze its highly complex and often very subtle structures.

Here again the need to study Buddhism in the context of Indian civilization as a whole makes itself especially clearly felt, for as we have just seen Tantrism is not peculiar to Buddhism, and its Buddhist forms give a place to the religious experience of its milieu inclusive

of Brāhmanism and Hinduism. Hence Tantrism provides a valuable focus for studying the complex relationship between Buddhism and the other Indian religions — not to speak of the relationship between Buddhism and the religions of Central, East and South East Asia when it was introduced in these areas. Happily the comparative study of the various forms of this movement is now in a more favourable situation owing to the recent publication of and research in the Tantras, Āgamas and Saṃhitās.<sup>25)</sup>

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Consideration of the relationship between Buddhism and the other religions of India is of course equally important at all stages. Turning once more to the origins of Buddhism, it would for example seem to be possible to clarify the use of such a characteristic term as *tathāgata* — an epithet of the *buddha* — by reference to semantically parallel terms such as Vedic *addhāti*, a word denoting the seer who perceives directly the hidden truth as it really is, and *adhibigata�athātathya* which, in PATAṄJALI's great grammatical commentary, is an epithet of certain sages who have a direct knowledge of the truth; hence there would seem to be no compelling reason to assume, as some scholars have done, either a non-Āryan or non-Sanskritic etymology for this particular use of the word *tathāgata*.<sup>26)</sup>

25) Of special importance in this respect is the programme of research and publication of the Saiva Āgamas being carried out under the direction of J. FILLIOZAT at the Institut Français d'Indologie in Pondicherry.

26) V. D. SEYFORT RUEGG, Véduque *addhā* et quelques expressions parallèles à *Tathāgata*, *Journal asiatique*, 1955, pp. 163-170.

According to their various attitudes scholars have envisaged Buddhism and Brāhmanism either as two closely related developments both having their roots (if to an unequal extent) in the same ground or, on the contrary, as two essentially separate movements with distinct origins and utterly opposed tendencies. A scholar living at the end of the last century, R. GARBE,<sup>27</sup>), has thus contrasted the 'orthodox' Brāhmanical tradition of Āryāvarta (where Brāhmanical influence was at its strongest) on the one hand and on the other the so-called Kṣatriya tradition of the noble and warrior class giving birth, according to him, in an 'outland' lying to the east of Āryāvarta, to various 'heterodox' schools including not only Buddhism and Jainism but also to the Sāṃkhya system (Kapila, the founder of the latter school, being in fact considered a *rājarsi* or King-Sage).<sup>28</sup>) And somewhat later M. WINTERNITZ postulated the existence of a whole more or less unorthodox literature, which he named the 'Śramaṇa literature' after the ascetics whom he supposed to be its authors.<sup>29</sup> — These problems have

27) Cf. R. GARBE, *Der Mondschein der Sāṃkhya-Wahrheit* (Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Ak. d. Wissenschaften, Philos.-philol. u. historische Kl. XIX, München, 1892), pp. 519 ff., and *Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie*<sup>2</sup> (Leipzig, 1917), pp. 11 ff.

28) Cf. G. A. GRIERSON, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, II 540a, and R. GARBE, *Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie*, p. 13, who quote *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* 3.21.26.

29) M. WINTERNITZ, The Ascetic Literature of Ancient India, in *Some Problems of Indian Literature* (Calcutta, 1925), pp. 21 ff., and Jainas in the History of Indian Literature, *Indian Culture* 1 (1934), pp. 145 ff. Cf. L. de LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, *L'Inde jusque vers 300 avant J.-C.*<sup>2</sup> (Paris, 1936), pp. 380-381; L. ALSDORF, *Les études jaina* (Paris, 1965), p. 3.

been taken up again recently in an interesting manner from a new viewpoint by a scholar who seeks to trace the role played, in the transition from Vedism or early Brāhmanism to Hinduism and in the development of ancient Indian civilization, by the ideas embodied in the semi-popular Gāthā and Sloka literature.<sup>30</sup>). With this end in view he has reformulated the 'Śramaṇa hypothesis', which emphasized the opposition between the ascetic (Śramaṇa) and the *brāhmaṇa*, and has combined it with a refined version of the 'Kṣatriya hypothesis' attributing to the class of nobles and warriors a predominant part in the creation and transmission of this literature. It should be observed, however, that the opposition between Śramaṇa and *brāhmaṇa* was apparently stressed more by those Indian sources which were pronouncedly hostile to the Buddhists than by the Buddhists themselves, who tend on the contrary to speak of Śramaṇas and *brāhmaṇas* in the same breath without any hint of a real opposition<sup>31</sup>), just as King Asoka did in his edicts.<sup>32</sup>). Indeed the Buddhists held the real *brāhmaṇa* — *i.e.* the person who is a *brāhmaṇa* by his nature and qualities and not merely by birth (*brahma-bandhu*) — in the highest esteem.<sup>33</sup>) It should further-

30) P. HORSCH, *Die vedische Gāthā- und Sloka-Literatur* (Bern, 1966).

31) That the Buddhists were well aware of the fact that the Brāhmaṇas held themselves apart from the Śramaṇas is of course clear from the *Agaññasuttanta* (Dīghanikāya III, p. 81.16, 19), etc.

32) Asoka's inscriptions have the expression *samanabambhana*.

