CATEGORICAL BLUE

Personalytic Ethic in Social Work and other Structures of Helping

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ARNAB CHATTERJEE

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDY
RASHTRAPATI NIVAS, SHIMLA 171005

First published 2017

ISBN: 978-93-

Published by:

The Secretary
Indian Institute of Advanced Study,
Rashtrapati Nivas, Shimla

Typeset at:
Sai Graphic Design, New Delhi

Printed at:
Pearl Offset Press Private Limited
5/33, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi

TO

MY (LATE) MA,
MEJDI, CHOTU SINGH, MERE BACHHIYA

& most of all to

MY DEAR WIFE ANURADHA
(assembling everything from ruins)

Is there a conscience before the we has been uttered? Is it certain that conscience can be separated from a command received, a certain heteronomy, a relationship with another, with exteriority? The other and exteriority do not necessarily mean tyranny and violence. The exteriority of discourse is an exteriority without violence. The absolute which supports justice is the absolute status of the interlocutor. His modality of being and of manifesting himself consist in turning his face to me, in being a face. That is why the absolute is a person.

—Emmanuel Levinas [1987: 32-33]

Conceptual personae' are thinkers, solely thinkers, and their personalized features are closely linked to the diagrammatic features of thought and the intensive features of concepts. A particular conceptual persona, who perhaps did not exist before us, thinks in us. For example, if we say that a conceptual persona stammers, it is no longer a type who stammers in a particular language but a thinker who makes the whole of language stammer: the interesting question then is "What is this thought that can only stammer?" Or again, if we say that a conceptual persona is the Friend, or that he is the Judge or the Legislator, we are no longer concerned with private, public, or legal status but with that which belongs by right to thought and only to thought. Stammerer, friend, or judge do not lose their concrete existence but, on the contrary, take on a new one as thought's internal conditions for its real exercise with this or that conceptual persona. This is not two friends who engage in thought; rather, it is thought itself that requires the thinker to be a friend so that thought is divided up within itself and can be exercised. It is thought itself which requires this division of thought between friends.

—Gilles Deleuze [1994: 69]

Some practices of partiality—friendship, romantic love, parenthood—can be justified on impartial grounds because they realize goods that are valuable when impartially considered. Why not the partiality of a lawyer, business competitor, or political operative? Because what the adversary professional seeks to justify is not merely the pursuit of a plurality of goods, but the violation of persons—mainly through deception and manipulation, but also at times through coercion, force, or violence.

—Arthur Isak Applbaum [1999: 258]

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Acknowledgements & more

The titled name of the book (Categorical Blue) owes its existence to the conversation of a few French and German thinkers spanning a century. Whereas the Kantian categorical imperative marked by the U norm ("Act only according to that maxim which you would will to be a universal maxim") –was supposed to have been refuted by Hegel who argued that such a formula could be made for evil acts too. "Everyone except me should be treated as a means and not as an end." This disruption of the categorical universal by such an "evil-personal" which could be declaratively thematized for all—plots the grain of these essays. Historically, Marquis de Sade is said to have uttered in a similar refrain, who having pronounced his commitment to socialism inserted a caveat –that everybody's estates should be confiscated except his own! Kudos to these immortal gurus, first.

I have been working and publishing on this theme of the personal (not identical with the private and thus beyond the private/public binary) through the modality of helping—since 1999—the year when I arrived at—the very theme of the personal via personal attacks in politics and wrote editorial page essays in newspapers of the ABP group. And to be fair to all those who have helped me in my dark journey, the list is long but still citable with a bit of listless labour: it has been really a terribly long and arduous detour. In fact, it is one single story I've been scripting throughout—whose folds have been interesting, yet incessant and many have been weaved into it.

In the year 2001, 'History and historiography of social work in India: Towards a localized critique of formations' was registered with the Department of History at Rabindra Bharati University

(where Prof. Rajsekhar Basu was a dear friend, historian and guide), in 2004, at the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta it was revised in the brief title, 'Towards a History of helping in India' and vis-a-vis 2005 a watershed year in many senses—in 2006—finally—everything coalesced in the now established title, 'Beyond Private and Public: New perspectives on the personal, personalist social work and other structures of helping'. Recorded with the Department of Philosophy at Jadavpur University; submitted in 2013, it was 'pedigreed' in 2015 after the intervention of the Governor of West Bengal Shri Kesari Nath Tripathi—troubled by the unfair delay that the work was being subjected to. Grateful thanks to Ms. Nandita Bhattacharya, Prof. Gautam Gupta, Prof. Sadhan Chakraborti, Prof. Soumitra Basu, Prof. Gautam Bhadra and the Governor of West Bengal—Shri Kesari Nath Tripathi. In that work I institutionally mooted my 'personalytical' approach and applied it to history, politics, culture and 19th century reform movements with a chapter on social work and its predecessors. I have retained an earlier version of my main observations from the above work which was also published as an article in 2006 (Chatterjee 2006a) since the rest is altogether a different entity and merits a separate publication. This is all in place also to situate a grim reminder that *this work should not be confused with its broader precedent but applies the paradigm only to ethics*. The work has a limited aim and comportment.

Though what such an approach could do to intervene in the public space of social sciences could be had from the last chapter of this book where holding onto the occasion of an EPW issue on Care-ethics for Men in Feminism, I offer a critique from my personal-singular standpoint; in 2008 in another review essay in EPW (listed in the Bibliography), and from the end note-references in that essay, too—the reader would be able to make sense of what such a critique could accomplish in its immediacy and thereafter—the changes—for some—that have had to be reckoned with: one wrongly answered, other unanswered and this goes on.

So, evidently, it has been a long detour with publications and seminars I have offered at institutes in Kolkata to Delhi, in Mumbai, Pune and then those at IIAS—(without naming, I thank them

all)—till the time this book was packed, unpacked and assembled together at the Indian Institute of advanced Study, Shimla during 2013-15. It was the best place that ever could be—with Prof. D.N Dhanagare, Prof. Radhaballav Tripathi, Prof. Udayan Mishra, Sri Rajesh Joshi, Prof. Kunal Chakraborty, Shri Sumanta Banerjee—a constellation of academic and creative stalwarts. Would they ever come together, again? Would we? Prof. Dhanagare is already gone. Moidul Islam, Rahul Govind, Amitranjan Basu, and Dr. Enakshi Mitra forced a presence that has become inevitable and has nearly naturalized me: I'm "organically yours." Here, Dr. Enakshi Mitra specially—she held an umbrella for me over the space of many months and I know how much I owe her; I wish I could ape her in responsiveness, but her analytical precision remains unmatchable—even un-tweetable.

Chetan Katoch, Aniruddha Choudhury and Yogesh Snehi's friendship at IIAS—brief though they may have been- will always be treasured.

Prof. Nasrin Siddiqui of YASHADA, Pune during 2008 was a similar shelter and unlike any Boss remains immortal in her goodwill and I remain her indebted and ardent, abstract- angel companion. I went on working for more 5 years on the laptop she had gifted me.

During my Independent Fellowship tenure at SARAI in 2007 I owe much to the friendship of the RAQS media collective—Shuddhabrata, Jeebesh, Monica, and Sadan Jha which continues to be fulfilling.

Pratiksha Baxi's writings teach me much and I continue to learn from them though the portion on consent and permission (in the Introduction) could not engage with her book; the longer version will surely strike a dialogue with her position.

Subodh Sarkar is not only the Sahitya Academy award winning foremost Indian poet, with Rohitaswa Sarkar—the emerging theorist—he is also the prophet of sensitive ennui and antipoetic anomie.

At CSSSC in Kolkata, Prabir Basu (whose non-administrative poetics—he being a great translator of Jibanananda Das) relieves and robs me of any nightmare; Prof. Partha Chatterjee, Prof.

Pradip Bose, Prof. Tapati Guhathakurta contributed to my work with longstanding empathy, at times deliberate pity due to the prolong, era taking attitude of mine; in response my shy answer was always Benjamin, "under the shadow of Saturn, I'm slow".

Prof. Manas Ray in Kolkata with his brilliance and rigour requires special mention; his (any) single journal article I value it more than a book; he still remains a friendly teacher and I owe him immensely.

Dr. Debarshi Sen—now at CSSSC, Kolkata, Sandip Chatterjee (the ex-registrar of TISS and JNU) now in Delhi, preceded by Prabir Basu are all emotional bureaucrats, and I love them.

Prof. Arthur Applbaum of Harvard University and Prof. Leslie Green -now at Oxford remain my icons of moral and legal philosophy; I have learnt most from their works and this work does refer to them with reverence. None of them are prolific or too productive authors in any way, but they tend to think more and write less—a habit now nearly forgotten, and that thinking is invested into the 'singular' pieces they write—which illuminate us with a strange, bright light. Prof. Chris Rojek—not many know—before arriving at Celebrity Studies—the phenomenon around which his fame is now woven, was into critical social work and brightened that poor field with a brilliant text, however, only to abandon it later. Having lost Chris, Social Work has been so much poorer. Stan Houston of Queens University, Belfast is another name who shares my interest in Habermas and social work, and though he is being subjected to some sane disagreement in a chapter here, exemplifies a standard of criticism that is not matched by many in social work pedagogy and practice. Fortunately Stan has not migrated.

Our Director and ex Fellow Prof. Chetan Singh—demonstrated for me that—intellectual excellence need not be without generosity or affective charity; sophistication of the highest order in him matches elegant patience and eloquent efficiency of the great. And oh—that intellectual humour! He will remain my last example whose laughter was not a "fraud practiced on happiness." His distant, impartial neutrality and romantic reasonableness always

draws, and redraws—the moral boundaries of the market—where competitive hate is supposed to triumph. And now that we know, and are convinced- 'that hate is but the vengeance of a long caress, and fame is pivotal to shame with every sun,' I lavish this book upon you.

I also take this opportunity to thank Mr. Premchand (librarian and now secretary, too)—who once—within a ten days' notice procured Badiou's "In praise of Love" to aid my work. This is unforgettable, sheer sympathetic magic and I thank him also for the excellent book exhibitions in which I would be his special invitee—as if; he would be so kind to personally call me up to attend if I felt a bit lazy and my little love of books matched his earnest and ever encompassing goodwill. No doubt that his team including Prachi, Dipak, Ghanashyam, Dipak 'Xeroxwallah") are so sound performers at IIAS; they are its pride.

Rakesh Singh—the chief of the IIAS accounts, Rameshji, Gopalji, Chandrakala ji (now in the Estate office), and the current excellent ARO Ms. Renu Bala and Dr. Anurag Sharma deserve the credit of being professionally upright and ethically earthly in an otherwise very complicated times.

Auro University's Chancellor and founder Mr. H.P. Rama, Mr. Suresh Mathur (CEO), our honourable Vice chancellor—excellent academician administrator—Prof. Avadhesh Kumar Singh, Prof. Rohit Singh (Dean), Prof. Ajay Yadav (Registrar), Mr. Kumar Kaushik, Chandrasekhar Vithal (Librarian) and the early Prof. Padmanava Ramanujam of Auro University, Surat. I owe special thanks for their encouraging presence. Neha Shirodkar excels and shines—and outshines me as always with her metalic clarity and pinned presence.

The late Niranjan Chatterjee, Atonu Chatterjee (who introduced me to the Subaltern Studies when I was in +2), Manisha Chatterjee, Paramita Chatterjee, Tathagata (Nanda) Ray, Sushmita (Minti) Chatterjee, Sujit and Srirup Kanjilal—as my immediate and extended family, suspect that even in social intercourse, I'm engaged in 'fake encounters,' but the kinship—they know—is too real even if materially absent—at times.

Dr. Palash Mandal, Prof. Arya Ghosh are boyhood friends and we still hangout; Arunangsu Guhathakurta, Mohid Hyder remain the remnants of the Santiniketan gang.

Kasturi Sinha and Debkishore Mukherjee remain the best of my students—both as student and interlocutor. Shruti Roychoudhury is in France now but we converse still, and there is the magic.

Prof. Dipankar Gupta and Prof. Mahendra Pal Singh, Prof. Sujata Patel, Prof. Abha Chauhan with their distant presence do not always know they epistemically excite me and I have an inheritance of gain.

Semi-finally, the book—is dedicated to my mother Dipali Chatterjee and she is here with me in each sentence I write, and Chotu Singh—my fiancée parakeet scratches them all with her edged nails: this is love under, (non) because always newer, erasure.

Lastly, I cannot but offer my heartfelt thanks to Mr. Ravi Shanker—who owns the typesetting unit (Sai Graphic Design) with whom this book was left for all the pre-press job. The immense and infinite labour, cooperation and support I've received from Raviji goes beyond words, realistically so—because this work belongs to the IIAS, Shimla and Raviji himself sat at the typesetter's desk to do the job. IIAS is lucky to have had such a pre-press unit with it, and conjointly I'm lucky to have shared it. Thank you Raviji!

Finally, and fatally, I know there are names on whom I have written nothing here, since I cannot.

Grateful thanks to all.

20 October, 2017

Dr. Arnab Chatterjee
Associate Professor,
School of Law
Auro University
arnabchatterjee@protonmail.com

Preface

If we are convinced of the collective personality of groups, is it possible to advocate 'collective punishment' for those involved in collective crimes? The fiery and blunt, and radically controversial relevance of this proposal in an age where gang rapes are evental and terroristic occurrences in India and everywhere, cannot be undermined. But this has to be derived from a work which is 'personalytic'. Now, what is it?

It has been more than a decade (and the synopsis being long indexed in international databases) I have been arguing the personal as a/the beyond of private/public binary and have been urging everybody to distinguish it from the private vis-à-vis the public. Private/privacy is opposed to public/publicity and resists public scrutiny—the stuff by which the public is made. Personal—the way we don't know what a person is, what his/her real/final intentions are or whether somebody is genuinely aggrieved or not—makes the personal—largely unpredictable and indeterminate in the final instance—unlike the private. Private/public being legal juridical categories have specific indicators. Personal relationships—like love or friendship for this reason remain outside legislation. The love' work being still worked upon, this book having derived some blood from the formal science of helping (social work), is applying the personal to ethics, judging it in other structures (charity, philanthropy, altruism) and then lividly and joyously going beyond. But how is such a theme (in its substantive intent) placed in relation to persons and things, friends and detractors?

Once early in the year 2014 at IIAS, Shimla a co-Fellow of mine in whose flat (at the Fellows' house) often I would to stay put at

night because of the fear of ghosts in my vast Delvilla apartment, and who having been trained in the rigours of high continental thought—Levinas, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Blanchot and others, showed marked reluctance to accept the personal as making and marking a progress on its own; he had in mind perhaps Heidegger's or Adorno's dismissal of personalism and Max Scheler—in their major works[1]. In an age where self and subjectivity raged hard and raged enough, I took upon myself to show the person (nearly out of fashion)is a cut above all these; self and subjectivity trailed when the person and the personal are able to triumph. Professor Arindam Chakraborty—who I think is making important inroads in 'public philosophy' and who made inquiries and took much interest in my work, to assure me that my emphasis on the personal-private distinction was refreshingly provocative, remarked once in the mood of (a) critique—if vestiges of (old) 19th century personalism remain in my 'personalytic' work. Now, while acknowledging that ethical personalism remains as an originary precedent, constant navigation between personalism and its false allies, becomes incumbent; though that version of personalism with its roots in spirituality, worn out transcendentalism and value-ground (found in Scheler too) is no match for my post-personalist (or personalytic) approach which is out and out social and political.

Back to my co-Fellows' objections: Not to pursue this deeply subjective topic here in detail, however, to meet on his points of strength, I picked up a book from his floor (one from his own 'personal' collection) and to his surprise and satisfaction-showed him the following paragraph, that which- even today, to begin this monograph—I shall rehearse for the sceptics who think, in a post-deconstructive, post-metaphysical age, the days of the persona-l are in deep and disinterred disarray:

> By way of making a final stab at this question, I would like to dust off an old word which has the advantage of having been coined before the advent of the metaphysics of subjectivity and which is not as "logo-centric" as it seems: the old word per-sona, per-sonare, the person as sounding-through, resonating. This pre-Cartesian word does not name a seat of self-identity and has nothing to do with an egological metaphysics. On the contrary, it means to name a difference, to pick up the interplay

between mask and voice, face and speech, look and language, eidos and logos. It means to open up and preserve the distance between the mask and the speaker and prevent their hasty identification. It means to preserve the non-identity of the speaker and the voice which resonates through the mask. Unlike the modern notion of the self- identical ego or self-present consciousness, the old sense of per-sona speaks in terms of difference and non-identity. It recognizes the mediation, the per, that nothing is immediately given or present here; far from being logo-centric, it aims at denying phonic immediacy. It is essentially the voice which does not keep silent, whose words are dispersed and disseminated and fall outside oneself, all over the stage, while the speaker remains concealed. It holds that whatever transpires on the face is echo, trace, sign, even dissemblance. It is a word for players, actors, the theatricum philosophicum. Unlike "ego" and "self," which belong to a metaphysics of identity, per-sona is embedded in the metaphorics of the flux. Everything deep loves the mask. Per-sona: the depths which rush under the surface, the deep resonance and rumble—of who knows what.

[Caputo 1988: 289-290]

As will be evident, this book on the personalytic ethic is basically rife with such instances where the mask and the face, the animal and the man, the character and the actor (the actor—who Camus wrote once upon a time—is himself acted upon) are addressed in difference and unity and their ethical implications are narratively described rather than prescriptively ordained. The book is basically a collection of ethical stories where the personal with its whimsical, contingent, arbitrariness—beyond the grasp of the private and the public—runs havoc overwhelmingly.

The main body of the text will document these claims. However, to begin symptomatically, let me hazard some telegraphic hints. When one is confronted with the hyperbological speech of somebody on poverty, and asks in turn, "well, how much do you earn yourself?"—is easily captured, and transfigured as prohibitively very personal, as something one should not have asked; it is forgotten however that long ago this was inaugurated by Marx when he talked about the class character of persons and things. During Rabindranath Tagore's life-time—in the 1930's, he was in trouble answering how could he write profusely—poems and

songs on poverty while being a Zamindar earning in millions.—Is it the old insertion of authenticity that interrupted his time? Later, the question of hypothetical self-experience (leading to de-Class-ification as if) displaced the objection of authenticity—which is not felt—the novelist Vikram Chandra feels, when one—all the while having had to learn Wordsworth under neem trees, is keen to throw the same stone in reversal on the post colonial, nonresident English authors; why?Because they have detailed *papri chaat* or *bhel puri* meticulously in their novels, and thus dropped silently a bomb into the critical womb—as if—to have invited such a reaction. This debate apart—the question of the "class character" remains for me one of the most vehemently personal-ethical questions, no more citable with the same rhetorical force, but still competent enough to retain an ethic: the personalytic ethic. How do we have it today? As a ready illustration consider a major Indian journal's issue on 'Men doing Feminism' (engaged in the Conclusion of this monograph). To assert the feminist conduct of a few Indian jurists, a writer asks whether simply by inquiring into "… the domestic economies of labour within the [Vasant] Sathe and [Upendra] Baxi households" (Sarkar 2015: 46), the matter could be settled? A personalytic ethic will grant Sarkar the force—at least to ask this question—but a private ethics will prohibit him. The private and the public are united in the person-al and the person maneuvers them often which results in cheating, duping, doubling, lying and fiction. How to reckon with this indeterminacy?

But the question of 'character' constituted by stable moral dispositions while is subjected to revisions and regret, in ethical personalism the basic moral tenor is a cut above character: "an inveterate criminal whose life consists of an uninterrupted chain of bad deeds could be a man of "good moral tenor." (Scheler 2009: p. 115.) The so called "character forming education" hardly influences the basic moral tenor. Character could be revised on the basis of deeds, but not the basic tenor for "it is not inferred from deeds at all; it is, rather intuited in deeds." (Ibid., p. 117.) This makes us remember something which Schopenhauer had argued long ago: willing separated from doing is mere intention and therefore just

a stigma of intellectual caprice and is genuinely nothing. Willing is intuited and objectified in deeds: Marx would have had nothing to object to this, I guess. Nevertheless—for Scheler the person and the character should be distinguished; however—after all that—I think, character remains a very personal question. What is the aim of teaching then? I think in such a fallen world, only one can be taught to choose a failed and damaged life. It is more assuring to read and hear that characters are looking for an author, and the author starts, looking for them in turn.

But such a personal question when comes -albeit interactively- through social work- retains strange consequences. "He thinks I can help him. He is a fool."—thus began the most discomfiting novel called *The Caseworker* (Konrad 1974)—the Case worker being a social worker who works with an individual and posits a problem solving procedure—which—finally ends up in a huff, expressed disturbingly by the novelist. When social work or sociology passes onto poetry then the loss that was always already there is perhaps not regained, but runs into a redoubling—more loss.

'Allothanatography' when allowed to replace autobiography substitutes one for the other. But when justice becomes fully poetic it is close to "street justice" or even revenge—the original model metaphor of punishment. By making justice poetic we are into an originary decrepitude where we gave our best arguments to our enemy but in turn we were given a bullet: poetic injustice? Injustice is always poetic. All of us have seen the most loving and innocently thriving, honest people untimely dying of incurable diseases or have had been killed, or thrown out of their positioned chairs, while the star-corrupt and killers have run into their nineties, and earned secure trophies. Here we would have liked a Hindi cinematic strong binary (good trumps evil) and would have voted for a particular axis, but the indeterminacy has troubled and pushed everything beyond repair. The world has been lost and regained only in profits in the crude commercial machine. My ruminations on poetic sociology is a tribute to this feeling—which deriving from Schmidt I shall call a 'lyrical ethic'[2]. But commenting

on the commerce and the exception that is nearly collateral, a contemporary cultural critic puts it excellently:

> Asking for alms with his head held high, the nomadic mendicant unsettles the householder and forces him to ponder over the business-merits of renunciation. Switching from one role to another with enviable dexterity, the entertainer instills in the entertained the anxiety that perhaps there is no notion of 'personality' which is not also about 'impersonation'. They all have, therefore, the power to dupe people.
>
> (Bandyopadhyay, 2012: 2)

Rightly so! Commerce and duping, cheating through artifacts and offering commitment to it and enjoying them althrough—is the stuff of Chapter VIII. Wives in a microcredit programme are showing savings which have actually been usurped by con-husbands; is this cheating, too? But cheating in a moment of mimetic rivalry is personal in the sense, if we could modify the above quote a bit—impersonal laws and procedures cannot warranty that we shall not be duped. So even if there is impersonation as the critic rightly informs us above—the moment of personal maneuver distorts the impersonal scene of general norms and hatch a hasty narrative.

This becomes a bit more problematic in the case of my paradigmatic examples: love and friendship as personal relationships which cannot be legislated in terms of private or public laws. There have been arguments that animals—while can become an object of legislation, do not form a part of a self-conscious legislative community. Marx in his discourse on pre-capitalist economic formations—while talking about serf/master-slave dialectic comments on how animals while could be made to serve a master, still, the animals' will cannot be appropriated, and therefore could not be dominated in the final determinate instance; his freedom is finally not won by the other, and the (hu)man never emerges as his master, truly. Two chapters are devoted to deal with this 'animanity'—the animal matrix at the human- nonhuman, person-nonperson ethical cusp energized by a personal anxiety when I see the nonviolent feminists or pacifists or whoever offer loud snippets against violence and then at the

lunch eat meat without compunction—while we losers are looking for substitutes for plant-foods. Its current ethical relevance to our continental friends? If Derrida and Agamben are old and Levinas on animals is depressing, hear David Wood: "Lastly, I suggested that violence cannot be eliminated from philosophy itself, though it can be abated. And I pointed to some glaring holes in the project of undoing the silent (and silencing) violence of a humanism that continues to be embarrassed by the existence of other animals." (Wood, 2005: 51). But two reminders (and remainders) which I have not been able to pursue here, one: I sincerely believe, i.e., philosophically believe—that extremely personal relationships are possible only with animals, plants and entities—even instruments; secondly, because human beings are deficient creatures who cannot fly, cannot naturally swim, cannot see in the dark, cannot sniff or over-sense thus absorb distances like the dogs, they create culture to compensate the lack; what follows is the terrible ordeal of the above inventory in the hands of beings who are (hu) man—the most "nasty and dangerous animal" on earth—if not elsewhere. For the animals and plants the man is a terroristic presence, no humanity saves them. For the tormented, humiliated, and exploited humans—humanity had long vanished. Then?

Finally, when all religious or metaphysical justifications have receded to the background, in a post conventional world, we must generate our own 'justiciable' norms whose validity claims we might be ready to redeem whenever required. The whole debate on Habermasian discourse ethics in relation to social work services has been charted in two chapters. The transit from Kantian monologism to dialogic communicative ethics is a long step forward but that cannot be allowed to atrophy to guard political propriety—the burden to engage in the case of controversial norms is such an ethical challenge that we cannot abandon even for a while.

Again, the indeterminacy that is built into the optic of the personal is put to some effect when our personalytic ethics is pitted against a care ethic mediated by a care epistemology: that is the last chapter in lieu of a conclusion. if a man feigns (this feigning has also been the stuff of chapter VIII)—successfully—to

empathetically share a woman's pain and experience, or emulates to be a feminist and do feminism, the political uncertainty drags us into a pure, political terrain which is very personal in nature. "So you are talking about feminism, do you have a maid and why do you need her? And have you given your maid an appointment letter? How much do you pay her? What kind of egalitarianism do you practice with her? What kind of decisive democratic participation is she offered in your family decisions?"

We have returned to Marx and the question of the uncomfortable class, caste, sexual or gender- character—with which we had begun. A personalytic ethic arms us enough to ask these questions, and never stop asking them—for that matter. And such an ethic is elicited by social work—not a mainstream social science; this book is all of it and all about it—while still going much beyond it.

NOTES

1. Though Heidegger did talk affirmatively about how Husserl's personalistic psychology replaced the naturalistic one for good, his specific complaint is that in personalism the 'being of the person' is not available, in fact the personalist substrate could act as a fetter to arrive at the being of the person—declaratively not reducible to acts, but the moment the being is called for, a ready reduction to acts or qualities occurs.
2. Though I gravely disagree with the theory of 'lyrical subjects' Schmidt derives from Kant's third critique (Schmidt, 2005: p. 4). As will be evident my obsession with animals or as I call it 'animanity', hardly will allow itself to rest on subjectivity.

Introduction

"The key to understanding modernity is the public/private divide and a corresponding failure to find a way beyond the binary. A stream of discourses could be recalled which had proposed, in their desperate will to move beyond this liberal paradigm, alternative versions of the private and the public where the personal appeared as another version of the private." My paradigmatic proposal in its broader version—wherefrom I cite this, argues the personal as a beyond of private/public binary and distinguishes it from the private vis-à-vis the public. This—as I have documented in already published pieces—could be said to have mooted the post-personalist or personalytical (briefly, personalytic) approach which (having posited the personal as being beyond the private and the public)—now regulates the personal as autonomous enough to bear an independent, analytical value by which it could be used to mediate discourses of politics, social theory, history, culture, ethics and social work. Having addressed elsewhere all the other discourses named above, post-personalist or personalytic ethics is the stuff of this book.

In politics (after the Trump-Clinton debates in the run up to the American Presidential elections in 2016, no one will doubt the importance of the personal) I have worked extensively on the phenomenon of personal attacks—where 'personal attacks' in themselves do not signify attacks on a person's privacy and thus here—the personal—could be distinguished from the notion of privacy as such. An instance of what could be a personalytic

approach to politics, here is an 'Abstract' rumination prepared in response to a seminar invitation:

Inspired by Immanuel Kant's immortal, controversial maxim, "He who openly declares himself an enemy can be relied upon, but the treachery of secret malice… is more detestable than violence," I want to look at some of the 'wicked', malicious and dirty everyday ways of experiencing the political where violence and nonviolence could rarely be distinguished. In other words, this paper is about something worse than violence. And because these everyday binaries are transcended in this form of politics, it is also called "pure" with an appeal to—or an invitation to insert our everyday narrative experience of lying, backstabbing, favouritism, betrayal, manipulations, machinations, intrigue, false complaints and malice into our political/social science textbooks, and thus supplanting those big, boring bombardments of 'state', 'democracy', 'nation', 'civil/political society' and such formal, broad metaphors— with the moment of 'pure' politics, which has arrived, finally: a *personalytic*, pure-political ontology.

The content of the 'pure' politics of dirty hands, to repeat, is made up of *persons* being subjected to negative gossiping, malice, backstabbing, lying, treachery, deception, taking undue advantage, subtle—nearly invisible, or subsequently erased, forms of discrimination and exploitation. These apparently transgressive but immanently acceptable, and immensely manipulable examples recover, as we shall argue, *mythical* forms of punishment. In order to reckon with this genuinely *real*, "pure" politics of dirty hands with a distinctive Machiavellian dig—we recover narratives of manipulations, machinations, intrigue and malice—all blossoming in nonviolent peace where peace is also a product of leisure (In Aristotelian terms peace is a virtue derived from leisure). Contextually, with a temporary historical incursion—the *babus*' potlachian extreme and the scandal journals of 19th century Bengal could be considered for their so called 'excesses.' But what is excessive when the threshold of expenditure is feigned, or forgotten?

Thus, in the discourse of pure politics, lying is the first political act by which persons govern each other; coercion or domination thus comes always in *personal* forms of brute factuality (being *exploited* in this discourse is a matter of political *feeling*) and thereby *personal* attacks (or political pornographic inscriptions) are often its (in)'appropriate' responses. But there is a lack of causality and diagnostic scientificity

in such events too; in fact, they are always marked by an empty non-historical circularity, a lack of distinct teleology without *limits*. An illustration is here in Kant when he discusses malice: "Men prone to this vice will seek, for instance, to make mischief between husband and wife, or between friends, and then enjoy the misery they have produced." Thereby our attempt might entail recuperating the lost history of conjugal quarrels incited by unknown others *for nothing*, or envious accounts of jilted lovers or friends.

But isn't there or hasn't there been a counter discourse? How such pure political experience were handled—then and now? When we refer to *experiencing* the political, no form of theory or practical political activity, public/private defences could have worked. Kant again: "The defence against such mischief makers is upright conduct. Not by words but by our lives we should confute them." In contemporary times-those present day 'agony columns' abound with the proliferation of false auto-suggestions iterated by an ever-increasing number of urban agony aunts, and uncles. Essentialised now as real life problems—they are excluded from mainstream political discourses or theories of violence—underscoring thus the fact that they are distinctly related to a certain form of governance—a third form of governance: besides governance by *force* and *consent*—two established modes—this is " governance by *fraud*" which parasitically feeds on the other two so much so that force and consent, coercion and persuasion, violence and non-violence, public and private can rarely be distinguished when personal *fraud* touches and transforms them. "Fraud thus opens up a space, beyond force and laws, for diverting their existence—a space in which force and laws are substituted for, feigned, deformed, and circumvented."

(See Chatterjee 2015 for the whole paper)

This then is the personalytic approach to politics.

The personalytic approach to and in social theory is then—while denying to be subsumed under the private, the personal emerges as a third—in fact it is the prior—the horribly first; such a firstly third I have used to historically explore the Gandhian notion of personal integrity as rememorating the monarchical unity of private and public in one person (see Chatterjee [2007] 2010). Elsewhere I have proposed a personalytical historiography of social work ([2007] 2010). Having delineated the personal as

the beyond of private and public I applied this paradigm to the history of 19th century social work and demonstrated how it could be used to interrupt the smooth transition by which social work is theorized to have evolved from a disorganized, personal or religious practice of optional benevolence to secular, rational, disciplinary and scientific provision of care and services. (See Chatterjee 2007, 2010) In the context of culture I have explored Max Scheler's cultural collective persons—where having previously recuperated the personal as a suppressed narrative using historical and socio-theoretic tools (as mentioned above), there I interrupt it by thematizing the category (though not limiting it) through the cultural self-understanding of particular communities and unpack the allegedly impersonal fund of cultural stock and deploy it later by using the registers of personalist social work: Deriving its force from social and psychotherapeutic case work, personalist social work as I theorize it denied to be absorbed in either the public (governmental state) or the private (resistance to publicity). What we are doing here—for the first time is—apart from deploying personalytic structures of helping and related forms in ethical thought we are using personalist social work's post-personalist lesson as an analytical mediating category to intervene into and interrupt other discourses.

I

A cursory look at the constantly shifting terrains of contemporary ethical thought and moral philosophy as practiced in the highest quarters (for evidence see the articles published in the journals: *Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Philosophy and Social Policy, Journal of Moral Philosophy* etc.) would convince us of the inherent blindness with which social work is (never or rarely) received and referred to in nearly all of them. But before that the blindness that marks current moral philosophy and ethics: Torn between universalism and particularism, or deontology and consequentialism—it is out and out prescriptive and one wonders what human experience, or the narration of it, could do unto them. Consider Bentham's famous distinction between public

and private ethics. Public ethics is oriented towards principles concerning governing others; private ethics is exemplary for the individual. Now, if the person could be seen to be straddling both the private and public selves of the individual or the group, what will follow?

Ethics in the private domain is, in a major way, made up of negative rights of noninterference (in those moral/immoral actions which do not directly affect or involve other people) and involves duties towards the concrete, intimate or relational others. It might also entail not giving reasons for being different to those who don't share a life world. The acceptance of some form of paternal or maternalism for infants and children may be said to be falling within an ethics in the private domain. Private charity is another example. Ethics in the public domain will orchestrate the normative principles of publicity and reference; it tends to ensure that values in the public sphere are not allocated authoritatively with an undue bias in relation to the state. Public welfare being a state related entity is subject to ethics in the public domain (answerability or accountability). Personalytic ethics (for more on virtue ethics and ethical integrationism in regard to the person see Chatterjee 2010)—again, encompassing public and private both, concentrates on persons who are irreducible to any registers of the private or the public and are in a sense transcendent to all of them. Persons range from individuals, groups, communities to firms and corporations.

Could the calling of social work in its right anticipation, and foregrounding, reserve a few lessons for all of us? Could the high rigours with which ethics and moral philosophy are embedded in the disciplinary departments of philosophy defamiliarize social work itself, for good and vice versa? Social Work which is known as a kind of practice-theory, as we all know, has had its diverse origins in charity, philanthropy, optional benevolence, reform, service, welfare and allied others on one hand and science on the other. Contemporary Social Work distinguishes itself from all the above and rejects them at the same time. Social work is the disciplinary, secular, 'scientific', professional institutionalization of helping which also claims the benefit of a specific body of

knowledge and services. (The international standard definition of Social Work is—it is the science of helping others to help themselves.) That welfare, charity, beneficence, altruism, social service and social work are different, have specific meanings and different and opposite ethical registers and moral world view remain still unknown to discussions in contemporary moral, ethical philosophy. (Helping is a broad rubric which suspends these distinctions for a moment.) This awaits a corrective. But social work is emphatically and simply absent in all mainstream ethical or moral philosophical discussions.

Two ready symptoms can be discerned marked readily by a certain lack of interdisciplinary rigor in contemporary ethical thought. Firstly, welfare or beneficence or altruism are used interchangeably as supererogatory registers while they are not the same; secondly, the discussion has been limited to the giver and not the recipient—there is no ethics of reception as such but which is a categorical error since social work or the modernist turn in helping came with this significant shift in emphasis and what has imparted social work its distinctive ethical flavour.

Social Work then is based on a disciplinary rejection of the personal or prudential considerations immanent in charity, philanthropy or beneficence. It is more interesting to reckon with the fact as to how an impersonal, secular science of helping emerged through the sieve of personal acts of virtuous giving. The roots may be found in Kant and Hegel. Kant had proposed "helping in some other way" instead of "charity" and "alms"; Hegel (as a forgotten theorist of helping)- in order to normalize the threat (of "arbitrariness," "contingency" and "deception") innate in unorganized personal acts of helping and private charity, had offered the solution of state related 'objective', 'intelligent' helping in the form of public assistance or welfare in civil society (in this sense welfare and wellbeing are not the same). The ancient and medieval discussion on who—after all- has the sanctioned competence to make charitable gifts now generates the huge debate on who should be the right recipients of objective, impersonal assistance. The modernist turn in helping tries to standardize this debate according to objective, generalizable yardsticks (system of

needs and assessment of felt needs of those who seek help). The debate on the right kind of recipient thus merged in the autonomy and self-determination of the client (two major values of social work). The autonomy of the helper thus having been shifted to the autonomy of the recipient, the prudential consideration of the supererogationist will be decided henceforth by the ethical (in) dependence of the recipient: The "voluntary consent" of the client! A moment later we shall pick this 'consent' up for unpacking.

Now, if we are convinced there are diverse but allied paradigms as beneficence, aid in times of crisis, charity, relief operations: then let us note that—it has been argued against the utilitarian urge, that the case of helping or augmenting social utility ought not to be obligatory and it might be right only if I (as a giver or donor) can undertake them willingly without sacrificing or causing significant harm to my own life-projects; -otherwise I might be wrong to my own self. This is the contemporary restatement of supererogation speaking the language of self-comportment or reasons for action. What is missing in this is, having become an object, the recipient-subject is lost; secondly, the discussion of the donor's autonomy does not acknowledge the discursive limitations placed upon its objects. Autonomy in charity is not as bounded as the autonomy of the social worker in social work. Charity or relief, forgiveness or altruism are neither disciplines nor professions. Social work being a modern profession relocates this debate in a unique way where what was a priori ethical (helping in itself was personally virtuous or religiously meritorious) becomes a matter of secondary ethical obedience (the worker has to abide by the values and principles and then by the particular professional norms stipulated by central coordinating agencies like the NASW (National Association of Social Workers) in the United States.

Our work then intends to interrupt this continuum through a definite medium of the person which modern social work has rejected and yet accepted (rejected the personal prudential consideration yet accepted and upheld the singularity and dignity of the person) in order to come into being back in the 19th century. If it is true then that the prudential consideration of the supererogationist will be decided henceforth by the moral

(in)dependence of the recipient, then the transaction is not free but mediated by an ethics of the interface: the profession of social work—where there are ("internal goods" of the practice) or standard codes of values and ethics inscribed and that which the professional social worker has to abide by if he has to be effective in the sanctioned narrative management of historical differences amongst peoples. Innocent social acts of uncovered optional benevolence or gratitude, forgiveness, heroic acts of self sacrifice move into the personal domain of love or friendship—the space of enhancing the utility of affective social ties and regulative bonding. They are then stripped of any large, universalizable human interests but are of local but elemental significance.

This follows up my deployment of the personal [elsewhere] in mirroring how the western universal forms of impersonal civil-social helping have been smeared with the whimsical and arbitrary forms of personalist polemic, finally coalescing in the personality of organizations or group personalities—evident even in post-colonial India. It was necessary to weigh the analytical use the category personal could have in laying bare the similarities and differences between various informal helping modalities and social work—the disciplinary helping canon. Two interrogations should be insisting enough: the so called modern impersonal forms of helping merging in the welfare state (proposed by Hegel with its modern origins in Kant) and finally social work, could they be sustained in that form? If not, then what are the consequences? As is evident, it could be surmised that the person and his/her ethical predisposition is different in all of them. Further if my personalytic frame is enduring enough then the suddenness with which the social worker rejects (thus reduces) the person to his whims and biases is unwarranted and too predisposed. It will also insist on a shift away from the recipient as the sole function of a success oriented social work. Thus, personalytic ethics, will urge us to concentrate on the interactive niche between the worker and the client, the profession and the public and thus the autonomy of the relief giver and the seeker will not appear as self-governing wholes. In fact, social work being a profession in modernity relocates this debate in a unique way where what Max Scheler called

formal ethics -which judges a person from within the profession according to its criterial norms—problematises other value regarding potentials. Even in the cases of institutions—when they are artificial persons imbibing juridical personality, it is possible to show how the evolution of institutional personality replaces the natural person everywhere. Professional ethics is this force of institutions where a certain personality has been conferred upon the latter. Personalytic ethics then shifts the burden of emphasis from that of legal facts to legal fictions. And then learning from personalytical or relational social work we might want to study the relational ethics of persons relating not only to other persons but institutions as well; institutions relating to other institutions, firms, corporations, even activities—human rights or animal rights' activities included.

II

(ETHICAL) PERSONALISM TO PERSONALYTIC ETHICS—OF THE UNKNOWN

Personalism (I have the German phenomenological version ("ethical personalism") of Max Scheler in mind) has shown how the otherwise negative theory of the personal is fallible on many grounds and, rather, could be grounded to generate the person and the personal as irreducible and transcendent to all his acts and objects. "The person is not just a single concrete act alone, but the qualitative direction of a pure "becoming different" that is contained in each act. It is this dynamic, qualitative direction of a pure "becoming different" that is of the greatest significance to ethics" (Spader 2002, p. 7). A brief summary of ethical personalism of Max Scheler is: it is a genre of non-formal ethics to be pitted against formal or rational ethics; in other words "the realm of the chaotic and the contingent" is allowed to win over the "seat of all stability and certainty" (Ibid, p. 32). The realm of the chaotic and the contingent is made up of feelings or emotions (the habitus of the heart) and not necessarily reason. Good and evil correspondingly are values of the person, prior to all acts

and they are not independent values floating without material bearers and the fulfillment of a formal law (Scheler 1973, p. 28). A courageous extension of this argument helps Scheler to conclude that in love the other individual person's separation is dissolved with his/her respect and dignity (which are Kantian primers) becoming redundant: "one is supposed to feel the other's existence and worth as transcended, simultaneously with one's own, as both disappear together by drowning in the fullness of nothingness. To this corresponds (existentially) fully reached knowledge, the final transcendence of individuality" (Scheler 1992 p. 151). Now, if a critic has questioned that Scheler's valorization of the contingent meets its limit point when it is required that the essence of this cannot be contingent in turn (or empirical) but ought to base itself on the non-contingent, we might answer now that the moment love could be shown to have generated knowledge and thereby the personal as the transcendence of individuality, the non-contingent base appears. Ethical personalism is on a solid foundation therefore.

Taking cue from this, and as has been proposed, it will be shown how this personal overwhelms and escapes its private and public confines and by the sheer dint of manipulation, lies and fictions—he can create startling figures of articulation. If the person in the final instance is indeterminate, irreducible, and transcendent in relation to all his acts and objects, personalytic ethics might justifiably be called an ethics of the unknown! Even Kant while speaking on friendship warns us against extreme familiarity in friendship and insists on an element of the unknown to be built into or be allowed to remain within the optic of friendship. This may take as its inspiration the immortal non-maxim of Nietzsche "We have expended so much labor on learning that external things are not as they appear to us to be—very well! The case is the same with the inner world! Moral actions are in reality 'something other than that'—more we cannot say: and all actions are essentially unknown!" Public/private are legal juridical categories with evident determinants; the personal is not. Thus, when Thomas Nagel observes as to how altruism in modernity becomes a basic rational demand to be exercised upon desire and action, it is

evident he is deluded by the rational, knowable component which flowers in public reasoning. But when Rawls invokes the veil of ignorance, we know the transcending value of the unknowable, the ignorant and the unconscious. This being available in persons or cultural collective persons (ala Max Scheler), it eminently disturbs and destroys the rational divide that separates the private and the public.

Finally then, the theme that I shall be exploring in the present book is, how a personalytic ethics as the ethics of the unknown could be foregrounded in the indeterminacy elicited by the person and the personal in different structures of helping, interpersonal associations, institutions and activities (including human rights and animal rights activities). Finally, if a post-personalist social work moots an area well beyond the private and the public (personalytic ethics as the ethics of the unknown and post-personalist social work as a new way of relating to unknown people), isn't it time to distinguish with force and rigor, personalytic ethics from ethics in the private and public domain? Below, we make a beginning by presenting two model debates where the first debate will demonstrate—how by negotiating the public/private parametric axioms, a personalytic ethic can navigate—in fact—any debate in the public sphere. Therefore, we are demonstrating the setting to work of a personalytic ethical critique—the displacements that it can make suffer while the horizon is arguable but easy: private and public; consent and permission will be the other registers of the personalytic ethic featuring in the second debate.

MODEL DEBATE ONE: CONSENT, CENSORSHIP AND PERMISSIBLITY

The conflict of opinion—even litigations have been raging in India since the last fifty years or so on the subject of governmental censorship of civil social freedom. Those who castigate and denounce such censorships do believe that in the space occupied by private mediations that uncensored expressions and critique occur. Editing (substantive and not structural) for instance is not

censorship—they opine. Aided by the participation of the writer or speaker—whatever—it gives a semblance of consensus.

A personalytic ethical critique will suspect both the public and private forms of self-expression as being the only sites of autonomy. Rather the transactional, mediated space between consent and permission which is occupied by censorship is where the interest and the critical force of a personalytic ethic will lie. Let me follow a debate to make things clearer.

There was a public debate in 2007 on the SARAI-CSDS reader list concerning open and explicit censorship and implicit and hidden ones legitimized through the door of necessity (there are more than one or two). Shuddhabrata Sengupta in a long answer denied to call this censorship. The everyday (privately controlled) media tactic (among many others) where he himself acknowledged that "things are distorted beyond recognition,"—where content is adjusted and compromised to an unreported extent, and because unreported, we are left with only ideological dismissal bereft of details; and all these happen while the mediocre form maneuvered by self-declared, salaried experts fly high in the flattened air. (The audience seems to be wanting it or asking for more—he seems to be saying later).

Before getting into the details, let me anticipate the conclusion I shall be making: I'll show theoretically that not only is this censorship, it is something worse. Explicit governmental censorship is a far more honest system; this one which parades itself as having inspired authorial self-censorship (and the media called onto 'self-censor' itself is heard regularly) is in tune with the new techniques of power (exercised through voluntary self-comportment) that Foucault charted so excellently. (My negotiation with my censor degenerates into my struggle with my own self and I'm adding this—the supposedly 'intelligent' pragmatic self wins). To understand our own times, we have to locate censor here in this form. We have to invoke all of these notions to understand such a phenomenon and stop not at just calling this force 'oppressive', since as Foucault could have argued, like many censored films have become landmarks, private censorial activity also grants

paradoxical positivity, i.e., identity (recall Freud's use of the word censor).

Now, please notice that one major argument underlies such a proposal: governmental censorship is against the author, private or civil censorship is with the author; the governmental censorship is imposing and obligatory, private censorship is processual and voluntary, it has the consent of the author, it is the author's self-censorship. Now this word self-censorship retains the word censorship and in a way, it not only defeats, but precariously harms my interrogator's purpose; but I'll overlook this technical moment of contradiction and speculate for it a better chance: let us propose, s/he is arguing—self-censorship is not censorship. This is a more promising path and I'll surmise, he is falling, despite his intentions, a victim to the blindness that a modern capillary mode of power regulates—where even the crudest form of intervention will seem, through this sieve, an exercise of free will. The so called 'working with the author' is the high noon of this disciplinary technique. Just imagine a real case and you can recover many instances of this: the film censor board says, you must sacrifice this bed scene and you find that foolish but comply with it; the editor rejects your article without a reason (because…?) or 'distorts beyond recognition', you are struck by his brilliance, his emotional management of expressive difference, his pathology, and you oblige by thanking him. The first one is censorship because the board calls it by that name; the second is not—it is the editor's prerogative and institutional autonomy. But suppose the film censor board changes its name: let us imagine it names itself, *Film Editing Board*; wouldn't its activity be classified as censorship anymore? I hope it does and if it does then the intelligent forum which bears the name *editing* might be—in a very possible manner—strike a censorious chord. Readers might argue, yes, but the Board has stipulated rules while the private media does not; I'll say that's a reprieve where you have clear rules, you can still argue or complain—even file a lawsuit, but where there are not, you are gone. It's a take it or leave it situation. Let me clarify one thing here: those who share this view-important as it is-are falling an unwilling victim to—what Foucault called—the legal juridical view of sovereignty. Where there are state

institutions, legally cognizable rules and power of coercion—we think censorship resides there; and where these entities are absent, it is not. I'll urge you to begin with something where it is NOT, and then only—dissatisfied with received definitions—we'll be able to chart new grounds.

Having begun thus, let us now raise this to a more theoretical and ethical level.

As many of us know Kant had fallen a victim to censorship both ways: to the state as well as the church. While state censorship today is minimal, I'll argue church censorship is retained in the civil censorship of today. All media houses, institutions can be seen as various churches. But it is interesting the way Kant formulates censorship, he could have easily defined it as falling to kingly edicts or church norms. But no, he defined censorship as "a criticism which has coercive power"[1] (and given Kant's own view of the critical, it cannot be dogmatic). Later Kant wants to understand censorship in disciplinary terms. When biblical theology thinks that philosophical theology has crossed its bounds and has encroached upon the former's boundaries, the biblical theologian tends to censor it. (Kant's own tryst with censorship and argument for rational theology to evade the censor of biblical theologians is irrelevant here; but that he could be held negatively within the stipulations of the latter is enough testimony to the presence of his attempt). Censorship then, in Kantian terms, is itself the philosophy of a limit where a number of obstacles seem to be struggling for expression. (Note, this is a curious point, obstacles looking for their own freedom). And here Kant makes a hierarchy of faculties:

> The government reserves the right *itself* to sanction the teachings of the higher faculties, but those of the lower faculty it leaves up to the scholar's reason. But even when the government sanctions teachings, it does not itself *teach;* it requires only that the respective faculties, *in expounding a subject publicly* adopt certain teachings and exclude their contraries. For the government, does not teach, but it commands those who, in accepting its offices, have contracted to teach what it wants (whether this be true or not). [2]

Now this is important, Kant makes this point repeatedly that for the welfare of the general public (not "welfare of the sciences"), the state is well within its right to put restrictions or censor (note that welfare as a helping form has returned). But this is because, and this is important, the government is not related to truth which could be pursued by a scholarly seeker of the sciences, and more importantly by the sciences themselves. And as we know—elsewhere (in his now famous 'What is enlightenment?') Kant had made a similar point: before our chosen public (say, the scholar and his audience, the scientist and his audience, the poet, and his audience) and Kant calls this private, we are free to criticize, but in public we must obey. Freedom to pursue truth is a private matter belonging to the faculties, the government with no claim to truth cannot allow you such a freedom and function. But this search for truth in unbounded private freedom, did it happen really? Then why would we have good minds arguing for autonomy of private institutions to select, edit, change, or transform an expressive content[3] as it thinks so? The assertion has a historic background. But this has become possible because the private forum with its reading or viewing or listening public has transformed its relation to truth itself. Kant says that government sanctions or rejects because it has no intrinsic relation to truth; I'll argue both ways, anything that has no relation to truth—sanctions (or censors because this criticism has coercive power), and anything that censors has no relation to truth. And because nobody believes that a newspaper or for that matter a capitalist is bound to (publish) true facts or opinion, it needs to censor; I'll say further that- it must.

