



Library

IAS, Shimla

PH 341.294 2 Ce 333



00020825

Printed in England by Swin

Victoria Rd., Swindon

THE CENTRAL TREATY ORGANISATION



PH

341.294 2

Ce 333

THE BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES

R.5296 January 1962

CONTENTS

Page

- 1 **The Pressure from the North**
- 1 Soviet 'Aspirations' in the Middle East
- 2 Soviet Middle East Policy since 1945
- 3 **The Baghdad Pact**
- 3 Terms of the Pact
- 3 United Kingdom Accession
- 4 **External Reactions**
- 5 Attitude of Egypt
- 5 Attitude of Jordan
- 5 Soviet Attacks
- 6 **Development to August 1959**
- 6 Accession of Pakistan and Iran
- 6 United States Association with the Organisation
- 7 Iraqi Withdrawal
- 7 Change of Name
- 7 **Structure**
- 7 The Council
- 7 The Subsidiary Committees
- 8 The Secretariat
- 8 **The Organisation at Work**
- 8 Strengthening the Defences
- 9 Economic Advance
- 9 The CENTO Institute of Nuclear Science
- 10 Technical Assistance Programmes
- 12 **Appendix**
- Text of the Operative Clauses of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation

Prepared by


REFERENCE DIVISION
CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION
LONDON

January 1962

Quote No. R.5296

(Superseding R.4304)

Classification II.5



Library


IIAS, Shimla

PH 341.294 2 Ce 333



00020825

PH
341.294 2
Ce 333



28/7/83

N.B. This pamphlet is produced as part of the British Information Services, and is intended to be used for reference purposes. It may be freely used in preparing articles, speeches, broadcasts, etc. No acknowledgment is necessary. Please note the date of preparation.

THE CENTRAL TREATY ORGANISATION

THE Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), formerly the Baghdad Pact, had its origin on 24th February, 1955, when Turkey and Iraq signed a Treaty of Mutual Co-operation, renewable at five-yearly intervals. This treaty was envisaged as the nucleus of a defensive *bloc* of Middle East States working in co-operation with the West to resist Communist aggression and subversive penetration into the region. It was joined by the United Kingdom on 5th April, 1955, by Pakistan on 23rd September, and by Iran on 3rd November.

After the Iraqi revolution of 14th July, 1958, Iraq took no further part in the work of the Baghdad Pact, whose headquarters were transferred from Baghdad to Ankara the following October. On 24th March, 1959, the Iraqi Prime Minister, General Qasim, announced Iraq's formal withdrawal from the pact. The Council of Deputies, set up under the pact, announced on 19th August, 1959, that the name Central Treaty Organisation had been adopted.

The United States, although not a signatory, takes a full part in the work of the organisation. Bilateral agreements of co-operation for mutual security and defence were signed between the United States and Iran, Pakistan and Turkey at Ankara on 5th March, 1959.

This paper provides information on the background to the Central Treaty Organisation and its achievements to date.

THE PRESSURE FROM THE NORTH

From the time of Peter the Great, Russia has sought to expand its influence and territory southwards west of the Caspian at the expense of Turkey and Iran. Since 1689 the Turks have fought no fewer than 12 separate wars with their northern neighbours; have seen the Crimean Tatars, a related people, over-run, and have themselves lost territory, including the port of Batum, east of the Black Sea. The Iranians have been attacked three times and have lost large parts of Armenia and Azerbaidzhan (including the port of Baku) and have been compelled to accept the Russian annexation of the ancient kingdom of Georgia. There was Russian military intervention in northern Iran in 1909 and again in 1911.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century the Russians also pressed forward east of the Caspian over the Kirghiz Steppe through Turkestan, where they subdued the ancient Moslem khanates of Khiva, Bokhara and Kokand, in the general direction of Afghanistan—whose frontiers they reached in 1885—and India. At present, as a result of their Central Asian conquests, they hold under colonial domination some 30 million Moslems.

