THE AESTHETICS OF NEW CRITICISM

J.N. PATNAIK
Postgraduate Department of English,
Samanta Chandra Sekhur College,
PURI

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The Aesthetics of New Criticism is an attempt at clarifying and evaluating the tensianal poetics of New Criticism. While the book refers to most of the major modern critics, its main concern is with T. S. Eliot, I.A. Richards, John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate and Cleanth Books. This study intends to achieve the two-fold purpose of reconstituting a theory of poetry based on the New Critics' concept of form, and of finding a rationale for the study of poetry in the perspective of form.

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

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Preface

There is so much work in literary criticism which might be called "New Criticism" that to attempt a comprehensive survey would lead to a very large and unfocused book. I have attempted to designate and analyse a centre rather than to map a boundary. Since the New Critics' concern with form has been repeatedly emphasized, their concept of form has been taken as the central theme. I have not analysed or evaluated the New Critics one by one but have used them as source to draw upon in reconstructing a theory of poetry in the perspective of the concept of form in New Criticism.

I am much indebted to Prof. Bidhubhusan Das, Ex-Director of Public Instruction, Orissa, for his valuable suggestions. I am grateful to Dr. M.K. Rout, Ex-Principal, Ravenshaw College, Cuttack, and now Vice-Chancellor, Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, who has been a constant source of inspiration. I am especially grateful to my wife Geetu but for whose help and inspiration this work would not have been completed. I should also like to thank the authorities of the Kanika Library, Ravenshaw College, Cuttack and the American Studies Research Centre, Hyderabad, for their ungrudging help at every stage of my work.

Postgraduate Department of English
Samata Chandra Sekhur College,
Puri (Orissa) 75 2001.
January 1982.

J.N. PATNAIK

Contents

The Premises of New Criticism

The critical situation at the beginning of the twenties was almost on the brink of disaster. The critical doctrines that had prevailed hitherto had exhausted their strength and significance and culminated in erratic assumptions and propositions about poetry. The romantic subjectivism ended in an unsystematic set of pronouncements by men like George Saintsbury, W.P. Ker, W.J. Courthope, Edmund Gosse, Oliver Elton and others. Though all these men were serious scholars and sensitive readers of poetry, they lacked the speculative awareness to formulate definite methods and principles of critical approach. They relapsed to the realms of biography, history and personal impressions, and failed to provide a basis of approach needed for poetry in an age of anxiety and crisis. The neo-classical objective approach, on the other hand, got precipitated into the cold clinical logic of naturalism and realism, or directed itself to the extremes of psychoanalytical and sociological studies. Poetry thus tended to be viewed as an occasion for personal reflections or a document for demonstrating scientific or sociological truths. Van Wyck Brooks' dig at the New Critics for their being confident as critical "policy makers"[1] had yet an element of honest confession in it. Against a blurred canvas of aimless critical procedures, the New Critics felt the urgent necessity of rescuing poetry and criticism from the vagaries of worn-out theories on the one hand, and on

the other, from the increasing influence of science that led to the apprehension that aesthetic sensibility was on the point of extinction in the face of materialism and utilitarianism. That was the reason why men who declared hostility yet felt reassured at the emergence of New Criticism.[2] No one could deny that the New Critics had some policy to offer at a time when there was complete anarchy of critical procedures.

Who are the New Critics ? There can be various answers to this apparently naive question. We might say that those literary critics on both sides of the Atlantic who have shown their deep concern at the crisis of belief engendered by the growth of science and technology are the New Critics. In a narrower sense, New Criticism is considered as a movement of the American South, of the "Fugitives" of Vanderbilt. Robert Daniel attempts to link both the broad and the narrow views of New Critical premises by suggesting a commonness of outlook in the new critics of both the British and the American nationalities : ". . . they are profoundly troubled by the crisis of belief that the progress of scientific discoveries had by Arnold's time engendered and they believe that since his time it has deepened."[3] The outlook suggested by Daniel is nowhere so apparent as in the writings of F.R. Leavis. Leavis declared that the function of literary criticism is to define modern sensibility and to help in preserving it in a world of spiritual bankruptcy. He asserts that "The loss of spiritual order and of integrity in modern consciousness had resulted in most readers becoming insensitive to experience . . . In this condition of disintegration, it becomes even more difficult for a critic or a group of critics to define and organise the contemporary sensibility'.'[4]

But there is a special sense in which New criticism as a school can be viewed as an American phenomenon. When the Nashvillians of Vanderbilt identified themselves with the vanishing agricultural society of the South, "they became particularly aware of the crisis that science had brought about, and the relationship between it and literature."[5] Allen Tate, in assessing the importance of the Agrarians of the South during the thirties, considers that in the concept of an agararian culture, he and Ransom and other Southern literary men had implicitly conceived of "the moral and spiritual condition which is favourable

to poetry."[6] What the critics of Britain were realising in terms of a general modern predicament was to the Southern critics a realisation through a regional awareness. But far from being parochial, this regional awareness brought to them an intensity of experience which was the result of involvement with the predicament created by industrialism. Being rooted in the down-to-earth experience, they felt the necessity of a concerted effort to overcome the evils of modern science. For a long time, they functioned as a group, indentifiable by the similarity of their views and interests. Starting from the "Fugitive Group" of Vanderbilt, they made persistent efforts in close and conscious collaboration with each other to preserve aesthetic values from the onslaughts of scientific attitudes. With this end in view, they patronised quite a few journals by editing them and contributing articles. For instance, *The Southern Review* was edited for some time by Cleanth Brooks in collaboration with Robert Penn Warren. John Crowe Ransom was the editor of *The Kenyon Review* from its inception till it closed down after his death. Allen Tate edited for some time *The Sewanee Review*. All these journals were consciously devoted to a particular approach to poetry and literature. They have undoubtedly exerted enormous influence on the critical tastes of our generation. Thus the reason why "New Criticism" as a movement can justifiably be limited to the American context is the consciousness with which the American New Critics persisted with their mission as a distinctly identifiable group. There can be no doubt that Ransom, Tate and the other "Fugitives" of Vanderbilt were the pioneers of a movement that attained significance and respectability chiefly by their combined efforts and almost missionary zeal.

How did the New Critics defend poetry against science ? The answer to this question seems particularly interesting in the context of Charles Moorman's discovery that the New Criticism "paradoxically seems to emulate its enemy, science"[7] in the use of terminology. Moorman shows that Ransom's key-term *Ontology* derives itself from the discipline of systematic philosophy while the word *Structure* is extensively used as basic concept in sciences like geology and chemistry. Tate's almost definitive term for poetry, *Tension*, is drawn from the field of psychology. Moorman explains this paradox by seeing a positive

advantage in such borrowings from the disciplines of science. They "can approximate the scientist's tone of exactitude and accuracy, while at the same time utilizing the connotational value present in these terms through their more general usage."[8] In fact, in applying the conceptual terminology of science to the study of poetry, the New Critics exhibited that the same set of terms meant different in terms of aesthetics ; though seemingly trivial, this was one way of exposing the inadequacy of science, which by freezing the meanings of words fails to perceive their connotative implications.

The limitation of science, as the New Critics view it, lies in its inability to encompass aesthetic experience. Any approach to a work of art in terms of scientific tools and methods is bound to result in only a partial explanation of it. The most fundamental error in literary criticism has been to approach poetry in the spirit of science—to explore the usefulness of the poem in terms of moral or social values, or to relate the poet's life to the poem in order to achieve insight into the poet's personality, or to place a poem as a specimen of historical evidence, or to search for great ideas in a poem. All these approaches are unsatisfactory, for they speak nothing of the poem itself "as a construct, with its own organisation and logic."[9] In other words, the moral, historical, biographical and philosophical approaches to poetry ignore the basic fact that there is something specific about poetry which distinguishes it from all other normative disciplines, that a poem has a norm of its own which sustains its existence as a reality. Poetry, therefore, must be defended by establishing its distinct identity in contra-distinction to the principles and methods of science.

The elimination of scientific principles from the study of poetry does not, of course, mean denial of its objective reality, as the Impressionists seemed to believe. Walter Pater's assertion that the primary requisite for the critic is ". . . a certain kind of temperament, the power of being deeply moved by the presence of beautiful object,"[10] ignores the universality of the verbal medium. The verbal elements, which alone bring the poem to bear meaning, are not evidently temperamental gestures, but objective signs and symbols. In repudiating science, the New critics were not certainly celebrating impressionistic or instinc-

tual response, but were pleading for poetry a different and distinct kind of objectivity.

How is poetry to be studied ? To answer this question is the precise aim of New Criticism. While attempting to do so, it has got inevitably involved with the more fundamental problem of knowing what a poem is. The New Critics assert that the poem is its form. It is this assertion which has provoked its antagonists to disparage the movement as prejudiced and one-sided. For instance, Van Wyck Brooks complains that ". . . preoccupied with 'form', they have little to say about values and less about the weighty affairs of 'content'."[11] Alfred Kazin condemns the New Critics, saying that ". . . the passion of these critics for form had made a fetish of form and had become entirely disproportionate to the significance of form in the artistic synthesis."[12] Such objections arise from a gross misunderstanding of the concept of form on the analogy of a container. Besides this naive notion of form, there is the commonsense approach of referring it to the organisation of the poem. This idea of form can at best explain the "fixed forms" like the sonnet or the epic, each of which has a typical pattern of organisation. The New Critic's concept of form, on the other hand, can be examined in terms of a two-fold quality: firstly, they consider form as inseparable from meaning or 'content' and secondly, they maintain form to be in itself valuable and requiring no external references for its realisation.

The question of the inseparability of form and content is, of course, not a typical New Critical pre-occuption. A persistent problem for the critic of poetry, through all phases of literary history, has been to find a rationale for the presence of two aspects in a poem the content and the form. Literary criticism has often swung between the two extremes of bias in terms of its exclusive concern with either of the two. The history of criticism is, in a sense, the record of confronting this uncomfortable truth of the presence of two aspects, complicated by the fact that in the experience of the reader, the poem, for all its complexity, is a single and coherent object. The notion of the inseparability of form and content seems to have existed in the very critical climate of the twentieth century beginning with the Symbolists, Impressionists, Imagists and coming down to

the "critics of consciousness" of the New Geneva School. A.C. Bradley hnd almost settled the issue in 1909 in his *Oxford Lectures on Poetry* by saying that ". . . it is a unity in which you can no more separate a substance and a form than you can separate living blood and life in the blood. . . . in a poem the true content and the true form neither exist nor can be imagined apart."[13] One can even go back to Coleridge to see this concept of form as opposed to what he calls the mechanic form. He defines organic form as "innate ; it shapes as it develops itself from within, and the fullness of its development is one and same with the perfection of its outer form. Such is the life, such the form."[14] Thus in emphasising a complete coincidence of the external and the innate, Coleridge in reality pleaded for the inseparability of form and content, a view that remained submerged despite Lord Shaftesbury's declaration in 1709 that "The Beautiful, the Fair, the Comely, were never in the *matter*, but in the *Art* and *Design* ; never in *Body* itself, but in the Form or *Forming power*. . ."[15] Coleridge's notion of a "blameless style" as "untranslatableness in words of the same language without injury to the meaning"[16] not merely asserts the coincidence of language and meaning but also suggests the objective status of poetic form by emphasising on the language-aspect, on "a perfect appropriateness of the words to the meaning."[17]

Modern critics, however much they differ in their enunciation of aesthetic principles and aims, have at least this fundamental agreement among them, so that a romanticist like Lascelles Abercrombie declares that the poem is an indivisible whole, a single complexity of things in which "nothing is there that does not belong to everything there—each for all, all for each,"[18] while a pragmatist like John Dewey can speak of the qualitative unity of the poem, by asserting that "The connection of form with substance is thus inherent, not imposed from without."[19] One can, in fact, cite any number of modern critics to justify the general assertion of the inseparability of form and content in the poetic object. There are exceptions, of course. Mark Van Doren, for instance, says, ". . . in art it is not true that the successful whole is the sum of its definable parts. There is something beyond the parts, a formed life which

in poetry at any rate is never born without benefit of subject-matter."[20] But such exceptions are rather rare. The general fact about modern approach to poetry remains to be the close attention to the poem as an existential reality, as form which embodies the experience that has gone into the poem.

The second aspect of the New Critical concept of form is that the identity of a poem is its form. It is in this respect that New Criticism, and particularly the American New Criticism, can claim an originality in speculative literary criticism. Though the majority of modern critics consider form as the basis of poetic experience, not all of them think that this experience is unique to the form itself and has no identity beyond it. A critic like Tolstoy or I.A. Richards would conceive of the poem as existing somewhere in the poet's and the reader's psychology while a critic like L.C. Knights with all his close attention to the text would say "of literature generally that what is there for intelligent discussion. . . exists only in individual apprehensions which themselves in some sense constitute its being,"[21] thus pleading for a subjective and impressionistic reaction. G. Wilson Knight's "spatial interpretation"[22] has the implications of transference of the poetic experience to a more tangible and sensory level while his insistence on symbolic meaning leads to a kind of romantic esotericism where "all art is necessarily inadequate since the suprasensuous reality cannot be captured and held by our minds."[23] The New Critics, on the other hand, do not place the identity of the poetic experience in the mind of the poet or the reader, nor do they consider it as symbolic of the transcendental, nor do they think that its identity is in terms of moral or sociological values. The experience is its own identity by virtue of the unique form it has achieved, and is not translatable to any other form of experience. Further, the effect of this experience has nothing to do with the realisation of it. As Abercrombie says, the poem exists as an indivisible whole, as "some sort of a microcosm—its own peculiar sort : it is a perfect system of its own inter-relationships."[24] This set of inter-relationships has nothing to do with that of the world of every day actuality. The poetic form, by its "ordered coherence"[25] provides us with sense of finality, a terminal satisfaction by which "we are delighted with the con-

sciousness of a world which is in boundaried and rounded perfection of accord with itself."[26] It is the identity of this new world, of a self-sufficient order of existence, which is the poetic form. And in approaching poetry, the literary critic attempts to discover the unique order of experience by contemplating on its form.

New Criticism, therefore, conceives of form as an autonomous whole. The order of experience obtained in a poem is the only possible order in relation to its formal status, and it is in this sense that Ransom speaks of a poem as ontological. The form is the being which assumes an identity of its own by virtue of the intrinsic relationships of its parts and their relationship with the nature of the total being. Just as one cannot think of a physical object, say a stone or a human being, apart from the aggregate of its constituent elements, so also is the poem inconceivable without the totality of its parts. In this sense, the poem exists in reality as much as any physical object, and the knowledge of this reality is obtained by apprehending what it is constituted of. The totality of the constitutive elements is the form and the study of poetry is the study of its being, its ontology.

The study of a poem, must, therefore, begin with the examination of the ontology of the poem, its form. And if one is a literary critic without any scientific interest in biography or history or sociology or moral sciences, his study ends, the moment the Being of the poem is disclosed. A critic's approach to the poem, Ransom maintains, is "to read and remark the poem knowingly—that is with the aesthetician's understanding of what a poem generically 'is' "[27] or as F.R. Leavis puts it, the business of critical intelligence is "to determine what is actually *there* in the work of art."[28] To understand a poem, it is not needed to refer to values, experiences and meanings outside the formal context, for understanding a poem is knowing the complex of relationships which is its form.

The poetic form conceived in terms of ontology is beyond space and time, for the physical reality of a poem's being is more than the reality of the moment and the place, a fact ignored by a critic like F.W. Bateson who defines the meaning of a poem as that which might have been discovered by the best of the

poet's contemporary reader. In a debate with John Wain, he states that the poetic meaning is determined by the interaction of the poet, the poet's contemporary audience, their language and their inherited literary conventions.[29] Bateson's assumptions seem too much rooted in time and space and on this basis, the study of poetry will ultimately mean the study of philology, anthropology and literary genres at the risk of missing the experience of the poem.

The space—time awareness in literary studies may be relevant for constructing a literary history, by taking into account Taine's famous formula of race, milieu and time. But the New Critics make a clear distinction between historical scholarship and literary criticism as is evident from the arguments between A S.P. Woodhouse and Cleanth Brooks in the pages of P.M.LA of December, 1951. While the former has its own uses, it can be considered merely as "Pre-criticism," for literary criticism is more than placing a work in its historical context. Bateson's view seems to suggest what Lionel Trilling says about Wordsworth's *Imortality Ode*, that it "is acceptable to us only when it is understood to have been written at a certain past moment; if it had appeared much later than it did, if it were offered to us now as a contemporary work, we would not admire it."[30] Trilling's assumption that in the pastness of the literary works "lies the assurance of their validity and relevance"[31] denies them their universal character. The authority of historical evidence does not explain the aesthetic value of a poem nor does Trilling's "sense of the past" help in saying why a poem of the past is still fascinating—why, in other words, it sustains its appeal through centuries. The space-time approach to poetry is thus incompetent to realise the universality of art, for it lacks the capacity to evaluate its intrinsic value which accounts for its sustained existence. The historical scholarship, as I.A. Richards says, "endeavours by underground tactics to invert the convenants of the trust held by literary criticism,"[32] while a literary critic, Cleanth Brooks declares, "must deal with it ultimately as a work of art and not merely as a grammatical or historical or sociological or political or biographical document."[33]

Duncan Robertson in his essay, "The Dichotomy of Form and Content," explains the New Critics' concept of form in

terms of the timeless reality. According to the New Critics, "The content is what *goes into* the poem and what may be *taken out* of it; but in the poem there is no content, only form : form is what *goes on in* the poem : the poem before it stood as form is a matter of "historic past" and a historical scholar confuses this with the poem itself. What can be taken out of it is a matter of "historical present" and the moral or impressionistic critics mistake this as the poem itself. The "Formal Critic" approaches the poem from the standpoint of a "timeless present, "realising that all external and internal relations dissolve in the very ordering of the poem which is its form. Thus the poem as Being is independent of the spatial and temporal considerations, and it is in this sense that the study of poetry as a product of historical circumstances or sociological phenomena is anathema to the New Critics.

The New Critics, like most other modern critics, have been awakened by the phenomenal growth of science and industrialisation threatening to inhibit aesthetic perception and knowledge, a fact realised by even a critic like Max Eastman who is ready to compromise art with science, for fear of art being eschewed by materialism. Eastman feels that "As science extends and deepens its domain, those cases in which the soundest judgement can be rendered by a man cultivating the mere art of letters will grow steadily fewer."[35] Ransom's fear of the similar kind can be discerned in such statements as "It is not a poetic age,"[36] or "The conditions are anti-poetic."[37] and his attempt to get over this fear can be discovered in such declarations as "that it is not a pre-scientific poetry, but a post-scientific one to which we must now give our consent. . . .a poetry which would not deny what we in our strange generation actually are : men who have aged in these pure intellectual disciplines and cannot play innocent without feeling very foolish."[38] The New Critic's concern about the menacing influence of science leads them to justify for poetry a distinct status and positive function. In this age of science, the need for poetry, as the New Critics contend, is all the more urgent. The awareness of crisis, brought forward by science, is clearly discernible in the fact that the New Critics have shown preference for such poets as Donne, Hopkins, Yeats and Eliot over poets like Chaucer, Pope and

Whitman in whom the sense of despair and crisis is less pronounced. Further the New Critics' pre-occupation with what Murray Krieger calls "the basic antagonism"[39] might be located in the feeling of deep schism in the modern sensibility between the apparent certitudes of science and deeper uncertainties about values of life.

