# A STUDY OF RYLE'S THEORY OF MIND

## EXPOSITORY AND CRITICAL

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


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


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# FOREWORD

Professor Ryle's "The Concept of Mind" is one of the finest specimens of systematic linguistic analysis in the field of mind. He has analysed the propositions of psychology in a right scientific spirit, relying entirely on the principles of economy, neatness and consistency and scrupulously avoiding all metaphysical entities that could be avoided, even though these have traditionally been presupposed by people using such propositions. Ryle is not indeed a pioneer in this field but he is decidedly the first linguistic philosopher who has covered such a wide area, limelighting so many details.

Dr. G. D. Jha has picked up the following broad topics from Ryle's book :

Dispositions, Self-knowledge, Sensation and Observation, Imagination and Intellect.

He has begun with a lucid exposition of Ryle's views on these topics, and this has been a very wise move on his part, for many of the critics of Ryle have not cared much to understand him as thoroughly and as honestly as they should have. I do not accept all the points in Dr. Jha's exposition of Ryle. But that matters little. Decidedly, it is an excellent exposition.

After exposition Dr. Jha has offered detailed examination of Ryle's views. Here too I do not agree with him on all the points. But I frankly admit that I have rarely come across such a thorough and honest study of Ryle.

In the second part of the book he begins with an examination of Ryle's *method.* He has correctly argued that though linguistic analysis serves a very useful purpose it cannot be the sole aim of philosophy. He, I believe, is equally right in holding that some of the puzzles that Ryle has referred to cannot be all due to linguistic confusion.

His criticism of Ryle's concept of mind as dispositional behaviour, particularly his study of the very concept of disposition, is undoubtedly refreshing, though it may not be acceptable at places. He is reluctant to accept Ryle's account of self-consciousness—he points out that to deny consciousness would often amount to *denying the obvious* —and argues forcefully that introspection cannot be replaced by retrospection. The well-known puzzle of infinite regress he brushes aside on the ground that mind is not a series of bits of consciousness.

He has challenged Ryle's fundamental contention that 'the sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same'.

He is equally against Ryle's condemnation of *images* and insists that there is no denying the fact that there are dream images. 'The ghost in the machine', he claims, cannot be banished altogether.

I am confident that Dr. Jha's 'A Study of Ryle's Theory of Mind' will be of immense help to future workers on Ryle.

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# PREFACE

With the aim of working on some of the contemporary theories of mind, I began to read Gilbert Ryle's noted work *The Concept of Mind.* After having gone through the book a number of times and after having read the available literature on it, I finally decided to work on Ryle's theory alone. I took this decision primarily because the book proved to be revolutionary and provocative, it continuously sustained my interest and set me thinking. For sometime it appeared that I would be conveniently converted to his belief. His charming style and forensic manner of presentation combined with all the devices of a rhetoric produced a lasting impression on me. Ryle is indeed a style. The racy, untechnical and idiosyncratic manner of his writing and the exasperating quality of its polemical tone, entirely devoid of jargon make the book eminently readable. An outstanding feature of the book is the substitution of the concrete for the abstract. Ryle is also admirably sensitive to the nuances. His thorough and expert analysis of modal statements, particularly of the word 'can', is an example of his originality and understanding. He is, without doubt, a powerful, original and ingenuous thinker.

But inspite of the fact that his thought is dressed in powerful and interesting style it has not been possible for me ( as will be obvious from Part II of this volume ) to agree to his views. Quite in accordance with the recent trends, his aim has been to dispense with the Cartesian mind on linguistic grounds. I have argued that he has not succeeded in this task. It has not, however, been my attempt—in any case, I lack the ability—to re-establish Cartesianism. What I have tried to suggest is that the Cartesian position is not untenable, the 'ghost' still haunts philosophy. In my attempt to do so I have been highly encouraged by the writings of a good number of persons. In this volume I have frequently quoted them in support of my contention. I have quoted them in order to show that Ryle's classic work has not had a less stormy life in the intellectual circle of the West.

But before I could criticise his views it was desirable on my part to present, to the best of my knowledge and capacity, Ryle's own thesis about mind. This is why in Part I of this volume I have given an exposition of his theory. The exposition has been a fairly long one. I would have very much liked to see it shorter. But in order to

understand and appreciate this novel theory in its diverse aspects, particularly when I was going to criticise it, the growing size of the exposition could not deter me from elaborating his view point as faithfully as I could.

The second part of this volume, which is a critical evaluation of Ryle's thesis, begins with the chapter on 'The Method'. Since I am not inclined to believe that linguistic analysis or the philosophy of ordinary use can finally solve or dissolve age-long metaphysical problems, I have deemed it necessary to attack Ryle's method first. My dissatisfaction with linguistic analysis as the sole method applied to the solution of major philosophical problems will, in the very beginning, indicate my general approach to such problems. This is why 'The Method' comes first. After having expressed myself on the method, I have devoted the next chapter to 'disposition'. 'Disposition' is a watch-word or key-word of Ryle's theory. Ryle has substituted Cartesian mind by disposition. Since it is a pivotal term of his theory, Ryle's success or failure is bound to depend on the merit or the demerit of his idea of disposition. I have, therefore, taken it up next and have shown how it falls short of the intended task. After this, I have selected a few of Ryle's own chapters for critical examination. The chapter on 'Self-Knowledge' has been taken up because Ryle has here dealt with the important concepts of 'consciousness' and 'introspection', the notion of 'I' and self-knowledge without consciousness. The chapters dealing with cognitive concepts, such as 'Sensation and Observation', 'Imagination', and 'The Intellect' have been subsequently taken up. Since cognising or cognitive activity is one of the basic functions of consciousness, not easily assailable by the opponents of mind or consciousness, and since Ryle has devoted considerable space to the discussion of this aspect of mind, I have preferred to discuss his chapters on cognitive concepts. I have done so also because here in these chapters Ryle's thesis appears to be more artificial and sophisticated. Instead of elucidating the regular use of psychological expressions to which he is committed, Ryle here introduces altogether new use of many of such expressions.

Ryle has also a chapter on 'The Will' and another on 'Emotion'. I have not devoted separate chapter to either of them, though I have discussed at times their salient points at appropriate places of

discussion. As most of the things that I could say while discussing these chapters would be mere repetitions (Ryle's basic arguments in the different chapters are more or less the same—to substitute consciousness and its modifications by disposition, i. e., by actual or possible behaviour) I did not think it necessary to deal with them separately.

As philosophical temperament notoriously differs, I have differed with Ryle. I believe that Cartesianism is still a suitable *hypothesis* to explain man in relation to his environment. In my attempt to emphasise this point, certain repetitions might have occurred in this volume, But these, I think, were unavoidable.

To the admirers of Ryle, however, my criticisms, which are not indifferent to the material mode of speech, may appear to be hitting at the wrong end and, therefore, missing the mark. Ryle, they say, is not concerned with Mind. He is concerned only with the *Concept* of Mind—It has not been his task to discover facts about mind. It has only been to elucidate the meaning of mind-involving sentences. Accordingly, Ryle, they claim, does not talk in the material mode of speech. Being confined to the limits of linguistic usage alone ( without going to the realm of facts ), he is said to have adopted only a formal mode of speech. A proper criticism of Ryle cannot, therefore, be evolved or formulated in the material mode of speech.

Now, with regard to the above anticipated objection, it is true that I have not hesitated to employ the material mode of speech, where I have found it suitable for the purpose. But this I have done not without reason. I am inclined to believe that any discussion which is concerned with a subject like the concept of Mind cannot be strictly formal. And this is obvious from the treatment of Ryle himself. Any impartial or uncommitted study of his *Concept of Mind* will reveal that Ryle himself has taken recourse to the consideration of facts ( and has, therefore, adopted the material mode of speech ). To take only a few of such instances : when he explains the category mistake with the help of Ashmoleum Museum, the Christ Church and the Bodlien library ( p. 16 ), when he compares mental privacy with the privacy of a diary kept under lock and key ( pp. 184-85 ), when he clarifies the role of Psychology with the example of a farmer who

returns from the market with his pigs unsold but with a definite look in his eyes, ( p. 326 ) etc., etc., he is certainly crossing the linguistic boundary to enlist support from the world of facts. As a matter of fact, his *Concept of Mind* abounds in statements where it is not difficult to notice his material mode of speech. To my mind, Ryle could not have avoided talking in the material mode of speech. We know that his butt of attack is mind as conceived by the Cartesians. Cartesians have never understood it only as a linguistic expression. For them, mind is a substance, an entity, a thing or a fact. So, when Ryle is making the 'mind' of the Cartesians a target of his attack, he is certainly concerned with a fact which he cannot effectively attack only through linguistic weapon He has, therefore, to fall back upon facts. So, when Ryle himself adopts the material mode of speech (may be unconsciously) there is no harm in evaluating his thesis by adopting the same technique.

Inspite of my disagreement, however, I do not deny the enormous value that Ryle's work has. Ryle has attempted very sincerely to dislodge Cartesianism. He has also shown how the method of linguistic analysis can be consistently applied to philosophical problems. Such a work has the merit of giving us an opportunity of re-thinking and reviewing our ideas, if necessary.

The present study, which was completed as a doctoral thesis and which was accepted for the award of Ph. D. degree by the Visva-Bharati University was carried under the guidance of Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharya, Director of the Centre of Advanced study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, and now Vice-Chancellor of the same University. It was indeed my privilege to work under Dr. Bhattacharyya. His customary care and kindness, encouragement and affection combined with timely discussions enabled me to complete this work smoothly. I am also grateful to my teacher, Dr. D. M. Datta, at whose feet I had the privilege to learn Philosophy for years together. His retired life at Santiniketan proved to be a boon for me, for he was also readily available to help me in need. In spite of the help that I received from such distinguished persons, I might have erred here and there in my estimation of Ryle due to my own inability.

I also take this opportunity to express my thankfulness to the

members of the department of Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, for their constant encouragement. I am also deeply obliged to Dr. S. K. Ghose of the department of English, Visva-Bharati, for his very kindly going through the chapters and suggesting improvement of English at places. Last but not the least, I express my deep sense of gratitude to all those authors and writers, whose work has helped me, directly or indirectly, in the completion of this book.

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May 1, 1967

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It follows, therefore, that truth manifests itself....

—*Benedictus De Spinoza.*

....it is impossible for us to *think* of anything, which we have not antecedently *felt*, either by our external or internal senses.

—*David Hume.*

# PART—I

## EXPOSITION OF RYLE'S THEORY OF MIND

# EXPOSITION OF RYLE'S THEORY OF MIND

## I

In his celebrated work *The Concept of Mind* Gilbert Ryle has used the current fashionable method of linguistic analysis to show the hollowness of mind-body dualism. Descartes, the father of modern European Philosophy, had firmly established the dualism of mind and body as two distinct substances, having opposite qualities. Man, according to him, is the union of these two substances. His body is in space and time, observable to every human being and is subject to death. His mind is not in space but in time, observable to nobody except himself and may survive death. A man is thus a peculiar combination of diametrically opposed principles.

Ryle finds in this dualism a capital mistake, which he terms as a category mistake. He explains this with the help of several examples. A visitor who wants to see a university is shown the Senate House, the Registrar's office, the different constituent colleges, the library and other units. After having seen them, he may still ask as to where the University is, which he has not seen. Obviously the man is making a mistake. He thinks that the University is some other unit like those which he has already seen. By treating the University as some such thing as Senate House, or Registrar's office, he is placing the University in the category of those which he has seen. But the University is not a thing like those units. It is just the way in which those units are organised. The co-ordination of those units is known as the University. The University is, therefore, not of the same category as the Senate House, the Registrar's office etc. The visitor, by demanding to see the University in addition to the different units has confused the category of the University with the category of those seen units.

According to Ryle, similar is the case with a dualist. He confuses the category of mind with the category of body. He thinks that if body is a thing, mind also must be another thing ( just as the visitor thought that if Senate House, etc., are units, the University must be some other unit ). If the body is a field of mechanical causes and effects, mind also must be another field of causes and effects, though not mechanical. The dualist forgets that 'mind' and 'body' are terms of different categories. Mind is just the way the human body and

its brain function ( just as the University is the way in which the different organised units function ). Thus, according to Ryle, a dualist makes a big category mistake by confusing the terms of different types to be terms of the same type. Mind and body are, according to Ryle, terms of two distinct types or categories.

Ryle further holds that it is improper to conjoin or disjoin the terms of different categories or types. It makes no sense to say that 'there are the Senate House, the Registrar's office, the constituent college, the library *and* the University.' It also does not make sense to say 'there are *either* Senate House, Registrar's office, constituent college, the library *or* the University.' For the same reason it makes no sense to say that 'there is mind *and* body' or 'there is *either* mind *or* body.' Mind and body being terms of distinct categories, conjoining or disjoining the two, will lead to nothing but absurdity. It is owing to a failure to recognise this absurdity that doctrines of materialism and idealism have come into existence. Both materialism and idealism are answers to an improper disjunction 'either there is mind or body.' Ryle maintains that his position cannot be either materialism or idealism. Neither mind is absorbed by matter, nor matter by mind. Both exist but not in the same sense. "It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds and to say, in another logical tone of voice, that there exist bodies",[1] says Ryle. As the term 'rising' has different senses in 'the tide is rising', 'hope is rising' and 'fever is rising', 'existence' has different senses in 'body is existing' and 'mind is existing'. Thus both mind and body exist but in different senses. As they do not exist in the same sense, it is ridiculous to frame a conjunctive proposition and say 'there exist mind and body' ( as the dualists do ). It is also, for the same reason, ridiculous to frame a disjunctive proposition and say 'there exists either mind or body', ( on the truth of which materialism and idealism depend ). But though statements about conjunctions and disjunctions are improper, separate statements about mind and body are not improper. We cannot make, as we have seen, conjunctive or disjunc-

1. The Concept of Mind, p. 23.

tive statements about the different units and the University, but we can certainly make separate statements about the units and the University. We can easily say in one sentence 'there exist the Senate House, the Registrar's office ...' and in another 'there exists the University.' So separate statements like 'Mind exists' and 'Body exists' are valid, though conjunctive or disjunctive statements like 'Mind and Body exist' and 'Mind or body exists' are invalid.

Thus Ryle makes it clear that mind and body both exist, but they do not exist in the same sense. The Cartesian dualism took them as existing in the same sense. According to it, mind and body were both substances existing together in a human body, having their own proper fields of action. Ryle is against this type of dualism, and advocates forcefully that such a co-existing substance as mind has no reality at all. Such a mind he calls a ghost, and he is totally against the conception of a ghost in the body-machine. This mind is a myth. Throughout his book *The Concept of Mind* he has tried to explode this myth. But by exploding the myth, he is not negating the concept of mind. Ryle has his own theory of mind. What he is negating are the idioms in which mind was conceived and described by the dualists. He emphatically asserts in the introduction to his book that his task is only "to rectify the logical geography of knowledge which we already possess."[2] He believes that "many people can talk sense with concepts but cannot talk sense about them".[3] So in practical life we all use mind-involving concepts correctly, but when an occasion to give an account of those concepts comes, we falter and describe them in a mythical way. Ryle wants to do away with this mythical account, as given by the dualists, particularly by Descartes.

## II

But the question is—how does he do away with the mythical account of mind and what positive account has he to offer? In answer to this question, we may observe that the main interest of his book is negative, i. e., to destroy the Cartesian notion of mind, and

2. Ibid., p. 7
3. Ibid., p. 7

only secondarily to give a positive account of the same. What he wants to destroy is mind as second to body, in any form—substance, process or anything. Just as the University is nothing else than the functioning of the different units in a certain way, similarly mind is nothing else than the functioning of the body in a certain way. Mind, according to Ryle, is nothing but behaviour of certain sorts. He explains psychological terms as behaviours or dispositions to behaviour. It is not a fact that bodily behaviours are caused by mind. They are occasioned by dispositions or tendencies. Man has many dispositions or bents or inclinations in him. He acts at opportune moments according to those dispositions. For example, he may have a disposition towards vanity in him. When a stranger comes to him, his disposition of vanity actualises in his tall talk and boastings. But these dispositions are not stored in an inner private chamber called mind. There is nothing mysterious or occult about these dispositions. They are just the ways in which the public behaviour of men are managed. Ryle explains mental qualities mainly as dispositions. Take, for example, the psychological concept of 'intelligence'. The dualists will explain an intelligent activity as a thoughtful activity. By this they will mean that for an activity to be intelligent, we must first think at a secret stage of mind and then act. The intelligent activity is, according to them, a tandem operation of first considering at a private stage and then doing publicly. It is a double operation of considering and executing. Ryle will differ from this explanation of intelligence. According to him, any intelligent activity is a single operation. There is no question of diverse processes in it. As an instance, we may take a piece of intelligent humour. Humour is spontaneous. It does not involve thinking and saying humorous words. Again, if we identify intelligence with considering and executing, it will lead to infinite regress. Considering or thinking is itself an activity which may be intelligent or unintelligent. So, in order that an activity may be intelligent, the so-called prior thinking must be intelligent. But in order that this prior thinking be intelligent, we *ex hypothese* require a further prior thinking to be intelligent and so on *ad infinitum*. Even if intelligent activity requires thinking, it does not entail privacy for we may think aloud. It is no part of the definition of thinking to

entail privacy. We may think aloud or silently as it suits us. It is only a case of convenience. Thinking silently is a sophisticated performance. We have to train ourselves to keep our thoughts within us. So, Ryle argues, that there is nothing ghostly or occult about intelligence. It is just a special manner or procedure of doing things. But the question may be asked : if intelligence is nothing more than a particular manner or procedure of doing things, how shall we distinguish the intelligent trippings and tumblings of a clown from an exactly similar but unintelligent trippings and tumblings of a clumsy man ? Outwardly the trippings and tumblings of both are the same. Ryle says that they can be distinguished. The clown's trippings and tumblings are the actualisations of his skill (which is a disposition) while the clumsy man's trippings and tumblings are not the actualisations of any skill at all. So, whether an activity is intelligent can be decided by considering whether it is an actualisation of a skill. Whether the activity is an actualisation of a skill can be decided by seeing whether the same can be done under diverse circumstances. The hitting of a bull's eye is skilful if it can be done again and again even when the target changes, the range alters and the wind strengthens. If it is skilful it is certainly intelligent.

Thus any act which is to be characterised by a mental predicate must be the actualisation of some disposition. Mind is a dispositional behaviour. There are some dipositions which always actualise in one way. For example, the disposition of smoking always actualises in the act of smoking. But there are many dispositions whose track of actualisation is not one. They may actualise in diverse ways. 'Intelligence', for example, is one such disposition. Intelligent activity is not one unique kind of activity. It may take various forms.

Almost all psychological concepts can be explained on the lines of 'intelligence' as given above. They primarily refer to dispositions or tendencies to behave. But there is nothing mysterious or ghostly about dispositions. They are just the ways in which parts of our conduct are managed. Ryle distinguishes between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'—knowing how to typewrite and knowing that the Indian typewriter is cheaper than others. He maintains that knowing

in the sense of 'knowing how' is a disposition or a bent. The dualists maintain that knowing is an occurrence in the secret chamber of mind. While knowing, an event or happening takes place in the inner world of mind. But Ryle does not find any episodic use of this term 'knowing'. When we say that this sleeper knows French, we do not mean that an occurrence, called knowing, is going on in his private mind. How can some such event take place in his mind when he is asleep? Therefore, when we characterise him (the sleeper) as knowing French, all we mean is that he can perform some actions with regard to the French language, if an occasion of that sort arises—e. g., if he is given a French newspaper, he can read it; if he is asked to translate a French passage into his mother tongue, he can do it, etc. That is, knowing in this sense is an ability or proneness to do certain acts or things. Such an ability or proneness is called a disposition. Here it becomes clear that there is nothing categorical about dispositions. Dispositional statements are always hypothetical statements. They always involve 'if, then'. That is why they resemble law statements.

Arguing in this way, Ryle has tried to prove that psychological concepts of 'know', 'believe', 'aspire', 'clever', 'humorous', etc. do not refer to secret activities conducted on a second stage called mind. They are disposition-words.

But there are some psychological terms which seem to refer to occurrences. They do not appear to mean any disposition or tendency. For example, 'reading carefully' or 'minding what one is doing.' Here 'reading carefully' seems to refer to two types of episodes—physical and mental. Reading is a physical activity while exercising carefulness is a mental activity, so that while reading carefully, something is happening both at the physical and the mental level. From this it is tempting to conclude that the term 'carefully' refers to a mental occurrence quite unlike the physical occurrence of reading.

Ryle will argue that the above interpretation of the phrase 'reading carefully' is a mistake. 'Reading carefully' does not refer to two activities. It is one activity. Humming while walking are two activities because one is possible without the other, but exercising care by itself is not possible. It cannot be said that the man is

simply exercising care but not reading. Can a man who is driving carefully cease to drive and still care or mind his driving ? Obviously not. For this reason, reading carefully is one occurrence, not two. Reading is certainly a physical occurrence. Carefulness is a frame of mind or disposition. It is a disposition to do many things including reading ; for example, to tell the gist of what one has read, to utilise the knowledge during conversation or examination, to point out the mistake if one says contradictory things, etc. So, 'reading carefully' refers to an occurrence of reading in a certain frame of mind. In that frame of mind, one can do a lot of things, besides reading, if required to do so. Thus the sentence 'He is reading carefully' has both an episodic reference and a dispositional reference. It shows something categorical ( e. g. reading ) and something dispositional ( e. g. carefulness ). Ryle calls such sentences, containing heed verbs or verbs of minding ( e. g. noticing, taking care, studying, trying, etc. ) Mongrel categorical or semi-dispositional. So, it comes to this that even those psychological words which on their face seem to refer to mental occurrences or hidden processes turn out to be actually dispositional. There is, therefore, no ghostly world of mind. Mind-involving concepts mean tendencies leading to behaviour in appropriate circumstances. Mind is behaviour. As behaviour it is nothing secret. It is open and public. By observing our own behaviour, we can have a look into our own minds. By observing the behaviour of others, we can have a look into their minds. There is an open access into the minds of others as well as of our own selves. The dualists had so conceived mind that nobody on earth except the agent himself could have an access to it. Only the agent had an 'open access'. The dualist's theory had made another mind completely shut from observation. This inevitably led to solipsism and complete ignorance of the minds of others. But neither are we confined to our own minds nor are we ignorant of the minds of others. Mind as behaviour is public, not private. This is what Ryle wants to establish throughout the book.

## III

Ryle discusses the traditional concept of 'volition' or the 'will' and argues strongly that there is nothing like 'volition' or the 'will'. Volition, according to him, is an artificial concept. No common man is seen using this term in his everyday conversation It is only philosophers and old fashioned psychologists who use this technical term to suit their queer theories. Volitions as thrusts, coming to physical body from the inner world of mind in executing a task is a myth. The traditionalists maintain that unless the phenomenon of volition occurs, the body cannot move to act. A bare decision to do something does not issue in action. In order that the action may be actually performed, a prior act of will has to be performed in the secret world of mind. According to the traditional theory, the physical act of doing something is the effect of the mental act of willing. My writing here is the effect of a will which I have already entertained in my mind.

But Ryle does not find any evidence of this mysterious thrust in the common talk of the people. Nobody ever speaks of having a volition at 10 A. M., or having five quick or slow volitions between breakfast and lunch. Novelists have never described volitions of their characters. Even if volitions be accepted as true, the traditionalists cannot explain the exact relation between them and the bodily movements. The dualists' explanation of the relation between mind and body is still far from satisfactory. Further, Ryle argues that volitions ares aid to make actions meritorious or wicked. As mental operations are themselves generally meritorious or wicked, the question of volition arises with regard to them. Then what about volitions ? Are they voluntary or involuntary ? If voluntary ( i, e. issuing from a prior volition ), we cannot avoid infinite regress. If involuntary ( i. e. not issuing from a prior volition ) they cannot make the issuing act voluntary. So if volitions are accepted, ridiculous consequences follow from the same.

But all the same, Ryle does not want to discard the concepts 'voluntary' and 'involuntary'. These terms are used in practical life, but there they do not mean adjectives related to a mysterious phenomenon called 'volition', The question of voluntary or involun-

tary is not decided with reference to a private act of will. It is decided with reference to 'could have avoided' or 'could not have avoided'. If somebody could have avoided doing something, the action is called voluntary and if he could not have avoided doing it, the action is called involuntary. Moreover, these terms are used with reference to a man who is suspected of a guilty action, If somebody breaks a watch, the question at once arises whether this act was voluntary or involuntary, i. e., whether he could have avoided breaking it or not. If it is proved that he could have avoided it, he is condemned ; if otherwise, he is let off. So, 'voluntary' and 'involuntry' are in use with regard to faults ( that is, where it is felt that the action should not have been done ). It is only philosophers who use them even for satisfactory or meritorious performances. But it is meaningless to call a meritorious action voluntary. When somebody commits a guilt, his action is called voluntary because he could have avoided it. He knew the right thing but did not do that. Similarly, if somebody performs a praiseworthy act, his action will be called voluntary only if he could have avoided it. That is, he knew the wrong thing but did not do that. But this explanation of praiseworthy act is too artificial to have any meaning. Is the praiseworthy solution of a problem voluntary because the agent knew how to avoid it but did not do that ? Surely, nobody will agree to an explanation like this. Ryle, by arguing so, holds that it is improper to label both right and wrong actions as voluntary. Only that is voluntary which is our guilt or fault.

Proceeding further, Ryle explains those idioms of everyday use which may appear to refer to the mysterious element of volition, for example, 'behaving resolutely', 'strength of will', 'effort of will' and so on. But there is nothing mysterious in them. Behaving resolutely means not getting slack in efforts. Strength of will means sticking to a task. Effort of will means acting in face of other stronger temptations. There is, therefore, no room for bringing in the ghostly concept of volition in order to explain them.

Ryle explains the philosopher's concept of 'the freedom of will' and holds it to be a direct product of the bogy of mechanism. Freedom of will was invented, he believes, out of the fear of mechanism. Mechanism had established that the physical world is governed by rigid laws.

The whole course of nature is strictly determined. There is no scope for freedom. Naturally, therefore, the question of morality could not have been raised with regard to actions done in such a world. Moralists and religious thinkers were shocked to hear it. In order to defend the ideas of morality and religion, they invented a peculiar world, called it mind and described its volitional phase as the source of these ideas. They said, we have a mind, whose one phase is volition or will and which by its nature is free. Actions issue forth from it, leading to plaudits or strictures. But, says Ryle, this concept of freedom is totally imaginary. There is no truth in it.

In spite of that, Ryle does not believe that mechanism is wholly true either. He also believes in freedom. He only resists us in seeking it in a ghostly world. For freedom we will not have to go to any mysterious world of mind. This physical world provides us with freedom. Necessity and freedom are both true of this world. He illustrates. In a game of chess, the bishops must move on the squares of the same colour, but on which particular square it will move at a certain juncture depends on us, the player. While writing, one has to obey the rules of grammar, but in what style one would write is not forced by grammar. There we have freedom. So, though physical laws govern everything, they do not ordain everything. Ryle asserts "Not all questions are physical questions". There is, therefore, a scope for freedom. Questions of morality are valid questions. In fact, one and the same occurrence can be explained in terms of mechanics as well as in terms of ethical principles, as the same game of chess can be explained in terms of the rules as well as in terms of freedom. So, even without the mysterious concept of mind and its will, moral concepts can be understood and explained. Ryle denies volition but he does not deny morality for his theory is not incompatible with the concepts of freedom and morality.

## IV

But what about emotions ? If the inner world of mind is to be rejected, how to account for emotions ? Emotion is generally defined as an experience of turbulences going on in the private stream of consciousness. Due to a certain situation obtaining in the environ-

ment, the normalcy of the internal stream of consciousness is disturbed. The feeling or experiencing of this disturbance is called emotion. So, this way of understanding emotion is necessarily connected with a ghostly world of mind where turbulences are said to occur.

But, says Ryle, this explanation of emotion is another extension of the dogma of the ghost. He makes a list of the senses in which the term emotion is used. It appears to Ryle that it is used either for feelings, or for motives ( inclinations ) or for moods or agitations ( commotions ). Now he takes them one by one and shows that none of them has any reference to a ghostly world. Feeling words, e.. g., thrills, twinges, pangs, throbs, qualms, etc., are also names of bodily sensations. We speak of a twinge of remorse as well as of a twinge of rheumatism. There are qualms of apprehension or qualms of seasickness. The feeling of despair can be located in the pit of the stomach. The tense feeling of anger can be located in muscles of the jaw and the fist. Those which cannot be so located pervade the whole body. So, with William James, Ryle is prone to believe that feeling refers to bodily sensations. There is nothing secret or mysterious about it.

Sometimes theorists confuse motive words as feeling words. By confusing so, they come to believe that motive terms are names of internal experiences called emotions. For example, we may take the the term 'vanity'. Theorists believe that there is a feeling of vanity in us. This specific feeling of vanity causes the outward behaviour of boasting, day dreaming, etc. But, argues Ryle, this way of treating vanity is nothing more than a muddle and confusion. 'Vanity' is a motive word. It signifies tendencies or propensities to act in certain ways in certain circumstances. As a matter of fact all motive words are names of propensities or dispositions. 'Vanity', as such, is a disposition. A vain man is he who has a tendency to make himself prominent in situations of certain sorts. For example, while in the company of newcomers, he would talk of his achievements in superlative degree, he would show his relations with the eminent persons of the society, he would take ill if compared with his opponents, etc. That is the tendency of vanity actualises in the various acts of boasting. It is not the registering of a feeling. We do not feel the thrills or twinges of vanity. Had vanity been any

feeling of this sort, the vain man would have been the first to know how vain he was. Moreover, it becomes almost a habit with the vain man to boast. But habit is not an internal event or process. Vanity, therefore, is a disposition and as disposition it cannot be an occurrence for no disposition is an occurrence, So, vanity cannot be felt as occurring internally. Similarly, patriotism is not a feeling. It is again a disposition of a patriot to behave in certain special ways when occasions arise. When his country faces danger, he is most likely to come to the forefront, sacrifice his time and energy to meet it and so on. Thus, Ryle believes that motive words cannot be taken as referring to internal feeling. Failing to stand for feelings, they cannot refer to emotions, as understood in the traditional sense.

But a difficulty to this view may arise. If vanity is not an occurrence but a disposition, what can be the cause of the act of boasting ? A cause is certainly an occurrence prior to the happening of an effect. So, if vanity is not an occurrence, what can cause or impel a vain man to indulge in the acts of boasting ? To meet this question, Ryle distinguishes between cause and reason. He maintains that the cause of an action is different from the reason of an action. Take the instance of the breaking of a glass which is hit with a stone. Obviously this is an occurrence. The cause is the hitting and the reason is its brittleness. The glass would not have broken had there been no previous incident of hitting. It also would not have broken had there been no disposition of brittleness in it. So the question why did the glass break has two answers : (1) because it was hit and (2) because it was brittle. The first refers to an antecedent event in time. So, it is the cause. The second refers to the character of the glass. So, it is its reason. Now, it is obvious that brittleness could not have broken the glass unless some such incident as hitting had occurred. So, between disposition and its actualisations, some intermediate physical incident must take place. That is cause. The disposition, therefore, is not an incident or occurrence directly causing the effect to occur. Nobody would say that brittleness is an occurrence. It is the same with motives. As motives are dispositions, they cannot be the cause of actions. Vanity, as such, cannot be the cause of boasting. It is the reason of the acts of boasting. The cause is some such event as meeting the stranger. So, in order to explain the acts

of boasting, we need not confuse their reasons with cause. We need not take vanity as a cause and thereby construe it as an event or occurrence. So, on no front the traditional theory that the motive words as names of feelings are names of emotions, survives. Emotion is not something ghostly or occult.

Ryle thinks that sometimes mood words are also confused as the names of feelings. Being so confused, they are taken to designate emotions. But it is argued that moods cannot be taken as feelings. Mood words refer to certain frames or bents of mind. When somebody happens to be in a certain mood, he is likely to do many things, which usually he would not do. For example, if somebody is in a hilarious mood, he would not talk harsh, he would not give serious consideration to the defects of others, he would be more benevolent, etc. So, like weather, moods are temporary conditions facilitating certain typical behaviour of the occasion. As weather is not the name of an occurrence, mood words are also not the names of occurrences. As weather is a temporary condition helping many incidents, e. g., rain, storm, etc , to occur, moods are also temporary conditions facilitating behaviours. Moods, therefore, are not occurrences though they collect occurrences. They are like motives dispositional in nature, the only recognisable difference being that whereas one can have several motives, at one time, one cannot have more than one mood at a time. Moods, unlike motives, monopolise. As monopolising or stabilising themselves for a while, they cannot be called feelings. Feelings come and go, appear and disappear in quick successions. But moods do not do so. Nobody says that his pleasant mood is fast appearing and disappearing. So, not referring to feelings, they refer to the short term tendencies of the individual. As tendencies they have nothing episodic in them. They cannot be understood as pointing to the episodes of feeling occurring within the individual. The theory of the traditionalists is, therefore, out of joint.

We now come to agitations or commotions. There are many people who frequently identify emotions with commotions. By a highly emotional person, they mean a person who is often agitated, that is, one whose turbulances in the stream of consciousness are violently aroused. But Ryle argues that this way of explaining

agitations is again a mistake. Words standing for agitation, e. g,, 'worried', 'excited', 'embarrassed', etc. are names of moods or states of mind. They either refer to temporary moods, e. g., when we say that the person was embarrassed for sometime, or they refer to susceptibilities to moods, e. g. when we say that the person is embarrassed by praise, i. e. embarrassed whenever praised. Ryle calls agitations as liability conditions. They are liability conditions because when one gets into the agitated frame of mind, one is liable or bound to behave in typical ways. The behaviour that ensues is mostly aimless and vacillating, sometimes even paralytic. So, even agitations do not refer to occurrences. They stand for certain states or frames of mind. That is, they have only dispositional use, not episodic. They do not stand for any occurrent feeling. But though the agitations do not signify any occurent feeling, they are more or less connected with bodily feelings. Ryle describes feelings as signs of agitations. They are signs of agitations in the same sense in which stomachaches are signs of indigestion.

Having thus classified and explained the different senses in which the term 'emotion' is used and understood, Ryle comes to the conclusion that it has no reference to the ghostly process of internal turbulences felt in the stream of consciousness. He has shown that as motive, emotion is a disposition, as mood, it is a frame of mind, as agitation, it is a liability condition and as feeling it is nothing more than bodily sensations. So, where is then a felt turbulence in the stream of mind or consciousness ? To understand emotion as turbulences of this sort is to misconceive its real significance.

Having thus examined critically the different uses of the term emotion, Ryle discusses in particular the import of the term 'pleasure'. This is one of the most popular words used in everyday talk and is more often than not confused as an internal feeling or experience appearing on a ghostly plane. But, argues Ryle, pleasure cannot be so conceived. He asks us to look to the different uses of the word 'pleasure'. In one use, this term is commonly substituted by the verbs 'enjoy' and 'like' ; in another, it is replaced by such nouns as 'delight', 'transport', 'joy', 'rapture', etc. In the sense of the verb, e. g., when we say 'this man is enjoying digging', the word 'enjoying'

does not refer to a separate experience of pleasure besides digging. Enjoying digging is not digging plus enjoying. It is not the physical act of digging and the mental act of experiencing pleasure. It is one act of such a kind that makes digging in itself a pleasure. Physical digging in a certain mood or frame of mind is pleasure, not a vehicle or means of pleasure. Had there been two acts, one of digging and the other of experiencing, conducted at different levels, one would have expected pleasure without digging. But that is not the case. This shows that there is nothing private about pleasure. Besides, when pleasure is used in the sense of a noun, it signifies moods including agitations. We talk in such idioms as 'too delighted to speak coherently' or 'crazy with joy'. 'Too delighted to speak' means to be so much delighted that one cannot speak coherently. This is obviously an upsettingness or agitation or commotion. We have already seen that there is nothing ghostly about agitations.

Arguing thus, Ryle tries hard to establish by referring to common usage that the introspective psychology which views mind as essentially private to the agent is defective and false.

## V

But if we reject mind and its contents, do we not go against the infallible testimony of consciousness and introspection? Are not consciousness and introspection sources of obtaining facts about mental life? Consciousness appears to be a constant element of all mental processes. Owing to consciousness, any mental happening is instantaneously intimated or revealed to the agent. As for introspection, it is understood to be a kind of deliberate scrutiny of mental events. Such a scrutiny seems to reveal at once the nature of mental events and processes. So just as perception and observation enable us to know and ascertain the facts of the external world, consciousness and introspection enable us to know and ascertain the facts of the internal world. They are taken as the unfailing ways of knowing and discovering the facts of mental life. How, in the face of these obvious truths, can we venture to deny mind?

This is a tedious problem but even here Ryle, armed with a host of arguments, resolutely charges against the citadel of the ghost. He

declares that the general theory of consciousness and introspection is a logical muddle. It is a product of misconceived notions and confused convictions.

Consider, he says in effect, the notion of consciousness. If consciousness would have been the constant and unfailing source of obtaining facts about mental life, people would have spoken of 'knowing through consciousness' or getting some truth as 'a direct deliverance of consciousness'. Had it really been so important a source of acquainting oneself with the private life, such idioms, would have surely entered into the common parlance of the people. But nobody speaks in such idioms. Secondly, if consciousness would have been the constant and unfailing source of obtaining information about mental life, nothing about the mental life would have remained hidden or obscure from the agent. But ask a man whether he is irritable, he will deny it in no time.

Further, if the mental would be known by consciousness, consciousness being mental must be known by another consciousness and so on *ad infinitum*. There would be an infinite number of such onion skins of consciousness. So, the general or official theory of consciousness is unacceptable to Ryle. By analysing the meaning of the words 'conscious', consciousness and 'self-consciousness' as used in day-to-day life, Ryle shows that none of them has any affinity with the philosophers' use of the same. His radical objection to the philosophers' theory of consciousness is that there are no ghostly objects to be illumined by consciousness. He asserts : "The radical objection to the theory that minds must know what they are about, because mental happenings are by definition conscious, or metaphorically self-luminous, is that there are no such happenings ; there are no occurrences taking place in a second status world, since there is no such status and no such world and consequently no need for special modes of acquainting ourselves with the denizens of such a world".[4]

Not only with 'consciousness', Ryle finds fault also with the philosopher's theory of introspection. First, if the official theory of introspection be true, it would require attending to two things at once. The object of introspection and the act of introspection, both being

4. Ibid., p. 161.

mental. must be attended to all at once. Fear ( the mental event ) and the scrutiny or introspection of fear (the mental process) must be simultaneously known since a mental by definition is said to be at once self-initimating. But can any body attend to two things at once ? Can anybody manage to know two things simultaneously ? Secondly, if a mental event is known by introspection, how is introspection known ? Obviously introspection must be known by another introspection and so on for ever. We cannot in that case avoid infinite regress. In order to aviod this, we must say that some mental process is unintrospectible. But if one is unintrospectible, why not all ? Thirdly, if introspection is the infallible source of acquintance with the inner world, why are there so many disputes in the intellectual, religious and moral fields ? They could have been easily settled with reference to the truth revealing faculty of introspection. Fourthly, introspection cannot enable us, as Hume said, to analyse the psychological states coolly and accurately. To be in a mood to scrutinize fear, anger or panic is not to be in the state of fear, anger or panic. So, according to Ryle, the traditionalists' theory of introspection is as little intelligible as their theory of general consciousness. The theories of general consciousness and introspection suffer from severe defects and as such they cannot be made infallible and unfailing sources of letting us into the secrets of mind. The word 'introspection' hardly appears in the language of the masses. It is a technical term, used in the theories of art. Moreover, the language of introspection clearly points out to what we call retrospection. 'When I catch myself getting into panic, I do such and such' or 'He caught himself wondering how to do so and so' is usually the language of introspection. The word 'catch' clearly suggests that by introspection we actually mean retrospection for we can catch only that which is running away from us and which is being pursued and overtaken. Thus, what we name as introspection is in truth retrospection and there is nothing mysterious or occult about retrospection. Ryle asserts : "In the same way that I can catch myself day-dreaming, I can catch myself scratching ; in the same way that I can catch myself engaged in a piece of silent soliloquy, I can catch myself saying something aloud."[5] So, in principle, there

5. Ibid p, 166

is no difference between catching oneself scratching ( the public act ) and catching oneself day-dreaming ( the private act ). Throughout his book, Ryle has tried to establish that in principle there is no difference between the physical or public and the mental or private aspects of a man. What is ordinarily private in a man is the subject matter of retrospection. Like a diary, retrospection supplies considerable data about the qualities of character of the agent. But as the diary and its contents are not ghostly, retrospection and its data are not likewise ghostly. Introspection, therefore, is nothing but the authentic process of retrospection. Having thus discussed introspection and consciousness, Ryle closes the door of open and privileged access. It is no more our privilege to be the lonely witness of our secret world called mind.