Soviet 'Aspirations' in the Middle East

The Soviet regime, which succeeded that of the Czars in 1917, has shown no disposition to reverse this policy. In 1918 some of the conquered peoples tried to free themselves, and independent republics of Armenia, Azerbaidzhan and Georgia were set up. These did not long survive the defeat of anti-Communist forces in Russia; by internal subversion, leading to Communist

coups d'état, or by armed invasion, the independence of all three was extinguished by the Soviet Union during 1920 and 1921, the last of them—Georgia—one month after it had received international recognition. The Soviet Government then tried, by the same technique, to restore Russia's pre-war position in northern Iran, where, in the early 1920s, they fostered an attempt to set up a Soviet regime in Gilan.

The disagreements between the countries of the West, which led to the second world war, offered the Russians a renewed opportunity for southward expansion. Their readiness to seize it was indicated by the then Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, in November 1940, when, in the course of secret negotiations for a projected Soviet-German-Italian-Japanese treaty—the USSR had already signed a treaty with Nazi Germany in August 1939—he stated that the USSR would agree to such a treaty subject to certain conditions, one of which was that 'the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf should be recognised as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union'.

After the war the Soviet Union renewed its attempts to realise these 'aspirations'. In March 1945 it denounced a non-aggression treaty it had signed with Turkey in 1925 and launched a propaganda campaign for the cession of the north-eastern Turkish regions of Kars and Ardahan which the Turks had lost in 1878 and recovered in 1919. At the same time, reviving the methods it had used successfully against the Caucasian States after the previous world war, it attempted to set up a Communist State in Iranian Azerbaidzhan. Soviet troops which, in concert with Commonwealth units, had entered Iran in 1941 to prevent a German *coup*, prevented Iranian forces from intervening against a rebellion organised by the Communists in December 1945; later they failed to withdraw from Iran until two months after the date they were required to by treaty and then only after an Iranian appeal to the United Nations.

The Soviet Union also renewed its thrust down the western side of the Black Sea, where, after establishing puppet regimes in Roumania and Bulgaria, it attempted to obtain a base on the Turkish straits, demanding a system of joint Soviet-Turkish defence and control of the straits which would have resulted in their domination by the USSR. The Turks stood firm against the threat.

Soviet Middle East Policy since 1945

For some years after 1945 the Soviet Union concentrated upon its attempts to subvert and dominate Central and Western Europe and confined itself in the Middle East to undercover intrigues through the diplomatic posts it had succeeded in establishing during the second world war, in Cairo, Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad. In Baghdad its attempts to sow sedition led the Iraqi Government to break off diplomatic relations, but the Russians then transferred their staff to Damascus from which they continued their activities against Iraq. Communist intrigue also continued in Iran despite the outlawing of the Iranian Tudeh (Communist) Party in 1949; in particular the Communists attempted to exploit the situation arising out of the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry.

The oil resources of the Middle East, not only in Iran but also in Iraq and the Arabian peninsula, provided an additional inducement for Soviet expansion in that part of the world; for Western Europe had become increasingly dependent on the Middle East oil resources and if the Soviet Government could bring these under its control—as it had done those of Roumania in 1945—by the establishment of satellite States, it would gain a powerful economic weapon for use against the free world. It has therefore sought, by manipulation of local tension, to increase the political and economic ties between Middle East States and the Soviet Union and to supplant traditional links between the West and countries in the area.

THE BAGHDAD PACT

To preserve their independence in face of Russian expansionism the Moslem countries along Russia's southern border have traditionally relied on Western support; within the last two decades they have also sought safety by association with one another. In 1937 a non-aggression pact between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan was signed at Saadabad. This established no effective link between the countries concerned, but on 2nd April, 1954, Turkey signed an agreement on mutual co-operation and defence with Pakistan.

In August 1954, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri-es-Said, put forward proposals for a wider defensive grouping. In talks with a visiting Egyptian Minister, Major Salah Salem, he suggested that the Arab League Collective Security Pact¹ should be strengthened by turning it into a regional alliance in harmony with Article 51 of the UN charter. Britain and the United States could then be sounded about the assistance they would offer to the new organisation, which might replace the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement² and the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.