The New Critics are involved in resolving this sense of a basic dualism by attempting to exhibit the limitations of science and by trying to establish poetry as a mode of overcoming the uncertainties brought about by science. Against the scientist's tendency to fragment experience into abstract description, the poet tries to realise the complete experience in terms of concrete perception. The experience is realised in terms of form which particularises it and thus saves it from being drowned in the current of generalisation that tends to make it a specimen of a class, an illustration of a concept. The poetic form embodies perceptual reality and thus completes the inadequacy of conceptual knowledge obtained through scientific formulations. The New Critics not merely consider form as the poem's identity, but also think of this identity as possessing a cognitive value distinct from the norms of other kinds of knowledge. A critic like John Dewey makes emphatic assertion about the inseparability of form and content, but finally values the poem in terms of non-aesthetic standards, as significant to the extent of realising practical consequences. The New Critics, on the other hand, declare that the value of poetry is inherent in its form. The study of poetry must begin and end with the contemplation and apprehension of its form. The poem is a state of Being which has a value typical of its own kind. It has no ambitions to provide remedies to the human problems. It tends to give, as Cleanth Brooks suggests, "diagnoses rather than remedies . . . a remedy involves an overt action whereas a diagnosis is still close to pure contemplation, which is the proper realm of art."[40] The diagnosis lies in the realisation of reality in terms of poetic form. A poem is not an instrument and it has "no great interest," as Ransom remarks, "in improving or idealizing the world . . . It only wants to realize the world, to see it better."[41] The aim of the critic is to realise this knowledge by the study of the poem's Being which is significant as a *form*

unknown to the world of actuality. In the consideration of poetic form as a potential instrument for conveying values through reference outside its context, poetry becomes an object of *judgment* in terms of the prescriptive values of morality or naturalistic values of actuality or deterministic values of time and space. To the New Critics, form is an object of contemplation. The poem, Ransom says, "is nothing short of a desperate ontological or metaphysical manouvre . . . The poet perpetuates in his poem an order of existence which in actual life is crumbling beneath his touch."[42]

The aim of the critic is to realise the aim of the artist which is the creation of an order that is not available in the world of actuality. T.S. Eliot says that 'The critical activity finds its highest, its true fulfillment in a kind of union with creation in the labour or the artist."[43] Ransom presents a similar view in remarking that "the critic wishes to know what he (the artist) is doing and how."[44] The critic thus aims to understand and realise the act of composition which is the act of formal embodiment. The notion of a poem is coincident with the awareness of its form and what constitutes the poetic value is the realisation of the poem as complete form. As Allen Tate says, ". . . if the poem is a real creation it is a kind of knowledge that we did not possess before,"[45] and this new possession is obtained through a new order of perceptual reality which is synonymous with poetic form. It is in this sense that Tate declares, ". . . form is meaning and nothing but meaning."[46] Tate conceives of the specific objectivity of a poem in terms of its formal properties which are "the focus of the specifically critical judgement."[47] Form thus becomes a concern of both the creative act and the critical judgement. In other words, poetic form becomes the perspective through which both the creative act and the created object are realised.

When Eliot speaks of the critic as partaking the creative labour of the artist or when Ransom speaks of the critic's aim to realise the poet's ontological manouvres or when Tate declares that both literature and literary criticism are concerned with the objectivity of form, none of them is of course assuming the critic as another artist—a fallacy that informs Impressionistic criticism. Whistler's notion that "none but an artist can be a

competent critic"[48] is governed by what to Oscar Wilde appears to be the aim of ideal criticism: "For the highest criticism deals with art not as expressive but as impressive purely."[49] This impressionistic view considers a poem as the expression of a temperament which is realised by the critic only if he possesses the same temperament. Whistler and Wilde fail to conceive of the specific objectivity of the medium and seem to deny the role of critical intellect in the appreciation of poetry. The New Critics' on the other hand, think of the critical activity as a process of analysis aiming to disclose the poem's ontology. What the poet achieves through sensibility and imagination is discovered by the critic through elucidation and analysis. Unlike the Impressionistic view, the theories of New criticism, despite their assertion of the similarity between the poet's and the critic's intent, prescribe different modes of apprehending the creative process and obtaining a critical understanding. Though the aims are similar, the tools are different so that a critic need not be a poet in order to apprehend the poetic experience realised in the form. The poem as a linguistic artifact discloses "an order of existence," and is not merely a promoter of moods and temperament as the Impressionists seem to believe. The poet, in using a universal medium, transcends the personal impressions to the objectivity of art. While the poet strives to obtain the objectivity of form, the critic attempts to know "what he is doing and how" through the study of formal properties that make the poem. Thus the perspective for both the poet and the critic is the form which organises experience to an order of Being.

Ransom conceives of an ideal critic as one who not merely studies aspects of poetic form but who is also committed to a speculative exercise, "speculative in the complete sense of—ontological."[50] He remarks that " The final desideratum is an ontological insight, nothing less."[51] The awareness of the existential reality of poetic form is what Ransom calls the ontological insight: ' He (the critic) will have to subscribe to an antology. If he is a sound critic, his ontology will be that of the poets."[52] To the New Critics, form is the focus of contemplation in terms of its perspectivistic value, as "a complex of interpretive processes in which every entity views every entity and event from an orientation peculiar to itself."[53] The crittc, as I. A. Richards

says, has to refrain from applying his own external standards, "for these standards can never explain the poem's success in doing what it set out to do, or if we like, in becoming what in the end it has become."[54] The intrinsic significance of the poetic form is what concerns a perfect critic who aims, to quote T. S. Eliot, at "a recognition of the truth that not our feelings, but the pattern which we make of our feelings is the centre of value."[55] It is in this sense that Eliot declares, "The poem has its own existence apart from us,"[56] and Ransom pleads for recognition of "the autonomy of the work itself as existing for its own sake."[57] The function of criticism, according to the New Critics, is to remark on the poem with the aesthetician's understanding of what a poem generically is: "an object of knowledge *sui generis* which has a special ontological status."[58]

The New Critics, in their exclusive concern with form, have salvaged poetry from the "Heresy of Paraphrase" which, as Cleanth Brooks aptly suggests, leads a critic "to judge the poem by its form as conceived externally and detached from human experience."[59] To sum up the New Critical position in the words of Benbowe Richie, ". . . the status of a work of art must be determined in terms of the formal value structure. It is obvious that we cannot legitimately criticize an aesthetic object because it fails to have certain extra-formal values. All that we can do is to criticize the way in which its elements are related."[60] In repudiating attempts to translate the distinctively aesthetic into some other kind of experience, and in emphasising on the intrinsic significance of the medium, the school of New Criticism has woven a novel kind of aesthetic for the art of poetry.

The Anatomy of Form

In a letter to Allen Tate in the spring of 1927, Ransom argued that poetry records the "Third Moment"[1] of experience, a thesis that he developed in a book of that title which he destroyed, considering that its publication was redundant after the publication of *God Without Thunder*. But the theory of the "Third Moment" is interesting, in so far as it throws light on Ransom's notion of creative process. He speaks of the three moments as characterizing the historical order of experience. The first is that of the original, the actual experience, "pure of all intellectual content, unreflective, concrete and singular; there are no distinctions, and the subject is identical with the whole." The second is the moment of cognition, of reflection on the experience from which come abstract ideas whose ends are practical. Whatever is left out in the transition from the first to the second moment passes into memory. In the third moment, we become aware of those aspects of the original experience which seem lost in the second moment, and therefore we try to recover them through image.[2] The creative act commences with this attempt to recover, in terms of images, the first moment of experience that has turned abstract in the second moment of conceptualization. The act of poetry is, thus, an attempt at recapturing an experience that has become "fugitive." Ransom

further clarifies his theory of the third moment in his essay, "The Tense of Poetry," where he asserts that in art, "we make a return to something," and that "the specific poems, the ones that we cherish as perfect creations . . . are dramatizing the past."[3]

The historical order of experience is thus a dialectical movement from sensation through conception to perception. When Eliot speaks of the transmutation of ideas into sensations, he seems to imply the transition of the second moment into the third which is the recovery of the first moment of sensation. But the third moment is not quite the same as the first, since the first moment has undergone the phase of reflection before it is recaptured through a context of images. It would therefore be more appropriate to call the third moment as the moment of perception. The difference between sensation and perception is that, in the former the mind is passive and unreflective, while in the latter the mind is active in attempting to evoke images that would reconstitute the original experience. Perception is neither purely physical nor purely intellectual. It is a way of understanding the relationship between the mind and the reality. The recollecting of a sensory experience in a state of "tranquillity" or "calm contemplation"[4] is possible only in terms of an organized pattern of relevant details. That is, while the original sensation of the first moment does not recognize the elements that constitute this sensory experience, the second moment of conceptualization recognizes only those aspects which identify the experience as having universal validity. The third moment undertakes a perceptual organization which tries to reconstitute the experience which was sensory but unorganized and conceptual but unspecific. In other words, perception of an experience is reconstitution of this experience in its specific and particular quality, which emerges from the context of relationships between reality and mind. Ransom's "third moment," the past tense of the experience, is a moment of perception which seeks to know the object in its particularity of context. The act of poetry, therefore, commences with a perceptual awareness of experience.

The creative process envisaged in terms of a perceptual awareness of experience is, of course, radically different from that envisaged in the theories of Inspiration. A theory of

Inspiration would plead for an immediate utterance of experience which being merely sensory fails to organize itself into a cognitive order. Shelley, in speaking of his own creative activity, declares, "When my brain gets heated with thought, it soon boils, and throws off images and words faster than I can skim them off."[5] This inability to discriminate finally results in a muddled collection of unconnected impressions. The poet's eagerness to put down what flows into his mind during the moment of inspiration, which is like a burning coal that is threatened of fading and extinction, leads only to frustration, for experience does not yield to verbal clarification until it submits itself to cool and calm contemplation. Shelley is aware of this need of temporal and psychic distance despite his enthusiastic pleading for Inspiration, for he makes it clear that in the "heated moment," what he writes is a "rude sketch" which would be polished "when cooled down."[6]

It is, of course, not an easy task for the poet to record the moment of perceptual awareness, for the "third moment" is constantly interrupted by the second moment which conceptualizes experience. The poet has to manage the conceptual reality of experience which has given him the occasion to reconstitute it, but which is not adequate to evoke the excitement of the first moment. The poet is thus confronted with the dual task of respecting the conceptual reality and of perceiving it as a unique and particular experience. Without conceptual awareness, there is no occasion for aesthetic interest. Without perceptual awareness, there is no possibility of an aesthetic experience. Thus the commencement of creative act is characterized by a sense of dualism between the concept and the context, between the abstract and the particular. In terms of the verbal elements of a poem, this duality is reflected in the denotative meanings of words and their connotative implications obtained from a contextual interection of words. The attempt to "employ both concept and connotation as efficiently as possible"[7] leads to ambiguity in poetry, which Willam Empson defines as "any verbal nuance however slight which gives room for alternative reactions to the same piece of language."[8] It is in this sense that T.S. Eliot declares, "When the dramatist is creative, then the more creative the dramatist, the greater varieties of interpreta-

tion will be possible"[9]. Of course, this notion of interaction between conception and perception would not apply to the narrative and descriptive kinds of poetry in the same way as it applies to dramatic and lyrical poetry. But this, far from belittling the significance of the notion, discloses the limitations of the former variety of poetry.

Narrative poetry is primarily interested in telling a 'story' with the varied aims of entertainment, preaching or palatable reporting. Descriptive poetry is concerned with the actuality of a situation or the ideality of a conception, and the creative process involved in such writing is merely a search for the rhetorical devices of embellishment. Narrative and descriptive poetry emerge not out of an attitude of calm contemplation, but out of an urge to versify a delightful or a moral situation. They deal with words as pictures, and the relationship between the name and the sense is absolute and singular. Pictures are not images, for they lack the dynamism of the image and fail to participate in what Herbert Read calls "the inherent dynamism of the inventive act."[10] Words as images, on the other hand create what to Ezra Pound appears as the intellectual and, emotional complex in an instant of time. In dramatic poetry, words as images obtain a complexity by a simultaneus suggestion of denotative and connotative meanings. The full significance of the word is grasped only in relation to the context in which it appears and with reference to the situation in which it is spoken. This is in contradistinction to the pictorial use of the word whose sense is emotionally freezed and meaning intellectually stabilized. In the verbal order of dramatic poetry, there is a mutual interaction between what Wimsatt calls "statement" and "suggestion"[11] that leads to "metaphoric and symbolic dimensions."[12] Donald Davie has this difference between the descriptive and the dramatic poetry in mind when he compares Ezra Pound's "The Gypsy" with Wordsworth's "Stepping Westward." Wordsworth's poem, Davie suggests, "tells us about an experience, instead of presenting it ; what happens is described, not embodied." Pound, on the other hand, deviates from the grammarian's "authentic syntax"[13] and achieves a structure of new relationships among verbal elements whose tenability cannot be questioned within the contextual

framework of the poem. In other words, while the *description* of an experience can manage with the normative syntax, the *embodiment* of an experience calls for deviations from the norms of ordinary linguistic behaviour.

The problem of resolving the universal-particular dualism in the act of poetry is what New Criticism is basically involved with. The two aspects of dualism have been variously described, the most comprehensive terms being Yvor Winters' *Denotation* and *Connotation*.[14] *Denotation* refers to the conceptual power of words that describe the "defensible rational statement about human experience,"[15] while *Connotation* suggests the emotions these words generate in the formal context. The distinction Winters makes, of course, seems to plead for poetry a dual existence. Winters does not show the ways in which poetic form achieves integration of the rational and emotional elements, and fails, as Murray Krieger says, to realize that "there is any significant interaction between the poet's experience and his chosen form."[16] Winters' over-zealous concern with moral judgment damages his sense of the aesthetic and there is an implicit approval of the possibility of a pre-determined content being cast into poetic form. A concern with moral judgment is, of course, not necessarily a submission to the dichotomous position of content and form. Winters' limitation is his inability to assimilate the moral disposition into a concept of organic form. F.R. Leavis is as seriously concerned with the moral issues as Winters is; but Leavis unequivocally asserts that the moral values in poetry are not separable from the verbal order which embodies them, and finds Milton's "defect of imagination" in his inability to assimilate moral grandeur into the poetic architectonics.[17] Leavis pleads for an interfusion of moral meaning and verbal organization into an organic whole while Winters would not let his "defensible rational statement" dissolve into the complex verbal order of a poem.

In 1938, Ransom described the implied dualism in the creative act in terms of *idea* and *image*[18] that seek to be integrated into the objective form of an aesthetic artifact. Ransom defends his own view of poetry against what he calls Physical Poetry and Platonic Poetry,[19] poetry that leans on

things in their mere thinginess, and poetry that turns to ideas that seek images to illustrate them. Ideal poetry, Ransom suggests, aims "to reconstitute the world of perceptions."[20] The pull towards ideation inhibits the perceptual impulse and leads to conceptual generalizations. The pull towards the simple physical sense of thinginess inhibits the cognitive impulse and leads to inconsequential realism. The poet's task is to uphold the physical distinctiveness of the thing not as an isolated entity, but as having an individual identity obtained in its relation to the context in which it exists. It is thus that the thing becomes an image embodying perceptual awareness. In his famous essay, "Poetry : A Note on Ontology," Ransom brings in two other significant terms to describe the dual presence of the conceptual and the perceptual in the aesthetic object. He says, ". . . ideas have extension and objects have intension, but extension is thin while intension is thick."[21] In a a poem, idea exists "thread-like," and tends to expand beyond the particular context of the form while the thing "thickens" with new dimensions of meaning in its contexual perspective. The idea names the object denotatively while the image individualizes it in a particular context. Ransom assumes that the object presents itself initially in its conceptual reality and achieves aesthetic identity by being placed in a context of images. While the image without reference to a named object is non-existent the object without realization of its particularity of context is non-aesthetic. Ransom conceives of the unity of idea and image as a reconciliation between *extension* and *intension*—the two terms that Allen Tate made immensely popular.

Allen Tate warns us against the two kinds of poetry—physical and platonic. James Thompson's poem "The Vine" is "a failure in connotation" because "the imagery adds nothing to the general idea that it tries to sustain."[22] This is the failure of physical poetry in which images fail to achieve contextual relationships. Cowley's "Hymn : To Light," on the other hand, "fails to use and direct the rich connotation with which language has been informed by experience."[23] This is the failure of Platonic poetry in which rigid adherence to idea denies to language its connotative quality. It is interesting to see

that Tate uses the same terms as Ransom does—idea and image. But while Ransom uses the two terms, "extension" and "intension," casually, Tate considers the two terms as crucial to any discussion of the poetic act. Tate defines a poem as "Tension" which implies the full organisation of all extension and intension, of "the literal statement" and "the intensive meaning."[24] Tate characterizes good poetry as "a unity of all meanings from the furthest extremes of extension and intension. . . to a single medium of experience—poetry."[25]

Ransom uses a number of inter-changeable terms to describe what Tate calls "literal statement" and "intensive meaning" and the famous texture—structure formula encompasses all these descriptions. Ransom speaks of "structure" variously as a logical object, a universal, the prose—object, the prose-logic, the logical construct, the presentable object, the core-object and the constant element. What the term finally suggests is that in every poem there is an aspect which can be stated in prose, an element "which any forthright prosy reader can discover. . . by an immediate paraphrase."[26] Texture, on the other hand, is described variously as increment, superfluity, tissues of irrelevance and residue. Texture provides a "private character" to the poem and "if a critic has nothing to say about its texture he has nothing to say about it specifically as poem, but is treating it only in so far as it is prose."[27] The following statement most precisely sums up Ransom's concepts of structure and texture :

> A poem is a *logical structure* having a *local texture*. These terms have been actually though not systematically employed in literary criticism. To my imagination, they are architectural. The walls of my room are obviously structural ; the beams and boards have a function ; so does the plaster, which is the visible aspect of the final wall. The plaster might have remained naked, aspiring to no characters, and purely functional. But actually it has been painted, receiving colour ; or it has been papered, receiving colour and design, though these have no structural value ; or perhaps it has been hung with tapestry, or with paintings, for "decoration". The paint, the paper, the tapestry are texture. It is logically unrelated to structure.[28]

Ransom evidently considers texture as the aesthetic of the poem which has no functional role in the sense of providing utility or moral principles. But he does not explain satisfactorily how the two elements are integrated into the single unity of a poem or how they are resolved into the objectivity of form. More unfortunately, Ransom considers that these two elements are separable in a poem : "The poem actually continues to contain its ostensible substance which is not fatally diminished from its prose state that is its logical core or paraphrase. The rest of the poem is an *x*, which we are to find."[29] This statement implies that structure and texture are two separable entities, that texture is super-added, "an increment," to the other, the two being "logically unrelated." It is this unresolved dualism in Ransom's concept of poetic form that leads Murray Krieger to conclude that the concept falls short of an organic view of form. Krieger suggests that if the structure is the logical core, it is a pre-determined presence which is given an "increment" or decorated with "local details." Ransom seems to ignore the functional role of texture in providing particularity of context and individual significance to an experience.