33) On the idea of the 'real brāhmaṇa' see also J. C. HEESTERMAN, Brahmin, Ritual and Renouncer, *Wiener Zeitschrift f. d. Kunde*

more be noted that some recent research having as its starting point the study of the Vedic ritual and the nature of the renoucer (*saṃnyāsin*) has also tended to reduce the opposition, at least as hitherto conceived, both between *brāhmaṇa* and *ksatriya* and between Brāhmaṇical 'orthodoxy' and renunciation (*saṃnyāsa*).<sup>34)</sup>

Accordingly, when studying the origins of Buddhism those scholars who have been more aware of the continuity existing between it and its Indian milieu have sought to bring out the close connexion between Buddhist conceptions and those of the *Upaniṣads* or the preceding Brāhmaṇa texts. One of the more recent contributions in this line is an article in which H. von GLASENAPP carried further his already mentioned researches into the Buddhist *dharma*-theory and suggested that YĀJÑAVALKYA's teaching concerning action (*karman*) as the factor determining a recombination of transient elements in a new existence after death might be considered to be a forerunner of the Buddhist doctrine of *karman*; and he furthermore pointed to what he considered to be certain close parallels in the *Upaniṣads* with the Buddhist *dharma*-theory itself while at the same time noting the appreciable differences in approach between the two.<sup>35)</sup>. On the other hand, in

*Süd- und Ostasiens* 8 (1964), p. 28: 'the true brahmin is the renoucer or the individualized sacrificer'.

34) V. HEESTERMAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 24 f.; L. DUMONT, *La civilisation indienne et nous* (Paris, 1964), pp. 48 ff.

35) H. von GLASENAPP, Der Ursprung der buddhistischen Dharma-Theorie, *Wiener Zeits. f. d. Kunde des Morgenlandes* 45 (1939), pp. 242-266; cf. *Actes du XXe Congrès International des Orientalistes* (Louvain, 1940), pp. 216-217.

some more recent studies the same author has emphasized above all the link between the Brāhmaṇa texts with their magico-ritualistic thought and the Buddhist doctrine of causality; and he has concluded that the *dharma*-theory — centred as it was on what he has named 'existential forces' (Daseinsmächte, Daseinskräfte, Daseinsfaktoren) — may in fact be a transformation of an earlier conception of the Brāhmaṇa texts in which various entities appear as cosmic forces (Kräfte) or potencies (Potenzen). <sup>36)</sup>

Many years earlier S. LÉVI had indeed suggested that these same Brāhmaṇa texts foreshadow many of the later Indian 'heresies', and he described their doctrines as the 'father of Buddhism'. <sup>37)</sup> One of the most extensive and thought-provoking treatments of these problems attempted so far is to be found in a monumental study of South Asian religions in which a Javanese monument — the Barabudur — serves as a point of departure. <sup>38)</sup> In it P. MUS, quoting as his exordium LÉVI's

36) H. von GLASENAPP, Nachwort zu: H. OLDENBERG, *Buddha*<sup>13</sup>, pp. 443, 446; cf. *Die Entwicklungsstufen des indischen Denkens* (Halle, 1940), pp. 9 f., 60 f.

37) S. LÉVI, *La doctrine du sacrifice dans les Brāhmaṇa* (Paris, 1898), p. 11: 'Devanciers des grandes hérésies comme des grands systèmes orthodoxes, les Brāhmaṇa les préparent et les annoncent également; par eux les lacunes se comblient et la continuité des phénomènes religieux apparaît... Le brahmanisme des Brāhmaṇas est si bien le père du bouddhisme qu'il lui a légué une regrettable hérédité...'

St. SCHAYER has also expressed a similar opinion regarding the Brāhmaṇa texts as forerunners of Buddhism; v. *Die Struktur der magischen Weltanschauung nach dem Atharva-Veda und den Brāhmaṇa-Texten* (München, 1925), p. 29-30.

38) P. MUS, *Barabudur, Esquisse d'une histoire du bouddhisme*

remarks just mentioned, has stressed the relationship of Buddhism with the Brāhmaṇa texts which — unlike so many Upaniṣads — do not postulate the existence of a permanent and absolutely transcendent universal metaphysical ground and are primarily concerned with the mechanism of the ritual act and its 'projective' effect; in particular MUS has suggested that it is just these speculations that foreshadow the Buddhist emphasis on causality and even the so to speak 'projective' relation between *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, which are 'connected' paradoxically through a rupture between these two levels of reality.<sup>38a)</sup>

In view of the circumstance that texts attesting the development in Indian thought between the later Vedic literature and the Buddhist canon are not available in any great number, these attempts to trace the relationship between them are inevitably tentative, as has indeed been admitted by the scholars concerned who have also recognized the considerable differences in theory and methods. — One such difference in approach between Buddhism and the later Vedic texts might be epitomized by pointing to the divergent use of common terms such as *nidāna* and *upaniṣad* meaning mystical connexion and symbolical correlation in the earlier Brāhmaṇical literature whereas in the Buddhist texts they usually refer to causality and production in dependence.<sup>39)</sup>

*fondée sur la critique archéologique des textes* (Hanoi, 1935).

38a) *Op. cit.*, pp. \*177 f.

39) Cf. L. RENOU, "Connexion" en Védique, "Cause" en bouddhique, *Dr. C. Kunhan Raja Presentation Volume* (Madras,

It may then be best in the circumstances to adopt the opinion of a noted historian both of Buddhism and of India who, while holding Buddhism to be essentially Hindu,<sup>40)</sup> considered that it descends *directly* neither from the Brāhmanism of the Brāhmaṇa texts nor from that of the Upaniṣads.<sup>41)</sup> The connexion he postulated with Viṣṇuism in particular will require further examination.<sup>42)</sup>

In sum, one of the urgent tasks in the field of Indian studies is to attempt to define the position of Buddhism in its Indian milieu. In this connexion it may be recalled for example that the Buddhist canon proves to be one of the chief sources for our knowledge of certain aspects of ancient Indian religion, such as of those groups of people for whom Brahmā and Indra were the principal gods.<sup>43)</sup> Of considerable interest also is the fact that the Buddhist code of discipline (Vinaya) prescribes that the usual period of probation (*parivāsa*) that must be

1946), pp. 55-60. Cf. St. SCHAYER, Über die Bedeutung des Wortes *upaniṣad*, *Rocznik Or.* 3 (1927), pp. 57-67.