During the closing months of 1954 the Iraqi Prime Minister held discussions with Colonel Nasser in Cairo and with Turkish leaders in Istanbul; he also visited the United Kingdom. His approach was favourably received by the Turks, whose Prime Minister and Foreign Minister visited Baghdad in their turn in January 1955. At the end of their visit it was announced that Iraq and Turkey had decided to conclude an agreement aimed at extending co-operation to 'ensure the stability and security of the Middle East'. The communiqué, of 13th January, 1955, added that the two countries believed it 'necessary and useful' that other States which had proved their determination to work for the realisation of the aims of the agreement and were able to do so by virtue of their geographical position and potentialities should join the agreement. A pact of mutual co-operation between Iraq and Turkey was accordingly signed in Baghdad on 24th February, 1955.³ It was ratified two days later by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and by both Houses of the Iraqi Parliament.

Terms of the Pact

The pact, which was renewable at five-yearly intervals, bound the signatories to co-operate in matters of security and defence. It was 'open for accession to any member State of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognised by both of the high contracting parties'. A permanent council of ministers was to be set up when at least four Powers had acceded. Article 8 provided that the pact should come into force as from the exchange of ratifications. In an exchange of letters, the parties placed on record their understanding that 'this pact will enable our two countries to co-operate in resisting any aggression directed against either of them and that, in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region' they had 'agreed to work in close co-operation for effecting the carrying-out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine'.

United Kingdom Accession

The pact was welcomed by the United Kingdom as a timely Middle Eastern initiative. On 4th April, 1955, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs recalled that it had 'long been the purpose of British policy to establish and maintain

¹Of June 1950. Iraq acceded in February 1951.

²Heads of Agreement of 27th July, 1954, under which the United Kingdom agreed to evacuate the Suez base. A formal agreement was concluded in October 1954.

³For text of operative clauses see Appendix, p. 12.

an effective defence system for the Middle East', pointing out that, while the need for this had been dictated in the past by geography and strategy alone, the development of the area's oil resources had lately added another compelling factor. At the same time the strategic picture had changed considerably, the need now being to safeguard and strengthen the extreme right flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In the Middle East, as in Europe, he affirmed, unity could only grow, and could not be imposed. That had been the British experience with the abortive project of 1951 for a Middle East defence organisation.¹ Speaking of the importance and significance of the Baghdad Pact initiative, the Minister concluded: 'By planning our defence arrangements in this forward area—the northern tier of Middle East defence, as it is sometimes called—we can more easily deal with an aggressor before he can penetrate deeply into the Middle East. If that is realised and understood, the likelihood of war will be vastly reduced. In short, these new arrangements are yet another essential contribution to the deterrent to aggression and to the cause of peace.'

The British Minister of Defence, Mr. Watkinson, addressing the Council of Western European Union in London on 1st June, 1961, and speaking of Britain's attitude to its defence alliances, recalled that in CENTO, in association with the three regional members and the United States, Britain was concerned with 'the defence of the vital "northern tier" that extends the NATO defensive structure eastwards'. Britain's air forces in Cyprus, he pointed out, provide potential air support for CENTO.

When the United Kingdom acceded to the pact² in April 1955 a new Anglo-Iraqi agreement was concluded under Article 1 of the pact. The new agreement formally terminated the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, which still had 2½ years to run,³ transferred the air bases at Habbaniyah and Shaiba from British to Iraqi control, and provided for British armed assistance to Iraq in case of need and for British help in developing Iraq's armed forces, particularly for the creation of an effective Iraqi air force and system of air defence. On 20th December, 1955, in an exchange of Notes, the United Kingdom agreed to waive payment of the sum of £2,755,000 which it had been agreed was due to it from Iraq for property at the air bases handed over, while Iraq undertook to devote, during 1956 and 1957, at least £2 million to the purchase in the United Kingdom of arms, equipment and defence stores and the remainder to expenses connected with the training of Iraqi forces in co-operation with those of the United Kingdom. Iraq also undertook to make available certain limited facilities free of charge for British forces.

When Iraq withdrew from the pact (see p. 7) this agreement lapsed.

EXTERNAL REACTIONS

The Baghdad Pact had been envisaged by its originators as the nucleus of a defensive partnership of Middle Eastern States working in co-operation with the West, but from the beginning the pact was opposed not only by the Soviet Union but by certain of the Arab States.