Ransom was aware of the confusion arising out of his structure-texture formulation of the poetic act, and in 1954, he confessed that the cause of such confusion was due to the inadequacy of the term *texture* which is "a flat and inadequate figure for the vivid and felt part of the poem which we associate peculiarly with poetic language."[30] Ransom now chose the term "organism"[31] which he envisaged as a composite product of three aspects—head, heart and feet. Ransom maintained that the poem is a joint product of three individual languages spoken by three persisent speakers: the head speaking the intellectual language, heart the affective language and feet the rhythmical language.

The poem correspondingly consists of intellectual action, action of the affections and the rhythmic action. Ransom could now see more of complexity in a poem than his structure-texture formula permitted. In fact, the language of affection and the thythmical language can both be seen as a broadening of the concept of texture while the intellectual language seems to correspond to the idea of structure. The idealists and the

psychologists concern themselves with the intellectual element, and as logicians they have a right to explicate what is implicit in a form of discourse. There is no justification in saying that by doing so, they are abusing the poem. It is only that they are not *literary* critics whose assumption is "that the language of poetry is the language of feeling, not the language of epistemology."[31] It is obvious that Ransom is now conceiving of texture in terms of the *language of feeling* which includes the two elements of affection and rhythm. Structure, which seemed to be too passive, has now become intellectual *action* signifying more assertive and positive presence in the poem, though Ransom warns: "we might sometimes be justified in not attending too carefully to the language of the head for fear we will miss its import."[32]

Ransom after all his repudiation of the affective mode of approach comes down finally to Richards' notion of poetic language as evoking "feeling." This relapse to the "emotive language" theory accompanied by the view of seeing the intellectual element as separable from the textural is perhaps the result of Ransom's inherent diffidence about the adequacy of tensional aesthetics. Cleanth Brooks aptly feels that ". . . the structure-texture distinction looks ominously like the old content—form dualism."[33] Ransom finds Wimsatt's idea of the poem as "the verbal icon," embodying a concrete universal, too inadequate to hold the three-fold poetic plaiting he pleads for. The poem, Ransom contends, may be an icon of the universal, but it is also, "an icon of symbolic rhythm."[34] In his essay "Humanism at Chicago," published in 1952, Ransom speaks of a poem as construing and realising three poetic objects simultaneously, and they are the logical construct which is the denotative meaning, "the big formless one" which develops as the "public or logical object is being whipped to shape," and the meter or the sound-pattern.[35] Ransom here is making a clearer articulation of what he had already conceived in the twenties—"to conduct a logical sequence" and "to realise an objective pattern with their(words') sounds."[36] Ransom was hardly able to resolve this dualism, so that the final impression remains to be what it was to him in 1924—"the miracle of harmony."[37]

The relationship between the dual elements remains rather

loose and arbitrary in Ransom's poetics. There is no trancendence of relationship to the level of formal unity, for Ransom conceives of unity in relation to structure, the universal element. In a poem, he says, "its texture of meanings should find a structure to attach to,"[38] thus implying what R.L. Brett asserts: that the "images" constituting the language of feeling "reinforce the conceptual content of poetry" in so far as "poetic language mirrors the discursive thought."[39]

For Ranson, there is no specific relationship between the concept and the image so that the question of importance of one element over the other is merely a matter of attitude one holds towards the art-object. The ontological critic, Ransom suggests, is concerned with texture. Ransom leaves the problem of dualism to be finally a matter of the intent of the critic though he himself declares his preference for an ontological approach. Ransom's two terms, "structure" and "texture" are metaphors taken from architecture, and suggest finish and shaping on the one hand and embellishment on the other. The total body of an architectural edifice does not give the dual impression of *shape* and *embellishment*, though it is possible to make a critical discrimination by separating the two objects. Ransom transferred these architectural terms to the verbal act of poetry and tried to show that the structure and texture are separable in terms of critical approach. What is lacking in Ransom's theory is the awareness of the poem in terms of its inherent dynamism—the interior landscape as it were—of language. There is always the possibility of the structure—texture relationship being modified or viewed against new dimensions of experience. While Ransom's logical distinction between structure and texture may be an acceptable working hypothesis for a critic, the final ontological insight has to erase this distinction in order to apprehend the aesthetic arti fact as a self-existent Being possessing a simultaneous identity of unity and plurality, the actuality and the possibility of what is real and concrete. The sense of holism implied in his notion of of the "world's Body" thus fails to find adequate justification in his structure-texture dualism, though his pleading for an ontological approach does not, for this reason, lose its significance as a valid critical orientation.

Tata conceives of the resolution of dualism in terms of the

inter-action of verbal elements and mutual transfusion of the determinate and indeterminate aspects of words within the formal context. Ransom's dualism is in terms of concept and image, while for Tate, it is inherent in the signification and suggestion of verbal elements. The "third moment" of perception does not co-exist with the "second moment" of concept formation, as Ransom would have us believe, but is a dialectical synthesis of the first and the second moments into a state of tension achieved by an interaction of denotation and connotation. The perception of experience is simultaneous with the occurence of image so that ". . . .by means of a new grasp of language. . . .the poet achieves a plastic objectivity that to some degree liberates him from the problem of finding a structural background or idea."[40] Tate conceives of poetic form as a specific organisation of language with regard to its sign-value and suggestion-value and thinks of aesthetic activity as coterminous with the resolution of the dualism of denotation and connotation inherent in the verbal material. In this process of resolution, the distinction between "literal statement" and "intensive meaning" is erased. Tate's definition of a poem as "the full organised body of all the extension and intension,"[41] suggests a specific functional relationship between the two aspects of form. The poetic material is not an increment, but the "body" itself, for in the complete organisation of the poem, there is no problem of reckoning with a para-phrasable content.

One possible way of filling in the gap, that Ransom seems to have failed to do, between the texture and the structure is to invoke the concept of imagination. Allen Tate seems to be aware of the role of imagination in poetry. He says that imagination is the faculty by which the distance "between a concept and its object, between the human situation in which the concept arises and the realisation of its full meaning"[42] is bridged. Dante possessed this faculty of what Tate calls "Symbolic imagination" as apposed to what he terms as "Angelic imagination."[43] The latter tries to bridge the distance without the aid of senses and images and Tate dismisses this way of transcending "the mediation of both image and discourse"[44] as untenable, for it "tries to distintegrate or circumvent the image in the illusory pursuit of essence. . . it loses its human paradigm,

and is dissolved in the worship of intellectual power, the surrogate of divinity that worships itself."[45] Symbolic imagination, on the other hand, mediates between the concept and the object and helps in obtaining the fullness of meaning. This faculty therefore is an agent that aids in resolving the antinomies in the poem by bringing it to a state of tension which is the full realised meaning—the integration of the conceptual and the perceptual, the structural and the textural. Tate suggests that it is not possible to realise the "essence" without image and discourse. Tate's symbolic imagination reflects the Coleridgean notion of primary imagination which is "incorporating the reason in images of the sense, and organising (as it were) the flux of the senses by the permanence and self-encircling energies of the reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves and consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors."[46]

Any attempt to discuss the language of poetic form as reflected in modern criticism must begin with I.A. Richards who was the first among modern critics to take a serious view of the use of language in poetry. Ransom acknowledges that "Discussion of the New Criticism must start with Mr. Richards. The New Criticism very nearly began with him. It might be said also that it began with him in right way, because he attempted to found it on a more comprehensive basis than other critics did."[47] This "comprehensive basis" was evidently an interest in the behaviour of language in an aesthetic verbal construct. This interest in the poetics of Richards provided a basic frame-work to the New Critics to explore the problems of language. They were almost initiated to the problem by Richards, and this accounts for Ransom's acknowledgement of debt to him despite his radical differences.

Richards discriminates between two uses of language. The language of the propositional discourse is the referential use which is "a very special limited use of language" connected with science or at least with the "tamer, more settled part of the sciences."[48] The function of this mode of language is expository while there is another function of language which is persuasion. In his early writings, Richards frequently interchanges the term "referential" with "symbolic" and "scientific"

thus suggesting that words involve references in a scientific discourse or are symbols of mental concepts. He contrasts this with words determined by emotions and desires. In this use of language, words do not correspond to the things they are habituated to denote. The emotive language has no references to the objects in their actuality but it is so used as to distort thoughts and stock perceptions. Richards assumes that the aesthetic experiences have their source in emotions alone and that such experiences are embodied in the kind of language that can produce or suggest those emotions. Richards in this assumption submits to what Wimsatt and Beardsley call the "Intentional" and the "Affective" fallacies.[49] The source of the art-object is a matter that might interest a psychologist but is irrelevant to the consideration of it as primarily an art-object. The poem as object may evoke different responses in different readers and in the same reader at different moments. The poem itself does not prescribe a particular response or describe the source of its origin. Emotion, says Eliseo Vivas "has, so to speak. its centre of gravity in the subjective"[50] and words being an objective medium cannot in themselves be emotive. In other words the language of poetry is not a medium for transference of emotions from the poet to the reader, but is "a system of signs" which through "the logical and the counter-logical"[51] potentialities of speech and rhythm settles into a meaning which does not call for the poet's emotion or the reader's response to justify its congnitive tenability. The problem with Richards, as is well known, was his preoccupation with stimulus-response psychology that led him to consider the poem with reference to the poet's or the reader's psychology. His theory that a poem's value is in emotion consisting of the complex organisation of impulses and that this value can be located in the experience of the poet and the reader implies his lack of concern with the poem as a linguistic construct having a reality of existence apart from the poet and the reader. Though he made laudable efforts to distinguish between the languages of science and poetry, he himself became a victim to the referential cast of naturalistic psychological terms, in consequence of which, "The Poetry has been absorbed into a pseudo—scientific jargon, no more relevant in poetry. . ."[52]

Richards considered language as a carrier of values and poetry as using, what Charles M. Morris said, "the language of value.."[53] Morris almost speaks on behalf of Richards who considers poetry as the exclusive function of communication : "Art is the language for the communication of values."[54] This view approaches language merely as signs to denote or designate values and boils down poetic language to the "referential function." Tate repudiates in clear terms he theory of communication in the critical procedure, for he contends that such emphasis might lead public speech to get heavily tainted with mass feeling emptying language of the possible subtleties. Thus the poetics of Richards in the matter of poetic language as "evocative" of emotions, communicating a state of neurological balance, is not acceptable to the New Critical temper which scrupulously avoids any extra-formal consideration in its reading of poetry. Ransom and Tate acknowledge their indebtedness to Richards for providing them with the apparatus of semantic analysis to enquire into the meaning of poetry, and a theoretical foundation through his critical awareness of the concepts of experience and organisation particularly in his *Principles of Literary Criticism*. But they are opposed to his dependence on psychology which confuses his theory of poetic language in the web of scientific jargons. Richards in considering poetic language as evocative or emotive imputes to it an attribute which is not in the poetic object itself and thus denies to poetry an objectivity of form, its ontological status. Richards is aware of the value that issues out of the interaction among linguistic items in the form of the poem, for he says in an essay entitled "The Interaction of words, that" words always work together. We understand no word except in and through its interaction with other words."[55] But he conceives of this interaction as analogous to ". . . the maintenance of stability within minds and correspondence between them," since "apart from the minds which use them they are nothing but agitations of the air or stains on paper."[56] That is to say, for Richards, words are indicative of mental states and are insubstantial apart from the mental referents.

Richards viewed poetic language as a vehicle for transferring emotional states from the poet to the reader. Ransom, on the other hand, was thinking of the language of poetry as reconsti-

tuting a "fugitive" experience. Louise Cowan has succinctly summed up Ransom's views in these words : ". . . the language of poetry must reconstitute experience by associating value with a concrete image upon which the poetic consciousness steadily gazes."[57] Cowan comes to this conclusion after a discussion of the theory of Third moment in which the original experience in its totality is recaptured by concrete images. Ransom conceives of poetry as a verbal artifact in which the past tense is restructured in the syntax of images. As an explanation of the creative process, the sequence of the three moments is too theoretically graded. The significance of this speculation, however, lies in its insight into the nature of poetic language. In speaking of image as the language of poetry, Ransom frees himself from Richards' conception of poetic language as mere referent and emphasises on the cognitive value of figurative language. In terms of Richards' emotive language, the poem is a mere transmission of message through a network of impulses that in their totality constitute emotion. The language of images, Ransom suggests, has "the effect of showing how the concept, the poor thin thing, is drowned in the image, and how the determinate is drowned in the contingent . . . ."[58] Here Ransom is obviously hinting at the element of texture which he believes to be the poem's aesthetic. Texture is a pattern of images and the perception of meaning in terms of the totality of relationships in this pattern is aesthetic knowledge. In considering the language of poetry in terms of image recapturing the unreflective original experience, Ransom rejects the notion that poetic language is a basis for providing expedient transference of values or messages.

Ransom of course has not particularly developed the concept of image in his later essays and so it would be unfair to attach to it too much of importance. But in speaking of the historical order of experience culminating in cognition through images, Ransom is at least freer from the confusion in Eliot's phrase "Objective Correlative" which, as Krieger in *The New Apologists* has rightly suggested, implies admission of a pre-existing emotion seeking appropriate objects for embodiment. Ransom, on the other hand, shows a greater clarity in asserting that by a deliberate recourse to images "Imagination or the Faculty of Pure Memory brings out the original experiences

from the dark store-room."[59]

With Ransom's development as critic, his concept of language underwent many ramifications to encompass the complex aspects of the poetic act and form. One of the indispensable technical devices in poetry, Ransom said in 1938, is the use of tropes, "employing figurative language for its definitive sort of utterence,"[60] and among the multitude of such tropes that poets take recourse to, *metaphor* is "the climactic figure" :

> Metaphor is the equation of the human action to that of some natural object ; the object really is extraneous to the human action, but it is made to involve in that action any way, which in effect is to be humanized.[61]

This, in effect, is an improved version of his earlier notion of image as embodying perceptions. The image, in addition to involving itself in the reconstitution of experience, also as metaphor, suggests "that the object is perceptually or physically remarkable, and we had better attend to it."[62] By holding this concept of metaphor, Ransom was able to surmount the confusion about the meaning of "image." Ransom, in celebrating the poetic value of metaphor, was thinking of the image in the sense in which, as C. Day Lewis says, "Every poetic image. . . is to some degree metaphorical. It looks out from a mirror in which life perceives not so much its face as some truth about its face."[63] It is not merely a sensuous apprehension of an object, but a perception of value, "some truth", which is regarded as the function of a figure of speech. The word "metaphor" gives this meaning more clearly than the term "image" which might suggest, as Resemund Tuve seems to believe, a mere "transliteration of the sense-impressions."[64] Metaphor is not merely an object of analogy with the sensory perception, but an object of value that makes the *cognition* of perception possible. When Ransom speaks of the involvement of the object with human action, he, in effect, conceives of metaphor as more than a mere analogy. It becomes the value of perception itself by the object being "humanized" so that the metaphor loses the two-term correspondence and attains what Mallarme meant by the "absolute power" of metaphor the power that makes the translation of one term to the other impossible. Seen in this way, metaphor is no more an aspect of the formal classification of

rhetoric, which, Cleanth Brooks argues, is ". . . .the fundamental fallacy which underlies the Romantic and Neo-classical account of the functions of figurative language,"[65] but possesses a functional character that "gives focus to experience."[66] It is not difficult to see that Ransom's concept of metaphor is radically different from that of I.A. Richards. Richards in fact takes metaphor to be the fundamental figure of speech in all modes of human communication including philosophy. Metaphor is "the omnipresent principle of language," and is involved in all human thinking : "Thought is radically metophoric." To Richards, metaphor is more than a literary phenomenon and is a basis of approach to the theory of language itself; Ransom, on the other hand, considered this figure of speech within the limited scope of poetic discourse, as an indispensable *technical* device. Richards applied this exalted sense of metaphor to poetry in terms of a pair of distinguishable elements, tenor and vehicle. Ransom's concept of metaphor is in terms of the identification of tenor and vehicle. Ransom's criticism of the following statement of Richards points to their divergent views. Richards, in discussing Denham's "Cooper Hill" says, "Here the flow of the poet's mind, we may say, is the tenor and the river the vehicle."[67] Ransom's feeling about this figure is "...the stream should be taken as the tenor, since Denham begins with it (and indeed calls it his theme), and the speaker's mind the vehicle."[68] For Ronsom, the tenor is the object which for Richards is the vehicle. The mind is moved to perceive an object as contributing to a pattern that seeks to embody an experience. The metaphor is neither the vehicle nor the tenor but an identity of both. The object is not a carrier of value that can be apprehended independently of it, but is in itself valuable in terms of concretising the experience. The experience is neither known nor perceived till the object clarifies it, and so the object is the meaning of experience and not its vehicle. The object is thus the tenor, the experience and becomes a metaphor by partaking an experiential order. Tate, in discussing the same poem "Cooper Hill" by Denham, criticises Dr. Johnson's view which suggests that in a metaphor, the tenor and the vehicle should be translatable into one another, should be reciprocally interchangeable. Tate's own view is that "The tenor can be located only in its

vehicle."[69] The poet is not concerned with "a pre-determined tenor in search of a perspicuous vehicle"[70] but is rather involved with the indentity of "vehicle" and "tenor" in the specific form of the poem. Tate holds that this approach to identity as "a feature of metaphor" was absent among the Neo-classical critics, which explains Dr. Johnson's misleading view on the Denham poem. We thus see that the concept of metaphor in the poetics of Allen Tate and John Crowe Ransom is radically different from that of I.A. Richards. The New Critical position pleads for metaphor a status that evisages a complete integration of the perception and the object. The New Critics approach the notion of metaphor exclusively as a matter of poetic device, as the figurative language typical of poetic form while Richards has a more exalted sense of metaphor in considering it as the primary principle of all linguistic modes of communication. Metaphor for the New Critics is a manner of speech that entitles the poet to realise the particularity, the contingent aspect, of an experience in terms of an identity between the human perception and the objective reality, by endowing "the natural object with a human sentience." The vehicle is not something "smuggled in from outside." As Christine Brooke Rose observes, even though the notion of metaphor implies two terms "the metaphoric term" and "the proper term", the metaphor itself "is a new entity, more or less successfully fused according to how it is expressed. . ."[71] Brooke Rose considers Richards' reading of the Denham poem as "making nonsense of the idea" of metaphor. Miss Brooke Rose laments that "Most studies of metaphor, from Aristotle to the present day, have been concerned with the idea-content, rather than with the form,"[72] and thus seems to take for her premises the New Critics' concept of organic metaphor. Though her *Grammar of Metaphor* is too technically grammatical, her premises are nevertheless sound and conform to the New Critical attempts to judge figurative language in terms of what she calls "an aesthetic criterion."[73]

Among the technical devices essential to the poetic form, Ransom considers metre as "the most obvious device."[74] While metaphor refers to the figurative aspect of poetic language, metre or rhythm refers to the sound-aspects of language.