Following Kant then—only unbounded seeking of truth—that too along with a specialized private audience—need not be coerced and censored or are not censorial agencies. But then when truth is 'distorted beyond recognition', what is that? It is worse than censorship. Kant could have given it a better name.

But still, if you are censored in one house, you can go to another—my able argumentative opponent—Shuddhabrata seems to be arguing somewhere in his submission. (This is the *private contractual freedom* of a wage labourer as if, you are free to sell your word power to another capitalist, but obey wherever you go

(a reversal of Kant) since the laws are the same. And you go to another house and they have their own scissors. Instead of one censorious authority, you have numerous. This is the pluralisation of the church today. We can still file a case against state censors and win the case (Taslima Nasreen did win one) but who has filed a case and won it against our numerous civil censors?

Censorship is everywhere because our relationship to truth needs to be censored, always, everywhere. A personalytic ethical critique beginning with the private/public divisions and inserting the question of consent and permissibility (which is sometimes a relata of truth) shows this by disclosing it.[4]

However, here is the second debate.

PERSONALYTIC ETHICS IN BETWEEN CONSENT AND PERMISSION: MODEL DEBATE TWO

Once when Nietzsche said that any act done out of love is beyond good and evil, we rememorate him by repeating that the personal is beyond the private and the public, and all predicates of these two binaries, too. I shall document one instance of this beyond: private (e.g., sex by consent) and public (governance by) consent. That is, while being irreducible to the private and the public, the personal spans, grasps, straddles both. How like a whistling windmill, it overwhelms and escapes both will be pursued in the book, here let me inscribe it within a stable narrative and a visible binary. Let us start with an exemplary, nearly historical instance.

There has been a veritable revolution in the context of rape laws in India—which—not to exaggerate—inscribes within its contours all possible progressive logic and parameters. But, though it seems so, have these been really liberating? Because the central signifier in all such rulings, judgments and legislation is- consent and the absence of consent—evinced contextually by examining all possible oral and circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish the charge of rape. This emphasis—rather over emphasis on consent also coincidentally coincides with Section 375 IPC where consent is the fundamental paradigm for a trial of rape. So far so good. But applied to the contemporary Indian situation, does this theory of

rape based on the valorization of consent hold water—in the face of what I shall call a personalytic objection? I have grave doubts.

My first example is the rape of Christian nuns, and the second one is the vexed question of teenage rapes—both well publicized and have had been the center of immense creative and destructive debate. One might begin this exercise—by asking—is it theoretically correct to say that a nun has been *raped*?—Since rape in Indian law and also to the law-sensitive feminists is—sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent. Now, what does it mean to say that one has forced sex on a nun without her consent? This question arises because when it is said that one has had sex with somebody without the other's consent, it is assumed that sex should have been had with the others consent; invoking it here- is it then expected to have "consensual" sex with a nun? This sexual expectation -inherent in the rape-law is ridiculous! Since the nun has had herself excluded from the worldly discourse of consent—the day she had decided to become a nun: thus, she has had herself excluded from the erotic practices of the body (sexual conduct) altogether; no sex (what to say of consensual sex), no sentimental biology for her. Her absence—rather her impossibility of consent has therefore to be presupposed than examined by the court; and any investigation into such matter would be at the cost of underwriting the dignity of her existential identity (of being a nun).

But is it not possible for a nun—even privately—to have consensual sex with somebody? A twofold answer is possible of which the first one is this: A nun, as argued before, because of her existential identity cannot do this. Her faith requires—she doesn't act as a private individual i.e. she cannot be a nun and have sex by consent at the same time. The moment she does that, she will have abolished her identity as a nun i.e. by having to practice corruption or after having become an ordinary civil-sexual woman.

Secondly, we are not interested in the private nature of consent but in its *permissible* nature, i.e. any instance of consent (giving or acquiring) which is not socially, customarily approved (otherwise incestuous relationships might be based on such a consent) is no consent at all. Permissibility is the limit where consent itself is a gift

of doubtful certainty; the point where we engage with the legitimacy of consent itself. Given such a view of consent, methodologically speaking, sex by consent—for a nun is thus based on our wrong preconception of consent. Accepted—we need to harp on a crucial distinction: that between consent and permission. All these events consisting of relationships that are based on a mutual 'affirmation' but rejected by the larger (collective, customary, group-personal) governing ego—all belong to the realm of *permission* rather than consent.

Consent is the immediate affirmation and negation (yes and no of private individuals) which might exist separated even from a group-personal will i.e. it may not have anything to do with any moral law; it can be anti-social, un-social, a-social—anything in nature. Being separated from a collective-will, consent is fated to be highly privative in nature rather than collectively social—I might say 'yes' and mean 'no' (when the feminists emphasize the denial of a sexual offer by holding effective- "no means no"—they actually make the mistake of trying to make consent group-ethical in nature or, mistaking the private personal for the group personal—which is foundationally impossible). In fact, it is permission which could enjoy such an attribution; it must have something to do with not consent but consensus—that is—when I'm having sex with you, it is not that I allow you to have sex with me, but I agree to have sex with you and vice versa; and permissibility also implies that not only us, given such a situation, everybody would have agreed with me and you. Consent therefore when foregrounded in the broader group-personal consensus becomes permission which cannot allow a person to act in a manner which is not communally or group sensually approved. Consent has no such stakes. A personalytic ethic is hinged at this cusp in between consent and permission, their mutative alterity and unpredictable, indeterminate plurality—given the playfulness of the person.

Based on a mix up between these two, and while valorizing consent (sex by consent to governance by consent) at the cost of neglecting permissibility, similar erroneous arguments were advanced when the media reported two or three incidents of

"minor teenage rapes"—not knowing that it is just ridiculous to say that the minor teenage boys had raped the minor teen girl. Since having been under the "age of consent" (the lower limit being sixteen) neither the girl could give her consent nor the boys were entitled to ask for it. This is the same situation as that in the case of the nun. When the (minor)boy and the girl are excluded from the world of consent (the nun had excluded herself on her own), it is simply banal to invoke the absence of consent and describe the phenomenon as rape; since *the presence of consent would have been disapproved too*. In fact consent, can never be present here, it is already outside of it. Therefore, a personalytic ethic will regulate that any theory or law based solely on consent is bound to fail to address these situations. All these might be theorized as instances of excesses which the rape law cannot corroborate, nor can any feminist legal theory. The way out is to put this sign of rape under erasure and rewrite it by other means so that its limitations are suspended for the time being.

As a demonstration—consider the "rape" of Christian nuns for the last time (one can consider the violation of Hindu or Muslim women in times of pogrom, too). They were (and still are) committed—as we know- not for personal sexual gratification but to degrade a community; most of all-to degrade the church (or the Hindus or the Muslims etc.). Here as we see, the sexual nature of rape is absent; rape instead of being an end-here is a *means* to achieve a political (a group-personal telos) and not a sexual end. Now, can the word rape which considers rape as solely an event of non-consensual, private sexual intercourse account for this? No! Then what we do is—we erase the word rape (with all its legal-cultural and private—consensual baggage) and choose to write over it a regional Indian equivalent of the word, say—*dharshan* (in Bengali). The word *dharshan* in its original etymological sense entails the notion of jealousy, anger and oppression; or oppression inspired by anger and jealousy; or, trying to defeat somebody (here a particular community) because it involves the ego. Therefore, what rape cannot convey, *dharshan* can. Similarly *balatkar* in hindi—may be used to describe instances of sheer force and *izzat*

lootna—to name events where different kinds of dignity/honour (different in the case of a nun and a civilian woman) are involved. Recently I viewed an old documentary film featuring a Dalit woman, who—not knowing the word rape—says *mujhpe gandha kaam kiya gaya hai* (the dirty job has been done to me) and all the notion of symbolic pollution is suddenly conveyed.

The need then is to move beyond the sexual limits of rape-and see how it is aligned with other forms of 'legitimate' social political and a sexual violence (refer to jealousy, anger, force, [invisible] oppressions, [permissible] pollutions etc. partially available in the above catalogue. But this will be difficult if we stick to the unit word rape with its timeless socio- legal, private- consensual baggage. So, the moment we erase the word rape and supplement its lack with other same but different words (*dharsan, balatkar* etc.) we start considering rape in its difference—(where it is not sexual) and not in in its sameness—(where it is over and above a sexual crime).

Therefore, personalytic ethic is the only one of its kind which sets deconstruction to work—while it travels the distance between consent and permission, private and public and unhinges them all in difference and unity.

IV

Now, having begun and engaged with post-personalist personalytic ethics in social work as a form of helping and several public forms of argument (rape laws or censorship), it is time we chart out the chapters in a phased manner.

AN ACCIDENT OF PARTS AND CHAPTERS

In Chapter 1 Nietzsche, who critiqued the Aristotelian tradition for destroying the personal force of the poetic metaphor found among the Pre-Socratics, has been recovered (energized by Heraclitus) as perhaps the first philosopher of the personal. The way Nietzsche charts the conflict of aesthetic singularity as against that of material singularity, and then projects Homer as a collective personality—a poet representing an age, pioneeringly illuminates

aspects of the person/al and its philosophic history. This initial provocation has been argued in this chapter to have the power to dispute, even demolish, the major observations of the (negative) dialectical philosophers of the enlightenment: Adorno and Horkheimer, among others—who repetitively, and vehemently, configure the mythic nature of the enlightenment. The problem of mythology and enlightenment is found to have had the final resolution in Schelling who harbours the "being of the people" coeval with mythic personification and fabulous disaggregation.

The second chapter is the core chapter of this book since it foundationally lays the personal as not the private and beyond the private/public binary. I demonstrate that the slogan 'Personal is Political' has been deployed by feminism and feminist social work as an invitation to all of us to take oppressive private matters for public-political redressal. What is glossed over in this urgency is that the personal has been allowed to coincide with the private! This chapter argues that the personal is not the private and urging us to go beyond private/public binaries, it concludes that personalist social work—in its post-personalist phase (which I have named 'personalytical') reckons better with this corrective to aid feminist social work in the latter's emancipatory journey. It moots a personalytic ethics of the unknown and anticipates with all the relational force that the new social work commits itself to—an era and area of the strangers—the anonymously bygones and similar others.

Part II deals with two recent trends in rights based social work where the person of the human and even the personality of non-human animals feature in a predictable (!) manner. Chapters III and IV demystify this in curious ways and with a certain overarching telos.

In chapter III, I argue that if suffering is personal, human rights could address suffering by being personal only. But, human rights, strikingly enough, is indifferent to suffering. If I suffer I have human rights, if I don't, still I have human rights; if I make other people suffer, I have human rights, if I enjoy suffering, I have them intact. This indifference is to reckon with the indeterminate personal nature of suffering. Further, human rights

if plotted against humanity—makes human rights loose much of its broad transcendental appeal, and albeit—expose itself—to a kind of group personal claim where capital punishment marks an empirical threshold. To elaborate on the above in a few more words: against the backdrop of a longstanding allegation that the death penalty in India is rarely or never awarded to the rich and the powerful, this chapter (Chapter Three) questions the politically neutral status of punishment in positive law and also the politically neutral status of human rights being upheld as universal moral rights. The above—situated within the broader polemics on capital punishment, the structural genesis of international society and the sociology of law, culture, nature, and suffering -argues that to confront the allegedly discriminatory nature of capital punishment being awarded only to the poor and the rebels, the human rights movement needs to align itself—in turn—with political forces which would challenge the former. Noticeably, such an assertion is also broached -aggressively—against the discursive contours of social philosophical arguments where stalwarts like John Rawls have hailed human rights to be, or ought to be, politically neutral.

Chapter IV engages with the apparent 'non-persons'—the animals. This is also necessary if we want to chart a transition from the legal juridical obsession of human rights culture and activity to ethical methodologism implicit in our plotting of the journey of the discursive appropriation of the animals by applied sociology to social work. The point is, does ethics and moral philosophy as such—require an appropriate discourse and a discursive sieve through which it would anchor and mobilize itself? Rememorating the need for social theory in Habermas, I argue ethics—and my brand of a personalytic ethic in particular—requires applied sociology to melt into social work in order to aid the discussion at the dialectical site of the concrete. But my version of applied sociology and a post-personalist social work are very different from the mainstream, institutional understanding of them, as would be poetic sociology—the last discursive requirement of our ethics. But on a cautionary note again, I've not spared many sentences on the theory of such a discursive requirement (in contrast to the authoritative view where ethics or moral philosophy are

considered free standing and suffer a peculiar kind of thrift and adequation). The demonstrative explication is self-explanatory—I suppose. Thereby, while proposing a frank revision for all to deal with the allegedly (animal) 'others', this chapter (IV) recuperates a counter enlightenment predicament to bring into relief two conventions of thinking: the social legislative tradition germane to what we call (animal aware) Applied Sociology and the voluntary ethical tradition more implicit in what we call (animal integrated) Social Work. Testing them theoretically, and ethno-empirically by exploring-synoptically through-ethical awareness contexts at the site of a zoo, a proposed transition from 'rule bound' (animal aware) Applied Sociology to a 'will bound' (animal integrated) Social Work is found to have been crucial in giving the former the ethical methodological handle to intervene and deal with the animal others—thriving in severe phenomenological interaction with us, you and them. Interestingly, *skeptical* and *pretense awareness contexts* are the exciting personalytical algorithms in the chapter holding the interpretive key.

In Chapter V, the question of animals, humans and terrorism is broached within a multi complex of discourses, and discursive apparitions. The journey from applied sociology to social work cannot be rested at a stable space, and therefore is brought forward to a poetic sociology (inspired by the tracts of poetic justice—elsewhere),—where the terror-insinuations are tropologically handled automatically and—perhaps too well. The summary of such an escalation is this: while literature and sociology are separately signifying, discursive practices, their use in unison has been limited to either the sociology 'of' literature or a sociology 'through' literature. This chapter—while demonstrating these two approaches as doubly mistaken, innovates—with two annotated poems—a more or most literary, poetic sociology—where the self-deconstructive writing that happens in the event of a poem, undergoes a destructive mutation being contaminated by the *sociale*: they cannot be sundered in annotation, cannot be gleaned from a unity a priori. The moments of circus animals and the personal avalanche of a lone 'warrior' with irremediable

grievances become symptomatic of a personalytic ethic where helping becomes nearly infinite and ironical.

In Chapter VI 'Habermas And Social Work Ethics' and Chapter VII: 'Discourse Ethics and Empowerment: A personalytic interruption' I deal with the debatable kinship between social work and discourse ethics willing to demarcate a further limit for an ethical indeterminacy that so peculiarly marks our personalytic ethic.

In Chapter VI the ongoing debate on Communicative or Discourse Ethics, Habermas, and his relevance to social work in *The British Journal of Social Work* (extended to the relevance of communicative ethics in family or child care conferences in institutional settings) has been critically summed up and weighed for its correctness in terms of contributions. Culling out certain strands of the debate, this chapter attempts to assemble some of the matrix-arguments essayed so far, secondly, (using the Habermasian predication itself) test the validity claims raised in them and finally, put them in a perspectival frame—so that we are able to infer a possible world of applied sociology, social work theory and pedagogy which would disturb the contemporary academic status quo in social work—seemingly self-complacent with its distance from the so called French or German high theory in which Habermas finds his renowned place. Our personalytic ethic comes up clearly when we emphatically insert that the real flourishing, speculative moment that could contaminate even Discourse ethics is when controversial norms come in to modify the enhanced picture, and there the self-generating and self-problematising potential gets tested,—apart from the question of self-validation.

Chapter VII begins with an interrogative surprise: Is there a corporate social work with a corporate personality? Do business corporations—as a part of their 'ethical-social responsibility' aim to socially empower community people by enhancing their basic 'capability' registers? While the newly acquired critical conscience has made social work ethics self-reflexive and thus interrogative about a lot of concept-metaphors taken for granted in traditional social work discourse, the language of 'empowerment' seems to

have bullied this apocalyptic, experimental eye. All the negative affects of power are lost in the blood of positive nonchalance that seem to promise the granting of power to the people (people's empowerment)—as if. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) leading to social empowerment (which is we term- Corporate social work (CSW)- thus is affirmed in many ways than one. This chapter instead of an external (typical of the radical) disavowal—offers through a theoretical and an empirical problematic an internal unpacking of the concept metaphor 'empowerment' where 'empowerment', 'doing empowerment' and 'being empowered' are demonstrated to be completely separate registers awaiting an ethical reckoning. Having completed this separation—however, the chapter proposes a personalytic ethical monitoring (which would be a 'failed' monitoring of course) of the capability approach where empowerment participates only as a ('three-way') fractured phrase in dispute.

Chapter VIII celebrates deception, fakeness, irresponsibility, indifference, and risk in a defamiliarized manner—to say the least. A *Bandh* (mass closure or general strike) frequently invoked by political parties from their urban headquarters in Calcutta (now Kolkata) gives unbridled opportunities to those who hate work and love leisure, love the bedroom rather than the boring office, serve the senses rather than serve others. No wonder that the media together with the development and growth minded expert mushrooms condemn this 'culture of bandh' in Kolkata in increasingly harsher terms. 'work', 'work culture', 'responsibility', 'the city's image' etc.,—are the root metaphors that run riot in this discourse. The chapter scrutinizes these warm predications. Again, Kolkata—otherwise a cheap city—also engenders euphoric dreams of white elephants at an affordable price. Even though it did not materialize, the mythopoetics of a grand sale of Chinese goods in May 2001 continues in the wake of fake china bazaars held at various transit points in the city. This lust for cheapness haunts and degrades the image of consumption, which is often taken advantage of by unscrupulous traders—thus opine the self-appointed development experts. Hawkers with their cheap knick-knacks flooding the Kolkata streets are removed or fake hawkers

by big traders are introduced in their stead. Dreams die, but the dreams of cheap things die hard. However, what is the effect of this virtual china? What kind of dumping is this—the second one? What kind of mimetic act is cheating? What perversions stir the desire for dumped goods of the associational dustbin? Who are these who enjoy this cheap chirping? What kind of risk and responsibility is left to them in their private moments? Why are they left out by the traditional disciplinary studies? Is it because they fear commodity fetishism of this kind? Is this related to the way the history of cricket excludes match fixing lest the reality of cricket matches is brought to a revelatory crisis? How do we grasp the nature and content of the discourse that is so shameless in its deliberate anticipatory exclusion? This, as we will argue, is the moment of pure politics, and a pure political ethic albeit a pure personalytic ethic which by an indirect maneuver comes to fruition in the conclusion.

In conclusion, instead of a traditional summary, I have offered what a personalytic ethic could do (besides participating in two canonical debates in the Introduction) to intervene and put aside a care-ethic in the wake of a care-epistemology. The occasion emanates from an Issue of one of the widest circulated journals in India and the world (EPW May 16, 2015) which regulates that—men can be feminists and they can contribute to feminist knowledge when they make 'care' an intellectual virtue and 'care epistemology' their choicest mode: this affirmative answer by the authors' is broached through an autobiographical mapping of each of the author's 'towards feminism' journey. In the context of our intervention, the articles seem, and is shown to have violated the same 'care-epistemic' principles they had set for themselves. And this reflexive critique, let us remind here, married to a personalytic ethic should seem revelatory here. A close reading displays why care epistemology lacks a fit with the agenda in question -and autobiography, ethnography and care could never accompany each other well. Finally, we conclude that if a man feigns—successfully-to empathetically share a woman's pain and experience, or emulates to be a feminist and do feminism, the political uncertainty that is unleashed cannot be circumscribed or thwarted by either a

feminist care ethics or care epistemology-who could support even forcible or 'coercive care'. This indeterminacy drags us into a pure, political terrain much beyond a simple epistemological or a care-ethical one. It is only a personalytic ethics that could bestow us with an alternative, new politics.

NOTES

1. Immanuel Kant, 'Religion within the boundaries of mere reason' in his *Religion and Rational Theology*, Trans. & Ed. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996, p. 60.
2. 'The conflict of the faculties' p. 248, in Ibid., pp. 237-327.
3. This cannot be reduced to the mere addressing of the structured infelicities—unless they are substantively indispensable—and are required to make sense.
4. I have left out Partha Chatterjee's question he asked in his 'Our modernity' as to why the Kantian use of the private and public did not become popular i.e., now we think public sphere is where we should disagree and debate (for Kant it is the private), and that a government should allow it publicly to become democratic; the private is the realm where we cannot transcend a particular standpoint (for Kant it is the standpoint of the Government). To Chatterjee's question I think I'm closing in on an answer which I shall be able to provide soon. It is the Kantian notion of truth and its relation to particular faculties that is behind such a formulation. Secondly, while talking about truth, in order to remain faithful to the Kantian use, I have avoided raising the question of dissensus on truth, how truth is the longest lie, a construction, a fiction etc. etc. (this will not affect Kant's project though]. More productive would be how different discourses appear with different truth claims in modernity: for Habermas they are morality, science and art and this could affect the Kantian project; but let it be somewhere else.

PART ONE

Personalytic Interruption & Helping Forms

And now gayman Tangier's, simple into property's isolation wooden
'The best man is still drunk'
the worst man is empty. And hidden half fully
in a sudden Hume and zero's limit suicide
as absolute to me now made sure
sitting on the edge of an age old average crazy boom
That was the first coin I had, the second: clown.

Wealth's baby fruit - who ran up to victory
faced the concept that faced defeat
then an improper attention paid as clue
circular to this last economy's Greece honeymoon
Out path shadow—fighting why money! Why money!
Save me...!! Save my doom!!!

And the winter I knew by heart I bought
speculated money, cold reserve and coin moon
And seeing the book burning
Wiped the reader wide out of pages and pages of cities flying
far Findley

To come back and find
the tree now stood a capitalist on my door and won't move.

('The origins of private property' in Chatterjee, Arnab 2017a)

CHAPTER 1

Heraclitus, Hegel to Adorno

A Philosophical Genealogy of the Personal

> From now on conditions will favour more extensive structures of mastery, the like of which have never yet been seen. And there's something even more important: …a new, tremendous aristocracy built upon the harshest self-legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of violence and artist tyrants is made to last for thousands of years:…to take the destinies of the earth in hand, to sculpt at 'man' himself as artists. In short: the time is coming where we will learn to think differently about politics.
>
> —NIETZSCHE 2003: 71

This work began in the year 2000 with a will to write the philosophical history of helping.

Helping is not a neuter activity on the brink of the unknown. Helping is also *comprehension:* a way of understanding. By helping, we understand others. -So much is generalizable and tolerable—even predictable and one might justly offer a reprimand that –so far—there is nothing so original and uncomfortable about this; but the moment we stake on a more radical claim like—*Those who don't help, don't understand others*, there would be discomfort for sure and would seem that thought is being pushed to its limits. To invoke this within the context of social work would be very tough and alarming an object, yet we could—within our scarce realm—make a beginning. Consider first the transcendental claims innate in a speech act (truth, sincerity, rightness), the principles of charity

necessary in interpretation-a lack of fit in between and that leads to an absence of understanding others; the proposition could be regulated otherwise too: *those who don't understand others, don't help*. Here help is not a gift or an offering but a matter of hermeneutic comprehension as a "task." Therefore helping the others—where others are particular forms of expressions (disabled, widow, orphan etc.), presupposes an understanding un-encompassed by their identities. If the *ugly* had required an inscription—"a carving into, branding into, stamping onto…forms of psychological and physical martyrdom" that Nietzsche counts among the "mnemotechncs" of the will, like quartering, breaking on the wheel, flaying and castrating,"[1] then when *we* confront the ugly we've met with what other people and their interpretations have done to or inscribed unto these people "[b]eautiful as the expression of a *victorious* will, of increased co-ordination, of a harmonizing of all the strong desires, of an infallibly perpendicular stress."[2] Beauty is beautiful because in it "opposites are tamed; the highest sign of power, namely power over opposites; therefore without tension.. everything follows, obey[s]"[3] and becomes the artist's delight. In ugliness this harmony and "equilibrium is lacking: the ugly limps , the ugly stumbles: antithesis to the divine frivolity of the dancer."[4] This is will as writing or speech, grammatolgical habit—till the time comes when the will is compelled to will itself which is, in essence, a sort of a non-will (not withstanding the question—can the will will itself?), or, in other words, one says yes to one's 'no' or that it *affirms* in acceptance, "I'm ugly (i.e., useless, non-beneficent, life-diminishing[5] or "decline, impoverishment of life, impotence, disintegration, degeneration"[6]): as you would have it." This is the standpoint that vouches for Nietzsche's "interested"[7] interpretation of beauty or ugliness, as against Kant's "impersonality and universality."[8] Nietzsche, to contest Kant, calls for meditation on the above as "a great *personal* fact and experience, as an abundance of vivid authentic experiences, desires, surprise[s]"[9] and therefore when beauty—in the Schopenhauerian strain—arouses the will[10] and beauty is itself the victorious will, the ugly is the degenerated and the defeated, it douches and diffuses the will of the bearer and the spectator both. But one might still argue, this identity

or the self-affirmative declaration of it (or what Kant called the "personality" by which the moral law becomes humanely living and distinguishable from animality—a rider on his supposedly universality) is the willing of an *a-identity* or that what is not one's own, still an *other's* (I'm poor, orphan and [ugly] but this is not my own, this is not my self; it is imposed, somebody else's—that I'm bound to bear as a trenchant burden). With this interpretive willingness, help (ing) becomes a hermeneutic task, a performance: *Those who don't help, don't understand others.* (That helping is itself a form of ressentiment is a question we shall deal with later.[11])

But, well—for that matter—who is an Other? Even at the bewildering risk of de-contextualizing Henry James, here is a snapshot from 'The Turn of the Screw'

"…Of course we have the others."
"We have the others—we have indeed the others," I concurred.
"Yet even though we have them," he returned, still with his hands in his pockets and planted there in front of me, "they don't much count, do they?"
I made the best of it, but I felt wan. "It depends on what you call 'much'!"
"Yes"—with all accommodation—"everything depends!" On this, however, he faced to the window again and presently reached it with his vague, restless, cogitating step. He remained there awhile, with his forehead against the glass, in contemplation of the stupid shrubs I knew and the dull things of November.[12]

Who is an Other? Levinas answers –not quite metaphysically— "the stranger, the widow, and the orphan," the victim and her shadow. Poor God appears in this poverty; truth in persecution.

To manifest … as allied with the vanquished, the poor, the persecuted—is precisely not to return to the order…through this solicitation of the beggar, and of the homeless without a place to lay his head—at the mercy of the bidding of the one who welcomes—humility disturbs absolutely; it is not of the world. Humility and poverty are a bearing within being—an ontological (or meontological) mode—and not a social condition. To present oneself in this poverty of the exile is to interrupt the coherence of the universe.[13]

Do they call for help? Yes, but while not wanting to be helped.

"people rarely really want to be helped."[14] But then the Other has to be formulated in and through language and thus language precedes the Other and formulates it later: as an answer to such discursive skepticism of the structuralist and to the problem whether the other is thematized by and through language, Levinas has to say this, "Language cannot encompass the other: the other, the concept of whom we are using at this very moment is not invoked as a concept, but as a person. In speech, we do not just think of the interlocutor, we speak to him."[15] Papering over the speech as presence, of immediate voice consciousness debate, here—the concept is not (as) a concept but (as) a person. This is possible, because, the concept of a concept is not a concept but a metaphor. Is the metaphor more of a life in its singularity, livid and joyously robust? One recalls Nietzsche's famous disjunction with Aristotle. He shows, how the concept effaces the metaphor and drowns personality, "metaphor foregrounds the 'personality' which is effaced by and in the concept." We can only understand and not be understood. The concept of concepts; the concept of all concepts—the person—is the maniacal metaphor. Helping is coming in as third—as justice[16] "helping cannot be given, it can only be offered" so that it could be refused. In a constellation as Benjamin would have it and in the spurious striving of the dialectical image—they all stay as one and still preserve a will to separation. "In the course of such criticism the concept of myth becomes secularized. Fate, which begins as the guilt of the living, becomes that of society: 'So long as one beggar remains, there is still myth.'"[17] And it is difficult to conjure up the inbuilt terror within myth that is as opaque to reconciliation or reconciliation as myth.[18] Now we understand why the beggar repels and the lack of money is a terror and the scenic insulation—is, ugly. Social work is interested not so much in the resurrection of the dead but more in "the restitution of distorted life".[19] The destructive details of this distortion must emerge from the voluntary fragmentation of the image of the life which has not yet begun—the bourgeoisie. This image must be devilishly broken to manufacture the beggar as the broken mirror of the identity—now upset.

ADORNO'S CRITIQUE OF PERSONALISM

Whatever for us, for Adorno the person is an "ideological mischief."[20] The aim of Adorno's trenchant and assaulting critique is evident: the *ethical personalism* of Max Scheler; and his discomfort is all the more clear, "Reflection on society does not occur in ethical personalism, no more than reflection on the person itself. Once detached entirely from the universal, the person cannot constitute a universal either; the universal is received in secret, then, from extant forms of rule."[21] Rule and role—for Adorno are both depersonalized forms of 'existential' ontology. The ethical personalism, finally, has to take recourse to the 'existenz'—the being "there is." Adorno's problematic,- that he confers upon the person is—the unity of consciousness and the immediate reflection that brings forth the person is—denyingly—but derivatively extracted from the universal; this notwithstanding, "the cogitative distress of coming to doubt the legitimacy of the universal makes the person withdraw to itself."[22] This inwardness is insufficient the moment it wants to reach a "point beyond the person"[23] and become objective—as in Hegel. This argument is crucial to Adorno's own project: this he delivers through a dilemma. While the illiterate same-ness of self consciousness through time has been constitutive of the person, through this it comes to a realization which is, in reality, contrary: the self is yet to come into its own. This helps Adorno hazard that self alienation is thus impossible and it is strange and adventureous that, in schizophrenia—at times—appears "the truth of the subject"[24] and likewise—in deep seated distortions—the secret scarlet of being. The memory of the lost community is recuperated through therapy. "If the role, the heteronomy prescribed by autonomy, is the latest objective form of an unhappy consciousness, there is, conversely, no happiness except where the self is not itself."[25]Adorno has arrived at his own point of affirmative—no return: the person is the utmost person when s/he is no more the person s/he is.[26] The self constituted subjectivity—the principle of "character" is thus thrown in a deep and disturbing disarray:

It is not the personal side of men that would have to be conceived as their intelligible character; it is what distinguishes them from their existence. In the person, this distinguishing element necessarily appears as non-identity.[27] What ever stirs in a man contradicts his unity. Every impulse in the direction of better things is not only rational, as it is to Kant; before it is rational, it is also stupid. Men are human only where they do not act, let alone posit themselves, as persons; the diffuseness of nature, in which they are not person[s].[28]

This can be turned easily against Adorno himself with a slice of Levinas. What happens when men intend not to act or vanish from the act at half mast?

Reaching out my hand to pull a chair toward me, I have folded the arm of my jacket, scratched the floor, and dropped my cigarette ash. In doing what I willed to do, I did a thousand and one things I hadn't willed to do. The act was not pure; I left traces. Wiping away these traces, I left others…Thus we are responsible beyond our intentions.[29]

This positing could be extended to argue that men act even when they do not act (join Beckett). I touch a table and go away and enter apparent passivity; but still I leave a trace. I act even when I've stopped acting. I'm intelligent in my stupidity. The hardest blows are given—as Nietzsche says—in left hand, and with eyes in blind fold. Therefore non-identity cannot but occupy only one pole; the consciousness in difference is neither identity nor non-identity.

Social work—as a structure of helping, to resume, is thus a narrative of distorted identities—the self-and non-self calibrated. But how to go about this except through style? But style, as we've had from Derrida meditating on Nietzsche, is *stylus* or pen or *stiletto* which could be used as a weapon of attack and also "as a means of protection against the terrifying, blinding, moral threat (of that) which *presents* itself, which obstinately thrusts itself into view. And style thereby protects the presence, the content, the thing itself, meaning, truth—on the condition atleast that it should not *already* (*deja)* be that gaping chasm which has been deflowered in the unveiling of the difference."[30] The stylus leaves a mark wherefrom it withdraws—this is the gap—the difference: it is the signature—

hinged in between its setting to work and withdrawal. The Style is the signature. But what is that against which Nietzsche requires to guard himself? It is to be remembered—however—that to avoid being pierced by the stiletto, one brings in the defence—but still it is an-other presence which opens up—and despite withdrawal—when the threat is over, a mark or a trace has been let; that is the signature in the interval of the in between. Predominantly, that is the style. Nietzsche cannot leave it even when he abandons it, or, in other words, Nietzsche's appeal to the style of the pre-Socratics becomes his own *personal* style. Nietzsche adopts the rapier in the act of protecting himself from it and thus, obliquely and unknowingly perhaps, makes it his own. This is all the more evident when Nietzsche critiques and parodies Kant to make a case for not allowing to invent *personal* virtues for self defence:

> Any virtue should be our invention, the most personal form of our defence, and necessary to this end. In any other sense, it is dangerous. Anything, that does not condition our life *damages* it: virtue believed in merely out of respect for the concept of "virtue" as Kant would have it, is dangerous. "Virtue", "duty", "good in itself", depersonalized and universalized, are ghosts, expressions of decline—the ultimate exhaustion of life, … despotism…[N]othing leads to a more complete ruin than "impersonal" duty, that sacrifice to the Moloch of abstraction.[31]

NIETZSCHE: THE FIRST PHILOSOPHER OF THE PERSONAL?

It is strange but seems historically inevitable that Nietzsche's early writings are not or at the most no more- taken seriously—atleast philosophically—or even stylistically—and that is much due to the Heideggerian reprimand that so far as early Greek philosophy or the pre Socratics are concerned, not Nietzsche but only Aristotle's treatment in the first chapter of *Metaphysics* is learned and philosophical.[32] And Hegel is his guarded, specialist witness here. However, Heidegger is clearly wrong.

Since the Heideggerian refusal can neither invoke nor match the mood of the now famous Nietzschean anti-humanism—when he is seen to be valorizing Thales for having said "Not man but water

is the reality of things" [for] "he began to believe in nature, in so far that he atleast believed in water."[33] But this allegorical standing is just a prelude; it has to be or is already—soldered to something else, and there one finds that not only Thales, also "Pherecydes… hovers with the expression of the later in that middle region where Allegory is wedded to Mythos, so that he dares, for example, to compare the earth with a winged oak."[34] This "becomingness" is true to "that sensation, by which during an earthquake one loses confidence in the firmly-grounded earth"[35]: the oak as if then readies itself to take the trembling flight; it seems to have had—all the while- clandestine wings kept in ambitious, and opportunistic waiting. But to wed the metaphor with life affirmation, and Nietzsche as a life-philosopher is not to be fair to Nietzsche. But let us keep that aside for a while.

One of the aims of Nietzsche however has been different: to show that the philosopher in Greek culture, unlike other ones, is not "accidental." This necessity of the philosopher, the career of the cause is very different in other thinkers, for instance, Foucault. Necessity, at the outset, is the accident of accidents: "the need of slavery"[36], the need of culture, with this only the self-work by which—Foucault notes—one tends to govern one's own self leading to the will to govern others, becomes possible. And slaves are those who fail—who look away, who totter, and who are the spoilt children of thought, and thus they unendingly labour. [The philosopher lends a helping hand ala Foucault]. In this context appears the disturbingly illuminating utterance of Nietzsche:

> I believe, finally, that up to now every heightening of the human type has been the work of an aristocratic society which believed in a long ladder of order of rank and difference in value between man and man, and which had need of slavery: yes, that without the *pathos of distance*, as it arises from the deeply carved differences between the classes, from the ruling caste's constant looking outwards and downwards onto its underlings and tools, and its equally constant practice of commanding, keeping down, keeping away—without this pathos there can be no emergence of that other, more mysterious pathos, that craving for ever greater expansion of *distance within the soul itself*, the development of ever higher, rarer, remoter, wider, more encompassing states, in short (to use a moral formula in a sense beyond morality), the self overcoming of man.[37]

Few clarifications are in order: Against the too often alleged improvisation, yet, an allegation against Nietzsche's supposedly aristocratic brief, it is not difficult to discern here—as in his numerous other aphorisms—*aristocratic* means not a historical predicate but 'very few'—where the herd and slaves stand for, arguably 'too many.' The problem of such a formulation, to begin with, is ofcourse whether the *pathos of distance* is an origin or a product; whatever it is, the sign that is significant is that there is no end to the overcoming as in Nietzsche. By the pathos of distance within oneself, by self differentiation-expansion the master—artist tyrant who is the maker of man—transcends himself.

But given the image of the herd and the slaves, there was one among the pre-socratics who heralded it without compunction and companion: Heraclitus, and was not Nietzsche indebted to him for this master metaphor? Who knows? While Nietzsche was posing himself as the first tragic philosopher, his firstness, to him was cast with some doubts only because of the instance of Heraclitus—with whom—

> The affirmation of passing away *and destruction* that is crucial for a Dionysian philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, *becoming* along with a radical rejection of the very concept of 'being'.-all these are more closely related to me than anything else people have thought so far.[38]

Therefore, all these Nietzsche holds very close to his heart as having preceded him somewhat (though Nietzsche will say, in his finer moments, he (i.e., Nietzsche) precedes himself in whatever he says or does); nevertheless, we could add the *herd* and include it in its inventory. But, isn't Heraclitus being boringly, and repetitively cloistered in the realm of rivers and steps, once or twice and thus a doubtful, relentless un-becoming where as, to us, he is the first philosopher of the common (logos): Therefore no doubt that the fragment (B50) "Listening not to me but to the account, it is wise to agree that all things are one"[39] will be made much by Heidegger. But how can I listen to *the account* without having to listen to *you*? Or are they so indistinguishable in the beginning (in as much as all are one), that when you are hearing or listening to or are common with the account, a separate, different

hearing for me is not required. If we go by this, after the circle moves once and for all, all are *one* again in the end-if not in the beginning. "Every gathering is already a laying. Every laying is of itself gathering."[40] The world of the logos or the common—then is exposed in its concealment. Therefore there is no *proper* here as beheld by Heidegger in transmitting and catching up hearing with hearkening. What is *hearkening* is orienting oneself, it may appear, to the practice of this unconcealing, unconcealment. "Hearing is actually this gathering of oneself which composes itself on hearing the pronouncement and its claim. [It is on the basis of this potentiality for hearing, which is existentially primary, that anything like *hearkening [Horchen*] becomes possible[41]]. Hearing is primarily gathered hearkening. What is heard comes to presence in hearkening.[42] Hearing in this sense is not simply the "passion of the ears"; "[i]f the ears do not belong directly to proper hearing, in the sense of hearkening, then hearing and the ears are in a special situation. We do not hear because we have ears. We have ears, i.e., our bodies are equipped with ears, because we hear."[43] Anchored to this we might be able to understand now Adorno's eternally opaque but irresistible saying, "We do not understand Art; Art understands us."

Given the above analysis, it is difficult to buy Heidegger's argument that the Heraclitean Fragment (B50) enunciates in explication: "Do not listen to me, the mortal speaker, but be in hearkening to the Laying that gathers; first belong to this and then you hear properl[y]"[44] Infact the above counter-argument apart, another Heraclitean standpoint is enough to contest and cancel this assertion: We hear and we do not hear. (And there could be a silent hearing and a loud one (listening). What Heidegger sorts as "privative modes of not hearing, resisting, defying"[45] (again a turning to sleep amidst the common) could be classed as forms of loud hearing such as turning a deaf ear. Or else what would we make of Nietzsche's remorseful refrain, do they have the ears to hear me?)

For Heraclitus, the world of changeless sleep and possessing a faceless private universe is similar to "A man when he is drunk is led by a beardless boy, stumbling, not knowing where he goes, his

soul moist"; (the imagery of moistness returning with a different Greek sound now). "A dry soul is wisest and best."[46] This being led, being driven backward—as if—by ecstasy is also invoked by the image of the popular singers leading the mob—(but isn't music that what preexists knowledge-even by Nietzsche's own assumptions?) unintelligent, un-guessing as they are—divined by the notion that crowd is the teacher and crowd is there that follows not knowing, and here comes the personal virtue of peoples as the criteria of a keen comparison, "[t]hat most men are bad and few good."[47] What wonder that Heraclitus—thinking the city had already been mastered by a wicked constitution and thus refusing to write laws for the people, went to play dice with the children, instead. "When the Ephesians stood round him, he said: 'Why are you staring, you wretches? Isn't it better to do this than play politics with you?'"[48] And here we may allow Nietzsche to step in, as the philosopher of the dice, to help us comprehend the living phenomenon that has just been described: a child is the true artist who only half-finishes a game, only to resume it once again—from the rudiments or the fragments of the components constituting the game: "The child throws away his toys; but soon he starts again in an innocent frame of mind. As soon however as the child builds he connects, joins and forms lawfully and according to an innate sense of order…how the struggle of plurality can yet bear within itself law and justice."[49] Heraclitus then not by his apparent denial but his affirmation in his involvement was poised well to write or re-write the laws, in as much as—he contained and did write the laws by his auto-enacted, gestural affirmation and that too by striking an attitude: his bodily inscription—that is; and well, would *break the same laws* to start all over, again. A law breaker infact sees the inside—the inner core-contingency of all laws and breaks them to want to begin anew, afresh, and s/he does begin because "It is not, for example, the same sun [sun which is 'as broad as a human foot'[50]] which sets to-day and rises tomorrow. It is a new sun."[51] This is named by Nietzsche as the "aesthetic fundamental perception"[52] of Heraclitus. The artist born and held by his culture-and the culture held by its slaves: because without this *looking down upon*, i.e., without this pathos of distance, and subsequently

self-distance—as we've noted previously, no artist can originate-willfully, and prosper.

The Nietzschean circle seems to have completed a cycle. But does the overman—who not only transcends the man, but with the inner self distance overcomes himself—in the true Heraclitean style, is able to puncture or interrupt this quasi-dialectical, vicious circle?

For this, Nietzsche from exploring the personal principle in pre Socratic Greek Philosophers, now turns his torch on Homer. Homer had set the standards and was immensely influential or why else from Heraclitus to Aristophanes—Homer would be discarded with such vehement unanimity that Heraclitus could go to the harshest extent of wanting Homer to be 'flogged' in the open?[53] Was it just because Homer was persuaded to invoke peace in the realm of Gods and Heraclitus et. al saw 'strife' as the key and core of (cosmic/universal) history or strife as right which is also praised by Nietzsche? With this didn't Heraclitus fail to overturn, overcome the dialectical principle to come? Nietzsche poses the Homeric problem quite independently in as much as here—from having to explore the personality of preSocratic Greek philosophers, he wants to explode the Homeric personality of the poet called Homer .

ENTER PHILOLOGY: NIETZSCHE'S PROBLEM OF THE HOMERIC PERSONALITY

Nietzsche then—wants to examine the Homeric question from a rough standpoint of confrontation of antiquity with classical philology: 'scholastic barbarism' as he designates it. And his question is centered around" *the personality of Homer*."[54] The problem is whether the authorial designate 'Homer' is a singularity, or occupies the rough standpoint of plurality. When the personality of Homer is said to have manifested, "a certain standard of inner harmony is everywhere presupposed" and anything not matching the above matrix "is at once swept aside as un-Homeric." Creation of such a Homeric personality, Nietzsche concedes, could be attributed forcefully to the heritage of Aristotle-and an inability

backwards; though Aristotle rarely lives up to his own criteria and "considered Homer", in a feat of "infantile criticism," "author of the original of all comic epics." Homer, or better put, the name of "Homer" in an age beyond and backwards from Herodotus, from being an "abundance of dissimilarities" nearly met a historical vanishing point. What was meant by "Homer" at that time? "[H]as Homer's personality, because it cannot be grasped, gradually faded away into an empty name? Or had all the Homeric poems been gathered together in a body, the nation naively representing itself by the figure of Homer?"

Having demarcated the central question in a profound manner, and overcoming Aristotle, Nietzsche holds on to the problematic fraction that remarks on the single creative author as a singularity (as that in Aristotle) in *individual* or "*artistic poetry*" or against it—as in *popular poetry* where amidst an abstract "poetic *mass of people*", "individuality has no meaning". While the first group would try to restore an "original plan", the second—by emphasizing "retouchings and interpolations," and adding on "inequalities, contradictions, perplexities," wanted to obfuscate the "original setting of the work." The conflict finally boiled down to that of the popular "oral tradition "and "individual handwriting." But as a later development, Nietzsche notes, this distinction outsmarts itself and popular poetry, too, is seen to have been in need of an "intermediary individuality" [55] as mediation. However, regardless of this distinction and its impact what so ever, what are the traits from which this individuality were to be gleaned? They range from "biographical details, environment, acquaintances, contemporary events" and mixing them to gather the "wished—for individuality. But they forget that the … indefinable individual characteristics, can never be obtained from a compound of this nature." This degenerated into "The sum total of aesthetic singularity[56] which every individual perceived with his own artistic gifts, he now called Homer. This is the central point of the Homeric errors…. Homer as the composer of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is not a historical tradition, but an *aesthetic judgement*." And with the process of "aesthetic separation" (between the heroic-material and the didactic-formal or Homer and Hesiod) "the conception

of Homer gradually becomes narrower: the old material meaning of the name "Homer" as the father of the heroic epic poem, was changed into the aesthetic meaning of Homer, the father of poetry in general and likewise its original prototype." Nietzsche now is at the end of this reevaluation and hazards—that by constructing Homer as the name of an aesthetic judgement, it is not conferred upon the meaning of "merely the imaginary being of an aesthetic impossibility", but that "The design of an epic such as the *Iliad* is not an entire *whole,* not an organism; but a number of pieces strung together"[which makes "The Iliad … not a garland, but a bunch of flowers"], "a collection of reflections arranged in accordance with aesthetic rules."

By this courageous extension of the distinction between material and aesthetic singularity and declaring the name of Homer or the personality of Homer as itself an aesthetic judgement, what did Nietzsche achieve and where does he lead us-with this maneuver? Firstly, as we shall discover in later chapters, Nietzsche as the first philosopher of the personal, significantly and remarkably, hatches onto the problematic of an array of *indefinable individual characteristics* in order (not) to define—on this ground—the Homeric personality but to subsume them under that of an un-Kantian aesthetic judgement made up of discrete parts without forming an organismic whole. Secondly, Nietzsche's hint on the emergence of Homer as a collective personality: his transition from being the poet of particular works to that of the father of poetry in general; in other words, Homer collated with what Schelling called the creation of a new mythology. If we are to go with Habermas then "In the same sense, Schelling, at the end of his *System of Transcendental Idealism,* tells us that the new mythology "cannot be the invention of an individual poet, but of a new race representing, as it were, One Poet."[57] But Schelling goes far beyond in reconstructing "the new" mythology modernistically and personalistically than it is available in Habermas's cryptic comment. On this, we shall expend a few more words but not before the elaboration merited by its' heightened scrutiny in the hands of the anti-enlightenment dialecticians is discerned.

HOMERIC PERSONALITY, DIVINE PERSONIFICATION AND THE CREATION OF A NEW MYTHOLOGY: THE ENLIGHTENMENT' AMBIVALENCE OF MODERNITY-FROM SCHELLING TO ADORNO

Homer as "the basic text of European civilization"[58] and following Nietzsche the question of the Homeric personality meshing in the cult of a new mythology is recuperated as the central discourse around which the philosophical discourse of modernity is weaved. We need to address this question, in insertion, before we pursue the Greek question of the personal in its later—for instance-Roman phases. Adorno and Horkheimer in their classic *Dialectic of Enlightenment* lodges a frontal assault on the myth of enlightenment by positing myth as enlightenment where "[t]he venerable cosmos of the meaningful Homeric world is shown to be the achievement of regulative reason, which destroys myth by virtue of the same rational order in which it reflects it"; in brief—this observation resonates "[t]he late German Romantic interpreters of classical antiquity, [who] following on Nietzsche's early writings" [those which we have followed in our own elaboration] "stressed the bourgeois Enlightenment in Homer."[59] This entails a demonstration—as undertaken by Adorno and Horkheimer—"the retreat of the individual from mythic powers"[60] and the emergence of the still ill formed subject—Odyssey—conjoined, and enforced by the exemplary force of Robinson Crusoe-as another example, or, a journey in brief—from bourgeois formalism to nominalism: "From the formalism of mythic names and ordinances, which would rule men and history as does nature, there emerges nominalism—the prototype of bourgeois thinking"[61] and then, by forcefully inserting history into "mythic prehistory", "the individual(s) who parts from the collectivity…their very isolation forces them recklessly to pursue an atomistic interest."[62] The theory of rational labour or enlightenment in myth, through the energy of this interpretation, is complete. Complete and yet incomplete with a tinge of suspicion lurking somewhere in the middle. "At the Homeric level, the identity of the self is so much a function of the unidentical, of dissociated, unarticulated myths,

that it must derive itself from those myths."[63] Therefore Homer is credited with the taking over and "organizing" the myths.[64] The rational organization, suggestively, must be thriving in this labour.