But does this rejection mean that we are blind about ourselves ? Do we not know many things about our character ? Yes, certainly we do, but what we know and how we know about our ownselves are not different from what we know and how we know about other people. Ryle says, "The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same."[6] How do I know that I possess the skill of type writing ? By observing whether I can actually do type writing. How do I know that you possess the skill of type writing ? By observing whether you can do type writing. How do I know that I have understood a poem ? By observing whether I can tell the meaning, appreciate the thoughts, make a comparison and critical evaluation of the same. How do I know that you have understood the poem ? Obviously if you can tell the meaning, appreciate the thoughts, make comparison and critical evaluation of the poem. So, neither knowing about one's own self is peeping into the windowless chamber of mind nor knowing about other self is peering into his private chamber. We know about ourselves almost on the same lines as we know about others. Knowledge in both the cases (about ourselves and others) can be had if

6. Ibid., p. 155

we simply know how to establish and apply certain law-like propositions about overt and silent behaviours of ourselves and other people. By observing the behavioural patterns of people, we establish certain law-like propositions about the traits of their character. For example, if we find that a man frequently loses his temper, we establish a generally valid proposition (i. e. law-like proposition) about him by saying 'he is irritable'. Once this proposition is established, we apply it by becoming careful in our dealings with the man since we expect him to lose temper. So, traits or inclinations or dispositions are established by observing behaviour and behaviours are predicted by knowing traits. The establishment of the motives or inclinations or qualities of character is, according to Ryle, an inductive process. We know them by observing conduct, remarks, gestures, grimaces and tones of voice. This way of establishing and applying law-like propositions is as much true about ourselves as it is true about others. We establish and apply them in our own case as well as in the case of others. Only that in certain circumstances it is easier for us to establish these propositions about our own selves, in certain others it is easier to do so about others. This is a difference of facility and not of type or kind.

Arguing thus Ryle maintains that there is no metaphysical iron curtain making us all complete strangers or foreigners to one another. It is not a fact that what a man can know of himself cannot be known by others. But though in principle self-knowledge is not private, circumstances may make it private in one sense. That will be just like the privacy of the knowledge of a clap of thunder in a desert where there is nobody else except the solitary traveller. So, self-knowledge, though not by nature private, is made private under some circumstances. The curiosity, therefore, does not lie in publishing our thoughts, it lies in keeping them to ourselves. Again, just as there is no metaphysical iron curtain, there is no metaphysical looking-glass to enable us to know ourselves completely. It is not a fact that we know each and every aspect of our character. Many of our qualities may lie concealed to us. Ryle agrees with Freud in believing that a man may be a stranger to himself in certain respects. But though everything that we are is not open to ourselves, knowledge about one's own self is more open than knowledge about others.



This is not because of our privileged access to the secret arena of mind. It is because of the circumstantial facility that we enjoy. Circumstances are such that we are more with our own selves than with others. So, concludes Ryle, though there is no intrinsic difference between self-knowledge and knowledge about others, either in content or in method, there are circumstances which provide reasonable aloofness of one from the other, making self-knowledge more open than the knowledge of others. So, whereas the dualists had based self-knowledge on consciousness and introspection Ryle bases it on induction. Whereas the dualists had based the knowledge of other's mind or character on feeble inference (feeble because, no body has perceived the connection between somebody's behaviour and his so-called accompanying mental experience), Ryle bases it again on induction.

The foregoing short exposition of Ryle s views makes it clear that there is nothing secret or ghostly about man. But what about the notion of 'I' ? What does this word stand for ? Time and again it has been said that 'I' is the name of soul or spirit which is the basis of identity in us and which survives death. It is the subject or knower as opposed to the body or material substance. But Ryle advocates that this way of interpreting the word 'I' is to rob it of its true meaning. 'I' does not mean a soul substance. It only means an index word. Just as 'now' refers to the time when the word is uttered, just as 'that' refers to the person or thing which is pointed out by the speaker's finger, so 'I' refers to the person by whom the word 'I' is uttered or written. Similarly 'you' refers to the person who hears one say 'you' or who reads the word 'you' ( He may be one or many ). 'I' and 'you' therefore cannot be the names of ghostly substances in me or in you. Ryle observes ; "'I' is not an extra name for an extra being ; it indicates, when I say or write it, the same individual who can also be addressed by the proper name 'Gilbert Ryle'. 'I' is not an alias for 'Gilbert Ryle' ; it indicates the person whom 'Gilbert Ryle' names when Gilbert Ryle uses 'I'."[7] As to the contention that the self is the knower of all

7. Ibid., p. 188.

that is known, Ryle asks : Is the self known or unknown ? If it is known, it is an object like other objects ; if it is unknown, it is an infertile mystery, leading to nothing. So, there is no question of the self and no question of 'I' as naming the self or standing for the self. As a matter of fact, 'I' or 'myself' is used in different senses in different contexts. 'I am warming myself before the fire'. Here the word 'myself' refers to the body. 'I caught myself just beginning to dream'. Here 'myself' does not refer to the body. 'I was not scorched, only my hair was'. Here 'I' is not used even for a part of the body. 'I collided with the police car'. Here 'I' is used for the mechanical auxiliary, viz., the car, which is far more inferior than the human body.

But it may be objected that these different usages do not deny the self ; they, on the other hand, suggest the various types of selves within the human body. As for example, when one says, 'I should not have done that', one's good self appears to be passing a remark or stricture on one's bad self. Against this conception of the team of selves within one skin, Ryle answers that 'I' or 'myself' always refers to the same person, though in different contexts. Just as in the sentence 'After her wedding Miss Jones will no longer be Miss Jones', the two 'Miss Jones' refer to the same lady but in different contexts ( one before marriage and the other after it ), so, in the sentence 'I found myself guilty', the terms 'I' and 'myself' refer to the same person but in different contexts. But this may look ridiculous. How can the same person be a judge and a culprit both ? Ryle explains this apparent paradox with reference to what he calls 'higher order acts'. There are some acts which are in some way concerned with or are operations upon some other acts. For example, when somebody steals a watch, we send him to the police. The act of sending him to the police is a higher order act because it is directed against the previous act of stealing the watch. So, higher order acts are always concerned in some way with some other acts done before, which Ryle calls lower order acts. Now, generally we direct our higher order acts against the lower order acts of other people. But we also learn and develop the art of directing our higher order acts upon our own lower order acts. By evaluating the acts of others, we also learn how to evaluate our own acts. By knowing how to find

others guilty, I also know how to find myself guilty. So, the judgement 'I found myself guilty'. No mysterious ghost is, therefore, suggested by the judgement 'I found myself guilty'. In the light of the above explanations, Ryle further explains the concepts of 'self-consciousness' and 'self-control'. Self-consciousness is, in part, the act of reporting on our own selves. Just as we report about others so we report about ourselves. The same is true of self-control. As we control others, so we control ourselves. Self-consciousness and self-control have therefore no reference to soul, enthroned in the body.

But still the ghost dies hard. The self or soul may still peep from another corner of its systematic elusiveness. We know that however hard we try to catch the self or 'I', it eludes our grasp. The self of every past minute can be described but the self of the present cannot be described, for in order to describe it we still need one to describe it, who remains undescribed. That is, there always remains a pure knower. If the pure knower of any stage is transformed into an object ( by making it an object of knowledge ), then one who so transforms it remains a pure knower or the subject. And this will continue *ad infinitum*. It is on account of this that many schools of philosophy have described soul as the pure knower, the pure ego or the ultimate consciousness. But Ryle argues that the fact of systematic elusiveness does not presuppose the fact of soul, mysteriously existing in human body. As a matter of fact, this elusiveness has no reference to an extraordinary being in man. This elusiveness is true of many observable facts of the world, which for that matter do not become extraordinary or mysterious. Ryle argues that all the acts of a diarist cannot be recorded in the diary for the last act of making entry still remains to be recorded. So of reviews. We can have any order review of a review, but there still remains a review which goes unreviewed. But on that account neither the last act of making entry nor the last review is different from other acts of making entries or from other reviews. As a matter of fact even the last act of making an entry is recordable in nature. The last review is also reviewable. Only that we fail to do so because they require infinite patience, which is impracticable. Similarly, the self or 'I' of any stage is describable. There is no question of pure ego or pure consciousness

as opposed to body. In this way, Ryle attempts to demolish the whole structure of Cartesian psychology.

## VI

But if we demolish the structure of the Cartesian psychology, how shall we explain the phenomenon of sensation ? Uptill now it has come to be believed that sensation is primarily mental. Text books of psychology define sensation as a primary consciousness originating from sense-object contact. Due to the stimulation of the senses, an initial consciousness emerges in the private realm of mind, which goes by the name of sensation. How can we, in the face of this account given by psychologists reject mind, which is the originating place for sensations ? Would it not make the phenomenon of sensation impossible ? No, it cannot, argues Ryle. He believes in the phenomena of sensations without believing in a mind to house them and as such he thinks that there is nothing other-wordly or mysterious about sensations. As a matter of fact, the word 'sensation' is used for tactual and Kinaesthetic perceptions. When we feel things as hot or cold, soft or hard, sweet or sour with hands, feet, lips, tongue or knees, as the case may be, we are said to have the sensations of the thing concerned. So, sensation, as ordinarily understood, is a species of perception. It is not an ingredient in perception It is wrong to believe that seeing, hearing and smelling are comprised of sensations. Nobody says that he has first visual sensations and then seeing or he has first auditory sensations and then hearing. The case of seeing, hearing or smelling is decided without reference to the theorists' use of the term sensation. So, according to Ryle, sensation means bodily feelings. When one says that he has such and such sensation, he only means that he feels such and such. Ryle advances a number of arguments to show that the theorists' conception of sensation is false and fabricated. First, the theorist cannot explain as to what their sensations are. There is no neat sensation vocabulary and as such sensation cannot be described in unambiguous language. The theorists always describe sensation with the help of some thing or object, e. g., it looks as such and such or it sounds like such and such. So whenever a sensation is

described, it is described with the aid of the vocabulary of common objects. This falsifies the theory of the traditionalists. Whereas they had sought to explain things with the aid of sensations, their sensations are themselves explicable with the aid of things. Secondly, the sophisticated use of the term 'sensation' has never appeared in the language of the laity. Novelists, biographers, diarists and the physicians never use this term in the way of the theorists. Thirdly, sensations do not seem to be connected in any way with the qualities of intellect or character. Even sentient creatures are said to have sensations. We frequently speak of reptiles having sensations. We cannot also use mental predicates in connection with sensations. Nobody can say that he is having sensations carefully, systematically, thoroughly or purposefully. Fourthly, even when we believe on the lines of the theorists that perception requires to be preceded by having atleast one sensation, we do not observe it. Ryle advocates strongly that sensations are never the objects of observation. We do not observe sensations as such. What is observed is an object, not its sensations. Sensations may only be noticed but not observed just as alphabets may only be written but not spelled. If sensations would have been observed, we would require the sensation of a sensation ( for observation entails having sensations ) and the series would go on for ever. Further, observations are characterised as good or bad, careful or careless, etc., but no sensation is so characterised. Objects of observation have size, shape, position, temperature, colour or smell, but sensations do not have these qualities. All these prove that sensations cannot be the objects of observation. There are objects and there are sensations to be noticed, but there is no mind to house them or observe them. All those who believe that sensations are the objects of private or internal perception are wrong because the question of their perception cannot be meaningful. Of course, the sensations that we just notice or mark are private but privacy does not make them mysterious or ghostly. As nobody else can eat what I am eating, so nobody else can have sensations which I am having. As the food I take, though personal or private is not ghostly, so my sensations, though personal or private is not other-wordly. Sensations, therefore, need not refer to a ghostly habitat called mind to exist in.

Having thus refuted the traditionalists' view of sensations as

something originating and existing in the private realm of mind, Ryle considers the connected problem of sense datum. Quite naturally, he fails to see any sense in the theory of sense data.

Now, what is a sense datum ? That which is given to the sense is a sense datum. It means that the different sense impressions are sense data. Looks, appearances, sounds, whiffs, flavours and tastes are sense data. Those who believe in the theory of sense-data believe in the three-factor theory of knowledge. According to them any knowledge situation involves three things, viz., the act of knowing, the sense impression or datum and the object. Accordingly, we do not know the objects directly. What we know directly is the datum and through such datum, we infer the object. So, when we know a horse, we actually see or sense some colour patches and through the impressions of those patches, we know a horse by inference. Similarly, we do not taste a lemon. What we taste is the flavour and know lemon by inference. Ryle strongly object to this way of explaining the knowledge of objects. The whole theory of sense data is, according to him, a 'logical howler'. It is incompatible with common language since it is completely strange or foreign to it. While laymen speak of directly knowing a horse, theorists speak of directly knowing only colour patches. Again, if we know a horse through colour patches, the question will naturally arise how do we know colour patches ? Certainly it must be known through something else and the series will go on for ever. Moreover, the theory of sense datum asserts absurd facts. When a round plate looks elliptical, the theory holds that we actually sense an elliptical look of a round plate, so that in this situation, the three factors are the act of seeing, the elliptical datum and the round plate. But a round plate giving an actual elliptical look is too absurd to be accepted. It is not absurd to say that a round plate appears as elliptical, but it is certainly absurd to hold that one is seeing an elliptical look of a round plate. Further, the so-called sense datum is nothing else than the object. Whenever we speak of looks, sounds, flavours, etc., we speak of objects, e. g., the look of a plate or the flavour of wine. So, there is no datum apart from the objects. What we see or observe are common objects, which can be likewise seen or observed by anyone. All secondary qualities refer to publicly ascertainable

facts. If I see a field as green, anyone on earth would see it green if he cares to see it properly. So, with the collapse of the sense datum theory, Ryle claims to prove that sensations or sense impressions are not the Rlues or tools of the observation of objects. Sensations are neither the objects of observation, nor the observing of objects. For perception, we do not require the via media of sense datum. We straightway perceive an object. Thus the datum being refuted, mind, the postulated place of the datum, is also refuted. The sense datum theory had unnecessarily established two worlds — the public world to house objects and the private world to house sense data.

As the denial of sense data automatically leads to the denial of phenomenalism, Ryle is against the doctrine of phenomenalism, which asserts that a thing is nothing more than the family of different sense impressions. Phenomenalism denies the 'thing in itself' and reduces a thing to the experience of different sense data. A thing, according to this theory, is what it looks, sounds, feels, etc. The different impressions that we have of a thing is the thing and beyond its looks, sounds, feeling, etc. it is nothing. So, phenomenalism asserts that talking of a thing is talking about sense data. Ryle finds this theory as untenable. Though it has the merit of denouncing the ghostly 'thing in itself', it suffers on several counts. It explains things in terms of sensations, but, as we have seen, sensations are themselves explicable in terms of things or objects. So, phenomenalism preaches the opposite of what the case is. Secondly, according to phenomenalism, observing an object means observing sensations, which again cannot be true. We have already seen how Ryle proves that sensation cannot be observed. Thirdly, lauguage does not permit the propositions about objects to be translated into propositions about sensible objects. It is objects (like gate-post) and not sense data which can properly fit into the gap of such propositions as 'John Doe is looking at ... ' Fourthly, as we know, sense impressions or data are temporary and evanescent but things or objects are more or less permanent. Ryle observes : "such facts as that gate-posts last a very long time, ... that, unlike shadows, anybody can find them, whether by night or day, that they support the weight of gates, but can be consumed by fire, can be and are found out by observation and

experiment".[8] Phenomenalism is therefore wrong. What is observed is not the family of sense impressions or sense data or sensations ; it is the object itself. We observe the common or public objects. But here a question may arise. What do we mean by the observation of an object ?

How does Ryle explain perception ? In answer to this we may note that Ryle rejects the traditionalists' account of perception. Perception or observation, according to the traditionalists, is sensation plus meaning. When we experience a sensible quality (or sensation), we, on the basis of past experience, impose all other qualities on the sensible quality which were found associated with it and thereby perceive an object. So, according to this theory, perception is more than sensation. It follows sensation and the 'more' consists in ideal construction. This account of perception obviously rests on the assumption that there is a private world of mind from where the meaning is applied to sensation. This account also suggests that what we directly observe are the sensations and what we indirectly know are the objects. We do not observe robin ; we observe its sensations and know the robin thereafter. Ryle finds no truth in this account. He emphatically asserts that "it is robins and games that we observe, and it is sensation that we never could observe."[9] Here Ryle's position is that of naive realism. Knowledge, according to him, involves only two factors : the knower and the object. As a matter of fact, there is no need of sensation to explain perception. What we call sensation is, in truth, tactual or Kinaesthetic perception. But even when it be accepted that perception entails having at least one sensation and that it is more than sensation, that 'more' does not lie in the ghostly mind's supply of meaning. It lies in recognition or identification. When we notice sensation, we at once recognise it or identify it. That recognition or identification is perception. Perceiving is, therefore, recognising or identifying. We learn recognising by practice. Ryle holds that we learn perception recipes as we learn bicycling, i. e. we learn by practice. To illustrate Ryle's standpoint : We perceive a tune when on noticing the

8 Ibid., p. 236.

9 Ibid., p. 224

auditory sensation we recognise it, i. e. when we utilise our past knowledge of the tune, we are said to perceive it. Recognition consists in the utilisation of the previous knowledge of the tune. It is utilized when, e. g., after hearing a bar or two, we expect those bars to follow which do follow ; when we correct ommissions and errors in the tune ; when after being stopped for a shortwhile, it resumes where we expected it to resume. That is, perceiving or recognising a tune means hearing a tune in a special frame of mind. When we learn a tune, we acquire certain auditory expectation propensities ( i. e. we expect to hear it in a certain way ), when we recognise it, we hear expected note after expected note ( i. e. we hear the whole tune in the expected way ). Similar is the case with visual and other perceptions. When we catch the glimpse of a thimble (i. e, when we have a visual sensation), we at once recognise it to be a thimble. When we know a thimble, we acquire certain expectation propensities, i. e. we expect to see it in a particular shape, size, colour, etc., and also expect to do with it in a certain way. When at the occurrence of the visual sensation, these expectation propensities are fulfilled, we are said to recognise or perceive the thimble. Thus perceiving, according to Ryle, is nothing ghostly. It is just recognition, which consists in doing with the recognised object in the expected way. When, however, we fail to utilize our previous knowledge of the object, we get a mistaken perception. Error in perception is, therefore, a misuse of the technique of the utilization of past knowledge.

But even when perception is taken as recognition, a certain difficulty remains. It may be asked, how do we pass from mere sensations to the observation of objects ? Sensations are personal or private, objects are public or open. How then do we know that cows and gate-posts exist by originally knowing only a few of sensations ? Ryle answers that this question about how is an improper question. It presumes that sensations are clues or tools which lead to the confirmation of objects. In Sherlock Holmes, the fingers on the glass and the conversations overheard by eaves-droppers could be clues or tools to confirm the game keeper as murderer because all those clues were observed. But sensations, as we have seen, are not observed. How can they then be clues or

tools ? So, the 'how' question about cows and gate-posts is an improper question. In addition to this improper question, there are some theorists who treat sensations as raw materials out of which the whole world of ours is constructed. Just as a cake is made of flour, sugar, milk and eggs, this world, they say, is made of different sensations. Ryle views it as ridiculous since certain notions as storing, sorting, assembling, arranging, etc., which are applicable to the ingredients of a cake are not applicable to the sensations.

Ryle thus concludes that there is nothing mysterious or ghostly or other-wordly about sensations. In his 'After thoughts', he categorically maintains that there is no sensation but perception. What we call sensations are tactual or kinaesthetic perceptions. They are organic feelings. But even when he accepts on the lines of the theorists that sensations are necessary for perceptions, he labours hard to prove that there is nothing ghostly or other-wordly about them. But with the view that perception entails sensations, he expresses his deep dissatisfaction. In his foreword to the chapter on sensation be exclaims "for reasons developed in its last section, I am not satisfied with this chapter. I have fallen in with the official story that perceiving involves having sensations. But this is a sophisticated use of 'sensation'."[10]

## VII

Granted that sensations do not constitute the stuff of which the secret world of mind or streams of consciousness are made. But what about imaginations and images ? About sensations, which are connected with the physical, physiological or neurological factors, it is indeed difficult to maintain that they are of purely mental make. But about images there appears to be no difficulty in taking them to be hundred percent mental. Theorists and laymen have always accepted that our images are mental beyond doubt. What we see in the mind's eye or hear in our head is certainly the creature of a non-physical world. We call that to be imaginary which does not exist in our physical world. Imaginary something,

10 Ibid. p. 200.

therefore, must exist in a different world,—the world of mind, which is other than the world of matter. Is not then the denial of dualism almost an impossible affair ? Must not mind exist as a separate theatre to house images ? These questions are certainly perplexing for one who is an opponent of dualism. Ryle has, therefore, to answer how images and imagination occur without a private world of mind.

Ryle's central thesis in his chapter on Imagination is that there are no images or internal pictures and afortiori therefore, there is no private realm of mind to house them. He accepts that picturing or visualising or imaging does occur but he denies that there are images to be seen. Picturing or imaging is only pretending or fancying to see ( which in fact one does not see ). A child may pretend to be a bear, where there is no actual bear. A man may pretend to see where there is no actual seeing. So, although imaging occurs, images are not seen. When one visualises or pictures his nursery, he does not see the internal replica or copy or resemblance of his nursery ; he on the other hand resembles the spectator of his nursery. That is, when one pictures or visualises a thing, he does not see any likeness of that thing, he, on the other hand, becomes like one who sees the thing. This clearly means that imaging is pretending or fancying to be one who sees, but actually there is neither any act of seeing nor any object to be seen. Just as pretending to murder on the stage is not actual murder, similarly pretending or fancying to see in mind's eye is not actual seeing. Just as stage murders have no real victims (i. e. the objects of murder), similarly picturing or visualising have no objects. Ryle thus wants to establish that as a matter of fact there are no images. Imaging or picturing or visualising is just fancying or pretending to be a real spectator, which in fact one is not. Ryle believes that the effect of refuting images will have the automatic effect of annuling mind since images require mind as their locus to exist in.

Ryle has his own arguments to show that an image does not exist. Consider the case of a child picturing her doll as smiling. Now where is the smile ? Obviously not on the lips of the doll because the doll is in front of the child and she does not see any smile there. The smile is, therefore, supposed to be existing in the child's secret

chamber called mind. But this is absurd. How can the lips be at one place and the smile at another ? The theorists conceive of the lips to be existing in one sort of world (the physical world) and the smile in another (the mental world). But nothing can be more fantastic than this. So, smile, as an image, does not exist. When the child imagines her doll as smiling, there is neither an actual smile nor a copy of the smile. The child simply fancies that her doll is smiling. Just as in a game she can fancy herself to be a bear, so she can fancy her doll to be smiling. But as there is no bear so there is no smile. So, while imaging or picturing (which is no more than fancying or pretending), the question of an image does not arise. Ryle observes : "There is not a real life outside, shadowily mimicked by some bloodless likenesses inside ; there are just things and events, people witnessing some of these things and events, and people fancying themselves witnessing things and events that they are not witnessing."[11] Secondly, if imaging means seeing a picture or copy of something, then it would be confined to picturing sights and sounds alone. If we see a mountain, we also see its photograph. If we hear a sound, we also hear its echo. The mountain and the sound are originals. The photograph and the echo are copies. But where are the copies of original smells, tastes or feelings ? There is no word to denote any such. So, if imaging means looking at a replica or copy of something, we cannot be said to imagine or picture smells, tastes or feelings. But as a matter of fact, we do not simply visualise or picture sights or sounds, we also picture or imagine smells, tastes or feelings. This proves that imaging is not at all concerned with the copy of anything. As visualising in the mind's eye is just fancying to see (where there is no seeing), smelling or tasting in the mind's nose or tongue is just fancying to smell or taste (where there is no smelling or tasting).

Thirdly, that imaging or picturing in the mind's eye is not seeing can be proved in another way. When one sees his home, he does not describe it as 'faithful', 'lifelike' 'vivid', etc. But when he imagines or pictures his home, he frequently uses these idioms to describe it. This clearly establishes that imaging is different from

11 Ibid., pp. 248-49.

seeing. It, therefore, does not mean any act of seeing. Nor it means any object seen.

Fourthly, if the theorists' version that imagination is picturing or seeing internal pictures or hearing internal sounds be true, then no writer, no poet, no scientist would be called imaginative for we do not know for certain whether they see any such picture. We do not see them seeing such pictures.

But the question may be asked : why does imaging appear to be the seeing of pictures of things ? Ryle answers that it is owing to the fact that pictures are great provocatives of imagining or fanciful seeing. While looking at the photograph of a man, one seems to perceive the man or fancies to see the man. So, physical pictures or photographs of things are good stimuli to arouse fanciful perceivings. Since pictures induce imagining or imaging or fanciful seeing, whenever there is imaging or fanciful seeing. we appear to be seeing pictures. But actually there is neither any picture nor any seeing of it. Ryle observes : "Imaging is not having shadowy pictures before some shadow-organ called the 'mind's eye' ; but having paper pictures before the eyes in one's face is a familiar stimulus to imaging".[12]

But again, a question may be asked : if picturing or seeing before the mind's eye is no more than a fanciful perception, why does not one realise that it is a fancy ? Why does not one believe that it is not in truth seeing but only pretending or fancying to see ? Ryle replies that as in a game, a child playing the part of a bear forgets that it is a game and gets afraid of a bear ( i.e. he does not realise that there is only a pretension of becoming a bear and not an actual becoming of a bear ), so a man while fancying to see in the mind's eye does not realise that it is just a fancy and nothing more than a fancy. As to the question why he fails to realise his fancy, Ryle observes ; "The fact that people can fancy that they see things... without realising that it is nothing but fancy, is simply a part of the unsurprising general fact that not all the people are, all the time, at

12 Ibid., p. 254.

all ages and in all conditions, as judicious or critical as could be wished." [13]

But a stiffer question remains. If there be no seeing of any internal picture at all, ( i. e. if there be no images ) how shall we explain dreams ? Dreams obviously refer to the seeing of the happenings of an internal world. Ryle explains dreams also as a fanciful seeing. He contends that dreaming is not witnessing a 'private cinematograph show'. Rather witnessing a public cinematograph show is dreaming, for here while we see variously illuminated screen, we fancy we are seeing kings, mountains or fairies.

So, with the help of all these arguments or analogies, Ryle comes to conclude that there are no images. Imaging or picturing or seeing in the mind's eye is not seeing, not even sham-seeing. There is no seeing at all. Ryle calls 'seeing in the mind's eye' a hypothetical seeing. When I see Helvellyn in the mind's eye, I simply know what I would see if the Helvellyn caught my sight. Picturing Helvellyn is simply realising how Helvellyn would look. Similarly, hearing a tune in my head is only a hypothetical hearing. It means becoming aware of what I would hear if the tune was actually played to me. So, picturing as hypothetical seeing or hearing refers to the future. It does not speak of anything happening at the moment. So, there cannot be any seeing of the internal pictures or images. Moreover, seeing in the mind's eye or hearing in one's head is one of the several ways of utilising the previous knowledge of the seen things or heard sounds. We can utilise our previous knowledge of a tune by recognising or following it when played, by ourselves playing or humming it, by finding the errors or omissions in it, by fancying humming or playing it or by fancying listening to it. When we fancy humming or playing or listening to it, the tune is said to run in our head. Of the several utilizations of the knowledge of the tune, the utilization by fancy is private or secret because it involves abstensions. It is not secret because the tune occurs in a ghostly world of mind. It is secret because we abstain from droducing the sounds of the tune. Secrecy lies in the act of checking the sounds from becoming public. This act of abstaining or

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13 Ibid., pp. 258-59.

checking is learnt later than the act of humming or playing the sounds of the tune. So imagination is a sophisticated performance.

It is true, admits Ryle, that imaging or picturing or fancying is connected with real perceptions but that is not on the lines as the theorists had conceived. The theorists had said that percepts leave their traces or copies or impressions on the ghostly plastic of mind which go by the name of images. According to them, looking at percepts is perceiving, looking at traces or images is imagining. So, they had explained imagination or imaging as looking at internal pictures or traces. But, says Ryle, though imagination as imaging is really connected with prior perceptions, it is not connected in that way. We know that only he can pretend or fancy to be a bear who has already seen a bear. Only he can pretend or fancy to be a king who has already seen a king. Hence picturing or imaging which is generally known as imagining is certainly connected with prior perceptions. In this connection Ryle observes: "A person who had not learned how bears growl, or how murderers comit murders, could not play bears, or act murders .... In the same way, a person who had not learned how blue things look, or how the postman's knock sounds, could not see blue things in his mind's eye, or 'hear' the postman's knock."[14]

Thus with the hypothesis of imaging as fancying, Ryle discards the theory of images as internal pictures, seen as existing in a separate world of mind. Ryle argues much against images. This he does because theorists very often equate imagining with imaging ( or seeing internal pictures ). But Ryle believes that imaging or fancying is only one of several kinds of imagining. Seeing in the mind's eye or hearing in one's head or smelling in the mind's nose, etc., is only one kind of imagination. There are other behaviours, in which we are no less imaginative. Lying, inventing a machine, constructing a romance, playing bears, following a novel and many others are operations of imagination. The theorists had wrongly identified imagination with picturing alone. There are hosts of activities with which imagination can be identified. But these activities are not species of imagination due to some common or nuclear operation present in all of them. As

14 Ibid., p. 272

a matter of fact, imagination does not consist in any single operation. As farming does not mean any one activity or operation, so imagining does not mean any activity or operation. It is, therefore, true to say that while picturing or fancying is one way of being imaginative, composing poems or writing novels is another

But if mind and its images are refuted, as Ryle has done, how shall we explain memory or remembering or reminiscence ? Remembering, as we know, involves recalling which is bringing on the mental plane the experiences of the past in the shape of internal pictures or images. Visualising in my own mind an incident of the past, which I myself had seen with my eyes, is called remembering the incident or having a memory of the incident. So, leaving aside the concept of images, how shall Ryle explain memory or the act of remembering ? In order to explain memory, Ryle first of all distinguishes between two senses of the verb 'to remember'. In one sense, 'I remember' means 'I know' which means 'I can do this and that'. When I say that I remember the road to the railway station, what I mean is that I know the road to the railway station and my knowing consists of taking the correct road while going to the station or showing the road to one who has lost the way. So 'to remember' in this sense means 'to know' which means 'can do such and such'. The word 'can' has obviously a reference to ability or capacity ; it has no reference to an occurrence. 'Remembering' in this sense, therefore, cannot be interpreted as an act or occurrence of bringing the past to the present in the form of mental pictures or images. In another sense, however, remembering has a reference to an occurrence. When I say, 'I am remembering or recalling or recollecting yesterday's railway accident', I am referring to what I am doing at the moment. It certainly means seeing the railway accident in the mind's eye. But this seeing in the mind's eye does not mean an actual seeing of a copy of the accident existing on the secret plane of mind. It simply means fancying to see the accident. So, instead of seeing a resemblance or copy of the accident, I am just resembling the spectator of the accident. Moreover, it is not true that when one remembers, one has always to take the help of imagery. One can remember by reproducing, sketching,

narrating or caricaturing. I am said to remember a song which I heard from a singer, if I myself can reproduce or sing the song. I am said to remember a house, if I can make a pencil sketch of the house on paper. I am also said to remember an incident ,if the only thing that I can do is to faithfully narrate or describe the incident. Not only that, I am also said to remember if I can mimic or caricature the incident. I remember how a dramatist misplayed his part by making a mimicry or caricature of his part. So, recalling is not only imaging ( in the sense of fancying ), it is also reperforming, sketching, narrating or caricaturing. Recall by imagery has certain advantage, but it has certain disadvantage, as well. Ryle observes : "Reminiscence in imagery does not differ in principle, though it tends to be superior in speed, if otherwise greatly inferior in efficiency ; and it is, of course, of no direct public utility".[15] So, recalling by imaging is only one of the several ways of doing the same. Recalling is the art of presenting, which can take many forms. Here we present what we had learnt in the past and have not forgotten. Ryle calls it a narrative skill if, as he says, " 'narrative' be allowed to cover non-prosaic as well as prosaic representations".[16]

Ryle mentions two important sources of confusing memory as seeing of internal photographs of what had been learnt in the past. Sometimes, we narrate the past in such minute details that it leads to the confusion of seeing the past in the form of its photographic duplication. Describing an object in its minute details is generally rendered possible when the object is kept before the senses. So, when one narrates the past vividly, one is said to keep the copy of the past before one's mind's eye or mind's nose or in one's head as the case may be. But this, according to Ryle, is no more than a confusion. Describing what one has learnt in the past vividly or minutely is just a knack or ability of linguistically competent people. There is no seeing of any ghostly picture or duplicate of anything at all. Another source of confusion in treating remembering as seeing is that when one remembers, one finds no option to remember in any other way

15 Ibid., p. 275
16 Ibid., p. 279

which one might like. Just as when one sees an object, one cannot but see it in the way it is, so when one remembers. one cannot but remember in the way one has learnt. In one case, one is tied to what one is seeing, in another, one is tied to what one has already seen. This similarity between seeing and remembering leads to the assumption that remembering is also a kind of seeing —that here too we see objects, though not in originals but in copies. But this is false. That we remember only as we have learnt can be explained, says Ryle, in another way. Just as we can spell the word 'Edinburgh' in any way we like, but we do it only in the way we have known the spelling, so we can remember an incident in any way we like, but we do it only in the way we have known or learnt the incident. As we spell 'Edinburgh' in accordance with the knowledge of its spelling, so we remember an incident in accordance with the knowledge of the incident. Though in principle, there is option in both the cases, simple logic forbids us either to spell or to remember in alternative ways. So, the analogy between seeing and remembering must not force us to conclude that remembering is also seeing.

Ryle also disapproves the approach of the theorists when they treat memory as a source of knowledge. Neither is memory a cognitive faculty nor remembering a cognitive process. Remembering, says Ryle, is not analogous to 'researching' ; it is analogous to 'recounting'. By this Ryle means that remembering is not finding or discovering. It is simply reproducing or reperforming. It only implies that something has been learnt and not forgotten. Had memory been a source of knowledge, the witness might have cited his recall for the veracity of his statements. He would have easily said, 'My recall enables me to say that such and such incident took place'. But obviously no witness, as a matter of fact nobody, refers to his memory as the source. of finding out something. Nobody says that he found out something from his memory. Had memory been a discovery, people by recalling an incident twenty times would have said that they had discovered the incident twenty times. But nobody talks in such fashion. This establishes that memory cannot be a source of cognition. Arguing in this way, Ryle tries to vindicate his general thesis that psychological concepts like imagination or memory have no bearing with a ghostly mind.

## VIII

But the ghost may yet have to do with intellectual activities. It is generally believed that theorizing or thinking out thoughts in the form of 'judging', 'inferring' or 'conceiving' is an intellectual activity, conducted on a secret stage of mind. Coming to conclusions, passing from premises to conclusion and cognising truths are said to be operations carried on in the occult theatre of mind. Mind has been understood as an internal or private organ which apprehends facts, intuits truth and sees implications. It is also understood as a publishing firm or mint which after great preparatory labour produces results in the shape of discoveries or theories. Some have understood mind as an internal lecturer or magistrate which speaks from within and commands obedience. So, mind as a fleshless organ to see truth, as reason to discover truth and as conscience to preach truth, has repeatedly appeared in the accounts of the epistemologists. In view of this oft-repeated account of mind and its intellectual operations, it becomes hard indeed to do away with this concept. How shall we explain the concepts of 'judging', 'inferring', 'conceiving', etc. if we do not believe in mind as a separate status, for we do not publicly observe these operations taking place anywhere ?

Ryle's purpose in his chapter on 'The Intellect' has, therefore, been to explain these concepts without the support of a ghostly mind. He asserts that judging, conceiving, inferring, etc., are certainly intellectual operations, but they are not so on account of their mysterious connections with a fictitious mind. He believes that these intellectual operations are in principle quite akin to the operations of tying knots, following tunes or playing hide-and-seek ; that is, there is nothing secret about them. He goes on to say that we have no fixed criteria to settle as to which human actions are intellectual. If thinking thoughts leading to discoveries is an intellectual occupation, playing chess, constructing bridges, introducing bills in parliament, etc., are no less so. Thinking thoughts is not doing something on a mysterious mental stage ; it is using words and sentences either silently or aloud according to convenience in a certain frame of mind. So, whatever operation we call intellectual, there is no secrecy or privacy about them,

Ryle considers in detail those intellectual operations of thinking which lead to discoveries, because it is these operations which are primarily spoken of as intellectual and which produce the illusion of mind, enjoying a separate status. First of all, he distinguishes between the two senses of thought and thinking. In one sense. thought is an activity ; in another it is the product of such an activity. When we say 'this man is engaged in thinking something out', we certainly mean an activity because thought in this sense may be hard, protracted, interrupted, careless, etc. But when we say 'so and so is what he thinks', thinking or thought here refers to the result of an activity for thought in this sense may be true or false, valid or fallacious, published or unpublished, etc. It is because of the failure of the theorists to make this distinction that they horribly confuse the second sense with the first, leading to the postulation of a mysterious entity called mind. They confuse the vocabulary of thoughts as products with the vocabulary of thoughts as activities. This misconception leads to the emergence of a ghost in the body-machine. Ryle believes that the terms 'judgment', 'abstraction', 'subsumption', 'deduction', 'induction', predication', etc., are meant for the description of thoughts as products and not for the description of thoughts as activities. When after an initial labour of pondering ( i. e. thinking as an activity ), we come to a certain discovery or finding, ( i. e. thoughts as products ), we report about that achieved thought to others or to our ownselves in terms of judgments, deductions, subsumptions, etc. This becomes obvious when we look to a scientist's published treatise or a detective's type-written report. While we go through them, we find arguments called 'inferences' or 'reasoning' ; conclusions called 'verdicts', 'findings' or 'judgments' ; abstract terms called 'abstract ideas or concepts' ; class membership statements called 'subsumptions' etc. Obviously the scientist's treatise or the detective's type-written report contains his discoveries or findings. So, the terms 'inference', 'reasoning,, 'verdict', 'finding', 'judgment', 'subsumption', 'abstraction', etc., actually belong to the classification of the products of pondering. But the theorists suppose just the other way. They treat them as belonging to the description of the acts of pondering. According to them, 'judging', 'abstracting', 'subsuming', 'deducing', 'inducing', 'predicating', etc.,

are inspectable operations or activities executed on a hidden stage. They believe that as we require expert anatomists to record the operations of a digestive system, so we require expert introspectionists to record these subterranean happenings. The epistemologists argue that the reasonings or inferences, the judgments or findings that we find in the published or expounded theories of an author are just the outer manifestations of the acts of inferring or reasoning, judging or finding, occurring on the private stage of the author's mind. Ryle observes: "Finding premisses and conclusions among the elements of published theories, they postulate separate, antecedent, 'cognitive acts' of judging; and finding arguments among the elements of published theories, they postulate separate antecedent processes of moving to the 'cognising' of conclusions from the 'cognising' of premisses."[17] But this is wrong. Intellectual process is not a double process, first appearing on the veiled stage and subsequently appearing in the published, spoken or expounded theories. Premise and conclusion do not appear on the ghostly stage; they, on the other hand, appear in the different expositions of the achieved theories. There is, therefore, no secrecy or privacy about them. Ryle tries to refute the superstition of the epistemologists that intellection occurs on an occult stage. He refers to the glossary of terms with which the theorists describe intellectual powers and operations. 'Judgment', 'reasoning', 'conception', 'idea', 'abstract idea', 'concept', 'making judgment', 'inferring', 'drawing conclusion from premises', 'considering propositions', 'subsuming', 'generalising', 'inducing', 'cognising', 'apprehending', 'intuiting',—all in short 'thinking'— are such expressions with which intellectual powers and operations are discussed. Ryle observes that none of these terms is popular in the everyday conversation of the people. Had they reported internal happenings or episodes conducted at the secret level of persons, they would certainly have forced their entry into their speech and conversation. But that is not the case. These are the words of the authors, scientists or discoverers and they employ them while classifying the different aspects of their achieved theories. Even if it be said that the

17 Ibid., p. 291.

intellectuals or the authors or discoverers actually undergo such operations internally, we would expect them to reply to certain queries. If asked how many cognitive operations did one make while exploring the solution of a problem, one should be able to answer it. Were those operations easy going or tiring ? Was the going over to the conclusion from the premises enjoyable or painful ? Did he stop at the premise when some visitor came and later jumped to the conclusion when the visitor left ? Was his conceiving quick or gradual, slow or difficult ? Such queries should have been easily answered, but no amount of head scratching enables an intellectual to reply to these queries. These questions make him mute not because they are difficult to be answered but because they are meaningless, since no intellectual operations are to be found on the ghostly plane. Terms which are wrongly assumed to refer to such operations behind closed doors are only applicable to the published or expounded theories. Ryle asserts that such terms "are referees' nouns, not biographers' nouns."[18] Their job is not to describe what happens within an individual ; their job is to describe what one has already seen or discovered. So, no such term refers to any internal episode of intellection. Of course, before we come to achieve any theory and classify it into judgments, premises, conclusions, etc., we have to make a lot of preparation. The pre-theory stage involves a lot of theorizing labour. We have to do a lot of soliloquy or colloquy, a lot of calculation or miscalculation either on paper or in head, a lot of diagram-sketching either on board or in the mind's eye and these preparatory operations involve a lot of expression-using, but these expressions do not signify judgments and inferences. We use them as our preparation for the achievement of theories, which when expounded are divided into judgments and inferences, deductions and abstraction. If at all some preparatory expressions have force to signify judgments and inferences, that must be in connection with sub-theories established *en route*, i. e., before coming to the final theory. So, at any rate, all such idioms which traditionally describe intellectual powers and operations belong to the expository stage

18 Ibid., p. 286.

of theorizing. They are wrongly believed to belong to the exploratory stage.