It is true that Ransom has not made much critical elaboration of the concept of rhythm in poetry. But one can see his obsessive concern with the fact of its inevitable presence right from the Fugitive years down to the fifties. In 1924 Ransom showed this awarness of the dual role of words in poetry : "words which make sense . . . also make a uniform structure of accents and rhymes."[75] He later made a graphic representation of this dual role of language in poetry in terms of a diagram which suggested the integration of the "range of words as meaning" and "range of words as sound." The poem in its final state sacrifices either determinate meaning in favour of determinate sound or this in favour of determinate meaning. This implies that a certain level of indeterminacy is inevitable in the poetic form. Ransom seems to plead for determinate meaning and indeterminate sound :

> You may ask him (the artist) to write a poem which will make sense and make metre at the same time, but in the performance he will sacrifice one or the other ; the consequence will be good sense and lame metre, or good metre and nonsense ; if he is a man of interests and convictions, the former.[76]

Sacrificing the determinacy of meaning in favour of determinate sound will lead the artist to "a tedious parlour performance" in making "much ado about saying nothing of importance."[77]

Ransom does not in any way deny the inevitability of a soundpattern "within which all the words of the poem dutifully assume their places though they may be very busy at other things."[78] He calls this sound-pattern "symbolic rhythm" and asserts that "The rhythm of the metres envelops. . . . like an atmosphere, a constraint, and a blessing too."[79] Ransom seems to feel that the sound-pattern symbolises the sense, contributes to its dramatisation in the poetic form.

The need to sacrifice the determinate sound is echoed in Ransom's assertion of the need to dislodge from a formal tradition in order to say about matters of importance, for obviously new perceptions seek new forms. In the essay, "A Poem Nearly Anonymous," Ransom, in speaking of Milton's *Lycidas* as "wilful and illegal in form,"[80] is in fact speaking of a true poet's need to revolt against a formal tradition in the

interest of retaining the value of individual perceptions, and this view is logically related to his preference of sense over meter. Ransom locates the dilemma of the artist as necessitating him, on the one hand, to "reckon upon the background of a severe technical tradition"[81] and on the other hand, to dislocate this technical tradition to retain the novelty of his perceptions. Ransom states this paradox in the work of an artist as "the climax of a tradition."[82] The "wilful and illegal form" of Lycidas reflects this paradox in its submission to the pastoral convention and yet taking liberties in drifting from this convention to accomodate the artist's free and personal realisation of the experience. We can relate, in terms of language, the poet's imperative need to accept the indeterminacy of sound with his need to dislodge himself from the rigours of a technical tradition. The poet's task finally becomes one of a compromise between what Eliot calls "Tradition and Individual Talent." His problem is to achieve in the form "the convention plus the individual experience."[83] Tate conceives of this convention as a matter of language : "A poetic convention lives only as language ; for language is the embodiment of our experience in words."[84] The poet's task is to see how far the poetic convention, the language of the past is relevant to embody his own unique experience in order to transform it to "a permanently intelligible order of human experience."[85] Since a new order of experience calls for a new order of language, the work of a great poet is "a body of new conventions."[86] While the necessity of technical devices in the poetic form is a traditional demand, the need to realise an individual experience may render the formal tradition inadequate. Hence in cherishing new modes of perception, the poet extends the conventions of language by overcoming the limitations of the existing conventions. The two organising principles of poetic form, therefore, are metaphor and rhythm. The metaphor, in taking the burden of a new experience, may eventually break the rigours of technical tradition, or conversely, a traditional metrical mode may suggest conventional experience through stock metaphors. The critic's task is to know their "companionship" in order to realise and evaluate the experience embodied in a poem.

The specific relationship between metre and metaphor

might appear to be the import of terms like Richards' "Equilibrium" and Tate's "Tension." But Richards, as we have observed, conceives of metaphor as a neat correspondence between tenor and vehicle, so that its significance is finally in terms of a referent outside the formal context. The "equilibrium" becomes a state of relationship between metrical expression and the tenor. Metaphor is no more than an affective language and metre merely an expedient device. Tate's notion of "tension" is related primarity to the form, the linguistic artifact, and his concept of metaphor is in terms of the tenor-vehicle identity in the specific context of poetic form. This identity is not out of a deliberate search for analogy, but is the "natural feature" of metaphor that obtains integration of the object and the perception in the very process of clarifying experience. Ransom's concept of image as the object of perceiving a past experience also implies that the calling forth of a past experience is synonymous with the occurence of an image. Thus for both Ransom and Tate the figurative language is not a reference to a mental or an emotional state, but a poetic material embedded in the form.

That rhythm and metaphor are the properties of language, both Tate and Ransom agree. But the structure-texture dualism, as we have seen, is not inherent in the nature of language, for in bringing in the conceptual proposition of structure, Ransom confuses the problem of dualism by a failure to grasp it on the level of language. This failure to integrate the structural element with the linguistic aspect of form is compensated in Tate's poetics where the dualism is conceived in terms of the verbal element, between its power of signification and suggestion. Metaphor and rhythm appear unrelated to the element of "prose-argument", and thus do not account for the fullness of poetic being. The figurative language as textural element is the poem's aesthetic, but constitutes only a part of the whole poem, the other part being the "paraphrasable content." Tate overcomes this inconsistency by considering metaphor and rhythm as the active agents of poetic organisation. It is the language which involves the experience in the dialectical process of resolving the dualities, and the language of poetry being metaphorical and rhythmic or metrical, experience is embodied

in the very act of obtaining metaphors and the metre. This view is consistent with the theory of "tension", for poetic form being a "body" rather than a result of "increment", the awareness of the *body* is the awareness of experience embodied in the poem. Tate's notion of metaphor as a complete identification of tenor and vehicle springs from his theory of language as the embodiment of experience in words. This position provides to the poetic experience an identity solely as verbal articulation, so that what is stated in the poem can never be abstracted as "literal statement." Metaphor as poetic language identifies the experience and the expression, and this identification takes place by a process of organisation of all the extension and intension, the denotative and connotative meanings of words. In other words, the dualism of extension and intension is contained in the tenor-vehicle complex of the mataphor, so that the perception of dualism is in terms of metaphor, and not, as in Ransom's theory, in terms of concept and image. The question of dualism in terms of structure and texture fails to find resolution in the intrinsic value of poetic form. Despite Ransom's assertion of tenor-vehicle identity, his notion of metaphor does not integrate the structural element, "the logical core" of the poem into poetic form. The fallacy of assuming a "content" aspect makes Ransom unaware of what Cleanth Brooks means by saying : " . . . obviously the 'what' that is stated (in a poem) in stated by the metaphor, and *only by the* metaphor."[87] There is rather an implicit submission to an affective theory in Ransom's concept of metaphor as a humanised affective state, and Ransom eventually confirms this in his pleading for a "language of affections." Tate seems more consistent in this regard, for he insists that the duality is implied, in the very language of metaphor. It is in this sense that Cleanth Brooks declares, "paradox is the language appropriate to poetry,"[88] and qualifies this statement by numerous assertions about metaphor as the only language possible in poetry. Brooks' theory of the language of paradox is a compromise of the structure-texture dualism. The object of experience appears in a poem as both conceptual recognition and perceptual awareness, both as structure and texture. This dual presence leads to a paradox of meaning through mutual interaction that makes the

poem an 'ironic" statement. The poetic meaning is neither in the "tissues of irrelevance" as Ransom would have us believe, nor in the state of "equilibrium" as Richards declares, but is in the irony that emerges out of an awareness of the two levels of reality implied in the literal and the metaphorical suggestions of the medium. Tate's "tension" may be equated with Brooks' concept of poetry for both are grounded on the problem of co-existence of the denotative and connotative aspect of the verbal element. This equation can be further reinforced on the basis of their insistence on the contextual meaning. We have already observed that the notion of "tension" is quite consistent with Tate's notion of metaphor which embodies both the signification and suggestion of the linguistic medium. These antinomies are brought to a state of tension in which, through mutual interaction and contextual control, the "literal statement" is completely submerged in the poetic form. The test for the validity of a metaphor, Brooks remarks, "must be an appeal to the whole context in which it occurs : Does it contribute to the total effect or not ?"[89] Brooks thus conceives of metaphor as functioning integrally in the poem, and thinks of the meaning of a poem as emerging solely from the centextual operations of the metaphorical language. Like Tate, Brooks does not believe that the prose-meaning of a poem can be abstracted from its poetic meaning and asserts that the meaning of a poem emerges "by playing off the connotations and denotations of words against each other so as to make a total statement. . ."[90] This total statement is obtained by metaphor which is "the only means available if he is to write at all."[91] Thus Brooks escapes the inconsistency inherent in Ransom's texture-structure theory by declaring that "to try to detach the context so as to speak of it separately represents a violation of the poem"[92] and by conceiving of the poem as constituted of the language of metaphor that creates a context of meaning which is a total statement embodying the paradox inherent in the dual apprehension of the conceptual and the perceptual reality. This statement is neither scientific nor direct and straight-forward, but is ironic, for it tends to play off two levels of reality against each other without excluding any of them at the end.

CHAPTER III

The Autonomy of Form

The three movements that marked the transition from the nineteenth century to the present—Impressionism, Symbolism and Imagism—did not sustain long, though they had a pervasive influence on the poets and critics long after their collapse as distinct schools. Criticism during the modern century has taken so many diverse routes that it is dangerous to label them with any particular term or a set of terms. With the growth of a spirit of scientism mingled with an interest to systematise sociological phenomena in terms of marxism or capitalism, literary criticism has undergone many orientations in tune with the various movements of thought. John Crowe Ransom in *The New Criticism* declares that there are two specific errors which have damaged modern criticism. One is the "idea of using the psychological affective vocabulary in the hope of making literary judgements in terms of the feelings, emotions and attitudes of poems instead of in terms of their objects,"[1] and the other is to distinguish poetry in terms of moralism. Ransom dismisses both these conceptions of poetry as "an act of despair to which critics resort who cannot find for the discourse of poetry a precise differentia to remove it from the categories of science."[2]

Both Ransom and Tate have attacked the psychologistic criticism of I.A. Richards who, Ransom says "approaches poetry as a psychologist,"[3] attempting, as Tate remarks, "to rescue

poetry by attributing to it the functions of practical volition."[4] Ransom's objection to Richards' theories is two-fold : that he is a nominalist in apprehending a poem as mere reference to psychological context, and that he is a positivist who aims, to quote Tate, "to represent the total poetic experience and even the structure of poetry in one of the positivist languages—experimental psychology."[5] Vivas sums up the two objections by suggesting that "Richards in his aesthetics is a positivist committed to a subjectivistic interpretation of the aesthetic judgment and to a therapeutic, not to a cognitive, conception of the use of art."[6]

Richards' view that art induces affective states raises a few important questions. Richards ignores the presence of objects in a poem and their cognitive value in the context of poetic form and emphasises too much on the emotive and conative elements. As Ransom puts it, "To Richards, the object known in a poem . . . is preferably a mere stimulus that produces first a set of emotions, and presently a set of attitudes."[7] In denying to poetry a cognitive value and its claim of being a linguistic artifact, Richards in effect denies the objectivity of poetic form, the autonomy of the poem. The poem, in Richards' poetics, exists in the reader's or the poet's psychology as states of emotion or sets of attitudes, for the value of poetry is its ability to gratify feelings and impulses. Richards never named these feelings and impulses for the obvious difficulty that they are too many to be named. Ransom rightly objects to the use of the term "emotion" in Richards' theories, for there can be no independent purity of emotion, since "emotions are correlative of the cognitive objects."[8] Ransom believes that the specific quality of any emotion is indefinable in pure emotive terms, and "that seems to be because the distinctness that we think of as attaching to an emotion belongs really to the object towards which we have it."[9] It appears as if Richards would be satisfied with an impressionistic painter if his mood finds proper and exact transferenee to his observer. The words in the poem, in Richards' account of poetic value, do not relate to the object, but only to the psychological contexts of emotion, feeling and attitude. This nominalist bias is the basic error in Richards from *The Meaning of Meaning* to the last and the New Critics are not

far from being justified in their disapproval. Emotion may be one of the components of the poem, but to make this the exclusive justification for poetry is to provide only a partial account of the poetic object. As Arnold Berleant remarks, "To characterise the totality of an experience by its emotional component is at best to indulge in synecdoche by mistaking a part of aesthetic experience for the whole experience . . . ,"[10] a mis-conception which underlies Arthur Berndtson's book, *Art, Expression and Beauty*."[11] Berndtson, in tracing the movement of emotion from its origin in man to its embodiment in art, finally exhibits his interest in emotion rather than in art.

Richards was unduly pre-occupied with what Tate desingnates as "the fallacy of communication"[12]—a mistaken view of art of which Leo Tolstoy was a notable victim. For Tolstoy the existence of the art-object is justifiable solely in terms of its ability to transfer the emotions of the writer to the reader : "If a man is infected by the author's condition of soul, and if he feels this emotion and this union with others, then the object which has effected this is art, but if there is no such infection. . . there is not art."[13] This proposition is quite similar to Richards' thesis of the transference of affective states. These "affective" and "intentional" fallacies are the result of the "fallacy of communication" which views a poem as a telephone—link as it were. Tate remarks that "we have got a bad metaphor in the word, *Communicate*. We've got a wire here ; one fellow on one end and somebody on the other listening to it."[14] Such a consideration misses the central fact about poetry which, as Tate says, is "trying to create something real in language."[15] Despite all the uses of tools obtained from the complex discipline of behavioural and experimental psychology, Richards' view of poetry finally appears too simplistic in attempting a transparent explanation of what goes on in the poet's or the reader's mind, and rather unliterary in its gross neglect of the instrinsic worth of poetry as a form of linguistic construct.

While Richards was involved with the behavioural and experimental psychology to defend poetry, there were other critics who were following the findings of Freud and Jung to explain the phenomenon of art. F.L. Lucas, for instance, in his

book *Literature and Psychology* explains classicism and romanticism in terms of the Freudian Id and Super-ego. Maud Bodkin's *The Archetypal Patterns of Poetry* in its analysis of the poetic material as corresponding to the Jungian concepts of archetypal image and myth finally emerges as a contribution to the field of psychology rather than to literary criticism. Herbert Read asserted that a critic cannot avoid "a dependence on general psychology."[16] In as early as 1907, the American literary criticism was already showing psychologistic tendencies through the views of Elizabeth Kemper Adams whose book *The Aesthetic Experience : Its Meaning in a Functional Psychology* speaks for itself by its title. Kate Gordon's book, *Esthetic*, published in 1909, declared all aesthetic speculations as a branch of advanced psychology and proposed a view of art as expression of emotion. The New Critics have revolted against this whole tradition of psychologistic criticism for the one important reason : it has failed to consider a poem as an autonomous order of experience, a form of verbal reality.

The positivistic bias in modern criticism is not merely manifest in the psychologistic criticism with its heavy dependence on the methods and concepts of the science of psychology, but also in sociological and historical approaches to poetry that have found considerable number of adherents. Christopher Caudwell, for intance, conceives of poetry as a product of socio-economic forces and finds no error in this application of Marxian ideology to the analysis of poetry. Max Eastman's advice to the literary critic "to be an expert in some branch of psychology or sociology"[17] in order to obtain a fusion between sensibility and intelligence is a clear instance of the positivistic thinking. Edmund Wilson's pleading for an integration of science and art in the best interest of the latter seems to be the central concern of his *Axel's Castle*. Tate sums up this stance of Edmund Wilson in an article reviewing this book : "The futility of the Symbolists and our trouble in general are due to this : poetry and science are not on speaking terms. . . that a union of the poetic and the scientific principles must take place. . ." and then Tate remarks, "Mr. Wilson does not want to give up poetry, but he says that science is triumphant ; therefore let each yield a little to the other."[18] The problem with the

positivistic critics is that they are awe-struck by the advances of physical and social sciences, and would like to surrender a little of their own interest in order to secure intellectual recognition. Thus, though Richards began with a repudiation of the scientific value in relation to art, he nevertheless failed to escape the positivistic bias for fear of being inadequate in his explanation of poetic art, and he submitted himself to the naturalistic cast of psychological terms. Eliseo Vivas aptly warns that positivism "teaches that the cognitive value of literature has been replaced by the superior knowledge of man given us by the social sciences. The upshot of such positivism is the degradation of literature. . ."[19]

Thus one of the major weaknesses in modern literary criticism is to consider poetry as affective—either in terms of emotion and feeling, or in terms of socio-scientific ideals. Both these trends finally bring down a poetic construct to bear upon the psychological or sociological dispositions of the reader. The poem to them is, first of all, a consumer product to be examined of its utility before the full value of credit is given to the poet.

The moralistic critics, Ransom says, "attribute some special character to poetry which otherwise refuses to yield up to them a character. The moral interest is so much frequent in poetry than in science that they offer its moralism as differentia."[20] The view of poetry as affording moral health and ethical values is, of course, as old as Plato who said, ". . . let them (the poets and their defenders) show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit ; for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers —I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as delight."[21] This moral bias has continued to play a major part in literary criticism from its beginnings through the nineteenth century till Oscar Wilde's nonconformist blast in calling ethics and moralism as the signs of the baser forms of art.