To begin with, and to be with Nietzsche for a while—that this attempt at achieving material singularity must fail for Homer himself (or the collection of texts under the proper name of Homer) has already been shown. This is also required by a departure from the notion of judgement and the realm of the reader or the spectator to that of the artist. With the problem of what Nietzsche calls "aesthetic singularity" in the forefront and Homer being the name of an aesthetic judgement, our disagreement with Adorno and Horkheimer is clear: it is not the problem of subjectivity as yet but the problem of personality, Homeric personality in particular—as traced by Nietzsche; it is not the organization of myths that is at stake but the prior (dis)organization or the fragmentation of the one who is credited to have organized them. The second moot point as to the enlightenment as myth will be hinted at the end of this Section.

But to grant some credence to the other inferences, we might, before we engage, cryptically comment that the first modernist reading of the Homeric myth(s) was in the hands of Schelling and not Adorno et.al and that myth depends on reason has also been pronounced by Benjamin, earlier.[65] But Benjamin is more acute in his emphasis and warning as to, despite recognizing the ultimate resonableness of myth, where we should look and why:

> Gide does not claim that reason produced Greek myths, nor even that for the Greeks the meaning of myth lay in its rationality. What is important, rather, is how the modern meaning gains a distance from the old, and how that distance from the old interpretation is just a new closeness to myth itself, from which the modern meaning inexhaustibly offers itself up for renewed discovery.[66]

Therefore what Adorno and Horkheimer might be oblivious of is the modern, enlightened grounding of their own interpretation—and this is what Habermas attracts our attention to, but Habermas's ultimate objection to them—that "they will have to leave at least

one rational criterion intact for their explanation of the corruption of *all* rational criteria"[67] after having expounded the corruption of myth by rationality—is—as we shall show now—redundant for us. This is to acknowledge that Adorno et al.are perhaps successful in their attempt. But if enlightenment is still mythical to its very core, then the authors' reflective distance—which grants them the force of the critique is not available in myth. It is rather the distance between the mythical self comportment of a peoples faith and the contemporary rationality of critique—is where the crux of the resolution lies. And the man who accomplishes this feat is Schelling. This would entail two or three consequences: As we've said before, with Schelling we shall discover not the emergence of atomistic bourgeois subjectivity in Homeric mythology but rather a people's coming into "being": "peoples' being"; secondly, while Schelling all the way precedes Adorno et.al in historicizing the mythical Gods, that he does not accomplish by plotting a mythical prehistory before history, but only *after*wards; thirdly and finally, the most crucial point for our own project and undertaking: if the allegorical albeit symbolical[68] self-mediation of myth is admitted—and Schelling seems to be doing so, then the problem of personification (Gods as civil or natural historical metaphors) that is central to mythology takes a cramped, yet fabulous turn: the often improvised allegation, and even Schelling reverts to it, that it is the absence of formal or scientific language—even the poverty of all languages—generates personification, then symbolically speaking and from within a connotative semiotic—all personification are signifiers of a masked impersonality and universality; now granting this, mythology as myth can still hold sway or cast its blinding spell only when it is exorcised out of this scientific impersonality and become independent using impersonality's own techniques—perhaps. So Adorno etal. can't have it both ways. Therefore, by way of the problem of personification, the way myth persists even in enlightenment is answered by Schelling—for us—in a more plausible manner.

With Schelling then, the centre is weaved around mythology, which—besides being symbolically grounded in nature—even

in personification (when they are thinking of gods they are thinking of some or other natural forces and therefore thinking of something else—as signs) as the "history of the gods"[69] who the Hellenics, endorsed by Herodotus, owed to Hesiod and Homer.[70] This is to reconstruct their positions—not as outside of "historical relations" but as "historical beings": "the full concept of mythology is for this reason not to be a mere system of the gods, but rather the *history of gods*."[71] While the central thrust of Adorno and Horkheimer's assault on enlightenment thinking is the plotting of prehistory against history ("the interaction of prehistory and history proper"[72]), Schelling poses mythology not as prior to history and thus inaccessible, but rather as after history when the time of myth begins. (Infact this is the same sensibility that helped Benjamin to arrive at the stark observation—where to confront the vicious circle of mythic fate, it proposes interrupting that what always goes on without change and "enciphers the utopian experience in a dialectical image[73]—the new within the always-the-same. The reversal of modernity into primal history" [74]: this aided Benjamin to propose history as prehistory and thereby displacing the position of myth as primordial or pre-historical.[75]) To resume, even the personalities meant in myths are not gods parading as "superhuman beings belonging to a higher order; rather, human historical beings and also actual events are meant… events of the human or civil history. The gods are only heroes, kings, legislators exalted to divinities; or when, as in today, finance and trade are major considerations, seafarers, discoverers of new routes of trade, founders of colonies, etc."[76] And therefore, Schelling goes on,

> The so called miraculousness of the Homeric epic poem is no objection against it. It has an actual foundation in the system of the gods, which from the standpoint of the poet is already available and accepted as true. The miraculous becomes the natural because gods, who intervene in human affairs, belong to the actual world of that time and are appropriate to the order of things once the latter is believed in and taken up into the ideas of that time. If, however, Homeric poetry [*Poesie*] has as its background the full totality of the belief in gods, how could one again make poetry the background for this totality. Obviously nothing preceded the full totality that was only possible after it and was mediated by it itself.[77]

If it is the modern project of demythologization, then for Schelling personification is, at a second remove, another stepping stone: "A second gradation would then be to say that no gods are meant in mythology at all; neither proper and real nor improper and unreal, no personalities, but rather impersonal objects that are only represented poetically as persons. Personification is the principle of this method of explanation; either ethically customary or natural properties and phenomena are personified."[78] If this is right, then the impersonal and universalizing aesthetic spectatorial 'Kantian' judgement which was heavily denounced by Nietzsche comes full circle. The artistic vitality by which values are posited (where spectators only consume and judge) through the immanent soldering of poetry and philosophy—at the same time, in the final stage cannot but rely on the invention of the scientific, formal language (previously Schelling has told us that the poverty of language or the lack of a formal scientific language leads to personification) whereas now even personification acts as the mask of impersonality, thus of a redeeming universality. But once this language is at hand, there is an attempt at a rescue and thereby the next stage we can infer from Schellling: "[m]ythological personalities have supposedly achieved the independence from their scientific meaning—in which they present themselves with the poets—and have arrived at the senselessness in which only popular belief still knows them."[79] The methodology by which enlightenment is still myth is the above and not that what the dialecticians of enlightenment have made us believe.

Thus, it is not the appearance of bourgeois subjectivity from the silent and deepening, trembling womb of mythology which is required in order to show that myth is already enlightenment—as in Adorno and Horkheimer; for Schelling—and we concur with him, mythology emerges from and with the people i.e., in the process of the "people's coming into being" (and the Homeric principle being the name for a new race of people and not a single poet, this is all the more true); further, Schelling argues, firstly, for this—one will have to "always already presuppose the people itself"[80]; secondly, with the "concept of a people…governmental authority, legislation, customary mores, and even occupations

are immanently connected with the representation of the gods."[81] From the Homeric world of Greek Gods we have arrived at the door of Rome and the Roman gods.

FROM THE GREEK TO THE ROMAN

If it is the Schellingian arrangement or 'representation of the Gods' and the *people*'s coming into *being* (for Hegel it is the Community), then the departure from the Greeks and the arrival at the Romans is significant in more ways than one. Prefacing this arrival is "[t]he Christian God, truly man and truly God, whose history is actual, replaces the Greek gods who portray the self as an objective work of art…it is *manifest (revealed)* religion."[82] "The God-man must disappear in time like every "sensuous here" and every historical here, but he is resurrected and transformed"[83] by a spiritual community. Preserved and transformed in the memory of those who have "gathered" in his name, it is the immediate self-consciousness of the community, community as certainty—where the community is its own spirit: "for the past has become spirit living in the community, mediated by the history of this community."[84] This is the community of Hegel holding forth and held back, too, by the person of Christ[85]—where by relating themselves to Christ only, that they are related to each other, or it becomes possible for them to become so related.

Infact the Young Hegelians pushed this thought to the extremes. Amidst an internal polemic over the mythical or the historical sense of the Life of Jesus, David Strauss concluded for all his listeners:

> This individual through his personality and his fate became the *occasion* for the elevation of that content into the universal consciousness… and (2) the stage of the spirit of the ancient world and of the people and of the people of that time could perceive … the *idea of humanity* only in the ['person and fate'] of the concrete figure of an individual. … Then it must occur to everyone that this matter is of personal import, and Christ appears as the one who, … 'takes on himself the whole drama of humanity.'[86]

Against the private utilitarian inwardness of Roman religion, the Christian experiment, as we've learnt, is the origin of a community—not only origin but also perpetuation. Christ enacts the drama of humanity where humanity is singular, "or in the determinacy of singularity and particularity,"[87] in as much as "Christ has died for all."[88] This is different from the aesthetic religion of the Greek kind where the Gods as sculpted artifacts masqueraded as "making" and followingly were immersed in worldly interpretations; they were not taken seriously. Here God is human and since dies as a human, is after all "God-Man" … "a monstrous compound"[89] This opportunity means for God—his arrival not in mud or stone, but in flesh: "a certainty for humanity,"[90] yet he is bereft of all corruption or corruption of the flesh and all that is evil and worldly to humanity, "Thus this one stands over against the others as what humanity implicitly is—a single individual [who is there] as the soil of certainty."[91] And in his death which is "still the death of a human being, a friend, who has been killed by violent means; but when it is comprehended spiritually, this very death becomes the means of salvation, the focal point of reconciliation."[92] Because by means of resurrection and ascension, "the little community achieves certainty."[93]

However, this will come later. Let us resume the Roman time of the Gods. What we shall observe is a severe conditioning of spiritual matter: its lapse into something private, irrational statehood, styled in the "for—the-sovereign—dying individual" from where finally, the person of the Christ will redeem humanity from the state of disappearing individuals. To a utilitarian division of Gods into private and public purposes, ultimately the personal figure of the emperor had to embark upon to conjoin this split[94], and not the person of God in the form of Christ who is rational, concrete spirit. In their engagement with defect, injury, fever and failure, they were also the first to dedicate altar to care but stopped short of granting subjectivity of individuals the right other than the right to property. Is this a lack of concretion or concretion alone in its finitude? Nevertheless, this abstract personality, as it is found with the Romans, has its own significance, and the right to property, elsewhere in Hegel acts as a fundament to ground

personality in the concrete. We shall pursue the matter elsewhere; an essential but a brief detour here.

Now, with the appearance of *Fortuna Publica* albeit the world of dominion ("the uniting of individuals and peoples within one bond and under one power"[95]) and private needs and purposes were demarcated and apportioned among the Roman Gods. The journey from the beauty of the gods or beauteous gods to the gods with purposes presupposed the state with a rational purpose which was not there; not there because the state was "an abstract state; it is the unification of human beings under one bond but in a such a way that the unity is not yet a rational organization internally"[96] because god is not yet rational, concrete spirit. "This purposiveness is external…" and because "this purpose or the state is not yet this rational organization or rational totality internally; hence also it does not merit the name "state." Instead it is dominion…".[97] The *purpose* becomes objective, internally coherent and an organizing principle only when it is *realized:* "[t]he realization is conquest, acquisition of dominion, the realization of a purpose that is a apriori, that takes priority over the peoples and simply fulfills itself."[98] The purpose of world dominion is coeval with the "god in the figure of Fortuna Publica… the necessity that embodies the Roman purpose itself."[99] But while Dominion is the purpose of the state and thus the citizen, "the individual is not wholly taken up with that": they are smeared with private purposes falling "outside of that abstract purpose."[100]

But not to leap into modernity and stay with this for a while—let us hold onto a demonstrative, situational example where there is a curious overturning in as much as, the Greek speech seems to have been replaced by the mimic; the gestural, silent face seems to have come into play more than the speaking tongue.

> In Greek drama it was what was spoken that was the main thing; the persons who acted retained a calm plastic attitude, and there was none of that mimic art, strictly so called, in which the face comes into play, but rather it was the spiritual element in the conceptions dramatized which produced the effect desired. Amongst the Romans on the contrary, pantomime was the main thing—a form of giving expression to thoughts,

which is not equal in value to the expression which can be clothed in speech.[101]

We could have speedily referred to the significance of the face (or the face of the other which is revealed only personally) and the face of the liar, but suffice for the moment to say here that, the Roman plays didn't portray anything substantially tragic, or comic for that matter—entailing a moral-ethical element dispersed in ir-reconciliation, rather that what was real, brute and actual bereft of a "representation of a *spiritual* history": "the slaughter of animals and men, of the shedding of blood in streams, of life and death combat." Or, "cold, unspiritual death" … ["arbitrary murder"]…"brought about by an exercise of empty arbitrary will, and which serves to feast the eyes of others."[102] The world of dominion is, also, the world of sovereignty entailing the sacrifice of individuals- where the bloodied sacrifice would signify—in the act of annihilation—the life of individuality as an empty signifier,[103] in itself busy and burning, always—in this absent art of dedication to the universal. The particular—to use a Hegelian strong term—thus "perishes" in the universal, in the sovereign authority, in the Fortuna Publica.."[104] Death is the new universal here—as if: "dying was thus the only virtue which the noble Roman could practice, and he shared this virtue with slaves and with criminals who were condemned to death"[105]; a slave thus organizes *it*self through this principle of negativity—death or the fear of death-in the hands of the sovereign master—and being extended to a whole: All taken, yes, but this "conscious principle of" negativity has affirmation *within*. Transformed—it becomes a (human) life-principle: purposive relentlessness. "[I]t is through this very consciousness of death, through anxiety in the face of death, that human existence becomes its own origin."[106] And Hyppolite's reading here—is—benignly Hegelian:

> Thus it is through the Terror that a revolutionary populace reconstitutes itself and is, so to speak, reborn. It is in war, where their whole determinate life is at stake, that cities and nations rise to the level of spiritual life, or what Hegel calls true Liberty, and thereby avoid wallowing in the unconscious beatitude of private economic and family life. In 1807 Hegel

wrote-as only a German could—"In order not to let them get rooted and settled in this isolation and thus break up the whole into fragments and let the common spirit evaporate, government has from time to time to the very centre by War. By this means it confounds the order that has been established and arranged, and isolates their right to independence."[107]

Now, the empty, empirical destiny leading to the disappearance of the individual, "finally found a personal representation in the power of the Emperor, a power which is arbitrary and takes its own way, unhindered by moral considerations." (This segment, though tangentially, was pursued elsewhere to preface the history of the personal in divisions: private and public.) Infact here in Roman hands we have, albeit, for the first time, the person of the emperor who imbibes both the private and the public and then transcends both of them by a feat of sheer, arbitrary will. And here we also do have welfare in its ancient, personal form. That is, proasaic power limited to finite, "immediate, real, and external circumstances" which "represented the Welfare of the Roman Empire" involving the Romans who—

[w]orship as God the actual present Power connected with such ends, the individual present form of such welfare, the Emperor in fact, who had this welfare in his hands. The Emperor, this monstrous individual, was the Power which presided over the life and happiness of individuals, of cities and of states, a power above law. He was a more wide reaching power than *Robigo*; famine, and all kinds of distress of a public character were in his hands; and more than that, rank, birth, wealth, nobility, all these were of his making. He was the supreme authority even above formal law and justice, upon the development of which the Roman spirit had expended so much energy.[108]

And if we remember that Hegel called 'self'—the abstract person, the Romanian arraignment for the self to be brought before 'rights' becomes absolutely understandable. "Private right, which was initially proposed as the correlate of personality, turns out to be a "not recognizing of personality" to the point of being its disappearance."[109] But such a critique will be preceded by a rider:

This involves what constitutes for the Romans the basic feature, the fact that the abstract person as such has attained the visible status. The

abstract person is the person with rights. Hence the elaboration of right is an important part of Roman culture; but right is restricted to juridical right, to the right of property. There are higher rights than this: human conscience has its right, and a right much higher still is that of ethics, of morality. But these higher rights are no longer present here in their concrete and proper sense, for the abstract right of the person prevails here instead, a right that consists in the determination of property alone. It is personality, to be sure, that maintains this exalted position, but only abstract personality, only subjectivity in this abstract sense.[110]

Gillian Rose, in a brilliant piece, comments that in Greek social life the question of subjectivity didn't arise since preceding the Romans there was only the religion of beauty where the Gods were justly joyous because "*Athena* [meaning both *polis* and God][111] herself is Athenian life", state and religion were identified in as much no distinction between law and custom were made;

[f]or to be a subject means the universal and the particular are not unified. A subject understands itself as infinite (universal) precisely by excluding the finite (determination, or, the particular) and then misrepresents the universality to itself in the form of religion. Athena is not a subject because in the Greek *polis* law and custom, legal forms and all other areas of social life, are not distinct from each other.[112]

The point, to reiterate, this separation appeared only with the Roman law, Roman private property law in particular. Hegel elsewhere, charts a quiet transition where he argues that with the Orientals freedom was One, with the Greeks and Romans freedom was for some (who were not slaves), and only later freedom was (even though only formally) for all translated into the Rousseauan axiom that man is by nature free. In Hegelese, and the discursive fragment with which we had begun, "[p]ersonality is what is based upon freedom—the first, deepest, innermost mode, but it is also the most abstract mode in which freedom announces its presence in the subject, "I am a person, I stand on my own—this is an utterly unyielding position."[113] Unyielding because, as Hegel argues, when each one of us are defined as one person but entailing an effect of two and more persons in separation "what the idea demands appears to be made even more unattainable, namely, to regard these

distinctions as distinctions which are not distinct but absolutely one, [and so to attain] the sublating of this distinction."[114]

But how to attain this sublation? One at the same time is two and/or more, much due to an internal annulment—cancellation.

Post personalist social work where passion is performative charity, tries to attend this sublation with fulfillment and annulment happening, or bursting—at the instance of one inscription and erasure; this originary moment of the birth of the personalytic ethic we shall follow in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Werner Hamacher, 'The Promise of Interpretation: Reflections on the Hermeneutical Imperative in Kant and Nietzsche' in Lawrence A. Rickels ed. *Looking After Nietzsche*, pp. 19-47, State University of New York Press: Albany, US, 1990, p. 39.
2. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power,* Transl: Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale,Vintage Books: New York, 1968, p. 420.
3. Ibid., p. 422.
4. Ibid., p. 427.
5. This is a variation on Nietzsche's –beauty as "useful, beneficent and life-enhancing", Ibid., p. 423.
6. Or more on this , "The effect of the ugly is depressing: it is the expression of a depression. It takes away strength, it impoverishes, it weighs dow[n]", Ibid., p. 427.

   But Nietzsche elsewhere confronts this argument which benignly upholds that the ugly is a"contradiction to art" by observing that the portrayal of ugliness in art is still the artist's will to harmonizing, integrative power and therefore there is nothing called pessimistic art; it displays exuberance. "Tragedy does *not* teach "resignation"—to represent terrible and questionable things is in itself an instinct for power and magnificence in an artist: he does not fear them—There is no such thing as pessimistic art—Art affirms…The things they display [might be] ugly: but *that* they display them comes from their *pleasure in the ugl[y]"* Ibid., p. 435.
7. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche,* pp. 437-599, Transl: Walter Kaufmann, The Modern Library: New York, 2000, p. 541.
8. Ibid., p. 539.

9. Ibid., p. 540.
10. Ibid., p. 541.
11. This is because, to Nietzsche the hermeneutic-empathetic understanding is itself a product of life enhancing endurance and therefore within the grid of beauty. Helping the ugly or the limp (i.e. the limp as ugly) cannot suggest ugliness (since"The ugly suggests ugly things") but is beautiful and elevating-to say the least. For Nietzsche "Every enhancement of life enhances man's power of communication, as well as his power of understanding. Empathy with the souls of others is originally nothing moral, but a physiological susceptibility to suggestion: "sympathy", or what is called "altruism" is merely a product of psychomotor rapport which is reckoned a part of spirituality." Nietzsche, Ibid., pp. 427, 428.

    But the rationale of a psychomotor rapport with "the ugly who limps, who stumbles" (p. 427)—the origin and the way that would be divined—is not clear.
12. Henry James, 'The Turn of the Screw' in *The Great Short Novels of Henry James,* pp. 627-748, Jaico Publishing House: Mumbai, India, 2002, p. 739.
13. Emmanuel Levinas, 'A Man-God?' in *Entre Nous: Thinking –of-the-other,* (pp. 46-52), Transl: Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav, Continuum: London, 2007, p. 48.
14. Alan Keith-Lucas, ' The art and science of helping' in *Talking about welfare: Readings in Philosophy and Social policy,* (pp. 267-289), Eds. Noel Timms and David Watson, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, p. 268.
15. Emmanuel Levinas, *Entre Nous: Thinking –of-the-other,* Transl: Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav, Continuum: London, 2007, p. 28.
16. As to how the invocation of the third in the juridical triangle becomes a problem for Levinas, Drabinski's acute reading has been exemplary. See John Drabinski**,** 'The possibility of an ethical politics: From peace to liturgy' , Philosophy and Social Criticism 26(4), 2000, pp. 49-73.
17. Theodor Adorno, ' A Portrait of Walter Benjamin' in *Prisms,* pp. 227-241, Transl: Samuel and Shierry Weber, Neville Spearman: London, 1967, p. 223.
18. This goes against Adorno's suggestion on "reconciliation of myth" on p. 234, Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 241.

20. Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, Transl: E.B. Ashton, Routledge: London, 1990, p. 278.
21. Ibid., p. 276.
22. Ibid., p. 276.
23. Ibid., p. 280.
24. Ibid., p. 281.
25. Ibid., p. 281.
26. Though the coalescence between the *person* and the *self*, even if we've underlined it, has to be kept in suspension for the time being.
27. This ofcourse has an applied consequence.
28. Ibid., p. 277.
29. Emmanuel Levinas, 'Is Ontology Fundamental' in *Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-other,* (pp. 1-10), p. 3.
30. Jacques Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1979, p. 39.
31. Friedrich Nietzsche, Cited from *The Anti-Christ* in *Nietzsche: Selected Stories*, Mahaveer Publishers: New Delhi, pp. 52-53.
32. Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking,* Transl: D.F Krell and F.A Capuzzi, Harper and Row: San Francisco, 1984.
33. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
34. Ibid., p. 89.
35. Ibid., p. 100.
36. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks,* Transl: Kate Sturge, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003, p. 68.
37. Ibid., p. 68, italics mine.
38. Friedrich Nietzsche *Ecce Homo* in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings,* (pp. 69-151)Transl: Judith Norman, Cambridge University Press: UK, 2006, p. 110.
39. Fragment B 50, in Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy*,p. 50.
40. Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking,* p. 62.
41. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* Transl: J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Harper: SanFrancisco,1962, p. 207.
42. Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking,* p. 65.
43. Ibid., p. 65.
44. Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking,* p. 75. italics mine.
45. Heidegger, *Being and Time* p. 207.
46. Cited in Jonathan Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 57.
47. Ibid., p. 58.
48. Ibid., p. 53.

49. Friedrich Nietzsche,'Philosophy during the Tragic Age of the Greeks (1873)' in *Early Greek Philosophy and other Essays,* pp. 71-170, Transl: Maximilian A. Mugge, T. N Foulis: London:, 1911, p. 108.
50. Cited in Robin Waterfield transl. *The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and the Sophists*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009, p. 43.
51. William Terence Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, St. Martin's Press: Macmillan, 1969, p. 74.
52. Friedrich Nietzsche,'Philosophy during the Tragic Age of the Greeks (1873)', p. 111.
53. See Barnes, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 53; Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy,* Vol. 1, p. 413; T2 in Robin Waterfield transl. *The First Philosophers,* p. 38.
54. Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Homer and Classical Philology' from *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nioetzsche* Vol. III, Oscar Levy ed., Transl: J.M Kennedy, 1910, available as Project Gutenberg E-Book #18188, Released on April 17, 2006, accessed on 10-8-2008. (all quotations unless otherwise mentioned are from this book; italics when used are in the original; no pagination exist in the doument).
55. It could be noted that individuality and personality are still not distinguished.
56. Nietzsche casts aesthetic singularity against "material singularity" brought forth by "[t]he generation that invented those numerous Homeric fables, that poetized the myth of the contest between Homer and Hesiod, and looked upon all the poems of the epic cycle as Homeric, [who] did not feel an aesthetic but a material singularity when it pronounced the name "Homer." Nietzsche, Ibid.

    Nietzsche charts a transition from material singularity to that of aesthetic singularity.
57. Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, Transl. Frederick Lawrence, MIT Press Cambridge: Massachusetts, 1993, p. 88.
58. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Transl: J. Cumming, Verso: London, 1992, p. 46.
59. Ibid., p. 44.
60. Ibid., p. 46.
61. Ibid., p. 60.
62. Ibid., p. 61.

63. Ibid., p. 48.
64. Ibid., p. 43.
65. [I]t is reason above all—and reason alone—to which every myth turns; no myth has been understood unless it has been accepted by reason. The Greek myths are fundamentally rationa[l]."

    Walter Benjamin, 'Oedipus, or Rational Myth' in his *Selected Writings*, Vol. 2 (Part 2) 1931-1934, Transl: R. Livingstone et.al, Ed. M.W. Jennings, H. Eiland et.al., Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2005, p. 578.
66. Ibid., p. 578.
67. Jurgen Habermas, 'The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno' in his *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, pp. 106-130, Transl. Frederick Lawrence, MIT Press Cambridge: Massachusetts, 1993, p. 127.
68. We must keep in mind the corrective provided by Benjamin where he weds symbols to both myth and magic and allegory "figures in the blasting apart of myth"; "The antithesis between allegory and myth should be clearly developed…The antidote to myth is to be demonstrated in allegory." Cited in Winfried Menninghaus, 'Walter Benjamin's Theory of Myth' in Gary Smith ed. *On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections*, pp-292-325, 1999**,** The MIT Press: Cambridge,MA, p. 314 But this dialectical dissolution of myth –where the collective dream image awaits wakening-as if to continue—seems to be happening in the 'space of history' (ibid., p. 303) where for Schelling it is the 'philosophy of history.'
69. Schelling, *Historico-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology*. p. 23.
70. Ibid., p. 16.
71. Ibid., p. 10.
72. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 46.
73. For an excellent account of the dialectical image as "a temporal experience of image", see Aniruddha Chowdhury, 'Memory, Modernity, Repetition: Walter Benjamin's History, *Telos* 143, 2008: 22-46, pp. 23, 39.
74. Jurgen Habermas, 'Walter Benjamin: Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique' in Gary Smith ed. *On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections*, pp. 90-128, 1999, p. 101.
75. And in consonance with Adorno's suggestion—that "[t]he complete

'prehistory' and ontology of the 19th century could be established only by an exact definition of the industrial form of the commodity as one clearly distinguished historically from the older form' (Theodor Adorno, 'Letter to Walter Benjamin' in Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukacs et.al, *Aesthetics and Politics,* pp110-133, Verso: London, 1980 p. 114);—which was in no way remote to Benjamin's thinking manifested itself in his imputation of "expressive character [to] the earliest industrial products, the earliest structures, the earliest machines, as well as the earliest department stores, advertisements, ...winter gardens panoramas, factories, wax figure cabinets, casinos, and railway stations" as the material, mythic aesthetic of a dreaming collective. Cited in Winfried Menninghaus, 'Walter Benjamin's Theory of Myth' in Gary Smith ed. *On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections*, pp-292-325, The MIT Press: Cambridge, p. 301.

76. Schelling, *Historico-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology*, p. 23.
77. Ibid.,p. 13.
78. Ibid., p. 24.
79. Ibid., p. 27.
80. [e]very people is *first there* as such after it has defined and decided itself in view of its mythology. Thus this mythology cannot emerge for it in the time of the *already completed* division and after it had already become a people…mythology's origin will occur precisely in the *transition.* Ibid., p. 79. Italics in the original.
81. Ibid., pp. 48, 49.
82. Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, Transl: S. Cherniak and J. Heckman, Northwestern University Press: Evanston, 1974, p. 54.
83. Ibid., p. 561.
84. Ibid., p. 563.
85. …[t]he person of Jesus, even independently of his teaching, must have become infinitely more important still because of the story of his life and unjust death must have riveted attention and captivated the imagination. We share in the interesting fate of unknown and even fictitious persons, we sorrow and rejoice with them; we feel in ourselves the injustice encountere[d]. Hegel, *The positivity of the Christian Religion* in *On Christianity: Early Theological Writings* (pp. 67-181) by Friedrich Hegel, transl: T.M. Knox & R. Kroner, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Brothers: New York, 1961, p. 78

86. David Friedrich Strauss, 'The Life of Jesus' in L.S.Stepelevich (Ed.) *The Young Hegelians: An Anthology*. (pp. 21-51). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 49
87. G.W.F Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion(*One Volume Edition, The Lectures of 1827), Ed . Peter C. Hodgson. Transl: R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson et al, University of California Press: Berkeley, 1988,p. 455.
88. Ibid., p. 469.
89. Ibid., p. 457.
90. Ibid., p. 455.
91. Ibid.,p. 456.
92. Ibid., p. 467.
93. Ibid., p. 468.
94. God too is dictatorial, undemocratic.
95. G.W.F Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (*One Volume Edition, The Lectures of 1827), Ed . Peter C. Hodgson. Transl: R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson et al, University of California Press: Berkeley, 1988, p. 378
96. Ibid., p. 378.
97. Ibid., p. 378.
98. Ibid., p. 378.
99. Ibid., p. 380.
100. Ibid., p. 382.
101. G.W.F Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. II, p. 314.
102. Ibid., p. 315.
103. "The nothingness of human individuality, and the worthlessness of the individual who has no moral life in himself." Ibid., p. 315.
104. William Terence Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel,* p. 385
105. G.W.F Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. II, p. 315.
106. Jean Hyppolite, *Studies on Marx and Hegel,* Transl. John O'Neill, Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1969, p. 29.
107. Ibid., p. 30.
108. G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. II, p. 308.
109. Robert Bernasconi, 'Persons and Masks: The *Phenomenology of Spirit* and its Laws,' in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, David Gray Carlson eds. *Hegel and legal theory*, Routledge: New York, (pp. 78-93), 1991, p. 85.
110. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (One Volume Edition), pp. 386-387.

111. Gillian Rose,, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, Athlone: London, 1981, p. 113.
112. Ibid., p. 113.
113. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (*One Volume Edition, The Lectures of 1827), p. 427.
114. Ibid., p. 427.

CHAPTER 2

Introducing the New Personal

Personalist and Post Personalist Social Work

> "The private is the public for those for whom the personal is the political."
>
> —CATHARINE MACKINNON (Mackinnon, 1992:359).

Let us begin the beginning by showing how the personal is different from the private and not necessarily opposed to the public and further—how this generates a new ethic of dis-appearance—strangers in the wake of love and friendship. The beginners' blind spot could be the telegraphic brief engineered in the slogan 'the personal is the political.'

The slogan "personal is political" has become commonplace today and has been adopted, because of its immense creative energy, by the gender aware and feminist social work as a truism. In this chapter I try to examine and rethink this statement without belittling its importance and promise for the future.

I re-examine the theoretical feminist claim that the personal is the political where the personal, as instanced in Catharine Mackinnon's statement above, stands for the private and the political is the public. My central contention is, this mistake, which wrongly collapses the personal and the private has gone unnoticed and in personalist social work, there are possibilities that this wrong receives a corrective which could prove adequately productive for feminist social work practice.

When feminists argue that the personal is the political or in brief personal is political, they mean:

> Placing the family in the realm of the private and a personal protected patriarchal privileges. The separation of the private from the public meant that the issue of unequal or unfair treatment within the family remained untouched… Hence, in the interest of justice and democratization, they strongly advocated that affairs of the family also be opened to public examination. (Mahajan, 2003: p. 12).

Personal as private then is political in the feminist sense as far as such coercive private matters could be brought to public scrutiny for legislation. With the insistence to discover this political nature of the private, various resistance movements under the rubric of social action or gender-aware social work have responded appropriately by taking the so called private matters of many women for collective vigil and social legislation. This is all fine till the time when 'personal is political' slogan is engineered to stand for such a phenomenon; it makes the personal one with what goes on in the private sphere. (Even the above quote repeats this conflation.) This chapter argues that this is a historical mistake so much so that we too in our everyday life use personal and private interchangeably (for instance our *byaktigat* in hindi means—without an alternative—both private and personal as if they are one). In this chapter the personal-private binary has been historically separated, theoretically established and tested through existing forms of social work approaches and therefore this critique ought to go a long away to aid feminist social work which despite sharing much of the premises (and also misgivings) of western canonical feminism has immense emancipatory potential.

THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: MEANING, THEORY, HISTORY.

Today public/private have become a part of our everyday vocabulary so much so that their meaning seems self-evident and ready at hand.

Public means all the citizens of a state and "unconcealed, not

private" [S.8, expln.2, Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872)]. The operative principle here is, "everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity" (Arendt,1958: p. 50). Etymologically meaning 'of the people', 'public' is built into the optic of the 'public sphere'- where public opinion is formed among people who are political equals (no distinction of class, rank is made) through the mediation of publicity forms (media) and is connected to certain forms of representation (elections, referendum), deliberation (debates in the parliament) and political authority (that government is most legitimate whose authority rests on a changing public opinion). In Hindi *janta* is the closest equivalent of the word public meaning crowd, a collection of people, and *aam janta*—specifying the average, ordinary character of the word public in India.

Private classically means that which is not open to or that which does not belong to all; it does not rest on the principle of publicity or equality of persons (an example of which is the family). In post medieval English and in Latin usage 'private' stood for an existence withdrawn from public life or anyone not working in an official capacity. Again, *privatus* stood for that which belongs to the individual and not to the state. In India, following our colonial induction, the private has been defined as- not public, or opposed to public; not open to public; or, apart from the state; belonging or concerning to one or more individuals [S.75, Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872)]. The individual as a private person (when not acting in official capacity) and family (often organized around private property[1]), sex and such matters give content to the private and privacy. Privacy, though not a constitutional right as in the U.S, is defined in the Indian Penal Code as "freedom from unauthorized oversight or observation; seclusion" [S.509. IPC. (45 of 1860]. The word *byaktigat* in Indian cultural settings does convey some of these meanings.[2]

The public/private binary—whose historical roots have been traced to classical Greece acquired its modern meaning through the mediations of medieval Roman Law and 18th century Europe. Aristotle makes a distinction between the household (oikos) and the space of the city state (polis) where through deliberation

(lexis) and common action (praxis) a shared, common and in a loose sense 'public' life beyond bare essentials or necessities was sustained. The private realm of necessities (subsistence, reproduction) was the household. Therefore property, "and the art of acquiring property" was considered a part of "managing the household" (Aristotle, 1988: 5) and one's status or rank as a master of *oikos* restricted his/her participation in the polis.

In the medieval age in Roman Law one encounters terms like *publicus* and *privatus* but without the standard usage (Habermas, 1996: p. 5) because everything public/private ultimately resided in the person of the monarch (more on this later). However, in Roman Law—the first systematic legal document—the privacy of the home (*domus*) was sanctioned (Black, 1988: p. 593) and Roman Law itself was "private law"[3] in that it would have application only for individuals or relations of coordination. Public law would administer affairs of the state or relations of domination. But like the Greek city state, it was the status of the individuals that determined their participation in the medieval public sphere. We enter modernity when men entered the realm of contract from that of status, from duties to that of rights (18th century enlightenment and the French revolution remain the authorized examples). Formal equality of persons was a prerequisite of such a contract. Particularly, at the break of the medieval age, in the wake of civil or commercial law in 18th century Europe, a democratic climate was created where apparent equality of all before the law and the market was preempted. And the public sphere was thus—in a sense—opened to all. This meant the formation of public opinion through the media (enabled at that time by the advent of print capitalism[4]) and institutionalization of state sovereignty which would rest, henceforth, with the people or the public. A new category of legitimacy was created. This also engendered the rise of civil society where the subjects would fulfill two roles at the same time: as a property owner or bourgeois he would pursue his private interests and as a citizen in the public sphere he would bear equal rights granted by the state. This also—as a part of the public sphere, ensured the separation of society (family) from the state and that the state would not intervene in societal matters and expectedly,

privacy would be in the societal realm hence forth. (Separated from the state, classically, the church was the first private to have imparted the secular colour so characteristic of modernity.) The state would ensure privacy, but would not intervene; its closest analogy was the market: the state would ensure a free market by itself not intervening in it and the free market was not only of commodities but a great market place of ideas and exchange of opinion in which, irrespective of birthmarks and the stink of status anybody could participate. The modern public sphere had arrived. It was just a step further when Marx would denounce universal suffrage and invoke the proletariat as the class with "universal suffering" (Marx, 1983: p. 320) and would mock this artificial equality of publics before the law and the market (alleging that they masked real inequalities) and thought of smashing the private/public divide by abolishing private property- which he thought was at the core of this suffering. The rest is history and its repetition. No wonder that the public/private divide has been considered as the core of our modern existence.

RELEVANCE TO SOCIAL WORK

Personal as Private in Feminism

Problems arose with the reception of this history that we have been narrating. Feminists pointed out, and with much justification that the public sphere that emerged out of the European experience in the 18th century and was consolidated in the 19th century, was exclusively a male domain. Women being identified with the private and the home—were excluded from participation in the public discourse and therefore denied a political identity.

But was the private apolitical—where care, love, fraternity and affection naturally reigned? The feminists showed that this was a male construction too. The interior of the home was as much infected by relations of domination-subordination (and not simply co-ordination), exploitation, exchange and disenfranchisement as were the public outside. Therefore, they urged, that women come out with the issues which were erstwhile considered private and

submit them to public scrutiny. Women's education, in the 19th century assumed the form of such an agenda. No wonder that this was considered an aesthetically opportune moment for the slogan 'personal is political' and it did receive a warm welcome. It went right into the hearts of millions of women shedding mute tears while drifting within the insurmountable domestic comportment of 'privacy'. Summarily put, women should cease to think the home as the place where their interests lie and identify with it, rather they should realize the political nature of the private sphere and challenge this comportment by bringing oppressive private matters to public light. According to these feminists, the 'personal is political' slogan serves as an active vehicle for this purpose (thus completing the personal –private identification). A feminist superstar Catharine MacKinnons' construction is a glaring example: "The private is the public for those for whom the personal is the political." (Mackinnon, 1992: p. 359). Followingly, feminist social action (vis-à-vis Social Work) in recent times has witnessed numerous N.G.O.s moving to the court for the revision of existing (erstwhile private matters like) family laws, inheritance, marriage and rape laws; recognition of alternative sexual life styles (same sex marriages) while using the public language of non-discrimination, equality etc. and debating it in the public sphere.

The point is, how far does this compulsion travel to become a mistake? The easy conflation between private and personal, is this admissible? What I propose to do in the rest of the chapter is to argue—taking this moment as the occasion, that this is a politically fruitful but nevertheless a serious and historically guided theoretical mistake and there are ways, within social work, to give it a corrective. But before that let us rehearse what is at stake and how the problem is relevant to social work.

Personal as Private in Feminist Social Work: Repetition as error

We have been examining the political reasons which enabled feminism the use of personal as private. In this Section, we are about to prove that feminist social work has adopted from

feminism the slogan 'personal is political', which, however, has similarly collapsed the personal and the private.

In this respect, nothing can be a better demonstration than that which comes from the global practitioners of international social work—the National Association of Social Workers (NASW) in their towering and voluminous *Encyclopedia of Social Work*. In the entry covering social work practice with women (2001: pp. 2529—2539), the authors—M.B Jenkins and P.W. Lockett cite from a source 'Ten propositions and Assumptions of feminist Practice' as a revealing guide for feminist social workers or 'direct' social work practice with women. There 'politicization' is included as a basic philosophical value with a terse elaboration, "All practice is inherently political in consequence; feminist practice is explicitly political in intent" (Jenkins and Lockett 2001: p. 2533). Now, having declared this hyperbolic goal, the authors elaborate on the same and state that "Personal is Political: Individuals and collective pain and problems of living always have a cultural and/or political dimension" (p. 2533). Further they state, "We are all connected; there are no personal private solutions…" (p. 2533). Notice the personal-private equality in alignment with 'personal is political' in the above statement. For a supplement, apart from the leaders, here is another theorist, "In feminist social work personal problems are defined as political, thereby focusing on social justice campaigns to increase the allocation of resources to gender-specific programs" (Martin, 2003: p. 28). These excerpts prove—more than adequately—that feminist social work has adopted this feminist truism without a systematic critique.

RECOVERING THE PERSONAL AS NOT PRIVATE: HISTORY, THEORY AND SOCIAL WORK

The Evolution of the "Personal" as the repressed in western social theory

Now, having proved that the personal-private coalition has continually infected feminism and feminist social work, let us see how are we able to separate it—in terms of history and theory

and then engage with social work again to see how would that corrective be subsumed under the rubric of existing genres of social work. It might be productive then to ask, that in the history of the binary public/private we have been retelling, where is the personal? The absence is truly eye- catching. The state of the personal is somewhat dubious and absent in all classic European discussions—even in Jurgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt.

Let us try to recover this repressed history by requesting the reader to take a detour to the portion on the medieval senses of public/private. It was the person of the monarch which was considered to have been the seat of everything public or private; it means, adopting a 17th century Hobbesian argument, he represented all and everything (Hobbes, (1651)1997: p. 88) (the modern forms of representation begin by questioning this self-representation). Although Habermas does cursorily refer to the process through which the "modern state apparatus became independent from the monarch's personal sphere" (Habermas, 1996: p. 29) he rarely engages with it. For instance, here goes this recognition in the form of a footnote to one of his famous articles: "the important thing to understand is that the medieval public sphere, if it even deserves this recognition, is tied to the personal. The feudal lord and estates create the public sphere by means of their very presence" (Habermas, 1974: p. 51).

But the personal sphere[5] of the monarch—and what it means in the western tradition is somewhat available in G.H Mead from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. Mead meticulously charts the components of this personal sphere where the people within the same state "can identify themselves with each other only through being subjects of a common monarch…." (Mead, 1972: p. 311). Mead traces the phenomenon to the ancient empires of Mesopotamia and observes, "It is possible through personal relationships between a sovereign and subject to constitute a community which could not otherwise be so constituted…." For the Roman instance—we can borrow from Max Weber the diffused origins of the Public Law-Private Law distinction, which as Weber shows was "once not made at all. Such was the case when all law, all jurisdictions, and particularly all powers of exercising authority

were personal privileges, such as especially, the "prerogatives" of the head of the state." … [Who was] "Not different from the head of the household" (Weber, 1978: p. 643). This world of the personal or as Weber calls it "patrimonial monarchy" forms, in a sense, the prehistory of the private/public distinction. In the Roman Empire through the mediation of Roman law, Mead notes, while the emperor-subject relationship was "defined in legal terms", through sacrificial offerings made to the emperor—the subject was "putting himself into personal relationship with him, and because of that he could feel his connection with all the members in the community". … "It was the setting up of a personal relationship which in a certain sense went beyond the purely legal relations involved in the development of Roman law" (p. 312). In India considering the King's person as sacred, it was assumed that he had influence over crops, cattle, rain and general prosperity. So again, the subjects, to relate to cattle, the mediation of the King was involved in a metonymic gesture, through whose presence, people could relate and be present to themselves (Hocart, 1927: p. 9). In this sense, the personal is that which predates both the public and the private and what is historically interesting is to discover when and why the collapsing of the personal and the private began—to which today's feminists are but victims.

This major point then needs mention: the qualitative leap when the personal came to be identified with the private. Now, private property is as old as Greek antiquity: Aristotle had argued in its favor and Plato had wanted to abolish private property. That is not the point; the first signs were available in the natural law[6] (or natural rights) tradition and despite a lot of caveats, one of its representative voice remains John Locke. In this tradition property, for the first time, is placed in the person:

> Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a "property" in his own "person". This nobody has any right to but himself. The "labour" of his body, and the "work" of his hands, we may say are properly his. Whatsoever…he hath mixed his "labour" with, and joined it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his "property"…that excludes the common right of other men
>
> (Locke, (1690) 1982: [Sec. 27.] p. 130).

When "His property" or private property is derived from the personal capacities of labour, the first motivated mix up between the personal and the private occurs. And then having had its eighteenth century initiation, it became a cornerstone of liberal theory where property had become an attribute of personality. If you take away property from me, I become a non-person because (private) property is in my person. Here there is natural ownership before there is a legal ownership. A classic example is here in Hegel, "Not until he has property does the person exist as reason" (Hegel, (1820) 1991: p. 73). Hegel goes at length to show how property is required to supersede the "the mere subjectivity of personality" (p. 73). In fact, this is the personal in Hegel invested with some kind of immediacy but lacks in content i.e. Hegel's "abstract personality" in order to become concrete and objective awaits a trick:

> Since my will, as personal and hence as the will of an individual [des Einzelnen], becomes objective in property, the latter takes on the character of private property… (p. 77).

This would be picked up by liberal capitalism and now onwards property being in (the) person and that which makes objective, tangible personality possible, private becomes the realm of liberty, reprieve, and freedom. Marx would fall heavily on all of this and in fact this discourse finds its final resolution in Marx only. His argument was just the reverse: in a society without private property, the personal selves of men freely blossom and enter the true realm of freedom. Therefore, this hyphenation between the private and the personal is more an ideological investment necessary for liberal history than a structurally indispensable relation[7]. With this our narrative of historical recovery or historical demystification of the personal reaches a benchmark and awaits if the personal/private distinction can be theoretically grounded as well.

Personal vs. private vis-à-vis the public: theoretical distinction

After hinting at a historical reconstruction then, it would be interesting to examine if the distinction can be sustained theoretically as well. Notice that when we were revisiting the

etymological meaning of private and public, we didn't refer to person or personal. But if we had done so, the personal-private difference would be restored even in that. Person deriving from old Latin *persona* meant mask, particularly one worn by an actor; personal also derived from the same persona. Now one reason for wearing this mask was to enable the audience to identify the character's personality, who - because of the distance, could not always traverse it—visually. Therefore, while private meant (often) a solitary existence removed from public life, person or personal grew up in response to a collective audience—in communicative complicity [(more in (ii) below]. Armed with this insight, now we can expand on the distinction theoretically:

i) *Personal is phenomenological, private/public are political*: We are aware of the criteria for public and private. Private/public are stable categories which are defined by legal-juridical indexes and people go to the court for redress[8] if they feel violated. But genuine personal matters like that of love or/ and friendship cannot be legislated and are not subject of litigation. There is a unique uncertainty and indeterminacy associated with the decision or the destiny of a person in these cases (nobody knows whether A loves B—even B does not)—which makes it a phenomenological notion and not a political one.

ii) *Private is opposed to the public, personal is not*: The personal unlike the private is not necessarily opposed to the public. I might choose somebody to be my lover, it's my personal choice and I might want to declare my choice to the public; this makes love a personal relationship, and not a private one. Consider more examples: When "personal attacks" are made in politics they may not intrude into somebody's sacred domain of privacy but are essentially directed against a person and in this sense, they are personal attacks. I have a personal opinion and who stops me from uttering it to the T.V interviewer? But consider sex, sex is private in the sense I cannot choose to have sex in public or consider the case

of private property which is famous for its exclusion of the public.

iii) *Person/personal are not spheres like the private and the public*: The interesting point is, while public/private spheres are categories that are tied to certain phenomenon; the 'personal' is a category that is peculiarly tied to the 'person'; there is no 'sphere' which is or ought to be explanatively employed here. (Sphere, etymologically, is referred to an area of activity and public/private arenas do refer to a collection of actions whereas the personal refers to the agency of these actions.) We may be fathers in our private sphere and officers in the public office, but a person is not simply a father or an officer. We might perform our public or private actions but a person cannot be reduced to these actions. He is both a father and an officer. A dangerous mafia outside may be a caring father at home. That in the agency of his person he combines these irreconcilable roles and the way he does it constitutes the personal agency of the person.

iv) *Personal is both private and public and/or beyond*: Let us remember that in Indian law the personal is defined as anything referring to a person—they may be private matters or public affairs. In this sense the personal is both public and private. A person at times is a private person or assumes public roles. But as s/he belongs to both—it can as well be argued that s/he belongs exclusively to neither. Or again, belongs to both by virtue of crossing these two floors time and again. And as such the personal becomes a third not reducible to the two other registers. It is impossible to reduce it to private/public functions because it can grasp and escape both limits at the same time.

Our personal/private distinction and existing forms of Social Work approach

Now, the point is, the distinction that we are proposing provides the key to correcting the personal-private mix up. That this

corrective needs to be incorporated into social work practice has already been stressed. But is there an existing form of social work practice wherefrom this corrective can be recovered—in the style of an immanent critique (which recovers answers from nothing external to,—rather from within that which it critiques). The answer is, yes, it is personalist social work vis-à-vis critical social work (though for the present occasion we shall concentrate mostly on the former).

In the previous sections, we have noticed how love, pain or grief are personal emotions in the sense nobody really knows, finally, if I'm in pain or not, in love or not. This indeterminacy is not available with the private which can be dealt with in the courtroom. Betrayal in love cannot be taken to the courtroom. But the corresponding pain can be shared which proves we often don't consider pain as private and excluding others, try to own it absolutely. In fact, any attempt in that direction might lead to a fatal breakdown. Pain or mourning if shared becomes normalized. Social work, particularly case work, psychoanalytic or psycho therapeutic counselling establish this truth more than others. Further the fact that the personal doesn't have a private nature and therefore is not opposed to the public has been supported, though indirectly, with greater force by the emergent tradition of critical social work in the west (established in the tradition of critical theory, critical social work opposes instrumental reason and the kinds of rationality (noticeable in capitalist forms) which enables the use of other people merely as a means towards private self-interest maximization). But let us begin by recovering an example from the East.