¹In October 1951 France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States had proposed to Egypt the setting up of an Allied Middle East Command in which Egypt would participate 'on a basis of equality and partnership'; but Egypt did not accept.

²The British Government did not associate itself with the letters exchanged between the original signatories about Palestine (see p. 3).

³The treaty, signed on 30th June, 1930, at a time when the United Kingdom held a League of Nations mandate to prepare the country for independent self-government, was to come into force when Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations and to be valid for 25 years. Iraq was admitted to the League, and the treaty came into force, on 3rd October, 1932.

Attitude of Egypt

Egypt was the leader among these. When, in January 1955, the Turkish-Iraqi communiqué announcing the intention of the two countries to sign the Baghdad Pact was published, the Egyptians convened a conference of Arab Prime Ministers in Cairo which the Iraqi Prime Minister did not attend, although Iraqi representatives were present. At the conference, Colonel Nasser questioned the usefulness of a Turkish alliance to Iraq, which he said was already protected by her treaty with the United Kingdom. After discussions lasting from 22nd to 30th January, 1955, the conference adjourned to allow a delegation to visit Baghdad. At these Baghdad discussions, said the then Iraqi Prime Minister, 'Iraq was being asked to seek the permission of Egypt before deciding on any policy whatsoever'. The delegation returned empty-handed to Cairo. Thereafter the Egyptian Government (from February 1958 the Government of the United Arab Republic) became intensely critical of the pact.

Attitude of Jordan

Following discussion of the possibility of Jordan's joining the pact, the President of Turkey paid an official visit to Amman in November 1955. In the following month, at the request of the Jordan Government, General Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, visited Jordan and put forward proposals under which, in the event of Jordan's joining the pact, additional military aid would be provided by the United Kingdom, and the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1948 would be replaced by a special agreement under Article 1 of the pact. On 13th December, 1955, the Jordan Government announced that it would accede to the pact. But Egyptian influence, and the embittered outlook of a large number of Palestinians incorporated into the population of Jordan following the armistice agreement of 1949 (who were concerned exclusively with hostility to Israel and had not forgiven Turkey for recognising that country) were working against this policy. Four Ministers, all ex-Palestinians, left the Government, which resigned. Finally, after strikes and riots had forced the resignation of a succeeding Government, and the dissolution of Parliament—an act subsequently declared illegal by the Jordan Supreme Court—Samir al Rifai took office as Prime Minister on 9th January, 1956, and announced that his Government would not adhere to 'any new pacts'.

Soviet Attacks

The Soviet Union vilified the pact from the beginning. A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement on 17th April, 1955, declared that, under 'Western pressures and threats . . . aggressive military blocs' were being formed in the Middle East. It went on to allege specifically that attempts were being made to coerce Syria into joining the pact. On 12th October, 1955, the Soviet Foreign Minister told the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow that the pact was a 'tool of certain aggressive circles' which had as their objective 'the retention and restoration of the colonial dependence' of the countries of the Near and Middle East. Mr. Molotov added that Iranian accession to this 'military alignment' would be incompatible with 'good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and with Iran's well-known treaty commitments'. In exchanges with Western governments about the Middle East during 1957 the Soviet Union consistently stigmatised the pact as an instrument of aggression. Curiously enough, the Soviet Union, in its abortive negotiations for a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Iran in January 1959, was prepared to accept Iranian membership of the Baghdad Pact though not a bilateral agreement between Iran and the United States (see p. 6). The propaganda campaign against Iran organised by the Soviet bloc, particularly by radio broadcasts in Persian, has, however, continued.

DEVELOPMENT TO AUGUST 1959

Changes in the membership of the pact have had the effect of removing it from involvement in Arab politics and bringing it closer to the 'northern tier' concept implicit in the original Turkish-Pakistani agreement of April 1954.