Among the modern critics in whom the moral bias is clearly pronounced, one easily thinks of Irving Babbitt and the Neo-humanists of the American twenties. These men were of course basically concerned with philosophical ideas and speculations. But they found it necessary to fit in all human products into their philosophical framework, so that poetry too became

for them an object of study and analysis. Further, their philosophical position was a considerable influence on critics like Yvor Winters and T.S. Eliot. An explicit concern with the ethical aspect of life governs the Neo-humanist attitude towards literature. Babbitt considers *The Ancient Mariner* as inferior because it is not properly concerned with moral choices and their bearing on human happiness. Paul Elmer More criticises *Ulyses* because "spiritual authority (has been) repudiated and the only law governing the flux is the so-called assaciation of ideas.. ."[22]

The asstheticviews of the Neo-Humantists were of course seriously questioned by such critics as Rebecca West, R.P. Blackmur and Yvor Winters. Rebecca West thought that they were "like a league of the uncreative against the creative." Blackmur dismissed them saying that "either humanism is not interested in the content of literature and the problems surrounding it, or it has no experience therein."[23] The moral concern of these men led to their total neglect of poetic form, the aspects of technique and organisation. Literature for them was a kind of knowledge that proved a concept of culture. It is this lack of attention to the form that made Yvor Winters say of Babbit : ". . . his analysis of literary principles appears to me to be gravely vitiated by an almost complete ignorance of the manner in which the moral intelligence gets into poetry. Babbitt was unable to create a functioning body for his morality."[24]

Winters of course confesses his debt to Babbitt and shows a whole-hearted admiration for him. He was only trying to improve the neo-humanist position by incorporating ethical values into the structural pattern of poetry and by attempting to provide a corrective to the Humanists' obviously imperceptive views on poetry. Winters made it clear that he was all for ethical and moral significance of the "comprehensible rational content"[25] in a poem. The poet's task is to combine his moral responsibility with his craft. Ransom objects to a disproportionate devotion to moralism in Winters who "believes that the ethical interest is the only poetic interest. (If there is a poem without a visible ethical content, as a merely descriptive poem for example, I believe he thinks it negligible and off the real line of poetry."[26] In spite of Winters' belief that the moral

element is inseparable from the poetic form, his assumption that the creative act commences with a conscious moral choice of content reduces the concept of form to the deliberations of embllishment and rhetoric.

T.S. Eliot's concern with the moral and religious values in literature is too obvious in an essay like "Religion and Literature." Eliot finds it essential that the modern critics develop the habit "to scrutinise their reading, especially of works of imagination, with explicit ethical and theological standards."[27] This sense of orthodoxy largely governs and provides coherence to Eliot's critical outlook in various guises of critical terms and one easily discerns his moral pre-occuption in such ideas as tradition and impersonality. He has also attempted to see the literary and the religious as aspects of a single experience, and approvingly speaks of those critics who. . ."consider that art, specifically poetry, has something to do with religion. . ."[28] It is not difficult to see Eliot's stress on the moral and religious element in aesthetic activity inspite of his claims that poetry must be approached as poetry and not as another thing. F.R. Leavis admires D.H. Lawrence as "The greatest kind of creative writer," because in him, "The presenting sensibility and the inquiring intelligence engaged are, of course, profoundly and essentially moral. . . ."[29] For Leavis, the best poetry embodies the moral strength and ambition of the contemporary generation. The pre-occuption with the didactic in all its aspects of ethics, morality and religion has tended to neglect the typically aesthetic in poetry.

The critical principles that we have considered above have one point in common : that the value of poetry is related to an objective situation outside the formal reality of the poem—either to the psychology of the poet and the reader, or to the normative values of life in general. In the former case, the plea for objectivity is betrayed by the submission to a psychological condition which in its essence is a subjective locus. This implied subjective bias can be discerned in a more recent movement whose adherents are termed by Sarah N. Lawall as the "Critics of Consciousness."[30] These critics of the New Geneva School—Marcel Raymond, George Poulet, Jean Rousset and others—profess, on the one hand, that "the language of a literary work

is complete : it means only what it says in terms of its own system. . ." and speak, on the other hand, of poetry as subjective experession of the author, as a process of "existential awareness."[31] They do not consider single works as autonomous wholes, but look for a single voice in a series of works by the same author. They seem to believe that no poet ever writes a complete poem till he ends his career as a poet. This conflicting view which sees poetry in terms of its own system and yet as the life-long process of an "existential awareness" keeps one wonder about the aims of the New Geneva School. These critics lose sight of the art-object in their interest in the subjective process of "awareness."

The other stance of the modern critical outlook—the application of normative values of living to the study of poetry, or as Arnold would say, poetry as a means of the "application of profound ideas to life,"[32] conceives of the objectivity of art in terms of a dichotomy. For such critics, a poem has two kinds of objectivity. The one is the objectivity of content which has undergone judgment, prior to its embodiment in poetry, in terms of morality or social codes or paractical consequences. The other is the objectivity of expression obtained by the standards of communicability. John Dryden's injunction to keep to the rules of *dispositio* (arrangement of design) and *elocutio* (expression) in conveying the *inventio*, the poet's invention of material prior to the creative act, finds its variant surrogates in the modern criticism by way of distinction between content and form. The Cartesian dualism of the thought and the thing which influenced the Neo-classical theories thus continues to plague modern criticism. The Blakean subjectivism which culminates in the surrealistic fantasy of psychic automatism is a reaction to this dual standard of objectivity, and its mordern surrogate—the psychologistic crititcism—in trying to bridge the dualism has unwittingly reverted to the mystique of stimulus-response sensationalism.

Most of the theories of modern criticism have considered the poem in terms of what lies outside its form. The objectivity that has been celebrated is the objectivity of non-aesthetic norms. The New Critics are *new* in their radical departure from the fallacies of modern criticism. The poem, as Being, is

in itself an objective reality. It is a single object integrating all the components of emotion, content and expression. The prime task of the critic, therefore, is to know and let know the nature of the ontology which makes the poem an object for apprehension.

John Crowe Ransom defends obscurity in modern poetry in spite of its problems of communication, for obscure poems, in any case, aim at poetic autonomy. The poet might or might not have intended obscurity and the reader's inability to understand the poem might not be merely the result of his mental incompetence. Such speculations are the interests of the psycholoists and social scientists, but their nods of approval of disapproval do not cause, in any case, the evaporation of the objective reality of the poem. "The poem has its own existence apart from us," says Eliot, and in his introduction to the 1928 edition of *The Sacred Wood* declares that poetry is ". . .something over and above, and something quite different from, a collection of psychological data about the history of an epoch."[33]

Eliot advocated for the recognition of the autonomy of the work. But Eliot is never consistent in his defence of poetry as "autotelic." For Eliot, the value of poetry finally turns out to be a value of the moral kind. Eliot's concepts of Order and Impersonality as issuing from an awareness of tradition are primarily concepts of moral order which lead him to declare : "There is accordingly something outside of the artist to which he owes allegiance, a devotion to which he must surrender and sacrifice himself in order to earn and to obtain his unique position."[34] Thus, though Eliot would like to consider poetry as autotelic, his pre-occupation with the problems of tradition, orthodoxy and theology uneasily diverts his attention from the poem to the non-poetic realms.

Eliot attempts to justify the objectivity of art in terms of the separation between the man and the artist, "the man who suffers and the mind which creates."[35] Eliot contends that the artist escapes from his personality and emotions into a state of "unified sensibility" which is the creative mind that proceeds to "transmute the passions which are its material,"[36] into poetic concretions, the objective correlatives. Once the passions find "a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events, which

shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion,"[37] the mind withdraws and the poem assumes an objective reality. Eliot in this theory of objectivity commits a few inconsistencies. Firstly, Eliot seems to believe in the affactive value of poetry, for the "objective correlative" seems to embody emotions and what, in turn, it does is that "the emotion is immediately evoked."[38] The objects in the poem, therefore, have no cognitive validity but have the simple function of affecting emotions. Secondly, Eliot does not clearly say what he means by mind. Apparently, this seems to refer to the state of unified sensibility whose function is to organise the particular emotions into "feeling" embodied by the total poetic pattern of objective concretions. If this is taken to be true, then the mind which undertakes such an organisation and unification has to be active, and cannot be passive as a catalyst. The mind, as catalyst, may suggest, on the other hand, that it only mediates between what is already present in the poet's psychology and the verbal medium which seeks to embody this predetermined content of experience. This leads to the admission of dichotomy between content and form. Eliot's distaste for the wilderness of romantic theories leads him to *The Sacred Wood*, but with all the peregrinations, he has failed to show where lies the sacredness of the wood he has chosen to adopt.

Eliot's chief contribution to the theory of objectivity lies in his repudiation of the romantic concept of the role of personality in poetry. Any insistence on the expression of a personal identity, or on telling one's "own story", Ransom says, is a "simple but mistaken theory of art."[39] Ransom's alternative is anonymity as the basic condition of art. He dismisses Wordsworth's autobiographies as "unfortunate for the prosperity of art," on the ground that "A good poem, even if it is signed with a full and well-known name, intends as a work of art to lose the identity of the author ; that is, it means to represent him not actualized. . .but freed from his juridical self and taking an ideal or fictitious personality."[40] It is on account of this extinction of personality in poetry that the Milton of Lycidas is praised—his having assumed the fictitious personality of a Greak shepherd and thus sacrificing his identity as Milton of the scrivener's son, the master of arts from

in itself an objective reality. It is a single object integrating all the components of emotion, content and expression. The prime task of the critic, therefore, is to know and let know the nature of the ontology which makes the poem an object for apprehension.

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Cambridge etc. The poet by assuming the role of a dramatic speaker saves the poem from being subjective and personal. Thus the man is separated from the artist by the latter becoming *dramatis persona*. In this position of a dramatic identity, the speech rendered by the artist becomes the role he assumes and not what he personally experiences or the audience desires. The poem is the speech that is appropriate to the character that the poet has become as artist.

Both the Impersonality Theory of Eliot and the "Fictitious Personality" theory of Ransom emphasise on one central aspect of poetry—that a poem is constructed or formed, and not uttered as a personal outburst or compensation for desire, suffering and agony. Further both the thories imply the concept of "psychic distance" that Edward Bullough had advanced in 1912.[41] While Eliot's "objective correlative" makes the poet escape from his personal emotions into the objects organised in the art-work, Ronsom's dramatic speaker is distanced by his other-than-self response to the object of his confrontation. Both the theories thus plead for a distance between the object and the self. Bullough's approach to the notion of distance is from the stand-point of experience of the poet : "Distance. . . .is obtained by separating the object and its appeal from one's own self, by putting it out of gear with practical needs and ends. Thereby the 'contemplation' of the object becomes alone possible."[42] Ransom's theory extends this notion to bear upon the principle of poetic form. Ransom says that "when a consensus of taste lays down the ordinace that the artist shall express himself formally, the purpose is evidently to deter him from expressing himself immediately."[43] Ransom imagines the three co-ordinates of the work of art as the three points of a triangle : the artist and the object as two points at the base, and form at the apex : "The Form actually denies him the privilege of going the straight line between two points, even though this line has an exiomatic logic in its favour and is the shortest possible line."[44] The object contemplated in this manner becomes "an aesthetic object." The form thus "proposes, to guarantee the round—about of the artistic process, and the "aesthetic distance."[45] In the concept of the fictitious personality, Ransom pleads for the objectivity of poetic form in terms

of distance between the artist's personal self and the object on the one hand, and the reader's personal response and the verbal construct on the other.

When Cleanth Brooks declares that "The method of art can never be direct—is always indirect,"[46] he implies this notion of Ransom's "aesthetic distance." E.M.W. Tillyard says that "All poetry is more or less oblique ; there is no direct poetry,"[47] and finds fault with Samuel Johnson's criticism of Milton's *Lycidas* by saying that Johnson's attack springs from putting the poem in the wrong category : "Johnson assumed that *Lycidas* is what I shall call "direct" poetry or the poetry of "statement," and by such a standard he found it wanting. Actually the poem is far other than what it professes to be. Its main concern embraces vastly more than grief on the death of Edward king."[48] Tillyard thus believes that the obliquity of the poetic form arises out of the poet's assumption of distance from his personal passion. This distance is obtained by the assumption of fictitious personality—the role of the shephard. The passions by attaching themselves to the objects of a pastoral setting are "transmuted," so that the distance between "the man who suffers and the mind which creates" endows impersonality to the speech of the fictive personality and raises personal experience to the level of objective form.

Eliot's theory of impersonality and Ransom's theory of Fictitious personality are thus based on the proposition that, the poetic form is occasioned by a sense of distance which assures to it an objective status. But what complicates this apparently simple argument is the problem of finding out the point of severence between the man and the dramatic speaker, and their relationship in terms of the aesthetic product. We can consider *Lycidas* as illustrating this problem. The occasion of the poem—what urges the poet to the commencement of writing —is of course the personal grief on the death of Milton's friend. This personal grief can be expressed either directly, as "statement" in which case it may become a lyrical expression of the poet's "mood" of grief or it can be expressed obliquely by finding objective equivalents for his "mood", by detaching the self from the immediate experience and contemplating on it by assuming a fictitious personality. If it is not the expression

of experience as it affects immediately, the problem for the poet becomes the problem of choosing a dramatic role. Ransom does not clarify whether this choice is not deliberately made. Why, for instance, did Milton choose the role of a shepherd and not the role of a grave-digger? When Cleanth Brooks and Penn Warren claim that "every poem implies a speaker of the poem. . . .the poem represents the reaction of such a person,"[49] they fail to explain who this "person" is in relation to the real personality of the poet. Why does this person assume the dramatic stance in one particular way, not in any other? This question remains unsolved in the aesthetics of New Criticism. As Monore C. Beardsley says, " . . . the concept of the dramatic speaker—'persona', 'mask'—is widely used in but seldom analysed."[50]

The dramatic speaker's assumption of the particular role is induced by "the particular emotion," which for Eliot, gropes for objective equivalents, and by "sentiment," which for Ransom, is the source of aesthetic activity. The dramatic speaker becomes the personification of the artist's response to the experience. Ransom explains "sentimental attachment" with an example : " . . . a rich man declines the market-price for the village house where he originated, probably will not consider any price for it, nor does it matter how shabby the old place is, nor how impossible for his living in now."[51] The sentiment "likes to dwell on those of its private properties in which its utility never resided."[52] In this trope, the "fictitious personality" of the rich man is his response to the house in "its private propeties" while his real personality can be considered in terms of responding to the material value of the house. The former is the aesthetic interest which makes him choose a role that would best represent this interest. Milton's choice of the role of a shepherd can thus be explained as his "sentimental attachment" to his friend as a "natural" rather than a functional relationship which, groping for a situation or an event to attach to, finds the pastoral setting as most appropriate. This seems to be the most probable answer to the question of the relationship between the man and the dramatic speaker, though it still fails to say adequately if the poet's choice of direct statement, or lyrical expression, is not as legitimate as this oblique,

indirect and dramatic projection. Milton's grief, which is a pure emotion, might find its "correlative" in the "innocence" of a pastoral situation, but what remains unanswered is whether this pure emotion can also not be expressed lyrically. The New Critics would grudge to call the latter mode poetic, for poetry, as they conceive it, is primarily a cognitive discourse and not an emotional outburst. Eliot seems uncertain about this, for he has committed himself to an affective theory of the evocation of emotion, not being sure if the objective correlatives in the poem have solely this function to perform. But what one finally derives from the concept of dramatic speaker is that the choice of the role is conditioned by a subjective response to reality. Ransom's "sentimental attachment" in this sense is emotion generated by a subjective interest.

Once the choice of the role is made, what remains for the poet is the enactment of this role in the verbal medium. Enactment implies the externalization of the nature of the dramatic character, and has two essential components—'Mask' and 'costume.' Ransom brings in these two terms to reinforce his notion of fictitious personality. In a poem, the 'mask' is the metre which releases the aesthetic role,[53] as in drama it provides a distinctive appearance. In terms of Ransom's trope, the "sentimental attachment" is not realised until the rich man gives up his real personality and wears the 'mask' of a native inhabitant of his village house. This gives him the distinctive appearance, agreeable with the role, the particular kind of attachment he has for the house. The function of 'costume' is to give "form to the aesthetic activity. . .It binds the play of sensibility to the playing of a character part, and unifies it by dramatic propriety."[54] 'Costume,' in terms of Ransom's trope, is what the rich man considers proper in terms of the sentimental attachment—not to sell the house, but to respect "the private properties" of the house, realisable through the mask of a native inhabitant. In putting together the notions of fictitious personality, mask and costume, we can sum up Ransom's concept of aesthetic distance as this : the poet responds to a situation which generates an attachment, an emotion, and detaches him from his self which tends to respond in the rational way, or with a utilitarian motive. What is detached from this self is the aesthe-

tic attitude, the fictitious personality. But this attitude is not realised till it finds the appropriate mask, the distinctiveness from other attitudes concerning the rational and the utilitarian. In poetry, this distinction resides in the metre But the mask is not enough to provide proper identity of the personality, for with the mask of, say, a medieval knight, it would be incongruous to put on the costume of a swim-suit. The "costume" thus provides propriety to the character in its particular role. In the context of poetry, the metre is not enough to identify the attitude. The attitude must obtain articulation in a form proper to it. The dramatic speaker's utterance is not a free outburst of emotions, but is controlled by such factors as metre and a sense of formal propriety. It is in this sense that Ransom says, "Drama is a good symbol for poetry. . .it maintains faithfully certain features. . .If a poem is not a drama proper, it may be said to be a dramatic monologue. This is the literary type, in an accurate yet flexible sense, whose pattern or outline can be made out in objective poems."[55]

Another way in which the problem of poetic objectivity can be examined in the poetics of New Criticism is in relation to the concept of tradition. The word "tradition" may be taken to mean variously as the imposition of the past on the present, as a continuity of values, as a transmission of identity in the perspective of a temporal flux, or as Orthodoxy providing a centre of reference for evaluation of human action and experience. T.S. Eliot's concept of tradition is a fusion of all these meanings. Eliot believes that the appreciation of a poet "is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone : you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead. . ."[56] The value of a poet's work depends on the degree of his correspondence to the tradition as cultural continuity, for "A common inheritence and a common cause unite artists consciously or unconsciously"[57] so that the poet in his conformity to the tradition preserves this inheritence by interpreting it in contemporary language, and becomes its agent of further continuity. Tradition therefore is not so much of a literary concept as a concept of the larger cultural situation, "something outside of the artist to which he owes allegiance."[58] This is to suggest that the poet, before embarking on the creative

project, is already equipped with a mental frame through which he indentifies his attitudes or emotions as relevant or otherwise. The experience gets identified in the perspective of a temporal flux that contributes to the smooth movement of cultural values in time. This historical sense of the creative artist is what makes a poem both dated and timeless, a point of intersection between the time and the timeless—a theme so very recurrent in Eliot both as critic and poet. Rene Wellek speaks of the tradition that Eliot has used in his own poetry as a fusion of "the bright visual imagination of Dante, the living speech of the later Shakespeare, of Donne and Dryden, the dramatic lyricism of Donne, Browning and Pound, the wit and unified sensibility of the metaphysical poets, the irony of Laforgue, the impersonality of Mallarme and Valery."[59] Wellek shows that what tradition meant for Eliot the poet was ultimately the one that handed down the best of poetic techniques. Poetry in this respect shows the presentness of the past and the pastness of the present. It becomes a part of a literary continuum. In "The Function of Criticism," Eliot remarks that the sense of tradition to which he referred was "generally a problem of order."[60] Tradition, in this sense becomes what Ransom calls a "technique of restraint,"[61] or what to Eliot appears as "simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history."[62] But the essential difference between Ransom and Eliot is that Eliot's poet is a historian who knows a special technique of organising the data, but Ransom's poet is a person who possesses a unique experience that needs a form to be known, the form that is apprehended through tradition which "should mean simply the source from which the form most easily comes. Tradition is the handing down of a thing by the society, and the thing handed down is just a formula, a form."[63] The formula or the form that tradition provides is, for Ransom, no more than a technique of restraint which in terms of his dramatic theory is the "costume," the propriety with which an experience is constructed as an artifact. Ransom divides the traditional forms into two broad categories: the economic-forms or the work-forms which are "recipes of maximum efficiency. . .to the attainments of natural satisfactions and com-

forts," and the aesthetic forms which are "a technique of restraint, not of efficiency."[64] The aesthetic formula of tradition restrains the natural man from utilitarian interests and is reflected in the spheres of poetry, manners and religion. Thus the social code restrains a man from approaching a woman with immediate instinct of lust by his taking recourse to the traditional form of romance. In religion. rituals on the occasion of death mitigate the sense of grief through a form of pageantry. That is to say, the private instincts and responses are transformed into aesthetic perceptions through "forms" that tradition has handed down. They are severed of their crude and practical consequences by the objectivity of form. Eliot's way of appreciating tradition as "a method or an abrtract hierarchy"[65] is a historical method which, as Allen Tate says, degenerates into "monistic naturalism"[66] and a scholar of this kind "cannot discern the objectivity of the forms of literature ; he can only apply to literature certain abstractions."[67] The monistic naturalism has the danger of freezing certain values in the flux of time. But values, as Tate remarks, should be seen "in constantly changing relations and perspectives."[68] What is central to the concept of tradition in the poetics of Ransom and Tate is the "technique of restraint" that helps to clarify experience by "elevating (it) to the objectivity of form."[69]

Tate asserts that "As literary critics, we must first of all decide in what respect the literary work has a specific objectivity. If we deny its specific objectivity then not only is criticism impossible but literature also."[70] Tate further makes it clear that the concept of objectivity implies basically a concern with form : ". . . the formal qualities of a poem are the focus of the specifically critical judgement. . ."[71] In other words, nothing that is relevant to art is outside its form.

