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Institute of Commonwealth Studies

COLLECTED CONFERENCE PAPERS

on

IRELAND, BRITAIN AND EUROPE

May 1971

The Trustees of the Nuffield Foundation agreed to make a grant to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies to enable it to hold this Conference. The meeting took place at the Institute on 7-8 May 1971 and this volume contains the papers prepared for the Conference and a report on the discussions. The Institute and the conference participants are most grateful to the Trustees for their assistance.

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A REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS

I

The conference was designed to provide a forum in which to speculate on the effects which the United Kingdom and Ireland joining an enlarged European Economic Community might have on two sets of relationships - those between the two states concerned and those between the North and the South of Ireland. The discussions therefore incorporated three viewpoints: the Republic, Northern Ireland, and Britain. The conference brought together academics, journalists, civil servants and businessmen from the main points of the triangle, Dublin, Belfast and London. The six papers prepared for the conference were taken in the order reproduced here, and a list of participants is attached.

Participants from the Republic thought that the successive British applications to join the EEC were 'a happy accident' and 'an extraordinary bonus' which had given the government of Ireland an opportunity to move out of the shadow cast by its more powerful neighbour. They thought that this fact alone had transformed the position of the Republic in international affairs, and that whatever happened to the British and Irish applications, relationships between the constituent parts of the British Isles had been permanently affected. This confidence in the possibility of change gave the conference an optimistic tone.

Its deliberations were naturally affected by its being held at the same time as the meeting of the Ministers of Finance in Brussels, called to discuss the crisis precipitated by Germany's action in closing the exchange markets in order to stop speculation in the Deutsche Mark. Some participants thought that the prospect of joining Europe was now more attractive to Britain and Ireland.

There were two differences of emphasis in the discussions. First, there was some dispute whether the success or failure of the EEC applications would have any significant consequences for the future of Ireland, and its relations with Britain. Some thought that integration in Europe might encourage 'micro-nationalisms', which could easily develop from existing conflicts. It was argued that the tensions between the two halves of Belgium had been increased as a result of EEC membership. Others saw the EEC as an organisation which provided a

unique opportunity for an effective regional policy which would unify the two parts of Ireland in economic terms.

Second, some participants were convinced that only the Irish themselves could overcome the damaging consequences of partition, while others placed great faith in direct bilateral action agreed between Dublin and London. Even those who pressed for an 'Irish solution' developed by negotiations between North and South acknowledged that the British government would have to play a part in shaping the future of any all-Irish institutions.

These two differences were constantly faced in the course of the conference, but not in any sharp or intractable way. It may have been a weakness of the conference that those willing to attend did not express extreme points of view. There were no outspoken representatives of the 'anti-EEC lobby' or of the body of opinion which favours direct rule from Westminster in Northern Ireland.

II

Participants from the Republic emphasised how its social and political life had changed since Britain's first application to join the Common Market. At one stage, this emphasis developed into a claim for republican 'self reliance', which was contrasted unfavourably with the 'welfare mentality' of Northern Ireland. Some maintained that Northern Ireland had a much greater sense of isolation from Europe than the South. It was acknowledged that there were many other factors at work than the 'European movement'.

The changes in Ireland during the 1960s were quoted as evidence in favour of entering Europe with some optimism. Perhaps the most fundamental change was demographic. There had been a 25% increase in the number of marriages and a 20% increase in the number of young people in their 20s. It was pointed out that Irish agriculture could sustain entry into the Common Market, because the age structure of the farming population encouraged the consolidation of holdings and greater efficiency in the future. The growth rate of the Irish economy during the 1960s (4-5%) had been much higher than that of the United Kingdom during the same period. It was this growth rate which had given the basis of an increased prosperity and an accelerated rate of social change. There had also been a transformation in the position of the Church, particularly since the

declarations of the Second Vatican Council.

Participants from Northern Ireland were less convinced that there had been a real transformation in the nature of the political life of the Republic. They were more inclined to point to the limited extent of its 'welfare policies', and to suggest that its political parties had not in fact responded to the challenge of the changes which had undoubtedly taken place. There was a lot of support for the dilemma of Irish politics identified by Professor Lyons in his paper, a contradiction between the rhetoric of nationalism and the serious implementation of policies promoting social justice.

But various indications were given of a common Irish identity which straddled the border. Several speakers pointed to the affinities between the North and South which they thought were more important than the differences. Professor Beckett thought that there were 'two main ways of being Irish'. There was general agreement that Irishmen tended to see their common interests when they were faced with other Europeans.

Yet there remained considerable doubt whether the political and social institutions of Ireland, both North and South, were capable of responding effectively to whatever situation emerged after the EEC applications had been considered. The conference did not have time to select particular institutions for scrutiny, and there was little opportunity to discuss the affinities between the North and South in institutional terms. What did emerge from the discussions was the degree of mutual incomprehension between North and South. Several Dublin officials confessed to knowing procedures of the central government in London better than those of the Stormont government in Belfast.

The conference paid some attention to the question of political parties as suitable vehicles for promoting social change. It was doubted whether the 'catch-all' character of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael could provide the necessary leadership in welfare legislation. Some expressed the hope that the 'move to the left' in Fine Gael since 1964 would mean that this party and the Labour party could promote reform. Concern was also voiced about the vertical split in the society of Northern Ireland which lessened the effectiveness of a Labour or Social Democratic party appealing to both Catholics and Protestants. There seemed to be little hope of

an all-Ireland party system. Some thought that Irish parties were quite unlike those of the rest of Europe, because they had not been concerned with a redistribution of wealth based on rapid economic growth.

Some participants asked for an 'exchange of institutions' between North and South: the North had institutions which the South might copy, and vice-versa. It was suggested that the North could introduce - or perhaps more accurately re-introduce - proportional representation into its electoral system, with a transferable vote on the same lines as the procedures used in the Republic. It might be possible to exploit the potential for 'judicial review' which lay in existing provision for the judiciary in the North to determine whether legislation was repugnant to the Government of Ireland Act. Northern Ireland had the appropriate legal base into which a Bill of Rights could be grafted. Several speakers referred to the possibility of reforming the Stormont legislature, for instance, by introducing some kind of committee system. Three institutions in the North which might be transferred to the South were the Ombudsman, the Commissioner for Complaints, and the Citizens' Advice Bureaux. But the conference acknowledged that it pursued these ideas with what one member called 'a certain lack of clarity'.

All saw value in proposals for extending 'functional co-operation' between the North and South. Senator Robinson's paper was welcomed for outlining some of the possibilities. Other suggestions made included a concession from the North making Derry into a free port for Donegal, and a concession from the South to remove tariffs from northern goods.

Partition itself was not called into question. Indeed, some members argued the case for the Republic 'going it alone' if Britain's application to join the EEC failed. Although some maintained that the Community would not entertain a separate initiative from the government of Ireland, others thought the latter might act independently of Britain, regardless of the consequences for the future of all-Ireland co-operation. But it was admitted that politicians in Ireland nowadays were frequently ahead of public opinion. On both sides of the border, there was constant fear of a 'sell-out' which inhibited politicians from taking up certain causes. The government of Ireland had approached the negotiations to join Europe with a degree of ambivalence. It had, for instance, argued that participation in NATO was not acceptable, because it might be required to guarantee existing

frontiers. One consequence of the application to join the EEC was clear. The Irish application had mobilised opinion and generated considerable discussion south of the border, while there was little interest in the North in the progress of the British application.

It looked as if the 'European Movement' in the Republic, which encompassed representatives of the major parties as well as the principal agricultural and industrial interests, had managed to develop lines of thought which clarified positions to be taken in Irish foreign policy. It was claimed that as a result of discussions within the Movement, the government of Ireland was much more clearly committed to certain policy positions. It was in favour of joining Europe, decidedly sympathetic to notions of supra-nationality; it also supported the détente between the West and the East, and was prepared to enter negotiations for international control over the supply of arms. The Movement could obviously have had no comparable influence in the North.

It was considered highly desirable that British financial support for Northern Ireland should be continued. No one contradicted the view put forward by several participants from Northern Ireland that the events of the past few years had worked a fundamental change in both the North and South of the country. First, responsible authorities in the North recognised the need for a more just society and were committed to a programme of genuine reform. This required moral support from Westminster, but was basically 'home grown'. Second, responsible authorities in the South now respected the right of the North to self-determination. Any London-Dublin bilateral action which compelled the North to move against the will of its inhabitants might lead to civil war.

The conference was therefore interested in the influence which the Republic might exercise as a small power in international affairs. It was agreed that its foreign policy had hitherto been dominated by economic questions or by support for various moral principles which emerged in the Thirld World during the period of decolonisation. But the Republic's field of interest was already broadening out, and if Ireland joined the EEC, a much wider range of domestic groups would come to see their interests as part of the government's foreign policy. Such interests might conflict with the moral objectives to which the government

had been committed. The implications of joining Europe for the formation of an Irish defence policy had still to be worked out. Irish beliefs about neutrality had encouraged confused thinking on security matters.

But whatever degree of influence the Republic achieved, some form of interdependence between Britain and Ireland was unavoidable. Membership of the EEC was unlikely for a long time to affect the basic relationship between adjoining nation states, and future relations between the governments in London and Dublin would inevitably be subject to stress. This would partly be the result of frustrations which naturally arise when their respective domestic audiences find that the issues are difficult to understand. Each side cannot find a simple and coherent approach. It might be possible in the future to shift some of the crucial decisions out of the arena of negotiation between nation states, and place them either in the institutions of an enlarged community or in smaller organs of regional co-operation. But no one thought it wise to count on this possibility.

There was instead a general agreement that conferences such as this are themselves a valuable contribution towards a refinement of the issues involved. The Irish have hitherto been obsessed by their relationship with Britain. An opportunity to discuss Anglo-Irish relations and North-South relations with a British audience is paradoxically a way of breaking away from this preoccupation.

III

It was agreed that there was a good case for future meetings of this kind, to examine in greater detail some of the questions which had been raised and to bring together people from 'both sides of the water'. It was thought that the success of this conference would mean that the participants on future occasions could be drawn from a broader range of interests, and that representatives from the Republic, Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom could be more evenly balanced.

The following topics were suggested for future conferences:

(i) The party system in Ireland: contrast between North and South.
(ii) Welfare policies in Ireland.

(iii) The common administrative tradition: Dublin, Belfast, and London.

(iv) 'Functional co-operation' future relations between North and South Ireland, and between Ireland and the United Kingdom.

THE MAINSPRINGS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN IRELAND

by

F. S. L. LYONS

Although this is a conference devoted to present problems and future prognostications, anyone who knows anything of Ireland will recognize that the organizers of the proceedings showed an unerring instinct in decreeing that the opening contribution should be historical in character, however open to censure they may be for their choice of historian. The past still casts such a heavy shadow over the country, south as well as north of the border, that even to begin, as I have been asked to begin, as long ago as 1945 is to invite the charge of brash contemporaneity. But, though I cannot promise not to go further back in time than that, I shall do my best to keep my excursions into remoter epochs to a minimum.

One exception to this self-denying ordinance must, however, be made at the outset. The title suggested for my paper - the mainsprings of social and political change - may surprise sceptical Irishmen (if the tautology be permitted), who could be pardoned for thinking that for most of recent history continuity, not change, has been the most characteristic feature of both parts of their island and who, if pressed, might even be prepared to admit that "continuity" is a polite euphemism for what James Joyce long ago described more brutally as paralysis. Of course, if we are to look only at the last few years such a description would seem grossly unjust. Change is in the very air we breathe and it would be idle to deny that many things have happened almost overnight which would have been almost unthinkable a decade ago. Nevertheless, though this paper will have to take account of the climate of change in which we all live nowadays, it is necessary to insist from the beginning that the forces of inertia are still very strong in Ireland and that really radical readjustments - whether between the two sections of the country, or between Ireland and Britain, or between Ireland and Europe - will be difficult and almost certainly painful.

The reasons for this resistance to change obviously vary as between north and south, though not, perhaps, so greatly as might be imagined. For it must surely seem to the moderately dispassionate observer that, on both sides of the border, political

parties, and the voters they seek to woo, have until the last few years remained frozen in the attitudes they or their fathers assumed not ten or twenty but fifty years ago. Events in Northern Ireland since 1968 have emphasized this point in that province to the extreme of over-exposure. But those who are pleased to hold forth on the stultifying effects of half a century of unbroken Unionist rule might at the same time reflect upon the sterility of political life in the south, which, for much of that half century, has revolved round the arid theology of the pro- and anti-Treaty positions, and which has turned aside from such bickering only to produce periodic declarations - ringing, if not always entirely convincing - about the wickedness of partition, the sacredness of the Irish language, the desirability of protecting Christian (in effect, Catholic) values, and the need to safeguard the identity of Ireland, "a nation (or, as some would claim, three-quarters of a nation) once again".

In saying this I would not wish to be misunderstood. A concentration upon these themes was as natural and understandable in the politicians of the south as the maintenance of a siege mentality was natural and understandable in the politicians of the north. Just as the latter were obsessed by the dominant questions of the legality and viability of the new state, so the former were blighted by the long-continuing aftermath of the Civil War. But let us be clear about the cost of these preoccupations. In both parts of the island, although problems of economic development, or rather of economic survival, were urgent from the start, we find disappointingly little evidence of constructive thinking about social welfare, or even about the rudiments of social justice. In this, admittedly, they were by no means alone and it would be unfair, as well as anachronistic, to expect any striking initiatives in those early years of insecurity followed by depression. Nevertheless, one has only to look closely at the levels of social security, of housing, of health, of schooling, in the Irish Free State and in Northern Ireland up to the Second World War to realize how far each section was from even remotely realizing the high hopes with which it had set out.

From this failure seriously to tackle the business of providing a decent life for the majority of citizens until after 1945 have sprung two important and related consequences with which we have still to grapple today. First, a tendency towards increasing disillusionment with routine or conventional politics, leading inevitably towards the re-emergence of militancy in various forms. And, second, a growing concern among young people with the distribution of wealth and a mounting impatience to make up for lost time by going as far as possible as quickly as possible.

In Ireland, as elsewhere, what seems to parents a degree of state largesse inconceivable in their own youth, appears to their children merely a convenient base-camp from which to launch their campaign for a much more radical reordering of society. There is always a "generation gap", of course, but I do not think it fanciful to suggest that the new generation on either side of the border is significantly different from its predecessors both in its rejection of the past and in its orientation towards social, and in some cases socialist, goals.

But there still remains the element of inertia which I mentioned earlier. For this new generation is now face to face with parties and institutions which have had time to root themselves deeply in the life of the country and are not easily to be transplanted. At this point, however, although I believe the conflict between past and present to be equally a fact of life in both sections of Ireland, it will be desirable to differentiate between the Republic and Northern Ireland, with the general proviso that for both of them the ending of the war and the Labour victory in the general election of 1945 may be said to have marked a turning-point.