Accession of Pakistan and Iran

On 1st July, 1955, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, then Mr. Mohammed Ali, announced that his country would join the pact; this followed a visit by General Ayub Khan, then Pakistani Minister of Defence, to Ankara, where he held discussions with Turkish leaders and with the King and Prime Minister of Iraq. Pakistan deposited its instrument of accession on 23rd September, 1955. An official spokesman indicated that the defence aspects of the Turkish-Pakistani pact (see p. 3) would be merged with those of the Baghdad Pact.

In a speech from the throne on 9th October, 1955, the Shah of Iran foreshadowed his Government's accession to the pact; Iranian membership formally began on 3rd November, 1955.

The Shah, on 9th October, 1955, said that events had proved that neutrality¹ 'not only fails to restrain the powerful from resorting to unreasonableness and to encroachment, but indeed provokes them to violence and aggression'. The framers of the United Nations charter had given due consideration to this experience. 'In order to provide against the recurrence of such sinister incidents, they have permitted countries in any region, for the defence of their independence and frontiers, to unite together and form a unified force, in order that they may, in the event of an outbreak of danger, assist each other in withstanding aggressive forces.'

United States Association with the Organisation

The United States, although not a member, takes a full part in the work of the organisation. On 29th November, 1956, the United States Government announced that: 'A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members [of the pact] would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.'

At the meeting of the Ministerial Council held in London in July 1958, the United States declared its intention of concluding special arrangements with the pact signatories for co-operation for mutual security and defence, as provided in Article 1 of the pact. In accordance with this declaration, bilateral agreements of co-operation for mutual security and defence were signed at Ankara on 5th March, 1959, between the United States and Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. A State Department announcement said that the conclusion of these agreements 'reflects the importance which the United States attaches to the collective efforts of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to develop their economies and maintain their independence. The US has, on various occasions, made it clear that it would view with the utmost gravity any threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of these nations'.

The countries concluding these agreements with the United States did so in the face of various warnings from the Soviet Union of the untoward consequences that might be expected to follow. This was particularly so in the case of Iran, which was the only member of the pact not already linked with the United States through other collective defence agreements.² (See also p. 5.)

¹The pact has been criticised adversely, in some of those non-Communist countries whose foreign policy is based on the principle of neutralism, for splitting the Arab world into contending groups and provoking the Soviet Union to take a more active interest in the Middle East than it would otherwise have done.

²The United States was linked with Turkey and the United Kingdom through NATO and with Pakistan through SEATO.

Iraqi Withdrawal

Following the Iraqi revolution of 14th July, 1958, Iraq ceased to participate in the work of the pact. The Iraqi decision to withdraw formally from it was announced by the Prime Minister, General Qasim, on 24th March, 1959. General Qasim was reported to have said, in his statement, that membership of a 'military and aggressive' pact was not in harmony with Iraq's neutralism. The decision finally to withdraw, said General Qasim, would increase co-operation between Iraq and the remaining members of the pact.

The decision to withdraw had, as a consequence, the lapsing of the special agreement concluded under the pact by Iraq and the United Kingdom (see p. 4). The evacuation of the small RAF contingent at the former base at Habbaniyah was completed on 31st May, 1959.

Change of Name

In October 1958 the headquarters of the pact were transferred from Baghdad to Ankara. On 19th August, 1959, the Council of Deputies announced that the name had been changed to the Central Treaty Organisation.

STRUCTURE

The structure of the organisation as it has developed since the inception of the pact is as follows:

The Council

The Ministerial Council, the controlling body in CENTO, was set up in accordance with Article 6 of the pact, following the accession of Pakistan as the fourth member in September 1955. Until April 1960, when it met in Tehran, the council met at ministerial level approximately every six months. Its next meeting was held a year later, in Ankara, and it is due to meet again in London in April 1962. The meetings are usually attended by Foreign Ministers or other senior cabinet Ministers, and are presided over by the leader of the host country's delegation. Each member government has on the council a permanent deputy representative of ambassadorial rank, and meetings at deputy level are held regularly at headquarters. United States representatives attend as observers at both ministerial and deputies' meetings, and at the invitation of the council take full part in the meetings.

The Subsidiary Committees

Four major committees serve the council: the Military Committee; the Economic Committee; the Counter-Subversion Committee; and the Liaison Committee.