The Aesthetic Norm

The aesthetic attitude is distinguished from the non-aesthetic by its non-utilitarian stance in which there is no desire for possession and use, and no motive for action and gratification of desire. The notion of non-utility envisages a sense of exploring the object's being in a state of contemplation. The aesthetic attitude is characterised by a state of desirelessness that stops action and generates contemplation. The non-aesthetic and the aesthetic attitudes therefore can be comprehended in terms of the two polarities: desire and action, desirelessness and contemplation.

The attitude towards use leads to the object being apprehended in terms of an a priori concept. In the realm of poetry these concepts generally belong to the categories of emotional satisfaction or moral and social values. In such an attitude which tends towards a rational application of a pre-determined concept to the object of study, the object finally presents itself as a conceptual abstract evoking a pragmatic interest. The object appears valuable through its operational role in the continuity of action or in the improvement of life. The meaning is not perceived as present immanently in the object, but is conceived in relation to other frameworks of meaning and conceptual reality. The non-aesthetic is governed by the faculty

of reason whose function is to reduce the object's being to an abstraction of features agreeing with the concept of its class. This faculty ignores the individuality of the object, its own peculiar context and its particular identity in this context.

The aesthetic attitude, on the other hand, is obtained by the faculty of sensibility. The exercise of sensibility produces the aesthetic interest in which "we neither desire the world nor pretend to control it."[1] Ransom conceives of sensibility as the faculty that stops action and releases a state of contemplation : "In order to be human, we have to have somthing which will stop action, and this something cannot be possibly reason in its narrow sense. I would call it sensibility."[2] This faculty leads to the kind of experience, which, as T.S. Eliot suggests, is an "essential quality of transmuting idease into sensations, of transforming an observation into a state of mind."[3] The aesthetic attitude has the human advantage of transmuting and transforming. While the pragmatic interest changes sensations to ideas, the aesthetic interest is able to change ideas to sensations. This is the most fundamental element of an aesthetic attitude. Eliot differentiates between two kinds of feeling : the vague and the precise. The vague feelings are chaotic and inarticulate while the precise feelings are definite and articulate. The "state of mind", in transmuting sensations or observations or vague feeling, makes feeling precise and concretely perceptible. Sensibility leads to a state of mind which can best be called "innocence",[4] a state in which there is only an interest to know the object for "its own sake and conceive it as having its own existence."[5] Innocence is not related to feeling, but to knowledge without desire. Eliseo Vivas calls this state of innocence "rapt attention" which "involves the intransitive apprehension of object's immanent meanings."[6]

Thus the attitude that leads to aesthetic experience can be summed up in terms of New Critical aesthetics as a state of innocence induced by sensibility and can be contrasted with other experiences in terms of an absence of a utilitarian motive. Kant speaks of this attitude as "the only one that is disinterested and free"[7] and characterises aesthetic experience as "how we estimate it (the object) in mere contemplation. . .,"[8] as opposed to a conceptual apprehension : "If we estimate objects

merely by conceptions, all idea of beauty is lost."[9] Schopenheur too speaks of the aesthetic attitude as being possessed by a man who "raised by the power of the mind" does not allow abstract thought, "the concepts of the reason, to take possession of his consciousness, but instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object actually present. . ."[10] To both these philosophers, the New Critics seem to owe their concept of aesthetic experience. Vivas proposes a very much similar definition of aesthetic experience when he says, "An aesthetic experience is an experience of rapt attention which involves the intransitive apprehension of an object's immanent meanings in their full presentational immediacy."[11]

The aesthetic experience is the result of interaction between the state of mind that is desireless and the object of contemplation. The totality of the relationships between the object contemplated and the mind that contemplates is absolute in the sense that beyond the interaction nothing else is permitted to enter. In its status of being an absolute experience, it becomes distinct from other kinds of experience, the mystical, the moral and the social. The mystical experience is a state of identification between the subject and the object, when there ceases a relationship, a betweenness, and the subject-object interaction becomes a transcendent mystique of the supra-real consciousness, where the object loses its reality of existence and the subject its *human* identity. Schopenheur suffers from this confusion of categories in saying that in aesthetic experience, there is a dissolution of Will, a complete merging of the subject into the object which leads to a supra-sensible apprehension of pure Idea. Schopenheur's inability to distinguish between the aesthetic and the mystical experiences is reflected in all theories of art that speak of Intuition as the source of creative act. When Croce declares that all art is intuition and imagination, he means what Theodor Lipps in 1903 termed as "Empathy" defining it as a condition in which "the distinction between the self and and the object disappears or rather does not exist."[12] Croce's position can best be summed up in the words of Walter Pater : "all beauty is in the long run. . . .the finer accommodation of

speech to that vision within. . . ."[13] Collingwood sums up this position when he says, "The aesthetic activity is an act of imagination ; and imagination creates its own object. . . .to look imaginatively at objects (is that) which exist solely in our own imagination."[14] Collingwood defines his own concept of aesthetic experience as "an experience of utter union with the object."[15] Thus what Croce calls "Intuition" or Collingwood means by "Imagination" is an experience which is purely private and subjective having no necessary relation to the objective reality. The experience that these critics speak of is absolute but the apprehension of this absoluteness is not tangible and sensible and therefore can be called mystical. What is not apprehended through intellect or the senses is the "Pure Idea" of Schopenheur that seeks expression, even though in its ultimate sense it remains inexpressible. The moral and social experiences, of course, are too obviously different from the aesthetic. In fact, the former ones are in reality judgments and not experiences. They comprehend the subject-object relationships in terms of a pre-determined scale of judgment.

The aesthetic experience is absolute because the complex of relationships between an object and the subject obtains through an interaction of only two defined entities. Nothing enters into this context nor can anything be taken out of it without disturbing the complex. Thus aesthetic experience is an absolute of inter-relationships within a particular context ; its context is "given," that is, outside this context, the experience has no meaning. Ransom speaks of this absolute inter-relatedness as "a feeling of communion or *rapport* with the environment,"[16] corroborating Tate's view of" the work of literature as a participation in communion."[17] While mystical experience is apprehended as complete identification between the subject and the object, or as purely subjective without any necessary relation to the objective reality, and while moral and other kinds of experiences are a mode of judgement in terms of external reference, the aesthetic experience is a relationship between the subject and the object in total indifference to the transcendental values and utilitarian effects.

This self-contained system of relationships, the aesthetic experience which is autonomous by the very reason of its

particularity of context, is obtained through a state of innocence, or what Kant calls "calm contemplation."[18] Through this state of mind, what is obtained is not "a sensation, as that in the pleasant does, nor yet. . . .a definite conception as does, that in the good. . . .The beautiful in nature belongs to the form of a thing, which consists in having boundaries."[19] Kant here speaks of the beautiful, the aesthetic, as related to the object in reality and differentiates this from the sublime : ". . . .a thing is sublime, if the mere power of thinking it is evidence of a mental power surpassing all standards of sense. . . ."[20] Kant thus seems to dismiss the Crocean notion of intuition. Intuition may be an innocent state in the sense that it is exclusive of what Croce calls "logical knowledge," but this kind of innocence is, as Ransom declares, "infantile."[21] The aesthetic attitude does not shut a man from the experience of objective reality, but rather strives to achieve a relationship of the mind with the object of contemplation. The structure of relationships obtained through contemplation is the vision of "reality refracted through human responses,"[22] as Cleanth Brooks puts it. The term 'refraction" suggests the complexity arising out of the interaction between the object of reality and the medium into which this object is submitted. The objective reality, in being involved with the state of mind in "rapt attention" obtains a different identity as suggested by the 'refraction' metaphor. This identity of the real is the aesthetic experience of reality and the embodiment of this refractory world is the poetic form.

The mark of aesthetic experience, Ransom declares, "is its desirelessness—this is the character in which authorities like Kant and Schopenheur have celebrated it."[23] Thus, as Ransom confesses, the New Critics go back to Immanuel Kant who distinguishes between the *purposiveness* of a particular whole and the *purpose* which it serves. Kant maintains that "An object of experience may be viewed as purposive only relatively to the subject that is conscious of it, in other words, the idea that it is purposive may rest upon the mere harmony of the form of the object with our faculty of knowledge, a form which is directly *apprehended* without the intermediation of any conception."[24] The apprehension of this purposiveness is, according to Kant, the proper realm of aesthetic experience. Kant defines purpose:

as "the conception of an end,"[25] whose examination is the function of teleological judgment. Beauty in Kantian aesthetics is "the form of purposiveness in an object in so far as it is perceived apart from the presentation of a purpose."[26] Pleasure or pain or any instrumental value, for that matter, "does not enter as an ingredient into knowledge at all, for it contributes nothing to the knowledge of an object, though it may be the result of that knowledge."[27] Kant's notion of purpose relates itself to the notion of determinate concepts which emerge from the faculties of reason. In aesthetic judgment, what matters is the purposiveness, "the harmony of the form." Reason leads to desire for effect, while beauty pertains to desirelessness, purposiveness without purpose.

The Kantian position, in its essential features, is reflected in the view of Arthur Schopenheur though it must be remembered that there is a wide difference between his and Kant's philosophical temperaments. Carritt sums up this temperamental difference : "Kant had been by nature or training pious or rationalistically dogmatic . . . Schopenheur was by temperament pessimistic and sceptical, with the imaginative impulse to personify abstraction."[28] But despite this difference, their views on aesthetic value seem to approximate each other to a remarkable extent. Schopenheur conceives of aesthetic experience in man as that which "does allow abstract thought, the concepts of the reason, to take possession of his consciousness, but, instead of all this, gives the whole power of his mind to perception . . ."[29] Schopenheur relates this Kantian distinction between conception and perception to his own philosophical concepts of the *Will* and the *Idea*. The *Will*, in his view, leads to the instinctual tendency to live, and realises itself in the various grades of phenomenal being. Schopenheur maintains, "So long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with their constant hopes and fears,"[30] we are submitting ourselves to a process of lust and satiety. Objects attended to in terms of the "motives of willing" lead to "the abstract conception of the thing"[31] pressed towards adaptation for use. In contra-distinction to this motive, there is the pure, will-less perception, "of observation that in every sense is wholly disinterested, as sensuous contemplation, strictly so

called, is."[32] In this disinterested disposition, Schopenheur's "man of genius" attains the knowledge of the Idea, relates himself "to the pure subject of will-less knowledge."[33] In this state of "the predominance of knowing over willing," what emerges is the "world as idea . . . and the world as will has disappeared . . . "[34] Schopenheur's agreement with the Kantian view is in his insistence on the value of aesthetic experience as purged of the sense of desire and utility, as disinterested and contemplative. Schopenheur's concept of value then strays into the domain of ascetic ideals and mysticism : "In the aesthetical mode of contemplation we have found two inseparable constituent parts—the knowledge of the object, not as individual thing but as Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of this whole species of things ; and the self-consciousness of the knowing person, not as individual, but as pure, will-less subject of knowledge,"[35] and then Schopenheur takes us to the mystical situation of subject-object identification, to the level of transcendence where objective reality loses meaning. Ransom's acknowledgement to Schopenheur's ideas therefore is only in respect of one aspect—the desirelessness implict in the value of aesthetic experience.

The two-fold distinction in relation to man's attitude towards the world of reality finds in the aesthetics of New Criticism an expedient polarisation in the extremes of science and poetry, springing chiefly from the milieu of predominant scientism which necessitated a defence of poetry more vigorously than was ever needed in the past. The basis of defence was obviously to be in terms of distinguishing the two areas of science and poetry as pertaining to two levels of experience, value and cognition.

Science, Ransom maintains, has the tendency to abstract concepts from the experience of an object, and to know the object in terms of formulas or finite propositions. Thus "a chemical formula, say NaCl, is a definition with a convenient and specific yet a limited and finite meaning."[36] This generalised concept fails to apprehend the rich details that are involved in the process of the molecules forming into NaCl. Similarly a ballistic table tells us the path a bullet might take when fired from a rifle. But "under what skies, we wonder, over what con-

formations of landscape; towards the heart of a person having what personality ?"[37] Ransom is full of such examples to illustrate the limitations of scientific generalisation. The scientist, as Schopenheur might say, "in all that is presented to him hastily seeks merely the concept under which it is to be brought."[38] Ransom asserts that poetry, unlike science, provides the knowledge of the particular with all the details of context. Ransom conceives of the uniqueness of aesthetic experience as the perception of the rich context in which an object in known as a totality, the perception of contingent details that discloses the whole. "You can define man," Ransom says, "but not Socrates. Your definition of Man is peculiarly finite, handy and intelligible, but it is not Socrates."[39] Science "would like to enforce an arbitrary simplification upon us, rather than to recognise a complication which exists,"[40] so that the world comes to us "reduced, emasculated and docile."[41] The poetic apprehension of the world is, as Allen Tate remarks, the "ability to look into a specific experience, and to recreate it in such a way that its meaning is nowhere distinct from its specific quality."[42] Tate declares that "the integral character of the work of art forever resists practical formulation . . . whereas the half-statement of science arrests our attention at those features of the whole that may be put to the service of the practical will."[43] Tate views aesthetic value in terms of the specific and the particular, the totality of experience and comprehends this view into the single phrase that distinguishes a poem : "concrete whole."[44] There are numberless assertions in both Tate and Ransom to claim for poerty a distinct category of value and knowledge. Poetry constitutes, for Ransom, "a revolutionary departure from the convention of logical discourse," Poetry "is a kind of knowledge which is radically or ontologically different," a form of discourse, "an order of existence, a grade of objectivity, which cannot be treated in a scientific discourse."[45] In fact, the New Critics make radical assertions to suggest the two-fold distinction of the aesthetic activity proposed by Kant and Schopenheur : that art is not a conceptual experience, but a perceptual and contemplative one, and that the value of art lies, not in finite generalities, but in the knowledge of the contingent.

The relationship between art and reality has been variously

viewed in terms of photographic apprehension of reality, or analogy, or correspondence with reality. The problem of relationship between the reality of the world and the object of art was of course proposed by Aristotle for whom art was an imitation. But Aristotle was not sure of the implications of the mimetic view, and Ransom sees the reason for this inadequacy of the Aristotelian concept as a historical limitation. The Greeks of his time were not, Ransom says, "quite advanced in their linguistic," and "were not provided with a technical vocabulary with which to philosophise." "Consequently, Ransom feels, "you could never be sure at first sight just how philosophically some term was being applied."[46] This uncertainty about the exact meaning of imitation led to various misinterpretations. The Realists believed that "the artist is the man who makes an imitation because it is portable and inexpensive ; he can manage with it when he cannot have access to the original."[47] This notion of mimesis, in the Greek context, is not at all credible, for the Greek plays were produced under severe restrictions of form and stagecraft, and could never be the "undisguised" imitations of reality. The Platonic idealists and moralists, on the other hand, consider imitation as "the communication of ideas ; of ideas and ideality in general, or of those special ideas which have regulative or moral value in the determination of the persons who will receive them."[48]

Ransom proposes a concept of imitation consistent with the aesthetic value of the particular and the nonutilitarian. A painter, to cite Ransom's example, may enjoy a landscape by standing at the window instead of attempting to see it in his painting. Yet the artist in him is "impelled to paint the imitation of it on canvas in preference to the window as the occasion of his aesthetic experience."[49] This implies that the painting appears to him in some sense superior to the original. Ransom explains this strange sense as issuing from the non-utilitarian attitude : "An imitation is better than its original in one thing only : not being actual, it cannot be used, it can only be known. Art exists for knowledge, but nature is an object both to knowledge and to use; the later disposition of nature includes that knowledge of it which is peculiarly scientific, and sometimes it is so imperious as to pre-empt all possibility of the former."[50] The idea of

apprehending nature for pragmatic purposes, whether it is to illustrate a number of universal laws, or for the purpose of reducing them to human prediction and control, puts it "in fact into laboratories . . .stripping off as much particularity as human wit could devise."[51] Ransom puts this attitude in contra-distinction to the mimetic principle by which the artist "interests himself entirely in individuals, or he should : if he does not really, he should declare himself a scientist or a moralist."[52]

Ransom discriminates between two ways of transcribing nature. One is the way of science, "by the graphs or formulas that record the universal relations," and the other "is the one which makes imitations or full representations of nature, and these are the works of art."[53] The scientific formulations of nature tend to reduce reality to the "class concept" while the artistic imitation wants to realise reality by recording "an infinite degree of particularity."[54] Both science and poetry are modes of formal cognition, but what is different in their formal elements is what distinguishes the two in terms of their aim. Since all knowledge is ultimately a kind of ordering of experience, poetry too possesses an order, and in thinking about the cognitive value of poetry, we cannot escape bringing in the formal element which provides to it the order and the coherence that are the marks of knowledge of any kind. The consideration of form in aesthetic judgment is particularly relevant in the context of Kant's injunction that the value of art is primarily in its harmony of form. But the knowledge that poetry affords is knowledge for its own sake with no instrumental purposes. "Purpose" is outside the field of aesthetic judgment. It is a teleological question, while 'purposiveness,' knowledge without desire, is the proper realm of aesthetic judgment. This knowledge of the aesthetic kind is not in what might be called the "prose aspect" of the poem or in its content, as has been held by the moralistic critics, for whom "form" is embellishment, "Nature to advantage dress'd." To say that poetry provides knowledge is also to repudiate the psychological orientation which considers the poem as an affective and not a cognitive discourse. Aristotle in his *Poetics* suggests that poetry satisfies both our appetite for imitation and our appetite for harmony and thus implies that the former is not separable from the latter, from the form.