40) L. de LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, *L'Inde jusque vers 300 avant J.-C.* 2, p. 340.

41) *Op. cit.*, pp. 312-313.

Like OLDENBERG, LA VALLÉE POUSSIN also rejected GARBE's Kṣatriya hypothesis (p. 271 note 2 and p. 314). And he reformulated WINTERNITZ' Sramaṇa hypothesis by specifying that a connexion is to be found with a certain popular literature of only partly Brāhmanized householders who were the donors and devotees (*upāsaka*) of the Buddhist community (p. 380-381; cf. P. HORSCH, *op. cit.*, p. 481 note 1).

42) *Op. cit.*, p. 312. Cf. E. LAMOTTE, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, I, p. 431-438.

43) Cf. P. HACKER, Zur Geschichte und Beurteilung des Hinduismus, *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*, 1964, Sp. 234-235.

undergone by a candidate for admittance into the Buddhist order ( : *upasampadā* ) need not be observed in the case of those Brāhmaṇas who have performed the fire-sacrifice ( *aggikā jaṭilakā* ) ; the reason given for this highly significant exemption is that such a Brāhmaṇa accepts the theory of acts ( *kammavādino*, *kiriyavādino*. <sup>44</sup> )

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On the more specifically philosophical and doctrinal side also the relationship between Buddhism and the classical Brāhmaṇical schools raises complex problems, and many hypotheses have been put forward which seek to demonstrate the dependence of Buddhism on one or the other of these schools. Thus, towards the end of the last century, H. JACOBI not only argued that Buddhism originated from some variety of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, but he sought to derive the 'links' ( *nidāna* ) in the Buddhist chain of causality — or more precisely of production in dependence ( *pratītyasamutpāda* ) — from

44) *Mahāvagga*, p. 71.

It has also been suggested that a Sūtra of the Pāli canon — the *Tevijja* (Dīghanikāya 13) — contains explicit references to several Upaniṣadic philosophical schools known to the early Buddhists, such as the Taittiriyas and Chāndogyas, after whom important Upaniṣads were named ( v. M. WALLESER, *Die philosophische Grundlage des älteren Buddhismus* [Heidelberg, 1904], p. 67 ). This hypothesis has been contested ( cf. H. OLDENBERG, *Die Lehre der Upaniṣaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus* [Göttingen, 1923], p. 245 note 182, and A. B. KEITH, *Buddhist Philosophy* [Oxford, 1923], p. 138 note 1 ) ; but an attempt has been made to show that this Sūtra at least shows some familiarity with the Brāhmaṇical schools ( *carāṇa* ) ( v. O. H. de A. WIJESEKARA, A. Pāli Reference to the Brāhmaṇa-carāṇa-s, *Adyar Library Bull.* 20 [1956], p. 294-309; cf. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS, *Dialogues of the Buddha* [London, 1899], I, p. 303 ).

the evolutionary theory of the Sāṃkhya school;<sup>45)</sup> and he later made his view clearer by stating that Buddhism, although not a mere copy (Abklatsch) of the Sāṃkhya, was built up on the basis of the system of this school, of which it was an individual transformation (individuelle Umgestaltung).<sup>46)</sup> Other contemporary scholars also argued that Buddhist philosophical theory was a development of the Sāṃkhya which, as they accordingly held, existed practically in its evolved form even at this early time.<sup>47)</sup> — Such assumptions have since been severely and very properly criticized<sup>48)</sup> not only because they involved hypothetical and rather anachronistic reconstructions of the early history of the Sāṃkhya doctrines but also because the individual members in the Buddhist chain of production in dependence have in fact little in common with the factors (*tattva*) of the Sāṃkhya system, and because the Buddhist *pratītyasa-mutpāda* as a whole cannot be reduced to a simple

45) H. JACOBI, *Der Ursprung des Buddhismus aus dem Sāṃkhya-Yoga*, *Nachrichten v. d. Königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, 1896, pp. 43-58.

46) H. JACOBI, *Über das Verhältnis der buddhistischen Philosophie zum Sāṃkhya-Yoga und die Bedeutung der Nidānas*, *Zeits. d. Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 52 (1898), pp. 1 ff.

47) Cf. R. GARBE, *Der Mondschein der Sāṃkhya Wahrheit*, Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Ak. d. Wiss. XIX, pp. 519 f., and *Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 6 f.; R. PISCHEL, *Buddha*<sup>2</sup>, p. 65.

48) Cf. H. Oldenberg, *Buddhistische Studien* VII, *Zeits. d. Deutschen Morgenl. Gesellschaft* 52 (1898), pp. 681-694, *Buddha* (especially in the earlier editions), and *Die Lehre der Upaniṣaden...*; A. B. KEITH, *The Sāṃkhya System* (Calcutta, 1918), pp. 23-33; but cf. *Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 106, 138 f., and IHQ 12 (1936), pp. 14 f., 19-20.

evolutionary process. These assumptions indeed rendered an understanding of the *pratītyasamutpāda* theory practically impossible, and for a long time they stood in the way of a more accurate understanding of Buddhist thought.