But here a question arises. From where do the judgments and inferences of the expository stage derive their meaning ? In order that the theory may be sensible, the judgments and inferences of which it is comprised, must be significant. But words and sentences are not significant by themselves. A child may utter a very difficult word of English but, for that matter, the word does not become significant for the child, So, in order that the published theory may be meaningful, the meaning must come from somewhere. We have, therefore, to accept an internal stream of consciousness which supplies meaning to the spoken or written words. Thought occurs in that stream and gets concretised in words. As published theories are caused by significant thoughts, occurring internally, they derive their significance from such a causation. So, if expounded theories have judgments and inferences, corresponding acts of 'judging' and 'inferring' must occur in mind.

But this is not true, according to Ryle. While writing or speaking anything significant, we are never in the know of two operations, one taking place externally either with pen or tongue and the other occurring internally in the mysterious world of mind. Saying something significant is not doing two things at two levels. It is doing one thing in a specific frame of mind. When we say things in such a frame of mind or when we use words on purpose ( i. e. with heed), we are said to be thinking. So, thinking, according to Ryle, is not the private act of doing something in a secret chamber. It is the public act of saying things or using idioms. Ryle observes : "To say something significant, in awareness of its significance, is not to do two things, . . . . It is to do one thing with a certain drill and in a certain frame of mind, . . . . Saying something in this specific frame of mind, whether aloud or in one's head, is thinking the thought."[19] So, says Ryle, when one wields his premise-sentence and conclusion-sentence heedfully (i. e. carefully and seriously), "he is then and there thinking what they mean."[20] Meaning of an idiom or sentence

19 Ibid., p. 296.
20 Ibid., p. 297.

is, therefore, simultaneous with its use. It does not lead an expression, it goes with it. We do not require any antecedent act of occult thinking to fill in meaning in the subsequent verbal pronouncements. Had meaning occurred on the private stage, nobody except the agent would have an access to it. Moreover, we never come across a meaning as distinct from verbal pronouncements. As to the question what antecedent occurrence takes place internally so that the overt statement 'Tomorrow cannot be Sunday unless today is Saturday' may attain significance, we have no answer except to repeat the same statement silently. So, if meaning is searched elsewhere, nothing but duplication is achieved. Had meaning been some where else than the pronounced statement, we would have expected it to be described. But when the description is attempted, the statement itself is repeated. This clearly establishes that meaning does not descend to a statement from a ghostly region called mind. The moment a statement is made in a definite frame of mind, it then and there becomes meaningful. There is, therefore, no act of judging as distinct from the different pronouncements of judgment.

This may be accepted. Judgments may not refer to a ghostly act of judging. But what about inferring ? As man is a rational creature, reasoning, arguing or inferring is true of him according to definition. Inferring, as they say, is deriving or deducing a conclusion from its premises. It is as such an implication seeing. We see what the premises imply or entail and this occurs as if in a flash. So, inferring, as described by the theorists, suggests that there is a fleshless organ called mind to see implications and there is a private stage for the bursting of light. We cannot, therefore, dispense with mind if inferring is to be accepted. But Ryle rejects this traditionalists' account of inference. He has a number of arguments to prove that there is nothing like immediate apprehension of the connection between premises and conclusion. Truth, he believes, is not revealed in a flash. It is obtained slowly by practice. The detective is posted with the clues or facts or premises but he takes time to submit his report or finding or conclusion. He does not discover all at once. He has to consider and reconsider, chew and digest the premises before he can come to any conclusion. When the clues are first given to him, the gaps between them generally remain wide. When

they are subsequently tackled, the gaps gradually dwindle away. Ultimately 'at no specifiable time', as Ryle calls it, all the gaps are bridged over and he is left with a finding. Once the argument is so established, the detective has occasions to repeat it in reports and in verbal communications and the repetitions give him mastery over the argument. Subsequent narratives of the argument become so easy, quick and automatic that a light seems to burst. Ryle holds that arguing is a skill or competence, learnt by practice. As we learn cycling, so we learn arguing. Cycling requires riding, arguing requires reading, conversing and doing exercises. It is, therefore, a mistake of the epistemologists to hold that arguing occurs on a concealed stage of mind. Those are the specimen of best arguments which we either read or hear ( i. e. which are public). If somebody takes pride in having an argument but fails to publish it ( i. e. fails to make it open ), we will not believe him. An argument is, therefore, by nature public or open, It cannot be described in terms of the ghost. Neither can it be described as a slow or quick process. Nobody says 'I began to deduce but had no time to finish'. This he does not say because an argument is not a passage from premise to conclusion so that it would involve time. It is not a process at all. The verbs 'conclude', 'deduce', 'prove', 'arrive at', etc., are achievement verbs or 'got it' verbs. Question of time about achievements is invalid, though it is valid for processes. We can safely ask how much time one took to run a race but we cannot ask how much time one took to win it. So, argues Ryle, we cannot describe an argument with the help of temporal idioms—either as quick or slow or in a flash. Of course, when an argument is expounded or an exposition is made, it takes time. So, with regard to its expositions, questions about time can validly be asked.

There is yet another superstition entertained by the traditionalists. They believe that theorizing operations or thinking things out (i. e, thinking as an operation ) involves implication seeing. When we prepare a theory, the preparation contains a lot of implication seeing which enables us to draw conclusions and form arguments. Mind as an internal organ sees those implications. But this is again a muddle, according to Ryle. Firstly, theorizing is an operation, seeing is an achievement. How can operations be

described in terms of achievements ? Can travelling be described in terms of arrival ? Secondly, though we speak more of seeing jokes and less of seeing arguments, we do not presume that there is an antecedent mental act of cognising the points of a joke. The traditionalists, however, suppose that there is a prior mental act of seeing the implications of an argument. Is this not peculiar ? Thirdly, we know that unless a joke is made, it cannot be seen. So, unless an argument is got or achieved, its implications cannot be seen. We do not first see an implication and then construct an argument. We first construct an argument and then see its implications. Implication- seeing therefore, does not belong to the exploratory stage. It is an affair of the stage after arrival. Fourthly, the epistemologists believe that all cognising is on the patterns of geometry. A candidate has only to sit and see what is written in the book or what goes on the blackboard. Had the epistemologists been aware that cognising is also on the patterns of arithmetic where a candidate has mostly to do on paper or on board, they would not have described the operations of theorizing in the contemplative idioms or idioms suitable to geometry. The acts of theorizing are on the patterns of arithmetic, where one first calculates and then sees connections. So, the question of first seeing implications on a secret stage does not arise. Of course, there are circumstances in which implications become immediately plain or clear to us. But that is not owing to a mysterious seeing on a ghostly stage. That is due to practice. The more we use the argument, the more obvious its implications become. Just as our repeated seeing of cows from our infancy now makes the cows obvious to us the moment we catch their sight, so our repeated use makes the argument obvious to us. It is due to our familiarity that we conclude 'Then tomorrow must be a boxing day' on being told that 'Today is a Christmas Day'. Thus the traditionalists' account of mind as an internal organ to see implications falls once again. There is no mind as a ghostly creature to see implications and apprehend in flashes.

But these onslaughts on the ghost may not prove sufficient. Mind may still appear as the store house of abstract ideas. Of the infinite variety of terms that we use in everyday conversation, abstract terms are useful and important. We constantly make use of such abstract idioms as 'mile', 'national debt', 'equator', 'the average tax payer', etc.,

and we are easily understood. This has led the epistemologists to conclude that pertaining to every abstract term there is an abstract idea which exists in the private mind and which is referred to by the abstract idiom. This, argues Ryle, is a myth. Nobody in actual life ever says that he is busy in framing abstract ideas or he has just found an abstract idea. No student ever reports that he has been taught abstracting in school. 'To abstract', therefore, is not a biographer's verb. Abstract terms without referring to mysterious ideas work in life. Geographers' 'contour' is an abstract term since nothing answering to the contour line is found on the mountain or elsewhere. A trained mountaineer very well knows how to use it. He finds a contour indicating 1000 feet on his map. At one point of his journey, he comes across a dense forest, which is also marked on his map. With the help of the contour and the forest, he can by a simple calculation discover how high he has climbed from the sea-level and how high he has yet to climb to reach the summit. So, as contour works, all abstract idioms work. Having an abstract term or idea is, according to Ryle, doing an infinite variety of kindred tasks. We acquire the knack or competence of using an abstract term by training and practice. The mountaineer had already a lesson and practice in using contours before going to the mountains.

But one question may still puzzle us. If thinking is not carried on in the second status world of mind, if it is nothing more than using words and sentences either publicly or privately in a certain frame of mind, if meaning does not come from the traditionally accepted world of mind, how shall we account for the progressive nature of our pondering or thinking ? We know that our thoughts are by nature progressive. We pass from one thought to another and the series continue as we continue thinking. If thinking be saying words and sentences, we may ask : how can words and sentences be in themselves progressive ? To answer this, Ryle distinguishes three between types of sayings or talks : (1) the casual talk of conversation ; (2) the guarded talk of the hypocrite or insincere person, and (3) the prepared, unconversational. shod talk of the instructor or teacher. Intellectual operations, so far as they are thinking, are carried on in the third type of talk or saying. This type of talk is instructive. A swimming instructor, for example, uses this type of talk when he teaches swimming to his pupil. The

pupil makes movements according to instructions, but a time comes when he begins to make altogether new movements which were not contained in the instructions. The words of the instructor had, therefore, a capacity to produce new results. The instructor in this case was talking to the pupil. But there are times when we talk in this way to ourselves. The words of such talks to ourselves have likewise a capacity to produce new results. When we tell ourselves that there are seven tins in the garage each containing two gallons of petrol, we can tell next that there are fourteen gallons of petrol in the garage. Just as the instructor's words and sentences produced new movements in the pupil, so our own instructive words and sentences to ourselves produce new words and sentences in ourselves, Talking of a certain sort has therefore a capacity to lead to further talking and the series may continue. So, thinking as talking to ourselves is progressive and we need not assume a ghost to explain its progressiveness.

But can we not identify the ghost with our conscience ? Somebody appears to be dictating from within ourselves. The moralists say that we ought to follow the inner voice of conscience or reason. Is not conscience a dictator, different from him whom it dictates ? Ryle argues that such terms as 'conscience', 'reason', 'voice of conscience', etc., are nursery myths. A child is generally taught by parents and teachers to do certain things and not to do certain others. They more or less use a commanding tone of voice while imparting instructions. When the child learns those instructions, a part of learning consists in rehearsing those instructions either loudly or silently in almost the same dictatorial tone of voice. The rehearsal serves the purpose of refreshing those learnt lessons. That rehearsed voice is, to use an obnoxious phrase, the voice of conscience. Conscience is not therefore a super-dictator, seated in a ghostly region.

Arguing on the lines as given above, Ryle attempts to explode the Cartesian myth that mind is a separate existence, enjoying an altogether separate status. But with the exit of mind, ws also require a revision of epistemology. The whole of traditional epistemology is based on the mind-body dualism, If dualism is to go, what shall be the fate of epistemology ? Ryle maintains that in view of the new

situation, what epistemology requires is reorientation, which can be effected by converting epistemology either into a theory of science or into a theory of learning. As a theory of science, its business will be to study the structure of built theories. As a theory of learning, its business will be to study the concepts of learning, teaching and examining.

So, with a new role, epistemology will not be haunted by the old ghost. The new epistemologists will not describe the fundamental concepts of intellect and intellection as referring to the mysterious happenings in a second status world.

## IX

But if there be no second status world and if what Ryle says is true, what will happen to Psychology ? Psychology has traditionally been defined as the study of 'experience and behaviour'. If there be no experience occurring on a private stage, Psychology is forced to confine its study to behaviour alone. Ryle points out that a psychologist, as a matter of fact, is absolutely engaged with the study of human behaviour. Though professing to discover the laws of a mysterious world, he is forced to remain content with the study of human behaviour, for he cannot have any acquaintance with the ghost supposed to be within him.

But here a question arises. If Psychology is nothing more than the study of human behaviour, what difference does it have with other branches of study which also study human behaviour ? Dramatists, novelists, literary critics, historians, economists, philologists, criminologists, anthropologists and many others have human behaviour as a subject matter of their study. Should not Psychology retire in view of the fact that there are already several such studies of human behaviour ? Does Ryle's thesis leave any scope for Psychology ? With the explosion of the myth, Psychology seems to lose all its reason for existence. But, argues Ryle, Psychology has yet reasons to exist. There are some such studies of human behaviour, in comparison to which psychology is scientific and informative, He illustrates. A country postman and a geographer may both know the same details of a region, but the geographer's account of it is bound to be scientific in comparison with the

postman's account of the same. The geographer can say how high the place is above sea-level, which the postman cannot. So, compared to the unscientific and unsystematic studies of human behaviour, Psychology has its own use and value. So far as the different scientific studies of human behaviour are concerned, Ryle suggests that Psychology should denote the consortium of all such studies. Just as 'medicine' does not refer to any one study but to a group of loosely connected studies, so Psychology should not refer to any one unique study. It should refer to all such enquiries and techniques which are concerned with the scientific study of human behaviour. Denoting thus a 'fortuitious federation of enquiries and techniques', Psychology has a meaningful role to play in the study of human beings. There are thus no reasons for it to make an exit with the exit of the ghost-in-the-machine. It has to exist as a federation of different scientific enquiries and techniques which are burdened with the study of human beings as reflected in behaviours.

But here a last question remains. Has not Psychology a distinctive feature of its own even when it is a federation of different enquiries ? A federation, as we know, has at least some reality of its own. Ryle answers that Psychology too has a distinctive business of its own. Its business is to discover the unknown causes of known actions and reactions. There are some behaviours whose causes are hidden. For example, one does not know why one becomes nervous in the presence of a certain acquaintance or why one dreams a particular type of dream now and then or why one frequently forgets to call one by his correct name. Such questions are psychological questions. Of course, it is not the burden of psychology to discover all sorts of causes. The question why a farmer came back from the market without selling his pigs at a certain price is an economic question. Psychology has nothing to do with it. But the question why he will not sell pigs at any price to a customer with a look in his eyes is a psychological question. Here it is the business of psychology to ascertain the secret of his behaviour.

It thus becomes evident that as a scientific study of human behaviour, as a consortium of all other scientific studies dealing with human behaviour and as a discoverer of the hidden causes of human behaviour, the job of Psychology, Ryle thinks, is secure in his hands. Psychology, according to him, does survive even without a ghost.

# PART—II

## CRITICAL STUDY

## THE METHOD

Ryle's *Concept of Mind* is without doubt an outstanding example of the application of the current method of linguistic analysis to the solution of some major philosophical problems. By analysing psychological concepts on the basis of their everyday use, Ryle has wished to deny that mind is anything more than our typical bodily behaviours. The thesis of the book is that there are no such things as 'mental happenings'[1] and to talk of a person's mind is "to talk of the person's abilities and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and underdoing of these things in the ordinary world."[2] The truth of this will be obvious, he maintains, if one takes recourse to the analysis of the language which involves mental concepts.

Following Wittgenstein, Ryle believes firmly that linguistic analysis is the sole aim of philosophical enterprise. It is so because philosophy cannot profitably engage itself with the task of considering facts. The study of facts is exclusively the concern of science. So, the world of facts remaining outside the scope of philosophical enquiry, it was perhaps inevitable that philosophy should concentrate on the analysis and examination of language. The pioneers of the movement of Logical Positivism, saw that the business of philosophy was clarification, not discovery ; its concern was with meaning not with truth ; its subject-matter was language, not facts. The present day analysts—one of whose leading members is Ryle—entirely agreed with this programme of the Positivists. They, however, felt the need of analysing language for the purpose of clarification more acutely because they discovered that linguistic confusions were the perennial sources of absurdities in philosophical theories. Wittgenstein, the initiator of the modern trends in analysis, observed that "All philosophy is the "Critique of language"[3]— that Philosophy is the "battle against the bewitchment of our intellect by means of language."[4] Ryle was so much convinced of the muddle created by

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1 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 161

2 *Ibid.*, p. 199.

3 *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Kegan Paul, Ninth Impression, 1962, Thesis 4.0031.

4 *Investigations*, (1953), para 109.

the philosophers' mishandling of language that he also turned easily to the belief that the proper business of philosophy is "the detection of the sources in linguistic idioms of recurrent misconceptions and absurd theories."[5] Not only Wittgenstein and Ryle, the analysts in general grew suspicious of the philosophers' language. They took it to be full of confusions, paradoxes, contradictions, deadlock and nonsense. They, therefore, felt the need of crying halt to the use of faulty language. With the aims of halting improper use, exposing absurd theories, dispelling confusions, overthrowing idols and securing clarity, the analysts began subjecting language to examination. They thereby wanted to replace defective by non-defective language and achieve results on the subjects of mind, morals, nature and God.

Wittgenstein clearly saw that the reason behind philosophical difficulties lay in the violation of ordinary language. He pleaded for bringing "words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."[6] His objection was that the metaphysicians operated with ordinary words but deprived them of their ordinary functions. He complained that the metaphysicians had distorted ordinary language to the extent that a fog had been created blurring all 'vision' and causing 'deep disquietitude'. His intellectual successors saw his point and believed with him that it was philosophers' misconstruction and misdescription of ordinary language that led them go astray. So, if philosophy was to succeed, they argued, it must determine how our language is in fact used—what we mean when a word or a sentence is used in everyday discourse. The programme of the analysts was therefore, clarification based on common use because it was only after determining the common use that a philosophical dispute could be solved or dissolved. They took common or ordinary use to be the only proper use and what they wanted to clarify was not the knowledge of facts but the meaning of statements. Their clarificatory philosophy aimed at clarifying puzzling sentences into equivalent non-puzzling sentences. By so doing, they hoped to remove the darkness of perplexity and cure Philosophy of its muddles or headaches.

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5 G. Ryle, 'Systematically Misleading Expressions', *Essays on Logic and Language*, First series, ed., Flew, Basil Black Well, Oxford, 1952, p. 36.

6 Investigations (1953), para 116.

The above, in brief, is an account of the linguistic conception of philosophy and the notion of ordinary language as a philosophical touchstone. Ryle is one of the most influential proponents of this new concept of philosophy. His *Concept of Mind* is a fine specimen of the ordinary language philosophy, where he is at pains to analyse the psychological concepts in order to show the hollowness of mind-body dualism.

Now, we may observe at the outset that the programme of the analysts is perfectly rational in one sense. It is indeed worthwhile to insist that in philosophical discourse the terms must be univocal and well defined. It cannot be denied that words or expressions have exercised an unholy fascination over the philosophers. In many cases unclarities have hovered around their theories. So, the demand for halting improper use in order to subject it to examination appears to be quite legitimate. Words and expressions are the intellectual tools with which we operate in philosophical transactions. The tools must be fit in order to yield result.

So far the programme appears to be sound. Where it goes entirely off the rails is in supposing that analysis is the only business of philosophy and that every day discourse is the only court of appeal in solving philosophical disputes. Does every philosophical problem arise out of linguistic confusions so that the sole business of philosophy be linguistic analysis ? Are all philosophical problems pseudo-problems arising out of muddles, felt as problems ? It is not at all clear how the problems of evil, sin, immortality, freedom, the nature of the external world and mind first arose out of muddles or verbal confusions. One may rather feel inclined to believe that such problems are genuine problems arising out of the irreducible reflective nature of man. They have their source in man's curiosity to know, not in his inability to command a clear view of linguistic usages. It may be that some ways of thinking out these problems might lead to obscurity rather than to profundity and analysis of concepts used, be necessary. But that has only an instrumental value in clearing the ground so that the normal philosophic 'vision' may be restored. The goal of philosophy is not analysis or clarification ; it is something else and philosophical analysis may well be a means for its realisation. To say that philosophical analysis is the whole

and sole aim of philosophy is to confuse between means and end. A man who goes for hunting must be advised to avoid misuse of his rifle. A man who starts philosophising must be advised to avoid misuse of words. But just as the aim of hunting is not avoiding the misuse of rifle, the aim of philosophy is not just avoiding the misuse of words. After all, linguistic analysis is only a method, it cannot be its own end.

The analysts seem to think that philosophy has only one function — the negative function of clearing up linguistic confusions and exposing absurd theories. They decry ontology or speculation on the ground that it creates pseudo problems. They think that philosophical problems do not start with wonder, as Plato and Aristotle said ; they start with puzzlement or perplexity. Philosophers, in their view, cannot have any problem about *Weltanschauung*, they can only have the problems of logic. Now, whatever intellectual merit this conception of philosophy might have, it fails to relate philosophy with life. Instead of giving us an integrated view of life and the world ( a task whose fulfilment is the prime responsibility of philosophy), it is content with mere formal analysis of words and sentences, which at times looks so trivial. Their seeming recommendation that philosophy, instead of giving us an insight into the meaning of life and existence, should give us the meaning of sentences, sometimes as trivial as 'this is a rocking horse covered with pink spots', may have an unfortunate effect on the mind of the readers. It has already bewildered and frustrated many philosophically minded persons. Bertrand Russell has wondered "why a whole school finds important wisdom in its pages".[7] ( In the pages of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* ). According to him, this philosophy "is, at best a slight help to lexicographers, and at worst, an idle tea-table amusement".[8] H. H. Price has observed that this philosophy in its attempt to neglect metaphyics, may succeed "at the expense of being superficial".[9] He feels that "in our zeal to 'disinfect'

7 B. Russell, 'Philosophical Analysis' *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1956, Vol. LIV, p. 320

8 Ibid., p. 320.

9 H, H. Price, 'Clarity is Not Enough', *Clarity Is Not Enough*, George Allen & Unwin, 1968, pp. 40-41.

our language from muddles, we shall only succeed in sterilizing it".[10] Blanshard comments that a philosophy in which 'logical subtlety and acuteness play a larger role. . . . philosophy is losing some part of that connotation of wisdom that it once carried".[11] Even Waismann, a philosopher more or less under Wittgenstein's direct influence seems to feel 'cramped' in the tight jacket of Wittgensteinian philosophy. He maintains : "There is something deeply exciting about philosophy . . . , It is not a matter of 'clarifying thoughts' nor of 'the correct use of language' nor of any other of these damned things . . . . Philosophy is many things and there is no formula to cover them all. But if I were asked to express in one single word what is its most essential feature I would unhesitatingly say : vision".[12] Though Waismann explains 'vision' in his own way, still it is clear that he is not in favour of confining philosophy to the sole task of clearing up linguistic confusions.

Modern British philosophers by making it their cult to use plain language and odinary words seem to think that ordinary language is enough to bear the burden of philosophing. But it is not at all clear how philosophic truths—the deeper and subtle truths of our many-toned existence—can at all be consistently conceived and expressed through the medium of ordinary language. Is scientific truth expressible fully in vernacular medium ? We know that scientific language is often in conflict with ordinary language. Ordinary language makes the sun 'rise in the east and set in the west.' But scientific language rejects it. Physics gives its own account of the rainbow but the common man gives another account of the same. It was out of a realization of this fact that popular language may not correctly depict the reality that eminent philosophers had recommended us to think with the wise and speak with the vulgar. So, when the piecemeal scientific truth cannot always be correctly pictured by ordinary language, what to talk of philosophy which has

10 Ibid., pp. 40-41.

11 Brand Blanshard, 'The Philosophy of Analysis', *Clarity Is Not Enough*, Allen & Unwin, 1963, p. 107.

12 F. Waismann, How I see Philosophy', *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Allen & Unwin, 1956, pp. 482-83

a much wider aim of presenting a synoptic view of the world as a whole? The traditional programme of giving a synoptic view of the world is, however, not palatable to the analysts. They have cultivated a mood of ridiculing the past attempts at system-building. The metaphysicians have been condemned for saying strange things. They have been charged for attacking common sense and the ordinary everyday language that expresses common sense. The analysts believe that the philosophers by making departures from Standard English have consistently slipped into nonsense. In order to talk sense, they seem to think, we must resort to the use of Standard English or fixed ordinary language. But one may question the ground of such an assumption. We may ask: Is there anything called 'Standard English' or fixed ordinary language? And even if there be one such, can ordinary language be a touchstone of philosophical propriety? Why should the ordinary use of any *particular* language decide about the sensible or nonsensical nature of any philosophical problem? As to the notion of Standard English or fixed ordinary language, we quote the views of some competent writers. P. L. Heath remarks: "..... Writers who appeal to standard English display a surprising confidence and authority in pronouncing upon the proper, normal, literal, primary, true, correct or dominant meanings of words and phrases. It is surprising, because if you look up what the linguists have to say on the subject, you find that this strictly normative conception of vocabulary and grammar is completely out of date, and has been for centuries. To the vast majority of modern linguists, 'Standard English' is no more than a trade-label annexed to a particular dialect, and has no special status or authority, apart from the (irrelevant) social approval accorded to those who happen to speak it."[13] S. Körner observes: "But this appeal to the man in the street must, I believe fail because there are so many different men and so many different streets and because there is no reason why one of these streets should be preferred even if it should turn out that it leads through the

13. P. L. Heath, 'The Appeal to Ordinary Language', *Clarity Is Not Enough*. ed., H. D. Lewis. George Allen & Unwin, 1963, p. 186.

centre of Oxford and the outskirts of Cambridge."[14] C. A. Campbell thinks that "there is no 'accepted linguistic usage' in respect of most mental operations ....."[15]

As to the desirability of making ordinary language the sole medium of philosophising, the views of most eminent thinkers are not less adverse. Bertrand Russell while commenting on Ryle's *Concept of Mind* has criticised him for preferring the language of the 'uneducated people' and condemning the 'sophisticated language of the learned'.[16] H. J. Paton is of the opinion that "it is a mistake to suppose...that any language, whether home-baked or dehydrated, can be used as a standard to which philosophical thinking must conform."[17] Frederick Copleston denies that there is anything as 'fixed ordinary language' and "if there were, it is not at all self-evident that it would constitute a court of appeal in philosophical disputes."[18] It is indeed difficult to see how the deeper and subtle truths about the universe can always find their proper vent in ordinary language. As a matter of fact, one may not find suitable idioms in ordinary language to express one's thoughts. In the absence of suitable terminology one may not express clearly though one may say things of very high importance, As higher philosophic truths are not always expressible in the existing vocabulary, philophers have often coined words and used technical concepts. If they replace the technical by non-technical concepts, they will have to use the same set of terms for the technical as well as the non-technical sense. This will undoubtedly create more problems because it will lead to the confusion between the fixed and the fluid senses.

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14 S. Korner. 'Some Types of Philosophical Thinking', *British Philosophy in the mid-century*, ed., C. A. Mace, London : George Allen & Unwin, 1957, p. 122.

15 C. A. Campbell, 'Ryle on Intellect', *Clarity Is Not Enough*, George Allen & Unwin, 1963, p. 283.

16 Bertrand Russell, 'What is Mind', *My Philosophical Development*. George Allen & Unwin, 1959, p. 250.

17 H. J. Paton, 'Fifty Years of Philosophy', *Contemporary British Philosophy*, George Allen & Unwin, 1956, pp. 351-52.

18 Frederick Copleston, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Burns & Oates, 1960, p. 14.

The analysts have sought clarity on the basis of everyday language. The tacit assumption behind this is that our everyday language is free from ambiguities, which is obviously a simplification. Words in daily use may be hazy and indefinite and they may not always yield the desired clarity. The word 'good', for example. There are some people, John Hospers writes, who "feel that the word as now used is simply a blanket term covering a nest of confusions..."[19] The analysts, however, are not inclined to disbelieve the efficacy of ordinary language. They seem to entertain full faith in it. But even if we grant that ordinary language is unambiguous, it does not follow that philosophical problems are to be solved with reference to the ordinary usage of a *particular language.* Philosophical problems are not relative to the language analysed. Ryle's analysis of the concepts of English language does not, therefore, settle the problem of dualism for good. It hardly needs any saying that if we want to derive philosophy from linguistics, we must study different languages in order to achieve result. But if we take up the arduous task of analysing different languages, philosophy will be more a matter of industry than of insight and it will gradually lose its distinctive character and merge itself with philology. The oxford philosophers have already shown interest in language to an extent that philosophy is more or less giving way to philology.

Ryle, one of the few staunch supporters of ordinary language philosophy, analyses mental concepts in *The Concept of Mind* in order to show that ordinary language does not permit an existential conjunction between mind and body. By constantly arguing against the traditionalists and the theorists, he seems to maintain that it is the traditionalists and the theorists who have foisted the myth of Mind on ordinary language. But the question at issue is whether ordinary English language is not frankly dualistic. It we look at the traditional language habits of English-speaking people, it will not be difficult to see that the dualism between mind and body is a regular feature of their ordinary language. Since the earliest known times, they have

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19 John Hospers, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956, p. 9.

been talking in terms of the said dualism. Stuart Hampshire argues this point when he observes :"...Common-sense language is in fact, for better or for worse, firmly dualistic, in the sense that we do operate—and have operated since the earliest known literature—a distinction, or rather a whole set of distinctions, involving various and shifting criteria, between mental and physical states and events : We constantly ask, and are beginning to answer, various more or less general questions about the relation between a person's body and his mind, questions which cannot therefore be dismissed as 'improper' (p. 168)....."[20]

Ryle does not seem to recognise that ordinary language may be deeper and wider and it may be Cartesian here and non-Cartesian there. Without perhaps going deep into the working of the ordinary language, he has boldly asserted that 'volition' is an 'artificial concept.'[21] His main contention in his chapter on *The Will* is that the term 'Will' or 'Volition' is not used by the laity and it is foreign to the vocabulary of the ordinary language. His ground for saying so is that nobody ever speaks of being "occupied in willing this or that" and in having "five quick and easy volitions and two slow and difficult volitions between midday and lunch time." This contention, however, has been refuted by persons not less familiar with the working of the English language. A. C. Ewing, for example, gives instances to show how, in a way, we talk of volitions in our everyday discourse.[22] It is not out of place to mention here that the analysts themselves do not seem to agree about the behaviour of ordinary language. We may,for instance, refer to Ryle's view of the ordinary use of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary'. Ryle thinks that these terms in their ordinary use are applied only to those actions which ought not to be done.[23] Austin, however, does not appear to hold so, for he states at one place :".....for example, take 'voluntarily' and 'involuntarily' : we may join the army or make a gift voluntarily,

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20 Stuart Hampshire 'Critical notices', *Mind*, April, 1950, pp. 240-41. Page 168 in the bracket is the page reference of *The Concept of Mind.*

21 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 62

22 A. C. Ewing, 'Prof. Ryle's Attack on Dualism', *Clarity Is Not Enough*, George Allen & Unwin, 1963, p. 328.

23 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 69.

we may hiccough or make a small gesture involuntarily....."[24] when even two Oxford men are not agreed about usage, how can ordinary language be the touchstone of philosophical propriety ?

Ryle in his *Concept of Mind* has stigmatised the traditionalists' notion of mind as a "dogma of the ghost in the machine." He has attacked the dogma broadly in two ways— the first by introducing the notion of 'category mistake' and the second by analysing the meaning of mental concepts. To take the first, he thinks that the traditional psychology is a bundle of confusion because there has occurred an improper juxtaposition of the terms of different orders or categories. As such terms are, according to Ryle, incapable of being brought into intelligible relation with one another, he believes that their mixing up has resulted in incoherence and confusion. 'Mind' and 'matter' are, according to Ryle, terms of different orders or categories. They cannot as such be legitimately conjoined or disjoined. The conjunctive phrase 'body and mind' is, for Ryle, a meaningless phrase. He asserts that the psychologists have committed a category mistake by describing mind in terms which are suitable only to the body. It is important to note here that though Ryle does not believe in the dualism between mind and body, still he wants to make a categorial distinction between the mental and the physical. He holds strongly that there is a syntactical difference between the mental and the physical. Mental adjectives are, according to him, terms of a higher order or category. They cannot, therefore, sensibly fit in with what is physical.

Now, with regard to Ryle's thesis that the ghost is born of the illegitimate mixing up of the terms of different orders or categories, we may point out that Ryle does not give us any criterion in the *Concept of Mind* to distinguish such orders or categories. The rejection of the ghost on the basis of category mistake should have been preceded by a precise definition of category. Unless the reader knows what exactly Ryle understands by category, he may be ill at ease to appreciate the category mistake.

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24 J. L. Austin, 'A Plea for Excuses', *Ordinary Language*, ed., V. C. Chappell, Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964, p. 53.

It is true that when Ryle illustrates the category mistake with the help of a few examples, he makes the reader feel that something has gone wrong. But in order that one may be familiar with the mistake, one ought to be equipped with an adequate criterion to determine the category difference. This is what Ryle has failed to provide in the *Concept of Mind*. Warnock has, therefore, rightly objected : "If one is not prepared, and indeed is deliberately unwilling, to say just what a category is, and what categories there are, can one really be entitle to employ the term 'category" ?[25] It may however be argued that Ryle might not have thought it necessary to discuss category and category difference in view of his earlier paper 'categories' where he is explicit about the test that will discriminate concepts into different categories. The test that he provides there is : "Two proposition-factors are of different categories or types, if there are sentence-frames such that when the expressions for those factors are imported as alternative complements to the same gap-signs, the resultant sentences are significant in the one case and absurd in the other."[26] This means that of the two terms, if one can and the other cannot fit in the blank of a sentence without making nonsense, they are terms of different categories. Obviously, the category of which Ryle is talking here is, like that of Aristotle, a logical category. Now, as to the appropriateness and adequacy of Ryle's category, we may point out that it has not generally found favour with the critics. Smart has argued that if Ryle's criterion of determining category differences is to be adopted, terms which so obviously form one category fall into different categories.[27] R. C. Cross observes : "One should not expect that in their behaviour words will always fall into sharp and clearly defined and exclusive patterns, or that there is some easy and simple test to determine

25 G. J. Warnock, *English Philosophy since 1900*, London : Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 96.

26 G. Ryle, 'Categories', published in *Logic and Language*, Second Series, pp. 77-78.

27 Smart, 'A Note of Categories' *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* Vol. IV, 1953, pp. 227-28.

their patterns."[28] Ryle himself has subsequently preferred not to take the term 'category' so seriously. In Dilemmas he says that he recommends it "not for the usual reason, namely that there exists an exact, professional way of using it, in which, like a skeleton key, it will turn all our locks for us ; but rather for the unusual reason that there is an inexact, amateurish way of using it in which, like a coal hammer, it will make a satisfactory knocking noise on doors which we want opened to us."[29]

Now, whatever merit or drawback Ryle's concept of 'category' might have, we are not so much concerned with it as with Ryle's assertion that 'mind' and 'matter' when conjoined or disjoined make no sense. If ordinary language is to be trusted, we find that the structure of this language is dualistic. Mental and physical concepts are freely used together and they convey significant information to us. "Eagerness was written all over his face" ; "I was trembling with anxiety" ; "No doubt his gastric ulcer is due to his suppressed hostility" ; "An attack of the flu left me discouraged and depressed" ; "A resolute decision finally enabled me to overcome my addiction," etc, etc., are a few illustrations which indicate that ordinarily language unhesitatingly combines mental and physical terms in its description and explanation of human behaviour. Ryle will, of course, interpret the meaning of these sentences in his own usual behaviouristic way. For him mental concepts always mean some externally recognisable behaviour, But when I report my moods, feelings, emotions, sentiments, thoughts, images, dreams, etc., that I *experience*, I am not reporting my behaviour, be it actually occuring or likely to occur under certain conditions. I am reporting those states or processes of my direct experience which I live through ( enjoy or suffer ). Also in the case of others, when I report their thoughts, feelings and other mental happenings, I do not report their behaviours. I report their mental states and processes, which I know indirectly through inference from their behaviours. Though this

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28 R. C. Cross, 'Category Differences' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. LIX, p. 270.

29 G. Ryle, *Dilemmas*, Cambridge : At the University Press, 1962, p, 9.

inferential knowledge of other minds may, at times, turn out to be false, still it works out well and justifies itself in the practical conduct of our life.

As to the second line of attack on the ghost, we find Ryle analysing the meaning of mental concepts in order to show that, in actual use, they do not refer to any ghostly entity called mind. His behaviouristic appraisal of such concepts enables him to say that they primarily mean some bodily behaviour, actual or possible. 'Intelligence', for example, is for him only a manner of *doing* things in certain ways. Similarly, 'anger', 'fear', 'joy' and the like mean only characteristic behaviour patterns. 'Thinking' means silent speech or soliloquy. It is simply saying in a certain frame of mind. Now, with regard to this sort of analysis which Ryle undertakes in order to refute the so-called dogma of the ghost in the machine, we may point out that Ryle identifies meaning with the method of verification. When he explicates the meaning of 'vanity' in terms of certain behaviours, "namely to talk a lot about himself, to cleave to the society of the eminent, to reject criticisms, to seek the foot-lights and to disengage himself from conversations about the merits of others" ;[30] when he asserts that "in ascribing a specific motive to a person we are describing the sorts of things that he tends to try to do or bring about..... ;[31] when he thinks that "it is a part of the meaning of 'you understood it' that you could have done so and so and would have done it if such and such....." ; [32] when he understands the meaning of 'noticing', 'taking care', 'attending', 'applying one's mind', 'concentrating', etc., in terms of "meeting a concrete call and so meeting it that he would have met, or will meet, some of whatever other calls of that range might have cropped up, or may crop up"[33] he is certainly identifying the meaning of mental concepts with the method of their verification. His analysis equates the meaning with the circumstances that would make the idea either true or false. But

30 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 86
31 *Ibid.*, p. 112.
32 *Ibid.*, p. 170.
33 *Ibid.*, p. 147.

the most controversial question that arises in this context is whether meaning can necessarily be identified with the evidence or test that would certify truth or falsity. Ryle by seeking meaning in evidence has, in fact, accepted the Positivists' doctrine of meaning. But to embrace the Positivists' doctrine of meaning is to invite endless controversies. We know what a storm this dubious concept of meaning—dubious because it went through a series of interpretations by the Positivists themselves—has raised in the philosophical world. A. C. Ewing's threadbare criticism of the Positivists' criterion of Verifiability has the success of exposing its absurdities.[34] Without going into the detail of the criticism, we may point out that one of its fundamental blunders was to confuse the meaning of a proposition with the evidence that we use to verify it. When we speak of electricity, we do not mean the different tests that confirm the presence or absence of electricity. When scientists speak of electrons, they do not only mean the paths in a cloud-chamber, which they would offer as evidence for electrons.