On the issue of a public condolence meeting after the passing away of Bankim Chandra Chattpopadhyaya (the great Bengali litterateur and arguably the first theorist of modernity in India) there was a debate between Rabindranath Tagore and Nabin Chandra Sen.[9] Sen's contention was that grief is a personal emotion (in the privative sense) and therefore a public condolence meeting is quite meaningless and simply a bad European inheritance; the show is totally artificial with the public not at all aggrieved and rather going in for an evening's amusement. Tagore retorted by

saying that to consider personal grief as only a privative emotion would be a mistake. Or otherwise why is there ceremonial mourning at the death of our close ones? "At the death of one's father whether one is really aggrieved or not is unimportant; *samaj* [our community[10]] says- you are bound to express grief before me and that according to my customs (Tagore, (B.S 1301) 2003, p. 506; insertion mine). Tagore argues, "The way in our country 'ceremonial mourning of father's death is staged in the open and as it is incumbent upon every bereaved one that he mourns the loss of his father also in the open" (p. 507), there is nothing wrong in holding a public condolence meeting. Tagore also emphasizes how through social mourning the excessive nature of my /your personal loss becomes somewhat tolerable. Therefore, from Tagore's argument we can infer three things:

1. Personal grief in our *samaj* is bound by customs and therefore is not private; it can be collectively shared through symbolic behaviour; 2. Personal grief being indeterminate, nobody knows whether one is really aggrieved or not; this helps grief retain its personal nature; 3. Extending further, the personal and the private may be shown to be different. Having been aided in our endeavour to distinguish the personal and the private, let us connect this indigenous incident to the disciplinary discourse of social work.

Recently, June Allan in a landmark paper has noted in unconscious agreement with Tagore the socially constructed nature of personal grief "because of the rules and norms relating to how we are 'allowed' to grieve, who is 'allowed' to grieve, and who we are 'allowed' to grieve for" (Allan, 2003: p. 177). Allan's discussion is relevant because of its contemporaneous nature. Following Paul Halmos, from a society of pastoral care (or sacred personal care rooted in traditions/customs to which Tagore refers) we have arrived at professionalized secular personal care in modernity. The journey therefore is from communitarian pastoral care to secular personal rational care marked by the emergence of personal service societies and the appearance of counsellors as "therapeutic social change-agents", who provided—according to Halmos, in terms of agency, "the secular replacement of pastoral care" (Halmos, 1978, 49). The generic name of this care is significant: Personalist Social

Work. If tradition or custom is the existence of ancestral rules and the unquestioned (pre enlightenment and pre scientific) collection of other people, in today's secular, post enlightenment societies, what happens to personal grief? Does it become privatized? We separately cry inside closed doors? Or ala Tagore is it shared by religious or ritual mourning? But in a functionally differentiated society ritual mourning can rarely become exhaustive: for instance, if somebody is shocked at her lover's death; no familial/communal/social mourning is forthcoming. The new, contemporary personal appeals to other people in a different form and personalist along with critical social work and a host of others address this phenomenon. The aggrieved may go for either action oriented or relational healing (p. 178): "Individuals are then expected to participate in some sort of mutual help or therapy to bring about resolution of their mourning" (p. 180). Through individual counseling and "a sense of community", "social workers can contribute much by helping to build stronger communities and social infrastructure that help when grief strikes, and by linking those who grieve with existing communities of support" (p. 182). "Ensure that people who are grieving have access to information and personal experience, to practical and emotional resources, and to justice (p. 184). (Allan, 1978: pp. 180,182,184) Notice then, this personal—is not at all limited to the secluded sphere of privacy—even in the midst of capitalist modernity, but its face is turned towards "others" for support in a different way. The relief comes in when one "disowns" the shock and distributes it—even if unequally—among others—it could be the social worker, his/her friends, or colleagues. Here there is no political possibility beautifully expressed by a poet, "Yours tears are not political, they are real water." (Thereby the slogan 'personal is political' fails again for the last time.) And what helps us discover this non-privative nature of the personal and deploy it in social work practice is an existential phenomenology (which deals with how our existence and our experience are embedded in various life-worlds) and not any version of liberal political theory (which does not encourage looking beyond the public/private binary and therefore wants to

see everything including the personal as a version of the private).

But no more if my arguments are correct. It's time therefore to respond positively to personalist social work paradigms using phenomenology as a filter and use them all to enhance the bright -possible worlds of gender-aware or feminist social work practice.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I have argued that the personal is beyond the private/public binary and tried to point out, how, in feminist discourses including feminist social work, the personal has been wrongly used as a synonym of the private. I have tried to advance a corrective from within social work. I shall risk a reiteration and reinstate my inference once more:

Private/privacy is opposed to public/publicity and resists public scrutiny –the stuff by which the public is made. Personal –the way we don't know what a person is, what his/her real/final intentions are or whether somebody is genuinely aggrieved or not—makes the personal—largely unpredictable and indeterminate in the final instance—unlike the private. Private/public being legal juridical categories have specific indicators. The absence of these indicators makes personal relationships—like love or friendship remain outside legislation. This thesis—as per the proposal of the chapter –has been shown to have been adopted and demonstrated by Personalist social work.

Now, if the chapter has been correct to argue—with a lot of evidence—historical, theoretical, and also from social work—that personal is not private, what results is—the slogan 'personal is political'—which was broadcast with this similarity in mind, and deployed derivatively by feminist social work, falls flat. The slogan has to be revised in a major way if not altogether abandoned; the feminists themselves have to undertake this reconstruction. But in all this it must be seen that the feminist liberationist spirit is not offended; it has a long way to go. Secondly, feminism had argued in this wake that women should stop identifying themselves with the private sphere and demystify the urgency with which home and

house work have been valorized as their natural forte. It follows from my argument that the above is possible only when women stop identifying their personal selves with the private.

Thirdly, when the client's personal emerges independent and shows mastery over both the private and public spheres—which in reality constitutes his/her environment, then the accusation that social work though being interested in the interface of the person and the environment has failed to adequately address it (Roberts, 1990: pp. 142-143), will not seem convincing anymore.

Not, because and this is the fourth point, the network of services and social work that has been designated as personalist (and from where this chapter draws much of its argumentative force) becomes the core descriptive index of what social work is—after all. When Halmos was talking about personalist social work it was 1978 and rarely were we taught this taxonomy in our student days. But in 2004 a canonical book on social work defines social work thus: "Social work can be defined as an exercise in engaging with people to facilitate the telling of their story around a particular problem relating to their well-being, that is, to articulate what has happened to them and why. Its interactive base makes social work a relational profession" (Dominelli, 2004: p. 5).

This is very different from the usual neutral designation of social work as a science of "helping people to help themselves." That the problems faced by people form a part of their personal autobiography is acknowledged here and the articulation of this narrative is what is deemed important. We have talked about relational healing earlier; now we learn that social work itself has emerged as a relational profession: i.e. it's another effective way of relating to unknown people. And it's no surprise that this theorist after having clarified the new relational nature of social work, talks about personal social services which "can be provided by a plurality of providers—the state, the voluntary, commercial or household sectors." We have thereby arrived at the major consequence or impact of our chapter. By this, social work is nothing but personalist. If people ask, is social work liberal capitalist (where private absorbs the public)? We'll say, no! If people ask, is social

work vulgar Marxist (where the public usurps the private)? We'll say, no! Then what is social work? Beyond both public and private, social work (personalist—in the old form or verbiage) and now – in its post personalist avatar—*personalytical*: a narrative science of relations—after it has debunked the private; it is, in itself—a new way of relating to unknown people, stray cats, dogs and parrots—a blind date with immense fate. Personalytic also in that it invades and haunts other discourses, texts, points and limits.

NOTES

1. "Ambivalences in the principle of privacy derived from the system of private property and from a family caught up in the requirements of the market" (Landes, 1995: p. 96).
2. For more on Indian cultural notions of the binary see Madan, 2003.
3. There are of course disagreements on whether Roman Law "guaranteed an order of "private law" in the strict sense (Habermas, 1989: p. 76).
4. A decade ago an acclaimed historian traced the colonial attempts to institute the Indian public to the 18th century (1793) when the regulations of Lord Cornwallis were "printed and promulgated" for the Indian public and a special press was set up for the purpose (Ray, 2003: pp. 548-549).
5. I'll later make a point on why, while marking the site of the personal, this word 'sphere' should not be deployed in the way Habermas does it.
6. I shall not address the 'rights to persons' in Roman Law (and the Hegel-Kant debate on that) and the theory of personal property later in English common law since neither of these could be said to have—despite linguistic overtones—founded property in person.
7. For a brilliant exposition of the incompatibility of personal rights and property rights see Bowles and Gintis, 1986: 34-41.
8. In this sense let us not be misled by what goes on by the name of personal laws, they are but remnants of private or customary law.
9. We are indebted to Partha Chatterjee (Chatterjee, 2001) for attracting our attention to this debate.
10. Tagore's use of *samaj* (as a community/collection of communities) could be deployed to mark its difference from the western society

(Chatterjee, 2000: 76). I have detailed elsewhere how the personal being *samajik* or customary and pre-historical has a collective-communitarian nature as against the private which blossoms forth in historical, western 'society' established by contract (Chattopadhyaya, 2005).

PART TWO

Persons and 'Non Persons': Terror, Ethics, Animanity

To concoct the universal human
Keep in mind deception, pepper with need,
Muddy want with anything you can eat.
[…]
Arguing tomorrow's transformation
Into some more tenable connection—
And when tomorrow fails, repackage your tricks,
Renew, let the future be displaced

Into its own future's future. Please let it go on.
Don't shut the highway out, keep it, it's yours,

Build bigger things, populate them, and trace
Their whoops and sacrilegiously sinous whorls

Into artless screens: make a plan.

—Vivek Narayanan, 2006, Day 5
(Lust, a cycle', p. 29, [25-32])

CHAPTER 3

Humanity Against Human Rights?

A Personalytic Revision

> The right of humanity in our own person cannot have the right of human beings as a restricting condition. But also not the reverse. For another cannot have any right to me insofar as I am a person; thus the possibility of the first is grounded in personality and does not have personality as a restricting condition, including the rights of humanity flowing from personality.
>
> —IMMANUEL KANT (2005: 475)

In a famous critique of Kant Hegel had argued that all rights are finally rights that belong to, and exercised by persons; therefore, to argue for personal rights and impersonal rights specifically is a non-starter. The same is also polythetic: when all other rights fail, an appeal to the bare personhood of humans is made, a natural right—as if. But it is a reversal in as much as several rights (civil, political, juridical) trump the bare life of the human and complicates and engages with the other dimensions of human personality and affects—civil or political, private or public. But this bareness, or barrenness could be easily understood as a path to nature, which is, in a sense, indexed on animality—held in reserve by a mere reference bereft of personality. But this appeal to bare, fundamental rootedness fails under the sway of techne or instrumental reason; the will to scientific control; in other words-ideology, which shifts our attention to the constant use of human persons as means rather than as ends as the Frankfurt school had

argued; the appeal is also supposed to have been made in the end—after the atrophy of all other rights. But, a way to begin—with other rights in hand?

Against the backdrop of a longstanding allegation that the death penalty is rarely or never awarded to the rich and the powerful in India, this chapter—inscribed within its limited scope, begins by interrogating the politically neutral status of punishment in positive law in India and the politically neutral status of human rights being upheld as universal moral rights. The above—situated within the broader polemics on capital punishment, the structural genesis of Indian society and the sociology of law, culture, nature and suffering -argues that to confront the allegedly discriminatory nature of capital punishments being awarded only to the poor and the rebels, the human rights movement needs to align itself with particular political forces which would challenge the former. Noticeably, such an assertion is also broached -aggressively - against the discursive contours of social philosophical arguments where stalwarts like John Rawls have hailed human rights to be, or ought to be, politically neutral: An adjectival ascription gained—as our detour shows—by being only in-humane and un-democratic.

THE MANY LIVES OF DHANANJAY CHATTERJEE: CONSTRUCTING THE MERCY PETITION AS WRITING

With August, every year after 2004 the death by hanging of Dhananjay Chatterjee is recounted at least by his parents and co-villagers; but the intense debate on the connotative significance of capital punishment seems to have been lost on us. This chapter is an attempt to reconstruct the events and the debates that took place nearly thirteen years ago, and interpret a way forward amidst the silence that surrounds us now.

It is not very well known that the first mercy petition by Dhananjay Chatterjee submitted to the president was rejected; the second was upheld. The reason of the rejection was that it was so poorly written that it made no sense. It was written by the social welfare officer at the Alipore jail. The second was written by a fellow convict: Peter Bleach—then serving a term being convicted in the

Purulia arms dropping case (a few months before Dhananjay's hanging, Bleach, released on request by the U.K government is now leading a happy second married life in the U.K.). Bleach in one of his memoirs published in the Hindustan Times recounts these details about the "silent, poor boy" (Dhananjay) he knew at the jail. This general acquaintance took a turn when a staff of the jail with some sympathy for Dhananjay and the draft of the rejected petition in hand approached Bleach. Bleach says, having gone through the draft he was stoned: it made no sense, it was utterly ridiculous. He took up the cudgels and wrote a patient draft; it struck: the president upheld Dhananjay's petition and his hanging was stayed for an interim period. The media took up the cause and a furiously loud conversation followed in the form of a country wide furor. TV shows, talk shows, radio and college debates had only one subject then: Dhananjay and the death penalty. In West Bengal the chief minister's daughter and his wife joined demonstrations with the dead victim Hetal Parekh's school mates in favour of his hanging while Hetal's parents who had left Calcutta after the event stayed away in silence in Mumbai. The whole country waited in breathtaking attention. President Kalam himself was put under pressure so much so that (according to later reports) he had given up his regular nightly amusement with the sitar. Dhananjay's parents and kin by then had come to Kolkata and had started demonstrating—promising suicide if Dhananjay was hanged. The human rights movement was in full force sending e-mail after e-mail to the President thanking him for the stay and requesting a final verdict in favour of the mercy petition. Alas! The president as usual fell a victim, predictably, to the political pressure mounted on him. The mercy petition was rejected. Dhananjay was hanged on the 14th of August 2004: at 4.30 am. Outside the jail along with the human rights activists a little girl was awake the whole night with a placard in hand which read, "We kill people to tell people that killing people is bad." A chapter was closed; or opened? The native village of Dhananjay observed a *bandh* (mass closure) the following day with bandh supporters openly declaring that he has been hanged just because he was poor; and recounting instances before journalists as to how many such cases involving

rich convicts had received a drubbing, they were quick to express their hate for this pro-rich penal system. Processions came out with loud chants, "Shahid Dhananjay amar rahe!" The media was now on its back foot and found it too much to consume: the "rapist murderer" becoming a martyr! The curtains fell. But to mourn the day of Dhananjay's hanging, even today a closure and a shok dibas (mourning day) is observed in his native village. Sudden sparks of memoirs come to some with innumerable news of rape and murder coming up every day. The Jessica Lal convicts were exonerated of all charges and then amidst the resounding allegations of "pro-rich Indian judicial system" clamoured by the elite media itself for an elite socialite, the case undergoes a resurrection. A chapter is closed, or, a new one opened?

A last rejoinder in order: Why was the West Bengal Government so keen not to have the hanging order revoked? Critics tell (though not reported in the media), it is because the civil rights movement in West Bengal, which over the years had gained in strength by being immensely critical of the methods by which the Government had been suppressing the Maoist and other extremist movements, would have scored a major victory if Dhananjay's petition was finally upheld. Chief Minister Bhattacharya in his appeal to the police (made elsewhere) had been eloquent on this, "You do what is to be done, I'll take care of that human rights' rubbish (*osowb manobadhikar- fanobadhikar ami bujhe nebo*!)."

What is interesting in the face of the above two (explicitly political) charges—(one, that the death penalty is anti-poor and two, a so called pro-poor government advocating for the continuation of such an (allegedly) anti-poor (and anti-human rights) punishment by pretending to be pro-woman) is that the human rights movement is left with no choice: should it align with political forces which helps its cause? But wouldn't that hurt its universal, moral appeal? What should it do?

THE TERRORS OF EXPERIENCE: A QUASI-EMPIRICAL RE-CONSTRUCTION OF THE CASE

One looks back in anger and awe to observe that while in 2004 there was a debate raging all over India and was expected not to

subside even if the President of India had decided not in favour of Dhananjay Chatterjee's execution, the silence is deafening now. The flurry has subsided and the silence signals the absence of any debate in the media on capital punishment in India—even in the face of Lokpal and civil society activism. At this level one wonders why it was not the case when Billa Ranga or Satwant Singh were hanged; is it because their sentences had not been stayed temporarily? Certainly then, it would be an obvious conclusion that this particular 'commercial' break, which is largely of a technical nature, had occasioned the debate in 2004 on the justification of continuing the death penalty in India. This is most unfortunate. For the last thirteen years or so after the hanging of Dhananjay Chatterjee, and years before the event, there has been no visible movement against the presence of the death penalty in India. But the debate ought to be more pronounced when nobody is being hanged (as of now-except the Afzal Guru and the Kasav and the Yakub Memon ones- where it seems the timing has come to be disputed instead of the substantive question of the punishment itself) with the clause remaining intact on the Statute book rather than when a sudden breather emerges with the staying of execution of a death convict. It puts into question the sincerity of those—including a number of Human Rights activists, political scientists, and political sociologists who had argued that the death penalty should be abolished in India taking the Dhananjay case as their model occasion. While on the other side, the charged protagonists of the death penalty for Dhananjay seemed to draw a picture as if the President had referred the mercy petition to them for their 'second' opinion.

The problem is more severe when we notice, with regret, that this particular case had been made the pretext to score a larger point which cannot possibly be made; that is, whether the death penalty should be abolished, could not be argued, far from settle it, on the basis of Dhananjay Chatterjee's case of alleged rape and rape after murder. Since, it has been noticed internationally as well as in India now, that popular sentiment or 'public opinion' seem to have always been reluctant to give a verdict in favour of an (absolute) abolition of the death penalty. It is so much more eloquent when the crime was so gruesome as in the Dhananjay case. The principal

of the school in which Hetal Parekh had studied had excelled everybody in putting up a portrait of the tortuous death in a Talk Show (hosted by NDTV) by elaborating how when she reached the site to offer condolences at Hetal's house found blood splattered on the wall, wrists broken, throat strangled and how Dhananjay had raped Hetal twice. It made for good theatre when the famous M. Satyu—the maker of *Garam Hawa* (during the Emergency in India) was interviewed in an evening ('We the People') Talk show in a New Delhi T.V. channel: he was plainly of the view that given the tradition where the poor are the victims of the death penalty, it might be true—as a corollary—that Dhananjay had been victimized too; or even if it was Dhananjay, given the grotesque, brutal nature of the rape and murder, he was not alone—it called for a collaborative crime! A man in a blue Maruti used to visit Hetal when her mother would go to the temple! This brisk counter narrative made the host of the talk show (Barkha Dutt) quickly switch over to a sane exchange of arguments. What is so strange about this episode is to note how the natural facts of the case came into the purview of the dispute in order to interrupt the debate that was on. But they are hardly necessary. (And with this we jump into the theoretical canon.) What Hobbes had said is still valid. A convict will be punished on the order of the sovereign just because it is the order of the sovereign—irrespective of the natural facts of the case. What it is then to ask for natural facts? How did nature feature in the debate?

NATURE, CULTURE, SUFFERING: A THEORETICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DEBATE ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Yes, all those old arguments had made a comeback: for instance, if the state cannot give life, who attests it to take life? Which is why capital punishment—when executed even under error—is irreversible. Life belongs to nature, they say: an echo of the old Natural Rights argument. But what about unnatural death? The dangers of such a position should not be quashed once and for all. Here is Feuerbach, "The origin of life is inexplicable and

incomprehensible." So be it. Feuerbach's hunch is if life cannot be discovered on natural grounds—its "incomprehensibility" doesn't justify anyone to take recourse to "super- natural", "super-material" causes and beings.… "instead of being so honest and modest, so as to say: "I don't know any basis, I can't explain it, I lack the data, the materials," you transform this lack, these negations, vacancies in your head, by means of fantasy, into positive beings, which are immaterial beings, i.e., are not material or natural beings, just because you don't know of any material or natural causes" (Feuerbach in Wartofsky 1977: p. 399) To Feuerbach this is a short route to theology. May we argue on similar lines that if there are no natural grounds, let us not, in reckoning with Feuerbach's appeal deceive or delude people by taking recourse to the cultural argument also and try to discover life basing ourselves on cultural grounds. And as long as it is super-material—we can't claim we know it. When we refer to this "life" then, we must not try to transform this vacancy in the head which Feuerbach so eloquently refers to. If nature is unknown, we know not all of culture. If nature is incomprehensible, culture too. In the departmental corner of confident culture, there emerges the unknown dark side of rights (no-rights). But at this point we could still pose the question by aping and repeating the confessional mood of somebody who while commenting on life borrows these from Feuerbach, "I don't know any basis, I can't explain it, I lack the data, the materials," (Ibid: p. 399)—how does the State appropriate it? By death so easily? Is it the shortest route to punishing by death? If the agency of nature is denied, does it foster the State's in any way?

This apart, what is the consequence of giving rights to nature? Today what we call ecological rights—establish the premises of ecological citizenship. But giving rights to nature completely undermines the basis for nature giving us rights. If men give rights to nature, who gives a right of life to men? Again, men and that too in the modern state. A last comment on why nature or theological conceptions cannot be said to have provided us with rights. Nature or "Christianity cannot expect its ethically saturated conceptions of the history of salvation or of the created order to receive universal recognition in the same sense as a procedurally

formulated theory of law and morality, which claims to ground human rights and the principles of the constitutional state with the help of a concept of procedural justice (Habermas 2001b)" Does this solve or mitigate the cultural objection to Human rights? If yes, then how? This suspicion gains some ground after Rawls declared that the role of human rights is to "put a limit to pluralism among peoples" (Rawls 1999: p. 555). The cultural argument is simple and clear: deriving from the historical role played by natural rights—human rights are instrumentally seen as having been wedded to imperial eurocentrism and the expansionist metaphor of colonial aggrandizement.

One of the most curious argument then voiced and heard, clapped and repeated in the media and even by the community of anti-human rights lawyers—audible even today—is that, is it the rights of the criminal that concerns human rights activity and not the human rights of the victims that stand violated? Why are they so concerned about the rights of the arrested, the disappeared, the convicted and so on and so forth? Most of all—at a talk show on terrorism it was shocking to hear famous jurists- endorse this view. Let us try to put this argument permanently at rest. Faced by this curious caveat, it would be best to ask what is the actual point they want to make. Their point is, if an offender has violated other's human rights, he ought to have no claims on human or any protective rights what so ever. The point for their kind cognition is, a rapist is arrested, investigated, convicted or released not because he has violated human rights of any person but because he has violated the standing law of the country: it is a legal infraction more than a moral infraction. Human rights are moral rights unless incorporated in a constitution (when incorporated they become moral plus legal). So to deal with this violation is the duty of the State and not the Human Rights Commission. Human Rights will intervene only when the State armed with the means of legitimate violence is overstepping its "legitimate bounds". To this, it might be objected that there could be a judicial intervention in this matter which is incorrect. The judiciary, despite episodic complaints of 'activism'—unless petitioned does not move on its own. Following Rawls, we need to have a mobile background culture where some

such grievances get a first hearing by which we come to hear our own complaint from a different institutional mouth (this must be distinguished from the "culture of complaint" one often hears in political theory circles today) and when all ordinary rights in the existing constitutional language fail, we need to have a special class of rights which are more than fundamental rights—namely Human Rights. Human Rights activity (where we also distinguish between "human rights activity" and "human rights culture") in the Rawlsian sense is a part of the background culture constituted by civil social institutions (their synonyms of civil rights or democratic rights organization not withstanding) which helps a complaint to surface in the foreground composed of judicial and political authority.

But a different twist to the objection raised could be imagined if we are ready to acknowledge some of the arguments brought forth by those who are not convinced by the human rights rhetoric. We start from here—if it is to be granted that the convict relinquishes all his human rights when found guilty, there is a presumption in those who advance this argument that rights as if are elicited by certain acts i.e., if we accomplish a gruesome evil act and subsequently must abandon all rights including human rights; an impossible but easy corollary comes forth: does it mean then that certain good acts endow us with rights too? No! Then if good acts have not endowed us with rights and do not do so in future, evil acts cannot strip us of them as well. This objection is actually, as we understand now, based on a grievous misunderstanding of the inalienability doctrine which founds Human Rights.

Now, if we could axiomatically ground the above argument in the assumption that the inalienability of the human rights is sourced at its indifference to both the perpetrator and the sufferer, we could expand on it in the following way. Against the description of pain as private (and much has been written on it), I have been trying to argue for quite some time that—if pain is unknown (you don't know whether I'm in pain or not etc.) and indeterminate, then pain is personal and not private since I may invite publicity and thus if I disclose pain (ritually or really), it will not remain private anymore; it is not public as well since it rarely could be a

matter of public (common) knowledge or reason. What could be asked is, how then human rights will deal with this question of uncertainty unless there is something stable to reckon with; one might rightly invoke the taxonomy of suffering. In today's world 'social suffering' is an accepted and a necessary jargon. Then, how do human rights deal with suffering? I dealt with the answer at a web debate -as to how pain could be feigned and suffering could be forged in terms of the Austinian speech act theory debate between Derrida and Searle etc. Further, I had reiterated the ethical status of human rights as moral rights which helped my paradigmatic examples—love and friendship—where in the absence of operative legal rights, jilted lovers or friends could claim a moral right not to be betrayed or deceived.

Now, following the above—I shall argue that if suffering is personal, Human rights could address suffering by being personal only. But that is, surprisingly, not the case. Human rights are indifferent to suffering. This follows from the naturalistic basis and its roots in the natural law tradition (naturally being human is the precondition to claiming the benefit of human rights). So far suffering is concerned, one of the primary theorists—as anybody could guess—was the famous Jeremy Bentham (that utilitarian and legal philosopher)—who was at the same time furious about natural law claims and allegories. Here he was speaking about misery as a virtue in the case of asceticism. While discussing asceticism (though as a principle of government) he makes an interesting point on this subject:

> Whatever merit a man may have thought there would be in making himself miserable, no such notion seems ever to have occurred to any of them, that it may be a merit, much less a duty, to make others miserable: although it should seem, that if a certain quantity of misery were a thing so desirable, it would not matter much whether it were brought by each man upon himself, or by one man upon another (Bentham 2004: p. 11).

If we discard this 'misery' argument and go for suffering—it is close and given by the utilitarian calculus of pain and pleasure, they can even be substituted. The ascetic, the punisher, the sadist or the masochist—all suffer or make other people suffer because of

the intrinsic merits of suffering—people are redeemed or rescued, coerced and corrected and such others! Then suffering as such is not a signifier that ought to attract human rights; suffering has positive and even pleasurable duties it seems.

Now, if this is so, then human rights and suffering must relate to each other in a different manner. This it achieves by striking an attitude: indifference. How? It is simple: if I suffer I have Human Rights, if I don't, I still have human rights; if I make other people suffer, I have Human Rights, if I enjoy suffering, I have them intact. From this, one can justly infer—Human Rights are indifferent to suffering. Indifferent because of a structural indispensability: to deal with the intense poly-plurality, unknown indeterminacy of the signifier called suffering. And because of this indifference, Human Rights cannot be inscribed within humanity, but modernity.

HUMANITY AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS?

During those days of July and August in the year 2004—*Ajkal*—a newspaper in Kolkata and Akash Bangla -a television channel invited public responses to the dispute on the death of Dhananjay. Death punishment for Dhananjay won overwhelmingly. Those who opted for a "no" trailed unendingly behind the for-death voters. Calling for a popular referendum therefore is not a perfect gesture to handle the agenda that wants to abolish the death penalty, which means—while the agency of Human Rights needs, as has been reiterated repeatedly, democracy to flourish, a majority franchise does not, necessarily, endorse its well-intentioned clauses or help establish its aims. Therefore, the helplessness of the abolitionists in the talk shows in the Indian media over those few weeks when they had to face the grunt of the majority in the audience raising their hands—wanting the death penalty to survive, was sad but a bitter toast to watch for its truthfulness. What does the democratic will (formed through public opinion) oppose? It is, as we will say by adopting and then transforming Partha Chatterjee's suggestion made in a different context, modernity (His graph that democracy opposes modernity—I shall rephrase as political modernity is opposed to cultural modernity). Modernity emerges when (among

others) Man replaces God. The human person being central to its project emerges with a free will and the 'Rights of Man'. Don't kill an offender because he has a 'right to life' is a slogan only believable in a modern state—ethical in nature. Had it been a medieval one, the attempt to save life would have had to be made in religious terms. To talk in the language of rights—human rights or whatever is to speak in the inescapable language of secular modernity which only invented the entity we know now by the name of 'rights'. Only modern theories of punishment aided by criminology, psychology etc. etc. reckon with this while in those States where personal or religious laws are on the rampage still retain not only death but death by stoning for anything as little as adultery. Various tribal panchayats living on the borderlines of the modern State order death for suspected 'witches' among their womenfolk. Modern Law or law courts won't recognize the existence of human witches or ghosts (though the freedom to belief—with no 'harm' to others—will be protected). Therefore, to use Human Rights as an instrument is not an argument for humanity, but modernity. What we call humanity, human morality or humane feeling, they do not talk in the language of rights or law, instead it is an appeal to the heart rather than the court; for instance if I'm ditched by a friend, I might conceive it to be an immensely inhumane act but rarely can I say that s/he, by her/his action, has violated my human rights and approach the Human Rights Commission. So what we shall call the 'Human Rights activity' (elsewhere called 'Human Rights culture') is not equal to humanity. Humanity made up of suffering and humiliation- is abstract and informal, emotional, and non-enforceable—thus personal. Therefore, what the sample public opinion in India during the Dhananjay episode seemed to have been opposing is not the appeal to humanity to do away with capital punishment but rather the appeal to modernity which classifies the death penalty as a medieval form of punishment and incongruous with the terms and conditions it inhabits; and to take this side or that side here is to forget that they are irreconcilable. Modernity has a global civilizing mission for which it asks for a consensus: it wants all of us to embark upon modernity. But democracy helps us disagree. While many would try to be politically correct being

on the side of modernity, still many would choose to err while being on the side of democracy. Abolition of the death penalty is for the public but the public seem in no mind to acknowledge this commission, strange! What is at stake then? Where are we going wrong? Taking this to a better theoretical level, Habermas for instance, has noted how political philosophy has never been able to "strike a balance between popular sovereignty and human rights" (Habermas 2001 a: p. 116) or, while—trying to prevent "the sovereign will of the people from encroaching on inviolable spheres of individual freedom" (ibid.,: p. 116) we might just set up humanity as against human rights.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The problem is threefold: if the abolition of the death penalty is a human rights' argument made from the people's point of view, a public referendum will show that the rights activists are absolutely mistaken, the people don't want it abolished!—secular, cultural Modernity irreconcilable with democracy or political modernity. Secondly, if we grant that those sociologists are right in saying that this is a moral debate, it is astounding that they recall empirical proofs to back up their claim by saying that it has been a proven fact that the death penalty has had no deterrent effect on the rate of capital crimes. But the point is, in a moral argument can empirical or statistical proofs be furnished? 'Honesty is the best policy' if tested empirically will prove disastrous. Similarly, here if that is done then provided the rate of capital crimes goes down with the death penalty in vogue, the abolitionists must accept it as viable! But if it is a moral argument then even if the rate of capital crimes doesn't go down with the abolition, arguments could still be made for capital punishment to be revoked—by arguing that the value of human life will have to be respected irrespective of the crime rate. This is morality against scientificity or reality. Thirdly, as per the alternative punishment argument, some might want to forward the suggestion canvassing (which included even Dhananjay's counsel) an 'imprisonment till death' for a death convict arguing that that is equally powerful, and therefore a good substitute. But given the

Human Rights activists' respect for moral autonomy of persons and a respect for their integrity and self-determination, they should be presenting the choice to the convict for 'their' preference and not to experts and Advocates or to us for that matter. And Norberto Bobbio—the great Italian Human Rights theorist—informs us that given the choice—many convicts had chosen to die immediately rather than die slowly and incessantly in prison. This then, after all, is not a very good alternative. The person whom the human rights want to protect, s/he supposedly turns against it. Strange again!

All three positions above, we fear, remain trapped in older forms of pursuits. To reconsider this in different terms is to think in terms of a group-personal politics. Here it would be useful to rehearse a distinction which Upendra Baxi has made. He makes a distinction between a politics of human rights and a politics for human rights. "The latter challenges not only the performative acts of sovereign state power but also the bases of the legitimacy of political power. The former deploys human rights as practices of governance and strategies of global diplomacy, tending primarily to reinforce national sovereignties as well as global hegemony" (Baxi 2002: p. 136). The scrapping of TADA, POTA are cases in point. Irrespective of the brouhaha created by the Human Rights activists and others, they would never have been repealed (UAPA though still awaits its fate) had they not been taken up by a political coalition feeding on the vote banks of certain communities. Till the death penalty is seen as coming down 'unjustly' for political crimes on particular communities who also retain the power of political bargain, we see no hopes for its abolition despite the pressures of the European Commission which is also a diplomatic or 'political' pressure so to say; therefore, the final answer perhaps lies in politics and the assertion of group personalities. The moment a State feels it can enhance its political legitimacy by abolishing the death penalty—the way TADA or POTA's were repealed (or replaced), it will do so. All decisions in the annals of human progress have been political decisions of compulsion and not of plain persuasion or coercion. To argue that only the rebels or the poor have been sent to the gallows is a political argument; in

brief a group-personal statement. A few Dalit peasants convicted to death were languishing in Bhagalpur jail in 2004. A newspaper in Kolkata while supporting death for Dhananjay had called for a signature campaign against the death penalty of those peasants. This feat cannot be accomplished without looking at death penalty politically. But that capital punishment in India being awarded to the poor and the rebels makes it inherently political and group-personal in nature and that human rights culture—in order to confront this has to have a political culture in terms of a group-personal politics-and no more remain a-political or politically neutral as Scanlon and Rawls have theorized (Rawls 1999: p. 552); then the alleged moral totality of Human Rights is replaced by an ethical locality—orientated to group egos. It is high time that the same is publicly and academically acknowledged.

CHAPTER 4

The Transformation of Pretense Awareness Contexts

From (animal aware) Applied Sociology to (animal integrated) Social Work

> My dog has died.
> I buried him in the garden
> Next to a rusted old machine.
> Some day I'll join him right there,
> But now he's gone with his shaggy coat,
> His bad manners and his cold nose,
> And I, the materialist, who never believed
> in any promised heaven in the sky
> For any human being,
> I believe in a heaven I'll never enter.
> Yes, I believe in a heaven for all dogdom
> Where my dog waits for my arrival
> Waving his fan like tail in friendship. …
>
> —PABLO NERUDA: A Dog Has Died[1]

> After a devastating earthquake hit Pakistan in December 2005, residents were allowed to free animals from their cages at the Jalalabad Zoo and move into the empty cages. The fate of those animals remains unknown.
>
> —RIZVI 2009[2]

In the last chapter I have argued human rights as against humanity (rather inscribed within modernity). This in-humanity (or as

I name it " animanity") is the exploitable crux of this chapter—where—I infer that—awareness without integration is absolutely unethical, and in the face of pretense awareness, deception and indifference, the challenge is manifold; more because it is not in philosophy, but the human/animal binary is exploded by a poetic tract. "For thinking concerning the animal, if there is such a thing, derives from poetry" (Derrida 2002: p. 377) and beyond the private and the public sphere, there is the zoo sphere. But when awareness refuses to be integrated? From poetry to poetic justice: In fact this is the bloody point when emotional moral blackmailing, and as a next step—violence—(ought to) become moral—as a counterpoint to the existence where violence done to animals, plants or (nonhuman) whoever is not only not illegal, it is not even immoral. In an act of imitating De Sade then, the theatrical enunciation and compilation would assume this form: " Forgive me for I've killed this pig, this dog, lamb, cow, chicken and….. !" The answerer: " Yes, I shall forgive you, but I shall forgive him too who will kill you" ! Poetic justice. Will s/he appeal to human rights then? Who knows?

Truly human rights is supposed to have been grounded in unblemished, white nature. But what happens when the ideological unravelling of human rights reveals it to be politically infected and motivationally impure?

> The question is whether in the face of the irreducible contamination of human rights in global capitalism (a case of ineluctable historicity) we must give up their normativity and reluctantly embrace cynical realism if we reject a teleological solution of historical contingency. […]The task is rather to rethink the normativity of human rights claims within the original contamination and violence of global capitalism, within ineluctable historicity" (Cheah 2006, p. 170).

Is Human Rights then a contaminated response to an originary heteronomous, in-humanity—actualized and de-actualized at the same time and instanced in the last and formative appeal to differences from the ever recurring, ever incurring image of animality? I want to argue that this cannot be deduced or extrapolated in the abstract normative form but must be played

out and relayed in the open, in concrete 'touch' with the visible inscription of the 'field' of animality in general (where animals are literally grazing in the field)–even if it takes an exaggerated form of a narration and predictive, plural irreducibility. Autonomy must then re-emerge from within the contaminated force-field of heteronomy in not law but in group-personal, ethical self-giving in the present—the poetic self-instantation; enabled by whom? Well, the animals,—the "I am."

ANIMALS' DISCOURSIVE SELF-(A)PRESENTATION

From the circus to the eating house, from the semiotic use of animals in the sociology of communication and advertising to animals as metaphors in fiction—I must begin with a frank revision while deploying a heterological (in place of a plainly scientific-sociological) explanation which is custom-built to deal with the (animal) 'others.' In such a hetero-structuration-here, literary figurations and poetic tracts are thrown in to problematise and displace the easy sociological binaries. A counter enlightenment predicament is recuperated to bring into relief two conventions of thinking-the social legislative tradition germane to what we call (animal aware) applied sociology and the voluntary ethical tradition (more implicit in what we call (animal integrated) social work. Testing them theoretically, and ethno-empirically by exploring- synoptically though, social works' ethical awareness contexts at the site of a zoo, informs us that the first—social legislative tradition—which makes us law and 'rule bound' has been comparatively more emphatic and a strong winner over the voluntary ethical tradition—where people are 'will bound' and they act by the force of their own inner convictions. A proposed transition from (animal aware) applied sociology to (animal integrated) social work is found to have been crucial in giving the former the ethical methodological handle to intervene and deal with the concrete others like the animals thriving in severe phenomenological interaction with the often indifferent and un-engaged (in) hu/men. Finally, the death of a dog is symbolically seen to have been littered over the whole of the chapter, is haunted

by it, and performatively used to connect the beginning with the end. Sociology and the circle of animals: An introductory, synoptic co-view.

The inter-discursive apportionment of sociology and social work has been relatively, even reflexively, unproblematic. In Sociology courses, social work is not taught, rarely or very briefly mentioned in passing. In social work—sociology is taught in relation to the corpus of other social sciences—as part of the beginner's inventory. What is presupposed thereby is that there is perhaps no compulsory, determinate transference. This chapter proposes a peculiar thesis (not) in view: it tends to demonstrate, cursorily though, how sociology melts into social work vis-à-vis an ethical applied sociological mediation: awareness had to become integration, and when integration fails the waiting cannot become infinite. The terse answer is already inscribed in the first paragraph. But not necessarily the practical and the efficient—in terms of advocacy, the pedagogic answer is that ethics requires other discursive mediations to become worldly; this has not been discussed till date. Our proposed post-personalist, personalytical ethics bears this lesson in its womb and pathology.

Let us then begin with sociology first. Only a few know, or recognize that the theory of the social contract—crucial to laying bare the discovery of the *sociale*, entailed the fabled image of a lion in contractual singularity. Simmel, while theorizing domination and subordination, emphatically refers to the "determination by the lawyers of the Late Roman period that the *societas leonina* is simply no longer to be understood as a social contract" (Simmel, 2009: p. 129). The fable enumerated and aggravated the image of the lion in a partnership of proxy where he, though in a partnership, keeps the prey to himself-denying any contractual obligation whatsoever. Not only the Roman Law, but having had its precursors in the Pre-Socratic *First philosophers* (where the primal principle is often the fish[3]) to Herbert Spencer; Aristotle to Descartes and Hobbes; Hegel, Marx to Derrida, Bataille or Agamben—and anyone imbricated within the discourse of classical social philosophy and sociology—the animal is a paramount and momentous parallel. The fact that "Durkheim

was an enthusiastic reader of Espinas's early work *Animal Colonies* as well as Perrier's *The Transformism* and *Animal Colonies and the Formation of Organisms*" (Gissis, 2002: p. 86) assumes—factically, the importance of heightened scrutiny when it could be fed well into the narrative of—say the conflict between Lamarckian and Darwinian evolutionary biology, with the French Sociology emerging victorious, and which speaks volumes about the animal as a master metaphor in the emergence of Sociology, "where the evolutionary matrix enabled practitioners to utilize materials relating to past and present western and non-western societies in constructing a single continuous narrative" (ibid.: p. 73).This flows down to the recent upsurge of sociobiology and bioethics in mainstream sociological research and pedagogy (Machalek and Michael W. Martin, 2010). So much about sociology. Now, the discursive construction of animals vividly remains at the secular cusp of a positive concern for animals with a concomitant dedication to their utilitarian usage in a state of denial and hence a counter discourse of social welfare activism based on juridification: applied sociology. Paradoxically, it was in the 19th century that the concern about experimental cruelty to animals and the progressivist stance—not only of science, medicine, health but also of women, makes the debate on vivisection in 19th century America a self-differentiated, complex issue: the case for cruelty and concern seems to have arisen-co-originally; for instance consider this: "The debate over vivisection within the women's rights community and beyond shows how the politics of pain and cruelty extended beyond the laboratory, to the walls of Congress, and even to the voting booth." (Bittel, 2005: p. 694). Mary Putnam Jacobi (1842-1906)—a New York physician "strove to articulate that science and suffrage were complementary, not contradictory" (ibid.,: p. 687) and "also believed that the antivivisection movement only hurt the cause of women's rights by reifying women's alliance with sentimentalism" (ibid.: p. 686). Was this a counter-discourse within a favourable one, or vice versa? But abiding by a transit from the past and the past which is not always present, we may now justiciably ask: has sociology or even personalist social work (which we shall pick up in a

separate section) neglected the incorporation of animal ethics? However, nearly seventeen years ago, it was announced "This topic has been of rising interest in sociology, as evidenced by the … formation of the *Animals and Society* section of the American Sociological Association, a special issue on animals and society in the *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*…, and the "Symposium on Vivisection, Animal Equality, and Organizations" (2000) in the journal *Organization & Environment*." The territories of interest have ranged from the slaughter house to the circus, from the zoos to that of the laboratories; from the use of animals on the internet in the sociology and semiotics of communication, advertising to the rhetorical strategies used by animal rights advocates and opponents. With an emphasis on communicative rhetoric, a summary, selective glimpse of the range of arguments for the reader and a critique from our vantage point follows.

If one, or—for that matter—everyone has followed the Vodafone advertisement in the year 2012—the cute dog who hears the resounding cycle ring of the minor teen girl, cannot but notice that the dog literally pulls up the teen boy from slumber to reach out to the girl, then he runs, with the dog literally leading him in his race for romance-and all the while romancing the race (if we may); elsewhere, keeps a watch on strangers and howls at anyone invading the teens' private rendezvous-when they are at it; one may guess easily that the animal 'who clearly hears everything' is just instrumental enough to endorse the audio-audacity of a mobile network company.

> Animals don't "mean" nature here, in any literal sense; they mean the desire to connect…this relationship is not merely analogical but interlinked through the changing assemblage of popular culture, telecommunications, and the military-entertainment complex.… (communication, technology, connection, and security).
>
> (Berland, 2009: pp. 60-61).

But is this hearing clear and enough an indication of the animal-threshold sufficient for communication to be complete, and secure in its solidity and bias?

The tele-technological communication regimes, may, mis-

leadingly though, seem from above, conjure fully and palpably the possible worlds that animals could suggest; but this comes to a fracture in the fictional phronesis where the agency of an individual dedicated to the telegraphic procedure, never meets the adequation that is required of her and the chewing becomes understandably endless, interminable; the position becomes parasitical—inhabiting the host first to survive, and then to destroy, from deep inside-the reservoir of life's lingering.

> …as nibbling rat, however, James may come closest to emulating his telegraphist's mode. Consider the possibility of imagining her as a version of the "parasite" theorized by Michel Serres: the rat who chews over the leftover scraps of the non-producing rich. To parasite, Serres explains, in fact means literally "to eat next to"; in French, intriguingly, the same word also refers to static, "a corruption, a rupture of information": what keeps "a message . . . from being heard, and sometimes, from being sent." (Fleissner, 2008: p. 51)

Animals, like religions, because could not be grasped and absorbed by the enlightenment litanies, "their unspent semantic potential" leads to the joyful perversion of testimonies, a corruption of communication regimes, and a murder of meaning leading to a motivation of the signifier un-intended. It reaches the addressee where it was not supposed to; is this a determinate instance of mis-spent communication,—an expenditure un-allayed by economy—as argued above? Or the "unspent semantic potential" coming to a grammatical conflict with the masters of messages who send and receive? Possibly or perhaps, the latter—to our discomfort, is terribly true. The way we had theorized the personal as that could not be tempered by the private and the public, makes animals veritably, very personal beings and a step afar from the axiom that only personal relationships are possible with animals, and plants.

But as evinced—not to say of the enlightenment debates as will soon become clear, the sociological concern about animals is not dryly weak-cognitive but a matter of practical, critical sensuous activity: sociology melts into social work vis-à-vis an ethical applied sociological mediation. How this happens will be amplified after the following detour beginning with the Middle Ages.

ANIMALS DOWN FROM THE MIDDLE AGES: PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS AND REASONS

Now, if it is a question of philosophy, let us note in passing that continental philosophy has suddenly, and only recently, woken up to the *question*, if not the *cause* of animals and there is a slow reversal taking place. Take for example Heidegger's thesis that the 'animal' is the nominalistic instance of an overgeneralized essence: animality—which is, supposedly—the catchall essence for all animals. Captivated and immersed in the environment, there is no totality that is outside of it, therefore the animals are literally "poor" in the world, they sincerely lack one. This could be posited against someone like Michael Harr who described the animals' self-same mode of being, a property in the sense "being proper to itself." What Heidegger distorts is this unreserved self-absorption because it is, seemingly, without that sense of self; to Heidegger this is nothing but captivation; borrowing from Levinas, though going against his spirit, I would argue that this is in fact the state of "pure being" (in which animals are) wherefrom man breaks and falls apart-as Levinas points out (Levinas 2004: pp. 47-50). Heidegger is not only mistaken but murderous! His is a kind argument which describes the animals as naked because they don't wear clothes; for this correction we had to wait till the ethical metaphysician appeared and pointed out, that the skin is not clothing (except for the ridiculous but special "human skin" named by Levinas, again), nor it is nudity, and animals cannot be described as nude.

So, this discourse denies that animals have personality: the dog's boredom, the cat's laughter, the owl's shriek or the parrot's kiss are all papered over in a lousy way. The consequence is obvious: Someone on a Facebook post commented with an unmatched—even unmediated—accuracy: we've not learnt from the dog his ability to love and be friends, "but only a position." But this recognition, historically comes down in unintended ways: It was not just another day in the Middle Ages when "a cock was solemnly placed in the prisoner's box and was accused of contumacious crowing. Counsel for the defendant failed to establish the innocence of his feathered client' and sadly, the

bird was finally ordered to be executed. "In 1508 the caterpillars of Contes, in Provence, were tried and condemned for ravaging the fields" (Mahajan, 2008: p. 379). Such huge swathe of examples when animals were tried for acts which were otherwise "law breaking", inspired a man named Gaspard Bailey to publish a book which was a compilation "including forms of indictment and pleading in animal trials" (ibid.: p. 379). In all these, animals were held to be legal persons—who—if they failed in their duties (!)—could be tried for breaking the law. Now, to connect this with the Heideggerian discourse, placing him just opposite us, we might just recall a continental snippet that, to posit otherness, there must be a witness, but who was the witness in these trials? The trying of the animal was therefore bereft of a witness or, who were only men. The romantic description of lone witnesses as the sky, sea or tree seems to be awkwardly true by now. But to posit otherness, there must be a witness, here, the witness itself must be an Other in order to be a witness. Failure to have achieved this—makes human beings rather poor in the world and locked in an insurmountable self-contradiction: Heidegger paid back.

Socio historically speaking, the inference is, however, different. The examples of the Middle Ages go a long way to show—what the animal welfare activists and theorists have been arguing for long and with a lot of force—that animals could claim legal rights and in a sense, they could be called persons—the way a human individual could be—even if they could not be imprisoned (except in a zoo—for no reasons). And what is the jurisprudential reflection in this context? "The view of Salmond is that these duties towards animals are conceived by the law as duties towards society itself.… The community has a rightful interest in the well-being even of the dumb animals which belong to it." (ibid,: p. 380)

Therefore, ethical viewing or ethical treating of animals by a *community is an* act by which the community helps its own self, by protecting its own 'rightful interest'—because—as we have learnt—these are duties towards the society itself. The question is, can sociology remain indifferent to the cause of the community—even if it involves those mute and 'dumb'—in a sense—helpless

creatures? Surely it cannot. Let this be the inaugural clause by which 'animal aware (applied) sociology' grounds itself.