That there should however exist some resemblances between Buddhism and the philosophical ideas that developed into the Sāṃkhya is only to be expected when we consider that they grew up towards the same time and often in the same areas and that they accordingly had, at least in part, a common background; this situation would then explain why they share certain philosophical problems and methods and why they agree for example in attaching particular importance to the problem of causality in the wide sense. But at the same time the point of departure and the basic approach of the two trends show fundamental differences; and perhaps the most that can be claimed is that, just as the Sāṃkhya places activity inclusive of mental activity within the realm of non-spiritual Nature (*prakṛti*), so Buddhism ascribes all processes, mental as well as physical, to the realm ruled over by causality.<sup>49)</sup> However, unlike the Sāṃkhya which posits an eternal and unchanging Spirit (*puruṣa*) over and against Nature, Buddhism altogether eliminates

49) See H. OLDENBERG, *Die Lehre der Upaniṣaden* . . ., pp. 255-256, 272 f., 286; A. B. KEITH, *The Sāṃkhya System*, p. 23 f., and *Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 38-43, 142; E. FRAUWALLNER, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, I (Salzburg, 1953), pp. 221-222; cf. pp. 204, 233. FRAUWALLNER considers that the Sāṃkhya was born not long after the death of the Buddha (I, p. 282); on Buddhism and the Sāṃkhya see also his *Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharma*, *Wiener Zeits. f. die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 33 (1926), pp. 57-68.

such an entity as a proper and useful topic of philosophical speculation.

On the other hand the connexions between Buddhism and Yoga have in all likelihood always been quite intimate, the term *Yoga* being understood here in its widest sense of psycho-spiritual 'effort' and not as referring specifically to the *Yogadarśana* expounded in the *Yogaśūtras* of PATAÑJALI. The importance in Buddhism of meditation and of certain broadly speaking yogic exercises is indeed obvious; and the term *nirodha* which defines in the *Yogaśūtras* the function of *yoga* — the stopping of the 'fluctuations' of the mind (*yogaś cittavrittinirodhah*, 1.2) — also plays a leading role in Buddhism, where it denotes the stoppage of phenomenal processes. But it is no doubt somewhat wide of the mark to conclude<sup>50)</sup> that Buddhism is essentially and above all Yoga; for while very many Buddhists (along no doubt with the Buddha himself) have been Yogins, specifically Yogic theories find no place in such fundamental doctrines of Buddhism as the *Pratītyasamutpāda* or the Summaries (*dharmamudrā*, 'uddāna) of the Buddhist *dharma*. Besides, as concerns at least the classical system of the *Yogaśūtras*, far from having been the borrower Buddhism appears to have exercised a very considerable influence on it.<sup>51)</sup>

50) Thus E. SENART, *À propos de la théorie bouddhique des douze Nidānas*, *Mélanges Ch. de Harlez* (Leiden, 1896), pp. 281-298, and *Bouddhisme et Yoga*, *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 42 (1900), pp. 345-364; cf. *Nīrvāṇa*, *Album Kern* (Leiden, 1903), p. 104.

51) Cf. L. de LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, *Le bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali*, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 5 (1937), pp. 223-242.

When searching for links between Buddhism and Brāhmaṇical philosophy it is above all to the early history of the Advaita-Vedānta that we must turn, though here again the exact interrelationships between the two are far from established. There exist for example many points of contact both in vocabulary and thought between the early Vedānta — e.g. the *Gaudapāda-kārikās* attributed to a certain GAUDAPĀDA considered to be the teacher of SAMKARĀCĀRYA's teacher — and the Mahāyānist Madhyamaka and Vijñānavāda.<sup>52)</sup> The question of Buddhist influence arises also in the case of SAMKARĀCĀRYA himself, and his opponents in fact did not hesitate to brand him a crypto-Buddhist; but the existence of a real dependence is far from proved, and SAMKARĀCĀRYA severely criticized what he held to be the doctrines of both the “Sūnyavāda” (i.e. the Madhyamaka) and the Vijñānavāda. Nevertheless the points of contact are so numerous that the historian of Indian

On the relation between *yoga* and intellectual analysis in Buddhism see L. de LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Musila et Nārada, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 5 (1937), pp. 189 ff. Compare the contrast between the *gantbadura* and the *vipassanādbura* (and also between the *pāṇi-sukūlika* and the *dharmakathika*) in the history of Indo-Sinhalese Buddhism (cf. W. RAHULA, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon* [Colombo, 1956], pp. 158 f.). — This opposition between two ways was projected into the Brāhmaṇical tradition by the Buddhists, who distinguish between meditating Brāhmaṇas and those who settled near villages and composed texts (cf. e.g. Dīghanikāya, III, p. 94).

52) Cf. S. N. DASGUPTA, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I (Cambridge, 1922), p. 423; V. BHATTACHARYA, *The Āgamaśāstra of Gaudapāda* (Calcutta, 1943). The existence of a close connexion between Gaudapāda and Buddhism has however been denied by T. M. P. MAHADEVAN (*Gaudapāda* [Madras, 1952]) and by R. D. KARMAKAR (*Gaudapādakārikā* [Poona, 1953], pp. xxiiff.).

philosophy will undoubtedly continue to look for some kind of connexion, even if it be indirect and due to a common background. — On the other hand, in the case of a famous Advaita-Vedānta philosopher of the 12th century, ŚRĪHARṢA, the influence of the Mādhyamika dialectic is not only evident but it has been acknowledged by ŚRĪHARṢA himself. <sup>53)</sup>

Certain links between Buddhism on the one hand and the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* <sup>54)</sup> and the Sivaism of Kāśmīr <sup>55)</sup> on the other can also be postulated.