The analysts will, however, claim a difference with the Positivists on the question of meaning. The alleged difference is that when a Positivist speaks of meaning as the method of Verification, what he means is the empirical or factual verification. But when Ryle speaks of meaning, he means only use and not facts. But though a distinction regarding meaning may in this way be drawn between the Positivists and Ryle, yet it hardly appears to have any substance because one thing that is not clear to imagination is how language and fact can be kept so apart. After all, language does not originate and develop without relation to facts. The analysts by showing their antipathy to facts have treated language as an independent realm. They have granted an untrammelled freedom to language because they believe that analysis is purely a verbal activity. But this, again, appears to be a queer assumption. The question that may disturb one's mind in this connection is: Can there be a mere language, completely abstracted from facts? It hardly needs saying that words and sentences usually acquire their meaning

34 A. C. Ewing, 'Meaninglessness',—*Mind*, Vol. XLVI, pp. 347-364.

with reference to things or facts. It is not so only with the propositions of pure mathematics, where we are concerned with syntax. But every proposition that we ordinarily use is not a mathematical proposition. Most of the words and sentences that we use do have a connection of one sort or other with facts and our talk of the relation between language and fact cannot justifiably be vetoed. Ryle, true to the programme of his school, has sought to maintain an underlying distinction between fact and language. But instances are not rare when even he, while explicating concepts, has fallen back on extralinguistic data. His elucidation of the concept 'university' involves an inspection of such extra-linguistic data as Christ Church, the Bodleian library, the Ashmolean Museum and the rest. But should one say that Christ Church, the Bodleian library, the Ashmolean Museum, etc., are for the purposes of Ryle only linguistic expressions, then we may reply that he is drawing heavily on what may be called lingua-centric predicament. It is indeed our difficulty that we cannot conveniently express facts except in terms of language.

Before we close this chapter we may note that Ryle's dispute with the Cartesians is that whereas according to him 'mind' is a descriptive concept, according to the Cartesians it is an explanatory or causal concept; whereas according to him the difference between intelligent and non-intelligent behaviour lies in their description, according to the Cartesians, it lies in their causation. With regard to this dispute, what Ryle is saying may not be disputed in some sense because the difference between intelligent and non-intelligent behaviour may indeed be generally shown on the basis of behaviours themselves. Their descriptions may really enable us to see the difference. But that is not the point at issue for the Cartesians. They do not introduce their theory of mind in order to show how intelligent behaviours differ from non-intelligent ones ( for the difference may be obvious from the behaviours themselves ). They introduce mind in order to explain or account for such a difference. Having known the difference, we may still ask : why at all does such a difference occur ? It is in reply to this 'why' that the Cartesians have advanced a theory of mind of their own. We know that to ask for a cause or explanation is a deep-seated psychological need. The Cartesian theory has the merit of satisfying this

need. Ryle, however, has denounced this merit and has attacked 'mind as a cause' theory. Following Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophy can only describe linguistic usage, he has felt satisfied with descriptions alone. But description cannot be a substitute for cause. Description and explanation are two different things concerning an event and both have their own functions. The Cartesian theory of mind cannot, therefore, be thrown overboard.

# DISPOSITIONS

In his Introduction to *The Concept of Mind* Ryle declares at the outset that his aim in the book is not to 'give new information about minds'. It is 'not to increase what we know about minds'. but simply 'to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess.' He thus seems to think that the rectification of the logical geography does not amount to a contribution to our knowledge of mind. But can a reader of *The Concept of Mind* escape the impression that Ryle has sought to advance a new theory of mind ? The central aim of the book has been to explode the Cartesian account of mind and to erect on its ruins a new theory—the theory of dispositional account of the same. Throughout the book, his fire has been directed against the Cartesian soul-substance and he argues vehemently to impress upon the reader that mind is not a ghost ; it is only a disposition to behave in certain ways. His attempt has been to pursuade the reader to give up the idea of the ghost and to believe instead in the theory of dispositions. This is certainly presenting a new picture of the mind. It is indeed true that Ryle has not sought to give us new information about the mind in the same way in which the old behaviourists and other psychologists have sought to do the same. His method is primarily linguistic and not factual. But even when he has engaged himself with the programme of conceptual re-mapping of the language in which we talk about minds, its effect has been to present an altogether new map in which the Cartesian ghost is left out in order to make room for dispositions. Had he not something new to say, he would not have begun his Introduction by saying : "This book offers what may with reservations be described as a *theory of mind.*"[1] Nor would his admirers have elevated his book to the status of 'the Bible of the new philosophy of 'mind'. So, it is not at all clear how he can advance his theory of dispositions and maintain at the same time that his business is not to say something new. Of course, he might contend that when he says that he has not to give something new, what he means is that his aim is not to add to our knowledge of mind *as fact.* His study is not a laboratory study based on observation and experiment.

1 The Concept of Mind, p. 7.

It is a study directed towards the re-arrangement of what we have already known about mind. That is, it is not a talk about mind as a fact. It is only a talk about our talk of mind. But it is not difficult to see in this connection that to say so is to make a very disturbing contrast between mind and the concept of mind, between fact and language. A pertinent question that arises here is whether a rectification or re-arrangement of mental-conduct concepts is possible without any regard to our knowledge of mental operations. It is needless to say that a talk having no consideration for facts will be destitute of useful logic. How can Ryle who talks like a positivist and bases his study on empirical considerations afford to neglect facts ? If one goes through *The Concept of Mind*, it will not be difficult to see that Ryle has *not failed* to discuss questions about things instead of questions about the concepts of those things. He could not have avoided doing so because language is a revealer of thought and thought is intimately connected with facts or things. While elucidating his point of view, Ryle has often to depend on analogies, which he draws from facts. To give one such instance, we may refer to Ryle's comparison of the privacy of our experiences with the privacy of a diary kept under lock and key.[2] Ryle himself appears to be conscious of giving the impression of going over to facts for he observes : "In attempting to explode this myth, I shall probably be taken to be denying well-known facts about the mental life of human beings, and my plea that I aim at doing nothing more than rectify the logic of mental-conduct concepts will probably be disallowed as mere subterfuge."[3] This observation also reveals his anxiety to remove the misconception that he is in any way 'denying well-known facts about the mental life of human beings.' But how can a reader escape an uneasy feeling that this is in general the case ? We know that Ryle's target of attack is the mind as conceived by the Cartesians. Cartesians had dealt with mind, not simply with the *concept* of mind. So how can Ryle make mind his target and profess at the sametime that he is not going to touch it ?

2 *Ibid.*, p. 185
3 *Ibid* , ; p. 16

To return to the point made earlier—the point that Ryle's book offers a new theory about the philosophy of mind. Much that is new and original in the book is said about dispositions. He replaces mind by disposition and believes that all psychological terms are more or less dispositional in character. The sum and substance of his book is that "To talk of a person's mind is not to talk of a repository which is permitted to house objects that something called 'physical world' is forbidden to house ; it is to talk of the person's abilities, liabilities and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world."[4] Mind is thus denied to be a substance over and above the body. It is thought to be a disposition, a set, a style, an *Einstellung* or an organic state of readiness 'to do and undergo certain sorts of things' in their appropriate situations. A disposition, however, is not an occult or mysterious inner quality or potentiality present in the person or the object about whom the disposition is said to be true. It is nothing actual. It simply signifies a tendency for certain events to occur if some conditions are realised. When glass is said to be brittle, it does not mean that brittleness is a property secretly present in glass. It only means that when a certain situation obtains, e. g., when it is hit with a stone, a certain event takes place, i. e., the glass breaks into parts Similarly of human vanity or any other disposition. When a man is said to be vain, it does not mean that there is an inner element of vanity in him which he feels or experiences. It simply means that he is prone to behave in certain ways under some specific circumstances. If, for example, he gets into the company of a stranger, he is likely to do such things that will show him to be prominent. Ryle thus believes that disposition-words are not the names of existing qualities. Dispositional statements are not the categorical reports of some occult or secret phenomena. They have only a hypothetical import. "To say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water. To say that this

4 *Ibid* , p. 199

sleeper knows French, is to say that if, for example, he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately or translates it correctly into his own tongue."[5] Now, this observation makes it clear that according to Ryle, though a dispositional statement may be categorical in form—this sleeper knows French—it is actually hypothetical in meaning because it is always unpacked in hypothetical statements : If he is addressed in French, he responds pertinently in French, if he is shown any French newspaper, he acts appropriately or translates it correctly, etc. etc. Being, therefore, equivalent to one or many hypothetical statements, a dispositional statement cannot be a reporter of existing states or processes. It is, so to say, an 'inference ticket' enabling us to move from one fact to the other. If I know somebody to be vain, I am, so to say, in the possession of an inference ticket, which entitles me to infer about his acts of boasting on finding that he is in the company of strangers.

The above, in brief, is an account of Ryle's idea of disposition with which he has sought to displace mind. By arguing that mental-conduct concepts are dispositional or hypothetical, he seems to think that he can remove the misconception that they refer to a certain existing entity called mind. His theory of disposition, however, raises a number of questions. First of all, why should Ryle think that a disposition is primarily a tendency to behave *overtly* ? Why should 'knowing French' mean only such overt acts as replying in French, translating in mother tongue and so on ? Why should it not also mean a covert feeling of confidence in tackling with whatever is there in French ? Why should 'vanity' almost mean the overt acts of boasting alone ? Why should not it also mean a private experience of annoyance when it is touched ? Ryle's account of disposition lays an over emphasis on overt acts for disposition may be a disposition to act outwardly as well as to feel and experience inwardly. Sibley has this thing to point out when he says".....he inclines to say that disposition-statements are not only hypotheticals about possible acts ( which is true ) but about ( atleast predomi-

5 *Ibid.*, p. 128

nantly ) overt acts. Why then this emphasis on the overt ?"[6] Ewing also feels the same way and says that a disposition may not be primarily "a disposition to behave in a certain way, but a disposition to have private experiences of a certain kind."[7] Besides. the limitation of signifying only some behaviours, imposed on mental concepts, is beset with a further difficulty. If vanity means only the possibility of doing this and that, then on seeing that somebody does just that, we may infer for certain that he is vain. But can anybody be so confident of his finding ? There is no contradiction involved in the assertion that a man does all that a vain man would do but still he is not vain. He might be doing those things not out of vanity but from some other motive. The same can be illustrated with the help of what Ryle calls a family concept—the concept of 'intelligence'. Ryle thinks that 'intelligence' is a disposition of doing things in certain ways. He equates intelligence with a certain manner or procedure, so that if somebody is intelligent, he will do in that manner and if he does in that manner, he is intelligent. But there are cases in which this equation breaks down. Somebody's inner communings might, be intelligent but public performances dull because of, say, shyness or stage-fright. An intelligent student might do worse at the examination. Conversely, somebody might do well at times but he may not be intelligent. His so-called intelligent action may be only a chance performance. This shows that intelligence cannot be identified with the manner of doing things, though it is intimately connected with such a manner or procedure. It is true we will not call a man intelligent if he never acts intelligently, but to say so is not to identify the meaning of intelligence with the evidence that will certify its truth or falsity. We may observe in passing that one of the basic confusions that Ryle has made in his book is between the essence and the evidence of mental concepts. Many of the logical problems that Ryle's analysis of mental concepts has raised are due to his failure to distinguish the essence with evidence. It might be that for elucidating the essence of mental concepts, some reference

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6 Frank Sibley, 'A Theory of Mind' *Review of Metaphysics*, December. 1950, p. 267.

7 A. C. Ewing, 'Prof. Ryle's attack on Dualism' *Reprinted in Clarity Is Not Enough*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1963, p. 318.

to their evidence is necessary, but "it is one thing to insist that the terms in which we appraise mental qualities are unintelligible without reference to what the subjects of those qualities do and quite another to say that we can find the whole meaning of such terms in overt actions."[8] It is indeed too much to say that mental factors are completely and exhaustively objectified in behaviour. Ryle's version that the thoughts of a clown are totally objectified in his trippings and tumblings is unacceptable because besides the idea of amusement, there might be several other thoughts ( the thought of profit, etc. ) ideally present in the clown's mind. Ryle's attempt to unfold the meaning or significance of a mental concept in terms of behaviour has, therefore, its own limitation.

Not only this. In addition to our inability to see how a dispositional mental concept can stand only for behaviours, actual or possible it is also difficult to see how a categorical statement containing a disposition-word can be unpacked in hypothetical statements for we do not know how many hypothetical statesments will be required to express fully the meaning of such a dispositional statement. Obviously the statement 'this sleeper knows French' does not mean only a few hypotheticals like "if he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately or translates it correctly into his own tongue." But there is also no means for us to say how many other hypothetical statements will supplement and exhaust the meaning of the above-said categorical statement. Ryle thinks that the meaning of most of the dispositional statements involves an infinite number of hypothetical statements. He observes : "When an object is described as hard, we do not mean only that it would resist deformation ; we mean also that it would, for example, give out a sharp sound if struck, that it would cause us pain if we came into sharp contact with it, that resilient objects would bounce off it and so on indefinitely."[9] Likewise when a man is said to be vain, we do not mean only that

8 W. H. Walsh *Metaphysics*, Hutchinson University Library, 1963, p. 52.
9 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 44.

he tends to talk a lot about himself if in the company of others, we mean also that he cleaves to the society of the eminent, if there be any such persons ; rejects criticisms, if there be any such ; seeks the footlights and so on indefinitely. "To be vain is to tend to act in these and innumerable other kindred ways."[10] Now, we may ask : is it not trying one's patience to recommend that the meaning of a dispositional statement is to be sought in an infinite series of hypothetical propositions ? Can such a series be ever completely formulated ? The original statement will always mean more than the hypothetical observation-statements and a complete analysis of the under analysis will remain logically impossible. Ryle's phenomenalism with regard to mind ( phenomenalism because he holds that mind is not over and above certain sorts of behaviour—just as the phenomenalists had said that an object is not over and above certain sorts of sensations ) will, therefore, suffer from the usual charge that no phenomenalist analysis can ever be completed. His assertion that a mentalistic sentence instead of reporting some actual episodes of mind, reports an infinite series of possible behavioural episodes, has the effect of making simple things look rather complicated. It is a complexity of this kind which makes Peter Geach comment : "It is really a scandal that people should count it a philosophical advance to adopt a programme of analysing ostensible categoricals into unfulfilled conditionals, like the programmes of the phenomenalists with regard to 'physical-object' statements and of neo-behaviourists with regard to psychological statements."[11]

We have thus seen that Ryle's attempt to describe a dispositional concept in terms of behaviour and to reduce a dispositional sentence into a series of hypothetical statements is faced with difficulties, which however do not end here. His notion of 'many or multi-track' dispositions is another instance where we come across fresh difficulty. We find him drawing a distinction between 'single-track' dispositions, the actualisations of which are 'nearly uniform' and 'many-track' dispositions, the actualisations of which are 'indefinitely

10 *Ibid*, p. 86.

11 Peter Geach, *Mental Acts*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Second impression, 1960, p. 7.

heterogeneous'. The word 'Cigarette-smoker' is a single-track disposition-word because it always means a tendency for only one type of activity, viz., the activity of smoking. But the word 'vain' or 'greedy' is a 'many-track' disposition-word because it signifies not one but diverse activities in different situations. Ryle illustrates it with the concept of 'grocing'. As the term 'grocing' stands for different activities like selling sugar, weighing tea, wrapping up butter and so on, so the term 'vanity' or 'greedy' stands for a wide range of different activities under various circumstances. Being a reporter of a number of possible actions and reactions, a dispositional sentence, containing a many-track disposition-word has to be unpacked in a set or series of hypothetical statements. The many-track dispositional words are, according to Ryle, 'highly generic or determinable' while the single-track words are 'highly specific or determinate.[12] As many of the dispositions which we ascribe to human beings are "not single-track dispositions but dispositions the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogeneous", so much of the descriptions of human beings are given with the help of 'many-track' dispositional words.

Now, our difficulty lies with the way Ryle conceives of a 'many-track' dispositional word. Such a word, according to him, is 'highly generic' i. e. it serves as a genus having heterogeneous episodes as its species. But the question is, according to which principle can a series of episodes, being so heterogeneous in character be all subsumed under a common genus ? Is it not at least a verbal contradiction to say that a genus has such species whose character or virtue of coming under one class is unintelligible ? Can anybody take a few things blindly to hustle them up into one class ? How in the absence of a relationship between the various episodes, can they all be taken to refer to a common generic term ? According to which rule of construction can the diverse hypothetical propositions be grouped together ? Such questions may disturb a reader's mind. It is in this connection that Spilsbury remarks : "I do not understand Ryle's use of the term 'generic' in this context. In any ordinary use it would be absurd to say that *hardness* was a genus, of which the properties

12 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 118

of causing pain, resisting deformation, and giving out a sharp sound were species".[13] We may also note that Ryle's example of 'grocing' does not establish his point satisfactorily. Whereas any overt performance of selling, weighing or wrapping is grocing, any overt performance is not the working of mind or in Ryle's terminology the actualisation of a disposition. Of the two episodically identical performances, if one is an instance of grocing, the other also must be an instance of the same. But of the two episodically identical actions, if one is an actualisation of a disposition, the other may not be the actualisation of the same, for it may be done absent-mindedly or accidentally.

A further important question that arises in this context is whether dispositions are only hypothetical and not actual. Ryle's thesis is that to expect of a disposition-word to denote some specifically existing property is to expect of the term 'average rainfall' to denote some particular pod of water. 'Average rainfall' does not mean something over and above the particular instances of rain. Disposition-words similarly do not mean anything over and above the particular episodes of one's life and work. He, therefore, believes that to call a man intelligent is not to say that there is an ingredient in him, called intelligence ; it is only to say that he *would* behave so and so in such and such circumstances. As psychological terms are the names of different dispositions, they have, according to Ryle, only a hypothetical import. Regarding this, however, a very searching question arises in our mind. Does or does not a dispositional sentence evoke in our mind a thinking in terms of 'if and then' ? Do we on hearing the sentence begin to think what *would* or *would not* happen in certain situations ? A little of reflection will show that a hypothetical reference is not usually the case. When a man is said to be intelligent, we do not usually begin to think of his possible activities, nor can we then have the slightest idea of the situations in which those activities would be realised. What we normally mean is that the man has in him a certain positive

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13 R. J. Spilsbury, 'Dispositions and Phenomenalism', *Mind*, July 1953, pp. 342-43.

trait or quality which would enable him to do and cope well in various situations.

Further, to say that dispositions are not actual is to say that there is no *actual* difference between person and person. It is only to say that a difference *would* arise when they *would* act in their own ways. But to say so is to say something very unusual. When we look for the difference between two persons, we do not merely look for their hypothetical difference, on the contrary, we go for some actual difference, existing at the moment which alone enables us to anticipate their future behaviour. Ryle believes that if we want to distinguish a soluble thing from an insoluble one, we can do so not by virtue of a property or character, present in the one and absent in the other. We can do so only with the help of certain hypotheticals. A hypothetical which will be true of the one will be untrue of the other. If the hypothetical 'it will dissolve, if submerged in water' will be true of a soluble thing, it will not be true of an insoluble thing. But suppose, we do not take recourse to the experiment of submerging soluble and insoluble things in water, suppose all the water of the earth evaporate, not to come back as water again, will the difference between soluble and insoluble things vanish altogether ? Of course, one may say that 'soluble' in that case would mean 'if there would be water and if it would be mixed up with it, it would dissolve'. But to go on adding 'ifs' to avoid a positive quality, character or property is to adopt a programme which appears to be too sophisticated. It is indeed true that the existing character of solubility is imperceptible. But so is an atom. Ryle will not be prepared to take an unobservable atom as unreal. Is not the unobservable solubility a reality then ?

The denial of the actuality of dispositions also appears to be incompatible with the learning of skills. We know that skills are learnt gradually by practice. But unless every practice leaves something positive to be carried forward in the next, how can we improve and acquire skills ? If nothing positive, born of practice is to be sustained and carried forward, every attempt at learning a skill will, in effect, be an altogether new attempt, leading to the learning of no skill at all.

Further, the rejection of dispositions as something actual leads to

queer consequences. For instance, it has led Ryle to believe that vain behaviour is not due to an element of vanity present in the agent. It is due to some such thing as meeting the stranger. But to say so is to explain vanity more in terms of the stranger than in terms of the agent himself—what could the agent have done? He met the stranger and behaved vainly. So, the agent is not to blame. Blame either the stranger or nobody. Ryle's account of dispositions thus in a way relieves us of our responsibility for our own actions. If at all it is to be apportioned it is to be fixed on the situation that leads to the actualization of the disposition. But the situation is too impersonal a concept to bear any responsibility.

Our belief in the actuality of dispositions is, on the contrary, strengthened if we examine our reflexes. Reflexes are the actualisations of the dispositions of an organism to react to the different stimuli in more or less definite ways. Such an actualisation, however, presupposes a stable system—a nervous system—within the organism. It is the interaction between the sitmulus and this system that results in the manifestation of behaviour. So, just as some enduring system is required for the actualisation of innate dispositions, some stable property or properties within the human organisation should be required for the actualisation of all other dispositions. Stimulus acts on the nervous system to produce reflex-behaviour. Circumstances should likewise act on the inner qualities to produce dispositional behaviours.

Ryle, however, thinks that a disposition only me ans a regular sequence of behaviour under appropriate conditions. To say that X has a disposition is to say that X has regularly behaved in manner Y and is likely to behave so in future. Dispositional words, according to him, do not stand for drives, forces or powers, existing within the agent. The conception of an occult force, he reminds us, has been given up by physical sciences. Why should it then at all continue to exist in the theories of mind? But we may point out that though physical sciences might have given up the idea of an existent force, ordinary language, which is the basis of his analysis, has not given it up. The phrase '*force* of habit' is today as much in use as any other phrase. Habit is our disposition. Can we not on the basis of this usage treat disposition as a force? That dispositions exist within

us as a force is best experienced when we want to do contrary to what we are disposed to do. In a situation like this we cannot easily do what we want to do. We feel, as if something ( or force ) is resisting us. We have to develop a counter-force to meet the resistance. The resistance that we feel and the force that we apply to meet it clearly suggest that there is a pre-existing force or drive in us to do things in a certain manner which we want to break in the present case. Ask a habitual cigarette smoker, who has voluntarily given up smoking, how much of will-force he has to apply to overcome the pre-existing force of temptation for cigarette. So, in view of all this, it becomes difficult to believe with Ryle that a disposition is not an existing drive or force. Aaron, while explaining the nature of dispositions observes that a disposition does not signify only a regular behaviour-sequence. On the other hand, "when ordinary men and some scientists and philosophers speak of dispositions they clearly mean more ; rightly or wrongly they mean drives, forces, or powers."[14] It is, therefore, at least debatable if a dispositional statement is not categorical in significance. So far ordinary people are concerned it does report some existing quality or force. When sugar is said to be soluble, more is meant than that it would dissolve if put in water. We ordinarily assume that sugar has certain inherent tendency to dissolve under some circumstances. Our assumption may be wrong. But this is how common people think about the solubility of sugar and use it in their general discourse and Ryle's theory is concerned with common people and common usage. He has, however, tried to understand a dispositional statement only in terms of hypothetical statements. He has argued that both categorical and hypothetical statements are not true of dispositional concepts. But there appears to be no difficulty in expounding the meaning of a dispositional concept with the help of both categorical and hypothetical statements. To say that sugar is soluble might well mean both that solubility is a power or quality or characteristic of sugar and that it would dissolve if put in water. Of course, the

14 Aaron, Dispositions, *The Theory of Universals*, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1962, p. 174.

categorical statement is generally made when the hypothetical state ments are found to be true. If a sugar-like thing does not dissolve in water, we cannot ordinarily say that it has solubility as its quality. But that is only to make the truth of the categorical statement depend on the truth of hypothetical statements. That is not to deny the categorical significance altogether. Dispositional concepts are not, therefore, unsuggestive of inner or hidden qualities. Even when mental concepts stand for dispositions, our inner life is not to be denied.

We may also point out that Ryle's theory of dispositions is helpful chiefly in deciding about the 'character of mind', not about the 'working of mind'. We may explain it with the help of one or two of Ryle's own illustrations. While giving us a criterion of intelligent activity, he holds that an intelligent activity is one which is the outcome of a skill or disposition. The shooting of a bull's eye by a marks-man is an example of an intelligent activity because the marks-man has the ability or the skill or the disposition to do it under various circumstances—"even if the wind strengthens, the range alters and the target moves."[15] The corollary of this view is that the same act of successful shooting by a novice is not an intelligent activity because he is not able or disposed to do it again and again. But here what the ability or the disposition helps us to decide is that the mind of the marksman is superior to the mind of the novice, the character of his mind excels or surpasses the character of the novice's mind. The fact that the marksman was disposed to shoot again and again while the novice was not, does not mean that the marksman had directed his action of shooting and the novice had not. Both of them might have consciously tried to shoot the target. The mind of both of them might have moved into action, the only difference being that the mind of the marksman was superior in being able or disposed to achieve the success under diverse circumstances, which the novice's mind was unable to do. It is on account of the superiority of mind of the marksman that his action is called intelligent. So, when the question of knowing the quality of one's mind and comparing it with

15 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 45.

that of others arises, dispositions may be of help. But when the question of knowing whether some action is the working of one's mind is at issue dispositions can be almost of no help. Whether the novice had pressed the trigger mindfully or absent-mindedly cannot be decided with the help of his dispositions. Which of his dispositions will help us here ? In a situation like this, it is not through his dispositions but through his avowals that we can know whether he had or had not directed his action at the moment. Consider a second case. While discussing what heeding or minding is, Ryle says that a driver's minding of his driving consists in his preparedness to meet certain sorts of emergencies. If he is prepared or disposed to handle the expected and unexpected contingencies, if he is alert to chuck-holes and pedestrians, if he foresees that the donkey standing there might bolt out the street etc. etc., he is certainly minding what he is doing. This is true. But Ryle is here using the term 'minding' in the sense of 'doing carefully'. If a driver is disposed to drive his car carefully, his disposition or preparedness only shows the quality of his mind. For a driver who is not disposed to drive carefully may also be minding what he is doing as he might be driving consciously, not mechanically or out of habit. The word 'minding' may mean both 'doing carefully' and 'doing consciously' of which the first implies the second though the second does not imply the first. A driver, therefore, has to mind first in the sense of 'doing consciously' before he can mind in the sense of 'doing carefully'. So, when Ryle explains the driver's 'minding' in terms of his dispositions to meet the emergencies, he is only pointing out a quality of the driver's mind, that he is careful. Of the two drivers, one prepared or disposed to meet the emergencies while the other not, both are minding their driving ( in the sense that both are doing their work consciously, not mechanically ). But the difference between them is that whereas one has the ability or disposition to meet the emergencies, the other one does not have so. Clearly the disposition here does not distinguish a working of mind from that which is not the working of mind. It enables us only to find out which of the two workings of mind is qualitatively superior. So, we find that Ryle's attempt to make disposition take the place of mind, falls short of the intended task. His theory seems to succeed because he does not take into account the

different senses of the words 'intelligent' and 'minding'. The word 'intelligent' when predicated of an action may mean 'directed action' as opposed to the action of a machine or it may mean 'well directed action' as opposed to the action of an idiot. Similarly, the word 'minding' may mean 'doing carefully' or it may simply mean 'doing consciously' as opposed to 'doing mechanically or out of habit'. Ryle's disposition is no doubt helpful in accounting for well-directed and careful actions. It, however, fails in the case of simply directed or conscious actions.

But even when dispositions may seem to be a good substitute for mind, it is necessary for the purposes of Ryle to distinguish between human and non-human dispositions. Merely to say that mind is a disposition to behave in certain ways will not do. Inanimate objects also have their dispositions to behave in their own ways. What is it, then, which makes us classify some dispositions as physical and others as mental ? Ryle does not provide a suitable answer to this question. Nor does he seem to think it necessary to explain the criteria that will distinguish the two sorts of dispositions. "A plain man would say that 'brittle' denotes a disposition of bodies and 'intelligent' denotes a disposition of minds — in fact, that the two adjectives apply to different kinds of 'stuff'. But it is not open to Professor Ryle to say this, and I do not quite know what he would say".[16]

He does not distinguish human dispositions from the dispositions of other beings and objects, but he makes certain distinctions amongst mental dispositions. Of the dispositions 'know' and 'belief', one refers to capacity and the other to tendency. 'To know' means to be able to get things right ; 'to believe' means to tend to act or react in certain ways. So neither the capacity verb 'know', nor the tendency verb 'believe' refers, according to Ryle, to any act or process conducted on the private stage of mind. These verbs, Ryle believes, cannot report secret acts or processes, because there are no such acts or processes. His main objection against cognitive acts is that certain questions which ought to be answered about them, because they are

16 Bertrand Russell, *My Philosophical Development*, George Allen and Unwin, 1959 p. 247.

acts, cannot be answered. Nobody can answer such questions as: "How many cognitive acts did he perform before breakfast, and what did it feel like to do them? Were they tiring? Did he enjoy his passage from his premises to his conclusion, and did he make it cautiously or recklessly? Did the breakfast bell make him stop short halfway between his premises and his conclusion? .... Is conceiving a quick or a gradual process, an easy or difficult one, and can he dawdle over it or shirk doing it...."[17] Besides, if the word 'know' of the sentence 'this sleeper knows French' refers to cognitive acts, the sleeper's mind must experience such acts. But to assume that it is so is preposterous.

Now, with regard to such questions, the alleged impossibility of whose answers is taken to be the ground for rejecting cognitive acts, we may observe that the answers cannot be easily given not because there are no cognitive acts but because the question themselves are more or less illegitimate. Such questions can be validly asked about physical or bodily acts. But if someone makes their answer a condition for the acceptance of cognitive acts, we may say that we can answer some of them. We do enjoy drawing certain conclusions. We do at times infer cautiously or recklessly. Conceiving is sometimes quick, sometimes gradual, sometimes easy and sometimes difficult. We often speak of something (say the breakfast bell) interrupting our thought, etc. etc. So, we cannot reasonably deny cognitive acts. The only difficulty is that we cannot know them by making them the objects of our consciousness. They are always subjects' consciousness or awareness. They are known in relation to their object because knowing or believing cannot be abstracted from the known or believed. The verbs 'know' and 'believe', therefore, do report mental acts in certain contexts. It is true that the verb 'know' in the sentence 'this sleeper knows French' does not report any cognitive act occurring in the sleeper's mind at the moment. But there is no difficulty in accepting that the word 'know' has both the functions, to report dispositions as well as occurrences. When we say 'this sleeper knows French', we do only

17 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 292-93.

mean that the sleeper has an ability or disposition to act in certain ways in certain conditions. But when I say 'I have just *come to know* how the incident occurred', I do not usually mean to communicate that I have acquired an ability or disposition to do some such thing as narrate the incident, if somebody asks for it ; what I mean is that an awareness about the way the incident occurred has taken place in my mind. That I shall be able to do some such thing as narrate the incident, if someone asks for it, is not the meaning but the consequence of my coming to know how the incident occurred.

Ryle distinguishes between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that', between, for example, knowing how to tie a reef-not and knowing that the English word 'tie' has three letters and thinks that 'knowing how' always means 'knowing how to perform a skill or task.'[18] That is, 'knowing' in the sense of 'knowing how' is necessarily a disposition to act outwardly. But we may ask, is the use of 'knowing how' always one without a second so that it may wear its logic on its sleeve ? What performance of a skill or task is involved in the statement 'I have just come to *know how* the incident occurred." ? Jane Roland gives examples to show that "in ordinary language the phrase 'knowing how' is often used when performances are not involved ..."[19] So, we may say that neither 'knowing how' has one kind of use to refer invariably to dispositions, nor is mind only a series of acts for the psychological terms to refer invariably to mental acts.

About the verb 'believe', Ryle thinks that it is a tendency word signifying some possible actions or reactions, To believe means to be inclined or prone to act or react in certain manners. But, if 'belief' be only a tendency to overt action, we cannot say that a veteran smoker ever believes in the injurious nature of smoking for he has always a tendency for the overt act of smoking.

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18 He does not explicitly discuss the logical status of 'knowing that', though he is particular about discussing the logical status of 'knowing how'. For our purposes, it is enough to show that his analysis of 'knowing how' (an expression always signifying a disposition according to him ) is of a limited nature.

19 Jane Roland, "On 'Knowing How' and 'Knowing That'.', *Philosophical Review*, July, 1958, p. 380.

Besides, if belief be merely the possibility of certain actions and reactions, how is it that I know directly that I believe something though I do not know directly that if such and such occasions arise, I would act in such and such ways ? These are the difficulties which arise regarding the dispositional account of psychological concepts.

But these are not all. Ryle has himself seen that a concept of heed, e. g. noticing, concentrating, caring, attending, etc., is not fully explicable on dispositional lines. In the case of these concepts, grouped under the common heading of 'minding', Ryle has to take recourse to the language of 'mongrel-categorical' or 'semi-dispositional'. Such concepts, he believes, are half-dispositional and half-episodic. They have both, an episodic and a dispositional reference. To say that 'X is reading carefully' is to say (1) that he is doing something *now* ( the incident is datable or clockable and certain adverbs which are applicable to occurrences are applicable to his act of reading ) and (2) he *would* be able to answer questions about the subject of his study, if called upon to do so in future. Obviously, (1) makes it episodic and (2) dispositional. The proposition 'X is reading carefully', containing the heed concept 'carefully' is, therefore, neither fully dispositional nor fully episodic. It is in the language of Ryle, mongrel-categorical or semi-dispositional.

Now, by introducing the concept of 'mongrel-categorical' for elucidating the meaning of heed concepts, Ryle is gradually modifying his original position to an extent that it hardly appears to survive. We know that his case against the traditionalists is that they had interpreted all mentalistic sentences as categorical reports about the happenings of an inner world ( the ghostly world as he calls it ). By so doing, he holds, the traditionalists had misunderstood the logic of mental concepts. Mental concepts, according to him, do not report any happening or episode for "there are no such happenings ; there are no occurrences taking place in a second-status world...[20] To talk of a person's mind is to talk of his abilities, liabilities, and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary

20 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 161

world."[21] From these and other remarks, his basic approach to the concept of mind becomes abundantly clear. He appears to maintain firmly that mental concepts are dispositional and not episodic in import ; that categorical statements about mental events are to be re-interpreted as hypothetical statements about possible behaviour ; that the logic of disposition-words is different from the logic of episode-words. But when the question of elucidating the logic of heed verbs arises, the occurrence-disposition dichotomy proves for him a great handicap. He then yields to maintain that the logic of occurrence and disposition words meet in the heed concepts, that they are at once dispositional and occurrent. This obviously weakens his original thesis because "it is essential to Ryle's arguments to maintain that disposition and episode words are of different logical types."[22]

Ryle argues that when a man is said to be minding what he is doing, his minding is not something over and above his overt doing. It is not that the man is minding at a ghostly level and working at the physical level. If minding and reading would have been *two* activities, it would have been possible to continue minding even in the absence of reading, just as in the two activities of walking and humming, it is always possible to do the one in the absence of the other. Now, with regard to this analogical reasoning of Ryle, we may say that it has little force since there is one important point of difference between walking and humming on the one hand and reading and minding on the other. Of the two acts of walking and humming, it is in the nature of neither to involve the other. But it is in the nature of minding to involve some such thing as reading. Minding cannot go on by itself. It is a conscious direction which requires some object on which it can be applied. Of course, when it is directed upon some activity, say the activity of reading, it forms a complex whole having all the semblances of one activity.

The whole of the complex activity of doing mindfully or attentively is not, however, open to an outside observer. He does not

21 *Ibid.*, p. 199

22 T. D. Weldon, 'The Concept of Mind', ( Discussion ), *Philosophy*, July, 1950 p. 269.

have an access to the mind of others to see directly the 'minding-aspect' of the complex activity. He can see only the overt or the public part of the activity, viz., the act of reading. He can know that it is also mindful only indirectly through certain tests. If he finds that the man concerned is able to satisfy some tests, i. e. if the man concerned can do some such thing as tell the gist of his reading without hesitation and research, he ( the observer ) can be sure that the man was minding what he was reading. Ryle is right when he says : "To notice what one reads entails being prepared to satisfy some such subsequent tests. In a similar way, certain kinds of accidents or near-accidents would satisfy us that the driver had not been taking care. To take care entails being prepared for certain sorts of emergencies."[23] But it is not difficult to see that such tests are necessary only in the case of others. When I have to decide whether somebody else's action is heedful or unheedful, I have to fall back upon tests. But I have not to pass these tests in order to know whether my own action is mindful or unmindful. If I am myself driving a car, I do not have to wait and see if I can avoid certain accidents or near-accidents before I can decide whether I am or am not minding my driving. As a matter of fact, there is no contradiction involved in the statement that I am minding my driving though I am somehow failing to meet certain sorts of emergencies. So, minding, attending, noticing or caring in my own case is known directly through the deliverances of consciousness. Ryle while talking of minding talks of the minding of others. He appears to have confused the question 'How do I know that I am minding my activity ?' with the question 'How do I know that someone else is minding his activity ?'

But if I say that minding in my own case is known from consciousness, Ryle will not fail to bring the charge of infinite regress against my statement. Ryle will argue that if minding is known from consciousness, the consciousness of minding must be known by another consciousness and so on for ever. Ryle uses his favourite argument of infinite regress against the traditionalists' concept of heed

23 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 189.

when he observes: "Doing something with heed does not consist in coupling an executive performance with a piece of theorizing, investigating, scrutinising or 'cognising'; or else doing anything with heed would involve doing an infinite number of things with heed."[24] But it is not difficult to see that behind this infinite regress argument, there is a mistaken notion of consciousness working in Ryle's mind. He seems to presume that if there is consciousness it must be instantaneous or fragmentary because it is only with such a notion of consciousness that he can speak of going back from one consciousness to another and so on *ad infinitum*. But if consciousness must be instantaneous, Ryle cannot form the idea of an infinite series. The very fact that an idea of an infinite series can be formed proves beyond doubt that there is a kind of consciousness other than what Ryle assumes it to be which can grasp and form the idea of an endless receding series. The charge of infinite regress often brought against the traditionalists' notion of consciousness and introspection by Ryle does not therefore, appear to be quite valid. Why should he go on positing one consciousness as a source of knowing another consciousness? Mind is not a mere series of different bits of consciousness like walking which is a mere series of different steps. Besides, even if the 'regress' be accepted as true, consciousness is not thereby refuted. Every 'infinite regress' does not, for that matter, refute a thing against which it is applied. We know that a burning flame kept between two vertical mirrors reflects an infinite series of flames in the mirrors. But we cannot say that since an infinite series of flames are reflected, the burning flame is refuted. Infinite regress is also in a way true of tree and seed. But neither the tree nor the seed is therefore contradicted. The argument of infinite regress has its destructive force when it defeats a purpose. If for drawing money from the bank the signature of a drawee is to be attested and the attested signature is again to be attested, so on *ad infinitum*, the drawee cannot withdraw his money. Infinite regress is harmful here and in cases like this. But no such harm is done to consciousness even if the regress be true there. Ryle appears to depend a little too much on

24 *Ibid*, p. 137

the argument of infinite regress for the refutation of consciousness in general and its modifications in particular.

Further, Ryle seems to identify heed with intention or purpose. His discussion of the heed concepts[25] and the inclusion of the word 'trying' in the list of such concepts give the reader an impression that according to Ryle doing with heed means doing with purpose and vice versa. But however closely related these concepts might be, they are not identical in significance. Somebody's action may be intentional but unheedful or unintentional but heedful. Lighting a cigar for the purpose of smoking is intentional but it may be unheedful because the man concerned might be absorbed in some other activity. Similarly, we may begin to pay attention to somebody's conversation accidentally, without any plan or purpose or intention to do so.

Ryle while explaining an attentive or heedful activity thinks that it is an activity done in a certain frame of mind. The activity which is being performed is one of the several activities that could be performed in that frame of mind. To do with heed is, according to Ryle, to do something in the present and to be disposed to do a lot of associated things in future if required. Accordingly, he thinks that the difference between a heedful and an unheedful activity is primarily a difference in the frames of mind in which the two sorts of activities are performed. Overtly or outwardly, an unheedful activity may be so similar to a heedful activity that they may not look to be different at all. The question of heed is not, therefore, to be decided with reference to the outward activity. It is to be decided with reference to the frame of mind, the readiness or the preparedness or the disposition of the agent to do some other possible but connected things. In short, minding according to Ryle, is 'the frame of mind' in which one is found to work at the moment. It is a disposition which may actualise in several ways and one of whose actualisations is the activity in which the agent may be engaged at the moment.