So it is not surprising as to how in the Middle Ages—and not modernity—there was an unconscious affirmation of the personality of animals; though the way this personality was deployed and posited (to try them for offences) is not a very justiciable way to acknowledge their personality—however. But the above anecdotes do establish for both animal aware sociology and social work—where could the origins of what we are calling 'animal aware sociology' lie. The Middle Ages and the legal recognition of the personality of the animals, the growth of charities and trusts for animals provide us with a solid foundation to derive its sources. The picture becomes complicated in the age of enlightenment—in the 18th century—so to say. The rational foundations of the human sciences, liberty, freedom and the recognition of the worth and dignity of individuals (the key features of modern sociology and social work today) are all traced to the enlightenment' tradition. The 'principle of self-determination'—one of the strongest principles to be found in the French Declaration (also a potent document for human rights) is a testimony at hand. While all the key features of post-enlightenment, scientific rationality that are incorporated in the human and social sciences today including sociology and social work, there is an 'ambivalence' about the non-human animals. Animals could not reason, they don't have languages, they cannot determine themselves—and therefore they are non-persons and could not be ascribed any rights what so ever. This was the enlightenment reasoning on animals—in synopsis. Consider for example the following, famous statement by Spinoza (one of the founding enlightenment thinkers of secular reasoning):

> It is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on *sound reason*. The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us *the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow-men*, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own. [*w*]*e may consult [only] our own advantage* and use them as we please, *treating them in the way which best suits us*; for their nature is not like ours…. .[4]

From Spinoza's callously stupid indictment above, his enlightenment thesis is clear: "If animals are irrational, and value and dignity depend entirely on reason, animals cannot matter…" (Midgley, 1983: p. 11). But Spinoza and his friends were not all. And this is the tradition to which the animal aware applied sociologist must turn. 'Some central enlightenment thinkers (notably Montaigne, Tom Paine, Voltaire, Bentham, and Mill rejected this [like Spinoza's] idea strongly, and insisted on extending humane consideration to animals' (ibid: p. 11); what did these thinkers say? Let us take a representative utterance on this made by Jeremy Bentham and consider:

> Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?

The animals are here for a reason of their own.[5] And (wo) man can be the measure of (wo)man but cannot be the measure of animals. "The animal shall not be measured by man. They are other nations, caught with ourselves in the net of life and time, fellow prisoners of the splendor and travail of the earth"[6]: The animals' are their own unintelligible measure-if at all.

BENTHAM AND THE *SOCIAL LEGISLATIVE* APPROACH TO ANIMALS: ANIMAL WELFARE

With the above leanings, what Bentham had inaugurated was—we might designate as a kind of *social legislative approach* to animals. And because of its heavily statutory nature, what we call animal welfare—has had its rightful beginnings in the modern sense in that only (belonging to the other tradition of the enlightenment). Animal welfare thus—in liaison with social welfare—is the well-being of animals achieved through the State. (The phrase 'well-being' should of course be understood only in a limited sense.)

Now, let us inquire into the kinds of legislation, legislative codes Bentham was proposing.

According to Bentham, men as agents are capable of directing actions either of their own or others. When men direct their own actions, it is called the 'art of self-government', or 'private ethics' (Bentham, 2004: p. 310). Governing others with the rule of law is public ethics—but the case that Bentham makes is nearly beyond the private and public confines, and is close, precariously close to what we've termed 'personalytic ethics': inhabiting the interactive spatial niche of the private and the public. Now, who are the other agents who may come under man's directive influence? Here Bentham not only names the 'animals' but also notes—how—"on account of their interests being neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of *things*" (ibid.: p. 310). Secondly, he notes that leaving living beings to their tormentor for the colour of skin, or the number of legs or the lack of reason has already been discovered by the French to be capricious; now the cause has to be transferred to the case of animals "The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny."[7] Bentham then proposes an extension of legislation so that they may cover the cause of animals:

> I will add that legislation might be extended further than it is in relation to the interests of the inferior animals.—What can be said to justify the useless torments they are made to suffer: the cruel caprices which are exercised upon them? …. It confines me to that which relates to my subject. It is a means of cultivating a general sentiment of benevolence, and of rendering men milder; or at least of preventing the brutal depravity, which, after fleshing itself upon animal, presently demands human suffering to satiate its appetite (Bentham, 2000: p. 39).

In this vein, Bentham goes at length to discard the use of animals as sources of amusement and torturous entertainment. By way of legislation, he wants to forbid "every kind of cruelty to animals, whether by way of amusement or for the gratification of gluttony. Cock fights and bull-fights, the chase of the hare and the

fox, fishing, and other amusements of the same kind necessarily suppose a want of .... humanity" (ibid.: p. 263).

So, we have another version of humanity from Bentham. Bentham is trying to extend, stretch humanity beyond its own confines—and by trying to include the nonhuman animals is perhaps making thereby a case for what we've called *animanity.*

> The legislator who wishes to inspire a people with humanity ought himself to give the first example of it. Let him show the utmost respect, not only for the lives of men, but for all the circumstances which have an influence upon their sensibility. … Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being? A time will come when humanity will spread its mantle over everything that breathes' (ibid.: p. 263).

To name it, this is Bentham's *principle of benevolence* realized. Bentham had proposed "two objects for the legislator." First, to give new force to the sentiment of benevolence; Secondly, to regulate its application "according to the principle of utility" (ibid., 262-263). The inclusive 'humanism' that the social legislator upholds—and as we have noted in the penultimate lines of the last paragraph—displays the principle of benevolence. And most relevant to the discourse of applied sociology and *personalytic* social work, and with which Bentham engages at length while he talks about benevolence and beneficence is, charities and charitable institutions. "Many of these charities have particular objects: the blind, orphans, the maimed, widows, sailors, the children of clergymen. Each individual is more touched by one kind of misery than by another..." (ibid., 264). The social legislator in Bentham is touched and applies the principle of benevolence—in a similar manner- to cover all non-human animals and eliminate cruelty, torture and violent sport. This is plausible because Bentham's final proposition is, "Cruelty towards animals is an incentive to cruelty towards men"[8](even if it were not, a moral argument would still abolish cruelty without the collateral clause). Laws must make men more humane (i.e., from our point of view—laws should not make us more impersonal or neutral; the laws should explore the absence of laws when laws are maneuvered); animal sensitive laws are, in reality, humanity sensitive. But the legislative principles

of benevolence to render men 'more mild'—how would they succeed? In other words, how could they take root? How could they work without exaggeration and waste? Bentham seems to be doubly aware of this danger and therefore brings in the *principle of utility* here to protect the principle of legislative benevolence. How does it work then? According to Bentham, utility gives us a sense of proportion and thereby tends to help us avoid waste and degradation. For Bentham, this observation is important because he had previously noted in the case of benevolent charities in England and elsewhere how the spirit to relieve people from their miseries is often marred by the love for 'publicity' and the greed for 'reputation.' And here Bentham makes an advance which will help us turn to the next Section with ease. Benevolent legislation will not work- in the right proportions- with force and command; in other words, with the mere and sheer force of law (laws as commands of the sovereign), but must become *voluntary.*

> It cannot be set right except by instruction. Command and force do not avail. Men must be persuaded, enlightened, taught little by little, to distinguish the different degrees of utility, and to proportion their benevolence to the extent of its object. It should be the object of public instruction to direct the affections of the citizens towards the end of utility; to repress vagaries of benevolence; and to make each individual perceive how the general interest involves his own (Bentham, 2000: p. 264).

This rightly sets forth the limits of the social legislative tradition in regard to animal thinking or animal rights' activity—that which we have called animal welfare—in its attempt to combine legislation and benevolence (a part of the social welfare inventory in general). But the principle cannot work, as Bentham rightly confesses, unless men make it their own, their personal attribute—as if. This is possible through 'instruction and persuasion' as Bentham calls them—to be used to bring forth the whole baggage of 'public education' in its understanding of the general interest. Applied sociology and contemporary social work—as we all know—name this phenomenon: 'awareness' or consciousness raising—one can further with him who vouched for a sentimental education and

moral, emotional blackmail. When Bernard Williams said that the animal rights' theorists were provoking a guilt-complex in their audience, the moral appeal of an emotional blackmail (consider the horrifying PETA videos of animal exploitation and torture) is philosophically positioned. With this, we have made our transit from the realm of *animal aware applied sociology* to that of *animal integrated social work*—where instead of legislation, force and command, people are persuaded by moral reasons to freely accept the rights of the animals and recognize their life-world in favour of the general interest by giving them a place to live a life without torture, cruelty, death and servitude.

So, the transition to an 'ethical' self-enabling of 'most of the people' seem to be obvious and called forth. In this ethical view, people are not compelled but convinced; from particular interests, they shift to general interests—which, they come to realize—unless otherwise protected, their particular interests will not be fulfilled. In fact, with this emphasis, what is known as 'Practical Ethics' came into prominence.

> [t]he application of ethics or morality…to practical issues like the treatment of ethnic minorities, equality for women**,** the use of animals for food and research, the preservation of the natural environment, abortion, euthanasia, and the obligation of the wealthy to help the poor (Singer, 1996: p. 1).

The question of animals then becomes, in this discourse, a *practical* question and not seemingly a theoretical question.

The above two are representative strands of arguments—the way 'mankind's general interests are brought in. Maximum benefit for the maximum number of people (living beings)—isn't this the eternal utilitarian dictum? Peter Singer and others realize the dictum in the above manner; however, the second category-value, is not thereby neglected. The practical ethical idealists (if we may call them) and activists, have offered very sharp, pointed answers from the value-ethical standpoint (which includes a departure as well from this utilitarian standpoint beneficial to human interests, and includes animals as rights bearing,—if not 'agents', as 'moral patients' claiming bounden obligations as a part of their 'rights').

THE EMERGING TEXTS AND TRENDS OF (ANIMAL INTEGRATED) SOCIAL WORK

Now, as we have seen, applied Sociology with its social legislative concern, containment and applied ethical care is insufficient at the outset to intervene without a practical handle—a *techne* beyond the explanatory craft of formulating policies or legal principles of rule bound obligation for (hu)men to adopt. And social work offers this transitional translation

Beginning in the late 19th century, the movement to protect abused children was closely associated with the animal welfare movement. During the early 20th century, however, these causes evolved into separate organizational structures. Child protective services became primarily a function of the government, and private humane societies addressed animal welfare.[9] In the 19th century, organizations against animal cruelty, religious propaganda for non-violence and vegetarianism find mention, though with an attendant mockery, even in the works of Karl Marx.

In fact, it was only in the 1970's—with the advent of practical ethics—pointed out emphatically by Reamer[10]—that social work for the first time confronted the question of animals that asked for inclusion in its baggage of social works' ethical norms and values. The first link was established between children and animals—

> Because of the potential seriousness of the link between cruelty to animals and a child's experiences and behaviour,…a child's cruelty to animals may be an important symptom of negative experiences and/or predictor of future aggressive behaviour and that cruelty to animals should be included in assessments of vulnerable children.[11]

But who are the children who become abusive? A vitriolic *cycle* of abused children abusing animals becoming abusive adults abusing spouses informs Heather Piper's article 'The Linkage of Animal Abuse with Interpersonal Violence: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?' (Piper, 2003: pp. 161-177) which is a milestone for many reasons. While reviewing the cases, which establish that animal abusive children tend to become abusive adults and perpetrate

interpersonal violence, he furnishes a flood of material which are important for the second step in the ladder to be understood:

> Individuals who are cruel to animals are more likely to be aggressive towards their partners and children …; that children who have been the victims of violence are likely to harm animals, and more likely to be aggressive towards humans later in life…. These proposed links or cycles of domestic abuse suggest that children who witness such violence later harm animals and eventually humans. The weakest family member usually becomes the ultimate target or scapegoat. The assumption is that victims become perpetrators and are thus predictable and appropriate targets for prior diagnosis (Hutton, 1983: pp. 444-447)[12].

While these articles tried to put animal abuse in perspective and successfully relate it to social work, it was not until J.S Hutton's landmark article in 1983 'Animal Abuse as a diagnostic approach in social work' (Hutton 1983) that what we are calling 'animal integrated social work' methodologically came into being. What was important in Hutton's thesis is the advocacy that animal abuse initiates a diagnostic approach in social work. The domain areas that were acknowledged—were used to address '[g]rief after loss of pets …, animal-assisted therapies …, the importance of maintaining the relationship between elderly people and their pets, and social work in veterinary clinic settings…'[13]. There came into being, followingly, *Veterinary social work*, *Animal Assisted Therapy* (AAT), *Pet loss counseling, Animal Shelter Emotion management* and similar other social work modalities. To give it an institutional fillip and an organizational instinct it was advocated that—

> [h]uman and animal welfare organizations may strengthen prevention efforts and service delivery through greater collaboration and cooperation. Consistent with an ecological perspective, social workers who are alert to the web of violence will perceive the presence of animal abuse as an indicator that other types of violence may also be occurring in a household?[14]

But the typical anthropocentric bias in such arguments has already been attacked and devastated: without having to establish this long and unnecessary sign chain that animal abusers are human

abusers too (even by an indirect ethical linkage), to comprehend the singularity of violence to animals—in its sufficiency, we better undertake an appraisal of several personalytic registers—deception, pretense, a sanctioned indifference, withdrawal and a kind of vested anonymity.

But what it is to try and explore the culture of limited ethical comportment at a setting peculiar to and registers in terms of existing ethical awareness contexts? This is necessary because it might be asserted that Basic or pure Sociology wants to leave things as they are, and applied Sociology wants to step in and help change, while social work offers the frame for such a 'helped-change' effort: a tired or untiring activity to some. The field is this critico-practical prologue. Though this is going to be very, very brief, let us begin with a frame in order.

FROM THEORY TO THE FIELD: A TYPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL AWARENESS CONTEXTS—AN ETHNOGRAPHIC IN-SEEING

How to distinguish then spontaneous ethical will for the animals—from the greed of reputation and publicity? How to demarcate pretense from within an ethno-hermeneutics of suspicion? Let us first derive a few lessons from a diagrammatical, visual enframing of the ethical awareness' epistemic contexts in their comportment, and then go on to explain, in brief, the lines, and the folds—and what do they stand for.

Now, when we typify subjects or informants according to awareness contexts, we mean to sharpen and specify what is meant by ethical awareness in the animal context, and such that they can be en-boxed or classified according to the hierarchy of such awareness or un-awareness. As we have come to know, the model[15] was first proposed by Glaser and Strauss—two pioneers of qualitative social research. Let us first specify what they had meant by each type, and then we shall apply this model to our encounter.

An open awareness context obtains when each interactant knows or is aware of the other's true identity and his own identity in the eyes of the other. A *closed awareness context* obtains when one

interactant does not know either the other's identity or the other's view of his identity. A *suspicion awareness context* is a modification of the closed one: one interactant suspects the true identity of the other or the other's view of his own identity, or both. A *pretense awareness context* is a modification of the open one: both interactants are fully aware but pretend not to be (Hammersley et al., Ibid., p. 173).

Very frankly, an *open awareness context* is difficult to obtain between a man and an animal. A *pretense awareness context* is a modification of the open one where both interactants are fully aware but pretend not to be; this is also not feasible since pretense is not an emotion established with the animals. Considering open awareness, while it may be said that men may be aware of the 'true' (!) identity of the animals, we cannot say the reverse is true. A closed awareness context is similarly impractical since men would rarely acknowledge that he does not know the identity of the animals. A *suspicion awareness context* is the best choice here. Men suspect "the true identity of the other or the other's view of his own identity, or both." Rephrased in our context, it would stand to mean, men suspect the true identity of the animals and the animal's view of his own identity. But adopting the model in our context would require that we apply it on our ethnographic data-text[16] and interpret through these tabled categories. Consider the following matrix utterances by the Informants and her/his awareness context at the site of a zoo.

AWARENESS CONTEXT MODEL (CREATED): ETHNOGRAPHIC RESULTS FROM THE FIELD

Matrix Utterances	**Awareness context**
[Informant 1] ..."they [the animals] are staying amidst genuine or bad 'animal' conditions of existence".	Open [Clearly affirming knowledge]
[Informant 4] "But I was not teasing, just trying to make it move and make noise."	Pretense [Pretends to be aware and denies violation]

[Informant 8] "So if they [the visitors] are feeding them what's wrong in it?"	Closed [Justifying violation and denying that it could be mistaken]
[Informant 3] "No, not really, I suspect if they [the animals] could have rights like us at all."	Suspicion [In between affirmation and denial of animal rights]

Evidently, animal-aware applied sociology melting into animal-integrated social work would want to emerge in open awareness contexts not as a product of law or rules. Furthermore, this is where the traditional animal rights and animal ethical thinking and activism have gone weak. Social work does not approve of dependent, rule bound people doing things out of compulsion but self-convinced, self-persuaded people acting out of conviction. But we need both—at an initial level atleast: the awareness of being legal and conscious as the first moment; the ethical comportment may be unconscious and a product of emotional blackmail (which is interesting), or a result of bold persuasion or moral argumentation as the second, crucial moment. The final moment is the animal vigilante groups, with cow vigilantism already being unleashed in India; this armed animal activism has to be extended to all animals—that's the idea.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF *PRETENSE AWARENESS* CONTEXTS

So the transformation of pretense awareness contexts marking a transition from 'humanity' to 'animanity'—as proposed—of course resonates with the strong, and vigorous sound of anonymity: what is the significance then of a personalytic ethic boasting of a relational filiation?

> Much of that to which we do violence has no name, will never know our name, and does not address us. We must perhaps begin with the ruptures in the familiar, with the uncanny we find at home. But we must also step off the porch and reflect on the violence that is being done in our name, without our knowing it, and the violence happening behind the back of history merely as an aggregated consequence of the individually reasonable things we do (Wood 2004: p. 142).

But is it really without our knowing it? Or we tend to be as if we don't know it. The author of *Our tragic relationship with animals* reminds us somewhere that it is the unknown cats who deserve more of our moral concern. But it is difficult when we pretend not to know and then an easy, and silent conversion occurs when all are translated to become "strays." Pretense originarily from prae- ("before") + tendō ("to stretch") is a continuity that is but based on an appropriation of the past—a mis-appropriation at best, and there is a prolongation—however shadowy—which makes our journey a double and a damaged one.

It has been a double journey in this sense: the central thematic orbit around which we've moved has been the contingent necessity to make a transition from (animal aware) applied Sociology to (animal integrated) social work discourse; from mere consciousness to a discursive incorporation; transition-yes, but with the compulsion to compound them together at the distance of a discourse, or within the distant mutuality of discursive inter-relatedness. This will be at a welcome remove from the general positioning of applied sociology in the academia:

> When sociology is not an end in itself, ["like pure sociology"] but becomes a means to some other end, it is Applied Sociology. The end may be to sell more automobiles, to improve the operation of a hospital, or to decide whether the school system or the police department should be given the task of driver education; in every case instrumental decisions have to be made, and sociology is called upon as a discipline that can help to make them. (Angell, 1967: p. 725)

Angell then devotes himself to articulating powerfully the ethical problems that haunt applied sociology during such a call for help. The point we have tried to enforce theoretically, and then through synoptic ethnography is that social work as a helping discipline and a profession believing in the self-transforming potentialities of persons—has to be depended upon, and selectively adopted with interpretive discretion, to resolve such ethical dilemmas of applied sociology.

The Sceptical juggernaut

The problems formulated sceptically could be many but here is the one enunciated by one of the greatest cultural critics of our times—Frederic Jameson:

> It is a nightmarish (or dystopian) vision which will now with one stroke suddenly transform our admiration for the animal rights movement itself: for we suddenly grasp the fact that "rights" are a human concept, and that by extending their sway into hitherto uncolonized and untheorized zones of nature and of the animal world, we are preparing an intervention into non-human life and an appropriation of nature by human bio-power for more all-engulfing than anything the planet has hitherto known. "Animal rights" thus becomes the vanguard of bio-power's totalitarian sway over the earth (Jameson, 2009: p. 52).

Jameson contemporaneously summarizes, to the point of becoming a vanishing mediator, a hundred years of violent laughter spitted at attempts to be one with whom we call animals in our being–with ness, in our world hood alleging that the animals have less of a world, and we—more. Long ago it was Rilke who warned us that we are not safe in this interpreted world and Nietzsche—to whom—our anger, our hunger—are not 'pure' anger or hunger since they are always already interpreted. If this is the case (in fact this *is* the case) then concepts invade our very being and not only animals: they are a name given, the taxonomic predicate human is also given; it is a gift or an offering. If animal rights and animal ethics are an invasion, then human rights similarly have been argued as a western imperialist predication. Does that mean we shall forego human rights? Further, the all-round scepticism cannot be a plea for *in-decisionist* reductionism, particularly in a case where there are performative positions like 'killing animals and eating them'/'saving animals and loving them'—*we have to decide*-even with riders-if one may, but one has to, there is no point in overriding this. Killing and saving by loving both are values and "How can one rationally resolve a conflict between two values by appealing to one of them?"—(Williams 1985a: 79) as Jameson seems to be doing so. "The choice can only

be whether animals benefit from our practices or are harmed by them. ..Our arguments have to be grounded in a human point of view; they cannot be derived from a point of view that is no one's point of view" (Williams,1985b: pp. 118-119). In Williams the exclusion of the animals (which is only their) point of view is glaring. But arguing with points of view in a rational persuasion—when sometimes only one view is correct, has, ostensibly, its self-demarcated limits. What is the other way then? How are we to emerge in an open ethical awareness context—if not by argument?

Animals in the cages, in a zoo …but still——and there lies the philosophical, existential-transcendental catch documented beautifully by an author here:

….[T]hat seed sometimes lets itself be sown but often is simply strewn, disseminated in multitudinous engenderings that are irrecoverably beyond human calculation and control, sown sometimes across a carefully cultivated vineyard or field, yes, but at other times cast into the wild—which is where language, along with other plants and animals, dwells. If Heidegger's worst nightmare, haunting him his life long, is Zerstreuung, "dispersion," his most transcendent hope is Streuung, "bestrewal," and it is impossible for him or for the rest of us to say precisely where and when bestrewal becomes exorbitant.[…]

(Krell 2013: 144)

This dispersal and dissemination mocks at the 'pretense awareness' as a mode of being's comportment. Now, how to avoid and avert this and jump up to a reversal? The other way with which we had initiated the chapter is by way of traversed poeticity (the Neruda excerpt in the beginning) -where the smugness of crude binaries are metaphorically torn and narratively pressed within a number of inner folds displaying an inversion of the root judgements of man-animal interaction (like, autonomy for us, heteronomy for animals and so on): in this sense, if we allow us to rest on this fiction of repetition, ours has been a damaged travelogue for good. It is time we become energetically ethical to become virtuous, viciously.

In such terms, then how do we run up to, comment, narrate and/or evaluate the death of a dog (the inversion of 'death of God'—

contemporaneously speaking—takes this shape now)? We'll leave the stage to Neruda to continue from where he had left:

…Ah, I'll not speak of sadness here on earth,
of having lost a companion
who was never servile.
His friendship** for me, **like that of a porcupine
withholding its authority,
*was **the friendship of a star, aloof,***
***with no more intimacy than was called for**,*
***with no exaggerations**…*
[N]o, my dog used to gaze at me,
paying me the attention I need,
the attention required
to make a vain person like me understand
that, being a dog, he was wasting time,
but, with those eyes so much purer than mine,
he'd keep on gazing at me
with a look that reserved for me alone
all his sweet and shaggy life,
always near me, never troubling me,
and asking nothing.
Ai, how many times have I envied his tail
as we walked together on the shores of the sea
in the lonely winter of Isla Negra
where the wintering birds filled the sky
and my hairy dog was jumping about
full of the voltage of the sea's movement:
my wandering dog, sniffing away
with his golden tail held high,
face to face with the ocean's spray.
Joyful, joyful, joyful,
as only dogs know how to be happy
*with only the **autonomy***
***of their shameless spirit**.*
There are no good-byes for my dog who has died,
and we don't now and never did lie to each other.
So now he's gone and I buried him,
and that's all there is to it.

The friendship of a dog (already abandoned by legal juridical regimes): "His friendship…, like that of a porcupine/withholding its authority,/was the friendship of a star, aloof,/with no more intimacy than was called for,/with no exaggerations." Now, the fact that we had begun with a part of the Neruda poem and ending also with the remaining part of it, does it signify a statement, or could we comment on the merit of this retrieval? The transition from a *pretense awareness context* to a supposedly open awareness context via a *suspicion awareness context* is the real trajectory of a personalytic ethic in an animal integrated social work' setting—where both pretense and suspicion are signifying, travelling registers and when openness is suddenly accomplished by the self-deconstructive feat of writing: the poem, and vigilante violence as a form of poetic justice springs forth as the last, dangerous signpost. The stray cat is the only stranger in between, who has to be rescued and loved, for s/he demands this. However, is the post personalist, personalytic ethic most disclosed not in frozen prose but poeticity, in chaos and dance? And the form of moral terror that is aligned with it? In the next chapter we precisely pick this up for elaboration and proof.

NOTES

1. Translated, from the Spanish, by Alfred Yankauer at www.PoemHunter.com-The World's Poetry archive (Publication Date: 2004; accessed on 18 October 2008).
2. Rizvi, Syed, 2009. 'Are zoos really necessary?' (Pakistan Animal Welfare Society) at http://pawspakistan.org/2009/01/are-zoos-really-necessary/ (accessed on 20 June 2010).
3. See Guthrie1962: pp. 102-103 for an excellent appraisal on this.
4. Spinoza, *Ethics,* Part IV, proposition 37, note 1. Cited in Midgley 1983: 10 (italics and insertion mine). On Spinoza's above dictum consider this: "Ask the experimenters why they experiment on animals, and the answer is: "Because the animals are like us." [and you remember the rat—for instance] "Ask the experimenters why it is morally okay to experiment on animals, and the answer is: "Because the animals are not like us." Animal experimentation rests on a logical contradiction." ~Charles R. Magel; at [http://

www.quotegarden.com/a-rights.html] accessed on 18 May 2010. (Insertion mine).

5. The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men. ~Alice Walker; at [http://www.quotegarden.com/a-rights.html] accessed on 18 May 2010.
6. Henry Beston, 1928. The Outermost House,; at [http://www.quotegarden.com/a-rights.html] accessed on 18 May 2010.
7. Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* [Printed: 1780; Published: 1789; Reprint of the London Edition of 1823] (London, 1907) p. 122; Online at Library of Economics and Liberty, URL: http://www.animalrightshistory.org/animal-rights-romantic/ben-jeremy-bentham.htm, accessed on 16 May 2010.
8. Jeremy Bentham, from 'Principles of Legislation' in *The Theory of Legislation,* http://www.animalrightshistory.org/animal-rights-romantic/ben-jeremy-bentham.htm, accessed on 17 May 2010.
9. Arkow, P. 1999. 'The Evolution of Animal Welfare as a Human Welfare Concern', in F. R. Ascione and P. Arkow (eds) Child Abuse, Domestic Violence and Animal Abuse, pp. 19–37. West Lafayette, in: Purdue University Press.at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-104681133/domestic-violence-and-animal.html (accessed on 12 June 2010).
10. "The 1970s saw a dramatic surge of interest in the broad subject of applied and professional ethics…. involving such issues as….Is it ethically justifiable to implant an animal's heart into the body of an infant born with an impaired heart?" (Reamer 2005: 7).
11. Lorna Bell. 2001. 'Abusing Children—Abusing Animals', Journal of Social Work, Vol. 1, No. 2, 223-234, excerpt available at http://jsw.sagepub.com/cgi/content/short/1/2/223 (accessed on 12 June 2010).
12. But Piper's article comes with a critical rider which we should not be side stepping: 'This article has argued that the dominant discourse based on an assumption of links or cycles is inherently flawed. It does not suggest that links never exist but rather that this use of language narrows options and therefore limits knowledge and understanding' (Piper 2003: 174).
13. Catherine A. Faver and, Elizabeth B. Strand (2003) 'Domestic violence and animal cruelty: untangling the web of abuse. (Special section: domestic violence and social work education)' at http://

www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-104681133/domestic-violence-and-animal.html (accessed on 12 June 2010; Italics and emphasis mine).

14. Ibid.
15. Adopted with modification from Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, *Ethnography: principles in practice*. London: Routledge, 2007.
16. I'm grateful to Shruti Roychowdhury who conducted a fieldwork based public ethnographical study at Alipore Zoo in Kolkata on the issue under my guidance. I'm thankful to her for sharing the data with me and allowing me to interpret as I may.

CHAPTER 5

Animals, Crime and Terror

Two Annotated Poems for a poetic sociology and a personalytic, lyrical ethic

> No mean esthetic skill is involved in Marx's depiction of capitalism as a structure in motion, in Tocqueville's rendering of equality as a dynamic process…[S]ocieties are organisms—All of these are instances of metaphorical constructions.
>
> —ROBERT NISBET (Nisbet 1976: 07, 32).

> I believe that anyone who stood up at a meeting, banged his fist on the table and declared: 'We demand a sociology that seeks to be nothing other than sociology,' could be sure of a certain measure of collective assent.
>
> —THEODOR ADORNO (Adorno 2000: 101)

> But we also have to ask all the others to examine their conscience and answer the question: Do you believe you could bear to see mediocrities getting ahead of you year after year without feeling inwardly embittered and crushed?
>
> —MAX WEBER (Weber 2008: 30)

INTRODUCTION

While reeling off this apparently very personal, uncomfortable, and embarrassing anecdote (quoted above), Max Weber was engaged, not in an autobiographical-albeit an auto suggestive

gesture (or for that matter, he wasn't enunciating the scream of his friend Simmel-who, surrounded by aggressive mediocres, never got a respectable, full time tenure); in fact he was busy engineering a distinction between the vocation of sociology as a science and sociology as an art; and the only significant difference he could observe and regulate on it was that, in Sociology one paradigm is transcended, overcome or surpassed in favour of another (later Kuhn will make much of this) and there is 'progress' (though the Sociologists' progress is interrupted ironically by such 'personal' factors as Weber, inadvertently seems to have confessed), while in art it isn't. "A work of art that attains real "fulfillment" will never be surpassed, and will never become obsolete" (Weber *ibid*.,: p. 34). Then derivatively, we could ask, how could Sociology be an *art* as Nisbet—while noting the presence of styles in sociology (Nisbet Ibid.,: p. 29) seems to suggest?

In fact in 1971 Andrew Greeley—five years before Nisbet had declared Sociology to be an art form [Greeley 1971], or anachronistically only after 60 years or so (since 1910) that Sociology claimed for itself the form of an art, because, delightfully, by the first half of the twentieth century, art happened to have been condemned and abandoned by the Dadaists or the futurists and their skinless, faithless kin; even with the Surrealists—their co-habitation with whatever was Art, was all too distant.[1] The fragmentation of the world tended or pre-tended to be reconciled in art—if we are to go by the Hegelian version of early modernity; therefore in order to celebrate the fragment, art would have to be opposed: this manufactured the birth of the avant-garde. "Artists discover the compulsion towards disintegration in their own works, in the surplus of organization and regimen…[H]owever, the truth of such disintegration is achieved by nothing less than the triumph of guilt and integration" (Adorno 2004: p. 57). By the end of the sixties, if we are convinced about the death of the avant-garde or their practice of guilty integration, art—in order to be emancipated or resurrected—was reclaimed by other disciplinary forms—Sociology is an immediate, heterogeneous instance for us. The autonomy of art was, by then, a sham. The autonomy of Sociology was a sham, too. And now, Art is no more possible, but

only as literature! Or when literature -if it has become impossible, then the only way to its recurrence is its appearance as, or, in the novel or -the least of all- in the body of the poem, or again, in resemblance-which is an "as if a poem."[2] And after Auschwitz, if poetry were to become impossible-as Adorno declared, then what remains? The visuals today are not visible to the plain eye; it is only accessible in the movie theatre—at the multiplex-located not at a distance, but within—at the epi-centre of the high profile, prolific market complex: the eternity of the shopping mall subject to central surveillance. Therefore, even the thief is no more. Writing *The Thief's Journal* (Genet. 1994) becomes albeit all the more emptier and secondarily marginal; the saint out of the thief (Sartre 1963) is similarly improbable. As Hegel remarked somewhere[3] that in the ancient world courage as a Homeric virtue could accomplish great feats or "acts of heroic courage", bravery; in the modern world—the same-even more- could be accomplished by the force of connections. Today, "On earth, everything is designed to promote connections" (Benjamin 2006: p. 369). Thereby the simple, everyday ritual of asking, "how are you?" and answering "I am well" is a reference to an absent, patronizingly mediocre collectivity pertaining to (not) saying in ritualistic shame, "*I'm well (connected)*" or "*I'm 'well' amidst my connections*". It is here that one understands art as conjecture and configuration, not refutation.[4] but let us put this aside for a while.

In a postcolonial polity such as India the situation is severe. In the novels of Rushdie, Taslima Nasreen's autobiography and essays, in movies like Fire or Water, paintings by M.F Hussain—various communities have claimed their demands for rightful representation, problematising the modernist niche of autonomous art to be judged by the only norms of aesthetic representation. The arrival of the counter-norms of *political representation*—we may agree with it or not—have notched and bullied, and finally crisscrossed with the rules of *aesthetic representation* in the art-object. The problems of art as representation is no more the same and ought not to be considered the same; it is in fact two-fold "requiring a double reflection on their being-for-themselves and on their relations to society" (Adorno 2004: p. 297). Even with this

double entendre in play, a sociological text is far from being an artistic one and vice versa. It is commonplace now that sociology is not literature and literature is not sociology—and for this reason D. P Mukherjee in the 1930's while wrote literary novels and engaged with the sociology of literature remarked on the resemblance of the work of the sociologist as *akin* to that of the litterateur' (Basu 2012: 164), but did not think they could be united in a dialectical moment. M.N Srinivas—the seminal Indian sociologist and social anthropologist—wrote two beautiful short stories (now available in Narayanan 1997), but did not, despite requests, include them in any of his works or anthologies. Another grand sociologist of our time T.N. Madan thereby undertook the work of recuperation and recovery and notes in his excellent account—how "[T]hrough the medium of fiction, Srinivas said things that he did not through his ethnography"(Madan 2011: p. 193). This reluctance also went against Srinivas's own exhortation elsewhere- where he quotes Mauss and Malinowski to argue how-the anthropologist-while empathizing with the indigene and imagining himself in their place and pathos, "crosses the barriers between himself and the indigenes. In doing this, the anthropologist is *close to* the novelist who places himself in the position of the diverse characters in his novel" (Srinivas 1998: p. 2526; italics mine). If it is all that, a sceptic will argue, why did Srinivas assert himself against the disciplinary, ethnographic incorporation of his own stories?

That is because, despite admitting compliance here and there (expressed by 'like a', 'akin to' 'similarly' or 'close to' and such other adages by both D.P and Srinivas), literature and sociology have always been defined by a close negation; in 'literary sociology' this negation is transcended and an existence is affirmed. Let us see this affirmation embedded in sociological traditions—even in marginal forms- to establish it as not arriving from nowhere, and then we shall try to get a handle over its ur-essence..

LITERARY, POETIC SOCIOLOGY IN EXISTING SOCIOLOGY: A REVIEW

'Literary sociology' as a phrase has appeared in Sociology circles—though to my mind—with an unsatisfactory and insufficient ring.

Within a sociology of reading it has been used interchangeably with the Sociology of literature having been fed with bits of literary history—where to the author (Miles), beginning with the Positivists to the Reader Response aestheticians—all are literary sociologists (Miles 1975). Or it has been taken to stand for socially oriented textual criticism (Tanselle 1991: p. 85) where the text is conceived to have been, exorcized from the intentions of the originary single author, reaches the reader as a collective product bearing the marked imprint of many collaborators hinged in between (ibid., pp. 83-143). And where is poetic sociology here—in its primordial form-as a precursor to our own mooring? One could easily begin by relating how, explicit in Paz's affirmation, Georg Simmel influenced poet Octavio Paz and this influence could be deciphered and delineated in Paz's work culled as a sample (Capetillo-Ponce 2005). Influence apart, a sociologist who has been studied in terms of poetic metaphors is Zygmant Bauman. "Bauman's societal metaphors…of liquidity is employed to describe a world that has melted, changed beyond all recognition when compared to its former 'solid state'. Liquid modern society is one that does not hold any particular shape for long. Life in a 'liquid' environment is such that one cannot rely on anything to remain fixed: nothing lasts, nothing stays the same. Individuals cannot use past events and experiences to navigate their futures…" (Jacobsen and Marshman 2008: p. 805).

A more promising endeavour has been to consider poetry and "learning to view them as 'primary data,' to be interpreted, rather than as sources of entertainment and escape" (MIley 1988: p. 176). J.P Wards' 1981 classic (Ward 1981) is updated in (Ward 1986) where he observes "[T]he poeticality of language in the new sociology signifies an attempt to combine understanding this constraint [which society imposes and poetry helps breaking and freeing us from) with breaking it." (Ward Ibid.:p. 330). Without commenting, however, on what he calls "sociological activity", Ward illuminatingly summarizes, "The crucial thing is that sociology's central concern (collective order and therefore control) is argued to be only able to be broken by poetic language" (ibid.,: p. 331): this is the subversion of the sociologic to which we have referred to in the title. Also, our annotation which would follow

the poems-subsequently- could be seen as what Ward terms as a poem's *resonance* where "The poem's resonance *is the poem* (ibid.,: p. 335, italics in the original). The annotation could also be a *stance* which, elaborated as lyrical sociology, is not an explanatory narrative but an emotional subject position towards a moment (Abbott 2007). This is more justified taking into account the new French pragmatic sociological argument where the fictional characters seemed to provide "justifications" through their own dilemmas and voice, in other words, the very necessary substratum for an empty, injunctional 'ought' otherwise universalized as a moral solution. "We argue that social actors (real or fictional) voice critiques in the name of values, ideals, and repertoires of justification that are presumed to be universally shared" (Dromi and Illouz 2010: p. 355); emotion has an ethics too and fictional characters here are taken as moral sociologists, therefore. But this exciting linkage immediately becomes dull the moment it is, as the authors do, link it to the "sociology of literature" (ibid., p. 353).

This being the state of things in current, contemporary sociology, we shall now reveal briefly, how, a more literary, poetic sociology is not only the outside of sociology-subverting and fracturing the socio-logics and the semiotics of objects and things and thus not the sociology of literature—as it is so often (mis)understood, but also is, at the same time, the outside of language itself.

From phenomenological Sociology to a more literary, poetic sociology: A Prelude

Methodologically speaking, the debate between whether sociology is a science or a factorial, olive branch of the Humanities remains unresolved though in our context it is uncompelling: But this debate, in another form, has been persistent enough-though from the vantage point of methodology mooted in such terms as—whether sociology is a science, quasi, inexact science or a non-science: a factorial, olive branch of the Humanities—a liberal discipline-that is! Rephrased, this debate degenerated, or exhausted itself into becoming the quantitative/qualitative adoption of methods or methodical modes to be applied internally. But because it

is not a mere question of form, this debate and this positioning is a misnomer: internally practiced, it will still be within the set parameters of the scientific paradigm. Here is a classic case where it is forgotten, forcefully, that to resemble the humanities and not science, sociology must abandon a procedure rather than resemble one. Zald however—who is not opposed to "playing the science card" argues that,

> In a sense there are lodestone classics for each of the enduring civilizational themes. Returning to the classic themes and the classic answers occurs as our common language usage shifts and as we attempt to refine and rethink our orientation in specific problem areas. As the focal concerns of scholars shift in the context of the larger society, different historic usages and analyses come to the fore. That resembles the procedures in the humanities more than it does those of the sciences.
>
> (Mayer N. Zald 1991: p. 179)

It was required to make a reference to this and so far, so good. But for us, it is not a keen question of methodology, but a substantive question of a discipline's intent, direction, and essence: meaning is what sociology must mean and nothing less. Here, phenomenological sociology emphatically mooted the question of meaning. Weber being a neo-Kantian—is no exception with his emphasis on other oriented meaning and value, and such is the case with all classical sociologists. Anybody suspicious about this claim may see Gillian Rose's brilliant classic (Rose 1981) for a high scholarly, excellent demonstration. We shall first state this position and then, briefly, curve a departure.

In phenomenological sociology, the origins of literariness or a literary attitude is foregrounded in the everyday. The question of meaning in the intended meaning acts—even speech acts of other people may elicit the following questions among others:

> "Have I understood you correctly?" "Don't you mean something else?" "What do you mean by such and such action?" These are typical of the questions that I am forced to ask every day in my relations with other people. The moment I raise such questions, I have abandoned my simple and direct awareness of the other person, my immediate grasp of him in all his subjective particularity. I have abandoned the living intentionality

of our confrontation. The light in which I am looking at him is now a different one: my attention has shifted to those deeper layers that up to now had been unobserved and taken for granted.

(Shutz, 1980: pp. 140-141)

The naturalized attitude and the shared lifeworld being abandoned, now we brace ourselves for the unobserved: the allegorical abbreviation of the "taken for granted"; the double reflexivity, the tropes and figures in comparability, briefly- the lie; in other words, a uniqueness, a oneness quickly, and silently sets in through this very aperture. In poetry this is consolidated and the journalistic world of everyday life is readily defamiliarized; the expectation of a deep structure is handy and could be compared rightly to a second natural attitude,—though this is its problem which is also the problem of phenomenological sociology, yet that the poem or the literary speech act—even if contaminated by everyday speech acts is also parasitical upon the latter in some form, grants it a value more than validity. A poem is a closed social world therefore, but resembles the interrogation of meaning that we indulge in our everydayness, and here the conventions that give rise to such and such meaning have to be discovered and debated but simply ascribing it a social conventionality or rituality is to practice the sociology of literature, not 'literary sociology'.

A literary sociology is where the social world is reconstituted through the acts of literature and sent back to the social to be thrown back once again, and this goes on. Let us put a few more words to clarify this complex issue. Above, Schutz holds on to a very crucial aspect of the everyday social world no doubt but-as we have noticed—his limitation is the limitation of phenomenological sociology in general. The emphasis on the intended meaning-acts of the actor/speaker is elusive to say the least.

Reaching out my hand to pull a chair toward me, I have folded the arm of my jacket, scratched the floor, and dropped my cigarette ash. In doing what I willed to do, I did a thousand and one things I hadn't willed to do. The act was not pure; I left traces. Wiping away these traces, I left others…Thus we are responsible beyond our intentions (Levinas 2007: p. 3).

If this is so, then we are responsible beyond our meaning. It is not that I ask what did you mean, and s/he as the answerer has a full grasp of it and the 'meant' could be narrated as a commentary or quoted in full translation in its full measure; it could well leap out of his competence and the sense of complacence and out of the sense of well-formed intentional speech acts; it could face up to an exteriority—the thought of an outpouring—an outside totally uncalled for. Language slips through the sovereign I and the whole network of the formal modes of representative conventions used to situate and interpret the force of the authorial, speakers' signature. This unknown, this limited infinity is what is literature, and what it is meant to be. Foucault—apart from making a terse nullification "'I speak"; it disappears the instant I fall silent" (Foucault 2000: p. 148), expresses this beautifully:

> If the only site for language is indeed the solitary sovereignty of " I speak," then in principle nothing can limit it—not the one to whom it is addressed, not the truth of what it says, not the values or systems of representation it utilizes. In short, it is no longer discourse and the communication of meaning, but a spreading forth of language in its raw state, an unfolding of pure exteriority. And the subject that speaks is less the responsible agent of a discourse… than a non-existence in whose emptiness the unending outpouring of language uninterruptedly continues (*ibid.:* p. 148).

And literature, followingly, is the short name for this opening of language to its outside and not really the self-referential interiority captured within the prison house of language—as held by the structuralists in the moment of their allergy towards phenomenological sociology, nevertheless being blind to its own outside. But *how* is this possible? When we are doing sociology—that too with an applied niche—we ought to undertake an answering of the question. The predictable answer is that—we achieve it by departing from the everyday language or habits of speech as one step forward from the Husserlian and Schutzian move away from the naturalized worldhood in general. But literature as the outside of language must be envisioned and encrypted from within that of language itself (in Sociology the problem as 'The Problem of

Sociology' finds itself in the classic statement by Simmel "It is first necessary to find *in society* what 'society' actually is, just as geometry determines in spatial things what spatiality actually is" [Simmel 2009: p. 27, italics mine])—this paradox seems insurmountable—apparently but reasonably so. More because it is not always the realm of the figure, sometimes it is-of course, -but the figure—in contact with the non-figural, non-tropological, non-allegorically ordinary and the everyday, expressive commonplace that literature arises or dissolves within and outside of itself:

> Not when it is set apart from words, but within the intimacy of what is said, through the operation of clichés, which alone are capable of rescuing it from the anamorphoses of reflection. One might imagine this thought which is revealed in conventions, which both escapes and is kept safe [*se sauve*] within constraints. But that is language's secret…[A]ll we have to do is to imagine that *true* commonplace expressions are words torn apart by lightning and the rigours of law found the absolute world of expressions, outside which there is nothing but sleep and chance.
>
> (Blanchot 1995: p. 60)

So it is not always our hunt for the figural immanent in everyday practice of signification but in a literary act where the figure, the trope are entwined with the cliché in an extra-ordinary no-distinction; and this non-distinction traverses to the literary text which is sociological, literary, and auto-genetically ethical at the same time in the single act: the poem.

To be more clear and precise, let us state that what is at stake here. Sociology is supposed to have a handle over the everyday life world—the world of cliché, stereotyped commonplaces and repetitive non-events, boredom—captured in the Husserlian 'natural attitude;' literature is held to be defamiliarizing this world of clichés by introducing an experience which seems to be—for the moment at least-original; this it does by playing upon the common with the common and bringing upon, rather bringing open the 'uncommon' or the extraordinary—for example by juxta-structuring a full moon with and against a *chapathi*, a cracked mirror standing for a broken marriage, the strap of a white

blouse showing itself as a shimmering white bone, a shoe shop 'bleeding' red slippers etc. etc.: this is the handiwork of the figure or the trope, the allegory, icon, index, symbol and so many others. Therefore, in the literary act or the literary feat, everyday cliché and the uncommon are—so to say—united in one moment which could be named—the poem.

A 'MORE LITERARY', POETIC SOCIOLOGY: PREFACE TO THE PRACTICE AHEAD

Subsequent to Georg Lukac's famous sociological studies of literary realism, George Konrad's excellent novel *The Case Worker* (Konrad 1974), later Lewis Coser's collection of literary narratives for the adumbration of a sociology—creatively informed (Coser 1963) and finally in the year 2011 Michael Ungar's *The Social Worker: A Novel* (Ungar 2011), a collection of 'sociological' poems for a "more literary, poetic sociology" adumbrating a personalytic, lyrical ethic has been long overdue.

These two poems—one (The Animal Trainer) is by the American poet John Berryman; the second 'Bleached Fatal: Cho's Iraqian confession' published in the Sunday Statesman- the present author's own[5]—are responses to this intimate, academic calling. Like the narrative tracts of Coser or Konrad, these poems could be used specifically in social science classes and be read together with the topics they theoretically regulate. While standard sociological themes are invoked in the class, these poems, for their obvious allegorical and tropological form will defamiliarize them readily and urge the students in the wake- to unravel the deep structure of apparently sociological content localized in such tremendous and untoward literary formations. Therefore, while the students could start by separating the poetic and the sociological or the tropological and the cliché, they will, finally give the exercise up in despair: the magic of 'poetic sociology' ought to be this not to be pinned down by the gravitational pull of separately signifying discourses. One might call this, if he may, not a 'sociology through literature' but the intimate, responsible '*de-structuration of*

sociology through literature' This much for the traditional, didactic use of our text.

Now, a note on annotation: annotation follows the two poems; is it explanation? Evaluation? Commentary? Criticism? In response to this question one recalls the highly interesting maneuver made by Walter Benjamin in his 'Commentary on Poems by Brecht' (Benjamin 2006:pp. 215-250). I agree with him as far as he makes a distinction between a commentary and an assessment in that a commentary is not an evaluation. "The commentary takes for granted the classical status of the work under discussion and thus, in a sense, begins with a pre-judgement" [concerned only with] "the beauty and positive content of the text" (ibid.: p. 215). But I disagree with Benjamin so far as he makes "the business of a commentary is to demonstrate the political"(in our case-sociological) "content of the very passages that are purely lyrical in tone" (ibid., p. 216) since that will be again a sociology of literature which we are positioned to detest and decry, and why not since these poems are themselves sociological-at the very, prominent outset; at the same time and tone, they are on their own immanently 'literary'. Have we been able to make our case with sufficient reason? This should be read with a singular caution *since everything literary could be sociological* (this is the stuff of the 'sociology of literature' or sociology through literature) but *everything that is sociological is not literary*. Therefore, a *literary sociology* is, at the same time, literary and sociological. Here the poems are therefore the primary objects; they are self-evidently adequate. The annotation comes only as a double exposition and could be considered by some, for very pointed reasons, redundant.

POETIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE CIRCUS: 'THE ANIMAL TRAINER' BY JOHN BERRYMAN

The hunt for the stable signified is mechanized in the traveling tent and content of the circus. The general sociological view tends to endorse an anthropomorphic (entailing enforced humanization) explanation of the trained tactic and the territorialization that the

animals undergo; the question of admissible hospitality and terror at their tortured acrobatics is, to this admonition, a rememorating of the pre-history of the peoples as spectators—such goes the view and here below is a superb, to my mind-the best 'sociological' summary:

> It is in this context of an industrial and commodified order, of the "fear and trembling" at the loss of Nature, that the new circus play emerged on the periphery. Anthropomorphism is being played here anew and gains new significances. It is no longer just part of the narrative of control and subjugation of Nature, as some "anti-circus" voices would argue … It is no longer just a trope of critical irony, of the grotesque, as in Grandville… as perceived by the circus spectators…Nature is constantly there, in those anthropomorphic segments of the act [where "Animals are "self-referentially " absorbed into Human forms"], yet it is constantly being disintegrated, transgressed, and textualized. In an era fearing the loss of Nature, it is in the periphery, that is, the circus, that this loss is playfully pushed to the extreme and experientially "realized." Elsewhere… I have looked at this circus experience as part of a phenomenological interpretation of the accusations the "anti-circus" group level against circus cruelty to animals. My argument was that the experience of "cruelty" among some of the spectators in circus animal acts does not originate in the witnessing of actual torture inflicted on animals during the performance…If the accusations leveled against the circus do persist, it is because "cruelty" arises from the public's perceptual experience of Nature as being shattered and transgressed in the circus performance. This circus experience of transgression, evoked at the sight of Nature being made an object of play, impacts on the spectators' sense of their own ontological grounds. In the peripheral circus performance, the public's Nature-mirrored (Animal- opposed) Human self is playfully endangered. (Carmeli 2003: pp. 79-80)

This explanation of sociological poetics above- plausible though it may be—apparently, would be problematised first theoretically and then as we shall demonstrate—made to perish through a poetic sociological experiment as delineated below.