This may seem less obviously true of the south, where Mr. de Valera, already in power for thirteen consecutive years, was to continue at the helm for another three. But it was soon evident that neutral Ireland, which was indeed eager to end its isolation, could not ignore the immense changes that had taken place and were taking place in the world outside. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the war these affected the south in three inter-connected ways:

(i) The wage restraints and shortages of the war years had built up inflationary pressures which, on the short-term, were irresistible.

(ii) Outside Ireland - and inside, also, to a considerable degree - the experience of the war years, combined with the necessities of post-war reconstruction, had greatly increased the role of the state in economic planning, with the result that the pressures upon the Irish government to play a more active part in regenerating the economy were quickly intensified. A start had indeed been made in this direction quite soon after independence, but the period of maximum expansion in the number and importance of the so-called state-sponsored bodies came in the years following

the war.

(iii) Since welfare became an integral part of post-war reconstruction in Britain - and, of course, in Northern Ireland as well - the demand became clamant in the south for an overhaul of the exiguous social services inherited from the inter-war period. So strong indeed was the demand that the key reforms in this field actually antedated the economic expansion which might have been thought to be their sine qua non. The latter was delayed until some fifteen years after the war, whereas the main edifice of the enlarged social services was constructed between, roughly, 1944 and 1952.

Yet, although factors such as these may have served as "mainsprings" of social change (and therefore also of political change), they were subject to certain limiting circumstances. Not all of these can be listed here, but the following were probably among the more important:

1. An unfavourable age-structure, of which the most striking features are a legacy from a distant past. These include a high fertility rate, a low marriage rate, and a comparatively late age of marriage. Although this situation may now quite rapidly be changing, it has obviously had its effects upon the framing of policy, not least because of the large number of single people who make a disproportionately heavy demand on the social services, especially in the older age groups.

2. The mobility of the population. As in the second half of the nineteenth century, so in the first half of the twentieth, emigration has remained a social fact of high importance - amounting to over 800,000 in the period 1926-1961, of which nearly half occurred in the single decade 1951-1961. Even though this trend too has begun to be reversed, its persistence up to very recent times has had a number of effects on the domestic situation of which two are particularly relevant. It has resulted in a steady outflow of able-bodied young men and women; and the total exodus has, in general, more than offset the normally very considerable natural increase of the population. The consequence has been that a rather small working population has had to support a rather large dependent group. In the mid-1960s it was reckoned that 100 people of working age were supporting 73 dependants, compared with 48 in Germany or 52 in Britain. Of course, if a counter-swing develops in the near future, the demand for more houses, schools, doctors, etc. - to say nothing of jobs - may naturally be expected to increase; there are signs, indeed, that this has

already begun to happen and it is a process which may accelerate very quickly.

3. The exceptionally low average income per head, at least measured by the more advanced West European standards. As recently as 1963 this was estimated at £240 per head per annum. No doubt it has since considerably improved, but at that time it amounted to little more than half the figure for Britain, Germany or France. The bearing of such a low figure both upon taxable capacity and upon need of social services hardly needs to be underlined.

4. The persistence of economic ties with Britain, and the country's general dependence upon international trade, have meant that economic conditions have been much affected by external factors, especially by fluctuations in the prices of both exports and imports, with all that this entails for the national income and therefore for the availability of funds for welfare. This has led to the slow and unpalatable realization (so unpalatable, indeed, that many in the south still refuse to swallow it) that political independence has been to a considerable extent eroded by economic interdependence. In this respect, it has made relatively little difference whether the constitutional status of the twenty-six counties has been the dominion of Mr. Cosgrave, the "dictionary" republic of Mr. de Valera, or the juridical republic of Mr. Costello. It is true, no doubt, as Dr. FitzGerald points out in his paper, that independence, carrying with it tariff autonomy, made possible the development of a significant manufacturing sector where almost none existed before, but the reverse side of this coin, as Dr. FitzGerald also shows, has been the harsh impact of British agricultural policy upon Irish farmers. In short, the over-riding impression one has is that in one form or another economic interdependence whether with Britain or with Europe is likely to remain an important factor affecting the level of prosperity in the Republic and, by definition, the degree of welfare it can afford.

5. A further element which, though more imponderable, also exercises a restraining influence upon progress has been the social conservatism of the country. Partly, it is clear, this has been due to the predominantly rural pattern of society which changed little for generations and which contributed both to the low income per head of the population and to that population's reluctance to contemplate change, whether in the structure of the family or in the management of the farm. We are told that all this is rapidly changing; no doubt it is, and no doubt the mass media will ensure that Ireland shares in the general movement away from long-established usages and conventions, but it is legitimate to wonder whether an inertia hitherto so deep-seated will really vanish quite so quickly as the proponents of progress affirm.

6. No less important - and no less imponderable - in

determining the rate, or absence, of progress in welfare has been the Catholic church, whose influence at different times and in various hands has been cast now in this scale, now in that. It is indisputable that its ubiquity in the work of education and of charity has relieved the state of some of the obligations that normally fall on the public sector, and it needs also to be said that individual church leaders have quite frequently played a prominent part in the formulation and execution of social policy. On the other hand, it is equally indisputable that in certain aspects of welfare - notably in matters relating to the health of mothers and children - the insistence by the church on the sanctity of the family has created formidable problems and precipitated one major crisis in church-state relations. It is only fair to add, however, that the impact upon Ireland of the Second Vatican Council has been most marked and that the role of the church in society is more widely and critically debated than ever before.

7. Conservatism, it is hardly necessary to insist, has been political as much as it has been religious or social. The lines of demarcation between the two largest parties have for most of their history been rigidly engraved by the Civil War, and although the echoes of that tragedy may at last be dying away it is still not easy to use with confidence the ordinary terminology of parliamentary politics - to say, for example, of Fianna Fáil that it is a party of the left, or of Fine Gael that it is a party of the right. They might both best be regarded, in Professor Chubb's phrase, as "catch-all" parties, in perpetual orbit about the centre, Fine Gael inclining somewhat to the right, Fianna Fáil inclining somwhat (but rather less) to the left, though embracing also a radical section, and even that leftward inclination being more characteristic of its early years before the sweets of office and the temptations of technocracy had softened its revolutionary austerity. Given the imposing respectability and staidness of these "catch-all" parties, it might have been expected - especially in view of the (mainly posthumous) veneration of James Connelly - that Labour would have supplied an alternative sufficiently left-wing to attract those alienated by the bourgeois characteristics shared by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. Yet this has barely begun to happen. It was only as recently as 1966 that the Labour party braced itself to adopt a distinctively socialist programme, and only in the election of 1969 that it began to attract into its ranks a small group of intellectuals capable of providing it with a coherent ideology. Until this transformation occurred, the louder the Labour party leaders had paid lip-service to Connelly's ideals the more nervously they had seemed to back away from implementing them. For this many reasons could be advanced, if time allowed; here it must suffice to mention the absence of an industrial proletariat, the party's reluctance to incur the hostility of the church, personal rivalries among leaders and friction between trade unions, plus the important fact that, as both the main parties when in power had freely indulged in a kind of pragmatic socialism - mainly

through the creation of state-sponsored bodies - the orthodox rallying-cry of public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange was rather less available to Labour than in other capitalist countries.

To the historian the past history and present preoccupation of the three principal parties (for, although proportional representation usually ensures a fairly wide spectrum of opinion in the Dáil, the three I have mentioned at present monopolise the scene) pose an interesting problem. Eventually, it is the problem of how far any of them will find it possible in the immediate future to address themselves simultaneously to three distinct questions to which the answers may or may not be mutually contradictory. First, there still remains - battered but seemingly immovable - the question of partition. Next, there is the question of how to meet, or else to contain, the mounting demand for increased attention to social welfare, with the implication behind it of a much more extensive redistribution of income than has hitherto been the case, and behind that again the growing realization of the urgent necessity so to raise productivity as to ensure that there will be more income to redistribute. And, finally, there is the question of how to deal with both these intractable issues in an international environment which is changing, or threatening to change, very rapidly and which offers in about equal measure opportunity, challenge and hazard. But, to understand the kind of tensions these triple pressures are likely to cause, we have to look some way back into the past, and especially to what I would regard as the inner ambiguity of the revolutionary situation which developed in and after 1916.

Inherent in that situation was a potential conflict between nationalism and socialism. For historic reasons largely connected with the Anglo-Irish war and the two subsequent hammer-blows of the Civil War and the division of the country, this conflict went underground and has scarcely even now re-emerged into the light of day. Yet, as we have already seen, since 1945 all parties have been more or less committed to the realization of a welfare state on the model of what was created in Britain during and after the first post-war Labour administration. Carping critics might describe the Irish welfare state as a caricature of the British, but this would be both unfair and inaccurate. It is perfectly true, of course, that the benefits available to citizens of the Republic are markedly below those obtaining in the United Kingdom and in Northern Ireland, but this is entirely to be expected in view of the disparity in the resources available. In intent, however, the welfare "revolution" in the Republic has been very similar to that achieved by its more affluent neighbour and the points of emphasis - social

insurance, health, education and housing - have essentially been the same.

This revolution is clearly a very different one from the political revolution that ushered in the new state, and the historian confronting it must be conscious of a certain irony. Much of the rhetoric of party politics in the past fifty years has been concerned with the traditional goals of nationalism, and the likelihood that the two most central of these - the ending of partition and the preservation of a Gaelic-Catholic culture - may turn out to be fundamentally incompatible has in no way affected the fervour with which they have been proclaimed. Yet the real changes that have taken place in Irish society, both the economic expansion of the last decade and the development of the social services, point in quite a different direction. They have not created a socialist state, nor are they likely to do so in the immediately foreseeable future. But they do suggest that a good deal of the debate in the years ahead will be in language more reminiscent of Connolly than of Pearse. How quickly will the parties react to this new preoccupation of the voters with social gains, whether these be registered as "progress" or as "justice"? How readily, one wonders, will they adjust to the realization that patriotism is not enough, or at least that it has to be redefined in contemporary terms? And how easily will they be able to make that adjustment within the context of the rapidly changing international environment and of the even more explosive national situation? The question of how they may react to the changes in the international environment prompted by the imminence of the Common Market I leave to the more expert attention of my colleagues. But in order to understand more clearly the explosiveness of the national situation it is necessary to say something about contemporary developments in Northern Ireland.

I do not want in this brief résumé to attempt an analysis of recent events which are, indeed, so recent that the historian has every reason to refrain from comment. What I do want to suggest is that, although we are all wearily familiar with some of the more obvious differences between the two Irelands which those events have emphasized, we are apt for this very reason to lose sight of the amount the two Irelands have in common. I do not, of course, wish to minimize the differences, but at least the pitiless publicity to which Northern Ireland has now for so long been exposed should make it unnecessary to do more than remind the reader of the province's salient characteristics - of the experiment in devolution which has given the local parliament considerable powers, but has left the ultimate responsibility with Westminster; of the unbroken rule at Stormont for the last fifty years of a Unionist party still deeply attached to the British

connection; of the delicate religio-political balance which is far more complex and deep-seated than Englishmen even yet can fully comprehend; of the existence of long-established but struggling industries with a high rate of unemployment. And, in addition to all this, any assessment of the situation in the north has further to take account not only of the extent to which Northern Ireland, despite its smallness and poverty, has been able, through the British connection, to achieve a pattern of welfare on all fours with that of the rest of the United Kingdom and markedly superior to that of the Republic, but also of the substantial economic assistance it has received from Britain, lacking which it is difficult to see how it could have survived without a catastrophic lowering of its standard of living.

Yet, although these various characteristics have obviously separated the north very sharply from the south and constitute, I suppose, the main obstacles to the reunification of the country, or even to the establishment of better relations between the two sections, Northern Ireland, like the Republic, is irrevocably the product of Irish history and bears some of the same imprints. I will restrict myself to suggesting a few of the more obvious illustrations:

(1) In the north, as in the south, there is a similar preoccupation with the past. These pasts may be thought to be quite different (though, in fact, they are inextricably entangled) but the obsessive concern is common to both sections and the "style" of politics on both sides of the border, with its frequent and flamboyant use of rhetoric and of symbols drawn from fifty years ago - or three hundred years, or seven hundred years - has a curious family resemblance.

(2) The still prevalent conservative attitudes in both sections also bear a family resemblance whether one thinks of the conservatism as social, or religious, or both. It is sometimes forgotten how much of Northern Ireland is still countryside, how many farms are small family concerns, and how very closely agricultural legislation followed the same pattern in north and south in the first decade after partition. And while it is true that agriculture in the north has gained enormously from British price-supports given during and since the war, changing in the process almost out of recognition compared with agriculture in the south, no one who is at all familiar with what one might call the social anthropology of the two areas could fail to be struck by the similarity of both communal and individual attitudes.

(3) Religious influences may be said to have operated in somewhat the same way. We hear so much of sectarian strife in Northern Ireland that we don't pause often enough to reflect that

although the strife may be sectarian because sects are identified with ancestral rivalries, with political animosities, and with economic status, it is also sectarian because attachment to religion happens to be both usual and genuine. Indeed, the very tautness of the tensions between the different religions may be a factor in keeping those religions significantly free of the relaxations and accommodations to which churches of all denominations have increasingly been prone elsewhere. Generally speaking, in Northern Ireland a religion in full vigour has meant a socially conservative religion, and this remains broadly true whether one is thinking of Catholics, of Anglicans, or of the various shades of Presbyterianism. Of course, we know only too well that on the small, enclosed stage of the six counties religious intensity can issue in religious bigotry, but the history of religious toleration in the south holds out at least some hope that this friction might diminish if the two religious Irelands found themselves side by side in a larger and essentially irreligious entity. Pearse once wrote that the Orangeman with a rifle was to him a less ridiculous figure than the nationalist without one. A modern observer may perhaps be permitted to vary this dictum (without too much intent to parody it) by remarking that to most Irishmen an Orangeman with a bible may come to seem a much more acceptable figure than an Englishman, or any other foreigner, without one, though this depends, of course, on how far religion in Ireland will continue to be capable of resisting the erosions that have diminished it elsewhere.

(4) Although the economies of the two section have diverged so widely of late years, it remains the case that both have had a similar demographic history, that both have known serious problems of unemployment, and that for both emigration has been for much of their modern existence a necessary safety-valve. I am not, needless to say, implying that a shared heritage of economic hardship is likely to make north and south easier bedfellows - the fierce and sometimes violent competition for jobs inside Northern Ireland itself would quickly give the lie to that. What I am saying is that in the long run it may turn out that the very special dispensation under which the northern economy has functioned since the war has introduced a distortion into the development of that section, differentiating it much more sharply from the south than would otherwise have been the case, or was even the case before 1945. If, as Dr. FitzGerald suggests in his paper, one possible effect of Common Market membership would be to restore the balance between the two economies, or at least between the two agricultures, then this in time might serve, as he also says, to enhance "the sense of common identity of Irish people on both sides of the border".