Wimsatt echoes this view more neatly when he says that form "embraces and penetrates 'message' in a way that constitutes a deeper and more substantial meaning than either abstract message or separable ornament . . . The poetic dimension is just that dramatically unified meaning which is coterminous with form."[55]

Since the problem of knowledge is fundamentally a problem of order, what can be assumed is that the poetic form is a coherent order and the aesthetic knowledge is the knowledge of this coherence in terms of which experience is realised. The poetic form itself begets the knowledge as a way of achieving an order of relationships, and the critic attempting to define aesthetic cognition, according to Cleanth Brooks, "finds himself talking less about the correspondence of the poem to reality than about the coherence among the parts of the poem,"[56] or as Eliot remarks, the critic's task lies in the "recognition of the truth that not our feelings but the pattern which we make of our feelings is the centre of value."[57] But to talk about correspondence is no less a necessity if we accept that the experience is outside the poetic form as long as it is not articulated, and that this experience seeks to clarify itself coherently in the medium. The notion of correspondence is implicit in this position, for obviously the poetic form is what it is in its attempt to correspond to the experience. Cleanth Brooks is aware of this crucial problem, for he says, "The verbal construct that is the poem is then at some level a simulacrum of the world of reality—necessarily so since it is formed out of words and in accordance with the laws of the mind. It is a portion of reality as viewed and valued by a human being."[58] Form thus has definite implications in terms of reality, and as Brooks puts it, "Poetry is distinctly man-centred in that it represents experience seen in the perspective of human values,"[59] thus echoing Ransom's definition of sensibility as basically a human faculty. Brooks is aware that the correspondance between poetry and reality is realisable only in terms of form so that reality as it obtains in poetry is not detachable from the poem itself: "But the correspondence to reality that a poem achieves is mediated through its special kind of structure."[60]

Cleanth Brooks in his attempt to bridge the gap between reality and poetic form eventually says that the reality, the poet grapples with, is the one that emerges "through a perspective of valuing," and that the correspondence between reality and the poem gets assimilated into the "dramatic organisation" of poetic form, so that the poem discloses a "truth of coherence" which "depends upon our belief in the plausibility of certain human actions and reactions, responses and valuations."[61]

Brooks ultimately resolves the problem of correspondence by a special variety of the concept of belief. This belief states that what is obtained in the coherent poem, in some way, corresponds with the human situation, or what goes on in the poem is a human probable. This echoes, on the one hand, the Aristotelian position which declares that the poet imitates objects "according to probability or necessity,"[62] and suggests, on the other hand, a renewed version of the Coleridgean doctrine of the "willing suspension of disbelief."

Brooks' view of the valuing implicit in the experience relates itself to the Aristotelian sense of probability. Belief in this case is the belief in the plausibility of new human situations. Ransom, on the other hand, seems to consider belief in terms of the poet's faith in the possibility of reconstituting the World's body. Belief in poetry is the belief in "an order of existence, a grade of objectivity, which cannot be treated in scientific discourse."[63] Poetry, Ransom tells us, "intends to recover the denser and more refractory original world which we know loosely through our perceptions and memories. By this supposition it is a kind of knowledge which is radically and ontologically different."[64] Ransom, in fact, declares that the knowledge obtained from poetry springs from a belief that poetry can give us the cognition of the world as "bodied" rather than abstracted. The poet, Ransom says, "perpetuates in his poem an order of existence which in actual life is constantly crumbling beneath his touch."[65] It is this belief that sets the aesthetic attitude to operate. The poet in contemplating an object gets into a state of innocence that is possible on account of his belief in the possibility of an order of reality unavailable in everyday actuality of experience. Thus what Brooks suggests

by his notion of human valuing as characteristic of aesthetic experience is clarified by Ransom as the recovery of the "denser and more refractory world" that we fail to perceive when we cease to be human, i.e., when there is no play of sensibility. The belief in this level of reality makes the knowledge of this reality possible in poetry. Tate, too, in his distinction of poetry as providing "complete knowledge, the full body of the experience it offers"[66] takes the same position by implying that the poet possesses a belief in the possibilities of the fullness of experience. What both Ransom and Tate maintain in their notions of belief in poetry is that, the aesthetic attitude is shaped by an implied faith that reality can be comprehended in all its fullness consisting of the contingent details and the rich context. Implicit in this belief is also a disbelief in the scientific attitude which lacks the apprehension of this fullness on account of what to Ransom appears as a sense of puritanism, which " . . . craves to perfect the parts of experience, separately or in their purity, and in a series of isolated perfections."[67] It is this belief in the aesthetic experience as unique and "ontologically distinct" that releases the attitude of contemplation to obtain the knowledge of this experience.

The New Critical position that poetry provides a knowledge of "an order of existence" is in direct contradiction to Richards' notion of "pseudo-statement" in poetry. The New Critics hold that poetry is a statement of experience in a way that does not admit of any alternative modes of expression. The statement of experience is the coherence of images in the poem itself, so that this experience is no more what it is if the particular coherence is dislodged of any of its components. To Richards, poetry is not what the poem is. The poem is a "pseudo—statement" which for Richards "is a form of words which is justified entirely by its effects in releasing and organising our impulses and attitudes."[68] What makes the statement in the poem acceptable is its ability to effect upon the psychological states. Words in the poem do not refer to the experience but to the psychological contexts, so that the poem is not an "experienced order"[69] as Tate would say, but a psychological tool. When Richards says that no "definite state of belief" is necessary for the full comprehension of the poem, he seems

to disregard the presence of belief as understood in terms of religion and other normative disciplines. Richards is concerned with the problem of belief primarily as related to communication and asserts that the readers need not have a belief in order to appreciate the value of the poem, and considers "doctrinal dissent . . . a very serious obstacle"[70] to the full reading of poetry. He distinguishes between the "Intellectual Belief" and the "Emotional Belief."[71] While the role of the Intellectual belief is "to bring all our ideas into as perfect and ordered system as possible," the Emotional belief can be justified only by "its success in meeting our needs'[72] and it has nothing to quarrel with whatever we disbelieve intellectually. The function of the Emotional belief is to create "a pattern of response . . . and it is this pattern rather than the revelation which is important."[73] In this respect, Ransom and Tate would agree with Richards. Tate says that in poetry, "a statement remains experienced, and thus significant and comprehensible, whether it be true or false."[74] Ransom suggests that the aim of poetry being the reconstitution of the world of reality, what is needed in evaluating the poem is to find its degree of success in the ordering of that reality into the poetic form, for "poetry is the kind of knowledge by which we must know what have arranged that we shall not know otherwise."[75] What the reader requires is not a doctrine of belief, but a sensitiveness to comprehend the truth of coherence obtained out of the structural interrelationships in the poem itself. Richards' alternative to the doctrinal approach is in terms of affective satisfaction, while both Ransom and Tate propose a cognition of coherent order as an alternative to the doctrinal approach. The "pattern of response" that Richards refers to consists of neural units so that the poem is just a referential statement. The order that the New Critics conceive of has images as its constituents, and images are, as Ransom declares, "perceptions and perceptions are assertions ; perceptions are as true and as false as propositions."[76] To Ransom and his school, the poetic form is thus a pattern of perceptions which possesses meaning, for it conducts a cognitive discourse which asserts a "a valid world-view, a realistic ontology."[77] The notions of Intellectual and Emotional beliefs are irrelevant

to the consideration of poetic meaning, because the poetic form is neither an intellectual ordering nor does it aim at an emotional gratification but "is a context made of images."[78] If the perceptions are contextually relevant, they are true and the "truth of coherence" is the truth of perceptual reality embodied in the poem. The creative process of obtaining the completed poem is not, as Richards would have us believe, a process of building up an emotional state, but is rather a process of *knowing* an order of reality. Thus to deny "Intellectual belief" in poetry is not to deny the knowledge and value intrinsic in the form. Belief in the aesthetic norms of reality and order yields a kind of knowledge "which the scientist as scientist can scarcely understand . . ."[79] for it is obtained through the play of sensibility by which "we are able to contemplate things as they are in their rich and contingent materiality."[80]

What finally emerges as the New Critical concepts of belief, knowledge and poetic form as mutually related is this : that the poetic belief is the belief in the power of poetry to reconstitute reality as a fresh order of existence ; the poetic knowledge is the knowledge of a reconstituted reality ; the poetic form is the order which alone discloses this reconstitution. The total activity of aesthetic ordering has correspondence with reality in terms of the human faculty of bestowing on it a value by an ordering of its materials in a way which is different from the order it obtains in its actuality of existence. Since this order is known through the coherence of poetic form, which, as Wimsatt remarks, "generates an extra dimension of correspondence to reality,"[81] the knowledge of this coherence is itself the knowledge of the reconstituted reality. The function of art, as Eliot says, is "in imposing a credible order upon ordinary reality and thereby eliciting some perception of order *in* reality . . .,"[82] and aesthetic knowledge is the perception of this new order experienced by the contemplative mind as a unique system of interrelationships.

We have observed that the aesthetic attitude is marked by a quality of desirelessness achieved through the psychic distance of the mind from the object of contemplation which inhibits instinctual response and releases aesthetic sensibility. Further,

the aesthetic attitude is embedded in the poetic form as a "fictitious personality" whose character is determined by sentiment and sensibility both of which are *human* as contrasted with the scientific and the utilitarian. When Cleanth Brooks asserts that "Poetry is man-centred in a very special way,"[83] he seems to consider this "special way" in terms of the non-utilitarian stance obtained by the "mask" which deters the animal instinct from domination and is thus opposed to what Ransom calls "the primary man."[84] Such terms as contemplation, attention and innocence, which, compounded with sentiment and sensibility, account for the identity of aesthetic experience, refer to what Tate calls "the serenity of temper"[85] and get obviously associated with a state of meditation. Ransom identifies the aesthetic attitude of calm contemplation in terms of a mask which, to use his own terms, indicates the "antithetical man" as opposed to the "natural man."[86] What is obtained through meditation is not intuitive knowledge, as Croce seems to believe, but aesthetic knowledge constituting a reality refracted through human responses. Intuitive knowledge is obtained by striving after the articulation of a pre-conscious reality while aesthetic knowledge is obtained by articulating the objective reality in its process of *refraction* through the contemplative mind. The human interest determines the form which embodies the experience and it is this interest which becomes the definitive element of aesthetic attitude, experience, and knowledge. In the apprehension of the aesthetic problems, the human element must become the central concern of critic.

Since the human element springs from the subjective core of sentiment, its articulation in the aesthetic artifact is bound to reflect the dramatic speaker's "point of view". That is to say, the determination of the aesthetic quality is related to the artist's quality of mind. Poetry, in this sense, seems to be prefigured in the personality, for in striking an attitude, the personality of the poet cannot escape its involvement. Here is thus a strange paradox—the prefiguration of the aesthetic attitude in the subjective consititution and the articulate form that is objective—which the New Critics have struggled hard to resolve. In one sense, despite its having a subjective locus, the

sentiment can be considered objective, for it is primarily a human aspect, and the "point of view" governed by it implies a valuing of experience in human terms which are universal norms. Granting that the aesthetic attitude is pre-figured in the artist's personality, it is nevertheless true that the "sentimental attachment" is also a *human* attachment, and that in spite of the involvement of personality, this attachment implies an objective validity by virtue of its being human. In terms of the "mask" metaphor, we can say that though a particular mask is a matter of subjective choice, the mask itself possesses objectivity and acceptability as signifying a credible human identity. Thus the "point of view" may have its origin in the subjective constitution of the artist's mind, but it becomes universally valid by virtue of its credibility. The value of poetry, therefore, lies in its apprehension, as Cleanth Brooks declares, of "experience seen in the perspective of human valuing,"[87] and depends on an implicit trust on 'the plausibility of certain human actions and reactions, responses and valuations."[88]

Ransom's notion of the *human* is in terms of the faculty of sensibility which stops action and is thus opposed to the pragmatic interest. Cleanth Brooks thinks of the human element in poetry in terms of the valuing of reality : "The poem . . . is a portion of reality as viewed and valued by a human being."[89] Brooks conceives of human element in poetry in terms of the ordering of experience. Allen Tate asserts that the mark of genuine poetry is to provide a knowledge of ourselves in the form of an "experienced order" of which "man alone is capable."[90] The New Critics thus seem to identify aesthetic quality with human situation, and the term *human* is used by them to suggest that *what is aesthetic is fundamentally human.* But what is baffling is that the term "human" has a wide range of implications beginning from instinct and ending with the highest spiritual awareness. Of course, the instinctual aspect is easily eliminated by the very definition of aesthetic attitude and is relegated to the realm of science. But apart from instinct, human responses and experiences are governed by an infinite number of forces, such as the sociological, the political, the religious, the zeitgeist. If human values are implied in aesthetic

realisation, the aesthetic value must encompass this whole complex of forces. In other words, Taine's famous triad of race, milieu and time would seem to be eminently relevant to the consideration of an aesthetic object. Eliot apparently falls into this naive conception of poetry when he declares that the unity in the works of Dante, Shakespeare and Geothe can be explained in relation to "the world seen from a particular point of view of a particular European age and a particular man of that age."[91] What redeems Eliot of the naivety of Taine's formula is the addition of a personal disposition, so that poetry becomes, for him, "the precise statement of life which is at the same time a point of view—a world which the author's mind has subjected to a process of complete simplification."[92]

Eliot's concept of the "point of view," in relation to the poetic art, is a comprehensive notion of the total perception of reality and is not limited to one's personal belief and predispositions. He conceives of objective reality in terms of historical forces, but the complex of race, milieu and time, when submitted to the contemplative mind, transforms itself into a "unity of impression,"[93] or what Eliot terms as *concentration* :

> It is a concentration, and a new thing resulting from the concentration, of a very great number of experiences which to the practical and active person would not seem to be experiences at all ; it is a concentration which does not happen consciously or of deliberation.[94]

Aesthetic experience, in other words, is shaped through an organic process which brings to a single focus all the social, historical and individual elements. The point of view is not a partial perception of reality, but a total experience which transcends space and time. The human element implied in the aesthetic experience is shaped by race, time and milieu but is transcended through "individual talent" to a concentration of reality. The human element is not an aspect of poet's belief, but a universal element striving towards aesthetic form : "That is to say, an accumulation of experiences has crystallized to form material of art, and years of work in technique have prepared an adequate medium ; and something results in which medium and material, form and content, are indistinguish-

able."[95] The material which embodies the point of view as concentration of various forces is articulated through the medium and when there is the complete act of articulation, the distinction between the point of view and the aesthetic expression ceases to exist. The "point of view" of Eliot's conception is thus not a belief, but a human awareness of reality whose aesthetic identity is the poetic form. The point of view becomes an integral constituent of the aesthetic artifact, and is comprehensible only in terms of its formal context.

Eliot does not deny to the poet a belief in the normative values, but this belief is not relevant to the apprehension of aesthetic situation, or as he himself puts it :

> I doubt whether belief proper enters into the activity of a great poet *quo* poet. That is, Dante qua poet, did not believe or disbelieve the Thomist cosmology or theory of the soul ; he merely made use of it, or a fusion took place between his emotional impulses and a theory, for the purposes of making poetry.[96]

Belief for the poet as person may have a great deal of significance, but *qua* poet, he only makes use of it as material of art. In *Knowledge and Experience*, Eliot conceived of experience as "point of view" or in F.H. Bradley's terminology, as "finite centre."[97] Eliot tried to establish that the Bradleyan theory of the "finite centre" and his own "point of view" could solve the problems of knowledge beset with such apparent distinctions as the ideal and the real, the private and the public—the problems that have confused the writings of such metaphysicians as Stout, Alexander and Lipps. Eliot saw aesthetic experience as a point of view which is a concentration of a variety of impressions, ideals and feelings.

The "concentration" might vary in relation to the quality of the poet's mind. The maturer the artist's mind, the greater will be the value of his experience, his point of view. For Eliot, the way to maturity is through traditional values, through Orthodoxy. A mature poet, of course, has more tenable beliefs than an imature poet. Eliot discards Shelley because "Shelley did not live to put his poetic gifts, which were certainly of the first order, at the service of more tenable beliefs—which need

not have been for my purposes beliefs more acceptable to me."[98] Eliot is making here a subtle distinction between what is tenable and what is acceptable belief. A tenable proposition as the material of art will eventuate in a greater coherence of poetic form. Thus, though Eliot believes in belief, he does not believe in its primacy in the aesthetic artifact nor does he feel the need for preferring one belief to another for the purposes of literary assessment. If he brings in the concept of belief into the consideration of poetry, it is only to justify that aesthetic experience and knowledge have an aspiration for a mature and sane awareness of human values.

This Eliotian concept of knowledge and experience vis-a-vis belief has gone deep into the making of the New Critical aesthetics. John Crowe Ransom, for instance, thinks of religion, social manners and poetry as aspects of a single experience-the aesthetic.[99] They are one, he contends, in relation to their concern with form. The three aspects of ritual, social manners and poetic expression belong to a single "point of view," and are comprehensible in terms of one "finite centre." Eliot's notion of experience is rather too generalised, so that he finds it necessary to specify aesthetic experience in terms of a process of transmutation. Ransom, on the other hand, is more specifically concerned with aesthetic problems, and can think of aesthetic experience in exclusive terms of a formal expression. What to Eliot appears as "concentration" is "form" to Ransom. Just as in the enactment of rituals, belief in the religion which prescribes them is not questioned, or just as in approaching a woman in the code of social manners does not need questions about her moral being, so also in the apprehension of poetic form, the material that goes into it does not require value considerations.