In terms of a historical sociology, the trajectory Carmelli charts for the emergence of a new circus in the "context of an industrial and commodified order, of the "fear and trembling" at the loss of

Nature" is self-fulfillingly teleological-to say the least. The circus had both a public—political and a private-cultural significance in medieval Rome. The circus—where the sovereign was often present to preside was also home for the plebeians, and in times of agitation and political turmoil- "it was to those places that they hastened to assemble and demonstrate" (Veyne 1990: p. 401). This public-political significance of Roman circuses was christened and hastened by the fact that they were "official ceremonies which theoretically formed an element in the state religion (except for gladiatorial *muner,* which were, so to speak, a matter of custom and folklore" (ibid.,: p. 415). And it was through the circus, or the site of the circus—which emerged as the place holder, that the relations between the sovereign, the people and the Sennate were reorganized. The peripheral movement of the circus was already evident in the late Roman formations. The circus itself had become a matter of popular[6] political diversion, leading the people to be interested only in the circus as festivals- energized by their sole engagement with "breads and circuses" only. "The Roman people, the poet exclaims, no longer wants to vote, it has renounced public life, and is interested only in its bread and festivals" (ibid., p. 417). The Circus then being a part of "city's business" was pushed to have become a part of "festivals" only—which was the third beyond the public "city's business" and "private life". So, the modern meaning of the Circus as a show or an entertainment was already imminent in the Roman decline of the circus as a public event and not an industrially modern phenomenon as Carmelli seems to suggest. Secondly, his phenomenological interpretation of the loss of nature personified, displaced and mourned in the spectatorial imaginary is attractive and interesting but would hardly stand the test of a radical, semiotic analysis. In this, the circus imbibes a meta-cultural code "i.e., as a code that implicitly refers to the cultural codes" and thus situates the circus as both "within" and "outside" culture (Bouissac 1976: p. 7)

Some of the cultural elements are combined differently in the system of the circus than in the corresponding everyday instances. The rules of compatibility are transformed and often even inverted:

at the level of the decoding process, a horse makes fun of a trainer; a tiger rides an elephant… Even the basic rules of balance are seemingly defied or denied (ibid.,: p. 8).

And here the spectator is horrified not at the loss of nature and mourns his own pre-existence being endangered, but at the loss of culture and is both, at the level of a meta-semiotic, and in consonance with it, horrified and fascinated at the same instance. "The circus freely manipulates a cultural system to such an extent that it leaves the audience contemplating a demonstration of humanity freed from the constraints of the culture within which the performance takes place" (ibid.,: p. 8). Carmell's whole explanation based on the supposed transgression and torture of nature is thus entirely problematised with the spectators wanting to be within and also to overcome the imperatives of culture itself (and the clown mediates this interface), and we concur with this view.

Now, having begun with a hisorico-theoretical rejection of the standard sociology of the circus evinced in Carmelli, we shall get on with the poetic sociological elaboration that begins with the poem as an existential sample itself inseparable from the other ruminations we might pursue.

To begin with, one needs to remember John Berryman's poems *The Animal Trainer* 1 and 2 (henceforth AT 1 and/ or 2); submitting it to a ready mix, it assumes a form like this:

POEM(S) 1: *Animal Trainer* (1)

I told him: The time has come, I must be gone.
It is time to leave the circus and circus days,
The admissions, the menagerie, the drums,
Excitements of disappointments and praise.
In a suburb of the spirit I shall seize
The steady and exalted light of the sun,
And live there, out of the tension that decays,
Until I become a man alone of the noon.
Heart said: Can you do without your animals?

The looking, licking, smelling animals?
The friendly fumbling beast? The listening one?
The standing up and worst of animals?
What will become of you in the pure light
When all your enemies are gone, and gone
The inexhaustible prospect of the night?
—But the night is now the body of my fear,
These animals are my distraction. Once
Let me escape the smells and cages here.
Once let me stand naked in the sun,
All these performances will be forgotten.
I shall concentrate in the sunlight there….
I reared them, tended them (I said) and still
They plague me, they will not perform, they run
Into forbidden corners, they fight, they steal.
Better to live like an artist in the sun.
—You are an animal trainer. Heart replied.
Without your animals leaping at your side
No sun will save you, nor this bloodless pride.
—What must I do then? Must I stay and work
With animals, and confront the night, in the circus?
—You learn from animals. You learn in the dark.

(Berryman 1989, AT 1:pp. 30-31)

We would speed through and abide by the poem in the following manner: The dread, the fear and the trembling in the trainer of course emerges from the scared adventure of meeting the most obstinate, unruly animal on whom the whip dithers and breaks: "the unbroken animal that cannot be trained" (Bataille 1988: 24); besides, "all this performance will be forgotten"(by whom? It could be by the audience or by the animals whom the trainer anticipates "will not perform' ever-anymore"). This is all his baggage of culpable, collapsible fear. Cultural training demands obedience and obedience is a sort of, if not in its entirety, a form of blindness that ushers, flowers in the dark. As against this demand, the animals' inherent denial in that—"they fight, they steal" and by "forgetting"

(if they are to) and running " into forbidding corners" (but what is forbidden in the dark since the dark and the night themselves are of forbidding, sensuous propensity "The animals are coupling, and they cry/The circus is, it is our mystery,/ It is a world of dark where animals die" [ibid.AT 2: p. 32]). A dark, dangerous, dirty world of slaves—stealing, copulating, defecating, forgetting and thus—, showing in droplets, a rain of rebellion to come—appears as a possible world to the trainer where the darkness gravitates towards or invades his own interiority and he wants to stand "out" in the sun; he wants to escape.

The animal trainer then wants to abandon the dark corner of the circus (though they still are "circus *days*"), abandon training and thus un-inhabit culture (all culture is discipline, training, and selection ala Deleuze) and by it—the animals; abandoning, so that by this translation he may become an artist alone- with art not "decaying" in forged "tension". The sound, the smell, the entwined acts of standing up and putting up " soul delighting tasks"—all a product of taming the animal "enemies" presupposed by the performative acts of punishing them—where the acts-a posteriori- are themselves punishments. Punishment is performance here. The dread, the fear and trembling in the trainer of course is: apart from meeting "the unbroken animal that cannot be trained" (Bataille 1988: p. 24), "all this performance will be forgotten"(by whom?) or else, the animals' inherent denial in that they—by "forgetting" (if they are to) and running " into forbidding corners" (but what is forbidden in the dark since the dark and the night themselves are of forbidding, sensuous propensity "The animals are coupling, and they cry/The circus is, it is our mystery,/ It is a world of dark where animals die." [ibid.AT 2: p. 32]), "they fight, they steal" and "will not perform" ever-anymore. There is then an indeterminacy built into the optic of everyday taming of the animals—not once for all—but which must be repeated, rehearsed and reiterated with the shock of pulsation, again and again. This distraction which the trainer confides—while trying to impinge upon the constant attention of the animals—derives not from an externality for sure. "The animal has contingent self-movement because its

subjectivity is, like light and fire, ideality torn from gravity,—a free time, which, as removed at the same time from real externality, determines its place on the basis of inner chance." (Hegel 2001)[7]. This "inner chance" or "spontaneous determination" is what is indeterminate to the trainer and therefore even an overburdening of attention (or gravitation to pull down and keep them pinned to disciplinary regimes) is not enough: freed from this gravity, they always slip through the attentive, concentrated net of eyes (Bataille would call this the pineal eye).

Notwithstanding the fact that in *Animal Trainer* (2) Berryman declares the suburb and the sun—where the trainer wants to escape and reside, stand alone, "are pale." (Berryman, Ibid. AT 2: p. 32); if the suggestion to abandon is the spirited lesson of the head, the heart persuades him to stay learning from the angels of the night, since the sun that leaves no shadows cannot save and if all learning is journeying from darkness to light, then dispelling all cognitive dissonance or, ignorance could happen at the site of this thin darkness only. The trainer must remain, and learn from the animals-learn from the night which treasures "inexhaustible prospects".

Let us rehearse the grounding of the animal ontology once again: who is the animal? The Animal "I" is identity or equality to itself (Kojeve 1980: p. 5), the "given being" of animal life (ibid.: 10) rooted in natural heteronymy; while animal is anima-tion or spirited life, bestiality is incest; the most ghostly/major sin—the only one with which animals could be distinguished[8] from the human, yes!—neither by labour nor by language-as traditions have had it. And Bataille rightly, therefore, in this old fashioned way- has Levi Strauss as his primary interlocutor. But we must differ with him as his tiring anthropomorphism (as also in the Sociological abstract of Carmelli 2003 cited in the beginning of this sub Section) plots the animal as the negation of man or vice versa; the opposite of animal (or, animated, spirited life as above) is, actually, non-life, de-animated, matter[9]. Yet he is true to the extent that (if) man does negate animality, in order to disown his nature,

[m]an negates himself; he trains himself; he refuses,… It still must be granted that the two negations … of the given world and of his own animality—are linked. It is not for us to give a priority to one or the other, to try to determine whether the *training*' [in our case it appears in the form of prohibiting the animals to assert their nature][10] 'is the consequence of labor, or the labor is the consequence of moral mutation' (Bataille 1991: pp. 52-53).

Therefore, when finally the trainer is left to learn from the circus in the dark, he is actually left to train himself. Finally, to end this strenuous reading with a bit of Bataille as our instrument and purview, let us take on the metaphor of the sun and the noon. The trainer's plead to gravitate from the dark circus' night and darker animals (all attributes pervade to the symbolic centre) to the noon's "exalted light of the sun" is reversed by the metaphor's own mythological burden of the signified and we shall allow Bataille to have the last say: the sun though often "is confused with the notion of noon… is the most *elevated conception.* It is also the most abstract object, since it is impossible to look at it fixedly at that time of day…." (Bataille 1986: p. 57). It could be blinding if one does so "adequately expressed by the horror emanating from a brilliant arc lamp" (ibid.: p. 57)—(as in custodial interrogation).

In the same way that the preceding sun (the one not looked at) is perfectly beautiful, the one that is scrutinized can be considered horribly ugly. In mythology, the scrutinized sun is identified with a man who slays a bull (Mithra), with a vulture that eats the liver (Prometheus): in other words, with the man who looks along with the slain bull or the eaten liver…[O]fcourse, the bull himself is also an image of the sun, but only with his throat slit. The same goes for the cock, whose horrible and particularly solar cry always approximates the screams of a slaughter (ibid.: p. 57).

To conclude, where is the will of the trainer traveling then? Against his willing grain, he journeys (or, is on his way to travel) from blood to more violent blood, from darkness to blindness, from madness to murder, from circus to slaughter vis-à-vis the myth of the sun and the noon.

With this our de-structuring seems to have been complete

but awaits a sociological, stable resolution: let us climb down to the margins of the earth again. Relevant to the pulls and pressure of our interest—how is it that the tusker in the circus could be claimed by the anti-circus animal rights activist as well as the pro-children, pro-entertainment and thus the pro-circus lobbyists? Two provisional answers for the time being are, one, as the semiotics of the circus suggests that the circus because is a meta cultural system and manipulates culture by altering the codes of it, it becomes relevant to the culture as such "it is the very relevance of the circus to culture that accounts for the semi rejection of the circus by the culture. … [i]ndividuals who have not been fully integrated into a culture" [for instance, children] "find it more acceptable to enjoy this type of performance, as do individuals with a marginal unique status, such as poets and artists" (Bouissac 1976:p. 8). The second explanation is here: the animals are "boundary objects" (or, boundary beings?) inhabiting several social worlds and their informational requirements—at the same time (Marie 2008). To pose them as a pure object of natural/social, scientific, or commercial-sympathetic recognition is thus difficult. The conflicting claims on the same object/subject therefore arises from this transitional, moreover, shadowy presence, and their discursive appropriation thereby or even an attempt to it, is therefore, never sufficient. This inadequacy, this falling out in itself is ethical and reflects a deep personal indeterminacy, a contingent chaos that the animals bear with them, and poetry and only poetry could instantiate it, without letting the unspoken being appropriated.

CHO OR CHE? From Saddam to Che:
"To play with the four seasons: this play, this evil"

POEM 2. *Bleached Fatal: Cho's Iraqian confession*

Counting the absurd
as I wake up a thousand times shivering
along the finished rod

—"what are you scared of, donkey?"
Tube light or terror no matter
I'll give the drift I own, possess me
by the skull and nail those
furniture sitting on the setline, now
kneel me down
before they melt, I'll go!
Cast me out, Lily
I want to be classical in all that
I'll have connections,
More wombs, more bombs,
more temples and tombs…
..'Saddamned' to hell we are..
'*saddamn*'!! -okay, yes, but '*whose-sane*,' say?
Those who are,
press their tulips down, Lily
at the broken bronze byline.
All the cups that you won
for sprint at school,
now have tea in them,
sunflowers supply coffee.
Don't be sad!
See, I'll run meat in the moonlight
bleached fatal: excess
I want to keep my weight off then,
Air and architecture, fire encumbered.
Cast me out Lily—if I flop.

(Chatterjee, Arnab, 2017a)

Annotation

Though the poem, apparently, was written with the Saddam event and the counter event as the two centres, I was lost in between someone who could mobilize a narrative in favour of violence (Saddam or Bush) and a lonesome, stray killer like Cho Seung-

hui who killed many without a warning for reasons of his own, and finally got killed. The Virginia Tech massacre being over, hoax bomb alerts and false gun signals ran riot. How are we to understand these—aided by the poem-if we want to—as forms of mourning? This apart—how do we make sense of Cho Seung-hui's violent onslaught is still not clear-even in the year 2017. My annotation argues, he could not sell his "mental defects" to similar minded people (like Saddam or Bush could do) and thus his grievances were not political and will never be taken seriously.

It was those days in the early 90's when leaving my desolate college in Park Street, I used to walk down with "shoes full of blood" to the American Center Library at Esplanade (which was there then) to read Gregory Corso and *The American Poetry Review*. It was exciting when I came across an adolescent monograph on postmodernism (edited by Ihab Hassan) in which there were praises for separate and lonely, unorganized acts of violence as being postmodern. I still remember at least two of those anecdotes: "What is Stalin but a Chenghiz Khan with a telephone" and "terrorists are the greatest entertainers of our time" [except for the victims]! Quotable quotes—of course (though neither Stalin nor Chenghiz Khan or the terrorists could be called lonely aggressors in any imaginary way!)

Having grown up in age, it seemed no longer interesting to grapple with things such as postmodernism—and "post" others—and sit, being unwell, in an eternal post-office—as if. But those two sentences remained in my mind and slept as quotations like two friends till Cho Seung-hui and his Virginia Tech massacre—sparked that memory with bright light. If you had followed the incidents post Virginia-Tech carnage, you will nothing but agree with me ('Counting the absurd'). In a US school campus—in the canteen somebody had left a small note: "Shooting will start at dot 12 noon and it will be worse than Virginia Tech." Immense snooping followed up the threat to find just nothing—it was a joke. A boy in a New Jersey college was arrested, because, from the dorm he swayed his toy gun in ambivalence to a suspecting

audience; at Oklahoma a man's umbrella was seized for a gun. Several campuses were shut down to goof up security and return to normalcy. All in the United States ("along the finished rod/—"what are you scared of, donkey?"). In India for instance one remembers, after Dhananjay Chatterjee's hanging (who was hanged for allegedly raping and murdering a minor girl), a number of adolescent deaths while aping that act were reported. I still remember an excerpt (published in a local Bengali daily) from a boy's interview who belonged to a group in which at least two such dramatic deaths celebrating Dhananjay's noose had been reported. The kid said, "Thank God !—I have escaped; now in our group—this is the latest game, last Monday I was to be hanged—it was my date…" .

To make sense of this, one needs to examine several play theories that we know. Winicott for instance noticed somewhere -how for a child any violent act he perceives will be the subject of his next new game. Only children could afford "To play with the four seasons: this play, this evil." But when so called adults give hoax calls as bomb alerts, then how come s/he adopts the gesture of a playing, aping child? I think we need to take this with a pinch of sugar. This is how things become normalized (the way 'reading' normalizes texts). Similarly, 9/11 or Carnage-Cho will be memorialized as video games for the bore: ("All the cups that you won/for sprint at school,/now have tea in them,/sunflowers supply coffee.")

It might be painful this way but there is less cause for misunderstanding if one reckons with the fact that these hoax callers, game players, joke makers are not at all insensitive people; they have real, moving tears in their eyes which have not been planted. But most of all—they can transform an event into an image—which having undergone this change—loses much of its cutting edge. Doesn't this beget an immense contradiction?—that we must remember injuries, but remembering itself seeps away their strength and sharpness. This is peculiar and paradoxical! On a massacre therefore- either a joke is invented, virtual games introduced or a cinema censored; stories written, documentaries are shown, novels forbidden! It's not only remembering but also

mourning (as all the hoax calls are mourning) in a very different way; even some mourning will not be permitted. It proves that all deaths are interpretive and allegorical. Or how come people arrive for a feast (the *shraddh*) after a very near one has died? One popular explanation is, to forget the setback and get on with life again. An objection is easy: time itself erases the ruthlessness of pogroms and poetry continues to be written after Auschwitz; so why do we need a joke, or games have to be crafted to aid us in forgetting? Truly, time is a good leveler. But time takes time and if we agree that we live in an age of speed and trace, we need to undertake the duties that time performs and accomplish acts well *before* time. A hoax bomb alert is thus after an event but it is well before time too—for what "remains to come"! Situated in between, it's mourning for the already dead; also for the deaths to come. No one can deny its message. It is meant for everybody but the bomb being nowhere—it's for no body. This disillusionment is the consequence or cost of adopting an impossible duty that only time performs.

And this is the final crux of the Virginia Tech carnage. Cho had complained that everybody in his audience had had a hundred chance to be saved from his gunfire, but could not avail them ("I want to be classical in all that/I'll have connections"). Teachers and pop-psychologists complained that signs were everywhere—in the country's errant gun laws to Cho's authored dramas, his "unwanted" SMS's sent to campus girls, his 'Old man' movie, his voice, his loneliness ("I want to be classical in all that/I'll have connections")—that he was dangerous and 'sick' ("with the chemical weapon of tears we have / "*saddamn*"!!—okay, yes, but "*whose-sane*," say?") and needed 'counseling' (though his so called ex-counselors had released him with Cho showing 'normal' responses). Alas! it seems, signs—for both the perpetrator and the victims, were everywhere and nowhere.

Now, to declare a war of extermination against "the rich, the debauch and the deceitful charlatans"—which Cho said he did, in 2007, was and still-a sickness and a crime both; a personal war against the personal! An anarcho-communist syndrome as if—

anachronically misplaced in time and space. Let's agree he was sick. The problem with Cho is he could not persuade others to go with him. In an age of unashamed commodification, he could not transform "neurosis and even mild lunacy into a commodity which the afflicted can easily sell, once he has discovered that many others have an affinity for his own illness" (Adorno 1994: 223). Cho Seung-hui could not; but who could have done that? Adorno answers, "The fascist agitator is usually a masterly salesman of his own psychological defects" (ibid.,). Do Cho's critics want him to have been an anarcho—communist with the techniques of a proto-fascist? Well, it comes for the first time that Cho's acts will be praised as infinitely normal and (in)comparably sane not having had the potential to play a Hitler or a Pol Pot game. And in the wake of this uncalled-for praise, Cho's footage will be surrounded by (dead) bodies of those—all of whom were not rich, debauch or cunning charlatans (the personalytic, ethical war against cunning and deception), equally or perhaps—not even minimally—bestowed with Cho's itemized "Mercedes" or "cognac". They will stand (or sleep for ever)—allegorically for perpetrators who were not present—a utopia again. Neither Cho would represent the "weak and the defenseless" as he had claimed. Cho is definitely a postmodern unlike Che who had had his aims and enemies clear. Cho will surely be cast out as fatalistically personal and dumped in the dustbin of history: "Cast me out Lily, if I flop. "

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Have we been telling two stories in their finite but incomplete description, middle range totality? And, have they been adequate, or more could have been likened to this sense?

Whatever, having completed our sampled, selective but laboured detour, now we could meditate on the consequences of such an exercise and take account of this initial, affirmative exclamation: The moment of poetic sociology-as we have argued before is—like literature being the outside of language[11]-is the outside of sociology situated 'in' the outside, opening to an

exteriority and could be used to destroy the sociological binaries and subvert the sociologic in a relentless process of resumption and a consequent—(in) completion: radical alterity. It is the high moment of a personalytic, lyrical ethic: a song sung to its end, then sung again, and again ! Genealogically speaking, poetry meant something created through literary work. So, in its etymology the recognition of semiotic labour is evident. Close to skills and artisan craft, even if the storyteller is close to being dead in the Walter Benjaminian version, the poet is not. Literature when "seen as a late medieval and Renaissance isolation of the skills of reading and of the qualities of the book" and poetry, also etymologically, as imaginative speech (Williams 1976:pp. 153-154), it is possible to reinforce them through the practice of reading and tracing the escapade of the (ethical and singing, stinging) signifier from book to book: call it poetic sociology, call it 'lyrical ethics!'

The indeterminate personality of animals never to be mastered by a trainer and the personal war-avalanche of a depressed and 'personally' aggrieved killer-student—for whom counseling had gone terribly awry, could be easily upgraded to occupy the stage of a descriptive ethic required by a personalytic aptitude, but this description has to be *poetically* broached—because in the poem only the metaphorically torn insides of the familiar and the stranger are stitched in aboriginally radical ways: this has been the lesson of the chapter. The animal is not mastered finally, or truly; the poem is interpretively never mastered, too. Animals needn't be persons in the anthropocentric legal sense, they are poems. The poem is an animal.

NOTES

1. I have discussed this point extensively with a different tenor elsewhere in the book.
2. This is to say, when the constructivist paradigm delineates everything as constructions or as logical, legal or literary fictions, then the apparent valorization of literature is understandable; but the moment literature is reduced (as for instance, famously, by the formalists) to just another use of language, literature itself goes

atrophy and could be recuperated only in crude remainders i.e. in its parts: literature in a poem or a piece of fiction and not as a whole, and when even this fails, too, we have it in resemblance or only in the culture of the copy: we are undecided whether to declare a poem a poem or *quite like a poem*, *akin to a poem* etc.

3. "The modern world is this essential power of connection, and it implies the fact that it is clearly necessary for the individual to enter into these relations of external existence; only a common mode of existence is possible in any calling or condition…[T]hus in earlier times bravery was individual; while modern bravery consists in each not acting after his own fashion, but relying on his connection with others—and this constitutes his whole merit." (Hegel 1955: p. 169)
4. I have in mind Kafka on refutation, here: " I always have to say that my education has done me great harm in some ways. This reproach is directed against a multitude of people;.. [from] my parents to … a certain particular cook, several girls at dancing school.. several writers, a swimming teacher, a ticket-seller, school inspector, then some people that I met only once on the street, and others that I just cannot recall and those whom I shall never again recall … And I address my reproach to them all, introduce them to one another in this way, but tolerate no contradiction. For honestly I have borne enough contradictions already, and since most of them have refuted me, all I can do is include these refutations, too in my reproach, and say that aside from my education these refutations have also done me great harm in some respects." (Kafka 2001: pp. 15-16).
5. The use of poems—even the teacher's or the students' own poems have been acknowledged and affirmed for the use of a teacher in the sociology class room (Samuels 1987: p. 59).
6. Paul Veyne makes a larger point here and should be noted for its prominence:
   "…the ancients distinguished between three things where we see only two. We contrast public life with private or everyday life. They distinguished between the city's business, private life and festivals… [In] Polybius… and in 'Juvenal's *panem et circenses*' there is the same triple division" (Veyne 1990: p. 417).
7. Georg Hegel, 2001. *The Philosophy of Nature* in Blackmask Online, http///www.blackmask.com (accessed on 16 November 2002). I preferred the above translation for its simplicity over this one: "The

animal has freedom of *self-movement* because its subjectivity is, like light, ideality freed from gravity, a free time which, as removed from real externality, *spontaneously determines its place.*"(Hegel 1970: p. 352).

8. And such a suggestion that works on or urges us to work on the 'political mystery' of this distinction is—to this extent-illuminating. See Agamben 2004.
9. But in pre Socratic Greek philosophy—among them Thales in particular—held even the stone to have had a soul: 'the stone has soul because it moves iron'(Waterfield transl. 2009: p. 13).
10. My insertion.
11. In explanation, let us put a few more words in order. Imagination is not mere cloud of energy and cannot be limited to, or constrained by, a force-field of expressions or a set of formal conventions; similarly, literature is not the mere use of language (and therefore not in the inside) but has the power of world dis-closure and bursts forth while giving birth to (or bringing forth) a world-hitherto unformed; literature is therefore the limit case of language; it destroys language while it creates its own self—creates by means of or 'out' of language; having been destroyed in the process of creation, it falls in the outside of language. Etymologically 'out' is also complete, utmost and utter (ance). Therefore when we say that something is in the outside, we mean it is 'in-complete', un-utmost (not in the Heideggerian sense of being "included and drawn, unlightened, into the drawing of the pure draft" (Heidegger 2001:p. 106). In the same manner, simply put, more literary, poetic sociology, is in the outside of sociology (it opens itself means it un-conceals, it exposes nothing but itself; to an exteriority because "boundary sets free into the unconcealed" (ibid: p. 82) and destructive of the set binaries that go in the process of founding Sociology: science vs. art, community vs. self, individual vs. society, association vs. institution and so on. In the poems we pursued as adequate moments of poetic sociology (because "only poetic saying can speak of the poem in a suitable way" (Heidegger 2000: p. 209)), similarly it would be difficult to discover the work of plain, opposed dualisms (like nature/culture, humanity/animality in the Animal Trainer poem or conformity vs. deviance, violence vs. peace in the Cho's Iraqian confession poem for instance) acting as interpretive resolutions, resoluteness. Instead, these traditional,

tough binaries awkwardly shift places in a radically alternate, self-forgetting fashion (radical alterity) to dinn into us the old sense of—in-completion, in-finity: and the work goes on, and on. This is the endless ethical alterity of a personalytic ethic.

PART THREE

Ethical Intelligibility & Social Work Practice

> Don't give way to conformity and to office hours. Don't give up. Never give up—always demand more. But stay lucid, even during office hours. As soon as we are alone in its presence, strive after the nakedness into which the world rejects us. But above all, in order to be, never try to seem.
>
> —Camus (2010: 73)

CHAPTER 6

The Case for Controversial Norms

Habermas and Social Work Ethics

How 'animanity' could interrupt human non-persons and blossom in indeterminate freedom, never to be usurped by the trainer or the master led us to a personalytic, poetic sociology and 'lyrical ethics' elicited by poetry in the last two chapters. But to the objection that animals being on the borderlines of social work or pre-social work and working only as subtexts of mainstream social work, how would we situate ourselves in relation to the domain areas or the conservative motors of social work? Here, we have arrived at two (such) social work domain areas (child protection conferences (in this chapter) and women's self-help groups in the next chapter) where a standard ethical theory (Habermasian in Communicative or Discourse ethics) would be negotiated first to emerge in the realm of controversial norms, and an indeterminate empowerment hoax (in the next chapter).

Any patient reader of 'considered' thought—who has followed, with a fuller patience, the ever-growing, burgeoning literature on Habermas over these years, ranging from the annals of analytical philosophy to reflexive sociology, has surely not been surprised by the series of articles appearing in *The British Journal of Social Work* (BJSW)attempting to situate or displace Habermas in relation to social work. This engagement is commendable and—as far as I know—without a seeming parallel—in the social works' literary world. Trying to institute a Habermasian social work of course,

should be a failed instance of cognitive labour, and is more of an imputation than an ascription in the genuine sense, and is not an exercise in founding a new school of social work. Yet, the truth of these articulations and exchanges—amidst the sound and fury of the phrases in dispute—ought not to go astray. In this chapter, therefore what I'm trying to do is, in the context of these debates, assemble some of the matrix-arguments essayed so far, secondly, (using the Habermasian predication itself) test the validity claims raised in them and finally, put them in a perspectival frame—wherefrom we may be able to infer a possible world of social work theory and pedagogy which would disturb the contemporary academic status quo in social work—seemingly self-complacent with its distance from the so called French or German 'high theory' in which Habermas finds his renowned place. This chapter is an exercise, therefore, in a critical summation, classification, and interruption; but given the wide range of arguments pronounced in the ongoing polemic, it would not be possible to cover all of them equally; therefore, this chapter is the first investment of a fuller journey to be undertaken in future.

Let us begin by admitting that while Habermas' pluri-disciplinary and various interests are diverse and different; the discourse of social work is remarkably absent in his corpus. Except for a few technical references to the welfare state, care or empathy, social work—in the significant sense we use the term—has to be extrapolated from his vast, enabling discourse, and then only—interpreted and placed. The vantage point of arrival and departure for Habermas has been, to put it telegraphically, social theory. In fact his initial navigation in between social philosophy and sociology, and the corresponding struggle to find his own foothold and a proper language, gave way to the theory of communicative action—which straddles both philosophy and sociology at the same time. Therefore, when Habermas says, "from a sociological point of view it makes sense to begin with communicative action (Habermas, 1984, p. 274)", it also stands to mean that it might not make so much of a sense from a social works' point of view, unless we are ready to coalesce the sociological point of view with the view point of social work. The study of society (as the complex

of social action and social fact) or the production of the social ought to be different from what it is in social work (as the study of the disciplinary institutionalization of helping); in fact, one must be readily wary about re-marking this as a 'study' because it is the site of the disciplinary institutionalization itself. Social work is a peculiar discourse where practice and theory ought not to be distinguished whereas the theory of communicative action, to use Habermas' own language, is a free standing 'social theory' and a 'continuation of the theory of knowledge with other means' (Habermas, 1984, p. xxxix). Conclusively then, while from a sociological point of view it makes sense to begin with communicative action', in social work, it can appear only as a middle level question. The second step only follows from this: implications for communicative action for social work have to be derived through cognitive- semiotic labour and they are not automatically congenial as it is with sociology or sociologists for whom the problem of societal rationality (and thus communicative rationality) has been a deep seated, intrinsic problem. My point in the beginning is, having been bereft of a natural relational kinship, social work has to reconstruct communicative action for itself; the product of this reconstruction, predictably, is a new one. Under the weight of disciplinary interpretations, communicative action for sociology retains a different hue than communicative action for social work which is an interesting disjunction.

However, Habermas's central agenda is, apropos other theorists of the critical tradition, reason, or societal rationality in the wake of the modern 'disenchantment of the world.' While disenchantment devastates faith and values and unpacks traditions, rarely it can provide content to the space emptied of its past. Habermas seems to arrive where reason appears to have been destructive and modernity negative. And here he is ready with an alternative. While he accepts the fact that with an intensive and all reaching (capitalist) modernization, our world dissolves into three autonomous domains of science, morality, art and secondly, two separate spheres of 'system' and the 'lifeworld' (society, culture, personality) emerge where lifeworld seems to be increasingly invaded by the systematic steering media of money and power,

which are however not sufficient for Habermas to loose faith in the communicative rationality of everyday life. In our everyday life, each day, we tend to carry on by saying what we mean and reaching active, native understanding (vis-à-vis social action) through a communicative consensus. Now, Habermas's project is to export this model to develop a theory of argumentation by examining, and sticking to, the presuppositions immanent in all argumentation (intelligibility, truth, sincerity, normative rightness). These presuppositions are themselves communicative and adequate to ground all future conversations in practical discourses. With this now, Habermas is armed enough to lay down a procedural map (and map only) to test all criticizable validity claims and controversial norms. This will then offer, at a second remove from Weber, normative or social legitimacy to norms, laws and authorities. They then become one with the question of justice or morality and exclude questions of the ethical good life or leave them to themselves. Finally, this leads support to Habermas's stronger calculus: When all religious or metaphysical justifications have receded to the background, in a post conventional world, we have to generate our own 'justiciable' norms whose validity claims we might be ready to redeem whenever required. With this discursive turn given to rationality, modernity gets back its good name.

Now, how, and where does social work feature here? One might argue that social work as a discourse of social integration acts upon the pathogenesis of systematic fracture and disintegration that occasions modern life and tends to reorganize it and therefore is relevant. In fact, the mourning of Habermas that sociology could not assume the above role (Habermas 1984a: p. 5) fully gets replaced by social work and so on. But except this much there is nothing left for social work. That communicative or discourse ethics could help us achieve shared understanding in natural or administered forms of life could be claimed by any discipline—from the theory of communication to that of public relations network.

However, suspending these initial ruminations, it is time now that we enumerate the main terms of the debate.

A SUMMARY OF THE DEBATE

It all began with Hayes and Houston's landmark article in the BJSW (Hayes and Houston 2007) in which they tried to argue—resonating the feminist critiques of Habermas that given its emphasis on rationality, justice-morality, and consensus, it would be difficult for Habermasian communicative ethics to posit itself and thereby creatively contribute to ethical-existential situations hinged in interpersonal normativity. Cast against such a discouraging relief, Hayes and Houston intended to show that communicative ethics, contrary to popular academic perception, could be relevant to a Family Group Conference (FGC) in Child Protection which brings up a concrete child welfare plan through successive stages of Referral (Stage 1), Preparation (Stage 2), The conference—comprising of: a. Information Giving, b. Private Family Time, c. Agreeing to the Plan (Stage 3); Monitoring & reviewing the plan (Stage 4). (Hayes & Huston, p. 995). They conclude: In summary, FGCs value the experience and commitment of families while attempting to harness the knowledge and skills of the professionals who are mandated to intervene in their lives. In doing so, this unique decision-making process represents a primary example of mediation between the 'lifeworld' and the 'system' and we provide evidence for this claim below. More specifically, the model "empowers families to engage with the legal process surrounding child protection, to challenge professionals' interpretations of legal statute and to make a plea for state resources to improve their situation. As such, FGCs are a microcosm of exchange within the 'lifeworld'—of 'will formation' (to use the Habermasian term) that produces a communicative power to influence the enactment of statutory processes within formal child protection" (Ibid., p. 996).

But, having advocated feebly, (feeble—because the Habermasian 'political will formation' here is transposed to mean family members who become metaphors of people who challenge the rule governed bureaucratic statutory mechanics which augurs with the onset of child protection service systems), the relevant insertion of communicative ethics, Hayes and Houston offer a corrective:

That said, we believe there is a significant gap in the FGC process relating to the absence of explicit, moral rules for reaching agreement over the welfare plan for the child. In other words, while the conference provides an overarching format for deliberation, the precise moral standards governing what is said and by whom, are less clear. What is central here is the need to regulate power on the basis of formally agreed procedures that can be adopted by all those participating in a dialogue over matters of moral concern. (Ibid., p. 1000)

And this debate is relevant more so because—it is to the sphere of communicational procedures that we must turn to ensure that ethical decision making takes place against the backdrop of a pluralistic world where "former certainties have been eclipsed by novel expressions of doubt." (Ibid., p. 1003)

Now, Paul Michael Garrett in a perceptive piece (Garett 2009) in BJSW sought to generate a devastating critique of Hayes and Houston. But her objections are predictable and popular—in fact these are mainstream objections against Habermas. "…the work of Habermas is problematic because of the 'lifeworld'/ 'system' binary and on account of his failure to appreciate the complexity of power differentials."(Garett 2009, p. 881). How does Garett chart his rescue? He places in position Bourdieu, Bakhtin, Gramsci and Foucault to render the blind spots in Habermasian social work ethics redundant.

This chapter is not to support Hayes-Houston or Garett: in real terms, as I shall try to show, both are mistaken in more ways than one. I shall discuss Bakhtin and Bourdieu in some detail here and Gramsci and Foucault later sometime. I shall simply show here—one, all these correctives (i.e., thinkers in supplement or replacement) fail since Habermas is well placed to visit and counter their objections—discursively limited as they are; secondly, the new social work ethics in touch with discourse ethics flourishes strongly in the realm of what Habermas calls 'controversial norms' and that too, in connection with social action which is the real canon-ground of social work, too and not necessarily the child protection conference which could be only an erroneous example. This I shall demonstrate in the last part of the chapter.

To begin with, the family involves a discourse of application (Habermas 1993: p. 152) and calls for appropriateness.

"The principle of discourse ethics (D) refers to a *procedure*, namely the discursive redemption of normative claims to validity. To that extent discourse ethics can properly be characterized as *formal*, for it provides no substantive guidelines but only a procedure: practical discourse."[1] (Habermas 1990: p. 103) Consider one discursive presupposition: sincerity. "Claims to sincerity can be redeemed only through actions" (elsewhere Habermas adds to this, "by actions and not by giving reasons"). "Neither interrogations nor analytic conversations between doctor and patient may be discourses" (Habermas 2001c: p. 93). The family group discussion argues about what? Social workers' empathy or "shared, reciprocal perspective taking: each individual finds himself *compelled* to adopt the perspective of everyone else" (p. 154) not benevolence or interpretive charity.

Already, acting as a backdrop and provided by the ethical professional codes of conduct, the values and principles themselves are not produced or reversed argumentatively. They act as anchors for the social worker.

LIFE WORLD/SYSTEM

It is not that a family visiting a care agency represents the lifeworld and the social work professionals "are representatives of the system" (Hayes and Houston, p. 993). This must stand corrected. Both are ethical groups (voluntary care givers). Life world works always in the background and we are always embedded in this or that form of the lifeworld; lifeworld is "culturally transmitted background knowledge, for culture and language do not normally count as elements of a situation" (Habermas 1987:p. 134) and is "pre-interpretively" (Ibid.,p. 132) "given" to us. Only when there is a displacement or a disruption, disturbance (like when we are healthy we are unconcerned and unconscious about the operations of the body; only when a wrong accumulates, health can be thematized in the language of sickness—as Bachelard would have it) then it

can be thematized but not as such[2]. Habermas puts it forward more eloquently, "…we learn only from having our experiences disappointed… We do not notice when our expectations are confirmed" (Habermas 2001c: p. 88). It is not a domain that can be pointed out and said, look this is the life world. Life world is a phenomenological and not a sociological notion. But instead of fundamentally interrogating Hayes and Houston's deployment and designation of lifeworld in this manner, Garett questions the lifeworld algorithm—as if from the outside—by taking recourse to Nancy Fraser, Gramscian hegemony, Bakhtinian dialogue and Bourdieun habitus as space filling theorists making them respond to a supposed lack. Garett wrongly positions himself in all these.

Fraser had argued that the so-called lifeworld giving itself as a background for the so called private spheres are not a-political emotional spheres where care, affinity, fraternity 'naturally' reign; rather they are shown to have been—via feminist "analyses of contemporary family decision making, handling of finances, and wife battering that families are thoroughly permeated with money and power. They are sites of egocentric, strategic, and instrumental calculation as well as sites of usually exploitative exchanges of services, labor, cash, and sex, not to mention sites, frequently, of coercion and violence" (Fraser 1994, 205).[3] According to Garett, Habermas's 1974 lecture "adds little to undermine this critique" (Garett, Rejoinder, p. 1756). The critique is absolutely undermined but Garett's engagement with communicative 'dysfunctional' pathologies within families is finally a sociological report and repeats, systematically though, what millions of family studies or family research reports have reiterated.

Does the question of Bourdieu then act as an intervention? When Habermas talks about reproduction of the life world and social reproduction in terms of labour, he is aware of the problem that Bourdieu could pose. The question of autonomy is more complex in Habermas. He thinks, and correctly so, that private autonomy could be had equally and at the same time by the guarantee of public autonomy: they are co-original.

BAKHTIN'S 'ANSWERABILITY' AGAINST A COMMUNICATIVE ETHIC?

The sad part about Garett flaunting the muscle of Bakhtin against Habermas is, he has entirely relied on secondary sources and with Bakhtin even being quoted in the second hand, the problem of capturing his misconstrual would be that the complaints could be disowned and redirected to his expert witnesses and might be subjected to an easy self-abandonment. If that is not the case and Garrett is ready to accept responsibility, then let us admit, plotting Bakhtin against Habermas is a sheer miscarriage of concepts. Bakhtin being the theorist of 'answerability' is absolutely with Habermas except that his discussion is at a phenomenological level (manifested even in his philosophy of language and aesthetics) and Habermas wants to be stationed at the level of social and moral theory. This corrective being inserted, let us demonstrate by consulting Bakhtin in the original and show conclusively how Habermas might overcome Bakhtin in as much as he had had to overcome phenomenology itself. But we shall not address the whole of Bakhtin and limit ourselves to the points already raised (or quoted by Garrett).

Bakhtin—if we are to believe Garrett—ala his experts—detested transparency, and invoked 'unfinalizability' or 'incompletion', openness or 'openendedness', opacity and ambiguity in communications and thus was better placed to deal with 'real people in real situations' (Garrett Ibid., p. 877-p. 878) than Habermas.

To begin to respond to these non-objections, is to state, very briefly, that Habermas who brought back early in his career the phenomenological life world- and posited it against the *system* and its corresponding colonisation could hardly be accused to have been an abstract formalist not willing to deal with real people in real life situations. For Habermas, what produces the social life world—he calls 'constitutive intersubjectivity' and thus cannot be accomplished by a subject in an all-encompassing singularity. The moment this is comprehended, everyday communication—dominated by—what Bakhtin calls the 'speech plan' or the 'speech

will' (Bakhtin 1988: p. 77) of intentional subjects, goes beyond the singular intentions of the speaker or the hearer and thus they are immanently and always already open ended and non finalizable. But still, Habermas will argue that in everyday situations unless we can rely upon the 'transparent enough' sincerity, normative rightness, truth of the second persons' sentences, social activity will miserably break down. It is true that people can lie, deceive, obfuscate and thus the open-endedness of normal encounters may take a drastic and a dramatic turn but when we lie, Habermas points out, we know we are breaking a norm and when lies could be anticipated, translated and identified, i.e., when lies could be brought forth as lies, the truth claim reenters through the back door.[4] But since we have already mooted the lie and the fiction innate in deceptive mock-figurations as the realm of the personal, it is hard to agree with Habermas here. The point is, we know what lies are but this knowledge is hardly adequate: every day we return cheated. The identification of the lie is only an "afterward" and rarely acts as fore-knowledge in self-referential systems. Only in fiction, novels, poetry etc. they take on the mantle of very different forms and Bakhtin correctly classifies them as "secondary speech genres" (Bakhtin 1986: p. 61). But these kind of speech acts and their meaning complexes themselves derive their legibility from every day speech worlds and rule governed practices. Bakhtin here is entirely in agreement with Habermas "…they absorb and digest various primary (simple) genres that have taken form in unmediated speech communion" (p. 62). So opaqueness, irony, or all kinds of ambiguous metaphoricity feed on the illuminated worlds of everyday clarity and straightforward ness. Here Bakhtin and Habermas are in absolute agreement. Therefore, valorizing the literary speech act—as Garrett does so—is no way to address real life situations; the mask is no truer than the face, more so, the mask to make sense has to have the face. One who mediates is the person and what is produced is the personal.

This having said, we need to delve deeper into the Bakhtinian world to explore his synchronicity with Habermas. One, Bakhtin as the phenomenologist of the act and language, is identifiable because of his well-known aversion towards ethical formalism and

linguistic structuralism. Bakhtin wants to have the 'act' or deed' in its living, historical dimension and is thus reluctant to accept a "theoretical world" where "we find ourselves to be determined, predetermined, bygone, and finished, that is essentially not living" (Bakhtin 1993: p. 9). On this old ground, his reticence towards Kantian ethics is understandable. The norm of universalization is intrinsic to Kantian ethics from which even Habermas derives his principle of Discourse D. The Kantian principle was, act in a way that the maxim can be adopted by all or universalized.

Now let us hear Bakhtin on this and as we shall see—Habermas could be made to follow what Bakhtin says against Kant; "Kant demands: the law, which applies a norm to my act or deed, must be justified as capable of becoming a norm of universal conduct. But the question is—how will this justification be effected?" (Bakhtin 1993: p. 26). Bakhtin is questioning the empty formalism of Kant marked monologically ('my act or deed') and intending to restore the act in its "actuality "(p. 26). How could then the justification be effected, that's the question for both Bakhtin and Habermas. The answer is also the same- dialogically (i.e., which takes the form of a human dialogue)—through the dialogic form of interaction. So, the Bakhtinian project having started from the same question and the same answer—does diverge in the final instance. Habermas does not stop at this discovery but develops a theory of dialogic discourse by which such justifications could be effected. Bakhtin renders a phenomenological analysis of the utterance or the act where "something issuing from within myself, namely "the morally ought-to-be attitude of my consciousness" (Bakhtin 1993: p. 23); in other words, the intentional directionality of the subjective consciousness, is primordial. But, as is evident, this is not dialogism and Bakhtin tends to derive, true to the phenomenological tradition, an ethics of the act (as he calls it 'answerability') from within the self-constitution of the act itself (Habermas calls this elsewhere the "normative power of the factual"); for this, that which is the first is the famous category of Husserl, empathy: "empathizing into an individual object of seeing—seeing it from inside in its own essence." (Bakhtin 1993: p. 14); secondly, "participative (un-indifferent, engaged) thinking

(which seeks to overcome its own givenness for the sake of what-is-to-be-attained)" (p. 11). And even while it is emphatically reiterated that the act, the deed ("which is an actual historical performance" (p. 18) or the Being-as-event can be grasped only participatively, this phenomenological inwardness is strengthened when Bakhtin says, "It is only from within my participation that the function of each participant can be understood" (p. 18). The Kantian monologism or mono-subjectivism that was being critiqued by Bakhtin, he returns back to it now. In fact, this is the problem of phenomenological sociology as such and Habermas has long outlived it.[5]

Finally therefore, even if Bakhtin cannot sustain the 'dialogic' force of his initial proposal which had coincided with Habermas in objecting to the monological structure of the Kantian categorical imperative, two other Bakhtinian modes will be seen to have been endorsing Habermas's thematic commitment but without, as we have seen, a procedure to sustain it; and this is our last comment. We have talked about the immediate beingness of the deed or the act as the being-event, but we have scarcely mentioned the programmatic intention of Bakhtin to recuperate for himself "the answerable deed" (p. 9) or as it is famously known 'answerability'; in absolute concordance with a Habermasian ethic, Bakhtin wanted to be provided with a "criteria for the life of practice, the life of the deed" (p. 9). A personalytic ethic will ofcourse intervene to ask what happens to the life of the criteria and then we shall need, initiating the unending sign-chain in a series, the criteria of criteria and more of the criteria and so on. And in the face of the very personal, aesthetic power of deception, manipulation and lies, this hankering shall remain with us till the last chapter—where the criteria for authentic feminist conduct will seem to be deluding us.

BOURDIEU

Now, while Garrett's claim that Bourdieu's habitus could interrupt and complicate the discourse ethics of Habermas is another gross misreading—firstly of Bourdieu and then of Habermas, Houston's acceptance of this in his response is equally frustrating. Here very

briefly I shall put Bourdieu in perspective first and then I shall exonerate Habermas of these pseudo- Bourdieuian allegations—counterfactually conceiving—as if they were true. In this not that we have external objectifying structures as impediments first, the participating subject has his/her own ego as the primary obstacle which s/he must transcend in a moral argument; then there are others—who are more 'like me and with me'—who are apparently similar but internally heterogenous. When we try to settle a contested point, do we then emphasize on our differences or thematize them to the extent that they can be generalized and therefore not end up being excluded from the hot—yet desirable—purview of discussion?

> In this forum, only those norms [are] proposed that express a common interest of all affected can win justified assent. To this extent, discursively justified norms bring to expression simultaneously both insight into what is equally in the interest of all and a general will that has absorbed into itself, without repression, the will of all. (Habermas 1993: p. 13)

To Habermas these are 'self-corrective discourses' and for social work these are important and may be ascribed-from the social work' point of view- a therapeutic value.[6] If we always want to valorize the differentials of influence, authority and anxiety that allegedly contaminate discursive argumentation, we are unable to answer, how would these differences themselves be identified and examined in argumentation. It is not that a beggar cannot argue with a millionaire, the power incapacities themselves could be put into argumentation and without a resolution, the debate might just be suspended or refracted in other mediums, a revolutionary dissensus[7] or a parliamentary consensus on a policy—for that matter- are arguments at a very high level of self-transcendence (obviously Habermas has been untiring in pointing out the 'rational core' of parliamentary discussions which might seem vacuous to a Marxist rebel—who at the same time, and this is interesting, relies on a scientific rationality and 'reckless criticism'). So the objection (of course not voiced by Bourdieu but true of some other authors) that all discourses are structured from outside and are infected with empirical irregularities meets with this rejoinder from Habermas:

> Discourses take place in particular social contexts and are subject to the limitations of time and space. Their participants are not Kant's intelligible characters but real human beings driven by other motives in addition to the one permitted motive of the search for truth.…institutional measures are needed to sufficiently neutralize empirical limitations and avoidable internal and external interference so that the idealized conditions always already presupposed by participants in argumentation can at least be adequately approximated (Habermas 1993: p. 92, italics mine).

This approximation as a reminder is necessary to be kept in mind. Either an ideal speech situation or systemic distortion is not the right binary for Habermas. Finally, isn't this also a testimony to his sense of unfinished inadequacy and openness to relative approximations in empirical discourses of argumentation? Now, because the disputants on Bourdieu have already consumed much space, I shall be brutally brief on this part and ask, has it been right on Garrett and Houston's part to construe Bourdieu as the author of structural conditionings that solely determine subjects, and thus, undermine autonomy?