(5) This may be the place at which to suggest that what now appears to be a decisive difference between north and south may in the years to come appear in quite another light. Much has been said

and written in the last two years about discrimination in Northern Ireland and, as we all know, an elaborate programme of reforms is in course of being implemented in an effort to remove the grievances of the Catholic minority. But to the historian the most interesting thing about the present explosive situation is that it has taken so long to reach the point of explosion. And he will observe with special interest that the impotence of the forces of the left in Northern Ireland has traditionally rivalled the impotence of the forces of the left in the south. Given the existing industrial base in the north, this may seem very odd to outsiders, but there are several possible explanations.

One may be that, despite elements of discrimination, the coming of the welfare state has markedly improved standards of living among the population as a whole - to such an extent, indeed, that it could be argued that what we are now witnessing in Northern Ireland is an upsurge of protest springing not from total deprivation (real revolutions seldom erupt from the lowest depths) but from the frustrations of an enfranchisement which is genuine, but has for too long been partial. A second explanation, surely, must be the continuance of that social conservatism I have already mentioned and which for most of the modern history of Northern Ireland has been at least as pronounced among Catholics as among Protestants, if not more so. The persistence of deep, sometimes fanatical, religious divisions must be accounted a third explanation, and to this religious fanaticism must also be added a political primitivism which again recalls the political primitivism of the south. By this I mean not merely the deep-seated tendency in both sections for all main parties constantly to hark back to stereotyped and highly simplified versions of the origins of the two states, but to continue believing, decade after decade, that these increasingly mythological interpretations are highly relevant to the contemporary situation. Thus, just as southern parties have been hypnotized by the Civil War, so northern parties have methodically worked themselves into periodic frenzy over the great, over-riding question as to whether or not Northern Ireland has any right to exist as a separate entity. Traditionally, this has been the dominant issue at elections, and he would be a bold prophet who would affirm that it is likely to be any less so in the foreseeable future.

Yet, here too we may be at a parting of the ways. For it is possible to argue that just as the increasing preoccupation of parties and voters in the south with social reform marks a significant break with the past, so the significant break with the past in the north may involve not just the winning of concessions to satisfy an aggrieved minority but a turning away from old groupings and allegiances towards some new complex of which the outlines are as yet only faintly discernible. One indication of such regrouping may be the recent formation of the Social Democratic and Labour party. Another may be the evident cracks that have appeared in the surface of the Unionist party; never in

any real sense a monolith, it seems at the moment nearer the fissure than at any previous period in its history. If this, indeed, should turn out to be the case, then who knows what the future may hold?

(6) One final point. The crisis in Northern Ireland, and its reverberations in the Republic, have hitherto been contained within a broadly constitutional framework. But, here again, an element of similarity between the two sections asserts itself. The plain fact is that in each of them, at intervals during the past half-century, the politics of the gun have threatened to take over and that governments north and south of the border have been driven to safeguard their existence by the use of special powers of one kind or another. Within the last year we have seen enough in Belfast and in Dublin to suggest that the old militant tradition, so far from being dead, is perhaps more aggressive than it has been for a long time. Nothing in the historian's experience equips him to predict what the outcome of this recrudescence of violence may be, but this historian cannot end his paper without expressing a foreboding and asking a question. The foreboding is that, if the present crisis is allowed to smoulder on in the old triangular pattern, what has happened before may happen again and we shall have an explosion on a large scale, with incalculable consequences. And the question, to which I hope my colleagues will supply the answer, is this: Is it just remotely possible that the way out of this impasse may lie through involvement in a European community which might at one and the same time allow the old triangular mould to be broken and reduce insular quarrels to less lethal and more manageable proportions?

IRELAND: THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 1980

by

MARTIN O'DONOGHUE

The purpose of this paper is to speculate on the possible situation which might obtain in Ireland by 1980, should Britain and Ireland both join the EEC in 1973. I should emphasise that the discussion is confined to economic aspects and to the impact which these might have on development of social services; it specifically excludes any of the political or wider social factors which may be operative. Finally I have, as suggested, attempted to contrast the expected pattern for the Republic of Ireland with that for Northern Ireland, though naturally my references to the latter must be rather sketchy.

Effects on Irish/U.K. Trade

Membership of the EEC might be expected to alter the pattern of economic activity between the U.K. and the Republic. At present, the bulk of the Republic's trade is with the U.K. - in 1970 66% of its exports, and 54% of imports were so accounted for. When allowance is made on the import side, for commodities such as oil and tobacco, which cannot be supplied by the U.K., it will be realised that a large fraction of the total available trade is confined to the two countries.

One question is whether this high level of Republic/U.K. trade is likely to be maintained in the 1980's. General arguments on the effects of customs unions would suggest not. The elimination of trade barriers with the other Community members would be expected to make the latter more attractive both as suppliers of imports and as markets for exports, and this attraction would apply to both the U.K. and the Republic. Hence the Republic would be looking to the Community for imports while simultaneously the U.K. might be diverting some of its exports from Ireland to the Community, so that both demand and supply factors would suggest a fall in the U.K. share of the Republic's imports. Similarly, the Republic would be diverting some of its exports from the U.K. to the Community, at a time when the U.K. was increasing its imports from the Community, implying a fall in the U.K. share of the Republic's exports.

When account is taken of the detailed pattern of Republic/U.K. trade, some possible moderation in the application of these general tendencies suggests itself. Insofar as the Republic's imports are concerned, it would appear that the Community would become more competitive, with the abolition of tariff disadvantages, in the case of many products supplied from Great Britain. In contrast, it is probable that there would be a growth in trade between the Republic and Northern Ireland, both because of their proximity and the fact that in several sectors output in the two areas is complementary rather than competitive (some illustrations are given in Dr. FitzGerald's paper).

However, since trade with Northern Ireland at present forms a comparatively small fraction of the Republic's total trade with the U.K. (roughly 10% for imports and 20% for exports), it is probable that by 1980 greater imports from Northern Ireland would serve to moderate, rather than completely arrest the expected fall in the U.K. share of imports.

In the case of exports from the Republic, it is less clear that there would be in fact any fall in the proportion going to the U.K. The probability of an increase in trade with Northern Ireland has already been mentioned. As regards trade with Britain, the agricultural and industrial sectors, which each account for approximately half the total, may be separately distinguished. In principle, Community markets would open to Irish agricultural products, but in practice since Britain would be the main net importer of agricultural produce, there would continue to be strong attractions to marketing the main Irish products, beef and dairy produce, in Britain. In the case of industrial products, there would be more presumption in favour of selling to Community markets, but even here it should be noted that both older firms, and many of the new enterprises established over the past decade, are geared to selling the bulk of their output in Britain.

The suggestion is then that actual market conditions may mean that the fall in the U.K. share of the Republic's trade would not be very pronounced by 1980. However, even if this proves to be the case, it would still be true to state that there would be a considerable reduction in the Republic's dependence on the U.K., because by then, the U.K. would be only marginally more attractive either as an import supplier or as an export outlet, so that the costs of diverting the Republic's trade to the Community would be much lower than they are in present

circumstances.

Apart from direct trade, there are of course, other important economic links between the U.K. and the Republic, and these too would doubtless be affected by EEC membership. British investment has, for example, played an important part in Irish development. Many of the firms created by the tariff protection of the 1930's were offshoots of British organisations, designed to cater for the insulated Irish market. More recently, of the export-oriented firms attracted to the Republic by tax concessions and other incentives, 150 of a total of 350 foreign-based projects set up in the 1960's, were British. Apart from industry, British investment has also been significant in commercial property development, and to a lesser extent has been a feature of service sectors such as hotels and retailing. EEC membership might be expected to bring a greater degree of Continental interest and activity in these spheres of the Republic's economy.

Insofar as external investment by the Republic is concerned, the only traditional flow of significance has been the tendency for financial institutions and private investors to channel their funds through London. Some diversion to Continental markets might be assumed by 1980, but since the amounts involved would be negligible in relation to the total funds in these markets, such movement would not warrant any exploration here.

The general picture then is that EEC membership should reduce the existing high degree of interdependence between the economy of the Republic and that of the U.K.

The Geographical Pattern of Development in Ireland

In the absence of specific policies to counteract such tendencies, the natural trend has been for economic activity to concentrate in the Eastern portion of Ireland. There is no reason to expect that membership of the EEC would do anything to weaken this tendency - if anything it might serve to accentuate it.

To counteract this 'pull' towards the East coast,

governments in both the Republic and Northern Ireland have operated policies to boost the weaker regions. Within the EEC such policies would continue to be necessary. However, while the general principle of regional policies is recognised and accepted within the Community, the precise form which actual policies may take is not yet decided.

It is already clear from the discussions which have taken place within the Community, that some changes in the format of existing policies will be necessary for the Republic. For example, the EEC has laid emphasis on the 'transparency' principle, that is, the principle that any aids given to areas or individual projects, should be clearly identifiable. This concept would appear to rule out policies such as tax concessions, where the precise value of the benefit may not be readily apparent.

What is not clear so far, is the range of permissible regional objectives within the EEC. The relevance of this aspect can be readily illustrated.

Thus, for example, the regions to be aided might be defined as being the existing designated areas within the Republic, and the policy target might be to ensure that these areas achieve a growth rate in output comparable to that of the rest of the country. Whether or not this would produce acceptable results would clearly depend on the performance of the more advanced regions of the country. The dominant view, is that, on balance, the Republic would benefit from EEC membership - the reasons for this are set out in Garret FitzGerald's paper - in which case a satisfactory growth performance could be expected for the economy, and the regional policy stated above would ensure a satisfactory geographical distribution of this growth.

However, there is also the fear held by a minority, that EEC membership could trigger off a decline in both agricultural and industrial employment. Were this to happen, the regional policy outlined would be of little benefit since there might be little or no growth to distribute among the regions.

One way to guard against a pessimistic outcome of this latter type would be to have a wider definition of 'region'.

Thus if the Republic as a whole were to be regarded as a region within the EEC, it would be possible to define appropriate policy objectives both for it, as well as for the 'sub-regions' within it. It is not suggested that equality of growth with other EEC members would constitute an acceptable regional objective for the Republic, since this could result in either too high a level of emigration or might preclude it completely.

It would not be appropriate to attempt here any discussion of the probable form which regional policies within the EEC may take. Instead we may assume that they will be adequate, in conjunction with the general results of membership, to produce an adequate overall growth rate, and an acceptable geographical distribution of this growth.

Similar results may be assumed for Northern Ireland, although in their case there is technically a difference in the definition of regions. Northern Ireland is regarded as a region in the context of U.K. regional policy, and this will presumably continue to be the case. Sub-regional policies would continue to be required within this region, and are assumed to be admissable in an EEC context.

North/South Development Trends

During the 1960's, Northern Ireland and the Republic had a similar growth rate per head of approximately 4% annually. In the absence of a comprehensive regional policy, it might be expected that the Republic would have a somewhat faster growth rate than Northern Ireland in the 1970's. This because of the beneficial impact which EEC membership is expected to have on agriculture - an industry which accounts for 20% of output in the Republic compared to about 5% in Northern Ireland. However, since the two areas both need continued growth to reduce unemployment and emigration, it may be assumed that regional policies will have the effect of producing similar growth rates in the two areas.

Apart from the expected similarity of growth rates for both North and South, there is the question as to what this growth rate would be. Majority opinion in the Republic would expect a somewhat faster growth rate than that experienced in the 1960's,

minority opinion a slower one. We may accordingly use the same figure as being a reasonable compromise.

Such a growth performance would be expected to result in a moderate increase in employment and population for both North and South. Emigration would still occur in both areas at a significant, but not severe level.

Insofar as living standards are concerned, this predicted growth performance would mean that personal income levels in the two areas would continue to be somewhat similar, with the tendency towards higher incomes in the North still present, though to a less pronounced extent. On the prices front, EEC membership would eliminate the present gap between the higher prices of some agricultural products in the South, and the lower prices of the North.

Some price differences could of course continue to exist by 1980 because of differences in tax structures and tax rates between the two areas. At present, for example, taxes on items like motor-cars and beer are somewhat higher in the Republic, whereas taxes on tobacco and spirits appear to be higher in Northern Ireland. Other differences also exist because of the contrast between the structure of purchase taxes in the North and of wholesale and retail taxes in the South.

In both areas the existing systems of general sales taxes are being replaced in the next two years by the EEC system of value-added taxes. However, although both areas would have the same system, there is, as yet no requirement on EEC members to have similar rates of tax, so that it is possible that some differences between North and South would still obtain in 1980. But, it is unlikely that such differences would be very great, since people would be free to shop in the lower-tax area.

We may conclude then that by 1980, there would be a high degree of price comparability between the two areas, though not necessarily complete price equality.

In the case of direct taxes, such as income tax, the present position is that there are some variations between North and South in the amount of tax charged on any given level of income or wealth but in the majority of cases these are not very pronounced. There is no reason to expect that this position would change significantly by 1980 - again the general expectation would be a tendency towards reducing the areas of difference.

The final element to assess in contrasting living standards, and in many respects the most complex one, is that of trends in government spending. At present there are significant differences between Northern Ireland and the Republic in many items of such spending - social welfare benefits, education, health services and housing are perhaps the most obvious examples.

Developments in public spending depend both on the relevant policy objectives of governments and on the availability of tax revenues to finance them. It is clearly not feasible to discuss the probable trends in policies here, instead we may simply assume that the Republic would wish to provide broadly comparable levels of public services to those of Northern Ireland.

This then places the emphasis on the availability of funds. This availability is in general geared to the growth rate of the economy, since it is the growth of output and real incomes which raises the taxable capacity of a country. We have already indicated an expected growth rate for the Republic of 4%. For Northern Ireland, we need to know the expected growth rate for the U.K. as a whole, since developments in public services for Northern Ireland are geared to overall U.K. policy decisions.

It is outside the scope of this paper to embark on an assessment of the U.K. economy. Instead, we may extend the assumption used above for Ireland, that the 1970's growth rate will be similar to that of the 1960's. This would put the U.K. figure in the 3% region - say 1% below that for the Republic.

On this assumption the 1970's would see a faster rate of improvement in government services in the Republic than in Northern Ireland. This should mean that by 1980 for example, there would be negligible differences in the level of social welfare

payments, comparatively small gaps in the level of educational, health and other services.

The 1980's Outlook

Given entry to the EEC in 1973 and a transitional stage lasting up to 1978, it would be unreasonable to expect that the full effects of membership would have worked themselves out by 1980. Thus, it may be expected that the future sketched above of a lessening in the Republic's economic dependence on Britain, and of a reduction in the economic disparities between North and South in Ireland,would be continued in the post-1980 period. This expectation is reinforced by the movement towards harmonisation of economic and social policies among Community members which should be well under way by that time. Already there exists in outline form, a degree of understanding among the 'Six' as to the nature of these harmonisation measures. Whatever their final form may be, a common set of policies in these areas would serve to further diminish any remaining disparities in material well-being among the members of the EEC.