Relations with the ritualistic Mīmāṃsā and the Brāhmaṇical logicians of the Nyāya school were on the contrary anything but close, though even here sustained contact and controversy could not help but produce certain accommodations with the passage of time. <sup>56)</sup> For example, even within the eminently 'orthodox' Mīmāṃsā school, PRABHĀKARA has been suspected by his opponents of being influenced by Buddhist theories; <sup>57)</sup> and the Nyāya author JAYANTABHĀTTĀ is even

53) ŚRĪHARṢA, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*: *mādhyamikādivāgvyavahā-rārāṇām svarūpāpalāpo na śakyate* (quoted by Th. STCHERBATSKY, *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 22). Cf. S. MOOKERJEE, The Absolutist's Stand-point in Logic, *Nava-Nālandā-Mahāvīhāra Research Publication* 1, pp. 59 ff.

54) Cf. S. N. DASGUPTA, *History of Indian Philosophy*, II (Cambridge, 1932), pp. 228, 268 f.; H. von GLASENAPP, *Zwei philosophische Rāmāyanas* (Ak. d. Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz [Wiesbaden, 1951]), pp. 59, 67, 94-96.

55) Cf. L. SILBURN, *Vātulanāthasūtra* (Paris, 1959), pp. 6 f.

56) See for example DHARMĀNANDA SASTRI, *Critique of Indian Realism* (Agra, 1964), *passim*.

57) V. ŚRĪDHARA, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 228-229 (VSS) = p. 552-553 (Gaṅgānātha-Jhā-Granthamāla, 1963) (on the theory of *abhāva*);

able to detect such influence on the unimpeachable KUMĀRILA.<sup>58)</sup> But the opposition on the part of the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya systems was so uncompromising and the attitude of most of the exponents of these two schools so hostile towards Buddhism that any really profitable philosophical exchange or mutual enrichment was virtually excluded, the relations between them being characterized chiefly by mere unilateral polemics. Nonetheless JAYANTABHATTA, who combats the Buddhist doctrines as ardently as anyone else, considers that not only the sage Kapila, the reputed founder of the Sāṃkhya, but also the Sugata (i.e. the Buddha) is one with Siva.<sup>59)</sup>

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Fundamentally averse as it is to positing eternal and substantial entities, the attitude of Buddhism is equally critical of the various forms of the *ātman* doctrine as well as of the uncritical realism of certain Brāhmaṇical schools; and in this respect an impassable gulf seems to have separated Buddhism from these schools from the very beginning.

JAYANTABHATTA, *Nyāyamañjari*, I, p. 167.12 (on the theory of error). Cf. Dh. SASTRI, *op. cit.*, pp. 14, 477 f., 486; S. DASGUPTA, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 390; S. MOOKERJEE, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Eternal Flux* (Calcutta, 1935), pp. 426 f., 440.; Th. STCHERBATSKY, *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 51.

58) JAYANTABHATTA, *Nyāyamañjari*, I, p. 16 (on Kumārila's theory that cognition [*jñāna*] is not directly known). Cf. Dh. SASTRI, *op. cit.*, pp. 14, 372; S. N. DASGUPTA, *History*, I, p. 388 note 1.

59) JAYANTABHATTA, *Āgamaḍambara* (quoted by B. GUPTA, *Die Wahrnehmungslehre in der Nyāyamañjari* [Bonn, 1963], p. 14 note 27).

This idea is also found in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 3, p. 192.

Yet the situation as regards the *ātman* and the theory of the Absolute may not be quite as simple as has sometimes been thought, and all depends on just what is meant by *ātman* and other similar terms. Moreover, not only are certain ideas of the Brāhmaṇa texts and the Upaniṣads to be traced also in Buddhism, but its scriptures do not hesitate to describe its ideals in terms of what is 'brahmic'. And at a much later period the leading authority of the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school, BHĀVAVIVEKA, writes that the great Bodhisattvas — Ārya-Avalokiteśvara, Ārya-Maitreya and the others — in fact reverence (*upāsate*) the supreme — *paramam brahma* — under the paradoxical mode of non-reverence (*anupāsanayoga*);<sup>60)</sup> furthermore the same author states that the Absolute is *brahma* (or *brahmā*?) because it is essentially *nirvāṇa*.<sup>61)</sup>

Equally important, it would seem to be quite misleading to represent Buddhism as invariably and dogmatically asserting the absence of the self (*anātmanavāda*) and making of Voidness (*śūnyatā*) a kind of creed. It is of course true that the known forms of Buddhism reject the current speculative theories of an *ātman* or any similar entity; but as an authoritative Sūtra puts it (*Kāśyapaparivarta* § 64), the dogma of Voidness

60) BHĀVAVIVEKA, *Madhyamakabṛdaya* 3 (quoted by V. V. GOKHALE, *Indo-Iranian Journal* 5 [1962], p. 273). Compare also *Lankāvatārasūtra* 3, p. 192.

61) BHĀVAVIVEKA, *Tarkajvālā*, ed. H. NAKAMURA in *Indo-Iranian Journal* 2 (1958), p. 188: *mya.ñan.las.'das.pd'i.bdag.ñid.yin.pd'i.pbyir.tshañ.s.pd'o*. (Compare in the Brāhmaṇical tradition the term *brahmanirvāṇa* and the assimilation of *nirvāṇa* to *brahman*).

(*śūnyatādṛṣṭi*) is even more dangerous than the personalist dogma (*pudgaladṛṣṭi*), and *śūnyatā* is in fact release from all speculative views founded on the discursive development of the dichotomy Self/non-Self (*ātman/anātman*) etc. (*op. cit.* §§ 64-65). The Middle Path then always lies between the extremes (*anta*) of *ātman* and its opposite (*op. cit.* § 57).