Ransom, of course, thinks of the problem of the acceptability of beliefs, for he says :

> If Dante's belief cannot be accepted by his reader, it is worse for Dante with that reader, not a matter of indifference as Eliot has argued. If Shelley's agrument is foolish it makes his poetry foolish . . . That consideration would enter into my preference of Dante over Shelley.[100]

But this acceptability is not, for Ransom, for the sake of

belief itself, but because sound beliefs exhibit that the mind of the artist is "substantively...better grounded, and methodologically far more consistent."[101] That is to say, sane convictions are a sign of maturity and the artist's maturity is a measure of his technical excellence or consistency of method. It is in this respect of the artist's maturity of mind and sanity of conviction that poetry becomes, for Ransom, "an advanced pattern of human behaviour in the series or hierarchy of patterns."[102] The question whether we can make a deliberate effort to put out of mind all our convictions and passionate beliefs about life when we sit down to read poetry is answered by Ransom in rather simple terms :

> It might be said that the occasion of poem is a *moral* situation. But immediately it must be added that the occasion of a poem is a moral *situation*. The moral is never to be emphasized as if the poem existed for its sake, but must stay implicit in the situation.[103]

Ransom admits that "there is ordinarily a moral composure in the poem" but, at the same time, "The poetic consideration of the ethical situation is not the same as the ethical consideration of it". It is in this sense that Ransom declares, "Art is post-ethical rather than unethical."[104] When Eliot criticises Thomas Heywood's plays as lacking the "reality of moral synthesis,"[105] he speaks of the necessary presence of what Ransom calls the "moral composure." But this moral element is not an affective value ; it rather gets assimilated into poetic form so that the poem does not speak with the voice of a teacher or a preacher. Eliot realises this, but he tends to emphasise more and more on the moral element as he develops as a critic and a man of letters so that finally he becomes uncertain about how to evaluate a given poem. Ransom, on the other hand, asserts unequivocally that the dramatic voice in the poem, witnin the context of its total utterance, is concerned primarily with the process of achieving a form, and not with the value of his utterance as a moral substance. The act of poetry is not an act of imposing the artist's belief on the reader, but is an act of realising a belief in terms of poetic concretion. The poetic act is not an act of displaying a belief, but that of rendering it into aesthetic

discourse. The knowledge that this discourse offers is the knowledge of a form which is obtained through a mature attitude capable of experiencing conceptual reality in terms of perceptual images. The value of a man's belief determines the degree of his maturity of mind which accounts for a consistency of method and a substantive ground for the organisation of responses. As an object of "unified sensibility" the aesthetic artifact becomes "the knowledge of man," as Tate remarks, "which literature offers us for human participation."[106] The human mind, in itself a complex of beliefs and historical pressures, in course of its response to the objective reality, creates an aesthetic object which is neither his beliefs nor the realities, but a synthesis of both in terms of human sensibility.

What is human interest in poetry, therefore, is the interest in the order of reality as it obtains to the man of mature sensibility. The "pattern of response" that Richards speaks of as synonym of poetic form is informed by the mind capable of "concentration." The mind participates in the process of patterning an order, not to make revelation, but to realise the perception of reality as a cognitive order. While it is true that aesthetic knowledge is the perception of a new order experienced by the contemplative mind, perception and experience attain value and "the truth of coherence," in accordance with the quality of mind that interacts with the objective reality. If the artist has any moral obligation, it is in terms of nurturing his sensibility towards a human outlook informed by the values of culture and religion. When T.S. Eliot insists on the need for a social and cultural continuum as providing the imaginative and intellectual centre to the artist, he evidently speaks of a need "to define and organise contemporary sensibility."[107] It is in this sense that Eliot considers Orthodoxy as a guiding principle and Allen Tate seeks, in an age of crisis and anxiety, "the moral and spiritual condition which is favourable to poetry."[108] When Ransom declares that "The object of a proper society is to instruct its members how to transform instinctive experience into aesthetic experience,"[109] he actually speaks of sensibility that *humanizes* the natural functions of man. Ransom speaks of Eliot's assertion, that he is in politics a roya-

list, in religion Anglo-catholic, in literature classical, as "how comperehensively this formula covers the kingdom of aesthetic life . . ."[110] While one's religious or political faith does not matter in the apprehension of a poem, these faiths, nevertheless, enrich the poet's mind whose perceptions find a tenable form of organisation and a mature technique of expression. In short, a refined sensibility, marked by the human attitude, provides to the aesthetic situation a sense of plausibility and credibility. What is human is ultimately what is religious, cultural and spiritual. The aesthetic attitude, is, in this sense, a human attitude shaped by beliefs. The aesthetic experience is valuable because it springs from an attitude which contemplates through the faculty of sensibility. Aesthetic knowledge is distinct in as much as it is derived from sensibility and not from reason. The aesthetic artifact is neither an expression of beliefs nor an order of normative principles, but is a new world of Being which discloses a knowledge of the human situation, or as Tate says, "the knowledge of ourselves", which is the result of the interaction between a sane mind with refined sensibility on the one hand and the world of objective reality on the other. Aesthetic situation arises when sensibility acts on reality, and sensibility is obtained when there is a perference for what is human over what is instinctual and utilitarian. When Tate speaks of the basis of creative act as "the irresistible need of the mind for absolute experience,"[111] he conceives of this absolute experience in terms of the Old South, Catholicism and poetry, and thus implies that while aesthetic experience is in itself absolute, the source or basis of this "absolute experience" is in the human concentration of values to which he owes allegiance as a man of sensibility. This allegiance makes him capable of a mature apprehension of life and things, so that he is free from what Ransom calls the "Extensive limitations" and "Intensive Limitations"[112] of science. That is to say, a sensibility that is matured by virtue of its being human is able to perceive the totality of experience and make assertions about what is beyond the visible and the sensory, so that the order of Being, that an aesthetic artifact is, becomes an order of reality that embodies the totality of relationships between the

mind and the object.

The poetic object is a self-contained, complete world of reality unavailable to the ordinary mind, and this sense of reality is brought to aesthetic focus in terms of the "finite centre" which concentrates various levels of human awareness and involvements into a single "Point of view" that provides coherence of method and sanity of attitude. Poetic belief, as an aesthetic norm, is the belief in this transcendent order of Being, founded on the conviction that such an order is possible in the form of a verbal construct.

The Relevance of New Criticism

The two main objections against New Criticism are that (i) the New Critics assume "a rational scheme of definitions and distinctions"[1] by which they hope to explain the whole process of poetic activity, and (ii) the New Critics fail to appreciate the social and historical context in their overwhelming zeal to justify form as the be-all and end-all of all poetic activity. R.S. Crane finds the "critical monism" of the New Critics inadequate on account of its "quasi-mathematical treatment,"[2] and its negligence of the historical context.

Crane considers that literature is something "that exists in history and has its character moulded in countless unpredictable ways by it."[3] The New Critics would not of course question the validity of this proposition. Ransom submits that sometimes historical adaptation is a necessary preliminary, in understanding such poets as Chaucer, "before our minds are ready to make the aesthetic approach . . . "[4] In other words, historical scholarship is a postitive aid to the understanding of poetry and thus close textual criticism can have no quarrel with it. But the New Critics would not agree that literature is something "that exists in history."[5] Historical criticism may be instructive in clarifying certain beliefs, ways of thinking and linguistic oddities, but all this does not constitute literary criticism. To

say that a poem has a historical context is obviously not the same as saying that it is also a historical document. One reads Shakespeare or Keats not merely to know what the Elizabethans or the romantics thought and felt, but also to realise that core of perennial value which has helped their poetry to survive for generations.

Eliot's concept of tradition involving a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence, and Allen Tate's contention that " . . . the perpetual task of criticism . . . is to understand again the poetry of the past" through "a renewal of understanding,"[6] are attempts to see a literary work as embodying both a historical past and a perennial interest. Tate declares that "We cannot penetrate the mind of another age deeply enough to repeat its experience,"[7] and R. S. Crane intends criticism to do this impossible job. The New Critical approach to poetry through such "first principles"[8] as texture, tension, paradox and irony are not to undermine the value of historical scholarship, but to establish a distinct identity for poetry by finding a basis of discrimination between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic areas of human activity. To consider historical scholarship as the end of criticism would lead to the study of literature either as a historical document or a way of compiling the history of ideas. The New Critics, on the other hand, assert that " . . . an understanding of the literary document as a literary document is central to any valid discussion of literature."[9]

Crane feels that the New Critics' distinction between poetry and science is "an abstract contrariety" determined arbitrarily "by the logic of critic's divisions definitions."[10] By submitting themselves to "a method of dichotomous division," the New Critics, Crane declares, have fallen into a dialectical fallacy."[11] Crane tries to get over this fallacy by asserting his belief in a multiplicity of critical procedures, by celebrating a pluralistic approach to literature. Crane and his group of Neo-Aristotelians assert that each literary genre has its own principles of organisation and use of language. They hope to apprehend poetry on the basis of the rules of the "type" to which an "individual" literary work belongs. The Neo-Aristotelians thus

replace the "first principles" of New Criticism with a conglomeration of prescriptions out of which it is the writer's business to choose one depending on the "humour" he suffers from. Crane, as Yvor Winters aptly remarks, "seems...to have come to poetry through an interest in criticism, rather than to criticism through an interest in poetry."[12] The aim of the New Critics' "first principles" is to find a rationale for the sustained interest in poetry despite its incompetence to fulfil any pragmatic purpose. Though Crane is sore about the monistic approach of New Criticism, he himself finds it expedient to apply the Aristotelian mimetic principle to works like *Tom Jones* with the conviction that the Aristotelian method is, as Elder Olson asserts, "not only a permanently true but also an indenfinitely operable poetic method."[13] Yvor Winters rightly remarks, "One gets the impression from Crane and from his disciple Olson that works of one genre cannot be compared with works of another, yet nowhere are we told just where the impassable lines are to be drawn."[14]

The second important objection against New Criticism is its supposed inability to relate art and life. This failure, Andor Gomme thinks, "involves a serious playing down of the value of art."[15] The Chicago critics feel that the New Critics have failed to find connections between literary studies and other areas of humanities like linguistics, history and the history of ideas, while Charles I. Glicksberg declares that "a metaphysical essence, a spiritual dimenson . . . has been strangely eliminated from the aesthetic calculus of New Criticism,"[16] leading to what Geoffrey Hartman calls a "puerile, or at most pedagogic"[17] criticism. All these charges against New Critics have been founded on an inadequate reading of their works. Critics like Eliot and Winters are of course too avowedly involved with the relationship between poetry and religious-ethical values of life. The objection seems mainly directed towards critics like Ransom, Tate and Cleanth Brooks. But as we have already observed, the New Critics have shown deep concern with human values. Tate makes it clear that poetry has the moral responsibility "to supervise the culture of language, to which the rest of the culture is subordinate."[18] Tate finds in the values of the American South, "the reaffirmation of religious humanism, and that is very

intimately connected with poetry."[19] Ransom too thinks of poetry as only an aspect of a larger aesthetic field that includes religion and social manners.[20] Cleanth Brooks unequivocally asserts that "The poet is bound to be concerned, ultimately, with the good life and with the nature of reality."[21] Brooks is aware of the "big problem of evaluating the poem, as documents giving you a certain kind of truth."[22] Thus the allegation that the New Critics are not aware of the cultural, moral and spiritual implications of aesthetic activity is based on an incomplete reading of their writings.

The New Critics, in fact, have clearly demonstrared that their interest in form is not necessarily a severence of interest in the values of life. What they have tried to establish is that poetry is capable of assimilating the values, beliefs, perceptions and objects into a coherent order which is complete in itself. It is in this sense that the institution of New Criticism is a counterblast to the amorphous critical pronouncements of the Impressionists. The fact that Oscar Wilde, Whistler and their followers celebrated poetic form as the focus of creative and critical activities does not make the New Critics their descendents. The New Critics have a seriousness of purpose, for they view form not in terms of a pleasurable sensation, but as a cognitive discourse realised through certain special devices of language and composition. Unlike the Impressionists, the New Critics conceive of form as a distinctive mode of knowledge. In the calculus of New Criticism, form is a function of sensibility which in turn is governed by the awareness of cultural and spiritual values. Poetic form is thus functionally related to sensibility and values, and it is precisely this insight which makes New Criticism relevant to life.

There is, of course, an excessive emphasis on the autonomy of poetic object which blurs the New Critics' views on other problems. It is this disproportionate emphasis more than their critical formulations which has provoked the antagonists of New Criticism. This over-emphasis on the ontological distinction of poetry, an emphatic affirmation of aesthetic values, was perhaps a historical necessity to salvage poetry from attitudes governing science and technology. The contemplation of form

not merely reveals what is typically aesthetic in a verbal artifact, it also helps to clarify the subject-object relationship in the context of a perceived reality. What emanates from an interaction of human mind and reality is a *form* that embodies new dimensions of coherence and knowledge.

The function of art is to illuminate life on the basis of an intense awareness of the dynamic relationships between man and his environment, between mind and objective reality. Since the verbal artifact is the embodiment of this awareness, illumination of life becomes possible by an acute, intelligent and imaginative analysis of the work. This is what the New Critics have tried to achieve. Cleanth Brooks' analysis of *The Waste Land* in terms of the perception of relationship between death-in-life and life-in-death is perhaps one of the most succinct evaluations of modern life. Eliot's concept of the "Dissociation of Sensibility' arrived at through a critical understanding of the seventeenth century poets is one of the most profound insights into the nature of human life as affected by the forces of history. The New Critics illuminate life by concentrating on form which reflects a sense of integration against the menace of fragmentation and by asserting human values against the pragmatic forces of materialism.

One of the most salutary influences of New Criticism is in the area of teaching poetry in the universities. The pervasive influence of New Criticism in the 30s, 40s and 50s has penetrated into the minds of many generations of students who are now excercising enormous influence in the academic world of literary studies. The reaction of the 60's and 70's is yet too feeble to affect a change in approach to the teaching of poetry already shaped by the New Critical poetics. The reaction in favour of existentialism and structuralism has not yet been able to silence the persistent voice of New Criticism.

Notes

CHAPTER I
THE PREMISES OF NEW CRITICISM

1. Van Wyck Brooks, *The Writer in America* (New York, 1964), p. 16.
2. For example, Van Wyck Brooks, while lamenting, on the one hand, for "a discipline that has killed the poet in man" was, on the other hand, obliged to congratulate the New Critics for making criticism "a power in the literary world." (*The Writer in America*, p. 39 and p. 18) Alfred Kazin who felt that New Criticism was "floundering in the self-justifications of estheticism" was moved to call it "an eminently respectable criticism" and "an immensely satisfying criticism." [*On Native Grounds* (New York, 1941), p. 430 & 451] Douglas Bush, who attacked New Criticism for its "narrow and dogmatic and also erratic" approaches, confessed that it had brought "a new subtlety to the analysis of form, texture and imagery, and has refined our perceptions." [*PMLA*, 64 (March 1949), p. 18 & p. 14.]
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4. F.R. Leavis, "Introduction," *Towards Standards of Criticism* (London, 1962).
5. Daniel, p. 24.
6. *Fugitives' Reunion : Conversations at Vanderbilt, May 3-5, 1956*, ed. Rob Roy Purdy (Nashville, 1959), p. 160.
7. Charles Moorman, "The Vocabulary of the New Criticism," *The American Quarterly*, 9 (1957), 182.
8. Moorman, p. 182.
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10. Walter Pater, "Preface," *Rennaissance Stuaies* (London, 1873).
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12. *On Native Grounds*, pp. 430-31.
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21. *The Sewanee Review* (Spring, 1955), p. 235
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23. Ibid. p. 81.
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27. Ibid., p. 70.
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29. *Essays in Criticism*, Vol 2, p. 105.
29. "The Sense of the Past," *Liberal Imagination* (New York, 1950), p. 184.
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33. Cleanth Brooks, "The Critic and His Text : A Clarification and a Defence," *The Humanities : An Appraisal*, ed. Julian Harris (Madison, 1962 , p. 7.
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36. "Poetic Strategy," *The Saturday Review of Literature*, 12 (July 27, 1935), 6.
37. Ibid., p. 6.
38. *The World's Body* (Baton Rouge, 1968), p. viii.
39. *The New Apologists for Poetry* (Minneapolis, 1956), p. 4.
40. Cleanth Brooks, "Implications of an Organic Theory of Poetry," *Literature and Belief*, ed. M.H. Abrams (New York, 1958), p. 75.
41. *The World's Body*, p. x.
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43. *Selected Essays* (London, 1953). p. 31.
44. *The World's Body*, p. 348.
45. Allen Tate, *Collected Essays* (Denever, 1959), p. 240.

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49. *Intentions* (London, 1913), p. 209.
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3. *The World's Body*, p. 247.
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19. Ibid. p. 127.
20. Ibid, p. 130.
21. *The Worlds Body*, p. 126.
22. *Collected Essays* (Denever, 1959), p. 81 & p. 73.
23. Ibid., p. 82
24. Ibid. p. 82.
26. Ibid., p. 82.
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27. *The Intent of the Critic*, p. 89 & p. 91.
28. Ibid., p. 91.
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31. Ibid., p. 554.
32. Ibid., p. 562.
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83. *Collected Essays*, p. 545.
84. Ibid., p. 546.
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87. *Modern Poetry and Tradition*, p. 16.
88. *The Well-Wrought Urn*, p. 1.
89. *Modern Poetry and Tradition*, p. 15.
90. Ibid., p. 16.
91. Ibid., p. 16.
92. Ibid., p. xxvi.

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2. "Criticism as Pure Speculation," *The Intent of the Critic*, ed. Donald Stauffer (New York, 1966), p. 76.
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4. *Collected Essays* (Denever, 1959), p. 56.
5. Ibid., p. 56.
6. "The Function of Criticism Today," *The Humanities : An Appraisal*, ed. *Julian Harris* (Madison, 1962), p. 56.
7. *New Criticism*, p. 15.
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64. Ibid. p. 31.
65. *Collected Essays*, p. 60
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68. Ibid., p. 61.
69. Ibid., p. 60.
70. Ibid., p. 57.
71. Ibid., p. 57.

CHAPTER IV
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4. *The World's Body*, p. 45.
5. Ibid., p. 45.
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Dr. Jitendra Narayan Patnaik is lecturer in English in the Orissa state Educational Service. He has taught in the postgraduate Departments of English in Ravenshaw College, Cuttack and Khallikok College, Berhampur. A widely published Oriya critic, reviewer, translator and poet, Dr. Patnaik is now lecturer in the Postgraduate Department of English, Samanta Chandra Sekhar College, Puri (Orissa), 75001.

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