Propositions

1. EEC membership would reduce the Republic's economic dependence on the U.K. and the real extent of this reduction would be greater than that indicated by trade or other economic statistics.

2. In the EEC there would continue to be a need for regional policies in Ireland - both for the area as a whole, and for sub-regions within it.

3. Wage rates and prices would tend towards equality in both Northern Ireland and the Republic by 1980. Some differences could still however remain.

4. Taxation levels in the two areas should be similar in 1980. By that date too a reduction in existing disparities of social services and other public sector items would be expected.

5. This trend towards comparability would be expected to continue in the post-1980 period.

IRELAND AND THE EEC

by

GARRET FITZGERALD

I. Historical Background - Economic Basis of Partition

EEC membership will have a very great impact on the Irish economy. Its effects will, however, be quite different North and South of the Border. This reflects the very different shapes of the two Irish economies.

The division of Ireland in 1920, consolidated by the Treaty of 1921 and the Boundary Settlement of 1925, was no doubt motivated primarily by politico-religious considerations. Nevertheless, it reflected a genuine difference in the economic situation of the two parts of the country.

Partly because of greater security of land tenure in the north-east, and partly perhaps because of the impact of religious differences on economic attitudes, this area developed during the eighteenth century both a more prosperous agricultural sector and a stronger industrial arm. Industrialization in the north-east was also helped by legislation at the end of the eighteenth century favouring the linen industry, which had natural geographical advantages in the north-east. Moreover, the fortuitous development of shipbuilding in Belfast in the mid-nineteenth century provided a basis for the development of other types of engineering industries in the Belfast area.

By contrast, in much of the rest of Ireland insecurity of tenure discouraged good husbandry in agriculture, and industry, whose development in the eighteenth century had been adversely affected by British policies, lacked the vitality to prosper under the free trade conditions of the 19th century.

Consequently, by 1920 the north-east had an industrial economy closely linked to the UK and benefiting from world-wide

free trade. The rest of the country, on the other hand, lacked an adequate industrial base, and could hope to secure a measure of industrialization only through the operation of protection policies which prevailing political theories precluded within the territory of a single sovereign State.

These differences provided the economic basis for the division of the country, the economic interests of the Republic requiring at least a period of political sovereignty and industrial protection, while those of the north-east required a continuing link with the UK.

II. Changes in Economic Situation North and South Since 1920

A half-century of independence has changed significantly the economic situations in both parts of Ireland.

In the north-east, which remained a part of the United Kingdom as "Northern Ireland", the link with the UK has been consolidated by the impact of the UK agricultural policy, and especially the deficiency payment system, and by the considerable measure of subsidization of Northern Ireland social welfare benefits by the UK. Financial benefits have also accrued through the availability of UK funds for infrastructural investment and for industrial promotion, on a scale that Northern Ireland might not have been able to afford from its own resources. Arguably, however, the self-reliance of this community, which was a notable feature before 1920, has been weakened by the scale and extent of financial dependence on the UK.

In the rest of Ireland, now the Republic of Ireland, independence made possible industrial protection. As a result, a significant and highly diversified manufacturing sector of the economy was developed and industrial employment more than doubled. Some of this new employment is vulnerable to the freeing of trade but, especially in the past decade, most firms have been preparing to meet free trade conditions, and only about 5% of manufacturing employment is expected to be affected by redundancy in the event of completely free trade within an enlarged EEC.

On the other hand, agriculture in the Republic has suffered severely from UK agricultural policies; unlike agriculture in Northern Ireland, it has not been assisted to any significant degree by UK deficiency payment schemes, to which it has access only marginally. As a result, agriculture in the Republic has been relatively stagnant, output rising by only 6% in the eight years from 1961 to 1969. As agriculture still accounts directly for almost 20% of domestic output, and for 27% of employment, this has had a very adverse effect on the expansion of national output and employment in the Republic.

III. Trade Relations Between UK and Republic - Impact of Free Trade Area

Trade relations between the Republic and the United Kingdom have been regulated by a number of Trade Agreements since 1938. In 1965 a Free Trade Area Agreement was signed under which the Republic is to free the bulk of its industrial trade vis-à-vis the UK by 1975. Exceptions are the majority of food processing industries, the jute industry and the motor vehicle assembly industry - accounting between them for about a quarter of manufacturing output in the Republic - as well as a further group of industries to be determined by 30th June next, which could extend the area of exemption to a further 10% of Irish manufacturing.

In return for this partial freeing of industrial trade by the Republic, the UK gave some agricultural concessions, whose value has been estimated at £3 - 4 m., and gave guarantees of improved security of access, as a result of which future UK import levies will not apply to Irish agricultural products. In addition, the UK eliminated most of the few remaining duties on Irish manufactures entering the UK. The only significant beneficiary of these latter concessions has been that part of the Irish textile and clothing industries exporting to the UK goods containing synthetic fibres, whose exports have been rising by an additional £2m. a year as a result of this Agreement.

The balance of this Agreement is estimated to be in favour of the UK, which is expected to gain about twice as much at the expense of Irish industry in the Republic's home market as Ireland will secure in additional imports to the UK by 1975. In addition, a diversion of trade at the expense of other suppliers of the

Irish market, whose exports will be eroded in favour of the UK as a result of the bigger preferential margins arising from the elimination of tariffs in UK products, will also benefit the UK to an extent difficult to determine.

It could, however, be argued that the balance of the Agreement is somewhat restored by the fact that it exempts Irish agricultural exports from future UK import levies which might otherwise have been imposed on these products; this is rather a notional gain, however.

The income levels of Irish farmers are exceptionally low because of the fact that the bulk of Irish agricultural production has to be sold in the UK market, where a "cheap food" policy prevails, and because of the fact that, with a very limited exception in respect of a part of the meat trade, farmers in the Republic have been excluded from the benefits of the UK deficiency payment system. Moreover, because of the disparity in size between the two countries - the UK has almost twenty times the Republic's population and thirty times its national income - bilateral trading relationships between the two countries are inevitably unsatisfactory, from the Irish viewpoint.

On the other hand, Northern Ireland, while benefiting economically to the fullest extent possible from participation in the UK economy, seems to have lost some of the self-reliance which was a notable feature of this part of Ireland when the country was a unit, with or without a separate Irish parliament. Moreover, the North, to a far greater extent than the Republic, is cut off psychologically from Europe because its external relations are channelled through London.

It is against this historical background that EEC membership by the UK and the Republic of Ireland should be seen.

IV. The Republic and the EEC

It should be clear that the main benefits of EEC membership would accrue to the Republic - as, indeed, would the

principal losses due to membership. The impact on Northern Ireland would be less marked in either direction, and more indirect.

Agriculture

The principal economic gain to the Republic would be in the agricultural sector. The price increases recently agreed in Brussels will raise the price of milk in the EEC to about 70% above the present Irish level, and the price of beef, by mid-1972, to about 75% above the present Irish level. Even if one assumed no further increases in EEC farm prices during the transitional period and allowed for the impact of rising consumer prices on the purchasing power of farm receipts during this period, this situation would clearly be very attractive to Irish farmers and would be likely to induce significant increases in output from the 85% of land in the Republic that is under pasture. Increased prices and increased outputs would be likely to increase very sharply the purchasing power of farm incomes in the Republic by the end of the transitional period.

Employment Benefits

By-products of this would be increased output and employment in the key food-processing industries (notably dairying and animal slaughtering) and in industries servicing the farmer - e.g. fertilizers and animal feeding stuffs. (Output in meat slaughtering might be further increased by the substitution of a beef trade for most or all of the present store cattle trade.) Moreover, the spending of increased farm incomes will increase home demand notably, especially in rural areas, where the distribution sector should benefit particularly, and through the multiplier this could have a very significant impact on the whole economy.

Other beneficial effects on employment would come from a probable slowing down in the exodus from agriculture during the transitional period - although this could change into an accelerated outflow later, if and when the Mansholt proposals for structural reform become effective - and from a possible acceleration in the flow of US industrial investment following the entry of the Republic to the Community.

Industry

These beneficial effects of membership for the Republic would, however, be accompanied by adverse effects on employment in industrial firms which prove incapable of surviving in free trade conditions. The scale of these losses is difficult to assess, but studies carried out during the 1960s by the Committee on Industrial Organization - set up to survey manufacturing industries with a view to establishing the likely effects of free trade and recommending action to prepare for it - and by the Department of Finance and Confederation of Irish Industries in connection with the Second Economic Programme and the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement, together with the results of econometric studies, all point to a scale of redundancy of the order of 10,000 if adequate preparations for free trade are made. This would be reduced to about 7,000 if the motor vehicle industry is given an extended transitional period, as the Irish Government have proposed to the Community. On the other hand, if preparations are not adequate redundancy could be somewhat larger than this.

The net balance of these effects of EEC membership on output, incomes and employment seems likely to be favourable, and this accounts for the strength of support for membership in the Republic, despite the natural sensitivity of a young State about the loss of part of its sovereignty in economic affairs. (Last November a public opinion poll - unpublished - showed a majority of almost two-to-one in favour, and an earlier poll in April 1969 showed a majority of three-to-one.)

Sovereignty and Nationality

Although membership of the EEC also poses a number of economic problems - the effect on industry, on fisheries, on consumer prices and on the protection of Irish land-ownership - the principal objections to membership come from nationalist or left-wing groups, which object to the loss of sovereignty involved and to the departure from the policy of neutrality - adopted by Ireland before the last War and since maintained - which, they feel, is implicit in membership of the Community. These groups are carrying on a highly articulate campaign against membership.

There are, however, alternative views on this sovereignty/neutrality issue. Against the case based on loss of sovereignty in respect of key economic decisions, it can be argued that a country as small as the Republic, one dependent to such a high degree on agricultural exports for the external purchasing power needed to maintain and improve its living standards, and one whose main external relationship of a bilateral character - with the UK - has hitherto proved so unsatisfactory, would be in a much better position within a Community such as the EEC. Membership of the EEC with Britain would provide the Irish economy, and in particular the farming sector, with a guarantee against exploitation through cheap food policies of the kind operated by Britain, using a deficiency payment arrangement to shelter its own farmers in a discriminatory manner from the consequences of this policy.

The present neo-colonialist relationship between Ireland and Britain, which the size disparity between the two countries makes it impossible to tackle through bilateral negotiations, would, within the EEC, give way to multilateral partnership in which discrimination between the nationals of member countries is outlawed. This would change the whole dimension of Anglo-Irish relationships in a way that has not hitherto been found possible in any of the constitutional relationships hitherto tried - the dual monarchy of the period of 1800; the union with Britain from 1800 to 1921; Dominion status within the Commonwealth from 1921 until 1949; and independence as a Republic outside the Commonwealth since then.

Moreover, this transformation of the relationship between Ireland and Britain would be achieved without the sacrifices of identity and self-reliance which would be involved in an alternative approach involving a closer bilateral constitutional link between the two countries.

On the question of neutrality, it has been argued that no country can any longer remain outside the international forum, opting out of the consequences of the decisions of the Great powers. Neutrality in present conditions is an illusion for a small country, and if Ireland wishes to avoid the consequences of tensions between the super-powers, it can best do so by joining with its European neighbours and seeking with other like-minded countries to influence Western Europe towards a more independent and more neutral European policy, based on a <u>détente</u> between East and West.

V. Northern Ireland and the EEC

Agriculture

The impact of membership of the EEC on Northern Ireland will be less dramatic than in the case of the Republic. Northern Ireland agriculture will not benefit in the same way as agriculture in the Republic, and industry in the North will also be less adversely affected.

First of all, farm prices in the UK, and therefore in Northern Ireland, are nearer to the EEC price level than are prices in the Republic, and the impact on agriculture of price increases will therefore be less.

Secondly, the difference between UK and EEC farm prices is at present largely bridged by deficiency payments, which maintain farm incomes in the UK at levels reasonably close to those of EEC farmers; indeed, in some types of farming incomes in the UK are at present higher than in the EEC for any given level of efficiency.

Thirdly, the pattern of agriculture in Northern Ireland is different from that in the Republic. Milk and sheep account for a much smaller proportion of farm output in the North, and poultry, eggs and pigs for a much larger proportion. Prices for milk and sheep are relatively high in the EEC, and, together with cattle, these products will be the main ones to gain from price increases within the Community. On the other hand, pigs, poultry and eggs depend upon inputs of feeding stuffs, whose price level is much higher in the Community.

The share of output accounted for by cattle is now much the same in Northern Ireland as in the Republic - about one-third - following the sharp rise in cattle output in the North since 1967. But cattle production in Northern Ireland depends heavily upon imports of store cattle from the Republic - which represent the equivalent of about 40% of Northern Ireland cattle output - and EEC membership could lead to a change-over in the

pattern of the cattle and beef trade in the Republic, store cattle being phased out in favour of beef production, which could be more profitable under EEC conditions.

The agriculture in Northern Ireland faces very different prospects in EEC conditions, with many losses as well as some gains, whereas in the Republic the gains for agriculture will be very great indeed, and the losses relatively small. At the same time it is right to comment that once both parts of Ireland are within the Community they will share a common interest in many aspects of EEC policy, and in some important respects the agricultural interests of Ireland as a whole will diverge from those of the UK.

Industry

So far as industry is concerned, Northern Ireland is better placed than the Republic - except for the fact that industry in the North cannot expect the same indirect benefits from a sharp increase in agricultural prosperity as will be derived in the Republic.

Because industry in Northern Ireland has grown up in free trade conditions vis-à-vis Great Britain, it is unlikely to suffer from the extension of free trade to most of Western Europe; indeed, much of Northern Ireland industry will gain from the enlargement of its market.

Regional Policy

Both Northern Ireland and the Republic have a considerable interest in the evolution of the Community's regional policy. In the negotiations for enlargement this is a significant issue because only through the adoption of a Community regional policy, involving the availability from Community funds of capital at subsidized interest rates for regional development, could the UK hope to secure some direct, visible return from its contributions to the Community's finances.

In this connection it is of interest that the Community is especially interested in projects involving cross-border co-operation, in which it could play a special part. There are evident opportunities for such a development in Ireland, where the border cuts across the Derry/Donegal region, runs through the impoverished areas of the north-west, and cuts across the Belfast/Dublin axis of potential industrial growth.

Free Movement of Labour

A feature of Northern Ireland legislation that will have to be modified as a result of EEC membership is the licensing of workers, under the Safeguarding of Employment Act. This Act is clearly contrary to the Rome Treaty provisions for the free movement of labour. Its removal is unlikely to be followed by much cross-border movement of workers, owing to the absence of full employment in Northern Ireland, but it may lead to a small flow of workers with special skills between the Republic and the North.