The Military Committee: The Military Committee is composed of Chiefs of Staff or Commanders in Chief, who normally meet shortly before the Ministerial Council. The United States has been a member since 1957. Through a Permanent Military Deputies Group in permanent session, set up in January 1960 (and replacing the military deputies who formerly met at half-yearly intervals), the committee directs the organisation's military planning, which is undertaken by a Combined Military Planning Staff in Ankara.

It is in the field of co-ordination that the military work of the organisation largely lies, since there is no CENTO command and military assistance is mainly provided bilaterally. At its ninth session in Ankara in April 1961, the Ministerial Council agreed, in order to improve such co-ordination among the participating States, to appoint a Commander, CENTO Military Staff.

The Economic Committee: Of late, increasing emphasis in CENTO's work has been placed on economic development, since all member countries appreciate that military planning and security vigilance would be ineffective in building up resistance to Communism if extremes of poverty and inequality were not eliminated. At Baghdad in November 1955, the council members decided to set up an Economic Committee to examine measures of co-operation which would strengthen the economies of member countries. This committee met for the first time in January 1956 and has since met shortly before each meeting of the Ministerial Council. The United States announced at the Tehran meeting of April 1956 that it would become a member of this committee.

The Economic Committee has devoted itself to tasks which would make the greatest impact on the daily life of the people. It has appointed a Scientific Council and four main sub-committees dealing with: communications and public works; trade; agriculture and animals; and health. A number of working parties examine particular projects within these fields. A meeting of economic experts reviews and co-ordinates the work of these bodies on behalf of the main Economic Committee, whose meetings it precedes.

The Counter-Subversion Committee: The Counter-Subversion Committee exists to advise on ways of countering the threat of subversion to the member countries in the region. It generally meets twice a year. The United States has been a member since 1956.

The Liaison Committee: The responsibility of the Liaison Committee is to facilitate exchanges of information between the member countries.

The Secretariat

These organs function with the assistance of a permanent secretariat headed by a Secretary-General. In January 1962 Dr. Abbas Ali Khal'atbari, formerly Iranian Ambassador in Warsaw, succeeded Mr. M. O. A. Baig (Pakistan) in this office on the expiry of the latter's three-year term. Deputy Secretaries-General direct a Political and Administration Division; an Economic Division; and a Public Relations Division. Also under the Secretary-General is a Security Organisation.

THE ORGANISATION AT WORK

Strengthening the Defences

At the Ministerial Council meeting in Karachi in June 1957, the British Foreign Secretary announced that his Government was prepared to contribute up to £500,000 a year in cash or in kind for training for the provision of a defence 'infrastructure' (the fixed installations required for the service of a modern fighting force) for the pact forces. This is but one among many important though less conspicuous measures which have buttressed the defences of the alliance. In the event, this figure was exceeded and the expenditure has enabled two radar stations to be established in Iran. When these are completed, they will provide a very valuable contribution to the air defence of the area. As a forerunner of this the United Kingdom placed at the disposal of Iran in December 1957 a light mobile radar training unit. The United Kingdom has lent £3.3 million to the Turkish Government to enable it to purchase and re-equip four large British destroyers. Turkey, of course, as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, also receives considerable military help, including such modern equipment as anti-aircraft missiles from the United States. Pakistan receives assistance under the United States Military Aid Programme. The British Government has provided £40,000 worth of anti-

aircraft equipment on indefinite loan to Pakistan, and training facilities in the United Kingdom for Pakistani technicians and Services personnel.

Another part of the British contribution to CENTO is the provision of courses and other training facilities for members of the forces of the regional countries. For several years past, senior officers from Iran, Pakistan and Turkey have toured service and civilian establishments in the United Kingdom, the most recent visit of this kind being in June 1961. A further visit is planned in 1962.

To help to co-ordinate regional defence training, joint exercises, developed by the Combined Military Planning Staff, are undertaken regularly by the forces of the regional countries, the United Kingdom and the United States. These have included staff, air defence and naval exercises, of which recent examples are the two in a series of air defence exercises, *Shahbaz IV* and *V*, held over the region in November 1961, and *Midlink IV*, one of a series of maritime defence exercises. To *Midlink IV*, held at Karachi from 11th to 25th November, 1961, naval units were contributed by Iran, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States, with air cover by aircraft of the Royal Air Force and the Pakistan Air Force.