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25 For example, on pp. 296-7 of *The Concept of Mind*, he maintains that 'thinking' (a heed concept) is saying something either aloud or in one's head *purposefully or heedfully*.

The above, in short, is the account of heed as given by Ryle. It is clear from this account that heed, according to Ryle, is a frame of mind or disposition. Now, a pertinent question that arises is whether 'the frame of mind' is not something actual. Is not the agent in addition to his overt doing also knowing directly that he is minding or having a certain frame of mind ? Ryle will say that a 'frame of mind' is a disposition and it cannot as such be actual. But if the frame of mind or minding is not something actual given in introspection, how is it that the agent when asked if he is minding what he is doing is able to say at once that he is minding his activity ? If the Rylean analysis of heed is true, the agent ought to have said, 'Wait. Let me see if I can do some associated thing or things or meet some test or tests before I can tell you whether I am minding my activity or not'. But this is not how one talks about his own heed or attention. Heed or minding or conscious direction in one's own case is directly given or known in experience. It is only in the case of others as we have said before, that it is known indirectly through tests.

Mind or consciousness cannot as such be so easily replaced by dispositions or semi-dispositions. Hugh R. King's observation is very true when he says, "We cannot reduce 'my mind' to simply 'my ability or proneness to do certain sorts of things'. Indeed, ability and proneness may be just those dispositions which allow me to do a thing unconsciously and without heed, to dismiss my 'mind'."[26]

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26 Huge R. King, 'Prof. Ryle and the Concept of Mind', *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLVIII, p. 293.

# SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Ryle's primary concern in his Chapter on 'Self-Knowledge' is twofold. The first is to dismiss the traditional notion of consciousness and instrospection and the second is to establish the identical nature of knowledge of one's own self and the knowledge of others. He asserts that the traditionalists' idea of consciousness and introspection is a 'logical muddle'. By showing that the prevalent notions of consciousness and introspection are beset with difficulties, Ryle comes to maintain that our knowledge of our own selves cannot be based on such doubtful means. He believes that the traditionalists' theory of 'privileged access' to our own mental states and processes rests on an imaginary assumption that there is an internal faculty of reflection or intuition or introspection or consciousness in general, which supplies the data about our internal life. It is this unwarranted assumption which, according to Ryle, tempts one to suppose that the method of knowing one's ownself is different from the method of knowing others. Once the hollowness of the supposed internal faculty of consciousness and introspection is exposed, it becomes apparent that self-knowledge does not differ in kind from the knowledge of others. By attacking the idea of consciousness and introspection and by showing that self-knowledge is of the same pattern as the knowledge of others, Ryle thinks of dispersing the the Cartesian ghost to nothingness.

Let us first examine the arguments with which he has sought to dismiss the age-long notions of consciousness and introspection. First of all. he draws our attention to a number of senses in which the words 'conscious' and 'consciousness' are used in our daily life. In none of these, he holds, does the philosophers' sense of the word 'conscious' find a place. Ordinarily the word 'conscious' or self-conscious' is used in the following senses :

(a) It is used when we want to convey our vague or indistinct apprehension of some object or situation, e. g., when we say, 'I was conscious that some wrong had occurred somewhere',

(b) It is used when we want to speak of the embarrassment shown by other people. We often say, 'he is conscious of the sorry figure that he cut on the occasion'.

(c) We also use the word 'conscious' or 'self-conscious' when we

want to talk of the heed that we pay to our own qualities of character or intellect ; e. g. when we say 'I am conscious of my homesickness'.

(d) 'Conscious' is also used for 'sensitiveness', e. g., when we say, 'consciousness is returning to my numbed leg'.

(e) It is at times used for the heed that we pay to our own bodily sensations It is in this sense that we say, 'I was not conscious of the pinching of the shoe because I was deeply engrossed in talk.'

Ryle's point in enumerating the different senses in which the word 'conscious' is used is to show that the philosophers' concept of consciousness is not covered by any one of them. As to the philosophers' notion of consciousness, Ryle says that they invariably use it in the sense of an essence of the mental as opposed to the physical. Mental for the philosophers, is by nature conscious or self-intimating. Anything appearing on ths mental scene makes itself felt or known by the person concerned.

Now, if we reflect a little, we will find it difficult to see how the everyday uses of the term 'conscious' or 'consciousness' are fundamentally different from the philosophers' use of the same. The different uses, as shown by Ryle, mean awareness. The term 'conscious' though used in different contexts, is always used in the sens e of awareness on the part of the person for whom the term 'conscious' or 'consciousness' is predicated. Our apprehension, whether clear or vague, is an awareness. Our embarrassment is an awareness of the awkward situation in which we are put. 'Conscious' in the sense of 'sensitive' of a particular part of the body means awareness of that part of the dody. Also in the sense of paying heed, it cannot but mean awareness since it is a contradiction in terms to say that 'I am paying heed to x though I am unaware of x'.

Now we may ask, is not our awareness peculiarly personal and private ? Can one's awareness be shared by others ? It is logically impossible for others to notice directly my awareness the way they could notice my sneeze. This is what makes my 'awareness' mental and the 'sneeze' physical. Curt Ducasse is right when he says that to be material or physical "basically means to be or to be capable of

being, perceptually public."[1] The unperceivable electrons and protons are, according to him, only derivatively physical, only in virtue of their being constituents of the things that are perceptually public. Now, who will say that our awareness can ever be made perceptually public ? Since it is not public in this sense, it can not be called physical. It cannot, therefore, be made of the same stuff of which this objective, world of ours is made. Ryle's slogan—"Not Two-worlds but One World ; not a Ghost, but a Body ; ( people are not ) Occult but Obvious[2]—must therefore rest on his improper estimation of our awareness, which is a synonym of consciousness. He does not believe that awareness or consciousness, as it is generally understood, really exists. He substitutes awareness by disposition, which according to him, is no more than behaviour, actual or possible. But consciousness or awareness cannot be identified with behaviour. A paralysed man may be completely incapable of any behaviour, but he is still conscious. Conversely, a robot may behave as perfectly as a human being, but it is not for that matter conscious. The mistake of identifying consciousness with behaviour lies in one's failure to see that there is only a correlation between consciousness and behaviour. Our consciousness of things certainly makes us behave in multiferious ways. There is indeed a close bond between consciousness and behaviour. But a correlation or a bond does not mean identity. Our awareness of things as distinct from any kind of bodily happening is so normal and obvious that one may feel at a loss to be told that there is no such thing as consciousness. Consciousness is the precondition of our being, of our living and of our having all that is for us. It is the presupposition of all assertions and denials. So how can it itself be denied ? To deny consciousness is to commit the philosophical error of denying the obvious. By denying consciousness, Ryle has only strengthened the belief that dispute about what is most evident is the characteristic of philosophical problems. As a matter

1 Curt Ducasse, 'In Defence of Dualism'. *Dimensions of Mind*, ed., Sidney Hook, Collier books, New York, N. Y., p. 86.

2 Stuart Hampshire beautifully puts Ryle's theory in these lines—vide his review of "The Concept of Mind"—*Mind*, April, 1950, p. 238.

of fact, the phenomenon of consciousness is so fundamental that it cannot be either defined or properly described. Arguments and reasonings therefore, cannot prove to be effective either for its affirmation or denial. What one requires in order to see its truth is to examine his own being without any materialistic bias. Of course, if one is keen to reject it, he cannot be convinced. While speaking of awareness as something basically distinct from the body or the bodily, Price observes : "It is too fundamental, and if any one says he cannot understand what I am talking about, I do not know how I can help him".[3]

Ryle thinks that the philosophers' popular notion of consciousness is an extended version of the Protestants' belief that there is a God-given light of conscience within us. As the protestants thought that there is an internal light of conscience to discern moral qualities, so the philosophers think that there is a general light of consciousness to reveal the mental episodes. But had there been such a light within us to manifest the occupants of the mental stage, we would have often said, 'I have known or found it from my consciousness', 'This is a direct deliverance of my consciousness', or 'I say it from my immediate awareness'. But nobody ever speaks to have known or found from consciousness. Moreover, this internal light of consciousness is understood by the epistemologists to be infallible and sufficient and as such it ought to reveal to us a full and unmistaken picture of the mental states and processes. But neither are we conversant with all the qualities of our own character and intellect, nor do we always make a correct estimation of the same. So, argues Ryle, how can an internal light of consciousness be accepted ?

Now, with regard to the above observations of Ryle, it is not difficult to see that they are either untrue or superfluous for the rejection of consciousness. First of all, it is historically untrue to say that the philosophers' popular notion of the internal light of con-

3 H. H. Price, 'Some objections to Behaviourism', *Dimensions of Mind*, a symposium edited by Sidney Hook, Collier Books, New York, N. Y., p. 79.

sciousness was only an outcome of the Protestants' faith. The history of philosophy does not testify to the fact that the dualism between mind and body was introduced in or after the days of the Protestants. Secondly, the denial of consciousness on the plea that people do not mention it in their common parlance is hardly satisfactory. As a matter of fact, consciousness is so basic and obvious a fact about us that we need not refer to it in order to be understood. That which is obvious seldom requires to be expressed. For instance, all statements that we make about ourselves for the furture presupposes an obvious condition— the condition of our remaining alive. But nobody ever feels the necessity of speaking out the obvious and say, 'I shall come to you provided I am alive'. 'Provided I am alive' does not enter into common conversation, but that does not mean that it is not a pre-condition. Similarly about 'consciousness'. Being a condition for any one of us of having the world at all, it is so obvious that we need not state it in our everyday talk. But absence of reference in our talk does not deprive it of its genuineness. Thirdly, Ryle's rejection of consciousness on the ground that it cannot be a sufficient and infallible source of knowledge as is held by the theorists, also does not carry much weight. It is one thing to say that it is not infallible and sufficient and another to reject it altogether. We may at best say that the epistemologists were wrong in treating it as infallible and sufficient. The content of consciousness may at times prove to be false, though consciousness or awareness as such is not false. Consciousness may also fail to inform us fully about our mind. But that may be due to the fact that a major part of our mind, viz., the unconscious is beyond the reach of our consciousness. Ryle who appears to be sympathetic to Freud has little to say about his theory of unconscious, a theory which has drawn universal attention for its ideas. The Freudian concept of 'unconscious' has intimate connections with the substance theories of mind, and Ryle's target of attack is the substance theory of mind. It is, therefore, strange that he allows the theory of unconscious to pass unnoticed. The fact that we do not know many of our own mental qualities might be due to the fact that the unconscious is not open to our private inspection.

Ryle has one important argument against the concept of

consciousness. That is the argument of infinite regress. The theorists had maintained that consciousness is phosphorescent or self-luminous. It reveals itself as well as its objects. When I am conscious of something, I am *ipso facto* conscious of my consciousness of that thing. Consciousness of an object and the consciousness of that consciousness are simultaneous. Ryle, however, argues that the theorists' notion of consciousness cannot escape the conclusion that there is an infinite series of consciousness in us. When I infer something, the apprehension or consciousness is expressible in the form, 'because so and so, therefore such and such'. But my consciousness of that apprehension is expressible in the form 'Here I am deducing such and such from so and so,' Since my consciousness of the apprehension is again mental, it must also be self-intimating. That is, I must be aware that 'Here I am spotting the fact that here I am deducing such and such from so and so.' This awareness being mental again, it must lead to another self-awareness and so on for ever. So, Ryle believes, that if this absurd notion of a series of consciousness is to be avoided,, the theorists' notion of consciousness must be discarded.

Now, with regard to this difficulty of infinite regress foisted on the theorists' notion of consciousness, it is not difficult to see that this is due to Ryle's failure to distinguish between the two senses of the term 'conscious.' The word 'conscious' is used in the sense of general awareness or vague feeling as also in the sense of particular or distinct awareness. We are often conscious of our headache in the first sense. While having a headache, I have not to be every time distinctly aware of my headache and say to myself 'Here I am knowing that I am suffering from headache'. I may be only vaguely conscious of my headache for I may engage my attention with many things else. Now, the way I am conscious of my headache, I am conscious of my self-awareness. While inferring a conclusion from its premise, I need only say 'Because so and so, therefore such and such.' I need not be also distinctly aware of my self-awareness and say, 'Here I am deducing such and such from so and so'. Self-awareness which is implied in our conscious activities is only vaguely felt or known. Ryle has overlooked this point. He argues as if self-awareness is a distinct awareness on our part, running concomi-

tantly with every apprehension of ours. It is on account of this failure to distinguish between the senses of the term 'conscious' in which I am said to be conscious of an object as well as conscious of my consciousness that he could see an infinite regress in the notion of consciousness.

In addition to the infinite regress argument, Ryle has one more objection on linguistic ground. He argues that if consciousness is to be conceived on the analogy of light, the theorists ought not to say that consciousness enables us to *know* the mental states and processes. His objection is to the use of the word 'know'. He argues that we speak of only seeing things, say a table, in light. We do not speak of knowing it. Light enables us to talk of seeing, not of knowing for 'knowing is not the same sort of thing as looking at, and what is known is not the same sort of thing as what is illuminated.'[4]

Now, with regard to this objection, it is enough to say that it is too much to depend on linguistic subtleties for the refutation of so fundamental and clear a matter as consciousness. The question at issue is whether the irregular speech habits of people can be made a criterion for deciding about the reality of so obvious a thing as consciousness. Ryle argues as if seeing and knowing are opposite concepts so that if we could speak of seeing in the context of light, we could not speak of knowing in the same context. Besides, it is one thing to say that we do not speak of knowing in the context of light and quite another that we cannot speak of knowing in the same context.

Ryle's basic objection to the theorists' notion of consciousness is that there is no mental happening to be consciously known or felt. He emphatically asserts : "The radical objection to the theory that minds must know what they are about, because mental happenings are by definition conscious, or metaphorically self-luminous, is that there are no such happenings ; there are no occurrences taking place in a second-status world, since there is no such status and no such world and consequently no need for special modes of acquainting ourselves

4 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 162.

with the denizens of such world".[5] Now, it is with this notion of mind and the mental that Ryle keeps on using the word 'ghostly' for whatever is said to occur in the 'private theatre'. But we may ask : Is the content of consciousness as mysterious, slippery or elusive as a ghost is said to be ? Ryle thinks that the philosophers have committed a category mistake by conceiving of mind in the idioms which are suitable only for the body. But does he not himself commit a category mistake by likening the mind to a ghost ? A ghost is a nebulous body. It appears. But consciousness or mind is not a body. It does not appear as an object.

For his own purpose Ryle has sought to replace consciousness by disposition. The effect of such a replacement has been to present an altogether new picture of man. Man is now a typically behaving body. Though unconscious, he is thought to do everything that is called intelligent. But however perfectly behaving a body he might be, the idea of his being unconscious will deprive him of his interest in life. Ask a man that he is everything but conscious, he will be least prepared to accept it. One may wonder whether Ryle himself believes that he is unconscious. As a matter of fact, man's conscious nature is so dear to him that he may feel completely shocked and disappointed to hear that he is in fact unconscious. As D. S. Miller puts it : "If you learned today that your own life from tomorrow morning on would be of this sort, the life of a perfectly hehaving body but a perfectly unconscious one, you would suddenly cease to be concerned about it, you would not in the least cling to life on these terms. Why ? Because you cannot for a moment identify yourself with a body without consciousness".[6] A conscious mind is the creator of all human values. It is the source of art, literature and religion, of all that is beautiful and sublime in and around us. The task of creating and maintaining such human values cannot devolve on our body, however perfect an organism we might conceive it to be.

We may now pass on to Ryle's account of introspection. He has denied introspection almost on the same lines on which he has denied

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5 *Ibid.*, p. 161.

6 D. S. Miller, "Descartes' Myth and Prof. Ryle's Fallacy", *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLVIII, April 26, 1951, p. 272.

consciousness. We have seen how unsatisfactory his denial of consciousness is. Ryle opens his discussion of introspection with the observation that introspection is a term of art and it seldom finds a place in common use. The common man is little conversant with this concept and it is only a highflown utterance of theoretical philosophers. Now, this argument of common use, on which Ryle frequently leans for support, has little substance. Why should our theoretical concepts enter into our everyday discourse? Does it have to be scholarly so that all those deep and technical notions of the scientists and philosophers must find a place in it? A mathematician's formula or a physicist's hypothesis is not condemned because it is little used by the laity in their discourse.

Ryle rejects introspection on other grounds as well. If introspection be the mental act of scrutinizing the private experiences of one's own, it would mean that we can attend to two things at once. But can one attend to the act and the object of scrutiny simultaneously? As to this usual difficulty raised against introspection, we can say that this would be valid if we could know for certain that in introspection, the act and the object remain distinguishable. It is certainly difficult to attend to two disconnected things all at once. In introspection, however, the act and the object may fuse together to become one whole. The charge of double attention may, therefore, prove to be inappropriate. Even when the charge is supposed to be true, the question is, how is its truth known? How do we know that we cannot divert our attention to two things at once? Surely, it can only be ascertained by introspection.

Ryle brings another familiar charge of infinite regress. If the mental is known by introspection, introspection being mental must be known by another introspection and so on indefinitely, Now, it is not difficult to see that this objection rests on the same assumption that in introspection the act and the object must retain its individual identity. We must be able to say, 'here is my act and here is the object on which I am applying the act', because it is only in such a case that the question will arise : if the object is known by the act, how is the act known? But can we ever so distinguish the act from its object? The act of introspection and the mental state scrutinized may form one whole and we may be

conscious of the whole without being distinctly conscious of parts. A. C. Ewing correctly holds, "So if I introspect or am in some way conscious of myself as resolving, both introspection and resolving will be part of my total felt state, but they need not both be objects of distinct consciousness...[7] The question of infinite regress cannot arise with introspection because it makes no sense to say that one knowledge requires another knowledge to be known. After all, consciousness has been conceived on the analogy of light. One light does not require another light to manifest itself.

Ryle attacks introspection also on the ground that it is not what it is said to be. Introspecting, the theorists believe, is the deliberate act of internally perceiving the mental episodes. It is said to be unerring in informing us about our internal life. Ryle argues that if it is so, why do several disputes exist relating to the nature of our internal life ? Why do they not 'look within' and settle the issue ? Now, this criticism of Ryle appears to have some substance. It is true that the claim of infallibility is an extravagant claim on the part of the introspectionists. Introspection means scrutiny and scrutiny involves judgements. One may err in his judgment. But error in judgment does not establish that there is no judgment. The introspectionists may be wrong in their concept of infallibility. But their mistake should not lead to the further mistake of denying introspection altogether, for the fallible method of introspection may yet be real. After all, we commit mistakes of external perception but we do not hasten on to declare that perceiving itself is false.

Ryle will, however, insist on rejecting introspection on the ground that we do not use verbs like 'observe', 'witness', 'discover', 'listen to', etc., in connection with the objects of introspection. We have found him asserting : "In the sense in which a person may be said to have had a robin under observation, it would be nonsense to say that he has had a twinge under observation."[8] Now, an argument of this type depends too much on common sense idioms for the refutation of well established theories. Common sense idioms may not be consistent

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7 A. C. Ewing, 'Prof. Ryle's attack on Dualism', Reprinted in *Clarity is not Enough* George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963, p. 320.

8 *The Concept of Mind*,. p. 205.

in their use. Besides, we have not examined other languages to find out whether the equivalent words for 'observe', 'witness' 'discover', etc., are also not used in connection with the objects of introspection, The fact that we do not use such terms in connection with introspection may be quite in consonance with dualism because one may be justified in using one set of words for external perception and some other for internal perception.

Ryle, following Hume, points out the futility or worthlessness of the supposed acts of introspection on the ground that they do not enable us to have a true picture of our emotional states or experiences. A study of anger, for example, will automatically decrease the intensity of anger with the result that the introspectionist will fail to get a correct picture of the same. In a situation like this, it is retrospection which comes to our help. So, why should not, argues Ryle, retrospection alone supply us the data about our self-knowledge ? "If retrospection can give us the data we need for our knowledge of some states of mind, there is no reason why it should not do so far all".[9] Ryle believes that what we call introspection is in fact an 'authentic process of retrospection'. By substituting retrospection for introspection, he seems to think that he can eliminate the ghost. But it is not at all clear how this substitution can help one to escape the ghost. For if we do not introspect, how can we retrospect ? Retrospection, as it is commonly understood, means scrutiny of the recent past. But unless the recent past was also once the present and felt as such when it occurred, retrospection upon how we did feel or act would be impossible. We know that retrospection involves memory and memory involves our consciousness or awareness of some state or situation. So, even when retrospection is the scrutiny of something not present at the moment, still what is scrutinised is the experience of one's own. It is in this connection that Price observes : "Introspection may always be retrospection ; it may always be form of short-range memory. But even if it is always "retro-", the point is that it is "intro-".[10] It is indeed difficult to do away with introspec-

9 *Ibid.*, p. 166.

10 Price, 'Some Objections to Behaviourism', *Dimensions of Mind*, Ed., Sidney Hook, Collier books, 1961, p. 81.

tion, for if we do not introspect, how do we know that an attempt to introspect cools down the emotional experience ? Moreover, if I am asked to introspect the feeling of pain that I will have when the injection needle goes deep into my skin, shall I ever fail to introspect ? All these facts go to support the case for introspection and consciousness. Ryle's attemt to deny both consciousness and introspection is, therefore, debatable.

Having in his own way got rid of consciousness and introspection, Ryle goes on to say that it is not mind but person who knows, thinks or feels. He substitutes mind by person and believes that a person is not the combination of mind and body. According to Ryle, the conjunctive phrase 'mind and body' is as ridiculous as the conjunction 'in tears and sedan-chair'. To say that 'a man is mind and body' is as absurd as to say, 'She came home in tears and sedan-chair'. To add to his point, he further believes that to ask for the relation between mind and body is as good as to ask for the relation between the Home Office and the British Constitution or between a University and its Registrar's office, which is nonsensical. Throughout *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle argues to establish that the theorists' talk in terms of mind and body involves a series of breaches of logical rules. We can avoid such breaches, he holds, if we can talk as the novelists, biographers and the diarists do. He asserts : "Where logical candour is required from us, we ought to follow the example set by novelists, biographers, and diarists. ..."[11]

Now, with regard to such contentions, we may first observe that Ryle's substitution of mind by person really takes us nowhere. We may ask : What does Ryle mean by 'person' ? 'Person' is an ambiguous term and volumes have been written on it, some even in conflicting ways. So, unless Ryle defines his concept of person and explains how it can take the place of mind, a mere verbal substitution is not enough. Any substitution of this type which has some worth must be in the form of a simpler hypothesis. Here it is difficult to see how 'person' provides a less complex hypothesis than 'mind'. Moreover, Ryle has frequently identified the Cartesian mind with behaviour of certain sorts. In view of this, it is difficult to decide what he actually

11 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 168

wants to say—whether mind is the behaviour of certain sorts or person is the behaviour of certain sorts.

Next, we may ask : Is the conjunction 'mind and body' as ridiculous as the conjunction 'in tears and sedan-chair' ? The difference between these two conjunctions is that whereas nobody in his senses ever speaks of 'She came home in tears and sedan-chair', laymen and philosophers both use the phrase 'mind and body'. It is the unusual nature of objection to the expression 'mind and bpdy' that leads Frank Sibley to comment : "To say that the phrase 'Mind and Matter' is to be avoided seems to be pushing the objection too far."[12]

Further, Ryle's version that the question of relation between mind and body is as non-sensical as the question of relation between university and its Registrar's office, also does not hold good, It is true that no sensible man talks of the relation between university on the one hand and its Registrar's office on the other. But doctors do talk of mind affecting the body or body affecting the mind. A doctor conveys a significant information when he says, 'A fracture in the skull-bone has affected the patient's mind' or 'The cause of his disease is mental rather than physical.' Do not such observations of the doctor imply some kind of mind-body interaction ?

Ryle thinks that logical propriety in our language can be maintained and observed if we follow the example set by novelists, biographers and the diarists. He thinks that the writings of these people do not exhibit any kind of dualism between mind and body. That is why he frequently supports his case against dualism by talking of their writings. But we may ask : is not a novelist's Tragedy or Commedy sometimes a clean and clear description of the conflict between the inner and the outer life of his heroes and heroines ? How truly a novelist describes the contrast hetween the inner and the outer side of his character's personality often decides the quality of his novel. That the novelists' characters have a private side of their personality is admitted by Ryle himself. While referring to Boswell's description

12 Frank Sibley, 'A theory of Mind', *Review of Metaphysics*, December, 1950, p. 263.

of Johnson's mind he says that the description was incomplete "since there were notoriously some thoughts which Johnson kept carefully to himself and there must have been many dreams, daydreams and silent babblings which only Johnson could have recorded and only a James Joyce would wish him to have recorded."[13] Ryle will, however, say that he has no objection to there remaining something as private to a person. Silent deliberation and calculation, silent imagining and recollecting are indeed private. What he objects to is the 'privileged access' theory of privacy—the theory that only the agent has an access to the workings of his mind. His idea is that the mental is private in the same way in which the entries of a diary kept under lock and key are private. He asserts : "..... I cannot overhear your silent colloquies with yourself, Nor can I read your diary, if you write it in cipher, or keep it under lock and key,"[14] Now, this observation of Ryle makes it clear that the mental is private not in the sense of its being absolutely private. It is private only in the sense that it is restricted to one and could be made public—not that it is necessarily confined to one and cannot be made public. In short, Ryle believes that the mental is not made or meant to be private. One only manages to keep it private. The mind is open or public in principle, though one can maintain its secrecy if he prefers to do that.

Now, one thing that puzzles us is, whether the mental privacy can at all be likened with the privacy of a diary kept under lock and key ? It is not impossible to break open the lock and go through the contents of one's diary. But is it in any way possible to enter into another's mind to get a first hand report of its deliberations ? We are only empirically handicapped to read the diary of others. But our inability to know what is going on in others' mind is not empirical. Ryle himself later admits it to be logical when he says,"..... just as you cannot, in logic, hold my catches, win my races, eat my meals, frown my frowns, or dream my dreams, so you cannot have my twinges, or my after images."[15] Now, why is it logically absurd

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18 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 58.

14 *Ibid*, ; p. 184

15 *Ibid.*, p. 209.

to speak of your having of my twinges ? It is because my consciousness or awareness is by nature inaccessible to you. As a matter of fact, the privacy of our mental states and processes is so obvious that Ryle does not dare to deny it. But because it conflicts with his 'open access' theory of mind, he takes up the task of reconciling privacy with openness or publicity. But the reconciliation that he offers is vacillating. Sometimes he argues as if the privacy or incommunicability of one's mental states and processes is like the incommunicability of telephoning over a bad line ( viz., his analogy of a diary kept under lock and key ). Sometimes he thinks it enough to say that it contravenes the logic of mental words to hold that they are not private (viz., the observation quoted above). So, he does not appear to be definite about the nature of mental privacy ; it is a fact which he wants to accept as well as deny.

Let us pass on to Ryle's account of self-knowledge without consciousness and introspection. In this connection he makes a bold statement which dominates his thoughts and ideas throughout *The Concept of Mind.* He says, "The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same."[16] Now, even when we acquiesce and say that what we can know about our own selves, we can also know about others, still it is hard to believe that the methods of knowing in both the cases are the same. Is it at all to be believed that the way I know my pain, I also know the pain of others ? An observer has to imagine, guess or infer whether I am actually in pain, but I have not do the same in order to know if I am in pain. A doctor has to ask and interrogate his patient in order to know the nature of his trouble but the patient has not to ask and interrogate himself for knowing the nature of his suffering. How, in view of this, can one say that the patient's and the doctor's methods of knowing the trouble are the same ? Moreover, if the methods in the two cases would be the same, certain questions which could be asked of the one could also be asked of the other. When I say 'I feel depressed'

16 *Ibid.*, p. 155.

nobody would legitimately ask me the question : 'How do you know ?' or 'Are you sure ?' But if I say of the other 'He feels depressed,' the same question can easily be asked. I may say that I have reasons or clues to believe that he feels depressed but I cannot say that I have reasons or clues to believe that I feel depressed. This clearly establishes that my justification in making the two statements is not one but different. Shall we then agree with Ryle to maintain that the method of knowing about one's own self is the same as the method of knowing about other ?

It is not difficult to see in this connection that Ryle's identification of the method of knowing one's own self with the method of knowing others is due to his oversimplified notion of mind and the mental. He thinks that mind is just a name for a certain class of behaviour, typical to human beings. That is why he believes that by marking the behaviour of others we can know other minds and by noticing our own behaviour, we can know our own. But the question that arises in this regard is, whether behaviours, however typical, can be said to be constitutive of mind ? If mind is behaviour, how does mentality differ even when the behaviour is the same ? A robber can behave as perfectly as a saint but his mentality is not that of a saint. He behaves as a saint but knows that he is not a saint. Does it not establish that our life is not necessarily 'one concatenation' or series of events ? We think, feel, will or believe one thing and do just the other. There is lying, there is hypocrisy, there is suppression and all that in which we indulge. How, in view of this split personality of ours can we maintain for certain that 'life is not a double series of events' ?

It is true that behaviour is the only source of our information about the mind of others. One has certainly to see how the other talks, acts, moves and manoeuvers before he can know what the other wants to do. But I have not to do the same before I can know what I want to do. My mind is not necessarily open to me through my behaviours though other minds certainly are. Other minds can be known only through behaviour because it is none of our privilege to have a direct access to other minds. Behaviour in general is a clue or pointer to the workings of other minds. It is so because it is more or less like a 'proprium' of mental phenomena. A 'proprium' follows

from an essential property without being itself an essential property. Behaviour follows from mental phenomena without being itself a mental phenomena. That is why, there does not appear to be any difficulty in conceiving of mental states and processes as forming a whole with outward behaviour. Many psychological terms do cover private experience with physical behaviour and our inference of mental states and processes on the observation of behaviour works out well in the practical conduct of life. We are, of course, yet unable to say how the heterogeneous elements of the mental and the physical form one whole or how the mental has non-mental as its effect. But our inability to understand the relation between mind and body does not entitle us to deny mind altogether. If one can deny his mind on this ground, he can also deny his body on the same ground. Ryle's real difficulty is that if we do not identify mind with behaviour, we can never in that case know that there are other minds for we can never observe the thoughts and feelings of others. Now, even if this difficulty be accepted as genuine (which in fact it is not) it does not follow that mind is behaviour because to say so would be to confuse the question 'How do we know that there are other minds ?' With the question 'How do we know that there is a mind ?' Ryle's observation that "the ascertainment of a person's mental capacities and propensities is an inductive process, an induction to law-like propositions from observed actions and reactions"[17] is fully true with regard to other persons. It is also true in some sense with regard to our own selves. I can certainly be sure of my mental abilities and propensities by observing what I can or cannot do. To boast of intelligence and to fail in the task at the same time go ill together. Behaviour certainly helps in the assessment of mental qualities. But the fact that we can 'ascertain' ( to use Ryle's own terminology ) our mental qualities by observing our actions and reactions does not mean that our mental qualities are those very actions and reactions. After all ascertainment does not mean identity. Who will say that my anger and my anger-behaviour both denote the same event ? Had my anger been my anger-

17 *Ibid.*, p. 172

behaviour then because my anger-behaviour is in principle public, it would always be possible for others to say when I am angry. But is it acceptable in principle that you can always tell when I am angry ? It is not out of place to mention here that one of the basic confusions that Ryle has made in *The Concept of Mind* is between mental qualities and their tests. It is his failure to distinguish between the essence and the evidence of mental qualities, between the meaning of a statement and the method of its verification, that has led him to say that mind is just a summary of the different behaviours peculiar to a human being. He believes that a question about mind is not a general question like, 'How do we know that there is a mind ?' It is a range of specific questions regarding occurrents and dispositions. It is a question like, 'How do I know that I or you have understood a poem ?' or 'How do I know that I or you are a man of vanity ?' Ryle argues that since these questions are settled with reference to what I or you do or fail to do, the meaning of 'understanding' or 'vanity' is constituted by behaviours. He observes : "it is part of the meaning of 'you understood it' that you could have done so and so and would have done it, if such and such ...."[18] "It is however difficult to see how he can say so when he himself thinks that behaviours are the *tests.* the means of *discovery* and *ascertainment* of mental capacities and propensities.[19] Ryle's writings give the impression that he has not decided whether mental concepts stand for some behaviour or they are only tested by some behaviour. Critics have invariably found this fault with his theory of mind. Hampshire in his review of *The Concept of Mind* remarks : "Professor Ryle is not really arguing that all or most statements, involving mental concepts are ( or are expressible as ) hypothetical statements about overt behaviour, but ( and it is very different ) that to give reasons for accepting or rejecting such state-

18 *Ibid.*, p. 170.

19 Vide his following statements in *The Concept of Mind* : "The tests of whether a person is conceited are the actions he takes and the reactions he manifests in such circumstances." "I discover my or your motives in much, though not quite, the same way as I discover my or your abilities." (p. 171), "The ascertainment of a person's mental capacities and propensities is an inductive process . . ." (p. 172).

ments must always involve making some hypothetical statement about overt behaviour."[20] Ryle will however say that it is not in his scheme of things to distinguish between the meaning of a mental concept with the method of its verification. On the other hand it is his theory to identify the two and say : "Even to be for a brief moment scandalised or in a panic is, for that moment, to be liable to do some such things as stiffen or shrieck, or to be unable to finish one's sentence, or to remember where the fire-escape is to be found.[21] Now, with regard to this contention of Ryle we may simply point out how much debatable the positivists' dictum that 'the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification' is. When physicists speak about electrons, they do not simply mean the paths in a cloud-chamber, which they would offer as evidence for electrons.

We may note that Ryle's attempt to confine a man's mentality in his behaviour, not above or behind it, is primarily motivated by his belief that there is one world—the world that is open to everybody. It is in accordance with this belief that he tries to squeeze out whatever is thought to be private in man. He does not believe in the subjective and objective sides of man's existence. All aspects of a man's personality are, according to him, necessarily public ; only that he manages to keep some of them as secret, as is true with the contents of his diary. Inspired by his idea of one-world theory, he goes on to say that the subjective or the self or the soul in us can be thoroughly described in objective language. It is true, argues Ryle, that the self of the moment cannot be caught for objective description, it is nevertheless true that it is objectively describable at the next moment. What eludes us at one moment is perfectly tractable at the next. It is not difficult for one to describe about his own self of a moment before, of the past. So, Ryle thinks that inspite of the systematic elusiveness of 'I', it does not follow that there is a mysterious entity within us—a soul as opposed to the body, a subject as opposed to the object. We cannot review all the reviews of a book. The last review must remain unreviewed. But this does not

20 *Mind*, April, 1950, p. 245.
21 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 97.

mean that the last review is for that matter one which is beyond the scope of review. "Given complete editorial patience, any review of any order could be published...." So is the case with making entries in a diary. Though an act of making entry cannot at the same time be entered in the diary, still it does not mean that it is impossible to enter it subsequently. Ryle believes that the same logic which is true of reviews and diary-entries is also true of 'I' or the self. Though the self of the moment cannot be brought under the purview of description, this does not mean that it is beyond the scope of description.

Now, with regard to this attempt to objectify the subject and to bring it in line with other facts of the world, we may observe that this poses certain problems. The first problem is the problem of personal identity. If a human being is a mere collection of objective data, what is it, we may ask, that binds them into one whole so as to make him feel one in the midst of changing facts and circumstances? It is not impossible to conceive of two persons objectively looking like the same. In that case, it would be extremely difficult for others to say who of them is X and who Y. But X and Y will have no difficulty in distinguishing themselves from one another. This is so because personal identity is given in self-awareness which is other than the objective facts constituting partly the life of an individual. The absurdity of replacing self-awareness by objective data is shown by Ramsey[22] with the help of a Nursery Rhyme. He writes: "The familiar Nursery Rhyme about the old market woman, who, sleeping on the way back from market, had 'her petticoats cut all round about' by a pedlar. She, on walking says: 'Oh, deary, dear me, this is none of I.' Then she argues: 'But if it be I, as I do hope it be, I have a dog at home and he will know me; if I be I, he will wag his tail, and if it be not I, he will bark and wail'. Off she goes home, and the dog begins to bark. The result is that she cries: 'Lawk a mercy on me, this none of I."

Not only does Ryle's extreme objectivism make personal identity difficult, it also obliterates the distinction between subject and object. His theory of 'higher order actions' is an attempt in that

22 I. T. Ramsey, "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I' ", *Philosophical Quarterly*, July 1955, p. 199.

direction. He believes that self-consciousness or self-awareness is just our higher order action directed on our own previous actions. A higher order action is one which is somehow concerned with other action or actions. When I cheer up B while he plays football, my cheering up activity is a higher order action since it is concerned with B's action of playing football. When someone else applauds my cheering up activity, his action is still higher in order and so on. Ryle thinks that just as one directs his higher order action on the actions of others, so he directs his higher order action on his own. Just as I applaud B's success at the examination, so I applaud my own success at the examination. He argues as if the formula is one — A applauding B's success at the examination — and we may substitute the variables A and B with 'I', 'you', 'he', 'she', 'my or mine', 'yours', 'his', etc. These substitutions, Ryle seems to think, will give us the specific instances of the same basic fact. The implication of this line of thinking is that the word 'I' is of the same category as the words 'he', 'she' or 'it'. This has then the effect of annuling the distinction between subject and object — a distinction which in the words of Ramsey "is the permanent pre-supposition of all living and talking alike". In his extreme behaviouristic and realistic fervour Ryle has sought to merge the subject with the object, as if, to use Bosanquet's phrase, to swell the bank balance of mind's objects. It is, however, a serious mistake on the part of contemporary thinkers to view the subject as object. If we can charge the mystics for subjectifying the object, can we not charge Ryle and others like him, for the opposite mistake of objectifying the subject? According to Ryle himself, the self of the moment does not allow itself to be objectified. Aaron has argued that even from a linguistic standpoint, first personal pronouncements, which he calls *psi*-statements, are not reducible to statements of the third person.[23] J. N. Findlay thinks that man is necessarily a "two-sided person having an outward and an inward history".[24] Wisdom observes that "the peculiarity of the soul is not

23 Aaron, 'Dispensing with Mind', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. LII, p. 241.

24 J. N. Findlay, 'Linguistic approach to Psycho-Physics', Reprinted in *Language, Mind and Value*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963, p. 142.

that it is visible to none but that it is visible only to one".[25] So, we find that Ryle's attempt to take out the mind or soul or the subject and make it fall in line with the object is debatable in the British school itself.

Ryle might be trying the law of parsimony in abandoning dualism or he might be only playing a linguistic game. It is indeed good to think in as less a number of postulates as possible. But economy, where it cannot work, is a bad economy. We cannot consistently think of a man as a mere lump of flesh and bone exhibiting certain typical behaviours. He is more than these and there lies the ghost. "The ghost in the machine is, we may say, the machine itself as it appears to itself, and it can appear to itself as an extremely spiritual sort of thing — even as a 'disembodied mind".[26] If it be no economy but only playing a language-game, we may say that as one cannot play golf with the stick of hockey, so one cannot talk of the subject in terms of the object. To play golf with the stick of hockey is to endanger the play of golf itself. To talk of the subject in terms of the object is to endanger the play of language-game itself. 'Everything is what it is, and not another thing'.

25 John Wisdom, 'The Concept of Mind', Reprinted in *The Philosophy of Mind*, Ed., V. C. Chappell, Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1962, p. 53.

26 C. A. Mace, 'Some trends in the Philosophy of Mind', *British Philosophy in the Mid-centuries*, pp. 109-10.

## SENSATION AND OBSERVATION

Ryle denies sensations as private events or processes for two main reasons : (1) We have no neat sensation vocabulary i. e. there is no pure sense datum language and (2) It makes no sense to speak of observing sensations. So, because sensations cannot be said to be observed and because there are no pure sensation-words in our every day language, the phenomenon of sensations as occurring in the private realm of mind is a misnomer.

Now, let us examine these two arguments of Ryle. The first argument that there is no neat sensation vocabulary consists of the following :

(a) The concept of sensation as understood by the theorists does not occur in the accounts of the novelists, the biographers, the diarists, etc.