Propositions

That the EEC membership will transform the traditional relationship between Ireland and Britain, by placing it on a new footing, as part of a broader multilateral relationship between the members of a Western European Community.

It will, in particular

1. Eliminate the problem of inherent imbalance in a bilateral relationship between two countries of such unequal size as the Republic and Great Britain.

2. Protect the Republic from the adverse effects of Great Britain's "cheap food" policy.

3. Provide a wider framework and institutional structure, as well as additional resources for regional development in both parts of Ireland.

4. Eliminate one admittedly minor economic obstacle to an ultimate reunification of the island of Ireland - viz. the disparity in farm incomes North and South that exists

at present.

5. Reduce the practical importance, and therefore the emotive content, of the location of sovereignty over Northern Ireland, by transferring key economic decisions from London to Brussels.

6. Increase the desire of people in Northern Ireland for a voice in decisions affecting their lives that will be more direct and stronger than can be provided by the UK Government speaking on their behalf in European institutions. (In this connection, the gross disparity between the representation of Northern Ireland and the Republic in Community institutions under present arrangements could be a significant factor.)

7. Enhance the sense of common identity of Irish people on both sides of the Border by increasing their involvement with "foreigners", and by creating conditions in which their common interest vis-à-vis Great Britain will become clearer.

THE FUTURE OF NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIPS

IN IRELAND - I

by

BASIL MACIVOR

Given normal circumstances in Ireland, the subject of relationships between North and South would be of minor importance in a European context. There are however good reasons why I should appear to bring to my subject more emphasis than it would otherwise merit. I am quite certain that problems between, for example, two different parts of Holland or Belgium would seem to be irrelevant to any discussion of Europe as a whole. The problems in Ireland are now such that it is imperative that relationships between the North and South must be improved before we can consider any successful participation by Ireland as a whole - and, indeed, by the United Kingdom - in the European Economic Community. My thesis must be that only some form of unification of the islands forming the British Isles can bring us to a cohesive, rationally arranged situation which can be more easily dealt with in the European context; yet the flexibility needed to arrive at such a situation is almost totally absent. Ireland as a whole has, I regret to say, failed to outlive historical situations which are outmoded, irrelevant to the times and destructive of community harmony.

It may seem pretentious to suggest that the problems of Ireland can or should be major factors in any United Kingdom-Europe relationship. Looked at from Paris, Brussels, or Bonn, they will almost certainly appear peripheral and capable of a speedy and satisfactory conclusion by statement. We must, however, accept as a fact of history that many statesmen and, indeed, in the latter part of the last century and the early part of this century, successive Governments have tried and, as many people now feel, failed to solve the 'Irish problem'.

The decision in 1921, to create within one island two separate states was seen as the only visible solution to a situation in which two separate sections of a community with different cultures, different history and, indeed, different language had to co-exist. In Ireland, however, perhaps more than in any other country there was a further complicating factor - religion. It is my belief that this factor, which to any reasonable person is the

most irrational of all differences, is nevertheless the most intractable. It is not a matter of logic but of emotion. But whether we agree or whether we do not on the merits of logical as against emotional views, we must,in looking at the relationships in Ireland, be pragmatic. In examining the views of the people of northern Ireland on the future of the Union and on links with the Republic of Ireland, we must at all times take into account the fundamental and violent antipathy which exists between the extremes of different religious factions.

I think I can simplify and isolate the problems in this way: we have in Northern Ireland about the highest unemployment rate in the United Kingdom. The 7% or 8% unemployed, in any other area in the United Kingdom would very probably create a Labour stronghold. But in Northern Ireland the extraordinary situation is that the political split is vertical, if I may so describe it, rather than horizontal.

In other words working class Protestants direct their allegiance upwards to a Conservative policy which will ensure the union rather than allying themselves with their fellow-workers (or fellow-workless) who are Roman Catholic and who in turn give broad allegiance to Nationalist or Republican representatives. Accepted political theory goes by the board and the loyalties in the main are determined by (a) fear on the Protestant side of a Roman Catholic dominated All-Ireland Republic and (b) resentment on the Roman Catholic side at a permanent religious minority status which can only, as far as can be seen, be ended by incorporation in an All-Ireland Catholic Republic.

I will admit quite honestly that in the 50 years of Northern Ireland's history there have been grounds for fear, on the one hand, of discrimination against the minority, and on the other of unremitting efforts, even by force of arms, to subvert the lawful Government of Northern Ireland.

In the past three years there have been unprecedented efforts on the part of the Northern Ireland Government to put right those things which have been seen to be wrong and to make clear that many supposed grievances were not in fact valid and supported by facts. Nothing perhaps illustrates this so well as the Reports of the Ombudsman and the Commissioner for Complaints, who between them cover the whole field of grievances

against central and local government. In their impartial investigations they find little of substance in an area which had hitherto been regarded as a hotbed of malpractice.

Yet the fear remains on both sides, and I make no apology for saying that events of the past two years have shown that today the Protestant population's fears have vastly and justifiably increased as bombs and weapons of all sorts have taken over from the ordinary democratic methods of seeking change.

It is my view that the best interests of the Minority in Northern Ireland lie within the present constitutional framework, provided that such a framework can be seen to be guaranteeing fair treatment to all sections of the Community. I submit that it does now give such guarantee and that when and only when the Minority accept this to be the fact can we then turn our eyes to the problem of relations between North and South.

Northern Ireland cannot exist in a vacuum. What happens in Northern Ireland has profound effects upon our neighbours: both upon our fellow-citizens in Great Britain and our fellow Irishmen in the South. Events in one place interact upon events in another.

The constitutional position of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom does not justify hostility between ourselves and those in Southern Ireland.

I fully endorse what was said by Major Chichester-Clark some time ago when he underlined that the policy at which we aim is one of mutual confidence, friendship and understanding, such as is operated between many neighbouring countries in the world. "The Border envisaged by the 1920 Act was no major international frontier - no "Emerald Curtain" within these islands. It was others, and not our predecessors, who piled brick upon brick along that wall so that by the end of the day we could scarcely see or comprehend each other." I would like to see that wall demolished. But first of all we must in Northern Ireland demolish the wall in people's minds, separating worker from worker and neighbour from neighbour. The Authorities in the

South must also ask themselves if they are genuinely trying to create the kind of State with which a neighbourly relationship can be developed.

Their utterances have not always been helpful in this respect and I would like to see a more positive effort to understand the fears of the majority in the North as well as a greater reluctance to harp upon the situation once faced by the Minority.

I must come back finally to this major factor in Irish politics: the division along religious rather than orthodox political lines. There can be no doubt that this has seriously distorted the normal development of politics by comparison with the pattern of 20th Century British class divisions. The domination of the Church in Southern Ireland appals the Northern Protestant. The dominance (and I do not mean domination) of the Orange Order in the North repels the Northern Catholic.

Both factors have had the effect of pushing what would be regarded as normal current political issues in other countries into second place in Northern Ireland, the main issue being the existence of the Constitution itself. They also discourage the participation in the processes of Government by the Minority which in my view is essential if we are to achieve the integration of this community necessary to strengthen it as a force within any future European Economic Community and necessary for the future happiness and prosperity of its people. Neither of these factors in my view should be relevant. What I, a son of the Manse and a Conservative/Unionist, am arguing for is a removal of religion from politics and the emergence of a Catholic-Protestant workers' alliance, both North and South, to provide true and understandable political counter-balances.

Only in this way can we begin to arrive at a base for reasonable and practical relationships between two peoples, sharing one island, lying remotely to the North-West of Europe.

THE FUTURE OF NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIPS IN IRELAND - II

by

MARY T. W. ROBINSON

In order to try to assess the future of North-South relationships in Ireland, it will be necessary to have a brief look at the constitutional background to both parts of the country.

Constitutional Background to the Republic of Ireland

The Anglo-Irish Treaty which had been signed in London in December, 1921, was adopted by the Irish Dail on the 7th January 1922 by 64 votes to 57. Mr. de Valera who led the anti-Treaty minority resigned the Presidency of the Dail and led the anti-Treaty forces in the resultant Civil War. At the subsequent election held in June, 1922, to elect the provisional parliament of the state, the anti-Treaty forces were severely defeated, securing less than 22% of the total vote. Subsequently, the hostilities between the two groups broke into full Civil War. This war continued for over a year until the Republican Party surrendered in the Summer of 1923. Meanwhile the Free State constitution to which the Treaty was scheduled was drawn up during this period. It had been drafted by a committee set up by the Provisional Government when the Treaty itself was ratified by the Dail. Then in September and October, 1922, this Dail Eireann, sitting as a "constituent assembly" amended it in minor respects and finally approved it on the 25th October, 1922. On the 6th December, the British Parliament passed the Irish Free State Constitution Act, of which the constitution of the Irish Free State was scheduled. This constitution lasted for 15 years during a period of constant amendment until the present constitution of 1937 was adopted in its place.

By Article 1 the Irish Free State was declared to be a "co-equal member of the community of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations". The legislative power was vested in the Oireachtas consisting of the King and two Houses, a Chamber of Deputies (Dail Eireann and the Senate, Seanad Eireann). By article 51 the executive authority was declared to

be vested in the King who was to exercise it through the Governor General, advised by an Executive Council consisting of members of Dail Eireann. The President of the Executive Council was to be nominated by Dail Eireann and was to nominate the other members of the Council. The constitution itself was flexible, providing that it could be amended by ordinary legislation during a period of eight years and thereafter by means of a Bill passed by both houses and then submitted to the people by way of referendum. However, during this eight year period the period of eight years was extended to sixteen years so that the Free State constitution was flexible for its duration of fifteen years. Altogether, there were 27 acts expressed to be acts to amend the constitution during these fifteen years. Many of the earlier amendments were to control the extreme Republican element in the country by extending the power of the state to set up military courts and intern persons. When Mr. de Valera came to power after the general election of 1932 he used the amending power for the systematic exclusion from the constitution of every trace of reference to the British Crown.

The constitution of 1937 which was drafted by Mr. de Valera was merely approved by Dail Eireann in draft and then adopted by a plebiscite of the people. This method was chosen in order to give it constitutional validity by means of the principle of the basic right of the people to determine their own destiny and their own sovereign form of government. The new constitution was enacted by a very slim majority (685, 105 votes for and 526, 945 votes against) and it came into force on the 29th December, 1937. It was more rigid than its predecessor since it could only be amended by legislation for a three year period which could not be extended and henceforward any amendment of the constitution would require the approval of a referendum. Fianna Fail under Mr. de Valera won the two war time elections in 1943 and 1944 but at the General Election of February 1948 it was defeated after 16 years in office. A Coalition Government succeeded led by Mr. John A. Costello. In 1948 Mr. Costello announced that the last remaining constitutional link with the British Commonwealth was to be removed by the repeal of the External Relations Act 1936. This repealing Act came into force on the 18th April 1949 and the state was formally declared to be a Republic.

The Coalition was defeated in 1951 by another Fianna Fail Government but this only lasted until 1954 when a second Coalition Government was returned. Fianna Fail came back into power with an easy victory in 1957 under Mr. de Valera and has won the subsequent General Elections of 1961, 1965 and 1969. In 1959 Mr. de Valera gave up his position as Taoiseach and was

replaced by Mr. Sean Lemass. In the same year Mr. de Valera was elected President and has subsequently been re-elected President, a post which he still holds. Mr. Sean Lemass resigned as Taoiseach in November, 1966 and was succeeded by the present Taoiseach Mr. Jack Lynch, formerly Minister for Finance.

One of the main problems raised by the 1937 Constitution is posed by the assertion of jurisdiction over the whole island of Ireland contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. Article 2 reads as follows:

"The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas."

Article 3 continues:

"Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the parliament and government established by this constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by that parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorstat Eireann and the like extra territorial effect."

This assertion of jurisdiction has been maintained and re-iterated by successive governments, and by the present Taoiseach as recently as March of this year. This concept of the island of Ireland in terms of land, of territory, as opposed to thinking in terms of people living in different parts of the island has been severely criticised by Northern politicians particularly by Mr. John Hume. The rigid adherence to this assertion of jurisdiction can only block any attempt at true reconciliation between the peoples of North and South without undue emphasis on the territorial aspects of the question.

In August 1966 the three political parties agreed to set up an informal committee to review the constitutional, legislative and institutional basis of government and to report. This inter-party committee reported in December, 1967. In commenting upon Article 33 and the extent of application of the laws of the Irish Republic the committee reported as follows:

"We have given careful consideration to the wording of this provision. We feel that it would now be appropriate to adopt a new provision to replace Article 3. The wording which we

would suggest is as follows:

1. The Irish nation hereby proclaims its firm will that its territory be re-united in harmony and brotherly affection between all Irishmen.

2. The laws enacted by the parliament established by this constitution shall, until the achievement of the nation's unity shall otherwise require, have the like area and extent of application as the laws of the parliament which existed prior to the adoption of this constitution. Provision may be made by law to give extra territorial effect to such laws."

In commenting on this re-drafting of Article 3 the committee states that the reason for retaining reference to extra territorial laws is because of the possible implications of the extension of certain national laws to extra territorial areas surrounding our coasts known as the continental shelf under the 1958 Geneva Convention.

In commenting on the republican status of the 26 counties the committee notes that Article 5 of the 1937 Constitution provides that "Ireland is a sovereign independent democratic state" but does not proclaim that Ireland is a Republic and this is not mentioned in any other article of the constitution. The omission of this proclamation of a Republic in the constitution of 1937 was deliberate. In dealing with the draft constitution in the Dail in 1937 Mr. de Valera stated that were it not for the Northern problem the constitution would in all probability contain a flat downright proclamation of a Republic. The Republic of Ireland Act 1948 declared that the description of the state would henceforth be the Republic of Ireland by repealing the executive authority (External Relations) Act 1936. The consequence of this is that although the state is a Republic and is internationally recognised as such there is no statement to that effect in the constitution and the committee recommends that like other constitutions such as the French, Italian and West German, the Republican status ought to be written into the constitution.

Constitutional Background to Northern Ireland

There were various attempts to grant a limited form of home rule to Ireland towards the end of the 19th century, but the first home rule measure to reach the statute book was the

Government of Ireland Act 1914 which, however, was suspended at the outbreak of World War I and was eventually repealed without having come into force. It was during the parliamentary discussion of this act, both before and after its passage, that it became clear that the Ulster Unionists would not easily come into an arrangement in a Sinn Fein sponsored state and that they were prepared to uphold their aversion to this by an armed volunteer corps.