Economic Advance

The financial requirements of the regional members for capital development and technical assistance were already being met in considerable measure before the Baghdad Pact came into being. Between them they had received grants of some \$700 million under the United States Mutual Security Programme down to the middle of 1955, as well as considerable loans; this flow of United States aid has continued without abatement. Pakistan had already received aid from members of the Commonwealth under the Colombo Plan, including a special £10 million credit for the development of food production from the British Government and allocations running into many millions of pounds from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Iran had, in addition, received a credit of £10 million from the United Kingdom; in any case, Iran has considerable financial resources of its own from royalties and taxation yields from its large and growing oil industry developed by British and other concessionaires.

It has therefore been in the provision of technical training and of expert assistance in the planning and execution of particular projects that the Baghdad Pact, and later CENTO, has been able most fruitfully to contribute to the drive of its regional members towards economic and social improvement. In this work the Economic Committee and its subordinate bodies have received much assistance from the Resident Advisers of the British Middle East Development Division at Beirut.¹

The CENTO Institute of Nuclear Science

The first project to materialise under the auspices of the Baghdad Pact was a Nuclear Centre, opened at Baghdad in March 1957, for the study of radiation problems and the training of postgraduate students in the peaceful application of radioisotopes. After the revolution of July 1958, Iraq ceased to participate

¹The functions of the British Middle East Development Division are to report upon economic and social issues affecting more than one territory in the Middle East; to develop and ensure the co-ordination of the British Government's economic and social policy in the area and to recommend action required; and to advise Middle East governments, at their request and free of charge, on social and economic development problems. It grew out of the British Middle East Office set up in Cairo in December 1945 as a result of recommendations made at a conference in London of British Government representatives in the Middle East countries, called to discuss what the United Kingdom could do to promote development in the Middle East. It was transferred to Beirut in March 1952. The present staff consists of, in addition to the head of the division, six advisers in the fields of agriculture, animal husbandry, engineering and industry, forestry, co-operatives and statistics and economic development.

in the activities of the pact and at the Ministerial Council meeting in January 1959 it was decided to set up a Nuclear Centre in Tehran to take the place of the Baghdad Centre; this was opened on 23rd June, 1959. To these centres the United Kingdom has given specialised apparatus and provided the directors and supporting scientific staff from the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. With the development in the regional countries of their own atomic energy institutions, the emphasis of the centre's activities is shifting from training and formal courses in the direction of research and consultative work. An annual fund of £30,000, provided by the British Government and administered by the director of the centre in his capacity as 'CENTO Scientific Adviser', enables scientists in the region to obtain items of equipment which they need for their research projects.

Technical Assistance Programmes

The third session of the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact, held at Karachi in May 1957, marked an important stage, for it saw the committee and its sub-committees pass from the phase of preliminary study to detailed planning and execution. The way for advance was cleared by the grant for 'joint economic projects' of substantial funds by the United States (\$12,570,000) and the United Kingdom (£1,000,000 for capital equipment as well as £1,000,000 for technical assistance for five years against an earlier offer of £250,000). Two years later, at Karachi in January 1959, the British representative, with new requests in mind, promised that his Government, in substitution of the five-year offer, would 'make provision in each financial year for a rate of expenditure of £850,000 per annum'. Of this total, as announced in June 1961, the British Government are now earmarking £450,000 per annum for assistance in the development of communications projects.