(b) Common people talk of seeing, hearing or smelling objects quite unconscious of there occurring anything as sensations in between.

(c) We speak only of objects and not of sensations. If we want to talk of a glimpse ( which is a sensation word according to the theorists ), we talk of the glimpse of some such object as a robin. The look ( again a sensation word ) is always the look of say, a haystack or a tree or an animal. So, instead of the robin being described in terms of its glimpses or sensations, as the theorists had supposed, we describe the glimpses or the sensations in terms of the robin.

(d) There are some words e. g. 'pains', 'itches', 'stabs', 'glows', 'dazzles', etc., which are taken to be pure sensation words by those who think on Cartesian lines. But according to Cartesians themselves whereas we can be unmindful of a sensation, we cannot be unmindful of pains, itches, glows, etc. So, how can they be neat sensation words ?

Now, none of the points mentioned above is good enough to establish that sensations are myths. First, why should novels set the standard for philosophical theories ? To think of philosophical theories to contain only those words which generally occur in novels is to keep philosophy and novel at the same par. Nothing can be more suicidal for philosophy than this. The manner and purpose of philosophy and novel are different and if philosophy chooses to borrow the vocabulary of novels, its purpose will cease to exist. Moreover,

why should novels be authoritative criteria of philosophical theories only? Why should not these hold for science as well? If the scientists do not feel guilty of making departures from common usage, why should a philosopher? If science adopts the vernacular method in its laboratories, one can very well imagine what will happen to science. So, it cannot be argued that because the theorists' sensation is not covered by ordinary language, it has no reasons to be meaningful when introduced in theories.

Secondly, to say that common people know what hearing, seeing, smelling, etc. mean long before they come to know anything about sensations is not to invalidate the concept of sensation. One or two examples will make this point clear. Consider the case of thousands upon thousands of half-educated persons who meaningfully use the names of different food stuff ( rice, wheat, etc.) in their everyday talk without knowing or talking anything at all of the vitamins that they contain. Does it then mean that since they do not use the names of vitamins, the concept of vitamin has no meaning at all? To take another illustration. In our everyday life, almost all of us are aware of the idea of motion. We frequently speak of the motion of a moving train, the motion of a ball, the motion of a player etc., but very few of us speak or know of the Newtonian laws of motion, according to which all motions take place. But the fact that most of us know and speak of motions long before we know and speak of the laws of motion does not invalidate the Newtonian laws of motion. The point of the illustrations is that in practical life we may know a thing without knowing its details. It is only the analysis of things by competent persons ( and not by everybody ) that can reveal to us the different details. So, when we know and talk generally what seeing, hearing, smelling etc., mean without knowing the details of such processes, we do not thereby forfeit the details. The philosophers have tried to understand the different details that are involved in the processes of seeing, hearing, smelling, etc., and it is in this attempt that they have discovered a process called sensation. As vitamins have been discovered by a process of analysis by competent scientists, so, sensation has been discovered by a process of analysis ( though a different one ) by competent people called philosophers. As the seldom use of the names of vitamins

does not invalidate the concept of vitamin, so the seldom use of the terms of sensations does not invalidate the concept of sensation.

Thirdly, as to the contention that we speak of sensations in terms of common objects, this is true but there are more than one reason for the same. The first is that our ordinary language is very much matter-oriented or object-oriented. The concrete world is and has been too much with us. It is why the structure of everyday language has so evolved that it contains too many of concrete terms and references. Not only this, our sensations are unique experiences, too unique to be adequately conveyed by language. We know, we cannot describe the sensations of sound, taste, colour, smell, etc. If a child wants to know how a lemon tastes, we cannot but put a lemon piece on his tongue so that he can know the taste. Naturally, therefore, when there arises a need to convey our uniquely personal sensuous experiences, for which our conversational language is not so competent, we have to take the help of common and concrete objects so that we may be at least partly understood. That is why when we talk of a glimpse, we talk as if it is the glimpse of a robin. We have also to notice that sensations normally lead to the perception of objects. It is, therefore, in a way intimately connected with objects. So, whenever a talk about sensations happens to come up, it is but natural for the object words to creep in. So, to say that sensations are spoken in term of common objects is true, but it is not true to say that sensations have no meaning apart from the objects and that they must disappear into diaphanous nothing. Fourthly, the rejection of 'pains', 'itches', etc., as sensation words on the ground that one cannot be unmindful of them whereas one can be unmindful of a sensation also does not hold good. Is it not true that the more we become attentive of something other than pain, the more less conscious or unmindful we become of pain? During moments of deep excitation and delight, the pains that we might be having seem to disappear. Of course, if the pain is too acute, it becomes extremely difficult to pay no heed to them. But that is also true of sensations. If the sensations are too intense, it becomes very hard to remain indifferent to them. Thus, we may conclude that the different points of Ryle's first argument are not persuasive. Inspite

of them, we have reasons to retain the phenomenon of sensation as a fact about ourselves.

Let us now come to the second main argument of Ryle—the argument from the impossibility of observing sensations. The points of this argument may be summarised as follows :

(a) Mental predicates are not applicable to sensations. We cannot speak of having sensations carefully, systematically, purposefully etc, Such predicates are only applicable to perceptions. We can listen carefully, look systematically or observe purposefully. As there is nothing mental about sensations, so we speak of reptiles having sensations.

(b) Objects of observation have size, shape, temperature, position, colour, etc., but sensations do not have them. So, sensations cannot be the objects of observation.

(c) We require aids for observing objects e. g., telescope, stethoscope, torch light etc. But we do not require them for observing sensations. So, sensations cannot be affirmed as the objects of observation.

(d) If sensations would have been observed, we would ex-hypothese require the sensations of a sensation. But this is ridiculous.

As to the first point, it may be argued that there is no logical contradiction in saying that we know or observe our sensations carefully or carelessly. When we have a visual sensation and when we cannot discern the object, we do try as carefully as possible to observe the visual sensation so that the relevant object may be discovered and known. Of course, we do not frequently talk of observing or inspecting sensations because either we have no occasions to talk so, or we do not have any interest in sensations as such. The force of Ryle's argument suggests that in order that a concept may be called mental, it has to be qualified by some such mental predicate as 'carefully', 'systematically', etc. But there is no must about that. After all, what concept can be more mental than the concept of 'awareness' ? But we never—or rarely—say, we are having awareness carefully or systematically. If it is proper to say that the concept of awareness is mental even when 'carefully', 'purposefully', 'systematically', are inapplicable to it, it is no less proper to say that the concept of sensation is mental even when such terms are

not applicable to it. After all, a mental does not require a mental to be proved as a mental. Sensations are mental. They do not need anything else to be established as mental. Further, Ryle's contention that sensations are non-mental, because reptiles have sensation, goes against his version of perception or observation. If sensations are non-mental because reptiles have sensations, observations are not less non-mental, because the same reptiles do observe. These creatures observe and therefore act. Ryle, therefore, cannot maintain as he does that whereas sensations are not mental, observations or perceptions are so.

As to his second contention that the objects of observation have size, shape, colour, etc., which are not at all to be found in sensation, we would like to point out that this only strengthens dualism instead of weakening it. This only proves that the objects of observation (and by objects of observation, Ryle obviously means the objects of the physical world ) are different in nature when compared to sensations. So, this argument, though seeming to support Ryle, may also go against him. His third argument that we do not know what it would be like to use observational aids like telescope, stethoscope, etc,, in the case of sensations is also not very helpful for this may mean or suggest that the methods of knowing sensations and the external world are different. This again supports dualism for sensations and external objects being different in nature, the methods of knowing them must be different. Lastly, his argument that the observation of sensation would require the sensation of sensation is unsatisfactory for the same reasons. Ryle maintains that as the observation of a robin would require the sensation of a robin, the observation of sensation would require the sensation of a sensation, But this argument presumes that the method of knowing sensations must be the same as the method of knowing robins. The question is, why should the methods in the two cases be the same, particularly when the robins ( and as such the physical objects of the world ) differ sharply from sensation in having size, shape, colour, etc., which Ryle himself admits ? The point is, can we have sensations of such an entity which has neither shape, nor colour, nor size, nor any such quality which is ordinarily found in a physical object ? Sensation is the medium of knowing physical objects,

It is not itself a physical object, A sensation, therefore, which is very much unlike the physical object, does not need a prior sensation in order to be known. The argument that a sensation must be known by another sensation is similar to the argument that a light must be known by another light.

When Ryle puts forward the arguments of this type, it is not difficult to see that they generally suffer from the fallacy of begging the question. Instead of proving that the real is only the outer world, which is his main concern, he presumes that the real is the outer world, because it is only with such a presumption that he can argue that if sensations are to be observed, it must be observed on the pattern of a robin.

Ryle maintains that sensation cannot be observed by pointing out the absurdity of such expressions as 'sensation of a sensation', 'the glimpse of a glimpse' or the 'whiff of a pain', etc. Obviously here he takes the words 'glimpse' and 'whiff' as sensation words. But he himself says[1] that these words are not sensations words. They are observation words. So taking them as observation words but arguing as if they are sensation words will itself lead to nothing but absurdity and confusion. Instead of proving that sensation cannot be observed, it will only prove that Ryle's conception of sensation is ambiguous. Thus we find that even the second argument of Ryle does not establish his conclusion.

Here a further question can be raised. Why does Ryle insist that sensations cannot be observed ? Obviously it is to show that there is no sensation. Obviously it is against the traditionalists' conception that a sensation is a private phenomenon which can only be introspected or internally observed. His objection, as it is abundantly obvious from his argument, is against the use of the verb 'observe' with regard to sensation. He asserts : "As letters are neither easy to spell, nor insuperably hard to spell, so, I argue, sensations are neither observable nor unobservable".[2] He has, however, no objection to the use of the verb 'notice' in connection with sensations since

1 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 206

2 *Ibid.*, p. 206

according to him, it is quite proper to speak of 'noticed headache' or 'felt tweaks'. But it is difficult to see what particular harm is done to the theorists' concept of sensation if the verb 'observe' is substituted by the verb 'notice'. The psycho-physical dualists, as has been pointed out by Arthur Pap,[3] should gladly accommodate this language. Instead of speaking of privately observing sensations, they should henceforward speak of privately noticing sensations. But in any case, the privacy of a sensation is not lost. It is still true to say that a sensation, unlike a car accident, cannot be noticed by more than one person at a time, Ryle himself says : "It is true and even tautologous that the cobbler cannot feel the shoe pinching me, unless the cobbler is myself....."[4]

Ryle, of course, makes a distinction between observing and noticing. He says that whereas observing involves noticing, noticing does not involve observing. But this simply means that observing is a complex process consisting of, among other things, the noticing of various sensations. So, while observing, it is quite sensible to say that we observe sensations, since sensations form a part of the larger whole of observation. Of course, we do not observe sensations as abstracted from the concrete situation. The observation of sensations goes simultaneously with the observation of the concrete situation. While observing a group of persons, we do observe the different persons. But as our interest is primarily in the group, we say, we observe the group and not individuals. Similarly, as our interest is primarily in the objects, we say, we observe the objects and not sensations. Ryle would have been right if the theorists had maintained that sensations are always observed in isolation, independent of everything else. He would also have been right if the theorists had maintained that sensations are some such things as robins or trees so that they are observed in the same sense in which a robin is observed. But nobody, not even Ryle, would say that they are taken in this sense by the theorists. In this connection it may be

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3 Arthur Pap, 'Semantic analysis and Psycho-Physical dualism,' *Mind*, April 1952, p. 216

4 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 208

observed that Ryle himself does not appear to be confident about the nature of sensation and observation. In his Chapter on 'Sensation and Observation' he categorically asserts that observation is a complex process, comprising of the noticing of sensations. He says, 'observing entails having sensations'[5] and 'watching and descrying do involve paying heed, but paying heed does not involve watching'.[6] This clearly establishes that observation is a complex process and is more than having sensations. But in another article[7] on sensation, he does not seem to hold so. There he observes :"... .....the concept of *perception* is on a more elementary or less technical level than that of *sense-impression* ..." Obviously, therefore, the whole idea seems to be confused.

Further, we see that Ryle himself takes sensations to be private. He observes : "It is, of course, true and important that I am the only person who can give a first-hand account of the tweaks given me by my ill-fitting shoe, and an oculist who cannot speak my language is without his best source of information about my visual sensations."[8] Now, why is it that I am the only person who can give a first-hand account of the tweaks ? It is plainly because my experiences of the tweaks cannot be shared by anybody else. Why can't an oculist know my visual sensations unless I tell him and he understands me ? Surely, because my sensations are private experiences, which cannot be had also by the oculist. The main burden of Ryle's argument is to disapprove that sensations are private on the ground that they are unobservable. His objection is to the use of the word 'observe'. He emphatically asserts : "In the sense in which a person may be said to have had a robin under observation, it would be non-sense to say that he has had a twinge under observation."[9] But though he rejects the privacy of sensations on the ground of the impropriety of the use of 'observing

5 *Ibid.*, p. 206.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 207.

7 Published in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 3rd Series, George Allen & Unwin, p. 428.

8 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 209

9 Ibid., p. 205.

sensation', he does not fail to secure its privacy on other grounds. What is thrown out from the front door is received back through the back door. This time he secures its privacy on logical grounds. He observes :".....Just as you cannot, in logic, hold my catches, win my races, eat my meals, frown my frowns, or dream my deams, so you cannot have my twinges, or my after-images"[10] So, my having of sensations ( twinges ) is, according to Ryle, analogous to my eating the meal. But should not this analogy fail ? There is one great difference between my having of sensations and my eating the meal. Whereas others can see me eating the meal, others cannot see me experiencing the twinges. The experience of what the twinge is, can only be known by me. So, where is the point in comparing the two ? Prof. A. C. Ewing has made a similar objection. He remarks : "...I cannot hold somebody else's catches, but I can be aware of his catches in a way in which I cannot be aware of his pain".[11] So, the privacy of sensations is not 'philosophically unexciting' as Ryle thinks it to be. It is not like winning the race or frowning the frowns. Ryle is right when he holds that 'I had a twinge' does not assert a relation between myself on the one hand and the twinge on the other, as it is in the case of 'I had a hat'. But this simply establishes that 'I had twinge' does not assert the same sort of thing as 'I had a hat' does, which Ryle himself admits. Whereas some one else can be in relation to my hat, he cannot also be in relation to my twinges. My twinge, therefore, is peculiarly personal or private to me which a hat is not. Naturally, therefore, the method of knowing twinges must be different from the method of knowing a hat. If the method of knowing a hat is alone observation, ( about which Ryle is insistent ) the method of knowing twinges must not be observation in the same sense. But nothing substantial is gained by confining observation to the observation of a physical object. That would only establish that a sensation is not observed like a physical object. But this will neither do away with the reality of sensations nor with the privacy of sensations. We may not observe our sensations in the

10 *Ibid*, p. 209.

11 A. C. Ewing, 'Prof. Ryle's attack on Dualism', Reprinted in *Clarity Is Not Enough*, p. 314.

Rylean sense, but we still have them as something not open to others, which Ryle himself admits. Is it not obvious then that the so-called argument from the impossibility of observing sensation is quite superfluous for the purposes of Ryle ?

Let us now come to Ryle's attack on the theory of sense-data. We know, for any realistic theory of knowledge, the theory of sense-data serves as a good hypothesis for explaining errors in perception. One of the principal reasons for inventing this theory was to give a satisfactory theory of illusions within the realistic frame of epistemology. If Ryle ( who is a naive realist ) could say of errors in a more convincing way than what the theory of sense-data does, we would certainly be at least sceptical about this theory. But that is not the case. We find that the way in which he chooses to do away with the sense-data is hardly convincing and even difficult to grasp. We may take his famous illustration of seeing the elliptical look of a round plate. When a round plate is gradually tilted away from us, it constantly presents an elliptical look before our eyes. Now, the question is, how to account for this elliptical appearance when the plate itself is round. The upholders of the theory of sense-data would say that this elliptical appearance is a sense-datum—that which is given to the sense. They would say that there is however no correspondence in this case between the datum and the plate. Ryle, however, dubs this theory as a 'logical howler'. He says : "Now a person without a theory feels no qualms in saying that the round plate might look elliptical. Nor would he feel any qualms in saying that the round plate looks as if it were elliptical. But he would feel qualms in following the recommendation to say that he is seeing an elliptical look of a round plate"[12] This assertion would mean that it is meaningful to say that a round thing might look elliptical though it is not meaningful to say that its elliptical appearance is seen. But is it not extraordinary to say that a tilted round plate might look elliptical without its elliptical appearance ever been seen or experienced ? Ordinarily, a thing might look such and such means it might appear as such and such, which means it

12 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 216.

might be seen or experienced as such and such. So, an ordinary interpretation of the lines quoted above, makes it easy to see that they are not compatible with one another. If Ryle, by pronouncing the above statement means something deep and extraordinary, then it is difficult to see what he actually means. It is a difficulty of this kind which makes Russell comment: "I cannot understand what exactly he is maintaining"[13] Ryle's mind appears to work on this line. He finds the plate to be round. How can he then say that he is seeing an elliptical plate ? But this is a difficulty before him because he knows the plate to be round. Had he not known it or had the object been in the sky, what would he have seen — a round something or an elliptical something ? Ryle's particular objection is to the use of the idiom 'seeing a look'. How can a look be seen ? But it is a matter of everyday experience that when a rope appears as a snake, we do not see the snake, we only see the look or the appearance of the rope. Ryle's contention is that when a round plate looks elliptical, the look is not an 'extra object' besides the plate to be qualified as elliptical. But the question is, if the look is not elliptical, what is that which is elliptical ? We cannot say that the plate is elliptical, since we clearly know it to be round. It is perhaps on account of this difficulty that Ryle almost denies that there is anything elliptical. He says that when a tilted round plate looks elliptical, there is no actual seeing of anything elliptical. It is just comparing or "likening how the tilted round plate does look to how untilted elliptical plates do or would look".[14] But if common language is to be trusted, which trust is the basis of Rylean analysis, we do not find anybody saying in such situations that he is only comparing one plate with the other. A person without a theory would feel no qualms in saying that he is seeing the elliptical look of a tilted round plate. But he would certainly feel qualms in following the recommendations of Ryle to say that he is only 'likening' the tilted plate with an elliptical one. Further, Ryle is of the view that when a tilted round plate appears as elliptical, this is not owing to the

13 B. Russell, 'What is Mind', *My Philosophical Developments*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959, p. 251.

14 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 217.

fact there is anything elliptical to be seen but this is due to the fact that we apply a perceptual recipe, learnt from seeing real elliptical objects, on the object ( the round plate in this instance ) which is not elliptical at all. That is to say that an elliptical appearance is an illusion, which is produced by the application of a certain perceptual recipe on a certain object, which is misfit for its application. But the point is, why is it always necessary to apply the recipe 'elliptical' and not the equally well-known recipes 'square' or 'triangular' in the case of the tilted round plate ? This is obviously a case of permanent illusion. What can account more convincingly for the permanent applicability of the 'elliptical' recipe in this case except the fact that the plate, when put to this situation, produces an elliptical appearance or datum which is actually experienced by the person concerned ? The elliptical appearance may not be an objective fact about the plate, but it is certainly a fact about the perceiving subject. The elliptical appearance is experienced as a sense datum. As a matter of fact, it is always a convinient hypothesis to suppose that in illusion we only perceive sense-data. While having an illusion of a snake in the rope, we do not perceive a snake. We simply perceive a snake-appearance or the datum. It is all the more true of hallucinations, where there are only sense-data and no object. While speaking of mistaken observations, Ryle observes : "Getting a thing wrong entails what getting it right entails, namely, the use of a technique. A person is not careless, if he has not learned a method, but only if he has learned it and does not apply it properly."[15] So, according to Ryle, an error in perception is due to our own failure in the application of the proper technique of perception. It is our own misuse of the perception recipe. But this is fixing the whole responsibility on the percipient alone. Do we ever believe that the fault of committing error lies solely on ourselves ? Moreover, the question of applying improper perception recipes seems to be invalid in the case of hallucinations. There is no object in hallucinations. How can the question of applying proper or improper recipes would ever arise in this case ? The question of application entails the question of application on what ? Further, Ryle does not distinguish

15 *Ibid.*, p. 284.

between illusion and hallucination. On the other hand, he speaks of errors in too general a way to convey anything definite and concrete. He observes : "Only a person who can balance can lose his balance ; only a person who can reason can commit fallacies ; only a person who can discriminate huntsmen from pillar boxes can mistake a pillar box for a huntsman ; and only a person who knows what snakes look like can fancy he sees a snake without realising that he is only fancying,"[16] But as it is obvious, these sentences convey fairly wide and general truths which cannot throw any light on the specific nature of the different kinds of errors and as such the main problems of error remain unsolved.

Let us now come to Ryle's views about the secondary quality. Secondary qualities, as we know, depend on the experience of the percipient. They occur because of a contact between the perceiver and the perceived. The different colours, tastes, sounds, smells and the rest are all secondary qualities, none of which can be said to exist without being experienced by the persons concerned. They are not objective i. e in the object. They are subjective, depending on the apprehension of the agent. Ryle, however, does not believe that they are subjective. They are not, as he says, personal or private experiences of the experiencer. They are the objective characteristics of common objects. If I see a field as green, any normal person would see it green if only he cares to see it properly. Ryle observes : "Secondary quality adjectives are used and are used only for the reporting of publicly ascertainable facts about common objects ; for it is a publicly ascertainable fact about a field that it is green, i. e. that it would look so and so to anyone in a position to see it properly."[17] Now, this assertion of Ryle appears to be incompatible with his previous assertion about sensations. We have already quoted him as saying "It is, of course, true and important that I am the only person who can give a first-hand account of the tweaks given me by my ill-fitting shoe, and an oculist who cannot speak my

16 *Ibid.*, p. 234
17 *Ibid.*, 220

language is without his best source of information about my visual sensations."[18] Obviously, here he maintains that our sensations are strictly personal or private. My visual sensation of greenness or the green must, therefore, be exclusively mine. That it is so is quite clear. We have no means to say that my experience of greenness is exactly identical with somebody else's experience of greenness. It is true that all of us, except in abnormal circumstances, call grass as green. But it is more so because all of us have been taught that grass and things like grass are green. It is very much probable that we are having similar experiences while looking at the grass but it is not hundred per cent certain that all of us are having exactly the the same experience of the grass. Might be that I see it as green$_1$ while you see it green$_2$ and so on. So the experience of these secondary qualities is peculiarly personal. Ryle maintains that to describe a common object as green or bitter is to say that". . . . . it would look or taste so and so to anyone who was in a condition and position to see or taste properly."[19] But however properly we see or taste a common object, we have no means to be sure that our experiences are exactly the same, In this connection we might mention Bertrand Russell's reaction to the use of the word 'properly'. He says: "I am particularly puzzled by the word 'properly'. Birds whose eyes look in opposite directions, presumably see things quite differently from the way in which we see them. Flies, which have five eyes of two different sorts, must see things even more differently. A bird or a fly would say that it sees 'properly' and that Prof. Ryle's way of seeing is eccentric and peculier."[20] As a matter of fact Ryle's use of the word 'properly' is not helpful in showing the objectivity of secondary qualities for we may see or taste properly and still differ in our judgment.

Ryle holds that the proposition 'the field is green' is analogous to the proposition 'this bicycle costs £ 12'. These propositions, though grammatically categorical in appearance, do not state anything

18 *Ibid.*, p. 209.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 220.

20 B. Russell, 'My Philosophical Developments', George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959, p. 252.

categorical about their author. Ryle observes: "My statement 'the searchlight is dazzling' no more reports a sensation that I am having than 'the bicycle costs £ 12' reports money that I am handling."[21] The proposition 'this bicycle costs £ 12' means that if there is an actual or possible purchaser of the bicycle, he would be required to pay £ 12. So, instead of saying anything categorical, it implies a hypothetical proposition about an actual or possible purchaser. Similar, according to Ryle, is the story about 'the field is green'. Instead of reporting anything about the author's present sensation, it simply asserts what one would see if he is in a position to see the field properly. But the point is, should we accept this analysis of the proposition 'the field is green' as given by Ryle ? Has this proposition no categorical significance at all ? If it is not categorical, which proposition is categorical ? Ryle gives 'John Doe is speaking French' as an example of a categorical proposition.[22] But it can be shown that it is also hypothetical in the same sense in which Ryle calls 'the field is green' as hypothetical. 'John Doe is speaking French' may be construed as 'If somebody heard and understood John Doe, he would find him speaking in French'. But if we interpret categorical propositions in this way, no proposition will ultimately turn out to be categorical. We will have, therefore, to abandon the idea of categorical proposition itself. Albert Hofstadter has this in his mind when he comments: "I would like to see Prof. Ryle (or anyone) give an example of a pure categorical statement."[23]

There is yet another reason to say that the likening of the proposition 'this field is green' with 'this bicyle cost £ 12' is not satisfactory for there is a big difference. Whereas the adjective 'green' is a matter of our sense (which Ryle admits when he says "in the country of the blind adjectives of colour would have no use"[24]), the adjective 'costs £ 12' is not at all a matter of any of our senses. In the face

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21 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 221

22 *Ibid.*, p. 124.

23 Albert Hofstadter, 'Prof. Ryle's Category-Mistake', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 9, p. 266.

24 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 221.

of this striking difference, not much valuable similarity can be drawn by making a comparison between the two propositions.

We now pass on to Ryle's conception of observation. First of all, he distinguishes between process-verbs and achievement-verbs. According to Ryle, some observation-verbs are task words and some are achievement-words. 'Watch', listen', 'probe', 'scan', 'savour', etc., are verbs of observational undertaking. 'See', 'hear', 'detect', 'discriminate', etc., are verbs of observational successes. Just as running a race is a process, which begins, proceeds, and takes time, similary 'watch', 'listen', 'probe', etc., are processes, which begin, proceed and take time. Just as running a race may result in winning, which winning is not a process but an achievement, similarly 'watch', 'listen', 'probe', etc., result in 'seeing', 'hearing', 'detecting', etc., which are not processes but achievements. The task-word 'running' has its corresponding achievement-word 'winning'. The task-word 'watching' or 'listening' has its corresponding achievement-word 'seeing', or 'hearing'. So, Ryle contends that 'seeing', 'hearing', 'detecting' and the rest which have been taken to describe mental processes are not processes, they are achievements. They are the achievements of the public or quasi-public testable performances of observing. There is, therefore, nothing as secret about them. As to the reason for treating them as achievements, Ryle says that certain adverbs which can be combined with the process-verbs cannot be combined with these achievement-verbs. One can be said to watch carefully or carelessly, successfully or unsuccessfully, but he cannot be said to see carefully or carelessly, successfully or unsuccessfully.

Let us look into this ingenuous theory of achievement-words. The point is, do we always mean success when we talk of perceptions ? What success or achievement does a young astronomer have when he talks of perceiving a solar eclipse with naked eyes ? Or what do we achieve when we see a stick as bent in water ? Do we not fail in our perceptions ? An experimenter spends his tiresome days and sleepless nights in the expectation of achieving results but to his great disappointment what he perceives is not genuine but fake. His perception does not turn out to be an achievement. Hugh R. Kind of Oxford makes a similar observation. "Prof. Ryle would like to call (p. 152) words like 'perceive', 'see', 'observe', etc., 'achievement

words' such that they are incapable of being qualified by adverbs like 'erroneously' and 'incorrectly'. The question now arises whether it makes sense in any sense to call a word like 'observe' an 'achievement word'. It would certainly seem to be an achievement if an Oxford undergraduate observed the sun at the moment it rose over the horizon. However, if he were a budding astronomer, the thought might occur to him that, for all his efforts he had failed. He would realise that the sun had, in fact, intersected his horizontal 'line of vision' i. e. the straight line ( Euclidean or otherwise ) extending outwards from his eye and tangent to the earth, some eight minutes before he witnessed it do so."[25] So we see that Ryle's theory of achievement can only be right if by perceptfon we mean correct perception. But then the question will arise, are we linguistically justified in so limiting the scope of perception words ? As to Ryle's argument that perception-verbs cannot be meaningfully qualified by adverbs like 'successfully', 'carefully' and the rest, we see that this observation requires a thorough grounding in English language, which Ryle being an Englishman and a scholar, certainly has. But this also is not indubitable. In this connection we would like to quote the words of Stuart Hampshire, a competent critic : "On what grounds does Prof. Ryle decide that there are no acts answering to such verbs as 'see', 'hear', 'taste', 'deduce', 'recall' in the way in which familiar acts and operations do answer such verbs as 'kick', 'run', 'look', 'listen', 'wrangle' and 'tell' ? ( p. 151 ) The ground suggested are inefficient, namely that certain adverbs which can in English be combined with the second class cannot be combined with the first ; for it is always easy to find many exceptions to such generalisations about English idioms, even apart from the idioms of other equally adequate languages."[26] Ryle argues to show that the idiom 'seeing successfully' is as absurd as the idiom 'winning successfully'. But the first idiom does not seem to be parallel to the other in absurdity. 'Winning successfully' is absurd

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25 Hugh R. King, 'Prof Ryle and the Concept of Mind', *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLVIII p., 289.

26 Vide his review of 'The Concept of Mind', *Mind*, April, 1950, p. 212.

because winning means succeeding. 'Seeing successfully' is not absurd becaue seeing does not necessarily involve achieving.

We now come to observation proper. In the beginning, we notice how Ryle dismisses an important question about observation in favour of another less important question, which has, as a matter of fact, nothing to do with the cancellation of the previous question. He observes : "The questions, that is, are not questions of the para-mechanical form 'How do we see robins ?', but questions of the form, 'How do we use such descriptions as 'he saw a robin' ?"[27]

Now, this statement of Ryle *emphatically asserts that all genuine* questions about perception are descriptive questions. We have, therefore, no right to pose explanatory questions about the same. But the question is, are explanations and descriptions mutually exclusive in a way that if we are entitled to ask for descriptions, we are at once debarred from asking for explanations ? As a matter of fact, the same thing may have an explanation as well as a description. We may describe an event as well as explain it. Descriptions and explanations are both normal, useful, and legitimate ways of acquainting ourselves with the facts of the world. It, therefore, does not follow that since we need descriptions we must abhor all explanations. It is true that explanations sometimes turn out to be no more than concoctions, as is occasionally the case in metaphysics but this is not generally true of the positive science of Psychology, where we know, much light has been thrown on the problems of perception by the joint efforts of Physics and Physiology. The problem of perception is more or less a scientific problem.[28] One need not, therefore, be afraid of explanations in the field of Psychology. Ryle has failed to realise willingly or unwillingly that his approach to Psychological problems is not necessarily in conflict with the Cartesian approach to the same problems. Whereas Ryle views things with a descriptive attitude of mind, the Cartesians view them with an explanatory attitude. But both of them may validly work together

27 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 225.

28 Russell holds that the problem of perception is a scientific and no longer a philosophical problem.—Vide 'My Philosophical Developments', p. 250.

in the pursuit of our understanding. So, why should Ryle reject one type of question in favour of the other ? This will only show that he is unnecessarily enthusiastic about the one at the cost of the other.

About perception Ryle says that it is the having of appropriate sensations in the appropriate frame of mind. Perceiving a thimble is having the visual sensations of a thimble in the thimble-seeing frame of mind. He appears to suggest that mere sensing and perceiving though episodically identical, differ with regard to the frames of mind. They may differ only in that the sensory act is done in two different frames of mind. But here one question puzzles us. How can a thimble-seeing frame of mind be acquired and developed if one can never observe a thimble without any such frame of mind ? If observing a thimble presumes a thimble-seeing frame of mind, the having of a thimble-seeing frame of mind also presumes some observations of the thimbles. Then how are we to break this vicious circle ? Ryle has said nothing so as to overcome this difficulty. It is a fact that the observations of a child are not backed by any frame of mind. Has he any frame of mind at his age ? It is, therefore, incredible to hold that observations are sensations in certain frames of mind.

Further, we see that Ryle argues in order to make us believe that perception is recognition or identification. According to him, "certainly a person who espies the thimble is recognising what he sees."[29] Now, this identification of perception with recognition is an instance of exaggeration. It is true that perception frequently ends in recognition. But we cannot for that matter say that perception is recognition. Instances are not rare when we are said to perceive without recognition. A chemist, while going through the process of a chemical analysis, may observe an element which he may not recognise as an element. A friend may gaze at a long lost friend without making himself sure that he saw his friend. A child may stare at his mother clothed in an unusual dress but he may not succeed in discovering her as his mother. So, how can observation be neccessarily recognition ? While speaking of recognition, Ryle

29 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 280.

says : ".....a person who recognises a cow at sight is prepared for a multifarious variety of sights, sounds and smells, of none of which need the thought actually occur to him."[30] But we may ask : is this true of children ? They recognise cows at sight long before they learn what varieties of sights, sounds and smells to expect from the cows. So, how can they be said to be prepared knowingly or unknowingly for the multiferious variety' when they may not have the knowledge of the variety at all ?

Further, we find Ryle saying that whenever there is an observation, it is always an observation of something or fact. He observes : "If we could not observe somethings, we should not have claues for other things, and conversations are just the sorts of things to which we do listen, and finger prints and gate-posts are just the sorts of things at which we do look."[31] But the point is, what things or facts are there in the mistaken cases of observations ? A patient might complain of pains in his foot though the foot might already have been amputed. Macbeth complained of vividly seeing the dagger, but there was no dagger to be seen. Ryle argues as if the mistaken cases of observations are not observations at all. Instead he would like to call them imaginations. Macbeth was not misperceiving, he was only imagining. But whereas common people talk of making mistakes of observation, Ryle would like them to talk of indulging in imaginations. Whereas we say 'X has misperceived', Ryle would say 'he has only imagined'. This is a departure from common usage by one who is a stickler for common usage.

Further, we find Ryle criticising the theory of phenomenalism in connection with the physical objects. It is amusing to find him criticising phenomenalism so vehemently with regard to the physical objects but defending it so fervently with regard to mind. Mind, for him is nothing more than the manifest behaviour. Matter, however, is more than its manifest appearances. But if we can posit matter beyond its appearances, can we not posit mind beyond its behaviours ?

To conclude, it is not necessary for us to treat Ryle's views on

30 *Ibid.*, p. 231.
31 *Ibid.*, p. 232.

sensation and perception as irrefutable. In fact, one will be aggreeably surprised to find Ryle expressing candidly dissatisfaction with his own theory. He observes : ".... I am not satisfied with this Chapter. I have fallen in with the official story that perceiving involves having sensations. But this is a sophisticated use of 'sensation'."[32] Indeed, Ryle again and again finds himself helpless with the concept of sensations. In his separate article on sensation,[33] he confesses his helplessness when he says : "one of the things that worry me most is the notion of sensations or sense-impressions". In the same article, there is a bold statement again, where he appears to yield in favour of the theorists' notion of sensation. He says : "However, after all this has been said, I confess to a residual embarrassment. There is something common between having an after-image and seeing a misprint. Both are visual affairs. How ought we to describe their affinity with one another, without falling back on to some account very much like a part of the orthodox theories of sense-impressions ? To this I am stumped for an answer".[34] Not only this. He is not in a position to say about the logical grammar of such words as 'hurt', 'itch', 'qualm' and the rest. According to Ryle himself, such words are neither the names of mood, nor the nouns of perception nor even the reporters of achievements. Then what are they ? He answers : "I do not know what more is to be said about the logical grammar of such words, save that there is much more to be said".[35] These confessions are frank and honest. They, however, do not support the programme of Ryle, viz. the exorcising of the ghost.

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32 *Ibid.*, p. 200.

33 Published in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 3rd Series, ed., H. D., Lewis, George Allen and Unwin, p. 427.

34 On pp. 442-448.

35 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 244.

# IMAGINATION

Ryle in his bid to destroy the Cartesian theory of mind makes a vigorous attempt to establish that there is nothing like images appearing and disappearing on the private stage of mind. Imagining, according to him, is not the seeing of mental pictures, it is only pretending to see or fancying that one is seeing which, in fact, one is not seeing, By repudiating the theory of images, Ryle claims to cut at the root of the Cartesian mind, since the presumption of images inevitably leads to the supposition of a ghostly mind as their habitat. Ryle believes that once the theory of images is discarded, Cartesian mind is easily dislodged out of existence.

In his Chapter on 'Imagination' in *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle provides or pursues two approaches, negative and positive, to the problem. In his negative approach, he vehemently criticises the concept of image as a private picture. In his positive approach, he describes imagination as pretension. As the negative approach is more directly concerned with his thesis, it will be better if we first examine his arguments whereby he seeks to prove the images as non-existent. His arguments under this head can be summarised as follows :

(1) Seeing things and hearing tunes with our sense organs are fundamentally different in kind from seeing things in our mind's eye and hearing tunes in our heed. Ryle gives several reasons for the same. First, where as we see mountains and hear sounds, we only 'see' and 'hear'[1] the objects of our recollection and imagination. That is to say that whereas the objects of our perceptual cognition is some physical object, present in front our nose, there is no such object when we just indulge in imagination. Secondly, the description of seeing and hearing is different from the description of 'seeing' and 'hearing'. Whereas one can describe the seeing of his home in his mind's eye as 'faithful', 'vivid' or 'life-like', one cannot describe the seeing of his home (with his eyes) as 'vivid', 'faithful' or 'life-like'. Our visualisations can be termed as vivid, our physical perceptions or cognitions cannot. Thirdly, whereas it is always possible for us to see unknown things or hear unknown tunes, it is not possible to 'see'

1 'See' and 'hear' ( within inverted comma ) respectively mean see in the mind's eye and hear in one's head.

unknown things or 'hear' unknown tunes. We can hear brand new music but we cannot have brand new music going on in our heed. Strange things can catch our sight but strange things cannot be pictured. It is why, though it is possible for us to see but not identify, it is not possible for us to 'see' and fail to identify. These arguments enable Ryle to assert that "When a person says that he 'sees' something which he is not seeing, he knows that what he is doing is something which is totally different in kind from seeing....."[2] Since 'seeing' is intrinsically different from seeing, we cannot legitimately say that while 'seeing' we do nothing but see mental pictures. Ryle maintains that while 'seeing' or imaging, there is neither any act of seeing nor any object to be seen.

(2) But, if that be so, how is it that we are forced to believe that 'seeing' is not different from seeing ? we somehow feel constrained to believe that imagining or visualising or seeing in the mind's eye is only a special case of seeing. This belief, argues Ryle, is based on our uncritical attitude. He lists a number of reasons to show that this belief is erroneous and ill-founded. First, this belief arises due to our wrong inversion. When we see pictures or snapshots of things, we seem to see the originals themselves, though the originals may not be physically present. Seeming to see the originals in such cases is imagining to see the originals. Seeing of pictures or snapshots, therefore, invariably leads to imagining. This invariable bond between seeing of pictures and imagining confuses us and leads us to believe that the inverse is also the case. That is, if seeing of pictures is imagining, imagining is also seeing of pictures. But this inversion is not valid. Secondly, this belief ( that imagining is the seeing of mental pictures ) is caused by our temptation to explain the vividness of our imagination in terms of the perception of a replica or a copy or a similarity. How can I see my home in my mind's eye so clearly and vividly unless I happen to see the picture of my home ? Ryle holds that the picture theory of imagination is introduced because of our effortless attempt to explain the phenomenon of vividness which often accompany our

2 *The Concept of Mind.*, p. 246.

acts of imagination. But looking at a similarity, however similar it might be, observes Ryle, is no guarantee of seeing something vividly and clearly. Instead of similarity guaranteeing vividness of seeing, it is vividness of seeing which guarantees similarity. Thirdly, our failure to realise that 'seeing' or imaging is not seeing is similar to a child's failure to realise that while playing the game of bears, there is no bear. As the child unnecessarily gets afraid, so we unnecessarily feel convinced of the existence of mental pictures. Ryle scribes our failure to realise the truth to our uncritical attitude. He observes : "The fact that people can fancy that they see things, are pursued by bears, or have a grumbling appendix without realising that it is nothing but fancy, is simply a part of the unsurprising general fact that not all people are, all the time, at all ages and in all conditions, as judicious or critical as could be wished."[3] Fourthly, Ryle thinks that the powerful similarity that appears to exist between seeing and 'seeing' is not due to the fact that 'seeing' is a special case of seeing. They appear to be similar because both of them are the utilizations of our same piece of knowledge. Our knowledge of a thing sometimes results in seeing and recognising, it sometimes results in visualising. Moreover, the assimilation between seeing and 'seeing' is also due to their common characteristic. As we are not free to see as we wish, so we are not free to visualise as we like. This constraint in both leads us, says Ryle, to suppose that seeing and 'seeing' are alike.