It is Garrett's firm conviction that Bourdieu's habitus, field and capital complexes affect the communicative competences of participants in communicative action and interrupt by positing "power differentials" the "utopia of perfectly transparent communication." (Foucault quoted in Garrett, 2009, 39, p. 874). This so-called utopia has already been discussed before, and it is necessary that we need to do our own reading and thinking—than rely on thinkers and their versions, which are forms or texts in themselves. In this brief paragraph, we would just show that while talking about "permanent dispositions" acquired through individual history or social conditionings—where habits are living gestures or "morality made flesh" (B, 1993, p. 86), Bourdieu does have space for autonomy or freedom. One is hard pressed to understand if Bourdieu, despite his logic of cultural, educational or social reproduction, is to offer an individual the potential for transformative politics; then what's wrong with Habermas when he talks about participants in a speech situation willing to identify and remove constraints in favour of a rational consensus? Here is Bourdieu, finally:

[H]abitus is a product of conditionings which tends to reproduce the objective logic of those conditionings while transforming it …The habitus is a principle of invention produced by history but relatively detached from history: its dispositions are durable… So, the habitus is the principle of a real autonomy with respect to the immediate determinations of the 'situation' (B, 1993, p. 86, except habitus all italics mine).

With this we guess Garrett's error as to his undue emphasis on the conditioning structuring in Bourdieu is revealed, Houston's acceptance of the same to discredit Bourdieu is similarly regretted. In fact, in Habermas this event undergoes a sort of procedural actuality—where the dialogic interlocutors are the products of history (even products of their own histories) but can, with durable dispositions, detach themselves from that history with the labour and motivation of a method.

Finally, a lightning note on power and hegemony for Habermas (since as noted before I shall discuss our Gramsci and Foucault on some other occasion). But a quick starting point which could act as a straightforward reminder. This is because Gramsci again has been upheld by Garrett for making explicit how "a particular ruling bloc in a given social formation maintains 'hegemony" and how this is transposed to infect a family group discussion in a Social Work setting in all its specificities (Garrett 2009, 39, p. 880, italics mine), and Houston for reasons of space could not attend to it. However, the question in other words is, is the Habermasian communicative ethic oblivious of the processes of cultural self-formation effective in moments where the cultural rationality and the rational substructures of domination manifest themselves, immanently in the process of "linguistically mediated interaction?" Habermas has a short but fatal counter point:

Market and power relations, too, are normatively—as a rule, legally—regulated, that is, they are set within an institutional framework. Even military conflicts remain embedded within normative contexts. Civil wars—and genocide even more so—leave behind them traces of moral distress that support the view that intersubjectively shared life-worlds constitute the indispensable ground even for strategic interactions. (Habermas 1998b: p. 249).

Isn't this sufficient to ensure an engagement with Foucault and Gramsci and turn them around, suitably? I hope so.

THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF 'CONTROVERSIAL NORMS': EXAMPLES

To resume, bringing up a welfare plan for a child is firstly an ethical question and secondly it is not a matter of argumentation: a welfare plan for a child is necessary so there is no basic disagreement. We might of course disagree about the details of the plan but that is again a question of application and appropriateness tied to an individual or a group (the family): we have to picture the most 'appropriate' plan for the child while responding to his/her specificity. This is not immediately a question of judging a disputed norm though all the participants and potential participants (like the mother at home) have to come to a consensus: the recipients have to agree to this plan, but if it is discursively brought about, there would be nothing not to agree—this has been the predominant hunch of Hayes and Houston. But, in posing this as a Habermasian instance, there are empirical constraints (which could be normatively overcome). Firstly, the expert-lay divide interrupts and cuts across this felt need to have a welfare plan for the child by the care agency. The technical knowledge and disciplinary competence of the official care agency cannot simply be transcended by the call for a consensus on the plan. There will be parts of the plan on which the parent side will not be able to give an opinion, but with the belief and faith in the agency-expertise, they might just accept or keep it open to decide on its consequences when the latter multiply. Secondly, there has been an uncomfortable, and to my mind an unhappy, repeated emphasis in Hayes and Houston as well as Garrett on the voice of the child. This is a deeply problematic insertion. Given Habermas's progressive outline of cognitive-developmental agency, the child is at a pre- conventional stage of moral reasoning or consciousness.

Now, on a more extensive note—when all metaphysical and religious worldviews have receded to the background, they are no more capable of providing us with justifications for norms—that were erstwhile available; we have to generate our own answers

to existing questions: answers with a high serious content of answerability. So much so good. But my contention in this chapter is, it is not that we start arguing about all norms; that would enshrine an infinite responsibility and an overgrown task (as Habermas had remarked somewhere—everything cannot be problematized at the same time). The discourse ethical process would be more effective for social work, I may surmise, if we subject only controversial norms to its effects. The developmental moral world view ala Kohlberg which Habermas catalogues, will find evidence in this assertion, too. "Post conventional morality provides no more than a procedure for impartially judging disputed questions"[8] (Habermas, 1996b, p. 114, italics mine). In fact this will give the Discourse ethics an interesting turn more relevant to social work as well for social sciences which does not foreclose the possibility of raising problems of interpretation and thematization for every accepted norm on earth and garner 'disputes': it resolves a specific problem for a communicative ethic by stipulating that some originary questions have to be suspended, to begin with, till the time comes that they could be opened again for argumentative resolution. Unless "all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual" (Habermas 1990: p. 93), discourse ethics doesn't rest.

Now recall MacIntyre's challenge of war, abortion, euthanasia, pornography as irresolvable. Contextualy illuminating, the question of arguing and justifying or rejecting controversial or 'contested' (Habermas 1990: p. 93) norms is intriguing, interesting and enabling enough so much so that I might just begin by a provocative counter question: if all theories are correct and no theory is incorrect or false, then the theory of error itself is erroneous and so on and so forth. In fact, if we are not keen to recognize that, the theory of truth itself might not be true. When we are arguing we are actually into debating this contrary correctness and determined by the "force of the better argument"—often there could be just one true correct answer.

We can start with an offhand approach by taking theoretical

correctness in scientific (or empirico analytic) discourses. There a theory is incorrect if the axioms it proposes is invalidated, say—in experiments or other forms of self -referential 'methodological' moorings peculiar to science. In other forms of human (historical-hermeneutic) sciences, the question of theoretical correctness has been debated for the last 200 years or so. (So, one is apparently on strong grounds to raise such an objection.) But to ease this trouble let us take a simple approach. Marx himself never believed that all theories could be equally true or correct or otherwise he would not have laid emphasis on practical-critical sensuous activity where theory must prove itself and vice versa. But these are old debates and all are aware of them; my point here is to hint at the availability of the option of true theory in older discourses also. So, these were the precursors. In between you can throw in the fact that a theory consistently has been held to have been generating or relying upon abstract universals (supposedly immune to interests) while 'practice' is concrete, particular and interested. Much of this has been refuted. But what has not been refuted is that truth is simply not discursive: that we sit and talk and come to a consensus to assertively construct something as true and thereby it becomes true. There are statements or propositions which *are* true or false. There is an internal justification that is necessary other than an external one. Starting from this assumption and using Habermas' insights, we can make a clear departure here. The erstwhile discourse of practice didn't admit of truth or correctness (I'm overriding for simplicity's sake the little hiatus of levels between declarative claim to truth and the normative claim to correctness—as in later Habermas.). For instance, that women should go out and vote or wear a particular sign when they are married was not considered akin to statements that could be true or false. But the moment the feminists and erstwhile, old style reformers started debating these rules, norms, or customs—it could be said that the question of correctness was brought about in the realm of practice through their argumentation. Why child marriage should be shunned became a matter of argumentative justification and thus particular norms or customs were not simply in-appropriate, they

were incorrect. Habermas goes as far as to argue that even social norms could be argued and debated only in this manner, and style. "Practical questions admit of truth ... and correct norms must be capable of being grounded in a way similar to true statements" (Habermas 1979: 111). Validity involves a notion of correctness analogous to the idea of truth. And this applies to all those harassment norms, groping forms, and all that we are discussing and debating in current times. And if there is a debate (moreover if they are to be justified) then it must be intersubjectively validated. Now, to examine a validity claim in a discourse, one stops conveying information or experiences from the empirical standpoint (i.e., variety in difference), and brackets or suspends all judgment to examine a problematised validity claim. This is extrication from all claims to action or practical rationality and is absolutely self-reflexive or theoretical. A "critique of knowledge" is the aim of theoretical discourse; "political will formation" is the aim of practical discourse. Therefore, what is politically incorrect may be theoretically correct and what is theoretically incorrect may be politically correct.

Let me try to explain this a bit: theoretically incorrect but politically correct. Consider the anti (sexual) harassment legislation initiated by the Indian Supreme Court which it calls 'norms' and must be instituted in all offices (but it excludes its own self from the domain of this legislation and will thus fall a victim to a personalytic ethical question). However, as is well known, it catalogues a list of 'unwelcome sexual behaviour' ranging from sexual propositions to showing pornography and axes them under its tough rubric. Urged to debate this, our question could be, if sexual propositioning at workplace is harassment, then where there are so called 'sex workers' who are looking forward towards those sexual propositions—which is also an indispensable part of their form of life, how would it be problematised? In fact, sexual harassment at workplace could be very different when sex itself is work. But couldn't the sex workers be harassed? Plausibly so, but there the harassment has to be largely non-sexual in order to be outside of work (like sex here is considered external to work in

office); for them there will be a separate list we guess. Or consider a workplace relationship between an employer and an employee which is apparently consensual, and deriving advantages from this (a quid pro quo)—the employee is witnessed by a third person to have been enjoying 'favours' in the forms of undue promotions and privileges. If sexual harassment is all about equality and dignity in the workplace, then the third employee's rights to equal treatment is severely violated: couldn't the third person file a *third-party harassment' complaint* against the above duo? A prudent one could simply discourage us by saying that there is less use of theoretical or robustly problematizing objections here; a consensus is assumed and such norms should be put in place as protection is also warranted; it is practically useful—even if it is defective or violative (if we may). Shouldn't we agree? I think we ought to.

Still I'll argue that in the domain of ordinary discourse—claims are still being made in the context of everyday life, but are not allowed to be problematised on the basis of a vigorous debate. Correctness here is in accordance with the rules. It is not that harassment norms will be debated and if some of them cannot be justified—they will be dismantled. This call for argumentative justification is overruled in favour of moral, practical or political propriety. We cannot doubt the normatively emergent nature of this overruling but reiterate again that what is practically useful or politically correct may not be theoretically correct too. We have to live with this disjunction like people live with incurable, terminal illnesses.

Finally an exemplary reference: Leslie Green—one of the greatest legal (and social) philosophers of our time and now a professor of law at Oxford has deployed the phrase theoretical correctness while he talks in this mode , "the central theoretical error thus lies … etc.…" [Green 1995, p. 80]. Numerous other examples could be recovered. Suffice for the moment to note that Social work vis-a-vis social action could be enriched by the Habermasian communicative or discourse ethics in the context of controversial norms and not necessarily child protection conferences, and that has been our bare addition to the discourse while standing on the substrate of a personalytic ethic. But consider 'empowerment'—is

it controversially normed? If not, how does it become so? In the next chapter, we shall address this contentious issue.

NOTES

1. … "discourse rules are merely the *form* in which we present the implicitly adopted and intuitively known pragmatic presuppositions of a special type of speech, presuppositions that are adopted implicitly and known intuitively" (Habermas, 1990: p. 91).
2. Particular validity claims are thematized only if the functioning of a language game is disturbed and the working background consensus is undermined. (Habermas 2001: p. 90)
3. For a devastating critique of Fraser and particularly the way she confuses steering media (money, power) with generalized modes of communication (gender)—symptomatically present in major feminist discourses, see Cohen and Arato 1994.
4. .. "he realizes that in offending the particular person, he has also violated … a generalized expectation that both parties hold" (Habermas, 'Discourse Ethics' in Habermas 1980: p. 48). We shall return to this point, elsewhere, when we discuss strategic action or power relations in regard to Habermas vis-à-vis Gramsci and Foucault.
5. For Habermas's own critical engagement with phenomenological sociology (which as it is evident resembles the Bakhtinian mode in some of its formulations)is available in Habermas 'The Phenomenological Constitutive…' in On TPOSI, pp. 23-44. For an excellent appraisal of Habermas's rebuttal of this position see Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas*' pp. 158-162.
6. "I think that there are several types of discourses that are self-corrective in terms of being sensitive to a critique of systematic exclusionary mechanisms built into them" (Habermas, 'Concluding Remarks' 1996, in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 478 , 1996, pp 462-479).
7. This point owes itself to Habermas's acknowledgement of Bakhtin where a periodically recurring violent revolt of the plebian culture had informed his thinking as to "how a mechanism of exclusion that locks out and represses at the same time calls forth counter effects that cannot be neutralized." (Habermas, 'Further Reflections on the Public Sphere' 421-461 in Calhoun ed. p. 427). Habermas

however, has always been careful to chart his differences on the cause of violent revolutions.

8. "Normally, the basic principles themselves—entailing such duties as equal respect for each person, distributive justice, benevolence toward the needy, loyalty, and sincerity—are not disputed" (Habermas, 1996b: p. 115).

CHAPTER 7

Discourse Ethics, Responsibility and Empowerment

A personalytic interruption

Before we arrive at the substantive terms of the debate: empowerment versus a deceptive group personality, let us begin with a celebrated ethical register—celebrated by Levinas and Derrida and who not: 'responsibility.' And responsibility, before it is ethical, well, it is criminal. Here is Arendt at her best:

> [W]hatever brotherhood human beings may be capable of has grown out of fratricide, whatever political organization men may have achieved has its origin in crime. The conviction, in the beginning-was a crime—for which the phrase 'state of nature' is only a theoretically purified paraphrase […].
>
> [Arendt,1982: 20]

And now it is easy to perceive that liability in this orginary crime in the 'beginningless' beginning cannot be owned or attributed to. What is the result then?

THE CRIMINO-ETHICAL ORIGINS OF 'RESPONSIBILITY'

Is responsibility pre-predicative? Perhaps not. It is predicated upon several agencies, functions, sentiments and structures. In the linguistic taxonomy of social work however, responsibility features significantly. The workers' ethical responsibility towards his/her

clients, organization, environment, social work profession and his own self is reiterated infinitely as finite tasks in repeated texts that want to regulate 'values' for social work.

But what about corporate organizations publicizing their own agendas that exhibit, and perhaps, perform their 'social responsibility' towards the environment that surrounds them? Does social work have a problem with that? Held within the opportunistic enclosure of 'fundraising', rarely one would disagree. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) if leads to social empowerment—as it is popularly so called, social workers would willingly go for what the companies say 'participatory management.' In this chapter, I'm less concerned about this joyous affirmation. Neither I want to negate it from the outside as social work being simply comprador and thus advocating people's em-bourgeoisie-ment (if I may)[1]. I want to unpack it from the inside.

Corporations (though originating in workmen's guilds in Ancient Rome, but now in the contemporary distorted sense—'for profit' business enterprises) undertaking 'social projects'[2] or indulging in social empowerment (or 'strategic philanthropy')—if this is the contemporary restatement of what could reconstructively go by the name of Corporate Social Work (erstwhile Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), then my thesis in this chapter is, empowerment, doing empowerment and being empowered are three different moments altogether (and thus making it controversial), and corporate enterprises—having been hedged—imperceptibly not in favour of—as it has been assumed and relayed—a fight for social justice but somewhere in between the calculus of the just and the good—finally—thereby could not be offered the name of a single event. But before that I intend to refer to for once the essence of a legal discussion on responsibility from the forgotten annals of analytic jurisprudence (ala H.L.A Hart: Hart, 1970) and use it to some 'interruptive' effect by using some paradigms of social philosophy. I shall be terse and telegraphically synoptic here-though.

The old discussion in the philosophy of law on responsibility was stated in the language of criminal responsibility—voluntary

wrong doing, free will etc.—interpreted as "a condition required for liability" (Hart, 1970: p. 218) and because all this has entered the inventory of received ideas–we are—perhaps—aware of all that. But interestingly, Hart does note that "A wide range of different, though connected, ideas is covered by the expressions 'responsibility', 'responsible', and 'responsible for', as these are standardly used in and out of the law" (Ibid., p. 211). Hart goes on to classify four such senses: a) Role-Responsibility (when specific duties are attached to a person's station or office); b) Causal-Responsibility (e.g., "his neglect was responsible for her distress", (Ibid., p. 214); c) Liability-Responsibility (if "a person is legally responsible for some action he is liable to be punished for it" (Ibid, p. 222); d) Capacity-Responsibility (cognitive and competent awareness of action—its consequences and/or "mental ability adequate to restraint," Ibid., p. 230).

Now, among all the above four, the appropriate register that could be deployed for CSW is, I propose, capacity—responsibility and following (invoking Hohfeld) my discussion elsewhere (Chapter VIII) on how responsibility could be interpreted as 'loose duties', CSW could not be claimed as rights by the community peoples who form a company's environment. If this is correct, then CSW is well within the discourse of moral obligation and if not performed—only morally blameworthy. All the other three being redundant, I shall just hint at the conceptual complexity of Capacity-Responsibility and then enter the second (main) part of the chapter. Before that-a small rider: In the existing juridical tracts in India—the way responsibility features in the Indian Contract Act (9 of 1872), Ss44 & 164, S. 129 etc. as—'accountability', 'able to respond' (Aiyar, 2004, p. 751) remains crucial in endorsing our Capacity-Responsibility register.

Now, our question is, wherefrom does this capacity -responsibility arise? What is the source of this specificity?

Briefly, to tell that a corporate body is socially responsible is to impute it a moral agency peculiar to a human being. This capacity-responsibility arises and can be conferred upon (and not wrongly) because corporations are group persons; they display group

personality and its 'very dispositions.' Given the illustrative legal history of the group personality (and the concomitant legal and logical fiction debate) of corporations and churches charted by Maitland (which in our context could raise the question—whether it is wise at all to impute 'responsibility' to a juridical fiction), I would not indulge in this legal historical or legal philosophical debate and debacle thereof, but as promised would engage in a social philosophical discussion of the intended consequences of the social acts undertaken by the corporate bodies.

Following Hart then—who charts separately—'responsibility', 'responsible', and 'responsible for', I'll argue in the next section—this separation and semantic distance of the three derives from the complex moral agency of 'capacity responsibility' of corporate group persons. As a demonstrative proof, I'll hold on to the handle of the 'social project' or 'social empowerment' drive of the companies—where 'empowerment', 'doing empowerment' and being 'empowered' will also display—rememorating Hart—striking disparities.

EMPOWERMENT: A JUSTICE OR A GOOD-LIFE QUESTION?

Then—as it goes, empowerment is fine, but doing empowerment (i.e., the practice of empowering other people) and being empowered (i.e., the difference that it makes to an individual person's being or identity)—are they the same? If their defining indices are different, how could they be subsumed under a single rubric of empowerment? And how could the dispute or disagreement (I'll say –controversy) on this, if any, be settled? This chapter intends to be provocative in this one aspect and excite further debate for the better; I begin with a philosophical problematic but end with a quasi-empirical thematic, and all the while the text moots an internal critique of the capability approach with which the names of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have been associated—for reasons now we know.

ISSUES OF THE GOOD AND THE JUST: SEPARATE THEN

At the outset, then, let me begin with a little surprise which is my own. Once, in the hey days of liberalism, questions of justice were neatly separated from the questions of the good. How would I live my life, what clothes I shall wear, who will be my friend and who do I want to be—in all these issues the condition of formal equality, impartiality, and universality (that signify justice) were cautiously foreclosed. Justice' questions invoke what would be equally right for all and each of us; questions of the good are limit questions: the dress I like, the hat I hate—I wouldn't try to generalize and thus universalize for all and everyone. Simply put, justice' questions—as they were framed—were public questions related to distribution and redistribution and were to be decided in a collective manner; questions of the good life were private matters outside of public scrutiny. For the liberal argument then, the next step was an inch further: issues of the good life can flourish only when individual autonomy is protected and individual autonomy is guarded only when the state is limited. Now, who were the people who threatened this neat division and tried to interpret everything as if they could be translated into becoming questions of justice and injustice? The communists and the fascists: they would, allegedly, make even art and literature serve their cause; while confronting an art object, the latter would question the class character of the author and the work (politicizing the aesthetic) and the fascists were alleged to have translated murder into an art form (aestheticize the political). For the liberal though—literature and art are essentially matters of private experience, private judgment and good life—they are not justiciable questions at all: you cannot condemn a novel or inhibit me from reading it—because it celebrates the rich exploiting the poor or condemns the slogan of pure blood. The way you don't discard milk if you don't drink it, you would similarly tolerate, inspired by this market metaphor, difference, inequality, opinion, or views that are not only different but are also allegedly—offensive and mistaken. What is good may not be just. In liberal political theory, the defensive arguments in favour of obscenity and even

pornography for instance (which are doing the rounds in the west today) were born by such simple statements of John Stuart Mill. There is an illustrative and anecdotal story to tell. Lenin in those (pre-1917) days used to be at Zurich in exile where at a restaurant he met the Dadaists (those bohemian, auto-destructive anti-art writers and intellectuals) and there they had condemned Lenin as an opportunist conservative (Yes!). Lenin's answer is famous: he is reported to have said,

> I don't know how radical you are, or how radical I am. I am certainly not radical enough. One can never be radical enough; that is, one must always try to be as radical as reality itself' (Cockburn, 1991, p. 167).

I assume he had meant, it's no use trying to be unrealistically radical because one then experiments with an impossibility and ends in nothing: gains only the vacant centrality of that which is real. One can be radical only as reality itself: the radical situation could never be saturated or infinitely fulfilled. I, materially, is the extent of the real. This realism, then was condemned in liberalism by another genre: surrealism (the post Dadaists)—which was again a genre of non-generalizable literature providing content to the good life which could be experienced and expressed now only internally. Reality was not allowed to become a limiting instance there; never. Sur-realism catered to a good (and even a wrong) life; fascist or socialist realism to just life where justice would reign. But this should not urge us to think that liberal capitalism thrives on the good against the just; in fact, there is a convenient back and forth and while at times it plays the good against the just, in other times it does the reverse. What is significant is this binary, this play. Now, how justice is played against the good to inhibit the latter, here is a story narrated by our Sister Nivedita (of the Vivekananda lineage) writing in 1900:

> In the Russian famine of 1895, M. Hikoff, Minister of the interior, stopped the trains of wheat on the way their way to Odessa, and ran them into the famine—stricken districts. To this good man, it seemed obvious that what hungry people needed was bread. The British in India, on the contrary, shrink with horror from any act so calculated to ruffle

the composure of the merchant. They venture on no remedy that would disturb the operations of commerce. The correct theoretical relation between man, money, and food must be observed at all costs, even if only in resemblance. And in this way they arrive at the startling paradox that what a hungry man needs is work! (Nivedita, 1999, p. 193).

Surprisingly, these arguments are still debated though not in the same manner and for the same ends. For instance, a few years ago, I noticed that an astute and rigorous a thinker as Rajeev Bhargava (Bhargava, 2008)—quotes Amartya Sen and Jeremy Waldron to argue the following: "Which is more important, needs or freedom? What does a homeless man need? A shelter? No, first, freedom of movement to look for a shelter or a home." Derivatively, if a hungry man is said to need work, one might go further and argue that before he needs work he needs freedom of speech to ask for work and so on (an infinite, and endless regression?). In fact, this is the contemporary remnant of the debate I was referring to and my hunch is, till this day the liberals have opposed an overarching view of justice with the latter's emphasis on equality and universality by playing certain notions of the good life against the former where unequal, different competing conceptions reign. Or the game at times, as I showed, could be the reverse: a view of justice would be used to buffet an encroaching, emergent good (Nivedita's famine example).

THE 'CAPABILITY' AGREEMENT ON GOOD 'QUALITY OF LIFE': POSSIBLE, NOW?

So, this being the state of things, something queer has happened in the meanwhile. From the vast domain of literature-which now could be called *social economic* (rather than political economic), addressing desirable objective conditions of the good life have become—potentially possible at last in liberalism too. Previously, as we have been narrating—the premise that there are innumerable conceptions of the good and good life—was adopted well and was used fruitfully to put down any—particularly communist attempts to categorize and benefit from an arrangement of

goods and advantages which would allegedly, regulate universal, standard conditions for all without exception. Now there is an interesting turn visible: while it is not denied that there might be various conceptions of the good life possible and that they might be competitive and taxing on matters of individual autonomy—this is bracketed as the old liberal conception; the new liberal conception—deriving much of its charge from globalization and John Rawls states that—even in the face of sometimes irreconcilable plurality of life choices (being and doing), there are a few unpindownable conditions to which people can reasonably agree with and these cannot be denied in any order of things. This is an interesting accommodation. The greatest theorists of this scheme of thinking *for us* have been (as stated before)—Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum has declared in this wake, that Sen and herself are unashamed universalists and essentialists; nevertheless Sen qualifies now that this positioning does not lead him,necessarily, to look for 'just institutions' in the social order). According to Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1995) for instance—these are truly human functioning or central human capabilities which are 1) Life i.e., not dying prematurely …; 2) Bodily health—Good health … adequate nourishment … adequate shelter; 3) Bodily integrity—… having one's bodily boundaries treated as sovereign; 4) Senses, Imagination & thoughts—Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom; 5) Emotions—… not having one's emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear & anxiety .. or abuse or neglect; 6) Practical Reasons—Being able to form a conception of the good.. to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life; 7) Affiliation—Being able to live with others …[and] protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation; 8) Other species: [this is] being able to live with and concern for [e.g.,] animals, plants & the world of nature; 9) Play—Being able to laugh etc.; 10) being able to possess and exercise political and material control over one's own environment including equal property rights.[3]

The point in all of this is, certain notions of the good life can be standardized in terms of living or life opportunities. But let me hint at some of the easier objections which I draw from the

liberal inventory itself: Consider for example "the interest in life, physical health, financial security, and liberty. Yet this formulation soon runs up against the depressive who has no interest in life (because no goal seems worthwhile to him), the vagabond (who has no interest in property), the ascetic (who has no interest in bodily health)" and the superrich (for whom a little theft hardly matters).'[4] This puts us in a larger quandary: consider again health or sexual health for that matter. An invert or a pervert will not agree with your or my conception of sexual health but then should s/he allowed to have the opportunities to pursue her/his so-called inversion or perversion? Consider more from Nussbaum's redoubtable catalogue of capabilities above "Bodily integrity—… having one's bodily boundaries treated as sovereign": how would the problem of abortion be resolved if we are to go by this index? If the mother feels her bodily boundary is sovereign, she should be allowed to abort, but the pro-lifers will argue and argue with reason that, the potential embodied being—the fetus inside is invested with a sovereignty of his/her own and cannot be sacrificed at will: the mother cannot abort. We are into an abyss.

Consider life or life expectancy. What would be its relation to say—capital punishment or suicide? Suicide is the most interesting case here since Amartya everywhere bloats the case of choice (given adequate opportunities, one must be free to choose). Suicide is the height of voluntarism, height of choice and mental strength; at the same time, as all of us know, it is also an instance of extreme choicelessness. The notion of adequate life is meaningless to many and they would not like to live any longer. Should we have the right to commit suicide if we want to? Should euthanasia be legal? Finally, where would we position a masochist (who finds pleasure in pain being inflicted on his/herself?) Even Freud found it incomprehensible in 'economic' terms (Freud, 2003, p. 445) (that we intend to be happy rather than sad, that we want to avoid fear and extreme shock etc. [see 4 & 5 above in Nussbaum's list). Masochism attacks and devastates our sense of (moral) economy, what to say of bodily integrity. This 'will to be beaten and pained'—to the will that wants to prostitute itself—has hardly been affected by the bodily integrity argument. That

one's bodily integrity should be respected and remain unharmed has been successful only in addressing rape. Many more marginal cases remain unresolved. And in this case Amartya Sen's acute and repeated emphasis on a choice theory is hardly dependable. That one chooses to sell sex since that fetches a high price at one go—should such a life practice be allowed to avail adequate opportunities to realize itself? And even if this is not a choice, there is the 'interest' theory to come to its rescue. Children cannot choose rights but must have rights, somebody else will exercise them in their 'interest'; similarly—and this was an argument often rehearsed during the bar dancer debate in Mumbai (India): they are getting money by dirty dancing and those who have money they are spilling it—why does anybody have a problem with such a transaction of mutual exchange and benefit? Similar arguments have remained in currency in the west and have been cited against those who have been trying to ban prostitution. Rom Hare made a memorable and eternally devastating argument in a similar context: He said, this is neither about choice or interest, what is at stake is an ideal—it's all about an ideal; some believe that intimacy is socially sacred and cannot be sacrificed; there should remain certain things which 'money cannot buy' and thus markets need to have a moral boundary and everything ends there. Neither mutual interest nor a voluntary choice theory of rights can ever dream to make a mark here. In brief, here is an ideal of good life which at the same time denies to tolerate other competing conceptions which it finds as offensive; brutally put, it denies to tolerate a bad life or a bad conception of what one mistakenly perceives to be the good life. The point to note here is, where a prior conception of the 'good' is operative, life opportunities and living, capabilities and the quality of life—can hardly make any turnaround possible.

This is relevant because it has also been pointed out in this regard that by Capabilities Sen is said to have created a space in which 'life opportunities' and 'living' can be compared, and the contrast can be made to elicit interesting dimensions about the standard of living a good or a bad life not to be decided by people's achievements ('well-being achievement'), rather by a set of real opportunities ('well-being freedom') that matter to achieve those

things or states of being. To reiterate for the last time, if somebody wants to be a sadist or a masochist in his/her sexual life; wants to prostitute himself/herself or make illicit, immoral compromises (add and throw in such other similar examples), there will be an apriori, ready disagreement for some; a disagreement which trumps opportunities or well-being freedom. Here a conception of the good life is prior to achievement, opportunities, or freedom; it comes well before them. Having said this, let us now step down to the empirical threshold and find this problematic playing havoc.

EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN IN AN INDIAN STATE: THE FRACTURE OF INDICATORS

Predictably, in the context outlined above, *empowerment* among other paradigms—becomes a vexed issue. It would of course stand to mean attempts to increase real life opportunities for some—popularly—the women. The urgency itself has been fueled by the Human Development Report which based on Gender empowerment indexes (GEI) like life expectancy, educational attainment etc., has observed gross gender disparity—that too with differences across locations and throughout the globe.

Bangladesh and Tamil Nadu are said to have etched for themselves a worrying artwork in this regard. Therefore, *empowerment of women* comes now only naturally and with enlarged legitimacy. But the point is, as a few empirical studies, and a grand paper on micro credit programmes (one famed vehicle of women empowerment) show (Kabeer 2001), the women who were the receipts of the credit, subscribed to a very different view of empowerment than did those who evaluated them. To address this apparent relativism some authors have proposed that while evaluating we take intersecting realities in evaluation; the articulation of the inventory is interesting: firstly, well researched and well circulated, accepted indicators in a particular field of development are the "outsider's indicators", secondly, the 'agency's indicators are those with which the agency undertakes evaluation of its own objectives; the most crucial in this is—the beneficiaries' indicators, "these express how those who are expected to benefit

from a particular intervention would themselves assess their own well-being experiences." Reports on two Tamil Nadu (a southern Indian state) Women's Development programme exhibit stark contrasting realities: poor women's groups were helped on the condition "they accumulate a minimum amount of saving in order to ensure that they had learnt to manage their funds effectively". An evaluation—with probably the outsider's indicators—showed "it was often men's savings that were being used to access the credit"; a second evaluation proposed, "it was the women who were using men's saving in order to expedite their access to programme credit'; derivatively speaking, the two mutually opposed conclusions—'men were using women' and 'women were using men' made for an excellent theatre. The point is of course not to opt for this set of conclusions instead of the other one, but rather to explore the consequences deriving from the irresolvable dilemmas that are being generated. Would it be ethical to replace the indicators of the recipients with that of the agencies? Following Sen and Nussbaum—will they be overridden to standardize them as per central or basic capability registers? Or go back home with pockets full of indeterminate freedom?

Otherwise, we suspect his one register of capability can work only by blinding the other one (recall bodily integrity and high class voluntary prostitution or masochism). Sen et.al—to ground central or basic capabilities have appealed to states of things and beings to which people can reasonably agree to—but has not examined the method to achieve this 'reasonable agreement.' Discourse ethics or Communicative ethics (see Habermas 1990) tries to do just that: come out with a theory of argumentation (which the author of 'argumentative Indian' is suspected to have been lacking). The search for a rational theory of reasonable agreement may begin by examining the fact that being empowered and doing empowerment have two different cognitive validities, empowerment as such—then—would have to be considered at a higher level than being empowered and doing empowerment clearly waylaid by Sen who nearly clubs them together in a haste to distinguish between achievement and well-being.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To summarize, empowerment when considered as an issue of the good, shows divisions; when individual positions are transcended through free and fair argumentation, then only empowerment can address justice equally in the interest of all. Followingly, the ethical empowerment drive tied to individuals or groups, freed from the constraints of empowering actions and identities, has to rethink empowerment as *another* question which would be equally in the interest of all (an objection that says, are our interests the same?—is a 'good life' objection; affirming it, would make even two individuals' empowerment impossible through the same act, what to say of a group).

Nevertheless, whether a 'good life' question or a 'justice' question, empowerment then is different from being empowered and doing empowerment. This is also in consonance with the classical formulation which stipulated that *what I want to do* and *whom I want to be* are issues of my life. This is apparently a strange inference and much more—strange delight (the liberal argument sent back to itself like 'cups of wine thrown back to the bottle'). Wonder, how do we expect a 'reasonable agreement' on this, i.e., my conclusion, again? The moment we disagree, the test will have begun: reasonable agreement would be put to the test of argumentation itself; and the lesson of communicative or discourse ethics is just that, perhaps.

However, this lesson if it must come to terms with the undecidable norm of the narrative self-presentation of women in the empowerment theatre, it cannot but take the group personal in question. Were the women deceiving, or the men? Or just the self—description that was going awry? The failure of the impersonal procedure by which rules don't trump the persons but s/he maneuvers regulations—private- or public and mirrors a gain not preconceived, is realized by others only late, or even too late; but the group-personal—does it trump the individual persons? Our answer could be that in the moment of manipulation by which the rules are overruled, they are set free, and thereby empowerment as doing becomes alienated; as a norm it becomes disputed. One

might go further and argue, this is the way the normative is set free from the constraints of the factual. More on the doublings, deception, and fracture in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. This is to charge the "Developers with constructing a theater of responsibility to disguise the mechanics of unrestricted capital investment" (Spivak, 200, p. 80). But is this not based on a non-knowledge of one's own originary site? Responsibility "caught between an ungraspable call and a staging, or production" (Ibid., p. 61) is always already a 'performing' contradiction within an exchange structure of violation.
2. For such "Social project", "welfare activities" etc. and related items of "social responsibility", refer to the narration on the Sachar Committee Report (1978), see (Ghosh, 2005, p. 81);
3. Though Nussbaum notes that such a list of central capabilities is missing in Sen, it is not entirely correct, because elsewhere Sen does enlist basic capabilities like survival and education, live with increased life expectancy and health care etc.
4. This has been slightly reworked from Brudner, 1995: p. 212.

CHAPTER 8

Irresponsibility and the Fake

The ethic of Indifferent doubling

> Not infrequently, we encounter copies of important people; and, as with paintings, here too, most people are better pleased with the copies than with the originals.
>
> —NIETZSCHE [1997: 197]

After our engagement with responsibility and the poignant indeterminacy pervading even the women-empowerment mechanics, now we shall expend a bit more energy on irresponsibility and the fake double of duped commodities—all these being strong registers of the personal. Truly, this chapter is an essay on poetics in the times of development and disguise—like love in the times of malaria. It narrates two uncomfortable experiences stuck onto the underside of urban development narratives: one, narrating how and to what extent the people of Kolkata welcome and enjoy the *Bandh*, which is a voluntary or involuntary general mass closure designating the loss of a day's work for some and that of a working day for the business chambers; two, the other—narrating how they fling themselves into a shopping spree in their craze for fake Chinese goods and how, taking advantage of this, local traders have set in motion what may be called an anarchy of adulterated or locally made Chinese goods, much to the chagrin of those who should like to think commodity processes in the city in sane and respectable terms. The distance between the mask and the persona seems to have been travelling a lot, and becoming lengthier.

Let us start with an incident reported with a tremulous and puzzled consideration in a Kolkata newspaper, either *Bartaman* or *Anandabazar Patrika* and conveniently glossed over by the readers. It read: the night Mother Teresa died, some emissaries of the *Missionaries Of Charity* reached a home run by them in order to wake up the inmates with the sad news of the Mothers' demise and subsequently absorb them in ritual collective mourning. Now consider what the newspaper report narrates: informants knocked at the door; after some calling, someone from inside the home answered, "who's there?" Those standing outside replied,—"Our Mother is no more." Then came the astonishing reply from inside,—"So, what are we supposed to do?" [In the original—"*Tow, Amra ki korbo?*"]

We miss the unreported next link here: The saddened informants might have exploded,—"What do you mean by what you said? Just get up and come out." Here our memory fails and we quit the story for good. The fragment could be read in a variety of ways. However, what is most relevant to our consideration is that such—untoward events form the obscene underside of public life. They are less mentioned, less reported and, furthermore—less examined. Why? The answer is not difficult to imagine. A more appropriate question would be: How would we report them? Even if we want them to be included, which is the right and inclusive discourse that might with justice contain them? One simple response to this is to say—all apparently neutral propositions and event syntaxes, descriptions, pedagogies have an uneasy underside which is not covered by disciplinary, sane significations. For to consign everything to practical political contingencies is to ask for massive quanta of discursive energy competent enough to grasp,—if not evaluate systematically, the underside of presented events. To put it in more embarrassingly brazen terms, this is pure politics though it is in a way presented as if it is a crisis of culture. Pure politics deals with the undergarments of events not subjected to the symbolic dressing of objective ethics. All such disciplinary categories as civil society, political society, the family and the State just vanish into thin air before this. (For instance, try explaining the Mother Teresa incident narrated above by these categories.)

You will be stunned when you come to know that maybe the girl whom you have always loved hates you. Similarly, it is likely to be a novel experience to know that the Christian dwellers of a Home should prefer to enjoy undisturbed sleep at night rather than mourn the death of the Mother. Those are the moments when we feel the hand of politics on our back, but nothing—no category—can save us then. They are moments of personal, pure experience, despite the Heideggerian objection that life when divorced from life-experience cannot elicit much results and fails to generate a task that could be within the umbrella of a life-philosophy.

We document here two instances—both are in a sense redundant because neither could be deployed to serve as materials for a broader constructive narrative with a telos. The first instance is here:

RISK, RESPONSIBILITY AND RESTITUTION: CLOSURE AS PLEASURE

Calcutta—now Kolkata—being the affective center of all political movements in West Bengal appropriates the pro-urbanist ideologies of nineteenth century liberalism and has evolved historically, with or without the motivated rigors of its own intentions, perhaps in favor of strikes, processions and *bandhs*, as the city endorsing all these signs of once anarchic, syndicalist and now social democratic resistance; and it is these signs that have gained her the positivity that belongs to the exclusivity of herself. A Kolkata based urban folk singer (Kaji Kamal Naser in his *Made for Each other* album, New Rhythm Cassettes, 11, Shymananda Road, Kolkata-700025, 1995) in Bengal has a song written on the pleasures of the bandh. The city's self is important because in contemporary Bengali literature the city has often been metaphorically enumerated as sleeplessly haggard because of its sympathetic leftist inheritance; development is thus worked out meticulously in dreams and displaced at the same time. The Kolkata High Court sharply reacting against the phenomenon, observed some time back that there is at least one bandh every three months, called by this or that political party. Advantageously

instanced by the decision of the Kerala High Court, which ruled bandhs as illegal, the frustrated supporters of the social order in Kolkata have argued, that political parties would invoke it, if necessary in cloaked forms. In other words, bandh is unstoppable; in Kolkata, it is irresistible.

But recently it has been noticed—people in Kolkata have started enjoying the bandh;[1] the city media has often voiced its concerns that bandhs have become an instrument of making the people idle and have been reinforcing idleness; a large chunk of city dwellers, service holders are reluctant to go out to work and any iota of work mindedness if left, it has been alleged, is thus being erased leading to the complete annihilation of the decaying and nearly destroyed 'work culture' in Kolkata and West Bengal. The media has been branding bandhs as *karmanasha* (killer of work) and the parties indulging in the technique as irresponsible'. They also have taken recourse to a queer argument: why a bandh should not be called, the reason—apart from the fact that it destroys development, they feel, it is now bereft of any genuine utility because of massive and indiscriminate overuse, and people—particularly the salaried ones, students and others—indifferent to those who earn a days' income, enjoy a bandh and look forward towards the next one. It has been accused by the media as well as the party opposing the bandh that the usual claim as to the success and all-pervading ness of the bandh staged by the bandh protagonists is wrong. People who are exceptionally diligent and don't enjoy sitting inside their homes still do not go outside on work because of fear; real support has become unfathomable and bottomless—nearly elusive. And the most interesting part is, these days' political parties- particularly SUCI (Socialist Unity Center of India) in Kolkata which has specialized in staging bandhs—do call a bandh on Friday or a Monday thus enabling a three-day holiday for many people. The ruling left front even had voiced its disgust over frequent bandhs in Kolkata and Bengal! And now the ruling TMC government in west Bengal—once a bandh-specialist—now not only has banned bandhs in the state, but by threatening government servants a break in service, has compelled them to attend office despite a bandh.

We need to investigate this queer process which seems to have set in: an instrument of political protest has become a tool of pleasure, but can it become a weapon? Is it possible to politicize this pleasure? A matter of difficult investigation—given the techniques of governance and resistance themselves having undergone a deeply symbolic transformation. But what are the details when we reckon with the fact that only details administer people? To try to address this entanglement by discursively engaging these people—who are otherwise called the stakeholders—the citizen individuals, the political parties, the media etc., we need to have the textuality of utterances made from various subject positions examined against numerous background assumptions—political and commonsense,—aiming to foreground a micro-theoretical praxis for a political phenomenology of bandh in Kolkata itself.

For instance, to refer to a pilot study we conducted, our hunch was—how do the accused segments of the Kolkata population—look at a general mass strike or a bandh in the city? How do they enjoy it without a political commitment? Why do they not feel for those who are being deprived of a day's living as the media accuses them to do? How could they have felt it otherwise?

The interviews when being subjected to a complex semiotics of reading utterances, reveal this politics turned pleasure factor: That- enjoyment is a political factor and the obscene underside of Law eroticises the notion of obstruction and the limit by its own-quota of affect no more strikes us as new; the one who enjoys a bandh and welcomes another one is perhaps a true political pervert. But the political having become 'pleasureised' (if we may), it would be interesting to go for a new notion of the political. Is it the counter holiday which breaks with the calendrically limited national or State holidays? In the Middle Ages—named by some symbolic anthropologists as—time out and reiterated by Foucault—there used to be the festival of collective role—reversal where the rich used to adopt the role of the poor, the fool used to lead the congregation at the church and vice versa:—it was a counter holiday in relation to Sunday, Christian or Easter, one that escaped from the habitual circuit of ordinary festivals. Has bandh in Kolkata set such a time in? Why not?

Secondly, the subject structure of political parties as strategic interventionist actors, institutions and organizations in Kolkata as another crucial stakeholder in this debate were explored; What do the bandh specialists say about this phenomenon? The left still boast it as their weapon; the moderates trace it to the days of Gandhi. A sample review (of relevant literature) tells us that classical discussions on strikes have nothing to tell about bandh which is very different from the fourfold classification that Roland-Holst prepared on Kautsky's suggestions: solidarity strikes, anarchist general strikes, the economic mass strikes, political social mass strike etc.—it's none of them. The 1889's ultimatum for a general strike in London was disapproved by Engels himself. The aim was to paralyze the daily life of London. Engels wrote—it was creating millions of hungry mouths for no reason but because they had some tens of thousands they could not feed. Though this argument today would be classed by the bandh protagonists as reactionary, it is evident that bandh is a kind of sympathetic mass strike in solidarity, though essential services are excluded. But again, the CPI had objected to the immunity rendered to the essential services when the ESMO bill was passed in the parliament in August 1957. How do these things stand today in the wake of the bandhs and recent legal row over uncontrolled processions and rallies? How would Sorel's strike as myth be invoked by CPI (M) ideologues today? Interviews reveal—there is a doublespeak on these. Party ideologues have not heard of Sorel.

Thirdly, in the trade and industrial circles in Kolkata, it has been commonplace to accuse the bandh culture as destructive of the city's and consequently the state's work culture. A preliminary exploration in the death of work through the sieve of various notions of work that are being mourned and secondly the notions of responsibility offers interesting possibilities. For instance: work in the modern sense is a paid activity in the *public sphere* as Andre Gorz (Gorz 1989) argues by branding it as the monetarization of work, separated from the daily tasks—indispensable for the maintenance and reproduction of our individual lives; but the realm of labor performed under necessity does not belong to the realm of freedom. Marx says, "in fact, the true realm of freedom

actually begins only where labor which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus, in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production… beyond it begins the development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom" (cited in Ibid., p. 14).

Therefore, the innumerable Kolkatans who have vanished into their own homes to carry lifeworld tasks enjoy what kind of freedom? Is it not the better kind—the true real freedom? What do their wives say? Foucault reminds us that Freud was correct when he wrote that a mad person is he who could neither work nor love and with the romance of the industrially developed state setting in, it was obvious that the mad, the sick and the old people who could neither work nor love were confined and excluded along with the unemployed (Foucault 2000: p. 337). Do the psychologists in Kolkata need to activate the psycho-trendy *Work therapy* for every one of those who have been noticed to escape the monetary work for a days (counter) holiday?

N.G.O.'s or the 'welfare thieves' are always willing and ready.

Fourthly, what do the media representatives think when they say the parties have been irresponsible in calling a *bandh*? What do the youths and the employees think of responsibility when they are told about their enjoying the *bandh* a detour in irresponsibility? In contractual terms how is responsibility inscribed? How do the people react when they are shown their places as tacit legal beings? What do the lawyers say? How does common sense envisage when responsibility fades into—not oblivion but obligations?

Only one half of the answer to the many questions that have been posed above is in order. It is easy to talk emptily or fashionably about responsibility, or responsibility to the other but we are at a fix when we want to consider it as a discursive question; what is the techno-utilitarian apparatus of this responsibility? Rarely we know how in a complex framework of rights, non-rights, claims, duties and privileges; negative, positive and neutral freedom, the form that social responsibility, dissociated from the economic rationality innate in the impact studies of mass closure in terms of income effects and consumption effects, will assume.

To present a brief sketch and attempt a beginning, we can adopt

and transform some ideas of Neil W. Chamberlain who, borrowing from Hohfeld, has tried to address this question of responsibility in a concrete discursive context (Chamberlain 1953).

Firstly, we might want to re-state the morpheme *responsibility* in the sense of loose duties. That is, in a legal relationship there are different expectancies of conduct than in non-legal ones. Responsibilities that are customarily inscribed bear social or conventional sanctions with them while legal ones are prized with enforceable sanctions backed by legitimate coercion. In a legal relationship, it is a duty which is a correlative of right. (Throw in here also the fact that different job-responsibilities may be seen here as enumerated kind of duties without the normative gloss borne by the latter.) If A has a *privilege*, B has a *negative obligation* or a *no-right* not to prevent the other's initiative if s/he chooses to exercise. If A possesses legal power, B must have a legal liability; A's legal immunity will impose on B as the correlative a *legal* disability; *rights, privileges, power, and immunities*—all according to Hohfeld are rights which set up enforceable expectancies of particular kinds of responses; the correlative relationships he denominated as *duties, no rights, liabilities* and *disabilities*. Following Chamberlain four correlative obligations as against four types of Hohfeldian *rights* may be delineated here. For 1) *right-* there is the obligation of *specific performance*, for ii) *privilege-* the obligation of *non-intervention*; for iii) *power* the obligation of *submission*; for iv) *immunities* the obligation of *non-deprivation.* In this framework of reciprocal rights and obligations, what is the nature of responsibility? In this legal system the possession of a right carries with it an authority, an authority to compel specific performance from another whose specific obligation was the correlative of the right. The latter person has a responsibility to comply. But as visible from above, responsibilities emerge within the complex context of liability, disability etc.; the *specific performance* issue could be broached only when it occurs within the authoritative claims of a kind of right and not otherwise. Chamberlain elsewhere argues in order to distinguish between obligation and responsibilities that a right for one person is defined by the conduct (obligation) he can expect from others, and authority is

defined by the conduct (responsibility) he can command from others. Therefore, responsibilities in this framework is a response to authority while obligations are responses to rights. If we are willing to dispense with the complexity that is generated here, we could just insert a modifier. Responsibilities as loose duties are a matter of interpretation; they cannot be claimed as duties; they are contextual, contractual, contingent and a matter of arbitrary adjudication, nevertheless they have specific meanings and applications attached to them. Duties are broad narratives of no-compulsion. The prolific but cheap use of irresponsibility in well-known urban circles deployed to argue against the bandh evades these questions to make a quick point. This is most unfortunate.

While opportunistically the question of responsibility is raised there, in an age of fading social securities and social responsibilities, how risk becomes a paradigmatic relata used to mark the moment when I'm taught to live alone and acknowledge the erasure of responsibilities, the second story is offered below.

ENJOYING ELEPHANTS AT RS. 2/- OR FROM CHINA *FEAR* TO CHINA *FAIR*[2]

This section should have begun with an analytical explanation of a picture published on 26 May, 2001 in The Telegraph, a daily published from Kolkata showing disgusted buyers walking out of the China fair—that never was.