It is appropriate to call attention besides to the fact that a certain group of Mahāyānist texts comprising in particular those Sūtras dealing with the *tathāgatagarbha* theory have characterized absolute Reality positively as 'permanent' (*nitya*), 'stable' (*dhruva*), 'eternal' (*śāśvata*), and *ātman*. This kataphatic and quasi-substantialistic theory, which is seemingly quite 'aberrant' in the history of Buddhist thought, naturally raises the question of the genuinely Buddhist character of these texts and would even seem to suggest a connexion with Brāhmaṇical and above all with Vedāntik thought. A closer examination of these works shows however that there is no cause to impugn their Buddhism, and that they are Brāhmaṇical only insofar as they deal with problems occupying the thoughts of Indian philosophers in general and adopt in so doing methods that are usually employed by the Indian philosophers. If we consult the Sanskrit treatise on this subject — the *Ratnagotravibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantrāśāstra* — along with its Sanskrit and Tibetan commentaries, we find that it has in fact been possible for their authors to interpret this theory in terms of the Middle Way; for what is of importance in the last analysis is not so much whether Reality is to

be described negatively or positively as whether the theory actually adopted avoids presenting this Reality either as the nihilistic destruction of some pre-existing substantial entity or as a literal void to which one might attach oneself dogmatically.<sup>62)</sup> This is because the Middle Way consists, as already mentioned, precisely in the cessation of all dichotomous oppositions between the Self and the non-Self, etc. Consequently these texts can make use of the term *ātman*, etc., to indicate or point to Reality while at the same time rejecting the view which posits an *ātman* as an eternal and substantial entity in a speculative system.<sup>63)</sup>

These texts treating in positive terms of absolute Reality and of the spiritual Element — the *tathāgata-garbhā* — which makes possible the Awakening to this Reality nevertheless represent a distinct trend in Buddhist thought. — The possibility may also be considered that at least some of the positive and quasi-substantialistic formulations found in them are figurative in the particular sense mentioned earlier when discussing the problem of the 'pre-canonical Buddhism' reconstructed by SCHAYER and other scholars on the basis of certain 'aberrant' passages in the canon; however, since the latter are precisely aberrant in relation to the body of texts in which they appear whereas the positive conception of the Absolute with which we are now dealing

62) See for example the *avataraṇikā* of the commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantrāśāstra* 1.154.

63) Since such terms are used only to indicate or point to Reality, they obviously cannot be descriptions of it as it is *per se*.

is on the contrary typical of a whole section of Mahāyānist scriptures, the two cases are not strictly parallel; and it is no doubt preferable to consider this trend of thought as representing a particular teaching which is of direct (*nītartha*) and not of figurative and indirect meaning (*neyartha*). At all events, it does not seem possible to consider this positive trend as a development, or as a reappearance after many centuries, of Schayer's 'pre-canonical Buddhism' and, hence, as a proof of the existence of the latter notwithstanding the fact that the notion of luminous Thought (*prabhāsvaram cittam*) plays a conspicuous part in the Mahāyānist theory as well as in the passages of the canon singled out by SCHAYER. The precise nature of the connexions between this current of Mahāyānist thought and the *śūnyatā* theory of the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras and the Madhyamaka remains to be worked out in detail.

It in fact often remains difficult to determine precisely the exact place occupied by so many of the above mentioned movements in the history of Indian philosophy since, in the present state of our knowledge, they all too often appear as isolated features in an only partially explored landscape. In these circumstances it would no doubt be premature to assume non-Buddhist, and in particular Vedāntik, influence on the positive trend just mentioned in Buddhist philosophy, just as it would seem adventurous to establish the hypothesis of a 'pre-canonical Buddhism' on the ground that it resembles in many points certain contemporary ideas in Brāhmaṇical philosophy.

In sum, before it will be possible for us to arrive at definite conclusions about the amount of influence exercised by one school on the origin and development of another, or by one master on another, the schools and techniques of Indian philosophy will require much more individual examination from both the descriptive and historical points of view. It is no doubt because of the speculative (and occasionally even subjective) nature of certain hypotheses advanced in the past that in more recent years writers have tended to give their attention above all to the study of the doctrines of particular systems or authors and have confined themselves to noting parallels and points of contact without assuming the dependence of one on the other — unless of course the testimony of the texts is so clear or the resemblance so close and the historical situation so favourable that such a conclusion is practically certain.

At the same time it does not seem overhasty to say in general that Buddhism and the other religions and philosophies of India including of course Jainism cannot be regarded as altogether separate bodies living in hermetically sealed compartments: they spring from either related or identical backgrounds, touch on problems that were of common concern, and very frequently employ similar philosophical methods and practical techniques.

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Having thus briefly considered the position of Buddhism within the field of Indian studies, let us now see what Tibetan studies may be able to contribute.

The documentary value of the Tibetan records is so

well known that it is unnecessary to dwell on it again; it will suffice to recall that the Tibetan translations help to fill the large gap in our knowledge of Indian literature resulting from the loss of a great quantity of works in the original Indian languages, and they indeed go a long way towards compensating for this loss. Moreover, even in cases where the Indian originals have been preserved, the Tibetan translations can still be of considerable use to textual criticism as a means of establishing readings. Finally, inasmuch as a translation is by its very nature to a certain extent at least a kind of commentary, the Tibetan translations allow us to gain an insight into the meaning of the texts as they were understood by leading Indian authorities when Buddhism was still a living force in India; for these versions were normally made by a Tibetan translator (*lo-tsā-ba*) in close collaboration with an Indian scholar (*pandita*) of distinction.