Progress in the various fields covered by the sub-committees and working parties of the Economic Committee is summarised below:

Communications: Sums totalling approximately \$18½ million and £650,000 have been allocated by the United States and British Governments to improve telecommunication links both between London and Ankara, Tehran and Karachi and between the last three cities; the project linking London, Ankara and Tehran was completed in June 1961. In addition, the British Government have provided about £250,000 worth of meteorological and meteorological telecommunications equipment. With substantial assistance from the United States and the aid of British equipment worth £100,000, work has progressed steadily on the development of a railway link between Turkey and Iran (Mus-Tatvan-Tabriz). CENTO is also concerned with road links between Turkey and Iran (Tabriz-Bazargan and Shivelan-Bajirge-Rezayeh) and, in Pakistan, with the Makran coast road and a road linking Karachi with Kerman via Quetta; orders for equipment to a total value of £420,000 had been placed by the British Government by the end of 1961 for these road links. Finally, in the sphere of port development, the British Government has contributed a number of cranes and ancillary equipment for Trabzon in Turkey and undertook, at the end of 1961, to give similar help for the development of Iskenderun.

Agriculture: An Agricultural Machinery and Soil Conservation Training Centre was opened at Karaj in Iran in the summer of 1961 with 24 students from Iran, Pakistan and Turkey and with the support of the British and the three regional governments and the organisation's Multilateral Technical Co-operation Fund. The British Government has contributed the services of the director and four instructors and workshop and other equipment; agricultural machinery has been provided on indefinite loan by the Agricultural Engineers Association of the United Kingdom. Among the more important contributions from the

United Kingdom to bilateral technical assistance in this field are the provision of equipment and staff for an animal reproduction centre at Malir in Pakistan; equipment valued at about £40,000 and £50,000 respectively for a soil fertility survey in Pakistan and for the Razi Institute in Iran; £20,000 worth of equipment for a biological laboratory in the Faculty of Veterinary Sciences in Tehran University; some £20,000 worth of equipment for a brucellosis laboratory in Turkey; equipment worth £12,000 for the manufacture of rinderpest vaccine in Pakistan and some £5,000 worth of materials to each of three pilot projects for the campaign against animal parasites in the three regional countries. British and United States scientists have played a leading part in the organisation of specialist seminars, and a large number of fellowships in a wide variety of agricultural and veterinary subjects have been awarded to students from the CENTO region.

Trade: A number of technical seminars and conferences, many of them financed by the United States Government, have been held for the technical discussion of such problems as the role of banking in development, statistics, tourism, mineral resources and narcotics control. Surveys have also been carried out under the organisation's auspices on customs procedure and associated problems.

Health: Teams of British nurses have been sent to Tabriz, Iran, to assist in the development of a three-year nursing school, and to the Ankara hospital in Turkey. The United Kingdom has also supplied X-ray equipment for tuberculosis centres in the three regional countries; a caesium unit for the University of Shiraz, Iran; and awarded numerous fellowships for study in the United Kingdom. The United States has financed travelling fellowships, and within the region programmes of exchange visits of research workers, especially in anti-malarial problems, are under way.

Technical Education: The United Kingdom has been providing considerable assistance to the Middle East Technical University in the form of equipment for laboratories in the Faculties of Engineering and Physics and of senior staff in these faculties as well as the Faculty of Administrative Sciences and the English Language Department; a British Registrar was appointed to the university from 1960 to 1962. A team of five British instructors is working at a Vocational Training Centre in Tehran and some £75,000 worth of equipment, to be followed by three instructors, has been sent to the Institute of Mechanical Engineering in the Tehran Polytechnic.

APPENDIX

TEXT OF THE OPERATIVE CLAUSES OF THE PACT OF MUTUAL CO-OPERATION.
SIGNED AT BAGHDAD ON 24TH FEBRUARY, 1955

- Article 1.* Consistent with Article 51¹ of the United Nations charter, the high contracting parties will co-operate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.
- Article 2.* In order to ensure the realisation and effect application of the co-operation provided for in Article 1 above, the competent authorities of the high contracting parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the high contracting parties.
- Article 3.* The high contracting parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any disputes between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations charter.
- Article 4.* The high contracting parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States. They do not derogate from, and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present pact.
- Article 5.* This pact shall be open for accession to any member State of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognised by both of the high contracting parties. Accession shall come into force from the date on which the instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq. Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements in accordance with Article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact. The competent authorities of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with Article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned.
- Article 6.* A permanent council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become parties to the pact. The council will draw up its own rules of procedure
- Article 7.* This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods. Any contracting-party may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so, six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties.

¹Article 51 provides that the charter shall not impair 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security'.