Instead let's begin with a linguistic narration. The interesting event took place in Kolkata—the cultural capital of India in May 2001; rumors were rife that unbelievably cheap Chinese goods would be made available at the Netaji Indoor Stadium. This information reached the public through randomly distributed pamphlets, news clippings in daily newspapers, and through the all-pervading bulk of electronic mails. But the rumor was made concrete by a few traders who feed on such rumors. There were price lists cataloguing highly desirable consumer items at throwaway prices: a 14" color television whose cost in the year 2000 in the Indian market was Rs 6,500, rumor told it would be available for just Rs. 3000/-; a motorcycle which costs at least Rs.32,000/- here

were available suddenly on the price list for an unbelievable Rs. 11,000/-; a fridge which costs at least Rs. 10,000 would cost at the great China fair Rs.1,400 and so on and so forth. Interestingly even before the real—sale of Chinese goods took place, what actually sold according to news reports—were these price lists particularly at Patna, Guwahati and Cuttack. Consequently, on the 25th of May, the fateful day for the mammoth sales, a large crowd gathered at the gates of the stadium—which were (un)expectedly closed. The authorities refused to allow anybody to enter, because as they clarified—no such sale was scheduled. They instead blamed the people to have been victims of wrong information. However, the ever-swelling crowd refused to comply with what they heard now and demanded that the doors be opened. To avoid a possible, gate-crash, at last the gates were thrown open for public verification. People rushed in and were witness to an empty stadium but still could not believe that they have been subjected to a fraud. They rather believed that the government had played fraud with them by selling the cheap goods to wholesalers who would charge a lot more now if they go to buy them. They left the arena cursing the government, calling the traders names, abusing the parents of respectable ministers.

Following this, the Kolkata Police initiated a probe to find how the whisper campaign had begun and how all these really happened. Because of this investigation, two companies—a Banglore based company dealing in electronic goods and a Mumbai based Shangrita Electronics and Automobiles—were booked under the anti-cheating laws. A retrospective survey by the media displayed queer results: it was revealed that when the rumour was doing its rounds in Kolkata, genuine dealers of Chinese goods had also suffered confusion and had been compellingly perturbed. They had reported that there was a steady decline in their sales effected by the ambiguous prospect of cheaper goods. Later, talking to news persons, city Police Commissioner Sujoy Chakravorty told,—if somebody tells you, you can get *elephants at Rupees Two* and you believe it, who is responsible? This remark makes the event doubly ironical. But where the show ends, the story begins.

In the aftermath of the gala event, an increased sale for

dealers in imported Chinese goods was noticed. Local China bazars started getting organised in nearly all local transit points throughout the city where locally made goods were sold in the name of Chinese goods; and still these fake China fairs in the wake of the failed grand China show at Netaji Indoor stadium attracted consumers who were not bogged down by the defeated beauty of a rumor. And yes, the mystery of this peculiar consumption remains alive even after so many years have elapsed. Some have argued—trying to explain the incident as the falsification of information and bad media effect leading to the embarrassment of thousands, comparing in the process why such things do not take place in the developed North; some have thought it wise that such rumors do spread in India which is symptomatic, they say, of India's growing induction into the processes of globalization; to them—here otherwise– in softer times—there are rumors about adultery, black money, god drinking real milk etc and of course more effective rumors about fellow religious brothers being killed or oppressed by people of an enemy religion (in India it is Hindu vs. Muslim) leading to dangerous riots and pogroms. Rumor about commodities to be sold and the huge rush that followed are signs of increasing material sensibility and visibility of Indian citizens and a positive consciousness of consumption available as neverbefore. These theorists do not discount the fact that what these people have believed to be true may not have been factually true; those prices may have been parts of a classical rumor, (un)believable,—even scandalous, but the point is, that the people did believe that such impossible prices could be true is a thematic subtext in favor of globalization conceived as the gift or *daan* of globalization[3]. At last common men, have comprehended globalization, at last it has started to work in favor of them!

These are the interpretations that have been doing the rounds and we have no quarrel with nearly all of them; they are pretty plausible: globalization will have rumors about its own self, the type of rumor will be different, through such rumors globalization perhaps advertises itself in the present and will advertise in the future; but the point that we want to make here—is, the rumor of cheap commodities may be a product of globalization, but

does it not also by default give credence to the fact that Chinese commodities which parade our attraction are cheap only by virtue of cheap labor in China condensed in innumerable sweat shops? This invokes a now classical debate.

Situated at a local vantage point—let us give it a different twist: consider the fake China Bazaars in Kolkata selling fake Chinese goods. The departure it invokes is—when commodities are not real, say in counterfeit Chinese goods, sweat shops are also virtual; they are not practically real. Here keeping in memory the incident that happened at Netaji Indoor Stadium, how the China fair actually served to dispel the fear of imported Chinese goods among local producers and then started to serve as a model of local China Bazaars held at nearly all trade transit points and how through the sale of fake, forged Chinese goods, local businessmen here in Kolkata came to negotiate this fear and shifted the success in trade in favor of themselves, invokes a kind of mytho poetics. We have our own sweat shops, there are cheap goods made locally which get sold in the name of Chinese goods which are in no need of anti-dumping laws, trade restrictions and police intervention. The anti-dumping laws are redundant in this sphere. Our local con tradesmen pass their own goods as Chinese goods. Who's afraid of dumping anymore? This creative economic action is we suggest can be studied as a literary act—the way one copies the image of a bird through painting or words, one forges a Chinese label, inscribes a Chinese script on the objects and gets hold of the Chinese fear. We find this a literary feat to dispel an economic fear, created and produced by the businessmen themselves. The urban poetics of cheating is still to be written, but the poetics of the 'will to be cheated' is ready at hand!

Similarly we would argue that even in the case of counterfeit Chinese goods, the Chinese imaginary is always already present. It is a phenomenon of virtual commodities with a Chinese signature. Linked to this, let us elaborate upon our thesis by explaining a few categories: what is virtuality, why do the sweatshops become virtual here? The factual China is absent but the virtual China is present; those who throng these sale exhibitions get the self-satisfaction of buying cheap things which are derived from the rumor that once

caught hold of the Calcutta market; the goods may not be Chinese but China is in their minds—it is present by its absence—this is what we call virtual. Julia Kristeva in one of her not so remembered novels- *Possessions* gives a narrative of virtuality,—

> Gloria was lying in a pool of blood with her head cut off. The ivory satin evening dress, the rounded arms, the long manicured hands, the cartier watch,…. The sun tanned legs, the shoes matching the dress—no doubt about it, that was Gloria. There was nothing missing except the head.—My sexual organ, as she laughingly used to call it, referring to the cerebral pleasure she got out of her work as a translator and the equally intense pain she suffered from her headaches. Some times she'd amend the description and called her head—the tool of her trade. And now here she was, bereft of her organ or tool, and so made almost anonymous. But only almost. For, head or no head, Gloria Harrison was easily recognizable.
>
> (Kristeva 1998: p. 3)

This is virtuality, Gloria is not recognizable, but still recognized; the same we can tell for the immense number of China Bazaars that are staged in Calcutta, their commodities resemble the original Chinese goods by imitating them, therefore even if they are not confirmed as Chinese goods, still they are recognized because they are imaged about the Chinese. A virtual China is present here and with this virtual China at work, local goods dealer negotiates with the fear of cheap Chinese goods, not only that, it becomes a tool in their trade.

Now to address a more philosophical question as to whether we are in this act, essentializing the idea of Chinese by claiming truths in favor of a real Chinese in contrast to a fake Chinese good, we might like to reconsider Jean Paul Sartre's advocacy of Cartier-Bresson's photographs which were—according to him less than or not quite Chinese. Here is the moment: Sartre, introducing Cartier-Bresson's album of photographs, is said to have declared the—death of the picturesque—in that—"while other photographers—seek out a Chinese who looks more Chinese than the others, in the end they find one. They make him adopt a typically Chinese pose and surround him with chinoseries. What have they captured on film? One Chinaman? No … the idea of what is Chinese" (Sartre 2001:

p. 18) But then what difference does Bresson do? His photographs find those Chinese who are—not quite Chinese. No doubt this construction makes for an excellent post-colonial theatre, but is this appropriation of Sartre justiciable? No! Let's see why.

Please note—where the picturesque brings to focus someone who is more Chinese than others, Bresson endeavours to portray someone who is less Chinese or not quite Chinese; that is to say, there is an element of excess in the first and lack in the second but both are paradoxically fore grounded on some subject called Chinese 'and an elemental system called China'; or otherwise how could one explain away the fact that—yes, something is more or less than Chinese- but then what is this measuring standard ideally called Chinese in response to which you decide something as an excess or a lack? This is where Sartre's troubles begin and those who have read Sartre's *Psychology Of Imagination* and linked it with a bit of Lacan, will agree—that all these boil down to the regime of the image. Let us regard here Sartre's analysis of the portrait of Charles VIII who is at one and the same time absent and also present. This would testify to the fact—that the less than Chinese notion is already present in the more than Chinese images; this would be consonant with the recent suggestions made by Ashis Nandy, that a history of the poor can be written by concentrating on the lives of the superrich and similarly a history of knowledge can be written simply by trying to write a history of errors. It follows—Bresson's less than Chinese photographs reconstruct, unconsciously and more emphatically than any others- the more than Chinese notion.)

But isn't there a constitutive deception involved here? Who will take the responsibility of faking Chinese goods and selling them to people as real? What does it have to do with the new economic order? For this, let us take to the other register available in the narrative of the Grand China Fair. The police Commissioner of Kolkata (anti-cheating section) accused the people of believing the unbelievable. He put forward the philosophical question of responsibility. We would like to put forward here—the question of risk. This will link our story to the globalized world where social securities are withdrawn, salaries go down, jobs vanish and

fake things are sold in the name of the real. Ulrich Beck in his now famous book *World Risk Society* comments on this world in dangerously secular terms,—as the bipolar world fades away, we are moving from a world of enemies to one of dangers and risks. Let us add here that to move into the world of risks suggests that we move out of the world of responsibility; in that good old world somebody would take the responsibility of the other, here risk means to be responsible to one's own self, to one's own desires and needs; nobody would satisfy them. Beck argues that the new risk regime predicts a new future symbolized by the emergence of private insurance: now the greatest symbol of calculation and alternative security which does not cover nuclear disasters or climate changes. It would not cover anything which does not have any risk. It would also deny to cover everything which bears too less or too much risk. Do we expect the blind consumers who thronged the stadium to be covered by such an insurance? If not, then they should be left to themselves in a volatile market society to bear the risk for themselves without subjecting them to the sermons of responsibility. To satisfy desires through an economic shortcut—one takes risk without becoming irresponsible. Beck concludes for us—one thing is clear how one acts in the situation (of the risk trap)—is no longer something that can be decided by experts. Let us then in the aspect of bandh too stop preaching the gospel of responsibility to the irresponsible people who have made it a habit to convert a day of bandh to another (counter) holiday and wait for another one to come.

Finally, one historical question to examine the claims of novelty attributed to such moments as being generated by the grand narrative of globalization. Contextually put, consider the mad drive at the great China fair—is it dangerously accidental without continuity? Not at all. In fact, the new days of consumption in Europe began with the promise of cheap goods. There is nothing wrong in this expectation. John Carrol in his book—*Sceptical Sociology* recalls the novelist Emile Zola who according to him has provided us the perspective. Carrol writes,—"In his richly sociological novel *Au Bouhevr des Dames*, written in 1882 he described the great department store. The new emporiums were

eclipsing all the tradition shops in their neighborhoods. Zola attributed their success to the factor that they exploited the—bargain [by]—seducing women into buying things they did not need by making them so cheap that the customer imagined every time she bought that she was bringing of a brilliant economic coup. " [Carrol 1980: p. 102, Italics mine] Therefore when producers sell fake Chinese goods they do deal with the Chinese rumor- that is true, but people by buying still cheaper goods and trying always by never giving up exhibits their desire to go for an economic coup every day; they want to buy cheap goods nevertheless—that is how the public negotiates with the rumor; the virtual china fair has provoked the dream of cheapness never to be appeased. Communism is the final stage of this longing for cheap things which however has turned to be very costly. And now the resurrected—cost of things have become a nightmare.

Lastly, as the word dumping suggests—it is the desire for the dustbin. Isn't there something sick, perverted with the abnormal wish to go for dumped goods—fake or real? Here is Carrol again,—"To know a society means to above all to know its irrationality. Sociologists do well to take as their exemplar the haughty madame in Louis Malle's brothel, in his film Murmur of the Heart, who claimed that she could tell a man's perversion at a thirty second glance"(Carrol Ibid.: pp. 106-107).

Having had our china fair specialists, producers and public alike—if the Madame were here, I bet—it would have taken her an hour.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Then the man who enjoys a bandh is a true political pervert; the person who has a desire to consume dumped goods is also a very good pervert. The first is a pleasure which is abandoned rather than politicized. Condemned rather than criticized. Because the moment a critique is launched—we have seen—it becomes handy that the critics and the growth-development-cum city's good name experts are identified to have been operating with a keen singular notion of work, idleness, holidays etc. and to ask everybody to

agree with them without engaging in a minimal discursive process of testing those validity claims raised by the arguments as have been conveniently and constantly done by the media and the pop sociologists and economists in India is simply a fascist-capitalist funny gesture. To sum it up quickly, 'closure as pleasure' cannot be appropriated by those narratives where the loss of a working day is comparable to the mourning that follows the moment one looses one's father or mother; neither it is a part of the usual resistance critique which fuels the anti-development narratives.—I have vanished into my home with my girlfriend or boyfriend, wife, or husband; I hate work, do whatever you want to in the outside. The second part narrated how people are enjoying and increasingly desire more so to enjoy elephants at rupees two. And that too at their own risk. Risk means- the responsibility is mine. Risk means being uncovered by the politics of insurance. Risk means the vanishing point of utterance. And the two examples stage a queer theatre. Responsibility is invoked in the first instance to argue why bandh should be dumped; in the second it was evident that—in an age of diminishing responsibilities and expectations where all are encouraged to become selfishly rational, private pleasure maximizers, responsibility is a doubtful and disputed neo liberal gesture perhaps interpretable only within the semiotics of private insurance. Briefly, all our secret economic coups were failed encounters with the moral boundaries of the market.

In other words, these are words—these are worlds—these are ears which can only be arbitrarily i.e., personally pierced. But these ears are long and they inevitably cast a lengthy shadow; the question is, are they those of the elephant bought at rupees two? And lest we forget, let us rehearse for the last time—the discourse of personalytic ethics which deals with the narratives of experiencing the bad and the transcendent, is a discourse of experience, and does not sustain answers to enrich the merely ethical.

NOTES

1. The recent crackdowns of the Trinamul government on the W.B government servants could be constructed as a response to this

holiday culture elicited by *bandhs*, but to keep them in good humour they are bribed with an extra holiday during puja; so the loss of a bandh holiday is equaled. The culture regains speed in this persistence.

2. This part derives from a draft written originally with Surbhi Tiwari. Her archival help is generously acknowledged. An earlier version was published in Chatterjee 2006a.
3. In fact this is one of the central and somewhat erroneous argument of Bhaskar Mukhopadhyay, *The Rumor of Globalization: Desecrating the Global from Vernacular Margins,* London: C. Hurst & Co., 2013.

PART FOUR

A Conclusive Care(less)ness

My patient—I leave you out alone like a doctor here, in this small library of loans—where babies burst out of stoves: machines for heating tears. Out there the receptionist stands behind the desk of rejection—the Rejectionist keeps animated electric response beside—and s/he is laughing: just laughing but not joking—bare teeth—being hinted at by the rain-heat, hired and fired, investing all closeness to charity's home; before tooth becomes paste—pride became powdered CARE. Here—seek them—if u can—love—their bombs are pressed tigers, watch the dance of nurses in the capitalist courtyard. Watch! Now I leave you alone here; have sex with the harassing sweepers. Crawl. Come near… What more! News is what nobody told you—the decorated juvenile of flowers my dear.

('Towards a Cultural History of Nursing Homes' in
Chatterjee, Arnab 2017a)

In Lieu of a CONCLUSION

Personalytic ethic in narrative intervention: a polemic on care ethics

> There are immediate sentiments of the senses or hypothetical (and substituted) sentiments. The former arise from everything that pertains to our state and when we ourselves are the object of our consideration. The latter: when we as it were transform ourselves into an alien person and invent for ourselves a sensitivity that we approve or desire. …One's own or personal sentiments must be distinguished from substituted ones; the latter can be a disagreeable imitation, but still be personally agreeable. … Such substituted sentiments make [us] neither happy nor unhappy except when they are connected *indirecte* with our state. They are only *fictiones aestheticae* and are always agreeable. (The good is always agreeable in substituted sentiment.)
>
> —IMMANUEL KANT (2005: 486, 484)

From responsibility to irresponsibility, indifference and risk: Is the ethic generated by the personal able to take on the challenge of a care ethic mediated by a care epistemology—besides discourse ethic in previous chapters? Also if we had begun with feminism and its slogan 'personal is political', it's time to close with feminism, too—this time it would be instructive to examine personalytic ethic and the revisions it could promulgate, the indeterminacies it could proliferate. Let us have a session of the polemic!

Now, if India were tired of traditional feminism practiced in all too predictable quarters, then the (May 16, Vol. 1, No. 20) Issue of the largest circulated journal *Economic and Political Weekly* (EPW) on 'Men doing Feminism' is invigorating and refreshing in more ways than one; though all the articles never refer to for once the classic texts of Alice Jardine edited *Men in Feminism* published far back in 1986 (Jardine 1986); Tom Digby edited *Men doing Feminism etc.*(Digby 1998)[1] where all the questions, that have been broached in the issue, have long been anticipated and answers given—which were—also—quite *similar* to those which have sprung up here and autobiographically offered. Still, the universal and western tone of the compendiums referred to above, and in the face of the quite vicarious criticism of the postcolonials, the whole agenda required to have been contextualised anew—and that is what the Issue has accomplished.

"Men doing feminism" remains striking as ever like the old ways of enunciation in which agencies and their corresponding function—when allowed to strike an opposing pose, took on the mantle of a hermeneutics of an Olympian suspicion: can the rich talk for the poor, without falsity? Can the white struggle for the blacks? Can the straights represent the homoerotics?—and such others. This Issue answers in affirmation that all of them could, but with *care*—when, interconstitutively—we occupy the others' shoes. The origin of such thinking is in Kant.

EPISTEMOLOGY AND CARE: A DATED MISFIT?

But how is epistemology still alive in social theory in the continental tradition today? Epistemology—to begin with its pet questions—How do we know and wherefrom; is our knowledge reliable; how do we know that we know; or, how do we know that we do not know—these questions—except in the positivist annals of analytic philosophy, are dead and redundant and long surpassed[2] in what is known as continental philosophy.[3] We think it was Foucault who said it doesn't matter if there is a truth or there is an immaculate conception of truth or not, only *truth claim* matters, because truth claim masters, or tries to master. Matters because it is related to

certain forms of sovereignty (even sovereignty of the self) and the designed analytics of positioned power. And the Anglo-American analytic philosophy of language or what goes by the name of even feminist epistemology has never, because it cannot, engaged with the registers of 'stimulating' and digesting power, authority, influence, anxiety and the "adult interpretation of strength." It cannot answer.

> How is that every execution offends us more than a murder? It is the coldness of the judges, the painful preparations, the understanding that a man is here being used as a means to deter others. For guilt is not being punished, even if there were guilt; guilt lies in the educators, the parents, the environment, in us, not in the murderer.(Nietzsche 2004: p. 58).

Nietzsche's disdain is for the educators' knowledge, cold justice and for judges with eyes of steel who declare, and by declaration disseminate punishment -which is according to Nietzsche-the social distribution of cruel delight. So, at the outset it is not asked whether epistemology itself has exceeded its signs and times, except in those closed quarters of analytical philosophy—who are still—and I'm compelled to use the shunned word 'positivist'—unless you think that knowledge is possible, or truth is possible and so by this logic and apology, a philosopher is an "optimist" who knows either truth or falsity (and cannot understand as told by Nietzsche "lies which are beyond truth and falsity").

Once, Professor Vrinda Dalmiya (who is the model theorist adopted by the authors in this Issue), Linda Alcoff and others intended to bring in "personal experience" pertaining to "traditional women's beliefs—about childbearing and rearing, herbal medicines, the secrets of good cooking" which were excluded by analytical philosophy or "Anglo-American epistemology" (Dalmiya 1993: p. 220), but paradoxically in the end—moving within the knower-known-knowing registers—wanted to make them, self-defeatingly, epistemological; this only legitimated Anglo-American epistemology and discredited feminist epistemology to the extent it could never come unto its own. Its days are sadly but surely over. It would be now interesting to explore the limit points, the margins, the outside of feminist epistemology—those that are

excluded by its threshold of discursive toleration. I can just mention two items here: Knowledge in its etymological root-structural but obsolete sense is "acknowledge"—which when extended to erotic, carnal knowledge of intimacy behold the two senses in which we may find 'knowledge' relevant, but to ask for an epistemology or science of acknowledgement or carnal cohabitation would be to repeat the same error, this time with an iota of humour.

Walking along this path mark, you cannot ask, or at least authentically ask, the two questions which ground the whole EPW Issue: "Is the sex of the knower epistemologically significant?; What part can men play in the production of feminist knowledge?" (Chowdhury and Baset 2015: p. 29). The answers, as in the Issue, are candidly predictable and all the authors are in vulnerable agreement: yes, of course, the sex of the knower is significant and secondly, men can play an important part in the production of feminist knowledge—provided they don't want to 'play' it out, simply; in the words of the editors, if they are not politically suspect initiatives under the labels of "women's rights" and "gender equality" (Chowdhury and Baset 2015: p. 31). But if such feigning and role playing happens, how do we distinguish the counterfeit from the genuine—is not clear from the articles: borrowing from the Dalmiya version of care epistemology (which, established in the analytical tradition is out and out dependent on *cared/caring*, *virtue/vice* dualisms); if "Caring for requires that the one caring imaginatively and empathetically "simulate"/"pretend" the reality of the other, in order to act "in accordance with the point of view of the cared-for herself" (Chowdhury and Baset 2015: p. 30), then this is disastrous[4]: pretension is nearly a lie. Having seen her child crying, when a mother is in tears because of a felt pain or a similar interruption, there is an immersion in each other so much so that it could not be named as inter-subjectively shared life-world; it is hardly 'caring for' or 'taking care.' But love as a primordial affliction[5] and as a form of recognition could neither act as a prerequisite for knowledge. Do I love somebody because I know her, or want to know her? Love rather abandons all knowledge, and the metaphor of blindness is not therefore an empty formal one (i.e. one cannot surmise, or say that love is blind in one eye, not two).

However, is it true that the "The dominant reaction of men to feminism within the Indian academy has been one of opposition?" (Chowdhury and Baset 2015: p. 31). Then the proliferation of women's studies/school/centres/ and courses based on gender in disciplines like Sociology or Culture studies and even Literature modules in India must be indexed upon such an opposition. Adequate empirical data to back up such a sweeping claim is called for. A more "trustworthy" sweeping claim is rather the concomitant drying up of Marxist study centres or schools in Indian colleges and universities. And it is quite paradoxical that the gender equality advocates did not resist, or introduce them if they were not there, thereby a larger discourse of equality could be allowed so that the specific discourse of equality (feminism) could derive support and sustenance from a wider ideological regime of change and resistance. And this has resulted in the consistent de-politicisation of feminism and women's studies; without a political theory and a visible programme of practice, gender rights become a funded category and it is curious that while *gender* or *women* become a fund-favourite everywhere, 'class' is never within the optimism of the fund raisers or donors. The *gender* based NGOs carry on while pro-poor, 'anti-development' NGO's are being blocked and forced to shut down. If this trend persists we shall never have a feminist state, and as it was said once of Edward Said's students "They are not interested in capturing the government, they are only interested in capturing the English department," will remain woefully true. The present array of articles do not explore or advance this political possibility—even minimally. While Marxism or Maoism, despite historical setbacks, remain a persistent threat, the gender question—I repent—could be co-opted and played by anybody, anywhere—safely.

If 'care' (or care epistemology) is the ideological handle/world-view proposed for the articles, 'autobiography' is the methodological tool of the authors' explorations. But a cursory note on care epistemology first, deriving from the section above—on which we shall elaborate more in the next section. "[T]he very relation originally established between myself and others, between myself and someone, cannot be said to reside in an act of knowledge

that, as such, is seizure and comprehension, the besiegement of objects" (Levinas 1993: p. 40). The order is pre-ethical and irreducible to knowledge which works with the subject-object bad binary correlation. If we go by this argument, then the originary ethical relation could not be based to generate and advance gender equal considerations of empathetic care: because here the *other* comes before the self and is placed higher [Levinas 1993: p. 44]. "[I]t is also worth remembering that the ethics of care is historically rooted in the moral sentimentalism of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith, all of whom were men. Moreover, the moral sentimentalist emphasis on benevolence itself shows the influence of the Christian ideal of agape, and the founder of Christianity was no woman" (Slote 2007: p. 3). Slote's gender neutral theory of care and the origins of care as moral and social concern is rooted not in maternal nature or nurture (since feminists themselves have argued against their internalization and using them as projective devices against oppressors) but forms of helping (which later came to be known as 'care work advocacy') and the critique which finally went into purifying them, "amenable to the prospect of retrieving a "forgotten" antecedent attitude of care within the recognitional domains of love, law, and solidarity" (Ganis 2011: p. 141). In its ancient usage Care from Latin *cura* and later in its Roman usage "obtains in the representative functions of the *procurator*—the officer who personally assumes a "concern" or "care" (cura) "for" (*pro*) another"; security (*securitas*) intervenes as "Roman Epicureans and Stoics underscore. A person is literally *secured* when he or she is liberated from worry or care." (Hamilton 2015: pp. 7, 10, 7). For the contemporary unbeliever, we might just remind that all the five tenets which the authors recite, *caring about, taking care of, care- giving* and *care-receiving* (contributed by Joan Tronto et al.) and the fifth addition '*caring about caring*' have been inbuilt into the social care work advocacy (i.e., within the structure of helping that is called Social Work) since the nineteenth century and consolidated in early twentieth century as its cardinal values and principles (Bytheway et al 2002).

Having gone so far, let us consider this tenet again. "Taking care is driven by the intention of doing "good," which may not always coincide with the cared for's expectation/desires from a

given situation" (Chowdhury and Baset 2015: p. 30). The doing "good" itself has been disputed in moral and legal philosophy so much that it needs no rehearsal. In these discourses good is pitted against justice; I might want to do good but I might do something wrong but that could be, arguably, enabling. This stands opposite to the notion of 'just care'[6] in social work care advocacy. This conflict between good and right and bad and wrong is nearly unsurpassable, displacing in the process the traditional battle of the binaries between good vs. bad and right vs. wrong. A terminally ill or an obstinate patient desperately requires a life-saving operation which might risk his life as well; what to do? After a quick consultation with the possible stakeholders, the operation is performed and s/he is saved. The act is good but wrong. And this is, putting the authors' caution to the winds ("To ensure that caring does not become paternalistic or an instrument of control" (p. 30), of course paternalism: welfare paternalism (we understand your good or welfare better than you do). Do the Issue editors then approve of coercive care?[7] They do, purportedly having received some encouragement from such quarters: "And, although this may be a shocking thing to say, society ought to sanction that sometimes patients and clients be in various ways manipulated to receive the treatment they desperately need but refuse to accept voluntarily. Society ought to countenance the fact that sometimes patients should have their medicine smuggled into them, through their food, for example" (Tännsjö 1999: p. 1). Further, the acknowledgement that "The capacity to make decisions concerning one's own treatment is not necessarily ethically or legally related to competency" (Lowey et al 2002: p. 32) while is relieving in one way, complicates the picture further and cannot, finally, do away with coercive care. Now, if this is the result of care ethics or empathetically identifying/occupying the others' pain-position, point of view, then I think we would better do without it.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND CARE

Now, on care and autobiography: Do they themselves go together? Autobiography as a form of self-enunciation is not always other-

regarding in the neutral altruistic sense. Somewhere in between fact and fiction and straddling both at times, autobiography is the most elusive of genres. It is its own worth. "…The literary and the erratic, makes the presence of the autobiographical in the body of philosophical reason an irritant. That is the interest of it" (Smith 1995: p. 5). Who has questioned the truth claims made in an autobiography and won? Self—speaking emerges only after it has trumped, and erased, or won over other forms of self-substantiations in a particular speech community. Autobiography cannot run free when the self is itself a disputed possession. Further, if caring is, as the issue editors define, an intellectual virtue which creates and clears—a space for the other (Chowdhury and Baset 2015: p. 31), then there is no warranty that autobiography does it, or does it at all. The autotelic author is knowable only in her/his wantonness and vulnerability (Taslima Nasreen's autobiography is a crucial case in question); autobiography is not, and it should not be—even cannot be—an authentic experience. The performative gesture of the enunciation would in the act prove the opposite of what the testimony claims to declare, namely, a certain truth.

> "And, truth to tell, it never was [mine]," you dared to say. The one who speaks, the subject of the enunciation, yourself, oh yes, the subject of the French language, is understood as doing· the opposite of what he says. It is as if, in one and the same breath, *you were lying by confessing the lie* (Derrida 1996: p. 3).

The *I* is formed or discovered or invented at the moment, before, or after autobiography? "This *I* would have formed itself, then, at the site of a situation that cannot be found, a site always referring to elsewhere, to something other, to another language, to the other in general. It would have located itself in a nonlocatable [insituable] experience of language in the broad sense of the word" [Derrida 1996: p. 29). Paul De Man refused to give autobiography a generic status itself: "the works themselves always seem to shade off into neighboring or even incompatible genres" (1984: p. 67); if it were, then not because a woman subject is writing it, but because it is the genre of autobiography that will be more potent and consequential in projecting a voice that will unite all or most of the women.

> And since the mimesis here assumed to be operative is one mode of figuration among others, does the referent determine the figure, or is it the other way round: is the illusion of reference not a correlation of the structure of the figure, that is to say no longer clearly and simply a referent at all but something more akin to a fiction which then, however, in its own turn, acquires a degree of referential productivity? (De Man 1984: p. 67).

Autobiography, then, is not a genre or a mode, but a "figure of reading or of understanding that occurs, to some degree, in all texts." The interest of autobiography, then, is not that it reveals reliable self-knowledge—it does not-but that it demonstrates in a "striking way the impossibility of closure and of totalization (that is the impossibility of coming into being) of all textual systems made up of tropological substitutions" (De Man 1984: p. 68). Then autobiography could become only, in its becoming, another *figure* of the woman, declaratively foreclosed by masculine superstructures, but nonetheless undecidable in its tropological functionality, albeit fictionality.

A view from the personalytic ethical angle will be: A care-ful autobiography—unless all writing is auto-affectionate- would be collectively re-written—while interrupting each other, or must hinder its writing through an 'interdiction' which promises to suspend it. In fact, a care-ful engagement would be to denounce and inaugurate the ethical suspension of autobiography, rather than its own writing.

And finally, while I look at me and write myself, a distinction should be drawn between I and me: I'm looking at my self—its time and space from the outside as if; this is the third person standpoint rather than the first. So the intimacy that is gathered the moment it is autobiography, is also a misnomer. '"Born from Enlightenment secular humanism, [autobiography] denotes the narrative inscription of an abstract and unique individual agent moving through time and space"'[...] Insofar as autobiography has been seen as promoting a view of the subject as universal, it has also underpinned the centrality of masculine—and, we may add, Western and middle-class—modes of subjectivity' (cited in Huddart 2008: p. 2).

READING MANU WITH 'EPISTEMIC CARE'

Eminent cultural critic Sibaji Bandyopadhyay's essay in this Issue of the EPW (Bandyopadhyay 2015: pp. 36-39) is the most unproblematic and makes for smooth, pleasurable reading being invested with also a bit of intellectual humour. From his standpoint and theoretical inscription Bandyopadhyay is unassailable and we, or any reader, will agree with him fully. But, what it is to read *The Laws of Manu*—infamous for its so called patriarchal codes and lineaments with *epistemic care*?—The question and the only premise we can fault Bandyopadhyay on, is this. It is, if we are to believe the Issue-editors and their proposed paradigm of care epistemology, then, "[s]ince the attitude of caring cannot be captured in universalizable rules or particular gestures, the focus of epistemology shifts from specific principles to the "wider life surrounding the belief," to the nature and specificities of whose belief it is" (Dalmiya 2002: 48). Followingly, the wider life-world and the form of life during Manu and the epistemic community of Manu amidst which he wrote the text, occupying his shoes for sometime; do we do that—in this piece, or is Manu ravaged by particular contexts and universal principles applied monologically by the reader-knower like Bandyopadhyay - (who now enjoys, for the right reasons, a legendary status as a cultural critic, and we have learnt some of these critical maneuvers and metaphors from his writings alone). But that too, quite anachronistically—is there such a danger ? Manu's time is not our time. To understand this rightly, not care epistemology, but a more ancient hermeneutic lesson is enough. "[T]he lived experience of the Reformation occupies a middle ground between the principle of Scripture proper and the material principle of the Reformation: It is *an experience that consists both of comprehending and living through the inner coherence of Scripture, a coherence that enlivens all of its separate parts*" (Dilthey 1996: p. 37). What it is to live through the inner coherence of a text by Manu, and has it been done, here? When Dilthey wrote that Thucydides or Herodotus are not history for us, we have to transform them into history, he performed a major breakthrough; similarly the laws of Manu are still not (patriarchal)

laws or history, but they are made unto becoming one: we make it through our reading. Was Manu's text reflexive of the domineering patriarchy (and in that sense autobiographical), and thus would have a secondary status, or it produced patriarchy from nowhere?

Manu's enactments when starts with "Listen! Once upon a time this (universe) was made of darkness….it seemed to be entirely asleep" (Manu 2000: p. 3) is a beginning which is a mythical fore-thinking; a story telling so to say. "Once upon" is an episodically absent history, but still, a period of all periods, a non-time—which opens us all to the phenomenon of time itself. "The waters are the children of the (primordial) man" is easily reminiscent of the pre-socratic thinker who similarly thought water as the first substance. If it is possible to think Manu as the author of caste and gender inequality, it is equally possible to read *Manusamhita* or Manu's laws as scripting an equality from nowhere—as primordial as inequality. For Manu both are, it could be argued—co-original, and none more emphatically disposed than the other. "If a man takes away a deposit or keeps something loaned for personal use, the king should make him pay a fine equal (to the value of the deposit), without distinction. Any man who takes away another man's property through circumvention should be publicly struck down…" (Manu 2000: pp. 173-174). This *any man* is (if we may) the eastern—universal, cosmographic man in terms of an elemental earth matter—as if—without differences. (And here it ought to be shocking to consider why *Manavadharmashastra* became *Manu smriti*) which mostly discusses varna without the asramic cycle—and also inserts new paradoxes which have not been accounted for (Olivelle 1993: p. 137). When Manu ordains "Those that do not move are food for those that move,…those that have no hands are food for those with hands; and cowards are the food of the brave… The eater who eats creatures … are to be eaten … ." (Manu 2000: p. 102) are nearly Nietzschean exhortations. Strength, vitality and self-preservation to the extent of self-sacrifice are the true givens.

With Manu the noble classes, the philosophers and the warriors, have the upper hand over the masses; noble values everywhere, a feeling of perfection, a yea-saying to life, a triumphant sense of well-being towards

oneself and towards life—the sun shines on the entire book" (Nietzsche 2004: p. 163).

In Manu's text, Nietzsche notes, no modern idea has any power; the laws are given and lived and assumes the position of nearly natural laws. Opposed to mediocrity, Manu is aristocratic and highest to the point of being honest. Isn't honesty an extreme subtlety?

However, is the result of our reading-knowing Manu with empathic care favourable, or would the orthodox feminist academia deny it- because it doesn't fit the bill? The latter, while mercilessly subjecting Manu to modern ideas, unfortunately would bring the whole aesthetics of care-reading into question. I'm sure this would go against even Bandopadhyay's intended critically open spirit.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY AS ETHNOGRAPHY?

Kamala Viseswaran—the competent author of *Fictions of Feminist Ethnography*- who is not—despite Puspesh Kumar making a similar claim and exercise, even referred to by him in his piece in this Issue under review (Kumar 2015: pp. 40-43), cites Caren Kaplan who "reads ethnography as a means of challenging the genre structure of autobiography" (Viseswaran 2003: 8). This piece by Puspesh Kumar, honest in its mode of telling and very readable, remembers and reiterates (which becomes by now) an auto-ethnographical account where as a male ethnographic researcher, he encounters academic and institutional blind spots, dialogic irresponsibility ("not their job" (Kumar 2015: p. 41), non-committal insensitivity—all coalescing in a binding anti female, momentous complex of encounters—wherefrom the ethnographic project is supposed to have been launched, and then implemented and realized in the field. But Puspesh never clarifies by what empathetic magic he could override such torrential roadblocks, which besides practically affecting the research design and ethics, theoretically impinges, at the same time, upon his whole cognitive framework—so to say. If he is successful, anybody could be. His ethnographic model, one might argue easily, is masculine in

and out and had come under heavy fire, so much so that the so called social or cultural ethnography is in a shamble. Pushpesh's ethnographic encounter is thereby finally modelled upon studying the strange outsider with their own uncanniness of having had nearly no "class differentiation" among the Kolams (Kumar 2015: p. 42)—which apes the established model of the authentic "native informant", in the participatory observation mode (coupled with "listening" however, (Kumar 2015: p. 41)—which at the same time, seem to propel classically the informative account of bookkeeping of manners, jokes, rituals and other life practices in a reductively "purposive fieldwork" (p. 43) where women became—or were transformed teleologically, and merely, into becoming—"information machines" and where her native informant played a double with him as a "mother" (Kumar 2015: p. 43); he was a son to her and brother to all other women (and never a lover to anybody—in consonance with research ethics). The repetitive prejudice of this maternal (asexual) metaphor is exhausted at the end of his account where he confesses that the "mother son-bond was a mere "public performance" (Kumar 2015: p. 43), a staging, a spectacle required in all narratologicallly sound ethnographic encounters, and thus is truly—which now appears in all nudity, in immense violation of a community's own affiliated life-world without *seemingness* or pretension. The care-epistemology of the essays under review is put to the winds. The ethnographer introduces a new differentiation. So, the (now familiar) cultural critique against trying to colonize the lifeworld of a community by the instrumentality of a research method and the researcher's dramatization stands too strong and valid—nearly unputdownable, and his gender sensitivity (if that is his care-cognitive clue) falls flat and cannot rescue him from this impasse—wherefrom perhaps—there is no escape and no denying whatsoever.

Normative ethnographic description, even of the feminist kind, also—

> [p]ropagates a sanctioned ignorance, for to continue to even talk about women as "women" (or to assume that the subjects of feminist ethnography are "simply" women) represents a not unfamiliar success-

in-failure. And like the subaltern studies historians, feminists too fail for historic reasons: the displacement of the very epistemological center of feminism (gender) means that we can no longer describe women as women, but as subjects differently and sometimes primarily constituted by race, class, and sexuality (Viseswaran 2003:p. 99).

The real emanicipatory moment could not be grasped by a gendered lens since, subsequent to Kumar's confession of the relationality of mother-informant/son -ethnographer trope, later, "Our relation developed into an human bond where age, sex and gender hierarchies began to crumble" (Kumar 2015: p. 43). If this could be seen as a refusal to not wanting to gravitate towards, and imbibe the maternal metaphoric habitat, then it would be more productive. "In staging series of encounters with individual interlocutors, [I] ask what anthropology looks like when the acts of subjects deflecting or refusing our inquiries form a part of the analysis" (Viseswaran 2003: p. 13). Where the informant-mother, subsequent to the abandonment of the spectacle, even urinated with Kumar's knowledge and consent and it is accountably narrated in this memoir as a scenic-confession; it is a true debilitating moment when the gendered, sexed and age, or cultural territories crashed and were left quivering on the anthropological floor—the field. This *excretionary beyond* establishes a hetero-temporal and hetero-spatial, and hetero- personal form of living which exceeds the boundaries of Kumar's espousal of—non-neutrality or his claim to the successful accessibility of women's worlds or any life world (Kumar 2015: p. 43) whatsoever.

But the point is, if this so happens—that sociologists, cultural theorists, or anthropologists, in their manifest will to perform care-epistemically sensitive feminism in their texts, go against their own grain—unknowingly, and is locked in a 'performative contradiction'; then which is the pathmark, where is the way? Would Women's Studies correct Feminism which is an ideologically closed system—is that possible? Blatant masculinism would be corrected by an emerging Men's Studies? Or indeterminacy is our structured fate, character, and destiny?

MASCULINITY STUDIES AND FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTER-CORRECTION

It inaugurates for good a conflict between gender and genre: Patriarchy vs masculinism, feminism versus women's studies. And such a diagram of resistance easily defies the easy relational filiation that Sanjay Srivastava charts in his essay (Srivastava 2015: pp. 33-36) which while reiterating honour and honour crimes littered throughout the article, does not clarify for once the otherwise valorization of dignity and *human dignity* (steadily, and serially parodied in Nietzsche propelling us to ask—how far does honour lie from dignity); and therefore does not problematize it. Ambedkar was clearer when he wrote that "customs were honoured..*Sati* had been honoured" (Ambedkar 2014: p. 251) but to say "honour is being honoured" is to start at or stay at a tautology. Srivastava instead expresses his interest to make masculinity studies "a supplementary discourse to feminism" [Srivastava 2015: p. 33]. Such gender-correctness (correctness in terms of gender politics) is appalling. If femininity or feminism does not require matriarchy (except in ancient residual anthropology) to reinforce it in place of patriarchy, why would *masculinity studies* require patriarchy—or even masculinism? If patriarchy is the ideologeme, then it is time we announce that masculinity is freed from the ideologeme's symbolic function and can operate autonomously. The same with feminism: in some hands it enjoys a break with the feminist ideologeme and works in peculiar ways so much and so queerly that it remains no more graspable with known, and recognizable motors. This is surreptitiously, even evasively pointed out by Oishik Sarkar in his piece in this Issue 'Doing and Undoing Feminism: A Jurisdictional Journey' (Sarkar 2015: pp. 44-47) when he rightly captures the devolutionary degeneration of feminism which, despite warnings from Indian feminists, has ended up at the doors of *Women's Commission* and is increasingly being deployed by the strategic state actors and any such force with a lip service to stop 'violence against women' with more and more laws, and more laws—as if that is the core and singularly subjective issue; and this strange 'advancement' of the women's

cause, expressed in this severe language, "keeps in place the very identities, binaries and power structures it claims to challenge, but to do that it uses the same vocabulary of transformation that it was founded with" (Sarkar 2015: p. 46). This takes us to the heart of feminist jurisprudence, or gender equality through law [and] for justice without juridification; this is more precarious because men do not need to be feminists anymore, feminism here is always already masculinist, if we are to agree with the primary definitions. To get out of this entrapment, Sarkar's resolution is all the more nervous: Sarkar argues that to be a feminist and do feminism is to bring down feminism from theory and practice distinctions to that of 'conduct' where "feminist critique is lawful conduct"(Sarkar 2015: p. 45). Conduct is the matrix-signifier of his paper. Now what is conduct and what is lawful conduct? If it is legitimate conduct then either it is in accord with the norms and laws of the external social environing world, or it is according to the internal criterial norms of—say, one's profession, vocation or commitment. I think Sarkar means, not the etymologically original "conduit or bringing together" but the mid 16th century meaning of 'management of oneself or behaviour'—Foucault makes much of which (and we'll tell you later how Sarkar cannot escape Foucault in this). However, conduct as standing for such an " ethic of responsibility" (Sarkar 2015: p. 45) is all too acceptable but he does not elaborate on how to rescue feminism from becoming another hegemonic discourse which victimizes both women, men and "normed" others. His good intention is throughout visible but without a concrete analytic and a referendum. Is it simply by inquiring into "… the domestic economies of labour within the [Vasant] Sathe and [Upendra] Baxi households" (Sarkar 2015: p. 46)? No, not really, he seems to mean somewhere that the private practice and the public preaching must meet in the feminist person of the male academic: but would the protection of privacy as a liberal obstacle be glossed over in this urgency? If not, then, how to straddle both and still be informed about a person's feminist conduct? There is no answer. Partly because the use of Sarkar's concept metaphor *conduct*—(which cannot put aside Foucault)—is itself problematic for this occasion. Sarkar wants to designate that while theory and

practice could be impersonally grounded, conduct relies on an Actant or agency. If conduct is then embodied practice, a way of life ("life-conduct" in Karl Jaspers), non-dispositional behavior, and still not a virtue, then it is possible to argue, and argue fatally, that it is well within the thematics of Foucauldian taxonomy of power which has been so severely critiqued by feminists all the way. Conduct is "a mode of action upon the action of others…" [and myself].. "government.. in the very broad sense of guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome." (Foucault cited in McCarthy 1994: p. 263). This, as Tom McCarthy rightly notes, and noted by Nancy Fraser among other feminists, is coextensive with every social relationship and is emptily broad and universally sweeping. Is there a social action which does not influence others or does not modify others' actions? (Ibid.,: p. 263). Tersely put, this is not the answer to the broader crisis to which Sarkar has justifiably referred to: how to avoid the effects of feminist wrongful domination, appropriation and the "strategic games between liberties" (pace Foucault), that men or women feigning feminism and using the language of feminist "conduct", play and oppress others: men, women, and many "others"?

CLOSING REMARKS

Then, after such poisonous non-knowledge, how far does the Issue editors' steering inquiry into the question that triggers this Issue: "Under what conditions can men's speech about women's experiences become credible to feminist politics?" [Chowdhury and Baset 2015: p. 30], and that the Issue is also in place "in order to contend that men can access, understand, and write about women's experience without the disavowal of sex difference" (Chowdhury and Baset 2015: p. 30), stand the scrutiny? This is, or ought to be, hardly the case—which is excellently expressed by an author in a whole book on men in feminism:

> My conclusion then is that feminism should be about gender and the structures of sexism and oppression that arise from hierarchical evaluations of gender, not about the problematic ahistorical category

of woman per se…the core of feminism would be *feminist* positions, not *women's experience.* As a result of this characterization, men can be feminists.. .. and feminism" [would turn out to be something] "we all can do" (Hopkins 1998:pp. 51, 52).

This corrective is welcome. Yes we all *can be* and *can do*, but, and that *but* lingers: to conclude in a more earthly manner, when men or women *be* feminists and *do* feminism in the most tellingly ironic and perversely mimetic manner, feign, pretend and never come unto their own, quite successfully hide behind themselves, all epistemologists and ethicists fail: the specter of a personalytic, pure politics haunts us deliberately—even decisively. This has to be explored personalytically, too . The equation is, veritably, ethical.

Throughout the monograph we have been trying to accomplish it. Thankfully, the recognition of this 'indeterminacy' and 'second thought' in all their poignancy has been recognized in a recent essay (Dalmiya 2015: pp. 7-28) by Professor Dalmiya as well. I think that would be reassuring for many of our friends who have gone for the 2002 model without a revision. Second thoughts are sometimes the best thoughts because they are built on an ethic and erotics of reiteration, yet removal.

NOTES

1. Though Digby's book (Digby 1998) finds a lone mention on page 30 of the Issue under review.
2. Foucaults' *episteme* or the recent emergence of *social epistemology* (deployed even in analytical jurisprudence)are very different disciplinary events and are hardly epistemological in the classical sense.
3. Compare for instance the analytic account here with the *care structure* in Heidegger (where he overrules "care for oneself" among many others)which is reflexive of the complexity with which care is taken up in continental philosophy (See Heidegger 1962: pp. 225-273) for a primary exposition. Also consider how Habermas, in the context of care for the "concrete other", puts the "misgivings" of Carol Gilligan and Seyla Benhabib in place. (Habermas 1993: pp. 153-154).
4. The Issue editors misquote the original author (Dalmiya 2002: p.

37) or do not apprehend her intentions here. The original author uses the word simulation or pretend to in a very different sense, but since I'm discussing the EPW (May 16, 2015) Issue, I shall limit myself to the articles there—the way they appropriate and engage with the paradigm model referred to above. The full unpacking and bringing the Dalmiya 2002 article to a crisis is beyond the scope of this chapter.

However, the stumbling question, that simulation could be "notoriously off the mark" (Dalmiya 2002:p. 37), or, we engage in false, injurious mimetic rivalry, symbolic violence and what could be its antidote has not been answered by the editors or the model author. Here is a classic bombardment on such 'empathetic simulation' our history is full of:

> The history of the Labour Party in Britain is littered with smooth talking ambitious men who climbed to power on the backs of working men and women, took over their language, claimed empathy with their sufferings, and then proceeded to sell them out. The recurrent mistake of working people was to be generous-hearted enough to trust these opportunists—allow them to speak in their name, be grateful for allies from elsewhere, believe that support from any quarter was better than none." (Eagleton 1986: p. 134).

5. Similarly in Habermas and Otto Apel—all Speech Acts have apriori normative presuppositions (intelligibility, truth, sincerity, normative rightness) which foreground all speech acts. In this sense, speaking or listening to *with care* in a particular speech community is clearly secondary.
6. The title Just Care is intended to combine the notion of justice and fairness with both the active and emotional senses of the word 'care'. (Hopkins 2009: p. 13).
7. An initial statement on *coercive care* would be something like this: "Society sometimes has to allow that medical or other kinds of treatment be forced upon patients who desperately need to be treated, but who refuse to undergo the needed treatment voluntarily" (Tannnsjo 1999: p. 1). Such forms—which, reasonably so, have come to be known as 'Coercive care' violates Dalmiya's other principle of "acting in accordance with the point of view of the cared-for herself" (Dalmiya 2002 cited in Chowdhury and Baset 2015: p. 30) and she herself endorses it, "it could well be argued that ignoring the cared -for's desire-of-the-moment is quite consistent with acting for her good" (Dalmiya 2002: p. 38).

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