When looking to these translations for clarification of textual and exegetical points it will however not be enough simply to refer to the version (or versions) contained in the *bKa'gyur* and *bsTan'gyur*; and the original Tibetan commentaries will also have to be consulted since they may contain variant readings and corrections to the translations included in these two canonical collections. Hence we should not be justified in calling into question or in rejecting out of hand the Tibetan textual and exegetical tradition merely on the ground that a version in the various editions of the *bKa'gyur* or *bsTan'gyur* contains misreadings or errors, for we must

first verify whether the correct version (and explanation) is known to the Tibetan commentators. It is moreover important to note that these commentators sometimes even know a more complete form of a text than the one contained in the canonical collections; for example, a hemistich of the tenth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (10.50cd) missing in the Peking, sNar-than and sDe-dge editions of the bsTan.'gyur is actually supplied by BU-STON in his commentary on this work.<sup>64)</sup> And the fact that this complete version was known to Tibetan scholars explains how it was possible for the later Mongolian translators to include it in the Mongolian version of the bsTan.'gyur, a point that has intrigued scholars for some time.<sup>65)</sup>

64) *Byañ.chub.sems.dpa'i.spyod.pa.la'jug.pd'i'grel.pa. byañ.chub.kyi.sems.gsal.bar/byed.pa.zla.bd'i'od*, completed in the year 'bru.mañ = sa stag = 1338/9.

65) F. WELLER, *Zum Blockdruckfragmente des mongolischen Bodhicaryāvatāra, Mongolica der Berliner Turfan Sammlung Ia* (ADAW 1954 Nr. 2, Berlin, 1955), p. 9-10. This second hemistich is to be found in the Mongolian translation of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* revised in the 18th century by BILIG-ÜN DALAI as published by B. VLADIMIROV in the *Bibliotheca Buddhica* (XXVIII, 1929); it is however missing in the translation made in the early 14th century by CHOS.KYI.'OD.ZER published by E. HAENISCH (*Mongolica der Berliner Turfan-Sammlung I, Ein buddhistisches Druckfragment vom Jahre 1312* [Abhandlungen der Deutschen Ak. d. Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Kl. f. Sprachen, Literatur u. Kunst 1953, Nr. 3], Berlin, 1954).

CHOS.KYI.'OD.ZER, the Mongolian translator, is to be distinguished from (CHOS.KYI.'OD.ZER ~) CHOS.SKU.'OD.ZER, the pupil of 'JAM.GSAR.ŠES.RAB.'OD.ZER and teacher of THUGS.RJE.BRTSON.'GRUS, who lived from 1214 to 1292 (according to SUM.PA.MKHAN.PO's Re'u.mig; see my note in *JAOS* 83 [1963], p. 80). These two persons seem to have been confused by several writers in the past, as would appear from the bibliography given by F. W. CLEAVES (*The Bodistw-ačari-a avatār-un tayilbur* of 1312 by Čosgi Odsir, *Harvard Journal*

The Tibetan *bsTan.'gyur* contains besides a considerable number of translations of Indian works dealing with medicine, grammar, poetics, and the plastic arts — that is, with the sciences and arts serving as a foundation for secular activity which constitute a kind of pro-paedeutic for the monk and above all a vehicle for the

*of Asiatic Studies* 17 [1954], pp. 13 ff.), who himself refers to the translator into Mongolian as a Tibetan (following perhaps the Chinese source he quoted on p. 15). However the Index to the Mongolian *bKa'.*gyur clearly refers to this person as a Uighur (*u yi yur-un chos-ki 'od-zer pandita*; fol. 20a as reproduced by L. LIGETI, *Catalogue du Kanjur mongol imprimé* [Budapest, 1942], p. 333). But in his note 101 CLEAVES opines that '*Uiyur-un*', in this instance, seems to be synonymous with *Töbed-ün*', although he himself adds that this is the only text cited by him 'in which an attribute of nationality appears in connection with the name of Čosgi Odsir'!

BU-STON (1290-1364) was a younger contemporary of the "Uighur" CHOS.KYI.'OD.ZER, who was active at the Mongolian (Yüan) court in the early 14th century, at the time of Külüg Qayan and Buyantu Qayan, and who held the title of *kuo-shih* 'master of the kingdom'.

The question remains why a text known to BU-STON should be missing in the Peking, *sNar.thaṇ* and *sDe.dge* editions of the *bsTan.'gyur*, of which he was one of the chief editors (cf. *Life of Bu ston Rin po che* [Roma, 1966], pp. 30 f.) and which is usually thought to go back to a manuscript 'edition' prepared by BU-STON and his collaborators. F. WELLER (*Über den Quellenbezug eines mongolischen Tanjurtextes* [Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Ak. der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philol.-hist. Kl. 45/2], Berlin, 1950, p. 7) apparently thought that this portion had fallen out of the Tibetan version he designated as "Tiba" which was the common source of the *sNar.thaṇ* and *sDe.dge* versions, and which derived from a still older version — designated as "TibO" — on which was also based the Tibetan version used by the Mongolian translators of the *bsTan.'gyur*.

The question then is: Was BU-STON's MS version, kept in the *bsTan.'gyur.lha.khaṇ* at Ža.lu (v. *Life of Bu ston Rin po che*, pp. 30 f.), the source of today's *sNar.thaṇ* edition or not? And what is the connexion of the *sDe.dge* edition with this old version (and with the *sNar.thaṇ* edition)?

altruistic activity of the Bodhisattva. From the earliest period Tibetan scholars attached great importance to the study of these Indian sciences and arts to which they devoted — and still devote — much attention. In fact, even long after the virtual disappearance of Buddhism in India they continued to maintain contact with Indian scholars; thus in the early 17th century TĀRĀNĀTHA was in contact with pāṇḍits from Banāras, and in the 18th century the great grammarian and polymath SI-TU-RIN-PO-CHE (GTUG-LAG-CHOS-KYI-SNAÑ-BA) consulted on a trip to Nepāl the works of BHĀNU(JI)DĪK-ŚITA — the son of the famous grammarian BHĀTĀOJI-DĪKŚITA — and of RĀYAMUKUTĀ for his revision of the Tibetan translation of the *Amarakośa* and his own commentary on it.<sup>66)</sup>