After the war it became necessary to tackle the home rule question again, and finally the Government of Ireland Act 1920 was passed providing the basis of the present situation. This Act envisaged the creation of two provinces, Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. It came into force with regard to Northern Ireland in 1921 but Southern Ireland chose to be a dominion under the Irish Free State Agreement Act 1922 and later to become a Republic in 1937. Under Section I of the 1920 Act, Northern Ireland was constituted of six of the counties of the old province of Ulster (Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone) and the parliamentary Boroughs of Belfast and Londonderry. It was to remain part of the United Kingdom but to have a separate parliament with limited powers. It has its own legislature, executive and judiciary, based on the British model, but again with limited powers. In the sphere of foreign relations such matters as the concluding of international treaties, the conduct of war, diplomatic representation and external policy are within the sole competence of the Westminster government. Even in domestic affairs the United Kingdom parliament remains legally supreme as has been shown vividly in the Northern situation since 1968.

Originally the method of voting for the houses of parliament, the Senate and the House of Commons, was by Proportional Representation. This was abolished in relation to the House of Commons except as to the University seats by the House of Commons (Method of Voting and Re-distribution of Seats) Act 1929. It is one of the strong contentions of those who support the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland and also those who agitate for greater participation by the minority that the method of voting by proportional representation should be reinstated in order to allow minority views to be represented in terms of elected members to parliament. It is felt that this might break the Unionist monopoly of power by allowing smaller parties to gain sufficient seats to form an effective coalition government.

Section 4 of the 1920 Act gives the parliament of Northern Ireland general power "to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Northern Ireland" but without power to legislate with extra territorial effect. The section also lists matters on which parliament cannot legislate such as in relation to the making of peace or war treaties and foreign relations, foreign trade, quarantine, navigation, etc. and also "reserved matters". Reserved matters are those which were to be put within the competence of a parliament of all Ireland if established. However, because of the improbability of such a legislature coming into existence in a foreseeable period a process of de-reservation was commenced to take matters off this list.

Section 5 prohibits the making of any law "either directly or indirectly to establish or endow any religion, or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof, or give a preference, privilege or advantage, or impose any disability or disadvantage, on account of religious belief or religious or ecclesiastical statute or make any religious belief or religious ceremony a condition of the validity of any marriage, or affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction of that school, or alter the constitution of any religious body except where the alteration is approved on behalf of the religious body by the governing body thereof, or divert from any religious denomination the fabric of cathedral churches, or except for the purpose of roads, railways, lighting, water or drainage or other works of public utility upon payment of compensation, any other property or take any property without compensation." This provision has been construed to include any property belonging to an ecclesiastical body and provides protection to individuals and to religious bodies from discrimination under the state power in Northern Ireland.

Section 6 enacts that except where otherwise provided, the parliament of Northern Ireland shall not have power to repeal or alter any provision of the government of Ireland Act or of any Act of parliament or the delegated legislation that the United Kingdom passed after May 3rd, 1921. Any statute which is ultra vires these powers is void and a court in Northern Ireland may hold such a statute void. By section 50 of the 1920 Act there is an appeal to the court of appeal in cases involving the validity of a statute where there would not otherwise be any such appeal. This limited judicial review to ensure that legislation is within the terms of the Government of Ireland Act is unknown in the rest of the United Kingdom where the sovereignty of parliament cannot be challenged in this way. For this reason it would be

easier to introduce a bill of rights into the Northern Ireland constitutional arrangement than to try to introduce a similar restriction on the sovereignty of the Westminster parliament, because the courts of Northern Ireland are already familiar in a limited way with the concept of and the control by judicial review of the legislation by the parliament at Stormont.

Possibilities of a Constitutional Solution

In an article in the Irish Times in July, 1970, I outlined a proposal for a constitutional solution along federal lines between the North and South of the country. This was put forward on the realisation that in order to undertake the obligations of the E.E.C. treaties it will be necessary to modify certain articles of the 1937 constitution. This must be done by the introduction of a bill to amend the constitution in the Dail, its passage through both Houses of the Oireachtas and the holding of a referendum of the people under Articles 46 and 47 of the Constitution. This elaborate and expensive process is one which ought not to be engaged in very often and it appears short-sighted to engage in such a major constitutional reform without also examining the modifications which would be necessary in order to formulate a constitutional solution to the problem closer to home of North/South relations. The suggestion I put forward involved a federalist structure which would provide a first step in the evolution of constitutional co-operation by "cross fertilisation" of members of the various institutions.

(a) The Legislatures.

The constitutional bodies which must be developed as a primary step are the legislatures. I propose the retention of both parliaments, Stormont and the Oireachtas, but with a certain inter-changeability of manpower and the continued attendance of a proportion of M. Ps. from the North at Westminster. To make this cross representation a valid representation of the two communities, North and South, it would be necessary to introduce proportional representation and multi-seat constituencies in Northern Ireland. Cross fertilisation of this sort would enable the respective members of both Houses to speak with authority on the problems of their own part of the country and of the solutions for Ireland as a whole. They would provide the type of liaison and co-operation vital to the ending of partisan strife which is crippling the country and they would be accountable to the community for their actions in both parliaments. The method of selection of existing members of each parliament to sit in a dual capacity as members of the other parliament could be on the

same lines as the selection of members of parliament to sit in the parliamentary assembly of the Common Market.

(b) The Executives

The governments of Northern Ireland and the Republic should continue to exert exclusive jurisdiction as at present, but each should have one member with the right to sit in both governments. The increased power of the executive and the fact that this body is the policy making organ of each community necessitates this personal participation by one member of the alternative government. Only in this way can good-will and trust be built up and close liaison maintained between the two governments. It is shocking, if true to realise that the first debate on Northern Ireland in the government of the south, took place after August 1968. Prior to that there had been no major policy formation and no major discussion at that level of the problems of the North or the attitude of the South towards these problems.

(c) The Judiciaries

The southern judiciary has the power of judicial review of legislation on the ground of repugnancy to the fundamental guarantees of individual freedom in Articles 40 to 44 of the 1937 constitution. Under the Government of Ireland Act 1920 the Northern courts can declare legislation contrary to that Act to be ultra vires and void. By adopting a bill of rights which would bind the Stormont parliament it would be possible to extend the same powers of review of legislation of that parliament to the Northern courts and secure the impartial protection of the individual.

(d) Other Structures.

The North is fortunate in having adopted the device of an ombudsman to redress grievances. The parliamentary commissioner there is hampered by a lack of power to look into abuses in local government, but how much more appropriate it would be to have a single parliamentary commissioner for the North and South of the country. Added to this there ought to be citizens advice bureaux to advise on the availability of social services, etc. In counties near the border these advice bureaux ought to be joint bodies with the county on the other side, for example, between Donegal and Derry, its natural hinterland. Nothing could bring home more effectively to those sitting on such bodies the advantageous position, as far as educational and social welfare benefits are concerned, of the citizens of the North. This ought to force the south to concentrate on these areas in order to try and raise our standards and equalise the positions of citizens of the whole country.

A Functional Approach

A more realistic solution to the problem of co-operation between North and South might lie in the pragmatic approach of functional co-operation in trade, tourism, use of natural resources, such as electricity, and travel and interchange of peoples. This method has the advantage of concentrating on the aims to be realised rather than focusing on the potentially emotional steps to be taken.

Instead of debating possibly controversial constitutional and legislative changes involving such conceptual ideas as recognition and sovereignty, informal structures of co-operation and inter-dependence can be forged linking the two parts of the island inexorably together. This low key functional co-operation has already been inaugurated by the commencement of second level talks announced on the 1st April of this year in economic areas of co-operation. The Irish government has announced that senior officials will consult with their northern counterparts and this increased co-operation has necessitated the creation of an inter-departmental unit on Northern Ireland in the Department of Foreign Affairs which is comprised of officials of that department, of the Department of Finance and of the Department of the Taoiseach which reports through the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hillery, to the Taoiseach.

Senator John Maurice Kelly, a prominent spokesman for the Fine Gael party, in a series of articles published in the Irish Times during the course of last year emphasised the importance of interchange of personnel and co-operation in unspectacular pragmatic ways between the North and the South of the country. People from the south ought to be encouraged to boost tourism in Northern Ireland by holidaying there and the tourist boards of both countries are and ought to continue to co-operate in promoting Ireland as a tourist resort.

It is in the area of functional integration and co-operation that entry into the E.E.C. may have a significant impact. It has been realised in Northern Ireland that it constitutes a peripheral area which will depend for equitable treatment on the emergence of a strong regional policy. Such a regional policy cannot be conceived in isolation from the very similar problems which exist in the rest of the island, and it

is also appreciated that from Brussels thinking in terms of a regional policy for Ireland will naturally consider the island as a unity. Secondly, the gradual elimination of the customs barriers and the free movement of labour, capital and goods will reduce the border to an irrelevant minimum.

British Financing

Whatever the constitutional solution to the North, whether it be a federalist solution by the cross-fertilisation and co-operation between institutions north and south, or whether it be a functional approach leading to a de facto constitutional arrangement between the two parts of the country, one vital factor which must be discussed is the question of the continuing of British financing of the northern part of the country. It has been said that if the question were put to the most rabid nationalist either north or south of the border "would you like the border to end to-night, would you like partition to end to-night?" the question would be answered by an emphatic "no" because the ending of partition and withdrawal of British subsidies to the north would spell financial ruin in the short term to both ends of the country. Northern Ireland at present forms part of the United Kingdom and the association between the two islands has been a long one which has given rise to duties and responsibilities. It seems fair to suggest that one of these responsibilities is the continued financial support by the north which would not be withdrawn for a substantial time after the possibility of a constitutional solution between the north and south of the country had been accepted. It is only in the light of this fact, of the commitment by Westminster for a substantial time to continue to support northern Ireland, that positive negotiations between the two parts of the country can continue without fear of economic disaster.

Impediments to a Constitutional Solution

The following matters ought to be discussed as constituting possible impediments to a constitutional or functional solution to north/south relations.

(a) The assertion of jurisdiction in the 1937 constitution. Is this territorial assertion of jurisdiction still valid or might it be withdrawn in favour of the concept of co-operation between

the two peoples in the island rather than sovereignty over land over particular territory?

(b) Are there two peoples in Ireland, particularly in Northern Ireland? Northern Ireland is roughly two thirds Protestant and one third Catholic. Of the Protestant population more than half are Presbyterians. In practice except in intellectual and University circles Catholics and Protestants do not meet much socially and it is impossible to converse even for a limited time with a person without ascertaining his religion and being compromised into confessing one's own. The division between Catholics and Protestants in the North can be traced to factors other than religion. They are educated separately although this is principally due to Catholic intransigence; the Northern Ireland government is prepared to go more than half way to integrate the Catholic schools into the state system but the Catholics insist on complete control of their own schools. The result is that there is segregation in schooling and that in the Protestant schools no Irish history as such is taught and matters such as the Easter rebellion are mentioned only in the context of the great War. Another important factor is the economic discrepancy. In general Protestants are better off and this economic differential is maintained by careful screening in the handing out of jobs. Of the ten thousand workmen in the Harland and Wolfe shipyards in Belfast about three hundred are Catholic. Another relevant factor is the depth of the attachment of Ulster Unionists to Britain and to the British Royal Family. This loyalty often astonishes somebody living in Britain itself. Finally, in this context of whether there are two peoples, the argument is put forward that the roots of the two peoples are entirely different and that the Protestant Ulsterman has more in common with his Scottish counterpart than with the Nationalist Catholic.

(c) The Question of Fear

A community based on fear is not in a position to consider constitutional arrangements or even a healthy co-operation with other peoples. One of the main roots of fear in the north is the wide distribution of arms. It was stated in April 1971 that there are more than 100,000 legal guns circulating in the North. Opposition M.Ps have maintained that there is a ratio between the number of legal and the number of illegal guns and that this huge arsenal in civilian hands is a constant source of apprehension. The Northern government has condoned the spectacular growth of gun clubs in the North of which many of the members are former B-Specials (the armed police force which was disbanded as one of the reforms introduced in Northern Ireland after the troubles in 1968). Attempts are now to be made to encourage the voluntary surrender of some of these legalised guns except insofar as they are necessary for hunting purposes. If this voluntary campaign is unsuccessful then the

government will have to consider the unpopular measure of withdrawing licences except in certain limited cases.

Another source of fear is the allegation of imbalance by the army in search for arms in areas of Belfast. It is alleged that these search parties concentrate on the Catholic areas in their searches whereas there are similar Protestant areas widely reputed to contain large arsenals of guns and yet left untouched by the army. The widespread feeling of discontent about this apparent partiality in arms searches has led to the growing unpopularity of the army with the Catholic population. Having come in as the protectors and as the defenders of the minority the soldiers have now become to some extent the instrument of the oppressive government to these people.

An Economic Solution

The major problem in the Northern Ireland situation is not a sectarian problem but the problem of too few jobs. The rate of unemployment there is higher than in the south or in the rest of Britain. It is likely in the present context to increase; so is the fear of redundancy and so is the population which will be on the streets of Belfast and Derry during the summer. This is the real problem in Northern Ireland and it affects people of different creeds. It accentuates religious difficulties in that the Protestants who are more likely to have stable jobs wish to hang on and the Catholics who have received less from the government have less to lose from a total destruction of the present constitutional structures in Northern Ireland. Only the creation of a substantial number of new jobs and the resultant elimination of fear of redundancy can diminish tensions and prevent further outbreaks of violence in the Summer.

Problems of Church and State

A much discussed "impediment" to the fostering of North/South relations is the allegation that the south is subject to Rome rule and to Church influence in legislation. Exponents of this argument point to Article 44 of the constitution which provides:

"The state recognises the special position of the holy, catholic, apostolic and Roman church as the guardian of the faith professed by the greater majority of the citizens.
The state also recognises the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, the Methodist Church in Ireland, the Religious Society of Friends in Ireland, as well as the Jewish congregation and the other religious denominations existing in Ireland at the date of the coming into operation of this constitution."

This "special position of the Catholic Church" was commented on in the 1967 report on the constitution as follows:

"The significance of these provisions has subsequently been touched upon in a number of court decisions but their legal effect has not been conclusively pronounced upon. The general view of commentators on the constitution is, however, that these provisions are of no juridical effect and do not give any special privileges to the Catholic church under the constitution. The prevailing view is that sub-section 2 merely recognises the statistical fact that the Catholic Church is the guardian of the faith professed by the greater majority of the citizens; other provisions of the constitution prohibit religious discrimination of any kind so that there can be no preference for any particular religion. Not only legal experts but Catholic theologians support this view. There seems however, to be no doubt that these provisions give offence to non-Catholics and are also a useful weapon in the hands of those who are anxious to emphasise the differences between north and south. They are also defective in that they make no provision for religious denominations which did not exist in Ireland at the time the constitution came into operation in contrast to later provisions of the Article which apply universally to all denominations. ..... we feel that sub-section 2 might profitably be deleted on the ground that our circumstances do not require any special mention of a particular religion in the constitution."

Leaders of Church and state including Cardinal Conway and the present Taoiseach have recommended the removal of this provision of Article 44 and this may be one of the constitutional amendments which will be given effect in the context of the series of referenda when Ireland seeks to join the E.E.C.