The above is a short account of Ryle's arguments on which he bases his rather queer theory of imagination. Let us now examine their validity. We have seen that Ryle's chief objection to imagining as seeing of mental pictures rests on his showing that seeing in the mind's eye cannot be seeing ; they are fundamentally different. But this very argument instead of weakening dualism, may also support it. The difference may be described as natural since one is a case of physical seeing while the other is a case of mental seeing. After all, have not the dualists been saying all along that the physical is fundamentally different from the mental ? Ryle appears to assume that

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 258-59.

seeing, if there is to be any, must be a physical seeing with eyes open and under conditions in which others could also see. But why should seeing be confined to literal seeing ? It is true that in our ordinary discourse, we use the word 'see' mostly in the context of literal seeing. But that does not establish that seeing always means literal seeing for the same word 'see' is used also in the case of hallucination and dream. We often say, 'I saw it in my dream'. When under the spell of hallucinations of the class called 'apparitions' the percipient speaks of his experience of the hallucinated 'person' in terms of the ordinary verb 'see'. He often says, 'I see him as clearly as I see you now'. Such instances clearly show that the use of the verb 'see' cannot be confined to literal seeing. It is true that literal seeing is basically different from mental seeing. One requires, while the other does not, the medium of the senses and the physical presence of an object. But this basic difference, it is obvious, lies in the method, not in the resultant experience. The same thing can generally be brought to the conscious level either by seeing or by visualising. Seeing and visualising meet as experiences, though they differ sharply as processes. This is why seeing and 'seeing' appear to be so similar, though externally they are quite different. For seeing, we have to open our eyes. For 'seeing' we have preferably to close our eyes. For seeing, we must have an object present before the senses. For 'seeing', we only require an object of recollection or imagination. But the awareness that ensues in both cases is basically the same. It is this identity in experience which enables one to treat 'seeing' as a case of seeing. Ryle overlooks this identity and only emphasizes the difference because that serves his purpose. But however hard he may try to argue that 'seeing' is totally different in kind from seeing, it is difficult to bolieve that it is so. What is self-evident cannot be brushed aside with the aid of arguments, however astute. Neither can the attempt conceivably prove to be satisfactory. We know the fate of Zeno's arguments which tried to prove the impossibility of the motion of a moving arrow. His dilemmatic argument had in itself a force but that could not stand before what was obvious and evident. Berkeley argued, and argued well, that matter is idea but how many of us believe that we eat and drink ideas ? Berkeley argued brilliantly that matter is not material, so Ryle argues with

no less brilliance, or obtuseness, that 'seeing' is not seeing. But none of them have sound evidence behind them. Ryle's conclusion is unsupported by experimental evidences. J. R. Smythies speaks of his experience with normal persons who were administered hallucinogenic drugs to have hallucinations. While under the spell of hallucination, these persons, he reports "were particularly impressed by how similar 'seeing' is to seeing."[4] As a matter of fact, the seeing of an image in the mind's eye is so crystal clear and obvious that a writer has gone to the length of saying that Ryle's non-seeing of images might be due to the peculiar constitution of his brain. Arthur C. Danto[5] says that the brain so constituted as to have much of alpha-rhythms is incapable of seeing visual imagery. Perhaps Ryle's brain is similarly constituted. Whatever the reasons of Ryle's denial of the seeing of mental imagery might be, it is clear that his assumption that seeing means literal seeing is based on his ontological conviction that there is only one world—the wide external world. It is with this conviction that he endeavours to interpret all mental terms in terms of physical concepts. But occasions are not rare when he has to face serious difficulties. He cannot say that illusions, hallucinations, dreams and images are public external objects. Nor can he say that they are private internal objects. So, what alternative is left to him except to say, ( as he does) that in perceptual delusion, dreams and imagination, we see nothing ? We have already seen that in his chapter on 'Sensation and Observation', he, while explaining the elliptical look of a tilted round plate, almost denies that we see anything elliptical. Ryle thus appears to be forced by his own assumptions to conclude that in imagination we do not see anything. But is it not very much strained and unnatural to say so ? How can one deny those clear glittering hypnagogic images ? Or how can one say that his after-images are non-existent ? Visual images are not only existent, they are existent with spatial

4 J. R. Smythies, 'On Some Properties and Reflections of Images', *Philosophical Review*, July 1958, p. 390.

The author held a Nuffield Fellowship in Medicine.

5 Arthur C. Danto, 'Concerning Mental Pictures', *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LV, Jan. 2. 1958, p. 18.

properties. Our visual images and their parts bear spatial relations with one another. We can validly talk of them in terms of 'to the left of', 'above', 'below', 'near' 'near to' 'farther from', etc. Not only that. They have their boundary, geometrical and topological properties. They can be brought to mental stage, stayed and allowed to pass. Their details can be examined, scrutinised and marked. Their colours can be changed, if desired. Are we then doing all these things in oblivion ? When so many details are apparent about an image, shall we proclaim with Ryle that the question of an existent image is meaningless ?

Let us hear Ryle on the subject. He says : "Much as stage-murders do not have victims and are not murders, so seeing things in one's mind's eye does not involve either the existence of things seen or the occurrence of acts of seeing them. So no asylum is required for them to exist or occur in".[6] Now, this dismissal is open to difficulties. If Ryle be taken as right in saying that in imagination there is neither an act of seeing nor an object to be seen, there remains no criterion for us to distinguish imaging from non-imaging. Ryle recognises that "picturing, visualising or 'seeing' is a proper and useful concept .... Roughly, imaging occurs, but images are not seen".[7] But, if imaging occurs, there must be a criterion to distinguish it from non-imaging. How shall he do so ? When I imagine, there is neither an object nor an act of seeing according to Ryle. When I do not imagine, obviously there is neither an object, nor an act of seeing. Now, what can make one an instance of imagination to the exclusion of the other ? A similar thinking makes Russell[8] also object like that. He suggests that if Ryle be true, a peculiar situation of this sort arises. When I imagine a horse, there is no seeing of an object like a horse in the mind's eye. When I imagine a hippopotamus, there is no seeing of an object like a hippopotamus in the mind's eye. So, both according to Ryle, are the cases of 'not seeings.' Still Ryle must

6 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 245.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 247.

8 B. Russell, 'What is Mind ?', *My Philosophical Developments*, Second Impression, 1959, p. 248.

hold that they are two instances of imagining. Now, what is there to make them two unless, observes Russell, "I should have thought it as obvious as anything can be that something is happening in me and cannot be known to anybody else unless I do something overt to let it be known what it is that I am imagining". Of course, Ryle will defend himself against these objections by making an appeal to his novel theory of imaging as pretending. He will say that imaging differs from non-imaging because pretending differs from non-pretending. He will also say that imaging a horse differs from imaging a hippopotamus because pretending to be a horse differs from pretending to be a hippopotamus. But we will notice that Ryle's new theory is not a satisfactory substitute for the old theory. We have seen that he conceives of imaging or picturing on the analogy of stage-murder. As in stage-murder there is no actual victim of an actual act of murder, so in imaging or seeing in the mind's eye there is no object to be actually seen. But this analogy of Ryle is not entirely valid. It is true that looked from the point of view of murder, there is no victim ; but it is also true that looked from the point of view of stage-murder, there is a victim. Similarly, while it is true that looked from the point of view of seeing with the senses, there is no object in imaging, it is also true that looked from the point of view of seeing in the mind's eye (without the senses) rhere is an object. As stage-murder requires a stage, so seeing in the mind's eye requires a mind.

Further, while arguing that 'seeing' is completely different from seeing, Ryle gives us an impression that the theorists had interpreted 'seeing' as a special case of seeing. It is presumably with this conviction that he argues so forcefully. But here he takes an exaggerated view of things. We know that no text of Psychology deals with perceiving and imagining in the same context. The theorists had also maintained that 'seeing' is not seeing. The obvious difference was clearly admitted but inspite of this difference they took them to be meeting on the level of experience. Seeing is an experience. Imaging is also an experience. If I see a tree, the tree becomes a content of my experience. If I visualise or imagine the tree, it similarly becomes a content of my experience. As experiences, having more or less the same contents, they have a strong similarity of appearance though the differences are not less important.

Ryle, however, does not believe in experience as enjoying a separate status. Experience or consciousness for him is only a disposition for actual or possible behaviour. According to him, it is disposition and not consciousness which keeps us awake. But we have seen at the place of our discussion that Ryle's account of disposition has little to say about the distinction between physical and mental dispositions. Elasticity of rubber is a disposition. Intelligence, according to Ryle, is also a disposition. Then what is that which makes elasticity physical and intelligence mental ? Ryle certainly does not and cannot hold that elasticity is like intelligence. Ryle is surprisingly not particular about the issue. One can, of course, distinguish dispositions on the basis of episodes. But what if the dispositions are episodically identical ?

Ryle has one more objection to the theorists' concept of imaging. If imaging be the 'seeing' or 'hearing' of copies or replicas of things or sounds ( which is the case according to the theorists ), how can one imagine smell or taste, since no one ever speaks of a copy or replica of smell or taste ? The language of original and copy is applicable to sights and sounds but inapplicable to smells and tastes. Things have their copy in snap-shots. Sounds have their copy in echoes. But smell or taste has no copy at all. How can imaging in these cases be the smelling or tasting of the copy of an original smell or taste in the mind's nose or tongue ? The very idea of copy, holds Ryle, is meaningless with regard to smell or taste.

As for the difficulty pointed out by Ryle, it is true that smell or taste has no physical likeness as snap-shots and echoes are of sights and sounds. The physical world does not consist of both smells and the likenesses of smells. But the question is, why should the impossibility of a physical likeness deter us from imaging a mental likeness ? Do we not 'smell' fragrance even when the fragrant rose is removed from the contact of the nose ? Ryle's theory that 'smelling' in this case is only pretending to smell physical fragrance is directly against the evidence of our experience. Further, Ryle believes that it is the perception of physical likenesses that wrongly induces us to posit mental likenesses. Because there are snap-shots and echoes, therefore, we are tempted to believe in ghostly snap-shots and echoes. He observes : "The visual comparison of seen things with the seen like-

nesses of those things is familiar and easy.... So it is easy and tempting to describe visual imaging as if it were a case of looking at a likeness...."[9] But this is obviously false. There are many people on earth who might not have seen any snap-shot at all and who might not have a chance to make a visual comparison between 'seen things and seen likenesses of those things.' Still, if asked, they will unfailingly report of the occurrence of imagery on the mental scene. Ryle has not kept these ignorant people in his view when he has generalised that our perception of physical likeness wrongly leads us to believe in mental likeness. His theory that "we speak of 'seeing' as if it were a seeing of pictures, because the familiar experience of seeing snap-shots of things and persons so often induces those the seeing of things and persons,"[10] does not hold good in the case of those people who have had no experience of seeing snap-shots of things and persons at all.

It is in his ambitious attempt "to rectify the logical geography of knowledge" that he holds that imaging is not seeing of pictures; rather seeing of pictures is imaging. Dreaming is not "being present at a private cinematograph show; on the contrary, witnessing a public cinematograph how is one way of inducing a certain sort of dreaming."[11] The phenomenon of dreams, we know, is so much subjective and other-worldly that it provides a good challenge to Ryle's denial of the world where dreams take place. But Ryle has preferred not to meet this challenge since he has said almost nothing about dreams. Ryle's theory would have been strengthened if he had devoted some space to the discussion of dreams. But disappointing as it is, dreams do not occur even in his index. He only makes casual references about them, which are quite perfunctory. Even the little that he says about dreams throws no light on them at all. As we have seen, he believes that witnessing a public cinematograph show is one way of dreaming. But if that be so, what are the other ways of dreaming? Ryle has no answer. By saying that dreaming is 'not being present at a private cinematograph show' Ryle goes against the universal

9 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 252.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 253
11 *Ibid*, p. 255

experience of mankind. If democratic principles be true and if Ryle's manifesto—'The Concept of Mind' is cast in the form of a manifesto—be subjected to vote, he is bound to lose at least on this front, if not elsewhere.

Ryle takes recourse to such unacceptable arguments because he has to do away with images. But images do not allow themselves to be done away with in such cavalier fashion. They compel us to believe in their existence. Ryle, however, ascribes this feeling of compulsion to our uncritical attitude. Our belief that images are existent beyond doubt is, according to Ryle, due to the "general fact that not all people are, all the time, at all ages and in all conditions, as judicious or critical as could be wished."[12] But this dictum is hardly satisfactory. If not all people, many people at least sometimes and in some conditions are as judicious or critical as could be wished. But how many of them have gone to the length of Ryle in denying images altogether ? Ryle compares our conviction of seeing images with the children's conviction of seeing bears when they only play a game. As a child while pretending to be a bear is often wrongly convinced of the presence of an actual bear, so all of us while pretending or fancying to see, are wrongly convinced of an actual seeing of the replicas of things. But this analogical reasoning is again faulty. It makes all of us only as good as children in the matter of images. Is our knowing faculty as uncritical as that of children ? As it is, even uncritical children can be made to realise that their seeing of a bear was a mistake. But critical persons can hardly be made to realise that their seeing of an image was a mistake. Ryle's analogy is therefore ineffective.

Ryle's attempt to prove the unreality of images is thus peculiar. Let us now see what alternative theory of imaging or imagining he has to give. Imaging or picturing, according to Ryle, is only fancying. Instead of picturing being seeing pictures in the mind's eye, it is only pretending or fancying to be seeing. We do not see, we only pose to see. Picturing a horse does not mean seeing a mental horse. It only means seeming to see or fancying to see a physical horse. Ryle

12 *Ibid.*, p. 259.

observes : "True, a person picturing his nursery is, in a certain way, like that person seeing his nursery, but the similarity does not consist in his really looking at a real likeness of his nursery, but in his really seeming to see his nursery itself, when he is not really seeing it. He is not being a spectator of a resemblance of his nursery, but he is resembling a spectator of his nursery."[13]

Now, this assertion of Ryle has queer consequences. If picturing a nursery is resembling the spectator of a nursery, picturing a centaur must likewise be resembing the spectator of a centaur. But can there be any spectator of a centaur so that we can resemble him ? We at times picture some such things which have no reality in the world of facts. How can picturing in such cases be equated with our resembling their spectators ? Can there be any spectator of a thing which does not exist ? Ryle himself contends that "not all imaging is the picturing of real faces and mountains .... We can fancy ourselves looking at fabulous mountains".[14] But this, he explains, is due to the fact that not all pretending[15] is pretending to be real things. We can play the part of a Frenchman as well as the part of a visitor from Mars. Just as we can pretend to be unreal things, so we can fancy to see unreal things. But this argument does not carry much weight. By introducing the words 'pretend', 'fancy', 'mock', 'make-believe' and others in the description of picturing or imaging, Ryle makes it more a description of a pantomimist than of one who sees mental pictures or hears mental sounds. It is against this theory of picturing as fancying that Hampshire emphatically remarks : " .... it is plainly false, since we may imagine things without fancying ourselves witnessing them".[16] Ryle thinks that his theory of imaging as fancying will necessarily repudiate the traditionalists' theory of imaging as seeing of mental pictures. He seems to think that fancying

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13 *Ibid.*, p. 248.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 270.

15 Ryle believes that 'there is not much difference between a child playing at being a pirate and one fancying that he is a pirate' ( p. 264 ). So pretending and fancying are more or less the same.

16 Stuart Hampshire, Critical Notices on 'The Concept of Mind', *Mind*, April. 1950, p. 255.

and mental seeing are incompatible concepts. That is why by introducing the theory of fancying he hopes to explode the theory of mental seeing. But one can fancy and yet see mentally. One can fancy to see his nursery (which he is not seeing ) by seeing mentally the image of his nursery. There is no logical contradiction in saying that 'I fancy to see the Taj by mentally viewing the image of the Taj'. J. R. Smythies is of the same opinion when he says, ". . . . the statement 'I am imagining the facade of my house by having or entertaining images of the facade of my house' makes perfectly good sense".[17] So, even when Ryle's theory of picturing as fancying be true, it does not follow that we should drop the idea of images. If we drop them altogether and think of imaging as fancying alone, we have in that case to adopt a queer and uncommon sort of language. J R. Smythies mentions of the extensive experiments of Henrich Kluver on imagination. Kluver found that a continued imaging, say of a horse, led after sometime to the fragmentation and distortion of the horse-image. Now, we would like to express this fact as : 'The image has broken into parts'. Ryle, however, would like us to express it as : 'We only imagine a physical horse that breaks into parts'. Now, this usage which Ryle recommends is obviously not a common usage. It is not in conformity with the slogan of the school to which Ryle belongs. ( The slogan of his school is that the ordinary use is the proper use ). As a matter of fact, Ryle's departure from common usage is so evident in the description of image that we cannot but agree with Morris Weitz when he says that "Ryle's denial of images rested upon a proposed new use of an expression and not upon the elucidation of a regular one".[18] By insisting on the refutation of image Ryle is criticising not any philosopher or a philosophical system ; he is criticising all ordinary persons and ordinary usage.

Further, Ryle has made his problem easy by not distinguishing the various senses of the word 'see' when it is used in the

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17 J. R. Smythies, 'On some properties and reflections of images', *Philosophical Review*, July 1958, p. 389.

18 Morris Weitz, 'Oxford Philosophy', *Philosophical Review*, April, 1953, p. 220.

context of seeing in the mind's eye. "It is this failure," observes J. M. Shorter, "which makes his account of visualising seem plausible."[19] When a normal person visualises or 'sees' a snake he does not believe that there is a snake. When a patient of *delirium tremens* 'sees' a snake, he believes fully that there is a snake. Ryle would say that both of them are only seeming to see a physical snake. But "the concept of imagining," continues J. M, Shorter to say, "is to be illuminated by distinguishing visualising or picturing from the sort of imagining that a drunkard does, not by identifying the two.' Shorter comes to this conclusion by following the same linguistic technique which Ryle uses. He argues that the two cases of imaginings must be distinguished because whereas adverbs like 'faithfully' and others can be combined with the verbs of picturing or visualising, they cannot be legitimately combined with the visions of a drunkard.

Not only does Ryle not distinguish between the different senses of the word 'see', when it is used in the context of seeing in the mind's eye, but he also does not distinguish between the various senses in which the word 'imagine' is used. Consider for instance, the following sentences which involve the use of the word 'imagine' :

(1) 'I can well imagine how you would look like when you put on this dress'.
(2) 'Imagine that India's policy of non-alignment succeeds'.
(3) 'The doctor mis-diagnosed because he imagined it to be a case of typhoid.'

The first sentence refers to the appearance of a man in a certain dress, which is visualised or seen in the mind's eye by me. That is, it refers to an image. The second refers to a supposition. The speaker wants the hearer to suppose that India's policy of non-alignment succeeds. The third refers to a mistake. The doctor had imagined and committed a mistake. Now, the three sentences are clearly different in meaning. Annis Flew[20] distinguishes the three senses by

19 J. M. Shorter, 'Imagination', *Mind*, Oct. 1962, p. 529.

20 Annis Flew, 'Images, Supposing and Imagining' *Philosophy*, Vol. XXVIII, July 1958, p. 247.

calling the first as 'imaging sense', the second as 'propositional entertainment sense', and the third as 'perhaps mistaken thinking sense'. Ryle while conceiving of picturing as fancying is as a matter of fact talking of the first in terms of the third sense. His version that picturing is seeming to see, which one does not see, is really an analysis of illusory perception. Ryle believes, as we have seen, that in picturing or visualising there is no object whatsoever to be actually seen. We only imagine or seem to see something which does not exist. Picturing therefore, is taking nothing to be something. But if this be the account of visualising or seeing in the mind's eye, it is difficult to see how it differs from perceptual illusions. We know that one case of perceptual illusion is taking nothing to be something ( which technically goes by the name of hallucination ) while the other is taking something as something else. Ryle, while talking of picturing as the taking of nothing as something, is virtually identifying imaging with the illusory experiences which we call hallucination. His illustration support our contention. He asks us to consider the case of a child who imagines her doll to be smiling. Now, where is the smile, asks Ryle ? On the lips of the doll ? No. The child would have seen it then. Does the doll begin smiling when the child imagines it to be smiling ? No. The child would have been frightened in that case. Is the smile then hovering somewhere betwixt the child and the doll ? No. There cannot be any disembodied smile. So, Ryle argues that there is no smile at all. The theorists, according to him, would commit a blunder by assuming the lips to be in the physical space and the smile in a fantastic non-physical place. When the child imagines her doll to smile, she is not seeing any smile at all either in the physical world or in the so-called mental world. She is only seeming to see a smile, which is found nowhere at that moment.

Now, this account of picturing, as seeming to see something which does not exist, is obviously an account of illusion of the type which we call hallucination. Hallucination, of course, is one instance of imagination. When a terribly frightened man while passing through a lonely place in a dark night, sees a ghost, the putative content of his experience is only imaginary. He has only imagined vagrantly a ghost which does not exist. But the fact that hallucination

is imagination does not in any way license us to infer that deliberate visualisation is also hallucination. When Wordsworth sat in an arm chair with his closed eyes to recall the visions of dancing daffodils, he was not doing so in order to enjoy certain hallucinations recollected in tranquillity. When melodious tunes rang in the deaf ears of Beethoven, he composed the world's greatest symphonies and orchestra music. But nobody would say that he composed some of the world's greatest music on the basis of his hallucinations. Ryle conceives of visualisation in terms of hallucination because he does not take into account the different senses in which the word 'imagine' is used. We have already seen that the word has different senses in different contexts.

Apart from what we have observed about Ryle's illustration of a smiling doll, it is not difficult to see that this illustration is not free from a psychological mistake. Ryle argues as if the traditionalists' theory of imagination involves a physical doll and a non-physical smile suspended somewhere else. It is perhaps with this presumption that he argues in terms of attached or unattached smile. But why should the question of attached or unattached smile arise at all? We do not feel any difficulty in imagining or picturing a smiling doll itself. Ryle's finding that the imaginary smile cannot be on the lips of the doll is untrue. When imaging is involved, why should it not be there? It is not a smiling face but the image of a smiling face that is involved.

Not only does Ryle use a faulty illustration to uphold his thesis, he also uses terms which sound strange in connection with our familiar experiences. Consider, for instance, Ryle's use of the term 'knack'[21] in place of the traditionalists' concept of memory-image. We know how often we have to rely on memory-images when we are required to give a description of our past experience. As the idea of memory-image is unacceptable to Ryle, he says, "Ability to describe things learned by personal experience is one of the knacks we expect of linguistically competent people ....."[22] But this does not satisfy us. A knack is more or less acquired.

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21 *The Concept of Mind*,. p. 276.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 176.

We have to wait and acquire the knack of tying a reef knot before we can do so. Have we similarly to wait and acquire before we can describe our personal experience ? In this connection it is interesting to observe that Ryle himself talks of the occurrence of visual imagery in his unguarded moments. Let us quote from his writings in the *Concept of Mind.* On page 27 of this book he says, "Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph-show of visual imagery." This statement does not only assert the occurrence of visual imagery, it also asserts that imagery takes the form of 'internal cinematograph show' which Ryle openly denies in his casual treatment of dreams.

Before we conclude our discussion of Ryle's theory of imagination, it is well to give vent to a possible objection. The supporters of his theory might object to our criticisms on the ground that we have frequently talked in material mode of speech, which mode cannot provide a proper criticism of Ryle. Ryle, they say, does not talk about mind. He only talks about the talk that the Cartesians and other theorists had about mind. "The Concept of mind," observes Norwood R. Hanson "is a second-order commentary on the first-order talk about minds.' "[23] That is to say that the problem of Ryle is linguistic, not factual. The linguistic nature of his problem makes him to adopt a formal mode of speech. A material mode of speech therefore, cannot provide a proper criticism of the formal mode.

But if we go deep into the matter, we will find that Ryle's problem is not entirely linguistic. We know that his problem is to establish the proposition that 'there is no image or mental picture.' This is a universal negative proposition. A universal negative proposition can either be factually based or linguistically based. Consider, for instance, the following two universal negative propositions :

(1) 'There is no centaur in the world.'

(2) 'There is no four angled triangle.'

Now, both these propositions are true, but whereas the truth of the first is guaranteed by facts, the truth of the second is guarnteed by

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23 Norwood R. Hanson, "Prof. Ryle's 'Mind' ", *Philosophical Quarterly*, ( Edited by T. N. Knox ), July 1952, p. 246.

language. Those who deny the truth of the first proposition can be taken round the world and shown that there are no centaurs. Those who deny the truth of the second proposition can be shown their mistake by making an analysis of the language of the proposition itself. A triangle means a figure that is tri-angled. A tri-angled or three-angled figure cannot therefore have four angles. Now, let us consider if the proposition 'there is no image or mental picture' is linguistically based or factually based. It cannot be linguistically based because there is nothing in the concept of image so as to entail its non-existence. The concept 'traingle' implies the non-existence of four angles. That is why the proposition 'there is no four angled triangle' is linguistically based. But there is no such implication in the concept of image and we cannot therefore say that the proposition 'there is no image' is linguistically based. It is this difficulty which forces Ryle to take to material mode of speech. As the linguistic approach is unworkable for his purpose, he tries to base his negation of images on facts. This he will not admit but it is evident from the material mode of speech that he adopts in his chapter on Imagination. A careful study of this chapter will convince one that he does not fail to talk in terms of facts. So the proposition 'there is no image' is a factually based proposition, though, paradoxically enough, facts do not support its content. Mental gazing at mental pictures is a fact which cannot be doubted. If we doubt it, there is no reason why we should not doubt the perceptions of the physical world as well. Ryle argues in terms of facts, but facts hardly come to his support. It is in this connection that Annis Flew comments : "Perhaps the paradox of the denial of the occurrence of imagery is in part at least a misleading and unfortunate consequence of his systematic use of the material mode of speech."[24] When Ryle himself talks in the material mode of speech, there is no harm in evaluating his thesis by adopting the same technique.

24 Annis Flew, 'Images, Supposing and Imagining', *Philosophy*, Vol. XXVIII, July 1953, p. 253.

# THE INTELLECT

In order to refute 'the dogma of the ghost in the machine' Ryle, in his chapter on 'Intellect', is at pains to establish that the supposed intellectual acts of conceiving, judging, inferring, deducing, subsuming and the rest do not occur on the secret stage of mind. Mind, he holds, is not a secret entity. There cannot, therefore, be any secret activity going on in its spectral region. All those idioms which have been wrongly taken to denote the occurrence of private intellectual activities are, in fact, the names of the different elements of published theories. A scientist's published treatise or a detective's type-written report contains judgements, inferences, deductions, subsumptions and the rest. If the scientist can see that a certain portion of his theory contains deductions, others also, who have at least some knowledge of theories, can see that those are his deductions. So, where is the privacy in deductions ? There is accordingly no privacy suggested by the concepts like judging, inferring and the rest. These terms occur with reference to achieved theories. It is only when one has a theory that he can say that he has judgments, reasonings, arguments, inferences, etc. So these terms refer to achievements. They are 'achievement' verbs. It is only the philosophers who take them to be process-verbs. Now, not standing for process-verbs, they cannot be taken to refer to recordable operations actually executed at the exploratory stage of pondering. Instead of saying that judging, deducing, inferring and the rest are occult activities leading to discovery, we should say that it is discovery which leads to the classification of its elements into judgments, deductions, inferences and the rest. These epistemological idioms have published theories as their proper fields of application. There is nothing private for them to connote.

Such is the central theme of Ryle's discussion of intellect.

Ryle holds that the theorists' postulation of secret intellectual acts in terms of 'judging', deducing', 'inferring', etc., is due to their failure to distinguish between the two separate processes of theory-building and theory-expounding. It is this failure which leads them to think of theory-building in terms which are suitable only for theory-expounding. Theory-building or theorising labour consists of some such things as calculating or miscalculating, diagram-sketching, interrogating, cross-examining, debating, experimental asseverating and

the rest — all executed either in soliloquy or in colloquy. Theory-expounding consists of judging, deducing, arguing, inferring, subsuming, abstracting and the rest. Though theory-building also consists of expression using and sentence-wielding, they are not to be described as judgements or inferences, since they are not to enter into the achieved theory. The epistemologists have wrongly transferred the idioms of theory-expounding to the operations of theory-building. They have thought that if there are judgments, inferences, deductions, subsumptions and the rest at the expository stage of the theory, there are also corresponding acts of judging, inferring, deducing and subsuming at the exploratory stage. Ryle observes : "Finding premisses and conclusions among the elements of published theories, they postulate separate, antecedent, 'cognitive acts' of judging ; and finding arguments among the elements of published theories, they postulate separate antecedent processes of moving to the 'cognising' of conclusions from the 'cognising' of premises".[1] But this way of thinking by the epistemologists is wrong. Ryle holds that there is no evidence to support the contention that corresponding to every element of a published theory, there is a prior intellectual operation of thinking conducted at a ghostly stage. Neither we find others nor our own selves doing any such type of ghostly thinking at any stage.

The above argument of Ryle contains two obviously important observations. The first is that the theorists have failed to distinguish between the exploratory and the expository stages of theorising, in other words. between theory-building stage and the theory-expounding stage. The second is that this failure has led them to believe in the prior secret acts of judging and inferring corresponding to the published judgments and inferences found in their theory.

Now, these two observations which form the basis of Ryle's denial of intellectual acts do not seem to be true. Have not the theorists distinguished between the two stages of theorizing ? The theorists' distinction between 'the order of discovery' and the 'order of exposition' is well known. Reputable epistemologists have always been conscious of the two stages of theorizing. They have told us that the order of discovery is not necessarily the order of exposition.

1 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 291.

Consider, for instance, a simple case. How do we discover that a house is on fire ? The first thing that occurs is the perception of smoke coming out of the house. The second is the spontaneous apprehension of the invariable relation between smoke and fire. The third is the cognition of fire in the house. This is the order of our discovery. But the order of exposition may be different. While admitting that the order of discovery may be as indicated above, logicians go on to propound it in a different way. They first place the universal proposition which states the invariable bond between smoke and fire. Then they place the second proposition which states the cognition of smoke in the house. This proposition, though ranked second in the order of exposition is, however, the first in the order order of discovery. So we see that the logicians and epistemologists are well aware of the two stages of theorizing—the exploratory stage and the expository stage. It is not, however, logically necessary to change the order as shown here. The change of order at the expository stage is a matter of convention. We have developed this convention because of the convenience that we have in driving the argument home to others. As a matter of fact, the thoughts of the exploratory and the expository stages of theorizing do not differ in fundamentals. They differ only in details. There is usually a good deal of trial and error at the theory-building stage and all those exploratory thoughts need not find a place in the exposition. But this does not enable one to say that the thought-elements of the two stages are completely at variance. Why should Ryle presume that judgments, inferences and the rest are elements of only published theories ? They may as well be elements of exploratory process because if they are not there, where from do they emerge at the expository stage ? It cannot, therefore, be maintained, à *la* Ryle that the assumption of judging and inferring as private mental acts is due to the failure to distinguish between the two stages of theorizing.

Next, is it at all satisfactory to say that it is the failure to distinguish between the exploratory and the expository stages of theorizing that is responsible for our postulation of intellectual acts occurring in the private stream of mind ? Is it a fact that it is "the finding of premises and conclusion" in the published theory that wrongly tempts us to postulate the 'cognising' of judgments and

inferences at the theory-building stage ? No. The acts of judging, inferring and the rest belong to the theory-building stage. While talking of this stage, Ryle is surprisingly brief, though he devotes some space in talking about the analogical path-making and path-using moves. But the question is, if theory-building is not comprised of judging, inferring, deducing, subsuming, etc., what it is that it is comprised of ? Ryle answers that it is comprised of calculating or miscalculating, diagram-sketching, interrogating, cross-examining, debating and the rest. But this description of the exploratory stage of theorizing shows that Ryle has taken only a surface view of things. Had he gone deep into the matter, he would have seen that theorizing at the exploratory level has atleast four distinct steps, some of which include calculating or miscalculating, diagram-sketching or interrogating. As the logicians[2] have consistently maintained, a theoretical peoblem is solved or a discovery is made when one defines his problem, frames hypothesis, deduces consequences and verifies with the aid of observation and experiment. The act of deducing is only another name for the act of inferring. We draw the different implications of the hypothesis. We consider what would follow if the truth of the hypothesis was taken for granted. Obviously then, it is what we name as the process of inferring or reasoning. Once the implications are drawn, we being to verify them on the basis of observation and experiment. This verification consists in our judging as to what is and what is not in accordance with the deductions from the hypothesis. So, this stage involves our judgments. Now, it is in these two stages of deducing and verifying that we have to do "a lot of calculating or miscalculating on paper and in our heads, a lot of diagram-sketching and erasing on the blackboard and in our minds' eye, a lot of interrogating, cross-examining, debating and experimental asseverating." Ryle is, therefore, right in what he asserts but not so in what he denies. He fails to take into account what goes on in the background of all these miscellaneous activities.

Ryle lists a number of terms which describe our intellectual activities. But he does not find evidence to support the theory that they

2 Such as Stebbing, Mace, Joseph, Latta, Macbeth, Mellone, Welton, Monahan and others.

refer to the occult operations of a veiled stage. Common people, argues Ryle, do not use them in that sense. Does anybody say that John Doe has woken up "to do some judging, conceiving, subsuming or abstracting" ? Does anybody say that John Doe has entertained a proposition for three seconds or has just passed from a premises to the conclusion ? Now, this argument does not appear to help Ryle in his objective. Why should we be able to proclaim such judgments about John Doe when by nature his mind is epistemically sealed to us in the sense that we cannot directly enter into his mind ? We can see him waking up but we cannot see him judging, conceiving or abstracting. In order that we may know about his judgments, conceptions or abstractions, we have no alternative but to depend on his pronouncements—oral or written. But we have not to do the same in order to know our own judgments, conceptions and abstractions. The predicament that we have about others need not be the predicament about our own selves.

But if we say so, we have to face another sort of difficulty which Ryle has pointed out. If one says that one can know one's secret acts of judging, inferring and the rest, one ought to answer some pertinent questions about the same. The person ought to answer "how many cognitive acts did he perform before breakfast, and what did it feel like to do them ? Were they tiring ? Did he enjoy his passage from his premisses to his conclusion, and did he make it cautiously or recklessly ? Did the breakfast bell make him stop short halfway between his premisses and his conclusion ?... He does not know how to begin to answer such questions".[3] But as we have seen elsewhere, such questions about mental acts can in a way be answered, though they are more or less meaningless. They can be asked meaningfully about physical operations. One can legitimately ask : How many times did one take to digging before breakfast ? Were they tiring ? Did the breakfast bell make him to discontinue the operations of digging ? Did he enjoy his passage through the Suez ? etc. etc. Now, why should Ryle presume that if mind is to be existent, the questions that can be legitimately asked about physical operations must also be asked about mental operations ? Has he not

3 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 292.

himself said that to speak of the mental in the self-same idioms in which we speak of the physical is to commit a category mistake ? Ryle thinks that the helplessness felt in answering these questions is owing to the fact that mental acts are non-existent. But the helplessness may really be due to a completely different reason. It may be due to the unsuitable nature of the questions themselves. Our inability to answer some invalid questions about an act or a process should not lead to the nullification of the process itself. It will not be out of place to mention here that Ryle uses exactly the same type of argument in declaring volition as an 'artificial concept'.[4] But the question is, why should he pose such questions about a reality which has no bearing with those questions at all ? The question of 'how many' posed with regard to cognitive acts or volitions is invalid because we have no prescribed cognitive unit to answer such questions. The fact that we cannot count them does not in any way stand in their way of being real. We cannot count all the stars. But they are as real as anything could be. C. A. Campbell remarks : "As well ask John Doe how many breaths he drew between waking and breakfast ; and then, because he cannot tell us, conclude that he must really have been dead. Certain others of the questions are unanswerable absolutely, because they are asked about non-existent features of mental acts".[5] A. C. Ewing has the same thing to say in reply to Ryle's question of 'how many' with regard to volitions. He observes : "The fact that we cannot answer questions such as how many acts of volition we performed in a given time is partly due to the fact that owing to their lack of practical importance hardly anybody has got into the way of asking such questions . . . . We are practically without any ideas as to what constitutes *one* act of will at all. Neither do we remember how many times we got up from our chair during the morning, nor is it ever asked how many assertions were made in the news-paper leader we have just read, nor what was the total number of times during the day I noticed the mantlepiece or felt a headache".[6] The question of the breakfast

4 *Ibid.*, p. 64

5 C. A. Campbell, 'Ryle on the Intellect', Reprinted in *Clarity Is Not Enough*, p. 290.

6 A. C. Ewing, 'Prof. Ryle's attack on Dualism', Reprinted in *Clarity Is Not Enough*, p. 329.

bell intervening between the premise and the conclusion is generally a question about the non-existent features of an inference. Inferring does not involve a lapse of time between the premise and the conclusion. It is a spontaneous activity which, though occurring in time, does not consume time. So, it is no wonder that one is bewildered when asked to answer such psychological posers as are raised by Ryle.

Ryle has other reasons to believe that judging and inferring do not occur at the exploratory stage of theorizing. For him, in order that a proposition may be called a judgment, it is necessary that it must appear in a theory that one has already arrived at. The detective's report that the 'gamekeeper killed the Squire' is a judgment. He is able to tell it when he has already arrived at a conclusion. He could not have said it while at the exploratory stage of making investigations. Though he might have said a lot of things to others or to himself at this stage, they are not his judgments since they are not to enter into his 'didactic expositions of conclusions reached, or arguments mastered'. In short, Ryle holds that a judgment is an achievement.

But the point raised in this argument appears to have no reasonable basis. Why should a judgment be only that judgment which gives us the final conclusions of a theory ? That the game-keeper was the murderer is a judgment which the detective finally arrived at. But it is no part of the definition of a judgment to include this sort of connotation. There may be many judgments *en route* leading to the final judgments. Judgments like 'there is a small round hole in the Squire's forehead' ; 'the hole is just of the size that a bullet from a service revolver is seen to make' etc., etc., must have occurred at the exploratory stage leading to the detective's final report that the gamekeeper was the murderer. Ryle himself admits of judgments occurring at the exploratory level. But he pins them with the sub-theories established at that level. This acceptance of the occurrence of judgments at the exploratory level ( whatever form Ryle may ascribe to them at that level ) considerably weakens his earlier rigid stand that the judgments are the elements of published theories. Though not an open acceptance, it verges on the acceptance of intellectual acts as understood by the theorists.

About inference again, Ryle has to tell the same story. There is

no ghostly act of inferring at the level of exploration. An inference or a reasoning or an argument is a matter of a published theory. It is an achievement. It cannot, therefore, be designated as a process occurring at a secret level. In order to win his point, Ryle is critical of the epistemologists' definition of the act of inferring. They had defined inferring as intuitively apprehending the relationship between the premise and the conclusion. In other words, their inferring was an implication seeing. It was, so to say, a bursting of light, a cognition, as if in a flash. For Ryle however, this flash is not the flickering of light at a ghostly stage. It is our hackneyed arguments that produce an illusion of a flash. Repeated use of an argument breeds familiarity and it becomes absolutely effortless to use it afterwards. It then appears to "leap to the eye or flash upon us now, but it was not so once". It is this familiarity which enables one to say all at once "then, tomorrow must be Boxing Day", on being told that "to-day is Christmas Day". When, however, one comes across unfamiliar situations, eg., the murder of the Squire, he cannot say anything all at once because the gap between the facts of the situation remains wide. It is only after much "chewing and digesting" that the gaps can be bridged. Once the gaps are bridged and the loopholes disappear "at no specifiable moment", can he say "so it was the game keeper who killed the Squire". Ryle thus believes that conclusion is not obtained quickly or intuitively or in a flash. It is obtained slowly or gradually with efforts on our part, It is the fruit of an effort. Once the conclusion is got and the argument repeated, it entitles one not only to use that argument but also to use several others of the same family in different situations. So, the feeling that one is entitled to use an argument is not the consequence of an implication seeing. It is only an effect of practice.