Facts such as these, which could be multiplied, justify the claim that the Tibetan scholars were amongst the leading forerunners of the science we now call Indology;<sup>67)</sup> and it is probably no exaggeration to say that the seminaries of Tibet have played almost as important a part as the schools of India in preserving up to the present time much of Indian thought and the traditional

66) See SI-TU's *Slob.dpon.'chi.med.señ ges.mdzad.pa'i.miñ.dan.rtags.rjes. su.bstan.pa'i.bstan.bcos.'chi.med.mdzod.ces.bya.bd'i.gžuñ.skad.gñis.śan.sbyar.ba* (vol. na of the gSuñ.'bum, fol. 121), and also the same author's preface to his commentary entitled *Legs.bśad.sgo.brgya'byed. pa'i.lde.mig* (vol. cha of the gSuñ.'bum, fol. 3b-4a).

67) In this role the Tibetans were of course preceded by a Chinese scholar like HSÜAN-TSANG. Such Central Asian scholars as KUMĀRAJĪVA fall into another category inasmuch as they had close family connexions with India and were born and received their early education in areas which were under strong Indian influence.

system of education of that country. Given these intimate links between India and Tibet, the Indologist will find that Tibetan studies can be of very considerable value to him not only as a means of studying the diffusion of Indian civilization but also as a kind of measuring rod or control with which it may sometimes be useful to compare developments within India itself <sup>68</sup>). Tibetan thus proves to be in some respects as important an instrument for the study of certain periods of Indian civilization as a language of that subcontinent. At the same time the process of the introduction of Buddhism and the assimilation of Indian culture in Tibet provides us with an unusually interesting and historically valuable example of how a people can adopt another culture and religion without totally foresaking its own deeply rooted traditions or being untrue to its native genius.

Tibetan studies are of course not to be regarded merely as an aid to or as a province of Indology. Having either themselves travelled to India for study or invited the best Indian teachers available to come to Tibet and having thus imbibed the values of Indian civilization, the Tibetans so quickly and so well assimilated this civilization and made it such an integral part of theirs that they were soon able to strike out on their own, both creating a quite original civilization and making their very notable contributions to Buddhism as a religion and philosophy. Consequently Tibetan history and culture

68) An example may be the question of the link between Buddhism and the religious 'substrata' of the areas in which it flourished; see above, pp. 19-22 and note 24.

can and indeed must be studied independently in its own right; moreover, since in the course of its history Tibet has often been in close contact with still other lands and cultures these too must be considered. At the same time it is well to keep in mind that, whenever we consider Tibetan civilization as a whole in most of its phases since the end of the 8th century A.D. at the latest,<sup>69)</sup> Buddhist ideas and practices constitute part and parcel of it. In short, Tibetan civilization reached its peak and full flowering under the sign of the *chos* — the Tibetan Buddhist *dharma* — which, as already mentioned above, embraces the domains of philosophy, religion and customs with their expressions on the literary and artistic levels.

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In the foregoing I have attempted to sketch, however briefly, a number of problems which have held the interest of scholars concerned with Indian and Tibetan thought and civilization and to indicate directions in which solutions may be sought. Needless to say, such a survey, even though limited chiefly to questions of philosophy and accessorially of religion, cannot possibly

69) The propagation of Buddhism in Tibet has generally been thought by recent writers on the subject to have really begun only in the 8th century (cf. J. BACOT, *Journal asiatique* 1937, p. 149; H. HOFFMANN, *Die Religionen Tibets* [München, 1956], p. 27 f.; see however R. A. STEIN, *La civilisation tibétaine* [Paris, 1962], p. 36 f., 39). But in a recent article Mlle. M. LALOU argues that it must have already played an important role at least a century earlier during the reign of SROÑ-BTSAN-SGAM-PO, as is indeed claimed by the Tibetan historical tradition (v. Chine et Tibet aux VII<sup>e</sup>, VIII<sup>e</sup> et IX<sup>e</sup> siècles, *Journal des Savants*, Octobre-Décembre 1965, pp. 636 f.).

be comprehensive. Nor have I ventured to say anything about the closely associated fields of Buddhist studies in East Asia or of Indo-Buddhist studies in South East Asia; it is however obvious that, just as scholars working in these fields have often felt the need to turn to the Indian origins and background in order fully to understand developments in these areas, so also the Indologist and student of Buddhism will profit much by acquainting himself with the forms Indian and Buddhist thought and civilization have taken on in these lands to the north, east and south of India, and by consulting scholars working in these closely related fields.

To conclude I should like to express my respectful thanks to H. M. the Queen for my appointment as professor in this university.

Mr. President and Members of the Board of Curators, I wish also to thank you especially for the support you have given for the furthering of these studies here, and for the confidence you have placed in me; needless to say I am not unaware of the very heavy task I have set myself by assuming what in effect amounts to a triple charge. Honoured Rector Magnificus, Professors of the University and Members of the Faculty of Letters, I wish to express to you my sincere thanks for having admitted me to your company. It is my earnest hope that the studies with which I have been charged will flourish in Leiden; as is, I think, clear from what I have already said, I feel most keenly the need for collaboration both within the field of Indology and also with related or parallel disciplines.

Students of Leiden University, I hope that these studies, despite the very considerable expenditure both in time and labour that they require, will prove to be of interest and value to many of you, and that I may be of help to you.

Ik heb gezegd

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