Another provision is the absolute prohibition of divorce under the Irish constitution. Article 41 section 3, subsection 2, states that "no law shall be enacted providing for the

grant of a dissolution of marriage" and sub-section 3,

"no person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of any other state that is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time being in force within the jurisdiction of the government and parliament established by this constitution shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction within the life time of the other party to the marriage so dissolved." It is argued that if the south wishes to encourage people in the North to join in a constitutional framework it must provide facilities for divorce which they already enjoy in the northern part of the country.

Another area of recent controversy in the south arises from an attempt being made to amend the law relating to the prohibition of the sale of contraceptives and the censorship of literature relating to "the unnatural prevention of conception". A private members' Bill which the present writer and two other senators have tabled in the senate and which has yet to pass its first stage and be published has given rise to a wide and emotional debate on the danger of altering the "sacred sense of sex" in the south of Ireland. Statements have been issued by various bishops in their own right and also a statement from the hierarchy in Maynooth emphasising the danger of any change in legislation relating to contraceptives or abortion and seeking to warn the legislators against this. It would seem to be a false premise that we should change our law in the south only for the reasons that it would appeal to people in the northern part of the country and the valid basis for seeking to amend laws such as that relating to the prohibition on the sale of contraceptives lies in the fact that this discriminates in an area of private conscience and morality against individuals who feel justified in using contraceptives and who are at present living in the south. It has been said, and I think with justice, that people in the north are not particularly interested in whether those in the south use or are able to use contraceptives or not. It is not the real issue, which is that people in the south view with trepidation the attempt to influence legislation in the south by the hierarchy and by various lay Catholics on the basis of Catholic doctrine. This poses a real problem as reduced by Dr. Noel Browne to the simple question "whose writ now runs in the South, that of the Church or the state?"

The Arms Trial

The arms trial in the South of Ireland which dominated

attention during last year, and the sittings of the public accounts committee of Dail Eireann enquiring into the spending of £100,000 voted by the parliament and unaccounted for, have appeared to confirm the worst suspicions of extreme northern views on gun running from the south. There is not any doubt that both in the south and for northern observers the institutions of the judiciary and of parliament have been adversely affected. The climate is now one of cynicism in which little credibility is given to the denial and counter denial which takes place whenever allegations of gun-running or participation by prominent citizens in the activities of the I.R.A. are made. Many people have lost the original thread of the story because of the ramifications involved, but the long term effect is to promote a climate of cynicism and disillusionment and to detract from the major economic problems facing the state. These two dramas, the arms trial and the public accounts tribunal,have between them supplied enough inflamatory material to satisfy any northern extremist for the next decade in seeking evidence of ill-will towards the northern government from southern politicians.

Conclusion

The preceding problems have been stated rather briefly so that they may form the basis for discussion in trying to isolate the problems which would impede or inhibit the fostering of good relations between north and south and the possibility of constitutional solutions to the Irish question.

IRISH FOREIGN POLICY

by

PATRICK KEATINGE

That "old moulds are broken in the North"[1] has become one of the more convincing clichés in recent Irish politics; it carries weight in the South, too, and no less in Irish foreign policy than in domestic issues. Indeed, there were two external developments which were in large measure responsible for the state of flux in which we find ourselves. Both occurred in the spring of 1969. General de Gaulle's resignation cleared the way for a revival of the government's "European" policy, while Captain O'Neill's departure, followed by a violent summer, brought Northern Ireland back to the top of the agenda in both Dublin and Westminster. Over the past two years, then, considerations of foreign policy - its goals, methods, effects - have been an important feature of Irish public life.

This is in some contrast to the previous decade. True, the decision to apply to join the EEC was made in 1961, but it was left in a limbo after the 1963 veto. Mr. Lemass exchanged courtesies with Captain O'Neill in 1965, but if this had incalculable results in the North, it met with benevolent indifference in the South. In any case, neither of these two important developments were regarded in Dublin as "foreign policy". Discussion about the EEC was mostly about economic implications and capabilities and was very much the province of the "economic" departments in the administration; Northern Ireland was clearly the fief of the Taoiseach. While it was no doubt an oversimplified view, foreign policy only too often seemed to be something which was largely conducted in New York and largely ignored in Dublin.

This, at least, is no longer the case - the pace of events has seen to that. Moreover, in addition to a new set of circumstances and priorities there are new personalities.[2] After a General Election, in the late spring of 1969, Dr. Patrick Hillery again took over the Department of External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs), after twelve years during which it had reflected the personal leadership of Mr. Frank Aiken. Mr. Jack Lynch, too, emerged from this electoral victory as a new political personality, no longer encumbered with the stigma of being a compromise leader of the Government party. However, the most acute problem facing these men was by no means new - the fundamental

problem of Anglo-Irish relations.

Anglo-Irish Relations

Relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom are significant on many levels, and even if they are relatively more significant for the smaller state they cannot in the long term be ignored by the larger one. For Ireland, the economic relationship has been crucial, in the attempt to develop a modern national economy within the constraint of a rigid pattern of trade. Social links are important, too; the numbers of Irish in the United Kingdom, broad cultural affinities, the existence of the common travel area encompassing the two states - this relationship has been described as a "unique condition between independent countries."[3] It is, however, the more narrowly political relationship which once again predominates in Anglo-Irish relations, a relationship which has always been threatened by the problem of the status and future of Northern Ireland, the "Partition problem".

In order to see in what ways and to what extent Partition is expressed as an issue in Irish foreign policy, a very broad classification of the goals of Irish policy towards the North may be made, according to whether these goals are seen as attainable in the long, medium or short term. The long term objectives of any state are generally embodied in "aspirations" rather than identifiable policies; they often have a strong ideological content, being determined by political will rather than capabilities.[4] In the case of Ireland, just such an aspiration may be found in Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Constitution, with the claim to the "whole island of Ireland", a claim recently reaffirmed by Mr. Lynch and seen by him as implying the "right to speak in relation to events that happen throughout the whole country".[5] For its part the British Government, even without the benefit of a written Constitution, is firmly committed to uphold Partition, so long as the majority within Northern Ireland so wish it. The temptation to relax this commitment may have been strong from time to time, but only in times of extreme peril, as in 1940, has even a hint of relaxation occurred. On the whole, the goal of Irish unity has remained an aspiration, every expression of which has met with denial, as the status quo of fifty years ago is continually reaffirmed.

However, the political context within which recent reaffirmations have been made by British and Irish leaders has changed. A comparison with superficially similar statements of long-term objectives in the late 1940s illustrates this quite clearly. Then, a bitter international propaganda assault, encouraged by all political parties, was made by the Irish Government on Britain's position over the North; the British reaction to this, as expressed in the Ireland Act of 1949, had the effect of sustaining the Unionist majority's position on Northern Ireland without asking any questions as to how that majority was sustaining its position within Northern Ireland. Now, on the other hand, Mr. Lynch reaffirms the Irish claim while at the same time speaking of "our trust in the good faith between our countries".[6] The political parties in the Dail now compete to speak the language of peace and reason, and the nationalist groups outside the Dail are anything but agreed on their interpretation of the situation. The leaders of both major British parties have referred with some sympathy to the aspiration of Irish unity and, above all, since the Downing Street Declaration of August 1969, they have committed successive British governments to reform in Northern Ireland. Far from sustaining traditional Unionism, it can be argued that they are going a long way towards dismantling it.

Thus, as far as the long-term goal of Irish policy towards the North is concerned, there is, in spite of the repetition of "sterile and primitive slogans"[7], a political atmosphere in which new initiatives can at least be explored. This is a process which has gathered momentum amongst Irish political groups over the last six months, and while it contains much conjecture and covers almost the whole spectrum of political issues - a broad spectrum, indeed, in Ireland - it is possible to identify some general themes which could have some bearing on the development of Anglo-Irish relations. These may be classified as medium-term goals. They are intended to contribute towards a long-term solution, but could be embodied in policy in a less remote future; on the other hand, they could not be expected radically to alter the outcome of the immediate problem which Northern Ireland poses.

Three kinds of medium-term goals are of interest, the first being the creation of some new "constitutional" arrangement covering all the parties to the dispute. In this category there is speculation that, when the reform programme in the North is implemented, top-level talks between the governments of Ireland, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland will lead to some form of federation within twenty years.[8] The left-wing of the Sinn Fein movement is more explicit, claiming that there are in fact

"serious moves afoot ... in regard to a new constitutional relationship between this country and Britain" which would lead to "the reunification of Ireland as part of the British Commonwealth".[9] Mr. Cosgrave, leader of the main Opposition party (Fine Gael), has urged the Irish Government to take the initiative in consulting the Westminster and Stormont governments "at the highest diplomatic level".[10] However, Mr. Lynch has rejected this suggestion, and the air is hot with official denials that the governments are working on these lines. Indeed, Mr. Lynch has told his party that Anglo-Irish relationships "require no formalisation".[11] The fact that some members of his government, in the most general terms, have implied that the European Community would be the institutional framework in which Irish unity would be achieved, may be seen more as an association of ideas with some electoral appeal than as evidence of policy on the North.[12]

The emphasis has recently changed to a second type of medium-term goal, this time involving the alteration of existing "constitutional" arrangements within the states concerned. The possibilities raised here include the introduction of proportional representation within Northern Ireland (rejected by Mr. Faulkner)[13], and the introduction of Direct Rule within the whole of the United Kingdom. To date, this is seen as a last resort and one which, although it might simplify diplomatic procedures, would be a leap in the dark politically. From the viewpoint of Dublin, though, most attention is given to changing the Republic's Constitution. There have even been suggestions from opposition party spokesmen that, for tactical reasons, the aspiration to unity be dropped or modified, and that Stormont be "recognised". But from the Government's statements this is clearly a non-starter, and its proposals have centred on constitutional and legal changes in the area of public morality, and particularly on contraception and divorce. Foreign policy? What was originally presented - in major speeches of the Taoiseach and the Minister for Foreign Affairs[14] - as a means of appeasing northern protestant fears of "Rome rule" is, it now seems, developing into a major domestic controversy on the issue of Church versus State relations. Quite what effect this has on Northern opinion remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, a third type of medium-term goal is quite widely mooted - the development of functional co-operation between North and South, or, in Mr. Lynch's words, "practical matters in economic development in which we can agree to co-operate for the benefit of all Irish people".[15] This is in a sense the continuation of the gradualist, pragmatic approach towards

North-South relations promised, if not developed, in the Lemass/O'Neill entente and realized to a limited extent in some previous co-operative ventures. Proposals have been made in general terms concerning, for example, co-operation in tourism, university education, and the joint development of Border regions[16], the Irish Government has announced that senior officials are "available for consultation" with their Northern counterparts, while a sympathetic reception to the idea was given by Sir Frederick Catherwood, Director-General of the United Kingdom National Economic Development Office.[17] On the 1st of April both the Dublin and Stormont governments announced the opening of official consultations.

An intriguing dimension is given to the question of functional co-operation by the implications of EEC membership on regional development. M. Borschette (the Community Commissioner in charge of regional policy), in the course of a brief visit to Dublin (8 March 1971), raised the question of "cross-border co-operation"; the following day Dr. Hillery renewed the Government's offer to make available to the Stormont Government "knowledge built up on EEC matters".[18] None the less, even its advocates realize that the functional approach to Irish unity will yield results only in the long term and seems to offer little to alleviate the immediate pressures which the Northern situation imposes on Anglo-Irish relations. In Sir Frederick Catherwood's words, this approach "looks ahead of the present strife".

It is with the "present strife" that the diplomatic activity of the Irish and British governments has chiefly been concerned; here the goals pursued are short-term goals, expressed in specific policies, whose outcome depends not only on relations between the governments involved but perhaps even more on the local situation in the disputed area. The central fact for Anglo-Irish relations is that since the Downing Street Declaration of 1969 the main short-term objective of both the British and Irish governments has been identical - the implementation of reforms in Northern Ireland.

From the Irish Government's point of view this policy is based on the broad assumption that reconciliation between the Northern communities is the key to national unity, an assumption which has not always been very obvious in Dublin. But it now underlies Irish policy, a policy which finds two types of "diplomatic" expression. The first takes the form of contacts between the Irish Government and the Catholic minority in the North. The

"Arms Trial" last year showed that some of these early contacts were, to say the least, unco-ordinated in form and ambiguous in purpose; nevertheless, they have increasingly been characterized by exhortations on the part of the government to the minority to show patience, a repudiation of violence, and a trust in the reform programme. This may involve gestures which include a measure of diplomatic risk, such as Dr. Hillery's visit to Belfast in July 1970, but it more often is seen in direct public appeals, of which Mr. Lynch's speech of 11 July 1970 was a notable example.

The second type of diplomatic action is more orthodox; here the appeal is to the British Government and the subject matter is, in Dr. Hillery's words, "Matters of concern to this country in relation to the North, including the pace and quality of reforms".[19] Over the past few months the emphasis has been on the impartial application of British security measures, control of the "gun clubs", attempts to encourage community co-operation, and so on. The methods used have been "quiet diplomacy and personal conversation"[20], in "periodical discussion at ministerial level" and "through diplomatic channels".[21]

It is possible to speculate only in the most general terms about the effect of this diplomatic approach, which is sometimes referred to as the Irish Government's "guarantee" of the reform programme. Undoubtedly, both the Westminster and Dublin governments have a common interest in restoring peace in the North, and the British government clearly has an interest in supporting moderate policies in the Republic; they are reluctant to say or do anything which might adversely affect Mr. Lynch's domestic position. Both sides, therefore, have taken pains to keep the diplomatic channel open at all levels and to stress the existence of co-operative and constructive relations. Awkward incidents on the spot - and there is much potential for these both on the land border and in maritime security - are not allowed to mask this image.

Nevertheless, there are limits to the extent to which either government is able to achieve its ends. In Dublin, for example, there is concern about what is seen as the one-sided nature of the security operation, and the ambiguous position with regard to Stormont's policy on the "gun-clubs". The question is often posed about the British Government's reaction to an increase in violence in the North. Indeed, the very discretion and moderation of current Anglo-Irish diplomacy, seen against a

long history of failure in both Dublin and Westminster to do anything more than live from hand to mouth so far as the North was concerned, can lead to a mood of frustration. If the situation in the North deteriorates and the moderates' panaceas, such as "summit talks" or UN intervention, are seen as illusory, the governments on both sides of the Irish sea will find it difficult to protect their relatively harmonious diplomatic relationship from the pressures of their respective hard-liners.

Irish Foreign Policy in International Institutions

Much of Irish foreign policy is developed and conducted within the framework of international institutions, which offer to small states opportunities for the sort of diplomatic action which their very limited resources allow. On several occasions the dominant theme of Anglo-Irish relations has been approached in this context, the most remarkable case occurring in the first years of the Irish Free State. From 1923 to 1932 both the Commonwealth and the League of Nations were organizations in which the Irish government of the day could define its relations with London increasingly in its own favour.[22] These policies made little impression in domestic politics, however, and none at all on the issue of Partition. After the Second World War the anti-Partition crusade spilled over into the one available international institution, the Council of Europe, again without success, and it was not until 1969 that a further sortie was made, this time in the United Nations.