The above is a brief account of what Ryle has to say about inference. Shall we agree with him in his contention that there is no intuitive apprehension, no bursting of light, no flash, no implication seeing at all ? It is true that many of the arguments which we use in our day-to-day life are hackneyed ones. Their use need not depend on any bursting of light at the mental plane. Our argument that 'Because the ailing man had stopped breathing, therefore he

was dead' does not need any light of this sort to burst. The same is true of the argument "Because to-day is Christmas Day, therefore, to-morrow must be Boxing Day". But if there are hackneyed inferences of this sort, there are un-hackneyed inferences as well. If an average intelligent man is told for the first time that "A is greater than B" and "B is greater than C", ordinarily he will consume no time to conclude that "A is greater than C". How does it happen unless one sees the implications of the given propositions more or less instantaneously ? He does not have to chew and digest ( in the words of Ryle ) before coming to his conclusion. Sometimes a hypothesis strikes a scientist so abruptly that it has all the semblances of the bursting of light. Of course, in complicated cases the insight is not so quick. There are times when we have to face new situations, solve new problems and resolve complications. At first the solution does not seem to be in sight. Light does not burst. We have to think and re-think. And. experiences are not wanting when suddenly during the process a solution is reached, the point gained, an implication seen and, finally, a conclusion is drawn. So at times one has to go a long way before his culminating insight is reached. He has to do a lot of "chewing and digesting". But this "chewing and digesting" may itself be comprised of the different shafts of light which lead to the final illumination. There is as such an irrefutable role of implication seeing in the process of inference. While speaking of the role of intuition in unhackneyed inferences Aaron observes : "There are genuine intuitions of implications, for instance $a=b$, $b=c$, $\therefore a=c$, when this is not a hackneyed inference. Nor are intuitions confined to inference. For instance, we may intuit the truth of such a principle as that what is green all over cannot be red ; or again we intuit that one conclusion is more probable than another."[7]

Ryle thinks that what the epistemologists' intuition is supposed to give is an achievement. As a process cannot be described in terms of its achievements, so the theory-building stage cannot be described in terms of intuitions. As a journey cannot be described in terms of arrivals, so a process of inference cannot be decribed in terms

7 Aaron, 'Dispensing with Mind', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. LII.

of the having of intuitions. This may be so. But there is no difficulty in conceiving of a journey as made of so many intermediate arrivals. There is no difficulty in conceiving of the thinking process as made of so many intermediate insights. Ryle's own conception of sub-theories found at the exploratory stage goes to support our contention. As a matter of fact, Ryle's concept of "chewing and digesting" and the traditionalists' concept of the "bursting of light" are not altogether opposing concepts. One may "chew and digest" as well as intuit the implications. A period of apparent chewing and digesting followed by a sudden solution of the problem was observed by Kohler in his Chimpanzees. The denial of intuitions at the mental level is hard indeed to defend. Ryle has to make queer assertions in order to defend it. He asserts : "Perhaps during some minutes or days he considered and reconsidered these clues, and found that the loopholes they seemed to leave became gradually smaller and smaller until, *at no specifiable moment*,[8] they dwindled away altogether."[9] This observation clearly states that a conclusion is got at no specifiable moment of time. But can that be so ? The apprehension of the premise as implying the conclusion certainly happens in time. To speak in terms of Ryle's own analogy, the arrival is certainly made at a specific moment of time. Even if Ryle be right in saying that a conclusion is got only by the gradual dwindling away of the loopholes, that 'dwindling away' process must complete itself at a certain point of time. That specific point of time is decidedly one which coincides with the final achievement of the conclusion. So, if a man is cautious and keen to record time, it will be possible for him to say when exactly he came to a certain conclusion. Of course, one does not feel the necessity of recording time because that is irrelevant to the purposes for which the conclusion is drawn. As the time factor is unimportant, we have not developed the speech habit of saying that 'I came to this conclusion at such and such time'. But this does not establish that the arrival of conclusion is not clockable or datable.

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8 Italics mine.

9 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 299.

Ryle is right when he says that a conclusion can be drawn from premises only in the knowledge that one is entitled to do so. It is certainly true that "he must know that acceptance of those premises gives him the right to accept that conclusion." But the point is, how does one know that one has the right to draw the conclusion ? What constitutes his knowledge that he is 'licensed' to deduce the conclusion from its premises ? It cannot be, according to Ryle, the implication seeing of the theorists. So what is it then ? This right or the license is so important a matter that Ryle ought to have explained it thoroughly for the clarification of his stand. But instead of doing it, he only speaks of the *tests* that will confirm his knowledge. He writes "If he is to merit the description of having deduced a consequence from premisses, he must know that acceptance of those premises give him the right to accept that conclusion ; and the tests of whether he does know this would be other applications of the principle of the argument....."[10] But the tests of knowledge do not constitute the knowledge. The evidence does not make the essence. Ryle talks of the knowledge of license and leaves it quietly. One may wonder whether he is not reverting back to the two-world theory, though without knowing it.

While speaking of the progressive nature of thinking, he says that a proper handling of certain kinds of sentences yields new results in the shape of new sentences. Sentences "properly delivered and properly received have an instructive effect. They teach us to do and say things which were not said or done in their delivery."[11] It might therefore be argued that premise-sentences used properly or in a certain frame of mind have the nature or the effect of producing the conclusion-sentence. But this again does not appear to be helpful for one whose task is the complete exorcising of the ghost. We may ask, what constitute the proper delivery and the proper receipt of a sentence ? What is that frame of mind in which the premise-sentences breed the conclusion sentence ? Does not the ghost live in that frame of mind ? Does not the word 'properly' incline us to

10 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 300.
11 *Ibid*, p. 314

think more in terms of the ghost than in terms of no ghost ? A mere living body cannot have the sense of proper as distinguished from the improper. The oft-repeated phrase 'the frame of mind' may have the effect of silencing an inquisitive mind but that does not satisfy his inquisitiveness. He will continue to be troubled by the question : Is man a mere machine with some of his typical behaviours, actual and possible ?

Ryle is keen to show that the intuitive apprehension of implications in the inferential process is a myth. As the term 'intuition' or 'intuitive apprehension' or 'seeing of implications' has always signified mental acts at a private stage, Ryle is anxious to establish that there are no such acts at any stage. He believes that it is not the seeing of implications that gives us an argument. On the other hand, it is an established argument that enables us to see the implications. It is only when we have an argument that we can connect its propositions, correlate its points and see their entailments. To make it clear, he asks us to see what happens in the case of a joke. We always speak of seeing the points of a joke. But before the points can be seen the joke must be made. Nobody ever speaks of first seeing the points and then making a joke. Similarly, when we speak of seeing the implications of an argument, the argument must be got before its implications can be seen. Like a joke the argument must be there in order that its implications can be cognised. So, instead of saying that we first see the implications and then come to an argument, we ought to say that we first come to an argument and then see its implications. Now, let us examine how far the instance of joke helps Ryle in his objective. If we think a little we will find that Ryle's account of seeing the points of a joke is only partially true. It is true only so far as the audience is concerned. Before others can appreciate my joke, I must have already made a joke. But the same is not true of my own self. I do not have to wait for the self-pronouncement of my own joke before I can see its worth. Had it been so, the making of a joke would not have been more than a mere babbling. As a matter of fact, the time interval between the seeing and the making of a joke is often so negligible that one may overlook the antecedent act of seeing the points of a joke. Jokes generally strike with a speed and before one can be in an introspective mood, he may already

find himself speaking out the jokes. So, the instance of joke does not prove what Ryle has thought it to prove. Ryle's assertion that an implication can be seen only when a theory is already arrived at is true, provided the theory is not one's own. I can see the points of a scientist's discovery only when he has a theory and he tells it either orally or in writing. But the same is not necessarily true of me. I may not have a theory, though I may have some intuitive flashes of the constituents that will go to the making of the theory. Autobiographies of the eminent scientists bear testimony to the fact that it was with some random intuitive flashes that they had started for their final discovery. Intuitions, therefore, occur at the exploratory stage, paving way to the final emergence of well-accomplished theories.

But Ryle will not hesitate to rebut it. He will say ( as he does ) that inferring is not necessarily the making of a discovery. So how can inferring be tagged with implication seeing ? An argument can be deployed for any number of time, but every time we are not making a discovery. So, it is not necessary that inferring or arguing must go with implication seeing. True that it is so but it does not hold good with every case of inferring. This assertion of Ryle may hold good with the hackneyed cases of inferring. A hackneyed inference may have little of implication seeing. But why should the same be true with the unhackneyed cases of inferring ? The ability to use an argument for the first time is an effect of implication seeing for what else can it be except an expression of discovery ? Ryle, however, does not agree that an implication seeing is a forerunner even of the first case of arguing. But the soft words with which he chooses to deny it ( rather unlike him ) indicate that his convictions at this point are not particularly strong. He says : "Nor need there have been any occasion on which the light burst upon him."[12] The use of the term 'need not' clearly weakens his stand. Thus we see that Ryle's account of inference fares no better. His version of both judgment and inference fails to convince.

There is again a difficult question of meaning. Where from do our judgments and inferences derive their meaning ? Does not the

12 *Ibid.*, p. 299

meaning descend to the inert words and sentences from the speaker's private stream of consciousness ? If there be no mind, how can our utterances be meaningful ? Now, in reply to these questions, Ryle maintains that we do not need a second-status world of mind to deal with the concept of meaning. The concept of meaning can be elucidated without reference to such a mind. Meaning, he believes, is the use of an expression or a sentence in a certain frame of mind. It is saying something either loudly or silently "not by rote, chattily, recklessly, histrionically, absent-mindedly or deliriously, but on purpose, with a method, carefully, seriously and on the *qui vive*."[13] Ryle thinks that if we postulate mind as a source of meaning, we cannot answer some questions that arise in that context. First, if meaning be the monopoly of a personal and private mind, how is it that a peculiarly personal and private something is also shared by others in so far as they also understand it ? The very fact that meaning is meant "to be understood by anyone" shows that it is public, not private. Secondly, if meaning is something other than the expression used, it ought to be apprehended as such. But however hard we try to get it, we do not succeed. The meaning of the utterance "to-morrow cannot be Sunday, unless today is Saturday" turns out to be just the soliloquised duplication of the overt utterance itself. So, if we try to catch meaning as distinct from the utterance on which it is supposed to hang, we get nothing except the utterance itself So where is meaning, an ethereal creature ? asks Ryle.

Now, with regard to the first difficulty that Ryle raises against the privacy of meaning, it is not difficult to see that it is unreal. Ryle's objection that meaning cannot be private since it is understood by every one rests on the assumption that privacy cannot go with communicability. But something may be private and still it may be communicable. Are not our feelings ( even in his own sense of bodily sensations ) peculiarly personal and private ? How is it then that statements about one's own feeling are also understood by others ? Do not the hearers exclaim : 'Yes, I know exactly how you felt at that time', 'How very well I can enter into

13 *Ibid.*, p. 296

your feelings', and so forth ?[14] Further, meaning does not arrive already hall-marked 'public'. It is not "meant to be understood by any one" just from its inception. We may not understand the meaning of significant assertions made by a speaker. Where shall the significance or meaning lie in such cases if we do not posit it to belong to the speakers' private stream of consciousness ? Cases of misunderstanding also prove that the speakers' meaning is not necessarily the hearers' meaning. Even when the hearer understands exactly what the speaker wants to convey, meaning retains its privacy because there are two persons having their own understanding of a common subject. Ryle's observation, that a bear can be led by a bear-leader but an expression cannot be led by meaning, is true provided we talk of the hearer's meaning. In case of a hearer, expression leads and meaning follows. He must first listen to the expression and then grasp its significance. But that is not true of the speaker himself. He has not to watch his expression before he can understand its significance. So, meaning in his case is decidedly one that does not depend on the expression used. The phrase 'meaning of an expression' is an ambiguous phrase and before anything can be validly said about it, the context of its use must be kept in view i. e. whether it is used in the speaker's or in the hearer's context. Ryle has generalised about meaning without regard to its context. So his sweeping generalisation about the concept of meaning is not fully acceptable.

With regard to the second difficulty that the meaning of an expression ultimately turns out to be the covert duplication of the expression itself, it is tempting to agree with the observations of C. A. Campbell,[15] who believes that our meaning, which in other words is

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14 Prof. J. N. Findlay in his article 'Recommendations regarding the language of introspection', *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, December, 1948, discusses the question of the communication of our inner experiences. He observes: "Ordinary people do something very successfully which they call communicating the quality of their inner experiences to each other : their talk moves in a region by no means wholly nebulous nor devoid of uniformities, and there is no good reason why philosophers, who have occupied themselves deeply with the ethics of speaking, should not make many profitable recommendations in this field".

15 C. A. Campbell, 'Ryle on the Intellect', Reprinted in *Clarity Is Not Enough*, p. 296.

our thought, is made of two elements, the process and the content. Thought implies a psychological process of thinking and an object or content on which the process is directed. He terms the first as 'that' aspect and the second as 'what' aspect of thought. Now, when we want a description of our thought behind an utterance, we can only do so with reference to the 'what' aspect of our thought, i. e., with reference to what we have thought and to describe with reference to what we have thought is to repeat the utterance itself. If, however, we want a description of thought as a process, it is impossible to give a definite one, because consciousness by nature is indefinable. So, even when the thought corresponding to the statement 'To-morrow cannot be Sunday, unless to-day is Saturday' is to be found in the statement itself, it does not follow that mind is thereby contradicted.

Ryle argues to say that the thought or significance of a proposition is derived from the "frame of mind" in which it is uttered or spoken. He says : "Saying something in this specific frame of mind, whether aloud or in one's head, *is* thinking the thought".[16] Now, the question is : what exactly does the phrase "frame of mind" mean ? Does it consistently fit in with Ryle's scheme of things ? He believes that to be in a thinking frame of mind is to use words and sentences purposefully, carefully, seriously or on the *qui vive*. That is to say that thinking is minding what one is saying. But this does not involve the two acts of minding and saying. It does not mean, as the theorists would suppose, that we are minding at a ghostly level and saying at a completely different physical level. Had it been so, argues Ryle, we would have expected our minding to continue even when the other activity of saying was discontinued. When we talk while we walk, we are simultaneously doing two thinks — talking and walking. Since there are two activities, we can continue the one while discontinuing the other. We can simply talk and stop walking or we can simply walk and stop talking. But the same is not true with minding what one is saying. Had minding and saying been two activities, we could have continued our minding while discontinuing the other. But can one go on minding his saying when he has stopped saying altogether ? A driver who has discontinued his driving cannot go on minding

16 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 296.

his drive any more. This proves, argues Ryle, that minding what one is saying is not two but one activity. Now, this argument has hardly any substance. It is true that talking and walking are two activities because one is possible in the absence of the other. But why should the same be true in order that minding be a separate activity ? Why should Ryle conceive of a mental activity on the analogy of a physical activity ? Talking does not require walking but minding by nature requires something to mind upon. We cannot have minding by itself. Minding is a conscious direction which requires some such activity as talking, driving, writing, playing or any of similar things as its object on which this direction can be applied. The intrinsic connection between the mental and the physical is a universally felt experience. We may not understand the nature of this connection. But failure to understand the connection should not lead to the denial of the connection itself.

Nont only this. There are other difficulties. If thinking or minding what one is saying be only one activity, viz., the physical activity of saying things in a certain way, we cannot, in that case, have an effective criterion to distinguish between heedful and unheedful utterances. The statement of a statesman made in public may be successfully reproduced or exactly mimicked by a child or an idiot, but that does not enable one to say that the child or the idiot is going through the thoughts of the statesman. Ryle himself has seen this point when he says that a mindful activity is an activity "with a special character", which special character eludes "the observer, the camera and the dictaphone",[17] i. e., which cannot in principle be a feature of the overt activity itself. But though he believes in the unwitnessable special character of mindful activities, he does not think that this special character is provided by an inner process of thought. He explains this "special character" in his own way. He says that whether an acivity is mindful (that is, whether it is with a special character) is to be decided not with reference to a ghostly process going on inside, but with reference to some open tests. Whether a man has read something attentively or inattentively ( i. e. with or without his mind on the subject) is

17 *Ibid.*, p. 188

to be judged with reference to some such tests as whether he can summarise its points, disagree with its opposite, utilise his knowledge at opportune moments, etc. Now, with regard to this contention of Ryle, there cannot be any two opinion. But such tests only constitute the evidence. They do not make the essence of mindful acts. After all, the tests of electricity do not make the nature of electricity. So, how can the nature of a mindful act be revealed in its tests ? Moreover, we require such tests when we have to decide about the activities of others. Whether one has done something attentively or absent-mindedly has to be known with the aid of tests. But whether I myself have done it attentively or absent-mindedly is not to be known similarly. I have not to wait and see if I can give the gist, contradict the opposite, utilise the knowledge gained, etc., before I can declare whether I am minding my reading or not. Further, while speaking of the mongrel-categorical or semi-dispositional nature of heed verbs, Ryle says that minding is a state of readiness or preparedness to do a lot of connected things, of which one is that which the agent might be doing at the moment. He maintains that "To describe some one as now doing something with some degree of some sort of heed is to say....." that "He is in a 'ready' frame of mind, for he both does what he does with readiness to do just that in just this situation and is ready to do some of whatever else he may be called on to do."[18] Now, there appears to be no difficulty in accepting this version of minding. But the point is, does not mind reappear in the theory of Ryle with the changed name of 'preparedness' or 'readiness' or 'ready frame of mind' ? The question that perplexes the readers' mind is, what after all is this ready frame of mind ? Is this "ready frame of mind" observable in the behaviour of persons ? Perhaps not, because the same behaviour can be accidental or habitual. Ryle himself observes that "In any case, in describing him as applying his mind to his task, we do not mean that this is how he looks and sounds while engaged in it....."[19] This is to say that the "ready frame of

18 *Ibid.*, p. 147
19 *Ibid.*, p. 138

mind" is not covered by the behaviour concerned. But once the 'ready frame of mind' is allowed to transcend its behaviour, the door is left wide open for the ghost to walk in. The ghost is permitted to live, though with a ban. The ban is that it must not be called a Cartesian mind. Instead it is only to be called a "frame of mind." But this difference in nomenclature does not lay the ghost at rest The ghost survives in spite of Ryle's continuous assault.

# CONCLUSION

A close and careful study of Ryle's *Concept of Mind*, aptly described as the *locus classicus* of the new revolutionary philosophy of mind, enables the reader to draw certain broad conclusions about the book and its author. The first is its apparent inconsistency. We know that the radical thesis of the book is that Cartesianism in all its versions is a mistake because it believes in hidden and unwitnessable mental events, never knowable by others but completely open to one's own self. The book is packed with such details as purport to establish that there is no private inner life at all, that mind is just a name for typical human behaviours, that all statements ostensibly referring to mind are reports about current bodily behaviour or predicted bodily behaviour. The book is thus anti-Cartesian and anti-dualistic, which leaves no room for inherent privacy in the life of an individual. But though the general trend of the book favours a down-right condemnation of inner life theory, there are statements in the book which, if closely viewed, lend slender support to it. Rather they positively go against it. We may take a few lines from the book in support of our contention. "Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph-show of visual imagery."[1] "It makes no difference in theory if the performances we are appraising are operations executed silently in the agent's head.....of course it makes a lot of difference in practice, for the examiner cannot award marks to operations which the candidate successfully keeps to himself."[2] "If you do not divulge the contents of your silent soliloquies and other imaginings, I have no other sure way of finding out what you have been saying or picturing to yourself."[3] So, Ryle accepts that there are silent thoughts and imaginings, executed in one's head. He also accepts that if the agent is unwilling to reveal them they may not be known. Now, the point is : are not these confessions sufficient to establish that Ryle is also subscribing to the view of dualism, knowingly or unknowingly ? The book abounds in statements which speak of Ryle's acceptance of silent deliberation and calculation, silent imagining and recollecting

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1 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 27

2 *Ibid.*, p. 50.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 61.

in one's head. But we may ask: when Ryle accepts such silent deliberations, is he not talking of mind which he abhors? Such statements as appear inconsistent with the wider aim of the book and smack of the revival of dualism, have the effect of considerably softening the revolutionary nature of his thesis. While remarking on some of his clear-cut relapses into dualism, Prof. A. C. Ewing writes that Ryle is "trying the tactics of the woman who excused herself for an illegitimate baby by saying that it was a very little one."[4]

It is true that when he speaks of mind's silent deliberations, he does not think that they are theoretically different from their overt counterparts. He will say that a sentence uttered or a sentence muttered has no generic difference bacause the latter is only a vanishing point of the former. His idea is that mind is inherently open or public; it is only by training or 'special artifice'[5] that we keep it secret. He seems to be steadfast in his view that unless mind is basically public, we cannot know about the mental qualities of others. But the critic may argue that unless mind is private, how is it that we are deprived of sharing one another's experience? It is not difficult to see in this connection that we can reasonably account for the knowledge of other minds with the hypothesis of strictly personal or private minds because minds, though not public, may be published. I can certainly communicate my thoughts and feelings to others through perceptual means, behavioural or oral. But I cannot make them think my thoughts or feel my feelings. In view of this, it is not clear how Ryle can make an apparently sweeping observation that mental privacy is an acquired or artificial achievement. Is the privacy of our dreams a learnt or an artificial accomplishment?

Not only that. Whatever kind of privacy he ascribes to mental phenomena, he does not seem to be consistent about

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4 A. C. Ewing, 'Prof. Ryle's attack on Dualism'. Reprinted in *Clarity Is Not Enough*, p. 338.

5 Ryle observes: "People tend to identify their minds with the 'place' where they conduct their secret thoughts. They even come to suppose that there is a special mystery about how we publish our thoughts instead of realising that we employ a special artifice to keep them to ourselves."—*The Concept of Mind*, p. 27. Though here he speaks of 'thoughts' alone, he seems to say the same about all mental happenings.

it. As we have already discussed, he at times thinks that mental privacy is analogous to the privacy of a diary kept under lock and key. A natural corollary of this comparison is that mental privacy is a matter of physical or physiological accident. But there are also lines in the book which state that mental privacy is only a verbal matter. He believes that as we cannot sensibly speak of eating what others eat, so we cannot sensibly speak or dreaming what others dream.

Now, we may ask : why this wavering concerning fundamentals ? Why within the bulk of arguments against dualism, do we find statements more readily interpretable in favour of dualism ? Why are there two lines of thought regarding mental privacy ? To questions like these we may answer that all this may be due to the insurmountable difficulty that Ryle has to face in questioning a reality that makes itself felt in the life of an individual. Persons, not committed to any philosophical theory, do not seem to have any difficulty in seeing that consciousness or experience is qualitatively different from what is not consciousness or experience. Everyone of us in our life knows how to distinguish qualities which are modifications of consciousness from qualities which are at most objects of consciousness. This dualism, as we have seen, reflects itself in the speech habit of the people. When we speak of 'mental disease' or of a 'hospital meant for mentally sick, or of a man who is both 'physically healthy and mentally healthy', we are certainly contrasting mind from body. Our belief in mind would seem difficult to overcome, if we consider, among other things, the psychic phenomena of dreams, images, pleasure and unpleasure. We have seen how Ryle has almost avoided discussing deams. We do not know how to disbelieve the inherent privacy of dream experiences. We do not also know how Ryle's one-world theory is competent to account for the fantasy worlds that dreams create. Dreams are not public events. Of course, when we communicate or make statements about them, they are, in that way, made public. But to say that dreams are made public is not to say that dreams are dreamt publicly. Imagination also, like dreams, makes the denial of private minds extremely difficult. Ryle flatly denies that there is either any act of seeing or any object seen in the mind's eye. But the long and

laboured process by which he comes to this conclusion seems to be very artificial and sophisticated. His theory that imagining a nursery is only resembling the spectator of the nursery, instead of seeing the resemblance of the nursery, seems to be an altogether new thing about the use of the expression 'imagining'. It is not the elucidation of the regular use to which Ryle is committed. As a matter of fact, the denial of image or imagery is so unusual, unnatural and strained that it appears to be one of the queerest aberrations of philosophical theories. The same might be said about Ryle's account of pleasure and pain. Ryle thinks that pleasure and pain are not anything beyond physical behaviour. Enjoying digging is not digging *plus* enjoying. Certain ways of digging are themselves enjoying. Similarly pain is some such visible behaviour as groaning, screaming, shouting and the rest. But here also we may observe that Ryle's conception of pleasure and pain is in conflict with the obvious and the manifest. Pleasure and pain cannot be understood in terms of physical categories alone. We must, for example, distinguish physical pains from the pains of the heart, for obviously, the pains of tooth-ache are not of the same kind as the pains of disappointment. Even physical pains have two aspects—subjective and objective. Objective pain is neural excitation which can be studied by counting the throbbings and relating them to the pulsing of the blood in the arteries. But subjective pain is quite different since it is a personally felt experience. That is why a surgeon's pain ( objective pain ) is not the same as the patient's pain ( subjective pain ). Objective or neural pain remains unaffected but subjective or the felt pain gets affected when the sufferer engages himself in some activity like conversation. Moreover, the visual, tactual or the exteroceptive perception of objective or neural pain is very difficult for the agent himself. But there is no question of difficulty with regard to his feeling of pain. The fact that mental phenomenon like pleasure or pain sharply differs from the physical phenomenon like the brain is admitted by as eminent a physiologist as Sir Charles Sherrington. He observes : "Thoughts, feelings and so on are not amenable to the energy ( matter ) concept. They lie outside it. Therefore they lie outside natural science. If as you say thoughts are an outcome of the brain, we as students using the energy concept

know nothing of it"'[6] In view of all such facts and statements, one cannot help being sceptical about Ryle's findings. We have seen in the preceding chapters how his arguments fall short of the intended task. This is primarily so because the myth of the ghost is not gratuitously introduced into philosophy. It is always very strongly suggested by certain facts and expressions.

Ryle has, however, attempted to dispense with the ghost. This has clearly led to the revival of behaviourism, though in a new form. Throughout the *Concept of Mind*, we find him preaching with the fervour of a proselyte the doctrine of behaviourism. His theory that "when we describe people as exercising qualities of mind, we are not referring to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects ; we are referring to those overt acts and utterances themselves ;"[7] or "To find that most people have minds (though idiots and infant in arms do not) is simply to find that they are able and prone to do certain sorts of things and this we do by witnessing the sorts of things they do ;"[8] links him with the behaviourists. His behaviourism, however, is not naive or psychological. It is logical or analytical. By logically analysing the meaning of mind-involving sentences, he comes to maintain that mind is only a manner or a style or a way of behaviour. He classifies mind-sentences into three distinct logical types or kinds— the categorical, the hypothetical and the semi-hypothetical or mongrel-categorical— none of which, according to him, meaningfully refers to any ghostly entity called mind. The categoricals, of course, utilize episodic verbs and refer to clockable incidents but the episodes referred to are not private at all. Ryle argues that episodic verbs are either task verbs or achievement verbs. When a categorical sentence utilizes an achievement verb, e. g, in the sentence 'He *solved* a puzzle or *saw* a joke', no occurrence, either private or public, is being referred to since an achievement is not an occurrence. When it utilizes a task verb, e. g. in the sentence 'He *looked* for his master or *pondered* for a few moments', 'looking' or 'pondering' does not

6 Sir Charles Sherrington. *Man On His Nature*, Second revised edition, 1951, p. 229.

7 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 25

8 *Ibid.*, p. 61

refer to any secret process, for it refers to public or quasi-public testable performances. So, Ryle believes that there is no question of categorical sentences referring to private minds. The same, he believes, is true of hypothetical or dispositional sentences. 'He is vain' or 'He knows French' does not mean that 'vanity' or 'knowing French' is an occult episode of his private mind. Both 'vanity' and 'knowing French' mean possible behaviours if some conditions are realized. Such sentences, therefore, have a hypothetical import concerning behaviour. The same again, Ryle maintains, holds good of mongrel-categorical or semi-dispositional sentences. 'He is driving carefully' means he is doing something *now* and is disposed *to do* other relevant things in future if their need arises. It is in this way that he dispenses with the ghost and establishes behaviourism on logical considerations of the sentences which involve mind-reports. Obviously, his behaviourism is different from naive or old behaviourism. Whereas old behaviourism bases itself on the consideration of physiological and neurological factors—thought is movement of the vocal chord because it is speech expressed or unexpressed—Ryle's analytical behaviourism is based on the consideration of linguistic data. That is, whereas the former is a factual study, the latter is a linguistic study. The latter is concerned about how words mean, not about how dogs and infants learn. The second important difference between the two is that whereas naive behaviourism totally believes in mechanistic explanations, Rylean behaviourism does not believe like that. In this connection, old behaviourism will perhaps deny the difference between a man and a well-conditioned machine. Ryle, however, will not deny the difference. He emphatically asserts : "Man need not be degraded to a machine by being denied to be a ghost in a machine. He might, after all, be a sort of animal, namely a higher mammal. There has yet to be ventured the hazardous leap to the hypothesis that perhaps he is a man."[9] He brands mechanism as a bogy and thinks that, since every question is not a physical question, man is free.

Now, whatever difference Ryle may have with the naive behaviourist, it cannot be denied that he belongs to the same fraternity.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 328.

His behaviourism, though dressed in logical robe, lacks the charm of appeal. This is primarily so because he has failed to distinguish the essence of mental qualities from those that are only their evidences. Behaviours are the criteria or the evidences that enable one to determine mental qualities in others. Since they are correlated or intimately connected with mental happenings, they serve as signs or pointers to the occurrence of the mental. They may be treated as 'propria' of mental phenomena. We know that a 'proprium' invariably accompanies an essential property, without itself being that property. So, however close a bond behaviours might have with mental happenings, they cannot be identified. Had pain been identical with pain-behaviour, a successful pretence of pain would mean the emergence of pain. But neither does it so happen nor is it ever taken to be so.

It is true if we take mind to be more than bodily behaviour, some thinkers overstressing the academic aspect of philosophy, would raise the problem of our knowledge of other minds. They believe that our scepticism about other minds can be set at rest if and only if we identify mind with behaviour. Now, the way Ryle argues and equates mind with behaviour, a doubt arises whether he is not also guided ( may be unconsciously ) by the problem of other minds than by the problem of mind as such. This doubt is strengthened if we look into the beginning of his Introduction to the *Concept of Mind.* Here he explicitly seems to be concerned about other minds. He observes : "Teachers and examiners, magistrates and critics, historians and novelists, confessors and non-commissioned officers, employers, employees and partners, parents, lovers, friends and enemies all know well enough how to settle their daily questions about the qualities of character and intellect *of the individual with whom they have to do.* They can appraise his performances, assess his progress, understand his words and actions, discern his motives and see his jokes. If they go wrong, they know how to correct their mistakes. More, they can deliberately *influence the minds of those with whom they deal* by criticism, example, teaching, punishment, bribery, mockery and persuasion, and then modify their treatments in the light of the results produced.

Both in describing *the minds of others and in* prescribing for them,

they are wielding with greater or less efficiency concepts of mental powers and operations....."[10] Frank Sibley has also felt the same when he says :"....."What is the analysis of mental concepts ?' have been confused with the question 'how do we know that there are other minds ?' and 'what sorts of criteria do we need for asserting that there are other minds ?' "[11] Owing to this confusion most of what Ryle says would appear to be more appropriate if they were said about other minds, though of course, mind could not have been dispensed with even in that case. Those who feel sceptic about other minds argue that our knowledge of them cannot but be based on weak inference. But they seem to forget that before we begin to take help from such inferences, we already find ourselves believing instinctively in the reality of other minds. The inference also justifies itself on the whole because it works out well in the practical conduct of our life.

We may also note that Ryle's patronage of behaviourism makes him look like a materialist. Though openly he declares that "both Idealism and Materialism are answers to an improper question,"[12] still his emphasis on bodily behaviour as not merely manifesting but being the working of mind, together with his attempt to dispense with all specifically mental happenings ( acts of will or insight ) can be taken as supporting a materialist view. If we recapitulate the thesis that Ryle is propagating, we will have no difficulty in judging that he has a clear materialistic bias or leaning. Warnock very aptly sums up his theory when he says : "This is the thesis that there *really exist* only bodies and other physical objects, that there *really occur* only physical events or processes, and that *all* statements ostensibly referring to minds are really categorical statements about current bodily behaviour, or more commonly hypothetical statements about predicted bodily behaviour ; that, hence, there is really no such thing as private, inner life at all, and that in principle everything about every individual could be known by sufficiently protracted

10 Page 7, Italics mine.
11 Frank Sibley, 'A theory of Mind', *Review of Metaphysics*, December, 1950, p. 267.
12 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 22.

observation of his bodily doings."[13] Does it not make it abundantly clear that Ryle's position is akin to materialism ? When he reduces mind ultimately to bodily behaviour, it is manifestly an absorption of mind by matter and there we find materialism. It is of course true that his materialism is not mechanistic. His important observation that "Men are not machines, not even ghost-ridden machines. They are men — a tautology, which is sometimes worth remembering",[14] expresses his opposition to mechanism. He opposes it because he finds a peculiar purposefulness, appropriateness and adaptiveness in human behaviour. Accordingly, he concedes a place to freedom and intelligent purpose in human life. But we may ask : has freedom or intelligent purpose any meaning without consciousness which he denies ? 'Intelligent purpose' without 'consciousness of an end' is a near self-contradiction. Besides, it involves freedom about which Ryle is not very clear. A room for freedom is of course made by tabooing the 'bogy of mechanism' but that does not cast sufficient light on the concept of freedom. As a matter of fact, Ryle's attempt to get rid of 'the ghost in the machine' should pave the way to a mechanistic theory of nature. But as his aim lies in steering a course between Hobbism and Cartesianism, he must get rid of the ghost as well as be half hostile to mechanism. This double-fold purpose he thinks to fulfil by making some romantic and essentially un-Rylean statements about human beings, one of important examples of which is "Man need not be degraded to a machine by being denied to be a ghost in a machine. He might after all, be a sort of animal, namely, a higher mammal. There has yet to be ventured the hazardous leap to the hypothesis that perhaps he is a man".[15] Such statements indeed modify his materialism to an extent that it begins to differ considerably from its old forms. But that does not for that matter affect his position in being called materialistic. It is still,

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13 G. J. Warnock, *English Philosophy since 1900*, London ; Oxford University Press, reprinted 1961, pp. 100-101

14 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 81.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 328.

as it has been aptly called a 'polymorphic'[16] or an 'undefined'[17] materialism.

This undefined materialism has obviously emerged in the attempt to slay the ghost. But if the ghost is slain, what alternative account does Ryle have of psychology ? The one that he has is not illuminating about the role of psychology. He finds a divergence or disparity between the programme and the practice of the psychologists—whereas the psychologists profess to study the ghost, what the experimental psychologists actually do is to study human behaviour. A psychologist, according to Ryle, cannot do more than that because "a researcher's day cannot be satisfactorily occupied in observing non-entities and describing the mythical".[18] He contends that psychology, like many other branches of study, has human behaviour as its subject-matter. Only that it differs with many such branches in being scientific. With regard to others, which are equally scientific, Ryle thinks that psychology can easily denote a federation or consortium of enquiries and techniques. Psychology, he says, need not be the name of a unitary enquiry. We may however observe in this connection that the idea of federation makes psychology an innocuous and ineffective concept. If 'psychology' is only another word for a federation or consortium, why make so much of fuss by retaining the concept at all ? A federation has meaning when its units are interdependent, when a strong tie binds its components and when the whole generally regulates the parts. It is not clear in what way psychology's so-called units viz. economics, criminology, sociology, anthropology and the rest are interdependent. Each of them on the other hand seems to be quite strong to stand by itself. It is true that the study of human behaviour is something common to all such sciences. But that is only a tenuous bond to enable them to form a federation. Besides, psychology does not control all the member-sciences by its own laws.

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16 C. A. Campbell, 'Prof. Ryle on Intellect', Reprinted in *Clarity Is Not Enough*, p. 280.

17 D. M. Datta, *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy*, The University of Calcutta, Second edition, 1951, pp. 489-90.

18 *The Concept of Mind*, p. 321.

How, in view of all such drawbacks, can psychology denote a federation ?

Ryle himself appears to be aware of such short-comings for he gives another suggestion about the role of psychology. He now holds that the business of psychology is to discover hidden causes of human actions. The ordinary or the familiar causes are usually open to our 'ordinary good sense'. Psychology is not required to investigate them. It is only when our common sense fails to explain a conduct that psychology is needed. Ryle illustrates. A farmer returns from the market with pigs unsold. We know how to explain it—he found the prices lower than what he had expected. But if the same farmer comes back without selling his pigs even at high prices with a look in his eyes, our ordinary causal account fails to explain the same. It is here that we must, according to Ryle, call on the psychologist. The task of psychology, Ryle maintains, is to explain those "actions, fidgets and utterances, the author of which cannot say what made him produce them."[19] That is to say psychology, according to Ryle, deals with mental incompetences and probes into man's unconscious in order to find out the hidden cause. But here we may ask : Is not Ryle equating psychology with psycho-analysis ? The two cannot be so easily equated because psycho-analysis these days differentiates itself from psychology and claims to be an independent science. Psycho-analysis, as we know, concentrates more on the sub-conscious than on the conscious. Psychology, on the other hand, cannot afford to pay scant attention to the conscious. Furthe, Ryle talks as if ordinary explanations are enough for us, He asserts : "We know quite well what caused the farmer to return from the market with his pigs unsold. He found that the prices were lower than he had expected. We know quite well why John Doe scowled and slammed the door. He had been insulted. We know quite well why the heroine took one of her morning letters to read in solitude for the novelist gives us the required causal explanation. The heroine recognised her lover's handwriting on the envelope. The schoolboy knows quite well what made him write down the

19 *Ibid.*, p. 325.

answer '225' when asked for the square of 15. Each of the operations he performed had put him on the track to its successor."[20]

But the question is : Can one be quite sure about the ordinary causes ? We know that common-sense generalisations about every-day affairs are neither precise nor strictly universal. Finding prices lower than what the farmer had expected may not be the cause of his coming back from the market. Sometimes one sells one's things at prices lower than what one had expected. Besides, if we content ourselves with ordinary causes and say, for example, that we know quite well what caused this wire to conduct electricity—its ends were attached to a live-battery—then how much of mathematical physics could we have ? If scientists were to think as Ryle does, how much progress could we have made in our knowledge of the external world ? So, in spite of the ordinary explanations that we have of human behaviour, a psychologist does not refrain from investigating scientifically its deeper and subtler cause. The province of psychology does not, therefore, embrace those behaviours alone where we fail to account for the cause. It also embraces those behaviours where we ordinarily succeed for we have yet to explain them on scientific basis. Ryle himself says that psychology differs from some other studies of human behaviour in being scientific. But if it has to be scientific, it must go beyond the ordinary and the uncritical account of behaviour. His statement does not therefore appear to be convincing when he says "Let the psychologists tell us why we are deceived ; but we can tell ourselves and him why we are not deceived."[21]

We may in the end observe that most of those difficulties, drawbacks and limitations from which Ryle's theory suffers and of which we have talked frequently, have their genesis in Ryle's treatment of mind exclusively as an object. He views it merely as an observer and equates it ultimately with behaviour. But it is not clear how a full picture of mind can emerge by treating it solely as an object. If we concentrate on our own experience, we should have no difficulty in seeing that our knowing consciousness cannot at the

20 *Ibid.*, p. 825.
21 *Ibid.*, p. 326.

sametime be objectified. We know that in any knowledge situation, the opposition between the knower and the known, between the subject and the object, between experience and what is not experience makes itself felt and it cannot be ignored. Not only this. The very existence of man seems to involve two sides, the subjective and the objective, the knowledge of what is gained by virtue of the fact that man can use more of his senses in observing himself than can the other persons in observing him. It is true that the adherents to Rylean programme would not like to consider these facts for, according them, such considerations transgress the limits of linguistic boundary. But an important question that arises in this context is : Can any linguistic study fruitfully ignore facts which are vitally connected with it ? A study of Ryle leaves no doubt that even he has frequently taken help of extra-linguistic considerations in order to uphold his thesis. But the way in which he has taken help of logic, language and fact, he has not succeeded in eliminating the bugaboo of the ghost-in-the-machine. In spite of his most interesting arguments in masculine style, a rumour about the ghost is still left in the air of Ryle's anti-ghost philosophy and this gives strength to much-maligned cartesianism. Cartesian dualism still seems to serve at least as a good hypothesis and even if we ultimately succeed in dispensing with the concept of mind altogether, it is not likely to be along the lines of *The Concept of Mind.*

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