Several points may be made about Ireland's request for a UN peace-keeping operation in the North of Ireland in August of that year. It was a move made only under the pressure of events, when the Irish Government, after fifty years of irredentist talk, had to give the appearance of <u>doing</u> something. It was a move in which the diplomatic courtesies were more than preserved, so far as the public was concerned; Dr. Hillery's tone in the Security Council was almost apologetic. The amount of pressure it exerted on the British Government is debatable; indeed its primary purpose may have been to placate domestic opinion[23], and here, too, it was but one factor operating in a confused situation. But, above all, it was not typical of Ireland's role in international institutions, and this was recognized as such.[24]

The norm in this respect is the pursuit of what are sometimes termed "milieu goals" - goals that "do not involve the defence or the increase of possessions held to the exclusion of others, but aim at shaping the conditions in the international environment".[25] In this category are included a wide range of activities connected with "functional" co-operation in the context of such institutions as the UN specialized agencies, OECD, GATT, and so on. There is a general commitment to Human Rights, both in the United Nations and European contexts, though with reservations in some specific areas, such as birth control and women's rights. On a more overtly political level, there is consistent support for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, to the extent of direct participation in ONUC and UNFICYP, while Mr. Aiken's concentration on disarmament made some contribution to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968.

One particular aspect of Irish policy in international institutions which deserves closer attention is that which relates to "Third World" issues, especially anti-colonialism and aid. It is often claimed that, as a West European state, Ireland is unique, owing to her recent anti-colonialist background, and that she has, therefore, a special contribution to make in the development of contacts between the "western" states and the new Afro-Asian states. If such a contribution is to be made it has, on the whole, to be made in terms of United Nations policy; here the record has its ups and downs. Broadly speaking, with regard to the tougher UN resolutions on Southern Africa which have been proposed during the last ten years, Irish policy has been cautious; only in 1970 was there a move away from a largely abstentionist position, which did something to restore a rather faded anti-colonialist image. This move was also reflected in the abandoning of advanced plans to send a trade mission to South Africa.

On aid, too, performance is difficult to assess. Official aid runs at the level of about one-tenth of the UN target of 1% of GNP, but the Government points out that this is supplemented by unofficial aid which is disproportionately large for a country with Ireland's resources. One source claims that "7,000 missionaries in the field, 2,800 priests, 3,500 nuns, as well as brothers and lay missionaries, provided primary and post-primary education for over two million children and adults in 57 countries and treated over five million patients in hospitals and clinics in 37 countries".[26] A more precise quantification of this aid does not exist, but whatever the amount it is not likely that there is any significant economic "pay-off" for the

contributors.

In the pursuit of these milieu goals, Irish foreign policy contains some distinctive moral attitudes towards international politics, which stem from two main sources. In the first place, there are attitudes deriving from a consciousness of the size of the state. The small state, lacking the capabilities to engage in expansionist policies, is sometimes seen as being more virtuous. Though not always expressed as crudely as this, this assumption may be seen in an instinctive distrust of "power politics" and, given Ireland's struggle for statehood, an especial distrust of the domination of small states by the great powers. There is thus sympathy for other small states as such and a tendency to think in terms of anti-imperialism.

But another source of moral attitudes is often equally noticeable - the notion of Ireland as a "Christian State". Thus there have been calls for crusades - with Mussolini against Ethiopia, with Franco against the Republicans in Spain, with John Foster Dulles against International Communism. In terms of specific policies this does not always lead to very much; Ireland supported sanctions against Italy, the non-intervention policy in the Spanish Civil War, and has sat out most of the Cold War in splendid isolation. There is, none the less, a widespread and rather primitive commitment to the "West", to which policy-makers are on the whole sensitive.

Of course, these two sorts of moral attitudes are often diffuse in expression and sometimes contradictory in effect. They converge most clearly on the broadly humanitarian issues, where there will be agreement amongst the political, administrative and social elites and where the general public may be mobilized to some purpose. A notable example is the wide support for the anti-apartheid campaign (the Russian navy in the Indian Ocean has not yet made much impression on the land-bound Irish). There can be more controversy, however, on Ireland's position on issues with "Cold War" implications, and this may encourage caution in policies. A pioneering stance on the question of UN membership for Communist China in the late 1950s was not pursued, though we are back on this bandwagon after the most recent count of heads. On the Vietnam war, silence.

General de Gaulle is reported to have said that small

states (he apparently mentioned Ireland) should "throw their spiritual weight about".[27] Irish foreign policy in recent years cannot have excited him overmuch; on the whole, the government has "walked softly".[28] In a parliamentary system which offers little reward for the discussion of foreign policy, the few critics of this approach are prophets crying in the wilderness.

Isolation and Security

To some extent the caution and discretion which have marked Irish foreign policy during the 1960s is not altogether surprising in a state which has for much of its existence adopted an isolationist role in world politics. Isolationism "as a state policy", it has been said, "rests essentially on two conditions: the determination of those in charge of their country's affairs to eschew an active involvement in international affairs, and geographical or military conditions favourable to ensure this".[29] From the mid '30s to the mid '50s the first condition was in large measure fulfilled, though as much by circumstances as by the determination of our leaders; since then, there has been a move towards active involvement, even if it has at times been hesitant in some respects. The second condition has, throughout the existence of the state, applied to Ireland, for her geographical situation has permitted her a high degree of freedom with respect to security commitments.

Of course, in Ireland we do not talk of "security" - we talk of "neutrality". A student of this phenomenon has recently predicted the expansion of a "somewhat messy neutrality" in international relations[30]; with regard to "messiness" Irish neutrality may be seen as a precursor of this trend, for there is some ambiguity about its place in Irish foreign policy. On the one hand, the anti-EEC establishment assures us that "we have followed a policy of military neutrality since the foundation of our state which is quite as legitimate and important for us as is their similar long-established policy for the people of Sweden and Switzerland".[31] On the other hand, government spokesmen speak in terms of "ad hoc neutrality"; Dr. Hillery maintains that "while Ireland remained neutral during World War II we have never adopted a permanent policy of neutrality in the doctrinaire or ideological sense".[32]

The first claim is blurred a little by Irish membership

of the League of Nations. Strictly speaking, "by and large the Covenant abolished neutrality"[33], but the manner in which collective security was applied (or rather not applied) allowed the Irish Government to evade this issue, though there are signs of some heart-searching in the hey-day of the sanctionist campaign against Italy. But the Government's present line on the history of neutrality contains a measure of over-simplification, too. It slips altogether too lightly over Mr. de Valera's very clear development of a neutral stance, expressed in public speeches from the Summer of 1936 on, and in policy from the return of the Treaty Ports in 1938 and throughout the Second World War. It also plays down the very important fact that neutrality was not only a security policy during the war but it was seen as a symbol of freedom; the decision between war and peace is perhaps the ultimate expression of sovereignty. Then, through the 1940s, the policy of neutrality became a symbol of the lack of freedom - with regard to Northern Ireland.[34] When, with the aid of a rather doubtful legal interpretation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Ireland refused to join NATO in 1949 neutrality was not so much a security policy - a luxury Ireland could then coyly deny - as an extension of irredentist policy. It may not have enjoyed constitutional expression but there is no doubt that, politically, it had been enshrined.

There is some confusion, then, in both the "ad hoc" and "ad infinitum" Schools of Irish Neutrality, and this is reflected to some degree in attitudes towards the political implications of the Common Market application. As far as the government is concerned, it is possible to trace the steady pursuit of the "desanctification" of neutrality, from Mr. Lemass's disarming admission in 1962 that somebody had got the North Atlantic Treaty all wrong to Dr. Hillery's claim that partition was "only one possible aspect of joining a military alliance".[35] Partition can still act as an isolating factor, however, as can be seen in the government's coolness towards participation in a European security conference that had the acceptance of existing boundaries as a precondition.[36] There remain, perhaps, some more legal hairs to be split.

None the less, the greater emphasis in the government's line lies in a general acceptance not merely of the Treaty of Rome but of some of its more far-reaching political implications. Thus Dr. Hillery has stated that "if we are part of Europe and enjoying all the benefits of being part of Europe, then we will take part in the defence of Europe, but that is far in the future".[37] Nothing more specific has emerged from this or similar government statements, leaving the field wide open to speculation, but this much is clear: neutrality is up for reconsideration.

Those supporters of Ireland's EEC policy who are outside the government are occasionally more forthcoming in their views of neutrality policy, if not always more lucid. A Fine Gael spokesman has been reported as saying that "Ireland's military neutrality was a policy of avoiding international military commitments, but [the state was] prepared to defend itself, as an integral part of Europe".[38] A more precise view is presented by another member of the same party, Dr. Garret Fitz-Gerald, who, while accepting that EEC membership implies a move away from the isolationist stance, argues that it does not imply the obligation to join any existing security system to which other members belong.[39] This theme was pursued at the European Parliamentary Council Conference in London earlier this year, when the Irish delegation successfully proposed that European foreign policy should be developed within the context of the Community system, rather than in the extension of some existing institution such as WEU.[40] At the same conference it was also noticeable that some of the Irish delegation were looking forward to a Europe which would be independent, open and ... "neutral".[41]

Opponents of EEC membership, on the other hand, regard neutrality as a policy not lightly, if ever, to be abandoned. While their case remains, to date, on much the same general level as that of the government, some underlying themes can be identified. There is a fundamental distaste for militarism - "Would nuclear bases corrode our coasts and tanks manoeuvre in Connemara?"[42] But there is, too, a more characteristically Irish view, summed up in the phrase "conscription of Irishmen to fight for Mother England".[43] Conscription has long been an emotive issue in Irish politics, being regarded as being the very essence of imperial exploitation, and even if the Irish government is the agent of conscription, or an international organization the framework in which it is effected, the traditional charge can still stick. Its appeal is broad, from the left-wing Sinn Fein movement (which claims membership of NATO is inevitable in the EEC)[44] even to pro-EEC grass-roots conservatives, such as Mr. Oliver Flanagan of the Fine Gael party.[45]

A notable feature of the debate on neutrality so far has been the almost total absence of any discussion of military or strategic considerations, in the technical sense. One of the fruits of our neutrality is that we simply do not think in these terms, and are barely aware of the sorts of factors which concern those governments which do. Asked in Norway recently (1st April) about the Irish view of Soviet manoeuvres in the North Atlantic, Dr. Hillery is reported to have replied: "We have not

been conscious of such manoeuvres."[46] There appears to be a general assumption that the only war situation Ireland could face would be a nuclear holocaust; the possibility of economic, conventional or subversive warfare has hardly been touched on.[47] Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, of the Labour Party, has suggested in the Dail that if theories of graduated response were applied Ireland might well find herself in the front line, as the smallest and most expendable component of a European political system.[48] The Dail, true to form, paid no attention. Small states which survive in the shadow of other powers' defence umbrellas cannot be expected to have institutes for strategic studies; even so, the silence of the Irish military elite is eloquent. The debate has an air of unreality, and in the context of the EEC issue as a whole it is peripheral. The main determinants of policy are economic.

Notes

1. The phrase, that of an Ulster poet, was used by Mr. Lynch in his "reconciliation" broadcast of 11 July 1970.

2. New institutional patterns are also to be found in the administration. In the Department of Foreign Affairs (a new title, since March 1971) the past two years have seen the creation of (a) an Anglo-Irish Political Section and (b) an EEC information section. There is also an "inter-departmental unit" on Northern Ireland, comprising officials from the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Finance and the Taoiseach, reporting to the Taoiseach through the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3. Mr. Lynch at the Fianna Fail Party Conference, 21 February 1971.

4. These characteristics are noted in J. Frankel, National Interest (Pall Mall, 1970), pp. 31-32.

5. BBC interview, 1 March 1971.

6. In a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 22 Oct. 1970.

7. Senator John Kelly's phrase. Irish Times, 3 March 1971.

8. e.g., see Irish Times, 1 January 1971.

9. Irish Times, 5 December 1970 and 18 December 1970.

10. In a speech to the Dail, 3 March 1971.

11. 21 February 1971.

12. For example, Mr. Brian Lenihan associated "Europe" with "Irish Unity" during a recent by-election in Donegal, in a constituency sensitive both to the "Border issue" and to the future of the fishing industry in the EEC. Irish Times, 9 November 1970.

13. Irish Times, 9 March 1971, i.e. before Mr. Faulkner became Prime Minister.

14. On 21 February 1971 and 9 March 1971, respectively.

15. Quoted in Irish Times, 26 February 1971.

16. See, e.g., Irish Times, 17 February 1971, 16 March 1971; Mr. Lynch in the Dail, 3 March 1971.

17. Irish Times, 19 March 1971.

18. In the Dail, 9 March 1971.

19. In the Dail, 28 January 1971.

20. Mr. Lynch's expression, UN General Assembly, 22 October 1970.

21. Dr. Hillery in the Dail, 28 January 1971.

22. See D. Harkness, Restless Dominion (Macmillan, 1969)

23. The Security Council proceedings were broadcast direct on the national radio network. This is not a usual occurrence.

24. See Ireland at the United Nations: Text of the Main Speeches, 1969 (Browne & Nolan Ltd., Dublin, 1970).

25. Frankel, op. cit., p. 133.

26. Irish Times, 3 November 1970.

27. According to Claud Cockburn, see Irish Times, 10 November 1970.

28. A phrase used by the Fine Gael foreign affairs spokesman, Richie Ryan, Irish Times, 12 November 1970.

29. P. Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester University Press, 1963), p.99.

30. R. Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 205.

31. In an open letter. Irish Times, 19 September 1970.

32. Interview in the Irish Press, 2 December 1970.

33. Ogley, op. cit., p. 97.

34. See Conor Cruise O'Brien introduces Ireland, ed. O. D. Edwards (Andre Deutsch, 1969), pp. 118-127.

35. Interview in the Irish Times, 19 March 1970.

36. Irish Times, 2 April 1971.

37. In the Dail, 24 November 1970.

38. Irish Times, 16 October 1970.

39. Irish Times, 28 November 1970.

40. Irish Times, 15 February 1971.

41. Irish Times, 13 February 1971.

42. Letter to the Irish Times, 18 November 1970.

43. Letter to the Irish Times, 25 November 1970.

44. Irish Times, 27 October 1970.

45. Irish Times, 11 March 1971.

46. Irish Times, 2 April 1971.

47. An intriguing exception is found not in Ireland but in the United Kingdom, where the Monday Club has published a pamphlet - mainly concerning Northern Ireland - entitled Ireland - our Cuba?

48. In the Dail, 24 June 1970.

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

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